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
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East Central Europe
and
The World



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East Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era

Edited by STEPHEN D. KERTESZ



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PREFACE

The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy, published in 1956 by Notre Dame's Committee on International Relations, examined America's twentieth-century relations with the East Central European countries especially the international political conditions which made possible their subjugation after the Second World War—and the methods through which communism was imposed on them.

The present volume deals with East Central European events in the post-Stalin era, in particular since 1956. Its central purpose is to analyze the continuing Soviet domination of countries in the area and developments in some countries on the periphery of the Soviet orbit. The Baltic nations have lost separate statehood, while Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have retained formal independence under Soviet-protected governments. The Yugoslav people experience Tito's brand of communism. The Albanian communist regime, first sponsored by Yugoslavia, then taken under the wing of the Soviet Union, since 1960 has been patronized by Communist China. In no case has a communist government acquired power at the polls or dared to test popular will in free elections. Police methods in internal affairs and a new version of imperialism in foreign affairs have marked communist policies.

The fate of the satellite countries transcends in significance the particulars of their own experience and is of importance in worldwide relations. For noncommunist nations their fate should be a writing on the wall. Premier Khrushchev has condemned some of Stalin's abuses and crimes, but does not abandon Stalin's principles in international politics; he merely practices them in a more flexible way. While the Soviet Union is the self-appointed champion of liberation and freedom in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, East Central European nations with a long record of independent existence are ruled by an iron fist and are forcibly separated from the rest of Europe. The diplomatic performance of Soviet representatives is characterized by double talk. Everywhere they advocate national

liberation, while the USSR imposes a communist system on a hundred million people in East Central Europe.

In the communist bloc during the last few years a substantial transformation toward a peculiar diversity has occurred. The centralized character of the bloc has changed in the sense that China competes with the Soviet Union for the control of communist parties in some countries within and outside the communist bloc. China has become a political factor in East Central Europe. Policies of the Soviet Union within the bloc have themselves undergone change. These new factors deserve careful appraisal, which it is the purpose of this volume to provide.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professor Robert H. Ferrell, Indiana University, who was my editorial consultant. He read all chapters, some of them several times, and gave most valuable help in the editorial process. My research assistants John Crutcher and Martin Gildea participated in the editorial work and I gratefully acknowledge their co-operation. Many specialists in the field kindly read some of the chapters and offered helpful comments. I am grateful for their invaluable assistance. The preparation of the index, begun by George Olgyay, was completed by Paul Bödy.

S.D.K.

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1: ANOTHER FIVE YEARS

Stephen D. Kertesz

Since publication of the symposium, *The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy*, the most revealing events in East Central Europe have been in Poland and Hungary. On the very day of publication of the above-mentioned volume, October 30, 1956, the Soviet government expressed readiness to enter negotiations with the Hungarian government and other participants in the Warsaw Treaty "on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary." But instead of negotiations the Soviet Union chose military means for settling the Hungarian question.

Suppression of the revolt by Russian troops brought an hour of reckoning. It proved, even to communists themselves, that communism could achieve no lasting hold on men's minds but depended on the support of Soviet arms. It constituted a warning to the uncommitted nations. Most important, it revealed to the captive nations the seriousness of their predicament: the West had failed to challenge Russia's domination of the area in a critical hour and could offer little more than moral support to a nation trying to liberate itself.

Although Hungary's short-lived independence was destroyed, the lesson and world repercussion of Hungary's fight for liberty has proved far from negligible. The workers and students massacred by the Soviet Army in the streets of Budapest exposed the Soviet big lie, just as the later Chinese invasion of Tibet demonstrated in Asia the practical meaning of peaceful coexistence as advocated at the Bandung Conference by Chou En-lai. The Russian soldiers who fought in Hungary knew very well that they had to kill workers and students—the very people who were supposed to be ardent supporters of the communist regime. Several hundred Western correspondents witnessed the revolutionary days in Budapest and reported and even televised these events to the world. Soviet leaders denied the facts.

But even in the Soviet Union some citizens were ashamed of the Soviet Army's role in the Hungarian Revolution. Although communists still repeat the official Soviet version of events in Hungary, many of them know better.

The Hungarian Revolution demonstrated *urbi et orbi* that the communist indoctrination of the population and particularly of the youth had failed. Fear had existed that the new generation educated according to communist precepts would be lost to the free world. The Hungarian Revolution dealt a crushing blow to the idea accepted even by some anticommunist Western thinkers, of the ascendancy of communist ideology. Hungarian writers, students and workers called the bluff of communism; the revolution proved that communism was not voluntarily accepted or retained, that it could survive only with support of the Soviet Army. When Moscow showed its hand, disillusion with communist doctrines and practices increased among communists and their sympathizers, particularly intellectuals, in many countries.

The Hungarian Revolution, the simultaneous Polish October, and the resulting political tremors throughout the communist bloc are indeed manifestations of the indomitable human spirit. Despite Western passivity, the weaknesses of communism were revealed in East Central Europe. In recent years open discussion of differences has been grudgingly tolerated. Intrabloc co-ordination has become a more complex task.

RUSSIA'S SATELLITE EMPIRE

Even some astute Western statesmen believed that Stalin's demise would be followed by revolutions and upheavals in the Soviet bloc. These expectations did not materialize. Despite difficulties that followed Stalin's death, the government of the USSR has retained the essentials of its power in East Central Europe. Many transformations did, however, take place in the Soviet bloc. The rigid policy of Stalin's last years was followed by a scramble for power by his heirs. The spectacular reconciliation with Tito and the Declaration of Belgrade in 1955, which emphasized every country's right to choose its road to socialism, and above all else Khrushchev's denunciation of his former master in 1956, strengthened anti-Stalinist forces and liberalizing trends in most of the satellites. These happenings culminated in the

Polish upheaval and Hungarian revolt of 1956. Khrushchev not only survived these events, but showed ability to use setbacks to his advantage. Western passivity in the face of Soviet military intervention in Hungary underlined the satellite predicament: there was no alternative to Soviet control.

In Poland, after a reluctantly made initial decision to meet Gomulka's insistence on autonomy in domestic affairs, the Kremlin kept on top of developments. Events in Poland demonstrated that even at best only a limited degree of national freedom could be attained within the communist bloc. Western reluctance to accept *de jure* the Oder-Neisse line, coupled with widespread apprehension in Poland of a German revival, helped limit the course of events in October 1956. It was not long before the Poles began to look to the future. Party militants around Gomulka set out to rebuild the power edifice, emphasizing the formal institutions of the party apparatus and the government. Compromises were made with respect to the "October goals." Anti-Soviet Polish nationalism was again curbed during the *Po Prostu* riots of 1957. Gomulka has succeeded in re-establishing a considerable degree of discipline within his party. He has won the Kremlin's confidence, and proved that a moderately liberal Poland could remain a reliable satellite. Dutifully, he approved Imre Nagy's execution in 1958. During a visit to Poland in 1959, Khrushchev endorsed all he had seen of Gomulka's "gradualist" policies, and all bloc theoretical formulations since have provided room for them. Gomulka went to the Bucharest and Moscow meetings in 1960 and the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961 as a staunch supporter of Khrushchev and emerged with the friendship of the USSR firmer than before.

Although many of the October gains were gradually abolished, there have been some Polish successes. Freedom of discussion has remained, and cultural exchanges with the West have continued. Poland has demonstrated that a communist-bloc country is able to improve relations with and receive economic help from the United States. If Gomulka's attacks on the United States have had some sobering effect on American foreign policy—and in December 1961 the United States sold agricultural commodities to Poland worth only \$44,600,000, *i.e.*, much less than in preceding years—still Poland has received a substantial American aid since 1956.

Through the Warsaw Pact, Russia has continued to direct and

control the military establishments of the satellites. There are about 60 satellite divisions. Even though numerically the satellite contribution to the communist bloc's military forces is considerable, reliability of the satellite armies is doubtful. The USSR in 1956 proved its willingness to suppress an unruly satellite and maintain the power monopoly of a local communist party. Generally, achievements in rocketry and space technology and seeming Soviet ability to transform such tangible evidence of industrial skill into political power has strengthened the Kremlin's authority within and outside the bloc.

The overwhelming military power of the USSR in the bloc is paralleled by the power monopoly of the communist party, which has asserted itself in numerous crises. In each communist country the gap between formal authority and effective power has remained as great as ever. The state apparatus serves party policy. Communist leadership rules with Soviet support. Most diplomatic representatives in the bloc are party officials, and there is a substantial linking of diplomatic and party channels of communication. For these and other reasons, developments in the bloc cannot be analyzed only on the basis of intergovernmental relations. The hierarchy among the communist parties, and particularly the personal connections of the various communist leaders in Moscow, are all-important.

Relations nonetheless have perceptibly changed between the Kremlin and the other communist countries. Khrushchev has made concessions not only to China, but has taken the specific interests and developments of all the satellite countries more into consideration than did Stalin. Some aspects of human relations underwent truly fundamental changes, particularly among Muscovite and satellite leaders. The influence of some of the satellite leaders increased considerably in intrabloc relations. Khrushchev introduced a dynamic itinerant diplomacy, and many satellite leaders indulge in it. The "flying Dutchman" has been replaced by "flying commissars."

THE CHINESE FACTOR

Simultaneously with transformations in Russia's Europe, the structure of the whole communist bloc has changed. Today the USSR presides over a heterogeneous empire and even grudgingly tolerates the activities of a rather overbearing junior partner which seeks to interpret Marxist dogma in its own way, influencing bloc policies—

domestic and foreign—in a manner not always in accord with Moscow's views and interests. That the once centralized communist system is undergoing bipolarization is evidenced by the frequency with which many of the other communist parties now pay tribute to both the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. In the past, identification of communist leadership with that of the CPSU had been axiomatic and almost a natural part of communist thinking. China's increasing influence in the communist bloc and in world-wide relationships has been a novel development; the speed with which Peking has intruded in Moscow's East Central European precincts was unexpected. Perhaps rivalry between two major centers of power is unavoidable: rivalry between Communist China and the USSR can be genuine in terms of national interests, interpretation and application of ideology, and leadership of the bloc. Who will dominate Asia? Where will the boundary separate Soviet and Chinese spheres of influence? Who will control the communist movement in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and who will be the infallible interpreter of Marxist doctrine? Such problems form the core of antagonism between the two leading communist states.

The Chinese have a feeling of superiority; they distrust the Russians as they do everyone else. Still, a time-honored Russian pastime is nurturing suspicion toward foreigners. A great deal of built-in mistrust thus exists in Soviet-Chinese relations. In recent years the Chinese have energetically promoted their national interests and, like the Russians, have equated these interests with those of the international movement. They have challenged Soviet hegemony on the ground that Moscow seeks to advance "parochial" Russian interests at the expense of China and other communist states. Such differences—couched in terms of fidelity to the Marxist *Weltanschauung*—often constitute a more acute threat to bloc unity than do the almost perennial territorial conflicts.

For a variety of reasons, including economic and population difficulties, the Chinese take a more harsh view of the world situation and advocate more violent policies. Chinese demands became strident when Soviet technological skill was demonstrated by the launching of ICBM's and Sputniks. China disapproved of Soviet support of noncommunist governments in Africa, the Middle East, and South America, and opposed any policy which might lead to an East-West *détente*. The Chinese abhorred some of Khrushchev's propaganda

slogans, such as "peaceful coexistence" or "immediate and complete disarmament."

Further, at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 the Chinese did not welcome Khrushchev's theory of the "peaceful transition to Socialism." At the Rumanian party congress in Bucharest in July 1960, and at the Moscow meeting of the 81 communist parties the following November, the Chinese openly attacked the Soviet position on some outstanding issues. The Soviets prevailed at Moscow, but only at the price of concessions to the Chinese. The program accepted by the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, in October 1961, paid lip service to the Chinese revolution, while the European satellites rated major attention. No mention was made of Mao Tse-tung's contributions to Marxism-Leninism, although prior to July 1960 his original application of Marxist doctrine was repeatedly recognized.

Khrushchev gave China economic and technical aid and made numerous political and doctrinal concessions, but he was unwilling to give China atomic weapons or accept some bellicose Chinese suggestions on world politics. China was particularly dissatisfied by the lack of Russian support in her attack against the offshore islands in 1958. Khrushchev then knew that substantial Russian support could have led to war with the United States, and he was aware of the possible consequences: if the United States and the USSR devastated each other in a nuclear war, China could become the dominant power in Eurasia. Chinese overlordship, involving imposition of the Chinese brand of communism, was not a prospect appealing to the Russians.

China's growing power position within the communist bloc and the antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union seriously affected events in East Central Europe. Chinese intervention in East Central European politics is an entirely new phenomenon dating from 1956. At first, mindful of their own history vis-à-vis Moscow and of the brake which Stalin applied to their ambitions, Chinese leaders may have been genuinely sympathetic to some complaints of the satellite nations and have welcomed the early stage of the Polish and Hungarian developments in October 1956. They may also have gambled that any weakening of Russian hegemony in the area would enhance their own status within the bloc. Chou En-lai visited Poland

and Hungary in early 1957 and tried to calm these nations. He might have offered, at least implicitly, Peking's support to those people in Warsaw and Budapest who opposed a return to the oppressive policies emanating from the Kremlin. When the full import of the Polish upheaval and the Hungarian revolt could no longer be ignored, and the lack of popular support for communism was all too plain, the Chinese reversed themselves and became the nemesis of "National Communism." Today they are the most bitter opponents of the Yugoslavs.

One of the most interesting spectacles of the Twenty-second Congress was Khrushchev's violent attack on the Albanian communist leaders. He accused them of Stalinist practices and of hostile acts against the Soviet Union. The Albanians were defended by Premier Chou En-lai, head of the Peking delegation. He asserted that Khrushchev had no right to criticize in public any member of the communist bloc. The Albanian leadership has been loathe to alter its draconic domestic policies—"de-Stalinization" barely reached Tirana—or to abandon their xenophobic view of the outside world. "Proletarian internationalism" by no means weakened Albanian determination to preserve national identity. Such a policy had worked to Moscow's advantage in 1948, when the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture ended several years of Albanian vassalage to Belgrade and when Tirana turned to Moscow as its last and best hope of "independence." Khrushchev's later doctrinal "softness" and flirtation with Tito worked against Moscow and probably, indeed, accounted in part for Tirana's obvious preference for the Chinese. An opportunity to register that preference came in the spring of 1960, when Peking brought its dispute with the Soviet leadership out into the open. For the first time the Albanians sensed support for their militant dissent from Soviet policy, and cast their lot with the Chinese at Bucharest in June 1960 and, again, at Moscow in November.

Moscow has responded with economic pressure, and innuendo in public speeches, while attacks have been made on the Albanian leadership by the East German boss Walter Ulbricht and the Italian communist chief Palmiro Togliatti. The Soviet submarine force withdrew from the Albanian base at the island of Sasseno. Russian and most of the satellite specialists left Albania and were replaced by Chinese technicians. A new Chinese long-term aid agreement, an-

nounced in April 1961, granted \$125 million of credits toward Albania's five-year plan, 1961-1965, and China has supplied Albania with wheat bought in Canada and Western Europe.

Following Khrushchev's verbal attack at the Twenty-second Congress, Enver Hoxha retaliated in kind at the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1961. He demanded that the Soviet bloc adopt a more militant attitude toward the West and toward Yugoslav "revisionism." Public debate between Russian and Albanian leaders was followed by severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Albania in December 1961. Some of the satellite countries followed suit and recalled their ambassadors from Tirana. To be sure, Albania is only a pawn in the doctrinal and power political struggle between Moscow and Peking. Though China seeks to play an ever more active role in intrabloc relations and to influence the bloc's policies toward the noncommunist world, it is unlikely that she intends—at least at present—to wrest leadership of the bloc from Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet alliance is a marriage of convenience. China is a vast, economically underdeveloped country which looks to Moscow and the industrially skilled Soviet East European satellites for its own internal development. Overriding common interests and ideology determine the form and dimension of the alliance and demand accommodation between the major partners. Some communist leaders in the satellite countries may agree with certain Chinese policies, but they cannot afford to follow them. Although Albania has no common boundary with the USSR, Soviet punishment could be forthcoming through a variety of ways. Even so, these and numerous related developments demonstrate in Russia's Europe that the monolithic character of the communist bloc has been replaced by some diversity and dissension. János Kádár, in a *Pravda* article dated December 26, 1961, compared the communist rift concerning Albania to the Stalin-Trotsky feud in the 1920's; and his allegation was not far from the truth. The Peking-Tirana axis is convinced that war cannot be avoided with Western "imperialists" and advocates forceful policies for the "liberation" of the remaining colonial peoples. At the Stockholm World Peace Congress in December 1961, a Soviet representative reportedly warned the bellicose Chinese that there would be no one left to "liberate" if the world experienced a nuclear holocaust.

The split between China and Russia created problems for com-

munist parties in many countries. They have to make a choice between the various centers and trends of world communism, a new situation for them. Khrushchev's policy opposes both the "dogmatic" leftists and the "revisionist" rightists within the Soviet Party and within the international communist movement. On the world scene the communist leaders now can make a choice or attempt to maneuver between Khrushchev, Mao, and several shades of Titoism.

Communist leaders of the satellite countries depend on Soviet support, and so do not have much choice between loyalties. But their fate might be greatly influenced by the outcome of the intrabloc struggle. Confusion and turmoil in the communist world might allow satellite leaders more leeway in intrabloc politics.

THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

Since 1958 the integration of the satellite economies into a bloc-wide economic system has been one of the major objectives of Soviet policy. At the Twenty-first CPSU Congress in January 1959, Khrushchev emphasized the importance of integrating the economies of the East Central European states through plans of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Since then, satellite plans for long-range development have been drafted and redrafted, to accord with the Soviet Seven-Year Plan. Co-ordination and supervision of national economic planning has become a function of COMECON. Khrushchev considers economic integration and planned diversification a basis for greater political unity of the bloc.

Satellite heavy industry is increasingly dependent upon delivery of Soviet industrial raw materials, for which Moscow in turn receives manufactured goods. The USSR determines prices for both, thus maintaining a strangle hold on economic growth and living standards of the captive nations. Soviet exploitation continues, though less drastically than under Stalin, and it varies in each satellite country. Growth and diversification of satellite industries, and the increase of their trade with Asian, African, and Latin-American countries, might bolster national feeling in the satellite states and in the long run prove useful to some of them. For the time being, the Soviet Union directs their industrial and commercial expansion which serves primarily the realization of world-wide Soviet objectives. Some satellites, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have established large over-

seas trade relations and play a major role in Moscow's assistance program for strategically important, underdeveloped countries. In recent years, the Kremlin has often paid them world market prices for their products.

These developments have an important long-range effect on relations between Western and Eastern Europe. Even if Russian political control should disappear overnight, patterns of economic relations between an industrialized East Central Europe and Western Europe would differ greatly from those that existed before the Second World War. The success of the European Economic Community, the preferential system of the free trade area, and a possible blending of the two groups show the future trend in Western Europe. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe remains the only international forum wherein the Eastern and Western European states meet and on occasion achieve a degree of co-operation, mainly in technical matters.

Soviet military and economic power remains the key to intrabloc relations. China and most of the East Central European satellites depend on Soviet raw materials, industrial equipment and technological skills. Therefore, it is conceivable that changes in leadership of the Chinese or Russian communist parties could temporarily mend the split in the communist bloc. But even a re-established unity would not be the same as it was in Stalin's time. The days of a centrally directed communist empire are gone.

THE CURTAIN AND THE WALL

Ever since the Soviet Army occupied East Central Europe and imposed communist regimes on the satellite nations, this area has had a dual significance. Soviet domination and exploitation of East Central Europe constitute a great threat to the security of the Western world, but at the same time the area is a showcase of weaknesses of the Soviet system. This duality has remained one of the major characteristics of Eastern Europe despite many changes since Stalin's death.

A factor of world-wide importance is that the East Central European nations belong to the Western and Mediterranean cultural community, and according to much evidence their allegiance has not changed. Demonstrations in Czechoslovakia and riots in East Ger-

many in 1953, and the ferment of 1956 throughout the bloc (particularly the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution), proved that communist rule is maintained not by popular support, not by devotion to an ideology, not even by political police, but by the Soviet Army. Stalin reminded Tito in 1948 that without victory of the Soviet Army, people's democracies could not have been established in East Central Europe. The history of the postwar years proves his allegation.

Amidst many domestic and foreign political changes in the Soviet bloc, the most permanent feature of the system has remained the Iron Curtain, which has put entire nations behind bars. On August 13, 1961, the erection of a wall between East and West Berlin blocked the last avenue of escape. The value of liberty has seldom been shown more clearly than by the difference between life on the two sides of the Wall. The Curtain, and especially the ugly Wall in the heart of the divided metropolis, demonstrate that Soviet rule means captivity. Without the Curtain and the Wall people would run away from the communist paradise since they cannot change the system imposed on them by a foreign power.

The Curtain between the Soviet bloc and neighboring states is a symbol of the dual nature of the communist system. It is a source of communist strength because people who cannot escape are losing hope and can be more easily manipulated. But the Curtain and the Wall are monuments to the weakness of the communist system: barbed wire, watch towers, machine guns and mined strips keep the "happy people" from getting out; Turkish sultans never so isolated the territories they conquered as have the Red czars. Until 1956 fear existed that the new generation would be lost to the free world. Events in Poland and Hungary prove freedom the strongest aspiration of people on all continents. Although the new states in Asia and Africa have concentrated on their own problems, they cannot close their eyes and they are bound to see the Curtain and the Wall. After acquiring freedom, they would not care to lose it. From a long-range point of view, the Curtain and the Wall are the best deterrents to communism for developing nations searching for a political model.

ATTITUDE OF THE WEST, AND
THE NEUTRALIST NATIONS

The mass exodus from the people's democracies whenever possible demonstrates the East Central European feeling toward the communist regimes. Approximately 3,000,000 East Germans have fled their homes since 1949; almost 200,000 Hungarians escaped immediately after the 1956 revolt. These mass flights are "plebiscites with feet." But not everyone can or should escape. Emigration is no solution to the problems of the small East Central European nations, and could even bring disaster. Many unsung heroes remain at home and serve their nations under adverse conditions.

In recent years the Kremlin has realized that communist policies could not easily change a centuries-old spirit and tradition. The weaknesses of communism have led Soviet policy to attempt a spheres-of-influence agreement with the United States that would constitute a formal Western recognition of Moscow's hegemony over the East Central European area. The West, Khrushchev has contended, must forget about the possibility of reconverting the people's democracies of East Europe to capitalism. "What is lost, is lost," he said.

Can the West do anything? Indeed it can. Its diplomacy can be helpful; in many ways it can influence the future. The first requirement is realism. Unless civilization is to be swept away in a thermonuclear holocaust, some intercourse necessarily will continue between communist and noncommunist states. Contacts take place through (1) traditional diplomacy on the ambassadorial level; (2) international conferences of specialists, foreign ministers, and heads of state; (3) public diplomacy in the United Nations; (4) functional international organizations of governmental or private character, such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the International Labor Organization, and the International Parliamentary Union; (5) cultural exchanges. In most of these contacts the West is at disadvantage because its representatives incline toward traditional diplomacy, whereas the communists do not play the game by rules of bygone times. Although there have been important changes in communist policy since Stalin's death, the basic communist doctrine remains hostile. Diplomacy geared to orderly international intercourse does not obtain. Lenin's philosophy rejects those moral principles which

are necessary for a co-operative society of states. To the communists, diplomacy is a weapon of the cold war; international organizations and conferences are sounding boards for propaganda. Deceit is the method of communist diplomacy. Communist representatives do not hesitate to pursue contradictory policies simultaneously in various parts of the world or to reverse themselves during successive sessions of the same conference.

If communist diplomacy is free of moral restraint and employs a logic of its own, Western diplomacy remains bound by fundamental principles which should not be abandoned. Even so, Western traditions should not prevent fighting fire with fire in the field of public diplomacy, exposing communist duplicity. The ugly features and contradictions of communist policies are not highlighted to the world frequently and loudly enough. Khrushchev's contradictory promises or his outright lies seldom have been challenged through a united Western voice. The West achieves unity in military affairs more easily than in political. Western propaganda has not been co-ordinated. On proper occasions noncommunist states could raise many questions. Since the USSR is one of the world's strongest powers, why is it necessary to raise a six-thousand-mile-long iron curtain along its boundaries and along the frontiers of its satellite states and their neighbors? Since the Soviet Union boasts short and intermediate range, as well as intercontinental, ballistic missiles, why must satellite countries be subjugated militarily and kept under strict police control? If the African and Asian nations are entitled to self-determination, why is the same right denied the East Central European states? If communism is the best political and social system, why is an entirely free intellectual give-and-take between communist-dominated countries and the rest of the world prohibited? Such questions expose the double standard which underlies communist policy. The West has been excluded from the communist area, but the USSR demands a free hand in the rest of the world. Communist emissaries move outside the bloc and communist parties in many countries agitate against national governments, but comparable situations do not exist in communist countries.

Force is the major instrument of communist policy, and the West should point this out. In its manifestoes the USSR does not question the principle of national self-determination and the right of all peoples to fundamental freedoms. Stalin signed the Atlantic Charter

and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Khrushchev propagandizes against imperialism and colonialism. Soviet spokesmen repeatedly declare that every people has the right to live as it wants, and no state has the right to impose its way of life on other peoples. Despite such statements, the Baltic states were annexed by the USSR and communist governments were imposed on East Central Europe. After 1948 the Soviet regime and its supporters resorted to ruthless political propaganda and economic warfare against Yugoslavia for having asserted its local brand of communism. Having installed a communist regime in North Korea, Moscow supported that country's aggression against South Korea. Soviet tanks quelled the uprising in East Germany in June 1953. Khrushchev threatened to use the Soviet Army against the Poles in October 1956, and a few days later did use it to suppress Hungarian freedom. These records should be told whenever Soviet leaders decry imperialism and colonialism while limiting application of their principle of national self-determination to Africa and Asia. To Africans and Asians the Soviet Union presents itself as a benevolent and progressive power advocating national independence and "revolutionary" social change—change which it hopes under Muscovite direction will lead to the establishment of communist regimes.

National self-determination for the East Central Europeans must not be abandoned. But under existing world political conditions this remains a long-range goal which cannot be attained without a fundamental change in Soviet policies. The contest between the communist and noncommunist states will last for many years. But during this period the West might influence development within the Soviet orbit. Western unity and over-all strength coupled with political determination is a primary condition for a policy which might influence Soviet attitudes. Further political and economic integration in the North Atlantic area is particularly important. This powerhouse of the world will foster freedom everywhere.

Cultural diplomacy is not to be neglected. Cultural exchanges may have important long-range effects. Agreements for exhibitions and reciprocal exchange of scholars, students, and artists can be useful. Were most of the Western states to follow a purposeful policy in this respect, freer communication of ideas between East Central Europe and the West might follow. In the general area of cultural diplomacy the high standards and reliability of Western broadcasts to Soviet

bloc countries are of utmost importance. The oppressed people are most interested in Western achievements. Cultural diplomacy also may have short-range effects. Khrushchev offered a free competition of ideas during his memorable debate with Vice President Nixon in Moscow. Although his proposal did not change the Soviet system of thought control, cultural exchanges between the West and the USSR and some satellites increased. The West of course should consider the potentialities of cultural diplomacy without illusion, for the possibilities of influencing public opinion in totalitarian states with their elaborate system of thought control are limited. Moreover, Western precautions are necessary because true reciprocity in cultural contacts is not welcomed by communist states. The Soviet Union supports mainly those cultural exchanges which inflate its prestige or promote specific interests in scientific, technical, and industrial fields. Perhaps the Polish model offers the best guide for a Western cultural offensive. Poland is the only country in the Soviet bloc where Western books, scholarly periodicals, and sometimes even newspapers are not entirely outside the reach of the average man. The Gomulka regime maintains a relatively liberal cultural intercourse with the West. Western diplomacy should seek similar conditions in the other satellite states. The satellite nations' Western spiritual and intellectual heritage should thus be nurtured rather than allowed to wither away. Preservation of national cultures of the East Central European peoples, and maintenance of their ties to the West, should be important objectives of Western diplomacy. The West should try to have as many cultural links as possible with them.

The satellites also can serve as "transmission belts" between the West and the USSR. At present several thousand students from satellite countries are in the Soviet Union—students who exchange ideas with their Soviet colleagues. During the Hungarian Revolution, Polish students and newspapers were the chief sources of information at the universities of Moscow and Leningrad. The ways of history are strange. If satellite nations can exert some Westernizing influence on the USSR, their present ordeal may serve a larger purpose. Cultural exchanges may open more windows between communist and non-communist worlds, and prepare for a better future when ideology and the underlying political assumptions will not place almost insurmountable difficulties between states.

In a communist dictatorship the possibility of reverting to Stalinist

rigidity does exist, but intellectual developments could eventually influence the nature of the regime; and changes may reach a point of no return. True liberalization of the intellectual life makes reversals almost impossible, and from the point of view of intellectual developments, cultural exchanges between communist and noncommunist states may have decisive importance in the nuclear age. As the Western nations have ability to provide a better future for mankind, they certainly have no reason to fear an intellectual debate.

East Central Europe, we might conclude, is a symbol that the West and the uncommitted nations should not forget. Freedom cannot be isolated geographically. In the jet and missile age mankind cannot forever live half-slave and half-free. The problems of Eastern Europe involve all of Europe and indeed mankind. If subjugation of a hundred million people is approved by silence, similar conditions can be instituted elsewhere. The neutral nations bear a definite responsibility for the fate of East Central Europe. Open employment of the double standard by the so-called neutralist bloc at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961 was indeed a disservice to freedom. During public debates on imperialism no delegate mentioned Soviet oppression of East Central Europe: the final declaration of the Conference denounced "colonial occupation" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; but ignored regimes imposed on the East Central European countries by the Soviet Union. The declaration called for abolition of all foreign military bases, mentioning the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but made no reference to stationing of Soviet troops in the captive countries. It is true that participating countries expressed their "determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty." This nebulous text might have been applied to the East Central European situation, but to the knowledge of this writer no delegate expressed such an opinion during the Conference. From the public debates of the Conference it would appear that the non-aligned nations have forgotten General Assembly resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for armed intervention in Hungary and calling upon the Soviet government to withdraw its forces and permit political independence of the Hungarian nation. If positive neutralism and non-alignment are phenomena of our time,

in reality such slogans often cover political opportunism. Members of the neutralist bloc often repeat slogans of Soviet propaganda and support Soviet policies. They are not influenced by political morality and United Nations resolutions unless their interests are directly involved.

Employment of a double standard by a large number of states in the United Nations is the surest way to doom the world organization. As long as the world acquiesces in the political conditions imposed on East Central Europe by a foreign power, the United Nations is no forum of free nations as conceived by Western leaders. The West's silence is unwise and the uncommitted nations are mistaken if they condone Soviet duplicity in matters of national self-determination, fundamental freedom, and human liberty.

Unfavorable events in world politics, intimidation, and suffering have not extinguished national genius in East Central Europe. Embers glow under the ashes. We are entitled, then, to hope that when the wind of history eventually blows the ashes away, the nations of the area will resume their political membership in the European family of nations, perhaps within the framework of a United States of Europe.

PART ONE
INTERNAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND
FOREIGN RELATIONS



2: BALTIC STATES

Karlis Kalnins

De-Stalinization, initiated by Khrushchev three years after the death of Stalin, came not from a change of heart but from sheer opportunism. It was a shrewd tactical move. Stalinism had evolved into a thorny one-way road to bondage. Khrushchev denounced the builder of the road. He did not denounce the road itself. Condemning Stalin for some of his crimes and the cult of his personality, Khrushchev later commended Stalin for devotion to the cause of Marxism-Leninism.¹ In a number of statements Khrushchev has insisted upon the inevitability of the triumph of communism over the free world and upon his determination to bring it about. In the present strategic phase, he has switched the emphasis from shooting war to the battlefields of political and economic warfare.²

This change naturally affects the three Soviet-annexed Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Having to toil for communist construction, they are used as instruments for Soviet policy. Maintenance of their oppressed condition negates the general opinion about liberalization of the Soviet regime in the USSR, of which they are a part.

¹ See Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Za Prochnyy Mir i Mirnoye Sosushchestvovaniye* (For a Stable Peace and Peaceful Coexistence) (Moscow, 1958), pp. 13, 21. Hereafter cited: Khrushchev, *Za Prochnyy Mir* . . .

² "We are sure that the more progressive socialist system will win. The future belongs to our socialist system. Capitalism is on the downgrade, it is declining, although this does not mean that it is already prostrate and that it has turned up its toes. Much has still to be done to bring it to that state. But it is inevitable, just as inevitable as the death of a living body or plant after a definite period of development . . .

" . . . We shall not foist our socialist system on other countries by force of arms. We are against interference in any country in the domestic affairs of other countries. We are attacking capitalism from the flanks, from economic positions, from the positions of the advantages of our system. This will make certain the triumph of the working class, the triumph of communism." Nikita S. Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* (New York, 1960), pp. 311-13.

For the free world the Baltic republics may serve as a touchstone for Soviet sincerity. Soviet treatment of these non-Russian peoples exposes the discrepancy between Soviet words and actions, providing a key for understanding Soviet tactical moves in the international arena.

LIBERALIZATION: A PRETENSE

Since rising to power Khrushchev has introduced a number of changes in the USSR, most of them intended to improve the Soviet economic machinery. To further this purpose, there have been some improvements in the living conditions of the population. Another move towards liberalization in the USSR has been the much publicized reform of criminal law, a pretense of a greater concern for individual liberty. A new code was enacted at the end of December 1958.³ Soviet criminal law is in essence federal law, although it is included in the criminal codes of the individual Soviet Union republics. Crimes against the state and military crimes continue to be regulated by federal laws of the USSR.⁴ The change in criminal law has not helped people in the Baltic republics. Contrary to general provisions of the new law stipulating that penalties are to be imposed only by a court, the practice of certain Soviet authorities of imposing punishments—formally considered not to be penalties—outside the court has remained unchanged. In 1957 a law was enacted against so-called parasites in Latvia. According to this law, persons indulging in a parasitic way of life and living on income not earned by work may be deported and even subjected to forced labor for a term of from two to five years by simple decision of a meeting of their neighbors. A similar decree was enacted in Lithuania in May 1961.⁵ As before, activities which have a tinge of social danger are considered crimes and are defined as dangerous to Soviet public order. For instance, flight abroad, or refusal to return to the USSR, under aggravating circumstances may still be punishable by death.⁶

³ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Monitor of the USSR Supreme Council), 1 (January 1959), 22-76. Hereafter cited: *Vedomosti*.

⁴ Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, "Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union," *Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid Europe* (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.), VII, 1 (January 1959), 3. Hereafter cited: *Highlights*.

⁵ *Cina* (Struggle), October 15, 1957; *Sovetskaya Litva*, May 28, 1961.

⁶ *Vedomosti*, p. 37.

The powers of the apparent successor to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), the State Security Committee (KGB), have not as yet been defined.⁷ The right of the MVD to exile persons considered "socially dangerous," or expel them or confine them in a camp of corrective labor for up to five years, has not been either explicitly or implicitly revoked. According to new legislation, confinement is either in a prison or a colony of correctional labor, which evidently takes the place of the old-time labor camp.⁸

The "anti-parasitic" laws exist in various Soviet republics; enactment of a new anti-parasitic law for the Kirghiz republic took place on January 15, 1959, and in Belorussia and the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic⁹ in May 1961, in direct contradiction to the liberalization slogan.

Meanwhile there was delay in applying the new criminal codes to the Baltic republics. Drafts of these codes had been severely criticized by USSR legal scholars for deviations from basic criminal law. Only in January 1961 were the revised codes promulgated in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The concept of class justice in all countries within the Soviet orbit has replaced the dominating principle cherished by all Western democracies, equal justice under law. This class idea of socialist legality is particularly discriminating in cases involving Communist Party members. Exacting toward the nonparty population, Soviet justice is lenient to criminal deeds of communists; often they are exempt from jurisdiction of the courts.¹⁰ This leniency spreads corruption among party circles in the Baltic republics. The secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, O. Merimaa, writing in the party's periodical *Eesti Kommunist*, had to admit that

scoundrels, blackmarketers, corrupt elements, and persons of similarly low character have been appointed to positions involving great economic responsibilities. These comrades have embezzled large quantities of commodities, particularly textiles, which they have

⁷ Gsovski, *Highlights*, VII, 1 (January 1959), 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁹ Gsovski, *Highlights*, VII, 5-6 (May-June 1959), 229; *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, May 16, 1961.

¹⁰ Compare Dr. Domas Krivickas, "Illustrations on the Rule of Law in Lithuania," *Highlights*, VI, 5-6 (1958), 193-204; Dr. Armins Ruis, "Law Enforcement," *Highlights*, VI, 7-8 (1958), 273-87.

sent to external markets. By these transactions they have made profits amounting to hundreds of thousands of rubles. . . .¹¹

For similar large-scale embezzlements and blackmarket operations, or other crimes, nonparty persons are condemned to death, while party members generally get by with reprimands, demotions, or reassignments to other jobs, occasionally even to better ones. Engineer Vasilii Kuleshov, instead of being penalized for assault and battery of the director of a Tallinn brewery where he worked, was promoted and nominated director of a brewery in Valga.¹² The director of the restaurant trust, Alsia, fired for various transgressions, was appointed director of the Lithuanian supply organization in Klaypeda. The chief of supply for the fishing vessel *Sovetskaya Arktika*, Comrade Fridlib, "who had squandered not a little of state funds," was appointed deputy chief of the base of the herring fishing fleet.¹³

How "lenient" the Soviet colonial masters are to noncommunists appears from a news story published by the *New York Times* on June 16, 1961. The story, headlined "Latvian Reported Held; Soviets Said to Jail Former Leader over Memoirs," reads:

Dr. Frīdrihs Menders, labor leader and legislator during the period of Latvian independence, has been arrested, according to a report from Riga. . . . Dr. Menders was for many years president of the Social Democratic Labor party of Latvia. The Baltic country was overrun by the Soviet Union in 1940. The Soviet Secret Police are reported to have searched Dr. Menders' home in Riga and found a manuscript of his memoirs. On the basis of these memoirs, it is understood, he was indicted and is to be tried by a Soviet court. Dr. Menders is 76 years old and suffers from heart trouble. In 1948 he was sentenced to a forced-labor camp. In 1955 after Stalin's death, he was released.

In addition to supposed liberalization of criminal codes throughout the USSR—a move calculated to make de-Stalinization more popular to Russian citizens—there were other moves by the Khrushchev regime, likewise more verbal than actual, such as decentraliza-

¹¹ O. Merimaa, "Parteitoo Parandamisega Tagame EKP X Kongressi Otsuste Elluviimise" (Improving of Party Work Insures Realization of the Resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the Estonian Communist Party), *Eesti Kommunist*, no. 3 (March 1958), p. 8.

¹² *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, October 13, 1955.

¹³ *Sovetskaya Litva*, August 4, 1959.

tion of economic control. On May 10, 1957, the USSR Supreme Council adopted the Law About Further Improvement of the Organization of the Administration of Industry and Construction.¹⁴ The earlier administration and planning of the USSR national economy through the respective ministries in Moscow gave way to the territorial-administrative principle. One hundred and four economic-administrative regions were established, supervised by the Councils of National Economy. In the majority of the Union Republics, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, economic regions coincide with the existing state and administrative borders, except the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakh and Uzbek SSR, each of which consists of several economic regions. The purpose of the reform has been to effect better exploitation of the natural and economic resources of individual regions, with hope of steady increase of labor productivity; the main characteristics of regions are to be specialization and the development of their economies.¹⁵

Still, economic regions have remained parts of the USSR national economy. The new law stipulates that the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) is empowered to guide the most important branches of the national economy, to elaborate plans for material and technological supplies to the national economy, and to exercise control. The new economic order has increased responsibilities of the local regional administrative organs for meeting production targets assigned by Gosplan and the central committee of the party, but local interests of the economic regions, or interests of even the Union republics, remain subordinate to plans for the communist construction of the USSR.

It does no good for individual party members to oppose the democratic centralism of decentralization. The deputy premier of Soviet Latvia, Eduards K. Berkļavs, was fired in August 1959 for committing the error of placing "narrow national interests" above those of the Soviet Union. Writing in the August 1959 issue of the Soviet ideological periodical *Party Life*, Soviet Latvian Prime Minister Vilis Lacis disclosed that "former deputy prime minister Berkļavs stood up openly against the general party line, directed toward the development of heavy industry." Lacis wrote,

¹⁴ *Vedomosti*, 11 (May 23, 1957), 341-46.

¹⁵ Compare Vasilij M. Kostennikov, *Ekonomicheskiye Rayony SSSR* (Economic Regions of the USSR) (Moscow, 1958), pp. 4-5.

Berkļavs opposed expanding production of railroad cars and diesel engines in Latvia, insisting that capital investments should rather be increased in consumer goods industries. Moreover, Berkļavs proposed distribution of locally manufactured goods primarily within the Latvian Republic. These proposals meant in essence nothing but a striving toward autocracy and nationalistic tendencies. Thus harm would have been brought to the general interests of the Soviet Union and likewise to the interests of the Latvian people.¹⁶

Soviet standards and norms established by central authorities are enforced all over the Soviet Union. The Soviet *Izvestiya* reveals that "petty tutelage" goes even so far as to compel Lithuanians to pack cigarettes with two sheets of paper instead of one, to print labels for food products in two lines instead of one. Lithuanian restaurants are prohibited from including in their menus national Lithuanian dishes, because it would be against Soviet standards. Lithuanian kolkhozniks are deprived of a premium for delivery of sugar beets prior to September 15 of each year, in force all over the Soviet Union, because annual harvesting of sugar beets in Lithuania never starts before September 25.¹⁷

The development of the local administration in the Baltic republics was, however, opposite to that of the economic administration. In 1959, the number of rural administrative units (rayons) was considerably reduced: from 39 to 26 in Estonia, from 56 to 40 in Latvia and from 83 to 63 in Lithuania.¹⁸ The control of the party organization over the farming population was tightened.

Another aspect of de-Stalinization is "civic" activities. Efforts of the Communist Party to develop activities of the so-called civic organizations, as exponents of the Soviet democracy, have extended to the Baltic republics. Voluntary people's squads, or "peoples' militia," organized for protection of the population from antisocial elements, and "Comrades' Courts," established for maintenance of discipline and legality in Soviet enterprises and institutions, are two examples of such civic activities. At present there are over 1,500

¹⁶ Vilis Lacis, "Beneficial Reforms," *Partiynaya Zhizn*, 16 (August 1959), 14-21.

¹⁷ *Izvestiya*, October 6, 1956.

¹⁸ *Vedomosti*, 6 (February 5, 1959), 156-58; 46 (November 19, 1959), 595-96; 49 (December 10, 1959), 637-38.

peoples' squads in Lithuania and about 1,200 similar squads and 840 Comrades' Courts in Latvia.¹⁹

Through civic organizations the Party is able to exercise a more rigid control over the population. All activities of the civic organizations are guided by party organizations, trade unions, and the Komsomol. At the same time the Party diverts responsibilities for abuses and discriminations from the party to the civic organizations. With adoption of the Law About the Increase of the Role of the Society in the Struggle against the Transgression of Soviet Legality, and of the Norms of Socialist Intercourse, which is currently under discussion, the practice of civic organizations acting against criminality and transgression of the social order will be formally legalized.²⁰

Under rule by the USSR, and despite the promises of de-Stalinization, there has been a new procedure to cover the needs for manpower in the underdeveloped regions of the USSR, namely, that of "voluntary" exile. Mass deportations of Baltic nationals, practiced extensively in the 1940s, have been discontinued by the Soviet administration. But the Soviet Union republics have to supply the needed labor force on the basis of quotas fixed by the party. This new system has found extensive application in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The first secretary of the Communist Party in Estonia has reported at a party meeting that

over 1,000 youths, boys and girls, left Estonia to work in the construction of the Urals and in the mines of the Donets Coal Region. In the last two months, over 4,000 Komsomol members and youths have participated in the grain harvesting in Kazakhstan. . . .²¹

The Soviet Latvian school periodical *Padomju Latvijas Skola* also reported that in 1958 "four thousand youths from our republic proceeded to the virgin land areas."²² The Soviet *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* reported that "the patriots of Latvia" left also in 1959 for Kazakhstan.²³ Baltic youths drafted to complete their military service are not allowed to join Soviet military units stationed in the Baltic

¹⁹ *Sovetskaya Litva*, January 9, 1960; *Sovetskaya Latvija*, January 9, 1960.

²⁰ *Sovetskaya Litva*, January 9, 1960.

²¹ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, January 29, 1958.

²² Quoted from Karlis Dzilleja, "New Soviet School Law," *The Baltic Review* (New York), 16 (April 1956), 16.

²³ *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, August 2, 1959.

republics, but have to undergo military training outside their native countries.

The Communist Party exercises an absolute control and assumes undisputed guidance not only of economic but of cultural and educational fields as well. Libertarian attempts to put more emphasis on nationalist characteristics of the Baltic peoples, in literature, music, and fine arts, made shortly after the demotion of Stalin, were short-lived. The Party unhesitatingly re-established the old ideological line. In the words of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, Ivan G. Kebin,

Creative activities in the domain of literature and fine arts must be permeated with the spirit of the fight for communism. The party's leadership in literature and fine arts is one of the most important conditions for their further development.²⁴

The educational system in the USSR, including the Baltic republics, is likewise based on the ideological foundations of Marxism-Leninism. Schools have to produce builders of communism. The Soviet Latvian newspaper *Sovetskaya Latvija* states in an editorial that "the schools must educate our younger generation in the spirit of fierce Soviet patriotism, selfless loyalty to the Communist Party and the Soviet government."²⁵ In the Soviet educational system a new law obliges youths, aged 15 to 16, "to participate in socially useful work." They have to work in agriculture or industry before being allowed to study at the higher educational institutions of the USSR.²⁶ In addition, a written recommendation by some party organization is indispensable. This Soviet line rejects the Western idea of education directed to the full development of the human personality and to strengthening human rights and freedom.

In the new world of the Soviets, Russification is the order of the day. After the planned takeover of the world, the Russian language should become the universal communist language. Preliminary work in Russification has also been initiated in the Baltic republics. It finds expression in Russification of schools and languages and in Russification of the administrative apparatus and the territories. Educational work in the Baltic republics is being directed by Moscow.

²⁴ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, January 29, 1958.

²⁵ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, September 1, 1955.

²⁶ *Vedomosti*, 1 (January 1, 1959), 13.

