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SOCIOLOGY

IN ITS

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is an introduction to the psychological theory of society. The time has not yet come to write a system of scientific sociology. But in the meantime it would seem that the science might be advanced by the development of certain of its phases or aspects. This book attempts to deal with the psychological aspects of sociology, often called "social psychology," but, in the opinion of the writer, more accurately named "psychological sociology." Accordingly, the book does not aim to furnish a comprehensive view of sociological theory, but only of that section of it which rests immediately upon psychology. This part of sociological theory, however, is of the most immediate practical importance in developing a sociology which shall serve at once as a basis for the special social sciences and for the construction of sound social policies. Yet the writer is so far from denying the importance of other aspects of sociological theory that he would make the biological side of sociology coordinate with its psychological side. Biological sociology, including, among other matters, the theory of the growth of population through the surplus of births over deaths, of the influence of selective processes upon social development, and of the social effects of variation and heredity, this book takes for granted, though it is as yet far from satisfactorily worked out.

The position of the writer is, as implied, that sociology is a study of the biological and psychological factors in the social life with reference to certain problems, especially the problems of social organization and social evolution. As such a biology and psychology of the social life, sociology is as much a natural science as the foundation sciences on which it rests. A scientific sociology, accordingly, must rest upon the assured results of the

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SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

CHAPTER I

VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY AND OF SOCIETY [1]

Conceptions of Sociology.—The multiplicity of conceptions of sociology seems to the beginning student, and sometimes even to the advanced scientific thinker, an insuperable difficulty in understanding the science. The multiplicity of these conceptions is not, of course, nearly as great as has been often represented, and among sociological writers there is now far more unity in their conceptions of the science than formerly. Moreover, the differences between the various conceptions have often been exaggerated. They are not, for the most part, so entirely opposed to each other as has been represented, but they are often incomplete views of the same subject. So far from being mutually contradictory, therefore, they often supplement each other. Indeed, the variety of conceptions of sociology may be made to aid, rather than to confuse, the student in obtaining a proper conception of his own.

It has often been said that definition is the last stage of any science, and in a sense this is true. Certainly the

[1] The first four chapters of this text were originally published in substance in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, pp. 300–348 (November, 1907). The chief theoretical positions of the whole work were outlined, though in a crude way, in a series of articles published by the writer in the *American Journal of Sociology*, March–September, 1899 (Vols. IV and V), under the title "Prolegomena to Social Psychology."

variety of the conceptions which sociologists have held of their science, even though they mutually supplement one another, is further evidence of the truth of the dictum. Nevertheless, scientific workers in every field must have relatively accurate conceptions at least of the problems at which they are working before they can do scientific work. The student of any science, therefore, can scarcely do better than to examine the various conceptions and definitions of his science found in various texts. The value of such examination and comparison of definitions is so great that we shall use it to introduce the subject of psychological sociology.

The various conceptions of sociology may perhaps be reduced to six leading conceptions, which we shall now pass briefly in review in order to reach, if possible, a tentative working definition of the science.

1. The most common conception of sociology is that it is a science which treats of social evils and their remedies. This is, indeed, the popular conception of the science. Sociologists generally, however, repudiate it as an entire misconception. They say that sociology deals with the normal rather than the abnormal in society;[1] and it might be added that such a conception confuses sociology with scientific philanthropy, an applied science resting upon sociology, which does attempt to deal directly with social evils and to prescribe remedies. However, it must be acknowledged that even this popular conception of the science has a degree of truth in it. Sociology, while not treating directly of social evils, has been developed largely to correct social evils. Just as physiology and the general science of biology were developed largely through the medical sciences, through the studying of bodily disease, so sociology has been developed largely through the study of social evils, and the develop-

[1] Cf. Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 40, 80–82.

ment of scientific philanthropy to correct those evils. While sociology deals, to be sure, primarily with the normal, incidentally it must deal largely also with the abnormal, because social evils are frequently incidents in normal social evolution. The development of sociology, therefore, may be expected to assist largely in the correction of social evils, in the elimination of social maladjustments,[1] just as the development of biology has led to greater scientific exactness in the medical sciences. While sociology treats of social evils only incidentally, therefore, as the science of the normal it must throw light upon ways and means of getting rid of the abnormal.

2. A second conception of sociology is that it is the science of social phenomena.[2] This conception is current among many scientific men and even among some sociologists. It is not so much erroneous as too broad and too vague. It either leaves no place for the special social sciences, or else it makes sociology simply a convenient collective term for all the social sciences. There are other sciences of social phenomena than sociology; economics and politics, for example, deal not less truly with social phenomena than does sociology. The dictum of Professor Westermarck[3] that "the scientific treatment of any social phenomenon" is sociology leaves no place for the special social sciences. It would be difficult to say, for example, why the scientific treatment of trade and markets, according to this conception, would not fall within the scope of sociology rather than of economics.

There is, of course, no objection to using the word sociology as a convenient general term to cover all the social sciences, just as biology is used as a convenient term to

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[1] Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 34.

[2] Cf. Ward, *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1902, p. 113; also Bascom, *Social Theory*, p. 8.

[3] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 684.

cover all the biological sciences.[1] In library classifications, philosophic summaries of knowledge and the like, such a broad use of the term sociology is unobjectionable, but in scientific texts and in academic work we must have a more exact conception to satisfy the requirements of a working definition of a science.[2]

3. A third conception of sociology, which is found implied in a few sociological texts, though nowhere stated explicitly, is that it is the science of the phenomena of sociability.[3] This conception is, of course, derived from the preceding by giving to the adjective social a narrow meaning: it is the science of "social" phenomena in the narrow sense. Now, the phenomena of social attraction, or of sociability, in society are very important, but they must not be confused with social phenomena in the broad sense, and the science which treats of such phenomena of sociability cannot be the general science of society. It would only be another special social science coördinate with economics and politics. The non-sympathetic phenomena of society are too important to be excluded from sociology by definition. While it is improbable that a special social science will be developed to treat of the phenomena of social attraction separate from sociology, a sociology which dealt with these

[1] "Social science" is, however, preferable to sociology as an encyclopedic term for all the social disciplines, and is now so used by the best authorities.

[2] Cf. the statement of Simmel, *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. VI, p. 53: "If sociology, in place of a mere tendency in method, which has been falsely denoted the science of sociology, is to be a true science, the entire province of social science, in its broadest sense, must be divided for purposes of investigation, and a sociology in the narrower sense be separated out."

[3] Cf., e.g., Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 6, 8. If we substitute in the definition of sociology on page 8 the definition of society on page 6, we get the following: "Sociology is the scientific study of any group or number of individuals who cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement."

phenomena exclusively could only form a few chapters in the general science of society.

4. A fourth conception of sociology is that it is "the science of human institutions." Under this head comes Professor Ward's conception of sociology as "the science of human achievement," although he uses achievement in a somewhat broader sense than the ordinary definition of institution. By achievement he means those activities that are permanently incorporated into civilization. The sum of human achievement is civilization. Sociology is, therefore, according to Ward, the science of civilization and its institutions.[1]

The objection to this conception of sociology is that it omits many of the ephemeral and ordinary phenomena of daily social life with which the sociologist is necessarily concerned. It leaves out of account, for example, such ephemeral and transitory phenomena of society as mobs, crazes, fads, fashions and crimes, all of which are important phenomena for the sociologist to understand.[2] Moreover, it leaves out of consideration also the many instinctive activities of daily social life which do not take on institutional forms and which are, therefore, not visible in the fabric of civilization.[3] Again, if this conception of sociology is too narrow in one sense, it is too broad in another because the special sciences also deal with human institutions, though in a specific rather than in a general way; thus politics deals with the origin, development and workings of political in-

[1] This is also apparently Spencer's conception of sociology, although it has been claimed that he used the word as an encyclopedic term for all the social sciences. Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 15; also Wright, *Practical Sociology*, p. 1.

[2] Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 5.

[3] As Ross rightly says (*op. cit.*, p. 89): "If the institution is the thing to be explained, the ground is cut from underneath the lower human and subhuman sociology. For in groups of animals we find interactions, modes of mutual aid, habits of coöperation, etc. But do we find modes of life with a collective sanction annexed?"

stitutions. While this conception, therefore, indicates many of the important problems of sociology, it affords, nevertheless, an incomplete view of the problems of the science.

5. A fifth conception of sociology is that which makes it the science of the order, or organization, of society.[1] Under this head comes Professor Simmel's conception of sociology as the science of the forms, or modes of association.[2] Now there is no doubt that if this definition were understood in a broad enough way it could be made to cover all of the problems with which the sociologist deals. If we understand by the science of the forms of association the investigation of the origin, development and functioning of these forms, as well as their structure, this would cover all the problems of sociology. The trouble with the definition is that it fails to be specific enough, as Professor Simmel's treatment of the subject of sociology itself shows, because he excludes the psychical motivation of these forms of association, excludes also their psychical content, and would limit sociology to the study of the forms as such, making sociology, as he has himself said, a sort of social geometry.[3]

Now, this study of the structure of society is undoubtedly important; and much of the best sociological literature of the present is occupied with the discussion of these problems. The chief criticism of this definition is that it fails to emphasize the evolution of social relationships. All science is now evolutionary in spirit and method and believes that things cannot be understood except as they are understood in their genesis and development. A working definition of sociology, therefore, should throw the emphasis, not upon

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[1] Cf. Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology*, p. 1: "Sociology is the science which treats of social organization."

[2] See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 167; also *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. VI, p. 54.

[3] See Simmel's *Soziologie*, pp. 4–14. For further criticism of Simmel's conception of sociology, see Chapter XVI.

the static aspects of society, but rather upon social change, development, evolution.

6. A working definition of sociology might, then, be formulated as follows: *Sociology is the science of the organization and evolution of society.* This definition has the advantage that it indicates at once the problems with which the sociologist deals, namely, problems of the organization of society, on the one hand, and problems of the evolution of society, on the other. It delimits clearly the problems of sociology from those of nearly allied sciences. It is worthy of note that this definition is very nearly that which Auguste Comte, the father of modern sociology, proposed, namely, the science of the " order and progress " of society.[1] The words " organization " and " evolution " are, however, broader terms than order and progress and are, therefore, preferable. " Order " connotes a stable, settled and harmonious condition of the elements of society while " organization " means any relation of the parts of society with reference to each other. " Progress " means advance, change for the better, while " evolution " means, not necessarily a change for the better, but orderly change of any sort.[2]

This definition may, however, be criticised on account of the narrowness of the usual meaning given to the word organization. Social organization is practically synonymous with social structure. It, therefore, fails to include specifically social functioning, or activity. In general also, the definition just given is hardly specific enough. Prof. J. Arthur Thomson, a biologist, has suggested perhaps an

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[1] Cf. *Positive Philosophy,* Bk. IV, Chap. III (Martineau's translation); also *Positive Polity,* Vol. II, General Introduction. (In nearly all cases, references in this book are to English translations where such exist.)

[2] In strict scientific usage, of course, the word should not be used in any other way. "Evolution," as used by the biologists, contains no implication of "better" or "worse," but simply means "orderly change," or the theory of such change.

even better working definition of sociology because it is more specific, and indicates, if anything, even more clearly, the problems of sociology; namely, *Sociology is the science of the origin, development, structure and functions of the forms of association.*[1] While this definition might be reduced to the same terms as the definition first proposed, if we regard "origin and development" as synonymous with "evolution," and "structure and function" as synonymous with "organization," yet, because of the ambiguity of the word organization, and because the former definition is not specific enough, we shall accept this definition as, on the whole, the best working definition of sociology that has yet been formulated. This is, of course, not denying that other definitions of sociology may have equal validity.[2] Many other definitions might be given in other terms, but in every case they would imply the same problems and, therefore, the same content in sociological science.[3]

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[1] Professor Thomson's own words are (*Heredity*, p. 508): "The scientific study of the origin, development, structure and functions of human societary forms."

[2] Many examples of other equally valid definitions might be given. For example, Professor Giddings's definition (*Principles of Sociology*, p. 5): "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process of evolution."

[3] Professor Small's definition (*General Sociology*, p. 35)—"Sociology is the science of the social process"—comes to the same thing, since, as the context shows, the implication is that sociology deals, not with some specialized phase of the social process, but with the *whole* process of social interaction. Schaeffle's conception of sociology as "a philosophy of the special social sciences" (*Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*, Vol. I, p. 1) might seem at first to be radically distinct from any that have been given. But an examination of Schaeffle's writings shows, on the contrary, that the problems with which he actually dealt were precisely those of the origin, development, structure, and function of human interrelationships. Ratzenhofer's definition (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 177; also *Soziologie*, p. 1)—"The science of the reciprocal

Conceptions of Society.—It has been questioned by some whether the term "society" is capable of scientific definition. Some sociologists, like Professor Small, have even denied that the term society can be made a scientific category.[1] They say that the term "association" expresses better the fact which the sociologist is trying to get at. This we shall not deny, as the same conclusion has already been implied in our use of the phrase "forms of association," instead of "society," in the working definition of sociology which we have adopted. Nevertheless, in the historical development of sociology, the word society has been used and it seems best to continue its usage on that account, in spite of all the difficulty of giving such a loose popular term, which is continually shifting its meaning, a definite scientific content.

Even in the social sciences themselves, the word society has frequently been used with a variety of meanings and again we must note the chief of these in order that we may make the conception clear from a scientific standpoint.

1. One conception of society is that it is synonymous with the state or the nation. This is a conception of the term which is found chiefly among writers on political science, but also found among some sociologists, as for example Spencer, who often uses the word society where he might as well have used the word nation.[2] In general, how-

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relationships of human beings"—is seemingly in accord with the fifth conception discussed; but his actual treatment of sociological problems corresponds to the sixth conception, as do indeed those of most leading sociologists from Comte down to the present. Kidd, however, would apparently exclude from sociology the consideration of purely statical problems, as he defines sociology (*Eleventh Edition of Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. XXV, p. 323) as "the principles which underlie human society considered in a condition of development."

[1] See *General Sociology*, pp. 183–185.

[2] The conception of society as the nation is especially common among sociological writers of the continent of Europe. Thus

ever, most sociologists of the present would not defend such a use of the term. They regard the state or the nation as simply forms of association and, indeed, not primary, but derived forms. Nevertheless, the state and the nation, as important forms of human association, legitimately occupy a central place in the sociologist's thought.

2. Another conception of society is that it is synonymous with the cultural group. According to this conception, "a society is all that group of people that have a common civilization or who are the bearers of a certain type of culture." A society, then, could hardly be smaller than a nation but might be much more extensive. Western Civilization, or Christendom, would, in this definition, constitute a society.[1] There is, of course, no objection to regarding the peoples who have a common culture as forming one large society. The only question is whether we can limit the concept of society to such a group. To limit the term society to cultural groups, and the work of the sociologist accordingly, would be an arbitrary limitation which could scarcely be justified upon scientific grounds. The cultural group is again only one of the many forms of human association, and rather than limit the conception of society to it, it would be far better to take the term society with all the variety of

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Schaeffle says (*Bau und Leben*, Vol. I, p. 1): "By society, or the social body, is here meant the entire nation (*Volk*) and national existence, that is, the entire people and folk life." Dr. René Worms also says (*Organisme et Société*, p. 31): "We reserve the name *societies* for national groups alone. Society is, then, for us an enduring group of living beings carrying on all their activity in common." Dr. J. Maxwell goes even further, when he says (*Le Crime et la Société*, pp. 3, 4): "I shall use the word society in the sense of a political group having a legislative unity. France, Spain, Italy, are societies."

[1] This seems to be the conception of society endorsed by Fairbanks, though he also suggests the more general definition given below. He says (*Introduction to Sociology*, p. 4): "In general, a society coincides with a type of culture."

meaning which popular usage has given it and try to give it a scientific content by finding a common element in its varying usages. All recent attempts at the definition of society by sociologists have been directed to this end.

3. As an example of such a definition we might cite the definition of society proposed by Fairbanks: "A group of men who are bound together in relations more or less permanent."[1] This is substantially a correct definition of the term society as it is used in the concrete sense by most sociologists of to-day. It makes society synonymous with any permanent human group.[2] It is, however, somewhat vague as to what sort of relations constitute a society, and therefore falls short of the requirements of a good working definition. It fails to specify that these relations are not those of mere contiguity in time and space or of mere dependence on a common environment, but are those of *mental interaction*.[3]

4. This definition, in order to give it scientific precision, must be modified in at least two respects. While we cannot limit the conception of society exclusively to human groups, as we shall see later, we cannot, on the other hand, accept the view of Espinas that societies may be formed by individuals of different species;[4] for that disregards the essen-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

[2] Cf. Dealey (*Sociology*, p. 41): "The term society . . . is regularly used in sociology to denote a human group held together by common elements and interests."

[3] From Comte down, most sociologists have made the psychical element the constitutive principle of social life, or society in the true sense. See, for example, Schaeffle, *Abriss der Soziologie*, pp. 14-16. Compare also Baldwin (*Individual and Society*, p. 30): "A situation which is psychic in character and scope is fundamental. Without it no society could arise."

[4] See his *Des Sociétés Animales*, Section I. Espinas, however, admits that true or "normal" societies can be formed only by members of the same species. Associations of different species (parasitism, commensalism, mutualism) he would call "accidental societies."

tial condition of society. We do not think of individuals as constituting a society unless they are *psychically interdependent.* Mere physiological or ecological interdependence is not sufficient to constitute a society.[1] When one speaks of groups of plants or other low organisms as constituting societies, it is probable that he is using the term metaphorically, or else attributing to them some degree of psychic life. It is *the interdependence in function on the mental side,* then, the contact and overlapping of our inner selves, which makes possible that form of collective life which we call society.

Now, such psychical interdependence implies enough mental resemblance to make possible definite forms of stimulation and response. Professor Giddings is undoubtedly right, therefore, in insisting that similarity, resemblance, both physical and psychical, is an essential condition for society.[2] Whether, as he also insists, mutual recognition of resemblance, or "consciousness of kind," is an essential condition is a debatable question; but it is safe to conclude that without at least the amount of resemblance which is found among individuals of the same species, society, in the scientific meaning of the word, is impossible.[3]

[1] Espinas's mistake comes through making mere physiological interdependence or reciprocity sufficient to constitute a society. He says (*Des Sociétés Animales,* p. 158): "The characteristic trait of the social life is an habitual reciprocity of services among activities more or less interdependent." The opposite mistake of making some relatively specialized psychical element, such as sympathy or imitation, the constitutive principle of the social life will be discussed at length later.

[2] *Elements of Sociology,* Chaps. I and VI.

[3] Cornejo (*Sociologie Générale,* Vol. I, p. 205) goes so far as to define society as "the normal grouping of organisms possessing consciousness of kind (*conscience d'espèce*)." Cornejo and many other sociologists would not recognize as societies ephemeral and accidental groups. These groups, however, are always found within the larger, permanent groups, and their exclusion or inclusion within the conception of society is of no practical importance.

We shall assume, therefore, when we speak of individuals as the constituent units of society, that they are individuals of the same species.

With these assumptions, we may tentatively define a society, in the concrete sense, as any group of individuals having more or less conscious reciprocal relations to each other; or, more briefly, *any group of psychically interacting individuals.*[1]

It may be asked if another qualification should not be added to our definition, namely, that the individuals of the group be friendly or "sociably" disposed toward one another. But it is evident that hostility may exist among the members of the group and that it may be but a phase of their social life. Conflict between individuals usually arises because of their social relations (psychical interactions), not because they are socially unrelated. The conception of society cannot, then, be regarded as implying exclusively friendly relations. However, the prevailing relations between the members of a group are friendly and conflict may be regarded as a sort of a negative and destructive element in the total life of the group. Practically, therefore, the internal conflicts of a group may be disregarded in a constructive view of its life history. Ultimately, all the members of a group work together in the carrying-on of a common life-process. In this sense they may be said to cooperate. If we mean by coöperation nothing more than this living together and working together in a common life, it is a mark of all social groups whatsoever; and we should be substantially correct if we defined society as any group of

[1] For fuller discussion of the conception of society, see Chapters VII, VIII and XIX. No attempt has been made to discuss in detail the many definitions of society found in sociological writings. Among these that of Tarde is easily most novel (*Laws of Imitation*, p. 68): "Society may be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another." This conception is discussed in Chapter XIII.

individuals who either unconsciously (instinctively) or consciously (reflectively) coöperate.[1]

Thus, a society may be constituted as readily by two or three individuals as by a million. The only criterion by which we may decide whether any group constitutes a society or not is its possession or non-possession of the essential mark of a society, namely, the *functional interdependence of its members on the psychical side.*[2] According to this view, a family and a nation, a debating club and a civilization, are equally entitled to the appellation of society and to be objects of the sociologist's investigation. As Stuckenberg has put it—

"Society is created whenever men pass from isolation to a relation of coöperation or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity; whenever they affect each other as stimuli. . . . Society [is] constituted by the mental interaction of individuals, *that* is the essential idea."[3]

It is evident that society is but a broad term standing for the psychical interactions of individuals. It is practically, as Professor Hayes has said, a verbal noun,[4] that is a name of a process, and but a little narrower than the abstract term association, which, as we have already seen, is probably the more scientific term. When used abstractly, indeed, "society" is synonymous with this latter term,

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[1] Cf. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 5.

[2] This is the only possible criterion of "the social," in the view of the writer. Social life, on this view, becomes synonymous with intermental life.

[3] See his *Sociology: The Science of Human Society*, Vol. I, pp. 80–102. Among the earliest writers to define society as essentially an interaction of individuals (and so as a process) was Simmel (see his *Sociale Differenzierung*, pp. 12–20). Professor Small has especially developed and emphasized this idea (see his *General Sociology*, Chap. I).

[4] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 750–765.

meaning the interaction of individuals.[1] The conception of society which we have arrived at, therefore, is not very different from that which Comte had, for in his mind society was practically humanity viewed from the standpoint of reciprocal relations.[2] The chief difference between the conception which we have reached by analysis and Comte's conception is that he approaches the matter from the standpoint of the species while we have approached it from the standpoint of the individual. Accepting this conception and assuming the essentially psychical nature of the relationships, we might substitute in our definition of sociology the phrase "reciprocal relations," which would give us then the following: *Sociology is the science of the origin, development, structure, and function of the reciprocal relations of individuals.*

It is the interrelations themselves, however, not their products, which the sociologist is primarily interested in. What he investigates is not so much the organizations and institutions of society as the associational processes which lie back of these, the processes of individual interaction which constitute them.[3] These processes of individual interaction, it is manifest, must have both biological and psychological aspects. In explaining them, therefore, sociology, we shall try to show, necessarily becomes a biology and psychology of these associational processes.

Definition of "Social."—Much confusion has been introduced into sociological discussions through the lax use of the word "social."[4] On account of this, several writers

[1] Cf. Professor Small's definition of "society" (*General Sociology*, p. 405): "That phase of the conditions of human life which consists of inevitable action and reaction between influences in some

[2] Cf. *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI, Chap. III enough, Pro- *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 263–70; Vol. II, Introduction. os "the essen-

[3] See Professor Hayes's article, "Sociology a Study *and Society*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 750–765. *ental* bond

[4] For a critical discussion of the various conflicting rsonality." word social, see Waxweiler, *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, tute true

have proposed other adjectives, such as "societal" and "societary"[1] to mean "of, or pertaining to, society"; but there is no good reason why the word "social" should not be given in the social sciences the meaning which properly belongs to it, namely, "of, pertaining to, relating to, society." In accordance with our definition of society, therefore, the word "social" should mean "that which relates to, pertains to, the interactions of individuals." In other words, *the social is that which involves the psychic interaction of two or more individuals.*[2] *Social phenomena* are, accordingly, as Professor Ross says in effect, "all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one individual upon another."[3]

"Social," then, is a comprehensive term including the economic, political, moral, religious, educational, and all other phenomena arising from the interactions of individuals. The economic, political, etc., is not to be distinguished from the social, save as one aspect or phase of the social. Economic and political problems, for example, are at the same time social problems; but not all social problems are economic or political problems. Social problems are economic, political, moral, religious, educational, etc., problems, or problems which involve several or all of these aspects of

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Waxweiler defines "social" as follows: "All that concerns the actions and reactions effectively exercised by individuals in the relations which they have among themselves without distinction of sex."

[1] Cf. Sumner, *Folkways, passim;* also article by Small, *Annals American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V, p. 120.

[2] In harmony with this, though somewhat broader, is Professor [illegible] definition of the word social. He says (*Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 4): "In its largest sense it denotes that which pertains to the collective aspect of humanity." Very different, on the other hand, is Gumplowicz's conception (*Outlines of Sociology*, p. 83): "By social phenomena we mean the phenomena which appear through the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one another."

[3] *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 7.

the social life—problems, in other words, which are wider and deeper than any single phase of society. It is this latter class of problems which particularly deserve to be spoken of as sociological problems; but these we shall discuss later.

Unfortunately the word social is not used popularly in the strict scientific way in which we have defined it, but is used with a variety of loose meanings attached to it. It is especially used as nearly synonymous with the word "sociable." The scientific student of society, however, has little excuse for using the word in a loose sense. He can always find some other word, or make use of some qualifying phrase, when it is necessary to express a narrower idea than that which logically attaches itself to the word "social" from its connection with the term "society."

Animal Societies.—It will be noticed that in our definitions of sociology, society, and social, we have avoided the use of the words "man," "human being," "humanity," and the like. This is because there are animal groups from which we cannot well withhold the name of "societies," because they have all the characteristics of societies as we have described them. Such, for example, are the groups formed by the so-called "social insects," the ants, bees, and wasps,[1] and the groups formed by many birds and mammals.[2] Objectively and even subjectively, so far as we can see, these groups conform to the definition of society which we have accepted.[3] While there are vast differences between

[1] See Lubbock's *Ants, Bees, and Wasps;* McCook's *Ant Communities;* Wheeler, *Ants, their Structure, Development, and Behavior.*

[2] See Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution.*

[3] Of course, this is assuming that these animal forms have some degree of mental life, and that their mentality influences in some degree their conduct and interrelations. Curiously enough, Professor Baldwin seems to assume that in animal groups "the essential bond is lacking, *the mental bond*" (*Individual and Society*, p. 30). This is because he limits the conception of a *mental* bond to "common thought and the common apprehension of personality." Hence, according to Baldwin, animal groups never constitute true

these animal societies and human societies, these differences are specific, and not generic.[1] The theory of evolution has broken down the wall which so long separated the human from the animal world, and no longer permits us to regard human nature and human interrelations as something altogether peculiar and isolated. It is, in fact, impossible to define society in such a way as to include all human groups and *only* human groups, without resort to some arbitrary procedure. The fact of society is wider, then, than the fact of humanity.

The question arises, therefore, whether sociology should take account of animal groups as well as of human groups. If we assume the evolution of the human from the subhuman there can be only one answer to this question: sociology must take animal societies into account. Just as psychology cannot stop with the study of the human mind, but goes on to study the manifestations of mental life even in the lowest animal forms in order to throw light upon the nature of mind; so sociology cannot stop with the study of human interactions, but must go on to study the lowest type of psychical interactions found among animal forms, in order to throw light upon the nature of society.[2]

But it must be admitted that the psychologist's interest in the mental life of animals is prompted by his desire to explain the mental life of man. So, too, the sociologist's in-

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societies. (See also his *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, Fourth Edition, pp. 503, 524.)

[1] For discussion of the differences between animal and human societies, see Chapter VII. What is meant here by saying that the differences are specific, not generic, is that the differences are *quantitative*, not *qualitative*. Cf. Waxweiler, *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, pp. 82–84. An excellent discussion of some main differences of animal from human societies can be found in Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, pp. 277, 307, 339–41.

[2] For demonstration that light can be thrown on human society by the study of animal association, see Espinas, *Des Sociétés Animales*.

terest in animal societies is prompted solely by his desire to explain human societies. In each case, the human remains the center of interest. But because we believe that we cannot understand a thing unless we understand it in its genesis, and because we believe, furthermore, that the origin of nearly all important elements in human nature is to be found below the human line, we are forced to study animal mental and social life in order to understand fully the social life of man. Sociology is, therefore, essentially a human science; and its comparative chapters form but a brief introduction to its treatment of human problems. It would be substantially correct to define sociology wholly in human terms, were it not that some sociologists have denied that sociology has any comparative chapters;[1] that animal association can throw any light upon human association.[2] The elementary considerations on modern scientific method which we have here introduced are sufficient to refute this position; and to establish the proposition that sociology, though distinctively a human science, must take into account at every step the facts of the animal life below man.

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[1] As an example, see Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 92; also *Pure Sociology*, p. 29. The motive for such denial in Ward's case, as in nearly all such cases, is his intellectualistic conception of human society. Ward asserts: "It [human society] is essentially rational and artificial, while animal association is essentially instinctive and natural."

[2] Petrucci, in his *Origine Polyphylétique, Homotypie et non-Comparabilité directe des Sociétés Animales*, is one of the most recent writers to deny that animal societies can throw light on human societies. This idea he repeats in his *Les Origines Naturelles de la Propriété*, even going so far as to deny (p. 226) that social evolution has any sort of connection with organic evolution! But as my colleague, Professor Maurice Parmelee, shows (in the final chapters of a work on *The Science of Human Behavior*, soon to be published) both human societies and animal societies have been created by the same life forces, and that therefore it is possible to reason from the general facts in animal association to human association, provided sufficient precautions are taken. See Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY

The Subject-Matter of Sociology.—Considerable controversy has existed over the question as to whether sociology has an independent subject-matter or not. It is evident from our definition of sociology, however, that its subject-matter is the same as that of all the social sciences. The only difference between the subject-matter of sociology and a special social science, like economics, for example, is that sociology takes the whole field of social phenomena for its subject-matter while economics takes only one section or phase of social phenomena, namely, the industrial phase. In the same way, biology or physics has no distinctive subject-matter apart from the specialisms which exist under them. Sociology, then, like all general sciences, has no distinctive subject-matter of its own. This is true, however, more or less of all sciences. The distinction between the sciences is not one of subject-matter, but of problems. The same subject-matter may be investigated by several sciences, but always from different points of view, that is, with reference to different problems. Thus a movement of the human body may be investigated with reference to certain problems by the physiologist, and with reference to quite different problems by the psychologist. The truth is that there are no hard and fast lines in nature upon which to base the divisions between the sciences. The present divisions have grown up as a result of the division of labor between scientific investigators and are largely matters of convenience. That is, they are largely teleological divisions, based upon

the different problems before the minds of different investigators.

The subject-matter of sociology, is, then, social phenomena, in the broad sense in which that term has just been defined; or as Professor Small has somewhat more happily phrased it, "the process of human association."[1] The sociologist considers this process as a whole, in its totality, and especially in its more general and fundamental aspects; while the students of the special social sciences study relatively special products and phases of the same process. Thus the same objective social fact, say the French Revolution, may serve as scientific material for the sociologist, the economist, the political scientist, and many other investigators.

The Unit of Investigation in Sociology is a topic which has occasioned considerable discussion among sociologists. It is not apparent, however, that a science must have but one unit of investigation,[2] and the outcome of the discussion has been to indicate a number of units of investigation which may be used. Among the more important of these are: (1) the *socius,* or associated individual, the member of society, the unit out of which all the simpler social groups are composed; (2) the *group* of associated individuals, whether the groups are natural, genetic groups, or artificial, functional groups; (3) the *institution,* which we may here define as a grouping or relation of individuals that is accepted, usually expressly sanctioned, by a society.

It is evident that all of these units, and many more, may be employed by the sociologist in investigating social organization and evolution. The object of the sociologist's attention is always, however, as Professor Hayes has demonstrated, *the associational process,* that is, the psychical interactions of individuals.[3] Some phase of the social process is,

[1] *General Sociology,* Chap. I.

[2] Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology,* pp. 85–99; also Giddings, *Elements of Sociology,* pp. 9–11.

[3] See *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. X, pp. 750–765.

then, always the real unit of sociological investigation. It may be communication, suggestion, imitation, competition, coöperation, or any one of the many minor processes which go to make up the whole process of social organization and evolution. It is these *processes of individual interaction* and their many complications which the sociologist investigates and is bent on explaining. As soon as he shifts his attention from the interactions between individuals to the individual himself, he is no longer a sociologist, but a psychologist or a biologist, for the object of his attention is then either the states of consciousness of the individual or his physical characteristics. The socius can be a "unit of investigation" in sociology only in so far as he is considered a functional element in the associational process. So far as there is a *concrete* object of the sociologist's attention, it is the group of associated individuals.

The Problems of Sociology.—Disregarding the preliminary methodological problems of the science, which are discussed in the first five chapters of this book, the problems of pure sociology fall into two great classes:[1] (1) static problems, or problems of social organization and of social functioning; (2) dynamic problems, or problems of social origin and of social development.

(1) *The static problems* of sociology are problems of the coördination of the activities of individuals, and so of the relations of individuals to one another, and to groups, and of groups to one another. They may be divided, as has been already implied, into problems of the organization of the in-

[1] Other classifications of sociological problems are, of course, possible, and may be easily reconciled with the classification into "static" and "dynamic" (possibly "descriptive" and "genetic" would be better words); as, e.g., the classification into biological and psychological problems. A complete enumeration of sociological problems is not attempted in this section. Many so-called sociological problems (as those in social ethics) are, of course, not problems in pure sociology at all.

terrelations of individuals, and problems of the functioning of these interrelations; in other words, into problems of the structure and functions of the forms of association. From a psychological point of view, all these problems reduce themselves to the problem of the types of interaction found among the individuals of a given group under given circumstances. They are, then, problems of a hypothetically stationary society, such as arise from studying society in cross-section, as it were, when no question as to changes in society is raised. For this reason, Comte called this aspect of sociology "social statics."

As examples of problems of social organization, we might take such questions as the various forms or modes of association; the various kinds of social groups; their classification; the nature of the forces that act in social organization; the influence of various aspects of human nature upon social organization; the influence of physical factors (stimuli) upon social organization; the nature of social organization.

As examples of problems of social functioning, on the other hand, we might take such questions as how individuals act in groups or coöperate; how ideals, standards, public sentiment, and the like, shape social activities; how the group modifies or controls the individual; and how the individual modifies his group; how certain forms of association influence social activity.

These are but illustrations of the problems that may arise when no question as to change in the type of social structure or function is raised. Other illustrations will easily suggest themselves to the student.

(2) *The dynamic problems* of sociology are problems of the changes in the type of social organization and functioning; that is, in the type of individual interactions. They may be collectively called problems of social evolution, using that phrase to cover social genesis as well as orderly social changes. Under this head come then, the important pro-

lems of the origin of society in general—that of association among animals—and of human society in particular, and of the specific forms of association. While the genesis of particular human institutions, such as government, religion, property, and the like, may be considered as belonging to the special sciences which specifically consider these institutions, yet the genesis of the forms of association which give rise to these institutions must be considered a problem in sociology.

Aside from these problems of social origin, there are the problems of social evolution in the narrow sense—the causes of progressive and retrogressive changes in social organization. There is a sense, to be sure, in which the problem of social progress may be considered a problem in social ethics; that is, so far as the problem is one of determining a social ideal. But, in a deeper sense, the problem of social progress belongs to sociology.[1] Assuming a given social ideal, then the question of the causes or factors in social progress is purely a sociological question. However, many sociologists use the phrase "social progress" in an entirely relative sense, meaning thereby any advancement toward a higher,

[1] It may be admitted that the problem of progress, using the word in its usual sense, is not a problem in "pure" science. The very word has a practical outlook. If sociology were to remain rigidly a pure science, it could only speak of social change, as Ross maintains it should do (cf. *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 186–89), and not of progressive and retrogressive changes. However, no science is "pure" in this sense. All the positive sciences have a forward and a practical outlook; and surely sociology need not fear to have such an outlook! All the leaders of sociological thought from Comte down (including Professor Ross!) show very clearly in their writings that their main interest is in the theory of progress. While the theory of social evolution must be regarded as the main problem of pure sociology, yet this very statement implies that in so far as sociology has a practical outlook, its chief purpose is to develop a theory of social progress (the constructive aspect of the theory of social evolution). See Chapter XVIII of this book; cf. also Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Preface.

more complex type of social organization—higher that is, in the sense of better adapted for survival. The problem of the causes of social progress in this sense is manifestly sociological. So also the negative aspect of this problem, the causes of social decline or degeneration, that is, of reversion to lower and simpler forms of social organization. These two problems are perhaps the problems of chief human interest in sociology, the former being, of course, the more important of the two. The problem of social progress may, therefore, be said to be the most important problem of sociology and the one to which all other problems lead up. Indeed, the chief purpose of sociology may be said to be to develop a scientific theory of social progress.[1]

Of course, many other problems are included in, or grow out of, these two chief problems of social evolution; thus in formulating the conditions of progressive and retrogressive social evolution, the sociologist necessarily must formulate the conditions under which certain types of society emerge and develop; and so also the conditions of social survival, both in general and for particular types of social organization. The problem of the conditions of social survival is, however, evidently the same as the problem of the causes of social progress and decline.

The study of social evolution, then—that is, of social changes of all sorts, from those of fashions to great industrial and political revolutions—is the vital part of sociology. Social evolution, moreover, in its different aspects constitutes one large problem and that the central problem of sociology, just as organic evolution in general furnishes the central problem of biology—the problem which differentiates that science from the special biological sciences and justifies its existence as a science—so social evolution furnishes the central problem of sociology.

[1] Cf. Carver's conclusion (*Sociology and Social Progress*, p. 7): "The fundamental task of the sociologist is to furnish a theory of social progress."

The problems of change—development—in society are evidently problems of movement, hence Comte proposed that this aspect of sociology should be called social dynamics, as "dynamics" in his time was that part of physics which dealt with the laws of motion. Some recent sociologists have called this division of sociology genetic sociology, and some simply social evolution.[1]

Static and Dynamic Sociology.—Shall we, then, preserve the old distinction between static and dynamic sociology? It is worthy of note that even Comte, who made this distinction, said that he made it merely for purposes of scientific analysis, and that it must not be considered as involving "any real separation of the science into two parts."[2] The truth is that no problem in social organization can be deeply investigated without running into the problem of social evolution. We cannot study social structure without being led insensibly into questions of origin and development; on the other hand, we cannot study social evolution without considering the structure affected. Complete sociological theory, therefore, does not admit of division into static and dynamic portions. The distinction is merely one of problems, and arises through scientific analysis. It is a useful distinction in sociological investigations and for pedagogical purposes, but it cannot be maintained in a systematic presentation of sociological theory, as all recent sociological writers have discovered.

Moreover, the terms "static" and "dynamic" are borrowed from physics, and are not particularly happy terms when used to describe social processes. Terms borrowed

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[1] The student would do well to compare the above brief outline of the main problems of sociology with Ratzenhofer's paper on "The Problems of Sociology" in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 177–188. Of the thirteen problems which Ratzenhofer discusses, many, in the opinion of the writer, are problems of the special social sciences, while some are problems in philosophy.

[2] *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. VI, Chap. III.

from the biological sciences are coming, in part, to replace these borrowed from physical science in recent sociological discussions. Such terms as social morphology and social physiology are used instead of social statics, and genetic sociology instead of social dynamics. But it must be admitted that these new terms are scarcely more happy than those borrowed from physical science; indeed, in some respects they fail to convey the meaning as clearly as the older terms. There is, after all, little in names, provided they are used with clear and definite connotations. The adjectives "static" and "dynamic" are often convenient in the social sciences and there can be no great objection to their use, since they have been adopted into the vocabulary of nearly all the sciences. We shall continue to speak of the "static" and "dynamic" aspects of sociology, therefore, without implying, on the one hand, any separation of the science into two parts, and, on the other hand, any close analogy between physical and social conditions and changes.

The Relation of Sociology to Social Description.—Some sociologists have created another division of sociology which they term descriptive sociology, made up of descriptions of social activities and institutions. It is true that all science presupposes descriptive material. Thus, political science presupposes the description of actual government; economics the description of commerce and industry; biology the descriptive material which we term natural history. But it is true also that mere description is never science in the stricter sense of the word. Science, in the stricter sense, is always explanatory; it is a higher generalization, revealing laws, causes and principles. As Professor Small says, "Like all genuine science, sociology is not interested in facts as such. It is interested only in relations, meanings, valuations, in which facts reappear in essentials."[1]

[1] *General Sociology*, p. 15; cf. also Comte's statement (*Positive Philosophy*, Bk. VI, Chap. XIII): "Science is made up of laws and not of facts."

Moreover, another difficulty in creating a descriptive division in sociology which shall be recognized, is the fact that the field of social description is already covered by three well-recognized departments of knowledge, namely, ethnography, demography and history; ethnography, describing the savage, barbarous and semicivilized peoples; demography, describing the contemporaneous societies of civilized peoples; and history, describing the past events among the civilized. It has been somewhat of a puzzle with which of these three descriptive sociology should be identified. Spencer, in a famous passage,[1] identified descriptive sociology with history—as it ought to be written. Most other sociologists have tended to identify it with demography; while some have not hesitated to assume that the only social description worthy of attention by the sociologist was to be found in ethnography.[2] It is evident, however, that the descriptive material of which the sociologist must make use is to be found in all three of the above disciplines.

It would seem that the best way out of the difficulty is to drop the use of the term "descriptive sociology," just as we do not speak of a "descriptive biology." Its use only adds to the confusion already existing as to the relation of sociology to the above three disciplines. There can be no objection, however, to using the term to designate special organizations of descriptive material from the above sources for sociological purposes. This, in effect, is what Spencer attempted to do in his encyclopedic work entitled *Descriptive Sociology.*

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[1] *Study of Sociology,* Preface to American edition, p. iv.

[2] Apparently Dr. Haddon would identify sociology with ethnology or ethnography. (See his article on "Ethnology: Its Scope and Problems," in *Proceedings of the Congress of Arts and Science,* St. Louis, 1904, Vol. V.) For a discussion of the relations of ethnography and sociology, see Achelis, *Soziologie,* p. 38; also Steinmetz's article, "Die Bedeutung der Ethnologie für Soziologie," in *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Sociologie,* Vol. XXVI.

CHAPTER III

THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO OTHER SCIENCES

The Relation of Sociology to the Special Social Sciences.— The relation of sociology to the special social sciences, economics, politics, ethics, and the like, has often been compared to the relation of a trunk of a tree to its branches. Perhaps, as Professor Ross has suggested,[1] the tree in question should be thought of as a banyan tree, as many of these sciences have independent roots in psychology and biology. All of these sciences, however, derive their significance from the fact that they deal with some phase of human interactions; and they are, therefore, properly styled the special social sciences. The economics, the morality, the religion of a perfectly isolated being, if such could be thought of, would be something far different from the things we know under those names in human society. As was said above, the special social sciences deal with special phases or aspects of the social life; and they do this by a process of scientific abstraction, that is, by studying these phases as more or less separate, or abstracted from the total social life. They deal with problems which are relatively specific and concrete, concerning usually only one section or aspect of the social process. Their generalizations are, therefore, relatively partial and incomplete. Sociology, on the other hand, tries to reach generalizations of a higher order, which present a more general and fundamental view of the social reality. The social problems which are of a general nature,

[1] *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 27.

therefore, that is, those which pertain to the social process as a whole, are left necessarily to sociology. What these problems are has already been pointed out.

The special social sciences are not logically competent to deal with these general social problems, as their basis of induction is not sufficiently wide. This fact has not always been sufficiently appreciated by workers in these sciences, and the result has been many one-sided theories of the social life. In constructing a theory of social progress, an economist, for example, would naturally give undue prominence to economic factors, and perhaps even subordinate other factors altogether. This Karl Marx and other students of economic conditions have actually done. It was, in part, as a protest against such " fractional " views of the social life that sociology came into existence. The special social sciences, when pursued by themselves, necessarily furnish only fractional views of the social life; they must find their logical completion, in a general science of society, which shall furnish a complete view of social organization and evolution.

There has been much debate as to whether sociology should be regarded as a synthesis of the special social sciences or as a science fundamental to these. The question could have arisen only through confusion of the logical relations between problems. Sociology may be regarded either as a synthesis of the special social sciences or as a science fundamental to these. All the general sciences are synthetic in method and at the same time fundamental in character. Their fundamental character is a result of the wideness of their syntheses. Their generalizations are not only much wider than those attempted by the special sciences, but, because they are wider, they are also much deeper. Now, sociology, as a theory of social organization on the one hand, and of social evolution on the other, attempts generalizations much wider than the special social sciences; and for that very reason its generalizations are of

a fundamental character.) But it is only through the synthesis—the seeing together—of social phenomena that such fundamental generalizations can be effected. Hence, sociology is correctly conceived as, in many of its aspects, a synthesis of the special social sciences. But we mean by this, not a summing-up of the special social sciences, but rather *an all-sided generalization of the social process.* Hence, sociology is the fundamental science of the social life, the basis of the social sciences as well as their logical completion.

The relation of sociology in its synthetic aspects to the special social sciences may, perhaps, be illustrated by the relation of general philosophy, as a *scientia scientiarum,* to all the sciences.[1] Modern philosophy is not indifferent to the sciences, but is, in one sense, to be regarded as a result of the synthesis of all of them. The several sciences, dealing as they do each with but narrow segments of reality, necessarily present but partial views of the universe; to philosophy is left the task of combining these partial views into a complete and ultimate picture of the universal reality. To philosophy, therefore, are left the ultimate and universal problems, such as the nature of mind and matter, the ultimate relations between these two, the nature of causation, etc. In this sense, the relation of philosophy to the several sciences is similar to the relation of sociology to the special social sciences. The matter might be, perhaps, better illustrated by considering the relation of any general science to the special sciences under it. Thus biology may be considered a synthesis of all the biological sciences, and to it are turned over the general problems of organic life, such as the origin and evolution of species, the nature of nutrition and reproduction, the causes of variation, the theory of heredity, and the like. While these illustrations are imperfect, it is manifest that the relation of sociology to the special social sciences must be of the same general character

[1] Cf. Flint, *Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum,* pp. 1–63.

as the relation of any general science to the special sciences under it.

The distinction between sociology and the special social sciences, it may be well to repeat, is only a matter of convenience based upon the division of labor among scientific workers. The distinction, in other words, as has already been pointed out, is purely one of problems. The sociologist deals with the more general and fundamental problems of the social life, such as the theory of social organization on the one hand, and the theory of social evolution on the other; while the special social sciences deal with relatively specific or concrete problems which primarily concern only special aspects or phases of the social life.

It must be evident from all that has been said that the practical relations between students of sociology and students of the special social sciences should be those of sympathetic and helpful coöperation. The sociologist needs to know at every point in his work the results of the special social sciences, and, on the other hand, in order that he may have a proper point of view, a proper perspective, the worker in the special social sciences must be well grounded in sociology.

The dangers of isolation of the special social sciences from sociology, and of sociology from these sciences, are very grave dangers. Over-specialization in any one social science must be discouraged if one-sided views of the social life are not to prevail. Human life is a unity, and it must be studied in all of its aspects, on all of its sides, if a true conception of it is to be attained. Accordingly, we shall emphasize the close interdependence of the several social sciences with sociology and of sociology with these sciences in discussing the relations of sociology with each of them. We shall note briefly the more important of these sciences and the close interrelations between them and sociology.

1. *Economics.*—First among the special social sciences must be placed economics. This is primary among them

because it deals with that phase of the social life which is concerned with the production and distribution of the material means of subsistence. To be more exact, it is "the science of those social phenomena to which the wealth-getting and the wealth-using activity of man gives rise";[1] or in the language of another authority, it "treats of the commercial and industrial activities of men from the standpoint of values and markets."[2] It is evident, whichever of these definitions one adopts, that economics deals with a most fundamental phase of man's activity as a social being—the problems connected with the production and distribution of wealth. Its importance, therefore, in understanding the total social life, to the sociologist, cannot be too highly estimated.

On the other hand, it is evident that the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man are strictly an outgrowth of his social life and that economics as a science of industry, must rest upon sociology; for the fact which lies back of human industry is human association. The mistake has been made in the past, at times, of supposing that economics dealt with the most fundamental social phenomena, and even at times economists have spoken of their science as alone sufficient to explain all social phenomena. It cannot be admitted, however, that we can explain social organization in general, or social progress, in terms of economic development. A theory of progress, for example, in which the sole causes of social progress were found in economic conditions would neglect political, religious, educational, and many other conditions. Only a very one-sided theory of society can be built upon such a basis.[3] The sphere of economics is

[1] Ely, *Outlines of Economics*, p. 82.

[2] Davenport, *Outlines of Economic Theory*, p. 2.

[3] Cf. Carver's statement (*Sociology and Social Progress*, p. 3): "The chief danger is that if sociology is to be developed from the economic standpoint, and by an expansion of the method of economics, the purely economic factors will be overemphasized." Never-

to explain the commercial and industrial activities of man from the standpoint of values and markets, and not to attempt to become a general science dealing with social evolution. This is now recognized by practically all economists of standing, and the only question which remains is whether economics is independent of sociology or whether it rests upon sociology.

That economics does rest upon sociology is shown by many considerations. The chief problem of theoretical economics is the problem of economic value. But economic value is but one sort of value which is recognized in society, moral and æsthetic values being other examples of the valuing process; and all values must express the collective judgment of some human group or other. The problem of economic value, in other words, reduces itself to a problem in social psychology;[1] and when this is said it is equivalent to making economics dependent upon sociology.

Again, industrial organization and industrial evolution are but parts or phases of social organization and social evolution in general, and it is safe to say that industry, both in its organization and evolution, cannot be understood apart from the general conditions, psychological and biological, which surround society. Again, many non-economic forces continually obtrude themselves upon the student of industrial conditions, such as custom, invention, imitation, standards, ideas, and the like.[2] These are general social forces which play throughout all phases of human life, and

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theless, Professor Carver concludes (p. 7), "sociology is merely an expansion of the method of economics to include a study of many factors in social development not ordinarily considered by the economist"!

1 For a demonstration of the social nature of economic value, see Dr. B. M. Anderson's *Social Value*. This book is, on the whole, the ablest discussion of the sociological basis of theoretical economics which has yet appeared.

2 Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 29–40.

so show the dependence of industry upon society in general, and therefore, of economics upon sociology.

All of this argues the importance of sociology, as a science of social first principles, for economics as well as for the other social sciences; in brief, that economics must be grounded upon sociology. The economist, indeed, can less afford to dispense with the guidance which the sociological viewpoint can give him than the sociologist can afford to dispense with the knowledge of facts and principles which economics can furnish. Sociology is indispensable for economics, and economics is indispensable for sociology, if both are to attain the character of positive science.

2. *Political Science.*[1]—Among the oldest of the social sciences is the science of politics, or government. It was first systematized by Aristotle and down to the modern era may be said to have been almost the sole recognized representative of the social sciences.[2] Its relations with sociology are most intimate; the state is not only the most imposing social structure and the most visible manifestation of social organization, but it may also be regarded as the ultimate and highest form of human association. This, indeed, is exactly Aristotle's view when he argues that the state is logically prior to the individual and also to all other forms of association; for he recognizes that the family, the village, and many other forms of association, may have existed chronologically prior to the state, but they did not find their completion, or human society its ultimate form, until the state united households and villages for the sake of complete living.[3] The state must, therefore, be regarded as the last term

[1] For a somewhat fuller discussion of the relations of sociology and political science, see the writer's paper on "The Science of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, pp. 105–110; also Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, pp. 31, 32.

[2] Ethics was not, of course, recognized as a social science in the Middle Ages.

[3] *Politics*, Book I, 2.

in a long series of free associations, many of which may antedate the state historically, but all of which find their completion only under that final expression of social organization which we term the state. Hence the state is of direct concern to the sociologist.

Nevertheless, there is little excuse for thinking that political science and sociology deal with the same problems or that either science can supplant the other. The problems of political science are the origin, nature, forms and functions of the state and of government, the nature and location of sovereignty, and the methods of administration. These problems, which are well recognized as the chief problems of political science by all political scientists of standing, are evidently clearly distinct from the problems of sociology which we have already pointed out. The concept of the state is, therefore, clearly distinct from the concept of society, and this political scientists, in general, recognize.[1] Society, that is, human association, is the fact which lies back of the state. Many of the Eighteenth-Century theorists, for example, proposed a contract theory of the state or government, but distinctly disclaimed a contract theory of society in general.[2] While the phenomenon of authority, or control, is universal in all human groups, political science deals only with the organized authority manifest in the state.

Now the phenomena of governmental authority and control, and of political organization, however important they may be, are comparatively late developments in social evolution. Therefore, before authority and control as manifested in the state can be understood, social organization and the nature of society in general must be understood. Political science, must depend, therefore, for its knowledge of the

[1] Cf. Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, pp. 2, 3.

[2] Locke (*Two Treatises of Government*) is a good example of this type of contract theorist, who, while arguing that the state rests upon contract, recognized that many forms of natural association do not.

origins of authority and subordination, of social control, and of the springs of political organization, upon the general science which deals with the whole theory of society, that is, sociology.

3. *Jurisprudence.*[1]—An important branch of political science is jurisprudence. This is the science of law. Its problems are the nature, genesis and historical development of law. Now, law rests upon custom, that is, social habit. It is not something apart from social organization, but springs from the psychological nature of society. Formal law is, indeed, the expression of organized public control of social activities. It is for the sake of maintaining a given social organization or social order that law exists. The civil law and the criminal law of a nation may be considered the two great props of its social order. Since it is impossible to understand law in the abstract, or any given system of law, without understanding the principles of social organization which give rise to it, it is evident that sociology deals with the foundations of law.

In its comparative sections, moreover, jurisprudence brings together many facts concerning the laws, customs, and institutions of different peoples. In order to interpret these rightly, sociology is evidently essential. On the other hand, such comparative jurisprudence has made in the past very significant contributions to sociology itself.

Again, the legal codes of civilized peoples have been built up very largely upon some theory of society. Unfortunately, these theories have not always been sound. Much of the legislation and legal theory of the Eighteenth Century and of the early half of the Nineteenth Century was, for example, founded upon what is known as "the contract theory of society"—a theory long since discredited by social science. In order to be able to criticise intelligently legal

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texts and legal codes, it is evident that the student of jurisprudence or law must have a knowledge of sound, scientific social theory.

It is evident, then, that political science and jurisprudence are both closely related to sociology. Government and law are two of the most important aspects of human social organization and evolution; and they cannot be understood without understanding the principles which underlie all social organization and evolution. On the other hand, these aspects of human social life, because of their importance, present problems of their own, and there can be no doubt that they are legitimate fields for independent special sciences. But they will achieve their best development, and sociology will achieve its best development by a recognition of mutual interdependence.

4. *The Science of Religion.*—By the science of religion is meant, not theology, a metaphysical inquiry into the nature and attributes of God; but a study of the actual phenomena of religious belief and practice among men. An important section is called comparative religion. Its problems are the origin, nature, forms, and functions of both religious beliefs and religious practices. To superficial thought, religion may seem to be wholly an individual matter. But close study has shown that nothing is so inextricably interwoven with the social life of man as religion. Not only are the forms of religious belief and practice frequently an outcome of a particular social organization or stage of social evolution; but every type of civilization seems to rest upon a particular form of religious belief. Religious phenomena are, then, social phenomena,[1] and the science of re-

[1] Among recent studies which have recognized the essentially social nature of religion, may be mentioned Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience;* King, *The Development of Religion;* and Patten, *The Social Basis of Religion.* One should also not forget one of the earliest works to emphasize this point of view, Kidd's *Social Evolution.*

ligion is a social science, though like all the other social sciences it has independent roots in psychology. It is as yet in a comparatively undeveloped and unsystematized condition and its development must come through establishing it definitely upon a sociological basis. On the other hand, sociology needs the enrichment which will come from a scientific study of religious phenomena from the social point of view.

5. *Ethics.*[1]—The relations of ethics to sociology need careful consideration, as those relations are more complex than in the cases of the sciences which we have just considered. By ethics we here mean, not the metaphysics of morality, with which positive science as such can have nothing to do; but scientific ethics, a doctrine of morality based upon the knowledge furnished by the established sciences. A metaphysical inquiry into the nature of morality may or may not be a necessary part of the science of ethics in its final development; that does not prevent our consideration of the relation of those phases of ethical theory which rest upon positive science to sociology, and this is the only problem which concerns us here.

The student will note that ethics, even in this sense, as a positive science of morals, is a science of a different kind from the sciences which we have just considered. All of these latter have been pure sciences, describing and explaining processes only. But ethics is a science of norms and ideals; therefore, it may be called a normative science. While ethics may have descriptive portions, these are sub-

[1] For a full statement of the writer's views regarding the relations of sociology and ethics, see his article on "The Sociological Basis of Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1910. Cf. also Professor Höffding's article "On the Relation between Sociology and Ethics," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 672–679. In his *Introductory Study of Ethics*, Professor Fite discusses at length the relations between ethics and social theory, thus indirectly the relations between ethics and sociology.

ordinated to its normative portions, for its real problems are normative; that is, briefly put, the problem of ethics is what ought to be in human life.[1] There can be no doubt that ethics in the sense in which we have defined it is a social science, although it is, perhaps, not strictly accurate to conceive of it as a special social science; rather it is the normative science lying beyond all of the special social sciences. Because its problems are those of collective human welfare, some eminent sociologists have considered it to be merely a part of sociology. This was the position of Comte, who at first gave no place to ethics among the sciences. Later, however, he recognized the relatively independent position of ethics as a normative science, lying beyond the pure sciences.[2] On the other hand, there have been many ethical thinkers who have seen in sociology nothing but an extension of ethics. Ethics, they say, has a right to inquire into all phases of human relationships in order to determine the principles of right and wrong, and, in their opinion, sociology is simply such an inquiry. Here we have the old familiar situation. One group of thinkers maintaining that one science, in this case, ethics, has no right to exist because its field can be covered by sociology, and another group maintaining that sociology has no right to exist because its field can be covered by other sciences, in this case, ethics. As, in all of these cases we shall find reasons for pronouncing both of these extreme views radically wrong. Ethics is an independent science because it has problems of its own, such as the origin, nature, and validity of moral ideas and ideals, norms of conduct, and the like. These problems are distinct from those which we have already pointed out for sociology. Ethics cannot be reduced, therefore, to a mere

[1] See Thilly, *Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 5–9; Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 1, 38; Hyslop, *Elements of Ethics*, pp. 4–7.

[2] See his *Positive Polity*, Vol. II, Chap. VII (pp. 352–357 of English translation); also Vol. III, Introduction (p. 4) and Chap. I (pp. 40–42).

chapter in sociology, because its problems are sufficiently distinct and important to constitute it a relatively independent science;[1] nor, on the other hand, can sociology be regarded as a mere extension of ethics because its problems are not only distinct from, but fundamental to, those of ethics.

Yet it is impossible to separate ethics from sociology or sociology from ethics in any hard and fast way. It is impossible to study the various types of social organization and the conditions under which they develop and survive or become extinct, without indicating the superiority and inferiority of the various types. It is impossible, in other words, to study social organization and evolution without indicating advantageous and disadvantageous adjustments, tendencies toward social survival or social extinction. In general, it is impossible for the human mind to study social conditions without perceiving maladjustments or possible economies not realized; or to formulate a theory of social progress without implications of social obligation.[2] This is not saying that sociology is ethics or ethics sociology, but it is saying that a system of ethics grows spontaneously out of a system of sociology; and that the attempt to exclude all ethical implications and judgments from sociology is not only futile and childish, but undesirable. It is the business of sociology to furnish a foundation for ethics; hence it is desirable to recognize in sociology ethical implications. And such will be frankly the practice of this book.

On the other hand, ethics cannot discuss the ideal for human life, whether individual or social, without taking into

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[1] After calling morals "the Master Science," Comte goes on to say (*Positive Polity*, Vol. II, Chap. VII): "The distinction between Sociology and Morality [i.e., Ethics] is at bottom not less real and not less useful than the distinction between Sociology and Biology."

[2] It is on account of these psychological facts that certain sociologists have claimed that sociology is a normative as well as a pure science. But what can normative sociology be but social ethics?

account all social knowledge.[1] If it is to be a science of "the good for man," it must build up its conception of the good out of the tendencies and potencies of actual human society. Moreover, there can be no application of ethical principles to actual human life without involving again a consideration of the principles of social organization and evolution. All this is equivalent to saying that scientific ethics must recognize sociology as one of its necessary foundations; but this is not saying that ethics does not rest, though less immediately, like all the other social sciences, upon psychology, nor is it denying that ethics has metaphysical projections which, however, as implied at the beginning, belong rather to metaphysics than to scientific ethics.[2]

What, then, is the exact relation of ethics as a science to sociology? Before finally answering this question, it will be well to recall that ethics is a normative science, that is, a science of values and ideals. In character, then, it is midway between a pure science and an applied science. All the social sciences have implicit normative aspects, sociology, as the biology and psychology of the collective life, being only the general science which furnishes the basis for the synthe-

[1] Cf. Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chap. II.

[2] Much of the opposition of ethicists to the sociological point of view in ethics undoubtedly comes from misunderstanding. They fail to realize that sociology is essentially a psychological science; or they confuse the sociological point of view with the historical method. It should be unnecessary to add that the sociological point of view in ethics is not necessarily opposed to the metaphysical point of view. The sociological view of ethics is, of course, no recent development. Comte in the *Positive Polity*, Spencer in his *Principles of Ethics*, Leslie Stephen in his *Science of Ethics*, and many others have sought to develop ethics more or less upon the basis of sociology. In the case of Spencer, Stephen, and Ward, however, the sociological point of view in ethics was badly confused with utilitarianism or hedonism. This has added greatly to the misunderstanding already existing. It may be suggested that sociological ethics, so far from having any relations with hedonism, is essentially an ethics of universal order.

sis of their implied norms and ideals. Now ethics takes these norms and ideals, develops them, criticises them, and harmonizes them.[1] Ethics, in its widest sense, therefore, may be regarded as the normative section of the social sciences, or rather, as we have already said, as the normative science to which all of them lead up. In its narrowest sense, as the principles of right conduct for the individual, scientific ethics may be regarded as a synthesis of the normative aspects of sociology, psychology, and biology; but inasmuch as the sociological comprehends the psychological and biological, it would be sufficiently accurate to say that individual ethics is the normative aspect of sociology looked at from the point of view of individual conduct; while social ethics would be the normative aspect of sociology looked at from the point of view of collective activities. The various special branches of social ethics, such as political ethics, industrial ethics, and the like rest, of course, upon the corresponding special social sciences as well as upon general sociology.

Scientific ethics, then, presupposes a scientific sociology, as Professor Small and others have clearly shown,[2] and in large measure the development of the one must await the development of the other. The independence of ethics from sociology as a science, as in the case of all the other social sciences, is a matter of methodological expediency, of the division of labor, not of difference of subject-matter. The various social sciences cannot explain what is and what has been in human society without showing at least by implication, *what ought to be.* On the other hand, these sciences are not complete until their normative implications have been developed, criticised, and harmonized by a general

[1] It is, of course, not meant that norms and ideals are delivered by the social sciences to ethics fully developed; rather they are often mere implications in the social knowledge which those sciences furnish.

[2] *General Sociology,* pp. 674–96.

science of ethics; in other words, they find their completion in ethics.[1] The relations between ethics and the other social sciences, are, then, relations of mutual interdependence, and this is especially true of the relations of ethics and sociology. The scientific moralist and the sociologist, should, therefore, work hand in hand, for they are both working at the great problem of human welfare, the one directly, the other indirectly.

6. *Education.*[2]—The science of education, or pedagogy, as it used to be called, is an applied science, that is, a science immediately connected with a practical art. On the one side, it is concerned with the development of the latent powers and capacities of the individual; on the other, with the adjustment of the individual to society, the initiation of the individual into the social life. The science of education thus has two sides—one psychological and the other sociological; in other words, it is an application of psychology and sociology. The psychological aspects of educational science have been sufficiently emphasized but it is only recently that its sociological aspects have begun to receive attention. It must be evident, however, that if education may be regarded from one point of view, as the fitting of the individual for full and complete membership in the social life, it should proceed with full consciousness of what the needs and requirements of the social life are. There

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[1] Cf. Comte's statement (*Positive Policy*, Vol. III, p. 41): "Till Moral Science is instituted, all branches of speculation, even Sociology, using that term strictly, can be only preliminary."

[2] For a fuller discussion of the bearing of sociology upon the science of education, see the writer's article on "The Sociological Basis of the Science of Education," *Education*, November, 1911. Much of the recent work in education emphasizes the sociological point of view. Cf., e.g., Bagley, *The Educative Process*, Chaps. I–III; Graves, *A History of Education before the Middle Ages*, Chaps. I, II; Monroe, *Text-book of the History of Education*, Chap. XIII; Pyle, *Outlines of Educational Psychology*, Chap. I.

can be no such thing as a scientific educational program without an understanding of the first principles of the social life.

Moreover, education should be not simply the development and adjustment of the individual; it should aid in social evolution, regenerate society by fitting the individual for a higher type of social life than that at present achieved. And to do this requires an insight into the principles of social evolution as well as an understanding of human nature. The science of education rests, therefore, equally upon sociology and psychology. The educator, who would use the educational system as a means of social progress should have a profound knowledge of the principles of social organization and evolution; and even the humblest teacher who comes to his task equipped with such knowledge would find a significance and meaning in his work which he could hardly otherwise obtain.

7. *The applied social sciences.*—Many sociologists speak of an "applied sociology," but it is doubtful if there is such a discipline, or division of sociology. As we have already noted, an applied science is one immediately connected with some practical art. Now there are many arts dealing directly with human social life; hence, sociology, like most of the general sciences, serves as a basis, not for *one,* but for *many,* applied sciences. Thus biology is the basis for those applied sciences which are grouped together under the term "the medical sciences." It is also largely the basis of the applied sciences of agriculture and horticulture. But we hardly ever speak of "applied biology." There is scarcely more propriety in speaking of applied sociology, though the term might be justified (1) as a name for such an organization of the principles of sociology as will show their practical bearing upon human life, which is the sense in which Professor Ward uses it,[1] or (2) as a name for an organiza-

[1] In his *Applied Sociology.*

tion of all our knowledge of practical means and methods of improving social conditions, for which Professor Henderson has proposed the name of "social technology."[1] In our opinion, however, it would be better if the term "applied sociology" were dropped altogether.

Besides education, among the more important applied social sciences are philanthropy, social economics, and social politics. The best organized of these is the science of philanthropy,[2] or charitology, as it is sometimes called. This deals with the abnormal classes in society, that is, the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, their genesis, social treatment and prevention. It has numerous subdivisions, one of the most important being penology, which deals with the social treatment of the criminal class. The science of philanthropy is perhaps the best developed of any of the special social sciences, resting as it does immediately upon a practical art, and, in its broadest sense, it has good grounds for claiming to be the applied department of sociology. However this question may be decided, it is evident that the relation of the science of philanthropy to sociology is very similar to the relation of the science of medicine to biology.[3] The tendency to develop a science of philanthropy apart from sociology, is, therefore, to be regretted; and the tendency of some sociologists to ignore the work being done in the field of scientific philanthropy is equally regrettable. Just as many valuable contributions to biology have come through the development of medical science and art; and just as the development of biology has reacted to deepen and broaden medical science; so similar results can be ex-

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[1] "The Scope of Social Technology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 465–86.

