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ADVANCED MODERN FRENCH PROSES

BY

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PREFACE

THERE are already several excellent advanced French composition books for English students, but it is felt that one containing somewhat more up-to-date and interesting material than certain of the older textbooks will be welcomed by many teachers—and pupils.

The passages in *Advanced Modern French Proses* are accordingly taken almost entirely from contemporary authors, and have been chosen for their intrinsic interest, and not as samples of 'fine writing' or mines of stylistic difficulties. The latter abound in even the simplest-seeming phrase when brought to the test of translation, and that is why the annotations in this book are so copious. It is difficult to gauge the requirements in this respect of different pupils, but if too-full annotation unduly fetters the learner's initiative, most experienced teachers will probably agree that it is almost impossible to over-estimate the linguistic sabotage of which the average sixth-form or first-year University student is capable; and for the *forts en thème*, or in the last lap before examinations, it is always possible to reproduce passages annotated either sparingly or not at all. It need hardly be added that the suggestions offered in the notes do not pretend to be final in a matter where often no finality is possible, and that they do not normally deal, except indirectly, with matters of pure vocabulary, the use of a good dictionary, such as Larousse, Harrap's *Standard* or *Shorter French and English Dictionary*, or the *Concise Oxford*, being taken for granted.

It remains to thank very warmly the friends who have helped so generously in preparing the fair copies upon which the notes are based, in particular

MM. G. Berthey, E. A. Cossart, and R. P. L. Ledésert, whose suggestions have been most useful.

To my publishers, finally, thanks are due for their great kindness and forbearance over a long period; and, for permission to reprint copyright material from their works, to the writers named at the foot of the several passages or their representatives, as well as to the following publishers and literary agents for the passages whose numbers are given in brackets after their names: Messrs Basil Blackwell, Ltd (14); the Cambridge University Press (34, 35, 42); Messrs Jonathan Cape, Ltd (6, 7, 22, 23); Messrs Collins, Ltd (1, 13, 30, 31); Messrs Victor Gollancz, Ltd, and Messrs Pearn, Pollinger, and Higham, Ltd (15, 16); Messrs Heinemann, Ltd (12, 20); the Hogarth Press, Ltd (2); Messrs Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd (24); Messrs Macmillan and Co., Ltd (3, 4, 27, 28, 32, 33); Messrs Methuen and Co., Ltd (40, 41); Messrs John Murray (19); Odhams Press, Ltd (43); the Oxford University Press (21, 36, 37, 38, 39); Messrs Sheed and Ward and Messrs A. P. Watt and Son (29); the Proprietors of *The Times* (17, 18) and *The Yorkshire Post* (9, 10); Messrs Curtis Brown, Ltd (13); Messrs A. D. Peters (1, 12, 20); Messrs Hughes, Massie and Co., Ltd (30, 31).

E. M. T.

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HORS D'ŒUVRE

FOUR RECIPES

(a) *Jugged Rabbit*

Clean the rabbit, saving the blood in a bowl. Cut into joints and fry each in butter in a stew-pan. In this butter fry some onions, parsley, thyme, and 4 bay-leaves chopped small; add one tablespoonful of flour and mix until the substance has reached a beautiful brown colour. Still mixing, add immediately one glass of milk and one glass of red wine, or failing this half a pint of beer. Add the blood and then the rabbit, pepper and salt to taste; let simmer on a low fire for two hours. Serve. It is delicious.

(b) *Mushroom Pancakes*

Chop the mushrooms and cook in a little butter, seasoning with salt and pepper. Mix with equal parts of light pancake batter, unsweetened and seasoned with salt. Make the pancakes in the ordinary way, but keeping them very thin. Fold, put on a hot dish and serve with quartered lemons.

COUNTESS MORPHY, *Mushroom Recipes*

(c) *Sole à la Normande* (Pre-austerity)

Season the fillets and bake on a buttered dish for a few minutes. Make a sauce with flour, butter, cream, liquor from half a dozen oysters and two egg yolks. Mash some potatoes and make a border. Arrange the fillets and mask with sauce. Garnish with mushrooms and oysters.

(d) Stuffed Tomatoes

Cut the top off each tomato and take out the centres. To these centres add some meat or bacon, a small raw onion, and bread crumbs. Mince the lot. Season with parsley, thyme, pepper, cinnamon and salt. Fry the stuffing. Fill up the tomatoes. Place on a buttered tin, cover with buttered paper, and cook in a moderate oven for about twenty minutes.

THREE ADVERTISEMENTS

(a) Swimming Instructress

METROPOLITAN BOROUGH OF OVERTON

Appointment of TEMPORARY SWIMMING INSTRUCTRESS. Applications are invited from suitably qualified persons for the position of temporary Swimming Instructress at the Overton Baths for the summer season (April to September). The salary will be fixed within the range of £175-£210 per annum, according to qualifications and experience, plus bonus. Applications on forms which can be obtained from the undersigned should be forwarded, endorsed "Swimming Instructress," so as to arrive not later than April 1.

JOHN UNDERDONE, Town Clerk.

Town Hall, Overton, N.N.W.

(b) Panacea Pills

Tens of thousands of people who suffer from acidity, stomach inflammations, pains, fermentations, gastric complaints, heaviness after meals, and all forms of indigestion, have been cured by Panacea Pills, prepared according to the most effective formula used in hospitals and clinics by the best doctors. After a few minutes the patient feels relief. No more dry mouths,

your tongue is free, the heaviness is only a bad memory. Moreover, this remedy is not a purgative. From your first dose tendencies to unreasonable pessimism will be replaced by the reasoning optimism so necessary to everyone nowadays.

(c) *Agony Column*

Would the tall gentleman dressed in khaki shorts, shirt, and helmet, who stood and looked at lady in light-blue dress with pink spots and blue felt hat, outside the Tip-Top Café, Bulawayo, early in February this year, and rode off on a cycle, please communicate with 'Worried,' P.O. Box 1,000,000, Cape Town?

[Adapted from an advertisement in a South African paper, October 1947.]

I. DESCRIPTIVE

1. THE THAW

The great frost of 1940 was over. The great ¹ thaw had ² set in. For ³ nearly two months the flat ⁴ lands around Easterham Manor had been lying under a monotony of snow ⁵ which, like an enchanter, ⁶ turned even the most familiar ⁷ landmarks into strange and silenced shapes. ⁸ Gazing out from behind ⁹ the blurred ¹⁰ panes of the nursery window, John and Priscilla Restorick could see Easterham village, a mile away, gradually emerging from its snow-white trance. ¹¹ In this country of level ¹² fields and winding, hedgeless roads, there had been little else but the villages to arrest the steady flow ¹³ of the blizzards. Easterham had been half obliterated by drifts. As often as men had dug passages through its one street and their own backyards, the snow had come to fill them up again. ¹⁴ Today, ¹⁵ Easterham resembled a series of half-finished excavations ¹⁶ in a white desert: the snow, sliding off its red-tiled roofs and melting to a yellowish slush ¹⁷ where the inhabitants walked, pattering down from the vicarage elms, wearing threadbare ¹⁸ on the allotments, ¹⁹ was beginning to reveal the outline ²⁰ of the village the children knew.

NICHOLAS BLAKE, *The Case of the Abominable Snowman*

1. Can be rendered by *pour de bon* at end of sentence.
2. Imperf. 3. *Pendant*. (Tense?) 4. *sans relief*. 5. *la neige en couche uniforme*. 6. Fem. (to suit *neige*). 7. Onit, and tr. 'landmarks' literally. 8. *silhouettes*. 9. *A travers*. 10. *embuées*. 11. *engourdissement* (= 'torpor'—e.g., of a hibernating animal) *enneigé*. 12. 'flat.' 13. *ruée continue*. 14. *comblér*. 15. Not *aujourd'hui*. 16. *chantier de fouilles*. 17. *boue liquide*. (*Fange* =

inwards of the European structure. European Russia, though it constitutes half of Europe's total land surface, is yet only a smaller part of that wide reaching plain which extends from Northern Germany throughout its whole extent until it well nigh reaches the Sea of Okhotsk and the Behring Sea.

Why, then, we are again provoked to ask, has Europe attracted such reduplicated attention and why should one, and that not the largest of the States in a smaller continent, be suspected of planning the domination of the world? The answer to this question will only be vouchsafed with any degree of completeness at the close of this enquiry but, meantime, it is possible to envisage certain superficial advantages which qualify Europe to claim a leading place as a pioneer of human freedom. A State organisation is a combination of population and territory, and a high civilisation demands that an adequate population should so bore itself into its territory as to make that territory pliant to the requirements of its highly complicated life. Now transport, the power of circulating easily from place to place, is one of the more fundamental factors which enable any country or continent to qualify for a leading place in the forward march to freedom. In this most essential respect the European continent has many advantages. Its mountains, though high, are not impenetrable. It is deeply slashed by arms of the ocean such as the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Sea, and that means that sea transport, the cheapest of all forms of transport, will be, in a very convenient form, available. On the north, the European continent extends to within the Arctic circle and yet its winters are so warm for these latitudes that settlement and cultivation have been carried nearer the Pole than is the case anywhere else in the world. It thus happens that a smaller continent possesses larger diversities of environment and this means that there will be most favourable opportunities for accumulating various types of experience and for the active exchange of goods and ideas.

History is not entirely the record of an unbroken movement from bad to better, or a continuous struggle, without failure or pause, to overcome adverse and negative forces until at length, in the blazing glory of a triple dialectic, man's weary conflict arrives at some measure of full perfection. In this respect great thinkers like Comte or Hegel or Condorcet have unduly simplified the issue. There is not one civilisation but many in the world's history. The trumpeters of freedom have frequently to sound a retreat. If we could examine the dark masses of humanity, as we would a colony of ants under the experimental glass, we should see certain civilisations rise, flourish and then apparently decline and disappear; or survive to languish at last in a state of withered decrepitude, which would strangely contrast with their former vigour and vitality. For example, we have other civilisations such as the Egyptian, the Assyrian and Babylonian, and the Chinese civilisations, which have their territorial homes in Asia, and appear accordingly in a sense alien to Europe. Yet it would be misleading and even false to suggest that the lives of these civilisations can be considered as separate entities much like those animals that, each of them, lead a distinct and anti-social existence, and at the end creep into a corner and die alone. Rather we behold them acting and reacting on one another. They pile up their store of institutional memories. These memories are communicable; the traditions of a culture can be handed down from father to son. There is something individual in every civilisation and every culture. Even when they appropriate from each other they stamp their own creative power on whatever they appropriate. Yet it is this capability of action and reaction that justifies each of the world's civilisations in singing with Horace, *Non omnis moriar*. Even when they have appeared to die without hope, it is seen to be only a case of suspended animation, after all. They have bequeathed some of their distinctive gifts to other and later civilisations and they may receive them back again

pulsating with the power that has entered the world since then—a power which will thereupon vivify and refresh their own faded energies. That is why China, which Spengler would have considered hopelessly befogged in the mist of the past, is now regarded as a principal Allied Power and certainly proposes to play a conspicuous part in the future course of civilisation. That, too, is why to strangle or attempt to strangle a nation's cultural life is to sin against the Holy Ghost.

Civilisations, then, are not inclusive or isolated. They do not live and languish in utter independence of each other. I cannot without qualification be said that, as time goes on, the pathway of existence is only strewn with their cast-off debris and remnants. They bequeath their message, whether hewn out in stone or inscribed on bricks or papyrus, to the civilisations that succeed them. That is why, though civilisations first ran their course in Asia, they may be said to have existed only to leave some of their most valuable possibilities to Europe. For certainly it was in Europe that a civilisation took such a noteworthy course that from its garnered experience we can gather invaluable hints for a free Europe of the future. Politics is the latest efflorescence of sociological evolution and anything like real political democracy in the modern sense began, as a matter of history in Greece. In that land of peninsulas and islands, deeply slashed by the sea, and thus sharing, to a pre-eminent extent, the circulatory advantages of Europe, it was possible to found little territorial city States, each independent of the other, where the people were free to invigorate their own distinctive culture and where they could be assembled in a common meeting to decide their own affairs by their own discussion assemblies. Taking into account the numerous colonies founded by these parent democracies, Aristotle was said to have examined some one hundred and fifty-eight different constitutions before he wrote his great work on "Politics." There was thus afforded to the statesmen of this early time unexampled opportunities for experiment

and variation. The consequence was that it was here in Europe where there was cradled and nurtured that conception of government only by the consent of the governed which has to-day become a dominating watchword in the struggle for European freedom. In the nineteenth century it became almost an irrefragible deduction of history that the world's future was to be determined by this magnificent movement towards a fuller and fuller realisation of democracy. De Tocqueville regarded such a movement, which he plainly discerned in the United States, with mingled awe and admiration, and quite certainly fancied it as a blind overbearing force which nothing could arrest or overthrow. It is only in our own days that its supports have been seriously weakened, though the dramatic fall of Mussolini is a sure indication of where the victory will ultimately lie.

It was the smaller size of these Greek city States that enabled Athens, for example, to work out so victoriously some of the leading assumptions which alone will enable us to found, on anything like a stable basis, the free Europe of the future. Perhaps also it was the undoubted and sinister fact of the existence of a slave population that enabled the Athenian citizens to defend themselves from that supremacy of solely economic forces which, through a fierce struggle for existence, has introduced such a brutalising and disturbing influence into the effort after a free life. In that way the dangerous scrambles for markets which, in the bigger world of to-day so seriously complicates the issue, were avoided or rendered less unsightly, and the problem of establishing a free population made immensely more manageable. When the Greek city States lost their independence and wider combinations had to be formed under the aegis of Macedonia and Rome, it was evident that many adulterations would diversify the pure truth of the Athenian democratic doctrine. No longer could the population meet in the ecclesia, and unitedly demonstrate their claim to a free life in a free city.

Aristotle himself quite obviously never anticipated any of the more spacious developments of political statecraft. He wrote in the closing days of the Greek city States but no more than some of our modern writers was he able to formulate sure and certain historical laws, which would enable him to predict even the more immediate future events. Yet it was the Greek political speculations which, reformulated at the Renaissance, initiated that movement towards a free democratic Europe which is our inevitable aspiration to-day. Indeed, it is the importance which Europe claims in the history of free institutions that makes an enquiry which starts from one of the smallest of the continents to emerge as an enquiry which is significant for all the rest of the world.

Europe, in fact, has extended its hundred arms over all the other hemispheres. Its facilities for cheap communication have enabled it to keep in intimate touch with continents that surpass it in simple size. First its cheap and convenient Mediterranean route made it familiar with Eastern spices. Next the hegemony passed to the nations that fringed the Atlantic and that huge waste of waters became ultimately a Europo-American lake. That meant that the European civilisations were engendering young and vigorous successors throughout countries in other continents. From this Europe to the older races, in fact, emerged a long array of emigrants who transplanted, as pioneers, the institutions of the old world into the virgin countries of the new. What was the United States but the land which the Pilgrim Fathers made? Yet not the Founding Fathers only but their successors from almost every part of Europe, trekked, in something like endless succession almost up to our own days, to that home of a marvellous blend of European races which we term our American kinsfolk. European settlers laid the foundations of the Australian Commonwealth. They imported into its territories their own conceptions of justice and freedom. British and Dutch make up the Union of South Africa. India

will never lose the impress of the British Raj. Peter the Great was always unsatisfied until Russia, essentially an Asiatic State, opened up a window on Europe. Japan found Europeans on the islands of the Pacific and Japan will have to yield them to the influence of Europe again. Whatever the progress of Europe in the path to freedom, its movements are bound to exert their influence on all the rest of the world.

These are the facts which demonstrate the importance of enquiring into the conditions favouring the establishment of a future free Europe. If it is possible after the War to lay down the line of a sound political configuration in Europe, then it is pretty certain that the influence of a really free Europe will very soon extend itself over all the rest of the world. A notable American publicist has only recently pointed out that the whole future of European freedom and even the ultimate peace of the whole world depends fundamentally on the kind of settlement attempted after the war for the eastern part of Europe. If there is any attempt to stifle genuine political claims or to suppress particular culture or to submit countries that want it not to a subordinate position in relation to other and bigger Powers, then there will be kindled in Europe itself a conflagration which, smouldering at first, will ultimately break out with an ominous crash like a shattering flash of lightning. Movements may well burst into the public view which will show that there is an unsolved problem in the very heart of the European continent. It was once pointed out by the late Lord Acton in the fragments which have been published of his "History of Freedom," that the crowning acts of historical infamy known as the first three Partitions of Poland, left an inevitable Nemesis in their train. That was the ghost of the partitioned country, a national spirit that was unsubduable, wandering uneasily along the tangled spaces of the nineteenth century, demanding strongly to be reunited to its reft body, and everywhere and in almost every European land setting loose all kinds and sorts of nationalistic claims

and aspirations. Thus the peace in the nineteenth century which followed the fall of Napoleon was not in any sense a real peace. There were blue skies indeed, but they looked down on the subterranean fires. Is it not fitting that this time, after a hard and cruel war, we should devise our plans more carefully and skilfully for a free Europe of the future, remembering that we are not dealing simply with individuals but with a panoply of organised nations? If one of them gets the notion that it is wronged, then the whole settlement may go astray. It is from Europe that there has emerged the most cruel and ruthless aggression that has at any time blasted the career of history and it is from Europe that there must come that measured control of events which should for ever dispel the possibility of another Armageddon.

What then, is this freedom which we so confidently claim as the prerogative of a new Europe? The French Revolution coined the watchword of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," as the most precious characteristic of a free people in a free State. It is true that a political brain can very easily demonstrate that each of the elements of this watchword is inconsistent and even contradictory of the other. Liberty may be taken to mean liberty to starve and in that case there is no occasion for Equality. Or it might signify liberty to run amok and thus quite obviously rule out Fraternity. Again, Equality, if pushed to its extreme, would entail the absolute stripping from any one individual of all that separates him from the others; and that would precipitate such a paring of differences by the dictatorial action of an outside power that there would be no real man left to evoke the sacred name of Liberty. Besides a series of individuals, each absolutely the same and all complete in their several individualities, would have no desire for Fraternity because contact might mean aggrandising themselves at the expense of others and thus cancelling the Equality with which they started. Lastly, Fraternity is, in a certain sense, contradictory of Liberty, because to live in

amicable relations with others implies very often a repression of pleasant inclinations on the ground that to give rein to them would cause "thy brother to offend." It certainly also implies a negation of Equality because as Tolstoy discovered, an absolute practice of Fraternity may entail such a measure of renunciation that it would make sad havoc of any previous Equality among the sons of men.

But that is not the way to deal with this watchword of our modern times. It is not Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, viewed separately, which, by their mere mechanical addition, constitute true freedom. It is rather the organic relation of the whole three, each functioning in relation and in contact with the others and in this really vital union constituting true freedom. Liberty is only possible to one who is in a large sense equal in functional opportunities to others, and who is in contact not with a hostile world where the hand of one is raised to hurt and harm the other, but where all are organically united in the bonds of fraternal sympathy. Equality is no dead uniformity which reduces each to the dull drabness of a monotonously painted marionette, but an equality of opportunity in an organised world, where each has a function and where each has the function for which his natural powers absolutely fit him. Fraternity is not simply an emptying of oneself until at the end there is only a Diogenes eyeing you askance from the middle of his empty tub. In a society of equals where the law is the law of Liberty, Fraternity is then not simply emptying ourselves, but it implies that we may be filled again even to the brim. It is the surrender of our merely individual desires and inclinations to be rewarded by rich returns of sympathy and brotherly love which forward the entrance of the individual into a fuller and more precious social life. Only when the individual has appropriated all that is best in the mutual play and interplay of the organically united "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," can he be said in any rigid sense to be free.

Now Plato has maintained that the State is "the individual

writ large," and the philosopher has supplied in those fascinating dialogues which constitute his "Republic" the greatest help still afforded towards an appreciation of social philosophy. Europe is an array of States and though the end of the war has not yet arrived, it may be presumed that the number of its constituent elements will not vary much from what it did before the war began. That means that there will be some twenty-eight States in the new Europe which, by their union under the flag of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," should then constitute a free Europe. What this implies and how the way had been prepared for it, is the subject which we shall discuss in the succeeding chapters. Liberty for the State, no more than liberty for the individual, can be exaggerated until it degenerates into license. No State can inflate itself like La Fontaine's frog until it poses to the excited imagination of its people as a country of devouring Herrenfolk. To avoid such a catastrophe, Liberty must be qualified by Equality, i.e., there must be no such inequality between one State and another, as would warrant one of them to be termed a satellite State. Any State which can justly be termed a satellite State is a standing temptation to a powerful aggressor. If such an aggressor is not visible to-day, what are we to expect to-morrow? Of course, freedom will be adequately safeguarded so long as Liberty and Equality are supplemented by Fraternity. The principle of Nationality, as Mazzini taught us long ago, becomes a hateful Nationalism so long as nation and States in Europe recognises no duty to Europe. True freedom either for men or nation States, will never be attained by the application of the law of the jungle to supra-national affairs. In the tales of the children, the little ones, who trust themselves to a bear, discover in the long run that their very existence is in danger.

So it is under the influence of such dominating principles as these that our search for a free Europe must always be conducted. Only thus can we secure permanence for any settle-

ment or guard ourselves from a collapse which might involve the whole world in catastrophe. It is evident that we live in revolutionary and yet in reactionary times. History has reduplicated itself and instead of going forward it has reverted in the gospel of Hitlerism to a negation of freedom unless for a comparatively small section of the elect. Yet even in the reactionary Europe of to-day there must be beacons blazing in the right direction. It is the purpose of the succeeding chapters to discover these beacons and in their kindly light to fare forward boldly into the future. Society is a complex affair. The state is not unitary but plural. It is territorial and a federation of states can eventually compass the whole world. The forces and factors that make and mould it can be summed up as eugenic, economic, religious, artistic, legal and administrative, political and last of all, scientific or rational. Of these the eugenic factors lie closest to the physical life. They were prominent in early society as the cast iron rules of exogamy plainly declare. The political and scientific are the last and unifying influence in a free and progressive civilisation. Let civilisation turn the clock of progress backward as in a great war and the first of these to go are the habits of toleration and free speech, the liberty of thought and worship which are the glory of a nation's life. Scientific advance becomes scientific retrogression. The man of science creates angry Frankensteins to destroy us instead of those wonderful results of inventive thought which are to lighten and transform our life.

This is not a work of general sociology and these forces and factors of society will only be dealt with hereafter as they are important at a given stage of the advance towards a free Europe. Even at the present early progress of the enquiry, however, it may be indicated that one of the most pressing problems of the post war world is to settle the relative importance of the economic and the political factors and to secure that the more advanced democratic traditions of politics shall, in a free Europe, command a proper share of supremacy.

CHAPTER II

THE TOPOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

THE twenty-eight nation states in Europe which confronted us at the beginning of the present war were primarily based, as are all other states, on territory and population. They have each their definite habitat and though there are important topographical differences between these various habitats, they enjoy most of them a sufficient share of these climatic advantages which have made Europe the most important scene of one modern civilisation. That is to say, and as regards the southern part of Europe especially their temperature is neither so hot nor so cold or their weather changes so monotonous that through lack of humidity they interpose a serious barrier on the exercise of human energies.

It is easy to see that the first serious advance in civilisation occurred when society passed from the nomad condition and, settling down on a definite and climatically favourable territory, commenced to exploit that territory as the first set of farmers. Population thus tended to become more dense on a definitely limited space. The units of such a population were brought more frequently in contact with each other in all kinds of different relations. Things had to be organised if chaos was not to ensue. The machinery of a state had gradually to be constructed. Such organisation as it was little by little brought nearer to completeness demanded a longer and more variegated exercise of human energy and initiative. Inventions began, successive empires arose and decayed, human society had started on its long course of development. There were *corsi* and *ricorsi* as Vico put it, and at last after being refined through successive civilisations

there emerged as the result of it all these nation states which, some of them in a sadly battered condition, exist in our Europe of today.

A society which is primarily based on neighbourhood has, however, certain notable drawbacks. Blood relations have by nature certain ways and aptitudes which, being shared by each, make it practical for all to live in common. Nomads, also, though there is not naturally any reason why they should live together in harmony, have very wide spaces in which they can roam and chew the cud of their private grievance. But neighbours are planted in closer proximity and when the sounds of strife are heard in their encampments they cannot desert their holdings to lose sight of their adversaries in the solitude of illimitable prairies. So that if their community has to grow in grace they have perforce to tolerate one another. Often when there are angularities present in the population this process of acquiring mutual toleration is attended by distinctly painful experiences. Some neighbours may be good mixers and others the reverse and frequently in despair the dictator has to be summoned so that some binding power may be imparted to a new social aggregate.

Such was the case in the great Graeco-Roman civilisation to which our modern European civilisation succeeded. It had its great moments as in the short yet glorious period of Athenian aristocratic democracy but Gibbon has familiarised us with the unforgettable picture of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." Yet, before it fell, this Graeco-Roman civilisation, as Spengler has shown us, passed through a series of phases which can be shewn to be in some sense parallel with what has passed and is passing in our own civilisation. The Roman age of loosening ties of neighbourhood had its dictator in the person of Diocletian who sought to bind its estranged or indifferent elements through the mechanical pressure of an intricate bureaucratic system. The effort was not ultimately successful and our own civilisation

took root in a world of struggling landowners where each had his little court and where there were only private philosophies such as those of the Stoics and Epicureans to solace his individual soul. Modern society has to start by being bound together through the medium of land tenure in a system where all from higher to lower were connected by duties of service and defence. Of course if the principle of this modern Europe had been carried to its legitimate conclusion, society would have been eventually dissolved into a heterogeneous collection of lords and vassals. There could have been nothing approaching a nation state in the sense in which this is understood in modern Europe. That feudal groups at any one time chose to remain at peace like the poetic lion and lamb was no guarantee that for any length of time they should remain in such idyllic contentment.

Fortunately, however, history does not always encourage us to carry its principles to what might appear their legitimate extremes. There was always some rude sort of order apparent amid this chaos of competing lordship. The civilisation of Europe which, today, is in a state of dissolution and which, at any rate, cries aloud for a new principle of synthesis was, even when first it emerged from the ruins of the Roman Empire, never without some sort of a guarantee of ultimate unity. There was for example the Papacy which gained fresh prestige under Pope Leo and in the confidence of a spiritual heritage, confronted and arrested the material forces of Attila the Hun when that great conqueror was on the point of sacking Rome. Furthermore, there began to develop a gradation of lordships among the competing lords themselves. One lord, by various means, by force or chicane or by the judicious use of marriage claimed and obtained rights over other lords and began that process of historical development which has made the nation state the most characteristic political product of our own times—the analogue of the city state in the Graeco-Roman civilisation.

Every real nation state is more than a mere aggregate of units which have contracted to live in harmony. Each has a life of its own, a cultural heritage, traditions which have been handed down from father to son and whose praises were sung by the nation's bards from the earliest ages of its history. Mere neighbourhood is no guarantee of similarity in cultural traditions. Thus one of the most important considerations to be taken into account when discussing the future of the nations states of Eastern Europe is the difference in outlook and cultural inheritance between Russia and Poland. Poland has uniformly turned its attention to the West, Russia more often to the East. To propose to make one an appendage to the other would be to mar the individuality of a precious cultural life.

But although, in the nation state, there is this individuality of a cultural life, that has not meant that it is as easy to define the topographical boundaries of a nation as it is to perceive the boundaries of a human or animal organism. In point of fact there are only six out of the twenty-six nation states existing in Europe, before Hitler emptied upon them the vessels of his cruel wrath which existed within the self-same boundaries at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. These were Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Switzerland. All these, be it observed, have their habitat in the west of Europe. Indeed, one of the chief conclusions that immediately forces itself on our attention when considering this topographical question of boundaries is the great difference in stability of existence and certainty of boundaries between the west and the east of Europe. To guarantee boundaries in the west and to overlook boundaries in the east, thinking that thereby you are making Europe safe for democracy, is like pursuing a German army and forgetting to keep a watch for the mines which it may strew on the way.

Of course there were certain natural features which contributed to the stability of Europe's western boundaries. Great

Britain, for example, was an island and William of Normandy when he landed on its shores, had no doubts about the limits of the land in which there was to be established the first European nation state. France, too, was limited on two sides by the sea and the Pyrenees and aspired to have the Rhine for a third natural boundary. At any rate her position enabled her to be the second state to develop in a modern direction. Spain, too, has certain features in mountain and sea to give greater distinctiveness to her natural outlines. There is no doubt an old saying that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees" and though this is true only in a limited sense, it is also true that there is an aridity and an abundance of treeless spaces which distinguish the ground south of the Pyrenees from that which is further north. Certainly there is also Portugal in the Iberian Peninsular but Portugal is a strip of lowland surrounded by Spanish Sierras and the Cantabrian Sea; and the character and mentality of lowlanders are such as constantly to differentiate them from any highlanders who may settle in anything like a close neighbourhood. In the case of Switzerland, again, the mountains which act as sentinels on its frontiers are very apparent except when they are enveloped in mist; and Denmark though condemned to an uneasy juxtaposition with Germany, wherever the waters have failed to surround her, has yet from the beginning maintained a certain political and economic individuality which at all times has kept her separate from her more powerful neighbour.

The remaining states of Europe to which it is now necessary to devote some share of attention differ as has already been pointed out from these already mentioned because they are more or less the creation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, it is in dealing with them that we come across what have been rightly termed "the danger points of Europe." In four of the states which fell under this head the danger was not very pressing because the birthpangs attendant

on the operation which separated them was not at all severe. That means that though Belgium is now a separate state from Holland, and Sweden a different state from Norway there is yet such an affinity between them that they were able to agree to differ without any expenditure of temper and blood. Of course with all their similarities there is, on a closer inspection, a certain difference of outlook which has led them in their own directions. Sweden looks on an inland sea and has close topographical affinities with Finland, on which its gaze rests, because they are both largely part of the great Forest Belt which in earlier days stretched across the north of Europe and well into Asia. On the other hand Norway looks out on to the ocean and has closer affinities with Denmark seeing that both constitute the land of the Vikings and in the same earlier days consisted mostly of woodland and pasture. It may also fairly be added that, as Norway looks across the ocean, its gaze most frequently rests on the British Island ; whereas Sweden looks across the Baltic Sea to Germany and through this has not prevented its development on its own democratic direction, it is also true that before the present war there was in that country a distinct underlying sympathy for the German Reich.

As for Holland and Belgium, there are quite definite considerations which go far to explain their nineteenth century civilisation. Holland is the lowest of the Low Countries and gently buries in the sea the great European plain which goes right through Germany and Russia. To that extent because of this topographical affinity she might be presumed to have a German orientation owing to the continual going to and fro which a common situation on such a great level stretch does and must entail. On the other hand, there would be strong influences, arising from her near proximity to the sea, which would resist any attempt on the part of Germany to interfere with her right to live her own free and independent life. The sea is the cheapest means of transport. Transport implied voyages and colonisation. The cultivation of sea power

meant the nursing of that distinct and proud individuality arising from the consciousness of possessions which is very strong in Holland. This feeling of distinct individuality became exceedingly strong in Holland when the country stood up to the embattled power of the strongest epoch in Spanish history and it has continued to manifest itself even to our own days. At the same time Holland was sufficiently in the good graces of Germany during the War of 1914 to be relieved of the devastations of invasion and when Kaiser Wilhelm II retreated in contumely to his tent before the evident wrath and disillusionment of his country, it was in Holland where that tent was pitched. Of course the case is radically changed today. Hitler has no reservations and only the slightest of slight compunctions. He scrupled not to affront that proud instinct for independence which had been bequeathed to the Dutch people and he thus made certain that they would enrol themselves on the side of the Allies.