Heads of the Latvian pedagogical institutes are Russian. Over 90 per cent of the authors of special textbooks for the Latvian schools are Russians. Translations from Russian literature and propaganda articles are being used as materials for teaching the Latvian language. Russian in the Latvian schools has become compulsory. Without knowledge of it, students are not able to succeed in their studies at the universities.²⁷

The Soviet Lithuanian periodical *Literatura i Menas* insists that

the Russian language has had and still has a great importance for development of all languages in the Soviet Union. As a result, many new words have been introduced into the Lithuanian language. The majority of them came in under the influence and on the pattern of the great Russian language. The Lithuanian language acquired a new richness through introduction of these words, or through lending of new meaning to old words.²⁸

According to the periodical, *The Baltic Review*, the Experimental-Scientific Institute in Moscow has designed a new Lithuanian alphabet in which Latin letters have been changed to Cyrillic letters. This change is to become effective by 1965.²⁹

Russification means not merely changes in education and language, but in religion. Religious education by churches remains forbidden. Publication of religious literature is not allowed. As a substitute for church ceremonies, attempts now are being made by the Party to arrange communist-style ceremonies for baptisms, youth confirmations, weddings, funerals, and memorial services in cemeteries. Anti-religious propaganda has been stepped up, its purpose being "to accelerate the process of destruction of the religious ideology."³⁰ In Estonia alone some 1,407 atheistic lectures were delivered in 1958, as compared to 273 lectures in 1956.³¹

Russification of the political and administrative machinery in the Baltic republics, particularly after the futile attempts of a number of "national" Baltic communists to stand against this process, has increased rapidly. The Party is the omnipotent political, legislative,

²⁷ Karlis Dzilleja, "Schools and Educational Standards in Occupied Latvia," *The Baltic Review*, 14 (August 1958), 12-15.

²⁸ *Literatura i Menas* (Literature and Arts), January 14, 1956.

²⁹ "New Russification Drive in Captive Lithuania," *The Baltic Review*, 17 (July 1959), 46.

³⁰ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, August 11, 1959.

³¹ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, March 6, 1959.

and governing force all over the USSR, including the Baltic republics. The majority of members of the Baltic communist parties are Russian.³² They dominate all Baltic party conferences.

Even to the USSR parliament, the Supreme Soviet, the Baltic peoples must send as their national representatives Soviet Russians or citizens of other republics. During the 1958 oblast elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Latvia, as "an equally rightful sovereign socialist state,"³³ elected from its quota of seven deputies two such "Latvians" as the well-known Russian writer Ilya Ehrenburg and Soviet Army Marshal Bagramyan, a native of Armenia. Of their quota of ten deputies the Lithuanians elected two top Soviet military men: Marshal of Aviation Zhigarev and Army Major General Lyadis. All four of the Estonian deputies were high-ranking Communist Party officials of Russian-Estonian origin.³⁴

The USSR census of 1959 for the first time officially reveals population shifts in the Baltic republics, showing the extent of Russification in the Baltic area. According to data published by the Soviet *Pravda*, the ethnic Baltic population in all three Baltic countries has decreased, and that of Russians has increased. Of a total of 2,093,000 inhabitants, Latvia now has only 1,298,000 Latvians (or 62 per cent); the number of Russians shows an increase from 206,499 (1935 census) to 556,000—or from 10.5 to 26.6 per cent; in addition there are in Latvia 61,000 Belorussians (2.9 per cent), 60,000 Poles (2.9 per cent), 37,000 Jews (1.7 per cent), 32,000 Lithuanians (1.5 per cent) and 29,000 Ukrainians (1.4 per cent).

Lithuania now has 2,711,000 inhabitants, of which 2,151,000 are Lithuanians (79.3 per cent), 231,000 Russians (8.5 per cent), 230,000 Poles (8.5 per cent), 30,000 Belorussians (1.1 per cent), 25,000 Jews (0.9 per cent) and 18,000 Ukrainians (0.7 per cent).

There are in Estonia 1,197,000 inhabitants, of which 873,000 (72.9 per cent) are Estonians, 260,000 (21.7 per cent) Russians, 17,000 (1.4 per cent) Finns, 16,000 (1.3 per cent) Ukrainians, 11,000 (0.9 per cent) Belorussians and 5,000 (0.5 per cent) Jews.

In all of the USSR there are 2,326,000 Lithuanians, 1,400,000 Latvians, and 969,000 Estonians.³⁵ Consequently 175,000 Lithuanians,

³² U.S. Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, *The Crimes of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C., 1959), Part 4, p. 11.

³³ *Sovetskaya Litviya*, January 10, 1959.

³⁴ *Sovetskaya Litva*, March 20, 1959.

³⁵ *Pravda*, February 4, 1960.

102,000 Latvians and 96,000 Estonians live outside their homeland, the majority of whom, it is to be assumed, have survived the mass deportations of the 1940s.

The influx of Russians into the Baltic republics, particularly into Latvia and Estonia, is due not only to political but also military reasons. Russian troops and security police forces are stationed in all three Baltic countries. Their strength, according to estimates, is about 250,000-300,000. The Soviets have turned the Baltic coast into a strategic stronghold. The entire Baltic coast has been lined with fortifications. The territory of the Baltic area is covered with many military airfields. Ports serve as bases for the Soviet Navy. Almost every town has a Soviet garrison. Radar stations have been installed along the Baltic coast together with launching sites for missiles, and the majority of missile sites are on Estonian islands.³⁶

THE BALTIC STATES AND SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE

It was only to be expected that the Baltic states after 1940 would be incapable of maintaining a separate existence, least of all in their economic organization. Immediately after their annexation, the Baltic states passed into the Soviet political, administrative, social, and economic system. Industrialization, with preferential development of heavy industry, was imposed on them. Agriculture, the leading branch of their national economy and the main source of national income, became of secondary importance. Since then all the activities of the Baltic republics have been subordinated to ambitious Soviet plans for European and world communism.

There followed a considerable industrialization. According to Soviet data, between 1940 and 1959 the volume of industrial production in Latvia rose 9.7 times, in Lithuania 9.1 times, and in Estonia 10 times.³⁷ By 1959 industrial equipment in Latvia had increased 1300 per cent.³⁸ Lithuania, which previously had no heavy machine-building, pro-

³⁶ "Baltic Blackout," *The Baltic Review*, 2-3 (June 1954), 11; "The Politics of the Baltic States, Winter 1956—The Government vs. the People," *ibid.*, 9 (December 1956), 4-5; Dr. Konstantinas Rackauskas, "The Political Status of the Baltic Sea and Peace in Northern Europe," *ibid.*, 15 (December 1958), 78-80.

³⁷ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 Godu, Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik* (National Economy of the USSR in 1959, Statistical Yearbook) (Moscow, 1960), p. 148. Hereafter cited: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1959.

³⁸ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, January 31, 1959.

duced 8,468 metal-cutting tools in the year 1959 alone.³⁹ Estonia, in addition to development of machine-building and metalworking industries, increased output of oil shale from 941,000 tons in 1940 to 9,091,000 tons in 1959.⁴⁰

The current Seven Year Plan (1959-1965) contains fixed and rigid production assignments for the Baltic republics. It provides for accelerated development of Soviet industry. This plan covers the decisive phase in the projected 15-year period during which the industrialization process in the USSR should be completed. Capital investment in the national economy of Latvia will total 10.8 billion rubles; in Lithuania, 12.5 billion rubles; and in Estonia, 8.1 billion rubles. These figures are double the amount of investment in the preceding seven years, 1952-1958. Industrial production in Lithuania will rise 80 per cent (that of machine-building alone, 160 per cent); in Latvia, 60 per cent (machine-building over 100 per cent); and in Estonia, 80 per cent (machine-building 130 per cent).⁴¹

A campaign for meeting the Seven Year Plan ahead of schedule has been initiated in the USSR, including the Baltic republics. Lithuania, according to the chairman of the Lithuanian State Planning Commission, Aleksandras Drobnis, plans to fulfill the 1965 targets in 1964. In Drobnis' words, "The decisive condition for successful development of all the industrial branches is further technological progress, complex mechanization and automation of production, substitution of new equipment for old." In the case of Lithuania this condition requires from the Lithuanian Council of National Economy introduction of 230 continuously operating and conveying lines; 1,200 complex machines; about 100 automatic and semiautomatic lines; about 600 automatic and semiautomatic machines; and 200 installations for automatic control of production processes.⁴² In Latvia one third of the industrial equipment must be replaced by modern and more productive technology.⁴³

³⁹ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1959, p. 212.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 191

⁴¹ *Pravda*, February 8, 1959.

⁴² A. Drobnis, "Development of the National Economy of Lithuanian SSR," *Planovoye Khozyaystvo* (Planned Economy), no. 12 (December 1959), pp. 59-65

⁴³ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, January 24, 1959.

Meanwhile there must be changes in Baltic agriculture, since agriculture has failed to keep pace with industry. The collectivized farming population of the Baltic republics is being constantly reminded about the advantages of extensive socialist agriculture and about its steady progress. Statistical data belie these statements. The *Statistical Yearbook of the USSR* for 1959 discloses that under the Soviet regime the cultivated areas of grain crops in the three Baltic republics decreased from 3,342,000 hectares in 1940 to 1,868,000 hectares in 1959. Those of flax decreased from 181,000 hectares to 97,000 hectares. The area under potatoes, however, showed increase from 432,000 to 486,000 hectares.⁴⁴

At the same time, the harvested grain crops in tons decreased from 3,563,000 to 1,941,000, those of flax from 55,000 to 20,000 and potato crops from 6,042,000 to 5,952,000,⁴⁵ despite the larger area.

The number of milch cows decreased greatly, from 1,981,000 in 1941 to 1,516,000; in 1959; of sheep and goats from 1,565,000 to 1,259,000; and of horses from 1,142,000 to 507,000. Only the number

⁴⁴ *Cultivated Areas* (in 1,000 hectares)

	<i>Grain crops</i>		<i>Potatoes</i>		<i>Flax</i>	
	1940	1959	1940	1959	1940	1959
Lithuania	1638	1032	210	228	96	60
Latvia	1132	557	139	160	59	29
Estonia	572	279	83	98	26	8
Baltic Republics	3342	1868	432	486	181	97

Narodnoye Khozyaystvo, 1959, pp. 335, 343, 345

⁴⁵ *Gross Harvests* (in 1,000 tons)

	<i>Grain crops</i>		<i>Potatoes</i>		<i>Flax</i>	
	1940	1959	1940	1959	1940	1959
Lithuania	1536	977	2726	2003	30	12
Latvia	1372	611	2093	2752	18	5
Estonia	655	353	1223	1197	7	3
Baltic Republics	3563	1941	6042	5952	55	20

Ibid., pp. 356, 357, 362, 364

of hogs rose, from 1,975,000 to 2,393,000.⁴⁶ Livestock figures for 1959 are compared to those for 1941, *i.e.*, to the second year of the Soviet regime in the Baltic republics. Figures of 1940 and 1941 are lower than those of 1938-1939 when the Baltic states were still independent. Thus, in 1939, for instance, the total of hogs was 2,450,800 and that of horses 1,159,200.⁴⁷

The above statistics indicate a continuous agricultural stagnation in the Soviet-occupied Baltic countries. Therefore, corresponding statistics on the yield of animal husbandry products,⁴⁸ showing an increase, cannot be taken at their face value. In its issue of February 12, 1961, the Soviet Latvian newspaper *Cina* revealed that a number of rayons in Latvia, of which seven were named, had presented "fraudulent meat production data . . . in order to create an illusion of achievements." On May 21, 1961, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree providing a maximum of three years

⁴⁶ *Livestock* (in 1,000 of heads)

	<i>Milch cows</i>		<i>Hogs</i>		<i>Sheep and goats</i>		<i>Horses</i>	
	1941	1959	1941	1959	1941	1959	1941	1959
Lithuania	782	699	1068	1210	627	444	546	258
Latvia	797	533	588	751	613	555	393	164
Estonia	402	284	319	432	325	260	203	85
Baltic Republics	1981	1516	1975	2393	1565	1259	1142	507

Ibid., pp. 386-89.

⁴⁷ *International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1940-41*, International Institute of Agriculture (Rome, 1941), pp. 142, 164.

⁴⁸ *Animal Husbandry Products* (in 1,000 tons)

	<i>Milk</i>		<i>Meat</i> (<i>Slaught. weight</i>)	
	1940	1959	1940	1959
Lithuania	1383	1587	134	198
Latvia	1537	1437	123	139
Estonia	782	813	72	89
Baltic Republics	3702	3837	329	426

Narodnoye Khozyaystvo, 1959, pp. 396, 399.

imprisonment for persons guilty of presenting rigged production figures. This decree speaks for itself.

By the end of 1959, some 18,600 fifteen-horsepower tractors were brought to Latvia, 27,900 to Lithuania and 10,800 to Estonia—together 57,300 tractors.⁴⁹ On the average a horsepower of tractor is equal to three-fourths of a horse. Thus, 57,300 fifteen-hp. tractors substituted in fact for traction power of 644,620 horses. By 1959, however, the number of horses had decreased by 652,200.

Lack of agricultural specialists in leading positions is a sore point for the Soviet administration. In 1958, in all the USSR, 93.5 per cent of kolkhoz chairmen were party members. Only half of the kolkhoz chairmen had secondary or higher education,⁵⁰ which was attained by a smaller proportion in the Baltic republics: 44 per cent in Lithuania and 40 per cent in Estonia.⁵¹ The proportion was a little higher in Latvia, namely, 51 per cent.⁵²

Soviet planning nonetheless continues to be ambitious. Control figures for the 1959-1965 Seven Year Plan call for doubling grain and potato crops in the Baltic republics and for a 75 to 100 per cent increase of milk and meat.⁵³ But following the appeal of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party to accelerate development of agriculture, the communist parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have decided to fulfill the Seven-Year-Plan assignments in four to five years.⁵⁴ At the same time the local Baltic communists recognize that without raising the low grain and fodder crops, the increase of milk and meat production is impossible.⁵⁵ In addition, the cost of grain production is excessive. According to Khrushchev, production of one metric centner of grain in the sovkhozes of Lithuania cost 89 rubles, in Latvia 87 rubles, and in Estonia 107 rubles, whereas the USSR has produced grain at a price of 40-62 rubles per centner.⁵⁶ But even imports of cheaper grain from White Russia and Kazakh-

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

⁵⁰ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSR v 1958 Godu, Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik* (National Economy of the USSR in 1958, Statistical Yearbook) (Moscow, 1959), p. 531. Hereafter cited: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1958.

⁵¹ *Sovetskaya Litva*, February 15, 1960; *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, February 17, 1960.

⁵² *Cina*, April 9, 1961.

⁵³ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1958, pp. 376, 378, 382.

⁵⁴ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, February 17, 1960; *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, January 27, 1960.

⁵⁵ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, February 17, 1960.

⁵⁶ *Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 18, 1955.

stan have so far not raised the production of socialist farms in the Baltic republics. Even sovkhoses which are considered models of agricultural efficiency work with deficits. Thus in 1955 the sovkhoses in Latvia had a deficit of 10 million rubles, double that in 1956.⁵⁷ In the sovkhoses of Lithuania the harvests of agricultural crops are small, productivity of animal husbandry low, and production costs high.⁵⁸ In Estonia the sovkhoses have turned more than 6,000 hectares of arable land into wasteland and have left two thirds of natural hay meadows unharvested, half of pastures unused, and 52 per cent of fallow land idle.⁵⁹

Then there is trouble with farm labor. The first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, Kebin, has stated that in addition to all difficulties which have to be overcome, labor productivity must be increased in agriculture as well.⁶⁰ There are no labor reserves in the countryside. Along with industrialization of the Baltic republics, the rural population continues to decrease. In 1938 some 25 to 35 per cent of Balts lived in cities; in 1959 this rate increased, for Lithuania, to 39 per cent and for Latvia and Estonia, to 56 per cent.⁶¹

Responsibility for the early fulfillment of the agricultural Seven Year Plan has been placed on the party organizations.

It is they who are called to organize the fulfillment of socialist pledges undertaken by the kolkhoses and sovkhoses; they have to see that drifting is not tolerated. . . . They have to mobilize and direct the efforts of agricultural workers for the prefulfillment of the Seven Year Plan.⁶²

But the material situation of kolkhoz peasantry in the Baltic republics remains precarious. According to estimates based on Soviet data, peasant income averaged 250 old rubles per month during 1959, or 2.5 times more than in 1953. How far does this money go? Three meters of woolen fabric for a woman's dress cost officially 1,020 rubles, and three meters of woolen fabric for a man's suit cost 1,053.⁶³

⁵⁷ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, February 27, 1957.

⁵⁸ *Sovetskaya Litva*, March 2, 1960.

⁵⁹ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, February 17, 1960.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, January 26, 1960.

⁶¹ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1959, p. 10.

⁶² *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, February 17, 1960.

⁶³ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, July 3, 1959.

To subsist, kolkhoz members have to exploit most intensively the small personal plots of land which do not exceed a half hectare per family. These private plots make up 4 to 5 per cent of all agricultural land. Failure of the socialist collectivist system of agriculture is demonstrated by the fact that more than half of the livestock—cattle, hogs, goats, sheep—is privately owned by the kolkhoz peasantry and sovkhoz workers. The rest of the livestock is being raised in kolkhozes and sovkhozes occupying 95 per cent of the total agricultural land.

The precarious situation of the kolkhoz peasantry threatens to become worse in the future. The party cherishes the idea of agricultural industrialization. This process would end with transformation of kolkhoz members to salaried agricultural workers, merging the property of kolkhozes with state property. Expansion of the state farming system—sovkhozes—is indicative of these hopes. From 1953 to 1959 the number of sovkhozes in Lithuania increased from 88 to 226, in Latvia from 82 to 140, and in Estonia from 108 to 134.⁶⁴ The land areas of sovkhozes more than doubled, at the expense of the land of kolkhozes, to be used permanently “for eternal times.” There is also an attack on personal plots. The first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Antanas Sniechkus, declared in 1960 that “too large personal auxiliary plots reduce the labor activity of kolkhoz members; they waste much of their time on these plots because little use can be made of machinery.”⁶⁵ This pronouncement was in line with ideas expressed by *Pravda* earlier in 1958 that “with further development of the collective economy of kolkhozes the auxiliary economy of kolkhozes will become economically unprofitable and they will renounce it voluntarily.”⁶⁶

“Voluntary” reduction of the number of livestock in kolkhozes has already started. On the advice of Khrushchev⁶⁷ the Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted a law forbidding the keeping of domestic animals privately by the urban population, both in cities and workers settlements.⁶⁸ This “advice” has been heeded by other USSR republics. Thus all kolkhozes in Ventspils rayon in Latvia amended “voluntarily” their kolkhoz statutes, stipulating that a kolkhoz member has

⁶⁴ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1959, p. 439.

⁶⁵ *Sovetskaya Litva*, March 2, 1960.

⁶⁶ *Pravda*, June 27, 1958.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1959.

⁶⁸ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, November 29, 1959.

no right to possess privately more than one cow, two ewes with lambs, and one hog.⁶⁹

Certainly farming is no plush occupation in the former Baltic states. Albert Henrick Moon, a Norwegian journalist who recently had an opportunity to visit a kolkhoz in Latvia, wrote the following to the newspaper *Verdens Gang* in Oslo about his impressions:

The rural population continue to live in their former individual farmsteads. They have to go by foot five to ten kilometers to the kolkhoz center to get work assignments. I saw how this was done. A group of peasants was crowding in front of the office building of the kolkhoz center. Not one of them had decent clothing. Two men wore some primitive plaids made of old tarpauline. In contrast, the kolkhoz chairman who read the work assignments had a good suit and black boots. This reminded me of a picture I saw in a large South African farm near Johannesburg. A dignified man was standing at a distance from a group of Zulu Negroes giving instruction to them. . . .⁷⁰

RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME

The Soviet government has the most developed propaganda apparatus in the world. Through mass media of propaganda and armies of party agitators the projects of communist construction or current policy are supported. Thus in Tallinn alone over 6,000 propagandists and consultants, over 200 lecturers and reporters, over 8,000 agitators, propagate the decisions of the Twenty-First Party Congress of the USSR.⁷¹ The 1960 decision of the CPSU Central Committee on tasks for party propaganda in contemporary conditions provides ideological work with a streamlined program. It stresses that acquisition of the communist outlook, mastery of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and deep understanding of party policy, are necessary for every Soviet man.⁷² The barrage of Soviet propaganda will probably be stepped up.

The Baltic republics form an area where such improvements are badly needed. This comes to light particularly at any party conference in the republics. "Nationalist tendencies" are still alive, par-

⁶⁹ *Sovetskaya Latvija*, February 18, 1960.

⁷⁰ Quoted from the Latvian newspaper *Laiks* (Time) (New York), March 5, 1960.

⁷¹ *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, March 6, 1959.

⁷² *Ibid.*, January 12, 1960.

ticularly among youth. An opposition exists against the Russian "big brother." Party functionaries complain that foreign propaganda, inflaming separatist tendencies, is being spread among the population, that even manifestations of national communism have become apparent among party members. Nationalistic tendencies, says the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, Kebin,

appear as a rule in the exaggeration of the importance of national peculiarities in the economic and cultural construction, even in an artificial search for nonexistent nationalistic peculiarities. Falsifying facts and provocatively shouting about the danger of 'russification,' the bourgeois-nationalist elements lead the fight for elimination of socialistic content from Estonian national culture.⁷³

The first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party, Pelshe, blames party organizations for "lack of care of the political education of Komsomol members." Ideological work with students in higher educational institutions, according to Pelshe, is likewise unsatisfactory. Pelshe accused "reactionary imperialist circles" of spreading anticommunist propaganda.⁷⁴

Communist Party leaders in the Baltic countries are particularly worried about anticommunist activities of Baltic nationals abroad, about the influence they exert on their compatriots in the homeland. "The efforts of these enemies of the Latvian people," as former Soviet Latvian Premier Lacis calls them, "and of their transatlantic bosses are directed toward disruption of the historical friendship between the Latvian and Russian peoples."⁷⁵

Nationalism is considered by the Party to be of the greatest danger to international communism. The unsatisfactory ideological and educational work in the Baltic republics has resulted in purges among the leading Baltic communist functionaries. The scope of these purges is so extensive that it has found wide coverage in the Western press.

Nationalism has retained deep roots in all three Baltic republics, the ethnic population of which has ever professed individualism and Western cultural and spiritual orientation, opposing collectivist teachings. Even the youth, as now becomes apparent from Soviet sources,

⁷³ *Ibid.*, January 29, 1958.

⁷⁴ *Pravda*, January 27, 1960.

⁷⁵ *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Party Life), 16 (August 1959), 14-21.

has not been willing to surrender to regimental Soviet conformity. For many years the Baltic republics have been closed to foreign visitors, but in 1956 this rigid policy was liberalized, and tentatively a number of visitors from abroad, including journalists, have been allowed to enter. This is what a Swedish journalist writes about a visit of the Swedish navy to Riga and the attitude of Latvians:

On the last day before the Swedes left Riga, the Latvians became unrestrainable. They no longer tried to be careful, cared nothing about the NKVD agents who followed everyone who met a Swede, nor did they try to avoid spies and the police. . . . That night a Latvian woman stopped me on the street. She could tell I was Swedish from the cut of my suit. Immediately a crowd, eager to see and hear, gathered around us. The woman asked me about Sweden. I, of course, told her that we live well there, that we can buy what we want, can do as we like, and go where we wish. . . . She asked my opinion of Riga. . . . 'how does our life seem to you? You should live for at least a day, and you would know. Life is difficult here.' I warned her that she should be careful of what she said. There were people standing around us and listening. . . . 'Don't you understand that this is my last opportunity to talk to a Swede?' she retorted; 'what do I care what happens to me afterward,' she cried out, tears running over her cheeks; 'at least I have had the opportunity to speak to a free man from a free nation. You are a journalist; tell your people how we live here.' What happened to her after I left, I do not know.⁷⁶

BALTIC STATES—A TOUCHSTONE FOR SOVIET SINCERITY

In its drive for peaceful coexistence, Soviet propaganda endeavored to make the peoples of the free world believe that the Baltic republics decided voluntarily for "peaceful transition to communism." Khrushchev presented the new line about the possibility of passing from capitalism to communism peacefully at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. At the same forum the first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, Kebin, emphasized that Estonia had set an example that substantiated Khrushchev's thesis about the possibility of countries passing peacefully from capitalism to communism.⁷⁷

The history of the Baltic republics has been rewritten by the Soviet

⁷⁶ Quoted from "What Swedish Sailors Saw in Occupied Latvia," *The Baltic Review*, 8 (September 1956), 44-45.

⁷⁷ *Pravda*, February 19, 1956.

historians to fit this line. In November 1957, on occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev in his report to the USSR Supreme Soviet stated that "from the first days of its establishment the Soviet State categorically rejected use in international relation of all that was founded on robbery, violence and capture." Already, Khrushchev said, the Soviet Union had resolutely proclaimed

the principle of good neighborly relations and economic relations, based on equality, with all the countries of the world. . . . From the moment of creation of the Soviet state the principle of peaceful coexistence was taken for the basis of its external policy.⁷⁸

Since then, Khrushchev has explained repeatedly that the

base of relations between the states with different systems is formed by five recognized principles: mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; nonintervention in internal matters by economic, political or ideological means; equality; and mutual advantage.⁷⁹

Khrushchev claims that the Soviet Union has taken the principles of peaceful coexistence as a basis for its external policy from the moment of creation of the Soviet state. But the Soviets' disregard for these principles in the past belies their validity for the future. The Soviet Union has taken pride in showing disrespect for its pledges and contractual obligations. From 1918 to 1940 the Baltic states coexisted peacefully with the Soviet Union. Their relations with the Soviet Union were based on bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions, including treaties of nonaggression and mutual assistance. The Baltic states had never intervened in the inner matters of the Soviet Union. And still, in spite of all this and the Soviet standpoint that "all contestable questions in relations between states should be settled by the means of negotiations, without war,"⁸⁰ the Baltic republics in June 1940, following short ultimatums, were occupied by the Soviet military forces. Today, just a little more than twenty years later, Khrushchev declares that "Peaceful coexistence is not compatible with the policy 'from the position of power,' with the policy 'from the brink of war,' and with other similar procedures used . . . by the imperialist powers."⁸¹

⁷⁸ Khrushchev, *Za Prochnyy Mir* . . . , pp. 234-35.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 235, 258.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

Khrushchev praises the policy of neutralism. "Such a policy," he says, "is in keeping with national interests of these states, enhances their security and does not draw them into unnecessary, useless waste of their productive forces for military purposes. . . . Their attitude evokes understanding and sympathy."⁸² Twenty years ago this understanding and sympathy was not extended to the Baltic states which shortly after the beginning of the Second World War proclaimed neutrality as the basis for their policies during the war.

Today Khrushchev, denouncing any agreements on the spheres of influence, declares that

our principles do not allow us to agree with strong powers in order to harm the weak ones. This is alien to the spirit of the Soviet State. In all discussions we have *always* stood on the principle of non-intervention in the inner matters of other states, we help to strengthen the independence of all the countries, the development of their economy, the uplift of their living standard and culture. . . .⁸³

And again Khrushchev "forgets" the Nazi-Soviet Pact of Friendship and the Secret Protocol to it, fixing the zones of influence of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in the Baltic states and Poland.

The history of the arbitrary "sovietization" of the Baltic States is on record. Furthermore, the Soviet version of the "voluntary" transition of the Baltic states is in contradiction with earlier publications of the USSR. Textbooks used in Soviet military-political academies even offer elaborated and detailed programs for the planned sovietization of the occupied, or "liberated" countries.

Thus, the Soviet military writer F. Blumental, referring to the concrete tasks of the Red Army in the occupied territories, instructs:

The principal aim which we have to follow in our work of organizing the civilian rear is the political conquest of the population in the areas captured by our troops. Here we start from a point opposite to that of the bourgeoisie. The latter occupies the territory captured from the enemy. *We start from the task of the sovietization*, that is, rendering assistance to the working class of a rebellious country in their efforts to establish revolutionary power.⁸⁴

⁸² Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism*, p. 233.

⁸³ Khrushchev, *Za Prochnyy Mir* . . . , p. 275.

⁸⁴ Fridrikh L. Blumental, *Politicheskaya Rabota v Voennoye Vremya* (Political Work in Wartime) (Moscow, 1929), p. 192.

The handbook lists and describes seven consecutive stages of sovietization, beginning with the propagation of the Soviet ideology and ending with the liquidation of its factual and potential enemies. Point by point, this methodological plan was first applied in practice by the Soviets in the occupied Baltic States.

Another Soviet military writer, V. Triandafilov, even set deadlines, three to four weeks, for the completion of the sovietization program, emphasizing that the "definite solidification of the Soviet regime will result from the creation of a mighty communist party."⁸⁵ These deadlines were met in the case of the Baltic states: occupied in June 1940, these states completed their "voluntary" transition to communism four weeks later.

Absorption of the Baltic states within the political system of the USSR certainly has strengthened the military and economic potential of the Red empire. Already by 1959, the industry of the Baltic republics constituted 2 per cent of total USSR industrial capacity.⁸⁶ Simultaneously, inclusion of the Baltic states in the system of the so-called socialist camp has resulted in a similar loss to the free world.

Normally it would be irrational to develop heavy industries in agricultural countries lacking natural resources. It is contrary to the principles of a sound economy, as well, to push ahead the development of animal husbandry, with grain and feed imports from the outside, after ruining the agricultural prosperity by forcible collectivization. But the communist industrial drive is based on political and ideological considerations, without care as to cost and human sacrifice. All this is possible in a communist state where the administrative, legislative, and government powers concentrate in the hands of a party which possesses a monopoly of production and labor.

The Communist Party of the USSR pursues its policy in the Baltic republics in complete disregard for the interests of the population. During the process of forcible sovietization, the Baltic peoples were reduced to a proletariat. Prior to sovietization, about 60 per cent of the Balts were self-supporting and economically independent. Their bread basket was rich and abundant. Now they have to live on inadequate diet, even after all the broadly advertised improvements. The Baltic peoples have learned to endure hardships and lack of

⁸⁵ Vladimir Triandafilov, *Kharakter Operatsiy Sovremennykh Armii* (Character of Operations of Contemporary Armies) (Moscow, 1929), p. 178.

⁸⁶ *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1958, p. 134.

adequate food, housing and clothing. They do not complain about the lack of facilities and amenities which they formerly took for granted.

They do resent complete absence of freedom and basic human rights. They suffer from the conceit and arrogance of communist overlords, from communist perversion of moral standards, from lies and deceit, pretense and hypocrisy. They continue to maintain inner resistance to the regime. They live in hope that their countries will again be free.

3: POLAND

Oscar Halecki

In Poland, as elsewhere among the Soviet satellites, the death of Stalin in 1953 failed to bring the hoped-for relief some optimists had confidently expected. On the contrary, both the internal sovietization of the country—which had started immediately in 1944 when the Red Army entered her territory, and which reached its clearest expression in the constitution of 1952—and her integration with the whole Soviet bloc in international affairs continued to make steady progress in the first years after Stalin's death.

One year later, in March 1954, Stalin's main agent in Poland, Bolesław Bierut gave up the premiership, but kept the leading position of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the United Workers (Communist) Party. That change followed the Soviet pattern, in that it now seemed advisable to avoid the holding of both offices by the same person. Furthermore, it was evident that the general policy of the Stalinist period would remain unaltered. The man who from the outset had controlled that policy from behind the scene, Jakob Berman, was now made for the first time one of the vice-premiers; and the new Premier, Józef Cyrankiewicz, simply returned to the position which he had occupied in the decisive years 1947-1952.

Toward the end of 1954 Cyrankiewicz led the Polish delegation to the Moscow Conference of the satellite states which discussed the general problem of European security and prepared for a similar, much more important conference. This conference, which significantly enough, was held in Warsaw five months later, concluded the so-called Warsaw Pact of May 14, 1955. Conceived as a counterpart to NATO, the Warsaw Pact made it clearer than ever before that communist-controlled Poland was definitely part of the Eastern bloc. It was a twenty-year treaty of friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance, under the leadership of the Soviet Union and with the participation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

Poland, after formally ending the state of war with East Germany, signed in the same year a few special agreements with her and made a joint statement on July 6 which reaffirmed that the Oder-Neisse line was the definite frontier between the two countries. On the very day of the Warsaw Pact the armed forces of the eight member states were placed under the command of a Soviet marshal, not—as originally expected—Constantine Rokossovsky, then at the head of the Polish army, but Ivan Konev.

Poland's communist regime in 1954 had established closer relations with Red China, perhaps with a view to gaining more independence from Moscow. A few weeks after the Warsaw Conference it received Prime Minister Nehru of India and signed with the strongest neutral power of Asia a declaration based upon the principles of nonaggression and nonintervention. But this diplomatic act was in complete agreement with the official policy of the Soviet Union. It was so obvious that Soviet policy was being strictly followed by Poland that her candidature for the Security Council was strongly opposed by the United States at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1955. Yet shortly before the General Assembly convened, there appeared on August 21 in the official organ of the Polish Writers' Union a poem by Adam Wazyk¹ which has been considered a turning point in the intellectual life of the country. To what extent, however, Wazyk's "Poem for Adults" really started the trend towards that political—as well as cultural—liberation which made the following year so memorable is a question that must be studied against the background of Polish-Russian relations.

THE ORIGIN OF THE "THAW"

It is highly significant that the very name supposedly descriptive of the new trend in Poland's development is taken from the title of a novel published in May 1954 by the prominent Soviet Russian writer, Ilya Ehrenburg. In Russia the "thaw" was short-lived and

¹ An English translation of that poem can be found in the volume *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, ed. by Paul E. Zinner (New York, 1956), pp. 40-48. Most of our subsequent quotations are taken from that "selection of documents on events in Poland and Hungary. February-November, 1956," which is extremely useful and well edited, though the term "national communism" is open to criticism.

seemed to be officially liquidated by Ehrenburg's expression of regret at the end of the year. Similarly, the poetic criticism of conditions of life in Communist Poland which Wazyk made so courageously (concluding, however, with demands for improvement "through the Party") was at once condemned by both Party and government, so that the "party poet" did not publish again until April 1956.

By that time an event much more important than any literary discussion had taken place in Moscow. It had strong repercussions in the whole Soviet bloc, particularly in Poland where repressed dissatisfaction, even among the small group of communists, had been strongest. This event was Nikita Khrushchev's violent, unexpected criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, accompanied by the official statement that the liquidation of the Polish Communist Party in 1938 at Stalin's order had been "groundless" and based on falsified materials.

Even had Bierut not suddenly died in Moscow on March 12, there would have followed a change in Poland's communist regime. The most notorious Stalinists were replaced by other communist leaders who previously had been persecuted, as Stalin's opponents had been in Russia. Among those released from prison and rehabilitated early in April were the once-powerful Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been arrested in 1951, and generals Marian Spychalski and Wacław Komar. Two weeks later Stanisław Radkiewicz, who as head of the Ministry of Public Security (abolished at the end of 1954) had been responsible for the worst police terror, was completely ousted from the government. On May 6 Jakob Berman, so influential until quite recently, had to resign both as vice-premier and as member of the Party's Politburo. The replacement of Foreign Minister Stanisław Skrzyszewski by Adam Rapacki on April 27 was less spectacular, but it was to prove not without importance in the following years.

These changes in party leadership personnel did not seem to imply any basic change in its policies, especially since Bierut's successor as first secretary of the Central Committee, Edward Ochab, appointed on March 20, had belonged to the Stalinist wing. Writing on April 29 both in the Russian *Pravda* and in the Polish *Trybuna Ludu*, Ochab admitted, on the one hand, that the resolutions of the Twentieth Congress "had a tremendous impact on Poland and on the rest of the world," but, on the other hand, warned against "any

abuses of the freedom of criticism" which, according to Lenin, must never "affect the Party's unity of action," and against "the pressure of hostile bourgeois propaganda." At the same time he stressed the principles which in the following years were to guide the communist regime of Poland amidst all the apparent fluctuations of methods: first, the necessity of struggling on two fronts, not only against "schematism" and suppression of any criticism, but also "against middle-class unsteadiness" and undermining of party discipline and unity; and secondly, the particularly urgent necessity to oppose "any attempts to undermine the friendship between the Polish and the Soviet nations." The latter principle was to remain the unquestionable cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. As to the former, later called the twofold struggle against both "dogmatism" and "revisionism," it would depend on the temporary situation as to which of these two would be considered the greater evil.

In the first months of transition after the denunciation of Stalin in Moscow, the trend towards revisionism rapidly grew stronger, not only among the intellectuals—who were convinced that "the period of fear and cynicism has ended" and complained that even the Twentieth Congress, "which contributed so greatly to the task of clearing the poisoned atmosphere, unfortunately did not give us much in the field of literature"—but even among the secretaries of the Communist Party. One of them, Jerzy Morawski, just one month after Khrushchev's speech spoke of "the lessons of the Twentieth Congress"—that "landmark between two epochs"—welcoming the "new, bold ideas . . . regarding international problems." He recommended the strengthening of Polish initiative, including contacts with the capitalist countries of Western Europe, the new nations of the Middle East, all Southeast Asia, and Latin America. He concluded by stressing "the unity and cohesion of the entire socialist camp as the safest guarantee of Poland's security and of the maintenance of peace." Enlarging upon internal problems, he was still critical of Gomulka, who had not yet been readmitted to the Central Committee; but he gave his own interpretation of the "Polish road to socialism," joining "Comrade Khrushchev" in his struggle against the cult of personality. He recommended a policy to remove "excessive centralization" in the economy, "to restore and develop intra-Party democracy," and to follow Lenin's example in renouncing terror when it was no longer necessary.

The most concrete proposal which he made in the interest, not only of the Party but of all the people waiting for an improvement of their living standards, was "an increase of some 25 per cent in real wages for workers and employees" and a shortening of the working hours. In doing so, he proved well aware of the fact that nothing was more dangerous for the regime than growing dissatisfaction—not so much of the intellectuals, but more particularly of that working class which was supposed to profit most from the "building of socialism" and to be the strongest support of "the people's democracy." How different the real situation was became apparent three months later.

THE POZNAN RIOTS

Much more significant than the so-called "thaw" and the subsequent shifts within the Communist Party of Poland that were inspired by similar developments in Russia was the bloody uprising, limited in scope and duration, but clearly expressing the despair and the desires of the Polish people. It broke out in Poznan on June 28, 1956, at the very time when an International Fair had attracted many foreign visitors to the city.

The immediate cause of the riots was indeed economic. The complaints of the workers in a Poznan locomotive and heavy machinery factory (Zispo), where a wage decline had aggravated the already miserable living conditions, were disregarded by the responsible minister, Juliusz Tokarski. On the return of their delegation from Warsaw, a strike in the plant led to demonstrations which, in asking not only for "bread" but also for "freedom," became clearly political. The population sided with the workers—as did some of the soldiers who were supposed to crush the riots which flared in prisons, police headquarters, and party offices—and finally the riots developed into an uprising against Soviet Russian control. The street fighting lasted until the evening of June 29, leaving behind, according to official figures, 53 dead and over 300 wounded, and producing a tremendous impression in Poland and abroad.

The government, which immediately sent to Poznan a delegation led by Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, at first tried to interpret the uprising as the result of a well-prepared provocation by "imperialist agents and the reactionary underground." Of course, the reaction in

the Soviet Union was identical. *Pravda* at once attributed the "serious disturbances" to the incitements of "hostile agents," and two weeks later spoke of a "direct link between the Poznan events and the overseas centers which direct the cold war" from America. Soviet Premier Bulganin returned to the latter interpretation when visiting Poland on July 22, the new national holiday commemorating the establishment of the communist regime in 1944.

The regime itself had realized in the meantime the mistakes made "by the callousness and bureaucratism of the authorities both central and local." It recognized that the complaints of the workers were largely justified, and on July 8 dismissed Minister Tokarski and a few days later Eugene Szyr, the chairman of the state economic planning commission. The reinterpretation of the internal situation found its best expression in the resolutions of the Seventh Plenum of the Party's Central Committee. Its session, held in Warsaw from July 18 to 28, coincided with the visit of Bulganin and Marshal Zhukov, who tried to divert the attention of the Polish people from their internal troubles by warning against foreign enemies who "would want to estrange us from one another" and by recalling that the best guarantee of Poland's western frontiers, including Silesia, was "the friendship of the peoples of our socialist camp, the friendship of the Polish and Soviet peoples." Without discussing these international implications, the Central Committee, after electing three new members, including Foreign Minister Rapacki, and after hearing First Secretary Ochab declare it "erroneous to concentrate attention primarily on the machinations of provocateurs and imperialist agents," proceeded to a comprehensive revision of the Party's program in internal affairs.

After repeating the charge that "counter-revolutionary groups" were "drawing their inspiration from alien sources hostile to Poland," and obviously continuing to draw its own inspiration from the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the Central Committee admitted that "the Poznan events cannot be treated in isolation from the situation in the country." The resolutions tried, therefore, to make constructive contributions to an improvement of that internal situation, especially with regard to the living conditions of the working class. They favored economic decentralization and what is called "the trend toward the democratization of the country's life." But it was stressed at the same time that with regard to agriculture and relations with

the peasantry, there would be no change of policy. The usual reservations were made that freedom of criticism should not be used "to attack the policy of our Party," whose "leading role" was to be consolidated by the planned reforms, isolating "the class enemy." In conclusion, after a brief reference to "the national interests of Poland," the "bonds of solidarity and co-operation with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all fraternal parties" were duly emphasized as "an infallible guarantee of confounding the designs of imperialism and reaction, a guarantee of the consolidation of peace and the victory of socialism."

The resolutions of the Seventh Plenum can hardly be considered an indication of any basic change in the direction of liberalization and even less of a strengthening of Poland's independence. What was to be strengthened by avoiding past mistakes was merely the leading role of the Party. In agreement, however, with the loudly proclaimed principle of "full observance of socialist legality," the trial of those arrested after the Poznan riots—the 323 persons held in the middle of July had dwindled to 154 still under arrest when the trial started at the end of September—was conducted with unusual fairness and ended with rather light sentences. Furthermore, all indictments were revised, many of the convicts released, and other sentences postponed in connection with the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee which met on October 19.

THE 'POLISH OCTOBER'

The October meeting seemed to be a real turning point in Poland's postwar history. It was even interpreted at first as a bloodless revolution restoring to a large extent the freedom of the country in contrast with the bloody *coup* which in October 1917 had established the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Though such an interpretation proved to be based on wishful thinking, the events which began on October 19, 1956, were indeed so surprising that the question arises as to what had changed the situation in the three-month interval between the two sessions of the Party's Central Committee.

This time no new inspiration or challenge came from Moscow. Significant indeed were the continued changes in the leadership of the Polish communist regime, indicating in particular Gomulka's rise to power. On August 4, though only recently rehabilitated, he

was readmitted to the Central Committee, and on October 10 it was announced that his main opponent, Hilary Minc, whose ouster as Poland's economic dictator he had requested, had resigned from the Politburo. When five days later the Politburo met to prepare for the new plenary session of the Central Committee, Gomulka took part in the meeting even though he was not yet a member.

Important as they were, however, these changes within the Party could hardly explain the different atmosphere in which the Central Committee once more reviewed the whole situation—both internal and external, including relations with Soviet Russia—and even less could it explain the unexpected fact that for the first time in many years the voice of the Polish people was heard in the streets of Warsaw. This certainly was, to a large extent, evidence that the blood of so many Poles had not been shed in vain five months before in the streets of Poznan. But it also was undoubtedly a consequence of the inspiring influence which the strongest force of spiritual resistance against communism, the Catholic Church, continued to exercise upon practically the whole nation. The diversionist "Pax" movement had lost much of its importance after the condemnation in 1955 of some of its leader's publications by the Vatican, and now, on August 25 and 26, 1956, a pilgrimage of over a million Poles, including 34 bishops, to the shrine of Our Lady at Czestochowa, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of her proclamation as Queen of the Crown of Poland, left behind an atmosphere which must have contributed to the pressure which public opinion exercised two months later.²

On the other hand, the tension was obviously increased by the error of the Soviet leaders in attempting a too-open interference with the deliberations of the Polish Central Committee. Those deliberations had hardly started on the morning of October 19 with the co-operation of Gomulka and three of his supporters on the Committee, when a delegation composed of Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov arrived from Moscow and immediately began debates. These debates, according to the official communiqué issued the next day after the Russian visitors had departed, "were held in the atmosphere of Party-like and friendly sincerity." However, it soon became known that there had been a threat to use military force in order to retain

² It is interesting to note that such an interpretation has been suggested by the Protestant German historian Gotthold Rhode in the *Osteuropa-Handbuch Polen*, ed. by Werner Markert (Köln-Graz, 1959), p. 252.

in power the most subservient partisans of Moscow, including Marshal Rokossovsky, a threat which even Ochab rejected, demanding that all troop movements be halted immediately. (Rokossovsky, despite his powerful allies, was dismissed on November 8.) It was indeed surprising that the Russians yielded so rapidly without having apparently obtained anything. But to start a fight with General Komar's Polish units, which had taken up defensive positions in the streets of Warsaw and were supported by demonstrations of workers and students, must have seemed an unnecessary trouble. After all, the Polish Communist Party, notwithstanding the well-prepared change in its leadership, agreed to send "in the nearest future" a delegation to Moscow to discuss the problems "of further strengthening the political and economic co-operation between the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union and of further consolidating the fraternal friendship" between the two parties.

The personal triumph of Gomulka, who on October 21 was elected first secretary of the Central Committee and who had the backing of a majority in the new Politburo and party Secretariat, could hardly be interpreted as a triumph for the Polish nation—not even for "national communism"—in a struggle against Moscow which the new leader was neither able nor willing to conduct. The long address Gomulka delivered on the eve of his election and his subsequent public speeches could indeed have raised hopes of constructive reforms and more freedom in the daily life of the Polish people, thereby contributing greatly to his popularity. But the reforms were to contribute, in the first place, to "the further progress of Poland toward socialism" by strengthening "the leading role" of the Party "as the guiding political and ideological force." The freedom of choosing "ways and means" to build a socialist system in accordance with Polish interests was limited in advance by the stern prohibition of "any manifestations of anti-Soviet propaganda" and of "attempts to incite nationalistic and anti-Soviet feelings." The first of these points served as introduction and the second as conclusion to the resolution adopted by the Central Committee on October 21. In full agreement with Gomulka's program, the resolution emphasized internal problems. While stressing "the principles of equality and independence" in Polish-Soviet relations, which Stalin himself had recognized and proclaimed though not always respected, it repeated after its new leader that Poland's "friendship for the Soviet Union will be so pro-

found that no attempt to sow mistrust . . . will find a response in our country."

It is important to note that all this was announced before the events "of historic significance taking place in Poland" had encouraged in Hungary a reinstatement of Imre Nagy—similar to that of Gomulka—and a revolt that on its first day, October 23, led to serious street fighting, but after an apparent victory that included the withdrawal of Soviet troops, was brutally crushed on November 4 by Russian military intervention. Both the Polish people, who were in profound sympathy with the Hungarians, and anxious to help them, and the Polish Communist Party, which on October 28 addressed to the Hungarian communists an appeal to end the "fratricidal struggle," interpreted these tragic events as a serious warning: it was clear that even the most heroic fight for freedom from Soviet Russian control was hopeless, since it would not receive any support from the free world. Contrary to the expectations of the "Polish October," it gradually became apparent that even in the internal life of the country communist control would again be tightened. Furthermore, in November the Gomulka regime did its best to consolidate relations with the Soviet Union, continuing its complete dependence on Moscow in foreign affairs.

