

**THE BOOK WAS
DRENCHED**

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU 168660

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 182.9/M12N

Accession No. 30006

Author McCarthy, John. W.

Title Naturalism of Samuel Alexander.

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander

The Naturalism of

SAMUEL ALEXANDER

John W. McCarthy

KING'S CROWN PRESS

Columbia University, New York

1948

Checked 1969 Copyright 1948 by
JOHN W. MCCARTHY

Printed in the United States of America
by Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton, N. Y.

KING'S CROWN PRESS

is a division of Columbia University Press organized for the purpose of making certain scholarly material available at minimum cost. Toward that end, the publishers have adopted every reasonable economy except such as would interfere with a legible format. The work is presented substantially as submitted by the author, without the usual editorial attention of Columbia University Press.

hms

The following publishers have kindly granted their permission to quote from their publications.

THE MACMILLAN CO.; MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.;
HENRY HOLT CO.; OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS;
and ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.

*To my dear parents
and Harriet*

Preface

I am particularly indebted to Dr. James Gutmann for his painstaking criticism and reading of my manuscript and his general concern with this undertaking. I am beholden to Professor Horace Friess for many cogent suggestions which I have tried to incorporate, and, to Professor Helen Parkhurst of Barnard College who encouraged me to find a unifying concept which has enabled me to bring together Alexander's metaphysics and theory of value. My thanks also go to Professor William P. Montague for fruitful conversations pertinent to Alexander's metaphysical and theological ideas, and for his stimulating paper found in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*.

I wish to thank the Cornell University Library for allowing me to use its manuscript copy of Dr. Cresswell's thesis. To Dr. Herbert Schneider of the Philosophy Department of Columbia University I am greatly indebted for generous help in various phases of my doctoral work, and for acquainting me with the work of Konvitz. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Irwin Edman for his valuable advice and suggestions in connection with my treatment of the aesthetics of Alexander. Finally, I express profound appreciation and thanks to Dr. John Herman Randall, Jr., for the philosophical training he has given me during my years at Columbia. It was through his influence that I became acquainted with Alexander's philosophy and it was through his wise counsel and guidance that this was written.

Contents

Introduction	I
I. Some Basic Notions	8
II. Art, Beauty, and Aesthetics	25
III. Goodness	39
IV. Truth	51
V. The Tertiary Qualities	59
VI. Value	67
VII. Religion	76
Bibliography	109

Introduction

MY INTEREST in Alexander grew out of an attempt to find a contemporary philosopher who would give a comprehensive and satisfying analysis of experience. I was seeking a thinker who would do justice to religion, art and morality within the framework of our scientific enterprise. In my quest I was also looking for someone who would approach this task from a realistic viewpoint. In this book I have sought to show that the naturalistic basis of Alexander's thought is patent in his metaphysics, in his discussion of truth, of goodness, of art, and of religion. The fact of his naturalism or realism is also clear from the admiration which he displays for the thought of Spinoza, which comes out in several essays and in miscellaneous remarks, as when he writes that he will be happy if on his incinerary urn is inscribed: *cum Spinoza erravit*. I hope to demonstrate that Alexander's philosophy is, among other things, an illustration of a good variety of naturalism.

Many philosophers present admirable analytical studies on subjects of limited scope, but in Alexander I found one whose interests ranged the whole gamut of experience. Whether it was metaphysics or science, morality or art, time or God, Alexander pointed the way to understanding. Although we do not care for any final

synthesis in our day, and although we are suspicious of any one system, yet we do crave some kind of organization of our disparate experiences. We feel that there must be a way of harmonizing the multiplicity which modern times and scientific progress have brought upon us. My contention is that Alexander has made a notable contribution by his sympathetic understanding and ordering of all sorts of experience. He has presented us with a coherent, comprehensive and meaningful position which enables us to understand much matter of human importance which otherwise would go begging.

One of my criticisms will be to show that although Alexander has exhibited a wide range of human experience, nevertheless he has failed to make explicit certain unifying concepts which are latent in the structure of his thought. Perhaps Alexander considered them self-evident, but I do not find them so. One such unifying concept is his naturalism, and another is his principle of analogy. In the case of analogy he begins at the human level and discovers there the mind-body relationship. Using this as a metaphysical formula he extends its application to levels of existence below man as well as to God. The principle of analogy is used also in the case of value, where he begins with a discussion of human value and extends the results of his findings there to the organic and inorganic world and also in the other direction to deity. It follows, too, from his general scheme that there are levels of knowing which have their counterpart in levels of being, but this is not brought out. We also discover purpose in the case of the artist who works to embody his impulse. The results obtained here are likewise applied to the lower levels of existence where the adaptation of an organism to its environment is a forerunner of human intelligence and conscious purpose. I have tried, therefore, to make this analogical method more explicit. It is, as it were, buried within his system, and I have brought it to the surface in outlining his levels of being, his levels of knowing, and his levels of purpose.

It is in the area of biological concepts that one comes upon notions which provide a unifying thread for Alexander's whole system. De-

spite the fact that readers of Alexander have found his metaphysics and theory of value unrelated, I have tried to show that they are capable of being woven together by his concept of *nisus*.

The various impulses which give rise to science, goodness and art, the instincts which we share with animals, are united by the concept of *nisus* which is the tendency in all things to move to the next higher level of existence, which in turn serves to pull or attract the lower level of existence to it. It is the power of *nisus* which is the creative force in the universe. Materiality, secondary qualities, life, mind, the human values, and deity, are the forms which time assumes as it spins itself out under the creative propulsion of *nisus*. My purpose has been to trace the concept of *nisus* as it is revealed in Alexander's metaphysics, his religious philosophy, and his theory of value including truth, goodness and beauty, and thus to exhibit *nisus* as the unifying concept. As a result, I am able to show the unity of his thought in the areas of metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and logic. To illustrate, Alexander tells us that a work of art rests on an instinctive basis. It is the outcome of the tendency in man to construct something and assumes aesthetic properties when the constructive impulse has created something which is worth beholding for its own sake, and in so far as it is aesthetic may be detached from its practical usages. The aesthetic impulse is the humanized form of the vast cosmic creative urge of the universe which Alexander has designated as *nisus*. The power of Time to create new existents becomes in the artist the creative urge to produce a work of art. The artistic impulse is satisfied in creating a work of art, and in contemplating it the artist sees that it is good, just as God in the first chapter of Genesis created the world and then found that it was good. Neither God nor the artist knew beforehand that his creation would satisfy his creative desire. Only in contemplating his completed creation and seeing that it satisfied his creative impulse was God or the artist able to say that his work was good. It is in this way that Alexander's metaphysics and aesthetics are united by the emergent evolutionary concept of *nisus*. In passing, I should also like to point out that

aesthetic values are subject-object relationships. Since the aesthetic experience does not exist outside of the subject-object situation, I have ventured to suggest that Alexander's meaning here leads to the notion of process. In a word, the aesthetic situation is a process in which subject and object are intimately fused together.

In my treatment of value in general I have tried to show the interrelationships which exist between the various values from the lowest to the highest. Alexander's failure to co-ordinate the various types of value leads to unfortunate results when he deals with economic theory. In the region of economic values Alexander has failed to bring out the obvious implications which this value has with all other human values. An economic interpretation of history shows that goodness, beauty, truth and religion have an economic basis which is perhaps the most important single factor determining the nature of those values. Alexander's metaphysical scheme of emergent evolution should have provided the basis for a more revolutionary social outlook on his part, but unfortunately his economic views simply encourage the status quo.

Likewise in his ethical views, Alexander accepts the world as it is. He believes that the world is working out its own and our salvation, and consequently he accepts things as they are. His is not the passion of the social reformer but of the intellectual who wishes to get understanding. His emphasis on the impulse of sociality as the harmonizing factor leading to goodness, and on the fact that institutions embody the collective desires of men, tends to oversimplify what is actually an exceedingly complex situation. As in the case of economic theory, the good life is conceived in conservative terms and is not sufficiently dynamic. I have also criticized Alexander's ethical theory because he insists overmuch on the social character of the good life. I have suggested in its stead the proposition that in the end the good life is an individual achievement.

Also Alexander has made coherence the test of goodness. But I have maintained that a coherent system of morality may be evil. Consequently, by making coherence the criterion of goodness, Alex-

ander is unable to bring judgment on those systems which are coherent but immoral.

I have also taken up in some detail Alexander's naturalistic theology and have shown its relevance to his metaphysics of being as well as to his evolutionary notion of goodness. Too many people take Alexander's metaphysics seriously but are inclined to brush aside his theology. I have tried to show that his evolutionary *Weltanschauung* provides a remarkable foundation for a brilliant and convincing analysis of the place of religion in a world of science. As I see it, the conception of deity is an integral part of his philosophy of emergence. I have likewise stressed both the immanent and transcendent aspects of God. Most writers on Alexander dwell upon God's transcendence, that is, the next higher level of being toward which existents of the lower level strive. I have tried to remedy this situation by also bringing out the immanence of God or God as process, which is so all-important. Alexander's view of a pantheistic God has been neglected too often by writers who have been too largely captivated by his notion of a future, transcendent quality of deity. I have attempted to give a balanced account of deity which would do justice to both God's immanence as well as his transcendence.

Alexander, with startling simplicity, believes in the existence of God. This may come as a surprise to certain contemporary theologians who have not been too reassuring to us on this point. Not only does God exist, but He is also good and likewise on the side of our human goodness which He gathers up and conserves within Himself. Goodness is at the very center of things and therefore we and our histories are redeemable. The experience of our present generation has caused many to cast doubt on the evolutionary optimism which underlies Alexander's conception of deity. We rather suspect that evil is at the very heart of things and that we are all going to the devil at a great rate. And yet, when we utter such blasphemy are we not turning our backs on those most fundamental theological presuppositions, that God is good, that He is love, and

that He has a plan of salvation in which we are included? Is not Alexander's conception of God more in accord with traditional usage and also in tune with our innate feeling for God? We certainly do not picture Him as a bogey man plotting our destruction, and yet if we allow evil to dominate our thinking will we not end up by selling our souls to the devil? We shall have more to say on this point in the Chapter on Theology.

I should like to mention the work of two predecessors who have written theses on Alexander. Dr. J. R. Cresswell in 1926 wrote a thesis entitled, "The Position of Value in the Philosophical System of S. Alexander." Dr. Cresswell is very critical of Alexander, rejecting his theology, his theory of value and his metaphysics. Dr. Cresswell seems to have followed the trend at Cornell at that time which was to write dissertations on philosophers with whom the Department had little agreement, notably Dewey as well as Alexander. In his Introduction Dr. Cresswell states that "the main criticism will be from the standpoint indicated above, that there is a universe of reality independent of our knowing it, which, however, expresses its tendency towards wholeness most adequately in the region of consciousness."¹ The latter part of this statement becomes an idealistic critique in the spirit of Bosanquet who wrote: "The truth is the whole. Only the whole is self-existent and this whole has the character of mind."² With such a criterion it is apparent that the writer could find little good in Alexander.

Dr. Milton R. Konvitz published in 1946 his book entitled, *On the Nature of Value: the Philosophy of Samuel Alexander*. Dr. Konvitz has written a more sympathetic work. Although his interest is not metaphysical, yet because of a misinterpretation of Alexander's metaphysics he misses the point of Alexander's discussion of value. This is particularly evident in his treatment of truth where he thinks Alexander would have better defined truth as a correspondence of

1. Cresswell, J. R. *The Position of Value in the Philosophical System of S. Alexander* (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Univ., 1936), Preface, p. viii.

2. Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," p. 4.

coherences. Of course such a dichotomy as this suggests would be abhorrent to Alexander's metaphysics where he maintains the unity of mind and its neural basis. Alexander rejects the notion of a world which is split into a mental realm and a physical realm and brought together by mere correlation. Furthermore, Konvitz does not like the notion of natural selection as the means of explaining how the highest human values are arrived at. But I accept this description as a satisfactory account of how such values are attained. Nor can Dr. Konvitz stomach the realism of Alexander's aesthetics. In fact he frankly states that he is employing Alexander's inadequate theory of value as the starting point for a more adequate theory which he proceeds to outline. Hence, Konvitz entitles his thesis, *On the Nature of Value*.

The presentation which follows is intended to provide a treatment of Alexander's position more sympathetic than that found in the works of my predecessors.

I

Some Basic Notions

THE TWO PHILOSOPHERS to whom Alexander is most largely indebted are Aristotle and Spinoza. With them, Alexander insists that the world exhibits an intelligible structure which we are capable of reading. Like them, Alexander declares that there is a place for human values and God in a world which also has its mechanical side. "The physical aspect of things is pervasive or on one side they are all natural or even in that much misunderstood expression mechanical."¹ In our day, a healthy philosophy must make room for religion and morality as well as the discoveries of the scientific enterprise. Alexander's thinking represents a reaction against that phase of nineteenth-century science which declared religion to be outmoded and of no interest to a scientific age. While Alexander maintains that religion and human value should have a place in any adequate philosophy, yet he maintains that they can be brought within a naturalistic framework. He refuses to divide his world into a realm of essences which are real and a world of facts and existences which are of a lesser order of reality. He refuses to accept the belief that nature should be subordinated to our precious human values. Alexander

1. Alexander, "Lessons from Spinoza," *Chronicum Spinozanum*, Tomus Quintus, p. 14.

declares in his *Lessons from Spinoza*, "Spinoza is a living example to show how needless is the fear that a physical world has no place for religion or beauty."² Alexander asserts further on in the same essay that "religion and value are not degraded by their intimate relation with the modes of extension, but exalted."³

God, poetry, science and beauty are all found in nature and they are no less sacred because they stem out of nature and are natural phenomena. Professor Randall has written to the same effect:

All experienced facts are experienced facts, and all have their implications as to the nature of reality; but ghosts, growing pains, gorillas, gravitation, and God are obviously entangled in different ways in the complex structures of nature. Naturalism insists that they are all entangled; it also insists that intelligence must discover how. As against views that would disregard either gravitation or God, it maintains that both must be somehow fitted into Nature that experience reveals.⁴

There is no warrant for the assumption that even if all experience implies a mind that the *sensum* owes its being to the mind factor. Our human minds are the most gifted members of a democracy of things. Our minds exhibit more perfection of development than other finites but have no greater claim to reality.

Physical things are as real as mind but not as perfect. We may illustrate from the similar distinction in morals between goodness and perfection. The good Greek was no less good than the good Christian; but if progress has any meaning, or time has any driving power, the Christian is the more perfect man, richer and fuller and more comprehensive in sentiment and conduct.⁵

This method of treating all forms of existence equally and not giving undue prominence to any one factor, Alexander calls realism. It is the democratic spirit in metaphysics. All existences are on the same footing as far as being or reality goes.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

4. J. H. Randall, Jr. "Dualism in Metaphysics," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York: Henry Holt & Co.), p. 311.

5. S. Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, VI (January 28, 1914), 27.

Realism strips mind of its pretensions but not of its value or greatness. On the contrary, in leaving to other things their rights mind comes into its own. It is as in a democracy where all men are equal, but where to speak theoretically and disregard the limitations of custom or tradition or poverty, each man is free to rise to the height of his native powers, equality in principle leading to difference in eminence. Realism is the democratic spirit in metaphysics, and if it dethrones the mind, it recognizes mind as chief in the world it knows.⁶

Alexander's is an ontological approach which "examines in their order the various categorical features of existence and exhibits the relation of mind to its objects in its proper place in the system of finite empirical existence."⁷

Mind and human values are late arrivals in the cosmic spectacle but must be viewed with the same impartiality with which we examine the lower levels of existence. It is a mistake to view mind and human values as ultimate for they are not the highest aim of nature. There are higher achievements yet to come. Alexander's basic presupposition is that Time goes on spinning out higher levels of existence and it is human vanity which attempts to stop the evolutionary process with us, making man the cynosure of creation.

Alexander attempts to clarify his position by contrasting the Ptolemaic world view with the Copernican view of the universe. The Ptolemaic world had the earth as the center of the planetary system in which man and his values were supreme. We may talk of the overthrow of the geocentric view but in metaphysics it is still omnipotent. The human mind has been the center of the universe for nearly all modern metaphysics. Witness the absorption of metaphysicians with the epistemological problem. In some philosophies an external world depends on mind for its existence. In the philosophy of Kant, mind was thought of as supplying the unity and order of the world of knowable things. For his predecessors things had been the center and mind the satellite, but he changed it so that mind became the center

6. Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

7. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, I, p. 10.

and things were dependent. "This was the famous doctrine that all knowledge and all empirical reality depended on the unity of self-consciousness and on certain principles or forms of sense or understanding which were characteristic of it, by which it sustained and co-ordinated the sense materials supplied to the mind."⁸ Kant tightened the grip of the Ptolemaic habit. Still another philosophy maintains that ultimately things are spiritual in character. Mind, in any of these views, usurps far too privileged a position for itself and distorts the actual place of mind in the total world picture.

Alexander adopts the heliocentric view which relegates our earth to the place of one planet in a democracy of planets revolving round the sun and our universe as one among a myriad of universes.

As the privileged earth became, upon the new theory of the heavens, but one of the heavenly bodies amongst others, so in the Copernican metaphysics the mind is but one thing or class of things amongst others, physical bodies being a co-ordinate group, or rather, to speak more accurately, mind is a distinctive property of a certain group of things which are themselves physical.⁹

He accepts the Copernican revolution as it was applied to man, his mind and his values by Charles Darwin. Values are no longer considered legislative but grow out of lower forms of life and in their turn contribute to higher forms of existence. What can we say on this view of the universe as a whole?

It is a universe of which minds are but special parts, privileged ones, but in no way rightfully claiming pre-eminence so that they should control or be arbiters of the rest; and there is nothing which precludes the existence of higher existences than mind. Physical bodies, living bodies, thinking bodies—these constitute the things we know in the universe; and there may be others. Seeing that mind is but one set of things amongst others, it is clearly illegitimate to describe the universe as a mind or a living being.¹⁰

8. Alexander, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe," *Hibbert Journal*, 8 (Oct., 1909), p. 48.

9. *Op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

It follows that Alexander rejects that type of idealistic philosophy which construes mind and its values as the most real features of the world.

The merit of any philosophical system depends on how adequately it organizes the data with which it is confronted. Every element encountered in the world must be properly ordered. Our explanatory principle must not be reduced to one, exclusive principle by which the whole of experience is explained, or rather, explained away. For example, as we have just noted, we must guard ourselves against stating that the world is solely dependent on our minds. This is to commit the 'nothing but' fallacy. We must remember that we live in a pluralistic universe consisting of the richest varieties of experience.

The world does not depend on my idea, for without me it would go on in its vast and complex pattern. There is a world independent of my knowing it, although my mind is necessary if I would become aware of the intricate mechanism of the universe. Alexander declares, "Now the object is clearly dependent on my mind for being known. But it is, as the mind itself declares in the experience, not dependent upon the mind for the qualities which make it what it is. The mind is indispensable to blue in so far as it is sensed, but not for its blueness." ¹¹

Alexander attempts to place mind in its proper perspective in nature. He does not elevate it to supreme eminence but regards it as a finite having certain determinate characteristics in a democracy of finites all of which have theirs. If any factor deserves prominence, that factor is Time, and mind as we shall see is but one of its offspring. Alexander has specifically avoided the pitfall of exaggeration. His purpose is to understand the world and he assures us that correct understanding does not lead us to destruction. To see our precious human values in their proper relations to other things is to become conscious of the immense richness of the world and to bow before its strangeness and mystery with true humility. To see ourselves projected on the screen

11. "The Basis of Realism," p. 24.

of the universe does not make us less important but enables us to rejoice in the distance we have traversed. That man should have come from an amoeba does not make him or his values less impressive but rather deepens the mystery of the values with which he has surrounded himself. Because the evidence from evolution forces us to re-think our position in the world, this should not lead us to despair or should not cause us to say that we have no value because our exclusive monopoly has been broken. From time immemorial the world has been valuable to whomever has been able to make it so. Human values may be explained in terms of atoms and electrons but they are not, for that reason, simply movements of atoms and electrons. Men have always acted on the assumption that there is more to human values and personality than just that.

All experience is the territory of philosophy. To leave out any aspect of experience is to become bigoted and unscientific. True philosophy must be sympathetic to the demands of mathematics, of physics, of ethics, art and religion. To leave out any of these activities is to fall short of true philosophy. They must not remain unattached. A true philosophy is like a tree which supports every conceivable brand of human interest. Alexander is not a reductionist who reduces all of reality to physics and chemistry. To understand him in this way is to misconstrue his position woefully. He sees the world from the standpoint of the scientist but also includes within its structure the interests of the artist and the theologian.

Likewise, human value has just as significant a status as any other factor in the ontological scheme. But human value is not a clue to reality for values are found on other levels of existence. In the section on value I shall show how the notion of value extends to lower levels of existence. Value is not an exclusive possession of human beings. We do not spell human value with a capital V and confer our Value on the universe and subordinate the universe to our limited interests. Value simply stated, is the relation between two things whereby they matter to each other. In this way, food is a value to an animal or a man. Similarly shelter and clothing are values. They satisfy needs. Because

aesthetic values, for instance, are marked by certain distinguishing characteristics, this should not blind us to the fact that like food, clothing and shelter, they satisfy human needs and are in that sense relative to men. The need for food is a stronger drive than the impulse for pictures or poetry, but in the food situation or in the aesthetic situation, certain common factors appear. They are: 1) the appreciator, 2) the object, 3) the satisfaction of an impulse by the active appropriation of the object by the subject.

