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RISE OF THE
Christian Power in India

BY
MAJOR B. D. BASU, I.M.S. (*Retired*)

VOLUME II

R. CHATTERJEE
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PREFACE

This volume opens with the administration of Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of India. No period of British Indian History has been written about so much as the thirteen years during which that Governor-General presided over its affairs. It was his impeachment which exposed the manner in which the representatives and servants of the East India Company behaved themselves towards the princes and inhabitants of this country. They were very rightly called by Edmund Burke "birds of prey and passage in India." The fact should not be forgotten that, by its constitution, the East India Company was a Society of "Adventurers" and not of "gentlemen." (See p. 17 of Vol. I). So no surprise need be felt at their conduct towards the people of India.

It is quite natural that many of his countrymen, his admirers and indecent partisans, are trying to explain away Warren Hastings's misdeeds in India. The number of his apologists is very large. But we are of opinion that the account of that proconsul by Mr. Torrens in his *Empire in Asia, how we came by it, a book of confessions,* is so fair that we commend its perusal to our readers, especially as a cheap reprint of that book is now available. It is, therefore, that the account of Warren Hastings's

administration appearing in this work is brief and does not mention all the malpractices and vile deeds with the perpetration of which he was charged by the conductors of his impeachment in England.

The part played by Mr. Mostyn in fomenting domestic dissensions and confusion at Poona, and thus greatly contributing to the downfall of the Maratha Empire, has not been sufficiently laid stress upon in any work on Indian History.

Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore appear in this work, in quite a different colour from that with which they have been painted by Anglo-Indian writers.

The administration of the Marquess Wellesley forms an important landmark in Indian History ; and therefore, it has been given in greater detail than is to be found in any other work on the subject.

Some of the Chapters of this volume originally appeared in the *Modern Review*, from which they are reprinted with additions and alterations.

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RISE OF THE
Christian Power in India

CHAPTER VII

The Administration of Warren Hastings (1772-1785)

Till the appointment of Warren Hastings as Governor-General of India, it was thought, the East India Company would be content with their acquisition of the Dewany of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in the North and the strips of land they possessed on the Eastern and Western Coasts of India. But Warren Hastings tried to show that he possessed greater skill as a diplomatist and general and more want of scruples than Clive. So he looked eagerly to the wealth and earthly possessions of his neighbours, whom he wanted to fleece for his own benefit and also for his masters. The period of aggression commenced with Warren Hastings, in whose regime wars were fought with some of the native powers, and the skill of occidental diplomacy was manifested towards others, which did not raise the British

Christians in the estimation of the heathens of India for humanity and fairness.

No period of British Indian history is so well known as the thirteen years during which Warren Hastings presided over Indian affairs. This is principally due to the impeachment of the Governor, which thus brought to light many shady transactions which the Anglo-Indians had resorted to in acquiring political supremacy in this country. Edmund Burke, whose transcendental oratory has immortalised the impeachment of Warren Hastings, perhaps would not have taken so much pains in the prosecution of that Governor, had the latter brought any portion of the Indian territory under the jurisdiction of England. Eloquently said that orator:—

"Has he (Warren Hastings) enlarged the boundary of our Government? No; there are but too strong proofs of his lessening it?" (Vol. I, p. 131).

True it is that not one inch of land was added to the dominions of the East India Company while Warren Hastings was presiding over its affairs in the East. But as it is said that the man who standeth still also serveth, so the apparent want of increase of territory during Hastings' administration was of more importance to the subsequent extension of the British Supremacy than would otherwise have been the case. His policy consolidated the foundation of that Empire which Clive had laid by means of

forgery and fraud. Hastings' career as governor was not certainly that of a lion or even a metamorphosed tiger, but of the sly fox trying to achieve his object by cunning and fraud rather than by force.

His diplomatic transactions were meant to weaken the country powers and the East India Company gained strength in proportion as they weakened.

It was just about the middle of the eighteenth century, that Warren Hastings, who had received an indifferent education in his native country, came to India as a writer in the Company's establishment at Calcutta. Of the vicissitudes of his circumstances as a writer, it is not necessary to say much, except that he devoted his leisure hours to self-culture, to learn the languages of the country he lived in, and also the means to impose on the simple-minded natives of India. After serving for fifteen years he left India in 1764 for England. He returned to India in 1768 being appointed second in Council of the Madras Government. Four years later, when the post of the Governor of Bengal fell vacant, he was selected to fill that important office.

After the acquisition of the Dewany of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, the Nawab was reduced by his Christian friends to the position of a mere puppet. The real power was vested in the hands of the Naibs who were creatures of the Company of English

merchants. One of these Naibs was Mahomed Reza Khan at Murshidabad and the other one was Raja Shitab Ray at Patna. The latter had been of the greatest service to the British in the hour of their greatest trouble and peril. It is impossible to over-estimate the friendly offices he had rendered to them. But because he had been of the greatest use to the British, it was therefore that he was to be humiliated and disgraced by them.*

* The author of the *Seir* mentions how Shitab Ray "was often in the necessity of bestowing sums of money, on some Englishmen, recommended by the rulers of that nation, * * he made use of two methods, equally improper, and iniquitous, * * the first was, that in matters of *Atlac*, (which word signifies the sending one or two constables for compelling payment of sums due to the treasury), he used to send them by whole dozens at a time; * * His second method was no less iniquitous. He used to bring under contribution the possessors of jagirs, altumgas, and other freeholds, by telling them, that such an Englishman wanted to see their charters and vouchers; and when he had once got them in his possession, (and this was always in that Englishman's name) he used to put those vouchers in the hands of one of his own dependants, or heads of office, who without any possible reason or justice, would exact from his incumbent or possessor, a sum of money proportionable to his income. After this he got together all those contributions, which amounted to a large sum, and bestowed them on the Englishman that had been recommended to him. In this manner, he seemed wholly occupied by the thoughts

To take the management of affairs out of the hands of the Indian deputies, and to do away with the native agency altogether, Warren Hastings signalized the commencement of his rule by arresting Mahomed Reza Khan and Shitab Ray and ordering them to be brought to Calcutta for trial. The author of the *Seir* has described in detail the manner in which these two Indian functionaries were placed in arrest —that of Shitab Ray suggested treachery.

The trial of these two Indian functionaries took place at Calcutta. They were acquitted. If we are to believe Nundkumar, Warren Hastings received several lakhs of rupees from these two deputies and so was instrumental in getting them acquitted. Mahomed Reza Khan was not reinstated in his post at Murshidabad ; but Shitab Ray was, but he died soon afterwards of a broken heart.

The double government which had been set up by Clive after the acquisition of the Dewany, was thus swept away by Hastings, who also took steps in removing Courts of Civil and Criminal justice from Murshidabad to Calcutta. At the same time, he

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of keeping the individuals of that nation in good humor; but without minding the Divine resentment, in an affair of so much consequence. * * * It was from these very persons, whom he wanted to keep in good humor, that his ruin took its origin at last, * * * " (Vol. III, pp. 65—65, Calcutta Reprint).

reduced the allowance of the Nawab. Thus the shadow of authority which the Nawab possessed was removed, and the Company's authority over the whole of Bengal, Behar and Orissa was exhibited in bold relief.

But the Company was still a vassal of the Great Mogul, for they had yet to pay an annual tribute to the Delhi Emperor. Shah Alum left Allahabad in 1771 for Delhi. Warren Hastings, on assuming the Governorship of Bengal, considered the removal of the Emperor from Allahabad to Delhi a very good opportunity to deprive the Mogul of the tribute which had been solemnly promised to him by Clive on behalf of the Company. He went further and wrested the provinces of Allahabad and Corah which, by the Treaty, belonged to the Emperor, and gave them to the Vizier.

The partisans of Hastings have tried to justify all these high-handed proceedings of his on grounds of expediency. But perhaps all unprejudiced persons will agree with the historian, Mr. James Mill, in what he wrote regarding the provinces of Corah and Allahabad.

"Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, ... Justice, too, ... spoke on the same side : . . . . . But these considerations were a feeble balance against the calls of want, and the heavy attraction of gold." (Vol. III [5th Edition], p. 397).

Thus Mr. Hastings removed every landmark of native government from the administration of Bengal.

Having destroyed every trace of the native government, which was euphemistically called "reforms", Hastings turned his attention to foreign affairs. He entered into a compact with the Nawab Vizier of Oude to exterminate the Rohillas. For this act he, or rather the Company, was to receive forty lakhs of rupees. Regarding the Rohilla War, it has been truly observed by an English writer:—

"There is probably not another instance on record where a civilised power entered into war with the avowed object of destroying a people with whom it had no quarrel."*

Of course, the Rohillas were defeated by the troops led by British officers, and so Warren Hastings easily got the money he had bargained for this villainous transaction.†

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* British India and England's responsibilities, by J. Clarke, p. 25.

† The position taken by Hastings is thus described by Howett: "There does not seem to have existed in the mind of Hastings one human feeling; a proposition which would have covered almost any other man with unspeakable horror was received by him as a matter of ordinary business. 'Let us see,' says Hastings, 'we have a heavy bonded debt, at one time—125 lacs of rupees. By this a saving of near one-third of our military expenses would be effected during the period of such services; the 40 lacs would be an ample supply to our treasury, and the Vizier (the Nabob of Oude) would be freed from a troublesome neighbour.' These are

The year after the termination of the Rohilla War, Warren Hastings, who had been hitherto the governor of Bengal only, was made the first Governor-General of India, the presidencies of Madras and Bombay being placed under that of Bengal. He was to be assisted by a Council, five of whose members were sent out from England. The most important of these Councillors was Mr. (afterwards Sir) Phillip Francis. During the course of a century and a half, that India has been under the British rule, no individual of that race has ever tried so sincerely to do good to its people as Francis.* No less was to be expected from him who was the reputed author of the "Letters of Junius."

The administration of Warren Hastings appeared to him so rotten that he was obliged to violently assail

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the monster's own words; the bargain was struck, but it was agreed to be kept secret from the Council and the Court of Directors. In one of Hastings' letters still extant, he tells the Nabob; 'should the Rohillas be guilty of a breach of their agreement (a demand of 40 lacs, suddenly made upon them—for in this vile affair everything had a ruffian character—they first demanded their money, and then murdered them)—we will thoroughly exterminate them, and settle Your Excellency in the country.' "

[J. Clarke's British India and England's responsibilities, p. 25, foot-note].

* See the *Modern Review* for April 1915, pp. 504-506, *Sir Philip Francis—a true British friend of India.*

him. This ultimately ended in a duel between Warren Hastings and Francis, in India, and the impeachment of the former in England.

At one time, Francis had the majority of the Council on his side and in opposition to Warren Hastings. It was this majority which encouraged men to bring to light the corrupt practices of that governor. The most notable of these men was Nund Kumar. In his prosecution of Mahomed Reza Khan, Warren Hastings made use of Nund Kumar as a tool to serve his vile end. In a letter to the Court of Directors, Warren Hastings wrote:—

"You directed 'that if the assistance and information of *Nund Coomar* should be serviceable to me in my investigating the conduct of Mahomed Reza Khan, I should yield him such encouragements and reward as his trouble and the extent of his services may deserve.' There is no doubt that Nundcoomar is capable of affording me great services by his information and advice; but it is on his abilities, and on the activity of his ambition and hatred to Mahomed Reza Khan that I depend for investigating the conduct of the latter and, by eradicating his influence, for confirming the authority which you have assumed in the administration of the affairs of this country. The reward which has been assigned him will put it fully in his power to answer those expectations, and will be an encouragement to him to exert all his abilities for the accomplishment of them."

In the above passage, Warren Hastings is fully revealed in his true colors. He encouraged Nund Kumar with expectations of reward, in order that the

latter might exert his abilities for the accomplishment of the conviction of Mahomed Reza Khan. And of course after having gained his object, Nund Kumar was to be thrown overboard as mercilessly and unscrupulously by Warren Hastings as was "Umichand" by Clive. But the scoundrelism of Hastings was a shade deeper than that of Clive. He utterly lacked all sense of honor either in private or public life. In every transaction his conduct was prompted by greed and selfishness. He made a tool of Nund Kumar to ruin Mahomed Reza Khan. And after having made use of Nund Kumar for his fell purpose, in order to deprive that Hindu of his expected reward, he acquitted Mahomed Reza Khan, of course after fleecing him of a very large sum of money euphemistically called present but in truth a bribe. He knew fully well when he was employing Nund Kumar that there was no likelihood of his being given the coveted post of that Mahomedan minister, for it had been a foregone conclusion that the object of "eradicating his (Mahomed Reza Khan's) influence", was "confirming the authority which you have assumed in the administration of the affairs of this country." Yet with the consummate hypocrisy and bad faith which he and others trained in the Anglo-Indian School of diplomacy of the eighteenth century, could employ, Warren Hastings fed the mind of Nund Kumar with hopes of his being appointed the Naib of Bengal.

With one stone, Warren Hastings killed three birds—deprived Mahomed Reza Khan of the Naibship of Bengal, disappointed Nund Kumar of the expectations he had raised in his breast, dissolved the double Government in Bengal and brought that province under the direct rule of the East India Company. But above all he enriched himself with several lakhs of rupees. This was exposed by Nund Kumar, who delivered a letter to Francis to be placed before the Board in which he accused the Governor-General of taking bribes. On the 11th March, 1775 Francis informed

"the Board that he this morning received a visit from Raja Nundcoomar, in which the Raja delivered to him a letter addressed to the Governor and Council and demanded of him, as a duty belonging to his office as a Councillor of this state, to lay it before the Board. Mr. Francis conceiving that he could not, consistently with his duty, refuse such a letter at the instance of a person of the Raja's rank, did accordingly receive it, and now lays it before the Board, declaring at the same time that he is unacquainted with the contents of it. Mr. Francis further begs leave to observe that he received this letter publicly in the presence of a considerable number of persons, and that the Raja's verbal request was interpreted to him by these different persons."

In this letter Nund Kumar mentioned that Mahomed Reza Khan offered 10 lakhs to Hastings and two lakhs to him. Soon after, Hastings set Mahomed Reza at liberty and "entirely dropt the inquiry into his embezzlements and malpractices."

Francis and other members of the Council who were in opposition to Hastings believed Nund Kumar and the Governor was ordered to refund the money. Had Hastings been an honest man, he would have faced and not shirked to meet the charge brought against him. His conduct showed that he was guilty of the crime with which he was charged by the Bengali Brahman. He acted with a high hand and denied the authority of the Council to question the integrity of his character. He charged Nund Kumar with forgery, evidently thinking that such a move on his part was needed to whitewash himself. It was alleged that Nund Kumar had forged a bond in 1770, that is, some five years before.

Hastings laid the matter before the Supreme Court, which was established in 1773 in Calcutta. It was presided over by Sir Elijah Impey—a schoolfellow of Hastings who as a judge had his counterpart in the notorious Jeffreys. Nund Kumar was tried by this judge and was hanged. His execution was carried out in the teeth of public opinion. The alleged crime of forgery (if committed at all) was, as said before, committed in 1770, but the Court of which Impey was the Chief Justice came into existence in 1773. So this Court could not take cognisance of an offence committed years before its birth. Even assuming that the charge of forgery was a true one against Nund Kumar, the penalty inflicted on him

was out of all proportion to the nature of the crime. According to the English law forgery was punished by hanging. But Nund Kumar was not an Englishman and moreover he was not a servant of the English Company of merchants, but had been minister of the Mahomedan ruling family of Murshidabad and so his offence, if any, should have been tried according to the procedure of the Mahomedan Law.

The foundation of the political power of the East India Company was based on the forgery committed by Clive. But that "Heaven-born general" was rewarded with a peerage for his villainous deed, while the Bengali Brahman was hanged for the same offence, even assuming that he had committed it.

Nund Kumar was a thorn in the side of Hastings and so the Governor was extremely glad to have disposed of him in the above manner. He could now breathe freely, and for this he was extremely obliged to the notorious Sir Elijah Impey. It is not necessary to mention in detail all the wrong-doings of Mr. Warren Hastings. British authors have, as a class, come to look with a lenient and even an approving eye on the Indian administration of that pro-consul. Regarding his corruption, Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler writes in his Short History of India and of the Frontier States of Afghanistan, Nipal and Burma, published in 1880 by Messrs. Macmillan and Co.:

"Lord Macaulay acquits Hastings of money corruption

on the ground of want of evidence; had he been familiar with the workings of native courts in India he would have found Hastings guilty. Hastings acknowledged to having taken a hundred thousand pounds from Asaf-ud-daula in 1782. The inference follows that in 1773 he received a like sum from Shuja-ud-daula and silently pocketed the money. Officers of any political experiences would be satisfied that Asaf-ud-daula would never have offered the hundred thousand pounds to Hastings, unless a like sum had been previously offered by his father, Shuja-ud-daula, and accepted by Hastings."

The following extract from his defence shows what Hastings considered his meritorious deeds for maintaining the political supremacy of the East India Company in India:

"The valour of others acquired, I enlarged and gave shape and consistency to the dominion which you hold there; I preserved it; I sent forth its armies with an effectual but economical hand, through unknown and hostile regions, to the support of your other possessions, to the retrieval of one (Bombay) from degradation and dishonour; and of the other (Madras) from utter loss and subjection. I maintained the wars which were of your formation, or that of others, not of mine. I won one member (the Nizam) of the great Indian confederacy from it by an act of reasonable restitution; with another (Bhonsla) I maintained a secret intercourse, and converted him into a friend; a third (Madhoji Sindhia) I drew off by diversion and negotiation, and employed him as the instrument of peace. When you cried for peace, and your cries were heard by those who were the object of it, I resisted this, and every other species of counteraction, by rising in my demands, and accom-

plished a peace, and I hope everlasting, with one great State (the Mahrattas); and I at least afforded the efficient means by which a peace, if not so durable, more seasonable at least, was accomplished with another (Tipu Sultan).

"I gave you all, and you have rewarded me with confiscation, disgrace, and a life of impeachment."*

How Mr. Warren Hastings' rule was a curse to the people who had the misfortune to be placed under it, is thus borne testimony to by Colebrooke, the Orientalist, in a private letter to his father, dated the 28th July, 1788:—

"It was Mr. Hastings who filled the country with collectors and judges who adopted one pursuit—a fortune. These harpies were no sooner let loose upon the country, than they plundered the inhabitants with or without pretences. * * Justice was dealt out to the highest bidders by the judges, and thieves paid a regular revenue to rob with impunity."

Regarding the administration of Warren Hastings, he wrote:—

"Nor did his crooked politics and shameless breach of faith affect any but the princes and great men; the deposition of zemindars, the plundering of begums, the extermination of the Rohillas may be forgotten, but the cruelties acted in Goruckpore will for ever be quoted to the dishonor of the British name."

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* The reader is recommended to peruse Chapters VII—XIII (pp. 79-181) of "Empire in Asia—How we came by it—a book of confessions", by W. M. Torrens, M.P., published by the Panini Office of Allahabad, for a very fair account of Warren Hastings' administration.

Then he wrote :—

"The system upon which the British dominions have been governed in the East, has affected the happiness of the people. To regulate nations as an article of trade, for the profit which is to be derived, seems a solecism in politics; not to mention monopolies of salt and opium, or the principles upon which the Company's investment has been provided, I may confine myself to the stretching the land-rents to the utmost sum they can produce. A proprietor of an estate under the Mogul government, seldom paid half of the produce of his estate, and in small properties much less; he was further allowed to take credit for a certain sum by way of pension, or held rent-free lands in lieu thereof. Under the Company, a landholder is allowed ten per cent. of the net produce as his share."

No wonder Colebrooke was made to exclaim :—

"The treatment of the people has been such as will make them remember the yoke as the heaviest that ever conquerors put upon the necks of conquered nations."

CHAPTER VIII

The Rise of the Mahrattas and the First Mahratta War

It will be necessary here to give a short account of the different native powers with whom Warren Hastings, Cornwallis and Wellesley had to deal. Of these the Mahrattas, the Oude dynasty, Hyder Ali and the Nizam were the most important.

THE RISE OF THE MAHRATTAS

There is no need of entering into the antiquarian and philological questions regarding the origin of the Mahrattas. Whether we regard the Mahrattas as Aryans or Scythians*, they were, at some remote period of which there is no authentic record, a great nation. Speaking of their early history, Mr. Grant Duff writes :—

"Maharashtra, from its still retaining a distinct language, from its giving name to a class of Brahmins, and the general appellation of Mahrattas to its inhabitants, was perhaps at some distant period under one raja, or

* The origin of the term Mahratta has been very ably discussed by Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar, in his History of the Deccan. Mahratta is a corruption of *Maharastra* or great nation.

Hindoo prince." (P. 2. *Times of India* Edition, Bombay, 1873).

The Chinese traveller Hwen Thsang who visited India in the Sixth Century of the Christian Era formed very favourable impressions of the character of these Highlanders of the Indian Peninsula. He writes of the Mahrattas:—

"If they are insulted, they will risk their life to avenge themselves. If they are asked to help one in distress, they will forget themselves in their haste to render assistance."

The Muhammadan conquest was not without its beneficial influence on the Mahrattas. Truly has Mr. Justice Ranade observed:—

"It cannot be easily assumed that in God's providence such vast multitudes as those who inhabit India were placed centuries together under influences and restraints of alien domination, unless such influences and restraints were calculated to do lasting service in the building up of the strength and character of the people in directions in which the Indian races were most deficient. Of one thing we are certain, that after lasting over five hundred years, the Mahomedan Empire gave way, and made room for the re-establishment of the old native races in the Punjab, and throughout Central Hindustan and Southern India, on foundations of a much more solid character than those which yielded so easily before the assaults of the early Muhammadan conquerors. The domination therefore had not the effect of so depressing the people that they were unable to raise their head again in greater solidarity. If the Indian races had not benefited by the contact and example of men with stronger muscles and greater powers, they

would have never been able to reassert themselves in the way in which history bears testimony they did."*

The Mahomedan rulers were not such tyrants as the Christian historians have painted them. Muhammadan rule lasted in India for over six hundred years. But not till Aurengzeb's time, was there any desire on the part of the Hindus to get rid of the Muhammadans from India. It should be remembered, that there was not much difference between Hindoos and Muhammadans as far as physical courage or military skill was concerned. Hindoos were superior to Muhammadans in numbers and intelligence. The fact of the Hindus submitting to Muhammadan Rule for six centuries without a revolt speaks much in favour of the beneficent character of that rule.

The Muhammadans conquered India, but they did not treat Indians so badly and inhumanely as the Norman conquerors treated the conquered natives of England. The high posts in the gift of the Muhammadan rulers were open to the Hindus. The Mahrattas, in this respect, were better off, than the Hindus of the North. The Abyssinian traveller, Ibn-i-Batuta, who visited India in the middle of the fourteenth century, described the Mahrattas as a people well skilled in the arts, medicine and astrology, whose nobles were Brahmans. The Mussalman rulers of the

* Address delivered at the meeting of the Indian Social Conference, Lucknow, December, 1899.

Deccan being in a state of almost constant warfare with the Mughal Emperors of Delhi, had been forced in self-defence to propitiate as much as possible their Hindoo subjects. The Muhammadan rule, in fact, helped to build up the Mahratta nation.

From the time of Shivaji dates the rise of the Mahrattas. He founded the most powerful Kingdom in India on the ruin of the Moghuls. It is usual for Christian historians to call Shivaji a plunderer and his followers free-booters, and Mahrattas generally as marauders who came into power under quite fortuitous circumstances. But Mr. Ranade's words are pregnant with truth when he writes that

"Free-booters and adventurers never succeed in building up empires, which last for generations and permanently alter the political map of a great continent. Unlike the great *subedars* of Provinces, who became independent after the death of Aurangzeb, the Founder of the Maratha Power and his successors for two generations bore the brunt of the attack of the Moghul Empire at the zenith of its splendour." (P. 3. of *Rise of the Mahratta Power*).

Shivaji, although illiterate, combined in himself the genius of a general, the accomplishments of a statesman and the qualifications of an administrator. He showed great humanity in the conduct of his wars; even the highly boasting Christians have not shown greater tenderness and sympathy to the fallen foes than this illiterate Mahratta ruler did.

He was born in 1627. His father Shahiji was an

officer in the service of the king of Bijapur. Shivaji also took service under this Muhammadan ruler. But he did not or rather could not, remain long in that service. Aurangzeb was in the prime of his youth, a deputy of his father in the Deccan. It was there that he imbibed that fanaticism which proved fatal to the Empire founded by Babar and reared by Akbar. The Deccan was then the scene of the Mogul conquest, as the indigenous Muhammadan rulers, the descendants of the old Bahmani Kingdom, were being replaced by the Moghuls. The Moghul rulers were mild and kind to their Hindu subjects in Northern India, but their deputies could not have been expected to show that spirit of leniency and kindness to their newly conquered subjects in the South. History does not furnish any instance where the conquerors have at once bestowed all the rights and privileges of free citizenship on the conquered races. Conquest is effected by means of bloodshed and murder, treachery and fraud. The evil qualities of the human nature preponderate in the conquerors. In the very nature of things it cannot be otherwise, for the conquerors are generally butchers. They have to trample over the rights of man and must be strangers to those qualities which we associate with the names of saints and prophets. Conquerors and their associates must be selfish, for they have to purchase success by selfishness.

There was no need for the Deccan to be placed once more under a new dynasty of Muhamadans. This conquest of the Deccan was one of the principal factors which contributed to hasten the downfall of the Moghul Empire. It is also probable that Aurang-zeb's bigotry and fanaticism were due to his Viceroyalty of the Deccan, which was the greatest possible disqualification for his occupying the Imperial Throne of Delhi. Imagine how the people of England would have fared, had Clive and Warren Hastings, by any chance, been crowned as Kings of England, after they had played the tyrant in India.

It was the dispensation of Providence that the Moghuls did not get the sovereignty of the Deccan. Shivaji is regarded as an incarnation by the people of the Maharastra, because he was the instrument in checking the Moghul advance. Considering the state of the Deccan on the eve of the birth of Shivaji, his appearance was hailed as that of a prophet. Mr. Justice Ranade rightly says that Shivaji

"did not create the Mahratta power; that power had been already created, though scattered in small centres all over the country. He sought to unite it for a higher purpose by directing it against the common danger. This was his chief merit and his chief service to the country, and in this consists his chief claim upon the grateful remembrance of his people. It was not for nothing that the

people looked up to him as their inspired leader." (*Ibid*, p. 38).

The state of the Maharastra was almost exactly the same as that of Italy at the time of the birth of Mazzini. At that time, Italy was a geographical expression, so was Maharastra. Mazzini tried to coalesce into a homogeneous whole the disunited peoples inhabiting the different provinces of the Italian Peninsula, so did Shivaji. But he was greater than Mazzini, for the Italian patriot was an enthusiast and idealist. Shivaji was not only that but a soldier also. Mazzini was never crowned king of the Italian nation. Shivaji lived to rule the Maharastra people. Modern Italy has been brought into existence by the conjoint labors of Mazzini, the idealist, Garibaldi, the soldier, Cavour, the statesman, and Victor Emmanuel, the King. We shall understand Shivaji better when we realize the fact that he combined in himself the enthusiasm and idealism of Mazzini, the military genius of Garibaldi and the statesmanship of Cavour, while the noble qualities which he displayed as the king of the Marathas have hardly been surpassed by any monarch either before or after him. His faults dwindle into insignificance when compared to those of any great man in any age or country.

Shivaji was not only a man of this world, but he always thought of the next world also. It is true, that he was a soldier, a statesman and a king, but

above all these, he was intensely religious. The pride of power and pomp and show of this evanescent world had no charm for him. His eminently spiritual nature soared above all the petty considerations of temporal existence. It is on record

"that on three memorable occasions he was determined to give up all his possessions and retire from worldly life to seek salvation, and on all these occasions it was with great difficulty that his teachers and ministers prevailed on him to entertain more correct notions of his duty in life." (*Ibid*, p. 48).

In this respect Shivaji stands alone ; the history of the world does not present another instance of a soldier, or a statesman or a king ever manifesting such religious enthusiasm or zeal which was the moving spring of Shivaji's actions. With Shivaji the great problem of the day was a religious problem, to which all other questions were but secondary.

Shivaji was not a Brahman and was not a man of letters. He had for his spiritual guide or *guru*, the celebrated saint Ram Das. A great deal of Shivaji's career was influenced by the teachings of this holy man. The object of God in producing this matchless pair of the spiritual guide and the disciple was that Hindus should acquire the sovereignty of India and that this desired for end should be brought about through the instrumentality of Maharasthra. Mr. Ranade writes that

"in token of the work of liberation being carried on,

not for personal aggrandisement but for higher purposes of service to God and man, the national standard received, at the suggestion of Ramdas, its favorite orange colour, which was and is the colour of the clothes worn by anchorites and devotees. The old forms of salutation were dispensed with as implying submission to the foreigner, and a new form was substituted, which only recited the name of Ramdas's favorite deity. Under the same influence the names of Shivaji's principal officers were changed from their Mahomedan designations to Sanskrit equivalents and the forms of correspondence also were similarly improved. Shivaji, from a sense of gratitude to his spiritual teacher, made a gift of his kingdom, and Rámdás gave it back to him as a trust to be managed in the public interest. When Shivaji pressed him to accept some *Inám* lands for the service of his favorite deity, Rámdás significantly requested him to assign *Inams* in territories which were still under foreign sway, thus significantly hinting that the work of liberation was not yet completed." (*Ibid*, p. 82).

It was this ascendency of spiritual nature in Shivaji which accounts for his receiving the inspiration which guided his conduct in hours of troubles and trials. He was much in advance of the time in which he lived. The intensely religious nature of Shivaji prevented him in his career of conquest from perpetrating those atrocities with which the name of most conquerors or warriors is inseparably associated. It has already been said that, the task of the conqueror is generally that of a butcher ; that he is selfishness personified, and that he does not scruple in violating the honour of women, in desecrating the places of

worship of his conquered foes or massacring in cold blood the innocent women and children as well as helpless old and sick peoples. Of all the conquerors who have appeared on the stage of history, Shivaji alone kept his hands clean from the performance of such vile deeds. It was a glory all his own. In all his compaigns Shivaji came out successful. But in his hour of triumph, he never allowed his men to dishonor any woman or desecrate any holy place of worship. He was not a crusader as the Christians were, or a bigoted and unscrupulous man like Aurangzeb at whose hands he met with many persecutions.

His chivalrous respect for the female sex was mainly due to the influence which his mother exercised over him from his childhood. He was brought up by his mother, for he saw very little of his father Shahji. All great men have owed to their mothers a great deal for their successful careers. Shivaji's was no exception to this general rule. The name of his mother Jijibai should evoke feelings of respect from all those who honour her son Shivaji.

Shivaji's glorious career was prematurely cut short in 1680 when he was a little over fifty years of age. But during that period, his success was phenomenal. He carved out a kingdom for himself, and he so consolidated it that it stood the shocks of the invasions of the Muhammadans and Christians and

ultimately brought about the downfall of the mighty Moghuls. His idea of the united confederacy of the Maratha States, his mode of organization of the Maratha States and his mode of organization of the Maratha government enabled the people of Maharasthra not only to conquer India from the Muhammadans and fight the Christians on an equal footing but saved them from ruin during the critical periods of their history.

The reader is referred to Mr. Ranade's work for further details regarding Shivaji. It is only necessary for us to refer to the organization of the Civil Government of Shivaji and the Mahratta Chouth and Sardesmukhi, for the sketch in the sequel will not be made intelligible without thoroughly understanding these subjects.

Mr. Ranade writes:—

"Like the first Napoleon, Shivaji in his time was a great organiser, and a builder of civil institutions, which conduced largely to the success of the movement initiated by him;...These civil institutions deserve special study because they display an originality and breadth of conception which he could not have derived from the systems of government then prevalent under Mahomedan or Hindoo rule." (*Ibid*, p. 115.)

Shivaji's Board of Administration consisted of eight members called the *Ashta Pradhán*.

"The *Peshwa* was Prime Minister, next to the King, and was at the head of both the civil and military ad-

ministration, and sat first on the right hand below the throne. (2) The *Senapati* was in charge of the military administration, and sat first on the left side. (3) *Amatya* and (4) *Sachiv* sat next to the *Peshwa*, while the (5) *Mantri* sat next below the *Sachiv* and was in charge of the King's private affairs. The (6) *Sumant* was Foreign Secretary and sat below the *Senapati* on the left. Next came (7) *Panditrao*, who had charge of the ecclesiastical department, and below him on the left side sat the (8) Chief Justice. (*Ibid*, p. 126).

Mr. Ranade pertinently observes that Shivaji's system has its counterpart in the present constitution of the Government of India. The seed of the decline of the Mahratta Power was sown when the successors of Shivaji deviated from his system and when these offices became hereditary. The fault could hardly be laid at the door of Shivaji, for had his successors loyally worked out his system,

"many of the dangers which ultimately destroyed the Mahratta Confederacy, even before it came in conflict with the superior discipline and resources of the British power, might have been avoided."...

In another respect also, Shivaji was far in advance of his times. He set himself steadily against any assignments of land as *Jahàgir* to his successful civil or military commanders. Every one from the *Peshwa* and *Senapati* down to the lowest sepoy or *Karkun* was, under *Shivaji's* arrangements, directed to draw his salary in kind or money from the public treasury and granaries." (*Ibid*, p. 129).

Thus Shivaji's conception of the civil and military administration was the most perfect and it may be

added that no better system, up to this time, has been worked out in any country.

The concession to the collection of the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* was granted to the Mahratta Government by the Delhi Emperor, after the death of Shivaji and of Aurangzeb. But the conception regarding these was Shivaji's. Shivaji in his life-time exacted these demands from some of the Karnatik princes and chiefs. In his life-time, Aurangzeb was prevailed upon in 1705, in order to bring the war he was then waging in the Deccan to a conclusion, to consent to the payment of 10 per cent. of the whole revenue for which the Mahratta Commanders were to agree to maintain order in the Deccan. But the war was renewed and Aurangzeb died in 1707. On his death, his successor released Sháhu, who established himself at Satara in 1708. It was in his reign that the concession of the *Chauth* or 25 per cent. of the revenues of the Deccan then under the sway of the Moghuls was granted to the Mahrattas by the Delhi Emperor on the understanding that the local expenses of the Moghul Government in the Deccan were about one-fourth of the entire collections. Shivaji's idea of demanding the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* was to protect those who paid these against foreign aggression by maintaining troops for that purpose. According to Mr. Ranade, these institutions bear very close

resemblance to the Marquess Wellesley's subsidiary alliances. He writes:—

"This idea of the subsidiary alliances was, in fact, a reproduction on a more organized scale of the plan followed by the Mahratta leaders a hundred years in advance, when they secured the grant of the *Chouth* and *Sardeshmukhi* from the Imperial authorities at Delhi....

"The *Chouth* and *Sardeshmukhi* rights served, in the hands of the Mahratta leaders, the same purpose of giving legitimacy and expansion to their power which in the last century has resulted from the subsidiary alliances and conquests made by the British Government." (*Ibid* p. 220).

Much nonsensical talk has been indulged in by European writers and historians by their comparing *Chauth* to the levying of black-mail by the robber Highlander Chiefs of Scotland. But the Hindoo Prince's *Chauth* was no more black-mail than the system of subsidiary alliance instituted by the Marquess Wellesley.

Shivaji died in 1680. His death was hailed with joy by the Moghuls, especially Aurangzebe and the Christians such as the Portuguese and English, for he was a terror to them all. Aurangzebe, however, had the magnanimity to acknowledge the greatness of Shivaji, whom he had nicknamed as the 'mountain-rat.'

His son, Sumbhaji, succeeded him. Although he was cruel and vicious, he inherited the military

genius of his father. By his character, he made himself odious to the generality of his subjects. When he was taken prisoner by Aurangzebe, no attempt was made to rescue him. Aurangzebe offered to spare his life on condition of his turning a Mussalman. But Sumbhaji insulted the Emperor by asking the hand of his daughter in marriage and abusing the Prophet. It was more than what the flesh and blood of the fanatic Aurangzebe could bear. He ordered the execution of Sumbhaji, after putting out his eyes and cutting out his tongue. This cruel execution aroused the indignation of the Mahrattas and made them the deadliest enemies of the Moghuls.

His son Shivajee was a boy of six years only when Sumbhaji was executed. He with his mother was taken prisoner by Aurangzebe's troops. Aurangzebe named him Sahoo, an appellation which he always retained. Bernier has described how the refractory nobles and dangerous subjects were administered *pousta* by Aurangzebe's orders. *Pousta* was a preparation of opium and it acted as a slow poison on the system.

It is more than probable, that Shahoo *alias* Shivajee was made a victim to *pousta* by Aurangzebe. He was a captive in the Moghul camp till the death of Aurangzebe, which occurred in 1707, when he was released. He was a very weak prince and was a half-lunatic. His long captivity and the probable admini-

stration of the *pousta* told on his intellect and he was certainly not a proper person to rule the Empire which the genius of his grandfather had founded. He had imbibed the loose morals of the Moghul Court and kept a large harem.

Under such circumstances, his ministers for the weal of the state thought proper to circumscribe his authority to a narrow tract, *viz.*, Satara, and conferred the powers of government on the Prime Minister, known as the Peishwa. This was the origin of the Peishwa's rule At Shahoo's time, Balaji Viswanath was the Peishwa, and he succeeded in making the Peishwaship an hereditary office. Christian historians and writers have indulged in much nonsensical talk about the Peishwa's confiscating the powers of the Mahratta rulers. But it appears to us that the Peishwas saved the ruin of the Mahratta Empire, then in its infancy, by taking over the management from the hands of the incapable and pleasure-hunting and degenerate descendants of the Great Shivajee. No one, in his senses, would ever believe that had Shahoo been permitted to rule without restriction over the Empire of his grandfather, that Empire would have fared better than it did under the Peishwa's administration. The Peishwas should be hailed as saviours rather than as confiscators of the Mahratta Empire. From the death of Aurangzebe till the fatal battle of

Panipat which put an end to the sole supremacy of the Peishwas, the Brahmin Peishwas were engaged in consolidating and extending the empire of the Mahrattas. They extended their rule from Cape Comorin in the South to the confines of the Himalayas in the North, and from the Bay of Bengal in the East to the Arabian Sea in the West. Had the Peishwaship not been made hereditary, it is probable that the Mahratta Empire would have had a longer lease of life and successfully withstood the intrigues and conspiracies of the Christian merchants who brought on its fall.

In Mahratta History there are two central figures round which are to be traced the rise and the decline of the Mahratta Empire. The valor and genius of Shivaji laid the foundation of the Empire ; the imprudence and intrigue of Raghoonath Rao precipitated its fall. The latter was instrumental in bringing the Mahrattas into conflict with the Afghans, which resulted in the battle of Panipat ; and later still with the English, which ended in the break up of the great Shivaji's Empire.

How Shivaji laid the foundation of the Empire has already been told. The doing of the mischief by Raghoonath Rao or Raghoba, as he is called in Mahratta History, is to be narrated now.

Raghoonath Rao was the second son of the Peishwa Bajee Rao and brother of Ballajee Bajee Rao,

the greatest of all the Peishwas. At one time of his career he gave great promise of becoming an able military leader. He carried the Mahratta arms victorious to the North-Western Frontier of India. He subdued the Moghuls, entered Dehli and after defeating the Afghan troops kept on the outposts of the Punjab, captured Lahore and marched triumphantly as far north as Attock. It was an imprudent step, which brought on the Mahrattas the wrath of the Afghan sovereign Ahmed Shah Abdalee. The Punjab of the time we are writing of was in the hands of the Afghans. Nadir Shah's invasion had the effect of transferring the Punjab from the dominion of the Delhi Empire to the kingdom of the Ruler of Kabul. When Ahmed Shah heard of the occupation of Lahore by the Mahrattas, he lost no time in marching his troops to regain his lost possessions. The weak Mahratta garrisons in the Punjab had to yield to the Afghan invader. It was at Panipat that the Mahrattas concentrated to oppose the further progress of the Afghans towards Hindustan. Many a time before, the plain of Panipat had decided the fate of the Ruling Houses of India. Not far from Panipat was the scene of the Civil War between the Kauravas and the Pandavas in which was destroyed the Kshatriya or the Warrior Caste of India and thus the country fell a prey to the invasions of every rising power of the world. The sovereignty of India passed from the

hands of the Hindoos to those of the Muhammadans at Panipat, for it was here that Pirthwi Raj fell fighting against Muhammad of Ghor. Babar laid the foundation of the Moghul dynasty in India by gaining the victory at Panipat over his antagonist, the last representative of the House of Lodi. Again, Akbar regained his lost crown by slaying the usurper at the battle field of Panipat.

The battle fought at Panipat in January 1761, sealed the fate of the Mahratta supremacy in India. The Mahrattas were defeated and turned back towards Hindustan and the Deccan. The Dehli Emperor became, for a time at least, secure on his throne and independent of the dictatorship of the Mahratta General. The Moghul Viceroy of Oudh threw off his allegiance to the throne of Delhi. But the effect was most marked on the Mahratta Empire. The houses of Scindhia, Holkar, Gaekwar and Bhonslay, as independent of the Peishwa, date from the day on which the Mahrattas suffered the crushing defeat at Panipat.

Raghoba, as has been said, had, by his imprudence, excited the wrath of the Cabul ruler and thus brought on the battle of Panipat. But he was not present at that battle. From his intriguing character, it may be presumed that he did not wish the success of his own party. It is recorded in Mahratta History that on his return from the North after he had extended the boundaries of the Mahratta Empire

by adding the Panjab to it, he fell out with his cousin Sawdasheo Rao Bhow, to whom he made over the command of the army. Sawdasheo Rao Bhow proceeded to Panipat as Commander-in-Chief of the Mahratta Forces. This must have been rankling in the breast of the ever intriguing, and at the same time, ambitious, Raghoba. What wonder if he tried his best by intrigues and conspiracies to get his cousin into disgrace and ruin? It is a significant fact that Holkar held aloof and did not render any assistance to his chief, on that fatal day at Panipat.

But Raghoba's intriguing character became fully evident in his dealings with the English. Ballajee Bajee Row died a few weeks after the fatal battle of Panipat. He was succeeded in the Peishwaship by his son Madhoo Rao, then in his teens. Raghoba saw his opportunity. He was the regent during the minority of his nephew. For the first time in Mahratta History, during the regency of Raghoba, a treaty was concluded between the Christian merchants constituting the East India Company and the acknowledged head of the Mahratta confederacies, the Peishwa.

By this treaty the Seedee of Janjira was placed under the protection of the East India Company. The Seedee was also given back all the territory which the Mahrattas had taken from him. The treaty*

* Grant Duff calls it an agreement and not a treaty.

went further, for it assured civility and friendship between the Peishwa and the President of the Bombay Factory.

Raghoba had not the foresight of a statesman. He entered hastily into an alliance with the English which sapped the foundation of the Maratha Empire. By the treaty he showed his hand to the English merchants. He made the Seedee his enemy, for that Abyssiniam pirate commenced depredations in the Maratha territories, because he was now under the protection of the British. It may be that the Seedee was instigated to these acts of violence in the Mahratta territory by the Christian merchants.*

The immediate object of Raghoba in entering into an alliance with the English was to obtain from Bombay some European soldiers and arms, to resist the threatened invasion of the Nizam, the Subedar of the Deccan. The Christian merchants did not consent to render their assistance from a superfluity of unselfishness or for no end. They agreed to

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But to all intents and purposes, it served the purpose of a treaty.

* At the time when Raghoba was entering into treaty with the East India Company, "the Court of Directors," writes Grant Duff, "were desirous of seeing the Mahrattas checked in their progress, and would have beheld combinations of the other native powers against them with abundant satisfaction." (History of the Mahrattas).

furnish Raghoba with the required troops and guns provided the island of Salsette and the fort of Bassein were ceded to them. The degenerate Raghoba was willing to make even these sacrifices, but as the invasion of Nizam Ally did not come off there was no necessity for guns and Christian soldiers and so Salsette and Bassein did not pass into the hands of the East India Company then.

Thus Raghoba for the second time committed an imprudent act whose consequences he could not foresee. The Christian merchants were made acquainted with the weak points in the Mahratta Government and the Abyssinian pirate chief was raised to a position which but for Raghoba's action he would never have attained. Had Raghoba stopped short here without proceeding any further perhaps much harm would not have yet resulted to the Maratha Empire. But his ambition knew no bounds. He indulged in intrigues and conspiracies which weakened the Empire founded by Shivaji.

Causes of the first Mahratta War

It is not necessary to recount the vicissitudes of fortune of Raghoba during the life time of his nephew Mahdoo Row the Peishwa. When Mahdoo Row attained his majority he found that his uncle instead of delegating a share to him in the administration of the country usurped all power in his own

hands. Dissensions between the two occurred, which, though accommodated several times, ultimately led Mahdoo Row to place his uncle in confinement. Unfortunately for the Mahratha Empire, Mahdoo Row died on the 18th November 1772 at the early age of 28. Referring to the death of this young Peishwa, Grand Duff writes:—

"The root which invigorated the already scathed and wide-extending tree was cut off from the stem and the plains of Panipat were not more fatal to the Mahratta Empire than the early death of this excellent prince. Atlhough the military talents of Mahdeoo Rao were very considerable, his character as a sovereign is entitled to far higher praise, and to much greater respect than that of any of his predecessors." (*Ibid*, p. 352).

Mahdoo Row died without issue ; and his widow immortalized herself by immolating herself with the corpse. Prior to his death, Mahdoo Row had released his uncle, Raghoonath Row, from confinement and nominated his brother Narain Row to the Peishwa-ship, whom on his death-bed he recommended to the care and protection of his uncle. But that uncle now saw his opportunity to gain his ambitious end. He got his nephew Narain Row assassinated on the 30th August, 1773.

This occurrence was reported to the Bombay Government by Mr. Mostyn, whom the Bombay Government had sent to the Court of the Peishwa as its envoy. Grant Duff writes:—

"Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona by the Bombay Government, for the purpose of * * using every endeavour, by fomenting domestic dissensions or otherwise, to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder or Nizam Ally."*

The Bombay Government were very anxious about Hyder and Nizam Ally at the time when the young Peishwa was assassinated.

The Mahrattas were at the same time threatening the possessions of the East India Company, for they were establishing on the northern side of the Ganges. They would have invaded Allahabad, Corah, Oude, and Rohilcund, but Mr. Mill writes that

"In the month of May (1773), the situation of their domestic affairs recalled that people wholly to their own country."†

It will not be very unsafe to presume that Mr. Mostyn incited Raghoba to this dastardly deed in order to carry out the instructions he had received

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* Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, p. 340 (Ed. 1873). Mr. Mill writes that Mr. Mostyn was sent in 1772 with instructions from the court of Directors "to negotiate with Madhoo Rao the Peishwa for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay." (Mill, Vol. III, p. 424).

† Mill's History of British India, edited by H. H. Wilson (Ed. 1858), Vol. III, p. 394.

from his Government.* This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the British lent their support to Raghoba, the murderer of his nephew, in those transactions which culminated in the first Mahratta War.

Mr. Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, never visited India and was not acquainted with any of the

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* Captain Grant Duff writes :—"Rugonath Rao is said to have acknowledged to Ram Shastree that he had written an order to those men, authorising them to seize Narain Rao, but that he had never given the order to kill him. This admission is generally supposed to have been literally true; for by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ram Shastree, it was found that the word *dhurawe,* to seize, was altered to *marawe,* to kill. It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye."

It is not known on whose authority Grant Duff charges Anundee Bye with tampering with the order issued by Raghoba. That woman, however bad she might have been, entertained great affection for her nephew. She was a Brahman lady, and as such she felt great regard not only for human beings but for dumb creatures also. No Brahman lady would herself kill or cause any one to kill any animal; Anundee Bye was no exception to the rule. Our own conviction is that Mr. Mostyn had a hand in the matter. A writer in the *Calcutta Review,* Vol. II, No. 4, p. 430 (footnote) says "Ragobah afterwards murdered Narain Rao, . . . and was supported by the British Government. A *very evil chapter* in Anglo-Indian history."

languages spoken in the continent of India. To these causes are to be attributed the shortcomings of his otherwise admirable History of British India. He had to depend on the records of the India House for writing his history. Those records represent Raghoba almost as a saint and quite incapable of the foul deed associated with his name. Of course, it was the policy of the Bombay Government of those days to make Raghoba appear as an aggrieved party. A compact had been formed between the British merchants of Bombay and Raghoba. Hence it was that they did not believe in the murder of Narain Rao by Raghoba, or in his ambition to usurp the Peishwaship. Depending on these records, Mr. Mill wrote :—

"The members of the Peishwa family, instead of supplanting, had acted with the greatest harmony in supporting, their head. And if Raghonaut Rao had aimed at the supremacy, of which no other token appears than the accusation of his enemies, prudence would have taught him, either to usurp the authority from the beginning, or to leave but little time for his nephew to gather strength." (Vol. III, p. 419).

Regarding the murder of Narain Rao, Mr. Mill depended wholly on Mr. Mostyn's Report ; but unfortunately he did not know the part which Mr. Mostyn had played in all these transactions. It was this envoy's interest to speak in laudatory terms of Raghoba and his nefarious doings. But thanks

to the researches of Colonel Briggs and Captain Grant Duff, we know now the true character of Raghoba and also the reasons which prompted the British merchants of Bombay to give their support to him.

After the death of Narain Rao, Raghoba proclaimed himself as the Peishwa. Mr. Mostyn was sent, as has been said above, to Poona to prevent the Mahrattas joining Hyder or Nizam. Now Raghoba, whom he helped to gain the Peishwaship, was a tool in his hands. He made him wage war against the Nizam, and Hyder Ali. It is not necessary to refer to these wars. Raghoba, if not defeated in any, did not obtain any advantage by prosecuting these wars. His absence was taken advantage of by those ministers who had the welfare of the Mahratta Empire at heart. Foremost amongst them was the great Nana Fadnavis.* It did not take him long to discover that Raghoba was merely a tool in the hands of the Bombay Government and that the end of the Mahratta Empire would not be far off if Raghoba continued to hold the Peishwaship.

It is necessary to refer to the early career of this

* The writer is indebted to the able lecture delivered in Poona and reproduced in the *Kesari* of March 1900, by Mr. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, for some of the materials regarding the career of this great Mahratta statesman.

remarkable statesman. His real name was Balaji Janardhan Bhanu. He was born and bred as a high class nobleman. The fatal battle-field of Panipat was his training ground, for that event made such an impression on his mind that he directed all his energies and abilities to the maintenance of the Empire which Shivaji had founded. He had proceeded to Panipat, while in his teens, not as a fighter, but as Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mahratta Forces, and with the intention of making pilgrimages to the holy shrines of Northern India. For the latter purpose his mother and wife had accompanied him. But at Panipat, he lost both his mother and his wife. He himself travelled in disguise and on foot from Panipat to Poona. He was so much disgusted with life, for he had lost all those who were nearest and dearest to him, that at one time he seriously thought of turning an ascetic. But he was prevailed upon to give up this programme of asceticism. He served as Secretary to Madhavrao, on whose death he acted in the same capacity in the short-lived reign of the ill-fated Narain Rao. But it was in the reign of Madhava Rao II, the last but one of the Peishwas, that he reached the Premiership and displayed those qualities of statesmanship which have exacted admiration even from the fastidious British critics.

Nana Fadnavis was opposed to Raghoba, because

the latter solicited the armed assistance of the English merchants of Bombay. To quote the words of an English historian: *

"Nana Fadnavis avowed his respect and admiration for the English but shrank from their political embrace; and whatever dangers might impend, he steadily refused to accept their offers of permanent armed assistance."

It was therefore not to be wondered at that Raghoba and Nana could not keep on friendly terms when their views regarding the administration of the Mahratta Empire were so diametrically opposed.

When Raghoba learnt that Nana Fadnavis and other ministers were opposed to him, he fled for safety to Guzerat. In the meanwhile (*i.e.*, on the 18th April, 1774) the widow of the murdered Peishwa Narain Rao had given birth to a son.† Raghoba from interested motives disputed the authenticity of the birth of this posthumous son of his late nephew, whom he had contrived to assassinate. He was supported in this dispute by the Bombay Government, who were no doubt interested in giving every assistance they could to this wretched man, not out of any

* Torrens' Empire in Asia (p. 238, Panini Office Reprint).

† The fact of the birth of this child was at the time much disputed. The Bombay Government, on the report of Mr. Mostyn, were very incredulous and sceptical, but there is no doubt now about the authenticity of the young Peishwa's birth. See Wilson's footnote to his 5th edition of Mill's History of India, Vol. III, p. 422.

love for him, but for the sake of "fomenting domestic dissensions."

Raghoba applied to the President and Council of Bombay for assistance. They were too willing to render him assistance, but not from a superfluity of unselfishness or for no end. They knew that this hybrid alliance would sever Raghoba from the Maratha Confederacy and would thus weaken and enfeeble the Maratha Empire. Moreover, they had been strongly coveting for some years, Salsette and Bassein. In 1761, after the battle of Panipat, when Raghoba as Regent to his minor nephew Madho Rao, the Peshwa, concluded the fatal treaty with the English and asked for their assistance in guns and British soldiers to resist the threatened invasion of Nizam Ally, the English were willing to render that assistance on condition of Raghoba ceding Salsette and Bassein to them. It has been already stated that as the threatened invasion never came off, so Salsette and Bassein did not then pass into the hands of the Bombay Government. But the Government of Bombay were trying every means to get possession of those two places. Even the Directors of the East India Company, in their letter dated the 18th of March, 1768, wrote to the President and Council of Bombay :—

"We recommend to you, in the strongest manner, to use your endeavours, upon every occasion that may offer,

to obtain these places, which we should esteem a valuable acquisition. We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wish they could be obtained by purchase than war." They again wrote in a letter dated 31st March, 1769, "Salsette and Bassein, with their dependencies, and the Mahratta's portion of the Surat provinces were all that we seek for on that side of India. These are the objects you are to have in view, in all your treaties, negotiations, and military operations,—and that you must be ever watchful to obtain." "In more earnest prosecution of the same design," writes Mr. Mill, "Mr. Mostyn arrived from England, in 1772, with instructions from the Court of Directors, that he should be sent immediately to negotiate with Madhoo Rao the Peshwa, for certain advantages to the settlements on the coast of Malabar, and above all for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay." (Mill, III, p. 423).

A passage from Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas has already been quoted, in which that author states that Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona for the purpose of "fomenting domestic dissensions" for gaining certain advantages to his masters, the Directors of the East India Company. As long as Madhoo Rao and his brother Narain Rao wielded the Peishwaship, they were guided in all their foreign affairs by the great Nana Fadnavis. It was impossible for Mr. Mostyn to be successful in his undertaking.

"The result of this negotiation tended only to show that, pacifically at least, the coveted spots were very unlikely to be obtained." (Mill's History of India, Vol. III, p. 424).

Is there any wonder that Mr. Mostyn seeing that he did not succeed in gaining the object for which he had been sent by his masters, tried to "foment domestic dissensions" by abetting, if not directly instigating, the assassination of Narain Rao? It is also very significant that nowhere in his despatches, Mr. Mostyn has even hinted that the assassination was carried out by order of Raghoba. He could not have been ignorant of what the whole population of Poona were saying about the assassination. On the other hand, he blackened the character of the murdered prince, of whom Grant Duff writes:—"He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him."

The assassination of Narain Rao was hailed with joy by Mr. Mostyn and the Bombay Government. Narain Rao, as said above, was murdered on the 30th August, 1773. Mr. Mostyn communicated the news to the Bombay Government. What the Bombay Government thought of the event, may be better described in the words of Mr. Mill. That historian writes:—

"The assassination of Narain Rao, and the succession of Ragoba, announcing a weak and distracted government, appeared to the Council to present a favorable opportunity for accomplishing an object which their honourable masters had so much at heart, the possession of Salsette and Bassein. In their select consultations, on the 17th of September, 1773,

they agreed to instruct Mr. Mostyn, their resident at Poonah, to improve diligently every circumstance favourable to the accomplishment of that event, and on no account whatever to leave the Mahratta Capital." (Vol. III, p. 425).

It will thus be seen that every endeavour was made by the Bombay Government to get possession of Salsette and Bassein. It was the interest of that government to regard Raghoba as the rightful Peishwa. Raghoba, as said before, had fled to Guzerat. Now he sought the protection of the English and so proceeded to Surat. Here on the 6th of March, 1775, he entered into a treaty with the Bombay Government, by which he gave up Salsette and Bassein, together with the Mahratta's portion of the Surat provinces.

This treaty led to the First Mahratta War. The Bombay Government sent troops to assist Raghoba in recovering his Peishwaship. The troops were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Keating. He was sent with the troops "for the assistance of Raghoba against all his enemies." Raghoba left Surat and proceeded with Colonel Keating's detachment to Cambay, and landed there on the 17th March. The remnant of Raghoba's army had assembled at the village Durmuj, eleven miles north-east from Cambay, and here the detachment under Colonel Keating formed a junction with them on the 19th April. With this large army, Raghoba was made

by the Bombay Government to proceed to Poona. But Raghoba was not destined to see Poona again.

On the 5th of May, Raghoba moved towards Poona. But the army which the Poona Government had sent in his pursuit, prevented his ever reaching Poona. The Poona army was under the command of Hurry Punt Phurkay. This commander of the troops had been employed as a clerk by the unfortunate Mahdoo Rao ; but by sheer dint of ability he rose to fill one of the most important posts in the Peishwa's Government. On the 18th May, a battle was fought at a place called Arras, in which the troops of Raghoba and his ally fared badly. Many British officers were killed and wounded. But Hurry Punt Phurkay had to ultimately retire from the field and thus the hybrid allies thought that they had gained a victory. But that it was not a complete victory is proved not only by the heavy losses suffered by the British but by their inability to pursue Hurry Punt Phurkay. The retirement of the Mahratta Commander is to be attributed to the season of the year, for the monsoon was expected within a few days' time, which would have made the rivers of Guzerat quite unfordable, and occasioned great difficulties in getting his supplies. On the 10th June, while Hurry Punt Phurkay was crossing the Nurbuddah, Colonel Keating tried to harass his rear, but in this he was disappointed. The Mahratta General crossed the river without any loss

and Colonel Keating was obliged to give up the pursuit on account of the outbreaking of the monsoon.

But the retirement of Hurry Punt Phurkay from Guzerat, necessitated also by the affairs in the Deccan, brought on the defection of one of the principal members of the Mahratta Confederacy. From this time forward, the Gaekwar does not figure as one of the Confederates owning the Peishwa as their head. How this was brought about will be understood by what follows below.

The founder of the family was one Dumnajee Gaekwar, who for his bravery in the battle of Bala poor, fought in 1720 A.D., was appointed by Raja Shao, as Second-in-Command, under Khundee Rao Dhabaray, of the Mahratta army, with the title of Shumsher Bahadur. On his death, which took place in 1721, he was succeeded in the post by his nephew Peelajee Gaekwar. It was due to his enterprise that a greater portion was wrested from the Moghuls and added to the Mahratta Empire. He established his headquarters at Baroda. But in 1732 he was assassinated by the emissary of one of his enemies ; his eldest son, Dumnajee, succeeded him. Ever since then Baroda remained in the possession of the Gaekwar family. After the fatal battle of Panipat, Dumnajee followed the example of the Scindia and the Holkar by throwing up his allegiance to, and becoming independent of, the Raja of Satara. But like the other

Mahratta Chieftains, he joined the Confederacy under the Peishwa. Dumnajee died in 1768, leaving four sons—Sayajee, Govind Rao, Manikjee, and Futih Singh. Dumnajee, as was usual in those days when polygamy was prevalent, had three married wives. His eldest son, Sayajee, was by the second wife ; Govind Rao was the second son by the first wife ; Manikjee and Futih Singh were the youngest and full brothers by the third wife. After the death of Dumnajee, there was a dispute to the succession between the two half-brothers Sayajee and Govind Rao. Each advanced precedents to the superiority of his claim. Sayajee was an idiot, but his youngest half-brother Futih Singh, urged the claim of Sayajee to the succession. The adhehents of these claimants—Sayajee and Govind Rao—were waging war against each other, from the time of Peelajee's death till when Raghoba fled from the Deccan and sought an asylum in the Gaekwar's territory. When Colonel Keating arrived in Guzerat with his detachment for the purpose of assisting Rugonath Rao, he, in defiance of the instructions of his employers, tried to take advantage of the dissensions between the two Gaekwar brothers. He tried to negotiate and conclude a treaty with Futih Singh, and he actually sent on the 22nd April 1775, an agent, named Lieut. George Lovibond, to the camp of Futih Singh for the purpose of ratifying

the treaty. But the young Gaekwar grossly insulted the agent and did not conclude the treaty.

When the Bombay Government heard of the failure of Colonel Keating in getting the Gaekwar under their thumb, and the manner in which Lieut. Lovibond had been insulted, they determined to send a tried diplomatist to join Colonel Keating's force for the purpose of transacting the political affairs. Their choice fell on Mr. Mostyn. This diplomatist does not need any introduction now. His doings in the Peishwa's court have already been mentioned. It has been already stated that Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona for the purpose of fomenting domestic dissensions. It has also been mentioned that although it is impossible to prove from records the part which Mr. Mostyn played in the assassination of the Peishwa Narayen Rao, yet the presumption is not quite improbable that he abetted, if not instigated, the assassination. The success which attended his mission to the Poona Court, led his employers to expect better results from his presence in Guzerat while the Gaekwar brothers were quarrelling for settling the succession. And the Bombay Government were not disappointed. Mr. Mostyn was a past master in the art of duplicity, for diplomats, says the English proverb, are sent abroad to lie for the nation which employs them.

As long as Hurry Punt Phurkay was in Guzerat Mr. Mostyn did not meet with any success. But when

that Mahratta General retired to the Deccan, for the affairs at Poona necessitated his presence there, and also as the rains were at hand, Mr. Mostyn achieved all for which he had been sent by his employers. By playing on the hopes and fears of the Gaekwars, he succeeded in concluding a treaty with Futih Singh. By this treaty, the East India Company, not by any conquest but by diplomacy, secured a permanent footing in Guzerat. That Company gained territories yielding several lakhs of Rupees' revenue every year. The Gaekwar was obliged to cede to the Company "the government and revenue of the purgunnahs of Baroach," and also "the purgannahs Chickaly Veriow near Surat, and Coral, near the Nurbuddah river, and about 15 coss distant from Baroach, which together make three purgannahs." Sayajee Rao was recognized as the reigning Gaekwar but the real power was wielded by Futih Singh, for, as said before, Sayajee was an idiot. Henceforth, the Gaekwar's connection was severed from the Mahratta Confederacy and he entered into that hybrid alliance which was so repugnant to the feelings of the people of Maharastra and which ultimately completed the extinction of the Mahratta supremacy in India.

Prospects of the First Mahratta War.

The Government of Bombay had waged the war, concluded treaties with Raghoba and Futih Singh

Gaekwar, without the consent and knowledge of the Supreme Government, that is, Government of Bengal, and Governor-General of India. The Act of the Parliament of England passed in 1773, changed the constitution of the Company. The operation of the new constitution was ordained to commence in India after the 1st of August, 1774. The presidencies of Bombay and Madras were placed under the Governor-General, who was to be assisted in all his deliberations and political transactions by a Council consisting of five members. This constituted the Supreme Government of India. Warren Hastings was appointed by the new Act as the first Governor-General of India. The members of his new Council consisted of General Clavering, Mr. Monson, Mr. Francis and Mr. Barwell. The first three Councillors were appointed by the ministry in England and they did not arrive at Calcutta until the 19th October, 1774. One of the Councillors was Mr. (afterward Sir Philip) Francis, whose authorship of the Letters of Junius is now a well-known fact. He was the only man in the days of tyranny and oppression practised on the population of India by Europeans to protest against the conduct of his coreligionists and compatriots in this country. No Indian historian would discharge his task adequately, if he failed to mention with respect the name of this high-minded man, for he was instrumental in preventing and checking those abuses which greatly dis-

figured the early annals of the administration of India by the Company of Christian merchants of England. He could not and would not tolerate the abuses which were rampant in India and hence, Warren Hastings became estranged from him. Francis sympathized with the people of India and tried his best to ameliorate their condition. If Bengal enjoys Permanent Settlement now, it is mainly due to his exertions and advocacy. If the people of India have not been totally annihilated and exterminated, or reduced to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water, it is because Francis contributed in no small measure to the bringing about of the trial of Warren Hastings, which served to purify the administration of India. It was not to be expected that he would look, with indifference, on the war which the Bombay Government had waged on the Mahrattas. He kept himself informed of all that was going on in every part of India with which the British had any transactions. It thus happened that while the Bombay Government affected to know nothing against the character of Raghoba, he knew fully the man whose cause the good Britishers of Bombay were espousing. He was also aware of the fact that the Bombay Government had captured Salsette and taken possession of Bassein, and of the treaty concluded with the infamous Raghoba. As is well-known, he had the majority of the members of the Council on his side ; so he

made the Governor-General address a letter to the Bombay Government requiring an account of the state of that presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December, 1774, but was not attended to till the 31st December, 1774. Even then the reply given was very meagre and did not satisfy the Supreme Council. This letter was answered by the Supreme Council on the 8th March, 1775, in which they expressed their disapprobation of the connexion with Raghoba, and asked the Bombay Government to suspend all negotiations with him. But as this did not seem to have any effect on the minds of the members of the Bombay Government and as they did not suspend negotiations with Raghoba, the Supreme Council were obliged to use strong language. In their letter dated 31st May and received in Bombay, on the 12th August, 1775, Warren Hastings and his colleagues condemned the treaty with Raghoba and denounced the support the Bombay Government had given to that infamous man as "unseasonable, impolitic, unjust and unauthorized." They enjoined on the Bombay Government to cancel the Treaty with Raghoba and withdraw the troops from assisting him, and intimated their intention of opening negotiations with the authorities at Poona by an agent of their own. For their purpose, Colonel Upton was selected. He left Calcutta on the 17th July, 1775.

The Bombay Government protested against what they considered to be the interference of the Supreme Council in their sphere of jurisdiction. They stated that the measures had been begun before the controlling administration was formed, which was, of course, not quite correct, for they had intimation of the new constitution long before it came into operation. They defended their conduct by pointing out the advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rughoonath Rao. They sent Mr. William Tayler to Calcutta to advocate their cause, but he did not meet with any success.

On receipt of the letter dated 31st May, 1775, from the Supreme Council the Bombay Government directed an immediate cessation of the hostilities and Colonel Keating was ordered to return to Surat.

Colonel Upton was furnished with letters for Sakharam Bapoo, who was at that time at the head of the ministerial party at Poona ; and also Raghoba, in the event of his success. He was instructed to insist upon Salsette and Bassein, as indispensable conditions in the agreement which was proposed. In his letter to Sakharam Bapoo, Warren Hastings wrote, that the conduct of the Bombay Government was contrary to the Company's order,

"because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the King of England, has directed that all the Company's

Governors in India should obtain mine and my Council's permission, as King's Governor and Council of Bengal, either to make war or peace."

The Poona ministers were at the time at Poorundhur, where Colonel Upton arrived on 28th December, 1775.

The preliminary condition of ceding Salsette and Bassein to the East India Company, to any treaty with the British, was vehemently resented by the Poona ministers. In his letter to Warren Hastings, dated 2nd February, 1776 and received at Calcutta on the 6th March, Colonel Upton wrote :—

"The ministers imagine that I must treat with them at any rate;—And that I have vastly exceeded my instructions, by asking a surrender of Salsette and Bassein.* They ask me a thousand times, why we make such professions of honour? How disapprove the war entered into by the Bombay Government, when we are so desirous of availing ourselves of the advantages of it?"

The ministers insisted upon an immediate renunciation of Salsette and Colonel Upton despairing of compliance with all his demands wrote in his letter to Warren Hastings, dated 7th of February, announcing the breaking off of the negotiations. Warren Hastings prepared for war on the largest scale. He tried to enlist the Bhonslays of Berar, the Scindia and the Holkar to his cause, and wrote to

* Grant Duff, p. 392.

* Mill, III, p. 434.

Hyder and the Nizam to support him or at least remain neutral. Troops from Calcutta and Madras were prepared for embarkation.

Colonel Upton was about to return to Bengal, when the Poona ministers changed their mind. It is nowhere stated what were the reasons which led the astute Nana Fadnavis to agree to almost all the proposals of the Supreme Government of Bengal. But so it happened that a treaty was concluded between the East India Company and the Poona Government by which all the territories which they were coveting for so many years were granted to them. This treaty is known as the Treaty of Poorunder, because it was signed at Poorunder on 3rd June 1776. It consisted of 19 articles. It made ample provisions for that wretched man Raghoba and ceded to the East India Company Salsette and the revenue of the City of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lakhs of Rupees, "by way of friendship" to the English Company."

The treaty between the Bombay Government and Raghoba signed at Surat on the 6th March 1775 was cancelled. When the Bombay Government learnt the terms of the Treaty, they were disappointed and seemed to consider themselves insulted by the Supreme Council assuming authority and cancelling the Treaty they had concluded with Raghoba. They

appealed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Amongst the Directors, there was no Philip Francis to guide and control their deliberations. Every one of those directors understood well his personal interest but was regardless of Indian greatness or happiness. Prompted by selfish motives and led by the prospect of gaining a large dividend, the Court of Directors sided with the Bombay Government.

"We approve," they wrote to the Supreme Government of Bengal, "under every circumstance, of the keeping of all the territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Raghoba, and direct that you forthwith adopt such measures as may be necessary for their preservation and defence."* Mill, p. 436).