'REVISIONISM' IN RETREAT

The resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee contained far-reaching promises which were to implement Gomulka's statement on the Polish road to socialism. Before any such promises could be realized, a first concrete step on the road to more internal freedom was taken, when on October 28 the Cardinal-Primate, Stefan Wyszyński, was released after more than three years of confinement. Important concessions to the Catholic Church soon followed, including the reintroduction of religious instruction in public schools and the liberation of all arrested members of the clergy. These facts confirm that the unbroken power of Polish Catholicism is one of the major reasons which explain the "October Revolution." But it immediately became clearer than ever that the sudden revision of the Party's anti-Catholic policies had not been made in vain. In the critical months after the "Polish October" the Church not only rec-

commended quiet and unity among the Polish people, in accordance with the interests of both the people and the regime, but also encouraged participation in the forthcoming elections to the Sejm (Parliament), although these elections of January 20, 1957, which had Gomulka's promise that the people would be allowed "to elect and not only to vote," proved to be far from really free. It is true that there were more candidates (723) than seats to fill (459), but there was still only one list, that of the National Front sponsored by the government. While the voters were supposed to be free in choosing the candidates they would eliminate, they were warned by Gomulka on the eve of the election that the deletion of communist candidates "is synonymous with the deletion of Poland from the map of Europe." Coming shortly after the catastrophe in Hungary, this stern statement was an admission that neither was Poland sovereign nor the election free. Nevertheless, under the impression of a real improvement in the internal situation, especially the absence of the former police terror, 94.14 per cent of the electorate cast their ballots and out of these, 98.4 per cent voted for the National Front list. In spite of Gomulka's threat, many voters crossed out communist candidates who were on the top of the list; but even the reduced number of communist deputies remained in the majority (51.7 per cent, 238 seats out of 459). Since the two other recognized parties—Peasants and Democrats—were known to support the regime, and the "independents," including twelve Catholics, represented only 18.3 per cent, there was no real opposition in the Diet. With just one negative vote, it approved on February 27 the composition of both the Cabinet and the State Council, which remained largely unchanged. Jozef Cyrankiewicz continued as Premier and Aleksander Zawadzki as President of the Council, or official head of state, even though both of them had held these positions throughout the worst years of the Stalinist era.

In spite of the promise that the Sejm would be "the supreme organ of State power" its real role continued to be overshadowed by that of the Party's Central Committee. As early as 1957, on the occasion of its Ninth Plenum in May and even more of its Tenth Plenum in October, it became evident that Gomulka, simultaneously opposing the Stalinists and the "revisionists," both of whom he tried to "purge" from the party, was turning more and more severely against the latter. Ominous in this respect was the suppression on October 5, in spite of rather serious disturbances, of the student paper *Po Prostu*, which had

strongly supported Gomulka a year before but now was considered too outspoken in its criticism of the Party.

The same disappointing trend continued in 1958, and when in February, after the Tenth Plenum, the Stalinist wing of the Party seemed definitely defeated and Gomulka in full control, Gomulka declared before the Eleventh Plenum in December that the main problem now was the struggle against the "poison of revisionism." That struggle was conducted with increasing vigor not only in political but soon also in cultural life, especially after the dismissal on April 29, 1958, of Minister of Education Karol Kuryluk, who was considered too "liberal." Three months later when the police raided the Primate's offices at Czestochowa, looking for "anticommunist" tracts, it became apparent that even the situation of the Church was deteriorating again: all ecclesiastical publications were submitted to strict censorship, members of religious orders forbidden to teach in schools, and the crosses removed from the classrooms.

Though Cardinal Wyszynski was permitted to go to Rome not only in 1957 when he received his red hat, but also in 1958 when he participated in the conclave electing Pope John XXIII, his protests against new measures directed against the Church were disregarded. Propaganda against the Vatican resumed, and in June 1959 charges against one of the bishops, Monsignor Kaczmarek, which had been dropped in 1956, were revived. These measures were, of course, symptoms of a general change in policy which in the course of the same year led to another shift in the party leadership, soon after the Third Party Congress in March.³ The congress confirmed Gomulka's dictatorial position and the change reached a climax just three years after the "October Revolution," when even Ochab lost his position in the Cabinet and Jerzy Morawski felt obliged to resign from the Politburo. Notorious Stalinists, including men like Tokarski and Szyr, dismissed after the Poznan riots, returned to power. This defeat of "revisionism" and return to stricter centralization cannot be fully explained by the economic troubles of that other October, and though the economic situation improved in 1960, and the new five-year plan (from 1961 to 1965) promised a 50 per cent increase in the industrial output, the trend toward reducing Poland's hard-won internal freedom became

³ Recently discussed in the excellent article by Richard F. Staar, "Third Congress of the Polish Communist Party," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XI (1960), 63-73.

even more conspicuous. Significant in this respect was the continuing deterioration of the situation of the Catholic Church, a fact which in the spring of 1960 led to riots in Nowa Huta near Cracow and Zielona Gora in Silesia, threatened the position of the Catholic University in Lublin, and was described on September 4 in a long pastoral letter of the Polish hierarchy, publication of which was forbidden by the regime. The discipline and efficiency of the Communist Party was discussed at two plenary meetings of its Central Committee in January and June in which Gomulka stressed again the necessity of enforcing "socialism."

A year later, on April 16, 1961, new elections to the Sejm were so skillfully managed that in spite of a strong criticism of the situation in the courageous sermons of Cardinal Wyszyński, the result was surprisingly similar to that of the elections in 1957. More than 95 per cent (95.5) of the voters went to the polls and 98.34 per cent of these voted for the sole list of the National Front. It is true that again some Catholic candidates received more votes than leading communists, but only five of the eleven Catholics who were elected belonged to the "Znak" group loyal to the Cardinal-Primate, while the others were supporting the regime. The United Workers (Communist) Party gained a slightly larger majority (55 per cent) and the two other parties—Peasants and Democrats—remained entirely dependent on the former. The new Sejm started its activities by approving unanimously the almost unchanged composition of Cyrankiewicz's cabinet. It also approved on July 15, new restrictions which, in the opinion of the hierarchy, are preparing a gradual liquidation of religious instruction.

COMULKA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Throughout the years following the "Polish October" of 1956, the close connection between Poland's internal situation and her relations with Moscow remained unaltered. As a matter of fact, they had never basically changed. The Polish visit to Moscow, which had been promised on the fateful day of October 20, took place on November 18, 1956; and the result of the talks between the two party and government delegations was presented to the Polish people as a great success for Gomulka, who was accompanied by President Zawadzki, Premier Cyrankiewicz, and other high officials. The joint communiqué in-

cluded indeed a recognition of the principle of equality in the relations between the two states, with due respect for their "territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty"; a reciprocal promise of noninterference in internal affairs; substantial financial concessions to Poland; and an agreement as to the further repatriation of Poles still detained in the Soviet Union. Valuable, too, would seem the agreement determining the status of Soviet troops in Poland, but it was at the same time a formal recognition that the presence of these troops was still necessary in view of the existing international situation. The review of that situation in the first point of the communiqué stressed the complete identity of view of both sides in all international problems, including the recent events in Hungary. The Polish delegation had to join in the promise of support for the Kádár regime and in the criticism of "some decisions adopted by the United Nations with regard to Hungary."

The Soviet-Polish alliance, thus renewed and praised as a guarantee of Poland's independence and of her western frontier on the Oder and Neisse, was supplemented by special agreements, for example, that of March 5 of the following year on the final determination of the boundaries between the two states. But during the first half of the same year, 1957, serious efforts were also made to strengthen the relations between Poland and the non-Russian members of the communist bloc. Particularly welcome seemed the visit of Red China's Premier Chou En-lai to Warsaw, though the joint declaration of January 16 included not only a mutual recognition of equality and independence, but also another pledge to support Kádár. Returning the visit in March, Poland's Premier Cyrankiewicz also toured a few other Asiatic countries including India. Friendship visits were later made by Gomulka himself in various communist countries of Europe, in May to Czechoslovakia, and in June, to East Germany. Even in these countries Gomulka stressed the principle that each country should follow its own road to socialism. In September he also visited Yugoslavia, where that principle had been first applied and where it was now re-emphasized in a joint statement of September 16, 1957, with Tito, which recognized Poland's western boundaries. This same statement included also a pledge to support the Soviet Union in international affairs, especially in its demand for Red China's admission to the UN. It was made at a time when Yugoslavia, though in sympathy with the Polish and even the Hungarian attempts of the pre-

ceding fall to gain internal freedom, was having much better relations with Russia than in Stalin's days. In full agreement with that pledge, the Polish delegation to the United Nations, which only once, in a debate on the Hungarian situation, had dared to vote differently from the other communist countries, now in the fall of 1957, fully cooperated with the Soviet bloc in the General Assembly. Yet, the impression that Poland could take an independent initiative was created on October 2 when Foreign Minister Rapacki submitted his plan for creating in Central Europe a neutralized area, composed of the two German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (whose delegation joined the proposal), where no production or storage of atomic or nuclear weapons would be permitted.

This plan can be traced to Gomulka's talks in East Berlin where the idea of a zone of controlled disarmament in Central Europe, making also the Baltic "a sea of peace," was first discussed. But the plan was also in such obvious agreement with the Soviet proposals of withdrawing all foreign troops from Germany that it served Moscow's interests no less than it corresponded to the genuine desire of the Polish people to stop the rearmament of West Germany. It should not surprise us therefore, after Gomulka's visit to Moscow in November on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution (where, speaking first after Mao Tse-tung, Gomulka had recommended the co-operation of all communist countries under the leadership of the Kremlin) that the Rapacki plan continued to be propagandized as an independent Polish proposal. Early in 1958 its author tried to make it more acceptable to the West, allowing a strict control of gradual disarmament in the neutral zone. On February 14 he invited the noncommunist powers to discuss his proposal. At the same time Poland's friendly relations with Yugoslavia continued in spite of a growing tension between Khrushchev and Tito; the latter's visit to Warsaw, announced for May 1958, would have been, therefore, further evidence of independence in the conduct of Poland's foreign affairs.

Such a course, however, would have been too much for Moscow; and another turn in Gomulka's foreign policy came on April 24 when a Soviet delegation headed by President Voroshilov came to Warsaw. After these secret discussions Gomulka visited the capitals of three satellite countries completely subservient to Moscow: in Sofia, Budapest, and Bucharest he made statements directed against "revision-

ism," criticizing Yugoslavia so sharply that Tito's visit was cancelled. Speaking in Hungary, he added words of regret about the events of 1956, though approving Russia's intervention. A few weeks later, after the executions of Nagy and General Pal Maleter, which deeply shocked Polish public opinion, Gomulka felt obliged to state that these sentences were "not for us to judge." In reward for such an attitude, the Soviet government supported the claim of the Polish communist regime (as well as that of Czechoslovakia) to be admitted to the Geneva meetings of the great powers—unsuccessfully as far as the preliminary discussions for the planned summit meeting were concerned, but successfully with regard to the conference of scientists on the discontinuation of atomic and nuclear tests.

Continuing this policy, Gomulka, accompanied by Zawadzki and Cyrankiewicz, once more visited Moscow on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution; and on November 11, 1958, the twentieth anniversary of Poland's real liberation after the First World War, delivered there a speech violently attacking the Western powers, declaring the alliance with the Soviet Union to be the guiding principle of Poland's foreign policy, promising full solidarity in international affairs, and again condemning "revisionism" much more severely than "dogmatism"—all of which he repeated on his return to Warsaw. It is, however, significant that at this time Foreign Minister Rapacki was visiting the most "sympathetic" NATO country, Norway, trying to convince his hosts at Oslo that his plan, now definitely extended to the Baltic region and distinguishing two successive stages of disarmament, was a truly Polish initiative, not dictated by Moscow.

After Gomulka made another trip to Moscow, where he spoke on January 25, 1959, on the principle of equality among the sovereign members of the communist bloc, the foreign ministers of these countries met in Warsaw at the end of April in the presence of Chinese guests to discuss the applications of the Warsaw Pact of 1955. Rapacki continued his efforts to obtain from the Western powers a recognition of Poland's western boundaries, which later in the year was recommended in one of General de Gaulle's speeches. A rapprochement with West Germany, which seemed possible in the spring, did not, however, materialize; and the statement which Chancellor Adenauer made on the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War could not possibly have satisfied the Poles.

In the meantime, the three-day visit to Warsaw which Vice-Presi-

dent Nixon made in the first days of August on his return from Moscow, gave the Polish people an unexpected occasion to manifest their feelings of friendship for America, in contrast to the cool reception which they had given to Khrushchev two weeks before. These were certainly Warsaw's happiest days in the last twenty years, though they paradoxically also strengthened the position of the members of the communist government who had invited Nixon and had long talks with him. What they said about the Polish-German frontier and the fears of renascent German militarism proved once more to be the only concern that the regime had in common with the people and the only justification of Poland's solidarity with the Soviet Union.

That continued solidarity forced the United States to oppose the Polish candidature for one of the vacant nonpermanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations. The ballots at the General Assembly of 1959, which started on October 12, remained inconclusive until a compromise was finally reached after two months' debate, Poland receiving the seat for the first year of the term and Turkey for the second. At the Assembly of the following year which he attended with the other leaders of the communist bloc, Gomulka spoke in more moderate terms than Khrushchev and had a private talk with Secretary of State Herter. His basic position did not differ at all from that of the Soviet Union. Once more he stressed the danger of German revisionism and recommended the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe according to the plan of Foreign Minister Rapacki, who, on July 21, 1960, had requested again the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western boundary. And again Gomulka played a prominent part in the celebration of the Bolshevik revolution held in Moscow in November, supporting Khrushchev's interpretation of the "coexistence" of communist and capitalist countries. In spite of the political opposition between the two governments, however, the sympathy of the United States for the Polish people enabled Poland to take advantage of the possibilities which were opened in October 1956 for both cultural exchanges and financial assistance.

That contacts with the noncommunist Polish intellectuals cut off from the West and particularly from America during the Stalinist period were highly desirable, was indeed obvious and well-realized not only by the United States Government but also by private institutions such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. In line with

an agreement with the Department of State, these foundations began in 1957 a systematic program of inviting Polish scholars and students to American universities, which welcomed them as guests and found their co-operation valuable. The candidates, approximately 300 in number during the years 1957-1959, were carefully selected by representatives of the American foundations sent to Poland who succeeded in establishing direct contacts with the Polish universities. On the other hand, American professors and graduate students, including persons of Polish origin, were allowed to travel to Poland where they lectured, did research work, and attended congresses. All their contacts confirmed that the communist impact on Poland's intellectual life had been quite superficial and that the Western character of Polish culture remains unchanged. Unfortunately all these exchanges were affected by the restriction in cultural freedom which increased in 1960 despite the cultural agreement concluded with the United States on February 22 of that year. In the fall more than 200 professors in Polish universities had to retire, apparently because of their age but mainly in order to make place for candidates subservient to the regime; the granting of visas became more and more arbitrary, and all cultural exchanges were placed under the control of the Polish Academy of Science, which through a new statute, had become completely dependent on the government.

The problem of financial assistance to Poland proved even more delicate because such assistance, though it strengthens the Western sympathies of the Poles, and is badly needed by them, can only be negotiated with the communist government. Such negotiations, which were announced by both sides immediately after Gomulka's coming to power, resulted on June 7, 1957, after long discussions, in the grant to Poland of a \$95 million credit, an amount which was duplicated the next year, in the agreement of February 15. For accepting even such limited financial aid from the United States, the Poles were criticized not only by Russia but by China, which despite a continued exchange of official visits (including participation, in the fall of 1959, of a Polish delegation under Zawadzki in the tenth anniversary celebration of communist rule in China) disappointed the Polish hopes for support against Moscow's supremacy. Furthermore, Gomulka's foreign policy had its repercussions on the financial negotiations with Washington, which therefore in 1959, in a first agreement signed on June 10, led to a credit of only \$50 million. It was not until

the economic crisis in October, which reached its climax during Ochab's visit to the United States, that an offer of American aid followed similar initiatives by the Soviet Union. To discuss these matters, a delegation of the United States Government, headed by Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller arrived in Warsaw on November 16. After long negotiations and in spite of the growing tension in 1960, another agreement was signed on July 21, in which the United States promised to sell surpluses of agricultural production for \$130 million to Poland on favorable conditions. From time to time, however, even apparently minor incidents, such as the expulsion from Poland on November 12, 1959, of the well-informed American press correspondent A. M. Rosenthal, troubled Polish-American relations which suffered particularly in the summer of 1961 when Gomulka fully supported Khrushchev in the Berlin crisis. Nevertheless, in spite of so many disappointments, American support continues to be the only hope of the Poles.

These hopes are no longer expectations of a "liberation" in the near future, but there still is a conviction that the captive nations—captive in spite of all Russian protests against the use of that term—will not be entirely forgotten or sacrificed to either Russian or German interests. There is also a hope that Western public opinion will prove strong enough to prevent, after the brief years of "thaw," a new "frost" that would destroy what remains of Poland's limited freedoms—in particular freedom of worship and freedom from fear—gained in the year 1956.

4: EAST GERMANY *

Karl C. Thalheim

In the part of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union all power clearly rests with the German Socialist Unity Party (SED). It was formed in 1946 by uniting the Social Democratic and Communist parties, though from the beginning communist influence was dominant. Power was and is exercised primarily by a group of German communists, headed by Walter Ulbricht, who during the National Socialist period had emigrated to the Soviet Union. The men belonging to this group are unquestioning adherents of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet system. For this reason they were leaders in the sovietization of the political, cultural, economic, and social life of the Soviet zone of Germany, in the assimilation of all aspects of life there to those in the Soviet Union.¹

THE UPRISING OF JUNE 17, 1953, AND THE 'NEW COURSE'

The policy of sovietization pursued by leading communists in the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) in no way bespeaks the will of the people of this region. This truth was demonstrated with clarity by the popular uprising on June 16-17, 1953, which would have led to a total collapse of the communist system in East Germany if the revolt had not been put down by Soviet troops.

The revolt in the GDR was the first of the shocks which the communist bloc experienced after the death of Stalin. It was preceded by a declaration of the Politburo of the SED on June 9, 1953, announcing a "new course," which was put into practice in most of the other satellite states and also in the Soviet Union following the address of Premier Georgi M. Malenkov before the Supreme Soviet

* This chapter was translated by Mr. Frederick Haupt, III, with the exception of the final section, which was translated by Professor George A. von Ihering.

¹ See the chapter on "Eastern Germany" in Stephen Kertesz, ed., *The Fate of East Central Europe* (Notre Dame, 1956).

on August 8, 1953. If East Germany took the lead, it was undoubtedly not by its own decision but at Soviet direction. It was probably chosen as an area for experimentation with the new methods, because internal difficulties and the flight of refugees to West Germany—troubles which have no parallel in any of the other European areas dominated by the Soviet Union—made a change of course appear especially urgent. In any case, there was no anticipation in Moscow that the announcement of such a change shortly after the death of Stalin would be regarded by the population of the GDR as a sign of weakness in the communist system, and without doubt it played a part in the outbreak of the revolt.

Even though the badly shaken communist command was restored on the evening of June 17 by the use of Soviet military forces, the SED leadership—taken completely by surprise by this surge of popular anger—was obliged to make several concessions. Aside from a somewhat more liberal economic policy on consumer goods, these consisted mainly in a slowdown of sovietization and particularly in a temporary halt to collectivization of agriculture. The latter was an obvious symptom of the GDR's internal difficulties. There was scarcely any progress, therefore, in socialization in the years 1954 and 1955; in fact, some industrial and agricultural operations which had been expropriated were to be handed back to their refugee owners if the latter would return.

Without doubt, this halt to enforced sovietization did not involve a fundamental change in the communist line, but merely a tactical concession reminiscent of Lenin's decision in the spring of 1921 to introduce the New Economic Policy. The new course of 1953 in the GDR, however, was of short duration. As early as January 24, 1955, scarcely one and a half years after Malenkov's announcement of the new course, there appeared in *Pravda* a lead article by the then editor-in-chief, Dimitri Shepilov, entitled "The General Line of the Party and the Vulgarisms of Marxism," in which the prior development of heavy industry was designated, as usual, as the only proper economic policy in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Shortly thereafter Ulbricht followed suit, having agreed to the relaxation of 1953 obviously with considerable resistance. At the twenty-fourth session of the SED Central Committee, in the beginning of July 1955, he declared:

Many of you will wonder why I have not used the term "New Course." Of what does our policy consist? It consists and has con-

sisted of properly utilizing the effects of the objective economic laws of Socialism. . . . One of the basic principles of this policy is the priority of the development of heavy industry in the interest of assuring the upswing of industry as a whole, in fact, of the entire economy. . . . By using the term "New Course" to describe the corrective measures which we undertook in certain areas in the fall of 1953, we have occasioned several comrades to disseminate false theories about the prior development of consumer industries. At that time we corrected several economic overstatements which as a result of the throttling of production in private capitalistic operations led to a bottleneck in supplying the population. In connection with the concept of a "New Course," however, certain people have had strange ideas. In the ideological field, too, there have emerged some remarkable phenomena, some of the effects of which can still be felt. Tendencies of neutrality vis-a-vis bourgeois ideology and the spreading of superstition were strengthened. . . . The most remarkable thing about such a course would not be that it is new, but that it is false; and I cannot avoid disillusioning the people who adhere to such ideas. We never had the intention of setting such a wrong course as this and we never shall do it.

Ulbricht characterized the situation in the GDR by saying that it is in "transition from the anti-fascist-democratic order of society to a workers' and farmers' state creating the basis for Socialism"—a clear indication that he considered communist control to be once more sufficiently stabilized and the episode of the new course to be closed.

INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES DURING THE PERIOD OF DE-STALINIZATION

In the meantime events in the Soviet Union could not be without their effects in the GDR. As early as May 1955, Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade and sought to settle the conflict with Tito; and the statement which they agreed upon mentioned the possibility of "different forms of development for Socialism." This move was followed in February 1956 by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's secret speech about Stalin quickly became known and initiated the policy of de-Stalinization and the "struggle against the cult of personality." Such a policy must have been unsettling for an old Stalinist like Ulbricht; his entire attitude at this time indicated that he followed Khrushchev's words as reluctantly as he did carefully. Undoubtedly the events in Poland and

Hungary in the summer and fall of 1956 were of great importance for the protection of Ulbricht's power. Especially at this time, when there were visible breaches in the unity of the communist bloc and when Soviet supremacy in these two countries was in doubt, it must have been of the greatest value to political leaders of the Soviet Union to know that they had a man at the top in the GDR whose loyalty to the Soviet Union was absolutely certain. Ulbricht was thus not only able to maintain his position but to strengthen it. Following the death of the president of the GDR, the old communist Wilhelm Pieck, a revision of the constitution on September 12, 1960, abolished the office of president and replaced it with a Council of State possessing absolute power. Ulbricht became its chairman.

During the period of the thaw and de-Stalinization, the SED leadership also had to come to terms with internal difficulties in the area over which it ruled—still without the consent of the overwhelming majority of the population. This problem involved, in part, struggles for power within the communist leadership. In February 1958, the former Minister for State Security, Ernst Woolweber, one of the most powerful men in East Germany, and also the secretary of the SED Central Committee, Karl Schirdewan, who had been considered faithful followers of Ulbricht, were accused of factionalism and relieved of all their party functions. Another member of apparently intra-party opposition to Ulbricht was one of the leading economic specialists, the former Minister for Heavy Industry Fritz Selbmann, who had to pay for his attitude with a marked degradation.

The thaw in the Soviet Union and Poland awakened hopes in intellectual circles for a period of greater intellectual freedom; but these were crushed in the brutal grip of the SED leadership. The latter rightly considered this kind of revisionism—aided also by developments in Yugoslavia—a danger to its power. Concern about a hostile attitude toward the system on the part of the intellectuals became all the greater, because this kind of hostility had played a role in the events in Poland. The communist leadership in the GDR turned to the weapon of terror. Toward the end of November 1956 the authorities arrested one of the leading young communist intellectuals, the philosopher Wolfgang Harich, a member of a good, middle-class family, and several other scientists and publicists close to him, and charged them with "formation of a conspiratorial group hostile to the state." Several months later these dissidents were sentenced

to ten years' imprisonment. Such severe sentences were obviously intended to serve as a warning to all other revisionist intellectuals. Even such a well-known elderly scholar as the philosopher Ernst Bloch, who had returned to teach at the University of Leipzig after exile in the United States, had to cope with severe attacks and was forced to retire to an emeritus position in the autumn of 1956. Other intellectuals similarly accused of revisionism, as for example the economists Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary, could maintain their positions only by following the wishes of the party leadership and by self-criticism.

It was most embarrassing for the political leadership of the so-called workers' and farmers' state that strong opposition was noticeable even in the working class. In fact, the uprising of June 17, 1953, was primarily led by the working class; and now events in Poland (formation of workers' councils) led to the demand for co-determination in industries (factory councils, introduced after the end of the war, had been abolished in 1948). Therefore, Ulbricht in November 1956 under pressure from the Hungarian Revolution had to announce formation of factory workers' committees, though he did so with carefully chosen words which indicated that he was not serious about this move and that he had no intention of following the path pursued in Yugoslavia with its self-government of workers in industry. Indeed, even the hesitant steps in this direction were soon halted; and in the spring of 1958 the few workers' committees which had been formed experimentally were again abandoned.

THE WAY TO FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Ulbricht's position, apart from his great tactical skill and his unscrupulousness in employing every means to maintain his power, rests primarily on the backing—which he has had in every instance—of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His foreign-policy line corresponds fully with Moscow's wishes: the progressive political and economic incorporation of the GDR into the communist bloc. This development was supported by the Soviet Union, certain of the unconditional loyalty of the SED, by increasingly reducing the external signs of the GDR's dependence and giving the government the appearance of autonomy and sovereignty.

On May 28, 1953, the former Soviet Control Commission was dissolved and a Soviet high commissioner named in its place. On August 23, 1953, the Soviet Union in connection with the new course announced its abandonment of further reparations and return of the remainder of the SAG-factories (*Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften*, large industrial works which after the war were transferred to Soviet ownership as reparations). On March 25, 1954, the Soviet Union published a declaration concerning relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR, according to which the Soviet Union "assumes the same relations with the German Democratic Republic as with other sovereign states. The German Democratic Republic will be free to decide in its own way on internal and external affairs including the question of relations with West Germany." Supervision of the activity of government agencies by the Soviet high commissioner was to cease. (In conformity with the basic attitude of the German Federal Republic toward the problem of a divided Germany, the Federal Government immediately challenged the claim to sovereignty of the GDR.) On January 25, 1955, the Soviet government declared the state of war with Germany at an end.

THE WARSAW PACT AND STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN EAST GERMANY

Political co-operation of the communist bloc countries was assured by relations of the satellite communist parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It appeared necessary to the Soviet Union, however, to institutionalize military co-operation following entry of the German Federal Republic into NATO on October 23, 1954. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was concluded between the Soviet Union, the six European "people's democracies" and the GDR. Its official title reads: "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance." "In the case of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the member nations of the treaty" it provides for automatic obligatory assistance; there was also to be a united high command located in Moscow for those units of their armed forces "which according to agreement have been placed at the disposal of this command on the basis of mutually prescribed principles"; the pact called also for co-operation in political, economic, and cultural areas. A Political Consultative Committee was formed. The various commu-

nist parties, notably that in Germany, quickly fell into line. On May 15, 1955, the day after conclusion of the pact in Warsaw, the Central Committee of the SED announced its decision to establish armed fighting forces (in reality these forces had already been established in 1952 in disguised form as the so-called *Kasernierte Volkspolizei*, the "People's Police housed in barracks"). On January 18, 1956, the People's Parliament of the GDR passed the Law for the Formation of a National People's Army and the Ministry for National Defense. At this time the People's Police housed in barracks numbered approximately 110,000 men, in addition to 45,000 reservists. As early as January 28, 1956, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact agreed to include the National People's Army in the unified military forces; like the other defense ministers of the pact nations, the defense minister of the GDR was designated as one of the deputies of the supreme commander of the unified military forces.

In a "Treaty on the Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the USSR," signed in Moscow on September 20, 1955, parties to the treaty confirmed

solemnly that relations between them are based on complete equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and on non-intervention in internal affairs. In conformity with this the German Democratic Republic is free to decide on questions concerning its domestic and foreign policies, including relations with the German Federal Republic as well as the development of relations with other states.

According to Article 4 of this treaty, "the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic in conformity with existing international agreements" are to remain "temporarily" in the GDR; they shall not, however, "interfere in the internal affairs of the German Democratic Republic or in the social or political life of the country." In connection with the conclusion of this treaty the office of the Soviet high commissioner was abolished.

All these measures were employed by the Soviets to create formal prerequisites for application of the "two-states theory," that is, the contention that the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic are two equal and sovereign states confronting each other. The doctrine of the two German states has played an increasingly important role since 1956 in the Soviet Union's attitude toward German reunification. It is challenged by the West Germans chiefly with the argument that the GDR cannot claim legitimacy by popular will,

inasmuch as there have never been free democratic elections in the GDR since its founding in October 1949. In any case it is also a matter of fact that the sovereignty of the GDR is only of a formal nature, because the SED, which completely dominates the political life of East Germany, is dependent on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and as a result all basic matters of policy are determined by the Soviet Union.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The dependence of the GDR on wishes and aims of the Soviet Union applies also to economic policy; political and military integration of the area into the communist bloc by means of the Warsaw Pact corresponded to economic integration through the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, formed in 1949 and commonly known in the Western world as COMECON. The GDR was not one of its founding members, but was accepted as a member as early as 1950. The primary aim of the Council is co-ordination of economic planning of the individual communist-bloc nations and their integration into a large-scale economy under the leadership of the Soviet Union. COMECON is an organization of states; but economic integration within the communist bloc can also be furthered by co-operation of the communist parties. This co-operation is always used when governmental means do not produce desired results. In May 1958, when Khrushchev obviously was very dissatisfied with the efforts made thus far toward integration (dissatisfaction was indicated in a speech which he had given shortly before in Budapest), a conference was called in Moscow on short notice for the purpose of eliminating existing difficulties. This was no normal council meeting, but was officially described as a "conference of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid."

Until Stalin's death COMECON had little practical significance. Since about the years 1955-1956, however, considerable efforts have been made toward economic integration of the communist bloc; and to this end, for the first time within the organizational framework of the Council, "special standing committees for economic and scientific-technical co-operation" were created. Two of these special committees, for the chemical industry and for the construction industry,

have their headquarters in East Berlin. In this new phase of the Council's activity increasing importance has been given to a division of labor among the communist-bloc countries. Its primary purpose was to use local advantages in the individual countries as well as to impose greater demands on production and thus to increase the productivity of the entire communist-bloc economy.

These goals are important for the GDR, which is a highly industrial area with an old industrial tradition. Within its division of labor the communist bloc's task is to furnish capital goods, such as machines; measuring and regulating instruments; electro-technical, precision and optical products; conveyor machines and other means of transport. These branches of the economy, as well as the chemical industry, for which there are also favorable local conditions in the GDR, have been given attention in the seven-year plan.

Efforts toward economic integration of the communist bloc were at first interrupted by the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. Today, however, these difficulties have for the most part been overcome, and as a result of this development the economy of the GDR has become dependent on the communist-bloc economy. It is thus possible to forego the development of those branches of industry not favored by local conditions, such as raw materials. Also, choice of the most appropriate and advantageous partner in foreign trade is limited, and advantages of the international division of labor can in no sense be used to the extent they are in countries of the Western world. Some of the recurrent economic difficulties in the GDR can undoubtedly be attributed to this limitation of the possibilities of foreign commerce, which in the last analysis is the result of political dependence on the Soviet Union.

This strong dependence on exchange of goods with the Soviet Union and the other communist-bloc countries is expressed statistically in the regional composition of foreign trade. Of the entire volume of foreign trade in recent years, a nearly constant 73 to 75 per cent was accounted for by foreign trade within the bloc, about 11 per cent by interzonal trade (*i.e.*, exchange of goods between the GDR and the Federal Republic), and 14 to 15 per cent by trade with other non-bloc countries. Imports from the Federal Republic and other Western countries usually are products important for the economy of the GDR, so that the economic importance of GDR trade with these countries is greater than the small percentage indicates. Continuing

importance of purchases from West Germany was evident in the autumn of 1960 when the Federal Republic, because of interference with traffic to and from Berlin, served notice that it would terminate the current interzonal trade agreement. The reaction of the government of the German Democratic Republic revealed that the loss of these supplies was very inconvenient, with the result that after prolonged negotiations the agreement was renewed. Still, the experiences of that time resulted in a stronger attempt by the GDR to make its economic policy independent of supplies from the West, including the German Federal Republic, either by developing its own production or by trading with the Soviet Union or other communist-bloc countries.

The industrial significance of the GDR is clearly indicated by the fact that along with Communist China it is the most important foreign trade partner of the Soviet Union, and in many years it has even occupied first place in Soviet foreign commerce. The GDR's share in Soviet foreign trade shows the following development (in percentages):

<i>share in</i>	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
exports	13.8	15.9	19.7	18.6	19.0
imports	16.5	17.7	19.1	18.8	17.0

The delivery of machines and industrial and transport equipment is important. In 1958 no less than 44 per cent of the Soviet Union's imports of machines and production and transport equipment was from East Germany, while Czechoslovakia, also highly industrialized, had a share of only 17 per cent. The economic advantage which the GDR can derive from this close interconnection is questionable: for at least one portion of these deliveries, the relation between cost and price, is so unfavorable that exports can be managed only with subsidies from the national budget. Moreover, the intensified economic integration of East Germany into the communist bloc restricts its economic ties to the Western world.

THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE SED (JULY 10-15, 1958) AND THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN

The Fifth Party Congress of the SED proved that leadership of the SED considered the period of civil convulsions ended. The focus of

its deliberations was resumption of sovietization of the economy as well as strengthening the GDR's economic power, especially its effect on West Germany. The final statement of the congress declared "the fundamental task in the German Democratic Republic to be the development of socialist democracy, the constructive growth of socialism, and the victory of the socialist order of society." This statement indicated an accelerated tempo in the elimination of the "residue of capitalism" from the economy of the GDR. The Secretary for Agrarian Questions in the SED Central Committee, Mueckenberger, was even clearer when he said of agriculture: "Large-scale socialist production on the farms is necessary. Therefore, while preserving the principle of voluntary action, the socialist conversion of agriculture must be completed in the shortest possible time." The "chief economic task" for East Germany was described as

the development of the political economy within a few years in such a way that the superiority of the socialist order of society over capitalist domination will be fully proven. For this reason, the per capita consumption of the working population of all foodstuffs and consumer goods must be higher than the per capita consumption of the entire population in West Germany. This task is our Republic's share in the world-wide struggle for peaceful co-existence and for peaceful competition between the socialist and capitalist social orders, in which the superiority of our socialist order will be proven.

Ulbricht drew the political conclusion when he declared in his closing remarks: "It is necessary to speed up the tempo of economic development of the German Democratic Republic so that the East wind shall be more strongly felt in West Germany."

Decisions of the party congress found expression in the "Seven-Year Plan for the Development of the Economy of the German Democratic Republic in the years 1959-1965," which was to take effect on January 1, 1959, but was not proclaimed law until October 1. In this regard, too, the GDR followed the example of the Soviet Union. In Russia the goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan had been set so high that they were unattainable. The plan was suddenly broken off and, on January 1, 1959, replaced by a Seven-Year Plan. The Seven-Year Plan of the GDR also announced that the "primary economic task" is to "catch up with and surpass West Germany in the per capita consumption of most industrial consumer goods and foodstuffs," the end of 1961 being set as the target date. It can be said even now that the

GDR has failed in this task. The spring and summer of 1961 again brought supply problems for both foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods—clear proof that sources of supply were far below levels in West Germany and that there was not the slightest possibility of overtaking the latter in most fields of consumer goods.

PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIZATION

Difficulties in supplying agricultural products resulted to no small extent from the fact that in 1960 one of the chief demands of the Fifth Party Congress was fulfilled, namely “constructive growth of socialism.” The form which this growth took in East Germany was the agricultural co-operative association, for which the Soviet *Kolkhoz* served as a model. Type III of the agricultural co-operative association is closely related to this model, even though differences remain. (In the GDR there are three types of agricultural co-operative associations.) Thus even Type III allows the farmer to retain formal ownership, while the Soviet Union permits only state ownership; in practice, however, this difference matters little. By the end of 1959 approximately half the arable land of the GDR had been collectivized, if the shares of the agricultural co-operative associations and the “people’s farms” (state farms) are taken together. Toward the end of January 1960 the SED began its program of forced collectivization. This program used severe—primarily psychological—pressure on the farmer still operating on a private basis and forced him to enter the co-operative association. Within a few months all districts of the GDR announced the complete collectivization of agriculture. The GDR could boast a higher degree of collectivization than the Soviet Union where there are still a few, though very few, individual private farms.

The dogmatic obstinacy with which the SED forcibly eliminated the independent farmer without regard for economic consequences has already been bitterly paid for. It is easy to see that the formerly independent farmer had little incentive for higher production. Moreover, often the directors of the agricultural co-operative associations were obviously unqualified. Finally, the agricultural labor shortage in the GDR, which in any case is a difficult problem, was intensified by forced collectivization, because a sizable number of the members of families working on farms refused to enter the agricultural co-operative associations. The result of all these factors is that the great increases in agricultural production expected by the SED on the basis

of its faith in communist ideology have in no way been attained and, indeed, there has been a decrease. Inasmuch as the food situation throughout the entire communist bloc is difficult—to no small degree one can blame the failure of agrarian experiments in Communist China—shortages in the GDR cannot be offset by deliveries from other communist-bloc countries.

These unhappy experiences have caused the SED not to force socialization or collectivization in other branches of the economy. In industry, of course, only a few private operations remain; the 7,826 private industrial concerns which remained at the end of 1959 accounted for only 5 per cent of the total industrial output. An intermediate form of socialization of industry has been in use since 1956, the so-called “semi-state operations.” These are private businesses in which the state is interested (for example, with regard to their importance for export trade) and which are induced, or in many cases forced, to accept capital investment from the state. By the end of 1959 there were 3,534 such “semi-state industrial concerns,” accounting for 6 per cent of the total industrial output. A similar function is served by “commission agreements” between remaining private retail businesses and the state-owned retail operations; these arrangements reduce the former private owner to the status of a subordinate branch manager.

The crafts are the only business operations in which private ownership still plays a predominant role. In the Soviet Union they were collectivized in the same way as were the private farms, by incorporating independent businesses into a co-operative association. The GDR, too, wanted to use the same method; and a decree of August 18, 1955, laid the legal basis for co-operative associations of the crafts. Further decrees brought about a deterioration of the position of private craftsmen, while material incentives induced them to join the co-operative associations. Nevertheless, the resistance of the independent craftsmen remained strong, with the result that, despite increasing pressure, by 1959 only 20 per cent of craft production was by the co-operative associations. After the collectivization of small farms was completed, it was generally expected that a forced collectivization of the crafts would follow; but it has not yet taken place. Private crafts are temporarily indispensable in providing the population with household goods and services; and, in fact, state-owned concerns have demonstrated little efficiency in this area. Even the SED realized that forced

collectivization of the crafts would be noticeably detrimental to its "primary economic task" of overtaking and surpassing the consumer level in West Germany. This realization assures the private crafts in East Germany a reprieve, but it will not be more than that. The proclaimed goal of the SED is still to assimilate the economic order of the German Democratic Republic with that of the Soviet Union. It must be assumed that in all probability socialization and collectivization—more carefully timed—will continue.

FLIGHT TO THE WEST

One of the most embarrassing results of pressure exerted on the population in the form of collectivization of agriculture, as well as the lower standard of living as compared with the Federal Republic, has been the unending mass flight of refugees to West Germany. The following figures for the years 1952-1961 show the number of refugees from the GDR who registered at the three refugee camps in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic:

	<i>number of refugees</i>
1952	182,393
1953	331,390
1954	184,198
1955	252,870
1956	279,189
1957	261,622
1958	204,092
1959	143,917
1960	199,188
1961	207,026
<i>total</i>	2,245,885*

** Monthly Statistics for 1961*

January-June	103,159
July	30,415
August	47,433
September	14,821
October	5,366
November	3,412
December	2,420
<i>total</i>	207,026

In these ten years the GDR lost over two million people through escape to West Germany—in its form and extent a unique occurrence in today's world. The GDR is the only country on earth whose population is decreasing. The following population figures for the GDR including East Berlin are based on official statistics: 1949, 18,892,000; 1959, 17,298,000. In one decade the population decreased by 1,600,000, even though in the same period the births exceeded the deaths by 760,000. Presumably many returnees from Soviet PW camps and "settlers" from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line entered the GDR, and there also was some emigration from the Federal Republic to the GDR. All in all refugees during the 11 years from 1949-1959 must have amounted to much more than 2,500,000.

These figures, of which world opinion has taken remarkably little notice, indicate the resistant attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population of the GDR toward the communist system. Moreover, this continual emigration means reduction in the labor force. The emigrants are able-bodied persons of employable age, among them an unusually large number of young people under 25 years of age (from 1952 to 1959 they accounted for almost exactly half the refugees); this is a great hindrance to attainment of the ambitious aims of the Seven-Year Plan. Since a large number of refugees took the route through West Berlin, this mass exodus was certainly one of the reasons why the SED and the Soviet Union have raised the Berlin question.

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Combined with the flight of refugees from the GDR, the existence of West Berlin, with its over two million inhabitants, as an island of the free world surrounded by communist territory, is without parallel in the entire Soviet area. It is true that the Western powers paid for their rights in the three Western sectors of the German capital by pulling out from large and economically important parts of Germany

There were two main reasons for the high number of refugees in September 1961: there were many refugees who came over to West Germany *before* August 13, when the East Germans erected the wall dividing Berlin, but who registered *after* that date; also, a large number of East Germans who came to West Germany merely for a visit decided not to return to their homes after the erection of the wall.

which originally were occupied by them. When American and British troops on July 1, 1945, began to withdraw to the line of demarcation agreed upon before the end of the Second World War they already occupied all of Thuringia, large parts of the State and the Prussian Province of Saxony, as well as smaller portions of Mecklenburg. That meant the Soviet Union could take over highly developed and thickly populated industrial areas without having participated in their occupation.

But the presence of free West Berlin in the communist domain was the cause of many difficulties and much annoyance to the SED and the Soviet Union. The immutable and unequivocal rejection of the communist system by the people of West Berlin is—not only for the outside world but for people living under communist domination—all too clear a refutation of the thesis with which the SED seeks to justify its rule: namely, that the goals which it pursues and the system it has created in collaboration with the Soviet occupation force reflects the true will of the people and therefore true democracy. On the basis of the Four-Power Statute the SED is permitted in the three Western sectors of Berlin. For reasons difficult to understand, it availed itself of this legal right to participate in the elections to the West Berlin House of Representatives in 1954 and 1958, and on each occasion suffered a catastrophic defeat. The SED polled the following percentage of the total vote: 1954, 2.7; 1958, 1.9. It is especially significant here that the number of communist votes declined in 1958, even though Khrushchev had issued his Berlin ultimatum before the election (which took place on December 7, 1958). For purposes of comparison it should be noted that in the twelve administrative districts of Berlin which form today's Western sectors the communist vote from the time of the state assembly elections in 1921 to the Reichstag elections in 1932 increased from 9.3 to 28.2 per cent. For most of those persons who had previously seen in it the promise of a better future, direct experience with the reality of communism led them into the ranks of its enemies. Even in the workers' districts, as for example in Wedding, where the communist vote was regularly high in the elections before 1933, the SED could not rally more than about 3 per cent of the vote.

After these elections, it must have been clear that it was impossible for the SED to win support of large portions of the population either in West Berlin or in West Germany. Communist leaders also

must have found it all the more unpleasant not only that flight from the GDR to West Germany through West Berlin was easier than across the rigorously guarded zonal boundary (refugees coming to West Berlin are flown to West Germany), but that thousands of daily visitors came from the GDR to the Western sectors of Berlin where they could see the higher living standards of the Western world and, above all, could breathe the air of free men. The internal resistance of the great majority of the people of the GDR toward the sovietization forced upon them could be more easily and quickly broken if this constant contact with the world of freedom, true democracy, and an elevated living standard were impossible.

Behind the concessions which the Soviet Union made regarding the presence and rights of the Western powers in the Western sectors of Berlin was very probably the assumption that it would be possible within a relatively short time, and without the use of military force, to drive the Western powers out of Berlin and integrate it into the communist domain. The blockade of West Berlin begun in June 1948, for which the separate currency reform offered a welcome pretext, was an attempt to accomplish this. It failed after eleven months, mainly because of the airlift which the Soviets had considered impossible.²

After the failure of the Berlin blockade the Soviet Union must have realized that its hope of getting all Germany under its control, thus obtaining the most important springboard for expansion into Western Europe, had been dashed. Moreover, the popular uprising of June 17, 1953, must have left no doubt whatever that the Soviets had not broken the internal resistance to sovietization by the great majority of the people of the GDR. If the Soviet Union and the SED had any doubts that free elections—as the prerequisite for the reunification of Germany—would mean the end of communist rule in the GDR (the communist leaders probably had been aware of this for a long time), then these developments must have removed those doubts.

Therefore the communist leadership determined upon a five-point policy:

- 1) the sovietization of the GDR and its political, military, and economic integration into the communist bloc;
- 2) that the Soviet Union and the SED were not prepared to agree to free elections as a prerequisite to German reunification;

² *The Fate of East Central Europe*, pp. 163-166.

3) a repetition of the unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the freedom of West Berlin and to subject the city to communist domination was reserved for an appropriate time;

4) communist propaganda aimed at representing conditions in the GDR in terms of social progress and as superior to developments in West Germany;

5) if reunification of Germany under communist auspices appeared temporarily unattainable, at least the effort should be made to promote the "two-states theory" mentioned above and to gain recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state.

It has already been described how the Soviet Union in its own way tried to create for the GDR a kind of pseudo-sovereignty. With increasing clarity Soviet policy, even outside the communist bloc, was directed toward gaining legal recognition for the GDR. In the period under consideration the political fate of the GDR was closely connected with the all-German problem, that is, the reunification of Germany.

