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SOUTH AFRICA

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TO MY STUDENTS
AFRIKAANS AND ENGLISH
THROUGH WHOM I HAVE HOPE IN THE
FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA

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IMPORTANT DATES IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

- 1487 Bartholomew Diaz doubled the Cape.
- 1497 Vasco da Gama's voyage to India.
- 1652 Foundation of settlement at Table Bay by van Riebeeck.
- 1657 Establishment of first Freeburghers.
- 1745 Foundation of Swellendam.
- 1779 First Kaffir War.
- 1786 Foundation of Graaff Reinet.
- 1795 First British occupation of Cape.
- 1803 Transfer of the Cape to the Batavian Republic.
- 1806 Second British occupation.
- 1812 Kaffirs driven beyond the Fish River.
- 1820 British settlers established on eastern frontier.
- 1834 Liberation of the Slaves : Sixth Kaffir **War**.
- 1836 Beginning of the Great Trek.
- 1838 Murder of Retief : Foundation of Republic of Natal,
- 1842 Re-occupation of Port Natal by British troops.
- 1848 Proclamation of the Orange River Sovereignty.
- 1852 Convention of Sand River.
- 1854 Convention of Bloemfontein. Representative Parliament at the Cape.
- 1867 First diamond discovered near Hopetown.
- 1868 Annexation of Basutoland.
- 1871 Annexation of the Diamond Fields.
- 1872 Responsible Government at the Cape.
- 1877 Annexation of the Transvaal.
- 1879 Zulu War.
- 1881 Convention of Pretoria.
- 1884 Convention of London.
- 1886 Foundation of Johannesburg.
- 1888 Foundation of the British South Africa Company.
- 1895 " Drifts " question. Jameson Raid.
- 1899 **Outbreak of War.**
- 1902 Treaty of Vereeniging.
- 1907 Responsible Government in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.
- 1908 **National Convention.**
- 1910 **Union of South Africa.**
- 1914 **January: General Strike. October: Rebellion.**
- 1919 **Death of General Botha. General Smuts Prime Minister.**
- 1924 **General Hertzog Prime Minister.**
- 1932 **December: Suspension of gold payments.**
- 1933 **Coalition Cabinet formed.**

PART I
THE BEGINNINGS

SOUTH AFRICA

CHAPTER I

FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO 1806

FOR generations the outside world regarded South Africa merely as an obstacle. Herodotus tells with pardonable incredulity how Pharaoh Necho's ships sailed ever south until they came to a land where the sun passed by the north at noon. Centuries later Portuguese, Dutch and English found it a dangerous barrier to their east-bound trade.

The coast is rock-bound and forbidding, the land rises steeply to rugged mountains, and all the west coast for 1,500 miles is dry and barren. The country has no natural harbours. Table Bay is open to the north-west gales of winter, and none too sheltered from summer south-easters. Port Natal is fenced by a dangerous bar, as are the lagoons and " ports " further down the coast. The first settlement at the Cape was an incident of the India trade and its expansion a matter of natural increase : it was not until the mineral discoveries of the last century that South Africa attracted the interest and cupidity of the outside world.

Cape Town and the narrow strip of coast of the same latitude fall within the belt of winter rains. The " Western Province " is tolerably well watered, a land of vineyards and wheat, of settled farms and prosperous homesteads.

In Natal, at the eastern extremity of the coast belt, the rains come in summer, its climate ranks as sub-tropical, and the soil produces sugar, the banana and pineapple, and tropical fruits.

In the interior plateau, which sometimes rises to over 5,000 feet, the climate is temperate, with bitter night frosts in winter. Its outward rim is formed by the Drakensberg, the lofty range which sweeps in a great arc from the Zoutpansberg in the Northern Transvaal to the broken mountains north-east of Cape Town. This intercepts the rain-bearing winds of summer, and towards the east the country is fertile and well-wooded. Further west the rainfall becomes increasingly uncertain, until both rains and vegetation are lost in the sand dunes of the Kalahari Desert. In that area the rivers marked on the map, the Molopo, the Nosob, and their tributaries, are no more than wide tracks some two or three miles broad. Once in ten years the rains may reach the desert and the dry watercourses will fill with raging torrents, while the waste places rejoice for a few weeks with grass and flowers.

North of the belt of winter rains the plateau dries off in the same way to merge in the Kalahari. The intermediate regions of uncertain rainfall—the plains known as the Karroo—produce drought-resisting bushes which form their distinguishing feature and provide grazing for many thousands of sheep.

The earliest inhabitants of South Africa were a group of Stone Age men of whom little is known save that they used the weapons and tools which are often turned up in alluvial deposits all over the country. Archaeologists remark that "but for the material of which they are made, they might almost as well have been obtained from the terrace gravels of the River Thames or of the Somme."¹ The Stone Age lasted down into modern times, and the most primitive inhabitants known to the whites

¹ Henry Balfour in *The Report of the British Association, 1929.*

were also workers in stone—the Bushmen, little, fine-limbed men, yellow-skinned, with a language containing a large number of clicks and a gift of drawing which showed itself in spirited polychrome paintings which have survived in rock-shelters and caves. They were hunters, reaping no crops and keeping no cattle, and were systematically hunted down by successive cattle-raising invaders, Hottentot, Bantu and European.

The Hottentots came next, a little bigger, a little darker, but still small and slightly built, with high cheek-bones, sunken cheeks and small chins, which gave their faces a curiously triangular appearance. They were nomads, kept large herds, lived largely on curdled milk, and smeared themselves with rancid fat. Their communities were larger than those of the Bushmen, and they acknowledged a vague pre-eminence in their tribal chiefs. They, too, gave way before other invaders : many migrated to South-West Africa, many have been absorbed by the Bantu, while others form the basis of the Eurafrikan race known as the " Cape Coloured."

The most efficient of the natives of South Africa were those whom the Europeans call the Bantu. Darker, lustier, and more advanced, they have put up a better fight than their predecessors. They appeared out of the forests of Central Africa at the time when Europe was evolving its mediaeval system and they worked southward in two main streams. One came down the east coast, while the other steered a careful path along the centre of the continent, between the malaria of the river regions and the dry wastes of the Kalahari. They had great herds of cattle, but also tilled the soil in open fields which they changed at intervals of a few years. In their way, they were artificers in wood and metal; they built huts, worked pottery, practised the art of war more seriously than the Hottentots, were ruled by hereditary chiefs limited by the counsel of their " wise men " and the considered opinion of the tribe in council assembled, and

in many ways remind the Nordic reader of his Teutonic ancestors as Caesar and Tacitus first described them.

Generalization in respect of the Bantu is dangerous. The tribes of the interior, who use the tribal prefix *Ba-*, differ from those of the coast (who use *Ama-*) as much as the Teutons of Europe do from the Romance peoples. The separation between the two main groups occurred centuries ago, but they still retain many features in common, and the pressure of the Europeans has driven them closer together.

The great historical riddle of primitive Africa is put by the existence in Rhodesia of a number of stone buildings, of which the greatest and most important is known as Zimbabwe. Romantic pioneers believed them to be Phoenician, and connected the primitive gold workings in their neighbourhood with Ophir and King Solomon. More careful research has revealed the work to be of the usual native type (though of vastly superior workmanship) and excavations whose results turn on the finding of a single bead beneath the conical tower suggest that the builders were Bantu, working under the stimulus of east coast trade, and the date somewhere during the mediaeval period in Europe. Recent discoveries at Mapungubwe in the Northern Transvaal suggest the existence of a "culture complex" which covered the whole of what is now Southern Rhodesia, and of which Zimbabwe is no more than the highest architectural expression.

Europeans first cross the stage of Southern Africa in the person of the Portuguese. In 1487 Bartholomew Diaz doubled the Cape, thus reaping the fruit of sacrifices and privations that went back seventy years. Vasco da Gama set out on his two years' journey from Lisbon to Calicut and back in 1497, and on Christmas Day he named the land of Natal. Yet the Portuguese made little use of Table Bay. Beneath its sands sleeps Francesco d'Almeida, Viceroy of the East, who fell in a petty brawl with the

Hottentots in 1510, and his fellow-countrymen gave it a bad name. It was left to the English to dally with the idea of occupation in 1615 and 1620, and to the Dutch, then the masters of the eastern trade, finally to take formal possession of the roadstead and fresh streams of the Cape Peninsula.

Both English and Dutch sailors suffered cruelly from scurvy—the Portuguese with their different diet seem to have had far less trouble. Now scurvy brought about diminished efficiency and heavy losses that were bad for dividends, and the Netherlands East India Company resolved to establish a hospital, garden and cattle-post at the Cape. As Commander they selected Jan van Riebeeck, a ship's surgeon who had reported in favour of the settlement, and in April, 1652, he was put ashore with some eighty men. His troubles included drought, flood, starvation, and a band of decadent Hottentots. A policy of pacifism in his dealings with the latter was of no avail, and the experiment of a marriage alliance between a Hottentot maiden and a member of the garrison turned out badly.

The settlement was insignificant—the senior officer of the garrison was a sergeant—and it could not have held out against an European attack. Farming proved expensive, and the Directors suspected that the workers would be more successful if they had some personal interest at stake. They therefore fell in with the suggestion to establish "free" citizens who should produce the necessary grain and increase the number available for defence. In 1657 nine men were given a free grant of land along the Liesbeek River, and were aided by means of advances from the Company's stores.

It was the beginning of a new epoch, for though of these nine only one has left descendants in the country, they were the founders of white South Africa.

There was friction from the first, and the grievances which the colonists formally brought forward in 1658

continued in one guise or another throughout the time of the Netherlands East India Company. Though " freeburghers " in name, they had been planted to serve the convenience of the Company, and the Directors were determined that they should fulfil their appointed function. The price at which the Company bought their produce was fixed in Amsterdam, and there was no open market on which the colonists might fall back. The Company was sole purveyor in the settlement, even of wine and meat, though it farmed out these monopolies to contractors and their sub-agents. There were heavy restrictions on the supply of ships visiting the harbour, intercourse with the natives, especially the cattle barter, was strictly forbidden, the very crops the settlers were to grow were prescribed for them by authority, and in the limited area of the first settlement there must have been an irritating atmosphere of constriction and oppression. In good seasons the market was soon glutted, and there was no way of disposing of the surplus, since Batavia was too far away.

To make matters worse, the early governors were fond of experiment—at the expense of the burghers, who were obliged, for instance, to plant rice, merely to demonstrate to Simon van der Stel that it could not grow in South Africa.

The settlement grew slowly and the Directors marked their appreciation of its strategic importance by building an immense castle after the example of Vauban (1665-1677). The outstanding character of the early days was Simon van der Stel, the son of a high official of the Company by an Eastern woman, who arrived as Commander in 1679, was promoted to be Governor in 1691, and lived at the Cape after his retirement in 1699 until his death. His arrival brought an unaccustomed vigour to the station. He went on tours of exploration, braving the droughts of Namaqualand in search of the fabulous Copper Mountain. He established branch

settlements at Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, encouraged immigration, tried to improve the quality of the Cape wines, and began the planting of oak trees. He was a hospitable man, given to anecdote, and travellers to India brought back friendly memories of their genial host at the Cape.

In 1688 - 89 the settlement received its greatest single accession in the person of some 200 French Protestant refugees, who had fled from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and were assisted by the Company to settle at the Cape. After an effort to preserve their national identity, speedily crushed by the authorities, they intermarried with the existing population: du Plessis, de Villiers, Malherbe and Fouché became common surnames at the Cape, and it has been reckoned that the blood of the modern South African is one-fifth French.

Simon was succeeded by his son, Willem Adriaan, whose attempt, in concert with the other senior officials, to corner the Cape market for their private farming ventures led to a petition to the Lords Seventeen in Holland, and a drastic clearance among the holders of high places in the settlement (1706). The rest of the century passed, as far as the Cape and its immediate surroundings were concerned, in a somewhat bucolic plenty. It was the age of "Father" Tulbagh, who sounded a trumpet every day at the castle gate so that his good people of Cape Town should know that their Governor had sat down to dine, of the building of the stately white-gabled farmhouses that adorn the Peninsula, and the planting of vineyards and oak groves.

But the Peninsula was not the real South Africa. The Cape market remained stagnant; when the Company declined, trade dwindled away, and the natural increase of the European population had to find its outlet elsewhere.. A few miles from Cape Town arable **farming** ceased to be a means of livelihood, and the new generation

turned to cattle. A new type of farmer developed, returning almost to the nomadic state, for his cattle needed frequent change of pasture. Hunting carried the men on long journeys into the interior, houses and food became plain and coarse, life was simpler, wants fewer, and contact with government less and less. Only a deep religious conviction, fostered almost exclusively on family worship and the Bible—for the nearest minister was often hundreds of miles away—saved the people from decline. The "trekboer" was in process of evolution.

The Company looked with disfavour upon this "Diaspora." Simon van der Stel in the early days had packed off two notorious hunters to the island of Mauritius, where their wandering proclivities would find less scope. Frequent *placaaten* forbade the transgression of limits which, none the less, were frequently extended. The Company's reasons were various. Wandering negotiators spoiled its hold on the cattle trade with the Hottentots; there was ever-present risk of violence and retaliation at the expense of the settlement, and last but not least, it was impossible to extract taxation from gentry who might be anywhere between the Kei and the Molopo.

The first wave of white expansion spread down the valleys parallel to the south coast. The Company reluctantly followed. An agent or *landdrost* was established at Swellendam in 1745, but the farmers still trekked on. The grant of freehold farms stopped near Cape Town, but land was to be had for the asking, and anyone who chose to set up a beacon in unoccupied territory could secure an annual lease of the area "one hour" in each direction at a nominal rent of a few shillings. One "loan-place" was often abandoned for another, and each son in the huge families begotten by the trekboers would set up for himself on his early marriage.

The Hottentots fell back, broke up, or were reduced to subjection as the white men advanced. Thousands died and many clans disappeared in the epidemics of

smallpox that came during the eighteenth century. The Bushmen were killed off as vermin. It was not until the white men reached the Fish River in the third quarter of the century that they met with serious resistance. Here they clashed with the AmaXhosa, the spearhead of the south-westerly movement of the coast Bantu, and the great struggle began. It marks the beginning of an epoch in the history of South Africa no less than 1657.

In 1779 Governor van Plettenberg attempted a final delimitation of the Colony. He set up a beacon at Colesberg in the north-east, but the inhabitants of the district promptly pulled it down as soon as his back was turned, in token that they admitted no limit to their right to expand. He then made some sort of an arrangement with a handful of the AmaXhosa for the recognition of the Fish River as a boundary. Some troubled years followed. In 1786 a *landdrost* was stationed at Graaff Reinet with jurisdiction over the whole frontier from Colesberg to Algoa Bay and instructions to prevent the farmers from crossing the line. He failed. Trouble in Kaffirland then sent a large number of natives swarming over the Fish River, the scattered farmers retired before them, and in 1795 the frontiersmen ejected Landdrost Maynier on account of his humanitarian notions and summoned a "National Assembly."

The Netherlands East India Company was moribund. Mismanagement at home and decay of initiative abroad had brought on the inevitable bankruptcy, and the citizens of Cape Town grew restive under a government which was both autocratic and inefficient. A last attempt to set its house in order, and heroic attempts to reduce expenditure and impose taxation, were partly responsible for the unrest on the frontier. In that same year the French revolutionary armies overran the United Provinces, and a British fleet demanded admission at the Cape in the name of the exiled stadholder.

The short-lived British occupation made little

difference on the frontier, though the Republic of Graaff Reinet came to an end, Maynier was restored and expelled once more, and a British force was set upon by the AmaXhosa near Algoa Bay. In 1803 the Cape was handed over to the Batavian Republic in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. Two representatives of "enlightenment" took over in the persons of Commissioner de Mist and General Janssens, but on the critical eastern frontier they could do no more than acknowledge the facts and tolerate the presence of the Xhosa chief Ndlambe in the Zuurveld. They did not remain long enough even to measure the extent of their difficulties.

While Nelson lay off Cadiz waiting for Villeneuve, a British fleet and transports passed him on its way south, and in January, 1806, the Cape passed finally under the rule of His Britannic Majesty King George the Third.

CHAPTER II

1806-1867

THE Second Occupation of the Cape by the British marks another turning-point in the history of South Africa. British control meant that the Cape was now administered directly, and by the representatives of a great Power instead of through a decadent commercial organization. The new administration faced problems instead of evading them and, within limits, was prepared to spend money on its new possession. It was not without significance that British colonial policy has always tended towards the doctrine of the Liberty of the Subject and the development of representative institutions, and the country set out on the course of evolution which has continued to this day.

The European population was well under 20,000, of whom a quarter lived at Cape Town in the extreme end of the Colony, while the remainder were scattered more and more thinly as they neared the east. There were about 17,000 slaves, but the Company had acknowledged no responsibility towards Hottentots and Bushmen, whose numbers were unknown.

The coming of the garrison brought a temporary prosperity to Cape Town, while the economic restrictions of the old Company were abolished. Traffic between England and the East became more regular after the peace, Indian civil servants settled at Wynberg on pension, and many came to the Cape to recuperate during their spells of leave. The little town was tolerably prosperous.

In view of its strategic importance the Colony was governed by the unfettered discretion of the Governor, but local administration and the legal system remained unchanged. In 1820 English settlers to the number of nearly 5,000 were introduced into the eastern districts along the Fish River. The Government made the usual grants of land and advances of implements and rations, and after the troubles inseparable from all new undertakings they settled down to make the country round Grahamstown the prosperous English-speaking district that it is to-day. At the same time they brought the first elements of political discord into the Colony. Few of them had exercised the vote in the pre-Reform England from which they came, but they had absorbed to the full the Englishman's traditional dislike for arbitrary government. The Executive retained the powers and privileges of the old Dutch Governors, and it was not long before the newcomers were deeply embroiled with Governor Lord Charles Somerset.

Thomas Pringle, the poet, summoned his friend John Fairbairn, a pertinacious and polemical Scot, to start an "Academy" in Cape Town, and soon the Freedom of the Press, the Right of Public Meeting, and the whole question of the Liberty of the Subject were in hot dispute. Lord Charles went home to resign, and a Commission of Enquiry recommended many constitutional reforms. The Press was enfranchised and the right of public meeting acknowledged; in 1828 an independent Judiciary was established—the Judges were all Scots¹—and the power of the Governor was limited by a Council of Advice.

In 1834 a Legislative Council in which five nominated colonists faced the five official members was constituted, and in 1853, after local solidarity had been well illustrated by its refusal to accept the convict ship *Neptune*, a

¹ The legal tradition of Scotland of those days was strongly influenced by the Roman Dutch law.

Legislature consisting of elected Assembly and Legislative Council was set up. The popular rule of Sir George Grey (1854-1861) was followed by the term of Sir Philip Wodehouse (1862-1870), during which drought and depression combined to make the inevitable struggle between Executive and Legislature more acrimonious still. The Cape hesitated long between a desire to control its Executive and disinclination to face the responsibility for its own defence. Eventually, under the prompting of Downing Street, it chose responsible government, and the change was made with the minimum of legislative enactment in 1873.

The Cape Colony had grown up.

But the future of South Africa was being determined, not in the Cape Peninsula, but on the eastern frontier. Like most frontiers, it attracted its quota of undesirables, and the rising of Slachter's Nek, readily suppressed by the inhabitants of the frontier themselves, was engineered by a body of restless spirits who did not scruple to call in the AmaXhosa to settle their quarrel with authority. Five men were hanged, and the horrors of their bungled execution gave them an undeserved place among the heroes of white South Africa. The majority of the frontiersmen, however, though normally impatient of Government control, rallied to its side during the rising.

The frontier attracted also the missionaries. Men of great enthusiasm, though often lacking in culture and poise, they undertook the championship of the broken Hottentots and the inarticulate Xhosa tribes. The Moravians came towards the end of the eighteenth century, but confined themselves to one or two stations. More important were the London Missionary Society, which first arrived in 1799 and concentrated on the Hottentots within the Colony and the tribes beyond the northern border, and the Wesleyans, who worked among the Kaffirs beyond the Fish River. For the thirty years after 1819 the affairs of the London Missionary

Society were administered by Dr. John Philip, another active and provocative Scot, who spoiled a good cause and sound policy by his aggressive manner and reckless methods of controversy.

The Hottentots needed a champion. They were a feckless, unsettled people, but a series of vagrancy laws dating from 1809, coupled with a legal disability that made them incapable of holding land, had placed them at the mercy of the farmers. Until the establishment of a Circuit Court in 1811 there was no check upon the will of the master, and next year old Vanderkemp, the pioneer London Missionary, soft-hearted and credulous, infuriated the frontier farmers by bringing a large number of charges of murder and assault.

In 1828 Philip secured the reversal of the vagrancy policy by Ordinance No. 50 of that year, which conferred liberty of person and contract on the Hottentots and was irreversible save by the King in Council. In 1833, after some years of increasingly restrictive legislation, slavery was abolished throughout the Empire by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. The natural irritation of the slave-holders at external interference with their vested rights in property was increased by the failure of the compensation voted by Parliament to reach half the value of the slaves, and the fact that it was payable only in London and in stock which depreciated in value. In practice, however, the compensation money was almost pure gain to the Colony, for it was long before the "free" labourer's wage passed the subsistence mark.

On the frontier the coming of the British marked the beginning of a new epoch. In place of the negative attitude of the bankrupt East India Company, the new administration formulated a policy based on the expulsion of the natives beyond the Fish River, the maintenance of that line by forts and patrols, and closer settlement in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier. This was

done. In 1812 Ndlambe was driven over the Fish River, and Grahamstown was founded as the headquarters of the military defences of the boundary. Frontier farms were reduced in size, and the 1820 settlers were placed in still smaller holdings along the river line.