* Mr. Mill has thoroughly exposed the hypocrisy of the Directors in these transactions. He writes.—"The Presidency of Bombay informed the Directors by letter, on the 12th of January, 1774, that the Mahratta Government was in a peculiar crisis, and that such an opportunity now occurred of acquiring Salsette and Bassein, as they had very little intention of letting escape. *The Directors, as if anxious to allow time for the conquest, replied not till the 12th of April 1775, when their answer could not be received at Bombay in much less than two years from the time when the measure was announced as on the verge of execution.* Nearly six months after the place was reduced by their arms, and governed by their authority, they sat down to say, 'It is with much concern we learn from your records, that we are not likely to obtain Salsette from the Mahrattas by negotiations. We, however, disapprove your

On the receipt of the above-named despatch from the Court of Directors the members of the Bombay government were encouraged to treat with contempt the Treaty of Poorundur. Grant Duff (p. 395) writes:—

"The Bombay Government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views, or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them; instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the Supreme Government, and to a solemn engagement under the constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal."

They were ready to renew the war and vigorously prosecute their former intentions. Better counsels, however, prevailed, but the members of the Bombay Government never ceased to persevere in their covert opposition to the wishes and intention of the Supreme Government. They saw their opportunity when Colonel Upton was recalled to Bengal. They were directed by the Supreme Government to send a

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resolution to take possession of the island by force, in case of the death or deposition of Raghoba; and hereby positively prohibit you from attempting that measure, under any circumstances whatever, without our permission first obtained for that purpose.' " (The italics are ours). But these Christian Directors did not fail to approve of the acquisition when made.

Resident Envoy to Poona. Their choice fell on Mr. Mostyn—the very same man who had once before been sent to Poona for the purpose of fomenting domestic dissensions, which resulted in the assasination of the young Peishwa Narain Rao, and infliction of miseries on the land of the Mahrattas.

As was natural, Nana Fadnavis and other ministers of Poona strongly objected to Mostyn coming to their Court as the Envoy of the British Government. But the Bombay Government had no other diplomatist in their service so skilled in the art of duplicity as Mr. Mostyn. Moreover, that government were brooding over their grievances, for the Supreme Council of Bengal had lowered their prestige in the eyes of the Mahratta rulers by annulling the Treaty of Surat and not setting up their protege Raghoba, the murderer, on the throne of Poona. They over-ruled the objection of the Poona ministers, and insisted on sending the ever-to-be-detested Mostyn to Poona. Accordingly that diplomat came to Poona in the middle of March 1777, very likely with secret instructions from the members of the Bombay Government to do everything in his power for the non-fulfilment of the articles of the Poorundhur Treaty.

It is not too much to say that the rupture which eventually took place between the Mahrattas and the English would have been prevented had the Bombay Government complied with the request of the Poona

Ministers and not sent the notorious Mr. Mostyn to Poona as their Envoy. No sooner did he arrive in Poona than he opened a campaign of intrigues. He discovered that the French were influencing the deliberations of the Poona ministers! The sight or even the name of a Frenchman was enough to drive John Bull out of his wits, just as the sight of a piece of red rag makes an ordinary bull lose his temper.

Hardly had Mr. Mostyn been six months in Poona when he furnished the Bombay Government with an account of Maratha affairs which enabled the Bombay Governor named Mr. Hornby to write his minute, dated 10th October 1777. In this minute Mr. Hornby wrote that the Mahratta affairs

"were fast verging to a period which must compel the English nation either to take some active or decisive part in them, or relinquish for ever, all hopes of bettering their own situation on the West of India."

and he lamented the control by which the Bombay Presidency had been fettered. Mr. Hornby was obliged to write the minute in this tone because Mr. Mostyn discovered that a Frenchman named St. Lubin had arrived in Poona! It is nowhere clearly stated what was the object which this Frenchman aimed at by visiting Poona. It is conjectured that

"St. Lubin endeavoured to obtain the cession of the port of Choule, with the fort of Rewadunda; and in order to induce Nana Fadnavis to enter upon an offensive and defensive alliance, he offered to bring 2,500 Europeans to

support the ministry, to raise and discipline 10,000 sepoys, and to furnish abundance of military and marine stores."*

But the same historian says that Nana never believed in the assurance of this French adventurer, for he was jealous of all Christians and never trusted them. Nana is said, according to the authority of Captain Grant Duff, to have declared on St. Lubin's taking leave that, "if the envoy could bring a French corps to his aid, he would grant his nation an establishment in the Mahratta territories." There was no danger from the French intriguing with the Marathas as long as the great Nana Fadnavis had a voice in the Maratha affairs.

Not only did Mr. Mostyn discover the French intrigue in Poona, but he succeeded better still in strengthening the hands of the Bombay Government by fomenting dissensions amongst the ministers. He sowed discord between Sakharam Bapoo and the great Nana Fadnavis, and also between the latter and his cousin Moroba. With the assistance of Mr. Mostyn, Moroba succeeded to replace Nana in the Poona Ministry. Nana was obliged to retire to Poorunder. When matters had reached this stage, Moroba was made by Mr. Mostyn to request the Bombay Government to immediately conduct Raghoba to Poona. That government determined to afford their assistance without delay and hence com-

* Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, p. 404.

menced all their preparations. The Bombay Presidency were emboldened to set at defiance the Poorundhur Treaty, because on their representations to the Court of Directors, that Court had censured the Supreme Council.

"We approved," wrote those Christian Directors, "under every circumstance, of keeping all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by Raghoba; and gave directions to the Presidencies of Bengal and Fort St. George to adopt such measures as might be necessary for their preservation and defence. But we are extremely concerned to find, from the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, that so great a sacrifice has been improvidently made; and especially, that the important cession of Bassein to the Company by Raghoba has been rendered of no effect. We cannot but disapprove of the mode of interference of the Governor-General and Council by sending an Ambassador to Poona without first consulting you, and of their determination to disavow and invalidate the treaty formerly entered into by an agent from your Presidency, and solemnly ratified under the seal of the Company. We are convinced, that Bassein, which is so great an object with us, might have been obtained if they had authorized you to treat either with Raghoba, or with the ministers at Poonah; reserving the final approval and ratification of the treaty to themselves. This is the precise line which we have drawn; and which we have directed our Governors-General and Council in future to pursue. We are of opinion, that an alliance originally with Raghoba would have been more for the honor and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be lasting, than that concluded at Poonah. His pretensions to the supreme authority appear

to us better founded than those of his competitors; and therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poonah have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Mahrattas, and if, from any circumstance, our Governor-General and Council shall deem it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with Raghoba, on the terms agreed upon between him and you."

In plain language this amounted to directing the Bombay Government to provoke the Poona ministers to violate the articles of the treaty concluded with them by Colonel Upton. Armed with this unjust document from the Court of Directors, the Bombay Government lost no time in infringing the Treaty of Poorundher. They still afforded their protection and countenance to Raghoba, which served as a pretext to the Poona Council for delaying the concessions they had made.

Warren Hastings, when he deputed Colonel Upton to negotiate with the Poona Ministers, was obliged to condemn the proceedings of the Bombay Government at the instance of Francis and other members of the Council who were in opposition to him. He was then in the minority. In his defence, on his impeachment, he admitted that he agreed to the Poorundher Treaty to satisfy the opposition. Otherwise he would have approved of the Surat Treaty. But now the circumstances were changed. With his casting vote he placed Francis and his party in the minority and snapped his fingers at the opposi-

tion of the author of Junius' Letters and his friends. Warren Hastings thus succeeded in carrying into execution all his proposals. Regarding the Mahratta affairs, Warren Hastings trimmed his sail to the breeze. He had no sense of justice or equity in him. So when he found that the Court of Directors wished the annulment of the Poorundher Treaty, he unhesitatingly and without scruples, sat to undo what had been done by his command.

While the Bombay Presidency, on the report of that man Mostyn, represented (or rather misrepresented) to the Supreme Council of Bengal that St. Lubin had received countenance from the Poona ministers ; and the dissensions among them ; and when they declared their intention of assisting Moroba who had agreed to set Raghoba on the *Musnad* of Poona as Peishwa, Warren Hastings resolved that a supply of money and a reinforcement of troops should be sent to the Presidency of Bombay. Mr. Francis and his solitary friend in the Supreme Council, Mr. Wheler, condemned the resolution of the Bombay Government, as illegal, because not taken with the approbation of the supreme authority ; unjust, because of infringing the treaty ; and impolitic, as incurring the dangers and burdens of war.

Warren Hastings and his unflinching supporter, Mr. Barwell, on the other hand, contended that it was not illegal, because such were not the sentiments

declared by the Court of Directors; not unjust, because Sakharam Bapoo, who on behalf of the minor Peishwa, Madhoo Narayen Rao, and of the Poona ministers, had signed the Treaty at Poorundher, was now alleged to have applied for the interference of the Company and the re-instatement of Raghoba as Peishwa. This statement of Warren Hastings is not true, since Sakharam Bapoo did nothing of the sort. But perhaps he was not so much to blame as the Bombay Government and the ever-notorious Mr. Mostyn. This Envoy, after having fomented dissensions among the ministers, deliberately misrepresented to the Bombay Government that Sakharam Bapoo was desirous of the interference of the Company. Warren Hastings declared the war not to be impolitic, because it anticipated the evil designs of a hostile party, and would give the Company an accession of territorial revenue, and a permanent influence in the Maratha Councils.

Colonel Upton, who knew the Marathas much better than Warren Hastings, and who had concluded the treaty with them at Poorundher, sided with Mr. Francis and accused the Bombay Presidency, and answered for the sincerity and pacific designs of the Marathas. But Warren Hastings was bent on crossing swords with the Mahrattas. He did not pay any heed to the sound advice of Francis or of Colonel Upton. He gave orders that a force should march

from Kalpee to Bombay, traversing the dominions of the independent princes of Hindoostan and the Central Provinces.

But before the army ordered by Warren Hastings set out on its march to Bombay, news reached Calcutta of the changes that had taken place in Poona affairs. Moroba, who had solicited the assistance of the Company, was a prisoner in the Ahmednagar fortress and Nana Fadnavis was at the head of the Poona ministry. Sakharam Bapoo, on account of his old age, had retired altogether from the party politics of the day, but was reconciled to Nana Fadnavis and was guided by his advice. Henceforth, the star of Nana was in the ascendant and he tried to prop up the tottering Maratha Empire from dissolution. He was a born statesman and a genuine patriot. Mr. J. Sullivan, writing to Colonel Briggs in 1850, says:—

"Give us Nana Fadnavis and such like. What poor pigmies we are as Indian administrators when compared with natives of that stamp! ! !"

Nana's merits have been appreciated on all hands. It was with such a man that Warren Hastings had to deal.

When the news of Moroba's imprisonment and Sakharam Bapoo's reconciliation to Nana Fadnavis reached Calcutta, and when it was clear that no one in Poona desired the restoration of the murderer Raghoba, Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler again urged

the stopping of the march of the troops. But Warren Hastings was obstinate. He said that the machinations of the French, which only existed in his imagination, rendered it highly expedient to despatch the troops to Bombay. This Governor-General of India gave out that the troops were sent on account of the French and asked the permission of the Scindia and the Holkar and the Raja of Berar to permit the troops to pass through their territories. The Holkar and the Scindia were at that time in Poona and so they could not oppose the march of the troops, and granted the passage. An alliance was made with the Raja of Berar. The circumstances connected with this alliance will be narrated a little further on.

Mr. Mostyn was now very impertinent towards the Poona ministers, because he knew of the approach of a force from Bengal. He asked the new ministry under Nana Fadnavis if they held themselves bound by the Poorundher Treaty. This appeared to the great Nana as if the kettle was calling the pot black. His reply was characteristic of the man. He observed:—"The English should keep that treaty faithfully, when they should do the same."

The Raja of Satara had recently died without leaving issue. The Bhonslays of Berar were descended from a branch of the house of Shivajee. In these circumstances, the Governor-General saw his

opportunity of fomenting dissensions among the Marathas. He instigated the Raja of Berar to urge a claim to the succession. By this means, Warren Hastings thought he would succeed in crushing the Poona Ministry and giving the whole of the Maharashtra a King who would be a tool in his hands just as the Nawab Vizier of Oude was. He would alienate the Bhonslays from the Mahratta Confederacy and thus weaken them. Moodajee Bhonslay was at this time the regent of Berar, and with him Warren Hastings opened negotiations. The party of Mr. Francis pointed out that this alliance* for raising Moodajee to the throne of Shivajee was inconsistent with the declared object for which the war was being undertaken, namely, the re-instatement of Raghoba in the office of Peishwa. Now the Governor-General threw off the disguise. He said that the re-instatement of Raghoba had never been pursued as an end, but only as a means ; and that his hopes and expectations were placed on Moodajee. It is a great pity that Warren Hastings was not tried on the charge of provoking the Marathas to the war. Had the charge been proceeded with, it is probable that many important documents regarding the obscure transactions of that Governor-General with

* In our opinion, *conspiracy* would have been the more proper term.

the Marathas would have seen the light of day. But the managers of the impeachment of Warren Hastings dropped the charge.

The force which Warren Hastings sent from Bengal to coerce the Poona ministry to accept Raghoba as their Peishwa, consisted of six battalions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, and a corps of cavalry, and he placed Colonel Leslie in its command. The Governor-General gave out that the force was intended to defeat the French designs on the Western coast of India, and even had the audacity to ask Nana Fadnavis to permit the force to pass through the Deccan, that is, through the Peishwa's territory. Nana saw through the design of the crafty Christian. He argued that had such been the real intention of the Governor-General, the force would have been sent by sea to the Western Coast to crush the French and not by land through the territories of unknown and by no means friendly princes. He moreover dismissed the French adventurer St. Lubin from Poona. When he found that his remonstrances were of no avail with the Governor-General or with the Bombay Government, he concluded that they were determined to violate the Treaty of Poorundhur and wage war against the Marathas. He perceived the gathering storm and made his preparations accordingly.

About this time intelligence arrived of the war

of England with France and so the Bombay Government decided to subvert the Poona Ministry which they considered were hostile to the English nation. Although the Governor-General informed the Bombay Presidency of the despatch of an embassy to, and his intention of forming an alliance with, Moodajee Bhonslay, and although he warned them not to enter on any engagement hostile to the Government at Poona, yet they precipitately concluded a treaty with Raghoba and advanced to him a loan of a considerable amount and determined to send forward one division of the army immediately to Poona to crush Nana Fadnavis and his party. This resolution of the Bombay Government was formed on the minute of Mr. Carnac, one of the members of the Bombay Council, on the 12th October, 1788. Mr. Hornby, the Governor, approved of it. But Mr. Draper, a member of the Council, expressed his dissent. He urged a delay of at least two months, because Colonel Leslie's strong reinforcement was still at a great distance, and because it was impossible for them to judge what might be the object of the Governor-General and Council in treating with Moodajee Bhonslay. But he was over-ruled. On the 22nd November, a force set out under the leadership of gallant British officers from Bombay with the intention of re-instating Raghoba on the Peishwa's throne at Poona. This force was placed under the com-

mand of Colonel Egerton, and a committee consisting of Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton and the ever detestable Mr. Mostyn* were appointed to superintend the expedition. But, unfortunately for the Committee, the man who was an adept in the practice of fomenting dissensions among the Marathas, was taken ill and had to retire to Bombay, where he died on the 1st January, 1779.

Raghoba accompanied the expedition and, in his name, a proclamation was issued declaring the objects of the expedition. As far as Khandalla, the English pushed on without meeting with any resistance. But Nana Fadnavis was not sitting idle. We are told that "the working of his Intelligence De-

* The writer has not come across anywhere a bust or statue of the Envoy, Mr. Mostyn. Nor is he aware of any Englishman having taken the trouble to present to the world, a biography of him. Mr. Mostyn is entitled to the ever-lasting gratitude of the natives of England. Neither Clive nor Warren Hastings did so much for the establishment on a secure footing of the rule of England in India as this Envoy to Poona who succeeded to break the power of the Mahrattas by "fomenting domestic dissensions." The fact should be remembered that the Mahrattas were the only formidable rivals, the British had to encounter in India. Hence those Britishers lack in gratitude who have yet done nothing to keep the memory of Mr. Mostyn green, since he materially contributed to hasten the downfall of the Mahratta supremacy in India.

partment was so perfect that half a dozen or a dozen accounts of every important occurrence in any part of the country reached him from different sources within a reasonable time; so that sitting in his chamber, Nana could easily judge of the corroborative value of the different versions and arrive at a conclusion which was nearer truth than any single one of those accounts." Thus he was fully acquainted with the preparations of the Bombay Government. At that time, both the Scindia and the Holkar were at Poona. So Nana placed them in command of the Poona troops and sent them forward to oppose the English. The able and tried leaders of the Maratha troops knew their tactics so well as to encourage the British by retreating themselves till they could deal an effective blow by choosing their ground. In this instance, the British met with hardly much resistance from Khandalla till they reached Tallygaon. Tallygaon is about 18 miles from Poona. Here the Bombay Force arrived on the 9th January, 1779. The Maratha troops were arrayed here to oppose the force under the British leaders. At the sight of these sturdy Highlanders of the Deccan, the British officers and the men under them became panic-stricken. Without giving a battle to the enemy, they decided to retreat to Bombay. They had eighteen days' provisions with them, and Poona was only two or at the most three

days' march in front of them. So had they not become panic-stricken, the advance on Poona was easier than retreat to Bombay. Of course, British historians do not admit that the Bombay Force was panic-stricken. According to them, the retreat was decided upon, as Nana Fadnavis was rumoured to have given orders for burning Poona! The rumor was so absurd that none but a fool would have believed it.

The retreat commenced at 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th of January. The heavy guns had been thrown into a large tank and a quantity of stores burnt. But the ever-watchful Poona troops came to know that the Bombay Force was retreating to Bombay. They at once surrounded the Bombay Force and cut off its retreat. The Mahrattas plundered the baggage and stores of the Bombay Force and had the satisfaction to see the complete humiliation of their opponents. But with that regard for human beings and tender feelings towards the fallen foes which form such a prominent trait in the character of Hindus, the Mahrattas did not annihilate the Bombay Force. Had they done it then, their Empire would have earned a fresh lease of life for a few generations more at all events. But as will be shown further on, their kindness towards the British was misplaced.

On January 13th, a negotiation was opened by the Committee of the expedition with the Poona

ruling party. The Committee made use of perjury and treachery to purchase their retreat to Bombay. They sent their Secretary, Mr. Farmer, to negotiate with the Poona ruling party. Mr. Farmer had the mortification of conveying to the Committe the humiliating terms which the Poona party imposed on the Bombay Government before they would consent to conclude the Treaty. These terms were that Raghoba should be delivered over to them, and that the Bombay Government should restore to the Mahrattas, the whole of the territories they had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bullal, together with the revenue possessed by the Company in Baroach and Surat. The Committee replied that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the Supreme Government. But the Poona party pertinently asked them,

"Show us then, the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton."

To this pertinent question, the Britishers were unable to furnish a reply. They therefore submitted to those terms which were dictated to them by their Maratha conquerors. But in this submission, they displayed that character, which the continental nations of Europe ascribe to the English. The chief member of the Committee, Mr. Carnac, stated that they had submitted to those humiliating terms under a *mental reservation* and that these were of no

validity. The Committee were obliged, because they had been dictated to by the Poona party, to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal Troops, but no sooner had they returned to Bombay than they cancelled their previous order and advised the Commander of the Bengal troops to expedite their advance. Such was their idea of honesty! They did not feel grateful to those who had saved them from utter annihilation, but contemplated treachery and concerted measures to bring ruin on their benefactors. It is only necessary to add that the Court of Directors were displeased with the members of the Field Committee, because they failed to bring the expedition to a successful termination, and dismissed them from the service. So Mr. Carnac, who suggested the expedition, was dismissed together with the military officers.

Colonel Lesile, who had set out in command of the Bengal troops in May 1778, encountered great difficulties in his march, as the independent princes of Bundelcund opposed his passage. Mr. Francis again proposed the recall of the Bengal troops. But Warren Hastings again over-ruled it. Colonel Leslie was intriguing with the princes and chiefs of those territories through which he was passing. His progress was very slow, as he said, on account of the monsoon. He was condemned by Warren Hastings for the delay which he had incurred, and the engage-

ments which he had formed ; and he was ordered to resign the command to Colonel Goddard, who had been his second-in-command. But he did not survive to receive the intelligence of his disgrace. He died on the 3rd October, 1778.

Colonel Goddard commenced his march through Bundelcund and Central India. He was opposed by the Hindu princes and chiefs, but he succeeded in gaining over the Nawab of Bhopal. This Nawab had been an adventurer of Afghan birth. It did not matter to him in the least whether he favored the English or their enemies, as long as he could get that which was dearest to his heart, *viz.*, gold.

Warren Hastings' hopes as to forming an alliance with the Regent of Berar, named Moodajee Bhonslay, were disappointed, because that regent did not care to agree to the governor-general's proposals. He was, however, so much won over by the honeyed words of that crafty man, that he did not oppose the passage of the Bengal Force. His treachery to the national cause of the Marathas was amply rewarded when, after the second Maratha War, the Berar dominion was stripped of all fertile tracts and important territories, and when in 1853, the extinction of that Maratha Rajaship of Nagpore was declared by Lord Dalhousie.

Goddard was on his march when the Bombay tropps were ignominiously defeated by the Marathas

and when they purchased their safe retreat to Bombay by means of perjury and treachery. On the receipt of this intelligence, he marched towards Surat, but on the way, on the 9th February, 1779, a Vakeel arrived from the Poona Government, bearing the letter written by the Field Committe on the 16th January in which they countermanded his march to the Deccan and commanded his immediate return to Bengal. The Vakeel tried his best to enforce this injunction. But the British military officer made use of a lie and assured the Vakeel that his intentions towards the Marathas were most friendly and that he was proceeding to Bombay by order of the Governor-General. The simple Hindu Vakeel of Poona was utterly deceived by these false assurances of the Christian officer. Goddard arrived at Surat on the 26th February, 1779.

When the Governor-General was acquainted with the disaster that had befallen the Bombay Force, and of the Treaty concluded with the Poona party by which the English members of the Field Committee solemnly promised upon their honor and under the seal of the East India Company to restore to the Marathas all the territories that had been taken from them since 1756, he at once empowered Colonel Goddard to enter into a Treaty with the Poona party on such terms as he thought most advantageous to the Company. Goddard was given

the temporary rank of Brigadier-General and was not placed under the Bombay Government, but directly under the Governor-General. At first Warren Hastings wrote to him to ask the Poona party to agree to the Treaty of Poorunder, with an additional clause that the Poona Government would form no connexion, either political or commercial, with the French. Goddard was also empowered to renew the war in the event of the Poona Government not agreeing to these proposals.

In the meanwhile, Warren Hastings tried to create dissensions among the Maratha Confederates. Gaekwar, as has already been stated, had been detached from the Confederacy, when he entered into an alliance with Colonel Keating. The Berar Raja was humored and kept neutral by the smooth and specious promises and sweet words of the Governor-General. Of the remaining two confederates—Scindia and Holkar—the former was the stronger and abler. It was necessary therefore to win him over.

It was deemed politically expedient to negotiate with the Scindia. Scindia was the ablest and the most trusted General of the great Nana Fadnavis. Warren Hastings rightly argued that this great Maratha statesman would be rendered helpless, his right arm, as it were, would be removed, by the defection and desertion of Scindia. When the Field

Committee under the presidentship of Mr. Carnac signed the treaty, and when the Poona party asked for the surrender of Raghoba and two English hostages as preliminaries to the Treaty, Nana Fadnavis appointed Scindia as the custodian of Raghoba and the English hostages, when the conquered English made them over to the Poona party. Thus Scindia appeared to be the more important personage before the English than the Holkar.

It is necessary here to refer to the rise of the House of the Scindia and of the man, who was at its head, at the time of which we are taking note.

The ancestors of the Scindia family are believed to have been of noble origin. Some of them were military peers under the Mughal Empire. But the wheel of fortune had brought their descendants to occupy menial positions in the household of the Peishwa. It was through Ranoji Scindia, who by the loyal and faithful manner in which he served his master, the Peishwa, that the family once more rose to eminence and power in the Maratha Empire. The father of Ranoji was merely a *Patel* or village manager. Ranoji was a private trooper in the body-guard of the Peishwa Balaji Viswanath. His duty was to take care of the slippers of his master during any interview that the latter might have with the Raja. It is related that on one occasion when the Peishwa had a long interview with the Raja, Ranoji

became weary and fell asleep, but even in his sleep he held the slippers in both hands clasped to his breast. The Peishwa was much pleased with his conduct and he raised him to the high office of Governor of a province. This province was the northern half of Malwa.

Malwa or Central India was a part of the Moghul Empire and was governed by a Moghul Viceroy. In the beginning of the eighteenth century it was under the Viceroyalty of the Nizam, 'Asaf Jah, the founder of the existing dynasty of Haiderabad. When in 1721, he went to conquer the Deccan, the Delhi Emperor appointed a Hindu, Raja Girdhar Rai, to the Viceroyalty of Malwa. It was then that the enterprising Peishwa directed his attention to the conquest of this fertile province of India and he succeeded. He parcelled out this province into Northern and Southern divisions. The northern portion, he gave in military *fief* to his faithful slipper-bearer, Ranoji Scindia, and the southern portion to Malharji Holkar. Such is the origin of the two ruling houses which have played such conspicuous parts in the history of India.

Ranoji, according to the usages of the nobles of bye-gone days and of all ages and creeds, had a host of concubines in addition to his married wives. One of his concubines gave birth to Madhava Rao, commonly known as Madhoji. The exact date and

place of his birth is not known, as he was not born in wedlock. The legitimate sons of Ranoji did not long survive his death. The bastard Madhava Rao, obtained the possession of his father's fief without much difficulty. But his succession was the fatal flaw in the Mahratta Confederacy which ultimately brought on its ruin. English writers of Indian history have unduly extolled the merits of Madhava Rao. If they are to be credited, then it would seem that the Mahratta nation never produced a more valiant soldier or a greater statesman than Madhava Rao. But their statement would hardly be borne out by the investigation of the facts of the case. The reason for this undue eminence given to Madhoji appears to be that he played into the hands of the English—that he paved the way to the establishment of the English supremacy in India.

Schopenheur has said, "Call an Oriental a bastard and he will be your enemy." In the East, a bastard is despised. He is an outcast and lacks in influence with the respectable members of the community.

Madhoji was never respected by the orthodox portion of the Mahratta nation. But it does not appear from the records that the great Nana Fadnavis at first entertained anything but friendly regard for Madhoji. It was only when the latter suffered himself the embrace of the English that Nana protested

and warned him of the consequences. The latest British writer of the monograph on Madhava Rao Sindhia, in the *Rulers of India* series, Mr. H. G. Keene, says:—

"The old school of officials opposed him on account of his illegitimacy; and it is said that this circumstance caused him to conceive a prejudice against his countrymen and to show a strong preference for foreigners when he came to construct a civil and military administration."

In this preference for the foreigners Madhoji did not display any statesmanship of a high order.

The fatal battlefield of Panipat spared the life of Madhoji as it did that of Nana Fadnavis. But what a contrast between these two men! While the one tried his best to retrieve the disaster by uniting the Marathas in a Confederacy and not allowing foreigners to have any voice in the administration of the country, the other played into the hands of the foreigners, and filled with European adventurers all places of trust and responsibility in his dominion. This policy of Madhoji was one of the principal factors which contributed to the downfall of the Mahrattas.

At the time of which we are treating, the affairs of the house of Holkar were managed by a lady of great intelligence, ability and virtue. Her name was Ahalya Bye—a name that has become a household word throughout the length and breadth of

India amongst the Hindus. She was almost the contemporary of the Queen Catherine of Russia. But what a contrast between the virtuous Hindu lady of the East and the profligate Christian woman of the West! There was, however, one point in common between these two women of the East and the West. Both were able and sincerely strove for the welfare of their respective dominions. Ahalya Bye did not like the interference of the foreigners, and it was perhaps this reason which led the Bombay Government and Warren Hastings to seek the alliance of Scindia and thus to play off Scindia against Holkar.

It has been said before that the great Nana Fadnavis entrusted Madhoji with the care of Raghoba and the two English hostages. Nana never thought that Madhoji would betray the trust. Unfortunately for the Mahrattas, the bastard Chief proved false to the cause of the Confederacy. The English opened secret negotiations with him. He was privately promised the district of Broach in Guzerat and 41 thousand Rupees for his followers. He connived at the escape of the murderer Raghoba, who repaired to Broach and placed himself under the protection of the English. It is recorded by Mr. Keene that Raghoba brought with him messages of goodwill for the English from Madhoji by way of credentials.

General Goddard reached Surat on the 26th February 1779 and opened negotiations with the

Poona Ministry. He was at the same time making preparations for renewing the war and intriguing with the Gaekwar and Scindhia. The negotiations continued till October. Nana Fadnavis was thoroughly disgusted with the perfidious character of the Englishmen he had to deal with. At last in October 1779, he sent a message to Goddard that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Raghoba were preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to conclude with the Mahratta State.

The gallant English General evaded giving an immediate reply, but embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, consulted with the Government respecting the plan of operations and urged despatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Then he returned to Surat, told the envoy sent by the great Nana Fadnavis, that he could not accede to the conditions which Nana required of him as preliminaries to a treaty and put his army in a state of readiness to take the offensive. He opened negotiations with Fatiah Singh Gaekwar. It has already been stated before that Colonel Keating had concluded a treaty with Fatiah Singh ; but this treaty was not given effect to on account of the defeat which the English had suffered near Poona. Fatiah Singh hesitated to carry out the conditions which the Treaty imposed on him. So Goddard crossed the Taptee on the 1st January 1780. Fatiah Singh was

cowed down and without fighting the English he made an alliance with them.

Goddard raided some of the territories of the Peishwa in Guzerat and not without success. This is not to be wondered at when we remember that of the two generals, Scindia and Holkar, the former proved a triator. He now liberated the two English hostages whom the Nana had placed in his charge. Fatiah Singh Gaekwar was no longer a member of the Mahratta Confederacy. What with the treachery of Scindia and the defection of the Gaekwar as an ally, Holkar was unable to make any impression on the enemy in Guzerat.

The conduct of Madhoji Scindia requires some notice. He had been sent to Guzerat by Nana to fight the English. But he tried to curry favor with them. He was jealous of the Nana. Without possessing the ability, the statesmanship and the foresight of the great Nana Fadnavis, he thought he could oust the latter from the post of supreme importance which the Nana held in the Maratha Confederacy and himself be the protector and the dictator of the Marathas. To gratify his ambition, he did not scruple to sacrifice the good of the Maratha Empire. Without receiving definite promises from the English he liberated the two English hostages and thought by so doing he would succeed to win the goodwill of the foreigners. General Goddard was not to be so

easily pleased. Madhoji was desirous of a separate treaty with the English. Goddard wanted to know the terms which Scindia wished to propose. On the 16th March 1780, the Scindia's Vakeel submitted the following terms from his master:—

"That formerly, when Raghoba was at Tullygaon, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Scindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of 12 lakhs of rupees per annum; that the Sicca should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Raghoba, should be appointed the Peishwa's dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Scindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Raghoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona." (Grant Duff, p. 432).

What are we to think of the statesmanship and the character of Madhoji when we find him indulging in those low and base intrigues which weakened the Maratha Empire and finally brought on its downfall! He contracted alliance with the murderer Raghoba for his own aggrandizement. Had he not contrived and connived at the escape of Raghoba, the English would have been obliged to conclude the

Treaty on the terms dictated to them by their Maratha conquerors. But the possession of the person of the murderer Raghoba was a trump card in the hands of the Britishers. Mr. Mill has truly observed that

"With regard to Raghoba it was proposed to feed him with such hopes, as should ensure the advantage of his name; but to engage themselves as short a way as possible for a share in the advantages of the undertaking, to the success of which it was so little in his power to contribute." (iv. p. 38).

Goddard was not likely to throw away his trump card into the hands of Madhoji. He rejected the latter's proposals. Madhoji had the mortification to find that his cringing servility and treachery did not gain him those advantages which he had calculated upon, when he let Raghoba escape and the two English hostages proceed to join the camp of his country's enemies. Not only that, but Goddard a few days after the rejection of his proposals, attacked the camp of Madhoji and drove him and his men beyond the reach of pursuit.

The English were also extremely grateful to Madhava Rao Scindhia for all the trouble he had taken for them and the humanity he had shown to their hostages ; and it was therefore that they carried fire and sword into the very heart of his dominions. But this was a year afterwards, that is, about the

beginning of March 1781. We shall recur to this after we have narrated what took place in the Deccan, from the time when Goddard vanquished Madhoji and did not lend a favorable ear to his proposals, to the time when Nana Fadnavis with his consummate skill succeeded in again defeating the English.

It has been already said that Nana had become thoroughly disgusted with the low political morality of the English. He was a Hindu of the old type and had been nurtured on the traditions of the two renowned epics of Ancient India, namely, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. The heroes of those Epics sacrificed everything, their crowns and territories, for the sake of truth. The conduct of the English, their chicanery and perfidy, their utter contempt for justice and fairplay, were something abhorrent to his nature. But when he penetrated into their motives, he at once set to unite the different princes of India and try to show the English their proper place in Indian politics. With this object in view, he invited the Nizam, Hyder Ali, the Nawab of Arcot and other minor lights of the peninsula of India. He even addressed himself to the Emperor of Delhi, through his Vakeel at Delhi. A translation of this letter is given below.

Nana's letter to Purshotam Mahadev Hingne, his Vakil at Delhi, dated 6th May 1780, contains a clear indication of his line of policy.

"News has been received here that the English at Calcutta are going to open diplomatic negotiations with the Emperor at Delhi and win him over to their side. You should, therefore, clearly explain to the Emperor and Najab Khan as follows :—

"The ways of the Europeans (the word in the original is topikar, *i.e.*, one who puts on a hat) are unfair and wily. It is their custom at first to ingratiate themselves with the Indian princes, show them the advantages of their alliance and then put the prince himself into prison and seize his kingdom As instances of this, take the cases of Suja-ud-dwla, Muhammad Ali Khan, the Subha of Arcot and the Chief of Chandavar, &c. You should, therefore, put down the Europeans, which course alone will preserve the dignity of the princes of the country. Otherwise the European foreigners will seize the kingdoms on land and occupy the whole country. This is not good and will be highly prejudicial to all the princes in future. And the Emperor being the Lord of the whole of the Earth it is but right that he should feel himself bound by honor to attend to this matter. All the Chiefs in the Deccan have combined together. The Nawab, Nizam Ali Khan, Hydar Naik and the Peishwa have entered into a quadruple alliance, resolved to put down the English in all directions, and have prepared their armies, artillery and other armaments to make war against the English in their respective territories.

"In Northern India the Emperor and Najab Khan should combine together all the princes and put down the English. This will enhance the fame and dignity of the Empire."

This step of the great Nana, although it did not fully realize his expectations, obliged the English to sue for peace.

When Goddard had vanquished Madhava Rao and occupied some of the territories of the Peishwas in Guzerat, he was asked by the Bombay Government to quit Guzerat and make the Concan the scene of his future operations. This he did. He captured Kalyan, besieged and reduced Bassein and swooped down on many other places in the Concan. But when he marched towards Poona, the heart of the Empire, he fared no better than the officers of the previous expedition had done. He had to beat a hasty retreat without even being in sight of the capital of the Peishwas. He had not proceeded further than the Bhore Ghaut, when he was obliged to commence his retreat. But in this retreat he lost very heavily. His rear was threatened by such Mahratta Generals as the Holkar, Hurry Punt Phurkay and Purushram Bhow. This second defeat, which happened towards the end of April 1781, greatly disheartened the English. They now sued for peace.

To harass Scindia, Warren Hastings entered into a treaty with the Rana of Gohud. This Jat prince, whose house is now represented by the Rana of Dholepur, was a feudatory of Scindia. Gwalior was captured by a British officer named Captain Popham. This officer would not have succeeded in his enterprise, had the Rana of Gohud not thrown off his allegiance to Scindia. The British Force got a base

of operations by entering into an alliance with the Rana of Gohud. Gwalior was in the possession of Madhoji Scindia and its strong fortress, built on a hill, was escaladed by Captain Popham and his party and captured before the dawn of 4th August 1780.

The retribution which overtook Madhoji for betraying national interests was not yet complete. He had been vanquished by Goddard, and his impregnable fortress of Gwalior was made over to the Rana of Gohud. His territory was invaded by Colonel Carnac, who reduced Sipree and advanced on Sironjee on the 16th February 1781. On the night of the 24th March he surprised Scindhia's camp, attacked and routed his force, killed numbers of his men, took 13 of his guns, 3 elephants, his principal standard, 21 camels and many horses.

The humiliation of the traitor Madhava Rao was now complete. His reputation as a General had suffered, whilst that of the Poona party supported by Holkar was greatly increased. It was fortunate for him that the princes of Rajputana at this time did not co-operate with the English against him. Warren Hastings failed in his endeavours to stir them up against Madhoji. He made overtures for peace.

When Warren Hastings received information that Nana Fadnavis had succeeded in combining Hyder and the Nizam against the English and of Goddards' defeat, he informed the Bombay Goyern-

ment of his intention of making peace with the Mahrattas. At first, he tried to prevail on Moodajee Bhonslay of Nagpore to mediate for peace. In this, he failed. But that traitor, Madhava Rao, now came forward and offered his services to mediate for peace. This was the only course which would have saved Madhoji from utter ruin. After his defeat by Colonel Carnac, Madhoji, as said above, made overtures for peace. He could not maintain a contest in the heart of his own dominions. So when he intimated his intention for making peace, a separate treaty between him and the British Government was concluded on the 13th October 1781. Warren Hastings entered into a secret understanding with Madhoji and induced him to mediate for peace with the Peishwa.

About the same time, the Madras Government addressed a letter to the Peishwa, dated 11th September 1781, in which they stated their wish for peace, and their desire to conclude a firm and lasting treaty, and assured the Peishwa, upon their honor, and that of the King, the Company and the British nation, that just satisfaction should be given in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

Negotiations proceeded for some months and at last a treaty was concluded at Salbye, on the 17th May 1782, through the mediation of Madhoji Scindhia. It consisted of 17 articels ; the whole of the territory which had been taken possession of by

the English by fraud and force since the treaty of Poorundpur was restored to the Marathas. The territory of the Gaekwar, and the whole of Guzerat, were to remain precisely on the same footing as prior to the war of 1775. Raghoonath Rao was allowed 25,000 Rupees a month and permitted to choose a place of residence. The treaty which Warren Hastings had concluded with the Rana of Gohud was annulled; Gwalior was restored to Madhoji Scindia, and the Rana placed at the tender mercy of that Mahratta chief. This was how Warren Hastings expressed his gratitude to the Rana, without whose co-operation, the English would not have succeeded in defeating Madhoji and ultimately concluding peace with the Mahrattas.

With the conclusion of the Treaty at Salbye, ended the First Mahratta War. This war did not bring any new territories into the possession of the British. In fact, it showed them their weak points and proved to demonstration that the Marathas were not to be easily vanquished. Nana Fadnavis' statesmanship eclipsed that of Warren Hastings. It was a glorious triumph for the Mahrattas, and had Nana's advice been followed by the Chieftains of the Maharasthra, the Empire founded by Shivajee the Great, would have been established on a more secure and permanent basis. But unfortunately for the

Marathas, Nana's advice was of no avail, and thus all his labours could not prevent the disintegration of the Empire.

CHAPTER IX

THE RISE OF THE OUDE PRINCIPALITY.

Like some brilliant comet which rises on the firmament and illumines the sky for a very short time, but whose appearance is regarded as a harbinger of evils by the superstitious people all over the world, was the origin of the Muhammadan principality of Oude. It rose and became independent of the paramount Mughal power by means of treachery and its existence was like that of an ominous comet, for it never did any good either to the Indian people or to the Moghul Emperor. On the contrary, it materially contributed to the rise of the British Power in India, not only by means of intrigues but by furnishing assistance both in money and men. For, as truly observed by Sir Henry Lawrence in his article on the Kingdom of Oude which appeared in the *Calcutta Review* for January 1845 :—

"No portion of India has been more discussed in England than Oude. Afghanistan and the Punjab are modern questions, but for half a century, country gentlemen have been possessed of a vague idea of a province of India, nominally independent in its home relations, but periodically used as a wet-nurse to relieve the difficulties of the East India Company's finances."

Again, it was Oude which supplied men to the Indian Army with whose help the British rose into power in India. In the course of the article to which allusion has been made above, Sir Henry Lawrence wrote:—

"The population (of Oude) is estimated at three millions, four-fifths of whom, perhaps, are Hindoos, and they furnish the best disciplined Infantry in India. Three-fourths of the Bengal Native Infantry come from Oude, and recruiting parties from Bombay are sometimes seen to the East of the Ganges."

The history, then, of the origin of this principality is of great interest to the historian of the Rise of the Christian Power in the East, for although this Principality is not so mixed up with the early struggles of the different Christian nations for political supremacy in India as that of the Nizam of the Deccan, yet, the English were not a little indebted to the princes and people of Oude for the extension and consolidation of their power in India.

The founder of this Oude dynasty of Princes was an adventurer who came to India when the decadence of the Moghul Empire had commenced. He is known in Indian history as Saadat Khan, but his original name was Mohammad Ameen. He was a native of Persia but came at an early age to Hindustan to seek his fortune there. He was in

his teens when in the year 1705, he arrived at Patna to join his father and elder brother who had preceded him thither. On his arrival, finding his father dead, he with his brother proceeded to Delhi. At first he lent his services to Nawab Sirbaland Khan. But he afterwards quitted him and took his way to Court, where he soon acquired favour. The real rulers of Delhi at this time were the Syed brothers. They were called the king-makers and the Emperor was merely a puppet in their hands. While speaking of the rise of the Nizam, we have elsewhere said that justice has not been done to the services rendered to the tottering Mughal Empire by these Syed brothers. They had made many enemies. A cabal was formed for their destruction. 'Asaph Jah (Nizam-ul-Moolk) was one of the principal plotters. The part he played in this foul conspiracy has been narrated in another chapter.

But Mohammed Ameen was no less a conspicuous actor in the tragedy which encompassed the ruin of the Syeds. His intrigues and conspiracies bore their desired result. The Syed brothers were got rid of in the manner mentioned elsewhere.

Now was the opportunity for Mohammed Ameen. The Syed brothers were something like an incubus to the Emperor whom he had materially assisted in liberating from their thraldom. The grateful Emperor did not forget his services. He

rewarded him with the viceroyalty of Oude and ennobled him with the title of Saadat Khan.

Saadat Khan was not only a good soldier but possessed the talents of an able administrator. He found the province of Oude in great disorder but soon reduced the refractory spirits and greatly increased the revenue. Within his own viceroyalty, he established order and protected the husbandmen.

So far the acts of Saadat Khan elicit nothing but praise and admiration from every historian. He showed great administrative talents and rare abilities in bringing into order and introducing reforms in a province where life and property were not secure for want of proper government. But the moral turpitude of Saadat Khan comes into bold relief when one takes into consideration the means he adopted in not only aggrandising his power, but to make himself quite independent of the Delhi Emperor.

Nizam-ool-Moolk was the first traitor in the camp of the Moghuls who set the example to others of making himself independent of the Delhi Emperor. It has been pointed out elsewhere how that treacherous chief intrigued with the Mahrattas and others and helped in no small measure in dismembering the Mughal Empire. But Saadat Khan, the Viceroy of Oude, did not come either to the rescue of the

Emperor or the Empire. Sir Henry Lawrence writes of Saadat Khan :—

"He overthrew many lordlings, and established in their stead one stronger, and therefore better rule. No qualms of conscience in his way. The aggrandisement of his own family was his one object, in furtherance of which he was regardless alike of gratitude, loyalty or patriotism. So long as his own territory escaped, he cared not Persian or Mahratta should ravage the empire, and humble the monarch, in whose weakness he found his own strength."

No one doubts his abilities and talents as a soldier and administrator ; but had Saadat Khan been a statesman gifted with far sight and forethought, he would have, and could have taken steps to avert the downfall of the Moghul Empire. Whether he conspired with Nizam-ool-Moolk and invited Nadir Shah's invasion is a question which, however interesting, no historian is competent to decide. The evidence on this subject is too inconclusive to enable any one to arrive at a decision. However, Sir Henry Lawrence writes :—

"Modern historians question the fact of Saadat Khan having, in concert with Nizam-ool-Moolk, invited Nadir Shah's invasion. We have not room to detail the evidence on which our opinion rests, but a careful comparison of authorities leads us to believe that he was guilty of this treacherous deed."

It is much to be regretted that Sir Henry Lawrence did not adduce all his evidence in support of his opinion as to the treachery of Saadat Khan

regarding Nádir's invasion. But from the fact that the author of *Seir-ul-Mutakhareen* does not impute treachery to Saadat Khan, and also when it is remembered that there was rivalry between Nizam-ool-Moolk and Saadat Khan, it is difficult to believe that these two traitors, could have *in concert* invited Nadir's invasion. However, it is not impossible, or improbable that Saadat Khan, *independently* of Nizam-ool-Moolk, invited Nádir's invasion. But against this may be urged the fact that when Nádir Shah actually invaded Hindustan, Saadat Khan went out to fight him and did not remain idle at home and make excuses and pretexts for not opposing Nadir Shah's march like the Nizam.

After Nadir Shah had triumphed over the Mughal Emperor's troops, both Saadat Khan and Nizam-ool-Moolk tried to curry favour with the conqueror and vied with each other in winning his graces and being in his good books. It was in this manner that these traitors helped Nádir in perpetrating those atrocities which disgrace humanity. Sir Henry Lawrence writes:—

"The atrocities committed by Nadir are familiar matters of history. The traitor chiefs did not escape, and Nizam-ool-Moolk and Saadat Khan were especially vexed with requisitions. They were not only themselves plundered, but were made the instruments of extorting treasure from the distant provinces. Nizam-ool-Moolk, jealous of the power

and ability of Saadat, took advantage of the persecutions of Nadir Shah to execute a plan for getting rid of his rival. He affected to confide to him his own determination of suicide, and agreed with Saadat Khan that each should take poison. The latter drank his cup full, and left the hoary schemer without a rival in the Empire."

Such in brief, is the rise of the founder of the Principality of Oude. The English writer who has been quoted so often before says:—

"He (Saadat Khan) reaped much as he had sown; his ability and management established a sovereignty; his faithlessness brought him to a premature and ignominious end. He proved no exception to the rule, that they who are busiest in entrapping others, are themselves the easiest deluded."

Saadat Khan died rather comparatively young, for he had hardly completed fifty years at the time of his death. He left no male issue but a daughter. His two nephews who were the sons of his elder brother contended for the throne. They were named Sher Jung and Sufder Jung. Nadir Shah was at that time in Delhi. As he was the conqueror and the Moghul Emperor was a non-entity, each of the two brothers, nephews of Saadat Khan, applied to Nadir instead of the Emperor for the investiture of Oude. Sufder Jung though the younger was abler and more cunning than his elder brother. He was married to his cousin, the daughter of Saadat Khan. Moreover, he knew that it was gold which was the

real 'open sesame' with Nadir. Accordingly, he backed up his petition with an offer of a Nazzur of two millions sterling, and so he was invested with the government.

It was this Sufder Jung who was first invested with the *Vizaret* of the Moghul Empire. The Nizam-ool-Moolk was the original *Vizier* of the Empire, but on his resigning that honour it was conferred on the Viceroys of Oude, in whose dynasty it became hereditary, hence these princes are known in history as *Nawab Viziers*. Sufder Jung was the first *Nawab Vizier*, and he is said to have sustained the tottering authority of the King of Delhi.

It was during the regime of this Sufdar Jung, that war against the Rohillas was conducted, an event which was so pregnant with future evils. It is not necessary to refer to other historical events which took place during the Viceroyalty of Sufdar Jung, because these are foreign to our subject.

Sufdar Jung died in 1754 A.D. and was succeeded in the Viceroyalty of Oude by his son named Shujá-ud-doula. It was he who was the first Nawab of Oude to come in contact with the English. What he did for them and how the history of India would have been differently written had he not contracted an alliance with them are subjects which would be dealt with elsewhere.

The rise of the power of the English in India was so closely interwoven with the history of Oude, that it was considered necessary to give this short sketch of the origin of the Oude Principality.

CHAPTER X

HYDER ALI.

It was not the Mahrattas alone who tried to expel the English from India, but there was another man who struggled hard for getting rid of them. It has been observed by many historians that the British had not to contend with the Muhammadans for gaining the supremacy of India. All the important battles had to be fought with the Hindus. The English never met with such valiant antagonists as the Mahrattas, the Jats, the Gurkhas and the Sikhs. True though this observation is, but like all general rules, it has its exception. That exception was Hyder Ali. Hyder Ali was a Muhammadan and in none of the contests the English engaged with him, they were ever successful. The career of Hyder Ali deserves particular notice, as he was the most formidable enemy whom the English had encountered in India.

Hyder Ali was not the representative of any ancient line of kings. There was no royal blood flowing in his veins. By his ability and valor he succeeded to carve out a principality for himself. He rose from the rank of a private soldier to not that of a general only but of an independent sovereign

whose name inspired terror and respect in the minds of the English who were at that time pushing themselves and displacing and usurping the territories of the reigning princes of India. Till the moment of his death, Hyder was the victim of the persecution of the English. It was through the fear of his growing power, that the First Mahratta War was undertaken. Peace was hurriedly concluded with the Mahrattas because of the threatening attitude which Hyder had assumed towards the British. All these will be made clear as we proceed in our narrative of Hyder.

Haidar was a private soldier in the employ of the Raja of Mysore. The Muhammadans ruled over India for nearly 700 years. But during those seven centuries, they never succeeded in bringing Mysore under their sway. It was reserved for Haidar to do what the Muhammadan Emperors in their palmiest days failed to achieve. It was this absence of Muhammadan influence in the South, which accounts for the grossest forms of idolatry and superstition which prevail there. Mr. Justice Ranade in his address delivered before the Indian Social Conference, held at Lucknow in December 1899, truly observed that

"The one factor which separates Northern India from its southern neighbours, is the predominant influence of this conquest by the Mahomedans which has left its mark

permanently upon the country, by the actual conversion to the Mahomedan faith of one-fifth of the population, and by the imperceptible but permanent moulding of the rest of the people in the ways of thought and belief, the like of which is hard to find on the Malabar or Coromandel Coasts."

The grandfather of Haidar was one Muhamad Bhailol, an Afghan by nationality and a member of that clan which had founded the Lodi dynasty in India, which was uprooted by Babar in 1526. Muhamad Bhailol was a Fakir and he came to the Deccan and settled at Gulbarga. He had two sons ; of whom, the younger, named Ali Muhamad, migrated to Kolar, in the eastern part of Mysore, where he died about 1678, leaving four sons, the youngest of whom was Fatah Muhammad, the father of Shahbaz and the celebrated Haidar. Fateh Muhammad was made a Faujdar in Mysore and received Budikota as a jagir. The exact year of the birth of Haidar is a matter of dispute. According to some authorities it is 1717, while others place it at 1722.

The Rajas of Mysore were mere puppets in the hands of their ministers. Just as the descendants of Sivaji lacked in ability and administrative capacity which obliged the ministers to take all the power out of the hands of the incapable Satara Rajas, so the Mysore Rajas had for the same reasons to resign all

their sovereign powers into the hands of their ministers. At the time when the French and the English were struggling in the Carnatic, the ministers of the Raja of Mysore were Deoraj and Nunjeraj. The French were enabled to bring Nunjeraj to their assistance at Trichinopoly.

It is necessary to say, that the struggle between the English and the French had its origin in the succession to the Nizamat for which there were two claimants. The English took the part of the one, the French that of the other. The two claimants were Nasir Jung and his nephew Muzaffar Jung. Muzaffar Jung had been nominated to the Nizamat by his predecessor Kamar-ud-din, who died in 1748. The French espoused the cause of the rightful claimant, but the English took the part of the pretender. It is foreign to our purpose to describe in detail the various aspects of the conflict between the two claimants as well as between the English and the French in Southern India. It may suffice to say that the French succeeded in installing Muzaffar Jung on the Nizamat. In this contest the Mysore troops aided the French and they bore themselves bravely. Haidar served as a volunteer under his brother Shahbaz who had obtained the command of 200 horse and 1,000 peons in the service of the Raja of Mysore. He plundered the treasure of the late Nizam, with which he retreated to Mysore. Before returning,

however, to Mysore he paid a visit to the French settlement of Pondicherry ; he admired the discipline of the French troops and the skill of their engineer officers.

During the war, while serving as a volunteer under his brother, the ardour, the courage, and the mental resources which Haidar exhibited, attracted the attention of the Chief Minister of Mysore, named Nanjeraj, who appointed him in 1755, as Faujdar or military governor of Dindigul. From this period it was the ambition of Haidar to become the sole sovereign of Southern India. He employed in his service French artificers to prepare canons and ammunitions in his arsenal which he established at Dindigul.

Haidar was totally illiterate. He could neither read nor write. When he was appointed Faujdar of Dindigul, he engaged the services of a Mahratta Brahmin, name Khande Rao, to assist him in keeping his accounts and carry on his correspondence. This Brahman's name is inseparably associated with the rise of Haidar. It was through the instrumentality of this Brahman that the queen-mother tried to induce Haider to release her son the Raja from the thraldom of the Ministers. She succeeded in getting rid of the obnoxious ministers. But the condition of her son did not fare better under the galling yoke of Haidar. It was an exchange of

King Log for King Stork. When Khande Rao realized this, when he found that he had betrayed the Raja into the hands of an upstart, he reproached himself for this improper act. The ministers or rather the minister—for Deoraj was dead and Nunjeraj alone was alive—though tyrants, were after all Hindus. Belonging to the same creed, they could sympathize with their master and his subjects. But the Muhammadan upstart did not cherish any reverential feeling for the Hindu Raja who in his eyes was a *Kafir*. Khande Rao now tried to undo the mischief, and for this purpose, invited the Mahrattas to his assistance. Although the Mahrattas came, and although Haidar suffered some reverses at their hands, yet fortune favored him. The Mahratta force was recalled hastily to Poona, for it was about this time, that the flower of the Mahratta Army found their graves on the fatal battlefield of Panipat. This left Haidar free to pursue his career of conquest uninterrupted for a few years at all events. First of all he had to punish his quondam Private Secretary Khande Rao. This Mahratta Brahmin had collected a large army and taken possession of several forts. Haidar reduced these forts and captured Khande Rao whom he kept in an iron cage and fed him on rice and milk till the end of his life. He made some arrangement for the Raja's personal expenditure and took over the control of the State affairs in his own

hands. Henceforth the Raja was a non-entity in the Mysore politics, and Haidar became the virtual ruler of Mysore. For the first time that province came under the rule of the followers of the Crescent. But it does not appear that Haidar bestowed all the high posts of trust, emolument and responsibility on men of his creed or kinship. The Hindus were not molested or persecuted, for Haider was no bigot or fanatic.

Haidar was a keen observer of the men and events of his time. He noticed the process by which the British had made themselves masters of Bengal and other provinces of India. And he adopted the same methods. Thus when a pretender rose and claimed the Rajaship of Bednur, he espoused his cause, not out of any love for him, but for serving his own interests. This was in 1763. He ostentatiously undertook the reduction of Bednur for this pretender, but in reality made himself master of the same. He captured Bednur and appropriated the property of its inhabitants. The value of the property thus acquired was computed at twelve crores of rupees. Then he made short work of the pretender and those who were in power at Bednur by forwarding them to, and imprisoning them at, Madgiri, a hill fort in the eastern part of Mysore. He christened Bednur after his own name and called it Haidarnagar.

It is not necessary to refer to the war in which Haidar was engaged with the Mahrattas. In none of these wars, Haidar ever succeeded in gaining any material advantages over the sturdy Highlanders of the Deccan. The battle of Panipat only restrained the Mahrattas from uprooting the supremacy of the English in Bengal, then in its infancy. An English writer says:—

"By the temporary depression of their confederacy it deterred the Marathas from an attack upon Bengal in which they would probably have been joined by Shuja and Shah Alam, and would perhaps have succeeded in extirpating the still slender and struggling power of the British Company."*

Haidar Ali had to purchase peace of the Mahrattas at enormous sacrifices. It was these defeats which rankled in his breast and made him betray the Mahrattas to their Christian enemies. Haidar was a valiant soldier, but not a statesman. The Mahratta Confederacy possessed in the great Nana Fadnavis, a statesman of a very supreior order and one who was gifted with a prophetic vision into the future. So when the Mahrattas proposed to Haidar for an alliance against the English, he, lacking in all sense of honor, divulged the secret to the English. The writer of the monograph on Haidar Ali says:—

* H. G. Keene's Madhova Rao Scindhia, p. 46

"It redounds to the credit of Haidar Ali that, when the Mahrattas proposed in 1771, to settle their differences with him by an engagement that he should assist them in subjugating the eastern provinces, he made known their proposals to the English authorities. He frankly stated his opinion that such a union would give the Marathas so predominant an influence that it would seriously imperil his own position, and added that, if his alliance were rejected by the Madras Government, he should have no alternative but to seek assistance from the French."*

This betrayal of the Mahrattas hardly redounds to the credit of the Muhammadan upstart. Had he been a statesman, his self-interest would have dictated him not to take this suicidal step. What were the consequences of this betrayal? The English were smarting under the defeat they had sustained at the hands of Haidar. The English, therefore, did not care to enter into an alliance with him. The French were not in a position to render any assistance to Haidar. A few military adventurers of no status in society were no doubt in his employ, but the French Government had other concerns nearer home to engage their attention. Haidar also must have been aware of the fact, that the French were losing every advantage they ever possessed in India and were being ousted by the English. Under these circumstances his seeking alliance with the French,

* Bowring's Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, p. 83.

does not redound much to his credit as a statesman. The only course for him to adopt was to enter into an alliance with the Mahrattas. Had he done that, his power would have been established on a permanent footing and his dynasty would have, in all probabilities, been still ruling over Mysore. The Mahrattas with all their faults, were ever true to their engagements. The Mahrattas suffered by the betrayal of the secret by Haidar Ali. It was the betrayal of this secret which brought the ever detestable Mr. Mostyn to Poona for "the purpose of fomenting domestic disssensious." This Christian Envoy abetted, if not actually instigated, the murder of the young Peishwa Narayan Rao. The death of the Peishwa Mahadeva Rao was rather sudden. Does it not seem probable that Mr. Mostyn had some hand in hastening his death by poison?

All the misfortunes which befell the Mahrattas were due in the first instance to their being betrayed by Haidar Ali. It is not to be wondered at, that the astute Nana Fadnavis penetrating into the cause of the misfortunes should have assisted in those operations which resulted in the extinction of the kingdom established by the illiterate Muhammadan upstart.

Haidar had always come out victorious in his contests with the English. From 1767 till his death which took place on Dec. 7, 1782, he had been engaged in several actions with them, and

it was his sound generalship which made him always triumphant over his adversaries. He was the most formidable enemy whom they had ever encountered. The brilliancy of his achievements dazzled his enemies.

It was the English who were the aggressors, for in 1767, they invaded his territory Baramahal, under the pretence that it belonged to the Carnatic. The English over-ran the territory, but were unable to take possession of the country or make any impression on the strong forts. It is not necessary to mention all the incidents of the war, in which sometime Haidar, sometime the English seemed to gain the day, but at first without any decisive results. The English, however, with many contrivances succeeded in inducing the Nizam and Mahommed Ali (the Nabob of Arcot) to desert Haidar. Deserted by his allies, threatened by the Mahrattas and owing to the newness of his Government in Mysore which could hardly dispense with his presence from his capital for a longtime, the position of Haidar was a very precarious one. In September 1768, he made overtures for peace. But the Christians received his overtures with great contempt ; for these overtures made them think that their enemy was weak, and that they would succeed in speedily conquering his realm. When he found the English disinclined for peace, he made great preparations and displayed increasing

vigor. He sent in November 1768, his Lieutenant Fazl-ullahkhan to reduce the smaller posts held by the enemy, which easily fell into his hands. By the end of the year 1768, he repossessed all the territories which had temporarily fallen into the hands of the English. The English officers were now completely prostrate before Haider. The Madras Government became alarmed, and they despatched Captain Brooke to offer terms of peace. It was now Haidar's turn to pay back the English in their own coin. He told their Envoy:

"I am coming to the gates of Madras, and I will there listen to the propositions the Governor and Council may have to make."

The envoy returned to Madras crestfallen and hostilities were resumed. Haidar sent away all his heavy baggage and plunder home and proceeded towards Madras. He performed the March of 130 miles in three days and a half and appeared suddenly on the St. Thomas' Mount, five miles from Madras. The English were struck with consternation. Had Haidar chosen, he could have easily captured Madras. But for some inexplicable reasons, he showed great magnanimity and generosity which the English could not have expected from their conqueror. Haidar sent a message to the Governor, requiring that a negotiation for peace should be immediately opened and that in the meantime the approach

of the army in the field should be forbidden. The Madras Government deputed Mr. Du Pre to meet him. Haidar dictated his own terms to the English, which they were compelled to accept. These terms were reduced into the form of a treaty which was concluded on the 4th of April 1769. The principal conditions of this Treaty were: first, a mutual restitution of conquests; and secondly, mutual aid, and alliance in defensive wars. The district of Karur which was then held by Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, was surrendered to Haidar. This was done as a stroke of policy, for in this way, the breach between Haidar and Muhammad Ali was widened. The actual amount of war indemnity which the English had to pay to Haidar is difficult to state. Their humiliation was quite complete. According to a French writer, Haidar directed the English to affix a derisive caricature to one of the gates of Fort St. George, in which the Governor and his Council were represented as on their knees before Haidar, who held Mr. Du Pre by the nose, drawn in the shape of an elephant's trunk, which poured forth guineas and pagodas. The vanquished military officer, Colonel Smith, was shown holding the treaty in his hand and breaking his sword in two.

The English were obliged to conclude the treaty with Haidar, but they never intended to fulfill its terms. They seized every opportunity to

violate the conditions on which Haidar offered them peace. The Court of Directors whose sole concern was to make profit out of India severely reprimanded the conduct of the Madras Government, for the one visible effect of the Treaty was the sixty per cent. reduction in the price of East India Stock. The Directors accused the Madras Presidency of irresolution and incapacity and told them that by the manner in which the Presidency had carried on the war and made peace at the dictation of the enemy,

"They had laid a foundation for the natives of Hindustan to think they may insult the Company at pleasure with impuity." The Presidency affirmed that they "were compelled to make peace for want of money to make war."

By the treaty the English bound themselves to assist Haidar in all his defensive wars. An occasion soon occurred which made Haidar solicit their aid. The ubiquitous Mahrattas invaded for the fourth time Haidar's dominion. He demanded the aid of the Madras Presidency. But the English did not come to his assistance. It was at this time that the Mahratta Government proposed to Haidar to enter into an alliance against the English, which Haidar not only refused, but also made known to the English. When Haidar found that the English did not come to his assistance, he purchased peace of the Mahrattas by offering them a large sum of money and giving them in pledge some of his richest districts. Thus

he got rid of the Mahrattas in June 1772. But as mentioned, he did not exhibit any statesmanship in not entering into an alliance with them and also in betraying them to the English.

Haidar was relieved now of the presence of the Mahrattas in his dominions and so proceeded to his conquest of Coorg. He affected to regard that province as tributary to Mysore and hence his invasion of it. He found no difficulty in subduing it.

Haidar was taking note of the events which were rapidly developing in Poona. The Peishwa Mahadeva Rao had been dead ; his younger brother, Narain Rao, was assassinated. The murdered Raghoonath Rao had been trying to oust the posthumous son of of the murdered Peishwa Narayan Rao. Haidar thought the time had come for him to repossess the districts which he had given in pledge to the Mahrattas. For this purpose he sent his son, Tippu, who did not find any difficulty in carrying out the order of his father.

The great Nana Fadnavis, seeing how the English had been guilty of breach of faith with the Mahrattas and how they were supporting the murderer Raghoba, proposed to Haidar for the second time in 1780, an alliance against the English. He offered him certain advantageous terms. The province of Mysore was a tributary to the Peishwa's Government, for its ruler had to pay the Mahrattas the customary

chouth. Nana Fadnavis offered a reduction of the amount of *chouth* and in addition to this, he agreed to Haidar's keeping the districts which he had given the Mahrattas in pledge and which were retaken by Tippu. To carry out these negotiations, Nana despatched an ambassador named Ganesh Rao. Haidar had his grievances against the English, for he found to his cost, that they had not fulfilled the terms of the treaty concluded by them at Madras. He solicited their aid when the Mahrattas had invaded his dominion. But the English violated the solemn agreement they had entered into by refusing their assistance to Haidar.

When Haidar was on the eve of war, the English despatched to his court their well-known missionary Schwartz, apparently to amuse and keep Haidar inactive while they were at war with the Mahrattas. But Haidar was not again to be beguiled. He narrated all his grievances against them. When Schwartz returned unsuccessful to Madras, that Government tried again to enter into an alliance with Haidar and for this purpose they sent their envoy Mr. Gray to him. But Haidar reproached the Christians for their want of faith and rejected all the proposals urged by Mr. Gray whom he studiously insulted and treated rather as a spy than an ambassador.

In the prosecution of this war, Haidar showed his characteristic vigor and generalship. In July

1780, he swooped down upon the territories of the Nawab of Carnatic then in alliance with the Christians. The Government of Madras were quite unprepared to resist this invasion. Their usual excuse was what could they do as they had no money. However they decided to call the troops together, and form an army in the field, and the Governor-General and Council were importuned for money. In the Carnatic, Haidar met with hardly any resistance. He was hailed as a deliverer, because the people had been extremely oppressed and their minds completely alienated by the sort of government that had been established in that country by the Nawab with the alliance of the English. It is on official records, that while the English officer, Colonel Cosby, found himself in the greatest distress for intelligence, every motion of his own was promptly communicated to Haidar. It need hardly he added that this officer was completely non-plussed by the superior tactics of Haidar.

Madras itself was threatened, for on the 10th August 1780, a party of Haidar's horse committed ravages as near as St. Thomas' Mount. Now the Madras Government roused themselves from their torpor. They directed Colonel Harper, then in command of the Guntur detachment, to proceed at once southward. Colonel Braithwaite commanding at Pondicherry was ordered to Madras and a force from

Trichinopoly was instructed to intercept the communications of Haidar; detachments were at the same time despatched to occupy the forts of their ally, Muhammad Ally, in the Carnatic, *viz.*, Wodiarpaliam, Jinji, Karnatikgarh and Wandiwash.

With his superior tactics and large force and the able generalship, not of himself, but of distinguished French officers, notably Monsieur Lally, then in his employ, it was not too much to expect that Haidar would succeed in driving out the English from Southern India. But such was not the will of Providence. India had to pass through, for disciplinary purposes, the unsympathetic rule of the natives of England. And so it happened that Haidar committed a mistake which enabled Colonel Braithwaite to reach Madras safely from Pondicherry. Mr. Mill writes:—

"Colonel Braithwaite, after sending away from Pondicherry all the French officers capable of service, and taking an oath from the principal Frenchmen who remained, commenced his march. He arrived at Carangoly on the 12th of August, and found it garrisoned by only a petty officer of the Nabob and twenty sepoys. They would have surrendered it, as he was well assured, on the very first summons; and had it not by a singular oversight, as it commanded the only road by which Braithwaite could proceed, been neglected by the enemy, who had a large body of horse in its neighbourhood, the most serious consequences might have ensued. The country through which he passed after leaving Carangoly would have rendered it so difficult for him to escape, if attacked by the enemy, that he formed

a very contemptible opinion either of Haidar's military skill, or his means of offence, when he allowed so favourable an opportunity to be lost."

Then again, the whole brunt of the war had to be borne by Haidar. It has been already mentioned that there were three parties who had agreed to simultaneously wage war against the English. One party was the Mahratta Confederacy under the guidance of that remarkable statesman, Nana Fadnavis, the second party was the Nizam and the third was Haidar himself. The manner in which the English succeeded in detaching two of the most important chiefs from the confederacy has already been related. Now, it was the turn of the Nizam who had to be coaxed and threatened to withdraw himself from being one of the parties to the war. To disarm his hostility, Warren Hastings restored to him Guntur which had been made over to the Nawb of the Carnatic named Muhammad Ali. Moreover, with that remarkable capacity for mendacity which the English possessed, they played on the fear of the Nizam, by spreading a false rumour that the Emperor of Delhi had secretly promised to confer on Haidar the Viceroyalty of the Deccan.

But that which prevented the expulsion of the English from Souhern India was the death of Haidar himself in the midst of his successful career on the 7th December, 1782. Do not all these facts show

that Providence wished that the English should rule over India?

Now to revert to the war. Haidar proceeded to invest Arcot, which he raised on hearing that the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, Sir Hector Munro, was, with a large army under him, about to take the field against him. Sir Hector reached Conjeveram on the 29th August and awaited there the arrival of the Guntur Force under the command of Colonel Baillie, but that Force could not join Sir Hector on account of a sudden fall of rain which prevented the crossing of the river. On the 10th September, Baille was attacked by Haidar and was utterly routed. All his men were either slain or made prisoners. According to the French authorities 700 English were killed and 2000 taken prisoners, among whom were Baillie and Sir David Baird. This disaster was the most fatal that had ever overtaken the English in India, and Haidar had it commemorated at Seringapatam by an elaborate painting on the walls of the Darya Daulat Garden.