It is impossible to describe in detail all the negotiations over the fate of the whole of Germany. The policy of the Western powers as well as that of the Federal Republic—with several variations in detail—has been directed toward rejection of all Soviet proposals which would have rendered impossible a free expression of the will of the GDR's population. This may be the decisive reason why all negotiations on the German question have come to naught. "Reunification in peace and freedom" repeatedly has been confirmed by the Federal Republic of Germany as the goal in dealing with the German question. On the other hand, all Soviet proposals—by skillful use of terminology which is also common in the Western world—aimed at the establishment of conditions in a reunited Germany which would have made possible, even in its western half, the complete seizure of power by methods similar to those employed in the GDR. The same is true of the proposal still under consideration to convert West Berlin into a free city. This latter proposal is intended to create conditions in West Berlin for incorporating the Western sectors into the GDR.

The basic attitude which the United States, Great Britain, and France take toward the German problem and, therefore, toward the fate of the GDR and Berlin, is set out in the final act of the con-

ference held in London, September 28 to October 3, 1954. In it the three powers declared:

- 1) They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.
- 2) In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
- 3) A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.
- 4) The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.
- 5) The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

The other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization associated themselves with this declaration through a protocol of October 23, 1954.

Nothing has changed in this basic attitude of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The Western powers have consistently rejected repeated attempts of the Soviet Union by the most diverse methods to gain recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state.

For a long time the Soviet Union tried to postpone incorporation of the Federal Republic into the Western defense system by kindling hopes for "reunification in freedom" on the understanding that Germany would be neutralized. The Soviet Union was most interested in preventing the establishment of the European Defense Community, and after EDC was wrecked on the resistance of France it wished to prevent accession of the Federal Republic to the Western European Union and North Atlantic Treaty. Before the passage by the West German Bundestag of the Paris treaties of October 23, 1954, between the United States and the Western European nations, the Soviet Union, on January 15, 1955, published a declaration which

clearly revealed this attitude. Ratification of the Paris treaties, the declaration said, would "fix the division of Germany for many years to come. In the event of the ratification of the Paris agreements the Bundestag assumes the awesome responsibility for the continuation of the partition of Germany." If, however, "plans for the remilitarization of West Germany and for its incorporation into military groupings" are abandoned, "the carrying out of all-German free elections" for the purpose of the reunification of Germany would still be possible in 1955, and that, in fact, on the basis of an electoral law which could be drawn "with due consideration for the electoral laws of the GDR and the German Federal Republic." The reference to the law of the GDR clearly revealed the dangerous trap concealed in the Soviet proposals, for the unity-list system decreed by the SED has made free and democratic elections impossible in the GDR. Obviously the enticing Soviet promises were intended to induce a Bundestag decision against the Paris treaties. If the Bundestag had rejected the Paris treaties, it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union and the SED would have permitted free elections in the GDR in the traditions of Western democracy.

After the Federal Republic accepted the Paris treaties on March 24, 1955, the Soviet Union made its answer by concluding the Warsaw Pact, of which the GDR became a member. Hope now centered on the Geneva summit conference of the then four heads of government, Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden, and Faure (July 1955). Even Bulganin agreed to the wording of the directives concerning the German problem which the heads of government decided upon for the succeeding foreign ministers conference:

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

When the Conference of Foreign Ministers met, however, on October 27, 1955, it became apparent how divergent were the views of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The Soviet Union made an effort to have the GDR representatives drawn into the negotiations and thus gain practical recognition of their government. This effort was rejected, inasmuch as the West had established the Federal Re-

public as sole representative of all Germany. Even before the conference, in order to make possible the exclusion of the question of recognition of the GDR, the Federal Republic gave up direct participation in the Geneva negotiations and sent only a delegation of observers.

The course of the Geneva foreign ministers conference was to a large extent determined by the relation of the German question to European security, which cannot here be examined in detail. The attitude of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov revealed that the Soviet Union was not ready to agree to the reunification of Germany on a democratic basis. Molotov acknowledged the principle of German reunification "with the help of elections," but he devalued this statement by saying: "We do not regard German elections as isolated, but as a task which is subordinate to the solution of other problems." This position meant rejection of the proposal of the Western powers to hold free all-German elections in 1956.

Molotov emphasized strongly the necessity of maintaining the conditions created by communism in the GDR, which he called—for the first time on this high level—"social achievements," the continuance of which must be guaranteed in a reunified Germany. Inasmuch as two German states exist, he said, a "mechanical amalgamation" of the Federal Republic and the GDR would not be possible. Molotov attacked the remilitarization of West Germany and the alleged "rule of monopolistic capitalism" there. This attack was in accord with the long-standing attitude of the Soviet Union, which was to proclaim the conditions which communism had created in the GDR as the realization of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 and to reproach the Western powers for not having real democracy in their occupation zones—an impressive example of how differently such concepts are interpreted by the Western nations and the Soviet Union.

The attitude of the Soviet Union was tantamount to a demand for recognition of the continued partition of Germany and of the existence of two German states to which the Western powers neither could nor would accede. The conference therefore failed.

Since then the Soviet Union has demanded recognition of the existence of "both German states" and reunification on the basis of a "confederation" between the Federal Republic and the GDR. Article 2 of the Soviet draft for a peace treaty with Germany which the Soviet Union transmitted to the Western powers on January 10, 1959, read as follows:

Pending the unification of Germany in one or another form the expression 'Germany' in the present treaty will be understood to include the two existing German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—and all the rights and obligations of Germany, foreseen in the treaty, will relate to the German Democratic Republic, as well as to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 9 contains a categorical renunciation of Germany's claims to territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line; and Article 18, Germany's obligation "to dissolve and under the threat of criminal punishment not to allow on its territory the existence and the activities of any type of organization, including emigrant, carrying on hostile activity against any of the Allied and Associated Powers." (According to all previous experience, the idea of "hostile activity" would be loosely interpreted by the Soviet Union.) There is not a word about free elections in the entire draft, and just as little about the conditions under which a confederation of the "two existing German states" would be established. Statements of the SED indicate that it demands full parity in a confederation, even though the 56 million people living in the Federal Republic and West Berlin constitute a population more than three times greater than that of the Soviet occupation zone and East Berlin. Confederation under such circumstances would serve no other purpose than to bring all Germany under communist rule in the same way the communist government of Czechoslovakia was established in 1948. Unanimous rejection of proposals of this kind by the Western powers as well as by the Federal Republic is understandable. The Federal Republic continues to adhere to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine which regards diplomatic recognition of the GDR as an unfriendly act. The doctrine came to a test when Yugoslavia in October 1957 assumed diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic, whereupon the Federal Republic immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

The above-mentioned draft of a Soviet peace treaty contained in Article 25 the following settlement for West Berlin: "Until the re-establishment of the unity of Germany and the creation of a unified German state, West Berlin will be in the position of a demilitarized free city on the basis of its own special statute." This proposal expresses Khrushchev's demand in a speech at Moscow in early November 1958 for elimination of the occupation regime in West Berlin

"and therefore for the opportunity to create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic." The Soviet Union on November 28, 1958, addressed its notes on the question of Berlin to the governments of the Western powers, the Federal Republic, and the German Democratic Republic. In these notes the Soviet Union expressed its intention of

transferring to the German Democratic Republic the functions temporarily performed by the Soviet authorities by virtue of the above-mentioned Allied agreements and under the agreement between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955.

The note emphasized that "the most correct and natural way to solve the problem would be for the western part of Berlin, now actually detached from the GDR, to be reunited with its eastern part and for Berlin to become a unified city within the state in whose territory it is situated." Under present circumstances, it said, this solution of the problem would involve great difficulties. "In view of all these considerations, the Soviet Government on its part would consider it possible to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of West Berlin into an independent political unit—a free city, without any state, including both existing German states, interfering in its life." Further on it proposes: "In its turn West Berlin would undertake not to permit in its territory any hostile subversive activity directed against the GDR or any other state."

The threat expressed in the note, originally limited to six months, amounted to an ultimatum to the three Western powers. The proposal (also included in the above-mentioned Soviet draft of a peace treaty for Germany) to convert the three Western sectors of Berlin into a "demilitarized free city" meant withdrawal of the troops of the United States and the other two Western powers; and it also meant dissolution of West Berlin's close ties with the Federal Republic of Germany which are of utmost importance for the city's economy, and, therefore, of the material basis for its entire existence, because without financial aid West Berlin could never have attained the favorable situation it enjoys today.

Despite Soviet assurances to the contrary, it cannot be doubted that the conversion of the Western sectors presently under the protection of American, British, and French troops into an allegedly "free city" would help the GDR gain control of all Berlin at a mo-

ment deemed appropriate by the Soviet Union. The special difficulties for the communist rulers in the GDR caused by the existence of free West Berlin have played a role in this policy; and it is probable that Khrushchev was induced by the SED leadership, with Ulbricht at its head, to take rigorous action and issue his ultimatum, the expiration date of which, however, was postponed in subsequent negotiations.

It is not possible to discuss in this essay the complicated developments in the Berlin question since November 1958. Repeated assertion by the communists that West Berlin belongs to the territory of the "German Democratic Republic" has been decisively rejected by the Western powers. For example, in March 1960 the US Department of State published a photographic copy of the agreement signed in London on March 12, 1944, by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union concerning the parts of Germany to be occupied by their military forces; and it declared at this time:

The documents make clear that the Berlin area was not 'part of' or 'on' the territory to be occupied by any of the Powers under the agreement. Rather, the agreement clearly indicates that Berlin was designated as a separate area to be jointly occupied. The Allied military forces have remained in Berlin without relinquishing the rights derived from the military defeat of Nazi Germany. There is, therefore, no basis for suggesting that Berlin has been somehow mysteriously merged with or placed on the territory of one of the occupation powers.

The Western powers, in any case, are now having to pay for the fact that in recent years they have not reacted with sufficient energy to the increasing incorporation of East Berlin into the German Democratic Republic and to its growing militarization. They are also having to pay for their insufficient attention to, and refutation of, the repeated communist propaganda claims that the Potsdam Agreement has not been realized in West Germany. In both cases the West has had ample opportunities not only to point to the falsity of the claims and legal violations by the communists, but to resort to counterattack. Unfortunately, official policy, even that of the United States, has made use of these opportunities only to a very slight degree. The position of the Western powers in the struggle for Berlin would be better and easier in more than one respect, if they had made these counterattacks. President Kennedy, in his address of July 26, 1961,

clearly demonstrated how the actual situation in East Germany could be used for an active Western policy, when he said of the refugees from East Germany that "they have voted with their feet for the Western form of freedom."

The maintenance of the rights of the three Western powers in West Berlin and the safeguarding of the freedom of its 2,250,000 inhabitants continue to be of the greatest importance for the psychological attitude of the 17 million people living in East Germany and East Berlin. Six years ago I wrote at the conclusion of my chapter on the developments in Eastern Germany in *The Fate of East Central Europe*: "The stand of the Western powers, especially the United States, toward the problem of German reunification, and their corresponding actions, will be of decisive moment for the future political attitude of the people of the Soviet Occupation Zone." This sentence still retains its meaning today. Under present conditions there is, to be sure, little hope for the early realization of German reunification. It is all the more important, therefore, that the position of the free world in West Berlin remain unchanged and unshaken.

THE WALL ACROSS BERLIN

During the summer of 1961 the number of refugees fleeing from East to West Germany by way of West Berlin increased more and more; thus, for example, in West Berlin and in the two West German emergency reception camps for refugees at Giessen and Uelzen during July 1961 a total of 30,415 applications for emergency admission were registered, as against only 16,543 in July 1960. For psychological propaganda reasons this growing exodus became extremely embarrassing to the SED, all the more since the serious trouble which the GDR had continually had in procuring manpower grew even more urgent. The SED, therefore, tried to brand this mass flight as "slave trade," as exemplified in the following resolution of the "Central Democratic Bloc in the GDR," passed on July 31, 1961:

Accomplices to this barbaric trade are also the secret services of the imperialist powers of USA, England, and France who are abusing their presence in West Berlin to the purpose of luring citizens of the GDR to West Berlin and West Germany and of persuading them to spy against the workers' and farmers' state.

In reality, of course, there is no such thing as a "slave trade" or any organized propaganda for emigration to the West; the great increase in the flight to the West had to be explained in the first place by the growing fear of the East German population that the escape routes through West Berlin would soon be closed permanently. Although the Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht, stated in an interview with a journalist of the London *Evening Standard* on July 31 that there was no threat of closing the border, nor the intention of doing so, he modified this statement by stipulating "that the other side should manifest peaceful intentions by changing [its course] to normal relations." With this formulation Ulbricht tried again to tie the Berlin question to the conclusion of a peace treaty with "both German states."

However, that the people of East Germany did not put any trust in assurances of this kind became evident by the daily increase in the number of refugees during the first half of August; and very soon their skepticism was to be justified. During the night of August 12-13, the borders between the Soviet sector of Berlin and the three Western sectors were closed and East German authorities began to erect walls and barbed-wire fences, sealing off all crossing points as well. By this means practically all chances of flight from the Soviet-occupied territories to West Berlin were stopped, and the inhabitants of that region could no longer maintain, as before, direct contact with the free world by visiting West Berlin. Furthermore, 60,000 so-called border commuters (*Grenzgänger*), i.e., people residing in East Berlin, but working in West Berlin—mainly persons who had been permanently employed, in many cases for ten and more years, by West Berlin firms or households—were barred from reaching their jobs; by an ordinance of the East Berlin municipal authorities they were required "either to report to their last place of employment in democratic Berlin for re-employment, or to register with their local labor exchange for the assignment of suitable work." In brutal disregard of all humane aspects, the wall that split the former German capital physically also cut off innumerable relationships of kin and friendship whose preservation up to then had still been possible even across the sector borders of Berlin. Although temporarily "the visit of peaceful West Berlin citizens to the capital of the GDR" was still permitted by producing their West Berlin identity cards, this concession was cancelled on August 26.

Along with the blocking of the Eastern sector a communiqué of the Ministerial Council of the GDR was published, giving the following explanation for the closing of the border:

To stop hostile activities of the revanchist and militaristic West German powers at the borders of the GDR, and of the Western sectors of Greater Berlin, a control will be introduced such as is customary at the borders of every sovereign state. A reliable guard and official control must be guaranteed at the West Berlin border in order to thwart subversive activities. These borders may be crossed by citizens of the GDR only with special permit. As long as West Berlin has not been changed into a demilitarized, neutral Free City, citizens of the GDR will require a special certificate for the crossing of the border to West Berlin.

A "Declaration of the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states," also published on August 13, fully sanctioned the measures adopted by the communist regime of East Germany. Among other things it said:

The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states address the People's Chamber [Legislature] and Government of the GDR, and all working people of the GDR, with a proposal to establish such an order on the borders of West Berlin which would securely block the way for subversive activity against the Socialist-camp countries, so that reliable safeguards and effective control can be established around the whole territory of West Berlin including its borders with Democratic Berlin. . . .

The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states understand, of course, that protective measures along the borders of West Berlin will somewhat inconvenience the population. But the entire responsibility for the obtaining situation rests exclusively with the Western powers and with the FRG [West Germany] in the first place. If so far the borders of West Berlin have remained opened, this was done in the hope that the Western powers would not abuse the goodwill of the Government of the GDR. But they, disregarding the interests of the German people and the Berlin population, used the order now operating on the border of West Berlin for their own perfidious, subversive aims. Stronger protection and control on the border with West Berlin must put an end to the present abnormal situation. At the same time, the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states find it necessary to emphasize that this necessity will disappear when a peaceful settlement with Germany is achieved and the questions awaiting their solution are settled on this basis.

With the closure of practically all lines of communication within a large city—a fact that has no parallel in the whole world except perhaps in Jerusalem—the very last remnants of the four-power statutes on Berlin were disposed of by the communists, and the integration of East Berlin into the territory of the so-called German Democratic Republic was concluded. The tremendous psychological impact that this has had on the population of the Soviet zone of Germany and East Berlin, as well as on the people of West Berlin, has apparently still not been fully appreciated by the rest of the Western world. For the inhabitants of the Soviet-occupied territory the wall across Berlin means the final wrecking of any hopes for a German reunification in freedom. Ever since the suppression of the people's revolt of June 17, 1953, followed by the catastrophic ending of the Hungarian upheaval in October 1956, the people of East Germany, whose large majority, even today, is noncommunist, have not been so much in danger of eventually becoming communists, as of giving up all hope in the face of an apparently invincible power of Soviet communism. But also to the 2,250,000 inhabitants of West Berlin the events of August 13, 1961, caused such a shock as no previous communist threats and actions, not even the blockade from June 1948 to May 1949, could ever have achieved.

This shock was intensified by the reluctant way in which the Western powers reacted to the acts of usurpation on the part of the communist regime. It is true, in a statement issued on August 13 with President Kennedy's approval, Secretary of State Rusk declared, among other things:

Available information indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not at the Allied position in West Berlin or access thereto. However, limitation on travel within Berlin is a violation of the four-power status of Berlin and a flagrant violation of the right of free circulation throughout the city. Restrictions on travel between East Germany and Berlin are in direct contravention of the four-power agreement reached at Paris on June 20, 1949. These violations of existing agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through appropriate channels.

Also the three military commandants of West Berlin on August 15 handed a letter to their Soviet counterpart in which they protested against "flagrant violation of the four-power agreements on Berlin"

and against "the illegal measures introduced on August 13"; the Russian commandant, however, answered "that the attempt by the commandant of the American forces in Berlin to interfere with measures of the Government of the GDR, which concern exclusively the competence of the Government of the GDR and serve the protection of the lawful interests of the republic and its citizens, are completely out of place." The view of the West Berlin population—documented also by a mass demonstration against the border closing on August 16 which was attended by some 250,000 people—was expressed by Mayor Willy Brandt in a letter to President Kennedy (it became known by an indiscretion), from which we quote the following sentences:

The measures taken by the Ulbricht regime supported by the Soviet Union and the rest of the East bloc have almost completely destroyed the remainder of the four-power status. While formerly the commandants of the Allied powers in Berlin have protested against parades by the so-called People's Army, they have to content themselves now with a late and not very powerful step following the military occupation of the East sector by the People's Army. The illegal sovereignty of the East Berlin Government has been recognized by acceptance as far as the restrictions of the crossing points and access to the East sector are concerned. This I deem a serious turning point in the city's post-war history such as there has not been since the blockade.

The development has not changed the determination of West Berlin's population to defend themselves, but it was apt to arouse doubts about the Western powers' ability to react and about their determination. The deciding issue is that the West has always insisted on the four-power status. I know well that the guarantees for the freedom of the population, for the presence of troops and free access apply to West Berlin alone. Despite this, it is a serious turning point in the life of the German people and means a partial ousting of the common responsibility (for Berlin and Germany as a whole) by which the entire Western prestige is affected. I see the psychological-political danger in a double respect: 1) Inactivity and mere defensive tactics could bring about a crisis in confidence toward the West. 2) Inactivity and mere defensive tactics can lead to an overexaggerated self-assertion of the East Berlin regime, which is already boasting in its newspapers today of the success of its military demonstration of power.

The Soviet Union has achieved half of its free-city proposals through the deployment of the German People's Army. The second act has become a matter of time. After the second act there would

be a Berlin that is like a ghetto, a Berlin that has not only lost its function as a haven of freedom and as the symbol of the hope for unification, but that would also be cut off from the free part of Germany. We might then witness a flight out of Berlin instead of a flight to Berlin.

The governments of the three Western powers protested on August 17 with notes of identical content to the Government of the USSR against the closing-off of East Berlin. Complaining of a "flagrant, and particularly serious, violation of the quadripartite status of Berlin," the American note added that the United States Government

considers that the measures which the East German authorities have taken are illegal. It reiterates that it does not accept the pretension that the Soviet sector of Berlin forms a part of the so-called German Democratic Republic and that Berlin is situated on its territory. Such pretension is in itself a violation of the solemnly pledged word of the USSR in the Agreement on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin. Moreover, the United States Government cannot admit the right of the East German authorities to authorize their armed forces to enter the Soviet sector of Berlin.

In an answering note, delivered to the United States Government on August 18, the Government of the USSR stated that it "fully understands and supports the actions of the Government of the GDR"; it reaffirmed the pretension that West Berlin was "situated on the territory of the GDR" and repudiated the reference to the four-power agreement as "groundless and absurd."

It was a great boost to the morale of West Berliners that President Kennedy on August 19 sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to visit West Berlin as his personal representative, and on August 30 appointed General Lucius D. Clay to serve as his personal representative in Berlin with the rank of ambassador. The developments during the following weeks were marked by a repeated exchange of notes, continuous tightening of the barred frontier, and numerous incidents at the sector and zone borders; for a time, American and Soviet tanks were even confronting each other directly. All protests of the Western powers were unable to change the isolation of East Berlin and to prevent what practically means her complete integration into the GDR. At the time of this writing, the Soviet threat is still weighing heavily on West Berlin. It is opposed by the unequivocal guarantee of the United States to preserve the freedom of the

2,250,000 West Berliners. President Kennedy emphasized this guarantee in his speech to the General Assembly of the UN on September 25, 1961, with the following words:

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin—and there is—it is because of threats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Western powers, and the freedom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible. A 'peace treaty' which carried with it provisions which destroy the peace would be a fraud. A 'free city' which was not genuinely free would suffocate freedom and would be an infamy. For a city or a people to be truly free, they must have the secure right, without economic, political or police pressure, to make their own choice and to live their own lives. And as I have said before, if anyone doubts the extent to which our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in all Berlin and, if possible, among all the German people. . . .

The Western powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin and the self-determination of these citizens.

5: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ivo D. Duchacek

When the communist leaders of Czechoslovakia commemorate the successive anniversaries of their accession to power, they do so with gusto and glee. They display their pride over the exemplary fashion in which they seized power on February 25, 1948.¹ Not only their opponents in 1948 but communist leaders themselves were surprised at the ease with which power had passed from the hands of the National Front Coalition government.² Klement Gottwald, the first communist prime minister and chairman of the Communist Party, had shown his astonishment in conversation with other party leaders, reportedly in the following words: "It was like cutting butter with a sharp knife." The noncommunist majority had been sliced to pieces by a well-organized and Soviet-supported communist minority.

There thus has been well over a decade of communism in Czechoslovakia, and it is proper to inquire what happened to the country during this novel era of its history. What did the new Czechoslovakia look like? In 1960 it adopted a new name, that of Socialist Republic, and a new constitution which recorded Czechoslovakia's claim to be second only to the Soviet Union in the matter of building communism; the higher form of proletarian development (that is, socialism, in Lenin's sense of the word) was allegedly reached in 1960. Had Czechoslovakia in truth become the showplace of Marxism?

¹ For a detailed description of the communist takeover see the author's article in *The Fate of East Central Europe, Hopes and Failures Of American Foreign Policy* (Notre Dame, 1956), pp. 179-218. The period of the thaw was described in the author's article, "A Loyal Satellite," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, May 1958, pp. 115-22; the nature of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was also analyzed in the author's essay, "Czechoslovakia's Communism—A Profile," published by the Czech review *Svědectví* (New York, 1958), pp. 226-63.

² Two Marxist parties, the communists and the Social Democrats, and three non-Marxist parties, the National-Socialists, the Christian Democrats (People's Party) and the Slovak Democrats, formed the National Front coalition from 1945-1948.

Or was it another example of the dominance of the Soviet power over internal and external policies in East Central Europe?

Through the fourteen years of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy, leaders of the Communist Party not only maintained but consolidated, as well, their monopoly of power. This was at least partly due to their ability to preserve a careful unity among themselves on all major issues. In the difficult period following Stalin's death they proved able to avoid dramatic factional clashes which characterized other Soviet bloc communist parties including that of the Soviet Union. Essentially the same leading group whom Stalin, Beria, and Molotov trusted and whose loyalty to Moscow was confirmed by Malenkov enjoy the confidence of Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party³ entered the post-Stalin era already purged, so to speak, of the representatives of rigid Stalinism. This had been done under the banner of anti-cosmopolitanism and with open expressions of chauvinism, coupled with the "proletarian anti-semitism" which had marked the last years of Stalinism. At the only major and also the last purge trial in the history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, held at the Prague prison of Pankrác November 20-27, 1952, eleven former leaders of the Party (out of fourteen defendants) were sent to the gallows; of these eleven, eight were Jews, some speaking Czech with a German accent. These facts were stressed by both the press and the prosecutor. It was a clear attempt on the part of the Communist Party to don the mask of chauvinism and to thrive on the feelings of anti-semitism among the Czech and Slovak masses. It was the second time the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia tried to identify itself with the jingo fringe of Czech and Slovak nationalism: in 1945 in the wake of liberation from nazism, the Party associated itself in a quite un-Marxist way with the anti-German and anti-Hungarian emotions of the postwar era. It then added brutality to the forcible expulsion of

³ The CPCz has now 1,420,000 members (candidates for membership are included but their exact proportion to the actual membership is not known). This figure was quoted at the time of the Eleventh Party Congress in June 1958. While the Party claims that 60.9 per cent of its members are workers, an official organ of the Party (*Život strany*, June, 1958) conceded that many former industrial workers now hold offices in the administrative and economic apparatus. It may be assumed that manual workers actually represent at best only one third of the party memberships.

the Sudeten German minority, and insistence to the attempted transfer of the Hungarian one.

There was no clear doctrinal theme in Czechoslovak party purges. While in the 1950's the satellite communist parties as a rule sent to prison or to the gallows those communist leaders who had gained some popularity among the masses because of their inclination to follow the Soviet line of communism less slavishly (*e.g.*, Gomulka in Poland, Rajk in Hungary, or Kostov in Bulgaria), the victorious faction of the Czechoslovak Politburo executed the most hated Czechoslovak Stalinist, Secretary-General of the Party Rudolf Slánský.

At the same time, and quite contradictorily, Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis was executed for the alleged crime of Titoism and bourgeois nationalism—a deviation directly opposed to the “crime” of which the Jewish members of the party leadership were accused. Today Clementis, who in 1939 was known for his opposition to the Soviet-Nazi Pact, most probably would have been labelled revisionist and nationalist. The appeal of Clementis’ nationalism was, however, limited to Slovakia only. In Bohemia and Moravia his patriotism tended to antagonize the communists and anticommunists alike. To the Czech communists the Slovak nationalistic concept of communism represented a threat to their idea of monolithic centralism, anchored in the advanced industrial basis of Bohemia-Moravia; to the Czech noncommunists, on the other hand, Clementis’ and other Slovak communists’ concepts of nationalism appeared as merely placing emphasis on Slovakia’s independence from Prague while maintaining a full dependence on Moscow.

The problem of Slovak nationalism seems to have plagued the Czech communist leaders as much as it had their democratic predecessors in pre-Second World War days. During the war some Slovak communists apparently dreamed of a Slovak republic within the USSR rather than as a part of Czechoslovakia; some thought in terms of independent communist Slovakia. Both tendencies hoped to capitalize upon anti-Czech feelings in Slovakia. After the war both the Czech communists and noncommunists granted a concession to Slovak nationalism in the form of Slovakia’s semiautonomous status. A Slovak Communist Party was established as an autonomous part of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, although there was not to be a corresponding autonomous Czech Communist Party in Bohemia-Moravia.

In 1952, having thus gotten rid of both the symbol of excessive dogmatism and rigidity (Slánský) and that of nationalism with secessionist tendencies (Clementis), the Czechoslovak Communist Party entered the period of the thaw relatively consolidated and unified. The new Soviet line which in Poland and Hungary became a subject or pretext for severe factional strife remained in Czechoslovakia in the hands of a Party which perhaps today congratulates itself for having become, so to speak, "Khrushchevite" before Khrushchev.

The Czechoslovak communist leaders' almost baffling talent for political survival in a period marked by great uncertainty has not been matched by their capacity for physical survival; one should mention parenthetically that the presidency of Czechoslovakia has changed hands in natural ways. The first communist President of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, died dutifully, so to speak, one week after Stalin. The second communist President, Antonín Zápotocký, died in 1957. Apparently their deaths were natural, despite rumor to the contrary. The President of Czechoslovakia and First Secretary of the Party as of 1962 was Antonín Novotný (elected in 1957).

Following the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU the Czechoslovak communists conformed to the new Soviet line on de-Stalinization with the usual cautiousness. On November 17, 1961, President Novotný announced that streets bearing Stalin's and Molotov's names would be renamed, Stalin's monument, 36 times life size, dismantled, and Gottwald's mummified body removed from his glass-topped coffin and cremated (a Czech counterpart to the Russian "demausoleumization"). By April 1962 only a few streets had been renamed. Neither Stalin nor Gottwald had yet been sent on their posthumous journeys into oblivion. Indeed, two new statues of Gottwald were unveiled in Bratislava and Gottwaldov!

Among living communists, one quite unimpressive scapegoat was found in the person of Deputy Premier Rudolf Barák, purged (February 8, 1962) and charged with criminal activities. Clearly, "Go Very Slow," has now become the motto of Czech communist conservatives, who cannot really de-Stalinize without incriminating themselves in the first place.

The Czechoslovak leaders had long and open experience in politics prior to their accession to power and perhaps this fact accounts for their unity and their ability to survive. Unlike other East Central European communists, the Czechoslovak leaders did not mature on the periphery of national politics. In prewar Czechoslovakia the

Communist Party operated legally and openly like any other political party. With the exception of the period preceding and following the Nazi occupation (*i.e.*, 1938-1945), the Communist Party has never been outlawed, driven underground, or persecuted. The training grounds of the Czechoslovak communist leaders were the chambers of the prewar Parliament, the closest approximation of a West European parliament in Central Europe. They met their opponents in parliamentary cafeterias rather than in the mountains or royal and fascist jails, as was so often the fate of the majority of communist leaders in East Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia the idea of a bold guerilla warfare as a method of political struggle is generally alien to both communists and their adversaries.

Czechoslovak communists have always believed in Lenin's saying that a parliament is only a school for extra-parliamentary forms of political struggle, and that trade unionism without revolutionary aims represents collaboration with capitalism. Nevertheless, their experience with democratic institutions such as parliament, free trade unions and pressure techniques has been most helpful. Czechoslovak communists have sufficiently familiarized themselves with free institutions to be aware of their limitations, as well as their possibilities and potential misuses for the purpose of creating an illusion of democracy. Then too, in running for re-election in parliamentary or trade-union campaigns, communist leaders were able to become more intimately acquainted with broad masses of the people than was possible for their opposite numbers in less democratic countries of East Central Europe. Common sense rather than brilliance, shrewdness rather than wisdom, a clear-cut aim combined with alertness to new opportunities rather than bold vision, undeniable political skill rather than desire to blaze new paths—these appear to be the qualities of the political leaders who led Czechoslovakia into communism and through the uncertain years thereafter. To their seizure of power as well as to their subsequent years of rule, Milovan Djilas' characterization of modern leaders of communism seems fully to apply: "The new class . . . is tired of dogmatic purges and training sessions. It would like to live quietly. . . . The heroic era of Communism is past. The epoch of its great leaders has ended. The epoch of practical men has set in." ⁴

⁴ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1957), pp. 52-53.

The task of the leaders of Czechoslovak communism has not been easy, for there have been difficulties and troubles during the fourteen years from 1948 to 1962; and on occasion there have been threats of revolt of a rather serious nature. We turn now to consideration of these dangers to the regime, and how the regime met them.

First of all, take the situation in 1953. Not only international but also civil wars may sometimes start by miscalculation. Even level-headed people may occasionally act unrealistically if their view of the world is impaired by economic distress and anger; or if people simply err by underestimating or overestimating their adversary. In 1953, when Stalin died, general miscalculation as to the inner-bloc situation coupled with extreme economic dissatisfaction (two factors which three years later helped bring the Polish and Hungarian revolts) characterized the situation in Czechoslovakia. Although the Czechs are generally known for their levelheadedness (sometimes bordering on opportunism and often expressed by an over-reliance on outside events and foreign assistance), Czechoslovakia prior to the East German revolts and strikes in mid-1953 was the first country of the Soviet bloc to have an open clash between workers and the regime.

The Czechoslovak revolt of June 1, 1953, was a modest affair. The communist hold over Czechoslovakia early in 1953 seemed weak as a consequence of uncertainty in the Kremlin as to whom would inherit Stalin's mantle. Popular discontent with many aspects of life under communism had reached a high pitch. Workers resented the harsh norms and the decline of real wages; farmers opposed the hasty and forcible collectivization; housewives complained about the shortage of consumer goods and gaps in food distribution, particularly the meat and fat shortages. Finally on June 1, 1953, the regime decided to forestall financial bankruptcy with a currency reform which literally wiped out all savings, including those of the members of the Communist Party and police apparatus. Strikes at once broke out in large industrial centers. Economically motivated, they became politically colored as a consequence of the regime's inability to grant workers' demands. In Pilsen, the regional capital of Western Bohemia and seat of the famous breweries and Škoda (now Lenin) works, a revolutionary riot took place. For a few hours the center of the city and its administrative building passed into the hands of the insurgents. Slo-

gans which three years later would be echoed at Poznan and Budapest were first heard at Pilsen. They might, too, have had a sound similar to those heard at Kronstadt in 1921. Many slogans were socialist in spirit but asked for socialism without the communists, and in the Czechoslovak context without the Russians.

Besides economic dissatisfaction and a perhaps exaggerated estimate of the possibility of successful revolutionary action, there was in Pilsen in 1953 another similarity with the Poznan and Budapest situations of 1956: the revolt was a spontaneous outburst. Still the naive optimism of the insurgents could not compensate for the international isolation of the revolutionaries and their lack of revolutionary organization. When the Czechoslovak regime decided to liquidate the revolt harshly and energetically, local enthusiasm was no match for the communist display of armed power. An eyewitness described the Pilsen revolt as follows:

Workers (from the Lenin works) started to march through the city. Their slogan was: 'We refuse to be robbed.' (This was in reference to the currency reform and its effect on wages and savings.) I joined the demonstration . . . and marched with them to the town hall. So did others. . . . The communist chairman of the Regional National Committee of Pilsen opened the window and addressed the people who had gathered in front of the town hall: 'Comrades, we have our workers' president (reference to Antonín Zápotocký, a former relatively popular trade unionist). We have a workers' government. Its currency reform will finally benefit the working class, etc.' . . . The workers booed him and called for the resignation of the Communist government and for the establishment of a new one, their own, a workers' government. When the workers began to press against the gate, the Communist haranguer disappeared from the window. . . . Soon after, the town hall was stormed and also the local radio-station seized. Somebody grabbed the mike and proclaimed: 'This is the end of Communism . . . we will have free elections now . . .' I left the town hall as I was quite aware of the fact that something should be done. We all felt so very happy. So finally it happened what we had been waiting for. We all thought that it was all over. It did not occur to us that it could end otherwise. We had the town hall, the Communist mayor went into hiding somewhere, nobody offered serious resistance to us, and even the members of the Pilsen security forces either fraternized with us or remained passive onlookers. We were sure that the revolution had won . . . especially when we heard that something similar had also happened in Prague and elsewhere.

This latter was, of course, a false rumor. There were strikes in other cities, and some fraternization between security forces and striking workers, but a demonstration combined with successful storming of the center and symbol of communist political authority remained limited, as far as we can ascertain, to Pilsen.

It is important that the only open revolt against the communist government in Czechoslovakia during twelve years of rule occurred in that part of Czechoslovakia liberated by US forces and close to Western Germany and the US forces there.⁵ Memory as well as proximity of US forces perhaps prompted the Pilsen insurgents to hoist an American flag in the midst of the demonstration. But there was more here than naivete; the Pilsen revolt occurred only a few months after East Central Europe heard of the new US policy of liberation.

On the evening of June 1, security forces from Prague restored order. Revolutionary enthusiasm could not challenge armored cars and tanks manned by officers and soldiers more immune to local grievances than members of the Pilsen garrison. A number of local garrison officers were punished for support of the revolt. The workers were treated mildly.

The revolt of 1953 proved an important lesson for the communist rulers of Czechoslovakia. They saw the rapidity with which protest against currency reform transformed itself into a political demand that economic injustice be eliminated by political change and a new government based on free elections. The communist leaders seem to have concluded that the most pressing complaints of the Czech and Slovak consumers had to be satisfied. Excessively ambitious plans for heavy industry were somewhat downgraded in favor of concessions to consumers. As one Prague citizen explained to a Western journalist, the communists “shut our mouths—but with sausages.”

Czechoslovakia's standard of living has always been higher than in the neighboring countries. Even in 1953 when Czechoslovakia economically had reached the bottom, it did not reach the level of

⁵ The US forces which entered Czechoslovakia on April 18, 1945, liberated Western Bohemia to the line Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad)—Plzeň (Pilsen)—Budějovice (Budweiss) in agreement with the Soviet high command. When the US Army approached Prague on May 6, 1945, the Soviet high command asked SHAEF to stop the US advance. For details, see the author's article in *The Fate of East Central Europe*, pp. 201-204.

despair that prevailed in Poznan and Budapest three years later. The Poznan slogan, "Bread and Liberty" (placing bread *before* liberty), would have sounded quite unrealistic in Czechoslovakia.

In the effort to remove any possibility that economic discontent might fan political revolt, the Czechoslovak communists tried to eliminate another cause of worker complaints—a too-demanding pressure for output. The Czechoslovak government in a spectacular about-face revoked a draconic anti-labor decree of 1953 which had introduced severe penalties for job absenteeism, including the possibility of jail sentences. All that was finally left of this anti-labor measure was a pledge of the Central Trade Union Council to see that workers adhered to state and labor discipline.⁶

Such was the abortive Pilsen revolt of June 1953. There followed a period of three years before once again political trouble of a serious sort arose in Czechoslovakia.

The new source of trouble was, of all things, a regime-inspired literary conference. Two months after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, a long-prepared congress of Czechoslovak writers was held at Prague (April 22-29, 1956). It got out of hand. Having been prepared before the Russian thaw, its atmosphere, direction, and deliberations changed under the general optimism. "The Congress, as initially organized, was supposed to be only another occasion for acclamations, declarations, and stereotyped praises without admitting really basic mistakes," frankly admitted an official communist commentator.⁷ Instead "the Congress became a fighting arena where opinions were exchanged" and "many writers experienced everything that today is passing through the minds of our people."

Two poets, Jaroslav Seifert and František Hrubín, unfolded the flag of revolt and, boldly assisted by many others, not only condemned the previous Stalinist regimentation of art and literature but in courageous and explosive terms claimed spiritual leadership of the masses and their aspirations. Many of their declarations were identical in spirit as well as words with those uttered that same year by Polish

⁶ The working discipline of the Czech and Slovak workers seems to have remained one of the weakest spots of the system. Radio Prague (February 6, 1957) noted, for instance: "The average absenteeism today is higher than it used to be under capitalism. The statistics show that the average absence every day of the year is 234,000 workers."

⁷ Ladislav Blasko, Radio Bratislava, May 2, 1956.

writers and members of the Petöfi circle in Budapest. Thus, for instance, the Czech poet Jaroslav Seifert noted:

I have a quotation in mind which I must give you. With slight changes it is applicable to some of our writers. John Stuart Mill said once that he who permits the world, or any part of it, to choose the goal in life for him, needs then only one talent: that of aping. . . . It is wonderful when poets prod and influence the politicians but I daresay the reverse is less wonderful. . . . If only we, writers, could at this moment be truly the conscience of our nation, of our people.⁸

It was especially the writers' claim to leadership of popular discontent which irritated the regime and called for an immediate answer. President Zápotocký addressed the congress and distinguished between criticism based on loyalty to the Party and to socialism and the impermissible kind with a different basis:

Those who criticize from the viewpoint of victorious socialism and confidence in the future and the inevitability of socialism are correct; those who criticize from their personal point of view with the intention of serving their own purposes, are incorrect. Willy-nilly, regardless of their intentions, they are victims of demagoguery. This is shown in the statements of Hrubín, Seifert, and others. I recognize their talents as poets, and I believe they should not be overlooked as poets. I do not recognize, however, these poets as fighters and reliable pillars of the new socialist way of life.⁹

Soon after the writers' revolt in April 1956 came the May demonstrations of Czech and Slovak university students. These demonstrations contained some elements of an organized effort. "The anti-regime resolutions were dispatched from one college to another through couriers who even used chartered planes,"¹⁰ complained a Slovak communist publication. The nationwide and organized aspect of the ferment among the students was, however, only one of the reasons for the communists to be more concerned with this revolt than with the revolt of the poets. While some of the poets could be dismissed as remnants of the precommunist era manifesting aversion to "socialist realism" and general regimentation of art and literature, the students were different—they were the young generation, educated in communist schools, in communist youth organizations, by com-

⁸ *Literární Noviny*, Prague, April 29, 1956.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Kulturný Život*, Bratislava, May 26, 1956; an article by M. Ferko.

munist teachers. With no experience with freedom they now claimed it in unmistakable terms.

Unrest among the students manifested itself first by a nationwide effort to draft a common resolution acceptable to all colleges and universities; it was to be presented as a kind of *Magna Carta* to the communist minister of education. It was in the period of drafting the resolution that students sent couriers from Bratislava to Prague and back to harmonize their views and present a common platform.

The first open student manifestation against the regime in 1956 occurred in Slovakia's capital, Bratislava, during a students' festival. In a procession through Bratislava's streets, Slovak university students carried a coffin with the following inscription: "Here lay buried democratic liberties." As the official radio admitted, "this soon became a stirring and well-liked slogan."¹¹

Although there were variations in demands at Bratislava and at different university assemblies all over Czechoslovakia, their general import was identical. They ranged from requests for more contact with the West to protests against over-emphasis on the Soviet alliance. "The Soviet influence on our history has been exaggerated," stated one student resolution. "Citing the USSR as a model for us has become a pattern which is now being mechanically applied even in those cases in which Czechoslovakia is an example for Russia." In the Bratislava resolution there was even a demand for establishment of an opposition party as a condition for democracy.

While the students boldly raised political demands, and the writers claimed to be the true interpreters of their people's aspirations, what were the attitudes of the masses in general, and the workers in particular?

However intensive their sympathies with the revolting students and writers, the masses did not *openly* express their views. All through the spring of 1956 the workers apparently lacked not only the spark of economic discontent present in the Polish and Hungarian situation

¹¹ Maria Sedláková, Radio Bratislava, May 25, 1956. When one year later the situation was again under control, the regime turned its criticism against the teachers and the schools rather than against the students for the lack of enthusiasm for Communism. "Some [good communist] workers say nowadays: 'I shall not send my boy to the college. I do not want him to be politically corrupted there [i.e. in the anticommunist sense],' wrote the Communist weekly *Tvorba* in 1957 (April 11).

but also the opportunity for public demonstration. The communist regime in Czechoslovakia had offered such an opportunity quite unintentionally to the writers with the party-inspired plan for a writers' congress, and to the students with the official permission to restore their traditional May festivals and parades (a tradition dating back to the nineteenth century). The masses had no such opportunity. Nor, seemingly, did they search for one.

The workers admittedly had some grievances. A year later one of the powerful secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party, Bruno Koehler, who had to deal with the workers in 1956, admitted that in some cases at least the workers' demand went beyond the confines of party and trade-union actions; like the students, the workers also asked that the press censorship be lifted, foreign radio jamming abolished and the workers' militia eliminated. Other workers "expressed doubts as to whether party decisions should be considered binding upon the government, parliament, and mass organizations" (trade unions were meant in particular); other workers' demands limited themselves to the change of the party program. They did not represent an open challenge to the existing regime but rather pressures from within aiming at reform. Thus, according to Bruno Koehler, some Prague workers asked for "an extraordinary congress of the Party and the adoption of a *new party line*." ¹²

Should we assume that the workers' failure to state grievances openly and thus associate themselves with the revolt of the intellectuals reflected their experience of 1953 as to the futility of open political revolt against the regime? Or was it lack of contact and understanding between Czechoslovak workers, whose dissatisfaction tends to be usually economic, and Czechoslovak writers and students, whose protest was political and cultural?

At any rate the communist regime made every effort to keep the different elements of discontent and demands for a change compartmentalized and isolated. In such efforts it has been generally successful.

There were other reasons why the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia has been able to keep down discontent. There were, in fact, three specifically Czechoslovak factors which deserve careful attention.

First, the gap of three years which had elapsed between the first

¹² *Život strany*, Prague, March, 1957.

workers' revolt in 1953 and the crisis of 1956 helped separate the workers from the intellectual elite. While in 1956 the ferment among Czechoslovak writers and students reached its peak, the workers' grievances, to some extent pacified, were then three years old and therefore rather cold. It would seem that in the Hungarian and Polish contexts different complaints manifested themselves almost simultaneously and merged into one powerful revolutionary wave.

Secondly, within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia there seems to have been a lack of any idealist reaction to the thaw of communist principles and practices then occurring in Russia and elsewhere. There is no evidence of any important section of the leading core of the Communist Party associating and allying itself with the hopes and expectations of the Czech and Slovak masses following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and its condemnation of the rigidity and excesses of the previous era. Too few were those Czechoslovak party officials who would have understood the thaw as a possible basis for improvement of their system. The thaw, they believed, became a pretext for cryptodemocrats to use the de-Stalinization not for the purpose of liberalizing communism but for destroying it, and they stood firmly against all efforts of change. The Czechoslovak communist leaders tended to interpret the new freedoms granted by Moscow to East Central European parties as meaning freedom not to relax at all or only very cautiously, if the local situation and tradition did not warrant a real thaw.

In comparison with reforms announced or executed in other satellite countries, the list of Czechoslovak "liberal reforms" appears marginal indeed. The purge trial of 1952, for instance, was officially revised in June 1956. Yet the revision was much more limited than in the case of Gomulka, or the Hungarian Minister Rajk whose body was exhumed to be reburied with honors. Those Czechoslovak leaders who had been condemned to death by hanging were confirmed in their respective crimes. Only their crime of sympathy or conspiracy with Tito's Yugoslavia was struck from the list of crimes for which they had to die. All was in line with Moscow's attempts at reconciliation with Belgrade at that time. The other crimes were reaffirmed and the perpetrators, at least in words, re-hanged. But, quite inconsistently, those individuals who in 1952 were condemned to prison terms were released and given minor jobs in the State and party apparatus.

Thirdly, the democratic tradition of the Czechoslovak people has limited the scope of the post-Stalinist thaw in yet another direction—the experience of the Czech and Slovak peoples in democracy acted as a brake not only on the communist masters but, paradoxically enough, on their adversaries. Trained in the art of democratic compromise, negotiations and nonviolent solutions of issues by a majority vote, the Czechoslovak masses did not react to the new atmosphere of 1956 with the bold elation of daredevil revolutionaries but with the cautious circumspection of seasoned parliamentarians. While democracy supplies citizens with profound reasons for loving liberty and hating any form of totalitarianism, it does not necessarily prepare them for the art of conspiracy, subversion, infiltration and barricade warfare—methods of fighting which the struggle against communism may finally impose on anticommunists. This may seem a rather depressing observation, but in view of the Czechoslovak experience it should be stated. It is also interesting to note that the boldest action against communism had occurred in Hungary, a nation which before the war could hardly compare with Czechoslovakia in the development of free institutions.

