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GREECE

IN THE

AGE OF PERICLES

GREECE IN THE AGE OF PERICLES

BY ARTHUR J. GRANT

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UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

" Onde ogni scienza disfavillo "

DANTE, *Purgatoria*, xv. 99

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PREFACE.

IN writing this book I have had two objects in view. Firstly, I have tried to make my account of Greece as comprehensive as possible, and to omit none of the main forces that helped to mould Greek civilisation. I have therefore given a good deal of prominence to the social and religious conditions of the country. And next I have tried to treat of Greek history in relation to the general history of Europe. I feel that he who only knows Greek history does not even know that, and that it is only by connecting and comparing Greece with other European states contemporary and subsequent that we can duly appreciate her immense services to civilisation, and distinguish what is permanent and important in her work from what is temporary and trivial. I am conscious that my knowledge is not sufficient to allow me properly to execute so difficult a task, but I have felt the attempt ought to be made.

I have not given any bibliography of the subject. For the mass of literature dealing with Greece is so large that what is most necessary now is to distinguish what is more valuable from what is less so, and from what is of merely technical or antiquarian interest.

I have given, however, a few words in estimate of the greatest books that deal with the subject, and I wish to acknowledge the great debt that I owe to them, as well as to others whose names are not mentioned. In an introductory Manual such as the present, originality would hardly be a virtue, and many readers will see that I have borrowed freely, and only with a general acknowledgment, from Grote, Curtius, Evelyn Abbott, Busolt, Holm, and others. Most of the illustrations in the book appeared originally in Wordsworth's *Greece*, and were kindly placed at my disposal by Mr. Murray. The past thirty years have seen a great change in the illustrations to historical and topographical works, and many of these will appear antiquated in manner, and occasionally inaccurate in archaeological detail; but, despite these imperfections, I believe that students who are entering on the study of Greek History will find them interesting and useful. The frontispiece and the view of the Athenian theatre were specially prepared for this book. The plan of the Acropolis, facing page 200, is adapted from Bötticher's *Die Akropolis* and for the plan of Athens, facing page 180, I am indebted to Mr. G. E. Marindin, who had carefully prepared it for the *Classical Dictionary*. And while I am recounting my debts I should like also to say that my general view of the History of Greece, and its place in the development of European civilisation, has been largely influenced by the historical philosophy of Augusts

Comte. It may seem absurd to couple so great a name with so small a book ; but I do not like to quarry from him without acknowledgment.

During the passage of this book through the press I have had the advantage of much valuable assistance from Miss Thompson, of Scarborough, and from Mr. J. W. Headlam, and Mr. R. J. G. Mayor, Fellows of King's College, Cambridge. They are in no way answerable for the opinions expressed in the book; but I have to thank them for much useful criticism, and the detection of many errors.

A. J. GRANT.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

ON THE

HISTORIANS OF GREECE.

THIS book is only intended as an introduction to Greek History. At the end, therefore, of the chapters notes have been appended giving some information about books, and directions for further reading on each division of the subject. Here it seems well to say a few words about the books that deal with the whole subject.

The chief authorities of the period treated of in this volume are the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides. Next in importance and value come certain Lives of Plutarch. I have assumed throughout that I am writing mainly for those who have little or no knowledge of the original Greek. But this does not prevent me from urging those who desire a further acquaintance with the subject to go at once to the fountain-head, and turn rather to translations of these original authorities than to modern histories. Much, doubtless, even of a prose author, is lost in translation. His style cannot be exactly reproduced, and his style must and ought partly to influence us in the importance that we attach to his statements. But a translation of a historian gives the facts, and we get from Thucydides and Herodotus a.

more vivid impression of the reality of what we read than we can from any modern history.

Herodotus was born during the course of the Persian wars. He was a native of Halicarnassus, in Caria; lived during the middle of his life in Athens; and afterwards emigrated to Thurii, in Italy, where he wrote his history and died. He thus came in contact with the Persians, as well as with the state that had played the chief part in the defence of Greece. The personal narratives of those who had fought in the war are the main source of his information. He is the prince of story-tellers, as well as the father of history. The charm of his style and the general trustworthiness of his record have received general recognition. The story of the Persian wars is not given in this book, but I would strongly urge those who desire a further knowledge of Greece to read Herodotus rather than any other author. Better than any one else he allows us to realise the variety and the charm of Hellenic life. "He has caught," says Mr. Myers, "the smile upon the face of Greece." There are many translations of Herodotus, out of which I will select for mention Rawlinson's (in 4 vols.), with many notes and appendices; G. C. Macaulay's (in 2 vols.); and Henry Cary's (in 1 vol.). The first is, perhaps, the most interesting, both by reason of its style and comments; but the second corresponds more closely with the original; while Henry Cary's is a bald and accurate translation, in which most of the charm of the original disappears.

Thucydides is a still greater name. He has written an account of nearly the whole course of the Peloponnesian **war**. As supplementary to the present volume the first book, which sketches the history of **Greece**

between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, and the second, which contains the Funeral Oration of Pericles and the account of the plague and the death of Pericles, are perhaps the most important. He was a contemporary of the events that he relates, and himself a prominent actor in many of them. Born in Athens, he retired into exile during the course of the war, and, communicating freely with both sides in the great contest, was admirably qualified to write its history. His accuracy and truthfulness are undisputed. He refrains, as a rule, from all direct comment on the events he describes, and confines himself exclusively to the political and military aspects of the period that he relates. And yet the ethical tone of the book and the insight it gives us into the character of Greek city-life are among its great recommendations. Less attractive than Herodotus, and, to one who wishes to gain a comprehensive view of ancient Greece, less valuable, Thucydides is in matters of fact more trustworthy, and to the student of politics and society of much greater importance. There are many translations: that by Professor Jowett is far the most readable.

These two historians have all the importance that comes from contemporary knowledge of what they describe. Plutarch's *Lives* have no such recommendation. His precise date is not ascertainable, but the active years of his life are from about 50 to 100 A.D. In writing of the Periclean age, therefore, he is separated from what he writes of by a period greater than that which lies between us and the age of the Tudors. Further, he does not profess to write history, but biography. He explains what he means by the distinction in his *Life of Alexander*. He chooses those events, he tells us, which serve best

to bring out the character of his hero, rather than those which are of importance in developing the lives of states. His value as a historical authority arises solely from the fact that he had recourse to many authorities that have now disappeared. His knowledge of Greek literature was immense: his *Lives* are loaded with quotations from authors great and small; and his substantial accuracy in the cases where we can compare the quotation with the original gives us confidence in the rest. The *Lives*, as a whole, have been almost one of the Bibles of the world. The praises of Montaigne, of Rousseau, and of Emerson, and the use to which the *Lives* were put by Shakespeare, give convincing testimony to their value and interest. For the study of Greek History they form a most important authority, though one that must always be used with caution. They have been constantly translated. Where I have quoted them it has been from the translation by Stewart and Long.

Of the great modern histories of Greece, the most important of those that are accessible to English students are Grote's and Curtius\

Grote's great work is a counterblast to those writers, such as Mitford, who saw in Greek History nothing but a condemnation of the republican and democratic system. Against this view Grote protests in nearly every page of his twelve volumes. His work has for this reason been called a political pamphlet on a gigantic scale ; and if this partisanship makes him dwell on certain features and subjects at too great a length, it never has induced him to misread or to misrepresent evidence, and it adds greatly to the interest of the book. Himself a Member of Parliament, he enters into the political life

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of Athens as a statesman, not as an antiquarian. His work must be pronounced weakest where he deals with the art and poetry of Greece, or where he omits to deal with them ; and his defence of the Athenian democracy does not meet many modern objections. Yet Thucydides is not more decidedly the first of ancient historians of Greece than Grote is of modern.

Curtius has not Grote's political experience, nor his conscientiousness in distinguishing between the deductions from evidence and the results of conjecture. Yet his history is perhaps the most comprehensive and most generally attractive of all that have been written; the religion, art, and geography of Greece are admirably treated.

Mr. Evelyn Abbott's History of Greece gives, within reasonable limits, the results of the never-ceasing investigations and inquiries into the history of Greece that have been prosecuted of late years in England and Germany. It makes few pretensions to style, and does not present a continuous narrative. It can never displace Curtius or Grote. But its corrections, additions, and occasional comments give it a great value to careful students of Greek History.

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RESTORATION OF THE WEST END OF THE ACROPOLIS.

CHAPTER I.

THE ESSENTIALS OF GREEK CIVILISATION.

"THE whole series of human generations during the course of ages should be regarded as one man ever living and ever learning," said Pascal in the seventeenth century. No phrase could more excellently emphasise that continuity and identity of the existence of the human race from which the study of history derives the whole of its meaning and value. But in this process of "living and learning" so vast are the changes—political, social, religious—that we have at times some difficulty in recognising the kinship between far distant generations unless we have studied the intervening

* The equestrian statues belong to the Roman period, and the existence of the one on the right is doubtful. The entrance here represented was certainly not that of the Periclean era.

period. And, on the other hand, nothing is more fruitful in false historical judgments than the ignoring of the differences in the very bases of social order that separate one period from the other. If, for instance, we transfer to Greek history our own ideas on morality, politics, or religion, we fail to understand the problems that Greek statesmen and thinkers tried to solve, nor can we possibly rightly estimate their solution of them. Here, then, some attempt will be made to exhibit shortly some of the chief differences between the civilisation of Greece in the fifth century B.C. and the civilisation of Europe in the nineteenth century A.D.

The Greek and the Modern Conceptions of the State Contrasted.

In the modern world the state and the nation are, as a rule, identical, but this was far from being the case in ancient Greece. By Greece or Hellas we do not mean any political unity such as is implied by the expressions Great Britain, France, or Germany. The word bears rather the same sort of meaning that is conveyed by Europe. It indicates a very large number of quite independent states in Italy, Africa, Greece Proper, Asia Minor, which, despite many minor variations in religion, society, and government, were nevertheless bound together by the practical identity of race, religion, and language. "Europe," says Professor Seeley, "considered as Christendom, has had, and still has, a certain unity which would show itself plainly and quickly enough if Europe was threatened by a barbarian and heathen enemy." This was the unity that Hellas possessed: the behaviour of Europe in the face of the Saracenic invasion parallels very closely the behaviour of Hellas when the danger from Persia approached.

It is of the utmost importance to one who first approaches Greek history that he should understand how large was the number of these independent states, how complete was their independence. The district of Bœotia is not larger than a very moderate-sized English county; yet in historical times we can count in Bœotia eight states, which, though later on coerced into union by Thebes, regarded complete independence as their right, and desired to be related to one another, not as one English town to another, but as France to England. Again, in the island of Ceos, which is not more than twelve miles in length by eight in breadth, we find four different states fully organised with separate governments, constitutions, armies, communicating with one another by means of heralds, making treaties with one another, fighting with one another. And every considerable city in Greece either possessed or desired this independence.

For next it must be carefully noted that all these states were city states. To the Greek world, as indeed to the Roman, the nation state was quite unknown. Citizenship meant that a man possessed the freedom and privileges of a city. The only way in which the Greek mind could conceive of a very large state would be through the conquest of much adjacent territory by some single city, which would then hold that territory as municipal property. If so large a state as England had existed in the Greek world, all the dwellers in the provinces and in the provincial towns would either have possessed the franchise of London or they would have been subject to London. And another striking actual example may be given. When Rome, originally a small city state by the banks of the Tiber, had extended her conquests until the Mediterranean was a Roman lake, all these vast

dominions were the property of the city of Rome, and were managed simply by the municipal authorities of the city. The prime reason for the overthrow of the Roman Republic and the establishment of the Empire, is to be found in the impossibility of governing a worldwide empire by the forms and methods that had suited Rome while yet she was a small city state. For the world of Greece and Rome knew nothing of the idea of Representation. So fertile is the Greek mind in ideas, so true is it that most of the moving forces of the modern world are Greek in their origin, that we are surprised to find that the representative idea did not spring from them. And indeed it does just make its appearance, but ineffectually and not for long. The only way in which a citizen could make his citizenship effective, or exercise any influence on the government and policy of the state, was by presenting himself in person at the time of the transaction of public business and the election of officers, and giving his vote in person. Beyond this idea the greatest thinkers of Greece never rose. Aristotle in his *Politics*, the greatest and indeed the only work on comparative politics that the world knew until late in the eighteenth century, compares the various constitutions that the Greek world contained in order to arrive at some conclusion as to the best form of government. When he considers how large a state ought to be, his conclusions emphasise, as nothing else can, the smallness of the Greek city states. All the citizens must be able to gather together in one place to listen to a public orator, or at any rate to catch the announcements of the town crier. He goes on to say: "Just as a boat can no more be two furlongs long than a span long, so a state can no more consist of one hundred thousand than of ten

citizens. ... If just legal decisions are to be given, and if office is to be apportioned to men according to merit, it is necessary for citizens to have a knowledge of each other's characters, since where this is not the case things must needs go wrong with the appointment of officials and the administration of law." We seem to be speaking of some large club rather than of a state.

From what we have seen, it follows directly that a large state was necessarily a state of low political organisation. In a large state the citizens could obviously not constantly flock to the centre to give their opinion on measures or men. The large states of antiquity therefore, whatever name their governments may bear, are necessarily despotisms.

Further, not only was the idea of the ancient state different from that of the modern, but its spirit and its objects were different. The state was then considered not merely as a piece of machinery to secure the property and prosperity of citizens, but was regarded as something other than and higher than the individuals composing the state. The interest of the individual was regarded as entirely subordinate to that of the state. The state was idealised, and no virtue was so universally recognised as the duty of self-sacrifice on behalf of the state. This idealisation of the ancient state is probably to be explained by the necessity of procuring loyalty that rested on firmer grounds than the self-interest of the moment. It gives to ancient patriotism an elevation and a purity which its modern counterpart too often does not possess. The exclusiveness of the ancient state is connected with this idealisation. The entrance to citizenship was not thrown open to all, as it is with us. A man could not change his citizenship by changing his domicile

and subscribing to a few easy conditions. Except on quite rare and extraordinary occasions, during the zenith of Greece's greatness citizenship was not granted except to those who claimed it by right of birth from citizen parents, and the tendency as time went on was rather to render entrance to the ranks of citizens more difficult than otherwise. As a rule no fully legitimate marriage could be contracted between the members of two separate city states. A treaty recognising the validity of such marriages was one of the greatest proofs of friendship between cities.

Lastly, the ancient state proposed to itself an object different from that of the modern state. Of the distinction between the spiritual and temporal powers that is one of the distinctive products of the middle ages, Greece knew nothing. The state proposed to itself to watch, not only over the material, but also over the moral and religious welfare of the citizens. "Not life, but a good life," says Aristotle, is its object. By sumptuary laws, by moral-religious censorship, the Greek state undertook the moral guidance of the citizens; not as the supporter of any church or priesthood, but of its own initiative.

Greek Civilisation Non-Industrial.

Very rapidly, during the last two centuries, have all European states, and such as have carried European civilisation into other continents, become industrial. Not only have more and more time and attention been given to the production of wealth ; not only have all the agents of industry, high and low, rapidly and surely advanced in public estimation, but more and more have modern civilisations embraced industrial and eschewed military objects. Herodotus, who represents better than any other author the average opinion of Greece, says (ii. 167)

that the Greeks "hold the citizens who practise trades and their children in less repute than the rest, while they esteem as noble those who keep aloof from handicrafts, and especially honour such as are given wholly to war." Here we have a point of much importance. The civilisation of Greece was military in its basis. The objects of the Greek policy were military. There were indeed some industries in Greece. There was, of course, agriculture, the first, greatest, and among the Greeks the most honourable of industries; there were pottery, tanning, bootmaking, on a fairly large scale. But the amount of industry was not great, and before the state and the individual there was no industrial ideal whatever. A thoroughly self-respecting man could not harden his hands with the plough or the potter's wheel. For him the idleness of the marketplace was the only quite honourable alternative to political or military employments. Seeing then that among the Greeks industry, so far as it existed, was despised; seeing that society rested on a military basis, we may not think of war in the ancient world as we must think of it in our own country. In our society, now almost wholly industrial in character, war is a complete anomaly, which would be supremely ridiculous were it not so terrible. It fulfils no social function and acts only as a disturbing force. But this verdict, so obvious now, may not be transferred to earlier centuries. In Greece certainly war performed important social functions. Peace does not now mean listlessness or idleness, it means rather the turning of energy from destructive to productive channels. But in Greece, where military occupations were everywhere the most honourable, a long period of peace meant apathy, sluggishness, and nearly always

moral deterioration. When, during the fourth century B.C., the Athenians transferred to mercenaries the task of defending their possessions both by sea and land, the state received a blow from which it never recovered. For it is true of the ancient world, though not true now, that from war were derived many virtues that had then little other support, such as obedience, loyalty, trustiness, and the sentiment of honour.

Labour in Greece performed by Slaves.

Here is one of the most obvious differences between ancient and modern society: the civilisation of the Greeks rested on slave labour, ours on free or contract labour. In Athens there were probably four times as many slaves as freemen; in Corinth perhaps twice that proportion. The condition of Greek slaves and the influence of slavery upon the Greek state will be more fully treated of in a subsequent chapter. Here perhaps it will be well to notice that, as a result, the democracies of the ancient world do not deserve the name according to our modern ideas. It is true, indeed, that in some respects, subsequently to be noted, there is a striking resemblance between the methods and tendencies of Greek and modern democracies. But there are many meanings included in the modern vague use of the word Democracy which cannot be attached to the word in its Greek use. The first and most obvious difference is that, seeing that in the states of Greece the slave population was larger, and usually much larger, than the free, the government was in the hands of a small minority of the total male inhabitants of the state, and deserves rather to be called an oligarchy. But, further, the word in its modern use implies the dignifying of labour by the entry of the labourers into

the circle of citizenship; it means the transference of power mainly into the hands of the hand-workers. Of all this there is no trace at all in ancient Greece. It is possible to produce from the poets and philosophers of Athens a few passages in which it is maintained that any kind of useful labour is better than idleness. But these do not indicate any popular opinion in that direction. The Greek world knew nothing of the dignity of labour. The government of Athens was in the hands of people who were engaged in no productive occupation, and those took the greatest share in the government who had least occupation of any kind. The democratic citizens of Athens, though in relation to each other upon a footing of the most absolute equality, were, with reference to the whole population, slave-holders and despots.

Greek Civilisation referred almost exclusively
to Males.

The position of women in Greece, like the question of slavery, is reserved for further discussion in a subsequent chapter. But the complete subordination of women is a feature of Greek life that must not be omitted in this preliminary sketch. Everywhere in the ancient world women held a position of less liberty and influence than the modern world demands; and in Greece the position of women was, according to our ideas, one of degrading subordination. It is not of importance to consider here whether the fact was due to the military basis of civilisation, or to the religious ideas of the Greeks. The fact only need here be noted. Not only were politics and war wholly untouched by female influence, but the art, thought, and education of Greece were almost exclusively for men.

The Religion of Greece.

From this general survey of Greek civilisation religion must not be excluded, though here for the present it must be dismissed in a few lines. A further examination of the subject will follow in the next chapter. Greek Paganism has been defined by a modern thinker as "the frank acceptance of pleasure." Goethe spoke of mediæval Christianity as "the divine worship of sorrow." If it be true that in considering the development of civilisation social forces are more important than political, and religious more important than social, how wide a difference between Greek civilisation and the Christian centuries does this divergence in the fundamental ideas of religion imply ! It is a point that should be borne in mind in all comparisons that are instituted between Greek and modern life.

NOTE.—This chapter admits of no definite references. But there is an essay in *Hellenica* (Rivington's, edited by Evelyn Abbott), on "Aristotle's Conception of the State," from which much useful information may be gained. G. O. Trevelyan's *A Holiday among some Old Friends* (Bohn's Library) illustrates wittily the small scale of Greek political life.



RESTORATION OF THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ACROPOLIS,



ELEUSIS.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS.

THAT the religion of a people must be known and understood in order to know and understand the history of a people, is one of the most obvious generalisations of history. For by religion we mean, whatever else we may mean, a certain conception of the relation of man to the forces of the universe, and the guidance of life that is founded upon that conception. In an age of belief, therefore, we shall clearly find the chief motive power of history in the religious conceptions of the people; and in an age of unbelief it is almost as important to notice that there is no such motive power. In this chapter an attempt will be made to give some account, firstly, of the

beliefs of the Greeks, and secondly, of the various ways in which those beliefs influenced their lives. And then some considerations on the influence of Greek religion on Greek history will be offered.

The Beliefs of the Greeks.

It has been often maintained that the Greeks had no sense for the beauties of nature. Although this view does not lack the support of great names, it may be at once dismissed. There is indeed no other argument for the paradox except such as may be found in the fact that they expressed their admiration in ways different from those which are used by the modern world, or rather by the century that has succeeded Rousseau. Beautiful descriptions of nature are to be found in the Greek poets. There is hardly a temple in Greece that does not show a careful selection of the site, with reference, among other things, to the view commanded from it.) But the really final argument against the paradox above mentioned is, that the whole of their religion shows an intense feeling for the processes and beauties of nature. When Wordsworth wishes to emphasise the dulness of the modern mind to the external world, he does it by contrasting our callousness with Pagan enthusiasm :—

"I had rather be

A pagan nurtured in a creed outworn:
So might I, standing on some pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would leave me less forlorn,
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn."

The Greeks of an earlier period had explained to themselves the phenomena of the world by attributing to them a personal life. There were in historical times many traces of this fetichistic faith, which regarded stones

and trees and all things as themselves sentient beings; but for the most part this form of feeling and faith had come to an end. Men no longer attributed sense and feeling and desire to the phenomena themselves, but to quasi-human beings who were supposed to preside over and to cause the action of all things that were. And so Greek Polytheism, by a spontaneous movement, peopled mountain and stream, air and sea, with a vast number of beings with the loves and hates of men. This was the material out of which Greek theology was developed.

"There is perhaps no people," says a recent German historian of Greece,* "whose religion it is so difficult to bring into a system as that of the Greeks; no people whose religion contains so many contradictions.?" Upon this fascinating and difficult subject of Greek mythology it is impossible here to embark. It is hoped, however, that the following general statements may not be found inaccurate. In historical times there were a large number of deities who remained vague, characterless impersonations of natural phenomena. To the fellow-citizens of Æschylus mountain and forest and flood were full of non-natural but quasi-human beings, of whom nothing further could be affirmed than that they were the divine dwellers in mountain, forest, or flood. But a large number of gods had acquired attributes and biographies of a more or less definite kind. Various are the influences to which we may trace these developments in mythology. Sometimes these legends are nothing more than the personification of natural processes. Thus Persephone, the goddess of corn, spends half her time under the ground and half above. Thus the subterranean disappearance of Greek rivers gave rise to

* Holm.

stories like the legend of Arethusa, who leaps into the sea on the shores of Greece to reappear in Sicily. That is merely a mythological way of saying that a certain fountain in Sicily was believed to be identical with a certain stream in the Peloponnese. And, further, often the stories of the gods are the product of poetic imagination in an age when to translate the imaginings of a poet into a statement of actual fact did not imply deception. Herodotus tells us that Homer and Hesiod were the authors of the mythology of the Greeks by fixing the attributes and the narratives of the gods. And doubtless to these great names many a nameless poet might be added. Indeed, all through Greek poetry we see the mythology of the Greeks being added to and transformed by the poets. And these transformations and additions have their origins sometimes in the poets' creative imagination merely, sometimes in the desire to present to the Greeks objects for admiration and worship, "a mark above the howling senses' ebb and flow." And by these and other processes out from the vast throng of gods emerge certain prominent figures who are the great gods of Greece.

Greatest of all these gods was Zeus, "Father of gods and men." Originally he was the personification of the sky. Mount Olympus, therefore, the highest mountain that the Greeks knew, rising into the air for nearly ten thousand feet, was specially connected with him. And the calm of the mountain top was particularly characteristic of him. He too was the god who wielded the thunder and the lightning. And with this power of his was connected the story of his struggle with the Titans, representative doubtless of some earlier religion, or of **the** struggle of the local cults to hold their own against

the worship of the supreme Zeus. They had attempted to scale Olympus, and had been destroyed by the lightnings from the hands of its lord. To Zeus, too, belonged the waters of the heavens. In Homer he is almost always the "collector of the clouds." From him, therefore, come the rivers also. I have mentioned Olympus as the chief seat of his power. But there were also two other celebrated homes of this greatest god. At Dodona, in Epirus, was his oldest sanctuary, and an oracle : these clearly owe their foundation to the period before the movement of the Dorian invasion. In the Peloponnese the plain of Olympia was dedicated to him, and soon became, as will be explained below, one of the chief centres of united Hellas.

After Zeus, the god to whom the Greeks turned with most reverence and most hope for help was Apollo. He is the god of light. He was usually represented with a bow and arrows; and these doubtless were symbols of the sun's rays. And as the rays of the sun disperse the darkness, and as light makes civilisation possible, so with his arrows had Apollo slain many noxious monsters. As the god of light he is the god of knowledge. None sees so far into the future as he; and therefore his oracle at Delphi is of all the most honoured and the most visited. An easy transition makes him the god of healing also. So plague and pestilence are connected with him, and the means of averting them. He was honoured through all Greece, but Delos and Delphi were far the most important of all the places specially dedicated to him. Delos was the central point of the Ægean islanders. A small, bare island, coveted for its soil by none, had perhaps been chosen for that very reason as the place for the god's temple. There, in early times,

as we see in the Homeric hymns, vast concourses had gathered together in honour of the god. But in historical times Delphi was a far greater name than Delos. There was the very centre of the world. Two eagles that had been sent out by Zeus from the east and the west had met there; there Apollo had subdued the python; there was the great oracular shrine of the god, for some time the real centre of the civilisation of Hellas. Its action will be further considered in the second part of this chapter.

Poseidon, the brother of Zeus, is before all things the god of the sea. Yet he has also other functions which are difficult to harmonise with his central prerogative. The horse is specially dedicated to him, and he is the god of earthquakes. The horse may have something to do with the waves that hurry quickly to the shore; the blows of a heavy sea on a rocky shore may have given him his attribute of "Earth-shaker." The sea was the highway of the Greeks, and the chief source of their wealth and civilisation; no state could refuse to pay a special worship to such a god. We cannot, therefore, speak of any special home or sanctuary. On very many promontories were temples in honour of Poseidon.

Athene, the daughter of Zeus, who, according to the grotesque legend, sprang from the head of her father when he had been struck by the axe of Hephaestus, the god of fire, was originally probably the personification of some aspect of the sky. Her especial mark was the head of the Gorgon which she carried on her aegis or shield. That terrible head, upon which no one might look and live, with its encircling snakes, has been thought to represent the thundercloud with flashes of lightning playing round it. She is especially the god of Athens.

The olive tree, the chief source of the agricultural wealth of the state, was her gift. The owl was her sacred bird, and became the symbol of the city. She is the goddess of knowledge and of wisdom, and thus appropriately found her most famous temple in Athens.

Many other deities should here be mentioned, did the scope of this book allow it. But the deities of Eleusis must at any rate be named. There, in the sacred town of the Mysteries, Demeter and Persephone were honoured. Demeter is the personification of the fruits of the earth. Her daughter, Persephone, was carried off by Pluto, the god of the nether world, the abode of the dead. Her mother sought for her long, and at last by an appeal to Zeus managed to procure that for some months her daughter should abide with her in the upper world, while, for the rest of the year, she remained with Pluto as the Queen of Hades. How readily this beautiful legend can be explained by reference to the corn that Demeter personified has been mentioned above, and will be sufficiently obvious to every one. But these deities here deserve special mention because of their connection with those Mysteries that will be dealt with in the second part of this chapter.

But besides these deities, great and small, that are here mentioned or hinted at, it must be noticed too that the Greek mind was full of the superstitions, fair and foul, that are naturally engendered by a belief in a vast number of capricious deities whose actions are amenable to no law. In the age of Pericles scepticism had invaded the intellectual classes. Pericles interpreted an eclipse of the sun by reference to natural causes, and refused to regard it as an omen. Thucydides speaks of oracles and prodigies with something of the scorn of

Voltaire. But the mass of the people still clung to its superstitions long after the religion of the Greeks had lost its healthy social influence. The existence of supernatural beings was to them a matter of spontaneous belief: they accepted omens, prodigies, and miraculous occurrences of all sorts as readily as the mediaeval world. To Herodotus, who comes before the age of Pericles, and to Xenophon, who comes after, though both were men of intellectual eminence, the most trivial occurrence may be an indication of the will of the gods.

The Religious Institutions of the Greeks.

Religion and philosophy differ always in this, that while philosophy may seek after truth for the pleasure of contemplating it, religion always desires to apply it to the guidance of life. Here an attempt will be made to show by what channels and to what extent the religion of Greece influenced the life of the Greeks. It will become plain that the social action of Greek Polytheism was weak, and that this weakness resulted in both advantage and disadvantage.

i. THE PRIESTHOOD.

All the strong religions of the ancient, mediaeval, and modern world have tried to influence society by a class of priests with special knowledge of the doctrines of their religion and constantly occupied in disseminating them. And such priestly bodies have found a support sometimes in the intricacy of the ritual whereby the favour of the divine power can be gained, sometimes in the difficult and mysterious character of the doctrine, sometimes in a special training of character and a discipline of life that separates them from the rest of the world. Scarcely

anything of this was to be found in Greece. There were priests, but there was no priesthood. "Greece," as M. Renan points out, "never had a sacred book; she never had any symbols, any councils, any sacerdotal caste organised for the preservation of dogma." Homer was, indeed, in a sense, a sacred book, but he never had the binding force of Bible or Koran. Any one could, under certain circumstances, perform the functions of a priest. At Athens an officer elected by the chance of the lot from all the citizens was the official head of the religion of Athens. In the kingly times all kings were high priests also. In Sparta the kings retained these powers throughout the historical period. The priests that are found in Greece are not the special mouthpieces of the deity; they are simply officers appointed by various methods to carry out religious duties, as other officers were appointed for political duties. In some temples the priests were hereditary; in some they were elected. Sometimes they retained office for life; sometimes they held it only for a year. Patrons presented to some priests' offices; in many cases they were bought for money down. We have an inscription in which the prices paid for the position of priest to Hermes at Halicarnassus are chronicled. A sum representing £184 is the highest amount paid.


The very character of Greek religion forbade an organised priesthood. It was never worked up into a co-ordinated system. The doctrines, such as they were, were not the work of priestly guilds, but of the unrestrained imagination of poets and the common people. When, in the third and fourth centuries A.D., the pressure of the advance of Christianity forced on an attempt to systematise Paganism, the attempt failed, and indeed could

not be made without large importations of quite foreign ideas from the East. Upon such a basis of shifting legend no strong religious system could be built up. The priests of Greece never even aspired to such power as was possessed by those of Egypt and the Jews; they were even considerably weaker than the priests of Rome. They were united by no common bond; they did not profess an identical set of doctrines. They were simply charged, to use the words of Aristotle, "to attend to those things which are ordained to be done towards the gods," just as an officer of the navy attended to the things that concerned ships.

2. THE ORACLES.

The religion of Greece, we have said, had no official priesthood and no sacred book. An ordinary man might know as much of the gods as the priest of the temple; poet or philosopher had little hesitation in criticising and amending the legends of the gods. Yet there was one place where the priests could speak with authority, one channel through which the voice of the god made itself heard with particular potency. That place was the great oracle of Delphi.

There were a very large number of oracular seats in Greece. Two hundred and sixty have been counted either in Hellas or, though in foreign countries, known to and used by the Hellenes. And everywhere, by countless methods, the will of the gods and the hidden future could be discovered by signs and omens. Cicero gives in a sentence what must have been the dimly realised theory of all these divinations : " If frogs by croaking and **oxen** by snuffing the air can give us signs to foretell the **weather, why should there not be omens in the fibres of**



MOUNT PARNASSUS FROM DELPHI.

a victim's entrails or in thunderstorms?" To a Greek, who felt himself to be surrounded by a vast number of capricious deities, to whom the unchangeable laws of nature were inconceivable, there was nothing strange in the notion that the will of the gods could be determined by signs that are to us quite trivial. A chasm in the earth leading down to unknown depths or to a subterranean stream, the flight of birds, the lightning playing about the sacred mountain—what more natural than that all these should be regarded with pious reverence and carefully scrutinised to ascertain the intentions of the gods. All irregular human phenomena were especially likely to be full of divine meaning. Dreams, however impossible of interpretation, were nevertheless always sent from the gods. The phenomena of epilepsy were regarded as certainly the result of demoniac possession. Every day, in every state, the omens were observed ; and no Greek army ever joined battle until the favourable intentions **of** the deity had been discovered by sacrifice.

But as among the vast crowds of divine beings certain great gods emerged, so was it with these seats of divination. And by far the most important of all was Delphi. This place was considered to be the centre of the world, and was indeed a very central point for the whole of Hellas. The story was how here Apollo had slain the python, and in the great annual festival songs still recorded the contest, which may probably be taken as typifying the victory of the new development of Paganism over an older local cult. The situation of Delphi is solitary and forbidding. Parnassus rises to a height of 8000 feet behind it. The spot where the great temple of **Apollo** was built was somewhat difficult of access, **and the situation had little to recommend it except three**

excellent perennial springs. Yet the place was naturally connected with thoughts of supernatural powers : the deep cleft in the mountain side suggested a connection with the spirits of the underworld, and from it a maddening vapour was supposed to rise. The solitude and the height of the mountain increased the solemnity of the spot.

Here was the supreme oracle of Greece, the seat of the god "whose words could not lie." Upon a tripod over the cleft from which the miasmic vapour was said to rise, the Delphian priestess sat, and when she was under its influence the questions were propounded to her. What she said was not precisely made known to the worshippers. The priests of the temple interpreted her confused sounds, and usually gave them to the questioners in hexameter verse. That these responses and the right to apply for them were most highly valued through successive centuries is as certain as any fact in history. Wars were fought for the independence of the temple ; the right to consult the oracle was usually stipulated for in treaties and truces. It was not only the ignorant and superstitious who esteemed the oracle of Delphi. Kings and statesmen asked for its approval of their measures. Plato, when he is founding his ideal Republic, recognises religious institutions as "the greatest and noblest and chiefest thing of all," but expressly leaves the ordering of them to the god at Delphi "who sits in the centre on the navel of the earth and is the interpreter of religion to all mankind." Besides giving definite answers to definite questions, the Delphian god constantly maintained the principle of morality. Greek religion never did **and** never could produce a decalogue; **and it must be owned that Greek civilisation suffered through having**

no definite morality, no authority on matters of conduct. But the mottoes that were inscribed on the temple, beginning with the celebrated "Know thyself" over the main entrance, supplied a not contemptible substitute for a code of morals. And we see the oracle constantly exerting a practical influence on the course of affairs. Perhaps there has been some exaggeration in the matter. Yet that the oracle assisted always and sometimes directed the remarkable colonising efforts of the Greeks in the seventh century B.C. cannot be denied. Solon's legislation received the god's oracular sanction; by order of the god the Spartans, sorely against their will, drove out the tyrants from Athens. Nor was it in Greece alone that the oracular responses of the god were valued. The temple at Delphi was a museum of treasures, but nothing there was more valuable than the rich presents that had been received from Croesus, king of Lydia, not only to induce the god to grant favours in the future, but also as thank-offerings for benefits received in the past.

How are we to explain this long-continued influence on a singularly acute and not credulous people of an oracle in which no modern mind will find it possible to believe? Few now will care to repeat the Voltairian sneers about priestcraft and the gullibility of the people. The strength of an institution so valued and for so long must be found in something good it contained, not in the falsity which was common to it with all the beliefs of the time. Priestcraft there was indeed, and deceit. Many of the oracles that have come down to us are so mysterious that they may mean anything or nothing; others are clearly constructed so as to bear a double meaning, as when Cræsus was told that if he crossed the river Halys to fight against the Persians he would destroy a great

power, and the " great power " turned out to be that of his own kingdom. Many of the responses, too, upon which the fame of the oracle has rested, are, without doubt, forgeries after the event. But the enthusiastic veneration of centuries and the practical guidance given to Hellenic civilisation remain a fact. It can, I think, only be accounted for by supposing that the priests of Delphi, coming into contact with people from all the states of Greece, had better information than the citizens of any particular state could be expected to possess. Belonging to no state, they had no local bias to disturb them. They may very possibly have had foreign correspondents, which would enable them to guide the colonisation of Greece. And if they used all these means of gaining knowledge and gave out the results as the advice of the god, that does not necessarily imply that they were impostors. It is strange but certainly true that a man may forge miracles and yet believe in the god in whose name they are performed. The priest who worked the strings of the miraculous image was probably not a sceptic. And the need of some such central spiritual authority was so strongly, if unconsciously felt, that the not very satisfactory guidance afforded by Delphi was gratefully received.

But that guidance was not satisfactory and gradually weakened. Several times in Greek history it was a matter of notoriety that the priestess had been bribed. At the time when the invasion of Xerxes approached there came from Delphi no encouragement or incitement to heroic daring, but only words of despair and counsels of submission. And when the sceptical movement arose in Greece the Delphian oracle had no defence to offer. Obviously the utterances of a woman maddened perhaps

by mephitic fumes are no basis on which a stable spiritual power can be built when faith begins in the least to fail. And the priesthood had no system of theology, no scheme of life, no organisation even to appeal to, when the strength of the oracle began to decline. And so, though the oracle did not completely die, and perhaps gained in wealth and grandeur as Greek prosperity declined, it ceased to be a real centre for the religious life of Greece ; it ceased to give to Greece any spiritual cohesion, and thus to the centrifugal tendencies of Greek politics one strong check was removed. And here again we find that, as compared with other religions, the religion of the Greeks had little social influence over the people of the land.

3. THE GREAT GAMES OF GREECE.

It is in connection with religion, too, that the athletic festivals of Greece may best be considered. It is true that their influence upon the civilisation of Greece was rather accidental than intentional, and that before long the sporting element outstripped the religious. But they spring from the religion of the Greeks; they remain all along connected with it, and are highly characteristic of it.

The gods of Greece were not, as a rule, represented either as themselves cruel or as delighting in cruelty. True, there are signs in Greece of human sacrifices, and the gods were occasionally represented as administering vengeance for any slight to their honour. But this is not what is characteristic of Greek religion. If we contrast it with other contemporary religions we are struck with the absence of cruelty. The gods of Greece were never to be honoured by pain or self-torture; hardly

ever even by self-abnegation. The beliefs of Greece did not form one of the creeds "that refuse and restrain." The gods were honoured, not by pain, but by pleasure; not by solitary self-chastisement, but, as a rule, by public and tumultuous rejoicing. And hence in Greece nearly all acts of public worship took the form of popular festivals. All the theatrical performances of Greece were regarded as religious ceremonies, and as such might fitly find mention in this chapter. Still more distinctly were the great athletic festivals intended originally to do honour to certain deities.

The greatest of these festivals was the Olympian. It is unnecessary here to attempt to find any solid ground in the myths that professed to record its first establishment; enough for us to see it as it was when the full light of history strikes it. The scene of this, by very far the most important athletic festival in the world's history, was by the banks of the Alpheus, the most considerable of Peloponnesian rivers, a few miles from its mouth. There the mountain system of Arcadia sinks into a plain as it approaches the *sea. And by the banks of the Alpheus, fordable with difficulty in summer, and in the rainy season a raging torrent, was a level space well suited for athletic sports. To this spot, once in every four years, picked athletes flocked from every quarter of Greece. The precise date of the festival it seems impossible to determine, but it certainly fell either at the end of June or the beginning of July. It is a strange period of the year to choose; for then the valley of the Alpheus is so intolerably hot that now most of the inhabitants move up to the mountains. Some slight change in the climate may have taken place; but the time of year can only be **explained by reference to** some unknown religious reason.

Originally the festival had consisted of a single event, **the** short foot-race of six hundred yards. This always remained the nominally chief race of the year, and the festival was named after the victor in this contest. The year 776 B.C. is, on doubtless no very good evidence, taken as the first year in which this race was run. Soon another foot-race, twice as long as the former, was added. Both these races were run in the thick dust of a Greek midsummer; there was no preparation of the track. Other innovations rapidly followed. At the eighteenth festival the Pentathlon, or contest in five kinds, was added. This included running and jumping, the casting of the spear and the "discus," and ended with wrestling. How precisely the prize was awarded we do not know; but the victor must have shown capacity in most of the contests. Next came the introduction of the boxing contest, in which the combatants fought with their hands and arms wrapped round with leather and iron. It had all the brutality and more than the danger of a modern prize-fight. In 680 were introduced still more exciting contests: racing with four-horse chariots, and the pancratium or mixture of boxing and wrestling, the most brutal of all the Olympian contests, in which victory was determined by the inability of one of the combatants to continue the struggle. The only other innovation that need be mentioned is the introduction, in 520 B.C., of the race with the full armour of a heavily armed soldier.

What is most characteristic of these Greek festivals is the absence of cruelty and savagery when compared with the amusements of other people contemporary and modern. Doubtless the boxing contests and the pancratium were usually brutal exhibitions enough. Life was **not** infrequently lost. **The** pugilists formed a sort

of guild or school, and went from contest to contest. They must have possessed many of the characteristics of the modern prize-fighter; though the Greek pugilist's life was somewhat redeemed by the honour in which he was held, and the fact that his victory conferred glory upon his state must have helped to elevate his character. It must be owned, too, that as time went on the simple athletic contests lost in repute, and the brutality of the boxing match or the display of the four-horse chariot races created the greatest enthusiasm; the last came in the end to be the most important event in the festival. Yet notwithstanding all these considerations the Olympian festival, by reason of its comparative humanity, the valuable physical training that it implanted among the Greeks, and the proof it affords of their delight in physical grace and strength, gives us the best idea of the depth and reality of their civilisation. The Olympian festival, however, never included any poetical or musical contests such as we shall shortly have to notice elsewhere. There were indeed contests for trumpeters and heralds; here, however, it was strength of lung, not any musical excellence, that gained the prize.

But if we think of the Olympian games merely as a glorified athletic festival, we have not begun to appreciate their true significance. Here only in Greece we find a sense of the unity of Hellas and of the bonds that connected the different states clearly felt and really operative. No one might enter for the Olympian contests who was not of pure Hellenic blood; and though it was difficult to define and determine purity of descent, the need of such a qualification emphasised the fact that there was something which separated Hellenes from the rest of the world. It was the immediate cause of the

failure of Hellas as a political and military power, that there was no authority, spiritual or temporal, to enforce a sense of her unity. That the Olympian festival clearly could not do. Athletic games could not supply a lever strong enough for such a task. But it came nearer to the desired end than any other institution in Hellas. Before the festival the sacred truce, like the mediaeval truce of God, was proclaimed. For the time all hostilities ceased. None might molest any visitor to Olympia on pain of all the penalties that attended on sacrilege. Nor was the truce a dead letter. Proud Sparta herself had to pay a heavy fine for taking up arms during the sacred month. And in a later age even Philip of Macedon apologised for an insult offered by one of his soldiers to a traveller to Olympia.

And, further, not only were athletes and those interested in athletics attracted to the games. The gathering was also the opportunity for a great bazaar or fair, when traders from all states could meet on an equal footing. Hither, too, came artists, poets, politicians, to exhibit their talents and to interchange ideas. Here the orators Lysias and Gorgias tried to nerve the later Greeks to a common effort. The biographies of statesmen, philosophers, and poets show them to us appearing not infrequently at the great national festival.

The Olympian was by far the greatest Greek festival, but there were three others that were open to all Greeks. These were the Pythian festival held at Delphi, the Isthmian near Corinth, and the Nemean games in the valley of that name in the Argolic peninsula. These demand from us here no close attention. They repeat the Olympian festival in its main features, though doubtless they were frequented by a smaller concourse **and**

exerted less influence. They differ from the Olympian festival, however, in that prizes were given for music and for poetry.

The victors at these Panhellenic games were honoured and admired almost beyond belief. The desire for distinction was so keen among the Greek states, that the whole state felt honoured when, at Olympia, its name was coupled with that of the victorious athlete. And the actual rewards that he received were by no means unsubstantial. It is true that the actual prize at the four great festivals was only a "corruptible crown": the crown of wild olive at Olympia; the laurel at Delphi; fir leaves at the Isthmian; and at Nemea the ivy-garland. Nor were the actual prizes of much value even at the inferior festivals; we hear only of a silver cup, a woollen mantle, a brazen shield, and money prizes of a small amount. But in all the great contests victory brought with it great privileges. By a law of Solon the victor at Olympia received a considerable sum of money. The same custom was usual *in* many other states. Nearly everywhere he received freedom from taxation, public sustenance, the best seat at the theatre, and various other privileges. And thus the life of an Olympian victor passed into a proverb for the greatest happiness that was possible on earth. But if we wish to realise thoroughly how highly victory at the games was prized, it is only necessary to turn to the poetry of Pindar. There we find this great poet writing odes in praise of victory in the great games, in a style which at one time reminds us of Milton by the splendour of its colour, and at another time of Isaiah by its prophetic fervour. It is true that he usually, after a few words devoted to the victor and the contest, turns aside to speak of gods and

heroes connected with Delphi or Olympia, Nemea or Corinth. Yet of all this splendid poetry the immediate prompting cause was the victory of a boy in the short race or of some boxer in the pancratium, or the gratification of some great and wealthy prince by a victory in the four-horse chariot race. It is hard to make extracts from the odes in which Pindar sings of "the Olympian games where is striving of swift feet and of strong bodies brave to labour, where he that overcometh hath for the sake of those games a sweet tranquillity throughout his life for evermore." The two following extracts must suffice. If they give no idea of the splendour of the poetry, they indicate, in a fashion almost grotesque, the high esteem in which physical prowess exhibited at the games was held. Here, in the fourteenth Olympian ode, he sings the praises of Asopichus of Orchomenus, who had won the boys' short foot-race. "O ye who haunt the land of goodly steeds that drinketh of Cephissus' waters, O Graces guardians of the Minyæ's ancient race, hearken, for unto you I pray. For by your gift come unto men all pleasant things and sweet, and the wisdom of a man and his beauty and the splendour of his fame. . . . In Lydian mood of melody concerning Asopichus am I come hither to sing, for that in the Olympic games the Minyæ's home is winner. Fly, Echo, to Persephone's dark-walled home,* and to his father bear the noble tidings, that seeing him thou mayest speak to him of his son, saying that for his father's honour in Pisa's famous valley he hath crowned his boyish hair with garlands from the glorious games." In the seventh ode the praises of Diagoras, a professional pugilist, are sung.

* Asopichus' father was dead, but, even in death, his heart would rejoice to hear of his son's athletic victory.

First his many victories are recounted. "Of garlands from these games hath Diagoras twice won him crowns, and four times he had good luck at famous Isthmus, and twice following at Nemea, and twice at rocky Athens. And at Argos the bronze shield knoweth him, and the deeds of Arcadia and of Thebes, and the yearly games Boeotian and Pellene, and Ægina, where six times he won; the pillar of stone at Megara hath the same tale to tell. But do thou, O Father Zeus, who holdest sway on the mountain ridges of Atabyrios, glorify the accustomed Olympian winner's hymn, and the man who hath done valiantly with his fists; give him honour at the hands of citizens and of strangers: for he walketh in the straight way that abhorreth insolence, having learnt well the lessons his true soul hath taught him, which hath come to him from his noble sires."

Never again, we may safely prophesy, will a boxer find such high poetic eulogy.

4. THE MYSTERIES.

Even in so slight a sketch as this it would be absurd to treat of Greek religion without some mention of the Mysteries.

One of the most striking contrasts between the religion of the Greeks and the great religions of the ancient or the mediaeval world is the absence of the sense of mystery and of any attempt to solve the great problems of human life. Some have defined religion as a sense of the infinite; to many its chief *raison d'être* seems to be to answer the questions of the whence and whither of human life. But if this be a right definition of religion, Greek paganism hardly deserves the term. It knew little of mystery, except the infinite mystery of all things. The

popular religion only contained the vaguest hints of a life after life, in which pale shades regretted their former full existence. But this sense of mystery, this attempt to solve the problems of life, was brought by the Mysteries.

There were other Mysteries in Greece besides those of Eleusis, but so far more important were these than all the rest that I need speak only of them. As their name implies, there was much in them that was concealed from contemporaries, and we are not able entirely to pierce the veil that hid them from the outside world. But there is a good deal that we do know, gathered from the hints of Greek writers of the earlier period and the more explicit statements of those of a later period, from paintings on vases and the remains of the monuments of antiquity, and from the attacks of Christian fathers who saw in the Mysteries the most dangerous opponent of their own faith. What we do know, if we come to it with modern feelings and ideas, seems to us a piece of mummery, trivial, stupid, and often obscene. And I think there can be little doubt that if we knew more that feeling would be deepened.

Only if we approach the Mysteries with these feelings and ideas is it impossible for us to understand their meaning and their importance. We repeat the mistake of Protestantism which regarded the worship of saints and the Mass as degrading superstitions merely because the doctrines underlying them were no longer credible. Nothing is more certain than that for many in Greece the Mysteries were the starting-point for deeper thoughts on the great questions of life, the cause of nobler actions in life and braver hopes when death approached. How much the deep feeling of piety and awe that pervades the plays of Æschylus is due to his connection

with the Mysteries (he was born at Eleusis) is proved by the consent of antiquity and the fact that he was prosecuted for having made a revelation of the secrets of Eleusis in his dramas. The fair vision that Pindar again and again gives us of the life beyond the grave may be partly ascribed to the credit of the Mysteries. When Greece was no longer free and scepticism had invaded the Pagan faith, the credit of the Mysteries did not disappear. Cicero was initiated, and affirms that they enabled a man "to live happily and to die with a fairer hope."

That the Mysteries gave men these nobler ideals and these higher hopes is really the important thing about them. The trivial and repulsive details rather hinder than help us in really understanding the matter; but some account must be given of them. Eleusis, as has already been stated, was sacred to the worship of the two goddesses, Demeter the mother and Persephone the daughter, in whom we see the personification of the corn. One of the most beautiful stories of Greek mythology told how the daughter was carried away beneath the earth, how the mother sorrowed, and how at last the daughter was restored to her for a portion of every year. This is clearly an allegory of the sowing of the seed and the springing of the corn; but it is clear too how easily and naturally it could be connected with the worship of the deities of the underworld, and how easily the death of the seed and its resurrection into a new life might be made a symbol of immortality; and round this core the Mysteries grew up.