[2] For a fuller discussion of the relations of sociology and scientific philanthropy, see the writer's article on "Philanthropy and Sociology," *The Survey*, June 4, 1910.

[3] Cf. Dr. Wines's article, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. XII, pp. 49–57.

pected from the close coöperation of the sociologist and the scientific social worker.

"Home economics," or domestic science, is a good example of the complexity of an applied social science. So far as it deals with the practical problems of nutrition and sanitation in the family group, it rests largely upon chemistry, physiology, bacteriology, and other physical sciences. On the other hand, so far as it deals with the care of children and the higher life of the family, it rests upon physiology, the medical sciences, psychology and sociology. Sociology comes in, as in the applied social sciences generally, to give a point of view and of approach. Certainly the practical problems of the family life cannot be properly viewed unless something is known of the origin and evolution of the family as a form of association; and unless the function of the family in the collective life of man is understood. Sociology furnishes "home economics" therefore, with its necessary theoretical background.

Social economics is a term which has lately been used to cover the whole field of social betterment, and so as synonymous with philanthropy in the widest sense. Strictly, however, it should be applied only to the betterment of economic conditions, that is, to industrial betterment. In this sense, it may be regarded as an application of sociology and economics to a particular phase of the social life. Social politics is the science and art of bettering social conditions through the agency of the state or government. It may be regarded as an application of sociology and political science.

However the various applied social sciences may be defined, it is evident that they overlap; that they are closely related to sociology and the other theoretical social sciences; and that they are of interest to the sociologist.

The Relation of Sociology to History.—There remain to be considered the relations of sociology to one other body of knowledge which concerns human society, and that is

history. History is a concrete, descriptive science of the past of human society. Its problem is, "What was the social reality in the past?"—that is, past events and their connections. Sociology, on the other hand, as we have repeatedly noted, is an abstract, theoretical science of the social life,[1] having as its problems the laws or principles of social organization and evolution. It might seem from this that history is the descriptive material which sociology presupposes; and as we have already seen, some sociologists, notably Spencer, would make history synonymous with descriptive sociology. We are now speaking, of course, of written history, history in the subjective sense. But to understand the relations of sociology to history in this sense, one must first understand the relation of sociology to objective history.

Objective history is simply that which actually occurs in human societies; it is the procession of events in the entire life of humanity. History, in this sense, is evidently but a convenient name for the whole movement of human societies from the beginning of human life up to the present. Sociology, on its genetic side, is concerned with the constant factors in that movement, the laws or principles of social evolution. Objective history, if we include in it present social phenomena, is, therefore, the subject-matter of sociology; and in this sense, sociology is the science of history.[2] But objective history is not only the subject-matter of sociology; in its various phases it furnishes the subject-matter for all the social sciences. It is also the subject-matter of that organized body of knowledge which we term written history, or historiography.

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[1] One of my colleagues, Professor J. H. Coursault, has suggested that the relation of sociology to history is not unlike the relation of grammar to literature. An even better comparison might be the relation of biology to the "natural history" of plants and animals.

[2] Cf. Flint, *Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum*, p. 334.

The Relation of Sociology to Historiography.[1]—Historiography, or history in the subjective sense (the sense in which the term is ordinarily used), is the description or narration of past events in the life of humanity. It is the mental picture of some portion of the human past which we are enabled to form by means of documents and other remains. The knowledge of past social phenomena which we get from history is particularly dependent upon documentary evidence. It is, therefore, only a partial picture of the past, more or less accurate according to the character and abundance of this documentary evidence. Moreover, because it rests chiefly upon the evidence of written records, history, as a body of knowledge, is limited to what is known as "the historic period" in the life of humanity. Thus it furnishes no knowledge of a most important stage of social evolution, the period before written records began, during which social institutions were slowly forming and the foundations of culture being laid. To reconstruct this period the sociologist has to turn to the descriptions of the life of present savage and barbarous peoples furnished him by ethnography and cultural anthropology.

Again, because the method of history is the indirect method of investigating, that is, by means of documentary evidence, rather than by the direct method of observation, it rarely includes descriptions of present society. For his knowledge of present social phenomena, the sociologist has to turn to demography, various collections of descriptive and statistical material concerning present societies, besides, of course, making use of his own powers of personal observation. But this knowledge of present social phenomena is of primary importance in a scientific interpretation

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1 For discussions of the relation of sociology to written history, see Barth, *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 1–14; Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 15–18, 44–46; Forrest, *The Development of Western Civilization*, pp. 376–393.

of society, in accordance with the general principle that the scientific value of a fact decreases in proportion to its remoteness from the observer.

Thus written history, as a body of knowledge, falls short of furnishing a complete presentation of the subject-matter of sociology.[1] It fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of the earlier stages of social evolution; and it also fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of present social life. In studying social evolution, or the evolution of any particular institution, therefore, the sociologist must turn to ethnography and demography as well as to history. For example, the sociology of the family cannot be constructed from the knowledge which written history affords. All the earlier stages of the evolution of the family as an institution can only be made out by recourse to ethnography, while the latest stages, the present tendencies of the family, can be discovered only by recourse to demographical and statistical material relating to present society.

Moreover, history, as it is usually written, has certain shortcomings from the scientific standpoint which still further limit its utility to the sociologist. Perhaps the worst of these is the predominance of the literary over the scientific spirit in the presentation of its subject-matter. This leads to the story-telling type of historical narrative, and to over-emphasis of the dramatic elements in the life of societies. Now, the essence of the dramatic lies in the personal and individual; hence the literary historian crowds his narrative with striking personalities and personal incidents, neglecting not only the less obvious psychical and

[1] The limitations of the "historical method" in the social sciences here discussed must be evident even to historians! The truth is sociology (though it would be an abortive affair) could exist even if there were no written history. To paraphrase Mackenzie (*Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 32), sociology without history would be *empty*, but without psychology and biology it would be *blind*.

physical influences at work in the social process, but also the commonplace, recurrent events of the social life. Undoubtedly the personal and particular have a legitimate place in historical narrative; for without their proper emphasis history could not give a true picture of the social reality; but their over-emphasis serves to obscure the real and deep undercurrents in the social life which chiefly, determine its course.[1] The literary method of presenting historical facts is, therefore, subversive of scientific ends; the story-telling interest is opposed to the scientific interest. Consequently, the sociologist can look to the literary historian for but little help.

In a similar way, the exclusive attention of the historian to one or only a few aspects of the social life serves to distort the picture of the social reality. Thus much of the history written down to the present has been political history, the history of the state or government. This has been, perhaps, helpful to the political scientist, but it has been insufficient to reveal for the sociologist the forces at work in social organization and evolution. Political history, and in general, one-sided history of all kinds, falls far short of making that exhibit of all phases of a people's life which alone is a sufficiently wide basis for induction for the sociologist.

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[1] Professor Ross (*Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 81–83) seems to justify the predominance of the literary over the scientific spirit in the presentation of historical subject-matter by claiming that the historian deals with the unique and individual ("this individual quality is the staple of the historian"), whereas "the sociologist cancels out the particular." This is an impossible distinction between the tasks of the historian and the sociologist, as is shown by contemporary developments in both fields. At the very time when Professor Ross is justifying the "purple patches" of the historian, scientific students of history are paying more attention to the real and deep undercurrents which determine a nation's life. (See Robinson, *The New History*, especially p. 16 and many passages in Chaps. I, III, and V.)

Although written history furnishes but a part of the facts with which the sociologist deals, nevertheless the co-operation between the sociologist and the scientific historian —the historian who employs scientific methods and who aims at the faithful representation of the social reality— should be of the closest sort. They are both working in the same field and to a large extent have the same aim. The sociologist needs scientific history. He cannot complete his inventory of the social world without its aid. Moreover, sociology cannot content itself, as one author has well remarked, with being merely illustrated psychology; it must also be, at least in its final development, analyzed and compared history.[1] Finally, the historical method of study is of supreme importance to the sociologist, and this fact alone makes a scientific history of all ages and peoples perhaps the greatest desideratum of the sociologist. On the other hand, the scientific historian has need of sociology. Without some knowledge of the principles of social organization and evolution he can scarcely obtain a proper perspective of his facts; nor can he rightly interpret his facts or explain the causes of social changes without reference to such principles. The scientific historian could do his work more scientifically if he had a critical knowledge of sociological laws and principles. We conclude, then, both that scientific history is necessary to the sociologist, and that sociology is equally necessary to the scientific historian.

The Relation of Sociology to the Philosophy of History. —In the Eighteenth Century there grew up a body of speculative thought about human progress known as the philosophy of history. Among the founders of this discipline were Vico, Herder and Condorcet.[2] The attempt of these

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[1] Bouglé, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, March, 1904.

[2] The work of these men was not metaphysical, but was essentially the same as that of the modern sociologist, save for their faulty methods.

men and their successors was to find certain laws or principles which underlie historical phenomena and which would explain human progress. It is evident that the problem which the philosophers of history undertook to solve is the same as one of the main problems of sociology, namely, the problem of social evolution, or of progress. The method of the philosophers of history was, however, entirely different from that of the modern sociologist. In the first place, their method was speculative rather than scientific. For the most part they deduced their theories of progress from *a priori* assumptions rather than built them up out of the facts of history. In the second place, the philosophers of history usually sought some one all-pervading principle, which would be "a key to history," and which would explain everything in the historical movement; while the modern sociologist seeks not some abstract universal principle which will explain everything, but the psychological factors at work in producing social changes. It is not too much to say that sociology is the modern scientific successor of the philosophy of history.

Dr. Paul Barth, of the University of Leipzig, has claimed that sociology is identical with a scientific philosophy of history.[1] But sociology includes the static as well as the genetic study of societies. A scientific philosophy of history would be at most a genetic explanation of the historical movement—that is, a theory of social evolution. It is only by stretching the term philosophy of history beyond what it logically connotes, that it could be made to include all of sociology. As Comte clearly indicated, a scientific philosophy of history would coincide merely with genetic or dynamic sociology. It would, however, be better to drop

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[1] *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 4–13. Barth was by no means the first to make substantially this claim. Even Comte claimed "social dynamics" as the science of history and recognized the philosophy of history as its speculative predecessor.

the name philosophy of history altogether, both on account of its past unfortunate associations, and because the two aspects of sociological theory—the theory of social organization and the theory of social evolution—are now seen to be inseparable.[1]

A word should be said in conclusion about the relation of the philosophical historian to the sociologist. The philosophical historian is one who is not content with mere faithful description or narration of past events, but seeks to interpret them, and in some degree to unify them, through the light of general principles. In this interpretation, the older philosophical historians made use chiefly of metaphysical assumptions, such as fate, providence, and the like; but the modern philosophical historian makes use chiefly of psychological principles. He offers a psychological interpretation of social movements. He is, therefore, very close to the sociologist. Indeed he may be said to be a sociologist rather than a historian, to the extent that he makes use of general principles in order to interpret history. If his work is rightly done, it becomes a sort of illustrated sociology, and is of great value to the sociologist in the narrow sense. This type of historian, the sociological historian, we might call him, is becoming increasingly common, and from the sociological standpoint should be welcomed as a valuable auxiliary worker in the field of the social sciences.

The Classification of the Social Sciences.—Using the word science in its broadest sense to include all systematized knowledge, the social sciences would, then, in accordance with what has been said, be classified as follows:

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[1] There is, however, a place for a "philosophy of history" in the sense of a metaphysics of the historical movement. But this is beyond the domain of positive science, and can hardly be regarded as a part of sociology.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Descriptive Social Science	Pure or Theoretical Social Science		Normative Social Science	Applied Social Science
	I. *General*	II. *Special*		
History: General and Special, such as Political History, etc. Ethnography; Demography (including Statistics).	Sociology: Static and Dynamic; Biological and Psychological (Social Psychology).	Economics, Political Science, Jurisprudence, Science of Religion, etc.	Ethics: General and Special, such as Political Ethics, etc.	Education, Philanthropy, Social Economics, Social Politics (Legislation), Home Economics, etc.

The Relation of Sociology to Biology.—It is now necessary to examine the relation of sociology to the other general sciences. The other general sciences, usually recognized as antecedent to sociology, are mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. Upon all of these sociology is more or less dependent, but especially upon biology and psychology, as these sciences deal with the phenomena of life.

We must first consider the relation of sociology to biology. Biology is the general science of life. In its broad sense it is inclusive of all the special biological sciences, such as zoölogy, botany, physiology, anatomy, embryology and the like. In its narrow sense, it is a science fundamental to these, dealing with certain general problems of life, such as cell structure, heredity, variation, natural selection and organic evolution. In both of these senses, it is evident that biology bears a close relation to sociology. The phenomena of association are phenomena of life; the general laws of biology, therefore, must hold in sociology.[1]

[1] For an excellent discussion of the relations of biology and sociology, see Thomson's *Heredity*, Chap. XIV. Especially noteworthy, coming as it does from a biologist, is Professor Thomson's

General biology, in this sense of the science which deals with the laws and factors of organic evolution, must be regarded as one of the immediate foundations of sociology. All of the factors in organic evolution are also at work in social evolution, and show themselves not only in the biological, but also in the psychological phases of the social life. Thus heredity shows itself as native impulse or instinct, variation as individuality and originality, while natural selection shows itself not only in the natural elimination of the least fit, but also as the basis of all forms of social selection. It is not necessary to dwell upon these relations between the two sciences as they will necessarily become evident in our discussion of the problems of sociology.

Of the special biological sciences, some are, of course, much more closely related to sociology than others. Thus physical anthropology, which has been happily defined as "the zoölogy of man," with its problems of man's origin and place in the animal series, has many important bearings upon sociology, especially upon the question of social origins. Also physiology, in the sense of the laws which govern the bodily activity of the individual, especially the physiology of the brain and nervous system, must be understood in order to interpret scientifically mental activity and the mental interactions of individuals.

Biology, however, usually limits itself to a consideration of the physical aspects of life, passing on to psychology, in the scientific division of labor, the consideration of the mental aspects. For this reason some have claimed that biology is not directly related to sociology, but only indirectly through psychology. In other words, they claim

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protest (p. 510) against regarding sociology as "merely a higher department of biology." He says: "The fallacy of regarding sociology as no more than a recondite branch of biology is not merely verbal . . .; it involves a misconception of what human society is, a misconception which is discredited by history and experience."

tion of problems. The aim of social psychology is to give a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. It may be, therefore, best defined as the *psychological aspect of sociology.* A more accurate name for social psychology would be, then, "psychological sociology."[1]

Psychological Sociology and Biological Sociology.—The content of pure sociology, is, then, the biology and the psychology of the associational process (i.e., of the interactions of individuals). Every social problem, every problem of human interactions, is resolvable into psychological and biological elements, and may be approached from either side. Just as sociology has its static and dynamic aspects, so it has its biological and psychological aspects; and just as it has been found that the static and dynamic aspects

[1] The effort of Professor Ross and several other sociologists to make social psychology a distinct, specialized division of psychological sociology (*Social Psychology*, p. 2; Howard, *Social Psychology*, Syllabus, p. 14 f.) seems to the writer to be without any adequate scientific warrant, and to add very greatly to the confusion already existing. (See the writer's review of Ross's *Social Psychology* in *The Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. V, December 15, 1908.) Ross would limit social psychology to the consideration of "the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association"; that is, he practically limits social psychology to the study of the effects of suggestion and imitation in society. According to this text, on the other hand, this is but a small part of social psychology in the sense of a psychological theory of the social life. "Social psychology," in the opinion of the writer, is a term which had better be confined to the psychology of the social phases of individual consciousness and of the social tendencies of individual human nature (the interest being in explaining the individual); while what sociologists have called "social psychology" (a psychological theory of society) had better be styled "psychological sociology," or "psycho-sociology," and recognized as including all the psychological aspects of sociology. The distinction between social psychology and psychological sociology is, of course, of academic importance only. Cf. the discussion by Professors Ross and Mead, *Psychological Bulletin*, December, 1909.

cannot be kept separate in complete sociological theory, so it will be found that in a complete theory of social organization and evolution, the biological and psychological factors must be harmonized. Social biology and social psychology, so-called,[1] are simply different ways of attacking the same problem. They have the same problems, and they constitute one unified science—sociology. This does not, of course, reduce sociology to mere biology and psychology any more than physiology is reduced to mere physics and chemistry by saying that it is essentially a physics and chemistry of organic processes. Every science derives its principles of interpretation from the sciences immediately beneath it. Besides, since every social problem has both biological and psychological aspects, the science of sociology remains a unity, not portions of two sciences.

Biological sociology, however, dealing mainly with the influence of natural selection upon social evolution, with the social effects of heredity, and with the principles of population, may, for our purposes, be regarded as the foundation for the larger part of sociological theory—the psychological part. Though far from a settled condition, and still unsystematized, it is so much better worked out[2] that it may well be taken for granted in developing a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. Accordingly, this book will deal directly only with the psychological aspects of sociology. The point of view, however, will remain in a broad sense biological, since the point of

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[1] The terms bio-sociology and psycho-sociology are rapidly coming into use in European sociological literature.

[2] Reference need be made here only in a general way to the works of Galton, Pearson, Thomson, Geddes, Saleeby, Ellis, Davenport, Woodruff, and many others dealing with the application of the principles of heredity, variation, and selection to human society. My colleague, Professor Maurice Parmelee, also deals with some phases of biological sociology in a work soon to be published on *The Science of Human Behavior.*

view of modern psychology is broadly biological. Our standpoint, in other words, will be that of a collective life-process.[1]

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[1] It is barely possible that some explanation is needed of such phrases, in common use throughout this book, as "life-process," "common life," "collective life," "collective life-process," since sociological criticism of recent years has developed such metaphysical subtlety that words are now not allowed to have their usual, common-sense meanings. I wish to say, therefore, that I am not using these terms or any others in a metaphorical or unusual sense. When one speaks of a group having a "common life," good sense would indicate that he is not using a mere metaphor nor does he mean that the group is a big animal! The common-sense meaning is somewhere between extremes. By "life-process," for example, I mean simply the process of living, or the activities or changes connected with the maintenance and development of life. We may speak of life-processes, therefore, from the standpoint of the individual, of the group, of the race or species, or of life generally. The context will indicate the exact reference. By "a common life" or "a collective life" I mean simply the integration or coördination of the life-processes of the individual members of a group, such that the life activities become interdependent in functioning. By "a collective life-process" I mean the activities or changes connected with the maintenance and development of the life of a group.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY[1]

Sociology and Philosophy.—Sociology was the last, historically, of the great sciences to be differentiated from philosophy. For a long time prior to the definite organization of sociology as a science, there existed a body of speculative thought about human society which was known as social philosophy. This older social philosophy is related to sociology much as the older natural philosophy is related to modern physics and chemistry. It had the same problems as sociology—the origin, nature, and processes of development of human society. It differed from scientific sociology mainly in its methods, which were almost wholly speculative, or *a priori*. Of course, sociology in its more general aspects still remains a philosophy of society.[2]

Philosophy is no longer to be sharply separated from science. On the contrary, all modern philosophy is scientific in its spirit and methods, in that it has its beginnings in the established results of the special sciences, and in that it bases speculation upon the empirical study of reality. In a generic sense, philosophy is a term often used to designate the more general and speculative aspects of all the sciences.[3] It is entirely right, therefore, to speak of sociology as both a science and a philosophy.

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[1] The substance of this chapter, as of the three preceding, was first published in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1907. In the present revision the alterations are only verbal.

[2] Cf. Stein, *Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie*, pp. 6, 7.

[3] All modern science contains a large element of hypothesis. If "science," in the strict sense, be limited to what is demon-

In the stricter sense, however, the word philosophy has now two generally accepted meanings. First, it is used as a general term for all the so-called philosophical disciplines, such as psychology, logic, ethics, æsthetics and metaphysics. Secondly, it is used in a narrower sense as synonymous with metaphysics, including in that term epistemology as well as cosmology and ontology. We have already discussed the relations of sociology to ethics and psychology. It remains only to consider the relation of sociology to philosophy in the narrow sense, that is, to metaphysics. Before doing this, however, let us note that sociology as a general science has much in common with the so-called philosophical disciplines. Like them, it deals mainly with mental phenomena. Like them, also, it employs the method of generalization—of logical inference from facts—to a greater degree, perhaps, than the sciences of physical nature. Two general conclusions may be drawn from what has been said. The first is that sociology itself may be regarded as a philosophical discipline, quite as much as psychology; but this is not inconsistent with maintaining at the same time that it is a natural science. The second is that the study of other philosophical disciplines, and especially training in philosophical methods of reasoning, will be found of great help to the student of sociology.

Sociology and Natural Science.—Sociology is a natural science in the sense that it studies definite processes in real space and time. Like physics and biology, sociology does not question the reality of its subject-matter.[1] It may be

strated, then the hypothetical element in any science would be its philosophical part. In the general sciences, this hypothetical or philosophical element is very large. In the sociology of the present, both because of the complexity of the science and of its undeveloped condition, it is necessarily larger even than in the other general sciences.

[1] Cf. James's argument to show that psychology is a natural science (*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 183).

that there is no such thing as the interaction of individuals, as one mind acting upon another mind; but this is a postulate which sociology refuses to question. Its attitude toward its subject-matter—the social process—is the naïve, uncritical attitude which all the natural sciences assume toward their subject-matter. It starts with the common-sense view of the world, assuming the existence of real individuals, who are both physical and psychical beings, and who are in mental interaction with one another.

Again, like all natural sciences, sociology aims only at answering the question, "how?" "in what way?" It traces the coexistences and sequences among social phenomena, showing the method, or technic, of the processes involved. Beyond this it does not go. It does not attempt to give the what or the why of the social life. The what, or objective content, belongs to the descriptive sciences, history and demography. The why, or the subjective meaning of the social life, belongs to philosophy and religion. Though sociology may throw light upon such problems, as a natural science it makes no attempt to penetrate into the ultimate nature and meaning of things.

The term "natural science" is, we must note, however, sometimes used as synonymous with physical science. In this sense, of course, sociology is not a natural science. Despite the fact that it has certain biological aspects, it is properly placed among the psychical sciences. It is, then, a natural science only in the same sense in which psychology is a natural science.

The Relation of Sociology to Metaphysics.—The natural science point of view saves the sociologist from settling beforehand many troublesome metaphysical problems. It excludes metaphysical problems from sociology, though it does not, of course, exclude metaphysical implications; for these are found in all sciences and in every view of the world. Metaphysics, as Professor James said, means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and con-

sistently about the universal reality.[1] It deals with the ultimate problems of reality and of knowledge. It takes the established results of the special sciences, criticises and harmonizes them, so as to present an ultimate view of reality. In this modern sense, metaphysics is not non-scientific in character; it is rather a science of the sciences, a clearing-house of the sciences. It is as presumptuous, however, and unscientific for the sociologist as such to attempt to settle metaphysical problems as it would be for a physicist to deal with sociological problems; and it is a reversal of scientific method to attempt to build up a system of sociology upon some shadowy hypothesis concerning the ultimate nature of reality.[2]

While sociology must keep to the natural-science point of view, it is better to recognize frankly, however, the metaphysical elements in many of its problems. These words are necessary; for many sociologists have kicked metaphysics out of the front door, but have ended by lugging it in again through some back door. They have rejected as unscientific the idealistic view of the world, but have accepted as scientific the materialistic view. Now, materialism is just as much a metaphysical theory as idealism, and the sociologist as such has no more right to assume the one theory than the other at the outset of his investigations. He is not called upon to assume anything as to the ultimate nature of reality; but like all scientific investigators, he should start with the naïve view of the world. It is true that this naïve view has a great deal

[1] *Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 461; also *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 145.

[2] It must not be inferred that the writer is hostile to metaphysics. On the contrary, he believes that it is an inevitable intellectual task. But he would keep sociology from unnecessary meddling with metaphysical problems by proceeding, like all natural sciences, upon the basis of the naïve view of the world. Science, as Comte emphasized, is simply "a prolongation of common sense," or as Huxley said, "organized common sense."

of metaphysics implied in it; but it does not pretend to be a definite theory of the nature of reality, and is, therefore, merely provisional, subject to correction and revision in the court of last resort—metaphysics itself. Thus the sociologist has no right to assume that mind can be derived from matter and motion, nor that matter and motion can be derived from mind; but he must accept as a fact the existence of physical and psychical phenomena alongside of each other with no discoverable way of deriving either one from the other.[1] Again the sociologist must not assume that all is necessity in the universe; but he must accept the existence of that relative freedom of individual action which consciousness seems, at least, directly to testify to, until investigation proves the contrary.

The sociologist is, perhaps, more excusable for getting entangled in metaphysical problems than any other scientist; for he deals with both the bodies and the minds of men, with physical necessity and free choice; in a word, with human beings in all their complexity and with their interactions. Certain metaphysical problems inevitably obtrude themselves in his investigations. The more important of these are (1) the relations of mind and matter; (2) the freedom of the individual will; (3) the existence of immutable laws in social phenomena. In each of these problems it is so important that the sociologist should preserve a neutral attitude that we shall consider briefly some of the conditions of each problem.

1. *The Relations of Mind and Matter.*—The naïve view of the world sees in mind and matter two interacting ele-

[1] Nothing has so hampered the development of sociology, and often made it ridiculous from the standpoint of common sense, as metaphysical "monism," parading as science. The assumption of two distinct orders of phenomena, physical and psychical, is simply a methodological necessity for the sociologist in the present state of knowledge. Such an assumption, based upon common sense, of course in no way implies an ultimate or metaphysical "dualism" between mind and matter. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 81.

ments, each relatively independent of the other, but each a factor in a complex, unified whole. According to this view, mind may act upon and modify matter; while physical facts act upon and condition mental facts. As opposed to this view, materialism asserts that physical facts (matter and motion) are, in the last analysis, alone determinative of all processes; that mind is a derivative of these; and that we are, from an *a-posteriori* view, automatons. Again, idealism asserts that the physical universe is a mental construct, and has no existence independent of some perceiving subject. Without going farther into metaphysical theories of the relations of mind and matter, it is evident that for the sociologist to assume either of the above theories in his investigation and reasoning is for him to shut his eyes to half of his facts. The sociologist has nothing to gain, and much to lose, through his assuming either that the mind cannot modify and control physical forces, or that physical forces do not modify and condition mind.[1] Through assuming either hypothesis, he surrenders the uncritical point of view of natural science and becomes a metaphysician. And he reverses the true method of all science when he attempts to build a science upon a metaphysical theory. It is preposterous, therefore, for a man to offer to the world a view of human society embedded in his metaphysical philosophy as scientific sociology. It may be a valuable contribution to sociological thought, but it is not scientific sociology, because it has abandoned the method of science.

2. *The Freedom of the Individual Will.*—Has the individual a limited freedom in his deliberate actions (that is, in any one of several courses of action open to him), or is this freedom an illusion? This is a metaphysical problem which

[1] This is equally true of psychology. A functional psychology can, indeed, be based only upon the common-sense view that consciousness does modify and control to a greater or less degree psycho-physical activity. Cf. Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, pp. 281-82.

has puzzled the wisest minds. The general impression is that science pronounces in favor of the latter view—that freedom is an illusion, that we are really automatons—but this is an erroneous impression. Necessitarianism, or determinism, as it is usually called, is purely a metaphysical theory.[1] It is the view that everything in the world is mechanically predetermined by forces acting from behind (by a *vis a tergo*). Freedomism, on the other hand, is the doctrine that human actions may be determined teleologically, that is, by purposes or foresight of ends. It is almost unnecessary to point out that necessitarianism is based upon a mechanical view of the world, and that historically this theory has been prevalent in proportion as the mechanical view of the world, which is more or less based upon the physical sciences, has been dominant. Determination of activities by purpose or foresight of ends has been called teleological[2] or inner necessity; but this is exactly what is meant by freedom; and it is hard to see how this is identical with physical or mechanical necessity.[3] The fact is that

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[1] The principle that science is "organized common sense" would suggest that the correct methodological procedure for the sociologist would be not to assume mechanical necessity in social phenomena until in each particular case it was demonstrated.

[2] Cf. Stein, *Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie*, p. 15f.

[3] The real contrast, as has often been pointed out, should be made, not between necessitarianism and freedomism, but between physical and psychical (or teleological) determinism. Cf. Stein, *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 40–50. The existence of psychological "laws," it may be pointed out, in no way prevents freedom in the sense of conscious self-determination. The whole issue (and the only conceivable issue which anyone would care to debate from the standpoint of modern science!) is whether the conscious individual is an automaton or not (i.e., is determined entirely by extra-personal and extra-psychical forces). See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. V.

Of the many reconciliations of "freedom" and "necessity" which philosophers have proposed, it is not necessary here to speak, except to say that most of them involve logical inconsistencies.

mechanical necessity is the only necessity known to science; and this conception has been built up exclusively within the physical sciences, and purely for practical reasons. To carry over such a conception from the physical sciences and apply it dogmatically to all phases of human life is, therefore, an unwarrantable piece of metaphysical assumption.

It is not necessary, then, for the sociologist to take sides on this metaphysical question; and it is especially not necessary for him to view human society as a theater of physical necessity. It is the business of the sociologist to trace uniformities in social phenomena without reference to any metaphysical theory of human action, explaining them as determined, now by forces acting from behind, and now (when it is more reasonable to do so) by intelligible motives and foresight of ends.

3. *The Existence of Laws in Social Phenomena.*—Are there "eternal iron laws"[1] in social phenomena as in the physical world? This question would be at once answered in the negative if we assumed that the human individual has a relative freedom; or if strict metaphysical neutrality be maintained, no position regarding it need be taken. The question is, however, methodologically even more important than the other two which we have just discussed. It is said that if there are no laws in social phenomena, there can be no social science; that science is a causal explanation of phenomena through reference to laws; that a sociology without laws is not a science.

That there is some truth in these assertions we have already practically admitted by frequently using the word "laws" in discussing the problems of sociology. The real

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For example, Comte, while proclaiming that social phenomena are subject to "invariable natural laws," held at the same time that they are modifiable by deliberate action. This would be inconsistent unless the individual were conceded some measure of free variation and of self-determination through foresight of ends.

[1] The expression is Gumplowicz's.

methodological problem is, however, In what sense shall the word "law" be used in the social sciences? Shall it be used to imply the metaphysical theory of necessitarianism, that is, that the concept of mechanical necessity can be made to cover all phases of human life? Or, shall "law" be used in a broader sense, without implying any support to any metaphysical theory?

In deciding in what sense the word "law" shall be used in sociology, it is first necessary to call the attention of the student to nearly synonymous words. The words "truth," "truism," "rule," "generalization," "uniformity," "regularity," and "principle," are all often loosely used as more or less nearly synonymous with the word "law." But it is important that they be discriminated from one another, for the word "law" has become peculiarly specialized. Without stopping to define all of the above terms, it must be said at once that most, if not all, of the so-called laws in the social sciences belong to one of the above categories—that is, they are generalizations, uniformities or principles, rather than laws in the sense in which the physical sciences would use that word.[1] Thus Comte's famous Law of the Three States is only a generalization; while the so-called law of least effort (that the greatest gain is always sought for the least effort) is really a psychological principle. Now exactness in the use of terms is desirable in science; hence it is important that we inquire the exact meaning which the word "law" has acquired in the older sciences—the physical sciences. At first in the physical sciences law meant the manifestation of an outer force, controlling the action of things. But as the passive view of nature came to be given up, it came to mean

[1] Cf. the statement of Worms (*Les Principes biologiques de l'Evolution sociale*, p. 19): "We dare not quite speak of laws [in sociology], for this last term implies a precision quasi-mathematical to which up to the present the social domain seems to be repugnant. But at least we can speak of principles."

merely the uniform way in which things occur. Later, under the influence of the growth of the mechanical view of nature, law came to mean a fixed, unchanging, and so necessary relation between forces. The concept of a law of nature thus became deeply tinged with the idea of physical necessity.[1] Indeed, in the physical sciences, it became practically synonymous with physical necessity. Hence the expression "eternal iron laws," embodying the idea that nature is a theater of mechanical necessities.

Now it is the carrying over of this idea which has grown up in the physical sciences to the social sciences which we have called metaphysical. This can only be done by assuming that the subject-matter of the social sciences is homogeneous with the subject-matter of the physical sciences, as Comte assumed;[2] but this, at present, is an entirely gratuitous metaphysical assumption.

In order to prove that "eternal iron laws" exist in social phenomena as in physical phenomena we should have to prove (1) that physical necessity rules in human affairs;

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1 Professor Karl Pearson (*Grammar of Science*, Chap. III) denies that the conception of a "law of nature" contains any implication of necessity. He defines a scientific law (p. 77) as "a brief statement or *formula*, which in a few words resumes a wide range of facts." In other words, he defines it as a mere generalization. If such were the general usage among scientific men, there would of course be no objection to extending the conception of natural law to the social sciences without explanation. But physical scientists generally recognize as "laws" only *quantitative* statements (mathematical formulæ) of relations between variable forces. Hence "laws" in physical science are conceived of as fixed, invariable, and hence *practically necessary*, relations between forces. Moreover, Professor Pearson speaks in the name of "a sound idealism," and unlike many scientific men denies that mechanism is at the bottom of phenomena (see Preface, second edition). He has therefore left the naïve or common-sense point of view, and his whole discussion may be regarded as metaphysical in the sense that it criticises the presuppositions of knowledge.

2 See *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. II.

(2) that stimulus and response are equal to mechanical cause and effect. As regards the first proposition, we have already said that it is a mere gratuitous assumption, and is not capable of proof. As regards the second proposition, it must be said that psychology teaches that stimulus and response are something quite different from mechanical cause and effect,[1] though the popular mind and even sociologists sometimes assume the contrary. And as psychology is fundamental to sociology, its verdict must be accepted as final by the sociologist.

In the language of physical science, a "cause" has come to mean the invariable, necessary, and equivalent antecedent of a consequent which we call "the effect." Now, the "stimulus" in psychology is not the equivalent of the "cause," but rather the opportunity for the discharge of energy; and the "response" is not the mechanical effect of the stimulus, but is always teleological, that is, directed to some end. Hence, it is incorrect, from the standpoint of physical science, to speak of a stimulus as the *cause* of a response, or of a bodily state as the cause of a mental state.[2]

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[1] Cf. Titchener, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 343; *Text-book of Psychology*, pp. 39–41.

[2] There is no objection, of course, to speaking of the stimulus as the cause of the response, or of a mental state as the cause of conduct, or *vice versa*, provided the word "cause" is freed from its physical science connotations. For, as every psychologist acknowledges, there is no invariableness of sequence between stimulus and response and no equivalence between the two. We are not denying, therefore, that causation, in a wider sense than the mechanical, operates in social phenomena; that social phenomena, like mental phenomena, grow, *develop*, out of antecedent mental and social phenomena according to fixed principles which are fully as intelligible as mechanical laws. This is the *sine qua non* of all social science. What we are insisting upon is that there are two sorts of causation, physical causation and psychical causation, just as there are two sorts of phenomena; and that from the standpoint of a science which is *nonmetaphysical*, both sorts of causation and their peculiarities must be recognized. Interpreting causation in this broad

Now the connections between individuals in society are almost entirely those of mental interaction, of stimulus and response. Men influence each other, act upon each other, though acting as stimuli to each other. *Hence the word "cause" must be used in the social sciences in a sense different from its use in physical science;* for, from the standpoint of physical science, there are no causal connections between the minds of individuals.

The interaction between individuals which constitutes society, then, is upon the plane of stimulus and response rather than upon the plane of mechanical cause and effect. This is one of the first truths which the beginner in sociology needs to learn. The social process cannot be interpreted in terms of "natural" causation, if by "natural" is meant physical or mechanical causation. Physical causation operates between individuals in the main indirectly, through their relation to a common physical environment, and only directly in the case of heredity. This does not bar sociology from becoming a science. Psychology also as a science makes practically no use of the categories of cause and effect as they are used in the physical sciences.[1] Just as psychology has been obliged for the most part to interpret the mental processes of the individual in terms of stimulus and response, so sociology will for a long time to come have to content itself with an interpretation of social processes in terms of stimulus and response.[2] Now, what we

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sense as any process of development, one can agree with Professor Yerkes when he argues for a purely psychical causation between mental processes (*Introduction to Psychology*, pp. 313–323) or with James when he argues (*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 137) that ideas and feelings have causal efficacy.

[1] Cf. the writer's article on "Sociology and Social Progress" in *The Sociological Review*, October, 1910.

[2] Of course, there is no objection to using the words "cause" and "effect" in the social sciences in the broad sense of stimulus and response, provided that this is recognized. Under such circumstances, we could speak of the "cause" of a social occurrence,

have said answers the question whether there are laws in sociology in the same sense in which there are laws in the physical sciences. The laws of physical science are laws of cause and effect in the mechanical sense. No such laws are possible in social phenomena.

But are there no laws at all in sociology? There is no objection to using the word "law" in the social sciences, provided we do not carry with it all the implications which it has come to have in the physical sciences. By a "law" in the social sciences we can only mean a relatively regular or uniform way in which things occur.[1] In other words, we go back to the older and more general meaning of the word "law," meaning by it simply a uniformity or regularity among phenomena. Even though we grant that hu-

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meaning its psychical motivation, not its mechanical cause. Several sociologists have recognized that the word "cause" cannot be used in the social sciences in the same sense in which it is used in the physical sciences. Thus Ross says (*Foundations of Sociology*, p. 55), "the causes, i.e., the motivation of (social) occurrences"; and again (p. 80), "*the ultimate cause of a social manifestation must be motive or something that can affect motive.*" That is, the ultimate "cause" of a social phenomenon is something psychical—something that influences will. But as we have already pointed out, this is not cause and effect in the physical science sense. These terms, if used, therefore, in sociology, like the term "law," will have to be used in a wider sense than that given them in the physical sciences. For the sake of clearness it would often be better to use the terms stimulus and response.

Professor Giddings also ("Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, p. 144; also *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 129, 148) recognizes stimuli as causes of social phenomena. But in his earlier work, *The Principles of Sociology*, he speaks of sociology as "an interpretation of human society in terms of natural causation" (p. 7) and argues that an objective or mechanical interpretation in terms of the redistribution of matter and energy is equally valid with a subjective interpretation.

[1] This is by some writers called a "relative" or "empirical" law.

man freedom is not an illusion, and that the mental processes of individuals and the processes of society do not illustrate cause and effect in the sense in which those terms are used in physical science, still it does not follow that human nature is haphazard and that society is without regularities. On the contrary, human nature is remarkably uniform, and the interactions of individuals exhibit surprising regularities. But the uniformities of human nature and society are due to instincts and habits, that is, teleological adaptations rather than mechanical necessities.[1] The habits of action of individuals—using that phrase in its broadest sense, to cover the inborn tendencies and characteristics of human nature as well as acquired habits [2]—give rise, then, to regularities in social phenomena (the interactions of individuals) almost as invariable as those which characterize physical nature. This is what makes the social sciences possible. Law in the social sciences, then, rests upon the fact of habit. We arrive, therefore, at this definition of a social or sociological law: *A social law is a statement of the habitual way in which individuals, or groups of individuals, interact.*

But it may be said that these habitual ways of interacting among individuals are not invariable, and that therefore there can be no sciences of social phenomena. It may

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[1] Instincts are, of course, teleological only indirectly (see Chapter IX). They are adaptations, brought about, not by intelligence, but by selection. But they function toward maintaining the life of the species, and so are objectively teleological, that is, *directed to an end.* The teleological element in life and mind, it may be added, (which mechanistic theorists would totally exclude from science) is apparently rooted in the very character of the life-process. Modern psychologists, at any rate, almost universally admit that mind, or consciousness, is selective, that is, teleological, from the start. See Chapter VI.

[2] The use of "habit" in this broad sense as a convenient term to cover all the uniformities of action or behavior is sanctioned by the best psychologists, such as James, Angell, and others.

be granted that the social sciences can never become exact sciences like the physical sciences, but it does not follow from this that they are not trustworthy bodies of scientific knowledge, capable of affording guidance in all the practical affairs of life. A slight degree of inexactness does not invalidate scientific knowledge because science deals with large masses of facts and general situations. Thus if certain exceptions are found to some social law, it does not invalidate that law for the purposes of the sociologist, because ninety-nine times out of a hundred he can count on its working.

Again, it is not true that science consists chiefly of laws, unless that word is used in a very broad sense. A science consists equally, at least, of principles. Principles are generalizations, which usually explain the ways of working of certain forces or agencies;[1] while laws are more superficial formulations of the observed uniformities of the resulting phenomena. In physical science, principles explain by referring phenomena to mechanical cause and effect, action and reaction. But in the social sciences, the agent, man, acts teleologically; hence social phenomena must be explained in teleological terms. Thus it is quite as scientific to explain human actions in terms of habit, adaptation, purpose, stimulus, and response as it is to explain physical phenomena in terms of mechanical cause and effect. This is only saying, in effect, that sociology is a psychological science; but it is not, of course, saying that sociology is a metaphysical science.

To sum up: It is not the business of the sociologist to settle metaphysical problems, nor has he any right to as-

[1] Yerkes (*Introduction to Psychology*, p. 248), following Poincaré, defines a principle as "a generalization which must prove true if our definition of our object is to remain correct." In other words, a principle involves a *logical* relation between phenomena rather than a mechanical. Hence principles are more fundamental truths than laws, that is, are less relative.

sume, at the present time, that they are settled. It is rather his business upon the basis of a common-sense view of the world, to trace uniformities among social phenomena so far as he can, and to explain social processes, now in terms of physical causation, where such can be traced, and now in terms of mental activity, when the process is evidently one of stimulus and response. Only thus can sociology escape from the barren wastes of fruitless, metaphysical discussion; and only thus can it make its own proper contribution to that ultimate world-view to which general philosophy seeks to attain.

CHAPTER V

SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY

It is impossible to treat adequately within the limits of a single chapter the subject of scientific methods in sociology. Nevertheless, a few words about methods seem important in order that the point of view of this text may be thoroughly understood.

For the beginner in sociology, perhaps the most useful things that can be said about methods of thinking and investigating are mainly negative. First of all, it is necessary that metaphysical assumptions and personal bias be eliminated if the problems of the social life are to be studied from the scientific point of view at all. The necessity of avoiding metaphysical assumptions so far as possible has already been discussed. The peculiar thing is that some sociologists do not seem to understand that such assumptions as monism and materialism are just as metaphysical as assumptions of dualism [1] or idealism. As we have already insisted, the assumption of monism is as methodologically illegitimate from the standpoint of pure science as any other metaphysical assumption. The standpoint in approaching all purely sociological problems must be that of the naïve consciousness, which is the standpoint of all the natural sciences. As we have already shown, even such an assumption as that of the absolute universality of me-

[1] The recognition of a phenomenal duality, as has just been pointed out in the preceding chapter, is not to be confused with metaphysical dualism. Such recognition is as necessary for positive science as for common sense.

chanical cause and effect, or of physical necessity in the social life, is a metaphysical assumption, and therefore unwarranted in sociology. Such an assumption is warranted in the physical sciences because it is in accord with the common-sense view of the world and will work. For the same reason it is not warranted in the social sciences, because it is not in accordance with a naïve view and because it has not been found to work in their investigations.

As regards the effect of personal bias in the scientific study of social problems, Herbert Spencer performed an invaluable service for sociology when he showed the baneful effect of various class, party, sectarian, and personal biases upon the work of the sociological investigator.[1] It is difficult for us all to see social facts as they are, and the prejudices which each one of us has received from his environment prevent us from forming true judgments about social conditions and movements. These prejudices constitute what may be called, to borrow a phrase from the physical sciences, the "personal equation" of the sociologist.[2] This must be carefully allowed for in all social investigations and so far as possible eliminated. Of course, no one can free himself entirely from these influences which warp judgment and betray even the best thinkers into serious errors, but much more might be done through a careful study of scientific methods and through taking thought than is at present accomplished. It is only in so far as the mind raises itself above the personal and the local into true universality that such a science as sociology is even possible.

A peculiar sort of personal bias is frequently gotten from the study of the special social sciences, and this must be carefully guarded against. As we have already seen, these special social sciences are peculiarly apt to give the

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[1] See his *Study of Sociology*, Chaps. IV-XII.

[2] Cf. Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

student one-sided views of the social reality, and in certain types of mind such one-sided views become readily mistaken for the whole truth. Sociologists themselves, however, have frequently gotten the same one-sidedness from following up with too great faith some single clew or theory regarding the social life. Now it is evident that all such one-sidedness or partialness of view is the bane of the sociologist, whether it comes from personal bias, from long study of some one phase of the social life, or from too great faith in some single social perception. The sociologist, and particularly the beginner in sociology, must have no pet theories in his thinking and investigating; rather he must keep in his mind several working hypotheses, testing each by his facts and striving to see all sides of the truth.[1]

Inductive Methods.—It is only after the sociologist has cleared away all these hindrances to the scientific study of the social reality that he is ready for the complicated processes of the inductive method. All inductive methods are very complex, and we can do no more in this place than barely note the more important kinds of induction used in sociology.

(1) The primary form of the inductive method is *observation*. Too much emphasis cannot be laid in sociology upon the observation by the student of the daily social life around him. He usually has opportunity in almost any community to observe the principal forms of association, the types of interaction between individuals, and the various social classes. In the study of social organization, social activities, and social changes as they exist about us, a great deal of deduction is, of course, necessarily mixed with the inductive process; nevertheless, such practical observations are rightly regarded as preëminently induc-

[1] See Professor Chamberlain's admirable article on "The Method of the Multiple Working Hypothesis" in the *Journal of Geology*, November, 1897.

tive, and when intelligently and systematically carried out they are of the greatest value to the student, especially in studying the problems of social structure and function.

Experiment is a form of *observation* when the conditions can be controlled by the observer and he can vary, independently, some of the factors of the situation and observe the result. Obviously, the method of experiment which has been so fruitfully used in many of the natural sciences can be but seldom used in the social sciences, although governmental agencies and great endowments for social investigation, like the Sage Foundation, have it within their power to conduct true experiments along sociological lines.

(2) A second form of the inductive method of great value to the sociologist is the *statistical method.* This is where social facts are observed, colligated, tabulated, and compared, usually several persons being employed in this process. This method is more complex than ordinary observation, not only because of the great number of persons involved in observing and colligating facts, but also on account of the many mathematical processes involved in their tabulation and comparison.[1] While there are many opportunities for error, therefore, in this method, still when carefully carried out, it yields the nearest approach to exact measurement of social phenomena which we have in the social sciences. For this reason it has been claimed that the statistical method is the only method competent to produce sciences of social phenomena, since it is only by measuring phenomena that we can secure exact or scientific knowledge. Without endorsing this extreme view, it must be admitted that in the statistical method, the student of

[1] The statistical method is by some writers regarded as a form of the comparative and historical methods. Inasmuch as it involves a combination of several methods, it is best regarded, however, as an independent method. Use is made of it, more or less, in all the natural sciences.

the social sciences finds an indispensable aid in the scientific study of social phenomena, especially of mass movements, and general tendencies. Statistics, as the only means of measuring mass movements and general tendencies, must come into a larger and larger use in the social sciences.[1] General psychological influences and tendencies can often be measured in this way no less than the influences of factors in the physical environment. In so far as it is possible to measure the phenomena of collective life, the statistical method is, then, all important.

(3) When the study of social phenomena is extended to the past by means of documents and other remains, we have the *historical method.* This method has been thought by many students of the social sciences in the past, as well as by historians, to be the most important method of studying social problems. This opinion was indeed held by Comte, who declared the historical method to be the method *par excellence* of the social sciences.[2] There can be no question that the historical method is indispensable in the social sciences, and that it is especially valuable to the sociologist in the study of social evolution.

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[1] Professor Walter F. Willcox has for many years ably advocated the value of statistics as a method for the social sciences. Professor Giddings has also been one of the chief advocates of the statistical method in sociology. He says (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 176): "It has become the chiefly important method of sociology; and assuredly, in the course of time, it will bring our knowledge of society up to standards of thoroughness and precision comparable to the results attained by any natural science."

For doubts as to the value of the statistical method in sociology, however, see Waxweiler, *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, Chap. IV, pp. 103–106.

[2] See *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. VI, Chap. III. Comte was, however, right in claiming that the historical method is in a sense the peculiar method of the social sciences, since only the social sciences deal with historical phenomena in the strict sense.

Still it does not deserve to be considered of greater importance than certain other scientific methods.[1] Its limitations in sociology have already been so fully discussed that it is not necessary to enlarge upon this subject. The great advantage of the historical method is, manifestly, that it allows the survey, in broad outlines at least, of processes widely extended in time. In this way the student may perceive the trend of development and the different factors involved in bringing about social changes. Though the historical method does not permit of exact measurements or exact determinations of any sort, there can be no doubt that the emphasis laid upon it by certain students of the social sciences is in part justified because when rightly used, it serves to correct misconceptions and one-sided views of the social life perhaps better than any other single method.

(4) The *comparative* or *ethnographical* method is the study of different types of society scattered over the globe in more or less contemporary times. It is the study of social phenomena as extended in space rather than in time. It makes use of the descriptions, more or less accurate, by travelers, missionaries and scientific investigators of various peoples in different stages of culture. These types of society, representing different stages of social evolution, throw more or less light upon the problems of social development. Consequently, this method of study of sociological problems has been preferred altogether by certain sociologists, notably Spencer, who used it almost exclusively in his sociological inductions. In many university courses in sociology in the past, indeed, little or nothing was heard of any other method of sci-

[1] The claim formerly made by certain historians that only students of history (and of history alone) are competent to interpret history, or to put forth sound theories of social evolution, betrays, of course, not only too great confidence in the historical method, but also in induction generally.

entific approach to the problems of sociology.[1] The objection to this exclusive use of anthropological and ethnographical material in approaching sociological problems is that it gives those problems an appearance of unreality and of detachment from the practical concerns of life. While this method is indispensable in any exhaustive study of sociological problems, yet it is quite wrong in principle to start the study of sociology with an examination of the social life of peoples remote in culture from our own. There are too many opportunities for fallacy in sociological inductions of this sort, and, as has already been said, the resultant sociology frequently has little apparent connection with real life.

It is evident that the various inductive methods just discussed overlap, and it should be evident that the ideal inductive method lies in a combination of all of these four methods and not in the exclusive use of any one of them. The well-trained sociologist will make practically equal use of all of them.

Deductive Methods.—Beyond the inductive methods of sociology lie its deductive methods. Deduction, as we have seen, really accompanies induction at every step of scientific reasoning. It is impossible to make an induction

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[1] Even recently, it has been claimed that in university courses in sociology the approach to sociological problems should be through cultural anthropology and ethnography. It must be said emphatically that such a claim rests either upon a misapprehension of the nature of sociology or upon one-sidedness in scientific method. If the people of England existed alone on the earth, and if all knowledge of history stretching back farther than a lifetime were swept away, they could still have, biology and psychology remaining, a very respectable sociology. Anthropology and ethnography, like history and statistics, serve to perfect sociology, but they are not indispensable to it, while biology and psychology are. Cultural anthropology and ethnography are even more dependent upon sociology for the proper interpretation of their facts than sociology is dependent upon them. Cf. Waxweiler, *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, pp. 109-115.

from facts without some hypothesis in mind. It is only for the sake of analysis, then, that we separate induction from deduction. While all modern science is inductive in spirit and proceeds from the fact to the hypothesis, rather than from the hypothesis to the fact, yet, certain sciences are more deductive than others. In the general sciences, built up from the results of other sciences, such as sociology is, deduction is even more important than induction. The legitimate use of deduction in sociology is obviously, not deduction from metaphysical assumptions or speculative hypotheses, but rather deduction from the laws and principles of other established sciences which have more or less bearing upon the social life. The deductions of sociology, it is obvious, must be chiefly from the laws and principles of biology and psychology. It is psychology, in particular, which furnishes the principles of social interpretation. Deduction from psychology, or the so-called *psychological method,* is the most fruitful method in sociology at the present time. As Professor Giddings says,[1] "At present all serious work in sociology starts from psychological data, and proceeds by combination of psychological with statistical and historical methods." The method of psychological analysis, it may be added, has practically created modern economics, the most developed of the social sciences. There can be no doubt as to its value in sociology,[2] and it will be the chief method employed in this text.

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1 *Science,* Vol. IX, p. 16.

2 Professor Carver rightly says (*Sociology and Social Progress,* note, p. 64) that psychological analysis of familiar facts deserves to rank as a distinct scientific method in the social scences, and that the economists, led by the Austrian school, have carried this analysis further (though often on the basis of a faulty psychology—see Anderson's *Social Value*) than any other workers in the field of the social sciences. Carver concludes: "So fruitful has been this method in economics that the student of sociology must look for-

A special phase of the psychological method in sociology is known as *sympathetic introspection.*[1] The social observer puts himsef in imagination in the situation of a person or class of persons whom he wishes to understand. By so doing he can get at, with more or less accuracy through inference, the psychological processes of the persons studied, and foresee their probable social conduct. The psychological sociologist makes use of this method constantly in studying the social life from the psychological point of view.[2] He makes large use of this method in particular to understand special social classes, such as children, races, the poor, criminals and the like. It is evident that this method of sympathetic introspection, while it involves a large amount of social observation, is essentially deductive in character, and unless carried out upon the basis of adequate knowledge of psychological laws and principles, it is a method which is peculiarly liable to error. When based, however, upon an adequate knowledge of psychology and fortified by inductive evidence, it is a peculiarly invaluable and fruitful method.

It is never safe, it should be needless to remark, to make the social sciences simply deductions from biological and psychological principles. Biology and psychology are not sufficiently developed as yet to warrant any such procedure. The slower but safer inductive methods of study must be used in sociology, then, to check deductive processes at every step. Deduction may furnish the hypothesis in sociology, as in other sciences, but induction must always furnish the testing of the hypothesis.

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ward with confidence to its application to many of the wider problems of sociology and politics."

[1] Introspection in the strict sense (self-introspection) is not, as is so often assumed, directly available in sociology. In psychology proper, on the other hand, it is the characteristic method, and so furnishes facts and principles which may by deduction be used in sociology.

[2] Cf. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 7.

Certain other deductive methods, largely employed in sociology in the past, call for brief notice. One of these is deduction from the analogy between society and an organism. Another is deduction from the general parallelism between the individual and society. Both forms of deduction make assumptions as to similarities which have not yet been fully established. Nevertheless, both of these methods may be legitimate within certain bounds. In so far as a general likeness in organic and social structure has been established, it is, of course, legitimate to use this fact as a clew to discovery in sociology, but it is hardly safe to carry such deductions from analogy further than that. The same holds true of deductions from the assumed parallelism between the individual and society. There can be no doubt that there is an apparent rough parallelism in function and development between the individual and society which may suggest to the sociologist many valuable hypotheses, which, however, should always be tested by study of objective social facts.

From what has been said it is evident that an adequate method for sociology must be very complex. It must be a combination of practically all the more important inductive and deductive scientific methods. The method of sociology may be best described perhaps as a constructive synthesis;[1] for it takes the deductive elements of the different sciences and the inductive results of observation and history and fuses them into a new and all-sided view of the social life-process. At any rate, no sociology worthy

[1] While the chief method employed in this text is that of psychological analysis, the author feels that the work may with justice be described as an outcome of the method of synthesis, since it represents sociological studies along many lines with the use of many different methods (only a small part of which is indicated in his elementary text, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*). While the method of this book is psychological in form, it is intended to be truly synthetic in spirit. On the method of "psychological synthesis," see Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 66–69.

of the name can be built up through the employment of any single scientific method, and the employment of many methods implies that synthesis must finally be relied upon to bring their results into harmony.

Sociology and Mathematical Methods.—It remains only to say a word about the relation of sociology to the regulative or methodological disciplines, mathematics and logic. The physical sciences acknowledge no investigation or demonstration as final unless it is mathematical. On this account some have claimed that if the social sciences are to become true sciences they must also reduce their phenomena to mathematical formulæ. Without stopping to criticise the view that science consists of quantitative measurements, it must be evident to all who have sufficiently considered the matter that only a small portion of social phenomena will submit to mathematical treatment,[1] for mathematical treatment always presupposes measurements of some sort. Now, social phenomena are largely subjective and qualitative and many of the most intimate things concerning man's social life cannot be measured. The physical sciences, on the other hand, have as their subject matter external and quantitative phenomena; hence they submit to mathematics, the science of quantities and measurements, as their regulative discipline.

What, then, shall be the regulative discipline of the social sciences? Manifestly, it must be logic, which, as the science of right reasoning, is fundamentally the regulative

[1] Of course, social measurements are greatly to be desired wherever they are possible. Too great faith in the application of mathematical methods in sociology, however, is unwarranted, not only by the condition of present knowledge, but also by the nature of social facts themselves. The writer, of course, is unwilling to accept the claims of certain mathematicians who would conceive their subject so broadly as to make it practically synonymous with logic itself ("the science which draws necessary conclusions"—Benjamin Peirce). On the contrary, mathematical treatment of any subject is only possible where measurement is possible.

discipline of all the sciences, including mathematics itself. Logic has a peculiarly close bearing upon the psychical sciences, including sociology, inasmuch they must look to logic, rather than mathematics, for the validation of their reasoning, since their phenomena, for the most part, will not submit to measurement. In order to perfect an adequate scientific method, therefore, the sociologist must have recourse to the principles of logic at every step.

CHAPTER VI

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY[1]

WE have already called attention to the fact that psychology is the immediate basis of sociology; and that no one can be a sociologist unless he is, in some measure, a psychologist, since the interconnections between individuals are largely interconnections between their mental processes through interstimulation and response. Social processes may, indeed, be regarded as combinations of the mental processes of individuals; or, to put the matter in simpler language, the interrelationships of individuals are expressions of the influence which the thought, feeling, and will of one individual has upon the thought, feeling, and will of another individual. At any rate, we maintain that the essential element in the social process is the psychical element.

From all this, it follows that the development of sociology must depend upon the development of psychology. But, as a matter of fact, the development of psychology has not always afforded clearer insight into social questions. Much of the psychology which the student learns in text-books and in the laboratory seems so abstract and

[1] For the point of view in this and in the two succeeding chapters the writer is indebted to two of his former teachers, Professor John Dewey, now of Columbia University, and Professor G. H. Mead, of the University of Chicago. This chapter, like the five preceding, was written in 1907 in practically its present form. Since then a number of psychological works embodying the same point of view have been published.

remote from real life that it has but little evident bearing upon human conduct. This is because hitherto psychologists have been more concerned with analyzing the structure of human consciousness than with developing a psychology of human action. The latest developments in psychology are, however, developments toward such a psychology of human activities or behavior; and it cannot be doubted that when such a psychology has been fully developed, that it will supply the missing key for the interpretation of social phenomena.[1]

Knowledge of the psychology of the human individual in action being indispensable to the student of sociology, it seems almost necessary to begin a text in psychological sociology with some account of individual human nature. Just as psychologists have found it convenient and even necessary to preface their discussions of mental processes with a brief description of the structure and functioning of the brain and the nervous system, so sociologists will find it convenient to preface their discussions of social processes with some account of the psychical characteristics

[1] Says Professor Max Meyer: "Mind is a subject fit to be studied only because it is, and to the extent to which it is, significant for social intercourse. Because of this relation psychology is the foundation upon which sociology and all the special social sciences rest. But social intercourse is not a mystical transference of thought, a transference of the kind which exists only in the dreams of the spiritualistic deceivers and deceived. Social intercourse is conduct, behavior, or whatever name can be used as meaning action of organisms upon other organisms. But not all such actions are of the conscious type. What a folly when 'psychologists' for thousands of years took it for granted that they could afford to ignore all activity except that of which the actor was supposed to be conscious. The larger part of the activity of a human being is unconscious, but no less important on that account. If psychology is to be of any service to mankind, it must be, not an analysis of consciousness primarily, but a study of the biological laws governing human activity, human behavior."—*University Missourian*, April 16, 1911.

of the human individual. Moreover, it is desirable that the psychology which each sociologist makes use of in interpreting the social life should be made as explicit as practicable, so that there can be no misunderstanding on the part of the reader. We shall accordingly devote this chapter to a brief statement of some of the results of modern functional psychology.

Structural and Functional Psychology.—Let us first, however, stop to distinguish more clearly the two great divisions of psychology from each other. Structural or descriptive psychology is concerned with the analysis of the mental content of the individual mind—that is, with the analysis of states of consciousness into their constituent elements.[1] While an important part of general psychology, it is of little value to the sociologist, as he deals wholly with the person in action. We shall accordingly devote no special attention to this phase of psychology. Functional or dynamic psychology, on the other hand, is the science of the mind in action.[2] It deals with individual human conduct or behavior in the widest sense, explaining its genesis and function in the life-process. Thus it furnishes the principles for interpreting the interactions of individuals and the evolution of social organization. We shall now attempt to give a brief outline of these principles of functional psychology, though for any detailed and comprehensive account of them the student must turn to some work on psychology.[3]

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[1] It must always be borne in mind that these should be considered merely two aspects of one science—psychology—not distinct sciences. Other divisions of psychology, such as genetic, physiological, etc., are of course not inconsistent with the above division. See Angell's article on "The Province of Functional Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIV.

[2] Cf. Thorndike, *Elements of Psychology*, p. 184.

[3] Perhaps the best brief statement of the principles of functional psychology for the student of sociology is Thorndike's *Elements of Psychology*, Part III. Angell's *Psychology* is also excellent, while

Consciousness and Bodily Movement.[1]—Consciousness seems to be intimately connected with the katabolic nature of the animal organism—that is, with the tendency to expend energy rather than to store up energy. Thus the plants, in which the anabolic tendency predominates, show no evidence of consciousness. Indeed, it can be accepted as a general truth that the more complex and varied the bodily movements are in a species, the higher its intelligence. This is practically the same as saying that the more rapid the metabolism, that is, the more rapidly the process of bodily change goes on, the greater will be the degree of mentality.

Whatever may be the exact relation of consciousness to katabolic tendencies, it is certain that mind is fundamentally connected with the activities of the organism.[2] The dictum of James that "all consciousness is motor"[3] is accepted as one of the corner stones of modern psychology, not only in the sense that all conscious states tend to express themselves in bodily movements, but also in the sense that all conscious states are the outcome of bodily movements.[4] One writer has even gone so far as to declare that "the muscles in their active state are as much organs of thought as the brain itself." At any rate, bodily activity is the basis of the mental life. The act, or rather, the *coördination* of the organism (muscle fibers and nerve cells) in some activity is the real fundamental fact with which the psychologist has to deal.[5]

Miller's *Psychology of Thinking* presents (Chaps. I-VI) the functional point of view with admirable clearness, though largely from the pedagogical standpoint.

[1] Cf. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, Chap. VI; James, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, pp. 117–18, 370–72.

[2] Cf. James, *Briefer Course*, p. 5; Angell, *Psychology*, p. 283.

[3] *Briefer Course*, p. 370.

[4] Cf. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 48–52, 55–58.

[5] See Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, July, 1896. Some recent functional psy-

But not all bodily activities, or even acts, are accompanied by consciousness. Consciousness seems to appear at only those points where the purely physiological mechanism of the body is incapable of meeting the demands of the environment.[1] In other words, consciousness appears at those points where changes, new adjustments, in relatively complex activities occur. Consciousness is connected, then, with the process in living creatures which we know as adaptation, or adjustment to the environment, especially when the process of adaptation is rapid and complex.[2] Indeed, the function of consciousness in the life-process seems to be the mediation of adaptive processes which are too complex to be brought about by purely physiological means. In other words, as Professor Angell says, "Mind seems to be the master device by means of which the adaptive operations of organic life may be made most perfect."[3]

Mind, then, according to the view of modern psychology, is not something apart from the life-process, but is a functioning element in that process. It is subject to the laws of life, to the laws of its evolution, like all other elements in life. The things that act as stimuli to it, its valuations of stimuli, and its methods of response, are all in the long run as much determined by natural selection as the form and color of a leaf or a flower.[4] Thus our

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chologists would make "behavior" the fundamental fact with which the psychologist has to deal; but as the unit of behavior is the act, there is practically no difference in the point of view.

[1] Cf. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 50.

[2] Cf. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 18, 40–45.

[3] *Psychology*, p. 7.

[4] Cf. the statement of Balfour: "Eyes and ears, and all the mechanism of perception have been evolved in us and in our brute progenitors by the slow operation of Natural Selection." President's Address, *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1904, p. 12.

The selection hypothesis lies at the basis of a functional view of mind, and so is one of the assumptions of this text. The impression,

sensations, our percepts, our feelings, our likes and dislikes, our emotions, and even our reason itself, are all relevant to the life-process,[1] and, barring the individual variations, are outcomes of natural selection. If we start at the sound of a loud noise, if we fear the dark, if we are attracted by the smell of the rose, if we find the taste of certain fruits delicious, if we like people who are like ourselves, it is because these or similar methods of reaction have proved of advantage to the race in the past—barring again, of course, the possibility that they are individual variations or reactions acquired in the lifetime of individuals. The thought of evolution thus dominates modern functional psychology. But it must be borne in mind, of course, that natural selection is merely the elimination of the least favorable variations,[2] and is thus a framework, so to speak, marking the limits of variation which nature

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current among some, that the mutation theory of de Vries and Mendelism have negatived the whole theory of evolution by selection (Darwinism) is, of course, a gross mistake. Says Professor Bateson (*Mendel's Principles of Heredity*, p. 289): "There is nothing in Mendelian discovery which runs counter to the cardinal doctrine that species have arisen by means of Natural Selection." For a defense of the selection hypothesis, see Thomson and Geddes, *Evolution*, Chap. V.

[1] Life must not, of course, be thought of as reduced to its lowest physical terms, but as an expanding process which, potentially at least, is inclusive of even its most developed forms. See definition of "life-process" on page 65. Says Professor Miller, "When the biological view of mind is urged, its advocate is often thought to be making the body and its physical life the end, viewing mind and all its processes as mere means to that end. But mind, when it appears in the living organism, becomes a part of the whole, an integral aspect of the self" (*Psychology of Thinking*, p. 19).

[2] Some of the earlier exponents of the selection hypothesis greatly exaggerated the part which natural selection plays in organic evolution. The idea of de Vries and of the Mendelians that selection is to be likened in its effects to a sieve was greatly needed as a corrective. Natural selection permits an indefinite amount of free variation within certain limits, though in the long run all forms of

permits, but within which a large amount of free variation is possible.