But the strategic problem was really insoluble. The farmers were scattered in great ranches over a wide area. It was impossible to keep their cattle under strict supervision, and the thick bush along the Fish River provided admirable cover for raiders. Not unnaturally, the expulsion of the tribes failed to achieve its end, cattle-lifting still went on, the cost of the military establishment was immense, and constant reprisal raids into native territory did nothing to restore the peace. In 1819 the expedient was tried of pushing the natives still further back and keeping a neutral belt open between the Fish and the Keiskama. This served no better, and Philip maintained that peace would not come until the reprisals system was stopped and the recovery of stolen cattle put upon a recognized legal basis.

The Great Raid of 1834, in which native bands laid waste the Colony as far as Algoa Bay, led to another campaign—the Sixth Kaffir War—and to a decree of expulsion against all native tribes living as far as the Kei. A few weeks were sufficient to show the impracticability of the new expedient, and Governor Sir Benjamin D'Urban had already substituted a policy which involved the annexation of the natives as well as their land, when the Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg, peremptorily vetoed the original scheme. Andries Stockenstrom, a frontiersman by birth and training and ex-Commissioner General for the Eastern Districts, who had regaled Glenelg with grisly details of the reprisals system, was sent out as Lieutenant-Governor with instructions to substitute a policy of treaties and negotiation. D'Urban sulked, though his own remissness in reporting was to blame, did his best to make Stockenstrom's position impossible, kept

Glenelg waiting a year without explaining his change of plans, and finally sent home a despatch with annexes " a yard high " which earned his dismissal (1836).

Another period of uneasy peace led on to yet another war and to Sir Harry Smith's annexation in 1848 of the territory between the Keiskama and the Kei as British Kaffraria. This time the blunder of the attempted expulsion was not repeated, and the natives retained their land subject to a certain measure of European settlement. The new colony was directly under the Crown, and after the Eighth Kaffir War had been suppressed in 1852, it remained a more or less peaceful buffer between the Cape Colony and the natives. Sir George Grey, while continuing to plant European settlers in Kaffraria, founded his policy on the civilization of the tribes and the gradual reduction of the power of the chiefs. He was saved from a serious outbreak by the AmaXhosa themselves, who, at the bidding of some eschatological fanatic, slew their cattle and destroyed their grain.

In 1867 the British compelled the Cape to take over Kaffraria, and soon the process of expansion began once more. By 1877 the Kaffirs had been pushed behind the Bashee, the annexation of Griqualand, Tembuland and Pondoland followed, and by 1894 the last independent chieftainship in South Africa had disappeared.

The same process had been going on faster elsewhere. The resistance of the AmaXhosa had merely barred the original line of European advance, but expansion was a habit over a century old, and it now burst out to the north-east. It would have continued without a doubt, whoever ruled in Cape Town, but British land policy, by suspending the free grant of land and trying to secure stability on the frontier by a system of quitrent farms in place of the old " loan-places," made it inevitable that further advance would be outside the limits of British control. But there were other grievances which added bitterness and a sense of wrong to the inevitable

movement. The use of English as the sole official language, the abolition of the old boards of heemraden, and the substitution of unfamiliar though more efficient resident magistrates and civil commissioners, played their part, but more than anything else was a fundamental disagreement over native policy.

It was something deeper than a mere difference of opinion over the liberation of slaves or the economic position of the Hottentot. The frontiersman disapproved of British policy *ab ovo*, and his attitude must be understood as the key to all that followed. The frontier farmer belonged spiritually to the seventeenth century, the Bible was literally the only book he ever saw, and his scientific ideas were limited to the static universe of the Hebrew Scriptures. He was brought up to an intense pride of race which he rationalized in biblical language. The coloured races were obviously children of Ham, doomed by immutable Providence to labour for the Chosen Race. On practical grounds it was equally obvious that they were the inferiors of the European, and since the *Origin of Species* lay twenty years ahead, everyone assumed that their position of inferiority was permanent. Common-sense and religion both agreed that the native was an inferior being doomed to permanent tutelage : to deny the plain facts and to regard him as a citizen with inherent rights and the possibility of development was not only ungodly, but sheer perverse refusal to face the facts. The attitude of the British Government filled the frontier farmer with an asperity which, once his premises were conceded, was **not** unjustified.

The Great Trek was not only an escape from an unfriendly and unsympathetic environment, but aimed **at** establishing a State which should be based upon a **reasonable** and common-sense acceptance of the **proper relationship between** the white **master** and the **subservient coloured races**. The confusion that followed the Sixth

Kaffir War, and the disappointment of hopes of fresh land for settlement beyond the Keiskama, gave the final impetus, and a steady stream of immigrants moved northward across the Orange River.

Their migration was helped by the natives themselves. Towards the end of the eighteenth century a military despotism had grown up among the Nguni peoples north of the Tugela. It passed to Tshaka the Zulu, who employed his well-disciplined soldiers, armed with large oxhide shields and short stabbing spears, in murderous attacks on their neighbours. A wide stretch of land south of the Tugela was laid waste and its people were driven against the Mpondo and Xhosa tribes to the south. A Zulu captain, named uMzilikazi, quarrelled with Tshaka and fled across the mountains into what is now the Transvaal, where his "MaTebele" continued the work of destruction. Another tribe fleeing from the Zulu raids crossed the mountains further south and set in motion a mixed horde of fugitives, known as the "Mantatees," who wandered about laying waste the area between the Orange and the Vaal, and once threatened Kuruman.

By 1836, when the trekkers came north, a good deal of the plateau was deserted: the MaTebele were established at Mosexa among the headwaters of the Crocodile, while a chief named Moshesh was beginning the consolidation of groups of fugitives among the mountains which now house the BaSotho. A few groups of half-breed Hottentot hunters, known as Griquas, lived along the northern bank of the Orange, and some scattered and broken remnants of tribes existed along the fringe of the desert and in the mountains of the Zoutpansberg.

The advance guard of the Trek was attacked by the MaTebele near the Vaal River in October, 1836, but punitive expeditions drove uMzilikazi northwards to found a new settlement at Bulawayo. Piet Retief, an ex-Commandant from the Colony, joined the trekkers

and was elected " Governor." He persuaded a majority to leave the interior and settle in Natal, but was murdered, together with a large party of his followers, while on a visit to the Zulu chief Dingane. He was avenged by A. W. J. Pretorius, and a republic was duly constituted in Natal, while the dissidents settled under A. H. Potgieter in the districts of Potchefstroom and Winburg.

The new republic suffered much from the centrifugal tendencies of its own members, but Cape fears of a rival port at Durban, which had been founded some years before by a handful of English adventurers, and official alarm at the consequences of the republican native policy, prevailed on Downing Street to sanction the re-occupation of Port Natal by a British force (1842). After a year or two of indecision most of the trekkers moved north across the Vaal, where Pretorius began bickering with Potgieter for the supremacy.

The latter moved twice, once from Potchefstroom to Andries Ohrigstad in the eastern mountains, whence he tried to get into touch with Delagoa Bay, and then again into the wild country of the Zoutpansberg. For some time there were three or four little independent settlements, and personal, political and religious animosities were rampant. In 1849 Pretorius succeeded in bringing about a rough sort of union which included all save the followers of Potgieter in Zoutpansberg.

Meanwhile, there was trouble in the land between the Orange and the Vaal. British policy had at first tried to secure the northern frontier of the Cape by subsidy treaties with the Griqua " captains" Waterboer, of Griquatown, and Kok, of Philippolis, and with the Sotho chief, Moshesh. There was friction between Kok and the European immigrants, and in 1848 Sir Harry Smith declared all the treaties abrogated, and formally annexed the country as far as the Vaal River under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty.

The policy of expansion was now in the ascendant—first Natal, then Kaffraria, and now the Orange River territory, had been added to the British possessions, and it seemed that Britain, like the United States in America, regarded itself as the natural heir to the hinterland. But the hot fit soon passed. The Sovereignty produced no revenue, but many complications. Pretorius fished in the troubled waters of a war between the Sovereignty and the BaSotho, and in 1852 he was bought off by an agreement at Sand River which practically abandoned the whole interior in return for a disavowal of slavery. The end of the Sovereignty soon followed, and after Governor Cathcart's brief experience of campaigning in the Basutoland mountains, the British abandoned the country by the Bloemfontein Convention (1854). The little band of farmers then formed themselves into a republic as the Orange Free State.

The year 1854 is a convenient date for a survey of South Africa. The Cape Colony had just received its Charter and set out on its career as a self-governing colony. The population was almost exclusively rural and its farming was seldom much above the subsistence level: Cape Town, "the Tavern of the Seas," possessed the only independent industry. The Western Province around Cape Town produced wheat and wine and, together with the scattered population of the Karroo, was predominantly Dutch-speaking. In the east, with its centre at Grahamstown, was a much smaller block of English-speaking farmers, descendants of the 1820 settlers. Their initiative had acclimatized the merino sheep, and wool had just taken the first place in the list of exports. Between Grahamstown and the native territories lay the little independent colony of British Kaffraria, maintained by the British as a buffer state and separately administered by the Governor of Cape Colony. Beyond it was a mass of independent tribes occupying the area between the Kei and the Umtavuna Rivers. Then came

Natal, destined to become the centre of another block of British population, but for long no more than a handful of whites living amid a conglomeration of native clans and tribes whose cohesion had been destroyed by the Zulu troubles of a generation or two before.

Beyond the mountains the plateau was occupied by two small Dutch-speaking republics. In the Orange Free State a handful of farmers looked anxiously to the mountains whence Moshesh might issue at any moment to eject them, while north of the Vaal lived an amorphous group of farmers and pioneers on whom, in 1858, the Pretorius party attempted to impose a constitution with President and Executive. Even the Presidents of the South African Republics were obliged to admit that slavery was tolerated among the hard-headed pioneers and elephant hunters of the extreme north. The wants of the farmer of the interior were few; fortunately so, for his staple product of a few hides did little more than pay his ammunition bill, and the Orange Free State was chronically in debt to the coast. Through Natal passed a good deal of ivory, which came mostly from the wild quarter of Zoutpansberg, and this was long the principal export of Durban.

It was at this stage that Sir George Grey mooted a federation of all the European states in South Africa (1858). The Free State, anxious for a share in the customs dues which formed the chief item of the revenue of the coast colonies, and doubtful of the issue of its struggle with the BaSotho, was agreeable, but Downing Street refused to contemplate any extension of its responsibilities, and Grey's injudicious persistence earned his dismissal. The Transvaal was as yet too anarchical to have a mind of its own in the matter.

But beside the federationist Governor, the coast colonies contained a growing annexationist school. Where the British taxpayer rejoiced at the abandonment of the interior, the local business man watched with alarm the

growing self-consciousness of the Republics, and particularly the attempt of the Transvaal farmers in 1852 and 1858 to monopolize the country far into the Kalahari and to cut the trade route into the interior. The London Missionary Society had worked in Bechuanaland from the earliest years of the century, and along their line of mission stations moved a growing number of traders. They exchanged for the wild ostrich feathers, skins and ivory that were their object European manufactured goods of all sorts, cotton dress goods, trinkets—and ploughs. The route they followed became known as the "missionary's" or the "English Road" even in the Transvaal,¹ and the business men of the Cape looked upon the interior as part of their own inheritance. The remedy of the coast party was annexation—at the expense of the British taxpayer: periodic campaigns aimed at the reversal of the Conventions, and it is not without significance that Theophilus Shepstone, Agent of the Natal Government in its dealings with native tribes, spent much time in collecting evidence that slavery and similar malpractices were tolerated among the farmers of the north.

The turn of the tide soon came. After a dozen years of intermittent and none too successful warfare, the Orange Free State, under its new President, Brand, gained the upper hand over the BaSotho. Avoiding the impregnable mountain fastnesses, they plundered the Sotho cattle and carried off their grain, and in 1866 forced Moshesh to accept terms which deprived his people of practically all their arable and left them only a few square miles of mountain top. Wodehouse, fearful of the consequences of the break-up of the Sotho people, secured from frowning Street a grudging assent to their annexation to Natal, provided the Free State approved. Wodehouse deliberately exceeded his instructions, annexed without

¹ It is referred to under that name in a Presidential Proclamation of 1868.

conditions, and in 1868 forced assent from the Republic. The policy of abandonment was at an end.

It is only fair to the Cape annexationists to say that they formulated their policy when South Africa was still a poverty-stricken land, subject to droughts and murrain, producing little enough for its own needs and exporting only a little wool and a few hides. But their demands fell on a deaf ear in Downing Street so long as they expected a harrassed Colonial Office to finance expansion at the expense of the British taxpayer. The change came with the mineral discoveries of the next twenty years.

CHAPTER III

1867-1902

IN the year 1867 the first diamond was picked up on the banks of the Vaal River, and soon the first body of men pushed up the " English Road " to work the gold which had been discovered in the Tati region in the far interior. For a few months the gold discoveries eclipsed the diamonds, and the South African Republic intrigued both with the Ba-xa-mmaNgwato and the MaTebele for possession. The British diggers on the spot countered with other intrigues, the Union Jack was hoisted, and voices in the Cape clamoured for annexation. But the gold mining was not a success, and diamonds took its place in the popular imagination. They were discovered in a desolate stretch of land along the Vaal River, occupied only by straggling groups of Koranas and BaThlaping and a few white men, but there was no lack of claimants. Both Republics took the field, and a motley crew of adventurers produced powers of attorney which purported to proceed from Griqua, Thlaping and Korana chiefs.

The Cape Colony was vitally interested. The Dutch farmers showed no inclination to dig, but the English colonies were denuded of their male population, ships' crews deserted at the ports, and soon the rumour drew diggers from oversea. They formed their own government, set up a Mutual Protection Committee, elected their **own** president **and** court of justice, and in face of the chorus of claimants " said nothing and dug away." They did, **however**, express themselves **forcibly when sundry** **adventurers appeared with monopolies granted by the**

Republics. The river, they reminded them, was conveniently close.

Among the claimants was one David Arnot, a Colesberg attorney, who presented a mass of documents on behalf of the Griqua chief Waterboer. It was said that he was backed by Richard Southey, the Secretary to the Cape Colony, who was a member of an Eastern Province family and had interested himself in northern expansion. The BaThlaping were exploited by Theodor Doms, an engaging individual who served each possible master in turn, while Joseph Ludorf, a missionary, did his best for the BaThlaping.

President Marthinus Wessel Pretorius, son of the vanquisher of Dingane, made desperate efforts to secure the Diggings for the Transvaal, bullying native chiefs, wheedling the diggers, and even obtaining from the Portuguese the cession of their share of the empire of the Monomotapa. But Arnot plied him with demands and claims and documents, and in February, 1861, all parties to the dispute accepted the principle of arbitration, with Lieutenant-Governor Keate, of Natal, as the final referee.

Fresh complications arose with the discovery in July, 1871, of the great volcanic pipes at Dutoitspan and de Beers—the modern Kimberley—to which most of the River diggers soon adjourned. The Dry Diggings were situate in the angle between the Orange and the Vaal, in territory which most people assumed to be part of the Orange Free State, though Arnot, some years earlier, had formally claimed it on behalf of his principal, Nicholas Waterboer, of Griquatown. This claim he now pressed with renewed fervour, and Barkly tried to persuade the Orange Free State to accept a similar arbitration scheme. The Republic refused. Keate had just given an unfavourable award in its claim to part of the Transvaal territory, the annexation of Basutoland still rankled, and not least, Waterboer had been prevailed upon to sign a petition requesting to be accepted as a British subject.

In spite of the Free State's refusal, the fate of the New Rush was settled by the arbitration over the River Diggings. The rival parties met at Bloemhof and produced their evidence, the arbitrators disagreed, and the final decision fell to Keate. He seems to have taken as the basis of his line the distribution of territory before the war of 1858 between the Republic and the BaThlaping, and he assigned to the latter the land up to the Maquassi Spruit. More important was his recognition of a hill on the Vaal called Platberg as the corner beacon of the Griqua Waterboer. On the mass of documents presented by Arnot he could not well have done anything else, but his decision settled the future of the Dry Diggings. Armed with a judicial decision as to its boundaries, Governor Sir Henry Barkly took over Waterboer's territory, and Lieutenant John Campbell, in full Highland uniform, read the annexation proclamation to the diggers of Dutoitspan.

The British Government censured Barkly for his precipitancy: they had sanctioned the expansion of Cape Colony, but had no intention of accepting the responsibility of the Diamond Fields for themselves. Their misgivings were justified. The administration of the new province of Griqualand West was ruinously expensive, the diggers were restless, and a Fenian who passed under the name of Aylward fomented a revolution and raised the black flag. To crown all, a judicial inquiry into the hosts of conflicting claims made by speculators and land sharks ended in the decision that native chiefs and Griqua captains had no right to alienate their tribal land. The very foundations of the province were in question, and though the decision applied to private ownership rather than sovereignty, the British Government was thankful to buy off the Free State for the sum of £90,000 (1876). As soon as the question of title was settled and the Kimberley police had the worst of the lawbreakers safely by the heels, the Cape Colony took over the territory and Griqualand West ceased to exist.

One important result of the Keate Award was the forced resignation of President Pretorius. In his place the Transvaalers chose Thomas Francois Burgers, an ex-predikant¹ from Cape Colony, sanguine, enthusiastic, and above all, affable, but a poor judge of men, suffering from an incurable disease which rendered him liable to fits of depression, and always ready to promise that which he had neither the power nor the will to perform.

After a fierce controversy with Barkly over the observance of the Keate Award, Burgers went to Holland to raise money and recruit men for the reorganization of his State. He returned to find the country in chaos, its revenue non-existent, and serious threats from Cetewayo, the Zulu, to the south and SekhukhunS, chief of the BaPedi in the mountains round Lydenburg, to the east.

Meanwhile the success of the Colonial Office in edging the Cape Colony into responsible government encouraged it to seek a final release from all South African problems in a comprehensive scheme of federation. The Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon, supported it with all his power (1875), but the Cape was acutely self-conscious and sensitive to any external influence, and the Free State, freed of the Sotho menace at last and sore over the loss of the Diamond Fields, not unnaturally rejected the scheme. A Conference of South African Colonies and States held in London in the autumn of 1876 seemed to be achieving singularly little, when a secret message from Barkly announced the collapse of Burgers's army in the field against the BaPedi, and the receipt of a request from a meeting in Lydenburg for annexation.

Now Barkly was disingenuous, for the inhabitants of Lydenburg were English and Australian gold miners, very contemptuous of the farmers' republic, but the matter fell out pat for the dying federation scheme. Theophilus Shepstone, who was in England for the federation conference, came back with a commission

¹ A Minister of the Dutch Church.

authorizing him to annex the Transvaal should its inhabitants so desire, and in April, 1877, after long negotiations with the thoroughly despondent Burgers, he carried the annexation into effect.

The next few years saw the power of Sekhukhunê broken in the Transvaal (1878), and the Zulu War with its disasters of Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift, and the expulsion of Cetewayo after the Battle of Ulundi (1879). Prosperity came to the Transvaal with the expenditure of its garrison and the proceeds of land speculation and prospecting. Self-government, so often promised, was indefinitely postponed, and the farmers rose in revolt in December, 1880. A few costly skirmishes in the Laing's Nek pass and the discreditable episode of Majuba led the Gladstone Government to concede to the "Transvaal State" internal independence, save in native affairs, and a Royal Commission drafted the Convention of Pretoria in 1881. The State was to remain under the suzerainty of the Queen, and a western boundary was laid down which included all occupied farms, but was intended to set a final barrier to all further expansion.

The convention was a failure. The British would neither use their strength to save their prestige nor admit themselves beaten, and it was only foolish to imagine that the Transvaalers would be bound by a document which was only a cheap way of "saving face." The Resident at Pretoria was openly flouted, the State resumed the designation of South African Republic, and the republics of Stellaland and the Land of Goshen appeared in Bechuanaland beyond that fixed western border, and the New Republic was set up among the Zulu to the south-east.

The "English Road" was seriously in danger once more, and two persons, John Mackenzie, the London Missionary Society's representative at Kuruman, and Cecil Rhodes, a young speculator from Kimberley, independently set themselves to check the Republican

ajivance. A new convention was signed at London in 1884 which greatly relaxed the conditions imposed upon the Transvaal. The Resident was removed, the title of Republic conceded, the conduct of foreign affairs allowed, and though the specific request for abandonment was refused, the hated word "suzerainty" was allowed to drop, and no more than the veto on foreign treaties remained. On their side, the British gained the recognition of their Protectorate in Bechuanaland, and though the territory of the Republic was considerably extended, the western boundary was to run twenty yards east of the main trade route to the north.

Both Rhodes and Mackenzie failed as Commissioners of Bechuanaland, and it needed a military expedition under General Warren, bloodless as far as the freebooters of Stellaland and Goshen were concerned though productive of a terrific feud among the British representatives in South Africa, to restore order. A dozen years later Bechuanaland south of the Molopo, in which a large number of Europeans had settled, was taken over by Cape Colony, while the northern Protectorate, over tribes that reached as far as the Zambesi, was left to the direct control of Her Majesty's Government.

The road to the north was saved, but the British were obliged to give way in Zululand. The expulsion of Cetewayo had left the territory in confusion, which was not helped by the refusal of the British Government to accept the responsibility which it had obviously incurred. A number of Transvaal subjects repeated the process followed in Stellaland and Goshen. They took service with Cetewayo's minor son Dinizulu, and raised him to the throne after a biblical anointing with a bottle of castor oil and a more modern artillery salute. They were rewarded with land on which they established the "New" Republic, and this the British were forced to recognize. In a year or two it followed its appointed course and was duly absorbed by the South African

Republic. The remnant of Zululand was annexed to Natal (1887), but with its two districts of Utrecht and Vryheid reaching over the mountains, the Transvaal grasped the northern part of that colony in an uncomfortable salient.

