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Title Condition of Happiness

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CONDITIONS OF HAPPINESS

CONDITIONS OF HAPPINESS

Why is it that our civilisation, with all its tremendous opportunities, is so outstandingly an unhappy one? In other words, what are the conditions of happiness and how far does our society fulfil them? These are the questions Mr. Taylor sets out to answer, pointing out that 'only those who understand the nature of happiness are in a position to appraise the success of a society or the desirability of a régime.'

Mr. Taylor does not rest content with an analysis of current ills, but attempts to deduce principles on which to base practical measures. And here he emphasises that the problem of happiness is inseparable from the problem of behaviour. If we are unhappy, it is chiefly because people behave as they do. Making use of some of the most recent researches in anthropology and psychology, Mr. Taylor argues that 'human nature' *can* be changed—but to change it, we must understand the complex interrelations of personality and society.

Those who read his widely successful analysis of contemporary economics, *Economics for the Exasperated*, know already that he has an unusual power of clarifying the most complex and technical issues. All should find in his brilliant and searching argument points they will accept, others they will want to discuss—and, in a word, a great deal to think about.

by the same author

ECONOMICS FOR THE EXASPERATED

CONDITIONS OF HAPPINESS

★

GORDON RATTRAY TAYLOR

THE BODLEY HEAD · LONDON

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For Bettes

The question that faces every man born into this world is not what should be his purpose, which he should set about to achieve, but just what to do with life, a life which is given him for a period of, on the average, fifty or sixty years. The answer that he should order his life so that he can find the greatest happiness in it is more a practical question similar to that of how a man should spend his week-end, than a metaphysical proposition as to what is the mystic purpose of his life in the scheme of the universe.

LIN YUTANG, *The Importance of Living*

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Part One

ANALYSIS

I

ANATOMY OF UNHAPPINESS

I Nature Hits Back—II The Science of Happiness—III The Psychosocial Nexus—IV Human Needs—V What Happiness is Not—VI Pseudo-Happiness—VII Plan of Action

I *Nature Hits Back*

CONSIDER these facts: every day 50 Americans and 15 Britons commit suicide.

In the United States, every second hospital bed is occupied by a mental patient.[1] One in every six men rejected from the U.S. army for reasons of health was rejected on grounds of mental disorder.[2] According to an estimate by American psychiatrists, one person in every three met with in general practice is to some extent neurotic.[3] There are about 600,000 persons in institutions for chronic alcoholics, to say nothing of an estimated two million heavy drinkers outside.[4] The figures for Britain are scarcely less serious.

Lastly, bear in mind that the incidence of most of these figures is about three times as great as it was sixty years ago.

Whatever allowances we may feel inclined to make in interpreting them, it is fairly obvious that modern civilisation makes many people deeply unhappy, corrupting the personalities of some and driving a shocking number to escape from their problems in mental breakdown or self-destruction. In many

[1] Testimony of Surgeon-General John Parran before U.S. Senate.

[2] Ency. Brit. Book of the Year, 1946.

[3] Lichtenstein and Small, *A Handbook of Psychiatry*, 1942. A similar figure is quoted for Britain by I. Suttie, *Origins of Love and Hate*, 1935, and more recently by H. V. Dicks, *Clinical Studies in Psychopathology*, 1947.

[4] R. V. Seliger and V. Cranford, *Contemporary Criminal Hygiene*, 1946.

primitive societies, on the other hand, suicide and alcoholism are unknown and psychosis very rare.

Simultaneously we note throughout the world a widespread dissatisfaction with existing political, social and economic conditions. There is an uncontrollable desire to experiment with new systems. Few indeed are the states which are not toying with communism, socialism or fascism. The tremendous upsurge of nationalist feeling has a similar basis.

The fact is, the present world crisis is a crisis of happiness. It is because they hope and believe that the world can be reordered so as to dispel their sense of futility and frustration that so many people are prepared to fight and die for their chosen 'ideology.' It is because they see no hope of any more satisfying existence than they have got that so many other people in the west turn their faces from life altogether.

But it is very noticeable that although so many people feel, distinctly or diffusely, that something is wrong with modern life, yet they are very far from agreeing what this something is; still less can they agree what to do about it.

The detached observer is entitled to conclude that none of the solutions so hotly advocated provides an exhaustive answer to the problem of our present discontent—for it is hard to believe that a sound diagnosis of worldly ills could be preached so loudly and so long without finally winning general acknowledgment. The arguments of modern prophets are, very literally, unconvincing. Thus it is most striking how slow socialism has been in gaining popularity, when it appears to offer such striking benefits to the bulk of the population. For nearly a hundred years it has been advocated by many brilliant writers and speakers and supported with great devotion, and yet the world as a whole has remained obstinately suspicious. Even its victories have been due not so much to its own merits as to the miserable demerits of its opponents. People instinctively felt that socialism, though it might indeed ensure a greater measure of certain obvious types of satisfaction, would simultaneously destroy other less tangible but equally vital modes of happiness. In concentrating on meeting physical

needs—food, clothing, housing—it would neglect and smother obscure emotional and spiritual demands.

This intuitive feeling is, I believe, sound. Certainly it cannot be denied that some types of satisfaction are mutually exclusive: the more we obtain of one the less we have of another. So it is never a wise policy to pursue happiness by trying to maximise whatever satisfactions lie to hand. That a thing yields benefits is not a sufficient argument. We must always bear in mind *the whole field* of potential satisfactions and compromise between the various possibilities in accordance with our assessment of their relative value. Otherwise, like a two-year-old child which cannot pick up another brick without dropping the one it is holding, we shall lose one source of happiness in gaining another—and the exchange may not be to our advantage.

In fact, during the last hundred years a great many of the changes which reformers, both of the right and of the left, have been demanding have come to pass: but people seem, on the whole, to be even less happy than before. They are more anxious and the fun seems to have gone out of life. At the same time society itself has become much less stable. Yet it seldom occurs to us that the two facts may be connected: that it may be just because we have tried to raise the standard of living that we have made ourselves insecure and unhappy. By this I do not mean to say that a raised standard of living is necessarily associated with unhappiness. It may be merely that the methods we have chosen to raise it are wrong. Or that our conception of what constitutes a high standard of living is wrong.

'The real paradox of our time is not poverty in plenty but unhappiness in pleasure.'

But in practice political reformers always fail to take this wider view. It is, to be frank, a gross impertinence for anyone to put forward proposals for remaking the world without first having made an exhaustive survey of the whole subject of human happiness. None of the arguments put forward in favour of currently-popular ideologies has the slightest validity, except in so far as practical experience of it may have permitted some empirical observation of the results. We are like a party of

shipwrecked sailors afloat in mid-ocean without map or compass. One declares we should steer this way, another that. These proposals are all futile, for even if one chances to be right we have no way of knowing it.

Is it not truly remarkable that the political and economic reformers who surround us should feel so little hesitation in advocating reforms designed to achieve some immediate good without ever having satisfied themselves whether the course they propose will really achieve the ultimate objective? Look! they say, here is a cork with which to plug the leak in our boat! And so saying they wrench out the bung.

II *The Science of Happiness*

'Very well,' you say, 'I agree that we need a science of happiness—but it is not so easy.'

Certainly the subject is a difficult one.

It cannot be settled by any smoking-room wiseacre or rustic philosopher. But then smoking-room and tap-room discussion cannot penetrate the atom nor clarify the theory of relativity. The question is rather whether the mystery of happiness will yield to intensive scientific research.

But while we devote large sums and many man-hours of thought and labour to studying bodily health, we devote none to the study of happiness. The subject is still where electricity was in the time of Galvani or health in the time of Æsculapius. When the science of happiness develops it will, naturally, be a composite science, just as medicine embraces a score of related disciplines. In the last fifty years great progress has been made in many of the sciences which bear on the subject of happiness—psychology, psycho-analysis, sociology and anthropology in particular. Before the century closes the science of happiness will have been born.

But can we wait so long? The plight of the world is desperate. And in the hands of its suicidally-inclined peoples has been placed the atom bomb. Like scientists in war-time, we cannot afford to plan elaborate research, to check and recheck our

theories. We must speculate audaciously, improvising from the limited number of facts at our disposal a theory which will serve to guide us in the operations which are being conducted even as we study the subject.

Hence this book. It is a bold (even rash) attempt to bring together from a wide field a motley collection of facts bearing on the problem of happiness, and to combine them into a theory from which practical policies can be derived. Sooner or later —I hope sooner—investigators with more time and better resources will go over the ground again. Much of the detail will have to be scrapped, conclusions will have to be modified, and a vast array of new facts fitted into place; but perhaps the broad conception will endure. And if it does not, the attempt will not have been in vain if it stimulates the design of a more adequate structure.

Some readers, I expect, will find this book too broadly based, too detached in viewpoint, too theoretical, to suit them. What is the good, they will exclaim, of discussing the ideal organisation of society? What is the good of studying in detail the structure of personality? Faced as we are with a world full of wretchedness—of hunger, disease, war and other evident evils —we have work enough to do without bothering about psychological obscurities. Though natural enough, this is not a justifiable attitude. When the Black Death hit England, it was natural enough for doctors to try and help the dying. We know now that their efforts were largely futile, and that they would have done better to concentrate on isolating the plague and eradicating the vermin which bore it. So today, in our much larger problem, we devote our very limited resources to trying to help individuals when we should do better in the end to employ them in attacking the sources of the whole problem. But before we can do that we must understand its nature.[1]

[1] There are some, indeed, who would dismiss this whole argument with the comment that 'we are not put into the world to be happy.' Asked to explain this assertion they generally claim that we are put into this world to prepare ourselves for some superior future existence. The logical error here lies in the assumption that unhappiness in this world

III *The Psychosocial Nexus*

Out of the unco-ordinated welter of recent work in the fields of sociology and psychology one fact has gradually emerged, a fact so important and far-reaching in its implications that even those who work in these sciences have, for the most part, failed to grasp the full significance of what they are unearthing. It is that the nature of society is dictated by the nature of the personalities of those who compose it. Put like that, it does not sound very astonishing. We all recognise that the pattern of society, which consists of people, must be created by the behaviour of the people in it. But what the social sciences are doing is to show, first, that the influence is far deeper and more drastic than anyone had suspected; that factors in behaviour which we ignore because we imagine them common to all human nature are in fact quite arbitrary, and that these factors create patterns in society which are equally arbitrary, although we have long regarded them as natural and inevitable. And, secondly, the social sciences are revealing the exact nature of this influence and the way in which it works.

This series of discoveries has tremendous practical importance. It means that attempts to raise the level of happiness by changing society as a whole are doomed to failure. Whatever new institutions are devised, whatever new values are established, men will twist them to suit the needs of their personalities. We can see this in the history of the Christian ethic, which

in some way fits us better for our future life. This is nonsense. Though suffering may in rare circumstances ennoble, in many others it certainly degrades. The inmates of Belsen were certainly not purified by their sufferings, and the creation of many an ignoble and malicious character can be traced to youthful unhappiness too great to bear. Even if we regard this world as preparation for another life, we cannot afford to ignore the subject of happiness which, properly used, may be a major force in spiritual development. It should be added that in many cases this rejection of happiness is not really based on intellectual convictions, so much as on an illogical, unconscious belief that *all* happiness is wicked. The fact that such people generally feel that sexual gratification is especially reprehensible gives us a clue to the neurotic origin of their belief, and in a later chapter I shall indicate briefly how it arises.

started as a doctrine of love towards others, of freedom from guilt ('taking away the sins of the world') and of disdain of wealth, and which contrived in time to produce the Spanish Inquisition, the wars of religion, the doctrine of original sin, Calvinism, and an enormously wealthy property-owning church. And we can see it also in the case of socialism, which started as a doctrine of universal benevolence, and which in Russia, despite the introduction of radically new social institutions, has already become an oppressive dictatorship, arousing emotions not of love but of fear.

But the social sciences have also brought us a third and even more significant discovery: that certain elements in society play a decisive part in determining personality. As a result, it is phenomenally difficult, or actually impossible, for us to modify our own personality by direct effort. As Freud has shown us, a great part of the mind is unconscious, and we cannot alter the patterns in it by any conscious effort, short of the laborious and uncertain process of psycho-analysis. In addition to this, our standards of right behaviour are acquired, to a far greater extent than most people realise, from the society into which we are born. Very often these standards of right and wrong are faulty. Our 'conscience' is not necessarily a reliable guide. So we cannot confidently tell how best to modify our personalities, even assuming it were in our power to do so.

Only if we come to understand the whole nexus and direct our attack to the point where society and personality meet can we hope to achieve any progress.

Failure to recognise this fact has invalidated all previous approaches to the subject. Practically all the classical advice on happiness has emphasised *either* personal reconstruction *or* social reconstruction. Many moralists, from the early church down to Bertrand Russell or C. S. Lewis, have advised us to seek happiness by altering our behaviour. In contrast, others, neglecting the roots of unhappiness in themselves, have hoped to mend matters by the institution of a new form of society. The second method, being apparently less strenuous for the individual, is especially popular today.

Both are futile. It is useless to advise people to behave better when their actions are determined by social forces: it is no good telling the avaricious man that wealth does not bring happiness if avarice has been built into his character. Wealth may not bring happiness, to be sure, but nothing else will, either. To this extent the church is wrong and the communist partly right. But equally it is no good trying to build a new society and hoping that better-behaved citizens will emerge as an automatic result. There the church is right and the communist wrong.

On this showing, almost all contemporary political and ethical endeavour is, in the long run, wasted effort.

The vital lesson is: progress can only be achieved by attacking at the points *where society and personality interact.*

That personality and society are but two aspects of a single nexus is the main thesis of this book.

IV *Human Needs*

Brilliant as is the modern scientific treatment of the 'psycho-social nexus'—to give this crucial interrelationship a name—yet it does not go deep enough. It fails to explain personality and society in terms of the same postulates, to show that both grow in the same soil. This soil is the full schedule of irreducible human needs. Society is a system of devices for helping men to meet their needs, and can only be fully understood when we are sure what those needs are. By the same token personality is the name we give to the assembly of behaviour patterns which an individual employs in his efforts to meet his needs. Personalities differ primarily because different individuals find different methods rewarding.

To those who are familiar with only the clinical side of psycho-analytical work this will seem a hard saying: surely, they will mutter, people employ different methods because their personalities differ, and not the other way about. But as so often happens in studying the mind, the truth turns out to be a paradox. The justification for this assertion will appear in Chapter 5.

In other words, it is only when we have a comprehensive understanding of human needs that we can hope to come to an understanding both of our present frustrations and of what we could do about them. •

You will appreciate that when we speak of human needs we might equally well speak of conditions. It is no more than a difference of verbal formulation whether we say that food is a condition of life or whether we say that man needs food in order to live. To discuss human needs is to discuss the conditions of happiness in the broadest sense. You may object, however, that to establish the conditions of happiness is not necessarily to guarantee that happiness will manifest. One can wire up an electric lamp, and thus establish the conditions for its operation, but unless you turn the current on it will not glow. Similarly, you may say, I can agree that if a man's vital needs are frustrated he may not be happy. We are hardly likely to be happy when dying of thirst or lack of sleep but it doesn't follow that we shall be happy when we are rested and fed. Perhaps if all our needs are met we shall merely be not-unhappy.

The validity of this objection depends entirely on how wide we make our definition of needs. If, in the case of our electric circuit, we had included in the conditions that part of the wiring should move through a magnetic field we should have ensured that a current would flow through the circuit. And in some senses this might be called the vital or operative condition. Whether or not the schedule of needs outlined in the chapters which follow is complete and includes the operative conditions, or whether it merely clears the decks for happiness without engaging the battle, can hardly be proved except by experiment. Personally, I believe that it is a complete schedule.

Finally, there is the ticklish question of what we mean by happiness. If we can define the conditions in which happiness manifests we can arrive at a working definition of happiness, just as the physicist obtains a working definition of electricity by defining it as the phenomenon which occurs when a conductor is moved transversely through a magnetic field. Of course we remain ignorant of what happiness is, just as the physicist

remains ignorant of what electricity is—but this ignorance need not prevent us from achieving it. We do not reject the services of the man who mends—or who designs, for that matter—our radio set because he cannot tell us what electricity is. Equally we can hope to control the conditions in which happiness manifests without knowing what it is.

Even within these limits we must take notice of a difficulty which has nothing to do with happiness as such, but which springs from the nature of language: in brief, a difficulty which is not psychological but semantic.

The *word* happiness can never be defined to everyone's satisfaction, even in functional terms, as long as people insist on using the word to mean different things at different times. For instance, we sometimes use it to refer to quite short periods of intense satisfaction (properly called ecstasy): sometimes we use it to describe a prolonged period free from major worries or discomforts; sometimes we apply it to the experience properly known as joy, and so on. Some people would confine it to only one or two of such experiences, while others would extend it to cover the lot.

All these experiences, one immediately notices, are marked by the presence of agreeable feelings and the absence of disagreeable ones. So what it really comes to is, we have got to study the conditions in which agreeable feelings are generated and disagreeable ones prevented. When we have got this clear, we can settle the limits of the word happiness in any way which is convenient.

The point we have reached so far, then, is that we can legitimately attack the problem of happiness by trying to draw up a full schedule of human needs and seeing how far they receive satisfaction; and that in so doing we must not confine our attention to single individuals, but must constantly bear in mind their interrelation with the society they live in. To draw up such a schedule of human needs is a considerable task, for there is little previous work upon which we can call. We shall have to start at the beginning and spend several chapters, justifying our conclusions as we go along. But before we start this

undertaking, there are one or two misconceptions which it will be worth our while to clear out of the way.

v *What Happiness is Not*

The assertion that we can approach the subject of happiness by studying the conditions in which agreeable feelings are generated and disagreeable ones minimised does not imply that happiness is to be attained by satisfying as *many* needs as possible. There is a hierarchy among men's demands; some are absolute, others admit of alternatives, yet others can be wholly dispensed with in certain circumstances. Happiness is not the answer to a sum in simple addition.

Neither is it the answer to a multiplication sum. The task is not to meet the demands to the fullest extent. As we know from the old law of diminishing satisfactions, there comes a point in meeting any demand when it is no longer a wise use of energy to proceed any further; it is better to switch one's efforts to a different field. The delicate interplay of our various needs will become clear as we establish a picture of what they are.

A second source of error arises from the fact that when a man cannot obtain what he really wants he will accept a substitute. Substitutes, however, are never equal to the real thing in the long run and much unhappiness can be traced to the unwitting use of substitute satisfactions. In the absence of butter, margarine provides a very real source of satisfaction: it does not follow that we shall be wise to devote our best efforts to increasing the supply of margarine. Since this may seem rather obvious, it is perhaps worth pointing out that we constantly make this mistake in our civilisation. In economic terms, we assume that the existence of a 'demand' is good reason for supplying what is demanded. We also assume the converse: that we need not supply what is not demanded.

I need hardly add that the use of substitutes is not confined to the economic sphere: on the contrary it is the use of substitutes in the emotional and intellectual spheres which is of chief interest in the present context. The childless woman who

lavishes affection on a pet, the routine worker who pits his wits against the compiler of crossword puzzles, betray the flaws in our society, considered as a milieu for happiness.

Superficially similar to the use of substitutes is the use of anæsthetics. When we cannot meet a demand we may seek to numb it. Consider the case of the man who, being desperately unhappy because some fundamental need is being frustrated, takes to drink to numb his misery. Looked at mechanically, his action is well chosen to raise his 'happiness-index.' If we had an instrument for measuring such a thing, we should doubtless detect a distinct improvement after the third or fourth glass! Yet no one but a maniac would regard alcohol as a valid cure for his misery. (This, I need hardly add, is not to deny the great value of moderate quantities of alcohol in stimulating social intercourse.) Yet this is precisely the mistake we do make—in that we consider a demand for whisky an adequate reason for satisfying it and make no attempt to uncover the frustrations which cause a certain part of it. Still more generally, we accept the whole demand for goods, and adapt our civilisation to manufacture them, without asking to what extent the demand is a synthetic one.

From challenging hasty assumptions about how to meet demands we have gradually been led to challenge assumptions about the validity of the demand itself—and now we must thrust much further in this direction.

VI *Pseudo-Happiness*

Something which obfuscates many attempts to handle the subject of happiness in terms of needs is the existence of what we may call pseudo-happinesses and unhappinesses; or, more scientifically, neurotic needs.

The miser demands gold for his hoard, the Don Juan a steady procession of women, the masochist perpetual ill-treatment or humiliation. Can we say that these appetites are needs? Even if psycho-analysis had not exposed their artificial nature, we should still suspect them since we notice that the miser's gold

does not bring him happiness, and the Don Juan is not long soothed by his conquests. Though the victim of a pseudo-need is unhappy when it is frustrated he is scarcely less unhappy when it is met. In such a case the road to happiness does not lie in meeting the need but in getting rid of it—just as the treatment for the chronic thirst of diabetes insipidus is not a copious supply of water but injections of pituitrin aided by a low-salt, low-protein diet.

The moment we recognise the existence of such a thing as an invalid demand it dawns on us that a great range of supposed needs can be stripped off the human personality and thrown away, leaving—it may be—quite a simple range of primary needs on which to build our thesis. This at once recalls to us the view so prevalent in eastern cultures that the road to happiness is to be found not in satisfying needs but in reducing them. Thus the opposing schools of hedonism (satisfaction of demands) and stoicism (reduction of demands) are combined in a new synthesis. In this way we can meet another, well-founded objection to many previous attempts to handle the subject of happiness in terms of satisfaction of needs.

VII *Plan of Action*

These considerations dictate the shape of the book. It falls into three main divisions. In the first, I propose to try and catalogue man's needs and discover the relative importance and urgency of each. This leads naturally to a consideration of the way in which personality and society limit our attempts to satisfy our needs, and to the interactions between them. Having thus worked out the mechanics of the problem we can, in the second section, apply what we have learned to contemporary society in an effort to see why it is unhappy. It will also be interesting to apply it to the two great modern alternatives to traditional patterns, fascism and communism, and see if they stand up any better to our tests. I shall try to show that they owe their temporary successes to the fact that they do, in the short run, offer a higher standard of happiness than traditional

western society—and also why, in the long run, they must always fail. Finally, in the last section, I shall try to sketch the nature of an ideal society and derive from this some practical principles to guide us in our agonising contemporary dilemma.

In covering so broad a field within the scope of a single manageable volume, it will be necessary to deal briefly with many points and sometimes to oversimplify. I have therefore included a number of footnotes, not so much to indicate the sources from which I have myself drawn (which would require a much longer list) but rather to indicate to the reader who may, perhaps, be a specialist in one field but ignorant of another, a few outstanding books in which he can follow up points he finds intriguing.

Let us start, then, on our attempt to analyse human needs. As I have already warned you, it will take six chapters. The reader who is only interested in the application of this analysis to contemporary problems can safely skip to the last section of Chapter 7, where he will find the results of the analysis summarised.

II

HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

I Approach to Happiness—II Pain—III Physical Sensations—IV Æsthetic Experience—V Emotions—VI Relative Importance—VII Nature of Happiness—VIII Instincts and Drives—IX Modifying Factors

I *Approach to Happiness*

ONE might reasonably expect that human needs had long since been catalogued and reduced to order, but such is not the case. In fact, there is still an extraordinary amount of confusion on the subject. Since my main object in this chapter will be to discuss the relative importance of different types of needs, we shall have first to go to the trouble of arriving at some kind of classification.

I am going to suggest that these fall into three major groups which, for lack of better words, I shall call physical, æsthetic and emotional. I must say at once that the word 'emotional' is a particularly unsatisfactory label. I propose to deal under this head not only with experiences such as love, but with security, variety and success in one's enterprises.

At this point one of my more fractious readers may object to any classification in terms like this. I agree, he may say, that physical needs are really needs: it is difficult to be happy if one is desperately thirsty or short of sleep. But is it true we have æsthetic needs? Certainly, æsthetic experience is a *possible* source of happiness, but is it an essential one? Could we not be happy, in our own way, without such experience?

My reply to this would be to point to emotional needs. At one time many people thought that emotional fulfilment was 'optional.' But the work of psychiatrists has shown quite clearly that the person who fails to develop an emotional life is never

really happy, however convincing a front he may put up to the world or to himself. It seems to be the case that we literally *need* to fulfil our potentialities. If we fail to do so, we are not simply less happy than we might be, but are actively unhappy or distorted in some way. The man who does not fulfil his potentialities is not completely a man.

If this be so, it follows that we must realise our potentialities of æsthetic experience as fully as possible, and that if we do not, our nature and our pattern of life is bound to be blighted in some degree.

Since people try to satisfy their needs, any study of the subject naturally throws light on how people behave—or, in a word, on the subject of *motivation*—and it is chiefly in this connection that psychologists have been interested in the matter. Motivation is of interest to us, too, for we need to understand why man behaves as he does before we can persuade him to behave in some different way in order to increase his chances of happiness.

So obstinately do people try to satisfy their needs that one can justifiably speak, as some writers have chosen to, of *drives* rather than of needs. Thus we can describe hunger equally in terms of a need for food or a drive to get food.

Of course, there are occasions when the drive is inhibited, usually in favour of another still more powerful drive. And it is also true that these drives do not necessarily succeed, or they may succeed only in a very limited way. Our sense of beauty may only find expression in a sentimental chromolithograph, just as our emotional life may be centred on a Pekingese, or our efforts to get food on drawing the dole.

All drives operate through our ability to feel *pleasure* or its opposite. It is because food and being loved relieve unpleasant feelings of hunger and loneliness that we seek to find food and love. Having discovered them we find, in most instances, that they are sources of positive pleasure as well and from then on we seek them to gain pleasure as well as to avoid discomfort.

But what is pleasure? Like happiness, it is a word we use far from precisely. If we wish to avoid getting in a muddle we shall

need to clarify what we mean by it—and, in fact, the attempt to do so will help us to arrive at a classification of needs.

Most people use the word pleasure as if it were simply the opposite of pain. But, as a matter of fact, pain is a very curious phenomenon and nothing to do with pleasure at all.

II *Pain*

To make matters worse, we use the word with equal freedom to indicate the crude physical sensation which results from stimulus to sensory nerves and also to describe a physical state at the æsthetic or emotional level.[1] But we are not entitled to assume that all unpleasant sensations are of the same nature as physical pain. All the evidence is that pain is a unique phenomenon quite distinct from pleasure and its true opposite. I shall therefore follow the general psychological practice of calling the opposite of pleasure *unpleasure*, and reserve the word pain for the crude physical experience.

Physiological research supports this attitude. Pain, it has been shown, is conveyed only by certain nerves specialised for the purpose. Any stimulus to these nerves is experienced as pain, and they cannot in any circumstances convey the sensation of pleasure. (With the special case of masochism, in which pain is welcomed despite its painfulness, I shall deal in Chapter 4.) Quite distinct from the pain nerves are nerve fibres ending in organs specialised to respond to heat, light, sound, taste, smell and pressure. The sensation conveyed by these nerves may be pleasant or unpleasant according to circumstances.

Why certain nerves should have this distinctive property of conveying a sensation which is always disagreeable, no matter

[1] We require a word to indicate operations taking place at the level of the psyche: a word which will embrace mental, emotional, spiritual, æsthetic and any other experiences which may come under this head. Psychic has been pre-empted for the supernatural. Psychological, which is often used for this purpose, despite the fact that it is really the adjective of the science of psychology rather than of the psyche, has come to refer to those specialised patterns which are the field of psycho-analysis. I propose to use the word *psychical*.

what the circumstances, remains a mystery. The answer is not to be found in the nature of the nervous impulse, which, as Adrian has shown, is of the same type in both pain and sensory nerves.[1] Head and Rivers have suggested that the pain nerves constitute a separate system developed at an earlier stage in evolutionary history and that this simple 'protopathic' system was later supplemented by the more subtle and discriminating 'epicritic' nervous system.

Head severed two nerves in his arm and noted that awareness of pain, and of very marked heat and cold, returned after seven weeks. But this awareness was not proportional to the stimulus, it was of an all-or-nothing character, and it was not localised. Moreover, it produced an abnormally powerful emotional effect, similar to the reactions of people with disease of the hypothalamus. It was not for a year that normal awareness of nervous stimuli returned. In addition there were points on his arm, presumably fed by epicritic nerves which had not been cut, which retained awareness of the location and nature of a prick but without signalling pain.[2]

It should be noted, however, that when Boring, in America, and Trotter and Davies, in Britain, repeated this experiment they could not fully confirm Head's results, nor did they agree among one another. Volunteers for repetitions of this important experiment are needed.

The next step is to consider the pleasant and unpleasant sensations conveyed by the epicritic nerves. (Here again we must avoid any tendency to assume that all such experiences are of the same order. Let us therefore follow the general psychological practice of speaking of the *hedonic tone* of an experience: if it is agreeable we shall say that the hedonic tone is positive and if disagreeable that it is negative. This will leave

[1] E. D. Adrian, *The Basis of Sensation*, 1928. But see later for a further suggestion modifying this view. Pain is, nevertheless, a surprisingly complex and ill-understood phenomenon. See, especially, Adrian, *The Physical Basis of Perception*, 1947.

[2] H. Head and W. H. R. Rivers, 'A Human Experiment in Nerve Division,' *Brain*, 1908 (Vol. XXXI, p. 323).

us free to give an exact meaning to the word pleasure when we feel able to do so.) Here again the picture is not as simple as it seems.

III *Physical Sensations*

There is no great difficulty in cataloguing the physical needs of man: food, air, water, freedom of movement, etc. But what is the common element in all these needs?

If we consider a specific instance of sensation, such as warmth and cold, we see that the hedonic tone of the experience is entirely dependent on something *in ourselves*. If we are cold a moderate degree of heat is pleasant, if we are not it is unpleasant. Even our classification of the experience as hot or cold is made solely in relation to our own temperature. Water which seems cool to us when we are hot may seem hot to us when we are cold. Thus, unlike the case of pain nerves, the message conveyed by the epicritic nerves is in itself neutral.[1]

Developing this idea a little further we may say that the body has a *normal* temperature. Heat is experienced as of positive hedonic tone when it helps to bring the body nearer the norm (as is the case when it is temporarily below it) and as of negative hedonic tone when it carries it further away. The only qualification we need add to this is that the rate of change must not be too rapid. Note that the unpleasantness consists in our being at an abnormal temperature, too hot or too cold, and the hedonic quality we ascribe to the temperature of the environment should really be ascribed to the change in ourselves.

Note, also, that there is no positive hedonic tone in being at normal temperature: it is only *change towards* normal temperature which is pleasant. It follows that such an experience cannot remain pleasant indefinitely, for sooner or later normality must be reached. Finally, it is worth observing that the experience tends to be very little localised. On a cold day we are conscious of a general discomfort and lowering of physical tone, and this is far more important to us than any sensation of coldness at the surface of the skin or in the extremities, closely as

[1] This concept is as old as Plato; see *The Philebus*.

these may occupy our attention while our general bodily temperature is still high.

This concept of a distinct type of hedonic experience arising from the displacement of the body from a normal state can, I suggest, be generalised to include a wide range of sensations. The body consists of an elaborate nexus of chemical, physical and electrical equilibria, precariously maintained by the supply of new material and the removal of waste products as the body uses up its resources in growth and action. Whenever the supply falls short, whenever waste products are not removed and whenever the energy is not utilised in action, a sense of ill-being results for which I propose the name *discomfort*. Correspondingly, whenever a movement towards normal equilibrium takes place an experience of positive hedonic tone is recorded, and this I shall call *comfort*.

The exact quality of the sensation depends on the particular group of equilibria involved. One of the commonest is the one we call hunger. Pleasure is experienced as the body returns to repletion—and if we are unwise enough to continue eating past the proper point, the experience becomes disagreeable. As before, normality is neutral in tone, it is only movement towards and away from neutrality which is hedonically toned. Similarly failure to remove waste products results in a sense of ill-being, whereas normality is not actively agreeable but merely neutral on the hedonic scale. This state of normality is, however, marked by a powerful sense of physical well-being.

This brings us to a new concept of perfect health as the maximum of physical well-being instead of merely the absence of gross lesions or malfunctions as at present. Owing to our unwillingness to recognise discomfort as an experience in its own right, we tend to be extraordinarily apathetic about suffering it. Few people in a modern population can claim that perfection of function which we call perfect physical well-being, and since perfect health is an important element in happiness they are by so much removed from attaining it.

It must be emphasised that the normality of the body is a

dynamic, not a static, concept. The body does not simply require to be maintained at a certain temperature. It requires to maintain itself. It is an engine consuming fuel and producing energy. It maintains the correct chemical equilibria only by a continuous process of feeding material in at one end and draining off the products of metabolism at the other. Normality consists in the normal performance of these functions. If they could be arrested, as by a stop-motion photograph, the result would not be normality, even though the relation of the parts was absolutely normal. Normality, in fact, is a temporal as well as a spatial concept.

This perhaps explains the satisfaction experienced from the mere use of the body—so noticeable in growing children, who, having learned an action or discovered a potentiality, exercise it repeatedly with great delight. And I think it explains the satisfaction derived from what one may label *titillations*, such as stroking. The pleasure of being stroked (like the pleasure of scents and tastes) cannot be convincingly attributed to a πληρωσις or return towards normality. It may, however, be partly explained as a mere exercise of function—and partly, I think, on æsthetic grounds, as we are about to see.

And all this is equally true of the superphysical functions of the body-mind combination. Man requires to exercise his functions of feeling, thinking and achieving if he is to attain normality.

Maybe we should go further, for it is now generally recognised that a human being consists of an inseparable combination of body and mind, each influencing the other and in turn being influenced by it. We must admit, therefore, a concept of psychological normality—a normality of functioning—and recognise the existence of a general discomfort, both mental and physical, accompanying both mental and physical dysfunctions.

But if the hedonic tone is not conveyed by the nerves, how is it experienced? There seems no alternative but to suppose that it is felt as a *direct experience* of the body-mind combination. We have to concede that it is conscious of disturbance of function because it is a change *in it itself*. This, at the moment, is a

strictly unorthodox viewpoint, even though the evidence has been pointing in this direction for some time.[1]

So much for comfort and discomfort: now let us consider an æsthetic experience.

IV *Æsthetic Experience*

Let us take the case of a musical chord. A chord consists of a number of pure notes; if the frequencies of these component notes are harmonically related, the sensation experienced by a listener is pleasant, and if they are not it is unpleasant. Similar considerations apply if we consider notes ranged consecutively in time. If we play seven notes of the scale, the eighth is expected and the substitution of some other note seems hedonically negative. Note that the hedonic tone of the experience seems to depend not on the stimuli themselves but on their *harmonious* arrangement. If harmonious seems to be a question-begging word we can define it in terms of mathematical relationships.

So here again we have a case where the stimulus is neutral, and the human being's reaction is pleasant or unpleasant according to whether it contributes to his inner harmony or not.

Similar considerations seem to apply to constructions or the representations of constructions, which are æsthetically pleasing when the proportions are harmonious, and to combinations of colours. (It seems necessary to add, however, that æsthetic experiences must be related to the total horizon of experience. Thus a discord may be permissible and valuable in the course of a symphony, just as a bitter ingredient may be of value in cooking. More than this, a piece of music, itself charming, may be tasteless in a particular human situation, as a waltz at a funeral. And, of course, monotonous repetition stales even the most delightful experience.)

Or take the case of touch. A light touch (provided the general emotional situation is not unfavourable) is hedonically neutral,

[1] See Adrian, 1947, op. cit.

but a rhythmic series of light touches—stroking or patting—is generally regarded as pleasant. Here again we find pleasure in the harmonious or rhythmic arrangement of hedonically neutral stimuli.

But while these experiences are æsthetically determined, our response to them depends on our capacity to appreciate complex arrangements in space and time. The history of art, especially perhaps of music, is one of artists putting forward more and more subtle arrangements and the public failing at first to find anything pleasing in them. (The orchestra which was to give the first performance of Schubert's Ninth Symphony, the great *C Major*, refused to continue rehearsals, to take but one example.) So that as regards this category, our capacity for pleasure—and unpleasure—is to some extent within our power to develop.

How then are we to describe these experiences? Are they simply physical pleasures?—obviously not. It seems that they have, as it were, a foot in either camp. They are rooted in gross physical stimuli but blossom in the airy medium of the mind. I propose, therefore, to call them psycho-physical pleasures (or *pleasures*, for short). Each of them, of course, has its counterpart in an *unpleasure*: the chord is balanced by the discord and the perfume by the stink. In short, it looks as if æsthetic needs must be counted as a distinct category.

v *Emotions*

Acutest of all sources of pleasure are the emotions. There is the bliss of being united with the person one loves and the agony of separation; the joy of achievement and the misery of frustration; the bliss of security and the tortures of anxiety and guilt. I propose, therefore, to call them *miseries* and *blisses*.

Because they are so important to us, I want to examine and classify this group of experiences in some detail. But to do so at this point would mean postponing my general conclusion about motivation for so many pages that the reader might well be excused for losing the thread of the argument. I propose,

therefore, to leave the detailed treatment of this group to the next chapter and proceed without further ado to a consideration of the relative importance of these categories.

VI *Relative Importance*

Bearing in mind that the various types of motive we have been considering rarely exist in isolation, but are abstractions from situations which may contain elements of all of them, we can schematise the factors which influence men's behaviour as follows:

1. Pain
2. Comfort/Discomfort (Physical)
3. Pleasure/Unpleasure (Psycho-physical)
4. Bliss/Misery (Psychical)

In practice man makes a deliberate estimate of all these factors, weighing one against another, and regulates his behaviour accordingly. However, in so doing he does not regard them as exactly equivalent. The discrimination he makes is a little difficult to express precisely in non-mathematical terms. To simplify the exposition let us speak in broad terms of physical and emotional factors.

Broadly, then, physical factors make a more *urgent* claim on man's attention, but emotional factors provide him with his *ultimate* motives. The mistake people make is to suppose that because physical needs are more urgent they are therefore more final. They think that because a man will die if he goes without food but will not die if he goes without love[1] therefore hunger is a more fundamental motive than love. But consider the case of a man who, while driving to a concert, finds his petrol tank almost empty and stops to fill it, at the cost of missing the first few minutes of the performance. We cannot conceivably

[1] As a matter of fact this assertion may not be wholly true. Men may contrive to do without normal love but only by employing substituted or making neurotic adaptations or taking refuge in psychosis. When a person has centred all his emotional life on a single love-object and that object (person) is removed by fate, the partner—especially if no longer young—may fail to make an adaptation and will die 'of a broken heart.' There are some well-attested instances of this.

assert that this shows that his desire for petrol is more fundamental than his desire to attend the concert. He only wants the petrol as a means towards getting to the concert, and the latter is unquestionably his primary motive. So also a lover, looking for his beloved, will ignore the claims of hunger and exhaustion for a time but will finally stop for food and rest. This does not mean that he values food above his beloved, merely that he realises he will be unable to succeed in his primary aim, an emotional one, unless he first ministers to the physical vehicle of his emotions.

Man's behaviour thus displays a continual dichotomy. He is constantly being diverted from his main purpose—emotional satisfaction—to deal with annoying but urgent needs. Pain is most effective in distracting him, discomfort less so, and unpleasure least. Conversely, the blisses are more rewarding than the pleasures, and the pleasures more so than the comforts. Thus, to take but a single instance, if it requires an unpleasure of strength x to distract a man from a specified pleasure, it will require a discomfort of something more than x, or a bliss of something less, to achieve the same result.

Certain minor exceptions to this thesis are well explained by Bostock's theory of the neural energy constant.[1] According to this theory the amount of energy available to the centres in the brain which handle sensation, feeling and cognition is constant, so that when any one centre is being fully used the others are temporarily in abeyance. It then takes a fairly powerful stimulus to reconnect them to the circuit. Thus, when we are listening to a concert we remain unaware for some time that we are growing stiff or hungry. When this fact finally breaks in on our attention it at once reduces the amount of attention we are able to give to the concert.

We now have in our hands the outline of a theory of motivation. We see man engaged in a delicate assessment of the seven types of experience open to him, pursuing the more agreeable and being distracted by the less agreeable. But unfortunately

[1] See J. Bostock: *The Neural Energy Constant: a study of the basis of consciousness*, 1931.

there is another complication: he does not respond to them in a simple automatic way, like a needle to a magnet. His behaviour is dependent on the process by which he learns from experience. He can only seek to avoid the experiences he *knows* to be unpleasant, and to attain the experiences he *knows* to be pleasant. As a result he constantly neglects sources of positive feeling which he has never tried and mis-spends his energies in pursuing less rewarding goals. He fails to realise his potentialities. Thus a man who has never discovered the appeal of good music may pass his whole life without benefit of this source of satisfaction. Similarly those who have never experienced the 'oceanic feeling' are unaware that they are missing anything, although those who have done so earnestly strive to repeat the experience.

Hence one of the errors man frequently makes is to dally too long with negative activities. For instance, he inevitably devotes much of his time to obtaining food and shelter, a course which is at first highly rewarding. He then makes the mistake of continuing the same pattern of action, devoting his energies to acquiring ever more elaborate food, clothing and shelter when he would be better advised to switch the balance of his energies into seeking pleasures and blisses. For it is these which really matter, and it is the task of realising them which will chiefly concern us.

In fine, man is not, in the full meaning of the term, a pleasure-seeking animal. Though he certainly seeks out little bits of pleasure with which he is acquainted, he does not move so as effectively to maximise his pleasure as a whole. He seeks pleasures but not Pleasure. (Here, of course, I am using the word in the usual dictionary sense.) It follows that it is vain to expect that maximum pleasure will be attained automatically. Only by taking pains can we develop the full potentialities for happiness which are within us.

VII *Nature of Happiness*

In the light of this analysis, pleasure (using the word in the ordinary, vague sense) appears as an evanescent bonus received

in the course of return to a normal neutral state, departure from which was painful. We come, therefore, to the paradoxical conclusion that if anyone pursues pleasure with complete success he is bound to end up in a state in which pleasure is unobtainable, except by the drastic course of deliberately abandoning the state and working his way back to it.

Since, in the nature of things, we are all far removed from such a beneficent state of neutrality, we can justifiably pursue pleasure, providing that we attach greater value to the high level satisfactions than to the lower, and do not let the pursuit of the latter hinder us from maximising the former.

In the light of this analysis, the ancient Platonic controversy whether men should, as Philebus claimed, pursue pleasure or whether, as Socrates maintained, the Good Life consists of neutrality diversified by harmless pleasures, is seen to have been no controversy at all. A case could be made against the pursuit of pleasure just so far as the speaker conceived pleasure in terms of the lower-grade pleasures. On the other hand, in making a case for neutrality, the opponent was unwittingly accepting a wisely-ordered pursuit of pleasure, since neutrality can only be attained by passing through pleasure. In the outcome, Plato's solution coincides with the practical possibilities of the situation: neutrality as far as possible, with periodic bonuses of pleasure, when, in any particular respect, an advance is made towards neutrality in spheres where neutrality has not been achieved.

And so at last we come to the definition of happiness. You can, if you choose, define it as the maximisation of pleasure—as the most rapid progress *towards* that final neutral state of which we have spoken: or you can define it as existence *in* that state. The dictionary definition, 'a state of contentment,' tends to favour the latter.

Many present-day attempts to define happiness unhesitatingly choose the former: for instance, the definition which calls it 'the devotion of all one's energies to attaining the best possible goal.' But if we are going to define it in terms of progress towards something we must cast the net much wider than this. We cannot possibly afford to leave out the many forms

of happiness which have nothing to do with achieving goals in the ordinary sense of the word: to lie in the sun on a warm day, to hear a splendid symphony, or to return home hungry and find a satisfying meal. Happiness cannot be pinned down by a single-pointed definition. It comes in many guises. Some may be humble and temporary in their effects, to be sure. To say that we should not confine our attention to them is not to say that we should scorn them altogether.

But whether we choose a definition in terms of ends or one in terms of means makes no difference to our purpose. Since the one leads to the other, the conditions of happiness are identical for either definition.

VIII *Instincts and Drives*

As I have already suggested, the scheme of needs at which we have arrived provides us with the basis for a theory of motivation. Since it is an unfamiliar one, it may be advisable to compare it with standard theories and to mention some of the complicating factors.

Most people, I find, still have at the backs of their minds the view of motivation put forward nearly half a century ago by William McDougall, although it is now regarded as obsolete. People say: 'the instinct of self-preservation came to my rescue,' or they say: 'it must be her maternal instincts.' The idea that people were endowed with quite general urges or drives of this kind was started by William McDougall, and he most unfortunately called them instincts. He postulated fourteen such drives or instincts, such as the instinct of self-preservation or flight, the instinct of pugnacity, the instinct of repugnance and the protective instinct, the instinct of self-assertion and the instinct of self-abasement. Today few psychologists still believe these drives exist but, even if they do, they certainly aren't instincts. We can see why the moment we consider a true instinct.

The characteristic of a true instinct is that it is untaught, elaborate, and performed quite blindly. The non-intelligent, automatic nature of instinctive behaviour has been shown by

many experiments. For instance, one of the digger wasps buries its egg in a hole, and buries with it a paralysed grasshopper as provender for the offspring when it emerges. After dragging the grasshopper to the mouth of the hole, it leaves it outside while it enters the hole to make a final inspection. If, while it is in the hole, the grasshopper is withdrawn a short distance, the wasp, on emerging, drags it up to the mouth of the hole again and then repeats the inspection. It can be made to repeat this behaviour a number of times. Again, another variety of digger wasp always drags the paralysed grasshopper by its antennæ. If these are cut off it is baffled and makes no attempt to drag it by its limbs.

Numerous cases like these make it clear that the wasp is not animated by any generalised instinct to care for its offspring, but by a quite specific instinct to perform a series of precisely-ordained actions in a certain sequence. Similarly birds are not animated merely to build some kind of a nest, but to build a quite specific and often very complicated type of nest, varying from species to species. And if reared in isolation they are able, untaught, to repeat the pattern.

Having made the distinction between a completely generalised drive and a rigid, automatic sequence of instinctive actions, I do not think we need to push the distinction too far. It is the insects which display these patterns at their most elaborate; when we look at mammals we find behaviour, like nest-building or the mating habits of the eel, which, though limited in certain respects, also displays a considerable amount of flexibility and intelligence. The bird, for instance, can incorporate unusual materials in its nest, and does not get stuck half-way through if the action doesn't go according to plan.

Some people, dominated by the idea of the complexity of the instincts of insects, have denied that man displays any instincts at all. It may be that the adult, with his enormous cerebral cortex, has taken over all or almost all the functions which are left to instinct, but Claremont has argued convincingly that instincts exist in children, and if we admit it in the child it would be rash to exclude it too dogmatically in the

adult.[1] Without instinct it is very difficult to explain the insight with which children turn their attention to precisely those activities which are necessary for their development at the stage they have reached. We have to explain, for instance, why the new-born infant turns towards milk, why it sucks, why it rejects other foods. And we have to explain why the slightly older child practises producing different kinds of sounds, until it obtains the full control of its vocal chords needed for speech. Later we see children trying to walk, then practising balancing, and so on.

The odd thing about instincts—the thing which makes it necessary to place them in a section by themselves—is that they do not act continuously, but rear their heads unexpectedly, distorting the normal pattern of behaviour.

When this happens, the demand of the instinct is so strong that it may drive the animal, or person, concerned to fulfil the demand even at the cost of severe suffering and frustration of the more normal demands. Thus the lemming, driven on its periodical migration, plunges into the sea and is drowned.

This description aptly covers the sexual behaviour of man, which arises periodically with such force as to drive him to actions which he deeply regrets when the urge has passed, and which may damage his chances of happiness for the rest of his life.

Since the mechanism by which instincts operate is a complete mystery, no one can say whether they should be regarded as a special instance of one of the basic types of situation which I have described, or as an additional one in their own right.

One further point: many people use the word instinct when they really mean intuition. They say 'I instinctively disliked him,' or 'she felt instinctively that we would come.' Now intuition, if it exists (though most scientists would scout the idea), must certainly be reckoned as a modifier of the thoughts and calculations we make about how we shall behave—these thoughts being in their turn modifiers of our fundamental responses to pleasant and unpleasant sensations.

[1] C. A. Claremont, *The Innumerable Instincts of Man*, 1940.

IX *Modifying Factors*

Orthodox scientists, committed as they are to explaining man as a piece of elaborate machinery, place undue weight on physiological factors in behaviour, and periodically make the claim that these are capable by themselves of accounting for his actions. I suggest, however, that the influence of such factors extends only to controlling the speed and accuracy of man's responses, and does not affect their fundamental nature.

Such exaggerated claims are most often made for the endocrine glands.[1] There is, perhaps, one case in which the influence of the endocrines does seem to come very near to controlling the nature, and not merely the strength and speed of response: that of the glands which regulate sexuality. But the subject is not as simple as it looks. First there is the fact that a reversal of bodily sexual characteristics does not always imply a reversal of the psychological attitude.[2] Second, the fact that what we regard as the attitudes appropriate to each sex are to a large extent conventions of the society in which we live. Thus, we, in the European culture area (of which North America, Australia, etc., are daughters), feel that women should wear skirts and that men should do the work. But in many parts of the world men wear skirts (e.g. the Scottish Highlands, Albania) and in others women do the bulk of the hard labour. Margaret Mead has shown in some detail how very largely the whole psychological attitude to sex-distinctions is subject to social influence and customs.[3]

My own impression is that there are elements of both active and passive attitudes in the character of both sexes, and that varying physical, psychological and social conditions tend to bring out one more than another, at different times. In this way, a change in the quantity of one attitude present may cause a change in behaviour which appears at first sight as a change in its quality.

A very similar mechanism is at work in the striking apparent

[1] See, for instance, L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, 1928.

[2] A. P. Cawadias, *Hermaphroditos*, 1943.

[3] M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935.

changes of personality which occur after damage to the cerebral cortex after the operation of prefrontal lobotomy, in which nerve-paths in the forebrain are cut, and to a lesser extent when drugs such as alcohol or sodium pentothal are used. These all depend on the fact that the outer cloak of the brain, the cerebral cortex, 'the seat of reason,' exercises a restraining influence on the central part, more particularly the hypothalamus, which is the seat of emotion and desire.[1] If the cortex is damaged, or if its action is inhibited by drugs, striking changes in the personality result.

Thus the *Lancet* of 1942 (Vol. II, p. 717) records the case of a successful N.C.O. whose aggressive temperament was effectively restrained by army discipline. He received a head injury which caused basal atrophy of the frontal lobes and became an undisciplined, aggressive character of little value either to the army or to society.[2]

Food has also been held to determine character, chiefly on the grounds that it affects the endocrines, but also through its effects on general metabolism.[3] Here again the effect seems on examination to be quantitative rather than qualitative.

Similar remarks apply to the influence of climate and other physiographic factors.[4]

Perhaps the influence most widely thought to determine behaviour is heredity. But we must remember that the Mendelian theory of inheritance—the theory on which all modern genetics is based—does not claim to account for the inheritance, or apparent inheritance, of psychological characteristics. Its scope is confined to physical characteristics, such as body-size, skin-colour, and the clotting power of the blood. The only way in which it could possibly touch the inheritance of physical characteristics would be where they could be shown to be

[1] See, especially, H. R. Grinker's contribution to the *Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. I, No. 1.

[2] Quoted by V. H. Mottram, *The Physical Basis of Personality*, 1944.