Belgium on the other hand, has more distinct affinities with France through the fact that she incorporates part of the European northern forest land brings her also into topographical relations with Germany. Perhaps, too, the Flemish inhabitants of the country, which have been greatly but not entirely dissimilated, occupy a somewhat intermediate position between France and Germany. Yet if not entirely assimilated, the Flemings must still be held to have formed with the Walloons or French part of the Belgians a something distinctive in institutions and life, over which no steam roller could be ruthlessly passed without flattening out a most precious part of the World's cultural possessions. Furthermore, it has for many years been a dominating feature of British policy that the independence of Belgium should be as far as possible safeguarded and the dishonouring by Germany of the "scrap of paper," on which such an undertaking was made valid, was the proximate cause of the earlier stages of the war of 1914.

Here then on the west side of Europe we are on comparatively safe ground. The different nation states appear to have sorted themselves out into somewhat distinct entities, each with a heritage of culture and traditions which make it impossible to merge one completely into the other, or to enslave one by the other, without destroying or injuring most valuable cultural possessions. It is when we come to the east of Europe, as has already been pointed out, that we reach the real crux of our problem. There everything seems fluid, unsettled, and yet alterable only with much difficulty and trouble. In the West, the minorities, though less so in the case of Spain, have been almost completely assimilated. Even when a minority clings stoutly to the remains of its ancient culture it is suffered to do so because such fidelity is not inconsistent with its loyalty to the nation-state with which its destiny has now been joined. But in the east of Europe there is no such facility of assimilation. When the planners of a new Europe braced themselves, after the last war, to their difficult task, they found themselves confronted with large numbers of blocks of peoples who claimed to be ethnographically distinct, and who, some of them at any rate, had considerable cultural traditions and distinct historical memories. It was quite obvious that Eastern Europe, with any regard to its own safety from oppression could not be resolved into a competing crowd of petty principalities. But when the principle of self determination was operated to resolve Europe into larger masses of territory, it was found that for reasons, some of which will appear in the further course of this enquiry, the incorporated minorities failed to any large extent to be assimilated and indeed appeared to have influences working within them which opposed a total resistance to all such attempts at assimilation. What is there to account for this? And, finally, there is the huge and unwieldy extent of Russia, equal to the rest of Europe, and along with its Asiatic territories, greater, as Humboldt put it, than the entire surface

of the moon at its full ! How can we be sure that such an inflated giant may not yet crush all the rest of Europe in his mighty arms ?

To answer the first of these questions it is necessary to consider again that most unsettling and influential factor in modern European history, the great European plain, which extends from Holland through Germany and right through Russia as far as the huge peaks of central Asia, and is only stopped between the Black and the Caspian Seas by the great wall of the Caucasus. A plain, when it becomes the highway of nations is always the scene of restless motion, and this particular plain is an example, on a greatly increased scale, of what we find to be characteristic of all the rest. On this immense conglomeration of the earth's surface, there passed from East to West a many coloured variety of peoples, Scythians, Sarmations, Goths, Avars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Chazars, Petchenegs, Lithuanians, Mongols and Tartars. They came especially from the grassy steppelands which constitute the Asiatic southern layer of the plain and as they burst on more settled European civilisations they evoked sensations of terror and dismay. They passed along the plain in successive waves of peoples and when they found nomads who had preceded them in their way, they pushed these nomads before them and compelled the latter to impinge on whatever civilisation was to be found barring their path. The contemporary chroniclers are full of this abject horror and dismay. Thus the monk Gildas writing, it is believed, about A.D. 550, gives such a contemporary account of the settlements in Britain of the Angles, Saxons and Jutes. He says they came "like wolves into the sheepfold" and in another place that "a multitude of whelps came forth from the lair of this barbaric lioness." With a curious anticipation of future events, he adds that they called for a monthly supply of provisions, and threatened that if this was not forthcoming "they will break the treaty and plunder the whole island."

Some modern historians have essayed to brighten this picture and to overspread a friendlier atmosphere about the whole scene. These Goths, say they, who descended on the Roman Empire came only in smaller parties and when they arrived piecemeal they were quickly absorbed by a higher civilisation. But nothing can undo the effect produced on us by the terror and alarm of the contemporary witnesses. Caesar speaks of the restlessness of his Gauls, Jordanes of his Goths, and the Byzantine Procopius tells us that the Slavs "are always ready to change their abode." Hitherto, too, we have been chiefly dwelling on the movement from East to West. In later days, however, there developed a reverse movement when the Teutonic Knights descended on the plain in what they imagined were a strictly religious Crusade, and in a welter of blood and spoliation smote the aboriginal inhabitants in the Prussian portion of the plain, thus initiating the "Drang nach Osten."

This, then, is how our modern civilisation arose and that which is staggering us today with the problem of the nation states. The Graeco-Roman civilisation which preceded it was a Mediterranean civilisation. Rome had opened up the great inland sea and, except for the pirates overwhelmed by Pompey, it was free to the peoples included in the Pax Romana. But in the north it was a closed civilisation. The tribes of the plain, especially the tribes of the northern forests and steppe lands, were a collection of unknown and savage peoples. Caesar describes the Gauls but he knew only such Gauls as came in contact with his armies. All that is known of the Slav tribes when our civilisation arose is contained in the scanty notices of the Roman chroniclers when their armies chanced to come in contact with some of them. They had very little exploring curiosity, these Romans. That is why they bequeathed to our modern civilisation a plain inhabited by unknown terrors. These terrors gradually made themselves more palpable as Attila and his Huns descended on the nascent civilisation. It

was not simply the terror and devastation of Attila himself. It was that the onrush of the Huns set all the other tribes of the plain in motion. Fortunately, however, the effect of these rushes of unknown enemies of the plain was not wholly to disintegrate our European civilisation. The Franks in France and the Angles, Saxons, Jutes and finally the Normans in England made of France and England the first instances of the strong centralised states who were to make the world of the future. That was good arising out of what appeared to be evil. But a still more conspicuous good—at least for that early time—accrued from the meeting between Pope Leo the Great and Attila ; and when the Roman pontiff by the exercise of merely spiritual impressiveness and authority persuaded the Asiatic monarch to refrain from attacking and no doubt sacking Rome. That action was the source of great prestige to the Roman See and was instrumental in providing a spiritual power which could act as a co-ordinating force in binding together Europe in a spiritual whole.

Now one characteristic of this spiritual power was that it possessed that exploring curiosity which the Romans lacked. It sent its saints and missionaries all over Europe and they even penetrated into the forests of the northern plain. It had, of course, also its Teutonic Knights and that was not altogether a blessing. Yet the result was that the peoples of the north were no longer unknown barbarians invested with the capacity for unearthly cruelty and venting their uncivilised wrath on the civilised remnants who were trying to found a new European world out of the ruins of the old. There were continuing movements among the peoples of the plain. Scattered tribes coalesced. It was not that this was entirely Slav or that was entirely German. Pure races are like a thoroughbred dog—they have certain elements of weakness and a precarious tenure of life. Many elements went to the peoples who finally emerged as Germans, Poles and Russians on the great plain. Indeed the more intricate the mixture the

more distinctive and creative the culture. Because the Poles and Russians had a fundamental portion of Slavic blood that did not mean that they were strictly kindred natures. The truth is that the more they developed the more did their culture and traditions develop on their own lines. No progress can be made in the attempt to found a free and stable Europe until this all important fact, is completely borne in mind.

Through the work of knights and missionaries accordingly, the European plain had for the time been robbed of its primary terrors but there were still the grassy steppe lands of Asia. Urged by various reasons, chiefly the excessive aridity, all kinds of wandering tribes poured into European Russia which then became a cauldron of many contending elements. For that reason and for many centuries the European plain offered no kind of menace to the rest of Europe. Indeed there was one time when it was quite possible that Russia would be completely overthrown by Poland. On another occasion in the abortive expedition of Sviataslaw in 970 Russia, the Kiev Russia, appeared to break her traces and made a bid for the Eastern Empire. But the Eastern Emperor decisively defeated her and ultimately Moscow, situated in the Russian forest land of the northern portion of the plain, established its supremacy over Kiev, the land of the southern steppes. Peter the Great established St. Petersburg as a window from which he could look at the West but he had so many enemies, such as the Swedes, to overcome before he could take the stage as a great conqueror that his window never became much more than a post for distant observation. Russia, from the topographical point of view, remained mainly Asiatic and not completely European. Indeed, if we recall the two features which have been declared to be characteristic of Europe—its temperate climate and the fact that its land is lacerated by the seas, we can shew that Russia is not European in either of these senses. This huge country adheres solidly to Asia as her largest dimension. She is the most compact and eminently

continental of any of the countries of the globe and being deprived of the even temperate climate due to Europe's articulated structure, she subjects her people to a rigorous cold in winter and a torrid heat in the summer. Likewise is she bordered on the north by icy seas which permit to this border few of the advantages of a littoral. Indeed it is only in the nineteenth century that there is witness to the fact that the Russian plain is beginning again to exert an appreciable influence in European affairs. Of course that influence was strictly conditioned by the character of the people. Even when the Bolsheviks vaulted into the seat of power they had to deal according to a friendly modern commentator "with a barely literate and semi-westernised country accustomed only to a half Byzantine, half-Oriental despotism."

The great point then to remember about the plain is that its nations become a conglomerate of many elements. There was no such thing as a pure race. Uncontaminated Nordics are the base delusion of a dream. Movement, as has been said was facilitated on such a level surface if only the rigours of nature could be really overcome. Consequently, when in Europe the European plain came to be tenanted by the Russian, Polish and German nations, it must be taken for granted that there would be produced a mixture new and strange! And so we find it. The Germans attained no sort of unity until the 14th century. The Holy Roman Empire gave the centralised power to its Head. For that reason it did not until the later date exhibit to Europe the unsettling influence of the plain. It must, however, be remarked that the first of the German states to reveal such signs of danger was Prussia—the state which inhabited the northern or originally forest area of the plain and which inherited the "Drang nach Osten" policy of the Teutonic Knights.

While dealing with the northern part of the European plain a word must be added about Poland. As that country developed, it could not fail to be remarked that its animating spirit was

very different from that of either Prussia or Russia. It was in some sort a loose union of provinces and the *Liberum Veto* enabled the people of one province to hamper the combined operations of all the rest. The monarchy was elective, its powers strictly limited, and there was no effective centralised authority. That made it interesting from the point of view of the lover of freedom but objectionable from the point of view of the despot. One thing was certain that there could be no question of Poland using the plain as a starting point for aggression. It was once remarked by De Tocqueville that when a democracy starts a war it begins badly but ends well; whereas when an autocrat plays the same game he may start well but end badly. Certainly aggression needs for its most successful beginnings a strongly centralised and omniscient authority, a power that can say "Yes" when no one else can say it "Nay." No wonder then that Poland became an influence to be destroyed in Europe in the despotic mind of Prussia and Russia. That meant that when Prussia began to move aggressively, Poland, through the agency of the Partitions, had been treacherously moved from its path. It will be seen later, however, that the ghost of Poland, in menacing form and gait, haunted the despots of Europe all through the nineteenth century.

It is in the nations of the Danube basin, however, where we see most conspicuously the unsettling effects of the steppe grasslands of Asia on the configuration of Europe. On that Danube basin there descended quite an avalanche of Asiatic nomads, Petchenegs, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars and, finally, the Ottoman Turks. Then peoples were never able to get for themselves anything like stable boundaries. As fast as one set of invaders seem to settle down into anything like repose in any given territory, coalescing as they did so with the mixture of peoples who formerly inhabited these territories, another set of invaders would push on hotly from the grasslands and threw all the former pattern of peoples into

utter confusion. That meant that the problem of carving out stable nation States for the Danube basin has persisted as a pressing problem even unto our own times. In Victorian days the Ottoman Turks, whose armies and engineers had reduced the peoples of the Danube basin to a state of servitude, were sickening to decay. Turkey, in that secure and self-confident Victorian era, was known by the name of the "sick man of Europe." It was a species of skeleton in the Victorian cupboard and, as it lay in the direct path of Russia to Constantinople and the warmer waters of the Mediterranean, there could be no question of the interest Russia took in some freeing of the Danube nations from the Ottoman yoke while, at the same time, securing from them a favourable attitude towards Russian plans and projects. Here again we see how profoundly the nations of the plain can influence or even disarrange the best laid schemes for a free and stable Europe.

One word before this chapter closes about Czecho-Slovakia. To some extent this country occupies a certain position of detachment in relation to the problems which have hitherto been considered. It has a chain of mountains above 2,000 feet which form a natural frontier between it and Germany. Under its older name of Bohemia, the chief section of it was a part of the Holy Roman Empire to which on one memorable occasion it even presented an Emperor. It did not suffer so much from the Asiatic tribes and as it was a part of the Empire ensconced behind its natural defences and did not fear formal German aggression, all that it had to endure was the steady trickling of Germans over its borders—that stream of German emigrants from West to East which was the informal aspect of the "Drang nach Osten." At the end it accepted a Hapsburg ruler and perhaps it is the habits of mind engendered by this experience which make it so much inclined in our own days to seek safety in the protection of some larger and stronger power. Of course, like all the other nations in the East whose bounds were fixed at Versailles, it suffered

from the presence of imperfectly assimilated minorities. Certainly, in a future free Europe, it must retain its natural frontiers, but on the other hand, the Sudetan Germans who formerly inhabited its boundaries must opt whether they desire to remain as citizens of a Czecho-Slovak State or not. If they opt to remain Czechs, they must ask for no special privileges or offer any resistance to a policy of complete assimilation. All pretence to be under the protection of a neighbouring Reich must be renounced once and for ever. The aspiration to create a special party of Germans in the Czech Parliament or to be represented qua Germans in a Czech Ministry should be recognised as inconsistent with the future stability of a Czecho-Slovak State. On the other hand, the traditions of the Czech State are distinctively Western ; in its cultural and religious orientation it is widely different from Russia, and belongs to a European rather than a Russian federation.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC FACTS AND FORCES

IN the earlier pages of European history, the Mediterranean played the most conspicuous part. The creeks and islands of this sunny inland sea furnished a habitat for all the civilisations which give distinction to the opening chapters of any historical survey. The waters of such an inland sea were, on the whole, friendly, as their coasts could be conveniently charted; the harbingers of the earlier European civilisations dared no unknown perils as they slowly navigated their way along its shores. This was a time of small city states, limited in the main to their small size by the topographical background, but sometimes enshrining within that limited space the treasures of a culture which the world would not willingly let die. Crete, the scene of a most notable among those early civilisations, is an island. Greece, the habitat of the most glorious of them all, is a land of hills and valleys where each hill marked out the boundaries which separated one of these peoples from the peoples of the neighbouring valley. Rome was the capital of the empire which stages the closing episodes of the Graeco-Roman civilisation's rise and fall, but to the end of its days this Empire seemed to hug the conviction that it was only an extension of the original city state of its capital.

Early European culture then revealed its most gorgeous blooms in the smallest of states. Athens, for example, which has remained a glory and an astonishment to all succeeding ages would have been regarded in our own country as simply a minor borough; yet within that small space and shadowed by the violet crown of its hills, it produced such a wealth of literary achievement that subsequent generations have never

ceased to render it homage. Slaves and resident aliens saw to most of its commerce and industry and the citizens were left free to listen to a play which staked a claim to immortality or else, maybe, to discuss the affairs of a widening political world in the publicity of their ecclesia. They were happy within their own limits and it might have been supposed that the conditions of that happiness would remain valid for ever. For, let it be remembered, it rested on the separation of the economic from the political and the cultural, and it was only when the economic urge instigated the city state to a fatal imperialism that the weakness was revealed in that stately race of men who were responsible for the Parthenon.

But it is to our modern civilisation that we must chiefly turn in this inquiry—that civilisation which arose out of the ruins of the Roman Empire and which is now passing through most critical days, it may be to lay the foundation of a new order of affairs, and what may prove a higher civilisation. Sufficient was said in the last chapter about the forests and wide spaces of that great European plain from which emerged the peoples who were eventually to suffocate the Graeco-Roman civilisation. The nomads of the plain were restless. As Caesar put it when he was describing the Suevi, they could not bear to be permanently tied down to one place. They might conceivably settle in it for the night. But they would be up and away again on the wings of the morning. Their spacious camping grounds were hard and sparing of comforts and wherever they chanced, from whatever cause, to penetrate further south, they could not but regard with desiring eyes those evidences of settled and luxurious life which they beheld in the province of the city of Rome. The German tribes were the foremost in this trek and push to the south, and when they had sufficiently ensconced themselves on the South of Europe they turned to the East and dribbled along in the “*Drang nach Osten*.” For if there were not so many glittering prizes to be won, there were wide spaces where they might solace

themselves in that Russia west of the Urals which constitutes about the half of Europe ; and when its Asiatic territories are added it can be seen to be responsible for about a seventh of the surface of the whole globe. So that even when the first tribal restlessness of the Germans had paused for a season, there were Mongols and Seljuk Turks, as we have already shown in the last chapter, who were ready to upset by their raids the whole future situation in Eastern Europe.

Of course it was the relative comfort and luxury under the sunny skies of the Mediterranean that attracted the restless nomads of the Great Plain but there were differences in the way in which they reacted to this contact with a more developed civilisation. The hordes of Jenghis Khan remained, to the last, strangers in a strange land. They frightened Europe with their speed and ferocity, but when at last they were rolled back to their original haunts they were still the same untamed warriors as in the days before. But the Teutonic tribes who came from the European section of the plain were influenced to some degree by the Mediterranean culture though they never assimilated it to the same degree as did the Gauls in the western part of the empire of Charlemagne. Indeed the Prussians, before the Teutonic Knights drove them before them in a campaign of fire and sword, were an entirely pagan people and they had never been subjected to the influences of the Graeco-Roman civilisation. On the other hand certain of the Polish tribes are mentioned by the Roman chroniclers and this is a sure sign that they had been brought in contact with an earlier culture. Perhaps that was the reason that from the very first Poland seemed to orient to the west while the Russian tribes, mingled though they were with Nordic elements, bore indelible traces of the influence of Byzantium and the Tartar East. So that when we take into account the fact that Prussia, from which the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg were content to take a name for their future Kingdom, had for its early memories a tradition of murder and rapine and that the

Russian tribesmen had similarly dangerous traditions bequeathed to them from the further east, we must also concede that the aridity of the plain and the wandering tendency of a nomad were sure to encourage the Teutonic and Russian tribes in courses that were certain to prove dangerous to Europe.

Yet all the while the wheel of the World's progress was revolving in its cyclic course and as it continued to revolve, the Mediterranean gradually lost that importance which it had possessed in an earlier epoch. Intrepid mariners set forth from the western lands of Europe to chart unknown seas and to discover strange countries and peoples. That ultimately meant that the Atlantic and not the Mediterranean—an ocean and not an inland sea—was to become the most important economic factor of that civilisation which is seemingly drawing to a close in the chaotic Europe which we see around us to-day. The counties of the old Graeco-Roman civilisation lost their relative importance. France, Holland, Spain and above all the British Islands gleamed in the limelight and when, at a later day the Industrial Revolution, that most intense of influence in our own modern life, came in to institute a new order of National values, it was seen that all Europe was to be altered by fresh factors and forces. "Things" as Emerson put it "are in the saddle" and up to the present day they still claim to rule mankind. The first effect of the Industrial Revolution, indeed, was to make Great Britain and not Rome the leading state and ultimately the most influential in the European continent. The possession of minerals and raw materials and not altogether the size that came from the absence of obstacles in a great plain, was now to become the gauge of a country's relative importance. Thus it came about that coal was the secret of the sudden uprising of the British Empire into place and power.

It is in this way we account for the remarkable consciousness of power and security which had won its way to the British Islands during the reign of Queen Victoria. The

more we begin to question ourselves on this subject the more our surprise is increased. The country was a comparatively small country and as it was an island, its bounds were absolutely fixed. All attempts to gain a solid footing in France, which would make light of the sea barrier had ended in failure. Its armed forces were almost negligible as Lord Wolseley once revealed in an essay summing up the military preparation of the Victorian epoch and, owing to the system of linked battalions, a large part of what forces were available had to be stationed abroad. Yet Great Britain held her place owing to her immense quantities of coal. Other countries were thereby held in a sort of economic inferiority. From our little island there came the pattern of that industrial civilisation which from Europe was to make its mark for good or evil on the texture of the whole world. A whole host of new ideas and inventions came forth from the brains of craftsmen among the British people. They became the pioneers of railway and sea transport, King Cotton started his reign in the looms of Lancashire. In all that for a large part of the future was to make a nation influential and great, the British Islands at first possessed an absolute monopoly. That gave the country the prestige and the appearance of unchallengable power which seemed to make it vain for the legions of the plain to hope to prevail against her. Spain, Holland and France, which had been elevated into a pride of Empire place by their proximity to the Atlantic were successively deposed as colonising powers and Great Britain in concert with Colonies, that were afterwards to become Dominions, invented that British Commonwealth of Nations which shewed that in the latter days of a great civilisation the Ocean had been compelled to yield up its claim to set an insuperable barrier to the increased size of a nation. Before this new invention the nation-state of modern civilisation had already been founded on territorial contiguity. The history of Prussia before and after Frederick the Great is the effort not only to gain fresh contiguous

territory but to make contiguous the territory which it had already gained. Great Britain showed that if you can sustain a claim to be the mistress of the sea you can make yourself independent of the mere possession of territorial contiguity.

But what about these changes produced by the Industrial Revolution so far as they affected the peace of Europe? To some extent they enabled Great Britain, during most of the course of the nineteenth century, to assume the role of the guardian of European peace. It was a standing axiom of her policy that the British Navy should be equal to any two of the navies that could possibly be brought against her, and this possession of a relatively powerful fleet made it possible to mobilise a large effective power at any part near the sea where a disturbance of the balance of Europe was seen to be imminent. As regards the two great nations of the plain, however, Russia and Germany, this power of the British Fleet was comparatively ineffective. This was especially so in the case of Russia which consisted of a huge flat of land-locked territory which could never be subdued by the onrush of merely naval forces. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the nations of the plain, Russia and Germany, were cheek-by-jowl with each other since Poland had been previously partitioned by one of the outstanding crimes of history. But the Partitions of Poland only showed still more clearly what has been already noted—that Poland is not some adventitious space of land to be cut up anyhow, but that she had and still has a distinctive individuality and culture which rendered it impossible for either Russia and Germany to assimilate or subdue a people so spiritually constituted. This was especially so in the case of Russia where the contrast with Poland was the contrast between an eastern and a western cast of mind. Try as the two empires of the plain always did to curb the spirits of their Polish subjects, these remained ever an irredentist element, at times bursting forth in revolutionary ardour, but always a source of disruption to those who tried

to enslave them. Besides, as the nineteenth century developed this contiguity of Russia and Germany showed its baleful consequences as respects the tranquillity of Europe. Russia was long in developing industrially, in fact, it is only now that, as the U.S.S.R., she occupies a primary position in respect of her combined industrial and agricultural strength. But her wide spaces, her enormous populations, the thought of millions of men on the march against her eastern frontiers, by the very constraint of their sheer size, exercised a disturbing influence on the population of Germany and in the events that preceded the War of 1914 it was plain that a sudden start of Russian mobilisation made its mark on the mind of Kaiser Wilhelm II, on whose autocratic decision depended the issues of peace or war. Indeed, in the excited mentality of the whole German community before 1914, as also in the Hitlerite Germany of to-day, Russia has always hovered as an unwieldy and over-fed monster of the Frankenstein species. A monster too, which might at any time satisfy its voracious instincts by destroying all that was most distinctive in Germany.

Yet although it was only at the very close of the nineteenth century, hampered as she was in her wide spaces by the paucity of transport that Russia began to develop the distinctive potencies which were the result of the Industrial Revolution. It cannot be denied that throughout the later years of Victorian Britain there was a real and hurtful pre-occupation with such a colossus. As has been already remarked the British Fleet could not easily get at her and in the Crimean War, Britain and France combined had to be satisfied with an inconclusive campaign in the Crimea. There can be no doubt however, that Western Europe gazed with an uneasy eye on the Russian intrigues in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean as her diplomats strove to get her away from her ice-bound rivers to the open sea. Sometimes it was towards the Black Sea and the Dardanelles that her efforts appeared to be bent, and then the Jingoës of that hectic time set up a great shout, crying with

all their might that the Russian bear would never win a way to Constantinople. Even when a Berlin Congress set bounds to Russian energies in the European east, British public opinion was not lulled to anything like tranquillity. From the East of Europe the gaze of the directors of British policy was shifted to Afghanistan. Most disturbing tales were told of the activity of Russian agents in the lands bordering on our Indian Empire. But though Afghanistan for a time occupied in Britain a big corner of the day there still remain a most disturbed concern for the condition of Turkey, denominated most appropriately the "Sick Man of Europe." A sick man could never be trusted to attend to the sluices and so the torrent might any day gush to the detriment of Europe.

This was not however at that time, owing to the fact that Russia had not developed real industrial strength nor had adequately participated in the consequences of the Industrial Revolution. Still, on the economic side Russia always commanded respect seeing she is the biggest of the agricultural countries on the east of Europe and her Ukraine is one of the great wheat producing areas of the world. This predominance of the peasant in agriculture throughout the east of Europe is a point which is often overlooked, yet it must seriously be kept in mind whenever we are planning for a free Europe in the days to come. Europe must cater for the peasant as well as for the proletariat. The proletariat—a product of the Industrial Revolution—are gregarious. They have learned to endure the contact of their kind amid the crowded machines of the factory. They can more readily be reduced to the humbler position of the merely mass mind. But the peasant loves his solitary clearing. His life is an individualistic conflict with the uncertainties of sun and tempest. He is not readily susceptible to the blandishments of the mass charmer as Lenin found out to his cost. He can be broken but he cannot easily be bent. That was why the Bolsheviks took care, in a first strictly artificial Constitution, to give a larger number of votes to their

smaller industrial proletariat than they did to their larger peasant communities. But the peasant is not to be held back. He lets those who would set out to reform him exhaust their energies, and then he peeps out of his holding to go on as he did before. That is why a statesman should hesitate when in planning for a new Europe, he considers handing over a province mainly inhabited by peasants to a country whose policy is mainly dictated by industrial requirements and needs. In the heyday of German Socialism the Marxist Bebel was confronted from the side of agriculture by the Bavarian Von Vollmar.

Naturally it was not possible for the Russian peasant until the twentieth century to find scope for anything like an urge to individuality. When the nineteenth century started the country was agriculturally a nation of serfs. Even when the serfs became nominally free they were still curbed by a multitude of disabilities, from the exercise of their manhood. In the Bolshevik days, too, they were largely overawed by the superior prestige of industrial power. For Russia has industrial resources, and if we regard not simply its present promise but its future possibilities, it may well be regarded as second to none among the nations of the world. The immense extent of its territory gives it a preliminary and most formidable advantage. As we have seen in the present war it is no longer dependent on its European resources. In the regions beyond the Urals in its illimitable Asiatic territories, there are to be found abundance of iron, coal, copper, aluminium, lead, asbestos, manganese, potash, gold, silver, platinum, zinc and oil. Before the age of the railway, such a vast country was unable to profit from such undoubted industrial advantages by the paucity and inefficiency of its means of communication. Many of its streams which would have formed the cheapest means of transport, were frozen over during the winter. The middle and upper reaches of its great distinguishing river, the Volga, were useless from this cause during one hundred and forty to one hundred and sixty days throughout the whole

year. It was the inventive genius of the people of Britain that changed all this. The railways which spread from this little island over the whole world in the train of the Industrial Revolution made possible for the first time a method of communication which was the first step towards a practical annihilation of distance, though even the quicker communication between the various parts of the Russian Empire could not be effected at all during certain seasons of the year.

Time, however, was necessary to mature all this, and it is only in recent days that distance has lost most of its disabilities. It is true that, before the end of the century, Moscow was linked with Vladivostock on the Pacific by the Trans-Siberian line—a distance of between six thousand to seven thousand miles. Still on the whole, the Russia of pre-Bolshevik days must be pronounced a laggard in the industrial race, for even when its railways were first laid down, it was for strategical rather than for commercial purposes. On the other hand Germany when she once started to follow the example of Britain laid down her railways with astonishing expedition. It is true that, here also, the needs of the military caste were prominently in the foreground, but at the same time these railways served the purpose of cementing her industrial strength. She began even to forge ahead of Britain in the exploitation of essential minerals. Her commerce, too, prospered exceedingly. She was definitely crowding out Britain in the search for the most profitable markets of the world. That she flung away all these advantages in 1914, at the behests of a military autocracy, only shews that lack of political insight and good sense which, in spite of all its versatility, efficiency and cleverness has continually marked the German character.

Yet before this period of temporary eclipse which was ushered in by the settlement of Versailles, Germany had shown that she was still capable of continuing the restlessness of the crusading knights of the Cross. It has been already pointed out that the Russian menace was a prominent subject of alarm

in Great Britain in the otherwise complacent days of Queen Victoria. Before 1914 there was a similar expectation that something dread and terrible was to be expected from Russia's formidable neighbour on the plain. These were the days, for example, of the projection of a Berlin-Baghdad railway, which would at once threaten the security of a British way to India, and at the same time forestal Russia in an adventure towards the open sea. It was not that economic considerations were openly placed in the forefront of German demands for the future. You may read all the Blue Books and White Books and Red Books, or the books of any other hue that were published after 1914 to explain the initiation of the war, and see no trace of the income of economics into the manipulation of national policy. But, on closer inspection into the real contours of events, there you would find it, the economic urge plainly pushing at the background of events though it only became practically effective if it chanced to fall in with the policies of the military caste. So it was that Hitler fed his mind in "Mein Kampf" with other than the material of economics though all the time the German industrialists were watching his movements, and they came in at last with their cash to help him in the belief that they would thereby be fulfilling their own campaign to give Germany a better economic place in the sun. That does not mean that these German revolutions are simply to be surveyed from the standpoint of an economic interpretation of history. It may be true that the trader follows the soldier or the missionary, but the trader must not occupy our whole line of vision and Hitlerism is a great deal more than a phenomenon of what is termed a decadent phase of civilisation.

Certainly the Industrial Revolution did not remove the menace to Europe from the nations of the plain. It had only modified its nature and direction. In earlier days the plain had been peopled by a large and motley variety of tribes. These tribes, helped by the mobility of the plain were

scrambling and pushing at each other. The Teuton, succoured by the Knights of the Cross in the sacred name of religion, well nigh exterminated the Prussian and when the heathen Prussian was exterminated and his name appropriated he turned his energies less effectively against the Slav. That is to say, and when the Teutonic tribes coalesced to form the nucleus of states, they still retained, here again favoured by the nature of the ground, the restless spirit of the nomad. As Caesar put it from his own experience, the Teutonic tribes did not take kindly to the idea of being penned in a definite territory where they could settle down calmly and at ease. They must be up and away. If for one season they were in one space of ground, in another season they had wended to another. If their present habitat was spare and scanty or if they were pushed on in the scramble of their neighbourhood behind them, they inevitably found their way to the sunny south and to those Mediterranean lands where an ampler fare awaited them. What the Industrial Revolution did was to put the plain in a more favourable position to assemble its resources. Railways penetrated the length and breadth of Germany. More slowly, and yet in the end more and more surely, these same railways made less unwieldy the overgrown girth of Russia. And this improvement of communications once started went rolling on like a ball down a slope. First the motor, and then more conspicuously the aeroplane, made it possible for Russia to pass speedily from Europe to Asia or to defy the rigours of the Arctic.