The Bechuanaland affair was of more than superficial importance. Kruger and Rhodes faced one another for the first time, and for the first time South African politics, hitherto a somewhat dingy affair of petty jealousies and personal interests, witnessed the clash of personality and principle.

Rhodes was a dreamer by nature. The schoolboy sitting on his upturned bucket at Kimberley had envisaged a whole world led in the paths of peace and honour by the united strength of Great Britain and the United States of America: his ideal now was a united South Africa, in which all the people, the nations and the languages should work together for the common weal. As a good Briton he believed that this could be attained only under the British flag, but he was never one to boggle over questions of race and nationality. Among his friends and followers were men of every race in South Africa, His one great failing was a tremendous egotism which placed himself in the centre of all his schemes, resented their achievement by any agency but his own, subordinated morality and even expediency to the fulfilling of his will, and finally brought about his fall.

When he first ventured into politics Rhodes could rely on nothing except his own determination, but within a few years the vast financial amalgamations at Kimberley, in a way the first fruits of his dreams, brought him immense wealth. Thenceforward he was still a dreamer, but he had the power to put those dreams into practice. One of them was the extension of the British name into Central Africa, and his visionary eye caught the idea of a dominion that stretched from the Cape to Cairo.

By dint of energy and perseverance he steered his way through the maze of concessions and intrigues that surrounded the Tebele chief Lobengula at Bulawayo, secured a Royal Charter for his British South Africa Company (1889), founded a colony and suppressed two native wars, forced the Portuguese to withdraw from the plateau, and effectively blocked Transvaal expansion to the north (1889-1896).

But even a magnate and a millionaire is not all-powerful. No expansion could take place without the sanction of the Colonial Office, and the base of his advance must be fixed in the unsympathetic, if not violently hostile, Cape Colony. These two powers he played off, the one against the other—hence his bargain with J. H. Hofmeyr.

The latter, the earliest political expert in South Africa, had taken the Afrikaner Bond, founded in 1879 as a patriotic and cultural society by a band of enthusiasts at Paarl, weaned it from its extravagances and welded it into an efficient political machine. He taught the Dutch-speaking farmer that government was not a mystery understood only by those born in the temperate zone, but was capable of very practical application to his own advantage. Rhodes felt the power of the Bond during the Bechuanaland crisis, when it turned out the cabinet in which he was Treasurer in order to oblige the Transvaal, and he determined to win it to his side.

Frank conference with Hofmeyr revealed that their ideals, though different, were not incompatible. The "Mole"¹ had no objection to the British Empire so long as it respected the individuality of the South African; Rhodes on his side was prepared to tolerate Hofmeyr's economic protectionism—"dear bread and cheap brandy" was what his enemies called it—so long as he could rely on the cabinet maker and his White House party to

¹ The nickname was given by political opponents who disliked his subterranean workings.

support the policy of northward expansion. In 1890 Rhodes became Prime Minister of Cape Colony by the grace of Hofmeyr, and he held the post until the Jameson Raid.

If Rhodes stood for a policy of comprehensiveness, Kruger on the other hand was an unashamed particularism. He was a man of great personality and, as some of his photographs reveal, of homely dignity. His youth had been active, of great physical strength and courage, and he had a vigorous good humour which made him an admirable leader of men. If Rhodes's youthful journeyings, his romantic devotion to Oxford, and his mixing with all sorts and conditions of men on the Diamond Fields made him the prophet of co-operation, Kruger's upbringing, religious and political, made him the embodiment of the strictest sect of rigid exclusiveness. In his unswerving tenacity of principle lay the secret of his power.

His earliest recollections were of flight from the foreigner,¹ and of daring unknown dangers in the effort to escape. Though he wished to see expansion, it was the expansion of his own people and their ideas, and the banishment of all that was external to their mentality. If expansion was impossible, he would build a metaphorical wall round his country and keep his ideals safe from contamination.

Though his legal powers as President were comparatively slight, Kruger obtained a control over his followers—the majority, and hence the dominating force in the State—such as Napoleon himself might have envied. Once the struggle with the Uitlander had begun, his position was unshakeable.

Rhodes, with his keen appreciation of the essentials of a position, always maintained that he had no quarrel with the Dutch. In many ways he preferred the rough freedom of their manners to the stiff, mincing conduct of

¹ He went on the Great Trek as a small boy.

his own people, and he was never happy at Government House. He insisted that "Krugerism," and not Kruger, nor any individual, was the enemy, and beneath the sordid details of the conflict may be seen a struggle of ideals, a contest between the universalism and progress that were the watchwords of the nineteenth century, and the passionate belief in the local and the particular which finds virtue even in the insignificant.

The inexorable march of time seemed to threaten with extinction all that Kruger held dear. His people and their State were to be swallowed up in something alien and ominous—and when he determined to save them from contamination, who can blame him? It is better to leave the contest between the two as the conflict of ideals that it was in truth rather than to delve into the pettiness and corruption which did so much to bring both parties into disrepute.

South Africa had not yet recovered its poise after the troubles of the Transvaal Annexation and Retrocession when a fresh upheaval began with the discovery of the Witwatersrand. From the '70's onward, the Transvaal had been full of prospectors—those rather tragic adventurers who, with no more than a smattering of geology, mooned around outcrops and fossicked about in the deposits of river beds. They were gamblers rather than serious searchers, and less fortunate than other gamblers in that a lucky find invariably enriched others than themselves.

There were alluvial workings in the Lydenburg district when Shepstone annexed the Transvaal in 1877 '> **then** came the rush to Barberton after the Retrocession, and the fever-stricken valleys of the de Kaap field **were full of** adventurers when, in 1886, George Walker tripped **over** an outcrop of the Main Reef near Langlaagte, **and the Witwatersrand Gold Field had begun.**

The first workers came from Kimberley, with the Kimberley financiers, Rhodes, J. B. Robinson, and

Barnato, in their train, but soon the reports that were noised abroad brought strangers in their thousands from all the ends of the earth. The new fields were no place for the small man: capital was needed for sinking the deep shafts and setting up the expensive reduction machinery. Great financial interests strove with one another for the mastery, and consolidations, amalgamations and alliances gave scope for a new sort of diplomacy. The unfit were gradually eliminated and the fraudulent company promoter waxed fat on the plunder of the foolish. It was wasteful and extravagant, as is all war, but it was a necessary preliminary to the organization of the mining industry.

Then came the political complications. The farmer inhabitants of the Transvaal took no part in opening up the field, and many stories are told of farm-owners who pocketed their purchase money and trekked off once more into the wildest parts of the country. A mining-camp, after all, is not the best environment for a lover of peace. The Reef population was almost exclusively alien, and the fact had far-reaching effects. The Voortrekkers who left Cape Colony in 1836 were still living in the seventeenth century; now their sons were overtaken by the most vigorous aspects of the nineteenth.

Nor could the Transvaal farmers be blamed for their distrust. Pioneers are always pleasanter in retrospect than in close proximity in the flesh, and many of the earliest inhabitants of Barberton and Johannesburg were drunken rowdies and ne'er-do-wells, who were a pest to any law-abiding citizen. In the second wave came international crooks, swindlers and bullies, criminals of every sort who needed a respite from the attentions of the European police. The sweepings of Whitechapel and the ejects of Sydney and New York were not likely to predispose the rigidly "correct" farmer in favour of the Uitlander. Much of the contemptuous dislike which the Transvaaler evinced for the newcomers was thoroughly deserved.

In times past the farmers might have trekked, as some had done in the days when the heretic Burgers was President, going on until they reached the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.¹ But now there was no escape. Rhodes had blocked Bechuanaland and Rhodesia, the British Government was raising objections to the occupation of Swaziland and was soon to annex the last remaining tribes along the coast. There was nothing left but to fight it out with backs against the wall.

Of this attitude of mind the champion was Kruger. He it was who had led the opposition to the reforming ideas of President Burgers; he had pushed his way to the front in the triumvirate which expelled the British in 1881, and was now the hero of the particularists of the Transvaal. Tall, broad-shouldered, deep-voiced, and Calvinist to the core, he had the gifts and the skill to sway his fellow-farmers as he would, but his journeys to Europe and negotiations with Governors and High Commissioners had taught him that there was another way of dealing with the world outside. He was wise enough to realize that such gentry must be encountered on their own ground, and he fell back upon a device which must have seemed to him very like calling in Satan to cast out Satan, by importing foreigners, chiefly Hollanders and Germans, to stiffen his administration. Chief among them was the adroit Dr. Leyds, at first State Attorney and then State Secretary of the Republic. He threw himself into his task with the intellectual zest of a lawyer approaching his brief, and his keen if sophisticated mind plagued High Commissioners and Secretaries of State until the fall of the Republic.

There was something significant in the coming of the Uitlander. Hitherto the contests had been very largely **local** in their significance, and Southey, Shepstone, and **the old** advocates of the annexation policy were South

¹ They settled in Portuguese Angola, on the west coast.

African both in training and outlook. Now the march of modern progress introduced the Transvaal to the less pleasant aspects of international High Finance.

Yet Kruger's choice of helpers was unfortunate. The Witwatersrand soon passed out of the mining - camp phase, and many of the newcomers were the pick of the brains of Europe. They were reasonable men, not insensible of the farmers' point of view. The President's powerful personality, when he trusted to it, had its effect. What the Uitlander could not abide was the petty tyranny of adventurers like himself, who bullied and exploited him in the name of a State for which they themselves professed the liveliest contempt. Malicious tongues spread the fable of the youth who had been three days in Pretoria and threatened to pack up and return to the Netherlands because he had not yet been offered a Government post.

Transvaal politics were corrupt and many of the officials venal, yet the despised Uitlander had no hope of redress. It was this feeling of hopelessness which gave the touch of asperity to Uitlander sentiment. Many stories were told of the intrigue that must precede the simplest Government action. Scandal mongers spoke of an unofficial clique whom they nicknamed the "Third" Raad, over and above the official First and Second, who intervened in policy and hatched schemes for their own financial welfare.

The granting of monopolies was a convenient means of exploiting the Uitlander, since the farmer consumed little that he did not himself produce. There was talk of a Jam Concession in favour of one of the members of the "Third" Raad which was thwarted by a counter-intrigue, but the Dynamite Concession became a matter of international politics. It handed over to a group of German financiers the absolute control of one of **the** essential needs of the Rand. Repeated protests and British intervention were of no avail, and the concession

remained for the Crown Colony administration to expropriate after the war. Concessions were defended on the ground that they protected the early years of some nascent industry, but often enough the product was imported as before and the licensee merely slapped on to the price as much as he thought the article would stand. The resulting profit was then shared with the officials and politicians who had secured the privilege for him.

Taxation was heavy. The Reef contributed easily the greater part of the revenue of the State and received but a fraction in return, but this would have been endured if the authorities had proved friendly, or even coldly impartial. When the Government was frankly hostile and its servants cynically indifferent, matters approached the danger point. The Uitlanders complained that not even the courts were secure. In the notorious Brown case the Executive had intervened to secure what were commonly reported to be the financial interests of one of its highest members. The courts gave judgement in favour of an American miner named Brown and awarded heavy damages, but the Legislature was invoked to alter the law by an arbitrary process *ex post facto*, and the wrong was never redressed. The ensuing dispute between Executive and Judiciary ended in 1897 in the President's summary dismissal of the Chief Justice.

Railways, the urgent need of the Rand, provided another bone of contention. They were at first refused, but when at last they came, the Republic naturally favoured a line built by a Netherlands firm to the port of Delagoa Bay. The Company tried to overcome the competition of the Cape lines by tripling the rates on the section within the Transvaal. An attempt to evade them by waggon transport led Kruger to close the "Drifts" (the river fords) on the frontier, which **was followed by a peremptory demand from Rhodes for their opening in terms of the Conventions (1895).**

Exasperation in Johannesburg issued in demonstrations, secret societies, rifle clubs, much talk and a movement for reform. Hotheads began to talk of a rising, and rifles and machine-guns came in disguised as mining machinery. Rhodes came up to inspect his business interests and convinced himself that Kruger's hold on his own republic was insecure. There was a strong Liberal party in Pretoria, hampered only by inability to find a suitable candidate, and at the Presidential election of 1893, Kruger had just scraped home ahead of Joubert amid a host of malicious rumours. The Reformers were uncertain of their own aims : many felt that British intervention would alienate the mass of burghers, and a reformed republic, with a wider franchise, would have satisfied their desires.

Rhodes, whose health was failing, and who felt that his time was short, was pressing forward a movement for the federation of all the States of South Africa. The " Drifts Question " had given him a great moral victory over Kruger, there were rumours that certain Johannesburg financiers were plotting for the Presidency, and he decided that the Johannesburg Reformers needed guidance. He brought his friend, Dr. Jameson, Administrator of Rhodesia, to Pitsani to drill his police just over the frontier, in readiness for decisive action when **the** long-expected revolution should come to a **head.** **J**

The Rand hummed with excitement, drilling went on almost in public, but somehow the rising did not come. Jameson fidgetted on the frontier, an object of intelligent interest on the part of neighbouring farmers, and finally decided that the Reformers must be helped to make up their own minds. On the 29th December, 1895, he cut **the telegraph** wires behind him and rode with some 500 men **into the Transvaal.** The Reformers were horrified **at the approach of their " rescuer/' and their half-hearted rising missed fire. Jameson's men, exhausted by their long ride,**

were led into the circle of Cronje's men at Doornkop and surrendered unconditionally.

Kruger behaved with wise moderation, resisted the popular clamour among his own people, invited the High Commissioner Hercules Robinson to Pretoria, and handed over Jameson and his men, whose lives were forfeit by every canon of the law of nations, to the British Government. Some sixty Reformers were arrested and six, including Rhodes's own brother Frank, were condemned to death. The sentences were commuted for a fine of £25,000 apiece, while the lesser conspirators were fined a couple of thousand pounds.

The Raid ruined Rhodes, even though the mad rush into a peaceful State had been far from his intention. The Bond spurned him as a traitor, while English Liberals were horrified at his cynical betrayal of a place of trust. He resigned his Premiership, and though he restored his personal prestige by quelling the rebellion of the MaTebele unarmed and single-handed in 1896, his influence was gone for the remainder of his life. Kruger, on the other hand, was firmly fixed in the presidential chair, and the election of 1898 saw him returned triumphantly as the head of a united republic. The victors were naturally intransigent, while the Uitlanders were definitely in the wrong.

Jameson's blunder had made war inevitable.

Conferences between the British High Commissioners and Republican officials had been held at intervals during the last ten years. Swaziland, railways and railway rates, and the Dynamite Monopoly had come up again and again to lose themselves in a mass of irrelevancies; compromises and concessions were weighed against one another in a series of endless bargainings which suggest the traditional eastern bazaar. In all this the franchise question gained an undeserved importance. That many British subjects would have abandoned their nationality in favour of that of the Republic is doubtful, but the

progressive stiffening of the voter's qualifications to five years' residence in 1882, and thence to fourteen years' in 1890, was ominous of Republican policy. It seemed that the " Chosen People " intended to keep the Uitlander as a new Gibeonite in perpetual serfdom. The fact that the franchise question was raised at all was an unhealthy symptom. Many foreign merchants inhabit the cities of Europe, but they do not demand the franchise, nor do they agitate on the lines of the Uitlander protests.

In spite of the advice of friends, the Republican executive refused to give way. Sir Alfred Milner was imported to deal with the intellectual subtleties of Dr. Leyds on more equal terms, but an agreed solution seemed to be impossible. A conference at Bloemfontein in June, 1899, produced no result, the Orange Free State somewhat reluctantly intimated its intention of making common cause, and the South African Republic in October, 1899, launched an ultimatum which demanded the withdrawal of the British troops. Now an ultimatum is the first step in modern war.

The Republican strategy was sound—a sudden blow at Natal and the occupation of Durban, the only harbour on that coast. The greater part of Cape Colony would then rise to welcome an invading force, there was a good chance of European intervention, and the history of 1881 suggested that the British would make peace after a preliminary reverse. The scheme failed. The British troops were outnumbered at the start, and their artillery was much inferior to that of the Republics, but their retreat from the exposed salient in Northern Natal held up Joubert's advance long enough to allow Ladysmith to be put into some sort of state of defence. The Commandant-General failed to rush the town in the early days of the siege, and so long as it stood uncaptured across the junction of the Free State and Transvaal roads, he did not care to risk the advance on Durban. Small garrisons held out at Kimberley and Mafeking along the " English

Road," and the siege of the three posts occupied the forces that should have overrun the Cape and Natal.

The British disasters came with their counter-offensive. There were too many frontal attacks on strongly-held positions, too many cases of flagrant stupidity among the lesser commanders. The Black Week (December, 1899) of Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso awoke the British public with a shock, but the Republics had miscalculated its effect. The very fact that they were not obscure scuffles like Laing's Nek and Majuba in 1881 forced a realization that the war must be taken seriously.

Lord Roberts arrived early in 1900 and advanced against the strategic centre of the Republican position. Cronje, whose bull-dog tactics are somehow reminiscent of those of some of his opponents, was caught at Paardeberg and forced to surrender with 4,000 men on 27th February. Bloemfontein was occupied, and in May the Orange Free State was annexed as the Orange River Colony. In June Pretoria fell, the old President escaped through Delagoa Bay to Europe, and in September the South African Republic was annexed as the Transvaal.

The Republican leaders were faced by a serious problem. The field operations were over, foreign intervention had failed, and common sense urged that they should secure the best terms they could. No further action could better them, while continuation of the **war would** only bring its horrors into every corner of the country and entailed the prospect of worse conditions when the last resistance had been beaten down. On the other hand, a sense of honour bade them fight on, even when victory was hopeless, and the **war** took on its tragic second phase.

Guerillas may harass a **regular** army and **win great local** successes, but can never bring decision to a campaign. **The war dragged on. British detachments were ambushed, isolated posts overwhelmed, but the army remained in occupation, the mines were restarted, and**

civil population came trickling back to the towns. In the country every farmhouse was an enemy post, every inhabitant a disguised enemy soldier, and steady sniping along the roads accounted for heavy casualties. In the end Kitchener took drastic steps. The rural population was evacuated, concentrated in camps, and fed with Government rations. The farmhouses were then systematically destroyed and blockhouses and barbed wire sought to restrict the movement of the commandos.

As time went on the farmers lost both in numbers and enthusiasm. Some made their peace and tried to settle down. Kitchener was anxious to stop a useless war and used his influence on both sides. Peace was finally agreed upon at Vereeniging on 31st May, 1902. The terms were not ungenerous. The Republicans lost their independence, but were guaranteed self-government after a probationary period. They even kept their rifles "where needed for their protection," and were secured against a native franchise. Instead of the vanquished, the victors paid an indemnity: £3,000,000 was to go to the fighters, and the interest on a development loan was to be paid for two years.

The most fruitful clause of the peace was the most formal. Henceforth the whole of South Africa owed a single allegiance, and political union could be achieved without those meaningless complications of autonomy and precedence which are more difficult to overcome than serious questions of principle. Cecil Rhodes had died a few weeks earlier, and was buried on the mountain-top in the colony that bore his name, but in his will he left Groote Schuur, the great house that he had rebuilt on the slopes of Table Mountain, to be the official residence of the Prime Minister of United South Africa.

PART II
MODERN TIMES

CHAPTER IV

1902-1909

THE history of South Africa seems to make a fresh start after 1902. Much of the £250,000,000 that the Boer War cost the British taxpayer was spent in the country. South Africa was in the public eye and public imagination, capital flowed in, and many confiding investors increased the total of its wealth without reaping much benefit to themselves. There was a great influx of British population, and though the official settlement schemes were not particularly successful, many came out and found occupation on their own account.

Cape Colony was unusually prosperous. The post-war boom made money easy, and British prestige and the disfranchisement of the rebels who had helped the Republics during the war brought in Dr. Jameson as Prime Minister and head of a distinctively "British" Progressive Party (1904). Almost at once the equally inevitable slump set in. Revenue dropped from twelve to seven millions, and in 1908 the Bond—renamed the South African Party—turned him out, and that strangely negative genius Merriman took office. There was a deficit of £1,000,000 and heroic measures were called for. Merriman found his vocation in stringent economies, retrenchment and reduced salaries, and the unheard-of expedient of an income tax, graduated, however, to fall as lightly as possible on his Bond farming supporters.

Natal was happier than it realized. Though responsible government was ten years old, no burning question had split its somewhat pedestrian politicians into parties, and the Parliament was largely a matter of petty factions and personalities. It was faced, however, by the last serious native rising that South Africa has experienced. Its native policy since Shepstone had been stagnant, its white population, outnumbered by nine to one, was too timid to be generous or even wise, and in 1906 the grant of land in Zululand to Europeans and the imposition of a poll-tax provoked an intermittent sort of rebellion. Though Europeans were panicky at the time, the rebellion was suppressed and punishment duly meted out. It should be remembered in connection with later developments that public opinion in Natal bitterly resented the attempt of the Imperial Government to use the power of intervention reserved in the Constitution.

The real interest in South Africa lies, however, in the great work of reconstruction carried on in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony by Lord Milner, which showed his coldly efficient administrative genius at its best. From the Orange to the Limpopo the countryside lay waste, without house or inhabitant, and its simplest agricultural needs were imported from elsewhere—Swiss milk, Australian butter and Irish eggs. The whole rural population had to be repatriated, the economic machinery of the country must be set going once more, and a new civil service and administration re-created.

All this was done. There were blunders and misfortunes, it is true. Droughts intervened, and Government rations continued longer than had been hoped, but in spite of all difficulties the prisoners were brought back from the prison camps in Ceylon and St. Helena, the rural population was put back on the farms and, as a cynic remarked, "within six months they were hard at it talking politics again." The measure of

Milner's success is that the country was ready for self-government within four years.