The temple at Eleusis was the largest in Greece and built on quite a different plan from any other. It consisted of two stories. and was built to accommodate

a vast concourse of people, not merely to contain the sacred image of the deity. A large number of priests were connected with the temple, and the chief priesthoods were kept in certain sacred families. On assuming the office of priest a man dropped his secular name, and was henceforth known only by the office that he held. The most severe laws defended the Mysteries. Profanation was punished with death. It was made a capital charge against Alcibiades that he had parodied the Mysteries in his private house.

The ceremony of the Eleusinian Mysteries occurred once in every year at the time of the sowing of the corn, and lasted nine days. Until the time of the Peloponnesian war initiation was open to all freeborn Athenians, and nearly all Athenian citizens, men and women, were initiated. From those who claimed the privilege some sort of discipline was exacted. They must refrain from certain foods, from the flesh of chickens, from fish, beans, pomegranates, and apples. Early in the nine days of the ceremony they made their way along the sacred road, twelve miles in length, that separated them from Eleusis. Near the beginning of the Eleusinian plain were certain salt-ponds, which possessed a special sanctity through the unexplained variation in the height of their water. Hither those who were to be initiated came each with a pig, and there they washed themselves and the pig, that was shortly to be sacrificed to the goddesses. Then on the following days there was sacrifice and ceremonial enough, of which little is known in detail. Then came the great ceremonial day.

From Athens a great procession started carrying the sacred statue of Iacchus, the son of Zeus and Demeter, Sacred emblems of the sorrow of Demeter and her search

for her daughter were carried in the procession like mediaeval relics. The journey of twelve miles took the whole of the day, for halts were made at many sacred spots; and all through the noonday the procession was accompanied with lighted torches. And so at last the temple of the Mysteries was reached. The greater portion of the procession waited at the outer precinct; only those to be initiated were admitted further. And into the temple of initiation they were not admitted until night; and then at last into the great hall the crowd was admitted, to see and hear amidst solemn silence what was put before them.

And what was that? In detail no one can answer: only I think the excavations upon the site of the great temple and the arguments of those who have given special attention to the matter clearly prove that they saw, upon a raised platform at the end of the hall, some quasi-dramatic representation of the legend of Demeter and her daughter. There were, we are told, "hymns and sacred dances and mimical scenes and sudden apparitions, accompanied by solemn words and disciplinary precepts pronounced by the hierophants." There were two spectacles connected with the initiation—one for those who desired only to take the ordinary course, one for those who at a year's interval desired full initiation. Both were of the same character apparently: mimetic representations of the life of Demeter and Persephone and the latter's son Zagreus. They were assisted by all the resources of the drama: gigantic figures appeared on the stage; there were interchanges of darkness and the intensest light procurable. All would have appeared to modern eyes grossly superstitious, grotesque, and often obscene. Only the Athenian did not look at them with

modern eyes, any more than a Catholic of the middle ages looked at the elevation of the Host with the eyes of sceptical Protestantism. And doubtless the Greek worshipper gained from the spectacles of initiation much the same elevation of feeling and imagination that the devout Catholic obtained when, amidst the swinging of incense and the clanging of the bell and the blaze of candles upon the high altar, the Host was uplifted. And history is an unintelligible story if, in either case, the feelings of the pious worshipper deserve our contempt.

And from the Mysteries for some more than a vague elevation of feeling was gained. There does not seem to have been any dogmatic teaching at all; but to many of the worshippers the spectacle and the elucidatory comments of the priests clearly pointed to a vision of happiness in the next world; and all believed that for the initiated there were blessings in store that did not **fall to** the lot of ordinary mortals. It is of this happy future promised by the Eieusinian Mysteries that Pindar sings: "Ever in sunlight night and day an unlaborious life the good receive—neither with violent hand vex they the earth nor the waters of the sea in that new world; but with the honoured of the gods, whosoever had pleasure in keeping of oaths they possess a tearless life; but the other part suffer pain too dire to look upon."

Some Considerations on the Influence of the Religion of Greece.

As **one** reviews the history of Greece in relation to her **religion, and in** relation to the histories and religions of surrounding peoples, it becomes plain that the weakness **and** unsystematised **character** of her **religion** assisted

her intellectual development, and did not give adequate assistance to her moral life. For, firstly, the human nature of their deities, the absence of any authorised legends about them, and of any powerful priesthood to support their privileges, allowed the Greeks readily to disregard them when science or philosophy required it. It was notably different with the Jews. Their religion might seem, in a sense, to favour the growth of science. It spoke to them of an all-powerful deity; it seems a small step from that conception to the recognition of the unity and universality of laws in nature. But, probably, the conception of Jehovah was too stupendous to allow of criticism and reflection. In Greece it was far otherwise. As the Greek worshipper looked into the face of his deity when he prayed instead of bowing down in abject submission, so, too, he looked with daring eyes into all that concerned the deities; and so the scientific movement was born in Greece without birth-pangs, and grew up almost without persecution. That science comes from Greece is one of the greatest of her many great claims to the gratitude of posterity. Yet there is also another side to the matter. As freedom of thought is one of the highest characteristics of Greek civilisation, so moral laxity is her greatest danger. By which I do not mean that the Greeks were specially prone to sensual excess or specially dishonest: on both points the openness of their life and character has perhaps led to some exaggeration. But as in their political life lack of unity and cohesion is the great vice, so in their moral life we note a lack of strenuousness and aim, a dispersion of the forces of life. The real unity of a people is to be found rather in common convictions and devotion to common objects than in any merely political bonds; and

these common convictions and objects the Greek people notoriously lacked. When Plato in his *Republic* is sketching the outlines of an ideal state, very much in his propositions may be traced to a desire to implant that strenuousness the absence of which he deplored in democratic Athens. And his central institution bears a singular analogy to the social aspect of the mediaeval church. A body of guardians is to be created, without family ties, so that they may devote themselves solely to the protection of the state, claiming the guidance of their fellow-citizens by virtue of a stern moral discipline, a complete education in philosophy and single-minded devotion to the state. If the conception of a church had been known to Plato's age he could hardly have failed to use the word here.

Yet, on the point of the moral anarchy of Greece, we must take care to avoid exaggeration. In Mr. Ernest Myers' words, it is necessary to maintain that to the Hellenes "life could be more than a brilliant game or a garden of sweet sights and sounds. where beauty and knowledge entered, but goodness was forgotten and shut out." Of which no other proof need be given than this, that moral philosophy was the invention of the Greeks, and that they, first of Western peoples, applied reason and scientific thought to the regulation of the conduct of life.

NOTE.—For the religion of Greece generally see Maury's *Les Religions de la Grèce*. In *Hellenica* (see note to last chapter) there is an article on "Greek Oracles," by F. W. H. Myers. Curtius and Grote both give an account of the Olympian games and their influence. Pindar's Poems will give the best idea of their importance. The translation used in this chapter is by Ernest Myers (Macmillan & Co.). On the difficult question of the Eleusiniaq

Mysteries there are three articles by Lenormant in the *Contemporary Review* (May, July, and September, 1880). The legends of Greece are prosaically given and acutely criticised in the first part of Grote. But Curtius has given more attention to the influence of the religion of Greece upon her development.



PLAIN OF OLYMPIA.



PLAIN OF SPARTA.

CHAPTER III.

SPARTA.

EACH city state in Greece desired to remain completely independent, recognising neither the superiority nor the guidance of any other state. But this ideal was not attainable. The self-assertion that was the main root of this ideal naturally tried to satisfy itself by dominion over others, and not always without success. Besides the geographical position, the political and intellectual development of certain cities necessarily gave them such superiority over others that, either by coercion or agreement, they soon assumed a leadership in their districts. For a full understanding of Greek history it is necessary to know something of the history and character of a large number of these prominent states. But in such a sketch

as this little book attempts it will be enough to glance at a very few of the most important. And the most important are Athens, Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Thebes. Athens will occupy most of our thoughts in subsequent chapters, and will therefore find no place in this. Of the remaining four, Sparta claims far the most of our attention. The rivalry of Athens and Sparta, and the reaction of one upon the other, is indeed one of the most prominent influences of nearly the whole of Greek history. We will turn then at once to Sparta.

The Position and Early History of Sparta.

There is in Thucydides a prophecy that has been very literally fulfilled. "Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted and nothing left but the temples and the ground plan, distant ages would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame. Their city is not regularly built and has no splendid temples or other edifices ; it rather resembles a straggling village. Whereas if the same fate befell the Athenians, the ruins of Athens would strike the eye, and we should infer their power to have been twice as great as it really is " (i. 10). A ruin more entire than Thucydides dreamed of fell in process of time upon both Sparta and Athens; but now, while in Athens the Acropolis still bears aloft the ruins of its stately temples, and the whole city, at the distance of 2300 years, is still full of the relics of her former greatness, there has been, until quite recent times, some doubt as to the spot on the banks of the Eurotas where Sparta stood; and recent excavations, though they have fixed the site of the city, have revealed little more than a Roman theatre, a tomb, and a sarcophagus

The area of Greece is too small to allow of large rivers, and the lack of a good water supply has always been the great agricultural drawback of the country. What streams there were, therefore, were much valued; and the river Eurotas was certainly the first cause of the foundation of the city of Sparta. The river flows down from the mountains of Arcadia, at first through a narrow gorge, and then through a widening plain of eighteen miles in length, with an average breadth of four or five. It is nowhere larger than the Devonshire Dart, which, in many respects, it resembles; * but it is to this river that the plain owes its fertility. Upon the west side of Sparta rose the great mountain mass of Taygetus, some 8000 feet in height, and from all sides except from the south Sparta was approached by mountain passes, which made it possible for her citizens to boast that the city needed no walls or other defences than the arms of her citizens. But far beyond the valley of the Eurotas the Spartans had extended their sway. Westward, they had, in a series of campaigns fought in the dim dawn of history, gained possession of Messenia, the most fertile plain in Greece. Northward, they had driven the Arcadians back into their mountain fastnesses, and had torn from them some of their most fertile valleys. And upon the east their Argive kinsmen had yielded to the superior force of their arms a rich strip of their territory.

There had been a time when the Peloponnese had known nothing of this strenuous people. Homer's pages do not tell us of Dorian settlers in hollow Lacedæmon. **At that** indeterminable epoch the Dorians had lived in

* I owe this comparison to Mr. Tozer's "Lectures on the Geography of Greece."

the north of Greece, and the non-Dorian had been the most powerful race in the Peloponnese. But the dim light that is all we have to see by for many generations after Homer's sun is set, is enough to allow us to see great changes. From the highlands of Thessaly the Dorians force their way southward, probably across the Corinthian Gulf into the Peloponnese. All gives way before them, and that not only in consequence of the racial superiority of the new-comers. It is clear they had superiority in arms as well. Their battles are not the confused *mêlée* of the Homeric poems, in which the spear is used only as a missile weapon. Now the spear is the chief weapon, and the shield has become smaller and is fastened upon the arm. A severer discipline and a steadier drill are enforced, and so the Achæans of Homer, with all the rich civilisation of which Schliemann found such remarkable relics in the tombs of Mycenæ, give way and almost disappear, and the dominant race of the Peloponnese is the Dorian. And of the Dorians the Spartans are chief. That the Spartans were alien invaders, holding what they held by the right of the stronger, was a fact never forgotten by themselves or their subjects. It is a fact which colours and helps to account for the whole of their history and organisation.

As soon as ever we are able to look at the population of the Eurotas valley, we find that it is not homogeneous, but falls into three divisions quite distinct from one another. First, there are the Spartans proper, the descendants of the original Dorian conquerors, the free-born and full citizens of Sparta. Secondly, come the Periceci, "the dwellers around," the free population of the country that did not possess citizenship. Lastly, there are the Helots or serfs.

It was the full-born Spartans of the first division who alone were regarded as composing the state. They were never more than ten thousand, and in historical times much fewer. But all the institutions of the land regarded them only. The other sections of the population were in absolute submission to them. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with them, with their remarkable social discipline, and with their political institutions, and with their discipline more than their institutions.

The Social Discipline of Sparta.

To begin with, let us note two characteristics in the state—the complete subordination of the individual to the state and the all-engrossing pursuit of military objects.

The first has already been noticed as, to some extent, a characteristic of all Greek states, as being indeed comprised in the Greek idea of a state. But nowhere is the idea so fully worked out as at Sparta. The glory of Sparta and the safety of Sparta are everything. Compared to this the affections or the interests of individual citizens did not count at all. Brasidas' mother would not be comforted at his death by those who told her that Sparta possessed no other citizen of such mark. The mother might be pleased with the phrase, but the Spartan must rather hope that there were many others greater and better than he. No anecdote is better known than that of the Spartan mother who bids her son return either with his shield or upon it; that is, either victorious or dead. Patriotism crushing the softer emotions is the point to be noted in both stories. Even more characteristic in Sparta is the complete absorption in military pursuits. In that age, as was pointed out in our first chapter, all civilisation rested on a military basis, all

states pursued military greatness as their main goal. But while most other states were sometimes enticed by other objects, while Athens, at any rate in practice, devoted herself to art and thought even more than to war, Sparta never swerved aside. Soldiership was here the highest and the only idea of manhood. No art, no science, no virtue, no affection, was prized unless it contributed directly to military excellence. The whole state was indeed a camp under arms.

To achieve this military ideal the whole of the Spartan's life, from the cradle to the grave, was subjected to state supervision and the most rigorous discipline. That the Spartan might be nothing else but a soldier, he was not allowed to travel, lest he should catch the mercantile or artistic contamination of other lands. A similar reason induced the state in its earlier period to forbid to its citizens all use of money, except in so heavy and cumbrous a form as effectually to check the operations of exchange and commerce. There was at one time, we are told, a law which made the possession of gold and silver a capital offence. The law was indeed either abrogated or never applied. It illustrates, however, the tendency of the Spartan state.

But the strenuousness of the Spartans will be best illustrated if we follow in some detail the discipline imposed upon every Spartan citizen.

This discipline began with birth. Immediately after the child had seen the light it was visited by Spartan elders, to examine whether it were in any way deformed or obviously unhealthy. If so, the child must not be allowed to grow up "a feeble wielder of the lance," or to be the mother of children inheriting perhaps her own weakness. It was therefore immediately after birth

exposed halfway up the side of Mount Taygetus, and allowed to die almost before it had begun to live. Such was the summary method in which the Spartans, acting in accordance with a custom common to the ancient world, settled their population question. That custom was one of the most striking offences of the Pagan world against modern feeling, and its abolition was one of the great services of early Christianity. The Spartan method at any rate solved a problem which we are as yet content to ignore. If the child were healthy it was given back to its parents, and for seven years remained in the care of its mother, but not in her unguided care. The state prescribed that it should be immersed in a bath of wine. Its swaddling clothes did not escape the eye of the state. They must not be so long or so heavy as to interfere with the free action of the child's limbs.

At the age of seven years the male child ceased to belong to its parents and became the child of the state. Until the age of thirty he was not regarded as having reached maturity, and through all these years lived a barrack life with strict regulations and under immediate supervision. The hair was close clipped, the feet were bare in the blazing summers and in the bitter winters of the Eurotas valley. Their single garment was not changed either for cold or heat. Their bed consisted of reeds from the banks of the Eurotas, which each boy must pull up with his own hands. In winter indeed a luxury was allowed. "They might add to their reeds," says Plutarch, "a herb called lycophon." Commentators are not agreed whether lycophon means moss or thistle-down. Whichever it be, to modern minds their luxuries will seem more austere than their hardships.

They fed together in barracks. The mess was divided

into separate tables, at each of which about six were accommodated. And those who fed at each table were friends, for at each vacancy the new-comer was balloted for by the rest. And those who fed at the same table fought side by side in battle. Their friendship would increase the shame of cowardice and the glory of successful exertion. The food at these tables was of the coarsest, though sufficient in quantity. But all were encouraged to hunt the game that was plentiful on Taygetus, and the catch was added to the meal. A more doubtful statement affirms that the boys were encouraged to steal from the tables of their seniors, with the full understanding that if they were caught they would be severely punished. It is not impossible. Such a custom would closely reproduce the conditions of provisioning in war.

Through the whole of this disciplinary period of their lives there was something analogous to the monitorial system of a public school. The younger submitted themselves to the direction of the elder, who by the task of command learnt the necessity of obedience. Along with all the life that has here been described there went constant military drilling, as well as constant exercise in boxing, wrestling, and all sorts of gymnastics. Writing in a much later age, Plutarch tells us of a custom that had lasted down to his own time. Once in their lives the boys were flogged at the altar of Artemis Orthia, not for any offence committed, but as a training in endurance. "I have seen many of them perish under the scourge at the altar," says Plutarch.

The character of the whole training is clear. "To manifest a daring and pugnacious spirit; to sustain the greatest bodily torture unmoved ; to endure hunger, cold,

and fatigue ; to tread the worst ground barefoot; to wear the same garment winter and summer; to suppress external manifestations of feeling; and to exhibit in public, when action was not called for, a bearing shy, silent, and motionless as a statue,—all these were the virtues of the accomplished Spartan youth." Such are the words in which Grote sums up the ideal existence of a Spartan youth. A life of terrible and repellent severity, a life in which the object of living had been lost sight of, such it must appear to us, and such indeed it was. Yet it was by no means entirely without its compensations and consolations. If we read Plutarch's *Life of Lyscurgus*, where better than anywhere else we shall find the Spartan life mirrored, we shall feel occasionally the breath of joy that there was in this robust life, the joy of hunting upon the mountain side, the joy of the barrack festivals, when song and mirth proclaimed the devotion of all citizens to the state. And there was too the high and austere joy of the abandonment of all individual desires and their dedication to a common object.

At the age of thirty manhood was attained, but by no means complete individual liberty. No longer now did the Spartan live exclusively in barracks. He might at last know what family life meant. And family life was indeed enjoined upon him. "There were penalties in Sparta," says Plutarch, "for not marrying, and for late marrying, and for marrying amiss, and under the last head they brought more especially the case of those who sought rich connections, instead of good ones among their own kin." Upon one day in the year all bachelors above a certain age were summoned to the great square, and then, arranged in order, they marched through the city, while the women and boys sang songs in mockery of

their condition. What the effect of this custom was upon the marriage rate we are not told.

And though after thirty family life was possible to the Spartan, he was still a soldier first and a husband or a father after. Still there was drilling and reviewing and discipline; and these were of so severe a character that we can well believe that the declaration of war came as a relief. Instead of an increase of the rigour of discipline there was in time of war a relaxing of it, and thus war came to be regarded as a sort of holiday.

Nowhere in Greece had women a better position than in Sparta—a position more open, more free, more influential. Good soldiers must have healthy mothers, and therefore the physique of the women was not disregarded by the state. They underwent a gymnastic training of their own "in running, wrestling, hurling quoits and javelins." And, as in early Rome, the capacity of women to influence men to warlike energy was fully recognised. The women of Sparta were never, like their Athenian sisters, buried in an almost Oriental seclusion. They moved freely among the men, and were seen openly and unveiled in the streets. In the festivals they mixed freely with the men. Athenian prejudices were scandalised by all this, but it probably resulted in strength to the state, though later on the Spartan women are said to have degenerated in character, and to have often exercised a pernicious influence. The respect paid to them helps to give to Sparta that almost Roman cohesion which Athens lacked. They shared in the sternness of the state : an unbroken regulation forbade, after a battle, all female lamentation for the dead, lest men should deem it an evil thing to die fighting for the state.

The Political Institutions of Sparta.

Compared with the social discipline, the constitution of Sparta is uninteresting and unimportant, and must here be only summarily dealt with. But it is not without its striking features, and, like the social discipline, reveals the character of the Spartan state—an army encamped among enemies, so that military strictness was necessary to survival.

If we may regard the Homeric poems as mirroring in any way the civilisation contemporary with the poet, we may conjecture that in that early and indeterminate period all states in Greece were monarchies. The monarch holds his place not by heredity alone, but by the right of the worthiest, whether expressed in physical strength or counsel in war. He is assisted by a council of chieftains, who seem to advise and sometimes to dictate. Before the great questions, such as peace or war, were decided, the whole body of citizens had to be summoned, without debate, to vote "aye" or "no." If this was the primitive constitution of Greece, as other evidence besides that of the Homeric poems leads us to believe, no state had deviated from it so little as Sparta. And that we should have expected, for her whole existence is steeped in the strongest conservative spirit. Elsewhere in Greece, with hardly an exception, the monarchy had gone. In Sparta it still remained. But here the monarchy has been duplicated; there is not one king, but two. This arrangement finds no exact parallel in the constitutional history of Europe. Nor is it of any importance for us to balance against one another the arguments for the various theories that have been advanced to account for it. Whether it arose from a prehistoric amalgamation of different races, or from the

rivalry of two families, or from an accident of birth, or from aristocratic statecraft, enough for our purposes that we find two families always contributing a king to the state. And whatever the origin of the system, the result is clear: it destroyed the reality of the monarchy. Their position usually made the kings jealous rivals, and as they possessed equal powers, the monarchy was constantly reduced to a deadlock which the other sections of the community used to their own advantage. The kings were the religious representatives of the state, the nominal, and sometimes the real, commanders of the army. But they were really far less important in the state than the Ephors, of whom more shortly. And nothing will show the simplicity of the Spartan state more than the privileges which were allowed them. At the public feasts a double portion of food was set aside for them. They might absent themselves from the mess, but in that case only half their portion was sent out to them.

Next came the council of elders. It consisted of twenty-eight members over sixty years of age, elected by the people for life, and the two kings were ex-officio members. The duties of this council were to prepare all measures that were brought before the people, and to act as a court of criminal justice. And next to the council was the popular assembly—all citizens of pure birth who had submitted to the discipline of the state belonged to it. Once every month they were of necessity called together, and at such other times as the Ephors or kings thought fit. The election of all officers was in their hands. And though no discussion was allowed, **all** questions of importance, especially the question of war or peace, were submitted to them as the final authority. We may not regard them as a very powerful body, **but** it

was by their vote that the Peloponnesian war, the great tragedy of Greece, was opened.

So far, there seems no strength in the Spartan constitution. We see a monarchy hardly more powerful than the British, a senate without final authority of any sort, a popular assembly dependent for its calling together upon that council, and incapable of any discussion. So far there is insufficient motive power for any state ; certainly for an aggressive military state like Sparta. The necessary motive power was supplied by the Ephorate, the real government of Sparta and the most striking invention of the state. All history proves that no military policy can be carried on successfully if the actual management of the state be in the hands of Parliament or Senate or debating assembly. For war it is before all things necessary that the executive should be able to act with secrecy and rapidity. And hence all free constitutions have found themselves forced, under pressure of a great war, to draw a veil over the face of liberty. In Sparta the constitution of the Ephorate gave to the state this necessary secrecy and rapidity.

Every year by public vote five citizens, called Ephors, were elected, and into the hands of these five men absolute and irresponsible power was given for the space of a year. This abdication of power by the whole body of the citizens into the hands of five of their own number could hardly be understood if we did not remember the situation of the Spartan state, surrounded by a population whose hostility they made no attempt to conciliate. To these Ephors the kings were entirely subordinate. Upon their approach the kings rose. Yearly the kings took an oath to observe the constitution, and the Ephors then promised to uphold their throne. They were allowed

to fine and imprison the kings even against so powerful a king as Agesilaus. Though the kings were nominally the commanders of the army, the Ephors accompanied them upon all campaigns, to watch them, to check them, to report to the authorities at home anything that looked like incapacity or treason. They had in their hands all the relations of Sparta with foreign powers. Upon their shoulders rested the responsibility for internal quiet. In their management was the system of secret police whereby the surrounding masses of hostile peoples were kept in awe.

If we look back upon this constitution we see that Sparta is a democracy, if we use the word in its modern sense, to imply that the voting power was in the hands of all citizens. But in Greece democracy meant more than that; it meant the direct exercise of power by the people themselves, and not by their elected officers. And therefore Sparta is always spoken of as an oligarchy, for the hereditary kingship and the life tenure of office by the councillors and the unlimited authority of the Ephors curbed the power of the people and contradicted the democratic ideal.

The Subject Populations of Sparta.

The Spartans proper were by far the most important section of the Spartan state, but numerically they were an insignificant minority. they were outnumbered both by the Periæci and the Helots. The former were the free population of Spartan territory who had not full citizen rights. They were descendants of those earlier masters of Lacedæmon who had been subdued by the Spartans. Their personal liberty remained, though they were not allowed to share in any way in the government

of the city. There are, of course, no accurate statistics as to their number, but they were probably about three times as numerous as the Spartans proper. Most of the trade of Sparta was in their hands. A certain amount of ironwork, some manufacture of woollen goods, was carried on by them. They were taxed by the Spartans. They served in war as heavy-armed troops, and were often harshly treated by their governors. Under ordinary circumstances they seem to have lived a free, quiet, and industrious life, but deprived of that share in the rights of citizenship without which, to the true Greek, a full life was impossible. They chafed against their position, but we hardly hear of any insurrection, for they, equally with the Spartans, were permanently threatened by the bitterly discontented and really dangerous class of Helots.

At first sight there seems no sufficient cause for the bitter discontent of these Helots. Technically, they stood upon a better footing than most of the hand-workers of Greece. They were not slaves: they could not be bought and sold. They stood economically near to the serfs of the middle ages. They cultivated the land and were bound to it. Of the produce of the land they paid a certain large proportion to their masters, but what remained was their own. It was possible, therefore, for them to accumulate some money. Legitimate marriage was possible to them; family life was probably more possible to them than to their Spartan masters. They shared in the religion of the state. According to the ideas of the time, their position was neither unjust nor intolerable. And yet no class in Greece chafed more against their position than the Helots.

For their position, halfway between liberty and slavery, was a peculiarly irritating and tantalising one. They

perhaps possessed some tradition of a time when they were free, and looked on the Spartans as their dispossessors. Moreover there was in the Spartan character a rawness and harshness that made even fair relations to them intolerable, just as there was in the Athenians a geniality and reasonableness which made their slaves as contented a race of men as was to be found in Greece.

And there were in the life of the Helot certain terrible possibilities that quite explain their restiveness. We need lay little stress on such grotesque details as Plutarch's story that it was a Spartan custom to make Helots drunk in public that they might serve as warnings to the Spartan youth. It is more important to notice that the system of secret police (*crypteia*) was devised against them. At the beginning of every year war was declared against them, that their murder might not bring blood-guiltiness upon the state. Year by year a certain number of young men put themselves, as secret police, under the direction of the Ephors. It was their duty to go into the country districts to spy out any discontent or designs of insurrection that might lurk there ; and if any Helots seemed to entertain designs contrary to the interests of the state, they were at once to be put to death without form of trial. An incident in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war does not allow us to believe that the system of secret police was a mere threat. In that terrible struggle the Spartans were forced to give to the Helots not only the light arms with which they usually accompanied their masters to battle, but the full panoply of the heavy-armed soldier. To put such weapons into **the** hands of so hostile a population was clearly a great **danger, and a danger that** must be met. How it **was**

met Thucydides shall tell. "They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those Helots who claimed to have rendered the best service to the Lacedaemonians in the war, and promised them liberty. The announcement was intended to test them; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited and most likely to rise against their masters. So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands, and went in procession round the temple ; they were supposed to have received their liberty, but not long afterwards the Spartans put them all out of the way, and no man knew how any of them came to their end " (iv. 80).

The Results of the Spartan System.

It only remains to consider the results of the whole system upon the Spartan state.

1. It gave Sparta a great military success. No one questioned their claim to be regarded as the greatest soldiers in Greece. Though the Greeks were not the nation of cowards that they have been paradoxically represented, and performed many great feats of arms, they did not certainly display any great military genius. Not to put them into competition with Rome, the greatest military state of all time, it is clear that they lacked the uneducated valour of the Macedonian, and did not display the coolness and tenacity of many modern peoples. Greatest among their military shortcomings was their tendency to panic. This tendency the Spartans almost alone among Greeks managed to overcome. No instance of tumultuous flight is recorded of them. They remained at Thermopylae to face certain death rather than disgrace the Spartan name. When at last, in 371, the hour

of their doom struck, and the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea overthrew once for all their claims to invincibility, it was by a new tactic that they were overthrown, not by any superiority of physical courage in the enemy or any failure of nerve on their own side.

They were excellent soldiers, but they never showed that genius for war and organisation that characterises the Romans. They were never willing to open the ranks of citizenship to the conquered peoples. They did not even produce the great generals of Greece. In the development of the military art that leads up to Alexander the Great, Athenians and Boeotians have a greater share than Spartans.

2. And while the soldier was cultivated with such success, the man was neglected. Sparta has no such memories as Athens, or even as Thebes or Argos. From her come neither philosophers nor artists nor inventors nor poets. A certain greatness of character no one will be able to deny to the Spartans, and greatness of character is after all the highest product of a state. But the intellect and the imagination were starved. Martial poetry was allowed by their scheme of life, and they knew and valued the power of music to stimulate courage and the spirit of adventure. But from Sparta there came no intellectual or imaginative product that the world will not willingly let die. Their wit was indeed celebrated in antiquity. Nothing is so evanescent in its interest as wit, and we therefore cannot expect to catch all the aroma of jokes 2500 years old. Many of the witty sayings attributed to Spartans amount only to brutal rudeness. To some one who inquires, "Who is the best man in Sparta?" the Spartan wag answers, "He who is least like you." An Athenian reproached a Spartan for

his ignorance, and met the retort, "It is true that we are ignorant, for we are the only Greeks who have not learnt some mischief from you." Sometimes their wit exhibits a certain pithy shrewdness. It was told of Lyscurgus that when he was asked why he did not establish a democracy in Sparta, he said, "First establish a democracy in your own household." When a Spartan was asked how best to arrange means for defence, he replied, "By remaining poor and not each trying to be a greater man than the other." Occasionally their sayings have a really heroic ring, as that of the Spartan at Thermopylae who, when told that the Persian arrows flew so thick that the sun was obscured, replied that he preferred to fight in the shade. And again, when a bystander asks an athlete, who comes from a contest dust-covered, blood-smeared, but victorious, what good he has got by all his exertions, he replies that he has gained the privilege of righting in the hottest part of the battle. But on the whole we cannot rate Spartan wit very high. Jokes have doubtless their fates as well as books, and perhaps we have not got the best. But those that depend on intellect rather than character are certainly **poor.**

3. Yet in Greece neither friends nor enemies denied Sparta's greatness. Men looked with wonder on her success in war and the stability of her society and constitution. Elsewhere the constitutional character of Greek states changed with kaleidoscopic variety. But Sparta seemed to remain unmoved from quite the dawn of history down to the fatal year 370 B.C., when at last an enemy's watch-fires were reflected in the Eurotas. "This state," says Plutarch, "was by far the most celebrated in **Greece for** good government at home and renown abroad

for the space of five hundred years." So great and universal was the recognition of Sparta's supremacy that it formed the basis for the united resistance of Greece to Persia, and at one time it seemed as though it might offer a possibility of a really united Greece.

The eighteenth century of our era shared this enthusiasm for Sparta. To those who were wearied with the luxury and corruption of France, Sparta seemed to offer an example of simplicity and austere morals, and at the same time to prove what might be done for a people by state direction. Sparta was adduced as a proof of the thesis that with the help of the laws you can make people what you like, and a prominent heroine of the Revolution wept to think that she had not been born in Sparta. The modern world can hardly share this enthusiasm. We have almost fully emerged from the military stage of society, and no longer regard soldiership as the ideal of manhood. And if we judge a state by its work for the progress of the human race, how small is our debt to Sparta compared with what we owe to Athens! Yet Sparta was in the Greek world a great moral force, and a perpetual protest against the moral anarchy that was Greece's greatest danger. The concentration of purpose, the austerity of life, the readiness of self-sacrifice for the highest ideal then known, that were so constantly exhibited by the Spartans, will always claim a measure of admiration.

Argos.

Sparta possessed the first place in Hellas by the common consent of nearly all states. But she had a neighbour who sulkily refused to yield it to her. That neighbour was Argos. Greece possesses no plain more rich in historical associations than the one in which

Argos was situated. Here the Homeric poems placed the chief cities of Greece ; here were " golden " Mycenæ and " well-walled " Tiryns, that have of recent years yielded up such marvellous results to the excavations of Dr. Schliemann. Since the days of Homer everything had been changed. The Dorian invasion had altered the whole map of Hellas. Argos, not less than Sparta, was held by the descendants of Dorian invaders. The gold of Mycenæ had disappeared, the walls of Tiryns survived as little else than a curiosity. But however alien the new race might be to the stock of the Homeric heroes, Argos gained some glory from the fact that close to her was Mycenæ, the capital of Agamemnon, King of Men. But Argos could appeal to something else in support of her primacy besides poetic legends and historic monuments. Argos was a well-populated and healthy city; the hill that rose behind her formed an excellently defensible acropolis; the plain, now so bare and waterless, was then reckoned among the most fertile in Greece. And Argos had a great past. She could boast of a King Phidon—whose doubtful date we may place about 750 B.C.—who had given a system of coinage, weights, and measures to Greece and organised the state. Trained to a high degree of efficiency, she had then been a really dangerous rival to Sparta; and that rivalry had found expression in war, and in war the Spartan discipline had told with deadly effect. The Spartan king, Cleomenes, had invaded the Argolic plain (520? B.C.). Argos herself had escaped, but her troops were defeated, the plain was ravaged, and Argos had for a time to submit to the erection of Tiryns as a separate city state in the hands of slaves who had revolted from Argos. It is impossible here to follow her history in detail. But the territory that Sparta seized kept the

wound open. During the struggle with the Persians she stood aloof from the defence of Hellas, because if she joined it it would be as an inferior to Sparta. After the Persian war she rapidly revived. Again the whole Argolic plain was hers. But still Sparta far outtopped her, and the great jealousy between Sparta and Argos is one of the permanent factors in Greek international politics.

Corinth.

Where the mountain system of the Peloponnese sank into the plain, and before the plain rose again into the mountain masses of Geraneia, Corinth stood. She too had played no small part in the drama of Greek history, just when that history first begins. Her situation marked her out for a commercial state. She had harbours both upon the east and the west of the Isthmus. There was an apparatus, a sort of tram line, for hauling ships across, thus allowing them to avoid the perils of a journey round Cape Matapan. Westward as well as eastward her commerce might make its way, while most of the harbours of Greece opened only upon the east. And she used her topographical advantages to the full. From Corinth came all early improvements in shipbuilding. The trireme, the vessel driven by three banks of oars, was her invention. Before the commercial advances of Athens, to be noted in a subsequent chapter, Corinth had a more extensive and more lucrative commerce than any other state in Central Greece. Her colonies were to be found in all parts of the Hellenic world. Chief among them were Syracuse, the great island of Coreyra (Corfu), and the town of Epidamnus upon the mainland opposite. No state in Hellas seems so rapidly to have attained to a luxurious civilisation; nowhere was the

proportion of slaves to freemen so numerous. Here the whole of her interesting history must be omitted, except one point—her relation to Athens. At first there had been friendship between them, and during Athens' early struggle for liberty, Corinth had been her fast friend, and had refused to co-operate in the coercion of the nascent democracy. Then came the days when the history of Athens showed, in Herodotus' words, "how excellent a thing is liberty." Her commerce advanced by leaps and bounds; her settlements in the east and west cramped the action of Corinth. At last Corinth found herself hemmed in and almost strangled by Athens. In the Greek world commercial competition was not nearly so strongly felt between individuals of the same state as it is with us, but between different states it was more open and more resented. And the successful commercial rivalry of Athens against Corinth turned the latter from a useful friend into a most dangerous foe. Later we shall see how the hostility of Corinth, more than any single cause, precipitated the Peloponnesian war. Here it is only necessary to say that, for the period of which this little book treats, Corinth may be regarded as the permanent foe of Athens.

Thebes.

Athens and Thebes were another pair of inveterate enemies. There lay between them the mountain range of Cithæron as a clear and natural frontier. And their interests did not necessarily clash. Thebes was the complete mistress of the Boeotian plain, and had control therefore of considerable wealth and a large population. But the Boeotians were not an enterprising or an intellectual people. "A Boeotian pig" passed as a proverb

in Greece, and Pindar and Epaminondas **are** almost the only men of first-rate ability that Bæotia produces during the time of Greece's independence. Thebes was not a colonising power, and she had no commercial ambitions. An alliance between herself and Athens seemed a natural policy for both states. But the vanity of the Greek states, their desire to stand alone, what Grote calls "the centrifugal tendency" of Hellas, made all Greek alliances precarious. And, in addition, there was another cause of friction. The little city of Plataæa, in her struggle against the supremacy of Thebes, had thrown herself first upon the protection of Sparta, and, rejected by her, had cast in her lot with Athens. Thus Athens possessed a strip of territory which seemed naturally to belong to Thebes, and which would have belonged to Thebes had it not been for Athens' interference. The alliance between Plataæa and Athens brought little good to either party. It had one glorious moment on the battlefield of Marathon, and then, not sixty years later, brought extinction upon Plataæa. And to Athens the alliance brought the unquenchable hostility of Thebes. The cession of Plataæa, like the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, made peace between the two states impossible.

NOTE.—Grote, Part II., ch. vi. Curtius, Book II., ch. i. But Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus will, better than anything else, give an insight into the spirit of the Spartan state. He has drawn from authorities contemporary with the great days of Sparta, and has thrown on his narrative a romantic colouring and sentiment. His Lives of Lysander and Agesilaus are also valuable for the light they throw upon the general character of Sparta. Chapter viii. of Walter Pater's *Plato and Platonism* gives a very sympathetic picture of Sparta.



BRIDGE OVER THE EUROTAS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EARLIER HISTORY OF ATHENS.

The Situation of Athens.

ATHENS failed in her attempt to spread her empire over the whole of Hellas. Her good and bad qualities combined to give victory in the great and suicidal struggle of the Peloponnesian war to her rival Sparta. But time has brought in its revenges. Except to the student of history, Sparta and the other states of Greece are little more than names; while the name of Athens has become identical with the early history of civilisation. It was during the age of Pericles that this superiority in all that is best most clearly declared itself, and this must be my excuse for treating of Greek history henceforth almost exclusively from the Athenian standpoint.

Byron calls Greece "Land of the mountains and the sea"; **and** he has accurately chosen the two physical

features that are most prominent and had most influence on the destinies of the people. The mountains divided Greece into a large number of separate geographical units, and made possible the isolation of the city states of which we have already spoken; the sea allowed easy communication between these separate city states. Both influences did much for Athens. Though Attica belongs to the mainland, she is more really connected with the islands of the Ægean sea than with her continental neighbours. Northward, westward, eastward the plain of Athens was shut in by mountain ranges, the peaks of which reach, in many cases, the height of 4000 feet. The road into Bæotia was through the high and difficult range of Cithæron. Entry into the Peloponnese was barred by the ranges of Geraneia, **that** closed up the Isthmus from side to side. If we transport ourselves in imagination back into the period when roads were few and bad, and the mountains mentioned were held by states often hostile, we shall understand that intercourse with neighbours was neither easy nor always safe. But if the mountains were forbidding, the sea invited to travel and adventure. Not five miles from Athens was a good roadstead, Phalerum, and an excellent harbour, Piræus. And the Athenian sailor would not have to strike out without compass for **a** land far out of sight. From island to island he might make his way, sheltering behind them if a storm came on, and so might find himself on the shores of Asia Minor without ever having lost sight of land. The destiny of Athens is stamped on the geography of Greece. If she extends **her rule** beyond the borders of Attica, it must be over **the** island states of the Ægean, not the cities **of the mainland**.

Attica is not larger than a moderate-sized English

county, but it was the largest territory attached to any Greek city, with the exception of Sparta. The soil of Attica, according to modern ideas, is very poor; and even in the age of Pericles, and according to the standards of the Greeks, it was not very rich. A great deal of it is covered with hills; then for the most part well wooded, now treeless. There were three chief plains—the plain of Eleusis, the seat of the Mysteries, divided from Athens by Mount Ægaleon; the plain of Marathon, with the spurs of Mount Pentelicus separating it from the third plain, that of Athens herself. A modern writer has called Athens the most beautifully situated city in the world; and though the superlative could hardly have been used if it had not been for the great memories of Athens, it would be difficult to find any city of more beautiful physical surroundings. The plain is indeed now dry, and, except for the numerous olive trees, bare; but the circle of mountains with beautiful outlines, the sea that looks like a wide river between the island of Salamis and the mainland, and the clear atmosphere of which the Athenians were so justly proud, combine to make an almost unequalled panorama. And the situation had other qualities to recommend it than picturesqueness. Like so many Greek cities, it is near to the sea without being actually on it; that is, it allowed the inhabitants to use the sea without being in fear of being raided by pirates. And it possessed an excellent hill-fort, the first essential of all early Greek cities, and doubtless the true cause of the foundation of Athens in this precise spot. There are several hills scattered in the centre of the plain; Lycabettus, the highest, is 910 feet high. The one actually chosen for the fortress, the Acropolis, is only 200 feet above the plain; but its com-

paratively low elevation was an advantage if the population wished hurriedly to take refuge from an invader. It was easily defensible, for upon three sides it sank so perpendicularly to the plain that it hardly needed the extra defence of a wall. On the fourth side, the west, the descent was fairly steep, and could be readily so strengthened as to be almost impregnable. The surface of the hill measured about 1000 feet by 500. Nearly every city in Greece possessed its Acropolis or central fort, but none was so admirably adapted for every purpose, whether of adornment or defence, as this of Athens. Immediately to the west of it, and almost touching it, was a smaller mass of rock that is called the Areopagus, or Hill of Mars. Still farther westward are other hills, of no very striking elevation, the most important of which is the hill of the Pnyx, of which I shall have more to say further on. At first the Acropolis was the city; then a few houses clustered round its base; then, as Athens grew and prospered, the city began to extend rapidly in a westerly direction, towards the Piraeus and the sea. But as the importance of the Acropolis as a fortress decreased, its religious importance was rather augmented; it remained to the last the real centre and the most sacred spot of Athens.

The soil, we have said, was poor. Flowers grew everywhere in abundance; and the derivation that makes Athens mean the place of flowers is not without plausibility. But the soil was too thin for good corn crops; and, though probably the climate has somewhat changed in the course of 2500 years, partly owing to the disappearance of the trees from the mountains, the lack of water was always felt, and agricultural operations were only possible by means of irrigation. The chief product

of the land was the olive tree; and the export of the oil was one of the main sources of the wealth of Athenian farmers. Fish was caught plentifully on the coasts, and formed the staple article of diet. Meat was rarely eaten. The land was owned, in small farms, by Athenian citizens, who for the most part resided on their own land. It was not till much later that the residence in the town became the rule and country life the rare exception. But even in the earliest period a large proportion of the labour must have been done by slaves. Of industry, in the modern sense of the word, of course there was nothing; but the artisans of Attica had some celebrity beyond their own country. Athenian pottery and Athenian shoes were exported widely through the Hellenic world. Later, a large district of Athens was given up to the potters, and took its name from them.

What were the chief stages in the development of the life of Athens, social and political and intellectual, up to the appearance of Pericles? That is the question that I shall endeavour to answer in the briefest possible space.

The Legislation of Solon.

It is certain that Athens, to begin with, was a monarchy. The monarchy was changed into a republic, not by any sudden revolution, but by a slow process of encroachment and undermining. The name of king indeed never disappeared from Athens, though the officer who bore that name was in the age of Pericles one of the least important functionaries of the state. This encroachment was not in the interest of the people at large, but solely of the privileged class of the nobles (Eupatrids). **If we adopt the** uncertain chronology of the period, it was in

1066 B.C. that Codrus, the last king, died. The change that followed is doubtful. It seems only a change in name, for though the ruler of the state is now called archon, he holds office for life and must belong to the royal family. It is a safe assumption that the nobles had some part in the selection of the individual who was to occupy the post. In 752 B.C. the duration of the office of archon was limited to ten years. In 712 it was thrown open to all the Eupatrids. In 683 the most important change was introduced. Nine archons selected from the Eupatrids, and each holding office for one year only, stepped into the place of the single archon. The meaning of these changes is perfectly clear. The monarchy has gradually disappeared; an oligarchical dictatorship has taken its place. The change that passed over England between the Tudors and the Hanoverians is very analogous in reality though not in form.

But by the end of the century the rule of the nobles that had lasted so long was attacked on two sides. The seventh century B.C. had been full of changes for Hellas. It was the era of colonisation. Cities that have now dwindled into paltry villages sent out colonies as far as the Black Sea and Sicily. Maritime enterprise developed. Commerce increased rapidly. Coined money was introduced. Greek life lost entirely the patriarchal complexion that it wears in the pages of Homer. In every state in Greece the seventh century was an age of unrest. In Attica the difficulties arose from two sources. In the first place, as commerce developed, a class of merchants, rich according to the ideas of the time, rose up side by side with the Eupatrid nobles, whose wealth rested on the land. This merchant class found itself

excluded from all share in the government, from all share in the direction of the state, and grumbled in consequence. And the farmers of Attica meanwhile had a heavier grievance than this. Since the introduction of coined money into the Greek world, it had become the necessity of all classes. And at first the farmers could only obtain it by borrowing from the rich men of Athens. They borrowed at an exorbitant rate of interest; they mortgaged their lands, and in many parts of Attica were to be seen the pillars announcing the mortgage. But further, and worst of all, if their land did not suffice to pay the debt, the farmers had themselves to become the slaves of the money-lender. And this had happened on a large scale. Many men, once free farmers and the backbone of the land, were now either tilling those lands as the slaves of a money-lender, or sold into slavery in a foreign country. This widespread discontent, partly political, but mainly social, was not unknown in other Greek states. Elsewhere it had often produced the establishment of "tyrannies." By the word "tyrant" the Greeks did not mean a cruel man nor an oppressive ruler: they meant simply a personal ruler, whose power, resting on a command of physical force, was unsupported by law or custom, and without limitations or Conditions. In Megara, in Sicyon, in Corinth, men had seized this position by putting themselves forward as champions of the discontented, and then held by force a position that they had gained by fraud. Already such an attempt had been made in Athens. Cylon had seized the Acropolis with the help of foreign mercenaries, and seemed to have accomplished his end. But the whole state had risen against him. He had been obliged to flee, and his followers had been put to death (620)

The discontent was not thereby abated, and a renewal of the attempt with better success seemed highly probable.

It is due entirely to the high personal qualities of Solon that the attempt was not made. Solon is, in every respect, the most remarkable of the lawgivers of Greece. He belongs to a period when the religion of Greece had undisputed sway, before the inevitable advent of criticism had deprived Greece of a central spiritual power. His work receives the sanction of the oracle of Delphi. The era of specialisation had not begun. Solon is land-owner and merchant, philosopher and statesman, poet and athlete. There is no department of Greek life to which he does not direct his attention. Of his poetry something has come down to us in Plutarch ; more in the recently discovered work of Aristotle. His verses give us a record of his work as a lawgiver in Athens. They are written throughout with elevation and dignity, but contain nothing which would not later on have been expressed in prose. His whole work bears the stamp of the purest patriotism. It seeks the advantage of no class, and brought him personally neither wealth nor power. What Alfred the Great is for English history, that was Solon for Greek.

In 594 B.C. he was elected archon, with special powers to make laws and to heal the divisions of the state. His friends had urged him to make himself tyrant; even the Delphian oracle had given countenance to the idea. The temptation was great and the prize easily obtainable; but Solon remained true to the task for which he had been elected. The social difficulties were the most pressing. First Solon annulled all debts whatever.* In this,

* It was formerly doubtful whether he annulled all debts, or only those contracted on land; but from the new Aristotle it seems clear that all debts were annulled.

according to modern ideas, there must have been considerable injustice. But the interest had been so high and the bitterness against the lenders so great that the arrangement was apparently readily accepted. Next he forbade for the future all loans in which the person of the borrower was made security for repayment.

His political arrangements are for us more important. Firstly he so distributed the power and the burdens of the state that to wealth fell the heaviest responsibilities as well as the greatest authority. The population was already divided into four classes, according to the amount of their landed property. This classification Solon used as the basis for his constitution. All citizens possessed an equal vote in the election of all officers. But to the highest office, the archonship, only members of the richest class were eligible, and the fourth class was excluded from the tenure of all office. But if poverty was a bar to office it was also a security against taxation, and the taxes were so graduated that not only did the richest pay most, but they paid a larger proportion of their wealth than their poorer fellow-citizens. The poorest class was entirely free from taxation.

The next product of Solon's genius was the Council of 400. The free population of Attica was already divided into four tribes. Solon arranged that each tribe should elect a hundred of its number to serve on the council for a year; and to this office the members of the first three property classes were alone eligible. Into the hand of this council was given the real government of the state. It, or some portion of it, sat the whole year through. Home and foreign affairs, finance, and police were in its hands.

Two other institutions of the Athenian state yet remain

to be mentioned. **And** first we come to the general assembly of the people. Some such assembly there must always have been, even in the days of the monarchy and the undisputed sway of the nobles. We do not know of any changes in procedure that were introduced by Solon. But, since all offices were now elective, the actual importance of the popular assembly must very much have increased.

And lastly we must mention the revered Council of the Areopagus. There was no spot of Athenian soil more full of memories than the rocky hill of the Areopagus that almost joined the Acropolis upon its western slope. There the Amazons had encamped when they laid siege to the Acropolis; there Ares, the god of war, had been brought to trial by Poseidon, the god of the sea; there Orestes, charged with the murder of his mother Clytemnestra, had been acquitted by the vote of the goddess Athena. At the foot of the hill was the cave of the avenging furies. And on the rocky mass thus hallowed by legend had sat from time immemorial a council that watched over the state. Even before Solon the council had consisted of men who had held the office of the archonship. Those who entered the council retained their seat for life. No change in the method of appointment was made by Solon, but as election to the archonship was now by popular vote, it is clear that the character of the council was considerably altered. What precisely the duties of this council were is not known. But it is clear that **it** had the decision in certain cases, and especially in murder cases, and a general censorship over the whole **city**. **Our** modern world, with its complex life **and** large **populations**, knows nothing of this censorial **power**, **and can know nothing**. **But in the ancient world.**

where life was simpler and cities smaller, and where **the** priesthood had little influence on the general course of men's lives, such a censorial body was always found, and was probably highly beneficial. The members of the council are spoken of as "superintendents of good order and decency." It was their task to repress luxury, vice, and idleness; and their power of fine and censure was unlimited in this direction. Extravagance in dress or table, dissoluteness in life or language, would bring the guilty person before the bar of the council, to be punished either **by** a money fine or public disrepute. These two councils Solon regarded as the two anchors of the state. Riding on them, he says in his poems, the state would be less tossed by storms.