Indeed, so decided was the initial impact of the Industrial Revolution on the relative primacy and importance of nations, that, in our own times nations have come to be regarded according to their economic importance, or the amount of raw materials which are contained in the territories which they rule, or over which they exercise some sort of constraining power. Smaller states are at a discount because unlike their more giant neighbours they have not been able to add land

to land or to prevent land which is rich in mineral wealth from being forcibly filched from their sway. It did not matter whether these smaller states were rich in historical memories or were possessed of a culture which the world should never willingly let die. Things were really now in the saddle and the influence of Marxism as its tenets were trumpeted over Europe at the instance of the Russian Revolutionists was all in favour of a purely economic interpretation of history. The economics of Ricardo, which was one of the inspirations of Marx, was based on the free competition of individuals and accordingly on a hedonistic conception of ethics. Marx, who related the individual to Society in the Communist Manifesto, changed the economic war of individuals into an economic war of the two classes, into which he proposed, somewhat arbitrarily, to divide the whole seething mass of interests, societies, religious, artistic and other brotherhoods, and all the rest of the associations which contribute the complex social organisation which we behold around us to-day. History with its Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos is stronger however than Marx, and history as it has evolved up to our own times has given more prominence to the struggles and competition of nations than to the struggles and competition of classes. So it came about that the nations of the plain grew ever more great and mercenary because by successive organisations and acquisition of territories, they had partitioned Poland and were seen to be in possession of enormous economic strength. German Kultur became something materialistic, instead of, as often before, a philosophy of idealism. In the quest for the raw material of industry such as coal, iron and steel, Germany, to the alarm of British industrialists, began in the later years of the nineteenth century to catch up and overpass Great Britain. In 1920 it was estimated that British coal reserves amounted to just over 4 per cent. of the world's coal reserves as compared with 10 per cent. which could be laid to the credit of Central Europe. As for Russia she is now

possessed of enormous stretches of territory and she still longs for more. Sir John Maynard, whose book on Russia ("The Russian Peasant and other Studies") is the best and most discriminating that has been issued in this country, speaks of the Russian peasant as having "the restlessness of the nomad in his blood" and at another place as "a peasant in whom the nomad survived till yesterday, as much at home in Asia as in Europe." The present war and the bursting forth of the Russian hosts on Europe must have revived and reinvigorated this natural tendency in the blood. These territories including still untapped stretches of Soviet Asia, are possessed of enormous economic wealth, and when one takes into account both agricultural and industrial power and potency it can safely be prophesied that if not to-day, at least the day after to-day, Russia will stand first among the nations of the world in overpowering economic strength and in the consequent potentiality of aggression.

In all this grading of nations according to their adventitious economic strength there is a large amount of unfairness and gratuitous credit given to the caprices of fortune. It is not through sheer merit or inventive cleverness on the part of a nation's people that it finds valuable minerals on its native soil. Often it is the result of the most naked and unblushing imperialistic aggression that it stands possessed of the territories over which it now rules in chief. Indeed the economic strength which comes to a nation from this cause may be termed the unearned increment in modern nationalistic politics. Indispensable in all efforts after political influence, and in achieving success in the sorry game of power politics, is the possession or at any rate the unfettered access to raw materials. Obviously if you have such raw materials within your own domains and subject to your own jurisdiction you are in a dominating position over your neighbour who has to say "By your leave" if he wants such minerals and thus you become little more than a beggar dependent on the patronising

charity of others. It is Hobsons choice ; nothing more nor less. Either you become a beggar or a captive. If you do not possess the industrial strength to manipulate modern warfare you must submit to become a principal exhibit in your enemy's triumphal procession at the end of a war where he has been from the first in possession of all the trumps. Yet, as has already been noticed, it is the simple accident of territorial possession, and not any faculty of industrial invention or achievement, that determines whether a nation is in possession of these indispensable requisites of industry. If such possession is left unregulated in the future, or resigned to the competitive give and take of the market, one nation can, by the mere operation of quite undeserved chance, become the dominant influence in the life of another nation whose standard of values, whose culture and traditions, are radically different from the more territorially extensive power. In other words if you look at the future of Europe from an unregulated economic standpoint alone it would automatically become the prey of a few prominent industrial hegemonies. How could Russia fail, for example, to become other than the practical dictator of all the adjacent and smaller countries in Central and Eastern Europe, thus realising its ambition to make a way to the open sea of the Mediterranean ?

This is the result of enthroning Marxism as the predominant factor in the progress of nations along with that economic interpretation of history which has been deduced, as a principal legacy from his writings, by the great practical power and immense versatility of Lenin. Economics deals with measurable quantities of goods and reserves. If I have too much, you have too little. As it has been practised in these later years, radically unplanned and delivered over in the main to the tender mercies of only partially regulated competition, it has more or less acknowledged the sinister ethics of the jungle. Life is a scramble and a pitiful game of grab. There is a deterioration in human existence when the object of one is to gain a few

ducats in a commercial deal with another. Profit, whenever there is an opportunity, easily degenerates into profiteering. The white in a time of war can readily become the black market. And when economics is enthroned as a preponderant influence in the life of nations, the future of the world becomes a sordid scramble for economic advantage. "The race is to the swift and the battle to the strong." Politics emerge as power politics. In the individual competitive life of economics you can lead your competitor astray if thereby you carry through a favourable deal. In the national competitive life you can ignore or dis-own a treaty of non-aggression if thereby you can secure your economic dominance over a smaller and less favourably situated country.

What is the remedy for all this? The answer can only be found by taking into consideration the points to be elaborated in the next chapter, where politics come in to reinforce and correct the point of view of economics. The favourite economics of the Industrial Revolution was an economics unconnected with politics. The less the state interfered in economic affairs the better for all concerned. The distinguishing feature of the later days that have preceded our own time has been the emergence of the state, the political organ of society as a transforming and corrective influence in economic affairs. Indeed, the most outstanding question for the period succeeding the end of the war is how to adjust the relations between economics and politics, so that economic wrongs may be remedied by political methods and that any hitch or delay in the application of the remedy need not necessarily involve a revolt against the overruling political power. For at all costs the main configuration of the social order must be preserved intact and immovable. To tamper with the basis of social security means complete chaos and disorder; and complete chaos and disorder mean the entire blotting out of a whole civilisation.

CHAPTER IV

THE POWER OF POLITICS

Up to the present stage of the narrative no sufficiently comprehensive or unifying principle has emerged to offer any adequate guarantee for a free Europe in the future. In the last chapter indeed, we have found that the tendencies were rather to create big powers which would lord it over the smaller ones. Under the sway of economic facts and forces especially as these have revealed themselves in the Industrial Revolution, the nations in Europe have roughly merged themselves into two classes, those who are in the possession of conspicuous industrial power and those who are not so gifted. Those who boasted of this plethora of industrial power which made them dominant in modern warfare were called Great Powers ; the remnant were called the Little Powers. It was largely, as has already been remarked, a matter of chance and not of merit or even of inventive genius that the Great Powers found themselves enthroned in such a commanding position. One had territory with some of the important raw materials of industry ; and one had not, or only to a very much smaller degree. Generally the possessing powers had as evidence of their power a large expanse of diversified territory or if not characterised by its extent, their smaller territory, rich in minerals, was distinguished by a much greater intensity of population to the square mile. In the process by which this industrial hegemony was acquired, King Chance had thus in almost every case assumed a conspicuous role. It is instructive to follow in the pages of the old Chronicles the way which the different nations of Europe were enabled to reach their present shape. Out of the competing and various

lordships of the feudal period new centres of administrative organisation began gradually to form themselves. Sometimes it was a lucky marriage that brought land some day to become most valuable into the possession of a feudal chief who knew nothing of this potential value. Sometimes it was a ruthless and unscrupulous act of aggression which enabled a robber chieftain to acquire domain which now is regarded as country of old renown. Sometimes it was a skilful treaty arrangement, depending on an estimate of the survival value of two historically important lives. But one thing is certain that in the case of land which is now the most economically valuable, it was not its economic value or an anticipation of its economic value which put it in the way of descending to the nation state of which its minerals to-day form the most lucrative possession. This economic value is what Marx would have termed a "Mehrwert," something added as a sort of adventitious bonus and which you get in the habit at some future time of regarding as your indubitable right.

Of course as we approach our own time, indeed all through the nineteenth century, it is possible to detect an economic influence in the struggle of European nations for fresh territories or markets. But even then, if we are to judge from the evidence of diplomatic dispatches it was not exclusively economic motives that were the animating spirit of those who initiated what was termed a movement of imperialism. When a nation becomes imperialistic it is always because the military caste are in the saddle and the military caste, having no great opinion of the "frocks" in the form of merchants or hagglers in material gain, were unlikely to centre their policy on any shuffling about of filthy lucre. It happened, of course, that when they were making up their mind for some fresh operations of their armies the big business magnate gained access to them and whispered some information to their Kaiser which reinforced a previous inclination and made them all happier at the thought of killing two birds with one stone.

In many cases, too, these big business men came in to finance the military operations, when it was plain that the military operation was going to serve their business interests. But it was generally other motives that were initially placed in the forefront as governing any aggressive action that disturbed the harmony of nations, i.e., national prestige, the desire for domination, the conviction of being a Herrenfolk, the demand for *Liebensraum*, or even that adventurous craving, that lust for seeking fresh adventures in voyages across the sea that has played such an epoch-making part in the foundation of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations.

All this is, of course, very true but, though it governs the operation of the economic motive, it ought not to veil from us the fact that in these later years the economic motive has been making itself more and more prominent and interfering with the democratic development of the nation state. It is as if the system known as Capitalism was struggling for markets, at a time when the markets were gradually growing less profitable, and was determined to make a big bid to increase its influence before the time became too late. What we are here concerned with, however, is the result and not the process; and the result has been that, after the Industrial Revolution had run its course, we find Europe divided up into a series of nation states, some larger and some smaller, some with big industrial potentialities and some with little else than the possibility of cultivating their own Mother Earth. Yet this result was not achieved, as has been shewn earlier, because these bigger countries had shewn more genuine enterprise and activity but mainly because they were lucky enough to have found within their territories a large amount of the raw materials of heavy industry. That gave them industrial hegemony and, as their industrial strength enabled them to turn out more of the munitions necessary in modern warfare, and as their great extent of territory made it possible as well to supply more men for a modern battlefield, it was feasible for them to establish

a relationship between themselves and other smaller states which partook very much of the attitude of the superior to the inferior. To that extent the pre-war Europe did not appear to satisfy that postulate of some degree of equality between its constituent parts which, as has been seen in the opening chapter is necessary if we are to end with a Europe which is in any sense completely free. It is necessary to examine more closely into what follows from this situation because Europe has introduced its industrial civilisation into nearly the whole world and if Europe by such an operation has become very far from free, it follows that a similar deterioration may have been induced in all the rising industrial communities of the world.

At any rate the result did not seem to favour and, in fact, has not favoured, any real stability in the relations of the European states amongst themselves. The later nineteenth century in Europe was distinguished by the reinforcement of the economic motive by national ambitions, and by a development of what was termed the "struggle for markets." That meant that economic considerations were being installed in the central hall of the state and the different nations were competing against one another, however they might veil it, for any market in which they could dispose of that stock which they had been unable to sell in their own internal markets. That has already been pointed out did not by any means imply that economists had become all important in the economy of pre-war Europe. The diplomat of the older school did not relish the supersession of his household gods. But on the whole, sometimes to a larger, sometimes to a smaller degree, the tendency was to make the state an agent in the prosecution of economic plans and projects. Consuls were appointed to forward in foreign countries the interests of the countries they represented. Blue books were published, purporting to shew to the industrialists of different countries why, in the opinion of these consular authorities, they were

not so successful as they might have been in the world struggle for markets. The hope was expressed that they might profit by these failures and with the help and counsel of the state work their way to some outstanding success in the future. In some cases, however, this interposition of the state in commerce became more overt and menacing. If the Civil Servant of the older type were convinced that it would strengthen the prestige of his country he might even be prepared to second the operations of his trader by the dispatch of a gunboat.

Hence and to the extent that Europe was submitting to the entertainment of economic hopes and motives the grim principles of the "struggle for existence," were being introduced into international affairs. The race was to be won by the industrially swift, the battle by the industrially strong. Indeed, if economics is to be the chief or directing instrument in the co-ordination of international affairs, then the history of Europe will, and must be, a history where the bigger states reduce the smaller states to some sort of economic subjection and when the bigger states will struggle bitterly against one another in their attempt to possess themselves of these economic goods which are then reckoned the supreme possessions of their national life. How could any Europe which could remain permanently free be reached by such a heartless struggle? If I require a bale of cloth and you hold the approaches by which that bale can be reached, you and I necessarily pass through the several grades of belligerency. We are then under the domination of blind and dangerous forces which may well push us forward to our own undoing. There was too much of this unhappy condition of affairs in the Europe of the twentieth century. At such a time there obtrudes no unifying power which works in and through the national life and binds its constituent elements in a bond of harmonious friendship. Economists, where the wish was father to the thought, have sometimes discerned throughout economic plans and strivings the operation of an "unseen

hand," which is overruling the rivalry of such economic competition according to the established pattern of some definite game. But for all the operation of the "unseen hand" we can always discover the same disruptive tendencies in modern nations which are due to the operation of this economic belligerency and which are dignified by the name of Power politics. "Big fishes eat the little fishes," according to the old saying and "the little fishes eat mud." The only remedy that the industrialist can suggest for such a state of affairs is to regulate the international competition by the creation of international cartels. For that is how the industrial movement develops—it very soon passes beyond Europe and becomes a struggle for the world's markets. The creation of an industrial proletariat with wages settled by the "higgling" of such a market means wages which create no adequate army of consumers to absorb a nation's industrial products, and so the industrial Europe has necessarily overflowed into Asia and Africa. It is a sick and struggling world that must be the issue of it all, a world fundamentally at cross purposes when a projected railway from Berlin to Baghdad chances to interfere with the plans and projects of some other nation and where all Europe is in an excited nervous condition because of what any day may bring forth as the result of the search for territorial gain. One of the most outstanding requisites of the Atlantic Charter is no longer forthcoming. Europe rocks uneasily. There is no sense of security anywhere. Great plans for the world's future are produced and the nations play with them. Disarmament is mooted as a means of saving the world, but when the statesmen of Europe look in each others' faces it is seen that the last thing in the world they feel justified in doing is to be good and lay down their arms. A man may offer his right cheek to the smiter when his left has been violently smacked—that is his individual affair and responsibility—but when he is the trustee for a whole nation he dare not run the risk of leading his people in a straight path to glorious suicide.

What is the remedy? Surely there never was a time when it was more necessary than at present to lay a hand on Europe's pulse and to say where it aileth, here, there, or at some other part or place. And it is just here, when the outlook for Europe appears the darkest, that politics in the real and highest sense of the acceptation of that term comes in to save the situation and to substitute for the lust of gain and domination a more ethereal balm of unity and concord which is calculated to heal up the aching wounds. That means that the modern tendency in Europe which can be generally summed up under the name of Hitlerism is a reaction rather than an inevitable development. It is an attempt to turn politics back into the realm of economics where all other peoples are to be hewers of wood and drawers of water to some great master race. It strives to make of the political assemblies of the master race itself, where such political assemblies are suffered to assemble at all, only a replica of the typical Directors' Meeting where, as we are often assured, there is no time lost in useless debate but where the whole meeting comes to a conclusion in double quick time. While, as regards the super-men and super-women of this master race itself they are supposed to have no independent centre of individual life to react against the most transparently misleading propaganda. The methods of commercial advertising are introduced into the inmost sanctum of political management. There is only one wisp of hay offered to the Ass of Buridanus.

Very different is this from the method of politics as we find it manifested in the latest result of our own civilisation the appearance of the Democratic Nation-state. There the individual has a certain mystic significance—he has a possibility which ought not to be violated—he should never be treated as you might safely treat your paraphernalia of goods and chattels. He has a centre of life from which he can react against your approaches. He can be convinced but he cannot be driven. His political assemblies should never be assimilated to a meet-

ing of shareholders, summoned simply to endorse a previous decision which, by the operation of proxies, is certain to be ultimately carried. He should not be spoon fed as in Soviet Russia, or stunned into acquiescence as in Hitlerite Germany. He may make himself very disagreeable at times. Your best laid schemes may be destined for a long time to slumber on the shelf. But you have to give and take. You have to let his mind work into the interstices of your own until, as the result of individualities which naturally interpenetrate each other, a social mind is formed and this social mind is more than the simple addition of a number of individual minds. Each of these individual minds has rather something to contribute. It is only by active cooperation of all that the really creative social mind is formed. Tolerance for each other's opinion—a genuine desire to meet and compromise—these lie at the very root of the political spirit. The Democratic Nation-state, where the real national spirit is most characteristically developed, is prouder of its spiritual heritage, its literature and its historical traditions, its finest days, its religion and culture, than it is of the number of its bales of cotton or other material possessions. But such a pride is not a pride that estranges. It is a pride that can draw Europe together rather than blast it apart. The great historical memories of one nation in Europe can enrich all the rest. Shakespeare is read not in one country of Europe alone. And a nation can only effectively develop a national will out of this social consciousness, if its centre of independent life is not violently invaded, but rather if its relation to other nations is, as we shall hereafter see, safeguarded by those great ideas of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, which will lead the way to a free Europe. These at any rate are the questions which are really fundamental in the politics of the Democratic State.

Also when you deal with the Democratic-Nation state which is bravely playing its part in suffering the light of a distinctive culture to irradiate over the rest of Europe, you do not necessarily deal with a state enormous in its size. A most glorious

page of the literary history of Germany was opened in one of her smaller compartments. Indeed the small state is the most likely field for the cultivation of that responsibility of personal life and decision, which, as has been seen, is the characteristic of political influence in this state development. Bales of cotton may need big freighters for their carriage, and the Captain of heavy industry may need the world for his cartel, but a genuine nation state needs a limited domain which each individual feels he is playing a part and thus nourishing and perfecting his independent spirit of individuality. Yet his individuality is no individuality that repels or warns all intruders away from it in the sacred name of its own individual rights. The institutions of a democratic state are the possession of all in that particular state. The Parthenon at Athens could be gazed on even by the resident alien. If a state were really great simply by the possession of huge aggregations of territory then would there be smaller opportunity for the cultivation of a really free and independent life. The individual would be oppressed by the community. The mass mind would emerge. The constituency election would become the plebiscite. The big state, if it is to arise from bigness to greatness, must have its smaller constituent parts where the flame of nationhood is nourished and the people of which feel that, though federated in a whole, they yet preserve all the individuality of their spiritual and cultural life.

Politics, it is now evident, arises in the state and the state consists of population and territory. In the ancient Greek civilisation we see it emerging in the reforms of Cleisthenes, who superseded the ancient ties of blood relationship by one which was founded on the simple juxtaposition of neighbourhood. In the history of early European civilisation we behold Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, breaking away from the anarchy of a world of particular feudalities and cementing themselves into national states on territories that, in their larger outlines, become comparatively fixed and stable. But,

in its earlier developments the state of earlier European history was the state of Bodin, not the nation state of pluralist state or federated states which we see around us to day. It was the skeleton of executive power and administrative constraint which had to be clothed with intimate national memories and aspirations before it could manifest the vitality of reproductive life. It was formed because some King or feudal lord managed to impose himself on others and to reduce these others to some sort of feudal inferiority to himself. Of course, in most cases, the result was not quite so simple as that; for even the man who came to the top could be involved in all sorts of relations to others which might seem to affect judgment of his ultimate status. At the same time and owing to the religious struggles of the period of the Reformation there dawned on Europe a more intense realisation of the individual—the individual not entirely merged in an organisation, or a mere tool in complicated machinery, but one who possessed a soul to be individually saved and who was capable of criticising or at any rate discussing any “plan of salvation” which might be offered to his attention. Yet the religious organisation in its turn was subject to the outbreak of all sorts of difficulties and divisions and only the King was regarded as really free, set upon a throne to keep everything in order in the name of the “King’s Peace.” Where the main tie of relationship is based on neighbourhood there is no guarantee of any natural disposition to agree and so a fount of law and order which is itself above the law has to be brought in as a sort of *Deus ex machinâ*.

The European Renaissance, in this way, came to develop its national state first on the basis of law. It was not an entirely secular state for, as the religious troubles ran their course, each state was seen to have a national religion which reared its “mitred front in Courts and Parliaments.” Only the Church of Rome retained its international character. The King or Head of such a state was also the fountain of law. Originally the litigants brought their troubles and differences before him

and he came to a decision generally on the basis of the customs which had been handed down to his peoples by their fathers. When his realism became too expansive or complicated for him to declare the rule of law in his own person he had his officers who passed round the realm in circuit or exercised legal duties on his behalf at the centre of his power. Even at this centre of affairs then, he had to act through Judges who were supposed to have fathomed his imperial will. We can see how all this functioned when we consider the growth of the English Common Law. The deputy Judge, confronted with a fresh case took into account what the King had decreed in a case as nearly as possible similar. His own decision in turn became the starting point of a series of precedents which were gradually held to produce the exact rule which was applicable exactly to the case in hand.

The defect of this procedure was that it had no dynamic power. It searched for its precedents in the past. It had no constant gaze on the future. It sought its paradise in some ancient Gardens of the Hesperides. It had no stake in a coming Bourne of the Blest. Not that it was for ever barred from making some great contribution towards better days to come. There is, for example, such a thing as "Judge made law." That means that, if you scan the legal operation closely, the judge makes practically a new contribution to the precedents each time he emits a judgment on particular facts laid before him. No case is precisely the same as any other case. The facts may all be of somewhat the same style or kind as many which have been brought to the attention of his tribunal before. But life has many twists and turnings. It proliferates in all kinds of unforeseen ways. One little outgrowth here, one little change in proportions there, and the whole may present a real difference to anything that has happened in the past. The judge is only possessed of his old rules, but the old rules have somehow to be applied to the new cases. The result is that, in the sacred name of the past, we are in reality presented with a

new creation. But this dynamic tendency is never openly admitted. Indeed it is curbed and confined by many canons of judgment, lest, perchance, it might break away and turn to revolutionary ways. The law of the judiciary is always static, it is an assumed recapitulation of the past. In the Roman civilisation, when it became necessary for the Praeter Peregrinus to deal with a non-Roman population he had to evolve a *Jus Gentium* which at first was a supposed selection from the laws of the different peoples who submitted to his judgment, but which afterwards was defended as a *Jus Naturale* or law founded on natural reason, which stood behind all law, and which therefore could be assumed as a kind of norm which could be applied to test the worth of validity of all the different codes of law. In the hands of Rousseau, as Sir Henry Maine has taught us, this legal conception became the revolutionary doctrine of the "noble savage" who in the pride of that old nobility was quite evidently rebuking the present degenerate state of affairs.

All this, however, shows that legal assumption and precedents are not fitted to present us with that mediating principle which will heal the wounds of the body politic and present us ultimately with a free European Continent. In these latter days, indeed a reform movement has arisen among legal commentators such as Pound and Cardozo which aims at bringing legal judgments into line, not simply with past precedents, but with new and mightier forces. Such a movement is much needed. Europe is sick unto death. Its parts are warring against one another. Commercial competition has been an influence to divide. Nationalism has been an influence to enslave. Law can adjust the differences of the old society. It can submit such differences to the judgment of a reasonable man. But much more than a patching up of the old is needed. The old must be completely recast before we can find our way to the new. That is why we must pass from the domain of the law to that of politics.

Why politics is fitted to help us is because it assumes the conscious control of man's common life. It, more than anything we have considered hitherto, is fitted to guide Europe into a new road when the old road has led to chaos and old night. Politics accordingly requires the postulate of some dominating end or purpose by reference to which the concrete historical situation may be amended or it may be totally recast. In biology we attain at last to the idea of organism where each part has its function, and where, by the interplay of this functional activity, a unity is attained which is more than simply the added sum of the activities of each of these separate parts. There have been those who have sought to apply literally such biological analogies to the growth of society, and to postulate a healthy organism, or at any rate a superorganism, as the most comprehensive description of what we should desire in a future free Europe. But such biological analogies, though they are undoubtedly in some ways suggestive, do not cope with all the intricate facts and forces with which we have to deal in the attempt to diagnose the maladies of any social organisation. It is better to name as our ideal a better adjusted and more peacefully working organisation of the nations of Europe where there is some self-acting principle that binds rather than estranges and where this self-acting principle accordingly suffices to bridge over any gaping discords. In such an organised unity, where the Democratic Nation-state is the result, each individual will have his part to play, each a definite function to fulfil, and no part will be esteemed before another part in honour. Likewise when we pass from the individual to the life of nations we find that the idea of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" as guaranteeing the freedom of a new Europe leads us inevitably to the postulation of the same principles for the reformation of continents which are an aggregation of states. Each state is a part of the whole, has its part to play in the whole, and no one state can be put in the position of destroying the harmony of the whole. So when

currents of new life are pulsing vigorously through the national veins there is a faculty of automatic healing. The organised unity reacts against attempts to disrupt it. It restores the balance by the exercise of its own dynamic and political power. In the same way when the states of Europe are connected in some free and spiritual union in a vitally organised whole it must be by the operation of a principle which does not like the unregulated economical or military motives, set one against the other, but by the common possession of a cultural, religious, artistic and historical heritages which, through the possession of one, can add to the possessions of all. In other words, the principle of "besting" one another as applied either to individuals and nations must give way in a really free Europe to a sense of working together for that free Europe in a contest where the fuller attainments of one mean an enriching of the attainments of all.

Of course if it was only at a late period of the world's history, and only in fact at a late period of our own civilisation, that this idea of Progress dawned upon the mind of Europe. Only if the people of a state themselves were sufficiently far advanced to be able to acquiesce with some sort of an understanding in the exercise of the dynamic power could anything like a complete transformation of the structure of the political organisation be mooted or attempted. Such a transformation indeed may be associated with the name of a good statesman, as was that of Mustapha Kemel with Turkey or that of Sun Yat Sen with China. Yet that does not mean that the new ideas and impulses were solely the product of a single industrial brain. The individual is only the vehicle of a developing social purpose which is fascinated by the idea of revivifying a state old and outworn, or of putting an end to a condition of things which have made the nations of Europe one host encamped against another.

When the power of effecting such a transformation emerges, it means that the executive and administrative state of the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has become the democratic nation-state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The absolutist state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not bound together by any close or enduring national ties. It was as the Master of Balliol once defined it: "a wall or fence within which the really precious things of society are to have room to grow," and it was only at the end of a long period of time that these precious things escaped from the thralldom of meaner things which, like the weeds in a fertile ground, threatened to stifle them at the fount of life. The feudal relation was based on the possession of land, and the fact that you live on an adjacent plot to your neighbour does not justify you in assuming that you are one with him in spirit. When the land was limited by natural barriers, as in France or Spain, or by the sea, as in Great Britain, it formed a kind of limited mechanical unity and it was possible to let loose your sentiment upon it, as Shakespeare did in *Henry V*, and to proclaim that this soil is different from any other soil in the world. But such a sentiment, warm and inspiring as it may ultimately become, does not avail to give the community that dynamic power of transforming its own structure which is implied in the ultimate postulates of politics. To do this requires some free reactions among the peoples themselves as the ultimate source of all effective dynamic power, and it is when they are conscious of such an impelling common consciousness that they are obliged to consider the question how the good can be turned into the better life? That is to say and as Dr. Lindsay again expresses it, politics or the conscious control of man's common life, begins from the point "when in some concrete historical situation men begin arguing that the nature of the state requires that such should or should not be done." Distant traces, for example, of the future emergence of such a state of things can be found in the Putney discussions among the Ironsides in the days of Oliver Cromwell. The probing of these Puritan soldiers went far and deep, and it was motivated by

their challenging claim that "the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the richest he." This soldier's maxim in its turn may be applied to the international life of a free Europe by the proclamation that "the smallest nation in Europe has a life to live as the largest of them."

Yet it was only as late as the French Revolution that the capacity of change, this tendency to look to the future rather than the past for a more equitably developed community or, in our own day, for a more justly constituted Europe, was most decisively manifested. Many must still remember how vividly they felt when the first news of a revolution in autocratic Russia reached their ears, when they realised that a strongly entrenched fortress of reaction had at last fallen, that the Tsar had abdicated, that an old order was passing away within their living memory, and that the most distinct and powerful despotism in modern history was suffering the sceptre to be released from its trembling grasp. Yet this was only a prelude, a prelude which has reached its culminating result in the era of new constitutions and the total remoulding of the old Europe which has dawned upon us to-day. Nation-states of old renown lie before us, prostrate and trampled, and the new civilisation which, as the Phœnix from its ashes, must emerge on the ruins of the old has almost to change the former fabric of a state or of the society of states as by a bounteous fairy wand. No longer is it necessary to look back at the past models as our only exemplars and guides or to spend our days in poignant regrets for a vanished golden age. Peoples that are literally ground down by machines heavier and more powerful than the car or Juggernaut have never lost the hope of a new day dawning in which they can rise again unhurt and see the infernal machine fade away into the dim distance. North American states, beginning with the land which these Puritans made who sang the first songs of Liberty, emancipated themselves from the shaking hand of Britain and presented the world with the type of a new Federation of States, a union which, although its

constitution is tortured by too insistent an array of checks and counter-checks, has yet enriched the most precious possessions of all by the development of the free personality of each. Of course the French Revolution was born out of due time and developed into a military autocracy just as did the National Socialist Revolution, and as the Russian Revolution is quite appreciably in danger of becoming. Yet autocrat though he was, Napoleon did profess himself the soldier of the Revolution. In that capacity he exercised dynamic power through his legions and changed the whole face of the European continent. Forces long time suppressed were released. Peoples that had to speak their tongues in secret produced a literature which was destined to survive. The soul of Poland, in Acton's vivid phrase, went wandering over Europe, demanding to be united to its body and inspiring to high deeds of heroism the Polish soldiers who, on many soils of Europe and America, performed prodigies of valour. Polish culture, poets, painters, novelists lifted up their hearts in the darkest days of exile and furnished irrefragible proof that rooted national cultures are imperishable, that you cannot destroy a nation's spiritual life as you might its tanks and turbines—not even if you transport its painters and professors to be tortured to death in a foreign land. Mazzini, the prophet of this irresistible movement in the nineteenth century to renew the nations on the basis of their spiritual cultures, revived all those who were oppressed by the magic of his clarion call. "The map of Europe," he cried, "has to be re-made." "This is the key to the present movement. Herein lies the initiative. Before acting, the instrument for action must be organised. Before building the ground must be in our own possession. The social idea cannot be realised under any form whatsoever before this reorganisation of Europe is affected, before the peoples are free to interrogate themselves, to express their vocation, and to ensure its accomplishment by an alliance capable of substituting itself for the absolutist league which now reigns supreme."