[3] E.g. L. Berman, *Food and Character*, 1933.

[4] See, for instance, S. F. Markham, *Climate and the Energy of Nations*; and for a more general treatment E. Huntington, *Civilisation and Climate*, 1924; *Mainsprings of Civilisation*, 1945.

secondary consequences of physical make-up. Thus the thyroid type of personality (see below) would seem to be inherited if the disposition to have a large thyroid gland were inherited; similarly the inheritance of a Jewish cast of countenance would tend to expose the owners to the same social influence as Jews, and this might cause certain similarities in the behaviour of successive generations.

Yet the fact that special dispositions often do seem to run in families, in a rather erratic way—the musical genius of the Bach family is the classic instance—suggests that there may possibly be principles of psychical inheritance about which we know nothing at present. Moreover, we have well-investigated cases of twins separated at birth who have grown up not only physically but psychically identical—displaying the same taste in clothes, entering the same trade, marrying the same kind of girl at the same time.[1] Some light may be thrown on this mystery by the remarkable fact reported by Frances Wickes that children have been known to dream dreams reflecting the contents not of their own but of their mother's unconscious mind.[2] From this fact, which is vouched for by C. G. Jung, it would seem that some kind of psychic identity may exist between children and parents, which argues that some kind of psychic inheritance may take place.

Factors such as these may influence the speed and accuracy and even the superficial character of individual responses to situations causing pleasure or the reverse, but there is no need to suppose that they fundamentally alter its nature.

There are, however, two other modifying influences which are of far greater importance because they do condition the nature of our response, and which are still insufficiently understood. The first of these is the unconscious forces in the human mind. Though they have come to exert enormous influence on

[1] H. H. Newman, *Twins and Super-Twins*, 1942.

[2] F. Wickes, *The Inner World of Childhood*, 1927. Though this report is vouched for by Prof. Jung in his preface to Wickes' book, there has never been, so far as I know, any planned attempt to confirm or refute this remarkable claim.

certain specialist workers, they are still a closed book, or a much misunderstood one, to many of those who think they are capable of directing our affairs. The second is the influence on our behaviour of the customs and conventions of the society into which we are born. Because we are so used to them, we take them for granted even when they are quite extraordinary and find it very difficult to see them in perspective. It takes a course in comparative anthropology to jerk us into seeing them in their true light. I shall, later, devote a chapter to each of these immensely important factors in human behaviour and try to show how far they help, and how far obstruct, our search for happiness.

III

SUPERPHYSICAL NEEDS

I Love and Affection—II Love and Identification—III The 'Oceanic Feeling'—IV Nature of Emotion—V Mastery and Frustration—VI Creativity—VII Consistency and Variety—VIII Self-Determination—IX Freud's View—X Conclusion

I *Love and Affection*

JUST as man needs material things and the right material environment to maintain his physical body so also he needs the right emotional environment to maintain his physical life. He is a social animal. Provided he has not received such severe emotional shocks that he prefers to withdraw from all contact with others for fear of more, he welcomes social contact: more than this, he hungers after affection and feels the need to bestow it also. Failing success in this, he falls ill. Analytical psychologists agree that it is problems concerning the receipt and bestowal of affection which underlie most, if not all, neurosis.[1]

I am thinking here of all the many forms of favourable feeling, ranging from tolerance through approval and affection to the deepest love. We have no satisfactory generic term for these, except possibly the rather clumsy 'other-regard,' so I propose to employ the word love in this general sense.

We shall be quite safe, therefore, in naming love as one of man's fundamental needs.

Modifying factors frequently disguise the human being's innate thirst for affection—very often people who have failed

[1] Though they disagree about what affection is. The Freudians, who regard it as aim-inhibited sex, naturally express their views in the form: neurosis is caused by frustrating the sexual impulse. It is equally logical, however, to regard love as the primary phenomenon and sexual activity as a channel for its expression. This view, originated by Ian Suttie, is followed here. See I. Suttie, *Origins of Love and Hate*, 1935.

to obtain it react into an attitude of despising it, on the 'sour grapes' principle—but the case-book of the psycho-analyst affords copious evidence of the universality of this demand at the deeper levels of the personality.

By a fortunate chance, people not only feel the need to be loved, they also need to bestow love. But for this, our chances of obtaining the affection and approval we need would be slim indeed. We all know how childless women tend to lavish affection on pet animals; how people who have failed to make a satisfactory relationship with the other sex find it necessary to bestow affection on their own sex, or on themselves; and that prisoners in solitary confinement will make friends of birds, rats or even toads.

People adopt devious devices to assuage this need when the normal outlets are blocked. They may divert their emotions on to a public body or organisation—a club, regiment, town or country—and are more likely to do so if the organisation returns their devotion with privileges or marks of honour. Others direct their affection onto their deity and, rightly or wrongly, believe themselves to be loved in return. Another ingenious solution is that known to analysts as narcissism—that is, love of oneself. Though this would seem to satisfy simultaneously the desire to love and the desire to be loved, it does not appear in practice to offer a truly satisfactory solution, though it does represent a successful adaptation of the kind we call neurotic.[1]

Psycho-analysis has brought out, more especially in its application to children, the way in which the ideas of security and love are fused. As we shall stress again in the next chapter, the infant knows but two states: to be warm, fed and loved on the one hand, to be cold, hungry and unloved on the other. Hence, when we speak of a desire to be loved we might speak with equal justification of a desire for security. Conversely, the desire to love is equally a desire to sustain and protect the loved object.

Love, in this generalised sense of 'other-regard,' appears in many guises: paternal, filial, sexual, platonic as well as love of God, of country, or of self. I do not think we need suppose that

[1] The nature of neurosis is discussed fully in the next chapter.

there is any qualitative difference in the love exhibited. It is sufficient if we suppose it coinciding to a greater or lesser degree with sexual motives, and limited by socially-defined responsibilities. Thus the parent obviously finds more scope for exhibiting the protective aspect of love than does the child toward the parent. The child must exhibit its protective feelings towards dolls or pets. But there is one form of 'other-regard' which deserves special mention as I propose to discuss it again at a later stage: this is the approval of a group. It is clear that men feel a strong desire to win and preserve the approval of the people among whom they live, more especially those whom they see daily and with whom they have established a social relationship. It is true that a very intense personal love may swamp the desire for social approval, so that lovers count the world well lost for love, but this is exceptional.

How far this desire for approval is motivated by a deep-lying doubt about one's own value is a point to which I shall recur. But it seems to be the case that even among peoples singularly unmarked by a lack of self-confidence, the desire for public approval remains strong.

"Love is quenched wrath," said an old mystic, but hate is the emotion which we more usually regard as the antonym of love. Is hate an emotion in its own right, so that men have a 'need to hate' just as they have a need to love? It does not seem so. Hate is rather a converted form of love, which appears when love is blocked. The sour-grapes principle, by which men reject what they cannot obtain, operates consistently in the psychological sphere. Though we do not know why this should be so, the conversion of love to hatred is clearly an example of it.

II *Love and Identification*

It is characteristic of the emotion we call love that we wish to place ourselves in the closest possible relationship with the loved object. The small child often tries to incorporate the things he loves in himself by the crude but effective process of swallowing. In this he only repeats the pattern of his infancy

when he incorporates part of his mother (her milk) in himself while flooded with a warm emotion towards her.

But this attempt to identify the loved object with ourselves is not only a physical one. We also make his or her interests and well-being our own—in fact, since physical incorporation is impossible and even proximity can only be spasmodic, the psychological part of the operation is the more important.

Freud has written of a process which is curiously similar to this, which he called *identification*. He observed that small children, for instance, modelled themselves on their parents, and that people who are in love feel a hurt to the loved one almost as painfully as if it were themselves who were hurt. Since Freud did not admit the existence of love as a primary reality (regarding it as aim-inhibited sex) he confined himself to naming the process identification, and leaving it at that. But what is the difference? Identification is only a word to label the behaviour of people who love. In the next chapter we shall be concerned with some of the uses to which Freud put the concept, so I want to stress that I regard it simply as a description—and an enlightening one—of the nature of the love process.

Since loving involves this process of identification we feel pain when those who are dear to us are hurt and pleasure when they feel pleasure. This naturally drastically modifies our behaviour, causing us sometimes to seek the good of others rather than ourselves, in contradiction to our normal pattern of action. Obvious as this must be to the ordinary reader, to the behaviourist it is far from obvious. Since he cannot admit the existence of love (except as a by-product of action) he is baffled by unselfish behaviour, which seems to him contrary to the thesis that man pursues his own pleasure. To the ordinary man his difficulties will seem strangely artificial.

It is worth noting, however, that identification is not such a perfectly simple process as might appear. As R. G. Coulson has pointed out, it can take place in three ways.[1] With emphasis on the other person, with emphasis on oneself, or with a

[1] B. J. Reynolds and R. G. Coulson, *Human Needs in Modern Society*, 1938.

reasonable balance between the two. The person, often a woman, who has completely sunk herself in someone else and lost all individuality of her own is a type most people have encountered. The opposite extreme, in which other people appear as mere appendages of oneself, is common in very young children and certain forms of insanity. It seems reasonable to maintain that either extreme is equally unproductive of true happiness. Orthodox religion, however, has tended to approve complete self-abnegation, especially where the loved object is the deity, and it may be that this is an exceptional case.

Coulson maintains that the establishment of a reasonable identification on another person is positively essential to full happiness. This, I think, we can accept with the qualification that people appear to be able to identify themselves with the interests of a group—a club, a regiment, a society, a church, or their country—and to feel pride in its successes or anger if it is harmed or insulted just as they would with living persons. It is noteworthy that when an identification of this sort takes place, it does not lead *ipso facto* to any strong identification with individual members, though this may occur, of course, in the ordinary way should they come in contact with the person concerned. If a club member is insulted, the ardent supporter of the club may resent the implied insult to the club even when he dislikes the individual and is rather glad to see him humiliated.

This identification with individuals or groups leads to performing *service* and it is an interesting question whether people have a positive need to serve others, as is sometimes asserted. In answering the question we must distinguish between service which yields rewards to the server, and which is therefore, not strictly speaking, unselfish and complete self-abnegation. Obviously, many people serve groups because their service gives them status, security, power and purpose. And if this were all that service offered, we would have to class it as no more than a useful device for achieving personal ends. But the true rewards of service arise from the identification: the pleasures and successes of the object are felt as pleasures and

successes by the subject. Thus, to speak of a need to serve is no more than to speak of a need to love.

Where the rewards of identification and service play their greatest role is in the case of people who can no longer achieve direct satisfaction. The man whose health or education limits him to a mediocre job may find immense satisfaction in the success of his son, the weakly or invalid man in the prowess of his athletic friend. Especially for women, who are often prevented by the cares of housewifery or by social taboos from achieving personal fulfilment, self-realisation through others is a heaven-sent alternative. While for those who are leading a satisfying personal life, the power of identification with others opens up still further opportunities for satisfaction.

The conclusion which I think we can draw from all this is that society must do all it can to help people to achieve personal identifications, since these are potentially very rewarding, but that it must supplement this by providing plenty of opportunities for identification with the interests of groups for the benefit of those whom circumstances debar from the personal form of service. And it need hardly be added that the purpose for which those groups are organised must be a good one—it must contribute as much as possible to the happiness of as many people as possible.

Those of us who are more luckily situated may regard being 'wedded to one's work'—as we aptly say—as a poor substitute for more personal relationships, or we may detect a masochistic element in so much self-sacrifice. Be that as it may, service plays a major part in the attainment of happiness and the happiest societies are those which keep this fact in view.

But Coulson goes further than asserting a need to identify. He asserts that the area of identification must be extended and extended so as to include more and more people if the maximum psychic satisfaction is to be obtained. In his view, the process starts, as a rule, with marriage. Just about the time that each spouse has exhausted the resources of the other's personality children appear on the scene and create new opportunities for identification.

In a well-designed society, McDougall argued, there will be a series of well-graded steps leading up from the family, through in-group and clan to the largest unit conceivable by its members. As the individual becomes older he will find satisfaction in identifying his interests with larger and larger groups until the whole tribe or nation is the subject of his emotional life.

In this, however, he took up a view opposed to that of Bergson, who felt that there was a sharp distinction between the 'closed' morality (as he called it) of loyalty to a limited social group and the 'open' morality of universal love. He held that the transition from one to the other could not be achieved by a gradual widening of the circle but involved a radically different mode of feeling.[1]

I am inclined to agree with Bergson. You have only to look around you to see that people can scarcely resist establishing emotional links with people they see constantly and share experiences with, but that they have enormous difficulty in feeling any emotion about people whom they have never met. Considerable numbers of people in England today do not worry in any real sense about the starving populations of Europe (about which they hear a good deal) and still fewer worry about the state of the Mexican peon or the Malay. And that this is not due to a form of patriotic allegiance, or a sense that charity begins at home, is shown by the fact that whenever such people come in personal contact with cases of suffering their emotions are aroused—provided they are not among those whose power to feel any emotion at all has been aborted by some mishap.

It is true that by a considerable intellectual effort or by a feat of imagination, certain people make themselves aware of the plight of others, and feel obliged to act in a broadly humanitarian way. This is admirable as far as it goes, but it is not properly a case of universal love. The evidence seems to be that universal love, when it comes, bursts on one in a sudden revelation—a blinding awareness of one's identity with all living creatures.

But I am beginning to anticipate the next section.

[1] H. Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Eng. trans., 1935.

III *The 'Oceanic Feeling'*

There is still one more primary source of satisfaction which I think we must recognise, even though it is not always included in the psychological textbooks. This is the unique experience which Freud recognised under the name of the 'oceanic feeling.'[1] Tennyson's description of it is well known:

> 'I have never had any revelations through anæsthetics, but a kind of waking trance—this for lack of a better word—I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been alone. This has come upon me through repeating my own name two or three times to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this is not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, and the surest of the surest, the weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words, where death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life. I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said the state is utterly beyond words ?'

The existence of this experience is widely attested. Dr. P. M. Bucke has collected a number of instances, including his own experience, in the book *Cosmic Consciousness*, 1901; Wordsworth refers to it in the 'Lines composed above Tintern Abbey'; and there are numerous references in the literature of Christian mysticism, especially that of St. Augustine and St. John of the Cross, to say nothing of material from the Orient.[2] Anthropology also bears witness that such states are not uncommon in certain cultures which place high value on them—and it is also established that certain drugs, also starvation, are of assistance in inducing them.[3] So we may imagine that they would be much commoner in our culture if it were not our practice to regard them with suspicion and repugnance.

[1] S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 1930.

[2] See Dom Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism*, 1922, for a review; also W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902.

[3] Notably nitrous oxide and mescal. See H. Kluver, *Mescal*, 1928.

The difficulty in dealing with this phenomenon here is that it is generally interpreted in religious terms, as a reunion of the individual with the divine spirit, and this raises issues outside the field of scientific enquiry. But this is no excuse for ignoring it altogether. The phenomenon exists and we must reckon with it in our calculations. Ignoring the religious aspect, then, what do we know about it as an observed experience? We must, I am sure, avoid the old-fashioned error of dubbing it 'subjective' and disposing of it, classing it along with dreams and apparitions as an illusion. Of course it is subjective: so is our awareness of light vibrations as colour or air vibrations as sound. Our whole experience is subjective. Imagination is subjective, but we do not deny the importance of cultivating it. Equally the oceanic feeling is an experience which perhaps we should cultivate, like imagination, or avoid, like nightmares, but certainly not dismiss. Though in the nature of things we can have no dispassionate or objective evidence of such a state yet all observers seem to agree on at least two things: that the feeling is one in which the bounds of personality dissolve and there is a sense of unity with all life and that the feeling is extremely pleasant—in fact blissful.

This experience has also been described as the maximum of feeling combined with the maximum of awareness. This description must interest the psychologist, who knows that feeling and awareness (cognition and orexis) are the two modes of functioning of the mind. It suggests that it is a state when the mind's potentialities are being realised to the fullest extent.

The subject is highly speculative, but it seems possible to fit the oceanic experience into the same general framework as the other effects we have been considering if we view it as a dissolution of the boundaries of the personality, so that the individuality of the person concerned vanishes, and his being is merged in the universal spirit or universal ground. In contrast, simple identification, such as is considered in the previous section, must consist of a merging of two or more individual personalities, so that they become included within a single boundary. Formulated like this, the oceanic feeling is seen as a special type of identification—an extension of identification to the utmost

limit through identification with the ground from which all personalities are derived. As such, it would be an extreme manifestation of love, which is how it appears to the Christian mystics who write of it. This view would then lend support to the Bergsonian view of universal love as being due to a development of a somewhat different character from the love of a limited group. Yet the distinction may not be so very sharp after all. For if we can stretch the boundaries of our ego to include more and more of other people, perhaps, like the skin of a child's balloon, they will grow thinner and thinner and finally burst. In this case Coulson's view is an adequate description of one possible way of releasing the imprisoned ego—the other and quicker being to prick the balloon at an early stage. Thus, these opposed theses can be made to meet in a new synthesis.

Needless to say, such an interpretation involves the assumption of the real, objective existence of the personal spirit, or soul, and of the divine spirit, and cannot be acceptable to those scientists who view the personality merely as the sum-total of a number of physiological forces and mechanisms.

I suggest that this phenomenon serves to explain certain types of happiness which cannot be explained by reference to achievement and to emotional relations with other persons. Many writers have described a sense of release and tranquillity which comes from the solitary contemplation of nature, and this I believe to be simply a milder instance of what Tennyson and the professional mystics experienced in acuter form. In addition, a rather similar transcendence of personality seems to be induced by listening to music and perhaps by other forms of artistic experience.

But our culture, concentrated as it is on the material world, condemns such experiences as 'unhealthy' and distrusts even the milder manifestations just referred to. Few would be prepared to accept the suggestion that such states should be deliberately cultivated as a source of happiness. If, on the other hand, it could be shown that this experience is not 'unhealthy,' it would be well worth reorienting the whole of life so as to facilitate it, so great are its hedonic rewards. And this, no less,

is the proposal made by the religion of yoga—the word yoga means 'joining' and refers to the joining of the individual with the universal spirit. Western mysticism, though using images drawn from Catholic theology, draws extraordinarily close to oriental mysticism at this point.[1]

If it can be established that the experience does actually represent a reunion with a divine spirit, cultivation of the experience becomes not merely permissible, but a duty. Failing such knowledge, we can at least agree that a temperate use of the experience is reasonable and desirable. Our lives should be so arranged that we have periodic opportunities for tranquil contemplation in environments which favour the development of a sense of being (as the phrase so vividly puts it) 'at one with the world'—that is to say, chiefly in the depths of the country.

It seems possible that the oceanic experience may differ in one important respect from those earthly pleasures we discussed in the last chapter. These, we agreed, were generated in the process of returning to a state of normality which was itself neutral. Mystics seem agreed, however, that the mystical experience endures: it is an end-state, not a transitional phenomenon. If this be so, it becomes at once an objective beside which all others are insignificant and futile. The problem of happiness becomes immensely simple. The only relevant questions remaining would be: is this experience open to everybody, and how rapidly can it be attained?

It is, therefore, on the assumption that complete preoccupation with mystical experience is not a practicable proposition for the majority that this book, which deals only with the ordinary psychical pleasures, is written.

IV *Nature of Emotion*

Just as in the case of pleasure, our thinking on the subject of emotion is confused by the loose way in which we use the word. The word emotion is used to describe such feelings as joy,

[1] For further parallels see G. Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, 1934.

grief, anger, fear, pride, jealousy, love and hate. But are all these indeed the same *sort* of thing? Are they like the letters of the alphabet, which—though each is distinctively recognisable—are all comparable in nature and function?

A little consideration will show that they are not.

Love, anger and fear, are *activities*. There is, however, a difference between love on the one hand, and anger or fear on the other; the latter are responses to certain situations and vanish when the situations are resolved. Thus, anger arises whenever a programme is obstructed and fear when misfortune threatens. In sharp contrast with this, love is an activity engaged in as an end in itself. Anger and fear often arise when an attempt to consummate love is obstructed; but the reverse does not occur. In short, fear and anger are reactions, while love is an action.[1]

Next, let us examine joy and grief. These are descriptions of the two extremes of hedonic tone. Joy is a *state* of extreme pleasure, grief one of extreme unpleasure. We may say they are adjectival in nature. To say that men 'need' joy is no more than to say that they desire the fulfilment of their physical, æsthetic and emotional programmes.

It is odd, incidentally, that these distinctions did not occur to Prof. William James, the great proponent of the Lange

[1] In a classic experiment Watson showed that the infants are capable of only three emotions : love, when gratified; anger, when the movement of their limbs is obstructed; and fear when left without support or exposed to a loud noise.

All three are treated, you notice, as reactions to external situations, but I have already given reasons for regarding love as something more than that : the prisoner who loves a mouse, the mother who loves her child, does not love it because of any gratification it has given them.

Nevertheless, the experiment does raise an interesting point since it suggests that fear may be produced automatically—and not from a conscious evaluation of the dangers of the situation. I do not think that this invalidates the treatment outlined here, because, once we accept the existence of instinct, it is possible to admit the existence of an instinctive or 'inherited' feeling that certain sensations portend danger without denying the possibility of a conscious appreciation of it also. In both cases it is a reaction to the situation and not an action. (See J. B. Watson, *Behaviourism*, 2nd ed., 1931.)

theory of the emotions. This theory, as most people know, maintains that what we call an emotion is no more than the sum-total of bodily changes which occur in ourselves, in given circumstances, as they appear to us. This theory is always illustrated with the case of fear. In fearful situations the sympathetic nervous system stimulates the adrenals: adrenalin pours into the bloodstream, speeding up the heart, raising blood-sugar, inhibiting bowel action and generally preparing the organism for flight. In Lange's view it is merely consciousness of these changes which we call emotion. If a second instance is needed, anger is chosen. But no attempt is made to describe the bodily changes corresponding to pride, love and hate, joy and grief. If any bodily changes occur, they are small and widely diffused.

So that even if we accept the James-Lange theory in respect of fear and anger, it still does nothing to explain the primary emotions—love and hate.

However, recent work has rendered the James-Lange theory untenable. Not only do animals from which the sympathetic system has been removed continue to show signs of fear and anger, but the evidence of encephalography is that emotion is, in any case, centred in the mid-brain and not in the cerebral cortex at all.[1] Moreover, as Ogden has pointed out, it is a commonplace that we sometimes show all the bodily signs of fear without experiencing the emotion. Modern observers note that no emotion is felt when we are able to respond fully and completely to a situation. It is only when response is blocked by doubts or conflicts that emotion manifests.[2]

The conclusion to be drawn from these distinctions is that love is the only one out of all the so-called emotions which can be described as a *need*. There is no need to hate, no need to fear and no need to envy. They are but spontaneous reactions to passing situations. But love is an activity, one of the primary modes of functioning of the psyche, and as such a potentiality of our nature which we must exercise if we are to be fully and undistortedly human beings.

[1] H. R. Grinker, *Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine* (Vol. I, No. 1).
[2] C. K. Ogden, *The ABC of Psychology*, 1929.

But while there are no other emotions which can be regarded as primary modes of activity, or needs, yet there are one or two other distinctive needs which appear to be quite fundamental, and these I must now describe.

v *Mastery and Frustration*

Looking for fundamental characteristics of the living creature, we can hardly find one more basic than the urge to do something about painful or unpleasant circumstances. Even the amœba know enough to withdraw from heat, acids and electric fields. But is this simply a response to an unpleasant situation, or is it a drive in its own right? The view taken here is that it is an active drive. Deep in man's muscles and bones lies an itch to mould and adapt his environment. This primary drive has been called the drive to mastery.[1]

That it is not merely a *response* to unpleasant situations is suggested by the fact that men frequently go out of their way to invent situations in which they can strive for mastery, e.g., competitive sport. In fact, it is precisely when man is least able to master his personal environment that he finds the need to devise substitutes. To exercise a function, to fulfil a potentiality, is a source of pleasure and man needs the opportunity of exercising the mastery function—preferably on something useful, to be sure, but failing this in an artificial situation.

It is an observed fact that when such efforts are frustrated an emotion which we call *anger* is felt and the efforts are redoubled. Naturally these efforts are now devoted to removing the obstacle which is frustrating the original programme, since this is the first step towards attaining the original objective. Such intensive efforts to overcome an obstacle, accompanied by anger, are generally described as *aggression.*

This is an important point. For, since all man's actions are

[1] It is sometimes convenient to distinguish between *crude mastery* in the handling of materials, *personal mastery* or dominance over individuals and *abstract mastery* over problems and ideas.

directed towards modifying the environment, physical or psychical, in the face of various difficulties it follows that they could all strictly be described as aggressive. In other words, aggression is not a specific mode of activity which can, by careful management, be eliminated. It is the very essence of our being. The only man completely free from aggression is a dead man or a man suffering from general paralysis of the insane. Hence it is futile and fatuous to talk, as people do today, about 'putting an end to aggression.' Not only is it impossible, but no one in his senses would want to waste all this valuable energy. What we have to do, which is hard enough, is to see that it is directed towards useful instead of evil ends.

We are led into this erroneous approach to aggression by the fatal facility of language in giving labels to things which have no disparate existence; which are not, so to speak, clinical entities. As so often is the case, those who formed the language were well aware of the true nature of what they were describing. The Latin basis of the word means, of course, 'a step towards' and does not, as it does in common speech, imply violence or even that the movement is directed towards living beings.

Aggression, as we shall shortly see in more detail, can readily be diverted into substitute activities. Anyone who has worked off his anger by violent physical activity—wielding an axe or a sledge-hammer is particularly effective—will recognise the truth of this. But what is less generally realised is that this is only one aspect of a much broader principle. All forms of self-assertion can be converted into one another. Hence a society which offers insufficient opportunities for effective mastery of raw materials will find that pent-up energy bursting out in attempts to master people, i.e. in aggression, in the popular sense.

There is another aspect of this drive which is of interest. The crudest form of mastery is destruction. If you smash something, so that it no longer exists as such, you have established your superiority to it. But destruction is not a satisfying form of mastery. For one thing, it is too easy. For another, it

tends to make the environment a less and not a more happy place to live in. So normal people pass on to constructive forms of mastery. Besides making use of what they have constructed, they can show it to others and so win approval, thus gaining two additional sources of pleasure, neither of which accrue in cases of destructive activity. This progress from destruction to construction can be marked in children. But when we fail at construction we tend to revert to the earlier mode. Our anger at failing to attain our objective is released in crude aggression. 'The hell with it,' we say, and give it a violent kick.[1]

Hence societies where constructive opportunities are few tend to find relief in destruction.

VI *Creativity*

The suggestion made so far is that human activity, in so far as it is motivated by attempts to reach a certain emotional state, is primarily an attempt to secure a loving relationship with another individual or individuals.

As we survey human activities, testing whether they can all be fitted into this category or one of those considered earlier under the heading of physical sensations (and making due allowance for the peculiar transformations of impulse caused by the psychological superstructure) we come across one which seems to resist our efforts. This is the creative activity of the artist.

Artistic activity cannot be satisfactorily explained simply as an attempt to modify the physical environment, even if some arts, such as sculpture or architecture, do include an element of mastery.

The psychologists suggest that the artist is attempting to

[1] It might be thought that the word aggression can fairly be distinguished from mastery by restricting its use to the intense, angry mastery-impulse which manifests in destruction, as distinct from the calm, persistent constructive drive. I cannot agree, for I have seen men attack an obstinate constructive problem with a furious determination which was quite clearly aggressive in nature. Their spoken comments were also eloquently aggressive.

dispose of an emotional problem which worries him by externalising it. This is, anyway, part of the truth, for artists certainly achieve a feeling of release when they have completed their work and no longer wish to work over it again (unless it has failed in its purpose). But it is not quite enough, for it does not account for the universal element in art: its power to appeal to people of other places and periods. If the artist were merely trying to get rid of his own problem he could make it as individual as he liked; why does he seek for universal elements in experience?

Now another interpretation of art sees it as an attempt to introduce a pattern into the apparently chaotic—a definition, incidentally, which would include a creative theoretical study in the field of science. By reducing the aimless confusion of life to some sort of order and endowing it with significance, the artist ministers to the individual's feeling of isolation and lack of security. Though primarily engaged in mastering his own problems, the artist produces a solution which is also of value to others who lack the time or the technical facilities for achieving the same end themselves. Those who hold this view would regard artistic activity as at once a subtle therapeutic or religious technique and as a subtle form of mastery—an attempt to make the internal world of one's mind and the external world of nature less frightening than they seem.

Yet this functional explanation overlooks the vital element in the process: the æsthetic pleasure induced. A chord in music, as we have noted, induces pleasure just because it is harmonious, not merely because it persuades us into feeling the universe is harmonious. More complex works of art may possibly do this as well, but that is not their whole function.

But even this does not provide us with a satisfying explanation. If all we wanted from art was harmony, we would be perfectly satisfied to listen to or look at art produced by others. But it seems that some, if not, indeed, all, people require to produce such harmonies themselves. Put more generally, we may say that man stands for organisation. Though the energy

with which he organises is derived from the mastery drive, he prefers to organise rather than to disorganise, to construct rather than to destroy.

Furthermore, we must not overlook the connection between creative activity and sex. While Freud has treated creativity as a sublimation of the sexual act, many artists have noted that when their creative efforts were frustrated the dammed up energy suddenly diverted itself into sexual channels. (Later in his life Freud modified his treatment, postulating a generalised creative urge which could manifest either at sexual, artistic or emotional levels.)

It would seem, then, that we need to generalise our concept of the mastery drive into a broadly creative, organising urge, and to interpret artistic activity as a special form of outlet for this urge—special in that its main purpose is to provide æsthetic satisfactions, but also of great value because of its therapeutic role and its psychological effects. Whether or not this is correct as an analysis, it is certainly true that creative activity and æsthetic experience are important sources of pure happiness, and no well-designed society can afford to frustrate or neglect them.

To many this may seem an almost insultingly brief and arbitrary treatment of an involved and vital subject. The difficulty is the absence of any agreed body of opinion about the nature of art. This is no place for an excursus on that thorny subject, yet I cannot possibly omit all reference to art. My excuse must be this: art is not just an activity among other activities, it is an attitude towards all activities. All activities involve the combination of various elements in patterns which may or may not be harmonious, and to achieve this combination gives play to man's creative, organising urge.

A theoretical treatment, such as this, taking each factor in turn, conceals the fact that each is but an aspect of one reality. Just as a scientific theory can legitimately be described as beautiful because it organises concepts into a harmonious form, so also love can be called beautiful because it is the expression of a harmonious relationship. It is, therefore, not word-

spinning, but a perfectly accurate and meaningful statement to say that truth is beauty, and beauty, love.

VII *Consistency and Variety*

So far we have dealt with man's needs[1] at any given moment in time; but as soon as we take the time dimension into consideration we must recognise that he makes a contradictory demand: there must be a certain consistency about his environment; but, second, there must also be variety.

The demand for consistency seems to be a product of the process by which man learns and as such properly falls to be considered in the next chapter: nevertheless, it is more convenient to take it here. If man finds a certain action rewarding, he makes a note of the fact and repeats the action. If, however, it sometimes proves rewarding and sometimes painfully unrewarding—i.e. if the response is inconsistent—he cannot decide what to do and an acute form of frustration develops. Experiments with rats have shown that serious neurosis can be induced by such methods.[2] Child psychologists have also established that parents who one day mete out punishment for a certain act and another day applaud it cause more frequent and severe neurosis than parents who are consistently harsh.

This is a factor of considerable importance in the western world today, for, as we shall see in more detail later, many familiar patterns of behaviour have lost their former validity. Thus, the workman who first learns that he can ensure the necessaries of life by practising a technical skill and subsequently finds his skill useless and himself unemployed, is liable to acute frustration and unhappiness, and will end by

[1] It may seem stretching the definition of needs a little to make it include something of which man would, presumably, not be aware if he had no cerebral cortex. But since we mark the passage of time even in our sleep, it may be that our sense of time is something more profound than a mere enumeration of memories consciously recorded.

[2] J. McV. Hunt, *Personality and the Behaviour Disorders*, 1944 (contributions of H. S. Liddell and F. W. Finger).

abandoning all further attempts to cope with his environment.[1]

But while man expects each action to evoke its appropriate response, he does not want to be confined to a small number of actions. He wants a large number of possible actions, and he wants to combine them into ever varying patterns. Thus the desire for consistency is not basically inconsistent with the desire for variety, though the distinction is not always appreciated.

This concludes our catalogue of psychical needs, but perhaps one point needs bringing out. The dispassionate nature of our analysis may have obscured the fact that these experiences are marked by extremely strong hedonic tone. Successful achievement, unity with a loved one, perception of harmony, the oceanic feeling, are marked by pleasure of such intensity that we keep a special word for the sensation: bliss. Correspondingly, defeat, loss of a loved one, chaotic disharmony and the sense of isolation produce the most intense distress perhaps best indicated by the word misery.

VIII *Self-Determination*

There is one more point to be made: it is of the utmost importance to us in the west today.

When surveying man's physical needs I emphasised that the concept was a dynamic not a static one. We do not simply need to be *kept* in a state of physical equilibrium. We need to keep ourselves in it by a continual process of absorbing material from the environment and rejecting what we do not want. Ours is the equilibrium of the tightrope-walker (so rightly called, in the circus programmes, an 'equilibrist'). The same is true in the

[1] This desire for consistency strongly colours our conception of justice. We are much less concerned with the absolute justice of regulations than we are with their equitable application. We are much more concerned to see that rationing is equal than we are to find out whether the ration could be made larger than it is. This attitude was unconsciously summed up in Kipling's *Stalky and Co.*, when the boys, almost admiringly, characterised their housemaster as 'A beast, but a just beast.'

psychical sphere. We do not simply need to be given security; we need to achieve it for ourselves. We do not need to have the universe mastered for us, we need to master it. We do not simply need to be loved, we need to love.

It follows, therefore, that social patterns of the type it is now fashionable to call paternalist are unacceptable. Or, to put it in political terms, we need the power of self-determination. (I avoid putting the matter in the form 'we need freedom,' since freedom is a question-begging word.)

Another form in which we can usefully put it is that man needs responsibility. And that responsibility is of two sorts. In the first place he requires to be answerable to himself, at the penalty of losing his self-respect. Secondly, he requires to be answerable to society at the penalty of losing theirs. And both these types of approval he greatly values. At this point I shall so far anticipate the development of my argument as to say that the only social institution known to me in which a man can fulfil all these conditions is a self-governing, co-operative group.

IX *Freud's View*

The view of man's motivation which I put forward, then, is briefly this. That while his immediate motives are the preservation of the physical body (a programme which leads him into the pursuit of physical comforts) his ultimate motives are at the level of the psyche. But of these there are, when it comes to the point, only two: love and creativity.

The question which naturally arises in the reader's mind is how far this view may be said to coincide with the orthodox scientific view of the moment. If there is anything which can be called an orthodox view at the moment I suppose it is Freud's. Professional psychologists (as opposed to psychoanalysts) though very reluctant to accept the whole of Freud's formulation, have had quietly to jettison all they had to go on before, which was the theory of William McDougall, who, as I said in the last chapter, tried to explain behaviour in terms of

fourteen arbitrarily postulated drives. Though never officially thrown on the dust heap, this theory is no longer felt to hold water, and we need waste no time on it here.

It must be realised that Freud's treatment is much less broadly based than the one given here. It started simply as a clinical effort to find out what was wrong with certain obviously ill people, and led to the concept of libido as a basic drive or need. This concept, and the others that he built upon it proved so useful that he gradually extended the field to account for many facets of human motivation. But he never included physical needs in his synthesis because he simply was not interested in them. He left them to the doctors. Equally he never paid much attention to æsthetic needs, though he tried to fit them into his picture by regarding them as special outlets for libido, on the lines indicated.

It is therefore only in regard to love and creativity that we can compare Freud's views with those set forth here. In this sphere the chief difference is that I have treated love and creativity as primary concepts, and sexuality as a channel, one of many, through which they can be expressed. Whereas Freud treated sexuality as the primary concept, and love and creativity as derived or modified forms of it. But Freud steadily broadened his concept of libido as he grew older until in the end, after he had renamed it Eros, it had taken on a much more general form, hardly different from love and creativity as we have described them. Only because Freud was dominated by the mechanistic views of the psychologists who had preceded him, he could never take the final step of regarding emotions as existing in their own right. Rather than do this he had to invent a new, mysterious entity with all the properties of emotion but not the name. Freud's original concept of man as motivated primarily by the urge to reduce the tension in his seminal vesicles was aptly ridiculed by Suttie, who asked sarcastically whether he supposed a woman undertook maternity simply to relieve the tension in her breasts.

Suttie boldly completed the transition in Freud's views, openly calling the primary motive love and treating the

physiological manifestations as of secondary importance.[1] The change was subtle but significant. It was because the child loved its mother that it wanted to possess her, and not the reverse. Adler, however, seceded from the Freudian school partly because he perceived the importance of mastery-drives, and partly because he perceived that the love relationship was not confined to single objects but entered into our relations with everyone we meet, which led him to formulate his theory of social interest.[2]

The present position may be summed up by saying even Freudian psychologists treat emotion *as if* it really existed, while denying that it does. Fortunately it is not necessary for our purpose to await the solution of this controversy. We can treat emotion *as if* it were a primary cause and it will not affect the thesis of the book in any way if it turns out not to be.

Towards the latter part of his career Freud felt it necessary to postulate a second destructive drive as counterpart to the first creative one. Only thus could he explain such manifestations as sadism, and the perverse delight in destruction which many people display. Other psycho-analysts, however, have not found this hypothesis necessary. Destruction they see as the simplest manifestation of the mastery instinct. To blow up a building by touching a button—what god-like power! The neurotic patterns, such as sadism, in which Freud saw the action of Thanatos, the destructive drive, can also be explained without recourse to this assumption, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The point is important. For if man attains civilised behaviour only by suppressing an essential factor in his nature, he is bound to do so at the cost of some degree of frustration and neurosis. Whereas if his natural demands are positive and friendly—and if destructive behaviour emerges only when his natural demands are frustrated—then the possibility remains open of creating a normal society in which the friendly feelings will have full play and the destructive reactions will not be aroused.

[1] See I. Suttie, *Origins of Love and Hate*, 1935. This is required reading for all Freudians.

[2] See A. Adler, *Social Interest*, English trans., 1938.

x *Conclusion*

To sum up, I suggest that basic human needs are as follows:

BODY	Freedom from pain
	Health (maintenance of body in normal equilibrium)
	Maintenance of the physical integrity of the body
MIND	Love (active and passive)
	Beauty
	Creativity (purposive activity)
TIME	Security through self-determination
	Consistency
	Variety

Presented with any such list of desiderata, it is natural to ask why just nine requirements—or whatever the number may be. Our sense of fitness seems to demand a certain symmetry in the array of ultimates. Closer examination of this list will show that it has a certain harmony. Each of the postulates is of a different order; they are not varieties of the same thing.

We have but a *single motive*: the pleasure-principle. Psychologically, we have but a single *source* of pleasure : love. We have but a single *means* to this end: creativity, or the mastery drive. In order that the mastery drive can function effectively, a single *condition* must be observed: consistency. We have but a single *mode* of experience: change—hence our appreciation of pleasure must be characterised by change, or in different words, by variety.

Underlying all this we have the rather tiresome need to maintain the physical organism in an efficient state.

'Happiness has been defined as performing a task which is so difficult as to try your powers, but not so difficult as to defeat them. This is the same as saying that happiness is gained from the fullest exercise of the mastery drive. But the definition is faulty. To exercise mastery with no ulterior purpose is not long satisfying. The ultimate purpose of mastery can only be (*a*) to secure the physical pleasures of the body, or (*b*) to secure the psychical pleasures of the mind, i.e., to love and be loved. It is in love, therefore, not in mastery, that we find the true source of human happiness.'

IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE

I Learning and Mislearning—II Non-Valid Behaviour—III Origin of Neurosis—IV Control of Aggression

I *Learning and Mislearning*

PSYCHO-ANALYSTS, quite naturally, devote the greater part of their time to treating people who are psychologically ill—people whose behaviour and problems are far removed from the normal. In consequence many people suppose that analytical psychology[1] concerns itself solely with such clinical manifestations and may conclude from the title of this chapter that in it we shall be concerned solely with the happiness of this unfortunate minority.

That is not so. The forces which the analytical psychologist studies bear on all of us and affect the formation of our personalities. If he spends the bulk of his time studying those on whom the effect has been most marked it is simply because it makes his work easier to concentrate on the clear-cut cases. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the mentally healthy and the neurotic, between the 'normal' and the 'abnormal.' The difference is only one of degree.

To study psychology is to learn to understand our own motives—but it is not simply to ensure our own happiness that we must do so. The neurotic, in moments of stress, makes not only himself, but others unhappy and this is also true in some degree of all of us. Which of us can say that we have never, for instance, vented ill-temper or frustration by snapping at some innocent person?

[1] The name analytical psychology was taken by Adler and his followers to distinguish their teaching from that of Freud, which was known as psycho-analysis. I am not, of course, using either of these terms in these specialised senses here.

But that is not neurotic, you say. No, but it is a mechanism very much within the scope of psychology—it is, as a matter of fact, an example of a process known to analysts as displacement, and one which in certain contexts can be a very important influence on happiness.

In particular the analytical psychologist has much to tell us about those forces which restrain us from anti-social behaviour —what we commonly call the conscience. These mechanisms, though elaborate, do not always achieve their end, while in other cases they achieve it at the cost of making the individual concerned wretched. Since on the one hand happiness is endangered if people behave selfishly while on the other it may be destroyed by their efforts to behave unselfishly, it is clear that the conscience presents us with a problem of fundamental importance to the subject of happiness.

Psychological mechanisms, as most people now appreciate, owe their somewhat mysterious character to the fact that a large part of the human psyche is not accessible to consciousness. This unconscious part of the mind seems to observe and reason in much the same way as the conscious area but less critically and with less foresight and sense of proportion, so that its decisions—when brought to consciousness by special techniques—often seem childish and absurd. But fundamentally the mistakes it makes do not differ in type from those made by the conscious mind: both are caused by man's defective powers of learning. Man may indeed learn from experience but he does not always learn correctly.

If people would only grasp that the business of the professional analyst is to discover what lessons have been learned and teach his patient to relearn those which have been learned incorrectly—for to mislearn lessons is a potent cause of unhappiness—they would perhaps cease regarding analysis with the suspicion and fear it too often evokes.

But where the analyst accepts these wrong lessons and non-valid conclusions as a datum and concentrates only on rectifying the consequences, for our purposes it is necessary to make a different approach. We require to study how lessons come to be mislearned.

We need not go at length into the study of learning-theory, a subject which has been complicated by much erroneous teaching in the past fifty years: all we need to do is to draw attention to certain points.

The chief process by which adult behaviour becomes systematised is the one described by the proverb which says: 'the burnt child dreads the fire.' It is often supposed that such a reaction is quite a simple process, a mere 'conditioned reflex'; but in reality two quite elaborate processes occur. First, the child notes the association of two events and *infers* that they are related as cause and effect. Secondly, he *generalises* this discovery in two stages, (*a*) until he appreciates that *all* fires burn, and (*b*) until he appreciates that they burn not only himself but other people. (This is proved by the fact that a small child, though it will withdraw its hand if burnt, will repeat the mistake soon after.) Either part of the learning process is liable to error and may lead to the learning of an incorrect lesson. If this occurs, the plans which the individual formulates with the object of attaining pleasure or avoiding unpleasure will tend to be ineffective.[1]

Let us consider a particular instance.

[1] Though sufficient for our present purpose, this statement is perhaps somewhat misleading, since it might be taken to suggest that learning is performed by adding together a great number of such individual lessons. This old view of the learning process has been quite exploded by the gestalt psychologists who have shown very clearly that all human beings, and even the higher animals, start by appreciating the situation as a whole and only learn individual lessons within the general context. To illustrate the distinction quickly and crudely we may say that if the child was burnt *by* the mother, or even merely in her presence, it would not merely record a scientific fact about the properties of flame, but would almost certainly learn some distrust and fear of the mother, and would associate the experience with the room in which it took place or with any other fact which had captured its attention.

The reader anxious to follow up the ramifications of modern learning-theory should certainly read some book like K. Koffka's *The Growth of the Mind*, 1924; though often regarded as a textbook of gestalt psychology it gives an admirably-balanced outline of preceding theories of learning.

II *Non-Valid Behaviour*

Let us suppose that a man eats mushrooms for the first time and is taken seriously ill soon after. Almost certainly he will draw an inference—'My illness was caused by the mushrooms' —and then generalise it, perhaps in the form: 'I am allergic to mushrooms'—but more probably: 'Mushrooms are poisonous.' Thereafter he will avoid mushrooms like the devil. In short, a lifelong pattern of behaviour may quite possibly be established as the result of a single experience.

Now let us suppose that his illness was a pure coincidence, and had nothing to do with the mushrooms at all. Since for the rest of his life he will avoid eating mushrooms he may never discover his mistake. How are we to describe his behaviour in such a case? It is not correct to call it irrational; it is, rather, strictly rational behaviour with an error in the reasoning. The pattern of behaviour which results is out of harmony with reality. I propose to call this *non-valid* behaviour, because it is based on a non-valid generalisation.

In practice such non-valid conclusions are generally exposed as erroneous by other people. The man who avoids mushrooms sees other people eating them with impunity. Even so, he may yet fall back on the hypothesis that he is allergic to mushrooms rather than take the risk of another painful illness. Suppose, however, that he does take the risk of eating some and again, through an unfortunate coincidence, he falls ill. This will confirm his belief and it is extremely unlikely that he will ever be induced to try them again, however convincing the arguments of his friends.

In short, we learn our lessons almost too well. If fate is so unkind as to mislead us twice or three times on the same matter, our pattern of behaviour gets fixed for life, on non-valid lines.

It will be appreciated that the crucial point in this story was that the man was eating mushrooms for the first time. It is first experiences which are definitive, because we have no contradictory experience to offset them. Hence it is the lessons of earliest

childhood which are of dominant importance. The very small child, or infant, is in a particularly vulnerable position. He does not even have experience in analogous fields by which to test any specially important experience and he cannot discuss his profounder experiences with others for lack of vocabulary. Quite definitely, experiences in our earlier infancy condition our behaviour for the rest of our lives. They impel us to irrational behaviour and beliefs, and they do it to an extent far greater than the layman is ready to visualise. To the infant's case we shall return in due course, but first let us proceed with the subject of learning.

This tendency to 'fix' behaviour is noticeable even in a simple case such as the one we have just considered, where the truth is not difficult to establish and where the whole process is fully conscious. Obviously such non-valid generalisations are still easier to make on matters which are hard to establish, or difficult to discuss. For instance, a person will readily conclude that someone is untrustworthy on the basis of a couple of experiences. Since trustworthiness is a relative concept, and since it is unwise to discuss the matter except with intimate friends, non-valid opinions of this type are very common.

How much more so, then, when the memory of the formative experience is repressed! If the man in our first instance had repressed the memory of his illness, he would be left only with a vague, unlocalised distrust of mushrooms. Since people do not like to feel that their opinions are irrational, they tend to invent plausible explanations which they come to believe themselves ('rationalisations'). Thus a distrust of mushrooms might be rationalised by the assertion that it was unlucky, impious or barbaric to eat mushrooms. Since such beliefs would be taught to children, and uncritically adopted, they would tend to be perpetuated: so we can see how a taboo is born. A taboo is simply a rule of behaviour for which the real reason—valid or non-valid—has been forgotten or was never known. A familiar instance is the taboo on walking under ladders which protects you from having something dropped on your head.

I have gone into this matter of non-valid behaviour rather

carefully in order to drive home the fact that such behaviour is not just a peculiarity of 'neurotics,' a product of diseased minds, but something which affects all of us.

Since the most obstinate forms of such behaviour are those in which the causative factors are repressed, we must now ask ourselves the question: in what circumstances does repression take place? The matter is too momentous for a hasty answer. We must therefore interrupt our line of argument for a few pages while we clarify this subject.

III *Origin of Neurosis*

Human beings—and let us never forget that we are not talking about something impersonal, like the scientists' rats and guinea-pigs, but about ourselves—feel the emotion of love towards those who afford them pleasure, and of anger and hatred towards those who frustrate and frighten them. Now it often happens that we simultaneously feel both emotions towards one and the same person. The child may, in general, love its mother, but it feels anger and hatred when she punishes it or forbids it to do what it wants. The wife may love her husband, yet hate him if he does not live up to her conception of him. When such a *conflict* of emotions arises, the individual may manage to keep the two emotions intact. When the cliff of affection is strong the wave of hatred smashes against it and subsides. But when love and hatred are evenly matched the person concerned is torn between two courses of conduct, both painful. The child of cruel parents has a powerful motive for leaving them: but it knows it is dependent on their support and would get into serious difficulties if it did so. Such conflicts are biologically dangerous because they lead to indecision.

In such circumstances the ego generally deals with the situation by suppressing the inconvenient emotion. This simplifies the conscious life of the individual, who is no longer in a dilemma, and relieves him of the worst of his mental conflict.[1]

[1] Possibly this is only a particular case of a tendency to repress, i.e., forget, any unpleasant experience.

But the adjustment is not achieved without cost. For such suppressed hatred gives rise to a diffuse anxiety and unease. This is so unpleasant that it generally involves the ego in further attempts at adjustment often of a very complex kind. Let us note, before passing on, that this unease is a primary source of unhappiness and one of a most intractable description.

Thus far we have what has been called a *situation neurosis*. It persists only as long as the external situation persists. And even while the causative situation still operates it can generally be cured by helping the patient to understand the nature of the conflict within his mind. Once the conflict can be seen objectively, it can be handled rationally. The wiser course can be chosen and the disadvantages written off.

In illustration of this Horney relates the case of a young woman happily married to a somewhat older husband who finally became impotent. When approached by a young man friend, the woman developed headaches and depression. Analysis showed that she was torn between her loyalty to her husband and family whom she did not want to harm or lose, and her natural sexual desires. When she came to realise the nature of her problem she was able to settle it rationally, and the neurasthenic symptoms vanished.

But it is also possible that such an emotional conflict may be generated by an experience which (for reasons which may or may not be valid) is going to fix a pattern of behaviour in the manner considered in the previous section. An example may make this clearer. In a case which recently came to my attention, a man fell ill and his wife had to go out to work; in consequence she was forced to leave her two-year-old boy alone for long periods. The child, feeling it had been deserted by its mother, formed a non-valid behaviour pattern which we may call 'distrust of all women.' That was the quasi-rational side of the experience. The emotional side was that it felt hatred for its mother and this hatred conflicted with its natural love. The hatred was suppressed and ultimately the whole incident forgotten. It was therefore impossible for the child concerned to break up the pattern of distrust by logical means, for he did

not know its cause. Naturally, he rationalised his distrust as far as possible. Inevitably, the neurotic pattern became a permanent component of his character, and in his adult life he was quite unable to establish any satisfactory relationships with women. Notice the characteristic feature of such behaviour: its persistence. Whenever the stimulus is presented (in this case, the presence of women) the same reaction (avoidance) is produced. This rigidity is typical of neurosis and lines up with such manifestations as agoraphobia and, indeed, all 'compulsive' activities. In short, a non-valid pattern has been established and the victim continually repeats the same mistake.