, The re-creation of the Civil Service—many of the aliens in the Republican services did not return—was accompanied by an interesting experiment. The High Commissioner knew the difficulty of securing older men of the sort he required, and he chose instead to introduce a number of young men who had recently distinguished themselves in academic careers. They were nicknamed "Milner's Kindergarten/" but in spite of an occasional misfit, a service that could command Patrick Duncan, Lionel Curtis, Basil Williams, Philip Ker and John Buchan in the first flush of their youthful enthusiasms might count itself lucky.

Milner was a stickler for efficiency, and his Crown Colony Civil Service was such as had never been seen in South Africa before. It was, and the fact was patent, definitely part of a policy of Anglicization, and so full justice has never been done to its permanent achievement, but detachment from local factions—even from the South-African-born politicians who had influenced successive High Commissioners in the past—was no great disadvantage. They laid the foundation of the administration of the present day, and the main lines of their work still survive.

One of the most striking features of their work was the organization of scientific agricultural services on American lines. The Veterinary Research Institute, afterwards to blossom into the manifold activities of Onderstepoort, was started under Dr. (now Sir) Arnold Theiler; experimental stations, the education of the farmer, the introduction of new crops, notably teff grass, **the governmental introduction of stud animals, and the control of locusts, all trace their origins back to these times. Another undertaking was the reorganization of the railway system of the two northern colonies. Of the development loan of £35,000,000, roughly two-thirds was**

spent in the expropriation of the railway companies and the extension of the system. During the five years between 1902 and 1907 the tracks were doubled in extent.

It was a great achievement, but Milner himself would have admitted the immense asset he possessed in the mines. A 10 per cent, tax on profits provided the nucleus of a secure income, and he could devote his, organizing abilities to the task of building up the State. The mines, however, suffered from a chronic shortage of labour, and the first years of peace showed two-thirds of the stamps idle and an urgent demand for over 100,000 natives. The local labour force was ill-organized, and the farmers resented any diversion of their own supply. After various expedients had been tried and suggested—tropical Africans, natives from Portuguese territory, and Indians—and amid a good deal of trepidation on the part of those who looked at the experience of Natal, some 45,000 Chinese were imported in the years 1903 and 1904.

All this reconstruction was a means to an end, and Milner looked forward to the conclusion of his labours in the shape of a South African federation. As Governor of the two northern colonies he was assisted by an Inter-Colonial Council, and the railway systems and police forces were kept united. He gained a great victory for corporate action when he summoned the Customs Conference at Bloemfontein in 1903, and succeeded in imposing economic union on the five colonies (including Rhodesia) and the three Protectorates. Out of this conference arose a Native Affairs Commission, which reported in 1905, and in which for the first time South African native problems were discussed as a whole and the foundation laid for a common policy.

Milner's tenure of office came to an end in April, 1905. His frank policy of Anglicization naturally earned the fear and dislike of the Dutch-speaking people, but

in addition his autocracy gained the ill-will of many whom he opposed in South Africa and excited the alarm of the English Liberals, who blamed him for everything they disliked since his first arrival in South Africa—and before. It was his misfortune that he was retiring by nature and singularly sensitive to criticism. His personality failed to make the friends he deserved, and he was respected and perhaps feared where he might have been loved.

To his successor, Lord Selborne, fell the task of bridging the transition from the Crown Colony system to self-government. Letters Patent were issued for the establishment of Legislative Councils on the " Representative Government " plan (four-fifths to be elected), but without control over the Executive, but in December, 1905, the Balfour Cabinet fell in England. The Liberals swept the country with a campaign in which much denunciation of " Chinese slavery " and graphic bills on the hoardings illustrating miserable Orientals in chains played a great part. The new Liberal Cabinet shelved their immediate problems in South Africa by the grant of full responsible government to the late Republics, and in the Transvaal the elections were held early in 1907.

Responsible government meant the formation of parties. The British newcomers in the Transvaal tended to support the " Progressives " under Sir George Farrar, who was backed also by the mining interests, but their vote was split by Independent and Labour candidates. There was also a Nationalist party under E. P. Solomon and H. C. Hull, representing the older generation of English-speaking South Africans, who felt themselves swamped by the combination of Reef and the new importations.

The most remarkable feature was the Africander revival. The Boer War, which Rhodes believed had " beaten Krugerism/" had actually rescued the Africander **from** provincialism and was the occasion of a **great**

awakening of Africander sentiment. It was the time of the " Second Movement " of Afrikaans literature, and a stream of verse poured out, Kiplingesque in form and unequal in quality, but nevertheless the outcome of much genuine patriotic emotion. Louis Botha, the Boer commander after the death of Commandant General Joubert, now displayed gifts of statesmanship of a high order. He set himself to restore the unity and self-respect of his people. He healed the breach between the Diehard and the Handsupper (the man who had made his peace with the British before the end of the war) and gave them a renewed self-consciousness and self-esteem which, however contrary to Milner's hopes, might prove the basis for honest partnership in the future. In 1905 he formed the Het Volk¹ party, and in 1907 he secured the support of the Nationalists and Labour men and commanded the majority in the Transvaal Parliament.

In office Botha behaved with statesmanlike self-control. He preached the doctrine of conciliation and co-operation between the white men who were to build the new South Africa, and in his own person did much to allay the fear of the British. The Chinese were sent home on the expiration of their contracts. The Civil Service was little disturbed and continued its work, an Education Act established a unified system, and the work of restoration went on. By one of those inspired gestures which do more than reasoning and Acts of Parliament, the Transvaal Parliament marked the end of strife by buying the great Cullinan Diamond, newly discovered in the Premier Mine, and presenting it to the King.

In the Orange River Colony the change was not so peaceful. The coldly academic brains of the leaders of the Oranje Unie rejected the compromises that satisfied the Transvaal, there was no large body of

* Literally, " The People."

English-speaking people as on the Reef, and soon the minority was vociferous in its protests.

Everyone knew, however, that the question of federation must soon be faced. The members of the Kindergarten who remained after their leader's departure were ardent federationists, and busied themselves in the preparation of the document which afterwards grew into the Selborne Memorandum (1907). The Transvaal had denounced the Customs Union immediately after attaining to responsible government, and there was now no Milner to dragoon the colonies into common action.

After preliminary negotiations a National Convention, representing all four colonies and attended by assessors from Rhodesia, met at Durban in October, 1908. Meetings were subsequently held at intervals in each of the local capitals. Many causes were driving South Africa into union : questions of native policy, the Indians, railways and defence, the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interests in customs policy of the four separate colonies, a desire to oust Lourenço Marques from its share in the lucrative traffic with the Transvaal; some even spoke optimistically of the great economies that would be secured in administration, but the cynic may be pardoned for doubting whether any or all of these would have been adequate to overrule the local jealousies of the four colonies had not the Transvaal alone been prosperous in a time of depression, secure in the possession of the mines.

The first difference to be decided was between those who desired complete union and those who merely advocated federation in the strict sense. As things fell out the representatives of Natal, the smallest and most individual of the colonies, were the only members to be solid for federation, and they were outvoted in the Convention. The Cape delegates refused to surrender their native franchise, the interior would have none of

it, and the Convention decided to leave the franchise laws of the separate colonies as they were, unaltered. The last serious divergence arose over one of those trivial matters that commonly wreck empires—the site of the capital. All the existing capitals, together with many obscure towns and villages and some areas where there was not even a village, put in their claim, and in the end the spoils were to be divided. The Legislature was assigned to Cape Town and the Administration to Pretoria. The Court of Appeal was placed at Bloemfontein, but that town has not yet succeeded in attracting a permanent legal population.

As it emerged from the Convention, the Constitution provided for an Executive vested in the Crown and advised by a Council of ten members, and a central Parliament consisting of 120 members and increasing to 150, allotted upon a population basis. For ten years, however, Natal and the Orange Free State (the old name was revived on the motion of " Dr. Jim ") received more than their share. Of the Senate eight were nominated—four on the ground of expertness in native affairs—and eight were elected indirectly by the representatives of each Province.

The equality of English and Dutch as official languages was protected by a clause requiring a two-thirds majority for its amendment, a safeguard which was also conceded to the native and coloured franchise at the Cape.

As a concession to the federationists, each Province was to possess a Provincial Council with jurisdiction in education, hospitals, local government and public works, with the necessary financial powers. Their Executives were to consist of four members elected by the Councils on the system of Proportional Representation and were to be presided over by Administrators, who were to be officials appointed by the Union Government and virtually responsible to it. The Union Cabinet has the power of veto over all Provincial legislation, and

Parliament possesses concurrent legislative authority even in the matters assigned to the Councils.

Since 1910 Union control has been enforced through finance. The field of Provincial taxation is very limited—poll taxes, amusement and race-course taxes, and certain licence and company taxation would probably exhaust the list, and the Union Government supplements the income of each by a subsidy, formerly on a pound for pound basis, but recently adjusted to the educational expenses which form the chief item of Provincial expenditure.

The Act of Union also established a Court of Appeal for the Union, a Board of Commissioners to administer the railways "on business principles/" and a permanent Public Service Commission to control the personnel of the public service. Provision was made in the case of deadlocks between the Houses, and it was laid down that the earnings of the railways were not to be more than sufficient to meet the working costs and ordinary capital and interest charges.

The draft constitution was approved by the Parliaments of the Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State, and by a referendum in Natal. It was then forwarded to Westminster under the charge of a special committee, and it was passed by the Imperial Parliament as the South Africa Act, 1909, with no more than a mild question as to the desirability of handing over five millions of natives to a little over a million whites.

Union came into force on 31st May, 1910, exactly eight years after the signature of the Treaty of Vereeniging.

CHAPTER V

THE BOTHA MINISTRY: 1910-1919

THE political parties had been busy re-forming all over South Africa. Botha formed the South African National Party as an invitation to both races to co-operate in the task of making the new South Africa. He was beginning to make headway, but the majority of the British still looked askance at an Afriander leader. The Transvaal Progressives joined their Cape brethren as the Unionist Party. Only Natal held aloof and sent an independent Natal Party. After the inevitable intrigues the new Governor-General, Lord Gladstone, summoned General Botha to the Premiership. His Cabinet consisted of South African Party men carefully selected to balance the Provinces, and two members who brought with them the support of ultra-British Natal.

Party divisions were somewhat arbitrary. Racial cleavage was there certainly: the Unionist Party was British and the Afrianders followed their leaders into the South African Party, but Hull from the Transvaal, and Burton from the Cape, and Moor and Gubbins from Natal saved the Cabinet from any charge of racial exclusiveness. The economic element was present. The South African Party was a farmer's party, and always dealt tenderly with farming interests, while the Unionists were * townsmen, away behind whom their enemies professed to catch glimpses of the Chamber of Mines, but they had a large agricultural following in the English-speaking districts of the Eastern Province, which was strengthened when they won over Natal.

The new Government had an immense task. The four Civil Services were centralized at Pretoria, though not without objections from the other Provinces, and the railways were put under one administration. The Selborne Memorandum had recommended the virtual independence of both public service and railways under commissioners whose prestige should enable them to resist any political pressure. The South Africa Act had indeed prescribed the establishment of the commissions, but that jealousy of independent powers which is characteristic of South African executives kept them designedly weak. The Railway Commission in particular was reduced to a pale advisory body, membership of which soon became recognized as a cheap means of rewarding—and side-tracking—political adherents.

The thorny question of Provincial finance was attacked, a commission sat on the dangerous question of educational policy, while the consolidation of the immigration laws brought about a revival of the Indian troubles which had plagued the short life of the Transvaal Cabinet. Among the achievements of which the Government was most proud was the organization of the country's system of defence. The Defence Act of 1912, outcome of the Imperial Conference of the previous year, was regarded, and not only in South Africa, as a model of its kind. It repeated the traditional liability of every South African to military service, and ingeniously combined the old commando system with a small permanent force of professional soldiers and the training of a compulsory quota of youths—chiefly from the towns—as an active citizen force, on lines which were reminiscent of the British Territorials.

There were troubles of a graver sort. In July, 1913, a miners' strike in Johannesburg got out of hand and flared up suddenly in rioting and incendiarism which led to the hurried transfer of the whole Imperial garrison to restore order, and musketry fire in the streets. An

attempt at a General Strike in January, 1914, which affected the Government railways as well as the mines, was countered by the Proclamation of Martial Law, calling out the Defence Force, commandos included, and a bloodless siege of the Johannesburg Trades Hall. Nine trade union leaders were summarily deported without trial. Parliament obediently passed an Act of Indemnity, but the administration had revealed arbitrary tendencies which caused no small alarm. In the Transvaal Provincial Council the Labour Party swept the towns to the virtual extinction of the Unionists, and gained a majority of one. There might have been more far-reaching political results but for the outbreak of the Great War.

There were troubles within the Cabinet itself. Cape and Transvaal jealousies resulted in the resignation of Hull, the Finance Minister, early in 1912, and the party was split from top to bottom by a dispute with General Hertzog, the fashioner of the Orange River Colony education policy.

Englishmen, with their traditional opportunism in politics, found General Botha's somewhat vague policy of conciliation and co-operation intelligible enough. The precise, academic mind of General Hertzog, reminiscent of the rigid logicity of the Kelt or the Gaul, puzzled and irritated them. Hertzog was the heir of Krugerism, not the old instinctive, unreasoning distrust of all modern developments, but a new rationalized Krugerism, which sought to base its particularism upon logical and philosophical principles. To Hertzog there was something of real value in the existence of the separate nation: if it became extinct, something of worth had passed away. The nation must therefore be preserved from outside influences, and other considerations, however important in themselves, must take second place. The peculiar inheritance of the Afriander seemed endangered by General Botha's steady approach^o to the British, and General Hertzog

felt that that drift must be checked. The difference between the two men is probably that Botha's conception of Africanderism was something dynamic, to realize itself in action, while Hertzog regarded it as something static, to be preserved.

Hertzog's sensitive temperament had felt the humiliations of the conquest more keenly, and he probably exaggerated the importance and the danger of the few years of Crown Colony rule. He could not share Botha's optimism: to him, "the Englishman" was always the stranger and the enemy, and there was an asperity- in his references to British South Africans which precipitated a Cabinet crisis. The famous "foreign adventurer" phrase may not have been premeditated, but it represents what was fundamentally his point of view.

His campaign was resented in Natal, which Botha was steadily wooing, and whose people were as South African as any Europeans in the country. A Natal member of the Cabinet resigned, and when Hertzog refused to follow suit Botha resigned and reformed the Cabinet without him (December, 1912).

The result was the formation of a new National Party, or rather of new parties in each of the Provinces. At first they were joined only by some of the diehards of the late war and a few disappointed members of the Government party, but steady propaganda and a whole-hearted and more than religious enthusiasm steadily increased their numbers throughout South Africa.

The year of the Cabinet crisis was marked by the establishment of a Land and Agricultural Bank for the Union which was centralized out of the existing colonial institutions. It was to advance money on the security of agricultural land for the purpose of financing improvements such as fencing and water supply, and was able to offer better terms than commercial institutions. It undertook a good deal of Government business, such

as the collection of instalments paid by settlers under the various schemes, and has since proved a convenient means of administering Government attempts to aid the farming population, such as the measures for drought relief.

Native policy was left alone, save for the Native Land Act of 1913. This was avowedly a temporary half-measure, and was chiefly intended to allay fears that were being exploited for political purposes, but it served to complicate native policy for the next twenty years, and has not yet been replaced. In 1913 there came the great march of Natal Indians under Gandhi to the Transvaal frontier as a protest against its restrictive legislation. The Indian Government intervened, there were conferences, and an agreement with Gandhi was arrived at in June, 1914.¹

A few weeks later came the Great War. So unexpected was the crisis that the Union was without a Governor-General, and Lord Buxton only arrived to assume office in September. The attitude of the Union Government was the test of the new Imperial system in the eyes of Imperialists and Nationalists alike. General Botha undertook to release the Imperial garrison by accepting responsibility for the whole internal defence of South Africa, and in accordance with the wishes of the Admiralty, despatched an expedition consisting of regiments from the newly-raised Defence Force to occupy Luderitzbucht and destroy the wireless stations of German South-West Africa.

Neither of these steps was contrary to strictly South African principles, for they aimed at the exclusion of two extraneous powers—the British garrison and the German Empire—and laid the foundation for a new *Monro Doctrine for South Africa*. General Hertzog, however, maintained **that** it was both the right and duty of the Government **to insist** upon its neutrality in the European war, and

¹ On both these questions see Chapter IX.

Nationalists felt that their country was being dragged at the chariot-wheels of a greater power.

Many of the die-hards thought the time appropriate for the revenge, but General Botha's influence kept the Union at peace. In October, however, German intrigues secured the adhesion of Colonel Maritz, who was in command of the Union forces facing the Germans along the desert boundary. Risings flared up in the north of the Orange Free State, under the de Wet who had been the elusive hero of the last war, and in the Transvaal under Beyers, who had just resigned in spectacular fashion from his post of Commandant-General of the Union Defence Forces.

Though the Press ridiculed the " Five Bob Rebellion/"¹ the position was critical. English extremists welcomed the opportunity of " having a go " at the renascent Africander, and Botha, openly distrusted by the British, was in the cruel position of having to suppress the people for whose revival he had laboured during the past twelve years. He was justified in the event. Even a successful rebellion would have made no difference to the Great War, whose course it could have changed no more than the Dardanelles fiasco. On the other hand, it would have ruined the Union and put back co-operation between the two races for more than a generation. The Africander domination of the years following 1924 was only possible because Botha had stood firm for constitutional methods in 1914.

The rebellion was suppressed by commandos held together by Botha's energy and persuasive eloquence, and after the action at Mushroom Valley the opposing bands were disposed of as much by persuasion as by force. Beyers was drowned in the flooded Vaal River as he tried to escape, and de Wet, elusive to the last, was hunted down by motor-cars in the desert as he tried to

¹ de Wet complained that he had been fined 5s. for thrashing a native.

break through into German territory. The leading Nationalists remained quiet, torn between a natural sympathy with the rebels and conviction that their movement could not possibly succeed. But the rebellion had done its work. Botha's action was easily represented to suit the purpose of his enemies. He was execrated among his own people, the open admiration of British South Africans was an embarrassment, and the strain of the decision told upon his health. Where he was able to exercise it, his personality still carried the day, but elsewhere in the country districts the South African Party lost ground.

In 1915 Botha put himself at the head of the Union forces, and after a short campaign compelled the surrender of the German administration in South-West Africa. A new election in the Union brought in a strong National Party as the virtual opposition, and forced the Government to rely upon the Unionists in the House. The whole of the Orange Free State had followed Hertzog, and soon the whole of the north of the Cape, together with the Western Transvaal, were recognized as Nationalist areas.

The Union began to take a larger share in the war. This was partly due to the influence of the Unionist Party, partly to the conviction of the South African Party leaders that King Log, in the shape of the British Empire in South Africa, was preferable to the King Stork who would be the result of a German victory. A volunteer South African Brigade was recruited to serve in the British Army in Flanders, and General Smuts, who had been Botha's political lieutenant and firm supporter throughout, left to take command of an Imperial Expeditionary Force of South Africans and others in German East Africa.

Of all this the Nationalists disapproved. The Cabinet was becoming more and more closely involved in the fortunes of the hated foreign power at the precise moment when it seemed to be on the verge of defeat in Europe.

On the other hand, the British in South Africa became more restless and more acrimonious as the crisis approached. Afriander sentiment, now united in a vigorous political organization throughout South Africa, and forgetting that the Uitlander and the British South Africans were now citizens with an equal voice, turned to the old ideal of a republic. In 1919 a deputation went to lay its request before the British Cabinet, and before the Peace Conference which was busy remodelling the map of Europe. The reply was that this was a matter on which the people of South Africa must first be agreed.

In spite of its internal troubles, the Union was growing in importance oversea. South Africans probably did not realize the prestige it gained when, in 1917, General Smuts was chosen to represent the Dominions on the War Cabinet. He played his full part in the international politics of the time and was closely connected with one of the earlier attempts to negotiate a peace. It is one of the humours of history that in the War Cabinet one of his colleagues was Lord Milner. In 1919 both Generals Botha and Smuts set their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles. On the League of Nations constituted by the Peace Conference the Union enjoyed a practical equality with its fellow Member States from China to Peru.

General Botha survived his return only a few weeks. He died, worn out, in August, 1919. His had been an extraordinary career—the Transvaal Liberal became Commandant-General of the South African Republic and its champion to the bitter end; the reviver of Afrianderism became the first Prime Minister of United South Africa, and finally the hero of the Imperialists. It is still too early to estimate the permanent achievement of his career, but future ages will probably find that both Imperialist friends and Nationalist opponents were at fault, and that he was guided throughout by a desire to achieve what in the long run would be to the ultimate good of South Africa.

CHAPTER VI

THE SMUTS MINISTRY: 1919-1924

THE death of General Botha brought to an end a partnership which had lasted from the days of the reconstruction of Africanderism and the building up of *Het Volk* after the Boer War. Through all that time Botha, the genial South African farmer,¹ had been partnered by Smuts, the intellectual, the philosopher and botanist, the product of Stellenbosch, of Cambridge and the Inns of Court. It is noteworthy, by the way, that Smuts served as State Attorney in that Kruger Government to which Botha's friends had been opposed. The two made an admirable pair, for Botha was strongest in his management of that human nature with which Smuts always felt a certain philosophic impatience. The latter had now to face alone a situation which had taxed the partnership to the uttermost.