Enough has been said to show the general character of Solon's work. He established no democracy in the Greek sense of the word. He ministered to the passions and interests of no class. He endeavoured to fix and define the reciprocal duties and rights of the various sections of the population. His work did not last in its entirety. He did not succeed in blocking the way **for** tyranny; and when the tyranny was past, the rising tide of democracy soon swept the vessel away from the anchors that Solon had thrown out. But he had given to Greece an example of sympathy guided by reason and of conciliatory statesmanship such as she would not see again; and so great was his reputation even with those who deviated most from his principles that he was always claimed as **the** founder of the Athenian democracy.

The Tyranny at Athens.

If we look at Solon's work in the light of the contemporary history of Greece, we cannot (doubt that one of his

main objects was to ward off the tyranny that had, elsewhere in Greece, been reared up on popular discontent. In that object he failed. When he had finished his task he bound the Athenians by oath to make no changes for ten years, and then left Athens and journeyed in the East. The romantic stories that Herodotus connects with these travels, however little historical basis they may have, prove at least the loving veneration with which Solon's name was regarded. When he came back from his travels he found the disaster that he had tried to avert clearly imminent. The moderate nature of his reform had not satisfied either party: the poor had expected more; to the noble it seemed an outrage that one of their own class should have taken from them so much. The discontent had found a voice, and was organised into separate factions. The men of the hills, the men of the plain, and the men of the seashore, they are called by Herodotus. The men of the hills were the poor and revolutionary party; the men of the plain rich, and reactionary. The men of the seashore seem to have been moderate both in fortune and political aspirations. At the head of the hill faction stood Pisistratus, a man of high birth and some military renown. His attachment to the faction of the poorest could hardly be disinterested. To one who like Solon knew the history of other Greek states, it was clear that he intended to use the favour of the people to establish himself a tyrant. But Solon's eager denunciations were disregarded, and step by step Pisistratus mounted to power. "He contrived," says Herodotus (i. 59), "the following stratagem. He wounded himself and his mules, and then drove his chariot into the marketplace, professing to have just escaped an attack of his enemies, who had attempted

his life on his way into the country. He besought the people to assign him a guard to protect his person. . . . The Athenians, deceived by his story, appointed him a band of citizens to serve as a guard, who were to carry clubs and accompany him wherever he went. Thus strengthened, Pisistratus broke into revolt and seized the Acropolis, and in this way he acquired the sovereignty of Athens " (560). He was twice driven out, and twice, by arrangement and stratagem, he returned. The details of his career are interesting, but do not concern us here.

But the general features of his rule deserve to be considered. He preserved the outward forms of the Solonian constitution, as Caesar those of the Roman Republic, as Napoleon at first preserved the forms and phrases of the French Revolution. He assumed no regal display, but appeared in public as a simple citizen. He consented to be indicted before the Council of the Areopagus. He himself visited every part of the country, settling disputes and superintending improvements. Aristotle notes especially his "popular and kindly disposition." "He burdened the people," he tells us, "as little as possible, but always cultivated peace and kept them in all quietness." An income tax of five per cent. was levied from the three richest classes, but the poorest was doubtless exempt.

Liberty, of course, in the sense of self-government, had really disappeared. Meetings of the council and of the popular assembly could hardly conceal the fact that power rested on the body-guard that Pisistratus always kept round him. But after the manner of all great absolute rulers, Pisistratus tried to compensate for the loss of liberty by an increase in the splendour of the city both at home and abroad. If the parochial scale

of Greek politics will allow the comparison, he is like Louis XIV. during the early and splendid period of the rule of the Grand Monarch. Now for the first time Athens began to appear as the most beautiful city of the Greek world. Three great temples were begun, two were finished. The temple to Zeus was begun on so huge a scale that Greece never found time or money to complete it, and the task was reserved for the Roman Emperor Hadrian. By the Ilissus rose a temple to Apollo. On the Acropolis was built a temple to Athena Parthenos, the great temple of the tutelary goddess of Athens until the Parthenon of Pericles took its place. Some of the most interesting results of recent excavations on the Acropolis are statues and carved work belonging almost certainly to the earlier temple of Athena built by Pisistratus. The work, though crude, gives clear promise of the future glory of Athenian art. The artists employed in the work were brought to Athens from various places. Athens was already the artistic centre of Greece. But not alone with architecture was Athens made beautiful. The gods were honoured by religious services of increased magnificence, as well as by temples. The great Panathenaic festival received new splendour under the administration of Pisistratus. Once in every four years the solemn procession of the Athenian people, men and women, chariots and horsemen, went with splendid solemnity to give to the goddess Athena a newly woven scarlet garment, richly adorned with embroidery. Connected with the central act were athletic contests such as the Greek loved. With Pisistratus, too, begins the greatness of the Attic drama. Dramatic performances were, at first, religious services **in honour of Dionysus, the god of wine, and they never lost some**

trace of their religious origin. At first the performance was one of the utmost simplicity. A single actor recited some scene from the life of the god, the chorus sang and danced in honour of him. From that beginning, by allowing greater latitude of subject and more actors than one, was developed the great Attic drama, perhaps the greatest and certainly the most influential drama that the world has known. Delos, too, the great Ionian sanctuary of Apollo, was attended to. It had suffered pollution by the burial of bodies too near the temple. These were removed to a greater distance. Lastly a new recension of Homer was carried out under his superintendence. The very doubtful details of the procedure do not concern us. The fact only is of importance. Pisistratus had honoured the gods, he had built them temples, he had given splendour to their worship, he had published a " revised version " of the most sacred book of the Greek world. If Greece had had either a faith or a church, he would surely have been called the " eldest son of the church " and the " defender of the faith."

At the same time the material welfare of the people was attended to. Aqueducts were made and reservoirs ; roads were constructed. Every effort was made to prevent the country population from coming up to Athens. There is no need to see in every act of Pisistratus the anxiety of a tyrant to deceive his people, but clearly it was from the town population rather than from the scattered dwellers in the country that the tyrant would have opposition to fear. Abroad, too, Athens' reputation was increased by alliances with other tyrants, and by the conquest of Sigeum on the Hellespont. This last acquisition may be taken as marking the beginning of Athens' foreign empire.

In 527, after a beneficent and just rule, Pisistratus died, and, like any constitutional monarch, was succeeded by his sons Hippias and Hipparchus. The inheritor of wealth and power hardly ever uses them so circumspectly as he who first procured them. The sons of Pisistratus seem to have carried matters with a high hand, and seized not only the reality but also the appearance of power. Yet they carried on their father's patronage of art. It was Hippias, says Aristotle, who invited to Athens "Anacreon, Simonides, and the other poets." For fourteen years their rule lasted without open opposition; and when opposition came, it arose not from any concern for public liberty, but from private hatred. Harmodius and Aristogeiton in 514 attempted to murder the two tyrants on the day of the Panathenaic festival. Before the time for the attack had come they believed themselves betrayed, and at once attacked the tyrants. Hipparchus was cut down; Hippias escaped and revenged himself upon the murderers of his brother. Their motives in the attempt were purely personal, their failure was complete, the killing of Hipparchus had nothing to do with the subsequent destruction of the tyranny, and yet while Athens lasted they were honoured as the proto-martyrs of liberty, and the enthusiasts of the French Revolution dropped their own names and adopted those of the first tyrant-slayers. The immediate result of the conspiracy was to increase the harshness of the rule of the remaining brother. So his enemies increased in number, and his rivals saw that an attack might now be successful. Of his opponents the family of the Alcæonidae were the most important. They were one of the richest families of Athens, and produced many eminent men. It was from them that Pericles sprang.

They were now in exile, waiting on the confines of Attica with an exile's eagerness for return. Their opportunity came in a way that deserves some notice, even in this preliminary sketch. The temple at Delphi had just been burnt down. "The Alcmaeonidæ," says Herodotus, "contracted to build the temple which now stands at Delphi. Having done this, they proceeded, being men of great wealth and members of an ancient and distinguished family, to build the temple much more magnificently than the plan obliged them. Besides other improvements, instead of the coarse stone whereof, by the contract, the temple was to have been constructed, they made the facings of Parian marble. These same men during their stay at Delphi persuaded the Pythoness, by a bribe, to tell the Spartans, whenever any of them came to consult the oracle, either on their own private affairs or on the business of the state, that they must free Athens" (v. 62, 63). The task thus enjoined on them was not congenial to the policy of Sparta, for Hippias was a friend of the Spartan state. But this monotonous response, apparently excluding all others, amounted to something like the excommunication of the Spartan state from the central religious institution of Greece. After much hesitation, then, a Spartan army was marched into Attica, and Hippias was besieged in the Acropolis. The success of the siege seemed very doubtful, but the tyrant's children were captured as they were being sent out of the country. To rescue them Hippias abandoned Athens to the Spartans, and fled to Sigeum, in Asia Minor; and so the tyranny fell, never to be restored. The story of the expulsion shows us, in a striking way, the strength and the weakness of the oracle. It can force Sparta to an

expedition against **her** own interests, but it cannot resist a bribe.

The memory of the tyranny became abominable to the Athenians : the tyrant's statues were overthrown; his name was erased from public monuments; later, a fancied resemblance, to Pisistratus was used as a taunt against Pericles. But the modern student of Athenian history cannot feel the same hatred of the time of his rule. It broke the peaceful development of the Solonian constitution, and gave to the democracy an uncompromising character sometimes to be regretted. But benefits also accrued to Athens from the tyranny. How great was its service to art has already been shown. It must have tended to kill the factions, as the Norman rule broke down the Saxon factions in England. Not least of the benefits conferred, it implanted in Athens a never-effaced hatred of tyranny and love of freedom.

The Democratic Reforms of Clisthenes.

When Hippias had fallen, the course of Athens by no means ran smooth at first. Abroad she had the hostility of Sparta to face, for that state soon discovered how she had been duped by the oracle, and it was soon plain that Athens self-governed would be a much more dangerous rival than Athens in the hands of tyrants. How Sparta invaded Attica with a view to the re-establishment of the tyranny is in itself interesting, and reveals clearly the character of the policy of Sparta, but can find no place in this chapter. Of more permanent importance were the political conflicts that immediately developed in Athens herself. It was not yet at **all** plain in whose interests the tyranny had been destroyed. The family of the Alcmaeonidæ, who had played **the**

greatest part in the expulsion, were aristocrats. To many, and perhaps to them, the expulsion must have seemed a means towards the re-establishment of the privileges that had been cut down by Solon. The mass of the people desired to advance much further in the direction of democracy than Solon had allowed; whose ordinances had indeed, during the years of the tyranny, fallen into disuse. Those faction disputes that had led up to the tyranny of Pisistratus broke out again, but were attended with a different result. At the head of the Alcmaeonidae was Clisthenes. Of his past and his character we really know nothing. He was a nobleman of one of the greatest families of Athens; he had eaten the bread of exile during the rule of the Pisistratids, and doubtless came back to Athens full of ambition and thirst for power. He found himself a faction leader opposed to other leaders of factions; and in the struggle he was getting the worst. "Being defeated," says Herodotus, "he made friends with the people." We do not know how this friendship with the people brought them and him to victory.' That somehow or other under the guidance of Clisthenes a democratic victory was gained and democratic measures introduced is a certainty. As these measures gave to the democracy its chief features and were only developed by Pericles, they deserve consideration from us here.

First in order of importance comes the destruction for political purposes of the old tribes and the formation of new ones on an entirely new basis. While much is obscure on this subject, the main objects of the change are clear. The political influence of the aristocracy was destroyed, and a new class was introduced to the citizen-

ship. In modern phrase, the franchise was extended and aristocratic privilege was abolished. The four old tribes of immemorial antiquity, though they certainly included poor as well as rich, yet by the influence of tradition and probably of their organisation gave power into the hands of the Eupatrid nobles. While these tribes remained the units of political power—the constituencies we may almost call them, for each elected a hundred members to the Senate—it was in vain that democratic reforms were introduced. The tribes elected Eupatrids to office as naturally as a Scottish clan elected its chief. And further, seeing that membership of the tribes rested upon right of birth, it was impossible, while tribal membership alone conferred citizenship, to introduce to citizenship any large body of outsiders. And such a large body was to be found in Attica. Commerce had brought a merchant class ; for various reasons immigration into Attica had taken place. Here was a class of real value to the state and of the greatest value to an agitator. To include them in the state the old tribes must be entirely pushed aside for political purposes. The whole of Attica was already cut up into divisions called demes. They may be regarded as the "wards" of Attica, if the word, usually applied only to towns, can be extended to the country. "Parishes" would convey their nature still more closely, if we take from the word some of its religious meanings. The demes, then, were old divisions of Attica purely local in character, without any connection with particular aristocratic families or much organisation. These Clisthenes took as the basis for his new tribes. Either there were a hundred of them existing before Clisthenes' time, or by re-arrangement they were made into a hundred. Ten of these demes,

not contiguous, but taken from different parts of the country, were massed into a tribe. The ten tribes thus created were therefore without the local interest that might express itself against the general interest of the state, and would not supply any lever to the aristocracy whereby they might interfere with the now rapidly increasing democratic character of the state. These new tribes were to be the new political units, the new "constituencies" of Attica. From Delphi came approval of the new arrangement. The priestess herself chose the heroes who were to give their names to the various tribes. The old tribes still existed for religious and social purposes, but their political existence had ceased.

The real government, the central institution of the state, was, as we have already seen, the Council of 400, that owed its origin to Solon's activity. As that council consisted of a hundred members taken from each tribe, the new ordinances of Clisthenes necessarily led to some slight changes. Instead of four hundred it consisted henceforth of five hundred members, fifty taken from each of the ten tribes newly instituted by Clisthenes. And about this time, too, the order and method of the sittings of this council were further organised. But a consideration of these subjects will come more naturally when, in a subsequent chapter, we examine the Athenian democracy in the full development of the Periclean age. To that place, too, it is best to relegate some account and discussion of the system of election by lot, one of the most important and characteristic of the institutions of the Athenian democracy: noting here only that the lot was already employed in the time of Clisthenes.

There remains for consideration the institution of *ostracism*, which was introduced by Clisthenes at this period. The procedure was as follows. Every year the Athenian people were asked whether they wished to banish any one for the space of ten years. If in the public assembly a negative vote was given, as would usually be the case, nothing further was done in the matter. If the decision was in the affirmative, then a day was set apart for further proceedings. On that day the Athenian people were called together. Voting tablets, the "ostraka," from which the process takes its name, were distributed to them. No individual name was mentioned, no grounds for the taking of the vote were indicated. Without any guidance, without at any rate any official or open guidance, each citizen was asked to write on his voting tablet the name of any citizen, great or small, whose presence in the state seemed prejudicial to its best interests. No one need vote at all unless he liked. The voting tablets were then deposited in a great urn, and at the close of the day the proper officers scrutinised them and announced the result. If six thousand votes * had not been given, the whole proceeding remained without result; it was essential to the working of it that it should represent the opinion of a large section of the citizens. If the requisite number of votes had been given, then he who

* There is much doubt as to the number of votes necessary to a vote of ostracism. Must six thousand have voted against one individual, or was it merely necessary that six thousand votes in all should have been given? Grote holds the former view. Most historians since him have adopted the latter, and the weight of evidence seems to incline to their side. But is it consistent with the character of the democracy that perhaps a fifth of the whole **number of** citizens should be able to expel a popular politician?

had received most had to retire into honourable exile for the space of ten years. The vote carried with it no confiscation of property and no money fine. Absence from Attica and from all Athenian territory for the space of ten years was the only punishment that ostracism implied. But that punishment was greater than it sounds to modern ears; for to a Greek the life of a citizen was the only life worth living. To live as an alien in a foreign land was intolerable.

Such was the procedure. What was its meaning and its objects? When the measure was introduced, Athens had not long emerged from the tyranny of the Pisistratids. Hatred and fear of that tyranny was henceforth for some time the strongest motive in Athenian politics; just as for nearly a century after 1688 fear of a Roman Catholic regime was among the strongest influences on English politics. Pisistratus had gained power against the wishes of the Athenian people. Solon had warned them in vain. The suspicions of many had doubtless been aroused; but Pisistratus had made constant professions of good intentions, until he had obtained the body-guard that allowed him to dispense with guile in favour of force. Until the occupation of the Acropolis he had done nothing that would bring him within the reach of the law; the first steps in all usurpations are legal in form. Ostracism was introduced to give the Athenian people a legal means of acting on their suspicions before action was too late. Ostracism allowed the Athenian people to say to any prominent citizen, "We suspect your intentions: your life indeed shows no offence against the laws, but **your** conduct gives ground for suspicion. We ask **you, therefore, to** retire from Athens, that the confusion **your presence causes** may subside." A good citizen

might be expected to make such a sacrifice willingly; unwillingness would go some way to show that exile was deserved. If we wish, by a modern instance, to realise the circumstances under which ostracism was had recourse to, the career of General Boulanger is precisely analogous to the rise of a tyrant in Greece, such as ostracism was intended to prevent. Against General Boulanger no specific charge could be brought. That he wore a carnation and rode a black charger in a splendid uniform was not high treason. His vague and meaningless manifestoes betrayed the designs of a usurper, but were not actionable at law. But still the increasing majorities with which he or his candidates were returned showed how dangerously successful he had been in "making friends with the people." A procedure was therefore adopted which was confessedly unconstitutional, and the would-be usurper was, by special enactment, driven into exile. What in France was accomplished by a wrenching of the constitution of the most questionable kind, was done in Athens by a regular process of law, applicable to any person or by any party, which, because of its openness and legality, must have left comparatively little soreness behind.

Solon gave Athens a constitution with democratic features. Clisthenes introduced a real democracy. We have not yet arrived at the unbridled power of the popular assembly that we find in the Periclean era. **But** the bent of the whole constitution is in that direction, and within Athens herself there was no power that could resist that tendency. Monarchy was completely gone. Aristocracy and oligarchy were both overthrown, **after** having proved their incompetence to guide **the state**. **The few institutions that still limited the power of the**

people—mere surface-survivals after the root had been destroyed—were bound shortly to disappear.

NOTE.—Grote, Part II., chs. xi., xxx., xxxi. Curtius, Book II., ch. ii. Much is to be learned from Herodotus and something from Thucydides. Aristotle's newly discovered *Athenian Constitution* has settled some difficulties and raised others. I quote from the translation of F. G. Kenyon (George Bell & Sons). Plutarch's *Life of Solon* is one of his most interesting biographies, and historically valuable on account of the great number of authorities from whom he quotes.



VIEW OF THE PLAIN FROM THE AREOPAGUS.

* The temple on the right is the Theseum. The ruins on the Areopagus have no significance for the classical period.



TEMPLE OF ZEUS OLYMPIUS.*

CHAPTER V.

THE RIVALRY OF ATHENS AND SPARTA.

SOLON, Pisistratus, Clisthenes, are the chief names in the constitutional development of Athens up to the time of Pericles. But in the making of Greece there were influences other than political or constitutional. The influence of religion has already been dwelt on. Another most important influence was that of the Persian war.

All account of this great struggle is necessarily excluded by the scope of this book; but some mention of its results must be included. Of all wars in history, few has been so wholly fertile in beneficent results as this. To prove this there is no necessity to underrate the many high qualities of the Persians, and the excellencies of their state. It is enough to say that in the struggle

* Mount Lycabettus at the back of the temple; the river Ilissus in the foreground.

there was a real danger of the stifling of European civilisation in its cradle. To our era the idea of the overthrow of civilisation by barbarism is an entirely incredible one, because its basis extends over three continents and more, and the resources of science seem to have given to peoples of high intellectual development a necessary superiority over peoples less advanced. We see without any astonishment at all a regiment with modern drilling and modern arms of precision overthrow with enormous slaughter a horde of courageous barbarians unpossessed of scientific weapons and training. But science and gunpowder have given a military superiority to civilisation over barbarism that finds no parallel in the fifth century B.C. There were many instances where nations, once restless and victorious, growing into habits of settled life fell a prey to wilder tribes. The high state of civilisation in Greece might seem rather a danger than an assistance. And she found herself attacked at the same time both upon the east and the west by forces far surpassing her own in numerical strength and hitherto almost unbeaten. If Greece had succumbed in that struggle with a barbarian power, the stream of civilisation would have been choked at its source. Doubtless it would have begun again elsewhere, but how great must have been the loss to mankind if the wealth of Greek science, art, and philosophy had been lost!—how impossible is it to believe that any other nation could have made such contributions to the beauty and knowledge of the world!

It was not altogether the qualities of the Greeks that saved them. Persia attacked them when she was beyond the zenith of her development, when the great conqueror¹

who founded the Persian Empire had been succeeded by a voluptuary. How different must the course of affairs have been, whatever the final issue, if a Cyrus or a Darius, instead of a Xerxes, had commanded the expedition against Greece!

When the great attack from the East was visibly impending over that collection of small states that we call Greece, all was confusion and disorder. The jealousies of Argos and Sparta, of Thebes and Athens, and other similar jealousies elsewhere, made resistance by united Greece impossible. If the oracle at Delphi had boldly championed the national defence, the effect upon the wars and upon its own future influence could not have failed to be great. But the oracle gave answers sometimes ambiguous, sometimes directly counselling submission and despair. In this crisis, putting aside for the present the vices and follies of the Persians, Greece was saved mainly by two influences. In the first place, the character of Sparta had given her such pre-eminence in Greece that no state felt itself insulted by having to follow her leadership. And in the second place, at this crisis Athens displayed an absence of petty vanity, and a Panhellenic patriotism, rarely met with in any Greek state, along with an activity and clear-sightedness of the most remarkable kind. It was the supremacy of Sparta which gave to Greece the very moderate amount of unity that she showed during the contest; but in every instance it was from Athens that the ablest leaders and the best ideas came.

And thus Greece weathered the storm. Athens had borne the brunt of the first attack in 490, and alone, save for the not very important help rendered by Plataea, had fought the battle of Marathon. In 480 and 479,

though Argos, Thebes, Thessaly, and others stood sullenly aloof, most of the Greek states followed the leadership of Sparta, and were represented in the glorious struggles of Thermopylæ, Salamis (480), Plataea, and Mycale (479). With these last battles Greece emerged victoriously from the contest. The former terror of the Persian arms passed into contempt, and though between East and West there was constant friction until the time when, a hundred and fifty years later, Alexander the Great broke up the Persian Empire, never again did Persia seem at all likely to overwhelm Greek civilisation. The Persian wars, by their result, allowed the Greek world freely to bequeath its inheritance of art, science, and thought to later centuries. That is the great significance of the struggle.

But its influence upon the internal politics of Greece was also great and important. During its course Athens had risen from a subordinate position, not indeed to be the leader of the Greek states, for Sparta was that still, but to be recognised as the most enterprising and active state. She had drawn all men's eyes upon herself. And next the wars had shown, as had never been shown before, the need for unity in Greece. If we follow the course of the wars, we see how slight were the bonds that held the Greek states together, how well founded were the hopes of the Persians that they would be able by bribes to seduce most of them from the national defence. In 480 B.C. the congress of the patriot states at the Isthmus had sworn to take vengeance upon all states that had joined the side of the Persians except under clear compulsion. The oath emphasised the hitherto unrecognised duty of Panhellenic patriotism, but it did nothing for the establishment of any union. But at

Plataea, when the Persians had fought and lost their last battle upon the Greek mainland, and the Greeks for the first time were relieved from the pressure of immediate danger, it was determined to do something to form a national alliance. It is of the utmost importance to mark what was done. It forms the starting-point of the international politics of Greece in the age of Pericles. After the Persians had been defeated and their camp stormed, it was determined to do something in memory of the victory achieved. The oracle of Delphi presided over the work. Thence fire was brought to light again the fires that had been put out because they were regarded as polluted by the Persian occupation. A special altar was built to Zeus Eleutherius (the giver of freedom). An athletic festival, to take place every four years, was established in memory of the battle. Plataea was declared a sacred city, much after the fashion of Olympia. To those who had died in the battle yearly public honours were decreed, and the city of Plataea was entrusted with the duty of seeing that these honours were paid. Down to the first century after Christ, the chief magistrate of the state went once in every year to the monuments of the dead, and drank "to the men who died for the freedom of the Greeks." And further, upon the proposal of the Athenian Aristides, it was determined that commissioners from all the states should meet at Plataea every year, and that a force of ten thousand infantry, one thousand horse, and one hundred ships should be always kept in readiness for action against the Persians. This was not the formation of a league of all the Greek states in any workable shape. But it was a beginning that might have grown to something of great importance. A common standing army had been, at any rate in theory,

established; meetings that might have grown into a federal council of Greece had been begun : the great and successful war, calling out as it did all that was best in Greece, had given an impetus in the direction of union such as Greece had never known before. For a very brief period Greece, except for the few recalcitrant states, who were now disgraced and anxious to creep back to the patriotic side, was a united whole under the headship of Sparta. But there were several causes that made the continuation of this state of things as difficult as it was desirable. The idea of obedience to a common leader was contrary to the international morality of the Greeks. No state could well be imagined less capable of guiding a confederacy than Sparta; she lacked entirely the necessary initiative and conciliatory spirit. And, lastly, Athens was not likely to accept a subordinate role in the confederacy with ready submission. It would have needed the constant pressure of a Persian war to bring about a really stable union of the Greek states.

The First Differences between Athens and Sparta.

The impossibility of these two great states working together was not long in showing itself. Immediately after the battle of Mycale, a difficult problem had to be faced, and the divergent proposals put forward by Athens and Sparta showed how difficult it would be to remain in harmony. Though the Persians had been so decisively beaten, they were still masters upon the mainland. Greek states there still yielded submission to Persian masters. With the revolt of Ionia the Persian wars had begun, and until that revolt was successful the defeat of the Persians was **not** complete. And now the Ionian states, chiefly

those of the islands adjoining the mainland, asked to be admitted into the anti-Persian league, whereby of course the league would pledge itself to continue the contest until they were free. From this responsibility the Spartans shrank. How could a state, whose citizens by the letter of the constitution might not leave Sparta without special permission, contemplate a constant interference in the affairs of the eastern shore of the Ægean ? They proposed instead that those Greeks of the mainland who had taken the side of the Persians in the war should be expelled from their territory, and that it should be granted to the Ionian Greeks, who would then transport themselves thither with all their belongings. Such transportations of populations were not uncommon in the East, and the proposal would not seem so impossible as it does to us. But the Ionians resisted; the actual soil of a country, with its deities and memories, was dear to a Greek. And Athens joined in their protest. As head of the Ionian race, she regarded herself as specially responsible for them. In face of this double protest Sparta yielded. " Hereupon the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders were received into the league of the allies, and took the oaths binding themselves to be faithful and not to desert the common cause " (Herodotus ix. 106). Henceforth it is plain that Athens would be more popular than Sparta with the Ionian Greeks, but the headship of Sparta was nominally continued (479). The fleet then sailed on to the Hellespont, and after a long and tedious siege expelled the Persians from Sestos.

Meanwhile the Athenians could devote all their energies to their land, twice wasted by the fire and sword of the Persians. Private houses and the temples of the gods were all in ruins. The crops probably were scanty, for

the great year 479 can have given them little leisure for agricultural duties. But before temples or houses or crops could be attended to, a more pressing need had to be met. Before they could throw their energies into building houses, they must feel secure that what they built would be safe from invasion and overthrow. To fortify Athens was the first thing, and to this task Themistocles, the ablest statesman of the time, devoted all his energies. He it was who had seen the invasion of Xerxes before it came, and had induced the Athenians to prepare a navy to fight an enemy who, on the occasion of their first expedition, had been defeated on land. Through the year 480 he had constantly taken the lead. Even though romance has lent its colours to his cunning and foresight, we must own that probably neither Artemisium nor Salamis would have been fought had it not been for him. "From his own native acuteness," says Thucydides, "and without any study either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future." He it was who now urged upon the Athenians to build the fortifications on an extended scale. It marks well the chronic hostilities of these Greek states that this defence, which could only be intended against Greek enemies, should have been the first thought of a great statesman. And his anxiety in the matter was quite justified by the difficulties that were thrown in the way. Sparta had seen with jealous eyes the rise of the Athenian navy, her vigour in the struggle with Persia, her popularity in the Ægean Sea. If Athens was fortified, she would quickly take up an attitude independent of Sparta. Yet force could not, in the first

instance, be used against an ally. It was on the ground of patriotism that Sparta made her protest against the fortifications. If the Persian came again, she said, he might find in a fortified Athens, if once victorious against her, the same sort of support, but greater, that he had found in Thebes in 480. Athens should rather pull down her own walls, and force every other state outside the Peloponnese to do the same. The danger of such a request, which might easily be backed by an armed force, was as apparent as the jealousy that had prompted it. The situation required careful handling, but Themistocles had recourse to the "lie direct," with a frankness that would have startled Machiavelli. The method adopted can best be told in the words of Thucydides (i. 90): "The Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that they would send an embassy to discuss the matter, and so got rid of the Spartan envoys. He then proposed that he should himself start at once for Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who were not to go immediately, but were to wait until the wall had reached the lowest height which could possibly be defended. The whole people, men, women, and children, should join in the work, and they must spare no building, public or private, which could be of use, but demolish them all. Having given these instructions, and intimated that he would manage affairs at Sparta, he departed. On his arrival he did not at once present himself officially to the magistrates, but delayed and made excuses, and when any of them asked him 'why he did not appear before the assembly,' he said 'that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained by some engagement; he was daily expecting them, and wondered that they had not appeared.' The friendship of the magistrates for The-

mistocles induced them to believe him, but when everybody who came from Athens declared positively that the wall was building, and had already reached a considerable height, they knew not what to think. He, aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could trust out of their own number, who would see for themselves and bring back word. They agreed; and he, at the same time, privately instructed the Athenians to detain the envoys as quietly as they could, and not let them go until he and his colleagues had got safely home. For, by this time, those who were joined with him in the embassy had arrived, bringing the news that the wall was of sufficient height, and he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not allow them to return. So the Athenians detained the envoys, and Themistocles, coining before the Lacedaemonians, at length declared, in so many words, that Athens was now provided with walls and would protect her citizens; henceforward, if the Lacedaemonians wished at any time to negotiate, they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well what was best for their own and the common good" (478).

"It is of great consequence," says Machiavelli, "that a statesman should disguise his inclination and play the hypocrite well." The *coup* of Themistocles was a great success. Sparta could not openly quarrel just then. She had to pretend that her motives had been misjudged. But certainly the relations between Athens and Sparta **had** suffered a severe strain. The proceeding was quite incompatible with any genuine acceptance of the headship of Athens on the part of Sparta. **And** soon **the strained bond** was wholly rent in sunder.

The Treason of Pausanias and the Transference of the Naval Leadership to Athens.

When, in 477, the struggle with Persia was resumed, Sparta led the armament, and Pausanias, King of Sparta, was appointed to command the united navies. He had, during the year 479, by virtue of his official position as King of Sparta, rather than by any striking ability, become the most prominent figure in the struggle of Greece against Persia. He commanded the united forces at the battle of Plataea, and though the accounts we have of the battle do not allow us to ascribe the victory to him *in any way*, it drew for a time the eyes of all Greece upon him. In a manner characteristic of Spartans, he became intoxicated with success. He began to regard himself as the master of Greece rather than as her chosen leader. When a golden tripod was dedicated from the spoils of Plataea to Apollo at Delphi, he had only his own name inscribed upon it. When it was erased and the names of the states who had taken part in the battle substituted, he must have felt himself personally insulted. He already knew how wholly different was the position of a Persian general; he, at any rate, was not expected to be most obedient because he held highest command. Probably very soon after the battle of Plataea he began to dream of exchanging his irksome position as leader of the Spartans for the splendour and freedom of a vassal of the great king. As commander of the allied Greek fleet he came to drive the Persians out from the Hellespont and Bosphorus. He took Byzantium, and found among the prisoners many friends of the King of Persia. Here was an avenue through which he could open up those treasonable com-

munications with Persia of which he had long dreamed. He allowed the prisoners to escape, and sent to the king a letter claiming his gratitude for the service thus rendered. "I propose," said the letter, if Thucydides has quoted it aright, "to marry your daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your command." Xerxes accepted his offer with delight, and sent down an officer to the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus in order to co-operate with him. All this was not known to the Greeks, and perhaps not suspected. But its results upon the proceedings of Pausanias were plain enough. Already he acted as though he were in possession of that power at which he aimed. He surrounded himself with a foreign body-guard; the monogamy of the Greeks was openly discarded for the harem system of the Persians; the soldiers of the various Greek contingents were treated as slaves, flogged and subjected to non-Hellenic punishments. The allies contrasted the haughty brutality of Pausanias with the courtesy and humanity of the Athenians, whose leader Aristides had deserved his reputation for complete impartiality. The leaders of the allied armaments approached the Athenians, and proposed that they should undertake the leadership of the fleet in place of the Spartans. The purest Panhellenic patriotism might have rejected the proposal. But the removal of the pressure of the Persian war had allowed the egoistic state ambitions to emerge once more, and posterity cannot blame Athens if she accepted a position for which she felt herself fitted. A complete rupture between Sparta and the allies took place immediately, and the Athenian captains accepted, on behalf of their state, the proffered leadership. When news of all this reached Sparta, Pausanias was immediately recalled, and with

him went all the Spartan contingent. **On his arrival** in Sparta his conduct was inquired into, but nothing definite could be proved against him to the satisfaction of his judges. He remained therefore at liberty in Sparta, and continued his treasonable communications with Persia. But the suspicion against him was strong enough to prevent the Spartans from appointing him to the post of command in the allied fleet. Dorcis was appointed in his place, and sent out to the Hellespont.

But the complexion of affairs there had altered considerably. The Athenians had had time to settle into their new position, and showed no inclination to move from it. The Spartans found that they must subordinate themselves to Athens, or retire altogether from the alliance. They chose the latter course, and sailed back to Sparta. No Spartan commander was ever appointed again, and the leadership of Athens remained without challenge.

At the time the great importance of the event was **not** seen. The Spartans, not altogether unwillingly, retired from the responsibilities of leadership. "They preferred," says Plutarch, "to see their citizens sober and law-abiding than to rule over the whole of Greece." And Thucydides represents them as acquiescing in the position of the Athenians with no fears for the future. Yet the crisis, viewed in the light of succeeding events, is one of great importance. The Greek tendency to state isolation, checked for a moment by the pressure of the Persian war, begins again. The possibilities of the Platæan league are at an end. The religious and athletic festival there established went on yet for centuries; **but** the annual meeting **of** representatives, **the common**

standing army, the standard of Panhellenic patriotism—these had vanished for ever. What Grote calls "the bifurcation of Greek politics" had begun. In place of the one general league that we see after the Persian war, there were soon two leagues,—one of the states on the central mainland of Greece, led by Sparta; one of island and Asiatic states, first led and then governed by Athens. Between these two confederacies there is at first, if much jealousy, no open hostility. But then the rivalry increases in openness and bitterness, until it ends in the suicidal Peloponnesian war. The intricate details of the following period are best appreciated if we regard them as stages in the progress of Greece from the unity of 479 to the complete disruption that follows the Peloponnesian war of 431.

The sequel of Pausanias* career hardly concerns us here. It deserves mention, however, as one instance of the many treasons that Hellas, even in her best period, produced. From Sparta he still communicated with Persia. The authorities suspected him, but could not prove their suspicions. It was rumoured that he entertained a design worse than all his Persian intrigues—a design, namely, to raise the Helots against Sparta. A rising of the Helots was the Damocles' sword that always hung over the head of Sparta. They were only kept in subjection by organising a reign of terror amongst them. If they found a champion among the Spartans themselves, the whole state might very possibly disappear amid the waves of their rising. But at last the authorities got evidence to support their suspicions. I must refer the reader to Thucydides I. 128-134 for the most interesting narrative of the discovery of Pausanias' guilt; **most interesting as** being one of **the few** occasions when

we are allowed to see into the streets of Sparta with the clearness with which we constantly survey Athens. How Pausanias' slave betrayed his message to the Ephors, and how Pausanias, taking refuge in a temple, was starved to death, is there described at length. The career of Pausanias shows, if further proof were needed, how wholly incapable Sparta and Spartan institutions were of undertaking the guidance of a united Greece (468).

Themistocles in the Peloponnese.

"The death of Pausanias," says a modern historian of Greece, "was no loss either to Greece or Sparta." But it exhibited to all Hellas the failure of Sparta to ensure those qualities in her chief men that she so vigorously tried to implant in all her citizens. About the time of Pausanias' death the prestige of Sparta seemed rapidly declining. United Hellas no longer recognised her as leader. In the Peloponnese she was no longer the unquestioned mistress that she had been for so long. Even by the banks of the Eurotas she trembled before the possibility of a Helot rising. The movement that Pausanias had set on foot had not died with his death; for some time after certain Helots found it necessary to take sanctuary in the temple of Poseidon at Mount Tænarus. The fear and hatred of the Spartans made them overstep their religious scruples so far as to tear them from the altar and murder them.

And about three years before the death of Pausanias there had arrived in the Peloponnese a most dangerous opponent; for, probably in the year 471 B.C., Themistocles had been ostracised from Athens. All the causes of this event, whereby the saviour of Greece found

himself an exile from his own country, are doubtful, and do not deserve discussion here. So violent an ambition as that of Themistocles was sure to give offence in Athens. He had many enemies. Causes of unpopularity would not be wanting, and a full acquaintance with the characteristics of the Athenian state does not allow us to feel much surprise when we see him driven into temporary exile.

It is not impossible that he might have taken refuge in Sparta, had it not been for the enmity of that state to himself since the affair of the Athenian walls. To that enmity his expulsion may have been partly due; for Spartan influence told a good deal upon a certain section of the citizens of Athens. Themistocles turned then to Argos, humiliated by the arms of Sparta, discredited in the eyes of Greece by the part she had played in the Persian wars, compelled to see Mycenae and Tiryns in independent positions almost at her gates. The latter city was held against her by her own revolted slaves. The subsequent rehabilitation of Argos with the contemporary anti-Spartan movements in the north of the Peloponnese can without question be in part ascribed to the restless spirit of Themistocles. Mycenae was taken by Argos after a long siege, and entirely destroyed. Tiryns succumbed with less resistance. The whole valley of the Inachus was in Argive hands again, and Sparta's old rival again rose in dangerous strength upon her flank. Movements in Arcadia that endangered the Spartan position in an equal degree may also without much doubt be ascribed to the frequent journeys of Themistocles into that region, of which Thucydides tells us. All the mountain cantons with the exception of Mantinea joined in an attack on Sparta (468 ?). The danger was

really great. The Spartans were vastly outnumbered, but their drill and morale brought them through victoriously. But the prestige of Sparta was thereby only slightly increased, and Themistocles was still an enemy and still in Argos. On the top of these disasters came the disgrace connected with the death of Pausanias.

The overthrow of Pausanias brought some relief to them, for in his fall he pulled down Themistocles. The Spartans alleged that among the papers of Pausanias documents had been found which implicated Themistocles in his treason. Upon this charge he was indicted before the Athenian assembly for high treason. His ostracism prevented him from making any personal defence, and the verdict went against him. The punishment for treason was death, with entire confiscation of property, accompanied by every circumstance of ignominy. A joint force of Athenians and Spartans attempted to arrest him in Argos. He fled from there, and was hotly pursued. His future career, with its romance of fact or fiction, does not directly concern us who are studying Greece in the age of Pericles. After a flight which took him to Corcyra, to Epirus, to Pydna, and thence across the *Ægean* Sea to the coast of Asia Minor, the hero of Salamis, in a famous letter, threw himself upon the protection of Artaxerxes, the King of Persia: "I, Themistocles, have come to you; I, who of all Greeks did your house the greatest injury, so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father." He learnt the Persian language, and then had a personal interview with the Persian king. The king received him with delight, gave him a rich pension, and urged him to prosecute his designs against Greece; but he died before anything was done. The circumstance and manner of his death **were**

enveloped in legend before fifty years were passed—evidence of the impression he had made on the imagination of Greece. His genius is written on a great page of Greek history. The Persian war had given him the opening that his restless and undisciplined activity demanded. But when the crisis was over, Greece could provide him with no suitable career. The small scale of her politics gave no constitutional scope to an ambition such as his. His exile's death in Asia Minor was the result not only of his own restless and unscrupulous ambition, but also of the incapacity of Greece to make proper use of her greatest men. And Themistocles has in this respect many parallels.

Complete Rupture between Athens and Sparta.

Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B.C., Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens, on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival.

By what steps Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and changing her position from that of a president to that of an absolute ruler, will be explained at some length hereafter. She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon. In the domain of action Athens produced no nobler son than this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and by heredity and inclination took his stand

with the conservative party in Athens. He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he possessed all that statesman's purity of character. If there ever had been any opposition on the side of the conservative party in Athens to the development of her naval strength, that had all disappeared. It was as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting Athens. His character and personality were eminently attractive. It is characteristic of the Athenian state that his personal beauty should have counted for something in securing him support. He was very wealthy, and possessed large gardens in Athens, which he threw open to all the citizens.

Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck Persia blow on blow. The details unfortunately are either lost to us entirely or narrated by later authors with so much romantic colouring as to be quite untrustworthy. But it is plain that Persia received in the Levant a blow as crushing as Salamis or Mycale. In 466, near the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, the Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It was long before Persian influence counted for anything again on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of Themistocles.

Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it was ever to possess. Ephialtes was, indeed, its recognised chief, but Pericles was already beginning to display his power to win adherents. He was about thirty years of age. His birth, therefore, was three or four years before the battle of Marathon. He was some fifteen years of age when Xerxes' expedition came and went, and doubtless on his mind, maturing more rapidly under the stress of such events even than is usual in the warm south, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale had made a deep impression. He was related to great families through both father and mother, and to great families that had championed the democratic side. His father Xanthippus had prosecuted Miltiades, the father of Cimon, and his mother was the niece of that Clisthenes who was the real founder of the untempered Athenian democracy. Of his personality and opinions some further account will be given in a future chapter. Here it is enough to say that, though we may not yet regard him as the recognised leader of the people that he afterwards became, his great talents, both for speech and action, already marked him out for a great career in the near future. To lead the party of advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had hereditary hostility.

The first instance we have of such an attack is with reference to the expedition against Thasos that had been led by Cimon. The quarrel with this island had arisen out of a dispute concerning the mines upon the mainland **of Thrace opposite**. Athens **had** recently planted a

colony upon the Strymon, and now demanded some share in the neighbouring mines, to the detriment of the interests of Thasos. The friction between Athens and her allies was already considerable; the difficulty about the mines led to an immediate rebellion. Thasos was at once blockaded by the Athenian fleet, and after a resistance of two years was compelled to accept the terms of complete submission that were imposed by Athens (463).

Cimon returned victoriously from his expedition, and his return was the occasion for the first public appearance of Pericles of which we have any knowledge. He charged Cimon with having accepted bribes from Alexander, the Macedonian king, to abstain from making conquests on the mainland opposite to Thasos. The charge was sufficiently ridiculous by reason of Cimon's wealth and character, and he was acquitted. But soon another contest took place between these rivals on a greater issue.

When in 465 Thasos rebelled from Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of, but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos. Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made. **But** before they could fulfil their promise their own city was

overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. We never get that full vision of Spartan that we do of Athenian affairs, and the details of this catastrophe are far from certain. But we are told that nearly all the houses were destroyed. Only five houses were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. He was the "earth-shaker," and not long before Helots who had taken refuge in his temple had been dragged out and slaughtered. The Helots seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta. Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia, and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the natural Acropolis of that district. If the Periæci had risen Sparta's sun would have set for ever. Fortunately the majority of them stood firm, and Sparta had time to breathe (464).

But the danger was very great. Aeimnestus, a Spartan general of great renown, with three hundred Spartans, was defeated and slain and his force annihilated. Afterwards the Helots were no longer able to withstand the Spartans in the open field, but they held out behind the fortifications of Ithome, and all the efforts of their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to dislodge

them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her ally, she appealed to Athens.

Should the help be granted? On that point there was great difference of opinion and keen dispute at Athens. Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his strength. He appealed to the Athenians not to allow Greece to go lame on one foot, not to deprive their own city of her natural yoke-fellow. Cimon regarded the Spartans not as competitors for exclusive supremacy in Greece, but as fellow-labourers for the common good of Greece. The Athenian and Spartan ideals of statesmanship and life he conceived of, not as exclusive but as complementary; and we, with our fuller experience and knowledge of what was yet in store for Greece, must partially share his appreciation of Sparta and altogether admire the generosity of his political ideal. To stifle the state jealousies of Greece, to gain a broader basis for political and military action, that we clearly see was the one thing needful for the practical life of Greece.

But there was much to be said on the other side, and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles. The whole of Pericles' foreign policy is founded on the assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at opposite poles of thought. Athens represented democracy, Sparta oligarchy; and these were principles that could not exist tranquilly side by side. If Sparta were victorious and strong she would try to spread oligarchical principles; Athens under similar circumstances would try to establish democracies among her neighbours. How little capable Sparta was of loyal co-operation with Athens had been

shown immediately after the Persian war, before Athens had risen to her present power; and we have to admit the impossibility of any voluntary union between Athens and Sparta giving to Greece the strength that she would require if she were to continue an independent existence.

Cimon gained the vote of the people. He went at once with a force of four thousand heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges; but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once returned to Athens. The entire failure of his expedition in conciliating Sparta, and the insult that it had brought upon the Athenian state, must have decreased his popularity. And on his return he still opposed those complete democratic changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded. The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to retire into exile (461). Never was a vote of ostracism less justifiable. Cimon sought after no tyranny, and throughout his whole career is an upright and patriotic citizen. His ostracism doubtless allowed the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget Sparta's insult.

In 461 she renounced the alliance with her that had existed since the Persian wars ; and that this rupture did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta. Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming.

NOTE.—The references to Grote and Curtius can easily be found. For the Persian war Herodotus is the one great authority. But Plutarch's *Lives of Themistocles and Aristides* are also of great interest and value. For the later rivalry of Athens with Sparta his *Life of Cimon* is especially valuable. For the formation of the Athenian confederacy see especially Grote, chs. xlv., xlv. The early chapters of the first book of Thucydides are the most important **original authority for** the civil wars that now begin.



ACRO CORINTHUS.

CHAPTER VI.

CIVIL WARS IN GREECE.

IT is necessary now to give some account of the wars that broke out in Greece through the quarrel of Athens and Sparta. But the briefest account must suffice ; **for** the wars themselves are tedious in the extreme, and without any importance for universal history. The military and political history of Greece is indeed, as **a** rule, abortive. It leads us nowhere. In reading Roman history we feel the great importance of battles and constitutional changes; as we look at them we see the stream of the progress of the world widening and taking shape. But in the wars and politics of Greece it is very different. The Persian war did indeed save European civilisation, and deserves the highest gratitude of posterity ; but the wars that follow are a confused mêlée **that** lead nowhere and settle nothing.

And yet they have a negative significance of a good deal of importance. They give us clear proof of the failure of Greece in political and military organisation. The great need of the time was to secure a basis of order sufficiently wide and firm for the development and security of that civilisation which, upon the intellectual side, Greece had so worthily begun. For the present, the fortunes of civilisation were committed to her; it remained to be seen whether she would be strong enough to protect them. For this purpose some power larger than any individual city state, and more coherent than the union that had existed during the Persian war, was necessary. And this might come to pass either by some federal union such as we see a glimmering of during the Persian war, or through the rise of one of the existing states into supremacy over the others. Whether the first could, at this period of the world's history, have made a sufficiently strong government may be doubted; and certainly the rival vanities and fierce commercial jealousies of Greece made such a federal union impossible. And the wars at which we are now going to glance seem to prove that of the two great powers of Greece, Sparta lacked the initiative and Athens the solidity that were necessary for conquest.

The affair of Ithome had ended, as we have seen, in the definite rupture of those weak bonds that still held Athens and Sparta as allies together. A policy clearly anti-Spartan in its character was at once adopted by Athens. The alliance with Argos and Thessaly clearly implied hostility to Sparta, and the alliance with Megara that followed was even more important. For Megara possessed territory of great strategic importance. The mountain mass of Geraneia, filling up the Isthmus from

side to side, and commanding it far more really than Corinth did, was wholly within her territory. Whilst Megara was an ally of Sparta Athens was always liable to invasion. If Geraneia was in the hands of Athens' friends, she could feel tolerably secure. Just at this time between Corinth and Megara the hostility which in Greece was the normal relation between neighbours was embittered by some dispute about boundaries. Corinth was the stronger state, and Megara appealed to Sparta as her natural protector, for she was a member of the Spartan Alliance. But the Helot rising, either still continuing or just recently subdued, left Sparta in no humour for interference in any foreign affairs, and Megara in her distress turned to Athens. She, in her present mood, thought no responsibilities and dangers too great for the sake of glory and the extension of rule. Besides, in the present instance, the actual advantages offered, strategic and commercial, were so great, that there was no room for hesitation. An alliance with Megara was concluded, and that meant war with Corinth, the ally of Sparta (461).

This struggle in itself might seem to demand all the energies of Athens. But besides this she was all the time engaged in the war with Persia, which just at this moment entered on a very important stage. For Egypt had rebelled against Persia. Since the war with Greece the Persian king had laid upon Egypt heavier taxes than before, and the result of that war gave his subjects courage to rebel. It was Inarus, the King of Libya, who first raised the standard of a revolt which soon spread through nearly the whole of Egypt. But when, in 460, he knew that the Persian army was marching against him, he found that his own forces would not avail to resist the

attack, and appealed to Athens, as head of the Delian League. If Egypt were torn from Persia, her fleet would be annihilated, and she would suffer as severe a blow as she had received during the expedition against Greece. Athens therefore gave vigorous help; two hundred triremes were at this time engaged in an expedition against Cyprus, and these were despatched to Egypt to assist Inarus. We know, unfortunately, very little about the course of this interesting war, and almost nothing in detail. We know, however, that the Athenians and their Egyptian allies were at first brilliantly successful. The Persian fleet was again destroyed; the Persian army was defeated and its leader killed. It seemed as though Egypt would cease to be a portion of the dominions of Persia. But even if these high hopes had been fulfilled, Athens was still using in Egypt troops that were badly needed in the really more important war at home.