For the moment let us take cognizance of Alexander's analogical method, for it is basic to his entire procedure. Beginning with the mind-body relationship as it is revealed in man he transfers it to the other levels. The mind-body dualism is a metaphysical formula which has a wide range of application to levels below and above man. The instant is the mind of its point. Time is the mind of Space. Materiality is the mind of matter. A secondary quality is the mind of certain primary motions. Life is the mind of an organic being. Thus every finite is construed on the basis of this metaphysical formula which we observe in ourselves.

History demands of us that in using our experience of ourselves to help us in interpreting the world we should not take ourselves for more than we are. . . . But history demands also that we should not take ourselves for less than we are. Of all things in the world ourselves are nearest to us, and if we take due care the easiest to understand; for we sit in the 'centre.' The central experience we have may enlighten us about the peripheral experience of what is not ourselves.¹²

God is described also after the mind-body formula. The world is God's body and the new levels toward which the world as a whole is striving are his deity. This universal dualism establishes a kinship between mind and the physical world, for Alexander maintains that mind is a form of Time. Time is the mind of the world. "If it be true that Time is the mind of Space, or rather if Space and every part of it has something standing to it in the relation of mind to body and that something

12. Alexander, "The Historicity of Things," *Philosophy and History, Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 22.

is Time, then for us as for certain Greek philosophers, soul is the source of movement.”¹³

We begin with ourselves and find there the mind-body relationship and then transfer our formula to more obscure conditions. The world exhibits a certain harmony and unity throughout its entire structure. When we say that Time is the mind of Space, or that secondary qualities are the mind of extension, we do not mean a human mind. In fact, such a deliverance would not constitute an analogy at all. What we mean is that a secondary quality performs the office of mind to extension. The mind of extension constitutes a different quality than our human mind. Similarly, when we say that mind is a form of Time, we mean that mind is one of the evolutionary products of Time, but we are not identifying mind and Time.

The intimate connection between a quality and its mechanical basis is seen in this statement: “There neither is Space without Time nor Time without Space; any more than life exists without a body or a body which can function as a living body exists without life; that Space is in its very nature temporal and Time spatial.”¹⁴ It is because of this basic presupposition that Alexander cannot accept the doctrine of immortality, which in one form has claimed that the spirit continues to exist though the body dies. Alexander grants that his naturalistic conception of deity is derived from this metaphysical formula. “What we know about it is but its relation to the other empirical qualities which precede it in time. Its nature we cannot penetrate. We can represent it to ourselves only by analogy.”¹⁵ Alexander’s method is to take the mind-body relationship as it is discovered in us as human beings and then to use this mind-body formula as an hypothesis showing that the other higher and lower levels of existence are also bi-polar. It must be borne in mind that this metaphysical formula is an hypothesis which is kept or discarded on the basis of its ability to verify the facts which greet us.

13. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 48.

14. *Space, Time, and Deity*, I, p. 44.

15. *Ibid.*, II, p. 347.

Similarly Alexander takes value on the human level, the tertiary qualities, and extends the notion of values to levels below and above man. We begin with value at the human level and descending to the lower levels omit certain complex factors pertinent to the human situation. It is as Alexander states, a rigid and good use of the principle of analogy. I shall show his use of analogy in connection with value in a later section dealing specifically with that topic.

The concept of purpose or natural teleology similarly starts with man. Alexander says that the ways of the universe may be past finding out but the ways of art need not be. It is a good rule to begin with that which we know best before indulging in conjecture.¹⁶ The work of the artist is not foreseen but he is driven on by his impulse and excitement and in the completed work of art realizes his end. Alexander shows how the concept of purpose found at the human level may be transferred.

Now the use of analogy lies in its relevance; it misleads if it is not adapted to the new situation in which it is employed. It was from such neglect that, to take an illustration from psychology or biology, instinct was so long misunderstood as proceeding from explicit purpose. Closer inspection, freed from anthropomorphic or pathetic fallacy, showed that below the level of strict purpose there was something which simulates purpose, or of which purpose is an explicit form, which is nothing more than the pre-arrangement by which one step in a complex of movements prepares, and flows continuously into, the next.¹⁷

Impulse, the satisfaction of which leads to the highest human values of science, goodness, and art, is also transferred by analogy to the other levels. That which something desires is its good. The filings desire the magnet, the animal desires its prey, and the tendency of all things to break their bonds and blossom into new entities is the *nisus* of the universe for the next higher level of existence. Our desire for something higher is a presage of divinity.

Likewise one could point out that the human level includes organic

16. Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, London: MacMillan, 1939, p. 258.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69.

processes, response to sensation, and reflective thought. The lower processes support the higher and the lower processes of the human soul may be seen to be characteristic souls of lower levels of being.

The biological basis of Alexander's thought comes to the fore in his description of knowing. Since mind grows out of a lower level of existence, we may be sure that knowing comes about as a result of our practical response to our environment. We become aware of things as we respond to them. We exist because the apprehension of external things and one another have enabled us to persist. Our conscious adaptation is but a more highly developed form of the kind of adaptation which we observe among the lower forms of existence.

Epistemology, therefore, becomes an incidental chapter in metaphysics. Alexander declares that experience assures us of the existence of a mind, an object, and a relation of compresence between them. It is a philosophic intuition, but not in the bad sense of that word as due to some unexplained faculty within us. It is a fact which cannot be proved by argument. Like the use of a microscope, it puts us in a better position for seeing. We judge the success of our intuition by how well it integrates all relevant data.¹⁸

The knowing situation is not unique. It is similar to the union of mind and body in the human personality, a relationship we have already explored. We shall also find other situations like it when we come to morality and aesthetics. "As in aesthetics, in knowing, too, we have a blending of two reals, one physical and the other mental in which mind and body join just as mind and body are synthesized in the human person becoming something real and complete."¹⁹ The relation of mind to its objects in the knowing situation is simply seen in the functioning of any two things in the world whereby each satisfies the want of the other. The peculiar fact in the knowing situation is that one of the terms is a conscious mind. For an angel minds and physical things would be open to contemplation. Both would be seen as examples of universal compresence. From all this, it fol-

18. "The Basis of Realism," pp. 7-8.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

lows that things need mind for their percipi but not for their esse.

Alexander's method is scientific. He makes an hypothesis, like that of the metaphysical formula created out of the mind-body relationship, and then transfers it to other areas and tests it by its success in explaining facts encountered there. Another fundamental hypothesis is that of Space-Time. "The hypothesis is that the simplest being is Space-Time itself, and that material things are but modes of this one simple being, finite complexes of Space-Time or motion, dowered with qualities which are familiar to us in sensible experience. That hypothesis must justify itself in the sequel by its metaphysical success." ²⁰

His cosmology is characterized by the fact that it is an ontology as well as an evolutionary development from lower to higher levels of being. We may perceive distinct layers of existence graded according to degrees of perfection. By looking at the world we discern these levels exhibiting characteristic qualities. We note the quality of matter, of color, of life, and of mind, graded in a hierarchy of increasing complexity. Each quality carries as its structure a mechanical basis, a characteristic configuration of Space-Time. We see these finites as physical matter, plants, animals, and rational beings, which consist of qualities and with a Space-Time configuration.

Taking the doctrine of evolution seriously we may understand the process by which the more highly developed forms of life have grown out of the lower. From Space-Time, all of the rich variety of the world as we know it has developed. Although the world has emerged out of Space-Time, nevertheless that basic stuff of the world has not been discarded in the process but remains the mechanical basis of each new finite to emerge. The world as it grows in time is an adumbration of the potentialities inherent in Space-Time. Alexander declares:

Space-Time then is in Kantian language an infinite given whole, that is to say, it is experienced as such, where the term experience includes thought as well as sensible experience. Its elements are represented conceptually as point-instants or bare events; and we have added the hypothe-

20. *Space, Time, and Deity*, I, p. 172.

sis that other empirical things or existents are groupings of such events, whirlpools within that ocean, or they are crystals in that matrix. Only whereas a crystal may be separated from its matrix, existents never can; they remain swimming in the medium of Space-Time. . . . They are complexes of motion differentiated within the one all-containing and all-encompassing system of motion.²¹

As we have stated the perceived levels which confront us as we look out on the world, are linked together by an evolutionary process which connects the lower finites with the higher ones in a continuous process. The higher levels need the lower to exist and in turn conserve them as part of their greater complexity. Prof. Montague aptly characterized Alexander's plan as the temporally continuous development of qualitatively discontinuous levels of being. Alexander has made the same distinction in a footnote telling us that "the qualities as such form a discontinuous series, but they are connected spatio-temporally."²² In a word, we discern the levels of being and see how they are connected by a process of emergence.

/Qualities, therefore, are always correlated with some Space-Time configuration. Alexander sees things under a double aspect, that of extension and that of quality. There is a structure which may be analyzed in physical, chemical and mathematical terms but in addition, each finite has a quality, such as materiality, life, mind, or deity which is unpredictable. A tone may be explained in terms of the number of vibrations that a string makes per second but its qualitative counterpart which we hear is a certain pitch. We may explain a finite in mechanical terms, but for complete understanding and appreciation we must be aware of its qualitative aspect. Finites are not simply Space-Time but they also have a qualitative character. God's body is Space-Time and all its ramifications but his deity is his qualitative aspect.

The following diagram will serve to show Alexander's universe of levels. Besides levels of being, there are also levels of value, levels of

21. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

22. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 49.

knowing, and levels of purpose. In the levels of being we have sought to exemplify the two aspects of each finite existence—its structure which is expressible in physico-chemical terms and its quality. Space-Time breaking up into various complexes of motion produces the various finites. It is Time or *nisus* which is the creative force in the world leading to the next higher level of being. The *nisus* of the world in the region of value is the need of one thing for another which leads to the creation of value from the inorganic world through man up to God. Just as there are characteristic levels of being so also there are characteristic levels of value connected and driven upward by *nisus*. *Nisus* drives each level of being upward into the next higher level of being. Among the levels of value, *nisus* at the elementary level is the desire of one thing for another; in the plant and animal world *nisus* assumes the form of instinctive drives; at the human level it is seen in the various impulses as, for example, the acquisitive impulse which produces economic values, the impulses directed toward the maintenance of life, and the impulses which form the foundation for beauty, goodness and truth. *Nisus* assumes various forms in the upward ascent of values and is derived from the *nisus* which generates the ascending levels of being. The levels of knowing and the levels of purpose spring out of biological foundations and become more complex activities as they rise in the structure of being. They grow out of response to the environment and consist of adjustments to that environment which have their origination in a trial and error process by which means are found to achieve certain ends. Theoretical knowing has its foundations in practical response when knowledge is released from its immediate, practical concerns.

Each lower level is conserved in the next higher one and the higher levels need the lower levels to exist. All things are conserved in God. Each level is connected and shares the characteristics of each lower level. Man shares the characteristics of an animal, a plant, and matter. Man also has the quality of life as well as the quality of mind. The emergent includes both the body and the quality. Body would not exist without the quality, nor quality without the body. We stressed

LEVELS OF BEING		LEVELS OF VALUE	LEVELS OF KNOWING	LEVELS OF PURPOSE
Structure	Quality			
Whole world is God's body	GOD	<i>Values of God</i> Nisus—Urge of universe toward deity		
Body	MAN	<i>Human Values</i> 1) Impulse which gives birth to art, truth & goodness 2) Acquisitive impulse leads to economic values 3) Human psychological values 4) Instinctive values <i>Animal & Plant Values</i>	Practical knowing become contemplative	Intelligent functioning Means—Ends
	ANIMALS & PLANTS			
Organism (Physico-chemical process)	Life	Instinct	Stimulus-response	Adaptation to Environment
	MATERIALITY			
Matter	Secondary qualities	<i>Physico-chemical Values</i> Need of one thing for another	Need of one thing for another	Adaptation to Environment
	SPACE-TIME (motion)	<i>Atomic Values</i>		
Space	Time	Need of one thing for another	Need of one thing for another	Adaptation to Environment
Nisus is the Time element in the levels of being and is the driving force which animates the whole.		Nisus is the impulse in the levels of value which leads to characteristic values for each level and unifies them.		

Lower levels are conserved in the higher. Higher levels need lower levels in order to exist. All things are conserved in God. Space-Time is the unifying mechanical basis of all finites.

this intimate union when we discussed the mind-body relationship.

A corollary to this is that a finite can be expressed without residue in mechanical terms. "Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stages; mind in terms of living process, life in terms of physico-chemical process, sense quality like colour in terms of matter with its movements, matter itself in terms of motion."²³ In fact we could predict the mechanical basis of the next higher configuration if we could know all the facts but we could never forecast its quality. Prof. Montague parts company with Alexander because the latter accepts with natural piety the novel qualities which the universe exhibits. The novel qualities which the universe displays should also be subject to scientific investigation, according to Prof. Montague. We should not hand over the scientific enterprise to the agnostics and obscurantists at this point.²⁴

Alexander professes his inability to penetrate the aura of mystery which surrounds the emergence of a new quality such as life, mind or deity. He writes,

Several persons have found fault with me because I do not explain why in the development of Space-Time as I represent it, colours and life, etc., should emerge. Well, that is not my business and further I don't see how it can be anybody's business, except to note the facts and be grateful for them, or at least to put up with them. Many are quite content to say it is God's doing. I should not use their language, because I consider it unscientific, but I agree with the spirit of it.²⁵

In another context Alexander confesses ignorance as to how novelties emerge.

If it is asked by what steps it is that mere motion under the guiding hand of Time leads to the emergence of material complexes of motion which we find in the world of things . . . I can only reply that I do not know, and that it is not for the metaphysician to say, in the absence of indica-

23. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 67.

24. Montague, W. P., "A Materialistic Theory of Emergent Evolution," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, pp. 263-64.

25. Alexander, "Some Explanations," *Mind*, N.S., 30, p. 410.

tions from the physicist himself. The existence of emergent qualities is something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the "natural piety" of the investigator. It admits no explanation.²⁶

As we observed previously the mind-body relationship at the human level is exemplified throughout the universe. Time performs the office of mind to Space, life to materiality, mind to man.

The world as a whole and each of its parts is built on the model with which we are familiar in ourselves as persons, that is as union of mind and body . . . but as this may lead to the misapprehension that we are the standard and exemplar of things, the statement is better made in the reverse and truer form that we are examples of a pattern which is universal and is followed not only by things but by Space-Time itself.²⁷

We may add a word as to the difference here between explanation and understanding. Every level has a mechanical basis and a satisfactory scientific explanation will give us a true account of the mechanism involved. However, if we wish to gain understanding we must think not only of the mechanical basis but also of its quality. It is in terms of the next lower level from which the emergent quality originates, that one's explanation is made. In correcting certain misapprehensions which arose from his discussion of the emergent quality mind and its neural basis, Alexander writes:

I admit, of course, that the correct physiological description would serve in place of the enjoyment, just as the frequency of vibration serves in place of the pitch of a tone. But the quality, if it is rightly attributed, is there; why then omit it in metaphysics, which is not a special science, or in psychology, which deals with this specific form of existence? ²⁸

Spinoza sees the world under the attributes of extension and mind. Alexander modifies this analysis by seeing things under the attributes of extension and Time. In the Alexandrian formulation everything is subordinate to Time, including mind and God. In fact mind and God

26. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, pp. 55 and 46-47.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

28. *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 55-56.

are outcomes of the creative process of Time. There is an element of Time in all things. It is the indispensable factor which produces movement.

I trust that this presentation has brought out the realism or naturalism which pervades the philosophy of Alexander. In later chapters I shall show that the naturalism observed in his metaphysical analysis of mind and value is also basic to his treatment of truth, goodness, and beauty, as well as in the case of other forms of value below the tertiary qualities.

2

Art, Beauty, and Aesthetics

ART SATISFIES a human impulse. It satisfies the constructive instinct to make something when that instinct becomes first of all human and secondly contemplative. Thus, it may be seen that the constructive impulse is related to man's animal instincts which he shares with the lower animals. Since we occupy a higher rung on the evolutionary ladder than the other animals, and since human art has distinctive features which we can describe, Alexander has suggested that the constructive tendency in man be termed impulse rather than instinct. This also helps to grade the creative powers of the different levels. Impulse is a new capacity in man, related to the lower level of instinct and growing out of it, but also enjoying distinctive powers of its own. Similarly the human impulse of constructiveness is part of the *nisus* of the universe in its tendency toward deity. This constructive impulse of art is the *nisus*, or creative urge, of the universe as it is seen in humanized form. In this book I shall use the word impulse for the human drive which though growing out of animal constructiveness gives rise to distinctly human creations which we call aesthetic. Alexander has not been too careful in the use of his terminology here and thus has not made it clear that *nisus*, too, shares in his doctrine of a graded system of vitalities.

Mrs. LeBoutillier substantiates the claim I am making that *nisus* and the constructive impulse in man are related. She writes: "The *nisus* is in a sense the expression or summation of all the creativity of nature, not the cosmic creativity alone, but man's own achievement and the activities of all living things. . . . All man's ramified activity is part of the *nisus* which ceaselessly creates new and more valuable forms and structures."¹ In *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, Alexander definitely relates our impulse toward beauty with the constructive instinct among animals. Just as we have seen that there is a scale of knowing in the universe, so also there is a scale of urges in the universe which may be correlated with the various levels of being.

More exactly, *nisus* is the desire in the universe to attain deity. From the human viewpoint we note a desire of things for one another in the inorganic sphere. At the level of animals we observe the instinct for maintenance of the type, and the employment of the constructive instinct in the service of self-preservation and propagation. At the human level we see the impulse for goodness, truth, and beauty. In addition we feel ourselves drawn toward the next higher level of existence. The special impulse which gives birth to deity we identify as *nisus*. Everything has a *nisus* toward deity so that deity for each level is a variable quality. I have sought to scale these inorganic, animal and human drives in a continuous series, correlating them with their characteristic levels of being. Beauty, for example, is an emergent at the human level. I feel that Alexander might have made more explicit the interconnection of the different drives which we may observe operating at various grades of being.

My special concern in this section is to show that art grows out of animal instinct but surpasses it and becomes overlaid with special human characteristics, so that the external work of art is a distinctly human production and that the instinct from which it is derived is

1. LeBoutillier, Cornelia, *Religious Values in the Philosophy of Emergent Evolution* (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1936), p. 42.

so transformed as to merit the term impulse. Both Spencer and Burke were on the right track when they saw that art was rooted in instinct. Progress in aesthetics required that their initial insight be followed up, but Hume's analysis sought for the nature of the beauty in the characters of the beautiful object rather than in the human impulse which beauty satisfies. Kant also neglected to trace art to its instinctive source, although he suggests what the function of mind should be in the process of appreciation. Kant declared that "a beautiful object at once stimulates our understanding of it and sets going our imagination in harmony with our understanding; or as we might say in less technical phrase—supplements our perception of the object with characters woven into its texture by the plastic imagination."²

Although Spencer and Burke had picked up the scent, yet Spencer was content to say that art is derived from the play impulse but neglected to answer the philosophic question as to what beauty is. Burke limited himself in concentrating his attention on an analysis of natural beauty and the feelings it arouses in the spectator, and overlooked the insights which come from approaching a work of art from the standpoint of the impulses of the creator. Alexander suggests that instead we should start with a human work of art and indicate its root in the impulses of the creative artist. Here again may be seen Alexander's penchant for understanding the simple in terms of the complex. The wisdom of his procedure is patent, for if we correctly describe all of the factors in the complex and then delete those factors which do not pertain to the simpler instance, we shall not miss the mark by overlooking some element of paramount importance in the simpler situation.

The questions which Alexander answers in this part of his aesthetics are: 1) What is the human impulse which beauty satisfies? His answer is that the human impulse which we identify in beauty is the constructive impulse. 2) What is beauty? His answer here is that beauty is the constructive impulse at the human level become contemplative.

2. Alexander, "Art and Nature," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* (Manchester, Eng.: July, 1927), pp. 264-65.

The thesis which I submit to you is that the aesthetic impulse and the aesthetic emotion which goes with that impulse and is part and parcel of it are an outgrowth from the instinct of constructiveness, and are that impulse or instinct when it has become first human, and next, contemplative. Accordingly I should describe or define the beautiful as that which satisfies the constructive instinct when it has reached the stage of contemplation.³

First of all we study the constructive impulse as it appears among animals. The constructive instinct of the beaver is expressed in its dam-building. That of bees comes to light in the making of a hive. The constructive instinct in these cases is in the service of the instinct of self-preservation of which it is a derivative. The song of the nightingale is for the purpose of mating, but the constructive instinct diverts it into a song. Birds build their nests in order to insure the on-going of life and the constructive instinct flows into the act of building a nest. The conclusion is that the constructive instincts are employed in the service of simpler and more fundamental instincts such as those of sex, family and the preservation of life.