Thus by July of 1956 the communist leaders seemed firmly in the saddle, and the forces of dissatisfaction, so far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, began to recede. At least this was what the communist rulers tended or wanted to believe. A systematic observer of the Czechoslovak scene, Pavel Tigrid, has noted in his book, *Marx at the Prague Castle*:

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was the first Communist Party, except for that of Albania, and this was ahead of the Russian and Chinese parties, in succeeding in liquidating the results of the storm which the struggle for succession at the Kremlin has brought about. . . . This was four months before the events which in neighboring Poland and Hungary were to shake the very foundations of world Communism.¹³

Yet, one may ask what, even in the Czechoslovak context, would have been the cumulative effect of the poets' revolt, the students' ferment, the workers' pressures, and the traditional peasants' discontent, had the Soviet Union in 1956 failed to demonstrate its dominant power in East Central Europe, or, to propose an even more debatable point, had the Hungarian Revolution not occurred at all and thus, as

¹³ Pavel Tigrid, *Marx na Hradčanech* (New York, 1960).

some Czechs and Slovaks seem to believe, set the clock of gradual liberalization of communism from within behind by several years?

The revolts in Poland and Hungary did, to be sure, have some effect upon Czechoslovakia, even if that effect was transitory. It is perhaps worthwhile to recall the atmosphere in Prague in 1956. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was able to censor reports concerning the complex developments in neighboring Poland, but the simple and overwhelming fact of popular revolt in neighboring Hungary could not be censored or interpreted out of existence. In Czechoslovakia, in the autumn of 1956, the communist leaders and the noncommunist masses generally expected some Soviet action toward Hungary, but no one was certain of it. Condemnation of the brutal Stalinist methods was fresh in everyone's mind; the slogan of peaceful coexistence and a general relaxation were in the air. What would happen? Many Czechs and Slovaks did not exclude the possibility that Soviet displeasure over the turn of events in Hungary might not translate into military acts. We now know from Khrushchev himself that the possibility of nonintervention in Hungary was not entirely alien to the leadership of the CPSU. Apparently few people in Czechoslovakia asked the question of what the West would do. On the basis of interviews with persons who were in Prague at that period it would seem that most Czechs took for granted the inaction of Western democracies, recalling Munich, the United States' reluctance to liberate Prague against Soviet wishes in 1945, and the Pilsen revolt which had occurred not only unaided but also largely unnoticed by the West.

And so, when the ferment in Poland and Hungary began, the noncommunist masses of Czechoslovakia had great hope for change from within, coupled with admiration and envy of the Hungarian Revolution while it seemed successful. The communist rulers, on the other hand, passed through several days of anxiety and uncertainty, especially in the first phase of the Hungarian Revolution before Soviet tanks intervened. To be on the safe side the communist Czechoslovak government alerted its security forces and workers' militias to prevent any attempt at imitation of the Budapest revolution. It remains a matter of conjecture as to what would have been the loyalty of these guardians of communist peace and order in Czechoslovakia had the Soviet Union abstained from intervening in Hungary.

The communist rulers realistically based their hope for political survival on Soviet action in the area. As *Rudé Právo* put it,

The Soviet Union has not spared any effort to help additional states and nations to group themselves around it. . . . Our people know that strength comes to them from the Soviet Union, how ridiculous anybody would be who would attempt to shake the foundations of our link with the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Here then, was a tranquilizer for the shattered nerves of party members. Four days later the central organ of the Communist Party again reassured party members that they were not expected to defend communism against its adversaries without Soviet backing:

In the gravest moments of our destiny the fraternal assistance of the Soviet people has always been available to us. It was with the Soviet tanks that the sun of liberty returned to us in 1945. . . . Whenever we turn to our Soviet brothers, we always find understanding and assistance.¹⁵

When finally on November 4, the Soviet military intervention in Hungary took place, the Czechoslovak regime uttered a sigh of relief which could hardly have been more audible. A special edition of *Rudé Právo* announced that

The Hungarian counter-revolution has been smashed. . . . Government is again in the hands of workers and peasants.

The aggression against the social advances of the working people has been defeated. . . . With the velocity of lightning this news has spread over Czechoslovakia . . . it filled our people with joy. In Košice (capital of Eastern Slovakia) the people embraced each other in the streets, so great was their happiness . . . On the streets of our cities and villages a joyful, fighting mood now prevails.¹⁶

It is interesting to note that the fighting mood overcame the party members as soon as there was nothing more to dread and fight against.

During the subsequent celebration of the October Revolution, Vice-Premier Václav Kopecký expressed the Czechoslovak communist belief that Soviet defeat of the Hungarian Revolution saved communism in East Central Europe as follows:

All dangers which threaten Czechoslovakia were turned away by the victorious defense of the people's democracy and socialism in Hungary, a defense which was so significantly bolstered up by the Soviet armies . . . After the trials of these days we have now

¹⁴ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, October 27, 1956.

¹⁵ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, October 31, 1956.

¹⁶ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, November 5, 1956.

become even more convinced of the fact that our security depends on the mighty strength of the Soviet Union, that thanks to the Soviet support our people's democratic republic is assured.¹⁷

On the whole the Hungarian Revolution must have confirmed two basic operational assumptions of the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia: first, their belief that Soviet power was a more reliable basis for their rule than any kind of "democratic" fraternization with the masses and their aspirations; secondly, the correctness of their cautious reaction to any idea of a more than marginal relaxation of political control, even when suggested by Moscow.

During the Hungarian crisis the fragility of the Czechoslovak masses' commitment to communism was of course demonstrated. About eighteen months before, the one-time British ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, estimated that

if for some unpredictable reasons the Soviet Union were to abandon all its positions in the satellite countries . . . 50 per cent of the [Czechoslovak people] . . . would organize an immediate revolt, 40 per cent would wish them well, and of the remaining 10 per cent the majority would hasten to conceal their Communist sympathies and to climb on the democratic bandwagon.¹⁸

In 1956 this estimate, which in April 1955 placed only about 4 per cent of the Czechoslovak population in the diehard communist category, was largely confirmed; the communist press published bitter attacks on those members of the Party, who, to use the former British envoy's expression, hastened to conceal their communist sympathies. "There were some members of the Party," complained an editorial in *Rudé Právo*,¹⁹ "who at the time of the Hungarian events declared themselves sick, or even declared all members of their families sick. . . . We must not overlook these cases even though they might have been rare." Certainly there were more than cracks in the party monolith during the first phase of the Hungarian Revolution. A Czech civil servant who reached the United States in 1958 described the atmosphere in Prague as follows:

The Communists suddenly melted away. There seemed to be none. My supervisors transferred the Party insignia from their visible

¹⁷ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, November 7, 1956.

¹⁸ Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, "Report on Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (April 1955), 496.

¹⁹ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, December 11, 1956.

places on comrades' lapels into the invisible depths of their pockets—ready to show them again as soon as the situation would clear up. We [noncommunists] even began discussions whether or not we should contemplate treason trials against those who were members of the Communist Party without being overactive. And we reached the conclusion that, with the exception of real criminals in the secret police and frontier guards, it would not be worth the effort. So miserable and so few the Communists appeared to us when we all believed that Communism in our country would soon become a thing of the past.

The communist leaders of Czechoslovakia, one may conclude, seized a monopoly of power and have kept and consolidated it ever since with relative ease; factors which explain the smoothness of their *coup d'état* are largely identical with those which enabled the communist leaders to keep the masses in check even during the revolutionary year 1956. None of these factors has disappeared from the Czechoslovak scene or noticeably diminished its influence. On the contrary, some of the factors did, if anything, increase in effect, especially following the Soviet repression in Hungary, demonstration of United States incapacity to influence events in East Central Europe, and Soviet performances in the art of rocketry.

Five factors stand out when one tries to answer the question of why Czechoslovakia has proved the most silent of Soviet satellites:

(1) The down-to-earth, practical, and traditionally nonadventurist tradition of Czech political thinking. This applies only partly to the more emotional Slovak nation. Not only the noncommunist majority but its communist masters are, generally speaking, political realists. Both are reluctant to take risks; their "peaceful coexistence" rests on a "balance of mutual fears." Communists and noncommunists view the Czechoslovak situation as a reflection of a world distribution of power.

Modern Czechoslovak history—the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Munich in 1938, and the communist coup in 1948—confirmed the belief of many Czechs that a small nation in the shadow of an ambitious superpower may have some opportunity to shape its destiny only if imperial designs of such superpower are either checked by a contrary power or turned elsewhere.²⁰ Such a geographic shift of

²⁰ President Beneš made the following comment on the need of the physical survival of a small nation: "We are a small nation. One cannot be concerned with the happiness of just one generation. One must think of the generations of the

interest might be the result of a crisis in the center of the power system; or it might be the consequence of the superpower's expectation of benefits in other parts of the world. No shifts of Soviet interests occurred in East Central Europe between 1945-1962. Consequently, trained by their ancient and recent history to react sensitively to favorable or unfavorable shifts of power in their vicinity, the Czechs and Slovaks could not help viewing the spontaneous Hungarian Revolution as an unwise if admirable gesture.

(2) Czechoslovakia's high degree of industrialization and its relatively high standard of living. Life may not be as good as the masses wish or consider possible in view of their work, natural resources, and general know-how, yet it is much higher than in any other satellite country in East Central Europe, as well as in Russia. Since 1953, Czechoslovakia's political discontent has usually lacked the spark of economic protest.

Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia do not conceal the fact that they inherited an industrial base from the era of free enterprise. Describing Czechoslovakia as an industrially mature state, communist writers proudly assert that "historically speaking, our Republic is the first state in the world which was an industrially developed capitalist country when it embarked on the road of socialism." This statement was to demonstrate that Czechoslovakia's high per capita production was due to the introduction of socialism; production would have been lower if the capitalist order had continued. On May 3, 1960, at the opening of the "Czechoslovakia—1960" exhibit in Sokolniki Park in Moscow, Khrushchev adopted the same line:

It is necessary to recognize that capitalism (in Czechoslovakia) handed over to the people's government a relatively well developed industrial base. This means that the starting position favored Czechoslovakia's progress toward socialism more than was the case in neighboring people's democracies. This enabled the Czechoslovak people to proceed more rapidly toward a new life.²¹

Khrushchev added that the industrial basis, created by capitalism, was not as ideal as bourgeois propaganda suggested.

future, and of how to assure them the chance to be born and to be able to live in the land of their forefathers." Quoted by his private secretary, E. Táborský, in "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Beneš," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI (July 1958), 673.

²¹ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, May 4, 1960.

In 1960, 96 per cent of Czechoslovakia's national income derived from the socialist sector (that is, state and co-operatively owned enterprises).²² By January 1961, 88 per cent of Czechoslovakia's agricultural land was collectivized.²³ The agricultural lands which remained in private hands were mostly (80 per cent) poor peasants' farms under five acres.²⁴ The successful collectivization does not seem to be matched by a corresponding increase in production. Statistics for 1959 indicated that agricultural production dropped 1.4 per cent from the 1958 level. President A. Novotný noted that "the 1959 results in agriculture were considerably uneven."²⁵

The Marxist aim of "classless" society was largely achieved by 1960 when the central organ of the Communist Party reported that the "social group of capitalists, representing 9.2 per cent of the population before the war (counting the members of capitalist families, this meant over 1,200,000 persons) has now shrunk to 0.3 per cent, that is, about 42,000 persons."²⁶

As for industrial production, communist Czechoslovakia claims a higher per capita production than some well-advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe. One statistical boast asserts that Czechoslovakia's population, which represents only 0.5 per cent of total world population, accounts for 2 per cent of world production. This is probably correct. Precommunist Czechoslovakia was known for its high level of industrial development. Under communism, Czechoslovakia's industry turned away from consumer goods to heavy and capital goods production, yet its rate of development was not drastically slowed down by communist political experimentation and mismanagement. Together with East Germany, Czechoslovakia is one of the most important bases for communist economic aid and technical assistance projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Czechoslovakia's programs of assistance to former colonial areas include activities such as training or education of Asian, African and Latin-American students at Czechoslovak universities, institutes of technology and industrial establishments; purchasing of raw materials above Czechoslovakia's needs and selling them at a loss. (e.g. Egyptian

²² *Rudé Právo*, Prague, May 20, 1961.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, February 9, 1960.

²⁵ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, November 13, 1959.

²⁶ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, June 2, 1960.

cotton); shipments of industrial plants, machine tools, manufactured goods as well as jets and arms (e.g. to Cuba and Guinea); participation of Czechoslovak experts in industrial, agricultural or educational projects in underdeveloped areas (e.g. the Aswan Dam or assigning high school teachers to Iraq); and finally, granting low-interest credits. The total cost of these politically motivated programs is partly secret, partly impossible to evaluate. Only the amount of some low-interest credits has been publicized.²⁷ Between 1953-1960, India, for instance, obtained 346 million rubles (pre-conversion) in low interest credits; the United Arab Republic, Egyptian sector, 322 million; Syrian sector, 53 million; Indonesia, 210 million; Iraq, 134 million; Cuba, 80 million; Ceylon, 73 million; and Afghanistan, 56 million.

Economic penetration of Czechoslovakia into former colonial possessions of the West evokes pride and satisfaction to many hundreds of technicians and skilled workers (not necessarily members of the Party) who participate. Some of this is simply national pride; it paraphrases the old slogan of "my country, right or wrong," into something like "communist or noncommunist, Czechoslovakia is my country." Partly the opportunity given to Czechoslovak technicians and experts to travel to Indonesia, Cuba, Iraq and Guinea represents a welcome interruption in the monotony of life behind the Iron Curtain.

(3) The skill as well as cautiousness of the communist leadership. It shied away from experiment, preferring to play safe under all circumstances, sometimes even resisting Moscow's prodding to the contrary.

The lack of dramatic opposition to the communist system coupled with the rapid tempo of economic development has now become the basis for the Czechoslovak communists' claim that their country has become the second truly socialist state. Addressing the newly elected National Assembly in Prague in July 1960, President Novotný stated that through efforts of its working class Czechoslovakia "as the second country of the socialist camp" had adopted a new Constitution which reflected the victory of socialism. This thesis has remained unilateral. The "May Day 1961" slogans, issued by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and published by *Pravda* on April 9, did not distinguish between the socialist status of industrial Czecho-

²⁷ *Obránce vlasti*, Prague, May 12, 1961.

slovakia, and that of all other people's democracies, including underdeveloped Mongolia. Slogan 24 proclaimed: "Fraternal greetings to the working people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, who are building [and therefore have not yet achieved] socialism. Long live the eternal and unbreakable friendship and co-operation between the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples." Exactly the same formula was used for all the other members of the communist bloc with the exception of Yugoslavia whose friendship and co-operation is not yet labeled "eternal and unbreakable" but is only expected to "develop and grow stronger in the interests of the struggle for peace and socialism."

The new Czechoslovak Constitution adopted in July 1960, conspicuously resembles the Stalin Constitution of 1936; following its model it also formalizes the monopolistic position of the Communist Party as "The guiding force in society and in the State . . . a voluntary fighting alliance of the most active and most class-conscious citizens from among the ranks of workers, farmers and the intelligentsia."²⁸

Like its Stalinist model it contains an impressively long—yet in practice meaningless—list of civil rights and liberties, including the right of asylum to citizens of a foreign state persecuted for protecting interests of the working people, participation in the struggle for national liberation, and work in the defense of peace.²⁹

The new Constitution further reduced the area in which private property can exist. It tolerates personal possessions such as homes, but provides no safeguards even for marginal forms of private enterprise such as small family farms. The very term "private property" has given way to that of "personal property." The Constitution proclaims Czechoslovakia "a Socialist State based on the firm alliance of workers, farmers and the intelligentsia, led by the working class. Czechoslovakia is a unitary state of two equal fraternal nations, Czech and Slovak. It is a part of the world socialist system."³⁰

Several departures from the Soviet model are worth noting. For one thing, the socialist Constitution of Czechoslovakia does not imitate the Soviet experiment with federalism based on ethnic differences. The Constitution of 1960 is more centralistic than that of 1948—bearing in mind that communist federalism represents always

²⁸ Četeka, April 28, 1960.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

a federalist paper-wrapping around the hard facts of a unitary state. There is obvious fear of granting the Slovaks (whose nationalism often has anti-Czech overtones) more than nominal autonomy. Slovakia's previous mostly-symbolic autonomy in administrative and economic matters has narrowed. The communist press had to publish several articles explaining to the Slovaks that less autonomy would favor their catching up with the more-developed Czech portions of the state. One of the prominent Slovak constitutional lawyers, Dr. Peter Celotka, admitted that there were fears as to the narrow authority which Slovak provincial organs might have according to the new Constitution. In an effort to calm these anxieties the communist lawyer stated that "It was necessary to strengthen the unified nature of the direction of the national economy . . . Only on the basis of unity . . . is it possible to provide a wide program of industrialization in Slovakia."³¹

The new Constitution also reflects a clear bias against the Sudeten German minority or what is left of it after expulsion on the basis of the Potsdam agreement. While the new Constitution guarantees minority rights, the German minority does not appear among those ethnic groups to which guarantees apply (Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians).

Unlike the Soviet and many of the satellite constitutions, but similar to the constitutions of China and East Germany, the new Czechoslovak Constitution maintains the institution of the presidency instead of the Soviet collegial president. The role of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Assembly seems limited to that of a steering committee and a permanent miniature expression of the legislative branch of the government. The communist leadership must consider it useful to capitalize on the Czech people's attachment to the individual who inhabits the Prague castle, Hradčany, traditional seat of the kings of Bohemia and Presidents Masaryk and Beneš.

While the Communist Party's monopolistic position is confirmed by the Constitution following the Soviet model, the party system differs from that prevailing in the USSR in another respect: minor political parties from the pre-putsch era exist and continue to have representatives in Parliament and in the Cabinet. Thus, in form the government of Czechoslovakia is still a National Front coalition. In reality the Czech Catholic People's Party, the Czech Socialist Party,

³¹ *Rudé Právo*, Prague, May 19, 1960.

and the Slovak parties of Freedom and Regeneration fulfill the role of "transmission belts" between the Communist Party and adherents of the prewar political parties of Czechoslovakia.

(4) Lack of any consistent and energetic policy by the United States and other Western powers. This hiatus dates back to the war-time division of Europe into Western and Soviet theaters of operation. Although caused by purely military considerations, it was subsequently interpreted by the Russians, the communists, and finally by the Czechs and Slovaks as indication of United States inability to influence politics of an area which, for the United States, is militarily out of bounds. In the Czechoslovak view, confirmed by events of 1956, the United States is a well-wisher but not a shaper of East Central European destinies.

(5) Soviet political and physical might. By contrast to that of the West, it has proved ever-present and all-permeating. Any changes in the system and orientation of people's democracies seem possible only within the iron framework determined by Soviet will and power, not outside it. In some countries the presence of Soviet troops demonstrated this will and power ostentatiously. In Czechoslovakia there are no Soviet troops; yet they are there psychologically. Their arrival was expected, rightly or wrongly, during the coup of 1948 and again in 1956, although perhaps with less certainty than in 1948. This is partly the reason why in 1956, Czechoslovakia held its breath until the question, "Will the Russians intervene in Hungary?"—was answered by Soviet tanks in Budapest. In the Czechoslovak context, Eden's and Rapacki's plans concerning demilitarization of East Central Europe were received with less hopeful reaction than elsewhere; in a demilitarized Central Europe, Soviet tanks would remain psychologically present on every Czech square or street.

The Soviet art of rocketry added another dimension to the above image of overwhelming Soviet power in the area. Even the noncommunists tend to believe that, thanks to continuous Soviet rocket-rattling, the United States is being kept at a greater distance from East Central Europe than geography, the presence of American forces on the European continent, and American missile capacity would suggest. A Slovak sculptress who in the period of the Brussels World Exposition in 1958 was permitted to make a trip to a neutral country, described this awareness of the effect of the Soviet sputnik as follows:

People do not like communism in Czechoslovakia any more than they used to. Yet the people do not see how the situation could possibly change. And the sputnik has greatly added to the defeatism even among those who had remained hopeful and loyal to the West in spite of Hungary. . . . If you (Americans) do not shoot something or other at the moon soon, I cannot guarantee anybody's feelings any more . . . except my own.

Since these lines were written, not the Americans but the Russians successfully shot "something or other" to the moon, and put several cosmonauts into orbit. Such contrasting comparisons between the superior Soviet and inferior American space records were at least partly corrected on February 20, 1962, although John H. Glenn, Jr.'s space flight on that day, coming almost one year after the first Soviet one, did not match the impressive number of orbits of the second Soviet space flight (seventeen orbits on August 6, 1961).

With regard to Czechoslovakia, and perhaps to many other countries on the periphery of the USSR, the Soviet concentration and success in those technical fields in which they could overtake the United States in an impressive fashion has paid rich political dividends. The morale of the communists has been boosted; that of the noncommunist majorities has correspondingly wavered.

The interaction of the above five factors—the last being dominant—helps explain not only the past performance of the Czechoslovak communists (their smooth seizure of power and equally smooth consolidation) but the probability of their performance in the future.

Making any estimates of change within the bloc area, one should bear in mind that Soviet domination over East Central Europe, while sincerely deplored and lamented by the free world, has really never been—nor under present conditions could have been—challenged from the outside by means other than nonviolent pressure, expressions of hope, and faith in the ultimate victory of freedom over slavery. The challenge to communism from within necessarily uses similar nonviolent methods, unless economic or other despair, coupled with miscalculation, induces anticommunists to act otherwise.

6: HUNGARY

Stephen D. Kertesz

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 was a surprise to many quarters which had failed to recognize the unique character of postwar socio-political forces and developments in Hungary. In truth, the revolt of 1956 had specific causes. Hungary's status as a Soviet satellite was altogether unnatural. Neither Slavic nor Orthodox, the history and cultural heritage of the Hungarian people have little in common with those of the Russians. Memories of Russian intervention to defeat Kossuth's fight for independence in 1849 and of the communist regime of Béla Kun in 1919 were vivid. In the last stage of the Second World War, when the Hungarian people realized that Russian occupation was inevitable, not even the staunchest opponents of Nazism looked to the future with sanguine optimism. The behavior of the invading Soviet Army did not raise Hungarian expectations. Genuine homegrown communists were, and have remained, few in number. Indeed, there had been fewer channels of communication between Hungarians and the occupying Soviet forces than in any other satellite state. At first it appeared that Hungary might become a truly democratic country. For about two years there remained more hope for democratic developments in Hungary than in most of the satellite countries.

When in mid-February 1945 survivors of the seven-week siege of Budapest dared to leave their shelters, they found posters containing the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe all over the city. Amidst the lootings and atrocities of the Soviet Army, they read with incredulity that Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill promised free elections and a democratic government responsive to the will of the people. The Yalta pledge did not prove entirely worthless in Hungary, as it did in Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. During the armistice period the country lived under the strict control of the Russian-dominated Allied Control Commission and the occupying Soviet Army, but the results of the relatively free municipal elections

in Budapest (October 7, 1945) and of the general elections (November 4) created for Hungary an exceptional position in Russia's Europe. Since in the general elections the Communist Party obtained only 17 per cent of the popular vote and the Smallholder Party 57 per cent, the West concluded that free elections were possible under Russian occupation. The Communist Party, with the help of Russian pressure, secured key positions in a coalition government, but the majority of the cabinet was noncommunist. The prime minister, the speaker of the National Assembly, and the president of the republic established in January 1946 were Smallholders.

The noncommunist parties in the coalition were progressive in social, economic, and cultural questions; and the Communist Party, at the outset, adapted its tactics to the general mood of the people. All parties faced the common task of rebuilding the devastated country, and in this all-important undertaking communists displayed a zeal and energy that impressed even some of their enemies. Western passivity was discouraging, and the Smallholders made many tactical concessions in the hope that after ratification of the peace treaty the Soviet Army would evacuate the country. A *Times* correspondent noted on October 31, 1946, that a visitor to Hungary "will be surprised by the vigorous intellectual activity displayed both in print and in conversation. In comparison with the mental sterility and haunting fear prevalent in the Balkans, Hungary seems an oasis of culture and liberty."

When it became apparent that the Smallholders resolutely opposed the program for wholesale communization, the ramshackle coalition regime came to an end. The political police discovered a "conspiracy" and the Soviet Army arrested the Smallholder Party's Secretary General, Béla Kovács. His alleged confession implicated several Smallholders. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, while abroad, was forced to resign; the Speaker of the National Assembly, Monsignor Béla Varga, and many other noncommunist politicians fled; some were arrested. A new government was formed, the electoral law changed, and new elections held in August 1947. Despite physical terror and other abuses, the Communist Party polled only 22 per cent of the vote. After this new electoral failure, the communists set out to liquidate the opposition parties and void the parliamentary mandates of their members. Docile fellow travelers in the noncommunist parties were placed in key positions and the Smallholder President of the Repub-

lic, Zoltán Tildy, was forced to resign. Single-list elections were held in May 1949, and on August 20 Hungary was declared a People's Republic. Despite this inglorious end of the Hungarian Republic, it remained an important psychological factor that the Hungarian people had defeated the communists in elections and acquired some practice in the ways of democracy under very adverse conditions.

Simultaneously with the seizure of political power, the communists applied their usual methods in agriculture, banking, industry, commerce, and cultural fields. Prominent Catholic and Protestant churchmen were intimidated, forced to resign, or jailed. Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and imprisonment for life in February 1949 had particularly strong international repercussions. A forced merger of the Socialist and Communist parties eliminated the old-time socialist leaders and created the Hungarian Workers' Party¹ in June 1948. As the Cominform rift with Tito became more embittered, a sweeping purge was begun in the Hungarian Communist Party. László Rajk, former minister of interior and foreign minister, and other potential leaders of a national communist movement were liquidated.

Though the pattern was similar to those of other people's democracies, the psychological reaction of the people was different, partly because of the high hopes which had been generated by relatively free developments in 1945-1947. Moreover, the anomaly of Soviet-patterned planning became more blatant in a country such as Hungary, which had to import iron ore and coking coal for the heavy industries that were to be developed according to the ambitious scheme of a five-year plan (1950-1954). Consumer goods and light industries were neglected. With the imposition of absolute wage and price controls, and the accompanying disregard for the welfare of the masses, it was possible to accelerate manufacturing, primarily in heavy and machine industries. But the discontent was great.

Political and social changes in Hungary were directed by a small group of Moscow-trained communists under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi. They lived in great material comfort and had little contact with the Hungarian people, ignoring their desires. One of them proudly pointed out: "We were a minority in Parliament and in the Government, but at the same time we represented the leading force.

¹ This essay will continue to call it Communist Party, since this corresponds more to reality. The official name of the Party was changed after the revolution of 1956 to Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

We had decisive control over the police forces. Our force, the force of our Party, and the working class, was multiplied by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army were always there to support us with their assistance.”²

‘NEW COURSE’ AND REVOLT

The political “thaw” and uncertainty which followed Stalin’s death in the Soviet Union had far-reaching effects on developments along the Danube. In the Malenkov era, reversal of communist policies was more radical in Hungary than in any other captive country. The new masters of the Kremlin realized the necessity of political changes in Hungary. They summoned the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party to Moscow in June 1953, blamed Rákosi for the worsening conditions in Hungary, and ordered Imre Nagy to form a new government and to inaugurate new policies.³ Nagy replaced Rákosi as prime minister, but Rákosi remained first secretary of the Communist Party in control of the Party’s apparatus. On July 4, 1953, in his first public address as prime minister, Nagy confessed the over-all failure of communist policies and outlined a “new course.” He scaled down the five-year plan, promising to emphasize consumer goods and food industries, opened the concentration camps, ended deportations, and freed communists and noncommunists alike. Peasants were allowed to leave collective farms, which they did on a large scale. The People’s Patriotic Front, a new political center that included communists and noncommunists, was established to win popular support. Nagy, however, did not long enjoy Moscow’s support. Rákosi had undermined Nagy’s position in Moscow by the end of 1954; he branded the “New Course” as “right-wing deviationism.” The apparatus of the Hungarian Communist Party and Rákosi’s trusted

² Joseph Révai, “On the Character of Our People’s Democracy,” *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest, March-April, 1949). An English translation of the article was published in *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (1949), 143-52.

³ Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York, 1957), p. 252. This book is a collection of memoranda written in 1955 and 1956 and addressed to the members of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. The mimeographed manuscript was smuggled out of Hungary in the spring of 1957. Although these texts were presented to communists and couched in party jargon, some of the passages indicate that Nagy did not fully understand communism as interpreted and practiced by the cynical power politicians of the Kremlin.

henchman, Ernő Gerő, the first deputy premier, combined to block Nagy's actions.

Even Malenkov turned against Nagy, who had to resign as prime minister and later was expelled from the Politburo and the Central Committee. In November 1955 he was expelled from the Communist Party.⁴ His successor, András Hegedüs, Rákosi's puppet, modified the new course by placing renewed emphasis on heavy industry and farm collectivization. But there was no complete reversal, and a measure of criticism continued within the Communist Party.

The above events—from Rákosi to Nagy to Hegedüs—show that the Hungarian communists suffered a serious setback. They lacked unity and were insecure and unable to cope with a mismanaged economy and a hostile people. A nationalistic revival occurred even among some communist intellectuals.

While the struggle between the pro- and anti-Stalinist groups raged in the Hungarian Communist Party, the Hungarian press echoed Moscow's propaganda against colonialism and foreign intervention. The Bandung Conference, Khrushchev and Bulganin's trip to India, their spectacular reconciliation with Tito and the Declaration of Belgrade, which emphasized every country's right to choose its own road to Socialism, and above all, Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, February 24-25, 1956, strengthened the anti-Stalinist, and liberalizing elements in Hungary. The opposition to Rákosi became more vocal, and an almost inevitable rapprochement took place between communist intellectuals and the Hungarian people.

The Central Committee elected a new Politburo, which rehabilitated several hundred party officials. Hungary's chief prosecutor admitted that hundreds of people had been unjustly jailed and executed. Some leading communist intellectuals expressed strong criticism: the Writers' Union, and later the Petöfi Circle (authorized as a debating club in March 1956) and students' organizations, demanded the punishment of Rákosi, calling for his resignation and Imre Nagy's return to office. The Petöfi Circle held more than a dozen debates between March and June 1956, and at one of these meetings Rajk's widow demanded the punishment of her husband's "murderers." The stu-

⁴ See for details, Tibor Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin* (New York, 1959), pp. 17-61.

dents and writers were seismographs which reflected the feeling of the people.

Events in Poland influenced developments in Hungary. Under the impact of the Poznan riots, Anastas T. Mikoyan demanded Rákosi's resignation at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party, and Rákosi resigned. Gerö replaced him as first secretary of the Communist Party (July 18). Hegedüs remained prime minister. Rákosi's dismissal was also a gesture toward Tito, who refused to have any contact with him. The slow liberalization continued. The government submitted to questioning by Parliament. Gerö declared that Imre Nagy, expelled from the party in 1955 for "rightist deviation," might return if he would accept the regime's policies. In September Budapest radio announced an amnesty for Roman Catholic priests. At the end of the month Gerö joined Marshal Tito and Khrushchev at Yalta for talks on loosening Soviet controls in Eastern Europe.

In October 1956 dramatic developments in Hungary began. On October 6 Rajk and several other rehabilitated communists, who were executed in 1949 as Tito's agents, were reburied in a state funeral. During this macabre performance, speakers denounced the "sadistic criminals" of the Stalinist era. About 200,000 people used this occasion to show their opposition to the regime in the first spontaneous public display since the communist takeover. It provided a pattern for what was to come. A few days later, Imre Nagy was readmitted to the Communist Party and Gerö left for a state visit to Belgrade.

On October 22 the students in Budapest drafted a sixteen-point resolution that demanded immediate evacuation of Soviet troops, a new government under the premiership of Imre Nagy, the punishment of the leaders of the Stalin-Rákosi era, free multi-party elections, the right to strike and a minimum wage law for workers, freedom of speech and press, reorganization of the economy, return of persons who had been deported to Russia, and reappraisal of Hungary's relations with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The students expressed their solidarity with the Polish workers and youth.

Events quickly moved to a climax. On October 23 the students organized a solemn march to the statue of General Bem to express their sympathy for the Polish freedom movement. The minister of interior first prohibited, then permitted the demonstration. Later a

crowd of more than 200,000 persons gathered in Parliament square where they called for Imre Nagy, who eventually addressed them briefly in cautious terms. At 8 p.m. Gerö, who had returned earlier that day from a visit with Tito and apparently failed to grasp the popular mood, delivered a provocative speech and infuriated the demonstrators. Shortly thereafter the political police fired on demonstrators at the Radio Building. Most of the demonstrators were students who intended to broadcast to the nation their sixteen-point resolution. This bloodshed changed the character of the demonstration and triggered the revolution. People in working-class districts seized trucks, and obtained arms from the city police, military barracks, and arms factories. They attacked and temporarily occupied the Radio Building after fierce fighting. Soviet tanks appeared in the streets of Budapest in the early hours of October 24. This action served only to unite the people, and signaled the onset of guerrilla warfare.⁵

Soviet military intervention united the country almost to a man. Workers in Budapest and other industrial centers joined the revolt and organized a paralyzing strike. Workers from armament factories distributed small arms, and peasants sent food to the fighters. The Hungarian Army refused to fire on the people and turned over their weapons to the freedom fighters. A few military units in Budapest even joined the revolution. Communist-educated youth, indoctrinated soldiers, and workers—in whose name the regime ruled—organized and fought a revolution against the communist tyrants and foreigners who had exploited them in the name of the fatherland of the proletariat. Unlike the Poles, who had a choice, the Hungarians had to fight or accept a strict Stalinist rule. Gerö's blunders, the use of force by the political police, and Soviet military intervention made inevitable a full-scale revolt.

Belatedly, the communist leadership tried to take the wind out of the revolutionary sails. At a stormy meeting in the early hours of October 24 the Central Committee appointed Imre Nagy prime min-

⁵ For a documentary history of the revolution see United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problems of Hungary*, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592) (New York, 1957). Hereafter cited: *Report*. For a comprehensive scholarly presentation of events in Hungary, particularly between 1953 and 1961, see Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).

ister and selected a new Politburo and Secretariat. The next day, after street fighting had broken out in Budapest, Soviet tanks escorted Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov to the headquarters of the Communist Party. Gerő was removed as first secretary of the Communist Party and was succeeded by János Kádár and a five-man Secretariat. The Stalinist majority still retained some key positions in the Party and government.

Nagy's popular appeal was dimmed soon after his appointment by a proclamation of martial law and the government's alleged request that Soviet troops intervene to restore public order. During these events Nagy was under surveillance at party headquarters while the Stalinist hard core of the Party tried to use him as a tool for retaining power. Although Nagy later announced that his government would seek to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops, by then his vague statement could not satisfy the patriotic Hungarians who were engaging the Soviet aggressor in the streets. Western radios beamed encouragement, and the Hungarian people looked to the West and the United Nations for support against the Soviets.

After the outbreak of the revolt, the Hungarian Communist Party, which numbered about 900,000 members, almost totally disintegrated. Revolutionary and Workers' Councils sprang up all over the country. Participation of workers in the fight and emergence of the Workers' Councils are testimony to the maturity of the Hungarian working class. People of the middle and upper classes played only a minor role in the revolution; years of intimidation had caused them to become extremely cautious. Apart from the state security police and a hard core of the party elite, Moscow had no support in the country. In the first phase of the revolution the unorganized freedom fighters stalemated the Soviet Army. Government promises of amnesty for those who would give up fighting had no effect. The center of military resistance in Budapest was the Kilian Barracks under the command of Colonel Pál Maléter. On October 26 the revolt began to spread outside Budapest.

At last Nagy moved to the Parliament Building and began to act more independently. To reduce the power of the Stalinists he formed a new government including both communists and noncommunists on October 27. The Central Committee announced that the government would start negotiations for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. Gradually fighting stopped and Nagy dissolved the hated

security police and abolished the one-party system, promising free elections and the end of collectivization of agriculture. Eventually he dared to speak freely and denied that he had ever asked aid from the Soviet Army. This frank statement re-established his popularity. Nagy's actions were supported by Kádár, who called for the creation of a new Communist Party which would defend the cause of socialism and democracy, "not by slavishly imitating foreign examples, but by taking a road suitable to the economic and historic characteristics of our country."

Mikoyan and Suslov again flew to Budapest from Moscow seeking compromise. On October 30, the Soviet government declared:

Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government.

At the same time the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.⁶

In harmony with this statement the Soviet Army withdrew almost entirely from Budapest. Nagy reconstituted his government on October 30 and undertook to form a broad coalition based on the parties which existed in 1945. The noncommunist political parties rapidly began to reorganize themselves and almost overwhelmed Nagy with various demands as they started preparing for free elections.

These somewhat confused but generally favorable developments were then disturbed by alarming reports that new Soviet armored divisions were arriving on Hungarian territory. Nagy energetically protested to the Soviet ambassador on November 1 and 2. When the ambassador professed to have no knowledge of these troop movements, Nagy on November 1 announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary's neutrality with the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers, and asked the UN to consider the Hungarian situation.

This turn of events frightened many communists who thought that

⁶ *Soviet Affairs Notes*, no. 233 (Washington, August 10, 1959), 15.

Nagy had been carried away by the anticommunist character of the revolt and sensed that the Soviet Union would not tolerate Hungary's withdrawal from the communist bloc. Some of them, including Kádár, left Nagy's entourage and subsequently disappeared from Budapest. Unlike Gomulka in Poland, Nagy lacked dedicated and shrewd communist adherents capable of engineering a political compromise acceptable to the country and the Soviet Union. In any event, a compromise solution might not have worked in Hungary because of the popular wrath against anything which smacked of communism and foreign domination. Although Nagy had vocal admirers among the communist intellectuals, he never enjoyed favor with the party machinery. He was an honest idealist who tried to avoid the ruthless communist power-struggle.

Meanwhile tanks arriving through Rumania surrounded airfields, railroad stations, and other strategic sites in eastern Hungary. Nagy appealed to Dag Hammarskjöld on November 1 and requested

promptly to put on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations the question of Hungary's neutrality and the defence of this neutrality by the four great Powers.⁷

On November 3, Nagy again reconstituted his government, in which the Smallholders, the Social Democrats, and the communists obtained three ministries each, and the Petöfi (Peasant) Party two. Minister of Defense Pál Maléter was a nonparty man. The same day in the Parliament Building negotiations between representatives of the Hungarian government and the Soviet High Command on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary progressed so satisfactorily that general agreement was reached by the afternoon. The Soviet High Command invited Maléter, and other representatives of the Hungarian Army to Soviet Army headquarters near Budapest to discuss the settlement of remaining technical details. The Hungarian delegates attended a banquet given them by the Soviet High Command and Maléter even telephoned Nagy to report progress in the talks. They never returned. After dinner they were arrested—reportedly by General Ivan Serov, chief of the Soviet security police.

Simultaneously, Soviet armored divisions began to encircle Buda-

⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, 4-10 November 1956, Plenary Meeting and Annex* (Doc. A/3251), Annex, p. 1.

pest, attacking the city in the early hours of November 4. Imre Nagy delivered his last radio address to the Hungarian people:

Today at daybreak Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intent of overthrowing the legal democratic Hungarian government. Our troops are in combat. The government is at its post. I notify the people of our country and the entire world of this fact.⁸

Ruthless fighting went on in Budapest for three days, and armed resistance continued in the city and in some isolated spots throughout the country for a few more days. Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, freed during the revolt, sought refuge at the US Legation. Nagy and several of his followers were granted asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy.

One member of Nagy's cabinet, István Bibó, remained in the Parliament when the Soviet Army occupied the building. The Russian soldiers paid no attention to the lonely man typing a declaration that described the last hours of Nagy's government, characterized the Hungarian Revolution and Soviet intervention, and appealed to the UN and the world powers. He wrote in part:

Hungary has no intention of conducting an anti-Soviet policy; in fact she intends to participate fully in that community of free Eastern European peoples who wish to build a society free from exploitation and to pattern their lives according to the ideals of liberty and justice. I likewise reject before the whole world the charge that the glorious Hungarian Revolution was of Fascist or anti-Semitic character. The entire Hungarian people, regardless of class or religious differences, participated in the battle.

Their fair, wise and discriminating conduct, directed solely against the subjugating foreign army and the native hangmen-detachments was moving and remarkable. The mob justice practiced for a few days and the non-violent manifestations of old conservative political forces would have soon been eliminated by the newly-formed government. The assertion that an enormous foreign army had to be summoned or rather recalled for this purpose is not serious but cynical. On the contrary, the presence of troops was the chief source of unrest and turmoil.

I ask the Hungarian people not to consider the occupying army, nor the possible puppet government installed by it, the legal authority and to use all the weapons of passive resistance towards them, excepting those connected with the public utilities and supplies of Budapest. It is not within my power to give the order for

⁸ Free Europe Committee, *The Revolt in Hungary: A Documentary Chronology of Events* (New York, 1956), p. 82.

armed resistance; I have been a member of the government only for one day. I do not have information of our military situation, and it would therefore be irresponsible on my part to risk the precious blood of Hungarian youth. The Hungarian people have shed enough blood to show the world their devotion to truth and freedom. It is now the turn of the world powers to demonstrate the strength of freedom-loving nations and the validity of the principles embodied in the UN Charter. I ask for the wise and courageous decision of the world powers and the UN for the protection of the freedom of the subjugated nations.⁹

In the wake of the victorious Soviet tanks, Kádár reappeared as the head of the new Moscow-sponsored government.¹⁰ He blamed Rákosi for unjust conditions and resulting discontent which had prepared the way for the revolution. Initially Kádár promised to maintain the achievements of the revolution, and even negotiated cautiously with representatives of the Workers' Councils. Although he denounced Nagy, he admitted that Nagy had not knowingly helped the counter-revolution and did not reject the possibility of Nagy's participating in the government. He suggested that first of all Nagy should leave the Yugoslav Embassy, and promised him safety. Three weeks later Nagy and his entourage left the embassy with a safe-conduct pledge agreed upon by the Hungarian and Yugoslav governments.¹¹ Soviet

⁹ On the morning of November 4, Bibó personally took a copy of the declaration to the British, United States, and Indian legations. Later the declaration was circulated and even posted in Budapest. István Bibó, *Harmadik Ut*, edited by Zoltán Szabó (London, 1960), pp. 7-9.

Bibó did not seek refuge in the West. On May 27, 1957, he was arrested and later sentenced to life imprisonment. He is still in jail, for the amnesty of 1960 was not extended to his case. The masters of the Kremlin and their satraps do not appreciate scholars and politicians who are willing to stand up and be counted for their convictions.

¹⁰ When the Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party had adjourned in November 1959, Kádár accompanied Khrushchev to the USSR. At an impromptu rally in Uzhgorod, Kádár admitted that he had gone to that city "three years ago" to ask for "help" at a time when the Hungarians were "in dire straits." This slip proved that Kádár's government was formed on Soviet soil, probably on November 2 or 3.

¹¹ Kádár in his capacity as chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, stated in a letter addressed to the Yugoslav government on November 21, 1956: "In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian government . . . hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end

forces arrested them outside the embassy. Nagy was deported to Rumania and the Yugoslav diplomatic protest was of no avail. Nagy's case is only one of many examples of Kádár's broken pledges. Whether Kádár made promises through necessity, opportunism, or sincere conviction is immaterial. He was put in power by the Soviet Army and ever since has been a docile puppet of Soviet policies.

CHARACTER AND REPERCUSSIONS OF THE REVOLT

The Hungarian uprising was primarily the self-assertion of humiliated and mistreated human beings whose patience had reached a limit. It was not an outgrowth of jingoism. The participants took a stand with their lives for basic human rights, and were far from advocating restoration of the pre-1945 regime.

The revolt was neither planned nor organized. The USSR, the Western powers, and the Hungarians themselves were taken by surprise. Communist indoctrination proved a total failure. Communist-educated young people had compared communist theory to communist practice and had come to quite uncommunist conclusions. Writers and students started the ferment, and eventually aroused the whole nation. Events in Hungary obviated any fear that the new generation, educated according to communist precepts, would be lost to the free world. They also dealt a crushing blow to communist ideology. From the Soviet point of view, the most devastating aspects of the revolution were the complete success of the general strike, collapse of the Communist Party, and the unreliability of the communist-organized Hungarian Army. The revolution illustrated that in the event of conflict or a serious crisis the people of Hungary might easily become a source of trouble for the Soviet Union.

Widespread poverty directly attributable to the failure of communist economic planning contributed to the general dissatisfaction, but a low standard of living was not the cause of the revolt. In 1945-1946—amidst destruction of the war, lootings, a 'record inflation, reparations, and unemployment—economic conditions were certainly more desperate than in 1956, but a number of people had nevertheless believed communist promises and entertained hope for a better future. During the Red decade decency became outmoded, people

and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes." *Report*, p. 107.

were fed lies, and their confidence and hope dimmed. The communist leaders ignored or suppressed popular opinion and cynically violated pledges. They lived in luxury and lost all genuine contact with the workers who, tired and disillusioned, had to listen with outward enthusiasm to speeches they knew to be untrue. Albert Camus was indeed correct when he said that "the Hungarian insurrection was launched in the first place against the Big Lie."¹²

Although Hungary's independence was short-lived, the implications of Hungary's fight for liberty are far from negligible. Milovan Djilas,

¹² One of the oldest Hungarian communist writers, Tibor Déry, published the following open letter in the *Irodalmi Ujság*, November 2, 1956:

"My Friends: It was hard for me to make the decision to speak. When the first shot rang out, the blood drained from my head: you too are responsible for this. You talked, you agitated: how are you going to give an account to the dead? On the street the unburied dead multiply: go forth and halt the hand of the murderers! I cannot simply acknowledge that there is no revolution without bloody sacrifice. As each shot rang out, I felt, half raving, that it was I who pulled the trigger. I believe in man's conscience and put myself on the bench of the accused.

"My friends, I will shoulder the blame. Happy and proud am I that, together with my fellow writers, we were the first to hear and to record, by virtue of our profession, the word of a nation. This is the greatest revolution in Hungarian history, as well as the first victorious one. This revolution was not fanned by individuals, political factions or opinions, but was executed by the will of the people. It is with horror that I realize what we only vaguely felt and guessed for many years, what we only half-articulated—from the shaken marrow of my bones I can only now measure how cruel the oppression was which weighed on the people for them to respond in such unity, as one body, with bare hands against the tanks. A revolution of young hoodlums they said! From this day on the word "hoodlum" will be sacred to me. For years I watched the youth of Hungary with despair: they listened as if in a faint; on October 23 they came to and redeemed the honor of the nation. With awe and homage I tip my hat to them. Just as I had wished and begged and hoped, after the youth of '48 there sprung up a youth of '56 in the nation.