The Spontaneity of the Organism: Stimulus and Response.—Living things, and perhaps all things, are characterized by spontaneity;[1] that is, changes, movements are set up within them seemingly without the aid of external causes. This spontaneity is more manifest the higher we ascend in the scale of life and the more pronounced the katabolic constitution of the animal organism becomes.[2] The old conception of the organism as passive with reference to its environment is more and more being given up by modern biology and psychology; the new conception is that the organism is essentially active.[3] The organism is, then, a relatively independent center of energy, whose activities are directed to sustaining or maintaining itself. That is, the activities of the organism spring from its own organic needs, such as nutrition and reproduction, and are directed to the satisfying of those needs. No organism could survive unless its activities were thus selective. The organism is teleological, then, in its very constitution, and the essential ground for its activities lies in its own internal condition—in its organic needs.[4]

It follows from what has been said that the act, which we have said is the fundamental fact in the mental life

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life must be outcomes of natural selection. See Thomson and Geddes, *Evolution*, p. 248.

[1] Cf. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 261, 283-85.

[2] Spontaneity is, of course, *a direct corollary of the katabolic nature of the animal organism.* A "passive" psychology is an impossibility on the basis of modern biology.

[3] Cf. Jennings's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 284): "The organism *is* activity"; also Thomson's statement (*Heredity*, p. 172): "The organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive living creature—to some extent master of its fate." This view of the organism as self-active must not be confounded with the neo-vitalism advocated by Driesch in his *Science and Philosophy of the Organism.*

[4] Cf. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 302–05; 339–42.

from a functional point of view, begins from within, not from without.[1] It begins with the physiological impulse which springs from some organic need. In the katabolic animal organism, with its tendency to expend energy, these impulses are incessant, so that the organism is in continuous readjustment with its surroundings. It is in this process of continuous adaptation and readaptation to environment for the sake of maintaining and enhancing life that consciousness appears. It appears in order to guide and control activity with reference to the environment.[2] If the ground for the beginning of the act is within, it is not less true that the act is developed with reference to the environment, and through the stimuli which the environment affords.[3] The organism is equipped, accordingly, with various sense organs which report, through sensations, the conditions in the environment of which the organism needs to have knowledge in order to adjust itself successfully. The organism is, therefore, dependent upon the environment for the development and continuance of its activities; and this dependence is expressed in the mental life through the stimulus; but the essential ground for the beginning of its activities lies within—in its own organic

[1] Cf. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 283–86.

[2] Cf. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 2, 37. The assumption that consciousness does "guide and control activity," that it does function, *does work*, is of course the basic assumption of functional psychology. As this is the assumption of common sense, however, it does not need to be defended from the point of view of scientific method. For arguments for the efficaciousness and survival value of mind or consciousness, see James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 138–144; also Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, p. 6, Chap. XVII; Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, pp. 281–87. As Miller says (*loc. cit.*): "Though we may not be able to explain satisfactorily either to the materialist or to the idealist the ultimate relation between conscious processes and the physiological processes of the brain, yet we may consistently hold that the two sets of activities are functionally related."

[3] Cf. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 292–99.

needs. In other words, to use the language of some of the psychology of the day, activity depends primarily upon interest.

The Nature of the Stimulus.—The stimulus is, then, not that which forces action, but that which makes action possible along some line demanded from within.[1] It is, as as has been said, the opportunity for the discharge of energy along some line of organic need. The attitude of the organism toward the stimulus is not passive, but active.[2] The organism is keyed up, expectant of the stimulus through its inborn traits or acquired habits (inborn or acquired interests). Ordinarily, indeed, the organism seeks the stimulus. Thus, in daily life we continually seek the stimuli demanded by our inborn or acquired interests (organic needs). When the organism seems most passive, careful consideration of these cases shows that its passivity is but a high degree of specialized activity. For example, when we start involuntarily at the sound of a loud noise, it is not because the organism is passively forced to respond to the stimulus, but because it has been keyed up, made expectant, for such stimuli through many generations of inherited habit. Organisms in the past which did not

[1] Cf. Jennings, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 285, 286, 288.

[2] It is perhaps superfluous to criticise the "passive" psychology of the social thinkers of the past, although such psychology is by no means rare in the sociological literature of the present. Witness, for example, Ward's description of the way a sensory stimulus is converted into a motor impulse: "The impression made at the exterior is communicated through a nerve, by the actual successive alteration of the state of its molecules, to a less differentiated protoplasmic mass in the interior, which receives the impulse by a similar alteration of all its molecules, throwing it into an unstable condition, from which it immediately returns to its normal state by means of a discharge along a second line leading to some organ of locomotion" (*Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 272). This whole passage implies the activity of environment and the passivity of the organism; the activity of the organism being conceived as produced wholly by the stimulation of the environment.

respond quickly to such stimuli would be eliminated by natural selection. Thus natural selection established in us the neural habit of responding quickly to loud noises. Such cases of involuntary attention are, then, to be explained as due to the highly specialized receptivity of the organism for certain stimuli, brought about by natural selection.[1] They express the inborn activities or interests of the organism in contrast to its acquired activities or interests.

One other point implied in the above must be made more explicit; and that is that the response to the stimulus implies inner organization. There must be a coördination answering to the stimulus, or else no response could be made. Indeed, a stimulus could not be sensed at all unless there were an inner organization answering to it.[2] New stimuli are, for this reason, assimilated to old ones, and the response is made, as it were, by analogy, until the organism readjusts itself, that is, builds up a new coördination answering to the new stimulus. Not everything, in other words, has to be learned by us as individuals. We receive through our birth a certain stock of hereditary coordinations, known as reflexes and instincts, and it is upon the basis of these that the child makes its first responses to stimuli, and builds its new adaptations or habits.[3] These reflexes and instincts, which evidently represent the acquirements of the race through long ages of organic evolution, lie at the very basis of our mental and social life, and will frequently concern us later.

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[1] Cf. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 75.

[2] This is implied, of course, in the general fact that the development of consciousness has run parallel with the development of the nervous system. However, if the "tropism theory" is correct, the inner organization necessary for response to a stimulus would be, not so much anatomical, as chemical. But see Jennings, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIV.

[3] Cf. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 59.

The Selective Nature of Consciousness.[1]—The mind, then, presents itself to us, even in its early beginnings, as essentially a *selective* activity.[2] Its whole business to select, from among the countless stimuli which surround an organism, those which are needful for the maintenance and development of its activities. The basis of this selection is the inner organization of the organism, built up previously through natural selection and habit in response to organic needs. To say that the mind is a selective agency is equivalent to saying that it is also an *evaluating* activity; for the mind could not select among stimuli without valuing certain stimuli higher than others; and the basis of this valuation, which appears in consciousness under the forms of pleasantness and unpleasantness, is again the inner constitution of the organism.

An important practical conclusion from the above is that the organism is not in subjection to its environment, not at least directly, but only indirectly through natural selection and acquired habit.[3] Natural selection brings about certain innate or instinctive reactions to stimuli, but these are not hard and fast in man and the higher animals; while acquired habits create certain pathways in the nervous system which give rise to persistent forms of activity. But the organism plays a leading part, as we shall see, in determining what habits it shall have.[4] Thus the whole psyche presents itself as a delicate apparatus for mastering the environment. In the highest development of psychic life, we should expect, therefore, that the subjection to the environment should become less and less. This is the case with man. It is by the might of mind that he has conquered the world.

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[1] Cf. James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 284–89.

[2] Cf. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 302–5.

[3] Cf. Jennings, *op. cit.*, pp. 237, 284–85.

[4] Cf. Angell, *Psychology*, pp. 57, 58; Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, p. 54.

Instincts.[1]—We have already called attention to the fact that the organism is equipped by heredity, through the working of the principle of natural selection, with inborn capacities to cope with its environment. These are the reflexes and instincts. The reflexes are simple coördinations, like sneezing, coughing, winking, grasping, which are not usually controlled by consciousness. They may be regarded as purely physiological, and concern us only because of their connection with the instincts. The instincts are simply more complex and variable reflexes in which consciousness plays a dominant part. They are inborn capacities to act with reference to an end which has been established by natural selection. In the widest sense, they include all activities or tendencies to activity which are unlearned—are in us apart from training or experience.[2] The instincts proper differ from the reflexes chiefly through the fact that (in man, at least) consciousness of some desirable end seems to dominate the series of acts, though the real biological end which the instinct subserves the individual is usually unconscious of. In any case, the instincts are the psychical aspect of race heredity,[3] and represent preformed pathways in the nervous system made in response to the demands of previous life conditions—that is, natural selection.

[1] See Thorndike, *Elements of Psychology*, Chap. XII; Angell, *Psychology*, Chap. XV; Judd, *Psychology*, Chap VIII; James, *Briefer Course*, Chap. XII; Kirkpatrick, *Fundamentals of Child Study*, Chap. III; also Chapter IX of this text.

[2] Cf. Thorndike's definition of instinct (*op. cit.*, p. 15): "Instincts include reflexes and all other connections or tendencies to connections amongst thoughts, feelings, and acts which are unlearned—are in us apart from training or experience." This definition would make the conception of instinct much broader than the one just given, as it would include much more than instinctive activities. Compare, however, what is said in Chapter IX concerning instinctive interests and beliefs.

[3] Cf. Hobhouse's definition of instinct (*Mind in Evolution*, p. 53): "The response of inherited structure to stimulus."

Typical instincts are sexual and parental love, though the simpler ones of acquisitiveness, combativeness, and imitativeness are equally in evidence in human society. These examples of instincts suggest at once that human instincts ripen gradually; that they develop only through the presence of appropriate stimuli; and that they are variable in different individuals.[1] Indeed, human instincts are little more than a complex series of instinctive reactions, which are modified by experience and built up into permanent habits through the influence of successful adjustment. But the instincts are all-important as the basis of the mental and social life. They represent the biologically transmitted acquisitions of the race, and hence they are the "psychophores," or bearers of the mental life.[2] They furnish the nucleus of coördinations by which the organism must begin to master its environment, and all later adaptations are but modifications of these original, inherited reactions. All that we learn, all of our interpretation and mastery of life, is but a superstructure reared upon the basis of our instincts. But it is important for the sociologist to remember that the instincts are at the basis of the social as well as the mental life. All the interactions between individuals, no matter how complex they may become, all social structures and institutions, no matter how elaborate, rest finally upon the basis of instinct.

Habits.[3]—Instincts are inborn, while habits are acquired. Instincts are race habits;[4] while habits, in the narrower

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[1] Cf. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–90.

[2] Cf. Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol. II, p. 61.

[3] See Angell, *op. cit.*, Chap. III; Thorndike, *op cit.*, Chap. XIII; James, *Principles*, Chap. IV; Judd, *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

[4] The term "race habit," as describing instinct, is objected to by some because it is said to imply the inheritance of "acquired traits" ("habit" in the strict sense being always acquired). It is, however, a convenient term for racially persistent activities, and its use is sanctioned by the best psychologists (cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, pp.

sense in which we now use the term, are modifications of inherited activities acquired by individuals or groups of individuals during their lifetime.

Habits are due to the fact that nervous currents tend to employ the same pathways which have previously been employed. They may be regarded as expressions in the psychical realm of the law of persistence of force. At any rate, habit is the name we give to the persistence of an activity, though, as we have already said, the name, in strict psychological usage, is usually given only to acquired activities, while the term instinct is reserved for those race habits which are transmitted by heredity.

All acquired habits are modifications of instincts.[1] Instinctive reactions become modified by experience, that is, the inherited tendencies of the individual are adapted to new situations, and new ways of reacting are thus acquired. The failure of an instinct to function successfully in a new situation leads to the appearance of consciousness and the reconstruction of the activity through its mediation. When the new coördination thus formed no longer needs atten-

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59, 296), without, of course, any implication of the inheritance of acquired traits.

[1] A difference of opinion exists among psychologists as to whether all habits are ultimately modifications of instinctive impulses or not. The view given in the text is that of Thorndike, Angell, and many others. Professor Judd holds, on the other hand (*Psychology*, p. 216), that there are two classes of habits: (1) those which develop out of instincts; (2) those which develop by selection from diffuse or random activities. Professor John B. Watson (in *Harper's Magazine*, February, 1912) suggests a reconciliation of these apparently different views by pointing out that the "random activities" are of instinctive origin. The difference between the views is evidently due to a difference in the definition of "instinct." The word is used in this text in the broad sense of the inherent or hereditary impulses or tendencies which characterize a race. Of course, habits may also be based upon individual peculiarities, but these again may be regarded as variations in the relatively uniform racial tendencies.

tion, no longer exists for its own sake but is used as a means to something else, it drops more or less out of consciousness and becomes a habit in the strict sense of the word. Acquired habits, then, have their origin in adaptation. A single successful adjustment may be sufficient to establish a new habit. The habit is thus not started by the repetition of an act, but rather it is the habit which gives rise to the repetition.[1]

The earlier-formed habits become, of course, the basis for later ones through their modification by adaptation exactly in the same way that the instincts are modified. Thus are built up the countless habits of the mature individual. This process of building up habits out of instincts or previously formed habits constitutes the essence of mental growth both in the individual and in society. It is the method by which the individual learns, as we say, and it is also the method by which society progresses.

Adaptation.—We have already repeatedly called attention to the fact that the more important phenomena of consciousness occur in connection with the process of adaptation, that is, in the transition from one habit or activity to another. It remains to characterize briefly the part which some of the leading conscious processes play in the adaptive process. " Discrimination " is the mental process which marks the breakdown of a coördination. This brings the " sensation " to consciousness which is essentially the sign of the interruption of a habit. " Attention " is the focusing of consciousness for the sake of discovering or selecting the stimuli which are adequate to reconstruct the activity. " Association " is the process by which the discriminated elements are built up into a new coördination,

[1] Cf. Sisson, *The Essentials of Character*, pp. 61–63. This is not denying, of course, that repetition or " practice " may greatly aid in fixing a habit, as all experiments indicate. It is denying, as Professor Sisson says, " that mere repetition of an act will create a habit."

the association being primarily of motor tendencies and secondarily of ideas. Thus discrimination, sensation, attention, and the whole list of conscious states, are, from a functional point of view, but factors in the adaptive processes of life, and get their functional significance from their connection with the process of adaptation.

The whole mental life of the individual, then, centers about the facts of habit and adaptation. The building up of new habits, the breaking down of old ones, the adjustment of the countless number of habits to each other—it is in connection with these processes that all the phenomena of consciousness occur. It is also these processes which give rise to the most striking social phenomena. Habit and adaptation are, therefore, fundamental categories for the interpretation of the social life as well as the mental life of the individual.[1]

The Three Aspects of Consciousness.—Every complete mental process has three sides or aspects, the volitional, the affective, and the cognitive. In other words, thinking, feeling and willing are not separate divisions of the mind, but are simply different aspects of its activity.[2] That is, every conscious state has its motor aspects (will), its affective aspects (feeling), and its cognitive aspects (thinking). Of these three aspects the will, in the broad sense, may be regarded as primary, since the origin of every conscious

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[1] See Chapter VIII.

[2] As Professor Miller says, "They are not separate structures; they are rather organizations of consciousness in different ways, each mode of conscious activity being adapted to a particular phase of the work needing to be done in the facilitation of adjustment. They are to be regarded as *phases*, or *attitudes*, or *aspects* of one unitary consciousness which appear within the complete mental act to meet specific needs within the process of adjustment." (*Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 64, 65.)

From the standpoint of structural psychology, "will" is, of course, not a distinct mental element, though it has been suggested that it corresponds roughly to kinesthetic sensations.

state is in the physiological impulse or activity. The other two aspects of consciousness may be regarded as evaluations of the activity—feeling being an evaluation of the activity with reference to the organism, cognition an evaluation of the activity with reference to the environment. Every act is evaluated subjectively as to agreeableness or disagreeableness, and objectively as to its adaptation or non-adaptation to the environment. In other words, feeling is the subjective side of the mental process, while thought is the objective side. Both are essentially mediatory in character, since both are concerned with the mediation or guidance of activity.

Of course, the subjective or feeling side of a mental process may greatly predominate over the objective or thought side, and *vice versa*. Thus some mental states may seem to be practically all feeling or all thought. But investigation has shown that there is no state of feeling that has not elements of perception in it, nor in the nature of things could there be; while the most abstract scientific thought has in it elements of feeling.[1] Both are constant aspects of every mental process. However, in the evolution of conscious life, there seems to be a manifest tendency for thought to predominate over feeling in the higher stages, while in the lower stages of life it seems probable that feeling predominates over thought.

The Will.—In the broad sense, the will is synonymous with psychical activity. As Professor Angell says, "The term will is simply a convenient appellation for the whole range of mental life viewed from the standpoint of its activity and control over movement."[2] It is in this sense

[1] This is, of course, not denying that feeling may approach the point of indifference in mental processes. Some psychologists claim that it is possible to get states of pure cognition.

[2] *Psychology*, p. 379. Compare the narrower definition of will given by Miller (*op. cit.*, p. 63): "The controlling of action by ideas is will."

that the will is primary in the mental life, and is an aspect of every conscious state. It is, indeed, but a name for the instincts and habits, viewed collectively and from the standpoint of their activity.

Will manifests itself in consciousness under the form of impulse, which we may define briefly as the more or less conscious tendency toward a movement. When, however, the activity is an habitual one and is unimpeded, the impulse may not rise above the threshold of consciousness, but remains purely physiological. The " impulsiveness of all consciousness " is a fact abundantly demonstrated by psychological experiments, and is simply another way of saying that every conscious state has its motor (volitional) aspects. Activity, then, emerges into consciousness as an impulse, which is at once evaluated by the feelings and the intellect, and which, if in need of control, gives rise to the phenomena of will in the narrow sense, namely, choice, decision, determination.

Will, in this narrow sense of the power to control action by ideas, that is, the power of choice, decision, is seemingly a comparatively late development in mental evolution. It rests, however, on the *selective* power of mind which, as we have seen, has characterized it from its earliest beginnings. Conscious choice, decision, could hardly be possible, however, until the selective process came to consciousness; that is, until the mind became self-conscious. Of course, in acts of decision, or of " pure will," as they are sometimes called, no impulses are created; there can only be conscious selection among impulses already existing; that is, one impulse is developed at the expense of others. Hence arises in the individual the sense of freedom of choice, or " freedom of the will," as we say, though it is manifest that the freedom is very strictly limited by the individual's variety of impulses at a given moment. As Professor Thorndike says, " His will is free in the sense that at any moment what he will attend to and cherish de-

pends upon *him,* upon his attitude toward the situation he confronts."[1]

Feeling.—By feeling, we mean the affective tone which accompanies conscious states.[2] Feeling is used in some works on psychology in a much broader sense, as synonymous with consciousness itself,[3] but we have used it to designate the agreeable or disagreeable tone of consciousness. In this sense, feeling is practically synonymous with pleasure and pain, using those words in a broad way.

Feeling is, as we have already said, the subjective valuation which the organism gives to an activity.[4] It is, so to speak, the reverberation of the activity in the organism. When the activity is one which has, on the whole, in the past history of the species been advantageous, the resulting feeling is usually pleasurable; when, on the other hand, the activity is one which has been disadvantageous, the feeling is usually disagreeable or painful.[5] Because

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[1] *Elements of Psychology,* p. 281.

[2] Cf. Angell, *op. cit.,* Chap. XIII; Titchener, *Text-book of Psychology,* pp. 225–26.

[3] This is the case with James and also with Thorndike in his *Elements of Psychology.*

[4] As Miller happily phrases it, "Feeling is the me-side of the whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjustment" (*op. cit.,* p. 64).

[5] This is the crude, evolutional view of feeling (pleasantness and unpleasantness); for a more accurate statement, see Professor Max Meyer's articles in the *Psychological Review,* Vol. XV, on "The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness." According to Meyer, "While the correlate of sensation is the nervous current itself, the correlate of pleasantness and unpleasantness is the increase or decrease of the intensity of a previously constant current if the increase or decrease is caused by a force acting at a point other than the point of sensory stimulation." This theory has been rendered more exact by Dr. L. L. Bernard in his *Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control* (p. 18): "Feeling," according to Dr. Bernard, "is the result of the correlation, i.e., the supplementation or interference, of nervous processes in such a way as to

feeling is, however, the inner, subjective side of consciousness, representing the evaluation of the individual organism of its own activity, it is subject to all the variations to which the individual organism is subject. Conditions of health, habit, and personal idiosyncrasies often make that which is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. On the whole, however, pleasure or satisfaction is the rough sign in consciousness of the organically advantageous, while pain or discomfort is the sign of the organically disadvantageous. And because individual variations are usually not wide, human beings are, after all, remarkably the same in their feelings.

On account of the obvious importance of pleasure and pain in our psychic life, some psychologists have regarded them as the primary forms of consciousness, from which all other forms have been derived. But as we have already pointed out, feeling never exists in consciousness alone, but is always a tone attached to some other conscious state. It is always attached to cognitive elements and indeed necessarily must be from its very nature. There is no ground, then, for believing that pure feeling is the primary form of consciousness, though it is probably true that in the lower types of mind, feeling greatly preponderates and dominates the other forms of consciousness.[1]

Again, it has been claimed that pleasure and pain are the sole springs of action.[2] This was, indeed, the view

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increase or to diminish the neural activity along a given pathway. Where a nervous process is augmented, pleasantness is experienced, and where a nervous process is weakened or diminished, there is unpleasantness." These views are not irreconcilable with the evolutionary view of feeling; they are simply more exact.

[1] Professor Meyer, on the other hand, holds that feeling is a relatively late product in mental evolution. See the *Psychological Review*, Vol. XV, p. 320.

[2] Bentham's famous statement, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*" (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. I), is but one example

of human nature which prevailed during a great part of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Modern psychology, however, finds, as we have already stated, that feeling is, not the antecedent, but the accompaniment or even consequent of activity.

Feeling does, however, modify activity. If the feeling tone aroused by an activity is pleasurable, the activity is reënforced; but if it is disagreeable or painful, the activity tends to be inhibited.[1] But this is something very different from saying that pleasure and pain are the sole source of the activity. As Professor Thorndike says, "One of the most artificial doctrines about human nature which has ever acquired prominence is the doctrine that pleasure and pain, felt or imagined, are the only motives to action."[2]

To sum up: we are not pushed about hither and thither, by pleasure and pain, as the hedonistic psychology proclaimed;[3] but pleasure and pain are monitors, rough and inaccurate, but very useful, which indicate to us, without

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of hundreds of similar statements made during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. See L. L. Bernard, *op. cit.*, Chap. III.

[1] Why agreeable feeling should reënforce activity and disagreeable feeling tend to inhibit activity, Thorndike thinks to be a totally unsolved problem (cf., e.g., *Elements of Psychology*, p. 316); but if Meyer and Bernard's theory that agreeable feeling results in general when the main nervous current is reënforced by currents from lower centers and that disagreeable feeling results when the main current is interrupted or diminished by other currents, there would seem to be no mystery about the matter. Cf. Meyer, "The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XV, and Bernard, *Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control*, Chap. II.

[2] *Elements of Psychology*, p. 284.

[3] For further criticism of hedonistic psychology, see Fite, *Introductory Study of Ethics*, pp. 97–101. Part I of this work contains an extensive criticism of hedonism in all of its aspects, biological, psychological, sociological, and ethical. It may be added that the hedonistic psychology is essentially the same as the "passive" psychology spoken of above.

the labor of thought, the organically advantageous and disadvantageous.

The compounds of feeling with other conscious states are so important in mental and social life that we must note the chief of these, namely, the emotions, the desires, and the interests.

The Emotions.—The emotions are hereditary complexes of feeling and sensation which have become attached to certain instinctive reactions. It is the feeling aspect of the emotion, however, which predominates and gives it its significance in consciousness. As James says, "An emotion is a tendency to feel, and an instinct is a tendency to act characteristically when in the presence of a certain object."[1] Typical emotions are fear, anger, hatred, grief, joy, love and sympathy.[2] Their importance in the social life, and the difference in the explanation given of them by the old and the new psychology, make it worth our while to note briefly their origin and function.

According to the older theory of the emotions, they were aroused directly by some object or idea. They were primarily intellectual and affective states, which brought about certain bodily reactions. According to the newer theory of the emotions, put forth by Professors James and Lange, they are due to certain bodily movements, chiefly of the internal organs, which accompany certain instinctive reactions.[3] The feeling, in other words, which we term the emotion, is the result of bodily movements, and not the bodily movements the result of the feeling. To this theory Professor Dewey has added that the peculiar feeling which marks each emotion off from other emotions is due to the different reactions which various objects call forth, and that these reactions are the vestiges of acts originally advantageous to the species, and so have been

[1] *Briefer Course*, p. 373.

[2] Angell, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XVIII-XIX; Thorndike, *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

[3] See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Chap. XXV.

fixed by natural selection. As Professor James says in effect, it is not true that we run because we are afraid when, for example, we see a bear, but rather we are afraid in proportion as we have the tendency to run. Thus does the new psychology reverse the order set up by the older psychology. It would not be far from correct to say that the object which excites the emotion first excites the instinctive reaction, which gives rise to the emotion, while only later is the intellectual perception fully developed.

It is popularly supposed that the emotions give rise to actions; but at most they only reënforce instinctive activities. As Professor Thorndike says, "It is often stated that the emotions furnish the energy for action, while the intellectual states only guide and enlighten; that without the emotions man would never act vigorously. This is false. Men of vigorous action seem to be moved by strong emotions because acting vigorously itself tends to produce strong emotions, but really clear insight and prompt decision do as much to favor action as do soul-stirring fervor and intense passion."[1]

The emotions do, however, intensify action in certain instinctive ways. The impulsive power of the coarser emotions, especially, is marked, and they often lead to the most violent actions. In the social life the emotions powerfully reënforce habits and customs which are based upon native impulses, and in times of excitement they often produce reversions of activity to a purely instinctive type. But above all, they give richness and meaning to the social life. While the emotions are chiefly conservative in their social action,[2] because they represent, in the main, hereditary evaluations of activity by the individual organism, yet the social emotions form, as we shall see, a part of the psychological basis of progress; and emotional impulses in general, held in check and guided by reason, may intensify action

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

[2] See Chapter X.

in advantageous ways. The emotions, then, while not the primary forces in individual or social life, are true secondary forces which must be reckoned with both negatively and positively.

The Desires and the Interests.—The desires are complexes of feeling and impulse with the knowledge of the object which will satisfy the impulse. They are most manifest in connection with the instinctive impulses; hence the close connection of desire with instinct.[1] An impulse which springs from a purely acquired habit may, however, express itself in desire, though usually not of the strong, passionate sort. That the desires are expressions of habits as well as of instincts is shown by the fact that the desires of men differ greatly, but the instincts of all are practically the same.

Whether the desires are to be classified under the aspects of feeling or of will psychologists differ. Some place them with the emotions, while others regard them as forms of will.[2] It is evident, however, that inasmuch as desire is a compound of affective, volitional, and cognitive elements, it is of no importance whether it be classified as a form of feeling or of will. Desire arises, however, through the blocking of the impulse by some impediment to activity, which brings the feeling valuation of the activity vividly to consciousness. For the same reason, the cognitive elements in desire often become extremely vivid.

Although the desires are extremely complex mental states, they occupy a position of fundamental importance in the social life. The relations of individuals may be regarded as more or less direct expressions of their desires. For this reason, Professor Ward and other sociologists have claimed that the desires are the true social forces. This claim we shall examine later.

Interest, in the psychological sense, is the subjective or

[1] Cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, pp. 373–74.

[2] Cf. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 87, and Angell, p. 374.

feeling side of attention.[1] In a wider sense, interest is synonymous with organic need—that which concerns the life of the organism. Inasmuch as the organism is born into the world with instinctive tendencies to attend to those things which concern its life, and is constantly acquiring by habit further tendencies of the same sort, it is evident that interest in the subjective sense tends to conform to interest in the wider, objective sense. Nevertheless, it would perhaps be better, in order to avoid ambiguity, to use the word only in the psychological sense. In this sense, interests are of two sorts: inborn, or instinctive, and acquired.[2] An individual's inborn tendencies to attend may be called his instinctive interests, while his acquired tendencies to attend may be called his acquired interests. From this classification, it is obvious that the interests are subjective aspects of instinct and habit; and that an interpretation of the social life in terms of interest is essentially the same as an interpretation in terms of instinct and habit.

The Intellect.—The intellect is the objective, universal side of mind.[3] While the whole mind is concerned with the adaptation of the organism to its environment, the intellect, in the broad sense of cognition, is directly concerned with environmental factors. The various aspects of instinct, feeling and emotion stand peculiarly for the organism itself, while the intellect is turned outward toward the rest of the universe. Again, instinct, feeling and emotion all represent peculiarly the adaptations in the organism's past history, while the intellect stands chiefly for the present and the future. The intellect is the projective as well as the objective side of mind. All this is equivalent to saying that the cognitive elements of consciousness play the decisive rôle in adapting the organism to its environment. Feeling, at most, can

[1] Cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–68.

[2] Cf. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 309–10.

[3] Cf. Dewey, *Psychology*, pp. 21–24.

only evaluate activity with reference to the organism and its past environments; while the intellect, in its highest development, can evaluate activity with reference to present and future environments, and even the universe itself. If man were still living a wild animal life in the woods, his instincts and emotions might be safe guides; but in the midst of a highly complex civilization and a rapidly changing environment, they need criticism and supervision. Hence the demand for the supremacy of the intellect, especially the reason, over the feelings, emotions, and passions —a demand which is acquiesced in by every sane mind, though this is not saying that many persons of comparatively undeveloped intellect may not find in their feelings a safer guide than in their reason.

We must not think of the intellect, however, as something separate and apart from the instincts and emotions.[1] As has already been insisted, the intellect is but the more objective and psychological side of the same process which expresses itself in instinct and emotion on its more biological and subjective side. In the life-process, indeed, the intellect has been developed chiefly as an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling. Nevertheless, the intellect is not the mere servant of the instincts and emotions. In man, at least, it has achieved considerable independence of them, and not infrequently is in opposition to them. Chiefly on account of his rapidly changing environment, civilized man depends upon his instincts less than any other animal; for him, therefore, the intellect, especially the reason, has become the chief guide of life.

The reason is simply the most highly developed form of the intellect. It is the most complex of all the devices of consciousness for aiding the organism in adapting itself to its environment.[2] Without attempting to describe its work-

[1] Cf. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 98.

[2] Cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

ings in detail, it may be characterized as " the universal-relating activity of mind "; that is, it functions to adapt the organism to a wider and more universal environment. By means of it consciousness is able to take account of factors neither present nor tangible to the senses, remote, perhaps, in both space and time. Thus reason aids in adapting the organism to a much wider environment, both in space and in time, than such simple cognitive processes as sensation, perception, memory and recognition could possibly do. Indeed, the goal of reason seems to be to adapt the self to a perfectly universal environment. Thus it explores the unknown and guides in even transforming the environment itself. All the achievements of science, all the conquests of the practical arts, all man's mastery over nature and self, are products of reason. And yet reason has apparently only begun its work of transforming nature and man.

There is, of course, no foundation for the idea that the reason is essentially individualistic;[1] and that there is, therefore, no rational sanction for altruism, and so also none for progress. The conception of reason as essentially " the calculation of consequences to self " is too narrow to need serious refutation. On the contrary, the reason, as we have seen, is the most universal aspect of mind; and though in some of its earlier stages it may seem narrow and egoistic, in its higher developments it may be said to represent far more the race than the individual. There is as much, and more hope, therefore, that men will attain to common beliefs and purposes, to spiritual union, through reason as through external authority or emotional appeals. Like the whole mind, the reason has been essentially social in its development. Though unsocialized reason, like unsocialized desire, may be in abundant evidence in the present, it must be considered abnormal, and not that reason is essentially

[1] Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 464, 479–80; also Kidd, *Social Evolution*, Chap. III.

destructive of social unity, because destructive of the spirit of service and self-sacrifice upon which social unity subsists.

This brings us, however, to the last topic in our direct discussion of individual human nature.

The Social Character of Mind.—All that we know of mind indicates that it has been developed in and through the social life-process, that is, through the interaction of mind with mind in the carrying on and controlling of a common life-process.[1] While consciousness exists only in the individual, every aspect of consciousness is so deeply tinged with the social life around as to suggest to some psychologists that mind belongs primarily to the race or to the group rather than to the individual. Whatever truth there may be in this mystical theory, it is certain that all human consciousness is socially conditioned; that is, consciousness, as we know it, has been developed under conditions of association, and has reference to the common life-process of the group quite as much as to the individual life-process. This is as true of the racially inherited aspects of consciousness—the feeling-instincts—as it is of its acquired traits.[2] Thus the higher human instincts and emotions show very plainly their reference to the social life and function quite as much for the preservation of the group as of the individual. The so-called social or altruistic states of mind are, then, as natural as the individualistic states; and to explain the former as derived from the latter is bad psychology,[3]

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[1] Cf. Professor Mead's article on "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," especially pp. 403–8, in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VI; also, Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, Chaps. I and II.

[2] As Professor Mead points out (*loc. cit.*, pp. 403–4), practically all the human instincts have the implication of development in a social medium. In this sense even the consciousness of the infant is, from a genetic point of view, socially conditioned.

[3] As Hobhouse says (*Mind in Evolution*, p. 339), "The conception of a primitive egoism on which sociability is somehow overlaid is without foundation either in biology or psychology."

since they were both produced in a common process of evolution. As to the acquired traits of consciousness, it is quite unnecessary to show that practically all that we learn we get from our social environment, and that therefore not only our knowledge and beliefs, but even our percepts and concepts are largely social products. It is in the "give-and-take" of social life that all these mental states are developed as phases of individual consciousness. Philosophical individualism as a theory of human nature or as a theory of society receives no support from scientific psychology. Individual psychology thus comes to depend upon sociology in certain portions almost as much as sociology depends upon psychology.[1] Man's mental life and social life are inseparable; so, too, psychology and sociology. All these facts have been so emphasized of late by psychological writers that it is unnecessary to do more here than mention them,[2] while their implications for sociological theory proper will be developed in the succeeding chapters.

Summary.—If we were to try to sum up this chapter in a few sentences, we should say that man is made for action; that he is by nature active, not passive, in the presence of the forces of environment; that his mind has been developed in and through his activities, and for the sake of controlling them; that it has reference in all its phases to sustaining and developing the life-process; that mental life is itself but an aspect, though in man the significant and controlling aspect, of the whole life-process; and finally,

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[1] Cf. Mead's statement (*loc. cit.*, p. 408): "The evolutionary social science which shall describe and explain the origins of human society, and the social sciences which shall finally determine what are the laws of social growth and organization will be as essential for determining the objective conditions of social consciousness as the biological sciences are to determine the conditions of consciousness in the biological world."

[2] One of the best recent discussions along this line is an article by Professor E. S. Ames on "Social Consciousness and its Object" in the *Psychological Bulletin* for December 15, 1911.

that it has reference not simply to the life of the individual, but also to the life of the group and of the race.

NOTE ON THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY IN SOCIOLOGY. —Certain objections have been made to the use of psychological terms in sociology. It is said that every science should have its own terminology; that no terms should be brought over from one science to another by analogy; also that sociology should find its terms in common everyday language. With the last two of these propositions the writer is in hearty sympathy. Every science should use the language of everyday life as far as possible. But all sciences find such language inadequate for their purposes on account of its inexactness. This is unfortunately often as true in the social science as in other sciences. Thus, e.g., common language often describes the interactions of individuals in physical terms when it is manifestly inexact to do so.

Nothing is more vicious in science than the mere analogical or metaphorical use of terms. Terms should never be taken over from one science to another because of mere analogy, but only when they exactly describe processes. If psychological terms are used in sociology it must be shown that they exactly describe the processes to which they are applied. But in a science like sociology, so immediately dependent upon antecedent sciences, terms from those sciences often exactly describe the processes in question. Just as physiology finds it convenient and even necessary to take over many terms from chemistry, so sociology will find it necessary to take over many terms from psychology and biology. Inasmuch as many of the processes which sociology describes are extensions or aspects of psychical processes within the individual, the language of psychology describes them more exactly than any other terminology possibly could.

There seems, then, to be no good reasons for arguing that sociology should have a terminology quite independent of the sciences upon which it depends. It will, doubtless, develop in time a relatively independent terminology, although thus far all efforts to give it a distinct terminology of its own have failed. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that greater progress will be made in sociology if in the psychological aspects of sociology psychological terms are used and in the biological aspects biological terms.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY [1]

The Origin of Society in General.—The origin of society in general, that is, of association among animals, and of human society in particular, can no longer be regarded as purely a speculative question. During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries social philosophers gave so many and so varied answers to this question, from the supernatural to the contract theory, that it deservedly fell into disrepute. The advances of Nineteenth-Century science have made it evident, however, that the problem of the origin of society is no more insoluble than the problem of the origin of species. This is not saying, of course, that there remain no unexplained elements in the problem, or that there is general agreement among all sociologists upon this question. Life in general remains a mystery to science, and as long as it does the origin of association as a phase of the life-process must remain also to a certain extent a mystery.

The Life-Process Essentially Social.[2]—Fundamentally the problem of the origin of society is a biological question.

[1] The first two thirds of this chapter appeared as an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1909 (Vol. XV, pp. 394–404).

[2] The point of view of this chapter was originally gotten by the writer from Professor G. H. Mead of the University of Chicago in lectures attended during 1897–98. A number of recent biological works have expressed similar views. The most striking of these is perhaps the work of Mr. Henry M. Bernard on *Some Neglected Factors in Evolution* (Putnam's, 1911). This work sets forth essentially the same theory of the origin of social life as the one here

The psychological sociologist, in his discussion of the problem, needs only to point out that *the life-process is essentially social from the start;* that is, it involves from the first the interaction of individual organisms. This interaction, while in its lowest phases purely physical, gives rise in its higher stages to that psychical interaction which we call association or society.

Life is not, and cannot be, an affair of individual organisms. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species, which, except under unfavorable conditions, gives rise to group life and psychical interaction. Society is no more the result of the coming together of individuals developed in isolation than the multicellular organism is the result of the coming together of cells so developed. Society, that is, the psychical interaction of individuals, is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating organisms. Looked at from the standpoint of the whole evolution of life, it is really the result of the breaking-up of the life-process into several relatively independent centers while the process itself remains a unity. The functional interdependence on the psychical side which constitutes a group of organisms a society is a mark at once

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given, though unfortunately mixed up with questionable biological and psychological theories. Says Bernard (p. 395): "When we come to deal with the colonies built up of human units, we feel justified in postulating that, though accidents in the environment may have tended to foster association in some and to destroy it in others, yet the principle of association has been instinctive and organic, since the colonization of human societies belongs to the series of colonizations which have been such conspicuous factors in bringing about organic evolution. This point is very important and adds an element to the science of sociology which is much needed. Without it human societies would have to be regarded as more or less fortuitous aggregates of individuals who are slowly learning to coöperate."

of their original unity in a common life-process and of the fact that they now constitute a higher, more complex unity. In this view, the social process is strictly a phase of the life-process, even in the biological sense.

Social Life in Part a Function of the Food Process.[1]—The social process, then, grows spontaneously out of the life-process. It grows out of both of the fundamental phases of the life-process—the food process and the reproductive process. The food process, or the activities connected with nutrition, seems to act chiefly in a negative way upon the earliest beginnings of association. As a rule, organisms of one species remain together as long as food is abundant, and they scatter only when the conditions of nutrition become unfavorable.

The thing to be explained in the organic world is not the living together of large numbers of one species, but rather the scattering and separation of individuals.[2] As has already been said, separation usually takes place on account of lack of food supply, while where food supply is abundant and sufficiently concentrated the individuals of a species remain together in large numbers. Now, where living forms remain in close proximity to each other they tend to take on functional interrelations both in the food process and in the reproductive process. The conditions of food supply thus become the physical basis of the interrelations among organisms, interrelations which later become psychical. When the conditions of food supply become unfavorable, the tendency to scatter, moreover, may be

[1] For a very good discussion of the influence of the function of nutrition upon social origin and development, see Espinas, *Des Sociétés Animales*, Section II.

[2] The most serious errors in sociology have been introduced through the assumption of primitive isolation or separateness. One can never get anything but a mechanical unity in society unless there was some sort of vital unity at the beginning. The biological view of life, however, gives but little support to philosophical individualism.

overcome by new adaptations on the part of organisms which give rise to superior ways of coöperating, so that an adequate supply of food shall be assured. Or when scattering does take place it may be by bands, and those bands whose members coöperate best in finding a food supply would have the best chance of survival.

The control over the food process is the matter of supreme concern both to the individual and to the species. Not only is a stable food supply necessary for the survival of the individual, but reproduction can only take place after nutrition has reached a certain height, and it tends to go on only where food supply is abundant. Now, control over the food process can be more easily established by groups of coöperating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection operates, therefore, from the first in favor of such groups, and toward the elimination of individuals living relatively isolated. It must especially favor those groups in which the interactions between individual units are quick and sure—that is, those groups in which the power of psychic interstimulation and response is fully established, and in which intelligent coöperation and orderly relations between individuals are highly developed. It is not an accident that the most successful, and, in general, the higher animals live in groups with well-ordered relations and highly developed means of interstimulation and coöperation.

Thus the collective control over the food process, established primarily by natural selection, becomes the positive basis of social organization, so that it is possible even to say, in a rough way, that the social process is a function of the food process. The goal, indeed, of much conscious social development seems to be the collective control of the food process. Whether it is the only goal, or the highest goal, of social development will be considered later. It suffices to point out here that social organization and evolution present themselves, from one point of view, largely as

a direct outgrowth of that fundamental phase of the life-process which we have called the food process.

Defense against enemies may be regarded as the negative side of the food process, since it is largely in the efforts to secure and maintain a food supply that the necessity of defense arises. That such defense can be much better undertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated individuals; and that natural selection, therefore, operates powerfully in this way alone to favor group life, have long been among the commonplaces of sociologists. The conflict of group with group in the struggle for the possession of the means of subsistence has been one of the most important factors in social evolution, especially in the way of integrating groups. It is not our purpose, however, to discuss the workings of this factor in social evolution at this point, but only to recognize that conflict as a phase of the food process has contributed powerfully to the genesis and development of association or the social life.

Social Life in Part a Function of the Reproductive Process.[1]—It is not, however, the food process which has played the chief rôle in the genesis of association among animals. That honor belongs to the reproductive process, using that phrase in a broad way to cover all the activities connected with the birth and rearing of offspring. The study of the reproductive process is, indeed, the keystone of the arch in general sociology. The birth and care of offspring are essential phases of the life-process, and at the same time are essentially social activities, since in all but the lowest forms of life they involve the coöperation of at least two individuals. Sexual reproduction, necessitating the interaction of two individuals, lays a positive foundation for association. It is, however, the production of immature or " child " forms which need prolonged and ten-

[1] See Espinas, *Des Sociétés Animales*, on the influence of the function of reproduction on the formation and development of social groups.

der care on the part of one or both parents which gives rise to that most intimate form of association that we term the family, which produces and reproduces the social life from generation to generation, and which becomes the basis, in large measure, of all later social organization. In the relationship of the mother to the child we have the beginnings of that sympathetic social life, of which the family has remained the highest type, and which has become the conscious goal of civilized human society. Society, in the sympathetic sense, then, had its beginnings in the family, that is, in the relation of the child form to the mother form.[1]

The relationship of the child form to the parent form becomes more prolonged and increasingly important as organic evolution advances. While in the lower reaches of life the reproductive process is comparatively unimportant in its social results, in the higher animals with the prolongation of the period of immaturity and with the increasing necessity of the coöperation of both parents in the care of the young, it becomes supremely significant for the social life. While it is a law that the higher we ascend in the animal scale, the less energy is devoted to mere physical reproduction, it is equally a law that the higher we ascend in the animal scale the more energy is devoted to the care and rearing of the offspring that are born. The social results of the reproductive process become, therefore, increasingly rich, significant, and complex as we ascend in the scale of animal life. It is among the higher animals that the family as a form of association receives its highest development, and hitherto it has been among the most highly civilized peoples that the family as a human institution has been held in highest regard and most safeguarded in custom and in law.

It is not, therefore, too much to say that the social process is a function of the reproductive process quite as much

[1] Cf. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Chaps. X–XI.

as it is a function of the food process; that the social order exists to safeguard the birth and upbringing of each new generation quite as much as to assure an adequate supply of material goods to those already existing. Of course, these two phases of the social process are supplementary and should not be set in opposition to each other. They would not need to be distinguished, were there not some who talk as if the only function of the social life were to secure for all an adequate supply of material goods. Certain it is that all forms of social life, from the ants and bees to man, and in the human world from savage to civilized, have been determined from considerations of reproduction quite as much as from considerations of nutrition. The goal of social development is, therefore, quite as much control over the reproductive process as control over the food process. The child is not only the center of the family life, but of the whole social system as well. The child's heredity, birth, care, and education are the supreme concern of church and state as well as of the home, and the sooner this is recognized the better.

The Origin of the Social Nature of Consciousness.—If the general forces at work in the genesis of association or group life are now clear, it remains only to say a word about the social character of the individual mind; that is, how consciousness comes to be the chief connecting link between individuals living in association. As far back as we can go in mental evolution, the psychic elements of life are a chief means of binding individuals of the same species together. Instincts, emotions, and sensations of one individual organism often seem made to fit into corresponding mental processes of another organism; and varied means of interstimulation and response are developed. The mind seems to be social in its nature from the start, and to be at once a social product and a social instrument.

The reason for this is now clear. Consciousness is concerned with the mediation of the activities of the life-

process, particularly those of the food process. But the life-process of the individual is only a part of the larger life-process of the group to which he belongs. The procuring of food and the protection against enemies, as we have seen, are activities which can be more successfully carried on by the group than by the individual. But consciousness is concerned with the mediation of these life activities. If they are carried on by groups it is evident that the only way the mind can control them is through some form of psychic interconnection between the individuals of the group. Hence have arisen the various forms of psychical interaction (interstimulation and response) between individuals. These forms of psychical interaction, in man at least, are so perfect that intelligence controls collective action almost as easily as individual action. Thus the social character of mind is an expression of the fact that it has to do with the mediation of a process which is carried on by several coöperating individual units; while society, the psychical interrelations of these individuals, means that there is one common process of living carried on by these coöperating units on the psychic plane, that is, on the plane of interstimulation and response. Society in the concrete sense, in other words, may be practically defined as a group if individuals who carry on a common life-process by means of interstimulation and response.

The Origin of Human Society.—The position already implied is that the processes involved in human association are fundamentally the same as in animal association; in other words, that animal society is the precursor of human society, and that, strictly speaking, human society is but a form of animal society. Human society is, however, so different from animal society that it is considered by many to be *sui generis*. But the whole difference between the two, it can readily be shown, is in the forms and definiteness of the psychical interaction between individuals. What especially distinguishes human society from animal

groups is the possession of articulate language. It is this which makes possible the communication of definite ideas, giving a far greater degree of definiteness to the whole process of mental interaction and making possible among human beings many higher forms of coöperation. Articulate speech, of course, rests in some degree upon the power of forming abstract or general ideas, though it in turn reacts to develop that power. Upon these two great differences between man and the other animals—articulate speech and the power of abstract thought[1]—rest the chief differences between animal and human society; for the other great distinctive marks of human society, such as the rationality and self-consciousness of its individual members, religion and government, all go back to or are intimately associated with language and the power of abstract thought.

Instinctive Origin of Human Society.—If what has been said is true, then human society must be regarded as an inheritance from man's prehuman progenitors, and as a form of animal society. Even many of the forms of human association were doubtless fixed in the subhuman stage. This is notably true of man's family life, which in its essential features, as Westermarck and others have shown must be regarded as an inheritance from man's ape-like progenitors.[2] It is also true of such a form of association

[1] These, of course, go back to the more fundamental differences in mental constitution between man and other animals, pointed out by Professor Thorndike among others (see his *Animal Intelligence*, pp. 124–42). Thorndike sums up these differences in mental constitution between man and other animals as chiefly differences in their mental associations. Man's associations "are naturally far more delicate, complex and numerous" (*loc. cit.*, p. 137). This gives rise to the great difference that man has "free" or "independent ideas" which are unattached to specific reactions (*op. cit.*, pp. 124, 153–54).

[2] See Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, Chaps. I and III. For a judicious summing up of the controverted question of

as leader and follower, for the phenomena of leadership are found among many of the higher animals.

In a word, human society rests upon instincts established by natural selection during the long prehuman stage of man's evolution. These instincts were the basis of all the primitive forms of association among men, and the addition to these of the intellectual elements of language, abstract ideas, self-consciousness, and reason is what gave rise to the peculiar products of human social evolution, human institutions and civilization.

Human Social Life Modified by Intellectual Elements.— The origin of these intellectual elements which have given a peculiar color and form, so to speak, to human association we cannot here discuss except to say that they are themselves largely social products. Language is manifestly a social product, and the fact that man is the only speaking animal is correlated with the fact that he is preëminently the social animal. In the same way, the power of abstract thought and of syllogistic reasoning may be shown to depend largely upon language and other traits developed through association. Even self-consciousness itself, the consciousness of the unity and continuity of our mental life, which many make the distinctive mark of human society, is probably an outcome of association.[1] It certainly depends for its development in the child largely upon language and the general give-and-take of the social life. All this, of course, is equivalent to saying that the differences between animal and human society are due to the natural social evolution of the human species; that the causes of these differences are to be sought in human social life itself, and not outside.

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the existence of a primitive state of promiscuity, see Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, pp. 530f.

[1] Cf. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 13f.; Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chap. I; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, Chaps. IX and XX.

This is not saying, of course, that there may not be instincts peculiar to man as an animal which account in part for the differences between animal and human society. But it is saying that these peculiar human instincts are not what give human society its distinctive character, but rather the intellectual elements; and that these instincts have evolved, and all man's instincts been modified, under the influence of a social life in which intellectual elements were powerful. Thus are harmonized the instinctive and the intellectual elements in human society.

Contrasts Between the Family Life of Man and of Brutes.[1]—The family life of man, as the primary form of human association, will serve to illustrate these points. Though man's family life in its essentials is undoubtedly an inheritance from his prehuman precursor, yet one is struck at once by the vast differences between the family life of man and that of the higher animals nearest him. There is, for example, in the human species no pairing season, little tendency to natural ornament during the period of courtship, but a strong tendency to artificial adornment, while there seems to be an instinct against incest,[2] preventing close inbreeding. These differences may be perhaps set down to a difference in instincts between man and the higher animals. On the other hand, there are many differences which cannot be so explained, such as the fact that the endorsement of society is almost invariably sought among human beings before the establishment of a new

[1] The substance of this analysis (developed more fully in my elementary text, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 66, 67), I owe to Professor W. F. Willcox.

[2] The recent criticism of the view that the aversion to incest is instinctive (e.g., that of Havelock Ellis in his *Psychology of Sex*) amounts only to this, that the instinctive tendency is not so much against incest as toward sexual attraction between relatively strange or unfamiliar persons (the so-called "instinct of exogamy"). But this theory practically comes to the same thing as Westermarck's theory.

family, usually through the forms of a religious marriage ceremony; that there exists a feeling of modesty regarding matters of sex; and that chastity is enforced, on married women at least, among all peoples. While these peculiar traits of human family life may perhaps in part be traced to peculiar "human instincts," yet the element of self-consciousness in each of them is so large and so manifest that they may be safely ascribed largely to man's intellectual nature. Thus the human family life illustrates both the instinctive origin of human association and its modification through intellectual elements which have caused it to vary widely from the primitive animal type.

Prolongation of Human Infancy.—Here must be noticed the influence of the prolongation of human infancy upon human social life. This purely biological fact, whose importance John Fiske was the first to call attention to,[1] has had a profound influence on both the instinctive and intellectual elements in human association, and especially on human family life. We have already noted how the prolongation of the period of immaturity of offspring affects social evolution in general, cementing the union between the parents and giving opportunity for the development of the sympathetic instincts and emotions within the family group. It is, no doubt, largely due to prolonged human infancy, therefore, that we have regularly in human society a permanent union between the parents lasting throughout life; permanent sympathetic relations between all members of a family group, giving rise to the sentiment of blood kinship; and a high development of sympathetic feeling and altruism in human society generally. It is, however, often overlooked that the prolonged period of immaturity in man, besides cementing the human family group and generating altruism in an instinctive way, gives opportunity for the intellectual ele-

[1] *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 340–46, 360.

ments in human association to assert their influence. It is prolonged immaturity which makes education possible, and gives opportunity for social tradition to mold each individual in conformity with the habits of his social group. Language could hardly be transmitted, and could not be developed and perfected without prolonged immaturity. And so with every other spiritual possession of humanity. Abstract thought, religion, government, and moral ideals could hardly effectively mold individual conduct or influence the social organization, were it not for the period of relatively prolonged plastic immaturity through which every individual passes. Upon this biological circumstance depend, therefore, many of the striking features of human social life, especially the influence of intellectual elements, hence plasticity and, ultimately, the capacity for social progress itself.

Other peculiar features of human social life, which by some are held to be so peculiar as to make human society in a class by itself and not comparable with animal groups, may now be quickly disposed of. It is said that man transforms the environment while the environment transforms the animal.[1] While the contrast in such absolute terms is not justifiable, yet it must be admitted that man's growing mastery over physical nature is one of the most striking facts of human social life. But it is evident that it is but an outgrowth of man's power of abstract thought together with that vast coöperation which human science and art imply. It is a secondary, then, rather than a primary difference between human and animal social life. Again, the existence of a conscious social morality in human groups has been claimed to be an irreducible difference between them and animal groups. But even Aristotle perceived that this was due to the fact that human groups possess language and so social tradition, and we may add,

[1] See Ward, *Pure Sociology,* pp. 16, 17.

the power of abstract thought to form ideals. Organized government is a distinctive feature of human societies, although not all possess it. But organized government undoubtedly rests upon the same foundations as social morality, with perhaps an even larger rational and deliberative element. Finally, religion is a distinctive feature of all human groups whatsoever, but it is probably a product of the interaction of man's self-consciousness and reason with his instinctive life.

To sum up: we may conclude, then, that the social development which we find in humanity is in principle the same as the social development which we find in the animals below man; that the origin of human society is in the instincts established by natural selection long before the human stage was reached, though the development of human society has been largely modified by intellectual elements. Though these intellectual elements are important, human society is not in any sense an intellectual construction due to the perceptions of the utilities of association. It is not a contract, as was once thought, which can be made over to suit the pleasure of the parties thereto; neither is it a machine of the gods which man cannot modify. Human society is modifiable in the same sense and in the same degree in which human nature is modifiable. While social organization, customs and institutions rest fundamentally upon instincts which have grown out of the necessities of the life-process, these instincts and the habits which grow out of them are modifiable by intellectual elements, especially in the young. Education is the only sure means, and probably, the only safe means, of social reorganization.

Was Man Primitively a Social Animal?—If this question means whether man lived in association with his fellow human beings at the earliest human stage, not solitarily, there can be but one answer. There is not the slightest evidence that man was ever a solitary creature, or even

that he lived in solitary family groups.[1] The evidence from the highest animals, from prehistoric archeology, from the lowest existing savages, from human instincts, from language and other sources, points to the conclusion that primitive man lived in hordes of several related families. The full evidence for this conclusion cannot here be given. It is sufficient to say that the remains of paleolithic man in Europe clearly show the existence of hordes of considerable size and also indicate the existence of a family unit within the horde. Typical lower savages of the present, such as the Bushmen of South Africa, the Andaman Islanders and the Fuegians likewise live in hordes of related families as do also some of the apes, notably the chimpanzee, which is nearest to man. Finally, the human instincts furnish good evidence that man was adapted primitively to the family and to the kindred group, but not to larger groups.

What then about man's antisocial characteristics; were they not primitive? Is it not notorious that man, as the old Latin adage puts it, has always been the wolf of his brother man, and is not this wolfishness in man a survival from more primitive conditions? The answer is that while man was primitively social, his sociality was narrow, confined largely to the family and to the kindred group, and that consequently he is not as yet well adapted to wider social relations. It is interesting to note, however, that these so-called antisocial traits of man are not found most fully developed among the lowest savages. Rather they characterize peoples that are somewhat advanced in culture, particularly those in the stage of barbarism. Thus cannibalism, evidence seems to show, did not characterize

[1] Cf. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 232. The biologists, Thomson and Geddes, speaking even from the biological point of view, say (*Evolution*, p. 100): "There can be little doubt that man was from the first distinctively social." For the opposite view, see Ward's writings in general (e.g., *Pure Sociology*, p. 556).

primitive man (except as it may have existed sporadically), but only became developed after the stage of barbarism had been reached. At any rate, the peoples among whom cannibalism is most fully developed at the present time are peoples relatively high in culture. Again, there is good reason to believe that war was not common in the most primitive stages of human evolution, but only developed after population had considerably increased and peoples had begun to press upon each other's territorial limits and food supply. The lowest peoples in point of culture even at the present time we find again to be essentially peaceful. War with its ferocities, cannibalism, and slavery are relatively late products, then, in social evolution and incident to man's adjustment to a wider and more complex social environment. It is, therefore, quite within the truth to say that it is the struggle and conflict that have been developed within the species in its more complex stages of evolution that have called forth, sometimes in exaggerated forms, the predatory and antisocial tendencies which we see more or less in human society at present.

Nevertheless, as has just been said, man's sociality and his social instincts are adjusted primarily to a relatively narrow social environment, namely, the primitive environment of the family and the kindred group. It is not, therefore, incorrect to say that man is as yet only partially socialized. With reference to his present complex social life this incomplete socialization of man seems to be pronounced, but this is in part due to the fact that the complexity of social organization and its attendant competition have made demands upon the individual's instincts and reason which cannot, in the nature of the case, be met at once. As has already been pointed out, man's instincts in particular are found to be inadequate for the complex social life of civilized societies, and even individual reason is in part inadequate.

However, history shows that there has been an expand-

ing social consciousness; that is, while man's native impulses adjust him only to a relatively narrow group, his intelligently formed habits have been adjusting him to continually wider and wider groups. Accompanying this wider adjustment, brought about through the mediation of intelligence, reason and widening sympathy, are expanding feelings of social solidarity, until the most highly developed man of the present recognizes his oneness with all the rest of humanity, the conscious goal of his endeavor being to adjust himself to humanity collectively rather than merely to his family, his community, his nation or his race. There can be no doubt, therefore, that man is undergoing an evolution adjusting him to a wider social environment. In part this adjustment is perhaps taking place through natural selection, though it is even more an adjustment which is brought about through custom, tradition, education and conscious moral ideals. In other words, the most highly developed social groups are making conscious efforts to have all individuals born within their limits acquire habits of thinking, feeling and action which will adjust them to a much wider social life than that to which they are naturally adjusted. It is through such conscious efforts of education that we must expect the new and fully socialized individual to arrive rather than through waiting for the long process of selection to bring about the creation of such an individual type.

The Solidarity or Psychical Unity of Society.—We have already said that "society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating organisms." It is important that the student grasp this conception of the unity of society at the beginning;[1] and that he see that this unity, though primitively biological, is

[1] The idea of social unity is, of course, very old, going back to Greek philosophy. Cf. Stein, *Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie*, pp. 12, 13.

now mainly psychic. The picture which modern psychology presents of the individual mind is apparently at first sight not favorable to this conception of psychic units larger than the individual consciousness; for each mind is wholly unconnected with other minds except through the intervention of physical media, and, as we have already seen, there are no direct causal connections between one mind and another. Each mind, however, responds to physical stimuli, and among these stimuli are the signs or symbols created in the physical medium by other minds. Thus through interstimulation, mental interaction (i.e., intermental processes) is possible. Development under similar biologic conditions makes all minds of a given social group, moreover, respond in like ways to like stimuli. Thus, from the first the interactions of a group of individuals tend to become orderly; and as we have just seen, natural selection favors those groups in which orderly and definite forms of interstimulation and response are highly developed. Thus the action and reaction of mind upon mind through the intermediation of physical stimuli becomes an orderly, well-defined, and continuous process, which we know as the "social process," and which we name in its various phases communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy and the like. It is thus through various forms of interstimulation and response that groups of individuals can act together; and as we have already seen, groups of individuals of the same species living together must act together to survive. Hence from the beginning social groups carry on a common life-process by means of interstimulation and response; that is, they are functional unities in which the unity of function is secured mainly by psychical means.

Whether a society shall be called a psychical or a psycho-physical unity is manifestly merely a matter of the choice of terms. The phrase "psychical unity" seems, however, preferable because it expresses the dominantly psychical character of the processes with which the sociolo-

gist deals.[1] The process of interaction between individuals is dominantly a psychical process in that its dominant elements are psychical. The functional unity or solidarity of society is, therefore, essentially psychical, and society is in its essence, though in the broad sense, a psychical unity.

Thus is justified methodologically the sociological point of view—the view of the group as a functional unity, and the interpretation of its phenomena from the standpoint of its collective life, that is, from the standpoint of the mass as a whole. Hence the sociologist does not consider the individual as such, as we have already emphasized, but only the individual as a functioning element in the larger whole; while the psychologist, on the contrary, considers the social whole only to throw light upon individual experience as such. It is manifest that the study of interstimulation and response from the side of individual experience would show only half of the whole process. In the interests of science, it is important that the process be studied from the point of view of the larger unity, if the interstimulations and responses of individuals are determined, more or less, upon the basis of the needs and interests of a collective life. It is the task of the sociologist, then, to interpret the social life from the standpoint of a social life-process. Just what the nature and methods of this social life-process—this process of living together—are, we shall see in the next chapter.

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[1] Cf. the writer's discussion of this point in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 666–71.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY: THE SOCIAL COÖRDINATION [1]

The Psychological View of Society.—The psychological view of society which we have thus far developed in the preceding pages may perhaps be summed up roughly in a single sentence as follows: Society is a mass of interactions, of interstimulations and responses, between individuals, not haphazard, but regular, coördinated and controlled, working for the most part toward definite ends and making social groups true functional unities, ruled by habit largely, but like all organic unities, undergoing adaptive changes which are themselves regular, and which, moreover, give rise to the more important socio-psychical phenomena. As we have seen, from a psychological point of view, a society may be practically defined as a group of individuals who carry on a common life-process by means of interstimulation and response. In other words, society or association is a psychical process, that is, a process immediately made up of and ruled by psychic elements, such as impulse, instinct, habit, emotion, desire, interest, sensation, imagination and reason. The fundamental fact, accordingly, with which the sociologist has to deal, is the process of mental interaction, of interstimulation and response, between individuals. It is this interstimulation and response which makes up all social phenomena and which is, therefore, the

[1] The substance of the first half of this chapter was presented as a paper before the American Sociological Society, December, 1909 (see *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, pp. 596–618).

subject-matter of all the social sciences, and particularly of sociology. The significant thing for the sociologist, however, is not that mental interactions between individuals exist, but that they are regular; not haphazard, but coördinated and controlled. Without this regularity in the forms of interaction between individuals, social science in general would be impossible, for the object of all scientific study of society is to discover regularity in social activity, that is, in the forms of interstimulation and response among individuals.

The Social Coördination.—This regularity and coördination in mental interaction, interstimulation and response, which brings to a unity of aim the activities of the individuals of a group, may be called the social coördination, just as the bringing to a unity of aim of physical and psychical processes in the body is called a coördination. This coördination or coadaptation of individuals in activity is, of course, what makes group action possible. It creates the unity of the group; and the coördinations that persist—become habitual—form the substance of permanent social organization. Moreover, just as the conscious life of the individual centers about the process of adaptation, so it is the changes in these social coördinations, the breaking down of old ones and the building up of new ones, which give rise to the more important phenomena of collective mental life. From this standpoint, we shall find, the function of the various psychic elements in the social process will readily become clear. We are justified in concluding, therefore, that the most important and practically most fundamental fact for the psychological sociologist is this coördination or coadaptation of individuals in activity—the social coördination.[1]

[1] While the term "social coördination" was borrowed by the writer from the functional psychologists (see *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1899), the term was used earlier by other sociologists, though with a narrower connotation (see, e.g., Giddings,

To trace out the mechanism of the origin, development, and forms of these coördinations or adaptations between individuals constitutes the task of the sociologist from the psychological point of view. In doing this his point of view, as we have already pointed out, is necessarily that of the group, not that of the individual; for the individual in his instinctive and habitual reactions gives at most only the starting point for these coördinations. The real reason for the existence of such coördinations, or coadaptations, must always be found in the carrying on of a common life-process by a group of individuals, else they would not exist. The coördinations, in other words, are coördinations of individuals in function, and the group must be considered as a functional unity in order to understand them.

The Origin of Social Coördinations.—The biological origin of social coördinations is not a concern of the psychological sociologist as such, though the matter has received incidentally some attention in discussing the origin of society. We may note that the development of species and groups under similar biologic conditions gives rise, as has been so much emphasized by Professor Giddings, to such organic and mental similarity that their individual

Principles of Sociology, pp. 388–90). The term "coadaptation" was borrowed from the writings of Dr. M. M. Davis, whose views of the nature of the social life, as set forth briefly in his *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, are in many points closely similar to those of the writer. The term "coadaptation" has, of course, long been in use in biological writings (e.g., Darwin in *Origin of Species*). Recently many sociological writers have expressed views of the social life similar to those set forth in this chapter. Dr. René Worms, e.g., says (*Les Principes biologiques de l'Evolution sociale*, p. 23): "Adaptation is the most general fact in the social existence. . . . For the solidarity of all elements is the first attestation of social structure (*anatomic*), and their *coordinated* action is the first attestation of social function (*physiologie*)." Cf. also Waxweiler's discussion of social coördination in his *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*, pp. 228–48; also the general ideas in Vaccaro's *Bases sociologiques du Droit et de l'Etat.*

units respond in like ways to like stimuli;[1] and that this organic similarity is undoubtedly the biological fact which makes possible coördinated social activity. Moreover, on account of this fact and also on account of the selective processes in nature which favor the existence of group life, the instincts of the individuals of a social species are made, as we have seen, so that they fit into one another, as it were, and thus their instinctive reactions are coördinated with one another. Instinctive reactions thus yield certain coordinations or coadaptations between individuals to start with. In the social life of man these instinctive reactions are modified through habit and intelligent adaptation, so that the adjustment of the activities of individuals to each other may reach such a high degree of perfection that groups often act with the spontaneity and certainty of individual units. Through instinct, habit and intelligent adaptation, then, wrought out under similar life conditions, the activities of individuals become socially coördinated or coadapted.

Practically the psychological sociologist has to start his interpretation of the social life with these social coördinations. Just as the psychologist cannot get back of organic activity and have anything left of mental life, so the sociologist cannot get back of social activity and have anything left of social life, for we do not think of the group as a unity except in connection with its activities. The coördination of individuals in activity is the sign of social relationship, social organization, social life, throughout the animal scale. Individuals living together in mere proximity cannot be said to have social relationships until they become functionally related to each other as parts of some functioning whole. Society *is* the coördination of the activities of individuals.[2] In a psychological interpretation of so-

[1] See *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Chap. II.