When the news of the disaster reached Calcutta, Warren Hastings proposed that a sum of 15 lacs of Rupees, and a large detachment of European infantry and artillery, should immediately be sent to Madras under the command of Sir Eyre Coote. The war with the Mahrattas had not yet been concluded and so he recommended that an offer of peace should

be made without delay to the Mahratta State. Mr. Francis agreed with Hastings regarding the conclusion of peace with the Mahrattas on any terms which they would accept, but he objected to the despatch of money and men to Madras on the grounds of the indigence and dangers of the Bengal Government, of the probability of mismanagement on the part of the Government of Madras, and lastly, of the resources which that Government still possessed. But Mr. Francis was now in the minority, and so he did not succeed in preventing the Bengal Government from spending a large sum of money out of the revenues of the famine-stricken population of Bengal on an unjust war. At the same time, as said before, the Governor-General won over the Nizam, by restoring Guntoor and giving currency to the false report that Haidar had been secretly offered the Viceroyalty of the Deccan by the Moghul Emperor.

Sir Eyre Coote could not proceed to Madras by land, as Moodajee Bhonsla, the Regent of Berar, although won over by Warren Hastings, had to keep up appearances with the other members of the Mahratta Confederacy and as he had been ordered by the head of the Confederacy, represented by Nana Fadnavis, to invade Bengal. Moodajee Bhonslay was a traitor in the camp of the Mahrattas. He communicated beforehand to the Governor-General intelligence of his sending 30,000 troops to Bengal

apparently for the purpose of invasion, but in reality to please Nana Fadnavis, and he promised to the Governor-General that by means of delay he would contrive that his troops should not reach the borders of Bengal till the rains had begun.

Sir Eyre Coote with his army landed at Madras on the 5th November. Except relieving a few of the garrisons which had been besieged by the troops of Haidar, it does not appear that Coote succeeded in making any impression on Haidar's Army. He was disgusted with the conduct of the members of the Madras Government. In his letters to the Directors and ministers of the King, Coote "drew a picture in the darkest colors, not only of the weak and disastrous condition into which the country was brought, but of the negligence and incapacity, if not the corruption and guilt, of those servants of the Company, under whose mismanagement such misfortunes had arrived." As his situation was not tolerable to the Madras Government, he insisted on relinquishing the command of the army and on the 28th of September 1782, set sail for Bengal.

Haidar had not yet been vanquished. He was in the midst of his career of conquest, when fortunately for the British, he died on the 7th December 1782. The death of Haidar was a very fortunate event for the British, not because it brought the war to a close, or because peace was concluded with Mysore, but

because it made Nana ratify the treaty of Salbye entered into sometime May 1782. Although the Nizam had deserted him, and Scindhia and the Berar Regent had proved traitors, Nana Fadnavis did not still lose all hopes of success as long as he saw Haidar in the field against the English. As there was no understanding between him and Haidar's successor, Tipoo, Nana was obliged to ratify the treaty of Salbye. Had not Haidar's death occurred at this moment, it is probable that Nana would have renewed war against the English.

The death of Haidar Ali was a great loss to the Mysoreans as well as the Mahrattas. Haidar was altogether free from fanaticism. Usurper as he was, it does not appear that he was cruel to those whom he subjugated and brought under his rule. He was unscrupulous, but that was mainly due to his receiving no education of any sort while a youth. No greater mistake can be committed than that of comparing Haidar Ali with the great Shivaji. Excepting that both of them were illiterate and good soldiers, there was nothing common between them, Haidar was an usurper, which the other was not; and since he was so, he depended on extraneous help to confirm his authority, and to enable him to carry on his warfare. Without the aid of the French, Haidar's rise would not have been significant and assumed importance in the eyes of the English. As

said before, Haidar's statesmanship was not of a high order. In this respect, he can hardly be compared to Shivaji or even his contemporary Nana Fadnavis. But perhaps, his very precarious position, namely, that of an usurper, precluded him from taking a statesmanlike view of the political problems of the day. For what is statesmanship? Schopenheur writes that "right in itself is powerless; in nature it is might that rules. To enlist might on the side of right so that by means of it right may rule, is the problem of statesmanship." Because he trampled on right when he usurped the sovereign power of Mysore, he could not have been expected to be a statesman. His guilty conscience precluded him from being so. He betrayed, as has been said before, the Mahrattas by divulging to the English, the substance of the secret treaty which Nana Fadnavis had proposed to him. He would have shown statesmanship, had be acted on that proposal.

He was an upstart, an usurper and a free-booter, which Shivaji was not. In his "Rise of the Mahratta Power", Mr. Justice Ranade writes:—

"Anyone who sees no distinction between the great leaders who helped in the work of building up the Maratha Confederacy and the careers of Hyder and Tipu in Mysore, of Nizam-ul-Mulk at Hyderabad, Shuja-ud-doula in Oudh, Alivardi Khan in Bengal, Ranjit Singh in the Punjab, and Surajmall in Bharatpur, will never be able to occupy the correct standpoint of vision from which this (Mahratta) his-

tory must be studied, and he will fail to understand its real import. * * * Free-booters and adventurers never succeed in building up empires, which last for generations and permanently alter the political map of a continent. Unlike the great *Subhedars* of provinces, who became independent after the death of Aurangzeb, the founder of the Mahratta Power and his successors for two generations bore the brunt of the attack of the Moghul Empire at the zenith of its splendour. The military adventurers named above were not backed up by any national force behind them, and their power perished with the individual who founded it."*

In the above quoted sentences Mr. Ranade has told the difference between the great Shivaji and the upstart Haidar. The appearance of Shivaji was hailed with delight by an expectant nation, as that of the promised Messiah, because he represented the aspirations of the people of the Deccan. Haidar, on the other hand, was an upstart who tried to impose his will on others, he depended on outside help, for he received no support from within the territories he ruled over.

Haidar possessed many good qualities of the head and the heart. He was a born soldier, an excellent rider, and skilful alike with his sword and his gun. He was entirely free from bigotry, and never cared what faith his officials followed, so long as they obeyed his orders. There can be no doubt that he was a born leader of men and that his administrative

* Rise of the Maratha Power, p. 2.

qualities were of a very high order. He appointed Hindoos to all the high posts of administration under him and he never had any cause to regret for his choice of them. They were faithful to him even after his death. For it is related that when his end was approaching, his ministers, both Hindoos, named Purniya and Krishna Rao,

"took every precaution to conceal the gravity of his malady from the army. Immediately after his death, express messengers on fleet camels were despatched to apprise Tipu of the event, and to urge his return with all speed, while Haidar's body having been embalmed, was forwarded privately to Kolar in a coffin resembling a chest containing valuable spoil. Matters were so well arranged that the secret of his demise was kept for many days, not only from the English, but from his own army, only the most trusted officers being made acquainted with the occurrence. The troops marched westward, Haidar's closed palankeen being carried with the army as if containing an invalid."*

But the same cannot be said of the French on whom he depended for help. He showed a deplorable lack of foresight and judgment for relying on the people of another creed, color, and nationality for military assistance. It was not sound statesmanship to have placed Frenchmen in all offices of trust and responsibility in his army. How they proved unfaithful will be related when we come to speak of

* Bowring's Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, p. 118.

the fall of Tipu. But in his life-time also, he had every reason to be dissatisfied with their conduct. The same Christian author who has been quoted above, writes:—

"Haidar certainly failed in accomplishing the object he had in view at the close of his long and stormy career. But his want of success was mainly due to the supineness of the French Government, which reserved all its strength for its operations against us in North America, and seemed quite indifferent to recovering the prestige it had lost in India. Had it despatched a sufficient army to the Caromandel Coast when Haidar was operating against the Madras forces, there can be little doubt that Fort St. George would have fallen, and that the British authority would have been supplanted by the French flag."

But this was not the will of Providence.

As a soldier, Haidar, in his life-time, was without any equal in India and without many in the world.

"He was a bold, an original, and an enterprising commander, skilful in tactics, and fertile in resources, full of energy and never desponding in defeat."

He knew the wants of his times and as a born soldier, he tried to emulate the Europeans in their arts of war. It was this very ambition which made him seek the assistance of the French. He was not indifferent also to the defence of his coast line. He was the only Indian prince of his time who organized and maintained a navy. His rudimentary navy was destroyed by the English.

His death was a loss to the Marathas. For, as stated before, Nana Fadnavis would not have ratified the Treaty of Salbye, had not Haidar died in the midst of his successful career. The result of the last war with the English, Haidar did not live to see. But it is well-known that his successor Tipu achieved success in that war. There can be no doubt that Nana Fadnavis would have renewed the war against the English and perhaps succeeded in uniting the members of the Mahratta Confederacy and bringing Madhava Rao Scindhia to terms, had not the death of Haidar dashed all his hopes to the ground. From all these, who could fail to see that Providence wished that the English should rule India?

CHAPTER XI.

THE RISE OF THE NIZAM'S DYNASTY.

The history of the rise of the first Nizam derives its importance, from the fact that he was the first servant of the Moghul Emperor to deal the death-blow at the supremacy of his master's rule in India. The downfall of the Moghul Rule was due not a little to the example set by the Nizam. He was a traitor to his sovereign and his country, and his rise was due to treachery, intrigue, cunning and the many questionable means which he adopted. The dynasty which he founded has never been distinguished for any prodigious deeds of valor or acts of generosity.*

*Major Evans Bell, in his work on "The Empire in India", p. 34, in a foot-note says :—"And yet the Nizam has never been exactly a popular Prince * * His government has never been popularly credited with that liberality of rewards and promotions, on great occasions, to the humbler class of its servants, particularly to its soldiers after victory, which glorifies the vulgar notion of Sivajee, Tippoo and Runjit Sing. * * And thus, in consequence of the prevalent habit of the common people in every country, who endow the Prince, noble, or landlord of the day with special hereditary gifts or defects, the Nizam has much less prestige, and much less general influence, beyond his own frontiers, than several Mahratta and Sikh potentates of very inferior possessions."

But it has nevertheless played a conspicuous part in the history of British India.

After the death of Aurangzeb, his effeminate successors had neither the foresight and sagacity of statesmen and administrators, nor the courage and bravery of warriors and generals. As a result of these defects in the rulers, the real power was in the hands of the ministers. It was under these circumstances, that two Seid brothers, named Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali Khan, came to possess great influence in the declining days of the Moghul Rule. They are known in history as king-makers. But whatever faults these two brothers were guilty of, they had the welfare of the Empire at heart. Writers of Indian history have not yet done justice to these two brothers. These king-makers were sincerely desirous of saving from ruin the Empire founded by Babar and extended by Akbar. As long as they maintained influence in the court of the degenerate Emperors, the Empire was not broken up into pieces. But the murder of the one and the imprisonment of the other precipitated the downfall of the Empire. When we unravel the tangled web of the last days of the Mgohul Empire, we find that the Nizam-ul-Mulk was a prominent actor in those days. The death of the one and the imprisonment of the other of the king-makers were due to his machinations. The dissensions among the nobles of the

Moghul Empire were likewise his doings. The viceroys of the distant provinces imitated his example in throwing off their allegiance to the Emperor and declaring themselves independent.

It was he who instigated, incited and helped the Mahrattas in creating troubles in the territories then under the suzerainty of the Emperor and he is also suspected of having induced Nadir Shah to invade Hindustan.

Again, when we trace the history of the Europeans in India, whether of the French or English nationality, we find his dynasty asking for their co-operation, which brought about the supremacy of the Europeans in this country.

From these considerations, then, the history of the rise of the Nizam deserves our careful attention.

The man known as the first Nizam-ul-Mulk, but whose real name was Chin-Kilich Khan, was a Turany noble. He was appointed at one time the Governor of Moradabad in Rohilkhund. The Deccan was not his original satrapy. It was during the reign of the Emperor Ferokh Siar, the great-grandson of Aurangzeb, that the two Seid brothers named above, came to possess great influence at the Imperial Court of that ruler. Abdullah Khan was the Vizier, and Hussain Ali Khan was the Viceroy of the Deccan. The Nizam-ul-Mulk supplanted the latter in his Viceroyalty. The Deccan was the theatre of those

acts of the Mahrattas which led them to the supreme rule of almost the whole of India. When the younger Seid brother was the Viceroy of the Deccan, the Mahrattas had not yet gained much territorial concession in the rich Moghul Provinces of Candeish and Malwa. But in those provinces the Mahrattas had their officers to collect the *chouth* or fourth part of the gross revenue, allotted to them under former treaties. The author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin writes that

"This impost (i.e. *chouth*) had been extended throughout the Deckan ten or twelve years after the demise of the Emperor Aurangzib, at a time of the civil war, and when the princes of the Imperial Court, fully occupied by their own intestine broils, had no time to attend to the affairs of those distant parts." (P. 141, Brigg's translation).

It was not very easy for the Mahrattas to collect their *chouth*. They had to assume the part of the aggressors in the realization of this impost. During the time when Abdullah Khan was the Viceroy of the Deccan, several conflicts had taken place between the Mahrattas and the Viceroy's troops. Although the Mahrattas were always successful, yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that they would not have so easily made themselves masters of the rich and fertile provinces of Malwa, Candeish and Guzerat, had there been an energetic and loyal Moghul Viceroy in the Deccan. Seid Hussain Ali Khan was a man of energy

and character. It was a fatal day for the Moghul Empire in India when he left the Deccan. His brother Abdullah Khan was the Vizier of the Delhi Emperor. Selfish and interested persons at the Imperial Court were busy intriguing to ruin the two brothers and more especially the Vizier Abdullah Khan. When Hussain Ali Khan, who was at that time at Aurangabad, the capital of his Viceroyalty of the Deccan, became aware of the danger which was threatening the safety of his brother and his family, he left the Deccan and marched on to Delhi with the intention of crushing all his enemies. Of those who had conspired for the destruction of the influence of the Seid brothers, the Nizam-ul-Mulk's was a very prominent figure. He left his own government of Moradabad and with all his retinue and followers amounting to several thousand men repaired to Delhi, because he had been given to understand that he would be appointed the Viceroy of the Deccan, if he helped in destroying the influence of the Seids. It is necessary here to remark that the Nizam-ul-Mulk had never received any injury from any of the members of the Seid family. His eagerness therefore to crush the Seids betrays a very low and mean nature. When he came to Delhi, he found that the Emperor Ferokh-Siar, surrounded by self-seeking courtiers, neglected him and deprived him of the governorship of Moradabad. In his bitter chagrin

and disappointment, he joined the cabal formed to destroy the Seids. The Vizier Seid Abdullah Khan, when he came to know of the conspiracy that had been formed against him, ordered twenty-five thousand horses to be raised forthwith. His brother was also on full march towards Delhi which he reached in due time. These circumstances frustrated the designs of the consiprators. Nay, the Vizier even succeeded in gaining over the principal conspirators to his party, the Nizam-ul-Mulk being one of them. The Vizier gave him hopes that he would be appointed to the government of Malwa. The Emperor was now utterly non-plussed. He knew not what to do. Perfectly devoid of courage and self-reliance, he found himself deserted by those on whose advice and promises he had depended for bringing the Seid brothers to ruin. The Vizier Abdullah Khan now found his opportunity, for he went to the Emperor and addressed him in the following language:

"In return for the important services we have rendered you in times of weakness and distress; in return for the blood our family have shed in your service, as we had already done in that of our father and grandfather, such faithful servants have experienced nothing but mistrust and suspicion, and a variety of plots have been contrived against our lives and honor." (*Ibid*, p. 174).

The Emperor, perceiving his real situation, retired into the sanctuary or women's apartment. As

usual at such critical times, some nobles, incensed at the Emperor Ferokh Siar's reverse of fortune, considered themselves duty bound to come to his assistance and to support his defenders. But Nizam-ul-Mulk was not one of them. Nor did he go to the Vizier's assistance but he thought it most prudent to stay at home. A calculating and self-seeking man, that was the method he adopted for watching the course of events. There was now a regular fight between the adherents of the Emperor and those of the Vizier. These fightings and skirmishes took place in the streets of Delhi. After all the Vizier's troops gained the day, for it is related by the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, that

"A body of Afghan soldiers, mixed up with some of the Vezir's slaves, found means from the top of the house of Nejm-ed-din Alikhan, the Vezir's youngest brother, to descend within the yard of the king's female apartments, which proved to be guarded by a number of Abyssinian, Georgian, and Calmuc women. These being driven away, the soldiers penetrated within the gate, and every apartment was searched for Ferok Siar. At last some women, too delicate to bear the tortures to which they were exposed, pointed to the place of his confinement, and the soldiers ran to him, * * * he was dragged upon the ground and thrown into a small dark room." (*Ibid*, p. 181.).

In this way, the voluptuous, effeminate, and incompetent Moghul Emperor was disposed of by the Vizier. It is much to his credit, that he did not

usurp the royal power. It would have been in keeping with the circumstances of the situation, and perhaps better for the welfare of the Empire, had he proclaimed himself as the King or Emperor, instead of assuming the humble role of Vizier and King-maker. In many respects, the circumstances of the time resembled those of the days after the execution of Charles I. of England. The Vizier had his prototype in Cromwell. As Cromwell saved England, by becoming the Protector, so would have Seid Abdullah Khan, had he himself assumed the royalty. The English people rose and beheaded their King, because tyranny was rampant everywhere in their country, and because odious taxes were imposed on them. When the Seid named above made the Emperor Ferokh-Siyar a prisoner, the people of Hindustan, chiefly Hindoos, were becoming alienated from their Muhammadan sovereigns, because the latter had departed from the methods of administration introduced by the Emperor Akbar. The shortsighted policy of Aurangzeb brought on the ruin of the Moghul Empire.

After confining Ferokh Siyar, the Seid Vizier raised one of the descendants of the house of Timur to the throne, but kept all the power in his own hands. He showed also great statesmanship when he advised the newly created Emperor to relieve the Hindoos from the poll-tax. In a foot-note to his

translation of Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, Colonel Briggs writes:—

"This odious (poll) tax, abolished by the wise Akbar, was renewed in the reign of Aurangzib, and had continued without intermission till this time, and it is believed by the Hindus, and by most reflecting persons well read in the history of the times, that to this impolitic measure, and the excessive impost on the land, the downfall of the Mahammadan power is mainly to be attributed." (*Ibid*, p. 183).

This Seid Vizier rises in our estimation, when we find that he realized the danger which was threatening the Empire, on account of the odious impost of the poll-tax and that he advised its abolition. Had he been allowed to remain as Vizier for some years longer, it is probable that the Muhammadan Empire in India would have gained a fresh lease of life. But this was not to be. His own destruction and the destruction of his family was brought about by the Nizam-ul-Mulk whom he had raised to power.

Nizam-ul-Mulk was created by Vizier Abdullah Khan, Viceroy of Malwa. This was in 1720 A. D. As soon as he established himself in his Viceroyalty,

"He turned his attention towards increasing the number of his troops, filling his magazines, exercising his officers and soldiers, and in making new acquisitons in the district of Chandery." (*Ibid*, p. 205).

This conduct of the Nizam greatly alarmed the Vizier who also discovered that he had been intriguing at the Imperial Court. It has been already mentioned that the Viziers' brother, Hussain Ali Khan, was the Viceroy of the Deccan. He had not yet left Delhi, when Nizam-ul-Mulk was making all these preparations in Malwa. Naturally Hussain Ali was much concerned about the Deccan. Knowing that Nizam-ul-Mulk was under great obligation to the Vizier, for had it not been for the kindness and generosity of the Vizier, the Nizam would have hardly come to notice, Hussain Ally, the Viceroy of the Deccan,

"wrote to Nizam-ul-Mulk, that as both he and his brother, with a view to put an end to the internal troubles of the Deccan wished to establish their residence in the province of Malwa, midway between the Deccan and the Capital, they hoped that to accommodate them, Nizam-ul-Mulk would take his choice of the four governments of Multan, Candeish, Acherabad, or Allahabad." (*Ibid*, p. 206).

In this proposal, there was nothing which could have offended a just and reasonable man. But Nizam-ul-Mulk forgot the gratitude which he owed to the Seid brothers. He did not care to oblige them. The Muhammadan historian who has been already quoted above, writes:—

"This letter produced the very breach it was intended to prevent. Nizam-ul-Mulk, answered the moderate letter

of Hussein Ali Khan's in a haughty style * * * He held a consultation with his friends and military chiefs, and resolved to display openly the standard of revolt. * * * These disorders afforded a bad example, so that the meanest men availed themselves of their distance from the capital to aspire at independence." (*Ibid*, p. 206).

There was no other alternative left to the Seid brothers but to cross blades with Nizam-ul-Mulk. That disloyal and treacherous Viceroy of Malwa was the aggressor, for he marched out of his capital, crossed the Nerbudda and met the Imperial troops and gained an easy victory over them. The war lasted for several months and in it one of the Seid brothers was slain and the other made prisoner. These occurrences were very unfortunate for the Muhammadan supremacy in India. During the time the Seid brothers were at the helm of the Empire no dismemberment of the Empire had taken place. In order to prevent the threatening dissolution of that Empire, for the conduct of the Viceroy of Malwa left no doubt in their minds what the real intentions of the Nizam were, they engaged in a war which cost the one his life and the other his liberty. The star of the Nizam-ul-Mulk was now in the ascendent. He became Viceroy of the Deccan also, for Hussain-Ali Khan was now slain. Nizam-ul-Mulk mocked the Emperor when he congratulated him on his being relieved of the bondage of the Seid brothers. But

he was in fact congratulating himself on the favorable turn of affairs for establishing his independence. After settling his affairs in the Deccan, he came to Delhi on the 18th January, 1722 to pay his respects to the Emperor. The author of the *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin,* who is the best and most trustworthy authority on the decline and fall of the Moghul Empire, writes that Nizam-ul-Mulk

> was on that occasion raised to the office of Vezir, and received according to custom, the investiture of that high dignity, by being presented with a dress of four pieces and the imperial signet was placed in his hands. (*Ibid,* p. 325).

This occurred on the 13th February, 1722. Eight months afterwards, that is on the 15th October, 1722, he received a dress of investiture for the government of Guzerat.

Nizam-ul-Mulk was now the most powerful subject in the Moghul Empire. He was the Vizier or Prime Minister of the Empire, as well as the Viceroy and Governor-General of the fertile provinces of Guzerat, Malwa and Deccan. But he lacked in those qualities which are necessary for properly discharging the duties of the high office of the Prime Minister of the Empire. There was no threatened invasion of the Empire from without and it had not as yet to cope with any domestic rebellions worth speaking of. The Imperial Court was no doubt crowded with men of questionable character and the Emperor

himself was addicted to the company of debauched and lewd men. Had Nizam-ul-Mulk been possessed of sufficient ability, tact and energy it would not have been difficult for him to clear the augean stable and save the Empire. But he was singularly devoid of those qualifications which mark statesmen and administrators and exact admiration of all.* The author of *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* writes that Nizam-ul-Mulk's

"person and manners were the subject of ridicule as soon as he was out of sight, and never failed in his absence of becoming the topic of the most pointed raillery." (*Ibid*, p. 336).

He was a consummate hypocrite and thus could not have been expected to wield power with any advantage to the state. Finding how useless he was in the government of the Empire, he resigned the high office of Vizier and proceeded to the Deccan, where he

"resolved upon revenging himself by exciting troubles and raising commotions." (*Ibid*, p. 336).

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* "A statesman," writes Lord Rosebery, "measures the opinions and forces that surround him, and proceeds to act accordingly; he is not laying his account with remote posterity, or legislating for it. The politician who is a century before his time is hardly more a statesman than the politician who is a century behind it."

The Emperor accepted his resignation but

"honored [him] with the office of Vakil-i-muttak or Lieutenant of the Emperor; at the same time also he received the new title of Asaf-jah, and met with every demonstration of favor." (*Ibid*, p. 337).

But the Nizam-ul-Mulk repaid all these favors and acts of kindness shown to him by his sovereign by black ingratitude. On his return to the Deccan towards the close of the year 1724, he

"wrote to Hamid Khan, his maternal uncle, governor of Guzerat, to commence hostilities, in combination with Sillaji and Kantaji, two Mahratta Commanders whom he employed to make incursions into the imperial territories. Hamid Khan on this intimation raised the standard of defiance, and seizing on all the *jaghires* or estates belonging to the several nobles now at Court, expelled their stewards." (*Ibid*, p. 339).

When the news of these proceedings reached the Imperial Court at Delhi, an army was sent to Guzerat. After many bloody contests the Imperial troops were successful and Guzerat came once more, although for a short time only, under the suzerainty of the Moghul Emperor.

The Delhi Emperor deprived the Nizam-ul-Mulk of the Viceroyalty of Malwa and bestowed it on a Hindoo noble named Raja Giri-dhar. The Nizam-ul-Mulk was now stung to the quick. He left no stone unturned to bring the Emperor to whom he was

bound to pay homage, to the brink of ruin. He forgot the duty he owed to his sovereign and the creed to which he belonged. He did not hesitate to secure the help of the Mahrattas to destroy the Muhammadan Empire. He engaged the Mahrattas to invade Hindustan. He applied to Baji Rao.

"Nizam-ul-Mulk proposed to Bajy Rao to conquer Malwa and to recover Guzerat, or at least to ruin and lay waste those two countries so as to render them of no use to his enemies. Bajy Rao and the other Mahratta chiefs assembled a mighty army, with which they invaded both Malwa and Guzerat at one and the same time." (*Ibid*, p. 353).

The Nizam-ul-Mulk was the Muhammadan Viceroy of the Moghul Emperor in the Deccan. He conspired against his sovereign to destroy the Empire. But the Hindoo Viceroys of the Emperor in Malwa and Guzerat did all they could to uphold the Empire. We read in Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that

"the grandsons of the Gauls who had besieged Julius Caesar in Alesia, commanded legions, governed provinces, and were admitted into the Senate of Rome. Their ambition, instead of disturbing the tranquility of the State, was intimately connected with its safety and greatness."

The above is very truly applicable to the Hindus under the rule of the Moghuls. The Hindoo governors and viceroys of the Moghuls were loyal and they exerted their utmost for the safety and greatness of

the Moghul Empire. Thus the author of the *Siyar-ul Mutakherin* writes that the Hindoo viceroy of Malwa named

"Raja Giri-dhar, who commanded in that country with a small body of troops, would not suffer his country to be ravaged; and being an officer of character, he engaged Bajy Rao several times, after having in vain requested assistance from the capital. His repeated representations to the throne and to the ministers availed nothing, and that brave man, having wasted his small force in endless skirmishes, at last fell himself in one of them. He was succeeded in his command by Raja Dia Bahadur, a relative and son of the brave Chubilram, who, pursuing Giri-dhar's plans, did not cease to harass the Mahrattas, giving them no rest and taking none himself. He moreover wrote to the minister that, so long as he lived, he would prove a wall in the passage of the enemy towards Hindustan, but that after his death he apprehended that they would spread like an inundation all over the Empire. None of these representations produced any effect, and that brave man was also slain in defending the country." (*Ibid*, p. 354).

The Hindoo Governor of Guzerat although not so able and brave as the Hindoo viceroys of Malwa did not prove a traitor. Compare and contrast the Hindoo viceroys with the Nizam-ul-Mulk and the other Muhammadan viceroys and governors. The latter proved traitors and disloyal, which the former were not. Here is a lesson for the rulers of India, who should follow the policy of the ancient Romans and the Moghuls and repose confidence in the Indians

by entrusting them with all the high offices of the state, for that is the only way to safeguard the Empire against foreign invasions. Lecky writes that

"On the great theatre of public life, especially in periods of great convulsions when passions are fiercely roused, it is neither the man of delicate scrupulosity and sincere impartiality, nor yet the single-minded religious enthusiast incapable of dissimulation or procrastination, who confers most benefit upon the world. It is much rather the astute statesman earnest about his ends but unscrupulous about his means, equally free from the trammels of conscience and from the blindness of zeal, who governs because he partly yields to the passions and the prejudices of his time." *

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* Lecky's History of European Morals, page 41. This is the view of Machiavelli, whose biographer M. Villari tells us that "he (Machiavelli) clearly saw that statecraft has ways and means of its own, which are not the ways and means of private morality; that, on the contrary, the morality of private life may sometimes check a statesman in mid-career and render him vacillating without his being either a good or a bad man; and that it is mainly vacillation of this kind that leads to the downfall of states. There must be no vacillation, he said, but a daring adoption of the measures demanded by the nature of events. Such measures will always be justified, when the end is obtained. And the end in view must be the welfare of the state. He who achieves this, even if a wicked man, may be commended for glory. If, on the contrary, he should cause the ruin of the state, whether through private ambition, or from hesitation born of a good motive, he will be consigned to infamy as

Nizam-ul-Mulk would have exacted our admiration had he taken the reins of the government of the Empire, and tried to confer most benefit upon its inhabitants. He was the Vezier or Prime Minister and latterly the Vakil-i-Muttaq or Lieutenant of the Empire, and thus he had every opportunity to do good to the Empire. The times were such that he could have played the part of Cromwell and exacted the admiration of all, notwithstanding the questionable nature of his acts. But he was a traitor, and as such he does not deserve any respect.

To make friends with the Mahrattas, the Moghul Emperor

"thought proper to confer the government of that country on Bajy Rao himself; so that in this mannner Malwa passed under the Mahratta dominion." (*Ibid*, p. 355).

This was the first dismemberment of the Moghul Empire and this could not have been effected but for the treachery of Nizam-ul-Mulk. The Mahrattas acquired Guzerat by conquest.

Sivaji had no ambition or desire to bring the whole of India under his sway. He wanted to make the Deccan free from the rule of the Muhammadans. The constitution which he gave to his people was

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a wicked or incapable prince, even when as a private individual, deserving the highest praise. Such is the true meaning of Machiavelli's maxim, that the end justifies the means."

not meant for wielding the sovereignty of all the provinces of India. It was Nizam-ul-Mulk who awakened the ambition in the breasts of the Mahrattas for conquering Hindustan and establishing an Empire by supplanting the Moghuls. The Mahrattas

"talked of nothing but of new conquests, in which they were encouraged hitherto by Nizam-ul-Mulk." (*Ibid*, p. 364).

Nizam-ul-Mulk did not remain satisfied with throwing off his allegiance to the Moghul Emperor, and encouraging and helping the Mahrattas to dismember the provinces of the Moghul Empire, but he is also suspected of having instigated Nadir Shah to invade Hindustan. It is not necessary to mention in detail all the circumstances which preceded Nadir Shah's invasion. Nadir Shah was the Ruler of Persia and at that time, both Cabul and Candhahar formed part of the Moghul Empire. At Cabul resided the Moghul Viceroy of Afghanistan. Nadir Shah had some grievances against the Afghan subjects of the Moghul Emperor of India, to whom he made several representations, but these were unheeded. At last Nadir Shah sent an embassy to Delhi. The nobles of the Imperial Court

"looked upon the Embassy * * as a thing contrived by the Vezier Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Turany party at Court, and especially by Zakariah Khan, the Viceroy of Cabul, a relation of the Vezier."* (*Ibid*, p. 414).

The conduct of the Nizam-ul-Mulk when Nadir Shah actually invaded Hindustan, lends support to the suspicion that he incited him to invade Hindustan. The same Muhammadan historian who forms our authority on the subject of Nadir Shah's invasion and Nizam-ul-Mulk's treachery writes:

"On the first intelligence of Nadir Shah's having entered the province of Cabul, Khan Dowran and Nizam-ul-Mulk were ordered to march out to oppose him; but they contented themselves with wasting their time in the city, after spreading reports of their intention to proceed, which they thought a piece of very refined policy." (*Ibid*, p. 414).

Again, when Nadir's troops were attacking the Emperor's, and when the Viceroy of Oude, named Saadat Khan, went to assist his people actually engaged with the enemy and asked for assistance, the traitor Nizam-ul-Mulk is reported to have said,

"It was already three in the afternoon; that Saadat Khan's people must be exhausted by the length of their march and that it was unreasonable to expect them to fight that day. Let his majesty (added he), issue his commands to that general to restrain his eagerness for a few hours until to-morrow morning, when the whole army being assembled in battle array, with artillery in the front, may engage the enemy, and under his majesty's auspices obtain a glorious victory."* (*Ibid*, p. 418).

It need only be added that he did not go to render assistance to Saadat Khan.

Nizam-ul-Mulk had a hand in all the troubles

and disasters which befell Delhi during the invasion or rather visitation of the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah. He was secretly pleased at the humiliation to which the Delhi Emperor was subjected. Nadir Shah quitted Delhi on the 15th May, 1738. He contented himself with severing from the empire of Hindustan and adding to his own the province of Sind and Çabul, with some districts of the Punjab. Nadir Shah's invasion shook the Moghul Empire to its very foundation and hastened its downfall. Nizam-ul-Mulk returned to the Deccan and declared his independence. His example was followed by the Viceroy of Bengal, named Ali Verdy Khan.

After his return to the Deccan, Nizam-ul-Mulk never meddled in the affairs of the Imperial Court at Delhi, but left his eldest son there, named Ghazi-ed-din Khan, to whom he transferred his office of the Vizier or Prime Minister of the Empire. He transferred the capital of the Deccan from Aurangabad to Hyderabad and was busy in feathering his own nest at the expense of the Empire. The Emperor Muhammad Shah died in 1747 and was succeeded by his eldest son Ahmed Shah. When Muhammad Shah aescended the imperial throne of Delhi, the Moghul Empire, though not in the zenith of its glory, had not receded an inch from the boundaries which had been fixed by Aurangzeb. But on his death the boundaries of the Empire had considerably altered

for the worse. The Empire was in extremis, and its dissolution was only a question of time. Such a pitiful condition of the Empire was mainly brought about by the treachery and machinations of Nizam-ul-Mulk. He did not survive long the death of the Emperor Muhammad Shah whom he had injured in so many ways. He died in 1748 at the reputed age of 104. He was succeeded by his second son Nesir Jung. It was this succession which brought about the first conflict between the French and the English in India.

Such in brief is the origin of the dynasty of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The founder of this dynasty is not entitled to that respect and admiration which the usurper Haidar Ali of Mysore exacts. The latter was a brave soldier and his rise was due to his personal courage, whereas Nizam-ul-Mulk rose by foul treachery and was devoid of those qualities of the head and heart which endeared Haidar to his subjects and make historians describe him as a 'born soldier and leader of men.'

CHAPTER XII

SIR JOHN MACPHERSON AS OFFICIATING GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

After the departure of Mr. Warren Hastings from Calcutta, the senior member of the Supreme Council, who happened to be a Scotchman, named Mr. Macpherson, officiated as Governor General of India. He had landed some time in 1767 in Madras as purser of the Mansfield Chinaman, commanded by his uncle, Captain Macleod. In his native country, he received a sound education in classics and thus acquired great facility in English Composition. On landing in Madras, he got himself introduced to the Nabob of Arcot, who employed him and sent him to England to represent his grievances there.

As has been already said before, the English obtained their political footing in India by the part they took in the contest of two rivals for the throne of the Carnatic. They succeeded in establishing Mohammad Ali as the Nawab of Arcot, for which services they obtained territory from him yielding four and a half lakhs of pagodas. But the Nawab did not know the character of his Christian friends who always made demands on him whenever

they were in pecuniary difficulties. The Nawabs of the Carnatic, however, were held in great esteem by the East India Company and their representatives and servants in India. In a minute dated 4th February, 1779, the President of Fort Saint George in Council recorded:—

"All attention and support is certainly due to the Nabob as our old and faithful ally, connected with us by every tie, and demanding from us every indulgence..... .....*who, with his family, it is to be wished, may long remain instances of our national faith.*"

Great were the advantages which the English derived from their alliance with the Nawabs of the Carnatic.

No English sovereign wrote an autograph letter to any of the ruling princes of India as did George III to the Nawab of Arcot in 1771 dated 19th March. He wrote:

"We received from the hands of our East India Company, in July last, your letter, accompanied with your different presents. We shall look upon the picture of yourself and your children with pleasure, as it will put us continually in mind of that affection which you have always shown towards us, and which we have no doubt, will be hereditary to your offspring, as we are satisfied that our friendship and protection to you and your posterity will descend through our successors from generation to generation.....We have appointed to the command of our fleet Sir Robert Harland, Baronet, one of the Admi-

rals of our Navy, and have made him Plenipotentiary to you, ordering him to deliver you this letter, and present to you a pair of pistols, out of our private armoury, and some cloths of the manufacture of our country, which we pray you to accept as a token of the continuance of our esteem, of which you will be fully assured by our plenipotentiary; and we desire that you put entire confidence in whatever he shall say in our name. And so repeating our wishes for your prosperity, we bid you heartily farewell....."

Thus flattered and cajoled by the English from their sovereign downwards, the Nawab took every opportunity to please them with costly presents.

Sir Charles Lawson, in his *Memories of Madras* (p. 68), writes:—

"Almost immediately after his assumption of the office of Governor, Lord Macartney received an invitation from the Nabob of the Carnatic to honour him with a visit, and he promptly complied with it. Every mark of respect for his office was shown on his arrival at His Highness's palace, and he was probably thinking that his visit was one of agreeable ceremony, when the Nabob sprung upon him an offer for which he was unprepared. A brief account of what passed was given in the House of Commons on April 16, 1806, three weeks before Lord Macartney's death, by Mr. W. Keene. . . . . (who) stated that he had been told by Lord Macartney that the Nabob invited the visit in order to present him with a sum of money equivalent to £30,000, and at the same time to make handsome money presents to the officers of his suite. Lord Macartney. . . . expressed his astonishment to the Nabob; declined to accept the money; and inquired what had prompted His Highness to

offer it. The Nabob replied that it was quite a customary present to every new Governor, and had never before been refused. . . . . .

"As the accuracy of this statement was not challenged in Parliament or elsewhere it may be assumed that the episode really occurred. . . . . The Nabob evidently was apprehensive that it might fare ill with himself if he failed to place the new Governor under a personal obligation. . . . . Mr. Keene declared, when concluding his anecdote, that the 'generous integrity' of Lord Macartney 'was everywhere reviled by the servants of the Company, and every pains was taken to slander him for venturing such an innovation upon the system they had so long established.' "

It is no wonder that to please his Christian friends, the Nawab incurred heavy debts, and his creditors mostly belonged to that creed.

Macpherson was commissioned by the Nawab to go to England and plead his cause with the English ministry. He arrived in England in 1768 and approached the Prime Minister, the Duke of Grafton, and represented to him that the Nawab was being treated with indignity and tyranny by the Company whose servants fraudulently claimed very large sums of money from him. Macpherson offered bribes or presents to the tune of several lacs of Rupees to the Minister and his secretary, who did not accept them. Then Macpherson offered to advance to the Duke seventy lacs of Rupees or even more, as a loan for the public service, at a very low interest. This offer was also rejected. But the Duke's interest

obtained for him a writership in Madras for which he left England early in 1770. But he was dismissed in 1776 and returned to England where he created such an agitation over the question of his dismissal, that

"Either to rid themselves of a troublesome opponent, or from a sense of his very great address and abilities, the Company promoted instead of dismissing this intriguing servant; and from the time that Macpherson had attained the rank of a member of the Supreme Council of Calcutta he had ceased to care about the surcharged debts and grievances of the Nabob of Arcot."*

Mr. Macpherson rose to be the senior member of the Council and so on the departure of Mr. Warren Hastings, occupied his vacant seat as Governor General of India.

When he assumed the reins of Government in his hands, he found the "arrears to the army upwards of fifty lacs". He succeeded in reducing public expenditure and re-establishing public credit. No relief, however, was given to the Nawab of Oude, who was being bled white, "from motives of delicacy to the late Governor-General (Mr. Warren Hastings), and his arrangements in the Upper Provinces."

He peremptorily resisted the demand made by

* Charles MacFarlane's *Our Indian Empire*, London, 1844. Vol. I. p. 227.

Madhoji Sindhia on behalf of Shah Alam of the tribute to the extent of four crores of Rupees.

The authorities of the Company were so pleased with his able administration of the affairs of India, that he was recommended to the Crown for a Baronetcy —a recommendation which was accepted and acted upon by the then reigning sovereign, George III.

But he was not offered the Governor-Generalship of India in succession to Mr. Warren Hastings.

In a private and confidential letter dated Calcutta, August 8, 1789, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas that

"Macpherson seems to expect that you are to give him a pension, besides all the ill-earned money that he has got under the head of pay and presents. His flimsy cunning and shameless falsehoods seem to have taken in all parties; believe me that those who trusted the most in him will be the most deceived. He tells me in a letter that I received from him lately, that the field is as open to him as to any other person, to be my successor in this Government. On this I cannot help saying, that, as I must always take an interest about the future prosperity of this country, I hardly know any public event which is possible to happen that would give me more concern than I should feel at his ideas being realised, nor any measure respecting India that in my opinion would tend more in its consequences to vex and discredit both you and Mr. Pitt. You may be assured that under his management a relaxation of authority in Government, and a system of mean jobbing and peculation, would immediately take place; and if in my time we shall

have recovered any part of the national character for sincerity and honour with the native powers, you may depend upon it that his duplicity and low intrigues amongst them would soon completely demolish it." (Correspondence of Cornwallis, Vol. I., p. 415).

Macpherson wrote a letter to Cornwallis from London, dated March 9, 1789, published in Cornwallis Correspondence, Vol. I. pp. 429-430. Regarding this letter, the editor of the Correspondence appended the following note:—

"The whole of this letter is a string of gross misrepresentations. When Sir John wrote it, he had been distinctly informed that on no consideration would he be allowed to return to India, and he was perfectly aware that nothing but a change of Government could have given him a chance of being appointed Governor-General. He looked for support from the Whigs,.....but even among that party, there were several whose claims were stronger than his.

"His resignation was a farce, for when he left India he was in fact legally out of the service, although he endeavoured to evade the law by sailing nominally for the Cape instead of to Europe direct.

"His demand for a pension higher than that of Member of Council had already been rejected, both by the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, in the most unqualified manner; nor had greater success attended his attempt to prove that the appointment of Lord Cornwallis was illegal, and that in consequence he himself was still Governor-General.

"Sir John Macpherson was elected a member of Parliament for Crickdale, which was declared void on the ground

of bribery. Between 50 and 60 of his supporters had been convicted of that offence, and 82 actions had been brought against him, which he avoided by going abroad." (*Ibid*, p. 364, footnote).

In a letter to Lord Cornwallis dated Sackville Street, April 6, 1788, General Grant wrote that

"Sir John Macpherson has upon Petrie's prosecution been found guilty of bribery, and fined three thousand pounds, which they say at the India House renders him incapable of being a justice of the peace, and of course should operate more forcibly against his being a member of the Supreme Council. I believe his fortune is very inconsiderable, and he is said to be an expensive man." (*Ibid*. p. 365).

Such was the character of one who had been Governor-General of India.

Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, was offered that honour, but he declined it on the score of his health. After retiring from the governorship of Madras he embarked for England and reached London on the 9th January, 1786. On the 13th January he went to the India House to explain to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Company his reasons for declining the Governor-Generalship of India.

About a month afterwards, Mr. Dundas wrote to him to see the Prime Minister Mr. Pitt and himself on the 21st February at the office of the Board of Control, which he did. Mr. Pitt assured him of his

support and countenance if he would go out to India as Governor-General. But Lord Macartney, who was an Irish peer, was ambitious enough to declare that he would do so if His Majesty conferred on him the British peerage. This the Minister was not prepared to recommend to His Majesty and so Lord Macartney did not accept the office offered to him.

The authorities appointed the Earl of Cornwallis Governor-General of India..

CHAPTER XIII

LORD CORNWALLIS' ADMINISTRATION (1786-1793).

Lord Cornwallis hesitated to accept the Governor-Generalship of India unless additional powers were given to him which would make him an autocrat and quite independent of the opinions of the members of the Council. The Act of 1773 appointing four councillors for Fort William limited the exercise of unrestricted power of the Governor-General, for he had no greater power than his colleagues. This state of affairs did not meet with the approval of Lord Cornwallis. So he declined to accept the Governor-Generalship of India in 1782 when Lord Shelburne offered it to him. Warren Hastings' administration excited such an interest in Indian affairs in England that a select as well as secret Committee of the House of Commons was appointed and twelve reports from the former and six from the latter were issued which led to the introduction in the House of Commons, of Mr. Fox's bill on the 11th November 1783. Mr. Warren Hastings would have been thrown out of his office had this bill been passed. This bill, which seems to have been the handiwork of Sir Phillip

Francis, was unfortunately not passed. Mr. Mill writes:—

"No proceeding of the English Government, in modern times, has excited a greater ferment in the nation, than these two bills of Mr. Fox. An alarm diffused itself, for which the ground was extremely scanty, and for which notwithstanding the industry and the art with which the advantage was improved by the opposite party, it is difficult, considering the usual apathy of the public on much more important occasions, entirely to account. The character of Mr. Fox, who was at that time extremely unpopular, and from the irregularity of his private habits as well as the apparent sacrifice of all principle in his coalition with Lord North, was, by a great part of the nation, regarded as a profligate gamester, both in public and private life, contributed largely to the existence of the storm, and to the apprehensions of danger from the additional power which he appeared to be taking into his hands." (History of India, iv. pp. 384-385).

Mr. Fox's bill was not passed, but it overthrew the coalition ministry. Mr. Pitt now ascended the stage and in the next year, he introduced a bill which was passed into law on the 13th of August 1784. By this bill was established a Board of Control which was invested with the superintendence of all the civil, military, and revenue affair of the Company.

But this new Bill even did not satisfy Lord Cornwallis. Mr. Charles Ross, who edited his correspondence, writes that

"it was not till he was assured by the Government that

his objections should be obviated, that he finally consented to go to India.

"A bill was accordingly brought in (26 Geo. III. C. 16), but it did not receive the royal assent till after he had left England. By it the Governor-General and the other Governors were enabled, in cases which they considered of emergency, to act without the assent of their Councils, and even contrary to their opinion. But dissents might be recorded in writing." (Vol. I. pp. 213-214).

Under such happy circumstances Lord Cornwallis sailed from England in May 1786.

It is a common dictum of the writers on Indian History that Cornwallis was one of the noblest and best Governor-Generals of India and that he loved peace more than anything else. But this view is a fallacious one. If we scrutinize the career of Cornwallis in India, we shall find that he was not a man of strong principles. We should not forget that when he was sent to India, he was as it were under a cloud. His reputation had been blasted and his name held in obloquy by the population of England. He had surrendered the American colonies to Washington and his colleagues. In the American War of Independence, Cornwallis by no means played a very creditable part. So when he came out to India, he had to retrieve his character and bid for popularity with his countrymen.

Cornwallis was by no means a great man, nor his character above suspicion. Sir Philip Francis,

as writer of the *Letters of Junius*, wrote as far back as 1770, crediting Cornwallis with the intention of 'retiring into voluntary banishment in the hope of recovering some of his reputation.' Coming to the time of the American War of Independence, we find that his reputation was utterly blasted, because of his failure to rivet the chain of slavery round the necks of the colonists of America. The King of England and his Prime Minister, Mr. Pitt, agreed to expose him to the world 'as an object of contempt and ridicule.'*

However, the ministry wanted to give him a 'chance'. The ministry, at the head of which was Mr. Pitt, were crest-fallen on the loss of their American colonies. To compensate for this loss, they were dreaming of founding an Indian Empire. To realize their dream, they gave the chance to that very man who was instrumental in losing the colonies in America. So in the beginning of 1786, he was appointed Governor-General of India; he sailed in May and landed in Calcutta in September of the same year.

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*Cornwallis was a drunkard. Lecky in his History of England (Cabinet Edition, Vol. VII, pp. 197) writes:—

"Horace Walpole describes a violent quarrel at the opera, which was due to Lord Cornwallis and Lord Allan having come in drunk and insulted Mr. Rigby in the pit."

It is necessary here to mention that Cornwallis was a native of Ireland by nationality. The Irish question of our own time was also the burning question of the day in the time of Cornwallis. The Irish landlords were as cruel and tyrannical to their tenants as their later descendants. Their acts of tyranny and cruelty led to the depopulation of many a "Sweet Auburn" in Ireland. Evictments of tenants were of almost daily occurrence, for no love was ever lost between the Irish landlords and their tenants. The above facts, viz., Cornwallis' surrender to Washington, and his being an Irishman, should be borne in mind, for they help us in understanding the measures which he pursued during his administration as Governor-General of India.

When Cornwallis assumed the reins of Indian Government, he found an empty treasury, and the portion of India under the administration of the East India Company poverty-stricken, for people had ceased cultivation and famine had rendered desolate many a smiling village and town. If the lesser India under the British was in such a pitful plight, the greater India under her native sovereigns was still prosperous, for internecine wars and strifes were not so destructive of men and their domestic beasts of burden and agriculture as systematic maladministration. The Greater India then was under the sovereignty of the Marathas and the Viceroys of

the Deccan and Lucknow, and of Tipu Sultan. In Cornwallis' time, the name of Tipu was a name of terror to every native of Great Britain. A minister of the Christian faith has recorded that "Tipu was a sort of Eastern 'Boney' ; English mothers scared their naughty children with his name."*

So Cornwallis thought when he came out to India, that he would retrieve his reputation if he could defeat Tipu. The Anglo-Indians were smarting under the humiliation which some of their countrymen had suffered at the hands of Tipu and his father Haidar. The defeats which Haidar had inflicted on the English were rankling in their breasts. Here was then an opportunity for Cornwallis to make a name and earn a niche in the temple of fame. And he eagerly seized it.

Before we describe the manner in which he violated the engagements which the British Government had solemnly entered into with Tipu, it will be necessary to refer to his transactions with the other Muhammadan States. The Mughal Emperor was still the nominal suzerain of the whole of India. The English were, in theory, his subjects and as such they were bound to pay him their tribute. But they showed their loyalty by usurping his authority. Up to the time of Warren

*Revd. W. H. Hutton's *Marquess of Wellesley*, p. 32.

Hastings, the British used to pay their annual tribute for holding the Dewany of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. But it is well-known how that crafty man came to an understanding with Madhava Rao Scindhia and handed over the aged Delhi Emperor to that Maratha Chief and thus discontinued paying any longer the usual dues to the Mughal Emperor. During the reign of Cornwallis, Madhava Rao Scindhia, as guardian of the Delhi Emperor, demanded the customary tribute from the English. But Cornwallis possessed such fine sense of justice and honour that he refused to pay it. The understanding at which the Maratha Chief had arrived with the British and which ultimately proved the ruin of the supremacy of his dynasty in India, prevented him from firmly pressing the just claim of the Mughal Emperor.

With the Nabob of Oudh, Cornwallis behaved in a manner which does not reflect much credit on his sense of justice and honor. That Muhammadan prince had been burdened with troops whose services he did not require. The maintenance of these troops led by European officers was a great drain on the resources of the Oudh Nabob. He entreated Cornwallis to withdraw the troops agreeably to the contract with Mr. Hastings. But the Governor-General turned a deaf ear to all his entreaties. In the words of the historian, Mr. Mill, Cornwallis

"described the character of the Nabob as a pure compound of negligence and profusion. And though, at that time, Oudh was threatened with no particular danger, and the expense attending the continuance of the brigade at Futtyghur exceeded the sum which he was entitled to exact of the Nabob, he adhered to the resolution that the troops should not be removed." (Vol. V. p. 222).

Cornwallis' treatment of the Nizam does not raise his character in our estimation. On the eve of his departure from England for assuming the Government of India, Cornwallis was instructed by the Directors of the Company to demand from the Nizam the surrender of the Circar of Guntoor. Cornwallis did not demand the surrender in a straightforward manner. But he waited like the sly fox in watch for his prey. He was afraid lest his demand for the surrender of the Circar might drive the Nizam into the arms of Tipu. But when he realized how helpless the Nizam's position was, he set about demanding the surrender. For this purpose, he despatched a British officer to the Court of the Nizam. The name of this officer was Captain Kennaway. The manner in which the execution of the demand was planned, has been very graphically described by Mr. Mill. He writes:—

"No intimation was to be given to the Nizam of the proposed demand, till after the arrival of Captain Kennaway at his Court * * * The Government of Madras, under specious pretences, conveyed a bod[y] of troops to the

neighbourhood of the Circar; and held themselves in readiness to seize the territory before any other power could interpose, either with arms or remonstrance." (*Ibid.* p. 225).

But the Nizam did not raise any serious objections to the surrender of the Circar to the Christian merchants. This disloyal and usurping Viceroy of the Moghul Emperor was only too eager to purchase the friendship of the English at any cost. Perfectly devoid of pride and self-respect, as well as of honesty, the Nizam had by every possible means succeeded in climbing the ladder rung by rung, and invariably as he had climbed he had kicked down the rungs to which he owed his elevation. So it is not to be surprised at, that without a show of resistance even, the Nizam surrendered to the British the Guntoor Circar.

Having gained what he wanted from the Nizam, Cornwallis now thought that the time had arrived to cross blades with Tipu. To go to war with that Muhammadan sovereign without any apparent cause, would have been a gross violation of the Acts of Parliament. So the Governor-General adopted measures calculated to provoke Tipu Sultan to hostilities. He did not stop to consider the righteousness of his acts. But this would have been foreign to his purpose, inclined as he was to retrieve his reputation which had been blasted by the surrender of the American Colonies to Washington. Cornwallis

deliberately violated the Treaty which had been concluded with Tipoo in 1784. He professed the continued existence of the old Treaty of 1768 and to satisfy the demands of his new ally, the Nizam, he limited the meaning of the clause in the Treaty which stipulated the lending of the English troops to the Nizam, by saying that the Nizam should not employ the troops lent to him against the Company's allies, among whom were enumerated the Maratha Chiefs, the Nabobs of Oudh and Arcot, and the Raja of Travancore and Tanjore. The name of Tipu was deliberately omitted.

Regarding this measure of Lord Cornwallis, even his great admirer, Sir John Malcolm, is obliged to write as follows:—

"The desire of not offending against the letter of the Act of Parliament, would appear on this occasion to have led to a trespass on its spirit. Two treaties had been concluded, subsequently to the treaty of 1768, between Haidar Ali Khan and the British Government: and the latter State had concluded a treaty of peace with his son Tippoo Sultan in 1784; by which it had fully recognised his right of sovereignty to the territories which he possessed. And assuredly under such circumstances, the revival with any modification of an offensive alliance (for such the treaty of 1768 undoubtedly was) could not but alarm that prince."

"Nor was that alarm likely to be dispelled, by that qualification in the engagement wich provided that no immediate operation should be undertaken against his dominions, as the expression by which that qualification

was followed, showed, that the eventual execution of those articles, which went to divest him of his territories, was not deemed an improbable, or at least an impossible occurrence, by the contracting powers. Another part of this engagement which appeared calculated to excite apprehension in the mind of Tippoo was, the stipulation which regarded the employment of the subsidiary force granted to the Nizam; which was made discretional with the exception of not acting against some specified Princes and Chiefs, among whom he was not included.

"That such ideas were entertained by Tippoo, from the moment he heard of the conclusion of this engagement, there can not be a doubt. It would, indeed, appear by a letter from the Resident at Poona that the minister of that Court, considered this engagement *as one of an offensive nature*, against Tippoo Sultaun. * *The liberal construction of the restrictions of the act of Parliament had, upon this occasion, the effect of making the Governor-General pursue a course, which was, perhaps, not only questionable in point of faith, but which must have been more offensive to Tippoo Sultaun, and more calculated to produce a war with that Prince, than the avowed contract of a defensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition."*

Another officer, named Colonel Wilks, thus wrote regarding Cornwallis' conduct in these transactions :—

"It is highly instructive to observe a statesman, justly extolled for moderate and pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law, enacted for the enforcement of these virtues,

* Malcolm's Sketch of a Political History of India, pp. 68-69, (of the Second Edition).

by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance." (Historical Sketches, iii. 38).

All that could be said in favour of this treacherous conduct of Cornwallis towards Tippo, is that he found the other Powers of Southern India willing to assist him in annihilating the Mysore upstart. The Marathas and the Nizam had good reasons to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Tippoo. That Muhammadan Prince was bent on pursuing a career of conquest. He did not respect the engagements he had entered into with the Marathas and the Nizam. So it was no wonder that they were turned into his bitter enemies. The wars which they had made on him and in which he was worsted, were all his doing. It is a remarkable fact that the English then did not come to the assistance of their allies, the Mahrattas and the Nizam. But with great promptness Cornwallis swooped down on Tippoo when the latter, it is alleged, merely intended attacking Travancore, an ally of the ruling company of merchants. It need hardly be added that Cornwallis would have suffered the swallowing up of Travancore and he would not have raised his little finger to save his ally the Hindu Raja of Travancore, had he not considered that defeating Tippoo would retrieve his reputation and had he not also been promised assistance by the Marathas and the Nizam in attacking Tippoo. It was not out of any love for the

Travancore prince or any regard for the just cause of a weak ally that the Governor-General violated a solemn treaty.

Cornwallis was guilty of 'bad faith' towards Tippoo and disobedience of the orders of his employers, the British Parliament. When Haidar's death occurred in 1782, the war in which he was then engaged against the English had not been concluded. Tippoo had to carry on that war; and he managed the whole affair in a manner which reflected great credit on his generalship. The English were compelled to sue for peace and had to cringe before Tippoo. Regarding this, the historian Mr. Mill writes:—

"The injuries which the English had sustained, since Tippoo had joined in the business of negotiation, were such, as in a prouder state of the English mind, would have appeared to call for signal retribution. But the debility and dejection to which their countrymen were now reduced, and the despair of resources to continue the war, impressed the negotiators with a very unusual admiration of the advantages of peace; and meeting the crafty and deceitful practices of Tippoo with temper and perseverance, they succeeded, on the 11th of March 1784, in gaining his signature to a treaty, by which, on the general condition of a mutual restitution of conquests, peace was obtained." (Vol iv. p. 222).

By this Treaty, known as the Treaty of Mangalore, Tippoo was recognised by the English as

one of their allies. But Cornwallis did not treat him as such. Hence he was guilty of 'bad faith'. As said above, Tippoo was made to believe that the English meant hostilities against him, because he was not mentioned as one of their allies. Again, the military preparations which were going on in the territories then under the administration of the English left no doubt in his mind, that their intentions were any thing but friendly towards him. Grant Duff writes:—

"In September 1786, Lord Cornwallis, having assumed charge of the Supreme Government, addressed letters to the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, in which, although he expressly intimated his determination to take no part in the war between the confederates and Tippoo Sultaun, yet the state of military efficiency in which it became the immediate care of the new Governor-General to place all the presidencies, occasioned a bustle and apparent preparation, which seem to have convinced Tippoo that the designs of the English were decidedly hostile; and may afford some reason for that rancorous hostility which led him to persevere in schemes for annihilating the power of the British nation in India. The appointment of a resident at the Peishwa's court was a cause of alarm to Tippoo." (p. 472).

Cornwallis did nothing to remove or explain away the causes of Tippoo's alarm. On the contrary, he did everything calculated to make Tippoo believe that the English wanted to wipe off the disgrace which he and his father had inflicted on them. They circu-

lated wild stories regarding Tippoo's cruelties and barbarities. In his wars and conquests, Tippoo, like all other conquerors who preceded or have followed him, was unscrupulous as to the means which he employed in gaining his ends. But it may be doubted whether he was so cruel as his contemporary Christian rulers were. He never ill-treated his subjects. The land over which he ruled presented a scene of prosperity which was not to be met with in the British India of those days. But Tippoo was harsh if not exactly cruel to his enemies and his Christian prisoners of war. For this Europeans at least should not blame Tippoo. They should remember that it was one of the most pious European sovereigns who in the very last year of the highly civilized nineteenth century enjoined his soldiers not to give any quarter to the Chinese prisoners of war, and even invoked the blessings of God for the success of his soldiers in this task of bloodshed and rapine. They should also remember that it was a European general who did not show any mercy to the wounded and dying Dervishes in Sudan and who did not scruple to desecrate the tomb of one whom millions of people revered as their prophet. The incidents of the Balkan wars, too, are still fresh in men's memories. Compared to these cruelties and barbarities, those of Tippoo dwindle into insignificance. Whenever Europeans speak ill of others, they should be reminded of the great philoso-

pher Schopenheur's saying that "it is generally the old story of the dog barking at its own image ; it is himself that he sees and not another dog, as he fancies."

The immediate cause which led the Governor-General to declare hostilities against Tippoo was the allegation that the latter had been meditating an attack on the Raja of Travancore, an ally of the East India Company. It is not necessary to enter into the long-standing disputes between Tippoo and the Travancore State. It is of little consequence whether Tippoo was aggressive or the Travancore Raja had a grievance against the Mysore usurper. But from all accounts it appears that there was no desire on the part of Tippoo to go to war with the English. As said before, Cornwallis was determined to find a pretext to make war on him. And for this purpose, he had been making every preparation since his arrival in India.* He even did not scruple to set at defiance

*From the correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, edited with notes by Charles Ross, there is hardly left any ground for doubt about this point. The Marathas had been promised by the predecessor of Cornwallis an offer of aid against Tippoo. A few days after his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Cornwallis in a minute wrote :—

"That the offer, through our Resident at Poona, to grant an assistance of troops from Bombay to the Peshwa, proceeded from the warmest anxiety for the public good, I

the act of Parliament which imposed on the British Government the necessity of not interfering with the affairs of the native states of India. The system of

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am firmly persuaded; but I am clearly of opinion, that if performed, it would amount to a direct breach of the late treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultaun, in the first article of which, the contracting parties engage that they will not directly 'or indirectly assist the enemies of each other;' and it would be no less acting in defiance of the Act of 24th George III. I cannot consider the French, or any other intrigues that we know of, as in any degree approaching to the spirit of the above exception."

Yet the noble Lord, shortly afterwards, considered that it would not "amount to a direct breach of the late treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultan" to deliberately omit his name from the list of the Company's allies! He could not go at once to war with Tippoo, because the Company's finances did not permit him to do so. This will be evident from his letter marked 'Private' to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, dated Calcutta, March 5, 1787, in which he wrote:—"I am perfectly sensible of the importance of Tellicherry in case of a war with Tippoo, but the stationing a large force there, and the erecting considerable new works, would be necessary to give it security and importance. In the present state of our finances, nothing but the appearance of an emergency could induce me to think of either; for the constant drain of pay for the troops, and particularly the engineer's bills for the works, would totally demolish the effects of all my labours and economy in this country."

But such was his consistency that he wrote from Futtyghur on Oct. 15, 1787 to Sir John Shore to make

neutrality was required of the Indian Government. But Cornwallis, to retrieve his blasted reputation, took no notice of that Parliamentary act. According to him, the system of neutrality had "been attended

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necessary preparations for a war with Tippoo. His own words are:—"I most perfectly approve of your having resolved to support the declaration of the Madras Government and of its being our determination to protect the Rajah of Travancore as one of our allies. * * * We must no doubt make every preparation in our power to furnish supplies of men, money, or for carrying on the war (if we should be forced into it) with the greatest vigour; * * * It is impossible to enter into particulars, until we are acquinted with the manner in which Tippoo means to carry his designs into execution." That is to say, without knowing the intentions of Tippoo and without giving that Prince a chance to explain the authenticity or otherwise of the rumours that had been spread regarding his alleged invasion of the Raja of Travancore's dominion, Cornwallis ordered to "make every preparation for carrying on the war." The subsequent acts of Lord Cornwallis amply prove that he was fully determined to cross blades with Tippoo. He sent a British officer to Nagpore for the purpse of asking the Marathas to join him against Tippoo. For this purpose, one Mr. George Forster was selected. Writing to his protege from Cawnpore on October 23, 1787, Lord Cornwallis directed him to proceed to the Court of Modajee Bhosla, the acting chief of the Berar Government, to spy out the strength &c., of that State and also to incite the Maratha chiefs to combine with Cornwallis against Tippoo. At that time the Marathas were not soliciting the aid of the British

with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, without having previously received the assistance of efficient allies."*

He now invited the Marathas and the Nizam to a defensive alliance against Tippoo. Advantages were held out to these Powers; they were told that they would share with the British Government the

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against Tippoo. They were almost on terms of peace with that Muhammadan Prince. Hence Cornwallis wrote:—"If the Marathas have engaged or resolved to keep peace with Tippoo, it is not probable that our solicitations would induce them to depart immediately from that plan." Mr. Forster was therefore instructed to spare no pains to incite the Marathas "to form a close connexion and alliance against Tippoo as a common enemy."

To Mr. Malet, the Resident at Poona, Lord Cornwallis wrote on March 10, 1788:—"I look upon a rupture with Tippoo as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with France, and in that event a vigorous co-operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our interests in this country."

Here the Governor-General throws off his disguise; here there is no allusion to the alleged aggression on the part of Tippoo against the Raja of Travancore's territories. From perusing all these letters written by Lord Cornwallis, no one can help concluding that he had fully resolved to go to war with Tippoo and was merely seeking for a pretext to make the people believe that the war was a just one.

* Despatch to Mr. Malet, 28th February, 1790.

territorial conquests wrung from Tippoo. Accordingly when this triple alliance was formed, then Cornwallis thought that the time had come to declare war against Tippoo. A pretext was found. It was alleged that he contemplated attacking the Raja of Travancore.

It is necessary here to state that the Government of Madras were averse to the war. Cornwallis never consulted that Government as to the propriety or necessity of going to war against Tippoo. That Government was in a position to know Tippoo's intentions better than Cornwallis. Mr. Holland, who was made to retire from the Governorship of Madras, declared in his last letter to Cornwallis, that Tippoo "had no intention to break with the Company and would be disposed to enter into negotiation for the adjustment of the points in dispute." But Mr. Holland was superseded by General Medows, who was a fire-brand like Cornwallis himself. He proved an admirable tool in Cornwallis' hands.

Tippoo himself had no intention to wage war against the English or the Raja of Travancore. Colonel Wilks writes that Tippoo "was unprepared for war." Tippoo himself gave assurance that his affections were pacific, and that he had no intention to invade the ancient territories of Travancore. He even went so far as to write to the Madras Government suggesting to amicably settle the matters by

envoys on both sides, and asking for a safe conduct for his own ambassador. But neither Lord Cornwallis nor the newly appointed Governor of Madras, named General Medows, had the remotest intention of living on peaceful terms with Tippoo. They knew that Tippoo was unprepared for war and so Cornwallis wrote to the Madras Governor that—

"Good policy, as well as a regard to our reputation in this country, requires, that we should not only exact severe reparation from Tippoo, but also, that, *we should take this opportunity to reduce the power of a Prince, who avows upon every occasion so rancorous an enmity to our nation.*— At present we have every prospect of aid from the country powers, whilst he can expect no assistance from France. And if he is suffered to retain his present importance, * * until the French are again in a condition to support him, it would almost certainly leave the seeds of a future dangerous war." (Mill. V. p. 243).

From the sentence which we have italicised above, it is clear that the war which Cornwallis declared against Tippoo was an unjust and unjustifiable one. General Medows, the Governor of Madras, wrote an insulting letter to Tippoo in reply to the latter's request for amicably settling the disputes between him and the British. General Medows who professed at least to be a Christian and as such was in the habit of praying day after day for the kingdom of heaven to come on earth, or in other words, prayed that there might be peace and goodwill

amongst men, was only too ready and willing to plunge the country into all the horrors of war. He did not want peace but war. Tippoo offered to send a person of dignity to Madras to give and receive explanations on the subjects of dispute, and "remove the dust by which the upright mind of the General had been obscured." But the Christian General wrote:—

"I received yours, and understand its contents. You are a great Prince, and, but for your cruelty to your prisoners, I should add an enlightened one. The English, equally incapable of offering an insult, as of submitting to one, have always looked upon war as declared, from the moment you attacked their ally, the king of Travancore. God does not always give the battle to the strong, nor the race to the swift, but generally success to those whose cause is just.—Upon this we depend." (*Ibid.* p. 245).

In this letter the Christian General did not strike any note to peacefully settle the subjects of dispute. He insulted Tippoo. How different was the conduct of the Company's servants now from that of 1784, when they cringed before Tippoo to show mercy to them and submitted to be dictated to as to the terms of the Treaty of Mangalore!

The die was now cast. Tippoo had not to fight the British alone, but also their allies, the Marhattas and the Nizam. The Governor-General of India, Lord Cornwallis, was desirous of leading the troops in person against Tippoo. But when he found

General Medows nearer the seat of war, he delegated the command of troops to that officer, who, however, was no match for Tippoo in generalship, for he out-manouvered and out-generalled him. This success over the Christian General added another feather to the cap of the Muhammadan ruler of Mysore.

When affairs had taken such a gloomy turn, then Cornwallis thought it proper that he himself should take the field against Tippoo. So Cornwallis, who had arrived at Madras on the 12th December, 1790, assumed personally the command of the army and directed General Medows to return to the Presidency. It need hardly be said that with the assistance of his allies, and the large army which he had at his command, Cornwallis had no difficulty in defeating Tippoo, who, as said before, was not prepared for the war. Bangalore was taken by assault and in its capture, cruelties and barbarities were, under the direction of Cornwallis, practised on the inmates of the town. Mr. Mill writes that "the fury which almost always animates soldiers in a storm, when their own safety depends upon the terror they inspire, led to a deplorable carnage."

After capturing Bangalore, Cornwallis made every preparation for the reduction of Seringapatam, which was Tippoo's capital. That unfortunate Prince was all the time making overtures for peace. But his overtures met with no success. His letters

were not attended to by the Governor-General, who also declined receiving an ambassador from Tippoo. When Cornwallis' army was in view of Seringapatam, Tippoo sent a present of fruit which the Governor-General returned untouched. Referring to this incident Colonel Wilks, the historian of the Mysore Campaign, writes:—

"It will be difficult for the reader to conceive the intense delight with which, on the ensuing morning, the whole army beheld the loads of fruit untouched, and the camel unaccepted, returing to Seringapatam."