When a beaver finishes his dam, or the bird her nest, that is the end of the matter. They do not sit around and wonder at the marvelous aesthetic effect of their constructive skill. They simply use their respective products to satisfy practical aims. If the beaver should gaze upon his finished dam for its own sake we would be right in calling him an architect. If the nightingale could sing for the sheer joy of singing and delight in his tonal combinations for their own sake we might aptly describe him as a musician. This would then be a case of the constructive impulse become contemplative.

Between the productiveness of animals and artistic production lies the intermediate stage of human craftsmanship. While animals are driven to build by instinct, human beings build with a purpose and can modify their plans so that their contrivances will function more efficiently. The act of animal construction follows an unreflective pattern, whereas human craftsmanship enables one to vary both the

3. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 236-37.

means and the ends involved. A man has ideas and can refer to the past as well as look to the future. He can deliberate and can plan the steps he must take in order to obtain the ends in view. Animals share the impulse of constructiveness with us, but while their building is instinctive, our building involves reflective purpose.

Architecture shows most clearly the line of division between craftsmanship and art. The architect must be on the look-out for the utility of his design. However, the point to be made is that the artistic impulse of the architect is gratified, not by the usefulness of his building, but by its beauty which he contemplates for its own sake. Human constructiveness attains the stature of art when it ceases to be purely practical, and becomes something to be enjoyed for itself.

Physical things act physically on our sense organs and draw from us and from our brains a physical response. A red color sensitizes our retina and in turning our eyes to it, we become aware of it as a red patch. It is in reacting appropriately to the object before us that we see it. Similarly, with danger; we react to an object by running away and in so doing realize that it is dangerous. We know in doing and perceive in acting. From this elementary, practical knowledge of things we rise to the level of the theoretical. In the most common example, we substitute speech for action. Our normal response is diverted into the channel of speech. Instead of striking our enemy, we say, "I hate you." In so doing we have arrived at theoretical or speculative knowledge. The practical response may assume other forms than speech. An object may suggest ideas to which I am diverted. Before striking my enemy, I may recall that he is a good man, or stronger than I. In every case the normal response to an object finds another channel of expression and is diverted from practice. The difference between a constructive act and a practical one is this: whereas in a practical act the response is directed upon the object toward which we respond, in a constructive act the response is turned into something else. In the practical response of striking a person, I hit him, but by cursing him my response creates a new object—the words of the curse.

An animal, too, finds its constructive impulse diverted from practice. The instinct of the nightingale is aimed at mating, but the response is diverted from mating into a song. Both the beaver and the bee make something and do not simply respond. The end for which the beaver works is to make his home; the bee wishes to store its honey and therefore takes the intermediate step of making a hive. Similarly, the technician goes through the intermediate stage of constructing a machine. His impulse is diverted from a simple practical response to the intricacies of inventing and constructing an elaborate mechanism. One perceives the shade of Freud in this analysis of instinctive response being diverted into other channels.

When an animal has completed its construction and begins to use it, that ends the matter as far as its interest is concerned. The same may be said of the craftsman. Despite the added human characteristics of reflection and purpose, the human interest which the technician shows is identical with that which the animal evinces in his construction. The practical end is all that matters and the machine is observed for the sake of seeing that it functions properly. Such a man can only become an artist if he should observe the machine as an object of beauty without reference to the useful end it serves. It would then be contemplated for what it is worth in itself, lifted, as it were, out of the bondage of practice.

In a previous paragraph we observed that such a response as striking a man may be diverted into another channel, that of uttering a curse. Such an imprecation may take on the quality of a work of art when it is couched in the indignant language of a creative poet. The grandiose nature of the verbal expression may be so striking as to command our whole attention so that the original act of striking which initiated the curse may be forgotten entirely. We may be stirred so deeply by the words that we pass from practice into absorption in the newly created aesthetic object. Speech is a clear example of how we rise from simply acting to contemplation. Of course, much speech is practical in intent. We may say, "I am cold." That is a signal for someone to

turn on the heat. This is not aesthetic statement for we do not use the words lovingly and for the magic they evoke. A poet, on the other hand, may turn the situation into an aesthetic one by saying, "*Dissolve frigus, ligna super foco large reponens.*"⁴ The importance of this phrase is not to get the logs on the fire, but lies in the magic which the words may evoke. They are detached from the practical situation and become a new response—the aesthetic object. Incidentally, the aesthetic object is the last one in the series. In the first instance, the normal response was diverted into the practical words, "Put the logs on the fire." But when these words instead of having a practical bearing on the matter at hand become the aesthetic response, that is the final response and we cannot divert this response into another channel. "The words are used for their own sakes and not as external objects to be examined, but as the means by which the constructive passion is assuaged."⁵

In his discussion of material passions and formal passions, Alexander again demonstrates how practical speech is given the added lustre of poetic usage. He brings out the distinction by producing two examples. The familiar words from the Book of Ruth could be laconically summed up as showing the love of a foreign daughter for her mother-in-law. This is the material passion. But the formal passion which we may read in the Bible is a poetic flowering of the same sentiment far beyond the needs of practical statement, into a haunting and unforgettable setting in rhythmic speech. One may reproduce the sentiment of undying love by stating the material passion thus: "I love you, and always shall." But the formal passion as rendered by Robert Burns in poetic language says the same thing with deep and abiding impression.

As fair art thou, my bonnie lass,
So deep in love am I;
And I will love thee still, my dear,
Till a' the seas gang dry.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

To summarize, beauty as defined by Alexander is the constructive impulse become contemplative or disinterested. The essence of beauty is not its practical implications but the formal quality which catches and holds our imaginations. Beauty comes from the contemplation of formal relations inherent in a work of art rather than what they would be in real life. Art grows out of craft and surpasses it, when art not only serves a practical end but becomes contemplative and finds in the materials something valuable in itself. The artist uses the materials not practically, as does the craftsman, but contemplatively or, as Alexander says, "for their own sake."

Note also that the finished work of art assuages the impulse of the creator and he works until the passion which drove him to creation is satisfied in the form, if we bear in mind that by form Alexander means material formed and not mere abstract formal relationships. Konvitz, although showing insight into Alexander's aesthetic theory, fails to understand the meaning which he attaches to formal relationships and so berates our author for squeezing the life out of art and reducing it to mere formalism. I shall now go on to show that Alexander is not guilty of the formalist heresy.

Mr. R. G. Collingwood has said that a painter may be interested in the femininity of a woman or in her volumes.⁶ If his interest in the former becomes intense, he becomes interested in her as a practical object of affection or as the subject of an illustration, but not as the subject of a fine painting. The fine painting would demand absorption in form, design, relations, if we remember that an artist fills in his lines and volumes with a subject and a material medium. Alexander makes the distinction thus:

In so far as an artist seeks to be photographic, or to suggest, for instance, in the nude figure not the relation of its parts, but its sensuous appeal, to substitute attraction of the pretty or the sentimental for design, so far as he is allowing design to be outweighed by what is practically pleasing

6. Collingwood, "Form and Content in Art," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, p. 339.

or alluring, his art is that of suggestion, rather than of strict representation.⁷

The subject matter may please but does not convey aesthetic value. Such value resides in the distinctly beautiful element and is the disinterested satisfaction of the aesthetic impulse and lies in the formal design or the coherent pattern. Note also that the material basis and the subject are not absent. Thus, Alexander does not say that beauty is *nothing but* formal relations. But if you wish to know what the distinctly beautiful element in a work of art is, you must point to its formal structure. Other objects besides works of art possess a material basis and a subject; what they lack is the distinctive character of beauty.

Let us for a moment turn to the work of art and notice its relation to the appreciator. Beauty does not merely give pleasure but it pleases in an aesthetic manner. The reason that it pleases aesthetically is that its beauty lies in the congruence and coherence of its parts. The coherence of a work of art satisfies the aesthetic sentiment. With the notion of coherence Alexander is reviving the ancient doctrine of unity within variety. A work of art may merely bring pleasure to an individual. But a work of art *has value* when its distinctive character brings satisfaction to a plurality of persons. Compare this with Alexander's analysis of the appetite for food. In so far as the partaking of food is pleasant it pleases me as an individual, but in so far as food keeps us alive, it satisfies our hunger pangs, is nutritious, and *has value for the type*.

Thus we see that beauty is objective and has a social character. The mark of a work of art is that it is a coherent whole. Therefore the minds which appreciate truly are also coherent. It is comparable to the case of truth where the universe of discourse and the objective structure constitute a unity. Alexander delivers his opinion on this point as follows:

7. Alexander, "Truth, Goodness and Beauty," *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1930, p. 621.

Coherence in the internal constitution of beauty is also coherence among the minds which appreciate it and exclusion of other minds. The mind for which an object is beautiful is not any mind but one which apprehends or appreciates impersonally or disinterestedly. (From the creative side we have already seen that beauty is the disinterested satisfaction of the constructive impulse when it is raised to the height of contemplation.) Beauty in this way involves reference to other minds.⁸

We shall see that the social nature of value holds not only for beauty but also for goodness and truth. These values are similar to language in as much as they too are socially created. As to this characteristic of value, Alexander writes, "All values thus depend on propositions and this is the reason why they are exchangeable between persons and can exclude unvalues."⁹

Mr. Bertram Morris states that we arrive at aesthetic values by means of mediating judgments which are eminently social.¹⁰ It is these mediating judgments of a number of men which constitute critical opinion as to what is beautiful. It is not strictly true to say, as Cresswell infers, that the standard mind is made up of all those who appreciate beauty and excludes those who fail to appreciate it. Alexander does not infer that the general community is the arbiter of taste. It is the standard mind which determines what objects of art are beautiful and it is made up of those who are trained and sensitive practitioners of their art. The standard mind is a group of experts who through a process of airing their conflicting and agreeing opinions arrive at some agreement as to what satisfies the constructive impulse become contemplative and what does not.

That the work of art which we appreciate is beautiful is assured by the authority of the experts who through a long experience in the canons of their art, and through disciplined and sensitive taste, confer the distinction of beauty on this particular tertiary quality. It has been held that Alexander's position cannot be maintained because there is

8. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 294.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

10. Morris, Bertram, "The Role of the 'Standard Mind' in Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticisms*, IV, 4 (June, 1946), pp. 240-41.

no agreement among the experts. It is rather important to state in this connection that there is no absolute beauty for Alexander. In fact, as we shall see in his ethics, goodness is not a description of an absolute but it is the process by which goodness is arrived at if it is ever attained. So also in the case of beauty, it is the process by which agreement is reached, if it ever is reached, by which those who are in a position to know arrive at an agreement as to what constitutes beauty. The process by which such judgments are reached is experimental. We shall also show that the values of goodness and truth are struck out in the fires of experiment and not by the faculty of reason. Others may revolt at the authoritarianism which Alexander proposes for designating a work of art as beautiful. They may consider the appreciation of beauty a personal prerogative. That is of course in keeping with subjectivistic aesthetics but leaves us without any standards outside of our own personal judgments. To use the word standard in connection with our own personal taste is to destroy the meaning of the notion of a standard, since standard by its very nature is a group creation. It must be born in mind that Alexander is a realist or naturalist in his aesthetics as well as in other phases of his philosophy. He is concerned with arriving at objective standards for all instances of value. He declares, "Value itself is impersonal, and when an individual claims to be the standard of value he is leaving something personal in his art, and failing so far of perfect beauty. On the other hand, the person or standard of aesthetic judgment is the man to whom what seems beautiful is really beautiful."¹¹

Alexander speaks of this tribunal that sets up the standards of beauty as a conspiracy of experts. It is a conspiracy of the qualified against the unqualified, whose judgment is rejected. The qualified reject the taste of the unqualified by placing the objects which the latter admire into the limbo of the unaesthetic. Alexander refuses to admit that his answer is circular. His notion here is derivative from the Aristotelian conception of the "wise or prudent man." It is the judgment of the wise man that determines goodness but it is his

11. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, pp. 175-76.

goodness that makes us count him wise. As in this instance of virtue, so in beauty, the judges select themselves. It is the coherence of a work of art embodied in its formal design which allows it to be appreciated by him who judges truly or by the standard mind. The standard mind is a short symbol for the experimental procedure of conflict and co-operation, of rejection and acceptance, by which certain critical opinions about beauty are seen to have objective validity.

Returning again to the original theme, that art emanates from the constructive impulse in man when it arrives at the stage of contemplation, let us consider Alexander's treatment of the role of the creator in the aesthetic situation. The creative act issues out of the constructive impulse. In a representative art, the impulse of the creator is stimulated by his subject. The impulse under the guiding hand of the artist strives to attain a material embodiment in a medium which is likewise stimulating to the artistic passion. The impulse of the creator is also caught in the net of the universe which through its *nisus* drives the artist to find an objective correlative for his creative urge. Only in the finished and satisfying work of art is his creative passion appeased. We have seen that the work of art is constructed so as to satisfy a want or need of human nature. As in the case of the means-ends relation in nature, the artist, moved by the *nisus* in the universe, proceeds to the operation of satisfying his impulse. The work of art grows out of the artist's passionate excitement about the subject matter, and he does not know what the work of art will be until it is embodied.

Because of the importance of the physical embodiment of the artistic passion, Alexander disagrees with Croce who holds that the outward embodiment of a work of art is simply the means of communicating to others a vision which the artist has had. Alexander asserts that the work of the artist in actual concrete embodiment reveals to him what he wished to say. The artist discovers what his impulse was all about when he has satisfied his constructive impulse in the actual work of art. Thus, the work of art does not stem from a finished mental experience but grows out of the artist's passionate excitement about the subject matter.

Alexander defends his position that the creative process is started when the constructive impulse is touched off by the subject matter by citing several examples. Two of his friends, who are writers of imaginative literature, informed him that they did their best work when they did not know beforehand what they intended to say. Alexander also asserts that his own method of composition tallies with his belief that the act of creativity grows out of the excitement caused by the subject matter. The creative impulse and the excitement which the artist finds in his subject matter and medium enable him to do his work abetted by his artistic competence.

Alexander asks us to consider the nature of wit as substantiating his claims. A person, topic or situation releases a spring of gaiety which produces the words and not the image of what he means to say. Similarly in the case of portrait painting, we notice that the painter, first of all, absorbs himself in every detail of his subject. He becomes so deeply engrossed with his model that when his skilled hand moves, the motive power is the excitement which the subject has induced in him.

Alexander disagrees with those who say that the artist has a perfect image in his mind to which he compares his work and finds that it fails to measure up to the ideal. Alexander explains this by stating that the work of art fails to satisfy the passion which first drove him to outward expression and so the artist continues to revise his work until he satisfies his original impulse. The process is analogous to that of cooking where the chef alters the dish by adding a dash of this or that until it satisfies his palate.

My point has been to show that art grows out of the constructive impulse when that impulse has been assuaged in a formal pattern which is not a mere bloodless abstraction but is form embodied. The form embodies a subject matter and is embodied in a material medium. I have also shown that the creative act itself grows out of the constructive impulse and have illustrated this point by examples which Alexander has given of the creative process. Also I have shown that the artistic impulse in man has developed out of the constructive instinct of animals and is also the humanized form of the *nisus* in the

world toward deity. As a contribution to Alexander's theory of aesthetics, I have shown that there are gradations of urges which may be correlated with the evolutionary levels of being in his metaphysics, and that the aesthetic urge is one which we encounter at the level of man.

By concentrating on the impulsive basis of art, Alexander overlooks the importance of the external works of art. Surely they too will afford us valuable insight into the total aesthetic situation. The opinions of critics of specific branches of art should be taken into account in formulating an aesthetic that has any claim to adequacy. Alexander is aware of this problem, for he suggests that his findings should be scrutinized by practitioners in the arts, whom he claims are the most competent critics. Alexander affords us a suggestive prolegomena to aesthetics and leaves the detailed working out of his theory of art to artist-philosophers in sympathy with his fundamental views. It seems to me that in the main Alexander has approached the understanding of art from the impulsive side because he is thus philosophically able to relate art to other human activities and to the doctrine of emergent evolution with which he is working.

3

Goodness

IN THE CASE of morality we find that there are three sides to the value situation which may be distinguished. There is the individual and his desires, there is the relation of his will to the collective willing of society and then there are the goods, either material or immaterial, which are desired. Morality is not primarily concerned with the satisfaction of the impulses of the individual for the possession of goods; rather it is concerned with the social problem of the harmonization of the various competing wills for those goods. Despite the fact that in morality it is our wills which are in control, and although we all desire certain external goods, the problem of morality is really a social one consisting in how these goods are to be distributed. The harmonization of conflicting claims which Alexander advances as a definition of morality follows the pattern of economic value except that in morality we are dealing with many values which are not commonly associated with monetary considerations. In fact, it is the failure of Alexander to point out the close connection between economic value and moral value which we would criticize as an instance of his neglecting to bring to the fore certain intimate relations which pervade his system.

Alexander makes the distinction in these words.

In morality, on the other hand, we are concerned with the passions of men, with their desires for material (or it may be immaterial) objects, and the problem which morality has to solve is the fitting satisfaction of these passions, both as within the individual himself, and as between individual and individual. Now, our desires and wills are directed to some object external to us, in the sense that it is not yet ours, and in general, as with food, clothing, sex, office, riches, and the like, the objects are physical material foreign to us which we make our own. And morality may from one point of view be treated as adjustment in practice to our surroundings. Yet these surroundings when they are external nature, are but secondary to the desires, or rather to the wills, which are bent on attaining them. Goodness is an affair of motives or wills. External nature is material in respect of which we realize our moral nature. Goodness consists not in the good things we get, but in the good directions of our wills which good things satisfy. The foreign material is secondary to virtue; what is primary is our practical human nature. Virtue is not adjustment to our natural surroundings, it is adjustment to one another in the face of these surroundings.¹

But although the adjustment of our wills is primary for morality, yet without the will seizing and appropriating certain objects, we should be unable to approve or disapprove the will in itself. Just as in aesthetics the objective embodiment of a work of art was integral to the aesthetic situation, so also in morality we are unable to judge a will, good or bad, until we see it directed upon certain objects. Croce's aesthetic doctrine was rejected by Alexander because the former found the work of art a purely subjective experience of the artist who later embodied it for the purpose of communication. Alexander similarly rejects those subjectivistic ethical doctrines which maintain that morality is a private mental affair of unrealized good intentions. To the contrary, he maintains that we cannot tell whether a man is good or bad till we see what he does. The will, too, must have an external content, for we cannot judge a vague inner morality which desires we know not what.

I can judge you to be doing right or wrong only so far as I see you willing an object which I approve or condemn. It is not your will I approve

1. Alexander, "Morality as an Art," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 3 (1928), pp. 144-45.

merely as a mental process; what I approve is your will for temperate drinking or preservation of property. There is no such thing as inner morality, if it is thought of as independent of what is willed.²

The experiential emphasis in Alexander's philosophy comes into the foreground here, for his ethical science tests objective acts and not just some subjectivistic bias which is experimentally inaccessible. In ethics we do not judge the mental process but actual deeds, for morality needs an objective correlative as does art.

Alexander also employs the same distinction in discussing ethics as he does in art, namely the difference between the material and formal passions. Human nature, with its craving for satisfaction, is the raw material of ethics. When we merely gratify our individual impulsive tendencies without reference to a larger whole we gain material pleasures just as paints, tones, and stones may please in themselves. As a matter of course, material gratification of human passion is essential if virtue is to be attained, for if an ethical system did not satisfy human passions it would become sterile. We would discard it in less than a day as utterly useless.

Our passions and desires are, in themselves, neither virtuous nor vicious. It is only when we encounter them in responding to the environment and in adjusting to other men that we find moral judgment possible. Morality determines what passions may be satisfied, in what degree, at what time and place, and in what circumstances so as to establish a social harmony among wills. Alexander freely admits his indebtedness to Aristotle at this point.

We have been saying that the material gratification of the impulses lies at the bottom of any accepted system of ethics. But the mere satisfaction of the need for food and drink is not virtuous. We satisfy our impulsive demands within a social environment. Our self-regarding passions are harmonized in a certain way. We satisfy our passion for eating bread so that other men may eat bread, too. Individual wants are satisfied so that the formal passion of sociality is also gratified. Our moral sense is the offspring of our social impulse.

2. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 279.

"Moral value is the blending of the will under the impulse of sociality with the passions which are its material." ³ Beginning with the natural impulse of sociality, which dominates, regulates and harmonizes our desires, we create morality. Morality, then, is the harmonizing of individual wills under the impulse of sociality.

Since man is by nature social, his gregarious tendency impels him to join forces with others. He notes with sympathy the impulses of his fellow men as they respond to the environment, and in order to avoid conflict and insure co-operation he establishes with them an harmonious system of willing. By sharing each other's tastes and by competing for similar goods we have created a system of distribution of our activities, which those called good accept and those called bad reject. The problem of morality is to secure a coherent distribution of goods among people.

Alexander is face to face with the problem of the relation of the individual to society. He answers it directly. Aristotle's prudent man is the coherent individual who finds himself harmoniously adapted to a coherent society. Or he is in agreement with Plato's dictum that morality is specialization within a social framework. The individual finds his place in a society where his claims are fashioned so as to be compatible with the claims of other men. Specialization of functions, coupled with the highest efficiency among each of the parts, leads to harmonious satisfaction.