[2] Cf. the statement of Dr. M. M. Davis (*Psychological Interpretations of Society*, p. 9): "The essence of society is adaptation. . . .

ciety, therefore, we must begin with concerted or coördinated activity, with the group acting together in some particular way, for it is this which constitutes the group a functional unity, and which is the first psychic manifestation of group life.

Social Coördination and Social Coöperation.—It may be objected that what we have called the social coördination is nothing more than social coöperation under another name. But social coördination, as already implied, does not necessarily mean that the relationship is one of mutual aid. It may be one of exploitation, or even of modified hostility. There is, however, it must be admitted, no objection to employing the phrase "social coöperation" in a very broad way to designate the sum of social coördinations, for social coöperation in this broadest sense is made up of social coordinations; popularly, however, social coöperation is used in a much narrower sense as implying a high degree of reflective consciousness on the part of the individuals whose activity is coördinated. Even by some scientific writers the term coöperation is used in exactly this way. Thus, we find Professor Giddings, for example, saying, "There can be no coöperation except among those who are, in a good degree, like minded, and who are so far conscious of their agreement that they can intelligently plan their common activity."[1] It is manifest that such social coöperation as Professor Giddings is speaking of, implies a high degree of reflective consciousness which hardly exists until man is reached in the animal scale and is not present even in many human groups. The term "social coördination" has been used to express the connection between the activities of a mass of individuals living together and carrying on,

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Millions of brain cells are coördinated to think as one brain. Physiology tries to tell how. Millions of brains *coördinate* themselves and function in many ways as one brain. The *how* of that marvel is for sociology."

[1] *Elements of Sociology*, p. 77.

through interstimulation and response, a common life-process, because it is a colorless term, not implying the high degree of consciousness which sometimes attaches to the phrase social coöperation. Manifestly, as has already been said, all social organization is an outcome of social coördination and social coördination can, therefore, be regarded as synonymous with social coöperation only in the sense that all social organization implies coöperation.

Objective Expressions of Social Coördination.—Social coordinations have both objective and subjective expressions in the collective life. Their objective expression is chiefly in those relatively uniform and universal ways of action to which Professor Sumner has given the name "folkways."[1] The folkways are simply regular modes of social activity in a given group of people. The better term would probably be "social habits," since these regular modes of social activity are not, by any means, confined to the large group which we term a folk or a people, but are found in the smallest groups of society as well. Every family group, for example, illustrates these regular modes of social activity which we have termed social coördinations. The family, indeed, beautifully illustrates the whole matter of social interaction and social coördination; for the activity of each member of a family group is coördinated in very definite and regular ways with the activity of all the other members of his group. Just as every coördination in the individual that persists is termed a habit, so every coördination that persists in a social group may be termed a social habit. In those large groups which we term peoples there is, of course, no objection to calling these regular modes of social activity "folkways," as Professor Sumner does.

Of course, there are many other ways in which social coordinations express themselves objectively. As we have already repeatedly said, the whole matter of social organi-

[1] Cf. Sumner's *Folkways*, Chap. I.

zation is simply a matter of the types of social coördination that persist among the members of a given group, that is, all the forms or modes of association are simply different objective expressions of social coördination. All of the objective regularities and uniformities in society may, therefore, be looked at as so many objective expressions of social coördination. A custom, for example, is but a social habit (in this case, a "folkway") which has persisted long enough in a people to gain a certain prestige, while what we call institutions, are but *sanctioned* forms of association, or of social coördination.

Types of Social Coördination or Forms of Association.[1] —The analysis of the various types of social coördination has, as yet, only just begun. It is evident, however, that the types of coördination between individuals are as complex as human life itself, and that an analysis of society into its various types of social coördination would be practically equivalent to an analysis of social structure as a whole. All possible coördinations between individuals exist, and hence, an infinite variety in the forms of human association. The honor of beginning a serious study of the various types of social coördination, that is, of the forms of association, as a definite sociological problem, belongs to Professor Simmel,[2] of the University of Berlin, but his analysis is very far from satisfying. What he has studied chiefly are the empty forms of association, that is, the forms themselves without definite content, such as equality, superiority, subordination, and the like. He omits, for example, such common forms of social coördination as are seen in the family, such as husband and wife, parent and child. For a full understanding, however, of the types of social coördination, we must consider not merely their empty form, but also their content. It is apparently an inexhaustible task to classify

[1] See Chapter XVI.

[2] See his *Soziologie*, Chap. I; also *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, pp. 289f.

and arrange the various types of persistent interaction between individuals. The progress of sociology as a science is, however, not dependent upon any exhaustive enumeration or classification of the types of social interaction. Rather, sociology must show the way in which types of social coördination arise and are changed into other types and the significance of the principal types for the collective life of man.

Subjective Expressions of Social Coördination.—But the subjective expressions of social coördination are of not less importance than the objective expressions in folkways, customs, institutions and social organization. Those subjective expressions are to be found in the mental attitudes which the individuals of the group maintain toward each other. A group of individuals carrying on a common life-process through interstimulation and response, must maintain certain habitual psychical attitudes toward each other in order that they may respond quickly and effectively, each to the stimulus which the activity of the other affords. Hence, the significance of feelings, emotions, ideas and beliefs in all forms of human social life. Feelings, emotions, ideas and beliefs are, on the one hand, expressions of common life activities, and on the other, they powerfully reënforce and direct those activities. The family group again illustrates the matter. The mental attitude of the members of a family toward one another is an expression of their common group life and group activities. Corresponding to their habitual modes of interaction, are certain feeling, or emotional attitudes, and even certain ideas and beliefs. Thus, the social coördinations of husband and wife, parent and child, are each subjectively expressed by appropriate feeling, or emotional attitudes.

Common Feelings, Ideas and Beliefs in the Social Life.—Inasmuch as the family group is organized largely on an instinctive basis, the subjective expressions of its coördinations are chiefly in feeling and emotional attitudes. Hence,

we ordinarily think of such relationships as husband and wife, parent and child, in terms of feeling. In larger social groups, however, built up chiefly upon the basis of acquired habits, common ideas and beliefs may be the chief expression of social coördination; but in any case, habitual modes of interaction must come to have attached to them certain feeling tones in the individuals concerned—that is, they must give rise to certain feeling attitudes of certain individuals toward each other. In animal groups, where the interactions are almost wholly instinctive, not much more than the feeling attitude may exist as the subjective accompaniment of social coördination, but in human societies, with their larger element of acquired habit, the chief subjective expressions of social coördination are frequently common ideas and beliefs; thus, in a modern nation, unity of action and of life is secured partly through sentiments like patriotism, but even more through certain generally accepted ideas and beliefs. Such generally accepted ideas and beliefs, which form the psychical basis of institutions, may be called "coördinating ideas." The importance of such coördinating ideas in human social and institutional life, although first emphasized by Comte, has not as yet been adequately investigated, or even recognized, by sociologists.

The whole matter of uniformities of feeling, belief and opinion in social groups, evidently, then, must be studied in connection with social coördinations if it is to be understood; for the mental attitudes of individuals toward each other and toward their group as a whole are expressions of the way in which they are socially coördinated. These subjective expressions of social coördination are, of course, since thought and feeling mediate activity, also marks of incipient stages of new forms of social organization as well as of existing forms. In a group of individuals, then, carrying on a common life-process through interstimulation and response, mental attitudes mediating social activities

mark the beginning of new coördinations, or coadaptations, as well as those coördinations that have become fixed as social habits.

Social Habits.—Thus far in this discussion, the point of view has been that of the social habit, and it may be well to note a little more fully the nature of social habits. As has already been said, in a broad sense, social habits are simply social coördinations that persist. In their various modifications they are known, in the larger human groups, as folkways, customs, manners, morals, laws, institutions and the like. In brief, all the tangible uniformities of the social life are social habits. It is evident that they rest partly on instincts, partly on acquired habits. As has already been noted, in all social species, the instincts of individuals are made so that they fit into each other, as it were, and provide certain social coördinations to start with. This is especially true of man, human family life, as we have just seen, illustrating especially these instinctive coordinations between individuals. But it is also true that in man social habits are largely acquired. While the original or instinctive coördinations between human individuals may be numerous, yet on account of the complexity of man's social life, these original social coördinations have become overlaid with a vast mass of acquired social habits that are even more important for the distinctive character of human society than the instinctive coördinations. Hence the need in human society of definite forms of mental interaction, of interstimulation and response, whereby every individual may acquire the habits of his group. Hence also why human groups have developed such definite forms of interstimulation and response, as oral and written language, and superior types of suggestion and imitation.

The Psychical Mechanism of Social Change.—We must now leave the point of view of social habit, and ask what happens when social habits change; for we know that in social groups, as in individuals, habitual ways of action

are continually being modified. The social coördination that exists to-day in a group of individuals may no longer exist to-morrow. Even the type of coördination itself changes. Now, in a group of individuals carrying on a common life-process, there must be some very definite mechanism by which habitual ways of interaction are modified or even radically changed. That mechanism is found in the various forms of communication and in other simpler forms of interstimulation, such as suggestion. Psychologists, as a rule, have had little to say about communication, probably because it is so obviously a social process. At any rate, all that we know goes to show that communication is a device to carry on a common life-process among several distinct, though psychically interacting, individual units. All the higher forms of communication had their origin in the needs of, and exist for the sake of perfecting, a common life.[1] As we have already seen, the distinctive mark which separates human society from animal groups and which makes it separate and unique, is the possession of language, or articulate speech.

In the transition from one social habit to another, in the breaking down of one social coördination and in the building up of another, then, various forms of communication come in to mediate the process. Just as in the individual the transition from one habit to another is marked by mental processes of discrimination and association, so in the social group the transition from one social habit to another is marked by processes of criticism and discussion. When anything goes wrong with the working of a social habit, various appreciations of the social situation are communicated from one individual to another. Public

[1] Cf. the remark of Professor Mead (*Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VI, p. 406): "The probable beginning of human communication was in coöperation, not in imitation, where conduct differed and yet where the act of the one answered to and called out the act of the other."

criticism marks, then, the bad working or the breaking down of some social coördination. Discussion of the whole social situation comes in to pick out the elements in the old habit that are unworkable and to select those that may be made the basis of a new habit. Discussion works in society, therefore, very largely as the association of ideas works in the individual mind. Through discussion certain elements in the situation, objective stimuli, or ideas, are selected and fixed upon by the group for the building up of a new coördination. When the ideas for the building up of the new coördination have become relatively settled we have what is called the formation of a public opinion. In order to carry out this public opinion there is usually necessary the selection of certain individuals that are judged to be especially fitted to carry out the new social policy and we have the phenomena of leadership, and of authority resulting. Along with these more tangible processes of intercommunication, there are, of course, those less tangible processes of interstimulation, such as various forms of suggestion and imitation. At any rate, the mechanism by which the transition from one social habit to another is effected must be made up of various forms of interstimulation and response, and among the more important of these are public criticism, free discussion, public opinion and conscious social selection of ideas and individuals. It is obvious that without these the process of social change, of continuous readjustment in society, could not go on; that new habits adapted to the new life conditions could not replace the old habits which are no longer adapted.

The Function of Imitation.[1]—Here must be briefly noted the function of imitation in this process of continuous social readjustment. As Professor Baldwin has insisted,[2]

[1] See Chapter XIII.

[2] *Social and Ethical Interpretations, passim.*

imitation, in its broadest sense, is undoubtedly the chief means of propagating acquired uniformities in human society. Its exact function, as just pointed out, is to mediate in the formation of those social coördinations, where uniform, concerted activity is desirable. It comes in, therefore, to assist in building up most social habits, and, especially in mediating relatively simple and unconscious coördinations between individuals. The error of the imitation sociologists consists in fixing attention upon but one element in the building up of social coördinations, rather than upon the whole process. The tacit assumption of the imitation theorists is that it is the uniformity or likeness of activity which makes social coördination, society, possible; whereas unlikeness of activity is necessary for many of the higher forms of social coördination. In the family, for example, while imitation smooths the way for many adjustments, yet many of the coördinations between its members are possible only because of original and acquired differences. Imitation does not, therefore, enter into all social relationships—that is, into all forms of interstimulation and response. It is, however, the great and indispensable means of bringing unity in a group when uniform, concerted action is necessary or desirable. Hence, all social species, including man, are highly imitative. The tendency to imitate, therefore, like communication, must be regarded as an outcome, an instrument, of the social life, not its basis.

The Function of Sympathy and Understanding.[1]—We must also here note briefly the rôle of sympathy and understanding in mediating the more complex coördinations between individuals in human society. Sympathy and understanding are among the striking products of harmonious social coördination. At the same time they are chief instruments in effecting harmonious coördinations. Indi-

[1] See Chapter XIV.

viduals whose activities are coördinated in harmonious relationships, as, for example, in the family, always develop sympathy and understanding. Instinctive sympathy may, perhaps, be regarded as an outcome of those selective processes which have favored the existence of certain social coördinations between individuals; while habitual sympathy accompanies the harmonious coördinations between individuals that are acquired through habit. On the other hand, only individuals who sympathize with each other and understand each other are manifestly fitted to coordinate harmoniously their activities in very complex ways. Thus, in all the more complex social coördinations, sympathy and understanding are necessary processes for the harmonious adjustment of the activities of individuals. It is the lack of a sympathetic understanding, indeed, which most frequently gives rise to that failure to build up harmonious coördinations between individuals which, as we shall see, is the source of much of the conflict and much of the tragedy of the social life. As sympathy and understanding are so important in the collective life, groups of all sorts do all that they can to promote sympathy and understanding between their members. Every social group, therefore, strives to promote acquaintance and like-mindedness between its members. Here comes in the social significance largely of convivial occasions and of "society" in the narrow sense of the word. Modern civilized societies especially take many artificial measures, through popular education, the deliberate cultivation of altruism, and the like, to promote sympathy and understanding among their members. Moreover, individuals, conscious that their successful social adjustment depends upon being understood and sympathized with by their associates, sedulously seek sympathy and understanding from one another. It is safe to say that sympathy and understanding are more important in carrying on a collective life than external forms of social constraint.

Professor Giddings has formulated a law of sympathy, which we must here note, based upon the degree of resemblance or likeness between individuals, viz., "The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases."[1] But it seems more probable that sympathy is directly proportionate, not to the amount of resemblance, but to the harmony of the coördination between individuals. The more harmonious the coördination between individuals, the more their sympathy, and *vice versa*. Resemblance affects sympathy only indirectly, only as it is necessary for the coördination of their life activities. Thus a man may have more harmonious coördinations with his dog, and hence more sympathy, than with many of his fellowmen whom he resembles much more closely. Again, though members of the same family may differ greatly as regards sex, age, temperament, yet if they have a harmonious coordination of their activities, they rarely lack an abundance of sympathy for each other. All this does not preclude, of course, sympathy from arising in anticipation of harmonious coördination between individuals; for, as consciousness has to do with the mediation of activity, all mental processes may mark the beginning as well as the establishment of activities. If we take sympathy in the very broad sense of all the altruistic impulses and feelings of human nature, whether native or acquired, then evidently sympathy in this sense of altruism is necessary for all higher types of social relationship. Those coördinations which involve very complex coöperation or mutual service between individuals, often remote in time and place, involve a high degree of reflective sympathy or altruism. Sympathy in this broad sense is so important in human society that it will be necessary for us to examine in some detail later its function in social organization and progress.

[1] See *Elements of Sociology*, p. 67; also *Inductive Sociology*, p. 108.

The Function of Confidence and Mutual Trust.—Closely connected with sympathy and understanding in the social life are confidence and mutual trust. Confidence and mutual trust are, on the one hand, an outcome of harmonious social relations (coördinations), and on the other, are necessary for the establishment of any complex coördinations. Harmonious relationships beget confidence, but on the other hand, confidence is necessary for all but the simplest relationships. People cannot live together without some degree of mutual trust. Individuals must form a "stable environment"[1] with reference to each other, if they are going to successfully coadapt their activities. The knowledge or belief that we can rely upon the character of others, we call confidence or faith in others, and like all other forms of our knowledge it is concerned with the mediation of activity—in this case with the mediation of the coördination of activities.

Economists have remarked upon the vast rôle played by confidence or mutual faith in the transactions of finance and commerce. It is scarcely necessary to add that it plays an equally important part in all other phases of the social life. Without it the family could not exist, government could not be carried on, and philanthropic work would have no basis. The social worker who is trying to lift up a depressed family or class or a backward race must have faith in the persons he deals with if he is to secure helpful coördinations between his efforts and their own—that is, secure their coöperation in the betterment of their own condition.

The Function of Stimuli Arising from Intergroup Conflict and Competition.—Another factor in bringing about social coördinations of a high type are the stimuli arising from intergroup conflict and competition. While the stimuli

[1] I am indebted for this phrase to a former student, Dr. R. R. Kern, now of the George Washington University.

afforded by the struggle with the physical environment and with other nonsocial forces are conceivably sufficient to bring about the highest degree of coördination, unity, and solidarity in the larger human social groups, yet historically they have not done so. Rather, it has been the stimuli arising from the conflict and competition of one human group with another which has chiefly developed conscious social solidarity in the larger human groups. The conflict and struggle with natural forces of groups of individuals carrying on a common life has necessitated in some species the development of a high type of social coördination, but in humanity it has usually been conflict and competition of human groups with one another which has developed the highest degree of social unity.

Danger tightens, and security relaxes, the bonds of all social groups;[1] and no danger in historical times has threatened human groups comparable to that offered by conflict with other human groups. This conflict has stimulated in human groups not only imitativeness, sympathy and understanding among their members, but also the development of consciously coördinated activities and of conscious collective control over the activities of masses of individuals. In other words, human groups involved in a life and death competition with other groups, could survive only by the development of high types of conscious coördination of the activities of individuals. While previous to such conflict the members of a group may have but a vague consciousness of their common life and of the ends of their activities, through such conflict and competition these ends become sharply defined in consciousness and the individuals who make up the group become vividly conscious of the relation of the activities of each to the collective life. Thus the group achieves group or social self-consciousness. In the same way it achieves a higher degree of organiza-

[1] Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 287.

tion, for the group becomes conscious that definite relations between individuals and some centralized control are necessary if the group is to succeed in its competition with other groups; and more definite organization and centralized control are expressions of the closer coördination of the activities of individuals. In the same way, also, the group takes on a more decided individuality. In the intergroup competition, it must develop a definite direction and purpose in its activities and so a definite character. Thus groups develop what may be called a group will. Group individuality and group will are phenomena which will be discussed later.

Conflict Within the Social Group.—The process of continuous readjustment in society, the breaking down of old social habits and the building up of new ones, ordinarily goes on without shock or disturbance—oftentimes, indeed, without the individual becoming vividly conscious of change. Habits, however, must be continually modified in social life as well as in individual life. Variations constantly arise in individuals and in the environment, making old social habits no longer workable. Through processes of discussion, suggestion, imitation, the formation of a group opinion, the selection of ideas and ideals, a new social coördination, or adaptation between individuals, is built up, which, if it works well, persists and becomes a new social habit. This process often goes on, as we have already noted, without the individual even being conscious of change; for, though the individual may participate in discussion, may receive suggestions and may imitate, may accept ideas and beliefs, may even select leaders and authorities, yet he may be quite unconscious of the end of the process—the construction of a new social coördination. But sometimes a new and harmonious coördination cannot be built up, for a sufficient stimulus for its construction cannot be found. It is here that much of the tragedy of social life comes in, for it is here that the opportunity

for conflict and hostility within the group arises. Let us illustrate again from the family life. Parent and child may have a certain coördination—a certain habitual attitude toward each other, which works well during the child's younger years; but the parent often forgets that that coördination and his attitude must be modified with the child's growth. As a consequence, the old social coördination is maintained too long and when it finally breaks down, no adequate stimulus may be found for the building up of a new harmonious coördination. Hence conflict often arises between parent and child. It is the same with the relations of husband and wife and with all other social relations. Conflict of individuals within a group arises, then, through the failure to build up new social coördinations adapted to new life conditions, so that the individuals of a group may form a stable environment with reference to each other. The result is a conflict of habits and the possible disintegration of the group. Conflict of one social group with another is, of course, an entirely different matter.

Conflict Within National Groups.—It is the same in the wider social organization of nations and peoples as in the more intimate social relations of smaller groups. Normally, a people's institutions are continually changing; old institutions are gradually replaced by new ones as life conditions change. Normally, the breakdown of an old institution is so gradual that by the time it disappears a new institution adapted to the new life conditions is ready to take its place. The change has been brought about from one social form to another through such peaceful means as public criticism, free discussion, the formation of a public opinion and the selection of individuals to carry out the line of action socially determined upon. But where these means of effecting social readjustments are lacking, or imperfectly developed, social habits may become relatively fixed and immobile. Now, a society, like

an individual whose habits become inflexible, is bound to have trouble. It is from such conditions that those vast social disturbances which we term revolutions with their bloody conflicts between classes arise. Revolutions, in other words, are due to certain interferences in the mechanism by which normal social readjustment is accomplished; that is, they are disturbances in the social order due to the breakdown of social habits under conditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those habits, that is, a new social order.

Some degree of conflict and opposition within a group, whether small or large, is, however, a normal accompaniment of the breaking down of old habits and the building up of new ones. In any mass different individuals will be exposed to different stimuli, and will respond to the same stimuli differently. That is, they will be exposed unequally to life conditions, and will vary in their responses on account of organic variations. Hence, social coördinations, customs, institutions and the like, will be unequally suited to various individuals; and in the building up of new coördinations different stimuli, ideas, ideals, or practical interests, will appeal to different individuals as the proper basis (adequate stimulus) for the construction of the new coördination. Hence the degree of conflict which is often seen in criticism, discussion, and other processes connected with social change. Hence also the inevitable and necessary opposition between parties in building up new coördinations and institutions in national groups. It is evidently the proper function of parties to sense and evaluate different stimuli, to bring about discussion of these stimuli, which may serve as adequate (that is, as "coördinating ideas") for the construction of new and advantageous coördinations. Parties, however, as we shall see later, tend to become mere "interest groups" and to set up their own advantage or existence as ends in themselves.

Revolutions as Illustrating the Process of Social Readjustment Under Abnormal Conditions.[1]—The whole psychology of social coördination and of social change, and the part played by the more obvious factors in the mechanism of social change, cannot be better illustrated than by those convulsive movements in the history of societies which we term revolutions. It will be well, therefore, to examine the psychology of revolutions in order to illustrate the theory of social organization and of social changes which we have just set forth. We are not using the word revolution now in a loose sense to designate any sudden political or social change from *coups d'état*, or "palace revolutions," to mutations in fashions or industrial changes due to great inventions, although, of course, the psychological theory of social order and of social change that has just been set forth apply to these processes. Rather, we are now using the word revolution in its strictly political sense. As Bodin long ago pointed out, the mark of revolutions in this sense is a change in the location of sovereignty. Such movements always imply a shifting of the center of social control from one class to another and inwardly are often marked by change in the psychical basis of social control, that is, a change in the common ideas, beliefs and sentiments upon which the social order rests. Outwardly such movements are frequently characterized by bloody struggles between privileged and unprivileged classes, which not infrequently issue in social confusion and anarchy. Revolutions, in this strict sense, although superficially political, are, then, even more sociological

[1] The substance of this section was published as a separate article on "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions" in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1905. It is utilized here because it exactly illustrates the writer's theory of the nature of the psychological process in human society. The theory was first outlined in an article published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in May, 1899 (Vol. IV, p. 817).

phenomena, and as such the theory of revolutions must form an important chapter in any theory of social evolution which deals with human history as it finds it. Revolutions, in the sense in which we have used the word, are, perhaps, best typified in modern history by the Puritan Revolution in England and by the French Revolution. Less typical, but still in some sense revolutions, were the American War for Independence and the American Civil War. Many other essentially revolutionary conflicts in modern times might be, of course, instanced.

We may note that the objective explanations of revolutions which have usually been offered by historians and economists—that is, explanations in terms of economic, governmental, and other factors largely external—have been far from satisfactory inasmuch as they have lacked that universal element which is the essential of all true science. These explanations have, to be sure, pointed out causes operating in particular revolutions, but they have failed to reveal the universal mechanism through which all revolutions must take place. The reason for this must be now clear to the student, for as we have already seen, nearly all social occurrences are in the nature of responses to external stimuli. The same response, or similar responses, may be called forth, however, by very different stimuli, since the stimulus is only the opportunity for the discharge of energy. Consequently any explanation of revolutions or other social occurrences in terms of external stimuli is, as we have already seen, foredoomed to failure, because such an explanation will fall short of that universality which science demands. The particular stimulus which occasions a revolution will vary in each instance, but the psycho-social mechanism through which the revolution is effected in every case remains the same.

As has already been said, from a psychological point of view, revolutions are disturbances in the social order due to the sudden breakdown of social habits under con-

ditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those habits—the formation of a new social order. In other words, revolutions arise through certain interferences or disturbances in the process of normal social readjustment. Where the normal means of effecting readjustments in the social life are relatively lacking, social habits and institutions tend to become relatively fixed and immobile and a conservative organization of society results. Now, societies, like individuals, are in danger when their habits for any reason become inflexible. In the world of life, with its constant change and ceaseless struggle, only those organisms can survive which maintain a high degree of flexibility or adaptability. It is even so in the world of societies. As Professor Ward says: "When a society makes for itself a procrustean bed, it is simply preparing the way for its own destruction by the on-moving agencies of social dynamics."[1] It is evident, then, that a society whose habits become inflexible for any reason is liable to disaster. That disaster may come in two forms: it may come in the form of conquest or subjugation by a foreign foe; or it may come in the form of internal disruption or revolution, when the conditions of life have sufficiently changed to make old habits and institutions no longer workable. It is with this latter case that we are concerned.

Conditions Giving Rise to Social Immobility.—The conditions under which social habits become inflexible, hard and fast, are many. In a general way they have already been indicated by saying that the mechanism by which the transition from one social habit to another is effected—namely, public criticism, free discussion, public opinion—has been partly destroyed. This has occurred most frequently, no doubt, under despotic forms of government; and hence the connection in popular thought between tyranny and revolution. Not only absolute monarchies, but

[1] *Pure Sociology*, p. 230.

aristocracies and oligarchies also, have frequently created types of social organization which were relatively inflexible. Despotic government, however, is only one of the many conditions favorable to social immobility. Authoritative religions which have glorified a past and put under ban all progress have also had much to do with creating social inflexibility. Again, the mental character of a race or people has much to do with the adaptability and progressiveness of the social groups which it forms, and some writers would make this the chief factor. Finally, it is well known that in societies without any of the impediments of despotic government, authoritative ecclesiasticism, or inferior racial character, public sentiment, prejudice, fanaticism and class interest can and do suppress free thought and free speech, and produce a relatively inflexible type of society.

Possible Consequences of Social Immobility.—Whatever the cause of their immobility, societies with inflexible habits and institutions are bound to have trouble. The conditions of social life rapidly change, and opposing forces accumulate until, sooner or later, the old habit is overwhelmed. Under these conditions the breakdown of the old habit is sharp and sudden; and the society, being unused to the process of readjustment, and largely lacking the machinery therefor, is unable for a greater or less length of time to reconstruct its habits. There ensues, in consequence, a period of confusion and uncertainty in which competing interests in the society strive for the mastery. If the breakdown under these conditions be that of a habit which affects the whole social life-process, and especially the system of social control, we have a revolution. It is consequent upon such a breakdown of social habit, then, that the phenomena of revolutions arise.

Psychology of Revolt.—But before considering some of these phenomena in detail, let us note somewhat more concretely how the old habits and institutions are overthrown.

Of course, the opposing forces must embody themselves in a party of opposition or revolt. This party is composed, on the whole, of those individuals whom the changed conditions of social life most affect, those on whom the old social habits set least easily. The psychology of the revolt of large numbers of men to an established social order is, at bottom, a simple matter. It is simply a case of the breakdown of a social habit at its weakest point, that is, among those individuals with whom the habit is least workable, or, in other words, whose interest lies in another direction. From these the attitude of revolt spreads by imitation, first among those to whom the old social habits are ill-adapted, and finally among all who are susceptible to the influence of suggestion. Thus the party of opposition grows until it comes to embody all of the influences and interests which make the old habits and institutions ill-adapted or even unworkable.

The Rôle of "Destructive" and "Disintegrating" Ideas.—The party of revolt in attacking the established social order must have weapons. Usually it finds these weapons first of all in certain destructive and disintegrating ideas. Thought, as we have seen, in society may be concerned either with the building up or the tearing down of activities. Corresponding to the coördinating ideas, beliefs or opinions upon which the institutions of a highly developed social life may be based, accordingly, are certain disintegrating ideas upon which can be based no settled and harmonious social order. While the criticism of revolutionary periods begins with pointing out defects in existing social arrangements, it not infrequently ends by endorsing purely anarchistic ideas. In any case, ideas of an individualistic sort are made weapons of attack upon the established social order. They also often serve as watchwords and shibboleths to unite the party of revolt. Thus they serve not only as instruments of attack but also as means of rallying and unifying the revolutionary forces.

"Peaceful Revolutions."—If these forces continue to grow it is evident that there is possible to the ruling classes only two alternatives: either they must make concessions, that is, attempt themselves the readjustment of institutions; or they must face actual conflict with the party of opposition. As a matter of fact, historically the former alternative has much more often been chosen, thus open conflict avoided, and so-called "peaceful revolutions" effected. If, however, no concessions are made by the ruling classes, or only such as are insufficient to bring about the readjustments demanded by the life conditions; if, in other words, the relative inflexibility of the social order is maintained, then the antagonism between the old social habits and the new life conditions can be resolved only by open conflict between the ruling classes and the party of revolt. And when this conflict results in the success of the party of revolt, we call it a "revolution."

Anarchy of Revolutionary Periods.—Thus the old social order is overthrown, violently, suddenly, and sometimes almost completely. Now in the transition from one habit to another in the individual there is frequently to be observed a period of confusion and uncertainty; and this confusion is intensified if the breakdown of the old habit has been sudden or violent. We should expect, therefore, an analogous confusion in society upon the breakdown of social habits; and this is exactly what we find. The so-called anarchy of revolutionary periods is not due simply to the absence of efficient governmental machinery, but to the general breakdown of the social habits of the population. The anarchy is, of course, proportionate to the violence and completeness with which the old habits and institutions are overthrown. Again, in such periods of confusion in the individual consequent upon the entire breakdown of a habit, we observe a tendency to atavism, or reversion, in his activities; that is, the simpler and more animal activities tend to come to expression. This

tendency not only manifests itself in revolutions, but is of course greatly intensified by the struggle between the classes; for fighting, as one of the simplest and most primitive activities of man, greatly stimulates all the lower centers of action. Hence the reversionary character of many revolutionary periods. They appear to us, and truly are, epochs in which the brute and the savage in man reassert themselves and dominate many phases of the social life. The methods of acting, of attaining ends, in revolutions are, indeed, often characteristic of much lower stages of culture. These methods, as a rule, are unreflective, extremely direct and crude. Thus resort to brute force is constant, and when attempts are made at psychical control it is usually through appeal to the lower emotions, especially fear. Hence the terrorism which is sometimes a feature of revolutions, and which conspicuously marked the French Revolution.

Mobs in Revolutionary Periods.—Here another striking phenomenon of revolutionary epochs must be noted; and that is the part played at such times by mobs and other crowds.[1] It is evident that in the confusion and excitement of revolutionary times the most favorable conditions exist for the formation of crowds and the doing of their work. There is an absence, on the one hand, of those controlling habits, ideas and sentiments which secure order in a population; and, on the other hand, there is the reversion to the unreflective type of mental activities. Under such conditions, crowds are easily formed, and a suggestion suffices to incite them to the most extreme deeds. Thus much of the bloodiest work of revolutions is done by crowds. But it is a mistake to think that true revolutions can be initiated by mobs, or carried through by a series of them. Revolutions simply afford opportunities for mobs

[1] Le Bon especially has championed the "mob theory" of revolutions. See his works in general, especially *The Crowd.*

to manifest themselves to a much greater degree than they can in normal social life.

Duration of Period of Anarchy.—The duration of the period of confusion, anarchy and mob rule in a revolution is dependent upon a number of factors. If the party of revolt is united upon a program, and if the population generally has not lost its power of readjustment, the period of confusion may be so short as to be practically negligible. Under such circumstances the reconstruction of new social habits and institutions goes on rapidly under the guidance of the revolutionary party. As an illustration of this particular type of revolution with a happy outcome we may take our War of Independence. In this case the relative unity of the revolutionary party, the incompleteness of the destruction of the old social order, the vigorous power of readjustment in a relatively free population, all favored the speedy reconstruction of social institutions.

State of "Chronic Revolution."—Unfortunately, this speedy reconstruction of social habits is not the outcome of all revolutions. Too often the revolutionary party is unified in nothing except its opposition to the old régime. It can find no principle or interest upon which a new social order can be reconstructed. Moreover, through a long period of social immobility the population seems often to have lost in great degree its power of readaptation. Indeed, in rare cases, peoples seem to have lost all power of making stable readjustments for themselves. Under any or all of these conditions, it is evident that the period of confusion, anarchy, and mob rule in a revolution must continue for a relatively long time. During this time frequent attempts may be made at the reconstruction of the social order without success. These attempts are continued until some adequate stimulus is found, either in an ideal principle or in the personality of some hero, to reconstruct the social habits of the population. Or, if no basis for the reconstruction of the social order can be found, revolution

may become chronic; and the period of relative anarchy and mob rule may last for years, only to be ended perhaps by the subjugation and government of the population by an external power.

Sociology of the "Dictatorship."—A more usual outcome, however, to the chronic revolutionary condition is the "dictatorship." How this can arise from conditions in revolutionary times is not difficult to understand. The labors of ethnologists have shown us that democracy in some shape is the natural and primitive form of government among all races of mankind; that despotism has arisen everywhere through social stresses and strains, usually those accompanying prolonged war, when a strong centralized system of social control becomes necessary, if the group is to survive. Now, in that internal war which we call a revolution, if it is prolonged, it is evident that we have all the conditions favorable to the rise of despotism. When the party of revolt are unable to agree among themselves, and can offer to the population no adequate stimulus for the reconstruction of the social order, nothing is more natural than that that stimulus should be found in the personality of some hero; for social organization is primitively based upon sentiments of personal attachment and loyalty far more than upon abstract principles of social justice and expediency. The personality of a military hero affords, then, the most natural stimulus around which a new social order can, so to speak, crystallize itself, when other means of reconstructing social institutions have failed, and when continued social danger demands a strong, centralized social control. The dictatorship, in other words, does not arise because some superior man hypnotizes his social group by his brilliant exploits, but because such a man is "selected" by his society to reconstruct the social order. Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon, these typical dictators of revolutionary eras, would probably have had their places filled by other,

though perhaps inferior, men, had they themselves never existed.

Reaction After Revolutions.—Here may be briefly explained the reaction which frequently follows revolutions. No revolution is, of course, complete; it is never more than a partial destruction of old habits and institutions. Now new habits, as we have learned, have to be erected on the basis of old habits. What remains of the old social habits after a revolution must serve, therefore, as the foundation for the new institutions, since no other foundation is possible. After repeated attempts at reconstruction of the social order have failed, it is the easiest thing to copy the old institutions, and this is often the only successful means of restoring social stability. Hence the reversion to prerevolutionary conditions. But, in the nature of things, such reaction is usually only temporary. The population has learned that the social order can be changed, and at some later time is quite sure to attempt it again.

The practical conclusion from all this is that revolution is impossible in a perfectly flexible and adaptable type of social organization. On the other hand, revolution is inevitable, barring foreign conquest, in those types of social and political organization which do not change with changing life conditions.[1] If the social sciences cannot foretell social events, they nevertheless can so define the conditions under which they occur that social development can be controlled. Thus it is of value to society to know the general conditions under which revolutions occur; for such knowledge points out the way by which revolutions can be avoided. It is worth while for a society to know that by encouraging intelligent public criticism, free discussion, and free thought about social conditions and institutions,

[1] It is scarcely necessary to add that the recent revolutions, ending the reign of the Manchu dynasty in China and the Diaz régime in Mexico, though coming long after these words were originally written, have exactly illustrated the views here set forth.

by keeping itself adaptable, flexible, alert for betterment, it is pursuing the surest way to avoid future disaster. Social science, if it cannot foretell the future, can nevertheless indicate the way of social health and security.

Confusion in Periods of Transition.—Such social disturbances as revolutions, with their confusion, anarchy and conflicts between classes, are distinctly pathological; but we may note that there is often a period of confusion in the transition from one social habit to another, which is normal, because it may take some time for a large mass of individuals to discover an adequate stimulus for the building up of a new social coördination. This fact has often been noted even by nonscientific writers on social problems, but it has not usually been explained as due to the psychological difficulties of reconstructing habits in a large mass of individuals, that is, of building up new social coordinations. Temporary social disorganization may, therefore, result from the breaking down of old social coördinations and the normal difficulties in building up new ones. We see this with reference to the family in the United States at the present time. The old authoritative, semi-patriarchal family of past generations has broken down. As a form of institution it will no longer work under modern conditions. As yet, however, the mass of people have not been able to discover a sufficient stimulus in any social ideas or ideals for the reconstruction of the family upon a new and stable basis. While a new ethical family of a stable type has emerged among certain elements of our population, other elements are in a condition of confusion as regards their family life and have not yet developed any new and stable type of the family adapted to the new life conditions.[1]

"Critical" and "Constructive" Periods in History.—Many historical writers, since Saint-Simon first put for-

[1] Cf. the study of "The Problem of the Modern Family" (Chap. VII) in my *Sociology and Modern Social Problems.*

ward the theory, have noted that periods of relative stability in institutions are followed by periods of criticism and disorganization, only to be succeeded again by periods of upbuilding and relative stability. These periods need not, of course, coincide for all classes of social institutions, a period of breaking down in one class of institutions being not infrequently synchronous with a period of reconstruction in another class. Lately this theory has been revived and restated by the German historian, Professor Karl Lamprecht,[1] who finds that periods of individualism and dissociation are regularly followed by periods of synthesis and reorganization about some dominant idea or intellectual element. Hence he finds that there is a universal psychic mechanism by means of which all social transitions are effected. The reasons for these " critical " and " constructive " periods in the historical process are now clear. Quite evidently this theory states in somewhat looser language the alternation between social habit and adaptation which we have just been discussing. Periods of stability in institutions are necessarily followed by periods of breaking down, of criticism, and of disorganization when life conditions change, to be followed again by periods of synthesis, of reconstruction when some adequate stimulus (ideas, ideals, opinions) can be found upon which to base new social habits or institutions. The period of criticism, of disorganization, and of confusion is abnormal and socially dangerous only when unduly prolonged.

" Static " and " Dynamic " Civilizations.[2]—While under normal circumstances social life presents a more or less continuous alternation between habit and adaptation, yet habitual tendencies may predominate under some circumstances in some societies and adaptive tendencies under others, as we have already seen. The tendency for habit to predominate to the exclusion of adaptation is particu-

[1] In his book, *What is History?* Chap. IV.

[2] Cf. Dealey's discussion in his *Sociology*, Chap. IX.

larly seen under certain very simple conditions of life, such as have usually existed in primitive and barbarous societies, and such as sometimes exist, as we have already seen, under the powerful conservative influences of authoritative religions and of despotic governments. Under such conditions social habits tend to become fixed and immobile and we have resulting what is usually called static civilization. Where the conditions of life are comparatively simple and unchanging, relatively static civilization seems to be the normal result. If such a society is not disturbed by outside influences, such as incursions of hostile peoples or by changes in the environment, these static conditions may last for centuries. Sooner or later, however, adaptation, as we have already seen, must come, because the growth of population alone usually necessitates some changes in habits.

Whenever, then, through growth of population or changes in the environment, old habits of life work badly and break down, adaptive processes must come in in the ways which we have already described. In highly advanced societies rapid increase of population and changes in life conditions may go on so rapidly that adaptive processes seem to predominate altogether in the group life. Indeed, the trend of social evolution, as it becomes more complex, seems to be more toward continual change or adaptation in the social life. Under such conditions, we have a " dynamic " civilization, and it is conceivable that dynamic civilizations like the one which we are living in may continue an indefinite period, especially through reflective interference on the part of man with natural conditions with the object of securing man's adaptation to a perfectly universal environment. But while we cannot see any end of a progressive or dynamic civilization, it is evident that just as fast as adaptation is secured to life conditions in any given group, there will be a tendency again for habitual tendencies to predominate; and this is

to be welcomed, because, so far as we can see, adaptation is not an end in itself in the social life-process. Social equilibrium and stability are desirable not less than social change and adaptation. Every dynamic condition of society, therefore, looks forward to the reëstablishment for a greater or less length of time of static conditions of a higher type than those which preceded.

Radicalism and Conservatism in Society.—If human society alternates between periods of relative stability, or habit, and periods of relative instability, or adaptation, we should expect that these tendencies of the social life would appear in the character of individuals. We should expect some individuals to show more the habitual or static aspect of the social life, others to show more of the adaptive or dynamic aspect, for individuals in society are unequally exposed to the different factors which influence social change. This is exactly what we find. All social populations are divided more or less into conservatives and radicals, the conservatives being anxious to maintain the status in which things are found, the radicals believing in change. Of course, under certain social conditions, the conservatives, who, we may say, stand for social habit and represent, therefore, the habit type of mind, dominate; while under other conditions, the radicals, who stand for social change and so represent the adaptive type of mind, are in the ascendency.

Whether particular persons are conservatives or radicals will depend, of course, upon their mental make-up and upon their exposure to certain social influences. Biological make-up in the way of natural tendencies to variability has, of course, something to do with determining whether a person is conservative or radical. Most usually, however, the influence of the social environment, especially of education and economic conditions, will have the controlling influence. Those persons with whom existing institutions work badly will under ordinary circumstances

become the advocates of social change, and, under certain conditions, may become extreme radicals or revolutionaries, in ways which we have already described.

Both radicalism and conservatism, therefore, are simply expressions of tendencies of the social life, and in their interpretation are to be brought into line with the general theory of habit and adaptation in human society. The absurdity of extreme forms of either radicalism or conservatism must be manifest when we consider the rôle of habit and adaptation in the social life. No society could long exist in which habit wholly predominated and the power of adaptation had been lost. On the other hand, no society that is in a continual process of change or adaptation, which is always without a settled condition of its institutions, can possibly achieve anything worth while. Society cannot exist, therefore, without conservative tendencies, on the one hand, nor without radical and progressive tendencies on the other. Both are necessary for that wholesome alternation of condition and change, habit and adaptation, which makes up the normal life of human groups.

The Rhythm of Individualization and Socialization.—Finally it may be pointed out that the alternation of individualization and socialization in human society which Ratzenhofer has specially emphasized [1] is closely connected with this matter of social habit and adaptation. In periods when social habits are relatively fixed and stable the individual becomes seemingly simply an element in a static social order. The adaptation of the individual to the social order is so complete that he seems to lose a great measure of his individuality. Controlled by social habit he seemingly becomes a very insignificant element in the vast social mechanism. On the other hand in periods when social habits break down and there is necessity of social readjustment there is opportunity for the individual to assert himself. At such times the individual becomes

[1] *Sociologische Erkenntnis*, pp. 201–4.

more or less free from the domination of custom, tradition, folkways and even the recognized institutions of social control. The individual is thrown back upon his own instincts, habits, feelings, beliefs and ideas. Under such circumstances individualism grows and its growth may even become a menace to the reëstablishment of stable relations between the members of the group and between the group and its life conditions. Individualism may, therefore, tend toward social anarchy, that is, the dissolution of the whole social order. Sooner or later, however, as we have already emphasized, some adaptation of the individuals to each other and to their environment must be made, if not upon a higher plane than the previously existing social order, then upon a lower plane.

Hence the alternation between periods of individualization and socialization, like the alternation between critical and constructive periods, appears inevitable in human society, because it is based upon the rhythm of habit and adaptation in all individual and social development. But the outcome, whether of a higher social life or a lower social life, is altogether something within rational control. If there is too great socialization of the individual he loses individual initiative, becomes a mental and moral weakling, and the resulting social order is static, changing only to revert to a still lower type. On the other hand, if there is too great individualization, the individual sets himself up as a law unto himself. There results unending conflict of social habits and ultimately social dissolution, with inevitable reversion to a lower type of order when order is restored. If a society is to remain in a healthy condition, therefore, neither individualization nor socialization must be carried too far. Individualization must be such as to develop individual initiative, mental and moral character and yet prepare the individual for the highest coördination of his activities with the activities of other individuals. Socialization must aim, therefore, not at de-

stroying the initiative, freedom, and personal moral character of individuals, but must aim at creating in them a strong mental and moral character which will spontaneously and harmoniously adjust itself to the highest needs of the social life. Individualism of the right sort is necessary for any high type of social life. On the other hand, socialization is necessary for any sort of social order. Not an absolute individualism nor an absolute collectivism, but a socialized individualism and an individualized collectivism must be the rational aim of civilized societies.

Individualism and collectivism are, therefore, merely abstractions from the social life-process just like radicalism and conservatism. Neither can exist in its pure form in human society. The absurdity of either an absolute individualism or an absolute socialism as a practical social creed must be manifest. While the danger of present civilized societies seems to be from an excessive individualism, which at times seems to threaten to dissolve all existing institutions, yet it is evident that these societies could readily go to the other extreme, and that a socialism which would suppress individual initiative and lay no emphasis upon the mental and moral character of the individual is a very real danger which threatens in the future. The evident solution must be some form of education which while socializing the individual will at the same time develop a high type of individual character, thus assuring the continuation of social order and progress.

Summary.—This chapter, as its title indicates, has brought us into the heart of sociology and all of its difficulties. All are agreed that the social life is possible only through the mental interaction of individuals. This means that the social process must be described in essentially psychological terms. If sociology is to become a science, it must find, therefore, some psychological universal to explain social condition and change, social structure and functioning. Three possibilities present themselves in the

search for such universal principles of explanation in psychology according to the development of psychology itself. First, psychology may develop along mechanistic lines, in which case the universal, or principle of explanation, of social phenomena is to be sought in the physio-chemical processes of the nervous system.[1] In this case psychology resolves itself into the physiology of the brain and nervous system, and consciousness is not a factor, performs no work, in the social life. The second possibility is that psychology may develop along absolutely indeterministic lines and itself offer no universal principle of explanation for either individual conduct or the social life. In this case consciousness is essentially a lawless factor, and neither psychology nor sociology can become sciences in the strict sense. The third possibility, and the one which has been adopted in this book as most in accord with common experience and with the developments of modern psychological science, is that psychology will accept the functional point of view, that consciousness does work, does function, and as such has a survival value in the life-process; but that consciousness in its functioning is itself regular and does its work within universal organic processes, especially the processes of habit and adaptation. In this case sociology must find its universal in the processes of habit and adaptation in which consciousness appears as a mediating, guiding and controlling element. The social life being itself a form of adaptation, a coadaptation of individuals, can be understood psychologically only by locating its phenomena within the processes of habit and adaptation. This is what we have attempted to do in the first half of this chapter; but certain other equally valid ways of looking at the social life from the standpoint of functional psychology remain to be indicated.

[1] This would seem to be the position of my colleague, Professor Max Meyer, in his recent work on *The Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior.*

CHAPTER VIII (*continued*)

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY: SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL

In the first part of this chapter we have attempted to state the social process very largely in objective terms, that is, in terms of social coördination, social habit and social adaptation. It is, of course, possible to state the same facts in various subjective terms. Especially valuable is it to look at the whole process of social coördination and adaptation from the standpoint of the control which the group has over its own activities and the activities of its members. We shall therefore attempt to give a partial statement of the social life-process in terms of the social control of activity.

Social Self-Control.—In Chapter VII, we pointed out that collective control of the life-process in all of its phases has been aimed at by social groups from the beginning. This collective control of life-processes, which involves what we may call social self-control, is evidently an aspect of social coördination; for we could not have a coördination of the activities of individuals without some control over those activities. In the lower forms of social life control over collective activities is purely instinctive; but in human social life this instinctive control is gradually replaced by intelligent and purposive control. Human societies, therefore, undertake more or less consciously, to shape and mold the habits and even the beliefs, desires and ideals of their members, so that their activities may be easily and advantageously coördinated. Thus arise

the phenomena of social control, studied so fruitfully by Professor Ross, in his work on *Social Control,* and more recently by Professor Giddings in a paper on " Social Self-Control." [1]

In a sense social control is characteristic of all social groups whatsoever. Group action, except perhaps in its simplest forms, is impossible without some degree of collective control. But it is only in human groups with their self-conscious units that we get conscious and deliberate, though still perhaps more or less instinctive, attempts to control the activities of the individual. Human societies, therefore, from the first present the phenomena of authority and of social discipline. If an individual varies too greatly from the standards of his group, if he refuses to coördinate his activities in harmonious ways with the members of his group, he is punished; and from childhood to the grave the individual is surrounded with stimuli of all sorts, though chiefly in the way of rewards and penalties, to get him to coördinate his activities advantageously with those of his group. As Professor Giddings says, " The creation and perfecting of discipline, the standardizing of conduct and character by means of discipline, has been the work upon which society has directed its conscious efforts from the beginning." [2]

All of this of course involves social constraint upon the individual. Long ago Professor Durkheim claimed that such constraint was the distinguishing fact of society, the criterion of the social. While we cannot agree to this, yet it is evident that social constraint must be present in all social groups whose members have been in any degree individualized. And with the greater individualization of the units of civilized societies, apparently more and subtler forms of social constraint are necessary in order to get the

[1] *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. XXIV, pp. 569–88.
[2] *Loc. cit.,* p. 579.

individual to conform his conduct to the standards of his group. While these constraints may exceed the limits of wisdom, may prevent fruitful variations, that is, may maintain social coördinations which are no longer best adapted to life conditions, as we have just seen, yet unquestionably such social constraints are necessary to carry on a collective life-process at all, and are, therefore, on the whole, beneficent to the individual as well as to the group.

"Conscious of the usefulness of solidarity," as Professor Giddings says, "the group, as it becomes self-conscious, endeavors by definite policies so far to prescribe individual conduct as to control and limit variation from type. Society thus becomes a type-conforming group of associates."[1] But it is not for the end of simply maintaining a type that societies attempt to control conduct; for a certain amount of variation, of difference, in social groups is desirable and even necessary; rather it is for the sake of carrying on a collective life-process which involves ever more complex coördination of individual activities. As the collective life-process becomes more complex social activities and habits must be brought more vividly to consciousness for the sake of controlling those activities and habits. Hence, human societies enter upon definite conscious policies of social control, and some of the most important institutions of human society are devoted to developing and perfecting means of social self-control. These are the so-called regulative institutions of society.

The Function of Government and Law.—Chief among these institutions are government and law. Evidently the function of government, as the name implies, is to regulate, that is, to coördinate and integrate the activities of social groups. Definitely organized government in human society, according to anthropological evidence, seems to have arisen mainly through military necessities. Only when war-

[1] *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909, p. 86.

fare became common, that is, only when their safety was threatened, did human groups establish permanent authorities to more strictly coördinate and direct the activities of their individual members, particularly with reference to external enemies. But while government had its origin in military necessities, in all civilized societies it has undertaken the more positive work of coördinating and controlling the activities of the members of its group, first, with reference to securing internal order, and then with reference to social welfare generally. This last work of controlling the whole collective life-process in the interest of the well-living of its individual members, as Aristotle saw, seems to be the ultimate function of government in human societies. Government, therefore, becomes the chief regulative organ of civilized societies, and its work in the social life has been not inappropriately compared to the work in the body of the higher coördinating centers of the brain and nervous system.

Closely connected with government, though having to some extent independent origin, is law. Law undoubtedly had its origins in custom, as the work of all the legal historians and sociologists has shown. Law is, therefore, closely connected with social habit, and if connected with habit, inasmuch as all habits are ultimately based upon instincts, then connected also with instinct. Formal laws are, then, merely social habits brought to consciousness for the sake of greater control over the habit. In all social groups individuals vary in their habits and some vary beyond the limits which are judged necessary for group safety. Law is established, then, in its statutory and common law forms for the sake of effecting a higher degree of social self-control and of constraining individuals that vary from the standards which are recognized as necessary to carry on the collective or group life. In other words, laws exist for the sake of maintaining a given social organization or social order, though in recent times they have come to be used as

a means of coercing a variant social minority to coördinate their activities with those of a social majority. Law, in other words, has become a chief means by which government integrates and coördinates social activities. Consequently, laws which represent the habits of only a minority of a population are not easily enforced; at least, not in democratic communities where popular will and public sentiment are the chief means of social coercion.

The whole structure of the law is designed, on the one hand, to restrain the activities of individuals so as to prevent too great a departure from type, and, on the other hand, to coördinate the activities of individuals so as to carry on successfully a collective life-process. On account of its very nature, however, law is necessarily limited as an instrument of social control to overt acts of omission or commission.

Systems of Intercommunication and of Education.—In large complex social groups the coördination of the activities of a vast number of individuals would be impossible without a highly developed system of intercommunication between the individual units. Modern civilized societies could scarcely survive without such systems of intercommunication, for only with the help of these elaborate means of interstimulation is it possible for them to carry on their complex life-process. It is not necessary to dwell in detail upon the coördinating and integrating effect upon large masses of individuals of the stimuli communicated by the press, the telegraph, the telephone and other devices; for that has often been done. It is only necessary to point out that these devices were not invented and popularized merely for individual convenience, but rather as necessary means of achieving social coördination, social solidarity, social unity, in large and complex groups.

In the same way systems of education are necessary for the survival of large and complex groups. In such groups the opportunities for individual variation and differentia-

tion, and hence for the conflict of habits, greatly increase. While this can be overcome in part by government, law, religion and other agencies of social control, it can be radically overcome only by a system of education which will coördinate each individual effectively with the group before he actively participates in the carrying on of the collective life-process. Systems of education have not been created for the training and development of individuals as such, but rather to fit individuals for membership in society, that is, to control the process by which they acquire habits, so that they shall advantageously coördinate their activities with those of their group. Such social education remains, however, relatively an ideal in modern societies; for under the influence of philosophical individualism in the Nineteenth Century education became essentially an individualizing rather than a socializing process. Hence, many of the inharmonious adjustments between individuals in modern society.

The Function of Religion and Moral Ideals.—Finally, the function of religion and morality in the social life as regulative institutions needs to be noted. Religion is essentially an emotional attitude toward the universe, especially toward unknown powers or agencies which are supposed to be behind its phenomena. Practically, religion is a desire to come into right relations with these unknown powers or agencies. In all ages and among all peoples, therefore, religion has been a powerful instrument of social control, because it adds a supernatural sanction to conduct. The supernatural sanction of religion in the early stages of social development is especially seen in maintaining the social order, for the religious attitude of mind very generally attaches itself, at least in its earlier developments, to habits of action which have been found to be safe and to conduce to individual and social welfare. On account of the powerful reënforcement which religion gives to custom and other forms of social habit, it has frequently been, as we have

already seen, one of the main factors in producing social immobility or a static condition of society. For this reason many writers have seen in religion only a conservative force which tends always to be an impediment to progress. Even so, however, religion is such a powerful instrument of social control that such a writer as Ward can characterize it as the force which holds the social world in its orbit.

However, this view of religion as tending simply to maintaining existing social coördinations is but half of the truth. Religion is an instrument of social control in a higher sense also. All of the more highly developed religions at least are closely connected with social idealism. This is seen not only from the character of their divinities, which usually represent ideals of individual character, but also from the character of their heavens, which are always pictures of ideal societies. The religious sanction early becomes attached to idealistic morality; and moral ideals, for the mass of every civilization, seem to get their chief significance and sanction from religion. Moreover, the higher types of religion are powerful preventives of social pessimism, for they combat the idea that the misery and suffering of life are without meaning and value. Religion thus becomes a powerful instrument of social control for the adult individual. It gives meaning to life, encourages hope and strengthens loyalty to high social ideals. Thus it gives stability to character and not only makes possible stable and harmonious coördinations between individuals but also stimulates relations of a higher type. This is especially true of the Christian religion, the distinctive social merit of which seems to be that it stimulates especially the altruistic impulses and feelings of the individual; and, as we have already implied, it is only the highest development of the sympathetic feelings and altruistic impulses which is equal to the task of creating the highest type of social relations among individuals.

The chief social value of religion, then, is in supporting

moral ideals. These moral ideals are merely social ideals. They are standards of conduct or of behavior which society has reflected upon and sanctioned. In the low stages of mental and social development morality is therefore scarcely more than custom. The folkways, as Professor Sumner has insisted, become the *mores,* as soon as they are thought of in connection with social welfare.[1] The *mores* of low civilizations and of the masses of all civilizations may not be, therefore, greatly in advance of the actual social life; but through intellectual development and with the aid of religion moral ideals of a higher sort come in time to be widely accepted, ideals which represent not simply the order of things but an ideal order. The function of systems of morality is not only, then, to maintain social habits which have been found safe and useful, but also to secure higher types of coördinations between individuals. The virtues bind men together in harmonious social relationships. Things which conduce to social harmony and to social survival receive powerful social sanction, and these moral standards become powerful instruments of social control, the control extending not only to the overt acts of the individuals but to mental attitudes, motives and intentions. Thus moral ideals come to be formed which function toward a higher type of social life; and idealistic morality, coalescing with religion, comes to be rightly regarded not only as a device for maintaining social order, but also as an instrument for securing the highest type of social progress, that is, progress in harmonious adjustment of individuals to one another.

Social Maladjustment.—Social maladjustment in complex societies may spring from many causes. It may result from the failure of the regulative institutions or machinery of society to control the habits and character of individuals, so that they successfully coördinate their activities. But it

[1] *Folkways.* pp. 30f.

may also result from weakness of the individual, whether hereditary or acquired, physical or mental. Individual variation, in other words, springing from sources more or less independent of social conditions, may give rise to individual defects in body or mind which are fruitful causes of social maladjustment. However, the bulk of social maladjustment in modern civilization more probably springs from faulty social arrangements, especially from faults in the economic organization of society and in the training of the young.[1] Especially is it due to lack of adequate stimulation, training and education to make the individual acquire the habits and ideals of his group, so that he shall be able to participate effectively in the carrying on of the collective life-process. In complex social life there are, of course, many social conditions which may make it impossible for the individual to adjust himself to these conditions, or to the institutions and order of society generally. These conditions destroy the individual's power of harmonious adjustment, either through giving him habits which are not adapted to a high type of social life, or through compelling him to live in such circumstances that his normal bodily and mental development cannot be secured. Hence we have the genesis in modern societies of disproportionate numbers of dependent persons on the one hand, and of delinquent persons on the other, along with a class of more or less hereditary defectives. Such socially unadjusted persons, if their numbers sufficiently increase, menace the very existence of the societies of which they are a part; for besides the burden which they impose on the socially normal part of the population, there is always danger that the social degeneracy which they represent will spread to the whole population, rendering it incapable of complex adjustments or coördinations of activity. It is evidently the social function of philanthropy to reclaim to society, if

[1] Cf. Devine, *Misery and Its Causes*, Chap. I.

it can, these socially unadjusted classes, and if it cannot, to seclude them from free social life.

The revolt of a large number of persons to an established social order can hardly be considered a case of social maladjustment. It is rather the sign of the bad working or breaking down of social habits for a portion of the population. Usually it is, therefore, the forerunner of more or less social reconstruction. It is conceivable, however, that social revolt and opposition in some cases means nothing more than the love of opposition and conflict for its own sake. It is also conceivable that the exceptional individual, the genius, may be out of adjustment with his social order because he perceives an ideal social order, better social coördinations, beyond the capacities of his group. In both of these cases, however, the resulting social maladjustments are rarely serious.

Group Will and Group Individuality.—All human social groups elaborate what may be called a group will; that is, as has already been implied, they act to a certain extent as individuals, and acting as individual units they come to have a sort of individuality or *quasi*-personality. This follows from what has been said concerning the activities of individuals of social groups being necessarily coördinated in certain definite ways to carry on a common life-process. That is, they must be brought to a unity of aim, and therefore, of purpose. In human groups, these aims become conscious and accentuated by habit. Hence it comes about that human groups frequently have quite as distinct characters as individuals. The individuality of national groups is especially pronounced on account of the relative independence and high degree of unity of those groups.

The phenomena of group will and group individuality are an outcome, the student will note, of the coördination of the activities of the individuals in the group in certain definite ways. Group will, and so also " popular " will, is,

therefore, a very definite matter, and needs to be borne in mind in all study of the social life. By group individuality or personality we mean nothing more than that the activities of the members of a group are coördinated in certain definite, and usually in certain conscious ways, and that these have become so habitual that they give a fixed character to the group as a whole.

From the fact that groups act and behave as individuals do with reference to their life conditions, it follows that groups as well as individuals, as we have already noted, may exhibit selfishness or egoism in extreme degrees. Indeed, all social groups tend to consider their own collective life as of paramount importance, and "success at any price" may as easily become the watchword of groups as of individuals. Hence the danger to cultural and national groups and to humanity of the egoism of minor groups. Parties frequently set themselves above the country which they are supposed to serve. Religious denominations and sects have repeatedly in history been guilty of making the interest of their sect the final criterion of right conduct. Moreover, all institutions, although primarily but sanctioned forms of association, tend to become identified with "interest groups," and make themselves rather than the larger social life of which they are a part, an end. Even institutions of learning have been known to make their life an end in itself apart from the larger life of humanity. Thus, it is evident that group individuality is liable to become exaggerated into what we might call group individualism, or group egoism, and become an even greater peril to the larger collective life than the egoism of individuals.

Interest Groups.—Every social group of any size tends to differentiate and split apart into several competing groups, owing to the inevitable variation in the life conditions and activities of a number of individuals. Those whose activities are naturally most harmonious, that is, most easily

and spontaneously coördinate in carrying on certain phases of the life-process, tend to form groups of individuals whose activities are closely coördinated, and whose habits vary in certain distinctive ways from the larger group of which they are a part.[1] These subordinate social groups are usually called parties, factions, classes or "gangs"; but since interest is the subjective side of activity, they may be, and in sociological literature usually are, called "interest groups."

Interest groups are, then, subordinate groups of individuals whose activities are coördinated, either purposely or unconsciously, to achieve certain more or less definite ends in the collective life-process. While the end to be achieved may be at first very vague, yet through competition and conflict with other groups the end may become sharply defined in the consciousness of the individuals who make up the group. In the same way the interest group achieves organization and a relative degree of solidarity; for it is the strain and stress of competition, and of danger, as we have seen, which tightens the bonds of groups and unifies them. In other words, when groups in the face of great difficulties attempt to do certain things they can only do them by the closest coördination of the activities of individuals, by what we in ordinary language call "team work." This implies that each individual lose his personality, as it were, in his group, that is, subordinate his activities completely to those of the larger unity; it implies great collective control of individual activities, on the one hand, and great social self-control, in the sense of close and harmonious coördination of all the activities of the group, on the other. Like individuals, under such circumstances, interest groups develop a definite direction and purpose in their activities and a definite unified character. In other

[1] One of the best recent studies of the formation of groups is Dr. George E. Vincent's paper on "The Rivalry of Groups" (*American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1911).

words, they develop a group will and a group individuality. Like individuals, too, they develop, under such circumstances, tendencies to aggrandize and exploit, and to accept no standards but success and self-interest. That is, they develop group egoism.

All that has been said thus far concerning the development of solidarity and unity in interest groups applies equally to national groups. It is of importance chiefly because Gumplowicz and other sociologists of the "conflict school" have carried to an extreme the doctrine of the solidarity and egoism of interest groups.[1] These sociologists proclaim that the national group is nothing but a balance of competing interest groups; that it is out of an unmitigated conflict of classes and races that the structure of national governments arise; and that they represent nothing but an equilibrium or compromise between such conflicting "interests." The followers of Marx also advocate the view that there has been no other force in human history than the conflict of classes, of economic interest groups. As opposed to this doctrine of the absolute solidarity and unlimited egoism of interest groups, it must be said that, while there is always danger that the members of a class, a party, or a faction, may forget the larger social unity which they are supposed to serve, yet normally the members of such interest groups have their activities far more coördinated with the larger social whole than with the subordinate interest group. In other words, the whole personality of the individual is usually not surrendered to his class or his party, but a part of his activities, and usually the more important part, remain harmoniously coordinated with those of the larger group. Normally, then, an interest group will not push its victory to extreme limits. The doctrine of the absolute egoism of groups, and that political structures are a balance of the egoistic pressure

[1] Cf. the discussion in Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 272–90.

of one group upon another, is, therefore, without any adequate foundation in fact. Even in the case of the relations between national groups, where the doctrine of a balance between absolute egoisms should apply if anywhere, it is doubtful if it applies. More and more a larger proportion of the inhabitants of civilized countries, under the influence of humanitarian education and ideals of universal altruism, are seeking to coördinate their activities, not simply with their class, their nation, or even their race, but with humanity as a whole. Civilized nations, on account of the influence of these enlightened few, no longer dare to push to the limit any advantage which they may have over weaker nations.

"Stratified" and Compound Societies.—Groups enter into and form coördinations with other groups as individual units. Thus are formed all sorts of compound societies. In some cases such groups were originally separate, and do not lose their identity to any extent in the larger group, but remain separate and distinct. The familiar historical example is where one people has conquered another, and the subjugated are reduced to a subject or slave class. In such cases caste lines are apt to continue indefinitely to separate the several groups. What we have, therefore, in such cases is a coördination between groups, usually in the form of the exploitation of a weaker class by a stronger. The coördinations between the members of the two classes will all tend to be of the same general type, while within each class between its members will develop varied coördinations according to life conditions. Only in the ruling class, however, can the mechanism of social coördination and of social change be fully developed and function freely. Hence the whole psychology of group action, group organization, and social change which we have just set forth would have to be considerably modified if applied to "caste" or compound societies. In such cases there seems to be considerable warrant for the doctrine of absolute group ego-

ism, and it is worthy of note that this doctrine originated where such societies have existed more or less down to the present—in East Europe.