The Great War marked the end of the British period in South Africa. Thousands went to Europe on their own initiative, and few came back. Many of South African birth left their bones in Flanders and in East Africa. They were young men who would soon have been ready to take the lead in their country's affairs, and South Africa was the poorer for their loss. At the same time the Government was steadily passing to the Africander. In times past the farmers had stayed on the land, and the towns, even in the Republics, were little islands of English-speaking population. Government

¹ In later years he became a steady golfer and enjoyed a game of bridge.

offices were staffed from the Netherlands, with stray Europeans, or from the Cape. Now for the first time Dutch-speaking South Africans appeared in large numbers as candidates for the Civil Service. For the first time a generation was growing up among them which had enjoyed the benefits of modern education, and often of European training. Since their education had been largely through the medium of English, they fulfilled admirably the qualification of bilingualism which was now essential for the public service. As the Milner civil servants passed up the ladder and their seniors fell out at the retiring age, the Service itself changed its tone.

Other occupations saw the same change. Dutch-speaking girls became shop-assistants, the police filled up with young men from the *platteland* and, still more important, the place of the miners who went oversea was taken by a rural element which flocked in from the drought-stricken Cape Colony and Orange Free State. The racial composition of the Reef was radically changed.

Another factor was at work. The British were largely town-dwellers, and even the farmers of Natal and the Eastern Province accepted the same standards. Their birth-rate was low, and it may be doubted whether the town population does more than perpetuate itself. The birth-rate on the farms, though no longer mediaeval in its proportions, still remains that of a healthy and vigorous people.

Smuts inherited a peck of troubles. The elections of 1920 returned the Nationalists as the biggest single party, while the Unionists lost heavily to the advantage of Labour in the towns. Even with the Unionists and Independents the Government's majority was no more than four. Soon after he took office the brief post-war boom collapsed, and financial reconstruction became urgent. The war had seen the vicious circle of inflation and rising prices, temporarily alleviated by a system of bonuses, and now a good deal of dubious finance, including

the shelving of much expenditure to the " Loan Estimates," was adopted. As usual, the finances of the country were carried by the gold mines, whose product was at a premium owing to the depressed state of the currency.

Agitation against profiteering was insistent, and some rather tepid measures were taken for its control. The banks, whose short-sighted enthusiasm had gone far to exaggerate the " boom," now reacted with equal violence to the depression, and by suddenly shortening credit brought about a crop of bankruptcies that generally magnified its results. One of the great banking institutions of the country was in difficulties that could only be met by the exhaustion of its reserves and the reduction of capital. It was shortly afterwards absorbed by an overseas firm.

In 1920 the Government established the South African Reserve Bank and gave it the monopoly of the note issue and the general task of regulating the position of the South African currency. The commercial banks were obliged to keep a proportion of their reserves on deposit with the new institution and to provide half its capital. The Government appointed the Governor and Deputy-Governor and three out of eleven Directors. The new bank received a monopoly of the sale of gold produced in the Union and also acted as a clearing house to the commercial institutions. In 1922 a branch of the Royal Mint was established in Pretoria which strikes a silver and bronze coinage, probably ranking as the most artistic to be produced within the Empire.

The year 1920 saw the establishment of a civil administration in the South-West Protectorate, the Mandate for which was the spoil that General Smuts brought back from Versailles, and a substantial measure dealing with native administration, but the position of the Government was impossible, and the Prime Minister looked abroad for support. Negotiations with

the Nationalists failed, partly on principle and partly on personalities, but towards the end of the year the Unionists undertook to join an enlarged South African Party, which thus became more nearly the party of both races envisaged by General Botha. Three of the Unionists joined the Cabinet.

An election held early next year gave the new party a substantial majority, largely at the expense of the Labour Party, but the financial difficulties remained. The price of diamonds fell and the Kimberley mines were closed, to the great loss of the revenue of the State. Ruin spread throughout the midland districts of the Cape as it became clear that the ostrich-feather trade was dead. The nodding plumes which adorned Edwardian dames would have been strangely out of place on the shorn head and attenuated garments of the post-war maiden, and the South African farmer suffered in consequence. The ostrich-rearing districts of the Cape were dry and not particularly fertile, the industry had been heavily over-capitalized, and the sufferings of many of the farmers were tragic.

Progressive measures of economy abolished the extravagant "war-bonuses" paid to civil servants, and Jagger, a prosperous Cape business-man who became Minister of Railways, earned the ill-will of the railway workers by drastic economies. Unemployment was rife, and the depression intensified one of the long-standing difficulties of South Africa—the poor white. Relief works were started, and among the measures which virtually fell within this category were the great irrigation schemes at Hartebeestepoort, near Pretoria, and on the Sunday's River in the Eastern Province.

The reply of the Government to the depression was to concentrate on the encouragement of industries. The export trades were regulated by control boards, laws were passed and regulations issued for the grading and supervision of agricultural products, and the South

African fruit export trade virtually dates from this period. An attempt was made to encourage the export of maize, and an expensive elevator system, which cost in the end over £2,500,000, was initiated. Co-operative Societies were encouraged and regulated, and a marine survey was undertaken to find fresh areas for the fishing industry. In 1921 the Board of Trade and Industries was set up, and a Union Trade Commissioner was appointed for the Continent of Europe.

But besides the export trade the Government sought to build up internal manufactures. The isolation of South Africa during the Great War called forth a number of local industries, of which some, such as bacon-curing, survived and prospered. With the renewal of ocean traffic came a revival of imports. The fledgling industries clamoured for assistance, and the Government responded with large measures of industrial protection. Its chief object was to provide for the employment in industry of those poor whites who could no longer be absorbed in agriculture, but there were serious objections to this policy.

A country whose produce is almost entirely exported can hardly refuse to accept goods in exchange : shippers rely upon the transport of imports to balance the carriage of exports, and if they do not they must revise their freights. It may be doubted whether South African consumers are sufficiently numerous to make more than a limited number of industries economically profitable, and the world as a whole was already approaching a glut in iron and steel when the Government first offered bounties for their production. But the Liberal economists were a voice crying in the wilderness, and Mr. Jagger, who founded a boot factory in order to demonstrate that a good business man could make boots at a profit without the protection of a tariff, was the only prominent person to raise his voice in opposition.

The whole world was restless and uneasy. There were

minor native troubles at intervals during 1921, and early in 1922 the Government was faced by a serious European outbreak. So long as South Africa and Britain were both off the gold standard, high wages could continue in the mines. Towards the end of 1921 a sudden drop in the premium on gold forced the Chamber of Mines to consider the reduction of costs. Partly as an alternative to an attack on wages, and partly in order to regain the position from which it had been forced in 1918, it suggested an increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled labourers—that is, of natives to Europeans. In South Africa, with its extreme sensitiveness on the subject of colour, such a proposal would always be dangerous; there was great opposition in the Nationalist and Labour camps, the Chamber took no trouble to be conciliatory, and a strike broke out which involved coal and steel as well as the gold mines. Negotiations broke down and many of the strikers formed "commandos" which drilled ostentatiously along the Reef. After a month the Chamber attempted to re-open the mines with a moderate degree of success.

It is difficult to say at what stage the economic dispute became a dangerous revolution. Communists there were among the organizers of the strike—it was in the days when the Russian Soviet Republic went forward in the first wave of its youthful enthusiasm—and early in March the extremist elements broke out into open violence. It is not fair to blame Communism for all that followed. A number of cowardly and useless murders raised passions on both sides, and it seems rather that the lawless criminal element, often mentally deficient, which lurks well-suppressed in the background of society, broke out and ran amok. Only thus is it possible to explain the pointlessness of much of the vandalism and disorder. Long-continued propaganda had broken down that unconscious respect for law and order which is the whole basis of government, and it needed the calling out of the defence commandos, the mobilization of the permanent force,

and the use of aeroplanes and field artillery to reduce the strikers' stronghold before the revolution was quelled.

Considering the destruction that had been done and the loss of life incurred, the suppression of the movement was not particularly severe, but it strengthened the opposition to the South African Party and drew together its Labour and Nationalist opponents.

The Government was suffering from the general disillusion which followed the first high hopes of the post-war years. Its leader was continuously in office—including service in the Transvaal Colony—for a period of over seventeen years, and he was, in fact, the last of the great figures of the war period to survive defeat. Even his achievements helped little. He had stolen a good deal of the National Party's thunder when he returned from the Imperial Conference of 1921 with the attainment of "Dominion Status." That same year, the last few Imperial troops who had remained on special duty in Cape Town sailed away, 115 years after the occupation. But the Nationalists rather intensified their propaganda, and a good deal of intricate constitutional argument was used, somewhat to the mystifying of Britons, who had been trained in a different legal environment. The industrial troubles of 1922 led to the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act, and to the reform of the apprenticeship laws, but these did little to arrest the growing power of the Labour Party.

The swing of the pendulum was definitely against the Government, and the National Party was recruiting fresh followers. To its diehard veterans and Africander Chauvinists of the "Jingo" type, it was now adding young men. Some of them had been boys during the long-drawn agonies of the South African War, and grew up in an atmosphere of humiliation and longing for revenge. Others, of a colder and more calculating disposition, reckoned that promotion would come more rapidly when the new party came into power.

In 1924 the loss of a bye-election at Wakkerstroom determined General Smuts to appeal to the country. The depression still continued, and experienced political observers maintained that the Government lost much support through a tax recently levied on patent medicines, which brought home to the rural classes for the first time in their experience the realities of taxation. Actually it was in the towns that change took place. The Labour Party formed a pact with the Nationalists to avoid splitting the anti-Government vote ; they gained ground along the Reef, and the election brought the two parties in with a substantial majority of twenty-seven seats. Colonel Creswell, who had advocated white labour in the days before the Chinese were introduced, was made Minister of Defence and given the new portfolio of Labour, and Mr. T. Boydell received the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

CHAPTER VII

THE HERTZOG MINISTRY: 1924-1933

As a condition of their pact with Labour, the Nationalists dropped the Republican clause from their Constitution, public opinion was assured against any very revolutionary change, and the new administration had a good Press. Most people in South Africa who were not actually connected with the opposite party were prepared to concede at the least a suspension of judgment.

The new Cabinet was fortunate enough to take office on a rising tide of prosperity, and a succession of happy accidents culminating in the discovery of a diamond-field of unequalled richness on State-owned land in Namaqualand earned the new Minister of Finance the nickname of " Lucky " Havenga. The long-continued drought broke with the rainy season of 1924-25, and agricultural prices, though they did not soar to the heights of 1919-20, remained high and constant. The price of diamonds rallied, alluvial diggings, favoured by the Government because they provided employment for poor whites, were discovered in the Western Transvaal and in Namaqualand, and in 1928-29 over £1,500,000 came to the Treasury from the diamond industry in income tax and* export duty, while State ownership and State mining accounted for over £2,750,000. In 1925 came the platinum boom with its addition to employment and the prosperity of the country. In 1925 the currency was restored to the gold standard.

As was to be expected, the new ministry set itself to

redress the grievances of which it had complained in the past, but before approaching questions of principle it secured, in the first session of Parliament in 1925, the formal recognition of Afrikaans as an official language of the Union. Virtually the position had been recognized for some time, but the Act of Union was now formally amended and the seal was put to the process of the development of the language. Henceforward it displaced the Dutch of the Netherlands in those last few places where the older tongue had survived.

The pact with Colonel Creswell had removed the question of the republic from the realm of practical politics, but General Hertzog was anxious for the clarification of the juridical position of the Union, and the blessed word "status" was much debated in the years that followed. Contact with the Labour Party had convinced the Prime Minister that a republic of the old sort was no longer possible in South Africa, and further, that for a time at least, South Africa must remain within the British Empire. The position was honestly accepted, yet the acutely logical mind of the Prime Minister must be satisfied that in so doing he was not playing false to his older convictions of Nationalism. Where the traditional opportunism of the British statesman would have left inconsistencies to solve themselves in actual working, General Hertzog had to achieve in his own mind their clear and rational reconciliation. Irritated South Africans of British ancestry sometimes complained that he seemed unable to do this save by proving that membership of the British Empire meant nothing at all.

General Smuts had come from the Imperial Conference of 1921 with the assurance that Dominion Status meant that South Africa was a member of a free association of nations. General Hertzog, trained in the rigid discipline of the Roman law, was not satisfied with the generalizations that had been enough for those brought up in the

Teutonic tradition, and could not rest until the principle was stated in clear and unequivocal language. Fresh doubts arose in his mind when General Smuts contended that South Africa's position did not include the right of secession, though, as the London *Times* remarked, any Dominion that reached the point of desiring to secede was not likely to be restrained by any technical disabilities. It was not until the matter had been thrashed out in the two Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, and after the Statute of Westminster had been duly made law, that General Hertzog was satisfied with the position.

The same principle lay at the bottom of the Union Nationality and Flag Act of 1927, which raised a serious storm of protest. There was much misunderstanding on both sides. The Nationalists, to whom it brought only memories of defeat and humiliation, not unnaturally insisted that the Union Jack must not form part of the new flag, and when British people protested, the Prime Minister somewhat tartly told them that they must learn to be good South Africans. In point of fact, it was the long-settled districts of Natal and the Eastern Province which were most genuinely indignant. The Labour Ministers, who supported the Bill, were English-born and had no stake in the country. It was the British South African who feared the loss of all the history and tradition that are the basis of good citizenship.

The mistake of the Nationalist was that he tended to think of the "Englishman" always as the Uitlander—the foreigner. He forgot that there were men in Natal whose stake in the country went back further than that of many ardent members of his party, some of them in high positions. On the other hand, many of the British blundered woefully. They persisted in dragging in the Imperial connexion, which was not really involved, since **each of the Dominions and Colonies, in common with many towns and individuals in the Old Country, displays**

its own flag. They should have dispensed with patriotic claptrap and concentrated on the fact that, as good South Africans, they had the right to be represented on their own flag.

Committees and commissions met and recommended different designs, and a referendum was promised, but feelings were running high, and there was serious danger of an outbreak of violence. In the end, unofficial negotiations between parties evolved an agreed solution which provided for the recognition of the Union Jack as symbolizing the Imperial connexion, while as a National Flag the Act prescribed the old Dutch tricolour of orange, white and blue, with diminutive reproductions of the Union Jack and the flags of the two old Republics inserted in its middle.

The mention of the Union Jack in the Act satisfied the short-sighted Imperialists of Natal, though it should have been obvious that no legislation of the Union Parliament could affect its position one way or another. It was only afterwards that they found that they had accepted as their " National Flag " a device which in practice gave to their Dutch-speaking fellow-citizens a representation which was denied to themselves. The whole Flag Question revealed a painful lack of leadership in Natal, and a failure to grasp the political principles involved.

Economically, the new government plunged more deeply still into the policy of Protection. In fact, its enthusiasm sometimes earned it criticism which should have been applied to the previous government which initiated the policy. The principles of Nationalism invaded the economic field and economic self-sufficiency became the unquestioned goal. The Board of Trade was flooded with young men who scorned the doctrines of economic Liberalism and were swept away by the glamour of the policy which brought the United States to the pinnacle of 1925—and the crisis of 1933. South African

industries were still more strictly protected, the tariff was vigorously revised, and anti-dumping duties protected the new-born trades. An attempt was made to establish a diamond-cutting industry in South Africa. It seemed a reasonable enough development for the chief producer of diamonds in the world, but the Cabinet found itself in conflict with powerful monopolistic interests in Amsterdam: the project was hampered by troubles in South Africa, and it had by no means established itself when the depression came in 1933.

In other directions the Government carried on and amplified the Smuts Government's policy of the control and encouragement of exports. Thus, for instance, an Agricultural Products Packing and Marketing Act was passed in 1930, in which year the Wool Council was set up to consider the improvement of the quality of South African wools and the more successful methods of marketing. Of the same sort were the Mealie Control Board Acts of 1931 and 1932, the Tobacco Control Act of 1932, and the Meat Trade Control of 1932. Fruit export had been controlled in 1924 and 1929, and the Dairy Industry in 1930.

The bargain with the Labour Party led to the establishment of a Ministry of Labour, which set to work to extend the experimental labour legislation of previous administrations. In 1925 Parliament passed the Wage Act, which set up a Wage Board of three members with representatives of employers and employees of any particular industry. It was to conduct inquiries into the conditions of any trade or industry and make recommendations to the Minister in much the same way as the Wage Boards in Britain. Cynical members of the Opposition pointed out that the towns were obliged to accept the determinations of the Wage Board and Minister as having the force of law, **but the farms, whose representatives sat in serried ranks behind the Prime Minister, were exempt. In 1932 twenty-two**

determinations were in force covering the building, baking, and furniture trades, hairdressing, and others.

The Labour Department kept up a steady flow of legislation. The Wage Act was amended in 1930, in which year alterations were introduced into the Apprenticeship Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act, while the Factories Act was amended in 1931.

At the very beginning of his term of office General Hertzog promulgated the "civilized labour policy" (July, 1924) and this principle stood in the forefront of the Government programme. It was part of the response of the Cabinet to the poor white problem, and chief expression was given to it in the railway administration. Native labourers who formerly carried out all the unskilled work were steadily replaced by whites, and by the end of 1931 the number of white labourers employed reached 14,551. The tendency was to replace natives in other unskilled occupations—as office cleaners, for instance—and after the depression returned in 1930, pressure was brought to bear upon the larger municipalities to do the same.

Objections were urged against the policy on two grounds. In the first place it was maintained that the railways were being used as a means of disguised Poor Relief, contrary to the provisions of the Act of Union, which laid down the application of "business principles." It tended to over-staffing, and the excessive use of manual labourers hindered the development of mechanical devices and was frankly uneconomical. In the second place, it was objected that the policy added yet another disability to the natives, who were specifically debarred from skilled labour and found it increasingly difficult to make a living.

After the clarification of the question of status the Prime Minister's interests were devoted to an attempt to solve the "native question." Here again he worked from clear-cut principles. He accepted, in common with

the vast majority of South Africans of either race, the principle that the white man is, and ought to remain, the master. At the same time he realized, as nine-tenths of the white inhabitants of South Africa did not realize, that the native could not be ignored. General Hertzog leaned to the theory which is as old as Dr. Philip, that the simplest and fairest method of adjusting the respective rights of the two colour divisions of South African society would be the system of "segregation"—the separation of natives and Europeans into definite areas, geographical if possible, certainly economic and social and political. This was complicated by the economic needs of his farming supporters, who could not exist without large supplies of cheap labour on which to draw, and the general reluctance of white South Africans to concede the natives enough land. On the other hand, they urged repressive measures both in town and country, and secured the passing of the Colour Bar Bill by a joint sitting after a deadlock in 1926, of the Riotous Assemblies Act in 1930, and the Native Service Contract Bill in 1932.¹ Part of General Hertzog's policy aimed at the abolition of the equal native franchise at the Cape as an anomaly which conflicted with his theory of subordination and segregation.

It was on the question of the Native Bills that the Nationalist Party fought the election which came about in 1929, when the House of Assembly was dissolved on effluxion of time, but the "lucky" Minister of Finance had been able to do his part by reducing the Income Tax by 20 per cent, in the previous year. The Labour Party, some of whose members had been growing restive under the Government's Nationalist policy, split into two factions, one which favoured and one opposed to the continuance of the pact. The South African Party gained at the elections, but the system of representation gives special weight to sparsely settled areas, and it did not gain

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¹ See Chapter IX. below.

a corresponding increase in seats. According to the *Official Year Book* the South African Party obtained over 156,000 votes, in addition to nine unopposed returns, as against not quite 145,000 cast for the Nationalists, but the Government returned with seventy-eight seats to the South African Party's sixty-one.

In 1931 the Government still further strengthened their position by the enfranchisement of European women throughout South Africa and the abolition of the educational and wage qualifications formerly existing in the Cape and Natal. The object of these measures was to reduce the value of the coloured and native vote in the Cape Province, which continued to be governed by the old pre-Union qualifications, while conferring the vote on all adult Europeans. In previous elections the coloured vote had gone for the most part to the South African Party.

In 1930 the Government secured the passage of the Immigration Quota Act. The effect of this was to schedule a number of states, roughly those of Western Europe together with the United States, whose subjects were allowed free ingress into South Africa. All the others were limited to a quota of fifty immigrants per year.

The second Hertzog Ministry spent its whole career grappling with the great depression which engulfed the world in 1930. The economic maladjustments which led to the rise in the price of gold showed themselves first in a paralyzing fall in prices. The farmer, as in Australia, was particularly hard hit, and his position is best illustrated by reference to the staple products of maize and wool. In 1920 flat white maize fetched a fraction over 28s. per bag of 200 lbs.; the price remained about 15s. until 1929, and dropped to 7s. 1od. in October, 1932. Wool, which in the wonderful year 1920 fetched 29.6 pence per lb. and 20.5 pence in 1925 dropped in 1932 to 4.4 pence. Where the fall in value meant only a reduction

in income the problem was serious enough, but in South Africa the number of mortgaged farms is abnormally high. In many cases the proceeds of the loans have been used for improvements, or the bond represents the balance of a purchase price, but a farmer who had incurred a responsibility for interest payments which represented the value of 60 bags of maize in 1920 could not possibly face the same charge in 1932 when it had risen to something like 240.

To make matters worse, the years from 1930 onwards saw a steadily-decreasing rainfall, culminating in 1933 in the worst drought for many years. Crops failed, and the remnant could only be sold at the depreciated world prices. To crown all, an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease swept rapidly down from the north, and many farmers saw their last possible source of income disappear. Long-established landowners were ruined, and those small farmers and *bywoners* who normally lived close to the poverty line suffered appalling privations.

The price of diamonds finally collapsed. The "Premier," the last of the great mines, was closed, while thousands of diggers in the Western Transvaal found themselves destitute. The Government instituted relief works, employed more labourers, and implored municipalities to dismiss natives in favour of Europeans. But the Reserves were no more exempt from drought and depression than the Europeans, the natives suffered equally, and the Government was forced to concede to them a somewhat tardy relief.