Secondly, notice that the reaction—though consistent with the demand for happiness—does not yield it. The man avoids women because their presence makes him uneasy, yet, owing to his biological needs, he is not happy without women. He is trapped in a quandary. This is characteristic of neurosis. It defeats the demand for happiness by creating opposing and contradictory demands. This explains part of the mysteriousness of happiness.

Here, then, is the second way in which the psychological superstructure of man's mind can become a barrier to happiness. It can lead people into behaviour which, in the long run, is detrimental to happiness: into desires and avoidances which are based on non-valid conclusions.

This picture can be extended to explain such diverse types of behaviour as sadism, masochism, sexual perversion, all compulsive behaviour and many types of delinquency, as well as self-induced illness of the type we call hysterical, although it may not be marked by the loss of control which corresponds to the popular use of the word hysterics. In some of these cases the mechanism is pretty complicated and the original non-valid argument may take a wide variety of forms. For our present purpose we need not explore these variations on the theme. All of them constitute *character neurosis*, as opposed to situation neurosis: and it is character neurosis which is generally meant when the word neurosis is used alone.

Since the word neurosis is often used carelessly, perhaps we

should define precisely what we mean by it. Following Horney, we may say that it is being constrained to follow a pattern of behaviour which is *rigid* and *non-valid*.[1] By this we mean that all situations of a certain general type are met with the same attitude or behaviour, regardless of their true merits. This definition of neurosis covers a much wider field than in the popular use of the term. Many people who would not hesitate to describe Hitler as a neurotic would never think of applying the term to Himmler. But the sadist's pattern of impassive cruelty is just as rigid and non-valid as the emotionalism of the hysteric. Indeed, we are all to some extent neurotic. No one is completely free of repressed emotion, no one can entirely avoid learning a few non-valid lessons. Neurosis is a matter of degree. Hence the subject matter of this chapter is significant not merely for a few pathological individuals but for all of us.

More than that, it is not only those who have dealt with a conflict by repression who are guilty of non-valid behaviour. As I sought to show with the story of the mushrooms, mere coincidence may establish patterns of non-valid behaviour. Neurotic behaviour is only a special instance of this in which the error is abnormally difficult to expose because part of the material has been repressed.

The case of mushroom-eating is a very limited one. But a man might just as well be so unfortunate as to fail in a number

[1] This treatment of neurosis is drawn from the newer American analytical psychologists as exemplified in K. Horney's *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, 1935, and subsequent works. The difference from the Freudian view proves, on examination, to be chiefly one of emphasis. Freud sees neurosis as the consequence of repressing a basic drive, in his vocabulary the sexual or libidinal drive. But such repression, he agrees, takes place only because this drive is in conflict with socially or personally approved behaviour patterns. Thus Freud does not deny that repression is caused by conflict; he merely puts his chief emphasis on the word sex or libido. But he uses this word in such a broad sense as to include almost every conceivable variety of conflict, so that he approximates to the Horneyan view. It is, in the outcome, simply a question of whether the libidinal aspect or the conflict aspect is most fruitful in the context which, on any occasion, is under discussion.

of bold enterprises and conclude that boldness was too risky, where another more fortunate man might come to the reverse conclusion.

One of the morals we can draw from this discussion is that we can no longer discuss happiness solely in terms of satisfying needs; where the need is neurotic or based on non-valid conclusions, the proper course is to eliminate the 'need' by resolving the error. We are not called upon to provide a society in which the sadist can practise his cruelties nor one in which the anxiety-ridden individual can attempt to find security by accumulating wealth or power. It is not hard to accept this declaration while we are thinking of notoriously anti-social needs such as sadism or the lust for power. What is more difficult is to apply it to the numerous relatively harmless patterns of behaviour which are marked by rigidity and non-validity. How many of our hobbies and enthusiasms would be left if all neurosis could be dissolved is a question of almost frightening magnitude.

Incidentally, it follows also that the economists' assumption that man is a rational animal, and hence that it is proper for industry to try and satisfy any demand which men are prepared to express in terms of money, is wholly without justification.

IV *Control of Aggression*

I have talked of repressing conflicting emotions—but the possible varieties of conflict are very limited. Since, basically, there are only two sorts of emotion, positive and negative, love and hate, all such conflicts must either be clashes between rival loves and rival hates or between love and hate. The case just described, of the woman torn between her young lover and her impotent husband, would be a case of rival loves, but much the commonest combination is the clash between love and hate.

When such a clash occurs, the usual solution is repression of the hatred. Every one of us constantly has occasion to choke down angry or bitter words and to inhibit the aggressive actions which hatred inspires. Why do we do this? Ninety-nine times

out of a hundred because we wish to retain the goodwill of the person who has angered us.

But in addition to these crude instances of simple aggression aroused by short-lived contemporary situations, we also have more serious ones in which the conflict is acute and in which the aggressive feelings give rise to painful feelings of guilt or fear. This is especially frequent in early childhood, and in such cases the aggressive feelings are not only suppressed but *repressed*, in the technical sense. Such *repressed aggression* cannot be dissipated but comes to form a permanent part of the personality and dominate the individual's behaviour. This repressed aggression is at the bottom of many social problems. It may occasionally happen that a man represses his desire for love in order to be free to hate, and then we have the misogynist; but undoubtedly the commonest outcome of such a conflict is repression of hatred.

The person who carries a burden of repressed aggression (of which he is not consciously aware) seeks to discharge it in one of two ways. Either he displaces it on to some innocent victim or he turns it against himself. To the practice of introjecting aggression I shall recur in a few pages when considering guilt and the super-ego. Displacement of aggression is a familiar phenomenon. Just as the man who has had an unmerited rebuke from his employer is liable to snap at his secretary or kick the cat. Similarly, on a larger scale, people may displace their permanent repressed aggression on to innocent parties. A child may displace all the hatred it feels for its father on to an uncle so as to be able to love the father without reservation.

It is this dislike of entertaining conflicting emotions which impels us to divide the world into good people and bad people, friends and enemies. It accounts for the hero and the villain of drama (in real life people are seldom wholly good or wholly bad) and contributes to the concepts of Good and Evil, God and Devil.

Accordingly, the relations of a group become more harmonious whenever their feelings of hatred can be displaced on to some outside enemy. This is what happens in war-time, and is

one reason why people within a belligerent nation behave more friendly to one another. This fact was once exploited in a satire in which peace was brought to the peoples of the earth by encouraging them to hate a fictitious race of villains on the moon.

But it is essential that the displacement shall take place in some socially-acceptable direction. Before the war the Germans achieved enhanced unity by displacing much of their aggression on to the Jews, but this was hardly very satisfactory for the latter. On the other hand aggression directed to the defeat of social problems serves a useful purpose. Bad temper can be worked off by chopping up firewood, or more subtly by solving a mathematical or administrative problem. At present much aggression is displaced into business competition, which, at least, is preferable to physical violence against individuals, even if it is only sometimes constructive in its results.

To sum up, it is necessary to face the fact that there is no wholly reliable method of handling (repressed) aggression: the only satisfactory solution is to prevent its formation in the first place. If formed, it is better to discharge it in some socially acceptable way than to repress it. Repression, it must be remembered, only takes place when love and hatred are evenly matched. When one has a big margin over the other the conflict can be settled on the conscious level. Accordingly, if we cannot deal with the problem by reducing hatred, we can always deal with it by strengthening the positive factor—the capacity for love.

Unfortunately, in western society, there are taboos on discussing love and the subject arouses a feeling of embarrassment.[1] The work of many writers on aggression is vitiated by their failure to understand this fact, and by failure to understand the social factors in the control of aggression.

Any worthwhile scheme for increasing happiness *must* include effective techniques for handling aggression, and especially repressed aggression. The first step, perhaps, is to bring about a wider recognition of its existence, so that people will come to suspect their irrational animosities and realise that they need

[1] The 'taboo on tenderness' will be discussed further in Chapter V.

treatment; the second is curative treatment at an early age, before the personality has become too rigidly set in this mould. And we may hope that with wider recognition parents, employers, statesmen, and all others who have the opportunity will often find themselves able to direct undischarged aggression into socially useful fields—into wars against cruelty, ignorance and disease, instead of wars against other nations or the persecution of individuals.

V

PERSONALITY FORMATION

I The Infant Learns—II Parent Identification—III Guilt and Its Origins—IV Regulating Behaviour—V Super-Ego Formation—VI Ideal Pictures—VII Conclusion

I *The Infant Learns*

As I said at the time, the crucial point in our story of the man who was ill after eating mushrooms, was that he was eating them for the first time. It is first experiences which are definitive, because we have no contradictory experiences to offset them—and naturally first experiences occur most often in childhood, indeed, in infancy. Hence it is the lessons of earliest childhood which most commonly tend to mould our character by establishing rigid behaviour patterns. In his total ignorance, the very small child, or infant, is in a painfully vulnerable position. There can no longer be any doubt that many aspects of adult behaviour which we normally regard as haphazard, unassailable elements of human nature, are, in fact, created by these infantile experiences.

Now while to some extent the experience of every individual is unique, there are also large areas of common experience. Every child is born, is weaned, is house-trained. The shocks which these processes administer inject a common element into every mind, although with varying force.

About the effects of birth we know little, but of the subsequent experiences and their consequences we can say something.[1] First let us try and visualise the state of mind of a new-born infant.

[1] But see O. Rank's *The Trauma of Birth*, 1929, for an attempt to formulate a view. If he is right we should expect to find a difference of personality in those delivered by Cæsarean section as compared with those born normally.

The baby has no memory records and therefore no time-sense. If an agreeable sensation ceases, as far as the baby is concerned it has ceased for ever. The fact that it may return does not occur to it. Equally, if it perceives an unpleasant sensation, it has no reason to suppose it will stop. It lives for the moment: if that moment is unpleasant it is as much a disaster as an eternity of hell. The sensations which the baby perceives are almost wholly through its tactile nerves, more especially its mouth. It cannot focus its eyes, and its other senses are equally imperfect. It is therefore unaware of its mother as an individual: it knows only itself and a crowd of incoming sensations from something which is not itself. Hence all unpleasant experiences are alarming and arbitrary in the highest degree.

Broadly speaking, there are for the baby two states of affairs. One in which it is warm, replete, secure, loved; another in which it is cold, hungry, and abandoned. To receive love, to receive milk, to be secure, are fused into a single agreeable pattern; and so are the complementary experiences. And so, for ever after, to be short of food implies to be insecure and unwanted; and from this it is easy to proceed to the illogical (unconscious) conclusion that the way to deal with a sense of insecurity (in reality due to being unloved) is to acquire physical property, especially food.[1] Conversely poverty is felt as insecurity.

The importance to babies and small children of affection, as distinct from care, is supported by a mass of evidence. Children separated from their parents for prolonged periods in the first years of their life almost invariably sustain permanent psychological scars. The commonest reaction seems to be a determination to do without affection, producing the so-called 'affectionless character.' Where this is combined with a desire for revenge against society (or some similar motive) it often leads to criminal or ruthless anti-social behaviour. Psychologists have established

[1] See M. Klein and J. Riviere, *Love, Hate and Reparation*, 1937. This mechanism is behind some cases of persistent greediness, as with German refugee children taken to America before the war.

a strong connection between thieving and early disturbances of the child's affective life, the thieving being at once a symbolic attempt to secure the good things which it has missed and a way of revenging itself on society for not providing them.[1] Where parents display hatred, not affection, towards their children equally serious results are likely, though they may work out in a more complicated way. Especially is this true where parents are alternately neglectful and affectionate, or where one parent is affectionate but not the other.

The orthodox Freudian view, now obsolete, was that the child's real demand was for food, warmth and physical protection; that the emotional demand was no more than a sublimation of the physical demand. But the fact that children well-cared for in hospitals and homes frequently develop these psychological symptoms confirms the belief that it is the emotion itself which is of primary importance.

Indeed, deprivation of affection may threaten not merely mental health, but life itself. Well-run institutions for small children tend to have a death rate markedly higher than that for children brought up in quite insanitary conditions under their mothers' care, and Ferenczi has gone so far as to say: 'Children who are not loved don't live.'[2]

To be sure, owing to the child's tendency to interpret a failure of physical care as due to loss of affection, deprivation of care—especially of food—is extremely important and we must now proceed to consider the effects of an interruption or uncertainty in the supply of food (milk): in the technical jargon, oral frustration.

1. *Oral frustrations.* The baby's first major painful experience after birth is likely to be finding itself hungry, and *ipso facto* insecure and unloved. Unless the mother is constantly with it, and is ready at any time to feed it this is almost certain to occur. In many savage tribes, the mother is always with it, and is always ready to feed it, but in the west we impose on the infant rigid feeding schedules, largely to suit our own convenience.

[1] See John Bowlby, *Forty-four Juvenile Thieves*, 1946.

[2] Quoted in R. Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, 1947.

Since the baby cannot comprehend that the deprivation is only temporary and that it has only to wait to be satisfied, the frustration is felt as an all-absorbing disaster in its little world. It is interpreted as a permanent loss of security and affection.

This experience is repeated still more intensely when it is weaned. If it is allowed to take the breast whenever it wishes and is only offered other nutriment as an optional alternative, and if it is allowed to return to the breast when it wishes at any age—as happens in some primitive societies—no frustration will occur. But if it is weaned more rapidly than this, as it usually is in modern society, it is bound to record the experience as alarming and painful.

It has been established quite definitely that these infantile experiences, which seem to us adults so trivial, but which to the child are catastrophic, do actually cause marked, permanent changes in the personality. Parents who subject their children to oral frustration imbue them with ineradicable feelings of insecurity and lack of confidence, and these signs are lacking in societies which avoid this error. (I have to put the consequences of oral frustration rather vaguely at this point because the form they will take necessarily depends on the other experiences the child undergoes and on the peculiarities of the culture into which it is born. They may, for instance, be concentrated on fears for physical security, for the supply of foodstuffs, or they may centre around emotional security; or they may take yet other forms.)

In the west we now have a further variant of the problem in that we rely very often on bottle feeding. The subject is still but little investigated, but the position seems to be that if the bottle is given by the mother personally, with the child in her arms and all the evidences of affection present, as in normal feeding, and if it is given on demand, the effects of frustration will be avoided. Since, however, it generally is the case that bottle-fed babies suffer the same frustrations as breast-fed ones, as regards too rigid feeding time-tables and too abrupt weaning, and that in addition they may be left alone while they take the bottle, it is probable that their emotional frustration is even

greater than the breast-fed child's. In practice, analysts have noted that bottle-fed babies tend to suffer from neurosis more frequently than breast-fed ones.

2. *House-training*. The child's first social lesson, as we have seen, is connected with its mouth. Its second lesson is connected with its anus: it is house-trained.

This process may be considered from two aspects. It may be viewed as a task of holding something in, in order to win approval, or as a task of producing something upon request. If it is viewed in the former light, the child is apt to learn the unconscious lesson: to be loved I must hold on to what I have got, and this will tend to produce a grasping, stingy element in the adult personality structure.

Suppose, however, that the emphasis falls on the productive aspect. Suppose, that is, that the child remembers chiefly the approval it won by producing upon demand rather than the punishment it received for failing to retain. Then the lesson it learns is, in generalised form, 'creative activity pays off.' But the child's stool is something more than this: it is a love gift, and if it is refused, it will tend to become shy of offering its affection and friendship to others. Thus a house-training in which the emphasis has been not on punishment for failure of control but rather on affection given for successful production tends to create a generous, responsive, and productive type of personality. Where failure of control has resulted in loss of affection with consequent formation of guilt feelings, a personality preoccupied with cleanliness or self-control may result. The test of this is to be found in the frequency with which, in adults, obsessive cleanliness is associated with a materially-tight-fisted and emotionally-stingy nature. Here, as in every psychological field, neurotic patterns wreak their effects in both emotional and practical directions simultaneously.

A further variation on this theme may occur. If the child does not feel well-disposed towards its mother, it can retaliate by retaining its fæces when asked to produce them. This is a significant experience for by so doing it tastes power over others for the first time. (It will already have exerted some power over

others by crying, no doubt, but this is not quite on the same plane, for when it cries it is making a request of its mother, but now its mother is making a request of it.) The deliberate nature of this act, and its association with emotional factors is vividly shown in a case observed by Susan Isaacs, in which a small child, which had for weeks been recalcitrant about excreting, ten minutes after the arrival of a new nurse, whom it liked, voluntarily fetched its pot and announced: 'For you I'll do it.'[1]

In adult life this pattern may persist, transmuted into appropriate forms. Property may be accumulated, for instance, as a form of retaliation against society for not being sufficiently accommodating.[2] The general equivalence of fæces and money, which often seems to the laymen such a far-fetched idea, has been abundantly proved by Freud and thousands of workers since him. Popular resistance to 'symbolisms' of this kind is generally based on too literal an interpretation. It is not, of course, that the child says to itself: 'money is like fæces. I make money and I make fæces.' Or anything so crude. It is rather that the child learns a pattern which we can only express in the form: 'I produce something and I am loved.' Then, on later occasions, it tends to follow the same pattern, substituting whatever is now the appropriate comparable action for winning approval—which in our society may well be making a lot of money. Similar arguments apply, of course, to other situations. Great resistance was aroused, for instance, by the parallel Freud drew between the child's attitude to its parents—the son's love of his mother and his jealousy of his father—and the adult's attitude to women. But it is not suggested that the child thinks of its mother in exactly the same way, in every detail, as the man thinks of the woman he loves; simply that both follow the same pattern, so that implications of one tend to get carried over to the other.

[1] S. Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*, 1933.

[2] Or, as Geoffrey Gorer has pointed out, it may lead to an obsessive preoccupation with etiquette, as in the case of the Japanese. See *The Japanese Character*, by Geoffrey Gorer, Penguin Science News No. 1, 1946.

Finally, I should point out that the house-training pattern must not be considered in isolation, but in conjunction with the weaning-pattern which precedes it. For instance, if a harsh house-training is combined with an early weaning the two patterns will fuse, property being doubly desired as a form of (quasi-emotional) security and a retaliation for lack of it. It must also be related to the pattern which follows it, namely, the Œdipus situation.

3. *Œdipus situation.* The third of babyhood's major shocks occurs some time after the child has learned to discriminate between its mother and other human beings. One day it realises that its mother is giving her attention and affection to the father and it feels that it has lost this affection, perhaps for ever. This sensation will naturally be more intense if its earlier experiences have already laid the foundations of a sense of insecurity. This is the basic situation which Freud called the Œdipus situation.[1] Frequently the child gets over its fears and disappointment, but if the shock is sufficiently intense and if earlier or later experiences reinforce the sense of being excluded from the mother's affection, it may cause a permanent deformation of the personality, termed an Œdipus complex. Such a non-valid behaviour pattern is so common in our civilisation that Freud assumed it to be a universal characteristic, though later work has shown that it is weak or even non-existent in certain cultures (e.g., the Marquesans[2] and the Trobrianders[3]).

One thing which seems definitely established is that children experience a severe shock if at an early age they witness 'the primal scene'—their parents engaged in the sexual act. Such an experience is powerfully productive of Œdipal jealousy and guilt.

[1] It is often thought that the name signifies no more than Freud's acquaintance with classical myth. Jung has argued however that myths are essentially condensations of experience shared in common by the people making them, so that the Œdipus myth is actually a description of this very process. *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, Eng. trans., 1928.

[2] See A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, New York, 1939.

[3] See B. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Societies*, 1927.

The direct effect of the Œdipus situation is to produce a potential antagonism towards the father for having stolen the child's position, or a resentment towards the mother for having, as it seems to the child, betrayed its trust: or both. These antagonisms are frequently extraordinarily powerful, especially when reinforced by other circumstances, and come into sharp conflict with the child's natural affection for its parents. The child then finds a working solution by repressing the antagonism, enabling it to act with affection towards the parents; but the destructive wishes cooped up in its unconscious mind give rise to powerful feelings of guilt, though these also remain unconscious.

As Freud demonstrated, and his thesis has survived countless attempts to demolish it, the small child's affections are strongly coloured by sex. Observation of children in cultures which do not place the same powerful taboos on sex that we do abundantly confirms this. The outcome of the Œdipus situation is therefore apt to be that all sexual activity becomes associated with guilt; or, to put it in its crudest form, with fear of retaliation from the father. In this situation, the idea of castration often assumes great significance. With the ambivalence which is typical of the thinking of the unconscious mind, castration is feared as the father's revenge on the child for its desires, and at the same time is wished for because castration would solve its dilemma and free it from guilt. Parents who threaten children with castration (as a punishment for masturbation) powerfully reinforce this feeling and foster the setting up of a rigid system of ideas in the unconscious, i.e., a castration complex.

Masturbation, it is very important to stress, is a process of the greatest importance for a child's development. For at first the child is wholly dependent for its satisfaction on the ministrations of others—a situation which is inherently frustrating as the rage of an uncomfortable or unfed baby shows. The moment, therefore, when the child finds that it can provide itself with pleasure by its own efforts is supremely valuable: it is the first step towards the state of adulthood in which it relies on its own efforts instead of those of others. This moment generally occurs through the discovery of masturbation.

Accordingly it is now held that *infantile* masturbation is a vital stage in the child's development: it is the step which initiates what we may call its psychological weaning. I have italicised the word infantile because at a later age the situation is different. If development follows its normal course, the child will soon discover more constructive and rewarding methods of self-gratification—the whole world of experience will open out—and masturbation will be dropped and speedily forgotten. Persistence of masturbation, or its recurrence, must be viewed as the symptom of a failure to establish this wider relationship, a failure to find gratification in the external world; it is a retreat, when elaborate methods prove too exhausting or unrewarding, to a more primitive device.

But to teach the child that masturbation is 'wicked' does more than to handicap its psychic development. It strongly reinforces the feelings of guilt which, thanks to the Œdipus complex, are already connected with the idea of sex. (And, needless to say, it does not effect any real cure: the only effective cure is to help the child to establish a satisfactory relationship to the external world.)

When a child develops strong and persistent feelings of unconscious guilt about sexual activity it may deal with them in various ways; one of the commonest, perhaps, is frigidity or impotence. Inability to perform the sexual act achieves the same results as castration. It prevents the performance of a forbidden act and at the same time punishes the victim for guilty wishes. It is a psychological castration. Impotence of this kind does much more than deprive the victim of pleasure and handicap his marital life; it may fill him with doubts of his capacity in every sphere. Since all forms of creative energy are manifestations of the life force, of Eros, to use Freud's name for it, any failure to release it is liable to be reflected by impotence in every department of the person's life.

Alternatively, the victim may be driven to prove his competence by excelling in some suitable substitute activity or activities. Such a rigid compulsive desire for success and approval is often called the urge for *self-validation.*

The Œdipus situation, then, is a source of guilt and unconscious aggression, especially of sexual guilt and of inhibitions of the creative impulse.[1]

In addition to these almost universal experiences, some children undergo other painful experiences. For instance, their physical movements may be impeded by swaddling clothes. Such physical frustration may infuse into the structure of the personality an impatience at restraint or opposition and possibly lead to violent self-assertiveness in adult life.

In my efforts to clarify the effect of these basic experiences, I may have given the impression that each produces a characteristic result: irregular feeding, a sense of insecurity; harsh anal training, preoccupation with cleanliness or property; the Œdipus situation, aggression and guilt. In reality, however, one cannot divide the personality into watertight compartments. The personality is the outcome of *all* the contributory forces. The effect of any specific shock always depends to some extent on what other shocks have been experienced. For instance, the effect of the Œdipus situation is sometimes to produce resentment against the mother for her supposed faithlessness, rather than hatred of the father. We may speculate that this reaction would be most likely to occur if an abrupt weaning had already sown doubts as to her constancy: unfortunately, the exact mechanics of these interactions have not yet been established. This observation should be borne in mind during subsequent discussions of personality formation. Furthermore, the exact form which neurotic compensation takes is influenced by the customs of the society in which the individual finds himself. Harsh anal training is more likely to produce stinginess in a society which regards acquisitive activity as normal behaviour.

[1] It should, perhaps, be mentioned that the Œdipus situation does not work out in quite the same way for women as it does for men. In either case the first object of affection is the mother, which for boys is a heterosexual, but for girls a homosexual relation. Hence the father enters the boy's world in the guise of a sexual rival, whereas to the girl he appears simply as a more interesting and natural object of affection. Adult homosexuality is frequently to be explained as an attempt to solve this conflict, but the mechanism is highly complex.

II *Parent Identification*

It is a well-established fact that children build up their personalities by incorporating ideas and attitudes which they find in those they love. The process at work is that which we have already mentioned by the name of *identification*. The small child wishes to 'be like' its mother or father, just as a little later the schoolboy tries to model himself on his hero. Parents (or nurses) are the normal objects for early identification, but it does not always happen that the child draws from both indifferently. On the contrary, it usually tends to identify strongly with one and reject the other. Which it selects almost certainly depends on the way in which the Œdipus situation has worked out previously.

We express our recognition of this fact when we say that a child 'takes after' one of its parents, and we notice that it does not always model itself on the one it resembles physically.

Although parents differ widely, nevertheless there are broad general differences in behaviour between males and females. Consequently, whether the child chooses its father or its mother as an object of identification will tend to make a profound difference to its character. Alternatively, it may achieve some degree of identification with both.

As Flugel has pointed out, in a highly significant passage, those who identify themselves with the father tend to be authoritarian, conservative, puritanical and individualist. Those who identify with the mother, to be democratic, progressive, co-operative and free from sexual guilt. He found it possible to identify as many as twelve pairs of characteristics associated with the two types.[1]

So reliable is this correlation that intelligence officers 'screening' Germans to eliminate those with Nazi affiliations at the end of the recent war used it, in conjunction with other techniques, to identify adherents of the regime.

It must be made clear that these two types of personality —which we may call patriform and matriform—represent

[1] See J. C. Flugel, *Man, Morals and Society*, 1945.

extremes of a range and not two distinct categories. A child normally incorporates elements derived from both parents into its personality, and no doubt the kind of personality most desirable both for the person concerned and for society lies somewhere between these two poles. It is when a child has only one parent, or when it reacts from one of its parents, that a personality influenced chiefly by the other results. And we must also bear in mind other possibilities: for instance, a child brought up by nurses will tend to introject their standards rather than those of its parents.[1] Finally, it must be stressed that much of what it derives from each parent is not, or not wholly, determined by biological factors: much of what we regard as typically masculine, or typically feminine, behaviour, is in reality a product of the culture, as Mead and others have shown.[2]

Now one type of character may be more conducive to the possessor's happiness than the other—according to which type is best adapted to the society the owner is living in: moreover, one type may be more conducive to the happiness of others. So here, too, we have a factor which is very relevant to the question of happiness, and about which we shall have more to say in the next chapter.

From considerations of specific elements introjected into personality, I must turn aside for a moment to a more general concept, applicable to much that we have said, and much that is still to come. To wit, guilt.

III *Guilt and Its Origins*

Guilt, no one will deny, is a source of unhappiness. Yet no one would suggest that we should eliminate *all* guilt. If a man feels no guilt for anti-social acts which he commits, his

[1] This explains, incidentally, why men of position are sometimes unable to build a satisfactory sex-life with women of their own class, and are driven to maintain a mistress whose manners reproduce those of their one-time nurses.

[2] See M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935. The influence of culture is also discussed at some length in the next chapter.

behaviour will become more and more intolerable. It is *neurotic* guilt which is the danger; guilt which is out of all proportion to the cause, guilt which generated by acts which, rightly considered, are not guilty, guilt which persists long after the error has been expiated. I think it must be failure to appreciate this point which has caused some Catholic writers to attack psychology most bitterly for its attempts to reduce guilt.

And neurotic guilt is certainly a major factor in contemporary unhappiness. How, then, is it formed?

Guilt, essentially, is consciousness of having done something forbidden, something 'wicked.' As we shall see in a moment, the child's conception of what is forbidden is wholly arbitrary, so it may easily happen that guilt is generated by deeds which are in reality innocent, or, at worst, inevitable childhood misdemeanours. The next question is: Why should contravention of these prohibitions produce the unpleasant feeling we call guilt? It seems fairly certain that guilt is really fear of the consequences—fear of punishment or fear of loss of approval and affection. Of these the latter is much the most serious: indeed, for the child it is intolerable. Hence undiscovered crimes are a source of deep anxiety. So much so that the child often longs to have the misdeed discovered and undergo punishment so that it can regain a feeling of security and be confident of approval and affection.[1]

This desire for punishment is in direct conflict with the normal wish to avoid painful experiences and it is owing to the existence of this conflict that guilty persons find it so hard to avoid giving themselves away.

But conflict, as we know, evokes repression: so that memory of the guilty deed is lost to consciousness. Yet the sensation of having erred lingers on and this conduces to the formation of a

[1] At the writer's public school, any boy who had been given 'lines' up to a total of 500 automatically incurred a beating. It was not uncommon for boys who had received 400, or even in some cases 300, to bring the number up to 500 by some piece of deliberate misbehaviour in order, at the price of a flogging, to dispose of the psychological menace. In the same connection, the phrase 'I'll take my medicine' is graphically descriptive.

rigid, non-valid behaviour pattern which in severe cases may last throughout life. The person suffering from a load of unconscious guilt continually seeks new punishment or interprets every misfortune as deserved. Naturally, all guilt causes some unhappiness, but neurotic guilt goes much further. Because all conscious recollection of the crime has been repressed no amount of atonement ever succeeds in restoring confidence. The unhappy victim passes his whole life in a hell of insecurity and unease, and continually deviates from constructive activities to compensate for his mistake. Unless, indeed, he deals with the situation by projecting his guilt on to others and spends his time punishing these effigies of himself as the Nazis did with the Jews.

Where this self-punishing attitude takes an acute form we speak of masochism, and where it is projected, of sadism. In many cases both attitudes exist alternately and we speak of sado-masochism.[1]

The tragedy is that the original cause is generally trifling. Owing to the extraordinary persistence of repressed experiences adults may feel unconscious guilt for childish crimes which are in reality quite trivial, and which, when exposed by analysis, are seen to be ludicrously inadequate as justifications for the amount of suffering undergone. What makes it worse is that the mind, especially the child mind, is strongly disposed to regard wishes as severely as deeds. Unconscious guilt is often created by misdeeds which were never committed. Nearly all small children at some time entertain destructive wishes towards their parents for frustrating them, and especially towards the father who appears in the light of a rival for the mother's affection. Destructive wishes to rival brothers and sisters are also common. If something occurs to dramatise these early wishes—a typical pattern is that such wishes are followed, by chance, by the death of the parent or brother, of which the

[1] The Freudian view, however, is that sadism is aggression 'fused with' libido, i.e., sexual desire, while masochism is introjected sadism. Almost certainly both aggressive and punitive factors are present, but the subject is far from clear.

child then feels itself guilty—neurosis is often established. Unconscious guilt is a rather widespread feature of our civilisation, as witness the strong tendency to sadism and masochism.

The practical task then, is (*a*) to minimise the formation of guilt, especially infantile guilt, since it is around infantile guilt that later accumulations crystallise; and (*b*) to provide effective means for discharging guilt and restoring a sense of emotional security.

We *could* avoid the formation of guilt by never punishing children in any way whatever. The Comanche Indians of North America follow this course with great success, and several other peoples punish exceedingly little. Unfortunately it is a counsel of perfection, and one which works effectively only in societies which are well-balanced in any case. So we must reckon on having to make use of guilt-discharging techniques.

The nature of such techniques depends on the type of punishment which is customary. In our society we teach that wrong-doing can be expiated by physical suffering—but other societies teach that this result can be achieved by confession and repentance, by making restitution, by self-denial, by sacrifice to the gods, or other means.[1] All these are absolutely effective, provided the guilty person believes they are. So the practical question is to create belief in the method which is most valuable socially. Restitution, as far as it is possible, is to be preferred. It is valuable in cases of theft or destruction of property, though useless in mutilation or murder.

Another point is that the device should not be too difficult to

[1] Compulsive attempts to disperse neurotic guilt will take a corresponding form. Thus the child who has been taught to make restitution may go through life compulsively sacrificing its own interests to helping others, to an extent out of all proportion with its obligations. Or it may be neurotically scrupulous in avoiding 'crimes' similar to its original misdeed. Thus the puritan is often a person who feels neurotically guilty about having experienced sexual pleasure, generally because he has, as a child, been punished for masturbation. And we all know the person who is morbidly obsessed with cleanliness, which is frequently the result of guilt about failure of anal control.

achieve. A man will not readily invite five years' hard labour to clear his conscience though, at the other extreme, he will not boggle at confession.

It is well not to lose sight of the fact that confession, for anyone who believes in the priest's power of absolution, is a one hundred per cent. effective method of disposing of guilt, and as such is a therapeutic weapon of no mean value. And, in fact, the whole Christian religion is well adapted for this purpose. Anyone who believes that Christ really did take upon himself the sins of the world is thereby freed of guilt. The only essential is to have faith. Whatever else he was, Christ was a first-class practical psychologist. Divine or not, His claim that he could relieve people of the burden of sin was quite literally true, provided that his hearers believed him. He was engaged in a staggeringly bold experiment in mass psychology.

Those who doubt pay a high price for their scepticism, and their only hope is to find someone or something they *can* have faith in. Today that someone is the scientist, specifically the psycho-analyst, who is thus the direct successor to the priest.

By the same token, the sacrifices made by the Romans to their gods were equally effective in their way.

I said that the discharge of guilt should not be made too difficult: equally it must not be made too easy, or an important incentive to good behaviour is removed. In theory at least, confession meets this requirement, for the priest can always withhold absolution from the unrepentant.

But while such devices are effective in dealing with conscious guilt they cannot cope with the unconscious variety.

So far we have considered the psychological superstructure simply as a potential source of unhappiness to the possessor, but now we must switch from the personal to the social viewpoint and consider how far it is effective in regulating behaviour so that it will not injure other people. It is this second obligation which creates the difficulty. If we had only single individuals to deal with we could reduce the formation of guilt by refraining from punishing them at all, as do the Comanches. But our task is harder. We can hardly escape the obligation of teaching

children certain lessons. The most we can do is keep these lessons to the minimum and provide sure and certain means to the dissipation of guilt by reinstatement in parental—or, in the case of an adult, in social—favour.

What are the bases of a code of behaviour? Where does the child obtain the standards by which it judges the permissibility or otherwise of actions to which it is impelled?

IV *Regulating Behaviour*

One great force which restrains people from anti-social behaviour is the fear of sacrificing the approval and co-operation of their fellows. It is not, however, the only force. People do not at once behave with complete selfishness when they know they will not be found out: most of them are also restrained by an inner compulsion we call the conscience.

In most western countries the conscience plays a very prominent role but at the same time there are large numbers of people whose consciences are much less exacting than the majority's. This difference of standards causes unhappiness, and it also tends to degrade the standards of the more conscientious. It is therefore a matter of importance to study how the conscience is formed and nourished.

The conscience can be analysed into two parts: first, man has a picture of how he *ought* to behave; second, there is a driving force which keeps him up to the mark. The first we called, in Freud's terminology, the *ego-ideal*, the second the *super-ego*. Hence anti-social behaviour may be the result, either of the formation of a faulty ego-ideal, or of the weakness of the driving force—or of both. Accordingly the next step is to ask (*a*) whence do we derive our ego-ideals? and (*b*) whence the driving force?[1]

Research has shown clearly that ego-ideals are derived, in the first instance, from parental behaviour. The small child loves its parents and wishes to be like them. It models its behaviour

[1] For an excellent summary of what is known about the formation of super-ego and ego-ideal, see J. C. Flugel, op. cit.

on theirs. In the jargon, it introjects parental attitudes. If the parents later sacrifice its approval it may modify its ideal in compensation; thus, if they are mean, it may come to set a high value on generosity. Or it may seek to model itself on some other admired figure: this is the process, common in slightly older children, of hero-worship. In this early phase the child's conception of right and wrong is purely empirical. Mme. Montessori has observed that a child will, in a spirit of experiment, perform a whole range of 'naughty' acts simply in order to find out whether they are regarded as forbidden or not.

Later, however, as Piaget has shown, a new phase opens. The child begins to generalise from its own behaviour and its experiences with other children. It discovers that certain behaviour patterns are painful when it is the victim and begins to realise they are equally painful when it is the operator and someone else the victim.[1]

What can we learn from this?

I would like to draw attention to three things. First, there is the terrible rigidity of infantile conscience. The child transgresses parental edicts or patterns and is filled with guilt. Later in life, having evolved a somewhat more rational code of behaviour these early transgressions seem trivial and ridiculous. We laugh ruefully to think how much agony they cost us at the time. But it is not the transgressions we remember which cause the trouble: it is those of which the memory has been repressed. Many people are burdened by unconscious feelings of guilt for trivial transgressions—much of the work of psycho-analysis consists in bringing these incidents back to the conscious memory so that they can be seen in proportion, and that is why the recovery of memories alone has a therapeutic effect, even though it does not necessarily of itself effect a cure.

Although the second phase of morality is rational in nature,

[1] See J. Piaget and others, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, 1932. The effect of play with other children in stimulating a social sense is studied by Susan Isaacs, *The Social Development in Young Children*, 1933.

it is by no means wholly rational but is much influenced by social customs and standards which it takes for granted. For instance, if a child is laughed at for being unconventionally dressed it is likely to incorporate ideas about the proper way to dress in its ego-ideal and, as an adult, will feel uneasy if it fails to observe them. This is, of course, a perfectly practical response—though it may be in some cases excessive in degree —as far as the individual is concerned. He recognises that he may lose approval by dressing unsuitably and naturally avoids the blunder. But looking at society as a whole we see how unimportant it is whether one has a ring in one's nose or in one's ears. The mistake is for the people in a society to withhold approval from people who fail to conform to these arbitrary rules.

In short, our conscience in not a divinely-inspired guide but a haphazard collection of rules of varying value. At the core is the Golden Rule, the product of experience: do as you would be done by. But it is overlaid by ghosts of what daddy did and what Smith minor said that awful afternoon. That is one reason why consciences produce such odd results in practice.

And even the lesson of the Golden Rule may not be successfully learned. If a child finds that its attempts to be co-operative to others are rewarded by co-operation towards itself it will learn the lesson. But if its overtures are abused, it will tend to learn the contrary lesson, that Might pays off. As is now widely recognised, most vindictive behaviour (apart from the sadistic elements it may contain) consists in an attempt to compensate for injustices suffered in youth—injustices the memory of which has been repressed.

Finally, it must be pointed out that parents often fail to teach children the lesson they think they are teaching. Children are, above all, imitative. The father who thrashes a child for (let us say) getting himself dirty, believes he is teaching him cleanliness; he may be teaching him only that the best way to achieve one's ends is by violence, especially if the father allows himself the failing for which the child is punished.

v *Super-Ego Formation*

The second question we were to ask was what is the origin of the force which drives the individual to live up to his ego-ideal. Though the details are obscure, it seems clearly established that this is derived from the individual's own load of aggression which is, to a greater or lesser degree, turned against himself. In a classic experiment students were set a problem which was, though they did not know it, insoluble and their reactions were observed. It was found that some consistently blamed themselves for their failure, while others blamed the environment—the teacher or the puzzle. From this was derived the concept of an intropunitive and an extrapunitive type, though it has not been established that an extrapunitive never behaves intropunitively.

Extrapunitives, accordingly, are little troubled by conscience, while intropunitives tend to be extremely conscientious. The extent of their conscience depends, however, on the volume of aggression at the disposal of the super-ego. The child which has been much frustrated will tend to be the perfectionist, worrying type and will, of course, display these tendencies to the full whenever met by frustrating circumstances in adult life.

All the same, I find it difficult to regard this as a full explanation of the super-ego. The conscientious person, I suspect, is also motivated by something akin to fear. Deep down in his unconscious a little voice whispers, if you do that you'll suffer for it. Or we can say, quite simply, that he knows that if he goes against the dictates of his conscience he will feel *guilty*.

But it must not be assumed that the super-ego is formed in all individuals with equal force. As Bateson has pointed out, three conditions are necessary to super-ego formation:

1. There must be some individual adult who makes it his or her business to teach the child how to behave.
2. This teaching must be backed up by punishment.
3. The child must love the adult in question.

Where these conditions do not obtain the super-ego will be weak or missing.[1] This we can see in our own society today.

VI *Ideal Pictures*

Unaware, perhaps, of Freud's existing concept of the ego-ideal accounting for our moral and ethical ideas, Coulson has proposed a similar but broader notion which he calls the *ideal picture*.[2] Everyone, he says, creates a conception or picture of their life as they would like it to be. Such an ideal comprises a certain standard of home comfort, of personal liberty, of public approval and private regard, and so on. People regulate their actions in accordance with this picture. They refuse to live in a house which they think is 'beneath them,' to wear clothes of less than a certain quality or style, or to accept a wage or salary below what they think is their due.

This ideal picture comprises certain standards of personal behaviour too. People often say that they would think it 'beneath them' to behave in such and such a way.

Naturally, everyone constantly makes decisions on such matters, but Coulson was suggesting something more than this. He was suggesting that these decisions are not made afresh each time on the merits of the case but are referred to a pre-existing, internally consistent picture of oneself. How far this is true is still uncertain: Coulson makes many assertions about the way in which this picture was formed and revised which were probably of little significance except as descriptions, and it is not even established that any such *organised* view exists.

Nevertheless, it *is* true that people have standards of what is due to them, and that unhappiness results when these standards are ill-chosen. I want, therefore, to try and clarify the matter sufficiently for us to see what the practical implications are when it comes to designing a world in which we can be happy.

[1] J. McV. Hunt, *Personality and the Behaviour Disorders*, 1944.

[2] W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 23rd ed., 1936.

If we examine instances in which people have formed an 'ideal picture' (to use Coulson's terminology without prejudice) which militates against their happiness we find they are generally unsatisfactory for one, or both, of two reasons. Either their pictures involve being superior to other people, or it aims at the acquisition of things which are not, ultimately, necessary to happiness.

The introduction of this comparative element into motivation, so that whatever one does or possesses one must do better or possess more of than anyone else, I would regard as a disease or distortion of normal ambition arising from the urge to self-validation to which I have already referred. Its psychological roots lie in a fear of organic inferiority—impotence—and this is intensified if the person concerned is placed in an inferior position by fate or his own deficiencies at a later age. It is a common malady in western civilisation. The second error is subordinate to the first. The man who wishes to excel over his fellows, and so win their approval, must excel in the things they value and so he tends to choose material things rather than skill, aesthetic sensibility or spiritual insight, when he lives, as we do in a society which values material possessions, more strongly, on the whole, than non-material ones.

This urge to live at a certain standard, whether it be interpreted in terms of knowledge, power or possessions, which must *exceed other people's* corresponds to what we call ambition, in the strict sense—the sort of ambition Wolsey meant when he said: 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition.' In its extremest manifestation it may amount to megalomania or even delusional insanity, as in the case of the man who imagines he is Napoleon, or God.

I fancy that the ideal picture in its material aspects is normally a representation of one's childhood; in its non-material aspects it is no more than the normal desire for approval. The normal man wishes, for instance, to wear clothes which will not bring him into disrepute with his friends, and which will be comfortable. That is all. It is only if he begins

to use clothes as a device for being envied or admired that he begins to accumulate a vast wardrobe; it is only when he wishes to prove himself different from the common herd (and hence, he means, superior) that he may take to eccentric attire.

In itself, then, the ideal picture is not likely to be a major cause of unhappiness. It is primarily when it is distorted by ego-considerations that it becomes so. There are, however, two ways in which it can prove unsatisfactory. The first is when it incorporates materialistic aims to the exclusion of non-material ones. The second results from the division of our society into classes of varying material wealth. The man who has been born to circumstances of a certain degree of comfort, and who is forced by fate or his own deficiencies into poorer ones, suffers a frustration (over and above the material discomfort involved) which does not afflict the person born into those circumstances. Such frustration is hardly compensated for by the sense of self-satisfaction which is felt by those who have risen into a superior class, because the latter will only be felt by those who are suffering from ego-inferiority, while the former will assail all such people. This kind of frustration will only disappear when differences in the material standard of living either disappear or, as is more likely, cease to be considered important.

It is an interesting fact that such considerations only apply to material possessions. If a man felt frustrated when forced *by his own intellectual deficiencies* into a milieu less intelligent than the one into which he had been born, we could not do anything about this, because we cannot ensure that every milieu will be equal in such respects. But a man of little intellect does not feel frustrated when in the company of other people of little intellect; on the contrary, he would feel frustrated if obliged to consort with intellectuals. Similarly, with æsthetic and spiritual gifts.

This, of course, is not to say that a man of high intellectual gifts who is forced by material (economic) circumstances into unintellectual society is not frustrated: obviously he is.

But this is precisely the sort of situation which can be avoided by breaking up the economic classes in the way just suggested.

VII *Conclusion*

This huge complex of mislearned and misapplied lessons at which we have been looking impels man to many activities which do not further his happiness, nor that of his fellow men, and may even make it harder to attain. It is something to have recognised its existence, but the odd thing is that we have no word for it.

Those who study these matters refer to the field in which these processes take place as the *psyche*, and to themselves as psychologists, but this is to use the word psyche quite differently from its dictionary meaning or its meaning in the original Greek. The psyche is the soul, or spirit of man. Whether this spirit has an objective existence or not is an issue which may be, and often is, debated. But however the debate is decided, there can be no doubt that this network of behaviour patterns does not correspond to the idea of soul or spirit. It corresponds much more closely to the idea of personality. In fact, many psychologists (as I must continue to call them, in the absence of another word) would go so far as to say that the personality is *wholly* a construct built up on such lines and modified by physical influences such as the endocrine secretions.[1]

At least it is clear that we must regard it as very largely a construct or artefact and pay much more attention than hitherto to the forces which construct it. We must admit the discouraging truth that to preserve a harmonious and undistorted personality, a rare combination of care and good fortune is necessary.

And there, until recently, many writers would be content to leave the matter.

[1] See H. G. Wells, Doctoral Thesis: *The Multiple, Unstable Constitution of Individuality*, 1944; Sherif, M., & Cantril, H., *The Psychology of Ego Involvements*, 1947; etc.

But today opinion is moving away from this extreme emphasis on genetic factors towards a greater stress on environmental ones. Psychological blows may form the personality, but customs and social pressures regulate the ways in which it can express itself. Moreover, social situations can do much to reinforce or soften the effect of these early lessons: indeed, social factors regulate the lessons themselves.

To these cultural factors we must now turn our attention.

VI

SOCIAL MATRIX

I The Cultural Heritage—II Basic Personality Structure—III Cultural Neurosis—IV Patriform and Matriform Societies—V Harmful Culture Elements—VI Origin of Culture Elements—VII The Basis of Culture: Values—VIII Genesis of Values

I *The Cultural Heritage*

THOUGH we are now beginning to recognise the extent to which man's behaviour is governed by the forces within him, few people yet appreciate how much it is influenced by the customs, institutions and beliefs of the society into which he is born. Hence we fail to grasp how intimately his chances of happiness depend on the suitability of this heritage to its several tasks.

In sociology, the whole complex of ideas, customs, conventions, taboos, institutions, values, techniques and beliefs which, within any given society, is handed on from one generation to another is termed its *culture*; and this concept of culture as a moulding and determining force is of fundamental importance. Perhaps the most concise definition of culture is 'the learned reactions of a group.'[1] Culture should not be confused (as it often is) with the physical property which reflects it—the buildings, vehicles, tools, clothing, works of art, etc. For these the sociologist prefers the term *cultural equipment*, although the term *material culture* is sometimes used. Men choose to live in social groups because they find that, on the whole, they can satisfy their needs, psychological as well as practical, more effectively by so doing than if they

[1] Proposed by Gillin and Gillin, *An Introduction to Sociology*, 1942. The precise definition of the term culture presents some difficulty. See the discussion in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. R. Linton, Columbia University Press, 1945.

live in isolation. But although social existence yields benefits it also demands sacrifices. No individual can be permitted to satisfy his own needs at the cost of making it less easy for others to do so, or the group will tend to dissolve. So the function of society is twofold: to assist men in gaining their ends and to restrain them from injuring one another.

To assist men in achieving their ends, societies adopt *customs* and to restrain them from anti-social action they provide *taboos*.[1] It is easy to see that a custom such as the rule of the road simplifies life for everybody. The purpose of some customs is less obvious, others have outlived their usefulness, but initially all were functional in intention. Taboos are a special sort of custom about not doing something. We can either say it is customary for the captain not to leave a sinking ship until passengers and crew are clear, or we can say that it is taboo for him to leave earlier. An organised group of customs we call an *institution*. Marriage is a good example.

A third type of culture element of great practical importance is *values*. For most people the idea that values can be treated as having a kind of independent existence will seem strange. They are accustomed to think of values as no more than a convenient way of describing behaviour. Thus, the statement: 'I like cake' (i.e. 'I set a high value on cake') forms a convenient clue to how I will behave when faced with cake, but when I die the attitude disappears, if not before. It might seem, therefore, that to say 'Men like cake' describes how men now living react, but has no significance for the next generation, which might, conceivably, feel quite differently about it.

But the fact is that we take over many of our values quite uncritically from our parents or our society, instead of forming them by practical experiment, as we do in the case of cake. Thus, among the Veddahs, who like eating the lice out of

[1] Customs are usually classified as *mores* which have a moral significance and are thought essential to the welfare of society, and *folkways* which are simply a matter of convenience. Thus shaking hands is a folkway, but monogamy is a mos. Similarly, taboos may or may not be invested with moral significance.

their friends' hair, this taste continues consistently from one generation to another. Equally, vegetarian tribes continue vegetarian and meat-eaters continue carnivorous. Our own dislike of headlice as an item of diet is, after all, drawn from the culture and not from experiment. Or, if it is difficult to see the truth of such a bizarre example, consider the frogs and snails of French diet, or even our aversion from the perfectly palatable horsemeat.

In short, values, once established, tend to persist, and this is just as true of subtler values, such as approval of wisdom, courage or romantic love.

Further, the mere fact that a value is held tends to perpetuate it, because those who do not conform to it sacrifice public approval. Hence, values not only persist, but spread. In this way, the values of a society tend, in the absence of disturbing forces, to become uniform and self-consistent.

Living as we do inside a particular culture, we find it hard to grasp to what a large extent our actions and beliefs are predetermined. We take it for granted that we drink milk, that women wear skirts, that marriage is monogamous, and that most of the population are Christians, rather than Buddhists or devil-worshippers. We have an illusion of free will: anyone who feels strongly enough *can* be a Buddhist or abstain from milk—but for every two or three directions in which we break away there are thousands in which we conform without even hesitating about doing so. The fact seems to be that men make decisions only with difficulty; they do not have the energy to work out their own pattern of behaviour in more than a handful of instances, and unthinkingly conform to the approved pattern in the greater part of their beliefs and actions. Indeed, occasionally conformity is made compulsory: about polygamy we do not have even the illusion of free will.

Polygamy illustrates very well the curiously blinkered nature of our supposedly free judgment. A man may feel that the institution of marriage is not altogether satisfactory, and propose modifications in the marriage laws, but he is most unlikely to propose abandoning monogamy for polygamy, and if he

does so he will gain no audience. In some strange way polygamy remains outside our focus of attention, beyond our mental horizon. It is not that we have considered the arguments for it and rejected them; it is that we never let our mind inspect the subject at all. Monogamy is a datum in our culture.