Still, even without these troops Athens was surprisingly successful in that war. Sparta as yet took no part in it, being either still occupied with the revolted Helots or not yet recovered from the exhaustion consequent on that revolt; for the date of the submission of the Helots is not certain. But soon Athens, with Argos, Thessaly, and Megara as her allies, was pitted against Corinth and Ægina, for that island had thrown in her lot with the enemy. Athens was not uniformly successful; yet, on the whole, victory crowned her arms in the most surprising way. The allied fleet of the enemy was defeated (at Cecryphaleia, 458 B.C.). The Æginetan fleet was destroyed and the island blockaded, and so hard was the siege pressed that clearly submission was only a matter of time. The Corinthians possessed no navy whereby they might succour Ægina, but they hoped that an attack

on Megara might draw off some of the blockading forces, for Athens was depleted of men by the blockade and the expedition to Egypt. The territory of Megara was therefore invaded; but the Corinthians had underestimated the tenacity of their opponents, for Athens met the difficulty without calling off a single man from Ægina. All those who remained in the city, as being either too young or too old for the dangerous expedition that had been sent across the seas, were led out by Myronides, a veteran of the Persian war. An engagement took place in which both sides claimed the victory, but the Corinthians retired from the field of battle and allowed the Athenians to erect the trophy. On their return home, however, the Corinthians had to face the scorn of their fellow-townsmen for having failed to defeat an army of boys and greybeards, and therefore went to try their fortunes again after an interval of twelve days. But this time the Athenians gained a complete victory, and the Corinthian army was driven in disorder back to their own territory. A considerable portion of the army lost its way and entered by mistake a field surrounded by a great ditch except at the narrow entrance. The Athenians discovered their mistake, surrounded the place with troops, and killed their now defenceless opponents to the last man (458).

At home meanwhile the Athenians were taking a step that increased their strength more than many battles. Themistocles had been the first to insist that the real strength of Athens lay in the wooden walls of her ships. He would have preferred, we are told, that the city should be abandoned altogether and the Piræus adopted as the capital; but since that could not be, he had induced them to fortify the Piræus as strongly as Athens herself.

Since then more and more had Athens developed into a maritime power. Soon she would dare to claim equality with Sparta, even on land; but it was on the sea that her superiority was incontestable. To unite her more closely with the sea was the desire of the democratic leader. At present, however invincible her fleets might be, it was possible for a superior land force to enter Attica and starve her to submission. It was impossible to abandon Athens and the Acropolis with all their religious associations and memories, but might it not be possible to join Athens to the Piræus and the sea by lines of fortified walls? They would require to be of a magnitude quite unparalleled in Greece. It was four and a half miles to the Piræus. To build nine miles of wall impregnable to the siege apparatus of the time was a task not to be lightly entered upon. But Athens had already had some experience of the work at Megara, where they had connected the town with the seaport of Nisæa by two walls. The thing was clearly not impossible, and upon Pericles' advice the work was begun.

The extraordinary energy of Athens made it plain to Sparta that if she were not content to see herself wholly eclipsed she must interfere at once. The Phocians had overrun Doris—a quite unimportant state, and yet closely connected with the Spartans, who regarded it as their earliest home and "mother-state." With the nominal object of restoring it to freedom, the Spartans crossed the Corinthian Gulf, and entered Phocis with an army of 11,500 heavy-armed soldiers, and doubtless the usual contingent of light-armed. The size of the force showed that they had some other intention than their avowed one. The Phocians quickly submitted; the nominal end of the expedition was obtained. But now the

Athenians garrisoned the passes of Geraneaia and sent round a fleet to the Corinthian Gulf, so as to cut off the return of the Spartans both by sea and land. At the same time the oligarchical party in Athens entered into treasonous negotiations with them for the overthrow of their political opponents and the destruction of the long walls. The Spartans marched down through Bœotia and encamped at Tanagra, upon the borders of Attica, ready to interfere in any way that might seem feasible. The self-confidence of the Athenians was too great to allow them to stand on the defensive. It was determined to anticipate the designs of the Spartans by attacking them, and the whole Athenian army, 14,000 men strong, marched out to Tanagra. While the armies were drawn up opposite to one another, Cimon appeared before the Athenian commanders, and asked that, despite the vote of ostracism against him, he might be allowed to take his place in the ranks. But the prevalent distrust of the aristocratic party was so great that its leader was not allowed to share in the dangers of the coming battle. Cimon therefore had to retire, after having urged his friends to prove his innocence by their valour. The battle was stubbornly contested; but when the Thessalian cavalry deserted during the course of the engagement, the Athenians were no longer able to hold their own. But the Peloponnesians had suffered so heavily that they made no attempt to advance on Athens, and were content to make their way back through the passes of Geraneaia home (457). And indeed the battle rather strengthened the confidence of the defeated than of the victorious side. Cimon's friends had fallen to the number of a hundred after displaying great valour. Pericles had distinguished himself; and through the whole state there went the encouraging

feeling that they had measured themselves with the invincible Spartans and not been found altogether wanting. It might seem almost worth the loss of the battle that, upon the motion of Pericles, Cimon was recalled from ostracism. On his return some arrangement seems to have been made whereby he devoted all his attention to foreign affairs, and left Pericles undisturbed in his domestic policy.

After the check of Tanagra the series of Athenian successes recommenced even more brilliantly than before. Bœotia, during the time that the Spartan army remained there, had been reorganised under the rule of Thebes, and upon oligarchical principles throughout. Athens could not endure so plainly hostile a force upon her flank. Sixty-two days after the battle of Tanagra an Athenian force, under Myronides, entered Bœotia, and in a great battle at Oenophyta (456), of which we know nothing but the fact and the result, entirely overthrew the Theban army. The smaller cities were freed from the supremacy of Thebes, and the oligarchies overthrown. Even in Thebes the defeat brought about a political change and the establishment of a democracy. The cities of Bœotia became members of the Athenian Alliance and furnished troops. And soon afterwards Phocis, already hostile to Sparta for her recent raid into their territory, joined Athens also. Soon afterwards the long blockade of Ægina came to a successful conclusion : the fortifications were destroyed, the ships of war surrendered, the obligation to pay tribute for the future recognised. And meanwhile the long walls that connected Athens with the sea were completed (456). The eastern wall ran to the roadstead of Phalerum, the western wall to the harbour of the Piræus. The significance of

these walls on the immediate future of Athenian history can hardly be overestimated. Athens was now joined with the sea. The Athenian army might be defeated and Attica overrun, but while the walls stood and the sea was in her power Athens was safe. If Paris had had safe communication with the sea during the siege of 1870 how enormous would have been the change in the campaign ! The service that the walls performed for Athens was somewhat analogous. The year 456 gave new evidence of the unapproachable power of Athens at sea. Her admiral Tolmides sailed round the Peloponnese. He burnt the Spartan dockyard at Gythium, and nowhere met with any resistance at sea. Corinth found herself hemmed in on all sides by the dependencies of Athens. On the west, Megara, Ægina, and Trœzen closed her round. On the east, at the very narrowest part of the Corinthian Gulf, the Athenians had captured the important station of Naupactus, and when, in 455, the Helots on Mount Ithome surrendered on condition that they should be allowed to depart freely, they were planted in Naupactus by Athens. The bitter enemies of Sparta, and therefore of Corinth, they held the gate of the western waters against her. It was by her commerce that Corinth lived, and now she could only carry on her commercial enterprises with the permission of Athens. For the jealousy which she then created she was to pay dearly at the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Athens had reached the highest point of her material power. The Ægean Sea was hers, and hers was the centre of Greece. No power on earth could cope with her on the waters; on land Sparta could boast no assured superiority. The extent of territory that she controlled was greater than any that in historical times had belonged

to any state of Greece. Her revenues were, for the age, immense. And her intellectual supremacy, though doubtless to contemporaries not so important as her material greatness, helped to increase her splendour in the eyes of Greece. But this increase in dominion was too sudden a growth to last. Such extraordinary energy was feverish, and could not be permanent. She could not hope to win many victories with those who were too old or too young for regular service. Side by side with her conquests went the development of the democracy, and we shall see shortly how quite unsuitable were the institutions of the democracy for the management of an empire. And so the might of Athens from this point changes only to decrease.

Athens loses her Land-Empire.

The first sign of a turn in the fortunes of Athens came from Egypt. Her attempt to wrest that great province from the hands of the Persian king, after a brilliant beginning, failed completely. Persia put forth all her energies in order to retain her hold on Egypt. Megabyzus was despatched with a fleet of three hundred triremes and an army of three hundred thousand men to reduce Inarus and his Greek allies. Against so vast a force the Greeks failed to repeat the miracle of the years 480 and 479. Inarus and his Athenians were shut up in the island of Prosopitis, formed by two branches of the Nile and a canal. After a fruitless blockade the canal was drained, and then the whole army marched over. A vigorous resistance ended in the flight of six thousand Greeks to the sea-coast. Only a few of them ever saw Athens again. And, to increase their disaster, a fleet of fifty Athenian ships entered the Nile unaware of what had happened.

They were attacked by land and water, and almost all were destroyed. With such complete disaster the Athenian campaign in Egypt ended (455). This failure in Egypt probably rather strengthened the hands of Athens, for it left her now free to turn her whole attention to the complications of Continental Greece. But her high self-confidence was somewhat lessened, and the next thing that we have to chronicle is the conclusion of a truce for five years between Athens and Sparta (450). This temporary break in hostilities, for it pretended to be nothing more, was concluded through the influence of Cimon, who on his return from exile was still an admirer and well-wisher of Sparta. And Argos chose this occasion to leave the Athenian Alliance and make peace with Sparta. She had gained nothing from Athens and had not given much ; but her defection seems to show that the prestige of Athens was waning, and that her policy was creating irritation and suspicion in the minds of her allies.

For five years, however, peace subsisted in Central Greece. And during these years the contest with Persia was renewed by Cimon with conspicuous success. The war is of importance, and it would be interesting to watch in detail the last struggle between the great combatants. But our authorities here are meagre, and, except for the main features, contradictory; nor does the war in the East bear directly upon the development of Athenian power in Central Greece. It is enough then to say that in 449 Cimon at the head of the Athenian armament was engaged in the attempt to reduce Cyprus, when he was attacked by the Persian fleet. He died before the engagement, but his spirit animated his troops. And off Salamis, in Cyprus, the Persians were entirely defeated on

the same day, both by sea and land. The defeat was an exceedingly severe one, and now the Persian king acquiesced in an arrangement whereby the *status quo* was accepted and all hostilities terminated.* It is forty years before there is any further collision between Greeks and Persians. Meanwhile the fleet returned with Cimon's body. Athens never again produced a commander of such distinction.

His death was no doubt a great loss to the Athenians in the wars that immediately followed. There must have been preparations of which we know nothing, or else the rule of Athens must have been so irritating that at the very first opportunity all her subjects spontaneously flung off her authority. The first blow came from Bœotia. There by a sudden revolution the democracies were overthrown, and several of the cities of Bœotia declared against the Athenian supremacy. It was clear that the movement must be suppressed at once. Tolmides—a very prominent general of the time—wished to attack immediately with the small force at that moment available. Pericles urged the necessity of longer preparations and a larger force. But Tolmides carried the day, and with a small force in which there were only one thousand Athenian troops he marched into Bœotia. The Athenian forces were surprised at Coronea (447) and entirely defeated. Tolmides and many were slain; the rest were taken prisoners. The Egyptian catastrophe had already depleted Athens; she could ill afford to spare any more citizens. To get back those who had been taken

* This is the so-called Peace of Callias. It is an open question whether it was a precise arrangement or a tacit agreement to accept things as they were. Its date is as uncertain as its terms; but is, perhaps, to be placed as late as 444.

prisoners, she consented to abandon Bceotia. The oligarchs at once came back; again Bœotia was organised under the supremacy of Thebes; and Athens had upon the north a jealous and victorious rival, embittered by the memory of a recent humiliation. The loss of Bœotia was followed by blows still more dangerous.

First, in the summer of 445 the cities of the great and most important island of Eubcea revolted from Athens. Eubcea had been from the first a member of the Delian League; her position and her wealth made her friendship or her hostility of the first importance to Athens. Pericles with all the available forces marched to repress the revolt. But no sooner was his back turned than the storm broke from the west. Megara had made up her quarrel with Corinth and Sparta. With the help of troops from these two states the Athenian garrison was driven out; only in Nisœa did a small handful still hold out. And the worst was yet to come. For now, doubtless as the result of careful pre-arrangement, a Spartan army of considerable size, with their King Pleistoanax at its head, marched out through the Isthmus and the now open passes of Geraneaia straight upon Athens. Bœotia, Eubœa, Megara, Sparta—attacked by these formidable foes and taken by surprise, it seemed impossible for Athens to survive. Pericles turned hastily back from Eubœa. But Pleistoanax made no attack on Athens herself. The Spartan army got as far as the plain of Eleusis, within fifteen miles of Athens, and then turned back and retired over the Isthmus to Sparta. Had Pleistoanax counted on the absence of the Athenian army in Eubœa, and thus come unprepared to cope with the rapid return of Pericles? Or was the later suspicion correct, that Pericles had simply bribed him to suspend the attack?

Many considerations lead us to adopt the second view. Pleistoanax was suspected of taking bribes by his own countrymen. He was condemned to a fine of fifteen talents, and, not being able to pay it, fled and lived for nineteen years an exile in Arcadia. Further, this liability to corruption is at all times a characteristic of the public men of Sparta; and Pericles subsequently refused to account for the expenditure of a large sum of money, alleging only that it had been spent for a necessary purpose. So the greatest danger of all had rolled away. Megara could not be retaken : it was doubtless held by a Spartan garrison. But from this day forth Athens hated Megara as she hated no state in Greece, though she hated many.

But the Spartans could not get at Eubœa, and thither Pericles marched. We hear of no resistance, and quickly the island became a portion of the Athenian power once more. But not on the old terms: Eubœa was no longer a free member of the confederacy. She was now strictly subject to Athens. Everywhere the oligarchical constitutions were destroyed and democracies were set up. All adherents of the old system were expelled and not allowed to return. And the new democracies were not free to govern themselves as they liked. They were free only as long as they freely chose to be subjects of Athens. An inscription has been preserved giving us in full the terms of the agreement with Athens in the case of the city of Chalcis, and Chalcis was almost certainly on a similar footing with the other cities of the island. Every citizen of Chalcis is to swear on oath "I will not revolt from the people of the Athenians in any way or shape, in word or deed, or be an accomplice in revolt. If any one revolts I will inform the Athenians. I will

pay the Athenians the tribute, . . . and I will be a faithful and true ally to the utmost of my power. I will help and assist the Athenian people if any one injures them, and I will obey their commands."* The inscription goes on to say, " Any one who refuses to take the oath shall be disfranchised, and his goods shall be confiscated and a tenth given to Zeus Olympius." At Histiaëa, in the north of the island, the inhabitants were expelled and their lands divided among Athenian settlers, who retained their full rights as citizens of Athens, and were to act for the future as a garrison of occupation (445).

These losses and efforts had so exhausted Athens that the prosecution of the war with Sparta was not to be thought of. Sparta, on her side, feared foreign enterprise too much to desire to push her advantages further. And thus in 445, by mutual arrangement, a treaty for thirty years was arranged between them. The terms must carefully be noticed, for they become of great importance at the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. (1) Athens surrenders all that she held upon the mainland outside of Attica. Megara and Bœotia were already gone; all that she held on Peloponnesian soil must go too—Nisæa, Pegæ, Træzen, Achæa: of her great land-power almost nothing was left. (2) Otherwise the two alliances remained as they were. Any independent state in Greece might join either party ; but all efforts to withdraw states from their present allegiance were expressly forbidden. (3) Until the thirty years were ended all disputes between the two principals were to be settled by an appeal to arbitration and not by force of arms.

The rise and fall of the continental power of Athens

* I take the translation of this inscription direct from Mr. Evelyn Abbott's *History of Greece*, vol. ii

are so rapid, the acquisition of power is so transient and so entirely without positive results, that it is hard to follow this period intelligently or with interest. But for Athens the general result was important. After a short period of brilliant success she had lost all her territory on the mainland outside of Attica. She was now a sea-power only. That was a real advantage to her, not smaller than the loss of France or of Hanover to England. For to defend a land-empire she would need a far stronger army than she could put on foot, while at sea she was supreme and apparently invincible. And for Greece the change produced by these years is also important. It was not quite thirty-five years since the Persian war. Men fought at Tanagra who had fought at Plataea. But in those thirty-five years all possibility of a general union of Hellas has disappeared. The whole of Greece is divided into two camps, which have declared hostility to be their normal relation by limiting the period of peace to thirty years.

The Development of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire.

During this period of feverish struggle on the mainland of Greece, the relations between Athens and the other members of the Delian League had been undergoing a rapid transformation. The result of this transformation is clear, though the stages by which it was accomplished are not. In 476 Athens was the president of a league consisting of members voluntarily submitting to its rule; in 445 the relations of Athens and the other states are those of a mistress-city to her subject dependencies, those of a conqueror to the enemy he has conquered. The league is compulsory, not voluntary; tribute exacted

by actual or possible coercion has taken the place of voluntary contributions; the Delian League has disappeared, and given place to an Athenian Empire.

To understand this change it is necessary in the first place to recall the original character of the Delian League. That league had sprung out of the Panhellenic union that had been brought about by the pressure of the Persian war. The bad conduct of Sparta as head of that confederacy had made her retirement necessary, and she took with her all the states of the mainland. Athens, by right of her character and her past achievements, stepped into her place as leader of the maritime states, first in nominal alliance with Sparta, but since the civil wars of the mainland in clear hostility.

The arrangement of the Delian League had been largely the work of Aristides. His reputation for fairness had given the allies full confidence in the justice of his assessments. What these arrangements were neither the few chapters that Thucydides devotes to the subject, nor the hints in Plutarch's *Lives*, nor the existing inscriptions, allow us to determine as fully as we should like to do. But if some points are doubtful, we know enough to allow us to understand the general features of the Delian League in its earliest shape, and the chief stages through which it passed to its later form. It had been formed to carry on the war against Persia, and to give to its members security in their lately won liberties. To this end an army and a navy, a fund of money and a recognised leader, were necessary.

i. Athens was of course the leader. No other state in the alliance could possibly command the same amount of obedience. She was at first by no means a despot city. Representatives from the various states met year

by year in the island of Delos, there to deliberate on matters concerning the whole confederacy, and especially on the military and naval operations of the year. That every state had a vote is certain. But of the procedure of the synod we know almost nothing. Yet both the future history of the league and analogous cases in Greek history go to show that Athens would not be merely the executive officer of the decrees of the league. Her power and prestige would give her from the first a commanding position.

2. The contributions to the common fund were arranged by Aristides. That we know; and we know also that these contributions amounted at first to 460 talents (£92,000). It is certain, too, that at stated intervals the contributions were revised, and increased or diminished according to the necessities of the moment and the wealth of the states. But all the allies did not pay the same kind of contribution. Some paid money only. Some, and those the larger states, contributed ships and men, and perhaps money too : all were apparently called on for military service when occasion demanded. Ships, men, and money, in carefully fixed quantities and amounts, were supplied by the allies, so long as the league remained free, according to the original assessment of Aristides.

3. At the head of every expedition, naval or military, stood an Athenian commander. This followed, according to Greek ideas, necessarily from the position of Athens at the head of the league. As Spartan officers necessarily commanded in the Panhellenic League of 480, so Athenian officers in the Delian League. The Synod of Delos, whatever its exact functions, did not appoint the commander of troops or ships.

4. The centre of the whole league during its early

and independent period was Delos. That small and barren island had been once the great religious centre of the Ionian race. Its glory had declined, but still there was the great temple of Apollo. The place was full of venerable legends and memories of the past. This then was naturally chosen as the centre of the revival of the Ionian race; for as such the Delian league must have been regarded. Here the yearly meetings of the synod were held ; here was the treasury of the contributions of the allies.

The general aims of the league must commend themselves to every modern observer. That some check should be given to the state-independence of Greece; that some union should be created in which each separate state should recognise something higher than her own personal interests; that some broad political basis should be formed capable of insuring stability,—something of this sort was quite essential if Greece was to remain independent. But it may be doubted whether it was possible to make the Delian League strong enough for the task that it would have to face. The league was the same sort of organisation that the supporters of Imperial Federation propose to create: a confederacy of independent states with a common origin, and supposed common interests for common purposes. But in Greece the instinct for state-independence was so deeply rooted that even the slack bonds of the league proved too tight. No single state in its internal government showed cohesion or a sufficient discipline; and it was little likely, therefore, that their union should display these qualities. There was no power except that of physical force that would in the long run be **able to hold** the various states together. Panhellenic

patriotism was hardly felt; the god Apollo was losing his power; Athens was unable to inspire the states with sufficient personal veneration for herself, nor did she try to keep the league together by conciliation and kindness.

The Decay of the Delian League.

What if any one of the states refused to pay its contribution or complement of soldiers? The contingency was likely enough to happen, for as the Persians were pushed farther and farther away from the Ægean, the necessity of the league would become less and less apparent. Was the refusal to be accepted? The recalcitrant state would then enjoy the advantage of the security of the Ægean without contributing to the organisation that made that security possible. When the league had been founded each city had sworn to it with every circumstance that could impress the permanent nature of the contract upon the imagination. Lumps of iron were sunk into the sea; the oath was to be binding until the iron floated. Athens had then some just grounds for coercing any state into remaining a member of the league. And, a more powerful argument still, her ambition for empire drove her in the same direction. And yet such coercion offended at once the strong instinct for state-independence which was at the root of all Greek political life. The first case in which such coercion was necessary was in 466 B.C. Then Naxos rebelled, for what causes and under what circumstances we do not know. "The Naxians revolted," says Thucydides (i. 98), "and the Athenians made war against them and reduced them by blockade. This was the first of the allied cities that was enslaved contrary to Hellenic law ;

the turn of the others came later." Naxos was the most important island of the Cyclades; but after her revolt her ships were taken away from her, tribute was exacted from her, and she became-a subject of the Athenian rule.

"The turn of the others came later," says Thucydides, but how or when we do not know. We only know that from 466 onwards the character of the confederacy rapidly changed. Thasos is the next state of whose rebellion we hear, and in this case it was only partially connected with the management of the league; commercial jealousy was the chief cause. Of the revolt and subjection of the others we know hardly anything until we come to the year 440. Only three states then occupied an independent station side by side with Athens, and these were the three great islands Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. And in 440 Samos itself revolted. Of the expedition whereby this most important island was reduced to subjection we have a clear account in Thucydides. But here the details need not detain us. The islanders were reduced. They had to destroy all their fortifications, to give hostages for future good behaviour, and pay a full indemnity for the cost of the expedition.

How and why did all this come about? The chief causes are plain enough—the desire of Athens to rule, the refusal of the allies to submit to rule. "The Athenians," says Thucydides (i. 99), "were exacting and oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were neither willing nor accustomed to work hard." From the first many states had preferred to pay money rather than ships and crews. The preference was natural in small commercial communities. But as Athens used the money to build ships which she manned with her own

citizens, clearly a dangerous preponderance was being thrown into the hands of Athens. And each revolt increased this. The coerced state had to pay tribute instead of providing ships and men. So the power of Athens increased, and when other states rebelled they found that their own want of training and the great strength of Athens made rebellion quite hopeless. And, of course, the relations of the coerced states to Athens were not what they had been before rebellion. We find that garrisons of Athenian soldiers were placed in the conquered cities; many of their law-suits were transferred for trial to Athens, as will be subsequently explained; and, as all recalcitrant states were of course excluded from the synod at Delos, more and more was the management of the whole league thrown into the hands of Athens. The league rapidly disappears, the Athenian empire takes its place.

This was clearly the case when, at a date not precisely ascertainable, the synod at Delos ceased to exist, and the treasury chest was transferred from Delos to Athens. We are told that the transference of the fund was made upon the proposal of the Samians, and the reason alleged was the unprotected character of the island of Delos. Now the management of the finances of the league was placed in the hands of Athenian officers. The money was deposited in a chamber of the temple of the goddess Athena. The names of cities that paid the tribute and its amount were henceforth, year by year, inscribed on marble slabs, and fragments of these slabs are still preserved, which give us a welcome feeling of certainty on a few points in this dark and doubtful period.

And thus the change from confederacy to empire was complete. The object for which the confederacy **had**

been formed no longer existed. Peace, nominal or actual, had been made with Persia. The rich tribute of the subject states was piled up in the Acropolis, but no armament had set sail against the Persians since the last struggle on the coast of Cyprus. In 478 Athens had been acclaimed as leader by the island states, and now those same states were bowed under her yoke and eagerly looked for an opportunity of revolt while they submitted to the garrisons and exactions of the Athenians. The change deeply outraged the sentiment of Greece ; but in the light of universal history it can hardly be deplored. The new empire was stronger than the old alliance for offence and defence, and Hellas of the fifth century B.C. needed closer union rather than more independence. Had Athens maintained her power, and by judicious use of it welded her possessions into a homogeneous whole, she would stand justified for her usurpation before the bar of history. But side by side with the development of empire went the development of the democracy, and neither the spirit nor the methods of the Athenian democracy were suited to the management of an empire.

Democratic Changes in Athens since the Persian War.

The next chapter will be devoted to an examination of the spirit and working of the Athenian democracy ; here it is intended only to chronicle the chief innovations since the days of Clisthenes. That statesman had indeed laid very clearly the foundation of the Athenian democracy, but a good deal was wanting yet to its full completion. With the people lay even now the reality of power; more so indeed than in the modern democracies of England, France, or America. But to complete the

work it was necessary that the road to the attainment of office should be rendered easier, that there should be no offices that were not in the appointment of the people and controlled by them, and that administration and justice should be absolutely, whether directly or indirectly, in their hands.

1. Solon's arrangement of the state had given the most prominent office of the state, the archonship, to the richest of the four classes into which the people were divided. That had since been altered. When, how, and by whom we are not able to say with certainty. Before Aristotle's work on the constitution of Athens had been discovered we trusted implicitly the statement of Plutarch, in itself probable enough, that the changes were made upon the motion of Aristides after the Persian war, and that all offices were then thrown open to all four classes. But this newly discovered manuscript, which, whether it be by Aristotle or no, is a careful examination of the constitution of Athens in a philosophic spirit, states that no change was introduced until the year 457, and that then only the first three classes were made eligible to office, the fourth class, the poorest, and probably the largest, remaining in theory excluded from this office throughout the whole life of the Athenian democracy. This is a strangely undemocratic restriction, and out of harmony with the general character of the democracy. Yet two considerations will allow us to understand it. First, as Aristotle himself affirms, the qualification was often overlooked; and, next, the archonship was not an office of any importance in the government of the state. Real power was exercised, not by any officer at all, but by the people *en masse*, as will be explained in the next chapter. The archon, who had originally been the

real master of the state, had in process of time come to exercise no functions except those of ceremony and routine. This office demanded more leisure than a very poor man could give gratis, and did not really influence the course of government, and so the democracy accepted a very undemocratic limitation.

2. The existence of the Council of the Areopagus with its present powers was a really more serious check upon the full democracy. This council consisted of men who had once been archons—the large majority of them, therefore, drawn from the richest class of citizens. All the members sat for life ; they were not directly appointed by the people nor liable to that scrutiny of their conduct which was the general rule in Athens after a year of office. Their powers it is impossible accurately to determine. They were the supreme court of justice in Athens, and, more important still, had a general power of supervision over the state. "The overseer of all things and the guardian of the laws" the council is called in the days of Solon. And this general censorial power, founded on religion and the immemorial antiquity of their office, was probably the most important part of their functions. But the time had gone past for the exercise of functions such as these. They could only be used in an age of faith and loyalty. They were quite out of harmony with the prevalent scepticism of thought as well as with the ambition of the democracy.

But to attack them was a very grave step. During the Persian war they had acquitted themselves nobly. It is possible that the battle of Salamis would never have been fought if the Areopagus had not come forward to assist in the transport of the homeless Athenians. Further, **the** council was the last rallying point for **all** con-

servative sympathies. This and the Council of 500 are regarded by Solon as the two anchors of the Athenian state. The second was now no longer any check upon the absolute democracy, and if the Areopagus were swept away too those who feared the democracy would have nothing to trust to for defence. And it was not only prejudice that rallied on behalf of the attacked council. The danger to the venerable Council of the Areopagus naturally claimed the sympathy of so religious a poet as Æschylus. In the *Eumenides* the goddess Athena is represented as founding the Council of the Areopagus and praising it :—

" I give my counsel to you, citizens,
To reverence and guard that form of state
Which is nor lawless nor tyrannical,
And not to cast all fear from out the city.

This council I establish, pure from bribe,
Reverend and keen to act, for those that sleep
An ever-watchful sentry of the land."

The council was attacked by Ephialtes, at this time a prominent democratic politician of unblemished character, and by Pericles, who was now coming forward as a popular leader. The attack called out a fierce resistance, and Ephialtes was assassinated—a rare incident in the political life of Athens. But before his death victory was assured. About 460 the defeat of the Areopagus was declared, and its powers were diminished. It was not destroyed, and remained as long as the Athenian state existed. But it remained only as a survival. Murder trials were indeed left in its hands, for murder, by reason of the pollution that it brought, was partly a religious offence **and** naturally dealt with by a partly religious tribunal. But

the control of the administration of the laws and the general supervision of the state were taken away from the Areopagus. Selected as the members were from the richest class, it is probable that they used their powers in the interest of a class rather than of the state. But with the overthrow of the Areopagus the last barrier to the complete triumph of the democracy was removed.

3. By far the strangest of the institutions of the Athenian state, not even excepting ostracism, is the use of the lot for the appointment of officials ; not merely of the subordinate officials, but with a very few unimportant exceptions the whole army of officials in Athens. The meaning of this, the way in which it worked, its effect on the Athenian government, will be discussed in the next chapter. Here it is only necessary to mention the little that we know about its history. The lot had always been in use in the Athenian state. If that was doubtful before, it is no longer doubtful since the discovery of the new Aristotle. The lot had, perhaps, a religious origin. To appoint by lot was to leave the decision to the gods. We do not know that there was ever a period when it was not used in the Athenian constitution. But its application varied from time to time. Solon, says Aristotle, arranged that all officers should be elected by lot from candidates nominated by the tribes. When the democracy revived after the tyranny of the Pisistratids it seems to have been dropped for awhile; at any rate, as far as related to the archons. Probably it was felt that during the period of struggle with the Persians, and while the democracy still had to face a strong oligarchical party, leaders of assured capacity were necessary, and these could not be obtained by use of the **lot** From 487 onwards the **lot** is regularly used in the

Athenian state, and gives to the government of Athens some of its most striking features.

4. It was during this period, and probably shortly after the overthrow of the Areopagus, that the system of paying citizens for political and public services was introduced. When all citizens, rich and poor, had to take a part in the management of the state, payment for their services was essential. Service in the army and navy, service on the Council of 500 or in the very numerous magistracies of the state, were all paid for. And most important of all, payment was now, by Pericles, provided for service on the jury. Some popular trials there had always been since the days of Solon, but with the overthrow of the Areopagus the importance of the popular law courts had vastly increased. The law business of the state was indeed almost entirely brought before them, and in this service six thousand of the citizens might be employed. This system will be explained and criticised in the next chapter. Here it is only necessary to say that the introduction of the payment of jurors belongs to the earlier period of the ascendancy of Pericles.

NOTE.—Plutarch's *Life of Cimon*; Grote, Curtius, and Thucydides, as before.



VIEW OVER THE PNYX.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY.

ATHENS was in the Greek world the main supporter of democratic forms of government. All states who fell beneath her sway and influence almost necessarily adopted democratic constitutions just as those that were joined in any way to Sparta were oligarchical in character. And from the standpoint of universal history the logical development of the democratic idea in Athens is of immense interest and had considerable influence on future ages.

We have adopted the word democracy from the Greeks, and apply it to institutions and conditions of society which are to be found in France, England, and America, and various other parts of the world. The modern use of the word is a vague one. On the one hand, it is used to

denote a certain set of opinions or emotions which look to the well-being of the whole community rather than of a privileged few, and in this sense the word is sometimes identical in meaning with philanthropy. On the other hand, it is used for a form of government that rests in the final analysis on the will of the people, or one in which the will of the people plays a very considerable part. It is important to notice that neither of these usages would have corresponded to the Greek use of the word, Democracy meant a certain form of government of a very distinct kind.

A Greek would not have considered our institutions democratic. If an Athenian of the age of Pericles had been made acquainted with the English constitution or the constitution of France Or America, he would have been surprised to hear them called democracies. The English constitution would probably have seemed to him an oligarchy of a few hundred men (the members of Parliament), or perhaps, upon further examination, he would have said that the Cabinet was exercising a tyranny: a "democracy" certainly he would not have called us. He would have acquiesced in Rousseau's paradox: "The English people thinks itself free, but is very much deceived. It is only free during the general election of members to Parliament; as soon as they are elected it is enslaved." For democracy to the Greek meant, not government in the interests of the people, nor government indirectly by the people or their representatives; it meant actual and direct management of the state by the mass of the people themselves. This is evident everywhere; it becomes perhaps especially clear when we contrast the government of Sparta with that of Athens. Sparta stood as the typical oligarchy of

the Greek world. And yet in Sparta the officers (the ephors, etc.) were elected by the vote of all citizens. Only in Sparta the officers, when once elected, managed the state on their own initiative; they were not the passive instruments of the decisions of the people; they were not accountable for their conduct directly to the people. And therefore Sparta was not a democracy but an oligarchy. That the people assembled together should have the real control of the affairs of the state in small things and great—that was the first condition of a democracy.

The Eccleesia.

Let us look first at the fountain of all power, the general assembly of the people, as we see it in the age of Pericles. The Athenian year was divided into ten sections or prytanies, and in each of these sections the general assembly was necessarily summoned four times. Besides these regular meetings there were emergency meetings, which were summoned by special messengers sent out into the country districts as well as by the usual city-crier. All citizens above a certain age, probably twenty, were eligible for attendance, and measures were taken to secure the attendance of as many as possible. Lest the attractions of business or gossip in the market-places should prevent a good attendance, a cord was stretched round it, except only where the road led to the place where the general assembly met. All booths and shops were at the same time shut up. Later every one who attended the assembly received three obols (about 5d.), but in the days of Pericles patriotism was strong enough to dispense with th inducement. The assembly was held on a small hill near the agora called the Pnyx. The ground was artificially raised so as to

make a sort of theatre, and in place of the stage were seats for the president and other officers, and, most important, the great stone, or *Bema*, upon which the orator addressing the people had to take his stand.

Every meeting began with a religious ceremonial. Sucking pigs were sacrificed, and the place was sprinkled with their blood. Incense was burnt, a solemn prayer was offered, and a curse was pronounced upon all who deceived the people for bribes. The president then, who was a member of the Council of 500, chosen by lot, brought forward the first motion on the agenda for the day. If the assembly desired the vote could be taken at once. If discussion was demanded, as was usually the case, the question was asked, "Who wishes to speak?" Any Athenian citizen was at liberty to address the meeting: he mounted the *Bema*, and before he spoke put on a wreath of myrtle. A law of Solon ordered that those over fifty should speak first, but the rule was often disregarded. Only those subjects could be discussed which the Council of 500 brought forward, but any amendment could be proposed; and from the decision of the assembly there was no appeal whatever. The vote was usually taken by a show of hands; the ballot was only used when the interests of some individual were concerned. The meeting was dissolved by the president when the business had been gone through or when the sun set. Certain signs "from the gods" also led to its immediate dissolution, such as thunder, lightning, rain, or earthquake. If the business had not been got through an adjournment was made until next day.

It was this large meeting of many thousands of citizens, often turbulent in character, and growing more so as time

went on, that possessed the power of guiding the destinies of the state. It does not hold the place of the people in the English constitution. It was not merely the final court of appeal. It possessed and exercised the power of the King, the Houses of Parliament, and the constituencies rolled into one. The Council of Athens and all the official merely carried out the will of this assembly. There was nothing that approached to our system of party government. Neither the council nor the majority of the officers of the state were the *choice* of the people; the fact of their election by lot made that impossible. They were simply clerks and subordinate officers appointed to carry out the declared will of the people. But a body of several thousands of people cannot really exercise power by themselves. Leadership they must have of some sort. And, in actual working, the Athenian democracy, so jealous of all interference and of all rivals to its power, threw a great deal of power into the hands of a single leader. The real master of Athens was not the man who was elected to important offices, nor he who as president at any particular time represented the majesty of the state; but the orator who from the *Bema* of the Pnyx could by means fair or foul get the ear of the people and induce them to adopt his measures. Such a man held no office from which he could be ejected, and his position and tenure of power were permanent compared with the annually changing officers of the state, the vast majority of whom were appointed by lot. Modern constitutional life has nothing that corresponds exactly to the man who, in Aristophanes' phrase, "is master of the stone on the Pnyx." The closest parallel, perhaps, is to be found in those journalists who, sometimes in England and more often

in France, have had more real influence than ministers of state.

The people in its sovereign assembly the Tyrant Demos, as it was called—was the real depositary of power and the real governor of the state. That is the chief fact of the Athenian constitution. And the Tyrant Demos was Jealous of all rival powers. Councils and officers must be its passive instruments. Even the administration of the law must not stand in its way. All absolute rulers, except the very greatest, have shown the same tendency to check the rise of great personalities among their subordinates, and to control the administration of law. What we see in the policy of Louis XIV. we may find also in the democracy of Athens. We will notice now the method of electing officers and the council, their duties, and the method of administering the laws.

The Election of Officers.

To modern observers the strangest fact about the Athenian constitution is the use of the lot in elections. To many it has seemed wholly incredible that a people distinguished by its acuteness of intellect should have appointed its officers in a way which did not allow the suitability of the candidates for the offices to be even considered. Some have therefore held that the lot was only maintained in deference to an old-established custom of religious origin, but that in practice it was so manipulated that choice of individuals was rendered possible. For this theory, however, there is no particle of evidence or probability. All our authorities speak of the choice by lot as quite genuine. Aristotle regards it as particularly democratic measure. As Athens extended her sway over other states she forced them to adopt

election by lot. Some offices were always distributed by popular vote, and these were those that most obviously required personal capacity, but for the vast majority of offices the drawing of lots decided. It may certainly be affirmed that 95 per cent. of the offices in the Athenian state were thus filled. The judges of the state, the police the finance officer, the auditors of public accounts, the commissioners of roads, the members of the great Council of 500, even the clerk of the council—all were elected by lot. Such are the facts ; by what considerations are they to be explained ?

1. Citizenship at Athens did not merely mean that a man had a right to vote, but also that he was expected to serve the state in some capacity. So vast was the number of officials in Athens compared with the population, that every Athenian citizen probably held an official post of some sort once in his life; very many must have held such a post many times. Aristotle says (*The Athenian Constitution*, chap. xxiv.): " Out of the proceeds of the tributes and taxes and the contributions of the allies, more than 20,000 persons were maintained. There were 6000 jurymen, 1600 bowmen, 1200 knights, 500 members of the council, 500 guards of the dockyards, besides 50 guards in the city. Further, when they subsequently went to war, there were in addition 2500 heavy-armed troops, 20 guardships and other ships which collected the tribute, with crews amounting to 2000 men selected by lot; and besides these there were the persons maintained in the Prytaneum and orphans and gaolers, since all these were supported by the state." The passage is interesting as showing how largely the citizens of Athens lived on the resources of the state, and will in this connection be referred to again.

But here I quote it to show how large was the number of officers in the state. Exclusive of those employed on military duties, there are here mentioned over ten thousand officials in a state whose total number of citizens certainly did not amount to much more than twice that number. Aristotle tells us also that, except in the case of the Council of 500, no one might hold the same office a second time. The lot therefore did not determine who out of the whole body of citizens were to hold office. Office-holding was almost the normal condition of the Athenian citizen, and the lot merely determined which offices were to be held by which citizens. Perfect equality among the citizens was a great object of the Athenian democracy, and the very large number of offices and their distribution by lot secured this in a remarkable degree.

2. Next the appointment by lot rather than by vote was an exceedingly democratic measure, because it secured the complete subordination of all officials to the general assembly (the ecclesia). Had the archons or the council been chosen by vote, men of conspicuous ability or popularity would have been elected. A Council of 500 of the most prominent citizens of Athens, even if they sat only for a year, would have drawn men's eyes to themselves away from the general assembly. They might in time have eclipsed the power of the assembly, just as the Senate eclipsed the comitia in Rome. But the central object of the Athenian constitution was to give to the general assembly of the people the whole control of the state; all other institutions must be distinctly subsidiary, and confine themselves to carrying out the wishes of the assembly. The adoption of the lot showed a perfectly just instinct in the democracy. It necessarily

condemned all officers to the desired obscurity, and left the assembly supreme.

The duties of Athenian officials were usually such as could be easily performed by a man of average intelligence. Yet none the less the fact that the lot could work shows clearly how high was the average of ability in the Athenian state. No modern state could adopt such a system with such a measure of success. We must remember, of course, that all drudgery was performed by slaves, and that citizens had leisure and opportunities for an education, not of the modern kind indeed, but one which was more efficacious in sharpening the faculties. But, when all is said, it remains a most surprising fact that the Athenian state could take citizens from the street quite at random, appoint them to judicial and financial work, and suffer from this system so little as she did. We must add, however, that there were safeguards against the occupation of office by wholly unworthy and incapable men. The first of these safeguards was the *docimasia*, or examination of the candidate after the lot had fallen upon him, but before he entered on the duties of his post. This examination took place before one of the juries of which I shall speak presently. Doubtless it was usually purely formal, but it gave an opportunity for the rejection of an obviously unfit person. Aristotle gives us the methods of examination in the case of the archons. He seems to imply that the form adopted in their case was exceptional; but it is worth quoting. "When they are examined they are asked first, 'Who is your father, and of what deme? Who is your father's father? Who is your mother? Who is your mother's father, and of what deme?' Then **the** candidate is asked ... if he possesses a family tomb,

and where ; then if he treats his parents well, and pays his taxes, and has served on the required military expeditions. . . . The examiner . . . next asks, ' Does any one wish to make an accusation against this man ?'. . . If no one wishes to make an accusation, he proceeds at once to the vote. . . . When the examination has been thus concluded, they proceed to the stone on which are the pieces of the victims. . . . On this stone the archons stand, and swear to exercise their office uprightly and according to the laws, and not to receive presents in respect of the performance of their duties. . . . After this they enter upon their office." A further safeguard was the examination that each official had to undergo when he laid down his office. Incapacity and dishonesty could then be punished, and the knowledge that this ordeal had to be faced would prevent quite unworthy candidates from allowing themselves to be nominated for office.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that the use of the lot resulted in the complete subordination of all officials to the ecclesia, and it seems probable that it was consciously adopted with a view to that result.

The Council of Five Hundred,

After the general assembly the most important institution of the Athenian state was the Council of 500, the Boulê ; for the Areopagus, since it had been shorn of its power by Pericles, may be omitted from the survey. The Council of 500 was the permanent government of Athens. The general assembly only met occasionally, but the Council of 500 was always sitting. It had to decide in any case of emergency; it was the body to whom foreign powers in the first instance addressed

themselves. If we judged by the history of other great municipal councils, whether in Rome or mediaeval Italy or Germany, we should expect this council to become the real ruler of the state. It is the peculiarity of the Athenian constitution that it did not: it remained the strictly subordinate and almost passive instrument of the general assembly.

This result was due to the fact that its members were elected by lot and sat only for a year. The most influential politicians of Athens were not to be found there, or at any rate did not exercise their influence through that channel. The council had no separate *esprit de corps* ; it had almost no existence apart from the general assembly of which it was the obedient organ. It certainly had no separate policy; for it was appointed to attend to the routine management of the state, and to execute, without criticising, the policy that had been adopted by the ecclesia. No Athenian could feel jealous of it. It did not possess sufficient power to provoke such a passion, and besides every Athenian citizen would probably some time possess a seat in it. For, as no one under thirty years of age was eligible, and as no man could be elected more than twice, it is certain that most of the citizens of Athens must have passed through it.

We will look first at its organisation and then at its duties.

The Council of 500 was, since the days of Clisthenes, composed of fifty members from each tribe, chosen by lot. As the council was the standing government of Athens, it was necessary that some members should be in attendance every day. This duty was allotted to each tribe in turn whose fifty representatives (called for the time Prytanes or Presidents) were bound to attend—for a tenth part of the year. During this period they were fed

at the public expense, and were lodged in the Tholus, which we may almost regard as the Athenian town-hall. A meeting of the assembly was held every day, but the attendance of all except the presiding tribe was optional. Such a body must of course have a chairman or president, and the method of choosing the president is especially to be noted as eminently characteristic of the passion for equality that runs through Athenian politics. The chairman was chosen by lot from the presiding tribe. He held the office for a night and a day, during which time he held the keys of the sanctuaries in which the treasure and public records of the state were preserved, and the public seal. But no one might hold the office for longer than a day and a night, and no one might be re-elected. For that brief period he was the official representative of the Athenian state. He received ambassadors and headed all processions, and to this position of transient splendour the use of the lot allowed every Athenian citizen to aspire with good chances of attainment. It is as though every citizen of London had good reason to believe that he would for one day of his life be Lord Mayor.

The duties of this council were to carry out the business of the state upon the lines laid down by the general assembly. First, they had to prepare all business that was to be transacted by the general assembly. They had to determine its order, and to see that the proper order was preserved. They drew up in legal form any resolutions that were to be submitted to the people. They appointed the chairman of the assembly for the day; and it is characteristic of the spirit of Athenian politics that, in the time of Aristotle, the chairman of the council **for** the day might not be chair-

man also of the general assembly. These probouleutic or preparatory functions of the senate did not in any way interfere with the independence of the general assembly; with it and with it alone lay the determination of all policy. Next, the council had very extensive administrative duties. Aristotle mentions the chief of these. They conducted the earlier stages of the scrutiny (*docimasia*) that all candidates for office had to undergo. They superintended the building of ships and the management of the dockyards generally. All public buildings were inspected by them, and they decided on the plans for new ones. They examined all the horses belonging to the state. "If the council," says Aristotle, "finds one which, though sound, will not go well, it mulcts it of some of its corn; while those which cannot go or which will not obey the rein it brands with a wheel on the jaw, and the horse so marked is disqualified for service." The council also in Aristotle's time managed a system of poor relief, whereby two obols a day (3*d.*) were granted to persons possessing less than three minas (£15) who were too crippled to do any work. And besides all this "the council, speaking broadly, co-operates in most of the duties of all the other magistrates." And, lastly, the conduct of negotiations with foreign powers and the reception of ambassadors were in the hands of the council. But here, as everywhere, it was merely the subordinate committee of the general assembly. Foreign and domestic policy were equally the exclusive province of the sovereign Demos.

The Officials of the State.

The Council of 500 was the intermediary between the Assembly of the People and the officials of the state. It

superintended and co-operated with all these officials, but it did not, in itself, actually carry out any executive duties. Let us consider what these officials were.

The use of the lot was very general, but the Athenians recognised that there were some functions which lot-appointed officers could not adequately fulfil. And especially success in war depended so much upon personal ability in the leaders, and the consequences of failure were so great, that in military and naval appointments the lot was never used. The ten generals of the state were elected by show of hands in the general assembly, and in the same way their various duties were appointed them. This man is to command the heavy infantry, and take charge of all military expeditions; that man is to take command of the home forces; two others are to look after the harbour of the Piræus. Popular election seems to us, and indeed has been proved by history, to be a wholly inadequate method of distributing military appointments ; but at any rate it was better than the lot. Some of the lower officers also were appointed by vote, and the lowest of all were nominated by the higher ones. In military affairs the lot was not used at all. One or two other officials, whose duties were specially important, were also elected by vote. We may note especially the Commissioners of Springs. The supply of water for Athens was too difficult and too important to be left to an officer elected by lot.

We turn next to the general management and ad-ministration of the state completely in the hands of officials appointed by the drawing of lots

, The vast number of these officials has already been alluded to. It must also be again repeated that most of the offices could not be held a

second time. The system of election by lot as practised at Athens assumes that all Athenian citizens are capable of holding office, and ought often to do so. And by the multiplication of the officials the duties of office were so far cut down as to be really within the power of any citizen of fair capacity and industry.

Let us notice what duties of general administration were in the hands of lot-appointed officials. And on this subject Aristotle's treatise on the Athenian constitution will be our best authority. He enumerates commissioners for the repair of the temples ; city commissioners whose duty it was to see to the drainage of Athens; market commissioners "to see that all articles offered for sale were pure and unadulterated "; commissioners of weights and measures ; commissioners authorised to see that corn was offered for sale at reasonable prices, and that bakers "sold their loaves at a price proportionate to the cost of the wheat" ; the keepers of the state gaol (a curious appointment for the lot), and other judicial officers shortly to be mentioned. At the head of the state, as its nominal representatives, were the nine Archons, elected by lot from the richer classes; for Their office, like that of Mayor in an English municipality, involved a good deal of expense. At the head of the Archons were *the* Archon who gave his name to the year, and, amongst a great many other duties, protected the rights of widows and orphans; the King Archon, the official head of the religion of Athens; the Archon Polemarchus or General, who had once been a leader of the troops, but now was the chief protector of aliens resident in the state. And after these three came the six others, with functions mainly judicial. We **shall glance** at their duties again shortly. Enough **for the**

present that we see a vast swarm of officials settling on Athens, all paid by the state and nearly all elected by lot. Amidst so great a crowd no one was very prominent. The ten generals were doubtless the most powerful officers in the state, but they never attained to any separate authority. They held office for one year only; and at any time during the year it was possible to depose them without any accusation being presented against them. The military administration of the state without question suffered from such arrangements; but the military power was kept in strict subordination to the civic, and the Demos reigned supreme without let or hindrance.

Financial Administration.

There remain yet two important state departments to be considered—the management of finance and the administration of justice. Here the main features of the Athenian constitution repeat themselves. The initiative lay with the general assembly, the superintendence with the Council of 500, the execution with a large number of magistrates elected by lot. Month by month the council laid before the general assembly a statement of the position of the finances. Any new financial measures would be proposed from the Bema on the Pnyx by some popular orator, and would, after discussion, be ratified or rejected by the people. If it were ratified and turned out badly, the proposer was himself responsible, and could be punished by a special legal process. It was from the popular political leader for the time being, Pericles or Themistocles, Thucydides or Cimon, that all fresh financial proposals would come. But the carrying out of them depended upon officers

elected by lot from the mass of citizens, acting only under the superintendence of the council, itself elected by lot. Our chancellor of the exchequer finds his parallel in the public orator; but all the perma-
financial officials, all the auditors and collectors of tax were represented in the Athenian state by men of special training, who owed their appointment for a year to the indiscriminating choice of the lot.