In practice this would imply a highly regimented state. Alexander would have to admit that a Nazi or Fascist state embodied coherent individuals within a coherent organization and was consequently moral, whereas a more loosely knit democratic state failed to achieve morality. Personally I do not care for this integrated system involving coherence of coherences. I wish that Alexander would leave a little more room for individual idiosyncrasy and place less emphasis on efficient functioning in his ideal state. In like manner, he defines evil as misdirected coherency or a bad distribution of wills, but we

3. "Morality as an Art," p. 155.

are still unable to justify one set of coherences as against another. Alexander, I suppose, would say that between two given ways of life the good will prevail in the long run, for it is his faith that justice and right lie at the very heart of things.

Alexander emphasizes the coherence of the individual but such coherence is a derivative from the coherence which obtains in the social organism. This condition arises from his fundamental tenet that morality is the satisfaction of the social impulse. The view which we advocate affords the individual more flexibility in the art of living and does not demand that the individual be incessantly on the alert, functioning efficiently. Although the good life is lived in society, it must also be an individual achievement. Alexander in his drive for simplicity overlooks the complexity of the ethical situation. Whether the good life has been satisfactory or not is for the individual who has lived through it to judge.

We may review Alexander's treatment of the good life by scanning his words.

The good wills are those which cohere with each other, the bad ones are those which fail to fit into the system thus arrived at, and are excluded. Those practical acts which are thus coherent are approved, the others are disapproved. . . . The reality which we produce is good insofar as it satisfies coherently the persons who bring it about.⁴

He even maintains that the institutions of society embody the collective desires of men. "In a word, goodness belongs to moral institutions themselves which are made by collective men out of the needs and passions, selfish, or altruistic, of individuals."⁵ The fact that institutions become outmoded and oppressive indicates that it is plainly impossible for Alexander to maintain that institutions embody the collective desires of men. In many historical circumstances the wants of the many have been subjugated by a privileged few. We are censuring Alexander's definition of morality on the same grounds that

4. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 274.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

we are critical of his theory of economic value. The practical consequence of the acceptance of his moral views is the entrenchment of the forces of reaction.

Furthermore, the conception of the Aristotelian prudent man is so rare as to be a fiction. To determine what passions may be satisfied, in what degree, at what time and place, and in what circumstances, is so complicated a problem that it is incredible that men could always make the right choice and decisions in a changing and dynamic world.

Alexander defines the Aristotelian prudent man as the impartial spectator who is the ethical counterpart of the standard mind in aesthetics.

In so far as the individual is good he represents the collective wills of society. His approbations whether of himself or others coincide with theirs. He is himself a microcosm which in his place mirrors the larger society, and is trusted to judge himself by his conscience, just as the solitary scientific worker judges truth with the eyes of the collective judgment. . . . So far as he is good he embodies the common judgment; he is the wise man of Aristotle, or the impartial spectator of Adam Smith, who judges that to be good which is attuned to the needs of all; as he is the standardised man.⁶

Similarly the judges of right or wrong are self-selected just as we saw that the impartial judges in art selected themselves. The following will demonstrate this point as well as the fact that one's conscience is the functioning aspect of the impartial spectator.

The judges of what is right and wrong, good or bad, are self-selected and impose their approbations on the remainder. Those who do not conform are condemned as wrong-doers or immoral. The standard of right is embodied ideally in the good man, and *conscience* in any individual is the vice-regent of this impartial judgment.⁷

In fact, Alexander goes farther and identifies the impartial spectator with the play of our gregarious impulse as it makes the members of society settle down into an harmonious satisfaction of their primary instincts.

6. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 280.

7. "Morality as an Art," p. 155.

Alexander, as we have seen, leans heavily on Spinoza. In his ethics Alexander particularly draws upon Spinoza's notion of *conatus*. We are stimulated to respond to our environment by the *conatus* or *nisus* in the universe which draws all things forward. The first meaning of *conatus* is that the good is what we desire. We read in Spinoza's *Ethics*, Proposition IX of Part III that "we do not strive for, wish, or seek or desire anything because it is good; but on the contrary we judge a thing to be good, because we strive for, wish, seek, and desire it." Man's desires are regulated by reason and consequently what knowledge man possesses is the controlling factor in attaining the good life. In Alexander's language, our natural desires regulated by our superior social impulse lead to goodness. We are back at Socrates' dictum that virtue is knowledge and to the saying of Spinoza that a man is most truly human when he acts out of a background of adequate knowledge and not when he gives reign to his impulses which are confused and thereby cause him to suffer.

Another usage of *conatus* by Alexander carries us to the biological conceptions which he employs. It is the *conatus* in man and all things by which they persist in their being. Here *conatus* is equivalent to the notion of self-preservation. Everything has this *conatus* but it can be best seen in living things. "In all their goings-on, various as these are with the differences of occasions which provoke them, the plant or animal maintains its single individuality of being, abandoning it only to external violence or inner decay."⁸

It is in his description as to how goodness arises that Alexander shows himself a full-fledged evolutionist. The process by which all values are born as well as the process by which the levels of being and deity are engendered is thoroughly evolutionary. Alexander dwells on this point in "The Historicity of Things" when he writes, "The thorough-going conception of history in its application, not only to the affairs of man but to nature itself, is due, as I suppose, chiefly to Darwin."⁹ Just as in the case of aesthetics, Alexander did not so

8. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 379.

9. "The Historicity of Things," p. 11.

much define beauty as describe the process by which we arrive at beauty, if we ever do, so also in his ethical theory he describes how goodness is established rather than by giving us a definition of goodness as such.

First of all Alexander makes use of the biological concept that our action is response to our environment, an important part of which is social in character. Secondly, Alexander uses the biological principle which he employed in his aesthetics, that pleasure is for the individual while value inheres in the type. Biologically speaking, value is what satisfies the genus in the living world. Goodness, too, is a value insofar as it satisfies the social impulse and is valuable for the type.

Good institutions are a creation of men by which they live well in their non-mental environment, and are adapted to it. Any successful organic type is a kind of organism which can sustain its life under outward conditions, and moral persons are a type of beings which maintain their existence under their conditions, and do so by becoming socialised, that is by adopting conduct which they mutually approve.¹⁰

Values below the level of human life are established solely by competition. The procedure by which the suitable type prevails among plants and animals is left open to the operation of factors which bring about the failure of unsuitable types and secure the establishment of the adapted types. It is a brute process in which the inadequate species perishes. In the organic and inorganic world below life there is no sign of co-operation such as human life exhibits in the establishment of its values. Animals whose interests do not maintain their life perish under the conditions of their existence, and throw in the sponge to those whose interests can be satisfied quasi-permanently.

Alexander differentiates the process by which value is reached on the human level from the manner in which it is established on the organic level. Value, at the level of man, is established by competition and co-operation. The struggle involved, however, does not wipe out the person who fails to attain the proper value. The mind because of its superior plasticity may be reformed without destroying the body

10. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 278.

of which it is a part. For example, the failure of recalcitrant individuals to conform to the accepted moral code does not carry with it the death penalty of these individuals as it apparently does among the lower forms of organic life.

We have seen that the establishment of value over unvalue, in nature, in art, in truth and in goodness, comes about through a process of experiment and trial. Among the highest human values, the forces of persuasion and tradition are the chief means of establishing truth, goodness and beauty. Violence may be used in extreme instances but generally the suitable types gain the field by the operation of tradition and education which deliver the achievements of civilization to the next generation.

Morality is entirely experimental and what we discover as right is the result of experiment which is engaged in satisfying passions under the control of the gregarious impulse. The *modus operandi* of a committee is a direct revelation of how morality is discovered experimentally. The guiding force in the deliberations of a committee is what they want. Before the committee comes to a decision, right and wrong lie in abeyance. Each person states his opinion as to what course should be pursued. The decision of the committee is a result of balancing various claims so that the majority will be satisfied. It follows of course that badness is also discovered by experiment.

In settling a strike the same experimental procedure is followed. When negotiations begin, no one knows what is economically just. The employers want one thing and the workers, another. If the strike is amicably settled, it means that both parties have made certain adjustments of their conflicting economic desires. If a compromise among the economic wants of the contestants is not found, the solution is left to force, poverty and starvation, which means that the path of economic justice has not been found. The determining influence is the wants and desires of the respective parties moulded by the social impulse.¹¹

A person may refuse to accept the collective decision which has

11. "Morality as an Art."

been reached and thus exclude himself from the benefits which it confers. On the other hand, there may be someone who advances a proposal which fails at first to be accepted by the majority but eventually the true worth of his proposition insinuates itself among the group and receives the hearty support of his fellows.

Further, in this experimental movement, there may arise some one who desires a scheme of life which his fellows do not understand and have no sympathy for. He appears directly to contradict the view that virtue is the artificial work of gregariousness. For his will opposes that of society. But his ideal is still a forecast of a new social ideal, and he propounds it in the hope of attracting the rest of his fellows, by discovering to them feelings to which they have not yet awakened. The prophet of a new order is rejected by the men of old, but maybe he wins his way to the acceptance of his ideal hereafter.¹²

Alexander defends Darwinism from its critics who have decried its indifference to value. It has been seen that Darwinism for Alexander is exactly the process by which value has come into existence in every niche in the universe. The meaning of natural selection is that values emerge in an open contest between varying types. The trial determines in an unprejudiced manner which type has the best qualifications and is fittest to survive. "Every successful type in the organic world is, in an extended sense of the word, *right* in comparison with types which fail to maintain themselves against it."¹³ The doctrine of natural selection is the key which unlocks for us the story of values in the world of biology and also provides us with an account of how the tertiary qualities unfold in the area of the mind.

For this Darwinian view of value and goodness as the outcome of the process of natural selection, Alexander has been criticized as attaching value to existence itself. It is the Nietzschean worship of force and is the child of the doctrine that might makes right. Alexander repudiates such implication by this statement:

Might is not right; that half-truth has brought down a great nation; pray God it may not bring down another. But right is might; only, because that

12. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

13. "Lessons from Spinoza," pp. 23-24.

proposition is so easily misapprehended, it were better replaced by the less pointed one, that right is what is suited to prevail in the judgments of men. And *if we have the faith that the world works out its salvation and not its destruction*, we shall be apt to believe that what so prevails is rooted in the nature of things, including men. At least if it is not so, we act as if it were so; and if the pursuit of this faith leads us to our extinction, value will perish with us.¹⁴

Right is might for it is a basic presupposition of Alexander's naturalism that the world and other men are good for us and that together we work out our salvation in a natural setting which we can adapt to our use. The world in which man finds himself is no horrible creature plotting man's destruction, but on the contrary we can beautifully order it for our mutual benefit. Alexander has no morbid fears that the world is going to pieces. The world moves forward to higher levels of perfection and we as persons may co-operate in the process of construction. Evil does not constitute a real threat as it does in the Christian tradition. The essential structure of things is good. When we consider Alexander's conception of deity we shall again discuss human goodness and in what way we can say it is related to God.

Alexander assumes that the desires of man under the guiding hand of the social impulse will lead to goodness. The social impulse is equivalent to the impartial spectator or one's conscience. Of the three terms I should accept conscience as the most adequate instrument by which we attain morality. It is my belief that goodness does not necessarily result from the adjustment of the will of one person to that of another. A superior kind of goodness consists in positively contributing to another's interest beyond what the case merits or demands. Quite a different society results from the operation of the principle of true charity than in the case of strict justice working itself out coherently. And for the principle of charity to be operative somebody must initiate it and keep it alive.

The relations of one man to another are not always as crass and self-seeking as the doctrine of natural selection which Alexander is

14. Alexander, "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 276. Italics mine.

working with would imply. The fact that the weak survive proves that the ethical situation is more complex than Alexander's evolutionary ethics provides for. In the human struggle the weak often watch while the strong slug it out to determine whose way of life shall prevail. There are many people who do not get involved in any major struggle for power and yet manage to live quite contentedly.

Since Alexander understands all human activities in terms of their impulsive basis, we have found that morality also has its roots in instinct. Like the impulse for deity, goodness grows out of purely animal sociality such as we observe in herds of buffalo or among bees. As individuals we desire to possess certain goods and to satisfy our passions, and it is under the guiding hand of the social impulse that these desires become moral. Just as a work of art assuages the constructive impulse, so also good conduct satisfies the social impulse. We shall now turn to a study of truth and note again that it too grows out of an impulse, that of curiosity.

4

Truth

ARISTOTLE has said that man by nature desires to know. Alexander's position is the same, for he says that truth grows out of man's impulse of curiosity. Art is founded on the impulse in man to make something, which we have identified as the constructive impulse. Ethics stems from the desire of man to maximise his satisfactions under the compulsion of the social impulse. Truth is the offspring of our impulse of curiosity as it is manifested, for example, in our scientific enterprise. Again, if we wish to understand the meaning of truth we must seek to justify it in terms of the impulse which it satisfies, just as we have with the other values.

The impulse of curiosity which we observe in man is genetically connected with the instinct of curiosity which we detect among the lower animals. In fact, in its lowest and highest forms, it is based on intelligent response to one's environment. The curiosity of an animal spends itself within the boundaries of practice. Although the ideas of men come into being with the desire to end conflicts in practice, it does not end at the level of practice, but leads on to knowledge for its own sake. Just as in art, when the constructive impulse is crystallized in a material form released from the bondage of practice, so also in the case of human truth, when we attempt to eliminate the conflicts

and increase the corroboration of scientific hypotheses, we lift ourselves out of mere concern for practical exigencies. Our curiosity is deflected from practice into building up comprehensive and unified bodies of thought. Alexander says,

By the use of ideas the mind, under the spur of curiosity, produces unification of the information and experiences which are thus considered for its own sake. . . . Now this tendency of our mind to get rid of unrest in the data of its experiences and to connect them where they reinforce each other, produces at the level of ideas in the mental life contemplation of objects for their own sake, and not merely a satisfaction of practical curiosity, and leads on to the building up of science.¹

In a word, science is the impulse to know raised to the level of disinterestedness or contemplation. Men are so constructed that they respond to the stimulus of their environment in such a way that their curiosity, directed in a certain fashion, leads to truth.

In the case of truth two elements may be distinguished. There is reality, or the structure of things, which we must obey if we would discover truth. Let us not suppose that there is a distinction between mind and reality. Mind, like everything else, is an offspring of reality. Truth is the correct way of deciphering reality as it spreads itself out before the discerning eye. Truth is what we discover to be the nature of things under the guidance of reality. We become a mirror and reflect nature as flawlessly as possible by taking ourselves out of our scientific constructions. Truth is reality viewed in a certain way, as it is consciously possessed by human beings. There is no dichotomy here between mind and nature. They are a unity. Alexander rejects the correspondence theory of truth because of his metaphysical position. "If the reality is something other than what appears to us by all the ways of sense, ideas, imagination, memory, conception, judging, it cannot be appealed to." ²

Truth then comes to us as a discovery of reality. Michelangelo, in his unfinished statue of the slaves in the Florentine Academy, seems to be

1. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 193.

2. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 252.

discovering his work of art in the marble. Shakespeare discovered Hamlet in the language of the English people and so also Newton discovered the law of gravitation and Einstein came upon it later in its more precise form.

As we have stated, Alexander rejects the correspondence theory as guaranteeing the truth of our knowledge. That theory states that a proposition is true if it agrees with reality, false if it does not. He cannot accept this test because it assumes the existence of two worlds, one mental and the other physical, which must be correlated. If reality is something other than truth, then we cannot test truth by it. The character of our human situation is such that we can test our beliefs only by reference to other propositions. Our test of truth then is the coherence of propositions among themselves.

Konvitz, because of his own metaphysical presuppositions of a divided universe, fails to follow Alexander here. Konvitz writes,

His whole line of argument leads to only one possible resolution; namely, that the test of truth is correspondence of coherences, *the correspondence of mental system to physical system*, of ideal whole or coherence to real whole of coherence; neither simple coherence nor simple correspondence, but correspondence of coherences.³

Konvitz' failure to understand Alexander lies in the words we have underscored. Alexander's metaphysics does not involve a parallelism between mind and body but involves an identification of the two in which each is a discursive aspect of the same unity. Or again, it is the metaphysics of Aristotle in which the world of discourse and that of structure make a unified, intelligible whole.

In the case of Alexander it is the internal structure of reality which determines the truth or falsity of propositions. True propositions belong to that reality, whereas false ones introduce elements which do not belong there. Truth is human knowing when it correctly comprehends reality. Correct judging is not an individual achievement but is a social accomplishment involving the co-operation and clash

3. Konvitz, M. R., *On the Nature of Value, The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander* (New York: 1946), p. 110. Italics mine.

of many minds. But the acceptance or rejection of our propositions is determined by our experience of reality and by the experiments which we perform upon it. The propositions which the internal structure of reality permits us to maintain are true, those which it rejects are errors.

The fact that the coherence test of truth also includes testing by scientific experiment should be brought out. "A science always begins by being a collection of propositions with sensible material, and to the end it is never a mere organisation of universal propositions, though these are its highest achievements. Hence the part played by sensible verification in the discovery of true knowledge."⁴

Propositions which we call true, are not different from reality. They are real facts of that reality and when their truth is disregarded they are reality. The contents of a book of physics reveals the actual world to us in all of its rich and varied detail as it is reflected in its propositions. But a physical scientist who has such knowledge does not carry the physical world about with him. He is only compresent with it.

Error unlike truth has reality only in so far as it is possessed by mind. There is no real structure with which it is conversant. Alexander therefore determines the incoherence of propositions in a way which parallels his treatment of coherence. "Now, a proposition is incoherent with other propositions about that reality, in so far as the internal structure of the reality is different from features contained in the erroneous proposition; and this is discovered by experiment."⁵ Take the erroneous belief that an animal can live in an atmosphere where there is no oxygen. Conduct an experiment by placing an animal in such an atmosphere and you will find that the animal dies. In this way we learn that the proposition which states that an animal dies under such circumstances is true and that the original proposition is erroneous. We take the two realities involved, life and the atmosphere deprived of oxygen, and ascertain whether or not those realities are compatible with each other. In this way we sort out the coherent

4. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 253.

5. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 255.

propositions which are true from the incoherent ones which are false.

As in the instance of beauty and goodness, truth is arrived at by a process of conflict and co-operation of many minds. The short symbol for this process is the scientific enterprise. Trial and error are as much a part of the elaboration of truth as we find them to be in nature where the principle of natural selection is at work. Truth is the possession of the standard mind, and individual truths are put forward as claimants to objective status. A mind which errs casts itself out of the intellectual community. As in art, we may prize some object which brings us personal pleasure, but it has value only in so far as it pleases the standard mind. The same distinctions apply to truth except that the inner structure of reality reinforced by social believings, constitute a more rigid criterion for truth. Error tries to inject an element into the objective structure of reality which does not belong there and subjectively advances a proposition which does not fit into the already discovered body of organized knowledge.

In this process of discrimination of believings there occur all manner of adjustments of one believing to another, always at the guidance and under the control of appeal to the contemplated fact, but in one way or another truth means the settling down of individual believings into a social whole and the condemnation of the heretical or unscientific believing; just as in practical matters by interchange of counsel men settle down into a common course of action which may be the initial proposal of someone, or a number which wins assent, or may turn out in the end to be a proposal different from the original proposal of any one person.⁶

The social nature of scientific discovery follows precisely the pattern by which goodness and beauty are discovered. The trial and error method of the committee is a good example of what scientists do when they offer hypotheses which may or may not be verified by their scientific colleagues. Truth as well as the other values has a public character.

Truth is not the outcome of a clash of opinions in which the most aggressively advanced notions dominate the more mildly advanced

6. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 258.

ideas. In morality might does not make right, as we have seen. Similarly the most loudly proclaimed opinion does not insure its acceptance by those who are the experts. Our believings are guided by a reality outside of us and in science we watch and do not make the reality but discover it. We make truth by comparing what we believe with what other people accept as true under the guidance of reality which accepts or rejects our hypotheses.

It follows that Alexander accepts the teaching of pragmatism in as much as it states that a proposition is true if it works with other propositions. In so far as it stops here, and discourages inquiry into the reason why truth is true, it is incomplete. "Truth is indeed what works. But it works because truth is determined by the nature of reality. Reality is indeed no fixed thing, but being temporal is evolving fresh types of existence. But a truth which is not guided by reality is not truth at all." ⁷

There are limitations to the doctrine that the making of truth and error is an individual enterprise, says Alexander. For one thing, the life of one person is not long enough to make all the discoveries and unify all the facts and theories of science. Secondly, one person cannot view the scientific problem from the multitude of angles which the advancement of science requires. Robinson Crusoe is not an example of a real solitary. He carried the traditions of civilized life into his solitude and so judged matters from the standpoint of the social mind. As our conscience is the vice-regent of society and is the personal embodiment of the impartial spectator, so also Robinson Crusoe made judgments in his lonely world, with the social eye or in terms of the scientific enterprise of the civilization whence he came. A real solitary, unlike Crusoe, would not be conscious of error. He would be a pragmatist and finding that his old belief did not work he would simply abandon it.