Because of this basic conservatism, even when our attention is drawn to the fact that there are other ways of behaving, other beliefs, we mutely feel that our own way is somehow natural and right. As a result, we remain obstinately blind to the unsatisfactory and harmful features of our own culture.

Yet the moment we turn our attention to other culture we see at once that *they* often exhibit stupid and harmful features. At this point I will mention only a few crude and self-evident examples: cicatrisation, which often causes death; clitoridectomy, equally dangerous and fraught with psychological consequences; suttee, the practice by which the wife is burned to death on her husband's pyre; war. One a trifle subtler, but obvious to us today because we have recently broken free of it, is the seclusion of women and their exclusion from many natural and rewarding activities. It is not difficult to see that practices such as these—or even such a simple custom as that which forbids women to propose to men—may be productive of unhappiness. But beyond these self-evident examples there lie customs and beliefs which act in the psychological sphere; for instance, customs which cause anxiety and fear. This is not only true in the simple sense that the beliefs which made the Spanish Inquisition possible were a source of misery to its victims, but also in the sense that Calvinism made even those who believed and practised it, harsh and joyless. The power of such beliefs is made very obvious by comparative anthropology. We note at once that in some cultures people are fundamentally happy, in others anxious, vindictive and hag-ridden. Since these attitudes bear no relation to the physical environment, we can reasonably infer that it is something in the culture which makes them so. What these tyrannous forces are will appear in the course of the chapter.

The object of this chapter, then, is first to establish some

principles by which we can test culture elements from the standpoint of their effect on happiness and to show how undesirable elements can come to be adopted. But first we must consider a group of culture elements of peculiar importance.

II *Basic Personality Structure*

In the last chapter I described how the child's earliest experiences mould his character and named three experiences as of particular importance: the speed and violence of its weaning, the nature and violence of its house-training, and the violence with which it encounters the Œdipus situation.

Now we must point out that these early experiences do not depend wholly on the caprice of the parents, but are to a very large extent regulated by relevant customs and beliefs obtaining in the culture. To some people the idea that methods of child training vary at all will be strange, and even are anything but completely 'natural' and obvious will seem strange; and if other societies differ from us, it must be simply because they are savage and ignorant. But the fact is that practices governing child-training differ considerably in different parts of the world, and it is certainly unjustifiable to regard ours as any more natural than anyone else's. In fact, from the viewpoint of character formation, the customs of western culture are very arbitrary and unnatural, as we shall see in a moment.

Because of this tendency to follow custom, there will be a strong tendency for the children of a particular culture to undergo similar experiences, and so to have similar elements injected into their characters. Pioneer work has recently been done in this field by Dr. Kardiner of Columbia University, New York,[1] who has pointed out that even though the final pattern may vary greatly between individual and individual, and though the same element may give rise to different overt character traits in different societies, nevertheless, we are

[1] A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, 1941 : *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, 1945.

entitled to speak of the *basic personality structure* of a society. It is because of the similarity of their personality structures that each race has a characteristic way of behaving which differs from that of other races. Many people still imagine that such differences are due to inheritance, but this is definitely not so: not only do people of one race, born in another country, and brought up by indigenous parents take on most of the characteristics of their country of birth, but the stocks of most western nations are already so closely mixed that the clear-cut differences we find between European countries cannot possibly result from them.[1]

This concept of a basic personality structure is of supreme importance and plays a key role in the argument of this book. Let us, therefore, consider it in more detail.

Though separation from the mother is perhaps the earliest possible traumatic experience a child can undergo, most, if not all, societies recognise the baby's need for its mother, and separation is rare, except in so-called civilised societies. Every society, however, has views about the proper way of weaning a baby.

In some primitive societies the child is never refused the breast, and simply resorts to it less and less because other food seems more interesting. In such cases weaning generally completes itself by the third or fourth year, though individual children (probably those who through some mischance have formed a sense of insecurity) may continue to suck the breast occasionally up to seven years, or even later. In others, by contrast, weaning is completed in six months by violent methods, the child being slapped whenever it reaches for the breast. The age at which weaning starts does not seem to matter greatly: what matters is that the child should feel it always *can* resort to the breast if it wants to. It is the conclusive end of weaning which is decisive.

As will be understood, the anxieties generated by abrupt weaning will be greatly reinforced if natural conditions make the food supply—or, for that matter, the supply of affection

[1] G. Dahlberg, *Race, Reason and Rubbish*, (Trans.), 1942.

with which it is equated—unreliable in adult life. That adult food anxieties are not necessarily the consequence of real shortages is clearly established. Thus, the Dobu of New Guinea, who live in fertile country, are beset by food anxieties, while the tribes of Central Australia, who are constantly threatened by drought, have none.[1] The Dobu, as might be imagined, practise abrupt weaning, the Australians do not. The food anxieties of the Dobu are thus non-valid or neurotic; and so, one might add, is the confidence of the Australians, though the idea of neurotic confidence has received little attention from psychologists.

It is worth stressing that when the adult environment by chance justifies an anxiety originally formed by non-valid generalisation *its neurotic character will be concealed* and it will appear as a perfectly rational mode of behaviour. This is true of our own society, where genuine adult insecurity masks the effects of abrupt weaning.

The pressure to complete an early weaning in the West stems clearly enough from the social preoccupations of the mother, her clothing, and the absence of numerous dependent females in the household who can do the cooking and cleaning.[2] Similarly, in the case of house-training, it is the complex and easily damaged nature of household furnishings and the relative remoteness and complexity of sanitary equipment which makes the mother anxious to complete house-training, while making it difficult for the child to attend to its own needs. In the mud-floored huts of the Pondo,[3] the child has only to wander outside the door to relieve itself: there are no buttons to undo, and no pot to aim at. And if it fails in

[1] R. F. Fortune, *Sorcerers of Dobu*, 1931 : and G. Roheim, *The Origin and Function of Culture*, 1943.

[2] Weaning could, of course, be postponed if the mother chose to employ a wet nurse. For obvious reasons, this is unlikely to become the practice of the majority. Nor is it a psychologically satisfactory solution since it creates a problem of divided allegiance in the infant's mind.

[3] See M. Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest* for an account of the Pondo. The Tanala are described by R. Linton, in a contribution to Kardiner's *The Individual and His Society*.

this, the floor is not irreparably damaged. In contrast, the Tanala of Madagascar carry their children with them continually in a shawl: any incontinençe is highly inconvenient for the mother, especially since for this tribe fabric is costly and difficult to replace. Naturally, the Tanala try to effect a rapid 'sphincter control.' Not surprisingly, the Tanala are grudging and unproductive in adult life.

Thirdly, there is the Œdipus situation. It is still far from clear what factors favour or hinder the formation of an Œdipus complex, but considerable light is thrown on the situation by the case, fully investigated by Malinowski, of the Trobriand Islanders.[1] As is now widely known, the Trobrianders do not recognise the biological father as responsible for his children. The responsibilities of a father, including the obligation to punish or maintain discipline when necessary, devolves on the mother's brother.

As Malinowski has argued, the Trobrianders form virtually no Œdipus complex and, as might be deduced, they have absolutely no guilt feelings about sex and place extremely few restrictions on the sexual act. Significantly enough, however, they are much concerned about incest, and are scandalised if a young couple should fall in love with one another, although they have no objection to them living together, providing no affection is involved. In general, the Trobrianders are a remarkably happy, well-balanced people—in contrast to the Amphlett Islanders, not far away, who have more orthodox family arrangements, have rigid sexual taboos, and suffer from guilt, anxiety and suspicion.

The explanation would seem to be that the child can project all its hatred at restraint and discipline on to the uncle, while reserving its love for the mother and (true) father—thus avoiding the conflict created by the normal Œdipal situation. I am not suggesting that anyone should follow the Trobriand pattern, which is not wholly devoid of neuroticism, as is shown by the preoccupation with incest and the curious

[1] B. Malinowski, *Sexual Life of Savages in North-west Melanesia*, 1932, etc.

pretence of ignorance about the biological significance of the sexual act. But it does suggest very strongly that the quantity of Œdipal guilt displayed by a society depends on specific circumstances, and that if we can reduce this guilt to the minimum we can produce much happier, better-integrated personalities than we usually do at present.

Further light on the importance of these culturally-determined practices with regard to children is thrown by the case of those peoples who restrict the infant's physical movement, whether by carrying it in a birchbark tube, strapping it to a board or swaddling it in clothes. Such peoples are often marked by a personality impatient of any restraint and reacting with great violence to any restriction of liberty. Half a century ago, however, when babies were swaddled to a much greater extent than now, it may well have been a significant factor in character formation and played its part in creating the pathologically individualistic characters which abounded in that period. Arthur Bryant, discussing such types, tells of one man who directed that spikes be placed on his grave so that no one should walk over him.

In the last chapter we referred to taboos on infantile sexuality, especially masturbation, as a powerful formative influence, and here again it is obvious that there will be a high degree of uniformity throughout a society in the attitude of parents to such behaviour. Some societies display such taboos; others, like the Trobrianders, accept infantile sexuality as natural.

Uniformity is not always so marked in the case of the 'reinstatement pattern.' Our own society uses a variety of methods of punishment—though, on the whole, it prefers isolation and deprivation of rewards to shaming or using threats, and has recently made much less use of physical pain. Other societies are more limited in method; much depends on precisely what is regarded as worthy of punishment. In our own society, noisy, violent behaviour and damage to property are chiefly objected to, and disobedience is not, in itself, a very heinous crime; we even admire a certain independence

of spirit in a boy, and regard an absolutely obedient child as spiritless. Among the Tanala, in contrast, the whole emphasis is on obedience. A moment's reflection will show how largely our adult attitudes reflect this pattern: the boor is resented, but the unconventional character, who ignores society's minor rules, is treated with amused tolerance. Correspondingly, the adult Tanala seeks to achieve all his ends by conformity.

Social patterns may also regulate the formation of the super-ego. In societies where the inculcation of socially approved behaviour is not reinforced by punishment (including withdrawal of affection) or those where no effective emotional link develops between child and teacher, it will be weak. Indeed, Bateson suggests that the combination of needed factors is rather rare, pointing out that in many cultures (e.g. Samoa, Lepcha, Bali) the baby is left chiefly in the care of a small girl, so that if anything is introjected it will be the standards of a juvenile.[1]

The extent to which adult behaviour is modelled by early experience, and the extent to which such experience is approximately uniform throughout a society is probably quite clear by now to the reader. It is not necessary for me to elaborate the picture by discussing every possible influence: yet there is one more which should be mentioned. Many societies have two (or more) contrasting patterns of treatment for children. Thus, the Tanala, though they train the majority of the children for obedience, treat the first-born male quite differently, and train him for initiative. Similarly, a society which supports a slave population will, for a very early age, begin to train slave children differently from freemen, emphasising obedience and humility for the former, independence and authority for the other. Where this differential training becomes of almost universal importance is in the distinction between the sexes. The small boy is taught not to be 'unmanly,' the girl to be 'ladylike.' Thus, the natural behaviour of each is moulded to match a concept of behaviour which may have no basis in nature. How artificial this

[1] G. Bateson, in J. McV. Hunt, op. cit.

behaviour can be is shown by Margaret Mead's famous study. She found one society in which both sexes approximated to a masculine ideal of behaviour (as we would think) another in which both sexes were encouraged to typically female behaviour, and a third in which the sex roles were reversed.[1] But while this is an extreme, it is certainly true that many societies, including our own, force upon each sex a role which is largely artificial. In the case of our own society we have only to compare the Victorian girl with the modern woman to see how artificial was the Victorian concept of how a woman should behave. And just as the Victorian concept of truly feminine behaviour was much more feminine (if one can use such an expression) than natural feminine behaviour, so also it is probable that our concept of typically masculine behaviour is really much more masculine than is natural. The truth is that there are masculine and feminine elements in everybody, and to insist on suppressing one fraction and emphasising the other is an important, but little appreciated, cause of unhappiness.

As can be seen from this example, many of the influences to which we submit children are extremely difficult to detect as influences, so much do we take them for granted. To bring out this important fact, let me give one further example. It has probably never occurred to the reader that the personality of western man is permanently conditioned by his being brought up in a monogamous family. The Marquesans, however, are polygamous, and each wife regards herself as equally the mother of all the children, regardless of biology. Similarly, each child regards himself as having several equally important mothers. So if he is rejected by one mother, he does not worry too much: he knows that another will be along in a minute to look after him. This attitude is easily detected in the adult Marquesan, who rarely treats any disaster as final, and to whom the European idea of 'finding the one girl in the world for me,' or, in more formal language, the idea of a life-long romantic love for one individual, seems completely

[1] M. Mead, op. cit.

mysterious and irrational.[1] Thus, our own idea that the only really valid and rewarding relationship is with a single person of the opposite sex is simply a conclusion from our childish experience, when this was, in fact, the case. We should not be too eager to justify this attitude by hasty rationalisations, since, in many respects, the Marquesan attitude is much more conducive to happiness and peace of mind than our own.

From such instances we can see why we must speak of a basic, and not an overt character structure. All these factors interact, and the final overt behaviour is the result of all of them. A sense of insecurity, generated by irregular feeding, will drive a Tanala first-born to initiative, while it will drive a younger son to obedience. In another society, irregular feeding may produce resentment against the mother, rather than a sense of insecurity, and in another the most careful cherishing of the mother. Anal training may lead to stinginess or creative generosity, according as the reinstatement pattern is based on rewarding good behaviour or punishing bad. The concept is an analytical one.

For our present purpose it is not necessary to study in detail how the underlying structure works out in overt behaviour: what matters is the realisation that human personality is largely, if not wholly, an artefact; and the differences in personality between different races is artificially produced likewise. It is not a natural phenomenon that the Chinese behave differently from us, but the result of childhood experience—modified, certainly, by cultural patterns and by environmental circumstances.

From this it further follows that there is only one ideal, undistorted personality and everyone who differs from this mean must be regarded as to some extent the victim of neurosis. Furthermore, since whole populations undergo, to a greater or lesser extent, the same experiences, these whole populations are neurotic and we are entitled to speak of 'cultural neurosis.' This is such a novel and important concept that I propose to devote a separate section to it.

[1] R. Linton, op. cit.

III *Cultural Neurosis*

Many writers have been struck by the widespread existence of neurotic elements in our culture, and now that psychological knowledge is being assimilated into comparative anthropology, field-workers are beginning to recognise the behaviour of other peoples as typically neurotic. There has, therefore, been a growing tendency to speak of the neurosis of a whole culture (the idea was developed, particularly, in relation to Nazi Germany) yet, in the absence of any theory as to the way in which such a widespread neurosis could be generated, many people have scoffed at the idea and dismissed it as loose thinking.

Since it is humanly impossible to inspect our own culture without bias, it will be best to start by looking at a couple of others. First, there are the Dobu, who live in a state of perpetual suspicion which, if we observed it in a single individual in our own society, we should unhesitatingly diagnose as paranoia. So intense is this suspiciousness that the most ordinary, friendly acts are consistently interpreted as having some subtle and sinister motive. This attitude, which we should most certainly regard as a form of insanity, is so general among the Dobu, that they regard an unsuspicious, friendly individual as weak in the head.[1]

Or let us consider the Kwakiutl of Puget Sound. Unlike ourselves, who regard it as natural to spend all our time accumulating wealth, the Kwakiutl spend all their time giving it away. They devote their best efforts to preparing for, and holding, ceremonial feasts or *potlatches*, at which their most precious possession, sperm oil, is poured on to the fire, and their largest monetary unit, a copper sheet, is torn in pieces, because to do this reflects glory on the individual concerned.[2]

In order to be able to detect similar elements in our own culture we need some rules or standards. As was said in the last chapter, the characteristic features of a neurotic response are that it is *rigid*—i.e. it occurs whether the circumstances

[1] See R. Fortune, op. cit. and A. Kardiner, op. cit. for an analysis in the light of psycho-analytic theory.

[2] R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 1935.

justify it or not—and it is *disproportionate* to the stimulus. Suspicion, for instance, is not in itself neurotic. Some circumstances justify suspicion. What is neurotic is to be continually suspicious, or to be much more suspicious than the circumstances warrant.

The most prominent of several neurotic elements in our own culture is, I suggest, the need to validate the ego—a need which is more marked in the United States than elsewhere. It is quite normal and unneurotic to work and make money with which to support one's family. But to work incessantly, subordinating all other interests and modes of activity to one's work, to work with frenzied application, day after day, is distinctly neurotic. It is because such activity reduces his internal tensions that the American businessman is impelled to repeat the same pattern day after day. And in a wider sense, so is the modern preoccupation with accumulating goods neurotic. Western man's frenzied pursuit of a technological progress which bids fair to undo him is as suggestive of neurosis as are the ruinous potlatches of the Kwakiutl, the exhausting prestige wars of many Indian tribes, or the dangerous self-mutilations of Australian aborigines.

Such neurotically-determined codes of behaviour undermine happiness with double force. Not only is the neurotic unhappy when he is among normal people who do not observe his customs and taboos—or rather, not merely unhappy, but disgusted, nauseated and outraged—but the normal individual is painfully constrained to unnatural behaviour, if he wishes to avoid persecution, when he lives among neurotics: or, if he refuses to conform, he is despised and humiliated.

As is now being more widely recognised, where a whole culture is neurotic, it is the abnormals who are thought to be neurotic, while the neurotics pass for normal. Just as among the Dobu, the paranoiac is regarded as normal, and the unsuspicious man as contemptible, half-witted or ill, so among ourselves, many of those who pass for neurotic because they are uninterested in (let us say) competitive sport or outsmarting a business rival are, perhaps, healthy, while it is

among the most successful figures in business, sport and public life that we must look for the diseased.

Since they are really healthy, for such pseudo-neurotics there is no cure possible. It is society which must be cured. Like the sighted man in the country of the blind, they must accept the situation as best they may and subscribe to the general errors.

From this point it is but a short step to realising that such a culture will adopt 'values' which reflect its neurotic needs. It will value sport, or economic success, or the giving of potlatches, and all other actions will tend to be judged by how far they contribute to such ideals.

Now values, as I shall argue, are the most powerful determinants in a culture. So that once irrational values creep in, the culture is doomed to unhappiness. But before taking up this point, let us complete our review of basic personality formation.

IV *Patriform and Matriform Societies*

As, in the last chapter, I mentioned that two distinct types of personality, which I called patriform and matriform, can be identified in individuals, according to the parent with whom they have identified themselves, it is not unreasonable to expect that similar patterns may dominate whole societies. And in truth, it is easy to recognise that some cultures are authoritarian, conservative and puritanical, while others are progressive, co-operative, and free from sexual guilt.

There are two patterns of behaviour resulting from the type of parent identification which we can observe better in whole societies than in individuals, since the individual is, in any case, much influenced by the cultural environment and also because he may hesitate to confess his attitude freely when it is at variance to the one approved by the culture: I mean the moral code of the culture and its religious beliefs. The patriform society regards offences against authority and property as the most serious crimes and looks less severely on crimes against women. (We can see this pattern in Fascist

Germany.) And it tends to punish such crimes by castration or death. (The German interest in the sterilising of alleged anti-social persons is significant, as is that of some of our own authoritarians.) By contrast, the matriform society regards offences against women as most serious and typically punishes them by expulsion from the family, i.e. from society. It centres the concept of sin on the food supply: that is, it regards failure to provide people with the necessities of life as the real crime. In contrast, the patriform society centres the idea of sin on sex and on desire generally.

Social history is, in fine, a story of the struggle of matrists (if I may borrow a word and provide it with a feminine form) against the rigid, authoritarian, puritanical, guilt-burdened rule of patrists. Unfortunately, the matristic revolutions are always taken over by dispossessed patrists, and invariably end in the replacement of one tyranny by another.[1]

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this subject is the accuracy with which the religious beliefs of a society reflect the polarisation of the personality. As Suttie pointed out, patriform societies consistently favour religions centred round a god who is conceived as a father, located in the sky—i.e. above them. Matriform societies worship an Earth Mother—that is, they conceive the earth as the fruitful source of all good things, and engage in some variety of nature-worship, or conceive of God as immanent in all things. Religion thus provides us with a simple method of determining the personality slant.

Suttie's observation, I believe, enables us to clear up some puzzling features in the history of Christianity—features which provide a remarkable example of how people twist religion to suit the needs of their personality. Coming to a guilt-ridden, strongly patriform society, Christ made a tremendous attempt to introduce a guilt-free society based on loving co-operation, not on authority. He continued, however, to refer to God by

[1] Possibly this provides the factual basis for Kant's intuitively-perceived distinction between 'Promethean' and 'Epimethean' types of character.

the symbol, familiar to his listeners, of a father. When the new religion reached areas which were predominantly matriform, the demand for a mother figure swiftly hoisted the Virgin Mary into the key position of protectress and interceder with the Father—by now no longer conceived as inherently merciful and loving. In predominantly patriform areas, there was never any need felt for the concept of the Virgin Mary, and the religion was swiftly transformed into one of authoritarian type, differing but little from the primitive Jehovahism which Christ had sought to displace.

The forces which determine which attitude is adopted have never, so far as I know, been adequately investigated, though it can hardly be doubted that they are derived from the Œdipal situation. If the child identifies with the father, as sons most often do, he will tend to dominate the mother, while if he identifies with the mother, he will adopt a more passive attitude to the father, and will be 'a mother's boy.' As Suttie pointed out with remarkable prevision of the modern approach to anthropology, if the father uses force to dominate the mother, *might* will seem to the child the proper method of winning approval—this goes some way to explain the consistently aggressive and belligerent behaviour of patriform societies.[1] Whereas, if the relationship between the parents is based on love, the child can only win its mother's love by a loving attitude, including with this a loving attitude to its father. It rather looks, therefore, as if the attitude of the father to the mother is the chief factor determining the nature of the parental identification; and we might even go as far as to suggest that the Œdipus complex in its classic form can only exist in a patriform society—a fact which would line up with the weakness of the Œdipus complex among the Trobrianders, who are, of course, a matrilineal society.[2]

[1] I. Suttie, op. cit.

[2] Robert Briffault's *The Mothers*: a study of matrilineal and matrilocal societies, 1927, gives colour to this view: but the work was unfortunately written without psychological factors of this sort in mind, and so is often unenlightening.

Suttie also attempted to connect what he called the taboo on tenderness with the patriform society. He noticed the characteristic embarrassment of many Englishmen at the display of tender emotion towards themselves, and pointed out how small boys switch abruptly from an unself-conscious, affectionate attitude, to one in which all tenderness is stigmatised as 'sloppy' or 'cissy.' He suggested that this 'taboo on tenderness' develops whenever the mother has no social function other than that of being a mother. If bringing up children is her only *raison d'être*, she will try and prolong the period of their dependence upon her, for otherwise she will be useless, unwanted, and bored. The children react from this dependence to the other extreme, in their attempts to break free. It is not tenderness, but too much tenderness, which they are escaping from. This analysis seems to be borne out by the fact that the taboo on tenderness is far stronger in those sections of society where women lead lives of rather empty leisure than where they have a job, or have so many children that they are only too glad to let them become independent.

Here, once more, we have a vicious circle. The patriform personality tends to put women in a subordinate position in society, and this position leads them to drive their children into patriform attitudes. Of course, the matriform attitude *may* produce patriform offspring, too: for if the woman is so preoccupied with her work that she neglects her children, they may disguise their frustrated desire by reacting on the sour-grapes principle. The core of the matter is that we are up against the biological fact that a child's first emotional relationships are with its mother. If these fail or turn sour, we are liable to get the patriform personality. The sad fact is that such relationships very often do fail, and that is partly why we have so many aggressive, authoritarian, patriform societies in the world today.

Summing up the argument so far, then, we see that personality is, to a quite surprising extent, a product of forces in the cultural environment. To change personality, to improve it, we must change the customs which mould it. Many writers

in the past have argued that personality was affected by environment, but always in a quite general way. What Professor Kardiner has done, is to make the nature of that interdependence perfectly precise; in so doing, he has, perhaps, opened a new chapter in the history of human progress.

Important as are the customs which mould the developing personality, they are not the only customs, and so we must now consider culture in more general terms. What makes a culture good or bad, and how does it originate?

v *Harmful Culture Elements*

While customs such as we have been considering exert an indirect effect on behaviour by modifying the personality structure, all customs regulate behaviour directly, and their influence plays a far greater part in our lives than we are accustomed to recognise. The word summons up the idea of rather trivial conventions, such as whether we drive on the left or the right, whether we shake hands or rub noses, but in reality, customs affect our happiness intimately, as in our custom of monogamy, to take a single instance.

It is, therefore, worth our while to consider in general terms the ways in which culture-items may be unsatisfactory. Some are obvious, and I shall mention them only briefly.

Evidently a custom ought to be well adapted to fulfilling its ostensible purpose. To build houses of mud or make ploughs of wood is less effective than to make houses of stone and ploughs of steel. Such instances are very apparent, because we have already adopted better solutions; this must not lead us to overlook the fact that many of our customs are highly inefficient, yet we are hardly aware of their inefficiency. To take a crude instance, the House of Commons has no internal telephone system, and sends all its messages by hand. A more serious instance of our reluctance to adopt valuable customs was the continued refusal, until the government's big campaign during the war, to adopt the immunisation of babies against

diphtheria, a refusal which has cost many thousands of lives.

A slightly less obvious case occurs when a society adopts customs which may, perhaps, be perfectly efficient as regards their confessed purpose, but which, all unbeknownst, obstruct a basic need at another level or in another sphere. I say 'all unbeknownst,' because the danger is not appreciated in primitive and unself-conscious cultures. In the case of our highly conscious and analytic culture, what usually seems to happen is that the danger is not appreciated at first, but later begins to dawn on people. Even then, it is a long time before people consent to change their habits. For instance, both men and women have, in almost every part of the world, at one time or another, adopted customs of a more or less painful or dangerous character in order to be admired. From the native who cicatrises his skin to the Edwardian beauty with her wasp waist; from the Turkish harem girl, over-eating in order to be fat, to the western woman starving herself to be slim, people have risked their health, and even their life, to win admiration.

From the viewpoint of the individual concerned, the action was not necessarily stupid. If men do, at a given period, admire thinness, it is advantageous to women to make themselves as thin as possible. But obviously, in the long view, such expedients are not necessary. It is quite possible to have societies in which women of normal figure are admired, and cultures which demand the biologically abnormal are clearly introducing unnecessary obstacles to happiness. In a moment I shall try and explain how it is that cultures make these absurd demands, but first let us continue cataloguing the ways in which culture elements can be undesirable.

In the case just considered, a physical need was thwarted in order to meet an emotional need, but the reverse situation is much more serious. Psychical needs are often frustrated in order to meet physical ones: for instance, a man may take a job which he finds frustrating to his sense of mastery and creativity, or which he finds degrading, in order to ensure that he can afford to eat and have a roof over his head. In our

own culture, as I shall shortly show, in more detail, we have many customs designed to raise our material standard of living which obstruct emotional, æsthetic and spiritual needs.

These psychical frustrations are doubly dangerous, inasmuch as they may permanently distort the character, and thus make it permanently impossible for the victim to live a satisfactory existence as regards his psychical needs.

The worst feature of these cultural legacies, however, is that it is almost impossible to escape them. We are born into a culture and must, to a very large extent, accept the practices we find in it, even when we can see them to be dangerous. In a society which holds that woman's place is the home, or that sexual experience is wicked, we can only defy these limitations at the cost of so much disapproval, that it is questionable whether it is worth kicking over the traces.

The second way in which customs and beliefs can cause unnecessary unhappiness is by generating unnecessary guilt or anxiety. Really, this is not a distinct category from the one just mentioned so much as a different way of looking at the subject. The culture prescribes what we shall think and do, and penalties for those who do not conform. So whenever we do not conform, we feel anxious or guilty. Now it is, by and large, desirable that a man shall feel guilty when he has committed a real crime against a fellow man or men—but it is pure waste of spirit for people to feel guilty about breaking stupid or meaningless taboos. The savage who dies of terror because he has inadvertently looked upon the face of the King at the time when to do so is forbidden, is only the extreme case of a situation which affects all of us. The schoolboy who feels anxious because he has walked on a strip of ground reserved for prefects, or the suburban housewife who is embarrassed because her lavatory cistern is heard discharging in the middle of dinner, are making themselves miserable for reasons which, *sub specie æternitatis*, are futile and meaningless.

Whether we say that we hold the belief that it is wicked to look upon the King (or turn our back on him, if you prefer a domestic example) or whether we say more mildly that it is

the custom not to do so, is immaterial. The point is that such futile culture elements cause unhappiness to those who observe them, and feelings of guilt in those who ignore or transgress against them.

This raises the question of how we come to adopt customs, and why we sometimes adopt such irrational ones.

VI *Origin of Culture Elements*

The most obvious of the reasons why societies often adopt unsatisfactory beliefs and customs is sheer lack of forethought or inventive ability, as in the case of the mud-walled house. This is probably the biggest single influence, but it is quite straightforward, and we need not consider it further.

By an extension we can also consider here the very common case of meeting a cultural need by borrowing from another culture, and the case of adapting an item originally devised for one purpose to serve another. A well-known example of this is the handshake, which was originally adopted as a precaution in a period when all men went armed with daggers, and has been retained because there are advantages in having a formalised mode of greeting. This is typical of the uncritical way in which many culture items originate. They are not consciously devised for a purpose, like a plough or a house, but grow up, or are adopted or retained by a myriad unthinking decisions.

Perhaps the next most obvious source of unsatisfactory customs is changing circumstances, which render old customs futile, or even dangerous. To take a rather picturesque instance: it was until recently the case that the newly-elected President of the United States could not take power for four months after election, in order to allow time for delegates from the remotest States to reach the capital—a fact which caused serious consequences in 1933, when many American banks crashed during the interregnum because there was no one at the helm to take remedial action. This is a specialised example, but it is not too difficult to think of serious modern

instances of old customs proving inadequate, and of failure to replace them by new ones. It is the combination of a conservative attitude with a changing environment which is at fault.

From these simple matters let us turn to something a little more complex.

Men do not choose cultural items (whether consciously or by general unconscious consent) simply upon their merits, or their suitability for the end in view, even within the rather limited range of possibilities which their imaginations make available to them. Their choice is further restricted by their feeling that such items must not contravene certain established 'moral' principles. I put the word moral in quotation marks to indicate that men *feel* that there is something inherently right in them, although closer examination often shows that they are not based on any coherent ethical scheme at all. Similarly, their choice is limited by the nature of the universe as they understand it, the 'facts' of existence, as they conceive them. Whether this conditioning belief is quasi-scientific or quasi-moral, it is accepted as an unquestionable fact.

For instance, men work in order to satisfy material needs, and they adopt customs regulating their work so as to satisfy these needs the more effectively. But if they believe that women should not work, or that they should only do domestic work, all their customs will be restricted to the case of male labour. Or, to take the case of values, if they set a high value on individual freedom, they will exclude certain methods of regulating work as inconsistent with this valuation.

Thus, values and beliefs exercise a powerful determining influence on the type of customs and institutions we adopt. Now if the beliefs held in a given culture are incorrect or irrational—or if the values are irrationally based—this will effect a quite unnecessary limitation of the customs selected, excluding many which might be useful, and even leading to the adoption of futile practices. For instance, the African who believes that you can acquire a quality such as courage by eating the heart of a creature possessing it, will pursue lions

in order to obtain and eat their hearts. If he is injured or killed so doing, that is a cause of unnecessary unhappiness, since the risk was, in reality, taken in vain. And if he chooses to pursue other men in order to eat them with a similar object in view, this is obviously an even more serious source of unhappiness.

History and anthropology provide us with many examples of customs based on mistaken beliefs about the nature of the universe, and with even more based on faulty values. All the elaborate apparatus of Nazi ideology was based on the belief that the State was more important than the individual—with what dire consequences for human happiness we all know too well.

VII *The Basis of Culture: Values*

Since values are so important, it is worth considering them in more detail.

Clearly, the values obtaining in a society do more than limit the type of custom adopted; they govern, to a great extent, the whole character of the behaviour of its members. Thus, in a society which places a high value on physical fitness and skill, many people will be predisposed to try and gain the public approval they need by excelling in some sporting activity. If, on the other hand, a society despises sport and values art, we shall expect to find a majority of its members seeking to develop their artistic abilities.

To the reader unfamiliar with sociology, this will seem like putting the cart before the horse. People pursue sporting activities because they enjoy them, they will object, and the statement that their society values sport is merely a conclusion from how they behave. Thus, values are dictated by actions, and not actions by values, as you suggest. But this is not altogether true. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, people do accept many of their valuations ready made, and model their actions to suit.

The extraordinary thing is how uncritically we accept our values. So much so that we rarely consider the possibility of

holding any other attitude. For instance, if we explain our habit of carrying umbrellas by saying that they keep us dry, we tacitly imply that physical comfort is a good thing, i.e. we commit ourselves to a valuation. The possibility that it might be better to get wet and be uncomfortable hardly occurs to us. Yet such an attitude is not inevitable, as is shown by the fact that only a few hundred years ago in Britain the abhorrence of comfort extended in some people to self-flagellation and the wearing of hair shirts. Presumably a penitential friar would not have been a good sales prospect for an umbrella.[1]

Owing to this tendency to accept values as being above question it is necessary to infer a people's values from what they do, rather than what they say. Thus, we may note that in a certain society the men are very reluctant to marry women who have had previous sexual experience, although we may not hear the word virgin so much as mentioned. By the same token, values are transmitted to children much less by direct instruction than by example. Indeed, it may sometimes happen that formal instruction is directly contrary to practised values. A child born into our own culture inevitably notices the vast part played by 'distractions'; that is, entertainments in which the person entertained takes no active part, and comes to assume that time should be spent in being distracted, although this view is not formally taught.

Not only actions, but beliefs and dreams are clues to codes of value. A society which rations food, which believes that food has magical or therapeutic or religious significance, and whose members link food with status or tend to dream about incidents involving food, can be described as a society which values food, even if it is thought bad form to discuss it. (Substitute the word sex for food in the previous sentence, and you have a description which can be applied to our own society.)

Values are transmitted chiefly by implication. Every film,

[1] Though when such practices have become institutionalised and the original fervour of conviction has evaporated many such incongruities of behaviour develop.

book, newspaper article or broadcast—intentionally or not—implies a scheme of values and influences the public towards the acceptance of those values. When (as in a recent film) the heroine sings a ditty asserting that no one remembers intellectual girls, but that success comes to those who use their sex-appeal, the implied valuation is that intellectual achievement is not of value, while sexual achievement is.

I do not propose to broach the subject of what are good and bad values at this point, since the whole book is, in effect, a contribution to the difficult task of adjusting our value system, but there is one rather specialised way in which value systems can cause unhappiness which requires to be mentioned. I refer to the question of their internal consistency.

Situations not infrequently arise in which people find it hard to know which of two values or principles to take as their guide.

For instance, a man faced with the need to disclose a fact which would hurt someone else, might have adopted as a principle 'Always tell the truth,' in which case he would speak up, or he might have adopted the principle, 'Spare other people pain,' in which case he would tell some form of lie or evasion. Quite often, however, cases arise in which two standards conflict, and a person who has adopted both of them (as might well happen in the instance quoted) finds himself in a dilemma.

Such dilemmas are often extraordinarily painful. We can begin to appreciate the fact if we look at the dream, which is based very largely on such dilemmas; interest in it consists for many people almost entirely in studying how other people have worked out the dilemma for themselves. The man who owes a duty to his family and also to his country—which shall he serve? The man who owes a duty to himself and to another—shall he put himself into difficulties or deny himself a prize in order to save the other person? The person who pities someone for their sad history, but dislikes them for their disagreeable habits—what shall he do?

Some such dilemmas are unavoidable, but there are many

which could be avoided by working out a coherent philosophy of life.

Some of the dilemmas caused in this way are not due to mere difficulty of knowing how to apply a scheme of valuation, but are due to the existence of definitely contradictory valuations. For individual values may be collected into harmonious families: thus, there may be a whole code of values built around the idea of selfish behaviour and another contradictory set built around the idea of ruthless egotism. Or again, a whole set of beliefs and values can be erected on the proposition that the State is more important than the individual, and a contrary set on the reverse proposition. If an individual adopts a consistent set of valuations, he reduces the number of moral dilemmas in which he is likely to find himself to the minimum, but if through unthinking adoption of his values he acquires elements from several different systems, he is bound to run into trouble.

In our own culture this inconsistency is quite marked. In particular, we propagate one set of values based on the idea of unselfish behaviour and giving way to other people, and another based on the idea of personal success: we admire economic and political success and despise economic failure. Consequently, people often find themselves in situations where they have to sacrifice one or the other. They often try to meet this by adopting two codes of behaviour, one for business life and another for social contacts, but it is not always possible to maintain the separation: as we revealingly say, personal considerations sometimes 'intrude' into business.

In short, such conflicts are not a mere matter of chance, but are due to lack of organisation in the sphere of values. The task of working out the organisation of values is known as ethics, and it is a singular criticism of our culture that we regard it as a theoretical pursuit fit only to pass the time of philosophers in universities. In reality, ethics is of the most urgent practical interest, and we cannot hope to get our value system tidied up until we devote the same enthusiasm and attention to it that we devote to other technical problems.

(This is not to say that our incoherent values are due simply to intellectual errors. On the contrary, as we shall see in a moment, they are caused by active, irrational elements in our minds, and we shall have to neutralise these forces if we are to reconstitute our values. But having neutralised them, intellectual effort will be needed to fill the gap left by the collapse of the old irrationally-derived values.)

Generalising these remarks, we may say that a culture is required to be consistent in itself. This concept of cultural consistency was first demonstrated by Malinowski, but the application of it in the field of values is, I believe, a new one, and more work needs to be done on it. When a culture is divided so that its values fall into two clear groups—divided, that is, by a conflict of values at a fundamental level—we may speak of cultural bifurcation. Such a description would cover, in broad terms, the conflict between totalitarian and individualist ideals such as existed in Germany in 1932.[1] When the conflicts exist at many levels of complexity, so that different customs conflict within quite narrow sections of the culture, owing to differences in specific, derived beliefs and values (compare, for instance, the contemporary value put on safe driving and on having a fast car) we can speak of cultural chaos. Our own culture is in such a state.

However, it must not be concluded that a culture which is consistent within itself is necessarily well adapted to happiness. It will be stable, but that is not enough. Many stable, but unhappy, cultures are known to anthropologists. Cultural patterns must be based on values which are well chosen with regard to man's nature and the nature of the universe.

Faulty beliefs and values are not, however, always caused by innocent error—by a mere technical failure to analyse the universe correctly. Very often they are brought into existence by irrational—that is, emotional—forces, and especially by

[1] No real-life case has the simplicity of a theoretical example, and Germany, in 1932, was certainly split to a lesser extent along several other planes, as well as being in an advanced state of cultural chaos generally.

unconscious emotional forces, more particularly those we have defined as neurotic. Let us now see how this occurs.

VIII *Genesis of Values*

As with institutions, values arise because certain attitudes prove rewarding. (In applying this dictum we must again always remember that psychological comfort is more important to us than physical comfort.) If values can be defined as what people feel they need, then the formation of 'bad' values is due to the same causes as the formation of 'bad' institutions: that is, failure to take account of long-range consequences, failure to abandon obsolete patterns, and readiness to cater for non-valid needs. If human sacrifice is a 'bad' institution, then admiration for human sacrifice is a 'bad' value.

But values are subject to a further order of error, since they can get out of step with institutions. For instance, a 'bad' institution, having become obsolete, may be dropped, but the attitude of approval may persist for some time afterwards, just as confirmed Nazis continue to value totalitarianism after the formal break-up of the Nazi regime. Indeed, such attitudes may even flourish more robustly in such circumstances, since the evils of the institution can be conveniently forgotten, and only the more attractive features remembered through a rosy glow of illusion. Conversely, men may convince themselves of the value of institutions never yet seen, as revolutionaries commonly do when planning a new order of society. It is a general truth that values precede action, rather than follow it. And this leads to the highly important conclusion that we should seek to achieve reforms by changing values, rather than by trying to control actions.

This practice is often followed, of course. Those who wish to introduce legislation making divorce harder (shall we say) naturally try and foster the attitude that divorce is a damnable institution. Unfortunately, it is a very slow method, and it may be impossible to create the required attitude in a majority of the population. The determined reformer is then tempted

to resort to introducing the legislation first, and trying to bring values into line after. This is what we mean by anti-democratic or 'Fascist' methods.

But it would be quite wrong to suppose that the origin of values is always rational. Clearly, every society will unhesitatingly adopt or invent culture items which subserve or relieve its neurotic needs, though it may not do so consciously. In choosing between one of several ways of achieving some practical end, it will all unconsciously favour the one which meets these neurotic needs—which provides it with a sense of security, relieves its guilt, or whatever it may be. Indeed, more than this, it may, still all unconsciously, adopt a custom purely for neurotic reasons: but because it does not recognise or admit the reasons, it will be driven to provide 'rationalisations'—reasonable-seeming excuses for its conduct. For instance, a tribe which projects its aggression and relieves its guilt by human sacrifice may rationalise the action by saying it is demanded by a god or powerful spirit. Or a people which devotes excessive enthusiasm to sport, because sport subserves its need for ego-validation, may rationalise it by saying that sport is valuable for health, or for inculcating 'the team spirit.'

Such irrational valuations are widespread. The African political parties[1] which value excision of the clitoris so highly that their political slogan is 'Clitoridectomy, Communism, and better education!' no more understand the root of their attitude than the European who believes his wife should be a virgin when he marries her. The more intensely we hold to a valuation, the more likely it is that our attitude is energised by a neurotic need. Correspondingly, it follows that any change of custom which alters the basic personality will also alter our values. Indeed, we can go further, and say that no attempt to change values is likely to be effective unless we do change basic personalities. The Nazis knew this and sought to produce cruel, aggressive personalities by harsh treatment of the young, in order that the values of ruthlessness and

[1] e.g. The Kikuyu Central Association; see B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, (ed. P. M. Kaberry), 1945.

power which they taught might take root. The only variant of this principle which may occur is when a basic personality is already predisposed to find value in some new institution. The guilt-loaded personalities of the ancient world were easy meat for a guilt-relieving religion such as Christianity. It follows that it is futile to preach internationalism and co-operation in a world which contains large numbers of people who have identified on their fathers and acquired an authoritarian approach to life.

VII

FUNCTIONING SOCIETY

I Nature of Society—II Function and Status—III Types of Status—IV Determination of Status-Base—V Society as an Organism—VI Conditions of Happiness

I *Nature of Society*

WHAT, technically speaking, is the difference between a society and a mass, between a group and a mob?

It is this: each individual in a group is aware of the other individuals as individuals; he recognises each one as in some way distinct from all the others; he feels liking, hatred, fear, jealousy, contempt or respect for each, or some combination of these—or at the very least, he feels curiosity or a sense of possible emotional development concerning each. In a mob, on the other hand, no such emotional links exist. When we consider societies which contain within themselves many groups, the picture becomes more complex. No individual knows all the members, and some of his emotional reactions are directed towards groups rather than individuals. Nevertheless, the same principle holds good: a society is shot through with personal, emotional relations—and is, what's more, dependent for its stability and continued existence on the presence of such emotional links. In a mass, on the other hand, these linkages are either non-existent, or they have become confined within certain areas of the whole, so that the society is composed of groups which, though perhaps tightly knit internally, are separated from one another by chasms across which no links stretch. Such a society is in imminent danger of coming apart, and can only be held together by special techniques which do not concern us here.

It will be clear then that society is something quite distinct from culture. Culture is the system of ideas, habits, values and beliefs which are handed down from generation to generation

(while being gradually modified) within a society. Culture is thus an important influence on behaviour and thus on man's chances of attaining happiness. Society, on the other hand, is a source of rewards in itself.

The importance of these emotional responses in the scheme of happiness is often lost sight of today, because many people believe that men form themselves into groups for purely practical reasons: merely because together they can produce more goods or protect themselves more easily from attack. It is true that many groups are formed initially for practical purposes. But we note that such groups, once formed, often continue long after the practical purpose has ceased to exist. Old Boys' Societies and Regimental Clubs are typical of the attempts which such groups make to survive. Nor does the member of a functional group, say, a cricket club, resign the moment he ceases to have a function. If he can no longer play cricket, he will often seek to justify his continued membership of the group by finding a substitute function, perhaps as one of the officials of the club.

So powerful are these emotional considerations that they may come to override every consideration of self-interest, as we see in cases of patriotic self-sacrifice. I am sure it is true to say that if, in some exceptional circumstances, a collection of people had no common functional purpose whatever, they would still form themselves into a group. Man, in fact, is a social animal. He is not happy in isolation, and gets to know his fellow men primarily because he finds such personal relations rewarding in themselves.

It is worth our exploring the emotional structure of groups a little, because many contemporary problems and much unhappiness originate from defects in this structure.

II *Function and Status*

Because groups normally have a practical purpose, it follows that each member normally has a *function*. Groups will rarely tolerate the presence of functionless members, who draw benefits from the group without contributing to its purpose. In

fulfilling his function each individual acquires a rating in the eyes of the other members based on the value of the contribution he makes. This rating we call his *prestige* or *status*.[1] Thus the best cricketer in a cricket club will normally have the highest status of any of the members. Status is thus a measure of a special type of public approval and goodwill which we win by our merits.

When we raise the discussion from the level of a small group like a club to society as a whole the picture necessarily becomes more complicated. Our standard of judgment broadens, and we do not necessarily accept the judgment of the small group: which depends chiefly on some single aptitude. The most skilled member of the Magician's Circle, I am sure, enjoys high status among magicians but must be content with lower rank in the estimation of society as a whole. But the main outline remains the same. Status of this kind is an extremely important source of happiness. All normal people attach great store to public approval and feel lack of status as a serious deprivation.

It should also be noted that status is something quite distinct from and independent of the evaluation one individual makes of another's value to him personally. A man who is generally disliked as an individual may yet enjoy a high status on the strength of his contribution to the community.[2] Competent

[1] The relations between individuals within a group tend to become 'institutionalised.' There grows up a popular conception of how a son ought to behave towards his father, an employee towards his boss, or a host towards his guest. It has become customary to refer to the appropriate behaviour as a *rôle* and to the position which calls for such behaviour as *status*, so that we make such a comment as : 'in his status of guest, he should not have criticised his host's taste in decoration.' This specialised use of the word status is not employed in this book.

[2] A story which illustrates this point, and also shows how status comes to depend on obsolete indications, as mentioned below, is told by Whitehead : a new hand joined a works where status had long depended on skill with the cold chisel, although this tool had in modern times been replaced by power machinery. He aroused considerable dislike as an individual, but the men reserved their verdict until a break in the work, when they gathered to watch the new hand demonstrate his skill with the traditional tool. He did this very successfully and ever after retained respect as a man who 'certainly knows his cold chisel.' (See T. N. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society*, 1936.)

doctors, for instance, always enjoy high status because their value is recognised, even when excessively brusque in manner.

Other forms of status exist it is true, but I shall come to them in a moment. But first let me comment on function and status as we have so far identified them.

One of the great errors of nineteenth century treatments was to suppose that the performance of function is a tribute which man unwillingly pays for the privilege of membership in society. This is quite wrong. It is a valued privilege in itself. We all know how anxious a small child is to help in the activities around it. In this there is no doubt an element of the mastery drive and an element of satisfaction in being wanted; and perhaps there is something else, something in the nature of a wish to serve. To be deprived of function—to be unemployed, as we say—is inherently thwarting. And since to be deprived of function is to be deprived of status, it is doubly distressing.

It is, therefore, an essential condition of happiness that society shall provide function and status for its members. This our own society is very far from doing. The unemployed man is threatened not only with starvation but with loss of function and status, and in some senses this is the more serious loss, permanently undermining his character.

Though, in the years following the 1931 depression, a beginning was made with studying the psychological cost of unemployment, hardly any attention has been given to the case, psychologically similar, of futile or degrading employment. The girl engaged in making some ridiculous knick-knack, the man engaged in compounding some worthless specific, like the burglar and the stockbroker, must inevitably be haunted by a sense of something missing. Obscurely, they must appreciate that their work fails to give them a genuine functional status.[1]

[1] The criminal, or the man preying on society just within the pale of the law, must also be irked by the same feeling. The vast benefactions of the shadier industrial millionaires probably represent an attempt, belated indeed, to win back their status. It may be added that to bestow public honours on such men is a very unwise course, since it undermines the most important sanction on anti-social behaviour.

Society is failing in one of its most vital purposes whenever it fails to provide function and status for all its members. But the fault is not always society's. Owing to our lack of understanding of the subject, many people voluntarily relinquish function and cannot imagine what makes their life so empty. I refer, of course, to those who are so rich that they need not work, and thereupon choose not to. This applies with increasing force to women, whose domestic duties become steadily lighter, and who are often able to delegate some, or all of them, to servants. They then try and fill in their tedious leisure with cinemas, bridge, flirtations or other distractions. The wisest among them undertake voluntary work or public duties, but this tradition grows weaker as the number of people placed in such a position grows.

Since the subject of status is so little understood, I propose to develop it a little at this point.

III *Types of Status*

The status which derives naturally from function may be called functional status. There are, however, various other standards by which status may be measured, notably power, wealth and birth. Between functional and non-functional status systems there is an important difference. In power, birth and wealth systems only a small number of people can have high status; some must be at the bottom of the scale, a humiliating position. Such hierarchical systems are therefore always more or less frustrating. Only a few people can achieve widespread success, most will be in receipt of less respect than they would wish, while a few will receive none. In contrast, a functional status system contains room for all. Respect for father as the breadwinner does not take away from respect for mother, whose claims are based on different ground. The best dentist in the community is not the less respected because someone else is the best ploughman. Hence functional status systems are productive both of less rivalry and more satisfaction than power or wealth systems.

There is, however, a further criterion by which we must judge status systems: that of security. By this standard, status systems based on wealth are very unsatisfactory. It is at all times possible to lose wealth, frequently through no fault of one's own. Physical injury, old age, obscure economic forces may transform a man's position within a very short time, leaving him, after a life of high status, to drag out a dishonoured old age. Systems based on rank, on the other hand, are extremely secure: too secure, really, since a man may continue to enjoy status even when, through some moral deterioration, he no longer deserves it. Only functional status systems provide security combined with adaptability. Since people continue in a stable, integrated community to honour a man for his past achievements, he loses no status in his old age or if he is injured, unless he acts in such a way as to dissipate public respect.

Recently, the theory has been put forward that the ideal type of status is 'mobile status.' This view originates in the United States and represents an attempt to justify the American status pattern as against the European. According to this theory, European status systems (which are hereditary) are unsatisfactory because it is impossible for those not born into high rank to rise into it, whereas the American status system, based on wealth and notoriety, offers high place to all who are ruthless enough or skilful enough or lucky enough to get there.

But, as has been pointed out, if you can move up you can also move down, so that the American status system is a source of much anxiety, whereas the European status system, while not really quite so immobile as depicted, offers considerable security. In reality, the American status system is much inferior to the European, but its worst defects have been concealed during the past century by a fortunate accident. Owing to the great influx of immigrants, and the rapidly expanding population and national income, it has been the general experience of Americans to move up, rather than down, the status scale. Hence the advantages of mobility have been seen, but not its disadvantages.[1] When, in 1933, considerable numbers were compelled,

[1] This point has been made by M. Mead, *The American Character*, 1942.

temporarily, to move down the scale, anxiety and resentment were enormous.