South Africa was not a happy country even in 1931, when the failure of an Austrian bank spread panic throughout Europe. When in September the British Government decided to abandon the gold standard, the Cabinet very properly resolved not to tamper with the South African currency. It seemed probable that Britain's abandonment was only temporary. There was, on the other hand, no indication of the extent to which

the pound sterling might depreciate, and to link South Africa to the pound might easily mean a plunge into an unplumbed abyss.

The Government's technical advisers—most of them British-born—were nearly unanimous in favour of gold, but many South Africans clamoured for abandonment. Unfortunately, many of the Government's supporters felt that it was an admirable opportunity for demonstrating "economic independence;" others claimed a certain moral superiority for gold, and economics, patriotism and morals—and politics—were jumbled together in unbusinesslike confusion.

The question could not be settled on arbitrary principles. The plight of Great Britain itself was due to the fact that no modern State is economically independent—unless it is economically negligible. The South African Reserve Bank lost just short of £1,500,000 (the whole of its reserve and half its capital) and exporters were docked of 20 per cent, of any funds standing to their credit in London, in most cases considerably more than their net profit for the year. Prices did not rise, and fresh exports were paid for in a currency that lost anything up to a third of its value in transfer to South Africa.

A special session of Parliament was held in November, 1931, and the Government secured the Finance Emergency Regulations Act, which virtually gave the Minister of Finance power to do what he pleased in the fields of currency, banking, and the exchanges. It also obtained an Act sanctioning the payment of subsidies of 10 per cent.—subsequently raised to 20 per cent, and 35 per cent, in the cases of beef and mutton—on the export of primary commodities. The funds to meet this expenditure were to be raised by the levy of a primage of 5 per cent, over and above the normal duty on all goods imported. In December dumping duties were imposed on goods from countries with depreciated currencies, and British silver

coinage, which was being imported in large quantities from Britain and Rhodesia to evade the exchange, was withdrawn from circulation.

The financial situation grew worse. Many people, gambling on the inability of South Africa to remain on the gold standard, sent to London every penny they could raise : those with credits in Britain did not transfer to South Africa more than they were obliged. Building societies, savings banks and trust companies were denuded of their funds, and one important institution in Johannesburg failed. Business came to a standstill and money was phenomenally " tight."

Meanwhile the European situation cleared. It became obvious that the trouble was due to a world-wide appreciation in the price of gold, which had lost its relation to the various currencies. Great Britain had decided definitely against return, the pound was evidently kept well in hand and had found its level. In South Africa, however, the gold standard had become a matter of party politics—though more than one prominent member of the South African Party remained an adherent to the end. The Parliamentary session of 1932 merely reaffirmed the Government's determination to stick to gold.

The financial stringency had its effect in the country districts, aggravating a situation already desperate through world depression and local drought. The Government lost popularity. No administration can survive a long-continued depression, and it had been in power for eight years. There were complaints among its own people of favouritism and nepotism, and it had not escaped its share of those scandals that fall to the lot of any long administration.

Some of the party managers tried to redress the balance by a violent propaganda campaign, but even the country districts were coming to realize that party principles do not fill empty bellies. A marked South

African Party success in a bye-election at Germiston showed that even the well-drilled railway labourers were deserting the Government. The country was obviously tired of the existing administration, and a break-away in the poverty-stricken districts of the north-west of the Cape showed that even those who refused to follow General Smuts were looking for a change.

Popular opinion began to veer round to Mr. Tielman Roos, a Judge of the Appeal Bench, who had been a member of the first Nationalist Cabinet. In that capacity he had combined a humorous irresponsibility of speech with a reputation for sincere and honest work as a Minister. Several appeals were made to him to return to politics, and on the 21st December, 1932, he resigned his Judgeship and announced as his programme the establishment of a National Government and the abolition of the gold standard. For three days there was a run on the banks, a demand for gold, and a rush for gold mining shares on the Stock Exchange. Nearly £3,000,000 was withdrawn. The Christmas holiday saved a crash, and on the 27th December the Government relieved the Reserve Bank of the responsibility of honouring its notes. The exchange was left free, and in a few days had reached parity with sterling.

Parliament met in January, 1933, in the midst of a great campaign in favour of Coalition which was watched rather apprehensively by both the official parties. There was an accumulated deficit of £2,000,000, and a very considerable weariness with the professional politicians who filled the back benches on either side of the House. At first the Prime Minister refused an offer of co-operation made by General Smuts. A keen sense of public opinion is, however, one of his great political assets; negotiations began, and a Coalition between the National and South African Parties was soon achieved. Death and resignations had caused gaps in the Cabinet, **the two Labour Ministers,** whose party had "dwindled to five

members, were dropped, another portfolio was created, and General Hertzog was able to add six South African Party men to the six surviving Nationalist Ministers. General Smuts took office under his old rival as Minister of Justice.

Parliament was dissolved, but an adroit system of parcelling out the seats ensured the return of the two big parties very nearly as before. A number of Independents of various brands came forward as candidates, but lacked the efficient machinery of the large parties and failed to gain adequate representation. Mr. Roos was not elected against one of the Cabinet Ministers, but two of his supporters found places in the House.

When the new Parliament met, the Government announced measures for dealing with unemployment, the drought, and depression. Some millions were earmarked for direct relief, and after the end of the session schemes were published for two huge irrigation schemes on the Vaal River, the advance of a large proportion of the cost of small schemes undertaken by private owners, and the financing of measures to check soil erosion.

There was strangely little opposition to a measure reducing to 5 per cent, the interest paid on farm mortgage bonds, which were not usually undertaken at less than 7 per cent. It was a drastic attack on capital and vested interests, but the departure from the gold standard had brought back an immense amount of capital from London which was now seeking investment, and the Government was carrying through a conversion operation reducing the interest on much of its stock from 6 per cent, and 5 per cent, to $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. The Primage Duty was abolished, but the export subsidies continued to be paid.

The only question was whence this immense reconstruction programme was to be financed. There could never have been any serious doubt that it must be

carried through at the expense of the mines. Since its first discovery, South Africa's mineral wealth has been the stand-by of a bankrupt agricultural system, and the departure from the gold standard had placed a large premium on the product of the Witwatersrand. In other words, gold, like other commodities, was to be allowed to find its own level. The mines maintained that they had as much right to take advantage of any rise in the price of their commodity as had the maize and wool farmers in 1919, but some of the more extreme Nationalists claimed that the premium due to State action should be devoted by the State to the benefit of its citizens—notably their own farmer constituents.

The mines had certainly prospered; the rate of profit rose from 8s. 4d. per ton milled in 1932 to 16s. 6d. in 1933, and many low-grade properties were re-opened. The State would have reaped a rich harvest in tax payments in any case, but the Government introduced an Excess Profits Duty Bill imposing additional taxation on the gold premium which might, in some cases, carry off well over 60 per cent, of the increased profit. The Bill had been drafted hastily for the session before Coalition, it was complicated and often obscure, and experts pointed out that in some cases it would actually encourage bad mining. There was a storm of protest, especially from the Stock Exchange gamblers, who were caught by the sharp fall in share prices which followed the publication of the Bill. Representatives of mining constituencies opposed it vigorously, irrespective of their political colour, and in the end the Government admitted some of the inconsistencies and undertook to limit the amount that it would demand.

The session was short, and the Coalition Cabinet went out to its task of the regeneration of the country. It carried with it the confidence of all but a fraction of the Parliament, and united for the first time the official representatives of both white races in South Africa. In

November, 1933, the drought broke, and though the rains came in traditional African style in floods that swept away bridges and carried off crops and cattle, there was a happier, more optimistic spirit abroad, and men of good will hoped that the country had overcome the worst of its evils at last.

PART III
BALANCE SHEET

CHAPTER VIII

ASSETS. MINES AND AGRICULTURE

IN 1931 the value of exports from South Africa was divided roughly as follows: Products of the mines, £52,600,000; agriculture and pastoral products, £13,800,000; other articles (of which more than half must have been provided by the fishing industry), £625,000.

The figures are clear enough, and the chief assets of the country are not difficult to find. Considerably more than half the exports are drawn from the mines, and the economic edifice of South Africa now rests upon the foundation of the mining industry. In 1932, the last year before the abandonment of the gold standard, the mines of the Witwatersrand produced nearly 11,000,000 ounces of gold; valued at £46,671,000, they employed over 22,000 Europeans, with a wage bill of £16,000,000, and spent £35,000,000 in the country. In 1933 the gold premium swelled the value of the gold produced to £66,853,993, though the yield was the same. In 1931 the mines paid in taxation and rents to the Union Government the sum of £3,600,000, in addition to Provincial taxation and municipal rates. Their indirect influence on business and agriculture, through the services they require and the provisioning of their workers, is incalculable.

Though often reprieved—as in 1912 by the discovery of the Far East Rand—the mines cannot last for ever. Helped by the great strength of the roof and the unusually slow increase in temperature, mining has now reached immense depths. Shafts have actually been sunk to a

depth of over 7,000 feet, or from the height of the plateau to well below sea level, but systematic ventilation and supporting must be carried out, and working costs rise steadily. In 1930, before the recent fluctuations in the price of gold, the Government Mining Engineer calculated that by 1949 the value of the product would have shrunk to £10,000,000 a year, but the life of a mine depends upon the working of the marginal ores, and the Low Grade Ore Commission estimated that a reduction in costs of 2s. per ton would increase the tonnage milled by 50 per cent., while a fall of 4s. per ton in working costs would double it.

The earliest method of working was to crush the gold-bearing rock in stamp batteries and to pass it thence in a stream of water over copper plates coated with mercury. There an amalgam formed, out of which the mercury was later distilled in a retort, and the resulting "sponge" was melted down into gold bars. This is still the first process in extraction, though the stamps have been partially replaced by tube mills, and since 1923 the plates have been covered with corduroy. The ribs of the material catch the heavier sediment, which is then pounded in the amalgamation barrel by iron balls coated with mercury. The amalgam is then retorted and the sponge melted down as before.

Over 40 per cent, of the gold escapes the plates, and in 1890 the cyanide process was introduced; the residue of the crushed ore is treated with cyanide solution in which the gold dissolves. It is then induced to combine with zinc, which is driven off in its turn by the application of sulphuric acid. With the new process nearly 96 per cent, of the gold was recovered and it was proved that the deep levels could be profitably worked.

Much depends upon the supply of native labourers. In 1930 207,000 were required, but only during the last few years of drought and agricultural depression have the mines been able to satisfy their requirements.

Chinese labour and Mozambique natives were tried in turn, and in 1933 permission was given for the recruiting of labour from the country north of Latitude 20⁰ S. In the early days conditions were unsatisfactory, and the death-rate from disease, particularly pneumonia, tragically high, but native labour is too valuable to be squandered, and the mines now spend large sums on a very efficient medical service.

Another charge on the mining industry arises from the incidence among underground workers of silicosis and tuberculosis. Compensation is paid to those who contract the disease and its conditions are regulated by a series of Acts dating from 1911 and consolidated in 1925. The miner undergoes a preliminary medical examination and is examined periodically; he must leave work at the first symptom of phthisis. At the 31st March, 1932, awards had been made in respect of nearly 16,000 individuals and the amount paid out by the mines was over £13,000,000. The cost of the Miners Phthisis Board and Medical Bureau during the year was over £50,000.

The dust underground, which seems to be the cause of miner's phthisis, is kept down by spraying and ventilation. Research is constantly going on, and any discovery that would eliminate the disease would add very considerably to the life of the mines.

Diamond mining, like its fellow luxury trade in ostrich-feathers, is practically dead. The price was long kept up by agreement among the producers, but the growth of diamond mining in other countries, the working of the alluvial diggings at Lichtenburg, and the incredibly rich deposits at Alexander Bay in Namaqualand, added to the world depression, proved too much for the industry. All the great mines have stopped working, and the output, worth £16,678,000 in 1928, dropped to £739,000 in the first six months of 1933. All but £3,000 worth of this came from the alluvial diggings.

South African coal is usually of mediocre quality, but it is widely distributed, and without the coal deposits the Witwatersrand could never have been worked. The largest group of mines is in the Witbank district, though the coal from those near Newcastle, in Northern Natal, is better suited for the bunker trade. In 1931 the industry produced nearly 12,000,000 tons, valued at over £3,000,000, but it suffered heavily during the gold standard crisis, when British ships chose naturally to coal elsewhere. Copper, tin, platinum, asbestos, and other base metals and minerals have all been worked successfully, chiefly in the Transvaal, but the world depression and the gold standard troubles brought the whole mining industry to a standstill outside the Rand. There was a marked revival during 1933 and several mines were reopened.

Iron has become a political issue of the first magnitude. Large deposits of the ore exist, particularly in the Transvaal, and surface outcrops were worked by the natives before the coming of the whites. During the attempts to stimulate industry after the Great War, bounties were offered (in 1922 and modified in 1926) on the production of iron and steel, but they met with only a moderate success. In 1928 the Hertzog Ministry secured an Act which constituted the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, whose Chairman and half the Board of Directors are nominated by the Government. The capital consists of £500,000 worth of "A" shares subscribed by the Government which, according to the Act, give the Governor-General a majority of one vote over the subscribers of the £3,500,000 ordinary or "B" shares offered to the public. The issue of "B" shares, to quote the Directors' Report, "has met with a very limited public response," and the Government has been obliged to subscribe -practically the whole amount. In practice it will nominate all the Directors. The Company has also issued £1,500,000

worth of debentures, the 5 per cent, interest on which is guaranteed by the Government, and of these the Public Debt Commissioners have subscribed £1,000,000.

The Company is guaranteed a ten years' contract of all iron and steel required by the railways and harbours, and will certainly benefit from a highly-protective tariff. Immense works, designed to produce 150,000 tons of steel per annum, have been established just outside Pretoria, but critics have argued that there is no need for a new industry in a world already glutted with iron and steel, and still more that there are not sufficient consumers in South Africa to justify the £5,500,000 of capital that has been expended. The chances of an export trade in Asia are slight in competition with Europe and America, and in view of South Africa's definite hostility to Asiatic immigration. So far the only practical outcome has been to make certain the closing of the smaller works at Vereeniging and Newcastle, which have been built up under the previous Bounty Acts.

Indirectly, the new venture will have to be supported by the gold mines, which are, after all, the virtual providers of the capital.

After the mines comes agriculture. Though it is not now the most important, in its various forms it is the oldest and certainly the greatest industry in South Africa, In 1918 Professor Lehfeldt estimated its proportion of the total production of the Union at something under a half, with mining and the other industries sharing the remainder in roughly equal proportions. It should now account for the full half of the annual production, and as the country, like other " new " lands before it, passes out of the mining phase, agriculture must inevitably increase in relative importance.

Agricultural production is conditioned by the rainfall and by geographical conditions generally. South Africa is passing out of the time of more or less blind experiment, and experience is beginning to limit particular crops to

well-marked areas. The winter rains of the south-west Cape grow wheat and the vine ; the zone of heavy summer rains of 45" upward—what is called the Palm Belt—produces sugar cane ; the usual summer crops, of which maize is the staple, need between 24" and 45" of rain ; peanuts, cotton and millet will grow with a rainfall of between 20" and 24" ; from 15" to 20" will give only fodder crops, while the distinctly arid areas of 5" to 15" will not grow more than the spineless cactus, the saltbrush, and other fodder trees and shrubs.

The vegetation of South Africa falls into a number of well-marked areas. Along the narrow strip of south coast are to be found the remnants of the only true timber forest in South Africa, in which the most important trees are the coniferous yellow-woods, which sometimes reach 150 feet. From East London northwards runs the " Palm Belt," a region of sub-tropical forest receiving more than 45" of rain and stretching from the sea to the 800 feet contour line. Sugar and sub-tropical fruits have displaced most of the original vegetation, but for the present, tsetse fly and nagana among beasts and the malaria among human beings render it unsuited to cattle-farming.

Between the forest and the mountains runs a belt of scrub, sometimes 100 miles wide, known as the *Thornveld*, an area of acacia bush, tall grass and arborescent aloes. It carries livestock of all sorts and summer crops, but further north tick-borne diseases among cattle and the malaria in man restrict settlement. The interior plateau is the *Highveld*, with good grass but little bush, and bleak and cold about the 5,000 feet line. It is essentially a stock-breeding country, but extra " succulent " fodder is necessary, since the winter grass is dry and provides little nourishment.

To the north, the Highveld slopes down to the *Bushveld*, with its " sweeter " grass but unhealthy malarial conditions in summer. In the early days

of the Transvaal, farmers regularly owned a Bushveld farm to which they "trekked" their cattle during the bleak Highveld winter. On its western side the Highveld merges into the *Kalahari grassland*, where the grazing is good in quality, but the dryness of the country makes it impossible to carry much stock. South of the Kalahari and north of the Cape mountains come the *Karoo* and the Karroid plateau, lying between the summer and winter rains, devoid of grass but carrying small desert shrubs such as the "Karoo bush," which provide grazing for sheep and goats. It has suffered much from erosion, and it is significant that during the drought of 1919 the losses were between 14 per cent, and 20 per cent, of the total number of animals.

Since successful crop-growing is limited to land which receives at least 24" of rain, and a large area must be omitted as rocky and barren, only 15 per cent, of the country can possibly be accounted arable, and much must be of marginal utility to the crop-farmer. Of the surface of South Africa, 85 per cent, is fit only for pasture, and not more than 4 per cent, is actually now being cultivated.

According to European standards an annual rainfall of 24" is not ungenerous, but its value is affected by a number of considerations. Any rainfall figure for South Africa is the mean of a number of extremes, of droughts and floods, while at best a long dry season alternates with the rains. The evaporation from a free water surface in Johannesburg, which may be taken as tolerably well-watered, is 75" per annum, or two or three times the annual rainfall, a figure which increases to four or five times the annual rainfall in more arid parts. Plant transpiration in such a climate is excessive and much of the rainfall or of water supplied by irrigation passes out through the foliage into the atmosphere. When at length the rains come, their torrential downpour runs rapidly off the hard-baked soil and sets in motion what is probably

the grimmest menace of all South African agriculture—soil erosion.

Many causes are at work. The natural pasture is everywhere overstocked, particularly in the overcrowded native areas, vegetation tends to disappear, especially in time of drought, counsel and entreaty have failed to stop the habit of burning off the dry veld grass in winter, and the trampling of the stock reduces the surface soil to a fine powder which is blown off by the winter winds, or swept away by the first rains. The storm-water drains off in numberless channels, especially where footpaths and cattle tracks have prepared the way, and in a year or two these widen into immense dongas which drain the surrounding land so efficiently that soon even marshes are dry. The trouble is insidious and cumulative, and the Drought Commission of 1922 wrote: "The simple unadorned truth is sufficiently terrifying without the assistance of rhetoric. The logical outcome of it all is 'The Great South African Desert uninhabitable by man.'"

The obvious remedy for the instability caused by drought is irrigation, but South Africa has no Nile, and at the most favourable computation only 3,000,000 acres are irrigable. The surface is rough and broken, demanding many independent schemes, and compares unfavourably with the 8,000,000 irrigable acres provided by a single scheme in the West of India. Big irrigation projects, of the sort favoured by democratic governments with their eye on the polls, have proved extravagantly costly in view of their returns, and much of their capital has had to be written off. In 1933 a Government Department estimated the average figure to be roughly 75 per cent.¹ Irrigation may even prove a danger through its effect on the soil.

¹ In the first week of the Session of 1934 the Minister for Lands (Deneys Reitz) asked Parliament to write off nearly £2,000,000 on various schemes, and warned members that for the future the State would have to bear anything from 60 per cent, to the whole of the cost of irrigation projects.

Where flood waters, carrying off a great deal of somewhat alkaline soil in solution, are concentrated in the great storage reservoirs of one of the greater irrigation schemes, the mineral content rises rapidly. When this is led out to irrigate the lands, the water may quickly impregnate the soil with "brak," or mineral salts, and render it useless.

Nor is drought the only plague. The English Church in South Africa has included in the Litany a comprehensive suffrage against "locusts, murrain and drought," and not without cause. The Department of Agriculture warned South African farmers in 1933 to budget for the future on the basis of three years of unsatisfactory rains out of five, and though steady Government action has reduced the frequency and severity of locust inroads, its one-time claim to have cured them has proved to be vain. Fourteen cattle diseases are classified as "prevalent" and "serious" (as against nine in the United States and four in New Zealand) and swine fever seems to be the only plague which South Africa has escaped. After a long drought comes the hail, which will pound an area with great masses of ice the size of duck's eggs and nearly half a pound in weight, and it has been estimated to cause £500,000 worth of damage in a single year.

After these the mischief wrought by vermin—in South Africa the term includes the lion as well as the jackal—poisonous plants and politicians may seem comparatively slight.

Throughout the country the general level of farming is painfully backward. Recurrent plagues, especially drought and hail, induce a fatalistic tendency; the existence of the cheap labour of the native, a good stockman but an indifferent and thus really an expensive agriculturalist, and the tradition of "extensive" farming handed down from pioneering days of unlimited land, all tend to wastefulness; Government systems of protection and export bounties on cereal crops have tended to thrust

agricultural effort in wrong directions, while the constant reiteration of politicians that the farmer is the backbone of the country has blinded him to the fact that anything is wrong.

The chief single crop in South Africa is maize, which grows anywhere inside the 24" rainfall limit and forms the staple diet of most of the population, poor whites and natives alike. The poorest *bywoner* has his little patch of "mealies/" and there is a general belief, encouraged by Government efforts to foster its export, that South Africa should be one of the great maize-producing countries of the world. In point of fact, the yield per acre is a quarter of that in Canada, while it cannot compete with the mechanized methods of the United States, the Argentine and Russia, which have already brought about a world surplus. Much of the soil is deteriorating under constant cropping, a great deal of marginal land is already under cultivation, and it is difficult to see whence an increased yield can come. In the last seven years export has fluctuated considerably from over 9,250,000 bags to less than 1,500,000 in successive years, while the drought of 1933 rendered importation necessary. Of recent years the price has been kept at an artificial height by Government action. It is not surprising that the elaborate elevator system provided by the Government has resulted in a net loss on working of £322,123, and experts maintain that what surplus South Africa may produce beyond subsistence needs should be retained in the country for stock-feeding.