What was the inspiration of this mighty movement which revealed the overwhelming and compelling power of the political principle in the reorganisation of nineteenth century Europe? Mazzini, who, most of all others fashioned its power, revealed its underlying force as the "principle of nationalities." It was the claim of every people who had developed a national culture with the historical and religious memories on a given territory to express the distinctive quality of their genius in their own institutions and laws. That is to say, the culture which bound this given people together was spiritual or ethical in its distinctive character, not like the German idea of Kultur which, at any rate since 1870, has had many more material and monopolistic implications. The real spiritual culture on the other hand is connective and not exclusive. It is calculated to bind rather than to lose. The more richly a country is endowed with the supremely ethical spirit the greater will be its contribution to the whole spiritual life of Europe. It is only thus that Europe can be completely restored and revived. Kultur which most characteristically finds its expression in technical inventions or in the power of rapidly improving big armaments is estranging rather than espousing. It makes one nation look with hardly veiled hostility at another. The people that find their chiefest pride in a big and well equipped army are soon conscious of a desire to see that big army tramping it out in the battle field. They are then well on the way to a desire for domination, a craven lust to reduce Europe to servitude rather than to enrich the world by a national life of service. Mazzini separated himself from Marx by the whole diameter of being in his opposition to the merely economic interpretation of history. If economic motives have been during the last few years only too plainly apparent as a combining and, in some cases, even an overruling force in the strategic enterprises of the nations, then the time has come to reassert the supremacy of the spirit, to become what Heine called himself a "Knight of the Holy Ghost".

Mazzini saw in the Europe of his own day the principle of nationalities revealing itself as mightier far than the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx. It was subverting mighty empires. It was shattering the rod of the spoiler.

The principle of Nationalities is, then, the principle that we seek. It is the great overruling idea which, if properly understood and developed, is fitter to draw Europe together in an intimate organic whole. Such a unity is not imposed by force, or temporarily achieved by the domination of one by the other, but a real union of hearts. Only it has to be Nationalities, and not Nationalism. There is all the difference in the world between the two. Nationalism is the exaggeration of the principle of nationalities. It is a certain variety of national life and organisation pushed so far that it develops all the symptoms of a disease. It reappears on the body politic as a sort of dangerous and cancerous growth which threatens to eat up all the other organs in order to satisfy its insatiable craving for more of their vital tissues on which to feed. There is nothing of that in the principle of nationalities. It is based on Freedom, the union of the nations; and freedom of the nations is only achieved by the application of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity to the national life of a continent. There is no real freedom for example in the economic life of a country where liberty simply means the liberty to starve. Such a mockery of the real indications of liberty generally means that there is no economic equality or nothing near it between the people of a nation-state. Some, in respect of the others, occupy a partition of entrenched advantage for, as Mr. Herbert Agar has once remarked, if you command a man's source of livelihood you ultimately command the man. Similarly the idea of Equality is perfectly inept and barren if you do not supplement it by the idea of Fraternity. "The nationality of the peoples," again says Mazzini, "can only be founded by a common effort and a common movement. Sympathy and alliance will be its result. In principle, as in the idea formerly laid

down by the men influencing every national party, nationality ought only to be to humanity that which the division of labour is in a workshop, the recognised symbol of association, the assertion of the individuality of a human group called by the geographical position, its traditions and its language, to fulfil a special function in the European work of civilisation."

Finally, fraternity between the nations becomes simply a spirit of superiority or at best something like charity or compassion, unless there is some degree of equality between those who fraternise. If one nation is immense in resources and territory and the other, though great in spirit, and in the ennobling poser of national individuality and historical memories has vastly less of material resources or power, it would soon be like the companions of Odysseus in the cave of Polyphemus. It would by its own act put itself in the power of the giant but it would only find at the end that it was destined to be swallowed up alive. It is of small avail that the giant begins by being benevolent; that he swears how much he desires your closer companionship. At long last, or as Thomas Carlyle used to say, "at the close of the account," you could discover that all your individual life could be pulped in his iron jaws.

"Man must not be taught," further advised Mazzini, "*To each according to his wants, or to each according to his passions, but rather to each according to his love.*" Real and lasting love, and the love of free men and women and free nations, rests on the firmest of bases in mutual giving and receiving. Here is then no relation of charity. The one parts to the other but their combined life is more intense and comprehensive because of what each has yielded to the other. Two nations desiring a really free union may part with some imaginary figment termed sovereignty, but it is only to scale the higher heights of international endeavour and to obtain a richer realisation of individuality by the combined interpenetration of each by the other.

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONALITIES

The result of the discussion so far has been to propound the principle of nationalities as an organising principle of unity, which is not only fitted to cement any individual European state, but which at the same time should impel them all to a wider union where the individuality of each enriches the common life of all. Such a union cannot be cemented by the ethics of strictly commercial competition which, when it becomes a principle of national policy, inevitably ranges men and nations as opponents rather than friends, and which is most vividly summed up in the Marxian dogma of the "class war." Ultimately, however, the foundation of the whole national and international structure of a free Europe rests on an emancipated and educated democracy and it is worth while at this stage to examine and elaborate further this conception of the ultimate source of power.

One thing is certain that the principle of nationalities started movements in Europe that sallied forth from strength to strength during the course of the nineteenth century. So strong indeed did this idea become in its energising power that it assumed the aspect of a proselitising religious movement. It is one of the ironies of history that just when submerged nationalities were blossoming out and revealing their hidden stores of tradition and patriotism, Marx and Engels were preaching a theory of the "economic interpretation of history," which indeed was helpful to Europe in so far as there was any disposition abroad to forget that the material life is the basis of the good life, but which, in its too exclusive emphasis on this material side of existence, was apt

to neglect these ethical facts and forces which in the last analysis supply the most forceful dynamic of history. Not that Marx was wholly unmindful of the call of nationalities or was deaf to the cry of the oppressed countries of Europe. It was the plight of Poland and the persecuting might of Russia that formed the subject of the most vigorous and appealing of the resolutions passed at that meeting near to Covent Garden where was laid the foundation of the first Socialist International. But on the whole, Marx had no use for the state. He saw progress as a necessary and fatal evolution from Capitalism to Socialism, where there was not the slightest need for human interference, and where the state, so far from being the operating agent in the progress, was only destined in the last resort gradually to wither into nothingness. Consequently he had no cause for ambitious programmes of reform. The practical proposals at the end of the Communist Manifesto would not have troubled the heart of any of the British Radicals of that particular epoch. You could nibble away a bit here and a bit there from the weakening body politic—such a course would do no harm if it did little good—but in general it was better to watch the process accomplishing its own end and setting up a stiff fight against all influences that were prone to obstruct and hinder it. Marxian Socialism from this angle is a kind of militant waiting on Providence and it was because they inherited too much of this lack of a real constructive tradition that the German Socialists exhibited such a sorry bankruptcy of inspiring programmes when their best opportunity came in 1918.

The state, however, is not to be snuffed out at the first breath of criticism and the subsequent evolution of events has revealed it emerging as the primary instrument of progress. Indeed, in the speculations of politics it has manifested itself as the organised system of administration and legislation which claims to guard and to guide all other organisations which may chance to function in a given territory. Yet it is not a

mere casual collection of disconnected units who happen to have pegged out their home on a certain definite portion of the earth's surface. As it finds its developed form in the Democratic Nation-state it is bound together indelibly by bonds freely accepted, but which, in their spiritual force and potency, are stronger than those of brass or even that any sustained craving for food and drink. Spiritual ties take time before they manifest their first adhesive power, but when at length that power is exerted in its mighty strength there is no sacrifice too great for one who is possessed by some great idea. The nation-state is a place of cherished memories handed down in lays and ballads from father to son, of historical achievements which glow in the patriotic hearts of an unsubduable people, and of poets, preachers and statesmen who appeal to the consciences of those in one particular country as they appeal with equal force to no other country under the whole firmament of heaven. Generally the state comes before the nation. There is a rough and developing administration in a certain territory before there is built of this a heritage of historical impulses and memories. But sometimes, as in the Germany which was thrilled by the Reden of Fichte, there was generated an almost everblown conception of a national mission, ere in 1870, there came at last the administrative skeleton which this nationalism could fill out with breathing flesh and blood. No foreign ruler, however mighty his armies, could take the place in an established nation state, of its own ruler and its own distinctive traditions. One nation might be extensive in territories, the other might only be great in hopes. By the crass impact of cast iron power the small nation, possessed of the enlivening spirit of a distinctive culture, might be overthrown to-day, but the spirit of independent nationhood would live and relief would come in the morning. The nation-state is a people's state. It is the people aflame and afire. That was why the nineteenth century, the century of nationalists was

also the century of the triumph of democracy. At its very beginning De Tocqueville, one of the prophets of the new dispensation, saw in the democracy a steady and irresistible power which, with almost fatalistic effectiveness, was insinuating itself throughout the world and which, in the great Republic of the United States of America was destined to march forth from victory unto victory.

This mention of the United States of America, however, is for us a reminder that there are two main types of democracy in the nation state—the American system which is wedded to a series of checks and counter-checks which interpose themselves during the passage of public opinion from ideas to action through the administrative and executive organisation of the state, and, secondly, the British system, which although it still sustains a certain amount of checks yet tends as in the case of the House of Lords, to reduce those checks gradually to a nullity. In the case of both these types the organisation of government which was to carry out the democratic “general will” was considered by Montesquieu under three heads, the judicial, the executive and administrative, and the legislative. Of these the judicial was the survival shape of the earliest form of state machinery when the king, himself out of the law, dispensed the law to his people. The executive and administrative was a more complex and special form which emerged when the king or leader with the aid of a Council had not only to settle new forms of arrangement within the state, but, outside the state had to deal with more complex problems of peace and war. Neither of these two forms had much to do with democracy, although undoubtedly the King or leader had to keep his eye fixed on the mass movements among his people. Still it was in the third division, the legislative, that the democratic urge was most plainly revealed, for it was in legislation that the nation state began to fix itself on the future and plan out new social arrangements to cope with the needs of a developing world. It is a country’s

legislature that confronts the necessity of change. It is a legislature created *ad hoc* which can make a new constitution and thus practically forge a fresh state out of the remains of the old. It is a legislature selected by themselves, which is the instrument of progress in the power of a people who have deemed themselves to be of one nationality and which thereupon proceeds to manifest their distinctive national requirements in their own constitution and laws. Consequently, it is natural to demand that the legislature should be regarded as of primary importance among these three departments of the political organisation. It, and it alone, traces its membership directly to the people's will. It, and it alone, has undisguisedly dynamic power. Of course, in its various stages of development there are different degrees of closeness in the way in which the people's will directs the course of the legislature. At first the legislators look upon themselves as representatives pure and simple, they have almost a free hand as regards future legislation. This is the day when they consider themselves invested with almost plenary powers. As has been pointed out, there is one type of constitutional arrangement where any free passage of the people into the intricacies of legislation can be hindered by checks and counter-checks. Such checks and counter-checks may be stereotyped in a definite instrument of government. But, in the other main type, as has also already been indicated, there has been an increasing tendency to smooth out the passage between the people and the actual execution of the people's legislative will. The government then becomes a rapidly working organisation where the common man, as he has been recently christened, can make his power felt without being exposed to serious hindrances in his path such as might be interposed by a hereditary House of Peers. Even in the case of the judiciary, which is an independent power not derived directly from the people, there is a tendency to narrow the range of subjects in which they may claim to be watchdogs over the legislature as regards the

liberties of the subject. That is because the judiciary has claimed to interpret the provisions of Acts of Parliament, not as shown by the discussions when such Acts were actually passed, but according to an independent construction of their language which, owing to the patent defects and ambiguities of every language, may easily in the hands of acute and ingenious minds lead to an interpretation of some particular statute exactly the opposite of what Parliament intended. This indeed is the problem which, in critical days which demand definite and speedy operation in complex administrative details, has put the power of ultimate decision, subject to certain safeguards, in the hands of the administration itself, without allowing any subsequent review by the judiciary. On that account De Tocqueville once remarked that while as democracy might falter at the beginning of a war, it had greater powers of rehabilitation than any other government, as a war was drawing on to its close. At first its democratic powers might appear to function tardily. Public opinion might be slow to develop a practical mind. But the want produced the organ to satisfy the want and, before the war ends, the democracy has produced administrative machinery sufficient for the most urgent emergency. So also it is that under the American Constitution the President for the time being is also Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. He is thus in war capable of developing an administrative authority which not even the powers of the co-ordinate Senate and House of Representatives is able to make wholly of none effect. In this connection also it is to be remarked that even in the case of such a Dictatorship as obtains in Russia, Marshal Stalin has felt it necessary to add the Commandership-in-Chief to all the rest of his functions.

These then were the two main types that when the war of 1914 came to an end the states of Europe which owed their charter to the Treaty of Versailles had to put before themselves as exemplars when it fell to their lot to set in motion a brand

new constitution. Both claimed to derive their power from the people, but the American Constitution laid more stress on the work of applying a system of checks to the process of expressing the people's will in definite legislative action. There was also the French Constitution, which was a variant of the British Constitution, but which, to some extent, mediated between the two main types by showing certain resemblances to both. Its main difference from the British Constitution, so far as democratic routine is concerned, is that it made Parliament practically independent of the electors for a certain period of years whereas in the British systems a General Election might be precipitated at any time, while by-elections offered some sort of an opportunity for the people to say whether they were tired of their legislators or not. In the French system the legislators found themselves at liberty to play with legislation as they pleased during a definite period of years. They might invent all sorts of fancy electoral devices which tended to divide the Lower House of Parliament into all sorts of different groups. They might make or unmake ministries as a player scatters his ninepins. They might dilly-dally with schemes of reformation as outside agencies tried to allure them in this or that direction. Ordinary administration in the constitutional system of a state of this French pattern might be vigorous enough, but when it came to adapting the old order of things to the call of great emergencies there might be no power capable of sustaining a secure and continuous control of events. Public indignation might be strong, but the legislators could hide themselves under the ample expanse of the Constitution, and all that Paris could do would be to express itself in sporadic tumultuous Assemblies which soon could be quelled by a military power at all times popular with the populace. On the other hand, the British Parliament had to take a much more serious view of its work, because its legislators had always placarded before their eyes the spectre of a people before which, at any time, they might

have to answer for their deeds. Accordingly they had no leisure left for the manipulations of divergent group diplomacy, and for these kaleidoscopic changes in the course of which fresh combinations of deputies are formed and dissolved in the course of a single sitting, only to find, in the end, that the cupboard is bare and that nothing of permanent worth has really been accomplished. The British Parliament always tended like the American Houses of Parliament to be confined to two parties—the Government party which, by the electoral system, was generally made sufficiently powerful to be strong both in the administrative and legislative sense, and the opposition party, which had to be really responsible because, in the event of its gaining a sufficient number of allies to be able to defeat the government, it had to form an alternative government and incidentally to submit its actions to the judgment of the electorate.

These, then, were the variant types of constitutional arrangements between which or out of which the new nations of Europe created by the Treaty of Versailles had to choose. They had literally to build up this constitutional fabric in the shortest space of time. They could not, as in the flexible British Constitution, trust to time and experience for the gradual evolution of a course of constitutional Government. Decisive government was the power that was needed. Chaos had to be overcome if chaos was not to be the master and conqueror. Yet, with the single exception of Russia, where the dictatorship of a Communist society was effectively built up and cemented, the nations of Europe were in no mood for despotism. They were content to take the democratic constitutional arrangements for their model and to select this or that item as it approved itself to the members of their Constituent Assembly. Fundamentally the choice seemed to be for Parliamentary Government. It was in the legislative assembly that they desired to enshrine their chiefest casket of power. The executive had to answer to the legislative and

in the Czech-Slovak Constitution this power of Parliament was pressed so far that a Parliamentary Committee was to be appointed which could keep a watch on the Executive at times when the Parliament was in vacation. Everything then depended on the relative efficiency of Parliament. If Parliament was weak and ineffective, all was lost in Europe where a stable society had to be brought forth out of the confusion and the conflagration of a great war. A Parliament that was unfitted for clear and rapid decisions was a Parliament which paralysed rather than inspired the head of the executive. Indeed, it was just at this point where the post-war Europe failed to achieve the stabilisation it needed and where the nations were turned off in a direction which fatally led to war.

It has already been pointed out that in the British and United States democracies, the most stable of the democracies, one main foundation of that stability was a two-party system. The mark of a real Parliamentary party was Parliamentary responsibility. An absolute veto was imposed on any Parliamentary game of making or unmaking Ministries on the mere impulse of passing vagaries of opinion. If you put out the old you had yourself to constitute the new. If you overthrew a minister you could not retire to a Parliamentary corner and irresponsibly chuckle that you had thereby achieved your revenge. If you did, you had to face the certain risk of being banned by your own party and assured of no very secure welcome in the other. That meant that, as a rule, each of the two regular parties clung together and when they voted, they voted as one man and in one solid mass. That gave also a certain solidity and seriousness to their discussions. When they decided they did decide. There was no time for the persiflage of time-serving parliamentary manœuvre. In British electoral practice there emerged that rule by simple majorities in casual electoral districts which, however many theoretical objections might be offered to their configuration, did really increase the

tendency to executive stability by also increasing the size of a majority, and thus strengthening the hands of a Government which even, without such an electoral weighting of the scale, would still be in the seat of power.

Unfortunately, however, when the newly created European states settled down in earnest to draft out their new constitutions, they tended to follow French precedents rather than those of the United States of America. That is to say, they were unable to achieve that two-party government which gives a deadly seriousness to Parliamentary debate and their executives were as a rule so hampered by the discordant voices of the legislators that the tendency was for the executive to shake free of them and to find a refuge in some kind of dictatorship. Thus the German Weimar Republic had recourse to the rule by the administrative ordinance which was permitted to it by one clause of its constitution while Poland also amended its constitution so as to give greater power to its President. Strictly Parliamentary government, accordingly, in the course of constitutional development in Europe after 1918, tended more or less to be discredited and there appeared to be no stable or progressive public opinion based on the principle of Nationalities which might be trusted to invigorate Parliaments and make them the vehicles of a really strong and steady Government. Indeed, the principle of Nationalities was corrupted at its source and confused with the principle of race. Thus it was that after the close of the war of 1914, the planners at Versailles beheld the emergence of all kinds of racial groups, each of which claimed to be of the same nurture and blood to speak their separate language, and to have some sort of a distinct culture and tradition. Each of these also expected to be heard at the Peace Conference and each of them invoked in support of its claim the Wilsonian watchword of self-determination. Yet it was quite obvious that Europe could not be stable if it was split up into an indefinite number of small and economically weak principalities,

even if such could be constituted of a single race alone. Of course this could not really be the case, for races in Europe are inextricably mixed. There may be a city or town with a certain mixture and all the other surrounding country may be of different mixtures or hues. A nation state is not and ought not to consider itself to be a merely racial state. Rather a nation state may comprise the representatives of many races within the bounds of its territory and it is strong in proportion to the extent it is able to assimilate these races and to weld them together into a union which can stand firm and inviolate against the forces of fate. That does not mean that it need suppress all signs of individual life within these races or that it must ban their language or frown on their evidences of culture. Wales can behold her people speaking their old language or perpetuating their ancient cultural traditions, while all the time they are numbered as loyal English-speaking subjects within the nation-state of the British Islands. Indeed the minorities, if they work through the established instruments of government, may soon effectively permeate the majority. If England never annexed Scotland, Scotsmen have certainly annexed England! Yet, when the authors of the Treaty of Versailles set themselves down to carve their new Europe, they did not sufficiently keep in mind the conditions under which, and only under which, a stable European situation could result from the existence and interaction of states comprising different tribes and tongues.

This, indeed, is very evident when we look back at the cause of these eventful years after 1918. The planners of Versailles had bound their submerged nationalities, on which the war had bestowed a fresh lease of a freer life, by a Minorities Treaty which gave an encouragement to all sorts of separatist and dissentient racial tendencies. That meant that different races within a single nation-state were almost incited to keep themselves apart and to organise themselves as a group away from the main political groups in the National Parliaments.

This tendency, when it was combined, as it mostly was, with Proportional Representation, made the Parliaments of such countries more akin to the French Chamber of Deputies than to the British or American legislative assemblies. When there were measures of paramount importance to be passed from the people to be realised in the context of affairs, it was generally discovered that the floor of the House was occupied, not by two parties, as in Britain and the United States, and accordingly always furnished with a critical opposition which, in the last resort, could effectively form an alternative government, but by a plethora of opposing and discordant groups which played the game of forming new and evanescent combinations, and thereby prevented the formation of a really strong and continuously stable executive. Such a strong and stable executive, however, was just what was really necessary in the critical times that succeeded a great war, and it can easily be understood how this want of stability in the constitutional arrangements put very considerable barriers in the way of the effective establishment of a new and renovated Europe. Indeed, it was this tendency which encouraged statesmen in the countries so afflicted to cut the Gordian knot, and, if Parliament was impotent and the people gave no distinct and indubitable lead, to seek to order affairs from above by the assumption of something very like dictatorial powers. What is more, this movement, though in a somewhat milder form, was also imparted to states that did not feel it necessary to go so far as dictatorship. Even in Great Britain it has been necessary, in order to cope with new requirements and demands, considerably to extend the sphere covered by administrative decree ; but this tendency was certainly affected for the worse by the political consequences of the incitements to the manipulation of minorities offered by the Treaty of Versailles. And be it also remembered, that, in the case of the states covered by this Minorities Treaty, requirements were imposed which would have been rejected by the very states

which presumed, in the name of religion and justice, to impose the same requirements on others. In partitioned upper Silesia, according to the Geneva Convention, a few people of one race could ask of the state in which their lot had been cast, that it should, at the expense of the general ratepayers, provide a school in which instruction could be given by teachers of their own race, and in their own language, as well as a course of teaching dealing with the tenets of a religion which might not be the religion of the great majority of people in that majority state. Very much less than this at the beginning of the twentieth century produced in England a movement of Passive Resistance to the law and it was natural that Germany, which was especially interested in disturbing European equilibrium, should find this importunate Minorities Treaty a facile means of engendering difference and unrest.

All such baleful consequences ultimately arose from a serious misapprehension of the principle of Nationalities. Nationalities do not set a premium on the spirit of Racialism. Two countries such as Poland and European Russia may count themselves as Slav, but may differ profoundly in their culture and national affinities. Indeed, it is one of the main conditions for the emergence of a strong and enduring nation that it should be a congeries of races and that it should be able freely to assimilate such races. The merely state administration rules by force. The king or chief marks out his ground and keeps down discordant elements by force of arms or by coercive processes of law. The state only becomes a nation-state when these elements weld themselves together into a homogenous whole bound together by the possession of a common heritage of art, religion and their own cultural and distinctive institutions and memories. The English language draws its materials from many quarters, according as its islands were invaded by different races, or as the original divisions found their home in a single state but, in the end, something new and original was evolved, which became the medium of

communication for all and that is what we now christen the English language. The United States when, in the old days, it received emigrants from Eastern Europe freely into its midst, took care first by an elaborate and calculated process to initiate them into the idea that they were coming to a land where they would be under one flag, where they would conduct public and trade business in one language and where if, in the natural course of events, they might find themselves, as the negroes in Harlem, crowded together in the single quarter of a big city they were not therefore entitled to ask certain racial privileges or were destined to any special treatment in general and political affairs. Thus the deck is cleared for the ordinary processes of assimilation; but if at the outset a barrier had been erected in accordance with some international treaty, it is doubtful whether there would have been in the case of many races, the same meed of success.

But what about the people in all that elaborate process? How far does the principle of nationalities, as working through the constituted organisation of the State, ensure the freedom in a free Europe of the "common man" of Europe? Barriers interposed by a foreign power may be irksome and repressive, but, when self-erected or consciously recognised they may become the very corner posts of progress. Yet it is not sufficient, in order to ensure the victory of a public opinion in which the "common man" will count, to widen your suffrage until it includes men and women down to the age of striplings and expect that by doing so you have paid full homage to democracy. A real, and representative public opinion is not manufactured by devices so simple and summary. There must be a certain homogeneity about the units which coalesce to form what is termed "public opinion." They must give and take. They must have sufficient sympathetic movement from one to the other, so that the addition of one to one makes a good deal more than two. They must not be split up into little cliques and coteries which hold themselves apart from each

other and disturb the free intercourse of soul with soul. Above all, there must be a certain community of memories and a certain common consciousness of cultural traditions and achievements to bind the people one to the other, and cause them to regard themselves as the possessors of a common treasure. Only thus can there be any hope of obtaining such a manifestation of a common will as will ensure the creation of a free Europe.

Obviously the principle of nationalities can make itself the engendering cause of such a consciousness of common memories and traditions. The national spirit has been formed and fortified by a recognition of blood affinities which gradually becomes stronger and more powerful as, by living together on the same territory, they enshrine their primary fellow feeling in institutions, artistic masterpieces and religious hopes and fears which they are unwilling to barter, and which they regard as more precious because more pervasive than their own individual life. The state, as has again and again been repeated is an affair of organisation and settlement. It presupposes people in one territory who are not yet cemented together by bonds of sympathy and affection. It works from above downwards and has to rely on force to keep its territorial units true to one another. It is just when the idea of a common natural heritage comes in to reinforce the state organisation and to supply an integrating dynamic more powerful than any outward constraint that a free people in free nations in a free Europe can ultimately be guaranteed. And in this case every nation is primarily at home only with its own culture and its own historical memories. That does not mean that it sets itself like Athanasius *contra mundum* or arms itself with a triple barrier of steel to bid defiance to its neighbours. Culture is collective, not individual. The culture of a nation is not a stay-at-home but a traveller. The most valuable memories of one may also become an inspiring power in the inmost hearts of all. Yet it will not do to impose one culture

above the other by the rude hand, of a merely outward power. Two nations may live side by side and there may be a certain amount of affinities in their culture but whether there be much or little, there can be no certainty of inner union between them both if the way of life of one is to be imposed by force on those whose pathway leads them in quite a different direction. And this is especially evident when we take into account what, in preceding chapters, has been said about the relation of the economic to the political. One nation may be large in territory and thus economically stronger than another. Yet it owes that advantage, not to the cultural strength which both gives and takes, but to an adventitious economic strength—the unearned increment of national life which rather takes than gives and which seeks to crush the other culture by the iron hand of its economic power. Large territories are not the final qualifications for continental leadership and to crush a people's culture is nothing less than to impoverish the whole world.

This generalisation in regard to big territories becomes more settled in our mind, if we remember that such consciousness of a common culture can best arise among smaller aggregations of people or in smaller rather than larger territorial states. Large masses of people tend to be ruled by emotion rather than reason. They sway according to the wild impulses of many a passing passion. They may become delirious. Their spirit may be possessed. The whole may be less valuable than the sum of the parts. The "public opinion" that emerges may be directed by regressive instincts and subtle prejudices. To guard against any untoward results which may result from what is obviously reactionary mass emotions their governments in modern days may seek to "spoon feed" their people by a propaganda which resembles the commercial device of advertising. They may manufacture the "one man mind." They may seek to obliterate all these diversities of views and opinion which in their

mutual play and interplay constitute the value of a really creative public opinion. They may, in short, become impatient of the lengthy process by which in large territories, inhabited by people of varied tastes and degrees of cultural advance, any amount of common national agreement can be readily achieved. On the other hand, if the territory is not too large and the national consciousness and culture are not discrepant, a strong and stable culture can be obtained by one culture absorbing without impairing the other. So the Keltic spirit has strengthened English literature and Ossian has become a British possession. But if the differences are too great and the peoples are diverse and unwieldy the mere force of numbers at length may subdue the intensive power of strictly spiritual strength.

At this stage, however, it may be asked what are the conditions of a successful union when two or more nations come together. In the case where so-called racial groups form the component parts, one can only trust, as in the case of the evolution of the peoples of Britain, to the slow process of time ; and time will always decide the issue provided that two conditions are fulfilled. In the first place, there must be no artificial influence at work, such as was found in the Minorities Treaty imposed on certain states after the last war and which encouraged racial groups to perpetuate their grievances and to look on themselves as in some sort apart from their neighbours. In the second place, there must not be too great a difference between the two in religious and social outlook or in the approach to a free life manifest in their constitutional arrangements. This second requisite is especially clamorous where both of the racial groups have had previously an independent, natural and cultural life and where one of them, and that the greatest and most formidable in territory or economic power or both, has constitutional arrangements which do not give the same free play to the democratic spirit of man as in the case of the other. In such a

case there obviously will be a conflict between two types of governmental authority and if the more despotic authority is the most powerful it will undoubtedly seek to impose checks on that manifestation of an independent spirit, or these evidences of cultural distinctiveness, which are held to be the obstacle in the way of any really stable union. Of course it may be said that Federation is the correct way of reconciling the differences between the two. Federation gives the sense of unity while permitting also sufficient play to the sense of differences. But in the case of distinct cultures, where there is a profound sense of constitutional difference, Federation is not enough to be a satisfactory guarantee of success. Indeed, it may be claimed that either Federation or the looser arrangement of the British Commonwealth of Nations can never be satisfactorily worked unless there is some measure of cultural or constitutional agreement in outlook between the two that seek to come together in any kind of federal connection. When they are thus brought together, the one with the greater economic or territorial power tends to permeate the vitals of the other and as bad money chases out good money, to seek to suppress, by the power of the Gestapo law or even by the cruder force of arms, what it deems are the illegitimate manifestations of an independent life. Such a result would be deplorable even in a case where a racial group incorporated with another nation appeared to be closely akin in blood to the nation proposing henceforth to hold control of its destinies. Religious differences, when they are strongly held, cut sharply the ties of blood and a people's memories which are handed down from father to son mean more to them than the exact contour of their skulls.

In short, the course of this discussion has condicated the proposition, put forth at the beginning, that the principle of nationalities requires for its success the provision of an emancipated and educated democracy. The people of a Europe which is in any sense free, must have the Atlantic

Charter applied to them—they must primarily be free from Want and Fear. They must also—and this is especially necessary—have ethical and religious freedom and freedom fully to combine in associations and societies and in all kinds of non-treasonable assemblies. Without these there can be no possibility of a completely free life. In any satisfactory society, there must be a place for the man with the angular, as well as for the man with the angel mind.

The gist of the whole matter, accordingly, is that a totalitarian political regime can in no sense be reckoned a fully-fledged nationality because, in the first place, its people even if they are free from want, are certainly not free from fear; and, in the second place, because they cannot fully combine in associations and societies if these associations or societies imply any unfettered or independent thought which may involve criticism of the designs of their totalitarian chiefs. The government of such a country is despotic or autocratic, because it takes care that no power can arise that could with any success put forward a view which differs from its own. Isolated, the individual counts for very little as contrasted with the state. It is only when he combines with others in a community that he can acquire any positive freedom in the face of tyranny or oppression. When thinkers like Hobbes espouse the cause of absolute government it is only because they have a low view of the individual whose life they can only regard as "nasty, brutish and short." Even the French post-revolutionary government acquired a somewhat centralised form—it was to be "one and indivisible"—and so it regarded religious associations and even Trade Unions with a somewhat averted gaze. It is just when the nation-state evolves in the direction of a completer democracy that we behold the materials for the construction of a really free Europe. Then indeed the "social man" blossoms to maturity. The individual finds a fuller life and develops a self which acquired its more perfect freedom in the service of the state.

But besides his direct service of the state, the individual can obtain membership in all kinds of voluntary societies and associations. He can with his fellows, devise schemes and put forward opinions which may sometimes complement and may even clash with the opinions of his state governors, but he puts forward these opinions intelligently and as a result of that play of free discussion for which the voluntary society supplies him with the suitable opportunity. And the life which thus stands confronting the state is by no means "nasty, brutish and short," it is the life of a free society for which only the complete nation-state has a place and which it treats with calculated toleration. The individual may fade away like the leaf in autumn, but the society may go on through successive generations of chairmen, secretaries and committees. The contact and clash of opinions is the indispensable condition of progress. The idea of dialectic which Marx borrowed from Hegel implies at once Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis.