If you cannot have a truly functional status system it is probably better, therefore, to select a hereditary system and equip it with a number of ladders by which persons of exceptional talent can move up, than to choose one based on power or wealth.

I said just now that status was apt to be erected on non-functional bases and this raises the question of how this occurs.

IV *Determination of Status-Base*

It is a matter of no little practical importance to discover what induces societies to adopt non-functional status-bases. As far as I know, the subject has not been explored, but it would seem that at least two main forces are at work, one overt, the other covert.

In the first place, it is clear that people bestow their approval in accordance with their scheme of values. A group which values a sport will naturally honour sportsmen to a far greater extent than an intellectual group would, and vice versa. Correspondingly, if a society bestows respect on those who have accumulated wealth it is because the people of that society think the accumulation of wealth a worthwhile aim and make it their principal object. Valuations of this kind, as we have seen, can be traced to a psychological base: they are expressions of the basic personality structure.

It is interesting to note, however, that the erection of arbitrary status-bases does not have the effect of completely destroying functional status, at least where the function is evident. Even in a system devoted to wealth and power we find that the doctor and the nurse are generally respected, because their value to the community and the individual is obvious: even in our own society it is probably true to say that doctors enjoy higher prestige than, say, the proprietors of greyhound racing tracks, even though the latter are distinctly wealthier.

Distinct, however, from the erection of alternative status-

bases we must note the tendency of functional status to deteriorate. In the incident mentioned in a footnote a few pages back we saw how steelworkers continued to assess a man's worth by his skill with the cold chisel after it had been replaced by modern machinery. Here an overt sign of status has persisted and continues to carry weight long after the functional meaning has vanished. (The explanation, no doubt, was that the new machinery was so largely automatic that it afforded no opportunity to demonstrate skill, and so the old method was retained perforce.)

Within the small group, in which everyone knows everyone else, such deterioration is uncommon. But in society at large, it is easy. Because we cannot possibly know everyone personally we have to accept their status badges, such as titles, without question and even have to infer status from speech, clothing or possessions. If status badges are obtained by corrupt means. we cannot easily discover the deception. We are easily led into wrong inferences from secondary signs, such as clothes. Indeed, so complex are some modern activities, (such as administration or finance), that we can hardly judge whether a man has performed them well or ill, even when we know the facts. This weakening of functional status strengthens the hand of the non-functional types which are competing with it.

The problem becomes acute when status is made hereditary. In the past, people could be persuaded that the son of a worthy father was himself likely to be more than ordinarily worthy. Today we know there is little or no basis for any belief in the inheritance of nobility and we no longer feel any real respect for the inheritors of status badges, whether titles, power or wealth. Yet the badges persist, and out of mental inertia we continue half-heartedly to honour them.

This decay of status reaches an extreme stage in the modern mass society, which is so large that personal acquaintance with more than a fragment of the population is impossible. Hence opinion tends to be based overwhelmingly on such meretricious evidence as wealth or power. Modern status systems are therefore almost wholly non-functional.

Now status is not only an attribute, it is a sanction. In the small community, every member is strongly constrained to avoid anti-social action for fear of loss of status, culminating, if necessary, in ostracism. In the mass society, anti-social individuals can shelter behind the anonymity of joint-stock companies and, through them, can operate in zones far removed geographically and socially from those in which they live. Mass society has lost the most powerful of the instruments by which society maintains its cohesion.

v *Society as an Organism*

This brings us up against the third element in the emotional structure of society: *purpose*. Since people come together in groups with some purpose in view, it is essential to their happiness and to the continued existence of their group that their common purpose should be satisfactorily fulfilled. The members of a cricket club which, for lack of equipment, is unable to play any games are bound to feel frustrated; they will also feel frustrated if the executive committee fails to arrange suitable matches, to fix them for days which suit the convenience of members, and so on.

The common purpose of the members of society as a whole is the maximisation of individual happiness in its broadest sense. Consequently, great dissatisfaction will arise whenever those who administer society fail to administer it so as to maximise happiness or are thought to do so. That is a statement in sociological terms of all the unrest and dissatisfaction with political and economic organisation which is rife in the world today. It is necessary to make it in order to stress that this dissatisfaction is something over and above any direct unhappiness caused by maladministration itself. It is one thing to be hungry because their is no food, quite another to be hungry and know that simultaneously food is being deliberately destroyed. The second situation adds a sense of exasperation quite lacking in the first. Thus, even in a society in which the level of happiness is being raised, there will be frustration if

people think that the advance could be more rapid than is the case, or if they fail to recognise that any advance is being made.

In short, it is a condition of happiness that people shall feel that the purposes of society coincide with their own individual purposes.[1]

I would like it to be quite clear what this means. It does not mean that society must be perfectly organised so as to meet man's needs: people recognise that organisation is imperfect and that circumstances are frustrating. It does mean that people need to feel that society is getting somewhere, that it is making *progress towards* improving its organisation and conquering circumstances, with the object of raising their happiness. Thus, this condition of happiness does not raise the issue of what is the ideal economic and political organisation, but merely the issue of whether the government has got a proper grip of the situation.

It is, nevertheless, a condition of the utmost importance, because on it the whole cohesion of society depends. People will not desert their society merely because conditions are bad, but they will desert it, or make violent attempts to reconstruct it, if they think it is not coping effectively with these circumstances. That society should be stable and cohesive is, of course, a fundamental condition of happiness. Our own society is so marked by this sort of frustration and its cohesion is so seriously threatened in consequence, both on the national and the international scale, that the subject demands discussion in much more detail than is possible here. I propose, therefore, to defer the whole matter to another book, under the title *Theory of Social Collapse.*

One thing, however, may be said. Maladministration of society is not due simply to defective techniques. It is also due to ill-will, to selfish and unco-operative behaviour on the part of individuals. Societies develop various devices for restraining this kind of selfishness—such as the withdrawal of public approval or ostracism, as already mentioned, and others of a more

[1] The significance of function, status and purpose is brilliantly analysed by Peter Drucker in *The End of Economic Man*, 1939.

obscure nature—but these devices cannot cope with more than a small amount of unco-operativeness. The final basis of social cohesion is co-operativeness, in other words, the ability to feel affectionately and generously towards other people.

VI *Conditions of Happiness*

Let us now try and sum up all the considerations we have discussed so far: let us try and tabulate the conditions of happiness in order that we can test various societies against this standard in the chapters which follow.

Since affection is the mainspring equally of social cohesion and of the individual's psychic life, the cardinal condition which a culture must satisfy is that it should foster the production of responsive personalities and provide suitable opportunities for the expression of their affective impulses. It must thwart their legitimate aspirations as little as possible while restraining them from developing illegitimate aspirations.

In short, the first tests we must apply to any culture are: does it provide outlets for affection and for mastery? Does it foster the creation of sound basic personalities? Secondly, we can ask: does it assist the individual to meet his physical needs? Thirdly, does it assist him to obtain security without sacrifice of variety?

But from these tests, which measure the society in terms of a single individual, we must turn to tests in terms of its own structure. We must ask: is the culture functional? Is it integrated or internally cohesive and consistent? Does it provide its members with function and status? Does it meet their purposes? Finally, we must measure it with especial care against an absolute scale of values: its values must be wise, consistent and durable. Since values reflect the basic personality, this brings us back to our starting point, the customs which condition personality.

In applying these standards we must never forget that they are abstractions from real-life situations. Each practical issue must be measured separately against all the conditions. Work,

for instance, provides man with far more than the means of satisfying his material needs. It gives him function and status; security and purpose; opportunities for mastery and the exchange of affection. It is conditioned by customs and institutions and dominated by certain values. When we say in ordinary life, analysing the situation in familiar terms, that full employment is a condition of happiness, we imply all this. And until we understand the full complexity of the numerous conditions of happiness implied in any such practical issue, we cannot even begin to devise suitable organisations in the political and economic fields.

The method of analysis used here is thus one which takes place in a different dimension from the more familiar analysis in terms of institutions. In applying our conditions we must apply them to every kind of institution and activity throughout the societies we examine.

Part Two

DIAGNOSIS

VIII

CONTEMPORARY UNHAPPINESS

I Characteristics of Industrial Society—II Mastery in the Modern World—III Physical Needs in the Modern World—IV Emotional Needs in the Modern World—V Modern Life and the Oceanic Feeling—VI Consistency and Variety in the Modern World—VII Self-Determination in the Modern World—VIII Social Cohesion—IX Our Defective Institutions

I *Characteristics of Industrial Society*

WE are now in a position to assess contemporary industrial society against the standards we have evolved and thus to find out—not, indeed, whether it is happy, for we know it is not—but where the roots of its unhappiness lie.

It will help us to trace the sources of modern unhappiness if we first consider very briefly what are the most characteristic features of industrial civilisation.

Probably the first thing which would strike a visitor from the eighteenth century would be the enormous increase in the *density of population* and, in particular, the concentration of millions of people into huge cities and 'conurbations.' At the same time great tracts of countryside, formerly common land, have been enclosed and converted into private property. The result is that it is now very difficult or even impossible for men to engage in the sort of out-of-door activities which have been customary for thousands of years. Except for a few wealthy men, and for such limited outlets as walking and fishing, physical activity must take the form of organised sport in which a comparatively large number of men obtain exercise in a comparatively small area of land. A second result is that people are brought into much closer contact, and so their power of injuring one another is increased. Consequently, there has been a great growth of regulations designed to reduce such interference.

A man who lets his house catch on fire in the country injures only himself; in the town he endangers others.

This unparalleled crowding together of humanity has many other consequences, but these are the two which matter most in the present context: first, the cutting off of habitual physical activities and, second, the vastly increased power of people inadvertently to annoy, injure and obstruct their fellows.

The second highly characteristic feature of modern society is a dual one: the ever-increasing *specialisation* and *mechanisation* of work, including both the constructive and the administrative aspects. It must be stressed that specialisation and mechanisation are distinct processes: it is possible to have specialisation without mechanisation and vice versa. Specialisation is the consequence of the growing complexity and scale of industrial and administrative operations which have become too large for a single man to handle. Mechanisation is the result of having cheap power available.

Because of specialisation the modern worker does not, as did his forebears, carry through an undertaking from start to finish, whether alone or co-operatively: such an undertaking as making a chair or gathering in a harvest. Instead he handles only some tiny fragment of the process. And because of mechanisation he may use no more effort than is needed to pull a lever or depress a key—although many strenuous tasks still remain.

The third thing on which our imaginary visitor would certainly comment should perhaps be listed as a derivative of mechanisation: I mean the great *development of communications*. This has had the effect of bringing people into closer contact and so reinforces the effects of the increase in population density. The economic and political significance of modern communications has been copiously commented on, but much less has been said about their effect in mixing and modifying cultural patterns.[1]

Fourthly, he would certainly notice a huge *disparity in wealth*. Today we are impressed with the rise in the income of the poorer classes, but we must remember that in the

[1] See, e.g. E. Staley, *World Economy in Transition*, and H. G. Wells, *passim*.

nineteenth century the living standards of the poor were forced down far below those of the previous century: especially is this true if we take into consideration the toll of long hours and degraded surroundings, the disruption of family life and the growth of disease. Today the poorest classes have barely recovered the ground lost,[1] while the richer members of the population are able to command luxuries inconceivably more elaborate than any available even to kings in the past. By this I do not mean merely that the millionaire commands novel products—television sets and motor cars—which were not available to mediæval kings, but that they command the product of a greater number of hours of skilled labour, however used.

Another thing he would notice would be the emergence of a clear-cut *distinction between work and leisure*—and the employment of part of this leisure for self-education in the widest sense of the term, i.e. for reading, travel, etc.

The list might be extended very easily, but these few main trends will give us the background we need.

II *Mastery in the Modern World*

Let us start our diagnosis by considering the effect of these changes on the satisfaction of mastery drives. Mastery, it may be pointed out, occupies a position of particular importance in our culture in consequence of the relatively strict sexual morality which still persists. For, as Unwin's monumental study showed, sexual energy is converted into constructive social energy when its normal outlet is restricted.[2]

It can hardly be denied that the general effect of industrialisation has been to decrease opportunities for mastery. The reader will recall that we drew a distinction between crude mastery—involving the moulding of physical material; personal mastery—dominance over people; and mastery of problems and ideas. Obviously, mechanisation has displaced many processes

[1] C. Clark, *National Income and Outlay*, 1938.
[2] J. D. Unwin, *Sex and Culture*, 1934.

involving crude mastery. The old-time baker mixed and moulded the flour with his hands; the modern loaf is made by machinery. The horse set the rider a bigger problem of control than does a car. Moreover, the overall effect of mechanisation is to reduce the number of people handling materials while increasing the number in clerical, administrative, distributive and other ancillary occupations, in which crude mastery is generally quite absent.

Specialisation has also been responsible for reducing mastery, since people now purchase many services they formerly performed for themselves. The cook buys tinned foods; the traveller goes by train instead of riding; the housewife buys ready-made clothes instead of making her own.

Carpentry affords a convenient instance of a rather more elaborate form of mastery in which several processes of crude mastery are combined in a creative task, the latter coming under the heading of constructive mastery. By buying his wood cut and planed the modern jobbing carpenter sacrifices much of the crude mastery while still retaining the creative element. If, however, he enters the employ of a large cabinet-maker, where he is required to turn out chairs of a standard pattern, the element of idea-mastery vanishes; while if he is reduced to specialising in a single process the creative element vanishes entirely.

It is true that modern industrialism has given as well as taken away in the sphere of idea-mastery: the wide range of technical problems and new devices has created a flood of new creative and constructive problems. This, however, is in the nature of a short-term effect. The long-term trend is to standardise the design of these devices and submit them to the division of labour method until they, too, have become lifeless. Even such an operation as tracing a fault in a radio-set, which might be thought to offer an interesting challenge to ingenuity, has already been reduced to a routine.

Closely allied with the concept of mastery is that of *creativity*. While industrialism destroys the creative element in productive work, potentially it makes possible a vast increase in creative

activity during the rest of the day. Millions of people who, in primitive times, would have been obliged to labour long hours for a pittance can now afford the time and energy to follow some creative activity in their leisure. The ease with which knowledge can be spread today is also a favourable factor. Yet in point of fact we notice that the mass of people today spend their leisure being distracted by sport, gambling, the cinema and other entertainments which call for no personal participation—being urged to such behaviour by all the arts of advertising. In addition, a host of small household jobs of a mildly creative character has been handed over to paid employees or specialists. Few people still design their own clothes, and it has even become customary, among those who can afford it, to leave so personal a matter as the decorative scheme of their house to professionals.

The subject of creativity leads to that of beauty, or, more generally, harmony. No one, I suppose, would dare to claim that the modern urban environment is particularly beautiful, while it is also generally admitted that industrialism has ravaged great areas of the countryside with suburban development, to say nothing of defiling beauty spots with mines, quarries, power-stations and other undertakings.[1] In addition, extensive farming methods (as practised in the U.S. and the dominions) do not contribute to the beauty of the countryside. The mechanised society has, certainly, produced some novel forms of beauty (even if by accident, as in the much-quoted case of the high-speed monoplane), but these are not sufficiently numerous to transform the environment. Perhaps it comes nearest to a praiseworthy achievement in the interior of the home, where new standards of design have been applied to old problems and where so many new materials are now available for decorative purposes; but uncultured taste has generally succeeded in carrying the result at some expense to a lower artistic level than the inexpensive interior of mill or farmhouse. Clearly, industrial society fails to meet man's needs for mastery and creative activity.

[1] C. Williams-Ellis, *Beauty and the Beast*, 1937.

III *Physical Needs in the Modern World*

So far modern society has scored low marks—but if there is one sphere in which it might reasonably hope to claim a success, presumably it is in the matter of meeting man's physical needs.

As we all know, science has practically vanquished the forces which endangered man's food supply and has gone far to weaken those which threatened his health, while industrialism has iced the cake by placing at the disposal of the ordinary citizen a far wider range of material goods than ever before. But starvation and disease, driven out by one door, have crept back by another.

Though average crop yields per acre were higher than ever in history, more than half the pre-war population of Britain was suffering from some degree of under-nutrition.[1] Mysterious economic and social forces had nullified the agrobiologists' and geneticists' gifts. The ignorant savage starves when harvests are bad. It has taken western ingenuity to discover how to starve when they are good.

Similarly, while medical science and sanitation were busy vanquishing major diseases, crowded urban living conditions were increasing the toll of ill-health by imposing new strains on the town dweller—continuous noise, insufficient sunlight, impure air.

The effect of such factors is largely concealed by our habit of treating as healthy anyone who is not incapable or suffering from a diagnosable disease. If we turned our attention to the general low physical tone which marks most members of an urban population the picture would look very different. The Peckham Health Centre has found that fewer than 10 per cent. of its members are in perfect health.[2] Experimental work on these sub-critical factors is fragmentary, but we are beginning to know something about the serious effects of deprivation of ultra-violet light, such as is effected by the foggy atmosphere

[1] Sir J. B. Orr, *Food, Health and Income*, 1937.

[2] Pearse and Crocker, *The Peckham Experiment*, 1939. See also Scott-Williamson and Pearse, *Biologists in Search of Material*, 1947, especially the section on devitalisation in which two forms, hypotonia and dystrophy, are identified.

of cities and by an indoor habit. The very real effect that light can have on health is suggested by experiments with the soya-bean which becomes a sturdy herb, when grown in a blue-violet light, but a delicate twining vine when grown in a red-yellow one.[1]

Attention is also being turned to noise. Measurement of noise in city streets has shown it to attain the appalling level of 90 decibels, about as loud as the roaring of a lion at a distance of 25 feet. Before industrialism, few people heard a noise of such volume in the whole course of their lives.

As Simmel observed half a century ago: 'With every crossing of the street, with every fluctuation in the tempo and variety of domestic, professional and commercial life, there arises in the perceptual foundations of the personality a deep cleavage with the slow, habitual, smooth-flowing rhythm of the psycho-physical structure of life in the small town or countryside.'[2]

Modern technology has also introduced new industrial diseases, and, together with modern transport, has enormously added to the dangers of death or mutilitation. In addition to new diseases, it has vastly increased the death rates from familiar ones. Thus the death rate from chronic interstitial pneumonia among Welsh anthracite miners and among sandstone quarrymen at the last census was about 150 times that among agricultural labourers.[3] And as is well known, industrial conditions evoke a rapid rise in the incidence of cancer.

Specialisation also contributes to poor health since it compels people to use a single set of muscles continuously, and perhaps to sit in a cramped position. This is almost certainly a causative factor in rheumatism.[4] Furthermore, the skeleton may become warped in an effort to meet the demands thrown on it. Lane

[1] H. W. Popp, *Contribs. from Boyce-Thompson Institute for Plant Research.* I, 1929, 241.

[2] Quoted by N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life*, 1931, from Simmel, 'Die Groszstaedte and das Geistesleben' in K. Bucher, *et al.*: *Die Groszstadt*, Dresden, 1903. (Translation abridged and freely rendered.)

[3] Registrar-General's Report on *Occupational Mortality*, 1938.

[4] *Report of British Rheumatism Council*, 1939.

reports such permanent changes as fusion of the intervertebral discs among those carrying heavy weights.[1] Such changes always shorten life.

Pre-industrial man, compelled to take frequent and violent physical exercise, sweated freely and compensated with a large intake of fluid so that there was a steady 'turnover' in his body's water content. Similarly, spells of effort on short commons periodically forced him to mobilise his reserves of body fat. In eliminating such emergencies, civilised life has modified fundamental processes of bodily metabolism. This is quite probably a factor contributory to the city-dweller's indifferent health.

An aspect of the health situation which might equally be dealt with under the rubric of emotional life, is that of sexual potency. The matter is still imperfectly investigated, but it has been claimed that impotence and frigidity are on the increase in the civilised world. Where the causation is psychological, it can often be traced to the effect of our unnatural sexual ethic on the upbringing of children, but physical causes are also suspected. There is also some evidence that urban life increases the difficulty of childbirth.

IV *Emotional Needs in The Modern World*

That modern society does not meet our emotional needs is obvious enough from the frequency of neurosis and psychosis, from the high proportion of unsuccessful marriages, and from the many bigoted and ruthless individuals we see around us. But it would be an exaggeration to suggest that industrial civilisation is unique in this respect. Many other contemporary cultures and many periods in the past of our own culture have been unsatisfactory from the emotional point of view. Besides, there is a marked difference between the emotional life of today and that of the last century. In some respects it has improved, in others grown worse.

To analyse the emotional life of our time in detail would

[1] Sir W. A. Lane, *Acquired Deformities*, 1900.

require, at the least, a whole book. Here the most we can do is to indicate the main factors and see how far modern conditions are favourable to them.

Any such analysis must approach the subject from two angles. First, it must seek to show how far society tends to produce a personality capable of affection; secondly, how far social institutions favour the establishment of enduring emotional relations. Personalities which are practically incapable of any emotional response are rather common in our society and some degree of emotional anæsthesia affects the majority of us. As this fact is at the bottom of nearly all our troubles, I propose to discuss it at some length in Chapter X, under the heading of the Industrial Personality. At this point I shall deal only with the barriers which modern society places in the way of those who are reasonably capable of forming emotional relationships.

I will deal, first of all, with the affection and respect which normally develop between individuals of either sex who come into close association and not of such specialised relationships as marriage.

The conditions for the development of such feeling are that we should meet other people and that we should meet them sufficiently often to form some conception of them as individuals. Various institutions have been devised for the purpose but none is so effective as co-operation in a common project. It is there that we learn to know the true value of people and to discount the oddities of character which flaw the surface of their personalities.

The primitive in-group provided an unsurpassed example of this type of association. Not only did it engage in common tasks, such as harvesting, but it spent many of its leisure hours together, meeting for marriages, funerals and festive occasions. Such groups develop strong internal cohesion. We may find a modern instance in the ship's crew, or the members of a regiment or school who continue to meet long after the functional purpose for which they were gathered together has vanished. Hardly less effective, is the small, unmechanised undertaking in which people work together in conditions which favour a

certain amount of co-operation and social intercourse. Some semi-intellectual activities fall into this category: thus, the members of a research laboratory often develop a corporate feeling due to mutual knowledge and understanding.

In sharp contrast stands the modern factory, in which extreme specialisation has reduced co-operation to zero and where noise and separation of workers generally preclude social exchanges. A recent refinement of ingenuity applicable where there is no mechanical noise, is to flood the workroom with dance music, which virtually prevents conversation and induces a mildly hypnotic state in which the rhythmic movements of modern industry can be performed more smoothly and untiringly, with suitable effects on output; the effects on the personality are disregarded. The object is achieved by suspending the worker's attention to the external world and almost certainly contributes to his dependence on fantasy and his need for distraction in his (or her) leisure.

The factory, however, is not the only sphere in which social contacts have been minimised. The bus-driver, the airplane pilot, the linotype operator, the lift attendant, the man on the pneumatic drill is temporarily as isolated from his fellow men as if he were a Trappist monk.

In the primitive community, in contrast, the worker was not often separated from associates for any considerable period. Even in the fields, in the pre-mechanical era, people went sowing and reaping in considerable groups. Today, a single man on a tractor can handle an entire field, alone. In primitive society, too, the worker was not necessarily separated from his family and friends while at work. The modern worker travels to a factory where he spends the day away from home. Again, the big city affords a strange isolation in which it is possible for a person to spend months without forming a friend—a fact which is a commonplace of experience. The village or small town is potentially more friendly, even though hard material conditions sometimes create an embittered type of individual, who nullifies, by his personal animosity, the benefits of the village's lack of social separation.

Certainly, the improvement of communications does not favour the establishment and growth of enduring relationships. Relationships grow during prolonged association, but, as Chapman has stressed,[1] the needs of modern industry have forced on people a greater mobility than is natural to them—and war, of course, does still more to disrupt relationships. Today we tend to form more numerous but much shallower friendships. Human relationships are cemented by shared experience, but the atomistic character of modern life forces us to undergo some of our most pregnant experiences in emotional isolation.

Nor does our civilisation provide wholly adequate outlets for the need to serve others. The craftsman making an essential piece of domestic or agricultural equipment can feel that he is serving the community, as can the workers in certain basic industries, but nowadays a great proportion of the population is engaged in activities of dubious social value, some of which are actually anti-social in their effects. This not only thwarts the need to serve but undermines a man's self-respect.

This brings us to the subject of status, since functional status depends on the social value of the individual's function. But the status system of European countries is largely hereditary, modified by the fact that status is associated with wealth. In America it is almost entirely based on wealth. As long as it is possible for any penniless individual to reach the top of the tree within his lifetime, a system of status based on wealth gives an illusion of being a functional system, but in advanced stages of industrialism the need for capital excludes all but a few newcomers, and the status system merges into the hereditary. Hence we may say that no industrial country satisfies the requirements in this respect.

From these general considerations I turn briefly to intensive relationships between two individuals. The first thing which strikes the anthropologist is that, in western society, such relationships are almost entirely confined to people of opposite sex. Unlike the Arabs, for instance, who regard friendship

[1] G. Chapman, *Culture and Survival*, 1940.

between two men as an experience of far greater depth and value than any which is possible between a man and a woman, we regard relationships between persons of the same sex with some suspicion and only approve them if they are extremely undemonstrative. We stress the element of respect and co-operation and minimise the element of love. The psychologist will hardly hesitate to explain this by reference to our fear of homosexuality. It is extremely hard to induce any member of a western society to recognise that the western attitude to relations between members of the same sex is quite irrational, even though it carries all the earmarks of a neurotic attitude—such as the immediate provoking of disproportionate anger, disgust and aggression.

Turning, next, to marriage and noting the number of marriages which are ridden with spite and aggression, we are justified in asking whether the marriage institution as it exists in the west is adequately designed. Modern western marriage (which we too often suppose to be the only possible form of marriage) is marked by three highly arbitrary beliefs. We think it should be based on romantic love, that it should be monogamous and that it should be lifelong. There are very obvious arguments for polygamy in any society in which the numbers of the two sexes are not equal. The length of time it endures should be a function of its effectiveness, provided the interests of any offspring are protected.

It is, however, the belief in the validity of romantic love—a belief which has only grown up in the last two centuries, and which still does not hold in many parts of Europe—which is the strangest feature of our emotional environment. Dispassionate examination shows that the violent infatuations which we call being 'in love,' rarely, if ever, endure unless they are thwarted. To marry on the strength of them means that when the passion burns out, two individuals often little suited to one another are left to start from scratch the erection of a more enduring relationship.

Just as in the case of ordinary friendship, perhaps more so, enduring affection is slowly built up out of shared experience,

co-operation in a common purpose and reciprocal help. We can blame the culture of western society for its failure to instruct adolescents in the nature of emotional relationships, and I think it is true to say that it is worse in this respect than most primitive cultures, and than most stages in its own previous history.

Nor is it rational to let people undertake the building of a complex structure without first trying their hands at more elementary ones. A period of experiment, such as many primitive societies allow to adolescents, is essential.

I suppose I need hardly say that this is not a plea for complete promiscuity before marriage. To say one objects to one extreme does not mean one should fly to the other. If experimental relationships are permitted—as they are in fact permitted—they should be governed by values, customs and even laws, designed to prevent abuses and maximise the good. To permit them a hole-and-corner existence without benefit of social sanctions or approved modes of conduct, is to get the worst of both worlds.

However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to say what we should do, but to point out the defects of what we do do. It can safely be said that our rigid and limited marriage institution looks singularly impoverished when seen against a background of the many and complex institutions which various societies have worked out at different times, and it is an intolerable conceit to suppose that we, of all people, should have found the only satisfactory solution, or even that the best solution for one set of conditions is necessarily the best for another. It can also safely be said that our high valuation of infatuation, our absence of training for marriage and our ignorance of the way in which sentiments are formed, are serious defects.

Finally, it might be said that it is a mistake to make marriage an absolute condition of sexual satisfaction. Not only does this thwart those who cannot find suitable mates, not only does it drive many into unsuitable marriages, but it gives to marriage itself the character of a primarily sexual relation, instead of making it a primarily emotional one.

This being so, it is not surprising that investigation of reasons

for the break-up of marriage relationships give a high place to failures of the sexual relationship,[1] whether this be due to ignorance (and thus to our rigid sexual taboos) or whether to frigidity or failure of potency.

v *Modern Life and the Oceanic Feeling*

It is hard to say whether or not modern life is badly adapted to producing that supreme emotional experience we have called the oceanic feeling, since we do not know with what frequency it occurred in the past or occurs in other cultures. Still, it seems that it comes most easily in vast lonely places and when the mind is empty of thought and free from the claims of immediate sensation. These conditions are not readily realised in modern society. One is perpetually surrounded by others, perpetually subject to trivial stimuli of noise and movement.[2] Moreover, a mechanised society demands a much more sustained attention to material things.

vi *Consistency and Variety in the Modern World*

Modern civilisation wears an ambiguous air when assessed from the standpoint of variety. By making possible the importation of distinctive products from all parts of the world, it has certainly greatly widened the range of goods available to the ordinary man. Also, by bringing many products, formerly luxuries, within the range of a modest purse, it has achieved a similar effect. Yet there is certainly a contrary trend at work. Mass-production methods tend towards similarity of product. We can get into a friend's car and find that in everything (except perhaps the colour) it is the replica of our own. Such an

[1] K. B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of* 2,200 Women, 1930.

[2] There is, perhaps, one case when this experience does not demand isolation and that is when a group of people are all simultaneously in a mood of empty attention, such as happens at a musical performance, at a religious service, or possibly at a public meeting at which great abstractions are propounded. In the latter case there is a serious danger that the mood may be misused by the orator, as in the case of many of Hitler's meetings.

experience would be exceptional if it were a sailing boat. On a more subtle level, there is the standardisation of taste implied in such words as fashion. The rapid dissemination of ideas and habits reduces the need for evolving one's own. Not, of course, that fashion is a modern invention, but today fashions are wider in range of influence. Media such as printing and the cinema impose fashions on an enormous area. Typical of the ugly monotony produced by modern industrialism is the monotonous regularity of nineteenth-century slums—a poor exchange for the variety and balance of an Elizabethan village or the dignity of a Georgian crescent.

Again, modern civilisation has made striking advances in the direction of freeing people from the vagaries of the environment. It has largely conquered the physical dangers of fire and flood, tempest and wild beast, which beset our ancestors. It has eliminated the famines which ate up their food supply. But simultaneously, it has introduced vastly more costly sources of insecurity. Economic conditions reintroduce the element of insecurity on a larger scale for if one is out of work not only one's food, but one's clothes, one's home, one's self-respect, one's status and all else are in jeopardy.

Then again, as already mentioned, modern industrial machinery and transport has greatly increased the risk of physical harm both to oneself and those one loves. The suburban mother, quite reasonably, is anxious whenever her children go out alone, just as the miner's wife is never quite free from anxiety when her husband is down the pit. Such anxieties go far to undo the advances which have been made in conquering disease and the precarious limitations we have placed on the power of oppression. Finally, it need hardly be said that modern total war represents a far more serious and widespread actual or potential threat to life and property than even the most destructive wars of the past.

No, we cannot say that the modern world offers a satisfactory degree of personal security. Underlying all these fears for personal security is the lack of emotional security, to which we have already referred.

To close this section I will mention one more form of emotional security whose origins are social rather than psychological: insecurity of status. As I argued in the preceding chapter, only functional status offers security combined with justice. Hereditary status at least had the advantage of offering security: though it was hard to move up it was equally hard to move down. Today, in western Europe, we have practically abandoned hereditary status in favour of the highly insecure form of status which is based on the accumulation of wealth.

VII *Self-Determination in the Modern World*

Finally, it must be noted that the mass society of today has greatly undermined man's power of self-determination. The era of 'free enterprise' seemed at one stage to be increasing the power of each individual man to determine his own life, but this was an illusion due to the fact that we thought exclusively in economic terms. In the event, each man has greatly reduced choice. He may choose which industry he will work in but in every one he is held to an eight (or nine, or ten) hour day, he is obliged to live in a vast city and spend a great part of his day in travel . . . and so on. He can do nothing about the vagaries of the trade cycle, he can do nothing about the spread of urban development, he can do nothing about the wars which are precipitated by the negotiations of remote officials. He sees a state department or a large business concern appropriate a tract of land and flood with water the village where he has been wont to live . . . The charge has been made so often by the opponents of socialism that its terms are tediously familiar. But the fact is that this charge can be levelled with equal or greater force at finance capitalism.

So-called private enterprise, actually the enterprise of vast public corporations, imposes its decisions on the private individual just as arbitrarily. It is realisation of this which has produced the so-called 'we-they' attitude in which a mysterious 'they' is saddled with the responsibility for all social decisions. And the attitude is wholly justifiable. It reflects the undoubted

fact that the ordinary man does not have any part in the decisions which determine the patterns of human life. The existence of the popular phrase 'just a cog in the machine' is good evidence of the general feeling of inability to control one's own life and the dismay this has caused.

VIII *Social Cohesion*

There is yet one more standard by which we may assess modern society, a standard which to some extent affects all those considered up to now, that of social cohesion. If society does not hold together, it inevitably fails in its task of enabling the individual member to satisfy his needs.

A glance at the world today shows that society has failed to achieve cohesion between nations and no arguments need be adduced to prove the point. Within each national society the picture is less clear, but it is nowhere very encouraging. The most evident split is between capital and labour. Each has been organised into a coherent body and the better the organisation of each group, the poorer the unity of society as a whole. From the viewpoint of society, the Federation of British Industries and the Trades Union Council are equally undesirable. In both Britain and America the two chief parties are able between them to command the confidence of the bulk of the nation, but in France, as in Germany after the first World War, it is practically impossible for any party to inspire sufficient confidence to enable it to carry on the task of administration, and disintegration becomes so marked that people look for a strong man to restore cohesion by dictatorial methods.

However, it is not only these organised and warring groups which threaten the cohesion of society, much more is it the element of the population which endeavours to get from society more than it contributes. This parasitism is not confined to the deserter, the spiv and the black-marketeer; all those who receive incommensurate rewards, those who buy cheap and sell dear, those who make an income without contributing to the welfare of society, the makers of worthless medicines and useless

gadgets, the sellers of food without nutritive value, literature without literary value, and publicity without public value, the speculators in stocks and shares, in goods and in land, the legislators who do not legislate and the councillors who do not counsel, the purveyors of hopeless hope and loveless love, all these bear witness to the failure of society to integrate many of those who live within its formal influence into its essential emotional structure.

As I have said, the anonymity of modern life has rendered the old social sanctions largely futile. And while on the one hand the anti-social individual is not known to those he victimises, and cannot (if he keeps the law) be ejected from the group, on the other many innocent people felt themselves unwanted by the group and so take to anti-social behaviour. Cohesion is further undermined when the individual sees rewards being distributed in a manner which is both unequal and unrelated to merit, and while this is by no means a new phenomenon, in a mechanised society it becomes more acute, since the much-enhanced total output of goods exaggerates the discrepancy, while improved communications and more general education make people more widely aware of the state of affairs.

IX *Our Defective Institutions*

To say that modern society does not provide outlets for emotion and mastery, does not ensure security and variety, fails to bestow function and status, is to accuse our institutions of being defective. If unemployment threatens an individual's supply of food, and his right to function and status, it is the institutions through which we give employment that are at fault. If mass-production thwarts his need for mastery and creative activity and condemns him to monotonous isolation, then it is the productive institution which is wrongly designed.

Why are the institutions of modern society so extraordinarily badly designed as to produce all the evils we have catalogued in the earlier part of this chapter? Why has this period, more than any other, achieved such a remarkable low?

Three reasons spring to mind, the first is the rapid obsolescence of traditional institutions owing to the mechanisation of production and communication. Hand in hand with this goes the short-sighted way in which we have designed new institutions to replace the old.

Man, thanks to his power of appreciating the total configuration (gestalt) of any situation, when devising institutions to meet his needs, instinctively models them to meet *all* his needs, or at the least, to do violence to none. Thus marriage, though primarily connected with the task of reproduction, is so planned as to provide companionship, and emotional outlets. It is also an effective economic arrangement (division of labour and pooling of risk) increasing security and variety. It also plays its part in the integration of the community and so on. Similarly, the productive task, when planned by primitive man, though primarily designed to meet physical needs, also offered outlets for mastery, for physical exercise and for creativity. It yielded social contacts and introduced an element of variety and was often so organised as to increase security (e.g. it may be organised on a collective basis).

Modern man, however, approaches the productive problem not instinctively, but consciously. He is aware of the primary purpose but not of the subsidiary functions. Accordingly he proceeds to reorganise the institution so as to serve the prime purpose better, unaware that he is destroying its secondary functions. This is particularly true of the productive process. The whole trend of factory management, of what is called rationalisation, is to adopt any measure which will increase output, regardless of other consequences. Hence the employer does not hesitate to introduce mechanisation, being uninterested in the fact that it diminishes mastery, he does not hesitate to introduce standardisation, being uninterested in the fact that it reduces creativity and variety, he does not hesitate to introduce specialisation, being uninterested that it makes still further inroads on both. Furthermore, he tries to reduce the pauses which used to be filled with idle gossip and to fill them with work, not caring that contact with other workers is a

primary source of satisfaction for the human being, nor feeling that it is morally undesirable to ask anyone to spend eight hours without contact with his fellow creatures. With the same object he brings the task to the worker, rather than to let the worker seek the task, thus reducing both the worker's opportunities to relax his attention and his working muscles, his opportunity to take some general exercise, and his opportunity to exchange the time of day with other workers.

All this occurs because men ceased to evolve methods of behaviour instinctively and approached them rationally. Unfortunately their knowledge of what they were doing was more fragmentary than they supposed. They little suspected the complexity of the life processes they were so confidently tampering with.

Realisation of this fact enables us to begin to shape a dynamic theory of history. The moving force is man's attempt to deal with his problems rationally. In the primitive state society is regulated by powerful, unseen forces which, though they do not always ensure happiness, at least maintain cohesion and prevent total collapse. Primitive society resembles a tree. If it grows in an unfavourable position exposed to gales, parched by the sun, in sandy soil, it will become stunted and distorted in its attempts to keep alive, but in that one aim it will succeed as long as it is physically possible, for all other considerations are subordinated to it. Modern man, ignoring the unseen forces, attempts to deal with the situation rationally. It is as if he should attempt to force the tree to grow tall and straight. Comes the gale, and it is snapped and splintered. He does not know all the factors at work in the situation he dares to remodel. He is more ignorant than he believes.

Modern history (and ancient history, too, I believe) is a story of man's wilful and ignorant interference with social and life processes in an attempt to gain some possibly quite desirable end, with the result that he brings about the death of the culture which he is trying to modify.

The third reason is more fundamental. It is that our values are defective. The fact that when we design an institution for

productive work we suppress all its other functions in favour of its productive function argues that we regard this as the most important function. It is a materialistic valuation. The fact that men are prepared to sacrifice time which might have been spent in comparative freedom in some open-air activity to work in a factory for higher pay, shows that they value that pay, and the goods which they can buy, higher than the freedom. It may be true that, now the system is established, many of them have little choice. But once they did have the choice, and they took it, they left their farms and flocked to the factories. That it was possible at one stage to refuse is shown by the men of Harris and Lewis, who refused to work in Lord Leverhulme's factory at Stornoway and obstinately stayed on their crofts.

The fundamental question therefore is what has happened to our personalities, that we have adopted material values? What has happened to us? To this question I shall recur in the next chapter but one, when I shall also consider the unconscious causes of unhappiness in modern society. But first I have some more to say about the overt aspects of the problem.

IX

VICIOUS CIRCLE

Substitute Satisfactions—II Demand for Distractions

I *Substitute Satisfactions*

WHAT I now have to say seems to me so important that it merits the dignity of a chapter to itself, even though it can be said in a few words.

As the urbanisation and mechanisation of life proceeds, the drives which are being thwarted find release, to an even greater extent, in *substitute forms*. For instance, whereas in the natural society the need for exercise is met in an incidental manner in the course of performing daily tasks, in the industrial society it is met chiefly by rather highly organised sports, or even in an absolutely direct form, such as Swedish drill, the use of rowing machines, dumbbells and other exercises, or still less functionally by recourse to Turkish baths and massage. The distinction is not quite absolute of course: the non-industrial society has its sports, to be sure, but they are performed for pleasure, not as a duty. On the other hand, the modern citizen often plays squash, gardens, or walks primarily for the good of his health, and only secondarily for pleasure.

The instance of sport is a very simple one, but much the same is true of more subtle needs. For instance, the primitive man exerts his mastery in activities of direct value to himself and the community—his skill as a doctor or farmer and so forth. The industrial man, whose functional activities are largely automatised, must find substitute outlets for mastery in such activities as tennis or driving a high-powered car: or, if his need is for mastery at more subtle levels, by building himself a radio sèt, playing cards, running a model railway or solving a crossword puzzle.

Such activities are at least first-hand: a lower level of substitution is reached when people try to fulfil their vital needs by proxy, as in watching football, cricket or boxing matches or other contests, or through books, radio and cinema. I do not suggest for a minute that there is anything wrong in these activities as such; just as with alcoholic drinks, it is wholly a question of how they are used. There is no harm, but much good in watching sporting contests as a supplement to engaging personally in them. The danger comes when vicarious sport is wholly substituted for personal participation. The difference between these two attitudes is quite clear. The man who himself performs, when he stops to watch others, is primarily concerned to study technical skill and perhaps to enjoy the beauty of the movements involved; he is rarely interested in the question of who wins. In contrast, the onlooker who is using the game as a substitute for the outlet of mastery impulses is first and foremost a partisan. He is much more concerned who wins than how. This attitude reaches its extreme in the bettor who does not even attend the contest and whose interest is solely in the outcome.

Such contests may, of course, be used for the outlet of aggression, in which case the amount of violence inflicted becomes the primary consideration, rather than the outcome. This naturally applies chiefly to sports involving violence, such as boxing and all-in wrestling.[1]

The tremendous contemporary trend towards substitute experience is nowhere more obvious than in the case of the cinema, and here similar considerations apply. When the cinema is used as a clue towards the meaning of life or a means of assisting the assimilation of real experience (which is often too complex and too overwhelming to absorb at the time)—that is, when it is used as an art—it is of the utmost value. But that is

[1] Even the apparently innocuous sport of rowing can be utilised for such purposes. In a case known to the writer, it was used by a seriously-maladjusted woman as an outlet for death-wishes against the male sex. She would station herself opposite the winning post because, as she would gleefully say, she 'liked to see them flop.'

not how it is used by 99 per cent. of those who visit it today. It is used as a substitute for emotional experience, and for discovery about the world of personal relationships, more particularly sexual experience and sexual relationships. The parallel between the 'pin-up' photos which plaster the walls of the lonely, sex-starved soldier and the pictures of male film-stars which adorn the walls of the adolescent girl is too obvious to need stressing. Yet it would betray a lack of perception to interpret the impulse as wholly or even primarily sexual; it is the desire for companionship in its full sense which motivates these actions, not unmixed with a desire for the ideal.

The flapper's bedroom also displays photos of the female stars, which betray that identification is taking place. Thus the cinema becomes a vicarious source of prestige and admiration. Correspondingly, the male cinema-addict, identifying himself with the cowboy or gangster hero, finds a substitute outlet for his mastery impulses and a vicarious access to status. The great importance of the cinema as a mastery outlet is betrayed, I think, by the acute comment of Seldes that the unique attraction of moving pictures is that they move: pure movement being *per se* exciting, irrespective of its purpose.[1] The explanation, no doubt, is that crude mastery impulses can only be expressed through movement.

It has been suggested that another function of the cinema is to provide a spillway for aggression and this it does both by providing villains on to whom aggression can be displaced and by providing heroes with whom the onlooker can identify himself. But such substitute outlets are not to be placed in the same class as direct, overt action and leave behind much undischarged aggression which, in a simpler society, might have been usefully worked off in sport or constructive activity.

Social workers have tended to see in the cinema little more than a means of escape from a too-crowded home or a sordid environment into warmth, comfort, spaciousness and relative privacy. While not denying the force of these motives, I am convinced that the insistent attraction of the cinema rests on

[1] G. Seldes, *Movies for the Million*, 1937.

something much more positive. It is not just to escape something but to obtain something that the cinemagoer pays his mite.

These remarks apply in slightly lesser degree to the radio and to escapist literature. Not, as a matter of fact, that I would sweepingly condemn even escapism. In moderation it is harmless, even therapeutic in its effects. But however delightful as an occasional indulgence, as a regular diet—like caviare—it becomes disgusting to any normally-constituted person. To demand it continuously betrays the existence of a perversion of normal personality.

II *Demand for Distractions*

The discussion has brought us to a point where we must consider a manifestation uniquely characteristic of urban industrialism, the need for *distraction.* The majority of modern spare-time activities are distinguished by the passivity of the person taking part. He sits in his chair and is distracted by the efforts of others, without contributing anything himself. In contrast, the amusements of a less sophisticated people generally demand a high degree of active participation. It is perfectly true that a certain proportion of spectatorship occurs even in primitive peoples; what we have to explain is the emergence of distractions to a dominant position, and the fact that they have invaded a much larger proportion of the day—even the working hours, in the case of many factory workers, who are now regaled with dance music while they work.

This is partly of necessity, since the city-dweller cannot easily find space for vigorous activities, but the principal reason is to be found, I suggest, in that word 'distract.' To distract signifies to divert the attention from something. From what? Doubtless from the gnawing dissatisfaction which springs (did people but know it) from the frustration of their deepest needs. The factory worker demands dance music because her work is so tedious, provides so little opportunity for initiative, mastery and skill, that her mind is empty and bored. Into the cinema go,

among others, those who can find 'nothing to do at home.' To point out that there are books to read and concerts on the radio is no answer, because it is emotional relationships that the individual needs. The blame lies with the social conditions and the psychological weaknesses which make it difficult for him to construct such relations in the real world.

It would be easy to extend the catalogue of substitute satisfactions to much greater length. It is tempting to analyse the daily Press in terms of distractive emotional experience, or to demonstrate how such distractions represent an attempt to combat the deadly monotony of much of modern life. But the argument is already clear. So let us consider, instead, just what such substitutes mean in terms of happiness.

The first point to stress is that these substitute satisfactions are never as fully satisfying as the originals. First-order substitutes, such as engaging in sports and pastimes, are devoid of the sense of purpose and the essential rewards of primary mastery activities. The man who builds himself a home in the backwoods has made a major step towards securing his own comfort and even continued existence, and that of his family. The man who builds a rabbit-hutch enjoys these gains in diminished form: he has the benefit of the physical exercise and skill and has something to show for his pains, even if it is of relatively minor value in his scheme of life. But the man who, without even a back garden, is reduced to building a model of the town hall from match sticks is wholly deprived of such basic satisfactions; his action hardly brings him any nearer in his life objectives.

Similarly, the man who defeats a living enemy has won a more satisfying victory than the man who beats an opponent at tennis, and a still more satisfying victory than the man who beats an opponent at throwing dice, while the man who merely watches a boxer (a second-order substitute, i.e. watching a person engaged in first-order substitute combat), is even less satisfied. Nervous excitement may, indeed, rise to a higher pitch during the conflict, but the permanent achievement, the furthering of major life-objectives, is totally absent. Third-

order substitutes, watching an actor simulate a cowboy winning a combat, do more to arouse awareness of the need than to satisfy it.

The second characteristic of the trend towards substitutes—and this cannot be too strongly emphasised—is that it is self-propagating. The more life becomes industrialised, the more difficult it is to enjoy primary satisfactions. The more we turn to manufactured substitutes the more we foster the growth of the industrial machine. In this way a vicious spiral of industrialisation and substitution is established leading us further and further away from true happiness.

The great bulk of the goods produced by the industrial machine today would never be needed if there were no industrial machine.

If there were no industrial machine, there would be no urbanisation. If there were no urbanisation, there would be no need for the bulk of surburban transport and communications, and for the complex machinery of substitute satisfaction. Without the bulk of the railways, buses, cinemas, radio factories, cars, telephones, printing presses, cameras, etc., capital industry would be greatly reduced in size. We could probably produce all the goods we really need for a satisfactory existence, including a sane proportion of the aforesaid mechanical devices with about four hours of labour a day, or alternatively three full days a week, which would enable us in the other hours not, indeed, to do nothing, but to produce many of such goods as are wanted by individual processes of craftmanship which contribute to personal happiness. Such processes would not scorn the use of machinery, but they would reject the second-order division of labour which deprives the workman of the satisfaction of being the unitary maker of the finished goods.

The crazy use we make of our productive effort is well shown by the case of photographic cameras. American manufacturers estimate that, on the average, the buyer of a camera exposes six spools of film and then loses interest.[1] A study of prints made by any professional developing and printing service shows

[1] Privately communicated.

that an infinitesimal proportion are of any lasting interest. The majority are photographs of people, often casual acquaintances, and most of the rest are views of places visited, much inferior in quality to the postcards which could be bought by anyone interested in retaining a memento.

It must be clearly understood that I am not asserting that to own a camera and take such photographs does not give *any* pleasure to the person concerned: obviously it does. I am not even suggesting that, in our society, any *single* individual would be well advised to refrain from pleasures of this type, because he cannot, merely by refraining gain access to the other sort of satisfactions which are sacrificed by an industrial society. What I am saying is that if *everyone* would agree to use a very much smaller number of such devices, it would be possible to remodel society in such a way as greatly to increase other forms of satisfaction, and there would be a mighty profit in happiness when the gains were balanced against the losses. Looked at solely from the viewpoint of the number of hours of labour involved, and ignoring the indirect costs of industrial civilisation, it is questionable whether the average person gets a happiness-profit from the purchase of a camera. A good camera represents many hundreds of hours of labour: the buyer must have put in a comparable number of hours of work to obtain the money to buy it (modified, naturally, by the relative size of his salary to that of the men making the camera). Given a straight choice between taking those hours as leisure or working and getting the camera, quite a few people would choose the leisure.

But that is not the choice to which I am directing attention. I am saying that by giving up the general availability of all these costly mechanical toys, we could so enormously reduce the output of our industrial machine, effecting all sorts of incidental savings in reduced transport and other services, that it would be possible to remodel society so as to make life vastly more satisfying; and by so doing we should effect still further gains, because we should reduce crime, ill health and the need for distractions, enabling us to dispense with most of our police,

and legal experts, some of our doctors, nurses and psychiatrists, and all our mass-entertainment employees.

All these mechanical toys are, to be sure, valuable when used aright. The telephone is a boon when it brings the doctor to a lonely bedside. But once we instal a telephone service people start to use it for gossiping over, and so the whole telephone system grows, demanding millions of man-hours and woman-hours of our precious time and labour.

The industrial pattern therefore commits two errors. It teaches people to try and satisfy their needs by buying things. Thus, the assertion that the best people own such and such a make of car is, from the sociological viewpoint, an attempt to persuade people to base status on ownership of goods. And, let us not forget, it succeeds in its aim. Once a community begins to reckon status in this way then ownership of goods becomes the indubitable road to status, and the status-seeking individual is obliged to follow it. Similarly with fashion. Once it has been established that a girl who does not wear silk stockings or lipstick is a frump, then any girl who does not is at a very real social disadvantage. The truth of this was well illustrated during the war.