"I am primarily addressing myself to them, for today they hold in their hands the fate of the revolution. I am old, past 62, and have participated in two unsuccessful revolutions. In '45 I believed that workers, peasants—all of us who had been stepchildren of the country—would find a new fatherland. But in ten years, little by little, they sold the country out from under us. We thought we were building socialism but found ourselves walled in a prison of lies. I feel responsible for only now opening my eyes; and when they were open for not being able to broadcast my words or my silence so eloquently that all would understand. But we Hungarian writers have one saving grace: even though late, we were still the first to start fighting openly against tyranny." István Csicsery-Rónay, ed., *Költök Forradalma, Antológia 1953-1956* (Washington, D. C., 1957), pp. 79-80.

a former leader in Tito's Yugoslavia, suggested that with the Hungarian Revolution "a new chapter began in the history of humanity . . . perhaps no less meaningful than the French or Russian Revolution."¹³ Although Djilas, too, was jailed, he may be right that "the Hungarian Revolution blazed a path which sooner or later other Communist countries must follow."

The Hungarian Revolution proved that communism was not voluntarily accepted or retained in Hungary, that it could achieve no hold on men's minds but could survive only with the ruthless support of an efficient Soviet Army. As a result, in many countries disillusionment with communist doctrines and practices increased even among communists and their sympathizers, particularly among intellectuals.¹⁴

THE AFTERMATH IN HUNGARY

The first few weeks after the revolt saw anti-Soviet demonstrations, open defiance by the Workers' Councils, general and regional strikes and work slowdowns, and mass flights from the country. Processions of black-clad women, mourning their sons and husbands, defiantly marched past Russian troops. The economy, in a desperate situation even before the revolt, deteriorated still further. In Budapest alone 20,000 houses and 600 shops were seriously damaged. Material damages were estimated at \$300 million.

Kádár alternated between the stick and the carrot. The Workers'

¹³ *The New Leader*, November 19, 1956.

¹⁴ Numerous books of very different character and value have been published on the Hungarian Revolution and events related to it. A first-class documentary source is the *Report of the Special Committee on the Problems of Hungary*, and the most complete scholarly work is Ferenc A. Váli's book referred to above in footnote 5. Some representative publications are: Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, *The Revolt of the Mind* (New York, 1960); François Fejtő, *Behind the Rape of Hungary* (New York, 1957); József Kovago, *You Are All Alone* (New York, 1959); Melvin J. Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution* (New York, 1957); Tibor Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin* (New York, 1959); István Mészáros, *La rivolta degli intellettuali in Ungheria* (Torino, 1958); Leslie B. Bain, *The Reluctant Satellites* (New York, 1960) and Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution. Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising*. (Stanford, California, 1961).

For the communist version of the Hungarian Revolution see: Herbert Aptheker, *The Truth About Hungary* (New York, 1957) and *Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary*, published by the Information Office of the Council of Ministers in Budapest (Five volumes, no date).

Councils, still powerful throughout the country, organized a paralyzing general strike on December 11 and 12. Thousands of workers protested the deportations to Russia. Kádár felt compelled to offer sweeping concessions, such as the abolition of the secret police and the holding of free elections. He promised forgiveness for all who took part in the revolt.

The UN General Assembly provided for humanitarian aid to the Hungarian people. This aid from the West was channeled through and distributed by the Red Cross during the weeks following the revolt. A four-man UN economic fact-finding mission visited Budapest early in January 1957, and reported on the reduced capacity of Hungarian industry and the minimum needs of aid in foodstuffs and other supplies. More substantial Western economic aid, however, was not forthcoming, because it might have been misconstrued as support for Kádár's tank-protected government. The free world cooperated efficiently in helping the almost 200,000 Hungarian refugees. Particularly the Austrians treated them most generously, but Western interest gradually decreased and the refugees' lot became uncertain. A small percentage of them returned to Hungary.

Industry haltingly started its comeback. In the spring of 1957 manufacturing and mining output were still 40 per cent below their pre-revolutionary level, and leaders of the communist world were apparently worried about the possible repercussions. Hungary had become an economic liability. The Soviet Union and China granted stopgap loans. Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania followed suit with a variety of aid. When a delegation headed by Kádár visited Moscow on March 20-28, 1957, and agreed that Soviet troops should remain in Hungary "as long as necessary," the Soviet government cancelled several of Hungary's outstanding debts, suspended payments on several others, granted a long-term loan, and promised a large supply of goods. Although the arbitrary exchange rates and other factors make it difficult to judge the real value of such economic assistance, the communist leaders manifestly went out of their way to be generous. Bloc credits made it possible for Hungary to import needed commodities for its run-down industrial machine. But it could not solve the problem of chronic mismanagement or provide for badly needed investments, particularly in agriculture and mining.

Substantial foreign aid was all the more necessary since Kádár's

economic policy, aiming at winning over the peasants and industrial workers, set into motion the classical inflationary spiral. Compulsory agricultural deliveries were abolished, and the peasants were allowed to sell their produce to private persons and to bargain with state purchasing agencies. As a result, for a while the peasants received a considerably larger share of the national income. Wages were raised, but labor productivity did not increase correspondingly.

For a time the regime tolerated limited private enterprise and occasional criticism of the Communist Party—both from within and without—and made no attempt to recollectivize. These incentives were accompanied by a reconstruction of the communist control apparatus. Although Kádár promised a coalition government and free elections, as soon as the regime was consolidated his wrath turned against those intellectuals, students, and workers whom the Soviet government blamed for the revolution. The Hungarian Writers' Union was banned in January 1957 and the Workers' Councils gradually suppressed and definitively dissolved in November 1957. Deportations, arrests, political trials, and secret executions once again became the order of the day.

Since Kádár's only reliable supports were Soviet armored divisions, a policy of terror was perhaps inevitable. His rule demonstrated the dilemma of the post-Stalin era. Although communists in Hungary denounced Stalinism and promised more freedom, it proved difficult to grant freedom piecemeal. Continued passive resistance and unrest made a return to Stalin's methods and the use of force necessary. Subjugated Hungary became a showcase for the vicious circle in which communist dictatorship enmeshed itself. Kádár knew well through personal experience the tortuous and sometimes insane ways of communism. As minister of interior, he had participated in preparing the great purge of the Hungarian Communist Party, and was himself jailed and cruelly mishandled for three years (1951-1954). Later he entertained visits from the top leaders of world communism and received red-carpet treatment in Moscow and most of the communist capitals. It is indeed a revealing commentary on the Soviet world that a man of his background should have become the Muscovite satrap of subjugated Hungary.

Meanwhile the Hungarian people were witness to the treachery which befell those individuals who negotiated in good faith with the USSR and believed in communist promises. The condemnation and

execution of Imre Nagy, General Maléter, and several of their associates, announced in June 1958, constituted a breach of faith almost unprecedented in the history of civilized nations. Nagy had been granted asylum by the Yugoslavs, and Kádár gave a written pledge of safe-conduct to the Yugoslav government. Maléter was arrested while representing the Hungarian government in Soviet-initiated negotiations for withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary.¹⁵

The Hungarian Revolution was not Nagy's doing. He had been hand-picked by Moscow in 1953, and was pushed by the revolutionary events into a leading political position in October 1956. Although he felt he had a mission to lead the country and the Party, he did not seek party leadership or contemplate organizing—let alone lead—a revolt. When the revolution threw him into a responsible position, he manfully accepted the challenge. Later the Russians belittled his role. Voroshilov suggested at the Brussels World Fair in August 1958 that "Perhaps it would have been possible not to give Imre Nagy such a harsh sentence because he was just a fool. Nagy never helped us, never raised his finger to help us. He was not a real communist." In the same interview, he commented on the Hungarian Revolution: "Some people have called it counter-revolution, some called it revolution. I think it was just foolishness."¹⁶

AN ANTI-DOGMATIST AND ANTI-REVISIONIST COURSE

The Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party (November 20-December 5, 1959) marked the final consolidation of Kádár's position within his own party and the bloc as well. Although in January 1959 Ferenc Münnich succeeded him as prime minister, Kádár remained first secretary of the Communist Party and Khrushchev's favorite son in Hungary. The party numbered almost 450,000, which was about half the prerevolutionary membership but an increase of more than 300,000 over its January 1957 strength.

The draft submitted to the Congress was a blueprint for total communization of the country, including collectivization of agriculture. The program stated with satisfaction that tendencies in trade

¹⁵ For details see *The Truth About the Nagy Affair: Facts, Documents and Comments* (London and New York, 1959). This work was produced by a group of friends and former colleagues of Imre Nagy who live outside Hungary.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, August 19, 1958.

unions since 1956 that aimed at independence and at turning the unions against the Party have been overcome. Kádár's ideological specialist, Gyula Kállai, demanded the eradication—particularly among youth—of counterrevolutionary sentiments and, above all, nationalism and chauvinism. After the death of the Muscovite Joseph Révai (August 1959), Kállai had become chief ideologist of the Party. He was a "homegrown" communist, a member of the "Debrecen group" and formerly a newspaperman employed by *Népszava*, the daily of the Social Democratic Party. He was jailed by Rákosi, along with Kádár and Münnich. At the Congress, Kállai frankly admitted that the intelligentsia in Hungary was not converted to Marxism. He called for indoctrination of the intellectuals and for elimination of widespread petty-bourgeois ideology. Kádár emphasized the existence of a collective leadership, pointing out that the leaders argue among themselves often and strongly. He stated again that "Soviet troops will remain in Hungary as long as required by the international situation."

The USSR, the People's Republic of China, the satellite states, and the communist parties from many other countries were represented at the Seventh Congress. Khrushchev told the workers at the Ganz-Mavag engineering and railway factory that some of his Kremlin comrades argued against using the Soviet Army to crush the 1956 Hungarian revolt and expressed anxiety "that any aid would be misconstrued." To support his action, he referred to the armed intervention in Hungary of Czar Nicholas I in 1849 and asked: "How could the Soviet Union have withheld such help in 1956 when our troops were stationed in this country and the best sons of your people were being hanged?" He blamed the 1956 revolt on the mistakes of Hungary's former Stalinist leaders and reiterated his confidence in Kádár, who was quick to use such support to staff the party apparatus, particularly the Central Committee and country secretariats, with his own men.

It is difficult to ascertain any true manifestation of public opinion in Hungary, where the people are confronted with Hobson's choice. Although Kádár was selected and installed by the Russians, he seems more acceptable to most people than Rákosi. His anti-Rákosi stand certainly is popular, although it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between Kádár's and Rákosi's policies. The reorganized state security police apparently is not as powerful as it was in Rákosi's day. But Kádár's early promise to maintain the achievements of the revolution

was honored mostly in the breach. Political arrests and secret trials remained the order of the day, and large-scale executions took place as late as 1959. A genuine reconciliation between the Hungarian people and Kádár's regime can not occur, even though the people seem to appreciate that some ugly features of Rákosi's rule have not been reinstalled. To win popular support, Kádár revived the People's Patriotic Front, and that organization's Second National Congress was held in May 1960.¹⁷ The Front's purpose was to unite noncommunist forces "in order to give a new impulse to the building of socialism." Even the idea of "nonparty communists"—persons who are not party members, but whose attitudes would qualify them for party membership—was launched. Simultaneously, Kádár tried to eliminate or at least weaken such major forces of resistance as nationalism, the churches, and independent farmers.

NATIONALISM, WRITERS, AND INTELLECTUALS

Reawakened nationalism created a bridge between communist intellectuals and the Hungarian people after 1953. Without unprecedented national unity of thought and action the revolution would have been impossible. Because of the central role played by the writers and intellectuals from 1953 to 1956 in the creation of this unity, Kádár's regime made considerable efforts to win their co-operation. Many writers fled to the West, while some who remained in Hungary expressed their protest through silence. Several were imprisoned, as were a number of scholars and other intellectuals.

Kádár banned the Hungarian Writers' Union, which played a central role in the intellectual ferment prior to the 1956 revolt, and then permitted it to reorganize in the fall of 1959. The new union is to foster the production of "socially useful" literary works and encourage discussions in the silent camps of writers and intellectuals. Even the great Hungarian poet, Gyula Illyés, refused to publish until the spring of 1959. Several of the imprisoned writers were released from jail in March 1960, when the government announced an amnesty for certain categories of political prisoners and allegedly dissolved the internment camps. Later that year another group of intellectuals who had participated in the revolution reportedly was

¹⁷ The People's Patriotic Front was established by Imre Nagy and its first Congress was held in 1954.

released from prison, without any public announcement. But István Bibó and some leading intellectuals are still in jail.

Persuasion and pressure have been used to obtain a measure of co-operation from the more prominent writers. Life is made difficult for non-cooperative intellectuals and writers. Many of those who co-operate with the regime evaluate the revolution differently than the government and do the minimum necessary to exist. Most of them live in a state of "spiritual emigration" and try to maintain the national consciousness of the Hungarian people. They do not dare to express their ideas and feelings openly, but sometimes it is not difficult to surmise them; people who live in a dictatorship have learned to read between the lines.¹⁸

A fairly large number of scholars work in their ivory towers, although on occasion they must go out of their way to praise the ideas of socialism, and emphasize the magnificence of life in the USSR and China, as opposed to the decadence of the West. Various reforms in the educational system aim at securing greater co-operation from the young generation and eliminating those students from higher education who have a bourgeois ancestry or for other reasons seem unreliable.

RELIGION

While the practice of religion is tolerated, churches are subjected to increasing pressure and must compete with regime-sponsored anti-religious and atheistic propaganda. The Kádár government has purged many Catholic and Protestant clergymen and exacted a political oath of allegiance from church officials. The Reformed and Lutheran churches were brought under control in 1948 by replacing independent pastors with fellow-traveling bishops who co-operated wholeheartedly with the regime.¹⁹ One of the Calvinist bishops, Albert Bereczky,

¹⁸ A Swedish journalist visited Budapest in early 1961 and published an article in the *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, January 13, 1961, on conditions of Hungarian writers and the attitude of Hungarian authorities toward them. He wrote about Tibor Déry and Gyula Háry, who were released from jail, and George Lukács, who lives in isolation. Lukács is a leading communist thinker whose heresy during the Hungarian ferment in 1955-1956 greatly encouraged the revolt of the young communist writers. For excerpts in the English from the article, see "Hungary's Strange Literary Truce," *The Hungarian Quarterly*, I (July, 1961), 55-61.

¹⁹ See Gyula Gombos, *The Lean Years, A Study of Hungarian Calvinism in Crisis* (New York, 1960).

worked out a new pro-socialist theology which was sponsored with great enthusiasm by a younger Calvinist bishop, János Péter, who was appointed for political reasons. He also served the regime in foreign relations, and became foreign minister in 1961.

Since Catholics form a majority of the population, and their institutional contacts with Rome are particularly distasteful to communists, the major antireligious campaigns are directed primarily against the Catholic Church. The Primate of Hungary, Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, lives in complete isolation at the US Legation in Budapest.

After Mindszenty's imprisonment in 1949, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, József Grösz became the acting head of the Bench of Bishops. Grösz was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in 1951 on the charge of leading an organization aimed at overthrowing the democratic order of the state. He was granted "clemency" and allowed to return to his archdiocese in mid-1956. Grösz, the other bishops, and many priests have been pressed time and again to make statements favorable to government policies, including collectivization of agriculture. The government supports the Peace Movement of Hungarian Catholic Priests established in 1950. The Movement has its own paper, *Katolikus Szó* (Catholic Word), edited by an excommunicated priest. Subservient "peace priests" have been installed in key positions of church administration. The administration of each diocese is under the strict control of the State Office for Church Affairs established in 1951. The Kádár regime in May 1957 renewed the *modus vivendi* concluded between the Bench of Bishops and the Hungarian government in August 1950. The Hungarian government continued its financial support of the Church promised in the 1950 agreement, while the Bishops pledged support to the "Peace Movement" and sponsored an association called *Opus Pacis*, which incorporated several Catholic organizations, including the "peace priests."

A new series of antichurch moves was initiated late in 1960.²⁰ The State Office for Church Affairs has speeded up antichurch measures, the major goals of which are abolition of the remaining religious education, harassment and other means of discouraging seminarians, and control of church offices. Many seminarians were expelled for refusing to attend a conference organized by the "peace priests."

²⁰ See for details, "Church-State Relations," *The Hungarian Quarterly*, I (July, 1961), 51-54.

Bishops have been confined to small villages and thus impeded in the administration of their diocese, and priests have been arrested and accused of immorality, criminal acts, and particularly antistate activity.

Although Grösz was a sick old man, he energetically protested the arrest of priests and monks in February 1961. He challenged the government to arrest him in a letter in which he said that he himself must be as guilty as the arrested priests. His challenge was, of course, ignored. In March 1961, a statement attributed to the Bench of Bishops by the Hungarian news agency and publicized abroad, opposed "any actions directed against the security of the state." Eventually the secular priests, and the members of suppressed religious orders and others, who had been arrested for participating in "illegal organizations engaged in anti-state activity," were sentenced to several years' imprisonment.

Despite strong religious feelings in the country, the attrition of religious institutions presages a bleak future for churches in Hungary. The death of Archbishop Grösz in October 1961 left only five bishops in Hungary who are permitted to administer their dioceses under strict government control: one of them is in his 80's and two others are in their 70's. Cardinal Mindszenty cannot exercise his functions in the archdiocese of Esztergom; seats of the two other archdioceses, Eger and Kalocsa, are vacant; and the bishops of Vác and Veszprém live in confinement. Simultaneous with the process of systematic destruction of church organizations, heavy attendance at religious services continues, often as a silent protest against the regime.

ECONOMICS AND AGRICULTURE

The integration of the Hungarian economy into the over-all economic system of the Soviet bloc has become an overriding consideration under the general plan and supervision of COMECON.²¹ The Five-Year Plan (1961-1965), accepted by the Seventh Party Congress, called for complete collectivization of agriculture, a 65-70 per cent increase in industrial production, and a 150 per cent increase of the national income computed on the basis of 1954-1956 figures. To satisfy growing needs for basic industrial materials Hungary will have to import mainly from the USSR. A pipeline for crude oil from

²¹ See for details below, Chapter X.

the Volga region to Hungary, planned to be completed in 1963-1964, will be a further sign of Hungary's advancing economic integration into the Soviet bloc.

Simultaneously, trade relations are expected to increase between the USSR and Hungary and in them the Soviet Union will continue to determine the prices of raw materials and finished products. Hungary maintains intensive trade relations with Asiatic communist countries, and in recent years has begun to play a major role in the Kremlin's assistance programs for strategically important underdeveloped countries. Between 1958 and 1961 Hungary granted approximately \$150 million credits to Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea, North Vietnam, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Cuba, India, and Ghana. In turn, she received in 1958 a Soviet investment credit of \$110 million. Hungary's emergency credits of 1956-1957 became repayable beginning in 1961, and full repayment with accrued interest reportedly will take four years.

Food remains a critical item. Since an independent peasantry is not tolerated in a communist dictatorship, both Rákosi and Kádár collectivized. The collective sector diminished under Imre Nagy's premiership, 1953-1954, and was reduced to about 10 per cent of Hungary's total arable land in October 1956. By December 1958 the government claimed that 29 per cent of the arable land was under collective cultivation; by spring 1959 this figure had risen to 40 per cent, which was higher than under Rákosi's regime. By December 1959, 55.8 per cent of the arable land had been collectivized, and the Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party decreed full collectivization.

In February 1960 the Central Committee halted land collectivization in order to "consolidate the new collectives and organize party units inside the collectives." A year later it reported that only 10 per cent of the country's arable land, most of it in the hilly regions, remained under private control. Collectives account for 72 per cent of arable land, state farms another 14 per cent, while over 3 per cent is under some other form of collective cultivation.²² Independent farming was made all but impossible. The collectivization drive began in western Hungary and then extended throughout the country. Trained

²² For figures of land collectivization in the other satellite states see below p. 236-237. For earlier figures see Irwin T. Sanders, ed., *Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe* (Lexington, Ky., 1958), pp. 140-165.

agitators moved into the villages and with support of the authorities "persuaded" the peasants to sign up.

Theoretically, the new collectives have the right to elect their chairman, and the members receive bonuses. Each peasant family retains a small garden plot, and production per hectare on their plots far exceeds that of communal holdings. Village life changes rapidly. Large numbers of young peasants flee to the cities and the average age of those who remain on the collectives is reportedly over 50 years. This movement and other related transformations in the Hungarian countryside will have far-reaching effects on the future of the nation.

Some of the immediate results of the all-out collectivization have been hoarding of grain by peasants, blackmarketing, illegal slaughtering, and a general decline in production and agricultural export. Shortage of meat is another by-product of the new agrarian system. Hungary, a former bread-basket of Europe, has become a wheat-importing country.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although the Hungarian revolt was not sparked by Western promises, during the days of the revolution people remembered Western speeches about "liberation" and felt that the West would not let them down. This feeling was strengthened by Western radios which did not fail to broadcast encouraging messages.²³ By the end of October the question was no longer of liberation, but of preserving the freedom of a country that had liberated itself. The communist head of the legitimate Hungarian government intended to defend the nation's independence and desperately asked for Western support.

In these dramatic days it appeared that the United States was not at all prepared for these serious developments even though American political leaders had for years predicted, desired, and encouraged them.²⁴ The likely consequences of a revolution in Eastern Europe

²³ See Robert T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis, 1958), pp. 185-213.

²⁴ John Foster Dulles, a foreign policy adviser to General Dwight Eisenhower, Republican nominee for President, outlined a program for the policy of liberation at the meeting of the American Political Science Association in Buffalo on August 27, 1952. *The New York Times* of August 28 summarized his statement:

"First the President of the United States would declare that this country would never make any deal with the Soviet Union to recognize its conquests and let it keep its captive peoples permanently. The Voice of America and other

were not thought through. The London *Economist* commented in its issue of August 30, 1952: "Unhappily 'liberation' applied to Eastern Europe—and Asia—means either the risk of war or it means nothing. . . . 'Liberation' entails no risk of war only when it means nothing." The June 1953 uprising in East Germany gave warning of what was to come. Public opinion in the West welcomed the Hungarian revolt but the Western leaders revealed an astonishing political unpreparedness and ineptitude when the going became rough.

Direct military action in Hungary by the West would have been very difficult if not impossible, but it was unwise to make absolutely clear to the Russians that the United States would not move no matter what happened in Hungary. Yet this is what was implied in statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.²⁵ American foreign policy was paralyzed, while the Kremlin seemed un-

agencies would begin to stir up the resistance spirit behind the Iron Curtain, letting the Poles, Czechs and others know they had the moral backing of the United States Government. Next, he said, resistance movements would spring up among patriots, who could be supplied and integrated via air drops and other communications from private organizations like the Committee for a Free Europe. Finally he predicted the Communists' conquests would disintegrate from within; the Russians, preoccupied with their own problems, would cease aggressive actions and eventually realizing they had swallowed more than they could digest, would have to give up and go home.

"Mr. Dulles said the 'containment' policy of President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson must be abandoned. 'That policy has not contained Soviet Communism,' he said. Mr. Dulles also urged the abandonment of the Truman-Acheson policy of concentrating on the strengthening of Western Europe, and said we must 'pay more attention to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and South America.' . . .

"Mr. Dulles called a press conference to answer Averell Harriman, Mutual Security Director, who told the Association yesterday that the Eisenhower liberation policy had spread fear of war in Europe and that the Truman-Acheson foreign policy was not merely containment but one of 'helping our friends.' 'It is nonsense for Mr. Harriman to say that General Eisenhower's liberation policy is a trap and would lead to premature uprisings and more Warsaw massacres,' he said. 'There was nothing premature about the Warsaw uprising. What was wrong was that the Russians double-crossed the Poles. To suggest any analogy between this treachery and the general's idea is unthinkable. The only trap I see, is that in the Democratic platform which says, they look forward to liberation of all these peoples but they aren't willing to do anything about it. That's a trap to get votes, but I don't think it will work.' "

²⁵ See Secretary Dulles' address to the World Affairs Council in Dallas, October 27, and President Eisenhower's broadcast on October 31.

decided; the resources of diplomacy were not used with skill and determination. The protagonists of liberation were unprepared for contingencies inherent in the policy they advocated. Announced American passivity certainly weakened the arguments of those in the Kremlin who opposed military intervention. Good diplomacy would have required that Moscow be kept guessing about American reactions. But President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles apparently thought that the Soviet Union would behave more benignly toward the Hungarians in the face of American passivity. Such an attitude, however, strengthened those who wanted to crush the Hungarian Revolution by military means. Forceful American reaction could have exercised some restraining influence. An additional unfortunate circumstance during the Hungarian Revolution was the lack of an experienced ranking American diplomat in Hungary. Most of the legation in Budapest was new; and the United States Minister, Edward T. Wailes, had not arrived until November 2, 1956.²⁶

Lack of American policy in the UN was equally obvious. After the first Soviet intervention on October 24, the United States, Britain, and France called for a session of the Security Council, which convened on October 28. No resolution was introduced—largely because of news of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. The Security Council discussed Hungary's case on November 2, 3, and 4,²⁷ but the

²⁶ Wailes did not present his credentials to the Kádár regime. The US wanted to avoid a solemn recognition of a government installed in Hungary under the protection of Soviet tanks. Wailes was recalled for consultation in February 1957 and did not return to Budapest.

²⁷ See United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records, Eleventh Year*, 746th, 752nd, 753rd and 754th meetings.

Anthony Eden has made the following comments on UN procedures and American policies:

"The pitiable failure of the United Nations to influence Hungarian events in the slightest degree lit up that tragedy in flaming colour. I had announced from 10 Downing Street on October 28 that in concert with our allies we were referring the Hungarian situation to the United Nations. The Security Council did not dally at the start. It considered the plight of Hungary on that same day. The Western powers indicted the Soviet Union for 'violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people,' but the debate was inconclusive and the Council adjourned.

"Five days passed without any further Council meeting upon Hungary, despite repeated attempts by ourselves and others to bring one about. The United States representative was reluctant, and voiced his suspicion that we were using the

General Assembly did not meet in emergency session until November 4, after the second Soviet intervention. The UN presented a dismal spectacle; the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian Revolution and completely disregarded the world organization. The United States, hand in hand with the USSR, supported UN policies against its two most important Western European allies. While Soviet divisions poured into Hungary and Nagy desperately sought UN protection, Soviet diplomacy, almost with American assistance, succeeded in making Suez the central issue in the UN.

Several steps could have been taken between November 2 and 4. When news of the large-scale invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops reached the UN and Nagy asked Hammarskjöld for support of Hungarian neutrality and independence, at the very minimum, a UN observation commission should have been appointed and dispatched. UN members' diplomatic representatives in Budapest or Vienna could have been appointed and started functioning immediately. Instead the Security Council concentrated on the Suez crisis, and on November 3 postponed for forty-eight hours²⁸ the discussion of the Hungarian question because of the announcement that there would be Hungarian-Soviet direct negotiations. After a Soviet veto on November 4 made impossible the acceptance of a resolution concerning Soviet intervention in Hungary, an emergency session of the General Assembly met to consider the problem. It appealed to the Soviet Union "to desist forthwith from all armed attack on the people of Hungary and from any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary," and "to cease the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all of its forces without delay from Hungarian territory."²⁹ On November 9 the General Assembly accepted a five-power resolution, repeated the essence of the resolution of November 4, and suggested that free elections under UN supervision should enable the Hungarians to determine the form of their government. The resolution reaf-

Hungarian situation to divert attention from Suez. The United States Government appeared in no hurry to move. Their attitude provided a damaging contrast to the alacrity they were showing in arraigning the French and ourselves." *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (Boston, 1960), p. 609.

²⁸ See record of the 753rd meeting of Security Council, p. 23.

²⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, [Doc. 1004 (ES-II)], p. 7.

firmed its request to the Secretary-General to continue investigation of the Hungarian situation brought about by foreign intervention.³⁰ The Soviet Union disregarded these resolutions. The ordinary annual session of the General Assembly accepted two additional resolutions on November 21. Once again the Assembly called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary and "take immediate steps to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who have been deported from Hungarian territory." The other resolution called upon the Hungarian government to admit UN observers to Hungary.³¹

On December 4 the General Assembly reiterated the previous resolutions and again called upon the Soviet government to withdraw its forces from Hungary.³² Since these resolutions had no effect, on December 12 the General Assembly condemned the Soviet use of military force to suppress the Hungarian people's effort to reassert their rights. Fifty-five countries—including many Afro-Asian nations—voted for a strong official UN condemnation of the Soviet Union's actions in Hungary.³³

All of the Assembly resolutions were exhortatory. They condemned the aggressor in Hungary, but none recommended collective action against that aggressor, the Soviet Union. It was obvious once more that collective security does not operate against one of the two superpowers unless the other is willing to risk war. The United States was not willing. The Soviet Union ignored or rebuffed the resolutions, and the Assembly repeated its condemnation without even considering sanctions.

Thoughtful Hungarians, though they did not expect military help, were appalled by the West's diplomatic weakness in the decisive days of the revolt. UN resolutions were of little comfort. Because of individual and collective blunders by the Western powers, the Soviet Union was not opposed by a purposeful diplomatic action. The American electoral campaign was partly responsible, and the Anglo-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, [Doc. 1005 (ES-II)], pp. 42-81.

³¹ United Nations, *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly from 12 November 1956 to 8 March 1957 during its Eleventh Session* [Doc. 1127 (XI) and 1128 (XI)], p. 63.

³² *Ibid.*, [Doc. 1130 (XI)], pp. 63-64.

³³ *Ibid.*, [Doc. 1131 (XI)], p. 64.

French action at Suez further encouraged the Russians. Yet a margin for diplomatic maneuvering remained unused.

Strong American statements seemed effective diplomatic deterrents to Russian threats to violate Austrian neutrality or to despatch volunteers to Egypt. Since similar statements were not forthcoming on the Hungarian situation, many Hungarians concluded that the United States, possibly taken by surprise, was unprepared to execute its policy of liberation or had abandoned them. Few considered the difference between the Middle East, Austria, and Hungary from the standpoint of American military capabilities and strategic interests.

When Kádár refused to admit the UN observer team and declared a visit of the Secretary-General "unsuitable," the General Assembly on January 10, 1957, established a Special Committee "composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly."³⁴ The Kádár government refused to permit the Committee to enter Hungary, and so the Committee took evidence from refugees—111 eyewitnesses of the revolutionary events—and from other reliable sources, such as governments which had diplomatic representatives in Hungary during the revolution. The Committee completed its findings in June 1957, concluding that the revolt had been a spontaneous national uprising. Its report³⁵ established that the Soviet Union intervened twice, first to subdue the uprising and a second time to overthrow the legal Hungarian government. It is of great historical importance that the report evaluated crucial issues connected with the revolution:

It is incontrovertible that the Nagy Government whose legality under the Hungarian Constitution, until it was deposed, cannot be contested, protested against the entry and the use of Soviet forces on Hungarian territory, and not only asked that these forces should not intervene in Hungarian affairs, but negotiated and pressed for their ultimate withdrawal. The actions of the Nagy Government give proof of the firm desire of the Hungarians, as long as they could publicly express their aspirations, to achieve a genuinely independent international status for their country.

³⁴ *Ibid.* [Doc. 1132 (XI)], pp. 64-65.

³⁵ See above, p. 126, n. 5.

It is no less incontrovertible, that the Nagy Government was overthrown by force. Its successor assumed power as a result of military aid by a foreign state. The Nagy Government neither resigned nor transferred its powers to the Kádár Government. Noteworthy is the acceptance by the Kádár Government, after initial declarations to the contrary, of the continued presence of Soviet forces in Hungary (p. 59).

A plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly discussed and endorsed the report of the Special Committee on September 10-14, 1957, and condemned the Soviet Union for "the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly," and for its actions in Hungary as reported by the UN Special Committee.³⁶ In harmony with the report, the General Assembly resolution pointed out that the USSR "has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights," and stated that "the present Hungarian regime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This resolution was adopted with sixty votes in favor, while ten delegations voted against it and ten abstained. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand was appointed special UN representative to seek compliance with the Assembly resolutions on Hungary. Three months later he reported his failure to carry out his mission because of the refusal of the Hungarian and Soviet governments to co-operate.³⁷

In September 1958 the General Assembly voted to include the Hungarian question on its agenda.³⁸ On December 12 it once more condemned the Soviet and Hungarian governments for "defiance" of UN resolutions, and deplored the "continued repression of human rights" in Hungary.³⁹ Fifty-four countries voted for and ten against the resolution, and fifteen—including six countries which supported the resolution in 1957—abstained. The resolution denounced the execution of Nagy, Maléter, and other Hungarian patriots. The Assembly discontinued the Special Committee on Hungary, replacing

³⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Eleventh Session, Annexes*, VM III [Doc. 1133 (XI)], pp. 1-2.

³⁷ United Nations, *General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 63* (Doc. A/3774), pp. 1-2.

³⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, p. 55.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 481-547.

it with a *rappporteur* on Hungary, Sir Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand, former president of the General Assembly.

When the United States proposed to re-examine the Hungarian situation in November 1959, the Soviet delegate Vasily V. Kuznetsov contended that such a move would hinder the improvement in international affairs "which had been initiated by Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his negotiations with President Eisenhower." UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge retorted that he welcomed the results which had been achieved at Camp David.

He [Lodge] did not want the spirit of Camp David to be lost, and the best way of preventing that would be to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly. He had attended all the meetings at Camp David, and nothing had been said there which could justify a refusal to discuss the question of Hungary in the spirit of Camp David. The enslavement of small countries and acts of brutality committed in violation of human rights were contrary to that spirit.⁴⁰

Eventually Sir Leslie submitted to the General Assembly a report on Hungary, although he had not been allowed to enter that country. The report discussed the conditions of Soviet occupation of Hungary, the lack of elementary safeguards in criminal trials, the continued imprisonment of Hungarian patriots, and several other violations of fundamental human rights. By fifty-three votes to ten, with seventeen abstentions, the General Assembly on December 9 deplored the failure of the Soviet Union and the present Hungarian regime to honor its previous resolutions on Hungary and requested Sir Leslie to continue his efforts as UN representative.⁴¹ Despite this condemnation, the General Assembly elected Hungary to the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.⁴²

In September 1960 Khrushchev and a galaxy of top communist leaders attended the UN General Assembly. Although the Steering Committee had decided—twelve votes to four, with four abstentions—to place the Hungarian question on the agenda of that session,

⁴⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Fourteenth Session, Summary Records of Meetings of the General Committee*, pp. 22-24.

⁴¹ United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 74 [Doc. 1454, (XIV)]*, p. 8.

⁴² Ambassador Lodge explained that the Soviet bloc named the seven Soviet bloc members and the West had a determining voice in the selection of seventeen out of twenty-four members. *New York Times*, December 16, 1959.

Kádár headed the Hungarian delegation. In an address to the UN on October 3, Kádár described Hungary as a nation now at peace and happily progressing toward a fuller life.⁴³

Sir Leslie, in turn, reported to the General Assembly on December 2 that he was still refused admission to Hungary, that "the people of Hungary are subject to foreign domination, that troops of an alien power remain on their soil, and that in consequence the Hungarian people are denied the elementary human right of freely choosing those whom they wish to govern them."⁴⁴ The General Assembly considered the Hungarian question again on December 20, 1961, on the basis of another report by Sir Leslie. It deplored the continued disregard by the Soviet Union and the present Hungarian regime of its resolutions concerning the situation in Hungary.

Since 1956 the General Assembly's Credentials Committee has refused to approve the credentials of the Hungarian delegation;⁴⁵ UN debates have publicized conditions in Hungary and repeatedly ended with condemnation of the Soviet Union. These condemnations and numerous UN suggestions have been disregarded by the Soviet government—the real ruler of Hungary. The UN is powerless against an un-cooperative superpower. Nevertheless it is of some importance that the UN Special Committee was able to establish the authentic history of the revolution. Subsequent reports of the General Assembly by special UN representatives, and the ensuing debates, have further exposed Soviet duplicity and the true conditions in Hungary.

The Hungarian People's Republic has established around the world over fifty embassies, legations, and trade missions. These agencies serve primarily Soviet interests and are part of the Soviet political machine. In underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, technicians and trade missions of a small communist country are less conspicuous and not considered dangerous from a political point of view, and so can be more effective for penetration than Russian emissaries.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary, restricted to the level of *chargé d'affaires*, remain strained. Not until the summer of 1960 were American passports validated for travel to

⁴³ *New York Times*, October 4, 1960.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, December 3, 1960.

⁴⁵ This lack of approval of the credentials had a gesture-value but did not hinder Hungary's participation in UN activities.

Hungary. The Kádár government harassed the US Legation, which became Cardinal Mindszenty's refuge, for years. Hungarian authorities obstructed the work of local employees of the legation. In April 1957 the Hungarian government expelled the United States assistant military attaché, and the following month requested the legation to cut the size of its staff by more than a third. There followed a series of accusations that the United States was guilty of hostile activities, espionage, and intrigues against the Hungarian People's Republic. In July 1959 the Hungarian government restricted travel by United States diplomats to a zone of twenty-five miles from the center of Budapest. The State Department retaliated.⁴⁶ Hungarian diplomats had to remain within twenty-five miles of the center of Washington or, in the case of members of the United Nations delegation, of New York City. Travel beyond those limits required special permission from the State Department. These travel restrictions remained in force until the summer of 1961, when they were lifted by both sides.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE

Almost 2 per cent of Hungary's population, mainly young people, sought refuge in the West after the revolution. The majority of these refugees belonged to the productive 18 to 45 age group. In Hungary the birth rate has declined in recent years, and in 1959 and 1960 abortions exceeded registered live births. These phenomena constitute a serious predicament for a small nation in a strategically exposed area of Europe. Psychologically Hungary still lives under the impact of the 1956 revolution.

It is important to the Hungarian people that they successfully defied the Soviet Union and its domestic communist regime, even if that defiance was overwhelmed by the Soviet Army and followed by the re-establishment of a communist government that keeps Hungary in the Soviet orbit. The self-confidence of a proud nation was restored by the temporary success of the revolution. The spirit of the Hungarian people was not crushed. The Russians and the Hungarians—communists and noncommunists alike—know that October 1956

⁴⁶ An American *aide-memoire* handed to the chargé d'affaires of the Hungarian Legation at Washington on July 7, 1959, described the Hungarian restrictions and informed the Hungarian Legation of the American retaliatory measures. *Bulletin*, 41 (August, 1959), 161-162.

could happen again, although without a fundamental change of political conditions elsewhere in Europe the probability is not great.

How do the Hungarian people view the West, especially the United States today? Even to the most optimistic Hungarians, it is obvious that at a crucial moment the West failed to challenge or offer any alternative to Russian domination of East Central Europe. While American foreign policy was unable or unwilling to initiate purposeful diplomatic action in Budapest or the UN, France and Britain had plunged into the Suez adventure and absorbed the world's attention in the decisive days of the Hungarian Revolution. Lack of Western, especially American, political and military assertiveness may leave lasting traces in the Hungarian mind, possibly helping in the long run to create a spirit of accommodation to Soviet rule. Still, so long as communism remains alien to the Hungarian people, the West, particularly the United States, probably remains a source of hope.

Kádár replaced Münnich as premier in September 1961 and Hungarians quite rightly consider the Kádár regime a creature and instrument of Soviet policy. No Hungarian government could remain in power under existing international conditions without Russian support. But communist bosses, who have learned that terror cannot stifle the human spirit, are more cautious than Rákosi. Soviet military might is omnipresent even though Soviet military control is discreet. Local security forces have been reorganized and strengthened. A communist bureaucracy, willing to run the state under Rákosi, Imre Nagy, Hegedüs, or Kádár, has developed. Besides their vested interest this communist and fellow-traveler officialdom doubtless believes that the Hungarian state must survive and that somebody must run the country.

The average Hungarian avoids trouble if possible and concentrates primarily on personal survival. People are politically indifferent, having found that foreign affairs and politics in general no longer mean much, in the sense that they cannot influence the course of events. They readily recognize the fluctuation between hard and soft tactics and are resigned to them as an unavoidable part of their lives. Politics—like storms, sunshine, and rain—are considered beyond their ken.

It is in the West's interest to maintain the hope and vitality of the Hungarian people. Under the most distasteful conditions, Hungarians have demonstrated extraordinary capabilities for heroism, survival, and productive work. If the domestic political situation

changes for the better, cultural contacts should be developed; even humanitarian and economic aid should be extended when justified from the point of view of Western interests—possibly under the Food for Peace Program. President Eisenhower set the example for such action in the spring of 1956. But this is a delicate matter, because such aid should not include material which could strengthen the communist bloc as a whole. At present diplomatic relations with the puppet government in Budapest can settle only surface questions.⁴⁷ The chief difficulty in improving relations with the Kádár regime lies in the stigma of its origin. The settlement of basic problems and the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries remain dependent on the turn of world politics, mainly on the development of Soviet-American relations.

⁴⁷ A booklet published by Hungarian authorities, *Hungarian-American Relations, 1918-1960* (Budapest, 1960), contains much pertinent data on the communist interpretation of events.

7: RUMANIA

Stephen Fischer-Galati

Since 1955 the process of "socialist construction" in the Rumanian People's Republic has undergone significant modifications affecting both domestic developments and foreign relations. The postwar phase of rapid industrialization and ruthless annihilation of actual and potential obstacles to the "socialist transformation" of the country according to the blueprint of Stalinist Russia went into partial eclipse with the adoption of the "new course" shortly after Stalin's death in 1953. Further changes following Khrushchev's policy of moderation were introduced, at first gradually, then with increased, if not always even, momentum during the course of the Second Five-Year Plan inaugurated in 1956. This tendency toward moderation emerged as early as 1952 when the pattern of communist totalitarian dictatorship had been firmly established in Rumania. With the country's political, economic, cultural and religious life completely controlled and the struggle for leadership of the Rumanian Workers' Party resolved in favor of the middle-of-the-road elements, the Party was now able to come to grips with the problems related to the achievement of the visionary goals of the First Five-Year Plan. Stalin himself had apparently understood that the Rumanian working class could not attain the productivity goals set in 1950, that the peasantry was indomitably opposed to agricultural collectivization, and that the rapidly created Party was insufficiently reliable to overcome these difficulties and provide the effective leadership necessary to unify and win over the anticommunist and anti-Russian population. The new course gave official sanction to trends that had been tolerated earlier. By lowering the unrealistic goals of the First Five-Year Plan, by reassuring the peasantry of the regime's intention to prevent forcible agricultural collectivization, and by promising vastly improved living standards to all engaged in "socialist construction," the Party and government promulgated the principles of moderate communism from which they have but infrequently deviated.

The aims of the leaders of the Rumanian People's Republic were most clearly explained in the several reports presented to the Second Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in December 1955. In the industrial field, with emphasis still placed on the virtual doubling of production in heavy industry, every effort would be made to bring about a commensurate increase in the area of consumer goods. The development of heavy industry would no longer occur at the expense of the people's standard of living. Agricultural production would increase substantially through greater mechanization and expansion of the socialist sector. The latter goal would be achieved, always on the basis of "free consent," by enticing the peasant into any form of agricultural organization, not necessarily a collective farm. These changes, together with sizable increments in the earnings of the active population would bring the standard of living to unprecedented highs by 1961.

This alteration in the program undertaken under Stalin's tutelage was attributed, in order of importance, to the great weakness of the Rumanian Workers' Party, the low level of labor productivity, peasant opposition to agricultural socialization, and continuing popular opposition to communist rule. Pending remedial action in these respects, in the absence of pressure from post-Stalinist Russia, the Party and government therefore chose to adopt Lenin's formula of "*reculer pour mieux sauter*." Any analysis of Rumanian developments since 1956 must necessarily focus on the nature and effectiveness of the compromises designed to meet the goals of the Second Party Congress.

The building of a reliable organization, neglected because of the necessity to enroll as many "careerists" and "opportunists" as possible in the immediate postwar years, was assigned priority in 1956. The party leadership had candidly explained at the congress that membership had been nearly halved since 1950 by removing almost 400,000 members from active lists. In December 1955 the Party numbered only 538,815 men and women, more than half of "non-proletarian" origin. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the first secretary, further admitted that the "social composition" of the membership was unsatisfactory, that "bureaucratism" and "careerism" permeated the organization, and that by and large the Party was ineffectual, intellectually arid and incapable of "leadership and guidance." Elimination of these deficiencies through strengthening of discipline and attracting members of working-class origin was regarded as an immediate prerequisite for

the attainment of all other goals of the regime. Similar observations and recommendations were made relative to the principal mass organizations—the Union of Working Youth, the General Confederation of Labor, the Committee of Rumanian Democratic Women, and other party-controlled groups—all corrupted by a nonproletarian spirit. The bankrupt vitality of the Party and its subordinated organizations has not been restored as expected.

Consistently since 1956 members have been reproached for the identical shortcomings mentioned at the congress. Additional charges of “liberalism” and “bourgeois tendencies” were emphasized after the Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet purges accompanying Khrushchev’s unequivocal assumption of power. Purges as such have been rare, largely because the Party could ill-afford internal dissension. The most significant such action occurred in 1957 when Iosif Chisinevski and Miron Constantinescu were removed from positions of power for anti-party—allegedly “bourgeois” and “liberal”—activities. The only positive development was an increase in total membership to 834,000 by the summer of 1960, but at that the social composition of only 54.6 per cent “workers” was still considered insufficient, the political consciousness of most members low, and apathy of young communists in the Union of Working Youth toward party affairs and activities alarming. Thus in the absence of trustworthy replacements for a generally unsatisfactory membership the Party had to tolerate deficiencies as the only alternative to mass expulsions which would destroy the organization itself.

The “incorrect” attitudes of actual and potential members merely reflect those of the population at large and explain to a considerable extent the further compromises that the regime has been forced to make since December 1955. Foremost were additional revisions in the goals of the Second Five-Year Plan in both industry and agriculture with subsequent increases in workers’ and peasants’ benefits.

The principal obstacle to the realization of the economic aims of the regime had been diagnosed at the congress as low productivity of labor and corresponding high production costs. Throughout 1956 the party leadership harangued against the failure of its members, of trade union leaders, and of economic ministries to rectify this situation. Absenteeism, slackness on the job, and the prevailing lack of incentive was to be corrected by further application of “advanced Soviet working techniques” in industry and by the instilling of greater

"socialist discipline" among the workers themselves. The inability of the weak Party to execute these directives effectively in the face of workers' resistance to change and the continuing low technical level of the working class resulted in fundamental changes in industrial production plans and relationships in December 1956. At that time, clearly under the impact of the Hungarian Revolution, the Party decided to downgrade its goals for production in heavy industry to allow increases in the workers' standard of living. Reinvestment of the planned outlays was to favor the development of agricultural production and of consumer goods, food, and building industries. A new incentive system was to be adopted, emphasizing bonuses, sizable wage increases (up to 36 per cent), improved social security benefits, and a realistic revision of production norms. Enactment of these decisions, however, failed to achieve the desired results. The regime, as early as February 1957, complained that production costs could not be reduced in certain areas, particularly mining, timber, housing and food production, because of the inefficiency of the respective economic ministries. The reduction in the number of economic ministries, with greater economic decentralization, the replacement of inept personnel and the extension of the bonus system both directly and through heavy investment of profits in canteens, clubs, and other social activities for industrial workers, all undertaken in the spring of that year, still did not bring about the realization in 1957 of even the revised production goals.