How can there be less than the "diameter of being" between a totalitarian and a free society? To place a free nationality in the power or under the aegis of a totalitarian state is like condemning a Pericles to a life detention in Sparta. The principle of nationalities, accordingly, is definitely founded on a completely emancipated democracy.

CHAPTER VI

VIEWPOINTS FOR A FREE EUROPE

THE investigation which has been pursued in the preceding chapters has brought many fruitful results in its train. It has shown us that in the world's history there is no great continuous and irresistible movement of progress which goes on from more to more and at length reveals a blessed prospect of millennium at the close of a vista of years. Rather is the world's story a tale of many different civilisations, some of which rose, flourished, and then perished of inanition, while others, even when they fell into some sort of decay, yet managed to bequeath some more or less inspiring heritage to the civilizations which succeeded them. Indeed, one might go further and say that no civilisation has been an utter and unrelieved failure. Just as in the lowliest biography one can sometimes detect a moment at which an otherwise commonplace spirit appears to dart a glimmering ray of insight right into the world's dark mystery, so in the career of every civilisation one can discern some movement of forces, which, if they were suffered to work out their consequences in the more intricate circumstances of a succeeding civilisation, might materialize some invaluable elements in the complex concept of freedom. Death, in the sombre sense of annihilation, is a stranger to sociological history.

We live to-day amid the chaotic struggles of a civilisation, so fortunate as to have inherited some brighter moments of the Graeco-Roman civilisation which preceded it. It has seen the city state assume much more extended forms of territorial aggradiement until, in 1940, it revealed itself in Europe as some 28 aggregations of population and territory which each

of them more or less assumed the form of a nation-state. What viewpoints have we gained in a cursory view of this development which may enable us to throw fresh light on the shadowy future? Are we to grope our way blindly to the free Europe or are there any beacons to guide the weary traveller on his forward way?

Let it be answered at once that there is not any deductive certainty in hard thought anticipations of history. Social science brings with it no technique of investigation such as enabled Einstein to demonstrate that, if an astronomer pointed his telescope to the heavens, he would find something he had never seen before just there! and there! and there! Viewpoints and not categories are the playthings of the philosopher of history. Pragmatism is a theory not founded on the simpler but on the more complex of the sciences. Just when you have imagined that from the vantage of your viewpoints you have constructed a well-poised and completely satisfactory model of a free Europe, you find when you try to embark your model on the ocean of tempestuous facts that there is some disturbance here and another disturbance there, which at once puts that model in the deadliest peril. Indeed, in a world of developing forces, the philosopher has to give place to the statesman and the statesman has to lend an ear to the agitator before a forecast of the free Europe gains some comfortable point of attachment. Then the point with no parts or magnitude, becomes the electron, and the electron cannot be considered apart from the complications of its magnetic field. So if you rest your hopes for the future on a Europe where allied Great Britain and Russia are the powerful influences, and it is established that if things drift on as they have gone in the last decade, Great Britain in some fifty years or so will have five or six million inhabitants and Russia two hundred millions, this unexpected element of divergence from ideality may constrain you to revise every one of your former plans and purposes.

Yet that is not at all to admit that our chart is of no account, or that our viewpoints are of small practical utility when we seek to wend our way over what appears at first as a muddled and chaotic welter of events. With the viewpoint as our guide we can find method in the muddle, or we can so envisage a disorderly complex as to separate what is progressive from what is reactionary or select what is distinctive from what is irrelevant. That, at any rate, is the task which is set before us in this chapter, and it will be for the succeeding chapters to reveal how settled is the fate of this free Europe of our speculative hopes when it finds itself entangled amid the realities of a work-a-day world.

The nation-state is the particular outcome of our European civilisation and at the development hitherto studied in piecemeal fashion has shown it at work in the more highly advanced nations of Europe as a pluralist product of extraordinary complexity. It is itself founded on population and territory, and it contains within the expanse of its particular territory a pluralism of other societies or associations economic, religious, cultural and all the rest of them. That means that as it grows to a richer maturity it must also give full scope to its development by establishing the right of free speech, free meeting, and the freedom to form associations such as will supplement the individual strength by the integrated power of the group. In other words the developing nation-state reveals itself as the scene of intense internal activity. The individual—the scene of feelings and emotions which are only particular to his own organism and which because they are so particular cannot be shared by his neighbour—becomes in such a process a mere abstraction, a figment of outworn and mistaken speculation. Individual man reveals himself as social man. His emotional individual is seen from the first to be gregarious, to be groping about in an instinctive sort of way for points of attachment to his fellows. As his faculty of sight developed, he was able to split up his environment into diversified parts

and patches, and as these parts and patches can be described and explored in the knowledge of his fellows, individual feeling is supplemented by a social consciousness. This social consciousness manifests itself in the process of developing institutions which supply fuller content to the idea of the nation-state, and the effect is that through the interplay of all these vigorous and complex influences a public opinion is engendered which in its power and massiveness is more than could possibly be engendered by the individual alone. The first viewpoint then, from which we must survey the Europe of to-day is from that afforded by the more completely specialised and integrated nation-state. How far is the Europe from which we start, a Europe with nation-states which have gone through some appreciable instalment of that evolution from the simpler to the complex ?

Now let us analyse the concept of the nation-state a little more narrowly. It is founded on territory and population. As established on territory, it is distinguished from all other associations by the fact that its numbers can be limited. The amount of the earth's land space is a measurable quantity. You establish one state and then another, but as the earth on which you establish them is space with curvature, your other will at length become contiguous with those on the other side. Europe is such a space of territory with visible curvature and Europe which occupies a limited portion of this space has a limited number of territorial states. What is the ultimate significance of this territorial foundation of the nation state ? By virtue of this feature at any rate, it comes within the sphere of geography, and topography may supply some viewpoints which may be valuable in helping forward to a free Europe.

The most important topographical point about the state or nation-state of our modern civilisation is its frontier. If the frontier has any certainty or stability about it, than it is a sign that the organisation is buckling down to its task and that its vital energies are not being dissipated by outward expansion,

but enriched and revived by intense internal activity. In a Europe where every space is occupied and where one state can only expand at the expense of its neighbours, external expansion can only reveal itself as calculated aggression, or the practice of what has been denominated, power politics. Internal activity on the other hand, shows its most characteristic products in political and intellectual energies, which widen and extend the individual life till it discovers its perfect freedom in those activities of each, which are also for the benefit of all. The good book or the great painting are possessions for all the ages.

Now it has already been pointed out that the European continent has in the north of it a great plain and that it is further diversified by inlets and inland seas. What that infallibly means is that its significant states will be divided into two classes—land powers and sea powers. In addition we can also hazard the deduction that in relation to Europe, the land powers will be as a general rule, disturbing or aggressive influences, while on the other hand, the sea powers will be moderating or appeasing influences. The plain offers unimpeded facilities of movement. The frontier makes the irresistible appeal to the enterprising pioneers. If the tribe is a nomad one, it sees a tempting haven of rest in a neighbouring community, which has attained to the agricultural stage. If it has reached a later stage of history where communities are distinguished by their relative possession of mineral wealth, the less highly favoured will always covet the possessions of a neighbour. In each case, however, it is the lure of the open plain, the sense of immense opportunities, which lie open to the attainment of all, which increases the most sinister attraction of the frontier. Not that there are any strictly natural frontiers in the sense that they interpose unsurmountable barriers to the onward march of a people. A mountain indeed, in the early days of tribal history, would interpose a limit to tribal wanderings. Even if they determined to go round it, there would be

uncertainty as to what hobgoblins or shapes of dread might be encountered on the other side ; whereas the plain seems to be connected with no concealed ambush or to offer the possibility of any danger that they had not been able to surmount in their own ancestral lands.

It is to the plain, then, that we are to look for a dominating viewpoint, when we seek to discover the influences which make or mar the harmony of a free Europe. A sense of security is essential for real progress in a nation-state, and there can be no real security if aggressive eyes continually beheld you from the level spaces of the plain. As a matter of fact, it speedily became evident in the continuing history of Europe, that two great nations were qualifying to be the disturbing influence in the plain—Russia and Germany. Starting from Novgorod, Kiev, and then from the mixed forest land round Moscow. Russia, from the first, was a country of the frontier. First it cleared the forests, then it overflowed into the Western Steppe lands, and finally it spread itself thinly over the wide expanses of Asia. Towards the east it pushed its way more slowly than the loosely knit German Empire, which in the tenth century began vigorously to subdue the Slavonic Tribes—Lutetians, Obrodites and Sohrabs—that lay more immediately to the west in the plain. Later, in the thirteenth century, the Mark of Brandenburg, the nucleus of Prussia, and along with it, the Teutonic Knights joined in the movement, and it was at this stage, as has already been pointed out, that the German “*Drang nach Osten*” began its most accelerated drive. Both drives however, found themselves arrested, Prussia in her eastern, and Russia in her western drive, by the Polish-Slavonic tribes. These were very early able to mould themselves into the beginnings of a nation whose unconquerable national spirit was in our own time recognized by Hitler in conversations which he had with the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski. Poland, too, was a different country from both Germany and Russia in that, though it had great warlike tradi-

tions and opposed till the later days of the Partitions, an indomitable front to Moscovite, Tartar and Turk, it was not primarily organised for war. The leader in war is somewhat of a despot. There must be no reply to his orders. He has in his hands the power of life and death. That was how Prussia and Russia were organised. Prussia had her Frederick the Great, and Russia, her Peter, Catherine, and Ivan the Terrible. But Poland in the result, developed institutions which were very far from being centralised. They did not conduce to the making of rapid decisions or encourage a large and easily mobilised standing army. Yet it was this proud consciousness of distinctive historic institutions and of the possession of a culture all their own that bound together the Polish people with irresistible force and power. Even in the days of their Partitions, they produced a Mickiewicz who fed them with immortal hopes. Indeed, in considering the relations of Poland with Russia, we must keep this viewpoint continually in our minds, as a chiefest canon of interpretation, that Russia and Poland, contiguous in territory, are a universe apart in culture, outlook, and in the composition of their national spirit. From almost the earliest days of their recorded history, Russia looked to the East, while the gaze of Poland was directed to the West. East is East, and West is West ; and if Kipling's deduction that " never the twain shall meet " is a little too pessimistic in its outlook, it is yet absolutely certain that if the two are really to combine into any harmonious whole, it must be on no basis of domination, the one by the other, but on some basis where there is the utmost independent play of the capabilities of each, and where each is free to stamp its own distinctive impress on its own institutions and life.

So much for territory in a nation state, but what about population ? Is there any optimum of population suggested by a survey of developmental influences in Europe, which may suggest a further viewpoint for the survey of a continent fitted for freedom ? In answering such a pertinent question, there is

no need to begin by hypostatising an abstract individual, isolated and self-contained, and then considering by what pressure of events and circumstances he may be constrained to enter on some kind of social contract with his fellows. From the beginning, man has gregarious instincts, and from the time he assumes the erect posture and, aided by the development of eye and hand, delves deeply and widely into his environment, he gets away from the viewpoint of his individual and mainly sensitive organism, and attains more and more completely a viewpoint of events, where the welfare of others has equal claims to that of his own. Yet to sustain such an elevated standpoint, there must be a constant and unconquered development of social factors and forces. Not the mainly sensitive man, the child of primitive instincts and emotions, is the man who stands undaunted on the heights of Pisgoh. A man of feeling, is a man of fear. The World before him is a scene of unexplored terrors. There may be, for aught he knows, an enemy lurking in every bush. He has not entered on that upward path of knowledge where the unknown has at length been charted, and where his neighbour is beheld not as a source of sorcery, but one whose welfare is intimately bound up with his own. Yet it is the small state, as Rousseau quite clearly discovered, or in the large state, with quite developed areas of decentralisation, in which this process of development from sensation to knowledge can be most satisfactorily begun and continued. A large undifferentiated population, assimilated to a casual crowd, may very readily become a prey to all kinds of sudden influences of irrational emotion. The universal plebiscite can be a good deal more irresponsible than the more circumscribed elections in groups of constituencies. You can often find more instructed forecasts of the world's future in small than in great nations. The reason is that in the small nation as in the small city state of the Graeco-Roman civilisation, there more early develops that matured individual consciousness of cohesion, that conscious recognition of a

common pursuit of a common purpose, which in the last analysis makes a continent as well as an individual nation, good and great. So the viewpoint as regards population is undoubtedly this, that the attainment of a really free Europe postulates in its states no huge masses of undifferentiated voters but a constituency gradually built up by the practice of self determination in smaller areas, and where the smaller areas are, built up into larger areas by constitutional arrangement, which secures that the individual life of the smaller, shall not be entirely submerged, but shall combine with the rest of his fellows to attain a very much higher plane of social achievement.

Indeed, if we are to consider the viewpoints already obtained by the analysis of single nation states in their application to the twenty odd states of the pre-war Europe, we could best unite them in the single formula of our introductory chapter, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." The Europe of the future must have a freedom which is compounded of just these three. Liberty, in its constituent status, the opportunity to fulfil their national mission, not in competition, but in concord with others: Equality—that no one of the states should be exaggerated or stimulated by pathological growth to an unnatural size. And lastly, Fraternity,—that the constituent states should not be engaged on a beggar-my-neighbour competition where each regards the other with an envious gaze, but should devote their energies to those higher achievements of corporate life, where competition yields its place to co-operation for the integrated good of all.

Take first, then, Liberty. This is an essential prerequisite of a free nation state in Free Europe. A nation state is no simple compound of men and women of the same race and blood, who have casually discovered themselves as contiguous within the same territory. It is a compound or coalescence of men and women of many different racial types, and many varied blends of population. Indeed, the richer and more varied the

blend, the more distinctive and original is the product. Human evolution is like all other evolution, it is emergent ; the simpler combine to form a product new and strange. Thus it is that when a strong and stable nation state does finally emerge, it is because all the ranks and races within it have been assimilated to the whole, so that in fact something unique, a new nation with distinctive history, traditions and institutions is the result. Such a nation indeed may rise to an altitude of cultural achievements which differentiates it from all the surrounding nations, and which by so doing, makes the free Europe which is the result of such a combination, not an organisation of low class, but a unity which, while wholly unbreakable, yet at the same time, allows the utmost possible liberty and variety to its numerous constituent parts.

How then, is such liberty to be achieved ? And what are the factors and influences which may contend against its full attainment ? To answer the question it may be most helpful to revert to the Platonic dictum mentioned in our first Chapter, and to remember that the state is the individual writ large. If we grasp at the influences which militate against the possession of liberty in the individual, we shall get at the influences which curtail the full enjoyment of liberty in the nation-state.

Narrowing our gaze, then, in order to concentrate on such influences as hinder the possession of liberty in the individual, we are not slow in discovering that it is economic influences that to-day are the most inveterate foes of liberty. Liberty for the modern man, as the cynical phrase puts it, is only too often the liberty to starve. Political development may have advanced so far as to endow every individual with a vast variety of what are termed "rights." The citizen may have the right to vote, the right to the free expression of his opinions, and the right to turn up at a public meeting, to abuse the government ; but if the greater part of the day he is something like the mechanical cog of a big machine, doing fragments of

monotonous work of which he can discern no complete pattern, and subject to dismissal at short notice by the arbitrary fiat of managers, against whom he has no right of appeal, it can hardly be said that his life is anything like a life of liberty. He continues his existence without the saving hand of security. Like the aboriginal savage, he is the plaything of unknown fears and forces. How is he to believe? A life lived in the constant vicinity of the scrap heap, is a life that has not at all savoured the most exquisite zest of living.

The main reply given by intelligent individuals, subject to such economic constraint, is to combine with their fellows. Individually the slave may be weak; but the army of a Spartacus may even endanger the Roman state. Accordingly the worker joins his trade union to obtain a vastly increased bargaining power and the experience he has thus acquired of the value of combination gives him the idea of winning the Democratic Nation-state over to his side, so that what he could not do as an individual, and not even with the help of a trade union, he may be enabled to achieve through the aid of the organised strength of the community. Unfortunately, however, the political economists headed by Adam Smith, who worked at the earlier theoretic bases of modern industry, had no great love for the state, as claiming a primary hand in its direction. They beheld the industries of their own day, under the control of close corporations and mysteries which, fatally interfered with individual initiative and freedom. So they called a halt to any such bondage and plumped boldly for *laissez-faire* and the complete emancipation of the industrial entrepreneur from state interference or control. That meant that state organisation and industrial organisation went each their separate ways, and as the state passed from the state of Bodin to the more Democratic Nation-state of modern times, industrial organisation did not follow it along the path to real liberty. Political Democracy never received its proper complement in Industrial Democracy. Politics, the

higher and more specialised achievement of social development never reflected back its methods on the less specialised economics. The good life shed few of its refreshing rays on the life of business activities. The good life had experienced the value of culture, conciliation, co-operation and concord. The economic life tended to develop into a furious competition where every man suspected his fellow and where the main object of existence degenerated with a sordid game of "beggar my neighbour." And that was not all or even the worst of all. Not only in such a case was there no full influence of the Democratic state on industrial government, but the more ruthless methods of commercial competition, through the power of Great Captains of Industry, threatened to insinuate themselves into its methods and institutions.

Applying then, as we are now entitled to do, the lesson thus gained to the organisation of individual states into a free Europe, we discover that the first obstacle in the way of liberty is the economic trouble experienced in the claim of Power Politics to be supreme influence in mapping out its future a configuration. Modern economics for the most efficient and profitable exploitation of its industrial processes, demands wide areas and mass production. A multiplication of small and unco-ordinated establishments, spells ultimate defeat when brought into conflict with a more perfectly articulated combination or cartel. So it is that the industrial statesmen or the economic theorist of Power politics demands no small individual states but big individual states, where, because of the extent of the territory, there is the presumption of unbounded industrial wealth and potency, and when small states are in existence, and they cannot, in the face of modern democratic development, roundly claim that the big states should swallow the smaller states outright, they at any rate feel emboldened to advance the plea that the big states should fold the little states under their protecting arms, or that they

should be enrolled at any rate under their leadership. That is to say, if our dominating viewpoint for the re-arrangement of the New Europe is an economic one, and economic strength is joined up with relative economic weakness, that weakness very speedily becomes a condition of economic subjection. One of our viewpoints should accordingly be that no real liberty for the constituent state in a reorganised Europe can be achieved unless it can be guaranteed real independence, and there can be no political independence worth calling by that name when there is any danger of industrial dominance or subjection of one to a more powerful industrial neighbour. Besides, as has been emphasised again and again in the course of the preceding chapters, political development as it pursues its course, implies an increased emphasis on these cultural and spiritual activities, which encourage co-operation rather than competition and which not very readily yield themselves to the heavy hand of material and industrial power. What this implies in the future relations of politics and economics will be more fully deduced when we come to deal with fraternity. Meantime, it is clear that from the point of view of liberty alone, the large state can claim no preference over the smaller state. The smaller state has a more clearly-knit population, its public opinion may be more stable and instructed, and there may be within it such a fully developed sense of social duty that a much large amount of liberty can be allowed to the individual without endangering the integrated unity of the whole. The big state for the most part owes its hegemony to its unearned increment of mineral and other economic wealth and to its wide expanse of territory, too often gained in the past as the result of ruthless and unsatisfied aggression. A Europe under the domination or even under the dictation of one or two big states would be a Europe where the liberty of the smaller states to live their own lives would be in subtle and continuous danger. Neither does contiguity in territory or the prevalence in common of a certain racial type necessarily

imply that one nation may safely assume some directing leadership over another. As has again and again been revealed by the argument of preceding chapters, two nations may be of the same race and may have lived cheek by jowl for many generations and yet so deeply do they differ in cultural and political achievements, that even the faintest claim for hegemony by the one over the other would be an interference with the full efflorescence of national liberties.

Now as to Equality. Must not a measure of Equality among its constituent states be an essential requirement of a free Europe? This seems at any rate to be acknowledged in the structure of the modern Federal Constitution where a Second House of Parliament is constituted to introduce this principle of state equality. In the Senate of the United States of America, Vermont is equal to New York. It was checks which they conceived had been rendered to the idea of Equality which inspired the first volume of protest in the French Revolution. The earlier *Cahiers* were all for equality of taxation and privileges and when the States-General met, they were keen to detect evidences of undue and unequal luxury in the entourage of the King and the Queen, as Madame de Campan tells us.

It is easy at first to make mincemeat of this principle of Equality especially if, as in the case of Liberty, we start from the relation of individuals, to go on to the relation of nations. Individuals, objects the scoffer, are not at all evidently equal. Some are healthier than others, some show a greater facility of acquiring wealth than others, and all men conspicuously differ in character and mental endowment. How can we find a Greatest Common Measure in individuals who differ from each other in quality rather than quantity?

The reply is that the whole movement of reform in our modern civilisation has been in the direction of evening out these differences. What underlies all this political concentration on Health legislation and measures to protect the com-

munity from the unequal influences of want or fear ? And does not the socialist movement derive its major influence from a perception of the inequalities of wealth ? And, as for differences in character and mental endowment, have not most of our preceding arguments gone to show that they are neither anti-social nor productive of social inequalities ? A man of higher character will reveal it by his desire to improve and uplift his fellows. Mental endowments show themselves in achievements which cannot be selfishly appropriated by the individual but must be open to the possession of the whole world. So it is that the political principle of democracy is, as Kant would teach us, that "everyone is to count for one and none for more than one" and, as Bentham lays it out, that the end of legislation is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." In other words, and from the point of view of politics, no individual can segregate himself and claim special consideration on the plea of qualitative differences. His most far-reaching qualitative differences arise not to be regarded as his own, but as his own to be imparted to his neighbour. In the eyes of his nation-state he is one and he must never be regarded as more than one. And on the day of Judgment, all his differences are dismissed as adventitious. We shall all of us stand free and equal before an impartial judge.

It is accordingly evident, then, that the principle of Equality applies to the political arrangements of individuals and it was very soon recognised that to obtain a free Europe, it must apply as well to the political relations of its constituent states. Wherever a nation-state had been solidly established, that is to say wherever it had managed to weld a medley of races into a whole of cultural or historical value, it should be reckoned as one, and none of its neighbours in the same constellation of states should be estimated as two or more than one. Very early in the course of the enunciation of political viewpoints, this particular one came to be formulated as the principle of the Balance of Powers. From the pages

of Thucydides we can gather that it was recognised in the relations of the City States of the ancient Greek civilisation. Contemporary observers see it as applicable to the small states who wrought, fought, and thought in the Italy of Machiavelli. Wolsey propounded it and Pitt recognised in it a practical maxim of policy. No state by virtue of recognised territory, by possession of the unearned increment or economic advantage, can equitably claim a superior power over the rest of its neighbours. In the political economy of states, as in the political rights of the individual, all men and nations to be free must also be equal. And if we live in a time when economic advantage has been pressed to a point where it threatens the liberty of others, then surely a number of smaller nations should be suffered to federate to make themselves more economically equal to any Colossus which may threaten to imperil, at any epoch, their political rights or to impair the individuality of their culture.

The Balance of Power then, so far as it applies to a free and future Europe, is no discredited formula which is dying hard because it is striving to live on after its due time. It is still an important viewpoint upon dealing with the relations of states, one with another. That means that when you look with the interested eyes on a map of Europe with the view of prefiguring its future fate, you must ask yourself how its relative states stand to each other in respect of Balance? Is there any one of them most palpably overgrown? Is it disproportioned to the rest for example, as regards these possessions which are limited in quantity, in, as for example, its extent of land surface, or on its possession of industrial and mineral wealth? Because, if so, a position of danger has been infallably created; "To him that hath shall be given," is a dictum which has come to be recognised as the favourite aphorism of "power-politics" and certainly it has a preponderating relevance for the Europe of to-day. Fashionable philosophers, basing themselves on prevalent Marxian ideas,

have stressed "the economic interpretation of history," and this means that human history is above and beyond all an intestine struggle for the possession of material goods, which, because they are material, or can be valued in quantitative terms, are limited in their amount, so that the possession of too many by one, means the possession of too few by his neighbour. From the viewpoint of a Balance of Powers then, this also means that the Balance of Power will be continually threatened, and the accompanying dangers will be continually rendered more palpable and imminent if we recollect what additional factors are introduced by the great European plain, which invites any powerful nation based on it to a constant policy of movement which easily becomes a constant policy of aggression. That was the possibility of catastrophe which was always said to poison the air of the Europe of the nineteenth century. At the beginning, France was the aggressor: but then that France which became the aggressor was afterwards an instrument to spread abroad the watchwords of a Revolution. In that respect, Napoleon stands in another plane from that of Hitler. If from one point of view he can only be called a vulgar despot who tried to lay Europe prostrate under his iron heel, from another point of view he was what he called himself, the "soldier of liberty." He gave to Europe the "Code Napoleon." He stirred up in Germany after Jena that revival of natural energies which found its most classic expression in the Reden of Fichte. Thereafter it was the nations of the plain—Russia and Germany—that were the unsettling elements in Europe. Political strategy became a search for a system of alliances. One group of states was balanced against another group of states, and the idea was to make it too dangerous for any one group to break the balance for the simple reason that it would at once be opposed by the embattled pageantry of all the members of the other group. Great Britain, according to the vision of some of its statesmen, was even considered to be

situated outside of this balanced group, and to be able to take up an umpire's position in which she might throw in her power and influences on one side or another, according as she thought there was any immediate or unduly threatening danger from one group or the other, or according as in her own self-constituted judgment as umpire, she considered one of the causes "just" and the other "unjust." Up to about the beginning of the Boer War, she appeared to succeed in holding firm to this position. She had few troops to spare for any European War. It is amazing nowadays to read the revelations of how few she had. She had only her Navy, constituted on a two-power standard, to rely on, and her own moral prestige to keep her jealous rivals away from her coast line; yet strange to say, with the aid of these she was always able to keep her flag proudly flying while "Britannia rules the waves." She herself had not been behind in the race for the acquisition of fresh territories. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald was wont to tell with what a sensation of gladness and relief he once greeted the sight of the Union Jack on the North-West frontier of India after a toilsome and dangerous walk over mountainous tracks inhabited by potential enemies. Great Britain certainly had her colonies and dominions all over the world. Later on we shall consider how this affects her as a European power. But then she was a Sea Power and her territorial acquisitions were almost wholly outside Europe. Whereas the Powers of the Plain were Land Powers, and every uncommon movement of theirs had its repercussions in adjacent parts of the continent of Europe itself.

After the Boer War, when joints had been detected in the armour-plate of Great Britain, it was no longer feasible for that country to play the part of the disinterested and honest broker; and when the war of 1914 arrived it was discovered, and the discovery was a surprise to most, that she was no longer booked to play the part in Europe of Jupiter on Olympus. She had in fact, come down from her lofty

crest and was now to become a full participant in the game of the "Balance of Powers." That is to say, she had really joined the European system of alliances. She was out to secure that Europe was fairly and equally balanced.

It is well to remember at the same time, that if this equable balance was to be disturbed, it was Eastern Europe that laid itself open most temptingly to the hands of a breaker of the peace. The nationalities of the East had never had that security for any long period which would enable them to create out of a welter of races, a stable, and united nation state. They were subject, through recorded history, as has already been observed, to all sorts of invasions. Whether from the steppes which form the south of the Asiatic portion of the plain or from the Arabian Desert, came Tartar and Arab and Turk. The old Greek race was practically obliterated by the successive cataclysms and the little that remained was changed by fresh mixtures into a new and varied blend which, however, maintained a connection with the past by a revival of historical memories. The countries of the Balkans were ground down by the Turkish Janissaries. It was natural that the Russians and Austro-Germans—the rivals of the Plain—should look with eager eyes on possibilities of influence and aggression, and should desire to sterilise Poland, which was situated so obviously on the flanks of each of them. Both Germany and Russia—Germany more than Russia—had become far more formidable after the Industrial Revolution. Transport lies at the very material basis of a nation's life and Germany was honeycombed by a network of railways; Russia, too, was following, though somewhat in the rear, but yet in the same direction. On both of these powers of the Plain, because it was held they were threatening the Balance, the thoughts and speculations of men were directed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Their doings made good newspaper headlines. You read of Russian intrigues in Bulgaria, of Russian designs on Constantinople, and of the German

prospectus of a Berlin-Baghdad railway. All this shows how completely the plain was becoming an unbalancing influence in the European equilibrium, especially as the German schemes threatened to bring that country athwart the lines of British sea-power.

Lastly, to achieve real freedom in a free European continent, Fraternity must be added to Liberty and Equality. In many respects indeed, it is the most important of the three constituent demands of Freedom, because it is only in the most recent developments of the modern nation state that its importance has become specially pronounced. Here again, and beginning as is our wont with the individual before we deal with the nation, we discover that, as the individual emerged from a cast-iron feudal status, he tended to emphasise unduly his individuality as against the claims of his community, because he wanted to begin by stripping himself of everything, by a *rebellion à outrance* against the authorities which in the mediæval days had directed the thoughts of men and by an enunciation, at last, of the only certainty remaining, *Cogito : ergo sum*. Subsequent speculators were led to develop more and more completely this simple suggestion of individuality until the self became almost self-contained over against the community and could only correct itself with society by a series of contracts carrying more or less serious consequences. Lately, however, and specially owing to the influence of the Hegilian philosophy, the idea of organism, the social organism, was rendered familiar to modern political thought. The individual was no longer to be regarded as a host in himself, simply externally related to society and only to be reckoned free if he was allowed complete liberty of manœuvre so long as such liberty did not interfere with a similar liberty of manœuvre on the part of his neighbour. Man, on this latter view, was rather an integral part of society ; he was only man so far as he had absorbed all the intellectual and moral nutriment with what he was dowered by the social institutions which,

from his birth onward, had surrounded him on every side. Strip the individual of all that comes to him from his social surroundings and which he shares with all others in the nation-state of which he forms a part, and all that you get is a veritable ghost or phantom, the shadow or simulacrum of a living and breathing man or woman.

Apply this view of the development of individual and their connections to the mutual relations of nations within a free Europe. The nation occupies a definite space of territory but this definite space is only a part of that curvature of space which is occupied by the territorial domain of a whole European Continent. Yet, as the feudal system began to manifest its inadequacy, the tendency was for states to begin by separating themselves from the society around them, and by regarding independence as neither more nor less than the absence of external constraint. This is the era when states tried to acquire more and more of military power by successive aggregations of territory. One would marry an heiress and receive a gift of land for her dowry. Another would barter with less distinctively human interchanges. A third would simply gain his neighbours' land by the rude arbitrament of the sword. But whatever the method, the idea was to add land to land, and when in later days, minerals were found in this land, it was realised that such an unearned increment brought with it a claim to hegemony which was not for the good of Europe.

Indeed, it is this economic phase of the development in national intercourse, which has exercised the most destructive effect on the conception of a Free Europe. The nation was regarded as not only politically but economically to be regarded apart from its fraternal relations to any of its neighbours. Cobden saw the danger of this, and preached the gospel of International Free Trade, but he was only a prophet sounding a single clarion call in a wilderness of Tariffs and Trade Regulations which made crooked and tortuous the

course of international relations. It became an effort more and more important for diplomacy not only to support a nation's prestige, but to forward a nation's trade. Political nationalism still exercised its predominant role in Europe, but the economic search for raw materials, and more adequate markets, imparted to nationalism a go and an impetus which it would not otherwise have had. This was especially evident in Germany, one nation of the plain, and not so evident in the other nation, Russia, which was much later in its economic development.