But in a community totally without silk stockings, lack of them is no disadvantage. Thus the introduction of silk stockings to a stockingless community ultimately benefits no one, but saddles everyone with the task of producing the required number of silk stockings. In this way industrial civilisation has saddled itself with a farrago of 'needs' all of them real enough to the individual but collectively more or less futile.[1]

We are all busy producing goods, half of which we only need because we are so busy producing goods.

[1] This formulation throws a revealing shaft of light on the pretensions of economic science. Economics is rooted in the supposition that every human need can be legitimately expressed as a 'demand' and satisfied by a productive process. The possibility that the need would be better met by doing and not by buying is not considered. The fact that single institutions can satisfy several needs at once implies that an institution which satisfies only a single need may be undesirable, even though a 'demand' for it can be clearly demonstrated. The truth is, the science of economics, sensu stricto, has still to be formulated.

The second error of the industrial machine is to hold out to people the ultimate vision of an efficiency so great that all conceivable goods can be produced with the labour of a few hours a week, leaving the rest of the time free for 'leisure.' Such empty leisure would be intolerably vapid and boring. The object of life is not to do nothing but to do something—and, what is more, to do something which matters. The only sane use for such leisure is to employ it in establishing human relationships, and after this in producing things (and providing services) which are really needed by the methods which are most satisfying.[1]

To achieve such an end machinery is, of course, essential. Only by using it to do the tedious and dangerous jobs can we free men to do the interesting and creative ones. The only way in which we can spend a large part of our life in such pleasant constructive activity, and still have a reasonable standard of living, is if we use machinery to make up the total to the required level. This is no reactionary plea for a return to a sentimentally-conceived past. The past, though often psychologically satisfying, was also physically degrading for all but a favoured minority.

The error we make is to believe that every new technical process must be adopted automatically. Happiness will only come when society learns to pick and choose, adopting only those processes which can be made to serve the scheme of happiness and rejecting the rest.

[1] This definition does not, as might be thought, exclude such innocent recreations as, e.g., going on a picnic. On the contrary, this is an excellent example of meeting a basic need in an agreeable fashion.

X

INDUSTRIAL PERSONALITY

I Culture and Personality—II Formation of Personality—III Western Values as Causes—IV Basic Personality Structure—V Western Values as Effects—VI Western Culture

I *Culture and Personality*

So far it is in overt terms only that I have tried to analyse industrial culture, seeking to show how it directly frustrates our fundamental needs. But, as everyone knows, people may be unhappy even when external circumstances seem most promising. Sometimes such unhappiness is due to failure to make the best use of the available advantages, as when a rich woman spends her time in vapid activities because she cannot visualise the intensity of the satisfactions which are bought at the cost of discomfort and effort on the material level. But more often this mysterious unhappiness is irrational: it is due to 'psychological' doubts and fears.

In this chapter, therefore, I shall be concerned with this irrational kind of unhappiness, but I would like to preface the subject by stressing the connection between this kind of unhappiness and the one we have just been considering. Psychological unhappiness is not a special kind of unhappiness but runs straight back to the general human desire for love, approval and security. But instead of being concerned with real and tangible threats to approval and security it is concerned with imaginary ones—with illogical beliefs about not being loved and not being safe, based on false premises. Yet, though the threat is imaginary, the unhappiness is very real, just as real as the terror which assails the victim of the hallucinations of delirium tremens.

In fact, it may be the most important source of contemporary unhappiness. Probably much more of our unhappiness is due

to this sort of cause than we imagine: certainly most of the suicides and most of those who take refuge in drink, drugs and madness are accountable to it. Moreover, it is this which gives the real sting to overt frustrations. It is precisely when we have a neurotic sense of insecurity (for example) that we find real insecurity most intolerable.

Accordingly, the question we must now ask is: is our culture well designed to build sound personalities or is it likely to produce cultural neurosis?

To this end we must consider what effect industrialism has on the first experiences of the infant, those experiences which we designated as decisive for the formation of personality. We shall see that wherever industrialism flourishes much the same influences are brought to bear upon the infant. That is why we are entitled to speak of an *industrial personality structure*, regardless of whether it is Russia, Germany, Britain or the United States which we may have in mind in any instance. Since, however, every culture carries an enormous number of elements drawn from its pre-industrial phase, some of which are significant to the formation of personality, industrial personalities are not *ipso facto* identical. Fortunately for our purpose, the whole of Europe, the United States and the nearer parts of Russia have long exhibited considerable cultural unity. In particular they have embraced the same religion and have derived from it many similar values. Hence we can, without too much inaccuracy, speak of a 'western industrial personality' and treat it is an entity for purposes of discussion. Not that the word 'western' is entirely satisfactory, since this culture has also been carried to Australia and other parts of the world, but it is hard to think of a better.

Of course, only parts of the western cultural area are yet industrialised, so that the concept of 'western industrial personality' describes rather a pattern towards which we are rapidly moving, rather than a cross-section of the pattern which currently exists.

So much for preliminaries. Let us now consider the decisive infantile experiences.

II *Formation of Personality*

The child's first traumatic experiences, we said, are likely to be deprivation of affection or deprivation of nourishment, which it interprets as being a sign of lack of affection also.

Though western society does, in a general way, recognise the infant's imperious need for its mother's presence and affection, it can scarcely be denied that it subjects the infant to temporary separations on a relatively marked scale. Whereas the mothers of many primitive tribes carry their smallest baby around with them wherever they go, the western mother leaves it with a nurse, or even leaves it alone for considerable periods, while she is otherwise engaged. In particular, she leaves it when it is asleep, so that if it wakes it finds itself deserted. And though help usually comes in due course, this does little to mitigate the shock.

How little we really appreciate the child's need for affection is shown by the extraordinary fact that many hospitals forbid parents to visit hospitalised children except when they are asleep. (It was, as a matter of fact, a case of this sort which led Bowlby to notice the connection between separation from parents and the formation of the 'affectionless character.'[1])

If separation of this drastic kind is rare, to every child comes the shock of periodically remaining unfed when it is hungry, followed by the major experience of being weaned.[2]

In many primitive communities the mother or wet-nurse is always at hand and there is no taboo on publicly giving suck; frequently the breasts are not concealed at any time. Though the giving of alternative foods may start early the breast is not wholly refused until quite late—long after the child has become old enough to know that this refusal does not imply withdrawal of affection or danger of hunger. In the industrial west, however,

[1] J. Bowlby, op. cit.

[2] On the other hand, the more conscientious mother makes the mistake of insisting on a mechanically regular feeding schedule, instead of feeding the baby when it is hungry. It does not seem to be generally realised that thumb-sucking is a reaction pattern to oral frustration. Thumb-sucking is common among babies in our culture.

breast-feeding is very inconvenient for the mother. Everyone is more mobile today, and women are free, far more than formerly, to contract obligations outside the family circle, whether they be social or in the nature of work: the need to feed the baby interferes with these activities. A mother cannot take her infant with her to work, committee meeting, cinema or cocktail party, and is therefore strongly tempted to vary its feeding times to suit her plans, and to discontinue breast-feeding altogether as soon as practicable.

Physiological factors also play a part and many city mothers are unable to supply adequate milk of suitable quality.

In consequence the industrial child tends to be fed irregularly, to be bottle-fed rather than breast-fed, and to be weaned as early as possible. Weaning is generally started about the third month and is frequently completed by the sixth: that is, considerably before the child has become mentally capable of perceiving the enduring nature of its mother's affection, while the early irregularities occur before it has become confident of the reliability of its food supply.

Hence the western child is liable to develop deep-lying doubts as to whether it is loved, and may also suffer from food anxieties. The various forms which these doubts may take will be discussed later.

The child's second lesson is connected with its excretory function. It must learn to contain its urine and fæces 'to please mummy,' and to produce them upon demand for the same reason. As I have said, this act is significant both because it is the child's first creative act, and because it is the first act by which it can influence other people.

In the western world there is strong social pressure towards completing the anal training of children as early as possible. The savage child, naked and playing most of the day on grass does no material damage by incontinence. The western child is clad in garments which must be changed and washed and liable to damage relatively delicate carpets and upholstery by incontinence. In addition, western habits of cleanliness make us more sensitive to odours and so more intolerant of excretory

smells. As a result, most mothers try to complete anal training by the earliest possible date; the age of two years seems to be widely regarded as the point by which a reasonably reliable standard of continence may be expected.

Furthermore, lapses are generally treated as crimes: the child is told that it is 'naughty,' or that 'mother is cross.' In western society, therefore, retention of excreta becomes a way—*the* way —to win maternal affection; failure to do so becomes a source of guilt. There is also a third factor. Though the western mother is at first delighted by the production of fæces on demand the day comes when she treats fæces as dirty or disgusting. When this happens it seems to the child that its love-gift, so welcome before and so proudly offered, has been rejected. Apart from inculcating a somewhat rigid dislike of dirt, this inconsistency of its mother must produce much conflict and a sense of doubt about the effectiveness of all its actions. It seems reasonable to suppose that this tendency to regard fæces with disgust has been much intensified as our civilisation becomes more hygienic. The discovery of the role of 'dirt' in fostering bacteria played straight into the hands of our neurotic tendency.

The third element in character formation is the phallic. Masturbation, as I said, is important as marking the child's discovery that it can gratify its desires by its own actions. I have not been able to find satisfactory evidence which would show whether or not the taboo on masturbation has changed in intensity over the European culture as a whole. It is certain, however, that it became particularly intense during the Victorian period and though it still remains strong, it is not punished to the same extent or treated with the same horror. One would therefore expect to find the contemporary child more independent, and more able to create his own interests without parental help than the Victorian child. This seems to be the case, but we should not make too broad an inference about the improvement of psychical weaning. The youngest child always has the greatest difficulty; hence the modern tendency to smaller families, which means that the population contains a higher proportion of youngest children, acts in an

adverse sense. The tendency for parents to have children at a greater age may also contribute to the child's difficulty in breaking free.

There should, in addition, be a decrease in the tendency to feel that pleasure is wicked, and in asceticism and puritanism generally.

Fourthly, there is the Œdipus situation. Without opening the question of whether the child's affection for its mother is fundamentally sexual, we can agree that it will feel jealousy for the father.

To begin with, western society is monogamous, in itself a predisposing factor: in addition in western society the infant may not become aware of its father as an individual for some time, since he may spend the day at work, returning after it has gone to bed. It seems a reasonable speculation that the belated discovery of a rival comes as more of a shock than if he has been in the child's world from the beginning. Hence we may expect rather strong repressed aggression and guilt to mark western personality.

It is strongly held that the most powerful factor favouring the formation of an Œdipus complex is for a child to witness the 'primal scene.' In the overcrowded conditions of contemporary industrialism, in which children often share their parents' bed, this experience becomes rather general, as many social workers have noted.[1]

A vital point in personality formation is the approved method of dealing with guilt: the reinstatement pattern. Western society is still strongly committed to the practice of atoning by punishment—especially physical punishment, isolation and deprivation of rewards—rather than confession, reparation or humiliation. Such methods contribute to feelings of being unwanted, to the belief that the way to get out of difficulties is to go without something ('to tighten one's belt') or undergo some unpleasant experience ('take one's medicine') and to the interpretation of sado-masochistic elements in terms of physical cruelty and deprivation rather than humiliation or psychological tortures.

[1] Cf. M. Paneth, *Branch Street*, 1944.

However, the violence of punishment seems to be decreasing.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that western society offers an unusually high degree of general frustration to the ordinary child. A modern house, even a small one, is full of delicate bric-à-brac, easily dirtied surfaces, technical equipment (gas-stoves, radios, sewing-machines), sharp and dangerous tools, fragile accessories such as books, chinaware and lamps and miscellaneous personal property (fountain-pens, watches, barometers) which a child can damage. The western child is told 'don't touch' infinitely more often than, say, the Samoan or the Rhodesian baby. In fact, western society has been driven to the extreme of inventing a miniature prison for small children, called the play-pen, an extraordinary commentary on the unwelcomeness of the infant in the contemporary domestic milieu. Here is a fruitful source of aggression. It may also lead to a resigned and sheep-like attitude in which nothing can be attempted because it is a foregone conclusion that it is forbidden. So much for ontological factors: but neurosis can also be created, or enhanced, by situational factors, that is, elements in the cultural environment. These may be treated more briefly, since their chief effect is to intensify or exploit patterns laid down in infancy, these being the real determinants of personality.

III *Western Values as Causes*

The most striking feature of the western value system is that it puts forward two conflicting codes of action for almost every situation. We are taught to admire strength and success, but also to be unselfish and love our neighbour. We are taught a revealed religion which asserts the existence of a future life and a body of science which denies all knowledge of it. We are taught hedonism and asceticism. We are taught that art is admirable but are not expected in practice to bother much about it.

Each individual is left to resolve this conflict as best he may. Little wonder that he frequently finds himself torn between two courses of action. This, as we have seen, gives rise to neurosis.

Finally, we must mention an influence which lies somewhere between the two foregoing groups: the formation of standards of behaviour by the introjection of parental attitudes.

Since in western society parental attitudes are conflicting, the child naturally tends to introject conflicting standards. It is probably true that in western society the child sees more of its mother and nurse than of its father, so, other things being equal, it will tend to introject womanly rather than manly standards. We must not rely on this too much because repeated introjections are made, and because the mother will generally teach the child to admire the father and if it is a boy will teach it that certain attitudes are proper to boys ('only little girls cry.') Then again, if relations with the mother are unsatisfactory, the child may react into rejection of the mother and her standards.

IV *Basic Personality Structure*

What kind of character structure do these experiences combine to create?

In answering this question we must not make the mistake of drawing a picture which is too clear-cut. Western personality, even at its worst, contains favourable elements: if it were wholly neurotic western society would have collapsed long ago. It is the contradictions which are interesting—and dangerous. Again, many of the elements we shall find in it are not undesirable in themselves: they become dangerous only if we push them to an extreme—if they become an obsession. Finally, we must not hope for a static picture: western personality is in a rapid state of change and we shall often have to talk in terms of trends rather than of states.

The principal contradiction we must face is that the predominant element is western personality is not a product of industrialism, but has dominated western Europe (not to mention other cultures and periods) for the last millenium. This is the *ascetic element* which makes us feel that all pleasure is won from a jealous universe and must be paid for by suffering. It is frequently rationalised in the form that pleasure is wicked, and

as such an assertion is quite impossible to justify by any rational method it is attributed to the fiat of God. It would be a fascinating piece of research for someone to trace the way in which asceticism was grafted on to Christianity in defiance of considerable evidence in the new testament that Christ was actually opposed to asceticism for its own sake.[1] A brilliant instance is the way in which some Christian sects have made teetotalism a tenet of their religion, despite the fact that Christ (and St. Paul, too, which is odder) accepted moderate wine-drinking as normal.

This ascetic element certainly originates in the sexual taboos which have flourished in our society for so long. Here we have a typical vicious circle: the taboos produce a personality which feels guilty about sex, and such a personality maintains the taboos in its turn. However, such a circle can grow in size or can contract: which it does will depend chiefly on the violence of sexual guilt generated by the Œdipus situation, and to some extent on guilt generally. At the moment it is decreasing—but we must not overestimate the amount of this decrease. Struck by the contrast between our own customs and those of a century ago it is a commonplace to complain that our sexual morals are lax. In reality they are still extremely strict. The sexual act is taboo in ordinary conversation, even when performed between legally married couples. Extra-marital sex, though common, is generally condemned. To attempt to acquire a skilful sexual technique is thought *outré*, and all variants from the approved pattern are regarded as being to a greater or lesser extent perversions. Quite a number of people feel that the only real justification for the sexual act is procreation. And, despite the overwhelming evidence of psychology and anthropology to the contrary, people obstinately resist the idea that children have sexual wishes.

The marks of a neurotic reaction are excessive violence and rigidity; by this standard the reaction of most people to the idea of homosexuality and other abnormal sexual relationships can

[1] As far as I know this has not been done in detail, though there is a short sketch in John Macmurray's *Reason and Emotion*, 1935.

fairly be described as neurotic. To say this is not in any way to imply approval of or indifference to sexual perversion: a normal attitude is to regard it as a sad or even calamitous disability, a thing to be lamented and fought as we lament and fight tuberculosis or cancer. But the typical western attitude to perversion is distinctly different from the typical attitude to a terrible physical perversion like cancer. It contains elements of resentment and anger: the typical reaction is not to pity and help but to drive out and destroy. We are not honest if we fail to recognise that a neurotic *fear of homosexuality* is, and long has been, an element in the western personality structure.

The word homosexuality alone covers several distinct behaviour patterns and I cannot attempt to open up the difficult and still somewhat controversial subject of the pathology of perversion. I will, however, briefly mention a single typical pattern to help the reader unversed in analytical psychology to relate these remarks to what he already knows of personality structure. Faced with the Œdipus situation, in which his love for his father comes into conflict with his desire to possess the mother exclusively, a male child may seek to resolve the problem by identifying himself with the father, or with the mother as already described.[1] To the extent that he identifies with the mother he adopts a female role and desires the sexual attentions of the father. All this, of course, is at the most primitive and unconscious level of his mind. Growing up into a society in which homosexual relations are tabooed, he is forced to repress strictly his desire for his father.

Now it is a typical pattern that people resent most bitterly in others the things which tempt them most themselves. We have no sympathy for our own failings when we meet them in others and in punishing those others we punish ourselves. (This may seem a rather arbitrary statement but it has been proved in detail again and again in clinical work.[2]) Thus western man's intense antagonism to homosexuality in others entitles us to suspect a repressed urge to engage in it himself. This is not to

[1] See p. 84.

[2] Examples may be found in, e.g., C. Berg, *War in the Mind*, 1944.

say that western men are all on the verge of homosexuality, because if the urge were once made conscious it would be seen for what it is—an infantile and impractical pattern, inferior in reward to normal intercourse—and in most cases it would be rejected and disposed of permanently.

This element finds expression in the rigid fear of being thought effeminate or 'cissy' which marks both British and American culture. Any detached observer of our societies would certainly find it a matter for comment that men fear to be thought effeminate whereas women do not, to anything like the same obsessive extent, fear being thought masculine. Thus no odium attaches to a woman who wears trousers, while it is unthinkable that a man should wear a skirt.

I shall have some further reflections to make upon this element in due course, but first let us continue with the outline.

The most serious effect of our rigid sexual ethic is its inhibition of potency, and the creation of a drive to justify one's manhood in substitute forms. This we have already referred to as the drive to *self-validation*. It is this which has produced the thousand-year-long spasm of productive and creative energy which has marked western civilisation. Perhaps this is the outstanding feature of the western personality and it owes its strength to the way in which it is reinforced by other elements in the personality. For instance, we can see that an unconsciously-motivated fear of 'being a cissy' will intensify the drive to prove one's manhood by excelling in whatever activities are regarded by society as the proper domain of men—in our case, sport and business activity. And, as we shall see in a moment, this drive also derives energy from both oral and anal, as well as phallic levels.

Last of the direct consequences of sexual taboos is western man's outstanding *inquisitiveness*. Since I am thinking here of scientific investigation, the urge to explore and plain curiosity, perhaps I should dignify it by a grander term; let us say 'the investigatory character.' Because sexual knowledge is hidden, the child hitches its sexual drive to the discovery of hidden facts. Facts which are imparted to it voluntarily by adults have little

charm, but anything which constitutes a mystery and a challenge is a very different matter. And to the extent that it is a challenge, the situation borrows force from the self-validatory urge.

These four elements: self-validation, asceticism, curiosity and fear of homosexuality, have played a considerable role throughout the history of western civilisation, as well as in some other cultures. Since our sexual taboos have been relaxed a little in the last fifty years there may have been some tendency for these elements to become less marked, but we cannot conclude that such a relaxation is part of a long-term trend. Our history shows that such relaxations have usually intensified guilt feelings and created new waves of asceticism, as when the Roundheads replaced the Cavaliers.

If industrialism has had any overt effect, no doubt it has been to weaken sexual taboos by inducing a practical and material, rather than a mystical and moral attitude. Its most obvious covert effect, however, has probably been to intensify guilt, and it would not take very much to direct this guilt into ascetic channels again. On the other hand, if it has favoured mother-identification it has helped to weaken sexual taboos which are certainly related to the father's unconscious desire to keep his woman to himself.

Let us now turn to character elements which though far from new, have been more obviously intensified by the industrialisation of western life. First, there is *anxiety*. Few would challenge the assertion that we are much less self-assured, much less self-confident than our forefathers. Today such an attitude is justified by the overt world situation, but it is not caused by it. The attitude has been developing for years, and the overt situation merely provides it with a justification. This anxiety can be traced primarily, I think, to the abruptness of weaning and irregularity of feeding, which we have mentioned, but it also elements at the anal level (fear of loss of affection through loss of anal control) and at the phallic level (fear of impotence, fear of homosexual urges).

Since this anxiety is primarily caused by loss of affection we can identify in the personality a neurotic *desire to be loved*. The desire

to be loved is, of course, normal enough; but here it becomes rigid and excessive or obsessive.

Second, there is *guilt*. Few would challenge the assertion that today we tend to blame ourselves, to ask 'what have we done wrong?' when the situation is adverse and to resign ourselves to misfortune by 'tightening our belts': that is, we expect our mistakes to be met with punishment. Here again, our attitude is probably perfectly appropriate to the situation: it generally *is* our own fault, at least in part, when things go wrong. But the significant thing is that our forefathers rarely accused themselves, even when obviously in the wrong; nor did they project the blame on to some other party, which is merely a way of dealing with guilt. They put it down to ill luck and left it at that.

The most generally recognised source of guilt is the Œdipus situation, though I think we may also have to look still further back for it, since children often seem to interpret the real or apparent loss of their mother's affection as due to some defect in themselves. Guilt is also present at the anal level. (Fear of punishment for loss of sphincter control.)

The third great character element is drawn primarily from the anal level and takes on a dual form: *retentiveness* and *productiveness*, especially at the material plane. Western man likes piling up property or money both by accumulating it and by producing it. Single individuals may favour one or the other according as in their experience, failure to retain was greeted by punishment or productiveness rewarded by approval.

Though productivity is most generally interpreted in material terms we must not forget that it also appears as creativity. Obsessed as we are with the productive character of our society it is easy to overlook its remarkable creativeness.

This element draws important forces from the oral level also, since to pile up a supply of good things helps to assuage the fear that the source of all good things may suddenly be cut off. It is, I believe, true that house-training is the most violent of our disciplines. The damage to property, the element of shame (borrowed from sex, since the excretory organs are so close to

the sex organs) the dirt, all combine to make the mother quite rigidly insistent on anal control, and prolonged failure is often met with most violent beatings and other punishments.

If we are realistic we must also designate *cleanliness*, or rather shame at dirtiness, as an element in western character. This derives, naturally, from the anal situation and is certainly far more marked in the west than in almost any other culture.

To complete our survey it is necessary to deal briefly with parent identification and aggression. Western character has long been comparatively aggressive, as characters go in the world as a whole, a fact which can probably be traced to defective social control, permitting individuals to place obstacles in the way of their fellow men. Recently, however, the picture has changed in important respects. The growth in size of society and the failure of its natural sanctions has both permitted individuals to frustrate their fellow men on the economic plane and has evoked, by reaction, a central government which seeks to stop these attempts at the cost of imposing new frustrations. At the same time, the overt expression of aggression in violence has become much harder. In consequence aggression is bottled up and escapes either in converted forms (sado-masochism, racialism, political vindictiveness, vindictive written criticism, etc.), or in those periodic waves of aggressive activity we call war. In short, I should call *suppressed or converted aggression* a feature of industrial personality.

Finally we may note a tendency to change from a patriform to a matriform society. Today crimes against the supply of food and goods are taken more seriously than crimes against protected women, the sky-father religion is in decline, democracy (so-called) is rapidly extending and authoritarianism is in decline. Once the father was the dominant figure in the home; today, as studies such as that of Radke has shown, the mother rules the roost.[1]

To sum up, the contemporary western personality is obsessed by the need to validate itself, by fear of homosexuality and the

[1] M. J. Radke, *The Relation of Parental Authority to Children's Behaviour and Attitudes*, 1946.

need to find out. It is anxious and guilty. It is retentive and productive, materialistic but creative. It is anxious to co-operate, but full of bottled-up aggression. Its energy and creativeness are strong points, but they are made into bad ones by being carried to an obsessive extreme. Its fear and guilt are bad points. As it stands, it is not a personality we can expect to yield happiness to its possessors.

v *Western Values as Effects*

I have already said almost enough, I imagine, to indicate how closely the pattern of western society is dictated by the irrational demands of the western personality, and certainly enough to show that our society is deeply marked by cultural neurosis.

However it may crystallise the picture finally to list briefly the main values which we derive from this personality, for values are the determinants of the socio-cultural pattern. Inevitably it is a society which concentrates its energies on finance and production, and conceives success in terms of money, power and goods.

Probing more closely one can detect five valuations which chiefly dictate the shape of western society. The first is *materialism*, a preoccupation with the material world of things and people in their material aspect. About this enough has been said.

Secondly, there is preoccupation with *success*. How deep this preoccupation goes is shown by the fact that it scarcely strikes us as odd that people should value success. Yet would it not be more rational to value happiness? Few are so naïve as to suppose that the men we call successful are the happiest among us, yet we censure the man who eschews fame and retires into a happy mediocrity for wasting his talents.

Thirdly, we set an absurdly high value on our *food* supply. To insist on enough food for nutritional needs is reasonable, but we don't do this. We carry our eating to extremes of gourmandise and even have ritualised it. When we want to do honour to a man, we give a banquet! Try and put yourself in the position

of a detached observer and perhaps you will see how truly astonishing that fact is. The luckless man is not in need of food: he would much prefer something useful, such as a free pass on the railways. We would honour ourselves much more if we honoured him by giving a concert or a ballet.

This preoccupation with food becomes confused with our preoccupation with winning approval, with the result that we hold those who fail to secure food in low esteem. This corresponds to the frequently heard assertion that the unemployed are not to be pitied as they could get work if they had more guts. And to the equally scornful but quite contradictory assertion that they are unemployed because they are unemployable.

Fourthly, there is our growing tendency to idolise the *mother*, who is doubly important because she is also the original source of our food supply. Here we may think of the American institution of Mothers' Day, which is generally supported, while recent attempts to institute a Fathers' Day were a total failure. American mother-worship may also be seen in many films and the commission of both civil and military crimes is presented as fully justified when the object is to gratify a mother.[1] Rather naturally, this value seeps over into our sexual life, and a striking feature of American culture, which is also emerging in Britain, is breast-worship. The quasi-pornographic semi-nude drawings known as 'pin-up girls' are distinguished by the anatomical peculiarity of slimness amounting to serious under-development, except in the region of the mammary glands which are depicted as of phenomenal size and in a state of tension, such as exists only when they are in milk. They are relatively much larger than those on the Venus de Milo, although in every other respect the figure is much slimmer.[2] This graphically illustrates the oral anxieties of the American character and reveals why the American man cannot escape from the domination of the mother-figure.

Many other facts could be adduced, such as the fact that the

[1] One of many instances : *Hail the Conquering Hero.*

[2] Cf. also the almost proverbial American belief that the highest standard in cooking is 'as mother used to make it.'

American conscience is primarily derived from maternal standards, or the choice of a female figure for the national emblem (the Statue of Liberty, Britannia) but the point is already clear, and the only important qualification which should be made is the fact that Germany forms an exception to this pattern, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Finally, we must mention the high value placed on *competition between males*. Though its origin lies in doubts of potency, this pattern gathers particular force in America because it becomes the way to win maternal affection. Another typical pattern in western society is to urge the child towards manhood. It is constantly told that it is too old for certain types of behaviour, or that it will be allowed certain desired freedoms when it is older. Margaret Mead has observed a distinct correlation between this practice and competitiveness in the adult.[1] Here, again, we readily tend to take the competitive pattern for granted, ignoring the fact that nature displays as many co-operative as competitive patterns, and ignoring too how little it governs the actions of women. A woman does not cook primarily with the object of cooking better than her neighbour, and in general no devices exist for establishing comparisons in women's skill, except a few imported from the masculine world. In the male world, however, the most unlikely activities have been dragged into conformity with this pattern, and the preoccupation with the idea of establishing a record has become proverbial.

It is clear, then, that the pecularities of western society are the reflection of our peculiar non-valid needs. Just as the Marquesan indulges in human sacrifice to bolster his confidence, despite the endless train of bloodshed and reprisal; just as the Dobuan lives out his life in paranoiac suspicion and fear; just as the Kwakiutl asserts himself by prodigal wastage and destruction; so western industrial man seeks to relieve the tensions in his soul by the unremitting production of goods and the accumulation of money, heedless of the cost in frustration and

[1] M. Mead, *Co-operation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, 1937.

fear. Little does he understand that his efforts only intensify for those who follow the anxieties from which he is trying to escape.

VI *Western Culture*

Our thesis is stated: society conditions personality, but personality conditions society. The familiar commonplace that our psychological problems are due to our competitive environment turns out to be only a half truth. With more originality and equal accuracy, we may point to our psychological problems as the source of the competitive system.

Discovery of this interlocking relationship is, I would firmly suggest, one of the most important steps in the history of society. We could not understand our past, nor had we any hope of determining our future until it had been made. Theories of history and sociology which ignore unconscious forces are so much bunk. Ford was very nearly right. Attempts to account for our position in terms of society alone or psychology alone are futile and we must look for causes in a direction at right-angles to the vicious circle. In the case in question the immediate external cause is undoubtedly modern technology. Man would be glad enough to pursue happiness by other means if he knew them. Technology offers him a reliable, easily accessible device for meeting at least the very vivid needs for food and shelter, and indirect means of satisfying some of his other desires. Small wonder that he takes the opportunity; and the more he concentrates on this particular instrument for achieving happiness, the easier it is for subsequent individuals to follow the path; indeed, the harder it becomes to follow any other.

But modern technology has its roots primarily in curiosity and the drive for self-validation, so that we can trace our present situation back primarily to our sexual taboos; and these in turn are chiefly predicated on the patriform personality, with its desire to isolate women sexually. Thus, as far as western society is concerned, Freud was right to point to the Œdipus complex as the dominant factor.

Western man's mistake is thus to have advanced much too far on one sector, while the armies on his flanks are still fighting heavy defensive battles with the enemy. At any moment he may be cut off and wiped out in one of these 'battles of annihilation' of which we used to hear so much. Indeed, the battle may already have started. In such a position, if it is not too late, the only course is to withdraw. This does not mean that civilisation must 'reject the machine.' It must absorb it. Scientists are right to reject the rural Utopias of Morris and Butler as unrealistic retreats from the problem. But they are wrong when they argue that civilisation must be adapted to the machine. It is the machine which must be adapted to civilisation.

But that is not the course the world is following at present. So, before we try and visualise the structure of a machine-using, as opposed to a machine-dominated, civilisation, let us examine two contemporary reactions to the problem of western unhappiness—communism and fascism.

XI

FASCIST SOLUTION

I Popularity of Fascism—II Fascism Defined—III Appeal of Fascism—IV Status Under Fascism—V Integration under Fascism—VI Why Fascism Fails—VII Fascism's Values—VIII The German Mind—IX War and Happiness—X Danger of a Fascist Revival

I *Popularity of Fascism*

THE phenomenon of fascism has not been disposed of by the victory of the United Nations any more than pneumonia is disposed of when a patient is cured.

We cannot expect to be safe from fascism until we have discovered why it possesses such a hypnotic power over people's minds, for if it displayed it once it may do so again. Indeed, it does so at this moment, for in many countries authoritarian, quasi-fascist regimes still flourish, and receive a considerable measure of support from the population.

Nothing is more misleading that to conceive of fascism as a hated regime maintained by force. A regime maintained by force is what we commonly call a dictatorship, and there have been many dictatorships before fascism was thought of. What concerns us is how fascism differs from straightforward dictatorship. The characteristic feature of fascism is that it is welcomed in spite of its authoritarianism, in spite of its cruelties, in spite of all the objections which strike the onlooker as so obvious. Clearly it has (or seems to have) something to offer that is so desirable as to outweigh all these frightful disadvantages.

Anyone who was present in Germany when the Nazis were coming to power, or anyone who has had the opportunity of reading the diaries of dead German soldiers, or who had any other window into the German mind, will have been struck by the tremendous conviction many Germans displayed that here was something worth fighting for, something which justified

all personal sacrifice, all cruelties and treacheries, something so absorbing that without it life was scarcely worth living.

If we apply to fascism the criteria we have established as conditions of happiness, I think we shall gain an idea what that something was. We shall see that fascism undertook to satisfy essential psychological appetites, even at the cost of many physical needs. We shall also see why the solution did not prove an enduring one.

II *Fascism Defined*

First, however, we had better agree on what we mean by fascism. The word has been so used and misused during the past ten years that it is no longer any more an abusive epithet applicable to anything we don't like. For instance, it is often said that fascism is 'gangster rule'—but this shows a complete misunderstanding of the nature of fascism. If it were merely gangster rule it would be far less dangerous than it is. Fascism embodies a perfectly coherent political philosophy, one quite capable of attracting the support of people who would never be found supporting gangsters. It happens that in Germany the regime made the mistake of gathering round it many individuals of what may loosely be called the gangster type (though a professional psychologist would probably not agree even to this) while in other cases, such as Argentina, crude dictators have borrowed fascist devices to help in keeping the public under control. I will revert to this point at the end of the chapter, but first let us see what fascism really is.

The basic concept of fascism, as I understand it, is that the state is held to be more important than the individual. The state, instead of being seen as a convenient arrangement formed by individuals to assist them in attaining their individual ends, acquires a mystic significance and the role of the individual is to serve the state. In this it is different both from capitalism and from communism; for the communist revolution, even if it has tended to become an end in itself was always advertised as a device for benefiting individuals in the end, while monopoly capitalism, even in its extremest form, can hardly be analysed

as anything but an attempt to benefit individuals, even if only a minority of them.[1] One of the things which has helped to confuse the issue has been the communist description of fascism as 'the last stage of monopoly capitalism.' This would make it no more than another dictatorship. According to this description the exploited masses are rigidly held down by their fascist masters—but as we have just noted, the significant feature of fascism is that millions of 'exploited workers' supported it. On the other hand, capitalist apologists have suggested that there is little difference between fascism and communism—but we have already noted a crucial difference and will explore the matter further in the next chapter. The truth is, capitalism and communism are economic methods, fascism dictatorship and democracy are political methods. Fascism might employ either communism or capitalism for its purpose, just as democracy or crude dictatorship might.[2]

From this central concept of the subservience of the individual to the state flow the other features of fascism. Since the state is all, the actions of the individual are subject to state control. But this control is not exerted by an individual dictator as such; the leader is only the interpreter of the destinies and needs of the state. The idea that the fortunes of the state are the only interest which matters leads naturally to the concept that military power and territorial conquest are proper objectives, since these are often held to redound to the glory of states. Naturally, but not, I think, inevitably. It is conceivable, on paper anyway, that a fascist state might exist which thought its glory better served by peaceful behaviour and the maintenance of a high standard of living for its citizens. In practice, the combination is improbable, because goodwill and a belief in

[1] For a clear-sighted discussion of the nature of fascism, see E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist: His State and His Mind*, 1936.

[2] Fascism's readiness to use state ownership of the means of production as a method whenever convenient is explicitly stated in the fascist Carta del Lavoro of April 21, 1927, Art. IX : 'State interference in economic affairs takes place only where private initiative is lacking or insufficient, or where political interests of the state are affected. Such interference can take the form of supervision, aid, or direct assumption of control.

authoritarianism rarely go hand in hand (since one is based on mother identification, the other on father identification). Similar considerations apply to cruelty and ruthlessness: it is possible to conceive a fascist state which did not rely on cruelty, but the psychological attitude which welcomes authoritarianism is usually prone to cruelty too though not necessarily to the pathological extreme exhibited by Germany. Thus the links between fascism and cruelty and aggression are psychological rather than political.

But it is not the appeal of fascism to specialised psychological types with which we are now concerned, but its appeal to the population as a whole. To explain this appeal we do not have to resort to clumsy generalisations about the German character. Incidentally, it is always the German character which occupies writers on the psychology of fascism—as if there were no other fascist nations. Instead, we can interpret it in terms of the primary needs and appetites which are common to all humanity.

III *Appeal of Fascism*

Fascism rediscovered the remarkable paradox that people are happier when devoting themselves to a larger purpose than when working for their own material satisfaction. Fascism offered a cause to work for, and thus reimbued people's life with purpose. It enabled them to sink their personal identities in a larger unit and thus to forget their personal sense of isolation and helplessness, of futility and mortality, while giving them a stake in its achievements and a sense of sharing the glory of its achievements.

This cause, as we now can see, was not worthy of the devotion it inspired—but the point is that, at the time, many people thought it was. It is easy to be wise after the event. The victims of fascism might have been less easily duped if an alternative cause of equal attraction and solider credentials had been available. As a matter of fact there was an alternative cause: communism. And it was precisely from the ranks of the communists that the Nazis won many of their most fervent supporters. Hitler was quick to see that the same mentality which turned in its dissatisfaction to communism might turn

equally well to Nazism. As we know, he even chose red as the colour of the Nazi flag in order to attract people into his meetings under the impression they were communist meetings.[1]

Why communism failed to hold its converts we shall consider in the next chapter. What is more relevant here is to ask why the capitalist democracies were unable to offer a programme and a purpose at least as enthralling. To their failure to do so the successes of fascism are, in an important sense, due.

Participation in a larger purpose not only dissolves the sense of personal unimportance and helplessness but fosters a feeling of mastery. This feeling was fed by parades of armed strength in which the feeling of power could be savoured in vivid form. Even the most frustrated office worker could feel that he was playing a part in a programme of power and this banished the sense of futility in his job. The steady elimination of luxury trades and services and the transfer of labour into industries serving the task of national reconstruction and expansion also helped to provide the cog-in-the-machine worker with a new sense of purpose. Such transfers often meant a loss of pay but they led to few protests because the psychological satisfaction of the new role outweighed the material loss.

Apart from the increase in vicarious mastery implied by membership in a masterful state, there was a marked increase in crude mastery. The transfer of workers from clerical to manual jobs, the induction of men into the armed forces where they could operate guns, tanks and planes, the labour battalions of the Hitler Youth, all provided outlets for crude manual mastery, while the huge administrative machine, the party, the secret police and the expanding forces also provided openings for mastery of the administrative and executive kind.

Further, the fascist programme added to the sense of personal security, not only in the spiritual sense we have just considered, but also in the material sense. The almost complete elimination of unemployment assured the ordinary individual that, however small his stipend, he could at least rely on it continuing to be paid. Moreover, he knew that employers were not free to try

[1] A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1924.

and force his wages down, but must conform to the wage-fixing agreements made at the national level. In addition, the more erratic personal crises of marriage, illness, and death which represent such a bugbear to those who have no margin of savings were largely met by grants and relief organisations.

Of course, these gains in security were not unequivocal. Enjoyment of them was absolutely contingent on conformity to the purposes of the state. Deprived of membership in his state-approved trade union or professional association, no one could get any kind of a job. The choice was total security or nothing. And as we know the long-run consequence was war, which leads to extreme insecurity. But in the early days of the party this was obvious to few.

Much has been made of the rule of terror maintained by the secret police. But in reality even in Germany where it was most marked, this factor did not affect the bulk of the population. It was only the active opponents of Nazism, the Jews and the communists, who went in terror of their lives. The ordinary man saw little of the Gestapo, for all that he heard many rumours. (After the war began to go against Germany, of course, things were different.) If he was afraid of anyone, it was more probably the local party official. But in the early days, when the fascist movement appeared in the light of a great crusade, the local party organiser (who was generally an old inhabitant of the district, well known to all) appeared in the light of a hard-working and public-spirited individual.

Fascism, then, yielded dividends in mastery, security and purpose. To these we may add a fourth consideration, consistency. The conflicting values of democracy were replaced with a clear-cut standard. No longer need one waver between the command to 'be a success' and the command to 'love your neighbour.' For these were substituted one unequivocal criterion: does it advance the cause of the state? And lest there should be any doubt whether specific actions did or did not do so, a copious propaganda was at hand to point the right road out.

A striking feature of the German basic personality seems to be the existence of large quantities of guilt. It has become

customary to attribute these feelings to the 1918 defeat, but there is not the faintest evidence that mass-neurosis can be *produced* in adults in this simple way. What the 1918 defeat did was to serve as a convenient rallying point for already existing guilt feelings and as a rationalisation of them. Such guilt feelings must have been induced separately in each individual at an early age and are almost certainly of Œdipal origin. This conforms with what we know of the German basic personality, with its strong father-fixation.

One of fascism's, specifically Nazism's, most remarkable achievements was its successful handling of this source of misery. Two methods were employed, one to deal with pre-existing guilt and one to minimise the chance of further guilt arising. For the first, a scapegoat or series of scapegoats, were chosen: the Jews, the communists and the plutocrats. The 1918 defeat was explained as a 'stab in the back' by traitorous radicals. Economic misfortunes were the work of the Jews, and so on. This mechanism has been several times described.[1] Less attention has been devoted to the other mechanism. By means of the leadership principle, and in virtue of being the subject of widespread identification, Hitler was able to take over super-ego functions for the whole nation. Any misdeed, any cruelty, any betrayal was on Hitler's conscience, and Hitler's alone. The citizen's only duty was obedience, and provided he gave that he could sleep sound. That is why Germans could tolerate mass-executions and concentration camps, and why they looked so dazed when the Allied armies held them responsible.

IV *Status Under Fascism*

The concept of the all-important state made possible a dramatic transformation of the German status-system. Before the Nazis came to power it was strongly hereditary, though in a manner quite different from England. In the latter country birth gave access to the best social circles, to the fields of politics and diplomacy, and was a factor in the higher command of

[1] Cf. P. Nathan, *The Psychology of Fascism*, 1943.

the army. In the Germany of Bismarck the influence of birth was much more pervasive. To enter the civil service, even in the humble grades of postal and customs officials, it was necessary to have been born into one of the right families. In the army, birth played a role beside which its influence in the British army seems insignificant. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that only a nobleman could be an officer.[1] By the time of the Weimar republic this system had naturally lost some of its severity but the feeling of the omnipresence of privilege was still strong among the solid bulk of the population.

For this rigid system the Nazis substituted the principle of advancement and prestige according to the value rendered to the state. This principle was enforced with considerable thoroughness. Low economic and social status was never the slightest bar to advancement in industry, in the party or in the armed forces. On the contrary, it seems as if the Nazis took especial pleasure in advancing the lowly, no doubt reckoning that they thereby gained loyal supporters since their hopes of maintaining their new position were wholly dependent on the success of the National Socialist movement. This policy was applied with determination even in the caste-ridden Reichswehr. The ranks were combed through and through for potential officer material; promotion was no longer dependent on length of service and good conduct stripes but on initiative and resource in the severe mock battles of training. Moreover, commissions were often awarded on the field without further ado by umpires who attended for the purpose.

Again, the establishment of the Nazi party and the growth of the forces and the administrative machine created countless new 'status ladders' for the ambitious, while the transfer of labour from luxury industries to industries serving the purposes of the state greatly reduced the number of people in jobs devoid of natural status.

The fascist type of status can best be described as pseudo-

[1] In 1860, after the Manteuffel purge, two-thirds of the line officers, all the guards officers, and 95 per cent. of the other cavalry officers were nobles. See F. Neumann, *Behemoth*, 1942.

functional. Once the tenet that the state comes before the individual is accepted, this type of status appears as functional. But as long as one believes that the object of the state is to serve the individual then status based on value to the state is only functional as long as the state is truly subserving individual needs. (This, of course, is the crucial issue in assessing any fascist device.) Accordingly, what the fascist call functional status does not coincide with the natural assessment of the ordinary man who, unless converted to fascist ideology, tends to assess status by value to individuals. But the distinction does not become obvious until the fact that the state is not serving individuals' needs becomes obvious. Thus the task of the Nazis in the early days was a double one: to convince people that Nazism was, indeed, serving their needs—by such obvious benefits as reduction of unemployment, road building, and the 'strength-through-joy' movement—while steadily working to convert people to the belief that their overriding interest was the glory and renown of the Nazi state.

A pseudo-functional status system of this type has both advantages and disadvantages when compared with a truly functional system. Its main advantage is that status is never in doubt. The most familiar instance of such a system in democratic countries is the status system of the army; a man's status is at once revealed by his badges of rank and consequently there need be no hesitation whether to defer or whether to take the lead whenever two or more men meet. When two individuals meet in a non-militaristic status system, each must seek to impress the other with his value by devious means, and many find this obligation exhausting or exasperating (hence, of course, such unofficial status-badges as the old school tie). The disadvantages of any such system is that official rank does not always conform with true value, even when this is measured on an arbitrary scale, such as value to the army or the state. That party favourites were promoted was, as is well known, a common complaint in the later days of Nazism. But what the Anglo-American observer almost always failed to realise was that the complaint was really a complaint that the authorities

were not adhering to true fascist principles, rather than a complaint against fascism itself. Just as a complaint of unjustified promotion in the British army would not represent any objection to the army as an institution.

v *Integration Under Fascism*

But it was in the task of integrating the community that fascism scored its most definitive success. As Ashton has pointed out, both Germany and Italy had but recently emerged from a struggle to unify the state by extinguishing the authority of a score of petty princelings. For each of them central rule represented not dictatorship, but a greater degree of freedom than they had known under a system of local and individual freedom, so-called. The disruption of the post-war years, when scores of splinter-parties battled for a following and none had control, and when several towns established soviet independent governments, recalled with uncomfortable vividness the days of the dukedoms. Thus unity was an objective of supreme importance, such as we in Britain can hardly conceive.

Fascism provided the effective political integration needed, and also integrated the industrial sphere, but it did not stop at this. It also provided the individual with opportunities to sink his identity in something greater, in consciousness of the united state. The mass rallies, the processions, and the broadcasts of the leader—which seemed so ridiculous to watchers overseas—actually performed a vital function.

The weakness of fascist integration was that it spurned the traditional stages in the hierarchy of integration—family, in-group, clan and so on and substituted artificial hierarchies of party, youth movement, professional chamber and workers' front. In doing so it cut across irrefragable biological and emotional ties. Consequently integration could only be maintained by a continuous frenzied effort of propaganda. But owing to the disruption of the basic ties natural cohesion steadily diminished, so that the attempt to whip up an artificial unity had to be executed with ever more frenetic energy. Actually,

this process had not proceeded far: the consequences of the disruption of family ties had hardly come home to roost by the time fascism was dethroned. In the short run, it could claim an undeniable success. Only a fool would call the Germany of 1935 less integrated than that of 1925.

VI *Why Fascism Fails*

So far, then, we have seen that fascism provides a plausible answer to the demands for mastery, security, integration, purpose, consistency and functional status. In regard to the two other primary needs it is less successful. It does not, in essence, do anything to improve variety; on the contrary, the high degree of centralisation involved and the emphasis on consistency, must inevitably reduce variety. As against this, some minor gains may be recorded. For instance, the obligation to do military training took many people out of a humdrum middle-class groove and introduced to them new friends, new surroundings and new tasks. But chiefly fascism relied, as does democracy, on distraction. The constant political manœuvres of the state (and, in the event of war, its military fortunes) provide a spectacle in which the onlooker can find vicarious excitement on an unparalleled scale.

Fascism's most manifest failure, however, is in regard to love. Fascism is obliged to try and induce people to direct all their affection towards the state. Affection between individuals is only permissible if it does not interfere with the purpose of the state. It was in accordance with this need that the Nazis were obliged to teach children to spy on their parents; the normal emotions of family solidarity could not be allowed to stand in the way of the state's needs. Since they conceived the purposes of the state in terms of military aggression, the Nazis were obliged to go further and frown on all exhibitions of the tender emotions as 'unmanly.' And not merely on exhibiting it but on feeling it.

They sought to divert the emotion thus dammed up on to Hitler, as leader of the state. Hitler always addressed his vast

audiences with the intimate 'Ihr' and sought to assume the position of a father surrogate. But as we know, frustrated affection turns to hate, and so the Nazis had to deal with abnormal quantities of aggression. This was not altogether inconvenient, for in so far as they could turn it against other nations they created the requisite attitude to approve war, while in turning the overplus against the Jews in the domestic sphere they were able to provide an alibi for all their failures.

These are the immediate failures of fascism. The ultimate weakness is, however, its orientation towards war. The conception of the paramountcy of national interests is almost certain to be interpreted in territorial or economic terms and must finally lead to a clash. Only if a fascist state were to interpret national pre-eminence in terms of emotional, intellectual and artistic achievement could war be avoided and then we should have the chance to see whether the immediate disadvantages would finally undermine its position.

VII *Fascism's Values*

It was, I think, Peter Drucker who first pointed out that fascism represents an abandonment of the materialist (or economic) code of value, and stressed the great significance of this fact.[1] Practically all political and economic thinking during the last hundred years has been based on the assumption of classical economics that man is a creature who rationally pursues enlightened self-interest and interprets his interests solely in terms of goods and services. It is, for instance, always pointed out in defence of industrialism that it has raised the 'standard of living' and no compunction is felt in defining the standard of living wholly in terms of goods and services. The disastrous reduction effected by industrialism in the standard of living, measured in real terms, was never assessed, or even recognised. Now suddenly comes a reaction from this benighted doctrine. Progress is no longer seen as economic progress. Status is no longer defined in terms of economic success. Rewards are

[1] See *The End of Economic Man* for a most suggestive discussion.

no longer distributed in simple economic form. In short, economic considerations cease to be the constitutive motive. In the perspective of history the change can hardly fail to stand out as a turning point in the human story.

It was, of course, not the first time that anyone has proposed non-economic standards of values. Christianity made just such a proposition offering salvation as a motive, and measuring success in terms of asceticism and humility. But the fascist proposal was no mere reaction, it offered a new code of values. Progress was to be defined in terms of national progress. Status was to depend on service to the state. In accordance with this conception, German newspapers ceased, after 1933, to describe millionaires as men who were 'successful.' Advertisements and films did not hold out a goal of material wealth. On the contrary, as far as material goods went, the approved ideal was self-denial so as to spare more for the ends of the state: guns not butter. And along with the ideal of self-denial went the ideal of service. No kind of personal eminence, physical, intellectual, economic, military, social, mattered a jot unless it redounded to the power and glory of the state.

By the same token, the central tenet of fascism led to a reaction from individualism. This we have already discussed under the heading of integration. Popular journalism has concentrated on German worship of force and ruthlessness, and has said little about their fostering self-denial and service, since these are in themselves rather admirable characteristics. But it is stupidity to suppose that any fascist regime, German or otherwise, in actual fact cultivates admiration for force *as an end in itself*, whatever it may *say* on the subject: it is force in the service of the state which it approves. The private individual who appropriates goods by force for his own ends is as severely treated as in a democracy. Some misuse of force is tolerated as an inevitable product of training in the use of force—as in the case of the inevitable looting by soldiery in war-time. Now force turned to right uses is admirable—no one has ever suggested one should *admire* weakness. Hence the worship of force is not, in itself, a crime. The evil aspect is

solely in the way force is used, and here we again come up against the central doctrine of fascism. If you believe that the state matters and the individual does not, force which aids the state at the cost of the individual is no crime. It is not on its anti-democratic nature, not on its aggressiveness, not on its foul persecutions that we must arraign fascism: these are secondary and derivative. It is on the central doctrine that conviction must be obtained.