Limitations of a Functional Interpretation of Social Phenomena.—The interpretation of social life and processes which has thus far been offered has been strictly functional. However, it must be pointed out that such a functional interpretation has certain limitations. All processes in organic nature tend, as it were, to overflow their limits of utility; that is, nature's method seems to be to produce a superabundance so that actual functional needs will be certain of being met. The functional interpretation of such things in society as communication, imitation and conflict, therefore, breaks down at certain points. We communicate, for example, oftentimes when we have no need of doing so in order to carry on a common life-process. We talk with each other merely for the sake of talking without reference to the functioning of any coördinated activities. The process of communication has, therefore, been to a certain extent freed from life needs and life conditions. Nevertheless, to acknowledge this in no way overthrows the view of communication as having to do with the carrying on of common life-processes. Even if communication often does exist in human society for its own sake, from the point of view of the origin and development, structure and function of society, we may say that communication is a device, primitively and also dominantly at the present time, for the carrying on of a common life-process in a group of individuals.[1]

Again, while serious conflict arises in social groups mainly through the failure to build up new harmonious coordinations, yet we have to recognize that there is a certain amount of conflict in modern societies which is carried on

[1] Ross's criticism of a functional interpretation of social activities (*Foundations*, p. 154) is, of course, based upon too narrow a conception of function.

as it were for its own sake. Conflict, with some persons, has become an end in itself, and their love of conflict for its own sake leads them into all sorts of needless oppositions with other individuals. In other words, the combative instinct in some persons may become so greatly exaggerated that they take delight in conflict as such, without any reference to the life-process. This is as true of nations even as of individuals. History is filled with examples of such conflicts that are apparently meaningless from the standpoint of the carrying on of a collective life, although we should be cautious about interpreting conflicts of larger groups of individuals as belonging to this type. Even admitting, however, the existence of these meaningless conflicts between individuals, interest groups, and national groups, this by no means overthrows the view that conflict is primitively and dominantly a matter associated with the carrying on of a common life; that conflict is in the main either an expression of struggle between two competing independent groups, or else an expression of failure to maintain or build up harmonious coördinations between individuals belonging to the same group.

The Limits of Social Coördination and of the Complexity of Social Organization.—It is manifest that at any particular stage of the mental and moral development of the individual there are limits to social coördination and hence to complexity of social organization. The higher types of social coördination require a corresponding development in the intelligence and self-control of the individuals concerned. Hence, also, the more complex types of social organization require a similar development in individuals. It is not true, therefore, that social evolution can proceed independently of individual evolution. Upon the mental and moral development of the individual depends the height to which the complexity of social organization can be carried. The nature of the individual, therefore, marks the limits of social evolution at any particular stage. If

individual character and intelligence cannot be raised to meet the requirements which high types of social coördination and organization impose, then social organization must drop back to lower levels. If the social organization of any people, accordingly, becomes so complex that the character and intelligence of its constituent individuals are unable to meet its requirements, then such social organization must disappear, and there is a chance that in the process of social dissolution the people or nation itself may likewise disappear. While a people's social organization may therefore be much lower than their fully developed mentality and moral character is capable of sustaining, yet it is an old truth, and one well worth emphasizing, that any great advance in social evolution must ultimately depend upon raising the moral character of the individuals concerned.

Summary.—Activity is fundamental in the social life as well as in mental life. It is the coördination of the activities of the individual units which makes social life possible. The social coördination is, then, fundamental in any interpretation of the social life from the standpoint of activity or function. Ideas, feelings, and mental attitudes generally, are secondary, because these are merely mediatory of the social activities made possible by the coördination of innumerable individual activities. The social activities that persist, the more or less permanent social coördinations, resting upon habitual activities or attitudes in the individual, may be appropriately called "social habits." These social habits must continually be changed in order to adjust groups to new life conditions. Changes are made in group habits, collective adaptations are made to new life conditions, through various forms of interstimulation and response, especially through communication. Communication, suggestion and imitation are mainly devices to carry on a collective life—that is, they exist because of the social life and are its instruments. It follows that anything which

interferes seriously with the mechanism of social adaptation is liable to produce abnormal conditions of the social life and ultimately profound social disturbances. A certain rhythm is to be observed in institutions, and in social life generally, periods of criticism and confusion due to the breaking down of social habits, being followed by the building up of new habits and institutions which, when established, result in relatively long periods of social stability.

In order to carry on any collective life-process, except of the simplest sort, societies must control the activities of their individual members. All social coördination, beyond simple, instinctive sorts, necessitates collective control of individual activities. Hence the phenomena of authority, social control, and social constraint in human groups. Moreover, as social groups take on more complex activities, conscious social self-control becomes increasingly necessary; and in the more highly organized societies, therefore, social discipline of all sorts—government, law, education, morality and religion—become increasingly important. Conscious of the direction and purpose of their activities, human groups take on a definite character. They develop a conscious group will, and a well-marked individuality, which often becomes exaggerated. But the whole process of the developing social life is strictly limited and conditioned at any given time by the mental and moral character of the individual units.

Just the part played in the social life by the various psychic elements in the individual, such as instinctive impulse, feeling and intelligence, must now be examined before we can construct a theory of social order and progress.

CHAPTER IX

THE RÔLE OF INSTINCT IN THE SOCIAL LIFE [1]

THERE can be no psychology of the associational process, and hence no adequate sociology, until we can answer the question, What part does instinct play in guiding and shaping that process? While we have already discussed this problem to a certain extent and indicated roughly our view, we need now to examine more in detail the relation between instinct and social life.

It is said by some that instinct is a word which merely serves to cover our ignorance; that when we have explained anything through instinct we really have no explanation and that a sociology which employs such a term must be either very incomplete or very metaphysical in character.[2] In reply, it may be said that the psychological sociologist who bases his interpretation upon modern psychology has no alternative but to employ the word instinct. Modern psychology has given a perfectly definite connotation to this term, as we have already seen, and while the biological

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[1] Perhaps the better title of this chapter would be "The Rôle of Instinctive Impulse in the Social Life"; but as most psychologists use the term "instinct" in such a broad way as to make it synonymous with instinctive impulse, this usage has been followed. Those who prefer, therefore, may read "instinctive impulse" wherever the term "instinct" is used.

[2] Cf. the remarks of Professor Kelsey, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, p. 616. The question at issue is, of course, the old question of the importance and extent of the innate in man. See the writer's article on "The Instinctive Element in Human Society" in the *Popular Science Monthly* for March, 1912.

sociologist may properly refuse to allow the term instinct to stop his investigations, the psychological sociologist, on the contrary, when he has reduced social phenomena to psychological terms cannot be said to have any further duty. Of course, instincts are determined by selective processes in nature, and therefore can always themselves be explained by the biologist, or in the case of human society, by the biological sociologist; but when the psychological sociologist has pushed back his explanation to the biological process of selection that is as far as he can reasonably be required to go. Certainly a psychological theory of society that did not take into account such instincts as mother love, combativeness, acquisitiveness and the like, would be a very one-sided intellectualistic sort of theory. To understand human society on its spiritual side, we must begin, therefore, with the human instincts.

Recognitions of Instinct in Historical Social Theories.— The instinctive, or the inborn, has been more or less recognized in all theories of the social life since Aristotle, which take into consideration more than the intellectual elements. Aristotle's theory of society, indeed, may be said to have been that society was of an instinctive nature. From Aristotle down to modern times society has been explained more or less in terms of a so-called social instinct or instincts. The trouble with this theory of earlier social philosophy is manifestly that it based society upon one or more specific instincts, whereas, as we have seen, all man's instincts have been modified by his social life, and he enters into social relations not through any one or even a few, but practically through all of his instincts.

As we have seen, the instincts of the individuals of a social species like man are made so that they fit into each other, as it were, and so provide certain social coördinations to start with. While such instincts as sociability further and make easy the process of coadaptation of individuals to one another in society, it is not true that the

social life rests upon some vague specialized social instinct or instincts. To a certain extent, therefore, the older way of explaining man's social life through social instincts was unscientific and perhaps might even be called metaphysical, although Comte, who was extremely keen in detecting anything metaphysical in science, accepted the general view that man is by nature a social animal.[1] There can be no objection, therefore, to the essence of Aristotle's instinctive theory of society. The objection is only to the crude statements which it has received at the hands of certain theorists.

Among practically all writers in the social sciences we find, indeed, more or less recognition, implicit or explicit, of instinct as a factor in the social life. This recognition, however, is often given in such a crude and vague way, as McDougall has shown, that the use of the term instinct by many of these writers must be regarded as highly unscientific.[2] Likewise, implicit recognitions of the instinctive elements in the social life have been also at times exceedingly crude. The earlier economists, for example, made much of certain " properties of human nature " such as the aversion to labor, the love of gain, and the like. Now, by properties of human nature one can only mean, in terms of modern psychology, inborn tendencies or capacities, that is, instincts in a very broad sense. All the explanations of the past in terms of such crude psychology must, of course, be replaced at present by explanations which conform to modern scientific psychology, if the social sciences themselves are to be made scientific.

Recognitions of Instinct in Recent Sociological Literature. —Comte fully recognized the importance of instinct in human society.[3] He blamed the social theorists of his day for

[1] Cf. *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. VI. Chap. V.

[2] *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 21, 22.

[3] See *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. V, Chap. VI. Comte anticipated the modern psychological doctrine of instinct. He defined instinct

accepting the " fanciful supposition that intellectual constructions governed the general conduct of human life." [1] Nevertheless, it may be said that in his own theorizing Comte quite lost sight of the principle which he had laid down, when he indulged in the fanciful supposition, not only that society could be organized on a basis of intellectual constructions, but that it had in all past stages been actually so organized.[2] Comte, however, may be pardoned for his inconsistency in finally accepting an intellectualistic interpretation of human society, for he had not modern psychology to guide him. But the modern sociologist who sets up intellectualistic theories of human society at the present time may be less easily pardoned; yet among modern sociologists there has been, down to recent years, but little recognition of the part played by instinct in shaping and molding our social life. Some sociologists, to be sure, like Professor Ward, have emphasized the " unconscious " character of social progress in the past and of many present social processes,[3] and by this unconscious element in society they seem to mean very largely, an instinctive or biological element. In Ward's sociological theories this is still more evident by the use which he makes of " desire " in his social interpretations, for, as we have already seen, the desires are frequently more or less blind impulses connected with the instincts. In general, however, in sociological literature, there was

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as "any spontaneous [native?] impulse in a determinate direction," and even anticipated James's thesis that in this sense there were more instincts in man than in the brutes (*loc. cit.*). Comte got his view as to human instincts from Gall, who, as every student of the history of science knows, did much to put psychology on a scientific basis, though his just fame was long obscured by his connection with the pseudo-science of phrenology.

[1] *Op. cit.*, Bk. VI, Chap. V.

[2] See the discussion of Comte's "Law of the Three States" in Chapter XI.

[3] See, e.g., his *Pure Sociology*, pp. 250, 302–4, 545.

little adequate explicit recognition of the large part which instincts play in our social life down to the publication of McDougall's "Social Psychology" in 1908. While many scattered articles and passages had emphasized the importance of instinct in particular phases of the social life, McDougall's work first systematically attempted to show the bearing of instinct upon the social life as a whole and upon the social sciences.[1] After showing the large part which instinctive activities play in all social processes, McDougall concludes, "the springs of all the complex activities that make up the life of societies must be sought in the instincts, and in the other primary tendencies that are common to all men and are deeply rooted in the remote ancestry of the race."[2]

However great or small the part which instinct plays in human society, it is certainly necessary, if we are to study human society psychologically, to begin with the native elements found in the individuals which compose this society, and then to show the part they play in social organization.

Misconceptions of Instinct.—Much of the denial of any rôle whatever to the instincts in human social life has been due to many misconceptions of instinct. In the first place, many thinkers have conceived of instinct as some-

[1] While McDougall must be given the credit of being the first sociological writer to emphasize the fundamental importance of instinct in the social sciences, it is only fair to add that several teachers of sociology (including the present writer) had for many years done the same thing in their instruction. The common source of all ideas concerning the importance of instinct in human life among English-speaking psychologists and sociologists was, of course, James's well-known chapter on "Instinct" (Chap. XXIV) in his *Principles of Psychology*, which the student will do well to read even yet. Sociological writers of psychological training have accordingly long given more or less explicit recognition to the instinctive element in human society. See, e.g., Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Chap. I.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

thing hard and fast, as a definite, "crystallized," so to speak, mode of activity which characterizes only the lower animals.[1] These persons have in mind particularly the manifestations of instinct seen in insects and other lowly forms of life. It is true that in these low forms of life the inherited, preorganized forms of activity are hard and fast, and being so simple, are relatively definite. They, therefore, preclude all education; but as James and Thorndike and others have shown, in all the higher types of animals, on the contrary, instincts are almost never hard and fast and such as to preclude education. The instincts of many of the higher animals like the horse and the dog, for example, may be easily modified through training and experience in many ways. We must not, therefore, have the conception of instinct as a hard and fast, crystallized mode of action, for this is true only of instincts in the lower forms of life. There may be in the higher forms many preorganized activities without their being so definite as to preclude all modification, and hence all education.

Another misconception of instinct is that instincts express themselves without reference to the stimuli in the environment. That they are predetermined modes of activity with which the environment has nothing to do is, of course, not true of the instincts of any animals, and especially is it not true of the instincts of the higher animals. Instinctive activities never develop in the higher animals unless there are stimuli in the environment to develop them. While they are innate, complex, motor tendencies, they cannot set themselves off of themselves, so to speak, but are dependent for their development upon the appropriate stimuli in the objective world.

A third misconception is that instincts exclude consciousness and reason. We have already seen in a previous chap-

[1] This seems to be the conception of instinct held by Professor Lloyd Morgan. See his *Habit and Instinct* and his *Comparative Psychology.*

ter that the very reverse of this is the case. While a high degree of consciousness may not always attend instinctive activity, yet where any instinct in a higher animal is blocked, there is vivid consciousness through desire of the end sought; and reason, so far from being opposed to our instincts, as we have already seen, is very often merely an instrument in the carrying out of our instincts.

Instincts cannot be said, therefore, to be "blind" except in their beginnings and in the lower types of animals, although, of course, it is only the most highly developed mind that understands the meaning of instinct and perceives the biological ends involved in instinctive activities.

Another point which perhaps should be reëmphasized is that instincts in the higher animals and in most low animals only come gradually to expression. As Thorndike says, "there are all degrees of gradualness in the maturing of instincts."[1] Consequently it is only the mature individual who shows all of the instincts of his species, and even he may not show all in their full development, on account of the fact that the environment may not have afforded stimuli for their proper development, and also on account of the fact that organic variation may cause certain instincts to be weak or missing altogether in that particular individual. Thorndike goes so far as to say that there is probably "no instinct which is not entirely lacking in some individuals";[2] and this statement, though difficult to accept as regards some of the more fundamental instincts, is entirely in accord with what we know of variation in organic life.

[1] *Elements of Psychology*, p. 188.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 193. Cf. the remark of Royce (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 303): "In general our most important instincts appear slowly, bit by bit, not as at all finished tendencies to specific kinds of reaction, but as at first crude and awkward tendencies in the general direction of a given kind of action. The unfinished form in which the instincts appear in all the higher vertebrates seems to be of great importance for the development of the individual animal."

The Nature of Human Instincts.[1]—We are now prepared to see exactly the nature of man's instincts, and in what ways they differ from the instinctive activities of other animals, and particularly those of lower types of animals. In man, then, as in all the higher animals, there is a highly developed nervous system characterized by a multitude of more or less perfectly preorganized reactions.[2] These preorganized reactions have been established through the operation of selection upon variations in the hereditary elements, just as the bodily characteristics of the species have been established; and like the latter, they are transmitted from generation to generation. These hereditary reactions, as we have already noted, have been classified into reflex and instinctive, but for the sake of simplicity we shall call all of these inborn or preorganized activities instinctive. As noted, these native reactions are not in man fixed and unalterable, but are subject to modification or elimination, according to changes in the environment. Nor are these reactions always specific, but, as Thorndike says, "the majority of instincts are vague, variable, and rough-hewn"; "they are often *indefinite and general.*"[3] Strictly speak-

[1] The view of instinct here presented attempts to trace instincts no further back than the structure of the nervous system and the selective processes in nature which have determined that structure. As is well known, Professor Jacques Loeb has attempted definitely to connect animal instincts with the "tropisms" of organic matter (see especially the chapter on "The Theory of Animal Instincts" in his *Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology*). This theory, which would make instinct primarily a matter of organic chemistry, though apparently accepted by Royce (*Outlines of Psychology*), is very far from being accepted by psychologists generally. For criticism of the theory see Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, Chap. XIV.

[2] In addition to the authorities already mentioned the student will do well to read, for a simple description of the leading human instincts, Kirkpatrick's *Fundamentals of Child Study*, Chaps. III–XIII.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 189, 190.

ing, we have, therefore, in man no definite, hard and fast instincts such as characterize the lower types of animals. For that matter, this type of instinct, as we have already seen, is also rare in the higher animals. What we have in man is, rather, a complex series of more or less generalized instinctive reactions which fit man to cope with his environment fairly well from the start, and which, as we have already seen, are the basis of all of his mental life. The instinctive reactions in man are, therefore, but the starting point for his mental and social life. Upon them all habits must be built. Indeed, as Thorndike says, the instincts become "permanent property by being turned into habits."[1]

Nevertheless, these innate psycho-physical dispositions in man must be taken account of in all social theory and in all social practice. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to see in any concrete situation in human life just how much is to be ascribed to the innate and how much is to be ascribed to the acquired. However, even though we cannot quantitatively determine the relations between these two elements, it is important to know that they both exist and that the former is prior to the latter.

McDougall defines instinct as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action."[2] But this definition makes the conception of instinct needlessly complex, and McDougall himself is forced to admit that there are many instincts with no clearly defined emotions attached to them.[3]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

[2] *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 29.

[3] As Professor Mead says, McDougall has mixed up his doctrine of instincts with his doctrine of the emotions. While the emotions

Also he has to exclude, according to this definition, the more general or nonspecific tendencies of organic psychical life, such as imitation and sympathy; but McDougall's treatment of the matter shows that he regards the essence of instinct to be the "innate psycho-physical disposition." It seems, therefore, much better for the purpose of the sociologist to lump all of these innate tendencies of human nature together and call them instinctive tendencies, recognizing that there are in man, at least, few definite, specific instincts so well marked that we can point them out and say that this activity belongs to that particular instinct and that activity belongs to another. Rather, it is better to accept Thorndike's view that the majority of human instincts are vague, relatively nonspecific and rough-hewn; and instincts in this sense are, perhaps, as James has asserted, in man more numerous than in any other animal.

The Extent of Instinctive Activities in Human Life.— As we have already said, it is impossible to determine as yet, with any quantitative degree of exactness, the proportion of human activities that may be regarded as primarily instinctive. In general, we may regard those as instinctive which characterize the species, that is, which are relatively common to all men in all stages of culture. This, however, cannot be exactly true because different groups of man have been exposed to different selective influences. The different races, therefore, as we shall see, may well have certain differences in their instinctive reactions, and civilized man may have differences from uncivilized man. Indeed, the biological conception of instincts, as determined by the operation of selective processes upon hereditary elements, necessitates the view that instinctive

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are undoubtedly complexes of feeling attached to instinctive activities, it does not follow that every instinctive activity has a distinct characteristic emotion, or even that it has any emotion accompanying it whatsoever. See the discussion of the nature of feeling in Chapters VI and X.

reactions are continually being modified in all groups of man by selection. Various forms of social selection must have modified somewhat, therefore, the instinctive reactions in civilized man, as distinguished from the barbarian and the savage. We need have, accordingly, little hesitancy in affirming that those activities are instinctive or innate which are, with exceptions, common to a large majority of the species. We may also detect human instincts by comparing the activity of man with animals. Most of the human instincts have their parallel or counterpart in the instincts of the higher animals. Again, through child study it is possible to observe the unfolding of innate psycho-physical dispositions and tendencies where there has been no attempt to modify these through education, and in this way, from the study of the child and the adolescent, we may also perceive, with more or less clearness, some of the instinctive elements in human conduct and character. The task before us, therefore, in determining qualitatively, if not quantitatively, the rôle of the instincts in mediating coördinations of individual activity, in shaping forms of associations, and in molding human institutions is not an impossible one.[1]

Human Instincts and Human Institutions.—There can be no question that instinctive reactions are the basis of coordinations between individuals in society, that is, the basis of social relationships. Not only do many of the simpler forms of association spring directly from human instincts, but also the instincts or, rather, the feelings connected with instinctive activities, have been instrumental in securing those sanctions which give certain forms of association their institutional character. Human institutions rest, then, upon instincts, not merely as forms of association, but as

[1] Psychologists find also many other marks of instinctive reactions. As we have already noted, marked emotion is a frequent accompaniment of instinctive activities; and they seem to be invariably characterized by spontaneous or involuntary attention.

sanctioned forms, for the sanctions that are given in social life are as frequently instinctive as purely rational.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to trace out the instinctive elements in human institutions as they exist in modern civilized societies. This is not only due to the fact that instinctive reactions are overlaid with a mass of habits which we term custom and tradition, but also due to the very complexity of human instincts themselves. We cannot picture the relation of the various native reactions of man to one another as like that of the branches of a tree to each other and to some common trunk. Rather, instinctive activities coalesce, run into each other, and reenforce each other in such complex ways that we can find no figure in external nature to express it. Not only do certain instincts unite in certain modes of individual and social coördination, but they shift in their combinations of one with another so that in civilized society it is impossible to make out very simple and clearly defined instinctive activities, as we have already seen. The social consequence is that human institutions may be expressions of one or more simple instincts or of a number of instincts combined in various ways. The student must remember that we are considering living processes and not static structures, and that instinctive activities, like all living processes, are indefinitely complex and interdependent among themselves.

The consequence of this complexity of instinctive activities in man is that no satisfactory classification of human instincts has ever yet been proposed. Henry Rutgers Marshall has proposed to classify instincts into (1) instincts which preserve the life of the individual; (2) instincts which preserve the life of the species; (3) instincts which preserve the life of groups or societies.[1] While this is one of the most satisfactory classifications yet pro-

[1] See his *Instinct and Reason*, Chap. V, on "The Classification of the Instincts."

posed, it must be noted that it is not, by any means, a clear and exclusive classification. It is difficult to see, for example, whether certain instincts function most to preserve the life of the individual, of the species, or of the group. Others have proposed somewhat analogous classifications based upon the functional ends of instincts.[1] But these classifications are scarcely more satisfactory than that of Marshall. An ideal classification for sociological purposes would be, of course, to classify instincts according to the human institutions with which they are connected;[2] but the same instinct appears in so many institutions, and institutions are so frequently based on more than one instinct, that it is practically impossible to classify instincts in this way also. We shall, therefore, make no attempt to give a scientific classification of instincts either from a psychological or a sociological standpoint, but will content ourselves with noticing some of the principal activities of collective life and their connection with certain instincts.[3]

[1] See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, *Fundamentals of Child Study*, Chap. IV; Pyle in his *Outlines of Educational Psychology* (Chap. IV) follows a similar method.

[2] A very convenient classification of instinctive impulses which sociological writers frequently find necessary to employ is the classification into "social" or altruistic instincts, on the one hand, and individualistic or egoistic instincts, on the other. While there is no "social instinct," there are "social" instincts, including (1) those connected with the family group, (2) those connected with larger groups (e.g., gregariousness, love of approbation, self-subordination). The classification of man's natural tendencies into "social" and "antisocial" has, therefore, a certain psychological as well as practical justification. In a larger sense, of course, practically all of man's instincts are social, in that they presuppose an environment of other human beings.

[3] The discussion which follows concerning the relation of specific social activities with certain instincts is, of course, only tentative. Whether any certain alleged instinct is found later to exist or not cannot affect the general trend of the argument of the book. Intelligence, of course, continually functions along with instinctive impulse in any specific social activity, as has already been pointed out.

Instincts Connected with Nutrition.—Food supply, as we have already seen, is the main thing at any particular time in the carrying on of a collective life. Man, and all other animals, therefore, have strong instincts connected with the getting and keeping of a sufficient food supply. The hunting instinct which is so strong in primitive man becomes, perhaps, more or less transformed in modern society into a variety of economic impulses connected with the getting of a sufficient food supply. All races, however, whether obtaining food through hunting or not, seek instinctively to secure control over sources of food supply and to store up food. This leads man, and even some of the animals below man, to appropriate feeding grounds and to store food for unfavorable seasons. These feeding grounds and stored-up food supplies constitute the earliest wealth or property of human groups, though it is to be noted that this form of property is distinctly not private or personal property. Moreover, all of the higher types of animals, and especially such a highly developed type as man, must have instinctive tendencies to labor in order to secure food. While the older economists emphasized man's aversion to labor, there is unquestionably in man, and particularly in civilized man, an instinct to work under certain conditions or stimuli. The instinct to labor, primarily connected with the obtaining of food and with bodily nutrition, is something which must be taken into account in all social theory. Man cannot live without work. This has been demonstrated again and again when men are shut away from all forms of productive labor. While the instinct to work must have been originally connected with nutrition, it has, of course, in many of its higher developments, quite separated itself from nutritional functions.[1]

[1] See Professor Veblen's article on "The Instinct of Workmanship and the Irksomeness of Labor," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IV, pp. 187–201 (also referred to in his *Theory of the*

Many of the practical interests of social life gather, therefore, about food getting and the forms of labor necessary to get food. It is not difficult often to trace movements of population, such as migration and the like, to the food-getting impulses and the stimuli connected with food.[1] The more differentiated and individualized manifestations of this instinct we shall notice later.

The perversions of the instinctive impulses connected with food getting are numerous. Like all self-regarding impulses, they are liable to all sorts of egoistic exaggerations from gluttony to subtle kinds of self-aggrandizement and selfish exploitation of others. Begging and stealing may both be regarded as primarily perversions of the food-getting instinct, though often more immediately connected with the great semi-independent instinct of acquisitiveness which grows out of the food-getting impulses.

Instincts Connected with Reproduction.—More important in many ways to the social life than the instincts connected with nutrition are the instincts connected with reproduction. These are the foundation, not only of the family, but of all institutions connected with the care and education of children. We have under this head to do with two great primary instincts—the sexual instinct, or sex attraction, and the parental instinct, or maternal and paternal love. These instincts are relatively independent, and often differently developed in the same individual.[2] The sexual instinct is evidently the basis for that coördination between individuals of different sex which we term

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Leisure Class, pp. 15f.). Loeb in his *Comparative Physiology of the Brain* (p. 197) speaks approvingly of Veblen's theory and says: "One of the most important instincts is usually not recognized as such, namely, the instinct of workmanship. Lawyers, criminologists, and philosophers frequently imagine that only want makes man work. This is an erroneous view."

[1] For an example of this, see Woodruff, *The Expansion of Races.*

[2] Cf. the discussion on "The Reproductive and Parental Instincts" in McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (Chap. X).

sexual love, and which leads to marriage and the family. In furnishing a basis for such a primary and necessary coördination of individuals, sex attraction becomes one of the great primary forces in society,[1] and about it social life, especially that of the younger members of a group, largely centers. Remote manifestations of this instinct are not difficult to trace in practically all phases of the social life, as, for example, in the artistic and the religious. In all the larger natural groups of man this instinct must be strong enough to assure that each generation is slightly more numerous than the preceding, otherwise the group would soon become extinct; and the instinct is kept moderately strong by rigorous natural selection; for those in whom it is weak are apt to leave no offspring, while those in whom it is exaggerated are apt to leave only degenerate offspring. On account of the strength of the sexual instinct its control within the bounds of social utility has always been one of the most difficult problems of human society. Practically all social groups have attempted its control through custom, law, moral precepts or religious sanctions. As already pointed out, on account of its importance to the future and to the race, increasing social control over this instinct must characterize the more advanced stages of social evolution. The perversions of this instinct on account of its connection with the family and offspring are, perhaps, more dangerous to society's future than the perversions of any other.

While the sexual instinct leads to love and marriage, and so is the entrance to the family life, it is the parental instinct which gives stability to the family, and so is the

[1] Nontechnical writers on social matters, with a sanity sometimes not attained by professional sociologists, have always recognized this. Thus Professor Rauschenbusch justly remarks (*Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 272): "The attraction between men and women is just as fundamental a fact in the social life as the attraction of the earth is in physics."

real foundation of that institution in all ages and among all peoples.[1] This is shown, not only by the customs and laws of practically all peoples, but also by the fact that among both the civilized and the uncivilized childless couples separate much more readily than those that have children.

The parental instinct is noteworthy in that it is one of many instincts which differ in strength in the two sexes. Maternal love is notoriously stronger than paternal love. There can be no question, however, as to the instinctive character of paternal love, even though it appears to be often of a more deliberative and rational character. There was a time when even maternal love was thought to spring from such intellectual elements as the perception of the helplessness of the child, and the like. Such a shallow view of human nature failed to see entirely the biological springs of human passions, affections and emotions. It is safe to say that such a universal affection as paternal love is no less biological in its essential nature than maternal love, even though it may seem to have a larger rational and deliberative element in it.[2]

The parental instinct gives rise to a whole series of coördinations in society. Corresponding to the love of the parent is the filial love of the child, for the child no more needs to be taught to love its caretaker and protector than the parent needs to be taught to love the child. Among the children, too, develops that natural affection which we term brotherly love, and which later expands into the sentiment of kinship. The coördination between the parents also becomes more complex, as something more than sexual love now unites them. As in humanity, the care of the child is so long continued, this gives opportunities, as we have noted, to build up habits of service and self-sacrifice

[1] See the writer's discussion of this point in his *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Chap. IV.

[2] See McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

which few individuals would develop were there not such a powerful stimulus. Some psychologists, indeed, do not hesitate to trace all the altruism in society to extensions of the parental instinct. However this may be, the high development of parental and filial love is certainly necessary to any high development of sympathy and altruism in society generally. It has become a truism among sociologists that the family life is the chief generator of altruism in society;[1] and that the amount of altruism in any given society bears a close relation to the quality of its family life.

Instincts Connected with Self-Defense.—In the older works on social philosophy much is said of the instinct of self-preservation. But modern psychology has resolved this instinct into a number of instinctive impulses of different sorts. All animals have instinctive impulses to protect themselves from dangerous forces in the environment, which express themselves negatively in the instincts of flight and hiding, and positively by the tendency to fight or to defend themselves by physical force against enemies, whether of their own species or not. Chief among these instincts connected with self-defense is the fighting or combative instinct.

Conflict within a species, as we have already seen, may be considered the negative side of the food and reproductive processes; for, among individuals of a social species the occasions for combat are chiefly connected with the competition for food or mates, or with the protection of offspring. In social species, moreover, the fighting instinct is more apt to manifest itself collectively in the competition of groups for a common food supply.

On account of the strength of the instinct of pugnacity in man many have argued that primitively it must have been even stronger, and that the primitive condition must

[1] Cf. Comte's remark (*Positive Polity*, Vol. II, Chap. V): "In the family life alone can the social instinct find any basis for growth."

have been one of unmitigated struggle between individuals or groups of individuals. The erroneousness of this view has already been pointed out. Very few animals will fight unless they are attacked and especially not members of their own species. This seems to have been particularly true of primitive man. Not until the earth filled up and competition for food and territory became intense did man's full ferocity against his fellowmen develop. It is not improbable, therefore, that in the whole course of human evolution the fighting instinct has greatly increased in strength. While reaching its maximum expression in the barbarian stage of culture, even in civilized man this instinct is still unnecessarily strong. The unregulated struggle of our industrial, political and social life still causes, all too frequently, obscure ferocities between man and man which break out into crime, while modern nations seem ready to fly at each other's throats at the least provocation. The removal in society of unnecessary causes of conflict or of unnecessary stimuli to the fighting instinct is one of the greatest tasks of social and moral reform, while the avoidance of occasions for conflict between nations is one of the first tasks of modern statesmanship. On the side of the individual, likewise, the control and regulation of the fighting instinct, so that the individual may adjust himself properly to the members of his group, is one of the chief problems of education.

We have already pointed out the great rôle that conflict and the combative instinct have had in social evolution; how in social defense groups become knit together, better organized and more conscious of their collective life; how, also, in defensive or aggressive warfare the necessity of leadership and organization has greatly stimulated not only political development but all forms of social development as well. In these ways the fighting instinct has negatively mediated many coördinations in human groups. All military institutions, of course, rest directly upon the

instincts connected with self-defense, and especially upon the instinct of pugnacity; and as we have already seen, government and many other institutional forms of the social life were developed in connection with military activities. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in history on the whole, the peoples who have been the best fighters have developed the highest types of social institutions and of civilization generally.[1] Very often, however, these combative impulses have become so exaggerated that they have resulted in positive injury to their groups, brutalizing popular sentiment and feelings, destroying the material foundation of a complex civilization, and producing that "reversal of selection" in human societies which Dr. Jordan and others are inclined to consider one of the chief factors in the social deterioration of a people.[2] In other words, historical peoples have often allowed their instincts of pugnacity to thwart all their higher social development. They have literally often fought themselves to pieces. The perversion of the instinct of pugnacity is seen, then, both in the individual and in groups, where fighting is carried on, not as a means of defense, but for its own sake. Whether or not the fighting instinct needs ever to be exercised against human beings in order to maintain it at normal strength is an open question. There seems to be but little danger of the fighting instinct in any race dying out, and the more reasonable view is that its legitimate exercise in civilized society is in combating the moral and social evils which prevent humanity from realizing its ideals,[3] rather than in actual physical conflict between individuals or groups of individuals.

Closely connected with the instinct of pugnacity is the

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[1] Cf. McDougall, *op. cit.*, Chap. XI.

[2] See Jordan, *The Human Harvest.*

[3] The "moral substitute for war" is surely not the conquest of physical nature, as Professor James suggested, but the combating of social and moral evils.

instinct of rivalry or emulation. This seems to be, indeed, but an attenuation of the fighting instinct. It is, however, quite different in most of its manifestations. As McDougall says, " While the combative impulse leads to the destruction of individuals and societies that are least capable of self-defense, the emulative impulse does not directly lead to the extermination of individuals or societies." [1] Rather, he points out, the emulative impulse finds more satisfaction in keeping alive competitors. Emulation is, therefore, a form of competition which is markedly human, and especially adapted to civilized societies. In our modern societies it enters into practically all forms of our social life, being the form of competition which we find chiefly in education, in industry, in art, in science, and in practically all the other more " socialized " forms of activity. Emulation thus tends to replace the more brutal form of competition by physical conflict in modern society, although, as we have already seen, wherever competition becomes too intense or too unregulated, it tends to pass over into the lower form of conflict. Even in the relations between civilized nations emulation in commerce, science and art unquestionably tends to supersede actual conflict. While competition cannot be gotten rid of in social life for biological reasons, it is probable that well regulated and organized competition in which there is practical equality of opportunity and the " rules of the game are known " will not stimulate greatly the fighting instinct in man, but only the instinct of rivalry and emulation. It is by this plan, it is thought by many, that human society may escape from the bloody conflicts of the past which have resulted from man's fighting instincts.

Instincts Connected with Sociability.[2]—Man, like practically all the other higher animals, has always, so far as

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

[2] That sociability is an instinctive, not an " acquired " trait, practically all of the work in modern psychology and sociology goes to

we can discover, lived in groups larger than the family. The reasons for this we have already pointed out. The advantages of group life must have given rise very early in man, or rather in man's precursor, to strong gregarious instincts. While in primitive man these groups or hordes may not, on account of scarcity of food, have been as large as in some other animals, yet man, like many other animals, shows a strong "social" instinct. He wishes to be in and of his group. He is not satisfied to live alone, and solitary confinement has proved in all ages, among the most terrible forms of punishment ever devised. In protecting himself against wild beasts, in obtaining a food supply, and in defending himself against his human enemies, man, as we have already seen, has found it absolutely necessary to live in comparatively large groups in order to survive. Moreover, natural selection placed a premium from the first on those individuals that could live in large groups, for on the whole it has been the larger groups that have survived from the struggle of group with group in the past. Thus we find in man powerful impulses to seek the companionship of his fellows, to keep closely at home within his own group, to follow his group in all things and to listen, as Mr. Trotter says, "to the voice of the herd."[1]

As McDougall says, it is possible that many of the actions which Professor Giddings attributes to the intel-

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show. For example, Professor Giddings's whole sociology is a demonstration of this. However, sociability, or gregariousness, is not a simple, definite instinct like, say, pugnacity; but rather a general tendency, like imitation, made up of several distinct, though related innate tendencies and impulses. One of the best recent treatments of gregariousness from the sociological standpoint is an article by Mr. W. Trotter on "Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilized Man" in the *Sociological Review* for July, 1908. As Mr. Trotter says, "Gregariousness is a phenomenon of profound biological significance and one likely, therefore, to be responsible for an important group of instinctive impulses."

[1] *Op. cit.*

lectual element, "the consciousness of kind," should be attributed to the gregarious impulses in man,[1] although in fairness to Professor Giddings it should be said that he would doubtless include the gregarious impulse, or the instinct of sociability, within his concept of "the consciousness of kind."

There is, certainly, no instinct which is more important for man's collective life than the gregarious impulse. While it may seem satisfied simply by the presence of other human beings, or living and being at one with one's group, yet when combined with other instincts like the food-getting impulse it gives rise to a vast mass of coördinations between individuals of a coöperative character. While we can scarcely speak of a coöperative impulse, instinctive sociability, reënforced and combined with other instincts, gives rise to many instinctive forms of coöperation. Thus groups seek food together, defend themselves against a common enemy, and engage in many collective activities. As McDougall suggests, man's very tendency to live in immense aggregations of population which we term cities, may be perhaps more or less an expression of man's instinctive sociability or gregariousness,[2] for the tendency to city life is seen almost as soon as material civilization begins, and seems quite natural to man, although the great cities of the present are unquestionably the product of the industrial forces and conditions of our times rather than of man's gregarious impulses.

The perversions of the gregarious instinct are many—

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[1] *Op. cit.*, Chap. XII. Cf. Judd's statement (*Psychology*, p. 217): "There is among all the higher animals an instinct toward contact with members of the same species." This is, of course, the impulsive or motor side of "the consciousness of kind," as Giddings has recognized. Genetically, however, the impulse toward association or living together in groups must have preceded any cognition of kind or similarity.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

although not considered very reprehensible by society. The tendency of our times is, perhaps, to exaggerate certain aspects of the instincts of sociability, especially the fear which is shown of being conspicuous, the disinclination to preserve a relatively independent personality. Rather "the voice of the herd" is listened to so attentively that independent moral judgment and character are frequently lacking among many individuals in modern civilized populations. The dangers of these conditions to society are manifest.

McDougall, Kirkpatrick and others suggest that the gregarious instinct is simply an extension of the various instinctive impulses connected with the family life.[1] However this may be, it is certain that the instincts of sociability are but a section of that large mass of instincts which we call the sympathetic or altruistic instincts. Through the life in larger groups the sympathetic emotions get expansion along with the instinct of sociability. In this way altruism itself, which perhaps originated in the family life, came to extend, as we have already seen, to larger and larger groups of man. Thus the development of the instinct of sociability along with sympathy makes possible wider and wider coördinations between individuals so that social organization tends to embrace in its ultimate development the whole species of mankind.

Just how far the social virtues, such as veracity and loyalty, should be considered as resting upon native impulses or instincts has long been a matter of debate. Of course, in the strict sense it may be said that any social virtue manifests itself as such only after reflection and a

[1] Kirkpatrick's statement is (*Fundamentals of Child Study*, p. 113): "The social instincts and feelings are only an extension of the parental instinct from the family to the larger group." Sutherland, as is well known, would derive all man's sociability, all sympathetic and altruistic impulses and feelings, from the instincts connected with the family group.

definite choice of one or more courses of action. Even this view of virtue does not preclude us from looking to the instincts as a basis of many modes of conduct which we speak of as virtues. Truth-telling, for example, seems to be a natural impulse, and since as a method of conduct it is necessary for the harmonious and effective coördination of the activities of individuals in groups, it may rightly be regarded as having more or less of an instinctive basis, probably closely connected with the general instinct of sociability. While veracity may be largely a native impulse of man, this does not preclude, of course, that in certain situations deception and lying may not also be instinctive. We see in children, for example, the native impulse to tell the truth, and yet under certain circumstances we likewise see clearly the impulse to conceal and to deceive. As James and others have pointed out, these contrary impulses are a part of man's instinctive equipment in many directions.[1]

Loyalty to one's group is a conspicuous social virtue which probably has an instinctive basis. Without a native impulse to be loyal to one's group it is impossible to conceive any high development of group life. Patriotism as a sentiment or emotion is probably a development of instinctive loyalty to one's own group, though patriotism in the strict sense must be considered more of a sentiment than as a simple emotion connected with a simple native impulse. Inasmuch as loyalty plays such a part in the development of all social life, one is forced to conclude that it must have in some degree an instinctive basis, although this by no means precludes the development of loyalty through tradition, imitation and other forms of education. Loyalty is, therefore, probably also connected closely with man's natural instincts of sociability.

Love of approbation, or of the approval of others, is

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[1] *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 392: "Nature implants contrary impulses to act on many classes of things."

another manifestation, largely instinctive, of man's innate sociability. Individuals, to live together in large groups, must be exceedingly sensitive to the opinion of other members of their group, and this sensitiveness is the instinctive foundation of the control which groups exercise over their individual members. The love of approbation, therefore, serves to coördinate and integrate groups in many ways.

We have now, perhaps, emphasized sufficiently the great importance of innate sociability or of the gregarious instinct in man for his social life. This importance might be indefinitely illustrated on every hand, for there are very few social activities in which this impulse is not more or less manifest. As Mr. Trotter points out, the gregarious instinct is capable seemingly of indefinite combinations with other impulses, socializing them and at the same time often greatly intensifying them.[1] Moreover, this instinct also reenforces many acquired beliefs, interests and habits, and through this enforcement these beliefs, interests and habits get the sanction and force of the instinct itself. Thus society, in one way or another, finds ways of connecting beliefs, interests and habits which are valuable for the social life with man's gregarious impulses and in this way is able to make them of much greater influence in society.

Instinctive Imitation.[2]—As to whether there is an instinct of imitation or not psychologists disagree. Some hold that imitation is only a general neural tendency, that every native impulse tends to discharge itself not only in the presence of appropriate stimuli in the environment, but

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[1] "Impulses derived from herd feeling will enter the mind with the value of instincts. Acts which it would be absurd to look upon as the results of specific instincts are carried out with all the enthusiasm of instinctive behavior. Hence herd instinct can confer instinctive sanction on any part of the field of belief or action" (*op. cit.*).

[2] See Chapter XIII for the discussion of the rôle of imitation in the social life.

also whenever a similar activity is perceived in another individual.[1] According to this view there is no specific instinct to imitate, but all instincts develop more or less through imitation, imitation being essentially a similar response to similar stimuli from a similar instinctive basis. While it must be admitted that much of the imitation that we see among animals is simply a manifestation of the development of latent instincts,[2] nevertheless there are good grounds for arguing that in addition to imitation as a method of development of instinctive activities there is in man and in other gregarious animals a distinct specific tendency to imitate. In man it is seen in the passion "to do as others do." This tendency to do as others do or to fall into line is one of the most useful, from a social point of view, of all of man's instincts. It helps to bring about many simple coördinations in social groups and enables them to act together in simple ways as against enemies and the like. It is not surprising, therefore, to see this specific tendency to imitate strongest in the gregarious animals, and particularly in man. The imitative instinct proper must be regarded, then, as a differentiation of man's gregarious

[1] This is the position of McDougall (*op. cit.*, Chap. IV). Baldwin also considers imitation to be primarily a general neural tendency, though in a somewhat different sense from McDougall. His theory of "organic imitation" will receive consideration in Chapter XIII. It may be remarked that to view imitation as a general neural tendency (as in one sense it undoubtedly is) is in no way opposed to regarding it as instinctive in the broad sense. Since imitation is in the main not "learned" in human society, it is in a broad sense "instinctive."

[2] Thorndike points out (*Animal Intelligence*, pp. 76f.) that animals generally, with the possible exception of the primates, do not "imitate" in the sense of *learning* to do an act from seeing. Practically all gregarious animals, however, do imitate in the sense of showing sympathetically-induced activities; that is, the seeing of a certain instinctive activity in one animal furnishes the stimulus for a similar action in another animal, usually of the same species. (See McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 104.)

impulses, or, if not, a specific differentiation, a reënforcement of the general neural tendency to imitate by the gregarious impulses.

Closely connected with man's imitativeness, and also with his native sociability, is his suggestibility. For this reason it has been claimed that suggestion and imitation are the basis of man's social life and that it is through these tendencies that man has come to live in groups, that is, to carry on vast collective life-processes.[1] This theory of society we shall have to examine later, so that it is not necessary to do more at this point than to point out that we have to do in interactions between individuals not only with general neural tendencies to receive suggestions and to imitate, but also with a specific instinct to do as others do and with a sensitiveness to the views of one's group, both of which are unquestionably connected with man's strong gregarious impulses.

The Instinct of Acquisitiveness.—Acquisitiveness is a native impulse which has probably been more or less developed out of the food-getting impulses. As an impulse, however, it is not confined to the gathering and storing up of food, although it may have had its origin in that tendency, but it extends to the collecting and hoarding of anything. We find many evidences of this instinct in the animal world below man, since it is not infrequent among some of the higher animals for individuals not only to collect and store up a food supply, but also, as we see in monkeys, to collect and hoard things of no specific utility to them. In the lowest savages of the present this instinct seems to be but feebly developed, but it might well be argued that that is one of the reasons for their social backwardness, and that in primitive man this instinct of hoarding things of greater or less utility was one of the chief means of bringing about

[1] This is, of course, the central position of the imitation school of social theorists. Cf. also the remark of Boris Sidis (*Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 310): "Man is social because he is suggestible."

those accumulations of material goods which are essential to progress in human society. Perhaps, as McDougall emphasizes, the hoarding of grain for food supply among peoples was one of the first steps in civilization.[1] In the temperate zones especially individuals who did not store up food for unfavorable seasons, such as droughts and the like, would be at a great disadvantage and would be suddenly eliminated. Moreover, those groups and families in which weapons, utensils and precious metals were accumulated would soon come to have a great advantage in any competition with other individuals and groups. Thus early civilization favored the development of strong impulses of acquisition in man. Later civilization has scarcely less favored the development of such innate tendencies. There can be scarcely any doubt that the acquisitive instincts of man have laid the foundation for many of the prominent features of our present social life.

While the acquisitive impulse is not so much a means of coördinating individuals directly, it becomes a powerful social force in that it is taken into account in all groupings and relations of man. It is, however, we may note, the foundation of that most important institution of our civilization which we know as private property.[2] All other combinations and groupings of man have had to take into account more or less the existence of this institution. In consequence there is considerable truth in the view that the instinct of private gain dominates, to a great extent, our present civilization. The socialists are, no doubt, in great degree right when they say that present social organization immensely stimulates this instinct and causes all sorts of needless exaggerations. Indeed, the civilized man is having this instinct bred into him perhaps more than any other quality by the processes of selection now going on in society.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, Chap. XIV.

[2] See Letourneau's valuable study, *The Evolution of Property.*

Instincts of Self-Assertion and of Self-Abasement.— These two classes of instincts which have usually not received full attention from the psychologist are peculiarly human and have a peculiar significance for man's social life.[1] On the one hand, we find in human beings strong tendencies to assert superiority, to assume leadership, with which may be coupled tendencies toward self-exhibition and self-display. On the other hand, we find also developed, though usually not to the same extent in the same individuals, strong tendencies to subordinate oneself to superiors, to follow a leader and to subordinate and abase oneself in certain social situations. These peculiarly human instincts give rise to many of the most striking coördinations between individuals in society. The political tendencies of man and his superior social organization in general are more or less connected with the tendency to assert superiority on the one hand, and to follow a leader or subordinate oneself to an authority on the other hand. While we find leadership to some extent in animal groups in general, we do not find the tendency to subordinate oneself to a socially recognized superior anywhere nearly so developed in animal groups as in human groups. Even in those human groups in which there is no organized political authority there is, nevertheless, recognition of the superiority of the elder men and of those who show personal prowess in battle and the like. The tendency of all human groups is, then, to organize about one or more personal leaders or authorities. In certain individuals the instinct of self-assertion becomes highly developed through the stimulus of successful exploits. The necessities of social organization lead to a selection of those groups in which the tendency for the mass to subordinate themselves and follow one or more leaders is highly developed. Reason also reënforces these

[1] McDougall gives a brief, but trenchant, treatment of these two instincts, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–66.

tendencies, so that, given the lust for power or authority on the one hand, as we sometimes designate the instinct of self-assertion, and the tendency to subordinate oneself to an authority or to a leader on the other hand, we have the possibilities of very high types of social organization. Under the necessities of social survival, as we have already seen, these tendencies frequently give rise to a despotic type of society in which the will of the leader or ruler becomes the representative will of the whole group.

Of course, the instincts of self-assertion and of self-display are found in many of the more common things of the social life other than political and social organization on a large scale. We see on every hand the tendency of practically all human beings to assert their superiority in one way or another. Coupled with the tendency to imitate this tendency to assert superiority leads at once in society to the imitation of superiors and to the superiors refusing to imitate inferiors, but seeking to differentiate themselves from them in all their activities. It is upon this basis that fashions and conventions proceed, for the most part, in human society.

Coupled with the instinct of self-assertion, as we have already said, is the closely allied instinct of self-exhibition and display. This is seen quite fully developed in the lower animals as well as in man. It is especially noticeable in all animals, human beings included, during the period of courtship and seems to be in some ways intimately associated, therefore, with the sexual instinct. But self-exhibition and display are tendencies of human beings found in all age periods and in all situations in life. To these instinctive tendencies must be largely ascribed the tendency which we find in all human beings to love ceremonial, parade, public display and ostentation of all sorts. With the growth of wealth in society this tendency takes on many forms, especially that of the " conspicuous consumption " of wealth in order to attract the attention and envy of

others.[1] Pride of class, especially the pride of noble and wealthy classes, is a sentiment based very largely upon the instinctive tendencies to assert superiority and to display such superiority in the form of wealth or learning.

It is manifest that this peculiarly human tendency of self-assertion and self-display is at the basis of much in the life of civilized societies. While self-display may express itself in present society in more æsthetic forms than it did in the barbarian and savage stage, it is, nevertheless, quite as strong in civilized man as in primitive man. Again, self-assertion may be seemingly held in check by the modern gospel of equality and democracy; but we see on every hand sufficient evidence to show us that the love of power and the tendency to self-assertion are quite as strong now as ever they were. In fact it may be doubted whether man has not a greater love for inequality than for equality. Much of the so-called passion for equality is simply due to the desire of those lower in the social scale to assert themselves as the equals of those who are socially more fortunate. It is only in the humanitarian few that the love of equality, based upon a strong development of altruistic instincts, may be said to truly exist at all. Hence, upon analysis we find that the love of equality in the strict sense must be considered a comparatively weak tendency in human nature.

On the other hand, the tendency to subordinate oneself to superiors, even to abase oneself before superiors, seems also to be as strong in human nature at the present time as ever. Many of the arrangements of our social life exhibit this tendency. This impulse may be in part, to be

[1] Professor Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class* is the most valuable detailed study which we have of the working of this instinct in human society. See especially Chaps. II–VII. It may be added that Professor Veblen's book is one of the best studies in all sociological literature of the working out in human society of instincts as against impersonal reason.

sure, one of the expressions of fear, and in part it is also an imitative tendency; but self-abasement is also more or less a distinct tendency of human nature which exhibits itself in certain situations and is necessary if we are to have any effective coördinations between leader and follower, between ruler and subject, between social superiors and inferiors. Perhaps this tendency is connected with the instinctive tendency to obey parents which is seen in children. At any rate, we find universally in human society strong tendencies to follow leaders, to look up to and reverence authorities of all sorts (rulers, heroes, gods), and this tendency becomes exaggerated at times into sycophancy and parasitism. The tendency to subordinate and subject oneself to leaders and authorities is, however, whatever its exaggerations, one of the socially most valuable of all the native impulses of man. It seems, indeed, to be closely connected with the gregarious instincts. Without it complex types of social organization involving leadership and authority in varying degrees would scarcely be possible. Even the family, as we understand it, could hardly exist without this instinctive tendency, and certainly all forms of the state are dependent on the one hand on the tendency to assert superiority, and to assume leadership, and on the other hand, to subordinate oneself to authority and to obey superiors.

Many other instinctive tendencies have been studied and fairly definitely determined by the psychologists. Nearly all of these have, of course, more or less bearing upon the psychology of man's collective life, but it is not the purpose of this book to enter into any detailed study of the influence of all sorts of instinctive impulses in human society. Only a few others are of sufficient importance to need mention.

Constructiveness is a native tendency which is usually recognized by psychologists. As an instinct it is supposed to have had its origin in the nest-building propensities

which primitive man shared along with many other animals. It must have, however, been greatly developed in the early history of the race through the fact that only those individuals who had the capacity to make tools and weapons could have survived in the primitive struggle between man and other animal species. Strong constructive tendencies are, therefore, found in most normal children of the present. These tendencies in adults appear in what has been called the instinct of workmanship and the love of making things of all sorts, as McDougall says, from mudpies to metaphysical systems.[1] There can be scarcely any doubt that such an instinctive tendency exists in man and that it has been a very great factor in the development of material civilization. From the work of the megalithic builders of the second stone age to the great architectural and engineering triumphs of modern civilization, this instinct has constantly been in evidence, working hand in hand with the intellect of man to achieve the conquest of nature.

While *play* is not an instinct it represents the free functioning of many instinctive tendencies. As Groos has shown,[2] the various forms of play of all animals secure the development of the instincts for the serious business of life. The play of children, therefore, is filled with instinctive reactions and illustrates many instinctive forms of association. The amusements of adults are also more or less largely based upon the instincts. Amusement, as a form of recreation, almost necessarily must make its chief appeal to what is innate or instinctive in man, rather than to what has been learned or acquired, because activities of the latter type usually require more attention and effort to sustain them; hence, the tendencies for amusements, sports and the like to go on upon purely instinctive levels and sometimes, therefore, upon relatively low moral levels. The amusements even of civilized peoples are probably best

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

[2] See his works on *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man.*

classified, psychologically, according to the special instincts which they excite. Many of them excite the fighting instinct. Games of chance usually excite the gambling instinct, the love of hazard, while not a few amusements gain their popularity from exciting sex instincts. The popularity of sports like football, in which the fighting element is large, of various games of chance, of dancing, of the romantic novel, the sensational drama, the yellow newspaper, the detective story, prize-fighting and the like goes to show that the popular amusements and sports of even the most highly civilized peoples are those which stimulate, as a rule, very primitive impulses. It is because of the large element of instinct in amusements and of the reversionary character of instinct itself that amusements have always given rise to many of the chief ethical problems in society. There can be no doubt that play and amusement serve very largely to mold character, especially in the young, as Aristotle long ago observed. The old Puritan theory of the place of amusement in life has long been outgrown, but the modern view is probably just as wrong and more dangerous, because it tends to encourage the expression of brutal and sensual impulses in man. The great ethical problem in connection with play and amusement, in other words, is, What instincts can we afford to excite through amusement in view of the demands of modern society and of the future society which we have not yet reached?

In any case it is quite evident that in the forms of play and amusement, instinct plays a very large part, indeed the dominant part, even among the most highly civilized peoples.

Original Differences in Individuals.[1]—According to the general theory of instinctive reactions as the mental aspect of race heredity we would expect that these reactions should

[1] Professor Thorndike's educational monograph on *Individuality* is an excellent brief statement of the causes, nature and social effects of individual differences.

vary greatly in individuals. All organic structure is variable and this seems to be eminently true of the inherited structure of the nervous system; hence we have closely connected with the instincts proper, which must be regarded as relatively uniform throughout a species or a variety, many inborn individual peculiarities. For the most part these are variations in the strength or weakness of different instinctive impulses in different individuals. The student of sociology has to remember, then, that along with the principle of a fundamental similarity of all human beings in their instincts or native impulses goes the corresponding principle that individuals vary greatly and that these original individual differences have to be taken into account as well as the original individual similarities. Some individuals are born weak in some lines while other individuals are born strong. It becomes a practical problem of great importance as to how the individual that is weak in certain directions, as e.g., in altruistic impulses, may be stimulated, while another individual who is strong in some other direction, e.g., in combative impulses, may be repressed. All education and practical social work must take into account these original individual differences.

Certain differences in the native reactions of individuals correspond to large classes of the population and therefore are of peculiar importance to the sociologist. Such are the differences in the native reactions of the sexes and of the principal human races. We must note these in some detail.

Original Differences Between the Sexes.[1]—There can be little doubt, as we have already pointed out, that the strength

[1] See Thorndike, *Individuality*, Chap. II, "The Influence of Sex"; also Thomas, *Sex and Society*. The pioneer work in modern biology along this line was Geddes and Thomson's *Evolution of Sex*, which still remains standard.

As Professor Thorndike points out, the differences between the sexes are not qualitative, but differences in degree. Hence much overlapping in characteristics, the great mass of the two sexes coinciding. The same is true of racial differences.

of various native impulses varies greatly as between the sexes. We have already seen that the female sex is characterized by a stronger development of the sympathetic impulses and a weaker development of the combative impulses. Almost all of the important human instincts seemingly vary considerably between the sexes. This may be accounted for in part by the fact that the sexes have been exposed to different selective influences in their evolution, but probably it is even more to be accounted for by the fundamental difference between the sexes, their difference in organic metabolism;[1] the male sex being more katabolic, that is, inclined to expend energy and so more inclined to activity and even to violence, the female sex being more anabolic, that is, more inclined to store up energy, to be passive and conservative. Many studies have been made upon these original differences between the sexes which show themselves so markedly in every aspect of social life, and which endow the sexes with different capacities and fit them for different functions in society. Of recent years, however, there has been a growing school who have set out to show that all the mental and social differences of the sexes are due to their social environment. While there can be scarcely any doubt that the original differences between the sexes have been greatly accentuated by social conditions, and even that many feminine peculiarities are to be ascribed wholly to the influence of a particular culture, yet, on the other hand, when savages and children are studied, there is also scarcely any doubt that the original or instinctive differences between the sexes are very great. The attempt, indeed, to explain away these differences as due simply to cultural modifications of a human nature, which is the same in both sexes, must be regarded as one of the serious errors of certain modern schools of thought; for the evi-

[1] See Professor Thomas's *Sex and Society*, Chap. I; also Geddes and Thomson's *Evolution of Sex*.

dence from child study, from anthropology, and from animal psychology is overwhelmingly on the other side.[1]

Indeed, these variations of instinctive reactions between the sexes, as has been pointed out, furnish the instinctive basis for many of the most important coördinations in society. Inasmuch as the reproductive processes involve a difference of labor between the sexes, if there were not natural mental and social differences between them, it would be impossible for them to adapt themselves to each other in the carrying on of a common life. The different native reactions of the sexes are then valuable for society, and they are not less valuable in modern society than in primitive society. All intelligent social movements must take into account these natural mental differences between the sexes, and aim, not at their repression, but at their expression in accordance with the demands of present social conditions.

A general difference which must be noted between the sexes of social import is that woman is more generally guided by her instincts and emotions than man. In other words, the element of instinct seems to dominate more in woman's conduct than in man's. It has been said by some that for this reason woman is nearer the savage or even the animal type than man. It might very well be replied, however, that the reason for this is that woman's instincts show better adaptation to the requirements of the social life than man's. In other words, woman is more inherently socialized; hence her instincts and "intuitions" are safer guides for her than man's.[2] All of which results in woman's inherent social and moral superiority as regards natural

[1] See, e.g., Thorndike's study of *Heredity, Correlation and Sex Differences in School Abilities* for unsuspected differences between the sexes.

[2] Cf. Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, Chaps. XIV, XXVI. The word "intuition," as used by Ward and other sociological writers, can only mean psychologically that certain inherent connections in the nervous system favor certain judgments; i.e., "instinctive judgment."

tendencies. In a certain sense, therefore, the nature of woman is more fully socialized than man's nature, and so far from representing an inferior social type, the average civilized woman represents a superior social type, to which the average civilized man is only slowly approximating. However, as we have already seen, the instinctive sociality of both sexes is relatively narrow and adjusted chiefly to the family and the kindred group. Superior socialization in either sex implies the cultivation of the highest intellectual capacities and the repression and control of many instinctive impulses by the reason.

Original Differences Between Races.[1]—There can be no doubt that instinctive reactions are somewhat unlike in different races. All psychological experiments along this line point to this conclusion. This is what we should expect seeing that the great primary divisions of mankind have been evolved under widely different physical conditions in different areas of characterization. While the fundamental mental traits of the negro and the white, for example, are the same, yet differences in native reactions to similar stimuli are patent even to the ordinary observer. It is this difference of reaction which largely gives rise to racial problems, and which makes the harmonious adjustment of widely dissimilar races to each other and to the same environment so difficult. There is every reason for believing because of this difference of instinctive reactions between races that the negro problem in the United States, for example, cannot solve itself or be solved by any superficial measures. On the other hand, there is no reason for believing that a proper education which shall reach the negro masses cannot solve the problem of adapting the negro to our civilization, for education can unquestionably overcome the slight difference in native reactions between the negro and the white by training and modifying these impulses.

[1] Cf. Thorndike, *Individuality*, Chap. II, "The Influence of Race."

Another instinctive element which probably enters into the difficulty of adjusting widely dissimilar races to each other is racial antipathy. There is good ground for believing that this antipathy rests to some extent upon an instinctive basis; but there is no reason for supposing that, so far as this antipathy is irrational, it cannot be modified by humanitarian education and ideals.

Instinctive Interests and Beliefs.—As we have already seen, interest, in the psychological sense, is the feeling side of attention. We have also seen that we attend to many objects because of instinct.[1] From this it follows that all individuals have powerful instinctive interests. This being so, it also follows that the instincts of man are enlisted upon the side of some beliefs rather than others. In a certain sense, therefore, ideas do get into the blood. Selection fixes certain native reactions. These reactions have as their mental accompaniment attention and feelings of interest, and interest gives rise to belief. What we think is largely an outcome of what we do, and as what we do is largely a matter of hereditary reactions, so what we think is also powerfully influenced by these reactions.

Just what beliefs in human society may be traced to an instinctive origin and what to other sources, psychologists as yet are hardly prepared to say; but it is certain that the nonrational beliefs of humanity are not entirely due to custom, and indeed customs, as we have already seen, as frequently represent the instinctive tendencies of man as acquired habits. Probably many of the beliefs connected with sex, food, self-defense and adjustment to one's group are essentially instinctive. The belief in marriage[2] is such an instinctive belief among the masses of mankind. Optimism is probably an instinctive mental attitude, since it is found in children and the lowest races no matter how hard their

[1] Cf. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

[2] In the natural history sense of the term, as used by Westermarck.

conditions of life may be. Pessimism and meliorism, on the other hand, are outcomes of reflective thought. Many writers have ably argued that our essential religious beliefs are of instinctive origin. The belief in God and the belief in the immortality of the soul seem especially to have the marks of instinctive beliefs,[1] since in one form or another they are found among practically all peoples, and we may safely conclude, therefore, that they are an outcome of certain instinctive tendencies of man in interaction with his self-consciousness and reason.

Of course, not all the nonrational beliefs of human society are instinctive. Many of them have arisen simply through invention, and have been perpetuated by example and imitation. Beliefs in the long run, however, must conform to objective conditions, that is, they must favor survival. That a belief is instinctive, therefore, is no argument against its rational validity. Rather there is a strong presumption in favor of a belief that is widespread and of long standing. Instinctive beliefs which have served long the purposes of the race, controlling, educating, helping in social adjustment and so in social survival in the lives of countless generations, have certainly a strong presumption in their favor. The scientist and the philosopher may rationalize these beliefs, but among the mass of men they do not rest upon any rational ground. Whether the scientist finds them rational or irrational, they will probably continue to be accepted as long as they are necessary for individual and social survival.

Instincts and Civilization.—Probably civilization is not old enough to have produced as yet any profound modifications in man's instincts. Selection we know modifies native reactions only through long periods of time. Slight modi-

[1] See Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, especially Chap. II, on "The Nature of Belief." Cf. Marshall's study of religious belief in his *Instinct and Reason*.

fications have undoubtedly been produced by civilization. We have already noted, for example, that the instinct of acquisitiveness seems much stronger in the civilized man than in the uncivilized, and possibly also the combative instinct, as we have seen, may be stronger in the civilized. Apart from such slight modifications, however, it is probably true that man's instincts are more adapted to the barbarous and savage condition of existence than to civilization. Hence, human instincts are not sufficient to adapt man to the present conditions of life. They would be a much better guide if we were still living a wild life in the woods than they are in the complex civilized society of the present. As Sir Francis Galton has pointed out, this fact explains much of the difficulties civilized societies experience in securing such adjustments as are required by the conditions of their life. Galton remarks very truly, "Man was barbarous but yesterday, and therefore it is not to be expected that the natural aptitudes of his race should already have become molded into accordance with his very recent advance. We, men of the present centuries, are like animals suddenly transplanted among new circumstances of climate and of food: our *instincts* fail us under the altered circumstances."[1]

Here, of course, is one of the great reasons for the necessity of education in civilized societies. In savage and barbarous societies instinct plus customary imitation suffices to secure most of the required social adjustments; but in our complex civilized societies these adjustments can only be secured by the careful building up of acquired habits through the bending and training, and sometimes perhaps even the suppression, of native impulses. No instinct that man possesses seems to be any more entirely equal in itself to the complex requirements of our modern life. The pa-

[1] *Hereditary Genius*, p. 337; quoted by Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 449–50.

rental instinct seems to come nearer being adapted than any other, but even it, we are beginning to discover, needs education.

It follows from this that our instincts and the correlative emotions are not good guides in the present situation. All of our instincts need the control of intelligence and reason. They are insufficient to secure the moral conduct of the individual. Conduct of the highest type, as has always been insisted upon by moralists, comes only by reflection. The instincts at best furnish only presumptions which need to be analyzed. No instinctive reaction, of course, would exist unless such a reaction had had some utility in the past history of the race, but because it is adapted to the past does not show that it is adapted to the present. Instinctive impulses always need to be analyzed in the light of the existing situation. Those persons, therefore, who, like Fourier, claim that the instincts and the correlated emotions should be the supreme guide in social life, would plunge society again into barbarism.[1]

Instincts and Social Reconstruction.—It does not follow, however, from what has been said that the instincts should be disregarded by those who are seeking the improvement of social conditions. On the contrary, it is safe to assert that no permanent improvement can be made in human social life which does not take instinct into account. While our instincts are manifestly not adapted to present social conditions, they are nevertheless the basis, the raw material, out of which the acquired habits of individuals must be built up, which will adapt them to present complex conditions. There is no such thing known to the psychologists as habits built up out of nothing. All acquired habits are secured by the bending and training of the native impulses. This has come to be fully recognized in education, and

[1] This is the so-called "new hedonism" which would make the gratifying of natural impulses the supreme value in life.

scientific education has made the instinctive elements in the child the scientific basis for the training of the individual. It is also time that it should be recognized in social reform, because social reform or reconstruction, as we have already shown, is in its essence not different from individual education. Social reconstruction which ignores the instincts, which attempts to get a higher state of society without building it up out of lower types of reaction, is, therefore, destined to failure. The recognition of the true rôle of instinct in human social life is, therefore, necessary as a basis for scientific social work and all scientific plans of social reform. Any plan of social reorganization which is made without regard to man's instincts will certainly meet with as great failure as any plan of individual education which is made without regard to native impulses and capacities. The recognition of the part which instinct plays in our social life is, therefore, necessary for wise social practice. On the other hand, human instincts being indefinitely modifiable, through selection in the race and through education in the individual, present no insuperable barrier to any sane plan for the ultimate amelioration of social conditions. There is nothing in them, therefore, which puts any permanent obstacle in the way of carrying out any rational measure of social reform, but their recognition points to the inevitable conclusion that the one safe method of social reorganization is through education, especially through the education of the young. When the instinctive element is thoroughly understood, it can be controlled and in this sense transcended.