The serious import of this consists in the consequence that if such intestine competition of nations in the material plane of life is made a dominating factor in national policy, it will render any real fraternity of nations for ever impossible. It is at a time of real national stress and amid the hopes and agonies of a great war that the people of a nation state realise most profoundly, how readily profit making can be turned over into profiteering. When the major part of a nation's industrial energies must be concentrated on the manufacture and manipulations of armaments, and when the ordinary comforts and even the necessities of life are in very short supply, then comes the opportunity for the man who desires to gain some additional wealth by sharp or shady practices in his commercial deal. The appearance on the scene of the Black Market, indeed casts a shadow over all other and more human values. Workers complain of the increased prices they have to pay for a reduced share of necessities. Governments claim to control prices so as to avoid a dangerous spiral of inflation which would start wages and prices on a mad race for mastery. That means that the state has to step in and have all the prices of the goods most essential to life, limited by strict rules and regulations. This is, of course, in a time of war, when all the more sordid and sinister tendencies of human nature come forth most plainly to light ; but even in the more melodious days of prosperity and peace there is the

tendency in profit-making, to set trader against trader in a certain suspicious rivalry, which is certainly not in the best interests of any abiding fraternity. The big combine sees in the smaller trader, a nuisance to be either rendered innocuous, or forever to be swept from the bigger man's path. The small man sees in the Big Combine, a great octopus from which he must remove himself on penalty of being strangled to death. There are many mediating influences, of course, and it may be long before commercial rivalry became quite transformed into absolute commercial warfare, but there is the tendency, quite palpable and menacing, and if freedom is to be secured for the nations of Europe, there is bound to be required a large amount of state oversight and control.

This, it has already been remarked, was especially evident in the case of Germany in the ominous five unsettling years which preceded the war of 1914. The moves that led to the formation of a German Reich after the war of 1870, were preceded by a Zollverein and this brought commercial motives fairly to the front, as reinforcements of national feeling. It was not that economics had become the sole, or even the chief determinant in German national history. There were still the lectures of Treitschke, who summoned the students of Berlin to uphold the national glory of the German race. So, too, the Kaiser Wilhelm II. amid the many subjects which engaged his somewhat volatile mind, had also a desire to do something for big business, and he was well content to receive in his yacht, the selected Captains of Industry. Just as Napoleon despised in his soul what he called a "nation of shopkeepers," so Kaiser Wilhelm gained fresh confidence in his ability to sense "Germany's Hour of Destiny" by the sight of a commercial competition where German versatility and German capacity for organisation seemed to be leading his people to victory in an all-absorbing struggle for markets. Germany had been late in developing industrial strength; and, consequently, her later desire to overtop her rivals

proved a most unsettling influence in European affairs. Indeed, in the years between 1870 and 1914, Germany was the naughty element in European politics, and Russia, which had made such marvellous commercial progress, drew nearer to the Western Democracies from a consciousness of coming danger.

What does all this mean? Certainly, it means that there is a slender hope for a free Europe if the promotion of its big business is to be the ruling interest of a nation's policy. In that case, competition which may easily become a warfare of selfish interests, will set nation against nation, and will force one nation to concentrate in itself as much economic power as it can, even if this can only be done at the expense of its rival. Furthermore, by a process of unearned industrial increment, some nations will become economically far stronger than the rest, and they will naturally claim some sort of prominence over all the others, as a tribute to their industrial hegemony. Economics will lord it over politics; and a nation which from the political point of view, is the inheritor of great cultural and historical traditions, will run the risk of being submerged by another, which happens to be economically stronger. In the individual nation, the evils attendant on competitive struggles are being countered by a movement towards a planned economy and the same remedy must be sought when it is a question not of a single nation, but of the relations of nations one to the other, in a freer Europe. Economic planning must overstep the boundaries of nations. It must exercise no unsettling influences on the relations of nations one to the other. Indeed, such super-natural economic planning must ultimately emerge as world economic planning especially as it carries with it the control of raw materials, tariffs, currencies, and the movements of populations. Besides, there is the expansion of markets which involves the improvement of working conditions and the standards of life all over the world. This also could most effectively, be international, though there would have to be in Europe, a regional Board

as well, to secure that the nations of the eastern part of the continent which have suffered so much from the cataclysms of history should have their fair share of the requisites of economic prosperity.

Undoubtedly, this planned economy means regimentation. There must be final regulation from above downwards. Ultimately indeed, the economic system must be to some extent automatic. It must no longer exist in the world as a source of rivalry and disturbance. But there is no reason why such a regimentation should not be made to respond to the claims of a democratic advance, and British Production Committees and the Soviet remittance of their Gosplan to be checked up by individual and national establishments all over the country, have shown where the path of progress lies in this direction. Especially, too must the fear of over-regimentation be rendered quite groundless, when we remember that economics is not the whole, and not even the most distinctive part of life. The Free Europe must be most clearly marked by a political and cultural rather than an economic grouping of the nations. From that viewpoint the nation territorially smaller, has sometimes a richer life to live than the nation territorially larger. Cultural life goes back and far back into a nation's history. The present generation connects itself with the generations of the past—a past which contains within itself, the promise and potency of a far-off future. The developed nation-state gains by its intention, what it may have lost in extension. There should be no "beggar-my-neighbour" competition such as has too often been characteristic of economics. My gain in cultural activities does not and ought never to mean your loss. But the nation with glorious historical memories which have percolated throughout the mass of its population, can stand up against all threats of undue control or regimentation. If it joins with others, it is no regulation of servitude. It claims that if there is a whole of states, there should yet be due regard to the individuality of the separate parts.

That is why the more modern viewpoint of Federation has been employed so much in the discussions of recent years. Complete Federation is a union of the wholes, which is quite consistent with the liberty of their separate parts ; and it is only obviously successful when the separate parts have fraternal affinities to one another, or have not had such lengthened history apart from one another, that they have developed individual peculiarities or cultural traditions which do not easily accommodate themselves with those of their neighbour. One great obstacle, however, will be removed when the economic structure of society is fashioned as a planned economy. Then economic rivalry or the desire for economic leadership or domination, will no longer be a cause of trouble, and if to this is added the international or even the European control, of armaments, it will be found that the motives which for example induce Russia at the present time to object to a Polish-Czech Federation, will no longer have the same validity or force. Nations will join in free Federation on account of cultural and historical affinities. There will, on account of the formation of such regional Federations, be a greater approach to Equality in the different parts into which Europe is divided, and the Fraternity this engendered will be a fraternity in which the aggrandisement of each is consistent with the aggrandisement of all. Frontiers will then become relatively unimportant and the world will be many leagues nearer to the achievement of a lasting peace.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CLOSE OF A TIME

WE live in a time of confusion. An old order looks to be surely passing away. Ancient lights are extinguished. Venerable landmarks are razed at their foundations. There is nothing fixed and stable in the fluctuating combat of events that offers any chance of restful thought to him who would wrest its secrets from the future. Every sign in fact, appears to portend the vanishing of an old age ; and it is necessary to survey even if necessarily in a somewhat incomplete form, the present troublous scene before we can go on to gauge the prospects of a new age.

It has been indicated that the principal characteristics of the present period in Europe is its aspect of evanescence. You look at it to-day ; it is different to-morrow. No longer is anyone's home his veritable castle. He may be at home one hour, and the next hour he may be hopping to the ends of the earth. Was there ever such a continent of disorganized countries and deported peoples ? Czechs are evicted from their homes in districts like Vyskov, Blansko and Boskovice, and Germans from the Baltic coast are brought over to occupy the homes and land of the evicted populations. Some quarter of a million of the same people are now to be found in Germany, sometimes in areas frequented by British and American bombers and where they are utterly separate from their own polity and cultural institutions. That is bad enough for Europe but the case of Poland is infinitely worse.

Four years before the outbreak of the present war Hitler had seen in Poland a country which brute force could never

terrorise nor subdue. "With the understanding and heartfelt friendship of genuine Nationalists" he said once to his Polish Ambassador—"we recognise Poland as the home of a great and nationally conscious people." That was when he hoped that he might gain Poland as a partner in his designs; and perhaps it was because he had come to admit in his own soul that this deliverance of his corresponded to the facts that, when he did fall out with Poland he was the initiator of methods which yielded place to none for their ruthlessness, brutality and even bestiality. Food rations for the people were restricted to a starvation level. A million industrial and agricultural workers were deported to Germany. By a decree of 26th October, 1939, compulsory labour was introduced for the entire Polish people of the General Government, male and female over 14 years of age. No less than 900,000 Polish workers are believed to be at present in the German Reich. Besides there are over 200,000 Polish prisoners of war who are either labouring on the land in Germany or are engaged on German war industry. According to authentic reports submitted to the London International Assembly mass deportations from the Polish territory incorporated into the German Reich exceeded 1,500,000 persons. Gdynia saw its population decline from 130,000 to 60,000. A third of the Polish families in Poznan have been deported and, according to German estimates, 450,000 Germans have settled in the Polish incorporated provinces. "Robbed of all they possessed"—says the Polish report—"they left their homes at a few hours' notice, often without the barest personal necessities. After travelling for several days in unheated cattle trucks they were left to fend for themselves on land already ravaged by war. Many of them died."

Some emphasis has been placed on the case of Poland because here more especially, the idea had disclosed itself of stamping out of Europe the whole Polish race. To that end sterilisation was a frequent resort. Polish women were required

to submit themselves to German soldiers so that in the course of generations German should take the place of Slavonic racial qualities. Polish Jews were shot by the thousand in a cold-blooded orgy of intolerable slaughter.

Driven thither by the menace of starvation, numbers of Belgian workers had to go to Germany, because the Germans had robbed their home industry of raw materials and they would allow them no unemployment benefit or issue ration cards to non-workers. Vichy newspapers revealed that 44,358 French officers of all ranks and 1,382,064 non-commissioned officers and men were held in Germany as prisoners of war. 20,000 Jews, too, were transported from France to Poland or occupied Russia by the end of the summer of 1942. During a space of four months in 1942 it was known that some 100,000 Greeks from 160 villages had been expelled from their homes to make room for imported Bulgarians. Wealthier Greeks, too, who were held to be inhabiting what was claimed as a Bulgarian area, were obliged to sell up their estates, and on reaching the frontier of the area were dispossessed of all money they owned, with the solitary exception of a paltry 300 drachmæ. There was quite a mass removal, too, of the population of Slovenia because the Germans were particularly anxious to remove all Slovenes from a frontier belt of that country and to settle in their place Germans from the Tyrol, Bessarabia and the Baltic provinces.

Instances such as the above could be indefinitely multiplied but enough has been quoted to shew what a Europe it is that now obtrudes itself on our shocked and startled attention. The clock of time seems to be put back through the course of many generations. Small good it must be to talk to-day of "self-determination" and the necessity of suffering a people to choose their own distinctive form of government. The difficulty would be in any specific district to decide who were the genuine people. As well propose at the end of the war to inaugurate a new earth by the socialization of industries

in a Europe, decimated by torture, executions, famine and disease. Civilization began to make mighty strides when, from being a nomad and wanderer on the face of the earth, man began to settle on definite spaces of land in the neolithic days. Has not Europe become again a lost continent of Wanderers? Even in Great Britain there has been a great transportation of peoples, so that the political constituencies have a different population from what they had before the war and the process of holding a General Election requires a study on novel methods of performing the duties of a citizen.

But there is more to be said than that in seeking to gauge the significance of the present time. The facts hitherto quoted shew a Europe in sad disarray and confusion. The mass deportation of a people, inaugurated in the case of the Ukraine by Marshal Stalin before the war, has been carried by the Germans to such a pitch of subtle brutality and unblushing cruelty that former populations in Europe have very largely altered their abode. Men and women who have never strayed beyond their native village have embarked on strange seas to behold fresh and hitherto unknown countries. Bombing has blasted our cities and hindered rail transportation—still a fundamental factor in the life of a civilised society. Rationing has equalized the life of different ranks and classes, and in Great Britain the lordly palace is transferred to the safe keeping of the National Trust. Domestic servants refuse to be kept in a condition that anywhere approached helotry and as the cry is for “Work for all” there will be no further need of a “Theory of the Leisure Class.” These and such like tendencies surely show that the times are ripe and even “rotten-ripe” for change. But this certainly means as well that the change, when it does come, must be staggering and complete. To borrow the phraseology of the old Scottish proverb, a “stey brae” can always be confronted by a “stout heart.” To-day, however, there are important signs that the

“stout heart” is not always forthcoming. There are indications indeed, that we are facing a close of a time. Europe had begun to despair of the future of civilization itself.

To take an example that comes readily to the mind—the decline of the birth-rate. This is specially important as it refers to the genetic side of a nation’s life and this, as was noted in the table of sociological factors at the end of the first Chapter, exercises a fundamental influence in national good health and progress. Now in this connection is highly significant that before the war nine of the leading countries of Europe, Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland), Sweden, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Denmark and Czechoslovakia had birth-rates below replacement level. In other countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland the birth-rate was only just above replacement level, but then there is the further fact to be kept in mind that even in these countries the birth-rate had been tending to decline for many years. In many respects the Soviet population was exhibiting contrary tendencies to the rest in that, before the war, it was growing at the rate of 30 per cent. per generation. What does this portend as regards the future, say of Russia and England? Estimates have been made that if Russia continues to grow as it did before the war, its population at the end of the present century will have increased from 170,000,000 to 300,000,000. Whereas Britain, if we adopt the estimate made by Dr. Enid Charles in 1935, will have fallen by the end of the present century from 42,000,000 to some 22,250,000, so that in 100 years, if the process of decline still goes on, the number of the population will be 4,500,000. Are not such figures as these worthy of prolonged and serious thought?

Of course it may be replied that this is a trouble which is not incapable of remedy and, children’s allowances may be advocated as a policy for stimulating births. It is, however, fortunately possible not to minimize the importance of chil-

dren's allowances, and yet to contend that this policy only touches the fringe of a great and serious fall in the spirit of a civilization. In the ancient Rome it was the decline of the birth-rate that heralded a civilization's decay, and in many respects the age of to-day finds its counterpart in the latter years of the declining Roman Empire. An unsettled feeling about the future had taken hold of our time. Dangers like misty wreaths revealed themselves as hanging in the air. How could anyone desire to expose their offspring to such all-surrounding terrors? Appeasement was only a desperate device which accounted for a few seconds of tranquillity. If you threw a sop to Cerberus, the dog will spring at you all the more fiercely once your mouthful has disappeared within its terrible jaws.

What is the cause of it all? How can we get at the dominating factor in this malaise of European civilization? To make any sort of satisfying enquiry we must have recourse to our fundamental viewpoints, and first, to that of territory and population in the Europe of to-day! As we gaze at the territorial expanse of the European Continent, we ask ourselves from whence does there come the unsettling influence which has reduced such a large extent of space to chaos and confusion? And the answer to such a crucial question comes swiftly and surely that it is from Germany that there comes such an unsettling influence and Germany in so far as it is influenced by Prussian military traditions, is a nation of the Plain. From the beginning, as has been previously shewn, the German tribes settled in the North of Europe, went boring into the haunts of the tribes that surrounded them. Afterwards there was the more specialized *Drang nach Osten*. But then those drives were only instinctive. They were the result of a landlocked people seeking the open sea or a denizen of a plain, obeying his impulse to rest nowhere in an abiding habitation. The characteristic of the period before the war of 1914 and of the interlude between the two great

European wars is that then, these instinctive impulses became crystallized into a general theory. First political geography was brought into the calculations. The theory was developed of a larger "Deutschland" or "Mittel-Europa," the extent of which was guaranteed by a certain homogeneity in geographical features and in the natural lay of the land within the scheduled area. But then the "Big Deutschland" or "Mittel-Europa" even if it could be fully attained, would only be a static conception. It would possess no dynamic power or tendency which would lead it fatally forward in the way of encroachment. Indeed, the last shots had hardly been fired in the War of 1914 when Political Geography began to be superseded by Geo-politics and the claim for adjoining districts, geographically similar, by the more sinister doctrine of the "Lebensraum."

The geo-politician however, when he had completely rounded up his theories, was immensely more ambitious than the political geographer. The latter saw the summit of his aspirations in "Mittel-Europa"; the former extended the scope of his speculations until at length they came to cover the whole world. To do this he divided the peoples into "dynamic powers" and "decaying powers." Germany was an example of the first; France was an example of the second. The "dynamic power" had a vigorous consciousness of its destiny. It was all alive, and agog for more Lebensraum. The "decaying power" had lost its belief in the future; and as evidence of this the theorist quoted from Europe the general fall of the birth-rate. Of course the general fall applied to Germany as well. But that did not discourage the theorists. They pointed out that Germany possessed the dynamic power to turn that fall into a rise. They would reverse previous tendencies. They would through the agency of a Fuehrer adopt all manner of device to secure an increasing population. At the end the "dynamic" nations were reduced to two. Mussolini was hurled from his

throne in Italy, and only Germany and Japan were left to assume the role of leadership and to guide the peoples of the world straight on in a new direction. For that was another product of these ambitious speculations—the idea of the “Fuehrer” or leader-nations. The dynamic nation was to lead all the others within the orbit of its influence. A certain amount of what might be termed independence might indeed be allowed to them. But economically they would be in subjection. They would only be satellites circling eternally round their parent orb.

But what about Russia, the other big nation of the plain? Had it ceased to be a centre of disturbance and unrest? Not entirely. It is true that Bismarck by a somewhat cynical system of diplomatic insurance and re-insurance had contrived to some extent to allay the menacing actuality of the Russian menace to Europe. But he had not wholly removed it. In the days of William II. it still bulked largely in the imagination of the German people, and it must ever be remembered that the proximate cause of the German declaration of a “State of emergency” in 1914 was a partial mobilisation on the part of Russia. Nor were the German apprehensions completely unjustified as was clearly shown when the Russians embodied their designs and aspirations in Secret Compacts with their allies, namely the Sazonoff-Paleologue agreement, the Sykes-Picot treaty and the treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne—concluded in 1915, 1916 and 1917. “In these agreements” says K. Zilliacus “the British and French approved the annexation by Russia of Constantinople, the West coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, Southern Thrace up the Eros-Midia line, the Coasts of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus, the river Saakaria and a point to be determined later on the Gulf of Jonia, the Islands of the Sea of Marmara and Imbros and Tenedos. In return Russia agreed to the incorporation of the ‘neutral’ or ‘intermediate’ zone in Persia in the British

sphere of influence." No wonder that Turkey pursues a policy of cautious vigilance to-day.

Perhaps it may be replied that all this is past and forgotten history. The Bolshevists have abjured these unfortunate secret agreements. Russia is a changed nation and has purged her soul? But has she? . . . We must never forget that Russia was not only the proximate cause of the last war, but she was the proximate cause of the present war. If there is anything clear in the German diplomatic documents and despatches that preceded the present war, it is this that Hitler's military advisers had persuaded their Fuehrer into a refusal of war on two fronts. It was only when he had manœuvred Russia into an agreement which left him free to pursue his nefarious designs on the rest of Europe, that he declared the decks clear for an act of wanton aggression. Now what does this Russo-German agreement of 1939 ultimately signify? Before this through the agency of its Third International and its Communist parties scattered throughout the length and breadth of Europe, Russian Bolshevism had worked in the cause of International solidarity. By the Russo-German agreement, Marshal Stalin abandoned the working-class movements in Europe to the dominating wrath of Hitler and switched Russia into a policy where not the case of Communism or the interests of the workers was the prime consideration, but, above all and before all, the national interests of Russia. And if Bolshevik Russia thus became the guardian of predominant national interests, did she not thereby succeed to the national aspirations of a nation of the plain? Or if not to-day, why not in a to-morrow, when other men and other minds shall be the champions of her destinies? Such questions as these can never be banned from our purview when it is the question of the search for an altogether free Europe alongside a Russia which by that time may have numbered more than 200,000,000 of people.

Still, and for the time being, it was Germany that showed

the nations of the plain still to be the unsettling forces requiring to be watched if any progress was to be made in the direction of a free Europe. Progress, it is true, is never in a simply linear direction. You do not go fatally forward, here a little and there a little, so that every step gained is thoroughly consolidated and becomes a stepping stone for a further progress a few inches ahead. Historical progress in any particular civilisation may be likened to a spiral rather than to a straight line. There are epochs of advance and epochs of criticism. In the epochs of criticism, there are grave troubles revealed in the path of the oncoming advance. It may seem at times, that the advance has been arrested, that civilisation had only turned its back to the contemplation of its former glories. But in reality the spirit of history is never wholly at rest. Even when it turns its back and it is still turning, we can generally anticipate the day when its frontal gate will again be directed to the rising sun.

The characteristic of the National Socialist movement in Germany, however, is that it has so accentuated a natural "ricorsi," or movement in a reverse direction that all traces of former moorings appear to be disappearing and the epoch in which we live looks, in Europe at least, more like the end of a whole civilisation than an unvariable prelude to another step in advance. We have already referred to its altogether nomad character. Its populations appear to be continually moving. The aeroplane has annihilated space. But the import of the present blow to civilisation can more clearly be shewn by a consideration of the deeds done by the National Socialist armies and officials as they made their progress through Europe. Always and invariably they struck at the higher categories of historical progress—at political development and scientific advance. To take the last first, it cannot be forgotten that when the Germans established themselves in Czecho-Slovakia they at once began an attack on the Czech schools, the Universities, the Press and broadcasting. This

attack as far as the Universities were concerned, reached its climax in November, 1939, when, in the wake of a students' riot in Prague, all the Czech universities were closed. In Poland, also, all the Polish universities and chosen schools of academic importance, as well as all secondary schools, have been closed. Polish children can only have an elementary education under strict German supervision and afterwards some of them may attend trade or technical schools. "In November, 1939" according to an objective account submitted to the London International Assembly "170 professors of the ancient university of Cracow, which was founded in 1364, were arrested and sent to the notorious concentration camp of Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen. Seventeen of them died as the result of the ill-treatment to which they were subjected. In August 1941, after the Germans had occupied Lwow, sixty professors were taken to a concentration camp; Professor Kazimierz Bartel, a former Polish Minister, was summarily executed." In Luxembourg education was prostituted so as to influence uninformed minds in a direction predetermined by their instructor and to the exclusion of all influences which might foster the critical faculty or any sense of initiative. "The Germans do everything," says the report already quoted "to appeal to the uninformed minds of their pupils and concentrate in the elementary schools on physical training, singing and teaching history, through Nazi spectacles. The songs the children sing come from the repertoire of the Hitler Youth. Moreover, children shewing special aptitude for Nazi teaching are selected for further educational training in the New Hauptschule. Even a modicum of French is never taught in the secondary schools, and it is not unusual for a child of 12 to speak better French than the German professor."

Quite evidently then, the idea of the Germans was to reduce the population of Europe to the position of automata. There would be no independent thought. There would be no

capacity of reaction to the instruction of their taskmasters. There would no inclination to clamour for a better fate. In France, where the Third Republic had worked out an excellent system of education which gave equal opportunities to all without class distinction, all this good work was trampled under feet. "We were ordered," said a French teacher, "to leave out all moral teaching and to reduce the number of hours devoted to history and geography . . . The new order which the Germans are attempting to impose on France has, as its obvious aim, the desire to make our children ignorant beings who, without power of judgment will become the slaves of Germany without demur." Of course it may be said that the policy of Hitlerism tended to make the great body of the people automata as well. They had to think as Hitler thought. They had their instructions bellowed out to them from those loud speakers which, on any great occasion, such as a speech by the Fuehrer are omni-present in every German town and village. But then they are well fed—at least they were up to the time these lines were written. Their lessons are taught them in the name of national aggrandisement. They are flattered as Herrenvolk who are destined by Providence to lord it over their fellows. Their emotional self expands by reason of such enlarging hopes and the loot their soldiers carry away from invaded lands is a further confirmation of the claim that they are the destined heirs of all the ages. The consequence is that, though they too are in a manner slaves, they are contented slaves at that. The golden chains that fetter a Nazi troop leader are not apparent enough to gall him.

This convenient emotional receptivity, however, has one great and disturbing disadvantage. It is sometimes manifested in sudden outbursts of irrational obsessions which, spreading like a fatal contagion, from mind to mind, make a whole population act like one possessed, because they have become deaf to any appeals made in the name of reason and

humanity. The import of this can be pretty well shewn when we remember what is revealed from one of our viewpoints that political progress is achieved only when the State becomes pluralistic and when the people, through the people's legislature, acquire an intelligent influence on the course of events. But how do they acquire and maintain such an influence? By the fact that in a pluralist State there are all sorts of institutions, all kinds of different societies and associations which make up a discerned and informed public opinion, and which enable the vague aspirations of the one to be deepened and strengthened by the combined wisdom of the many. That is the only way to create a valuable "general will." A merely undifferentiated mass of voters may reach a result which is far inferior to that which could have been reached by the work of one of its individual constituents. Yet it is just this merely undifferentiated mass of voters which appeared to be the ultimate ambition of that Nazi political philosophy which is making such a sorry sight of so many countries of Europe.

Europe exists to-day, indeed, in a period of grave reaction, more complete and inherently hopeless than is discovered generally in a period of "ricorsi" or the critical rebound from a previous period of progress. It is more like the end of an epoch than the entrance of a new social life. How completely this could be substantiated can be shewn from the proceedings of the Nazis in the case of Norway. Here, on the basis of the crude Hitlerian dogma of race was indeed a Nordic country. Surely, therefore, on the principles of the Fuehrer, it should have been given all the privileges of the Herrenvolk. But after vainly trying to induce the Norwegian people to acclaim with gladness the Nazi faith, the German Reichskommissar, Terboven, proceeded straightaway to impose on this Nordic people a rule of slavery. He put back the clock of progress. He abolished all these political freedoms which always mark a high attainment and the development

of veritable nationhood. All the political parties were dissolved, with the exception of one which was called the Nesjonal Samling, and which was organised on Nazi lines. But although it adopted the sacred name of "National," this Samling was to have nothing distinctively national about it. Instead of that its members were to wear the German black uniform, and each of them was obliged to take an oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler, Leader of the "Germanics." Out of 25,000 boys, the 1929 age group, nearly 6,000 was called up, for a Nazi political Youth School. The Kommissar for Justice usurped the right to appoint and dismiss judges, and when the members of the Norwegian Supreme Court resigned as a body in protest, they were replaced by a new corps composed entirely of Quisling nominees. The Trade Union Council and the individual Trade Unions were placed under the control of Quisling Kommissars; and to shew that their antipathy was not simply directed against Workers' Associations, but against all manifestation of freely combined activity, the Nazis further banned the Norwegian Employers' Association and the Norwegian Craftsmen Association. Then to cap everything, and to shew how completely Europe had entered on an epoch where everything was to be cast into a melting pot, Quisling himself, the first of a degraded and discredited type, took powers to amend the Norwegian Constitution by simple decree.

From the view points of territory and population, then, it is perfectly clear that Europe has been uprooted, and its population split up into disintegrated units which have been deprived of all the influences that can heighten and vivify their intellectual life. Most of them have no settled habitat they can call their own, and where they can collect, as in a friendly home, their scattered thoughts. The German soldier goes first to Russia, then he may be switched to Italy and lastly he burrows in the ground in the effort to protect himself against bombers of

the Western Front. His wife goes to a factory and is changed to another as her first factory is visited by the enemy aeroplanes. His boys are trained in the way of grace in a Nazi Youth Movement, and when the family by any chance are flung together, the parents shiver lest one incautious word might lead their offspring to denounce them to an all-observing GESTAPO. The environment is one of fear, suspicion, and well-grounded apprehension. If you utter only one untimely protest, the place that once you occupied will henceforth know you no more. If, in the natural kindness of your heart, you offer some dainty to a British prisoner of war, you are punished for having a mind of your own, or if you are a Polish girl proffering a cake to a British prisoner you will be cruelly and brutally beaten. Germany appropriates willingly her unearned increment as an industrial power and other peoples are either agricultural serfs or are slaves toiling at a factory. What a Europe it is? And how, amid the unlovely cinders of this barren and blasted land, can we cherish any abiding thought for a free Europe in the days to come?

Indeed from the ultimate view point of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the European continent seems to have passed into an entirely hopeless condition. Society has been split up into antagonistic units. In the early days of civilisation man shivered in the presence of an unknown power. He struggled to protect himself by incredibly restrictive taboo. To-day over Europe fear, suspicion, cruelty, hatred, revenge, and the sadistic pleasure of the torturer, abound all over the land. Every device is used by the occupying German to set section against section and race against race. Serb is excited against Croat, and Slovene against Serb. The Flemming is spurred on to suspect the Wallon. The heroic Greek people are distracted by bitter internal rivalry. There is no great hope offered to the mind of man—no suggestion of any end to this period of unaccommodating rivalry and struggle. On the contrary

war is exalted as the predominant force in civilisation. Any nation which manifests a spirit of love and mercy is doomed to degradation and failure. It has already been pointed out that, if Europe is to be guided to larger issues, the economic side of life must be under some measure of blind control, because straight rivalries tend to set one country against its neighbour, and competition rather than co-operation has hitherto been the motto of its progress. But the Nazi philosophy of to-day is not content simply to sublimate its competitive instinct under the name of commercial progress and national gain. It openly avows its design of domination. The master race is to lord it over the rest. There never will be a time when the lion will lie down in peace with the lamb. Otherwise the lion's claws might be blunted by disuse. Unyielding conflict, the conflict that brings an enemy to his knees, is the eternal condition of the world's progress. Religion is much worse than an "opium of the people." It is a delusion and a snare and its elevated values are a weakening and enervation of the human race. Politics, with its trust in the ultimate attainment of an instructive "general will" implies a misunderstanding of human capacity. Even a Nazi trooper—the beau-ideal of a master race—must entrust his soul to the very doubtful custody of its Fuehrer.

With such tendencies afloat, then, no wonder that the birth rate has been falling throughout the nations of Europe. If the Nazi philosophy is true, what is there in the prospect ahead to guarantee the enduring welfare of our children? What Europe needs is a thorough reconstruction. First things must be put first. Cultural and spiritual values must take their true and leading position. Not mere territorial size of a nation, but its possession of tapped or untapped economic wealth, should be its leading qualification as a guide to a free Europe of the future. The small nation, as has often previously been remarked, may be small in material but great in its spiritual gifts. Two countries may be kindred in race

and language, but they may be poles asunder in religion and national spirit. It is a leading platitude of our own age that the future of Europe lies in the hands of the big nations economically, that is to say, the British Commonwealth and Empire, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and China. Proximately that may be entirely true. A first necessity of Europe, if civilisation is to be saved, is to attend to the demands of mere life. Famine has to be subdued. Disease has to be combated. The living standards of the people have to be raised. The supply of raw materials should be internationally regulated and controlled. Overwhelming forces have to be found to keep peace safe for the future. In all this work the big nations have the decided advantage. They profit by their "unearned increment" of economic power. They possess within their bounds most of the sources of economic advantage. But so far as Europe is concerned, the four principally mentioned must be reckoned as extra-European. China is frankly Asiatic. The U.S.A. has a whole hemisphere within which to deploy its energies. The U.S.S.R. would not cut the dash it does if it had no Asiatic dominions to supplement it in a great emergency. But Britain—is it not an integral part of Europe? Certainly it is so far as the British Isles are concerned; yet it may be doubted whether, if Europe is to get together as a main inspiration for the world of cultural enlightenment, the other nations of the European continent would suffer the assent of Great Britain to any common action made necessary by their interests as a whole, to be dependent on the consent of the Dominions and India. It was said, for example that the action of Sir Austin Chamberlain in rejecting the Geneva Protocol of 1924 was motived by a refusal of Dominion support for its provisions. Now the Geneva Protocol would have had its chiefest effect in Europe, and it is quite certain that the nations of Europe would not be willing that such a recoil from ratification should be possible once again.