Mr. Mill truly observes that—

"the fact is, that the English in India, at that time, had been worked up into a mixture of fury and rage against Tippoo, more resembling the passion of savages against their enemy, * * than the feelings with which a civilized nation regards the worst of its foes." (Vol. V. p. 278).

Even after receiving all these slights and insults, Tippoo again tried to open negotiations for peace with Cornwallis. That Prince was obliged to sue for peace, because there were traitors in his camp. The treachery was the result of the short-sighted policy of his father and himself in employing European mercenaries and appointing them to all high posts of trust and honor. These mercenaries considered it meritorious to desert their master whose salt they had eaten so long, at a very critical time. Although it is not on record, there is reason to

suspect that Cornwallis bought over these mercenaries. When Wellesley declared war against the Màrathas, he spent money like water to bribe and seduce the European officers in the employ of the Maratha Princes, especially of Scindia. He bought them over and they deserted their employers and also betrayed them. Cornwallis must have done the same, although it seems to us, that he never had the courage to acknowledge it. On no other supposition can we account for the readiness with which the European employees of Tippoo deserted him. Mr. Thornton in his History of British India writes:—

"A number of Europèans, principally Frenchmen, who had long served him (Tippoo) and his father, took the opportunity of quitting a service of which they were weary. Among them was a man named Blevette, whose departure was a serious loss to the Sultan, as he possessed considerable skill in fortification. * * * Tippoo's European servants were now quite as ready to exercise their skill and knowledge for his destruction as they had previously been assiduous in using them for his defence."

Owing to the helpless position to which he was reduced, Tippoo had to sue for peace. He sent a Vakil to Cornwallis, who consented to receive him at the warm instances of the Mahratta allies. But the messenger was sent back to his master, without being permitted to enter Cornwallis' camp, because he declined to treat with an agent. At the rejection

of Tippoo's overture for peace, the British were delighted. Mr. Mill writes:

"It is another among the many proofs of a most remarkable fact, that whole masses of men are capable of desiring the death of thousands of their fellow-creatures, at once, simply for their own profit. Had the negotiation proceeded, and been productive of peace, it might have been supposed, by an army which had confidence in Lord Cornwallis, that the peace, which he deliberately approved, was better for their country than war. *Better for their Country.*—Yes. But not better, for them, because it precluded the acquisition of plunder, promotion, and glory." (Vol. V. p. 284).

So the war proceeded for many months longer. At last Seringapatam was besieged. Tippoo again opened negotiations for peace. This time, at the intercession of his Maratha allies, Cornwallis was obliged to accede to Tippoo's overtures. It was the interest of the Marathas to curb Tippoo's power, but not altogether to annihilate him. At that time the Maratha affairs were being managed by that talented statesman, Nana Fadnavis. He knew how grasping the Europeans were. It was no secret to him that the English were doing everything in their power to found an empire in India. As was to be expected of him, he would not consent to extirpate Tippoo altogether. It was his influence which gave a fresh lease of a few years more to Tippoo's sovereignty. The intervention of the Mahrattas in preventing the extirpation of Tippoo at this time was fortunate for

the lawful Raja of Mysore. Haidar Ali was an usurper and his son Tippoo was no better. Had Cornwallis succeeded in reducing Seringapatam and imprisoning or slaying Tippoo, the whole of the Mysore territory would have passed into the hands of the British, for it does not appear that Cornwallis ever troubled himself about the rightful sovereign of the Mysore State, who was then a prisoner of Tippoo's. There would not have then arisen that Native State of Mysore which is now looked upon as a model State in India and is held up even to the British Government of India for imitation.

After considerable discussion, the treaty of peace was signed by Tippoo and Cornwallis as well as the allies. That unfortunate Prince was made to cede half the territory which he possessed before the war, to pay three crores and thirty thousand rupees, and to deliver two of his sons as hostages for the due performance of the conditions. This Treaty was signed on the 23rd February, 1792. The ceded territory was divided between the East India Company, the Mahrattas and the Nizam.

It was Cornwallis who could boast that for the first time, the British had obtained territory in India by conquest ; for, not an inch of land which they possessed in India previous to the war with Tippoo, had been obtained by conquest. From the time of Clive all the acquisitions of land by the East India

Company in India were by means of diplomacy, fraud and usurpation. Cornwallis was the first Englishman to obtain land in India by conquest. England also came to his assistance by giving a loan of several thousands of pounds sterling to carry on the unjust war against Tippoo. The English ministry gave every support in their power to Cornwallis in his aggressive policy. From all these facts, can it be doubted for a moment that they were bent on founding an empire in India to compensate for the loss of America?

There were a few members in the British Parliament who protested against the war. Mr. Hippesly, Mr. Philip Francis and Mr. Fox, with their usual eloquence and mastery over facts, raised their voice against Cornwallis' aggressive measures. The first-named member of Parliament had called in question the justice and policy of the war, affirmed that the Raja of Travancore was the aggressor, and complained that though the war was ostensibly undertaken on account of the alleged attack on Travancore, the Raja was not mentioned. Cornwallis' alliance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam was denounced by Mr. Fox as a plundering confedency for the purpose of extirpating a lawful Prince. He said, that when the progress of civilization had rendered men ashamed of offensive alliances in Europe, the Christ-

ians had signalized their virtue by reviving them in India.

But all these protests were in vain. The Ministry resolved to send out to India more regiments to assist Cornwallis and gave him a loan of £500,000 in specie. They deliberately violated the Act of Parliament which had been passed in 1784. It was their duty to scrupulously watch that their representatives in India did not infringe any of the provisions of that Act. But their conduct encouraged every Governor-General of India to treat that Act with contempt. Mr. Mill truly observes that—

"Sir John Malcolm, whose loyalty offends not commonly on the score of weakness, seems to regard it as one of the principal advantages of the war, that it displayed Lord Cornwallis' contempt for the act of Parliament. 'The policy' (says that writer, Sketch of the Political History of India, p. 94), 'of Lord Cornwallis was neither directed to obtain a delay of hostilities, nor limited to the object of repelling the immediate danger, with which the State over whose councils he presided was threatened': That is to say, it was not confined to the express object to which he was limited by act of Parliament. When fully satisfied of the designs of Tippoo, he hastened to attack him; he saw the great advantages which were likely to result from early offensive operations; and the moment he resolved on war, he contemplated (as appears from the whole tenour of his correspondence previous to the commencement of hostilities) the increase of the Company's territories in the quarters of the Carnatic and Malabar, as a desirable object of policy.

The grand object, indeed, of Sir John's intelligent work, is to point out the impolicy of the restricting act of Parliament, to demonstrate that the mst eminent of the Indian Governors, Mr. Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and Lord Wellesly, have treated it with uninterrupted contempt; and received applause for every successful violation of it." (*Ibid.* p. 327 f n).

Cornwallis was guilty of waging this unjust war in violation of the declared sense and enactments of Parliament. But he did not stop to consider that. The successful termination of the war retrieved his reputation.

Cornwallis further heightened his reputation by attacking all the French possessions in India. He was ambitious of obtaining the honor of extirpating the republicans, and he succeeded in adding the whole of the French settlements to the English possessions. This was done in 1793 on the eve of his departure from India.

Cornwallis was hankering after military glory, because he knew that that alone would set him right in the eyes of the inhabitants of Great Britain, enraged as they had been against him for surrendering America to the rebels. It was, therefore, that he was so anxious to wage war against Tippoo and extirpate the French in India.

Cornwallis as a civil ruler does not merit that admiration which writers on Indian History have

bestowed on him. His governing idea in the administration of India was to have India, not for Indians, but for England. To do this effectively, he adopted means calculated to demoralize the Indian people. He succeeded in establishing the British supremacy in India. Neither Clive nor Warren Hastings went the length which Cornwallis did, in permanently excluding the children of the Indian soil from all high offices of trust and responsibility, not only in the military but in the civil government of their country.

The Indian Princes were seeking the aid of trained European soldiers and officers to fight their battles. It was impossible, under the circumstances, to appoint Indians to high military posts. But Indians were well qualified to hold all the high posts in the civil government of their country. The states under the rule of Indian Princes presented a scene of prosperity which one would have looked for in vain in the territories owning the rule of the British. But Lord Cornwallis thought otherwise. He found his Christian countrymen in high offices of trust and responsibility corrupt and incompetent. The Christian Civil Servants of India in Cornwallis' time were a disgrace to any government. Lord Cornwallis saw this and he tried to remedy the evil in a way for which Indians should execrate his memory. In order to elevate the moral tone of his compatriots in

the public services of India, he resolved firstly to enhance their salary, as if the emoluments which they were at that time in receipt of, were not adequate to the services they performed, and secondly to exclude Indians from all high offices altogether. His measures stirred up in the breasts of his countrymen in India a spirit of hatred to, and contempt for, the natives of the country, and marked the line between the two peoples which it had not been the policy of Clive or Warren Hastings to accentuate. "Power is sweet," and he tried to have a monopoly of all that power in the hands of his own countrymen, and thus to reduce the children of the soil to the condition of 'hewers of wood and drawers of water.' From the effects of Cornwallis' so-called reforms of the public services India is still suffering. No British statesman or administrator has been as yet found strong enough to completely undo the mischief which Cornwallis committed.*

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* Kaye in his "Administration of the East India Company" writes :—

"And as the character of the English gentlemen as administrators continued to improve, the debasement of the natives of India became more complete. During the first quarter of the present (19th) century they continued in a state of dreary stagnation. There was no awakening of the faculties—no sign of progress within or without. There was nothing surprising in this. The intelligence of the people

He also changed the machinery for the administration of law and justice in India. His so-called

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of India had, for many years, been held in small esteem by their rulers; and they were not likely to rise much above the level which had been practically assigned to them by those who shaped the destinies of the nation. Our system, indeed, had been one of depression. Under the administration of Lord Cornwallis * * all the higher offices of the state had been conferred on European gentlemen—the Covenanted Civil Service of the Company. The practice thus instituted had been followed by subsequent administrators; and the official condition of the natives, in course of time, had rather deteriorated than improved. In fact, it was not only that the highest offices were conferred on the Europeans, but that none but the lowest were bestowed upon the natives. There may have been, in 1790, some wisdom in this. Perhaps it was not so much that Cornwallis and his advisers mistrusted the native, as that they mistrusted the European functionaries. Cornwallis found his higher European agency, not in the state which had roused the energies of Clive to the great work of 'cleansing the Augaen stable,' but very far removed from the purity and efficiency which it has attained in the present day. He saw, doubtless, that the native functionary in the hands of his European colleague, or superior, might become a very mischievous tool—a ready-made instrument of extortion—and he determined, therefore, not to mix up the two agencies so perilously together. It is probable that, at that time, many of the higher European judicial functionaries would have exerted themselves to secure the appointment of their own tools to offices immediately beneath them, and by throwing upon the native judges the actual duty

judicial reforms did not do any good to this country. The people became litigious, which they were not before. The mode of administration of law and justice which he introduced, was quite foreign to the

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of deciding cases in which their patrons were interested, work the mine of corruption beneath the soil, and so cover the worst abuses. The native agent in such a case never betrays his employer; so the European functionary would have been secure. It may not, therefore, I say, have been mistrust of the natives, so much as mistrust of the Europeans, which deterred Cornwallis and his advisers from mixing up the two agencies in the general administration of the country." Pp. 419–421.

Of course this is all special pleading of Kaye in defence of Cornwallis' conduct. But the defence is very poor and disingenuous. "When Lord Cornwallis was Governor of India, the Prince of Wales, then virtually king of England, for the king was "verging upon insanity," wrote to the former to displace "a black named Alie Cann", who was Chief Criminal Judge of Benares, in order that a youth named Pellegrine Treves might be appointed to that office. This Treves was the son of a notorious money-lender to whom H. R. H. owed money. (*Vide* Cornwallis' Papers). Lord Cornwallis had obliged the Prince oftentimes before in this way, but in this instance he could not do it. He replied, therefore, that Ali Ibrahim Khan (who was the "black Alie Cann" of the Prince), though a native, was "one of the most able and respected of public servants in India", while Treves was young and inexperienced and his appointment to such an important post, of the duties of which he had no knowledge, would only create ridicule, &c."

genius and taste of the people. Had he taken advantage of the existing village communities and their Punchayats, he would have done everlasting good to the people of India. But Cornwallis was determined to transplant everything European, foreign and alien, into India and thus to make India the happy hunting ground for the failures in their native country of England. Regarding these so-called judicial reforms, Mr. Mill truly observes:—

"For courts of law, provided for a people, among whom justice had always been distributed in the method of simple and rational inquiry, was prescribed a course of procedure, loaded with minute formalities; rendered unintelligible, tedious and expensive, by technical devices. Of the intricacy and obscurity thus intentionally created, one effect was immediately seen; that the candidates for justice could no longer plead their own causes; that no one could undertake to present a cause to the mind of the judge according to the nicety of the prescribed and intricate forms, unless he belonged to a class of men who made it their trade to remember and observe them. The necessity of an establishment of hired advocates, * * was therefore acknowledged. * * From this, one inconvenience immediately flowed; * * that the class of causes which is infinitely the most important of all, could not fail to be treated with comparative neglect, and to sustain a proportionate failure of justice." (V. 355).

If the people of India have become litigious and perjury is common in Indian Courts, it is not because the Indians are naturally so, but because the circumstances which Cornwallis introduced into the country

for the benefit of his co-religionists and compatriots, have demoralized Indians. Regarding the prevalence of lying and perjury in India, the late Mr. Justice Dwarkanath Mitter, an abler, more conscientious and more learned judge than whom has never sat on the Bench of any High Court of this country, wrote :—

"Prejury and forgery have increased to an awful extent * * The usual explanation of course is that the Indian is too black to be honest, as if the vices above referred to were indigenous to the soil of this country alone. One need not however go very far to ascertain the true cause of this deplorable state of things. The introduction of a judicial system altogether unsuited to the requirements of the people, the general incompetency of the judicial functionaries, most of whom are totally ignorant of the manners, customs and languages of the people, and an undue haste to dispose of cases without sufficient deliberation are quite sufficient to account for it, without attributing any peculiar depravity to the national character. * * * People will forge and perjure themselves so long as they find it their interest to do so.".

The well-known English Positivist Mr. S. Lobb, a late learned Principal of the Kishnaghur College, in writing to the above-named Indian Judge, said :—

"Look at our miserable legal system. Can anything be conceived more thoroughly immoral than the system of Western Advocacy which we are doing our best to introduce into this country? I ask you as one conversant with these matters, are not our law-courts hot-beds of corruption, and is not the love of litigation contaminating and thoroughly perverting the national mind? Why not let the

people settle their own disputes as far as possible? If we simply keep the peace and develop the wealth of the country in a quiet way, it ought to be enough."

If the people of India have become fond of litigation, and turned perjurers and forgerers, it is the judicial machinery set up in this country by Cornwallis which should be blamed for these results.

Cornwallis was very inconsistent in his so-called judicial reforms. All the judicial procedures which he introduced were meant for the people, and not the government of the country. Mr. Mill writes:—

"The Government had established courts of law, and appointed for them a numerous list of forms through which it required much time to pass. In their own case, however, it would, they perceived, be highly desirable to obtain speedy justice. To obtain speedy justice, they saw, it would be absolutely necessary to be exempted from technical forms. To what expedient then had they recourse? To the abolition of technical forms? No indeed! They made a particular exception of their own case. They enacted that in all suits for rent or revenue, the courts should proceed by summary process; nay, further, that in such suits the proceedings should be exempted from those fees and expenses to which other candidates for justice were appointed to submit. By a high and conspicuous act, more expressive than words, they declared that one thing was conducive, or rather essential, to justice. They established, by their legislative authority, the very reverse. On what conceivable principle, was speedy and inexpensive justice good for the government, and not good for the people? From which of its imaginary evils was it exempt in the case of the

government, and not equally so in the case of the people?" (*Ibid*, p. 366).

It will take too much space to mention all the evil results which followed Lord Cornwallis' Judicial Reforms. Mr. Mill has devoted several closely printed pages of his excellent History to the description of the evil results of Cornwallis' so-called Judicial Reforms. The Editor of his History, Prof. Horace Hayman Wilson, who was a bureaucratic Anglo-Indian of Sir Lepel Griffin's type and as such believed that the English Government stood in the relation of Providence to the people of India, has not appended any notes of dissent to Mr. Mill's just observations.

It is very commonly asserted that anarchy was reigning supreme in India when the English acquired it. Whether that is true or not is not the question for our consideration now. But it is an historical fact that Lord Cornwallis was to blame for the anarchy in the territories which had passed under the rule of the East Indian Company. What does anarchy mean? It means that the Government to which people owe their allegiance is unable to protect their lives, property and persons. It should be remembered that when Cornwallis came to rule the British possessions in India, their rule had been in existence for several decades. His so-called judicial reforms brought about a state of things to which the

gloomiest periods of the anti-British history of India does not afford a parallel. We read in an official Report* which is often alluded to by all writers on Indian History, of the anarchy which pervailed in Bengal after that Province had been under British Rule for over half a century. It is stated in that Report:

"That dacoity is very prevalent in Rajshaye. * * But if its extent were known; if the scenes of horror, the murders, the burnings, the excessive cruelties, which are continually perpetrated here, were properly represented to government, I am confident that some measures would be adopted to remedy the evil. Certainly there is not an individual, belonging to the government, who does not anxiously wish to save the people from robbery and massacre. *Yet the situation of the people is not sufficiently attended to. It can not be denied, that, in point of fact, there is no protection for persons or property. Such is the state of things which prevails in most of the Zillahs in Bengal.*"

In another part of the same Report, we read that Mr. Dowdeswell, the Secretary to Government, wrote in 1809:

"Were I to enumerate only a thousandth part of the atrocities of the dacoits, and of the consequent sufferings of the people; and were I to soften that recital in every mode which language would permit, I should still despair of obtaining credit, solely on my own authority, for the accuracy of the narrative. * * Robbery, rape, and even

* The celebrated Fifth Report of 1812.

murder itself, are not the worst figures in this horrid and disgusting picture * * * Volumes might be filled with the atrocities of the dacoits, every line of which would make the blood run cold with horror."

When the British take credit for establising order out of chaos in India, they should be reminded of the fact that at one time anarchy in India was a thing for which they were themselves almost entirely to blame.

Cornwallis has been unnecessarily praised for granting the Permanent Settlement to Bengal and some other Provinces, then under the British rule. But if we carefully study the subject in all its bearings, we shall find that Lord Cornwallis is hardly entitled to any credit for this measures.* He was an Irish man. The eviction of tenants was an

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* Kaye in his chapter on the Permanent Settlement of Bengal in "the Administration of the East India Company," wrote :—

1. "That the Revenue System, which we found in operation on the assumption of the Dewanee, was not conducive to the happiness of the people.

2. "That our initial experiments of brief leases and fluctuating assessments were advantageous neither to the Government nor to the people.

3. "That all the ablest revenue-officers in the country were in favour of a Zemindaree Settlement, and that the Court of Directors held the same opinion.

4. "That these officers had been for a great number of

almost every-day occurrence in his own country. When the British established their direct rule over the territories granted to them in Dewany by the Emperor of Delhi, they assessed the land so heavily, that, to quote the words of Burke, "the country had turned ino a desert," and these assessments materially contributed to the fatal consequences of the Great Famine of Bengal of 1770. The British in Bengal, like their prototypes of Peru and Mexico, were bent on amassing wealth and growing rich in as short a time as possile. No one observed these fearful things more accurately than Phillip Francis, the redoubtable opponent of Warren Hastings. It was with him that the idea of the Permanent Settlement of land revenues first originated.* His idea did not find favour with those who then

years collecting information whereupon to base this settlement—and that the Court of Directors were of opinion that sufficient information had been collected.

5. "That Lord Cornwallis came out to India instructed to complete this Settlement—*that he was not, in any way, the author or originator of it*—and that he sought for further information before carrying it into effect." P. 200.

* In a minute of 1776, Phillip Francis wrote :—

"The Jumma [assessment] once fixed, must be a matter of public record. It must be permanent and unalterable; and the people must, if possible, be convinced that it is so. This condition must be fixed to the lands themselves, independent of any consideration of who may be the immediate or future proprietors. If there be any hidden wealth still

governed India. But when Cornwallis came to India, he found an empty treasury, the best of the land grown waste and out of cultivation. This miserable state of things loudly called for some remedy. And the remedy which he found, had already been proposed by Sir Phillip Francis and he and the Court of Directors eagerly adopted it. Mr. Mill truly observes:

"The fate of Mr. Francis, and of Mr. Francis's ideas, formed a contrast. He himself had been treated by the powers which were, with anything rather than respect. But his plan of finance was adopted with blind enthusiasm, with a sort of mechanical and irresistible impulse." (V. 332 f. n.)

In the early days of the British rule in Bengal, no European, possessing greater sympathy with the suffering population of that Province, visited India than Francis. It is to him that India is indebted for bringing about the impeachment of Warren Hastings. He exposed the misdeeds of his countrymen in India and contributed materially to put a stop to their vagaries in this country.

It is necessary here to observe that Lord Cornwallis did not introduce Permanent Settlement out of any philanthropic motives, but to replenish the exausted treasuries of the East India Company. All

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existing, it will then be brought forth and employed in improving the land, because the proprietor will be satisfied that he is labouring for himself."

those Muhammadan rulers who understood and reformed the Revenue System of India employed Hindus always as their Revenue officers. But as said before, he excluded the natives of the country from all high offices. In one of his letters to the Court of Directors, Lord Cornwallis declared himself in the following words, which express his contempt for Indians in unmistakeable language ;—

"I conceive that all reform would be nugatory, whilst the execution of them depends upon any native whatever."

In a private letter to Mr. Dundas, dated Patna, Aug. 14, 1787, Lord Cornwallis wrote :—"Every native of Hindustan is (I really believe) corrupt."

The fact should not be lost sight of, when Cornwallis granted Permanent Settlement to Bengal, the assessments were very heavy, and the landlords were not able to keep pace with the inflexible demand, which resulted in a widespread default. Lord Cornwallis' law enforced a sale of the estate directly the owner was in arrears, and thus large numbers of estates were put up to sale.

An Anglo-Indian writer says :

"It is scarcely too much to say that within ten years that immediately followed the Permanent Settlement, a complete revolution took place in the constitution and ownership of the estates which formed the subject of that Settlement."*

* Mr. J. Macneile's Memorandum on the Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, p. 9.

Where were the beneficial intentions of Lord Cornwallis towards the Zamindars, when he introduced the 'Sale Law' with the object of reducing the size of the Zamindaries?

We have now done with the seven years' administration of Indian affairs by Lord Cornwallis. He came out to India in 1786 and left it in 1793. His services were so valuable to the British merchants, that he not only retrieved his blasted reputation but earned a step in the peerage. He was an Earl when he was sent out to India, but when he returned to England, he was created a Marquis. Because he carried out the wishes of the Ministry, he was sent out for a second time to India, where he died. His second administration lasted only for a few months and it neither added to, nor marred his reputation.

Cornwallis should be looked upon as the first Britisher who established the British Supremacy in India. The consideration of the following points will make clear the proposition:

1. He confirmed the usurpation of Bengal, Behar and Orissa granted in Dewany by the Moghul Emperor of Delhi, by finally refusing to pay the tribute. It is true that Warren Hastings withheld the payment, but it does not appear that the Moghul Emperor or his custodian Madhava Rao Scindhia was ever given to understand that the East India Company would never carry out their contract as to the

payment of the tribute. From the frequency with which the tribute was demanded, it would seem that the Maratha Chief who acted as the Finance Minister of the Moghul Emperor expected its payment from the Company. But Cornwallis made every one to clearly understand that the Company would never again pay the tribute to the Delhi Emperor.

2. He was the first Governor-General to add territories to the Company's dominions by means of conquest. Neither Clive nor Warren Hansting obtained an inch of land in India by conquest. Clive did not fight at Plassey in the name of the East India Company and his victory did not make that Company the *de jure* rulers of Bengal. Again, to carry on his conquests, Cornwallis was assisted with men and money by the English Ministry of the day, which Clive was not.

3. Cornwallis showed the weakness of the French settlements in India by the ease with which he captured them and expelled the French from India.

4. Cornwallis reduced the natives of the country to the position of 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' by excluding them from all high offices of trust and responsibility. None of his predecessors even ventured to adopt those drastic measures as to the exclusion of Indians from the public services of their country which Cornwallis did.

5. His so-called judicial reforms created anarchy

in the country and sowed dissensions and mutual jealousies among the natives of India and ground them down to poverty. To call Cornwallis a man of 'stern rectitude', or 'of high principles', or 'of pacific intentions', is one of those fallacies with which unfortunately the pages of Indian history written by the English abound. He has found favour with the educated gentlemen of India for his having granted the boon of 'Permanent Settlement' to Bengal and some other parts of India. But as said above, the idea was not his. He was merely masquerading, like the ugly crow in one of Æsop's Fables, with the borrowed feathers of the peacock. Remove all those gaudy feathers which are borrowed and not his own and the creature will be laid bare in all his ugliness. It is a strange irony of fate that Sir Phillip Francis, who, as writer of the Letters of Junius, credited Cornwallis with the intention of 'retiring into voluntary banishment in the hope of recovering some of his reputation', should have been deprived of his just meed of praise and reward, and altogether forgotten, while the person whom he hated, is admired in his borrowed garb by the Indian population.

CHAPTER XIV

SIR JOHN SHORE'S ADMINISTRATION (1793-1798 A.D.).

In 1793 A.D., a fresh charter was granted by Parliament to the East India Company, by which it received a lease of life for another twenty years. In this charter was inserted the clause

"To pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation," &c.

It is well-known that this clause was inserted by the exertions of Sir Philip Francis.

Mr. Pitt, who was the Prime Minister of England at this time, was no little Englander. But at that time it was not expedient to pursue schemes of conquest in India ; for there was the fear of the wave of the French Revolution approaching the shores of England. Mr. Edmund Burke was bribed by a pension of £1,500 a year to produce his celebrated diatribe against the French Revolution. At this juncture, the English Ministry thought it expedient to show to the world their pacific intentions by inserting the above-mentioned clause in the charter granted to the East India Company. But if avowedly any

scheme of territorial conquest in India was repugnant to the people of England, starving Indians by ruining their trade and industries was considered to be a meritorious act by the Christian inhabitants of that island. Mr. Peter Auber writes:—

"It is only necessary to allude to so much of the commercial part of the question as was connected with the products and manufactures of India. The same opposition to the reception of those products and manufactures into this country was then urged as has since been frequently advanced. The objection rested on the ground that it would interfere either with the national or with particular interests that had peculiar claims to the protection of Parliament. The manufacturers of Manchester and Glasgow, engaged in the cotton trade, had made strong representations, in 1788, against the importation of piece goods from India. Those representations were again put forward in 1793.....It was suggested to the Minister to prohibit, by a clause in the new Act, the export to or use of cotton machinery in India." (*Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, London, 1837, Vol. II., p. 136).

Of course, the Minister could not accede to the request of the merchants with any show of decency or decorum. But it was a broad hint to those in power in India to give effect to the desire of their co-religionists and compatriots of Glasgow and Manchester. We are inclined to think that it was in this spirit that Lord Cornwallis was prompted to frame that regulation which excluded Indians from all offices of trust and responsibility in the public

services of their own country. To show their pacific intentions, the authorities had to select a person for the office of Governor-General who possessed the reputation of being sanctimonious in appearance and a lover peace. Their choice fell on Mr. John Shore.

This servant of the East India Company was at that time in England with no intention of returning to India. Mr. Shore's rise in the service was due to the interest which Mr. Warren Hastings had taken in him. The despoiler of the Begums of Oude, the instrument of the judicial murder of Nand Kumar, showed such regard for Shore that he dedicated to him the English translation which he had made of that well-known Ode of Horace in which the Roman poet expressed his indifference to pomp and power and worldly riches.

It is recorded that Shore was reluctant to accept the office offered to him but he was made to do so by the earnest request of Mr. Charles Grant and Mr. Wilberforce.

The announcement of the appointment of Mr. Shore evoked strong objection from Mr. Burke, who addressed a letter to Sirs Francis Baring and J. S. Burgess, Chairman and Deputy Chairman respectively of the Company, urging the propriety of postponing the appointment till the judgment on the trial and impeachment of Warren Hastings had been

pronounced.* But they did not act on Burke's advice.

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* The letter which Edmund Burke addressed to Francis Baring from Bath, on October 14, 1792, is so important, that it is transcribed in full here. He wrote :

"Sir, I have heard and the account is generally credited —that Mr. Shore is in nomination, or actually appointed, to the office of the Governor-General of Bengal.

"Having been appointed by the House of Commons a Member of Commons, to impeach one of your late Governor-Generals, Mr. Hastings, I think it my duty to inform you, that, in the exercise of the function imposed on that Committee by the House, we have found Mr. Shore materially concerned as a principal actor and party in certain of the offences charged upon Mr. Hastings; that is to say, in the mal-administration of the Revenue Board, of which, under Mr. Hastings, he was, for some considerable time, the acting Chief.

"I think it necessary to inform you, that some of the matters charged as misdemeanours, in which it appears that Mr. Shore was concerned, are actually on evidence before the Lords.

"Other facts, of a very strong nature, which the Managers for the Commons have opened as offences, are upon your Records; copies of which are in our possession. They go seriously to affect Mr. Shore's Administration, as acting Chief in the Revenue Board.

"The Comimttee of Managers cannot, consistently with their duty in making good the charge confided to them by the House of Commons, avoid a proceeding in those matters, and the taking such steps, both for supporting the evidence now before the Peers, as well as putting the other and not

On being appointed Governor-General of India, Mr. Shore was made a Baronet and so became dignified as Sir John Shore. He arrived in Calcutta on the 28th October, 1793 and took up the duties of his office immediately.

A month before his arrival in Bengal, the titular ruler of that province, the descendant of the traitor Meer Jaffar, known as Nawab Mubarek-ul-Dowla, died at the age of thirty-seven and after a reign of twenty-three years. He left behind him twelve sons and thirteen daughters. His eldest son, Uzeer-ul-Dowla, was raised to the *Masnud* of Murshidabad and

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less important matter into such a proper course of proceeding as the ends of justice and the public policy may require. They have not hitherto, in any instance, deviated from the line of their duty.

"In that situation, it is for the prudence of the Court to consider the consequences which possibly may follow from sending out, in offices of the highest rank and of the highest possible power, persons whose conduct, appearing on their own Records, is, at the first view, very reprehensible; and against whom such criminal matter, on such grounds, in a manner so solemn, and by men acting under such authority as that of the House of Commons, is partly at issue, and the rest opened and offered in proof before the highest Tribunal in the nation." (*Life of Lord Teignmouth*, Vol. I, pp. 226-228).

"Mr. Burke addressed yet stronger remonstrances to Mr. Dundas." (*Ibid*, p. 230).

was solemnly proclaimed at Calcutta on the 28th September 1793.

When Shore assumed the reins of Government, no war cloud was visible on the horizon of India. Tipu had been humbled and neither the weak and timid Nizam nor any of the powerful Maratha confederates had any desire to cross blades with the English. He, therefore, turned his attention to the improvement of Calcutta, by the appointment of the justices of the peace, who "were empowered to take measures to improve the police of Calcutta, and its internal management, also for cleansing the streets, controlling sale of spirituous liquors, and other matters, which contributed to the welfare of the community." (Auber, Vol. II. p. 140).

Unfortunately for the Maratha people at this period died Mahadeojee Scindhia at Wanowrie, in the environs of Poona, on the 12th February, 1794. He was succeeded by Doulat Rao, who was a son of one of his nephews. He was in his fifteenth year when he became master of the vast territory of Mahadeojee, and more active and ambitious than the chief whom he succeeded. It was mostly by his exertions that the different Maratha chiefs combined in a confederacy to give battle to the Nizam.

The Marathas had accounts to settle with Nizam Ali which he evaded and when pressed to do so by the envoy of the Peishwa, Govind Rao Kallay,

"He produced a detailed statement showing a balance in his favour of nearly two crores and sixty lakhs. Warm discussions took place between the envoy and Musheer-ool-Moolk, when at last the former was told, in public durbar, that Nana Furnavees must himself attend at the Court of Hyderabad, in order to afford an explanation of the different items of their intricate claims. The envoy replied—"Nana Furnavees is much engaged; how can he come?' 'How can he come?' re-echoed Musheer-ool-Moolk—'I will soon show how he shall be *brought* to the presence.' This menace was considered a sufficient declaration, and.....both parties prepared to decide their differences by the sword." (Grant Duff's Marathas, pp. 513-514. Times of India edition, 1878.)

The war was now inevitable. The timid, degenerate and treacherous Muhammadan ruler of the Deccan counted on the support of the English. But this was denied to him by Sir John Shore on the ground of neutrality. Writes Sir John Malcolm, in his Political History of India :—

"There indeed appears every ground to conclude, that while the impressions which had been made on all the native powers of India, by the wise councils and military success of the Marquess Cornwallis, were yet in full force, the decided interference of the British Government would have deterred both the Mahrattas and Tippoo Sultan from an attack upon the Nizam."

However, this was not to be. In the war that ensued, at first advantage seemed to lie with the Nizam. But in March 1795, fortune seemed to desert

the Muhammadan prince, who shut himself in the fort at Kurdla, where he surrendered himself to the Marathas on the morning of the 15th March. He accepted the humiliating terms imposed on him by his "infidel" conquerors.

The Peishwa Madho Rao in whose reign took place the above-mentioned events did not survive long the glorious victory of Kurdla. With his death commenced the decline of the Mahratta power.

In a previous chapter (VIII) we have given an account of the Rise of the Maratha power till the first Maratha War which took place in Warren Hastings' time. It is necessary to narrate the course of events of Maratha History which took place after that war as far as they are connected with the Rise of the Christian Power in India.

As already stated before, it was through the mediation of Mahadajee Scindhia, who was the most powerful member of the Maratha Confederacy, that the Treaty of peace between the English and the Marathas was concluded after the first Maratha War. But unfortunately, he was no far-seeing statesman and so fell into the snares of the Christians and his successor had to pay the penalty for it. He allowed himself to be embraced by the Christians—an embrace which resembled that of the pythons or boa constrictors which reduce the objects of their embrace to

such a condition as to facilitate it to ultimately swallow them up.

Warren Hastings entered into secret treaties and understandings with him. One of the charges preferred against the first Christian Governor-General of India by the managers of his impeachment in England was :—

"That in contradiction to the safe, just, and honourable policy of the Court of Directors, which, whilst it forbade their Government engaging in any measure for the extension of the authority of Shah Alem, enjoined that he should be treated with friendship, good faith, and respectful attention, Warren Hastings did unite with the Captain-General of the Mahratta State, called Madhojee Scindhia, in designs against the few remaining territories of the Moghul Emperor; and that whilst he sent an agent to Delhi, and carried on intrigues with the King and his ministers, tending to involve the Company in renewed hostilities, he did all along concur with the Mahrattas in their designs against the said king and his ministers, under the treacherous pretext of supporting the authority of the former against the latter, and did contrive and effect the ruin of them all, having in view one only object, the aggrandisement of the lately hostile, and always dangerous, power of the Mahrattas, which he pursued by means highly dishonourable to the British character for honour, justice, candour, plain-dealing, moderation and humanity."

Unfortunately, this charge was not proceeded with. Otherwise, many facts and circumstances would have come to light which, for historical purposes,

would have been of great importance. But this much is certain, that the Christian Governor-General was not prompted in intriguing with the bastard chief Madhoji by any desire to contrive the aggrandisement of the dangerous power of the Marathas. That crafty Christian's policy was to make the Mahratta chief his cats' paw, a tool in his hands for ruining the Mahrattas on the one hand and reducing the Moghul Emperor to a non-entity, on the other. He succeeded admirably, in all his designs. That bastard Maratha chief did not understand how he was made use of as a tool by Warren Hastings.

It was Warren Hastings who furnished him with weapons of offence to excite the jealousy of other Maratha powers, to further humble the Moghul Emperor and his satellites ; which precipitated the disruption of the Mahratta Empire. The method of training the Sepoys in European drill and using their weapons of precision and destruction were not calculated to enhance 'the dangerous power of the Mahrattas'. Warren Hastings understood this ; and so did Nana Fadnavis ; but not Madhava Rao Scindhia. He himself forged the chain of slavery round the necks of his successor and other Maratha Confederates. He was led by Warren Hastings to commit this act so prejudicial to the interests of his State. That Governor-General encouraged him to employ European officers for his army. It was on his recommenda-

tion that Madhava Rao engaged the services of De Boigne in disciplining his troops on the model of the States of Europe. When some of the members of the Council of Warren Hastings pointed out the danger to the territories in the possession of the English from the novel departure adopted by Madhava Rao in the training of his troops it is on record that that Governor-General answered by saying that there was no ground for being alarmed by Madhava Rao's procedure, since his new method of training his troops would ultimately prove his ruin. And he was a true prophet. Within his life-time he had the satisfaction of seeing his prophecy fulfilled. Warren Hastings brought on the disintegration of the Mahratta Confederacy, since Madhava Rao considered himself superior to the other Mahratta States as he possessed troops disciplined by European officers. Naturally jealousy was created among the Mahratta confederates. The apple of discord was thrown among them.

With the help of his disciplined troops, Madhajee Sindhia entered on a career of conquest. He imprisoned the Moghul Emperor. This was exactly what suited the interests of the English in India. They never moved their little finger to come to the Emperor's rescue. They did not remonstrate with Madhava Rao. Warren Hastings had encouraged him to do so. The British up to this time were the

subjects of the Moghul Emperor. They used to pay him their usual tribute. Now they proved their disloyalty and treason by withholding the payment of their tribute and betraying their Indian Sovereign into the hands of the bastared Maratha Chief. All these proceedings of Madhava Rao helped the British in consolidating their power in India.

The dominions of Holkar had for its ruler, a lady of great moral worth and abilities. Her name was Ahalya Bai. She was a widow. Although she was not an 'educated' woman, natural intelligence and strong common sense, combined with the inspiration from above felt by those who lead virtuous and pious lives, made the people she ruled the most happy and prosperous of all mankind. But with her death, a change came over Holkar's dominions. Her successor was Tookajee Holkar. He did not possess the abilities or moral greatness of the late Queen, Ahalya Bai. He was jealous of the growing power of Madhava Rao Scindia and his conquests in Hindustan. For the first time in the History of the Mahrattas one of the Mahratta States went to war with another. The confederates had become demoralized ; internal dissensions among them had set in. Shivaji and his guru, Ramdas, lived and died to unite all who were Mahrattas.

"The history of the Mahrattas," writes Mr. Justice Ranade, "is a history of Confederated States. * * * When

the idea ceased to be respected, the Confederacy proved a source of weakness rather than strength."

This civil war between Scindia and Holkar greatly weakened and disintegrated the Confederacy. Holkar was defeated by the disciplined troops of Scindhia under De Boigne, but he

"consoled himself for his defeat by harrying the country and sacking Scindhia's chief town Ujjain.* * * From henceforth Holkar was a thorn in the side; and the feud was to be inherited, as one Scindhia was succeeded by another, in the succession of a new and still more formidable Holkar."*

Holkar also employed European officers for the purpose of disciplining his troops on the model of the States of Europe.

The Bhonslay family of Nagpur had been detached as stated before from the Maratha Confederacy and won over by the English. This short-sighted policy of the Bhonslays proved suicidal to them.

The Guicowar of Baroda also had ceased to take any active interest in the affairs of the Confederacy.

Thus, the four great limbs of the Mahratta Empire appeared as if they had no concern with the Central Trunk. They had not as yet been quite detached from, but were hanging loosely with, the trunk. The central trunk consequently appeared to

* Keene's Madhava Rao Scindhia, p. 172.

be quite weak and helpless. The Peishwa's authority existed only in name. Since the conclusion of the peace with the British, the Poona government had been subjected to various vicissitudes of existence. By that Treaty known as the Treaty of Salbye, Raghoonath Rao, who was the cause of the war, was not recognized as the Peishwa. It was thus that the Peishwa's Government gained a few years' lease of independent existence. Madhoo Rao Narain remained the Peishwa, with Nana Fadnavis as his Prime minister. Raghoba was given an asylum at Kopergaon, on the banks of the Godavery, where he died in the beginning of the year 1784. It would have been a good thing for the Mahratta Empire, had the descendants of Raghoba been incarcerated for life or disposed of in some other way. It should have been recognized as a maxim for the welfare of the Mahratta Empire, that no descendant of a murderer had any claim to the Peishwa's *Musnad*. Only in this way, the stability of the Mahratta Empire would have been insured. Bajee Rao, the son of Raghoonath Rao, who at the time of the death of his father was about nine years old, was surrounded by a band of intriguers who conspired to depose Mahdoo Rao Narain and elevate him to the Peishwa's *Musnad*. It is suspected that Madhoji Scindhia was the secret fomentor of the intrigues. It is probable that that bastard chief, intoxicated with his success in Hindustan, for now he

had with the help of the British, succeeded in making the Emperor of Delhi a prisoner, desired to be the dictator of the Mahratta Empire, by having a creature of his own as the Peishwa. But happily for the Mahrattas, the ever vigilant Nana Fadnavis nipped the conspiracy in the bud. We would have given the Nana greater credit, had he at the same time removed from Maharasthra, or disposed of, Bajee Rao and thus prevented all the intrigues and future complications which ultimately proved the ruin of the Mahratta Power in India.

It was the policy of Warren Hastings to betray the Moghul Emperor into the hands of the Sindhia, for which purpose a secret understanding existed between the Governor-General and the bastard Mahratta Chief. But Warren Hastings was now gone. The British were not fully acquainted with the nature of the secret understanding between Madhoji and Warren Hastings. They were alarmed at the increasing power of Scindhia. On the departure of that Governor-General for England, Mr. Macpherson succeeded to the temporary charge of the Supreme Government in India. Scindhia, as guardian of the Moghul Emperor, made a demand on the English for the tribute they had agreed to pay to the Emperor. The English refused to pay it. Had Madhoji been true to himself and loyal to the Emperor, he would have invaded the territories of

the British and exacted the just demand. But he tamely submitted to the refusal.

The English now were fully determined to reduce the power of Scindhia. Grant Duff in his history of the Mahrattas writes:—

"Mr. Macpherson conceived that the ambitious nature of Scindhia's policy was very dangerous and endeavoured to raise some counterpoise to his progress by exciting the jealousy and rivalry already entertained towards him among the other Mahratta Chiefs. Moodajee Bhonslay being at Poona * * * the Bombay Government, by Mr. Macpherson's desire, paid him extraordinary attention, which had the effect of gratifying Moodajee and alarming Scindhia." (History of the Marathas, 3rd edition, p. 463).

Since the death of that notorious Mr. Mostyn, no English Envoy had been sent to the Peishwa's Court. It was found necessary to send another British Envoy to create confusion and disorder in the Mahratta Empire. So long internal dissensions had not broken out among the members of the Mahratta Confederacy. It was politically expedient for the English that the Mahrattas should quarrel among themselves and thus become weakened. To secure this end, a British Envoy was sent to Poona. His name was Mr. Charles Malet. He was to pursue the line of policy chalked out by Mr. Mostyn. As events subsequent to his arrival at Poona show, he succeeded admirably and is entitled to the gratitude of his countrymen. The quarrel

between the clans of Scindhia and Holkar seems to have been fomented by the British Envoy at Poona. Of course, in a matter like this, none but a man of child-like simplicity would expect documentary or legal evidence to prove the point. We are quite justified to believe that the Holkars were played off against the Scindhias by the British, from the fact that the acting Governor-General of India was anxious to raise some Mahratta Chief as a counterpoise to the dangerous nature of the ambition of Madhoji Scindhia. Contemporary records do not disclose any hostile feelings entertained by Madhoji Scindhia against Holkar. On the other hand, if we are to believe the testimony of Grant Duff, (*Ibid*, p. 480) in 1790, Scindhia's

"immediate views were directed to conciliate Holkar and Ali Bahadur, with the hope of obtaining their assistance in checking the incursions of the Sikhs; in humbling the Rajpoots, who continued in opposition to his authority; and in securing the dependence of Ismael Beg."

But Holkar did not care to have friendly relations with Scindhia. As stated before, he even went to war with Madhoji and when defeated, did not scruple to sack Ujjain. These dissensions must have been fomented by the English.

Madhoji Scindhia was such an object of jealousy and terror to the British, that even Lord Cornwallis would not have anything to do with him.

When that Governor-General was conspiring to attack Tippoo, he did not include Madhoji as an ally against that Muhammadan Prince. Indeed it is on record that Lord Cornwallis somewhat ungraciously declined Scindhia's profered assistance, since his power and influence were always regarded with jealousy. It did not take Madhoji long to understand the policy of the English Governors-General. He was naturally indignant at the treatment which he had been receiving at their hands. In a secret letter dated Fort William, March 4, 1787, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Secret Committee :—

"From my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick, dated the 1st instant, you will observe that of late he has met with some slights and inattentions from India, to which as appearing to him to be an intended disrespect to the Government, he thought it improper to submit without some remonstrance."

It was then too late for Madhoji to understand the true nature of the policy of the British towards him. He had, in an evil moment, allowed himself to be embraced by them and had now to suffer the consequences of that fatal embrace. His English biographer ,Mr. Keene, says that

"he (Madhoji) had twice disclaimed with almost abject apology all intention of demanding from the British Government payment of tribute, which was indeed due on the twofold ground of constitutional usage and actual treaty-obligation."

Madhoji should have attacked the territories then under the rule of the English and thus obliged them to pay the tribute. But it seems to us that he was prevented from so doing for the following reasons. As stated before, the English had raised a counterpoise to his growing power by playing off Holkar and the Bhonslays against him. Holkar, as said before, had unjustly and wantonly attacked Madhoji and when defeated sacked Ujjain.

Then again, Madhoji had committed a great mistake in appointing Europeans to raise and discipline his troops. The Commander-in-Chief of his force was a European whom Warren Hastings raised to eminence and thus in other words De Boigne was the creature of the first Governor-General of India. It would have been idle to expect that De Boigne would have ever obeyed Madhoji and fought his co-religionists, if not his compatriots. Even, it is related that that General on the eve of his departure from India, advised the successor of Madhoji, "never to quarrel with the British, and rather disband all his new-model men than engage them in a conflict with that power."

Having such a traitor in his camp, how bitterly Madhoji must have cursed the day when he had played false to the Mahratta Confedercy by hugging the British to his breast. The words of Nana Fadnavis, with the ring of prophecy in them, must

have come to his mind and reproached him for his conduct. Nana had declared to Madhoji:

"The English must not obtain a footing in the Empire; if they obtain a footing in the Empire, the whole country will be in danger."

It would seem that Madhoji determined to undo the mischief he had committed. If there was any one throughout the length and breadth of India who had fully gauged the intentions of the English in India, it was undoubtedly Nana Fadnavis. It was therefore to Poona that Madhoji repaired for advice and trying to put his idea into execution. There is much truth in the conjecture of Colonel Malleson when he writes that Madhoji's going to Poona was actuated by a desire to "attain what had been the "dream of his later years.....to form one vast com-"bination against the English." But it was too late now to get rid of the poison which had entered the very heart of the Mahratta Empire. A British envoy had for several years past been busily engaged at Poona in the nefarious task of plotting and intriguing against Scindhia. For such was the mission with which Charles Malet was sent to Poona by the Governor-General of India. One false step taken by Madhoji led to the ruin of the Mahratta supremacy in India. His mediation for peace was the greatest mistake he committed in his life.

Nána Fadnavis was not a *persona grata* with the

British. The envoy at Poona, named Charles Malet, wrote :—

"As long as Nana remained supreme at the Poona Court they (the British) should never dream of obtaining a firm footing in the Mahratta Kingdom."

So in the Maharashtra, there were two tall poppies whom it was the interest of the British to destroy. Madhoji and Nana were now both at Poona where Charles Malet had been sent with distinct instructions to ruin Scindhia. It is a curious fact that Holkar attacked Scindhia's territories and when defeated, sacked Ujjain during the absence of Mádhoji in Poona. There are no records existing to prove if Holkar had been instigated to do this by the British. But in the absence of any act of aggression on the part of Scindhia, against Holkar, there should be no surprise if it were the truth that Holkar had been prompted and assisted by the British in attacking Scindhia's dominion.

Madhoji Sindhia died at Wanowdee in the environs of Poona, on the 12th February 1794.*

* The writer had an occasion to see the site where Madhoji breathed his last. The village of Wanowdee is about a couple of miles distant from the Poona Cantonment. The mausoleum which Daulat Rao Scindhia intended to raise on the spot where Madhoji died, had not then (1901) been completed. The vicissitudes to which the Deccan has been subjected during the last one hundred

Grant Duff attributes the cause of his death to 'a violent fever', with which he had been suddenly seized. But the English biographer of Madhoji, Mr. Keene, on the authority of the *Tárikh-i-Muzafari*, states that Madhoji

"had been waylaid the evening before by an armed gang employed for the purpose by the Nana—who had certainly good reason to wish for his removal."

The English also 'had certainly good reason to wish for his removal.' If it be true that Madhoji met with a violent death, is it not reasonable to suppose that the English, especially their Envoy at Poona, conspired with Nana against Madhoji and waylaid him?*

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years had stood in the way of finishing a building of great historical importance.

* That Madhoji was regarded with jealousy by the English is borne testimony to by Grant Duff. He writes:— "But although nothing decidedly inimical appears on the part of Scindhia towards the British Government, his power and ambition, his march to Poona, and above all, the general opinion of the country, led the English to suspect him; and we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy;.....There appeared,—soon after Scindhia's arrival in the Deccan, in an *Ukhbar*, or native newspaper, from Delhi, a paragraph, which stated that the Emperor had written to the Peishwa and Mahadajee Scindhia, expressing a hope that, by the exertions of the wukeell--i-moolluq and his deputy, he should obtain some tribute from Bengal." (P. 504).

Anyhow, one tall poppy was now gone. But the other tall poppy was still there, whom it was not so easy to get rid of. By the death of Madhoji, Nana Fadnavis became more powerful than ever in

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Thus it is evident that Scindhia was no longer in the good graces of the British. Even Lord Cornwallis wished to go to war with him. In his letter to Major Palmer, Resident at the Court of Sindhia, Lord Cornwallis writing on August 26, 1789, said :—"The particulr circumstance of Scindhia's having become a principal on the side of the Mahrattas in the late treaty of Peace, and the long connection which has now subsisted between him and this Government, has hitherto rendered it expedient to station a Resident with him, though I must confess that it is somewhat problematical, whether the measure is necessary or advantageous to the Company.

"From the authority which seems to have been delegated by the Peshwa's Government to Ali Bahadur and Tunkojee Holkar to interfere with Scindhia in the management of the Mahratta interests in Hindostan, *it appears to be more than probable that he may resolve to relinquish that scene altogether, and either return to his own territories or repair to Poona,* to endeavour to recover any credit that he may have lost with the principal members of the Peshwa's administration.

"Should he come to either determination, you are not to accede to any proposition for your remaining with both, or with either of the other Mahratta chiefs, but when Scindhia shall be ready to depart, you are to take leave of him and to proceed with your assistant and escort and suite with all convenient despatch to Benares."

the Maharashtra. If Madhoji was a thorn in the side of the British the Nana was equally so. There were only two events which would have favoured the cause of the British:—either, the Nana's death, imprisonment, or disgrace; or a change in the Peishwaship. Although the English had been since a very long time plotting against Nana Fadnavis, they had not yet succeeded in injuring him. Moreover, they were greatly alarmed at the increase of Nana's power by the death of Scindhia.

Fortunately for the British, the death of the Peishwa Mahdoo Rao II occurred on October 27, 1795, which greatly smoothed the way in their deal-

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From this letter it is evident that Holkar was instigated by the British to attack Scindhia, and from the words italicized above, it is also clear that the British were plotting against Scindhia; otherwise how could Lord Cornwallis have anticipated the departure of Scindhia for Poona?

When Scindhia repaired to Poona, the British Resident from his Court was withdrawn.

Madhoji's death greatly gladdened the heart of Lord Cornwallis. When that event took place, Cornwallis was not in India. He wrote to the then Governor-General of India, Sir John Shore, from Brome on September 7, 1794:

"The death of Scindhia, of which we have received accounts overland, will nearly remove every political difficulty of your Government, and the rectitude of your measures will insure success in all the internal business of the country."

ings with the Mahrattas. It was an event which was quite welcome to them, since it was calculated to create disorder and confusion in the Mahratta Empire, for a change in the Peishwaship was inseparably associated with intrigues and party feelings. Thus there was chance of Nana Fadnavis in not wielding the same paramount power which he was exercising at that moment. It is stated that the Peishwa "on the morning of the 25th October deliberately threw himself from a terrace in his palace, fractured two of his limbs, and was much wounded by the tube of a fountin on which he fell. He survived for two days." (Grant Duff, p. 521.)

There are two objections to the acceptance of the theory that the Peishwa committed suicide in the manner described above. In the first place, there does not appear any motive which prompted the Peishwa to commit suicide. Grant Duff writes (p. 521):—

"At the Dussera, which happened on the 22nd October, and was conducted with great splendour, he appeared amongst his troops, and in the evening received his chiefs and the ambassadors at his Court in his accustomed manner; but his spirit was wounded to desperation, a fixed melancholy seized on his mind."

This does not appear to have been a sufficient motive for suicide. The Peishwa would not have appeared amongst his troops, had he been seized with "a fixed melancholy." It is stated that the strict-

ness of his cousin Bajee Rao's confinement by Nana Fadnavis was not approved of by him and he was therefore "overwhelmed with anger, disappointment and grief." It should be remembered that Madhoo Rao had given a *carte blanche* to the Nana in the management of all state affairs. Moreover, it does not appear that he had ever remonstrated with the Nana against the confinement of his cousin Bajee Rao. There is no shred of evidence to show that the Nana would not have loyally carried out the wish of the Peishwa in releasing Bajee Rao had he been desired to do so. The Nana at this time was not particularly anxious to wantonly misuse his power. He was quite willing to retire from Mahratta politics. He had often and often expressed this desire, but it was the Peishwa Madhoo Rao himself who prevailed on him not to do so. It is hardly conceivable that under the circumstances he could have been irritated by the Nana's conduct in making the confinement of the state intriguers strict and rigid.

But even supposing that the Peishwa was goaded to commit suicide, was the method which he is said to have deliberately resorted to, calculated to be a painless one? Those who deliberately commit suicide generally choose painless modes for putting an end to their existence. The Peishwa could have taken poison, or shot himself, or cut his throat, rather than throw himself from a terrace, which might or might

not have resulted in death. It, therefore, appears to us that this story regarding the deliberate suicide of the Peishwa, was a fabrication to poison the minds of the people against the Nana. The Peishwa's fall from the terrace was either accidental or perhaps he was thrown down by some one of his enemies What wonder if some one of the emissaries in the employ of the British Resident at the Court of the Peishwa accomplished this vile act in order to create confusion and disorder in Maharashtra? In the time of Mr. Mostyn we know how the reigning Peishwa was assassinated so that the Peishwa's sceptre might pass into the hands of that wicked man Raghoba. In the time of Mr. Malet it is quite possible that the son of the assassinated Peishwa fared no better than his father at the hands of some villain, in order to make room for the wicked Raghoba's degenerate son. From the hour of his birth the English were opposed to Madhoo Narain Rao, because he stood in the way of Raghoba becoming the Peishwa. The wicked Raghoba from interested motives disputed the authenticity of the birth of this posthumous son of his nephew, whom he had contrived to assassinate. He was supported in this dispute by the Bombay Government, who were no doubt interested in giving every assistance they could to this wretched man, not out of any love for him, but for the sake of 'fomenting domestic dissensions.'

Thus the Peishwa Mahdoo Narain Rao was a marked man with the English and his death gave great satisfaction to them. Notwithstanding the death of Raghoba, the British did not give up all hopes of some day bringing the Mahrattas within their pythonic embrace. But the unfortunate death of the young Peishwa was fatal to their national independence. By his death, the wretched Raghoba's degenerate son Bajee Rao became the Peishwa. He was the last of the Peishwas and with his ascending the throne of the Peishwas departed the glory of the Mahrattas. Nana Fadnavis, who had so long steered the bark of the state, found himself quite helpless against the conspiracies against him. With that rare foresight which entitles the Nana to rank as a real statesman, he predicted the troubles which would befall the Mahratta nation by the elevation of Bajee Rao to the Peishwaship. To Tookajee Holkar, who was then in Poona, the Nana

"described the enmity, which from the first dawning of reason had been instilled into Bajee Rao by his mother, against the whole of those officers who had now any experience in the affairs of the state; he showed the danger to be apprehended from the connection between his family and the English, dwelt upon the happy state of prosperity and union which then prevailed in the Mahratta empire, and enlarged on the increasing benefits to be expected if the existing course of policy were carefully preserved.

"In these sentiments Holkar concurred, and the dis-

position of the other chiefs being sounded, Nana ventured to disclose his plan by suggesting that Yessooda Bye, the widow of the deceased prince, who had not yet attained the age of womanhood, should adopt a son, in whose name he proposed to conduct the Government as heretofore." ('*Ibid*, p. 521).

It would have been a fortunate thing for the Mahratta Empire, had the Nana succeeded in his intended plan. There was nothing preposterous or unusual in the plan suggested by the Nana. It would have been in conformity with the usages of the Hindoo Law. But unfortunately for the Mahrattas, he was not successful. It is suspected that his failure was due to his prematurely disclosing the plan to the British Resident at Poona. Grant Duff, from whose work the above extracts are made, writes:—

"In the preceding November (1795) Mr. Malet, the resident on the part of the British Government, had made a formal application to the minister for the purpose of ascertaining on what footing the Mahratta Government was to be conducted. Nana Furnavees replied that the widow of the late Peishwa was to be considered head of the empire, until the great officers of the nation had deliberated upon the succession, when the result should be communicated. He now (January 1796) therefore intimated their resolution that the widow should adopt a son, to which no objection on the part of Mr. Malet could be offered, and nothing was now apparently wanting except the selection of a child and the performance of the ceremony. But Bajee Rao, who had obtained information of the whole proceeding, by which he was thus unjustly to be deprived of his

right, gave a further specimen of his talent for intrigue." (*Ibid*, pp. 521-522).

The question naturally arises, how did Bajee Rao obtain information of the whole proceeding? Of course, Grant Duff does not write so, but from the context of the above extract, does not there appear reason for suspecting that Mr. Malet informed Bajee Rao 'of the whole proceeding by which he was thus unjustly to be deprived of his right?'

Nana failed in his plan. Bajee Rao intrigued and he succeeded. It is to be suspected that the English represented by Mr. Malet at Poona intrigued with Bajee Rao against Nana Fadnavis. Anyhow, the son of the wretched Raghoba succeeded after all. He became now the Peishwa. The stars of Nana Fadnavis ceased to be in the ascendant.

All are agreed on the point that Bajee Rao was not the man who under an elective system of government would have secured the largest number of votes for the responsible position which he attained. No sooner had he ascended the throne than he commenced intriguing against the Nana. The Nana had made himself obnoxious to his father and other members of his family. In Bajee Rao, the father was portrayed in the son. The animosity which Raghoba cherished against Nana Fadnavis, Bajee Rao tried to give effect to. Of course, Bajee Rao bore personal grudge also against Nana. When the nature of the conspiracy

that had been formed against him came to the knowledge of Nana Fadnavis, he had to run away for his life and spend some years in captivity. What a reward for the splendid services which the Nana had rendered to the Mahratta Empire!

Bajee Rao was now a veritable despot in the Mahratta Empire. His government lacked wisdom and moderation. But these very defects in the Peishwa's government were favorable to the cause of the British. How these defects favored them will be understood by those who follow the course of events subsequent to the ascension of Bajee Rao on the Peishwa's *musnad*.

After the battle of Kurdla, the Nizam, perceiving the perfidious nature of his British ally, demanded the withdrawal of the two Company's battalions from his dominion and began to encourage the French officers under M. Raymond to discipline and train Sepoy corps. A considerable part of Raymond's corps was sent to the Nizam's frontier to occupy the districts of Kurpah and Kummam. This so greatly alarmed the Governor-General, that in his Minute of 15th June, 1795, he wrote:—

"This last measure has a suspicious, not to say *criminal* appearance: and although we may acquit the Nizam of any hostile designs against the Company, I can entertain little doubt of the disposition of M. Raymond and the officers of his corps to co-operate with the French upon the Northern Circars. Such an attempt may not be

probable; but as it would, if carried into execution, be attended with very serious consequences to the British possessions in India, the strongest representations ought to be made, to induce the Nizam to recall the detachment of M. Raymond."

Sir John Shore addressed a letter to the Nizam also to the above purport. He also instructed the President at Hyderabad to represent to the Nizam, that if the French corps were not withdrawn from his frontier, the Governor-General would also order a body of troops towards the frontier.

Lord Hobart, the Governor of Bombay, is also alleged to have discovered that M. Raymond was in communication with the French prisoners of war at Pondicherry, who were preparing to escape from their place of confinement and join M. Raymond. He made their imprisonment more strict, thus preventing their escape, if they had any intention to do so.

The representations of the Governor-General and the Christian Resident at Hyderabad fell flat on the Nizam, who appeared to be determined to brave the displeasure of the Governor-General. This incident "sufficiently proved that the influence which had been established at the court of Hyderabad by Lord Cornwallis was entirely lost; and that the English not only could place no dependence upon the aid of the Nizam, but had reasons to apprehend that his resources might be early directed against the Company's possessions, either from the prevailing power of the French faction, from the complete subjection of his country to the Mahrattas, or

from throwing himself, to escape that Mahratta subjection, into the hands of Tippoo Sultan, the irreconcilable enemy of the English."*

It was very fortunate for the English that at this juncture, the Nizam's son, Ali Jah, raised the standard of rebellion against his father and fled from Hyderabad on the 28th June 1795. There can be very little doubt that he was prompted to take this step by the intriguing British Resident at Hyderabad. M. Raymond's corps had to be withdrawn from the Nizam's frontier and employed against his rebellious son, who was very easily defeated and captured and soon after died.

The cowardly Nizam was alarmed by the rebellion of his son and asked for the return of the two battalions which he had shortly before dismissed. The English saw their opportunity and made the Nizam accept all the measures proposed by them, as a condition preliminary to the return of the two Company's battalions.

To counteract the French influence at Hyderabad, "Sir John Shore encouraged a set of English adventurers to go to Hyderabad and offer their services to the Nizam. These adventurers were received at that court, and were countenanced by the English resident, but none of them possessed either the professional skill or the political ardour of M. Raymond; and the corps they attempted

* Macfarlane's *Our Indian Empire*. Vol. II. p. 26.

to discipline remained but as an awkward squad compared with the battalions the Frenchman had trained."*

The cowardly Nizam never gave any more trouble to the English but became a suppliant and useful tool in their hands in raising them to power and carrying out their nefarious schemes in depriving Indians of their independence and earthly possessions.

The affairs of another Muhammadan State in Southern India attracted a great deal of attention of the Governor-General. In a previous chapter (XII), it has been stated that the Nawab of the Carnatic, or as he was more commonly called, the Nawab of Arcot, named Muhammad Ali, succeeded in vanquishing his opponent by the help he received from the English and for which services he assigned to them territory yielding four and a half lakhs of pagodas. The English were thus enabled to obtain their political footing in India. This Muhammad Ali was greatly praised by the English because he showered gold and silver on them lavishly.

Wrote a well-known Christian historian who was personally acquainted with this Muhammadan Prince, that

"He is possessed of ambition, without any of those vices which too frequently attend that passion; and his policy is never unworthy of the magnanimity of a virtuous Prince. 'A great man,' says Mahommed Ali, 'may conceal

* *Ibid.* p. 27.

his sentiments but never ought to deceive. It was my fortune to place the way of rectitude before me in my youth, and I never deviated into the paths of deception. I met the British with that openness which they love; and it is my honour, as well as security, to be the ally of a nation composed of princes.' This was his declaration at the conclusion of the late war, when he was put in peaceable possession of the Carnatic; and these were his sentiments when, at the head of his father's army, he rejected the offers of France, and saved the very being of the Company by raising the seige of Fort St. David."*

It is not known how much gold and silver, Dow received from Muhammad Ali for penning the above panegyric on him. But the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Rumbold, received very costly presents and several lakhs of rupees from the Nawab and therefore it was not unnatural for him to write in January, 1780, as follows regarding the advantages which the English derived from his friendship :—

"It is unquestionably to this influence that we are indebted for a great part of our prosperity, for our success against the French in India in the last war, and for the decisive stroke made against them so early in the present war, to which, as affairs have since turned out, we owe perhaps our present existence in the East."

In a previous Chapter (XII) an extract has been given from Sir Charles Lawson's *Memories of Madras*, that Lord Macartney was invited by the Nawab to

* Dow's History of Hindostan, 1770, vol. II, p. 397.

Arcot and offered a present of £30,000 and handsome money presents to the officers of his suite.

Mr. Keene, who narrated the above incident in the House of Commons on April 16, 1806, also stated that the Nawab told Macartney that it was quite a customary present to every Governor and had never before been refused. Sir Charles Lawson proceeds:—

"The Nawab's assertion that he had followed precedent in making his offers involved a reflection upon Lord Macartney's immediate predecessor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, whose son was living when Mr. Keene obtruded the incident on the notice of the House. Yet it was not repudiated by any member of the Rumbold family." (*Loc. Cit.* p. 69).

Muhammad Ali died on the 13th of October, 1795, in the 79th year of his age, with a debt which was simply astounding. The subject of his enormous debts was not unknown in England and came several times under parliamentary discussion.

"'The debts of the Nabob of Arcot,' 'the Nabob of Arcot's debts,' were sounds that rang through the land session after session, year after year, like some mysterious shibboleth; and in every bill, in nearly every discussion on Indian affairs, it was said, and by every party in turn, that something must be done to effect a settlement, and to check a progressive increase, by interest and compound interest, by agencies, brokerages, and additions of all kinds, that bade fair to rival the national debt of Great Britain."*

* Macfarlane, I. p. 226.

But the Ministry did nothing to relieve the Nabob of his heavy load of debts. The reasons for this have been very fully stated by Mill in his History (Vol. V. pp. 17-31), to which no note of dissent has been appended by the editor of his work, Professor H. H. Wilson. Even the Historian of the East India Company is compelled to write

"The claims of the alleged creditors of the Nabob of Arcot were surrounded by circumstances of the highest degree of suspicion. If ever there were claims which called for minute and searching inquiry such were these. The course taken by the ministry upon this question tended to cast great discredit upon them, and afford to the opposition favourable ground of attack. On the 28th of February, 1785, Mr. Fox called the attention of the House of Commons to the subject, and moved for the papers connected with the inquiry. The motion was lost, as were two similar motions in the House of Lords; but opportunity was taken to impugn the motives of the ministry, and to adduce plausible reasons for believing that the decision was attributable to parliamentary influence. It will be recollected that a person named Paul Benfield was one of the chief creditors of the Nabob of Arcot, and that he represented several other creditors. Much jugglery had been subsequently practised, and the name of Benfield had disappeared from the list of creditors, and been restored to it, as circumstances suited. At length Benfield had procured himself to be elected to Parliament, together (according to Burke) with seven other persons, of like principles and vices with himself. He soon afterwards departed for Madras, leaving as his representative Mr. Richard Atkinson, a gentleman whom the ministry delighted to honour, on

the ground, it was alleged and believed, of the pains which he had taken to promote the return of members of Parliament favourable to their interests. The defence of ministers was weak, but their majority was large. The papers were refused, partly on the ground that the public interests might suffer from giving them publicity. It is not easy to suppose that ministers were influenced by this fear, for a book-seller had obtained a copy of the papers, and published them."*

At page 44 of the Introduction to this work, William Howitt has been quoted, who wrote:—

"What then is this system of torture by which the possessions of the Indian princes have been wrung from them? It is this—the skilful application of the process by which cunning men create debtors, and then force them at once to submit to their most exorbitant demands."

Muhammad Ali died, bequeathing the legacy of enormous debts to his son, Omdut-ul-Omrah, who succeeded to the *musnad* of the Carnatic on the 16th October 1795. In the time of Lord Cornwallis, a treaty was entered into with Muhammad Ali which vested the sole military power in the Company. But this treaty was not considered good enough by Lord Hobart, the Governor of Madras, who, on the accession of the Omdut-ul-Omrah tried to impose upon him a new treaty by which he would cede to the Company the districts mortgaged for the payment of the pecuniary instalments, and also some of the forts

* Thornton's History of British India. Second Edition, London. 1859, pp. 181—182.

in the Carnatic ; and yield the right of sovereignty over the Polygars.

The new Nawab did not accede to any of the demands of the Madras Governor and although the Governor-General and his Council wrote to Lord Hobart on the 28th of October, 1795, to endeavour to obtain the consent of the Nawab to the cession of all his territories, yet they did not approve of Lord Hobart's action and so for the present at least no portion of the Carnatic was annexed to the Company's Government.