There is only one case in which it is completely satisfactory to declare that truth is what works. For the solitary individual . . . it is a full account of reality that it is what works. There is for him no other test. But for

7. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 265.

him there is no such thing as truth at all just because he lacks that intercourse with others through which at the bidding of reality the distinction of the true and the false is struck out.⁸

Therefore, although reality, verifiable in the form of experiments performed within it, is one part of the truth situation, yet in addition there is the coherence of propositions among themselves as they are combined by the social mind, which makes truth true.

The argument is advanced to the disadvantage of Alexander that there have been intellectual rebels whose theories have run counter to the social believings of their time but whose heretical ideas have been justified by the subsequent development of thought. For example, Alexander's theory would have us say that the Copernican revolution was false because it failed to cohere with the accepted astronomical science of his day. But with our present attitude toward scientific explanation we see either the Copernican or Ptolemaic theories as sheerly tentative in character. The Ptolemaic astronomy might still have been used to explain the newly discovered facts. But the epicycles would have been very cumbersome and were discarded in favor of a simpler explanation of the same phenomena. Whether we say that the sun revolved round the earth, or the earth round the sun, is a matter of convenience, and our choice depends on which one gives us the most parsimonious explanation, more capacity for prediction, and more fruitful possibilities for further discoveries. Similarly from the standpoint of relativity, we may describe the fact that we walk up and down the room by saying that the room moves relative to us. Our hypotheses may give way at any time to other hypotheses which will enable us to obtain a higher degree of coherence and bring a wider range of empirically verifiable phenomena within the orbit of scientific understanding. Truth is relative to men and their interests in a particular historical epoch. Therefore, Galileo, Bruno, and Copernicus were breaking through the ring of coherence which had been built up in their time and were prophets of a new and more comprehensive order of coherences. Instead of calling the

8. *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

knowledge which Galileo offered the world false, we might more accurately speak of it as being anachronistic.

Truth varies and grows obsolete or even turns to falsehood. Hence a theory may be true for one generation and false for the next. Yet it remains true for the range of facts open to the minds of the earlier generation. This is possible because truth is different from reality and implies possession by a standard mind. Reality determines what is true, but reality includes more than that part of it which affects any one generation. The atoms really are simple to the minds which used methods different from the present physical ones. They have not ceased to have the simplicity imputed to them. But they are no longer simple to us. . . . Truth is thus the ever-increasing adaptation of minds to the reality which they know.⁹

9. *Op. cit.*, pp. 264-65.

5

The Tertiary Qualities

ALEXANDER uses the term tertiary qualities to cover the triad of values, beauty, goodness and truth. The meaning we must attach to the term is that of our highest human values as they are expressed in our discovery of truth, in our performance of moral actions, and in our creation of works of art. In an earlier section we saw qualities to be emergents from lower levels, but in this instance, tertiary qualities are emergents at the human level under the compulsion of impulse. A tertiary quality, then, is a specific kind of human value. Perhaps Alexander's terminology may become clearer if we recall a passage in which he compares primary, secondary and tertiary qualities. "The tertiary qualities are not objective like the secondary ones, nor peculiar to mind and thus subjective like consciousness, nor are they like the primary qualities common to both subjects and objects. They are subject-object determinations."¹

We have just completed a survey of each of the tertiary qualities and now we shall endeavor to point out the similarity of treatment which Alexander accords all three values. There are certain unifying concepts here which deserve mention. The most important distinction that Alexander draws is that these values are relative to men,

1. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 238.

that they are human inventions. They do not belong to things apart from their relation to men. On the other hand, they betray an intimate relation to non-human nature. Truth is what men believe about reality. Goodness consists of the reactions of men upon their environment and the effects of their action is seen in the physical world. Beauty is bound up with physical objects, either natural scenery, or statues, or pictures, or poems. But without the presence of persons who enjoy these things, there is no truth, goodness or beauty. The work of art is only beautiful to the appreciating mind which endows the dead stone with life or charges the spoken words of a poem with meaning. Beautiful nature and beautiful works of art are dumb, mute, senseless masses when the appreciating mind is not there to relish them. The beautiful is a process uniting the physical object and the appreciating personality. There is no goodness in a physical fact as such. A wall as a physical structure is not good. Its goodness resides in the fact that it was built by a competent workman. Without the element of human design and construction, we could not refer to the wall as good. Physical things are only good or beautiful in relation to us, its creators or appreciators. Similarly, an object in a museum is not beautiful, nor does a landscape possess beauty, unless it is related to us, the appreciators. Nor does a real proposition contain truth in itself. The proposition must be of such a sort that when it is related to a mind in a certain way we may designate it as true. Alexander introduces the following example.

Consider the proposition that this rose is red. The rose is real, its redness is real, and the redness really belongs to the rose. The elements of the proposition and the fact that they belong to each other are altogether independent of me. This rose would be red whether known to me or another and before there were eyes to see it. But the proposition is true only if there is human appreciation of it.²

We have seen that the empirical qualities which we observe in external things are outside of us and would exist were we not present. But tertiary qualities require both the external thing and the appreciating mind in order to exist. Alexander makes this statement:

2. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 237.

Values then are unlike the empirical qualities of external things, shape or fragrance, or life; they imply the amalgamation of the object with the human appreciation of it. Truth does not consist of mere propositions but of propositions as believed; beauty is felt; and good is the satisfaction of persons.³

The term tertiary quality is not used unadvisedly by Alexander. In the cognitive situation we have the knower and that which he knows. These in compresence produce value, a *tertium quid* as it were. The tertiary quality is the sum of these factors taken as a totality. Alexander writes,

In dealing with mere knowing we have on the one side the knowing subject and on the other the known object, the two in compresence with one another and distinct. We have values or tertiary qualities in respect of the whole situation consisting of knower and known in their compresence. Strictly speaking, it is this totality of knower and known, of subject and object, which is true or good or beautiful.⁴

For Alexander truth, goodness and beauty involve a relationship between the mind and its objective embodiment which it both creates and sustains. Alexander stresses this notion of relationship or process forcefully in his treatment of knowing. The knowing situation is described by him as the togetherness or compresence of a subject and an object. In its biological simplicity it may be described as stimulus and response, both tied together in a relationship of mutual interdependence. Alexander maintains in the Preface to the New Impression of *Space, Time, and Deity* that knowing is correctly described in biological fashion. Man responds to the object which excites him and in and through his practical response the object is revealed as being there.⁵ We may recall the parallel fashion in which he describes the aesthetic process. "Artistic production is on a line with the other organic actions by which we become aware of physical things in perception."⁶ And he goes on to say that we become aware of things

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 238.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Space, Time, and Deity*, Preface to New Impression, p. xvi.

6. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 261-62.

in our behaviour toward them. Our first responses to objects are practical in character and their purpose is to alter, use or avoid the object. The second stage of knowing is theoretical knowledge and it is grounded on our practical responses. The responses involved in knowing for its own sake are also instinctive but of a different order. Speculative knowledge is practical knowledge which has been diverted into speech or some other form.

The knowing situation is one involving a subject which responds to an object. Taken together they constitute the knowing process. From the standpoint of consciousness the experience is lived through or enjoyed while the object is contemplated. The knowing situation is another example of the basic relation of the universe in which one thing satisfies another. It is singular in so far as the experiencer has a conscious quality.

The fact that value is a relation or a process as we have described it comes out in the contrast which Alexander draws between mere psychological value and the value of the tertiary qualities. An animal eats an apple and is nourished by it and value is attached thereto. The value resides in the relation of object and subject and has no meaning if applied to the animal or the apple alone. Both the animal and the apple must enter into this relation before value arises.

Similarly, the highest values are like the apple in the above example. They have no being apart from their participation in each other. There is one important difference, however. The apple is discovered in the process of valuation to be nutritious. It is a created object already existent, whereas the tertiary quality comes into existence along with the value. The process of discovery is a dynamic one in which the object comes into being at the moment it is contemplated by the subject for itself. The value of tertiary qualities lies in their being held together by the mind which values them and which they satisfy. "Values thus belong to the object as it is possessed by the mind and not outside that relation." ⁷

One must be careful not to misinterpret Alexander on this point.

7. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 243.

Beauty, for example, resides in an active process requiring an appreciator and a work of art. Therefore one cannot single out the work of art of the appreciator involved in the artistic situation and state that the beauty is resident in one or the other. The solution Alexander offers is more subtle. Beauty resides in a compound whole and cannot be said to exist outside the total aesthetic situation. It lives within a relationship consisting of the work of art and the active appreciator who is moved to behold the beauty which that particular aesthetic object evokes in him.

This leads us to a rather startling conclusion. A picture or a statue when it is not in process, when it is not caught up in the act of appreciation, does not have an aesthetic existence. A poem when it is not being read and appreciated by the sensitive reader has no existence as a tertiary quality. A musical score which is not being rendered or enjoyed has no aesthetic existence. It leads to another striking fact. The work of art exists only in the process of appreciation and if this process should be defective in some way, the work of art would not exist as the creative artist had originally planned it. Likewise in a long work of art such as an opera, symphony or novel, what relation do the parts that have already been played or read exert on the present moment of appreciation and what is their relation to the parts to be heard or read as the work of art unfolds? When a long work of art has been completed and the separate parts have become dim and vague, obviously the process is inactive and the subject-object relation is no longer held together. We have a blurred remembrance of the whole, but how shall we characterize this particular, broken aesthetic experience of value?

Similarly, goodness may be described as a relation or process.

We may think of this Good apart from the wills which sustain it, but it does not exist without them. Just as truth resides in the union of reality with the minds which possess truth, so goodness resides not in the bare satisfactions of appetites alone nor in the will alone, but in the union of satisfying objects with the wills which sustain them.⁸

The tertiary qualities are based on specific human impulses. The social impulse harmonizes the conflicting desires of individuals and leads to morality. The constructive impulse is assuaged in the work of art which has been extricated from its practical setting into a disinterested beholding. The impulse of curiosity is the foundation of science. When we find objects beautiful or true or good, we may refer it to the fact that a special impulse has been aroused whose satisfaction is the good, beautiful, or true object. Alexander writes, "We may feel sure in advance that if we take objects and contemplate them for their own sakes and pronounce them beautiful or true or good, there is some special impulse in ourselves, which makes us do it."⁹

The impulse is satisfied objectively in each case. The constructive impulse is assuaged by the coherence of a work of art, which is equivalent to saying that it possesses unity amid its variety. Morality also gratifies the social impulse, since individual desires are made coherent with a larger whole. Goodness is a coherent system which harmonizes the passions of men for goods. In truth the impulse of curiosity finds its expression in the coherence of the propositions among themselves. The scientific investigator builds up a unified body of knowledge, the consistency of which can be tested by experiment.

Each of the impulses is satisfied disinterestedly. We find truth when our practical concerns are outweighed by our interest in knowledge for its own sake. Goodness remains a practical concern throughout but it goes beyond the indulgence of individual appetite by being referred to a larger socialized system where individual wants are restrained for the sake of the general good. A work of art satisfies the constructive impulse when the object is emancipated from practice and contemplated for its specifically aesthetic quality.

In each instance, the judgment as to what constitutes beauty, goodness and truth lies in the hands of the experts. The social nature of truth comes from the fact that it is the work of co-operating scientists. Truth is the creation of the collective mind. Similarly, goodness is that which satisfies the gregarious sentiment or in another phrase, is approved by the impartial spectator. The social criterion of beauty is

established by discriminating judges whom Alexander describes as the standard mind.

Alexander employs the biological principle of natural selection in describing how we arrive at truth, goodness, and beauty. By the conflict and co-operation of many minds, by a process of trial and error, in short, by experiment, these higher human values are established. Competition is not the sole factor in the establishment of our human values, as it would seem to be at the organic level.

In the case of truth and morality there is a single controlling factor; in the case of art there are two. The scientist is controlled by the structure of the world which he attempts to fathom. In morality we are controlled by our human nature. The artist is controlled by his material but his main objective is to express his own ideas by means of his material. He works under the double control of his material and himself.

The function of the scientist is to keep himself out of his science, otherwise he may be productive of error. The scientist must exercise his personality and his resources so as to get rid of himself. The personality of the artist, on the other hand, is indispensable to the work of art. Alexander points out this distinction when he writes, "Hence while only Shakespere could have written Shakespere, someone else or a committee of others must in the end have discovered the Einsteinian law of gravitation."¹⁰

We have seen that there are levels of perfection in Alexander's evolving universe. He similarly shows that there are levels of perfection among the tertiary qualities. There are no degrees of beauty, goodness, and truth. He says, "In morals there is the order of goodness, in which every good act is equally good, and the order of perfection in which some acts, though not better than others, are more perfect and greater."¹¹ The endowment of a university by a millionaire is a more splendid act than the self-sacrificing gift of a mite by a widow. Alexander also maintains that in art, Scott is a greater novelist than Jane Austen by virtue of the fact that the characters and events which

10. Alexander, "Truth, Goodness and Beauty," p. 626.

11. "Philosophical and Literary Pieces," p. 142.

he deals with are more comprehensive and grander in their range. "The novels of Jane Austen are admittedly specimens of consummate art; but they hardly rank as equally great with those of Scott, because the proportions of the subject matter are less impressive, though the art is probably more exquisite; and certainly not with Shakespeare."¹² Similarly, some scientific hypotheses are more far-reaching in their consequences. The Copernican theory is a more splendid conception than the phlogiston doctrine of the medieval alchemists.

Alexander also sees progress among these human values. Reality is no static entity and consequently truth is an ever-growing adaptation to the expanding flux. Progress is seen in the discovery of the doctrine of relativity by Einstein which supersedes the earlier formulation by Newton. The later truth is fuller and reveals the structure of things more perfectly. In fact, an old truth may become vitiated so that from our vantage point we class it as error. Morality, too, is a growing affair. "Progress is possible in morality because with time, more and more, fresh desires come into purview; fresh problems of harmonization have to be solved; so that there is progress from the morals of primitive man, or even of earlier civilized man such as the Greeks, to that of peoples whose morality is Christianized."¹³ Alexander is uncertain of whether or not there is progress in art. But he is inclined to think that there is also an advance from the Greek statue to that of Michelangelo.

From this review of Alexander's treatment of the tertiary qualities it is readily seen that on all important points the analysis of all three values is done by the same method. This is still another instance of his use of analogy which was so patent a feature of his metaphysical levels of being. We also saw it in his extension of the mind-body relationship from the human level to the other lower and higher levels. We shall now turn to a study of value and note that beginning with the results discovered among the tertiary qualities he transfers them by a rigid use of the principles of analogy to the organic and inorganic worlds.

12. "Morality as an Art," pp. 156-57.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

6

Value

WE HAVE SEEN that the tertiary qualities of beauty, goodness, and truth grow out of the process of evolution when mind becomes reflective. Our discussion has been confined to the highest human values thus far because we are interested in showing Alexander's method in the region of values. You will recall that in Alexander's metaphysical scheme he began with an hypothesis of Space-Time and showed how the world ascended from its simplest form of motion by an emergent evolutionary process up to God. It will also be remembered that Alexander employed a radically different procedure in dealing with mind. In this connection he took the mind-body relationship found on the human level and employed it as an exemplar of the manner in which finites on every level were constituted. There is an element in every finite which performs to it the office of mind. Time performs the office of mind for Space, color performs the office of mind to matter, and so on. Beginning at the human level of mind, Alexander finds there a feature of things which he is able to generalize up and down the entire gamut of his evolutionary schematization.

Similarly, in the case of value, he utilizes the distinctions which have grown out of his analysis of the values of beauty, goodness, and truth at the human level and finds that value partakes of some of these

characteristics in both the sub-human and supra-human spheres. The triad of values also enables us to understand the nature of the animal values which man shares with the lower animals. The highest human values serve as a clue to interpret the other areas of value we encounter on lower and higher levels. The method in the case of value is the same as that by which the mind-body formula is extended to the other levels.

Alexander accepts the challenge of those who would deny him the right to employ such an analogy as that outlined above. He writes,

The hardest thing is to understand that which is simple. We may and must approach it from the complex. But if we identify the simple with the complex we miss the sense of both. We use our knowledge of the complex rightly in interpreting the simple when we discount the circumstances which make it complex. And this is difficult and requires some pains.¹

Alexander wishes to show that our experience with the tertiary qualities is transferable to the newly discovered world below the senses. We must be careful in making this transfer to the lower levels that we do not extend the characters discovered in our higher experience without sufficient evidence. "But, once more, before we transfer it from the world of human values to the world in general, we must first find out what value means even for ourselves and consider how much of it is transferable."²

The principle of analogy is basic to his entire philosophy and the success of his system depends upon his judicious employment of this principle. From his rigid use of the principle of analogy it is seen that values appear at levels below man and are a common feature of all finites.

Mr. Laird, a friend of Alexander, has extended the notion of value below the level of life by his so-called doctrine of "natural election." This doctrine simply states that one thing matters to another. The relation of the magnet and the iron filings illustrates the mutual satisfaction that two things obtain from each other. Chemists have intro-

1. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 269.

2. "The Historicity of Things," p. 21.

duced a similar idea in the notion of valency. The oxygen atom requires two hydrogen atoms to satisfy it. In more recent terms, the outer shell of the chlorine atom has seven electrons revolving in its orbit. Eight is a stable configuration and the needed electron is obtained from the hydrogen atom which attains stability by giving up the electron revolving in its outer shell. The union of hydrogen and chlorine produces a new stable compound, hydrogen chloride. Alexander approves of Mr. Laird's extension of the notion of value to the inorganic world, calling it the most important contribution to the philosophy of value that has been made. Alexander describes his method in the affixed passage. "We can thus trace value upwards and downwards; downwards as I have done, by omitting complexities gradually, upwards by adding fresh elements of intensive meaning as we rise up the scale of being."³

In this presentation we shall reverse Alexander's procedure and as we ascend the scale of being we shall add fresh complexities where we need them to understand value at that level. Among inorganic things value is a relation whereby one thing satisfies the need of another. The notion of a relationship between a subject and an object and the idea of the satisfaction of a human impulse was a patent feature of the highest human values. Therefore the inorganic world exhibits three features of human value. We note first a relation and in that process we see two things, each satisfying the need of the other and a third feature of sociality, sociality below the human level. Alexander suggests this thought in the following passage. "Does not an electron attach itself to other electrons in what may metaphorically be called a social relation?"⁴

Rising to the level of life, it is apparent that in the response of the organism to the environment we have the notion of a relation as well as the satisfaction of an instinct. Value at the level of life also has a third feature, that of objectivity or value for the type.

At the level of life, it is the survival of the type which counts. The

3. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 289.

4. "The Historicity of Things," p. 20.

individual has value in so far as he represents the type. Animals may come and go but the species survives. The satisfaction of an instinct may please the individual animal but that which is valuable promotes the existence of the type and is therefore objective. We may say that values for animals consist of a relation, that they satisfy a need or instinct, and that they are objective in as much as they promote the type and thus have a social value. Animal values have these three features in common with the tertiary qualities.

Since men are also animals of a certain kind, their behaviour is motivated by certain instincts, the satisfaction of which is objective or has value for the type. Like animals they pursue objects which are required for the preservation and continuation of the species. We are moved by the *nisus* in the universe to propagate our kind and the same motivation propels us to maintain ourselves by eating, drinking, and sleeping. Alexander makes his point thus, "The breast has instinctive value for the child, as the lion or tiger values instinctively its prey, or the bird its worms. Such objects are valuable in so far as they promote the type, are necessary to the infant's growth and the like."⁵

As in the case of the human values of goodness, beauty, and truth, these instinctive values in man are so overlaid by higher characteristics that we sometimes fail to perceive their lowly origin in instinct. Without a care for these instinctive values the type would perish. Such instinctive values belong to the type and are necessary for its maintenance.

We discovered that the element of sociality played an important role in the process of arriving at beauty, goodness, and truth. As we have been moving up the scale of being from the bottom rung we have observed that value so far has not included the factor of human sociality. We add it as we enter the region of mixed values. Courage, resourcefulness, high spirits, good looks, strength, a hearty appetite are instinctive, but we admire these qualities and in so doing find that we are next door to reflective approval.

Now we may add the distinctive feature of reflection as we enter

the region of the highest human values. The tertiary qualities, like the previously mentioned values, involve a subject-object relation. Just as at the lowliest level, a subject which values and the object to which value is attached, are required. Likewise the notion of a satisfaction of an impulse is involved. We have a tertiary quality only when the desire to know, to act, or to make has been satisfied. Also in the case of tertiary qualities this desire must be satisfied objectively. The manner in which we arrive at objectively satisfying tertiary qualities consists in the use of judgments. The judgments of the standard mind as to what constitutes beauty, truth, and goodness are proposed, and a sorting out process involving conflict and agreement enables us to set up the criteria for truth, goodness, and beauty. The fact that the objective status of these values are arrived at by the use of verbal statements is the characteristic mark of the highest human values. Speech enables men to attain objective validity for their values and the fact of human reflection and critical judgment distinguishes the tertiary qualities from all lower values, whether human or sub-human.