Neither were the expectations of party planners fulfilled in 1958, although labor productivity and general industrial production rose by approximately 10 per cent. Accusations of increased absenteeism and embezzlement and theft of industrial capital and property became increasingly frequent in the fall of that year and resulted in the reactivation in September of judgment councils in factories and of the Stalinist system of industrial espionage. These drastic measures permitted the imposition of severe penalties through administrative action on workers delinquent in the fulfillment of their duties or guilty of speculation. But they proved inadequate; and were therefore stiffened by the introduction of the death penalty for "embezzlement of socialist property" and long-term imprisonment for lesser thefts. The immediate results were favorable. However, continuing slow-downs and passive resistance were apparently responsible for a return to the "carrot" treatment with new wage increases, price reductions

and considerable extension of social security benefits granted workers in 1959 and 1960. The regime rightfully claimed that overfulfillment of the plans for 1958 and 1959 in certain areas (not, however, in consumer goods, foodstuff and housing industries) permitted such action. Absenteeism, low productivity, and inefficiency on the part of government, trade union and party organs were nevertheless condemned at the same time.

The once ambitious plans for rapid agricultural collectivization had been abandoned long before the Second Party Congress. In December 1955, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej merely set as a goal for 1961 the "preponderance of the socialist sector" in agriculture. Other aims were a marked increase in the number of machine tractor stations and tractor production and the attainment of an over-all production of 15,000,000 tons of grain. The designs of the Party have not been fulfilled except with respect to the preponderance of the socialist sector, the all-inclusive category of collective farms, state farms and loose and temporary associations of individual peasants.

As in the past the principal obstacle to achievement was the opposition of the peasantry to joining permanent agricultural associations, the collective farms. The Party and government had hoped to entice the peasantry into collective farms through direct propaganda in 1956. The success of this campaign was so limited—only about 1 per cent of the total peasant population had joined the 5.5 per cent of the peasantry already in collectives at the beginning of the year—that the Party changed the Collective Farm Statute in September. At that time it became permissible for peasants to join without giving up title to the land brought into the collective farm, to have guaranteed compensation for cattle and equipment made available to fellow members and to enjoy other privileges deferring to the individual ownership-bias of the peasantry. Still the peasants shied away with only another 6 per cent of the total rural population joining by the spring of 1958. A concerted drive in 1958, 1959 and 1960, however, did increase the proportion substantially; by February 1961 almost 48 per cent of the total peasant population was collectivized. The number of agricultural associations of independent peasants has also increased substantially as has the total land area in the socialist sector. It was officially asserted that the socialist sector, in the spring of 1960, included 72.7 per cent of the total agricultural land in the country in contrast to only 35.2 per cent at the beginning of 1956. Statistical

success is nevertheless a far cry from party expectations, for it rests on *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of the individualistic ownership proclivities of the peasantry to which it has catered in order to achieve the aim of "socialist preponderance" by 1961. Further concessions were made as agricultural production failed to reach the goals originally set. On January 1, 1957, the regime abolished compulsory deliveries for most agricultural products and introduced the system of direct purchasing on a commercial basis from all producers to encourage greater production. But, largely because of the adverse price structure and the inefficient methods of agricultural production, aggravated by insufficient mechanization, poor weather, and faulty leadership, production of cereals fell far short, in 1958 and apparently also in 1959 and 1960, of the planned goal of 15 million tons by 1961. In 1958 it amounted to a mere 7.3 million and was not expected to exceed in 1960 the all-time high of 11 million realized in the bumper crop year of 1957.

The compromises imposed upon communist order by internal factors—party weakness, labor inefficiency, peasant resistance to socialization—by themselves do not threaten the stability of the regime or the achievement of a considerable proportion of the proclaimed economic goals. The palliatives offered and the direct measures taken by the Party and government, while not necessarily fulfilling the requirements of the ideal communist political organization, of the Second Five-Year Plan or of the Six-Year Plan adopted in 1960, have nevertheless established a degree of stability in the Party and in the economic relationships between the Party and the working class and the peasantry with consequent substantial economic progress. The general industrial growth has been indeed spectacular in terms of both prewar and immediate postwar production and in most areas even in comparison with 1955 achievements. At the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, held in June 1960, the leadership could announce with pride that by 1960 the production of steel had reached 1,400,000 tons compared with the 1938 production of 284,000 and 765,000 in 1955. The comparative figures for crude oil were 11,400,000 tons, 6,594,000 tons, and 10,575,000 tons and for commestible oil 63,842 tons, 17,800 tons and 48,000 tons respectively. While the 1959 production figures did not reach the original goals of the Second Five-Year Plan for production of 1,600,000 tons, 13,500,000 tons and 91,200 tons respectively, they are nevertheless impressive on a com-

parative basis. They were at least so regarded by the Party which set new ambitious goals for a new Six-Year Plan designed to better than double the country's rate of economic growth by 1966.

A more serious threat to the long-range, but not immediate, stability of the communist order stems from corollary developments, partly caused by Khrushchev's policies of moderation in the USSR and "coexistence" with the West, and partly by the improvement of the standard of living and other economic concessions made to the peasantry and working class.

The essential effect of Khrushchev's policies on Rumania since 1956 has been the sanctioning of the course of moderation adopted by the Party since 1952, particularly in the economic field, and encouraging coexistence between Rumania as a member of the Soviet bloc and the noncommunist world. With rising industrial productivity Rumania became one of the instruments for the achievement of Khrushchev's fundamental goal of "burying" the capitalist system through peaceful economic competition. This, in Rumania's case, has involved extension of her international trade predominantly within the bloc but also with the noncommitted nations of Asia and Africa and, to a lesser extent, with Latin America and Western Europe. The various trade and payments agreements concluded by the Rumanian People's Republic with countries of the Middle East, Ghana, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Australia, Sweden, France, and others, resulted in greater economic interdependence and more extensive exchanges of delegations and individuals between Rumania and the noncommunist world. It also entailed correct treatment of noncommunist diplomatic representatives with abandonment of protests, expulsions, and espionage trials involving Rumanians connected with embassies, legations or members of their staffs.

Another aspect of "coexistence," that of cultural exchanges between East and West, further dented the Rumanian "iron curtain" as Rumanian artists and intellectuals visited various European and non-European nations with which the Rumanian People's Republic has either formal cultural exchange treaties or informal ties as in the case of most Western European countries and the United States and, in turn, played host to their noncommunist confrères. The dangers inherent in "coexistence" have been clearly appreciated by the regime.

From the time of its formal assumption of power in 1948, the

Party has relentlessly denounced the cultural inheritance and mores of the "bourgeois" past and has rigidly stamped out any deviation from the rigorous Stalinist line of socialist realism. The heavy-handed destruction of Rumania's French-based and Western-oriented cultural tradition became more subtle after Stalin's death when unexpurgated presentation of French and Rumanian classics was permitted on the stage and the reading public was allowed again to peruse the works of Molière, Hugo, Balzac and, by 1956, even Anouilh, Sartre, Cocteau, and some of the more controversial Rumanian and foreign writers of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the regime has adamantly refused to relax its grip on contemporary cultural activity, insisting on strict adherence to the party-dictated socialist realism. Proust and Molière could not become mass literature whereas mass-produced short stories on factory or collective farm life would serve the purpose of educating the working class and the working peasantry. The most categorical statement of the position of the regime was made at the Second Party Congress by Miron Constantinescu to the effect that since "the past never comes back" it is not permissible for writers and artists to dwell on any themes that would reflect the past. Such "bourgeois-nationalist" manifestations would be "unmasked and unsparingly eliminated." All "retrogressive" ideas would be fought and only works "depicting the heroic struggle of the working class, of the workers in factories and construction sites" or similar topics would be permitted.

The Party's position reflects the fear that a relaxation of intellectual control, particularly at a time when economic concessions had to be made to the working class and the peasantry, might bolster the latent opposition against Rumanian communism and the Soviet Union by rekindling bourgeois intellectual values associated with the royalist-nationalist tradition of the past. These fears became more pronounced and valid as economic and political moderation at home and in the Soviet bloc progressed during and after 1956. The regime watched uneasily over the intellectual revival in other nations of the socialist camp in 1956 and acted promptly to prevent any similar development in the Rumanian People's Republic. As early as June of that year, at a time when socialist realism was challenged in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the Party, with much fanfare, expelled the writer Alexandru Jar for "adopting foreign ideologies" and "deviating from the Party spirit" in his work. To emphasize its position the Party

reiterated the cultural platform of the Second Congress and secured from the Congress of Rumanian Writers an unequivocal endorsement of its cultural policies. But writers and other creative artists were able to circumvent the rigidity of party policies by either producing works that merely paid "lip service" to socialist realism or by writing historical novels, painting abstract landscapes or even by devoting their energies to works of a spiritual-religious nature. Classical rather than contemporary works were also presented on the stage. These trends, markedly accentuated after the Hungarian Revolution particularly in Transylvania's cultural center of Cluj, brought forth repeated denunciations of artists, writers and theatrical producers. Accusations of "revisionism" for tacitly supporting alien intellectual trends and deviating from party edicts, of bourgeois and nationalistic manifestations, of seeking re-creation of the cultural atmosphere of the defunct past have consistently appeared in the party press. The campaign cannot have been wholly successful as these indictments are still published with surprising frequency. The regime however appears satisfied that sufficient "socialist realism" animates enough works to allow continuing indoctrination of the largely nonreading masses. Therefore, while carefully watching creative intellectual activity, it has taken positive measures only in preventing contamination of the passive elements whose intellectual development takes place within the confines of the classroom.

In July 1956 the government reorganized the primary and secondary educational system to improve the training of the future bureaucrats and technicians. The higher academic requirements adopted at that time were the equivalent of precommunist standards and curricula, emphasizing either scientific or humanistic specialization at the upper high school level. The stress on theoretical training, however, worked against the aims of the regime as it soon became apparent that the students specializing in the humanities acquired "impure bourgeois ideas" and in some instances even nationalistic views contrary to official doctrine. The Party at first merely denounced the youths for "unhealthy attitudes" but by 1957, shortly after the Hungarian Revolution and the "emancipation" of Polish students, expulsion of hostile elements began at the high school and university level. The continuation of these "unhealthy" activities, especially bourgeois and nationalistic manifestations, ultimately resulted in a reorganization of the curriculum expressly designed to bring a return

to orthodoxy. In 1959 polytechnicism, Khrushchev's scheme to expedite economic growth by substituting on-the-job training for theoretical studies of an "impractical" and politically dangerous nature, was adopted in the Rumanian elementary and secondary school system. At the same time all schools, including Bolyai University (the university of the Magyar population in Rumania), where the language of instruction had been that of one or another minority group, were compelled to teach both in Rumanian and the minority language to "fight tendencies toward national isolation." An energetic campaign designed to attract more elements of worker and working peasant origin into institutions of higher education who would "combat the nonproletarian ideology of nonproletarian students" constituted the last phase of the fight for ideological purity that the Party initiated in the summer of 1959.

The problems facing the regime at home since 1956 had also affected the course of Rumanian foreign policy. In this domain too the Party and government have tried to solve the dilemma posed by the relaxation of international tension as a consequence of Khrushchev's policy of coexistence and the maintenance of the status quo at home. Aside from the problems arising from the necessary contacts with the noncommunist world in the economic and cultural spheres that have been mentioned in a different connection, the regime has had to face the necessity of limiting its role in the area of coexistence to preclude the aggravation of the trends that were a consequence of its forced relaxation of domestic pressures. The Rumanian government has, since 1956, become the leader in the disengagement movement in the Balkan peninsula, has relentlessly sought official recognition by the West of the "socialist order" in the Rumanian People's Republic itself and, as a firm exponent of "socialist unity," has violently attacked any "revisionistic" trends within the communist world particularly in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. At the same time, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, it has vigorously supported every aspect of Soviet foreign policy affecting the bloc and European political problems, fully rejecting the Stalinist policies of Communist China. In short, it has tried to secure its domestic and international position as a devoted member of the Khrushchev team, but on the whole failed to achieve its aims.

The disengagement proposal, the so-called Stoica Plan, advocating the conclusion of a pact among all Balkan nations, including Greece

and Turkey, that would insure "peace" in the peninsula, was rejected shortly after its appearance in September 1957. Greece and Turkey, as members of the Western alliance, refused to be drawn into a scheme that would have given permanent recognition and acknowledged the supremacy of the communist nations in the Balkans. Even the further inducement of unilateral reduction, in 1958, of the size of the Rumanian armed forces by an estimated 20 per cent as a sign of sincerity and peaceful intentions failed to alter the position of these nations. Other attempts to achieve the same aims on a more limited scale—specifically the request for cessation of all propaganda activity by the West against the Rumanian socialist order—have been equally unsuccessful. The United States in particular has turned a deaf ear to all demands that the activities of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe be suppressed and has insisted on maintaining the "liberation" theme through repeated proclamations of "Captive Nations" events. The antirevisionist campaign which assumed major proportions after the Hungarian Revolution was to a large extent academic as no revisionists were ever discovered in the Party. The main purpose was, of course, to discourage possible tendencies among the Hungarian members of the Rumanian Workers' Party and more directly to prevent the transformation of revisionism into outright "bourgeois" chauvinism and nationalism among nominal members of the Party, intellectuals, students and all other restive elements. It is in this connection too that the relaxation of restrictions against Jewish emigration to Israel might be mentioned, since "cosmopolitanism" and "Zionism" are considered revisionistic tendencies of a bourgeois-minded minority, ill adapted to the "socialist order."

CONCLUSION

Since 1956 the Rumanian Workers' Party has pursued policies designed to expedite the building of socialism in the Rumanian People's Republic, as a member of the socialist fraternity headed by the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's moderate methods were adopted as were most of his policies. Moderation, however, has entailed marked departures from the original blueprint of socialization adopted formally in 1950 and has produced certain dilemmas and compromises. The main compromise forced upon the Rumanian

communist regime has been the abandonment of the goals of the First Five-Year Plan from as early as 1953 and the consequent downward revision of those of the Second Five-Year Plan in subsequent years. These revisions were forced upon the leaders of the Party and government by the realization that the original sights were entirely too high in view of the deficiencies of the party apparatus, of the low productivity of the industrial working class and the opposition of the peasantry to agricultural collectivization. Brutal police and other forcible methods employed to attain the original goals of the First Five-Year Plan had failed to produce the necessary results even during Stalin's lifetime. Discontinuance became imperative as early as 1952. Creeping moderation, embarked upon at that time, became more pronounced after Stalin's death. The new trend, characterized in industry by a revision of goals, by partial sacrificing of the development of heavy industry to permit increased production of consumer goods, by the adoption of a new system of bonuses and rewards, and by increments in social security benefits represented a drastic departure from the rigidity of the Stalinist methods of industrial planning. In agriculture this changed approach was characterized by giving up the policy of rapid collectivization, by revision of the Collective Farms Statute and stressing temporary unions of individual peasants as the means to predominance of the "socialist sector."

These departures from Stalinism represented an appeal to the working masses and the peasantry to support the moderate policies of the Party. In this respect the regime had been less than successful; popular support was lacking and the revised economic goals had not been fully met. The Rumanian Workers' Party's strength in 1961 was not much greater than in 1956 and its policies did not appear to have won new adherents or the esteem and affection of the masses. On the contrary, moderate communism created its own new problems. The expansion of production of consumer goods, the increase in housing construction, the extension of social security benefits had all reinforced the very "bourgeois" tendencies of the people so consistently condemned by the regime. The better economic climate contributed to a deeper penetration of other unwanted "bourgeois" propensities, nationalism and intellectual deviation from party dictates. Coexistence, Khrushchev's brainchild, had necessarily increased participation in international affairs and economic contacts between the Soviet and the noncommunist worlds. Such contacts, in the case of

Western-oriented and strongly anti-Russian Rumania, have brought forth cultural and ideological manifestations critical of communism and the communist order. These "impure" ideologies and the bourgeois materialism stemming from the regime's economic policies weakened rather than strengthened the acceptance of the communist order in Rumania. Cynicism and opportunism became the credos of actual and potential members of the Rumanian Workers' Party and of the population in general.

On the other hand, while acceptance of the regime had become no more enthusiastic than before Stalin's death, actual resistance to it diminished considerably. A temporary *modus vivendi* had been established between ruler and ruled. The struggle for ultimate victory had not, however, ceased on either side. The Rumanian Workers' Party, despite the compromise imposed upon it by domestic necessity and Russian policies, had not abandoned the ultimate aim of transforming Rumania into a replica of the USSR as soon as feasible. The rapid building of socialism through the attainment of the ideal goals in industrial planning, total collectivization of agriculture, extirpation of bourgeois nationalistic trends at all levels, were the avowed aims of Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates. Consolidation and extension of the economic concessions gained in recent years, further relaxation of police pressure, greater contacts with the noncommunist world and, ideally, liberation from Russian and communist domination were the aims of the vast majority of the Rumanian people. The regime and the opposition were both conscious of the complexity of this struggle, with the former holding the all-important trump cards: control of the instruments of economic and political repression and support of the USSR. The Party realized that moderation had not brought about the desired results any more than crude repression had been able to do in the period before the death of Stalin. However, as it was not a free agent but part of a team temporarily committed to coexistence, and moreover, as it had no *raison d'être* in terms of Rumanian tradition, conditions, or popular mandate, it accepted compromises that were thought best by those who formulated and directed the policies of the Soviet bloc. Thus in the 1960's, as for the past few years, the Rumanian communist regime was attempting to build socialism while at the same time battling the bourgeois tendencies which tradition, its own economic policies, and the ramifications of Soviet-planned coexistence naturally encourage.

8: BULGARIA

L. A. D. Dellin

BACKGROUND: THE STALIN ERA (1944-1953)

More than fifteen years have elapsed since Soviet troops and a communist-inspired *coup d'état* decided the fate of Bulgaria, against its people's will, for an indefinite time. The "Bulgarian case" is one of the many examples of the wartime illusions of the Western allies, and particularly of the United States, as to Soviet intentions, and is a consequence of power-political realities in the area at that time. Yet it seems to add to the contrast between the Western confusion and bona fide attitude toward the Soviet ally, on the one hand, and the Soviet determination to grasp any opportunity to achieve pre-meditated goals, on the other.¹

Thus, while the democratic and pro-Western Bulgarian coalition government was desperately seeking an armistice with the Western allies and, on the morning of September 5, 1944, broke off diplomatic relations with and prepared to declare war on Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, whose troops had finally reached the Bulgarian border, retorted with a declaration of war on Bulgaria, disregarded the offer for an immediate armistice and ordered its troops to march in. Not even the Western allies were previously informed about the Soviet action.

This was not a liberation from either foreign or domestic oppression,

¹ The Western approach is illustrated by the secret three-months trial agreement of June 1944, on the basis of which Great Britain, the United States and the USSR allotted temporary spheres of military responsibility in the Balkans and assigned Bulgaria as a "military responsibility" to Moscow, when at that time Bulgaria—alone among the Axis satellites—was not at war with the Soviet Union and, indeed, was preparing to regain its neutrality. It is also transparent from their later solicitation that the Soviet Union should participate in the elaboration of the Bulgarian armistice conditions with the Western allies, when again, the Soviets were not yet a party to the war with Bulgaria. The Soviets used this to delay the conclusion of the armistice until they were ready to intervene. See Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets* (London, 1948), Chapter VI.

but aggression, since there were neither German troops in Bulgaria to be destroyed nor a dictatorial or even anti-Soviet regime to be overthrown. The subsequent coup, made possible by treachery of the minister of war and carried out by the so-called Fatherland Front, accomplished its end on September 9, 1944.²

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

What followed was the application of the now familiar "salami tactics" which, by 1950 and until Stalin's death, was to result in the total and absolute control of the country by the hard Muscovite core of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Immediately after the September seizure of power, the country underwent the severest purge of anticommunists—as well as non-communists—of all the East Central European satellites. By the spring of 1945 "people's courts" and more so—the "people" themselves—had physically liquidated tens of thousands of innocent citizens and sent to jail even the anti-Nazi leaders of the coalition government. Then came the turn of the noncommunist allies within the Fatherland Front coalition. For a while communist-subservient persons were installed as leaders of these parties, but eventually all, except a "reformed" Agrarian Party, were also formally absorbed by the Communist Party or the "unified" Fatherland Front.

In order to placate mounting Western concern and obtain recognition and a peace treaty, the communists tolerated for a while a limited formal opposition which, during the 1946 elections for a Grand National Assembly, polled about 30 per cent of the vote—an almost unbelievable showing under the existing conditions of terror and falsifications. The fight of the opposition, led by Nikola Petkov, aroused the admiration of the free world. But in June 1947, immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty by the United States, Petkov was arrested, subjected to a mock trial, sentenced to death for alleged conspiracy and high treason, and hanged.

² For details on the relevant wartime diplomatic, military and domestic history see Philip E. Mosely, "Hopes and Failures: American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941-1947," in Stephen D. Kertesz, ed., *The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy* (Notre Dame, 1956); Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, 1956), especially pp. 248-59; and "Politics and Political Organizations," in L. A. D. Dellin, ed., *Bulgaria* (New York, 1957), especially pp. 114-20.

Western protests were to no avail. By 1948 the communists, headed by Georgi Dimitrov, former secretary-general of the Comintern, were full masters in the new "people's republic."

The following years saw the power struggle transferred to the ranks of the Party. After the death of the "old glories," G. Dimitrov and V. Kolarov, the estate became a matter of dispute between the disenchanted "natives" and the Muscovites, the first led by Traicho Kostov, the latter by Dimitrov's brother-in-law, Vulko Chervenkov (literally, the "Red Wolf"). With full backing by Stalin, Chervenkov had Kostov and a score of other native communists, apparently weary of Soviet interference and economic exploitation, tried for high treason and a multitude of other often contradictory crimes. Kostov, whose prestige among the local communists had earmarked him as Dimitrov's most likely successor, was executed, after confessing only to "national deviation with regard to the Soviet Union." Thus, Chervenkov emerged in 1950 as the nominal and actual dictator, in Stalin's image and as Stalin's faithful agent in Bulgaria.

Ruthless sovietization and Russification in all fields—political, economic and social—became daily routine in what had become in substance a Soviet colony.³

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The *Gleichschaltung* manifested itself clearly in Bulgaria's foreign relations. Ever since the October 1944 armistice gave the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission "general direction" of Bulgarian affairs, no independent foreign policy move of any import was recorded, with the possible exceptions of some phases of the efforts aimed at a South Slav federation. Soon after Bulgaria regained its formal sovereignty as a result of the Paris Peace Treaty, the government signed, in March 1948, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, supplemented by similar bilateral treaties with the other European "people's democracies." Thus the country was also formally tied to the Soviet orbit at an early stage, and Bulgarian foreign policy became Moscow's echo.

³ For details on the domestic developments during the Stalin era see the three volumes cited above; also Michael Padev, *op. cit.*, and the two government publications: *The Trial of Nikola D. Petkov* (Sofia, 1947), and *Le Procès de Traicho Kostov et de son Groupe* (Sofia, 1950).

Relations with Tito's Yugoslavia deserve special mention for, at several instances between 1944 and 1948, a South Slav federation seemed within reach. The Bled Agreement and the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, both signed in 1947, represented the highlights of the Dimitrov-Tito efforts to establish a common state. Whether or not their conflicting aims in the Macedonian dispute could have been reconciled, is open to speculation, but it is a fact that Stalin's distrust of a larger political unit in the Balkans and his suspicion of Tito's independent course eventually frustrated the implementation of the federation plan. This chapter of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, although revealing some independence by the Bulgarian communists, as also evidenced by *Pravda's* rebuttal of Dimitrov's vision of a larger East European federation in January 1948, should not subtract from the conclusion that the Bulgarian Party acted in the last analysis as an instrument of Soviet policy, ready to accept any solution as long as the password was Moscow's.⁴

Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 set the stage for violent Bulgarian attacks on his "chauvinistic policy" as well as his "treachery," as if a welcome relief from the embarrassing Macedonian nightmare had been found. The Bled Agreement and the Treaty of Friendship were officially denounced, and various hostile acts undertaken by both sides.

Relations with the noncommunist world, particularly with neighbors Greece and Turkey and with the United States, also touched their lowest point during this period. Support of the communist guerrillas in Greece until 1949, which drew United Nations condemnation, and the explosive dispute about the Maritsa (Evros) River islands in 1952, on top of historic antagonism, reduced Bulgarian-Greek relations to a mutual cold war and made resumption of diplomatic relations, broken off since 1941, unthinkable. Turkey was confronted with the mass "repatriation" of 250,000 Turks—the only

⁴ For a detailed discussion of the 1944-1948 federation efforts see my unpublished master's dissertation, "The Bulgarian Communist Party and the Macedonian Question—A Study on Federation," New York University, 1955. It is interesting to recall that Stalin, in trying to prevent Tito's defection, at the last moment insisted on a federation, but this time the Yugoslav communists declined, fearing that the Bulgarian Party would be a Soviet "Trojan horse." See Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York, 1953), pp. 321 and 328.

significant minority in Bulgaria—with the obvious purpose of disorganizing the Turkish economy and obtaining the property of the expellees. Although, on Turkish representations and threat of international recourse, a more orderly procedure was eventually arranged, relations turned tense and the propaganda war increased.

A major goal of the communist leadership became the complete insulation of the people from any Western, and particularly American, influence. Foreign schools were closed, Western correspondents excluded, espionage trials against Protestant and Catholic clergy staged, and ties with the Vatican severed. Then came the direct attack upon the United States, whose contributions to Bulgarian development dated back to the time of Turkish domination, which continuously exposed the regime's violations of the Peace Treaty and whose image alone inspired hope and courage to the captive Bulgarians. A few days after Chervenkov became prime minister, the government bluntly requested the recall of the American minister, Donald R. Heath, implicating him in Kostov's treasonable activity and implying that the United States was conspiring against the communist regime through Tito and Kostov. The United States Government insisted on an immediate withdrawal of the charges and when this was not done, severed diplomatic relations on February 20, 1950. Trials of Bulgarian employees of the United States Legation in Sofia and of other citizens friendly with Americans were initiated in an effort to discredit the United States. Even death sentences were meted out. Another trial of the "Kostovite" Petko Kunin implicated Great Britain. It had become a crime to maintain associations with anyone and anything noncommunist. Bulgaria was turned into an isolated outpost of the Soviet empire.⁵

THE POST-STALIN ERA: DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

In spite of the obvious danger of oversimplification, Bulgarian developments between Stalin's death and the present may be deduced from the swing of the pendulum of the personal fortunes of Stalin's Bulgarian *Gauleiter*, Chervenkov, which reflected the changes in the Soviet leadership and policy.

Taking the clue from Chervenkov's vicissitudes, one may divide

⁵ For details on Bulgarian foreign relations during the Stalin era see the three sources cited in footnote 2.

the post-Stalin era into four convenient, although overlapping, phases. During the first phase of cautious and belated relaxation of communist terror, Chervenkov was gradually eased out as secretary-general of the Party, retaining the premiership (1954), and then losing the latter but remaining deputy premier and full Politburo member (1956). The second phase, which consisted of limited freedom to criticize, unraveled the frustration and confusion of the intellectuals and youth and bore the seeds of revolt; it extended from the April 1956 Plenum of the party, which openly, but far from Khrushchev's anti-Stalin fashion, criticized Chervenkov for encouraging the "cult of the individual," and lasted until after the shock of the Polish and Hungarian upheavals. Then followed the uneasy "back-to-normalcy" phase extending beyond the Seventh Party Congress in 1958, when Chervenkov regained much of his power, and opposition was silenced but not eradicated. Since then, we are witnessing the phase of "building socialism," including the "big leap forward" and its questionable results, where attention has been devoted to rapid economic development as if the political and social problems had been solved for good, with Chervenkov still exerting considerable influence behind the scenes, at least until his anticlimactic removal from the Politburo in November 1961.

THE SWING FORWARD

Stalin's death found Bulgaria at the zenith of communist arrogance and well along the path of sovietization charted by the local "little Stalin," Chervenkov. This was the Chervenkov who had eliminated Kostov and his followers, demoted other native communists, like Yugov, Terpeshev, Trunski and Dragoicheva, expelled close to 100,000 party members, opened the country to the Soviets while blocking Western ties, and generally rode roughshod over the people. The effects of the death of the Soviet dictator and Malenkov's "new course" were not felt in Bulgaria for several months but pressures from above, and mainly from below, became gradually noticeable. In May 1953, tobacco workers in Plovdiv and Khaskovo demonstrated with shouts for "bread and freedom," but were quickly silenced. The peasantry which had rioted previously became so restless that the regime saw fit to exhume the memory of the Agrarian leader Stamboliyski and to pay lip service to the "workers-peasants alliance." Tax reductions and price cuts followed the East German revolt. But only

in September did Chervenkov ape Malenkov's line in a restrained version, promising higher living standards, abolition of forced labor camps, concessions in agriculture, and advocating a normalization in Bulgaria's foreign relations.⁶

The long-overdue Sixth Congress (February 25-March 3, 1954) revealed a renewed strain within the Party between Chervenkov and his Muscovites, on the one hand, and the "natives," on the other. But the Congress also pointed to a common realization that there were worse enemies to fear and that, in order to forestall a popular outburst, at least the semblance of a "national character" should be given to the Party by permitting the "national communists" a larger say in party and national affairs. Chervenkov delivered a two-edged political report by denouncing forced collectivization and other terrorist practices of party and police members and by promising magnanimity to repentants—albeit accompanied by a warning to the "class enemy." It appeared clear that the Party had become estranged from the people and was also infected with factionalism and careerism. Party membership since 1948 had decreased by over 40,000, to 455,251, with an increased workers' ratio but with peasants still in the majority. Todor Zhivkov, apparently a compromise choice, became first secretary and urged in his speech the adoption of the Soviet model of "collective leadership" and "inner-Party democracy."⁷ The reappearance of Yugov as first deputy premier and of other members of the native group presaged Chervenkov's further setback, but couched it in the framework of a mutual accommodation. Attempts were continued to build up popular support by economic concessions and the release of former opposition leaders, mainly of the Agrarian Union, who recanted and came out in support of the regime and the Fatherland Front. This was as far as the regime intended to go in its "democratization" and "liberalization" policy, when gradually but persistently the intellectuals started moving to the fore.

Events within the Soviet Union and its bloc, and particularly Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito, gave impetus to ideas and forces which could not be disregarded. An intellectual rebellion erupted within the Bulgarian Writers' Union against the Union's

⁶ Chervenkov's speech in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, September 9, 1953.

⁷ Full proceedings in the official publication *VI Kongress na Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partiya* (Sixth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party) (Sofia, 1954).

Stalinist leadership and indirectly against the Party's iron hold over intellectual freedom and general policy, and necessitated Chervenkov's personal interference.⁸ The opposition was only temporarily quelled.

Unexpected support for the centrifugal forces came from the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party and Khrushchev's violent denunciation of Stalin, which generated turmoil throughout the Red Empire. The Bulgarian leadership tried to minimize the happenings in Moscow but it became apparent that the changes had to reflect, at least to some degree, the example of the Big Brother.

Unlike other bloc countries, however, the Bulgarian communist leaders not only did not take advantage of the chance to assert a degree of independence from Moscow and pursue internal liberalization but appear to have been pressed by Moscow into the minor changes they made. Moreover, with Kostov executed and his true followers out of the way, there were no communist leaders of Gomułka's or Nagy's stature. Even the most prominent "national communists" like Yugov or Zhivkov, afraid of more liberties for the people and having derived all their power and personal well-being from Moscow, placed loyalty to the Soviets far above national interests. Therefore, when the "historic" April 1956 Plenum of the Central Committees reappraised the Stalinist past, it limited itself to exposing Chervenkov for fostering the "harmful cult of the individual." A few days later, First Secretary Zhivkov very casually mentioned that the accusations in the trial of Traicho Kostov and the other "Kostovites," during which the accused were incorrectly charged with having criminal links with the Yugoslav leaders, were "fabricated" and promised the release of all the survivors. On April 17, Chervenkov was relieved of his premiership, and exchanged cabinet positions with Yugov, who became premier.⁹

This was the climax of the post-Stalin changes in Bulgaria's communist leadership. In spite of the modifications, it revealed a continuity unequalled in the other East European countries, with the possible exception of Albania. Yugov, born in Greek Macedonia, was active in the communist underground during the war and as such could be classified among the "natives." But as minister of the in-

⁸ Chervenkov's speech was published as late as February 2, 1956, in *Rabotnichesko Delo*.

⁹ See *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 8, 14 and 18, 1956.

terior in charge of the police and forced-labor camps, he carried out mass murders and arrests and had always been known as an obedient Soviet instrument. After Chervenkov had criticized him for laxity in connection with Kostov's "conspiracy," Yugov was deprived of the Interior Ministry but remained in the cabinet and the Politburo. His appointment as premier was meant as a friendly gesture toward Tito and greater recognition of the local but Moscow-loyal communists, several of whom, such as Georgi Chankov, Encho Staykov and Boyan Bulgaranov, were promoted for the purpose of attracting the rank and file. Also, the release of conforming noncommunists continued, and an amnesty for repatriates was decreed, inducing a few "Pladne" Agrarians to repatriate. But little more liberalization was permitted and any signs of criticism of past errors, except those framed as meaningless generalities, were suppressed. Still, pressures were building up, and these were especially noticeable among the intelligentsia.

Drawing renewed courage from developments in other captive countries and taking advantage of the April Plenum denunciations, Bulgarian writers, joined this time by journalists and scholars, took repeated chances in expressing their dissatisfaction and urging change. The daily newspaper *Otechestven Front*, the organ of the Fatherland Front, went farthest. Its editor-in-chief, Vladimir Topencharov, Kostov's brother-in-law, gave an interpretation of the "new Party line" which went much beyond that intended by the party leadership. Topencharov implicitly compared Chervenkov's reign to Stalin's, deplored the alienation of the Party from the people, and suggested that those who failed to submit to the criticism of the masses should be eliminated. A *feuilleton* on the May Day parade exposed the new class in most derogatory terms. Topencharov also criticized the press for lack of creativeness, for distorting the true situation in the country, and for complete servility.¹⁰ On May 20, the party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* called a stop to these "excesses," severely reprimanded Topencharov and his paper and branded his ideas "an expression of anti-Party and petty-bourgeois tendencies . . . undermining party and state discipline and creating mistrust in our right cause." Topencharov promptly recanted. The communist academician Tsvetan Kristanov was also severely rebuked and expelled from the Party for his "hint that the entire Party policy in the villages was vicious" and

¹⁰ See issues of April 18 and May 1 and 5, 1956.

for his proposals "which would lead in practice to the dissolution of the collective farms." The writers, temporarily left alone after Chervenkov's demotion, had also gathered momentum and requested an extraordinary party meeting. Now they, together with unnamed other intellectuals, were violently accused of requesting "freedom of action, freedom of criticism, freedom of the press, and opposing . . . the leadership of the Central Committee."¹¹ This the regime could not and did not allow. But it was clearly apparent that the ferment was growing and that the Party was disunited and confused.

The dramatic October events in Poland and later, the Hungarian Revolution, induced the regime to take immediate and drastic preventive measures, made easier by the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the lack of support from the free world. Reports of large-scale arrests and deportations were not denied by the regime. Zhivkov warned the Fatherland Front, as did Yugov the Bulgarian youth, that any attempt to follow Hungary would be met by "our excellent servants in the Armed Forces, Border Guards, People's Militia and security forces who are in a position to cut off every cruel hand which dares to encroach upon the Socialist achievements of our people." The singling out of the officially nonpartisan Fatherland Front and the youth was symptomatic for identification of the potential danger-spots. Zhivkov tried also to placate the anti-Soviet feeling by extolling the "Soviet fraternal aid," pointing specifically to wheat deliveries and Soviet orders placed to help provide jobs for the growing number of unemployed.¹² Tensions were high, but the communist regime and Soviet domination was safe.

THE SWING BACKWARD AND THE 'BIG LEAP FORWARD'

The year 1957 saw the course back to complete conformism and reliance on the Soviet Union initiated.¹³ What remained of "liberalization" was the abatement of terror and the economic correctives, coupled with promises for higher living standards. But not everything returned to normal.

¹¹ See *Rabotnichesko Delo*, May 20 and June 10, 1956.

¹² Zhivkov's speech in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 29, 1956; Yugov's speech in *ibid.*, December 2, 1956.

¹³ Among the many examples of this abrupt reversal see *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 6, 1956, and Soviet-Bulgarian government declarations, *ibid.*, February 21, 1957.

On top of the pyramid Chervenkov's return was indicated by his appointment in February 1957 as head of the then strategic Ministry of Education and Culture. A triumvirate of Chervenkov and the two "loyal natives," Zhivkov and Yugov, seemed to emerge. But Georgi Chankov, another local communist, once considered as Chervenkov's successor, was on his way out. In repetition of the ouster of the Moscow "anti-party group," he was removed in July from the Politburo and dismissed from his position as first deputy premier, together with Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, two other "natives," who were expelled from the Central Committee. Zhivkov eventually accused them of "careeristic aspirations and sick ambitions," thus suggesting a power struggle within the Party.

Nor was there complete silence at the lower levels. A series of articles violently attacking a score of prominent writers, playwrights, and publicists revealed that another rebellion had erupted or, more likely, that the rebelliousness among the intellectuals, which had started in 1955, had never been totally quenched. A special meeting of the party organization of the Writers' Union at the end of November 1957 was intended to strike a final blow at the dissidents, but as it turned out even the Union leadership resented the Party's attack and many of the criticized individuals refused to recant.¹⁴ In spite of threats and dismissals of several of the criticized writers from executive positions, the chapter on the intellectuals' unrest did not appear to be closed. Moreover, strong appeals for "higher-level ideological work, particularly among the young generation," indicated that the youth also had not been cured from the "revisionist" bacillus. It so happened that thousands of young "volunteers" were sent to the Siberian virgin lands under the pretext of finding an outlet for the unemployed.

Khrushchev's confirmation as undisputed leader in March 1958, the April annual meeting of the Writers' Union which appeared at least on the surface to be calm and orderly, and the new National Assembly composed of "reliables," set the stage for the Seventh Party Congress—the era of re-established conformity. The Congress, which met in Sofia in June 1958, was attended by none other than Khrushchev himself who praised the Bulgarian Party for its loyalty and orthodoxy. "With its Leninist international policy, faithful to our common goal,

¹⁴ For details see *Literature Front*, July 18, October 17 and December 26, 1957; also "Bulgarian Writers' Revolt," in *East Europe*, March 1958.

the Bulgarian Communist Party earned the deep respect of the international Communist movement, of all fraternal parties," said Khrushchev pointedly. He commended the Party's "achievement" in bringing about the almost total collectivization of agriculture. The Bulgarian communists, led by Zhivkov, reciprocated with protestations of "eternal friendship" and an unconditional recognition of the Soviet leadership. They stressed the "iron unity and discipline" of the Party, the unrelenting struggle against views inimical to communism and above all, against "revisionism and bourgeois ideology," and explicitly rejected the notion that there could be some "national road to socialism, different in principle from the road of the October Revolution." The membership of the Party was given as 484,255, an increase of about 29,000 over the preceding Congress four years back. Workers' membership had increased to 36.09 per cent, while the peasants' share had fallen to 34.16 per cent of the total.¹⁵

The Congress confirmed the party's full submission to Moscow and its uncompromising orthodoxy. Chervenkov, who spoke at length, proved he still wielded power, although he indulged in mild self-criticism and gave up his post of minister of culture to later take that of president of the Committee on Science. Zhivkov consolidated his position, flanked by Yugov and Chervenkov. The eleven-man Politburo was re-elected and a Third Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) approved.

Gradually, the emphasis shifted to the economic front. The Second Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), although hastily revised to meet some of the most pressing popular needs by curtailing capital investment, reverted eventually to industry and particularly heavy industry as the pet sectors, at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods.¹⁶ With the almost complete collectivization of agriculture (production of which had remained in many fields even below the prewar level) Bulgaria had "completed the transition from capitalist to Socialist production relations . . . although [she has] not yet reached the

¹⁵ The Congress' proceedings are collected in the Soviet government publication *VII Suezd Bolgarskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii* (Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party) (Moscow, 1958). For the first time in many years the name of the exiled King Simcon II was mentioned, although naturally in derogatory fashion.

¹⁶ The Plan Report in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 16, 1958. For more detailed comments see *East Europe*, March and May 1958.

stage where one can say that a Socialist society has been built in our country." The Third Five-Year Plan, as revealed at the Congress, followed generally the familiar pattern of emphasis on heavy industry.

Toward the end of 1958, indications appeared that the Third Five-Year Plan was to be pushed at an accelerated pace. Quite suddenly the regime amalgamated 3,500-odd collective farms into some 900 mammoth units of about 10,000 acres each, announced the "mobilization of the masses" for continuous "voluntary" work, and made clear that it intended to engage in a "big leap forward" by fulfilling the plan in three to four years. This would be done, moreover, without much additional capital investment but through tapping "internal reserves"—idle stock and, above all, manpower. Zhivkov became the driving force. In his "theses" he overruled the directives of the five-year plan by requesting that the volume of agricultural production be trebled as early as 1960 (instead of increasing 35 per cent by 1962) and that of industrial output be doubled in 1962 (instead of increasing 62 per cent).¹⁷ This amounted to a drastic step-up, which necessitated enormous sacrifice.

In order to provide the framework for this overambitious task, Zhivkov undertook to emulate Khrushchev's administrative and economic reorganization. In mid-January 1959 he proposed replacement of the administrative division of the country and of the centralized governmental-economic apparatus by thirty "administrative-economic *okrugs* [districts]," to be headed by *okrug* people's councils with broad powers. He also proposed that the amalgamated farms become, in commune-like fashion, the basic units of the economy, to which craftsman co-operatives and local industrial enterprises be joined, and that machine-tractor stations be gradually relinquished to the collective farms. Zhivkov indicated that economic targets for 1965, when Bulgarian and Soviet plans would start to run concurrently, would be a trebled or quadrupled industrial output and a quadrupled agricultural production. Housewives and youth, as well as peasants, government employees and science workers, were included among those who had to join "voluntarily" in the common effort. Higher living standards were promised "only after the fulfillment of the tasks necessary for this accelerated development."¹⁸

¹⁷ See *Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 26 and November 14, 1958.

¹⁸ Zhivkov's "Theses on the Accelerated Development of the National Economy,

Zhivkov's "theses" were enacted into law March 14, 1959, but only after any possible connection with the Chinese example was denied officially, an afterthought significantly indicative of the Soviet viewpoint on the communes. Seven economic ministries were abolished, thirty new administrative-economic districts and four government committees created, and the 1959 economic plan approved. The latter provided for a 27.8 per cent rise in industrial and 73.9 per cent in agricultural output in 1959 alone, which was a reduction from Zhivkov's original proposals. To help implement the "big leap forward," the educational system was reorganized and patterned according to Khrushchev's "educational reform." It provided for lengthening the combined primary-secondary school period to twelve years, instead of eleven, but required that at least one third of the time be spent at factory or farm work.

Yet flaws in Zhivkov's "big leap forward" began to appear from the very start. Boris Taskov, a Central Committee secretary as well as minister of trade, was suddenly relieved of his post for inefficiency and "mistrust in the implementation of the plan." More important, a lag in agriculture officially attributed to a "lack in peasants' enthusiasm," which apparently could not be produced by abolishing compulsory deliveries nor by increasing purchasing-agreement prices, began to develop. Already at the July Plenum, Zhivkov's report revealed serious anxiety, and at the year's end it was reported officially that agricultural output had increased by only 26, instead of the planned 73.9 per cent, *i.e.*, by about two-thirds less than anticipated. This was a severe blow. Also industrial production had not risen to the target figure. The 1960 plan accordingly contained much lower targets: 15.2 per cent rise for industry and 32 per cent for agriculture. Zhivkov in his speech before the National Assembly on December 25, 1959, admitted that the plan had not been fulfilled in more than one field and limited his comparisons of "over-fulfillment" to the original plan, not his "big leap forward," and to growth rates and not volume increase. He envisaged further shortages of industrial raw materials, insufficient fodder and mechanization in agriculture, and a continuously poor distribution network. Promises of wage increases were

the Improvements of the Material and Cultural Standards of the Working People, and the Re-organization of the Administrative and Economic Leadership" in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 18, 1959. See also *East Europe*, January and February 1959.

made to buttress the obvious failure of the "big leap forward" in its maiden year and to generate more enthusiasm in the future.¹⁹

Confusion and priority of local interests were evident also from the partial return to centralization and multiplication in top government agencies, raising the number of the members of the Council of Ministers to twenty-six.

At the end of 1960 came the official claim that the Third Five-Year Plan had been fulfilled in three years. It was not mentioned, however, that this fulfillment had little to do with the targets of Zhivkov's "theses," not even with subsequently deflated goals, but involved rates of growth in national product and, primarily, industry. If compared with the "theses," the major targets have been missed by between one half to two thirds. Even the 1960 plan has actually not been fulfilled by over 2 per cent in industry and by an unknown amount in agriculture. As a consequence the targets for 1961 lagged behind the official percentage increase in 1960 and were, in fact, the lowest annual growth rates since the communist accession to power, obviously to allow a breathing-spell for overstrained natural and human resources and to forestall disappointments similar to those of the "big leap forward." That such is the case was now revealed by press attacks on the already-castigated Terpeshev, Panov and Kufardzhiev for "taking satisfaction from the difficulties," as well as by attacks and dismissals of party officials and most of the trade union leaders.²⁰

The deliberations of the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Party were bound to be echoed by the Bulgarian leadership. The most obvious consequence was the formal expulsion of Chervenkov from the Politburo on November 30, 1961, in what seems more to be lip service to Khrushchev's stepped-up denunciation of Stalin than a genuine change of heart. Even the recriminations against the Bulgarian Stalinist were restrained to his "failing to draw all necessary conclusions from the liquidation of the personality cult in Bulgaria . . . by not assisting in the complete elimination of the harmful

¹⁹ Plan Report in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 22, 1959. Zhivkov's speech, *ibid.*, December 27, 1959. The obtained increase in agriculture was further deflated to 18.1 per cent (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, September 9, 1960).

²⁰ Report on the 1960 Plan fulfillment and the 1961 Plan in *Rabotnichesko Delo* and *Zemedelsko Zname*, December 17, 1960. The attacks on and dismissal of dignitaries in *Partien Zhivot*, March 1961, and *Rabotnichesko Delo*, May 31, 1961.

consequences of this cult." Specifics were reserved almost exclusively to Chervenkov's "economic errors," which indicate, however, Zhivkov's desire to find a scapegoat for his own economic failures. In fact, the present tensions in the leadership and among the people are caused primarily by gross economic ills which culminate in unofficial food rationing of several items (see for example, *Otechestven Front*, September 12, 1961). Also, the currency reform of January 1, 1962, aimed at adjusting the lev to the new Soviet ruble (one new lev is exchanged against ten old ones) but at the same time devaluing the lev by over 40 per cent in terms of Western currencies (\$1 to be equal to 1.17 new leva), reveals inflationary pressures and can hardly calm the population.