It was not only the affairs of Southern India narrated above which engaged the attention of Sir John Shore during the term of his office as Governor-General of India, but those of Oudh and Rohilkhand also gave him a good deal of trouble. The Rohilla Chief, Fyazulla Khan, died in 1794 and the question of his successor had to be settled. Gholam Muhammad after killing his eldest brother, Ali Khan, the heir-presumptive to his father, Fyazulla Khan, usurped the reins of government in Rohilkhand. When this came to the knowledge of Sir John Shore it was his intention

"to wrest the country entirely from the family of Fyzoolah Khan, notwithstanding the rights of the son of Mahommed Ali, guaranteed by the British Government, and notwithstanding the rights of the people of the country happy under the frugal government of the Rohilla chief, menaced

with misery and ruin under the exactions of the Vizir, to which, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, the British ruler was about to condemn them. The rapidity of Sir Robert Abercromby anticipated the arrival of the instructions which were forwarded to this effect. A battle was fought at Bitowrah, in which, after making a partial impression upon the British line, the Rohillas were defeated. Negotiation followed, and an arrangement was made. The treasures of the late Prince, Fyzoolah Khan, were given up to the Vizier. And a jaghire of ten lacs of revenue, under the express guarantee of the English Government, was granted to Ahmed Ali, the son of Mohammed Ali."*

The manner in which Sir John Shore dealt with Oude was as atrocious as, if not more than, that of Warren Hastings with that State, and for which he deserved impeachment. He wrote:—

"The Government of Oude, both in the opinions of the natives, as well as externally, is considered a dependency upon the English, *whatever its relations under treaties may be.* Scindiah refers the investiture of Vizier Ali by his majesty the Moghul to the Governor-General, and there are many respectable families in Lucknow who live under the protection of the British influence. In the estimate of the natives of India, the Kingdom of Oude is held as a gift from the Company to Sujah-ul-Dowlah, and as a dependent chief."

Acting on that presumption, he was not ashamed to violate the treaty of his predecessor, Lord Cornwallis, with Oude. Major Bird, Assistant Resident at Lucknow, wrote in his well-known work on

* Mill, Vol VI. pp. 33-34.

"Dacoitee in Excelsis ; or the spoliation of Oude, by the East India Company,"

"The boons of Lord Cornwallis were conferred, however, only to be withdrawn after his departure by other hands; but the respite of the devoted province lasted for his time. A commercial treaty was concluded in 1788 between the Company and the Wuzier, in a fair and liberal spirit. The subsidy of fifty lakhs under these conditions, as Lord Cornwallis admitted previous to his quitting India, and while admonishing the Wuzier, was paid with regularity. Oude was again prosperous, happy, and solvent. But the engagement that no further demands should be made, entered into by Lord Cornwallis with all solemnity, was respected no longer than he himself remained in India. The succeeding Governor-General, Sir John Shore, required 'the wretched Vizier' to add to his former subsidy the expense of one European and one native regiment of Cavalry, provided the annual amount should not exceed five and a half lakhs of rupees. Thus the engagement of Lord Cornwallis was shamefully violated. Again the scale of charges and exactions which the Wuzier must have regarded as finally fixed, began to mount, and gathering courage from his sense of injustice, he boldly refused to pay one cowry more. Vain courage! Vain confidence in an incontestable promise and declared guarantee! The unsophisticated Wuzier had yet to learn to what lengths 'sincere friendship and firm union' would encourage his disinterested allies. The British authorities suspecting, it is said, Maharajah Jhaoo Lall, his minister, to be the cause of his refusal, seized upon that gentleman, and, in despite of all the remonstrances of the Wuzier, detained him, although guiltless of any crime, as a State prisoner in their own territory; and then, to compel the Wuzier to grant

the additional subsidy, Sir John Shore, in March, 1797, proceeded to Lucknow, and 'by means of threats, artifices, &c., forced him to make the addendum they required. Thus an additional body of troops, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, was quartered upon the Kingdom of Oude at an additional charge of five lakhs and fifty thousand rupees annually; and another result was attained, which was probably neither desired nor deprecated :—Asoph-ood-Dowlah took his treatment so much to heart, that he fell ill and refused medicine, exclaiming, 'There is no cure for a broken heart'; and so, a few months subsequently, died, and left the Company, as their custom was, to improve the incident of a fresh succession." (*pp. 32-34*).

Sir John Shore possessed the reputation of being a pious Christian. So the death of the non-Christian ruler of Oude which he was instrumental in effecting gladdened his heart, for this proved beneficial to the Company of merchant "adventurers" of his creed. As a follower and friend of Warren Hastings, he followed in his footsteps, and Mr. Burke was right in his objection to the appointment of Shore as Governor-General of India, for that orator apprehended that the latter would prove no better than the Governor-General whom he had impeached.

Vizir Ali, a natural son of Asaph-ud-Dowlah, succeeded to the *musnad* of Oude and this was formally acknowledged by the Governor-General. If the succession was not valid, Shore should have made inquiries about it before approving of it. It was not difficult for him to do so, since there was

"a resident at the court of Lucknow whose duty it was to watch and to report to the government which he represented everything of the slightest public importance, the general disbelief of the claim of the recognised son of the sovereign to the inheritance for which he was destined should have been either unknown or disregarded by the British Government." (Thornton's History of British India, 2nd Edition, p. 227).

But shortly afterwards, Shore discovered (?) that Saadat Ali was more eligible to the throne of Oude than Vizier Ali. Saadat Ali was a brother of the last ruler and was living as a pensioner at Benares. He was at first not considered eligible.

"For, during the Cheyte Sing insurrection at Benares, and the general revolt which followed it, the rebels were heard to declare that they were acting under the orders of the Begums, of Cheyte Sing, and of Saadat Ali."*

"Sir John", proceeds the same writer, "opined for Saadut Ali, but he had not yet made up his mind, or he had not yet ascertained what price Saadat Ali would pay to the Company for his elevation to the *musnad*. Warren Hastings had been accused of holding an auction at Lucknow; but Sir John now figured more in the light of an auctioneer in that city." (*Loc. cit.* p. 31).

Major Bird writes:

"Seeing that a better bargain could be made with a brother of the deceased Wuzier, Sir John Shore repaired to Benares, and proposed to the latter, who was named Saadat Allie, to dethrone Vizier Allie, offering the support of the Company on the intelligible condition that the

* Macfarlane, Vol. II. p. 30.

subsidy should be largely increased, and that their support should be paid for otherwise in money and kind. To this stipulation, bold and bare-faced, the aspirant to the princedom 'cheerfully consented,' and, after a preliminary process at Lucknow, termed in the 'Parliamentary Return of Treaties' 'a full investigation,' and purporting to be an inquiry into the spuriousness of Vizier Allie's birth, that prince was deposed, and Saadat Allie was proclaimed in his stead, at Lucknow, on the 21st January, 1798."

Then, on the 21st February, 1798, a treaty of seventeen articles, in its principal stipulations absolutely stinking of rupees, was signed in pursuance of the previous understanding between Saadat Allie and Sir John Shore.

". . . . The Wuzier is to pay up arrears. The Wuzier is required to give up the fort of Allahabad, and to pay eight lakhs of rupees to put it in repair for the presentees. The Wuzier is to pay three lakhs for repairing fort Futty Guhr. The Wuzier is to pay expenses of moving troops, the number of lakhs being as yet indefinite. The Wuzier is to pay the Company twelve lakhs in consideration of their expenses in establishing his right. The Wuzier is to pay a pension of one lakh and a half to his deposed rival. And lastly, by article 2, the annual subsidy paid by the Wuzier, and which amounted to something over fifty-six lakhs, is now raised to seventy-six lakhs, ... In all, a million sterling, and the fort of Allahabad are obtained in a single year by the East India Company, half of it in violation of the engagements of Lord Cornwallis, and in virtue of the union now growing firmer between themselves and the victim in their coils. . . . . All Europeans, *except the servants of the Company*, were, without any distinction

whatsoever, to be banished from His Excellency's country, one object of this arbitrary measure obviously being, that the exactions and other acts of injustice of which the local government and their officers were at this time guilty, might not get wind, and by reaching the ears of the British public, come, like the atrocities of Hastings, under the cognizance of Parliament." (*Dacoitee in excelsis*, pp. 35-38.)

Regarding this Treaty, Sir Henry Lawrence wrote in the *Calcutta Review* for January, 1845:—

"What will perhaps most strike the English reader of Sir John Shore's treaty is, the entire omission of the slightest provision for the good government of Oudh. The people seemed as it were sold to the highest bidder. Vizier Ali was young, dissolute, and needy; Saadat Ali was middle-aged; known to be prudent, and believed to be rich. Being of penurious habits, he had, even on his petty allowances as a younger son, amassed several lakhs of rupees; and, in short a more promising sponge to squeeze, than his nephew. From the general tenor of Sir John Shore's life, we believe that his heart was in the right place, though this his last diplomatic transaction, might, if taken alone, lead us to a different conclusion. Wherever his heart was, his head at least must have been wool-gathering. He set a bad precedent. He made the *musnad* of Oudh a mere transferable property in the hands of the British Governor, and he left the people of Oudh at the mercy of a shackled and guaranteed ruler. This may have been liberality, but it was a liberality of a very spurious sort. Much as we admire Lord Teignmouth's domestic character, we are obliged entirely to condemn the whole tenor of Oudh negotiations. Historians have hitherto let him down slightly, but his Lordship may be judged by the

same standard as other public officers; by the right or by the wrong that he committed, and not by his supposed motives, or his private character."

It was during the tenure of office of Sir John Shore that in 1795 the settlements of the Dutch in India were taken from them; Cochin after a great resistance. The Dutch were deprived of their possessions in Asia, such as Ceylon, Malacca, Banda and Amboyna. The French settlement of Mauritius and the rich Spanish possessions of Manilla were made parts of the British empire mostly at the expense of India.

It is true that Sir John did not levy war on any Indian ruler. But it was due to the finances of the country being low, that he was prevented from doing so.

Sir John Shore was created an Irish peer on the 24th October, 1797, by the title of Baron Teignmouth. He resigned the government of India and sailed for England in March, 1798.

Notwithstanding his reputation of being a man of 'Christian principles,' he emulated Warren Hastings in his administration of India, for he had received his training in the school of that first Governor-General of India.

CHAPTER XV

THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1798-1805 A.D.)

His Appointment as Governor General of India.

The history of the British in India entered on a new stage when the Earl of Mornington, afterwards better known as the Marquess Wellesley, was sent out as Governor General of India. He colored red the map of a large part of India, and to achieve this, he did not scruple to adopt means the nature of which he never stooped to question.

Before describing the Indian career of the Marquess Wellesley and the way in which he brought about the extinction of the independence of the different states of India, it will be necessary to refer to his nativity and private life. This Marquess was a native of Ireland and was born on June 20, 1760. His full name was Richard Colley Wellesley. In those days when Ireland possessed a separate Parliament of her own, he was a member of that Parliament and was known to be a great admirer and friend of the Irish patriot Grattan. When he came over to England, he entered the English House of Commons in 1784, and it is said that "his earlier political

attachments were all of a liberal complexion ; * * but with the progress of the French Revolution his division from the "Foxites" became marked. He was an enemy to Parliamentary Reform. * * His opinions were biassed by his fears of the Revolution."

Of his private life, it is only necessary to remark, that he did not particularly respect the seventh commandment, for "early in life he had formed a connexion with a brilliant French woman whom he afterwards made his wife. Their children were not legitimate."

If we remember these facts, namely, that he was a native of Ireland, and that he was of loose morals and that he kept a French woman as his concubine, and although he made her his wife, she did not care much for him, for she did not accompany him to India, and separated, if not legally divorced from him, on his return from India, we shall be able to understand the policy which moved him to adopt the measures well known to all students of Indian history. The keynote of all his Indian measures is to be found in his intense hatred of the French. In all that he did in subverting the independence of the different States of India, he had the Frenchman in his brain.* It is probable that he would not have

* The following extract from his "Private and Secret" letter to His Excellency, Sir Alured Clarke, Commander-in-

suffered so much from Frankophobia, had he not been attached to a French woman, who did not respond to his love. For, on no other ground could his hatred of the French be satisfactorily accounted for. Had he been a patriot, that is to say, had he loved his native country of Ireland, he would not have hated the French so bitterly as he did. Every

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Chief in India, from Fort St. George, 4th May, 1799, will show his Frankophobia :—

"The number of French established at Calcutta and in the provinces, is now a most alarming evil : I must request you will immediately institute a most active inquiry into the state of their numbers and conduct; and that you will send to Europe, without hesitation, every man who can not give you a satisfactory account of his principles and connections. At Calcutta there are not less than one hundred and fifty French,—all, I believe, dangerous subjects. They abound in Chittagong, where not a Frenchman should be left on any account. It would also be desirable to send to Europe as many as possible of the inhabitants of Chandernagore. In the name of the French, I mean to include all foreign Europeans connected with France. At Chinsurah there are many most malevolent persons who ought to be sent to Europe. In the interior of our provinces every Frenchman indiscriminately ought to be taken up and sent to Calcutta, and from thence, if a suspicious character, to Europe. . . . . It appears to me that you cannot give too serious an attention to this point; . . . . ."

Memoirs and Correspondence of Marquess Wellesley. By R. R. Pearce, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.

Irishman, if true to himself, and if he possesses any self-respect, ought to be grateful to the French, for that was the nation which tried its utmost to help the Irish in their troubles and sufferings.

Wellesley knew something of Indian affairs, for he was appointed a member of the Board of Control in 1793. He had also read Indian history, and it also appears that as far back as 1786, he took interest in Indian questions, for he wrote from Brighton to Grenville, July 30, 1786, telling him that he was reading Orme, and asking for 'some general account of the European Settlements in the East Indies.' From 1793 till he sailed out for India, that is during a space of four years, he studied Indian affairs very closely. Revd. Mr. Hutton in his biographical sketch of the Marquess Wellesley, published in the Rulers of India series, writes that "he (Wellesley) had the advantage of an intimate acquaintance with Lord Cornwallis, whose Indian administration had been the most successful portion of his chequered career." Most successful, because Cornwallis showed, if not paved, the way of establishing the supremacy of England in India. It may be that Cornwallis tutored Wellesley to pursue those measures which brought about the subversion of the independence of the different states and principalities of India. Wellesley only followed in the footsteps

of Cornwallis in extending the influence of the British over the natives of India.

The Governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, who had been promised the Governor-Generalship of India, was disappointed when he learnt that the Home Government were not inclined to bestow that high distinction on him. The true reason for this slight shown to him appears to be that he did not help Sir John Shore in the absorption of the State of the Carnatic. The measures of reform which he proposed, did not please the government of Sir John Shore, and the Court of Directors. So it was found necessary to search for some one else to fill the high post of Governor-General of India. At that time, Mr. Pitt was at the head of the Ministry. It is a well-known fact that Mr. Pitt was no "Little Englander." He wished to extend the influence of England beyond the seas. The creation of Greater Britain owes its impulse to Pitt. Ireland had a Parliament of its own, and used to manage its own affairs locally. This did not please the Ministry of which Pitt was the leader. He wanted to bring about an union of Ireland with England. Mr. Stead has proved from historical documents, that the British Government provoked the Irish rebellion of 1798 in order to bring about the Union. He writes:—

"Certainly if it had not been for the rebellion, which

was, as we have seen, the handiwork of the Government, there would have been no chance of carrying the Union."

On the retirement of Sir John Shore, Pitt's choice naturally fell on Cornwallis. For the second time, he was offered the Governor-Generalship of India. Pitt knew that Cornwallis would carry on his policy of acquiring territories in India for England. Cornwallis accepted the offer and was about to sail out for India. But the hell which Pitt had let loose in Ireland, required the strong hand of a tried soldier and administrator to manage. Cornwallis was just the man to fit the situation. So Pitt found that Cornwallis could be better employed nearer home to effect the Union of Ireland with Great Britain. Consequently Cornwallis was made the Viceroy of Ireland and he pleased Pitt immensely by his success in effecting the Union.

Lord Mornington had been previously offered the Governorship of Madras. But now when Cornwallis was appointed Viceroy of Ireland, Pitt could not choose a more proper tool to carry out his designs in India than Lord Mornington.* Accordingly he

* In his monograph on Pitt, published in the "Twelve English Statesmen" Series, Lord Rosebery has devoted a chapter to "Pitt and Wellesley." He writes that Pitt's

"friendships were few, but they were close, and even tender to a remarkable degree. Of Wilberforce and him it was said that they were like brothers. A scarcely less

was nominated Governor-General of India. Revd. Mr. Hutton writes:—

"After a week at Holwood with Pitt, spent in anxious discussions of the needs and prospects of our Indian possessions, Mornington was definitely appointed Governor-General of India."

It is conjectured by some that during this time, Pitt instructed Lord Morningon to found an empire in India to compensate for the loss of America. This appears quite reasonable, when we remember that Pitt was no "Little Englander," that he provoked the Irish to revolt, in order to bring about the union, and that he supported Lord Mornington in all his Indian measures.*

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affectionate though a later intimacy was that with Lord Mornington, afterwards Lord Wellesley, the great Viceroy *(sic)* whose brilliant rule in India conferred such renown on himself, though it afterwards disabled him to a great extent for the rough and tumble of English party strife." (p. 201).

In that Chapter Lord Rosebery has published some letters of Pitt to Wellesley regarding which, in a footnote, he writes:—

"These letters, which are in some respects the most interesting that we have of Pitt's, have been made available for this little book by the generous kindness of Mr. Alfred Montgomery."

* Mr. Pitt's Act of 1784 in which it was stated that the East India Company did not desire to make conquests or

So the Earl of Mornington, after receiving his instructions from Pitt, left England on 7th November, 1797. His brother, Arthur, the future Duke of Wellington, had already preceded him to India. He brought out his youngest brother, Henry, as his political secretary. Thus a cabal of three brothers was formed in India, with the object of carrying out the instructions of Mr. Pitt as to the founding of an empire for England in India. Singularly enough, his wife did not accompany him. It has been already mentioned above, that she was a French woman and had been in his keep before she was legally married to him. The children whom she gave birth to were all illegitimate. It is probable that had she not been on bad terms with him, he would not have been so much a victim to Franko-phobia, the symptoms of which he so markedly exhibited in India. Her presence in India would have, in all likelihood, averted many a war and bloody contest.

add to their territories was merely a blind to lull suspicions. It was during Mr. Pitt's *regime* that Cornwallis attacked Tippoo without provocation. It was he who induced Cornwallis to accept the Governor-Generalship of India for the second time in succession to Sir John Shore. When he could not spare Cornwallis, because the Irish affairs demanded his presence in that country, he appointed Lord Mornington to the high office of the Governor-General of India, but not till he had kept him as his guest for a week, during which time he instructed him about Indian affairs.

At the period of Lord Mornington's departure from England, India was in a state of profound peace ; and the noble lord made others believe that he would do nothing to disturb that profound peace. But he was thus acting the part of a consummate hypocrite ; he was thus trying to lull others into a false confidence regarding his pacific intentions to enable him to carry out his designs without let or hindrance.

That his intentions were anything but pacific will be evident to all from the extracts given below. Those historians who consider the Irish Governor-General as a man who was obliged to levy war on the several independent states of India, are either ignorant of Lord Mornington's views or else deliberately misrepresent facts. This Irish Lord was the aggressor in all the wars with the princes of India. He did not conceal his sentiments when he wrote to Lady Anne Barnard, wife of the Governor of the Cape, with whom he spent 'a couple of easy pleasant months' at the Cape on his way out to India. In his letter dated Fort William, October 2nd 1800, the Marquess Wellesley wrote to her :—

"On what honors you compliment me I know not. I am pursuaded you have too much good sense and good taste to esteem an Irish peerage a complimentary, or complimentable honor in my case. * * * * with respect to rewards of another description, I have received none—I expect none—and (be not surprised) perhaps you may hear that

I will accept none. This brief exclamation will admit you to the secret agonies of my poor dear heart, or soul, and give you some light to discover the causes of my ill-health, ** But do not suppose me to be so weak as to meditate hasty resignations, or passionate returns to Europe, or fury, or violence of any kind. No; *I will shame their injustice by aggravating the burthen of their obligations to me; I will heap kingdoms upon kingdoms, victory upon victory, revenue upon revenue; I will accumulate glory and wealth and power, until the ambition and avarice even of my masters shall cry mercy: and then I will show them what dust in the balance their tardy gratitude is, in the estimation of injured, neglected, disdainful merit.*"

The italicized sentences in the above extract clearly prove that the Marquess was not a peace-loving man, but on the contrary bent on wars and adoption of other questionable means having for their object the increase of the power and wealth of the British in India.

Lord Mornington did not come out direct to India, but stayed a few days at the Cape of Good Hope. He utilized the few days' stay by maturing those plans which helped him in destroying the liberties of the people of India. Luckily for him, he met here two men who were thirsting for revenge on Tippoo. These two men had resided for a long time in India. Their names were David Baird and Major Kirkpatrick. David Baird was a prisoner in Tippoo's camp. Perhaps he was ill-treated by Tippoo. It is

related that Tippoo took pleasure in making Baird play the monkey before him. For this purpose, Baird was clothed like a monkey and made to go up and down a tall bamboo pole. Having been made to suffer these humiliations, it was not strange that he should have been anxious to see the downfall of Tippoo. Of Tippoo's cruelties and atrocities, the only witnesses are the British prisoners, and their statements should never be relied on, because it was their interest to paint Tippoo in the blackest color possible. For whatever be the teachings of the Bible, they believed in and acted up to the proverb which says, "Vengence sleeps long, but never dies."

The other man, named Major Kirkpatrick, had been Resident at the Court of Hyderabad and had gone in 1797 to the Cape of Good Hope for the benefit of his health.

Major Kirkpatrick was an old diplomatist. He had been trained in the school of Warren Hastings and also of Cornwallis. At one time he was Resident at the Court of Madhoji Scindhia. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he was the chief adviser to the bastard Mahratta Chief regarding those measures which estranged Madhava Rao from Nana Fadnavis, and ultimately brought on disasters on the Maharatta Empire. However, it appears that after some time Madhoji and Captain Kirpatrick did not pull on well. In a Secret Despatch, dated Fort

William, March 4, 1787, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Secret Committee:—

"From my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick, dated the 1st instant, you will observe that of late he has met with some slights and inattentions from Sindhia, to which, as appearing to him to be an intended disrespect to the Government, he thought it improper to submit without some remonstrance; but I am in hopes that those grounds of complaint will soon be removed; and as I am determined on our side to act with fairness and moderation by Sindhia, as well as all the rest of the neighbouring States, I see no reason to apprehend that such altercation will essentially disturb our present tranquility in that quarter."

Lord Cornwallis' letter to Captain Kirkpatrick, dated the 1st March 1787, is nowhere published in the Cornwallis correspondence edited by Ross. Kirkpatrick's despatches to Cornwallis also have not seen the light of day. So it is impossible to judge of the grounds of complaint which the British Resident preferred against the Mahratta Chief. But Cornwallis removed him from the Court of Scindhia and employed him on an Embassy to Nepal. He was instructed to spy out the country and to note the military strength and strategical positions of Nepal, for such information would be of great use in a war with Nepal. After his return from Nepal, he was appointed Resident at the Court of Hyderabad. As Resident, he was not content with his duty of reporting to the Supreme Government at Calcutta of

what transpired at Hyderabad, but he meddled in the internal affairs of that State. He succeeded in introducing American and British adventurers in the Nizam's service so that they might act as counter-poison to the French officers in that State, and thus create disorder and confusion. In answering one of the questions put to him by Lord Mornington during his detention at the Cape of Good Hope, Major Kirkpatrick did not conceal the fact that he had done all he could to poison the minds of the Nizam and his ministers against the French. To quote his own words, he said:—

"It may be thought that the abominable tendency of French principles (in whatever view considered), and the evil consequences which resulted to almost every power that nation has drawn into its alliance, if properly exposed and illustrated, ought to have the effect of exciting, at the different Courts of India, such a detestation of the one, and dread of the other, as to render any connexion between them next to impossible. But though *these are topics which have not been neglected,* and though they doubtlessly seem well calculated to produce the sort of impressions to be wished for, yet it would be wrong to place any great reliance in considerations which unfortunately have not always had the weight they were entitled to with European powers better qualified, in general, to appreciate their force (as being more conversant in systematic and prospective politics), more immediately liable to suffer from a coalition with the new republic; and finally, more interested to oppose its aggrandizement, than any of

the princes or States of India can be."—(*Wellesley's Despatches*, Vol. I, p. 646).

From the words italicized in the above extract, it is clear that attempts had been made by the British residents at the courts of the Indian Princes to blacken the character of the French people. It is quite foreign to our purpose to say anything regarding the French Revolution. We may differ from Burke in his condemnation of the Revolution, and may not subscribe to the sentiments of Thomas Paine contained in his Rights of Man, but no reasonable man will be found who will not agree with the following remarkable utterance of the great Italian patriot, Joseph Mazzini, who wrote :—

"Five-and-twenty millions of men do not rise up as one man, nor rouse one half of Europe at their call, for a mere word, an empty formula, a shadow. The Revolution, —that is to say, the tumult and fury of the Revolution— perished; the form perished, as all forms perish when their task is accomplished, but the *idea* of the Revolution survived. That idea, freed from every temporary envelop or disguise, now reigns for ever, a fixed star in the intellectual firmament; it is numbered among the conquests of Humanity.

"Every great idea is immortal: the French Revolution rekindled the sense of *Right*, of liberty, and of equality in the human soul, never henceforth to be extinguished; it awakened France to the consciousness of the inviolability of her national life; and awakened in every people a perception of the powers of collective will, and a conviction

of ultimate victory, of which none can deprive them. It summed up and concluded (in the political sphere) one epoch of Humanity, and led us to the confines of the next.

"These are results which will not pass away: they defy every protocol, constitutional theory, or *veto* of despotic power."

While the French people were proclaiming Liberty, Fraternity and Equality all over the world, their neighbours of England were doing everything in their power against the spread of those principles.

Lord Mornington's meeting with Major Kirkpatrick at the Cape was of great help to him in his plan of establishing the supremacy of the British in India. The idea of bringing the states of India under subsidiary alliance was that of Major Kirkpatrick. The letters which Lord Mornington wrote from the Cape to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, show that the Ministers (especially the Prime Minister, Mr. Pitt) had instructed him to see if England could obtain the supremacy in India by some means or other. His first letter to Mr. Dundas, dated Cape of Good Hope, 23rd February 1798, begins with these remarkable words:—

"Among the subjects which you recommended to my early consideration upon my arrival in India, you particularly urged the necessity of my attending with the utmost degree of vigilance to the system, now pursued almost universally by the native princes, of retaining in their service numbers of European or American officers, under

whom the native troops are trained and disciplined in imitation of the corps of Sepoys in the British Service."

It was Mr. Pitt who, in 1784, proposed and carried a Bill through both Houses of Parliament, which made every one believe, that the Christian merchants constituting the East India Company had no desire to make conquests, or add to their territories, in India. Moreover, by this Bill, as the Court of Directors wrote in 1805,

"The control and direction of Indian affairs is not with the Company. * * * All the great wheels of the machine are moved by Government at home, who direct and control the Company in all their principal operations in India."

So the hypocrisy and insincerity of Mr. Pitt are quite apparent from his instructions to Lord Mornington "to attend with the utmost degree of vigilance" to the military strength of the different princes of India. If he was sincerely desirous of not founding an empire in India, why should he have concerned himself with the military resources of the Indian Princes?

From the perusal of the letters which Lord Mornington wrote to the Right Hon'ble Henry Dundas, from the Cape of Good Hope, it becomes quite evident that he meant to pursue a spirited foreign policy during his tenure of office as Governor-

General of India. He intended to carry into execution the suggestion of Major Kirpatrick, regarding the subsidiary alliances with the Indian Princes. He was also determined to annihilate the already humbled Tippoo. We shall adduce evidence further on to prove that he contemplated a war with Tippoo during his detention at the Cape. It is probable that Cornwallis had impressed him with the ease and facility with which Tippoo could be crushed.

To make the exterior symbols of the Christian Power visible in India, Marquess Wellesley took certain measures to impress on the minds of the "heathens" of India that the Company's government was a "Christian" Government.

He "prohibited the publication of newspapers on Sunday. His Lordship's motive in taking this step, in connection with other regulations, was, that the due observation of the Christian Sabbath, without interfering with the rights, duties, obligations, or prejudices of the native population, should act morally on the mind of India, in utter unacquaintance with the nature and character of the true God. Apart from all cant and pharisaical formality, the Sabbath is a blessed institution in any land, and has justly been assigned as one of the great springs of European Civilization, ...

"But great as the influence of the institution of the Sabbath on a community like our own unquestionably is, if we reflect, we shall see that it is designed to have a ten-fold greater influence in a land peopled by a race in ignorance of revealed religion.

"The observance of the Sabbath is essentially a public acknowledgment of belief in the God who made the heavens and the earth; and the institution of the Christian Sabbath necessarily implies a profession of faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. Every seventh day, therefore, an unostentatious proclamation of the true God was made in India; the recurrence of a day of rest and refreshment for man and beast, after the labour of the week, necessarily awakened curiosity and inquiry among the heathen dwellers in the British territory. . . . . Lord Wellesley conceived that it was the duty of the British Government in India to make a public official profession of allegiance to the author of Christianity; and . . . . not to conceal the fact from the subjects of the British Crown in Hindustan, that the British nation were the worshippers of the God of heaven." (*Life and Correspondence of Marquess Wellesley*, by R. R. Pearce, Vol. I. pp. 351-353).

The College at Fort William, Calcutta, was established with the ostensible object of training the civil and military officers of Government, but with the ulterior motive of evangelizing the natives of India. Writes the above-named author, that the Fort William College

"was also a most important agent in furthering the evangelization of India," (*Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 289).

He quotes one Revd. Claudius Buchanan, who wrote in 1805, that

"many circumstances concur to make it probable that the light of revelation is now dawning on the Asiatic world.

Under the auspices of the College of Fort William the scriptures are in course of translation into the languages of almost the 'whole continent of Oriental India.' . . . . . Directed by it, *the learned natives from every quarter of India, and from the parts beyond Persia and Arabia,* come to the source of knowledge: they mark our principles, ponder the volume of inspiration, 'and hear every man in his own tongue the wonderful works of God.'" (*Ibid,* pp. 294-295).

In March 1805, Revd. Claudius Buchanan wrote to his grace the Archbishop of Canterbury:—

"In the presence of the learned body of Asiatics assembled at the College of Fort William, the Christian scriptures have been exhibited for translation into the Oriental tongues. Under the auspices of the Marquess Wellesley, who by favour of Providence now presides in India, a version of the Holy Scriptures may be expected, not in one language alone, but in seven of the Oriental tongues, ... In the centre of the Pagan world, and at the chief seat of superstition and idolatry, these works are carried on, and the unconverted natives assist in the translations." (*Ibid,* p. 296).

Mr. Charles Grant, whom a well-known Christian publicist (Dr. John Murdoch of Madras) was pleased to designate as "the Christian Director of the East Indian Company," wrote to Lord Wellesley, on September 14th, 1801: —

"No accounts from the East have afforded me so much pleasure as those of the countenance your Lordship has given to religion. If you had seen fit to recommend the

diffusion of it among the heathen, no one could have done this with so much effect; and though now diversities of opinion on some other Indian subjects, and consequent divisions unhappily prevail, yet in the true glory of espousing such an object all the best judgments of the present and future times I am convinced would be agreed." (*Ibid*, p. 297).

Thus it will be understood that Lord Wellesley contributed not a little to the rise of the Christian Power in India by the sword, and that shedding of blood and fraud and force as well as trying to make the Holy Scriptures of the Christians accessible to the "Heathens" in their own languages, were the means adopted by him.

Lord Wellesley was determined to annihilate or curb the Musalmans and Mahrattas, by force or fraud. This explains his Machiavellian policy and Occidental diplomacy in dealing with the independent Princes of Hindustan. It was by fraud that he made the Nizam and the Peishwa prisoners, deprived the Nabob of the Carnatic, the Raja of Tanjore, the Nawab Vizier of Oudh, the Nawabs of Surat and Farrukhabad of their territories, and by force ruined Tipu and some of the Maratha princes such as Scindia, Holkar and the Raja of Nagpore.

CHAPTER XVI

LORD MORNINGTON'S TREATMENT OF THE NIZAM.

When Lord Mornington, on his way out to India, was detained at the Cape of Good Hope, he opened the Secret Despatches addressed to the Honourable the Court of Directors. From those secret despatches, as well as from conversations with Major Kirkpatrick, he came to know of the state of affairs which obtained in the different Native States of India. In his two letters to the Right Hon'ble Mr. Dundas from the Cape dated 23rd and 28th February 1798, he clearly indicated the policy which he would pursue in India. In the former, he asked Mr. Dundas to "bear in mind the state of the Native Powers in India at this moment ; and recollect that the greatest advantage which we now possess is the present deranged condition of those interests." That is to say, Lord Mornington was glad to inform Mr. Dundas that the favourable opportunity for establishing the supremacy of the East India Company in India had arrived on account of the deranged condition of the affairs of the Native Powers in India ; this opportunity should not be lost.

There were only two powers in the peninsula of India which had ever crossed blades with the Company for gaining supremacy in India. These two powers were Haidar Ali with his son Tippoo, and the Marathas. The State of Haidarabad, that is, of the Nizam, had never had the courage to fight the Company.

When Lord Mornington asked Mr. Dundas "to bear in mind the state of the Native Powers in India" he referred to Tippoo, to the Marathas and the Nizam. Tippoo had been unjustly attacked by Cornwallis and been made to give up half his dominion, as well as a very large amount of money as war indemnity. It speaks well for the good government of his State that he punctually paid up the stipulated sum. When Cornwallis imposed the large indemnity on Tippoo, he was under the impression that that prince would not be able to fulfil his engagements as to money payments owing to his resources being crippled, for he was made to part with half of his dominion. That nobleman must have thought that the East India Company would thus be furnished with a pretext for absorbing Tippoo's remaining territory for the prince's inability to pay the stipulated sum of war indemnity. However, in this Cornwallis and others were disappointed. Other pretexts were fabricated to which we shall refer further on.

The Marathas also were not objects of such terror and dread to the Company as they had been in the time of Warren Hastings. Mr. Mostyn at Poona and Captain William Kirkpatrick at Scindia's Court had admirably carried out their instructions as to creating confusion and disorder in the Maratha Empire. Lord Mornington wrote to Mr. Dundas from the Cape of Good Hope on the 28th Feb. 1798:—

"I am aware that some opinions have been thrown out from very respectable quarters, the tendency of which appears to lead towards a sentiment approaching to satisfaction in the dissensions and divisions which have lately taken place among the Mahrattas. . . . . Fortunately no one of the co-estates, nor the head of the Empire, has yet acquired the means of wielding the united force of the whole body; but while some of the chiefs have made great and valuable acquisitions of dominion, and considerably increased their military strength, the authority and influence of the Peishwa has rapidly declined; and it could not now be expected that any considerable body of chiefs would be disposed to prosecute, under his direction, any common view or joint operation with any degree of zeal or vigour."

However, the Marathas were still considered formidable, and it was not deemed advisable to cross blades with them. They had but recently inflicted a crushing defeat on the Nizam at Kurdala, and this victory showed the capabilities of the Maratha chiefs.

But the position of the Nizam was altogether a

different one. It was also a pitiable one. The Nizams of Haidarabad had never been conspicuous for their valour in the field or statesmanship in the cabinet. These princes always furnished the rungs of the ladder by which the British rose to their ultimate supremacy in India. After the death of the first Nizam-ul-mulk, it was the struggle for the succession to the Nizamat which for the first time brought the French and the English into the arena of Indian politics. Again, the Nizam yielded the Circars to Cornwallis without any remonstrance or show of resistance. In the war with Tippoo, the Nizam assisted the British.

Lord Mornington knew the weak position of the Nizam. He knew how he had been defeated by the Marathas. Major Kirkpatrick also made him acquainted while at the Cape of Good Hope with the actual condition of the Nizam's affairs. He wrote to Mr. Dundas:—

"I have already observed how much the posture of the Nizam's affairs is altered with relation to the balance of power between him and the Maratha States, and how much it has been weakened and degraded by the Treaty of Khuradlah and by the manner in which it has been carried into execution."

He rightly grasped the situation of the Nizam when he wrote:—

"At present the Court of Hyderabad seems willing to

purchase a closer connection with us by great sacrifices, and if that connection should not appear objectionable on other grounds, it may probably take place on much more advantageous terms to us, if we grant it as a matter of favour to the solicitation of the Nizam, than if we commence the negotiation by demanding the dismission of any part of the Nizam's military establishment."

Knowing the Nizam's position Lord Mornington decided to bring his territory under the control of the Company. But it was the fear of Tippoo which made the British deprive the Nizam of his independence and reduce him to the position of a feudatory.

Before we proceed to describe the methods which were adopted to reduce the Nizam, it is necessary to refer to the army of the native Powers of India at that time.

The natives of India have been always distinguished since time immemorial for their physical courage and truthfulness. They were no cowards. If they have been subdued by every rising Power of the world, it was not due to their inferiority in physique, or want of bravery, but mostly to their lack of miliary discipline, their disunion, want of weapons of precision and destruction and numerous other causes among which perhaps their childlike simplicity might be mentioned as one. They were simple to the limit of their own disadvantage, and

magnanimous to their enemies. Their possession of these qualities perhaps accounts for the absence of patriotism among them. For, patriotism, after all, implies selfishness and worldiness.

Of all the Christian nations who came out to India for the purpose of commerce, the French were the first to entertain the idea of the conquest of India. They also discovered the means of the conquest, because they mixed more freely with the natives of India than any other Christian nation. Mr. Mill writes:—

"The two important discoveries for conquering India were—1st, The weakness of the native armies against European discipline; 2nd, The facility of imparting that discipline to natives in the European service. Both discoveries were made by the French." (Vol. III, p. 53 foot-note).

To impart this European discipline to their soldiers the principal native Powers of India had employed European military adventurers in their service. Haidar Ali was the first to set example to others by entertaining French military officers in his employ to discipline troops. His example was followed by Scindia, Holkar and the Nizam. But this entertainment of European mercenaries was the fatal mistake which cost the native Powers their independence.

Although the French made the discoveries for the conquest of India, they never made any serious

attempt to found an Empire in India. Mr. Sullivan writes:—

"France was desirous of peace, England would only grant it on condition of Dupleix's recall: thus while England ceded a few insignificant cities, France resigned an Empire."

"Never did a country," writes Macaulay, "make so great a sacrifice from a love of peace."

The French being out of the field, the English found no difficulty in subduing the Dutch and taking possession of their settlements in India and the East. Thus they were left the sole Christian nation in India to do just what they liked. They had no anxiety from any European Powers, because none existed in India. So they turned their attention to extending their possessions in India. Cornwallis led the way by unjustly attacking Tippoo.

The entertainment of European military adventurers by the native Powers in India caused great anxiety to the Ministry in England, of which Pitt was the leader. Pitt thought this would stand in the way of his founding an Empire in India. So when Lord Mornington came out to India, he was instructed to particularly watch the armies of the native Powers.

Tippoo, Scindia and the Nizam had European adventurers in their employ. When Lord Mornington decided to go to war with Tippoo, he thought

it would be a precautionary measure if he could disband the corps of the Nizam officered by Europeans and especially Frenchmen. He knew that he could not bully Scindia as easily as he could the Nizam. So the Nizam was the first to fall under his scheme of subsidiary alliance. These military adventurers were ready to commit any baseness for a sufficient pecuniary inducement. Had Lord Mornington chosen to corrupt them or buy them over, he would not have found any difficulty in so doing. It was one of the methods suggested to him by Major Kirkpatrick at the Cape. But this method would have cost money, which Lord Mornington was not inclined to spend.

The Resident at Haidarabad at this time was Major William Kirkpatrick's younger brother, named Captain James Achills Kirkpatrick. He was known at the Nizam's Court as Hashmat Jung, the Magnificent in Battle. He was remarkably clever for intriguing among the nobles and had so far reconciled himself to the customs and manners of the East that he solemnised a marriage contract with the daughter of one of the Muhammadan nobles of the Court at Haidarabad, in the *nikha* form known to Muhammadan Law.

This Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick was not free from those vices for which the servants of the Company were notorious. The nobles of Haidarabad com-

plained to Lord Mornington, levelling the charges of bribery, corruption and murder against Captain Kirkpatrick. Meer Allum, a former envoy of the Nizam to the Company, openly declared that Kirkpatrick had once vainly endeavoured to influence him with a bribe.* Of course, Lord Mornington was in

* That Meer Allum should have at all ventured to bring such a charge against the Resident proves to demonstration that the Resident's conduct was not above suspicion. Meer Allum owed his position and very existence to the British; for him, therefore, to have complained against the British Resident shows that the latter's conduct was reprehensible. Meer Allum was the great grandfather of the first Sir Salar Jung. Regarding the appointment of Meer Allum as the Nizam's minister after the death of Azim-ul-Oomrah, a certain Indian gentleman writes:—

"High over all the rival candidates to wear the mantle of Azim-ul-Oomrah towered Meer Allum. Great and varied were his services to his country. . . . . His unsullied character and his vast knowledge of affairs, his intimate familiarity based upon a thorough sympathy with the cardinal aims of the British Indian policy, all combined to afford him an equipment, rare in the circumstances of his age, for the high office of Minister.

".....Although at this time none else in Hyderabad possessed Meer Allum's qualifications, the Nizam was not over-anxious to obtain his services; *and his appointment was mainly due to the strong support of the British Residency.*

".....In a country like India, where British Indian subjects and subjects of the Native States are, in every

duty bound to clear the character of the man who had rendered him valuable political services. But as the so-called 'honorable acquittal' of Warren Hastings

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respect but political, the component parts of the same social organisation, it becomes the obvious function of the suzerain power to educate those States into a capacity to accept and follow its own ideal of good government.....

"This community of ideal can be realized in two ways : firstly, through the instrumentality of ministers appointed to administer the government of native States; secondly, by the direct exercise on the part of native Princes, of their power and authority on the lines laid down by the Paramount Power.

"In the commencement of the nineteenth century, when the supremacy of England was recognised by native Princes without an adequate conception of how that supremacy would qualify their rights in the internal administration of their own States, it was the policy of British statesmanship to have that administration under the control of ministers whose elevation was the result, not of the choice of their own sovereigns, but of the influence of the Supreme Government.

".....It was therefore necessary at the period of time we have reached in the history of Hyderabad, that its Prime Minister should be a statesman who merited the confidence of the British Residency, even more than he had secured the respect of his own sovereign. Meer Allum made the nearest approach to that ideal of a Hyderabad Minister, which, in the early years of the nineteenth century, had been cherished by the British Government. To his appointment, the Nizam gave a reluctant consent."

by the noble peers who pronounced their verdict on his impeachment, does not prove that the first Governor-General of India was not guilty of the charges brought against him, so the whitewashing of Kirkpatrick's character by Lord Mornington is no evidence for any historian to believe that those charges were not genuine. The very fact that some nobles ventured to bring such charges against the Resident, whom they knew to be a great friend of the Governor-General, shows that these charges were not ill-founded.

Such was the character of the man whom Lord Mornington chose as his instrument for depriving the Nizam of his independence.

The Court of the Nizam was also corrupt. There was not at that time a single courtier at Haidarabad who could be called a statesman. Those who imagine that the sceptre of India passed out of the hands of the Muhammadans to the British, should remember the fact that the State which helped the British to gain the sceptre and, at a critical moment when the sceptre was about to fall from their hands, came to their rescue, was a Muhammadan one. That

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Thus, then, it is evident from the circumstances narrated above regarding Meer Allum's elevation that he enjoyed the confidence of the British. For him therefore it was not possible to have made any complaint against the British Resident without good and strong grounds.

State was Haidarabad. It has never been distinguished in possessing any far-seeing statesman for its ruler or minister, or any valiant soldier for its general.

This State owed its origin to want of fidelity, and its survival, to the lack of those qualities which distinguish men of a superior order.

Knowing the nature of this State Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident, Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, to displace the Nizam's corps officered by the French, by the Company's troops officered by the English. The letter is marked "Secret" and dated Fort William, 8th July, 1798. On the very same date, he wrote to the Resident at the Court of the Peishwa at Poona, making proposals similar to those in his letter to the Resident at Haidarabad. At Poona, the Resident did not meet wih the success which crowned Kirkpatrick's proceedings at Haidarabad. For, although Nana Fadnavis was a prisoner, the Poona Court was not so corrupt as that at Haidarabad. The reflection of Nana Fadnavis' splendid genius cast a borrowed light upon the Court which he had once warmed with his sunny radiance. Mornington's letter to Captain Kirkpatrick deserves more than ordinary attention. If the first Nizam-ul-mulk brought about the downfall of the Moghul Empire, the reigning Nizam of 1798 made the English the supreme Power in India. But this supremacy of the English was not a little due

to the instrumentality of the Governor-General Lord Mornington and the Resident at Haidarabad, named Captain Kirkpatrick.

Mornington's letter to Kirkpatrick shows the manner in which the Governor-General was desirous of accomplishing his object. He was conspiring against Tippoo, and to make the conspiracy a success, he did not stoop to consider the nature of the means he was adopting. We shall refer to his conduct towards Tippoo later on, but it is only proper here to state that there was not sufficient cause to go to war with that prince. In his letter to Kirkpatrick, Mornington presumes Tippoo entertained hostile designs against the Company and therefore the Nizam's French officers and men should be dismissed. He took it for granted that the Nizam's French officers would join Tippoo in the event of a war with Mysore. This was a preposterous and gratuitous presumption. The Nizam and the Peishwa as well as the East India Company had entered into an agreement in 1792, known as the Triple Alliance, by which each of the contracting parties were bound to assist each other against the aggression of Tippoo. In the event of Tippoo's invading the territory of any one of the allies, the other members of the Triple Alliance were to combine against him. No opportunity occurred to test the good faith of any one of the allies

regarding this agreement, for Tippoo never troubled any one since his defeat by Cornwallis.

It was against the Law of Nations to deprive any State of its independence in the manner which Lord Mornington proposed. To fight and conquer foreign territory, without any just cause, although reprehensible, is a straightforward procedure compared to the crooked policy of Subsidiary Alliance of which the Irish Governor-General was the author. Again and again, this Governor-General, whom his biographer, a minister of the Christian faith, named Revd. W. H. Hutton, considers "the first ruler of India to stand forth decisively as a Christian," wrote in public and State documents that he was "pursuing no schemes of conquest or extension of dominion, and entertaining no projects of ambition or aggrandizement." But was the project of the Subsidiary Alliance in keeping with this public assurance?

This scheme of 'Subsidiary Alliance' was the diplomatic snare invented by the genius of Lord Mornington on the suggestion of Major Kirkpatrick, late Resident at Haidarabad, to deprive Indians of their independence and extend the territories of the British in India. It is not easy to adequately describe the evil results which have befallen the simple and innocent native powers of India, who reposed unbounded confidence and trust in the Company, by "the Subsidary Alliance" scheme. The author of

this scheme meant nothing short of treachery by asking the independent States of India to adopt it.*

If the scheme in itself is so bad, the method by which it was forced on the State of Haidarabad was also dishonorable. The perusal of Lord Mornington's letters to Captain Kirkpatrick confirms the opinion. No one will give the credit to Lord Mornington of being "an honest thief." He enjoined the Resident at Haidarabad not to divulge the secret of the scheme to the Nizam, but to plot with his minister Azim-ul-Omra. "You will also

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* A certain European writing in the pages of the *Asiatic Quarterly Reivew* for January 1887 said :—

"The subsidiary system, however well it may have worked, was nothing more than a delusion; it was for the purpose of throwing dust into the eyes of the British public. It arose from the repeated orders of the home government to abstain from aggression.....

"To comply with the wishes of Parliament was impossible, so a milder course was adopted. These countries were not ostensibly conquered; the sovereign was allowed to remain on his throne, with all the trappings of royalty, but substantial power was transferred from him to the person of a political agent. British conscience was therefore soothed by substituting for the name of conquest the milder term of annexation and the Company was satisfied to pocket the gains which accrued to it without inquiring too carefully into the method of acquisition."

The simple-minded Asiatics could hardly understand this policy of subsidiary alliance.

urge to Azim-ul-Omra," wrote Lord Mornington to Captain Kirkpatrick, "the credit and honor which it would reflect on his administration if through his means the Nizam and the Peishwa should be enabled to derive reciprocal advantage and permanent security from a state of confusion which appeared to threaten their common ruin."

What was the object of Lord Mornington in thus withholding from the Nizam himself this scheme of the proposed Subsidiary Alliance? To our mind there is no doubt that Azim-ul-Omra was in the pay of the servants of the Company and had been bribed to betray his master. It was no uncommon thing in the time of this "Christian" Governor-General to bribe ministers of the Native Powers of India. The Duke of Wellington, the brother of this "Christian" Governor-General, wrote to Major Shawe from his Camp at Toka, north of the Godavery, on the 24th August, 1803: "You will have observed from my letters to Colonel Close, *that I have urged him to pay the minister,* in order to have accurate information of what passes." The Duke of Wellington, at that time the Honorable Major-General Arthur Wellesley, would not have ventured to bribe the Peishwa's ministers, had there been no precedents for so doing. There is no legal evidence to show that Azim-ul-Omra was receiving bribes from the British officials. But remembering the manner in

which he helped them in carrying out their scheme of "Subsidiary Alliance," and also the fact that the nobles of Haidarabad had levelled charges against Captain Kirkpatrick, there is every probability, amounting almost to certainty, that Azim-ul-Omra was in the pay of the Resident.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, as minister of the Moghul Emperor, betrayed his master and thus precipitated the downfall of the Moghul Empire. The State which had been founded by usurpation, lost its independence, if not existence, by the treachery of its minister.

But to turn to Lord Mornington's letter. The Governor-General wrote to Captain Kirkpatrick:—

> You will urge to Azim-ul-Omra in the strongest terms, the necessity of his taking every precaution to prevent the propositions for the dismission of the French party from transpiring; and you will suggest to him the propriety of dispersing the corps in small parties for the purpose of facilitating its final reduction, and of preventing the officers and privates from passing into the service of Tippoo or of Scindiah.
>
> "Should Azim-ul-Omra consent, in the name of the Nizam, to the proposed conditions, you will then require the march of the troops from Fort St. George."

On the 15th July 1798, Lord Mornington wrote to General Harris, who, in addition to his own duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, was at that time acting as Governor of Madras, as follows:—

"My object is to restore the Nizam to some degree of efficiency and power.* The measure forms part of a much more extensive plan for the establishment of our alliances, previously to the moment when Tippoo may expect to be enabled to attack us. The whole of my arrangements will shortly be communicated to you; at present, I shall only recommend to you, in the most earnest manner, the speedy and effectual execution of the measure directed in the annexed despatch; as I know your honest zeal for the public service, and the activity which accompanies it, I look with confidence to the accomplishment of my anxious wish for the success of that part of my plan, which is now committed to your charge. I imagine, that the best position for assembling the troops destined for Hyderabad, would be in the Guntoor Circar.....I need not recommend the most strict attention to secrecy in the whole of this proceeding; the least intimation of my design would instantly set the whole French faction at Hyderabad in motion, and frustrate the whole of my views It will be necessary to apprize the acting Resident at Hyderabad, of the intended station of the troops, in order that he may communicate with the commanding officer. I repeat my reliance on you for the expeditious and effectual performance of this service, of which the importance in my estimation is so high, that in addition to my applause on public grounds, I shall consider your cordial co-operation as a great claim on my private gratitude.....You will communicate the whole proceeding to the Resident at Poonah

* This is the language of diplomacy, meaning in plain words that the Nizam should be deprived of his independence.

and Hyderabad for *their* information *only*, and not to be imparted to their respective courts."

From the above it is clear that he did not consider it necessary to discuss the propriety or otherwise of the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance with General Harris. He had no authority even from Parliament or the Court of Directors to adopt the method which he did in depriving the Nizam of his independence. He wished to do everything by *coup de main ;* hence his solicitude in instructing General Harris not to impart the information regarding the dark scheme which he was hatching, to the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona. Knowing as he did, how easily he would succeed at Hyderabad in depriving the Nizam of his independence, Lord Mornington, on the 18th July, 1798, wrote to Colonel William Palmer, the Resident at Hyderabad, in a letter marked "Private" :—"that even the total failure of the negotiation at Poona will not prevent me from making an effort to recover the power and authority of the Nizam."

Captain Kirkpatrick at Hyderabad proved a very able lieutenant to Lord Mornington in his conspiracy. How far Azim-ul-Omra himself approved of the scheme, we have no means of knowing. It is from Captain Kirkpatrick's letters only that we learn that the Minister of the Nizam had no objection to the

proposed Subsidiary Alliance. Lord Mornington wrote on the 14th August, 1798, to Captain Kirkpatrick:—

"Azim-ul-Omra's reception of my propositions has afforded me the highest satisfaction; nor could it be expected that he should pledge himself to a greater extent on the first communication of a plan embracing so many complicated interests.....The anxiety with which Azim-ul-Omra presses for the arrival of the additional subsidiary force from Fort St. George as an indispensable preliminary to the destruction of the French party, is a sufficient confirmation of the opinions which I had formed of the dangerous strength of that party, and of the absolute necessity of our interference for the purpose of restraining its overbearing influence.

"It could never have been expected by me that the Minister should take any other step towards the dismission of Perron's army previously to the arrival of our regiments, than that of dispersing the corps of which it is composed, so as to prevent their forming a junction either with a view of exciting a commotion in his Highness's dominions, or of retiring into the territories of any other power. It is indispensably necessary indeed that the intended dismission of the French party should be kept secret until the Minister shall possess the means of attempting it with a certainty of success.....The nature of these measures requires great despatch, the ordinary delays of an Asiatic Court would defeat the whole system."

General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army and Governor of the Madras Presidency, although quite in the dark regarding the

purpose for which Lord Mornington had ordered him to assemble the troops at Guntoor Circar, obeyed the order wihout raising any objections. General Harris was a soldier and it would have been unbecoming on his part to question the propriety of Lord Mornington's order. But the members of the Madras Council were not to let the opportunity pass without a protest. General Harris paid no heed to their opposition. In his minute, dated "Secret Department, 31st July, 1798," he wrote:

"If I believed that the stipulated force was required only for the ordinary service of the Nizam, I would not hesitate to recommend that the execution of the order should be suspended until a reply was received to the representation which has been made to the supreme Government of our difficulties; but, judging from the very pressing private request of the Earl of Mornington, that the detachment may be equipped with the utmost promptitude and caution, that its formation is of great importance to the British interests in India, I should deem myself culpable if I thwarted any general plan which may have been formed by the supreme Government, by delaying, for a moment, to propose to the Board the mode which I deem most proper for the speedy and effectual accomplishment of the part with which we are charged."

For this service, Lord Mornington wrote to him on the 19th August, 1798:—

"I am anxious to avail myself of the earliest opportunity to return you my most cordial thanks for the zeal and resolution with which you have carried my suggestions

into effect; my letter of the 16th July will have informed you how essential a plan to the very existence of the British Empire in India would have been defeated if your honorable firmness had not overcome the suggestions of an opposition which would have pursuaded you to violate the law under the specious pretence of executing the spirit by disobeying the letter of the orders of the Governor-General in Council.

"This opposition I am resolved to crush; I possess sufficient power to do so; and will exert those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public service to be frustrated by such unworthy means. With this view my earnest request to you is, that you will communicate to me without delay the names of those who have arrogated to themselves the power of governing the empire committed to the charge.....The dismission of the French corps at Hyderabad will take place immediately after the arrival of our increased subsidiary force.....It is extremely necessary that you should not divulge this information, until I am enabled to transmit you a more exact state of our negotiations, which I will not fail to do by the first favourable opportunity."

The troops from Fort St. George were now on full march for Haidarabad. So a treaty was entered into with the Nizam. The treaty bore the date of 1st September, 1798. By this treaty, the Nizam signed the death-warrant of his independence. The very preamble of this treaty is a falsehood. It runs as follows:—

"Whereas His Highness Nizam-ul-Mulk Asoph Jah

Bahadur, has from the greatness of existing friendship, expressed a desire for an increase of the detachment of the Honourable Company's troops at present serving His Highness," &c.

This is not true, since the Nizam never expressed any desire for an increase of the Company's troops in his dominion. The fact is that the Company's troops were forced on His Highness by the Governor-General by means of fraud, combined with force. So the preamble of the treaty is not true.

Before the arrival of the Company's troops at Haidarabad, Captain Malcolm was appointed as Assistant to Captain Kirkpatrick. As he has played many parts, as a soldier, diplomatist and administrator with great credit to himself and benefit to his compatriots, a short account of his early career will not be out of place here. He was, as his name indicates, a native of Scotland. His parents were poor and were not above that parsimony which characterises the Scotch people. So they could not afford to give their son any education worth speaking of. Through the interest of Mr. Pasley, a London merchant, brother of Mrs. Malcolm, a cadetship was procured for the boy, who was then not more than twelve years of age. When he was presented before the Court of Directors, to receive their consent to proceed to India, one of the Directors asked him, 'Why, my little man, what would you do if you were to meet Hyder Ali?'

'Do Sir!,' said the young aspirant, in prompt reply, 'I would out with my sword and cut off his head.' 'You will do,' was the rejoinder, 'let him pass.' So the matter ended.

He reached Madras in April, 1783. At that time he was not quite fourteen years old. He was doing duty with his regiment for some years and it was not till 1790 that he got a taste for soldiering in earnest. In that year, Lord Cornwallis went to war with Tippoo, without a just cause or provocation, and the regiment to which Malcolm belonged took part in the campaign. During this campaign, Malcolm was brought into acquaintance with Sir John Kennaway, Mr. Graeme Mercer, and others of the diplomatic corps, then representing British interests at the Court of Haidarabad. This was the turning-point of Malcolm's career. His ambition was fired and he resolved to distinguish himself in the diplomatic line. He commenced the study of Persian and also the complicated questions of the relations of the East India Company with the native powers of India. But it was not till 1798, that his ambition was gratified by his getting the appointment in the Diplomatic Service of India. In that year, Lord Mornington was appointed Governor-General of India; on his way to Calcutta, he stayed for a few days at Madras. Here Malcolm had an opportunity of making the acquaintance of the Governor-General and taking the

liberty of presenting him with some of the papers he had written dealing with questions of Indian politics, and soliciting his Lordship that "when opportunity offered, he might be employed in the diplomatic line of his profession." Lord Mornington was very favorably impressed with Malcolm. In his 'most private and confidential' letter dated 29th July, 1798, to the newly appointed Governor of Madras (Lord Clive), Lord Mornington wrote as follows regarding Malcolm :—

"Captain Malcolm deserves every degree of countenance and protection. He is an officer of great worth, of extremely good sense, and well acquainted with the country languages; he has turned his attention particularly to the study of the political system of India, and to the relative situations and interests of the several native powers; on this subject he is capable of furnishing your Lordship with useful information; and you will find him remarkably diligent, active, and zealous in the execution of any service with which you may entrust him. He has also the advantage of very pleasing and amiable manners."

On the 20th September, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote to Captain Malcolm :

"The office of Resident at Hyderabad having become vacant by the resignation of Colonel Kirkpatrick, I have this day appointed Captain Kirkpatrick to succeed him; and it afforded me great satisfaction at the same time to have it in my power to nominate you Assistant at that Court, having learnt from my brother (the Duke of Wellington, then Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley) that, in a

letter to him, you had stated that such an appointment would be acceptable to you."

So Captain Malcolm set out with all possible speed for Haidarabad and when he arrived there he was of great use to Captain Kirkpatrick in carrying out the scheme of the Governor-General. "Fortunately," writes Mr. Kaye in his Life of Malcolm, "it happened that at the critical moment the troops were mutinying against their officers, because they were in arrears of pay, and had made a prisoner of their French Commandant." Mr. Kaye does not say whether the troops had been instigated by the Resident and his Assistant to mutiny against their French Commandant. For it appears quite probable that the Resident (Captain Kirkpatrick) must have incited the troops against their commandant in order to facilitate the task which the Governor-General had entrusted him with.

But the Resident and his Assistant triumphed over all the difficulties. When the Company's troops arrived at Haidarabad, the Nizam's Minister was, as it were, taken by surprise. He declined to disband the French corps, for such was the demand made to him by the Resident. It appears clear to us that there was some foul play in the transactions which the Resident carried on in getting the French corps disbanded. Perhaps the nature of the step which was forced on the Nizam's government, was not fully

explained by the Resident. For, on no other supposition can we account for Ali Khan wavering at the eleventh hour on being brought face to face with so great a renunciation. Of course this has furnished a theme to some English writers to abuse and vilify Indian Courtiers. Kaye in speaking of the share of Malcolm in assisting Kirkpatrick in disbanding the French corps, writes :

"The lesson that he (Malcolm) learnt was never forgotten. That little reliance is to be placed on the word of an Indian diplomatist, that no native court is willing to fulfil the conditions of a treaty except under strong compulsion," &c., &c.

But the writer quoted above, does not tell us what means were adopted by his compatriot, the Resident at Haidarabad, in forcing the Company's troops on the Nizam. It is a fact which even Kaye could not have denied that religion and morality with his countrymen in India were then at a low ebb. Respecting the treaty the English made with Jaffier Khan, Voltaire sarcastically remarked :—

"We do not find that the English officers swore to this treaty on the Bible : perhaps they had none."

Rev. J. Long wrote in the *Calcutta Review* for September, 1860 :

"We need not look for a high-toned morality in Calcutta a century ago, when we find such men as Drake, the Governor, and Clive bargaining with a traitor to sell

his country, they themselves sharing in the spoil, while those dealers in treason and rebellion pocketed each some 20 lacs sterling. *Force and fraud were the morality of the day*.....What an example set to natives, when Clive, by counterfeiting or forging Admiral Watson's signature to a treaty, defrauded the merchant Omichand of £250,000. Omichand became insane, Clive was made a peer, though he committed the same crime for which Nuncomar was hanged by English law."

Lord Mornington and his agents at Haidarabad, at whose head was Captain Kirkpatrick, were no exceptions to the morality then prevailing among the Europeans in India. "Force and fraud" were their gospel, and it is more than probable that by "force and fraud" they succeeded in getting the Treaty signed by the Nizam on the 1st September, 1798, and installing the Company's troops at Haidarabad. But English writers are all silent on the point. On the contrary, they blame the duped Ali Khan for wavering at the eleventh hour in disbanding the French corps. The French corps had served the Nizam with great fidelity ; to this even the biographer of Sir John Malcolm has borne testimony.

We fail to understand why the Nizam should have been so ungrateful as to disband the French corps. Does it not seem clear that Kirkpatrick conspired and plotted against the independence of the Nizam by making him sign the Treaty of the 1st September, 1798?

Mrs. Graham, in writing of the Peishwa in 1808, said that he was a prisoner and he paid for the guards who kept him a prisoner. Her own words are:—

"The present Peishwa is the son of Raghoba, whom the victories and intrigues of the English have placed on the Musnud, and have reduced to a state little more enviable than that of the prisoner Rajah at Satara, who is the grandson of Sivajee. The Peishwa still keeps up the farce of going to Satara to receive the insignia of his office from the hand of the Raja, but is himself so completely under our dominion, that *he pays a subsidy to maintain the three thousand troops which surround his capital and keep him a prisoner.*"*

The above applies with greater force to the Nizam. He was the first Indian Prince who was ensnared by Lord Mornington and made to pay for men who kept him a prisoner. The methods which Lord Mornington employed for depriving the Nizam of his independence very closely resemble those of Cortes and Pizzaro in their dealings with Montezuma and the unfortunate Inca, Atahualpa. But Lord Mornington and his agents, Captains Kirkpatrick and Malcolm, met with rewards which were denied to Cortes and Pizzaro for their vile deeds.

Lord Mornington's triumph in making the Nizam

* Pages 84 and 85, Journal of a residence in India, by Maria Graham, 1813.

sign the treaty of 1st September, 1798, by which he was to receive a subsidiary force of six thousand sepoys with artillery officered by British subjects, to be paid out of his treasury, and the whole of the officers of the French force were to be dismissed and no Frenchman was in future to be employed by the Nizam, nor any other European without the Company's permission, was cordially approved by Pitt's ministry.

'Your treaty with the Nizam,' wrote Dundas in a letter dated Wimbledon, 18th March 1799, 'effectually puts an end to every alarm upon that part of the business; and whether you consider it negatively as removing the French force from our neighbourhood, or positively in respect of the additional strength it affords to us and the aid it gives to our finances, it is a transaction which tells in our favor in a variety of ways.....your lordship has long before this time anticipated the satisfaction I have received from that transaction, which has been completed in so masterly and effectual a manner.'

In the Council Chamber at Calcutta, the portrait of Lord Mornington, painted by the celebrated artist Robert Home, shows the Governor-General resting his hand on a parchment scroll inscribed, "Subsidiary Treaty, Hyderabad, 1798."* The Britishers ought to

*He was also voted an annuity of £5000 for a term of twenty years by the Court of Directors; and the payment was ordered to date from 1st September 1798, the day on

be grateful to Lord Mornington, for his scheme of the 'Subsidiary Alliance' was the thin end of the wedge introduced for destroying the independence of the native powers of India and extending the influence of, and acquiring territories by, their compatriots in India.

Captain Kirkpatrick was also amply rewarded for the part he played in this transaction. He was made the Governor-General's Honorary Aide-de-Camp, which was a remarkable distinction, as he was the first person on whom this honor was bestowed. Subsequently when several charges of corruption, bribery and murder were levelled against Captain Kirkpatrick, Lord Mornington turned a deaf ear to these charges and 'honorably' acquitted him.

Captain Malcolm was also not forgotten. He was ordered by the Governor-General to proceed to Calcutta, which he did, bearing with him the colors of the disbanded French regiments. Kaye writes:—

"At the capital he (Malcolm) was warmly welcomed. The Governor-General—no mean judge of character—saw at once that he was a man to be trusted and to be employed. In truth, this meeting with Lord Wellesley was the turning-point of John Malcolm's career. From that day his future was made. He found in the Governor-General a

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which the Nizam was made to sign the Treaty by which he was robbed of his independence and a large portion of his dominion.

statesman after his own heart; and Lord Wellesley listened attentively to all that was said by the political assistant, because he found in John Malcolm's ready words fit and forcible expression of the opinions which were taking shape in his mind." (*Lives of Indian officers,* Vol. I, p. 138).

So every one was rewarded at the expense of the Nizam.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SECOND WAR WITH TIPPOO.

If the first war with Tippo was unjust, the war which Lord Mornington declared against him was a great crime. Except in the imagination of Lord Mornington, there was no *causus belli* to go to war with that unfortunate prince. But reading over the despatches of Lord Mornington, it appears clear that he had made up his mind to go to war with Tippoo, long before he set his foot on Indian soil. How far he was influenced in this determination by Lord Cornwallis, it is impossible to say. But his intimate friendship with Cornwallis and the high estimate which the latter entertained of him, makes one suspect that Cornwallis had some share in Lord Mornington's making up his mind to go to war with Tippoo. It will be remembered that Cornwallis wanted to altogether crush Tippoo and with this object in view, he did not accept the negotiations for peace which Tippoo tried to open, and he even was about to lay siege to Seringapatam. It was the earnest appeal of the Mahrattas which prevented Cornwallis from accomplishing his desire. But he had broken the back of Tippoo. It was impossible

for that prince to rise again or extend the boundaries of his contracted dominion.*

* Regarding Lord Mornington, Lord Cornwallis thus wrote to Sir George Barlow, the Acting Governor-General of India, on the departure of Sir John Shore for England :—

"Lord Mornington, your new Governor-General, is a man of very considerable abilities, and most excellent character. I have known him from his childhood, and have always lived on the most friendly habits with him. * * * * *Having assured you that Lord Mornington thinks exactly as I do both about India* and yourself, I have only to add my sincere good wishes for your health and prosperity."

From the words italicised in the above extract does it not appear clear that Lord Cornwallis commissioned his intimate friend Lord Mornington to complete what he had left unfinished, namely, the subjugation of Tippoo, for it was he (Cornwallis) who considered the existence of that Muhammadan Prince as a great danger to the British supremacy in India? Colonel Beatson in his "View of the origin and conduct of the war with Tipu Sultan," writes :— "The victories of the Marquis Cornwallis had greatly facilitated any future plan of operation against the power of Tipoo Sultan. By diminishing his resources, and increasing *our own*, they had produced a two-fold effect. And the extension of our frontier, by the addition of the Barramaul and Salem Districts, and a thorough knowledge of the defences of Seringapatam and of the routes leading to that city, were considered at that moment an inestimable advantage."

It is not improbable that Lord Cornwallis had im-

In his first letter to Mr. Dundas from the Cape of Good Hope, dated 23rd February 1798, Lord Mornington expressed his hostile intentions against Tippo. Of course, he was suffering from Francophobia. He wrote:—

"If the war is to continue in Europe without extending to the continent of India in the first instance the danger of French intrigue acting with such an instrument as I have described, would be greatly aggravated. But if the war should extend to the continent of India, and if we should be under the necessity of calling forth the strength of our allies *to assist us in any contest with Tippoo*, what assistance could we expect from the Nizam, the main body of whose army would be officered by Frenchmen, or by the agents of France, and the correspondents of Tippoo himself."

From the words put in italics in the above extract, it is clear that Lord Mornington had made up his mind during his stay at the Cape of Good Hope to go to war with Tippo. Tippo had not then shown any hostile intentions. How did the Governor-General *elect* express such an opinion as that quoted above without being on the spot and judging for

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pressed on Lord Mornington the ease with which Tippoo's dominion could be invaded. It is, therefore, that we find Tippoo the first object of his (Mornington's) eager attention. Just as a cat watches the rat, so was this Christian Governor-General watching the Muhammadan Prince.

himself if the reports and rumors spread against Tippo had any foundations in truth at all?