Reversions to the instinctive level of activity occur in civilized societies under numerous conditions. The chief of these conditions are conditions of excitement such as occur in crowds, in war and in conflicts of one sort or another between classes. The more important phenomena of the crowd are, indeed, to be explained almost wholly by the fact that under conditions of excitement in a crowd

men revert to the instinctive level of activities.[1] Hence, the social danger from crowds which many writers have emphasized. As has already been pointed out, in such internal conflicts in societies as revolutions the conditions exist, not only for reversion to an instinctive level of activities, but for the excitement of the more brutal instincts.[2] Attempted transformations of society by means of violent revolution, therefore, almost always result in at least temporary reversion of the social life to more primitive levels. In fact, any use of force in society, especially when force is directed against large masses of individuals, is apt to produce such reversions to instinctive activity. The use of force in human society is, therefore, to be deprecated and, indeed, all occasions which produce such emotional excitement as to make difficult rational control of instinctive impulses.

Instincts and Social Progress.—The view of instinct thus far presented has been that of a static or even reversionary element in human society. This is essentially the biological view. Biologists generally look upon instinct as something static, but this is, perhaps, not quite a correct view from the sociological standpoint. Kidd, in his *Principles of Western Civilization,* attacks this idea of the essentially static nature of human instincts or of the biological equipment of the race.[3] He shows that every species in order to survive has to be adapted even more to possible future conditions than to the present. Only those whose instincts are thus adapted to the future can have any chance of surviving in a rapidly changing environment such as we

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[1] See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology,* pp. 119f.; also his *Social Psychology,* Chaps. III and IV. The numerous studies of the psychology of crowds by such writers as Le Bon, Tarde, Ross and Baldwin make unnecessary any treatment of this topic at length in this work.

[2] See Chapter VIII.

[3] See especially Chap. II.

find at least in civilized human societies. How an instinct can be adapted directly to the future environment, since all instincts were fixed by the selection of past environment, it is difficult to see. What Kidd's argument amounts to is practically this, that in all species which live under the possibility of rapid changes in the environment, instincts must be plastic if the species is to survive. This is, as we have already seen, the case with the instincts of practically all of the higher animals. It is, of course, especially the case with man and possibly even more the case with civilized man than with nature peoples. Plasticity of the instincts in man means the possibility of bending them in many directions, and so of building up on them many different acquired habits as the situation may demand. Of course, in this sense a species like man which undergoes rapid progress must have great plasticity of instinct in order to survive, and in this sense man's instincts are adapted more or less to future possibilities, as well as to present and past situations. Instincts are not therefore adapted to the future in any mysterious way, but simply through plasticity. Therefore, man's instincts are such as to make possible his adaptation to wider and more complex environments than those under which he developed. To this extent progress is conditioned by the nature of man's instincts.

Of course, man's instincts are the general conditions of social progress from whatever standpoint we may look at the problem. As we have already seen, such instincts as acquisitiveness, gregariousness and constructiveness have been the very conditions under which intellectual elements have brought about man's civilization. The instincts must be regarded, then, as positive and constructive, rather than as merely negative. The ways in which the various instincts have functioned as aids to progress have been already pointed out. While all the instincts of man have been conditions under which human progress has developed,

there are certain instincts which, as it were, have a forward look, namely, the altruistic impulses. These make possible, as we have already seen, coördinations or adaptations between individuals of a wider and wider sort. It is the high development of these altruistic impulses in man which has especially made civilization and progress possible, for they make it possible for human groups to adapt their activities not simply to all other existing human groups but even to future generations. Of course, these altruistic impulses have to be developed through education before they can make possible coördinations which are as wide as the race itself, and so progressive adaptation to the requirements of existence; but the fact should not be forgotten that they are original, native impulses. We may safely conclude, therefore, that man's progress depends not solely upon his intellect, but also upon his social instincts, although these like many other things are, strictly speaking, to be regarded as the conditions of progress rather than its active agencies.

Summary.—The native impulses are, then, from the psychological point of view the basis of man's social life. Representing the innate or the biological element in the relationships of individuals, they are necessarily the raw material out of which the social life is developed. They are the psychological expression of the biological forces of selection and heredity as these latter well up in the social life at any particular moment. While they furnish only the beginnings of social organization, that is, only certain simpler coördinations between individuals, it is their modification by feeling and intelligence, functioning with respect to the environment, which produces the acquired habits out of which all higher forms of social coördination and social organization must issue. Concealed beneath these acquired modes of behavior or conduct in the individual and in society, behind them all, are always the various instinctive impulses. As they represent the

original motor activities, they may well be characterized, therefore, as the real propelling forces of society, since the feelings and emotions, as has already been pointed out, do not lie behind these activities but rather accompany them. The physiological impulses, then, which, when viewed from the psychological side, we term instincts, are the true primary forces of human society, the ultimate springs of all activity; and their guidance and control through the education of the individual and the organization of social relationships between individuals, that is, their control through reason, is the ultimate practical problem of human social life.

CHAPTER X

THE RÔLE OF FEELING IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

Feeling as a Social Element.—We have already seen that feeling is the organic valuation of our activities; that is, feeling is the value which is given to activity by the individual organism. We have also seen that when the activity has been in the past on the whole organically advantageous, the feeling accompanying it is usually agreeable, and when, on the other hand, the activity in the past has been organically disadvantageous, the feeling accompanying it is usually disagreeable. Feeling, therefore, modifies activity in individuals and must be regarded as a relatively independent element.[1] If the primary force in social life is the activity of individuals which springs from native and habitual impulses, then feeling, in modifying these activities, must be regarded as a secondary force. This is equivalent to saying that feeling in the form of pleasure and pain can neither be regarded as a primary force in the social life nor can it be utterly disregarded and said to be no factor at all.

The Older View of Feeling as a Social Element.—The social philosophy of the Eighteenth Century and much of that of the Nineteenth Century was based upon a hedonistic psychology, which proclaimed that all social actions might easily be explained in terms of pleasure and pain.[2] Accord-

[1] But compare what was said in Chapter VI on the Meyer-Bernard theory of feeling.

[2] See above, p. 113. The words "pleasure" and "pain," as employed throughout this book, are used in the popular sense (as, e.g.,

ing to this hedonistic psychology, as we have already seen, the springs of human action were always to be found in the calculation of agreeable or disagreeable sensations. According to this view, feeling was not only primary in the individual but also in society, and the whole explanation of the social life resolved itself into a calculus of utilities and disutilities to the feeling individual.[1] But the hedonistic psychology may now be practically regarded as a thing of the past. All the researches of modern psychology into human nature tend, as we have already seen, to discredit the theory that the springs of human action are in feelings of pleasure and pain. While hedonistic psychology has been overthrown, it is still found, however, as the premise of much that has recently been written in the social sciences and a hedonistic sociology still holds the field, although it is a manifest absurdity to maintain a hedonistic sociology when hedonistic psychology has been discredited.

For example, Professor Ward's sociology, epoch-making and of permanent value as it is in many of its features, is, nevertheless, based upon a hedonistic psychology. Ward regards the feelings as primary in the individual, and pleasure and pain as the sole springs of action. He accordingly considers that the feelings are the primary social forces. It is true that he speaks also of the desires as the true social force, but the context shows that in most

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in Bentham's writings), as the equivalent of the psychological terms "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness."

[1] As Dr. Bernard says in effect (*The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control*, p. 2), the influence of feeling upon social activity has been the central problem in the development of social and ethical theory since the time of Hobbes. It should be added that Dr. Bernard's dissertation is the clearest and the ablest discussion of feeling as a factor in the social life which has thus far appeared, but it came into the writer's hands after the present chapter had been written (1909), and it seemed best to leave his original statements unaltered.

cases he uses the word "desire" in the feeling sense.[1] He says, indeed, that desire is a form of pain. According to Ward, therefore, it is possible to interpret the whole social life scientifically in terms of feeling. All activities in society are but expressions, according to Ward, of feelings of pleasure or pain in the individual. Other influences in society, such as that of the intellect or reason, are not true forces at all, but simply serve to guide the expression of the feelings.[2] It follows from this that the practical end of the social sciences should be to secure the "organization of feeling" in society. With Ward, therefore, the subjective element of feeling is the beginning and also the goal of all social activities.

Dr. Bentley's View of Feeling as a Social Element.— Quite in contrast to Professor Ward's theories are the views of Dr. Arthur F. Bentley. According to Bentley, all attempts to interpret the social life in terms of either feelings or ideas have been scientific errors.[3] Just because these elements are so individual it is not possible, according to him, to make any use of them in the explanation of social phenomena. Rather, we can find sufficient explanation of all social phenomena in social activities themselves. Feeling gives no explanation, Bentley says, because feeling is simply the subjective side of activity. To state what goes on in society in terms of feeling may, therefore, have literary or artistic value, but it can have no scientific value. For the most part feelings are vague and unreliable and we cannot argue from them to social activities. On the other hand, whenever we find feelings definite, then they become simply synonymous with activities, and the explana-

[1] Ward regards "desire" as feeling acted upon by memory. Cf. *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 52–54; also *Pure Sociology*, pp. 99–105 and 124–32.

[2] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 97, 463.

[3] See *The Process of Government*, Chaps, I and II. The argument of these chapters is summarized in Chap. V.

tion of the activity in terms of feeling is simply superfluous. Says Dr. Bentley: "When a feeling is as definite as, say, the love of theater-going, or when an idea is as definite, say, as some detail of ballot law reform which we are on point of adopting, it becomes the same thing as our activity itself. . . . Feelings and ideas vanish into the activity. They stand naked before us as impotent inferences from activity."[1] Therefore, Dr. Bentley concludes that it is unscientific to regard feelings or ideas as something behind the activities of society working upon it as causes, but we must explain the social life in terms of activity itself, or, as he says, in terms of "practical interests," using that term in a purely objective sense.

Now there is much in what Dr. Bentley says which is in line with the new psychology and with what has already been said in this text. We have already insisted that the social life must be approached from the standpoint of activity, that it must be interpreted primarily in terms of activity rather than primarily in terms of feeling or ideas. But Dr. Bentley goes altogether too far—much further than modern psychology would warrant—in excluding feelings and ideas altogether from being relatively independent influences in our social life. Dr. Bentley seems to forget that society is made up of biological and psychological individuals and that these individuals are thinking, feeling men whose actions are mediated, guided and *controlled* by feelings and ideas. All sociology must start its interpretation of the social life with the biological and psychological individual whom Dr. Bentley regards, in the way in which he is put to use, as highly "fictitious."[2] We could afford to dispense with all references to feelings and ideas in the scientific study of society if it were true that feelings and ideas are coextensive with activity. But, as

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 168-69.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 170.

we have already seen, feelings and ideas appear within physiological activities at certain points to evaluate them, mediate and control them. They are, therefore, relatively new and independent elements which must be taken account of by the sociologist. Dr. Bentley's interpretation of society in terms of mass or group activities amounts practically to the interpretation of society as an immense machine.[1] While it may be admitted, therefore, that we cannot use feelings and ideas in a *causal* way in explaining society,[2] they must, nevertheless, come into every scientific interpretation of social facts, because, as has already been pointed out, social phenomena are, in the nature of responses to stimuli and these responses are modified, in the mature individual at least, by complex series of feelings and ideas.

Let us take the family group as an illustration. Any attempt to understand the family entirely apart from the feelings and emotions of its individual members would seem to be very far removed from the actual, concrete life of the family group as we find it. It is true that the life of the family group might be described at any particular moment quite entirely in terms of activity, but if we are to attempt to describe the life of any particular family, or of the family as an institution, we could scarcely do so without reference to the changes or modifications brought about in activity by feeling. While the feelings of agreeableness or disagreeableness may be neither the beginning nor the end of the life of any family group, they are, nevertheless, an active modifying element in the complex whole and must be taken into full account in any scientific interpretation of the life of the group. Dr. Bentley's

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[1] The philosophical implication of such a purely objective "mass" or "group interpretation" is, of course, materialism or a rigid psycho-physical parallelism.

[2] That is, in a causo-mechanical way. See the discussion of the concept of cause in Chapter IV.

proposal to interpret the social life entirely in terms of collective activities without regard to the influence of individual feeling upon these activities must, therefore, be rejected as erring as far on one side as Professor Ward's hedonistic sociology does upon the other side.

The Place of Feeling in the Social Life.—Professor Ward's sociology may, indeed, be regarded as much nearer the truth from the standpoint of the biology and psychology of the individual than Dr. Bentley's. Professor Ward says the true social forces are the desires, and, as we have already seen, the desires are complexes of physiological impulse and feeling with some cognitive elements added. Many desires are complexes of instinctive impulses and feeling. If we used one word, therefore, to cover both the instincts and the hereditary feelings which are attached to them, such as the word "feeling-instinct,"[1] then we would have a term which would be very nearly synonymous with the word desire, and in this sense there is no objection to saying that the desires, or the feeling-instincts, are the social forces. The objection to such a statement lies rather in its ambiguity than in its falsity. The word desire, because it covers a complex conscious state, is susceptible of many interpretations. As we have already seen, Professor Ward gives it a hedonistic interpretation, while some one who looked at society mainly from the standpoint of will and activity might interpret it in terms of activity or impulse. All this emphasizes what has already been said about the necessity of a careful and scientific use of psychological terms by sociologists.

The chief danger in using such a complex term as "desire" with which to designate the primary forces in the social life is that it opens the way to give greater weight to the feeling element, the element of pleasure and pain, than what properly belongs to it psychologically. Con-

[1] Cf. Hall, *Adolescence*, Chap. X.

scious desire arises, as we have already seen, mainly through the blocking of some physiological impulse; hence the pain aspect which Ward sees in it so clearly. Inasmuch as the gratification of the desire is usually the working out of an instinctive or habitual impulse this is usually accompanied by pleasurable feelings. Hence the opportunity for some one who reflects upon the action to say that it was done for the sake of the pleasurable feeling, whereas the exact scientific statement of the matter is that the activity has been evaluated as disagreeable by the organism when it was impeded and as agreeable when it functioned successfully. It is clear, then, that the agreeable and disagreeable feelings have simply accompanied the activity, not originating it, but perhaps modifying it either in the way of inhibition or of reënforcement. Feeling, therefore, shows itself to be clearly not the primary element in individual or social activity but a secondary element which modifies the activity on the individual, or subjective, side. Just because feelings are organic valuations of activity and nothing else they cannot be left out of account wholly in social interpretation.

The Feeling Aspect of the Instincts, as has already been pointed out, is the emotions. Feeling, indeed, is closely associated with the instincts, the successful functioning of an instinctive activity being usually accompanied by pleasurable feeling. Thus all that has been said about the place of the instincts in our social life might, with a change of a few words, be practically said about the place of the emotions which accompany the instincts. It matters little, for example, whether we speak of the rôle of the instinct of pugnacity in social life or the rôle of the emotion of anger. So, too, parental and sexual love are both instincts and emotions. While not all instinctive activities are accompanied by clearly defined feelings which we term "emotions," yet all the instincts are powerfully reënforced by certain pleasurable feeling tones which give them sanc-

tion, as it were, to the individual. Hence feeling indirectly plays a powerful part in the social life in sanctioning and reënforcing instinctive activities. Many of the values which the individual finds in association with the members of his group are due to the feelings called forth by the instinctive tendencies, as we have already pointed out, to associate, to coöperate, and in all ways to be at one with one's group. Thus it is through the feelings that the individual gets largely his values from the social life, and it follows accordingly that feeling is one of the most fundamental aspects of collective as well as of individual life. The feelings of groups of individuals become organized around certain instinctive and habitual ways of action which the group finds to be expedient. This organization of feeling which accompanies the organization of activity in groups we know under such terms as popular sentiment, public feeling, and the like.

The Feeling Aspect of the Desires and Interests also shows the importance of feeling as an element in the social life. As we have already pointed out, the desires and interests cannot be considered as pure feelings, as some writers have made the mistake of doing, nor can the feeling element in them even be considered primary. While the primary element in both desire and interest is undoubtedly activity or impulse, yet the feeling element is strong in both and powerfully reënforces the tendency to activity. That nearly all would unhesitatingly give such a large place to the influence of desires and interests of individuals in society shows that we must recognize also a large place for feeling. These desires and interests, as has already been pointed out, spring largely from the instincts and the early acquired habits of the individual. The feelings which accompany them serve to fix them in individual character, and hence in later life these complexes often enter very largely as units into the determination of individual conduct.

The sympathetic feelings are especially of great importance in the social life. As has already been pointed out, without them harmonious coördinations of the higher kinds could scarcely exist between individuals. Sympathy among all members of a group is a feeling element which is of the greatest importance, then, in the life of the group. Not only does it reënforce social organization by an accompanying solidarity of feeling, but sympathetic feeling is apparently also necessary for any very complex changes or adjustments in society, especially those which involve new relations between individuals. The sympathetic feelings, therefore, bear a relation to social progress as well as to social organization. As Professor Ward and others have emphasized, sympathetic feeling has had much to do with all the reforms in human society which have looked toward the amelioration of the conditions of lower classes and races. On account of this importance of sympathetic feeling, the most highly civilized societies take sedulous measures to cultivate sympathetic feeling among all their members. The rôle of sympathy as an aspect of feeling in human society is so important that we shall note it at length in another chapter.[1]

The Conservative Tendency of Feeling.—Because pleasurable feelings usually accompany the functioning of instinctive and habitual activities, the influence of feeling in social life is mainly conservative; that is, the sanctions of feeling are usually attached to those activities which are either deep-seated habits or instincts. Changes in activity are usually accompanied by more or less unpleasant feelings.[2] It is only when the change in the activity can be associated with some previously formed habit or instinct that it can secure the sanction of feeling. Consequently, all of the customs and usages of society, the accepted social

[1] See Chapter XIV.

[2] Cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

order of any group, is, as a rule, deeply embedded in feeling, and feeling opposes any change. Such an institution as slavery, for example, comes to have in time associated with it the sanction of powerful feelings which make the difficulty of abolishing the institution well-nigh insuperable. The institution of monarchy is another illustration of the way in which feelings become attached to institutions and provide supports for them, since the conservative tendency of habit becomes reënforced by the sanction of the feelings which become attached to the habit.

It is, therefore, always a problem for the social reformer who wishes to bring about changes in society to overcome the dead weight of feeling which opposes change. The skillful reformer or social worker strives to attach the changes proposed to some social habit of long standing or to some instinctive activity. In this way it is possible to enlist the feelings on the side of social change; for example, the parental instinct and the emotions which accompany it may be appealed to in bringing about a different social policy as regards the liquor traffic; or humanitarian impulses developed from the parental and social instincts may be appealed to in combating many social evils; but the task of enlisting feeling on the side of social change is always a difficult one. Nevertheless, it is manifest that no permanent changes can be made in society successfully without enlisting the feelings on the side of the change. If the intellect alone is enlisted the probability is that the old custom or tradition will soon reassert itself, because, as has already been said, feeling reënforces primarily habitual activities. The social reformer, however, has always this consolation in his efforts to change feeling, and that is, that feelings always follow activities, and if the new activities can be established long enough feeling is sure in time to give them sanction. Thus, while feeling for monarchy may be strong in a people who have but recently abolished monarchical institutions, yet if republican institutions can be

maintained long enough feeling will come to sanction them quite as much as ever it did monarchy.

What has been said in the past few sentences, however, applies more to changes in habitual activities than to changes in instinctive social activities. The feelings connected with the instincts are hereditary no less than the instincts themselves, and therefore they will reassert themselves in spite of the organization of society more or less in each generation, although even in this case the education of the young may greatly modify, not only instinctive activities, but also the powerful feelings which reënforce them.

The Individualistic Character of Feeling.—It is not inconsistent to say that feeling is individualistic in its social tendencies and effects as well as conservative. It has been claimed by some that the reason is essentially the individualistic force in society. But it might readily be shown that the reason is only individualistic to the extent that it is subservient to feeling. The instincts and the feelings are far more subjective and individual in their nature than the intellect. The instincts, however, represent racial tendencies and are, therefore, in a sense less subjective than the feelings. Feeling, as we have already pointed out, is the true subjective or individualistic element in the mental life, since it expresses the valuations which the individual organism gives to an activity. It is, so to speak, the *me*-side of activity. Feeling, therefore, is necessarily, through and through, an individual matter, and its tendencies must necessarily be individualistic except as it tends to conform to racially uniform tendencies or instincts on the one hand,[1] or to social control on the other.

[1] The background of feeling is, of course, racial, in so far as feeling is attached (as the emotions are) to instinctive reactions. Hence the fundamental similarity in feeling of all human beings. This is, however, only a qualification of the essentially individualistic character of feeling. As the *me*-side of activity, feeling is individual-

The individualism of Rousseau and his advocacy of the worth of the feelings was not, therefore, an accident. Neither was it an accident that the Nineteenth Century was dominantly hedonistic and individualistic at the same time. A society organized upon the basis of feeling must be organized entirely upon the basis of subjective or individualistic valuations of activity. Hence, such a society will be organized also upon an individualistic basis. What has been said about the conservative character of feeling must be modified, therefore, to this extent that when feeling is made the guide or goal of the collective life-process, then there are opportunities for many conflicts of habit within the group; and that gives opportunity to a certain extent for new tendencies in favor of change and of progress to assert themselves. The recognition of feeling as of great importance in the life of individuals and of groups has been in the past, therefore, a step toward progress. Nevertheless, it can easily be seen that any attempt to organize social life entirely upon the basis of feeling must lead to pure individualism and ultimately to social anarchy. It would be easy to show that no social group whatsoever can achieve stable organization if individual feeling is accepted as the ultimate and sole guide of social activity.[1] Thus the family, for example, cannot be organized purely upon the basis of feeling. Something more than the feelings and emotions must enter into the organized life of the family group if it is to persist. The attempt to maintain a family life purely upon the basis of feeling and emotion, necessarily, therefore, ends in disaster. It may be suggested that one of the reasons for the grave

istic; as dominantly attached to habits and instincts it is conservative and even reversionary.

[1] Very rightly Dr. Bernard says (*op. cit.*, p. 28): "Feeling is the least reliable of all subjective criteria or evaluations of action in an objective and social world." We cannot agree, however, when he says that it is "worthless" (p. 43).

instability of the family at the present time is that, owing to the emancipation of the individual, marriages are formed frequently with the sole end of individual happiness in view. That is, the union of the family group is formed purely upon a basis of feeling and with feeling as its goal. When the anticipated happiness fails of realization the result is frequently in such families that the organization of the family goes to pieces and relief is sought in the divorce courts.

It is the same with all the larger groups of society as it is with the family. Feeling cannot be made the basis of organization in them by itself, because of its purely individual character. Nevertheless, just as it would be a great mistake to leave feeling out of account in the organization of the family it would also be a great mistake to leave feeling out of account in the organization of any social group whatsoever. While feeling is not the primary basis nor the chief end of our social life, yet it is, nevertheless, a legitimate element in the social life and its worth should be recognized as such. While we cannot agree with Professor Ward that the chief end of society is the organization of feeling, or happiness, yet the organization of feeling must be something which is kept in view as a part of the end to be achieved in all rational social endeavors.

Summary.—Feeling, is, then, a powerful factor in determining the coadaptation of individuals to one another which we find in society. The feeling attitudes of individuals toward each other not only express the relation of their habitual activities, but also continually modify these activities. While in the main feeling is a somewhat conservative and passive influence in society, yet on account of its subjective and individual character it continually brings to bear an individualizing influence upon all social activities. Feeling is, therefore, an active as well as a passive factor in the social life. On the individual side it is continually modifying activity, both in conscious and in un-

conscious ways. Feeling must, therefore, be taken into account, not only in any theoretical interpretation of the social life, but in all practical measures for modifying or controlling social activity. While not a primary force in society, feeling presents itself as an important secondary force.

CHAPTER XI

THE RÔLE OF INTELLECT IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

The Intellect as a Social Element.—While the view of social organization and evolution thus far presented is very far from an intellectualistic one, this does not preclude us from recognizing in the fullest degree the place of the intellect as a factor or an element in the social life. As we have already seen, indeed, in the chapter on "The Origin of Society," the distinctive character of our human social life is due to the modifying influence of intellectual elements. While modern science makes impossible the older intellectualistic theories of human society, any sane interpretation of modern science also makes it impossible to leave out of account the intellectual element. While instinct and feeling may be the basis of our social life these mental elements can go but a little way in explaining the complex social life of modern civilized societies. As we have already seen, the intellect plays a decisive rôle in adapting the individual organism, in man at least, to its environment. So, too, we shall endeavor to show that the intellect plays a decisive rôle in bringing about those higher adaptations which characterize civilized societies.

Earlier Views as to the Social Function of the Intellect.—The hedonistic social philosophy of the Eighteenth Century was peculiarly intellectualistic in some senses. While it held that man could only seek the pleasurable and that the intellect was therefore in thralldom to the feelings, it nevertheless considered that all social arrangements were an intellectual outcome in the sense that they were due to

the deliberate weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements. Such a social philosophy was at once hedonistic and intellectualistic. The social sciences of the present, as we have already seen, have not altogether outgrown this influence. While sociology was, from the start, more or less of a protest against this intellectualistic view of society, yet even Comte held that "ideas govern the world or throw it into chaos," and that "all social mechanism rests upon opinions."[1] He also found, quite consistently with these views, that the forms of human society were practically determined by man's intellectual conceptions of the world, the history of society being at bottom the history of the development of man's speculative concepts.[2] This view of social organization and evolution was strongly protested against by Herbert Spencer, although many of his views of the family, the state and other human institutions were scarcely less intellectualistic than Comte's. In Ward's sociological writings we find the transition to another view, because, as we have already seen, Ward's chief theory was that the feelings, or the desires, are the true social forces. Intellect, Ward held, is not a true force in society at all. Nevertheless it guides and directs the social forces much as the rudder guides a ship.[3] While Ward refused to recognize the intellect as a primary force in society or to call it a force at all, he did, nevertheless, recognize that it has an influence in determining the direction and form of social activities. In the work of Dr. Bentley and a few other recent writers, as we have already seen, all recognition is refused to the intellectual elements as in any way factors or influences helping to determine social activities. An interpretation of the social life in terms of ideas or ideals, Dr. Bentley holds, is an unscientific inter-

[1] *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. I.

[2] *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. I; Bk. VI, Chap. V; *Positive Polity*, Vol. III, Chap. I.

[3] *Pure Sociology*, Chap. XVI.

pretation in no way justified by the social facts that we know. Only when ideas are synonymous with social activities is an interpretation of society in terms of ideas exact, and then it is unnecessary.[1]

The Psychological View as to the Social Function of the Intellect.—The conflicting opinions as to the rôle of the intellect in the social life which have just been given, indicate that it is possible to take several views, if we examine society in its external aspects. Here again, as so often, the true situation becomes evident only through turning to the psychology of the individual. As we have already seen, the intellect is the cognitive, objective side of the mind, having directly to do with the mediation of the activities of the individual organism toward its environment. The intellect, or cognitive side of the mind, evaluates activities then with reference to the environment, and functions to mediate and control them with reference to environmental factors. Intellectual processes, therefore, continually modify activities. While the intellect seems to have been developed chiefly as an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling, in its higher reaches it can and does act more or less independently of these. The intellect modifies the instincts profoundly, indeed, through substituting in their place habits which at least in later life become as strong as any of the original activities. The instincts and feelings, as we have already seen, are very insufficient guides in the complex social life of the present, and in all new and complex environments, to which man is not adapted instinctively and biologically, the intellect must play the decisive rôle in bringing about such adaptations.

The intellect is, then, developed to control activities in individual and collective life which cannot be controlled in any other way. Hence it must be regarded as the

[1] *The Process of Government*, Chap. II and pp. 166–71.

supreme device for controlling activity and modifying environment. This being so we should expect to find, as we do find, that it is only in the higher stages of development that the full importance of this element becomes manifest. Consciousness comes to play a greater and greater part as adaptation becomes more complex. In human society adaptations, as we have already seen, are made at first relatively unconsciously or instinctively. It is absurd, then, to trace social origins in any large degree to the intellectual elements, although, on account of the psychological fallacy of reading our consciousness back into earlier situations, there is an insidious tendency to do so. While we cannot find human social origins to any extent in man's intellect, yet more and more the process of living together needs the interference of reason if successful social adjustments are to be made. Later social developments and movements in human society, therefore, take on a preponderatingly intellectual character. Reflective thought, which probably played such an insignificant rôle in primitive society, becomes at last the decisive element, because upon it depends the control, not only of the forces of physical nature, but also, as we have already seen, of the feelings and impulses of human nature.

Idea-Forces in Human Society.—If any purely psychological elements are entitled to be called forces at all in human society, intellectual elements are certainly entitled as much to be so designated as feelings. French sociological writers, particularly Prof. Alfred Fouillée, have for years been accustomed to speak of idea-forces in social evolution; and rightly, since they at any rate become active factors in the later stages of social evolution and absolutely decisive, so far as we can understand, in the making of the more complex individual and social adjustments. Professor Fouillée says that the revelation of what is, can be, or ought to be, renders possible and even actually commences the modification of what is, the realization of what can be or of

what ought to be.[1] He argues that ideas are always suffused with feeling and impulse. While this is probably true, it is scarcely necessary to adopt this line of argument to show that ideas are active factors in the social life, because ideas, in civilized man at least, come in time to constitute for the individual and society a sort of "subjective environment," as Professor Ward admits, and this subjective environment the mass of individuals respond to quite as they do to the stimuli in the objective environment.[2] In other words, ideas modify activities directly without the interposition of feeling, just as sensation and images coming from stimuli in the objective environment call forth responses.

This "subjective environment" becomes increasingly important with the growth of civilization until the ideas, ideals and concepts of the intellectual life come to be more determining at any particular moment in the social life process than the factors of the physical environment. As Professor Ross says, "The key to his behavior (civilized man's) lies no longer in the play of stimuli upon him, but in his consciousness. This has gathered in volume and consistency until his center of gravity lies here rather than in current impressions. The mental content has acquired such mass, and experience has been wrought up into such forms —idea, concept, formula, ideal—that at each moment they control more than do the external conditions."[3] This is true not only of civilized man, as an individual, but of civilization itself. Civilization is in many respects, indeed, the substitution of such a "subjective environment" for

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[1] *L'Evolutionisme des Idées-Forces*, Introduction.

[2] The subjective environment of ideas and ideals modifies conduct directly, just as much as do the stimuli (sensations) received from the physical environment. Ideas and ideals are as much entitled to be styled forces in the social life (active factors) as are the stimuli received from the physical environment.

[3] *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 159.

the objective environment. All civilizations are dominated by certain ideas, ideals and intellectual beliefs which give color and form to each particular civilization. Many of these ideas, as has already been pointed out, are in the nature of coördinating ideas, cementing together, as it were, the activities of vast groups of men into complex wholes. Agreement upon fundamental intellectual notions, as Comte long ago insisted, has always been essential to any high state of civilization and of social stability. Opinions do, therefore, more or less underlie laws, customs and institutions of all sorts. These opinions may not for the mass of men be reasoned, but they are essentially intellectual states. Such opinions mediate the formation of habit in the mass of individuals and make possible adaptations which could not be secured upon instinctive or unconscious levels. The higher stages of social evolution become increasingly controlled and modified by intellectual elements and take on, therefore, a preponderatingly intellectual character. The whole progress of modern civilization has illustrated this fact. Intellectual achievements, and especially achievements which lead to fundamental agreement regarding social adjustments, are the great moving, dynamic forces of our time.

The nonfunctional view of intellect is no more justified, therefore, from the social point of view than it is from the individual point of view. Just as there is no ground for asserting that the individual intellect in its forms of imagination, reason and ideals is in any necessary or absolute subjection to instinct and feeling, so there is no ground either for asserting such subjection of intellectual elements in the social life to the nonintellectual.[1] Only gradually, however, do the intellectual elements free themselves and function efficiently in controlling the forms of the social life; but inasmuch as they are the supreme devices for con-

[1] See the discussion in Chapter XVIII.

trolling activity they must be the ultimate reliance and hope of civilized human society.

The Role of Invention and Discovery.—The consideration of the rôle of invention and discovery as functions of the intellect shows at once the importance of intellectual elements in the social life of man. Invention and discovery, so far as we know, hardly exist below the human level. If they exist at all in animal societies, the general level of individual mental development is such that they have no effect; hence, one reason why animal societies are nonprogressive. On the other hand, invention and discovery have from the beginning, as anthropological and ethnological researches show, played a very large part in the development of human social life. Civilization, indeed, has been built up, as has often been emphasized, largely through invention and discovery; that is, intellectual perceptions of certain ways in which advantages may be realized and disadvantages overcome have been at the basis of that progressive mastery over nature which is synonymous with progress. The invention of tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, the improvement of communication and transportation, these technical inventions along with scientific discovery of the properties and nature of things, as has often been pointed out, have been not only sources of the most important social changes, but also the very instruments by which progress has been effected. But it should also not be forgotten that new conceptions of human society and of the universe have played scarcely less important parts in human history. Invention is not confined to the putting together of material forces in new ways nor is discovery confined to understanding the workings of physical nature. Quite as important a phase of invention in the social life has been the making of new combinations of human activities. Thus new coördinations of individual activity, new modes of associating and coöperating, have been invented in the later stages of social evolution as well as machines.

In the same way the intellectual understanding of human nature and of human society has become one of the most important phases of scientific discovery.

Now invention and discovery are manifestly quite entirely intellectual processes. They involve the making of new intellectual conceptions or hypotheses and the testing of those hypotheses. They involve the use of the imagination, therefore, as well as of the reason. Invention has particularly depended upon the creative or constructive imagination and the inventions of the imagination must not be confined, as has already been said, to new combinations of physical forces, for æsthetic and moral ideals also are products of the imagination. Artistic and moral development have depended, therefore, upon intellectual processes, that is, upon the imagination and reason. All idealism in society, therefore, is a product of the imagination and reason of certain individuals. Of course, the copying of such ideas and mental attitudes by the mass of individuals may involve a relatively small amount of intellectual effort compared to the work of original invention and discovery. Nevertheless, the whole process may be regarded as essentially intellectual because the intellectual elements are those which dominate in the process.

The Individual Genius as a Social Factor.[1]—Not all of the inventions and discoveries of the individual are taken up and generalized by society. Indeed, the variations in intellectual concepts are so slight in the ordinary individual that they rarely have any considerable social effects. Therefore, it has often been claimed that ideas are really social products and not the products of purely individual mental processes. Though this is true in one sense, it is only the exceptional individual mind which seems capable of producing ideas that are sufficiently different from the

[1] Cf. the discussion in Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Chap. V, "The Genius."

mass and that are socially valuable. The exceptional person who produces such new and socially fruitful ideas is usually called a genius. Modern research has shown that this exceptional individual, the genius, is largely a product of biological variation. The genius, in other words, is a biological variation in the direction of mental equipment along some line which is socially useful and valuable. There can be no doubt, therefore, that in the genius there is a large individual element, the element of individual biological variation in socially superior directions. It is the superior brain power of the genius, in other words, which makes it possible for him to produce the inventions and discoveries which become the instruments of progress in his group. Any mass interpretation of the social life which would neglect this purely individual element in genius would leave out of account one of the most important factors in human progress. As Baldwin and many others have insisted, it is the individual, then, that produces the new variations in society, particularly the variations in those ideas, ideals and concepts which become the instrumentalities of mastery over nature on the one hand and of human nature on the other. Baldwin makes the mistake of calling these thoughts and ideas the content of the social life,[1] whereas they are rather the instruments of social change and adjustment.[2] Nevertheless, as instruments of social change and adjustment they are of the utmost importance to the sociologist.

These ideas, of course, which are the inventions of the exceptional individual mind, are of all degrees of social value. Some of them may be so reversionary as to lead man back to the lowest depth of barbarism. Others may be of a sort which will lead him forward to the highest conceivable type of social life. The social value of the inventions of the genius, then, that is, the value of his intellectual ac-

[1] *Op. cit.*, Chap. XII, sec. 3.
[2] See Chapter VIII.

tivity, can only be determined by thorough testing in actual social life. Not all genius in this broad sense of ability to produce new ideas and ideals is of value. Just how great influence the thoughts of the genius will have, therefore, depends upon how much in accord with the general trend or laws of social evolution his intellectual conceptions are. Whether or not the new thoughts and ideas of the genius are taken up and made any practical use of by the group in which he lives will depend not only upon the adjustment of the genius to his group, but will also depend upon the functional adaptability of his inventions to the group life. Hence, it happens that the inventions of a particular age which are assimilated in the social life are usually only the inventions for which that age or stage of social evolution is ready, and it is manifest that unless genius is socially guided and controlled it is apt to be either socially functionless or an actual impediment to real social progress.

" The ' great man ' theory " of history or of social evolution is not, therefore, endorsed because we must recognize the personality of the exceptional individual as a very significant and practically irreducible factor in social evolution. On the contrary, as we have already implied, and as has often been pointed out, genius has its receptive as well as its active side. The superior mental endowment of the genius but makes him the more sensitive to many of the forces and tendencies of his time. The " great man " is, therefore, usually a focusing point of many and sometimes of nearly all of the tendencies of his age. Indeed, greatness largely consists in being able to sum up in one's own personality some of the more striking tendencies of one's time. Again, unless the ideas, ideals and inventions of the genius are socially workable, his leadership will not be available. The great man who manages to perform a great work for his time is the one that is, as we have already seen, socially selected. Social selection based upon the

practical workability of the ideas of the genius is, therefore, what really produces the great man as we know him in history. The genius who is not thus socially selected by his age does not become a great man in the historical sense, unless by some accident his thoughts are preserved and later generations find them workable. In such cases there is still social selection, only, as it were, of a spiritual rather than a living leader. The genius thus has his place in social evolution as a factor which must be taken account of, but it is not a place which is independent of the collective life-process. On the contrary, genius finds expression only as it functions in connection with that process, and ultimately only as it furthers rather than impedes the development of the collective life of man. Nevertheless, the inventions of the genius are among the most significant factors of social progress. While not the sole source of social progress, as some writers have maintained, they are increasingly important in all the higher stages of social evolution and unquestionably are the instruments upon which society must rely for its highest development.

Intellect and Social Progress.—As has already been implied, the rôle of the intellect is seen chiefly in social progress rather than in social organization. Social organization at any given moment is so largely a matter of instinct, habit and feeling that interpretation of the social order must be largely in those terms. But social progress, on the other hand, is largely the outcome of man's intellectual life. It has been the slow accumulation of knowledge through the activity of the human intellect and the progressive rationalization of that knowledge which has been the basis of social progress as we understand that phrase. Civilization has not been built up through the instincts and emotions of man, even though they be regarded as the indispensable conditions of intellectual activity. Civilization is, as has already been said, decidedly an intellectual achievement. The intellect may be justly regarded, there-

fore, as the progressive force in human society, the active agent of progress. More and more the progressive rationalization of knowledge has enabled man to master nature and to control his own nature. Increasingly, man has come to rely upon his intellect in the contest for mastery over the forces, both without and within him, and increasingly social adjustments have been made and perfected upon this basis.

While we must repudiate the intellectualistic view of human society as at all adequate from a scientific standpoint, and even such a view as that of Baldwin when he advocates that "the content of the social life is thought" (intellectual processes), yet the functional or instrumental view of intellect compels us to recognize it as an increasing factor in social change and as the supreme device upon which man must rely to secure adequate social adjustments. Our whole modern attitude toward science and education, indeed, implies just this. Our modern faith in science is essentially that it is a superior instrument of adjustment, of knowledge of and control over, methods and forces. Education is essentially the bringing to bear of man's intellect upon the problems of individual and social adaptation. Science as an historical factor is simply the progressive rationalization of man's knowledge, while education is the progressive rationalization of individual and social adjustment. Both move toward the progressive rationalization of the social life as a whole, that is, the rational adaptation of collective human life to the requirements of its existence.[1]

Do we, then, accept Comte's generalization that the law of the evolution of society is the law of the evolution of man's intellectual conceptions, that social and intellectual evolution pass through three stages, the theological or prim-

[1] Cf. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, p. 9: "It is the final goal of reason . . . to bring all the experience of the race to bear in organizing the whole life of the race."

itive, the metaphysical or transitionary and the positive or final?[1] This law of Comte's, usually called the Law of the Three States, can, as we have already said, hardly be called more than a rough generalization. It is true that man's intellectual conceptions tend to become increasingly positive or scientific. More and more his intellectual conceptions become based upon facts, and scientific knowledge replaces vague speculations or instinctive beliefs.[2] But this does not mean that there are three well-marked, well-defined stages of man's mental and social life, which we may term the theological, the metaphysical and the positive or scientific, respectively. Some positive knowledge based upon facts must have existed from the beginning, while it is scarcely possible that man will outgrow the need of making metaphysical inferences from his knowledge of facts.[3] But metaphysics itself now tends to become positive or scientific, in that it aims to be a series of rational inferences from positive facts and a rational criticism of the presuppositions of knowledge. Even religious beliefs take on an increasingly positive character and strive to show themselves as rational inferences from our positive knowledge of nature and of man. While there is no danger of religious beliefs becoming extinct, they will become increasingly harmonious with scientific knowledge as mental and social evolution progresses. Comte's law of the three states could therefore be more accurately stated as the law or principle of the progressive rationalization of human knowledge and of human society.[4]

[1] The fullest and best discussion of this "law" by Comte is found in his *System of Positive Polity*, Vol. III, especially Chap. I.

[2] Cf. Hobhouse's excellent article on "The Law of the Three Stages" in the *Sociological Review*, Vol. I, pp. 262–79.

[3] Cf. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 610–14.

[4] It is only fair to add that in his *Positive Polity* Comte himself foreshadowed some such modification of his famous law as the above, as, e.g., when he speaks of it (Vol. III, pp. 15, 23) as the law of "the necessary and continual [increasing] subordination of our sub-

The Supposed Antagonism Between Intellectual Development and the Social Life.—If the view of the intellect which has been thus far presented is correct, then, the hope of man in the future must be an intellectual development which is in accord with social needs. But just here emerges again the view which we have several times referred to, that man's intellect is essentially antagonistic to social welfare, because it is essentially egoistic. This view of the intellect has been especially championed by Kidd among sociologists and endorsed and developed by Ward.[1] Kidd finds that the intellect, or reason, is destructive of social bonds and has to be restrained by a *supra-rational* force, namely, religion.[2] Ward also finds that the intellect is essentially egoistic, but its waywardness is held in check by religion and other agencies of social control.[3] At first sight there seems to be much in human history and in the social life of the present time to sanction this view. The Greeks, the most intellectual people of antiquity, had little or no practical moral genius, and their social life was characterized by instability, disharmony, and at length by corruption and degeneracy. Many of the most intellectual people of the present are noted as advocates of antisocial and antimoral tendencies.[4] Even science itself is at times apparently antisocial, or at least regardless of social welfare. As Professor Ross remarks, "The withering interrogation of all maxims, doctrines and ideals by men may lead to a denial of everything save one's own will."[5] There is, therefore, an apparent antagonism between intellect and social development. The question arises, there-

jective conceptions to the objective materials of which they are constructed."

[1] Cf. *Pure Sociology*, pp. 464, 479.

[2] *Social Evolution*, Chaps. III, IV and V.

[3] Cf. *op cit.*, pp. 133–34.

[4] Cf. what Comte says of the anarchical tendencies of the scientific class of his time, *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. VI, Chap. I.

[5] *Social Psychology*, p. 273.

fore, whether rationalism, or rationality, is consistent with the highest and best development of the social life.

But the antagonism between intellectual and social development is more apparent than real. Very largely it springs from the fact that the intellect, as the dynamic agent in society, is concerned more with social changes while the instincts and feelings are concerned more with maintaining the social order. But there is unquestionably a sort of intellectual development which is inimical to all sound social progress. This has already been implied in what has been said regarding the genius. While the intellect may be rightly regarded as the universal side of mind, functioning to bring about the highest and widest adaptation of the individual and society, yet, like any other part of man's nature, it is capable of exceedingly narrow and unwholesome development. The unsocialized character of much of the intellectual development of the present is therefore no conclusive proof that reason in its ultimate development is opposed to the highest interests of the social life. The reason which takes account merely of a part of man's nature would unquestionably be so opposed, but of the reason which takes account of all factors in the situation there is no need to have fear. Rationalism is a dissolving force in society only to the extent that it is a one-sided rationalism exaggerating certain factors in human life at the expense of others. The intellect will become socialized, in other words, only when it is turned fully, as Comte insisted, upon the study of human society itself. In such study the intellect escapes the bonds of a narrow individualism and becomes socialized through becoming itself an instrument of social adaptation.

Some practical conclusions stand out in our discussion which are well worth emphasizing. The chief of these is the importance of ideas and ideals in the higher stages of social development and a corollary is the practical importance of science and education as progressive agencies

in the later stages of social development. A clear understanding of a situation alone makes possible the highest type of adjustment. The work of science is very largely simply the making clear to the intellect of all the factors in a situation, their relative importance and the mechanism of their operations. The intellectual apprehension of the relations between factors or forces in social situations and of economies not realized must of itself greatly conduce to the solution of all social problems. However, when the discoveries of science and the conclusions of reflective thought are formulated into standards and these standards are attached to feeling elements, that is, made ideals, then their social efficacy is increased, at least for the mass of men, manyfold. For example, a clear understanding of the influences which have led to the decay of our family life and of the indicated adjustments necessary for stability will undoubtedly contribute something to the reëstablishment of a stable family. If such perceptions become the basis for ideals, however, their efficacy will be greatly increased. What is most needed, in other words, to secure the reconstruction of the family upon a stable basis is right ideals, and these ideals can only be reached by intellectual processes, although their diffusion in the population may be largely, of course, a matter of imitation. Ideals are judgments as to the value of activities. They express the mental attitudes of individuals toward things, persons and institutions. They are, therefore, indispensable instruments in bringing about any high type of coördination between individuals. Not only do the higher types of the family depend upon ideals but all the higher forms of association whatsoever. Ideals, as essentially methods of control over activities, deserve, then, all of the weight which practical social reformers, moral and religious teachers, and educators of all ages have given them.

Summary.—While intellectual elements have been given a place, especially in explaining social origins and social

organization, in the social theory of the past which is not warranted, yet there can be no doubt as to their increasing importance in connection with social changes in the higher stages of social evolution. Intellectual elements come in chiefly in the building up of new activities, especially in the making of very complex adjustments. As has been emphasized in earlier chapters, intellectual processes are concerned with the transition in the individual and society from one habit to another. Reflective thought may be called a bridge between two types of activities. The various intellectual processes in the individual and in society come in, therefore, to mediate, guide and control the adaptation of activities with reference to environment. All the higher types of coördination between individuals must therefore be in a large degree intellectual constructions in the sense that they are guided and controlled by reason. Social adaptations in the direction of increasing capacity for social survival, social harmony and social efficiency must be largely brought about, that is, mediated, by intellectual processes. The generally accepted ideas and ideals of a social group are, therefore, its most priceless possessions, for upon these its whole culture and civilization must rest; while the socially fruitful ideas and ideals which are the inventions of genius in science and art are the priceless instruments for raising the social life of man to its highest possible levels.

CHAPTER XII

THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES

THE only sense in which the term force can be used in the social sciences is in the sense of an active element or factor in social situations. There are grave objections to the use of the term force at all in the psychical sciences, and these objections are intensified when there is any assumption of a peculiar social force or forces. As Professor Hayes has insisted, the assumption of peculiar social forces is as metaphysical in sociology as the assumption of a peculiar vital force in biology.[1] However, just as in biology there is no objection to speaking of the special forces or factors which have shaped a given situation, so in sociology there is no objection to speaking of the concrete factors which are at work in a given social situation as social forces, provided we simply mean by such an expression that they are the active elements or factors in the situation.

Every factor which has some degree of active influence in shaping and molding the forms of association, the interactions between individuals, is, then, a social force. While the preceding chapters have argued that the mind in all of its aspects enters as a unity into the social life and that all phases of mind are active factors or forces in shaping the social life, yet the question remains whether these are

[1] See article on "The Social Forces Error," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, pp. 613–25. With much in this article I am in sympathy. However, the question as to the active or efficient factors in the social life is one of practical as well as of theoretical importance, and in this sense the theory of the social forces is important.

the only forces with which the sociologist has to deal. What about the physical factors of climate, soil, geographical conditions? Are not these also true social forces? What about such factors as heredity, variation and natural selection? Are not these also active factors at work in molding human society?

Physical Factors in Association.—It has lately generally been held by sociologists that these physical factors are not direct forces in human society;[1] that they are only conditions under which human society lives, since it is only through the psychological elements that we find any kind of social life maintained. As long as we adhere to a psychological view of society, such as this book is setting forth, that is a convenient and sufficiently accurate way to regard the matter. But it may be doubted whether this view of the matter is anything more than the mental bias of the psychological sociologists. It is true that at any particular moment the physical factors do not shape and mold the forms of the social life. At any particular moment these forms are seemingly quite dependent upon the psychological elements of impulse, feeling and intellect in individuals. But when one surveys human groups over long stretches of time, through many generations, the influence of physical factors is more evident.[2] In part, to be sure, this influence is indicated in the various innate tendencies, or instincts, of the individual, as has been already shown. That is, it is exerted through the selective influence of the environment. But in part, physical influences, like temperature, modify greatly, and apparently

[1] See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VII; Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 101; Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 532, 533.

[2] For a good statement of the influence of the physical environment, see Miss Semple's *Influences of Geographic Environment;* also Gregory, Keller and Bishop's *Physical and Commercial Geography.* For a brief summary, see Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, pp. 130f.

directly, the immediate responses in masses of individuals. Whether such active modification of instinctive and habitual impulses should not lead to the recognition of physical factors in some degree as active agencies or forces at work in modifying forms of association is an open question. The author has always been inclined to view these factors simply as conditions, but inasmuch as we must use the word force in a very broad sense in the social sciences, it would seem that anything that modifies stimulus and reaction must be considered in a certain sense a social force, inasmuch as it is an active factor in modifying human association. Be this as it may, it is certain that most physical factors under normal conditions, and particularly within short periods of time, modify the forms of human association only indirectly and remotely, since they influence society only through influencing the psychic nature of the individual. Physical factors in general, therefore, affect human society only indirectly, and by the psychological sociologist they can be, in a sense, disregarded, that is, they can be lumped together under the general head of stimuli from the environment which more or less modify the interstimulation and responses between individuals. The biological sociologist, on the other hand, considering the selective influence of the physical environment and the influence of heredity and variation, must take physical factors continually into account. From the standpoint of biological sociology the physical factors loom large and become the significant factors in viewing the evolution of society on its physical side. Psychological sociologists had better recognize, therefore, that their limiting the social forces to the various aspects of the psychical nature of the individual is only provisional and for their own purposes, not involving a rigid exclusion of physical factors from general sociology. For the purposes of psychological sociology all physical factors can be sufficiently brought in through their effects upon the physiological impulses of the individual, that is, through

their modifying effect upon these impulses through their perception by the senses, or the cognitive elements of mind. We shall, accordingly, make no attempt to discuss social forces in general, but only those with which the psychological sociologist is concerned.

The Psychological Factors in Association.—As has already been said, one of the main things aimed at in the last three chapters has been to impress the student that the mind enters in all of its phases as an influence or force into the various forms of human association. But the objection may be raised at this point that mind or consciousness is an entirely individual matter, and, therefore, it can have no influence in shaping the forms of society. Those who believe in the theory of "mass interpretation" would hold that all social movements must be interpreted entirely in objective factors, and that any interpretation in subjective factors is fallacious, or if not fallacious, at least unnecessary. The reply is twofold. In the first place, as we have already shown, the view of mind as entirely individual is without any adequate warrant. Mind and all the forms of consciousness have been developed in and through a social life-process. The individual mind, as we have already seen, has been created largely through the process of interaction with other minds. From the sociological point of view mind belongs quite as much to the group as to the individual. If thought and feeling have any functional relationship to individual activity they must have equally a functional relationship to social activity, since social activity is simply due to the interaction and coördination of individual activities. As the social life-process is carried on by the interaction of individuals, that process as well as the individual life-process is mediated and in all of its higher forms controlled by consciousness. The psycho-physical organisms of individuals with their inherited and acquired tendencies are, then, the spontaneous source of social activities, and we must start with the

biological and psychological individual in interpreting the social life from a natural science point of view. In psychological sociology that means that we must consider how these inherited and acquired tendencies are developed, modified and controlled in the activities of the social life. Starting with the original motor activities, we find, as we have already seen, these mediated on the one hand by feeling and on the other hand by cognitive processes. We are, therefore, compelled to bring into the discussion of every social situation from a psychological point of view the three elements of motor activity, feeling and cognition.

The impulsive aspects of our mental life, the feeling aspects, and the intellectual elements, all play some part, then, in determining the form of the social reality as we find it. The various theories which have attempted, therefore, to offer voluntaristic, hedonistic, or intellectualistic views of human society must be regarded as one-sided. Any sound psychological theory of the social life must make room for all of these elements, the impulsive, the feeling and the intellectual. That this must necessarily be the case can readily be seen by remembering that each phase of the mind has its definite function or part to play in the life of the individual. While these separate aspects of our mental life are but aspects of one process, we must not make the mistake of taking any one of these aspects and building up a theory of individual human nature or of social life upon it at the expense of the others. As we have already seen, the instincts or original impulses of the individual have a definite function in the social life. Again, the feelings have a perfectly definite function to perform in our mental life as individuals, and it would be strange if they performed no function in our social life. Finally, the cognitive elements have their definite function, without which we cannot conceive the individual even to exist. Likewise, in society these cognitive elements have such an important function that we cannot conceive of human so-

ciety existing as it is without them. The very fact, indeed, that the different aspects of mind have distinct and definite functions to perform in the individual life imply that they have likewise distinct and necessary functions to perform in the social life.

Nevertheless, as we have already seen, there is a certain order which may be given to these psychical factors or forces in the social life. Undoubtedly the native impulses which have been well termed "race habits" must be regarded as of primordial importance in the social life as well as in the life of the individual. In any study of human association from a genetic point of view these elements of original physiological impulse appear to be primary and for the psychological sociologist they are ultimate, although, as we have already said, the biological sociologist would analyze them into various factors. Again, the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness which either reënforce or inhibit the impulses must be considered to be secondary or modifying factors. Finally, the intellectual elements which guide and direct the activities must be considered also as modifying factors influencing human association.

The Classification of the Social Forces.—Summing up, then, we must note that we have three sets of psychical factors or forces at work in human society, and that each of these is capable of indefinite subdivision. It would seem that the only classification of the psychical factors at work in human society which can be reached must be along the lines of psychological analysis which we have followed: namely, we may divide the social forces (psychical) into the primary forces or the impulses, which may be subdivided into original and acquired; secondly, into the secondary forces or the feelings, which may be subdivided according to pleasantness or unpleasantness or according as they are attached to instincts (that is, are emotions) or to habits; thirdly, into tertiary social forces or intellectual

elements, which may be subdivided into the various forms of cognition, such as sensation, recognition, memory, reason, etc.

If this view is correct it is evident that the task of classifying the social forces is much like the task of classifying the elements in human nature; and that it is perhaps most successfully carried out along the lines of conventional psychological analysis. However, it is conceivable that these forces might also be classified by the ends for which they function. Numerous sociologists, such as Ward, Ross, Small, Ratzenhofer and others have attempted such classifications.[1] Of these classifications, according to the functional end involved in the activity, Ward's classification seems to be on the whole the most successful, and accordingly we shall give it here in a modified form as an example of a classification of the social forces according to the end which they serve in the collective life:[2]

SOCIAL FORCES (*Psychical Activities*)

I. *Life-Preserving Activities:*
  1. Preserving the life of the individual,
    (*a*) connected with nutrition (food process),
    (*b*) connected with defense,
      against inanimate nature,
      against animate nature;
  2. Preserving the life of the species,
    (*a*) reproduction,
    (*b*) care of offspring.

II. *Life-Mitigating Activities:*
  1. Moral—aiming at the good;
  2. Æsthetic—aiming at the beautiful;
  3. Intellectual—aiming at the true.

In this classification of Ward's it will be noted that the life-mitigating activities grow out, as it were, of the life-

[1] See Ross's discussion of these classifications, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VII.

[2] For Ward's statement of this classification (which he makes apply only to the "desires"), see *Pure Sociology*, Chap. XII.

preserving activities, the life-preserving activities being the essential processes of animal life, the life-mitigating activities being processes which are chiefly characteristic of human social life and some of them being only conspicuous in civilized society. For this reason Ward calls the life-preserving activities the essential and the life-mitigating activities the nonessential. The principles of classification and subclassification are clear except in the case of the life-mitigating activities. Here Ward has simply accepted the threefold division of cultural activities recognized by the ancient Greeks. It is not clear what the principle of division is, nor is it clear that this is an exhaustive classification. The classification is, however, an admirable classification of the main psychical activities evident in society from the standpoint of their end or function.

Professor Small has proposed another classification of social activities or forces in more objective terms. He proposes to term the active psychical factors in the social life *interests,* using that word in a purely practical sense.[1] The interests according to Small's conception are the practical social activities functioning toward the development of a more perfect social life. These interests he finds may be classified exhaustively under six heads, namely (1) health, (2) wealth, (3) sociability, (4) knowledge, (5) beauty, and (6) rightness.[2] He defines each of these interests in broad terms.[3] Thus under the health interest he would apparently place nearly all of what Ward terms the life-preserving activities. Using this sixfold classification of social interests, Professor Small believes that it is possible to express the active forces or factors which are at work in any social situation, and that if sociologists would go to work to study and analyze quantitatively the

[1] *General Sociology,* Chaps. XIV, XXXI, XXXII, XXXV.

[2] *Op. cit.,* pp. 198, 435, 444, 480, 542–43.

[3] See the definitions given in Chap. XXXII, and also in the table of page 542.

presence of these interests in certain proportions in given social situations sociology as a science would make much more rapid progress toward quantitative exactness.

There are, however, many difficulties in applying practically, in the way of quantitative analysis, Professor Small's classification of social forces. Some of his categories such as the health interest and the sociability interest are very vague and inclusive of even opposing tendencies in the social life. Thus, we have already seen that he places under the health interest, not only practical interest in the physical integrity or normality of the individual and the race, but also hunger and sex appetite. Under the sociability interest he includes not only the demand for companionship and personal appreciation but also nearly all of the political activities of human society. Again, it is difficult to discover what principle of classification is employed by Professor Small in making this sixfold grouping of social activities. He claims that the classification is an exclusive one, and says that "all the acts which human beings have ever been known to perform have been for the sake of (*a*) health, or (*b*) wealth, or (*c*) sociability, or (*d*) knowledge, or (*e*) beauty, or (*f*) rightness, or for the sake of some combination of ends which may be distributed among these six."[1] Probably this is claiming a simplicity for human nature and human society which does not exist. It is not difficult to think of many interests which do not fit into this sixfold classification happily, to say the least. The craving for amusement, for example, can scarcely be ranked wholly under the head of either sociability or health, or any combination of the above classes.

It is probably impossible to secure a completely satisfactory classification of social activities from the standpoint of the end or function which they serve in human

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 444.

life, both because of the complexity of human nature and society and *on account of the expanding character of the social life-process.* Ward's classification and Small's both have certain merits and are perhaps as good as can be secured just at the present. Ward's classification is of more value in approaching the matter from the psychological standpoint, Small's in approaching from the objective practical standpoint. It may be remarked in concluding that an exhaustive, logical or psychological classification of the active factors in the social life is not so necessary as some have thought for the scientific study of society. Quantitative exactness could, to be sure, be secured if we could isolate each active force or factor and study it in its variations of intensity in combination with other forces or factors in each social situation; but knowledge has not yet arrived at that stage where this can be successfully done, and in the mean time the progress of scientific knowledge of human society does not, so far as we can see, depend upon any successful classification of social factors or forces.[1] On the other hand, an understanding of what the active factors in the social life are is a necessity for any sound scientific reasoning concerning social situations. In this sense Professor Ross is right when he says that "the corner stone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces."[2]

Summary.—By social forces are meant the active factors in the social life. At any given moment these active factors are the psychical activities of individuals, their impulses, feelings, beliefs, ideas, ideals, interests and desires. But over long stretches of time physical factors must be recognized to be active, modifying influences upon the form of the social life, such as geographic environment, selection,

[1] Cf. Bernard's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 74): "The most accurate possible classifications [of social forces or activities] mark only the most elementary stage in the analysis of social phenomena."

[2] *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 181.

variation, racial heredity and the like. For the most part, however, these physical factors are simply the passive conditions under which human groups live, their effects being usually seen not directly, but only indirectly, as they affect impulses, feelings, beliefs, interests and desires. Among the psychical factors it is impossible to limit the social forces to any one of the numerous aspects of mental life. Even the desires, though complex combinations of mental processes, cannot be said to be the only true social forces; for social activity as frequently springs from impulse, suggestion, unconscious imitation, habit and so on as from conscious desires. The same must be said regarding the interests. Only when the word interest is made synonymous with social activity itself can the interests be said to be the social forces. But when this is done there is no scientific analysis of the active factors at work in given social situations, and an understanding of these factors is necessary for any scientific study of the social life. We must conclude, then, as has already been repeatedly emphasized, that, viewing society from a psychological standpoint, *the mind in all of its phases, whether simple or complex, enters as an influence or force into the various forms of human association.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE RÔLE OF IMITATION IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

The Psychology of Imitation.—Imitation is such an important element in human social life and so much has been written upon its rôle in human society of recent years that it is necessary for us to devote a few pages to the specific discussion of this social factor. It is first of all necessary, however, in discussing imitation in human society to turn back to psychology and attempt to understand, in part at least, the place of imitation in the mental life of the individual. Now, there are at least three very distinct sorts of imitation from a psychological view point.[1] These different kinds of imitation need to be noted and distinguished for they have a somewhat different social significance.

(1) There is, first, imitation as a method of development of the instincts. In all the higher animals instinctive reactions seem capable of excitation not only through the appropriate stimuli in the environment, but also through seeing the activity going on in other individuals, usually of the same species. In such cases the instinctive response seems to be excited sympathetically. It is set off by the example of other individuals in the immediate environment. The imitation in such cases is almost wholly unconscious, that is, there is no conscious copying of one by another. But the perception of the activity simply excites a similar activity in the observer from a similar instinctive basis. Imitation in this sense is simply the tendency to do

[1] McDougall distinguishes five different sorts of imitation; see *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 104–6.

what we see others doing. It is a similar response from a similar instinctive basis. For example, when we see two men fighting we may experience the impulse to fight also.

This sort of imitation is undoubtedly the most primitive type of activity to which we should give the name imitation at all, and yet even this sort of imitation is confined mainly to the higher animals.[1] Low types of animal life show, strictly speaking, little or no imitative tendencies that we can observe. In their case the instincts are excited, not socially and sympathetically, but only through very definite stimuli. The development of the instincts through imitation, of course, implies plasticity of instinct and developed intelligence, and that is why we do not find imitation in the lower orders of animal life. But in the higher animals, on the other hand, many of the instincts may be stimulated by social suggestion, that is they develop imitatively.

(2) A second kind of imitation to be seen in man, and probably in certain other highly gregarious animals, is the tendency to conform or to be like one's fellows. It is the desire to do as others do, to be like others. This is probably, as has already been pointed out, a specific instinct in gregarious animals and is simply a differentiation of the gregarious instinct. It may also arise through the reënforcement of the general neural tendency to imitate by the gregarious instinct. Certainly there can be no doubt that in man at least there is a very definite tendency to do as others do, a desire to be like others, to conform to the ways of living of the group, which is not, so far as we can judge, an acquired tendency, but innate. Imitation in this sense is the more or less conscious attempt to do as others do, to conform to the ways of thinking and acting of one's fellows. It is especially emphasized, of course,

[1] Or rather, as was pointed out in Chapter IX, it is confined mainly to the gregarious animals.

in the copying of social superiors, or of certain tendencies which have been sanctioned by the group.

(3) Still another sort of imitation is rational imitation, which is quite different from the others in that it is definitely teleological and purposive in character. It is always highly conscious. The individual may not be conscious, to be sure, of imitation as such, but he is conscious of copying in order to reach certain definite ends of his own. Rational imitation doubtless grows out of the two preceding sorts of imitation, but it is quite different from these on account of its large purposive element. Rational imitation is found only in man, so far as we definitely know, although the beginnings of such rational imitation are perhaps to be found in some of the higher animals. Like the second type of imitation—the passion to do as others do—rational imitation is closely connected with man's social life.

It must be noted that Professor Baldwin would give a much wider definition to imitation than any which has been indicated. Baldwin finds that underlying all conscious or psychological imitation there is *biological imitation* which he defines as " the organic reaction which tends to maintain, repeat and reproduce its own stimulation."[1] Imitation is the " circular " type of reaction through which the stimulation which has produced a movement is repeated. Imitation is " the unit, therefore, the essential fact of all motor development," and hence of all mental development.[2] It is this biological or organic imitation which accounts, according to Baldwin, for conscious or psychological imitation. And organic imitation accounts also for both habit and adaptation in living organisms.[3] Thus it is the foundation, or at least the essential method, of the whole life-

[1] *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, Chap. IX, also pp. 333–34, 466.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 205, 263–64.

process. Mental development and social development both rest upon it, according to Baldwin. This exceedingly broad conception of imitation has, however, not been generally accepted by psychologists, and there seems to be little warrant for it. What Professor Baldwin is really discussing is the persistence of activity in the organism which we have already spoken of as habit or the habit-forming tendency. There seems to be only an analogy at best between the persistence of organic activity and the various psychological forms of imitation. Upon such an analogy it is hardly possible to build a solid scientific superstructure. There seems to be no necessity of assuming a third somewhat lying back of habit and adaptation which may be called organic imitation. Any such assumption is not only unnecessary but somewhat forced or metaphysical. What Professor Baldwin calls organic imitation may be safely regarded, therefore, simply as the habit-forming tendency of all organic life. Imitation must be regarded as essentially a mental and social rather than a biological phenomenon; and this is the consensus of practically all psychologists. Professor Baldwin's extension of imitation to take in all of habit has no good scientific ground, and hence has not been generally accepted by scientific psychologists.