Another crop which has received much official assistance and encouragement is wheat, which the bankrupt Cape Colony subsidized to the tune of £1,500,000 sixty years ago. During the summer rains it suffers from rust and mildew diseases, and it is sown chiefly in the wet winter areas of the south-west Cape, where it ripens during the dry summer. Until 1928, 30 per cent, of

the Union's supply was imported, but legislation in 1930 imposed a high protective tariff which was intended to put a stop to external competition. None the less, the soil in the wheat-producing districts approaches exhaustion, and it is possible to buy self-sufficiency at too high a price.

Natal sugar partners Cape wheat in the business of profit-making at the expense of the consumer. The industry dates from the middle of the nineteenth century, but gained its first Protection by the Customs Union of 1903. As is the case with all drugs, increasing doses of Protection have been necessary, and the *Year Book* of the Union naïvely remarks: "The year 1927 . . . marked an epoch in Natal's sugar history, because increased fiscal protection, added to fiscal preference in the British market granted in 1919, stimulated progress in a remarkable way." By the Sugar Prices Act of 1926 retail prices were fixed for the Union, and the world has the somewhat puzzling sight of an industry in such desperate straits that it has to be subsidized at the expense of the local consumer, but which is none the less able to "progress in a remarkable way."

Taken in order of seniority, the leading South African agricultural industry is probably viticulture, which also belongs to the region of the winter rains. It dates from the second year of the settlement (1653), and enjoyed the fatherly care of successive governors. To-day there are Government experimental farms, including the famous *Cons tantia*, once the estate of old Simon van der Stel, and research stations, while a Co-operative Association under Government patronage controls the marketing side of the industry. Nearly 16,000,000 gallons of wine were manufactured in 1929-30, a figure which is more or less stable from year to year, but efforts have brought up the value of exports from £18,241 in 1910 to £133,706 in 1931, though there have been fluctuations in the amount exported during that time. More disturbing is a progressive decline in the average

price obtained. South African wines are good examples of their own class, and the mistake has probably been the aping of French styles and descriptions.

Among the other products of the grape-grower, brandy, the manufacture of which is closely supervised, has increased its local consumption of recent years, assisted by duties on imported spirits of all kinds which are almost heavy enough to be called prohibitive. The greatest advance of the industry has been made in the production of dried fruits : raisins, sultanas and currants. Production has roughly quadrupled in the last dozen years, and importation in some directions has completely stopped. Here again, heavy protective duties have played their part.

Grapes also play their part in what is probably the most active and flourishing of the country's export trades—that in fresh fruit. This industry, significantly enough, owes nothing to protective duties. It dates from the closing years of the nineteenth century, when Cecil Rhodes turned his attention to scientific fruit-farming, and by 1910 the shipments had reached 2,705 tons. The export of fruit is controlled by regulations made under Acts of 1914, 1925 and 1929, whose object is the maintenance of a high standard by strict supervision. Government Departments have collaborated with the Empire Marketing Board in carrying out research into packing, storage and transport, and the Government has brought pressure to bear to secure refrigerating space at the best terms on the liners carrying cargo to Great Britain. In 1910 South African exports of fruit were valued at £46,595, and in 1931 at £1,385,209. The chief fruits exported were citrus (mainly oranges), nearly £860,000; grapes, nearly £202,000; and peaches, apples, and pears, about £260,000 altogether. The grapes come from the south-west Cape, the citrus principally from Rustenburg, the Eastern Cape and the Lowveld areas of the Transvaal, and the deciduous fruits from the Cape, though there is a growing apple industry in the Transvaal

and the Free State High veld. The export of dried fruits; excluding raisins and currants, increased fivefold during the ten years 1923-33.

Ranking with viticulture in seniority among South African industries is livestock farming. The instruction of the Company to the founders of the settlement of Good Hope stipulated for the establishment of a supply of fresh meat. At first cattle were obtained by barter from the Hottentots, and with the expansion of the European inhabitants there developed a hardy breed, able to endure considerable privation and fitted chiefly for draught purposes. This was the beginning of the breed known as the " Afrikander." Contrary to European precedent, the ox has remained the draught animal of South Africa, and some two million are employed on farms and for transport purposes. The survival of the ox is due primarily to its comparative freedom from disease in areas where the horses are carried off by " horse-sickness," and its ability to live on grazing too poor to support the horse. A further cause may be given in the delightfully straightforward expression of one of the authorities on South African agriculture: " In the case of the ox there is no loss through depreciation, for he can be sold profitably for slaughter after some years of work." Beef-eating townsfolk will agree !

The original Afrikander beast was a poor producer of milk and beef, and even in the eighteenth century a few Frieslands were introduced. Some beef breeds in the shape of Shorthorns and North Devons came into the country about 1870. The outbreak of rinderpest, which the older generation still remembers as an epoch in the reckoning of time, swept great areas clear of stock, and the revival of the cattle industry was checked by the Boer War. Recovery is now complete, and the opinion of experts is that South Africa, with its small proportion of arable land to pasture, should concentrate on stock-breeding.

The industry is not without its drawbacks. In 1929--30 over 500,000 head of cattle were reported to have died from disease, drought, exposure, or from vermin, and the figures from native areas are admittedly incomplete. During the same period over 4,500,000 sheep and goats were lost from the same causes. The drought of 1919, which has since been eclipsed in severity, was officially reckoned to have cost £16,000,000 in direct losses alone.

On the other hand, Government action has done much to reduce the gravity of cattle diseases. The official Institute of Veterinary Research at Onderstepoort, near Pretoria, stands unquestionably in the very front rank and has justified the considerable expense of its upkeep many times over. It is intended for research into stock diseases and the discovery of cures, but it also prepares veterinary vaccines and prophylactics generally. Among the diseases which have been successfully treated are anthrax, horse-sickness, redwater and gall-sickness, contagious abortion, catarrhal fever in sheep (commonly known as bluetongue), paratyphoid, and a number of diseases among fowls. Its equipment is on a generous scale, and in 1927 the Imperial Agricultural Research Conference recognized it as the Central Research Station in the chain throughout the British Empire. It has since received a number of grants from the Empire Marketing Board.

The destruction wrought by vermin, chiefly jackals, is checked by fencing. This is carried out by farm-owners themselves, who often need many miles of fencing for a single Karroo farm. In the hands of the landowners lies also the remedy against drought. The Government is prepared to make liberal grants for each dam erected on a farm, and it should now be possible to feed cattle properly during the dry season and to break the power of drought.

Apart from improved feeding, which is necessary if the less hardy but more valuable stock is to survive, the other great difficulty lies in the quality of the stock itself.

The "scrub bull" is far too common and delays the "grading up" which must be the preliminary to the establishment of a prosperous cattle industry. During the Great War South Africa built up an export trade in meat, but it disappeared, owing to the poor quality of the product, as soon as conditions in Europe returned to normal. The inevitable Meat Control Board was established by the Government in 1932, with exceptional powers of controlling both the price and supplies of meat offering throughout South Africa, while large subsidies, going up to 35 *per cent.*, have endeavoured to encourage exports.

The Government Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Colleges do their best to encourage breeding; the Union Castle Mail Company is bound by the mail contract to carry pedigree cattle free of charge, and nearly 4,000 head have been brought into the country in this way. Some individual farmers have built up valuable herds and flocks, breeding bulls that have fetched over £5,000 and rams that have sold for £3,000, but not much can be hoped from an export trade until better stock and better feeding are more common than they are at present.

Progress is hoped for in the dairying industry. In 1912 the Union imported over 4,000,000 pounds of butter and 5,000,000 pounds of cheese. This has now been stopped, and in 1932 the exports were nearly 4,250,000 pounds of butter and 2,250,000 pounds of cheese. The industry is regulated under Acts of 1918 and 1926, while in 1930 a Dairy Industry Control Board was set up, which finances a somewhat unremunerative export trade by a levy on every pound of butter and cheese sold in the Union. Butter, however, was imported during the drought of 1933.

In the dairy business, the Union has the advantage over its most serious rival—New Zealand—in the matter of distance, but its cows produce only 50 pounds of butterfat against the 170 of New Zealand and the 210 of Denmark. In the semi-arid pasture of which so much of the country

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The " scrub bull " is far too common and delays the " grading up " which must be the preliminary to the establishment of a prosperous cattle industry. During the Great War South Africa built up an export trade in meat, but it disappeared, owing to the poor quality of the product, as soon as conditions in Europe returned to normal. The inevitable Meat Control Board was established by the Government in 1932, with exceptional powers of controlling both the price and supplies of meat offering throughout South Africa, while large subsidies, going up to 35 per cent., have endeavoured to encourage exports.

The Government Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Colleges do their best to encourage breeding ; the Union Castle Mail Company is bound by the mail contract to carry pedigree cattle free of charge, and nearly 4,000 head have been brought into the country in this way. Some individual farmers have built up valuable herds and flocks, breeding bulls that have fetched over £5,000 and rams that have sold for £3,000, but not much can be hoped from an export trade until better stock and better feeding are more common than they are at present.

Progress is hoped for in the dairying industry. In 1912 the Union imported over 4,000,000 pounds of butter and 5,000,000 pounds of cheese. This has now been stopped, and in 1932 the exports were nearly 4,250,000 pounds of butter and 2,250,000 pounds of cheese. The industry is regulated under Acts of 1918 and 1926, while in 1930 a Dairy Industry Control Board was set up, which finances a somewhat unremunerative export trade by a levy on every pound of butter and cheese sold in the Union. Butter, however, was imported during the drought of 1933.

In the dairy business, the Union has the advantage over its most serious rival—New Zealand—in the matter of distance, but its cows produce only 50 pounds of butterfat against the 170 of New Zealand and the 210 of Denmark. In the semi-arid pasture of which so much of the country

consists, additional green food is essential, which can come only from irrigated—and hence expensive—land.

Sheep-breeding is the oldest of the export industries in Africa, and even in 1822 20,000 pounds of wool were exported. In 1931 the figure was 301,000,000, which ranked fifth in the world's supply. The industry is to be found chiefly in the Karroo and in parts of the Highveld and the Eastern Province. Experts are inclined to believe that the deterioration of pastures through overstocking and consequent erosion has gone so far that the number is not likely to increase. South Africa has specialized in wool production, and it is unlikely that any export trade in mutton would ever compete seriously with the moist pastures of New Zealand.

The South African pig industry has now reached the point of satisfying the local demand. Imports of £250,000 in value in 1910 have been reduced to £45,000, which is nearly offset by its own exports (probably to Rhodesia under the protection of the tariff) which were valued at £35,000. Eggs, of which the average importation before 1915 reached 16,000,000, are now exported to the number of 69,000,000, which have the advantage of reaching Britain during the winter season. Here again, the Department of Agriculture has been busy with Egg Circles and Community Poultry Clubs. Horse-breeding, which provided a stream of remounts for India throughout the nineteenth century, has ceased to be an exporting industry, but the real tragedy of South African agriculture has been ostrich-farming. In 1913 the export value of feathers was nearly £3,000,000, and there were over 776,000 ostriches; farms had been cut up into small allotments, money was easily borrowed for capital expenditure, and the ostrich-farmers were an exceptionally prosperous community. The war broke the spell of the opulent Edwardian fashions, and the value of feathers exported in 1931 was £44,000. There were then 32,000 birds.

CHAPTER IX
LIABILITIES,
THE POOR WHITE AND THE NATIVE

Two major problems commonly exercise the minds of the people of South Africa: the Poor White and the Native. Much is heard of the former, especially at election times, for the poorest of poor whites has a vote, though little enough has been accomplished in the direction of remedying his troubles. "One-twentieth of the white population of the Union,"¹ wrote Professor Macmillan,¹ in his summary of the figures given in 1916, "were in permanent absolute poverty, many of them perhaps demoralized beyond redemption. But in addition considerably more than another twentieth were in danger of being dragged by adverse, but remediable, conditions down to the level of those submerged."

The official estimate which Professor Macmillan was quoting fixed the number in 1916 at 39,000 indigent poor or "*dood arme*" and 67,500 other poor, though the latter figure was probably guess-work. The Carnegie Commission which investigated the poor white question in 1931 reckoned that in 1929-30—before the effects of the depression were felt—17.5 per cent, of the population, or well over 300,000 in all, were "very poor." They checked this figure by reference to the occupation groups in the 1926 census showing the classes of shepherds, foresters, *bywoners*, transport riders and diggers, railway workers, labourers and unskilled workers generally. They estimated that by 1930 these would represent a total

¹ *Complex South Africa*, p. 54.

population of 220,000, and though a few of them might not be "poor whites" in the technical sense, the numbers of the latter would be greatly increased from other occupations, especially that class (representing over 350,000 in the 1926 census) whose males were described as "farmers."¹

Since 1930 the position has become more serious, not only by a normal development of the conditions leading to rural poverty, but by their abnormal intensification during a period of drought and depression. It is disturbing enough for 20 per cent, of the population to be described as "very poor,"¹ but when that population is a small aristocracy dominating and controlling a large proletariat without political rights or economic freedom, the prospect can only be described as grave.

The townsman usually thinks of "poor whites" as those who drift from the country to the towns, and especially to the great industrial centres such as Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town, living with their huge families on what they can pick up, shambling helplessly from relief work to soup kitchen, and back to relief work again. But there are others often overlooked—those who are too poor or who lack the initiative even to leave the farms, who exist somehow on a tiny patch of mealies and a few pumpkins, obviously ill-nourished and often drained of their virility by bilharzia or saturated with malaria.

Many explanations have been given for their condition, but the problem is not so simple as to be easily referred to a single cause. There is some truth in the ascription of one type of rural poverty to the survival of the "trek" spirit,¹ and even in the twentieth century there are still landless folk who wander with waggon and cattle about the arid northern districts of the Cape Province.² At the same time many poor whites belong to the *bywoner*

¹ See Groskopf, *Rural Impoverishment*, pp. 131 *sqq.*
² Wilcocks, *The Poor White*, pp. 12-14.

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class, squatters with no fixed ties who have been allowed to settle on a farm and who cultivate a patch of land and run a few head of cattle on the shares system. The development of sheep-raising on a large scale and improved methods of farming have resulted in the summary ejection of many *bywoners*, and there is little left for them save to drift to the towns.

Paradoxically enough, another cause of the poor white is to be found in too great stability, brought about by the South African habit of dividing landed property equally among all the heirs of an estate. Many families have remained on a single farm for successive generations, unable to realize the value of their inheritance owing to the legal expenses involved in registering transfers which may even go back into the eighteenth century, and unwilling to forfeit it by moving away. Cases are quoted in which thirteen families are joint owners of eight morgen (seventeen acres) in undivided shares,¹ of sixty-six children out of ninety attending a single school who possess the same surname, and of one individual whose

296,387,007

share was reckoned for legal purposes at $\frac{296,387,007}{4,705,511,234,00}$

of 2,527 morgen.²

It is often said that the poor whites, as a class, are of subnormal mentality—that the white stock degenerates after a few generations in South Africa—and that poor whites are potential criminals incapable of adjustment to modern society. The Carnegie Commission found that "the poor whites' intelligence is lower *on the average* than that of the European as a whole, and the percentage of them classed as subnormal is approximately twice as large as that of the European population as a whole/³

¹ Groskopf, *Rural Impoverishment*, p. 120.

² The whole farm was less than 6,000 acres. Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³ *Report*, Section 85.

But if there is any value at all in the competitive system, this was only to be expected, since the less intelligent would tend to become poor. At the same time the Commission found that "about one-third of them have more than average intelligence." In some cases the continued inbreeding of unhealthy strains has undoubtedly had its effect, but most of the poor physique and low mentality that exist may be attributed to bilharzia and malaria.

The poor white problem is not new. A destitute rural class is to be detected during the '80's of last century and certainly gave cause for uneasiness in the Republics, but so long as land was available and farmers were prepared to accept *bywoners*, its urgency did not appear. And yet, paradoxically again, the problem to-day is essentially one of rural depopulation. Large areas of the Cape and the Orange Free State are losing their inhabitants—in some districts the loss has been 25 per cent, in ten years.¹ Professor Macmillan has attributed the migration to five causes :² to drought, to the introduction of scientific sheep farming, to the fact that population has outgrown the old superficial farming methods of the backveld, and to the absence of legal protection for the *bywoner*. Something should also be set to the account of the railways, which have killed the rural industry of transport riding, and a good deal to the erosion and exhaustion of the soil, which mean that the land can no longer carry the same population on the old spoliative methods.

The drift to the towns is a modern characteristic. Until the close of the nineteenth century the countryman looked with contempt on the dweller in towns, exploited him politically, and was content with his own flocks and fields. Early in the present century he changed his mind. He discovered the possibilities of the towns, and especially of their charitably-minded inhabitants, and a steady

¹ Grockopf, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

² *Op. tit.*, p. x6.

migration began. Every town in South Africa now has its proportion of Dutch-speaking inhabitants.

The problem of the poor white is complex in origin : it is no less incapable of a single solution. Successive Governments have initiated expensive " back to the land " schemes, irrigation settlements, and suchlike. Their measure of success might have been foreseen. Since the intelligent and active are less in need of assistance, the successes have been few and the proportion of failures high. The capital supplied by the Government is consumed, and the incurable poor white exists on charity until the next scheme is ready. The story is told of an individual who was awarded a farm in South-West Africa, well-watered and easily accessible, but after a few months asked to be transferred. He was told that he already enjoyed the pick of the district, but replied : " Ah, no, man ! I have shot all the game there." Of all the schemes, the Dutch Reformed Church Settlement at Kakamas, on the Orange River, has proved the most successful, owing partly to some degree of selection in the tenants, and particularly to its insistence upon the utmost degree of self-help. The Government has tended to fall back on temporary relief works with little thought of a permanent cure.

In the country the poor white is defeated by his lack of capital: in the towns his disability is lack of training, which forces him into the unskilled ranks. " The poor whites," writes Professor Macmillan,¹ " are little more than the ' reservoir ' of unemployed to be found wherever Western industrialism has dislocated the old agrarian system." Complications have been introduced by the South African tradition that the land provides a better and more dignified occupation than the town, partly by the persistent wooing of cynical politicians, who assure the poor white that as member of an aristocracy his future will be secured for him at the cost of someone else. The

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

result is that the poor white seldom really settles down into the life of the town. He always looks forward to the day when he will live the life of a gentleman once more on the land, and labour organizers complain that he seldom takes much interest in trade-unionism or any attempts to better his conditions. Political propaganda suggests that he has only to wait and all will be set right without any effort on his own behalf.

Above all, however, the poor white is hampered by the standard set in unskilled occupations by native labour. He may be willing enough, and many are hard workers, but South Africa is glutted with unskilled labour, and its wages are fixed by the artificially depressed condition of the native. The overcrowding of the Reserves and the exclusion of the native from even the semi-skilled occupations force down his standard of living, and the unskilled poor white has to compete at the same level. The Government subsidizes white labour in its own and in municipal enterprises, but this cannot affect the whole field of employment, and merely has the indirect result of still further depressing the native.

Many of the younger poor whites have found their way into the police force and the lower ranks of the Government service. A large number now find employment in the mines, where a good deal of the underground work is no more than semi-skilled and is chiefly a matter of the supervision of gangs of natives. But the goal of the poor white is still the railway service. In some cases manual labour can be used as a means of testing suitable persons for promotion to the regular running staff, and in the years between 1925 and 1931 over 11,000 were actually so transferred. In practice, however, the poor white on the railways is competing with the native, and at best the expedients attempted so far have been mere palliatives.

In the old days things arranged themselves on simple lines. The white man owned land, the native worked for

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him : when the native did not work he went back to his kraal, which was often on someone else's unworked farm, and all was well. Now there are white men who have no land, and who can only drift into the towns to do unskilled labour: there they meet and compete with the native, who also has no land, for the Reserves are full and he is being ejected from the farms.

For the present the rest of the white community is carrying the " poor white " on its back through subsidized relief work and charitable organizations, but some more permanent remedy must be found, and the sooner the better. That remedy is bound up with the solution of the problem that is the crucial test of South African statesmanship, the accommodation within its economic, political and social system of the 5,500,000 natives. In other words, the fate of the poor white depends on the solution of the native question.

The natives of the Union may be classified from the economic standpoint as " Reserve " natives, farm natives, and town dwellers. The " Reserves " or " locations " are the last vestiges of the land once occupied by independent tribes, and of these the chief is the Transkei, lying between the Cape and Natal, into which have been packed most of the Xhosa, Mpondo, Thembu and other tribes, a million in number. It is the most definitely " native " territory in the Union, and the scene of its most interesting administrative experiment. Next come Zululand, with over 250,000 native inhabitants but little in the way of administration, while in Natal itself early native policy scattered the natives, now a million in number, in various locations which were intended to act as reservoirs of labour for the respective districts. In the Transvaal the Reserves are small and scattered, except in the north, and in the Free State they are negligible, and their place is virtually taken by the Crown Protectorate of Basutoland.

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In 1921 the density of population in the Transkeian territories was 57.41 per square mile, and in the Kingwilliamstown District 70.01. The average density of Europeans over the whole Union was 1.44 per square mile, but this is not quite a fair comparison, since the Transkei is one of the most fertile districts of South Africa. A better parallel is that between the figure for the native population in the urban and mining area of the Witwatersrand, where the great mine compounds bring the figure up to 169.20 per square mile, and that for Pietersburg, a rural and agricultural area, where it was none the less as high as 161.42. Obviously, therefore, the economic position of the Reserves is unsound. Professor Macmillan's detailed study of the district of Herschel showed that the average production was not more than £3 or £4 per head per annum, and that the consumption of imported goods—which included grain to make good the shortage in production—was about £2 per head. The exports of native produce—a few hides and a little wool—were well under £1 per head, leaving a heavy balance against the Reserve. The figures for the independent native territory of Basutoland seemed to agree tolerably well.