The main sources of revenue of the Athenian state in the time of Pericles were the tribute of the allies, the taxes which were farmed out for collection, and public lands and mines. Direct taxation on income and property was not a regular source of revenue, but was resorted to in emergencies. The tribute of the allies was collected by officers called Hellenotamiai, probably elected by lot. The farming of taxes and the renting of public lands and mines were carried out by a board of ten officers called Poletse, elected by lot. They presented to the council a record of such sales and of the dates on which payments were due from the buyers. All these payments were made to ten Receivers-General (Apodectæ), ten officers elected by lot, one from each tribe. They struck off the payments from the lists, noted any failures to pay, and reported them to the council, which had the power of imprisoning the defaulters until such payment was made. The day after the money was received it was portioned out among the various officials who presided over the spending departments. As a check upon the system there was a board of auditors or accountants (Logistæ). In the time of Aristotle they were elected by lot from the members of the council. As the council was itself elected by lot, this limitation was no sort of guarantee for even moderate

ability. There is no stranger feature in the administrative system of Athens than the relegation of duties, that are now regarded as wanting such special capacity, to lot-elected officers. Ten times in the year these magistrates audited the accounts of all financial officials ; with special attention, doubtless, at the end of the financial year, when the new officials entered on their duties.

Such, omitting many details, were the main features of the Athenian financial system. What guarantees were there for honesty and efficiency? For honesty there was an excellent guarantee. Between officials elected by lot, holding office only for a year, and always associated with many colleagues, the collusion necessary to fraud was almost impossible. And besides this, all officials had to face an examination of their conduct before they laid down their office. It was open to any one to bring an accusation on such an occasion, and the case would then be tried before the ordinary judicial tribunals. And although we may not rate the standard of honesty very highly in Athens, malversation of public funds was not one of the evils from which the state suffered. The efficiency of the system is much more doubtful. Athens must have paid dearly for her worship of the average man, her suspicion of special ability. In the Periclean age the income of the state was so great, the standard of life so simple, that no difficulty was experienced in meeting the requirements of the state. But later, when misfortunes had fallen on Athens and the resources of the state were hardly equal to the requirements of her ambition, the lack of better initiative than the general assembly could supply, and of more personal control than was possible with the army of lot-elected officials, was so keenly felt that an

alteration was made in the system, and a number of superintendents of finance elected by vote.

The Administration of the Law.

We have seen how the democracy in the general assembly (ecclesia) was the one supreme authority in the Athenian state, so far as regards internal administration and foreign affairs. We shall now see that the administration of the law was no check upon the absolute power of the *Demos*. All absolute rulers, from the Caesars to Louis XIV., have felt that in the administration of the law a limit might be placed to their powers, and have tried therefore to get the administration into their own hands. The same tendency can be traced in the history of the "Tyrant *Demos*" of Athens. The Areopagus had exercised a jurisdiction uncontrolled by any popular force, and for that reason had been shorn of nearly the whole of its judicial powers. And now the people were as supreme in the judicial as in the financial matters. To understand this we must look at the judicial authorities of Athens in the time of Pericles.

In petty cases lot-elected officers could decide without appeal to a jury. Thirty men chosen by lot from the body of the people made the circuit of the whole of Attica, and all cases "where the damages claimed did not exceed ten drachmae" (about eight shillings) were brought before them for a final decision. In more important cases also it was possible to get the matter settled without going before the popular jury. For there was a class of arbitrators (*Diätetæ*) before whom civil cases of importance could be brought in the first instance. It was their duty to try to bring the parties to an agreement. If that proved impossible, they gave a

decision upon the point at issue. But either party could appeal from this decision to the popular jury. These arbitrators were the nearest approach to judges that we find in the Athenian state, and it is therefore well to note how they were appointed. They were selected by lot from citizens sixty years of age. And not only was the arbitrator chosen by lot but the man so chosen was forced to serve. "The law enacts," says Aristotle, "that any one who does not serve as arbitrator when he has arrived at the necessary age shall lose his civic rights, unless he happens to be holding some other office during that year or to be out of the country." The disregard and indeed dislike of special talent and training in the servants of the state that is characteristic of the Athenian democracy could hardly be pushed further. But the great popular juries are of infinitely more importance than travelling justices or arbitrators, and these we will examine at once.

First for the constitution of the jury. Democratic feeling doubtless demanded that in judicial matters as everywhere else the will of the people should be supreme. And trials by the popular assembly had at one time existed; but, as trials multiplied in number with the increasing complexity of Athenian society, constant appeal to the popular assembly would obviously be nearly impossible. The problem was how to secure popular control of trials at law without having recourse to the general assembly. The solution was found in the jury system. At the beginning of each year six thousand Athenian citizens over thirty years of age—probably more than a quarter of the whole—were elected by lot. These six thousand were, again by lot, divided into ten sections of five hundred each, thus

leaving one thousand who belonged to no section, and these thousand were held over as a reserve. Each man knew to which of the ten sections he belonged, and the section was known by a letter of the alphabet.

Let us look now at the procedure whereby the case was brought before and decided by one of these juries. The first application was made to one of the nine archons. He was a lot-elected officer and had no jurisdiction whatever. His duties were purely formal. Defendant and plaintiff appeared before him and explained the nature of the case. He made no comment and gave no opinion. He only put down the case among those that were to come up for trial, and decided on what day the trial was to take place. And when the day arrived he had a further duty. He decided by the drawing of lots which of the ten juries was to sit upon the case. When this had been decided, proclamation was made that such and such a jury was summoned to such and such a court to try a certain case. Those who attended received at the close of the day two obols (about 3d.) for the performance of their duties. But no one was obliged to attend. The number sitting on different cases varied, therefore, very considerably. If enough jurors did not put in an appearance, another jury would be called upon. For important cases sometimes two or more juries were summoned.

When the trial began the jury thus constituted was supreme and its judgment was final. No judge presided over the trial to direct the decision and check the statements of counsel. There was indeed a presiding officer, but he was merely the submissive clerk of the jury, in no sense their superior or guide. The juryment listened to the pleadings on both sides, heard the

evidence, which was prepared in writing beforehand and submitted to no cross-examination, decided on matters of fact and questions of law, and finally, without any possibility of appeal, gave the verdict, affixed the punishment, or assessed the damages. On no question was the unanimity of the jury necessary: a bare majority decided.

If we compare an Athenian trial with an English one, the difference is very marked. The whole character of the two ceremonials is completely different. In Athens everything was in the hands of men without special training. The judges of to-day were ordinary citizens to-morrow. The pleaders were not men of special legal knowledge. Plaintiff and defendant spoke in person, and if they delivered speeches prepared for them, they had been prepared, not by a professional lawyer, but by a skilled rhetorician. The whole proceedings were conducted by amateurs. In England the professed object of all the minute details is to eliminate causes of error and to make truth more certain of attainment. In Athens one may say that the giving of a true verdict was by no means the one great end of a trial at law; but rather the supremacy of the people and the procuring of obedience to their decision. The speaker desired not to prove but to persuade, and as there was no limitation put upon him as to the facts he brought forward or the way in which he treated them, the forensic speakers of Athens often diverged wide of the point at issue and appealed directly to the emotions and passions of the jury. The proceedings were interrupted by cries of approval or the contrary. The defendant often introduced his wife and children into the court, that their tears might supplement his arguments. The

tone and spirit of the proceedings were rather those of a public meeting than of an English trial at law.

And how did the Athenian system work? **In** many ways well. It prevented bribery, and it procured obedience to the decisions given. For bribery was almost impossible where the jury might consist of five hundred men, whose names could not be known until the day of the trial. And as Greek officials were not unusually afflicted with "the itching palm," this is very great praise for the Athenian system. And the decision of the jury was accepted. For the jury, being a large committee of the sovereign people taken at haphazard, represented the sovereign people and excluded the possibility of a decision in the interests of an individual or a clique. The whole strength of the democracy was behind the decisions of the jury, and they were therefore accepted with a readiness that would not in Athens have been given to any single official or any professional class. The Athenians claimed for themselves with justice that they were a law-abiding people; and it is probably a greater social advantage that verdicts should be accepted without question than that they should be invariably accurate. But it is very evident that with such a procedure no great system of law could grow up. The experience of centuries has proved how necessary in a complex society is special legal knowledge and a fully developed system of law. But **in** Athens nothing of the sort could arise. The idea of law came into the world not from Greece but **from Rome.**

The Athenian Method of making Laws.

In the ancient world laws were neither so numerous nor so important as with us. In England the chief

work of Parliament is the making of laws for the people. But a great deal of the work of Parliament in framing laws would be accomplished by the general assembly at Athens in the shape of directions given to the assembly and officers for the general administration of the state. And what there was of Athenian law was not very technical. "Athenian law never got beyond the rudimentary state: it remained merely a list of rules or precepts for conduct, with apparently little attempt at scientific arrangement."

At the beginning of every year all the laws of Athens were read over before the general assembly. It was then open to any citizen to propose the abolition of some existing law or the adoption of a new one. At a later period of the year a certain number, which varied but was always large, was chosen by lot from the six thousand jurymen who were serving for the year. At the same time public advocates were named to defend the laws that were attacked. The question of the adoption or rejection of the new proposal was then brought before the selected section of jurymen (called for this special purpose *Nomothetæ*, or law-makers), and the matter was argued out exactly as if it were an ordinary trial at law. If a majority of the *Nomothetæ* voted in favour of the proposal, it became law at once; it against it, it was rejected. The object of the whole procedure is to keep the power of making laws in the hands of the people. The general assembly is too large a body to devote the necessary attention to the proposal. From the general assembly a large committee is taken at haphazard. No attempt is made to procure specially able men: they must represent merely the general character and ability of the whole people. **And**

for the time they are clothed with the authority of the sovereign people, and in its name make laws.

We have glanced rapidly at the chief features of the Athenian democracy. We must now attempt the extremely difficult task of estimating its success. There are two points of view from which all governments may be judged—the external and the internal. That is, we may ask, firstly, how far they succeeded in achieving the object at which they aimed; and, secondly what their effect was upon the citizens themselves. Both points must be borne in mind in estimating the Athenian democracy. We will look first at the judgment of contemporaries, and then consider the question in the light of subsequent history.

The Funeral Oration of Pericles.

Thucydides, in the thirty-fifth chapter of the second book, puts into the mouth of Pericles an eulogy of the Athenian democracy. We need not here inquire how far it represents the actual statements of Pericles and how far those of the historian. It is, at any rate, a notable contemporary judgment of the Athenian state. It is there claimed that the democracy exhibits greatness and nobility of character, and at the same time has achieved the greatest distinction in war—that Athens is both admirable and successful. The whole speech is of such singular beauty and possesses such unity as a work of art that it is hard to make extracts from it. But some of the most striking passages must be quoted.

Of the internal condition of the state Pericles says: "There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes ;

we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts ; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment. And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil ; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year ; at home the style of our life is refined ; and the delight that we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. . . . Our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace ; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household, and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. . . . To sum up : I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace."

Pericles further claims for Athens that their refinement has not enervated them for action ; that with less strenuous preparation they are as successful in war as the Spartans. " Our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or

prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret, if revealed to an enemy, might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face." For confirmation of his statements he points to the Athenian Empire. "In the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city ; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages. . . . For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity." No more splendid panegyric has ever been pronounced on a state, and the verdict of history must assuredly be that at the time when it was pronounced it was, in the main, deserved.

Later Contemporary Criticism of the Athenian Democracy.

The age of Pericles marks the highest point in the character and the achievement of the Athenian democracy. The position was indeed exceptional. The great personal ascendancy of Pericles gave to the government of Athens a cohesion and concentration that was not guaranteed by its institutions. The democratic form of government was, moreover, of recent date, and we must look to a later period for an example of its normal

working. It will be well therefore to put side by side with the eulogy of Pericles a hostile criticism from a later age. And such a criticism we find in the *Republic* of Plato. Athens is not indeed mentioned by name, but it is evident that Athens is taken as the typical democracy when democratic institutions are criticised. Plato is in some respects an unfair witness, for it was an Athenian jury that had condemned his master, Socrates, to death, and it is clear that he had not forgotten or forgiven that outrage; but, with that reservation, the criticism is full of interest and instruction for us. Plato demands in a state the same strenuousness of character, the same fixity of purpose, as in an individual. He finds that democracy is the direct negation of any discipline in life. The only wisdom of a democratic politician is to flatter the people, and the democratic regime, if prolonged, leads down into complete moral anarchy. A few extracts will give the general tone of the criticism, which is often written in a spirit of bantering irony.

Here is an interesting picture of an assembly of the people: "When they meet together and the world sits down at an assembly or in a court of law . . . or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said and done, or blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have **the notions of good or evil** which the public **in general have?**

He will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be " (Republic, 492).

And here is Plato's picture of the demagogue: "I might compare him to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him : he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds when another utters them he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further that when, by continually attending on him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute " (Republic, 493).

Later Plato describes "the democratic man," the typical product of a democracy. "He does not receive any true word of advice ; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head, and says that they are all alike and that one is as good as another. . . . He lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics ; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to bis

feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction ; or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom : and so he goes on " (Republic, 561).

The society corresponding to such an individual is described as follows : " In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike: and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of gaiety; they are loath to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young. . . . And I must add that no one who does not know would believe how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other state; for truly the dog, as the proverb says, is as good as his master, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen, and they will run at any one who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them; and all things are just ready to burst with liberty. . . . And above all, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them " (Republic, 563).

A Criticism of the Athenian Democracy.

It seems necessary in conclusion, however difficult the task, to attempt some criticism of the Athenian

democracy as a whole. We will consider, firstly, what its influence was upon the intellectual development of Athens; and, secondly, how it worked as an instrument of administration and government.

1. That the true task of Greece was intellectual and artistic will be denied by no one. And clearly in this task Athens had a greater share than all the rest of the Greek states put together. What then was the connection between this ever-memorable achievement and the democratic government of Athens? The connection is surely not wholly an accidental one: the services of the democracy to art and thought are not small. For the government of Athens allowed men far greater liberty of thought and speech than was to be found elsewhere in Greece; and freedom of thought is the first, though not the only, condition of intellectual development. If Socrates was put to death and Anaxagoras driven from Athens for opposition to popular opinions and beliefs, they would not have been able to develop their opinions so long with impunity elsewhere in Greece. Socrates indeed is represented by Plato as refusing to accept exile in place of death on this very ground, that no other state would permit him to carry on his philosophical discussions with the freedom that he had found in Athens. And if these considerations apply less to art than to thought, the poets and artists of Athens still owed much to the free atmosphere of the Athenian democracy. Traditional rules were more easily neglected, new developments were more readily welcomed. And the experience of the general assembly and the jury courts quickened in a remarkable fashion the intellect of the Athenian citizens; and if, in the end, the moral effects of the **system were** rather **evil than good**, it gave for a time

to the poets of Athens an audience of unequalled powers of discrimination and appreciation. But much beyond this it is impossible to go. It is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to state the conditions under which art and thought best flourish. Their vigour or decay does not, at any rate, depend solely or mainly on forms of government. They have flourished and they have languished under every kind of ruler. And Athens' greatest intellectual glory falls, not in the period of unbridled democracy that followed the death of Pericles, but while the people, not yet fully conscious of their own power, recognised authorities beyond their own will, while the old religious faiths were strong, while the Areopagus was regarded with veneration, or Pericles ruled with an authority greater than that of a king. If the democracy is to take all the credit for the early splendour of Athenian art and thought, it must also take all the blame of their later decay. In truth it was only a subordinate cause of both the one and the other.

Plato implies that the democracy has produced deterioration in the Athenian character. With the occupation of supreme power has come the loss of the sentiments of loyalty and obedience. The will of the people, and in many matters the will of the individual, is the sole criterion of right or wrong. And other thinkers of great power make in effect the same criticism : Aristophanes repeats it, and Xenophon and Aristotle. It is indisputable that moral deterioration had come on Athens by the middle of the fourth century. The fellow-citizens of Demosthenes have not the tenacity and the vigour that characterise the Athenians of the Periclean age. There is danger of exaggeration ; yet that virtue had gone out of the Athenian people is without question.

But while the influence of the democracy has to bear its share of the blame for the deterioration, it is surely not the sole nor the most important cause. The institutions that most influence the character were growing weak. Religion was losing its hold; the family, always weak, showed no signs of growing stronger. In Athens then the influence of the government upon the character of the citizens was far greater than it was in Rome and than it is in most modern states. Self-complacency and vanity were the chief vices that the Athenian character exhibited towards the end of the era of independence, and these vices must have been largely fostered by the flattery of demagogues and the undisputed tenure of supreme power. Yet to the last the Athenian democracy exhibits many fine characteristics—intellectual alertness, humanity, patriotism.

2. But after all our judgment on the Athenian democracy will depend mainly on the way in which it performed the task of government. Did it secure order and progress? Did it accomplish the ends, military or administrative, that the Athenian people set before themselves? If we base our judgment entirely upon a comparison of Athens with other contemporary states of Greece, our verdict must be favourable. For order and quiet government at home Athens is really far ahead of Sparta and Thebes, Argos and Corinth. And though she was crushed in war by Sparta, and though her empire, after a temporary splendour, crumbled to pieces, yet in the task of conquest and administration democratic Athens does better than oligarchic Sparta did after her rival's overthrow. But if we take a higher standpoint—if we judge the Athenian democracy, not merely in comparison to contemporary governments, but in the light of

universal history, we cannot allow it to take a high place among the governments of the world. If I have rightly analysed the working and spirit of the Athenian democracy in the preceding paragraphs, its characteristics are the complete supremacy of the mass meetings of the people, jealousy of conspicuous merit in the officers of state, the satisfaction of the sentiment of equality preferred to the furtherance of public business. It is not for a moment denied that along with these characteristics went some of the noblest kind—remarkable skill in the details of the constitution, great magnanimity, a tolerance and absence of vindictiveness unparalleled in that age and country. But if we consider the democracy merely as an engine of government, these points are not so important as those above mentioned. And, as a result, the action of the government lacked rapidity, continuity, and tenacity. With such an instrument it was impossible even for great statesmen like Themistocles, Pericles, and Demosthenes to accomplish the task which they felt to be most necessary for Greece—the formation of a power, strong and united, capable of resisting the attacks of barbarian enemies. Greece provided the ideas of civilisation : it was left to Rome to give the material basis on which they could grow and spread. There can be no more striking contrast than that between these two great states, to both of which civilisation owes so much. The divergence is equally marked in government and society. Everything in Rome breathes the spirit of subordination and loyalty. The respect in which the family was held gave coherence and strength to the whole of society. The loyal obedience of each man to his political superior, the devotion of all to the state, gave Rome in her dealings with foreign powers an unequalled tenacity.

The Athenian democracy compared to the government of Rome is like a pleasure-yacht in comparison to an iron-clad. It is hard to pass from the Athenian democracy with a hostile verdict, but it seems impossible to deny that when it had reached its greatest development it exhibited the gravest defects, whether for guidance in time of war or administration during peace.

NOTE.—I must acknowledge my great indebtedness in this chapter to J. W. Headlam's *Election by Lot at Athens* (Cambridge University Press). The last half of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* (see note to ch, iv.) gives a clear and interesting account of the actual working of the Athenian Constitution. Grote's defence of the democracy is to be found everywhere in his history. Note perhaps especially chs. xlvi., xlvi. For Curtius' views see Book III., chs. ii., iii. The quotations from Plato and Thucydides in this chapter are from Jowett's translation.



STONE BEMA.



ATHENE.

CHAPTER VIII.

PERICLES : HIS POLICY AND HIS FRIENDS.

Pericles' Private Life.

PERICLES' ancestors had played a prominent part in Greek history, and the part they had played made it almost impossible for their descendant, if he became a man of note, to take his stand on the conservative side. His father was Xanthippus, who had commanded the Athenians at the battle of Mycale, when the land and sea forces of Persia were so entirely defeated. And ten years before that (489) he had acquired notoriety in a **more** questionable way by impeaching Miltiades, the hero

of Marathon, for failure in his expedition against Paros. As a result of this accusation Miltiades had been condemned to a heavy fine, and died before it was paid. Cimon, the great conservative leader, was the son of Miltiades. The accusation and its results were not to be lightly forgotten, and the sons of the two opponents of 489 naturally were themselves opponents in the later political contests. His descent on his mother's side was an even more decidedly liberal influence. His mother was Agariste, a descendant of Clisthenes, the celebrated tyrant of Sicyon, and the niece of that Clisthenes who, after the expulsion of the Pisistratids, laid the foundation of the later Athenian democracy. Clisthenes belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonidæ; one of the foremost of Athenian families, but supposed to be tainted with religious pollution. For at the beginning of Greek history, in the seventh century B.C., a certain nobleman, Cylon, had plotted to seize the Acropolis and master Athens. The plot was frustrated. Cylon himself escaped, but a number of his adherents had been put to death, in spite, so it was alleged, of promises of safety and the protection of the deity to whose altars they clung. The men who had been guilty of this murder and sacrilege belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonidæ, and the insult offered by them to the deity was supposed to taint the whole family and all its descendants. It shows how strong was the vein of superstition running through all the vigorous intellectual life of Greece, that more than a century and a half after the offence had been committed the opponents of Pericles found it worth their while to bring the charge of pollution against him.

Pericles was born, perhaps, in the year 493, certainly

about that date. He must have had some recollection of the flight to Salamis and the triumphant return. The years of his life when impressions are most vivid and lasting were full of the triumphs of Hellas, in which Athens took a leading and an ever-increasing part. If, as a politician, he rated the strength of Athens too highly, her career during the time of his manhood must have seemed to justify the most sanguine anticipations. The political environment of his youth has been sufficiently dwelt on. Its intellectual character also deserves noting. The steady faith, the fixed ideals of the age of the Persian wars were giving way before a new intellectual movement and the philosophical criticism that was born in Asia Minor. The old and the new existed side by side. Æschylus and Pindar, with their unwavering faith, are contemporaries of philosophers who had rejected every particle of the orthodox Greek mythology; they are contemporary with the youth, if not with the activity, of men as thoroughly representative of the age of analysis and scepticism as Euripides and Socrates. And to the newer rather than the earlier age Pericles belongs. We know nothing of those details of his early life and education which a modern biographer would take care to give us. Doubtless his early training was that of the ordinary Athenian boy—a cultivation of the mind and the body: reading, writing, and methods of calculation, with the poems of Homer as the basis for all intellectual and moral culture. But the city life of Athens must have been for him and for most Athenian youths the chief source of training and knowledge. As he advanced in years the intellectual currents of the time began to affect him, and we have sufficient information on this point to allow us to say who were his

chief teachers and what was the bent of his mind and tastes. Zeno of Elea, Anaxagoras, and Damon are mentioned as Pericles' teachers in philosophy. Whatever divergencies there were between these three, they had all abandoned the mythological explanation of the universe and were seeking for some new basis of life. Zeno's influence upon Pericles does not seem to have been great. Plutarch tells us that Pericles attended his lectures on natural philosophy, and implies that he was especially attracted by his dialectical skill, for "Zeno had made an especial study of how to reduce any man to silence who questioned him, and how to enclose him between the horns of a dilemma": a power that would be often valuable to Pericles in the ecclesia. Damon was especially known as a "musician"; but the word in Greek would cover much more than with us, and might include all philosophy. Plutarch tells us that it was political philosophy that he taught under the name of music: "he trained Pericles for his political contests as a trainer prepares an athlete for the games." That Damon connected music with politics we know from a passage of Plato, and his political interests are shown also by the testimony of Plutarch, who records that he was ostracised eventually "as a busybody and lover of despotism." But more important than either of these was Anaxagoras. He was a physical philosopher, and continued the speculative task that had been begun by Thales. All the philosophers of the time strove to explain and understand the world without reference to supernatural causes. The earlier thinkers had found the cause of all things in matter itself. Anaxagoras found it in something independent of matter, and the something he called "Nous"—Intelligence— "In the

beginning all things were Chaos; then there came Intelligence and set all things in order." He lived in close intimacy with Pericles, and became for that reason an object of dislike to the opponents of Pericles. From this teacher Pericles derived two great advantages. In the first place, his acceptance of the system of Anaxagoras gave him an elevation and cohesion of thought that lifted him above the entanglement of petty political details and passions. "It gave him," says Plutarch, "a haughty spirit and a lofty style of oratory, far removed from vulgarity and low buffoonery, and also an imperturbable gravity of countenance and a calmness of demeanour and appearance which no incident could disturb as he was speaking, while the tone of his voice never showed that he heeded any interruption." And it freed him from the superstitious fears common to most of the Greeks and often injurious to action. Herodotus shows us a serious check in the battle of Plataea because the omens would not allow the Spartan king to order the attack; other instances are not wanting in Greek history of serious actions done or left undone because of omens and prodigies. From this disturbing element of superstition Pericles was completely emancipated. A story told by Plutarch is here worth quoting as typical of Pericles and of the time: "It is said that once a ram with one horn was sent from the country as a present to Pericles, and that Lampon the prophet, as soon as he saw this stray horn growing out of the middle of the creature's forehead, said that as there were two parties in the state, that of Thucydides and that of Pericles, he who possessed this mystic animal would unite the two into one. Anaxagoras cut open the beast's skull, and pointed **our**

that its brain did not fill the whole space, but was sunken into the shape of an egg, and all collected at that part from which the horn grew. At the time all men looked with admiration on Anaxagoras, but afterwards, when Thucydides had fallen and all the state had become united under Pericles, they admired Lampon equally."

Art as well as philosophy claimed his attention ; but before we speak of his relations to the great sculptor Phidias, it is better to speak of the woman who exercised over him so great an influence. Of the position of women in Greece more will be said in the next chapter. We have already seen how subordinate it was. The Athenian women of pure birth could not, as a rule, read or write. They lived a life of complete seclusion in apartments set apart for them. Without exaggerating the evils of their position, it is clear that men of the highest culture in Athens did not and could not find intellectual companionship in the citizen-women of Athens. But there was another class of women in the city—the *Hetæraë*. We translate the word courtesans, but the translation is a little misleading. Their position was recognised and accepted by the thought and sentiment of the time, and though some of them lived in complete degradation, others formed unions with Athenian citizens which, though the law could not recognise them, approached in many respects more nearly to the ideal of marriage than the legitimate marriages of Athens. To this class belonged Aspasia. We know little about her, and though some scholars have tried to develop a life of her from that little, the attempt has not been successful. She was a native of Miletus. How and when she came to Athens is quite uncertain. Pericles,



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VIEW OF THE PARTHENON.

when first he knew her, was married to a relation, and neither party to the union was satisfied with it. The marriage tie sat lightly on Athenians. Though two sons had been born to him, Pericles separated from his wife, "handed her over," is Plutarch's expression, "to another husband"; and shortly afterwards he began to live with Aspasia, and lived with her to his death.

The glimpses that we get of her and of her influence are most tantalising. Of few women in Greek history do we know so much, but there is no Greek woman of whom we so desire to know more. That Pericles was passionately devoted to her is certain. Plutarch repeats a contemporary report that "he never went in or out of his house without kissing her." The only occasion when Pericles broke through his Olympian calm was when Aspasia's life was in danger. At her trial, to be mentioned later, he wept as he asked the jury not to strike so heavy a blow at himself as her death would bring. Her influence on him was largely due to intellectual sympathies. What her opinions were we cannot ascertain; but she was the friend of Socrates, Phidias, and most eminent Athenians of that great age, and that is a sufficiently strong tribute to her intellect. It seems also highly probable that she was dissatisfied with the position of women in Athens, and tried to change it. Some scandal was caused in Athenian society because some prominent citizens brought their wives to listen to her discourses, and the probability is great that those discourses were often of the need for a better education and a fuller life for women, in order that marriages might be more satisfactory. The irregularity of her position, the eminence of Pericles and her influence over him, made her the natural mark for the arrows of his

political opponents. The comic poets, who filled in Athens, to some degree, the place occupied by the newspaper press of to-day, were full of sallies against her. She was alluded to as Omphale, the woman who bewitched Hercules; as Deianira, the wife of Hercules, and the cause of his death. Or she was called Hera, the consort of the "Olympian" Pericles, and under this title allusion was made to the dominant influence that she was supposed to exercise over the affairs of Athens. Of Aspasia's political influence there is, however, no evidence at all. Personal and intellectual companionship he found with her, but in his political measures he took his cue from no one.

Phidias has been mentioned as one of the frequenters of the salon of Aspasia, and he deserves further notice in order to emphasise the artistic interests of Pericles. Phidias, by general consent the world's greatest sculptor, had already in Cimon's time been employed in decorating Athens. The facts of his life are wrapped in a most annoying obscurity, but it is certain that before Pericles arrived at power, about 445 B.C., Phidias had already gained a great reputation. Statues from his chisel had been sent to Delphi in commemoration of the victories over the Persians. Already he had fashioned the colossal statue of Athena Promachus (the defender of Athens) which stood close to the entrance of the Acropolis. But his great opportunity came when Pericles assumed the real management of Athenian affairs. Between the statesman and the sculptor there were many grounds for sympathy. For Phidias's devotion to his art did not prevent him from taking a keen interest in the intellectual and political movement of the time. Himself an Athenian, he sympathised with the desire of

Pericles to glorify Athens. He was appointed by Pericles general overseer of all the public works of the city, and superintended therefore that rich adornment of Athens which is one of the most important achievements of the Periclean era. But the statesman was not merely the patron of the sculptor ; he was also his intimate friend. We shall see that when Pericles' opponents, fearing as yet to strike directly at him, singled out his closest friends for their attacks, Phidias was one of those most bitterly persecuted.

In personal appearance Pericles was supposed to resemble Pisistratus; though perhaps the resemblance was the invention of his opponents, who asserted that he was aiming at the establishment of a tyranny. He was graceful in figure, we are told, but his head was disproportionately high. And this physical peculiarity was constantly made the subject of allusion by the comic poets, who belonged for the most part to his political opponents. They called him "onion-headed"; they invented all manner of nicknames for him, all drawn from the shape of his head. It was asserted that in all his statues he was represented as wearing his helmet in order to cover this deformity; though his long tenure of the office of strategus (general) made the wearing of the official helmet natural enough. He possessed a very pleasant voice and great fluency of speech.

In his character what impressed his contemporaries most was his serenity, his reserve, his stately calm which they called "Olympian." Though the favour of the ecclesia was the first condition of all his activity, he seemed untouched by its passions. In speaking he used little gesture, never attacked his political opponents, or heeded their attacks upon himself. He had

introduced measures which completed the democracy and led directly to the rule of the demagogues. Some of his measures are certainly not without a taint of demagogism. But in his relations to the people he always adopted the tone of an authoritative counsellor, not of a flatterer or a mere follower of their directions. He did not speak constantly in the ecclesia, but only came forward on special occasions, and the rarity of his utterances added to their influence. It is interesting to hear that he was fond of introducing into his speeches illustrations from natural science. Aristophanes afterwards spoke of him as "thundering and lightning and confounding Greece." But this can refer only to the effect of his speeches, not to their style. Although perfectly fluent in utterance, he wrote his speeches before delivering them, and was the first, we are told, to adopt this custom ; and whenever he mounted the Bema he prayed that nothing unseemly might fall from his lips.

His private life was marked by the same serenity and restraint. We cannot, unfortunately, draw aside the curtain that hides from us his personal intercourse with his friends. We should probably have a different idea of him if we could see him with Aspasia and Socrates, Phidias and Anaxagoras. But the citizens found him austere. He was rarely seen abroad. Men said of him that he was never seen in any street except that which led to the market-place and the ecclesia. Cimon was a constant and welcome guest at the private festivities of the Athenians. But Pericles accepted no invitations. It was said that he was only once seen at any festal gathering; that was at the marriage of his cousin, and then he withdrew very early. This strict retirement is a very curious trait in the successful leader of a democracy. It was

doubtless partly the result of his disposition. He found in Aspasia's salon much more congenial intercourse than among the average citizens of Athens. It may have been partly due to policy and partly to prudence. For though Greece knew little of religious persecution, the fate of Socrates, and the subsequent prosecution of Pericles' friends for impiety, show us how dangerous might be the public expression of the opinions on philosophy and religion that Pericles held.

Philosopher, artist, orator, statesman, demagogue—Pericles is all these. He is an excellent example of the complete and harmonious culture of Athens at this epoch. But before all things else he was a statesman, and it is on his activity as a statesman that his reputation mainly depends.

Pericles as a Statesman.

How Pericles had succeeded in his political struggle with Cimon we have already seen. But Cimon, with his bluff sailor ways and exclusive interest in matters of war, had not been a very effective leader of a political party in a democracy. When he died the conservative party was championed by a relation of the deceased Cimon—Thucydides, the son of Miliesias.* This man devoted all his attention to the political contest, and kept up a regular opposition to Pericles in the ecclesia. The conservative party had now given up all reactionary hopes. The full democracy, with the equality of the citizens and the payment of all political duties, had to be accepted. To overthrow it nothing less than a violent political revolution would have been required. The questions that separated the parties related not to methods of government but to administration. Was

* Not to be confounded with Thucydides the historian.

friendship or enmity to Sparta to be the normal condition of the policy of Athens? Was Athens in her dealings with the league to accept resolutely all the consequences of the imperial position she had gained, or was she still to endeavour to keep up the appearance of equality and liberty? Was the tribute which the "allies" or subjects paid to be expended purely as Athens liked, or were the wishes of those who paid the money to be taken into some consideration? These were the questions that agitated the ecclesia, and the conservative party, with Thucydides as its leader, demanded friendship with Sparta and a tender handling of the allies. The struggle was a very keen one. No compromise, such as had been made with Cimon, was possible. It was really necessary for the due administration of the Athenian state that some decision should be come to. It was the party of Thucydides that made the appeal to ostracism, but when the vote was taken their own leader was condemned (444 B.C.). From this time until his death Pericles was the undisputed master of Athens, and as the whole character of the Athenian state seems determined by a desire to have no master, this undisputed position of Pericles is a phenomenon that deserves further examination and explanation.

The Political Position of Pericles.

The very striking talents of Pericles as well as his stately and commanding character helped to give him his position as unquestioned leader in the state. But they are not sufficient to explain it. At a later period of Athenian history such talents and such a character would probably have made the people rather suspicious than obedient. But in the middle of **the** fifth century

B.C. the democracy was recently founded. The rule of privilege was only just dead. Men were full of gratitude for the new feeling of independence and authority that they had acquired, and grateful to the man who had given it to them. Not yet certain of their ability to use their new powers, they were ready to follow any one whom they knew to be wholly on the popular side. The abuse of power and the sceptical influences of the time had not yet destroyed the sentiments of reverence and admiration. Not yet did the people "regard it as monstrous that they should not be allowed to do what they liked." It was fortunate for Pericles that he came at this epoch. After his death no one ever again was able to acquire the commanding influence that he held.

The basis of his power was the Bema on the Pnyx, from which he addressed the general assembly. He held important offices in the state, and they were valuable to him, for they allowed him to see that the policy which had been adopted on his proposition should be carried out in the spirit of the proposer. But in themselves they would not have given him the guidance of the Athenian state. He was the leader of the people because when he spoke in the assembly they listened; what he advised they adopted. There was no position in the state that could in any way rival that. Most of the officers were appointed by lot. All held office for a year only, and the most important, the generals, might be deposed during the course of the year upon the unexplained vote of the people. Until a people is so far carried away by the passion for equality as to prefer the gratification of that sentiment to solid success and good administration, it must feel the necessity for some guidance. From the ordinary offices of the state no

such guidance could come ; and so the place was left empty for the orator in the ecclesia. And Pericles was an orator of great fluency and persuasive power, and in addition a statesman of high rank.

At the election to those offices which were not given by lot the people again and again testified their full confidence in Pericles. Fifteen times he was elected Strategus (General). He had again and again proved his capacity as a commander, both by land and sea, and this office gave him the right, when hostilities broke out, to take the lead in military operations. But if he guided the policy of the people, it was not as Strategus, but as leader of the people in the general assembly. And besides the office of general, he from time to time held many others. We do not hear of his election to those offices that were determined by lot; though he must certainly have passed through these with the rest of the Athenians. He was, however, elected to the post of Director of the Public Works, and in this capacity co-operated with Phidias and other artists in the adornment of Athens. In this capacity vast sums of money passed through his hands, and his influence must have been very great. We hear of him, too, directing the fortifications and the preparation of war material, and arranging the public festivals of Athens.

But upon his power in the ecclesia everything depended, and what his conduct there was Thucydides has told us in some striking sentences. "Deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth being also a man of transparent integrity, he was able to control the multitude in a free spirit: he led them rather than was led by them; for not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the

strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unreasonably elated and arrogant his words humbled and awed them, and when they were depressed by groundless fears he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen. But his successors were more on an equality with one another, and, each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the moment." The government of Athens under Pericles was indeed, whatever its official title, a popular dictatorship. It gave to Athens the concentration and consistency of policy that later she so terribly lacked, and at the same time she enjoyed the fullest personal liberty, and every citizen felt that the greatness of the city was his own.

Pericles' Policy.

It is now time to consider what Pericles' policy was with regard to the various important questions which Athens had to decide. And, omitting the question of the internal constitution of Athens, which had already been settled, there were (i) the relation of Athens to Sparta, (ii) the treatment of the allies, (iii) the domestic and internal policy of Athens.

1. ATHENS AND SPARTA.

On this question the democratic and the conservative party had since Cimon's time stood in opposition. The latter necessarily looked to Sparta for support to those ancient institutions of the state which were jeopardised by the new democracy. Often they had taken a much higher ground. We have already seen how, when

earthquake and revolt endangered the very existence of Sparta, Cimon had supported their appeal to Athens on grounds of Panhellenic patriotism. Sparta and Athens were natural yokefellows. If Sparta were wounded, Greece would be lame of one leg. And the conservative party had carried on this same policy even after the insult that Athens had received at Ithome. Sparta and Athens, they said, were both necessary to a complete Greece. If they could not be bound together in alliance, they should at any rate be friends and well-wishers, and every opportunity of strengthening friendship should be seized. The democratic party, and Pericles, its supreme leader, took up the opposite policy. According to them, Athens and Sparta could not be friends. The divergence in character and in objects was so great as to make hostility the normal relation between them. War Pericles regarded as inevitable, and he desired to use the interval of peace that the thirty years' truce (445) had given in preparations for the great struggle. "We must be aware," he says in one of the speeches attributed to him by Thucydides (i. 44), "that war will come, and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our [enemies.be](#) to lay hands on us." With the war constantly before his eyes, he desired to organise the state up to its utmost military capacity. He desired no expansion of empire ; he did his best to control the hot-headed politicians who talked of the invincibility of the Athenian navy, and proposed expeditions against Sicily or Carthage or Italy. The resources of Athens he knew would not be too great for the coming struggle, even if they were carefully economised and concentrated upon it. Dispersion of resources must lead to the ruin of Athens.

If we accept Pericles' policy of hostility to Sparta as the right one, we cannot fail to remark and admire the way in which he prepares for the struggle. And though the issue of the war when it came proved quite opposite to his anticipations, its course showed how justly he had pointed out the rocks on which Athens finally was wrecked. But what are we to say of the policy of hostility itself? At first sight the nineteenth-century reader sympathises entirely with Cimon and his policy of conciliation. Weary of the jealousies between European powers, he sees in the policy of Pericles only something analogous to the jealousy between France and Germany or England and France. But the conditions are entirely different. The political problem before Greece was to secure for civilisation such a broad and stable basis as has existed in Europe for some centuries. The problem could not, of course, be stated in these terms at the time of which we speak, but there is sufficient evidence to show that Pericles saw the necessity of securing a state more stable than the isolated cities of Greece could provide. The past history of Greece showed how incapable Sparta was of combining with Athens for a common cause, how incapacitated she was by her good as well as by her bad qualities for guiding the common destinies of Greece. No statesman could hope after recent experiences to bridge over the gulf that separated Athens from Sparta. It remained then for Athens alone to undertake the task in which Sparta would not assist. No one will say that she made no mistakes, or even that she showed the qualities requisite for a great success. But if Greek civilisation was to survive on a basis of political independence the task must be accomplished. We may therefore sympathise fully with the attempt of Pericles to found a great

and coherent Athenian empire, and it is because he failed in this task and no other state in Greece came so near to success that we are obliged to welcome the incorporation of Greece first in Macedon and then in Rome.

2. THE TREATMENT OF THE ALLIED STATES.

It is from the same point of view that we can best understand the development of the relations between Athens and those states that were formerly her allies and now had become her subjects. By what process the change had come has already been sufficiently shown. By the faults of the allies themselves and by the faults of Athens, through natural development and through careful policy, Athens now found herself the mistress city of a large maritime empire, instead of the president of an equal confederacy. It is impossible to approve of the whole of Athens' conduct in the matter. The desire to rule had been one of the chief causes of the change. And Athens showed no tendency to anticipate Rome in giving the privileges of her own citizenship, in greater or less degree, to the subject states. The tendency was rather the opposite, for during the rule of Pericles there was a purging of the ranks of citizenship and a reduction in the number of those who could claim the privilege. The democracy of Athens in relation to the allies was nothing except the "Tyrant Demos." But when we consider how the activities of Greece were wasted in the petty squabbles of insignificant cities, we can only welcome the development of a larger state, even if the early stages of that development are not free from acts of injustice.

Pericles insisted that Athens should not consent for an instant to abandon her imperial position. The Ægean

Sea must become an Athenian preserve. A squadron of sixty triremes cruised for the greater part of the year among the islands, a standing menace to all who were thinking of revolt, and a school for the training of Athenian citizens in the difficult evolutions that were now necessary in Greek naval war. When in 440 Samos, *one* of the last of the allies that still remained independent, rebelled against Athens, Pericles himself commanded the expedition, and reduced the recalcitrant island to obedience with considerable severity. According to Greek ideas, Athens had no other right to do this than the right of the stronger. The sentiments expressed by an Athenian in the pages of Thucydides with regard to the matter probably represent the general feeling of the state. "An empire was offered to us: can you wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we accepted it and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, ambition, fear, and interest? We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. . . . Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force what he could?" But though the Athenian Empire was an usurpation, Pericles strove to justify it, so far as might be, by equitable dealing with the subjects. The tribute lists show us that soon after his death the tribute was considerably increased. Pericles recognised that Athenian rule rested on the right of the stronger; but whilst he was alive Athens never used her power with the brutality that was exhibited after his death. Pericles saw that in the interests of Athens herself the subject states must be tenderly handled.

The states complained that independence was denied

them, and that the payment of tribute was a mark of their servile position. But there were two other grievances not so clearly bound up with the empire which were also bitterly resented. And as both were developed under the rule of Pericles they claim mention here.

The first was the *Cleruchies*, or settlements of Athenian citizens in the island states. About the middle of the fifth century these plantations began to be made systematically, though something of the kind had always been known. In states that had been subdued after revolt or that were too weak to resist, Athenian citizens were planted as a garrison of occupation. These settlements did not form colonies ; for a Greek colony was always independent of the mother state. The settlers remained Athenian citizens, sharing in the benefits and the dignity of Athens, and their purpose was to watch the surrounding population, to report any signs of revolt or to repress an actual outbreak. The land occupied by them had of course been taken from the subject state. It is certain too that the Athenian settlers regarded themselves as the superiors of those among whom they lived, and treated them with contempt. There were thus material and sentimental reasons for the bitter hate that was felt against them. Eubœa and the Chersonese, Naxos, Andros, Lemnos, Imbros, were among the places where Athenian citizens were to be found in permanent occupation. A glance at the map will show that most of these states lie between Athens and the Black Sea, and they were probably partly intended to secure the Athenian corn supply, that came mainly from that quarter.

The other grievance was the transference of the decision of trials from the state where the offence took place to the Athenian law courts. Perhaps we do not know the


details of this system quite sufficiently to feel confident of our verdict in the matter. But we know that for some time before the Peloponnesian war broke out all trials involving the life of a citizen and all civil cases in which the sum involved was large were transferred for decision to an Athenian jury. It is quite possible that the Athenian jury would give a keener scrutiny and a fairer decision than could be obtained in the subject states. But the complete loss of independence was rendered painfully evident by such a system. And when we remember that the jury-fees were one of the chief sources of maintenance for a large section of the Athenian people, and that therefore it was of importance to them that there should be no lack of trials, we need not hesitate in affirming that the principal reason for the new system was to be found, not in any considerations of equity or good administration of the law, but in the desire of the people of Athens to make the rule of the empire profitable to themselves.

The question is worth asking, Did Pericles really contemplate the permanent management of a considerable empire by the democracy of Athens? We have already seen what the democratic system was: how the reality of power lay with an assembly that must often have contained five thousand men; how the whole system of government was designed to exclude special ability; how entirely absent was any means for the procuring of coherence or permanence in the policy of the state. Did Pericles seriously contemplate the foundation of an empire on such a shifting basis as that? Some contemporaries doubted his intentions. Men said he was aiming at a tyranny, and this was the point of the frequent comparisons between him and Pisistratus. Towards the

end of his career Cleon and the more anarchical of the democrats charged him with checking the action of the democracy. And as we have already seen, Thucydides, though full of admiration for him, pronounces the government of Athens in his hands to have been " nominally a democracy, but really a personal government by the first man in the state.*" The question admits of no certain solution. Nothing that we know of Pericles gives us the idea of a schemer for power. The full development of the democracy was due to him, and everything makes for the belief that it had been the work of one who believed in what he was doing. But the ready way in which for fifteen years the democracy accepted his control may have blinded him to the inherent tendencies of such a form of government; and when we see, towards the close of his life, his difficulties with the most advanced democrats and his suppression of public discussion in the first year of the war, we may believe that if the great catastrophe of his death had not occurred Athens would have seen some attempt to strengthen the executive of the state.

3. THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF PERICLES.

The policy of Pericles to Sparta and the allies of Athens is defensible, but its justice and expediency may certainly be questioned. It was, at any rate, unsuccessful: the Athenian Empire has left no mark on universal history; the struggle with Sparta ended in the political ruin of Athens. Had there been nothing in the policy of Pericles except what has been already mentioned, he would still be a striking figure in Greek history, and his policy would be regarded as a splendid failure that reflected credit on the author. **But** we have not yet



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PLAN OF THE ACROPOLIS,

seen that which makes his period of supreme influence so resplendent in the world's history. His true greatness lies in his domestic policy; he saw wherein the true greatness of the Athenian people lay, and assisted its development. In politics and in war the Greeks have many superiors; their true service to mankind was artistic and intellectual. It was in Athens, under Pericles, that the intellectual and artistic life of Greece was exhibited most perfectly; and as Pericles helped the growth of that life, part of its glory is reflected back upon him.

This is a subject too great to be treated of in a few paragraphs at the end of a chapter. Here only can be mentioned the glory of sculpture and architecture with which Athens covered herself, and the part played by Pericles in the work. The income of Athens, if meagre when estimated by a modern standard, was in the judgment of contemporaries almost incredibly large. The main source of that income was the tribute of the allies. Originally, as we have seen, Athens merely administered the fund in the interests of all the allies. But the confederacy had been changed to an empire, the treasury had been moved from Delos to Athens. The original assessment had been for war against Persia; but now all hostilities had long since ceased, and the assessments had not on the whole diminished. As a result there was a great annual surplus. How was Athens to deal with it? It was entirely within her control. None of the states were strong enough to make any effective protest, and indeed it was not the way in which the money was spent, but the necessity of paying it in the first instance, against which they most desired to protest

Opinion on this point was not by any means unanimous in Athens. The conservative party—the party of Cimon and Thucydides (see p. 189)—demanded that the money paid by the allies should be spent in the interests of the allies. They did not accept the Athenian Empire as a fact; they protested against the employment of the fund on objects from which Athens only would profit. On the contrary, to Pericles and his followers the imperial position of Athens was the central fact of their policy. The money belonged to Athens as the taxes paid by subjects belong to a master. They would use what was their own as seemed best to themselves. Arguments, usually of a sophistical kind, were brought forward to support this policy. When the conservative party alleged that the employment of the money was bringing dishonour to Athens, "that Greece was outraged and felt herself openly tyrannised over when she saw Athens using the funds which she extorted from it for war against the Persians for gilding and beautifying the city as if it were a vain woman, and adorning it with precious marbles and statues and temples worth a thousand talents," the Periclean party replied that the money had been paid in order that the Ægean Sea might be free from all fear of the Persians ; the Athenians had fully achieved that result, and owed no one, therefore, any account of the way in which they spent the money.

With the money thus obtained Athens proceeded to make herself probably the most beautiful city that the world has yet seen. To this task of Pericles circumstances were surprisingly propitious. The Athenian treasury was full. Greek sculpture was now fast emerging **from** its archaic roughness into full control over material and expression. Phidias was, without question, the first

sculptor of the time, and he was an Athenian, and to Athens came now the most prominent sculptors from all parts of Greece. The sides of Mount Pentelicus gave the best marble with no great expenditure. Best of all, perhaps, the impulse of the Persian war had not yet died out. Athens was full of a splendid national pride for her share in that great struggle; and though the sceptical movement had begun, it had not yet taken from the people a general veneration for the gods and a belief in the legends concerning them. Fifty years later Athens would have been without the high hopes, the general enthusiasm, and the common beliefs and affections of the Periclean period; fifty years earlier she would not have possessed either the wealth or the artistic ability for the task.

On all sides temples, theatres, and porticoes began to rise. But the centre of all was the adornment of the Acropolis. The holy rock had originally been merely the citadel of Athens. Even after the Persian wars its main object was to serve as a last defence for the city; but the rapid growth of Athens, the long walls and the extensive fortifications of the city, had taken away all military importance from the Acropolis. If the outer fortifications were once passed, it would be useless to hold out on the great rock in the centre; only a fraction of the population could be accommodated there. It was possible, therefore, now to adorn it with a single eye to architectural effect.

Let us look at the Acropolis, as it was when the work of the Periclean age was over. The chronology of the various buildings is full of interest and difficulty; but it is not of sufficient importance to detain us here.

On the western side only was there easy access to the

sacred hill. It was from here that Xerxes had attacked it, and in earlier times this side had been strongly defended. But there was no need for that now. A splendid mass of buildings arose on this side, planned by the architect Mnesicles. At the top of the steps stood a porch of marble columns in the simple Doric style, leading into a great hall, and out from the hall through another porch was the road to the Acropolis. When the visitor of the Periclean age emerged through the Propylæa (or porch) into the Acropolis itself, he saw on all hands sculpture and temples of a beauty certainly at that time without parallel. Before him and slightly upon his left stood the colossal statue of Athena Promachus (the defender of the city). She stood upon a high pedestal, with spear raised in martial attitude. Men said that sailors as they rounded the promontory of Sunium could see the sun shining on the brazen point of her spear.