Of course there must be international action in the future and there are spheres relating to defence against aggression and the material needs of life in which the big nations must play a preponderant part. But it is from Europe that there have emerged the higher values of civilisation, as it is from European nations that there has emerged the depreciation of these higher values which has led to the collapse of the whole fabric of a continent. In Europe nations will draw to one another because of their spiritual affinities. It is useless to say that ideology will have no influence in determining whether a nation shall join with its neighbour or not. If one nation encourages initiative and the other does not, there is a division between them which is more profound and far reaching than any blood brotherhood or any likeness which is founded wholly or chiefly on a common race. If one nation trusts its destinies to the decision of an instructed people and the other to an irresponsible leader it is the latter rather than the former that would be likely with a light heart to consign its nationals as cannon fodder to the hazards and dangers of war. It is in Europe where the opportunity now presents itself of constructing a new civilisation because it is in Europe where the highest values of the old civilisation have been most conspicuously manifested. No more trifling and patching will meet such an emergency and it is only if a union or unions of the peace-loving nations of Europe are able to exert their proper and equitable influence that we can any of us look with the highest hope to a renovated future for civilisation.

It is this emergence of primitive and brutal instincts that is so serious, and it is their revivication which makes it so impossible to harbour any talk of simply mending the present impasse in our affairs. Most clamorous among the wrongs crying to be righted is the use which Nazi philosophy has made of the crusade against the Jews. To Hitler a Jew is somewhat of a symbolic figure. On the Jewish race he pours in profusion

all the wrath of his Nordic contempt and scorn. To hate you must have a personalized object of your hatred. To preach a gospel of racial hatred you must embody your abstract terminology in creatures of flesh and blood. So Hitler sees the trail of the Semite everywhere—in religion and finance, in Europe and America. If he desires to shew that Nordic Britain must now be resisted, he tells his followers that the former mighty nation is fallen into the tainted hands of the Jewish plutocracy. If he feels confident that France will be overwhelmed by his legions he informs us that she has allowed her destinies to be directed by the Jews. If Bolshevism is regarded as the sin above all others, it is because he remembers that Karl Marx was a Jew. The Jew indeed has become to Nazi philosophy, and to the many young men who have been educated in its tenets, a kind of lay figure, an embodied object of wrath on whose head has descended all the curses of the time. Yet this gospel of hate is what makes our time so dangerous—so that the least touch might make its factors disintegrate into elements hopelessly sundered. What is needed is not the recognition of one or two great collections of people to map out policy for the rest because large bodies of men have an opinion of no greater value than their least common measure. That is to say, they may become uncertain and unruly, and then they cry out for a dictator to keep them in place and tune. It is from the small nation and the voluntary association that there comes the breath and promise of a new life. Society needs to be revived. Europe must be built on a new basis. The new wine must not be confined in the old bottles. A dictator suspects the voluntary association of free men and women. A Fuehrer has no desire to see the workers gather together in their Trade Unions to survey the whole face of industry. The corporate State is ruled in all its corners from above. Goethe flourished not in Prussia but in Weimar. If Europe is to be redeemed, it must be a process of self-redemption. Small nations must gain new hope and heart. The liberties of the

Atlantic Charter must become more than empty aspirations. The gospel of hate must lose its ancient power. A new rallying call must be given to Europe. Ancient things must fade away into the minds of the past and the smaller units made kindred in most cases by companionship in danger and misfortune, must join with each other in a unified Europe, where each of them retains command of its own peculiar individuality, embodied in its own culture, and its own characteristic efflorescence of national institutions and laws.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM VIEWPOINT TO REALITY

HERETO we have been dealing mainly with abstractions— weaker extracts from the great boiling maelstrom of reality. Not that any abstract viewpoints have been formulated that have no reference at all to reality. They have all been based on historical deductions, they have beheld their justifications in the running current of events. But these suggestions have yet to be clothed with particular and contemporary means. The lifeless categories have to be invested with the needful flesh and blood. The viewpoints have to get into a settled position in the revolutionary world around us. For reality is constantly in motion. As Heraclitus put it, the world is a becoming; the river of the Fates is furiously flowing along.

There can be no doubt, at any rate, that the latter description, in view of what has been written in the last chapter, is particularly apt in relation to the world of to-day. Europe is a chessboard in which the pieces are continually changing from here to there, or from one part of the continent to another. You say that White Ruthenia or Little Russia shall be directed in the future with regard to the wishes of their inhabitants; but who will be their inhabitants when the day for such a plebiscite has dawned? Armies have passed through these tortured domains during the period of the war. Villages have seen their headmen hurried off as hostages. Mass deportation has revived the memory of barbarian invasions which variegated the years gone by. Culture, toleration, these voluntary combinations wherein the weakness of one becomes the united strength of all, have all been sucked down into this maelstrom

of primitive passions. How are we to get on the track of these fortunate footways which alone can lead us on the plain and palpable path from slavery to freedom?

For that there must be some indication, even though it may be fitful and faint, of such plain and palpable footpaths, should be taken for granted even in such a revolutionary time as undoubtedly confronts us to-day. A revolution that is to end in aught that is substantial and lasting cannot totally cut itself off from all that has preceded it. It cannot shake everything into confusion and expect that some day, somehow, the disordered elements will range themselves into a new and more fascinating pattern. Indeed nothing that is either new or more approved can possibly emerge from a period of simple riotings and chaos. Or even, if there is no rioting and little chaos but some hastily conceived constitution which takes no account of the existing footpaths can there be the chance of anything resulting to endure the blasts of a fixed and irrepressible fate. So it was, for example, in the Cromwellian Revolution, when England, having abolished her House of Lords, and, with many enquiries and discussions into the true basis of a Commonwealth, had submitted to a rule of the Major Generals, thereafter acclaimed the gay King Charles, just as if the sterner regime that preceded it had never revealed its overwhelming might. So also it was with the Fascist regime of Mussolini. It looked back to the past indeed, but to a past in Imperial Rome so different and to a people of such a completely diversified strain that no way could be devised for adequately finding a firm foothold in present reality. So it passed away—vanished like a dream—and Italy finds her pleasure to-day in tracing out the old footpaths which have been well nigh obliterated in the days of the former regime.

This means, however, as has already been pointed out, that when the days of the war are mercifully over and Europe is contemplating what remains of her ancient institutions in the breathing time which succeeds the blitz, there can be no

question of again operating the Wilsonian maxims of "self determination" or of elevating the plebiscite to the rank of a major maxim of policy. Deported populations indeed, will tend to break loose from the bondage which has been imposed on them. Prisoners of war will flee away with a good heart from the sight of their chains. Many of these, if they do reach their former abode, may find that others are already in possession; and the second may have the rougher experience of discovering that the pleasant village in which they first saw the light has become a place of scattered and almost undistinguishable ruins. In such a case Europe might contain a medley of enraged and disillusioned men and women who could only complicate and impede the task of clearing up the path to freedom. The former viewpoints of "plebiscites and self-determination," though defensible in themselves, will be inapplicable to the confusions of the workaday reality; and the only way out will be the effort to view the new Europe on the basis of the pre-war boundaries of state and populations.

Now what was the general layout of the pre-war Europe as it was planned at the conferences that succeeded the contest of 1914? In Western Europe, except that Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France, it followed for the most part the ancient boundaries. In Eastern Europe, for reasons which already have been given, the boundaries have not been so firmly fixed in the past and of course had to be subject to plebiscites and to the balancing of various historical considerations in order to lay down the lines of the future. Yet in spite of much difference of opinion and many serious difficulties, the lines of a new Europe were ultimately laid and the first question which must be put is this, how far does the new configuration consist of nation-states which, as we have already seen, have a most developed result of political evolution?

The answer is that the nation-state, with its democratic

constitution seemed after the last war to be triumphing all along the line. Germany, Czecho-slovakia and Poland, the most important states to summon constituent assemblies found their exemplars in approved democratic models, the constitutions of Britain, France and the United States of America. The people were recognised as the primary Court of Appeal. The legislative was exalted over the executive and the judicial. That is to say and in planning for the future, the political structure of society was regarded as more important than the economic. Genetic questions involving the trends of populations were not regarded at all.

This attention paid to the political was all very well in its way as has been perfectly apparent from the considerations adduced in the course of the preceding chapters. Politics aim at adjusting and improving the economy of the community. Its democratic ideal is to enlist all the populations in the self conscious service of the state. Its most characteristic agency of progress is the voluntary association where the common aim of all is the conscious reference of each. Its societies of states, because based on territory, should ultimately encircle the whole globe; but it seeks to realise this ambition not by competition and conquest but by toleration, compromise, and concord. That was why, under the influence of this political trend of thought, a League of Nations or as the French call it, a Society of Nations, was founded as a result of the last war.

But there was one influence that was fitted to dispel all such golden dreams and that was the unsettling influence of the economic. After all economic satisfaction lies at the basis of the contentment of a community. It is not correct to say that in the past economic motives have always been decisive in the progress of history. Indeed in the nineteenth century, when Great Britain was the leading power, the tendency was to rail off business, so that it should be free from state interference and control and be delivered up to the unregulated power of

competition and then "the devil take the hindmost." That meant that it was under the influence of this order of thought that the end of the last war arrived and this also accounts for the fact that while the planners of Versailles exalted political considerations in the configuration of the new Europe, they were satisfied to leave the continent, in the economic field to the unregulated influence of competition. Accordingly, the unregulated economics ultimately undid the good that had been gained by the more regulated advance of politics. States that were independent politically became dependent industrially. Small countries that tried to form economic unions to make up for their industrial inferiority, were prevented from doing so by bigger nations who were able to make their will prevail because of that unearned increment of industrial power which they possessed by reason of the extent of their territories and the mineral wealth which was therein contained. The gold standard, which was London's mode of steadying finance in the nineteenth century, proved insufficient in the twentieth. Instead of featuring as partners in a political society of nations the countries of Europe beheld themselves in a condition of commercial rivalry. There was no such friendly and fraternal spirit such as might have incited the industrial nations of the west to improve by mutual trade the purchasing power of the nations of the agricultural east. There was a race for raw materials and a desire to get a preferential path to the regions where these raw materials were to be discovered. In the progress of this economic descent into the abyss, exchange restrictions, quotas, and blocked marks, became the evidence to what an extent political unity had been sidetracked by economic disunity and disagreement. The influence of the League of Nations was steadily weakening and Europe was drifting hopelessly into that ultimate state of disorder which has already been described in the last chapter. The international combine, trusts or cartels, which had perforce to be formed were fashioned in their own interests and did not

shrink from putting these particular interests above the interests of the community.

This reference to international cartels, however, brings to mind another unsettling division—that between national and international planning. It is evident from the argumentation in previous chapters that, for the completest economy and efficiency in economic planning, nothing less extensive than an international area will suffice. Raw materials are found all over the globe. Only an international authority can effectively regulate their control and distribution. Of course that international authority will have its national and regional agencies. But, during these years between the wars, when economic progress had been largely left unregulated the tendency had been for the municipality to give way to the region, the region to the nation, and the nation to the international cartel in response to certain distinct and definite demands of economic planners. And always these demands were directed to the elimination of the evils of uncontrolled or inadequately controlled compositions, because of the chaos thereby produced, and the perils arising from this cause, which forever menaced the security of any free Europe. In the end, however, in an economic regime where such a body as the I.L.O. even when it had been constituted, had no adequate influence over the national governments of Europe, it was certain that Nationalism, the exaggeration of the purely national authority, would stake a claim to triumph over internationalism in economic affairs. That, as has already been shown, is the significance of Hitlerism in the economic history of Europe. As there was no acknowledgment of a regulating economic authority internationally the nation must become the sole and self sufficient economic authority. For the raw materials which its territories did not furnish within their own boundaries, some substitute must be demanded of synthetic chemistry. Or where it was necessary to have some assistance without its own bounds, the national industrial strength, expressed in the

power of its armaments, must be used to reduce such countries to a condition of dependent helotry. So it was that Germany planned to surround herself with a Europe of satellite nations of no industrial efficiency, but which in the future should act as agricultural lion providers to meet her own insatiable demand and requirements.

By this time then it appears crystal clear that for the nation states which our viewpoints have shown are requisite for a free Europe, to function efficiently without the risk of heading towards conflict and care, it is necessary to have that perfected balance between international and national economic planning which is the only infallible road to success. Motives which are purely economic are by this planning governed and restrained. It is they which tend to make my interest conflict with yours or to incite my nation to acquire a slice of your nation's territory. Individuals imagine it their highest title to fame to bring off a clever deal. To get on in the world, even if you trample on others in the process, is a guarantee of enduring happiness and prosperity. Individualism in economics is founded on individualism in philosophy for the hedonist has never been able to give an adequate vindication of the development from egoism to altruism. Only if your political development is a social development, that is to say, that the political carries with it a benefit to my country as well as yours, can there be any hope or certainty for the free Europe. And as from its very nature economic science is concerned with quantitative objects which, under a regime of uncontrolled competition tend to be unequally distributed among men and nations thereby producing discontent and often disaster, it is necessary that the planning should be so comprehensive and complete that the risk of economic catastrophe and revolution should for ever be removed. Indeed the ideal for the economic functioning of such a free Europe must ever be that it should ultimately become entirely automatic. Markets could be expanded to the utmost extent but supply must be accurately

equated to the demand; and the resultant leisure should be applied to forwarding all the highest demands and purposes of life.

Of course it will be at once objected that perfect planning involves the servile state. Men become automatons; the worker is only a robot moved about by his controlling machinery. And if the state were only an economic state and economic machinery the sole directive of international affairs, that criticism, while relatively would also be absolutely just. But in the nation-state, the economic must be subordinate to the political, and the political ranges over a larger and much more ultimately valuable region of human life and thought. In the free Europe of the future the use that a man makes of his leisure will be much more important for the ultimate interests of his country than the use he makes of his working hours. Politics will bring in its conception of democracy to supplement by its freedom any automatism which may be engendered in his economic life.

Is it possible, then, to detect in the troubled and disorderly Europe of to-day any influence of political democracy in the operations of international relief and rehabilitation? Of course, a period of war is a very unfavourable epoch for the triumph of democracy. The soldier has to move as and where he is bid. "His not to make reply." The Bevin boys have no choice of profession or regiment. They have to descend, whether they like it or not, far down in the depths of the mine. Yet all the time, in Great Britain at least, the Ministry of Labour has allowed itself to be reached by an Advisory Committee formed in equal proportion of employers and workers. Furthermore, in electing these representatives, the voluntary associations of masters and men are recognised as the electors, and thus the voluntary association which, as has already been pointed out, is an essential constituent of the completed nation-state, is also brought directly into contact with the central control and government. Also, in the several controls which

dovetail the operation of industrial rearmament, there is provision made for democratic consultations of the representatives of the workers. All this is in the nature of moderating that autocracy which is to a large extent inherent in perfectly successful economic planning ; and though it is but a beginning, it is at the same time a real beginning. Besides, it must be remembered that the exalted ideals of political democracy react back again on the industrial workers and somewhat reconcile them to tolerating cheerfully any appearance of ordering from above which at first sight makes economic planning somewhat similar to Hitlerism. I may not like the dust, grime, and discomfort which attaches to work in a mine, but if I am persuaded that I am thereby urging forward Europe on the road to freedom, then the irksome duty may become a welcome task performed with alacrity, joyfulness, and hope. And if, in the free Europe of the future, this task which superficially seems so unpleasant is only a smaller part of that cultured leisured employment where the life of one interpenetrates with the lives of all, then it will be seen that there is no danger of Europe degenerating into a collection of servile states.

Nay, there is even more to be said than this. Hitherto the argument has been based on tendencies in Great Britain, but there are traces of democratic influence in the planning of a wider international arena. A successful revolution is never completely cut off from the past. It is only the village "natural" who lives in an isolated world of his own. Thus it is that out of the wreck of the old League of Nations, only the I.L.O. has come down to us practically unscathed. Now what is the work of the I.L.O.? According to its own scheme of activity, it might well be considered to cover the whole area of International reconstruction but it would be better to limit it to Point 5 of the Atlantic Charter, and to say that it "desires to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved

labour standards, economic advancement and social security." Bearing in mind, then, this end of its endeavours, it is significant that it has already been brought into connection with U.N.R.A.A., the international organisation for the temporary relief and rehabilitation of the world generally, but which all the same will have the most important field of its operations in Europe. And the task before U.N.R.A.A. as may be gathered from our previous chapter, will be by no means unimportant or easy. The European Regional Committee and Council has technical sub-committees discussing any measures of relief and rehabilitation which will probably be needed in the various European countries as they are liberated from the enemy. These have to consider the needs of the people of such liberated countries in the matters of health and clothing, and in order that such countries may make a beginning of providing for themselves, to undertake the important task of restoring industrial and agricultural production. Obviously the biggest problem before such a European Regional Committee will be that which was dealt with in the last chapter, the resettlement of the mass of people displaced from their homes because of the war. Incidentally it is estimated that, excluding Russia, the number so displaced is between twenty millions and thirty millions. The association or dovetailing of the I.L.O. in such a body as this will ensure that in the international economic field regard is to be paid to "improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security." That is to say the economic advancement shall not be gained by that one-sided competition which tends to exalt the few at the expense of the many, the big industrial nations at the expense of its poorer agricultural partners, but shall be one where the good of all shall be consistent with the good of each.

Of course such bodies as U.N.R.A.A. or the Internees and Displaced Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission are temporary bodies which have not yet assumed their permanent form but in the efforts that have already been made to

form such permanent functional bodies with, it may be presumed, European Regional Sub-Committees there is also an acknowledgment, at first very halting and hesitating, of the part that may be played in them by the I.L.O. Partly this initial hesitation may be owing to the fact that in the approach to a more developed economic planning which shall annul the evils of competition, the employer, who owes his position to a cash balance or to merely financial manipulation, is bound to disappear, and thus the tripartite composition of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. may be profoundly modified. Indeed even now it is significant that Russia does not participate in its conferences, and as Russia must certainly ultimately be included, the effort to smoothen out its entrance must entail a re-examination of the fundamental tenets of the I.L.O. Constitution. Of course it is impossible, in a general and mainly theoretic examination like this to lay down in detail a scheme for the future economic government of the post-war world. The method of sociology is the method of trial and error. Bodies are proposed with certain objects and a definite composition. If they succeed in coping with the complex forces which constitute social reality they become more or less permanent. If they fail, they pass easily away into the forgotten past. And unless the effort is to be of no effect there must be many variant proposals. It is only out of the fruitful clash of competing varieties that the final result can be reached.

Yet already in the steps which have been taken to establish a Food and Agricultural organisation of the United Nations⁴ there lurks the possibility of distinct dangers ahead. The I.L.O., although it made formal application to be represented at the United Nations Conference, was not so invited and subsequently its Acting Director received from the Government of the United States a communication expressing regret that "under the particular circumstances under which the Conference was held, it appeared advisable to confine representation

strictly to Governments and National Authorities." Now this refusal may not mean that the question is absolutely closed but it is ominous that the workers' group in the governing body of the I.L.O. takes a very serious view of the position believing as they aver "that the solemn pledges made by Governments should be honourably redeemed in practice" and also pointing out that "the Food Conference is dealing with matters of vital concern to the workers of the world and the failure to afford representation to the I.L.O. cannot be satisfactorily explained to the rank and file of the Trade Union Movement of the various countries which we represent."

Now what does this refusal, however carefully worded, cover? Does it mean that in the New Europe which is to emerge after the war the nation-states are also to be economic states and that the International and European bodies, which are to be brought into being to administer and regulate economic affairs, are to consist simply of official representatives of these several economic states? Because, if that is so, it augurs ill for the future, inasmuch as there is no guarantee that the developments which led to the temporary triumph of Hitlerism will not then be reproduced in a later state of affairs and that economic national states, striving to get rid all at once of the disability of economic rivalry and competition by becoming economically self sufficient, will in that event cast a greedy eye on whatever economic wealth there is in the possession of their less powerful neighbours. Indeed there are already traces that such a reading of the future is in the minds of those who at present on the Allied side are directing the destinies of the war. It is now almost universally agreed for instance, among the world's planners that an International organisation for the preservation of the peace, with sufficient power at its immediate command to enforce its decision, is absolutely necessary if the future peace of the world is to be made at once certain and irreversible. But some of these self same planners when budgeting for the future, do not seem to speak

as if the International organisation to which they fondly look forward can be anything like an infallible safeguard of a peaceful world. For example, the British Prime Minister tells us that he is ready to assign to Russia whatever is necessary to her security, even, apparently, if this involves a claim to half the territory of a smaller and contiguous allied power, and even if, contrary to what was laid down in the Atlantic Charter, it includes a claim for territory which has never at any time belonged to Russia in the past. Surely it will at once be conceded that such an attitude of mind implies a certain scepticism as to the efficacy of any successful international authority for the preservation of peace and the evident forecast that the nation-states of the post-war world will still live in the times to come under the constant dread of an aggression which cannot be internationally suppressed. Because if that is so it is the beginning of the end of any over-aweing power, at any rate as respects the bigger nations of the world, in the hands of the International Authority. The old League of Nations was first convicted of impotence in the organisation of peace when Sir Austen Chamberlain on behalf of Great Britain rejected the Geneva Protocol; and this conviction was made doubly evident when the League was successful against a smaller power but failed to repress the aggressive desires of Italy and Japan.

Besides, if the State is to be made *qua* state a centre of totalitarian economic planning, this will mean in the end a certain retrogression in historical development. As we have already shown political progress ultimately means the control of the administration by the legislature and in a completed democracy the briefing of the legislature by the people. Not that administration does not assume a large measure of importance in those complex plans for the New Europe which are now to be dimly envisaged. Indeed, for a time, the administrator will, in the initial stages, assume a greatly increased importance. So varied, indeed, will be the free scope which

must be left to him that he will, perforce, have to summon for consultation and advice all sorts of bodies who may have special knowledge and experience in the problems with which the times have confronted us. Nor, provided the oversight of the legislator is adequate and complete, can he be subject to the interference of the judiciary. This as we have already seen involves as far as statute law is concerned, the interpretation of an act of Parliament which may involve administrative action not according to the ascertained intentions of the legislature as revealed in parliamentary discussions and debates, but according to a certain linguistic interpretation of the preamble by an individual who is supposed to come to it with a blank and open mind and is really suffered to claim for the time the political omnipotence of a Fuehrer. Sometimes, indeed, this legal interposition in the past has even involved the reversal of a principle of political importance which has been the subject of much discussion in the country and where the legislature has evidently received a people's mandate. Evidently, then, administration is already assuming a conspicuous role as a department of government ; and if economic organisation and control be added to the duties of the political authority, then the administrator will assume such an overwhelming power and importance that he will absolutely occupy the whole stage to the ultimate harming of democracy. In this way we shall arrive at that idea of a servile state so confidently propounded by the old Fabians, which makes it consist of a territory of wide extent and controlled by a vast army of efficient and know-all administrators, who will simply move men and women about as it they were automata, only to be set in motion by the pulling of paltry strings. In such a world there will be no place for the small nation, or the culture which is not propagated by a super abundance of deadly bombs. It does not matter how unique that culture, or how precious are the historical memories which have been garnered in the course of a nation's evolutionary life. If that nation is territorially

small, and therefore is presumably efficient in the unearned increment of mineral wealth, it must inevitably bow down in subjection before its big neighbours, because that big neighbour is organised as an Economic Power, and economic power requires for its more efficient administration the provision of bigger and bigger areas.

For such weighty reasons as these, then, it is absolutely imperative that such bodies as may be hereafter formed, both internationally and nationally, for planning in the region of economics should not simply be a part of the political administration and legislation. For this means ultimately the domination of the political by the economic. As has unfortunately happened in Germany, the spiritual and religious culture, which is the only hope for peace, will in the end be overwhelmed by that material Kultur whose ultimate aim is the promotion of efficient war. A big business Fuehrer and his attendant super controllers will then triumphantly lord it over all the rest of the people. Indeed, as the late Lord Milner saw very plainly after the last war, there must, if the peace and progress of Europe and the world are finally to be made safe and secure, be an Industrial Parliament as well as a Political Parliament. Of course in such arrangement the political body must always remain as the supreme co-ordinating authority. That means that, in addition to dealing with all these cultural matters which are of the highest value for a free life in the future, it must also prescribe the main rules and regulations by virtue of which the Industrial Parliament is to exercise its powers. What these rules and regulations shall amount to in particular places, cannot be definitely laid down in the course of a merely theoretic discussion. They will be dependent on the political situation at the time, and on the material which lies conveniently to hand. But take, for example, Great Britain with its two party system and its Advisory Committees of masters and men who impart their ideas to the respective Ministers who are adjusting British

industry to the aims and purposes of war. What is to prevent the application of the Tripartite Constitution of the I.L.O. to such an Advisory Council or Committee? It might then become more than an advisory council because it would then consist half of representatives of the Government and half of equal numbers of management and men. The representatives of the Government might be chosen from the political Parliament and might consist of members of one or other of the two parties in exact ratio to their representation in the House of Commons, following on the result of a previous General Election. Other safeguards to ensure that the interests of the community should always override any particular interests of industry would no doubt be necessary, but enough has been said to show how a strict connection between the political and the industrial could always be maintained, while at the same time there could absolutely be no danger that the political should be swamped by the industrial.

It can now be easily discerned why so much concern was expressed at the fact that no direct representation had been accorded to the I.L.O. in the more permanent Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations after the war. This is the F.A.O. which *inter alia* has to raise the levels of nutrition and standards of living in the world and to better the condition of rural populations. It may be only a straw but it is a straw which may well show the direction of the wind. If economic planning in the international world is to be the affair of merely national representatives, then the representatives of the big nations will practically lord it completely over their fellows. Everything will be dominated by the concept of size. Providence will be on the side of the huge battalions. A nationality may be great culturally but if that greatness cannot be expressed in terms of a super abundance of armoured formations, then it must submit to be led by its big brother or go down in what will be an intestine contest

for place and power. The world will in such a case transform itself into an arena where big industrial nations with immense mineral resources will manoeuvre for position and the future of a free Europe will soon be as dark as night. Such an idea appears to be settling down in the imagination of the general body of the people as may be gathered from the result of the recent Referendum in Australia, where the people refused to give the Central Government powers which would have made it the chief planning economic authority. In this connection it is significant that it was the representatives of this self same Australian Government who proposed at the I.L.O., only to be defeated, that in the future this virile international body should simply consist of the representatives of governments.

Politics, then, must incur no risks of being dominated by economics if there is to be a Free Europe in the future. Politics means reform by negotiation and debate, the free assent of a convinced and willing mind. Its ideal cannot be better expressed than in the words of Lincoln when he defined democracy as "government of the people by the people for the people." It encourages all kinds of combination and negotiations but the obligations thereby incurred are voluntarily chosen and assumed. Where political government has been most successful, it works on a two party system. One party has its leaders in office; the other hopes to have its leaders in office. Indeed, the definition of a party as contrasted with a group is that it is capable of forming an alternative government. The function of the party is to gather up the results of all the discussions and debates which, fostered by the party press, are taking place within the circle of its adherent, who in their turn are influenced by the prevailing opinions around them, and to condense all this ultimately in the form of a programme feasible and flexible enough to be incorporated in the rough texture of reality. It is this programme which settles its extent of its support at the polling booth for though

in each of the parties there is a certain fixed nucleus of adherence, there is also a floating population which changes from Election to Election according to the appeal of the issues which have then forced themselves to the front. As to the content of these issues it may very well alter from time to time. Of course in a country like Great Britain, where there is a hereditary aristocracy and where there is an ambition in those who rise to be incorporated into that aristocracy, there will be a tendency for the two parties to become to some extent satisfied as those who oppose and those who would welcome any fundamental change in the stereotyped texture of society. But generally the tendency in a politically free society is to abolish all hereditary tokens of nobility and where this tendency has been allowed to have free scope, the line of division between the two parties may be changed from time to time in different directions. In the United States of America, for example, the dividing line between Republican and Democrat is very different from what it was in the days of Hamilton and Jefferson.

In the past history of democracy in Europe, however, it has not been possible everywhere to get this division into two parties so that the will of the people may be effectively expressed by a government which has any real element of continuity and permanence. If roughly speaking, there were, as has already been pointed out, two main types of democratic government which played the part of guides to the nations who were liberated by the war of 1914 and who, at the end of that war, were confronted with the task of constructing a brand new constitution. From the point of view of party government they were confronted with the French and British systems. The French was a group system. The British was a two party system. The French allowed the manipulation of groups in order to form quick-change governments which functioned for a day without enabling any of them, when defeated, to relieve their period of torture by dissolving parlia-

ment and thus ascertaining the feelings of the electorate. The British system, by its suspicion of such devices as proportional Representation and by its general electoral system based on majorities, tended to make that party majority, when it was ultimately obtained, a really effective majority. In addition and as a complement to this it further strengthened the executive by enabling it to appeal to the country when a parliament at first favourable, in the end proved refractory. The British system was thus more fitted than the French system to guide a nation through the troubled years that succeeded 1918, when there was needed a stout heart at the centre of affairs and a strong arm to guide the country's helm. Yet in the rest of Europe, especially, where, as we have shown in past chapters, successive invasions from the European Plain had imperilled any state of stability, the group system and not the party system had become the rule and the resulting want of a really settled government constituted a strong temptation to acquiesce in the rule of some self confident leader who put forward a claim to become his country's saviour.

What was the cause of all this? The main cause, as can be gathered from preceding chapters, was the way in which the people of the East had articially divided themselves into so-called "races" and the extent to which by the operation of proportional representation these races had found their way into a national parliament, not as representatives of their country generally, but as spokesmen for their respective racial groups. As a matter of historical development there are now in reality no more pure races. The populations of Europe are inextricably mixed and mingled. If the people included in some particular territory unite to form one integral nation state, they unite not as races but as citizens. "God has made of one blood all the nations." But the effect of the Minorities Treaty which was imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers not on themselves but on the smaller nations of eastern Europe, was to encourage racial groups to hold themselves

apart within the state and to resist these tendencies towards complete assimilation which had proved so successful in building up the Western Democracies and the United States of America. In the case of the German minorities in Poland, they were even made the agents of political manoeuvre and disturbance.

It is perfectly evident that if there is to be in the future a free and peaceful Europe this encouragement to resort to racial divisions in this way must be resisted at all costs. If people come together as members of a territorial nation State, they come together simply as citizens of that State, not as members of this or that race, which this or that difference of hair or skull has separated from their fellows in the days gone by. Such a remark is especially applicable to the problem of the Jews, who, unless their case is skilfully handled, may in the future, exercise a very disturbing influence in the east of Europe. In this country and the United States of America, the Jews, while they retain certain of their own institutions for relief and other purposes, are yet almost perfectly assimilated. They are British and American citizens. They have all the rights of citizens and they can complain of no crying disabilities. In pre-Hiterlian Germany there was also an older Jewish population who had similarly been almost perfectly assimilated, who were accordingly a notable asset to their country and whose liquidation by Hitler, in company with their compatriots of more recent date, was one of the Fuehrer's greatest mistakes, so far as concerns the future of Germany. In the east of Europe, and in Poland especially, the Jews were never perfectly assimilated. They presented themselves permanently before the imagination of their fellow citizens as a body apart, with their own rights and customs, with their own distinctive dress and appearance and competing in various fields of life in a fashion that, often through no fault of their own, excited envy and resentment. To a large extent their presence in large numbers was a heritage bequeathed by

Imperial Russia which had, in the former days, initiated many pogroms against them and dumped many of the victims into its unwilling Polish provinces. Probably it would be impossible to hope that, if they remained in these provinces in the future, they could even be perfectly assimilated, even if we take into account the fact that they have been so cruelly decimated in a massacre which has excited the indignation and wrath of the whole world. Surely, therefore, it is now time for the promise of a "Jewish National Home" to be fully implemented, so that Jews, if they desire to go to Palestine, should be able to go in sufficient numbers as to constitute a majority of the population.