The adverse balance against the Reserve was made good out of wages earned on farms and in the mines. It has been reckoned that at any one moment the absentees form one-tenth of the total population of the Transkei, and Professor Macmillan estimated that 75 per cent, of the able-bodied males of Herschel were away, either on farms in the Free State, at Kimberley, or on the Rand. Even when their remittances are taken into account the figures reveal that the standard of living in the Herschel Reserve was deplorably low, and Professor Macmillan summed up: "There is little room left for doubt that the natives of the Union as a whole are a community dragging along at the very lowest level of bare subsistence."¹

¹*Op. Cit.*, p. 221.

The absence of able-bodied males inevitably affects production. The density of population—many individuals have no land, and many families seek to exist on plots of one morgen (c. two acres) apiece—leads to impoverishment of the soil and overstocking the pasture. The result of these can only be erosion and the steady drying up of the land. The indigenous bush has been cleared, and the use of cattle-dung for fuel removes the one possible means of restoring fertility. There seems every justification for the statement that the Reserves have reached the limit of their population.

The members of the next class of natives, the two million dwellers on the farms, are often loosely spoken of as "squatters," but represent the remnant that was allowed to live on the land when it was annexed and divided up into farms by the white invaders. Many farms were not occupied by their white owners, and the natives were tolerated on condition of paying a share of their produce, usually the half. In any case, a few families were always left to provide a supply of labour.

The farm native has always been an object of suspicion. In old days strategic reasons led the Republican Volksraad in the Transvaal to decree a restriction of their numbers, which was never enforced, to five families per farm. In 1913 the Native Land Act, looking rather at a shortage of farm labour, abolished the vague "shares system" and substituted a labour contract which bound the native tenant to work for ninety days each year, and this was stiffened by the Native Service Contract Act of 1932. Agricultural progress has led to the occupation of long-vacant farms, the restriction of native agriculture, and the use of wage-paid labour in place of the old "shares" and labour tenants. Native families are then summarily dismissed and must either find another farm, gain admission to a Reserve, or drift into the towns.

Hence the anxiety shown by natives for land of their own. Tribes will impose heavy taxes upon themselves

in order to meet the instalments on the purchase price of a farm, and a number of groups have gained accommodation in this way. The free purchase of land by natives was, however, forbidden by the Native Land Act of 1913, and special permission must now be sought from the Minister for Native Affairs.

Financially the farm native is no better off than the inhabitant of the Reserve. Farm wages are very low, and the native and his family are liable for long periods of unpaid service. Many of the males go into domestic service in the towns, where their earnings, with rations and quarters, seldom exceed £40 a year. They do, however, retain a good deal of the tribal system, and where the farm owner is generous or easy-going the farm natives are tolerably cheerful.

The town native provides the most pressing problem. Sometimes he is a domestic servant (for most of the housework is done by males), living away from his family for months at a time, but intending ultimately to return home. But a new class has grown up in the persons of the detribalized natives who live permanently in the town "location" with their families, separated from the bases of their traditional morality and self-respect, and seeing, unfortunately, the least desirable side of European society. It is difficult to emphasize, but almost impossible to exaggerate, the difference in outlook between the detribalized town native and the country native. At best the town dwellers have adapted themselves as well as their wretched wages permit to European standards, both of life and morality, and there are many who keep together a neat home and bring up a decent family. At worst the town has developed the native criminal, depraved and unscrupulous, reckless in the use of the knife, a drunkard and a thief, a pest to his own people and to the European alike.

The average income of the town native without food or quarters does not usually exceed £50 a year, while the

minimum upon which he can support his family and pay his tax has been reckoned at £70 a year. The balance must be made up by the women, who earn a few shillings by going out to do washing, and too often by manufacturing "skokiaan"—a generic name for a particularly venomous type of yeast brew.

Town locations are improving. The Urban Areas Act of 1923 was objected to as providing fresh opportunities for harrying the native, but at least it put the responsibility for native housing upon the municipalities. Something has been done, but nevertheless the best locations are drab and monotonous, and individuality and personality have little scope in the hygienic but depressing rows of huts that characterize municipal housing.

Legally, the native remains in a state of tutelage throughout the greater part of South Africa. Native males were admitted to the franchise of the old Cape Colony upon the same conditions as white men and in 1927 the number on the roll reached 16,000. Recently, however, the educational and property qualifications have been enforced more drastically, with the result that the number has fallen to 12,000, while at the same time the tests in the case of European men and women have been abolished. In Natal the native franchise is so hedged with restrictions that the number of qualified native voters has never exceeded the half dozen : in 1931 there was one. In the inland Provinces the vote is withheld.

Except in the Cape, individual natives are not allowed to hold land. In the Cape Province the right was saved as against the Native Land Act by a decision of the Appellate Court. Except in the Transkei, a number of restrictive "pass" laws are in force. These vary from Province to Province, but in Transvaal towns natives may not reside without being in service, nor may they be in the streets after the curfew hour of 10 p.m. without special permission from their employer, given in writing.

They may not move about the country **without a** "travelling pass," while inability to produce a **tax** receipt on demand renders the native liable to fine or imprisonment. The advantage of these regulations **in** controlling the native is easy to understand, as is the reluctance of the police to approve any proposal for their abolition, but they press with particular hardship on the peaceful and the law-abiding and cause considerable irritation. In proportion to their earnings, fines **on** natives are heavy. "Ten shillings or a week" is a common penalty for breach of the curfew rule, or for not being in possession of the tax receipt, and imprisonment carries no social stigma whatever. Its frequency for purely technical offences defeats the object of punishment, while it brings the young native into touch with the criminal classes.

Native taxation is crushingly heavy. Every male native of eighteen and over pays *£1* a year as General Tax, while dwellers in Reserves pay an additional Local Tax of 10s. per hut, up to a maximum of *£2*. This is in addition to the indirect taxation which falls upon the native's blankets, clothing and tea. The proceeds of the Local Tax are paid to the Native Local Councils, or where these do not exist, to the "Native Development Account." The latter receives 1s. 5d. of the General Tax collected, while the remainder goes to the ordinary revenue. The Development Fund is spent chiefly on education and native agriculture, while the Local Fund goes to dipping, fencing and local public works.

Although it was widely quoted as one of the reasons for the Union of South Africa in 1910, native policy since that date has been static, and little has been done save to begin the gradual assimilation of the four administrative systems. The most influential have been **that of Natal**, "built up by Sir Theophilus Shepstone during the thirty years he was virtually in charge of its native affairs, **and** that of the Transkei, begun by Charles Brownlee **and**

shaped for years by a little group of families who formed almost a hereditary hierarchy.

The Natal system was based upon the retention of the tribal system: in fact, broken tribes were sometimes reorganized for administrative purposes. The Governor of Natal was proclaimed Supreme Chief, and the Secretary for Native Affairs—in Shepstone's time at any rate—acted in his name and played the benevolent despot. Great changes were brought about, but always nominally through tribal channels, the tribal law was codified and was administered by the Native Commissioners, with an appeal to the Native High Court. Though it was not particularly generous, the native policy of Natal gained a certain cohesion, it was based upon principles and couched in a style that the native could understand, and relations between whites and natives generally were helped by the Natal tradition that every white man should aspire to a command of the Zulu language.

The Transkeian system, which was that of the old Cape Colony, was founded far more on the personality of the European Magistrate and his substitution for the Chief. It aimed at development where the Natal system was static, and it is significant that native law, though recognized and administered in the courts, was never formally codified. Room was left for development. Early experiments, which were the basis of Rhodes's Glen Grey Act of 1894, aimed at the substitution of individual tenure of land for the communal system of the tribe. The object was to give scope for private initiative, particularly in the improvement of agriculture, but the practice has not yet become general. The outstanding achievement of the Transkeian system has been the development of the Council system, a first step in the direction of self-government.

To-day each district in the Transkei has its District Council, consisting of the Magistrate, two members nominated by the Governor-General (*i.e.* the Native

Affairs Department) on the recommendation of the chiefs, and four members chosen indirectly by the taxpayers of the district. Above these stands the United Transkeian Territories General Council, to give it its official name, though it is usually called the Bhunga,¹ which consists of three native members from each Council District, the chiefs of East and West Pondoland and of Tembuland, together with the Magistrates of the districts. It meets under the presidency of the Chief Magistrate.

This official is also Chief Native Commissioner for the Transkei, and his post in its variety and responsibility is more than the equal of any Lieutenant-Governorship. He is, in fact, Governor, Prime Minister, Speaker and Chief Justice all in one. The Bhunga resembles a local parliament, and has wide advisory powers in local matters, public works, dipping of cattle, native agriculture, and "the prevention, abatement, and removal of any nuisance." It also "advises" the disposal of the local Development Tax and quitrent payments, and it is one of the anomalies of the South African system that though its powers are perhaps wider than those of the Provincial Councils, it receives no grant in aid.

The debates are followed with interest and intelligence, and the speeches, though their style may seem discursive to European ears, are marked by a dry realism which is a native characteristic. There can be no denying the success of the Transkeian experiment—the police force of the Territories works out at an average of one per 2,000 of the population as opposed to the one per 800 of the rest of the country—and the Native Affairs Act of 1920 made the District Council system permissive throughout the Union. It has since been extended to various districts in the Transvaal, and in the Cape outside the Transkei, but no new "General" Council has yet been established. The Hertzog Native Bills suggested a General Council for the Union.

¹ From the Xhosa 'ibhunga'—a council.

In the past, the problem of native administration has been complicated by the South African system of local government, which makes the Magistrate the sole agent of the central power, part Governor-in-little and part Cinderella. The Magistrates are normally officials of the Department of Justice, and are transferred from post to post without much consideration of their proficiency in native affairs. In the Transkei, however, the Chief Magistrate and the twenty-seven Magistrates under him are members of the Department of Native Affairs, as are the Chief Native Commissioner in the Ciskei, stationed at Kingwilliamstown, and the Magistrates of the six almost purely native districts west of the Kei. In Natal, a considerable reform has recently been achieved by the transfer of eleven Magistracies in predominantly native districts to the Department of Native Affairs, but elsewhere the Magistrates are officials of the Department of Justice, though Native Commissioners and Assistant Native Commissioners are appointed to densely-populated native districts.

The Native Affairs Act of 1920 felt its way tentatively towards two great principles. By setting up a Native Affairs Commission of three members to advise the Minister it recognized the part that could be played by the expert, but the Commission is a nominated body, it has no executive powers, and can do no more than lay the expression of its dissent from Government measures upon the table of the House. In the second place, the Act recognized the value of consulting the native by setting up machinery for summoning native conferences representative of native opinion throughout South Africa. These again are purely advisory, and the Minister need not, and does not, summon them if he is not so disposed. They have, however, done valuable work, if only in demonstrating that the native has a point of view and is capable of expressing it.

Seven years later the Native Administration Act of

1927 marked the greatest advance in native affairs since Union, and did valuable work in the codification of much existing practice. It regularized the position of chiefs and headmen, of whom some 1,700 of varying importance are recognized by the Native Affairs Department, and receive a small allowance. It provided for a regular appeal from their courts and recognized the court of the Native Commissioner as a court of law, with a wide jurisdiction in civil matters and ordinary magisterial jurisdiction in criminal cases. Native law was formally recognized, save where it is opposed to public policy or natural law, and for the first time the legislature admitted that the native custom of *lobola* or *boxadi*¹ was not repugnant to either. Native Appeal Courts were established, one for Natal and the Transvaal, and one for the Cape and the Orange Free State, which consist of the President and two Magistrates or Commissioners, and which may call in native assessors for advice on points of native law.

A very important provision empowers the Governor-General to amend the Natal Native Code and to extend its sphere by Proclamation, while he is empowered to legislate for any "proclaimed" area—that is, any Reserve—by Proclamation. This is an extension of the old Transkeian system and puts into the hands of the Native Affairs Department a simple means of carrying through any internal reforms. At the same time, legislation by Proclamation, which means virtually legislation by some office clerk, is not without its dangers.

The Proclamation is to be laid upon the table of each House and remains in force unless specifically condemned by a resolution. The Governor-General is also given power to make regulations concerning public order—the holding of meetings, carrying of weapons, and so on—and very wide powers enable him to deport any who are

¹ The 'bride-price,' which is the foundation of the native law of succession and inheritance.

concerned with " anything which may reasonably be calculated to cause or promote any feelings of hostility between natives and Europeans." A Cabinet Minister, or perhaps even an officious policeman, is thus given immense power, not only over natives, but over Europeans as well. The legislative power is probably necessary, owing to the difficulty of getting native bills through Parliament and to the unsuitability of the House of Assembly for the discussion of native affairs, but its effect is to place nearly six million people at the mercy of the whims of a Cabinet Minister and his bureaucracy.

Outside the sphere of administration the Union has done little save to carry on the policy of repression which was characteristic of the old " colonial " mentality. In 1913 the Native Land Act, professedly a temporary measure, abolished the right of natives to purchase land outside the Reserves without special permission, and prohibited the old " shares " agreement with native tenants. A commission was set up to consider the widening of the area within which purchases might be allowed, but its recommendations, which would have had the effect of making 13 per cent, of the area of South Africa available for natives,¹ raised such violent opposition from Europeans that they were dropped. The restrictions imposed by the " temporary " Act of 1913 have remained in force for twenty years.

In 1926 General Hertzog introduced into Parliament a number of Bills which represented a considered native policy. While extending a number of privileges to the natives, they safeguarded the exclusive position which the white man commonly regards as his own *jure divino*, and they gained much support precisely because they seemed to secure the traditional policy. The Native Council system was to be extended, and the natives throughout South Africa would elect seven Europeans

¹ Natives requiring land would have had to buy it from the actual European holders, and at their terms.

to represent them in Parliament, but against this was set the abolition of the franchise of the Cape natives, which they enjoyed at that time on the same basis as the Cape Europeans. Fresh areas were to be made available for native purchases of land, but at the price of the abolition of the right of free purchase which the Court of Appeal had declared to remain vested in the natives of the Cape Province. Even the enfranchisement of the "coloured" or Eurafrican people was believed to be the price of their support in destroying the Cape native franchise.

The Bills spent much time in Select Committees, and the Representation Bill, which needed a two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both Houses, was defeated in that sitting in 1929. After the general election the Bills returned to their Select Committee, and had not yet emerged when the financial crisis turned men's thoughts in another direction.

Other legislation dealing with riotous assemblies, the "Colour Bar" Act of 1926 (which prohibited natives from carrying out skilled and semi-skilled work in the mines), certain master and servant legislation, and the attempt of the Transvaal Provincial Council, thwarted in the Law Courts, to refuse the issue of motor licences to natives, have carried on the policy of repression. They have been regularly welcomed by those numerous unskilled and uneducated white men who find in the colour of their skins their only claim to aristocracy. This is not a matter of racial or party differences. The Prime Minister could always rely upon the support of ultra-British Natal for the more repressive side of his policy, while the public pronouncements of some Rhodesian politicians are as illiberal as anything which has been "propounded for the "poor whites" of the backveld.

In his own person the South African native is cheerful and seemingly contented, even though, like the man in the fable, he has no shirt. The one great force working

for the amelioration of his social position is provided by the missionary societies. In times past, they were almost amusingly anxious to *get* rid of native customs ¹ to-day they tend toward a sentimental and uncritical desire for their preservation. But whatever their mistakes, they have done much to restore to the native his self-respect, to give him something in place of the tribal morality which has been undermined by contact with the Europeans, and by displaying fine examples of disinterested service may, perhaps, give him a better opinion of the European. Native education and practically all the medical services available for natives outside the big towns are controlled by the missionary bodies. They receive grants from the Native Development Fund, but these do not meet more than a portion of the expense, and the balance is made good by contributions raised mostly in Europe, and by fees paid by parents and patients.

Economically, the position of the native has become worse. In the past, white encroachment upon native land was somewhat counterbalanced by the demand for unskilled labour set up by the industrialization of the country. Of recent years the urgency of the "poor white" problem has led the Government to dismiss more and more natives in favour of Europeans, and the municipalities have been bribed and bullied into doing the same. The white man is thus encroaching upon the limited area left to the native.

Socially, the problem before the Union of bringing about an adjustment between a large native proletariat and a narrow European aristocracy is not easy, but to perpetuate a seventeenth-century mentality will not make it any easier. Nothing can be done until it is

¹ The writer once found among the papers of one of the oldest missionary societies a report in which the missionary regretted that he had not made a single convert during the year, but added hopefully that quite a number of natives were beginning to wear trousers!

realized, first, that the native is a fellow citizen of the State, secondly, that all human beings are capable of development, and thirdly, that it is false economy to keep one section of the community poor in the hope that thereby the rest will be made rich.

No householder need fear a neighbour who is both prosperous and contented, no merchant will open a business in a district whose inhabitants are living below the poverty line, yet it is as a neighbour that the native is feared, and as a customer that he is one of South Africa's greatest potential assets. The first and most obvious step is to increase the power of the native to consume, so that he may provide a market for the nascent industries of the country. Something must be done to restore his self-respect, without which he is a danger to society, and something to restore his confidence in the " State " as such, and to remove the impression of irrational tyranny which is too often all that it implies to him.

Another important social problem is provided by the " coloured " or Eurafrikan people, who in 1933 numbered over 500,000, of whom the great majority lived in the Cape Province. They arose principally through a mingling of European and Hottentot strains, though Malay slaves and Bantu are also represented, and in the Northern Cape the white infiltration is comparatively slight. In the northern Provinces there is a tendency to approximate them to the native, especially in liquor restrictions, though they are exempt from the pass laws, but in the Cape they are admitted to the trade unions, and form a sort of outer fringe to European society.

The other racial problem in the South African complex is provided by the Asiatic. Indians were imported into *Natal in 1860 to work in the cane fields, and in 1933 the total number was estimated at a trifle under 200,000, of whom 80 per cent, had been born in South Africa. The common objection to the Indian as a citizen is, in a way,

a testimony to his efficiency. His low standard of life and unremitting toil make him a dangerous rival to the European and, unlike the native, he is a nimble-minded trader. In the Transvaal, where landholding is forbidden them, they have monopolized the peddling of vegetables and the trade of the lower quarters of the towns.

The first champion of the Indian in South Africa was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was moved by the indignities he suffered on a legal visit to set himself to improve the lot of his people. Against the Transvaal Government in responsible government days he led a passive resistance movement, and when the Immigration Act for the newly-formed Union contained specific clauses aimed at "Indians and other Asiatics," his agitation culminated in a typical gesture. Gandhi led a great march of over 2,000 Indians across the frontier of the Transvaal—which still kept its anti-Asiatic laws—and once through Laing's Nek, the demonstrators sat down and waited arrest and imprisonment. It was something new in political technique, and General Smuts compromised. The legislative stigma was removed, but Indians who were, after all, most of them of the class of "untouchables/" were excluded by an administrative interpretation of the clause referring to "economic grounds or . . . standards or habits of life."

Though Indians no longer come from outside, attempts have been made to limit them to specific areas, as by the Class Areas Bills of 1924 and 1926. To a people who are mostly small traders, this spells ruin absolute and unqualified, and the Government of India intervened. Conferences held in 1926 and 1927 resulted in the financing by the Union Government of a scheme of assisted emigration from South Africa, recognition by the Indians of the right of South Africa to prescribe "Western standards" for its citizens, and a promise by the South Africans to improve educational and other facilities for the South African Indians.

The conferences did not achieve much more than an interchange of generalities, but the Union undertook to receive an Agent-General as representative of the Indian Government, and contact with the acute and cultured members of the Indian delegations and representatives has taught some South Africans to realize that the culture they desire so earnestly to preserve is independent of colour. It is probable that the whole colour question in the Union has benefited therefrom.

CONCLUSION

AFTER nearly a quarter of a century of Union, South Africa faces problems which are no nearer solution, though they are perhaps more clearly defined.

The first of these is the adjustment of the relations of the various races and colours that go to make up the Commonwealth. The race question, as between English-speaking and Dutch-speaking, is often acute, but should not last for long. Inter-marriage, though it may introduce complications at first, will settle the problem in a generation or two. What Englishman of to-day, save through sheer sentimentality, will take sides as between Norman and Saxon in the struggle of 1066 ?

Questions of colour are more difficult, for at bottom they are due to the determination of the European to defend his great heritage of Western Civilization. To solve them, the white man must rise superior to the fear-psychology of the mob, and realize more clearly the true nature of the things at stake.

But these questions are only preliminary to others facing every human being in South Africa, of which the most urgent is the replacement of that diminishing asset, its mineral wealth. In 1932 the Public Debt of the Union was £243,000,000, or £131 ns. 9d. per head of the European population, while the municipalities owed another £50,000,000. In other words, South Africa was like a man living upon a stock of sovereigns in a chest, who then proceeds to run up debts on the strength of his apparent prosperity. The estimate made by the Government Mining Engineer in 1930 has been affected by recent changes, and base metals and new discoveries

may continue to keep up the full production of the country long after 1949, or even after the complete exhaustion of the Witwatersrand, but sooner or later the problem must be faced. In the meantime, the financial policy of the State should be rigidly conservative, and the Public Debt and expenditure kept under firm control. Politicians and parties who fail to draw the attention of their people to the sheer hard facts are failing in a primary duty.

How South Africa of the future will dispose of its problems none can tell. That solution would certainly not satisfy any who are now living, but it must be left to the future to decide. All that we can do is to hope that those problems will be faced with courage, intelligence and charity, and to conclude, like the official documents of the old Republics:

GOD SAVE LAND AND PEOPLE.

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