VIII *The German Mind*

So far we have considered reasons why the fascist system might appeal to anyone. Over and above all this, however, it offered a special appeal to persons at one end of the psychological scale, those who had established father-identifications. This, as we have seen, is the type which welcomes authority and which often gravitates towards the army or the church. Then again the readiness of fascism to use force against individuals offers an appeal to the sadistic type of individual, while its demand for self-sacrifice appeals to the obverse type, the masochist. Both patterns seem to result from the frustration of normal mastery drives. Thirdly, fascism can use fanatics, especially those who are trying to compensate for an overwhelming sense of inferiority by exerting power over others and by tearing down and humiliating those who have shown their superiority.

Consequently fascism tends to gather round itself a prætorian guard of abnormal, even pathological, types. It is not difficult to see why fascism developed in its extremest in Germany. Over and above all the evils common to industrial states, Germany was split into scores of warring factions. People felt acutely the humiliation of the first World War. Unemployment and civil violence left everyone with a sense of insecurity. Fascism united the factions, restored security and charmed away the humiliation.

As Drucker has argued, the functioning society must provide the individual with function and status, its purposes must make

sense in terms of individual purpose, and its power must be legitimate. Thanks to the German sense of humiliation, fascist purposes did for a long time make sense in terms of individual purpose. Function and status it provided in abundant measure. Power was legitimate, as long as the Nazi leaders and the party were felt to be the most efficient people to perform the task of running the country. In the early days as Germany regained unity and prestige, and as unemployment diminished, the Nazis undoubtedly had widespread support. The existence of corruption, the rumours of barbaric cruelties, could not, of themselves, undermine this position. For the Nazis, even if imperfect, still seemed to the German the best available choice. To return to the weakness and shuffling of the Weimar days was unthinkable. A little corruption and cruelty was infinitely preferable. It was not until they began to lose the war that the Nazi leaders' power was seriously called in question.

IX *War and Happiness*

The appeal of fascism is, it will be seen, very much the appeal of war.

War has very definite advantages to offer, and if it were not for the overwhelming disadvantage of destruction and loss of life, would form an almost perfect pattern of living. It is no accident therefore, that the life of peace-time depends so largely on small-scale wars with the risk and destruction removed, that is, on competitive teamwork.

War gives admirable scope for mastery drives. It puts powerful machinery in the hands of every soldier and thus endows him with a sense of power which contrasts sharply with his former frustration. It provides a wide variety of active jobs calling for skill and initiative. And while it provides numerous constructive outlets for those with organising and inventive ability, it provides a wealth of outlets for that cruder and more infantile form of mastery, destruction. For a civilisation in which the mastery drives of so many individuals has been arrested at a pre-adult level, this is almost too good to be hoped for. Bruno

Mussolini's celebrated remark about the joy of bomb-dropping was as revealing as it was indiscreet.

Above all, the mastery outlets which war provides are subordinated to a purpose—and no trumped-up little goal like winning the stewardship of a silver cup for twelve months, but one vitally important to the future of every individual concerned.

In the emotional sphere war is less satisfactory, but even here it has certain solid assets. To begin with it provides a clearly-defined status system predominantly functional in type. The constant elimination of men as battle casualties ensures periodic promotion for all but the most unfortunate, and it must be remembered that whenever an officer is killed, this involves a promotion for someone in every one of the subordinate ranks: the death of a major makes possible the promotion of seven men. At the same time the men in each unit derive pleasure from the unit's prestige. This pleasure is with few exceptions much acuter than any corresponding satisfaction in the prestige of the firm in civilian life.

The comradeship of the barrack-room, which is no figment of a sentimental imagination, offers a substitute for the comradeship of the club and of marriage, and it is regrettably the case that it is sometimes found superior to the potentially closer ties of matrimony. The hierarchical arrangement of the services enables the individual to sink his identity in larger and larger units and brings home to him the relationship to the major unit of the nation. In support of this, war provides unlimited opportunities for service, as well as for egotism.

Nor must it be overlooked that war provides unparalleled opportunities for sexual achievement.

It is, perhaps, paradoxical that war provides a marked increase in security. In place of the responsibilities and risks of civilian life is substituted an existence in which every material need is provided for and all risk of this care ceasing vanishes. Status, too, is more secure, for downward promotion is almost inconceivable.

It is in variety that war is perhaps weakest, but even here there are short-run gains. The mere fact of joining the army

at first provides a change from civilian routine. Overseas service promises a wide range of novel experiences. With every promotion and every new course, new fields of interest are opened up.

Last, but not least, war provides the most effective possible outlets for aggression.[1]

The foregoing remarks are made with the fighting man chiefly in mind. The civilian also finds new outlets for mastery and status, though admittedly on a milder scale. The unemployed man, if not called up, gets a job and an income. The labour shortage lends security to employment. The nation is integrated and a common purpose lends new meaning even to the habitual routine of production. Opportunities for service abound. It is only in the matter of variety that the civilian is wholly worse off than in peace.

Small wonder then that many of those who escape personal loss or injury have a sneaking approval of war; and when time has obscured its drearier features look back with almost unmixed pleasure to their days in blue or khaki. This is a dangerous factor. Until peace can offer a life at least as satisfying as war it will never mobilise unqualified support.

x *Danger of a Fascist Revival*

In thus interpreting fascism as a bid for happiness we endow it with a much broader base than is conceived by the stock communist and democratic evaluations of it. To the communist it is the last stage of feudal capitalism. This interpretation betrays a complete failure to understand the difference between fascism and common or garden dictatorship. It is true that a ruling class, faced with popular unrest, might resort to dictatorship. It is true that in such an event they might use a programme of militaristic imperialism to justify their imposition of control. It is, in fact, true that German capitalists supported the Nazis in the belief that they could control their authoritarian machine,

[1] For a fuller account of the attractions of war, see, e.g. D. Harding, *The Impulse to Dominate*, 1941.

and because they concurred in their programme of strengthening Germany, and because they regarded Nazism as an insurance against communism. But this is not enough to justify the communist thesis. Its basic assumption is that Nazism is a dictatorship imposed by force on an unwilling proletariat: only thus can the picture be brought into line with marxist theories of history. But this assumption is demonstrably untrue.

Of democratic interpretations there are broadly two. The first is that the Nazis were a group of 'gangsters' who seized power, thanks to the witlessness of the German people in general, and the Reichstag members in particular. The second is usually expressed in the form that 'there is little to choose between fascism and communism.' This I take to mean that both are attempts to achieve Utopia by crude and violent methods which defeat their own ends. This overlooks the very important fact that the fascist Utopia is wholly different from the communist Utopia—so much so that democracy and communism are nearer to each other than they are to fascism. That is why each could fight fascism and find adequate ideological justification for so doing.

Now if this view is correct, that fascism owes its power to the fact that it appears to offer a profounder satisfaction of psychological needs than does democracy then it becomes clear that the defeat of the German has done nothing to 'put an end to fascism.' Fascism is not dead, but sleepeth. As long as democracy thwarts people and breeds unhappiness, so long will people turn to a system which appears to offer a way out. The ultimate blame for fascism rests on the democracies and in particular on the political and economic agreements after the first World War which made German democracy so abnormally frustrating and hopeless. Perhaps it is because they realise that it is they themselves who are ultimately guilty that some of our diplomats (and others) make such frenzied attempts to pin the whole blame on the Germans—as if no other country but Germany were fascist! Without question, the Germans made of fascism a filthier thing than any other country: nothing justifies their phenomenal cruelties and betrayals: a heavy load of guilt

and blame lies on them. But fascism and cruelty are not identical. There have been other regimes in history as cruel but they were not fascist. And fascism would be a disaster, even if purged of cruelty.

Yes, fascism is still an omnipresent danger. So far from putting an end to fascism, the military defeat of the Germans has probably given fascism a new lease of life. For defeat makes it possible for the short-sighted to argue that if only fascism had won, all would have been well. The miseries now being suffered are the result, not of fascism, but of failure to be fascist enough. Whereas if fascism had avoided war it would necessarily have perished from internal stresses, as its failure to provide a truly satisfying purpose became clear.

How, then, can we prevent a re-emergence of fascism? It is not enough to remind people that the benefits of fascism are largely illusory, that in the end it leads to frustrations so serious as to negative its advantages; it is not enough to remind them that it is likely to lead to the final disaster of war. We must do something positive and constructive: we must show that democracy can achieve permanently what fascism achieves temporarily. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to teach such doctrine to others until we have proved it in our own case.[1] As long as democracy fails to meet fundamental needs, fascism will remain an ever-present danger.

The paradox on which fascism is founded is that people can find greater happiness in serving a cause, even if this ends in

[1] Herein was the weakness of our propaganda position during the war. We could slang the Nazi system as much as we liked, but this was of no effect unless we could show that our system was better at those very things which fascism excelled in : the creation of unity, purpose and status. Through failing to grasp the realities of the situation, our broadcast propaganda endlessly played into German hands. For instance, it made a point of reporting strikes, on the theory that this showed the German worker how free the British worker was. All it did was to fill him with contempt and determination that such a state of affairs, in which a minority could, for selfish reasons, endanger the state, should never recur in Germany. The B.B.C. even made the incredible error of broadcasting in German talks about the 'chaos of the post-war years'.

mutilitation or death, than in working for their selfish satisfactions. Now this is perfectly true. The real weakness of fascism is not that it makes great demands on the individual —and propaganda which points to the greater comforts enjoyed by citizens of democratic countries merely reveals the petty, self-indulgent and materialistic nature of the ideals thus attributed, by implication, to democracy—the real error of fascism is this : that it believes that to serve a cause is enough in itself. It fails to appreciate that this service must be consonant with and based on justice, liberty, variety, individuality, beauty and love.

XII

COMMUNIST SOLUTION

I Contradictory Pattern of Communism—II Appeal of Communism—III Status Under Communism—IV Integration—V Future of Communism—VI Communist Values—VII The Real Danger—VIII Conclusion

I *Contradictory Pattern of Communism*

WHEN we say communism we inevitably think of Russia, and it is with Russian communism, as it exists in practice, not with some hypothetical method of organisation that I intend to deal in this chapter.

As in the case of fascism, the significant thing about communism is not what is bad about it but what is good. So strong is opposition to communism today, at least in the United States, that many Americans would not hesitate to tell you that there is nothing good about it. This is an extremely foolish and naïve attitude. If there were nothing apparently good about communism, there would be nothing dangerous about it. The Russian people would not tolerate it, and even support it as they do, and the peoples of many other countries would not flirt with it. It is precisely its superficial good points which make it dangerous and until we understand what those points are, and why they are not really satisfactory answers to our present problems, we cannot hope to resist its advance effectively on the world scale.

Perhaps I should apologise for undertaking to analyse a society which I have never visited. But Russia is so vast and various that a short acquaintance is worse than none at all—or so we are assured; and this book would be seriously incomplete if we made no attempt to apply the technique here developed to a country which occupies such a crucial position in the contemporary world picture. And in the event I believe it illuminates much that appears obscure about Russia today.

Every student of Russia is warned against the danger of making generalisations about this vast and puzzling country. Nevertheless, certain generalisations can be made provided we approach the subject the right way. First, we must relate our generalisations to the fact that Russia is in a state of rapid change, from primitive agriculture to advanced industrialism. Now, while the many primitive communities within the U.S.S.R. differ widely both psychologically and sociologically, the end-point to which they are all converging is the same: the typical pattern of western industrialism which we have already examined. Even though the economic organisation is different, the 'way of life' towards which Russia is tending is indistinguishable from that of the west. It is a pattern which gives absolute priority to material satisfactions and makes man subservient to the process of production.

Communism is often thoughtlessly presented as the opposite pole from capitalism, but the truth is that, in every respect except that of economic method, communism is based on the same premises as capitalism. And, from the point of view of happiness, the economic aspect is of minor importance.

Once we recognise this converging tendency, this uniformity of trend in Russian development, we can make generalisations about Russia which will not be invalidated by the fact that various parts of the system are more or less distantly removed from the end-point and have sprung from differing origins.

The second polarising force in the Russian continuum is less obvious; it has to do with the tendency, which we discussed earlier, of societies to fall into patriform or matriform patterns. Now communism *as a theory* is essentially the product of the matriform mind—the benevolent, co-operative, progressive mind. It is conceived as a system which will make people happier which will—like a mother—supply them with the means of life, and in which all will co-operate gladly for the common good. We can also trace the matriform origins of communism in its rejection of the guilt-loaded sky-father religion and its preference for a belief in a happy and spontaneous naturalism; or in its desire to take the woman from her lowly position by

the hearth and make her the equal, if not the superior, of man.

But the predominant attitude in Russia—in urbanised cis-Ural Russia at all events—is patriform. We can detect this in the prevalence of a deeply orthodox religious feeling of the usual sky-father type; or in the conception of the Czar, and later Stalin, as 'the Little Father.' The stubborn opposition of the agricultural population to collectivism was also typical of the patriform attitude—although this is not to say that some of the obscurer provinces are not matriform. Even if the population is not uniformly patriform, there can be little doubt that the Russian leaders are patriform and authoritarian to the last extreme. From the fall of the Kerensky government onward, the movement got wholly into the hands of the aggressive, authoritarian type. As usual, matrists made the revolution, but patrists wound up on top.

This explains why the Russian system has undergone a steady conversion from its original equalitarian, libertarian, progressive ideals to an authoritarian, disciplinarian, conservative pattern. But the authoritarians, having only a muddled and degraded conception of the original objective, still carefully preserve the institutions they have been taught to regard as constitutive—that is, the economic institutions—while blithely changing everything else. It is *this* that constitutes the fundamental contradiction which makes nonsense of so many generalisations about Russia.

It is this fact, too, which accounts for the difficulty of defining communism. For, whereas fascism embodies a coherent philosophy, communism (Russian communism) is little but a dogma about a means. The declared objective of communism is social justice—but then that is the declared objective of many systems. The distinctive feature of communism is that it maintains that social justice can *only* be achieved by public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange.

Finally, this enables us to assess the oft-repeated charge that the Russians are abandoning communism. In the sense in which it is ordinarily meant, this is sheer nonsense. The Russians

are not abandoning public ownership of the means of production and are not likely to. In the remoter sense of a system of freedom and equality, the Russians are not abandoning communism because they never had it.

II *Appeal of Communism*

The circumstances in which communism made its appeal are of course historically different from those in which fascism operated; psychologically, however, they are much the same. Where fascism presented an alternative to the frustrations of modern industrialism, communism appeared as an alternative to a corrupt feudalism. Under the Czar the average Russian—or rather, the type of Russian who played an active part in the establishment of communism, which is to say the serfs and industrial workers west of the Urals—was acutely frustrated in respect of purpose, mastery, security, variety and status. Physically he was at the mercy of his feudal lord and agriculturally he was at the mercy of drought and famine. The rigid status system deprived him of any hope of improving his position, the obsolete system of land tenure not only depressed his standard of living, but limited him to the most arduous and brutish kind of physical labour. Life offered no inspiring purpose: often it was all he could do to keep alive.

Accordingly, in considering the appeal of communism, we must judge it by two standards—how it compared with life under the Czar and how it compares with life in an industrial democracy. The first will tell us why the communists came to power, the second whether communism offers any solution for our own contemporary problems.

There can be no doubt that by the first of these standards communism offered overwhelming advantages. It presented the majority of Russians with enormously enhanced security, an absorbing purpose, a predominantly functional status system, and far greater consistency and variety than they had previously enjoyed—to say nothing of a higher standard of living. It also offered unique opportunities for service. It is absurd to contrast

the Russian way of life with that of England or America, and pity the Russian because he is less free, and less wealthy, or because great differences of rank exist. All this is true, but what matters to the Russian is that he is much more secure, much freer, much wealthier than fifty years ago. The present differences of rank, great as they are, are trifling compared with the difference between the overlord and serf; moreover, the prospect of attaining high rank is now open to all. Just like the rich man in America, the privileged man in Russia is an object of envy and admiration rather than of resentment. And in addition to all this, the Russian has something he never had under the Czars, a purpose.

At the same time he suffers, as yet, from few of the disadvantages of industrialism. Overcrowding, noise, misfeeding, strain, have not yet had time to undermine his physique; the obligations of civilised life have not yet corrupted his basic personality structure; no detritus of obsolete mores and taboos exists to clog the social system. All in all, is it probably true to say that up to 1939 the Russians were the happiest people west of the Urals.

Nevertheless, their happiness was not unalloyed. In the excitement of the great improvement in their affairs they were in no mind to quibble over minor imperfections, but these minor imperfections may prove all-important in the long run. Let us therefore examine some of the factors in communist happiness a little more closely, in order that we can subsequently assess its potential appeal to the industrial west. I shall start with the particularly significant matter of status.

III *Status under Communism*

The interesting thing about the Soviet status system is that it corresponds much more closely to the theoretical ideal, as we have argued it, than it does to the ideal embodied in communist doctrine. We asserted that status must grow naturally out of function: everyone must have a function and their status must depend on a free public evaluation of the way in

which they fulfil that function. Now communism has unquestionably succeeded in giving everyone a function. No one remains idle (not even the criminal) and no one wastes time in fatuous trivialities. Every citizen is made aware of the part he is asked to play in the purposes of the group. And status is certainly based on that function. It is the stakhanovite worker, the fanatical party member and the ballerina who delights tens of thousands who enjoy the highest status in Russia, with the supreme position going naturally enough to those who direct the purposes of the group.

Such status is mobile, but at present enjoys the great advantage that it is chiefly mobile in an upward direction—even more so than in America. All over Russia untrained manual labourers are becoming technicians and adding to their self-respect and to their public status as they do so. Any worker, if he has what it takes, can become a stakhanovite; he can even aspire to be a party member. It is true that there are certain alarming snakes among the ladders. The party has its purges, the factory manager who fails may be 'liquidated,' those who arouse the suspicions of the NKVD are transported in a flash to Square One, Siberia. But these measures, though brutal, effectively preserve the functional nature of status. They ensure that no one retains the appurtenances of status after he has ceased to deserve them.

The Russian status system can only be criticised at a very subtle level of discrimination. Though it is essentially functional, the concept of functionalism (we *might* object) is conceived too much in economic and materialistic terms. The Russian system is functional as long as we accept the purpose of the state as a satisfying purpose. But if we choose to challenge the purpose of the state we raise very broad issues and lift the whole argument on to the plane of sociology. Provided the purpose of the state effectively embodies the purpose of its constituent citizens, it will appear *to them* as functional and status derived from it will be functional status. On this basis we cannot even object if the state seeks to make the citizen concur in the purpose of the state, for this will add to his happiness. We can only challenge this conception if we feel

able to adduce absolute standards by which purpose can be assessed, so that even a generally accepted purpose can nevertheless be shown to be wrong. This general issue cannot be discussed as a pendent to the subject of status but requires a section to itself. Provisionally, therefore, we must think of the Soviet status system as functional.

How does orthodox marxist teaching compare with all this? Marx notes the injustices of a rigid, non-mobile system of hereditary classes and proceeds to the conclusion that Utopia will be a 'classless society.' His followers speedily read into this phrase the meaning that 'everyone will be equal,' and started an argument which continues to this day. But what is a class? Marx's basic objection to the so-called class system is, that members of the class acquire the privileges of the class wholly or partly by virtue of birth and not wholly by merit. That is, he objects to the status conferred being non-functional. His second objection, more dimly perceived, is that the status of classes is arranged in the form of an economic ladder. Those at the top receive not only more respect but more goods than those below them. In fact, so important have goods become that they have ceased to become a mere privilege of high status but have come to be the hallmark of it. So much so that goods actually confer status on persons who would otherwise have little claim to public respect.

The logical conclusion should therefore be that in Utopia status must not be, directly or indirectly, hereditary and that it must not depend on the endowment of goods. In Russia this is actually the case. A person of high status may be given a high salary or privileges as a mark of respect but never acquires status by the simple virtue of having managed to acquire goods. Goods are quite incidental; respect is all. But to the short-sighted and materialistic person goods are paramount. Hence the popular view that in Utopia incomes must be equal, and the popular error of believing that because Russian incomes are not equal the classless society has not been realised.

The trouble is the phrase 'classless society' is too ambiguous. It suggests a society in which there will be no division of people

into groups by any standards. This is a human impossibility. There will always be the strong and the weak, the stupid and the intelligent, the kind and the cruel, and many more categories. The only sense in which we have any say about classlessness, is in the distribution of privileges, The object of the reformer is to distribute them according to some logical principle (according to merit or according to needs) and not haphazardly. An equal distribution would be almost as unjust as a haphazard one.

IV *Integration*

Communism's other great achievement is the creation and maintenance of a functioning society. What enables it to achieve this is ready availability of a purpose which was generally acceptable—rapid industrialisation. Thanks to this the purposes of the state make sense in terms of individual purpose and the power of the leaders is legitimised. Cohesion is thereby ensured and the individual provided with the purpose—I almost wrote religion—which sustains and vitalises his life.

But it will be appreciated that industrialisation offers no final solution of the problem. Before long it will have been so far achieved that the Russians must look for some higher purpose, precisely as are the democracies at the moment. Moreover, the Russians have little understanding of the real nature of social cohesion, and here as elsewhere are banking on the accumulated credit of a long history of primitive, unindustrialised social organisation. Their strength is that, unlike industrial capitalism, they emphasise the social weal rather than individual goals and thus avoid the error of fostering the egotism which is at the root of social disintegration.

V *Future of Communism*

When, furthermore, we look more closely at the advantages brought by communism we begin to notice that many of them are not inherent in communism as such but are rather products

of the process of industrialisation. When the peasant gains in mastery by abandoning the hand-plough and driving a tractor, that is a simple consequence of industrialisation: he would gain in just the same way under a capitalist administration. When a higher national income gives him facilities to travel, or brings him the cinema and the radio, that is also primarily due to industrialism.

Communism can claim some credit in the matter on two scores: first because it undoubtedly brought industrialisation to Russia much more rapidly than would have occurred under the Czar, and perhaps more rapidly than under any other alternative regime which might have replaced him; and second, because it affected a redistribution of income and a breaking of feudal bonds which enabled the peasant to take the maximum advantage of the rise in the national income. A communist economy is not under the paradoxical need to export which I analysed in an earlier book.[1] But though it is true that communism effected in five years a social transformation that took a century or more in Britain, that does not give it exclusive rights in the benefits of industrialisation. Having achieved the transformation, why should communism not step down, its work done? —that is the rhetorical question we may ask to induce it to justify its existence.

The fact is, communism provides no true solution to the characteristic problems of an industrial civilisation. It cannot re-educate our emotions. It cannot provide mastery, variety, or purpose; it cannot restore cohesion. On the contrary, it is, if anything, slightly worse off in these respects. It has put all its eggs in the one basket of material production and has left even fewer backwaters for the exercise of mastery, even fewer alternatives for the manufacture of variety, even fewer beliefs or illusions from which a purpose might be derived. And it restricts personal freedom besides.

In a formal sense, perhaps, communism can do all these things. Because it is not tied down by considerations of profit it is free to modify the industrial system as it will, even to deindustrialise

[1] *Economics for the Exasperated*, 1947.

again. In theory it provides the pre-conditions for such a renaissance. What it lacks is the philosophy which would enable it to tackle such a problem, the insight which would enable it to detect its existence and the appropriate basic personality to execute the solution.

Summing up, then, we see that the communists are temporarily in an abnormally fortunate position.

The course of industrialism follows a curve which rises at first and then falls back. In its early stages it enjoys a great legacy of cohesion, of effective institutions and well-integrated basic personalities. On this legacy it lives while it adds goods and services to life and for a while only benefits seem to result. But as time passes the goods it supplies suffer from the law of diminishing satisfactions and meanwhile the social legacy is running out, so that suddenly numerous disadvantages develop while its advantages vanish into thin air.

Russia is still living on the rising part of the curve. For the moment it is enjoying all the benefits of industrialisation and none of the costs. The essential question is, has communism developed institutions and values which will prevent the ultimate débâcle? There is not the slightest reason for believing that it has. On the contrary, the later stages of industrialisation under communism may be slightly drearier than in the democracies. In a highly industrialised country the Russian will suffer as much from lack of variety and mastery. The customs governing the basic personality are just as likely to be evilly affected. The web of customs and taboos which hold society together will have been torn down even more drastically than with us. Status might, indeed, remain functional[1]—though reports from Russia suggest that is, in point of fact, becoming less so. Most serious of all, there will be a serious decay of purpose. When industrialisation has been achieved it will no

[1] Indeed, it might even become free of the popular objection that goods are unequally distributed, for as the national income rises there will be decreasing need to bestow special privileges on the most important public benefactors and such privileges will differ by an ever smaller margin from the normal standard of living.

longer serve to inspire loyalty and unity, so that with the decay of purpose will go a decay of cohesion. At the same time power will cease to be legitimate, for the purpose of the group will cease to make sense in terms of individual purposes.

If the Russian leaders are people of exceptional elasticity of mind they may be able to change over to the pursuit of happiness—but this implies abandoning all the techniques of mass leadership and all the ideological background which they have so long proclaimed and which will by this time have attained the force of a sacred tradition. In fact, the system will cease to be communism, as we at present use the word. Such a change is so unlikely of achievement that they are almost certain to do one of three things: revert to dictatorship, turn to fascism, or fall back on the old favourite, war.

It has often been said that no more difficult scene for the communist experiment could have been found than Russia—on the grounds that the backward nature of the population put great difficulties in the way of industrialisation. In truth, however, Russia was in an exceptionally favourable position for such an experiment.

To begin with, as we have said, Russians were so phenomenally badly off under the Czar that almost any change was bound to be a change for the better.

Secondly, because Russia is so largely unindustrialised the disadvantages of industrialism have scarce begun to appear, while the advantages of a larger supply of material goods are overwhelming. Industrialisation therefore provided the Russian leaders with a widely acceptable purpose which could be represented, and truthfully represented, as a road to greater happiness.[1]

Thirdly, the Russian basic personality is still largely

[1] It is an ironical reflection that the war, which so many opponents of Russia wanted to see prolonged until she was irretrievably weakened, has actually provided communism with a longer lease of life, by postponing the day when a new purpose must be found. And it is equally ironical that the Communist leaders are desperately trying to undo the effects of this stroke of good fortune.

unwarped by industrialism. The middle-class characters, guilty and frustrated, portrayed by Dostoievski and others, are not typical of the mass of the Russians. The Russian personality is generally cheerful, guiltless and unaggressive.[1] Such people are easily led, and having firmly-integrated personalities free from the spiritual sources of unhappiness—anxiety, guilt and frustration—are more easily able to endure primitive physical hardships and the absence of the more elaborate forms of self-expression.

Finally, the Russian leaders had the benefit of working with a society which enjoyed immense reserves of social cohesion. The age-old systems of institutions and taboos still ensured the survival of society as a functioning organism through all the vicissitudes of the revolution and the clumsy surgery of the period of reconstruction.

Lenin believed that communism was dependent upon industrialisation. He could not have been more mistaken. The truth is, communism can be made to work in Russia only because it is *not* industrialised.

VI *Communist Values*

The faults of communism can be traced to its system of values and it is probably best to approach the subject from this angle.

The outstanding mistake of communism is to overvalue material things and undervalue psychological needs. People are apt to forget that the one implies the other; they criticise communism for its preoccupation with materialism but attach no importance to its deliberate neglect of emotional factors. It was typical of the communist approach that they should have planned to take children away from the 'degrading influence' of their parents and bring them up in institutions. Indeed, they not only planned this but tried it, and needless to say it was a resounding failure. What pathetic ignorance! This tendency to treat man as a machine is as evident in the work

[1] See, for instance, E. Bigland, *Laughing Odyssey*, 1939.

of Pavlov as in the stories of Gogol and forms the basis of the materialist conception of history.

Accordingly, communist teaching does not stress the importance of the love relationship and attempts to treat marriage and parenthood as purely economic associations. Thus, so far from providing new institutions in which emotional relationships may be advanced, it works to undermine existing ones. It is true that, in the light of sad experience, it has been forced to retreat somewhat from its theoretical ideals but it has not shifted its ground of principle.

What is so odd is that communists fail to appreciate the fundamental contradiction in their attitude. They believe they are trying to operate a system which will bring good to all men: thus their own attitude to other people is a non-economic one. It is motivated by universal goodwill. And yet they deny for others the reality of such emotional motives and would have it that they are economic integers.

This contradiction runs through the communist value system. Communism sets out with immense determination to raise the level of education and then finds it has to restrict freedom of thought. It would deeply like to have a rich and flourishing art—but it has to bring pressure to bear on its artists that restricts their achievements to the level of talented mediocrity.

Now, as we have already seen, a contradictory value system is an unfailing source of neurosis. No artist can survive in a regime which limits his freedom to work as he feels. No scientist can endure a dogma which tells him, on *a priori* grounds, that what he has discovered must be wrong when he knows it to be true. Truth remains truth, however it be denied. Only fanatics —that is, neurotics—can convince themselves that black is white.

VII *The Real Danger*

The relationship of communism to happiness is complicated in practice by a further novel factor. The Russian policy of

educating people to approve of communism while eliminating all who prove recalcitrant amounts to an attempt to fit the people to the system rather than the system to the people. The policy was started, no doubt, in the genuine belief that only those with a vested interest in the old regime would have to be eliminated, but as it continues it is bound to result in eliminating not merely those who from traditionalism or base self-interest oppose communism but equally those who, having sincerely tried it, find it does not suit them. The authorities have committed themselves irretrievably to the attempt to attain happiness by the device of public ownership; what is more, they have come to have a vested interest in the attempt. No longer revolutionaries, they are conservatives. If they find their regime unpopular they will be irresistibly tempted to try and make the people like what they have got.

For the purposes of this book it is not necessary to discuss the ethics of such an attempt, which are less straightforward than they look, since even the most democratic regimes indulge in the same practice to a certain degree. All that matters is whether such an attempt would, if successful, be conducive to happiness. If it is truly possible to make people unreservedly like what they have got, this may be a much simpler course than changing the system. As long as people are happy in the end, what matters the means?

The answer is that determined attempts to secure acquiescence in a regime are always likely to prove successful. As anthropology shows, people who know no other way of life, acquiesce without hesitation or questioning in regimes which are far from perfect. And not only acquiescence may be obtained but even fanatical support, if the individual can be made to identify the success of the regime with his personal drives. Thus, the real danger is not that people may be unhappy under communism but that they may be too nearly happy.

Popular support is never a proof that a regime is satisfactorily designed. This is just as true of democracy, where popular support is given to a programme of industrialism which, in reality, is undermining happiness all the time. Only

those who understand the nature of happiness are in a position to appraise the success of a society or the desirability of a regime. However, in a society which places no barriers on free thought there is some likelihood that the underlying failure of an unhappy society will be pointed out, whereas any society which seeks to regiment thought will tend to continue in its error. And freedom of thought is in any case a condition of happiness. Hence, regulation of opinion is incompatible with the purposes of a society seeking happiness.

As long as it eliminates those who do not like the system it becomes an attempt to provide not happiness for *all* but happiness for those who like the particular approximation in stock. The objective of social justice is not attained.

VIII *Conclusion*

In conclusion let me reiterate my original point. Communism is based on the same false premises as capitalism. Marx's *Das Kapital* is limited in precisely the same sense that Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* is limited. Both deal with that fictive entity, economic man. Both make the gross mistake of conceiving social justice (*scil.* happiness) in materialist terms.

To Marx social justice was pre-eminently the fair distribution of goods and services. He could not conceive the proletariat as revolting because industrialism had made them profoundly unhappy but only because it had deprived them of their due share of the goods produced. Marx can scarcely be blamed for his limited vision. He wrote at a time when materialism was at its zenith, and at a time when poverty was so acute that to attack the forces producing it was a sufficient life's work. The trouble is that his writings have been invested with such sanctity that today, eighty years later, when the perspective has changed, they are still treated as gospel.

Because the communist analysis of unhappiness is hopelessly defective, the means proposed to remedy it are laughably insufficient. Even if public ownership could be proved to be the most efficient means of production this would still not prove

its desirability. All the dreary arguments about the relative merits of private and public ownership are an abortive waste of time. In this respect communism is the reverse of fascism; for where fascism seeks a bad end by a comparatively efficient means, communism seeks a good end by a quite inadequate one.

The communist analysis of happiness is defective because it has not had the elasticity or the imagination to modify its philosophy in the light of the teachings of psychology and sociology as they became available.

Hence all its mistakes. Its ignorance of sociology led it to such lamentable errors as the attempt to break up the family and the institution of marriage, its scorn for tradition and taboo, its attempt to annihilate religion, and its pursuit of the mirage of the classless society. Its ignorance of psychology led it to the belief that men would become perfect if only the environment were perfect.

Ingenious and stimulating when first formulated, it has failed to evolve—and having got into the hands of patrists it is never likely to. It can only do one of two things: regress to simple dictatorship or follow the kiwi and the dodo.

Part Three

SYNTHESIS

XIII

SOCIOLOGY OF HAPPINESS

I Reconstructing Society—II Population Density—III Remechanisation IV A Paraprimitive Society—V Changing Human Nature—VI Economics of Decentralisation—VII Consistency or Variety?—VIII Nature of Man—IX Security or Self-Determination?—X The Problem of Purpose

I *Reconstructing Society*

I HAVE attempted to interpret the ills of contemporary society in terms of the frustration of human needs and have suggested that fascism and communism have proved attractive, at least, in the short run, because they seem to offer a greater degree of satisfaction of these needs. The task which remains is to suggest some constructive alternative: to draw from this analysis some ideas about the ideal way to organise society and to deduce steps which might carry us towards it.

And certain conclusions do seem to me to emerge very clearly. The first is that man cannot hope to satisfy his basic needs in the crowded environment of the modern city. For one thing he needs space and quiet. He needs scope for physical activity: and not merely scope—which would be satisfied by parks and sports grounds—but a manner of life which makes a good deal of physical activity purposeful and rewarding. He needs, too, a calmer rhythm of life. But there is a second group of objections to the city: it is a poor psychological environment. As we have seen, it does not favour the growth of closely-knit groups bound by emotional links derived from shared experience. It is devoid, too, of those social sanctions which do so much to preserve cohesion and ensure co-operative behaviour.

Man seems to need membership in a fairly clearly defined social group of such a size that he can know every member by sight and recognise a high proportion as *people*. (By this phrase

I am trying to refer to a nameless but essential process which consists in forming an estimate of another person's significance in relation to oneself, and vice versa.) So I infer that the main structural element in an integrated society would be a social group of a few thousand people.

Such communities would have to be interlocked, primarily through members of one having a proportion of their friends in others. There would also be numerous functional organisations which would cover the territory of several communities and these would, if properly designed, serve to weld them together. While the proper design of such groupings is a matter for study (and has recently come to receive a certain amount of attention in the industrial field) it can be said that they should certainly not be pyramided in a hierarchical manner culminating in a central executive. A few threads may lead to the centre, but the weight of authority must be local and co-operation with other groups must be carried out on a person-to-person basis.[1] Equally, the ambit of such groups must not be sharply limited by national boundaries.

I stress this decentralisation of control because man needs the power of self-determination. Aldous Huxley has well phrased man's political needs as 'personal independence and responsibility towards and within a self-governing group.'[2]

In short, we seem to need a cohesive local group, both for emotional and political reasons; and we need a quasi-rural environment. All this seems to point to a dispersal of population through the re-establishment of the village, rather than through the provision of isolated country cottages or to skyscrapers set among parklands on the Corbusier pattern. However, the needs of cultural and economic life would seem to suggest that villages should be diversified by small towns—Clough Williams-Ellis has suggested 50,000 as the most suitable size.

[1] A glimpse of what can be done in this way was given by the army during the war. Though constitutionally given to the formation of hierarchies, it often achieved great functional co-operation between units in the field, under the pressure of necessity.

[2] *Science, Liberty and Peace*, 1947.

This seems remarkably near the pattern of pre-industrial Britain, but we must not, of course, envisage the change simply in terms of a return to the past. The village was, and is, often the scene of intense jealousies, ignorance, narrow-mindedness, sexual repression (alternating with promiscuity or perversion) and other evils. I am speaking for the moment of the physical rather than the emotional or cultural structure.[1]

As soon as we begin to envisage a dispersal of population on these lines, we at once have to consider the question of the overall size of the population in relation to the available land area. In a word, population density. If the population of London were dispersed over England the countryside would become one vast suburbia.

II *Population Density*

It is now becoming widely accepted that, for any given piece of land, there is a theoretically optimum population.[2] If the population is less than the optimum, transport charges are likely to be high, the population has to carry an unduly large load in maintaining fixed equipment such as roads, and in human terms it suffers from isolation. On the other hand, if the population is too dense people begin to get in one another's way; traffic becomes obstructed; money, time and effort has to be spent getting people to and from work; and a considerable apparatus of control is required to prevent neighbours infringing one another's rights.[3]

[1] It would also be unduly optimistic, I think, to see in the present plan to establish new towns outside the main London area, any real progress in the direction indicated. This plan is being carried through chiefly in an attempt to relieve the gross congestion of the capital, rather than as part of a constructive attempt to remodel the environment. It still leaves London as one of the most densely packed assemblies of human beings in the world, and the new towns themselves are too large for cohesion and will certainly undermine the rural life of their neighbourhood.

[2] P. Sargant-Florence, *Over-population, Theory and Statistics*, 1926.

[3] See Roy Glenday, *The Future of Economic Society*, 1944.

The concept remains a theoretical one partly because we do not know in what terms to measure it, partly because it is affected by the way population is distributed within the area. But that does not make it wholly useless. Even if we cannot calculate the optimum, we can at least recognise serious under- and over-population when we see it. In Britain, while much of the Highlands is under-populated, there is gross over-population in central and southern England. It has been tentatively suggested that fifty persons per square mile (which is a little more than the figure in the U.S.A. today) is about right. In Elizabethan England the figure was about seventy per square mile, and for contemporary England and Wales the figure is 727 per square mile—a higher figure than for any area of comparable size except Java. But these figures give us little clue to the real situation since much of Wales, the Pennines and the Lake and Border country is almost uninhabited. It is more to the point that one-sixth of the population lives in the four home counties at a density of almost 3,000 per square mile, and a rough calculation shows that over half the population of England and Wales lives in fourteen counties at an average density of 1,700 per square mile.

This astounding change has come about not simply in consequence of a drift to the capital but also because populations have been allowed to grow to the limit set by the food which could be grown or imported. That they have now virtually ceased to grow is probably, as Glenday argues, a direct consequence of the overcrowding, as happens with animal communities. In the future, with increased powers of production and improved techniques of transport and control, Britain—still more America—could doubtless support even denser populations if it were thought desirable. But can it be doubted that it will limit populations to a much lower figure—a figure which will make access to country and to solitude available to everyone? Not only this, it will hardly force people to live in the rainy and foggy areas of its domain. It will seek to establish an optimum ratio of population to favourable environments, rather than to its total land area. In fact, we may imagine that people will

drift away from the colder and less hospitable areas altogether, and confine themselves to the shores of the Mediterranean, California and the isles of the Pacific.

III *Remechanisation*

The second broad principle which seems to emerge is that we should be prepared to sacrifice a considerable part of modern mass-production technique. If work on the production line is frustrating, we must—if happiness is our object—keep it to the minimum. And this applies to other things beside the production line. If, for instance, work underground is judged too dangerous or unpleasant, we should try and get our power in other forms, even if they are technically less efficient. For lack of a better word, let us call this kind of change demechanisation, though by it I do not imply that power will not be used, so much as that work will be less repetitive and automatic. Both demechanisation and remechanisation are needed. Nor is it only a matter of removing the isolation and repetitiveness from work. We must seek to make work actively interesting by re-endowing it with creative elements.

The change implied here is basically a change of attitude. In the past we have assumed happiness came only through consumption of goods and services; hence we have felt that every technique which increased the output of goods and services was justified, however great the cost. In the future we must argue as follows. Happiness is a function of *living*. Half our waking adult life is spent at work. Therefore work must be made as absorbing as possible.

These two views represent extreme positions, of course. Just as we have always protected the worker from certain crass forms of exploitation, no doubt we shall always be prepared to make certain sacrifices in the interests of efficiency in the future; and the growth of the limitations on exploitation of the worker in recent years indicates the steady change in our attitude. This change will have to go much further than we imagine.

Nevertheless, the suggestion that we should demechanise

industry will seem to many so radical that we must examine it more closely. We agreed, earlier, that the main features of an interesting job were that it should provide scope for initiative and skill, that it should not be monotonous, and that the individual or the work-team should carry the whole process through from start to finish. To be exact, it is not mechanisation but automatisation and subdivision which have made many modern factory jobs dull. Studies made during the war in the U.S.A. suggest that work can be so arranged that the same individual or team works on the product right through from raw material to the finished article. No doubt, if we seriously turn our attention to it, we can find other ways in which interest can be restored without any sacrifice of efficiency.

But I am suggesting something more than this. I am suggesting that we must be prepared to sacrifice productive efficiency, too. I am suggesting that a certain fall in the standard of living as measured in goods would be more than compensated in terms of happiness by the increased pleasure of making them. Only if this point is quite clearly established, am I ready to go on and say that, for several reasons the fall in the material standard of living need only be slight. First, as discussed in our earlier chapter, a considerable part of modern production is marginal, in the sense that people's desire for the goods is very slight in comparison with the effort expended in making them. Many people buy precision cameras whose needs would be amply served by a simple inexpensive model. This is like giving an old lady a racing Bugatti or drawing a milk-cart with an Arab mare. The motives are, no doubt, connected with prestige and self-flattery: and by the same token we find much conspicuously wasteful expenditure in many other fields. Some people have far more clothes, larger houses and more numerous cars than they need. And, like the millionaire's yacht, representing many thousands of man-hours of labour, they lie unused a great part of the time.

All these marginal goods could be dispensed with and the labour, which at present goes to make them, devoted to more important activities. Given this extra labour, these industries

could then decrease their degree of mechanisation while maintaining the same total output. (Let us take the economics of such a change for granted at the moment.)

The second reason for supposing the ultimate loss to be small is that there are extraordinary inefficiencies in production and distribution in modern society: the U.S. dustbowl may stand as a symbol of them. With the reconstruction of the economic side of society (to which I am about to refer) many of these should disappear. Not least of them is the wastage due to war.

And should we, as suggested in a later section, succeed in re-establishing society on a co-operative rather than a competitive basis, it would become possible to eliminate the vast apparatus of police, prisons, lawyers, judges and the like whom we require at present to restrain anti-social behaviour; also many of the bureaucrats who, not only in times of shortage, are required to regulate the activites of our complex society.[1]

As a further outgrowth of this idea of demechanisation and remechanisation I should hope to see a change in the nature or our concept of leisure. As noted earlier, the distinction between work and leisure is an artificial modernism.[2]

Here, too, I think we must resume the earlier pattern of life. Work must be done in a leisurely manner. A rationally-organised society, instead of devitalising productive activity, and then trying to restore the balance by administering tonics to an equally devitalised leisure, will set to work to make the productive process vital and interesting, and the demand for leisure will be weakened.

There is a third and still more intractable reason why we should accept some degree of demechanisation. Men cannot be happy while engaged in making fatuous luxuries or performing unworthy services. Man needs a worthwhile purpose. To grow food, to make a ship or a house, to weave clothes, to

[1] Viscount Samuel estimates that hours of work could be reduced to 20 weekly at once, by such eliminations, if only the needed co-operation were forthcoming. See *The Unknown Land*, 1941.

[2] See G. Chapman, *Culture and Survival*, 1940, to which I am indebted for my appreciation of this point.

tend the sick—all these and many more provide a satisfactory motive and justify the effort and hardship they demand. But as we enter the field of luxuries the sense of purpose declines. This is not to say that there is *no* satisfaction in making, let us say, precision cameras or vintage port. The satisfaction depends on one's estimate of the role it is to play. It is the suspicion that the camera is to be used a few times by a wealthy *flâneur* and then put on the shelf or the port poured down some guzzling gullet which discourages.

These principles point uncompromisingly to a method of organisation which we are pleased to regard as primitive. They suggest a nexus of small-scale individualists working in their own time, for their own ends, at the tasks which attract them most. We are familiar with the disadvantages of primitive industrialism: technically it is less efficient and it is handicapped by lack of co-ordination, economically it cannot support research and sales organisations and cannot easily spread its risks. The technical problem is therefore to apply the machine to such small-scale industry in such a way as to raise its efficiency and to make use of technological knowledge to bring about the necessary co-ordination. Society cannot—nothing is more certain—do without the machine. What it has to do is make the machine its servant instead of becoming itself the slave of the machine. We must not modify society to suit machine production, we must modify machine production to suit the needs of society.

IV *A Paraprimitive Society*

We begin to get a picture of a country with a scanty, scattered population, neither concentrated in great towns and cities nor spread quite evenly over the land as in a primitive farming community, but gathered into little knots and clumps, some larger than others; here centred round a factory, there congregating in a modest town; here meeting for some functional, productive purpose, there subordinating productive purpose to psychological considerations.

Each scattered community will be free to meet its own problems in its own ways, and will develop its own institutions and cultural idiosyncrasies.

Life will flow slowly and smoothly but more widely. It will not often reach the violence of outstanding achievement—and, perhaps, such eminence when it does occur, will be half regretted —but on the other hand, it will not leave great masses of the population devitalised and incapable of any achievement.

To suggest this kind of pattern as an ideal may invite the accusation of indulging in romantic archaism, of attempting to escape into the past and of imagining it as a golden age. I must emphasise, therefore, that the view here put forward is not to be classed with these unrealistic, romantic archaisms. The Natural Savage of Carpenter's works is, in fact, often undernourished; tortured by yaws, hookworm, and many another revolting disease; worn down by strenuous labour; plagues by superstitious fears; harrassed by an oppressive religion; and even hag-ridden by neurotic compulsions like the Dobu and the Kwakiutl. I recognise the psychological motives which turn men's thoughts back to a primitive state and put a romantic halo round it. I accept the argument that, without machinery, society would not be Utopian but squalid. The task is to take the best features from the primitive pattern and to use machinery and technology to eliminate the drudgery, disease, and expense of spirit, instead of proceeding from one ridiculous extreme to another. What I assert is that man must use machinery deliberately: must adopt just so much of it as is necessary to transform the environment—but must be firm in rejecting it whenever it would distort his existence. Machines are something to employ or ignore, according as they subserve the needs of the Good Life or not. Today, in contrast, we adopt each new machine without question or hesitation. The machine is our master not our servant.

For a decentralised and 'demechanised' community which, nevertheless, makes full deliberate use of machinery and technology to serve its purposes, I propose the description 'paraprimitive.'

There is also a further sense in which we can afford a return to something resembling primitivism, though it is hard to pin down. Man seems to need to feel that he is playing his part in the whole vast process of life. This has been expressed by saying he needs to live *symbiotically*, or that he needs to live in an organic, and not merely a mechanical relationship with his surroundings. Here we are dealing with a concept too fragile for the coarse analysis of contemporary science. Whatever the rationale of this need, and for my part I would connect it with the oceanic feeling, it certainly exists and is evident in many primitive societies. Probably it is in this sense more than any other that we need a paraprimitivism.

v *Changing Human Nature*

As we discuss the sort of changes which might make life more satisfying, the question insistently arises: how could such changes be brought about? It is all very well to say that factories should deliberately lower their efficiency, but it is hard to conceive of any business man doing it today, and he would probably go bankrupt if he did. It is all very well to suggest that people should live in small towns in the country, but the fact is that they steadily flock into the metropolis.

I think we must suspend our argument to tackle this fundamental problem at once. Indeed, there are certainly many improvements we could introduce, quite apart from the far-reaching changes here considered, if only people would behave differently. And that, of course, is the heart of the problem: the real task is to get people to behave differently. Since it would defeat the purpose of happiness if people were compelled to live where they did not wish, or compelled to follow any other principle of some abstract theme, we are bound to operate at the level of making people *want* what is good for them.[1]

[1] This will cause some readers to raise the question : who is to say what is good for them? And they will suspect that I am merely substituting for the arrogance of planning other people's lives the greater arrogance of planning their personalities. This danger is discussed later in the chapter (p. 249).

And once we achieve this, no further 'planning' is necessary, or even desirable. It is a faulty approach to work out principles in the way we have just been doing. The only effective approach is to work for human self-development. To be sure, a technical problem remains, the problem of providing people with the best environment for right action—which means, before all, giving them the data on which to base their decisions—but this is a minor problem compared with the hopeless and self-defeating task of trying to compel people to right action.

At this point a good many people will be murmuring that you can't change human nature, which in the present context, must mean: people will always be selfish, acquisitive and aggressive. But if we inspect other societies and ways of living throughout the world we find that many, probably a majority, avoid the errors of our own civilisation. They do not devote themselves to the manufacture of goods to the point where this distorts their whole life. Their members do not try and accumulate a maximum share of what goods there are. Nor do they strive for power. When they employ labour they do not pay it as little as possible and demand as much effort as the worker can be induced by the fear of discharge to give. And some of them never wage war. Nothing could be further from the truth than to suggest that the pattern of western society is implicit in human nature.

So the question arises, why do they behave in this way?

To some extent this is to be explained in terms of their basic personality structure. Thanks to childhood training, both deliberate education and the unplanned lessons of weaning and the development of the maternal relationship, they often are less aggressive, acquisitive and selfish than we are. Similarly, the values they absorb are, frequently, those of co-operative behaviour and self-restraint, rather than of personal 'success' or conspicuous wealth. But, more important than these, they possess different patterns for expressing their needs. To use a technical concept from anthropology, they 'phrase' their needs differently.

For instance, a desire for the respect and admiration of others is general in humanity. In our culture it is often phrased in

terms of personal economic success: the man who makes money is regarded with envy and approval, the man who fails is regarded with scorn. (Note how our phrase 'makes money' automatically implies 'for himself.' But in many cultures only making money for others would evoke admiration; making it for oneself would evoke scorn. This is an example of how we 'phrase' our needs.)

But there are plenty of ways of earning approval which do not depend on money at all. The most satisfactory, perhaps, is to earn it by one's productive skill. This was commonly the case in our earlier history and still survives in a limited number of fields. Similarly, institutional outlets for aggression, such as the duel or the tournament, conducted under strict rules, provide a spillway for aggression which, without them, might burst out in uncontrolled form.

In my opinion, then, we can only solve the problems of modern society by a double change. We must change our values, but in order to make such a change effective we must also change the nature of our social pattern. To put it baldly, we must change from a competitive and individualistic basis to a co-operative basis. I do not believe that any change of values, any deeper understanding of the conditions of happiness, is enough in itself to stop the rot. We have to change the whole basis of our society.

Those who pin their faith to the need for a change of values (important as this is) forget that values are based in experience. If people flock to the towns it is because they actually find life in the towns, on balance, more agreeable than life in the country. If they take jobs on production lines, this is because they find such jobs more agreeable than no jobs at all. The choice which each man has to make is the choice between the alternatives which exist in his society as it is. Something must be allowed for convention and custom, but basically this is the position. Actions which would be wise in society as it might be are not rewarding in society as it is. Thus, it is only by a *creative effort* that we can solve our problems. We need the imagination to visualise a different pattern of society and the courage to work for it.