In tracing the values from their simplest beginnings and showing what elements taken from the analysis of the tertiary qualities are involved and adding more elements as we rise up the scale of being, we have supplied a unification of values which Alexander's presentation implies. When the values are set forth in this way we see that they are mutually interdependent. The lowest values to the highest ones now appear tied together along the ascending scale of being. Alexander unified his metaphysics by showing the interconnection of the emergent levels. By failing to bring out the implicit dependence of the higher values on the lower ones, Alexander, in the case of value, has tended to isolate the instinctive values from the values which lead to art, science, and goodness. He unwarily gives a preciousness to these latter qualities which would be contrary to the spirit of evolution with which he is working. I do not think he means to do this but it is the outcome of his failure to exhibit his series of levels as a rising, connected series. Since man is concerned with instinctive values as well as those which lead on to the human values of good-

ness, beauty, and truth, he should have shown how one grows out of the other and not have left them unattached. By reversing his procedure I trust that I have brought the values encountered at the lower levels into harmony with those which are revealed in man's highest activities.

Between the values just discussed and the tertiary qualities lie economic values. Alexander considers the economic structure from two angles. First of all, he asks us to suppose an economy in which the energies of the people are directed solely toward making a living. He calls this hypothetical economy the Platonic "state of pigs." Goods and services have an instinctive value only and moral value does not exist. I wish to differ here with our author, for how in this hypothetical society could exchange and distribution take place? In fact, how could such a social structure exist? If only its instinctive values counted, no one would produce. Everyone would be engaged in consumption or enjoyment, but no one would produce goods or services. There would be no incentive to set up a productive organization requiring saving—that is, abstaining from enjoying instinctive satisfactions. Even to secure effective distribution within the Platonic state of pigs requires foresight and responsibility which an economy bent on enjoying goods and services at an instinctive level could never have.

In this hypothetical economy food, drink and the service of the mother to the child have a merely instinctive value. The only value is living itself, says Alexander, and therefore no moral values are possible. I should rather say that in the case of plant and animal life adjustment to the environment is as important as mere living. The fast-swimming fish, the hard shell of a deep sea animal are the counterpart among lower forms of animal life of such human virtues as foresight and prudence. Among the lower animals the means by which life may be continued in the future is as important as living instinctively now. My criticism of Alexander here is that he has assumed a human society in which everyone lives instinctively and I maintain that it is not possible to have a purely instinctive approach to life in either the plant or animal world, including man.

If there are to be goods and services in an economy, work must be done to make possible instinctive living. As soon as this happens, and it occurs from the start, those who work are in a position to make out a case against those who do not work and we are immediately confronted with a moral problem—the workers against the enjoyers or spenders. To secure the most effective distribution within a fixed social structure constitutes a moral and economic problem of the first order. To think away the moral side of economic life is to indulge in day-dreaming.

When we advance beyond the state of pigs, the mere maintenance of life gives way to other interests. Humankind then pursues the tertiary qualities, being concerned at the same time with the fundamental drive of keeping the stream of life going. It is at this point in his economic analysis that Alexander introduces moral valuation. He says that moral valuation determines how far I may go in gratifying a taste for owning pictures or for being a robber baron. Public sentiment will rise up against me if I go too far. Yet many students of economics feel that it is at this point that the capitalistic system fails miserably. In a free, democratic society the ideal of a free market makes it possible for unscrupulous men to take advantage of the public and gain an unconscionable economic grip. It is this failure to distribute goods equitably under the system of free enterprise that rouses the Marxians and the socialists to scorn the entire system and advocate its removal and replacement. For them the moral valuation which Alexander suggests as a means of assuaging the grievances of the underdog are weak and ineffective palliatives.

The older economics mainly dealt with production and exchange. A high level of production assured the laborer a fair share of the profits and so there was no problem of distribution. An expanding economy and a free market guaranteed a decent living to everyone. When an economy contracts as in a depression period, the classical type of analysis breaks down and is replaced by the social agitator who points out the need for reforming a system which is rotten from the standpoint of distribution. Economics then loses its status as a science

of exchange and becomes shot through with ethical considerations. Alexander's economic theory does not place enough emphasis on the non-instinctive aspects of the subject. His analysis leads to conformity rather than to an active effort toward social amelioration.

Alexander also fails to make his economic theory cohere with the rest of his system. He writes as if he had never heard of Karl Marx or the economic determination of history. If economic matters are not secure, it is clear that there can be no human values of goodness, beauty and truth. Even if Alexander would not accept economics as the decisive factor in a culture, his treatment of this theme is quite inadequate when one considers the remarkable body of economic literature that exists. Indeed, it is strange that Alexander does not mention the class struggle as a determining influence in the course of human events. One would expect more vigorous thought from Alexander in the social sciences, especially since he takes change and the dynamic process of history seriously in his metaphysics. In his espousal of the doctrine of emergent evolution he makes room for a radical revolutionary eruption in the creative process of the world. But in his economics, he lets himself in for an untenable, reactionary economics which in fact connives at the status quo. Since Alexander was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manchester, we may perhaps forgive him for not giving this subject the attention which economists have persuaded us it deserves.

Furthermore, he could easily have indicated what elements in the human values of goodness, beauty and truth are present in the economic situation. Let us push Alexander's analysis of value in the economic sphere further and we shall see that it shares most of the characteristics of the tertiary qualities. Following the upward ascent of levels, one notes that economic values consist of a relation. The economic relation consists of the acquisitive impulse which is satisfied by the acquiring of goods. Economic goods are necessary for the maintenance of the type and are objective in that sense. Furthermore economics is closely knit with the notion of goodness arrived at socially. How far any one person should go beyond the economic

needs of the group in the direction of luxury is definitely a matter of social reflection and therefore necessarily a moral issue. In this treatment of economics I have attempted to clarify its place in Alexander's general scheme of value and to show the intimate manner in which it is bound up with all the other values. There is a natural ascent of values beginning with natural election up through human psychological values, economic values, the highest human values, i. e., the tertiary qualities, and the values conserved in deity, just as there is a natural ascent of finites from Space-Time to God. This parallel series of value and qualities while not a case of exact correspondence is implicit in Alexander as we have attempted to trace in some detail and to bring out.

Value in the domain of life as well as in mind consists in the complex of the subject with its object. The values of truth, goodness and beauty have arisen by a process of strife among finites at the level of mind. Alexander indicates that the process by which value is reached is the same at any level. The doctrine of natural selection may be applied to the formation of the highest as well as the lowest values. "The minds which judge truly, or behave rightly, or produce or recognize beauty, are the successful types developed on the level of mind, when to consciousness are added reflection or judgment and with it intrinsic sociality." ⁶

Alexander does not endeavor to tell us how natural election, instinct, human impulse, and nisis are related. It is my conviction that the instinct for preservation, that of sex, the impulse for beauty, truth, and goodness are all fragments of a vast cosmic urge or nisis. The nisis which creates new species also preserves them and gives man the vital urge to assuage his impulse for truth, goodness and beauty in science, virtue and art which is the creative nisis of the universe in humanized form. When one draws together his universe of levels with his theory of value, a great gain is made in terms of a unified and coherent system. In the next chapter we shall note in what sense value may be said to be attached to Alexander's conception of God.

6. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, pp. 308-309.

7

Religion

IN REACHING a correct appraisal of Alexander's theology, we must bear in mind that despite the novelty of his conception of God, he is very sympathetic to the demands of the queen of the sciences. The theology which he presents is not a mere appendage to a brilliant metaphysical analysis but is a natural outcome of his treatise on space, time and value. His treatment of deity is the crowning glory of a philosophy that wishes to take into account all of the facts of human experience, both scientific and religious. It is a naturalistic attempt which begins with statements about mathematics, physics, and biology which are honored by men of science, and concludes with observations about religion which may be scrutinized by theologians and men of practical religious faith. In developing his religious viewpoint he leaves revelation out of the picture.

Alexander consistently employs the method of looking to the instinctive basis of man's behavior. It is a searching criticism of atheism because Alexander says that we have within us a craving or a hunger for the divine. We are all endowed with a passion for deity and we are driven by the very nature of the world and ourselves to find an objective correlative for this basic want which we possess. Alexander finds this objective correlative in his account of emergent evolution

and how all things have been fathered by the creative principle of Time. In beginning a discussion of deity, let us recall the main outlines of his treatment of the tertiary qualities. There is an appetite or impulse in us which finds its completion in the discovery of truth. There is a social passion or impulse in us that demands our fulfillment within a social harmony. Our constructive impulse seeks its realization in a work of art.

Alexander applies the same analysis to deity. There is a passion in us that seeks for its satisfaction God. The impulse in man which leads to deity is just as valid as the impulses which lead to each of the tertiary qualities.

But there are always the tendencies to act and to know. Just so the impulse of love implies a mate of whom it sets a man in search; and the instinct towards one's fellows implies them and enables us to know them. Perhaps in the same way the impulse to worship implies a God, in searching for whom we get to know him.¹

In this sense Alexander agrees with those theologians who maintain that God comes to us through religious feeling. The instinct or drive within us will not give us peace until we have found Him. And we are so moved to find Him because the human impulses which lead to the discovery of art, truth, and goodness, are part of the *nisus* in the universe which sweeps all things toward deity. Alexander's metaphysical description of God rests on the solid foundation of an impulse or urge within man to discover deity.

Therefore, man first discovers God unreflectively and emotionally. God satisfies his religious craving. As in the case of truth, knowledge comes by doing, so also in religion, we find by experience that God is the one who satisfies our religious need. God is the correlative of the religious sentiment, just as food is correlative to our hunger. That which we worship is God.

The religious sentiment unfortunately leaves us without theoretical assurance of God's reality and this needs to be implemented by metaphysical inquiry. Alexander declares,

1. "The Basis of Realism," p. 27.

The religious description wants authentic coherence with the system of things. The metaphysical one wants the touch of feeling which brings it within the circle of human interests. Were the passion towards God not already lit, no speculative contemplation or proof of His existence or attributes of a metaphysical God would make Him worshipful.²

Before the appearance of sophisticated arguments for the existence of God, men were acutely aware of His existence through the religious sentiment. The distinctive element in that sentiment is the feeling of our going out towards something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, with which we are in communion. As in the pursuit of truth, the religious appetite does not make its object but discovers it. In civilized societies cognition and emotion are so inter-mixed that cognition may seem to precede emotional experience. Actually this is not so, for it is the emotional life which discovers the object which then becomes material for cognitive deliberation. Alexander admirably phrases it, thus:

That God is present in the thunderstorm is discovered only in the feeling which is our outgoing towards something or other which works through the thunderstorm or resides therein. That there is this something or other is not the discovery of reflection. The metaphysical interpretation of deity as that to which the world is tending, or any other metaphysical interpretation of God, is as far as possible from being an original discovery of knowledge; it is only possible to reflection working upon primitive notions already acquired. Even the idea that there is something mysterious which we fear or reverence is never in the first instance a piece of cognition; but it is revealed to our wondering response, our uneasy astonishment and curiosity. It is the feeling or emotion which images the object, not the idea which induces the emotion.³

Our awareness of God comes to us in the same way as eating flesh or grain. We have hunger pangs and by appropriating food we note that it is edible and satisfies our hunger. In like manner, our religious impulse is satisfied when we discover God. In the words of the Psalmist, "Taste and see that the Lord is good." Alexander dismisses the traditional proofs of the existence of God as no longer convincing.

2. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, 342.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 375.

He sets four requirements which a conception of God must have in order to satisfy the religious sentiment. God must be greater than man, He must be universal, He must be different in quality from man, and He must be responsive to the needs of man. Let us examine the last of these criteria. Alexander finds the responsiveness of God to man the most vital feature of the religious sentiment, especially in the higher religions. It is similar to the father-child relationship, in which the child senses a mysterious something over him, which he discovers to be like himself. The father sustains the child, issues arbitrary commands, which the child must obey. When the religious consciousness deepens, one does not attribute the commands of God to caprice, but to an inscrutable but wise Providence. God sustains His children by His love and they may rely upon Him in trustful assurance that God does not deceive. But this is a double-sided relationship as well. Even though man needs God, so also God needs man and is dependent upon man. We, too, may help God. Our religious life represents a co-operation between God and ourselves. The point to be stressed here is that according to the religious philosophy of Alexander this basic need for co-operation between the divine and man is satisfied. He states his case in this fashion.

So far as this is the case, the religious consciousness attests the philosophical conception that God's deity is the issue in Time of a tendency or *nisus* in the world, of which our minds and everything else of the nature of mind is the proximate highest outcome—an issue which is dependent on the nature of things lower than itself.⁴

Leading into the discussion of the relation of religion to conduct, Alexander considers several approaches to God. The first path is via natural phenomena. In its primitive form it is the religious sense of awe felt in the presence of natural powers. Religion in its primitive form is less closely allied to morality than it is to the uneasiness or sensitiveness which people feel, more or less, in the presence of mysterious natural occurrences, such as a thunderstorm, volcano, or hurricane.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 388.

Though fear of the thunderstorm is not itself religion, it may be the occasion of it, and at least a person who takes refuge in uncontrollable panic from a thunderstorm may with as good a right be said to be hiding himself from the face of God, as one who is oppressed with the consciousness of sin.⁵

Art is another avenue by which we approach the mysterious. Music, dancing and the other arts have proved themselves valuable as a means of expressing religious feeling and giving vent to our awareness of God. Similarly, the scientific investigator or philosopher in his quest for truth, as he delves deeper into his subject, may become deeply impressed with the vast beyond so that the insight which he has obtained dwarfs into insignificance. The search for truth, therefore, may give one a sense of religious awe and mystery.

The readiest approach to religion, says Alexander, is that of conduct. Custom is sacred from the beginning. Religious leaders may maintain that a code of morals comes from God. Religion and conduct are not distinguished in the early stages of social history. Religion is also communal in character. It binds people together and becomes institutionalized. Where there are institutions and questions of power, morality becomes pertinent. But Alexander insists that although religion and moral values are connected, yet they are distinct. A religious sense may exist in scoundrels or people who have no special feeling for goodness. Such persons may have an acute sense of the mystery of life but do not make a connection between this and moral obligation. On the other hand, we often find virtuous people who are deity blind. He concludes,

Since experience shows that there may be religion without virtue, and virtue without religion, we conclude that, however closely related, the two sentiments, that for deity and that for goodness, are distinct. . . . The religious emotion is as unique and self-sufficient as hungry appetite and love.⁶

Religion does not need morality and art to bolster it, but is merely stimulated to action through these as well as other means. The passion

5. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

6. *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

for deity seizes on moral and other values and "treats them as conditions to the enjoyment of itself, and offers a solution of the problems which they present." ⁷ Alexander states in a note that although Ethical Societies are admirable institutions they fail to come to grips with the religious problem. Hence we must distinguish our experience of religion from the enthusiasm and passion which surrounds our pursuit of beauty, morality and truth. From our moral life and the problems which beset us there, we could never arrive at the brute sentiment of deity.

We are now in a position to describe Alexander's metaphysical approach to God. Most religious thinkers would agree with Alexander that God is first felt through religious emotion. The area of disagreement would revolve about the validity of construing God both as process and as an emerging deity. As an intellectual elaboration of the nature of God, it is liable to all the censures which may be directed at such speculation.

The title of Alexander's Gifford Lectures, *Space, Time, and Deity*, is in fact a short summary of his philosophy. Space-Time, pure motion, or events, is the elementary matrix from which all higher existents have emerged, and the highest existent which we know is mind. In a lecture delivered before the British Academy in January, 1914, he stated that he had the conviction, which he could not defend, that there is only one matrix, Space-Time, from which all qualities arise. With regard to deity, he defines it as "an empirical quality the next in the series which the very nature of Time compels us to postulate." ⁸ It is unthinkable that Time should have stopped creating with the emergence of man. It is the very nature of Time to go on ceaselessly creating new orders of finites.

Primordial Space-Time is the basis of all future development and it is from this pure motion that Time sweeps out into Space ever more complex configurations of finite existences. Space-Time in all its varied history is compelled from its very nature continually to dis-

7. *Ibid.*, p. 407.

8. *Op. cit.*, p. 352.

charge fresh patterns into Space. Alexander declares, "the nîsus in the world which drives it, because of Time, to the generation of fresh empirical qualities is a verifiable fact. Its extension from mind to deity is an application of what can be traced as existent already."⁹

Alexander insists that we take Time seriously. For everything, as he conceives it, is subject to Time. God is no static ideal which stands at the end of a long process of evolutionary development. He is also engulfed in the process of the world and is involved in the spinning out of the world in Time. Nothing is at rest for everything is caught in the flux of becoming. Alexander makes this statement:

The discovery of Time means that we are to rid ourselves of this innocent habit of mind, and regard the world as through and through and intrinsically historical, and treat everything in it as events, not merely what are obviously events, but the most permanent things also, which seem to us fixed in their repose—stones, and hills and tables—which become what Mr. Whitehead calls "chunks of events." This is the simple meaning of the proposition of the mathematicians that we live in a four-dimensional world. It is another and purely mathematical way of saying that Time is not something which happens to extend things, but that there is no extended thing which is not temporal, that there is no reality but that of events, and that Space has no reality apart from Time, and that in truth neither has any reality in itself, but only as involved in the ultimate reality of the system of events.¹⁰

We may view the universe as subject to the nîsus which in its creative phase flings ever new finites on to the stage of the world. By a backward and downward glance we may see the qualities which the nîsus has already engendered. One of the earlier qualities to emerge was matter, another was color, another, life, and the highest quality we are cognizant of is the human mind. By a creative spurt qualities which are subject to scientific and human observation appeared. Undergirding each of these qualities is Space-Time, for we may be sure that no quality exists without this underlying structure. Furthermore, when a quality makes its appearance in the universe, it is always in-

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 367-68.

10. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, pp. 350-51.

corporated in some finite. We might define a finite as a configuration of Space-Time with a characteristic quality.

The world from Space-Time upwards exhibits a series of finites, growing in complexity, and bearing new qualities. This universe of levels is arranged in an order of perfection. The more perfect finites are those which emerged at a later date. The most perfect finite which we know of is the human mind, but the plan of emergence which we have observed in the inorganic and organic worlds is prophetic of the next higher quality, that of deity. Alexander states it in this way.

Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars are still raised to the unknown God. What we know of it is but its relation to the other empirical qualities which precede it in time. Its nature we cannot penetrate. . . . It is fitly described in this analogical manner as the colour of the universe. For colour, we have seen, is a new quality which emerges in material things in attendance on motions of a certain sort. Deity in its turn is a quality which attends upon, or more strictly is equivalent to, previous or lower existences of the order of mind which itself rests on a still lower basis of qualities, and emerges when certain complexities and refinements of arrangements have been reached.¹¹

For this view of God as process Alexander has been sharply criticized. A friend of his jested to him of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who is to exist a million years hence. Actually this is a result of misunderstanding, for the God of Alexander is subject to the process of Time and does not represent a fixed and permanent quality. He stands under the Promethean threat of being displaced. Broad, in his review of *Space, Time, and Deity*, makes a similar error when he writes, "It might indeed seem difficult to feel much enthusiasm about a God who does not yet exist, and who will cease to be divine as soon as He begins to be actual."¹² In "Some Explanations," Alexander defends himself with the following rejoinder.

11. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 347.

12. C. D. Broad, "Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures," *Mind*, N.S., 30, p. 148.

Mr. Broad deserts his scientific sobriety for a moment to 'parody' my 'theology': "God never is, but always to exist, and there is no God, but gods." This is not quite exact. What I say is that God as actually possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole Universe tending toward deity does exist. . . . Mr. Broad's suggestion of actual gods I have myself mentioned. I identify them with 'angels.' ¹³

The God of Alexander is the process whereby the next higher finite is reached. He is constantly in embryo and when an actual finite makes its way onto the stage the quality of deity passes on to that which is to be its successor. "But if deity is realized we have passed beyond the conception of actual God, the infinite world tending to deity; and God for the angels is an infinite being still transcending them in quality." ¹⁴

It has been suggested above that Alexander identifies God with process. Can we not say that God is process and in our religious life worship becoming as such? This is a question which readily occurs to the reader and Alexander answers it. We cannot identify God with Space-Time for the simple reason that Space-Time leaves out the quality of deity and it is precisely this quality of deity which is the object of religious worship. Space-Time may excite our speculative or mathematical enthusiasm, and it may stimulate our intuition, but it does not arouse our religious emotion. However, if true philosophizing forced us to say that God is Space-Time, we would have to accept it. But any speculative account is incomplete which ignores the religious experience which men have of deity.