From the very day of his assuming charge of office as Governor-General of India, he commenced plotting to ruin Tippoo. British historians of India, with the exception of Mr. James Mill, blinded by their prejudices, have not done justice to Tippoo. That prince has been described as cruel, and a tyrant. But these charges against Tippoo are not substantiated by his conduct and system of government. Even Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, who as a firebrand always preferred war to peace, for every war brought him distinctions and honors, was obliged to admit that Tippoo was a sagacious ruler. That Scotch officer wrote as follows:—

"Tippoo is generally described as a Prince equally destitute of humanity and reason, as one whose passions ever triumph over his judgment.

"Whatever arguments may be brought against the first part of this accusation from the treatment of his subjects, the tyrannical cruelty he exercised on his English prisoners will ever warrant their countrymen in affixing it on his name.*

* It is questionable if he exercised any tyrannical cruelty on his English prisoners. They were prejudiced against Tippoo, and consequently their statements should be received with great reserve. They were smarting under the humiliation they had been subjected to by Tippoo and hence their animosity against him.

"As to the latter points, I am not disposed to allow them just, as general positions. His conduct since the peace of 1792, has shewn that, though he possesses those feelings which are allowed not only to be natural, but honorable to a humbled monarch (*viz.*, a spirit of ambition to regain lost power and fame, and a spirit of revenge against the state that has humbled him), yet that he pursues these objects, not with that heedless and impatient rage that characterizes a man guided wholly by his passions, but with that unremitting activity and zealous warmth which we would look for in a Prince, who had come to a serious determination to endeavour by every reasonable means in his power to regain what he had lost.

"To prove what I have said, I shall take a short retrospect of the leading features of his conduct since 1792.

"This was first marked by an honourable and unusually punctual discharge of the large sum which remained due at the conclusion of the peace to the allies. Instead of sinking under his misfortunes, he exerted all his activity to repair the ravages of war. He began to add to the fortifications of his capital—to remount his cavalry—to recruit and discipline his infantry—to punish his refractory tributaries—and to encourage the cultivation of his country, which was soon restored to its former prosperity." (Wellesley's Dispatches, Vol. I. Appendix, pp. 668-669).

Such was the Prince whom the English had painted in the blackest color possible. Tippoo's greatest faults were that he was a brave soldier and a successful administrator. Therefore he was a thorn in the side of the British. Tippoo styled them 'the most faithless and usurping of mankind.'

The allegations against Tippoo were that he was conspiring with the French to wage war against the English. Tippoo was an independent sovereign and his State constituted what in modern times would be called an "International State." He had perfect liberty to solicit the aid of France in his difficulties. In modern times all the Christian states of Europe are armed to the teeth, and make secret treaties and covert overtures against other states. But that does not justify any state to go to war against another, unless hostilities are openly declared. Judging by their standard, even supposing that Tippoo entertained hostile intentions against the English, that was no justification for the latter to go to war with him.

We have not to judge any sovereign and any international state by their intentions or political prejudices, but should see whether they are in a position to carry out their intentions and prejudices into actual execution. The mere expression of a threat by a sovereign is no justification for any power to declare hostilities against him. If this were to constitute a *causus belli,* there would be no peace in this world. In Christendom, to-day, there is not a single Power which does not cherish hostile intentions, and sometimes even make use of threatening language, against a neighbouring Christian state. But this is not considered enough for a declaration of war.

Let us consider the allegations made against Tippoo, and see whether these constituted enough justification for war with him. The story is not a very long one. On the 9th June, 1798, Lord Mornington forwarded to General Harris, who was at that time acting governor of Madras, a document alleged to have been published at the Mauritius. In forwarding this to General Harris, Lord Mornington wrote:—

"Although I imagine that the enclosed Proclamation must have reached you, I think it most advisable to transmit a copy of it to you. There seems to be so little doubt that the Proclamation really was published at the Mauritius, that it must become a matter of serious discussion between this Government and Tippoo. How such a discussion may terminate it is utterly impossible to say. Perhaps the result of this may be to prove that M. Malartic has exaggerated, or wholly misrepresented the intentions of Tippoo; but on the other hand, if Tippoo should choose to avow the objects of his embassy to have been such as are described in the Proclamation, the consequences may be very serious, and may ultimately involve us in the calamity of war. I wish you to be apprised of my apprehensions on this subject, and to prepare your mind for the possible event. You will, therefore, turn your attention to the means of collecting a force, if necessity should unfortunately require it; but it is not my desire that you should proceed to take any public steps towards the assembling of the army before you receive some further intimation from me."

It will be observed from the above letter that

the Governor-General wanted to make the Proclamation a subject "of serious discussion" with Tippoo. But unfortunately he never did so. He assembled the troops, and, as will be related further on, went himself to Madras to demand satisfaction from Tippoo, without giving him a chance to explain the allegations and rumors that had been circulated against him. The Governor-General himself did not entertain peaceful intentions towards Tippoo. For, on the 20th June, 1798, we find him writing to General Harris that

"I now take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you with my final determination. I mean to call upon the allies without delay, and to assemble the army upon the coast with all possible expedition.....*It is my positive resolution to assemble the army upon the coast*.....

".....If you could.....send.....any intelligent officer who might be capable of entering into all the details of your force; of the seasons, and all other circumstances connected with the object of striking a sudden blow against Tippoo before he can receive any foreign aid, you would greatly assist me in the arrangement of my measures upon this serious occasion.

".....you will of course feel the absolute necessity of keeping the contents of this letter secret."

But curiously enough, Lord Mornington did not "call upon the allies without delay." Without ascertaining the views of the allies on the subject, he presumed that they were not in a position to render

him any help. He argued that the Nizam's army being chiefly officered by the French would not fight against Tippoo. But it was convenient for him to forget that the same army had six years previously taken the field against him. Against every received principle of the law of nations, he forced the Company's troops on the Nizam under the euphemistic words "subsidiary alliance." In his heart of hearts Lord Mornington was certain that he had no justification for declaring war against Tippoo and therefore he was afraid of "calling upon the allies." He knew that they would not combine with him in an unrighteous war and therefore he conspired to deprive them of their independence. This appeared to be a preliminary measure necessary before "striking a sudden blow against Tippoo." We have already described the manner in which the Nizam was reduced to the wretched position of "a prisoner."

But the Peishwa was not to be so easily made "a prisoner." Either the Resident at Poona lacked the scheming and intriguing propensities of Captain Kirkpatrick or the Peishwa's ministers were not to be so easily seduced as to betray their master and their national independence ; anyhow at Poona, Lord Mornington's conspiracy did not succeed. The Peishwa being one of their allies whom the British had solemnly promised to help against his enemies was suffered to be bullied by Scindiah. The

English did not come to his rescue. They did not attack the Scindiah's territory for the threatening attitude which he had assumed towards the Peishwa. Lord Cornwallis found a pretext to go to war with Tippoo, because it was alleged that the latter meditated attacking the Travancore Raja, who was an ally of the Company of Christian Merchants. But Scindiah, who was actually in the dominion of the Peishwa, was not coerced by the British. The latter had received more help from the Peishwa than from the Travancore Raja, and had they any sense of gratitude they would have, as in honor bound, helped the Peishwa. But they wanted to weaken the Peishwa. The Peishwa's ministers knew that the war which the English were going to declare against Tippoo was an unjust one. Nana Fadnavis, who had been once more allowed to wield the ministerial sceptre of the Mahratta Empire, was not the man to help the British in their unjust and aggressive war. Besides, it was not his policy to crush Tippoo. It was the Mahrattas who dissuaded Cornwallis from annihilating Tippoo.

So Lord Mornington did not "call upon the allies." He made the Nizam "a prisoner" and left the Peishwa to the tender mercies of Scindiah. He found his opportunity now "to strike a sudden blow against Tippoo."

Mr. James Mill is the only English historian who has tried to show that the war against Tippoo was not a just one. He has proved almost to demonstration that there were no just grounds for believing that the French would have invaded India, by forming an alliance with Tippoo. For our own part, we think it is superfluous and unnecessary to expose the fallacious reasonings of the Franko-phobist governor-general. He was fully resolved on the war and, as with the wolf in the fable, the allegation of the French intrigue served as the pretext of the muddied stream to "devour" Tippoo. He paid no attention to the representations of the Madras Government. General Harris, who was then the Acting Governor of Madras, wrote to Lord Mornington, on the 23rd June, 1898, as follows:—

"For my own part I have no doubt (as matters now stand with the French) but Tippoo will explain away our just grounds of complaints.

"His inveteracy to us will only end with his life, and he will always seize any opportunity that offers to annoy us; but, notwithstanding this, and that the political circumstances of India are now much in our favour, it perhaps still remains a matter of serious consideration whether, in our very great want of cash, and the effect our being engaged in war in this country may have on the affairs in Europe, it would not be better that he should be allowed to make the amende honorable if he be so inclined, than that we should avail ourselves of the error he has run into, and endeavour to punish him for his insolence."

The Memorandum which Mr. Josias Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Madras, wrote on the 6th July, 1798, on the possibility of an early rupture with Tippoo Sultan, displays views of real statesmanship. He wrote:—

"Whatever may be the object of Tippoo's embassy to the Mauritius, or whatever may be the event of it in Europe, the late intelligence from the islands, which leaves us no room to doubt that the military have been sent to France, and the French marine dispersed, satisfies me that no immediate co-operation can take place; and consequently, that no rupture is to be apprehended but by our own provocation."

But all these words of wisdom and justice were thrown away on the Governor-General like so much water on the duck's back. That man had no sense of right and wrong left in him. To talk of justice to him was like preaching morality to a horde of robbers while they are dividing their booty.

While the Governor-General was thus conspiring against Tippoo, it is necessary to turn to that Muhammadan Prince and ascertain if he had any intention of violating the terms of the Treaty of 1792. On the 26th April, 1798, a letter from Tippoo was received at Fort William addressed to Sir John Shore. In it that Muhammadan Prince wrote:—

"I have been favored with your letter, notifying your intention of returning to Europe, and the nomination of

Lord Mornington, who is of rank to the office of Governor-General, in whom the same disposition would be manifested with yourself to cultivate and improve the friendship and good understanding subsisting between the two states, and an inviolable adherence to the engagements by which they are connected. It is very well; you must impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between us, and constantly favor me with letters communicating your health and welfare...."

"Believing my friendly heart disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states, I hope you will always gratify me by letters notifying your welfare."

To Lord Mornington also the Muhammadan Prince addressed a letter received at Calcutta on the 10th July, 1798. In it he wrote:—

"Your Lordship's friendly letter containing the agreeable intelligence of your arrival at Calcutta, and your taking charge of the Company's affairs, reached me at the happiest of times, and afforded me a degree of pleasure and satisfaction that cannot be adequately expressed upon paper. May the Almighty prosper to your Lordship this event! By the divine grace, the exalted fabric of union and attachment, and the firm foundations of friendship and harmony between the two states, are in full strength. To adhere to the obligations of existing treaties, is a constant object with me. Your Lordship is from your heart a friend and well-wisher, and I am confident will hold in mind the observance of union and concord."

The English lay the charge of duplicity, prevarication and falsehood at the door of Tippoo ; they say that that Muhammadan Prince was intriguing with the French and was at the same time making protestations of friendship to the English. It is problematical and not quite proved that Tippoo's conduct savored of duplicity. But the fact is, about which there can be no question, that the Governor-General and the British generally were double-faced lying men. For while they were conspiring against Tippoo, they humored that Prince by their protestations of friendship and kind regards. It is these men who ought to be charged with duplicity and not Tippoo.

Colonel Gurwood, who edited Wellington's Despatches, the first edition of which was published in 1834, wrote :—.

"Some of the publications,.....have ascribed to the Indian Government at home, and to the new Governor-General (Lord Mornington), an inclination to take advantage of any pretext for reducing the power of Tippoo Sultaun : and for removing from India the French officers in the service of the native princes. This assumption is directly at variance with the general tenor of the public records. On the contrary, it appears that one of the first acts of the new Governor-General was to address a conciliatory letter to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 14th of June 1798, in

reply to an application received by Sir John Shore at the moment of his departure claiming restitution of Wynaad."*

It appears clear that Colonel Gurwood was not aware of the public despatches of Lord Mornington, for that Governor-General wrote to General Harris on the 9th June, 1798, that is, five days previous to his so-called "conciliatory letter" to Tippoo, to assemble troops. This "conciliatory letter" is an instance of duplicity.

Lord Mornington played his part of duplicity extremely well. He appointed a Commission to investigate Tippoo's claims and upon the Commission making a report in favor of Tippo Wynaad was restored to him.

The Governor-General was biding his time. Had he been a straightforward and honest man he would not have adopted the double-dealing procedure towards Tippoo. Instead of appointing a Commission to investigate Tippoo's claims and restoring to him Wynaad, and thus making the world believe that he had no hostile intentions against Tippoo, he should have taken that Prince to task for his alleged intrigues with the French. But a straightforward policy would not have served his purpose. So while he was humoring that Prince, he was devising means to cut his throat. When all his preparations

* Wellington's Despatches (1st Edition) Vol. I, p. 34.

were complete, then he threw off the disguise and shewed himself in his true colors.

On the other hand, Tippoo's communications to the Governor-General never contained anything which suggested the least suspicion of his hostile intentions. On 28th September, 1798, Lord Mornington received a letter from Tippoo, in which that Muhammadan Prince wrote that

"Mischief-makers, by starting empty disputes and altercations, hope to accomplish their own purposes, but by the favor of God, the fountains of union and harmony between the two States possess too much purity and clearness to be sullied by the devices of self-interested persons."

Poor Tippoo was soon to be disillusioned. He in his pure Oriental simplicity, had no idea of the measures which the Irish Governor-General was pursuing for his destruction. Although Lord Mornington received Tippoo's letter on the 28th September, 1798, he did not condescend to reply to it till November of that year. In the meanwhile he had succeeded in making the Nizam "a prisoner." There was also at that time no longer any fear of invasion of India by the French. In October, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote to the Chairman of the East India Company:—

"I trust that Tippoo will not venture to move without having obtained a more effectual succour from the French than they have yet afforded to him; and I am equally

confident that the vigilance of our Government at home, and of our fleets, will oppose every possible obstacle to the approach of the French towards this quarter of the globe. *But I still feel the necessity of active and early preparation for war.*"

Where was the necessity of active and early preparation for war, when he knew that the French had been defeated and that Nelson had totally annihilated the Toulon fleet? We find the Governor-General writing to Tippoo on the 4th November, 1798, on the signal victory achieved by Nelson. He wound up his letter by saying,

"Confident from the union and attachment subsisting between us, that this intelligence will afford you sincere satisfaction, I could not deny myself the pleasure of communicating it."

The Governor-General had not yet taken off his mask. He wrote to Tippoo what he believed in his heart of hearts was not true. He was playing the hypocrite. But on the 8th November, 1798, that is, four days after the letter from which the above sentences have been extracted, he thought the time had come to show himself in his true colors. He assumed an insolent tone towards Tippoo. He wrote to that Muhammadan Prince:—

"It is impossible that you should suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies

of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country," etc.

How are we to reconcile this with the sentiments expressed by the same Christian writer in his letter of the 4th November, 1798 in which he communicated the news of the disaster that had befallen the French in Egypt? This is a puzzle which the British alone can solve.

He also threatened Tippoo with the deputation of a British officer to his Court to demand from him such districts as would appear to the Governor-General and his non-Christian allies effectual for the maintenance of peace. The officer selected for this purpose was Major Doveton.

But before he could have expected any reply from Tippoo, Lord Mornington not only prepared the troops, but ordered the Indian Navy to be in readiness to swoop down on Tippoo's territories at a moments' notice. On the 13th December, 1798, the Governor-General wrote to His Excellency Rear-Admiral Rainier,

"The destruction of the French party in the Deccan, the advanced state of our preparations for war on the coasts of Coromandel and of Malabar, and the expected arrival of large reinforcements from the Cape and from Europe, place us in a commanding situation in the peninsula of

India. Being convinced of the hostile nature of Tippoo's views, I am resolved to avail myself of the present favourable moment to reduce his powers of offence, either by the terror or by the actual employment of our arms."

This is all plain speaking. Those who try to justify the Governor-General's attack on Tippoo on the supposition that the French would have invaded India, had that Muhammadan Prince been left alone, can hardly adduce any arguments convincing to any intelligent man that at the time when Lord Mornington was bullying Tippoo, the French were in a position to carry out the scheme with which they were credited, that is, of the invasion of India. The fear of the French was no reason for any unjust attack on any Indian sovereign.

Lord Mornington now left Calcutta for Madras to be near the scene of action. He arrived at Madras on the 31st December, 1798. On his arrival he received Tippoo's reply to his insolent letter of the 8th November. That Muhammadan Prince wrote his reply in courteous and at the same time dignified language. It is necessary to make large extracts from this letter to show his view of the case.

Regarding the so-called embassy of his to the Mauritius and the Proclamation of the French Governor of that island, which had served as handles to the British for justifying their war with Tippoo, that Muhammadan Prince wrote: —

"In this Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to the Mauritius, from where forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment. Such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar (the gift of God); and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports with the view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars.

"It is the wish of my heart, and my constant endeavour, to observe and maintain the articles of the agreement of peace, and to perpetuate and strengthen the basis of friendship and union with the Sircar of the Company Bahadur * * * And I am resident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amusing myself with hunting * * * In this case, the allusion to war in your friendly letter, and the following passage, namely, that prudence required that both the Company and their allies should adopt certain measures of precaution 'and self-defence' have given me the greatest surprise." (Wellesley's Dispatches, Vol. I, p. 382).

Regarding the deputation of Major Doveton with which the Governor-General had threatened him, Tippoo wrote:—

"It has been understood, by the blessing of the Almighty, at the conclusion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four Sircars were so

firmly established and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable;...and be an example to the rulers of the age; nor are they, nor will they ever be liable to interruption. I cannot imagine that means more effectual than these can be adopted, for giving stability to the foundations of friendship and harmony, promoting the security of states, or the welfare and advantage of all parties." (*Ibid*, p. 383.)

Those who charge Tippoo with duplicity should remember that that Prince was an orthodox Muhammadan and a religious man. Christians *may* take the name of God in vain, but such is never the case with strict and orthodox Muhammadans. When Tippoo, swearing on God, declared that he had no hostile intentions against the British, that was sufficient guarantee of his good faith. No further security could be exacted from an orthodox Mussalman.*

* Mr. James Mill writes:—"Another feature in the character of Tippoo was his religion, with a sense of which his mind was most deeply impressed. He spent a considerable part of every day in prayer. He gave to his kingdom, or state, a particular religious title, *Khodadad*, or God-given; and he lived under a peculiarly strong and operative conviction of the superintendence of a Divine Providence. His confidence in the protection of God was, indeed, one of his snares; for he relied upon it to the neglect of other means of safety."

To charge such a God-fearing man with duplicity, prevarication and falsehood, is, to say the least, ungenerous. Does it not remind one of the saying of Schopenhauer: "it is generally the old story of the dog barking at its

But the Christian Governor-General was not satisfied with this. On the 9th January, 1799, that is, after receiving and considering the contents of Tippoo's letter for over nine days, Lord Mornington wrote a long letter to Tippoo. In this letter the Governor General recapitulated Tippoo's conduct and was so unreasonable as to demand an answer within twenty-four hours after its receipt by Tippoo. For wrote the Christian noble in concluding the letter:—

"I most earnestly request that your reply may not be deferred for more than one day after this letter shall reach your presence; dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs." (*Ibid*, p. 400.)

It was an ultimatum to Tippoo. The Christian Governor General had not even the decency to allow sufficient time to the Muhammadan Prince to consider the contents of his long letter. However, with his consummate hypocrisy, to show to the world that his intentions were pacific, the Governor General wrote another long letter to Tippoo on the 16th January, 1799. With this communication, he forwarded to Tippoo the Sublime Porte's letter.

These letters must have awakened painful feelings in the breast of Tippoo. His father had once

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own image; it is himself that he sees and not another dog as he fancies."

shown mercy to the British when they sued for peace. Had Hyder been hard on the fallen foes, his son would not have been subjected to such bitter humiliation as Tippoo was at this time. It is, among other causes, the spirit of kindness to their enemies which has brought on the ruin of the Asiatics. Even Tippoo had at one time held in the hollow of his hand those English who subsequently blackened his character and involved him in miseries and disasters which ended in his death.

The proud spirit of Tippoo would not yield to the coercion of the Governor General. Surrounded on all sides, both on sea and land, by the British enemies, he tried his best to fight the troops led by their Christian officers. He did not reply to the Governor General's threatening letter within the stipulated period. So on the 3rd February, 1799, the Governor General issued orders to the British armies to march on the territories of Tippoo. Resistance for Tippoo was almost hopeless. He was not prepared for the war and had no resources to successfully withstand the overwhelming force that had been brought against him. So, on the 13th February, 1799, he wrote to the Governor General to despatch Major Doveton. But the Governor General considered Tippoo's proposals for peace as insulting to the might and majesty of the Power of which he was the representative. On the 22nd February, 1799, he

formally declared war against Tippoo. General Harris was placed in supreme command of all the troops.

General Harris was instructed to seduce the subjects of Tippoo; for the Governor General wrote to him:—

"I have reason to believe that many of the tributaries, principal officers, and other subjects of Tippoo Sultan, are inclined to throw off the authority of that Prince, and to place themselves under the protection of the Company and of our allies. The war in which we are again involved by the treachery and violence of the Sultaun, renders it both just and expedient that we should avail ourselves, as much as possible, of the discontents and disaffection of his people." (*Loc. Cit.* p. 442).

How very edifying for a highly professing Christian to write this. Lord Mornington, as a model Christian, was in the habit of daily praying to God "Lead us not into temptations." But he considered it quite consistent with his religious faith to lead others into temptations. For this nefarious business, he appointed a regular commission. He wrote to General Harris:—

"Being apprehensive that your more important avocations will not admit of your taking any part in the details of this business, I hereby direct you to constitute a commission for this purpose, to consist of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel Close, Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, assistant to the Resi-

dent at Hyderabad; with Captain Macaulay, to act as Secretary to the Commission."—(*Ibid*).

So it was not by means of arms alone that victory was obtained over Tippoo, but the British encouraged his subjects to betray him. This accounts for the ease with which Tippoo was crushed. There are reasons to believe that Lord Cornwallis's success in his first war with Tippoo was also achieved by means of foul play. The following letter from Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, leaves no room for doubt that in the First Mysore War in which at first General Meadows was appointed in chief command of the forces which operated against Tippoo, there was treachery in the camp of that Muhammadan Prince. The letter is dated Fort St. George, 29th Nov., 1798, and it runs as follows:—

"I have the honor to transmit for your perusal a paper of intelligence, on the correctness of which, as far as it goes, I believe you may with confidence rely. It comes through the channel of a friend of the family of the former king of Mysore, *who had communication and engagements* with Lord Pigot, Lord Macartney, and Sir William Meadows I believe, and whose information during the periods of their governments was found to be of importance, and invariably to be depended upon. This person, Tremal Row, keeps up a connection with the old Queen of Mysore, who is confined by Tippoo, and whose only hopes of the restoration of the family arise from the prospect of a war. Upon this unfortunate Lady's views and wishes, I expect very soon to be

able to send your Lordship a paper, which in that event may become a subject of your consideration. Tremal Row is also connected with some persons immediately employed in the Sultan's Government,. . . . . "—(*Ibid*, p. 361).

So the conspiracy was formed with the Ex-Queen and principal inhabitants of Mysore against Tippoo. There is no reason to believe that Tippoo's government was tyrannical and oppressive. It should be remembered that his subjects were not disarmed. Had there been any mis-government the people would have revolted against him, but this they never did. But now they were tempted to revolt against Tippoo. The members of the Commission appointed by the Governor General, smothered their conscience and in right earnest set to work in corrupting Tippoo's subjects.

The troops were now on full march towards Tippoo's capital. In a secret letter to General Harris, dated Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799, the Governor-General furnished him with instructions regarding the steps he should take should Tippoo send him an embassy with the object of opening negotiations for peace. The General was enjoined to vigorously prosecute his advance on Seringapatam ; for in Lord Mornington's opinion, "obtaining possession of that City would open so extensive and complicated a change in the political state of India, as to require the most comprehensive system of new arrangements."

General Harris was a soldier. Such a man is not the one to prefer peace to the honors and glories of war. Tippoo wrote several times to him to appoint proper persons for conducting a conference and renewing the business of a treaty. But he was determined not to negotiate with Tippoo. The rumored hoarded treasure of Tippoo tempted him to push on and crush him. This he did. On the 4th May, 1799, Tippoo's palace was entered and that Prince met the glorious death of a valiant soldier with the sword in his hand. The religious tenets of the Hindoos as well as of Muhammadans assign a prominent place in Heaven to those brave soldiers who never flinch from their duties but die fighting.*

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* Regarding the circumstances leading to the death of Tippoo Sultan, see Colonel Mils's *Tipu Sultaun* (Panini office edition, pp. 179 *et seq*, as well as the Appendix pp. 208-209).

After the fall of Seringapatam excesses were committed on the helpless inhabitants of that unfortunate place, compared to which Tippoo's alleged cruelties dwindle into insignificance. The authors of these excesses were mostly British soldiers. Colonel the Hon'ble Arthur Wellesley wrote to General Harris on the day following that of the capture of Seringapatam :—"I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder."

Again, he wrote :—"Until the provost executes three

That he was the victim of foul conspiracy, that the British entertained no kind feelings towards him, for they were jealous of his power and ability, no one who reads the contemporary records will fail to notice. Even the Chief Justice of Bengal, Sir John Anstruther, from whom at least the public would expect dispassionate views on the burning political questions of the day, was as great a fire-eater as the youngest subaltern of the lines. In a letter dated Calcutta 27th March, 1799, this man wrote to Lord Mornington :—

"I am not sure that I have made up my mind to wish submission on the part of Tippoo without some action which shall disperse or destroy part of his army, and tarnish his military reputation. A treaty following a battle operates more powerfully upon the mind than one which leaves the army entire."

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or four people, it is impossible to expect order or indeed safety. There are at this moment, sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart's in the town. . . . . It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations."

It should be remembered that these poor inhabitants had been assured by the Governor-General's Proclamation that their lives and properties would be respected by the troops under the Chief Command of General Harris. It was in this manner by plundering the people that the terms of the Proclamation were given effect to by the invading army!

Again, when the news of Tippoo's death reached Calcutta, the same judge wrote to the Governor General on the 17th May, 1799 :—

"It is with the most sincere satisfaction and heartfelt pleasure that I congratulate you upon the most brilliant and glorious event which ever occurred in our Indian history.

"Every man in the country will feel his security increased, and his character raised by the destruction of a power long looked up as the only one capable of resisting the force of our arms. The events of the last war, which, after two years of, I may say, defeat, ended in the third in a politic peace, proved to every native power the ability of a native power to resist even a confederacy against him with effect, at least, if not with success. It was reserved for the promptitude and vigor of your government to shew our power irresistibe—to render our empire permanent and secure in India, and your name immortal."

Tippoo's death was commemorated by the British by thanks-offerings in their churches. Revd. Hutton, in his biographical sketch of the Marquess Wellesley, writes that the Governor General

"marked the conquest of Mysore by a day of solemn thanksgiving. On February 6, 1800, the Governor-General, the Chief Justice, the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Alured Clarke), the members of Council, the Judges, and the public officers, civil and military, proceeded on foot to the New Church at Calcutta. The Streets were lined with troops, and royal salutes were fired during the procession and at the *Te Deum*. It was the first occasion on which any national recognition of Religion had taken place; and

it was marked by all the pomp and solemn dignity which the Governor-General could give it."

Every Christian who participated in this transaction received his reward. The Governor-General received a step in rank and became henceforth known as the Marquess of Wellesley. Moreover, he was made Captain General and Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in the East Indies.

General Harris now received a peerage. He was the son of a poor parson. As he himself wrote to the Governor General on the 27th June, 1799:

"An humble clergyman's son, thrown very early in life into the army, entirely a soldier of fortune, with scarcely any "assistance save his own exertions, is little likely to have any hereditary place he would chuse to commemorate."

This son of an humble clergyman had the vanity of soliciting the grant of the dignity of a peerage. His promptness in attacking Tippoo and not negotiating with him for peace is to be explained by the fact that had peace been concluded with that Prince, he (General Harris) would not have had any share in that prize money which raised him from the low position of being the penniless "son of an humble clergyman" to the proud distinction of General Lord Harris of Seringapatam.

The Hon'ble Arthur Welllesley's career and

fortune were made at Seringapatam. It was here that he learnt those lessons in duplicity (commonly called diplomacy) and corrupting others which made him ultimately the conqueror of Napoleon.

Tippoo's dominion was also partitioned. The English, of course, had the lion's share, but a slice of the territories was also given to the Nizam. The descendant of the old Raja whom Haidar had made a prisoner, was given a portion of Mysore to rule. This territory is now known as the State of Mysore—the model state in India.*

Thus ended the last war with Tippoo, the successful result of which benefited the British in so many different ways. In its origin, in its progress

* The creation of the new state and restoration of the descendant of the Rajas of Mysore was not undertaken from any motives of philanthropy, but as a reward for the manner in which the members of the ex-royal family of Mysore had helped the British by betraying Tippoo. The descendant of the Hindoo Royal family of Mysore on whom the state was bestowed as a gift was an infant. So it was that the astute Hindoo Minister, Purniya, was appointed to be the Diwan. This Hindoo minister bore very close resemblance to the French statesman Talleyrand. He had loyally served Haidar and his son, Tippoo, but without much regret for the fate of the members of the family of his late Muhammadan masters, he as promptly entered into the service of his Hindu master, as if no revolution had taken place in the political situation of his country.

and in its termination, it fills one of the darkest pages in the history of India.

It has not appeared necessary to us to discuss the question of Tippoo's alleged intrigues with the French. Nowhere has Mr. James Mill in his able work on Indian History shown greater judgment and cogent reasoning than in his handling of this subject. Mr. Mill has thoroughly exposed the fallacious arguments on which the Governor General based his case against Tippoo. Even the editor of his History, Professor Horace Hayman Wilson, has not been able to controvert Mill's views. But it is necessary to state that after Tippoo's death, it has been alleged that some documents written in French were found in his Palace from which the Governor General concluded that Tippoo had been intriguing with the French against the English. Mr. Mill writes:—

"When the papers of Tippoo, found in the palace of Seringapatam, were examined, the correspondence was discovered which had passed between him and the French. With this Lord Wellesley shows that he was singularly delighted; as if, without such means of persuasion, he had dreaded, that the grounds of the war, successfully terminated, would not have appeared satisfactory to all those whose approbation he was interested in obtaining"—(*History*, Vol. VI, p. 109).

Mr. Mill has taken some pains in demonstrating the innocent nature of the whole correspondence. But should not one suspect that some of the docu-

ments which were held up as incriminating Tippoo, documents in which that Prince was alleged to have proposed offensive and defensive alliance with France for the purpose of expelling the English from India, were forgeries? We should remember that the Governor of Madras at the time of the War with Tippoo, was the son of that Clive who as a reward for deceiving Amin Chand by forgery was raised to the peerage. The Governor General himself was a French scholar; he had kept a French woman as his concubine. This fact also should be remembered in suspecting the genuineness of the French documents incriminating Tippoo.

It was a singular fact that not more than 120 Frenchmen were found in Tippoo's service when Seringapatam was captured. This shows Tippoo's wisdom, for which he was reputed. He had derived an important lesson from the campaign of 1792 when the French officers, men on whom he had relied for help, deserted him at the most critical moment. It was therefore that he was so bitter against the French, whom he considered to be "of a crooked disposition, faithless, and the enemies of mankind." To have suspected him of allying himself with the French was preposterous nonsense. But it served the purpose of the English to make this a justifiable plea for attacking Tippoo. With the death of Tippoo did not end the troubles of the British in Mysore. There

were men in that principality who were opposed to place it at the feet of the conquering English. Chief amongst them was Dhoondia Waugh, whom the British historians are pleased to call a bandit or robber, but who appears to us to have been a real patriot. It is related in the *History of the Reign of Tipu Sultan* by Colonel Miles (Panini office reprint, p. 195) that

"Futteh Hydur Sultan. . . . . abandoned all intention of fighting or further opposition, although several of his bravest officers, such as Mullik Jehan Khan, ... also Syed Nasir Ali Mir Miran and other Asofs dissuaded him from peace, and strenuously urged him to continue the war. They represented to him that the Sultan had devoted his life only to the will of God, but that his dominions, his strong cities and forts were still in the possession of his servants, and that his army with all its artillery and stores was present. That if there were any intention to reconquer the country, or if any spirit or courage remained, now was the time (for exertion), and that they were ready and willing to devote their lives to his service. This descendant of Hyder, ... at the advice," of . . . the traitors of the Sultans' court, (everyone of whom thinking of his wife and family, abandoned his duty and loyalty;) was deceived, and acted in conformity to their wishes, at once rejected the prayers of his well wishers, and consequently washing his hands of kingly power and dominion, he proceeded to meet and confer with General Harris. . . . . .

". . . all the children and relations of the deceased Sultan, (many of whose ladies remained,) with Kurim

Sahib and his family were sent to Rai Vellore, and a liberal salary was allowed to each of the princes, ... "

Thus ended the rule of the dynasty of Hyder Ali Naik in Mysore.

CHAPTER XVIII

WELLESLEY'S TREATMENT OF THE NAWAB VIZIER OF OUDE.

After having conquered Tipu's dominion by force, Wellesley cast his longing eyes on the fertile territories of those Indian princes with whom the East India Company had concluded treaties of perpetual friendship. Oude was the garden of India. So Wellesley could not resist the temptation of swallowing it, if possibly he could.

The degenerate nature of the Mussalman Nawab of Oude was well-known to the Christian "adventurers" constituting the East India Company. Hence their representatives always fleeced them when it suited their convenience and purpose to do so. The Marquess Wellesley was not going to prove an exception to that rule.

One of the Nawabs of Oude named Vizier Ali was deposed and kept a state prisoner in Benares, where his keeper was one Mr. Cherry. It may be that he was intriguing with the nobles and subjects of Oude. He was ordered to be removed from Benares to Calcutta. He thought that his removal was suggested by Mr. Cherry, with whom he had an inter-

view and whom he assassinated. He with his followers ran amuck and, besides Mr. Cherry, killed two other Englishmen.

Vizier Ali made his escape from Benares and many a vagabond and person of evil disposition gathered round him. With such a force he raided some of the places then situated in the principality of Oude. The Nawab was alarmed and requested the Company the temporary loan of British troops to subdue his whilom predecessor. The request was acceded to by the Company with great alacrity. It happened in the regime of Lord Wellesley, to whom it served as a pretext to deprive the ruler of Oude of sovereignty of half of his dominion. This was done by the Governor-General in the name of *reform*.

Mr. Lumsden was the Resident at Lucknow when Lord Mornington arrived in India as its Governor-General. But that officer was not going to be such a vile tool of the noble lord as he desired him to be for the ruin of the Oude prince. So he was made to resign his post, to which office one Colonel Scott was appointed, who was to carry out the nefarious scheme of the Governor-General. What this nefarious scheme under the euphemistic term "reform" consisted in and how this was carried out has been very succinctly described in *"Dacoitee in Excelsis"* written by a responsible British officer

named Major Bird, from which the following extracts are made:—

Lord Mornington (better known as Marquis Wellesley), arrived in Calcutta in the month of May, 1798. In October of the same year he had "under his consideration the best means of securing the regular payment of the subsidy from Oude, and of reforming the Nawaub's army."* "This reform," says Mr. Hale, in his pamphlet on the Oude question, and referring to the Printed Paper, iii. 2, 3, "really meant the disbanding of the Nawaub's regular army, except as far as portions of it might be wanted for purposes of state, or for the collection of the revenue, and the substitution of an *increased* number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time, and to be paid by the Nawaub. The Nawaub Wuzier, however, in alarm at his proposal, spoke of abdicating. Lord Wellesley on this at once stated the grand object which he considered the Company had in view, and this was, 'The acquisition by the Company of the exclusive authority, civil and military, over the dominions of Oude.'† With this view a treaty was ultimately drawn up, the first article of which involved the virtual abdication of the Nawaub. But on this being presented to him, the Nawaub positively refused to sign any such agreement. The Governor-General entered into negotiations which extended over several months, in the course of which he admitted that his original object was not merely to secure the subsidiary funds, but to extinguish the Nawaub's military power.' "‡

* Papers relating to the East Indies, printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1806, v. 3.

† Printed Papers *ut supra*, 31.

‡ Printed Papers, 213.

Some particulars of these negotiations may delay the course of the narrative, but they are so illustrative of the Company's dealings with the Princes of Oude, that it is neither right nor expedient to omit them here. Without allowing the Nawaub time to draw up the remonstrance above mentioned, the additional troops had been actually ordered into Oude; and the ground on which this measure was attempted to be justified was this: that, as the Company was bound by Lord Teignmouth's treaty to defend the Nawaub's possessions, that treaty must be understood to confer upon them, by implication, the power of augmenting the British forces stationed in Oude entirely *at their own pleasure*, and even in spite of the Nawaub's assent, whenever *they* should think such a measure necessary to the discharge of their defensive engagements with the Nawaub. It was further contended that the latter was bound to maintain any number of troops which the Company might station in his dominions, because one article of the treaty obliges him so to do whenever any augmentation of his British auxiliary force "should be thought necessary." As soon, therefore, as one division of the troops, destined by the British authorities, in the manner above described, to occupy certain portions of the Oude dominions, had been stationed there, and the Nawaub had been compelled to become responsible for their pay, and while another body was ordered to hold itself in readiness to march after them, the Nawaub Wuzier Saadat Allie addressed the following memorial to the Governor-General, through the Resident at Lucknow:—

TRANSLATION OF A MEMORIAL, presented on the 11th of January, 1800, to LIEUT.-COLONEL WILLIAM SCOTT, Resident at Lucknow, by H. E. the NAWAUB VIZIER; for the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

"The real state of the case is as follows :—

"For these eighty and odd years these provinces have been under the most perfect and uncontrolled sway of my ancestors; and, from the time of my deceased father, treaties of amity have subsisted between the Honourable Company and this Government, by which the latter has been much strengthened.

"During the life time of my late brother, affairs between the two States went on as usual; numerous were the enemies he had to contend with, and frequent were the disturbances and mutinies that took place amongst his soldiery; nay, they even proceeded to such lengths, that during the late Rohilla war two complete battalions—as your Lordship may have heard—meditated going over to the enemy. Notwithstanding these circumstances, it never once entered the imagination of the British rulers to introduce the innovations, and carry into effect such arrangements as those now suggested by your Lordship.

"Through the favour of the Company, and assisted by their power, I ascended my hereditary musnud; and it being, in all ages and countries, the practice of powerful and liberal sovereigns to spare neither expense nor trouble in assisting those whom they may have once taken under their protection, I, being solely dependent on the Honourable Company, and confidently trusting to their magnanimity and generosity, fully expected that during my government the affairs of the country would shine forth with a splendour beyond that of my predecessors.

"The reputation of the Company will last *until the day of judgment.*" (We might almost infer from this assurance that Saadat Allie was a wag).

"God forbid that during my time any changes or degrading innovations should, without any cause, take place, or

that the ancient servants of the family should, for the crimes and misconduct of a few worthless wretches, be deprived of their subsistance, and being turned on the world, disperse my infamy abroad; whilst those who remain in my country, becoming my deadly foes, will disseminate enmity and distrust of me amongst those of my servants who may be retained, who will say amongst themselves, 'These people were dismissed yesterday, to-morrow our turn will come, 'until at length the whole of my servants will become my inveterate enemies; from which predicament may God defend me.

"What affects me above all things is, that by acting thus, the credit and honour of the Company will suffer, and I myself shall no longer be held in estimation, either abroad or in my own country. It will then be evident to every person, that the Company, no longer putting confidence in the sincerity of my friendship, deprived me of the direction of my own army, and spread their troops over my dominions.

"Should such an event take place, my authority in these provinces would be annihilated; nòr would my orders be attended to on any occasion, whether trifling or of moment; whilst any extraordinary exertions in paying the subsidy regularly, would become labour thrown away.

"Making myself, however, sure that it never can have been your intention, or conformable to your Lordship's wish, to distrust, to degrade me, or to lessen my authority in these dominions, I shall, without ceremony, disclose to your Lordship my unfeigned sentiments and wishes. With the advice of, and in concert with the Company, I consider myself fully capable of carrying into effect every necessary measure of reform, and through their kindness, I have neither fears nor apprehensions; reckoning it my indis-

pensable duty, above every consideration, to satisfy and obey them, I shall never swerve a hair's breadth from the treaty concluded with them on my ascending the musnud; whilst, from their known good faith and strict adherence to treaties, I am also certain that no breach of the said treaty is intended on their part.

"This premised, I must trouble your Lordship with a few remarks upon the treaty above alluded to.

"The second article of the aforesaid treaty sets forth that, 'By existing treaties between the States, the Honourable Company are bound to defend the dominions of the said Nawab Vizier against all enemies; and, with a view to enable them to fulfil this engagement, the Company have largely increased their military establishment by new levied regiments, both of infantry and cavalry; in consideration whereof, the aforesaid Nawaub agrees, in addition to the annual subsidy (being Lucknow Sicca rupees, 5,677,638), to pay the further sum of 1,922,362 rupees, making altogether the sum of seventy-six lakhs of rupees, of the present weight and standard.'

"By a reference to this article, it will be evident to your Lordship, that; on my accession to the musnud, the force designed for the defence of these dominions was increased beyond what it had been in any former period, whilst, on my part, I agreed to defray the expense of the said augmentation. But in no part of the said article is it written or hinted, that after the lapse of a certain number of years a further permanent augmentation should take place; and to deviate in any degree from the said treaty appears to me unnecessary.

"The seventh article of the same treaty states, that 'the Governor-General, Sir John Shore, Bart., on the part of the Company agrees, that the English forces maintained

in the country of Oude for its defence, shall never consist of less than 10,000 men, including Europeans and natives, cavalry, infantry, and artillery; and if it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude, beyond the number of 13,000 men, including Europeans and natives, cavalry, &c. &c., the Nawaub Vizier above mentioned agrees to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above the number; and, in the same manner, if the troops of the Company in Oude, from any necessity, should be less than 8,000 men, including infantry, &c. &c., a deduction shall be made from the annual stipend of seventy-six lakhs, equal to the actual difference of men below the specified number.'

"From an inspection of the article we learn that, after the conclusion of the treaty in question, no further augmentation is to be made, excepting in case of necessity; and that the increase is to be proportioned to the emergency, and endure but as long as the necessity exists. An 'augmentation' of the troops without existing necessity, and making me answerable for the expense 'attending the increase,' is inconsistent with the treaty, and seems inexpedient.

"By the same article, the increase of the force when necessity requires, and a corresponding deduction from the stipend, when a reduction of the army takes place, are evident.

"Towards the latter end of the seventeenth article it is stipulated, 'That all transactions between the two States shall be carried on with the greatest cordiality and harmony; and that the said Nawaub shall possess full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, his troops, and his subjects.' Should the management of the army be taken from under my direction, I ask where is my authority

over my household affairs, hereditary dominions, over my troops and my subjects?

"From the above considerations, and from the magnanimity of the Sircar of the English Company, I am induced to expect from your Lordship's kindness, that, putting the fullest trust and confidence in my friendship and attachment on every occasion, you, in conformity to the treaty, will leave me in possession of the full authority over my dominions, army, and subjects; and further, I have to request that you will enjoin Lieut.-Colonel Scott to advise and consult with me, when (with that gentleman's assistance), God willing, the necessary military arrangements shall speedily be made, and the whole of my troops become henceforth obedient, submissive, and ready for action; whilst, indebted to your Lordship's kindness, I myself shall continue obedient to your commands, consulting your pleasure in all things.

"The fame of the Company will, by these means, be diffused over the face of the earth; and, my reputation increasing, I shall continue to offer up prayers for the prosperity of the Company.

"Thus, with the freedom of friendship, I have exposed to your Lordship the secrets and wishes of my heart. The delay that has occurred in answering your letter, was occasioned by my wish to give you in detail the whole of my desires; your friendship leaves no doubt of your Lordship's compliance with them.

(Signed) WM. YULE, Assistant.

Lucknow, 12th January, 1800.

(A true Translation.)

To this remonstrance, as reasonably stated as it was justly founded, the following haughty reply was made by

the Governor-General, in a letter to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, the Resident at Lucknow :—

"SIR,

Par. 1. "Your letter of the 12th inst., with its several inclosures, has been received by the Right Hon. the Governor-General.

Par. 2 "His Lordship not thinking proper to receive, in its present form, the written communication made to you by the Nawaub Vizier, on the 11th inst., as an answer to His Lordship's letter of the 5th of November last to His Excellency, directs that you lose no time in returning the original of that communication to His Excellency, accompanying the delivery of it with the following observations, in the name of the Governor-General.

Par. 3. "The mode adopted in the present instance by His Excellency, of replying to a public letter from the Governor-General, attested by His Lordship's seal and signature, and written on a subject of the most momentous concern to the mutual interests of the Company and of His Excellency, besides indicating a *levity* unsuitable to the occasion, is highly deficient in the respect due from His Excellency to the first British authority in India.

Par. 4. "His Lordship, therefore, declines making any remarks on the paper which you have transmitted, and desires that the Nawaub Vizier may be called on to reply to His Lordship's letter of the 5th of November, in the manner prescribed, no less by reason than by established usage. If, informally answering His Lordship's letter, His Excellency should think proper to impeach the honour and justice of the British Government, in similar terms to those employed in the paper delivered to you on the 11th inst., the Governor-General will then consider how such unfounded

calumnies and gross misrepresentations, both of facts and arguments, deserve to be noticed."

On the subject of this correspondence it is here appropriate to append the remarks of Mr. Mill, in his "History of British India," vol. vi. p. 191 :—"A party to a treaty fulfils all its conditions with a punctuality, which, in his place, was altogether unexampled; a gross infringement of that treaty, or at least, what appears to him a gross infringement, is about to be committed on the other side; he points out clearly, but in the most humble language, savouring of abjectness much more than disrespect, the inconsistency which appears to him to exist between the treaty and the conduct; this is represented by the other party as an impeachment of their honour and justice; and if no guilt existed before to form a ground for punishing the party who declines compliance with their will, a guilt is now contracted which hardly any punishment can expiate. This, it is evident, is a course by which no infringement of a treaty can ever be destitute of a justification. If the party injured submits without a word, his consent is alleged. If he complains, he is treated as impeaching the honour and justice of his superior; a crime of so prodigious a magnitude, as to set the superior above all obligation to such a worthless connection."

In a further letter, dated the 22nd January, 1801, Lord Wellesley peremptorily required Saadat Allie either to resign his princely authority altogether, and accept an annual stipend, or to cede one-half of his territorial possessions to the Company by way of indemnity for the expenses incurred on account of the two bodies of troops already mentioned. The draft of a treaty to this effect was at the same time forwarded, as well as the necessary instructions to the Resident.

The aspect of the case was now this. The Company were no longer content with the annual seventy-six lakhs of rupees guaranteed them in addition to other items by the treaty of 1798, but they demanded, and, as will be shortly seen by the first article of the treaty of 1801 they acquired possession of a district having a gross revenue of 13,500,000 rupees, or an annual income of fifty-nine lakhs over and above the subsidy for which it was substantially treated as a commutation. The Wuzier at first remonstrated against the demand, urged as usual in violation of *an existing* treaty, but the Governor-General, without deigning to answer him, addressed a letter dated April 28th, 1801, to the Resident, authorising him, in the event of the Wuzier not consenting to make over the said provinces to the Company, *to take forcible possession* of the same; and instructing him, moreover, not to wait for further advice on the subject, but to act upon the present orders of the Governor-General; in short, instigating him to an act of dacoitee second only to that in which the Marquis of Dalhousie has so recently involved the reputation of General Outram.

Some expressions from Lord Wellesley's letter have been already cited, and they are here given with the context of that pretence on which Oude was to be despoiled consistently henceforth, and on which much will be said before this statement is concluded. "I am satisfied," says Lord Wellesley, "that no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred intact to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of His Excellency and of his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can

ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace." It might be asked, if no other remedy was available to avert the ruin of Oude, how came it that Lord Wellesley, absolute master as he was of the fate of the country, did not enforce this remedy? Did he fear the condemnation of English opinion? Did he hesitate in apprehension of the fate of Hastings? Or did he shrink from a measure which, on subsequent consideration, he himself could not justify, and so leave half the prey to the grasp of future spoilers? It is impossible to answer these questions satisfactorily, and to determine wherefore, when the real object was so manifest, the pretext and the victim were permitted to linger for another half century.*

Lord Wellesley, at all events, did not appropriate the entire province, but when his intention to take half the Wuzier's territory was announced, the latter, apprehending that the end had commenced, exclaimed, "If such be, indeed, the case, it will not be long ere the remaining portions of the country will be wrested from me." It proved longer than he expected: for those portions were made available to the Company's coffers, as the sequel will

* Great as was the sacrifice required from the Nawaub by this treaty, the wonder is it was not greater, if it be considered that, according to Lord Wellesley's own letters to Col. Scott, his Lordship's "object being the acquisition by the Company of the exclusive authority, civil and military, over the dominions of Oude;" "nothing should be allowed to impede the grand object—*the sole administration of the civil and military government of all the territories and dependencies of the state of Oude,* together *with the full and entire right and title to the revenues thereof.*"

prove, notwithstanding they were henceforth to be released from the subsidy. At the same time, it required all the assurances of the Resident and of the Governor's private secretary, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, to induce him to attach any value to the promise that he should have an undisturbed authority over the territory left to him; and in fact he at first seriously contemplated a voluntary exile from his native land and a pilgrimage to the holy places of his religion and to foreign climes, leaving his oppressors to act as they might think fit during his absence. "Let me," said he, "speedily be permitted to depart on my travels and pilgrimage, for I shall consider it a disgrace to show my face to the people here." But this intention was too hopeless and despairing for adoption, and eventually the Wuzier consented to sign the treaty placed before him, after discussion and expostulation had proved to be vain. Thus an act of tyranny was consummated, and the treaty was procured on which so much stress has been unwarrantably laid. Thus, and by such preliminaries, it was *forced* upon our reluctant Ally. The Company first poured upon the Wuzier such numbers of troops, they heaped demand upon demand on him so incessantly, that at length his resources became inadequate to their payment; and then, when he was compelled to make an avowal of such inadequacy, they seized upon that avowal as a ground for demanding a perpetual cession of one half his remaining territory. In short, to put the matter in its true light, they took away half his possessions because they had exhausted his purse, and in token of their "friendship and union" they made him bound to them—by a halter.

The treaty which accomplished these infamous results was signed on the 14th November, 1801.

The manner in which Marquess Wellesley wrested from the Nawab-Vizier, half his dominions—and those also the more fertile portions—did not escape the notice of some of the politicians of England. That true and sincere British friend of India, Mr. Philip Francis, who two decades before had helped in the impeachment of Warren Hastings, was still alive and so lost no time when the Marquess Wellesley and his brothers returned to England to help one Mr. Paull, who resided in Oude when the Governor-General was depriving the Nawab Vizier of his territories, in his accusation against the Governor-General of India. Burke was not then alive and no orator of his calibre sided with Paull and Francis in their attempt at impeachment of the Marquess Wellesley. Those were also the days when Napoleon Bonaparte was disturbing the even tenour of existence of the natives of Great Britain. Hence, no wonder, the majority of the members of the House of Commons did not favour the motion for impeachment of the Wellesley Brothers.

It was alleged that Mr. Francis bore grudge against Mr. Warren Hastings and, therefore, out of malice, he influenced Mr. Burke and others to impeach the first Governor-General of India. But no such motives could be imputed to him in his conduct towards Lord Wellesley. Allegations, however, were made against Mr. Paull that he had been prompted

by ill-will to prosecute that noble lord. This compelled that member to assure the House on 27th January, 1806,

"that he dared the breath of calumny to impute to him, with justice, any motives but those of a public nature. He bore no animosity to Lord Wellesley personally, he would exert his honest endeavours to prosecute him to conviction, as the enemy to the happiness and prosperity of India, and to the best interests of the mother country; he could consider him in no light but that of a great state delinquent, in the situation that Mr. Hastings stood on his return from abroad, with this essential difference, that what was undefined crime in the case of Mr. Hastings, was positive criminality in the case of Lord Wellesley. The latter could plead no error in judgment, no ignorance of the laws of his country, having been a member of the British parliament when the articles of impeachment were voted against Mr. Hastings."

It was after some delay and difficulty that the papers called for by Mr. Paull were ordered to be printed and laid on the table. This enabled that member to frame his charges against the ex-Governor-General, who had several indecent partisans in the House. One of these declared,

"by what kind of tribunal was the party accused to be tried? Before one, certainly, where the guilty man might escape through delay, or the most innocent man be ruined through expense; and, therefore, if there were any other legal or competent jurisdiction, before which this cause could be tried, the House ought not, for the sake of speedy

and substantial justice, to proceed by the ordinary mode of impeachment."*

This made Mr. Philip Francis say that the House of Commons

"was probably the grand inquest, whose province was to inquire respecting the validity of great criminal charges, and then to proceed as the accuser or prosecutor before a high court of justice."

After some wranglings and delay, on the 28th May, 1806, the article of charge of high crimes and misdemeanours committed by Richard Colley Marquis Wellesley, in his transactions with respect to the Nabob Vizier of Oude, was read by the clerk at the table.

At the same time, Mr. Paull's written statement in support of the charge was also read. His indictment was very powerful and unanswerable. He said that Lord Wellesley,

"in defiance and contempt of the laws, to the strict observance of which he was bound by engagements the most solemn, did, from the time of his arrival in India, conceive and entertain the intention, an intention which he finally executed, to enroach upon the power and rights of the said Nabob Vizier, to interfere in the internal affairs of his government, to undermine and to destroy his authority over his household affairs, his troops, and his subjects, and,

* Mr. Banke's speech on May 8, 1806, Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. VII, p. 65.

under pretences the most false, to extort from him the said Nabob Vizier, his hereditary dominions, so solemnly guaranteed to him by the Company in the treaty of 1798, and that all this he the said Marquis Wellesley did without the concurrence, approbation, or consent, and even without the knowledge, of the Council of Bengal, and without communicating to the said council, or to his employers the said East India Company, any information whatever of such his intention or proceedings."

The statement of Mr. Paull was a very lengthy one and his description of the means adopted by Lord Wellesley to gain his object, marked out that lord as a criminal of the vilest type.

The speeches on the charge reflected hardly any credit for fairness or honesty on the friends of Lord Wellesley.

On the 18th of June 1806, on the motion of Mr. Paull, the house resolved itself into a Committee to consider the charge with Lord Folkestone in the chair. Lord Teignmouth was called in, but his examination was not such as would have exposed the proceedings of the servants of the Company in Oude. This was due to the manner in which Lord Wellesley's partisans interrupted Mr. Paull in his interrogations of the witness.

The next day, Sir Alured Clarke was called to the bar and examined. But one of the questions put to him by Mr. Paull was strenuously opposed by some of the members ; whereon Mr. Paull moved for

an adjournment in which he was supported by Mr. Fox and Mr. Hutchinson.

On the 6th July, Lord Folkestone said that "obstructions had been thrown in the way" of Mr. Paull; and another member named Dr. Lawrence stated that Mr. Paull

> "was goaded at one time, and thwarted at another, and it was now endeavoured to precipitate that decision which had hitherto been retarded."

That session of Parliament did not come to any decision regarding the Oude charge. Mr. Grant truly said that

> "the house could not, in so thin an attendance, comprising of so many of the noble Marquis's friends, and at so late a period of the session, come to a decision, consistently with the decorum which belonged to its deliberative justice; . . ."

So ended the consideration of the Oude charge in that session, after which Parliament was dissolved and in the new Parliament neither Mr. Paull nor Mr. Francis found any seat. Consequently, the interest of the members on the Oude charge was not so great as it was when Paull and Francis spoke on it from their long residence in India and extensive knowledge of Oude politics. During the whole of 1807, the question was not touched at all in Parliament.

But the conduct of the Marquess Wellesley

relative to the Oude charge came up for discussion in the early part of the year 1808. On February 9, 1808, Lord Folkestone moved,

"that the several papers presented to the house in January, February, March, June, and July, 1806, and in February 1807, relative to the Affairs of the Province of Oude, be taken into consideration on Monday, the 22nd inst."

On that day, after Lord Folkestone moved for taking into consideration the papers, Mr. Creevey rose and said that it would be better to refer the papers to a Committee to arrange and make their report. For, he said:

"The papers were in such confusion that it was indispensable that they should be arranged before they could be perused, he had not met with three gentlemen who had read them."

But unfortunately, his proposition was not approved by the House, for it would delay the proceeding. In vain, Sir T. Turton

"exhorted the house not to hurry a proceeding of such great importance. . . . . It affected the rights of a whole people, who had no tribunal but that house to whom to apply for justice. They had no friend but that house, and if it slighted the appeal now made, it forfeited its own character and honour, and the character and honour of the country."

In vain, Sir S. Romilly expressed the opinion

"that to send the evidence to a committee to return a digested report of it to the house, would be the only means of arriving at substantial justice."

But when were the British people as a class actuated to do justice, substantial or otherwise, to the non-Christian princes and peoples of India? Those who moved for the appointment of the Committee found their motion rejected by the House.

The adjourned debate on the Oude charge was resumed on Wednesday, March 9, 1808, when Lord Folkestone rose and exposed the manner in which the friends of Marquis Wellesley were creating public opinion in his favour. He said that he had seen pamphlets which were

"written to bias the public mind in his favour, and were distributed gratis, not only to the members of that house, but in like manner through all the principal taverns and coffee houses in London."

Then, he truly said that

"In this case, the house were called on to judge between the noble Marquis and the Nabob; but he begged the house to recollect, that, in truth, there was only one party before them. The Marquis Wellesley had every advantage. The case was to be tried on his own grounds: the only documents, his own account of the transaction. He was before the house, if not in person, at least represented by friends and relations, persons bound to him by ties of blood, by friendship, by services, by obligations. The Nabob, on the other hand, had no representative but such as the justice

of his cause and the cruelty of the oppression he had suffered had called forth. He had no means of telling his story; no opportunity of producing his proofs. The house ought to look with a partial and indulgent eye to his case. However, as the advocate of the Nabob, he asked for nothing but justice; sheer naked justice—justice founded on the facts as Lord Wellesley had himself related them; and he was sure that, if the house but give a fair hearing to the case, these facts thus detailed would be sufficient to induce the house to mark, with the severest reprobation, the conduct of the noble Marquis: he hoped, too, to afford some relief and mitigation to the unfortunate Nabob."

But Lord Folkestone's pleading for justice to a non-Christian prince was in vain before the highly professing Christian members of the House of Commons. What if he narrated the manner in which the Nabob, on his part, observed the treaty he had entered into with the Company, and the treachery of the Marquis in forcing on him a new treaty by which he was deprived of half of his dominion? His words had no effect on those members, when he proceeded to say,

"that after a very protracted negotiation, in which, on the one side, is displayed all the arts of chicanery, accompanied with threats the most undisguised, and language of reproach and reviling the most contemptuous and unmerited, while on the other, patient, forbearing and earnest supplication were alone manifested, the unhappy Nabob was compelled to yield to the Company a portion of territory of the alleged annual income of one crore and thirty-five lakhs of

rupees in perpetual sovereignty, and to deprive himself even of all efficient government over the remainder."

He moved a series of twelve resolutions condemning the transaction of Marquess Wellesley and aiming at reparation and justice to the unfortunate Nabob.

Every resolution was vehemently opposed by the friends and relations of the Marquess ; for it should be remembered that his two brothers, *viz.*, General Sir Arthur Wellesley and Mr. Henry Wellesley, were at that time sitting in the House as its members. Like that marine creature which secrets ink to elude the pursuit of its enemy, the friends and relations of Lord Wellesley uttered words and arguments to mystify and mislead the members of the house. One would have expected a judicial frame of mind from Sir John Anstruther, the ex-chief justice of Bengal, in discussing the Oude transaction. But he showed indecent partisanship for his noble friend in the speech made in the House on 9th March, 1808. He and other friends of Lord Wellesley uttered trash and nonsense in his defence which it was not difficult for those who supported the resolutions to thoroughly expose.

One of the honourable members said that the functions of Parliament "were of a legislative, not of a judicial nature," and so it was improper for

them to discuss the conduct of Marquess Wellesley on the Oude charge. Against this frivolous objection Sir Thomas Turton said:

"Let me ask the hon. gent. where, or to whom in this particular instance, could the appeal against British injustice and oppression be made?—Not to our courts of law and equity; there it has been already determined, that an independent sovereign (yes a 'dependent Nabob', as he is called) can neither institute or defend a suit. To the sovereign, in council, can he appeal?—The constitution of our Indian Government permits not this. Where then can he apply, with a possibility of success, but a British Parliament, and to parliament only?"

Referring to the pretences assigned for Lord Wellesley's conduct, he said, these were

"threefold; first, the right; secondly, the expediency and even necessity for the exercise of it; and thirdly, instructions of the government at home.—First, Sir, as to the right of the Government of India, to commit these acts of tyranny. From whence is it derived? . . . Says an hon. gent. (Mr. Whitshed Keene) the right is 'that of the sword, obtained by conquest, by that alone can your government in India be supported.' What occasion then for treaties, if the will of the conqueror is to be the only law? . . . an honourable and gallant Colonel (Allan) . . . says, 'the Nabob was not an independent prince, he could not expect to be treated as such.' I have read something of this in two long publications gratuitously conveyed to me, on the eve of this motion; and I have thought it my duty to wade through them. Does the noble Marquis rest his defence on either of them? . . . To satisfy any man of the wildness and

extravagance of the doctrines contained in them, the author, after deducing from Vattel, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, and even Locke, the right to treat the Nabob as our slave, represents him, as filling 'an office perfectly analogous to that of lord lieutenant of Ireland'; and by another author we are told 'that Oude was a dependent fief, the Company paramount lord, and the Nabob its vassal,' and I think the result of his argument is, that not having taken from our vassal the whole of his dominion, we have treated him with 'signal indulgence.' I should be ashamed to answer arguments (if so they can be called) like these; . . . But, sir, if this unhappy prince had no independent power, if he possessed no power, no dominions or subjects, but those of the Company, existing only in a combined and amalgamated state with theirs, what occasion for this treaty of 1798, explanatory of the respective rights of the Company, and of the prince?"

In a masterly manner, Sir Thomas Turton showed the Company had no right to deprive the Nabob of his dominion. Regarding the policy of this nefarious transaction, he observed:

"I shall always think, sir, that if the policy of our government in India was to strengthen our north-western frontier by the possession of the Doab, and by the dismemberment of Oude, and the extension of our territory in India (a policy I much doubt) it would have been more manly, more becoming the character and honour of the British Government, to have openly avowed our determination, rather than by these little unworthy pretexts and artifices, so insulting to common sense and honesty, endeavouring to justify an act, which though in itself atro-

cious and tyrannical, was, in its execution, attended with circumstances still more disgraceful to the British name and character, than the act itself."

Lord Wellesley, it was said by Sir John Anstruther, had only followed the instructions he received from his employees, and that the commutation of territory for subsidy had been recommended by them. With reference to this, Sir Thomas Turton said:—

"When the right hon. Baronet stated the instructions Lord Wellesley had received, and held in his hand a large folio volume of papers and instructions, I thought he would have favoured us with one letter or paper of instructions from the secret committee, or the Court of Directors, justifying Lord Wellesley in his conduct to the Nabob of Oude, and which might have escaped my observation; and although I should not have thought the violation of a solemn treaty, even under the sanction of such authority, deserving the approval of this house; yet, certainly, the noble Marquis could not have been accused in such case of anything more than submitting to be the instrument of the Company's injustice. How then, sir, must the house have been astonished to find, that not one letter, not one scrap of paper, not one expression in any letter, which can be tortured into an instruction to the Marquis Wellesley, even to commute the subsidy for territory, with the consent of the Nabob, much less against it, has been produced or read," . . . . Not one instance of instruction to any governor-general in India, to obtain an exchange of territory for subsidy by force is to be found. . . . I defy the right hon. Baronet to adduce even one solitary instance."

So the ex-chief justice of Bengal said a thing which was not true. Neither logic nor rhetoric in support of Lord Folkestone's Resolution was of any avail to those who tried to do justice to the unfortunate sovereign of Oude. The House not only rejected the Resolution, but approved the motion of Sir John Anstruther, who showed himself such a coward as not to answer Sir Thomas Turton when he challenged his veracity, for a vote of thanks to Marquess Wellesley, regarding which Mr. Sheridan observed :—

"The whole he had heard in defence of the noble Marquis, did not appear to him to justify such a measure."

Thus ended the long drawn out debate on the Oude charge on the night of March 15, 1808. A few days afterwards, *i.e.*, on the 31st March 1808, an attempt was made by some members of Parliament to move

"for compensation to be made to the Nabob of Oude for the losses he had sustained by the seizure of one-half of his territories, and the very embarassed state of his finances, occasioned by the measures of Marquis Wellesley's government in India."

Although several eloquent and well-reasoned speeches were made in support of this motion, it met with no better fate than the previous one. Mr. R. Thornton

"lamented to see so thin an attendance upon a discussion so interesting to the national character. He thought the house on a former night had behaved worse even than Lord Wellesley himself, in the manner in which they had got rid of the charges brought against him. . . . . The noble Marquis seemed to have carried a sample of French fraternization to India. The treaty was really a sort of Gallican hug, in which the noble Marquis had squeezed the Nabob to death. One might as well call a robbery committed by a foot-pad on a traveller on Hanslow-Heath, a treaty!"

It was much to be regretted that Sir Philip Francis was not a member of Parliament at this time. Referring to the services he had rendered to the cause of good government in India, one Honourable member (Mr. Howarth) said:—

"Yes, sir, some of the worthy directors have now and then gently hinted at the mismanagements of their governments, and at the misconduct of their servants in India, over whom they had no control. But these intimations were rare and feeble, in comparison with the information given us by an honourable friend of mine (Sir Philip Francis) who is no longer a member of this house. From year to year as the mischiefs increased his speeches kept pace with them. From year to year, I might almost say from day to day, his talents and his industry were employed in exposing the fatal folly of that destructive system, which has been adopted by your government in India, and encouraged and protected in England, and the ruinous consequences which would result from it. His performance of this invidious duty was not confined to his speeches here. His writings

addressed to the public predicted everything that has happened; writings, sir, as remarkable for the clearness, the purity, and precision of their style, as they are for the comprehensive knowledge they contain of the subjects on which they treated; and I believe, sir, it would be as difficult to find a person, who has displayed in your Indian affairs more ability, more perseverance, and more integrity, as it would be to find another instance of a man, who has deserved more of his country, and whose merits have been so ill rewarded, as those of the honourable gentleman I allude to."

Lord Wellesley appointed his brother, Henry (who became afterwards Lord Cowley), Lieutenant-Governor of the Ceded Provinces.* But his appointment was strongly objected to by the Company, because he was not a servant of theirs. He was removed from that office and provided for afterwards by being placed in charge of Farrukhabad, which had been taken from its Nawab by the treaty signed at Bareilly on the 4th of June 1802, by which the Nawab Imdad Hussain Khan, handed over his dominions to the Company in perpetual sovereignty in return for a stipend of Rs. 1,08,000 a year, payable to himself, his heirs and successors.

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* In the *Journal of the United Provinces Historical Society,* Vol. I. Part II (June 1918), Mr. D. Dewar, I.C.S., has published an interesting paper on the Administration of the Ceded Provinces under Henry Wellesley, 1801—3.

How this was effected, will be evident from the proceedings of the House of Commons, extracts from which are given below.

On June 9, 1806, Mr. Paull presented to the House of Commons the following

"Article of Charge of High Crimes and Misdemeanours committed by Richard Colley, Marquis Wellesley, in his transactions with respect to the Nabob of Farruckabad."

The small principality of Farrukhabad was governed by Muhammadan princes of Afghan descent, and its protection and defence were entrusted to the Nawab Vizier of Oude, for which purpose he received four lakhs of rupees annually from that principality ; the East India Company guaranteed the fulfilment of the respective compacts between them. But the servants of the Company "under the influence of unworthy motives, interfered in the internal affairs of that principality." This led Cornwallis, in concluding a new treaty with the Nawab Vizier of Oude in 1787, to stipulate that

"The English resident at Farruckabad should be recalled, and that no other should afterwards be appointed."

But in November 1801, Lord Wellesley

"in opposition to the agreement made not to interfere in the affairs of Farruckabad; . . . and, in opposition to all right and justice, did conceive the intention, and form the determination of wresting from the Nabob the whole of his

authority, his government, his revenues, and his territory; which unlawful and wicked intention he did, without the knowledge or consent of the council, through the agency of, and in concert with, his brother the Hon. Henry Wellesley, under the most unjust pretences, and by the most iniquitous means, finally accomplish and effect. . . . That the said Marquis Wellesley, wishing to cloak this unjustifiable attempt with some show of equity, did direct the said Hon. Henry Wellesley, among other means, to prevail upon the said Nabob of Farruckabad to consent to an abandonment of his just rights to his own principality, and to sign an agreement for transferring them to the said East India Company; but that, foreseeing that, as the said Nabob had but just passed his minority, and would be therefore naturally inclined to resort to the old councillors and friends of his family for advice upon so important an affair; and foreseeing also that their influence would prevent his acquiescence; the said Marquis did authorize the said Henry Wellesley to promise to the said friends and connections of the said Nabob, ample rewards, in case they coincided with his views, and to threaten them with expulsion from their country, in case they opposed them; thus contriving, by intrigue and corruption, or by violence and injustice, to draw the said friends of the said Nabob into a traitorous dereliction of their duty to their own hereditary prince."