The foregoing statement of the double attack which we must make on society requires a second gloss which is already obvious. It is that values cannot be changed effectively unless personality is changed. And co-operative behaviour is also a matter of personality formation. So really the task is a triple one: to reconstruct personality, values, and institutions (or, if you prefer, phrasing).

The concept of a co-operative society needs expansion. So bound are we by our own experience that it is difficult for us even to imagine society organised on a substantially different basis from that we know. To work out the pattern of a co-operative society for a machine-civilisation cannot be done in a book or a paragraph, and I shall not attempt it. To give some hint of what I mean I can mention one or two features of life in primitive co-operative societies.

In general, people do not work for their own advantage. They spontaneously undertake projects for the good of the group—or rather of a group, it may be the family in-group or it may be the whole community. Sometimes the community will call on them to take such an initiative, for which their skill or experience fits them, and they accept this call, proud of the honour, but somewhat reluctantly, In return the group shares out its 'income' and possessions among its members. Occasionally such societies have aberrant members who take but do not give. They are regarded as a liability. Of course, the community has certain recourse against those who do not play the game. It can ostracise them or cut off the supply of goods. It can refuse to co-operate in their projects.

When we compare such a pattern with that of industrial society we find it so difficult that we can hardly imagine following it. We can scarcely visualise the business entrepreneur conducting business for whatever pittance society chooses to give him. But on looking more closely we find the differences are less striking. The civil servant does attempt to conduct the community's business for a sum which is relatively small. The prominent man does undertake work on committees and delegations as a matter of public spirit. The strength of such patterns,

once established, is well shown by the case of the family. The businessman, however egoistic, does provide for his family without receiving any material return. If occasionally a man refuses to provide for his family he has the whole weight of public opinion against him, and the law can also be invoked to enforce his conformity with the approved pattern.

The fact is, our society, like almost all societies, contains many co-operative elements. The concept of the pursuit of self-interest put forward by Adam Smith never had any justification as a comprehensive analysis of human behaviour. But during the nineteenth century, encouraged by Darwin, we steadily built up the competitive elements at the expense of the co-operative. We came to believe that society really was competitive. The truth is that competition, a disruptive force, can only function as long as co-operation is present to limit its evil effects.[1] Unfortunately we have begun to believe in competition as an unqualified good; the task today is to shift the emphasis back on to co-operation.

Such a change offers, without doubt, great difficulty. The transition must set up enormous tensions. While some people in the society are working to a new pattern and some to the old there will be disputes between them; and often individuals will be at conflict within themselves, torn as they must be between two codes. In fact, it is because we are engaged in a change from one pattern to another that our society is so disorganised and unhappy today. Unfortunately, we have no clear idea of what we are changing to, and the probability is that we shall have gone through all this torment without achieving happiness. The society at which we arrive may be stable, all right, but that does not mean that it will necessarily be co-operative—and it is only in a co-operative society that we can hope to achieve happiness.

[1] Anthropologically speaking, the division of society into co-operative and competitive elements is inexact . . . Properly, individualism is the other extreme from co-operation. Competition, as we understand it, lies midway between, since competition implies competition between groups, but co-operation within them. See M. Mead, *Co-operation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, 1937.

The interesting feature of Hitler's regime is that he clearly understood the nature of the problem of social change. His aim was the disastrous one of the totalitarian state, but his technique was on the right lines. He attacked at the level of personality (the Hitler Youth employed quite deliberate techniques for making young Germans selfless and aggressive) at the level of values, through the propaganda machine, and at the level of institutions, such as the Arbeitsfront, Kraft durch Freude, the Hitler brides, the mass rallies and countless others. The fact that Germany was defeated on the field of battle, while not unrelated to her ultimate aims, casts no reflection on the effectiveness (it was all too effective in the circumstances) of Hitler's social technique.

VI *Economics of Decentralisation*

But even if we establish such a society the technical problem remains. How will a decentralised community avoid wasteful disorganisation, futile duplication of effort, and unnecessary barriers to intercourse? And can it absorb the effects of local catastrophe by spreading it over the community as a whole?

If anything can solve this dilemma it is the machine. As I see it, the ideal society will be—it must be—comprised chiefly of small closely-woven communities. To a much larger extent than now, these will produce for their own needs. There will be much less to-and-fro movement of goods about the country. Administration will be very largely in local hands. There will be much less emphasis on consistency between one area and another. To knit these communities into a large organism there will be required a delicate but sensitive nervous system. Here a biological parallel may help us. It will not be, as at present, a system terminating in a great central brain with quasi-dictatorial powers over every part, but rather one terminating in a solar plexus which will, all unconsciously, balance out the counter-pulls of many local decisions.

In less imaginative terms, the local communities will have to keep the plexus informed weekly or even daily of their rate

of consumption and production. The plexus, which we may conceive of as a statistical office housing a battery of electric calculating and integrating machines, will sum all this information and indicate continuously whether production is going to balance consumption, in every class of goods, over the whole territory. On the basis of such information, received every morning, local consumers and producers will be able to adjust their behaviour so as to restore a balance.

We need not suppose that the administrative system will be rigidly compartmented. The administrative areas will vary according to the purpose they serve. The physical difficulties of bringing together committees involving people in different areas will be readily overcome by radio and television.

Nor need the principle of local autonomy be applied rigidly. Society should certainly not be developed according to a formal plan. Large industrial enterprises will not be wholly eliminated: such complex tasks as manufacturing aircraft or atomic energy plants will necessarily be organised on a regional or zonal basis, and no doubt these factories will themselves be the nucleus of a social grouping or community. In fact, variety of organisation should be one of the most striking characteristics of a reconstituted society. The great freedom of the local autonomous units will ensure that. But wherever consistency is logically indicated—as in standardisation of electric voltages for instance—a 'hook-up' of all interested parties on the television circuits will make the reaching of agreement a relatively easy matter. (Goodwill we are, of course, taking for granted. The problem here considered is the technical one.)

One of the arguments most frequently brought against decentralisation is that small industrial units are inefficient. The idea that size and efficiency are positively correlated is quite incorrect. Colin Clark, investigating forty industries in five countries found that 'no correlation existed between size of firm and net output per worker.' Going more closely into the matter, he showed that in certain industries large firms are more efficient than small, while in others the reverse is the case; in yet others still more complicated rules prevail. Thus, in the

case of Britain, at the time of the 1930 census of production, large firms were more efficient than small in the case of such industries as petrol refining, flour milling and tube making; small firms were more efficient than large in iron and steel smelting, cotton weaving, linen weaving and jute manufacture; firms of medium size were more efficient than large or small in wire making and non-metalliferous mining; both large and small firms were more efficient than medium sizes in aluminium, lead, cotton spinning, silk, sugar and iron and steel blast furnaces.[1]

Particularly interesting is the work of Ralph Borsodi in America. In practical tests carried out over many years in an experimental community near New York, he and his co-workers have shown that small-scale production is more economical than large in very many fields. Even in the case of flour milling, where Clark found large units more efficient than small, he has demonstrated that it can be done in the home with electric equipment at much less than commercial cost, even when full allowance is made for capital charges, depreciation, repairs and labour.[2]

Possibly the reader will expect me at this point, since I am writing under the heading of economics, to deal with such technicalities as inflation, the budget or the balance of trade. If so, he has misunderstood the role of economics. In mediæval society what people did in the economic sphere was settled by custom and, where custom failed, by agreement as to the most suitable course. Profit was not a primary consideration, nor did ownership bestow the right of disposing of property as the owner saw fit. But, as Sir Henry Maine pointed out long ago, status was gradually replaced by contract: that is, a man was held free to act as he wished provided he observed any explicitly stated conditions. Ownership of property entitled him to dispose of property as he liked. In short, economics became a *system of control.* The use to which land was put, for instance, was settled not by tradition or public feeling, but by whoever

[1] C. Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress,* 1940.

[2] See R. Borsodi, *Prosperity and Security,* 1938.

could afford to become the owner. This was the conception of economics developed by Adam Smith.

But I am now postulating a thoroughly public-spirited citizen as the indispensable basis of social reconstruction. Such a citizen will not feel himself free to exploit the situation for his own benefit within the limits imposed by contract. Such a citizen will feel obliged to ascertain the general feeling and to seek the best social solution. In these circumstances economics ceases to be a method of control, and becomes a technical problem. If a project is considered desirable and funds are lacking, all that is required is to pipe them in from some point where funds have accumulated. The 'owner' of such funds will have no more objection than does the chief engineer of a power station which is called on to put current into the grid. That is, he is free to object on technical grounds but not on grounds of proprietorship.

To work out the terms of a technical economics is a technical problem which must not be underrated. It would however be a waste of effort to undertake it at this stage, for this, of course, is not the direction in which we are moving at present. The course of leaving control to economics having produced such disastrous results as soon as it was applied without restraint, we have chosen to give to the state the role of imposing limitations on the contract. This method is quite ineffective and leads to the accumulation of more and more controls. The only workable control is one's own conscience.

The thing which makes the maintenance of such local communities as living organisms possible is the paradox that the more people can travel the less they need move. In the mass economic organisation of today a man must go where the job sends him, and owing to the pulsations of the trade cycle he is likely several times to change his employer. On each such occasion he may have to move house and family to a new district, cutting at one blow all the emotional and social roots he and his family have established in the district. Hence, in part, the disintegration and loneliness of modern suburban life. With the much greater diversification of local industry which we

foresee for the future, and the increasingly attractive nature of most productive processes, together with greater economic stability, such moves should be far fewer. On the other hand, when the job does take a man away from home, speedy travel will enable him to return to his normal residence between his brief stints of work, rather than tear up his home and carry it to the neighbourhood of his work.

In short, although people will travel more and will doubtless on their holidays visit all parts of the world, they will nevertheless grow much firmer roots in the soil of the county they have chosen to make their own.

VII *Consistency or Variety?*

A society such as I am visualising would necessarily exhibit great local variation. Such variation would probably affect the standard of living, and this may appear to some as an obstacle. We do not fully realise how dominated we have become in the west by the idea of consistency. We think it a genuine injustice if we find people getting unequal pay for equal work. The whole basis of trade unionism and hence of labour socialism is to establish consistency of pay and conditions for given jobs. The same assumption supports the plea of equal pay for women.

What is not understood is that this desire for consistency extends only to material goods and services. We do not think it wrong that one person should have more power than another, and so we see nothing ridiculous about constructing a system in which power is made more unequal in order to make the distribution of goods more equal. Still less do we worry about whether people have equal access to emotional, æsthetic or spiritual experiences.

The citizen of the future, not needing goods to bolster his personality, will attach relatively little importance to goods and so will doubtless be quite uninterested in whether the distribution is equal or not. People will take as much or little as they fancy and anyone who shows a pathological desire for

goods will recognise himself as ill and consult his doctor. If they worry about consistency at all, it will be in the emotional, æsthetic and spiritual sphere. But I doubt if they will worry as we do. They will recognise that, here as in so many things, one loses on the roundabouts what one gains on the swings. The more consistency, the less variety. Between these two they will try and hold a balance, and will, if anything, think variety the more important.

VIII *Nature of Man*

The objection may be offered by some that any attempt to change human personality by deliberate methods inevitably introduces satanic dangers. Everyone remembers the terrifying picture, drawn by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* (and sometimes oddly referred to as an Utopia) of a race conditioned from birth to behave as the state sees fit. Is this the danger which we run if we try to produce citizens for Utopia?

This problem really turns upon the nature of our concept of man. If we conceive him as fundamentally unselfish our work can be confined to removing the handicaps which stunt and restrict his development. A gardener does not determine the ultimate shape of the tree; he merely seeks to enable it to realise to the fullest extent the potentialities which were ever implicit in the seed. He cannot make an elm grow like an oak; he can only make it into an apotheosis of elmhood. It is only when he undertakes the distinctive arts of Japanese gardening or topiary that he begins to distort its treehood. As long as we confine ourselves to gardening pure and simple there can be no inherent danger in any attempt to foster human development.

If, however, human nature is essentially unco-operative and unloving any attempt to make men co-operate implies a policy of restricting development and implies the setting of an artificially-conceived target or pattern of desired behaviour. In this case attempts to improve behaviour are attended with a very real danger. This does not necessarily mean we should not make them, but it does mean we shall have to be extremely

careful to avoid dogmatism about the end and the danger of unscrupulous men misusing these new-won powers.

The view on which this book is based is that man embodies two principles, one self-assertive and primarily selfish, the other loving—and remarkable in that it both gratifies his own needs (i.e. makes him happy) and simultaneously leads him to unselfish behaviour. If man contained simply selfish and unselfish drives no stable solution would be possible. It is solely due to the extraordinary fact that love gratifies selfish needs in the course of unselfish behaviour that any satisfactory solution can be imagined.

IX *Security or Self-Determination?*

Finally we come to the question of security. Here we have a good deal of confused thinking to dispose of. Man has at all times to preserve a balance between his needs, and this is true of security. Man needs to feel himself a responsible agent in control of his own fate. A purely paternalistic security frustrates this need. The task which confronts us is not so much to provide security as to increase man's power to control his own fate.

The modern world has found subtle ways of undermining that power. The workman is deprived of his livelihood by impersonal economic forces, he is caught up in wars whose genesis baffles his understanding, and so forth—the arraignment is quitē familiar. But let us have no false romanticism. The primitive is also at the mercy of an arbitrary fate—crops may fail, disease may strike, catastrophe break loose. I don't doubt that he is worse off than industrial man in this respect.

In principle, technology *does* give man an added power to control his own fate. The task is to place that power in the hands, not just of man in general, but of each man individually. Society must be so organised that he can use that power.

In the sphere of economics there is no insoluble difficulty. The farmer can always survive a bad year or two. How does he manage it? First, he produces for subsistence—he produces

necessities, and can always meet his own basic needs. The fact that he produces necessities means there is always *some* sale for his goods. People may stop buying luxuries altogether, but they cannot wholly stop buying goods. If the money mechanism breaks down they will revert to barter to get them. The second element in the situation is that the peasant farmer can always spread the work thinner. If sales fall off he does not discharge men, he farms more extensively and less intensively.

Both these principles could be applied in a community of the type I have been describing. A co-operatively-run factory, in which the staff was bound together by ties of respect and affection, would always prefer to spread the work, and the pay, thinner rather than to throw out some of the workers, just as a family cuts its standard of living all round during a depression instead of throwing one of the children in the street. Secondly, the small local community, as I visualise it, will have diversified occupations and, owing to the reduced emphasis on luxuries, a considerable part of its activity will be concerned with necessities. Much more than now, it will verge on being self-supporting. At the same time, the existence of large regional, national and international networks of credit and communication will enable it to borrow to meet temporary crises in a way which is not open to the true primitive community.

x *The Problem of Purpose*

After all has been said and done, the irritating doubt arises: will the inhabitants of our paraprimitive Utopia really be *happy*? We cannot resist the suspicion that, like the seamen in *The Unknown Land*, they will feel bored. As Oscar Wilde said, there are only two tragedies in life: not having everything you want, and having it.

Thinking round this paradox we recall how often one struggles to attain some objective, believing it will bring happiness; and when one attains it, for a time it seems to do so, but before long one is off again pursuing some new goal. Looking back, it seems to us that we were happiest when we

were still striving for happiness. From this the view derives that happiness is a by-product of the effort to pursue some ulterior end, and must not be pursued as an end in itself. If this is so, for what end are the Utopians to struggle?

These considerations puzzle us because we view the problem from within the limitations of our own culture. Western society is, as we have argued, abnormally preoccupied with striving, with attempts at self-validation. When we are striving successfully, the neurotic anxieties which cause this behaviour are temporarily appeased, and so we do obtain a temporary increase in happiness. This is why Shaw can make Captain Brassbound say: 'Give a man a course to steer and he will be too busy to worry about happiness.' Any course, you note. But only a warped individual could be satisfied without asking to what destination the course led.

There is one purpose for which the Utopian *must* struggle, and that is, to meet his own needs. As I argued earlier, the concept of needs must be interpreted dynamically. Man does not simply require to have his needs satisfied; he needs to satisfy them by his own efforts, and to take the responsibility which this implies. If he is to be happy, his life must be so arranged that he is *directly* engaged in contributing to his own self-preservation and self-fulfilment and that of others.

Yet we know that no man can undertake undivided responsibility for himself all the time. There are bound to be occasions when misfortune and ill health defeat him. Therefore he must live among others who will at such times step forward to help him in just such measure, and for just so long as he needs help. And when I say help I mean much more than material aid; I mean also sympathy, moral support, wise counsel, intellectual stimulus and good example. Correspondingly he must stand ready to offer such aid to others. Finally, he will also be ready to take part in the collective purposes of the group.

At the same time, our preoccupation with purpose makes us fail to realise that many activities can be rewarding not just as means to ends, but in themselves.

It is because of this obsession that we get the classic western

definition of happiness as the devotion of the maximum effort to the best possible end. It is because of this obsession that we cannot conceive the Utopians being happy in a static Utopia. The idea that they might be happy doing things for the happiness of doing them eludes us.

When we look around and try to classify those who—in our own culture or some other—have truly achieved happiness, we invariably observe that they have rejected striving; that they find their happiness in 'just living', and in the security of a satisfactory relationship. We may suppose therefore that the Utopian citizen will be content to lead a life which, judged by contemporary standards, would appear as dull and stagnant. Judged by his own, it will seem rich and exciting, splendid with a great range of experience, feeling and discovery. While our obsessive, distractive, emotionally starved, artistically drab, intellectually stereotyped lives will seem sour and stagnant to him.

To the Utopian, having everything he wants, and not having it, will be matters of equal indifference.

XIV

POLITICS OF HAPPINESS

I A Revolution in Thought—II The Double Delusion—III The Synthetic Approach—IV Society is an Organism—V Progress or Regress ?—VI Reconstructing Values—VII Induction—VIII Is Happiness Possible ?

I *A Revolution in Thought*

It is difficult to over-emphasise the tremendous and far-reaching significance of the social and psychological discoveries which I have attempted to describe in this book. Many of the details may be wrong, yet the main thesis can hardly be denied: that men and society interact, and only an attack at the key-points of this process has any hope of success.

Even if the analysis is only approximately correct it calls for a complete reconstruction of our ideas about politics, economics, morality and how to live our daily lives. The bulk of human activity in the west is seen to be abortive. Most of its plans for the future are revealed as futile. The pattern of life needs reconstructing from the ground up.

Perhaps our most serious defect is to have lost the power of wonder. We scarcely recognise a revolution when we see it. Amazing technical miracles cause only a passing interest: even the miracle of the atomic bomb inspires no amazement, only fear. The man who tries to re-awaken our sense of wonder is accused of taking himself too seriously. Nothing ever changes, says the cynic from his comfortable superiority, ignoring the fact that things change all the time. The reasons for this attitude are easy to see: to admit that drastic readjustments are needed is to commit ourselves to an exhausting and anxious process of revision: we have to challenge all our hard-won convictions and reject many of them. We may have to change the habits of a

lifetime. The assertions in the last paragraph but one may seem sweeping, but I believe that we have here the beginnings of a revolution in human affairs, and to awaken an appropriate reaction in my readers I must risk the accusation of having overstated my case.

Whatever else may be cast in doubt, I believe it is beyond question that the many political and economic theories which occupy the world today, which absorb so much devoted support or embittered opposition, and which are held to justify so much brutality and bloodshed, are 90 per cent. error, both as regards ends and means. Movements like socialism which are primarily concerned to help men in meeting their physical needs, not only leave psychological needs unsatisfied but are bound to intensify frustration by the very means they adopt to further their main end. Socialists and communists are dominated by the same error as industrial capitalists: all believe or act as though they believe that the thing is to maximise the supply of goods and services.

If the conclusions of this book are correct, socialism and communism are pursuing the wrong end. Whatever they may say or believe, what in practice they are doing is trying to produce even more goods than capitalism and to distribute them according to a different system. But goods, in our view, constitute a trivially unimportant factor in happiness. It is no counter-argument to point to an undernourished man sitting workless in a slum and to expatiate upon the improvement there would be in his lot if he had a modern flat, more food, and a car to take him into the country, because the chances are that were it not for the industrial machine he would not be in the slum, he would not be workless, he would not be starving, and he would be in the country. The average crofter in the north-west of Scotland lives in accommodation which *if* it were in the centre of a slum would be intolerable, he spends on food a sum which *if* he had to spend it in a big city would be insufficient to support life, but which in the quite different circumstances of the country are only a little less than adequate. I am not suggesting that the crofter's lot is ideal—it is far from

that—but if I had to choose between a croft and a Glasgow slum I should not have to think twice.

It is a symptom of our misunderstanding that conservatives attack socialist proposals, such as nationalisation, on the grounds that they will not work efficiently and socialists defend them by denying this. The argument is idle. Even if we could prove that nationalisation will raise output, that is no reason for introducing it.[1] The question which matters is, will it raise happiness?

These criticisms apply with equal force to capitalism.

Socialists will point to the existence of undernourishment and overcrowding. Is it no contribution to happiness to attack these evils they will demand? Of course it is—within the context of our current type of society. It is also a good thing to give parachutes to the passengers of a burning aircraft, but it is still better to put the fire out: and there may not be time to do both.

Socialists will point to social security measures. At least you cannot object to them, they will say, for you have yourself stressed the need for security. But the same argument applies. Unemployment as we know it is a symptom of industrialism. With a less highly-differentiated industrial machine and an output confined to essentials, plus communal spirit, what little unemployment emerged could at once be absorbed by local readjustments of working schedules, just as it is in a primitive farming economy. The need for a costly social security organisation is created by the vast and specialised industrial machine on which both capitalism and socialism equally rely.

By the same token, our so-called science of economics is revealed as no science at all. It bases its arguments on the premise that happiness will result from supplying goods and services to meet a demand expressed in money. But as we have seen, men cannot express their most important demands in terms of money and supplying goods and services cannot meet them.

Equally, contemporary politico-economic devices are futile

[1] Except possibly as a temporary measure to meet post-war shortages and reconstruction problems.

considered as means. They attempt to change human behaviour without changing human personality. They can only succeed to the extent that human nature is ready for the change. Rationing, for instance, is a device for ensuring the equal distribution of scarce supplies. In England it works because the majority of the population regards such sharing as desirable and is morally ready to co-operate in such a scheme—or, if that is putting it too high, let us say, is not so extremely egoistic as to make a serious effort to wreck the scheme. In many European countries it fails for the converse reason. If efforts are then made to enforce it by heavy penalties what is really happening is that the authorities are trying to raise the moral level of human behaviour by force. Such attempts are futile. Even if they succeed for a time in changing overt behaviour, they fail to bring about any moral change, and the oppressive nature of their methods will produce a moral retreat. The use of force begets force, not co-operation.

Thus, if Britain can operate a socialised economy today it is because Britons are, on the whole, ready to co-operate in such a programme. If Americans are not ready, it is because they are still in a more individualistic, i.e. egoistic stage of development. Socialism is only an administrative *device*; it depends for its success on a moral advance which it cannot foster or control, and this advance is the only real progress in the situation. The rest is a matter of technique.

Marxists will protest that I have mis-stated their views. Of course, we recognise the necessity of producing better people, they will say, but how can you hope to produce decent personalities in slum conditions? This is a half-truth. The chances of a satisfactory psychological and physical environment are undoubtedly low in a slum. But they are not very high elsewhere. It is not from the ranks of the very poor, but from the bourgeois sections of society that most neurotics come. Some of the most ruthless and bigoted men in history were born in materially quite favourable conditions.

The marxist is correct in attributing to wrong environment the creation of distorted personalities. His trouble is, he does

not know the nature of the connection and instead of arraigning just those elements in the environment which are responsible, he seized only on those which strike the eye. If marxists want to save their thesis they would do well to bring it into line with modern research instead of treating it as a sacrosanct doctrine given *ex cathedra*.[1]

II *The Double Delusion*

One of the most serious errors in our political thinking is our division of the field into two mutually exclusive camps, right and left, conservative and socialist. As we have just argued, both right and left subscribe equally to a materialist outlook; they differ only as to the means. We should do better, therefore, to divide the field into materialists and non-materialists. This is a difference of ends.

It may be that there would be fewer non-materialists in the left-wing camp than the right: much would depend on the size of the political field we were examining, and the moment in time that we chose. Certainly there is a distinct tendency for the non-materialists—those who have an intuitive grasp of the psychological necessities of life—to find the left-wing camp uncongenial and flock to the conservative colours, where they find themselves in uneasy alliance with the commercial-materialists to whose ideals they are in reality fundamentally

[1] The acrobatics performed by western marxists in their attempts to reconcile analytical psychology with their dogmas provide much quiet amusement for onlookers. The first stage was an attempt to match Freud's social theories (he sees the origin of social action in a revolt of sons against their father to obtain possession of his women) with the history of the Russian revolution. (See R. Osborn, *Freud and Marx*, 1937). But when these were generally rejected by sociologists, marxists turned to the American school of psychologists represented by Horney, Fromm, Erich and others, who had begun to stress the importance of social factors in neurosis, and began to misrepresent them as attaching no significance to genetic factors. Now that Kardiner has shown that genetic factors can be traced to the environment, perhaps we shall see a reaction in favour of Freud, and the canonisation of Prof. Kardiner.

opposed. Here they are blinkered by tradition and reined-in by vested interest until they are incapable of preventing the destruction of the values they admire. It is, after all, in the name of individual freedom that millions have been degraded by unemployment, and that much of the countryside has been desecrated, just as it is in the name of freedom that American citizens lynch negroes. Thus, while the materialist-socialist is making rapid progress in the wrong direction, the progressive conservative is looking in the right direction and walking steadily backwards.

But there is another way of dividing the field of human aspiration which is more useful to our present purpose than either of these: we can make a valid distinction between those who wish to improve society by *social action*, that is, methods directed outwards from the self against others, and those who wish to improve it by individual *moral effort*, directed inward towards the self.

Those whose temperaments incline them to action want to prevent misbehaviour by the use of force. When they see some nuisance being committed their reaction is: there ought to be a law against it. Though, paradoxically as it may seem, when they find themselves restrained by a law from some course they wish to follow they complain of the imposition with the strongest annoyance. Unfortunately, the attempt to make people behave co-operatively by forcible methods can never succeed. The use of force begets force, not co-operation. The most a law can do is express the general conscience of the group, in which case it compels a minority of backsliders to fall into line. But if the group as a whole does not approve it no authority can enforce it. Even, however, if such an attempt forcibly to reform people could be carried through, it would inevitably fail in the ultimate objective of achieving happiness because the oppressive and frustrating nature of the regime would make happiness impossible.

People who, nevertheless, put their faith in the use of force are to be found in both the right- and left-wing camps. They are the possessors of patriform personalities, the fascists and the

communists, the militarists and the militant pacifists, the arch-conservatives and the fanatical revolutionaries. Too impatient to wait on the slow process of personal self-development, they try to take the short cut to Utopia, but succeed only in introducing the police-state and end in the irony of compulsory joy.

Equally vain is the second and contrary delusion, that man can be made into the perfect citizen by *moral effort*. According to this view, if we all would only try sufficiently hard to do our duty and behave according to the dictates of our consciences the world would be as nearly perfect as we have any right to expect.

If the authoritarian view is the view of the extremists and the patrists, the 'do your best' theory is the credo of the middle-of-the-roaders and the matriform types. It is the faith of the religious who call it behaving like a Christian, and of the atheists, who call it behaving decently. Unfortunately, this attitude pays no heed to the effects of environment in distorting personality. The neurotic and the criminal are viewed as people who, starting with equal endowments, just did not try hard enough to keep to the approved path. Of recent years some allowance has been made by this school for exceptional temptations (such as may confront the poor) and disadvantages in the way of inadequate education, but fundamentally they regard the lapse as a failure of will. But the failure is really a failure of the power to love: it is a neurosis. Now as we have seen, neurosis is not a divagation from the path of life, but a desperate attempt to adapt to it. It is only because of his neurosis that the neurotic manages to get as near normality as he does. To ask him to make an effort and conquer his neurosis is like asking a lame man to give up his limp. It cannot be done by an effort of will, only by a fundamental cure. In psychological terms, the only solution they see is an intensification of super-ego control: that is, improvement through the imposition of a self-discipline which, because it thwarts natural impulses, inevitably becomes more and more puritanical. This leads to a society in which the puritan, or calvinist, not only makes himself miserable but prevents anyone else from being happy either.

Furthermore, the religious or self-discipline approach (if we may so call it) implies a pessimistic view of the possibilities of progress. Each new individual that is born into the world must make the same old effort at self-control all over again. He gets no help from the achievements of those who preceded him, except perhaps the cold comfort of a mark to aim at. The defects of such systems is that, like Mrs. Partington with her mop, they register trifling tactical victories while being steadily defeated on the main front. And that orthodox religious teaching *has* been defeated on the main front cannot be denied by anyone who looks honestly at the world today. The picture disclosed by analytical psychology, on the other hand, is much more encouraging. By attacking the forces which create character distortion we can ensure a better start for all who come after. The path is difficult, but it does lead upwards.

The self-discipline approach is also susceptible of criticism on more fundamental grounds. By appealing to us to obey our consciences it accepts our ego-ideals as above criticism. But these, as we have seen, are no more than a reflection of the general values of our society, as transmitted through the imperfect channel of introjection. In sober fact our consciences often permit the undesirable and still more often disallow what is quite permissible. They are a sort of automatic pilot keeping us on whatever course we were following when they were switched on. They do not enable us to dispense with a navigator.

By another paradox, the advocates of personal effort are the last to complain when the advocates of direct action promulgate a law regulating some aspect of behaviour. In secret truth, they welcome it because it relieves their super-ego of some of its burden.[1]

As so often when two opposing theses have both proved impotent, a solution is found in a new synthesis which embodies features of both. The view put forward here can claim to be such a synthesis. According to this view neither social action nor personal self-discipline alone or in combination will suffice to bring us nearer a better world. The solution—the only

[1] R. West, *Conscience and Society*, 1942.

solution—is to attack at the points where society and personality meet. There are two. The customs which influence the formation of basic personality and the values which provide the field of force in which personalities operate. These are the decisive factors. All other reformative activities are as useless as putting more comfortable seats in a car which is travelling towards a precipice.

This thesis is a true synthesis: it agrees unreservedly with the moralists and religious reachers that society can only be reformed through improving individuals; it agrees unreservedly with the marxists that the pre-condition of better behaviour is improved environment. It goes further than both in specifying precisely *which* elements in the environment are the crucial factors in the case.

III *The Synthetic Approach*

In the final analysis, the defect of contemporary politics and economics is that they are flat two-dimensional views of a complex multi-dimensional reality. The reality with which we have to deal is man-in-society—a delicate reciprocal relationship which in my opening chapter I called the psycho-social nexus. The moment we begin to lift some part of this nexus out of its natural context and consider it separately we introduce a source of error into our calculations.

The simplest of such abstractions is to try and discuss man alone, ignoring the influence on him of society, and this individualistic approach generally leads to a reaction in which we begin to discuss society, ignoring its origin in men. Neither psychology nor sociology can be accurate as descriptions of their chosen subject as long as they ignore the other, because these two cannot in any real sense be separated. A biologist who attempted to discuss the human brain without reference to the body in which it is located would produce as partial and inaccurate an analysis as a biologist who attempted to describe the body without reference to the brain which controls it.

How much more inaccurate must our analysis be when we abstract some narrow group of functions, such as political or economic activities, from the complex of man-in-society. Immediately we are led into the error of treating an economic institution, as if it were *only* an economic institution, ignoring the fact that it has emotional, æsthetic and social functions too. Immediately, we treat political devices as if their sole function were to deploy power over individuals and forget that the real purpose of politics is to free those individuals from any but their own power.

The analytic method, by which we isolate objects from their context for closer study has its merits, but we have pushed it to the point where it has led us into disastrous errors. We must return to the synthetic method—that is, the method of building up fragments into coherent wholes. The situation will perhaps be clearer if we take a simple analogy: the case of a designer specialising in magnetos. Such a designer can never afford to forget the engine in which his magneto is to function. Though for short spaces of time he may isolate some small detail from its context, he must constantly refer back to the overall picture and every detail of his design will be dictated to some extent by whether he is designing a magneto for a Spitfire or for a motor-cycle. He must, therefore, have in his head a clear picture of the functioning of petrol engines in general and even of the detail design of the particular engine for which his magneto is intended. A magneto designer who worked in an intellectual vacuum would soon be out of a job.

Similarly, the man who poses as an authority on economics and politics must be fully educated in the whole range of man's motivations, so that he can see his political or economic motives in their proper context. Similarly, he must understand the nature, function and context of *all* social institutions before he presumes to design new economic or political institutions.

We are very far from such a state of affairs today. Few economists or politicians have any but the most rudimentary understanding of psychology and still fewer any understanding

of social structure. The ludicrous errors of economists are chiefly due to their childishly naive view of human motivation, so long described by textbooks as 'the rational pursuit of self-interest.'

IV *Society is an Organism*

In particular, we must open our eyes to the fact that society is an organism. Unfortunately, our fathers' excessive preoccupation with the individual—that is, with the first term of the nexus man-in-society—led to a violent reaction in which a great part of the world has become preoccupied with the second term of the nexus, and has tended to conceive social organisation and man in his collective aspect as the primary reality. Since society is made for man and not man for society this is an even more serious error than the first.

The solution is certainly not to react once more into the first error, but to build a new synthesis out of these two antitheses. It is in this context that we must consider the social organism. Even if its purpose is no more than the purpose of its component units that is no reason for ignoring the reality of its structure.

Society is an organism held together primarily by the desire of man for the companionship and help of his fellow men, with whom he forms emotional links which are the ultimate purpose of his earthly existence. No politics and no economics is of any value which does not respect these emotional links, and make their preservation and growth its main concern. What, then, are we to say of a politics which (as in the Versailles Treaty) blandly transfers whole populations from one area to another and draws lines through the middle of others, severing such emotional links by the million? Simply that it is blind madness. The statesmen, so-called, of Versailles were at no higher mental level than the child which cuts a worm in half to see if it will grow a new tail—except that the child at least has the excuse that it has been misinformed by its elders in the matter.

How dare people set themselves up to direct the affairs of men without having studied for many years in deep humility all that human wisdom has accumulated in the way of information about men and their societies? To practise politics without a degree in social science should be a crime more serious than performing a surgical operation without having done a course of study in medicine and surgery. To be sure, social science is still most imperfect, but the greater our ignorance the greater our duty to make use of the few facts we have established.

The example of Versailles is a crass one, and we have now come to realise the depth of folly it implied, but in slightly less obvious spheres we repeat the mistake all the time. We blithely undermine the structure of society by releasing technical devices like the motor-car and the radio without a moment's preliminary consideration of their effect. We cheerfully shift populations about, or appeal to women to go into factories without even wondering what effect this will have on a primary social unit like the family.

Despite the fact that every anthropologist knows that violent mixture of two cultures is a disastrous mistake we even commit the supreme folly of founding organisations to promote the dissemination of culture-patterns and thus increase the violence of acculturation, and we send films of life in New York into the remotest villages of the Balkans and the valleys of Norway, believing that in some way we are doing good!

As a matter of fact we even commit mistakes on the scale of Versailles; have we not divided Germany into four zones? Today we are beginning to see the economic consequences of such folly—which any competent economist could have pointed out at the time—but it is our children who will have to grapple with the social and psychological consequences of this act, just as it is the present generation which has had to pay the price of Versailles. Let every young and middle-aged reader take heed: our children will hurl at us in twenty years just the same accusation that we hurled at the generation before us: 'you got us into the mess, now we have to get you out.'

v *Progress or Regress?*

Faced with the reconstruction of all our political and econ omic thinking, dimly aware of the titanic errors in which we ar involved, and with an inkling of the vast reconstruction o daily life which a policy of happiness implies, it is natural t shrug one's shoulders and say: it is too much effort. If that is th price of happiness let us go on as we are.

But one cannot stay still, one must go on or go back. In th ultimate analysis, the process to which we are committed i the growth of consciousness. As Heard and Whyte have argued we are slowly changing from a mode of existence in which great part of the mind was at the unconscious level, and societ was held together by unconscious forces, to a mode in which w must be *consciously* aware of our unity with all men, and thu consciously refrain from doing anything to harm them, an consciously build a society held together by forces of which w are aware.[1] Such a development is, it would seem, part of th irreversible evolution of the race. If we, *homo faber* miscalle *sapiens*, fail to take this step forward we will be replaced, in du course, by a creature better fitted to do so.

But even if we do not choose to look so far ahead, the prospec still makes action imperative. Western society, beset by strain greater than have afflicted any in the history of the world, i bound to break up. In a final convulsive effort to prevent tha catastrophe (for catastrophe it is to the people within the society central governments impose a rigid control. It is a new nigh of totalitarianism which faces us, beside which the long nigh of barbarism under the Goths, the Vandals and the Huns wil be, as they say, a picnic.

What, then, shall we do?

The first thing, I suggest, is some research. If one-tenth par of all the sums which are now being poured into research into physics, chemistry, electronics, and the other science which are primarily responsible for our present plight were t

[1] G. Heard, *Man The Master*, 1942; L. L. Whyte, *The Nex Development in Man*, 1944.

be spent on research into the only sciences which could get us out of it, the outlook would be completely transformed.[1] If for every physicist we train at our universities we trained a psychologist, and for every chemist a sociologist, and for every doctor a social pathologist, we should have at least a sporting chance of survival.

It is constantly said that man's control over the physical world has outrun his control over himself, or that his knowledge of external nature has outrun his knowledge of moral and social forces. If that is true, as it obviously is, he has only himself to blame. Social research is the Cinderella of the sciences.

In this book I have quoted much anthropological work; I must now emphasise how unsatisfactory it is. Few cultures have been investigated by more than a single investigator, and many of them are being swamped so fast by western culture that no further investigation is possible. Each investigator brings to his study the prejudices of his own society, the people from whom he collects information are not a random sample, because he naturally chooses those who are most loquacious or most easily bribed, and their readiness to speak is conditioned by their liking for him as an individual. Many such investigators have had no psychological training and ignore just those facts which are most crucial to the analysis.[2]

All this work needs repeating again and again with improved techniques. And much work must be done on the techniques themselves. Devices such as the Rohrschach test, and the Murray thematic apperception test hold out the promise of a more objective and more rigidly standardised type of investigation than any hitherto, but they are still in a comparatively experimental stage.[3] Many other criticisms could be adduced.

[1] In 1947, in Britain, something like £120,000,000 was spent on research in the classical sciences as compared with little over £500,000 on the social sciences.

[2] For a fuller discussion see R. Linton, *Cultural Background of Personality*, 1946.

[3] See, for instance, S. J. Beck, *Introduction to the Rohrschach Method*, 1937; and H. A. Murray, *Explorations in Personality*, 1935.

Admitting, then, that our ignorance is still profound, what does it look as if we shall have to do?

Firstly, we must strenuously revise the techniques by which we train and educate our children.

I conclude, any intelligently founded programme of reform would start not with nationalisation or investment control, not with proportional representation or raising the school-leaving age, not with social security or town planning, but with a huge campaign to produce better people combined with a campaign to revise values. It would concentrate on improving the social environment rather than the physical environment. The Minister of Happiness, the supreme member of the peace cabinet, would devote to the instruction of mothers the same ingenuity that the Ministry of Food has employed in connection with their function as cooks. Happiness insurance would entitle one to routine psychiatric treatment just as health insurance covers medical treatment.

It might even be advisable, as a temporary measure at any rate, to make, not marriage as in some countries, but motherhood dependent on passing an examination—an examination which would not only ensure some knowledge of methods but also psychological fitness.

Next we must investigate the break-up of family life. It is insufficiently realised that the family (or, alternatively, in-group) is a miniature society in which the child learns many of its primary lessons in socialisation. But for the family to play this role, two things are necessary. First, it must contain a considerable number of persons. The only child of two parents living in a flat learns no lessons of socialisation, and when there are two children the relation is liable to become one of dominance and resistance to dominance. And while families have grown smaller the in-group has vanished altogether. Since the enormous families of the past are undesirable both from the viewpoint of the mother and of the total population, the solution seems to be a wide reintroduction of the in-group.

The second condition is that the child be left in the family

during all his formative years; but we send the child away to kindergarten and school at an increasingly early age and throw on the school almost the whole responsibility for training it. Small wonder that the child comes to look to an impersonal authority to regulate its life and meet its needs and so finds it natural to depend upon an impersonal state.

One of the most alarming features of contemporary society is the breakdown of super-ego control, or in classical terms, the decay of conscience. Selfish, violent or anti-social behaviour of an extraordinarily callous sort is becoming the rule rather than the exception as the columns of the more lurid Sunday newspapers have long been witnessing. I have no doubt that one of our most urgent duties is to restore such control in reasonable measure.

As Bateson has told us, the formation of the super-ego is dependent on the establishment of an effective link between child and parent. Harsh, unloving parents are liable to create anti-social children. Children who are separated from their parents are likely to become anti-social. But these things happen daily.

Secondly, the parent must, in fact, teach the child a code of behaviour. Social workers in the slums report that many such parents do not do so, or, worse, teach an actively harmful code.

Thirdly, parents must reinforce their teaching with some kind of punishment (including in this term such things as deprivation of affection). But many parents punish so capriciously, sometimes laughing at behaviour which on another occasion they will punish, sometimes venting their spleen by punishing innocent acts, that no lesson except doubt is taught.

Insensibly we have passed from the subject of the immediate physical environment of the child to the mental environment—the role to which he is brought up and the patterns which he learns from his parents and from society and introjects into his personality. Having ensured that something is introjected, the question becomes: what? This complex subject is most easily discussed under the heading of values.

VI *Reconstructing Values*

The ideal code of values is one which both encourages people to behave in those ways which foster happiness and which deters them from actions which are inimical to it.

The origin of codes of values, however, is in practical experience. And this is where the trouble originates. The unthinking man, and especially the young man, tends to attach value to experiences which are immediately rewarding, without considering the long-term consequences. The reconstruction of values therefore involves a constant fight by the most long-sighted and experienced individuals (not necessarily the oldest) to modify the spontaneously-formed valuations of the short-sighted.

Great importance, therefore, attaches to the machinery available for deriving permanent values and especially to the machinery available for propagating them. Most primitive societies include crude but fairly effective devices for the purpose. The formation of values is left to the elders of the tribe (not the leaders) and their great prestige normally ensures the acceptance of their opinions. In addition the social life of the tribe usually provides them with opportunites for advocating publicly the values they hold. In modern society this machinery has largely broken down. In the mass society it is only possible to propagate values by means of instruments of communication—newspapers, books, films and broadcasts. To a very large extent, however, these are at the disposal of people whose opinion on values is worthless. For all practical purposes, the values disseminated by these media are decided by the handful of men who control them.

Now the people most likely to reach positions in which they can control these great engines of opinion are those who are wholeheartedly devoted to the pursuit of wealth and power. In addition we have one fact that, whatever their personal beliefs, in an industrial civilisation it is in the interest of business magnates to cultivate a desire for goods and services: this is the sole object of advertising. In short, communication media are in the hands of men selected for their ignorant,

selfish and material viewpoint. Thus, we have established an enormous machine for the inculcation of materialistic values. (To the above list we may add the fields of publishing and drama: true, these also serve to disseminate good values—though hardly in such quantity as they disseminate bad ones; and we must qualify our indictment in the case of radio systems which are not subservient to commercial interests.)

This situation makes nonsense of democracy, and nonsense of education. The underlying idea of democracy is that every individual is free to make up his own mind his own way, and that out of the mass of freely-formed individual opinions a general consensus will emerge which represents the will of the people. It is questionable whether this was ever wholly true, but it is certainly far from true in the industrial state with its mass media for the inculcation of values. (This is typical of the way in which technology has made nonsense of the classical political concepts to which we still cling.) The far-sighted modern ruler does not seek to establish a dictatorship of force but a dictatorship of values—a bondage more secure and infinitely less troublesome to maintain. By these standards, our supposed democracies are in many respects dictatorships already, dictatorships not of fascism or communism but of materialism.

In our ignorance we confine our criticisms of the press, and other media, to the question of whether they report the facts. We fail to realise that a paper can report the facts with perfect accuracy and still disseminate the most disastrous values.

We are emerging from an age of individualism in which the law was ready to restrain people from committing actions or making statements damaging to individuals but was slow to restrain them from damaging the state. Recently we have begun to recognise that individuals can harm the public weal by overt acts, but we are so egregiously ignorant of sociology that we do not recognise the subtler forms of damage to society. We see nothing very wrong, for instance, in advertising a face-cream as status-conferring, and those of us who are sophisticated enough to see the factual fallacy laugh at it. That the true significance

of such a claim lies in the field of values and is independent of whether or not it is untrue escapes us.

VII *Inducation*

It is a platitude beloved of those who address schoolboy audiences that education means drawing out and not putting in. Grammatically this is correct; factually it is not. Even if the theoretical ideal is that the prime function of education is to develop the innate capacities of the pupil, nevertheless in practice all education involves a huge amount of putting in. I do not refer merely to factual material, dates and chemical formulæ, but to attitudes, interpretations and ideas. Any reader who doubts this should, if he is not a Roman Catholic, go to a Roman Catholic school and listen to the teaching of the history of the Reformation, while Catholic readers should try the same experiment at a non-Catholic school; or he might compare British and American versions of the War of Independence.

Apart from formal education, all forms of communication —propaganda, advertisement and even what we suppose to be factual information or artistic truth—inevitably contain a large element of putting-in. This putting-in process plays such an important part in our life that it is time we recognised its existence. It might be easier to do so if it had a name. I shall call it *inducation*. (And a pox on any don who objects.) By it I mean something much broader than propaganda, which implies a deliberate aim which is often absent in inducation. For instance, a school which provides religious services or a cinema which plays the national anthem at the close of the performance are inducating a respect for religion and the royal family respectively—but it would be inexact to describe either as propaganda. The headmaster may be an agnostic and the cinema manager a republican: but each defers unthinkingly to custom and public opinion.

Similarly, the producer of an American film does not deliberately inculcate materialistic values, or so I suppose.

Presumably he presents the values which he *thinks* the characters he is representing would normally hold. But if these values are wrong values he may be inducating wrong values into his audience, especially if, in his ignorance of sociology, he presents such values in a favourable light. He will, in general, be inclined to present the values which exist in his own culture as being good values, though the fact that values exist is, of course, no guarantee of their suitability. In addition, he will later send his film abroad into other cultures, possibly holding superior values to his own, and thus will be engaged in inducating the audiences of that country.

Because of the enormous weight and ubiquity of the inducatory forces, it is farcical to discuss the reform of education properly, so-called. Its inducatory content is poor enough, but its effect is in any case trifling as against these overwhelming forces.

The question arises, if we are to try and impose a value system on people, are we not running headlong into that very process of compulsion which we have already indicted? Is this any different from fascism? Here, I think we have to make up our minds. Either all values are equally worthy, or else there are good and bad values. If the latter, then the question which arises is, can we distinguish good from bad values? I believe we *can*; and that there is only one acceptable system of values —that based on love. Even if one distrusts religion and despises ethics one has to admit the bald fact that, fundamentally, only two schemes of value exist, those based on love and hate, respectively. The latter generates a vicious spiral of destructive activity and multiplies human misery; the former a benign spiral of happiness.

Provided that this fact is recognised, people can be left to work out courses of action—they will, no doubt, disagree violently on what course to take in given circumstances, but if their values are sound the result can be awaited with some confidence. Control or regulation of values is thus something very different from regulation of actions—'planning' as we call it. For control of values leaves entire freedom to the individual.

Nor can it of its nature be perverted to the uses of dictatorship, as can political power to regulate actions.

The only dangerous possibility—and it is the possibility which has become actuality today—is that men should band together to preach false values on a massive scale. Is it too optimistic to believe that if sound values are preached with equal force the public will soon recognise the false values for what they are and that their advocates will be compelled to change their tune by the force of public opinion? If it is, the outlook is indeed black. There remains the ancient social device of a college charged with the duty of protecting values.

In the past it was always a firm principle that the temporal power should be restrained by a spiritual power. This spiritual power was represented by the Church and the theory was that the Church, being uninterested in political issues and earthly gains, could advise or denounce impartially. The Church was thus conceived as the guardian of society's values. Unhappily the Church has not successfully sustained this proud role. The Protestant Church has shrunk from the responsibility of condemning those institutions and persons who contravene the values it preaches and has lost the prestige essential to its function in consequence. The Roman Catholic Church has been less cowardly but more venal. Though it has continued to pontificate on social and political issues, often most wisely, it has gained the reputation of concerning itself in material issues for material ends and has lost prestige likewise.

Society badly needs a corpus of wise men, selected not so much for experience, eminence or success as for breadth of vision, humanity and integrity, who will concern themselves not so much with the minutiæ of day-to-day legislation (as does the Senate and the House of Lords) but with the broad general picture of our times. But to establish a 'Standing Committee for the Maintenance of Values' would not at first be enough for it would be many years until it acquired the necessary prestige. Since the Church, despite its defects, still has vastly more prestige than any government department, possibly it should take the initiative in such a step: but it should not seek

to keep such a commission under its control. It should base it broadly, calling on all elements in the community to play their part.

VIII *Is Happiness Possible?*

I have attempted to analyse the unhappiness of our society. I have tried to show that our society is the reflection of our personalities. It is we who, by an elaborate process, make ourselves unhappy. I have suggested that machinery has stimulated this process of self-immolation, not because of anything inherent in machinery, but because of the way we use it. And I have suggested that totalitarianism is bound to gain ground, in fact to triumph, unless we can find a superior solution for our problems.

How this process comes about, what initiates it, is a question with which I have not attempted to deal. It raises such wide issues that I must leave it for another book. In any case we do not need this knowledge in order to see how sick our society is.

For too long we have pictured society as inherently stable, capable of healing by its own vital force the rough scars we inflict upon it by political surgery. We must force ourselves to think of it as assailed by a bombardment of technical change which threatens its very existence. Desperately strained as it is by the effort to adapt to shifting circumstances it has little vitality to spare for absorbing deliberately introduced readjustments when these prove ill-conceived. Social engineering of a delicate order and on a cyclopean scale is called for—but it is the most dire of errors to suppose that social engineering, even in conjunction with personal improvement, will suffice to restore happiness. Everyone might employ their best endeavours to be friendly in a society as stable as a gyroscope, and still be frustrated, anxious and bored. Only if values are sound can we hope for happiness.

It is a commonplace to say that we are living in a revolution —but the assertion is dangerously misleading. The revolution in the technological environment is the cause of our troubles.

The cure is a revolution in the field of values. And that is a revolution which is still to come.

Nevertheless, there is one thing which emerges from the present analysis from which we can take comfort. Behind all man's questioning lies a deeper unspoken question. Is the universe so designed that happiness is possible, or is it fundamentally antagonistic? Can we be assured that man's nature is in harmony with the nature of things if only 'the paralysing corruptions of custom would stand from between?' The answer I find in these researches is 'yes.' A cautious 'yes,' certainly, for the paralysing corruptions of custom are seen to be more subtle and complex than Rousseau dreamed. But basically the answer is favourable. Man's final need is to love and be loved. That is a need which answers the needs of other men, so that the more any one man attains his own true happiness, the more he must assist others in attaining theirs. In this reciprocal nature of the love-function lies the promise of final harmony. It is no easy promise. We have to labour to achieve it. There is no guarantee of success: indeed, we can easily fail altogether. It is not so much a promise as a challenge.

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