But it is not the statues so much as the temples that deserve our notice. Immediately to the right of the Propylæa and on a bastion that is actually behind the entrance to the rock stood the temple of Wingless Victory. Its date is doubtful, but it belongs to the Periclean age. It was probably erected to chronicle the victory of the Greeks over the Persians, and commands the most beautiful view over the Athenian plain, the bay of Salamis, and the islands and mountains beyond. The structure was a very small one, 18 feet wide and 27 feet long, and the columns are not 14 feet in height. The architecture and the sculpture with which it is adorned are of the greatest beauty, but other more important temples demand our attention. On the north side of the hill stood the temple which is now known as the Erechtheum. That was not its ancient

title. It was dedicated to Athena Polias (the guardian of the city) and to Pandrosos, the goddess of dew, and the name of Erechtheus, the legendary king of Athens, was also connected with it. The structure, of which the splendid remains are still standing, was probably planned and begun, but certainly not completed, in the lifetime of Pericles. This was the most sacred temple on the Acropolis. Others might commemorate recent victories over the Persians or the still more modern greatness of Athens, but here were the symbols of earlier worship and reminiscences of more naive faiths than those of the age of Pericles. The legend said that in the beginning Poseidon and Athena had striven together for the possession of Athens, and that in support of his claim Poseidon had produced a spring of salt water and Athena had secured the victory by bringing forth the olive tree. Both salt spring and olive tree were within the precincts of the Erechtheum, the latter rendered more holy still by the story which told that after it had been burnt down by the Persians it had, in a single night, sent forth a fresh shoot a cubit in length. Here, too, was supposed to live the snake sacred to Athena to which the priests gave a honey-cake every month. Among other sacred treasures contained in the temple may be mentioned the ancient statue of Athena, made of sacred olive wood. It had been displaced as an object of worship by the new work of Phidias, but it was too sacred to be destroyed. The Erechtheum was different in shape from any other Greek temple of which we know anything, for it had upon the north and south two irregular porches. The exquisite finish of the details and the softer beauty of the Ionian style make it one of the most attractive of

all extant structures of antiquity, but its completion does not belong to the Periclean period, and it claims, therefore, no further notice from us.

Upon the south side of the hill the ground sank rapidly, and for this reason all the earlier buildings had been erected farther north. But under Pericles the ground had been raised, by means of a vast substructure of masonry, so as to place the temple, not merely on a level, but actually on an elevation above the rest of the Acropolis buildings. And here the temple to the virgin goddess Athena, the Parthenon, was built. It is one of the largest of the Greek temples—228 feet long by 101 feet broad ; there are eight columns at each end and seventeen on each side; the columns are about 34 feet high, and consist of twelve sections or drums. But the Parthenon depended very little for its effect on mere size. It is surpassed in that respect by innumerable buildings, ancient and modern. But upon it were lavished all the artistic resources of Athens when her art was at its greatest. The proportions of the columns were carefully planned with an eye to effect; it is said that there is no straight line in the whole building. Colour was freely used both outside and in for decorative purposes; but the most universally admired feature of the whole building, both in ancient and modern times, is the wealth of sculpture bestowed upon it under the direction of Phidias, whose name is even more intimately connected with it than that of the actual architect, Ictinus. Only a small proportion of the vast amount of plastic work can have been the product of his own chisel, for there were fifty life-size statues, a carefully worked frieze 524 feet in length, ninety-two sculpture groups in the metopes, besides the colossal statue within the temple.


But all was done under the direction of Phidias, and, if different hands and even different styles can be traced, the whole is the expression of his ideas. In the gable ends of the temple (the pediments) were groups of sculpture representing the birth of Athena and the contest between her and Poseidon for the possession of Athens. The metopes represented struggles with Centaurs and with Amazons, incidents famous in the legendary history of Athens. The frieze that ran round the building within the exterior row of columns represented the great Panathenaic procession—the procession that took place every four years, in which all Athens joined, to present to the goddess Athena a newly woven robe, in recognition of her protection; the gods sit as spectators of the ceremony. Lastly, inside the temple was the colossal statue of Athena, 39 feet high, made of gold and ivory upon a framework of wood. The costliness of the material ensured the early destruction of the statue, but we know that the goddess stood with a statuette of Victory upon her outstretched right hand, her helmet on her head, her left hand resting upon her shield, inside of which was curled the snake sacred to Athens and herself. The other temples of the Acropolis often have reference to the common victory of Greece in the Persian war: it is the glory of Athens alone that is proclaimed throughout the Parthenon.

So the sacred rock received its marble diadem; but these works of art did not stand alone. The theatre of Dionysus was improved; a great temple, now called the Theseum, was built upon the north side of the Acropolis; a concert hall, the Odeum, was constructed near the theatre. The Pnyx and the Agora received vast improvements; the fortifications of the city and the suburbs

without the city were attended to. The architectural activity of the time extended beyond Athens. A great temple was built on the promontory of Sunium. The temple of Nemesis was built at Rhamnus, not far from Marathon, in commemoration of the great battle. Eleusis received the great temple of the Mysteries, designed by Ictinus, the architect of the Parthenon. Meanwhile the docks, harbour, and town of the Piræus were receiving special attention. The streets of Athens remained crooked, irregular, and poor; but the Piræus was laid out on a regular plan with straight streets.

This bare recital must suffice to give some idea of the architectural activities of Pericles, and the lavishing of the public money on such schemes as these formed one of the most important parts of his policy. His military and imperial schemes ended in ruin to Athens, though not through any fault of his. But the assistance he rendered to the intellectual and artistic life of Athens has assured him the gratitude of posterity.

NOTE.—For all details of Pericles' private life, see Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*. For his public life, and his policy with regard to the war, the first two books of Thucydides are almost the only authority. It will be interesting to compare the differing verdicts upon Pericles passed by Grote and Curtius among the modern, Thucydides and Aristotle among the ancient historians. The least favourable verdict is, perhaps, to be found in Evelyn Abbott's *History of Greece*, Part II. (Longmans & Co.).



ATHENS RESTORED ACCORDING TO A DESIGN BY THE LATE
C. R. COCKERELL, R.A.*

CHAPTER IX.

SOCIETY IN GREECE.

I PROPOSE in this chapter to give some account of the main features of social life in Greece. The details of their dress and furniture, of their manners and customs, will not here be dwelt on ; but I shall try to exhibit the occupations of the people, the conditions of labour, the position of women, and, in conclusion, to analyse the characteristics of the Greeks. It is of Greek, not merely of Athenian, society that I wish to speak; but Athens is so much more important than all the rest of the states of Greece together, that most attention will be devoted to her.

* This is Athens after Hadrian's completion of the temple of Zeus Olympius (on the left), and the vast additions that he made to the city. The old city (of the Periclean period) lay for the most part to the west of the Acropolis ; we are here looking from the east.

The Occupations of the People.

Commerce, trade, industry, were of comparatively little importance in ancient Greece. It is therefore often very difficult to understand what were the ordinary occupations of the inhabitants of Greece, and in what way they managed to gain a livelihood. And yet some clear conception of this is very necessary if we are to understand Greek civilisation.

The population of Greece was very far from homogeneous. The difference between the population of Arcadia or Acarnania on the one hand, and Athens or Corinth on the other, must have been greater than the difference between Cornwall and London to-day. And nowhere was the population upon the same footing. Every state contained slaves and freemen, and in all the more advanced states the inhabitants could be further subdivided. In Sparta, as we have seen, there were the Spartans proper; the free but non-Spartan population, the Periœci; and the Helots, or serf class. Much the same classification we detect in Thessaly, where, besides the ruling class and the free population who did not rule, we hear of the Penestæ, serfs in much the same position as the Spartan Helots. In Athens, too, we find a threefold division. For there, besides the citizen population and the slaves, we find a large and important class, the metics. These men were free Greeks resident in Attica who were not citizens. The Athenians boasted that their state had none of the exclusiveness of Sparta. There were no laws expelling strangers from their territory. And as Athens became the great commercial centre of Greece, more and more foreigners flocked into her. The reforms of Clisthenes had allowed a large number of these men to become citizens of Athens, **but**

the experiment had not been repeated. As the privileges of citizenship increased, the citizens became as anxious as any oligarchy to close all entrance to their ranks. There were therefore in the days of Pericles a very large number of foreigners resident in Attica, engaged in commerce, trade, or industry, protected by the Athenian state, but excluded from all participation in its privileges, pecuniary or otherwise. These were the so-called metics (*metæci*). It is not possible to estimate their number, which was certainly large. The majority of them lived in the Piræus, and a very large proportion of the trade and commerce of Athens was in their hands. The feeling in Athens was against commercial occupations; political and military duties occupied too much of the time of Athenian citizens to allow them, as a rule, to devote themselves to commerce, and so it came to pass that aliens managed to get into their hands lucrative work for which the Athenians were, as a matter of fact, well suited. But the state nevertheless reaped a considerable advantage from them. The larger portion of the Athenian revenues came from taxes upon articles of commerce, exported or imported, and it was therefore of importance to the state that a brisk commercial life should be carried on. And, further, every family of metics paid an annual tax of twelve drachmæ to the state. And besides the direct advantages to the treasury, it was obviously a good thing for Athens that the commerce of the state should not be allowed to languish simply because the citizens were unable or unwilling to apply themselves to it. And so the metics were always patronised and encouraged by Athens. Many grew very wealthy. We hear occasionally of individuals who received the gift of citizenship for services rendered to

the state. But they were always, as a class, kept in complete subordination to the citizens. By themselves they had no legal existence, and every metic had to put himself under the patronage of an Athenian, who had to represent him in all trials at law.

In thinking of the social life of Greece, we must remember this large and important class of metics. We must remember, too, the vast mass of slaves, who will be treated of later. But it is more important for our present purpose to inquire what were the occupations of the free citizens of Greece, and especially of Athens.

Nowhere in Greece was the great industry of agriculture thought unworthy of a freeman. In earlier times, to till the fields and to fight were the two normal occupations. Even in the age of Pericles this must have been the case to a very large extent. In Arcadia and Bœotia, and in all the lesser-known states of Greece, the yeomanry formed the greater part of the state. In Sparta the number of fully privileged citizens was so small, and the number of their enemies so great, that the discipline and preparations of war made other occupations impossible for them. The land was cultivated by the Periæci or the Helots. But in Athens, down to the period at which we have arrived, the land of Attica was not only owned but actually worked by Athenian citizens. It had been a great object of the policy of Pisistratus to keep the Athenians settled in the country away from the political excitements of the city, where the republican spirit was most likely to be developed. But after Pisistratus the movement to the large towns had gone on apace. The suburbs of Athens had grown rapidly. The market-place, the theatre, and the place of political assembly **had** more and more engrossed the attention of all who

desired to share in the civilisation of Athens. And the Peloponnesian war acted disastrously in the same direction. For many years the crops and homesteads of Athenian farmers were at the mercy of the Spartan invader, and all the citizens were cooped up for almost the whole of the year within the walls of Athens. And when the war was over city life had taken such a hold upon the population of Athens that the old class of peasant-farmers does not reappear. Citizens of Athens of course still held the land, for no landed property could be in the possession of any alien. But the land was worked by slaves, and the Athenian citizen had become merely the head manager and sole recipient of profits. But still agriculture was regarded as the best occupation for a man. Euripides speaks of the farmer as the "sole mainstay of the state," and in Aristophanes' *Peace* we get a picture of rural felicity impressed upon the imagination by its contrast with the restraints and miseries of the Peloponnesian war. Peace is supposed to have been declared, and the Chorus speaks as follows : " How delightful it is to get quit of helmet and cheese and onions! For I have no pleasure in battles, but I love a long drinking bout by the fireside with my boon companions, when the driest logs of last summer's sawing have been set ablaze, and the chick-pease is roasting and the acorns are crackling. . . . There is no greater pleasure, when the fields are already sown and a nice rain is falling, than for some neighbour to say, ' What's to be done now, Comar-chides? Heaven is good to us, and I have a mind for a drink. So, good wife, roast three pecks of beans and mix some wheat with them, and fetch out some figs, and call in the servants from the field, for the ground is soaking wet, and we can't dress the vine leaves or dig round

the roots to-day. And you may fetch from my house a thrush and two larks, "and I've got too some beestings and four pieces of hare, if the cat didn't run off with them last night. Bring three of these for us, and call *Æschinades* to join us in our drinking.' But when the grasshopper's sweet note is heard, how pleasant to watch the Lemnian vines, to see if they are getting ripe, for they are the earliest kind! How pleasant to see the green fig swell! And when it is ripe I eat it and exclaim, 'What weather it is!' And then I make a drink and grate in a little thyme; and so I grow fat in a summer like that. That's more to my taste than to look at an accursed sergeant with three crests on his helmet and a bright purple cloak, . . . who runs when the fighting begins and leaves me in the lurch." And later when, after the Peloponnesian war, city life had become the almost universal rule, Plato looks back with regret to a primitive agricultural life, when men "worked in summer stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They fed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves. These they served up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew and myrtle. And they and their children feasted, drinking of the wine which they had made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods in happy converse the one with the other." Enough has been said to show that in the days of Pericles a considerable number of Athenians were employed in agriculture, and that the farmer's life always remained an honourable one.

Trade and commerce were, at Athens, largely in the hands of the metics, as we have already said, and no-

where are they regarded by public opinion as altogether honourable occupations. And yet a considerable number of Athenians and other Greeks must have been engaged in them. The Greek cities of Asia Minor had in the sixth century B.C. done most of the carrying trade of the Ægean. Commercial jealousies are everywhere one of the strongest motives to war in Greek history; it was chiefly the jealousy of Athens and Corinth that produced the Peloponnesian war. This vigorous and increasing commercial life must have brought profit to individuals of Athens or Corinth or Ægina as well as to the revenues of those states. But the precise information that we should like on this subject it seems impossible to gain. Solon, we know, was a trader; the troubles of the Solonian period arose partly from the growth of a commercial class side by side with the landed aristocracy. We find in later periods men of great wealth who did not derive it from the land—Cimon and Nicias and Alcibiades and Cleon. Clearly after the Peloponnesian war a capitalist class rose in Greece, and the equality of the democracy was much endangered by it. But what proportion of the population of Athens were occupied in commercial pursuits we must be content to remain in ignorance. Certainly in Athens a very large number of citizens were thus employed. For Athens had now become the commercial centre of the whole of Greece. Her naval strength gave a degree of security to all her traders which was possessed by those of no other state. The prejudice against trade was not nearly so strong in democratic Athens as in other and more oligarchical states. Pericles says that no one regarded poverty as a disgrace; but the true disgrace was felt to be the idleness that did not attempt to avoid poverty. The eagerness

with which Athens fostered trade and tried to draw it into the Piræus shows us how profitable it was to her. The allies were bound to export certain articles to no other port but the Piræus. No Athenian was allowed to lend money on any vessel that was not bound to return with a lading to the Piræus. And if many of the Athenian restrictions upon trade are seen by modern observers to be unwise, the desired end was, at any rate, secured. Athens became the greatest commercial centre in the world. "The city became more and more the centre of the wide seas, and her port the principal market into which streamed the wares of ail the lands on the coast; where the slaves, the fish, and the skins of the Black Sea, the timber of Thrace, the fruit of Eubœa, the grapes of Rhodes, the wines of the Islands, the carpets of Miletus, the ores of Cyprus, the frankincense of Syria, the dates of Phœnicia, the papyrus of Egypt, the silphium of Cyrene, the delicacies of Sicily, the fine shoe-work of Sicyon—in short, all articles of foreign as well as native produce were exposed for sale" (Curtius). We should like on this subject definite statistics and accurate information, but even in the absence of these it is plain that it is easy to exaggerate the idleness of the Athenian people.

A still more difficult question is the extent to which **free** Athenian citizens were engaged in handicrafts and performed ordinary manual toil. And here again, while such work was not the rule among the Athenians and was usually relegated to slaves, it is easy to exaggerate the contempt of the Athenians for such tasks and their freedom from them. It is true that in Athens, as elsewhere in Greece, domestic service and the rougher kinds **of manual labour were** usually performed by slaves.

But manual labour was not regarded as so degrading by the democracy of Athens as in oligarchical states. How largely the labour of the farm was performed by freemen has been already mentioned, and certainly in the time of Pericles a considerable amount of manual labour in the city also fell to their lot. Plutarch alleges that one reason why Pericles undertook so many great building schemes was to provide work for the handicraftsmen of Athens. The passage is worth quoting in this connection (Plutarch, Pericles 12*). "It was right, Pericles argued, that after the city had provided all that was necessary for war, it should devote its surplus money to the erection of buildings which would be a glory to it for all ages, while these works would create plenty by leaving no one unemployed and encouraging all sorts of handicraft. . . . As he did not wish the mechanics and lower classes to be without their share, nor yet to see them receive it without doing work for it, he had laid the foundations of great edifices which would require industries of every kind to complete them. . . . The different materials used, such as stone, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, cypress-wood, and so forth, would require special artisans for each, such as carpenters, modellers, smiths, stone-masons, dyers, melters and moulders of gold, ivory-painters, embroiderers and workers in relief; and also men to bring them to the city, such as sailors and captains of ships and pilots for such as came by sea; and for those who came

* Plutarch is writing at a distance of more than 500 years from the event, and the passage reflects, perhaps, partially the ideas of the Roman Empire; but he wrote with much contemporary evidence before his eyes, and, though his statements must always be accepted with some reserve, this one seems to me suggestive and valuable

by land, carriage-builders, horse-breeders, drivers, rope-makers, linen-manufacturers, shoemakers, road-menders, and miners. Each trade, moreover, employed a number of unskilled labourers, so that in a word there would be work for persons of every age and class." It is clear that the workers here alluded to, both skilled and unskilled, were citizens, for Pericles would have no interest in providing work for voteless slaves or aliens. If we think then of the citizens of Periclean Athens, we must modify the view which makes them a race of idlers living on the tribute of subjects and the work of slaves. We must remember that a large proportion were engaged in commerce and a considerable number employed in handicraft. The roughest work, however, was doubtless always performed by slaves.

But it was the very great number of Athenians who received pay directly from the state, whether for services rendered or simply as a privilege of citizenship, that gives to Athens her most characteristic features. A passage from Aristotle has been quoted above (p. 150), giving the extraordinary number of citizens living wholly or partially on the revenues of the state. He enumerates 4880 people employed on military or naval duties, and 7900 employed in civic duties of one sort or another. "Besides these," he adds, "there were the persons maintained in the Prytaneum and orphans and gaolers, since all these were supported by the state. *In this way the people earned their livelihood*." Clearly many of those here alluded to by Aristotle only looked to the state for a portion of their livelihood. Of the six thousand jurymen mentioned, for instance, none were obliged to attend, and the greater part must have regarded their payment **for jury** service merely as a pleasant supplement to other

means of earning their living. Yet from such a passage as this we appreciate best the economical character of the Athenian state. The Athenians resemble the shareholders of a great company. The citizens of Athens manage the Athenian state; they divide among themselves the income of the state; but of the labour that produces the income they do, broadly speaking, nothing. Monarchical, oligarchical, and aristocratic governments have often held such a position: the peculiarity of the Athenian state is that here we have a democracy living principally on the work of others. That fact shows us how wide is the gap that separates the Athenian from modern democracies. The abundance of leisure time enjoyed by the Athenians is a fact always to be remembered when we are considering the state's artistic and literary development.

The exemption of citizens from hard manual labour is doubtless more striking in Athens than elsewhere in Greece. It was only possible there because of the large tribute annually paid by the subject states, and when the Empire fell the continuance of the habit brought Athens into very great financial difficulties. There must have been many states—Arcadia, Elis, Phocis—where labour of some sort was the rule rather than the exception even for citizens. But everywhere in the towns the ruling race lived upon the labour of others. In Sparta, in Corinth, in Megara, the market-place would be full of men ready for discussion or gossip, because labour and commerce made so few demands upon their time. For where the state had no tributary allies, like Athens, she had, at any rate, the arms and backs of innumerable slaves; and it is to the position and condition of slaves in Greece we turn next.

Slaves in Greece.

We noted in the first chapter that one fundamental difference between the civilisation of Greece and that of the nineteenth century is that the former rested upon the basis of slave labour, while the latter rests on free or contract labour. Everywhere slaves were very numerous; in some places they formed a majority of the population. It is calculated that in Corinth there were 460,000 slaves, in Ægina 470,000. The number of slaves in Ægina has been estimated at ten times that of the free citizens; in Athens at five times. In Sparta the number of Helots must have been very great. In military expeditions they always far outnumbered the free troops. At the battle of Plataea, where Sparta probably put forth nearly the whole of her strength, there were five thousand Spartans proper, five thousand free Lacedaemonians, and forty thousand Helot troops. Nor was it only upon the mainland of Greece that slaves were so numerous. The Greek cities of Asia Minor were also full of them. Thucydides (viii. 40) specially mentions the Chians as having more domestic slaves than any other Greek state except Sparta. In fact, wherever we get a glimpse of the comparative numbers of the free and slave population in any state, it is evident that the free are surrounded by overwhelming masses of slaves. The number of slaves was doubtless smaller in the more pastoral districts of Greece, but everywhere was very considerable, and forms the most striking contrast between the social life of Greece and ours.

Slavery, then, was universal in Greece, and was universally accepted by the conscience and thought of Greece. It was recognised indeed as the greatest dis-

aster to the enslaved. Some of the most pathetic passages of the tragedians are on the enslavement of captives taken in war. The enslavement of free Athenians seemed in the time of Solon an intolerable barbarity; and Plato states as an obvious truism that the freeman should fear slavery more than he fears death. But of any rebellion against slavery as an institution there is no trace in Greek writers; nor indeed in Roman writers or in the New Testament. Slavery is not to be abolished in Plato's ideal republic; and Aristotle, though he suggests alleviations, regards it as a permanent social factor. It will indeed be well to summarise here what Aristotle says of slavery in the *Politics*,

He bases the institution of slavery, firstly, on the necessity of subordination in society; secondly, on marked differences of disposition in men, so that some are naturally born to rule and others to be ruled. "Is there any one intended by nature to be a slave and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this question on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient: from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. . . . In all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. . . . Where, then, there is such a difference as that between soul and body or between men and animals (as is the case of those whose business is to use their body and can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them, as for all inferiors, that they should be under the rule of a

master. . . . Nature usually distinguishes between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the others upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally, for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless, if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if there is a difference in the body, how much more in the soul? But the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear then that some men are by nature free and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right." Slavery, then, seems to Aristotle a normal institution of society; the position of a slave does not seem to him an intolerable one; he clearly recognises the duty of the master to educate and train the slave. I have quoted the passage, not so much because of its great intrinsic interest, but rather to show the attitude towards slavery of one of the greatest and most humane of Greek thinkers.

But while the institution of slavery was accepted, there are not wanting instances of attempts to alleviate it or to limit the area from which slaves were drawn. Aristotle suggests that a prospect of emancipation should be possible to any industrious slave. Plato gives it as the mark of an ill-bred man to ill-use his slaves; and asserts with emphasis that no Greek should be the slave of Greeks. "Do you think it right," he says, "that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic states, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their

custom be to spare them, considering the danger that there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians ? " In Socrates, too, and in Euripides we find traces of the same movement for a more humane treatment of slaves.

How, as a matter of fact, were slaves treated in the days of Pericles ? On the whole there is nothing in Greek slavery that need shock us, nothing that need make us withdraw our admiration from Greek civilisation and its results. Slavery was in Greece usually domestic in character, and something quite different from the slavery of the Americas that the nineteenth century has known. The slave was a member of the household. He was in constant relations with his master and with the members of his master's house. The connection between him and his master was not merely one of money : it often allowed respect and sympathy and even devotion to grow up. It was not in Greece, but in Italy, that the ancient world had a foretaste of the plantation-slavery that the modern world has known. There were dangers connected with slavery such as Athens or Corinth knew, but nothing compared with the constant threat of devastation that the Roman slave-system held over the head of the declining Republic. The institution of Greek slavery gave to the freemen of Greece that leisure that was indispensable for any artistic and intellectual development, and it is doubtful whether anywhere else in the world at that time those who worked with their hands had a better lot. The slaves themselves were not by any means without their share in the culture of Greece; and seeing that Greek slavery allowed so much that was good to be produced, and did so little harm, we must recognise it as one of the most attractive

phases in the gradual progress of labour to its just place in society.

There were various methods of obtaining slaves. Some were brought from foreign countries. Illyria and Pontus are especially mentioned as great centres of the slave traffic. But the great source from which the slaves came was conquest in war. Many Greek slaves therefore were themselves Greeks, and the bitterness of their lot must have been aggravated by memories of recent liberty and power. The treatment of slaves varied much from state to state, and was much harsher in oligarchical than in democratic states. In his indictment of democracy Plato includes the liberty accorded to slaves. "The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money is as free as his master"; and the Pseudo-Xenophon, in his work on the Athenian republic, writing from a Spartan standpoint, laments the licence allowed to slaves in Athens. They wore, he tells us, no distinguishing dress; they did not cringe or cross to the other side of the street when they met a freeman; they seemed to claim some right to existence. Sparta formed a direct contrast to all this. The Helots (who, be it remembered, were serfs, not slaves) there were kept in the strictest subordination. They wore a different dress from freemen. They were systematically submitted to humiliations, whether or no the story be true that they were forced to get drunk as a warning to the young Spartans. At the beginning of every year, we are told, the Ephors declared war against them, so that their murder might bring no bloodguiltiness on the state. A system of secret police was organised specially to watch over them, and any that were suspected of plotting against the state were assassinated without com-

punction. The Athenian democracy was capable of sudden outbursts of great cruelty, but, as a whole, it was characterised by a humanity very much in advance of the age.

Of the slaves of Athens we may certainly say that their material condition, and probably their standard of culture, were better than those of great masses of wage-earners in Europe and even in England to-day. But there were terrible possibilities in the life of a slave. He must always be tortured before he gave evidence in a trial at law. This was not an inducement to those unwilling to speak, but a necessary accompaniment of the evidence of all slaves. Mr. Mahaffy calls this the only instance of *stupidity* in the life of the Greeks. And Greek slavery might become a very terrible thing when it lost its domestic character, and when the slaves were employed in great numbers in some remote place and regarded merely as animate tools. It was under such circumstances that slavery in Rome assumed so terrible an appearance and became so great a danger. Fortunately for Greece the industries were so little developed, and the farming was on so small a scale, that large aggregates of slaves in remote localities were avoided. But one such instance, of which we have some record, is to be found in the mines of Mount Laurium. Silver and tin were obtained from these mines, and the fumes of the operations were particularly deadly. The mines were worked by Sosias, a Thracian, and the slaves were hired from Nicias of Athens. They had only five holidays in the year, and how deadly the work was is clear from the fact that Sosias paid for the slaves a rent equal to half their value. If they lived three years, Nicias would make 50 per cent. profit. It seems clear that

life for a slave in the mines was not much longer than that of a tram-horse to-day, and was probably as little considered.

The usual effects of slavery upon any society where it may be found are, first, to render the basis of society unstable, and, secondly, to make all manual labour dishonourable, for what slaves do is *no* fit occupation for freemen. The second effect we may mark to the full in Greece. Even the great sculptors seem to have been held in no very high estimation, on the ground that they were handicraftsmen. But the first-mentioned result of slavery was not nearly so strongly felt as in most other countries where slavery has existed. The labour-basis of society was indeed, perhaps, more stable in Greece than it is in Europe in the nineteenth century. Yet the danger of having in the state vast numbers of men who participated only indirectly in the benefits of the state, was often severely felt. This was, as we should expect, especially the case in Sparta. Much in their social institutions can only be explained by the fact that they were constantly exerting themselves to maintain their supremacy over the Helots. Once, as we have already seen, a revolt of Helots almost brought Sparta to her knees (464), and during the Peloponnesian war this was the great danger that Sparta feared, more even than the arms of Athens. At Athens, under normal circumstances, we do not find the same danger; but when famine began to press upon Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, many thousands of slaves deserted to Sparta, and Plato in the *Republic* asserts that even at Athens it was only fear that kept them from rising against their masters. It is clear then that the mild form of slavery that prevailed in Greece had its difficulties and

dangers. That the dangers were not greater is due, at any rate in part, to the humane character of the Greek people.

The Position of Women in Greece.

When we come from the position of slaves to the position of women in Greece, the same sort of difficulty meets us. They were an entirely subordinate portion of the state; they had little share in the life of Greece, and therefore they are so far disregarded by historians that it is impossible to get the full information about them that we should like. But from all that we know about them, this seems plain, that their position was very much more unsatisfactory than the position of slaves, and did not tend as time went on to get any better. For the position of Greek slaves shows us very little that we can condemn, upon a fair review of the circumstances of the time, and endangered the state surprisingly little. But the position and treatment of women is worse than we might reasonably have hoped to find, and if it did not actually endanger the state, deprived it of what has been in most strong states a great element of strength.

The freedom and influence of women in Greece seem to have been greater in earlier ages than in later; greater in the less-advanced states than in those more fully developed. We may not treat the poems of Homer as though they were a delineation of a civilisation actually existing; yet the reader of Homer cannot help feeling that the women contemporary with him had a better lot than those who lived in Periclean Athens. Technically their condition is one almost of servitude. Slavery awaits the prisoners of war even of the highest rank; even free women are completely subject to the **male**

head of the family. Yet how striking are the female figures that appear in the pages of Homer! Helen and Nausicaa and Penelope, each in their different way, are the very types of the fascination of beauty and the simple charm of maidenhood and the constancy of married love. And female influence is strong throughout both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The Trojan war is fought for a woman; Achilles' wrath is for a woman who has been torn from him; the leading motive of the *Odyssey* is the constant love of Ulysses for his wife Penelope. Again in Herodotus we find women still playing an important part, and in his pages again and again we come upon important female influence. But if we pass to Thucydides—the representative historian of the Periclean period—we find we are in an exclusively male world; only twice is a woman's name mentioned, and then only as being the mother of a prominent character or the priestess of a goddess. It is pretty clear that the progress of Greek thought and civilisation brought increased restrictions and limitations to the women of Greece.

It is equally clear that the position of women was better in the less-advanced states of Greece than in cities such as Corinth or Athens. In Sparta there was nothing that at all corresponded to the strict seclusion of Athenian women. There, as has been shown in the second chapter, the Spartan discipline gave to those who were destined to be "the mothers and mates" of soldiers a position of remarkable freedom and influence. They underwent an athletic discipline; they mixed freely with the men without any false modesty; their influence in the state was always con-

siderable, and is stated, in the later period of Sparta's history, to have become too great. The rude health of Spartan women was famed throughout Greece, and everywhere they were *in* request as nurses. We have scarcely any detailed information of the position of women in the less-known states of Greece; but everything seems to show that where life was most pastoral, there women were most free; where the population was aggregated into towns, there at once restrictions were placed upon them.

The position of women in Athens must be considered more in detail. Whatever their earlier position may have been, they are, when we see them in the age of Pericles, surrounded by restrictions of the closest kind. They live in separate apartments, usually in the upper part of the house. They very rarely went out of the house. If we look into the agora or the streets of Athens, we see very few women, if any; probably none of free citizen origin. No education seems to have been given them. It is possible that the wife of Sophocles or Phidias could neither read nor write. The intellectual life of Athens was not for them. The philosophical movement of the time did not touch them. The theatre was so intimately connected with religion that its doors could not be entirely closed against them; but they were only allowed to be present at the tragedies. The comedies were performed before an exclusively male audience. The women who have an influence on Athenian history are not married women. The wives and mothers of the great men of Athens are, for the most part, names only, to which we can attach no character at all.

The marriage relationship at Athens was extremely

unsatisfactory. Almost always the husband was very much older than the wife. Aristotle suggests as the proper age for marriage thirty-five for the man and eighteen for the woman. It follows that the idea of intellectual companionship was excluded from the Athenian marriage. The matter was arranged by the parents, and the married couple often had not seen one another before the ceremony of betrothal. In all the utterances of practical men concerning marriage we nowhere hear of mutual affection as the main condition of success. Marriage is a duty to the state and a duty to the family, an affair of religion and of patriotism, but not of individual happiness. And the result was that romantic passion, as we know it, was hardly ever found in marriage. A pleader says, as though he were stating a truism, "We have female companions for our pleasures, concubines for daily attendance on our persons, but wives in order that we may beget legitimate children, and that we may have a faithful guardian of our households." And if we would complete our picture of Athenian life, we must remember the large number of courtesans (*Hetæraë*), who enjoyed a better education than citizen women and were more skilled in the arts of pleasing, and whose position, though not regarded as respectable, was at any rate fully accepted by the morality and convention of the time. If anything is to be learnt from history, it is certain that such a condition of things must degrade the moral and weaken the social life of a state; but the partial recognition which was given to them in Athens allowed the *Hetæraë* themselves to escape the debasement that is their lot in modern societies. There were doubtless many in Greece who had something of the character and ability of Aspasia.

Between husband and wife the tie was weak and easily broken. The wife never entered wholly into the family of her husband. A wife's legal guardian was not her husband, but her father or brother; the legal tie with her own family was much stronger than that with her husband's. In all marriage contracts the dowry seems the affair of most importance. It does not become the husband's absolute property, and in case of divorce must be restored to his wife. The whole life of the wife after marriage was within doors. Beyond the threshold indeed she was rarely seen. To rear up children and to attend to the house was the whole duty of woman; and however lax the moral ideas of Greece may have been about the conduct of men, they were sufficiently strict when they referred to wives and daughters.

Enough has been said to indicate the condition of almost Oriental seclusion and subordination in which Athenian women lived. The two chief reasons for that condition are probably to be found in the growth of city life and the contact between Greece and the states of the East. There is doubtless some danger of exaggeration. There must have been many exceptions to the rule, many instances of tender affection between wife and husband. The story of Ulysses and Penelope can hardly have been told and admired for generations without producing some results in the practice of life. The tragedians tell us stories of romantic love, and show us almost the highest types of female character; though it is noteworthy that none of the heroines, even of legend and mythology, are Athenian. But to show that even under Athenian conditions women could have influence and sometimes claim a measure of freedom, let these stories, the one from Plutarch, the other from Herodotus, suffice.

Plutarch tells us of Themistocles that "his son was spoiled by his mother, and by himself to please her. Themistocles used to say that his son was the most powerful person in Greece: for the Athenians ruled Greece, and he ruled the Athenians, and his wife ruled him, and his son ruled his wife." And in Herodotus (vi. 121) we find the following: "Callias was remarkable for his conduct in respect to his daughters, for when they came to marriageable ages he gave to each of them a most ample dowry and placed it at their own disposal, allowing them to choose their husbands from among all the citizens of Athens, and giving each in marriage to the man of her own choice." But that such influence in a wife and such liberty of choice should be mentioned at all shows that they were exceptions to a general rule.

It is certain too that there was in Athens much thought upon the question of the proper position of women. Clearly Aspasia's circle was not satisfied with the semi-slavery of the Athenian wife. And in the great tragedians, where most of the highest aspirations of Greece are to be found, we find constantly complaints of the destiny that is allotted to women. A fragment of the *Tereus* of Sophocles has been preserved, in which a female character speaks as follows: "Often have I thought thus concerning the nature of women—that we are naught. In our childhood, in our home, we have, I think, the sweetest possible life, for our thoughtlessness allows us to grow up happily. But when we arrive at maidenhood we are thrust out of doors, and sold as merchandise far away from our household gods and our parents. And some go to the house of strangers and some of barbarians. And to this we must agree, and pretend to think that all is well." And into the mouth of Medea Euripides



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VIEW OF THE ACROPOLIS

places the fiercest denunciation of the lot of an Athenian woman (*Medea*, 230 *sqq.*)

" Of all things that have life
And sense, we women are most wretched ; first
With all our dearest treasures we must buy
A husband, and in him receive a lord.
A hardship this : a greater hardship yet
Awaits us. Here's the question, if the lord
Prove gentle or a tyrant: if the worst,
To disunite our nuptials hurts our fame,
Nor from the husband may our sex withdraw
The plighted hand. . . .

If all our care
Gives us a gentle husband, one that binds
No galling yoke, happy our life indeed.
If not, death were more welcome. . . .

Yet will they say
We live an easy life at home, secure
From danger whilst they lift the spear in war.
Misjudging men ! Thrice would I stand in arms
On the rough edge of battle, ere once bear
The pangs of child-birth."

And lastly, Plato shows us in his *Republic* how deeply he was dissatisfied with the position of women, how clearly he saw the necessity of the greatest changes. His actual proposals are indeed the strangest possible, and are aimed at the total annihilation of the family. His statement that the highest intellect among women is only equal to that of a second-rate man, has made him seem to some a contemner of women. But the really striking thing about his proposals, if viewed by the light of contemporary social conditions, is his demand for a fuller education, physical and mental, for women, his claim that women shall not be excluded from the life of the state.

But in these criticisms the great minds of Athens do not seem to have been at all representative of general Athenian feeling. The position of women did not improve, and probably with the decay of Greek "morale" grew somewhat worse. The weakness of the family bond is certainly a most noticeable feature in Greek history. To this is partly due the lack of cohesion that we observe in the Greek state.

The Characteristics of the Greeks.

It is an extremely difficult task to estimate the characteristics of any people : witness the verdicts of modern European nations on one another. The difficulty is less with a people separated from us by so wide a gap as the Greeks. But there is a great difficulty even here. For many sides of the civilisation of Greece are of such transcendent beauty, and are so very attractive to those who are capable of valuing character and culture and art, that our eyes are dazzled and we fail to note the spots in the sun. It has been well said that when Greece is being tried, she, like Phryne of old, has merely to unveil her beauty and condemnation is impossible. But surely it is worth while attempting to distinguish the tasks that Greece performed admirably from those which she failed in or performed with only partial success, and, in no carping spirit, to show in what qualities the national life of Greece was deficient as well as those in which it excelled. And here even more than elsewhere we must look mainly at Athens as by far the most important state of Greece.

It is evident then, I think, to any one who stands upon any vantage ground from which it is possible to survey

universal history, that the practical life of the Greeks was not their great success, that they excelled neither in politics nor war. We see, and many of the greatest Greeks themselves saw, clearly enough how great was the danger of overthrow at the hands of barbarians, how paramount was the necessity of Hellenic unity. They could see the goal, but they could not reach it. The attempt was made both by conciliatory and by violent methods ; but with failure as the result in both cases. No state was patriotic enough to sink its own egoistic desires in the interest of Hellas; no state was strong enough to coerce the others into complete obedience. Divided against herself, Hellas became an easy prey for the first strong invader. Nor in domestic politics can the triumphs of the Greeks be rated very highly. Their political experiments are full of interest, and occasionally of value; but rather as warnings than examples. Oligarchies and democracies pursued equally narrowly selfish ends. And in the democracy of Athens the chief object seems rather to have been the satisfaction of a feeling than the accomplishment of a task. Viewed as an instrument of administration and government, the democracy of Athens must be written down a failure ; and during its period of success the real character of the democracy was obscured by the ascendancy of Pericles. Doubtless many other governments, perhaps most other governments, have been as weak as those of the Greek states. But their achievement does not allow us to class the Greeks with the Romans, or the republic of Venice or France or England, as a nation that has given to the world political precedents of permanent importance. It was left to Rome to give, by her arms and her high public spirit, a stable basis to the civilisation that she received from Greece.

The Greeks are further alleged to have been deficient upon the moral side; to have fallen short of a high standard of honesty, truthfulness, and courage; and, further, to have been a cruel people. A modern writer is never weary of contrasting the Greeks and their love for beauty and knowledge with the Hebrews and their sense of the importance of conduct. And a portion of the indictment is surely true, though liable to great exaggeration. The great moral movements of the world have hardly ever taken place without at least temporary damage or eclipse to thought and art. It is almost what we should have expected if the enormous artistic and intellectual advance made by Greece was accompanied by some moral aberration. But again how far advanced Greece was is proved by the fact that in these criticisms the highest standards of the nineteenth century are applied to a people who lived in the fifth century B.C. With this proviso, we may admit that the standard of honesty and truthfulness in Greece was not high. Whether we look to their political life or to their extant law pleadings, we find a marked absence of any strict sense of uprightness, such, for instance, as marked the Romans until the Republic began to decay. How rare pecuniary honesty was we may see by the influence which was possessed by such politicians as had not the itching palm for that reason alone. From the legal system of a nation we usually get a good idea of the characteristics of a nation, and certainly not the sole object, hardly the main object, of the Athenian jury system is the discovery of truth. We have admitted too in a previous chapter that the courage of the Greeks had limits. They were good soldiers; the European world had not at that time known better; but, as a race, they resisted discipline

and were liable to panic. It may be suggested that their imagination was too vivid to allow of the stolid courage of the Romans and of the German races. The charge of cruelty it seems impossible to admit. There are doubtless instances of horrible barbarity in the history of Greece. What nation's history is without them? They did things which no civilised nation of the nineteenth century would do. But it may be doubted whether Englishmen of the sixteenth, seventeenth, or eighteenth centuries were more humane than the Greeks. Rathlin Island and Drogheda and Culloden are not names of much pleasanter memories than Melos or Mitylene or Ægina.


The greatness of Greece is to be found, not on the practical, but upon the speculative and artistic side of human life. Other nations and not they have been the pioneers of mankind in politics, in social organisation, and in war. But to the world's permanent fund of truth and beauty the Greeks have contributed more than any nation, ancient or modern. And as a people they were characterised, above all peoples of which we know anything, by artistic sensibility and intellectual activity. If we may not call the Greeks a nation of artists, we must insist that the artistic triumphs of Greece could not have been achieved without a wide appreciation and love for beautiful things among the people. The dramas of Athens were her greatest artistic achievement; and a great drama presupposes an audience capable of appreciating it. The Greek people want no higher testimonial of artistic receptivity than the popularity of Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes. And the same thing applies, though not quite so strongly, to their sculpture and architecture. They were state works;

they were carried out by means of public money, which might have found its way into the pockets of the citizens. They consented to forgo a direct pecuniary advantage that their city might be beautiful. Imagine an English city submitting to a rate such as would have been required in Athens to decorate the Acropolis ! And the same keen sense for beauty comes out in other ways. At no time probably has mere personal beauty been rated so high as among the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.; as evidence let this quotation from Herodotus suffice: "This Philip was an Olympian victor, and the handsomest Greek of his day. His beauty gained him honours at the hands of the Egestæans which they never accorded to any one else; for they raised a hero temple over his grave, and they still worship him with sacrifices."

Their intellectual activity is so obvious that few words are necessary. Sir Henry Maine, who was not given to superlatives, has said, "Except the blind forces of nature, nothing *moves* in this world that is not Greek in its origin"; and if there be some exaggeration in this, it is true that the first steps in nearly every branch of science or thought or art were worthily taken by the Greeks. And again the glory belongs to the race, as well as to a few eminent men of genius. Their dramas, their political and forensic speeches, and the origin of their philosophy, all show the keen intellect of the Athenian people. The intellect of Athens needs no higher praise than that large popular audiences listened with delight to the choruses of the plays of Æschylus, the orations of Pericles and Demosthenes, and the keen disputation of Socrates. I have insisted, both in this chapter and elsewhere, on the darker side of Greek

character and Greek civilisation. It is certain that their moral development, to say the least of it, did not keep pace with the intellectual. It is certain that at the root of their society there was poison which was bound ultimately to destroy it. But while it lasted surely civilisation never bore a fairer blossom.

NOTE.—It is difficult to give any useful references in this chapter. For the whole subject, however, clearly marked views will be found in Mahaffy's *Social Life in Greece*. There are two articles in the *Contemporary Review* by Mr. Donaldson on "The Position of Women in Ancient Greece" (Nos. 32, 34). I cannot find any full treatment of the condition of Greek slaves in English, but something will be found in Mahaffy, and much that is very valuable in Aristotle's *Politics*. The translation in this chapter is Jowett's.



TEMPLE OF THESEUS.

CHAPTER X.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES.

HERODOTUS, towards the end of his work, which was composed in Thurii in Italy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, writes: "A civil war is as much worse than a foreign war as war itself is worse than peace." The words must have some reference to the struggle that had just begun. The outbreak of that war must have been a terrible blow to the Panhellenic patriotism of Herodotus. The end, if he had lived to see it, would perhaps have seemed to make the Persian war a fruitless victory.

From 445 to 432 Greece as a whole enjoyed a period of peace. Not that arms were altogether silent for those thirteen years, but the struggles were of an entirely local character, and hardly noticeable to men who looked back on them with memories full of the Peloponnesian war. All previous struggles lead up to that, and in that struggle the political doom of Hellas is sealed. I shall here resume the thread of the narrative that has been interrupted by an exposition of the internal condition of Athens, and, going back to the year 445, the year of the thirty years' truce, explain how the great struggle came upon Greece.

That war, not peace, was the chronic relation of the Greek states is shown by the fact that their peaces and truces were made for a specific number of years, after which war would come again unless the truces were prolonged. But in the case of the thirty years' truce the motives to war were too strong to allow it even to run out. The influences that made for war were mainly the three following:—

1. The great prestige of Athens necessarily aroused the fierce jealousy of Sparta. The year 445 had marked indeed the definite abandonment of all schemes for a land-empire; but the loss of power on the mainland had not been a real loss of power to Athens. Her empire had increased and solidified; her naval supremacy was more unquestionable than ever. No other Greek state had nearly the wealth that Athens possessed in her treasury. And added to all this was the intellectual and artistic glory of Athens. Here alone was a sufficient cause for the outbreak of war. The eighteenth century of our own era declared war when the balance of power was upset, and we can therefore hardly wonder that in

ancient Greece Sparta could not endure to see her old supremacy in Hellas successfully challenged.

2. Sparta was capable of bitter, sulky hatred, but not of fierce and rapid action. It was this temper of the Spartan state that prevented her from being a worthy leader of the Peloponnesian states that belonged to her alliance. But that alliance numbered other states equally irritated, and more capable of expressing their irritation in action. Since Megara had given the *coup de grâce* to the Athenian land-empire by her revolt, a decree of the Athenian people had excluded her from their markets and reduced her to a condition of miserable poverty. If any chance came to free her from her fetters and avenge the insult, she would not be found wanting. Equally bitter, and much more powerful, was the state of Corinth. She had been the first commercial state in Greece at a time when Athens had not yet mastered Salamis. She had invented the war-ship, the trireme, which had now become the main instrument of the greatness of Athens. Her position upon the Isthmus had given her great advantages for trade, and she had made full use of them. A vast slave population ministered to her wants at home and abroad. At Corinth probably life was more luxurious and more unhealthy in its social conditions than elsewhere in Greece. This state now found herself hemmed in by the growth of Athenian power. Ægina and Salamis closed her in upon the east, and both islands were now in the hands of Athens, And upon the west, in the narrowest part of the Corinthian **Gulf**, at Naupactus, the Athenians had settled the Messenians who had revolted against Sparta in the year **464**, when the earthquake laid Sparta in ruins. These *men* hated the Spartans and their allies more than the

Athenians themselves. They lacked neither enterprise nor courage, and Corinthian vessels could hardly feel safe until they had passed this robbers' stronghold and reached the broader waters of the Adriatic. I have said elsewhere that competition between individuals of the same state was smaller, but between different states keener, in the ancient than in the modern world. We need no evidence therefore to tell us how Corinth longed to do to Athens all that Athens had done to Ægina. Of herself Corinth could not act against the overwhelming forces of Athens; but she was the most important ally of Sparta, and might hope to influence the action of the Spartan alliance. We shall see shortly how her chance came and how she used it.

3. Lastly, as a permanent cause of unrest and jealousy there was the Athenian Empire. We have examined its character elsewhere, and seen that, despite injustice and some oppression, it was an experiment full of interest and promise. But it is subsequent history that allows us to think so. To contemporaries it was only clear that Greek states that had once been free were so no longer; that their subjection was accompanied with every mark of humiliation—the payment of tribute, the destruction of fortresses, often the presence of an Athenian garrison and Athenian settlers. There were many other cities in Greece that were not free—the cities of Messenia, for instance, and those that in Bœotia owned the supremacy of Thebes. And the free allies of Sparta would no more be allowed to revolt than Athens had allowed such action in the islands of the Ægean. But the subjection of all these cities was either softened by long duration or at least not emphasised by tribute and garrisons; so that neither Thebes nor Sparta outraged Greek sentiment at

all in the way that Athens did. Thus inside the Athenian alliance there was constant friction and anxiety to rebel, and the enemies of Athens knew that, if they attacked her, many of her allies would either revolt or render her grudging assistance.

Thus were laid the materials for a conflagration, and in 434 there came an event which soon set all ablaze.

The Quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth, and the Interference of Athens.

The conflagration began on the extreme rim of the circle of Hellas. Corcyra (the modern Corfu) had hitherto stood aloof from the politics of Central Greece. And she was wise in doing so. She formed the halfway house between Greece proper and the Greek settlements in Sicily and Italy, for it was the custom of Greek sailors to coast up as far as Corcyra, and then strike across the Adriatic Sea for the Italian coast. And her situation and neutral attitude had given her great opportunities of trading. At the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, they were "as rich as any state then existing in Hellas." So strong was their navy, so large their commerce, that their claim to be descended from the legendary Phæacians did not seem an arrogant one.

Corcyra was a colony of Corinth, and Epidamnus, upon the mainland opposite, was a joint colony of Corcyra and Corinth, the settlers being mostly Corcyræans and the individual founder a Corinthian. But in this family of colonies bitter feuds had broken out. Each was of course a quite independent state ; but Greek feeling demanded that the mother colony should be honoured by the daughter in certain matters of ceremony. This honour

Corcyra had refused to the Corinthians. "At their sacrifices they denied to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut from the head of the victim." They were as rich as Corinth, and believed their naval power to be as strong. Between them there was chronic feud. And now a bitter quarrel broke out between Corcyra and Epidamnus. In the latter town, as everywhere in Greece, there were two parties, the oligarchs and the democrats. The oligarchs were expelled from the city, and appealed for restoration to Corcyra; but there the democratic party was the stronger, and would render them no help. They turned to Corinth, and the Corinthians eagerly seized the opportunity of paying off their old grudge against Corcyra. They sent a considerable expedition, which easily forced an entry with the oligarchs at their head. The Corcyrasans were enraged and immediately blockaded Epidamnus, and seemed likely to capture the town and take prisoner the Corinthian armament. The Corinthians manned a relief expedition, and so Corcyra and Corinth were at open war.

Out of this quarrel, which must have had many counterparts in Greek history that have been forgotten, arose the great Peloponnesian war. For when the Corinthian and Corcyraean navies met, the former were easily defeated, and soon after Epidamnus surrendered. Then the Corinthians began to prepare an expedition on a much greater scale. They built many ships, and they offered high pay for rowers from any part of Hellas. The Corcyraeans felt themselves unable to resist so great a danger without assistance. It has already been noted that they had not hitherto joined either the Athenian or the Spartan alliance. But now they decided to abandon their neutrality. **The Spartan alliance was of course**

closed against them, for Corinth was, next to Sparta, its most important member. They therefore appealed to Athens.