The foul play that was practised on the Nawab of Farrukhabad in making him abdicate his *musnad* and part with his dominion was exposed by Mr. Paull in his speech in the House of Commons on April 18, 1806. He said

"that by the authority of the Marquis, the Nabob was sent for Lucknow, for the purpose of signing an agreement, and after his arrival, his seal was not to be found at his dwelling; and he would engage to prove, that the same seal was afterwards found in the house of the British Government, at Lucknow."

It is a pity that the Farrukhabad charge was not proceeded with.

CHAPTER XIX

MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S TREATMENT OF THE NAWAB OF ARCOT.

In a previous chapter has been mentioned the origin of the connection of the East India Company with the Nawabs of the Carnatic, as well as the manner in which those Muhammadan princes were involved in debt by the Christian adventurers who posed as their friends. Those princes were no longer of any service to the Company and so Lord Mornington wanted to annihilate the independent existence of the Carnatic, or reduce it to an insignificant state. When he went to Madras with the object of waging war against Tippoo, he wrote a letter from there to the Nawab of the Carnatic, dated Fort St. George, 24th April, 1799. This letter consisted of 63 paragraphs, and occupies 14 printed pages of Wellesley's Dispatches. After referring to the conduct of Tippoo, his Lordship wrote that the third article of the treaty of 1792 stipulates that,

"in the event of war breaking out in the Carnatic, and countries appertaining to either party, and dependent on the Carnatic, or contiguous thereto, it is agreed, for the better prosecution of it, that as long as it shall last, the said Company shall possess full authority over the Carnatic

except the Jaghirs belonging to the family of the said Nawab, and except also certain charities, and shall collect the revenues thereof, the said Company hereby engaging that, during such war, they will pay to the said Nawab one-fifth share of the net revenue arising therefrom."

After quoting the above article of the treaty of 1792, Lord Mornington proceeded:—

"Under this article it is now become the right of the Company to exercise that full authority over the Carnatic, which is thus formally acknowledged to be necessary for the better prosecution of war. . . . . .

"I am aware that both your Highness and your respected father have ever been disinclined to the assumption of the Carnatic by the article in question,"

Of course, the Company was receiving the stipulated sum from the Carnatic quite regularly. But regarding this regular payment, the Christian Lord wrote to the Muhammadan Nawab:

"Neither your Highness nor the Company can reflect with satisfaction on the regular discharge of your monthly payments, when those payments are known and acknowledged to be effected by means, which aggravate your Highness's embarrassments, and rapidly exhaust the territorial security pledged to the Company for the military subsidy."

His Lordship went on shedding crocodile tears when he wrote:—

"The Carnatic, therefore, in addition to the calamitous misrule of those who have governed it, under temporary

assignments of territory, has been subjected to all the accumulated evils of a divided government and of a fluctuating and precarious authority."

Lord Mornington referred to the debt of His Highness to the Company as follows:—

First.—Of the balance as reported by Messrs. Woolf and Place, on the 1st July, 1793—35,06,135.

"Second.—Balance of the Kistbundy Account, as per account, made up to 9th Sept., 1791—19,98,006.

"Third.—Balance of the new Cavalry Loan, with interest at 8 per cent., to the 12th October, 1798—11,62,770.

Total.—66,66,911."

It was for the above-mentioned reasons that Lord Mornington wanted to take possession of the greater portion of the Carnatic for the Company. He pointed out the advantages that would accrue to the Nawab as follows:—

"Under the new arrangement your Highness would be relieved from all urgent demands either of a public or private nature, and you would possess a much more ample revenue than you now enjoy, with the additional satisfaction of reflecting that your possession was liable to no disturbance, either from the contingency of war, or from any casual failure of your resources. You would be at liberty to direct your undivided attention to the cultivation and improvement of those resources to the utmost practical extent; and you never could feel the necessity of injuring the main springs of your revenue for the purpose of meeting the exigency of occasional difficulty."

Then his lordship wrote what amounted to a threat to the Nawab :

"The opportunity is now peculiarly favourable to the final adjustment of your Highness's affairs; if you suffer it to pass away without improvement, events may intervene to aggravate your Highness's embarrassments, to postpone, or even to preclude, all final arrangement of your affairs, and ultimately, to involve you in inextricable distress."

Such was the warning or threat held out to the Nawab by Lord Mornington.

But the Nawab was not cowed down by the threat, nor did he tamely submit to the dictation, of the Governor-General. With all the courtesy inherent in an Indian chief, he wrote on 13th May, 1799, in reply to the above mentioned letter of Lord Mornington :—

"I acknowledge, my Lord, that under certain circumstances, explained by the third Article of the Treaty of 1792, the Company are vested with authority to assume the Carnatic, and, amongst other things, empowered to collect the revenue, which it yields, and I confess, without regard to the consequence of that confession, that the assumption of the control over the affairs and revenues of my country, under the provision of the Treaty, would occasion a severe and heartfelt affliction; yet, if the time should arrive, which should render it necessary, that the Company avail themselves of the objects which that article secures, I hope that Divine Providence will endue me with fortitude, adapted to the necessity of the season, and the adversity of fortune, that I may make the sacrifice required of me, if not with

cheerfulness, at least with dignity and resignation. . . . . .

"I do not presume to know the grounds on which your Lordship has formed your opinion of the instability and uncertainty of my affairs, nor is it not necessary that I should be acquainted with them. It is sufficient for me to know, that they are abundant enough to enable me to keep with punctuality my plighted faith. . . . . .

"I do most unequivocally assure your Lordship, on the word and faith of a sovereign, that no one foot of the Districts, set apart by the treaty of 1792, have been, or are in any manner or way, directly or indirectly assigned by me, or *with my knowledge to any individual whatsoever;* and having made this solemn and unreserved declaration, I would hope that I need not urge more. . . . . .

"I have been represented, my Lord, to the world, and it were impossible to calculate how far I may yet be injured by it, unless I put a limit to the representation, to have notoriously mortgaged and assigned the Districts, pledged to the Company, and the manner of my doing it has been publicly and confidently spoken of and proclaimed. . . . . .

"You need not be told, my Lord, of the unconquerable and insurmountable obstacle in the way of any new engagement, which could not be overstepped without outraging every principle that should make engagements binding; for your Lordship is not unacquainted with my revered and honoured father, with his departing spirit, entreated and enjoined me that I should not consent to the alteration of a treaty, which he had painfully concluded; and I assured him on the most sacred obligation that religion imposes that I would obey his dying commands. Does it remain for me to conjure your Lordship, by the nobleness of your nature—by your filial piety—by the reverence you owe to God—by each and all of these, not to renew an application

which I cannot accede to, without a breach of all moral and religious duties, and cannot listen to without reproach. . . .

"The victories which my friends have obtained by Divine favour, has given the greatest joy to me who are their ancient ally, I consider them as an auspicious omen of my own happiness, and am persuaded that your Lordship will manifest your kindness towards me, especially in support of my rights. The talooks of Carrore, the two Sealams, and as far as Tungarpeatty, have always been dependencies on Trichinopoly. The father of Tippoo arrogantly usurped these talooks, I hope they will now be restored to me by your Lordship's justice. Another request that I have to make, and with which I trust your Lordship will not only be not offended, but that you will grant my desire is this—when friends acquire an immensity of power, those who are their sincere and ancient friends, are inspired with certain hopes of obtaining their wishes. The troops for which I pay nine lacks of pagodas yearly,[1] in the service of the Company, were employed with those of my friends in the reduction of the Mysore country. I trust, therefore, that I shall be allowed to participate in the conquered countries, in proportion to the sum I contribute for those troops, and that thereby through your Lordship's justice and equity, I who have always followed the fortunes of my friends, and prayed for their acquirement of such successes, may obtain my wishes." (Despatches, Vol. II. pp. 1-7).

The Nawab succeeded in giving very satisfactory explanations of all that had been urged against him. His requests were perfectly legitimate and reasonable. But it was not to the interests of the Christian

merchants constituting the East India Company to give any attention to them. The noble Lord did not condescend to reply to the Nawab's letter.

The Christian "Adventurers" in England also did not like the independent existence of the Carnatic. Thus the Right Hon. Henry Dundas writing his letter to the Earl of Mornington on the 21st March, 1799, which was received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799, said:—

"The double Government existing in the Carnatic has long been felt as a serious calamity to that country. It enfeebles the natural resources of the country, and above all, tends to continue that system of intrigue and consequent corruption which has been imputed to the Madras Government so much more than to our other settlements. . . . . Consistently with our treaties with the Nabob of Arcot, we cannot at present materially meliorate his Government, but must wait favourable opportunities, and embrace such means of conciliation and attention to him, as are most likely to accomplish this desirable object." (*Ibid.* II. 109).

Lord Mornington's reply to the above communication is so important that a considerable extract from it* is given below:—

"The double Government of the Carnatic is a difficulty which continues to present the most serious and alarming obstacles to every attempt at reform. The expectation of

* *Ibid*, pp. 244—245.

favourable opportunities of negotiation with the Nabob of Arcot, and of the effects of conciliation and attention towards him will, I am convinced, be ever disappointed by the event. You recollect with what sanguine hopes I looked forward to the result of measures adopted in a spirit of mildness and persuasion but I have found them entirely vain and fruitless; nor can I cherish the slightest ray of hope that such a course can ever prove successful, during the life of the present Nabob. His Highness is surrounded by European advisers of the most dangerous and profligate character, whose interests are deeply involved in the perpetuation of the abuses of his Government, and who (amongst other means of perverting his Councils) labour to inspire him with a notion of a distinction of interests and powers between the Royal Government and that constituted by Act of Parliament for the administration of the British Empire in India. In all his conversations and correspondence, he studiously distinguishes his Majesty's Government from that of the Court of Directors; uniformly treating the latter with disrespect, and even with ridicule and contempt. In my last conversation with his Highness he plainly declared to me that he considered his Majesty to be his father, friend, ally, and protector but that the Court of Directors desired to 'obtain his country any how.'

"The principles of this distinction are encouraged in his Highness's mind by the letters and embassies which have occasionally reached him from his Majesty through channels not only unconnected but avowedly at variance with the British Government in India. All such letters and embassies have the most pernicious tendency to withdraw the confidence and respect of the natives from the Governments in India, and to fix their attention on his Majesty's naval or military officers, or such

persons (of whatever character) as may accidentally be the bearers of his letters. The frequent letters which his Highness the Nabob receives from his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales greatly aggravate the same evil; and it is with the utmost concern that I feel myself bound by my public duty to request that you will take an opportunity of representing to his Royal Highness that his correspondence with the Nabob of the Carnatic has produced an effect entirely contrary to his Royal Highness's wishes, and has been highly injurious to the public service in India." (*Ibid* pp. 240-241).

Wellesley wanted to cut off the Nawab's communications with the Royalty of England and coerce him to respect the Company of Adventurers, for whom he felt, and that too very justly, the greatest contempt. The Nawab was not going to lose his liberty and country so very easily as the Christian lord was scheming. His lordship therefore wrote in the letter mentioned above:—

"I am thoroughly convinced, that no effectual remedy can ever be applied to the evils which afflict that country, without obtaining from the Nabob powers at least as extensive as those vested in the Company by the late treaty of Tanjore. At the death of the present Nabob, such a treaty might easily be obtained from his successor, (if after that event it should be thought advisable to admit any nominal sovereign of the Carnatic, excepting the Company). A young man resides at Chepauk, who is treated by the Nabob as his Highness's son. . . . . Numerous legitimate descendants of Wallajah are in existence The whole

question of the succession will therefore be completely open to the decision of the Company, upon the decease of the present Nabob. The inclination of my opinion is, that the most advisable settlement, would be, to place Omdut ul Omra's supposed son on the Musnud, under a treaty similar to that which was lately concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore. It will however, be expedient that you should immediately consider whether it might not be a more effectual arrangement to provide liberally for every branch of the descendants of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omra, and to vest even the nominal sovereignty of the Carnatic in the Company." (*Ibid*, pp. 244-245).

Thus it will be seen how the Christian functionaries of the "Society of Adventurers" were eager and anxious to possess the Carnatic. Some pretext of a muddied stream was needed for the Christian wolf to swallow up the Muhammadan lamb. And the wolf or wolves had not to wait long for such a pretext. Wrote the Governor-General in the letter to Mr. Dundas referred to above, that

"the records of the late Tippoo Sultan which fell into our hands after the capture of Seringapatam, have furnished me with the most authentic and indisputable evidence that the secret correspondence of a nature the most hostile to the British power, was opened with Tippoo Sultaun by the late Nabob Wallajah towards the close of his life, through the agency of Omdut ul Omra the present Nabob." (*Ibid*, p. 246).

Regarding this alleged conspiracy on the part

of the Nawabs, Major Evans Bell in his work on *The Empire of India* (pp. 107-108) writes:—

"We are called upon then to believe that the Nawab Wallajah, in his old age, after fifty years of faithful alliance and friendship with the English, and thirty years of almost incessant warfare with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan—both of whom, and especially the latter, had seized every opportunity of injuring him and of loading him with insults,—suddenly took it into his head to conspire against his friends of half a century, and to league with his enemies of thirty years. And we are called upon to believe that the time chosen for this sudden change of policy was just when the power of his friends was apparently established without a competitor, and when the power of his old enemy had fallen to nothing, beneath all hope of recovery. Wallajah and Omdut-ool-Oomra are accused of having begun their hostile intrigues with Tippoo in 1792, after Lord Cornwallis's campaign, when he had been compelled to cede half his dominions, to pay three crores and thirty lacks of rupees as a war indemnity, and to submit to the humiliating condition of sending two of his sons as hostages to Madras. And it is with two of Tippoo's officials who were sent to Madras in attendance on these young Princes, that the Nawabs are accused of having concerted and carried on this desperate conspiracy with their discomfited foe against their triumphant friends and allies.

"Extravagantly improbable as such a tale of conspiracy must appear, we should of course be bound to believe it if a sufficiency of evidence were produced. But not only is there no trustworthy evidence brought forward, but if every statement made by Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, Tippoo

Sultan's Wakeels, both in their written reports from Madras found among the records at Seringapatam, and in their depositions before the commission of inquiry, were to be accepted as truth, it would amount to *nothing*. The proofs of dark designs and hostile intentions on the part of Wallajah and his eldest son, which were collected by the commission of inquiry, are really so frivolous, even if considered as true, that but for the strong bias towards any conclusion affording a pretext for assuming the administration of the Carnatic, which we know from his previous endeavours in that direction actuated Lord Wellesley, we should be surprised that he did not throw the whole mass of gossip and guess-work into his waste paper basket."

No historian has devoted so much attention to the consideration of the two Nawabs' conspiracy against the British Government as Mr. Mill. (Vol. vi. pp. 217-244). His writings on the subject deserve the careful study of all interested in the history of British India.

As long as Oomdat-ul-Omra was alive, there was no chance for the Marquess Wellesley to wrest the Carnatic from him. But the Nawab's death occurred soon and this golden opportunity was taken advantage of by the Governments of India and Madras, a new treaty was imposed on his successor, by which he was made to transfer the civil and military administration of his territories to the hands of the East India Company.

The annexation of the Carnatic was not welcome to those who fed themselves by usury and fleecing the rulers of that principality by advancing loans to them. The number of such harpies was by no means a small one in England. So it was not unnatural for them to influence some of the members of Parliament to take up the cause of the Nawab of the Carnatic ; for they found their occupation gone.

On Tuesday, May 17, 1808, Sir Thomas Turton moved his resolutions respecting the deposition of the Nabob. It was after the death of Omdut-ul-Omrah in 1801 that those disgraceful transactions commenced which ended in the annexation of that state.

"On the 5th of July, 1801, Colonel M'Neil advanced to the palace of Chepauk with troops, under pretence of preventing commotion at the death of Omdut ul Omrah. On their entrance the old monarch, labouring under the disorder which in eight days after terminated his existence, sprung from his bed and begged of Major Grant not to expose him to the contempt of his subjects, by penetrating into the interior of his palace; and Major Grant applied for instructions to Col. M'Neil, who from motives of humanity did not enter. The troops, however, remained, surrounding the palace from the 5th to the 15th, when Omdut ul Omrah died, to all appearance in perfect amity with the Company. At no period were our dominions in India more quiet and secure than at the time when this outrage was committed, under the pretence of guarding against a petty commotion. On the same day on which the old monarch died, the prince, his heir, was dragged from his apartment,

and called upon to answer to certain interrogatories, on a charge of treachery preferred against his father. He was told that his father and grandfather had carried on a treacherous correspondence with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan, and that he, though innocent, was to be deprived of his dominions and reduced to the situation of a private person, where he expected to be a sovereign, that his succession would be set aside, and another placed on the musnad, unless he complied with certain requisitions, . . . Among the expedients tried in order to procure the prince's consent, intimidation was one. Troopers with drawn swords paraded before the tent in which one of the conferences was held, ... The prince, however, still continued to rely upon the faith and protection of the Company, and was at last told to prepare to receive the final resolution of the Governor-general, which was, that his future situation would be that of a private person considered as hostile to the British interests. . . . . When the commissioners had set aside the prince, one would have thought that they would have applied to the next in succession; but no: they passed over two and opened a negotiation with Azum ul Dowlah, who from his situation, they imagined would be most likely to comply with all their requisitions. He, as was usual in that country, had been kept in confinement and, when taken out, was greatly frightened, lest they were going to kill him."

He accepted all the terms dictated to him by the British Government and on the 28th of July, 1801, was placed on the *musnad*.

In referring to the death of the rightful heir, the aforesaid speaker said:—

"The rightful prince was, from the 15th of July, 1801, to the day of his death, confined with his mother in the palace of Chepauk, which was his own private property; but where, notwithstanding, Azum resided."—He "dwelt upon the imprudence and indecency of placing the prince in the same palace with the usurper, and stated that as soon as Mr. Addington heard of it, orders had been sent out to remove him. . . . .the unhappy man, after several ineffectual petitions to be removed, had written a letter, in which he strongly pleaded for being sent to another palace, instead of being kept constantly in the power of the usurper, who had only to commit one act to finish his crimes. This proved prophetical; for the prince not long after died of a dysentry. He would not take upon himself absolutely to affirm, that there was something unfair in this transaction, but he would say, that he believed there was. In these transactions he could discern nothing of the British character. The moment they passed the Cape, he believed, with Mr. Burke, that they unbaptized themselves; and that when they landed in India, they became something like the upas tree, described by a Swedish traveller, that blasted and destroyed everything that came within the reach of its pernicious influence."

Then he refuted the charge of conspiracy against the late Nawabs and said:

"And even supposing that Wallajah or Omdut-ul-Omrah, had been guilty of the alleged offences, what ground did his actions afford for the punishment of the son of the latter, and the grandson of the former?"

In concluding his masterly speech, he

"conjured the house by the national honour and faith,

of which it was the guardian ; he conjured his Majesty's ministers in the name of the national character, of which they were the protectors; he conjured every man in the name of that eternal justice which was the foundation of our happiness here and hereafter, to consider the importance of the vote which he was to give this evening."

But his speech had no effect on the majority of the members of the House. An indecent partisan of the Company and Lord Wellesley quoted the opinion of a jurist justifying the punishment meted out to the rightful Prince of the Carnatic for the alleged crime of his father and grandfather. That authority had written that

"It is one of the first principles of general equity laid down by the writers on that law, that, an heir or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inheritance, is not only bound for the engagements of the person whom he succeeds, but cannot be discharged from the obligation to repair the damage which the deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences; neither under the pretext that he derives no benefit from these crimes or offences, nor because there may have been no accusation or condemnation against the deceased." (Domat's *Compendium of Civil and Public Law.*)

It is not necessary to discuss this legal aspect of the case. If the case was so strong against the rightful Prince of the Carnatic as the friends of Lord Wellesley tried to make out, why was not that Prince tried before a court of justice for his serious offences? Mr. Sheridan very justly remarked that it had been

"said that Ally Hussain had forfeited his right to the throne, in as much as he inherited the treason of his father. He could never have been a party to a treason which had not been communicated to him, and with which the father had not been charged in his life-time. He never knew a more monstrous attempt than this to impose on the credulity of the public."

But the so-called hon'ble members of the House were not guided by any sense of justice or fairplay in their consideration of the conduct of Marquess Wellesley to the rightful Prince of the Carnatic. They paid no heed to what Sir Samuel Romilly said:—

"For the honour of the British character, he was grieved to witness such a division as had just taken place. Of late years many wicked and designing men had, by their writings and actions, endeavoured to bring the parliament of the country into contempt. They had maliciously attempted to bring disgrace on the legislature of the Empire; but he would seriously ask, whether all such persons could do, or any species of malice or abuse, had one-thousandth part of the effect of such a circumstance as this going out on a question which involved the national character in the nearest degree for policy, justice, and humanity, with only four or five members more than was absolutely requisite to decide on the most unimportant business. This was not a sound for the moment, it was not a transaction to be speedily forgotten. The papers now before them would be read and considered by future ages. . . . . It would then be seen that they had not the manliness to adopt and applaud those measures, but

that they endeavoured to get rid of a decision upon them by miserable previous questions and other unworthy expedients. It would be seen that the very confidential ministers of the crown had never delivered their opinions on these vast objects of policy and justice, and those who read the story would wonder what subject could possibly be of sufficient importance for them to speak upon. They would be in amaze, and merely at a loss to divine how they came repeatedly to vote with willing majorities on so great a question, without ever having the condescension to express their sentiments, or offer their reasons for so determining."

The worthy Baronet might have perhaps preached with more success to a gang of robbers and cut-throats to be virtuous, honest and god-fearing than exhorting the members of the Parliament then sitting to do justice to a non-Christian Prince.

Mr. Windham, who followed Sir Samuel Romilly, spoke the truth when he said that

"really from a sort of despondence he entertained that any arguments which could be offered could have any weight with the majority of the house, who seemed, in opposition to reason and evidence, disposed to pass a vote rather of approbation than censure. . . . . the policy of the East India Company in India, reminded him of the last line of a song, written by Dr. Swift for a highwayman, 'Every man round may rob if he pleases.' . . . . . the principle by which we were to be guided, was that the natives of India had no rights, that we had no duties, and that all was to depend upon the decision of our majesties."

But the majority not only rejected the Resolution censuring the conduct of Lord Wellesley for his transaction in the Carnatic, but passed a resolution approving of that conduct.

CHAPTER XX

ANNEXATION OF TANJORE.

Tanjore was a small Maratha principality in Southern India which dated its existence from the middle of the seventeenth century. It is not necessary here to mention in detail how it came to be established by the exertions of Sivaji's father, Shahji and his half-brother, Venkoji. In *The Rise of the Maratha Power,* Mr. Ranade has mentioned the reason of the failure of this principality as due to its not forming a part of the Maratha Confederacy ; for, according to him, "the strength of the Maratha power lay essentially in its union as a confederacy." (p. 238).

Venkoji made Tanjore the capital of his dominion in Southern India in 1675 and ruled here till his death in 1687.

In 1676, Shivaji led an expedition to Southern India and his progress could not be checked by Venkoji. The latter resolved to leave his territory and turn a hermit. But Shivaji dissuaded him from doing so. Ranade is of opinion that Shivaji committed a mistake in yielding to the importunities of his step-brother. He writes :—

"Shivaji at this time generously yielded all his claims to his father's patrimony to satisfy his brother. This generosity had the desired effect, and Venkoji continued to be in charge of his principality down to the time of his death. In the interest of the Maratha Confederacy it would certainly have been better if Shivaji had strengthened his hold in these parts at this time. By his abandonment of the kingdom to Venkoji, he cut off this settlement from its proper place in the united Maratha kingdom, and Tanjore suffered grievously by reason of this isolation." (*Ibid*, p. 246).

It was a great mistake on the part of the Tanjore princes to have sought the alliance of the Christian English. How the latter treated the "heathen" principality is thus described by Torrens, in his *Empire in Asia* (pp. 20-21, Panini Office reprint) :—

"Among the earliest allies of the English on the Coromandel Coast, was the Raja of Tanjore. In 1742, the reigning prince had been deposed by domestic revolution, and Pratap Sing obtained the throne. The authorities at Madras having no concern in the event, acknowledged the new prince without hesitation. Their correspondence with him was continued without any interruption, and mutual expressions of fidelity and confidence were interchanged for more than seven years. At the end of this period Sahujee, the exiled Raja, solicited their aid in effecting a counter-revolution. He offered, by way of recompense, if they should succeed, to grant them the Fort and Jaghire of Devicottah, and undertook to pay all expenses of the war. They accepted the offer. Pratap was their ally; they had recently sought his assistance against the French; they had

no pretence of provocation to urge against him : nevertheless they despatched an army to dethrone him. The expedition failed, but a second was resolved on. "They determined, however,' says their apologist Malcolm, 'that the capture of Devicottah, not the restoration of Sahujee, should be their first object.' The fort was accordingly invested and taken. And no sooner was this accomplished, than they entered into a negotiation with Pratap Sing,—agreed to desist from all further hostilities—not only to abandon him for whom they pretended to have heretofore fought, but engaged to secure his person and to receive a fixed sum for his maintenance, on condition of being suffered to remain undisputed masters of Devicottah and the circumjacent territory. This was the beginning of the conquest of Hindoostan."

In his brochure on "The Tanjore Maratha Principality in Southern Indian," Mr. William Hickey writes :—

"In all their transactions of whatever kind and character these Rajas have displayed such rectitude as could have been the result only of right principle, by which it was consequently manifest, they were influenced. And so it happened that when the British entered Southern India, and wished to settle in this country, their staunchest and truest friends were the Rajas of Tanjore. Confident of the trustworthiness of the English, the rulers of this district, with the implicit reliance in the good faith of the British, entrusted them with the management of their territories without any reservation whatever." (P. 2).

Writes Mr. Ranade :—

"Throughout these Karnatic wars, the Tanjore army

under Mankoji played an important part on the side of the English and against the French.

"Notwithstanding all these sacrifices made by the Tanjore Rajas in helping the cause of the English, the Nawab Mahomed Ali cherished a grudge against Tanjore, which was noted for its riches, and the interposition of the English alone succeeded in 1762 in establishing an understanding by which the Raja became a tributary of the Nabab, with an English guarantee, and agreed to pay four lakhs as tribute. Later on, in 1771, the Nabab secured the help of the Madras Government in attacking Tulsaji, the son of Pratap Sing, and Tulsaji had to sue for peace which involved him and his State in heavy money liabilities, and curtailed still more the resources of the Tanjore State. In their second treaty the interests of the Raja of Tanjore were completely sacrificed to the greed of Mahomed Ali, and of his English creditors, who dictated the policy of the Madras Government. The guarantee of 1762, by which the English had undertaken to be responsible for the autonomy of Tanjore, was thrown to the winds. In 1773, further acts of spoliation were renewed by the Nabab with the help of his English allies, and the Raja was taken prisoner, his city was captured, and his territory was annexed by the Nabab to his own kingdom. All these acts of spoliation and breach of faith had been undertaken by the Madras Government on their own responsibility, and in the interests of the English creditors of the Nabab." (*Ibid*, pp. 250-251).

What a pity, knowing the perfidious nature of those foreigners, the Tanjore princes contracted alliance with them!

The first Treaty of alliance was in the year 1787,

which consisted of 16 articles and bound the Raja of Tanjore and the East India Company in perpetual friendship. This treaty was made a ground for the imposition of the next treaty of 1793, because "the resources of the said country of Tanjore are not competent to enable the said Raja to perform the stipulations in the said engagements." This annulled the Treaty of 1787. The ruler of Tanjore with whom this Treaty was made was Raja Amar Sing. He was made to pay a large sum of money to the East India Company for the defence of his country.

Raja Amar Sing was a half brother of Raja Tuljajee, who had no male issue and adopted Sarbojee a short time before his death. Amar Sing succeeded his half brother as Raja of Tanjore. The adoption of Sarbojee was at that time considered invalid, because it was not in conformity with Hindu Law.

But Sarbojee was placed under the guardianship of a well-known Christian missionary, Revd. Mr. Swartz. He took so great an interest in his ward, that he did not remain content till he got him elevated to the throne of Tanjore replacing his uncle Amar Sing. The historian Mr. Mill very truly writes :—

"In the year 1798, a convenient discovery was made; that Amar Sing was not the legal heir to the *musnud* of Tanjore; but Sarbojee, the adopted son of Tuljajee. The

question of the rights of these two princes remains in obscurity." (Vol. vi, p. 216).

Horace Hayman Wilson, as usual, differs from the just view of the case expressed by Mr. Mill as quoted above. But his note does not convince any intelligent person that Mr. Mill was wrong in his opinion on this important question. Of course, Revd. Mr. Swartz and the Christian Resident at the court of the Raja of Tanjore were acting on the saying, "Give a dog a bad name in order to hang him." It was, therefore, that they represented to the Madras Government that Sarbojee was being cruelly treated by Raja Amar Sing. H. H. Wilson writes in the note referred to above:

"The cruel treatment of Sarbojee by the Raja was repeatedly brought to the notice of the British authorities by the vigilance of his reverend guardian; and upon his representations and those of the Resident, the Madras Government insisted upon the removal of Sarbojee and the surviving widows of Tuljajee, who were also objects of the Raja's oppression, to Madras."

After the removal of Sarbojee to Madras, intrigues were carried on with him. An appeal was made to Government against its former decision. It is a well-known thing in India that learned Pandits of Benares and Nadia can be made to give any opinion on Hindu Law by presents of suitable gifts or fees to them. So now the adoption of Sarbojee which

had been very correctly declared invalid by the learned Hindu jurists was to be enforced because some "Pandits of learning and character,...interpreted the law in favour of adoption."*

But the Christian Government of the day did not remove Amar Sing from the musnad of Tanjore and place Sarbojee on it out of disinterested motives. The new Raja was made to enter into a new treaty with them which made him part with his ancestral dominion and accept the position of a mere pensioner. His jurisdiction was to extend only to the Fort of Tanjore. Thus this Maratha prince was placed in the same category with the Muhammadan Nawab of the Carnatic. Amar Sing was deposed without being given an opportunity to answer the charges against him. The authorities in England ordered "the appointment of a Commission to examine and report on the real state of the country of Tanjore.....as a step preparatory to the ultimate measure of placing Sarbojee upon the Musnud."†

But Wellesley was opposed to the appointment of such a commission, for he wrote:

"I am convinced that while a large portion of the country shall remain in the hands of the present Raja, and while his authority shall be acknowledged to be lawful, the inquiries of such a commission would be embarrassed in

* Mill's History, vi, p. 217 (footnote).

† Wellesley's Despatches, I 41.

every shape, and frustrated in the end, and that the final result would prove equally prejudicial to the interests of Sarbojee, and highly injurious to the prosperity and happiness of the people of Tanjore."*

So poor Raja Amar Sing was condemned unheard. That gallant soldier, Sir David Baird, as said before, looked upon Raja Amar Singh as "the undoubted heir" to the throne of Tanjore and Sarbojee as "an unknown foundling" and accused the Governor-General and the East India Company of their arbitrary exertion of bare-faced power in dethroning the former.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.

It is a great pity that Mr. Mill was not in possession of all the facts of the case when he wrote his History ; for the Life and Correspondence of Sir David Baird had not then seen the light of day. But the editor of his work, Horace Hayman Wilson, was dishonest in not mentioning the manner in which the Christian Resident, Mr. Alexander Macleod and the Christian missionary, Revd. Mr. Swartz, were conspiring against Raja Amar Sing. No Christian

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* *Ibid*, p. 42.

writer of Indian History has done justice to that unfortunate "heathen" Prince, whose great fault was that he did not like to part with his earthly possessions so greatly coveted by his Christian allies, who, after allowing him to reign for about a decade, discovered that he was illegitimate and hence must be deposed from his *musnud*. "The pretext of the muddied stream was always nigh at hand with the official wolves."

In Vol. I (pp. 119 *et seq*) of the *Life of General, the Right Honourable Sir David Baird, Bart*, published from London in 1832, has been mentioned the cruel treatment the Raja Amar Singh received from the Madras Government and their Resident at his Court. It is stated there that

"The Rajah of Tanjore (Amar Singh) was a man of extremely good character and high principle, and exceedingly well disposed towards the British Government. He had been placed by Sir Archibald Campbell, on the *musnud* on the death of his brother, who left only an adopted son. . . . . Colonel Baird, on the 3rd of October, 1794, addressed Lord Hobart, the Governor of Fort St. George, ... stating that upon the abolition of the civil residency at Tanjore, the senior military officer . . . . . had always acted as civil resident, added, that he should feel gratified by being so considered, ... the request, however, was not acceded to, and shortly after the office of civil resident was revived in the person of Mr. M—— of the Honourable East India Company's service. "Mr. M—— had not long assumed the functions of his office before the Rajah, who

had a warm affection for and an implicit confidence in Colonel Baird, began to complain bitterly of his conduct, which he represented as not only disrespectful, but positively harsh; and, in the course of time, circumstances gradually transpired which convinced, not only the Rajah, but Colonel Baird himself, that this Civil Servant of the Honourable East India Company had been placed at the court of Tanjore for no other purpose than that of inducing, or even (if necessary,) compelling, the unfortunate Rajah to give up his territory and become a pensioner of the said Honourable East India Company for the remaining term of the natural life.

". . . . . the Honourable East India Company was not exceedingly scrupulous as to the means by which territory was to be acquired; and Mr. M——'s proceedings in furtherance of the object of his mission at length became so evident and so oppressive to the Rajah, that his highness stated to Colonel Baird that Mr. M—— was far exceeding the just limits of his duty; . . . . . it was perfectly clear that the primary object of his (Mr. M——'s) mission was to make new terms with the Rajah while under the influence of fear."

At 7 P.M. of 28th Dec. 1795, the Resident wrote to Baird to order a company of his regiment to march with all possible expedition and halt near the gate of the palace to follow such directions as the Resident might give them.

Baird sent the troops, which on reaching the spot, received a verbal message from the Resident that they might go.

The next morning, Baird wrote to the Resident that in future he would not comply with any requisition from him for troops, unless he was at the same time made acquainted with the nature of the service to be performed, to enable him to judge what force would be adequate to the execution of it. He also forwarded the correspondence to Lord Hobart, the Governor of Madras. Writes the biographer whom we have quoted so often before, that

"This course of proceeding, which Colonel Baird felt it his duty to adopt, was very much at variance with that which the Honourable East India Company considered most conducive to its interests, and the abrupt conduct of Mr. M—— was justified and supported "by the authorities of Madras."

"Thus encouraged in his pretensions, and supported in his operations against the unfortunate Rajah, it is not to be supposed that Mr. M—— lost any time in exhibiting the power and authority with which he was invested, and accordingly, on the 23rd of January (1796), he addressed *several letters* to Colonel Baird.

"In the first, he says, 'In consequence of instructions which I have received from government, I beg leave to require, in their name, that you give orders, so that neither Shiverow, the Rajah's Sirkeel, nor either of his brothers, Trimbjee, or Shankerow, be permitted to pass out of the port." (*Ibid* p. 126).

In the "Story of Satara," I have narrated the manner in which the Resident at Satara was prac-

tising refined brutalities on the unfortunate Raja Pratap Singh. The Christian Resident at Tanjore was perpetrating brutalities of the same nature on the unfortunate Raja Amar Singh, who

"communicated to Colonel Baird, that at the dictation of that most zealous minister, Mr. M——, and under the positive influence of fear, he had been induced, on the preceding evening (24th January, 1796), to sign a document, ceding the whole of his territory to the management of the Honourable East India Company; but that, considering how much he had been alarmed by threats, and how grossly deceived by misstatements, he resolved to address the Governor-General, and appeal to him for the restoration of his country.

"From this determination, he was certainly not discouraged by Colonel Baird, who was so deeply impressed with the justice of his claims, and the rectitude of his intentions, that he himself forwarded a copy of the correspondence . . . . . to Sir John Shore, at Calcutta. . . . . .

"As far as the Rajah was concerned, his own remonstances, coupled with the explanations and statements of Colonel Baird, induced the Governor-General to order restoration to be made;* and so far Colonel Baird succeeded

* "The Governor-General was not tempted by the value of the prize to overlook the means by which it had been secured. He observed, that the Rajah had been intimidated into compliance by the repeated calling out of British troops, even after he had consented to the dismissal of his Minister —that the employment of Mr. Swartz, the avowed protector of the Rajah's competitor and public impeacher of his title, as Interpreter in the transaction, had been injudicious—that

to the full extent of his wishes, and had the gratification of seeing his much injured friend reinstated in his rights and sovereignty; but even in this unwilling act of justice, there were quibbles and delays, the meanness of which, if they were minutely examined, would astonish the reader. Amongst others, Mr. M——, having received orders to replace the Rajah in possession of his territories, refused to do so, unless he became security for whatever *private debts* his people might owe to British subjects." (*Ibid*, pp. 130 & 131).

The author then has given the reply of the Raja to the resident, which translated literally into English by an Indian employee of his, is a specimen of what some Anglo-Indian publicists have labelled "Baboo English."

The Madras Government did not like the interest which Colonel Baird took in the Raja's affairs. Therefore to punish him, he was removed with his regiment from Tanjore.

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the punctuality of the Rajah's payments had precluded all pretext for taking possession of his territory—that if maladministration of mortgaged districts could justify the forfeiture of them, the British Government might lay claim equally to Oude and to Travancore; and he concluded by declaring, that justice and policy alike prescribed the rescinsion of the treaty, and the restoration of the ceded district to the Nabob (? Rajah), whatever embarrassments might result from the proceeding." (Life of Lord Teignmouth, Vol. I. p. 356).

The Raja was also to be punished. The author of the biography of Baird writes: :—

"The Rajah was devoted, and ere long, added another proof, to the many already existing, that whenever policy or aggrandisement seemed to warrant the measure, a pretext was never wanting to the *Honourable* East India Company, to remove a native prince." (*Ibid.* p. 138).

Colonel Baird was ordered for service at the Cape of Good Hope, for which he embarked on the 17th of October, 1797. His biographer writes:—

"By his conscientious partizanship in the cause of the Rajah, and by the earnestness with which he had espoused the cause of that unhappy prince, he had made an implacable enemy of Lord Hobart and the Madras government; for, in consequence of Colonel Baird's letter on the subject, to Calcutta, having been much spoken of, Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, called for the official correspondence which had occurred respecting Tanjore; and it is clear that Sir John's subsequent reprobation of the conduct which had been observed towards the Rajah, was, as has been already suggested, the real cause of the removal of Colonel Baird, by Lord Hobart, who had encouraged if not originated all the measures of the resident." (*Ibid,* p. 148).

Colonel Baird arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in December 1797, and was appointed by the Governor, Lord Macartney, as Brigadier General. A few months afterwards, Lord Mornington, on his way to India, touched and stayed at the Cape for a while. The Governor-General *elect*

"was extremly anxious to obtain from General Baird whatever information he could, with respect to the state of India when he quitted it; . . . . .

"Upon the subject of the Tanjore country (one particularly exciting to General Baird,) Lord Mornington's inquiries were extremely numerous and minute; and General Baird discovered, in the course of their conversations on this topic, ... that his lordship acually carried out with him definite orders relative to its settlement, founded, of course, upon the representations which had been made to Leadenhall Street; and he was naturally anxious to ascertain the probable fate of the oppressed Rajah, and whether he was to be eventually permitted the quiet enjoyment of his own territories. "Having candidly expressed his own opinion, General Baird, with his accustomed frankness, inquired of Lord Mornington what were really the intentions of the Honourable East India Company upon this important and delicate matter; but Lord Mornington stated that he felt himself bound not to answer General Baird's questions at that period, the decision of the Court of Directors being only known to himself and the Secret Committee.

"This diplomatic avoidance of giving him any information, General Baird too justly construed into an unfavourable result for the Rajah. What the specific instructions from Leadenhall-Street actually were, General Baird never discovered;* but Lord Mornington had not long been in India, before, as usual, a pretext was formed, and the *adopted son* of the Rajah's elder brother was placed on the

* "In reference to Tanjore, the Directors sanctioned Lord Hobart's Treaty with the Rajah." (Life of Lord Teignmouth, Vol. I, p. 392, footnote).

musnad, although his claims, which had been formally and carefully investigated long before, had been disallowed by Sir Archibald Campbell and all the lawyers at Madras.

"But what have legal decisions in India to do with strokes of State policy? or who shall be of sufficient importance to stop the progress of a resolution of the secret committee of the East India directors? Interest declared for the possession of Tanjore—justice upheld the claims of the Rajah, the undoubted heir, the legally acknowledged prince, the actual possessor of the territories. But when the Honourable East India Company discovered that this prince, who had sense enough to resist their usurpation of his rights, until actually frightened by British bayonets (how misused!) into an opposite line of conduct, was, in his present state, not sufficiently subservient to their will, the claims of the *adopted son* were again seriously brought forward and admitted; and an unknown foundling was placed on the Rajah's throne, upon condition that he would cede the revenue of his country to the Company, and become their pensioner for the rest of his precarious life." (*Ibid*, pp. 160-162).

Revd. Mr. Swartz evidently belonged to that class of missionaries regarding whom I have elsewhere* written :—

"Christian missionaries who are sent out to heathen lands do not seem to care so much for the welfare of the souls of the dark-skinned races as to bring those lands under the subjugation of Christian powers by stir-

* *History of Education in India under the rule of the East India Company*, pp. 207-208.

ring up troubles in those lands. Thus in the *Saturday Review* of July 10, 1880, in an article under the title of 'Flogging Missionaries' it is said :—'Almost all our recent "little wars" have sprung, more or less directly, from the enterprise of missionaries. The Abyssinian affair was caused by missionaries. Missionaries spread the reports about Cetewayo's cruelty and contempt of the Sabbath day, which at least hastened the inevitable encounter with the Zulus. A missionary complicated the relations of the late Government with the Porte, and missionaries have interfered pretty freely with the domestic Royal quarrels which keep Burmah in hot water."

In India at least, some Christian missionaries play the part of emissaries, spies and informers, as is evident from the conduct of the Revd. Dr. Wilson of Bombay (See my "Story of Satara," Appendix H. p. 492).

So the reports spread by Revd. Mr. Swartz regarding the cruelties and oppressions of Raja Amar Singh should be greatly discredited. The Resident at his Court, Mr. Alexander Macleod, had Mr. Swartz to support him in his conspiracy against the Raja. This is clear from the letter of Colonel Baird to Lord Hobart, dated Tanjore, 24th January, 1796, in which, after stating that he complied with the instructions of the Government in furnishing the troops requisitioned by the Resident, he wrote

"(I) went myself to Mr. M.————, whom I found

at the house of Mr. Swartz, and endeavoured to prevail on him not to employ the troops, etc." (*Loc. cit.* p. 129).

The fertile province of Tanjore excited the cupidity of the Christian merchant "adventurers" so much that they did not scruple to adopt any means to get possession of it.

CHAPTER XXI

ANNEXATION OF SURAT.

The English established their first factory in India in Surat. It is not necessary here to enter into details respecting the early history of the English in their Presidency of Surat, and their double dealings with and behaviour towards the people of that place. This has been very well described by Revd. Mr. Anderson in his work on "*The English in Western India.*"

The English ascendancy commenced by the capture of Surat in 1759 by them by fraud rather than by force. The author of the Surat Volume of the Bombay Gazetteer, in a footnote to p. 127, writes that

"Stavorinus states that one of the Sidhi officers was paid by the English to arrange that no resistance should be made to the English on their attack on the Castle. He hints also that the same means were used to prevent Mr. Taillefort, the director of the Dutch company, from joining in the struggle."

But the Governors of Surat were still Musalmans and thus there was divided rule. All the evil effects of divided rule were visible in that unhappy land. One Mr. Parsons, writing in 1777, said:—

"the government of Surat is, with reason, called double.

For instance, should the French, Portuguese, or Dutch ask for alteration of duties or increase of privileges, if the English chief is disinclined to grant their request he tells them to ask the Nawab, at the same time communicating to the Nawab what answer to give . . . . They all understand the farce."*

The Musalman governor was merely a puppet in the hands of the English, for all the power centred in their hands. Thus Stavorinus, a Dutch traveller, wrote in 1774 :—

"The English give laws to all, neither Europeans nor Indians can do anything without their special approbation. The governor of the city does not in this respect differ from the lowest inhabitant. He must obey their commands, although they show him externally some honour, and will not in public allow that he is subservient to them."†

Under this farce of double government, four so-called "independent" Nawabs ruled in Surat from 1759 to 1799. But now Lord Mornington was the Governor-General of India and he wanted to bring Surat under the direct control of the East India Company. The spend-thrift Company of Christian "adventurers" found it difficult to make both ends meet in their administration of the affairs of Surat. Therefore, it was considered expedient by them to wring conces-

* Quoted in a footnote, Surat Gazetteer, p. 129.

† *Ibid*, p. 129.

sions from the Nawab. With this end in view, they pressed him to adopt two measures,—one to reform the government in the city and the other to enlarge the English receipts. The Nawab was asked to disband his own troops and employ three battalions of the Company and assign the English funds for their maintenance. But the Mussalman Nawab turned a deaf ear to the importunities of the Christian schemers. Mr. Duncan, the then Governor of Bombay, wrote:

"The Nabob betrayed an immediate jealousy of, and repugnance to, any concession; as well on the alleged ground of the inadequacy of his funds; as of the principle of our interference with his administration; which he declared to be inconsistent with the treaty of 1759."

But he was so greatly pressed by the English for concessions, that at last he yielded to their importunities and consented to pay them a lakh of rupees annually and allow them certain concessions to the amount of more them 30,000 rupees a year. This treaty was not concluded when he died on the 8th January, 1799. He left behind an infant son who died a month afterwards. The brother of the late Nawab, by name Nasir-ud-din, claimed the government of Surat. The new Nawab

"consented to pay a lac of rupees annually but perseveringly insisted that beyond that sum the revenues of the place would not enable him to go. After every mode of importunity was exhausted, and every species of inquiry

was made, Mr. Seton (the chief at Surat) became satisfied, that his statement was just, and on the 18th of August, 1799, wrote to the Governor of Bombay, in the following words. 'I have left nothing undone; and pressed him to the utmost. I am convinced he has not the means, or believe he really would pay more. Poor Mr. Farmer has been led into a false opinion of the resources of Surat; and I could almost venture to stake my life on it, that more than the lac is not to be got by any means short of military force. Take the Government from the family, and pension them (though such a measure would, in my humble opinion, be contrary to good faith), I scarcely believe, after all endeavours, that the Company with these pensions, and the increased necessary establishments, would be more in pocket, than they will now with their present establishment and this donation. What were the views of the Company in possessing themselves of the castle? Whatever they were, they are not altered, and they were then satisfied with the castle, and tunka revenue, which is only diminished from a decrease of trade; and here a lac is unconditionally offered, which exceeds the amount of castle and Tunka revenue by 25,000 rupees per annum; yet the present government are not satisfied therewith, and still want more; which cannot be raised, if the Nabob does not squeeze it out of the subjects.'*

But the Christian Governor-General was not going to show any consideration for the Musalman Nawab of Surat. The sound argument of Mr. Seton had no weight with him. In his despatch dated Feb.

* Mill, 6th Vol. pp. 207-208.

18th, 1800, he wrote to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay:

"Having fully considered your several communications relative to the affairs of Surat, I have directed a despatch to be prepared on that subject for my signature in Council, together with the draft of a Treaty to be concluded with Nussur-ud-Deen previous to confirming him in the station of Nabob. . . . . .

"Being convinced that it is not only the complete right, but the positive duty of the British Government to secure the external defence, as well as the internal order and good government of the City of Surat; and being satisfied that the original Treaty between the Company and the Nabob Moyen-ud-Deen presents no obstacle to any conditions requisite to the permanent establishment of these important and salutary objects, I am resolved not to confirm Nusser-ud-Deen in the station of Nabob, until he shall have agreed to transfer the whole civil and military administration and revenues of the city into the hands of the Company; reserving to himself an annual stipend sufficient for the maintenance of himself and his family, to be paid by the Company from the revenues of Surat."*

So the Mussalman Nawab was to be pensioned by the Christian Governor-General—a step which, Mr. Seton was of opinion and with him also all right thinking persons, was contrary to good faith. But the Governor General was afraid of the Nawab not

* Wellesley, II. pp. 222-223.

transferring his authority to the Company without resistance. So he wrote to Mr. Duncan:

"I think it will be advisable that you should proceed in person to Surat for the purpose of concluding this important arrangement. I shall not, however, suggest this measure in my letter in Council; but you will understand my decided opinion to be, that, without your presence at Surat, the proposed reform cannot be carried into effect.

"You will, therefore, proceed without delay to add two regiments of native infantry to your establishment.

"It is also my desire, that you should immediately increase the force at Surat to one Company of European artillery, two Companies of European infantry, and one complete regiment of native infantry.

"You will observe, that it is desirable that this force should precede your arrival at Surat."*

So after all the Nawab had a treaty forced on him which made him part with his territory. In the language of Christian occidental diplomacy "The friendship subsisting between the honourable English Company and the Nawab Nusser-ud-Deen Khan, &c. &c. &c., is hereby strengthened and confirmed," &c.

The Governor-General in Council transmitted the Treaty to the Governor-in-Council of Bombay, "on the 10th of March, 1800," and it "was ultimately

* *Ibid*, p. 223.

agreed to, without any alteration, by the Nabob of Surat, on the 13th May, 1800."*

Thus the Nawab was displaced.†

Regarding this transaction, writes Mr. Mill:—

"This was the most unceremonious act of dethronement which the English had yet performed; as the victim was the weakest and the most obscure. . . . . To dethrone the sovereign, to alter completely the distribution of the powers of government, and to place them in a set of hands wholly different and new, though it constituted one of the most complete revolutions which it is possible to conceive, was spoken of as a 'reform of the government.'"

"The reasoning, by force of which the Governor-General claims the right to make such a reform, ought to be heard. 'On a reference,' says he, 'to the treaty of 1759, concluded with Mayen-ed-din, we find that it was only a personal engagement with that Nabob, and that it did not extend to his heirs. Independent of the terms of the treaty, the discussion which passed in 1793, on the death of Mayen-ed-

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* *Ibid*, p. 709.

† Regarding the passing of Surat entirely into the hands of the English, the *Calcutta Review* for June, 1848, says:—

"In the year 1800, by one of those strokes of injustice, which have too often accompanied our acquisition of power in India, and for which expediency has been the wretched plea, the East India Company took the whole administration of Surat affairs into their own hands. Any impartial person who will take the trouble to investigate this affair, will find that the helpless Nawab had reason on his side, the English force and sophistry."

din, as well as the letter from your government, dated the 25th of March, 1790, when the office of Nabob again became vacant, prove it to have been the general sense, that the operation of the treaty of 1759 ceased on the demise of Mayen-ed-din. The power of the Mogul having also become extinct, it follows, that the Company not being restricted with respect to the disposal of the office of Nabob by any specific treaty, are at liberty to dispose it as they may think proper.'

"Here two things are assumed: first, that the English of that day were not bound by the treaty of 1759; the second, that, wheresoever not bound by specific treaties, the English were at liberty to dethrone any sovereign whom they pleased; or, in the language of the Governor-General, 'to dispose of the office of Nabob, as they may think proper.' Upon no part of this reasoning is any comment required.

"Attention is also due to the conduct of the Bombay rulers. Governor Duncan and Mr. Seton, had, both of them, previously declared their conviction of the clear right of the Nabob, not only to the Nabobship by inheritance, but to the support and alliance of the English, by a treaty which their acts had repeatedly confirmed. Yet, no sooner did they receive the command of the Governor-General to dethrone him, than they were ready to become the active instruments of that dethronement, and, as far as appears, without so much as a hint, that in their opinion the command was unjust.

"The Governor-General next proceeds to say, that the sort of government which was performed by the Nabob, was exceedingly bad. . . . . 'It is obvious,' he continues, 'that these important objects,' namely, the security and good government of Surat, 'can only be attained by the

Company taking the entire civil and military government of the City into their own hands; and consequently,' he adds, 'it is their duty, as well as their right, to have recourse to that measures.'

"Here again we see the doctrine most clearly avowed, and most confidently laid down as a basis of action, that bad government under any sovereign constitutes a right, and even a duty to dethrone him; either in favour of the East India Company alone, if they ought to have the monopoly of dethronement; or in favour of mankind at large, if the privilege ought to be as diffusive as the reason on which it is founded.

"Though stripped of all the powers of government, and a mere pensioner of State, it was still accounted proper for Meer Nasseer ud Deen to act the farce of royalty. His succession to the musnud of his ancestors was now acknowledged by the English government, and he was placed on it with the same pomp and ceremony, as if he was receiving all the powers of sovereignty, on the day after he had for ever resigned them."*

* Mill, 6th Vol, pp. 208-211.

CHAPTER XXII

HOW THE MARQUESS OF WELLESLEY ENSNARED THE PEISHWA.

The story of the manner in which the Marathas have been all along treated by the British forms a black chapter in Indian history. An English gentleman who once occupied a very prominent place in the Bombay Civil Service wrote :—

"We now arrived at the Mahratta raj, which is closely coupled with the earlier days of the British. However fairly told, there is much for the English to be ashamed of in this period."

But British writers as a rule, have not scrupled to make out the Marathas as the delinquent party. The allegations which they have thought fit to make against the Hindoos of the Deccan, will hardly stand the scrutiny of any thoughtful writer ; yet from generation to generation, vile calumnies against the Marathas have been allowed to be very widely published. The greatest sinners, the original authors and publishers of these calumnies, were the two brothers, natives of Ireland, named the Marquess Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington. It was these two brothers who spread the snare of their machina-

tions to entrap the Marathas and thus to reduce their power.

No historian has as yet taken the trouble to unfold the manner in which the British treated the Marathas. We have to read between the lines of the Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington ; and what a flood of light these shed on their black and abominable transactions to encompass the ruin of the Marathas!

The first Maratha War was undertaken in the time of Warren Hastings. The first Governor-General of India could have boasted of establishing "Peace with Honour.' When he was impeached before the Houses of the English Parliament, in his defence, referring to the transactions of the Maratha affairs during his *regime*, he said :—

"I maintained the wars which were of your formation, or of that of others, *not of mine*. I won one member (the Nizam) of the Great Indian Confederacy from it by an act of seasonable restitution; with another (Moodajee Bhonsla) I maintained a secret intercourse, and converted him into a friend; a third (Madajee Scindia) I drew off by diversion and negotiation, and employed him as the instrument of peace. When you cried out for peace, and your cries were heard by those who were the object of it, I resisted this, and every other species of counteraction, by rising in my demands; and accomplished a peace, and I *hope everlasting* one, with one great state (the Mahrattas)."

Poor Warren Hastings's hope of "everlasting"

peace was not destined to be fulfilled. During his life-time, he witnessed all the three great wars with the Marathas and the last year of his life was synchronous with the last year of the existence of the rule of the Peishwas.

It should be remembered that the Marathas themselves did nothing to disturb the peace with the British. In fact, the descendants of those very men whom Warren Hastings mentioned as having contributed to his hoped-for 'everlasting' peace fell victims to the foul conspiracies of the English. They suffered for the deeds of their predecessors by whose help the English had succeeded in maintaining their position in India ; for it is probable that had not the Marathas been induced to conclude peace, the British would have found it impossible to remain any longer in India. But such was the sense of gratitude possessed by these votaries of Christ in India that they did not hesitate to ruin the descendants of their friends and benefactors in their hour of trial and troubles.

At the time when Lord Mornington landed in India, Bajee Rao was sitting on the Peishwa's *Musnad* at Poona. He was destined to be the last of the Peishwas. The great Nana Fadnavis was spending his days in captivity. Disorder and confusion were rapidly setting in and there are reasons to suspect that the Europeans were mainly instrumental

in bringing about this state of affairs in the Mahratta Empire.

Madhoji Scindhia was succeeded by his grand-nephew, Dowlat Rao Scindhia. Tookajee Holkar was dead. The late resident with Madhoji, named Major Palmer, who had since received a step in rank and hence was known as Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, had succeeded Mr. Charles Malet as resident in the court of the Peishwa at Poona. The Europeans seem to have been disappointed with Bajee Rao, for they had expected to secure many advantages from him. It will be remembered that Raghoba had promised them a good many things and they naturally expected that the son would fulfil the specious promises of his father. But so far Bajee Rao had not given them any hopes in that direction.

Lord Mornington had, long before landing in India, made up his mind to go to war with Tipoo. In the war which Lord Cornwallis made on that unhappy Muhammadan Prince, the success of the Europeans was mainly to be attributed to the assistance they received through their alliance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam. In the memorandum, dated 6th July, 1798, which Mr. Josias Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Madras, submitted to General Harris, "in consequence of his late conversation upon the possibility of an early rupture with Tippoo Sultan," it is stated that "the experience of

Lord Cornwallis's army proves that we were unable to supply ourselves, or to open our rear for the admission of Brinjaries until *we had been joined by the Maratha army.*" The italicied words show the importance of the Mahratta alliance. But Mr. Webbe did not think that either the Marathas or the Nizam would join the Europeans in their unholy war on Tippoo. So he wrote:—

"In respect both to the Marathas and the Nizam, I think there is no reasonable ground to expect effectual assistance from either until we should strike some signal blow."

Although humbled and made to part with half of his dominion, Tippoo was still regarded as a formidable enemy. It was not considered possible to attack him without the co-operation or, at least, the neutrality of the other native powers of he Deccan. Mr. Webbe truly gauged the situation of the Europeans in India, when he concluded his memorandum by saying:—

"I have not studied to exaggerate any part of this memorandum; but seeing that our resources have, by the mere operation of the war in Europe, been reduced to a state of the greatest embarassment, and having no hope of effectual relief but in peace, I can anticipate none but the most baneful consequences from a war with Tippoo. If this war is to be a vindication of our national rights, it is clear that we cannot undertake it in less than six months; and this delay, with a reference to our national

interests, may probably admit of its being postponed till we attain sufficient strength to prosecute it with vigour. But if war is inevitable, and the present are judged the most advantageous circumstances under which it can commence, I fear that our situation is bad beyond the hope of remedy."

Not only General Harris but Lord Mornington felt that there was a good deal of truth in Mr. Webbe's statement. The war with Tippoo was not undertaken "in less than six-months," nay, it was 'postponed' till the Europeans attained "sufficient strength to prosecute it with vigour."

Lord Mornington knew that no native power of India would join him in his unjust war with Tippoo. So he tried to ensnare the independent sovereign Princes of India with his nefarious scheme of Subsidiary Alliance. In Captain Kirkpatrick at Hyderabad, Lord Mornington found a worthy lieutenant to give effect to his scheme. But the European Resident at the Peishwa's Court, Colonel Palmer, did not succeed in ensnaring the Peishwa.

From the public despatches of Lord Mornington it appears that the Governor-General presumed that the Nizam and the Mahrattas, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultan, would not be able to render any assistance to the East India Company. As has been already stated, there was never any occasion to call in the aid of any of the allies for defensive purposes

against Tippoo. Therefore it was absurd for Lord Mornington to make this suppositious inability of the allies to render assistance in arms and men in a defensive war with Tippoo as a pretext for robbing them of their independence. It also further appears from his despatches that Lord Mornington never cared to consult the allies as to the advisability of making an unprovoked and aggressive war on Tippoo. After having brought the Nizam within the snare of the Subsidiary Alliance, and after his failure in this direction with the Peishwa, Lord Mornington did not consider it necessary to press the Marathas to join him against Tippoo.

From the perusal of Lord Mornington's despatches it is evident that he wanted to keep the Marathas neutral rather than seek their co-operation against Tippoo. He was also anxious that the Marathas should not join Tippoo or invade the territories then under the administration of the British or their allies.

We can understand the reason which prompted Lord Mornington not to press the Peishwa or the Marathas to co-operate with him against Tippoo. The Marathas had been always looked upon with jealousy by the Europeans. When Lord Cornwallis had gone to war with Tippoo, certain members of the House of Commons called in question the justice and policy of the war. They pointed out "that the Mahrattas

were the people from whom in India the greatest danger impended over the interests of England, and that the Mysore sovereign was valuable as a balancing power."

This argument must have carried great weight with the Governor-General in not seeking the co-operation of the Marathas, for it is certain that any aid from the Marathas, would have been purchased by the cession to them of a portion of the conquered territories of the Mysore sovereign, thus further enhancing the already dangerous power of the Marathas. To do this was not the policy of Lord Mornington. Accordingly he did not press them to co-operate with him against Tippoo. That the Mahrattas were quite capable of rendering military aid to the Company against Tippoo will be shown later on.

It was necessary to keep the Mahrattas neutral. Lord Mornington devised a plan by which he admirably succeeded in gaining this end. The Peishwa Bajee Rao was under the guidance of, and dependent upon, Dowlat Rao Scindhia. Without the aid of Dowlat Rao, Bajee Rao could never have succeeded in gaining the Peishwa's *munsad*. Grant Duff writes that Bajee Rao "addressed himself to Scindhia, offering him four lakhs of rupees of territory, and whatever might be the expenses of his troops during the time, he should require their aid

in asserting his lawful succession to the *musnad*. This offer was accepted." Lord Wellesley was pleased to describe this position of Bajee Rao as one of captivity. But Bajee Rao was not such an ill-treated prisoner in the hands of Dowlat Rao as was the unhappy Nizam in the hands of the British. He never complained of his hard fate, if any. He did not ask the British to help him in his difficulties ; he never requested them to loosen the yoke of captivity which Dowlat Rao had placed on his neck. There was a European Resident at his Court. We do not find this person ever making any report to the Governor-General regarding the presumed pitiable condition of the Peishwa. It is not till Lord Mornington made the discovery that the Peishwa was unable to fulfil the conditions of an ally in a defensive war against Tippoo, that we begin to hear of the Peishwa's situation as that of a prisoner. It was the business of the British Resident to din into the ears of the Peishwa that Scindhia was exercising undue influence over him and thus to make him discontented with his lot. In plain words the Resident opened a campaign of low intrigues against Scindhia. Without detaching the Peishwa from Scindhia, Lord Wellesley found it impossible to ensnare the former.

The Nizam had employed a large number of French officers to discipline and train his army. It was thought that this French influence in the court

of the Nizam at Hyderabad was injurious to the British interests in India. It was therefore necessary to bring the Nizam within the sphere of British influence and disband his force officered by the French.

But in the case of the Peishwa, there did not exist the pretext which had served to ensnare the Nizam. The Peishwa did not keep in his employ any French officers to discipline his troops. Therefore, it was necessary to invent the pretext that he was under the undue influence of Scindhia who of course kept a large force disciplined and drilled by the French. It was convenient for the British to forget that the Peishwa lay under a deep debt of gratitude to Scindhia, for without the timely aid of the latter, Bajee Rao would never have succeeded to the Peishwa's *musnad*. If the British were so very philanthropic as they would seem to make the world believe, why did they not make war at once on Dowlat Rao Scindhia and thus release the Peishwa from his galling yoke? The Peishwa was their ally and they suffered him to be unduly influenced in all state matters by Scindhia. How different was the course they adopted towards Tippoo, when it was suspected that that prince was meditating an attack on their ally, the Raja of Travancore!

Lord Wellesley pined and panted, as it were, to make the Peishwa independent of Scindhia, which

in plain terms meant the disruption of the confederacy of the Mahratta states. He knew that the Peishwa did not stand in need of any subsidiary force of the British. He knew that Bajee Rao was a weak man and thus if he could be once detached from Scindhia and other Mahratta confederates, it would not be difficult to rob the Mahrattas of their independence. With this object in view, he set the Resident at Poona to instil into the mind of the Peishwa the belief that Scindhia was exercising undue influence on him, that all the Mahratta confederates were his enemies and that the British alone were his true friends.

As said before, Colonel Palmer was the Resident at Poona when Lord Mornington set his foot on the soil of India. In his first letter to Colonel Palmer, marked private and dated Fort William, 8th July, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote :—

"You may be assured that it was a matter of real satisfaction to me that the affairs of this Government at the Court of Poona should be in the hands of a person of your talents and experience in a moment the most critical to our interests. You will learn by my public instructions the nature and extent of the general system of policy with respect to our alliances, which in my judgment the present crisis absolutely demands. I have the fullest confidence in your zeal for promoting the success of a plan which is founded on principles of justice and of all parties to be affected by its execution. There are only a few points which have been omitted in my public instructions, as

being more properly subjects of a private communication. If any opportunity should offer of restoring Nana on conditions favourable to our interests and consistent with the general tenor of my instructions, I think that such an event might tend to secure the permanent advantages of the proposed plan."

But before this letter reached Colonel Palmer, Nana Fadnavis had been restored to liberty by Scindhia. So Nana's release was not looked upon with pleasure by the British, because it was not brought about by them 'on conditions favourable to their interests and consistent with the general tenor of Lord Wellesley's instruction.'

The capital of the Peishwa was the scene of many disorders and revolutions. It is impossible for any historian to positively assert the part played by the British in creating these disorders and bringing about these revolutions. But it is not improbable, that the Resident at Poona fomented domestic dissensions and court intrigues in order to make the Mahrattas dependent on the British. It was the policy of Lord Mornington to create disorder and confusion in the dominion of the independent princes of India. Over and over again in his official despatches, he gave instructions to his subordinates 'to take advantage of the disaffection and discontent' that existed in the native states of India, which, of course, as every one knows, is merely a diplomatic expression for foment-

ing disaffection and discontent. Had not Col. Palmer carried out the policy of Lord Mornington, it is not probable that the Governor-General would have assured him that "it is a matter of real satisfaction to me that the affairs of this Government at the Court of Poona should be in the hands of a person of your talents and experience in a moment the most critical to our interests."

Nana was once more at the head of the Maratha affairs, and his views regarding the Europeans were well known to all. Moreover it was not his policy to see the total annihilation of the power of Tippoo. When he saw the Nizam ensnared by the British by their nefarious scheme of 'Subsidiary Alliance', without the knowledge of, and consultation with, the Peishwa's Court, he naturally became anxious as to the future safety and welfare of the Maratha Commonwealth. In a postscript to the letter to Col. Palmer, from which extracts have been given above, Lord Mornington wrote:

"I cautioned you against making any communication to the Peishwa of my intention with respect to the French army at Hyderabad for disposing the French in small parties, as it is probable that such a dispersion will have taken place before you can receive this despatch, I have given you full liberty to apprize the Peishwa of the nature of the arrangement to be adopted at Hyderabad, feeling that it would be very improper to use any concealment

at Poona or at Hyderabad with respect to the real object of the negotiations of either Court."

What greatly offended the Marathas was that the Nizam should have entered into an alliance with the British without previously consulting them. It should be remembered that the Marathas after inflicting the most crushing defeat on the Nizam at Khurdla were very magnanimous in their terms of peace with him. As conquerors they did not exact any heavy penalties from their vanquished foe. The Marathas naturally expected the Nizam to be grateful to them. Out of gratitude the Subedar of the Deccan should have, previous to his hugging the English to his breast, given an opportunity to the Peishwa and the Marathas to know the real nature of the alliance he was going to contract with them.

When Nana Fadnavis came to know of the Treaty which the Nizam had concluded with the East India Company, he became very anxious about the future independence of the Marathas. At this time he was reconciled to Scindhia, for he owed his liberty to him. The house of Holkar was also at this time subservient to that of Scindhia. Tookajee Holkar died on the 15th August, 1797, leaving

"two legitimate sons, Khasee Rao and Mulhar Rao. Khassee Rao was imbecile both in mind and body, but Mulhar Rao was in every respect qualified to support the

fortunes of the house. Disputes soon arose between the brothers, in which the illegitimate sons took the part of Mulhar Rao,.....Scindhia, on being solicited by Khasee Rao, readily afforded the aid of the body of troops for the purpose of apprehending Mulhar Rao, who, refusing to surrender, was attacked, and maintained a desperate defence until he was killed. His half brothers made their escape—Jeswant Rao to Nagpur, and Wittoojee to Kolapur." (Grant-Duff, p. 531.)

Thus Scindhia was the most powerful of all the Maratha confederates. He had an interest in maintaining the supremacy of the Marathas in the counsels of the native courts of India, for he had combined with the other Maratha confederates at the battle of Khurdla. Nana Fadnavis sought his aid and he succeeded. The Nizam had not as yet fulfilled the terms of the Treaty of Khurdla. With his alliance with the British, there was no indication that the Nizam ever meant to pay any attention to the terms of the above Treaty. The British also did not hold themselves responsible for the Treaty which their ally the Nizam had made with the Marathas. Of course, in his public despatch to Colonel Palmer, dated 8th July, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote :—

"You will make a formal tender to the Peishwa in my name of my arbitration between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and Hyderabad and Scindhia, etc."

But independent states never seek the arbitration

of a third party. Moreover, the British never came to the assistance of either the Marathas or the Nizam when they fought the battle of Khurdla. This offer of arbitration, therefore, appeared something like a deliberate insult to the great Nana, the Peishwa and Scindhia.