It is in answering the question of whether it is possible to identify God with Space-Time that Alexander avoids the pitfall of a reductive analysis. God is not simply Space-Time, for that would rob him of his distinctive quality of deity, which He just as surely possesses as He possesses that of Space-Time. The universe is not merely spatio-temporal. We perceive that it also has materiality, life, and mind. Although Alexander construes the world in terms of the mathematical and physical sciences, he does not rob it of color, sound, life, and mind,

13. Alexander, "Some Explanations," *Mind*, N.S., 30, p. 428.

14. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 361.

which are empirical qualities not known to us until after they have emerged. The universe is determined, but there are novelties. The world may be expressed without remainder in terms of Space and Time but there also exists that triad of tertiary qualities—truth, goodness, and beauty—along with other emergents of a lower order. Alexander makes the distinction:

On the one hand we have the totality of the world, which in the end is spatio-temporal; on the other, the quality of deity is engendered, or rather being engendered, within that whole. These two features are united in the conception of the whole world *as expressing itself in the character of deity*, and it is this and not bare Space-Time which for speculation is the ideal conception of God.¹⁵

Therefore, although the universe may be expressed without remainder in terms of Space-Time, it is not merely spatio-temporal. Within Space-Time we may note a series of empirical qualities in their increasing grades of perfection.

We have already seen how Alexander arrives at his metaphysical conception of deity, and in the following reference we may note how he adumbrates the quality of deity by re-introducing the subject of angels.

There is a *nisus* in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence. There is nothing in mind which requires us to stop and say this is the highest empirical quality which Time can produce from now through-out the infinite Time to come. It is only the last empirical quality which we who are minds happen to know. Time itself compels us to think of a later birth of Time. For this reason it was legitimate for us to follow up the series of empirical qualities and imagine finite beings which we called angels, who would enjoy their own angelic being but would contemplate minds as minds themselves cannot do, in the same way as mind contemplates life and lower levels of existence. This device was adopted half-playfully as a pictorial embodiment of the conception forced upon us by the fact that there is this series of levels of existence. It was used illustratively to point the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation. But we now can see that it is a serious conception. For the

15. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, pp. 353–54. Italics mine.

angelic quality the possession of which enables such beings to contemplate minds is this next higher empirical quality of deity and our supposed angels are finite beings with this quality.¹⁶

For men, deity is the next higher empirical quality above mind, but the description of deity may be generalized. Deity is the next higher empirical quality for any level of existence. Therefore as the world grows in Time the quality of deity is also variable. For each finite, the new unknown quality which looms ahead is deity. For us who live on the level of mind, we can but repeat that deity is deity. To creatures on the level of life, the quality of deity lies ahead of them, but to us, to whom it has been revealed, it is mind. For creatures made up of mere empirical configurations of Space-Time, their God is matter, assuming that there is nothing between spatio-temporality and matter. Deity, for each level of finite existents, is some "unknown," though not "unexperienced" quality in front, the real nature of which is enjoyed by the creatures of the next level. Material beings cannot forecast life, nor can unthinking creatures predict mind or even think. Alexander adds at this point,

If we think ourselves back into material existence, we should feel ourselves, though matter would be the highest that we know, still swept on in the movement of Time. A merely material universe would not be exhausted by materiality and its lower empirical qualities; there would still be that restless movement of Time, which is not the mere turning of a squirrel in its cage, but the *nisus* toward a higher birth.¹⁷

By the birth of qualities at successive levels of existence, Alexander has escaped the snare of the Atomists. His universe is not a mere shuffling and reshuffling of atoms in the manner of Democritus. Apparently the nature of God does not change because of the appearance of new qualities. These new qualities emerge mysteriously but do not affect the universe of Space-Time. One wonders how Alexander would reconcile his view that the *nisus* in the world continually creates new novelties with the view held by scientists that the world, like grand-

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 346.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 348.

father's clock, is running down. Certainly in the previous paragraph it is evident that Alexander is putting a great strain on his reasoning by analogy. It must be granted, however, that he uses this device in a daring and imaginative manner.

The world is not exhausted by intellect alone. The *nisus* toward that which is higher is also part of it. It is this tendency which affects the mind in other ways than by cognition, although these ways are subject to our cognitive capacity. On this analysis the object of religious sentiment is not a figment of our minds. It is not a subjective fiction, for we are always in its presence. Some of us may feel its presence more, others, less. At some times we may be more keenly aware of it than at others, just as we have no relish for delicate foods when we are sated. Sensitivity to the object of religious adoration runs the gamut in people from extreme sensitivity to complete callousness. Individuals may be deity-blind just as some are tone-deaf or color-blind. Most people have some degree of sensitivity to the call of deity, just as most people see colors and not mere grays.

Alexander also gives a similar answer to the question of how a future quality such as deity can affect us. Our environment is replete with this tendency toward deity. That which works upon our religious suggestibility is the actual world, but that actual world has within it the seeds for future development. Some, as Alexander, may have a sense that this *nisus* will carry us somewhere. What it will be, or its nature, he does not state with scientific certitude. Alexander in a sense is a clairvoyant who senses the direction in which the *nisus* moves. He does not know what will be the future quality of deity, but only senses it as giving a flavor to his whole experience of the world. Alexander, like Spinoza, 'is a God-intoxicated man.'

Nor do we have a special organ through which the religious sentiment works. We obtain knowledge of the external world through our sense organs and a knowledge of the categories through intuition. We find truth by reflection, and beauty through the process of appreciation, but the religious response has no special channel through

which it operates. Seemingly it is the response of the entire personality of man to the universe which reveals God to him. In the following quotation Alexander describes the path by which religious illumination comes to us.

But the religious appetite or emotion depends upon the whole make-up or constitution of the mind and body, and is the response of it to the whole of reality in its nisus towards a new quality. In that forward movement due to the onward sweep of Time our minds with their substructure of body are caught, and our religious response is at once the mark that we are involved in that nisus, and that our minds contribute in their part towards it. The world in its bearing towards a new empirical quality may be concealed from the cognitive mind, for though we are always in cognitive compresence with what is outside us, neither can the new empirical quality be contemplated, for we know not what it is, nor even enjoyed, since it is higher than mind. It makes itself felt in the religious sense, which thus discovers the world it sees to be clothed with divinity.¹⁸

We have been discussing Alexander's notion of God as becoming, but he also speaks of deity as a plurality of realized gods or angels. His usage of the term deity in these two different ways needs clarification. We have been discussing his monotheism. Now we shall turn to his polytheism which envisages a world filled with many gods. Deities exist everywhere in the world. Materiality is deity to Space-Time, life is deity to materiality, mind is deity to life, and angels or gods are deity to mind. This plan follows Alexander's scheme of construing the world in terms of the mind-deity relationship which finds its counterpart in the lower levels. The conclusion to be drawn from Alexander's view that a man is a god to a plant or an animal, would be that finite gods do exist for plants, animals and stones. The finite god for each of them is the next higher level in the hierarchy of being which we know exists by observation. For Alexander as well as Thales, the world is in this sense full of finite gods. But Alexander also considers the question as to whether finite gods or angels exist for man. If the analogy which he has stressed for the sub-human world holds for the human and supra-human ones, then assuredly we

18. *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

might deduce angels or finite gods from that relation. But Alexander refuses to extend the analogy found in an observable world to a sphere which lies beyond the range of empirical testing. He speculates as follows: that if Time has brought forth finite gods they do exist; if not, then they belong to the future.

If they do exist ("millions of spirits walk the earth") they are not recognizable in any form of material existence known to us; and material existence they must have; though conceivably there may be such material bodies, containing also life and mind as the basis of deity, in regions of the universe beyond our ken.¹⁹

Alexander tries to clarify this notion of an infinite God and finite gods by reference to the emergence of mind. At the period in the history of the universe when there was no mind, the *nisus* was toward the creation of an infinite mind. When mind came to birth in the universe, it was found that there were many finite minds but no one infinite mind. Beyond mind, the highest existent that we know, looms the next quality—deity. The ideal toward which all striving is directed is God, viewed in his transcendent aspect. When it has been reached, it gives way to another ideal, and so on *ad infinitum*. Infinite deity is the infinite world straining after deity and the realization of deity makes deity finite.

Alexander has here stated the Platonic version of the creation. Each time the *nisus* of Space-Time creates, a plurality of things or a class of objects arises. When a new class of finites is created a previous unity is shattered. Apparently, too, it is always a class and not an individual which is born. And the great original keeps forever cracking up and exploding into ever more pluralistic forms as the creative process goes on. Creation, in this sense, is similar to the descent of the ideal forms into a world of concretions. Whenever the process assumes new forms, it shatters into a plurality of finite existents. In picturesque language we might say that the imperishable process is God and its fragments are sons of God. Let us have recourse to Alexander's language on this point.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 365.

If the possessor of deity were an existent individual he must be finite and not infinite. Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a *nisus* to deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its objects as actually realized in an individual form.²⁰

This infinite which is Space-Time straining toward deity is not a creator but is subject to the on-going creative process which is Time. God, according to Alexander, is also caught in the change, and varies in His transcendent empirical quality of deity as Time goes on. Alexander admits that finite deities may exist and out of deference to man's mythologizing temper sketches such a being. The picture which he draws is imaginative and there is no scientific ground for believing in such an entity.

This being must be conceived on the analogy of ourselves. In us, one part of ourselves is the bearer of the quality of mind. A specialized constellation of living processes carries this quality of mind. The rest of the body in its material and spatio-temporal aspects sustains the life of the mind-bearing portion. The immediate basis of this finite deity is something of the nature of mind, just as our mind rests on the immediate basis of life. We, who are pieces of Space-Time, are differentiated in part of our life so as to be mind; in the case of deity, a mental piece of Space-Time is differentiated so as to be divine. This deity is sustained by all of Space-Time to which it belongs of however low an order. The finite gathers up into its divinity its whole body, only in its body are included mind as well as all of the other characters of a body which has mind.

Alexander goes on to add:

The mental structure of which a portion more complex and subtle is the bearer of deity, must not be thought necessarily to be a human mind or aggregation of such, but only to be of mental order. To assume it to be of the nature of human mind would be as if a race of sea-weeds were to hold that mind when it comes (the quality of deity for sea-weeds) must be founded on the life of the sea-weeds, and minds the offspring of sea-weeds.

20. *Op. cit.*, pp. 361-62.

What form the finite god would assume we cannot know, and it is idle to guess. The picture has been drawn merely in order to give some kind of definiteness to the vague idea of a higher quality of existence, deity as founded upon the highest order of existence we know.²¹

We may now return to a discussion of the infinite God which is the whole of Space-Time with its tendency toward deity. The body of God contains all the levels of empirical existence with their emergent qualities. The body of God includes everything and nothing exists outside of it. Our minds and the other emergents are members of God's body. We are, as it were, the hunger, thirst, heart-beats and sweat of God. Like the relation of our mind to our body, the deity of God is located in a portion of His body. God includes the entire universe, but His deity, although infinite, is found only in a part of the universe.

The conceptions of finite gods and infinite God are different. The finite gods were a product of Alexander's mythologizing imagination, whereas infinite God was the outcome of his speculative efforts. In his pictorializing of the finite gods, Alexander carried us to the next order of finites, while in his reflective approach he enabled us to see the whole world as tending toward deity. Polytheism satisfies the religious and speculative claim for a higher quality of existent. The deity is sought in finite forms and conceived in human patterns. But polytheism fails to see a God who has a body co-extensive with the whole world. Greek polytheism seeks to remedy this defect by introducing the idea of fate to which even Zeus is subject. In this way we are made to see the totality of things in their finite quality. In Alexander's theology, the *nisus* in the universe toward the production of new emergents in the future is God seen in His transcendent aspect. This is His deity. His immanence includes the total past history and present state of the world, which is total Space-Time and accompanying qualities. This is His body.

One of the interesting points to be noted in Alexander's philosophy of religion is his way of formulating solutions to vexatious theological

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

problems. Their paradoxical character vanishes under the impact of his speculative genius. We shall notice this in his treatment of the problem of evil, the problem of suffering, the problem of predestination and that of a transcendent and pantheistic god. From hints he drops it is plain that he considers these problems insoluble when stated in terms of classical theology, but making the best of sense when fitted into his world view. God suffers with us, His allies, in the fight against evil. Nor does God have foreknowledge, for the next higher finite, which is to emerge, is known neither to us nor to God, until after it has appeared. God, too, is involved in the problems which beset us and Him in the unraveling of Time. Let us examine in more detail Alexander's criticism of the way in which the immanence and transcendence of God are generally rationalized and then consider the manner in which these notions are harmonized in Alexander's metaphysical scheme. In theism God is set above the world. He is a transcendent being distinct from the finite creatures who make up the world. Its strength lies in the fact that the finite being retains his individuality. Man is free. But the relation between man and God is not clear. If the creation involves a tie between God and man, why, we may ask, is there evil in the world? Likewise, God's connection with nature is arbitrary, postulated rather than explained. Alexander suggests the difficulties in this statement.

The God of a strict theism is therefore artificially related to his creatures. He is one of a multitude of beings, infinite while they are finite, but does not live their life (as in some sense the Pantheistic God does), but remains outside them, ruling them by his power or wise governance or attracting them through love for him.²²

On the other hand, Alexander recognizes that the difficulty with pantheism resides in the fact that the individual loses his identity by sinking into the divine. The pantheist is absorbed in God and is one of His modes and is identified with the divine. Nor can man make any impact on God or influence Him in any way. Thus in pantheism man is minimized and his stature dwarfed into insignificance. A

22. *Op. cit.*, p. 391.

further objection to pantheism lies in the fact that God is all, both good and evil. This outlaws Him as an object of worship, for we presumably do not worship evil. Therefore, although pantheism supplies the continuity between God and man, it does so by blotting out the individual. As a practical solution to the religious problem, pantheism is forced to find some workable compromise. In this analysis of pantheism, Alexander has presented a clear picture of the difficulties it entails.

Alexander believes that he has solved the riddle of transcendence and immanence by combining the theistic and pantheistic viewpoints. He declares that his theology involves both and in case of a choice he would throw his weight with the theists, for deity, not Space-Time, is what is characteristic of God. He states that God is immanent in respect of His body but transcendent in respect of His deity.

For His deity is the outgrowth in Time of the preceding qualities of existence as contained within Space-Time, and while His deity is fed by lower finites, He Himself not only transcends them in quality but, including them all within His body and representing in His deity the goal of their efforts, releases them from their isolation as individuals and sustains them and gives them a significance which as mere individuals they do not possess.²³

Since God's body is the whole of Space-Time, all finites are included in him, while preserving their individuality. This is Alexander's pantheism. The distinctive quality which he is to attain, his deity, that toward which the process tends, represents Alexander's view of God's transcendence. The distinctive quality of God is not mind but the next higher quality. He is not an anthropomorphic being with personality and mental powers like those of man, raised to a higher pitch, but transcends all finites, because He is the whole world as tending toward a higher order of finites. Here Alexander is emphasizing the theistic conception of God. From this, it may be seen, that God is immanent in a different way than that in which He is transcendent.

Religious faith is faith in the existence of deity. Alexander rejects

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 395.

those who, like Höffding, have defined religion as faith in the conservation of values. Alexander says that Höffding was wrong in stating that religion is an outgrowth from goodness and other human values. For the same reason Alexander rejects Bradley's dictum that "morality is led beyond itself into a higher form of goodness. It ends in what we may call religion."²⁴ According to Alexander, deity, although it is not equivalent to goodness, is on the side of goodness. We have already dealt with value at the human level and in the organic and inorganic worlds, and have seen that each level has its own distinctive values and that they are all interrelated. Animal instincts were humanized in man and became the basis for the higher values. The animal instincts were not destroyed in becoming the human impulses for beauty, goodness and truth. They were conserved and transmuted. For the present we shall explore the relationship of value to deity, which will naturally lead us to a consideration of Alexander's solution of the problem of evil.

Deity is not to be identified with human and other values, for values are sub-human adaptations and human inventions, and deity is ultra-human. We have seen that there is an order of perfection and an order of value, and deity belongs to the order of perfection. Deity is a quality of God who is a being on a higher level of existence and for us He exists without a rival. The various types of good life constitute an order of perfection, just as successful plants and animals are more or less complex in their development. This idea of perfection is exemplified in the tribal state with its primitive laws, the ancient Greek state with its rule by custom and status, and the modern state with its ideal of the self-legislative man. The idea of perfection is founded on these differences of development. While there are grades of perfection there are no degrees of value. "Value is at any stage the distinction between what on that level is fitting and what is defeated in the contest or struggle with it."²⁵ God is the highest being in the universe but He

24. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 406.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 410.

cannot be called the highest value for he cannot be contrasted with any unvalue. Only when deity is realized and shattered into finite deities may we have value, for value is a character of finite existence of however high a level. The quest for survival by the self-centered use of superior strength and intelligence is not the sole means by which value is established among men. In his treatment of the tertiary qualities Alexander shows that other factors enter into the situation. Tradition, kindness, helpfulness, mitigate the harsh operation of the laws of survival in human society, but are inoperative in the lower forms of life.

Alexander asserts that it is a tempting hypothesis to construe God in terms of value and neglect His characteristic quality of deity. Thought of in this way, God would represent the line of values in the universe from subhuman 'values' upward. Each successive type of varying grades of perfection would have demonstrated its value whether in the natural or human world by defeating its rivals, thus creating the line of values as distinct from unvalues. The Manichean conception divides the universe between good and evil. The trouble here is that God is connected with goodness but loses His connection with evil and the totality of things. There is further no continuity of values as is here presumed. In Alexander's presentation a higher value may make use of a lower one. God may use Satan to His own purpose.

Elements emerge from the chaos of evil and are built up into good, as crops are nourished by excrement, or as one animal type may feed on the weaklings of a lower type which are not swift enough to escape. If the whole universe is, according to our conception, the body of God, this difficulty does not arise, for evil and good are present there together.²⁶

Deity is a type of perfection superior to human goodness, beauty, and truth, and also other lower forms of life, because it is different in quality. Though God is beyond morality, yet His deity is on the side of goodness. Goodness, according to the definition of Alexander, in either the human or the subhuman sphere, is that which prevails

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 411.

over against that which fails, or the evil type. That which prevails in the long run in the struggle for existence establishes its value and is consequently good. Alexander's position on this point follows.

For goodness, whether we are considering the human values or the sub-human values, is the character of the permanent as opposed to the impermanent contrasted evil. The universe works in experience so as to secure the survival of good, or rather that which survives in the long run in the contest establishes its value thereby and is good. To repeat a saying already quoted, "morality is the nature of things." The history by which new types of finites come into existence is, we have seen, the natural history of values.²⁷

The lower type of successful existents makes it possible for a higher type to arise. The higher lives on the lower and the chain of levels which results makes it appear that a Providence has arranged matters. But it is Space-Time itself, without forethought, and by virtue of its own *nisus*, which has elaborated it.

By observing the lower empirical qualities we may conclude by analogy that the process by which good overcomes evil in the region of the mind is one of the conditions of the emergence of deity, so far as human endeavor contributes to the generation of this quality. Deity thus is in the line of goodness and not of evil.

Good will, and each lower form of goodness, are types adapted to the world under the conditions of which their existence is carried on. Such adaptation carries with it the victory over ill-adapted types, which are evil. Deity is the distinctive quality of the higher type of perfection in this line of forms.²⁸

Deity is in the line of goodness, not of evil, and it is shaped from the materials of goodness or good will. Although God's deity is on the side of goodness, yet it should be remembered that evil exists in the body of God. God as deity is infinite, and the assumption is that good will triumph in the end, although the warfare is between finites at any level and involves a struggle between values and unvalues. The good will always triumph because the good value is defined as the form

27. *Ibid.*, p. 413.

28. *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

which has the best qualifications and will make the best adjustment in a given situation. The finite form which succeeds or triumphs in its trend toward deity purges itself of evil by discharging its unvalue into space outside itself. But God is infinite and there is no place outside Himself into which He may cast His useless parts. The evil in the universe is re-adapted and transmuted in such a way as to make it subservient to the cause of goodness and ultimately deity.

A functioning organism will illustrate this. Life means the death of certain parts of the animal. Life casts off useless poisons, gases and excrement. But the continued vitality of an organism depends upon those elements in the animal body which contribute to its life, which is its good. Goodness, beauty and truth are values which directly contribute to the life of deity, whereas evil, ugliness and error are unvalues which deity discards and must be transformed and readapted before they can be utilized.

It has been noted that deity has its roots or structure in some form of mind, just as mind has its structure in life. Deity is the next higher quality above mind and grows out of mind, and particularly out of valuable mental life. Deity, having its ground in mind, also shares the values of mental life. Thus in turn, proceeding by analogy again, we may see value in the levels below mind, and since the universe of levels is interdependent, deity is in the line of all value both human and subhuman. This is nicely summarized in the concluding paragraphs of an interesting article by Alexander entitled, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of Mind."