The crisis was a very serious one. The thirty years' truce did indeed expressly say that any Hellenic city which had not yet entered either alliance might join which it liked. It was, therefore, technically open to Athens to accept the offer of Corcyra. But whatever the letter of the treaty might say, no one could really doubt that if Athens admitted Corcyra into her alliance, it would be a step, and a great step, towards war with Sparta and her allies. The boldest might well shrink before such a danger. And yet if war was to come—and most people believed that it would come sooner or later—the whole result might depend on the decision of this question. If Corcyra were admitted, her navy, the third and perhaps the second in Hellas, joined to the Athenian, would make resistance upon the sea impossible. If Corcyra were not admitted, sooner or later she would yield to Corinth, and the Corcyraean navy, joined to the navy that Corinth and the rest of the allies of Sparta could put upon the waters, would offer a resistance to Athens of uncertain issue. The question seemed to narrow itself down to this: whether Athens should fight at an early date with an overwhelming naval supremacy, or somewhat later with naval superiority doubtfully on her side. The matter was brought before the general assembly. Envoys from both Corinth and Corcyra appeared before the Athenian people. A single day was not sufficient for the debate. On the second day, after some wavering, the vote was given for a defensive alliance with Corcyra. "They knew," says Thucydides, "that in any case war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they had no mind to

let Corcyra and her navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians."

The decision soon brought about a collision. In accordance with the vote, Athens despatched ships to the assistance of Corcyra, with strict orders to stand only on the defensive, for an attack upon Corinth would show that the thirty years' truce was broken. And thus, shortly afterwards (432), a great naval engagement took place near Corcyra. Never before had so many Greek ships fought together. The Athenian squadron at first took no part in the battle; they confined themselves to rendering assistance to such Corcyrasan ships as were being hard pressed by the enemy. On the whole, fortune favoured the Corinthians. It was only the resolute intervention of the Athenians that saved the Corcyræans from a severe defeat. The contest was not yet fully decided when some fresh ships were observed on the horizon by the Corinthians, who suspected them to be a reinforcement from Athens, and therefore drew off. They were justified in their suspicions, for twenty sail from Athens joined the Corcyræan navy during the following night. The reinforcement was not large, but so great was the superiority of Athens over the enemy in all that concerned naval warfare, that next day the Corinthians, though they claimed victory in the late battle, gladly received from the Athenian ships an engagement to remain strictly on the defensive, and sailed home.

If Corinth had hated Athens before, what were her feelings now ! She sought revenge for her humiliation in every direction. To set the great war ablaze was her chief object; in the meanwhile, and as a step to that, she raised up a rebellion against Athens in a distant quarter. The town of Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene

in Chalcidice, was a colony of Corinth, and was connected with her by more than the ordinary bonds of ceremonious affection. She received, we are told, magistrates from Corinth every year. But the whole Ægean Sea was in the hands of Athens, and willingly or unwillingly Potidæa had become a member of the Athenian Empire. Like most of the other "allied" states, she chafed at the yoke, and looked round for opportunities of revolt. The Athenians were suspicious of her intentions, and ordered her to raze one side of her fortifications and give hostages for good conduct. The Potidæans sought for assistance in resisting the demand, and readily found it. The Corinthians promised to assist them to the uttermost; an embassy went to Sparta and received a promise that if the Athenians besieged Potidæa the Spartans would invade Attica. For such a promise there was no justification in the thirty years' truce, for there it had been expressly stipulated that the head of each alliance should be allowed to punish its own members. Yet the promise is thoroughly characteristic of Spartan diplomacy; and it is characteristic too that they did not keep it. Potidæa revolted; the Corinthians sent assistance, and help too came from the neighbouring Macedonians; but the Athenians drove in their opponents and blockaded the town. Unless help came its fall was certain. All the efforts of Corinth had only made her smart under a further blow; and unless Sparta could be stirred into action, other such blows would follow.

The Debates on the Question of War.

The Spartan confederacy included all the states of the Peloponnese except Achæa and Argos, and many **states** in the centre of Greece. The Spartans were fond

of contrasting the voluntary nature of their own confederacy with the oppressive empire of Athens, but secessions from the first would have been permitted as little as from the second. Still a greater appearance of liberty was given by the fact that the allies of Sparta gave their contributions in personal service, not in money, and, being constantly under arms, were not so powerless to resist as the allies of Athens. From Sparta came the initiative in all questions that concerned the whole alliance, but no action could be taken until the decision of Sparta had been ratified by a meeting of the allies.

And now a meeting was called at Sparta to consider the question of war or peace with Athens. The Corinthian ambassadors were there; from Megara came bitter complaints of the exclusive mercantile policy of Athens; from Ægina. secret promises of revolt. The spokesmen of the various states were called before the general Spartan assembly. Athenians accidentally present in Sparta defended their own state. The debate was closed by speeches from the Spartans themselves. It was one of the most important ever known in Greece, and Thucydides has given us a full account of it. We must not indeed accept the speeches that he gives as a verbal report of what was actually said, but we may regard them as pretty closely representing the line of argument adopted by the various speakers. The speech of the Corinthian envoys is in every way the most important. It contains no argument on the justice of the war, but boils over with indignant protest against the slackness of the Spartans and bitter invective against the Athenians. The contrast they draw between the Athenians and Spartans deserves a brief quotation, "The Athenians **are revo-**

lutionary—equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are conservative—careful only to keep what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most necessary. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn, and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you to think you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous and you are dilatory; they are always abroad and you are always at home. . . . When conquerors they pursue their victory to the utmost; when defeated they fall back the least. . . . If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth." (i. 70)

To all this rhetoric the Athenians seem to have answered in a cooler strain. They called to memory their great deeds against the Persians and the honourable circumstances of the foundation of their empire, but they justified their rule, not by arguments based upon justice, but by the right of the stronger. "We are not the first who aspired to rule: the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger." They ended by demanding arbitration on the basis of the thirty years' truce. "If you refuse, we call to witness the gods, by whom you have sworn, that you are the authors of the war; and we will do our best to strike in return." Archidamus, the elderly King of Sparta, followed with words of caution. He poured cold water on the hot ambition of Sparta. The war would be a long one **and** of **quite** uncertain issue. He advised them to

accept arbitration, but not to slacken war-preparations. Then came Sthenelaidas, one of the Ephors, with a short chauvinist speech. "I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians mean. They have been loud in their own praises, but they don't pretend to say they are dealing honestly with our allies and with the Peloponnesus. If they behaved well in the Persian war and are now behaving badly to us they ought to be punished twice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. . . . Let no one tell us that we should take time to think when we are suffering injustice. Nay, we reply those who mean to do injustice should take a long time to think. Withstand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us betray our allies, but with the gods on our side let us attack the evil-doer." (i. 86.) After this the question was put to the meeting. It was usual to decide by acclamation, but the shouting on both sides was so nearly equal as to render decision impossible. The issue was so great that an accurate vote was a necessity. The meeting was therefore divided, and it was discovered that a considerable majority had declared for war (432). That decision was final so far as the Spartans themselves were concerned, but before action could be taken the rule of the Spartan confederacy demanded that a meeting of the allies should be summoned and their opinion taken. This meeting was held later in the same year. The Corinthians were again the principal spokesmen, and urged the necessity for war and the good prospects of success. The question was then put to all the allies, great and small, and the majority declared for war. Active preparations were at once begun, but nearly a year passed before blood was spilt

Pericles and the War.

During that year the situation at Athens was full of difficulty. The great danger of the war stimulated all passions, and Pericles especially felt the effects. "Nominally a democracy; really a personal government by the first man in the state,"—that is Thucydides' verdict on the government of Athens. Upon the strength and position of Pericles almost everything in the immediate future depended, and that both friends and foes knew. Already his supreme position had made him the mark for numerous attacks. So vigorous had the onslaughts of the comic poets been that in 440 a law had been introduced forbidding the personation of living men upon the stage. But the sallies of the comedians had only been the outward sign of certain discontented factions among the citizens. The old aristocratic party, conquered but not dead, had not forgiven the victorious democrat. The party of the priests and of the old religion knew that the friend of Anaxagoras and of Damon was their enemy. There was a not inconsiderable party who wished that the democracy in name should become a democracy in reality, and resented the appropriation of power by "the first man in the state." There were doubtless very many who genuinely disliked the idea of war with Sparta and shrank from the terrible dangers that it involved. All these different parties would desire to overthrow Pericles, and, if he was to be overthrown, action must be promptly taken. The period between the decision in favour of war at Sparta and the actual outbreak of hostilities is full of attacks upon Pericles and his friends.

No man had been more closely allied with Pericles

than the sculptor Phidias. His artistic pursuits had not separated him from the public interests of the state. He had sympathised with the designs of Pericles, as well as executed that portion of them which concerned the adornment of Athens. The details and chronology of his life are unfortunately very doubtful. But in the year 432 two charges were brought against him. First, one of embezzlement; for he was said to have charged the state for more gold than he had used in the great statue of Athena. This charge was not dangerous, for the golden robes of the goddess were detachable, and when weighed clearly proved the honesty of Phidias. But next the more dangerous, because vaguer, charge of impiety was brought against him. On the shield of the goddess was sculptured in low relief a representation of the Battle of the Amazons. Greek sentiment did not allow the introduction of realism into religious art, and it was alleged that on the shield there were two portraits. A bald-headed man lifting a great stone was Phidias himself. A man fighting with an Amazon, whose face was half-concealed by the spear that he held in his hand was Pericles. What exactly was the result of the charge is not certain. Plutarch tells us that he was thrown into prison, where he fell sick and died.

The party of the priests had gained a victory, and they gained another in an attack on Anaxagoras. The plaintiffs in this case were Diopithes, a fanatical priest, who had procured the passing of a law whereby refusal to accept the religion of the state was made a crime of high treason; and Cleon, the leader of the extreme democratic party, and after the death of Pericles for some time the leader of the state. So dangerous was the attack that Pericles had to advise Anaxagoras to fly

from Athens. The philosopher found a resting-place for his declining years in Lampsacus.

Aspasia was prosecuted on a similar charge; and along with impiety the corruption of the morals of Athenian women was charged against her. The danger to Aspasia was really great. Pericles, almost for the only time in his life, laid aside the Olympian calm in which he usually shrouded his personal feelings. It was long remembered how, with tears in his eyes, he pleaded for the acquittal of one who was so large a part of his own life. And the jurors yielded either to his arguments or his tears and acquitted Aspasia.

At last Pericles himself was directly attacked. Embezzlement of public moneys was laid to his charge, and the case was brought before a jury of fifteen hundred citizens. He was acquitted, but it was something to have ventured to attack him.

Thus harassed at home, he had at the same time to withstand the attacks of Spartan diplomacy. For the year of waiting was occupied by a diplomatic duel; in which, of course, all the real causes of quarrel were lost sight of, and either side tried to represent the other as the aggressor. The first demand of the Spartans was a singular one. "They desired the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess." In a period that precedes clear history—the date may conjecturally be placed at 620 B.C.—the family of the Alcmaeonidæ, to which Pericles belonged on his mother's side, had been concerned in the murder of certain suppliants at the altar of Athena (see p. 180). For this offence a curse was supposed to rest on the whole race. The intention of the move was quite clear. The Spartans knew that a party of some strength was opposed to Pericles on religious

grounds, and they tried to use these religious prejudices to their own advantage. But the blow was parried, and returned by a similar demand on the part of the Athenians. The Spartans had their own pollution for the murder of certain Helots in the temple of Poseidon. Let them, said the Athenians, first drive out this from their own land, and then they would have some right to complain of Athens. After this came demand upon demand, each carefully chosen so as to represent Sparta as the guardian of the liberties of Greece and Athens as the wanton aggressor. First the siege of Potidæa must be raised, and Ægina must be allowed her ancient freedom. Then the decree must be rescinded whereby the Megarians were excluded from all Athenian markets and harbours. Then at last, when each of these demands had met with a suitable reply, came a solemn embassy from Sparta: "The Lacedæmonians desire to maintain peace, and peace there may be if you will restore independence to the Hellenes." That is to say, the Spartans consented to refrain from war if Athens would voluntarily yield them all that they could hope to obtain by war. A meeting of the *ecclesia* was called. There were many voices for concession, and some apparently for peace at any price. But Pericles spoke, and turned the meeting in favour of an unbending policy. He dwelt on the weak points of Sparta and the strength of Athens, her wealth, her navy, and the homogeneity of her power. He hinted at the plan of campaign which he desired the state to adopt. He answered the demands of Sparta by counter-demands equally just, if also equally impossible. He again offered the arbitration that had been arranged for by the thirty years' treaty, and concluded: "This answer will be just, and befits the dignity of the city. We must be aware,

however, that war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands on us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the greatest honours are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persians, had no such empire as we have; what little they had they forsook: not by fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they repelled the Barbarian, and raised us to our present height of greatness. We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies with all our might, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity." The Athenians accepted Pericles' advice, and gave the Spartans a formal answer, refusing their demands, but offering arbitration. And thus war, though not actually declared, was certainly imminent.

In this great struggle either side was preparing to put forth its full strength. The strength of Sparta on land was quite irresistible. From the Peloponnese and from Central Greece sixty thousand heavy-armed troops would come at their call; and their superiority in military morale and discipline was as great as in numbers. Attica lay helplessly exposed to their attack. The isthmus of Corinth and the passes of Geraneia were in the hands of the allies of Sparta. The Athenians had no means at their disposal of preventing their entry into Attica, and no power of resisting them when they had entered. The real weakness of Sparta was, firstly, in money, and next in ships. Her allies would give their bodies, but they would give nothing else. The sinews of war would fail her if the war did not come to a very speedy conclusion. In ships she was even weaker. Now that the Corcyraean navy had joined the Athenian, the united fleets could sweep the seas without finding resist-

ance. But Sparta was strong in the moral support of Greece. All aristocracies and oligarchies everywhere looked upon her as their champion. All states regarded the Athenian Empire as unjust, and feared a like fate for themselves. It was certain that many of the allies of Athens would revolt at the first opportunity. The plan of the Spartan campaign was to invade Attica, and by ravaging the country induce the Athenians to fight; and if they refused to fight, by continued invasions to wear down their strength. To this and to the revolt of the allies the Spartans trusted most; though there were hotter spirits who desired to build a navy with all possible speed and attack the Athenians on their own element, and Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, and other maritime allies of Sparta could provide a valuable nucleus for a navy. But nothing could move Sparta from her more cautious policy.

On the other hand, the two main supports of the strength of Athens were her navy and her wealth. She could put three hundred ships on the water, and in tactics and naval strategy she was as supreme as in numbers. Athenian commanders felt a great contempt for the old methods of fighting, where ships charged one another, and then, lashed together, settled the question of victory by a *mêlée* of heavy-armed soldiers upon the decks; where there was no attempt to break the enemy's line, and "brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics." To the Athenian commander the ship itself was the most important weapon. To break the enemy's line and then ram the isolated ships of the enemy was his great object, and no other commanders in Greece could direct such manoeuvres and no other crews were sufficiently well trained to carry them out.

The naval supremacy of Athens under Pericles was at least as great as that of England under Pitt. Her treasury was also full. There was a reserve fund of six thousand talents. Probably no other state in Greece had an income one-fifth as large. Though the land forces of Athens were quite unequal to a contest with those of Sparta, they were not inconsiderable: 29,000 heavy-armed troops were at their disposal, and though a great proportion of these would be required to guard the fortifications of Athens, a powerful force remained ready for any expedition. Pericles had carefully drawn up his plans with reference to these forces, and the central feature of his plans was that Athens should be regarded as an island, that she should trust entirely to her navy, and only use her army for occasional descents and expeditions. Athens was joined to the Piræus and the sea by the long walls. She could not therefore be blockaded so long as her naval supremacy remained. Attica was to be abandoned, with all its farms and villages and country pleasures. The whole population was to crowd into the space between the long walls of Athens. "If we were islanders," says Pericles, "who would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let us give up lands and houses, but keep a watch over the city and the sea. . . . Mourn not for houses and lands. Men may gain these, but these will not gain men. If I thought that you would listen to me, I would say to you, 'Go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove to the Peloponnesians that none of these things will move you.' " While Athens thus stood strictly on the defensive at home, she was to show Sparta that she was also able to attack, by making descents on **the** Peloponnesian coast, as her navy would

allow her to do, and, carefully husbanding her resources and engaging in no distant expeditions, trust to some false move on the part of Sparta and her own keen watchfulness to decide the war in her favour.

Thus Pericles waited for the war with what Grote calls "a stately and majestic firmness." And this it is impossible not to admire. Yet as we see the two halves of Greece clashing together in one of the most suicidal wars in history, we ask, "In so civilised a world as that of Greece was it not possible to avoid war? And could the war policy of Pericles really lead to any good results?" His greatness of character, his vigour of intellect, every one will concede; but was he really in this case guiding Athens aright? It is no answer to these questions to point to the fact that the war ended in disaster for Athens, for that disaster only came when Pericles' successors entirely deserted his policy. Nor does it seem at all final to denounce the plans of Pericles as ambitious and oppressive of the liberties of Greece. On the contrary, it is plain that, if Athens had been capable of the task, the interests of civilisation would have been really forwarded by the subjection of the Greek communities to the rule of Athens. The real objection to Pericles' policy surely is that Athens was not capable of the task. She had held a land-empire once, and failed to retain it; the most that she could expect from the present war was the extension of her maritime empire. No naval supremacy would give her the control of the mainland of Greece. And if we look deeper below the surface, we surely find that Athens lacked the character necessary for the task; lacked entirely the cohesion and solidity and the high statesmanship that made the conquests of Rome possible and

beneficial. Athenian democracy and Athenian society had the seeds of decay in themselves, and were quite incapable of guiding others. Doubtless a successful war might have altered much in Athens: it might have strengthened the executive and upset the democracy; but it could not have given her the character that justifies government by supreme ability to govern.

The First Year of the War.

While the main combatants glared at one another with drawn swords, each hesitating to strike first, the combat was begun by the subordinates in the struggle. On the north of the mountain range of Cithseron was the little city of Plataea, in the territory of Bœotia, and yet an ally of Athens. Thebes was master of all Bœotia except this one city, and she had coveted that for many years past. It was Plataea's adhesion to Athens which made friendship between Thebes and Athens impossible. And now Thebes, by an act of treason that neither Greek morality nor the thirty years' truce in the least countenanced, attempted to seize Plataea. An intrigue was opened with the oligarchical party of Plataea. A Theban expeditionary party found the gates of the city treasonously opened to them. They made their way to the marketplace in the centre of the town and summoned the citizens to surrender. The danger was unexpected, the number of assailants unknown, and at first the city in terror accepted the terms offered. But as time went on the smallness of the attacking party was revealed, and the Plataeans found courage to resist. They overwhelmed the Thebans, barred the gates of the city against them, and took most of them prisoners. They would have been of immense value if held as hostages; but neigh-

hourly hatred was stronger than self-interest, and, in spite of promises that they had made, they put them all to death. The thirty years' peace had been flagrantly broken, and the war began at once (431).

Archidamus sent one last embassy to Athens, but the ambassador was not admitted within the walls. The Peloponnesian force then assembled at the Isthmus and prepared to invade Attica, and as the invasion approached the Athenians acted upon Pericles' advice and brought their families and all movable property, even to the woodwork of their houses, into the city. It was a cruel necessity for them. Hitherto the Athenians had lived largely in the country; now all the pleasures of the country must be cast on one side for such lodgment as they could find within the walls of the city. They forced their way where they could into the very temples of the gods; they found shelter in the turrets of the walls, or built themselves wretched cabins in the open space between the long walls. Such an entire overturn of the habits of a people was a heavy price to pay even for victory. Archidamus marched slowly up through the Eleusinian plain, and then entered the central plain Attica. For some time he refrained from spoiling the country, hoping that the Athenians would be induced to fight for their crops. It needed all the strength of Pericles to restrain them. He refused to call any meeting of the people, lest their wrath against him should find vent there. So Archidamus ravaged the country almost up to the walls of the city, and then retired. The Athenians meanwhile were not idle. A squadron was detached to sail round the Peloponnese, and landed here and there and did considerable damage. The population of Ægina was cruelly expelled from the island

upon suspicion of treasonous intentions. The territory of Megara was completely ravaged. Foreign alliances were made among the barbarians of the north. And so the first year of the war ended. No definite advantage had been gained. But men's passions had been embittered, and the hottest spirits of Sparta had to confess that the war would come to no speedy conclusion. And as Athens had lost no ground, and had been expected to lose much, the advantage on the whole rested with her.

The Plague and the Death of Pericles.

It seemed that the second year of the war would be a close reproduction of the first, consisting of a Spartan invasion of Attica and Athenian retaliation. For at the beginning of the summer of 430 King Archidamus again led a powerful Peloponnesian army into Attica and again ravaged the country. But then he withdrew from the neighbourhood of Athens, for news came that the plague was in the city. To us, acquainted with the all-important connection of sanitation and drainage with health, the plague does not come as a surprise. The vast influx of population into Athens, where no sufficient accommodation was to be found, must have produced insanitary conditions of an appalling character, and it is to this that modern physicians look, if not for the origin of the disease, at any rate for the character it took in Athens. It had already appeared in the East, but nowhere with such terrible results. Thucydides, himself a sufferer, has left us a full and most tragic description of it, and it is only possible to paraphrase or make extracts from his account.

At first the physicians applied the usual remedies, but without any result, and the mortality among their own pro-

fession was unusually high, because they most frequently came into contact with the disease. Men turned from human to divine assistance, but equally without avail. The oracles had no useful advice to offer. Men prayed in the temples, but the disease was not stayed. Then suspicion fell on the Peloponnesians, who were accused of having poisoned the drinking cisterns. The attack of the disease was frightfully sudden. The chief symptoms were inflammation of the eyes, with such violent internal fever that clothes were intolerable, and many plunged into the cisterns to assuage, *if possible*, their unappeasable thirst. Seven or nine days the disease lasted, and when it passed it left behind it a terrible weakness, so that many perished of exhaustion. In some cases it passed from the vital portions of the body and settled in the extremities, so that some lost fingers, toes, or eyes, and yet survived. What struck Thucydides most forcibly as he looked back upon this terrible time was the appalling despondency that fell upon the state, the disruption of all laws, human and divine, and the moral anarchy which it produced. "The dead lay as they had died, one upon another; while others, hardly alive, wallowed in the streets and crawled about every fountain craving for water. The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of those who died in them; for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. The customs which had hitherto been observed at funerals were universally violated, and they buried their dead each one as best he could. . . . When one man had raised a funeral pile, others would come, and, throwing on their dead first, set fire to it; or when some other corpse was already burning, before they

could be stopped, would throw their own dead upon it and depart. There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the plague introduced at Athens. Men who had hitherto concealed their indulgence now grew bolder. . . . Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honour, when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in honour? The pleasure of the moment and anything which conduced to it took the place both of honour and expediency. No fear of God or law of man deterred a criminal. Already a far heavier sentence had been passed and was hanging over a man's head ; before that fell why should he not take a little pleasure?" (ii. 53). This appalling catastrophe, coupled with the constant ravages that the Spartans were committing in Attica, naturally produced great exasperation in Athens. They turned in their wrath against Pericles, whom they regarded as the author of the war. Many were for accepting the terms of the Lacedaemonians. Pericles, who was as usual one of the generals of the year, called an assembly and addressed the people with his usual stately firmness. His speech is given by Thucydides, and is one of Pericles' most striking utterances. He dwelt on the imperial greatness of Athens, the incalculable nature of the late calamity, the good hopes that they might still entertain of future success. By the memory of what they had been and what they were, he conjured them to face the enemy undauntedly. "The visitations of heaven should be borne with resignation, the sufferings inflicted by the enemy with manliness. That has always been the spirit of Athens, and should not die out in you. . . . Even if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things have their times of growth and decay), yet will the

recollection live that of all Hellenes we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects; that we withstood our enemies, whether single or united, in the most terrible wars; and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort of wealth and greatness" (Thucydides, ii. 64).

He regained the Athenians' confidence for a time. They made no overtures to Sparta, and continued the war doggedly. Yet the power of Pericles does not seem ever again to have reached the point at which it stood before the war began. Shortly afterwards, but upon what charge we are not told, Pericles was fined by the people and not re-elected general; but afterwards he was again elected, and the management of all the affairs of Athens was put into his hand. And during these last months of Pericles' life the war went well for the Athenians. The siege of Potidæa ended at last, in 430, by the surrender of the place. Its revolt had so deeply incensed the Athenians that they would have doubtless liked to put a large number of the inhabitants to death, but the Athenian generals on the spot were anxious to bring the siege to an end, and allowed all the inhabitants to come out and disperse in the neighbouring states. A still more remarkable victory was gained by Phormio, the Athenian admiral, near Naupactus, in the Corinthian Gulf. It is impossible here to give the details of the struggle, which arose out of an effort of the Peloponnesians to wrest Acarnania from the Athenian alliance. All depended upon Phormio, the Athenian admiral, who, through mismanagement, was left with only twenty vessels to guard the Corinthian Gulf. First, he had to meet forty-seven Corinthian vessels, who were making for **the** Acarnanian coast never thinking that the Athenians

would attack them at a disadvantage of nearly three to one. But the superiority of Athenian discipline and tactics made up for want of numbers. The Corinthians were defeated, and twelve out of the forty-seven vessels taken. It was a notable victory, but something more surprising was to follow. The Corinthians were reinforced by a Peloponnesian fleet, and there were now seventy-seven vessels in all on the Spartan side, while Phormio still had only his twenty ships. He had applied for reinforcements, but they had not arrived: the whole expedition seems, indeed, to have been grievously mismanaged by the Athenian government. With twenty vessels against seventy-seven, Phormio had still no thought of flight. If he could fight in the open sea, he trusted to the rowing powers of his men and his superiority in tactics to avoid defeat. But Brasidas, the Spartan admiral, skilfully duped him into entering the narrow part of the strait, and there attacked him. Of Phormio's twenty vessels nine were driven aground. The eleven that remained were hotly pursued by twenty Peloponnesian ships that already sang the Pæan in anticipation of victory. Suddenly the Athenian vessels turned, rammed the leading ship of the Peloponnesian squadron, and by this unexpected blow so discouraged the others that they took to flight. The rest of the squadron caught their panic, and soon men saw the almost incredible sight of eleven Athenian vessels charging and driving before them in confusion a Peloponnesian fleet of seventy-seven. They recaptured all their own ships, and six of the enemy fell*into their hands. But the moral worth of the victory was greater than the capture of any number of ships. Nothing could more clearly have shown the superiority of Athens at sea.

When the news of this brilliant victory came to Athens Pericles was dying. The end of his life must have been a very sorrowful one. His house had been left desolate by the plague. His two legitimate sons Paralus and Xanthippus had been carried off by it, and his sister and many other relatives had also perished. He was sixty-four years of age. It is not certain whether he himself had had the plague or not, but it seems that since the time of the plague he had never been well. We can easily believe that it needed the persuasion of his friends to induce him to take again the helm of affairs. He used his regained influence to procure from the people permission to legitimise the son that Aspasia had borne to him, and permission was readily granted. But he had not health or strength sufficient for the task. We get two interesting anecdotes of his last days. When his friends came to see him he showed them an amulet that he had hung round his neck. We can imagine him smiling as he did so at the thought that he had been induced in his old age to adopt one of those superstitious uses that he had so despised all his life. And again we are told by Plutarch that when men spoke at his bedside of the victories that he had gained, the power that he had held, and his nobleness of character, he roused himself from the slumber into which his friends believed that he had fallen to say that these were not his chief titles to fame: he was proudest to think that no Athenian had ever put on mourning because of him. It is a strange claim from the unflinching adviser of the Peloponnesian war; but if it be interpreted as claiming for his policy a dislike for all but necessary wars, and for his character a high degree of humanity and a complete absence of vindictiveness, the claim will be readily allowed by all who know his history.

The greatest of Athenian statesmen died in the sixty-fifth year of his age. His great name as a statesman depends rather on what he attempted than on what he accomplished. He steered Athens straight for the Peloponnesian war, and she emerged from it defeated and broken. He completed the Athenian democracy, and he was hardly dead before it began to decline from that greatness of character that he attributed to it in his "Funeral Oration." He is not a great architect of order like Caesar, nor a great conqueror like Alexander. The institutions he founded had no permanence like the Roman Senate or the English Parliament. His idea of an imperial democracy was a phantom never yet realised in the world's history. He marks not only the zenith of Greece's greatness, but the beginning of her decline. Yet he has a claim to a place in the world's roll of statesmen which will always be conceded. For he saw the need of Hellenic union, and tried to realise it. We read vague accounts of an early attempt to collect deputies from all parts of Greece to consider some scheme for common Hellenic action. And after those early dreams had disappeared, he tried to make Athens worthy of the headship of Greece, and to gain her that position by diplomacy and arms. The attempt failed, perhaps was bound to fail; but it showed a just appreciation of the needs of Greece, and by Pericles was worthily made. And if his military and political schemes failed, his service to art and thought deserves eternal gratitude. The friend of Phidias and Socrates, Damon and Anaxagoras, deserves at least as great a name among the wise patrons of the world as Maecenas or Louis XIV. He showed the world that a city might be something besides an agglomeration of houses. In

his hands Athens became a thing of beauty in itself such as Florence was long afterwards. So long as the literature of Greece calls forth admiration, and so long as the pillars of the Parthenon remain upon the Acropolis, Pericles' name will be had in honour.

The personal character of a great statesman is not a matter of the first historical importance. But it is pleasant to find so close a correspondence between the work and the man as we do in Pericles. The character that he ascribes to the Athenian democracy was realised, at any rate, in himself: he was a philosopher, and yet a man of action; a lover of art, and yet lived an austere life. He led the Athenian democracy without ever adopting the tactics of a demagogue. It may be doubted indeed whether any great popular leader ever had so little recourse to flattery. He gave power to the people, but never assumed that the voice of the people was necessarily right. His speeches did not echo the wishes of the ecclesia, but gave it guidance, often of an unpopular kind. And in what more immediately concerns his private life, our impression is equally favourable. His continued tenderness to Aspasia, his passion of grief upon the death of his sons, the warm regard of so distinguished a circle of friends, all prove that behind his almost icy reserve there was a warm and affectionate heart. And though there is no evidence to show that he was an original thinker in philosophy, his devotion to high speculation helped to raise him above the petty passions of the hour and give him that Olympian calm which enemies and friends alike attributed to him.

NOTE.—Thucydides, Books I., II. Grote, Curtius, and Plutarch's *Pericles*.



TEMPLE OF ATHENA AT SUNIUM.

CHAPTER XL

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE history of the Peloponnesian war stands, strictly speaking, outside of the subject comprised in this book. But as the calm acceptance of that war was the main feature of Pericles' foreign policy, our judgment upon him and his age cannot be complete without some knowledge of the main results of the war. No attempt will be made to give a detailed narrative of it. For our purposes it will be most important in studying its course to seek an answer to the following questions: How did the Athenian democracy answer in the crisis? What was the influence of the war upon the general political outlook of Greece? What changes were introduced by it into the thought and feeling of Hellas? How far does its course justify, how far condemn, the policy of Pericles? And in view of the last question it is well to repeat the conditions that, in the opinion of Pericles, would have to

be observed if success were reasonably to be hoped for. He demanded that Athens should resign all hope of victory on land, and make full use of the almost insular position that her long walls gave her; that distant expeditions and further acquisitions of empire should be strictly resisted; and that the war should be on the side of Athens mainly defensive in character. And in addition to these expressly mentioned conditions, there must have been another in the mind of Pericles, unless his own supremacy had blinded him to the defects of the democracy: he must have seen the necessity for the commanding influence of some individual to give consistency to the war policy of the state.

The war falls naturally into three divisions.

From the Death of Pericles to the Peace of Nicias.

Until the sixth year of the war the operations follow very closely the lines that had been laid down on both sides at the beginning. Every year, except in 429, when the condition of the plague-stricken city made approach dangerous, a Spartan army entered Attica and ravaged the country. And during these years the Athenians as a rule confined themselves to measures of defence such as Pericles had suggested; or if they attacked, it was with their navy. In 428 an event of the first importance occurred, one that the Athenians had feared and the Spartans had hoped for from the first. The great island of Lesbos, except Chios, the last independent member of the Delian confederacy, revolted. It was mainly the work of the oligarchical party; the mass of the population remained, as usual, faithful to the Athenian democracy. The danger was very great. If the revolt had been immediately supported by Sparta, it would probably have

been successful, and would have given the enemy a possession of vast importance in itself and a splendid standpoint for the promotion of further revolts. But Spartan help arrived too late. Mitylene was reduced, and with it the whole island. And here we see the first striking instance of the cruelties which through the whole course of the war disgrace and degrade the Greek character. A thousand Mitylenæan prisoners and their Spartan leader were sent to Athens, and in a meeting of the *ecclesia* it was determined to put the whole of them to death, and not only them but all the grown-up citizens of Mitylene as well, amounting certainly to several thousands. A ship was at once despatched to order the execution of this atrocious decree, which had the support of Cleon and the extreme democratic party. Next day the people realised the character of their decision, and another meeting was held. The former decree was rescinded: the Mitylenæans were saved by the despatch of a swift trireme, but the sentence of death was carried out on the thousand prisoners that had already been brought to Athens. In the same year the siege of Plataea was brought to an end. A large proportion of the garrison had managed to escape. The rest, after a mock trial, were slaughtered by the Spartans.

In 425 came more striking events. The Athenian general Demosthenes, a man of great enterprise and daring, effected a lodgment in the harbour of Pylos, on the west coast of Messenia. The presence of an Athenian force there was a very great danger to Sparta. For it exposed Spartan territory to the danger of constant ravage, and it was a standing invitation to the Helots of the country to revolt—an invitation of which

they availed themselves in large numbers. A resolute effort was made to dislodge the Athenians, but in vain, and in the effort a considerable number of Spartan hoplites were shut up in the island of Sphacteria, just off the coast, and were then surrounded and besieged by the Athenians. They defended themselves so resolutely that the Athenians were almost ready to abandon the attempt to capture them. Cleon, however, with the extreme democratic party, clamoured for more vigorous measures. The command of a new enterprise was given to him. The island was captured, and 292 Spartan hoplites were brought prisoners to Athens. So great was the despondency of Sparta that, without question, Athens might have had peace had she wished it, and peace both honourable and highly advantageous. But the success at Pylos had fired the imagination of the Athenians ; nothing seemed impossible to them.

But the next year—424 B.C., the eighth year of the war—affairs assumed a different complexion. The tide of victory began to ebb from Athens. For, in the first place, they attempted a considerable operation on land. Thebes was almost as bitter an enemy as Sparta, and two expeditions entered Bœotia from north and south, intending to join and give battle to the enemy. But they failed to effect a junction, and the division that entered from the north, under the leadership of Hippocrates, was attacked and entirely defeated near Delium. And further north Athens had received a graver blow still. For Sparta had at last produced a man. The discipline and policy of Sparta kept up a high average of courage and civic feeling among the citizens, but the whole character of the state placed the greatest obstacles in the way of the production of special talent

and men of special ability could not use their powers in the neighbourhood of the city, under the watchful suspicion of the Ephors. Brasidas, who now comes on the stage, to play there for a short time a most brilliant part, had all the great characteristics of Sparta—firmness, courage, devotion to the state. But the Spartan fondness for routine and their contempt of speech and reason were absent in him, and had allowed place for the keenest enterprise and a singular gift of persuasion. He now determined to relieve Sparta from the pressure of something like blockade to which the occupation of Pylos and the supremacy of the Athenian navy had reduced her. And this he hoped to do by striking a blow at some distant and vulnerable part of her empire. His enterprise was tardily and reluctantly sanctioned by the Spartan state. He then led a force, almost entirely consisting of Helots, up through Thessaly to the coast of Thrace. Here was a rich portion of Athenian rule; the mines and commerce of the country made it particularly valuable to Athens. At first Acanthus and then many other towns were induced to revolt. Finally Brasidas possessed himself of Amphipolis on the Strymon—a place for which Athens had made many sacrifices—the very centre of the commerce of the district.

These blows induced Athens to consider more favourably the idea of peace. A year's truce upon the basis of the *status quo* was actually adopted. But the war party, the ultra-democrats under Cleon, were still arfxious for war, and in Thrace Brasidas continued hostilities. In 422, the tenth year of the war, Cleon was despatched to try to **repeat** his success at Pylos. At Amphipolis he was slain **and** the Athenian force defeated with disgrace. Six hundred fell on the Athenian side, but among them was

Cleon ; the Spartans lost only seven, but one of the seven was Brasidas. The great opponents of peace on either side were thus removed. The death of Brasidas was a great blow to Sparta, and probably to Greece. If Sparta had won under such a chief as Brasidas, it is possible that some really efficient and honest organisation might have followed in place of the brutal terrorism which, in the event, she spread over Greece. A peace—the so-called Peace of Nicias—immediately followed (421). According to the curious Greek custom which recognised war as the normal condition between states, that peace was limited to fifty years. Both sides were to give up what they had gained in the war. Eleven years of war had brought no decision of the quarrel, but the belief of Pericles that Athens would survive victoriously had been fully justified.

During this period the absence of Pericles was severely felt. Athens was no longer "nominally a democracy; really a personal government by the first man in the state." The ecclesia now reigned supreme, and as a result the policy of Athens lacked coherence. If space allowed us to follow in detail the events of the war, we should find numerous instances of quite stupid blunders in the use of fleet and army that are due to the orders of the general assembly; we should find throughout the whole war a lack of definite plan. Two parties had developed themselves, the parties of the moderate and extreme democrats; for now there was no party that dared to question or resist the democratic system. Oligarchs there were still in Athens no doubt, but they were driven underground into clubs and secret societies, which before long have a great and fatal influence on Athens. At the head of the more moderate party was

Nicias, a man of great wealth and universally recognised uprightness of character, but with little energy and no spark of genius—a man quite incapable of guiding the action of Athens in the terrible struggle in which she was engaged. His supporters were the richer classes and the men of conservative or timid feeling. The opposite party had recognised Cleon as its mouthpiece rather than its leader. He was a man of low origin, a tanner by trade. He did not possess the full Athenian culture of Pericles or Nicias. Thucydides, the most universally trusted of historians, and Aristophanes, the bitterest of satirical writers, have covered him with abuse. That much of this abuse is the mere expression of party hatred cannot be doubted. It is equally certain that he possessed great gifts as an orator, though his passionate gestures offended the Athenians who remembered the sobriety of Pericles. It is certain too that as a statesman he saw quickly and could act vigorously. The advice he gave with regard to the affair of Pylos was derided at the time, but proved a brilliant success. All this may be admitted; yet it is certain that Cleon was a power for evil in the Athenian state, and marked the beginning of a great political decline. He fawned on the people, and flattered their passions both good and bad; he substituted demagogism for statesmanship. The state lost the direction that Pericles gave it; the sense of loyalty perished. Henceforward the only wisdom of most of the prominent politicians of Athens was, in Plato's words, to observe the humours of the great beast. The people in the *ecclesia* recognised no authority outside themselves, and into their guidance, necessarily uncertain and changeable, the conduct of this great war was henceforth entrusted.

Such was the change that was being worked in Athens. And at the same time, both in Athens and elsewhere, a still more grievous evil was rising. Patriotic feeling was being destroyed by party spirit. The two great states that now struggled at death-grips represented the principles of oligarchy and democracy. This fact, together with the terrible pressure of the war, produced in every state oligarchical and democratic parties, or embittered their feelings and their action where they already existed. The course of the war gives us the most terrible picture of civil feuds raging, seen or unseen, in almost every Greek state. The opposite party was hated more than the common foe. And as Greek morality was state morality, and half of what was best in the average Greek came from his devotion to the state, this meant a frightful moral deterioration. This was the feature of the war that seems to have struck Thucydides more than any other. In the eighty-second chapter of the third book he says: "In every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace men would have had no excuse for introducing either and no desire to do so, but when they were at war the dissatisfied party was only too ready to invoke foreign aid." And with special bitterness he speaks of the moral decline that ensued from the bitterness of the parties. "The meaning of words had no longer the same relations to things, but was changed by men as they thought proper. Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; frantic energy was the true quality of a man. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood. The seal of good faith

was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. . . . The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked on a contest. **For** the leaders on each side used specious names, the one professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy ; while they made the public interests to which in name they were devoted in reality their prize. . . . Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and disappeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no word binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure : he must look to his own safety, and could not afford to trust to others." Such was the condition of Greece when the Peace of Nicias gave her a gasping space before a fiercer struggle began.

The Sicilian Expedition.

When we consider the high hopes of immediate victory with which the Spartans entered on the Peloponnesian war, it is plain that the Peace of Nicias really marks an Athenian victory. It seems plain too that if the conditions of Greece and the ambitions of the contending states did not allow a permanent peace, Athens might have faced a renewal of the struggle with equanimity, confident that an adherence more or less close to the advice of Pericles would secure her victory in **the** end. But a combination of circumstances drove her into a wild scheme of conquest that, in the event,

brought rum to the state, and, so far as we can see, could not by any possibility have brought lasting good.

Foremost among the causes that led to the ruin of Athens was the rise of Alcibiades to influence and power. There is a great temptation to linger over his most striking character. Nature had given him every gift and grace to the ruin of his state and himself. A less suspicious state might have used him as an instrument to the greatest victories ; a less disloyal nature than his might have done great things even for Athens. But Alcibiades was unfortunate in Athens and Athens in him. His father died when he was about five years old. Yet he fell under influences of the best kind; for Pericles was his guardian and Socrates was his earliest teacher. What Pericles' influence upon him was we do not know, though his commanding influence in the state must have been a stimulus to the ambition of his ward. Socrates fascinated his intellect and awoke whatever was best in him ; he seems nearly to have saved his pupil from the egotism that was his doom and the state's. The novelty and effectiveness of the Socratic method must have been infinitely attractive to so keen a brain as his; and his egotism was not yet too fully developed to prevent the moral earnestness of Socrates from appealing to him. Between politics and moral philosophy there was a struggle for mastery over him. The influence of Socrates went near to effecting a religious conversion in him; the vision of moral goodness that he held up made Alcibiades' " heart leap up far more than the hearts of those who celebrate the Corybantic mysteries." But in the end the attraction of politics was too strong. "The glory which the multitude confers" overwhelmed him. Inclination and

necessity alike drove him to the side of the extreme democratic party; for Nicias was still the trusted leader of the conservatives. With superb abilities that amount nearly to genius, and with a complete absence of moral scruple that reminds us of the age of Machiavelli, he drew the eyes of all men on himself, and guided the state with a single eye to his own personal advancement. He became, without question, the first man in Athens. His influence in the state was almost as great as that which Pericles had possessed.

In Athens there was no sufficient career for his ambition. He must flatter the people in order to hold his own, and by flattery of the people no stable power could be gained. He sought therefore for some opportunity in foreign countries.

Despite the peace between Athens and Sparta, the whole of Greece was full of their rivalries. Many of the states of the Peloponnese were extremely dissatisfied with the recent action of Sparta, and from 421 to 418 Alcibiades was employed in organising an anti-Spartan confederacy within the Peloponnese. His success was very great to begin with, but in 418 the Spartans crushed their opponents at the battle of Mantinea and re-established their supremacy in the Peloponnese. The year 416 saw one of the most terrible acts of the war, an act which shows us the desperate cruelty and the entire unscrupulousness with which the objects of the war were prosecuted even when peace nominally prevailed. The island of Melos belonged to the group of the Cyclades, but was not a part of the Athenian dominions. In 416 it was summoned to join. A conference was held between the Melians and the Athenians. Thucydides has given us a report of it perhaps rather dramatic than

strictly accurate. Yet there can be no doubt that it represents justly the complete moral anarchy which had fallen upon Greece. "We will not," say the Athenians, go out of our way to prove that we have a right to rule. . . . The question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is equal. The powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must. . . . Of the gods we believe and of men we know that, by a law of their nature, wherever they can rule they will." No other right is recognised except the right of the stronger. The Melians resisted courageously, but yielded at length to a blockade. "The Athenians," says Thucydides, "thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children."

In the same year there came envoys from Egesta, in Sicily, asking for help against their neighbours of Selinus. We may dismiss the precise question of boundaries that caused the original appeal, for, in a manner characteristic of the times, the question was soon lost sight of. The Athenians did not debate whether they should assist Egesta against an aggressive neighbour, but whether they should invade Sicily with a view to their own advantage. Even at the beginning of the war men's eyes were directed westward. Sicily, Italy, Carthage, were spoken of as possible spheres for Hellenic conquest. Just now Athens was full of confidence in herself, but painfully conscious that she was unable to meet the Spartan spear in the open field. And now Egesta held out delusive promises of money to pay for the whole campaign. The imagination of the Athenians kindled. It was in vain that Nicias urged the vast difficulties, the real impossibility, of adding so great an island as Sicily to the Athenian Empire. Alcibiades saw in the

expedition a chance of almost irresponsible command and an indefinite career. The Athenians followed his counsel and voted for the war.

It was the first decisive deviation from the lines of Pericles' policy, and it was necessarily a fatal one. Athens with all her strength could barely hold her own against Sparta. What could Athens depleted of all her best troops hope to do? "You must not be extending your empire while you are at war or run into unnecessary danger. I am more afraid of your own mistakes than of your enemies' designs." So Pericles had said before the war began, and now his words were to be fully justified.

The chances of permanent success were against the expedition from the first. But its ruin was precipitated by events that still remain one of the unsolved problems of history. Athens was full of secret political societies, oligarchs *enrages* for the most part, who abandoned public for secret opposition to the democracy. It is to this origin that we may, with probability, ascribe what follows, though the details are as inscrutable for us as they were for contemporaries. Shortly before the expedition sailed, it was found that most of the statues of Hermes which stood before the doors had been mutilated or overthrown. Superstitious fears counted for much in Athens. This insult to the gods was a terrible omen on the eve of the Sicilian expedition. Rumour connected Alcibiades' name with the outrage even before **the** expedition sailed. No decisive action was taken at **the** time; but after the expedition had departed, taking with it a very large proportion of the citizens of Athens, **the** matter was more closely inquired into. The oligarchical clubs saw their opportunity in the absence

of the more vigorous part of the population **and of the** soldiers, who were devoted to Aicibiades. Specific charges of impiously parodying the mysteries were brought against him. It was determined to order him to return home to stand his trial, and a trireme was despatched to bring him back to Athens. He refused to face the farce of a trial in a city clearly bitterly biassed against him, where he would be without the support of his own followers. He promised to follow the trireme that had summoned him, but took the earliest opportunity of escaping. His passionate and egotistic nature saw by what means he might acquire distinction and revenge. He repaired to Sparta, and put at **her** disposal his talents and his knowledge of Athenian affairs (415).

With terrible accuracy he pointed out the weak points in the Athenian defence. Open war must at once be renewed; a fortified post must be established in Attica, where a Spartan garrison might be left the whole year through, to prevent the Athenians from enjoying a single moment of complete security and to entice the slaves of Athens to desert; lastly, and above all, a small force under a Spartan commander must be sent to Sicily, so that the enemies of Athens there might know that they were to be actively supported by Sparta. Aicibiades' advice was taken. Decelea in Attica, a strong position near the chief road from Athens to Eubœa, was chosen for fortification, and a Spartan force was shortly despatched thither to begin its permanent occupation. And Gylippus, a Spartan soldier somewhat of the type of Brasidas, was despatched with a **very** small **force** to Sicily.

Up to his arrival the Athenians, despite **the** **slackness**

of Nicias' command, had been making rapid strides towards success. Syracuse was attacked with considerable energy. On sea and on land the Athenians had shown themselves more than a match for their opponents. The great city was closely blockaded on the side of the sea, and Nicias had begun to build a wall of circumvallation on the heights of Epipolæ behind the city. Depression prevailed within Syracuse. Then, despite the efforts of Nicias to intercept him, Gylippus made his way into Syracuse. At once all was altered. Hope returned. The Syracusans, under Gylippus* guidance, took one of the Athenian forts and completely frustrated the circumvallation. The depression was transferred to the opposite camp. Nicias, never sanguine, had fallen into complete despair. He was ill, and dared face neither the responsibility of going nor remaining. He wrote helplessly to Athens entreating succour, and declaring that nothing could be done without considerable reinforcements. However disappointed the Athenians might be by the failure of their first expedition, they did not yet abandon all hope, and sent out Demosthenes, a tried and resolute commander, with seventy-three fresh triremes and their full complement of troops (413).

The reinforcements only increased the number of victims. True, Demosthenes threw more vigour into the attack. He directed a vigorous onslaught upon the counter-works of the Syracusans to be made at night. At first successful, it was in the end driven back; and Demosthenes, considering the strength of the city and the enfeebled condition of the Athenian troops, had the courage to advise a retreat. But Nicias feared the censure of the Athenian democracy, and though entirely without hope preferred to remain. Yet the danger increased

every day, and at last he gave his consent to the idea of withdrawal. Everything was prepared. Already the sailors were preparing to push off, when an eclipse of the moon took place. Nicias was in all things full of superstitious piety. The soothsayers declared that the gods were clearly opposed, and the departure must be delayed to the next full moon. But in this over-harassed man religious conviction was as little stable as his military resolution. Frightened by the prospect of impending calamity, he again gave the word for flight. It was too late. The desire to escape being in itself a declaration of defeat gave the Syracusans courage to attack. The Athenian ships, rotten and manned by dispirited crews, and fighting in the harbour, where there was insufficient space for manoeuvres, were defeated, and the Syracusans proceeded at once to block up the mouth of the harbour.

The position was now one for utter despair. At all costs the entrance of the harbour must be forced. The Athenian ships were manned once more, and sent against the blockading line. A desperate struggle ensued, while the shores were thronged with thousands of spectators. But Athenian seamanship, even if their ships had been good, could show nothing of its wonted skill in such confined waters. The enemy's ships had been made specially strong for the struggle. In the end the Athenians fell back defeated, and no efforts of their commanders could give them heart for the renewal of the struggle. No hope now remained except to retire by land to the neighbouring friendly city of Camarina. If the attempt had been made at once it would probably have succeeded, but Nicias was duped into a delay of twenty-four hours, and when the army set out all the roads were guarded

with Syracusan soldiery. What follows is the most tragic picture in Greek history. The force marched out of camp in two divisions, commanded by Nicias and Demosthenes. Disaster met them from the first. They were forced to turn aside from their intended route because it was blocked by a Syracusan force. Henceforward they wandered almost aimlessly where the prospect of less resistance or better provisions attracted them; all the time they were harassed by cavalry and many were cut off, and hunger and thirst maddened them. On the sixth day of this miserable retreat the division of Demosthenes was surrounded and overwhelmed by missile weapons, until those that remained, six thousand in number, surrendered upon promise of their lives. Two days later the troops of Nicias, tortured by thirst, flung themselves into the river Assinarus, and amidst the constant flight of missile weapons slaked their thirst in the water, muddy and dyed with blood. At last, when the corpses were piled in heaps upon the banks and in the river, Nicias and the few survivors surrendered at discretion. Both the Athenian commanders were put to death. The prisoners were thrust into the stone quarries, and exposed to all the inclemencies of the weather and the mockery of the Syracusan populace. The insufficient food and the insanitary conditions rapidly thinned the ranks. After ten weeks the allies of the Athenians were sold as slaves. But the Athenians themselves had to expiate their greatness and their aggressiveness by an imprisonment that ended only with life. The high hopes of Periclean Athens ended in the red waters of the Assinarus and **the** stone quarries of Syracuse (413).