Taking all the circumstances, narrated above, into consideration, the story is not quite impossible that the Marathas intended to make war on the Nizam and to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Tippoo. Colonel Palmer, the resident at Poona, wrote to Lord Mornington on 8th April, 1799, that

"Rubah Ganwar, Vakeel at this Court, has informed Moonshee Fuckeer-ud-deen with whom he has long been in terms of great friendship and confidence, that having enquired of Jadoo Bauschar the state of affairs at Scindhia's Durbar, Bauschar communicated to him a plan concerted by the Peishwa and Scindhia to attack the Nizam, and eventually to form an alliance with Tippoo Sultan."

How far this story is reliable, it is not possible for the purposes of historical accuracy to positively declare. But there was nothing improbable in this. This shows, if anything, great statesmanship on the part of Scindhia. Scindhia had been smarting under the ill-treatment he had received at the hands of the Governor-General. Lord Mornington wanted that Scindhia should leave Poona, because it was presumed that he was exercising undue influence over the

Peishwa and it was also feared that the disciplined corps of Scindhia might render assistance to Tippoo, if Dowlat Rao remained in the Deccan. Lord Mornington wrote to Colonel Palmer on the 8th July, 1798:—

"I have already observed that the present position of the army of Scindhia operates as an effectual assistance to the cause of Tippoo Sultan; if an alliance offensive and defensive had been formally concluded between those two powers, Scindhia could not render a more acceptable service to Tippoo, than he now performs by holding in check both the allies of the Company."

Thus the return of Scindhia to Hindoostan was considered a great political necessity. This was effected in a way which brings to prominence the crooked methods employed by the Governor-General in all his dealings with the Indian sovereigns of India. Captain Grant Duff (p. 540). writes:—

"The reported designs of Zuman Shah, King of Cabul, and grandson of Ahmad Shah Abdallee, a name terrible to Mahrattas, were strongly set forth, by the British agents, in order to induce Scindhia to return for the protection of his dominions in Hindusthan."

Mr. Mill (VI. pp. 128-130) writes:—

"In 1798, a belief, but solely derived from rumour, of vast preparations making by the Afghan, for the invasion of India, was excited anew. The apprehensions, however, of the British government were allayed, by intelligence received toward the end of September, that the disturbances

within the dominions of the Shah had compelled him to leave his capital and march to Kandahar. But this was speedily followed by reports, that the 10th of October was fixed for commencing his march from Cabul towards Hindusthan; and though the authenticity of these reports was held very doubtful, the English Government deemed it their duty..... .....to take every precaution against the possibility of an event, which, combined with the designs of Tippoo and the French, might become of the most serious importance. Endeavours were used to prevail upon Doulat Rao Scindhia to return from the South, and put his dominions in the best posture of defence; and great hopes were expressed, that he would follow this advice. .....The fact appears to be that Scindhia knew the improbability of being invaded by the Shah; and though such invasion would bring on him greater evils than it would bring on the Government of any other State, he chose to remain at Poona, for the promotion of those objects of which he was there in eager pursuit."

The English had a purpose to serve by spreading the reported designs of Zemaun Shah. It was not Lord Mornington alone, but his predecessors also had done the same.

Thus Mr. Mill (vi. p. 125) writes:—

"The threat of Zemaun Shah, King of the Abdallees, or Afghans, became a convenient source of pretexts for urging upon the vizier the projected innovations..... The object of the Shah, as announced by rumour, was to re-establish the house of Timur, to which he was nearly related, and restore the true faith in the empire of the Great Moghul."

It appears to us, that Lord Mornington made use of, if not fabricated, the reported designs of the Afghan sovereign, to go to war with Tippoo and to detach Scindhia from assisting Tippoo or entering into an alliance with that Muhammadan Prince.

As said before, the threat of Zemaun Shah's reported designs had no effect on Scindhia. He remained in Poona assisting the Peishwa. But if the threat of an invasion from without failed to remove Scindhia from Poona, the creation of disorder within his dominion enabled Lord Mornington to withdraw Scindhia from Poona. Lord Cornwallis had withdrawn the British Resident from the Court of Scindhia. Since then no Englishman represented the interests of the Government of the East India Company at Scindhia's Court. One of the first acts of Lord Mornington was to re-appoint a British Resident at Scindhia's Court. The British had to see the advantages which resulted to them by keeping a resident at the Courts of the native princes of India. These residents have enabled them in gaining power in India which their highly trained and disciplined soldiers and generals would not have succeeded. So Lord Mornington despatched a Resident to Scindhia's Court to carry out his policy. The man chosen for this purpose was one named Colonel Collins.

Scindhia, as said before, was at that time in Poona. Colonel Collins did not go to Poona but to

Scindhia's capital in Hindusthan. At the time of his taking leave of Lord Mornington, that Governor-General gave him some oral instructions. The nature of these instructions is not known. In his letter to Colonel Collins, dated Fort William, 15th September, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote:—

"My conversation with you, at Barrackpore, apprized you of my ideas with regard to the objects of your mission.

The question which will demand your immediate attention will be, the best mode of securing the strongest barriers against Zemaun Shah, not only with a view to the present moment but to all future contingencies.....

The return of Scindhia to that quarter, attended as such an event must be by the restoration of his power to a considerable degree of efficiency, appears to me to be the best possible means of checking the motions of the Shah; especially as it must ever be the interests of Scindhia (within his own dominions) to cultivate our friendship, and to co-operate with us in opposing any invader, and above all, a Muhammadan plunderer. Scindhia, therefore, has been the object of my unremitting attention. If he should return to Hindusthan, you will immediately apply yourself to the commencement of negotiation with him, for the purpose of framing a defensive treaty against the Shah."

It is evident then that the object of despatching Colonel Collins to Scindhia's Court was to induce Scindhia to return to Hindusthan from the Deccan. But, as said before, Scindhia did not credit the rumour with respect to the Shah's invading India.

He did not remove from Poona. It was necessary to adopt other means. Although the actual means which Colonel Collins had adopted to bring about the return of Scindhia into Hindusthan, is nowhere put in black and white, it is not very difficult to guess their nature. It appears to us that Colonel Collins adopted the same means which the Governor-General recommended the Governor of Bombay to pursue in order to prevent Zemaun Shah from invading India. In his letter to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan, dated Fort William, 8th October, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote :—

"It has been suggested to me, and I understand it was the opinion of Sir Charles Mallet, that a further diversion of the Shah's force might be created by our affording certain encouragement to the nations occupying the Delta and lower parts of the Indus, who have been stated to be much disaffected to the Government of the Shah; I wish you to give this point the fullest and most serious consideration; to state to me your ideas upon it; and in the meanwhile to take any immediate steps which shall appear proper and practicable to you."

It appears to us that Colonel Collins took steps similar to those mentioned above which the Governor-General recommended to the Governor of Bombay, for inducing Scindhia to return to Hindusthan. He fomented disaffection and discontent among the troops and subjects of Scindhia. The probability of his

doing so is heightened by the fact that Lord Mornington looked upon Scindhia as an enemy. Since the days of Mr. Macpherson, the officiating successor of Mr. Warren Hastings, every Governor-General had secretly tried to reduce the power of Scindhia. Lord Mornington, notwithstanding all that he did, firstly, by spreading the reported designs of Zemaun Shah and secondly by despatching Colonel Collins to Scindhia's court to create disaffection and discontent in Scindhia's territories, failed in inducing Scindhia to return to Hindusthan. Mr. Mill (VI. p. 130) writes:

"Notwithstanding the hopes, however, which had been fondly entertained of a defensive alliance with Scindhia, the authorities in India (*i.e.*, Lord Mornington) wrote to the authorities in England in the following terms:

"From the letter to the Resident with Doulat Rao Scindhia, dated the 26th of October, you will observe, that Scindhia's continuance at Poona, the dissensions and disaffection which prevail among his commanders, and the unsettled and precarious state of his authority in Hindusthan, have prevented our taking any further steps for carrying the intended arrangements with effect."

The dissensions and disaffection among Scindhia's commanders, "and the unsettled and precarious state of" Scindhia's "authority in Hindusthan," seem to have been, as stated before, brought about by the English, for these were discovered when it was found impossible to induce Scindhia to return to Hindusthan.

"It was in the beginning of October (1798)," continues Mr. Mill, "that the authorities in India delivered it to the authorities in England, as their opinion, that the greatest advantages would arise from a connexion with Scindhia. Before the end of the same month, they find the circumstances of Scindhia to be such, that no further steps for carrying the intended arrangements into effect are accounted advisable. Again, the inability of Scindhia from the disaffection of his commanders, and the tottering state of his authority, were now made the foundation on which measures of policy were built."

Lord Mornington made a discovery that Scindhia was intriguing with Vizier Ali of Oudh. As we do not find any allusion to this intrigue in any official records we are justified in expressing our opinion that this alleged intrigue of Scindhia was a fabrication of Lord Mornington. Dating his letter from Fort St. George, March 3rd, 1799, and marking it "private," Lord Mornington wrote to Colonel Palmer:—

"I employ private mode of communication for the purpose of informing you of a circumstance which has just now come to my knowledge.

An original letter from Ambajee, Scindhia's principal commander in Hindusthan has been found among the papers of the Vizier Ali, which were taken at the attack of Madhoo Doss's garden, from which it appears that a treaty has been secretly concluded by Ambajee, on the part of Doulat Rao Scindhia, with Vizier Ali.

The treaty itself is not in possession of Government, but from Ambajee, and from the letters from Kamgar Khan, Namdar Khan, and other papers belonging to Vizier

Ali, there can be no doubt that the principal objects of this treaty are of the most hostile nature to the Company, and they are proposed to be accomplished by placing Vizier Ali on the Musnud of Oude, by means of the assistance of Scindhia, and by the establishment of the union of interests between Scindhia and Vizier Ali.

You will be cautious not to disclose your knowledge of this circumstance to any person whatever, but you will endeavour, consistently with this caution, to obtain every information which may tend to throw light on the motives and objects of this flagrant act of treachery on the part of Doulat Rao Scindhia; and you will keep a vigilant eye on all his proceedings, giving the earliest information of them to me."

While this alleged "flagrant act of treachery" on the part of Doulat Rao Scindhia has never been proved, this much is certain that the Governor-General's conduct towards the successor of Madhoji Scindhia savours of foul treachery. While to all outside appearances, the British professed great friendship and regard for Doulat Rao Scindhia, as evidenced from the fact that a Resident was sent to his Court, they nevertheless did not scruple to secretly adopt questionable means to bring about his ruin. If this was not treachery, the word has no significance.

On that very date, Lord Mornington wrote a private letter to Captain Kirkpatrick, the Resident of Hyderabad. In it he enclosed a copy of his letter to Colonel Palmer and wrote:

"I recommend the important intelligence which it contains to your most serious attention, relying on your discretion for an exact observance of the same secrecy which I have enjoined Colonel Palmer to observe. It does not appear to me to be advisable, in the present moment, to hazard the disclosure of Scindhia's views, in their full extent, to Azim-Ul-Omra, but I think it would be highly necessary in my name, to point that minister's particular attention to the probability of some attempt on the part of Doulat Rao Scindhia against the Nizam's territories, during the progress of our operation against Seringapatam."

This allegation of treachery served as a hint to the British Residents at Poona and Hyderabad to conspire and plot against Scindhia. What appeared to Lord Mornington to be "the probability of some attempt on the part of Doulat Rao Scindhia against the Nizam's territories," was made by Colonel Palmer to appear as almost a certainty. Almost immediately on receiving Lord Mornington's letter, from which extracts have been given above, the Resident at Poona discovered that Doulat Rao Scindhia had been concerting plans for attacking the Nizam. Dating his letter from Poona, April 8, 1799, Colonel Palmer wrote to Lord Mornington that,

"Rubah Ganwar, Vakeel at this Court, has informed Moonshee Fuckeer-Ud-Deen with whom, he had long been on terms of great friendship and confidence, that having enquired of Jahdoo Bauschar the state of affairs at Scindhia's Durbar, Bauschar communicated to him a plan

concerted by the Peishwa and Scindhia to attack the Nizam, and eventually to form an alliance with Tippoo Sultan."

It will be noticed that Colonel Palmer dragged in the name of the Peishwa also. Colonel Palmer did not take the trouble to find out if these allegations and rumours had any foundation in truth. In his letter from which an extract has been given above, the Resident states that he could not find out how far the alleged treachery on the part of the Peishwa and Scindhia was reliable. But nevertheless he mentioned these rumours to Lord Mornington, because he knew that in that way he would curry favor with the Governor-General.

The English did not rest satisfied with merely conspiring and plotting against Scindhia. In order to induce him to return to Hindustan Lord Mornington adopted coercive measures to intimidate him. He wrote on 3rd March, 1799, to Captain Kirkpatrick:

"You have been already apprised of the embassy which I have despatched to the Raja of Berar. The moment appears to approach when the advantage to be derived from the connection with the Court of Nagpur may become highly important in the scale of our political relations. It would be desirable to cement this connection through the means of the Court of Hyderabad; and perhaps ultimately, to form a defensive alliance, of which Scindia as well as Tippoo should be the object.....Until the war with Mysore should be brought to conclusion, it will not be prudent to undertake any hostile operations against Scindia."

The man chosen for the purpose of acting the part of emissary at the Court of the Rajah of Berar, was Mr. Colebrooke, afterwards well known as the great Sanskrit scholar. In a letter to him enclosed in the Governor-General's letter to Captain Kirkpatrick of the 3rd March, 1799, he was told:—

"My verbal instruction to you on your departure from Fort William, proceeded no further than to direct you to endeavour to ascertain and report to me the character, disposition, views and interests of the Rajah of Berar; the nature and extent of his resources and military force, and the best means of availing ourselves of his alliance, in the event of hostilities, either with Zemaun Shah or Tippoo Sultan.

"The local position of the Rajah's territories appears to render him a peculiarly serviceable ally against Daulat Rao Scindhia,.....I therefore wish you to turn your attention immediately to the consideration of a treaty of defensive alliance, against the detected projects of Scindhiah,* between the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam, and the Company, with power to the Peishwa to accede to it whenever he shall think fit.

* * * *

"However evident the hostile designs of Scindhiah may be, in the actual state of affairs, it is not prudent to propose to the Rajah of Berar, or even to the Peishwa or to the Nizam, a treaty of defence nominally against Scindhia. Even the preliminary measures for ascertaining the disposition of the Rajah of Berar on this subject, must

* No project of Scindhia had been as yet detected.

be taken with the greatest caution. The object of our apprehension should appear to be Tippoo Sultan; and although 'any other enemy of the contracting powers' may be named in general terms, no suggestion should yet be given by which the name of Scindia could be brought into question.....

"A treaty might, therefore, be proposed to the Rajah, the immediate and ostensible object of which should be to strengthen and define his defensive engagements against Tippoo Sultan but the terms of which should be such as to admit the insertion of Scindhia's name, if such a measure should become necessary previously to the conclusion of the treaty."

At the same time Lord Mornington kept a large force facing the frontiers of Scindia's dominions in Hindustan. Dating his letter to Colonel Palmer from Fort St. George, 3rd March, 1799, he wrote:—

"The considerable force now under the command of Sir James Craig, will remain assembled on the frontier of Oude, and I should hope that the knowledge of that circumstance would prevent Scindhiah or Amvajee from making any movements, of a hostile tendency, to the interests of the Company."

All these measures made Scindia believe that the British meant invading his territories. So he left Poona and returned to Hindustan. Although there is no evidence, yet it is quite possible that he harboured designs not quite favorable to the interests of the Company. It was in this way, that Lord Mornington succeeded in detaching the Peishwa from Scindia. It

was the object of the Governor-General to keep the Marathas neutral, and he succeeded in this also. For the reason stated before, he does not seem to have been particularly anxious to have the Marathas to co-operate with him in his war with Tippoo.

Lord Mornington's chief argument for forcing the Subsidiary Alliance on the Nizam and trying to do the same on the Peishwa was, that, in an event of war with Tippoo, these two allies of the Christians would not be able to render any assistance to the Company. It has already been said that no occasion had arisen to test the correctness or otherwise of this opinion of the Governor-General. The Nizam, of course, had now entered into the Subsidiary Alliance. But the Peishwa had not as yet done so and he was in a position to afford assistance to the Company. Captain Grant Duff (p. 542) writes:—

"The Marathas naturally viewed this treaty (of the Nizam) with much jealousy, and the Peishwa, on being urged by the British agent to conclude a similar one, evaded the subject by an assurance that he would faithfully execute the conditions of subsisting engagements, and, on the prospect of a war with Tippoo, promised to afford his aid. In these replies Bajee Rao had followed the opinion and advices of Nana Furnawees. * * * Nana Furnawees recommended that Appa Saheb, the son of Pureshram Bhow, should be appointed to command the contingent intended to co-operate with the English; and in the present exigency proposed to assemble it, by collecting the force under Dhondoo Punt Gokla, Sur-Subedar of the Carnatic,

the troops of Rastia Vinchorkur, and all the horse which the Brahmin jaghirdars could raise. The necessities of the state, and the presence of Sindia, precluded the Peishwa from recruiting his own army or detaching any part of it from Poona.

"Appa Sahib refused the command, but the offer having led to a reconciliation between Pureshram Bhow and Nana, the Bhow agreed to head the contingent himself..... An English detachment, similar to that formerly employed and under the command of the same officer, was held in readiness to join Pureshram Bhow."

But all the preparations and the expenses incurred by the great Nana were in vain. The Governor-General would have nothing to do with the Maratha contingent. The reasons assigned by Captain Grant Duff (p. 543) for the Governor-General's refusal do not seem to us to be the real ones. He writes:—

"After the English had commenced hostilities against Tippoo, his envoys were publicly received at Poona although repeated remonstrances were made on the subject by the British Resident. Even after their formal dismissal was intimated to Colonel Palmer, on the 19th March, they retired only to Kirwee, a village 25 miles South of Poona. Colonel Palmer at first supposed that the detention of the Wukeels was a mere repetition of the formal plan of obtaining a sum of money, on a false pretence of neutrality or aid. The British Resident knew that Bajee Rao had received 13 lakhs of Rupees from Tippoo, to which Scindia was privy, but it was not known at that time to Nana Furnawees; and when the Governor-General noticed the conduct of the Court of Poona, by simply countermanding the detachment

which had been prepared to accompany Pureshram Bhow, Nana Furnawees could not comprehend the reason."

The story of the Peishwa receiving 13 lakhs of rupees from Tippoo, without the knowledge of the astute Nana Fadnavis, whose Intelligence Department was the most perfect in India, carries the stamp of improbability on its face. Regarding his Intelligence Department Mr. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, than whom there is no better authority on the life and times of Nana Fadnavis, writes:—

"He was a past master in the art of getting speedy and reliable information from every part of the country. He commanded the means of knowing, while sitting in his room, everything of importance that was occurring from day to day at the different royal courts of India. The working of his Intelligence Department was so perfect that half a dozen or dozen accounts of every important occurrence in any part of the country reached him from different sources within a reasonable time; so that, sitting in his chamber, Nana could easily judge of the corroborative value of the different versions and arrive at a conclusion which was nearer truth than any single one of these accounts."*

So we are fully justified in looking upon the story of the 13 Lakhs as a pure fabrication of the Resident to prejudice the Governor-General against the Peishwa. Colonel Palmer did not succeed in forcing the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance on the

* The *Mahratta* for March 19th, 1900.

Peishwa. He was, therefore, trying to widen the gulf between the Peishwa and the British Government. All sorts of stories based on idle rumours calculated to discredit the Peishwa were reported by him to the Governor-General. And at last he succeeded in inducing the Governor-General to decline to accept the offer of assistance by the Peishwa.

Grant Duff is mistaken in writing that the Governor-General countermanded the detachment which had been prepared to "accompany Pureshram Bhow" because of the rumoured intrigue of the Peishwa with Tippoo. Lord Mornington had no idea of the intrigue till Colonel Palmer wrote to him about it in his letter dated Poona, April 8, 1799.

But this letter was written five days after the Governor-General had officially declined the Peishwa's offer. Dating his letter from Fort St. George 3rd April, 1799, Lord Mornington wrote to Col. Palmer :—

"The reasons which induced me to order the recall of the detachment must be obvious to the durbar of Poonah; and, I imagine they had already been fully stated to you."

The letter is a long one, and his lordship, who never acted on the saying that "Brevity is the soul of wit," has introduced in it a great deal of irrelevant and unnecessary matters. In searching for the reasons of recall we nowhere find any allusion to the

story of 13 lakhs of rupees, which, it was alleged, the Peishwa had taken from Tippoo, or the alleged intrigue of the Peishwa with the Muhammadan prince. After carefully analysing the whole letter, we hit upon two reasons which seemed to have induced the Governor-General to decline the Peishwa's offer. One of the reasons was the delay on the part of the Peishwa in furnishing the necessary funds for the detachment. To quote the Governor-General's own words:—

"Every artifice of vexatious delay has been employed to frustrate the necessary means of enabling the detachment to move from Jyeghur....The necessary funds for its subsistence have been neglected."

This does not appear to have been a reason of any importance to have induced the Governor-General to decline the offer. It does not even seem to be correct that the necessary funds were neglected. Had it been so, the Governor-General's order in countermanding the detachment would not have taken Nana by surprise, as stated by Captain Grant Duff.

The second reason assigned for countermanding the detachment appears to be "the detention of Sultan's Vakeels at Poonah, in contempt of my (Lord Mornington's) repeated remonstrances." This appears to us to be merely a pretext and not a valid reason for declining the offer. The Governor-General

did not take into due consideration the arguments of Nana. He writes:—

"The arguments of Nana, drawn from the last war with Mysore, are not applicable to the present case. The connection between the Courts of Poonah and the Company had not at that time been so defined and cemented as to render the admission of Vakeels from Tippoo Sultan incompatible with the spirit of the subsisting treaties."

It was convenient for Lord Mornington to ignore the customs and etiquette of the Courts of Asiatic Princes observed since time immemorial. But the Peishwa's Court went even to the length of dismissing Tippoo's Vakeels from Poona in order to oblige the Governor-General. Even this formal dismissal did not satisfy the Resident at Poonah. He reported to the Governor-General that these Vakeels "only retired to Kirwee, a village 25 miles south of Poonah." Their formal dismissal and denial of official recognition to them should have been considered as evidence of the Peishwa's good faith in carrying out the wishes of the Governor-General. As private individuals, they had every right to remain in any part of the Peishwa's territories. Nana Fadnavis was now the Peishwa's minister. That he knew not of the detention of Vakeels in the Peishwa's dominion, exonerates the Peishwa's Court from the accusation of 'a violation of faith'. Colonel Palmer, in his letter of April 8th, 1799, writes to Lord Mornington that

Nana "was uninformed of any reasons for the detention of Tippoo's Vakeels after they left Poonah, except such as they assigned themselves, which were the want of carriage and dangers of the road." These were sufficient reasons to have carried weight with any unprejudiced mind.

It has been already said above that the real reasons which led the Governor-General to decline the Peishwa's offer of aid seems to have been the jealousy of the dangerous proportions which the power of the Marathas had assumed. It has also been said that after the Nizam had been forced to lose his independence and when the Governor-General made up his mind to go to war with Tippoo, he did not consider it necessary to press the Peishwa to render him any assistance. This is borne out by the Governor-General himself. In his letter to Colonel Palmer dated Fort St. George, 3rd April, 1799, Lord Mornington wrote that

"the proposition for employing a detachment of the Company's troops with the Peishwa's contingent in the eventual prosecution of hostilities against Tippoo Sultan did not originate with me, but with the Peishwa himself"

Bearing this in mind, we should be very chary in believing that the Peishwa was at the same time intriguing with Tippoo against the Company. We have already stated before that the Marathas did

not consider the war with Tippoo a just one, and therefore it is probable, that at first they did not approve of the aggressive measures which Lord Mornington was adopting towards the Mysore Ruler. The policy of self-defence must have even dictated them to attack the Nizam who had not as yet fulfilled all the terms of the Treaty of Khurdala, and to assist Tippoo against the allied forces of the British and the Nizam. It might have been the policy of Doulat Rao Scindia. Of this however, as said before, there is no evidence. But when the Marathas saw that it was hopeless to attack the Nizam and go to the assistance of Tippoo, the Peishwa under the guidance of Nana Fadnavis agreed to furnish a contingent to co-operate with the Company's troops against Tippoo. At first Lord Mornington acceded to the proposal. But almost at the eleventh hour he declined the offer. Lord Mornington, according to his own showing, was never very solicitous of the Peishwa's aid. And now circumstances had so far occurred to his favor that he could afford to decline the profered aid of the Peishwa. Doulat Rao Scindia had returned to Hindustan, which had the effect of keeping the Marathas neutral. Moreover, in all the arguments with Tippoo, that prince had been worsted. So, after putting the Peishwa to all the unnecessary expense, Lord Mornington declined his offer of aid ; and in so doing he wrote to Col. Palmer on 3rd April, 1799,

from Fort St. George: "My confident expectation is, that the allies will speedily reduce the vindictive spirit of Tippoo Sultan to submission without the aid of the Peishwa." Here at least, Lord Mornington states the real reason which prompted him to decline the Peishwa's offer of aid.

But Seringapatam had not yet fallen; Tippoo had not yet been slain or taken prisoner. It was possible for the Peishwa to do a great deal of mischief and annoy the Company and their allies. Hence it was a stroke of diplomacy and manifestation of the spirit of perfidiousness to feed the mind of the Peishwa with false hopes. Lord Mornington wrote to Colonel Palmer that

"notwithstanding the perverse and forbidden policy of the Court of Poonah, I shall not fail to secure for the Peishwa an equal participation with the other allies in any cessions which may be enforced from Tippoo Sultan. *I authorize you to make this declaration, in the most unequivocal terms, to the Peishwa and to Nana.* If even this declaration shall fail to excite the Peishwa to employ every practicable effort to fulfil his defensive engagements with the Company, I trust it will, at least, serve to prove the disinterested attachment of the British Government to every branch of the triple alliance."

A few words in the above extracts have been put in italics to show that Lord Mornington did not attach any conditions 'to secure for the Peishwa, an equal participation in the cessions enforced from

Tippoo.' But with the Governor-General the most unequivocal terms bore other significance. It meant, in plain language, *'bad faith'*.

Seringapatam was after all captured and Tippoo was also slain. This event happened on the 4th May, 1799. But before the news of the fall of Seringapatam could have reached the Peishwa, he had once more offered his assistance to the Company. His contingent under Pureshram Bhow was not yet broken up and he thought that perhaps it might with advantage co-operate with the British against Tippoo. The Governor-General not only curtly refused that offer, but attributed improper and unjust motives to the Peishwa for so doing. Dating his letter from Fort St. George, 23rd May, 1799, Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident at Poona:—

"The Peishwa's sudden determination to take the field accompanied by the tacit acquiescence of Scindhia, and by the orders which you state to have been forwarded to Pureshram Bhow appears to me very suspicious. It is possible that before the 10th of May, the Peishwa might have been apprised of the fall of Seringapatam; and his own preparations together with the orders of Pureshram Bhow, may have been intended to favor the seige of Bednore, or of some other part of the late Tippoo Sultan's dominions, with the view of securing the dominions seized in defiance of the consent of the Company and of the Nizam."

In those days there were no telegraphs and no

railways. It was therefore perfectly impossible for the Peishwa to have been apprised of the fall of Seringapatam 'before the 10th of May.' It was also equally impossible for Scindia to know of the fate of Seringapatam before that date. As to the motives which the Governor-General attributed to the Peishwa's 'preparations together with the orders to Pureshram Bhow,' it is only necessary to say that if the British did not go to war with Tippoo from a superfluity of unselfishness, or for no end, they should not have expected the Marathas to render them assistance without receiving any reward. But the Governor-General did not stop by merely questioning the motives of the Peishwa, but for the first time in his official correspondence, he charged the Peishwa with 'treachery'.

He wrote to Colonel Palmer:—

"I desire that you will take the most effectual measures in your power to discover the intentions of the Peishwa with respect to the treacherous designs which I apprehended him to have formed; and that you will employ such representations or other means as may appear to you most likely to prevent the execution of this design, if really entertained."

This was, of course, the diplomatic way of ordering the Resident to fabricate, if necessary, evidence to incriminate the Peishwa. And the Resident gladdened the heart of Lord Mornington by so doing. As a pretext for not fulfilling the

promise made to the Peishwa, the British invented 'the treacherous design' of that Hindu sovereign. If there was 'treacherous design' on anyone's part, it was that of the Company's servants themselves. This imputation of 'treacherous design' to the Peishwa reminds one of Schopenheur's saying that "it is generally the old story of the dog barking at its own image, it is himself that he sees and not another as he fancies."

As said before, the promised cession of a portion of the conquered territory to the Peishwa was quite unconditional. But this promise, it appears, was made to keep the Marathas quiet and neutral. When this object had been gained and when Tippoo had been slain and Seringapatam had fallen, the Governor-General wrote to the Resident at Poona, on the 23rd May, 1799, that

"previously to the cession of any portion of territory to the Peishwa, I should wish to endeavour to accomplish the whole of the arrangement contained in my instructions to you of the 8th July, 1798. And I desire to learn from you, without delay, whether a renewal of those propositions under the present circumstances of affairs would prove acceptable to the Court of Poonah."

Nana Fadnavis knew the perfidious character of the Europeans of his day. Twenty years had not yet rolled their course since Nana Fadnavis had reasons to be disgusted with the conduct of the Europeans

for their remarkable capacity for chicanery and perfidy and their utter contempt for justice and fair-play. He was a Hindu of the old type and was nurtured on the traditions of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Twenty years served to strengthen his conviction that the 'ways of the Europeans were unfair and wily.' But he was not quite prepared to believe that the Governor-General would unblushingly violate his most solemn promise and withhold the cession of the conquered territory.

The principal reason assigned by Lord Mornington on his arrival in India for trying to enforce the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance on the Peishwa, was based on his presumption that in the event of a war with Tippoo, the Peishwa would not be able to fulfil the conditions required of him as those of an ally. But that his presumption was totally groundless was proved by the fact that the Peishwa offered a contingent to co-operate with the Company's troops against Tippoo. The Governor-General's calculation being falsified by the recent events, he evaded the non-fulfilment of his unconditional promise by starting other objections.

Twenty years before, Nana Fadnavis had asked all the independent princes of India to combine against the Europeans. Even the Moghul Emperor was approached to lend countenance to his scheme of a general alliance of all the independent powers.

of India against the wily and perfidious Europeans. He had succeeded so far that the then Governor-General of India was obliged to sue for peace on the terms dictated to him by Nana. But those twenty years had made a great difference in the history of India. The Nizam was now virtually a prisoner of the Europeans. The principality raised by Haidar was now in the hands of the Europeans who were on the frontiers of the Marathas. But the great Nana did not still despair. He thought that the Marathas alone were capable of coping with the Europeans and their new allies. Of course, he did not cease pressing the Governor-General to fulfil his promise regarding the cession of a portion of the conquered territory to the Peishwa. He would not agree to the conditions which the Governor-General now tried to impose on the Peishwa, previous to ceding him any portion of the late Tippoo's dominions. But when he saw that the faithless Governor-General did not mean to fulfil his promise, he tried to unite the Maratha confederates and with their help attack Nizam Ally and the English. The nucleus of an army for these operations, he possessed in the force under Pureshram Bhow, previously intended to co-operate with the allies against Tippoo.

But unfortunately he did not succeed in his attempt. There were not only distractions in his dominions, to which reference will be presently made,

but there was formidable disturbance in the southern Maratha country. The Jagheerdars of that part of the Maratha Empire, had rebelled against the authority of the Peishwa. It is a noteworthy fact, that these Jagheerdars of the southern Maratha country should have raised the standard of rebellion soon after the English had taken possession of Tippoo's dominions. Does not this very fact suggest that their disaffection and discontent were probably encouraged by the Europeans, who also in all probability instigated them to rebel against the Peishwa?

When Lord Mornington declared hostilities against Tippoo, he appointed a commission for the purpose of encouraging "the tributaries, principal officers, and other subjects of Tippoo Sultan to throw off the authority of that prince." After the fall of Seringapatam and death of Tippoo, three out of the five members of the commission, were still in Mysore. These three were Lord Mornington's brother Col. Arthur Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington), Col. Barry Close and Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm. They were members of another commission appointed for the settlement of the Mysore territory. Arthur Wellesley was made the Governor of Mysore. It is only necessary to make a passing allusion to the appointment of Col. Wellesley. No fair-minded writer has ever justified this appointment. It was a jobbery of the worst

type perpetrated by the Governor-General. Sir David Baird had superior claims to the appointment. In the *Calcutta Review* for July, 1857, Revd. Dr. Thomas Smith refers to the slight supposed to have been cast upon Sir David Baird by his exclusion from the Commission, and by the appointment of Col. Wellesley to the command of the city, to which Baird was thought to have a superior claim. He writes:—

"We have no wish to revive this controversy; but we do think it is scarcely fair to admit, as seems to be sometimes admitted as an element in the discussion, the subsequent career of Colonel Wellesley. It is forgotten that the controversy took place in the eighteenth, not in the nineteenth century: that the parties were not Sir David Baird and Colonel the Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley..... ....We have not been quite convinced, either that Wellesley had showed so pre-eminent qualifications, or Baird so striking disqualifications as to justify the Governor-General passing over the fine old hero, appointing his own brother."

But it is not remembered by these writers that the business of the Commission mainly consisted in corrupting, bribing and coercing the adherents of Tippoo into submission. Sir David Baird was a gallant soldier; a straightforward, though probably a blunt and brusque man. He could not have approved of or carried out the crooked policy of the Governor-General. What wonder if the commissioners appointed for the settlement of the Mysore

territory, extended their field of work into the dominions of the Peishwa bordering on Mysore? The very fact of the rising of the southern Jagheerdars while the Mysore Commission were in the midst of their labour would, as said before, point to the members of that commission probably having had a hand in encouraging these disturbances.

Nana Fadnavis was therefore required, first of all, to set his own house, as it were, in order. The force under Pureshram Bhow was despatched to the Southern Maratha country to suppress the disturbances. But order and tranquillity had not yet been restored in the territories of the Jagheerdars of the South, when death overtook Nana Fadnavis. This sad event took place on 13th Feburary, 1800. His death was an irreparrable loss to the Marathas. With him passed away the dream of the Marathas to regain their lost supremacy in Indian politics. He was the only man in India to see through the designs of the crafty and faithless Europeans of his times. His death, therefore, was welcome to them.

But they did not yet breathe very freely. Doulat Rao Scindia was still alive and was known to be a very ambitious prince. Without curbing or reducing him, there was to be no peace for them. Ever since his arrival in India Lord Mornington had paid as much attention to reduce the power of Scindia as that of Tippoo. He did not conceal this.

He entered into a campaign of intrigues and conspiracies against Scindia. He sent a Resident to Scindia's Court and despatched another to Nagpoor to stir up the Raja of Berar against Scindia. At first it was given out by the Governor-General that all his efforts were directed against Scindia in order to induce him to return to Hindustan. When this was accomplished, that is, when Scindia had left the Deccan for Hindustan, Lord Mornington entered into a fresh course of intrigues against that prince and invented the pretext for so doing by stating that that prince had hostile intentions against the Company and their allies. The despatches of Lord Mornington convince us that he had intended to go to war with Scindia a long time before he declared hostilities against Tippoo Sultan. He himself went to Madras to be near the scene of operations against Tippoo; leaving at Calcutta Sir Alured Clarke, the Commander-in-Chief, as provisional Governor of Bengal. It was given out that the stay in Calcutta of the Commander-in-Chief was necessary as Zemaun Shah had threatened an invasion of India. But it was a mere pretext to cover the real design of the Governor-General to attack Scindia. All his letters and despatches from Madras prove this. In his private letter dated Fort St. George, March 3rd, 1799, to Captain Kirkpatrick of Hyderabad, Lord Mornington informed him of the embassy which he had des-

patched to the Raja of Berar. This embassy was sent "to form a defensive alliance, of which *Scindhia as well as Tippoo should be the object.*" The words in italics show his meaning very clearly. Again, dating from Fort St. George 8th March, 1799, in his "private and secret" letter to Sir Alured Clarke, he wrote :—

"In every private letter which I have written to you .....I have uniformly desired that a respectable force should be maintained on that frontier, with a view to check the possible designs of Dowlat Rao Scindhiah

* * * *

"My wish is, that you should, without delay, reassemble in Oude such a force as you may deem adequate to the object in checking.....the whole of Scindhiah's force if that chief should return into Hindustan. You will also keep in view the probability of early offensive operations against the dominions of Scindhiah."

The Governor-General advised the Commander-in-Chief to tell horrid lies to Scindhia, for he wrote :—

"The reassembling of the army may possibly alarm Ambajee and Scindhiah, and an explanation may be demanded of the motives of such a step. You will ascribe it to the escape of Vizier Ali from Benares, to the probability of his attempting to join Zemaun Shah, and to the consequences which that event might produce."

There are reasons to suspect that the distractions which had taken place in the dominions of Scindhia, even in the time of Madhoji, and the

feuds between Holkar and Scindia, were brought about by the exertions of the successive Governor-Generals from the time of Sir John Macpherson. No previous Governor-General was so rash as to put this in black and white. But we must give credit to Lord Mornington for being an honest scoundrel. He wrote to Sir Alured Clarke :—

"If hostilities should commence.....you will use every endeavour to excite the Rajpoots and other tributaries against Scindhiah, and to induce the Rajahs of Jynagur and Jodhpur to enter zealously into the war; you will at the same time take proper steps for supporting and encouraging the exertions of the partizans of the Byes and Lukwaji Dada, together with all persons in the family or service of Scindhiah, who may be disaffected to his Government."

Here, after all, the cat is out of the bag or, rather, the murder is out. All the distractions and disorders which prevailed in the dominions of Scindia were most probably the doings of the Company's servants. It is probable that they instigated Yesvant-rao Holkar to attack Scindia. Lord Mornington further wrote to Sir Alured Clarke :—

"I am equally satisfied of the policy of reducing the power of Scindhia, whenever the opportunity shall appear advantageous. But while Scindhia shall remain in the Deccan, and while our armies shall be engaged in war with Tippoo Sultan, Scindhia will possess considerable means of embarassing us in that quarter; for this reason it is

extremely desirable to avoid hostilities with him until either his return to Hindustan, or a peace with Tippoo Sultan shall place our affairs in a condition, which may enable us to punish the treachery of Scindhia, with more effect."

But before we describe the measures adopted by the Governor-General to reduce the power of Scindia, it is necessary to advert to the occurrences at Poona after the death of Nana Fadnavis.

Bajee Rao neither possessed administrative capacity for civil government, nor pluck and courage for military affairs, by virtue of which the earlier Peishwas had succeeded in extending the Maratha power in all directions of India. He was not even a statesman like Nana Fadnavis. Lacking in all the qualities which ought to be possessed by a man in the important situation of the Peishwa, after the death of Nana, he eagerly listened to the advice of the interested intriguers and conspirators. He did not repose confidence in any one. Always distrustful of every one about him, he proved to be a fitful tool in the hands of the Europeans for the destruction of the independence of the Marathas.

Both the Nizam and Tippoo Sultan used to pay *chauth* to the Marathas. When the former concluded the treaty of Subsidiary Alliance with the Company, and the latter was slain by troops led by European officers, the Marathas asked for their *chouths* from

the Europeans, as they had to settle all foreign affairs on behalf of the Nizam and of the successor of Tippoo. This question of *chouth* formed a strong point in all discussions which Nana Fadnavis carried on with the Governor-General. But Nana died and the Europeans refused to settle this matter on behalf of their allies. Under the circumstances, the Peishwa would have been fully justified in holding no communication with the Europeans. But Bajee Rao inherited the weakness of his father Raghoba. He liked to dally and coquet with them. Instead of looking on the Europeans as enemies of his nation, he treated them as the friends and even would have hugged them to his breast, had he been permitted to do so during the life-time of Nana Fadnavis or the ascendancy of Scindhia in Poona affairs.

As has been stated before, Bajee Rao owed his elevation to the Peishwa's musnud to the help accorded to him by Dowlat Rao Scindhia. The latter, therefore, naturally expected that in all important state affairs, Bajee Rao would consult him. A feeling of gratitude should have dictated Bajee Rao to do so. But like Frankenstein of the fable, Dowlat Rao Scindhia had brought into existence a creature who ultimately brought about his ruin. It is probable that the Europeans seized every opportunity to poison the mind of Bajee Rao against Scindhia. With his characteristic short-sightedness, he was intriguing

with the Europeans to throw off what he supposed to be the galling yoke, and become independent, of Scindhia. In all these intrigues he was encouraged by the Europeans. Dowlat Rao Scindhia at first did not pay any attention to these intrigues.

But he had every reason to be indignant when, without his knowledge, the Peishwa granted the permission to the British Government of sending troops into the Maratha territory for the pursuit of Dhoondhia Waugh* After the fall of Seringapatam, Dhoondhia, who had been the prisoner of Tippoo, made his escape from Seringapatam, and succeeded in gaining around him many adherents. With these men, he carried on guerilla warfare in the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultan. It was necessary that the Company should do something to protect the lives and properties of their new subjects. A large force under Colonel (but now Major-General) the Honorable Sir Arthur Wellesley was sent to pursue Dhoondia who escaped into the territories of the Marathas. The British Government made application to the Peishwa, and obtained permission to pursue and destroy Dhoondhia. It was the grant of this permission which justly exasperated Scindhia. Dowlat Rao

* He was a Maratha, converted to Muhammadanism by Tipu. See Colonel Mile's *History of Tipu* (Panini office reprint, p. 176).

possessed a sound knowledge of military tactics, which Bajee Rao sadly lacked. Besides, it appears that as a statesman he was far superior to his uncle, Madhoji. The Peishwa committed a suicidal mistake by permitting the British to send troops into the Maratha territory. These troops were under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He entered the Mahratta territory, and pursued and slew Dhoondhia Waugh. He did much more. He espied out the strategical positions and weaknesses of the dominions of the Marhattas. This knowledge stood him in good stead in all his wars with the Marathas, and his subsequent successful career is mainly to be attributed to his gaining the knowledge of the country of the Marathas. After his return, he wrote a "Memorandum upon the operations of the Maratha territory." The opening words of the Memorandum were ominous, for these do not show the gratitude of the British for the favour they had received at the hands of the Marathas. This Memorandum begins:—

"As before long we may look to war with the Marathas, it is proper to consider the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired in the late contest with Dhoondhia Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points for the benefit of those in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the

operations of the army in case of such a war, as I have supposed we may expect."

Then he goes on to detail his observations, which it is not necessary to refer to in this place.

As said before, Scindhia was much dissatisfied with the conduct of Bajee Rao. He was afraid lest Bajee Rao should commit other blunders by courting the friendship of the British. Grant Duff (p. 551) writes:—

"Fearing that Bajee Rao intended to fly, he (Dowlat Rao Scindhia) for sometime kept a guard over his palace. The Peishwa found that his condition was by no means improved by the death of Nana Furnawees, and from the situation in which he was so long placed we cannot be surprised that his natural disposition to intrigue should have become incurably habitual."

The Marathas had, a quarter of a century before, been plunged into the war with the English, by the flight of Raghoba. Therefore Dowlat Rao was fully justified in keeping a guard over the Peishwa's palace. But, unfortunately, Scindhia did not go far enough. He adopted half measures. He should not have scrupled in dethroning and imprisoning, or if need be, executing, the Peishwa. This would have perhaps saved the Marathas from losing their independence. But like Frankenstein of the fable he spared the Peishwa who brought all the miseries and foreign rule upon Maharashtra.

Bajee Rao was intriguing with the British. But Scindhia's influence at Poona prevented the Peishwa's intrigue bearing any fruit. The Resident at Poona, Col. Palmer, it seems, was not so clever as Captain Kirkpatrick of Hyderabad. From his stay in Poona, he was unable to gain any advantages for the British. So Colonel the Honorable Arthur Wellesley wrote to Major Munro (afterwards Sir Thomas Munro) on 20th August, 1800 :—

"Scindhia's influence at Poona is too great for us; and I see plainly, that if Colonel Palmer remains there we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow's family under our protection, we should counter-balance Sindia."*

*It is probable that Bajee Rao, when he granted the permission to the British Government of sending troops into the Maratha territory, contemplated an alliance with the English, and also flight from Poona, to become independent of Scindhia. In these views, he was probably encouraged by the British Resident. Captain Grant Duff (p. 552) writes :—

"He (Bajee Rao) was, however, conscious of his own unpopularity as a son of Raghoba. He was anxious to keep well with the British Government, and really had a partiality for the English."

The force under Colonel Wellesley sent into Maratha territory to pursue Dhoondhia, would seem to have been designed for marching on to Poona, in the same manner,

Every one seems to have been dissatisfied with Colonel Palmer because he could not force the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance on the Peishwa. It was, therefore, considered necessary to replace him. The

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as the force from Madras was sent to Hyderabad to overawe and disband Raymond's corps. This is borne out by the Marquis Wellesley's letter to the Right Honorable Lord Clive dated Fort William, August 23rd, 1800, in which he wrote :—

"My latest advices from Colonel Palmer indicate an approaching crisis of a nature which may demand our speedy and active interference in support of the just authority of the Peishwa. It is probable that I may receive an early and urgent application for that purpose from the Peishwa himself. In such an event, it may become necessary for a large proportion of the troops under the command of Colonel Wellesley to proceed (in concert with those of the Nizam, and with a detachment from Bombay) towards Poona. The intermediate motions of Colonel Wellesley must be guided with a view to this probable contingency.

"The necessity of guarding against the revival of 'Dhoodhia's rebellion, and against the possibility of other commotions on the frontier, render it advisable that Colonel Wellesly should continue to occupy the Maratha territory, and to hold several posts from which he has expelled Dhoondhia's forces until all reasonable apprehensions of further disturbances shall have been removed. In either of two possible events, it would be wise and just to proceed still further :—first, the flight of Bajee Rao from Poona; second, the seizure of His Highness's person by

Marquess Wellesley's choice naturally fell on Colonel Kirkpatrick. That officer made the acquaintance of the Governor-General at the Cape. He was the real author of the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance. It was his brother Captain Kirkpatrick who succeeded in

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Doulat Rao Sindhia. In either of these cases Colonel Wellesley's secure establishment, within the Maratha frontier, would facilitate his advance towards Poona.....

"I, therefore, request your Lordship to inform Colonel Wellesley, without delay, that on his receiving authentic and unquestionable intelligence either of the flight or imprisonment of Baji Rao (unless some obstacle should exist from the position of Dhoondhia or some other force) the British army is directed and authorized to take immediate possession, in the name, and on the behalf, of the Peishwa of all the country as far as the bank of the Kistna. Colonel Wellesley will also summon, in the name of the Peishwa, such forts and strong places within the limits described as it shall be judged expedient for the British troops to occupy.....

"If Colonel Wellesley should engage in the operations described and authorized in the foregoing paragraph, he will take care to satisfy the inhabitants of the country that the British Government entertain no other view in them than the restoration of the Peishwa's lawful authority."

But both the Marquess Wellesley and his brother Colonel Wellesley were disappointed. In their opinion it was Colonel Palmer who was to blame for not bringing about such a state of affairs in Poona as would have necessitated the march of British troops on the capital of the Peishwa's dominions.

carrying it out in a masterly manner in the Nizam's dominions. What the younger brother did so very admirably, the elder was bound to do more excellently. But Colonel Kirkpatrick's ill-health obliged him to leave India for England. The next choice of the Marquess Wellesley fell on Colonel Close. It is probable that Colonel the Honorable Arthur Wellesley had a hand in the appointment of Colonel Close to the office of the Resident at Poona. Colonel Close was the right hand man of Arthur Wellesley in the settlement of the Mysore territory, as he was on that commission appointed by the Governor-General for that purpose, and subsequently he acted in the capacity of Resident at Seringapatam. Arthur Wellesley naturally reposed every confidence in Col. Barry Close to take advantage of the 'opportunity' to 'curb' Scindhia. It was thus that Col. Barry close succeeded Colonel Palmer as Resident of Poona.

But it would be a mistake to suppose that Colonel Palmer had not tried his best to bring the Peishwa under the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance. He had carried on the intrigue with the Peishwa to such a length that there was every prospect of success, had he remained a few months longer at Poona. Mr. Mill writes:—

"A few days before the arrival of Colonel Close, the Peishwa had communicated to Colonel Palmer, his predecessor, his consent to subsidize a permanent force of the

Company's infantry, to the extent of six battalions with the corresponding artillery, as the Governor-General had proposed; and to assign territory in Hindustan, producing twenty-five lacks of rupees annual revenue: but that the troops shall be retained within the Company's dominions at all times, except when the Peishwa should require their actual services. There was still a great distance between the compliance of the Peishwa, and the Governor-General's demands. 'I am to have my last private audience,' says Colonel Palmer, 'this evening, when I will make a final effort to convince his Highness of the lasting security, power, and prosperity,' (such was the language which the Governor-General and his agents held even to one another to their scheme for reducing to dependence the Princes of Hindustan) 'which he will derive from embracing your Lordship's proposals; though I apprehend, that nothing short of imminent and certain destruction will induce him to make cessions, which militate with his deep-rooted jealousy and prejudices' (so the aversion to a final renunciation of all independent power was coolly denominated); 'of which he thinks', continues the despatch, 'that he had already made extraordinary sacrifices'." (VI. p. 275).

The Governor-General had meditated attacking Scindhia when he went to Madras to fight Tippoo Sultan. But as yet he did not think that the time had arrived to attack Scindhia. So he opened negotiations with him and tried to force on him the scheme of Subsidiary Alliance. On a previous page it has been said that Colonel Collins had been sent as Resident to Scindhia. But in December 1801, he was directed to repair to the camp of Dowlat Rao Scindhia, for the

declared purpose of robbing that prince of his independence.

According to Lord Mornington, a defensive alliance with any one of the Maratha princes would produce one of two effects. Mr. Mill writes:—

"Either it would compel them to give up their military power, in imitation of the state which had submitted to that stipulation; or it would place them 'in a dependent and subordinate condition,' a condition in which 'all their ambitious views, and aggressive designs, would be controlled.' 'It may reasonably,' says the Governor-General, 'be expected, that the success of a negotiation, for that purpose, with Dowlat Rao Scindhia, will materially promote the complete accomplishment of His Excellency's views, by inducing the other Maratha powers to concur in the proposed arrangement with a view to avoid *the dependent and subordinate condition to which they must be reduced,* by their exclusion from an alliance, *of which the operation with respect to them, must be, to control all ambitious views and aggressive designs on their part,* without affording to those powers the benefits of the general guarantee!' The doctrine of the Governor-General, therefore, was, that, in this manner, every one of the Maratha States would become dependent upon the English Government; those who did not accept it, by being deprived of it; the same happy effect, in two opposite cases, by the same ingenious combination of means." (*Ibid,* pp. 270 and 271).

But Scindhia was not going to fall in with the views of the scheming Governor-General. Colonel Collins was disappointed. Mr. Mill writes:—

"It was the wish of the British Negotiator, who joined

the Camp of Sindhia on the 20th February, 1802, to draw from that chieftain a declaration of a desire for British assistance; and afterwards to present the scheme of the Governor-General as the condition on which that advantage might be obtained. Sindhia, however, would not admit that he had any other motive for desiring the presence of a British Resident, than to cement the friendship which already subsisted between him and the British Government; and to possess a more immediate channel of communication: especially, 'as he was guarantee to the treaty between the English Government and the Peishwa,' in this expression, exhibiting even at this early period, his jealousy with respect to the negotiation, which was now carrying on at Poonah, for superseding the existing treaty with the Peishwa, by a treaty upon the Governor-General's favorite system, called 'the system of defensive alliance and mutual guarantee.' " (*Ibid*, p. 272).

Of his failure, the Resident wrote to the Governor-General that

"Sindhia was anxiously desirous to preserve the relations of friendship at that time subsisting between him and the English Government. At the same time, I consider it my indispensable duty to apprise your excellency that I am firmly persuaded he feels no inclination whatever to improve those relations."

Referring to this language of Colonel Collins, Mr. Mill writes:—

"In other words, he (Scindhia) was not yet brought so low, as willingly to descend into that situation in which a participation in the 'system of defensive alliance and

mutual guarantee' would of necessity place him." (*Ibid*, p. 272).

Colonel Collins strongly recommended to the Governor-General to induce the Peishwa to enter into this system of alliance. He wrote:—

"Were the Peishwa to accept the aid of a subsidiary force from our government, I shall, in this event, entertain strong hopes, that Sindhia, apprehensive lest the authority of the head of the Maratha Empire might be exerted against himself, would solicit as a favour to be admitted to the benefit of the treaty of general defensive alliance." (*Ibid*, p. 273).

The motive of Scindhia's not accepting the Governor-General's propositions was rightly stated by him. He wrote:—

"It must likewise be considered, that, however much it may be to the interest of the Peishwa to engage in the defensive alliance, with a view to the restoration of the due exercise of his authority, as head of the Maratha Empire; yet that Sindhia is by no means in a similar predicament. On the contrary, as the Maharaja (Scindhia), by the real superiority of his power, is now enabled to intimidate Bajee Rao into concessions suitable to his purposes, he is apparently urged, by principles of self-interest not only to decline becoming a party himself in the treaty, but moreover to exert his utmost influence, in order to prevent the Peishwa from entering into engagements which, if carried to the extent originally proposed, would completely render him alike independent of Sindhia, and of

every other chieftain of the Maratha State." (*Ibid*, p. 273 f. n.).

So it was decided that the Peishwa should be the victim. Colonel Barry Close was trying his best to effect this. The Peishwa, in common with all the other native rulers of India, knew that the Europeans were prostituting their military strength. It used to be the practice with the princes of India to hire the European soldiers to fight their battles. The Europeans were mercenaries of the worst type and they rose to power because they were mercenaries. The Peishwa wanted to treat them as mercenaries, but the Marquess Wellesley, perhaps judging from his own domestic experience, thought that no other process in bringing under control an Indian prince could be followed than that of placing him at the mercy of mercenaries.

The ruin of the Indian princes would not be very far off, they being obliged to keep, instead of their own army, mercenary British officers and men who had prostituted their military skill and strength. It is idle to expect mercenaries to be faithful soldiers. The Peishwa wanted to keep the European officers and men outside his dominions, because he knew of their intriguing and faithless character. The Marquess Wellesley, it appears, was willing to agree to this. Mr. N. B. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, wrote a secret letter on 23rd June, 1802, to

Lt.-Colonel Close, Resident at Poona. In this occur the following significant passages:—

"The measure of subsidizing a British force, even under the limitations which the Peishwa has annexed to that proposal, must immediately place him in some degree in a state of dependence upon the British power,.....*The dependence of a state of any degree upon the power of another naturally tends to increase.* A sense of security derived from the support of a foreign power, produces a relaxation of vigilance and caution. Augmenting the dependence of the Peishwa on the British power under the operation of the proposed engagements, would be accelerated by the effect which those engagements would produce of detaching the state of Poonah from the other members of the Maratha Empire."

He rightly argued that

"the conclusion of such engagements with the Peishwa would preclude the practicability of general confederacy among the Maratha States,.....This separate connection with one of the branches of the Maratha Empire would not only contribute to our security, but would tend to produce a crisis of affairs which may compel the remaining states of the empire to accede to the alliance."

It was to reduce the Marathas to the position of dependence on the British that the Marquess Wellesley withdrew his resignation tendered to the Directors of the East India Company of his office as Governor-General of India, and stayed in that country. He knew that the seed which he had sown of his machinations was soon to bear fruit and so he

changed his mind as to his returning to his country. It would have been fortunate for the Marathas, had he never set his foot on Indian soil or not changed his mind regarding his resignation of the Governor-Generalship of India. But on the 24th December, 1802, he wrote to the Honourable Court of Directors:

"I received with great satisfaction the notification of your appointment of Mr. Barlow to take charge of this government in the event of my death, resignation, or departure from India and I shall accordingly have considered myself to be authorized to embark for England in the approaching month of January, if an important crisis had not arisen in the state of political affairs in India since 13th of March, 1802.

"The recent distractions in the Maratha empire have occasioned a combination of the utmost importance to the stability of the British power. In my judgment, the confusion now prevailing among the Maratha powers, cannot terminate in any event unfavourable to the security of the Honourable Company or of its allies. But I can not behold, without considerable solicitude, a conjuncture of affairs which appear to present the utmost advantageous opportunity that has ever occurred, of improving the British interests in that quarter on solid and durable foundations."

Of course, the Marquess Wellesley does not say anything about the authors of the distractions in the Maratha empire, but if we bear in mind certain facts or circumstances it will not be a great strain on the intellect to understand that the English were pulling the strings which wrought the distractions and

confusion among the Marathas. In a half-hearted manner, the Peishwa was seeking the alliance of the British. He fully knew what dependence on them meant. His close association with Nana Fadnavis for a large number of years had taught him exactly what Mr. Eldmonstone wrote to Col. Barry Close that "the dependence of a state in any degree upon the power of another naturally tends to increase." He had also before his eyes the object lesson of the treatment meted out to the Nizam by his European friends and allies. The Nizam, as the price for his alliance with the latter, was obliged to grant them in 1798, a portion of his dominions. But the treaty of 1798 was annulled and in 1800 a new one was substituted, by which he was again obliged to part with a very large portion of his territories. In both the wars against Tippoo, viz., those of 1792 and 1799, the Nizam had assisted the British with men and money. He was allowed to participate in the conquered territories. But for his alliance with the Europeans, the Nizam was deprived by them of all his acquired territories, and the boundaries of his dominions in 1800 were not even those he had in 1790 A.C. Besides, he was deprived of his independence and was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the Company. Seeing the fate of the Nizam, it is not surprising to understand the half-hearted manner in which the Peishwa was courting the friendship of the British.

In his last official despatch to the Governor-General, Colonel Palmer, the Resident at Poona, had written :—

"I apprehend, that nothing short of imminent and certain destruction will induce him (the Peishwa) to make concessions, which militate with his deep-rooted jealousy and prejudices."

That is to say, the Peishwa was not willing to permit the pythonic embrace of the Europeans unless as a last resource he was compelled to choose between the devil and the deep sea.

It was necessary, therefore, that something should be done to make the Peishwa apprehend his "imminent and certain destruction". To understand how this was done, one has to advert to the fugitive Holkar brothers.

Scindhia had defeated the Holkars, of whom Yeshwant Rao fled to Nagpore and the younger, Withojee, was a fugitive at Kolapore. There was already a British Resident at Nagpore, in the person of Mr. Colebrooke, sent by Lord Mornington to negotiate with the Raja of Berar for the purpose of forming an alliance against Scindhia. It is on record that the embassy of Mr. Colebrooke was a success in as much as the Raja was willing to do anything to oblige the English. At a time when the Governor-General was devising every scheme calculated to reduce the power of Dowlat Rao Scindhia, when he was advising his Commander-in-chief "to use every endeavour to excite

the Rajputs and other tributaries against Scindhia" and to "take proper steps for supporting and encouraging the exertions of the partizans of the Byes and Lukwaje Dadu, together with all persons in the family or service of Sindhia, who may be disaffected to his Government," it will be folly and stupidity not to believe that the Governor-General's agent at Nagpore was not trying to take advantage of and encourage the defeated enemy of Scindhia who had sought an asylum in the dominions of the Raja of Berar. The avowed object of the mission of Mr. Colebrooke to Nagpore was to excite the Raja of Berar against Scindhia, for wrote Lord Mornington to him that "the local positions of the Raja's territories appear to render him a peculiarly serviceable ally against Dowlut Rao Sindhia."

And when Mr. Colebrooke found Yeshwant Rao Holkar as a fugitive at Nagpore, it is reasonable to conclude that he employed every means he could think of to help Holkar against Scindhia. Holkar made his escape from Nagpore and raised an army and levied contributions on Scindhia's subjects. One is perfectly justified in believing that the English furnished him with means to effect all these.

Scindhia was at that time in the Deccan. But Yeshwant Rao Holkar's progress and raids into his dominions obliged him to leave the Deccan and proceed to Malwa. The widows of the late Madhoji

Scindhia were still in rebellion against Dowlat Rao, for they were encouraged and supported in this by the English. Scindhia tried to come to terms with Yeswant Rao. The latter seemed willing to agree to this. He agreed even

"to seize the Byes, to whom he had before proferred friendship. He accordingly attacked their troops, forced the ladies into Burhanpore, where he besieged them, but they were so fortunate as to escape towards Maywar,.. ...Sindhia supposed that, in permitting them to get off, Holkar had acted with double treachery." (Grant-Duff, p. 553).

Scindhia's supposition was a fact. Unfortunately, he did not know Yeshwant Rao Holkar was merely a tool in the hands of the Europeans. The Holkar was no statesman. He, therefore, carried on the policy which helped the Europeans. Holkar's 'proferred friendship, to the Byes, and his subsequently letting them escape towards Meywar, were in all probability dictated to him by the Europeans. We should not forget the instructions of the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, to "use every endeavour to excite the Rajpoots and other tributaries against Scindhia" and also to "take proper steps for supporting and encouraging the exertions of the partizans of the Byes." The Holkar played into the hands of the Governor-General.

It is not necessary to refer to all the battles fought between Scindhia and Holkar in Malwa. Fortune

sometimes favored the one, and sometimes the other. During the absence of Scindhia, from the Deccan, Poona was the scene of distractions and disorders. Withojee Holkar, who had taken shelter in Kolapore, raised the standard of revolt against the Peishwa, but he was captured and cruelly executed. Yeshwant Rao Holkar, when apprised of the cruel execution of his brother, pledged the vow of vengeance against the Peishwa. Accordingly he turned his steps towards Poona. That he received assistance from the English the despatches of Lord Wellesley leave no room to doubt. In his despatch to the secret committee of the Honourable Court of Directors, dated Fort William, December 24, 1802, Lord Wellesley wrote:

"The increased distractions in the Maratha state, the rebellion of Yeshwant Rao Holkar.....against the combined forces of the Peishwa and Sindhia, appeared to constitute a crisis of affairs favourable to the success of our negotiations at Poona."

Again,

"This crisis of affairs appeared to me to afford the most favourable opportunity for the complete establishment of the interests of the British Empire, without the hazard of involving us in a contest with any party.....The continuation of the contest between those chieftains would probably weaken the power, and impair the resources of both, and would afford to the British Government an opportunity of interposing its influence and mediation for the restoration of the Peishwa's just authority, under terms calculated

to secure our relations with the Maratha Empire, on the basis of a general defensive alliance and reciprocal guarantee,..."

He instructed the Resident at Poona "to adopt every practicable precaution to preclude every risk of hostilities between the British troops and those of Yeshwant Rao Holkar, and to endeavour to secure the accomplishment of our views by means of amicable negotiation." In other words, the British troops were to assist Holkar against the Peishwa.

Reading the above extracts between the lines, no man possessing a grain of common sense can help thinking that the British were assisting Holkar against Scindhia. The very fact that no attempt was made to check Holkar, nay, on the contrary, the Resident was instructed "to preclude every risk of hostilities between the British troops and Yeshwant Rao Holkar," is a strong evidence in support of the view that Holkar received every encouragement, direct and indirect, in his contest with Scindhia and the Peishwa. It should be borne in mind that the Peishwa was an ally of the British. Lord Cornwallis went to war with Tippoo Sultan, because the latter was understood to meditate an attack on the Raja of Travancore, who was an ally of the British. But in this instance, Holkar invaded and occupied the capital of their ally, the Peishwa, and yet the

British did not even protest against Holkar's conduct.

When Scindhia left Poona for Malwa, he left behind at Poona five battalions of regular infantry and 10,000 horse. His troops were all well disciplined and equipped. Holkar's army consisted of rabbles compared to Scindhia's. It was between two such forces that the battle was fought at Poona on the 25th October, 1802. Of course, the Peishwa's troops fought along with those of Scindhia against Holkar's. There was thus every probability of Holkar meeting with defeat. But fortune smiled on him. He was victorious. The combined forces of Scindhia and the Peishwa were utterly routed. What part the English Resident at Poona played in contributing to the success of Holkar's army in the battle of the 25th October, 1802, will never be known. But as stated above, there are strong grounds for suspecting that the Resident assisted Holkar.*

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* It is also probable that Scindhia was betrayed by his European Officer, named Captain Fidele Filose. Sir Michael Filose writing in the *Asiatic Review* for April, 1889, thus spoke regarding Captain Fidele Filose's committing suicide :—

"Surj Rao Ghatgay, the Maharaja's (Dowlat Rao's) father-in-law, was a man of great influence.....He now began to accuse Fidele Filose of being in correspondence with Jeswant Rao Holkar, and of seeking opportunity to betray his master Sindhia. These false accusations and the

As Colonel Palmer had written to the Governor-General "that nothing short of imminent and certain destruction will induce him (the Peishwa) to make cessions", it appears probable, nay almost certain, "that imminent and certain destruction" should be made to stare him in the face. And this was easily to be effected by rendering aid to Holkar in his raids into the Peishwa's territory. It would have been unimperialistic policy, had the Governor-General and his agent withheld their assistance to Holkar in this crisis to which they were looking for years and which was to prove so beneficial to their interests in India.

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constant hostilities of Surj Rao so preyed on the mind of Fidele Filose that he committed suicide."

It appears to us that it was the guilty conscience of that officer of Scindhia which led him to commit suicide. Had there been no truth in the accusations brought against him, he would have either demanded an enquiry into his conduct or left the service of Scindhia. But since he did not adopt either of these measures, one is inclined to believe in his guilt.

Holkar's unexpected success also over Scindhia's troops add some force to the view that there was a traitor in the latter's camp. Who could have played the traitor's part so well as the European officers? It is therefore not improbable that Surj Rao Ghatgay was not wrong in accusing Captain Fidele Filose of being in correspondence with Jeshwant Rao Holkar and of seeking an opportunity to betray his master, Scindhia.

The Peishwa, on hearing of the defeat sustained by his and Scindhia's forces, fled from Poona. Had he fled to Scindhia for protection, matters, perhaps, might have been again mended. But Scindhia had played the part of Frankenstein in creating this monster in the shape of the Peishwa. The English, also, were instilling poison into the mind of the Peishwa against Scindhia. Years previously he had been told by the Governor-General, that in an emergency, he would always be granted an asylum in Bombay.

Curiously enough, the British Resident did not accompany the Peishwa in his flight, but stayed on in Poona.

Captain Grant Duff (p. 558) writes:—

"Holkar sent an invitation to the Resident to come and see him on the following day, which Colonel Close did not think it prudent to decline.....In his conversation he (Holkar) was polite and frank,.....and expressed himself in the most friendly manner towards the Resident and the British Government. He seemed extremely desirous of obtaining the mediation of the resident in settling with Sindhia and the Peishwa, and solicited Colonel Close, whom he detained about a month in Poona, to arbitrate in the existing differences."

The Peishwa fled from Poona to Singurh and from thence to Raigurh. From Raigurh he retired to Mhar,

"whence he despatched letters to the Bombay Govern-

ment, requesting him that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that Island.....But on hearing of the approach of the Holkar's troops, who were sent in pursuit of him, the Peishwa repaired to Severndroog, where he resided for sometime,.....(then), he crossed over the Rewadunda, and thence embarking in an English ship provided for his reception, he proceeded to Bassein.....where he landed, 6th December, 1802." (Grant-Duff, p. 558).

This is another proof in support of the view that Holkar had received aid from the British in the contest with Scindhia. But the object of the British was now served. They had used Holkar as the cat's paw and now they did not care any longer to listen to his solicitations and requests.

The Peishwa was now to exchange King Log for King Stork. He was going to suffer the pythonic embrace of the Europeans. Colonel Palmer's prediction was coming to be realised. The Peishwa's "destruction was imminent and certain," and so the Europeans were to be triumphant over him. For four years and more the Governor-General had tried to ensnare the Peishwa. He had left no stone unturned to accomplish this object. But all his labours seemed at first to have been in vain. After all, he was now going to succeed. At Bassein, the Peishwa agreed to those very terms which he had been made to decline year after year, and month after month, by the great Nana Fadnavis and Dowlat Rao Scindhia. But now, a weak man as he was, lacking the states-

manly foresight of Nana and the martial instinct of Scindhia, he fell an easy victim to the temptations of the Company's servants. On his neck was yoked the scheme of the Subsidiary Alliance. On the 31st December, 1802, he concluded the famous treaty of Bassein. This treaty sealed the doom of the independence of the Marathas, those whom the genius of Sivaji had evolved as a great nation. Nay, in this treaty was sounded the death-knell of the independence of India. No longer were the peoples of India to dream of regaining their lost independence.

Nana Fadnavis's prophecy came to be fulfilled. He had opposed the raising of the son of the weak-minded Raghoba to the Peishwa's musnad on the ground of "the danger to be apprehended from the connection between his family and the English." Any other strong-minded Peishwa would not have been so easily ensnared by them, as was the imbecile Bajee Rao.

ERRATA.

Page 64 line 17, for 'relinguish' read 'relinquish'
,, 89 line 7 for 'triator' read 'traitor'
,, 119 line 18 for 'March' read 'march'
,, 122 line 13 for 'murdered' read 'murderer'.
,, 126 line 10 from bottom, for 'Nawb' read 'Nawab'
,, 156 line 7 for 'province' read 'provinces'.
,, 244 line 8 for 'President' read 'Resident',
,, 244 line 12 for 'Bombay' read 'Madras'
,, 337 line 14 from bottom for 'Mile's' read 'Miles' '
,, 404 line 6 omit 'as said before',
,, 407 line 3 from bottom for 'port' read 'fort'.
,, 424 line 2, omit 'of'.