Somewhat in this fashion the universe as a whole may be revealed to us, first kindling us into emotion and then bodied forth as the object of that emotion. But the more specific religious object emerges when, in this world, as a whole, a distinction takes place between that part of it which makes for good and that part of it which makes for evil. For though evil is vanquished in the struggle for good, the evil and struggle are there: Ormuzd may overcome Ariman, but Ariman is a reality. As the world goes on in time a sorting out is effected of those parts of it which make for continuance and those which, though real, fail and perish. Among minds the failures are those which miss truth, the ignorant and the prejudiced

and the sophisters: those which miss goodness, the vicious; and the sordid which miss beauty. The developed sentiment of religion finds its objects in this continuously growing part of the universe which represents in a now famous phrase, the conservation of values. . . . All values are contained in God. . . . Man's dependence upon God and his worship of Him is part of man's own contribution to the conservation of values.²⁹

Although it is important to make such a statement as the one outlined above, it does not give us the liberty to say that religion is faith in the conservation of value. Religion is faith in God Who has the quality of deity, and when we reflect upon it, we see that it is in the line of value. Religion is simply the crude awareness by mind that there is something with a distinct quality of its own beyond it. It is like the apprehension of any other quality such as color or life, except that we cannot state the nature of this new quality since it has not been revealed to sense or thought. We are only certain that it is there. God is the immediate outgrowth of our values, but He depends upon the whole gamut of value—human, living or natural. "Deity is the outcome of the onward sweep of all that is persistent and counts in the economy of the world."³⁰

Alexander's insistence that evil as well as good belongs to God's body recalls the famous suggestion of Origen that the Devil, being a part of the universe, would ultimately be redeemed when God would be all in all. Alexander declares, "We have here the foundation for reflective religious ideas of ultimate redemption of evil in all its shapes by purgation or other process whereby God 'unmakes but to remake the soul.'"³¹ Similarly, he avers that the unvalues perish and are reworked and remoulded so that they may contribute to the purposes of deity. We cannot solve the problem of evil if we imagine that as in pantheism deity is equally in all the parts and not rather in that part which is to be the carrier of deity. Nor can we solve it as in theism where God is remote from the world and not responsible for the evil

29. Alexander, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of Mind," pp. 65-66.

30. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 417.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

in it. These attempts at a solution to the problem of evil are impossible because in them God has the attributes of timelessness. Once Time is conceived as an essential factor in God's existence and that He is subject to Time and development, deity evolves continuously in successive types of adaptation. Socrates said, "Evil, O Glaucon, will not vanish from the earth." Alexander's retort is that it cannot disappear, for it is through the defeat of evil that perfect types acquire value. Evil is like a discord in music which is later resolved, but it must be remembered that the discord remains an integral part of the musical composition. But in the world of change, the resolution of good and evil is effected on the next higher level.

Alexander also considers the problem of suffering as it affects theism and his own system. In theism a timeless God stands outside the turmoil of the world. Apparently God does not concern Himself with the world, for the just often suffer bitterly and needlessly. The theme is given a classic statement by Thomas Hardy in his poem, "God Forgotten." If God precedes the world and is responsible for all that happens therein, why should He not spare His creatures pain? The question is asked by the author of the book of Job, but no answer is given. That the just suffer remains an inscrutable mystery of God. Alexander amplifies the query by setting the same question against the background of World War I. How can we, he asks, rest content with the idea of a God Who permits these sufferings to exist but does not share them? All of these perplexing questions are settled, says Alexander, if deity is thought of as the outcome of the world's movement and its value dependent upon the efforts of the human species. God, too, is caught in the struggle and is engendered among other ways by blood, sweat and tears. It is the struggle itself which determines deity and which ideal is to prevail. God is not then responsible for the miseries endured, but He also suffers and we are responsible agents and can determine to some extent the character of deity. A man will use prayer as a means of giving expression to his hopes and ideals for the future. "The God they pray to is the God to Whose nature

they contribute, but the call of their ideal is the call of the universe as a whole as it appeals to them." ³²

Alexander rejects the idea of a creator-God. As the whole universe, God is creative, but as the distinctive quality of deity, He is created. As a matter of fact, it is the *nisus* in Space-Time which is the creator and not God. Alexander declares: "If indeed, we take God to mean no more than the creative impulse by which the world goes its restless way in time, in this sense there is indeed a Creator God." ³³ He, like the other empirical qualities, is subject to Time. In another passage Alexander says: "Deity owes its being to the pre-existing finites with their empirical qualities, and is their outcome. God, then, like all things in the universe, is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature." ³⁴ If we free God from Time then we may ask why He did not create a perfect world all at once. But if God is involved in the upward sweep of Time, we realize that He is helpless to prevent evil. God does not foresee evil or good, since He is the whole world where the contest between good and evil is staged. Alexander therefore denies providence to God. The design apparent in the universe is the effect of Time. Alexander dismisses those who hold out for an all-wise providence in the following words. "We are involved otherwise in all the mystery of a God who can foresee the history of the world, and this, if history is history, is self-contradictory." ³⁵

Nature is both kindly and stern toward us. Those forms of life which are adapted to survive are searched out by experimentation and colossal loss. Goodness itself issues from this sort of experimentation. By trial and error we discover what form of social adjustment is able to satisfy our needs. This being the case, we cannot say it is good or bad. We can only accept.

Alexander offers a few remarks on the subject of immortality. From

32. *Op. cit.*, p. 400.

33. "The Historicity of Things," p. 15.

34. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 398.

35. "The Historicity of Things," p. 15.

the metaphysical viewpoint which has been developed, we cannot state that the mind will continue to exist without the body. The mind is just one aspect of a bodily process that ceases with death. Before we can accept such a belief in immortality we must await the experimental evidence supporting such a claim.

The personal continuance of our lives beyond the life of our bodies is fully accredited by none. I can only repeat what I have said before, that should the extension of mind beyond the limits of bodily life be verified, so that a mind can either act without a body or may shift its place to some other body and yet retain its memory, the larger part of the present speculation will have to be seriously modified or abandoned.³⁶

It is not the individual who persists but the species. The type embodies the valuable ideal. We should be happy to hand over our work to other hands.

Alexander's position on the question of immortality brings us face to face with his original metaphysical formula. A body cannot exist without a mind, nor a mind without a body. Time cannot exist without Space, nor Space without Time. Time performs the office of mind to Space. Or as Alexander phrases it, "Rather than hold that Time is a form of mind, we must say that mind is a form of Time."³⁷ At any rate Alexander could not maintain in the face of his hypothesis that the mind could exist without the body. We should have to conclude that if the doctrine of immortality and Alexander's metaphysical formula should both be verified, it would not be a mere spiritual resurrection but would also include the resurrection of the body.

His metaphysical formula states that the world and each of its parts, including God, is built on the model with which we are familiar in our persons, that is, we are a union of mind and body. Alexander starts at the highest level we know, the human level, and finds the unity of mind-body fundamental. Then he generalizes and says that we are examples of a pattern which is universal and is followed not

36. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 424.

37. *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

only by things but by Space-Time itself. His method was to begin in the case of the mind-body relationship and that of value on the human level and turn what he discovered there into an hypothesis as to the nature of the world below man and above man, as in the case of God. It is merely an hypothesis, the success of which Alexander has exhibited by its ability to account for all the diverse phenomena of life. It is this method of analogy, beginning at the human level, and proceeding rigidly in both directions, which is one of the great factors making for unification in Alexander's thought.

Another unifying factor which we have attempted to make explicit in this book is the fact of drive, instinct, urge, impulse, or *nisus*. As pointed out before in our section on value, we have assigned the term instinct to account for certain results we have observed in the organic world. We reserved the word impulse to account for certain tendencies which in an intelligently functioning human nature lead to beauty, goodness, and truth. So also in the case of God there is a comprehensive form of impulse, which we specifically call *nisus* which leads on to the creation of deity. The creativity of the universe, which we observe in animals and in special activities of humanity, are but instances of a general trend in nature toward the creation of newer forms. This *nisus* is the tendency of Space-Time which is exhibited in the emergence of higher levels of existence and in its movement toward the quality of deity.

That toward which the universe strives is its good. All things by their nature desire their own good. The *ὁρμή* or *nisus* of the universe infects all things and drives them Godward. We are close to the Aristotelian conception of God, who pulls all things to him by desire, except that the deity which Alexander seeks is dynamic, and, constantly being born, is a constantly evolving deity, driven by the restlessness of Time which does not stop but constantly creates higher levels of being. There is no place for the Aristotelian unmoved mover who stands outside the time process. The world is always incomplete and there is no being who exhausts the future, for God himself is a creature of time and is in the making. The life of man is a preparation

for the emergence of the divine quality and the figure of Jesus is one which pre-eminently presages the trend toward divinity.³⁸

In viewing God as an emerging quality, Alexander has expressed discontent with the older notion of God as something unchanging and static, lying outside the turmoil and fluctuation of the world. He discards the notion that while all else suffers change, God alone never changes. But in Alexander's theology, God, like the rest of the universe, is subject to Time. To his credit it should be observed that Alexander has also tried to adjust the values associated with a timeless God to his emerging deity. We have noted that Alexander feels that the unresolved theological paradoxes, implicit in the older views of God, are readily rationalized within his newer framework.

Alexander assumes that the world is eternal. There is no place in it for a creator-God. It is the *nisus* of Space-Time which is creative. His version of the creation is the reverse of the Platonic fall of the ideal forms into materiality. Instead of the Plotinian creation by descent from God or *vous* we have here a creation by ascent from Space-Time into materiality and on to the higher levels. Space-Time itself contains the seeds of creativity (a *nisus*), and the emerging finites display a creation from below without a supreme creator or intelligence.

Alexander has demonstrated that God is a real fact among other facts of the universe. His account of an emerging deity grows naturally out of the biological concept of emergent evolution. His analysis stating that we seek God because of a religious impulse within us is also a vitalistic conception and is bolstered by his analogous treatment of our human values as being founded on impulse. But for him, it is a waste of time to deal with matters which are unintelligible and lie outside the orbit of scientific understanding. He avoids the language of myth or symbolism or poetry since that would be dealing with material which is notoriously recalcitrant to scientific handling. Alexander takes us as far as he can by a rationalistic method and then he breaks off. The world of liturgy and worship is one which he

38. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 330.

does not enter. That the divine world completes the human one is a miracle which his metaphysics rejects. And yet if his God is worshipful and satisfies the religious needs of men, he would perforce write a liturgy. The liturgy would glorify the creative power of Time and recognize man's share in the forward sweep of the world. In line with Alexander's aesthetics, the religious emotion to be recognized as such needs concrete expression in liturgical forms. For religion is not simply theology but is more significantly worship. The success of Alexander's metaphysical description of God must be seen in its ability to satisfy in concrete forms man's religious fervor. Alexander would encounter a difficult problem in liturgy because of the realism of his aesthetics. The aesthetic experience was a process, an end in itself which leads nowhere else. Yet the basic assumption of liturgy is that it somehow puts us in touch with a world which lies outside of ourselves.

In Alexander's treatment of goodness as a human value we criticized him for being unable to bring judgment to bear on a coherently organized state like Hitler's Third Reich. Similarly, all existence up to God is good insofar as it survives and contributes to the economy of the world. We worship that which survives, for evil itself is transmuted into subserving good at the next higher level. But what guarantee do we have that *nisus* will produce a good deity? May not the created deity prove to be a monster? There is no criterion here by which we may distinguish God from the devil. One might live in deadly fear of the unknown toward which the world is irresistibly sweeping onward. But for Alexander there is no terror in what time may bring forth. Alexander's faith is that the world works out its good and our good also. Man is no beast to man and the goodness of the world lies in the very nature of things. An American could very well share this faith, but how acceptable would such confidence appear to the tragedy-ridden continents of Europe and Asia? This naturalistic faith of Alexander's that the world works out its salvation and not its destruction is not too far removed from the Hebraic-Christian belief that God is good and that his love is stronger than

his wrath. We are expressing a similar conviction when we say that all things work together for good for those who love God. We have pointed out that Alexander failed to show how the notion of impulse is the unifying concept of his graded universe and also that he failed to make clear how by starting at the human level he makes the pattern of mind and value there an hypothesis applicable to every other level.

Alexander's otherwise lucid presentation suffers from a considerable amount of confusion which attends his usage of the terms *nisus*, time and Space-Time. He maintains that Space and Time are indissolubly linked together. Once the necessity of Space for Time is seen, then Alexander goes on to say that Time is the principle of motion and change.

Time is in truth the abiding principle of impermanence which is the real creator. Or to descend from such high phrases, it is a kind of cosmic gendarme who makes stagnation impossible, and at once creates the movements which constitute things and keeps them in movement. *Circulez Messieurs.*³⁹

But in another passage he seems to claim this creative capacity for *nisus*.

This impulse of creativeness I call the *nisus* of the universe, borrowing an idea from Spinoza and agreeing, as I think, with the spirit tho not all the details of Mr. Bergson's *élan vital*. This *nisus* not only leads to the formation of things and to the sustainment of them, but impels the world forward towards new creations, bringing forth the new out of the bosom of the old.⁴⁰

Comparing these two passages it would seem that Time and *nisus* have identical functions and I cannot see why Alexander employs different terms to express the same idea. The equivalence of *nisus* and Time is still more strikingly shown in another context. "Now this *nisus* is the element of Time in the primordial world, its principle of mobility and restlessness."⁴¹

39. *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, pp. 47-48.

40. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, p. 273.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

Here, too, he uses *nisus* and Time without taking the trouble to show conclusively that they have the same meaning. This indiscriminate usage is a source of much confusion to the student of Alexander and leaves one with the impression that *nisus* is a superfluous term. We have suggested that he might have specified *nisus* as the inclusive term covering instinct in animals and impulse in human beings which leads to deity. Alexander calls mind a form of Time. Since we have already shown that mind is an essential ingredient of human value, mind is linked to the element of Time in the universe or to *nisus*.

Despite Alexander's protest that his philosophy is scientifically verifiable, he has generalized the evolutionary process downwards and upwards into areas where empirical verification is obviously impossible. No one has seen finites emerging, neither materiality, nor life, nor mind. Mr. G. Dawes Hicks in his excellent review of *Space, Time, and Deity* takes exception to Alexander on this very point. Hicks claims that Alexander's philosophy has not proved verifiable under empirical conditions accessible to us.

Bearing in mind that the method of philosophy is empirical, one is justified in asking what empirical existents are generated in the manner assumed. I suppose the nearest approach which we know, on a large scale, to the "skeleton universe of Space-Time" would be those vast fields of inter-stellar space which have been thought to be filled by an ether, but which our author would say are full of Time. Has there, however, in the history of human science, been a single instance recorded of what could conceivably be regarded as a new empirical existent, endowed with a specific quality, emerging from this huge realm of Space-Time? Even though "from mere simple motion to matter is a far cry" (II-53), yet, if the theory is to be rendered empirically plausible, there ought surely to be some indications that material existents do emerge in this way in the regions of Space-Time accessible to the astronomer.⁴²

Alexander adopts the hypothesis that Space-Time is the fundamental stuff out of which the universe has grown. He does not explain how Space-Time becomes matter. That matter should have

42. G. Dawes Hicks, "Review of *Space, Time, and Deity*," p. 581.

been created from Space-Time is hard to understand. It would seem that the Platonic position that matter has always existed is more in accordance with the facts. That a material world should have emerged from Space-Time is something of a miracle in itself.

In his analysis of Art, Alexander has insisted that art only becomes intelligible when we realize that it rests on a constructive impulse. He tells us no progress in the understanding of art is possible if we persist in simply trying to find the secret in the works of art themselves. Goodness likewise is the outcome of the social impulse and the impulse of curiosity is the foundation of science. In his religious philosophy, he also holds that the validity of our concept of God rests ultimately on a religious impulse or sentiment which gives us an immediate awareness of God. The passion for production gives us art, the passion of sociality issues in ethics, the passion of curiosity gives us truth, and the passion for religion leads us to God.

Bibliography

I—Books

- Alexander, Samuel. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (London: Macmillan, 1933).
- *Locke* (London: Constable, 1908).
- *Moral Order and Progress* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1906).
- *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, ed. by his literary executor (London: Macmillan, 1939).
- *Space, Time, and Deity* (London: Macmillan, 1927), 2 vols.
- Bosanquet, Bernard. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1921).
- Bradley, A. C. *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (London: Macmillan, 1934).
- Bradley, F. H. *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
- Creswell, J. R. *The Position of Value in the Philosophical System of S. Alexander* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1926).
- Höfding, Harold. *The Philosophy of Religion*, translated from the German by B. E. Meyer (London: Macmillan, 1914).
- Konvitz, Milton R. *On the Nature of Value, the Philosophy of Samuel Alexander* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946).
- LeBoutillier, Cornelia G. *Religious Values in the Philosophy of Emergent Evolution* (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, New York: 1936).
- Morgan, Conrury Lloyd. *Instinct and Experience* (London: Methuen, 1912).
- Otto, Rudolph. *The Idea of the Holy* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925).
- Townsend, H. G., ed. *Studies in Philosophical Naturalism*, Humanities Series, I, # 1 (Eugene: Oregon Univ. Press, 1931).
- Wickham, Harvey. *The Unrealists: James, Bergson, Santayana, Einstein, Ber-*

trand Russell, John Dewey, Alexander and Whitehead (New York: MacVeagh, Dial Press, 1930).

II—ARTICLES

- A.D.R. "Professor Samuel Alexander, O.M., F.B.A.," Obituary notice, *Nature*, 142 (Oct. 1, 1938), 603-604.
- Alexander, Samuel. "Art and Nature," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* (Manchester: July, 1927).
- "The Artistry of Truth," *Hibbert Journal*, 23 (Jan., 1925), 294-306.
- "The Basis of Realism," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, VI (Jan. 28, 1914), 279-314.
- "Collective Willing and Truth," *Mind*, N.S., 22 (Jan. and Apr., 1913), 14-47 and 161-89.
- "Foundations and Sketch-Plan of a Conational Psychology," *British Journal of Psychology*, 4 (Dec., 1911), 239-67.
- "The Idea of Value," *Mind*, N.S., I (Jan., 1892), 31-55.
- "The Historicity of Things," *Philosophy and History, Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Klibansky & Paton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 11-25.
- "Lessons from Spinoza," *Chronicum Spinozanum*, V, Tomus Quintus, 1927.
- "Mental Activity in Willing and Ideas," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S., IX (Nov., 1908), 1-40.
- "Morality as an Art," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 3 (Apr., 1928), 143-57.
- "The Objectivity of Value," *IXth Congress of Philosophy*, X (Paris: Hermann, Apr., 1937).
- "Philosophy and Art," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, #14 (Apr., 1929), 157-61.
- "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe," *Hibbert Journal*, 8 (Oct., 1909), 47-66.
- "Science and Art," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 5 (July and Oct., 1930), 331-52 and 516-32.
- "Science and Religion," *The Listener* (Dec., 1930).
- "Some Explanations," *Mind*, N.S., 30 (Oct., 1921), 409-28.
- "Truth, Goodness and Beauty," *Hibbert Journal*, 28 (July, 1930), 616-28.
- Bateman, J. V. "Prof. Alexander's Proofs of the Spatio-Temporal Nature of Mind," *Philosophical Review*, 49 (May, 1940), 309-24.
- Broad, C. D. "Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures," *Mind*, N.S., 30 (Jan. and Apr., 1921), 25-39 and 129-50.
- Calkins, Mary W. "The Dual Role of Mind in the Philosophy of S. Alexander," *Mind*, 32 (Apr., 1923), 197-210.
- Ducasse, C. J. "Introspection, Mental Acts and Sense," *Mind*, 45 (Apr., 1936), 181-92.

- Fox, A. C. "Prof. Alexander's Ethical Views," *International Journal of Ethics*, 44 (July, 1934), 405-17.
- Haldane, Viscount. "Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures," *Nature*, 105 (Aug. 26, 1920), 798-801.
- Hicks, G. Dawes. "Space, Time, and Deity," a review, *Hibbert Journal*, 19 (Apr., 1921), 573-81.
- Holmes, E. "A Criticism of the New Realism as Expanded by Prof. S. A. Alexander," *Hibbert Journal*, 28 (Oct., 1929), 46-68.
- Knight, Helen. "Beauty and Other Forms of Value," a review, *Mind*, N.S., 43 (Oct., 1934), 511-18.
- Laird, John. "Samuel Alexander, 1855-1938," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 24 (1938), 378-95.
- Laird, John. "Samuel Alexander's Theism," *Hibbert Journal*, 40 (Jan., 1942), 146-55.
- London Times Supplement*. Article on Samuel Alexander, Nov. 9, 1933.
- Loughman, H. B. "Emergence and the Self: a Chapter in Dr. Alexander's Philosophy," *Monist*, 46 (July, 1936), 211-27.
- Montague, Wm. P. "A Materialistic Theory of Emergent Evolution," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929).
- Moore, G. E. "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind*, 12 (Oct., 1903), 433-53.
- Morris, Bertram. "The Role of the 'Standard Mind' in Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, IV #4 (June, 1946), 239-44.
- Muirhead, J. H. "Samuel Alexander," obituary notice, *Philosophy*, 14 (Jan., 1939), 3-14.
- Murphy, A. E. "Alexander's Metaphysics of Space-Time," *The Monist*, 37 (July and Oct., 1927), 357-83 and 624-44.
- Rainer, A. C. A. "The Field of Aesthetics," *Mind*, 38 (Apr., 1929), 161-83.
- Randall, John Herman. "Dualism in Metaphysics," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York: Henry Holt, 1929).
- Stout, G. F. "Personal Reminiscences," *Mind*, 49 (Jan., 1940), 49-126.
- "The Philosophy of S. Alexander," *Mind*, 49 (Jan. and Apr., 1940), 1-18 and 137-49.
- "Professor Alexander's Theory of Sense Perception," *Mind*, 31 (Oct., 1922), 385-412.