While imitation is a mental phenomenon which is confined to the higher animals, it must be correlated with the other processes of life in order to be understood. It is an outcome of instinct and habit and is largely mediatory of those processes. We have just noted that those racially persistent activities which we term instincts are frequently developed in the higher animals by imitation, by the stimulus of a conscious copy, and they are modified in the same way. Again, our acquired habits express themselves continually in imitation as in custom and conformity, while imitation mediates at the same time the modification of these habits. But as has just been said, this mediation of instinct, habit and adaptation by imitation is most con-

spicuous in animals which live in social groups. Imitative tendencies, therefore, are closely connected with group life. We shall see that they spring from the necessities of a collective life-process, that while not the basis of collective life they are indispensable instruments in its development.

The Connections of Imitation with Other Mental Processes.—The close connection of imitation with many other mental processes must also be continually borne in mind by the student. Imitation is not to be conceived of as the relatively isolated and socially universal process which some writers have tended to make it. The close connection between imitation and suggestion has, to be sure, been recognized by the whole imitation school of social theorists, but its equally close connection with sympathy in the broad sense has quite generally been neglected. In the broadest sense sympathy is simply feeling with or like others. It is induced feeling. Imitation, on the other hand, is induced activity, while suggestion is induced cognition. Imitation, suggestion and sympathy (in this broadest sense) are not, therefore, three isolated mental processes, but are rather three sides of one process, imitation representing the side of activity, suggestion the side of cognition, and sympathy the side of feeling.[1] It is not meant, of course, that wherever we find imitation there we must also find sympathy, but it is to be borne in mind that sympathy in the sense of feeling as others feel, and imitation in the sense of doing as others do, are continually associated in actual life and must not be set in opposition in social theory. Also, social suggestion must be regarded as a type of stimulation which gives rise to imitation on the one hand and sympathy on

[1] This may be expressed in the following simple formula (understanding by "mental induction" the type of mental interaction which tends toward uniformity in the interacting individuals):

Mental induction = imitation (motor aspect), or
= sympathy (affective aspect), or
= suggestion (cognitive aspect).

the other. If this view is correct, it is evident also that imitation has many close connections with social coöperation and with what Professor Giddings calls the consciousness of kind.

The Imitation Theory of Society.[1]—In 1890 M. Gabriel Tarde, a French sociologist, put forth the theory that human social life could be interpreted fundamentally in terms of imitation.[2] The influence of one mind upon another through the suggestion-imitation process, Tarde thought, could sufficiently explain all changes and movements in society. "Society is imitation," he proclaimed.[3] Imitation is "the elementary social phenomena," "the fundamental social fact."[4] It is the criterion of the social and alone constitutes society. The unity of the social life, Tarde argued, is wholly due to the process of imitation. Tarde found the basis of the social life, to be sure, in the minute interagreement of minds and wills, but this he believed to be due, not to organic heredity, but rather to "the effect of that suggestion-imitation process which, starting from one primitive creature possessed of a single idea or act, passed on this copy to its neighbors and then to another and so on."[5] The social, Tarde says, is the imitative, and imitation is, therefore, "the key to the social mystery."[6]

To be sure, Tarde left a place in his sociology for con-

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[1] See the writer's article on "The Theory of Imitation in Social Psychology" in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 721–41 (May, 1901).

[2] In his *Les Lois de l'Imitation* (translation by Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons, *The Laws of Imitation*). Tarde had previously set forth his main idea in an article "*Qu'est-ce qu'une Société?*" published in 1884 in *La Revue Philosophique*. For detailed exposition and criticism of Tarde's sociology, see Dr. M. M. Davis's *Psychological Interpretation of Society*, Section Second.

[3] *Laws of Imitation*, p. 74.

[4] *Social Laws*, p. 56.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 39.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

flict, or opposition, and invention; but he found the essential basis for conflict or opposition in the interference of the dissimilar waves of imitation and the basis for invention in the union of harmonious imitations.[1] The laws of imitation, Tarde proclaimed to be to sociology "what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics."[2] As this last statement implies, Tarde would connect the phenomena of imitation in society with other phenomena of repetition in the universe, such as vibration in physics, heredity in biology and habit in psychology.

As we have already seen, Prof. J. M. Baldwin, in 1895, put forth a similar theory of mental and social development.[3] Professor Baldwin, like Tarde, found imitation to be fundamental in both the mental and social life. He, however, guarded himself against certain exaggerations which Tarde had been guilty of. Baldwin did not say that society is imitation or that imitation is the criterion of the social, as Tarde said, but he found that imitation was, nevertheless, the method of social organization and development.[4] Defining organic imitation as we have seen above, he found it possible to interpret the child's mental development entirely from this standpoint.[5] It naturally followed from this conception of individual mental development that the method or process of social organization and development must be the same. The individual develops intellectually and morally by imitating the mental attitudes and actions of those about him, while society changes through the continued imitation of the thought of some

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[1] *Social Laws*, pp. 133–35, 202–4.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[3] In his *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, and (1897) his *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development.*

[4] *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Fourth Edition, pp. 427–28.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 109.

individual, a leader or a genius. A distinguishing mark of Baldwin's theory in contrast to Tarde's is Baldwin's emphasis upon the idea that the content or matter of the social life, in distinction from its method, is thoughts.[1] While some such idea may be implicit in Tarde's writings, in that Tarde lays stress on beliefs and desires, in Baldwin the imitation theory receives a decidedly intellectualistic trend. Baldwin's whole theory of the social life becomes, therefore, a very simple one and may be briefly stated in four propositions: (1) The matter of social organization, that is, the content of the social life, is thoughts; (2) the method of their organization is imitation; (3) these thoughts originate with the individual; (4) later certain of these thoughts are imitated and so generalized by society.[2]

Criticisms.—While the above is an inadequate statement of Tarde's and Baldwin's theories, it nevertheless gives the gist of their theories. The difference between such an imitation theory of society and the broader psychological theory which we have thus far set forth must be manifest. In the first place such an imitation theory of society, since imitation in the psychological sense is confined to the higher animals, makes a gulf between human and animal social life which seems difficult to reconcile with the general doctrine of descent. If, as has already been said, the social development which we find in humanity is in essentials the same as that found in the animals below man, then, this imitation theory of society should be sufficient to explain animal social life, as well as human social life. Tarde believed that his imitation theory was sufficient to explain the beginnings of social life among animals and so used it without hesitation. Baldwin, on the other hand, acknowledges that instinct dominates in the social life of the animals below man, and hence he finds them not true societies,

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[1] *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Fourth Edition, pp. 504–24.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 465–84.

because true societies can exist, according to Baldwin, only where there is self-consciousness and thought can be generalized by imitation. Therefore, Baldwin calls animal societies companies.[1] But such a procedure does not do away with the difficulties in interpreting social life from a psychological standpoint, because the psychological factors which make animal groups, if there be such, are still important in giving a complete psychological interpretation of human society. Professor Baldwin has evaded the difficulties rather than met them. There still remains the question of whether the psychical factors which have functioned in the group life of animals are not really of more importance in the collective life of man than certain factors which like imitation do not play a conspicuous part in animal group life.

(2) This question naturally brings up another criticism of the imitation theory and that is that it is impossible to understand how a single native tendency, imitation, has come to be so all important in the social life of man to the exclusion of many other native tendencies. Does not this imitation theory unduly simplify human social life? Unquestionably imitation in the psychological sense apparently goes on in human groups in comparatively narrow channels and under very definite conditions of control. Individuals do not imitate everything or everybody. Tarde explains this by saying that they imitate upon the basis of their beliefs and desires which have been themselves acquired by imitation.[2] Baldwin's explanation is similar to Tarde's. He says, in effect, that we imitate simply what we have gotten in the habit of imitating,[3] and habits are acquired, according to Baldwin, through the imitation process. Thus the process of imitation in society, viewed in its entirety, explains the selective character of imitation at any particular moment. But these explanations are not in accord with

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 503, 524.

[2] See his *La Logique Sociale.*

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 131, 192.

modern psychology. Habits are not wholly acquired by imitation, and besides, far more important than the habits as a basis for selective imitation are the instincts or other native impulses than imitation. Professor Giddings has suggested that we imitate chiefly our similars, those who are like-minded with ourselves, and that imitative tendencies are controlled largely by the "consciousness of kind."[1] But this qualification of the imitation theory is not sufficiently radical. The fact is that modern psychology shows that the imitative tendency is mediated and controlled by a great number of other natural tendencies, such as the sexual instinct, the parental instinct, acquisitiveness, combativeness, constructiveness, the self-exhibiting impulse, the self-subordinating impulse and the like. In the adult individual, moreover, the tendency to imitate is controlled by numerous acquired habits, some of which may possibly have arisen quite independently of any imitative process. Again, in the adult the imitative tendency is continually guided and held in check by the reason. This results in more than mere rational imitation, although that type of imitation is of sufficient importance to demand special explanation in social theory. The control of reason over imitation results in numerous adjustments which are not imitative, some of them being instinctive, some inventive, and some in the nature of counter imitation. We may conclude, therefore, that the imitative process in human society is guided and controlled by many elements in human nature, chiefly perhaps by the native impulses and by processes which modify the native impulses.

(3) This brings in a third criticism of the imitation theory which is worth some consideration and that is, that it is not closely correlated with the selection hypothesis in biology. Selection, whether natural or artificial, is a means of modifying, as we have already seen, the native tenden-

[1] *Democracy and Empire*, Chap. III.

cies of a stock, and these native tendencies considered psychologically are the instincts. If the psychology of the social life is to rest upon biology, there must be some reference to the various selective agencies which fix in man various natural tendencies. While it may be granted that natural selection is an extra social influence, social selection can scarcely be so considered, and in any case our psychological theory of society must be such that it can recognize the possible influence of selection upon human nature and the organization of human society. The imitation theory of society, because it has not sufficient biological roots, tends to divorce the social process from the life-process as a whole, and it takes no sufficient account of those deeper forces connected with species and race which mold the psychical life of the individual and the psychical processes of society.

The Real Function of Imitation in Society.—This has already been pointed out in the chapter on social coördination. The imitative tendency, as we have already said, does not exist apart from other native and acquired tendencies. Rather imitation comes in to mediate other natural tendencies. It helps forward, makes easy, development in certain directions wherein the social life has furnished models. It thus secures social adjustments with greater quickness and ease, and affords greater uniformity of thought and action throughout the social group. Imitation, in other words, is not the foundation of the social life but an instrument which the social life has developed to perfect its coördinations. It is true, as Professor Baldwin has insisted, that imitation is the chief means of propagating *acquired* uniformities in human society. The uniformities of the social life which are largely furnished by instinct are not sufficient for any high development. It is rather the acquired uniformities in human society, as we have already emphasized, which make the peculiar developments in human social life possible, and the suggestion-imitation process is the chief

factor in building up these acquired uniformities. Imitation, therefore, comes in to assist in building up most social habits. The error of the imitation sociologist, as we have already said, consists in fixing attention upon but one element in the social process rather than upon the whole process. The function of imitation in bringing about the most important adjustments between large masses of men is admittedly, therefore, most important; but this does not excuse the overlooking of other aspects of our social life, or any undue subordination of these other aspects to imitation. The only result of attempts to unduly subordinate other elements in the social life to the imitative process is the production again of another one-sided theory of society. Hence, the economic determinists and their like see nothing in the imitation theory but the dry bones of academic scholasticism.

The true view of imitation in relation to the social life must be that it is but one of the types of interaction between individuals. Imitation is, in other words, one of the simplest coördinations between individuals. It is, as we have already said, the great and indispensable means of bringing about unity in a group when uniform concerted action above the lowest instinctive level is necessary or desirable. Just so far as it is desirable for individuals to act, feel and think alike above the instinctive level, so far imitation must play a great part in human society. But from the very beginning coördinations of activity in human society have been made possible not simply through uniform activity, but also through differences in activity. Unlikeness of activity is necessary for even some of the simplest types of social coördination. Unlikeness of activity is more and more necessary the more complex society becomes. Imitation mediates social uniformity, but it is not sufficient alone for the development of those higher types of social unity in which difference of activity is as necessary as likeness. Imitation is not, therefore, the basis

of all social relationships. It never has been, and it becomes less and less an adequate basis as social evolution advances. Hence we find that imitation is instrumental in developing the social life chiefly in its middle phases. In its lower phases, as we have already pointed out, society is instinctive and biological. Imitation in the lower types of collective psychic life seems to be the chief factor making for social unity simply because it makes for social uniformity. But in all higher types of human social life, and especially in the highest civilization, imitation becomes again relatively less important, because in those later phases unlikeness of activity becomes of greater social value. The suggestion-imitation process must be regarded, therefore, as an instrument of the social life, not its basis.

It may be argued that while imitation may be regarded as one of the simplest types of social coördination or of social relationship, it is in fact the fundamental type of social interaction and is to be found universally throughout society as the basis of all other higher types. Imitation would then present itself as the universal form or method of the social life, as Baldwin and others have claimed. But it is not certain that imitation is the fundamental type of social coördination or of collective life. On the contrary, coördinated activities, collective life, and so social relationships in the broad sense, seem to exist far below the level of imitation in the psychological sense. It is only by accepting Baldwin's theory of organic or biological imitation that it is possible to put such a construction upon the processes of collective life, and we have already seen that this particular theory of organic imitation has no very good scientific warrant. Imitator and imitated as a form of social relationship is scarcely to be regarded as any more primitive than many other forms of association nor even as primitive if we confine imitation to the psychological sense. Imitation as a method of the social life cannot be

claimed, therefore, to be the exclusive method of carrying on the social life. It is only one of a number of very simple, primary coadaptations between individuals. It is, however, as we have already insisted, one of the most important of these from every point of view, because it is the type of coadaptation which brings about uniformity of activity. While uniform ways of activity, as we have already insisted, are primarily secured through selection and instinct, yet unquestionably "acquired" uniformities are attained chiefly through imitation, and so imitation as a method of the social life is of the very greatest importance for the sociologist. No group could survive in times of danger, for example, without quick and uniform ways of acting together, and while such concerted action might be secured to a limited extent through other native reactions, in all the higher and more intelligent forms of life it must be secured mainly through imitation. Imitation has thus become one of the very greatest instruments in the carrying on of the social life, and its importance is such as to necessitate a somewhat more detailed analysis of the way in which imitation works in human society.

Customary and Conventional Imitation.—The exact function of imitation in society is seen most clearly in connection with those uniformities which we term customs and conventions. Customs, as social habits persisting through relatively long periods of time, are unquestionably acquired by individuals mainly through the imitation of the past. Convention is a word, on the other hand, which has come to stand mainly for those uniformities in society which are brought about by the imitation of contemporaries. Tarde and Baldwin and more recently Professor Ross have dealt with these matters at such length and with such fullness and clearness of psychological analysis that the only excuse for touching upon them in this book at all is to guard against a misunderstanding which might lead some one to say that the writer had no appreciation of the importance of imita-

tion as a factor in the social life of man.[1] Very briefly, therefore, we shall consider imitation in some of its aspects as a factor in maintaining social order and as a factor in social progress.

Imitation as a Factor in Conserving the Social Order.— Children get the bulk of their habits, ideas, ideals and purposes from association with their elders and chiefly from their parents. Beginning at a very early age the child begins to absorb, as Baldwin and others have shown, imitatively the copy in the way of activities, ideals and character furnished by his family circle. This process goes on so rapidly that by the time the eighth year is reached it seems highly probable that the foundation lines of the child's social and moral character are already definitely laid. The child has received from his family circle, mainly in an imitative way, his language, his ideas of life, his standards of conduct, his æsthetic tastes, his religion and practically all of his essentially social activities. This transmission from one generation to another of the spiritual possessions of the race mainly through imitative processes is what Baldwin and others have called "social heredity." It is also what has been called "tradition." While the word "tradition" may seem inadequate, the phrase "social heredity" is still more objectionable because the process is only remotely analogous to physical heredity, and the biological analogy which is implied in this phrase of "social heredity" is apt to be confusing rather than helpful, leading, as it may, to overlooking the very important differences between this process and that of heredity in the biological sense. Whatever phrase we accept to describe this process, whether it be social heredity or tradition, it is evident that cultural continuity, and so social continuity, is secured mainly through imitation of one generation by its successor.

[1] Professor Ross's admirable treatment of customary and conventional (or mode) imitation in his *Social Psychology* makes unnecessary any detailed discussion of these factors in the social life.

Thus imitation preserves the continuity of the social environment and is a vast conservative force in human society. The social achievements of the past are thus preserved and handed down with little or no loss through unending generations. The social importance of custom, of usage, of folkways, of tradition is the social importance of imitation. This is so obvious and has been dwelt upon at such length that there seems scarcely any reason for enlarging upon the matter. It may be pointed out, however, that the full significance of custom, usage, folkways and tradition are even yet not appreciated by some workers in the social sciences, especially in sciences like economics which deal with the immediate present.

Social order and social organization, therefore, are very largely conserved through imitative processes. Nearly all of the forms of the social life are handed down from one generation to another and unquestionably are acquired mainly through imitation. It is only the simpler forms of human societies that are determined to any very great extent by other native impulses, and even these simpler forms become overlaid in time with many customs and usages which are transmitted from generation to generation imitatively. While imitation is not the only force at work in social organization it must be recognized as one method, and that a very important one, of maintaining and transmitting the social order.

Imitation as a Factor in Social Progress.—Tarde and Baldwin have both emphasized, as we have already noted, that progress comes about mainly through the imitation of certain inventions by the mass of individuals. That is, the copying of socially fruitful variations in the ideas or ideals of individuals is the real method of progress in human society. There can be no doubt that this is the method by which the most striking advances have been made in civilized human societies. The imitation of the leader or the genius becomes, therefore, the factor of supreme importance

in the social uplift of great masses of men. This has already been brought out in our discussion on the rôle of the intellect in human society. Mere imitation, however, as even Baldwin has emphasized, is not the thing which secures real progress. It is rather the intelligent assimilation and adaptation of the ideas of the leader. The rise and spread of Christianity, for example, affords an excellent illustration of the part the imitation of ideas and ideals has played in human progress, and at the same time of the limitation of imitation as a factor in progress. There can be no question that Christianity, as a set of moral and social ideals, spread over Western Europe almost wholly through the force of imitation. Such ideals failed to spread in Africa and in Asia to any extent, possibly because imitation was limited by certain racial traits, even more probably because it was limited by certain already acquired habits on the part of African and Asiatic populations. The acceptance of Christianity by Western Europe, however, has been effective for real social progress not in proportion as certain ideas and beliefs were blindly imitated, but in proportion as there has been intelligent understanding of the ideas and ideals of Christianity and intelligent adaptation of them to the social life. Almost any other dynamic movement in civilized societies would serve equally well to illustrate the function and the limitations of imitation as a factor in social change. Thus the French Revolution, as we have already seen, illustrated the working of imitation along with many other social psychic factors. In practically all social movements imitation is present, but in all except a few its activity is complicated by very many other factors.

Another example of the powerful influence of imitation upon human society is to be found in the results which especially Tarde and Ward have dwelt upon of the contact of two dissimilar cultures.[1] In this case mutual imitation

[1] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 235–37.

gives rise to very rapid changes in the social life, and this fact favors a general development of social plasticity. Under such circumstances many new adaptations and coördinations are rendered possible and when the tendencies imitated are dominantly progressive these adaptations usually take place upon a higher plane.

Finally, the study of social origins illustrates in a very striking and conclusive way both the importance and limitations of imitation as a factor in progress. In spite of the efforts of certain German theorists to prove the contrary,[1] it seems practically certain that human culture in its various stages had its origin in many places instead of one. Early civilization was not brought about simply through copying from some one primitive center. If we take the case of the culture peoples in the two Americas, for example, we seem to find many independent centers of origin. All the evidence seems to disprove the idea that there was a single center for the origin of culture in the Western Hemisphere and that gradually it was diffused from that center to peoples in the lowest stages of savagery. On the contrary, in a great many centers certain levels of culture seem to have been reached nearly simultaneously. This is, of course, in line with the general contention of the economic and geographic determinists who look to conditions in the environment for the decisive stimuli in the production of a given civilization. But it is also in line with our knowledge of human nature. Given, in other words, a similar mental equipment, similar instinctive tendencies and

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[1] The reference is to the so-called new culture-history school of Graebner and others like him who try to trace civilization back to a single source (*Kulturkelle*). It should, perhaps, be here stated that the writer has thought it unwise to burden this text with numerous references to the anthropological and ethnographic literature which he has continually made use of in developing his theories. Some of the chief authorities referred to have been Ratzel, Deniker, Keane, Tylor, Brinton, Morgan, Letourneau, Boas, Starr and Thomas.

intellectual capacity reacting upon relatively similar stimuli, and a given culture results without borrowing.

Ethnographic parallels, of which perhaps the *Couvade* is the most famous, show that imitation has had much less to do with the diffusion of at least the earlier and simpler developments in civilization than men have thought. The *Couvade,* for example, is found in many places in Africa, South America, Europe and Asia, widely separated and without any possibility of communication. As Ward has shown, the only rational explanation of the *Couvade* is that in the transition from the low stage of metronymic culture to the patronymic stage, the *Couvade* spontaneously resulted.[1] This is not denying, of course, that, having sprung up spontaneously, within relatively narrow limits, the *Couvade* was spread by imitation. So it is with almost any other institution of early society. Imitation is found to be a continual factor working for the spread of certain customs and institutions, working, that is, to bring about uniformity in a given group, but it is not conspicuous in social origins. Its part in early society seems to correspond, therefore, exactly to the rôle to which we have already assigned it.

Summary.—Imitation is not, then, entitled to be called the constitutive principle of the social life. Rather it is a factor which works harmoniously in combination with many other active factors. Its closest connection is with suggestion and organic sympathy, but it works in harmony also with all the specific instincts, with the reason, and with all other external and internal factors in society. This is what we should expect, seeing that in its broadest sense imitation is but a general neural tendency which functions to make easy the development of other native tendencies, being especially closely connected with sympathy, the gregarious impulses and reason in man. It is seen to work in

[1] Cf. Ward's discussion of the *Couvade, Pure Sociology,* pp. 342–44.

harmony with all of these in practically all phases of human social life, both on the side of social order and on the side of social progress. It is in fact but one of the simplest types of interaction between individuals and therefore is at the same time one of the simplest and most universal forms of coadaptation between the activities of individuals. It is, however, only one case, though a very important case, of interstimulation and response. While it must be thus regarded as but one factor in the social process, it would be a mistake to suppose with certain social theorists of the past that it is a wholly subordinate factor, quite determined by other elements in the social life process. While these other elements do, as we have insisted, continually condition and limit the rôle of imitation in human society, yet within those limits imitation is a relatively independent factor. Imitation has continually to be appealed to, therefore, in any rational explanation of human history or of human society as it is. While an interpretation of human society wholly in terms of the suggestion-imitation process gives a superficial and relatively unreal view of man's social life, yet to ignore imitation would leave out one of the most real and potent factors in human association.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RÔLE OF SYMPATHY IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

The Psychology of Sympathy.—Quite as much is to be said for sympathy as a universally important element in human society as imitation. In the history of sociology, when it is finally written, Professor Giddings, who has especially stood for the recognition of this element of sympathy, will be accorded as large a place as Tarde. But sympathy is a word which has been used with such vagueness and variety of meaning that some psychological definition of this term is even more necessary than it was in the case of imitation. There are at least three main types of sympathy in human society, and while these are closely connected, yet their confusion with one another has made the whole rôle of this feeling element in the social life one of vagueness and uncertainty in the minds of many. Let us try to distinguish the three different senses in which sympathy is used in sociological writings.

(1) First, sympathy is used in a broad way by many psychological writers to mean simply induced feeling.[1] The word sympathy means etymologically feeling with or like others. In this sense sympathy is fellow feeling, or, as we have already said, induced feeling. This sort of sympathy is best called "organic sympathy." It is seen most clearly in children and in animals. When one child cries, another may cry too; when one is angry, another gets angry too. While in a sense this is imitation, yet we have reason to

[1] Cf. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 90–6.

believe that similar feelings exist at least in higher animals in such cases of the sympathetic excitation of native reactions. As we have already said, sympathy in this sense is the feeling side of induced activity or imitation. Even this sort of sympathy, simply the feeling with or like others, is very important in all forms of social life. Like imitation it is one of the simplest types of mental interaction, and, as McDougall says, it is the very cement which holds together animal societies and renders all the activities of the group harmonious.[1] For even sympathy in this very broad sense of fellow feeling is, as a reënforcement of uniform activities, all important in the social life. Giddings would doubtless call this aspect of sympathy, or "organic sympathy," the feeling side of like-mindedness; and sympathy in this broadest sense is, as Professor Giddings has claimed, directly dependent upon resemblance and the perception of resemblance. Even in this sense sympathy exists because man lives a social life. It is not so much the basis of the social as an instrument which functions to perfect the collective life process.

(2) Another very common meaning given to the word sympathy, especially among sociological writers, is the use of it as a collective name for all of the emotions accompanying the altruistic impulses. Sympathy in this sense is not simply feeling as others do, but rather altruistic feeling. It is the feeling accompaniment of the instincts connected with the family life and the group life generally. These are more properly spoken of as the sympathetic or altruistic emotions, but in popular language and often even among sociological writers, these sympathetic emotions are lumped together and called collectively sympathy. There is some psychological justification for this, since, as we have already seen, the gregarious impulses, or the impulses connected with living in large social groups, are probably an expansion of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

the instincts connected with living in family groups. Even McDougall, who would confine the term sympathy when used by itself to the first sense which we have mentioned, recognizes that what he calls " active sympathy " is closely connected with gregarious impulses.[1] Indeed, sympathy of this sort is based, as McDougall shows, upon the gregarious instinct, and is almost always accompanied by gregarious impulses. If we regard instinctive sociability as more or less connected with the reproductive and parental instincts, then, all of the emotions that are connected with the harmonious association of individuals in groups, whether the family group, community groups or still larger groups, may be very properly lumped together and called the sympathetic emotions. Sympathy in this sense is the feeling that accompanies harmonious association and so reënforces powerfully the natural tendencies toward association, coöperation, and group life of all sorts. In this sense, sympathy is preëminently social emotion,[2] because it is preëminently feeling which accompanies harmonious association. It is in this sense, also, that sympathy is proportionate to the success and harmony of the coördination of activities between individuals.

It may be objected that this loose, popular use of the word sympathy, standing for all of the altruistic feelings and emotions, should be excluded from scientific works; but, as we have just said, there is need for just such a general term for the characteristic emotions accompanying the other regarding impulses. Psychologists have recognized this themselves, and have used the word oftentimes in practically the same sense. It is seemingly in this sense that James uses the word when he speaks of sympathy as an

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 168–71.

[2] The suggestion of Baldwin (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 236) that *suggestibility* is the social emotion, is from a psychological standpoint, almost unpardonable, coming from a man of his eminence, since suggestibility is not even an affective state.

emotion.[1] Strictly, as we have already seen, sympathy in this sense is a name for a class of emotions and not for a single one, but this class of emotions is so important in man's social life that some name is useful, almost necessary, to designate them as a class, because these emotions are the feeling basis of altruism in human society.

It is to be noted that sympathy in this broad sense of sympathetic emotion is primarily unreflective in character. It might be classed with the first type of sympathy were it not for its closer association with certain specific instincts, especially gregarious impulses. It is, moreover, essentially other-regarding or altruistic in character, and is rightly considered the basis for all the higher forms of natural affection. Sympathetic emotion is, for example, necessary to love in the family, at least in all of its higher forms, and to any such relation as friendship between individuals. This instinctive sympathy is most important, however, in that it becomes the basis for a third type of sympathy.

(3) The third type of sympathy is what has been called reflective or rational sympathy. It is simply the second type of sympathetic emotion developed, guided and controlled by the reason or reflective thought. It is this rationalized form of sympathy which is, of course, most valuable to the higher phases of social development. Any such sentiment as the love of humanity, for example, must come from a high development of reflective sympathy. Rational or reflective sympathy thus becomes, as we shall see, one of the chief instruments of progress in human society. It is, however, a great mistake to consider reflective sympathy to be the type of all sympathy in the social life. Many sociological writers have made this mistake, especially Ward, who says, "that sympathy is a rational faculty admits of no doubt."[2] All sympathy, Ward thinks, comes

[1] *Principles*, Vol. II, p. 410.
[2] *Pure Sociology*, p. 423.

from reflection, that is, from the exercise and the use of the imagination and the reason. Hence, sympathy, he thinks, is essentially egoistic.[1] The correct statement, however, would be that sympathy is at first entirely organic and instinctive,[2] and in the second sense of the word which we have just noted, it is altruistic. The imagination and reason, however, acting in connection with sympathetic emotions produces a much higher development of sympathy which we call reflective sympathy. The egoistic element in reflective sympathy may often be apparently large, but the real direction and trend of reflective sympathy in society is given by the social or altruistic instincts to which sympathy was originally attached. Reflective sympathy, therefore, also unquestionably functions for the advantage of the group as a whole rather than the individual, not less than instinctive sympathy.

The Connections Between Sympathy and Altruism need brief attention. Some recent psychologists have argued that sympathy is not the root of altruism and is not in itself altruistic.[3] In a sense, of course, sympathy is not the root of altruism, because the sympathetic emotions are the accompaniment of altruistic impulses rather than the root of them. Feeling, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, is not the basis of activity, but rather an accompaniment of activity. Therefore, the roots of altruism have to be sought in the life-process as a whole rather than in any particular form of feeling or emotion. Nevertheless, feeling is an essentially conscious mode of the mediation of activity, because, as we have seen, activities are evaluated upon their subjective side by feeling. Inasmuch as feeling reënforces or inhibits activity, it is an essential factor in

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 424. Ward's view, it is almost unnecessary to add, is that of practically all of the associationist school of psychological thinkers.

[2] Cf. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 197–98, 229–36.

[3] Cf. McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

the development of activity. In this way sympathy in the sense of the sympathetic emotions is a necessary element in the development of altruistic activities. It is in this sense the feeling basis of altruism, and altruism may be regarded as the active expression of sympathy. It accompanies altruistic activity and reënforces it everywhere. A high development of altruism in human society is, therefore, impossible without sympathy and particularly impossible without reflective sympathy. Ward's doctrine of the close connection of sympathy and altruism is, therefore, practically correct.[1]

Altruism is, indeed, a word which is most frequently used to cover all of the impulses and feelings of the individual, whether native or acquired, which are favorable to others, especially to the welfare of large groups. In this sense sympathy becomes the feeling side of altruism; or, on the other hand, if the sympathetic feeling be regarded as the subjective sanction of the altruistic activity, then, sympathy may be properly spoken of as the subjective basis of altruism, and altruism as the active expression of sympathy. Certainly no high degree of altruism can exist, as we have just insisted, without sympathy. Humanitarian sentiment and humanitarian impulses are so closely related that they cannot well be sundered except by the psychologist; and humanitarian sentiment is but another name for the widest type of reflective sympathy. All the specifically altruistic activities depend, therefore, upon the development of sympathy, especially the growth of humanitarian doctrines and of philanthropy. Philanthropic activities, like all other altruistic activities, must be regarded as very largely a development due to the increase of sympathy in the sense of altruistic feeling in human society. Just how this extension of sympathy comes about we shall consider later.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 422–26.

The Connection Between Sympathy and "The Consciousness of Kind."—As we have already seen, Professor Giddings has especially championed the idea of a close connection between sympathy and the consciousness of similarity or resemblance, whether actual or potential.[1] There can be no doubt that this connection is close in the case of all three sorts of sympathy which we have just distinguished. The first sort of sympathy may, as we have already said, be indeed regarded as simply the feeling aspect of like-mindedness. The second and third types of sympathy depending upon the altruistic impulses which have been developed by group life must also be, though less closely, correlated with perceptions of physical, mental and moral resemblance. While it is impossible to think that the most primitive sorts of sympathy depend upon conscious reflection as to similarities between one individual and another, yet, even in the lowest stages of evolution, it is highly probable that the sensing or perception of the points of similarity between individuals of the same species may give rise to responses from the "social" or altruistic instincts. Consciousness of similarity, in other words, though not in any reflective form, may serve, even in the lower stages of development, as the stimulus to set off altruistic impulses, and so give rise to the sympathetic type of emotion. In the higher stages of mental evolution consciousness of resemblance plays if anything an even more important part. From a reflective standpoint it is impossible for us to sympathize with anyone whom we do not think of as in some degree like ourselves. This is simply one of those necessities of our mental constitution by virtue of which, as Baldwin has shown, we can only think of others more or less in terms of ourselves. These perceptions of similarity between individuals and the development of the reflective consciousness of their similarity are

[1] Cf. *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 94–7, 108–10; *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*, pp. 278–88, 298.

indispensable for the development of high types of sympathy in a group. Professor Giddings is mistaken only when he attributes to the consciousness of resemblance the principal part in bringing about the existence and organization of social groups. Rather *the consciousness of kind comes in as but one element making for group solidarity and cohesion.* Neither the collective life of man nor of any other animal can, from a genetic point of view, rest upon any cognitive element whatsoever. Similarity is, however, within the limits which we have already discussed, necessary for harmonious association; and perceptions of similarity are the stimuli which in all the more highly developed forms give rise to those instinctive activities, whether reproductive or gregarious, which are the primitive basis of group life.

We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness of resemblance, even in its lowest forms, is closely connected with sympathy, being largely an intellectual aspect of the same process and that as such it functions for the development of harmonious types of association and of the solidarity of the group. "Consciousness of kind," in the more developed sense in which Professor Giddings has defined it, however, as "including organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, reflective sympathy, affection and the desire for recognition," is, of course, only a relatively late product of mental and social evolution and can hardly with justice be styled "the simplest of all the states of mind that can be called social," as Professor Giddings styles it.[1] Rather such a consciousness of kind as that is the complex outcome of a long process of social evolution,

[1] *Elements of Sociology*, p. 66. In his later works (*Inductive Sociology* and *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*), however, Professor Giddings distinctly says, and rightly, that organic sympathy (the first element in "the consciousness of kind") precedes, in the development of consciousness, the perception of resemblance, and so "the total consciousness of kind."

not being found probably at all among the animals below man. Consciousness of kind in this sense is little more than a collective name for some of the principal social aspects of the mental life, though it is entirely proper to regard these aspects collectively as most important instruments from a psychological standpoint in perfecting the social life-process.

The Sympathy Theory of Society.—Even older than the imitation theory of society is the sympathy theory. It has its roots in Aristotle, was implicitly developed by Bodin, but was not explicitly developed until Adam Smith.[1] Smith, as is well known, regarded sympathy as the true basis of the social and moral life of mankind. While more or less of the sympathy theory is to be found in Spencer, it became more fully developed in the writings of Professor Ward and, especially, of Professor Giddings. It is the views of these writers, to which we have already referred in part, with which we shall especially concern ourselves. As already noted, Professor Giddings, in his *Principles of Sociology,* found the basis of the social life in what he called "the consciousness of kind," which, in the third edition, he identified in one of its aspects with sympathy.[2] Professor Giddings's main thesis has been that social organization, coöperation and all phases of social solidarity depend upon the development of sympathy or "the consciousness of kind." In his later works, to be sure, sympathy and the consciousness of kind are subordinated to the more fundamental conception of similarity or resemblance as the basis of the social life, especially mental resemblance, or like-mindedness. Upon this hypothesis he has constructed what must be regarded as in

[1] *Theory of Moral Sentiments,* especially Part I. For an exhaustive treatment of the significance of Adam Smith in the development of sociological theory, see Small's *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology.*

[2] *Principles of Sociology,* Preface to Third Edition, pp. x–xiv.

the main a sympathy theory of the social life, giving sympathy and the consciousness of resemblance primal importance in the interpretation of group life.

So many references have already been made to Professor Giddings's theories that it is unnecessary to discuss them here further, save to indicate their relation to the general psychological theory of society. It is evident that Giddings, like Tarde, has performed an invaluable work for sociology in calling attention to certain aspects of the social life whose significance had not been adequately emphasized by other sociological writers. Giddings's theories, in other words, are to be criticised only in so far as they are claimed to be a complete presentation of sociological truth. The system of sociology built upon them is very far from being complete; rather it is, like Tarde's, merely certain chapters in the psychological theory of society. As we have already emphasized, sympathy and the consciousness of kind must be regarded simply as one factor or set of factors in our social life and not as an adequate statement of the whole. Sympathy and the consciousness of kind, in other words, must themselves be interpreted as instruments in the development of social life rather than its basis.

Only a word is necessary as regards the place which Ward gives to sympathy in his system of sociological thought. Ward, as we have already noticed, makes the feelings primary in human mental and social life. But feeling is, as Ward acknowledges, a subjective and individualistic matter. Very naturally, therefore, Ward seizes upon sympathy as that phase of feeling which is favorable to others as the basis for all higher developments in the social life. It is sympathy, he finds, which makes possible altruism, and, hence, also sympathy which makes possible all humanitarian advances in society. The sympathetic feelings are, then, according to Ward, the essentially progressive forces in human social life.[1]

[1] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 422–26, 450–54.

The Social Function of Sympathy.—As has been already pointed out, the feeling attitudes of individuals toward one another are all important in initiating and maintaining types of social coördination or adaptation between those individuals. Common feelings serve to reënforce and to fix common activities. Sympathy in the sense of common feeling we have already spoken of metaphorically as a sort of social cement. In a former chapter we have discussed the very important rôle of sympathy, in the sense of altruistic feeling, in initiating and maintaining complex coördinations in groups of individuals. If feeling has any value whatsoever in the social life, then, there can be no question of the great importance of sympathetic feeling. The very word society (Latin, *societas*) originally meant "comradeship" and "comradeship" implies sympathy, at least in the sense of fellow feeling if not in the sense of altruistic feeling. If we regard society as a mental fact, therefore, sympathy is very nearly coextensive with it. Nevertheless, as has just been said, sympathy must be regarded as functional to the social life rather than as its basis. Sympathy and sympathetic understanding (which we may define as understanding plus sympathy) are necessary to build up all higher types of harmonious coördinations or relationships between individuals. It is sympathy, for example, which makes easy the development of those complex adaptations which we find beginning with the family group and ending, possibly, in the philanthropic activities which we find in a modern nation or great city. Without those tendencies to feel with and for others, which we gather together under the name of sympathy, it is inconceivable that any high types of relationship between individuals could be initiated or could persist. To be sure, it may be said that we find much complex coöperation in modern society which is apparently not accompanied by sympathy between the individual coöperators. But even in such cases there is probably a certain amount of common

feeling among the individuals concerned and a high development of general altruistic tendencies in their personalities. Coöperation, to be sure, is not inconsistent with self-interest, but no complex and stable types of coöperation can be developed, so far as we know, upon a basis of self-interest alone. The attempts to develop forms of coöperation in modern society purely upon the basis of self-interest without any sympathetic or altruistic feeling being enlisted must be regarded as a serious mistake from the standpoint of psychology and sociology. Coöperation of stable and complex sorts has never existed, and can never exist in human society, without conscious efforts toward mutual helpfulness. Altruism is, therefore, the indispensable basis for all the higher forms of coöperation and this implies that sympathy in the sense of altruistic feeling as well as in the sense of fellow feeling, is a necessary element in such forms of coöperation. Professor Giddings has especially shown that conscious forms of coöperation depend upon the consciousness of kind which is only of course another way of showing that they depend upon sympathy.

All this is equivalent to saying that sympathy is more or less an element to be found in practically all forms of coadaptation between individuals, or of social coördination, from the lowest to the highest, and that, like imitation, it is a practically universal instrument for developing the social life both on the side of maintaining social order and on the side of furthering social progress. Let us see briefly in what ways sympathy functions in both of these aspects of the social life.

Sympathy as a Factor in Maintaining Social Order.—While the actual organization of society is perhaps not the work of sympathy, but is rather, as has already been pointed out, primarily the work of instinct and habit functioning especially through imitation, yet after any organization of society has been achieved, then the rôle of sympathy

is that of a social bond of primary importance between all members of the group. It conduces to the solidarity of the group, for the solidarity of feeling reënforces the solidarity of life. Not only the family group, but all natural, genetic groups may be rightly regarded, therefore, as knit together by the bonds of sympathy. The consciousness of kind here again, of course, is very manifest as a cohesive element. The sentiment of kinship, which is but a specialized form of sympathy, has played the most conspicuous part in all ages in maintaining the unity and continuity of the life of groups. The " blood bond " between the members of primitive groups was, of course, a form of the consciousness of kinship, a powerful expression in those communities of natural or instinctive sympathy between their members. As sympathy and the consciousness of kind function thus to maintain the unity and continuity of the life of groups, so they also function to maintain habits and customs which have become associated with the activities of the group. Under such circumstances sympathetic feeling becomes a powerful conservative social force, helping to maintain institutions and usages from generation to generation in ways which we have already discussed.

But even in the most advanced societies, in which the sentiment of kinship no longer plays so conspicuous a part, sympathy is, nevertheless, a cohesive force which can in no degree be dispensed with. It is for this reason that all social groups and classes seek to cultivate sympathy among their members. It is doubtful indeed, as was long ago pointed out, whether moral obligations would be met in human society were it not for sympathy. If self-interest did not prompt the meeting of such obligations, then, the disinterested tendencies of human nature, of which sympathy is among the more conspicuous, must be relied upon as motives for meeting such obligations. To a very considerable extent, therefore, the moral or social order depends

upon sympathy. This, however, was long ago set forth by Adam Smith and other English moralists; and it must be acknowledged that morality, as we understand it, could not exist in human society without altruistic feeling. Sympathy, both in the sense of common feeling and in the sense of altruistic feeling, is, therefore, a powerful factor in maintaining any given social order.

Sympathy as a Factor in Progress.—As we have already noted, conscious changes in human society can be satisfactorily brought about only by the enlistment of the feelings upon the side of the change.[1] Feeling, as has already been emphasized, is a necessary element in the achievement of any complex adjustment in human life, because it functions to sanction such adjustment upon its individual or organic side. Now, the sympathetic feelings are obviously those which can be most easily enlisted on the side of changes advantageous to the group. The constant appeal in any reform movement in human society, therefore, is to the sympathies; and it is successful enlistment of the sympathies in behalf of reformative changes which has accomplished much of the social and political progress of the past two centuries. As Ward insists, the great humanitarian reforms of the Nineteenth Century are to be explained largely through "the growth of sympathy in the human breast."[2] The appeal on behalf of those who suffer wrong and oppression has been mainly an appeal to sympathetic emotions. The moral and mental soil, as Ward says, into which the reformer and agitator have successfully cast the seeds of many social movements, has been the soil of sympathy and humanitarian sentiment. So conspicuous, indeed, has been the growth of sympathy and altruism within the past century and so many have been the changes apparently wrought by it, certainly at least sanctioned by it, that one is not surprised to find a declaration like

[1] See Chapter X.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 452.

Sutherland's that "the law of sympathy has been the law of progress."[1] Sutherland, however, goes through the whole range of living creatures from the lowest to the highest in order to get proofs for his thesis, and his conclusion is that "the sympathetic type is the one which is more and more distinctly emergent as we ascend in the animal scale."[2] This is, indeed, what we should expect seeing, as we have already shown, that mind in all its forms and aspects is more and more emergent as we ascend in the scale of life as a device or instrument for perfecting the life-process. Sympathy in all of its forms is, however, but one aspect of mind and is, therefore, but one of many mental instruments increasingly used for the mediation, control and perfectioning of the life-process.

Of course, it is the higher or intellectual forms of sympathy which are chiefly conspicuous as instruments of progress. It is especially sympathy in its forms of ethical love[3] and the love of humanity which plays a conspicuous part in alleviating miseries and opening the doors of opportunity to all classes in civilized societies. To be sure, sympathy has always reënforced what Drummond calls "the struggle for the life of others," that is, altruistic impulses and activities. From the mother's care of her child to the martyr's sacrifice of himself for the sake of humanity, sympathetic feeling has been an undoubted, constant factor in the reënforcement of altruistic activity. It

[1] *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Vol. I, p. 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 291. Cf. Darwin's remark (*Descent of Man*, p. 122): "Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring."

[3] By "ethical love" is meant unselfish devotion to the welfare of others. This is, of course, not merely a matter of feeling (sympathy), but even more of will. But sympathy in the sense of altruistic feeling may be said to lie back of ethical love in the way already explained. The love of humanity is only the expansion of ethical love.

is not to be wondered at, therefore, that a humanitarian writer like Henry Drummond finds that love is the "supreme dynamic."[1] In a sense this is true, that is, in the sense that ethical love must very largely prompt and sanction all the highest efforts for the welfare of humanity or even of individuals. But in another sense sympathy and love are but imperfect instruments for bringing about the highest type of adjustment in society. They should always be present, to be sure, in all reform movements, in all humanitarian work, whether for a class or for individuals; but as sympathy unguided by reason often leads to efforts which are demoralizing to individuals, so sympathy and even the love of humanity must be controlled by reason. There is much evidence to show that maudlin sympathy with the oppressed classes in society may be as demoralizing to those classes as unwise philanthropy is to individuals. The experience of the American people in dealing with the negro is indeed very good evidence of this. Sympathy and love are not always progressive forces in human society. They may work at times retrogressively. They need to be controlled by reason. However, one must admit that the great increase of sympathy and altruism in modern civilized society is probably the surest guarantee of continued progress and of the ultimate social adjustment of all classes in a perfectly coördinated and harmonized social life.

The Expansion of Sympathy.—We have already spoken of the increase of sympathy and altruism in society as one of the large factors in social progress. But how, it may be asked, does sympathy increase? Does it not increase simply as activities become more widely extended, that is, is not the increase of sympathy a result of higher social organization and of more extended altruistic activities in society rather than *vice versa?* To a certain extent, of

[1] *The Ascent of Man*, p. 216. For Drummond's full argument, read the whole of Chap. VII on "The Struggle for the Life of Others."

course, the growth of sympathy, like the growth of all feeling, is merely a result of the growth of activities realized. If we want people to have similar feelings, that is, to have organic sympathy with each other, we have only usually to get them to act alike. If we want to get one individual to entertain an altruistic feeling for another, it is notorious that one of the best ways to accomplish this result is to get that individual to do something for the other. Even altruistic feeling very oftentimes lags behind and is an accompaniment or resultant of altruistic activity rather than otherwise.

However, the reader will remember that we have insisted that feeling attitudes practically mark the beginning, as well as the end of activities, that they have to do with the initiation of activity, that is, with the selection of impulses which are allowed to develop, as well as with the guiding of developed activity. Sympathetic feeling, therefore, has a very real part in the initiation of practical social activities of an altruistic character. Moreover, in man activities of many sorts are gone through imaginatively before being realized in actual social practice. The imagination, therefore, has a great deal to do with the development of feeling. Sympathy in mankind is, therefore, largely developed through the imagination and the understanding. Hence, as Professor Giddings has insisted, the expansion of our consciousness of mental and moral similarities and identities between ourselves and our fellow human beings has much to do with the expansion of our sympathies. We cannot, indeed, as has already been insisted, sympathize with those whom we do not understand and whom we do not conceive to be in a certain measure like ourselves. On the other hand, sympathy while not inevitable, is apt to arise spontaneously between those who know and understand their mental and moral resemblances, that is, their similarities in nature and in destiny. The growth of sympathy, therefore, in mankind has been very

largely due to the growth of intelligence, and the expansion of sympathy has accompanied the expansion of the consciousness of kind.

Supplementary to these ideas of Professor Giddings, are those of Kidd, who insists that the great expansion of sympathy and altruism in Western Civilization has been due very largely to the influence of Christianity.[1] Kidd is undoubtedly right in this contention, because a leading, if not the distinguishing mark of Christianity, has been its insistence upon the essential moral and spiritual identity of all men. Christianity has insisted upon the brotherhood, that is, the essential kinship of all mankind, and at the same time upon the essential oneness in moral condition of all men before God. In brief, Christianity has taken the sympathies and sentiments natural to the family group and given them a humanity-wide expansion. It has made the bonds of sympathy, love and altruism which are naturally characteristic of the family, the ethical bonds of all humanity. The development of the perception of the moral and spiritual similarities in nature and in destiny of all humanity which has accompanied the growth of Christianity has undoubtedly been responsible for the development of most, if not all, of modern humanitarianism, or, in other words, as Kidd says, for the growth of that fund of altruism with which our civilization has become equipped and which, as we have already said, is the basis for the largest hopes which one may reasonably entertain for the humanity of the future.

The Social Function of Charity.[2]— Charity as the form of altruism which shows itself in social help for the weaker members of society may be regarded as an expression of sympathetic feeling or emotions. As a concrete expression

[1] *Social Evolution,* Chaps. IX, X.

[2] See the writer's article in *Charities and The Commons* (now *The Survey*), January 4, 1908, on "The Functions of Charity in Modern Society," for fuller discussion.

of sympathy in human society, therefore, the working of charity at its best will illustrate the function of sympathy. As we have already noted, charity may lead to grave evils in society. It may perpetuate the degraded, the unfit, the wicked and the worthless. But when guided by intelligence, charity is capable not only of performing a useful function but the very highest social function. The functions of scientific or rational charity in modern society may perhaps be reduced to three types. The first work of rational charity is evidently to help those out of adjustment with society to get adjusted if possible, that is to reclaim the socially weak when they are capable of being reclaimed. The second function of a rational charity is to care for all that cannot be reclaimed in such a way that they will encumber least present and future generations, but also in such a way as not to injure the finer, that is, the altruistic, feelings and sentiments of society. It is as much the work of charity to segregate the hopelessly weak and degenerate, to remove them from free society, as it is to reclaim the temporarily weak. The third function of charity is to remove the sources of human misery by searching out and removing its causes. Preventive philanthropy which tries to stop the making of the unfit through rational eugenics, through the education and training of the individual and through the improvement of social conditions, is, of course, the highest form of charity.

Modern scientific charity itself, needless to add, is performing in larger and larger measure all three of the above functions in modern society. It illustrates, therefore, at its best the working or functioning of sympathy as an instrument of social progress. Scientific charity, therefore, deserves the interest and support of all civilized communities as a scientific means not only of alleviating human misery but of furthering human progress.

Summary.—Sympathy in the sense of induced feeling is one of the simplest types of mental interaction between

individuals. It is a practically universal accompaniment of all coördinated activity between them. In the sense of altruistic feeling or emotion sympathy is a mental attitude favorable to the development of the higher and more harmonious types of social coördination and coöperation. It is, therefore, the feeling which especially reënforces activities which are favorable to the group as a whole. While sympathy in the organic sense is practically a feeling accompaniment of all forms of association, it is sympathy in the sense of altruistic feeling which mediates the more complex activities of group life and especially those activities which demand some sacrifice on the part of the individual. Sympathy in this sense has accompanied all altruistic activities in society from the simplest up, but it is especially the higher forms of such sympathy, as humanitarian sentiment and ethical love, which have been definitely progressive forces in man's social life. Crude forms of sympathy, like the sentiment of kinship, seemingly function in an almost wholly conservative way, but the higher forms, like the love of humanity, especially when guided and controlled by the reason, become most important instruments of progress. Our whole conception of sympathy in the social life of man must be, therefore, a functional one. It is a mental element which we may describe as the primitive social cement, but which develops with the expanding process of life into one of the chief instruments for maintaining social order and solidarity on the one hand and bringing about progressive changes on the other. It would seem that its place in developed social life can be regarded as subordinate only to reason.

CHAPTER XV

THE SOCIAL MIND, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR WILL

The Concept of the Social Mind.—There are two extreme views of the psychical life, or mind, in society. One is the individualistic view that the mind or consciousness of the individual is something entirely separate, a unique isolated thing, each individual mind being related in no organic or vital way to other minds. This view, while still championed, is practically a psychological view of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century which now has but little scientific evidence in its favor.[1] We have already endeavored to show that the individual mind is not isolated but a part of the larger whole, the content of individual consciousness being almost entirely derived from heredity, or the physical life-process, on the one side, and from society, or the social life-process, on the other side.

The other extreme view is that the individual mind is only a part of some over-soul, a real social mind outside of the individual. This view offers the hypothesis that there is a consciousness over and above individual consciousness of which we cannot be conscious, but of which we are in some mysterious way a part. This mystical view

[1] It has lately been revived by Professor Fite in a modified form in his *Individualism*, a book whose psychological postulate is the essentially self-regarding nature of consciousness. See the writer's review of the work in the *International Journal of Ethics* for April, 1912, pp. 348–52; also Mead's review in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VIII, pp. 323–28.

is not, so far as the writer knows, endorsed by any sociological thinker, although strangely enough it has received support as a tentative hypothesis from a prominent psychologist, Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall.[1]

The truth would seem to lie somewhere between these two extremes. Mind has both its individual and its social aspects. As we have shown, the individual mind is very largely a social product, but on the other hand the individual alone is a center of conscious experience. The individual alone thinks, feels and wills. Society as a group of individuals carrying on a common life-process thinks, feels and wills only through its individual members. Society, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, must be thought of as a complex unity made up of many individual psychic units that are in interaction, continually affecting and modifying each other, so that the only unity which we have in society is a unity of process. It is possible that this is the only sort of unity which science may be able to find in the individual, but for the present the individual appears to be a different sort of unity than society. The individual consciousness is unified both structurally and functionally. The mental life of groups is unified only functionally.

This is equivalent to saying that there is a collective mental life, but no such thing as a social mind in the same sense in which there is an individual mind. The phrase social mind, however, has come into general use not only in sociological writings but also in popular speech. Let us note, therefore, that all that can be meant by it is the psychical aspect of society. It is the psychical side of the social process. The term social mind, in other words, is a convenient term to express the mental unity of our social life. This unity is a very real thing and even though the term social mind is open to many objections because

[1] See his *Instinct and Reason*, pp. 65–7; also *Consciousness*, pp. 173–80.

of possible misunderstandings, it is certainly convenient to have such a term to describe the functional unity which arises from the interaction between many individual minds. Professor Cooley has compared the unity of the social mind to the unity of the music of an orchestra which though it comes from many different instruments and is made up from divergent but related sounds is a harmonious whole. "The unity of the social mind," Professor Cooley rightly says, "consists not in agreement but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole."[1] This conception of the social mind as due to organization or coördination between the activities of many individual minds is somewhat in advance of the conception of Professor Giddings, who considers the social mind to be essentially "the concert of thought, emotion and will" of individual minds,[2] although this conception of Professor Giddings is not essentially different from that of Professor Cooley.

It is chiefly convenient to retain the term, the social mind, in sociological discussions because of the fact that we retain other analogous terms, such as social consciousness, public opinion and popular will. If it is allowable in scientific usage to speak of social consciousness and public opinion, it should certainly be allowable to speak of the social mind, provided that we understand that that term is simply a name for the mental life, the psychical unity, of society.

Social Consciousness.—Rejecting the mystical idea that there is a social consciousness over and above the conscious-

[1] *Social Organization*, p. 4.

[2] *Elements of Sociology*, p. 120; *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*, p. 185. See the excellent discussion of the conception of the social mind in Davis's *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Chap. V.

ness of the individual, there remain two rational meanings for the phrase social consciousness. In the first place we may mean by social consciousness simply one aspect of individual consciousness. Practically all consciousness of the human individual is socially conditioned and functions toward social ends. In this sense practically all the consciousness which we find in society is social.[1] As has already been repeatedly said, practically all consciousness has its individual and its social aspects, and these two aspects of consciousness are in several ways correlatives. As Professor Cooley says social consciousness in the sense of awareness of society is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves except in reference to a social group of some sort. Social consciousness in this sense becomes the correlative of individual consciousness.[2] But it is evident that this consciousness of others and of the relations of one's activity to the activity of others may assume a higher form. It may itself become a coöperative activity involving many individual minds. Hence, we come to the second rational meaning which may be given to the phrase social consciousness, and that is a consciousness of social solidarity, a general awareness on the part of each individual in a group of a given social situation. This is the usual sense in which the phrase social consciousness is used by popular sociological writers.[3] It is a social state, in other words, in which each individual of a group is conscious of the relation of his activities to the activities of the whole group. Such a social state

[1] Cf. the statement of Professor Ames in the article already referred to (*Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VIII, p. 415): "Our minds are fashioned in a social medium and our intellectual operations are conversations from first to last."

[2] This is the chief sense in which Professor Cooley uses the term. He employs "public consciousness" for the second meaning mentioned. See his *Social Organization*, Chap. I.

[3] As when one speaks of arousing "social consciousness" regarding some evil, as, e.g., child labor.

might perhaps better be called a state of social self-consciousness than a state of social consciousness. It implies a heightening both of the individual's consciousness of himself and of his consciousness of others. As all consciousness exists to mediate activity such a state of consciousness evidently functions especially to mediate complex types of social activity. Under such conditions, the activities of the members of a group can be coördinated more accurately than under conditions of lower consciousness.

Social consciousness in this sense evidently marks mainly very complex stages of social evolution. It characterizes chiefly recent social developments in modern civilized societies. It would seem as though the most highly evolved societies of the present are moving rapidly toward a condition of social self-consciousness in which conscious efforts will be made by the individuals comprising the social group to control their whole collective life-process. Such a state of social self-consciousness should make possible a better collective adaptation of all members of modern societies to the conditions of social existence. Sociology itself may be regarded as but one manifestation of this increasing social self-consciousness. All the efforts of governmental bureaus in gathering reports of crops, of meteorological conditions, of social and economic conditions in this and other countries are, of course, but manifestations of this tendency to bring all phases of the social life under conscious control.

One cannot doubt that the growth of social consciousness in this sense is perhaps the most significant development in modern history, since it expresses the tendency to bring all phases of our collective life under conscious control. Hitherto mind has seemingly occupied itself more in securing individual adjustment than in securing the adjustment of large groups to the requirements of their existence. As has already been pointed out, consciousness itself is becoming more completely socialized by becoming more

completely enlisted in the work of social adaptation. In this sense all modern society seems to be moving toward a stage of collectivism or socialism, involving not so much the public ownership of the means of producing material goods as the socialization of individual consciousness, making it primarily an instrument for the carrying on of the social life-process rather than an individual life-process.[1] There are not wanting, of course, skeptics who tell us that such a socialization of individual consciousness is impossible and others who tell us that if achieved it could only result in social awkwardness rather than in real efficient control over the collective life-process. Be this as it may, we have only to note as scientific students of society the increasing growth of social self-consciousness, that is, the increasing socialization of individual consciousness, and that all this increase of social consciousness functions toward the bringing about of more complex, more exact and more efficient coördinations between individuals and between groups and their environment.

Public Opinion.—Highly dynamic societies control social activities by what is known as public opinion. Public opinion is not found to any extent in savage and barbarous societies, because social tradition takes its place. By public opinion we mean a more or less rational collective judgment formed by the action and reaction of many individual opinions upon one another. Such collective opinion functions in the lift of the group, as has already been pointed out, quite as individual opinion functions in individual life. Just as the individual has to form more or less rational opinions or judgments in order to build up a new activity

[1] Cf. Mr. H. G. Wells's definition or description of his own socialism (*First and Last Things*, p. 132): "Socialism is to me no more and no less than the awakening of a collective consciousness in humanity, a collective will and a collective mind"—a conception of socialism which, however, would scarcely satisfy the party which has appropriated the name.

or habit, so masses of men usually have also to come to some collective conscious opinion before some practical course of social activity is entered upon. Otherwise social activities can scarcely be mediated by consciousness.

Professor Cooley, in his book on *Social Organization,* has rightly emphasized that public opinion implies, not so much that general agreement has been reached, as that there is a certain coördination and organization of individual opinions. Public opinion implies, therefore, no absolute agreement or uniformity, but rather organization of the opinions and judgments of individuals. Therefore, public opinion need not represent, as has so often been claimed by sociologists and social psychologists, the judgment acquiesced in by the lowest member of the group making the opinion, but it may well represent the matured opinion of leaders and specialists after these have reacted with their public. Inasmuch as public opinion functions to coördinate activity, no absolute uniformity is needed in order to secure such a coördination of activity, but rather a harmonious trend among the various elements which make up public opinion. Professor Cooley cites as an instance the state of opinion in the United States regarding slavery at the outbreak of the Civil War. He says " no general agreement had been reached; but the popular mind became organized with reference to the matter until a certain ripeness regarding it had been reached." [1] This conception of public opinion as " an organization of separate individual judgments, a coöperative product of communication and reciprocal influence," functioning itself to bring about some new social coördination, is unquestionably the conception which is in harmony with the whole psychology of the social life which has thus far been set forth in this book.

The Development of Public Opinion.—So much has been written upon public opinion, its growth, its development

[1] *Op. cit.,* Chap. XII, p. 401.

and guidance that the only excuse for saying anything further regarding the matter is to bring our conception upon this important topic into harmony with what has already been said regarding the psychical life of society. It is evident that the growth of public opinion as an important factor or instrument in the social life depends quite entirely upon the freedom of intercommunication, of instimulation and response, which we have already discussed in Chapter VIII under the head of "the psychical mechanism of social change." Without free speech, free public criticism, a free press and free discussion, the highest development of public opinion is impossible, since public opinion is formed by the action and reaction of many separate private judgments. Professor Giddings is right in claiming that the highest type of public opinion, that is, rational public opinion, depends for its development upon the right of free discussion, free speech, freedom of assemblage and the like. He perhaps goes too far, however, in saying that in those countries where free discussion, free speech and freedom of assemblage are interdicted there can be no true public opinion.[1] It is true that under such conditions public opinion can never reach its highest and fullest development; but often in countries where the censorship of the press is very rigorous and where free assemblage is interdicted there are socially many means of intercommunication between individuals. Indeed, intercommunication can go on, although in no very rational form, upon the level of mere suggestion. It is probable, therefore, that even in countries where the mechanism of free intercommunication is interdicted there may still form a true public opinion though it may not be of the highest rationality.[2] This we seemingly see both in France before the Revolution and in Russia. In such cases, how-

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 138.

[2] Professor Cooley says (*op. cit.*, p. 109): "Even in prison there is public opinion among the inmates."

ever, public opinion is of a very low order of rationality and is powerless to effect social changes. The results of such interference in the conscious mechanism of social change have already been fully discussed in the theory of revolutions. The free functioning of public opinion in societies is on the whole a safeguard against violent and revolutionary social changes since it always represents the coördination of many separate individual judgments and, therefore, the more or less rational attempt to control collective action. We may conclude then that anything that interferes with the means of intercommunication interferes with the proper development of public opinion and so ultimately interferes with the wholesome and rational growth of social life itself.

The Social Function of Public Opinion.—We have already said that the social function of public opinion is to mediate in the transition from one type of social activity to another. It is a selective process which has to do with the building up of new coördinations in society. This is, of course, equivalent to saying that public opinion is a very important means of adjustment in the higher forms of social life. Upon public opinion in the later stages of development, therefore, come to rest custom, law and many other social institutions. It is a mistake, of course, to trace laws, customs and folkways back to the public opinion of primitive groups, because, as has already been pointed out, laws, customs and folkways very often get their original start from certain instinctive reactions or accidental adjustments on the part of groups; but in the later stages of social development, especially in free societies, public opinion modifies profoundly all customs, laws and institutions. In these later stages of social development, therefore, the social order comes to rest more or less upon public opinion and may be, indeed very often is, the creation of public opinion in the sense that public opinion has been the decisive element which has brought about certain types

of social activity and relationship. The tendency in free societies is undoubtedly to bring custom, laws and all institutional forms under the control of public opinion.[1] In such societies public opinion may be regarded as the chief instrument of social control, inasmuch, as in such societies government very largely rests upon public opinion. Just what rank shall be given to public opinion as a means of social control is, however, a subordinate question. The more important fact to note is that public opinion is playing an increasing part in all social regulation and control. It seems capable, indeed, of accomplishing things which government and law are quite ineffective in accomplishing. For example, rational marriages in society can probably never be brought about effectively through legislation or governmental regulation, but a powerful public opinion regarding the conditions under which marriage should take place, backed by a public sentiment which is shared by practically all, many believe, with good reason, could secure the rational regulation, and so the socialization, of the institution of marriage. The bringing of a larger and larger number of matters in our social life under the control of public opinion is, therefore, to be welcomed, if it is possible to have such free discussion that the more rational judgments of men shall come to find expression in public opinion. Many of the most important problems before society apparently await their solution through the development of a rational public opinion. Not only the marriage problem, but in the United States the temperance problem, the negro problem, the immigration problem and many others must be solved, if solved at all, by intelligent public opinion.

A word only need be said upon the guidance and means of formation of public opinion, a topic upon which much has been written. If public opinion plays such an im-

[1] Cf. Cooley, *op. cit.*, Chap. XI.

portant part in the adjustments of modern societies, then, the social importance of the guidance and means of formation of public opinion is manifest. Increasingly, in the large complex social groups of the modern world the guidance and formation of public opinion is a function of the press. The pulpit, the lecture platform, and the popular assembly seem to be playing a less and less important part in the formation of public opinion. To the press, including in that term not only newspapers but books and magazines, belongs the preponderant part in the guidance and formation of public opinion. Yet it is notorious that the press to-day is very largely upon a commercial basis, and is frequently managed to serve individual ends rather than to meet social needs. If we are to leave the control and regulation of much in society to public opinion, it is evident that society must devise some way in which the press shall itself be socially controlled—a system of censorship or control over the press which shall allow for social development, and yet keep entirely within the limits of social advantage. This is one of the most important concrete problems of present social life and one toward the solution of which as yet few steps have been taken.

The Popular Will.—Social judgment as reached in collective opinion must issue in collective action, just as individual judgment issues in individual action. We give the name popular will, or social will, to those decisions which have been reached through public discussion and the formation of a public opinion. As has already been said, the popular will is simply the coördination of the activities of the group in a given direction. Like social consciousness and public opinion, the popular will represents, therefore, an organization and coördination of many activities of a group so that they issue in securing a unified result. The whole process of a group carrying on a collective life is, of course, a process of will or activity. Just how far such activities are mediated by social self-consciousness and

public opinion depends upon the stage of social evolution. It is apparently only in the higher groups that definite social choice and decision become very conspicuous. While group will has been an inseparable concomitant of group life from the beginning, yet the popular will of recent times is so much more a conscious matter that it seems a relatively new thing, and in a certain sense group action that is definitely mediated and controlled by social self-consciousness and public opinion is a different affair from the social action which is mediated by instinct, custom or tradition. Popular will in this higher sense of deliberate social choice, like social self-consciousness and public opinion, must be regarded as a relatively late product of social development.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION

We have repeatedly spoken throughout this text of the forms of association. There remain certain things which must be said in order to clear up this phrase and the numerous references which we have made in connection with it. First of all, of course, comes the question, What do we mean by forms of association?

What is a Form of Association?—A form of association is simply a type of coördination or coadaptation between individuals. It is the form of relationship to one another which individuals take on in carrying on some phase of a common life. As has already been said, it is largely to be accredited to Professor Simmel that more attention has recently been paid to this important phase of the social life.[1] Simmel, however, maintains, as we have already seen, that the form of association must be studied as an abstract or empty form by itself, and that such study alone constitutes sociology. Without denying that valuable results of a certain order might be secured from this sort of social geometry, as Simmel himself calls it, it must be evident that there are grave limitations to the value of such study for understanding the collective life of man. Societies are living unities. Their abstract or empty forms cannot be studied by themselves with any great profit any more than the abstract forms of plants and animals can be.