Of course there will be Arab difficulties. There are difficulties in every political problem. But certainly these difficulties are not so great that they cannot be met and surmounted. Is it impossible to hope that the question may not yet be settled by agreement with Egypt, Syria or Transjordan? And then there is always the method which now obtrudes itself into any discussions about a free Europe—the method of transfer of populations. This is a method which certainly must be sternly applied to all German minorities in other countries. It was the method of German aggression, even under the Weimar Republic, to use their minorities in other countries as centres of propaganda and disturbance. All possibilities of such a crime against the peace of Europe must be completely eliminated for the future. The same remedy may also be found necessary in the case of other minorities, or whereas in the case of Jugo-Slavia these minorities, claiming different racial affinities, are mainly concentrated in certain districts, recourse may well be had to the political principle of Federation. This gives every element full scope to perpetuate its own language and culture; only with this limitation that in a central political assembly and in the administration of the supreme federal authority there must be only one language. Nothing is so fitting to perpetuate racial

isolationism or to encourage hurtful racial propaganda as a spectacle of orators, delivering speeches in a different mother tongue to a sleepy assembly, where time is lost and the spirit of the discussion is evaporated by the necessity of listening to endless repetitions. This multiplicity of groups, as has previously been insisted, is fatal to stable and effective government, and deputies insisting on speaking a different language collect together in a separate group, thus endangering the formation of that permanent two-party system which, in a complicated nation-State, is so necessary for successful political government.

That is not to admit that the ideal of the future is the big electorate of a huge unitary State, where a numerous population, liable to be swept by all kinds of feverish and dangerous emotion is called upon to give a lead on great principles of politics and policy. In a large State there must be a certain amount of devolution of business on smaller areas and the prevalence of voluntary societies for enquiry, discussion and debate are all necessities for the ultimate creation of an informed public opinion. In the absence of such a complicated internal life there is no certainty that the public opinion of a nation of wide territorial limits shall be of a high order of quality. To suppress discussion or the formation of an opposition opinion results in a faint and fitful public opinion, which is easily seduced by the alluring notes of the microphone. Indeed, such an unwieldy and too often uninformed public opinion is the delight of a Fuehrer or a despot. That is why the results of a referendum are often disappointing when compared with the recommendations of a party conference which has given to such recommendations a large amount of ordered consideration and debate. In the earlier discussions on the policy and future of the United States of America, such as the classical work of the late Lord Bryce, there was a certain awe manifested when chronicling the existence of a huge proletariat, scattered about in far-reaching territories, and which

was called upon at stated times to pronounce a final opinion as to their future President and Government. Such a massive electorate was written about just as if it were a great monster of uncertain appetites and habits, which might develop uneasily in this or any direction and with the capriciousness which was assumed to be a settled characteristic of its nature. So also to-day we see in Russia a huge proletariat which, under the domination of some leading idea, urges itself forward in unexpected directions and justifies itself in language and actions which to the politicians of the West often seems both childish and inept. Thus it is that some article of Pravda, taking its cue from what it senses in the atmosphere around it, shows little disposition to conciliate or to compromise, and too often confounds vitriolic comment with rational discussion. Of course it is true that there is the Communist party, which functions throughout the whole U.S.S.R. and which is presumed to be the kind of infallible medium of a formed public opinion. But the Communist Party is a one-eyed party. It is wedded, without any prospect of divorce, to a certain over arching collection of fixed and irrevocable opinions. "Theirs not to reason why." In such circumstances, it cannot be expected to encourage any discussion which might lead to deviation from a general line of approach. Rather it hopes, by a lavish use of the loud-speaker, to encourage the same cultivated deference to authority as it first discovers in itself. So too, it is that, in Russia, even after the promulgation of a democratic constitution, there are at a parliamentary election almost no opposition candidates. And yet another consequence must be laid to the charge of the Communist party. It not only functions in Russia, but it forms what is practically branches of itself in other countries which aim, if they are allowed to do so, to play the same part in the internal politics of these countries as the mother body does in Russia. In this way Communists tend to bring confusion into the politics of these countries by encouraging that

formation of groups and coteries in the party of the Left, which, as has been seen, is ultimately fatal to the prospects of fixed and settled government. This has not mattered up to the present in Great Britain for the British Labour Party has said convincingly to the Communists: "If you want to work with us and play your proper part in British politics, you must join us as individuals and not as a group. If you hold out as a group that must be because your intentions towards us are not exactly honourable." But in other countries, especially in Eastern Europe in the latter stages of the war, there is evidence that these Communistic societies are not exerting a very happy influence.

It is in following out the progress of such machinations as these that we come in contact with what Hitler in one of his earlier moods proclaimed as the modern mode of warfare—that, if the paradox can be excused, which works by peaceful propaganda rather than by the force of arms. In the previous chapters of this inquiry great emphasis has been attached to Germany and Russia, the nations of the European plain, and in that connection it has been pointed out how necessary it is to have regard to their possible unsettling action in any plans which aim at a settled future for a free Europe. Indeed, now that we are passing from abstract viewpoints to the present reality, we are confronted sternly with the fact that it is Germany, one of these nations, that has plunged Europe into a hideous turmoil and which has created a situation which can only be remedied by a surgical operation on the body politics of a whole Continent. The war of to-day, in fact, appears to be only a logical conclusion of all the unsettling tendencies—practical and doctrinal—which found their climax before the war, in the claim for Lebensraum and a Mittel-Europa and in the armed attack on Poland which defeated itself because at last it ranged the greater part of Europe against the aggressor. From this point of view the armed attack on Poland and the later attack on Russia were the

first and fatal mistakes which were made by the Germany of Hitler. Up to the point of the attack on Poland with arms, no doubt, and a great weight of them lurking in the background, but with no need to use them very conspicuously in the foreground, the Fuehrer had unified Germany, overrun Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and had created centres of Nazi propaganda in France, Spain, Turkey and the other States of the Balkans. He boasted aloud to the world that it had not been necessary in all these cases to resort dangerously to the use of arms. The world was his oyster ; but it was not with the sword, but by a paradoxical and peaceful penetration that he was purposing to open it. Probably he believed that he would manage this new method quite successfully in the case of Poland, but the cleverest of men cannot often extricate themselves from the consequences of a big mistake. Poland was death to his sinister invitations, when he proposed to her a union of forces so as to subdue any danger from the rival nation of the plain. He had called forth in each of the other nations the requisite army of " appeasers." He would have finally succeeded in his desire to dominate Europe if only the other nations which possessed a core of Communists for peaceful penetration had been finally rendered innocuous.

It was a plan of dangerous cleverness and it is not too much to assert that the firm stand which Poland made against it baffled Hitler, and produced such a situation as enables us now to cherish hopes for a free Europe in the days to come. Still, in any of these future plans it is necessary firmly to keep in mind that the two nations of the plain, these very two which in the past have exerted the most unsettling influence in Europe, have both adopted this totalitarian scheme of government from above, whereby a society strictly limited in numbers and attuned to its objects by numerous trials and tests, possesses a monopoly of political power and status and becomes the agency through which is formulated the decrees of its leaders

to whom previously it has blindly submitted. No other societies for any political purpose are then allowed in that particular place. That multiplicity of voluntary associations for illumination and debate which constitute the education of a thoroughly effective proletariat in the more ideal form of the nation-state, are then conspicuous by their absence, because they have been banned by an over-seeing Gestapo. In such a totalitarian regime there can be no real clash of ideals. There can only be a wholehearted endorsement of the settled decision of the Fuehrer. And if in other countries there are parallel societies which are constituted on the same pattern, it is natural that they should think more of a country on whose practices they modelled their constitution than of the political practice of their own native land. So it was that before the war Nazi groups were working insidiously as far away as Brazil and the Argentine; so it was too that Communists were working in China and even in the western democracies.

It is clear, then, that if we are to have anything like a free Europe, the last shreds of the Nazi regime and domination must be sternly banished from the Continent. This is no forward development; it is a retrogression rather than a progression. It has made Europe an arena of confusion so far as it still extends its influence. It would be a penetrative power of bad report so long as any Nazis are suffered to band themselves together. In tune with the revolutionary spirit of the times, there should be a complete clearing of all these infected regions which have been inhabited by the spirit of appeasement. Europe must begin again with a live proletariat settled down in countries not so big as to overawe the initiative of the individual life. The small state must come into its own. The big state had somehow or other come to an elevated position of prominence during the course of the war, because the state had become an instrument for the manufacture of munitions, and there was obviously a greater

extent of territory in the big states for the location of factories than there could possibly be in the small states. Economics, as has been insisted again and again in the course of these discussions demands for its efficient development a large extent of territory. But if economics is to be removed as an unsettling influence in its relation to the state economy and if its unearned increment of raw materials is to be managed and controlled internationally, then countries will be great not according to their acres of territory or their inherited mineral resources, but according to the wealth and grandeur of their culture, their encouragement of individual and associated initiative and their contributions, not to the science of destruction, but to that science of constructive and disinterested investigation which may yet open up new vistas of hope and endeavour to the people of a free Europe. Hellas, someone once remarked, was not a state but a culture ; yet it was the culture of this small state which was ever in the van of the old Europe. Quantity is supplemented by quality in the estimation of the future.

No programme for a free Europe, moreover, could be adequately prepared without some candid and long term consideration of the problem of Russia, the second big nation of the plain. In the destruction of the bad old Europe, her people have played a glorious and conspicuous part. Yet it would be wrong to deny, and fatuous to ignore the fact that this great country, extending not only over Europe, but including a considerable portion of Asia, was organised before the war in a way which suggested to Hitler some of his own most unfortunate and sinister ideas. It, too, came to be unilaterally directed mainly to the manufacture of munitions. It, too, acknowledged the over arching supremacy of economics although its planned economy had many features which may yet be found as a model for the new Europe. It has furnished a forecast for the institution of a Gestapo. Its Communists antedated the Nazis. It is anti-religious because the Com-

munists, who constitute its background, have no place for religion which they term the "opium of the people." More recently it has seemed to deviate in a democratic direction. But, on more intimate investigation, it is found that this is true more in appearance than in reality. Into however many autonomous states the U.S.S.R. is declared to be divided there is always the same Communist party functioning throughout them all, the same OGPU to make short work of critics and opponents, and the same Great Russia who controls all the unifying agencies, including the army, and thus over-shadows the other so-called autonomous States by her resources and the hidden threat of her military might. In a real federation, as has again and again been pointed out in these discussions, there must be some measure of equality between its constituent states and it can hardly be contended that this requirement is fulfilled in the relations between Great Russia and the other autonomous Republics of the U.S.S.R.

But then, it will be said all this may be changed in the future. The U.S.S.R. has struck its first democratic note. That note may be sounded again and again until it becomes a resounding peal of triumph. And it must be confessed that in Josef Stalin the Russians have found a leader who understands compromise and the evident limits of the actual. But it can hardly be believed, although some forecasts of the future have claimed for humanity an immensely longer lease of life, that the present Josef Stalin can possibly live for all time. And after him who or what? The question is a momentous one. At any rate it can hardly be left out of our calculations in any considerations as to the constitution of a free Europe. For, let it be remembered, a great deal of the latest evolution of the Russian people has lain in the direction of substituting for socialism, nationalism. Alexander Werth, a convinced friend of the U.S.S.R. has told us that though the name of Leningrad is still universally used the streets of that city are now generally

called not by the new names the Soviet gave them but by their old Imperial appellations. New names are often the clue to the discovery of the person who owns them. In the days of early man to know a person's name was to control his destinies. When a country harks back to its old Imperial names, it may yet also hark back to its old Imperial policy. In such circumstances it would desire to control an open road to Istanbul and it would be tempted to use its later device of peaceful penetration to prevent any intervening or surrounding nations from becoming so formidable by association or federation with its neighbour that any obstacle could be interposed between itself and the accomplishment of what may be its ultimate design.

Where, then, has our enquiry led us? Europe, if it is to be a free Europe in the days to come will be divided into a certain number of nation-states each of them composed of people who have incorporated their particular national spirit in distinctive institutions and laws and all of them realising in their inmost soul that these institutions and laws are the free and unfettered embodiment of their special corporate personality. There may be groups among their citizens of these different nation-states who have bequeathed to them the tradition of a different racial origin and they may even have a separate language or dialect in which ballads or tales have been handed down from father to son. They will not surrender the appeal which these ballads or tales have made to them, or cease to express themselves in that aboriginal language, but at the same time there must be a language which is the language of the whole state and in which the common business of that state is transacted. It is a sign of big dangers ahead, and of a possibility that the unity and diversity of the nation-state has not been perfectly accomplished. When a certain group of its inhabitants are roped apart under the name of a minority and are by statute almost invited to resist assimilation and to devote a part of their native ingenuity to

the dressing up of grievances. It is then, as has been pointed out, that the national Parliament is first divided into groups and any possibility of continuity in the national policy effectually endangered. In the Western States of Europe, this process of assimilation within a fixed and definite number of nation-states has, in the main, accomplished its perfect work, but in the east of Europe, from historical causes which have already been particularised there is still a large number of problems, connected with national boundaries, which have been worked up until they became a menace to the future of Europe. However these are settled, it is impossible to doubt that advantage will be taken of the way in which the peoples of Europe have been callously mixed up by the Nazis to secure that those who have represented themselves as uneasy in a certain locality and surroundings shall find themselves in the new Europe transported to what they may then deem a more congenial locality and more acceptable surroundings. That is why it has already been suggested that all Germans should in the future be contained within the limits of the German Reich and that the Jews should be assured of their possession of a national home.

Yet a further word about Germany—what is to be her future in a free Europe? Should she still exist within these spacious bounds which made her a pride to Kaiser Wilhelm II and formed a base from which Hitler launched the legions which sought to dominate the world. Certainly, if the future freedom of Europe is to be amply secured, Germany should not in the coming days exist as the completely unified State which Hitler made of her. There was in Hitler's Germany too much levelling of the boundaries. Social or provincial patriotisms were ground down with an unfaltering hand. All men and women were equal before the Gestapo, but that was because the constraining power of an all-pervading fear had emptied the mind of rational contents, and delivered over every German, whatever his credentials or qualifications,

as yielding plasticine in the usurper's hand. And fear becomes much more penetrating and evasive when it finds an entry into a large population than it does in a small. On the other hand local attachments, particular cultures, that consciousness of kind which Giddings has made the most potent force in sociology, seems to gain the most effective influence in a smaller society. Where people are contained in a more limited space they brush more against each other, they are more tempted to make combinations and consequently there is more possibility of a reaction against all levelling influences. The sense of a common life is keener and more aggressive. There certainly was in Germany, before the age of Hitler, a certain difference in outlook or mentality or in the cherishing of ancestral memories between South and North Germany. Whilst the King of Prussia who was Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, barred all socialist international congresses from the sacred soil of Prussia at a time when the German Socialists were the largest and best organised in Europe, the King of Wurtemberg, taking his own line from a keen perception of the mind of his people, allowed the Labour and Socialists' parties of the world to plan for a freer and more liberal future. Along with Wurtemberg must certainly be classed Baden and Bavaria.* It may be that Saxony would also range herself under the same ensign. Then it has gradually been felt with an increasing degree of conviction that East Prussia should be given to Poland. Alsace and Lorraine would, of course, go back to France and Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. Thereby we set more manageable limits to the German leviathan ; yet these limits would not be artificial. They would be limits which the mentality of peoples would plainly suggest. In the case of East Prussia, for example, all Germans would be deported to the territories of North Germany ; and Poles from North Germany would fill the vacant spaces. It might

* This point has already been made by George Solovyetchik in his book "Peace or Chaos".

seem arbitrary at first but to those who, after the war, are called on to contemplate what a mess Hitler has made of Europe it will seem the only possible thing to do if the future of a free Europe is to be finally and effectively secured.

At this point, however, we are confronted with a very troublesome question. What will be the position of the British Commonwealth of Nations and Russia in a Europe which may possibly be federated and which must certainly be free? It has often been pointed out that, in the schemes for the future world government, it looks as if the destinies of Europe are to be directed by Powers not European. The British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China, are not the whole or the greater part of their territorial domains entirely out of Europe. And in the case of the U.S.S.R. is it not also the case that its political structure and the influences which now form its culture are entirely different from those which form and influence the European tradition and culture? The fact is that a nation may be cheek-by-jowl with Russia, and even claim distinct racial affinity with the Great Russians, and yet at the same time be utterly different in its historical traditions and in the religious influences which interpenetrate a large part of its national life. Obviously it would be wrong to place a European nation smaller in extent, but great in the intensity of its national life and in the spirituality of its western culture, in the power or at the mercy of a nation, the culture of which is dominated by more material influences and which is also great by reason of immense territories, with a great treasure of mineral wealth and resources outside the Continent of Europe. For these reasons and bearing in mind the fact that the U.S.S.R. policy has distinct claims in many respects to be the progenitor of these Nazi organisations against which the war has been principally waged, it can hardly be anticipated that, unless there is a very radical change in the spirit and orientation of European civilisation, the U.S.S.R. could be freely associated with the

surrounding European nations in a future European Federation. It is a continent in itself, an assemblage of States with its own authoritarian style of federation. The League of Nations failed because it was a League of Nations with different standards and politics, and where there was no certainty, when a decision had to be taken, that each of these nations would consider the decision in the light of the same viewpoint. Federation will begin in a free Europe when its different nation-states begin voluntarily to associate themselves in leagues or minor federations by reason of the possession of a common or analogous cultural tradition, made manifest in their art and religion, as well as in their social life and their separate historical memories. It is difficult to believe, accordingly, that, even in the east of Europe, any of the new nation-states would of their own will desire to associate themselves federally with the U.S.S.R.

Next as to the British Commonwealth of Nations. What will be its position in relation to a free Europe of the future? We are naturally disposed to regard this question as one that admits of no manner of doubt. We look on Great Britain as backed by the Greater Britains beyond the seas, and possessing a population surpassing that of Russia or the United States by reason of the addition of the dusky millions of India. Its constituent parts, while united as the British Commonwealth of Nations, have yet all the independence which the Statute of Westminster secures for them and so Great Britain is able to exercise added influence by claiming a vote for each of them in any international assembly. But would it be possible to claim this increased numerical power in a federation strictly European? Such a federation could not be established by a fiat from above. It would not burst suddenly on the world like the first flying bomb. Nations of like affinities and with similar cultural blends would spontaneously together in a union which, because it was not primarily economic or for material ends and aims, would be

a union where the good of each would be at the same time the good of all. Thus Great Britain, as General Smuts bluntly advised her to do, would seek associates in Europe, at first probably among the countries of the European West, but she would seek such associations as a Britain with European contacts and cultures, not as the leading power of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and she would then have to take advantage of that provision of the Statute of Westminster which allows the alternative of separate action in foreign affairs. How could she hope, where the decision is strictly European, to have a numerical influence corresponding to the number of her Dominions? The nations of Europe could hardly be expected to forget that, according to Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Dominions exercised a leading influence in the rejection by the Mother Country of the Geneva Protocol, when we take into account the fact that it was this rejection of the Geneva Protocol which dealt a deadly blow to the future efficacy of the old League of Nations in safeguarding the peace of Europe. In truth the interests of the British Dominions are not primarily with Europe. Canada is the next door neighbour of the United States, and since the start of the war with Japan, Australia, too, has recognised how closely her future defence is connected with that country. Great Britain, on the other hand, is connected with Europe by many of the closest ties. That continent owes much to her leadership in the days gone by; her culture has imparted inspiration and hope to the people of many other European lands. Her statesmen have been protagonists in the struggle for European freedom. If the U.S.S.R. becomes a continent by herself Europe would hardly desire that the influence of Great Britain would be withdrawn from a European Federation. Only they would hardly desire that, though they might ultimately acquiesce in it, any decision that Britain should make in a matter strictly European should be initially dependent on the assent of her

Dominions. Of course this action, which would be strictly within the limits of the Statute of Westminster, need not and would not necessarily involve any loosening of the ties that bind Great Britain to the advantage of all of them with her young and virile Dominions.

But now it is necessary to deal with the over-ruling supposition of everything—the creation of some International Authority for the preservation of the future peace. Without that the dearest speculation as to the orderly attainment of a free Europe will utterly come to nought. War is cruelly destructive in the way in which it destroys all the hard-won acquisitions of the most promising and the most advanced community. War is a reversal to primitive instincts and to unruly primitive passions. All these habits of agreeing to differ which have been the sustaining power of any advanced political system disappear as if they had never been really attained and were only the figments of an idle dream. Reason gives place to a coarsened intuition. Science loses all its spirit of disinterested curiosity and becomes simply the bond slave of Ares, the God of War. The nation-state is diverted from any pursuit of spiritual values to concentrate on strictly material ends and objects. It allots all the stateliest treasures of its soul as a sorry contribution to the manufacture of munitions. To outwit the wiles of such a coarse and deadly foe the International Authority to combat it must be both surpassingly strong and amazingly confident. It would be no good, for example, to say that such an Authority should be dependent for its order to act on the assent of ever so many other states, or even of an all-powerful Big Three or Big Four. That would produce just the fateful interval of indecision which has ruined many a promising plan or purpose. If an International Authority is created it must have an operative executive and that executive must be able to act promptly and decisively and that on the authority of a simple majority. There may be a Council, too, composed of repre-

sentatives of all the nations but which will meet less frequently; and will deal with larger issues which may be termed in the general sense political, and which are much more complex than the mere suppression of aggression. But one duty must not be expected even of the large Council of such an International Authority—that of continually surveying and at times proposing the alteration of national divisions and boundaries. Once the present chaos of Europe gives way to more settled conditions and a division of the new Europe into nation-states is safely accomplished according to the precepts of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, these three which give rise to a true freedom, then there must be about such new arrangements a certain quality of finality and permanence. Europe must not awake some sunny morning to find that its freedom is imperilled by finicking frontier disputes. That is why time must be taken to complete the division of the new Europe; it must not be a hasty operation to be rushed through at the behest of some powerful state without that careful consideration which a work such as this undoubtedly requires. Of course, if economic affairs, those which so often give rise to national differences, are managed by bodies subordinate to but separate from the political, then boundaries will cease to have the importance they had in the Europe of the olden days. Race and size will no longer be the criteria of a nation's vitality. It will not be necessary to add land to land in order to acquire, by the addition of matter, a larger portion of national economic strength. And then it will be possible to formulate a simple definition of aggression which will be sufficient to meet the most sudden emergency. Nothing is more disquieting in the present discussions regarding some future International Authority than the intention, attributed to the British Foreign Office of maintaining that there is no effective definition of aggression. To take up such an attitude of helplessly waiting on Providence is to imperil the whole possibility of a world at peace. There can be no

effective action when you have to grope about for a motive for your action. Surely that simple ground of action which before the war was explored by the Russian Foreign Office and incorporated in treaties with its neighbours, is enough—you indulge in aggressive action when unilaterally and without the consent of the International Authority your armed forces cross over into the territory of another. The Russians further elaborated this to make it automatically applicable to every case of violation of territory, but the above is a fair epitome in the principle embodied in the whole. Neither will it respond to the call of the future if you lay it down that the policing of the world is to be in the hands of four or five big nations and that the assent of all of them is necessary for any armed action to maintain the world's peace. Such an attitude of mind betrays a simply guileless or perhaps even a craftily guileless belief that no bad thing could be expected of a big nation. Or if the big nation did indulge in a bad act of aggression, where would then lie the power to overawe the disorderly policeman? The old League of Nations generally succeeded in keeping the peace when it was only a small transgression; but from the first it miserably failed when it was sternly confronted with a guilty and embattled might. If, however, pitfalls such as these are to be avoided, it should not be impossible to equip with the requisite national strength and to endow with the requisite executive power an International Authority for the preservation of the peace. Of course that International Authority should not be the same as the international economic Body which is to plan the distribution of raw materials; but in the case of an act of aggression so certified as a ground of action by the Peace Authority, the latter might find that it could bring effective pressure on the aggressive power by withholding from that power the minerals necessary for modern armaments, some of them scarce and not easily to be obtained. At any rate it should be impossible, in a free Europe, for any power to

support an aggressive claim for a slice of its neighbour's territory by the plea that, whatever the political or religious affiliation of that territory, it was necessary to the intending aggressor for reasons of security. That surely would be a fatal line of argument. Once allowed, it would open up the way to such an unsettled feeling in the new Europe as would infallibly be the precursor of a later and even more frightful war. Germany, one of the two great nations of the plain which have figured so conspicuously in previous discussions, as the result of the present war, and if such viewpoints as are revealed in this book are kept in mind, will be rendered innocuous for a distant and perhaps an illimitable future ; but there is also the other denison of the plain, that very great nation, Russia. Her civilisation is developing in a direction very different from that of the nations of Europe. Its unit is the mass man losing himself in the lump. Their unit is the individual man attaching himself to the community by his voluntary choice and aspiration. It appeals to passion or prejudice by the use of the gramophone or by engendering a natural pride of conquest through the roar of triumph of its mighty guns. They rather appeal to reason or to the moral or religious standards of a historical tradition and they resent being spoon-fed by exaggerated or richly spiced representations of a military victory. It makes its peaceful penetrations through the encouragement in another country of a communist society which acts in some sense as an outpost of its power and influence. They lay down as one of the primary articles of their creed the bounden right of every nation to develop according to its own cast of mind and the colour of its culture without any kind of interference or undue influence from outside. These differences cut deeply and they are of the greatest possible importance and it would be simply acting in the worst interests of the future of a free Europe to ignore them in a spirit of chivalrous bravado.

Of course, of all the economical problems which await

solution before any hopes of a free Europe can be adequately fulfilled, the most urgent and clamorous is that of the future of air power and the aeroplane. In this connection there is the possibility of hurtful and dangerous competition among the nations, unless there is also some measure of international regulation and control which has a regional agency in Europe. The pitfalls on the way are endless and menacing. Questions of the use of national ports, of a nation's right to claim a certain possession of the regions of the air above its territory, and other thorny problems such as these, afford abundant facilities for that noisy clash of interests which have rendered the people of a particular country ready for the prosecution of a war. If the element of economic competition is to be eliminated in the future of Europe, it is necessary above all that air transport, the latest and most effective gift of science to bring the nations together, should not become in the future the medium of national strife and estrangement. This applies in the first place to the commercial use of aeroplanes ; but, in regard to the use of aeroplanes as weapons of war, there are other considerations which make the internationalisation of this weapon of the future even more immediately deserving of attention. In the hands and under the control of an international peace authority, it would be a sanction of the utmost efficacy and importance. Where sanctions had unfortunately to be put in motion, it would secure that speed of executive action which is obviously necessary if a sudden dash of motorised forces into a neighbour's territory has rendered Europe sadly aware of a traitor in her midst ; and it would give the requisite batons to the policeman who, if he is anything of a policeman at all, must not be dependent on appeals to the bystanders for his power to run to earth a double-dyed offender. It must further be kept in mind that if the world for the future is to be administered in the interests of security, all nations must participate in this combined endeavour. Neutrality must be a thing of nought. The effect

of this would then be that the blockade would be promoted to an embargo where all the rest of the world is prohibited from entering into trade or other relations with an offending State.*

This international police Authority, then, is the presupposition of everything else ; it is the guardian of the peace that will enable Europe, free from want and fear, to start again on a new career of freedom. The chaos and confusion in which Europe finds itself and which was briefly considered in the last chapter may indeed betoken the end of a civilisation ; but there are strands of progress, as we have seen in the present chapter, peeping out of the confusion, and it is by tracing them out on their way that we can behold in the ruins of the present the beginnings of a new civilisation which shall forward us to a fairer fate. The European civilisation, which Hitler appears to have resolved into chaos, inherited at the Renaissance a splendid gift of political inspiration from the greater Roman civilisation. This aspiration for a political freedom which would be the heritage of all, found a lurid expression in the French Revolution. Yet even before the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution had let loose some unsettling influences to work their way in the minds of men. The men who were elevated by the Industrial Revolution claimed to work apart from the State. They called out "hands off" to the officials and the bureaucrats. However, when they had done their perfect work, they could only forge a "cash nexus" between man

* In an article on "Transport and Communications" in a Bulletin published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, its author points out that the world may soon have to make a fateful decision between security and free aviation, and he concludes that "a fully effective control would seem to require an International Air Organisation which should own or participate in the principal international services and license all other services including national services, with the right of participation, "should own or participate in the airports used for international services and license all other airports ; should license and participate in all aircraft construction firms and schools for pilots ; and should have full right to protect its functions by inspection." See *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XXI, No. 19, p. 754.

and man. Only the cash was very unevenly distributed. A few entrenched themselves in mountains of money; but the less favoured who lived at a lower altitude were "crucified on a cross of gold." Appeal was made to the political nation-state for help in this condition of injustice and distress. German theorists allowed the claim of the state to intrude into the fenced-off grounds of political economy. Only the end was that economics aspired to lord it over politics. For the economic competition of individuals began to be substituted the economic competition of the nation-states. Synthetic chemistry came in to render its aid and it looked as if through its agency the nation-state itself might be made economically self-sufficient. At any rate that was the goal that Hitler and his advisors set before them; only when they had sufficiently, as they thought, provisioned themselves at the expense of the nations around them, they set out to destroy and paralyse all these nations so as to protect themselves against the possibility of any future national competition.

It was the Nazi practice, however, to begin from the top. All good gifts must come from the Fuehrer. He was the semi-divinity in the heavens above whose competence and power obviated all necessity for competence and initiative in the people below. But it will be the characteristic of a Europe which owes its freedom to the watchword, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," that it begins from below and gives the peasants and workers of Europe the possibility of themselves earning their own emancipation. Everywhere, even in a Europe of pestilence, confusion and despair, there is the faint promising of better things. Liberty—because by the supremacy of the political over the economical the nations will be able to pursue their future untrammelled by the spectres of want or fear. Science will be free from that blind worship of quantity and the material which has made its professors specialists in the instruments of destruction. Penicillin will take the place of poison gas. A competition for the good of all will

become the substitute for a competition which in the end meant luxury for some and penury for many of the rest. Great public buildings will arise in the cities where societies and associations of all kinds can meet to employ their leisure in the pursuit of the public good. Equality—because nation-states will no longer be valued because of their size or the quantity of their industrial resources. A country may be smaller in size but qualitatively greater in its patriotism, its respect for spiritual values, and in the combined intensities of its individual and its communal life. Fraternity—because there will then be an automatic urge for unity among the nations. The highest individual good will be discovered to be identical with the highest common good. And good will be extracted even from the deadliest brew of evil. Nazi Germany has turned Europe into confusion; yet that very confusion has made of its nation brothers in misfortune, and there is nothing like common sufferings and sorrows for binding two hearts into one. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—these three; and the pursuit of them, as they can be blended into the freedom of a free Europe, will lead us to what has been desired as the last object of this enquiry. In that event civilisation will be no private possession of a single continent. It will radiate from Europe, no doubt as it has radiated from Europe in the past; but in the end it will be equally evident in its influence over the rest of the world; and the new trust thus engendered will cause these population difficulties which have sometimes obtruded themselves into this discussion to vanish like some scurrying cloud.



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