The End of the War.

The tragedy of the Sicilian expedition is none the less pathetic because we feel that it was deserved. The ambition that prompted it was not a noble one; the decision to despatch it was, in view of the situation in Central Greece, decidedly unwise; the recall of Alcibiades was either treason or insanity. But what follows makes it necessary to pass as severe a verdict on Sparta. If Athens was incapable of maintaining or using the headship of Greece, Sparta could not grasp it when it was held out to her. After the Sicilian disaster, Athens lay an easy prey : Sparta gave her time to recover. And so between 413 and the end of the war there are nine weary years of quite profitless fighting before Athens lies in the dust. No chronicle of these nine years can be given ; but again, sometimes disregarding the order of events, we will consider the main characteristics of the contest.

The war is very confused; the details seem sometimes to have no connection with one another. But the character of the war is determined by two circumstances. Firstly, if Athens was to be brought to her knees, it must be by the destruction of her naval power. The city itself was impregnable while the Athenian navy existed. And so the theatre of war moves to the Ægean Sea, where, after the Sicilian disaster, the Spartans found courage to Attack Athens. And, secondly, the need of money is a most important factor. The treasury of Athens was exhausted; Sparta had never had control of much money; and thus on neither side was resolute and continuous action possible without assistance from some foreign quarter. And thus it came to pass that

again, after the lapse of more than half a century, the histories of Greece and Persia intermingle. Persia was rapidly falling into that decay that made possible the successes of Alexander the Great. But in her degradation the civil contentions of Greece gave her an opportunity of interfering decisively in the affairs of her formerly victorious enemy. Persia was probably not a rich country ; but if the pockets of the people were empty there was money in the treasury, and money would decide the struggle in Greece. Thus soon both Sparta and Athens began to consider whether there were any means of becoming pensioners of the great king. Marathon and Salamis might seem avenged when Sparta and Athens appeared, hat in hand, before the Persian satraps. Sparta first applied for a loan, and Alcibiades was the diplomatist she used in her application. To his career we may best attach ourselves as the thread that will guide us through this perplexed period. He was beginning to weary of his life in Sparta. His dissolute manners were effacing the favourable impression that his abilities had at first produced. King Agis was his bitter enemy; the boundaries of the Spartan state were as much too narrow for him as the walls of Athens had been. He was doubtless delighted to get this new possibility of action in the waters of the Ægean. Here the allies of Athens were falling from her on all sides. Chios, Lebedos, Miletus, Abydos, Thasos, Rhodes, Eubœa, Byzantium—these and many others broke away from Athens in the years 412 and 411. If Sparta could only get money, she might drive the blow home, and Athens would be at her mercy. In 412 Alcibiades negotiated three treaties with Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap. In all, though in slightly different forms, Sparta

sold the hard-won independence of Greek soil for pay for her sailors.

But Alcibiades was becoming uneasy in his position. The Spartans were growing suspicious of him, in characteristic Spartan fashion. We are told that orders were sent out for his assassination. Clearly Sparta would not accept him as her master. He conceived the daring plan of returning to Athens, despite all the incalculable injury that his treason had inflicted on her. His assumed influence at the Persian satrap's court, and his really unmatched abilities as military leader and diplomatist, might make the Athenians willing to receive him. But in the strangest way he managed to come as champion of the democracy. For in Athens, partly through his own instigation, a great oligarchical revolution took place in 411. The political clubs, in the absence of the Athenian fleet at Samos, using the openest terrorism as their instrument, overthrew the democracy, and established an oligarchy of four hundred as traitorous as it was cruel; for one of its first acts was to attempt to betray Athens into the hands of Sparta. Against this oligarchy the Athenian navy and army at Samos protested. They declared themselves the real Demos of Athens. Yet their position was full of the greatest danger. Alcibiades, to whom nothing seemed impossible, was welcomed to their camp, and elected general for the year. The events that follow form a most interesting page of history, but must be passed over with the barest mention. A revulsion of feeling in Athens overturned the rule of the **Four Hundred**. In the armament at Samos the prevalent enthusiasm made the men submit to discipline and **face any danger**. In Alcibiades they had a general **who seems to have possessed real genius for war**, In the battles

of Cynossema (411) and Cyzicus (**410**) the Athenians gained signal victories. In the former, fighting against odds, the old superiority of Athenian tactics came to light; in the latter, under the personal guidance of Alcibiades, the Spartan fleet of sixty sail was destroyed or taken prisoner. Sparta offered terms for peace ; but Athens rejected them, and there is some doubt whether they were sincerely meant. The years 409 and 408 passed without such important occurrences. The great question was the money of Persia, and in 408 embassies from both sides were sent up to Susa to seek the favour of the great king. Yet still Athens was improving her position, and in 408 Alcibiades could return to Athens. He was received with a mixture of enthusiasm and astonishment. Never before in his career had he seemed so powerful. After all her disasters a brighter day might seem to be dawning for Athens.

But now the war took a turn wholly unfavourable to Athens, and that for many reasons; and the faults of Athens are as notable as the superior strength of her adversary. This indeed received now a most important increase. For Cyrus came down to the sea-coast as representative of the whole Persian power in that district, He possessed firmness of character and pertinacity, and he threw himself wholly on the side of the Spartans. In the Spartan admiral, Lysander, he had a man after his own heart: a keen Spartan, a capable admiral, and even more capable in intrigue and diplomacy. Alcibiades meanwhile, after a small and unimportant naval defeat, was deposed from his office as general. His life would not have been safe in Athens. Sparta would scarcely receive him back again. He withdrew, **therefore, from the force to his fortified castle. in the**

Thracian Chersonese, to die two years later by assassination. The next year (406) saw another brilliant Athenian naval victory. Fighting at Arginusæ with a hundred and fifty ships against a hundred and twenty, the Athenians, with the loss of twenty-five ships, destroyed seventy of the enemy. But no defeat could have been so ruinous to the cause of Athens as the consequences of this victory. A sudden storm had prevented the Athenian generals from taking up after their victory the corpses and the still living sailors who clung to the wreckage. There is no sufficient evidence to show that they neglected their duty. But when the news was received in Athens, the victorious generals, whose act, if properly used, might have saved Athens, were condemned to death for neglect of the religious duty of collecting the dead and the wrecked survivors. The offence to Athenian religious sentiment was doubtless really great; but it seems probable that the oligarchical party, in their secret societies, used the religious feeling as a pretext for a deliberate act of treason. It is certain that the clearest provisions of the law and the most obvious principles of justice were pushed aside to accomplish a deliberate act of murder. After this iniquity Athens' cup was full. In the next year (405) the Athenian fleet of a hundred and eighty triremes was destroyed by the Spartans at Ægos-Potamoi, on the Hellespont. Bad generalship and actual treason both had their share in the disaster. Recent events in Athens were not likely to encourage Athenian generals in patriotic devotion or military enthusiasm. This terrible war was fittingly concluded by an act of appalling barbarity: all the Athenian prisoners were put to death.

Now even the toughness of the Athenian people was broken. Hunger did its work on the city, blockaded both by sea and land. At last Athens must yield. Some clamoured for utter destruction. Sparta allowed her to continue to exist, but an oligarchical government must be established and her long walls pulled down. The destruction of the fortifications was accomplished to the sound of flutes. Many believed that the first day of the liberty of Greece had come.

When we glance back on the twenty-seven years of this struggle, our first and strongest impression will be the tenacity and elasticity of Athens. Blow after blow fell upon her. The plague, the treason of Alcibiades, the Sicilian disaster, the revolt of the allies, the Spartan and Persian alliance—these were blows any one of which might seem enough to ruin a state not possessed of so many causes of weakness as Athens. Again and again the enemy declared that Athens had sunk; as often did the vessel right itself and make headway against the storm. And our next impression will probably be the incapacity of Spartan leadership. The war is one long string of broken promises, missed opportunities, half-hearted attacks. Athens must have fallen after the Sicilian expedition if Sparta had resolutely followed up her advantage. The fact that Sparta triumphed at all was due rather to her allies than to herself. Brasidas, Gylippus, and Lysander did what they did in spite of the narrow jealousies of the state. But assuredly the war showed also that the character and constitution of Athens were not fitted for government or war. It was in vain that the course of the war showed most plainly the need of a coherent policy, and a centralisation and strengthening of the


executive. The democracy went on in the old spirit of suspicion of superior ability, sacrificing the real and obvious interests of the state to their passion for equality. Had Pericles lived ⁴o curb or guide the tendencies of the democracy, the result would probably have been different. But all restraint had been removed, and the constitution was overthrown and the fortifications of the city demolished ! From the standpoint of Hellenic and universal history the most important result of the war was the doom of the independence of Hellas. The policy of Athens offered the best chance of the formation of a really stable power in Hellas: it was at one time possible that the subjects or allies might follow her, forgetting their subjection in the glory that flowed from their connection with Athens. It was partly through her fault that the opportunity had been lost. Lost it had been: the result of the war consecrated afresh the idea of city autonomy. Where Athens had failed no other state was likely to succeed. From this time forward one of the chief interests of Greek history is the gradual but sure approach of foreign conquest. Nearly seventy years of independence still remained for Hellas. The first part of these seventy years is occupied with the headship of Sparta. And then it was clearly proved that the liberty of Greece under Spartan headship meant an oppression far more severe and infinitely more stupid than had ever been implied by the Athenian Empire. Athens recovered from her desolation and despondency, and again became a power in Greece. Her long walls were rebuilt in 393. She allied herself with Thebes, now grown jealous of the power of Sparta, and soon the supremacy of the latter was seriously threatened. For

Thebes, the dulness of whose citizens was a byword in Greece, produced a statesman perhaps the most eminent that the history of Greece knows. Epaminondas possessed both the character and the talents to make his name memorable in universal history, but the circumstances were too hard for him. In the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea (371 and 362) he crushed the military prestige of Sparta. He himself fell in the last battle. Had he lived he could hardly have made the Theban headship of Greece an effective reality: his death destroyed even the appearance of it.

Divided against herself, Greece saw with an astonishment that yet could not subdue her jealousies the rise of the Macedonian power. The royal family of Macedonia claimed Greek descent. Greek culture had long found in the court of Macedonia a refuge from the turbulence of Hellas. The "barbarian" inhabitants of the country afforded an ideal war material under trained leaders. In vain Demosthenes endeavoured to rouse Hellas to avert the blow visibly impending. It fell at Chæronea in 338, and the independence of Hellas vanished, not to reappear until our own century. Some sense of pathos it is impossible not to feel when the states of Greece lose their liberties. But the historian must confess that little was lost that was really valuable. For liberty had become anarchy and party passion had destroyed patriotism, and nowhere inside of Greece was there any sign of the rise of a better social or political system. The incorporation of Hellas, first into the Macedonian power, and afterwards into that of Rome, allowed all that Hellas had so nobly achieved in art or science or philosophy to pass into a wider sphere, and

play its great part in building the fundamental basis of European civilisation.

NOTE.—The war is merely sketched in outline in this chapter. A translation of Thucydides will give the best account of the war. But Grote, Curtius, and all modern historians of Greece have described it fully. Of special interest too are Plutarch's Lives of Alcibiades and Nicias.



THE ATHENIAN THEATRE.*

CHAPTER XII.

THOUGHT AND ART IN ATHENS.

IT has been already maintained in this volume that the essential gift of Greece to civilisation is not to be found in her military efforts or in her political ideas. The task of conquest and organisation, so absolutely necessary for the expansion of civilisation, was worthily performed by Rome, after Greece had shown herself unable to cope with it. Art, Science, and Philosophy—that is what Greece gave to the world. She taught the lessons of "joy in the beauty of life, and of search for truth apart from gain or profit." What she gave in art, including

* The marble seats belong to late Greek or Roman times; the remains of the stage are Roman; but the situation and general appearance of the theatre are the same as in the Periclean period.

poetry, directly conditioned all the artistic effort of Rome, and, after having been the chief factor in producing the Renaissance, has less directly influenced all modern art. What she gave in science and philosophy formed the intellectual basis of European life for at least fifteen hundred years: for Christianity, on its intellectual side, owed more to Greece than to Judaea, and mediaeval scholasticism worked almost entirely with the light which was reflected from Greek thought after it had for the time ceased to shine directly on the world. This vast artistic and intellectual elaboration is not compressed within the limits of the age of Pericles. Many of the greatest poetic works of Greece had been produced before this period, and the most important scientific and philosophical work comes long after it. Yet the Periclean era marks the most brilliant period in the life of Athens, when art and science and politics and war were all prosecuted with energy and success. It sees the old age of Æschylus, the chief works of Sophocles and Euripides, the triumphs of Phidias, the beginning of the career of Socrates, the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides. The intellectual movement that is indicated by these names is much more important in the world's history than the democratic changes of Pericles or the Peloponnesian war. It is well, then, in a book that deals with the age of Pericles, to conclude with some account of the intellectual and artistic life of Athens.

Hard as it is to determine what conditions are most favourable to art and thought, it is clear that there was much in the spiritual and material position of Greece in the fifth century B.C. that favoured development in both directions. If difference be the first condition of progress, the numerous petty states with their different

constitutions, and, to a less extent, their different customs, assisted intellectual progress. At the Olympian festival how great a fund of varied experience must have been presented to the politician or the philosopher! How this variety must have stimulated speculation and driven the mind out of a tame acceptance of routine ! Further, the institution of slavery played an important part. Arts and thought are both luxuries of life, and only begin when the immediate wants of the body have been satisfied. The free Greek need not devote all his attention to these wants, because a slave class existed to do that for him. If we look into the Greek market-place, we see men with no very definite occupation, ready to talk, argue, admire, and criticise; as ready in the days of Pericles as they were five centuries later to hear any new thing. This habit developed later into a purposeless and indeed debasing argumentativeness. But it was the source out of which came the eloquence and the philosophy of Greece. Without slavery, indeed, Greek civilisation is inconceivable. The climate of Greece, too, deserves a passing notice. It is not an accident that civilisation and thought and art have their beginnings in warm countries. The first wants of life are there more easily provided for; the contest with the soil and the climate is not so engrossing.

Nor was Greece less favoured in other and more general ways. The small scale of her political life prevented attention being absorbed by war or government. If Athens had conquered in the Peloponnesian war, it would have been surely to a practical, not to a speculative life, that her best spirits would have turned. Baulked in her striving after material supremacy, she, consciously or **instinctively, only the more** carefully asserted **her** in-

tellectual and artistic superiority. There is a real antagonism between speculation and effective action. Plato and Aristotle could hardly have carried on their work in conquering and organising Rome. And, lastly, the art and thought of Greece were helped by her religion. Heaven and earth were peopled with beings of the same nature as man. The legends that were told of them gave to poets a material that would interest all, such as the mediaeval legends gave to the painters of the Renaissance period. The simply human character of the gods prevented the sculptors from engaging on grotesque monsters such as the art of the East too often presents us with. And Greek religion performed a negative service even to thought. The Greek conception of the deity had never been sufficiently awe-inspiring to overwhelm and crush the imagination and the intellect; and by the time of Pericles the literary class were completely free-thinking, and were busy in seeking for a relation between themselves and the world that their religion no longer afforded.

Greek Education.

Greek education consisted of three parts—"Letters," Music, and Gymnastics. By "Letters" we are to understand reading and writing, as well as simple operations in arithmetic. Neither reading nor writing was such an easy matter as with us. For in the Greek manuscript the words ran into one another with no indication where one ended or the other began; and writing was done with a sharp instrument (stylus) on a tablet smeared with wax, which offered much greater difficulty than our modern pen and paper. The poems of Homer formed the basis of this division of education. Mottoes from

his poems were written as "copies": they formed the first reading lesson, and were committed to memory. The incidents and the reflections in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were taken as the basis for such moral training as was given. No poet ever penetrated and influenced the life of a great nation to an equal extent. It has been remarked that he was at once the Bible and the Shakespeare, the Robinson Crusoe and the Arabian Nights, of the Greeks. He was, moreover, the common possession of all the Greeks, and thus acted as a great uniting and unifying force; perhaps the most potent of all.

The most striking feature of Greek education to our eyes is the large space and great importance allotted to music. It was regarded as an absolute necessity in all education. We are told that Themistocles, being of half-alien blood, was therefore not admitted to the ordinary education of Athenian boys, and his incapacity to play on any musical instrument is mentioned as an evidence and a result of it. The artistic and emotional temperament of the Greeks, and perhaps also the simple character of their music, made them extraordinarily susceptible to its influences. Both Plato and Aristotle protest against the admission of all kinds of music indiscriminately. It is not to the words attached to music that the objection is made; but to the moral effect of certain styles or modes of music.

The education of the Greek was completed by a course of gymnastic training, which was superintended with a care and assiduity unexampled. The gymnasium was a feature in every Greek town, and no Greek boy, unless physically incapable, failed to go through the discipline. Its object was at first to train the body with a view to efficiency in war; but later the influence of the Olympian

and other athletic festivals became very great, and gymnastic efficiency was pursued for its own sake. The Greeks were passionately fond of all sorts of competitions between individuals, whether decided by strength or dexterity; but games between sides, of the nature of modern athletic games, were almost wholly unknown to them.

This harmonious training of the mental, physical, and aesthetic nature, together with the simple character of early Greek society and the absence of specialised sciences, allowed a comprehensiveness of interests and knowledge to the men of the earlier period which afterwards became impossible. For after the Persian war life became more complex, and with the beginning of the scientific movement knowledge became more specialised, and it was no longer so easy as it had been for a Solon or a Pericles to "see life steadily and see it whole." Especially town life became more and more important, and the political assembly and the jury courts forced themselves more and more on the attention of all citizens. To satisfy political ambition, or strive with success in the courts of law, it was necessary to be able to think quickly, to argue cleverly, and express one's thoughts in clear language. And along with all this went a gradual weakening of the old religious and moral bonds. The old religion had lost its hold on the more educated classes, and was ceasing to exercise a beneficent influence on the masses. Religion and tradition had once been sufficient guides for conduct. But now the intellect disputed both; and in a manner to which history supplies so many parallels, the growing light seemed for a time to obscure the difference between right and wrong. Greek education, such as has been described,

served admirably for a world where the convictions of men on the greatest questions of life were fixed. But it supplied no sufficient instruction for practical life, nor sufficient guidance in questions of morality, for an age of fermentation and unsettlement. And such was the Periclean age.

The Sophists.

To meet the new wants of the age a new class of teachers arose, and these teachers were called Sophists. The name was used at first to denote any one who professed knowledge and was willing to impart it. It always included a large number of men teaching very various subjects, bound together in no way at all, professing no common set of opinions, working to no common end. We hear of some that were metaphysicians, but as a rule they were "rhetoricians, grammarians, teachers of mathematics and of what was then known of physical science, teachers of music, teachers of virtue and of politics and of the art of success in citizen life, dialecticians, disputants and experimenters in logic." They were in fact a sort of unorganised university, a number of lecturers on all subjects that were embraced in the intellectual horizon of the Greeks, without material organisation, and without any common intellectual basis. But the subject that they most usually taught, because there was the largest demand for it, was the art of speaking and arguing, rhetoric and dialectic : the art, that is, which would allow its possessor to shine in the meeting at the Pnyx or discomfit his adversary before the jury courts. In both places victory, and not the discovery of truth, is the object aimed at. It was the duty of the Sophists to teach a fluent and grammatical style, the

correct use of words, the best method of rebutting or of eluding the arguments of an adversary, how to cover a weak case and how to attack a strong one. All these accomplishments might be used in the cause of truth; but they might also be used against it. The Sophist was indeed like the fencing master, who teaches the use of weapons without any thought of the cause in which they will be used. The same spirit too seems to have animated them when they dealt with other subjects. When they treated of ethical questions they may often have upheld the principles of truth and justice, like Prodicus in his fable of the Choice of Hercules. But there is reason to think that they displayed as a rule a mere intellectual pleasure in juggling with arguments on the one side and the other, and in showing on how insecure a basis the traditional view of morality rested. They contrasted "conventional" morality with "natural" to the disadvantage of the former, and often made "natural" morality consist in the declaration that "might was right." There was doubtless a good deal of vulgar envy and dislike felt against these men, such as is often manifested against those who possess superior talents and use them to reject what is traditional. But the Sophists were also bitterly attacked by the greatest names in Greek philosophy, by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and a short consideration of their objections may lead to a clearer opinion on the work of the Sophists.

The first and most constantly urged objection is that "they teach for pay." They are "mercenary adventurers." They take fees from those whom they teach, and become wealthy in consequence. Some of them gained great wealth. Socrates tells us that Protagoras "gained greater wealth by his profession than Phidias

and ten other sculptors put together." The fact that they charge fees for their instruction is what is urged against them. The nineteenth century A.D. finds it a strange objection, and yet it has its explanation, and at any rate a partial justification. The whole system was a new one to the generation of Socrates, and was regarded with the suspicion that usually attaches to any novel method of making money. And coming from Socrates, who took from his pupils only what they willingly gave him, and, teaching constantly, still remained poor, the charge had a peculiar cogency. He pursued after knowledge, not for assistance in the competitions of the Pnyx or the law courts, but for enlightenment on the destiny and duties of man. He was in fact essentially a religious teacher, and despised all knowledge that did not aim at a mark as exalted as the one he had chosen. And it was and remains true that the propagation of a new religious truth is impossible on a commercial basis.

The next charge is connected with the first one. Seeing that the Sophists taught for the sake of their fees, they must necessarily teach in such a way as would attract pupils; and therefore Socrates and Plato charge them with being mere flatterers of the people, not their leaders. Plato says of them in the *Republic*. "All those mercenary adventurers called Sophists do but teach the collective opinion of the many, . . . and this is their wisdom."

And further, there is the charge underlying those already noted that, dealing with subjects where philosophy of the most comprehensive kind was necessary, they had none at their command. They professed to teach wisdom, and were not wise. They are alleged to

be as shallow in their philosophy as they are time-serving in their morality. The method of their teaching excluded the best results, and even with a better method they had nothing of the highest value to teach. Such upon analysis seems to be the sum of the hostile criticisms of Socrates and Plato.

This judgment, accepted for many centuries upon the authority of such great names, has been in our own century strongly disputed. In the fifty-third chapter of his history of Greece, Grote has detailed all that we know of the Sophists themselves, their work, and their opinions, and he has inquired how far the vague charges of immorality and corruption so freely brought against them are justified by facts. He has clearly proved that they did not teach as a body a specially low morality, nor occupy themselves in corrupting the young; that they have nothing in common except the fact that they are professional teachers teaching for pay. He has conclusively shown that some such professional teaching in thought, argument, and expression was imperatively required by the system of the Athenian democracy, where so much depended on the spoken word. He has brought forward instances from their teaching of sound work done in matters of grammar and expression, of interesting speculation upon metaphysical and philosophical questions, of elevated morality instilled. The verdict of posterity, he insists, is too much influenced by the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle, and is very different from the opinions of contemporaries. If we accept the intellectual, social, and political condition of Athenian society as tolerably satisfactory, we shall be forced to admit that their work was of high utility. Others have followed Grote, and have pointed out **that**

the charges brought against the Sophists could be brought in almost the same words and with equal force against the newspaper editors, the lecturers, the university professors of to-day. They, like the Sophists, profess no common set of doctrines, and strive towards no common object; they too do work, often of an excellent kind, for pay. Plato and Aristotle represent, Grote tells us, the objections of theorists and reformers to practical men. The substantial accuracy of these criticisms must be conceded, and yet the criticisms of the philosophers have, I think, a greater value for us than contemporary opinion. For Greek society needed something more than a system of instruction within the limits of conventional thought. Greece in the fifth century B.C. needed a new moral discipline, and a clearer view of the meaning and object of life, far more than a sharpening of the weapons of political combat, or the quickening of the intellectual faculties of the average citizen. The Sophists are not to be cleared of all reproach by pointing out that they have their modern counterparts. "Wherever," says Sir Alexander Grant, "men set themselves up as teachers of the highest subjects, and in lieu of being devoted to truth for its own sake exhibit a tinge of worldly self-interest, there is a reappearance of the sophistic spirit." If the future sees the acceptance of some coherent philosophy embracing the nature of man, the objects and the duties of his life, "lecturers, professors, and newspaper editors" may have to wince under a criticism that resembles Plato's strictures on the Sophists, and it will be seen that what is true in his views is not less important than Grote's convincing exposure of the great misconceptions that have surrounded and concealed the subject.

Socrates.

Socrates was himself classed among the Sophists by ordinary people, and was finally condemned to death upon the same sort of charges that are brought by Plato against them. It was alleged that he rejected the gods of the state, introduced new objects of worship, and corrupted the young. But in temper and method and objects he was far removed from the Sophists ; and the unanimous verdict of posterity has accepted him as one of the greatest moral teachers of all time.

Neither the facts of his life nor his death concern us very much. He was born in 469 B.C., and drank his cup of hemlock in 399. His youth thus saw the enthusiasm caused by the victories over the Persians; his last years witnessed the humiliation of Athens at the hands of Sparta. In the momentous events embraced by his life he had taken such a part as fell to the lot of every Athenian citizen. He had served in the army with conspicuous courage. During the siege of Potidæa (432—430) his endurance of cold had excited the wonder of his comrades in arms ; in the rout at Delium (424) he was one of the few untouched by panic. He refused to pay court to the democracy, and regarded with unconcealed contempt its use of the lot, its enthusiasms, and its ambitions. As a rule, he abstained from all political contests, warned by the inner voice, the " dæmon " of which he so often spoke. Yet he always inculcated loyalty to the laws of the state, and was an obedient subject though an outspoken critic of Athens. Twice he had to face as great dangers at the hands of his fellow-citizens as he could ever meet on the battlefield—once when he refused to be a party to the illegal

trial of the commanders in the battle of Arginusæ, and again when he resisted the will of the oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants (404). On both occasions he followed the course of legality and right, without hesitation and without consideration of the consequences.

But the external facts of his life are of little importance. His character and his teaching are what have left a permanent mark upon world-history. In appearance his thickset and ungainly figure, his bald head and uncouth features, contradicted the Greek belief that moral excellence was always indicated by physical beauty. In *The Banquet* Plato makes Alcibiades compare him to a box such as sculptors used, shaped into the coarse figure of Siienus, but when opened revealing the images of the gods. When, in the fifteenth century A.D., the revival of learning came, and men read the story of Socrates' life and death, they hailed him as a saint of the Christian type. But, though in his insistence upon morality and in the strenuous cast of his character there is something in Socrates not usually found among the Greeks, he was in many things typically Hellenic. He was, as we have seen, a soldier of stubborn courage; and he accepted without question all the pleasures of life. Usually abstemious to the verge of asceticism, he was, on occasion, a hard drinker, and manifested always keen susceptibility to beauty of person. He was passionately devoted to the search after truth, and never doubted that reason was the guide to which he must trust. "A life without inquiry is a life not worth living," is a saying put into his mouth by Plato. Undaunted by failure, he still presses on, and urges his disciples to spread wide their sails to reason, and trust that it will bring them to the right harbour in the end. When, at the last, sentence of death has been pronounced

upon him, he accepts his doom with joy, hoping for opportunities in the next world of prosecuting his researches without interruption. But this passion for knowledge was associated in Socrates with a deep piety. He was found guilty of rejecting the gods of the state and introducing new ones, and the charge was doubtless literally true. His courageous and lucid mind could not accept as actually true those faiths which were rapidly losing their hold upon the cultured class. But no one was less a scoffer than he. He consented even to pay the usual sacrifices to the gods of the city; he was penetrated with the sense of a Power greater than himself who watched over him. He is essentially a monotheist, though he still speaks of the gods, and is convinced that this divine power has care of men and that no harm can happen to a good man. And if a passion for truth and a deep piety are the two chief features of his character—features rarely combined in so high a degree in the same person—its outline is not complete until we have added the humour, often taking the form of irony, which plays over all his actions and utterances.

As a thinker he established few conclusions, if any, but he gave an impulse to thought the effects of which have never ceased. He turned speculation to ethical questions, and is universally recognised as the founder of Moral Philosophy. Others had thought and taught on the subject before him; but he devoted all his attention to it, and proclaimed it superior in importance to all others. His insistence on the necessity for clear thought on ethics led him to underrate, and indeed to despise, the physical sciences that had been so worthily begun in Asia Minor. It was human life and its problems that

interested Socrates. His disciple Xenophon tells us: "He never ceased discussing human affairs, asking: What is piety? What is impiety? What is the noble, what the base? What is the just and what the unjust? What is temperance? What is madness? What is a state? What constitutes a citizen? What is rule over men? What makes a man able to rule?"

He found these words current in society, with all definiteness of meaning rubbed off them by constant usage. His first task was to make men see that it was possible to use words without understanding them. He insisted that conventional phrases were not enough, that an appeal to Homer or Pindar or Æschylus was not enough. Accurate and careful thought was necessary. He gave no systematic instruction, and charged his disciples no fee; but it was his custom to get into conversation with any Athenian, and if he used any word with an ethical meaning, such as "temperate" or "pious" or "courageous," to press for a definition of the word, professing merely to desire the illumination of his own ignorance. We have in the *Euthyphro* of Plato a dialogue illustrating by a typical instance Socrates' method of cross-examination. Euthyphron, a complacent young Athenian, uses the word "holiness," and is asked to define it. He defines it as that which is pleasing to the gods. Socrates lays his finger on the weak point of polytheism. There are many gods, and they sometimes differ among themselves? what if a thing is pleasing to one god and displeasing to another? The young man re-defines holiness as that which is pleasing to *all* the gods. Socrates professes to be pleased with the definition, but then goes on to ask whether the pleasure of the gods is the cause or the

consequence of the holiness of the act. "Is a thing holy because it pleases the gods, or does it please the gods because it is holy?" Euthyphron is driven to admit that holiness is an essential quality which the favour of the gods cannot change. Socrates thereupon implacably presses for a further definition, but Euthyphron, wearied and exasperated, flies from his tormentor. The definition of words was new to the age. Few in our own century could answer the questions of Socrates; used against the self-satisfied society of Athens, his method was clearly invincible. Equally clear is the irritation which the exposure of his ignorance was bound to produce in the person interrogated. He roused in this way that animosity which ultimately brought about his death. Ethical discussions and the definition of words are said by Aristotle to be Socrates* contributions to thought. His character was perhaps nearly as important for Greek thought; for by his courage, his elevation, his disinterestedness, and his singular charm—above all, perhaps, by the heroism of his death—he drew to himself the warmest affections of disciples both during his life and after it, and became an important moral force for the next five or six centuries.

The Theatre at Athens.

It is not possible to deal here with all the forms of intellectual and artistic activity at Athens. I must confine myself, in addition to what has been said, to a short notice of the Athenian theatre and some names in Athenian literature.

The great theatre of Athens was at the south-east corner of the Acropolis. The stone seats now *in situ* do

not belong to the Periclean era, but they give us an idea of the extent and accommodation of the old theatre. It is computed that thirty thousand could find seats there; that is to say, room was provided for the whole free adult population of Athens. At no time in history has there been a theatre so influential on the national life as that of Athens. Athenian society lacked most of the channels through which intellectual and artistic influences are brought to bear on the popular mind to-day. There were no sermons and no newspapers, and the literature of the period, contained in books, must have had a very restricted circle of readers. What newspapers, sermons, and current literature do for our modern society, that was done by the theatre for Athens. For during the best period of the Athenian stage there was almost no message that might not be delivered from it. We find in the plays that still are extant the highest teaching in morality and ethics, direct advice on contemporary politics, romance, and buffoonery.

Every feature of the Athenian drama is thoroughly characteristic of the people. For, first, it was managed by the state. Rich men took in turn the task of providing the cost of the staging and production. This was a system common in Athenian political life, and the service thus performed was known as a "liturgy." But, except for this, the whole production was under direct state control. And, next, this the greatest amusement of the people was countenanced by their religion. All dramatic performances were in honour of the god Dionysus. The priest of the god had the seat of honour in the theatre; the statue of the god was solemnly borne thither on the night before the performance began. There were theatrical exhibitions only twice in the year:

each time on the occasion of festivals of Dionysus (the Lenæa and the greater Dionysia). And, thirdly, we see here as everywhere in the Athenian state the Greek love of competition, and their belief in the award of a popular jury. For on each occasion three poets competed for a prize, each poet presenting three tragedies and one humorous or satiric piece. And the prize was awarded, after the pieces had all been performed, by five people taken by lot from a list voted by the tribes. Every precaution was taken to ensure that they should give an unbiassed verdict, and although there are instances in which posterity has refused to accept their verdict, the general fairness of their decisions is attested by the large number of victories gained by Æschylus. And, after all, theatrical reputations have always been gained by popular approval. What is peculiar in Athens is the definiteness with which the verdict was given.

The accessories of the theatre would seem to us rude and often grotesque. But great attention was given to the subject. Æschylus himself introduced many improvements, and others were added by his successors. Yet realism seems never to have been attempted. Individual actors gained great reputations, and the fate of a play was sometimes decided by the presence of some popular performer; but, on the whole, the personality of the actor was much less emphasised than in the modern theatre. The features were concealed, and the voice was probably assisted by the mask which every performer wore. The success of a play, therefore, rested mainly on its poetic and dramatic qualities, and only secondarily on the adventitious assistance of scenery, music, or **the** personal popularity of an actor.

The Periclean age saw **the** masterpieces of **all the great**

Athenian dramatists. Æschylus died in 456, twenty-four years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, and in spirit he belongs rather to the period of the Persian wars than that of the triumphant Athenian democracy. He had himself fought with distinction in the great battles with the Persian power, and in his play of the *Persians* he has expressed the triumph of Greece at the humiliation of her enemy. But the greatest of his plays, *the Agamemnon*, and the other plays of the Oresteian trilogy, belong to the year 458, and were produced during the heat of Pericles' early political struggles. No dramatist that ever lived has conceived so highly of his functions as Æschylus. He paid, indeed, the greatest attention to his craft. The first dramas had consisted only of a single actor and the chorus. Æschylus added a second actor, and thus made real drama possible. Improvements in scenery and stage effects are also ascribed to him. But he used the stage for the utterance of the most profound thoughts on all the deepest problems of life. He preaches patriotism and the civic virtues; his mind is always dwelling on the relations of the gods to men; he rejects the cruder ideas of an earlier period, and represents the divine power as essentially just, even though justice be long in coming. His dramas are second to none that Greece produced in interest, but their value as dramatic compositions is not the most important thing about them. His spirit, as has been well said by Mr. Frederic Harrison, is the spirit of "Isaiah and Ezekiel, of Dante and of Milton." His utterances on men and gods, on life and destiny, make him in Greek life a spiritual influence second only to Homer.—Sophocles (495—406) saw both the beginning and the end of the Periclean period. With him the drama threw off the last trace of archaism, both

in scenic arrangement and in style. In language, in construction, and in presentation of character, he is a flawless artist. During the sixty years of his poetic activity he produced, we are told, one hundred and thirteen dramas. The seven that remain give us specimens of grace and pathos that have no equal. But he has no share of Æschylus' prophetic fire. Under his guidance the Athenian stage ennobled life with a series of touching and loving figures, but it did not grasp the conscience and the heart of man as Æschylus had done.—Euripides, (480—406) is a contemporary of Sophocles, and it was his misfortune, both during his lifetime and after it, to be overshadowed by his greater rival. He represents a different part of the same age. He, like Æschylus, uses the stage for the expression of opinions on government, society, and religion; but they are the opinions of a sceptic and a revolutionist. He is penetrated with the spirit of the new philosophy, which in its vast and progressive movement was shaking the bases of Athenian society. He had studied, we are told, with Anaxagoras, Pericles' teacher in philosophy, and later had fallen a good deal under the influence of Socrates. The unsatisfied and questioning side of his mind and character make him peculiarly attractive to the nineteenth century. But, on the purely art side, he has great claims on our admiration. He can strike a deeper chord of pity than any other Greek tragedian, and shows remarkable insight and power in his representation of female characters.—Aristophanes (444—380) does not belong so much to the Periclean era as to that of the Peloponnesian war. But no account of the Athenian stage, however cursory, can omit some mention of his astonishing genius, to which literary history can show no parallel. Mr. Frederic Harrison

has recently * described the genius of Aristophanes so well that I shall be pardoned for adopting his language. "The poet, a passionate believer in the old heroes and the ancient institutions and manners of Athens, attacked in a series of satires the demagogues, the war politicians, the dandies, the quacks, the pettifoggers, the innovators in philosophy, politics, manners, and poetry. He is an intense and unscrupulous partisan, an incorrigible mocker of gods and men, and a bold assertor of the 'good cause' and the 'old times.' He exhibits, with all his party acrimony and his extravagant ribaldry, a sound political sense, a conscientious conservatism, and a courageous love for what is just and true. . . . Cleon the demagogue, Euripides the sentimentalist, and Socrates the type of the critical sophist, are the constant objects of his ridicule. In all these attacks there is much that is blind, not a little that is unfair. But to an earnest conservative like the poet, Cleon embodied the follies and conceit of democracy, Euripides the taste for morbid rhetoric in poetry, and Socrates the Rousseauism of antiquity which subjected every established belief to a metaphysical criticism. . . . That as poet and satirist he showed every quality in perfection, the ancients and moderns are agreed. His inexhaustible wit, his fantastic imagination, his rollicking humour, his exquisite visions of fairy-land, have never been equalled but by Shakespeare : they two only of poets have raised the burlesque into the truly sublime. There are, moreover, in the choruses of these comedies passages of lyric beauty and power which Pindar might envy; and in mastery of the Attic tongue Sophocles and Plato alone can vie with Aristophanes. . . . His comedies

* In *The New Calendar of Great Men.*

combined all that in modern times is aimed at by political journalism, pictorial caricatures, poetical satires, comic opera, and pantomime. If we take Aristophanes in all his elements, we should have to look for parallels to Swift's pamphlets and *Travels of Gulliver*, the caricatures of *Punch*, the lyrics of Shelley and Victor Hugo, the fairy world of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*, the invective of Junius, and the humour of Carlyle; all represented with the musical accompaniment and the scenic resources of a modern theatre."

Prose "Writers of the Periclean Age.

Properly to appreciate the comprehensive activity of the Greek intellect in the Periclean period, it would be necessary to investigate much besides what is treated of in this book. The rapid progress of philosophy in Greece, her contributions to science, the important steps already made in mechanical discovery, the medical system of Hippocrates, would all have to be examined. But I shall, through lack of space and knowledge, put aside most of these topics, and confine myself to the prose writers of the Periclean period.

Books were, of course, not nearly so important in the Greek world as they are with us. It is only the invention of printing which has allowed them to exert any widespread influence on the human mind. In Athens the work of copying was not prosecuted in the methodical way that is later on found in vogue in Rome. We have, I think, no information as to the price of books, but the book trade must have been insignificant. Moreover, many influences connected with the public and judicial life of their city had given the Athenians a great preference for the spoken over the written word, and in the style of

most of their authors we may distinctly trace the influence of the law courts and the public assembly. Alike for information and for intellectual stimulus, the average Athenian looked to the theatre and to the ecclesia, to arguments and conversations in the market-place, rather than the scrolls of great writers. We hear even of historians reading their works in public. There is no trace at this time of literature being regarded as a profession in the Athenian world.

Among the prose writers of the time, two names—Herodotus and Thucydides—stand out conspicuous above all others. If we put aside Xenophon as belonging to a later period, it is their works alone that have been preserved to us, except in inconsiderable fragments, and it is to them that our attention must chiefly be turned. But they were not the first Greek authors to write in prose, nor were they even in their own time alone. Prose writing, like philosophy, begins upon the west coast of Asia Minor, where first the Greek mind showed the plenitude of its powers. Cadmus of Miletus is the first Greek historian whose name we know, and of him we know little but the name. Hecataeus of Miletus is the most important predecessor of Herodotus. We see him, in the pages of his greater successor, dissuading his fellow-countrymen from resistance to the Persians in the year 500 B.C., and, when he failed to convince them, giving them valuable advice for the prosecution of the war. Of his writings very little remains. But we know that he was a great traveller, and his Egyptian travels were certainly known and used by Herodotus. His most important work was a blending of geography and history, and we hear of him producing an emended map of the world. Leaving Herodotus aside for later notice, the

next name of importance is Hellanicus of Mitylene, whose doubtful date is placed at 496—411. His works dealt with genealogy, chronology, and history, and are said—for only a few fragments remain to us—to have been written with little attempt at order or style. Among the contemporaries of Thucydides two deserve mention, Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Ion of Chios. Plutarch has preserved sufficient fragments from both to allow us to understand the character of their works and regret their disappearance. Stesimbrotus lectured on Homer in Athens, and among his works are mentioned the *Lives* of Themistocles, Thucydides (the statesman), and Pericles. Ion of Chios was a friend of Cimon and of Æschylus, and all that we know of him shows us that he was an eager partisan of the aristocratic party at Athens. He produced many tragedies, of which hardly a trace has been left. What we have more reason to regret is a number of light sketches of the leading men of Athens, and especially of those who were distinguished in art and letters. Plutarch has preserved some interesting fragments. Those that deal with Pericles lay stress on his arrogance and exclusiveness, and generally represent his conduct in an unfavourable light. We cannot help lamenting the disappearance of these works, which would have given us so much interesting gossip as to the life of the artists and statesmen of the Periclean period; but time has dealt kindly with us in leaving the two greatest historians of the period, and it is to their works that we must now turn.

Herodotus was born at Halicarnassus about the year 484. He was too young, therefore, to retain anything but the faintest recollection of the great struggle between the Greeks and Persians that he was afterwards to narrate.

It is believed, on perhaps insufficient evidence, that he fled from Halicarnassus to Samos, but returned after the tyrant Lygdamis had been driven out. He travelled far and wide in the Greek world. We have in his history evidence of journeys as far north as Pontus and Scythia, south as far as Elephantine in Egypt, eastward to Babylon, and westward to Italy and Sicily. He left Halicarnassus, and settled in Athens,—driven from his native country, according to one story, by the banter that his naïve views on religious matters had received at the hands of his sceptical countrymen; or attracted, as is more probable, by the growing pre-eminence of Athens in all matters of literature and art. In Athens he seems to have associated with the great men of the time, and his friendship with Sophocles is specially well attested. In 446 he is said to have received a grant of money from the state after the recitation of a part of his history. When the colony of Thurii, in Italy, was founded, in 443, he joined the new settlement, attracted, perhaps, by the possibility of gaining there the full privileges of citizenship, which were unattainable in Athens. There he wrote his history, and there he died. He cannot be proved to have lived beyond 430.

He undertakes in his history to describe the great conflict of the Persian war, which he regards, not only as the most important struggle, but also as the converging point of history. Lydia, Persia, Egypt, Scythia have all to be dealt with that the real importance of the Persian conflict may be understood. His treatment of the whole subject is penetrated with deep religious feeling; he undertakes to explain, if not to justify, the ways of the gods to men. He lived in the age that saw scepticism on religious subjects invading the cultivated

classes; but he himself belongs to the age of faith. We can indeed find evidence that he is not untouched by the tendencies of his time. Here and there a legend is rationalised; occasionally doubts are expressed as to the accuracy of some pious tradition. But the prevailing characteristic, and the great charm of his work, is to be found in its tone of piety and simple acceptance of the faiths of his time. He tells us how Pan appeared to Pheidippides before the battle of Marathon, how the favour of the gods to the Greeks was clearly shown before the battle of Salamis by signs on land and in the sky. He finds in the whole course of the war clear proof of his belief that the gods are jealous gods, jealous of human greatness, unwilling that anything should be greater than themselves, loving always to strike down what is highest. He takes therefore his duties as a historian very seriously, and yet he loves, too, to tell the story for its own sake. He writes his history, he tells us, "in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their due meed of glory." And when, in the course of his narrative, a good story occurs to him, he tells it, even if he has to add that in his opinion it is not true. Thus, to take two instances out of very many, he tells us (i. 94) how the Lydians, sore pressed by famine and blockade, invented games, "dice and huckle-bones and ball," to stay the pangs of hunger. "The plan adopted against the famine was to engage in games one day so entirely as not to feel any craving for food, and the next day to eat and abstain from games. In this way they passed eighteen years." And, again, he tells (ix. 74) how, at the battle

of Plataea, Sophanes "wore an iron anchor fastened to his belt, and this, when the enemy drew near, he threw out, to the intent that when they made their charge it might be impossible for him to be driven from his post." There is something of the spirit of Froissart in him, and we must not go to Herodotus for any attempt to trace cause and effect, for any philosophical views or any constitutional details. But we get from him a narrative of one of the greatest crises in the history of the world, told with great honesty and impartiality, and doubtless with substantial accuracy; we get a very noble story told with wonderful grace, and such elevation of feeling that his history may almost take rank with the epic poems of the world; we get, lastly, from the anecdotes and allusions with which his pages are filled, a more full and attractive view of the social life of Greece than from any other source whatever, which the student of history would be loth to exchange for much information on constitutions and treaties and wars.

Thucydides differs so completely from Herodotus in temper and in belief that it is sometimes hard to realise that they were contemporaries. Yet Herodotus was probably not more than thirteen when Thucydides was born, in the year 471, though he outlived Herodotus by about thirty years, dying probably in 403 B.C. The details of his early life are unknown to us, but we are told that he was influenced and taught by the philosopher Anaxagoras. "He began to write," he tells us, "when the Athenians and Peloponnesians first took up arms, believing that the war would be great and memorable above any previous war." And all the rest of his life qualified him for his task. "I lived," he says (v. 26), ' through the whole of the war, and was of mature years

and judgment, and I took great pains to make out the exact truth. For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events."

If we turn from his life to his work, we find in his History of the Peloponnesian war the most universally admired historical composition of all time. In style and tone he is the exact opposite of Herodotus, at whose work he seems occasionally to sneer, as one of the "chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather than to speak the truth." His striving after accuracy is everywhere discernible. He is most careful to distinguish the time and place of each event, and in this connection the opening of the actual narrative of the war in the second book is most characteristic: "In the fifteenth year of the Peace, when Chrysis, the high priestess of Argos, was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood, Anesias being Ephor at Sparta, and at Athens Pythodorus having two months of his archonship to run, in the sixth month after the engagement at Potidæa, and at the beginning of spring, about the first watch of the night, an armed force . . . entered Plataea." In matters of religion he belongs to the new sceptical school. Portents and oracles that Herodotus chronicles with such childlike faith are not mentioned at all, or mentioned only with a sneer. He finds nothing supernatural or prophetic in an eclipse of the sun that occurs at the beginning of the war. He mentions the prophecy that the war would last twenty-seven years, but adds that "this was the solitary instance in which those who put their faith in oracles

were justified by the event" (v. 26); and in another place (ii. 54) he delights in showing how oracles are altered to make them fit in with circumstances.

His political attitude is a somewhat exceptional one. He is an ardent admirer of Pericles, but an opponent of the democratic party. Pericles' policy before the war, his proposals for the conduct of the war, his handling of the Athenian assembly, are all spoken of with approval. But he clearly maintains that what was good in all these must be put down to Pericles, not to the democracy. Athens, he says, in words already quoted, was under Pericles "nominally a democracy, but really a government by the first man in the state." After the death of Pericles, the leading politicians "were more on an equality with one another; and each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people" (ii. 65). Cleon, the most influential democratic champion after Pericles' death, is attacked with a bitterness which occasionally gets the better even of Thucydides' usual reserve. We get no idea of the form of government which he would have liked to see in Athens, but clearly the working of the democracy had failed to satisfy him.

Most noticeable too is the strict reserve, both in style and subject, that Thucydides manifests throughout his work. He has a very high conception of the historian's duties. "The strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an

everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten." He casts all aside that does not directly assist his attainment of his object. He conceives of only two forces as influencing the lives of states—viz., war and politics. And his history therefore is entirely devoted to politics and war. The art, the drama, and philosophy do not seem to exist for him. If he mentions the Propylæa, it is to record the expenditure; Phidias' statue of Athena would never have been named were it not that the golden robes of the goddess were a useful asset of the state treasury. He will tell us absolutely nothing of the private life of Pericles and his relations to Phidias and Aspasia. Women are indeed hardly ever so much as mentioned in his pages. In confining himself thus to the work of statesmen and soldiers, he omits influences which we now see to have been of the utmost importance in the life of Athens ; and the passage of twenty-three centuries has made the building of the Parthenon a matter of much greater importance than the siege of Plataea or the battle of Amphipolis. But as a result of his method the book has a stern simplicity of aim which is not the least among its many charms. For Thucydides is no mere painstaking chronicler, but a great artist. He refrains, as a rule, from the picturesque and sentimental details with which some modern historians load their pages, and is singularly sparing of moral comment, passing over deeds of the greatest atrocity without on© word of censure. What comment there is is usually thrown into the speeches which, with more or less of accuracy, are put into the mouths of the leading actors in the great drama. Yet a careful reader will find that a deep earnestness underlies the whole work, and that if he refrains from comment, he is careful that the events


should reveal their own morals. And if his narrative is often restrained even to coldness, there are occasions when through sheer force of presentation he can rouse the extreme of terror and of pity. This is nowhere so noticeable as in his account of the Sicilian expedition, of which Macaulay says: "What colouring is there which would not look tame when placed side by side with the magnificent light and the terrible shade of Thucydides?"

We have traversed in this chapter only some departments of the mental activity of the Greeks, but enough has perhaps been said to show that it is no foolish exaggeration to call them, intellectually, the most highly gifted race that the world has known.

NOTE.—For Greek education Mahaffy's *Old Greek Education* is very useful. For the Sophists see Grote, ch. liii. There is an excellent discussion of the subject in Sir Alexander Grant's edition of the *Ethics* of Aristotle. For all the material details of the Greek theatre see Haigh's *Greek Theatre*; for the great dramatists Mahaffy's *History of Greek Literature*, vol. i., is very valuable. Vol. ii. deals with the prose writers of Greece.



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