[1] See his *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung.* The major part of this work appeared as articles in the *American Journal of Sociology* (Vols. II–XVI), and so is accessible to the English reader.

Just as the biologist finds himself forced to take account of the whole life-process at every moment in accounting for any given organic form, so the sociologist will find himself forced to take account of the whole social life-process in accounting for any social form. The forms in which individuals associate or by which they are held together in groups (*Vergesellschaftung*), considered as empty forms, can yield no very valuable knowledge of the social life-process, unless the psychic factors of instinct, feeling and intelligence, which give rise to these forms, are studied in connection with them. A geometry of the forms of plants, for example, would tell us little about the processes of plant life. So a geometry of the forms of association will tell us little about the processes of social life. What is needed is, of course, a study of the psychology of these forms of association or types of coadaptation among individuals. Professor Simmel himself, indeed, while professing to treat simply of the forms of association as such, goes very largely into the psychology of these forms, and this is by far the most valuable part of his contribution to sociology.[1]

It follows from what has been said that the mere empty form, we might almost say the geometric form, of social groups is not alone to be considered, but also all the elements at any given moment which make forms of association in any way peculiar in themselves. Forms of association are, therefore, synonymous with forms of group life. They include not only such empty forms as superiority and subordination, equality, hierarchy and the like, but many concrete groups which must be classed as distinct types of coadaptation between individuals.

The Practical Importance of Forms of Association.— As Simmel and many other sociologists have emphasized, the way in which people are associated together is fre-

[1] Cf. the writer's review of Professor Simmel's *Soziologie* in the *Economic Bulletin* for March, 1910.

quently very influential in determining their behavior.[1] Human nature is such a complex affair that the reactions which may be called forth in any one individual will vary indefinitely according to the way in which he happens to be associated with other individuals. Many a person, for example, who is a model member of society in a subordinate position may become an altogether dangerous individual in a position of superiority or authority. The reactions between the same individuals when they associate upon a basis of equality may be very different from when they associate, say, as masters and slaves. More and more students of society are discovering that what the forms of association are is a very important matter in human social life.[2] One of the practical tasks of sociology must undoubtedly be to discover those forms of association which are most likely to call forth the highest and best development

[1] Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 116f.

[2] It is these facts which have led some sociological writers to claim that social phenomena are distinct from organic and mental phenomena, and that sociology is absolutely distinct from biology and psychology (the distinction being not one of problems, but of an entirely different order of phenomena). This seems to be the position of Professor Hobhouse in his recent work, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (pp. 30–4), a book which has come into my hands too late to be of any assistance in phrasing my own theories, but which I find to be in general remarkably in harmony with them. However, the importance of social organization, or of forms of association (which I fully concede) does not absolutely separate sociology from biology and psychology; for the only principles of explanation which sociology can invoke must be found in the facts and principles of the two antecedent sciences. Thus while the same persons will behave very differently under monogamy or polygamy, slavery or freedom, the explanation of their behavior is to be found in every case in the complex biological and psychological make-up of the individuals concerned, who respond in different ways to different stimuli. Thus theoretical sociology remains, as we said in the earlier chapters, *the biology and psychology of the associational process*, the study of the forms of association as such remaining a purely "formal" discipline.

of individual personality. The whole history of human progress is to some extent the history of trying different forms of association, because the taking on of one form of institution and the sloughing off of another is just this process, looked at from one point of view, of testing forms of association.

Besides the practical value of understanding the forms of association, there is also, it is needless to point out, a large theoretical value in the study of such forms. If the study of several typical or normal forms of association, or types of coadaptation between individuals, is thorough enough, undoubtedly such study will reveal many of the principal laws of human association. As the author has elsewhere attempted to demonstrate, "any form of association, or social group, which may be studied, if studied from the point of view of origin and development, whether it be a family, a neighborhood group, a city, a state, a trade union, or a party, will serve to reveal many of the problems of sociology . . . and to illustrate concretely the laws and principles of social development."[1] To be sure, one could not learn thoroughly the processes of plant life by studying intensively just two or three typical plant forms, neither could one learn thoroughly the processes of the social life by studying intensively two or three typical forms of association. Nevertheless, one could scarcely understand the processes of plant life without some such intensive study; nor can one understand the social life without intensive study of concrete forms of association, for the study of large social masses is attended with many difficulties which can only be overcome by constant reference to simpler units. It is for this reason that many of the illustrations which we have used have been drawn from the family life. The family group, it may be added, because it is biological as well as psychological in its nature, and because it enlists

[1] *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, p. 9.

crowd, or mob. The public, or dispersed crowd, differs very much from the real crowd, because it does not involve the association of personal presence, and because it gives more opportunity for reflection and deliberation, though still comparatively unorganized. The mass meeting is, after the crowd, the next lowest form of association which involves personal presence, and shows slight organization, having a chairman who is supposed to exercise more or less control; then comes the deliberative assembly with a still higher organization, then the representative body, then many associations which do not involve personal presence and which are higher than the public, such as sects and parties. Finally come corporations, industrial and cultural, including fraternal orders, trade unions, religious orders, and the state. The corporation Professor Ross evidently regards as the highest form of association from the standpoint of organization, though he would restrain the power of the corporations by many free associations of lower degrees of social organization, because the overorganization which the corporation represents, whether it be the state, the church, the trade union or the business corporation is apt to encroach too much upon the individuality of its members, reducing men to ciphers.[1]

While Professor Ross's classification of the forms of association is evidently very incomplete, and is probably intended as scarcely more than a suggestion, there is in it a possible basis for the making of a more complete scheme of classification. Such a classification would depend upon the degree of control exercised by the form of association over its members, the amount of association of personal presence involved being a secondary consideration.

Giddings's Classification.—Professor Giddings has suggested several other classifications of the forms of associa-

[1] "The cause of right," Professor Ross rightly says, "is bound up with the triumph of free associations giving play to the conscience and the judgment of each individual" (*op. cit.*, p. 146).

tion. First of all, he would divide all societies into "component societies" and "constituent societies."[1] Component societies are natural genetic groups composed of both sexes and all ages, such as families, villages, communities and tribes. Constituent societies on the other hand are associations organized for carrying on a particular activity or for achieving some special end. They are usually made up of members of the same sex and approximately of the same age. They are definite, purposeful forms of association found only within the limits of human society, so far as we know. Professor Giddings classifies component societies beyond the family group, which is the simplest genetic group, into ethnical societies (which include hordes, tribes and federations) and demotic societies, or the genetic groups of civilized peoples (such as neighborhoods, hamlets, villages, parishes, towns, communes, cities, counties, provinces, commonwealths and federal nations). The chief forms of constituent societies he finds to be the household, the clan, the state and the numerous voluntary associations within the state, such as political parties, industrial corporations, trade unions, and cultural associations, whether for religious, philanthropic, scientific, educational, ethical or pleasurable purposes.

This classification of concrete social groups by Professor Giddings is based upon a principle which has often been mentioned in sociological writings, namely, that there are two great types of association, first natural genetic groups whose members are linked together more or less by bonds of physical heredity and the natural physical environment; secondly, artificial, purposive groups whose members are bound together upon the basis of some more or less definite, conscious purpose, and whose association is more or less definitely determined by this conscious purpose. Tönnies has called the first type of association "community" (*Gemeinschaft*), while the second type he calls "society"

[1] *Elements of Sociology*, Chaps. XVII, XVIII.

(*Gesellschaft*).[1] As we have already seen, Professor Baldwin, in a somewhat similar spirit, would limit true societies to those forms of association in which there were definite conscious relations maintained for some definite, conscious end.[2] While we cannot accept the implication of Tönnies and Baldwin that natural genetic groups are not true societies, it is manifest that such groups differ in their principle of organization from the artificial, functional groups which exist to conserve well-defined ends in the social life. It may be convenient, therefore, to base a classification of the forms of association upon this distinction. While the distinction is a vicious one, if it is made the basis for excluding from sociology the consideration of natural genetic groups, yet, on the other hand, it is a very useful distinction in classifying the forms of association.

In the opinion of the writer, the natural genetic groups which Professor Giddings calls component societies should be regarded as fundamental in attempting any interpretation of collective human life, while the artificial, functional groups, or constituent societies should be regarded as superadded to the natural genetic forms of association through the influence of the intellectual elements which we have already spoken of in the chapter on the "Origin of Society." These artificial, functional forms of association then become in part the distinguishing marks of human societies; and the extent to which they modify natural genetic groups, may well be made a basis for classifying human societies according to their stage of development or civilization.[3]

In some of his later writings Professor Giddings has pro-

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[1] See his work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.*

[2] *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 503.

[3] Cornejo in his recent work (*Sociologie Générale*) divides societies (Vol. I, p. 204) into "simple or domestic, formed by generation" and "composite or political, formed by integration." The distinction is in effect the same as that just discussed.

posed a second classification of societies which is more upon a psychological basis. He would divide all societies into Instinctive and Rational societies, the Instinctive being limited to the bands, swarms, flocks and herds of animals, the Rational to human groups, since there is no human community in which instinctive response is not complicated by some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of association.[1] Human, or Rational, societies Professor Giddings would subdivide into eight distinct types, as follows: (1) the Sympathetic type of society in which the chief social bond is sympathy and which is exemplified by a homogeneous community of blood relatives; (2) the Congenial type of society in which the social bond is similarity of nature and agreement in ideas, as illustrated by the "Mayflower" band; (3) the Approbational type of society in which the social bond is a general approbation of qualities and conduct, as illustrated by the frontier settlement; (4) the Despotic type of society in which the social bonds are despotic power and a fear-inspired obedience; (5) the Authoritative type of society in which reverence for authority is the social bond; (6) the Conspirital type in which intrigue and conspiracy are the social bonds; (7) the Contractual social type in which the social bond is a covenant or contract, as illustrated by the Achean League; (8) the Idealistic social type in which mutual understanding, confidence, fidelity and an altruistic spirit form the social bonds. Professor Giddings adds that to a certain extent these different types of society or forms of association overlap and that the higher types may and usually do include examples of the lower types among their component groups.

Certain Other Classifications of the forms or stages of human association may be suggested. For example, human societies may well be classified according to the basis of social control in given groups. The lowest form of control is undoubtedly the instinctive control which rests ultimately

[1] See *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*, Chap. III.

upon selective processes. This is after all a very imperfect instrument of securing the highest type of adaptation in human societies. Societies which are wholly upon the basis of instinctive control are all below the human level. The next form of control is habitual control, or the control of custom and tradition, which we see in very primitive human groups. A third form of control is the control by despotic government which characterizes the social life of barbarism and lower civilization. Finally the highest type of social control is that secured through such education of the individual as will give him habits and ideals which will adapt him to relatively free forms of association, and yet meet the requirements of social existence. This last type of association is evidently a form of association into which human societies are only beginning to enter.

Summary.—The forms of association are expressions of the mental attitude of the individuals in a group toward one another. They are, therefore, types of coördination or coadaptation between individuals. They are of not less importance than individual character, accordingly, in determining the general type of social life. Social evolution is essentially an evolution of the forms of association, and hence social progress is a development of higher forms of association, that is, higher types of adaptation between individuals. The classification of forms of association, while an important matter for sociology, is not of such importance as some sociologists have thought, since, on account of the complexity of human nature and society and also on account of the expansive character of social life, an exhaustive classification of the forms of association is impossible. Only general types can be made out. Such classifications are essentially classifications of the mental attitude of individuals toward one another and may proceed upon many different bases. The classifications already made by Simmel, Ross, Giddings and other sociologists while helpful are by no means final.

CHAPTER XVII

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER

The Problem of Social Order.—As we have already indicated, social order is a term not strictly synonymous with social organization. Social organization refers to any condition or relation of the elements of a social group, but by social order we mean a settled and harmonious relation between individuals or the parts of a society. The theory of social order is, then, something more than the theory of social organization. The question arises, how do the relationships between individuals become settled and harmonious? The problem of the social order is, in other words, the problem of harmonious coördination or adaptation among the individuals of a group. Such a problem, it is manifest, is more than a problem in pure science. It is a practical problem as well. The theory of social order has a practical and ethical outlook, in other words, in addition to its purely theoretical aspects. It is at this point that sociology and ethics touch perhaps most closely, although in the theory of social progress, as we shall see, ethical questions also become prominent.

Social Order and Social Organization.—It is evident that the factors or forces which shape social organization must enter more or less into this problem of the determination of the conditions which make for settled and harmonious relationships among individuals. The whole problem of social order has been indeed continually discussed in the preceding pages in elaborating our theory of the organization and evolution of society. Social order in any group, for

example, must rest more or less upon human instincts. Harmonious coördinations between individuals are, as we have already seen, more or less mediated by certain native tendencies of individual human nature, such as the sexual and parental instincts, the gregarious instinct, sympathy and imitation. Moreover, the acquired habits of social groups, whether we call them customs, traditions, usages or folkways, also make, as we have seen, for settled and harmonious relationships between individuals.[1] We may say roughly, then, that in lower types of social life social order is almost entirely an outcome of the working of similar instincts and habits in the individuals of a group. In animal groups, order must be almost entirely an outcome of instinct plus more or less intelligently acquired habits. But in all human groups except the very lowest we begin to find evidence of another factor working for social order, namely, conscious means of social control, or regulative institutions. This third factor is, of course, not to be distinguished sharply from the second. The only intention is to emphasize the rise in human society, at a point beginning somewhere in the later stages of savagery, of conscious and deliberate means of coercing the individual. These means are the so-

[1] See James's oft-quoted tribute to habit as a conservative factor in society (*Principles*, Vol. I, p. 121): "Habit is thus the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprising of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deckhand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and to his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps the different social strata from mixing."

order in our complex industrial civilization. Here come in, of course, most of the practical problems of modern politics.

It should be needless to remark that our whole view of the social life leads to the conclusion that government and law instead of being less needed in the future will be more needed. The regulative functions of government instead of being contracted to a narrow sphere must, as has just been said, be expanded to include practically all human interests. There is, therefore, no good foundation for the belief which was current during the first part of the Nineteenth Century that government would be less and less needed as social evolution advances; and it follows that the social ideal of no government, or the anarchistic ideal, is based upon an utter misconception of the nature of human social life.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that government and law are by themselves relatively inadequate means of social control in very complex societies. The control which government and law exert must necessarily be over gross external acts. Such control does not go deep enough to secure the highest type of social order, or indeed any type which is adequate for modern social life. The social control which government and law represents, therefore, is relatively crude and primitive compared to the control which may be secured through other means. Hence, government and law, we may safely conclude, are an inadequate means of social control except as they support religion, morality and education.

Religion as a Means of Social Control.—Religion, like government, is one of the oldest means of control in human societies, though it was perhaps not used consciously as a method of control over the individual until government had been in some degree developed. The religious sanction for conduct, being a supernatural sanction, all human experience shows, has been one of the most effective means of con-

called regulative institutions of human society. A natural or spontaneous social order is, to be sure, furnished by instinct, sympathy, custom and tradition; but social order in all very complex human groups, and especially in the great civilized societies of the present, is achieved by many other than these natural means.

Social Order and Social Control.—Professor Ross in his work on *Social Control* has presented in an admirable manner the many devices which modern societies employ to control the conduct of individuals. We shall not attempt in this chapter to cover the field which he has worked over so thoroughly, but only to point out certain supplementary conclusions which stand out clearly as corollaries of the psychological theory of the social life which has been presented. The growing complexity of social life as social evolution advances calls for increasing means of control over individual character and conduct if conflict between individuals and between classes is to be avoided and settled and harmonious social relationships achieved. Less and less, therefore, are the instincts and other natural tendencies of human nature to be relied upon in securing order in large and complex social groups. More and more certain regulative institutions are needed to secure a high condition of social order. One of the great practical problems which has confronted human societies, therefore, almost from their beginning, has been the development of such regulative institutions.

The problem of social order becomes in human groups, therefore, very largely a problem of effective means of social control over the individual. All social organization, as we have pointed out, is necessarily more or less compulsory in character. Just how the compulsion shall be applied to get the individual to conform his habits and ways of thinking to those of his group is a practical problem the answer to which historically has varied all the way from the most brutal means of despotic government to the most subtle con-

trol through suggestion and education. The chief regulative institutions which have been employed are, of course, government, law, religion, morality and education. All of these institutions, because they are concerned chiefly with social control, that is, with the problem of social order, have tended at times to become static and thus to become impediments to social progress. A further practical problem has arisen, therefore, in connection with these regulative institutions; and that is to work out means of control which will be efficient and still in harmony with social development. Let us note very briefly the function of each of these great regulative institutions in securing and maintaining social order.

Government and Law as Means of Social Control.—Government and law are perhaps the oldest of the agencies consciously employed to secure social control. Government may be, indeed, regarded as the chief regulative institution of human society in that government as an agency to enforce law must be the last resort in controlling individual conduct in any group. While government probably began chiefly as a means of control in time of war, more and more government has tended to absorb to some degree at least all the other regulative institutions of society. Government and law have at any rate become the chief means of social regulation in modern societies and some would have them absorb and direct all social activities. While such an extension of the functions of government must be regarded as unsound in theory and unwarranted in practice, yet there can be no doubt that inasmuch as the purpose of government is to regulate, its functions are "coextensive with human interests." There can also be no doubt that one of the great practical problems of modern politics is how to make government more effective as a regulating agency. The problem of government is evidently still not worked out. Modern governments can scarcely be said to be adapted to their work of maintaining a high degree of social

trolling the conduct of normal individuals. The desire to come into right relations with a deity, who represents in the earlier stages of development the authority of the ruler, and in the later stages of development the ideal of personal character, has been an effective means of preventing too wide a variation in conduct in individuals. This fact has so impressed practically all students of social history that most would agree with Ward in declaring religion to be "the force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its orbit."[1] There can at least be no question that in the later stages of religious development, when religion powerfully reënforces social idealism, it is a most effective means of bringing about and maintaining harmonious coördinations between individuals. Christianity with its belief in the divine fatherhood and in universal human brotherhood has been especially powerful as a force making for social order among all peoples that have accepted it.

The belief that society in the future will be able to do without religion rests upon about as unsatisfactory a psychological and sociological foundation as the belief that society will be able to do without government. Instead of religion becoming less necessary as society advances it becomes more necessary, for the simple reason that there is more necessity for social control; and as yet no substitute for the transcendental beliefs and ideas which religions offer as a means of social control has been found. One of the gravest and most disturbing signs of the social life of the present, therefore, is the decay of effective religious belief. Such decadence of religious belief in the past has marked the dissolution of social order and even of types of culture. One of the greatest practical needs, therefore, of the present, from the standpoint of social order, is a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life. The church

[1] See his article on "The Essential Nature of Religion" in *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. VIII, pp. 169–92.

instead of being an outworn institution in human society evidently has before it a field of social usefulness such as never existed in any past stage of social development. Until we get a church that is effective socially, law and government will not do much to maintain a social order that is adequate for modern social life.

Morality as a Means of Social Control.—What has been said regarding the function of religion in maintaining social order applies with double force to moral codes or systems of morality, for, of course, religion secures its social effects chiefly by giving supernatural sanction to ethical standards and ideals. Like religion, morality goes to the innermost motives and secures social order through controlling character and conduct at their source. No social order, except of the lowest or savage type, has ever existed or can exist save as it is based upon some accepted moral standard or code. The moral, as we have repeatedly insisted, is nothing but the social raised to an ideal plane. Proper moral ideals in individuals and moral practices, or virtues, of themselves ultimately guarantee the harmonization of relationships between individuals. The virtues, indeed, as we have already said, are what mainly bind men in harmonious relationships. Without loyalty, honesty, veracity and justice in a society there is no possibility of maintaining anything more than the shabbiest semblance of social order. In every phase of the social life this is true. Order is no more to be secured in the economic world than in the domestic world without the virtues, although some current economic philosophy may teach that order in economic matters is quite independent of personal morality.

Morality is more and more needed as society becomes more complex. The simple virtues that suffice for a rural population living under simple conditions are found to be no longer adequate for complex urban populations.[1] Moral

[1] This thought is particularly developed by Ross in his *Sin and Society.*

standards and moral practices have to be continually raised in society as social evolution advances if social order is to be maintained. Increasing population and complexity of social life will try our civilization, as has been well remarked, far more than the limitation of natural resources.

A stable and harmonious social order cannot exist in complex groups without high character in individuals. Individual moral character is, therefore, in a certain sense the foundation of social order. Systems of morality, moral codes and moral standards are, therefore, all important in society from the standpoint of social order in so far as these may affect individual moral character. A system of morality adequate to support a complex civilization is a concern of the very highest importance in our present social life and so far as one can judge in any society of the future. The struggle to find and secure the general acceptance of a rational system of morality, adapted to the needs of our social life, is certainly one of the greatest practical and scientific issues before modern society. The hedonistic system of morals, or the ethics of pleasure, has commended itself in all ages to the thoughtful and experienced as essentially antisocial and anarchistic in character. The ethics of self-realization, on the other hand, appealed to many of the best minds of the Nineteenth Century as in essential accord with the demands of human progress. It must be said, however, that the ethics of self-realization is oftentimes popularly interpreted in an extremely individualistic way to mean self-development and self-culture, regardless more or less of the welfare of others. The hedonistic and self-culture ethics of the Nineteenth Century must both, therefore, be regarded as essentially inadequate for the needs of our social life. The ethics of service implicit in Christianity on the other hand, containing all that is of value either in hedonistic or self-culture ethics, must be the ethics of the future if highly complex types of social life are to

survive, because the problem of the social order is the problem of harmonious coördinations among individuals; and these cannot be secured without the high development of sympathy, understanding and altruistic activity which is implied in an ethics of service or of love.

Education as a Means of Social Control.—The emphasis which has just been laid upon individual moral character as the ultimate basis for high types of social order leads to the conclusion that our ultimate reliance in securing such high types of social order must be the education of the individual. Since human character is formed mainly in the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence, education furnishes the ultimate and most subtle form of social control because it controls the formation of habit and character in individuals. Education, if wisely carried out, can secure undoubtedly more difficult forms of social adjustment than can government, law, or religious sanctions acting upon the adult individual, because education furnishes, at the plastic period of life, a subjective environment for the individual of ideas, ideals, beliefs, motor and feeling attitudes, which are capable of molding individual character in almost any direction. Of course, the education which can achieve this would be something far different from the education furnished by the schools of the present. We are speaking of education in the broad sense of training and preparation for life along all lines, especially along lines of social adjustment. Moreover, education is of all the means of social control best adapted to secure a *progressive* social order. Government, law, and religion and even moral codes have tended to become static; but education can as easily adapt itself to the higher social order which should be as to any social order which exists. Other means of social control are, of course, not to be neglected for all are important in human society in maintaining social order, but it would seem that education as an instrument in developing and maintaining a progressive social order has advantages

over any other of the means discussed. Education is, indeed, itself not so much to be thought of as separate from these other means as simply a method by which other means may be more successfully realized.

Conflict and Social Order.—Just the place of conflict in the social life in relation to social order may need a word further of discussion. Certain sociological writers of late years have tended to make conflict a normal, if not an ideal element, in the social life. In one sense, of course, there is no objection to this view so far as conflict means simply competition upon high planes of endeavor. So far as it may mean simply struggle for adjustment, conflict is a normal element in the social life and is not inconsistent with social order of the highest type. As we have already pointed out, there is an element of conflict in all social change and adaptation. A progressive competition between interests, ideals and institutions in human society must be welcomed as a necessary method of progress in no sense opposed to social order. But conflict in the sense of hostility between individuals and classes is another matter in human society. Conflict in this sense is opposed to social order, is indeed the antithesis of social order, because there can be no harmonious coördination between individuals when conflict of this kind exists. To be sure, such conflict may issue in social order, and in social order of the higher type, through the elimination of lower types of individuals or classes or groups. This was undoubtedly the primitive method of progress. It would seem, however, to be a brutal and unnecessary method in the social life of the future, because through education and through rational eugenics such socially unfit types of individuals need not exist. The more regulated and refined forms of conflict which we ordinarily speak of as competition and emulation should suffice for all of the demands of a selective process in the social life of the future. Certain it is that many of the present forms of conflict between individuals and groups which exist in the

society of the present ought not to be tolerated. As long as the war between individuals lasts and as long as antagonism and hatred between classes and races exist there can be no guarantee of any settled and stable social order. Conflict of this sort is not a necessary element in the social life process but rather marks a failure to build up proper co-adaptations between individuals and classes. This sort of conflict is, in other words, a negative and destructive element in the social life. Its predominance is simply the sign of social dissolution. The International Peace Movement is to be welcomed as a step in the right direction, but it is far more important, as has just been said, that the war between individuals and classes should cease if there is to be social peace and harmony. Indeed, there can be no guarantee of the cessation of war until the lower and more brutal forms of conflict or competition disappear between individuals, classes and races.

The Conflict of Ideals and Social Order.—Professor Giddings has emphasized throughout his writings that a stable social order must rest upon like-mindedness. That he is essentially right in this view has been clearly implied in the discussions of the previous chapters. Without such like-mindedness as is furnished by likeness of instincts, habits, feelings, desires and interests in a population social order would be impossible. We have already seen that a natural, spontaneous social order rests upon fundamental similarity in these psychical elements of individuals. While it is undesirable from the standpoint of social order that individuals should be mere copies of each other in their mental and moral make-up, essential resemblance, or similarity within limits, is necessary, we have seen, for any harmonious coördination of their activities. Moreover, we have also seen that the higher types of coördination between individuals rest upon and are mediated by coördinating ideas. Common activities and common life of any high type, in other words, depend upon essential intellectual

similarity between the individuals constituting the group. A stable social order of a high type, therefore, depends upon agreement, similarity in the ideas and ideals of the individuals who participate in the social life. This has already been quite fully implied in what has been said regarding the necessity of mutual understanding and of mutual trust and confidence between individuals if a high type of society is to exist.

From all this clearly follows the importance of relative agreement in the ideals of life of the individuals who compose a complex society, and the extreme social disadvantage of conflicting ideals regarding the most fundamental relations between individuals. Some conflict of ideals is, to be sure, inevitable and necessary, as has already been pointed out, if there is to be any progress in society. Conflicting ideals of life become a menace to social order only when the conflicting ideals are too far removed from each other, and involve the most fundamental relations between individuals. When such a conflict, however, exists in fundamental opinions and ideals there can be no doubt that it is a condition which, if long continued, is radically opposed to the development as well as to the maintenance of any high type of social order. Comte was undoubtedly right when he attributed social disorder and anarchy to such a disagreement concerning fundamentals, and when he declared that "stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order."[1]

The present age even more than Comte's age is suffering from a disagreement, all but universal, concerning the fundamental ideals of the social life and of right relations between individuals. No stability in our institutions can be assured as long as the present strife between the conflicting ideals of life continues. In many ways the greatest task of science in society is to settle upon

[1] *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. I.

the basis of fact and reason, these disagreements in opinions and ideals among individuals. If there is no hope of science through reason bringing men to more unanimity and more genuine unity in their opinions regarding the meaning and ideals of life, then, there is also no hope of any very high or harmonious type of social order emerging from the strife of the present. It is not, of course, claimed that science alone can in practice bring about this desirable unity with regard to the ideals of life. As we have already indicated, government and law, religion and education, have also their work to do in this connection. But the work of science, and especially of the social sciences, and among the social sciences particularly that of sociology and ethics, is in a sense fundamental; for it is the task of science on the one side to detect error and on the other side to synthetize ideas and ideals into a harmonious whole from which the true view of human life should clearly emerge.

Summary.—The achievement of social order in the sense of settled and harmonious relations between individuals, if it be of a complex type, is evidently not a simple matter. Many forces must receive careful consideration if such an order is to be achieved. There must be fundamental likeness among individuals in those primitive elements of human nature—the instincts and impulses. There must also be fundamental likeness and agreement in acquired habits, especially those which children take on through early training and by imitative absorption from their environment. There must also be sympathy and mutual understanding between all the members of the group. Finally, there must be agreement with regard to the more fundamental ideals of life. All this implies, if such relative uniformity and likeness is to be achieved in the mass of individuals composing those great societies which we term civilized nations, that government and law, religion and morality, standards and education must be continually used to control and

constrain the development of the individual; and it implies also that the grosser forms of conflict between individuals and absolute conflict between fundamental ideals and maxims must be overcome by all these agencies working together and guided by humanistic science.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

The Problem of Social Progress.—The theory of social progress is, as we have seen, not strictly synonymous with the theory of social evolution or change. Progress implies at its minimum definition a more complete adaptation to the requirements of existence and an amelioration of the conditions of human life. A theory of social progress, therefore, is possibly outside of the limits of pure science, since such a theory looks to the practical. Some sociologists, therefore, have held that sociology should not concern itself with the theory of progress but only with social changes, regardless of their direction. But the aim of all science is ultimately practical and the social sciences would themselves be far from "socialized" if their aim were merely to furnish knowledge regardless of practical considerations. The real psychological motive for the development of the social sciences, as of all science, and hence their real aim, must be to secure the more harmonious adjustment of man to the requirements of his existence. Now, sociology, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is the general and synthetic science which deals with man's collective life. No other science is in a position to develop a scientific theory of social progress if sociology fails to do so. Sociology, therefore, must offer a theory of progress if it is not to be an abortive affair, but to take its place among the living sciences vitally related to human life and destiny. As a matter of fact, the majority of sociologists from Comte down have made the problem of progress the central and

highest problem of their science. As Comte insisted, all the work of sociology necessarily leads up to a scientific theory of progress.[1] It is the main business, therefore, we may rightly conclude, of sociology to furnish to ethics and to the applied social sciences, to moralists, reformers, statesmen and social workers of every sort a scientific theory of progress.[2]

This practical aim of sociology has been constantly kept in view in the preceding pages. Practically all that has been said, therefore, has a bearing upon the theory of progress. We have tried to show how the foundations for social progress were laid in the native impulses and feelings of the individual, especially in the so-called social or altruistic impulses and feelings. We have seen that man's intellect, operating through the imagination and reason by means of discovery and invention, has been the active agent in progress; and that imitation has served to diffuse and generalize progressive adaptations, while social sympathy and the expansion of the consciousness of kind have been extending the benefits of progress to all classes and all races. The reader must look, therefore, for the writer's theory of progress not simply within the limits of the present chapter but in practically all the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, there remain certain points which have not been discussed, certain conceptions to clear up, and certain positions to summarize. We must first of all see clearly what we mean by social progress in the sociological sense.

The Definition of Progress.[3]—What we call progress is not anything which can be explained in a simple way

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[1] *Positive Polity*, Vol. I, Introduction.

[2] The purpose of this chapter is, of course, not to show that social progress is ethically desirable, but, assuming that it is desirable, to analyze the conception of social progress and to show the factors at work in progress.

[3] Cf. Professor Hobhouse's chapters on "The Meaning of Progress" and "Progress and the Struggle for Existence" in his *Social*

or defined once for all in a few set phrases. Social progress depends upon social change; but not all changes in society are progressive. In general we call those changes progressive in society which secure a more harmonious adjustment of individuals to one another and a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence. Social progress means for one thing, then, the adaption of society to a wider and more universal environment. It means increasing mastery of man over nature and increasing control and mastery of human nature. Social progress, therefore, means more harmonious coördinations among the members of a group. It means also greater efficiency of the group in carrying on its common life—greater capacity for, and greater development of, coöperation. Hence, also it means greater capacity on the part of the group to survive. Social progress includes, therefore, all movements which make, in the long run, for social harmony, social efficiency and social survival.

In any large conception of progress we must make humanity rather than smaller social groups the subject of progress. We judge those things to be progressive which on the whole aid humanity in mastering physical nature and in adjusting harmoniously its various elements to one another. Mechanical inventions, economic prosperity and the like are considered marks of progress because on the whole they are usually judged to be the means of man's mastering physical nature, and therefore serve to adjust him to a more universal environment. Changes in political conditions and in moral standards which make for more harmonious relationships between individuals and groups are also judged to be progressive because they aid in man's mastery over himself and his social environment.

Evolution and Political Theory. Certain factors in progress are stressed by Hobhouse which are only implied in our brief analysis. These chapters are especially, therefore, commended to the reader to supplement what is said in this text.

The ideal of human progress is apparently adaptation to a perfectly universal environment, such an adaptation as shall harmonize all factors whether internal or external, present or remote, in the life of humanity, securing the greatest possible harmony among its various elements, their greatest efficiency in mutual coöperation, and finally the greatest capacity for social survival.[1]

Some writers have made the chief criterion of social progress increased complexity of social organization; but it is doubtful if this is a necessary mark of social progress or anything more than its incidental outcome. Other writers have claimed similarly that social progress consists in the increase of the division of labor and of interdependence in society;[2] but the criticism which we have just made of the conception of progress as increased complexity of social structure applies also to this conception. Still others hold that social progress consists essentially in passage from a general state of hardship, fear and pain to a condition of general comfort and happiness, in passage from a "pain economy" to a "pleasure economy."[3] While we would not deny that all true social progress must ultimately work for the greatly increased happiness of humanity, yet a hedonistic criterion of progress cannot be accepted, because again happiness is an incidental outcome of progress rather than its criterion.

Accepting provisionally the conception of progress which we have set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the

[1] Cf. what is said on the meaning of the social life in Chapter XIX; also the suggestion on page 273 that the ideal of progress is, from one standpoint, the progressive rationalization of all social activities.

[2] See especially Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social.*

[3] This view of progress is essentially implied in the whole hedonistic school of social theorists (e.g., Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 161). It has been especially developed, however, by Professor Patten in his *Theory of Social Forces* (see especially Chaps. IV and V), to whom we owe the names "pain economy" and "pleasure economy."

question arises, How then is progress possible? What factors determine that changes shall be progressive rather than retrogressive in their nature? How may these factors be understood and controlled? This question as to the causes of progress has been discussed by pretty nearly every social thinker from the time of Plato down to the present. Every conceivable theory of progress has been set forth but most of these theories while perceiving a part of the truth have been decidedly one-sided, that is, they have been based upon the perception of some single factor at work in progressive social evolution. Our space does not permit that we pass all of these theories in review, but it is necessary before setting forth the sociological theory of progress to briefly review some of these one-sided theories of progress.

One-Sided Theories of Progress.[1]—*The Anthropo-Geographical Theory.* According to many social thinkers, the determining factors in human progress have been physical. They have been certain conditions of climate, food and soil. This theory received, perhaps, its classical expression in Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*[2] in which he endeavored to show that indirectly physical conditions operating upon economic conditions would absolutely determine social progress. The geographical conditions in Europe, the climate, the fertility of the soil, the aspect of nature, for example, have been the prime factors in the development of European civilization. Moreover, no high civilization, Buckle thought, could develop outside of Europe, because only in Europe were physical and geographical conditions suitable for a high development of progress.

Other theories of this same general school have maintained that the conditions of food supply are the deter-

[1] For an excellent detailed exposition of the one-sided theories of progress, see Barth, *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, Zweiter Abschnitt.

[2] See especially the famous second chapter.

mining factors in social progress, for food supply determines the size of the population, and the pressure of population upon food supply is the immediate stimulus which gives rise to invention and discovery and all control over nature. The simple equation of food and population offers, therefore, the solution of the enigma of progress.[1]

All of these physical and geographical theorists have forgotten to question why social decline takes place, though geographical conditions remain the same; or they have failed to show any definite and certain connection between changes in climatic and geographical conditions and well-known historical instances of social retrogression. Moreover, progressive evolution does not always take place when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable physical conditions prevented social retrogression. The anthropo-geographical theory of progress is too simple, and is inadequate to show what are the real determining factors in progress. It has, however, emphasized the part which climate, soil and other geographical conditions do actually play as conditions of the social life and even as stimuli to social development in certain directions.

The Biological or Ethnological Theory of Progress.— This has been called, with justice, "the stock breeder's theory of progress." It is the theory that the determining element in progress is that of the breed or biological constitution of the group.[2] Quite evidently the anthropo-geographical theory neglects this internal factor of blood or biological make-up. Otherwise geographical conditions should make progressive societies out of hordes of monkeys or even hordes of lower animals. The biological explana-

[1] A good recent example of this sort of anthropo-geographic theory may be found in Woodruff's *Expansion of Races.*

[2] An extreme example of this sort of social theory is to be found in de Gobineau's *Essai sur l'Inegalité des Races Humaines* (an American popularization is Schultz's *Race or Mongrel*).

tion of progress has this great advantage, that it seems to explain the difference in the life of various species of animals. Why should it not explain also quite adequately the difference in the life of various human groups?

There can scarcely be any question, considering all that we know of biology, but that blood counts in human society; that the biological make-up of the individual enters very largely into his social reactions. We may even admit with the eugenists that all progress in human society depends upon the relation between one generation and its successor;[1] that without sound physical heredity there would be but little hope of continuing human progress. Nevertheless, admitting to the full the importance of racial and individual heredity, this theory is inadequate to explain human social progress, because human groups have so much in their collective life which does not come to them by the way of physical heredity, and the impulses and instincts which it furnishes. So much in human society, in other words, is acquired by each individual in his lifetime. Social tradition,[2] or "social heredity," as it has been called, plays such a large part in handing down the achievements and possessions of the past that it is doubtful if the biological constitution of the individual does more than furnish the condition of progress. It is doubtful, for example, whether the biological conditions of English-speaking societies are as favorable to-day as they were two thousand years ago when their ancestors lived in the Teutonic forests, yet there can be no doubt that their social progress during the last two thousand years has been enormous.

It would seem, therefore, that biological conditions or racial heredity merely furnish the potentialities for social progress. Proper inborn racial traits are the necessary

[1] Cf. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, p. 10.

[2] See Hobhouse's discussion of the sociological importance of "tradition," *op. cit.*, pp. 33–8.

conditions for social progress as much as a proper geographical environment, but like the geographical environment they are only conditions, or at most furnish innate tendencies in certain directions which develop when the proper stimuli appear.[1]

The Economic Theory of Progress.—More popular than either of the two preceding theories is the theory that progress depends upon economic conditions, that is, upon the conditions of the production and distribution of material goods. This theory, indeed, may be considered to be the dominant theory, not only of social progress, but of social evolution at the present time.[2]. Its vogue is mainly due to its advocacy by the Marxian socialists under the name of "the materialistic conception of history," although its spread and acceptance has been aided not a little by the works of certain economists who advocated the same theory of social evolution under the name of "the economic interpretation of history." According to this theory, in the words of Marx, "the method of production of the material life determines the social, political and spiritual life process in general." That is, methods of producing and distributing material goods ultimately determine all other social processes, because all other social processes are mediated and controlled by the economic process. The determining factor in human progress is, therefore, economic conditions, or the methods by which the means of subsistence is produced and distributed in

[1] Cf. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, Chap. III, on "The Value and Limitations of Eugenics."

[2] First put forth in definite form in Marx's *Critique of Political Economy;* all recent economic literature has abounded with this theory in one form or another. Economic determinism is the chief basis, e.g., of Patten's social theories (see especially his *Theory of Social Forces* and his *Social Basis of Religion*), not to mention the sociological doctrines of practically the whole socialist group of writers, and of the ultra-Marxians like Loria (see his *Economic Foundations of Society*, trans. by Keasbey).

social groups. Other factors are recognized as determining only to the extent that they may react upon these economic conditions. In any case the forces of the social life are all mediated and controlled by the economic process. The practical inference, of course, from all this is, that if economic conditions are made right all other social conditions will spontaneously right themselves. This, as we have already seen, is the theory of progress upon which a very large number of social movements of to-day are based. Many people, in other words, who are far from ignorant sincerely believe at the present time that all that is wrong with human society is economic conditions, and that if we could straighten out these conditions so as to abolish poverty and assure to everyone an economic surplus the key to human progress, which has so long been sought in vain, would at last be in our hands.

Any elaborate criticism of such an economic view of our social life is unnecessary here because the basis for such a criticism is amply evident in all that has been said in the preceding pages.[1] Human society, as we have seen, is a complex of living organisms responding, now this way, now that, to external stimuli in the environment. These responses vary according to the inner nature of the individual organisms, that is, according to the hereditary tendencies and habits of the individuals composing the group. Social stimuli may, of course, by a process of abstraction be classified into several great groups, the economic, the reproductive, the political, the religious and so on, the economic stimuli being roughly defined as those that have to do with the production and distribution of

[1] For a more elaborate criticism, see the writer's article on "Marx's Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychology" in *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1911 (Vol. XVII, pp. 35–46). Seligman's *Economic Interpretation of History* contains a mild criticism of the theory without any attempt at psychological analysis.

wealth. Now, there is no reason why the responses of the social group to these economic stimuli should determine the responses to all other stimuli, that is should determine all other social activities. It is true that our habits of response to a certain class of stimuli affect to a certain extent our habits of response to all other classes. Thus it follows that the economic phases of human social life do affect to a very great degree all other phases of that life. This is simply a consequence of the unity of individual personality and of the interdependence of all phases of the social life, that is of the psychical unity of society. But there is no reason for believing that economic stimuli determine, in any exact way or to any such extent as Marx and other economic determinists have thought, responses to other stimuli. Under the doctrine of social interdependence it is just as reasonable to say that the religious and intellectual phases of the social life, for example, determine the economic as it is to say that the method of producing and distributing wealth determines all other phases of the social life. Thus modern psychology leaves the doctrine that other phases of the social life are determined by the economic or are simply reflections of economic processes without any scientific foundation.

We must admit, however, that the economic element is a very large one in our social life, and particularly in modern social life. There can be no question but that the method of producing and distributing wealth is one of the most important factors affecting our social life, and therefore social progress, to-day; but it is unfortunate that the emphasis upon the importance of economic conditions in social progress should just now be obscuring the importance of many other factors. The true significance of the economic element in the social life is not unlike that of the physical environment. Like the physical environment, economic development presents the platform upon which social progress must go on. Like the physical

environment, too, it is not so much a rigidly determining element as a stimulus to development in certain directions. The economic factor in social progrees may justly demand, therefore, a large consideration from the sociologist.

Hence, the sociologist, along with all other students of social conditions, must be heartily in favor of all those social reforms which aim at securing to each individual the economic minimum which is necessary for right living and social efficiency. Sociologists may unite with social workers in approving of such movements as compulsory insurance against the contingencies of life which now cause poverty and dependence; a minimum wage, sufficiently high to make possible a human standard of living; labor legislation which will protect the worker against accident, disease and injustice; a liberal relief system which will meet the needs of those who become accidentally dependent; and finally such reforms in our systems of taxation as will furnish adequate revenue for social needs and at the same time serve to distribute wealth and economic opportunities more evenly in society. All these and many other economic reforms are certainly necessary preliminaries for any real social progress. Poverty ought to be abolished, and it can be abolished without social revolution, except where it means simply dependence due to accident, or congenital defect or degeneracy.[1] When an economic competence is assured to each normal individual in society, then more attention can be paid to the mental and moral factors in progress; but it must be emphasized that an economic competence for each individual will not alone assure progress. That is only a preliminary step to make room for the higher mental and moral adjustments which are necessary before we can have a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence.

[1] Cf. Devine, *Misery and Its Causes*, Chap. VI.

The Idealogical Theory of Progress.—All the theories of progress which have thus far been mentioned are more or less materialistic in character; but philosophers and religious teachers have emphasized for ages that the character of man's social life, and hence human progress, depends upon ideas and ideals. Much ridicule has been poured upon these so-called idealogical theories of progress by the advocates of the materialistic conception of history and by others within recent years; but if the intellect is the supreme device to control individual and social adjustment, and if the reason is the highest part of the intellect, these idealogical theories still deserve serious consideration, even from the most rigorous scientific point of view. We have already seen the part that ideas and ideals play in bringing about social changes and especially higher types of adjustment between individuals and groups and their environment. It is noteworthy also that the founder of scientific sociology, though very far from sympathizing with the idealogical philosophers of his time, considered the history of human progress to be essentially the history of human thought. In other words, Comte held that the determining factor in progress was an intellectual one, and that we must control and reorganize society through science.[1]

But the idealogical theory of progress is open to grave objections, even though we admit that the determining factor in human progress must be psychical rather than biological or physical. Much that has been said in the preceding pages has been in opposition, the reader will remember, to an intellectualistic view of human society, though at the same time the writer freely conceded that the intellect was the active agent in social progress. Idealogical theories of social progress have, however, been so stated at times by philosophers, especially those of the Hegelian

[1] *Positive Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. I; *Positive Polity*, Vol. I, Chap. I.

school, that ideas or thoughts were made to seem the social reality rather than simply the instrument in the perfecting of the life-process. Hegel himself offered a theory of social evolution which was purely in terms of a logic of ideas. With thinkers of this type social movements become entirely movements of ideas, ideas become the social reality, and the concrete life of societies, nations and civilizations tends to be lost sight of. Under such circumstances idealogical theories of social progress become as one-sided as any of the theories which we have passed in review. Such theories even detract from the real significance of ideas and ideals, because they lose sight of life itself.

The Educational Theory of Progress.—From Plato to Prof. Lester F. Ward, many of the sanest social thinkers have held that the key to social progress, in the future at least, lay in education. Professor Ward in his *Dynamic Sociology* undoubtedly demonstrated once for all that education was the initial or proximate means of progress in human society.[1] If this must be admitted even in the narrow sense which Professor Ward gives to education, as simply meaning the diffusion of knowledge, it must all the more be admitted if we broaden education to mean the fitting of the individual for the social life, not only by giving him knowledge, but also by controlling the formation of his habits and character. The key to progress certainly lies in the psychical adjustment of the individual to society, and the psychical adjustment of the individual to society is very largely a matter of education even in the narrow sense. This is demonstrated, not only by the experience of every day life, but by the examination of the civilizations of the past, for all civilizations have depended in one way or another upon educational processes, not only for their continuity, but also largely for their development. Not only has culture been passed down in history essentially

[1] See Vol. II, Chaps. X-XIV

by educational processes, but these processes, controlling the formation of habits and character, and ways of thinking and ways of acting in individuals, have been the explanation of much of the social progress of the past. Progress in human society certainly depends upon the relation of one generation to its successors, but that relation is not only one of physical heredity, but also one which involves the education and training of the young. Much can be said, therefore, in defense of the view that methods and processes of education have determined the social progress of the past.

But education is not so much an original factor in social evolution as it is a method through which other factors work. When we attribute great importance to education in social progress we are not singling out any one determining factor of social progress because religion, government and economic factors may all work through education. This is, however, only equivalent to saying that the educational theory of social progress approaches the sociological theory because of its synthetic character. The education of the individual, we must agree with Ward, is the initial means of social progress and the final reliance in all attempts at social reconstruction. But education may dissolve the social order and block all social progress. Education without the proper controlling ideas and ideals cannot be the key to social progress.

The Sociological Theory of Progress.—If all the above theories of progress must be rejected from the sociological point of view as more or less one-sided and inadequate, what theory, then, has sociology to offer? The reply is that the sociological theory of progress is synthetic; that sociology finds some truth in all of the one-sided theories but regards them when taken singly as partial and inadequate. The large synthetic view of the social life which sociology offers shows at once that there can be no single key either to social evolution or to social progress. Just because causes

of change in society are complex, so also the causes of progressive evolution are complex. No doubt some of these causes are more important than others. Assuming fairly favorable physical and geographical conditions, the biological factor of heredity, the economic factor, or the methods of producing and distributing wealth, and the educational factor, or the fitting of the young properly for the social life, loom perhaps larger than others. At any rate, we may agree with Professor Dealey that many of the eminent social thinkers of the past have united in agreeing that race, economic organization and education are the three vital things in social progress.[1] But it is certain that two of these, economic organization and education, must be guided and controlled by ideas and ideals, and could not become effective without the aid of government, law and religion; all of which is again equivalent to saying that any scientific theory of social evolution and of social progress must be synthetic.

This means with regard to social practice that if we are to secure true social progress in modern society we must have a synthesis of social movements. We will not be able to secure any progress worth while by going from one factor to another, doing a little here and a little there. Something, perhaps, may be secured by this method but not much. Our civilization is obstructed and menaced by one-sided development, one-sided efforts at reform, all based upon one-sided theories of the social life. Social policy must be broadened so as to give equal attention to all factors in the social life, and social movements must be synthetized if any sort of satisfactory social adjustment is to be reached;[2] and the intellectual basis for all this

[1] *Sociology*, p. 198.

[2] Among recent notable expressions by social workers of this idea, see Miss Mary E. Richmond's paper on "The Interrelation of Social Movements," *Proceedings National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1910, pp. 212–18.

must be the synthetic view which only a scientific sociology can give.

While we have repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate reliance in social reconstruction must be the education of the young, yet it is also not inconsistent to say that in a sense the ultimate hope of society must lie in the development of its own social self-knowledge, that is in the development of the social sciences. It is after all through scientific study and investigation of the social life that the value of each of its phases as a factor in progress becomes apparent. The perfecting of the instruments of social progress must be largely, therefore, dependent upon the development of the social sciences. With the fuller knowledge of human nature and human society which the development of the social sciences will give us, it will be possible for humanity to control its own social progress even more than it can control the forces of physical nature.

CHAPTER XIX

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

The Nature of Society.—What then shall we conclude as to the nature of the social life from the discussions of the preceding pages? Three great historical theories of the nature of society have been more or less held by the social thinkers of the past and all of them are to some extent still held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the contract, the organic and the psychological theories of society.[1] Other theories relative to the nature of society than these are, of course, possible, such as the materialistic or mechanical view of society. As a matter of fact, however, those who have insisted most strongly upon the mechanical view of nature have perforce abandoned mechanical interpretation when they have come to consider the social life. Mechanistic thinkers have very generally adopted with reference to the social life, strange as it may seem, an extremely intellectualistic view of the social unity; that is, they usually consider that all such unity is a matter of agreement, or contract, between individuals. Let us now consider briefly these three theories of the nature of society in the order of their development.

The Contract Theory of Society.—The view that the unity of the social life is a matter of agreement or under-

[1] Professor Small suggests that these three theories are not so much absolutely opposed to each other as that they emphasize different aspects of the social life. With this suggestion the writer agrees, only he would contend that the psychological theory of society, rightly understood, offers the only adequate basis for a true synthesis of the opposing contract and organic theories.

standing between individuals, that is, that it is essentially a matter of contract, is a very old one. It goes back at least as far as the Epicurean school of philosophy in classic antiquity, but it became fully developed only in the hands of the legal and political thinkers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. The sociological thought of those centuries was very largely in terms of the contract theory of society. Such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau each gave the contract theory a peculiar expression. While Nineteenth-Century thought very largely renounced the contract theory of society in favor of the organic theory, yet it has by no means lacked defenders even among modern sociologists.[1] De Greef, the Belgian sociologist, finds the essence of society to consist in the phenomena of contract.[2] Moreover, all sociological thinkers who find that the social life rests fundamentally upon mutual understanding or mutual agreement should be ranked with the contract theorists.

The essence of the contract theory of society is, then, that social organization is primarily an intellectual construction depending upon expressed or implied agreement, explicit or implicit contract, between individuals. This theory would make, for example, government or the institution of the family to consist essentially in contract. All social organization is, according to this theory, an outcome of self-conscious relations between individuals and these relations subsist only by virtue of the mutual consent of the parties thereto. Society is, therefore, an intellectual construction.

A modification of this theory is to be found among those writers who hold that while the origin of society was not

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[1] The most recent defender of the contract theory of society is Professor Fite in his *Individualism* (Lecture IV). See the writer's review in *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1912, already referred to.

[2] *Introduction à la Sociologie*, Vol. I, pp. 131, 132, 146, 147.

in contract or mutual agreement, society should proceed to organize at once upon the basis of contract. Mutual agreement as to the forms of association or of social organization, if it has not been the basis of social order in the past, should speedily become so. Marriage and the family may not have been, for example, originally a contract, but marriage and family relations should be wholly of the nature of a contract in the future. These theorists, of course, receive considerable support for their contention through the undoubted fact that the self-conscious and intellectual elements in the social life become more conspicuous and more influential seemingly as we advance in social evolution. According to this modification of the contract theory, contract is not the origin of society, but its goal. Even with this modification, however, the contract theory assumes that the social life may become, even if it is not yet such already, quite entirely an intellectual construction. Biological elements and other psychological elements than the intellectual are usually quite ignored by such contract theorists.

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the contract theory of society in some of its forms with the psychological theory of society. The contract theory is, however, as has already been said, not psychological in the broad sense, but rather an intellectualistic theory of society. It is also on account of its very terms an individualistic theory. It is to be sharply distinguished, therefore, even in its modified forms from the psychological theory of society that has been set forth in this book, because it generally neglects or discards as of no importance biological, instinctive and habitual elements, to say nothing of the great factor of coercive control or constraint. The contract theory of society is an inheritance, then, from the intellectualistic and individualistic social philosophy of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. However much it may be questioned in the world of theory, we may note that it is still the dominant

theory of society in the world of practice, especially in the law, in government and to an increasing extent in modern views of the family life.

Detailed criticism of the contract theory of society is unnecessary at this point, since the whole theory of the social life which has been presented in this book amounts to a criticism of the contract theory. We are very far from denying elements of truth in the contract theory and especially as stated in its modified form. However, it is clear that the contract theory of society, even as an ideal, presupposes that society is made up quite entirely of normal adult individuals each of high intelligence, capable of understanding and acquiescing in all of the regulations and organization which exist in a well-ordered social life. That such a condition of affairs existed primitively or that it even exists in the most highly civilized societies of the present is, of course, ridiculous. The contract theory affords no explanation of social organization as we find it. Many people who see this do not see, however, that it affords no adequate ideal for the social life. They fail to see that society cannot be made over according to agreement to suit the convenience and pleasure of its individual members. They fail to see that in its essence the social life is not, and never can be, a mere matter of contract or agreement between individuals. As we have already seen, the foundations of society are far deeper than the intellectual element in human nature; not only has this been true of the social past but it will also hold true of the social future. Social organization is not, and in its nature cannot be, merely an intellectual construction; for it is a phase of the life-process, and in the life-process biological factors and forces are fundamental.

The Organic Theory of Society.—A reaction from the contract theory of society is to be found in the organic conception of society. This is the conception that society is an organism and a product of organic evolution like all

other organisms. The essential idea in this theory is the opposite of that in the contract theory, namely, that society instead of being an intellectual construction is a product of the operation of blind forces of organic nature; that it is a growth which has come about through the operation of biological laws. The unity of society is accordingly in no wise different from the unity which we find in the biological organism. Society is an aggregate of the same sort as the living vegetable or animal. Even if there are differences between the social organism and the biological organism, these differences are of relative unimportance in contrast to the many points of resemblance. Society in any case remains essentially an organic structure subject to the general laws of organic growth and decay. It may be a super-organism, but it is nevertheless essentially biological in its nature.

The beginnings of the organic theory of society like those of the contract theory are very old, going back again to Greek philosophy. The organic theory received its full development, however, only as a reaction from the contract theory of society. When the contract theory began to be given up in the earlier years of the Nineteenth Century, nothing was more natural than that with the contemporary growth of biological science the organic theory should have received its full development. This theory came to its fullest and most consistent expression in such writers as Spencer and Lilienfeld, in whose writings society appears as a sort of superhuman organic structure which science might presume to describe but hardly to control.[1] In Lilienfeld and in many minor writers elaborate analogies were traced between the social and biological organisms. These analogies were sometimes even supposed to represent scientific truths. Lilienfeld, indeed, and some other writers

[1] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Part II. Lilienfeld, *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*, Vol. I.

held very logically that the organic conception was not an analogy at all, but an accurate scientific description of the social reality.

When the full implications of the organic conception of society began to be perceived reaction from it was inevitable. Many modifications of the organic theory arose. Some writers undertook to interpret the view that society was an organism in a philosophical or psychological way.[1] They held that the concept of organism was essentially philosophical rather than biological and that society was an organism only in this most general or philosophical sense. Other writers, like De Greef and Fouillée,[2] aim to reconcile the contract theory of society and the organic theory, finding society to be essentially a "contractual organism."[3]

There can be, of course, little objection to the use of the term organism in the broad, philosophical sense to describe human societies, if by it is meant nothing more than to emphasize the unity and interdependence of the social life.[4] In many ways the word organism is the most apt philosophical term which we have to describe the unity of the social life. On the other hand, it often suggests misleading analogies, and the organic theory of society is something quite distinct from this very broad and general use of the word organism in describing the life of social groups. Detailed criticism of the organic conception of society in the strict sense is unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that such a conception is very far from corresponding with the actual life of social groups as we find them. Not only are human social groups made up of relatively independent, self-conscious, self-

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1 See especially Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Chap. III.

2 *La Science Sociale contemporaine*, Bk. II, Chap. III.

3 A good summary of the theories of leading organicists is to be found in Coker's *Organismic Theories of the State*, Chap. IV.

4 See Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 87.

determining individuals quite unlike, in their nature, relations and behavior to the cells of a plant or animal organism, but it is also true that these individuals are members now of one group, now of another, and even of many groups at the same time, a condition which has no parallel in the organic world. The organic conception of society in the strict sense, therefore, radically misinterprets the nature of the social life. This is not saying that the conception is void of all elements of scientific value. On the contrary, as a reaction from the contract theory, the organic theory served a very useful purpose in the history of social thought in emphasizing the real connections between life in general and society, between organic evolution and social evolution, and also in emphasizing the compelling nature of the social unity, and the fact that social institutions are by no means arbitrary inventions. The view has been set forth at length in this book that human social life is a phase of the whole life-process; that in that process biological processes and forces are fundamental; and that the unity or solidarity of society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process. This view brings into sufficient relief the elements of real value in the organic theory; but they are not sufficient to justify a purely organic conception of society.

The Psychological Theory of Society.—The psychological theory of society is that the unity of the social life is that of a psychical process. It is the theory that has been set forth in the preceding pages and was sufficiently indicated in the definition of society which we finally adopted —that a society is a group of individuals carrying on a collective life by means of mental interactions. The social unity has for its basis, to be sure, a collective life-process; but that life-process, unlike the life-process of biological organisms, is carried on by means of mental interaction between its different elements. The psychological theory of society, therefore, conceives of the social unity as created

by this process of mental interaction between psychical individuals. The social process is a psychical process, not, to be sure, in the sense that it is purely subjective, but in the sense that its significant elements are subjective or psychical.

The psychological theory of society has often been confused on the one hand with the contract theory and on the other hand with the organic theory. This is perhaps due to the fact that it gives a place to both the biological and intellectual elements in the social life. It should be evident, however, that the psychological conception of society is a distinct conception and is not to be confused with either of the preceding, but is rather a synthesis of the elements of value in both of them. It gives, indeed, a fundamental place to the blind forces of organic nature, but it gives also a large and increasingly important place to the intellectual elements as we ascend in the scale of social evolution. Moreover, it gives a proper place in the understanding of the social life to imitation, to sympathy, to conflict, to control or constraint. Thus, the psychological conception of society is not merely synthetic of certain biological and intellectual elements, but is synthetic of all factors. It is, in fact, inclusive of all the factors which in any way have gone to make the social life of man. The psychological theory of society, leaving ample place as it does to all other factors, must be considered, therefore, when fully developed, to represent the synthetic or final stage in the development of sociological theory.

If there be in the social life a real coördination or integration of the activities, feelings, thoughts and ideals of individuals and if, moreover, the social life contain the end of its development within itself, what objection is there to calling society a psychical organism?[1] The reply is that

[1] Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 420, also Barth's article, "Unrecht und Recht der Organischen Gesellschaftstheorie," *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Sociologie*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 69ff.

there can be no objection except that some people so persistently misunderstand the use of the word organism in this broad sense that it is perhaps wise, in order to avoid misunderstanding, for social thinkers to employ it as little as possible. To some minds the use of this term immediately suggests the older organic theory of society with all its crude analogies and parallelisms. Moreover, when the sociologist insists that there is a psychical unity in our social life, that the social process is a unified process, he accomplishes all that he would accomplish by employing the phrase psychical organism.

The social life is, then, a process. It is a process of living together. In this process of living together social groups necessarily become functional unities, unities which do work more or less as unities. In this process of living together, however, and in carrying on a common life the psychical elements of impulse, feeling and thought, and their expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion and other types of mental interaction, are the vital, constituent elements which make it possible to carry on a common life. The social process is, therefore, essentially psychical in its nature and the social life must be interpreted, if interpreted scientifically, not in terms of mechanical causation, but in terms of interstimulation and response. The social life is, therefore, essentially a psychical process, more or less unified, because more or less directed to the carrying on of common, though differentiated and integrated, activities. If societies may be styled organisms in any sense they are therefore preëminently psychical or moral organisms.

The Meaning of the Social Life.—The question of the meaning of human social life belongs to philosophical ethics rather than to sociology. However, a few words may properly be said upon this question in concluding our discussion in order to gather together and make clear the implications of this text. Three principal theories as to the meaning

of our social life are to be found in the ethical and sociological writings of to-day. The first is the theory that the goal and purpose of human society, and therefore the whole meaning of our social life, is to be found in the happiness of individuals. According to this theory the subjective condition of a preponderance of agreeable over disagreeable feelings in the mass of individuals is the adequate and rational aim of human association. Without entering into a detailed criticism of this hedonistic theory as to the meaning of man's social life, it is perhaps sufficient to say that if the view which we have striven to present is at all correct no merely subjective element can be made the goal of human social development or give adequate meaning to that process. And especially so subjective an element as agreeable feeling in individuals cannot be made the meaning and goal of social development. The subjective elements, as we have seen, are functional to the whole of life, while the feeling element at any particular moment is merely functional to the individual organism. Moreover, because of the close connection of feeling with instinct and habit people can be happy in almost any situation to which they become habituated, provided that such a situation affords satisfaction to their animal instincts. The concept of happiness is, therefore, all but useless as a guide in the vast and complex forces of modern social life. No more elusive goal could be set for social science or practical social policy than the maximization of human happiness. It is notorious that it is not certain that civilization has added anything to the happiness of the peoples among whom it has been most highly developed. To be sure, this may be no necessary consequence of civilization; but the futility of the chase after happiness, enjoyment, comfort, and pleasure by all classes in modern society emphasizes the inadequacy of this subjectivistic ideal. This is not saying, however, that the happiness of individuals should not be included as one element in the end or meaning of the social life. The socio-

logical view, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, is a synthesis of all elements of value in human society, and the happiness of individuals is certainly one of these, though by no means the supreme element of value.

A second theory of the meaning of human society found in the thought of to-day is that human society is for the development of personality, that is, the self-realization or self-development of the individual. Conceived broadly enough there is perhaps little objection to this theory; but as we have already seen the popular interpretation of this theory is that the self-culture and self-development of the individual is an adequate ideal of life by itself. This makes the end of social development again quite entirely subjective and individualistic. It is perhaps sufficient to say in criticism of this social and ethical doctrine that the meaning of the social life cannot lie merely in individual development, because individual development apart from social considerations gives no assurance of an ideal social life. It is this very ideal, indeed, together with the hedonistic ideal, which is the source of most of the anarchistic and disintegrating tendencies in modern society. If there is to be any sort of unity in the social life, then the ideal of social development cannot be an individual superman or any number of individual supermen. The ideal of development must be some sort of *society* of individuals. As Professor Adler says, "the moral ideal is to be described as a perfect society instead of a perfect individual."[1]

We therefore come to the third and final theory of the

[1] *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XX, p. 394. Professor Adler adds, "Actual human society, the concrete basis upon which this ideal structure is to be superimposed, supplies meaning to the abstract relations stated, while conversely, the abstract ideal furnishes a margin of infinitely possible extension to the system of human relationships upon which it operates." This is the social view of the moral ideal, it is unnecessary to add, which has been constantly implied in this text.

meaning of our social life, namely, that it is not simply for the sake of happiness, nor even so much for the sake of the development of self, as it is for the sake of the development of a harmonious and perfect society of individuals. The goal and purpose of our social life, according to this view is not self-realization, but the progressive realization of a society of harmoniously adjusted individuals. Not the development of self, but the development of humanity, in a word, is the meaning of society. Self-culture, or self-realization, is good as an ideal only in so far as it conduces to the development of humanity. Practically, for the individual, therefore, the ideal becomes a life of service, a life, in other words, in which he shares in and strives to realize the highest life for all humanity. Self-development is thus only a means to a larger end. The individual lives not for himself but for his race. Happiness and self-development should be for him but means to service.

This ideal is synthetic, because it includes all elements of permanent value in human social life; and it therefore answers the requirements of sociological science. It includes the ideal of self-development, because the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life is the first condition for the realization of humanity. The individual finds his own self-realization in the development of the life of humanity, not an arbitrary self-realization, but one conditioned and limited by the needs of the larger life of which he is a part. This ideal also includes the happiness of the individual for the most efficient service and most harmonious social life can be secured only when reënforced by agreeable feeling. Thus the humanitarian ideal is synthetic of all subordinate ideals, giving them their due place and value, but taking from them the danger necessarily inherent in them when given the first place in the social life.

Moreover, the humanitarian ideal is alone absolutely constructive from a social point of view. Individualistic

and hedonistic ideals are, as we have seen, to a certain extent destructive of social possessions. They work, not toward social conservation, but toward social exploitation for the benefit of special classes and privileged individuals. The great fundamental need of our civilization, therefore, is an ethics of service, a humanitarian ethics which will teach the individual to find his self-development and his happiness in the unselfish service of others, and which will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from regarding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of humanity.[1]

Only this meaning of our social life—that it is for the development of a humanity, all of whose elements shall be harmoniously adjusted to one another and to the requirements of existence—is adequate to explain the great social movements of our time. From the International Peace Movement and the Conservation Movement down to the humblest of present-day philanthropies, the ideal of the service of man and of the development of a perfect humanity dominates, even though it has not yet penetrated very effectively into our business, our politics, or our education.

It is often said that this ideal is vague and that it has no definite content in it. The reply is that the development of humanity must in the nature of things be not a static and definite, but a dynamic and expanding, ideal. The ideal is one of progress, in other words, and does not admit any more than life itself of complete definition. The direction of progress is, however, clear, namely, that it is a progress toward a completer adjustment of all factors, both internal and external, in the life of humanity, to the requirements of its existence. This means that the process

[1] It is a pleasure to add that the trend of much of the best ethical thinking of the present, despite eddies in the stream, is in this direction; and it is unnecessary to say that practically all of the literature of high moral purpose since the establishment of Christianity has inculcated more or less this ethical ideal.

is one of the progressive rationalization of all factors in the social life, and so of progressive control by the higher and spiritual elements in life over the lower and more brutal elements.

The outcome of any rational sociology must be, therefore, to point to, even if it does not establish, a humanitarian ethics and a humanitarian religion. Thus, as Comte foresaw, science in its final development as applied to the social life of man, is in harmony with the highest development of morality and religion which we know. Science, morality and religion must all unite in the work of realizing a perfected human social life, or in theological phrase, in the establishment of "the Kingdom of God."

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