Still, the ultimate goal to "build socialism" as soon as possible, although now postponed to 1965, has not been abandoned, nor has the stress on heavy industry. It is clear, however, that the experience of the improvised "leap" has been disappointing, in spite of the prohibitive cost, and may affect Zhivkov's future unless he has won Khrushchev's confidence to the point where he can do no wrong.

THE POST-STALIN ERA: FOREIGN POLICY

One needs imagination to speak of an independent Bulgarian foreign policy, since the regime during the post-Stalin era has followed the Moscow line consistently and without any deviation. A slightly distinguishing feature is Moscow's apparent assignment to the Bulgarian regime of certain more specific tasks toward areas and countries which could be influenced or intimidated by Bulgaria's acts and pronouncements. One of them is, logically, the Balkan area; the other encompasses the uncommitted and underdeveloped countries and, in particular, the geographically-closer Asian and African areas.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND BLOC

It is often alleged that Bulgaria's complete subservience to the Soviet Union is due in substantial degree to genuine popular support arising out of the ethnic, linguistic and religious kinship of the Bulgarian and Russian peoples, and particularly because of the liberation of the Bulgarian people from Turkish domination by the Russian imperial armies. Such allegations should be treated with skepticism, since they do not do justice to historic facts which abound since

the liberation, almost three generations ago. Thus, even the liberated generation quickly realized the real motives of the liberators, and became so disillusioned that as early as 1886 Russian authorities had to leave the country and diplomatic relations were severed for almost a decade. Moreover, Bulgarians fought without hesitation against Russian troops in the Dobrudzha in 1916, and in both world conflicts the country was allied with the camp opposing Russia. But even if all these facts are disregarded, the post-1944 years of ruthless Soviet and communist oppression should be sufficient to dispel any "gratitude" of the Bulgarians toward the Russians. A much more plausible explanation of the present-day links of Bulgarian to Soviet policy is the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which ever since its inception has revealed an almost pathetic attachment and a complete subordination to the Bolsheviks.²¹

Blind obedience explains why, in spite of repeated opportunities to assert at least some independence in foreign affairs after Stalin's death and especially until 1957, the Bulgarian regime refused to take any advantage and clung to the Soviet line on all issues and with all nuances. The regime does not make a mystery of the fact that the "eternal and unshakable friendship" with the "older brother and two-time liberator and protector" represents not only the "cornerstone of Bulgarian foreign policy" but that—quoting Dimitrov—"it is as necessary as the sun and the air are to every living creature." The Soviet Union is constantly glorified in pathetic forms and given all credit for Bulgaria's domestic and foreign achievements. The people are said to owe it "eternal gratitude." Servility, perhaps, makes the Bulgarian communists Moscow's pet Party, as Khrushchev's unqualified praise at the Seventh Congress in Sofia illustrated. Moreover, except for Chervenkov, there is now no one of stature who has any voice in international communist deliberations.

In economic relations with the USSR, Bulgaria after 1957 signed several bilateral agreements, to dramatize unity, to prove Soviet "brotherly help and altruistic assistance," and to implement an international division of labor within the bloc. Soviet aid, mainly credits,

²¹ See Joseph Rothschild, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development: 1883-1936* (New York, 1959). On the formal Soviet-Bulgarian ties see Ivan Sipkov, *The Soviet Union Treaties and Agreements with Bulgaria, 1944-1958*, supplement to *Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe*, May and June, 1959 (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress).

to Bulgaria during the fifteen years after 1944 was reported as totaling over two billion rubles (\$200 million at the tourist rate), but neither details of this aid nor Bulgaria's contributions are publicized. Soviet economic exploitation of the country, especially during the Stalin era, is a known fact and, although this has been mitigated, the Soviets still have priority on resources and products and the final say on the country's economic development.²²

Besides the bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, signed by Bulgaria with all European communist-bloc states, the country is a founding member of the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and all other intra-bloc organizations.

Relations with individual bloc countries may be summarized in capsule form. Bulgaria patronized Albania until very recently and joined it in attacking Tito's Yugoslavia whenever possible. Although now it has joined in Khrushchev's campaign against the Albanian leadership, Bulgaria has not yet broken off diplomatic relations with Tirana; speculation indicates that Khrushchev wishes to have the Bulgarian communists, who have always been closest to the Albanians in anti-Tito fashion, keep ties with Tirana, in order to follow closely and possibly influence developments there as well as check Tito if need be. Future relations will thus take their cue from Moscow. With Rumania, Bulgaria is at the forefront in trying to disrupt the Balkan Pact; she supports the Stoica plan for a Balkan summit meeting and a collective security pact. Relations with East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland are closer than with Hungary in the economic field. Bulgaria, of course, supports the Rapacki Plan and the partition of Germany.

Relations with Communist China, whose cause Bulgaria heralds at every official occasion, also reflects Moscow's attitude. Some speculations were raised in 1958, after Chervcnkov's visit to Peiping, as to whether the orthodox Bulgarian communists were not more inclined to take the Chinese road, since the Bulgarian press made specific reference to the communes as models for amalgamation of the collective farms and borrowed the "big leap forward" slogan. But these speculations were dispelled in January 1959 by Chervcnkov himself, after the Soviets had rebuffed the commune idea and after Mao recog-

²² See Part IV, "The Economy," in L. A. D. Dellin, *Bulgaria*; and Horst Mendershausen, "Terms of Trade Between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-1957," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, May 1959.

nized Soviet supremacy in interpreting communist dogmas. More recently, the Bulgarian leadership sided with Khrushchev in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although Mao must appeal to frustrated "dogmatists."

Within the revived COMECON Bulgaria has been assigned the task of developing selective technical crops, fruits and vegetables and products of the light and food industry together with nonferrous metallurgy and light electrotechnical branches, which amounts to a partial reversal of precommunist economic policy. However, little success has been achieved thus far, and the emphasis remains on heavy industrial development, irrespective of domestic resources, technology and skills. The paucity of fuels, metals and heavy machinery has made the country increasingly dependent on imports, while most of the surplus goods are not internationally competitive unless subsidized, and demanded goods are in short supply. In 1960 about 80 per cent of foreign trade was with the Soviet bloc, and over half with the Soviet Union alone. Since the latter seems to obstruct over-all integration of the area, Bulgaria is bound to pursue an illogical and costly economic development, reflecting its political subordination.²³

RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

Although the Soviet line has been loyally followed and applied toward all non-bloc countries, the regime's attitude toward Yugoslavia has evidenced some specific overtones, last but not least because of the Macedonian issue. The Macedonian question has been magnified or minimized during the post-Stalin period in accord with the state of the ideological dispute between the bloc and Tito. Whenever relations with Yugoslavia deteriorate, Bulgaria, together with Albania, adopts a much more virulent attitude toward Tito than does Moscow.

Chervenkov's belated "new course" speech initiated the "normalization" of relations with Yugoslavia and gradually traffic, trade and cultural ties were resumed, border questions settled, and ambassadors exchanged. Then came Khrushchev's unexpected Canossa trip to Belgrade which pushed the Bulgarian communists much farther than

²³ See Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (New York, 1957); Jan Wszelaki, *Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East-Central Europe* (Washington, D.C., 1959); and Dellin's "Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria," *Focus*, May 1960.

they had anticipated. On his way back from Belgrade, Khrushchev stopped in Sofia and declared that the road toward "friendly relations" with Yugoslavia had been cleared. This meant a most embarrassing retreat for the Bulgarian communists with repercussions to the very top of the party leadership. But, willy-nilly, they had to comply, and 1956 marked the year of the closest post-Stalin relations between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav parties and states, although the uneasiness of the Bulgarian leadership and Tito's revengeful attempts were even then clearly noticeable.

In April the anti-Titoists suffered an open humiliation, when Chervenkov, the arch-foe, had to resign as premier in the presence of a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, and also one month later, when the Bulgarian return visit was cancelled because the Yugoslavs objected to inclusion of two unnamed communists in the Bulgarian delegation. Kostov's posthumous rehabilitation was another slap in the face of the anti-Titoists, but it was apparently Tito's minimum condition for resumption of party relations. With the elevation of Yugov to the premiership, the inclusion of other "natives" in the Politburo, and the official re-establishment of party relations, the horizon seemed brighter. But these concessions did not appear to satisfy Tito who continued to press for changes in the Bulgarian attitude, possibly also on the Macedonian question. Speculations about a revival of federation plans were dispelled by Yugov, symptomatically through the Moscow *Pravda* in September 1956, which indicated that neither Moscow nor, of course, the Bulgarian communists were prepared to move much beyond the status quo. Time for any further improvement in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations ran out shortly thereafter as a result of the Polish and Hungarian events. Again, as in 1948, the Bulgarian communists sighed with relief and were all too anxious to resume the anti-Tito campaign, although in a modified and less vituperative way.

Throughout 1957 the anti-Tito accusations were of the well-known general character and familiar terminology. Government relations remained stationary, and some technical, cultural and legal agreements were concluded. At the Seventh Party Congress, however, Khrushchev chose to use the Bulgarian platform to criticize at great length the theoretical position of the Yugoslav Party and to accuse Tito of complicity in Hungary. He stated that relations on the government level should develop normally. Zhivkov expressed the identical Bul-

garian attitude. But the attacks intensified, this time with participation of the leading communists: Ganev, the subsequent head of state, Premier Yugov, and Party Secretary Zhivkov. The latter openly identified Tito with Imre Nagy, calling both men "revisionist agents of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists."

The Macedonian issue was bound to reappear. In fact, charges of persecution of Bulgarians in Yugoslav Macedonia started in the fall of 1958. In a speech on September 22, Ganev protested against the Yugoslav leaders "who have rushed to place themselves in the service of the American imperialists as traitors of socialism and who try to sever the ties of the Bulgarian population (in Macedonia) with their common Bulgarian history." He went on to say that "the people are compelled to give up their mother tongue for an artificially-molded, strongly Serbianized language, imposed upon them," thus alluding to the Bulgarian character of Yugoslav Macedonia.²⁴ Accusations imbued with chauvinism flew both ways, but relations on the state level were not broken, as was apparently Khrushchev's wish. Trade and cultural exchanges even increased.

Beginning in June 1959, taking its cue from Khrushchev's milder pronouncements in Albania, the Bulgarian vituperative campaign subsided, but Yugoslav sources continued to accuse the Bulgarian communists of "Great Bulgarian chauvinism." The oscillations were evident also through 1960, when a Sofia party delegation visited Niš, and in 1961, when a Yugoslav diplomat was expelled and Belgrade reciprocated, stepping up the verbal attacks. The present state of affairs was best summarized by Zhivkov as follows:

Our relations and cooperation with Yugoslavia have improved on the governmental level and in the trade and cultural fields and must continue to improve all the time. . . . We think that the ideological differences should not be an obstacle for expanding the cooperation between our neighboring countries.²⁵

The future of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, especially in view of the Soviet ostracism of Albania and the split in the bloc, is a matter of speculation but it seems that the *modus vivendi* will not be seriously disturbed. They remain, however, a potentially explosive matter, and a good example of the inability of communist movements to purge themselves of "nationalistic prejudice."

²⁴ Radio Sofia, September 22, 1958.

²⁵ Zhivkov's speech in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 27, 1959.

As for Bulgarian relations with the other Balkan countries, they too reflect Soviet interests. When Soviet purposes are implemented in greater detail vis-à-vis the Balkan countries outside the bloc, Bulgaria is a communist spearhead. The obvious goal is to disrupt the 1953 Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and even more to jeopardize Greek and Turkish membership in NATO. In September 1953 Chervenkov made vague overtures to the Balkan neighbors. With the same purpose the regime supported the formal Rumanian proposals for a Balkan collective security pact. Zhivkov went even further in his 1960 United Nations speech, proposing that the Balkans should become the test case for implementing Khrushchev's total disarmament plan, outdoing even the Soviet premier. But the gamut reaches implicit threats and intimidations whenever necessary. Thus, to obtain a reversal in the Greek and Turkish acceptance of NATO missile and nuclear weapons bases, the Bulgarian government warned that it might ask and was "certain to receive" similar weapons from the USSR, so as "to counteract American imperialism, of which Greece and Turkey are obedient tools." In June 1959 Khrushchev himself mentioned Bulgaria and Albania as possible missile sites "to destroy the bases of the enemy." About one third of Zhivkov's December 1959 speech was devoted to the Balkan problems, and he alternated luring with threatening words, offering "peaceful co-existence and competition" as "the only alternative to a devastating nuclear war."²⁶

Relations with Greece are worse than with Turkey, although relations with both have improved since the Stalin era. It took some time after Stalin's death until diplomatic relations with Greece were resumed in May 1954, following a 13-year break. This came as a result of the settlement to Greek satisfaction of the dispute over the Maritsa (Evros) River islands. But ambassadors have not been exchanged. A normalization seems impossible until serious financial matters, including war reparations, are settled. Negotiations to that effect have been repeatedly resumed and suspended.

After Khrushchev's May 1959 Tirana speech and Bulgaria's appeal for a Balkan "zone of peace and security" agreement, the Sofia government submitted to Greece on July 22, 1959, a formal draft for a twenty-year pact of friendship and nonaggression which was flatly

²⁶ *Ibid.*, and Radio Sofia, September 28, 1960.

rejected by the Greek government. Relations became strained and, as was the case with Yugoslavia, historic animosities appeared. In September the party organ pointed to "ruthless pressures" applied by Greece to the Bulgarian population of Aegean Macedonia, to force it "through mass vows to forego its mother tongue," and warned against Greek "chauvinistic and anti-Bulgarian passions." Zhivkov in December blamed the Greek government for reverting to the cold war and exhuming "forgotten pages of history." He repeated protests against Greek hospitality tendered the exiled Bulgarian king.²⁷ The Greek attitude is not less uncomplimentary, so that relations remain far from normal. Relations with Turkey show no animosities of nationalist character and center on power-political and social-economic recriminations.

Relations with the other European "capitalist countries" are of course more intensive in the commercial and cultural fields, with West Germany, Italy and Austria leading as Bulgarian trading partners outside the communist bloc.

Bulgaria's role in the not-too-distant Asian and African areas bears some more specific connotations, since its geographic proximity and small size tend to make it more acceptable as an "interested and equal partner." It thus participates actively in the fore of the Soviet bloc's drive for political and economic penetration, particularly in Syria and Iraq, trying also to impress the underdeveloped area with the "benefits" of short-cut communist industrialization by sending manufactured goods and technicians. In the more distant uncommitted countries Bulgaria performs camouflaging and propaganda tasks. The regime has gone a long way in stressing the Asian origin of the proto-Bulgarians (despite the official thesis of an exclusively Slavic and even Russian Slavic origin) and also the "liberation from capitalism and colonialism." In 1961, Bulgaria joined with other bloc countries in extending Cuba a long term credit valued at \$5 million.

In 1960, Bulgaria maintained diplomatic relations with 41 countries and trade relations with 67. In 1955, as a result of the notorious "package deal," it became a member of the United Nations where it echoes the Soviet line. Bulgaria is a member of UNESCO, UNICEF, and also of the Council of Governors of the International Agency for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, participating in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. It goes without saying that the regime took

²⁷ See note 25 above.

full advantage of admission to the UN, presenting it to the people as international recognition of the legitimacy of the regime, made possible by belonging to the Soviet camp.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

It is impossible, of course, to speak about American-Bulgarian relations in the formal sense, since from 1950 on, and until very recently, diplomatic ties have been severed.

The period between the break and Stalin's death was characterized by incessant and vicious attacks upon the United States. In the Kostov trial the United States was not only formally identified as the mastermind of almost all preceding "conspiracies" against the regime but was also blamed for all international and internal evils. It was only too obvious that the regime was trying to discredit the United States in the eyes of the people and to weaken their hope for liberation. Ample evidence suggests that the campaign was unsuccessful. On the contrary, it seems that the majority of the Bulgarian people interpreted the break in relations as an American repudiation of the communist rule, and saw in the anti-American diatribes an indication that the regime realized its unpopularity and that the United States was concerned with the people's lot.²⁸

In his 1953 speech Chervenkov, after having bitterly attacked the United States for "fomenting the class struggle" in Bulgaria, indicated for the first time that he found no justification for severance of diplomatic relations and expressed the government's readiness to resume them. Thus the initiative for resumption came from—and remained to the end—in Bulgarian hands. Chervenkov's overture did not lead, however, to any substantial abatement of the familiar anti-American propaganda. The United States Government stood aloof to Chervenkov's and other appeals until the Soviet-Tito rapprochement exhumed the Kostov case, the official motive for the break.

As far as is known, after Kostov's rehabilitation was announced, no mention of the charges against the United States minister or their withdrawal was made public, nor did the Bulgarian government openly tender apologies. In fact it took three years after the first direct contact was made in Paris in the spring of 1956, and repeated

²⁸ See Harrison E. Salisbury, "Fount of Amity in Eastern Europe Is Largely Untapped by the U.S.," *New York Times*, October 22, 1957.

Bulgarian appeals, before the American government consented to start negotiations on renewal of diplomatic ties. The American conditions were the formal withdrawal of the charges made against Mr. Heath and the assurance that American legation employees would not be harassed. No request is known to have been made to withdraw the charges against the Bulgarian personnel of the American Legation or against other "American spies," or to release them from prison.

On March 27, 1959, Washington and Sofia announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Washington declared itself satisfied that its conditions had been met and that, particularly, the charges against Mr. Heath had been withdrawn. Moreover, resumption was viewed by the United States Government as offering a listening-post and possibilities for contact and exchange with the people, a step, in effect, that would outweigh any possible psychological disadvantages. It was made clear that this act did not imply endorsement of the communist regime.²⁹

The motives, acts, and interpretations of the Bulgarian government were, however, quite different. In its communiqué and in subsequent comments the regime made no mention whatever of the cause for the suspension, of the American conditions, or of the cause for renewal of relations. On the contrary, *Otechestven Front* (March 28, 1959) stated that "it must not be forgotten that the suspension came at a time when the so-called cold war against the Socialist countries was at its peak." This clearly put the blame on the United States. The paper termed the resumption as a "new success for the policy of the Bulgarian government." *Zemedelsko Zname* of the same date declared that "the abnormal situation . . . continued through no fault of our own," and that the renewal was "a victory of the principles of peaceful co-existence and understanding in international relations" which have "always guided our foreign policy." All commentators warned that the basis for normal relations had to be "mutual respect, equal rights and noninterference in each other's domestic affairs."

It is thus clear that the regime did not inform the people about the official background of the resumption of relations, and persisted in its twisted interpretation, trying to present the normalization as an American retreat and Bulgarian triumph. In retrospect, it seems that

²⁹ See *New York Times*, March 28, 1959.

the United States Government should have clarified this point, especially in view of the fact that the Voice of America broadcasts are heavily jammed. American prestige suffered a blow in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution; and renewal of relations by itself, without knowledge of American motives, is likely to convey an additional American weakness. The choice of the new Bulgarian minister to Washington was another move in the communist psychological game. Dr. Peter Voutov is known in Bulgaria and elsewhere as most violently anti-American. His book, *The Anglo-American Imperialists—The Most Vicious Enemies of the Bulgarian People*, is the communist standard text for anti-American propaganda. Good taste prohibits quoting from it, but it might be mentioned that the author charges all former American officials in Bulgaria with subversive activities and refers even to President (then General) Eisenhower as belonging to the “most prominent obscurantists and warmongers . . . and American gangsters.”³⁰

Thus, the initial phase did not reveal any Bulgarian desire to make amends, and the otherwise successful American participation at the Plovdiv Fair in 1960 witnessed the harassment of an American official. The negotiations for settling United States war claims were also interrupted in 1961. In view of these happenings it seems doubtful that the United States' expectations of a net gain will materialize.

THE BALANCE SHEET

In 1962 communist Bulgaria is again one of the tightest dictatorships and most obedient Soviet satellites. The Bulgarian Party, which of all foreign parties has the longest and most intimate ties with the Soviet communists, is in full control, although its membership is barely over 6 per cent of the people and its ideological appeal more nominal than real. The antagonism between the Muscovites and “natives” has been pushed aside, because of the unquestionable loyalty to the Soviet cause of most of the natives. The resumed de-Stalinization has brought thus far only Chervenkov's formal and quite honorable removal, besides equally automatic substitutions for Stalin's statues and place names. If past experience is a teacher, little more will be done from above in the direction of genuine

³⁰ Dr. Peter Voutov, *Anglo-Amerikanskite Imperialisti—Nay-zli Vragove na Bulgarskiya Narod* (Sofia, 1953), p. 67.

liberalization, let alone gravitation toward greater independence from the Soviet Union. This should not suggest that there is all calm and unity at the top: an attempt to stage a military coup was rumored at the beginning of 1961, and Peking's orthodoxy, as well as Belgrade's independent brand of communism, continue to appeal to groups and personalities, although presently neutralized. But Moscow remains the fountainhead of the leadership, by and large, headed by Zhivkov's core. The new party secretary, a representative like Khrushchev of the successful "new class," does not seem to hold absolute power as yet, although Zhivkov's protégés are ever more frequently installed in leading positions. Such upcoming younger communist "aparatchiki" as Stanko Todorov and Mitko Grigorov, both promoted to Politburo membership after Chervenko's expulsion, together with older survivors such as Anton Yugov, Dimitur Ganey, Rayko Damyanov, Ivan Mikhailov and Georgi Tsankov, provide the backbone of the communist leadership and guarantee submission to Moscow.

The communist-dominated Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, under the leadership of First Deputy Premier Georgi Traykov, is the only other political party. Officially, however, it recognizes the leadership of the Communist Party and thus cannot compete for power. A many-times purged remnant of the old Agrarian Party, the Union claims 120,000 members, while the peasantry accounts for two thirds of the population. It plays the role of a communist spearhead for the collectivization of agriculture.

The Fatherland Front, bearing only the name of the communist-inspired wartime coalition, has a membership of 3.2 million, *i.e.* about 40 per cent of the population, but almost all adults are members. It has the trade unions and the youth organization as collective members and is headed by the Politburo member, Encho Staykov. It also officially implements the program of the Communist Party. The youth organization, renamed in 1958 "Dimitrov Communist Youth Union," and the Trade Union each have over one million members and serve also as "transmission belts" of the Party.

During the post-Stalin era, the regime permitted little relaxation and, with the national leadership as well as the communist dissidents liquidated long ago, no Hungary or Poland was possible. Yet the undercurrents were strong and potentially explosive. The writers' rebellion showed that even the communist intelligentsia—not to mention

the noncommunist masses—are restive and dissatisfied. Youth groups—the communist hope—proved that they have responded little to the relentless ideological drive and that, on the contrary, they resent Russification and sovietization. This is one of the most significant and, for the free world, most encouraging lessons of the communist experiment.

The lesson cannot be disregarded by the communists either. The year 1962, compared to 1953, evidences a letup in the most odious terrorist practices of the Stalin era and a slight improvement in the unbelievably low living standards. (Average salary is claimed to be 70 leva; *i.e.* about \$60 monthly at the official rate.) But there is no letup in indoctrination or economic practices. “Constant vigilance against the class enemy” and the “instilling of fidelity to communism and hatred of its enemies” are stressed continuously, and “voluntary workers’ detachments” and “comrades courts” have been substituted for the most objectionable open duties of the militia and courts. With collectivization in agriculture completed, the regime embarked upon the “big leap forward,” and this proved not only unrealistic but required enormous sacrifices. Industrialization continues to get priority with minor modifications as a result of COMECON policy. Economic crimes have become numerous and are punished most severely. Nevertheless, socioeconomically, the country has been changed substantially—from an overwhelmingly agrarian to an agricultural-industrial society.

The lack of an independent foreign policy has, paradoxically, brought some international prestige and respectability to the regime because of its admission to the United Nations and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States. Less successful have been the regime’s policies toward Bulgaria’s non-bloc neighbors.

Although the ruthless Soviet exploitation has been modified, foreign rule seems to be the most strongly resented feature of communist practices. Religion and particularly nationalism remain the “deadly enemy”³¹ and are even exploited by the communists against Bulgaria’s neighbors. Since liberation has become a remote possibility, the attention of the people is absorbed by the many problems of everyday life. But, it seems safe to say, they would hardly stay aloof in the event of any hopeful developments.

³¹ The most recent of a score of articles on the subject is “Nationalism, an Ideological Weapon of Reaction,” *Vecherni Novini*, September 22, 1961.

9: ALBANIA

Stavro Skendi

TIRANA'S ATTITUDE AND UNITED STATES POLICY

If one excludes the short period from the communist takeover to the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, when the Tirana regime was still undetermined as to relations with the United States, Albania's attitude has been on the whole hostile. Even when President Eisenhower on March 4, 1955, expressing the friendly feelings of the American people toward the Albanian people, offered to help to ease the food shortages in that country, the Tirana government turned down the offer, although the need of such assistance was deeply felt. While the real reason for refusing it was that gifts of food would enhance American prestige among the Albanian people, Enver Hoxha, the head of the Albanian Communist Party (Albanian Workers' Party), referring to it again in his speech of May 25, 1956, at the party congress in Tirana, charged that Eisenhower's relief offer was not acceptable "when the American government denies their [the Albanian people's] heroic battle, . . . when it violates their legitimate rights in the international field, when it encroaches on the territorial integrity of the fatherland, when it sends diversionary agents to disturb the peace at home, and sabotage."¹ It is evident that Hoxha's aim was to represent the United States as an enemy of the Albanian people.

Some ten months later, February 13, 1957, at a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, Hoxha scrupulously followed the Soviet line. Discussing the Hungarian revolt, he considered the "intervention" of the imperialists as the principal cause, leaving no doubt that among them he considered America first of all. He directly attacked United States policy when he spoke about the Suez affair and when discussing the Eisenhower Doctrine. He maintained that the offer by the American

¹ *Materialy III S'ezda Albanskoj Partii Truda*, 25 Maja—3 Ijunja 1956 goda (Materials of the IIIrd Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party, May 25-June 3, 1956) (Moscow, 1957), p. 37. Hereafter cited: *Materialy*.

president of economic aid, military assistance, and use of American military force to the countries of the Middle East, to protect them from the danger of communism, had as its object the political and economic domination of those countries. He denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine as a plan to enslave the Arab people and prepare an attack against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.²

The same accusations were reiterated in the joint Soviet-Albanian declaration, signed in Moscow on April 17, 1957, by Bulganin and Mehmet Shehu, premier of Albania:

today the United States is attempting to occupy the place of her predecessors in the colonial pillage of the people of the Orient. The Eisenhower Doctrine constitutes a plan of replacing a bankrupt form of colonial domination with another form, a plan which inevitably leads to the worsening of the situation and to new conflicts which are of grave consequences for the cause of peace.³

The attack on the United States continued during the May 1958 parliamentary campaign, but in general and vague terms. Shehu held Americans responsible for the cold war, while Pilo Peristeri, then the president of the Albanian Trade Unions, denounced the United States for fostering the atomic weapons race, creating new threats of war in the Middle and Far East, furnishing Western Germany with atomic arms, and systematically sabotaging the initiative of the USSR for disarmament and a summit conference.

In accordance with the Kremlin line, NATO from its very foundation has been a target of the Albanian regime. Soon after returning from Moscow, Hoxha made a speech blasting that organization. He stressed that the Warsaw Pact of 1955, of which Albania is a signatory, was the legitimate answer to NATO and a guarantee of peace in Europe and the world. He stated that the Albanian government was ready to discuss and sign a collective security treaty with the participation of all European countries, if the "imperialists" discarded NATO.⁴

After the emanation from Moscow of the principle of peaceful coexistence, the Albanian government from time to time mingled its

² Hoxha's report in *Rruga e Partisë* (The Road of the Party), theoretical organ of the Party, Tirana, IV (February 1957), 5-8. Hereafter cited: *Rruga*.

³ Declaration in *ibid.*, IV (April 1957), 3-13.

⁴ Cf. *Bashkimi* (The Union), organ of the Democratic Front, Tirana, May 14, 1957.

attacks on the United States with a desire for "normal" relations. On March 19, 1958, Foreign Minister Behar Shtylla told the Albanian parliament that Albania was prepared to "normalize" her relations with the United States. He gave as proof of his government's good will the friendly treatment offered an American jet pilot who on December 23, 1957, made an emergency landing in Albania. Although Beqir Balluku, Albanian first deputy premier and minister of defense, in Hanoi in early September 1960, charged that the United States wanted to deprive Cuba of freedom and the Congo of independence, as well as to suppress the national movement in Laos, Shehu, upon his return from the United Nations General Assembly of September-October 1960 expressed the desire for improvement of relations with the United States.⁵

The policy of the United States Government toward Albania has been, in general, part of its broader policy toward the satellites and the Balkan countries. As a satellite, Albania came under the policy of liberation. When Khrushchev used President Eisenhower's 1955 Christmas message to the people behind the Iron Curtain to denounce him for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations and violating the Geneva spirit, the United States stressed that she had not accepted the idea of the permanency of the satellite regimes. In fact, President Eisenhower had said in his opening statement at Geneva:

There is the problem of respecting the right of people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been deprived of them.⁶

Distorting the Christmas message and overlooking the Geneva statement, Albania accused the United States of seeking to restore the prewar regimes.

The reaction was stronger when President Eisenhower, authorized and requested by a joint resolution of the Congress, issued a proclamation on July 17, 1959, designating the third week of July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week," and announcing also the possibility of issuing "a similar proclamation each year until such a time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all captive nations of the world."

⁵ Radio Tirana, October 25, 1960.

⁶ For the reply of the White House to Khrushchev, see text in the *New York Times*, December 31, 1955.

With respect to Albania, United States policy until December 15, 1955, had been to bar that country from membership in international organizations. But on that date Albania was admitted to membership in the United Nations during the voting on the "package" proposal for Western-supported and Soviet-supported countries. Albania became a member of UNESCO as well. Despite these moves, the US State Department, on each anniversary of Albania's declaration of independence from Turkey (November 28, 1912), addresses a message to the Albanian people expressing sympathy and concern. In 1959 the reaction of the Tirana regime was violent. On December 2 Radio Tirana broadcast an editorial of *Zëri i Popullit* (Voice of the People), organ of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, in which, among other things, it was said:

The ruling circles of the United States are known for their hostile attitudes toward the Albanian people . . . they have not abstained from anything in order to apply against Albania their infamous policy of liberation, that is, to restore in Albania the feudo-bourgeois tyranny. . . . Every year the State Department has made it a habit to make an appeal to the Albanian people for "liberation and independence" from the Communist yoke, from the so-called Soviet domination. . . . The Albanian people see with contempt this gross interference of the American government. . . .

The Albanian communist press has incessantly attacked America as heading the forces of "imperialism" which lead to war. Hoxha, in his speech to the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Communist Party on February 13, 1961, repeated the accusation.⁷ Following the Cuban collapse, the attacks on the United States became harsher. President Kennedy's policy was considered aggressive and adventurous, especially after his Washington speech of April 20, 1961, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He was denounced as advocating "the organization of large-scale ideological and practical diversion," which would open the way to direct armed intervention as in Cuba, and, recently, as "in the plot organized against Albania by Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Sixth Fleet of the United States, in collaboration with some traitors of the Albanian people, outside and inside the country."⁸

⁷ For complete text of Enver Hoxha's speech to the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party, see *Zëri i Popullit* (The Voice of the People), organ of the Central Committee of the Party, Tirana, February 14, 1961.

⁸ *Ibid.*, April 26, 1961.

With the exception of Albania and East Germany, the United States now has diplomatic relations with all the European satellite countries.

RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA

In relations with Yugoslavia, which are of great consequence to Albania, there have been many ups and downs. After the Tito-Cominform break, Tirana's attitude toward Yugoslavia was most hostile. It changed following the June 1955 Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Yugoslavia, when signs of rapprochement became manifest. On April 3, 1956, the Yugoslav envoy, Arsa Milatović, presented his credentials in Tirana. A convention on the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier was signed on August 16, 1956. Negotiations for a post, telegraph, and telephone accord began in Belgrade on October 1, 1956, and agreements were signed on August 29, 1957. But nothing happened in the direction of the prophecies made by Western observers after the death of Stalin: Hoxha's downfall and the rehabilitation of his late communist chief rival, Koçi Xoxe.

The starting point of all Western prophecies about Hoxha and Xoxe was that Hoxha was a Stalinist. It is true that Hoxha's methods have changed very little and that Stalin is still honored in Albania, but Hoxha's position was not that of Rákosi, and Xoxe's case was not similar to that of Rajik or Kostov. The de-Stalinization of Albania has been limited because of the peculiar situation in that country.

It should be remembered first of all that the Yugoslavs had created Albania's Communist Party and controlled it until 1948, turning Albania into a sub-satellite. Xoxe had attained high positions—general of the Albanian army, minister of the interior, member of the Politburo, head of the secret service—and had become Hoxha's rival thanks to Yugoslav support. In fact, in a conversation between Stalin and Tito in 1946, Stalin expressed doubts about harmony within the Albanian Politburo, because Hoxha was not allowed to go to Moscow, unless escorted by Xoxe, obviously as a sort of control. Ranković, minister of interior of Yugoslavia, who was present, replied:

There are no matters of import, except that the comrades in the Albanian Politburo do not consider Enver Hoxha a sufficiently firm Party man and always endeavor to have Kochi Dzodze [Koçi

Xoxe] going about with him as the eldest member of the Party in the Politburo . . .⁹

When Stalin in 1947 again opened the question of the Albanian communists, during another conversation with Yugoslav leaders, Kardelj replied diplomatically that Hoxha was "good and honest on the whole, although he has certain characteristics of a petty bourgeois intellectual" and "lacks Marxist-Leninist training . . . But we consider that the best and most consistent man there is Kochi Dzodze, a worker, although he also lacks training."¹⁰

The Tito-Cominform rupture offered Hoxha the opportunity to rid himself both of his personal rival and the Yugoslav bosses. The Albanian Communist Party took the side of the Soviet Union, and the Tirana government expelled all Yugoslav experts, advisers, and representatives of companies, denouncing at the same time the agreements with Yugoslavia. The Albanian communists declared that the Yugoslav leaders "have tried to destroy the independence of our country and Party." Xoxe was arrested and executed as a Titoist in 1949.

It was natural then for Hoxha and for Shehu—who from disgrace was restored to power following Xoxe's arrest—that they would change their attitude toward Yugoslavia only reluctantly and partially. They had experienced Yugoslav control. Any revival of Yugoslav influence would endanger their personal power and perhaps their very lives. A change of status of their country, whereby it would again become dependent on Yugoslavia, would also incur the dissatisfaction of the Albanian people, who consider the Yugoslavs their traditional enemies. Perhaps encouraged at the same time by that segment of opinion in the Soviet collective leadership which opposed resumption of party relations with the Yugoslav communists, Hoxha took a resolute and adverse position concerning Xoxe's rehabilitation in his speech at the Congress of the Party in May 1956:

The hostile activity of Koçi Xoxe and his partisans had been directed against the Party and against the government . . . Koçi Xoxe had placed the activity of the Party under the control of the security organs of the State, he had prepared the political and physical extermination of the leaders of the Party and the government, he had grossly violated governmental legality. . . . The ac-

⁹ V. Dedijer, *Tito* (New York, 1953), p. 273.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

cusation against Xoxe and his partisans was perfectly founded and the verdict of our party and government totally just.¹¹

The Congress, which unanimously approved and re-elected all the Stalinists in the Central Committee and Politburo, was attended by a strong Russian delegation, led by P. N. Pospelov, secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, who congratulated the Albanians and ostentatiously patted Hoxha on the back.

If Khrushchev had ever intended to bring about liberalization in Albania and the resumption of friendly Albanian-Yugoslav relations, the control of the party by former Stalinists and the paucity of its cadres, which made replacement very difficult, would have discouraged him from carrying out his plans. Even Hoxha and Shehu had patched up any differences of the past and formed a common front against the impending danger.

The dispute engendered by the rejection of the proposal to rehabilitate Xoxe grew in bitterness and reached new heights after outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956. The Albanian leaders became panicky, particularly since the country, influenced by the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of the "different roads to socialism," began to grow restive. Hoxha made no secret of the fact that he considered Marshal Tito responsible for Albania's domestic difficulties as well as for those of the other satellite countries. In an article in *Pravda* (November 8, 1956) he accused the Yugoslavs, though in veiled form, of being at the root of the Hungarian revolt. Tito, knowing well who in the Kremlin stood behind that article, attacked Hoxha personally in his now famous speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, describing him in a sarcastic vein as a person who "knows only how to say 'Marxism-Leninism' and not a word more." He further charged that in the article Hoxha condemned the inclination of a country to take its own road, and even opposed what Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders recognized, that is, that there were "specific roads to socialism." Striking at what he called "obdurate Stalinist elements" in various communist parties, he obviously had in mind the Albanian regime, when he added that these elements believed that "people of the Stalinist cast would be found in the Soviet Union to assist them to maintain themselves on the back of the people."

The Tirana regime replied by announcing on November 23 that

¹¹ *Materialy*, p. 172.

the death sentence long hanging over three alleged "Titoist spies" had been carried out, one of them, Petro Bulati, having been claimed by Yugoslavia as her national. On the same day the press bitterly assailed the Pula speech, especially with regard to "Stalinist elements" in the Hungarian revolt, countercharging that the Yugoslavs were interfering in Albania's affairs.

But it was Hoxha who in his speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party on February 13, 1957, took up the defense of Stalin. After having defended the Soviet Union for her action in suppressing the Hungarian revolt and denouncing Yugoslav "revisionism," he declared that all campaigns which the imperialists and revisionists had started against Marxism-Leninism, against communism, were carried out under cover of struggles against "Stalinism." He used the Hungarian experience to justify the hard line pursued by the Albanian Communist Party. He added:

We are not in agreement with all those who attempt to discount the entire positive revolutionary side of Stalin, as experience, and who see only the black side of it . . . As is known, J. V. Stalin was a great Marxist. After Lenin it was he who protected Marxism-Leninism on all sides from revisionism and contributed greatly to the further development of science [ideology]. Great merits are due to him in the preparation and development of the October Revolution, in the building of the first socialist state, in the historic victory over the invading fascists, in the development of the international communist and workers' movement. For all these deeds Stalin enjoyed great authority, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the world. But as is known, the propagation of Stalin's personality cult caused serious mistakes and many violations of Soviet law. For that reason the Soviet Communist Party was fully justified in criticizing Stalin's mistakes. In spite of all these mistakes, Stalin remains a great Marxist-Leninist. Stalin was never mistaken in such questions as the protection of the interests of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist theory, the fight against imperialism and against the other enemies of socialism. He was and remains an exemplary figure. Stalin's tragedy was that when he made these serious mistakes he thought they were necessary for protection of the revolution.¹²

When one takes into account the encomiums bestowed on Stalin, and the phrase "as is known," a cliché Soviet speakers often use, one is inclined to believe that this part of Hoxha's speech was prepared in

¹² *Rruga*, IV (February 1957), 22-23.

the Kremlin by the diehard Stalinists, to whom Tito referred in his Pula speech. Perhaps this apology for Stalin was not directed only against Tito; it was partly an answer to Khrushchev.

Following the visit of Hoxha and Shehu to Moscow in April 1957, the Albanian regime, undoubtedly under Soviet pressure, expressed desire to improve relations with Yugoslavia. The Albanians referred to relations at government and not party level. When the Yugoslavs in November 1957 refused to sign the Moscow Declaration of the communist bloc and accept Soviet leadership as binding, Albanian-Yugoslav relations cooled. After publication in the spring of 1958 of the program of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Yugoslav League of Communists), a political and ideological fight flared. The question of Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija), an autonomous region in Yugoslavia with a large Albanian Moslem minority, which had arisen a year before, assumed large proportions. The Yugoslavs were accused of maintaining a "chauvinistic anti-Marxist" attitude and of forcing Albanians to leave for Turkey. The Albanian press went so far as to ask for frontier revision. The Yugoslavs countered sharply, considering Albania's attitude intervention in internal affairs.

There has since been no relaxation in the attacks on the part of both countries. Most of the complaints have been about frontier violations. Yugoslavia has protested about the harsh treatment of her diplomatic representatives in Tirana—they lived as in a concentration camp. Employees of legations on both sides have been asked to leave the countries as undesirable. In the speech of February 13, 1961, Hoxha protested again against persecutions and expulsions to Turkey of the Albanian minority in Montenegro, Kosmet, and Macedonia. Distinguishing between Yugoslav neutrality and that of the United Arab Republic and India, he accused Yugoslavia of "participating in the NATO aggressive bloc through the Balkan Pact," since Greece and Turkey are bound to NATO. He protested more strongly against brutal Yugoslav interference in the affairs of Albania—by organizing and using groups of agents, sending diversionists and guerrilla bands from Yugoslavia—and he declared:

The whole history of relations between our Party and Yugoslav leadership, between our country and Titoist Yugoslavia, is the history of continuous plots of the Tito clique for the subjugation of our Party, for the liquidation of the independence of our country. . . .

However, the fight between Albania and Yugoslavia has predominantly been carried on from the ideological angle. At the Fourth Congress Enver Hoxha spoke at length about Yugoslav revisionism, as the Albanians saw it, but when he made basic and specific attacks on it, he resorted to the Moscow Declaration of the Eighty-one Communist Parties (November 1960), which regarded Yugoslav revisionism as a reflection of bourgeois ideology in theory and practice, being the main danger to the international communist movement.¹³ He attacked Kardelj, Yugoslavia's vice-president, as a revisionist who argued theoretically that the danger of real war came from the communist countries, especially China and Albania. The Yugoslav revisionists, Hoxha continued, had made all sorts of slanders and attacks on the Albanians, denouncing them at times as "nationalists," at other times as "dogmatic" and "sectarians," and at other times (obviously alluding to Tito) as men who "know nothing about Marxism." He concluded by saying that the 1960 Moscow Declaration condemned the Yugoslav revisionists as being neither for peace nor for socialism.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Following the principles of "collective leadership," Hoxha in July 1954 abandoned the premiership to Shehu, keeping for himself the more important position of first secretary of the Party. The parliamentary elections which were held on June 1, 1958, under the aegis of the Democratic Front, completely controlled by the Communist Party, brought back to power the same group. On June 22, 1958, Shehu's cabinet was reinstated with no significant changes.

Prior to the elections, there had been manifestations of discontent in the ranks of the Albanian communists, but the regime had taken measures to purge the suspect and troublesome elements. Delegates at the party conference of the district of Tirana in the spring of 1956, who dared criticize the party leadership for its selfish policy, lack of inner-party democracy, and indulgence in luxury, were eliminated. Hoxha, in his speech before the Third Party Congress, denounced them as anti-party elements and unhealthy intellectuals, stemming

¹³ For the particular section relating to Yugoslavia in the "Text of Statement by Leaders of 81 Communist Parties after Meeting in Moscow," see the *New York Times*, December 7, 1960.

from the bourgeois layers of Albanian society, who under influence of enemy propaganda tried to lead a struggle against the Party and its leadership.¹⁴ Some months later General Dalli Ndreu and his wife Liri Gega, an exponent of communism, were arrested in Dibër, near the Yugoslav frontier, and executed as "enemies of the people." When Moscow at the April 1957 meeting ordered the Albanian communists to drop the quarrel with Tito, at least publicly, there were rumors of a threatened split at the top over anti-Soviet feelings. It was at that time that General Panajot Plaku, a former deputy minister of defense, fled to Yugoslavia.

In July 1960, a group of Albanian communists, headed by Teme Sejko, reportedly commander of the naval base of Durrës (Durazzo), was arrested and imprisoned. Sejko, who belonged to a well-known family from Çamëri (Chamouria in Greek), which now constitutes part of northern Greece, was trained in the Soviet Union and since 1958 had served as a rear admiral. On September 8, 1960, two important communists, Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko were expelled—the first from the Politburo and the Secretariat, and the second from the Central Auditing Commission, of which he was the president, and the Party. Belishova was accused of having committed "grave faults concerning the party line" and Tashko of "hostile activities." Although Tashko has an American education—he is a Harvard graduate—it would be wrong to link him with the Western world. Tashko is a communist of long standing. These two expulsions were indications that there were troubles within the higher ranks of the Party, and they were strengthened by the fact that twice the date of the Fourth Congress was postponed. In the speech of February 13, 1961, Hoxha included Liri Belishova in the category of traitors, but abstained from mentioning Tashko. As for the Sejko group, its fate was sealed when Hoxha, accusing its members of collaboration with Yugoslavia, Greece, and the US Sixth Fleet, declared that "the plotters and the facts are in the hands of the people's justice." On May 31, 1961, Teme Sejko and three other defendants were executed, while six others received prison sentences.

The strained relations with Yugoslavia made the Tirana regime intensify its ideological propaganda within the country. However, on September 16, 1960, Radio Tirana admitted that the struggle in

¹⁴ Cf. *Materialy*, pp. 167-169.

this field, after being intensively waged for fifteen years, had failed among the broad masses of the people and the party members.¹⁵ At the Fourth Congress Hoxha called for vigilance. He appealed to the communists for the defense of the Party, but he appealed to the communists and the patriots for the fight against any enemy of the republic. Apparently the Party, in the present situation, needs badly the support of the people. Giving as a reason the increase of the number of workers in the Party during the last five years, from 19.76 per cent to 29.66 per cent (the total number of communists is 53,659—50,802 regular members and 2,857 candidates), he proposed that the requirements for admission to membership in the Party should not make class discrimination. He then worded the change in the constitution as follows: "Every person who asks to be admitted to the Party must present the recommendation of three members of the Party, who must have been members of the Party for not less than three years and must have known the recommended person in common work for not less than one year."

INTERNAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Discrepancies in the official Albanian statistics, usually in percentages, blur the picture of the country's economy. Moreover, it is confusing, when during the years the press complains about non-fulfillments of the plan, and at the end, when the report of the Five-Year Plan is presented, it is stated that everything went well, even beyond the targets set by the plan.

According to directives by the party Congress of June 2, 1956, for fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1960), production was divided into two groups: group "A" comprised capital goods, and group "B," consumer goods. At the end of 1960, the production of group "A" was to increase by not less than 102 per cent and that of group "B" by not less than 84 per cent.¹⁶ Although discontent had been expressed by the press about its non-fulfillment, because of poor management, bureaucracy and confusion, or poor use of machinery and waste of material, Hoxha reported that the Second Five-Year

¹⁵ Cf. Assembly of Captive European Nations, *A Survey of Recent Developments in Nine Captive Countries* (March 1960-October 1960) (New York, 1960), pp. 3-4.

¹⁶ Cf. *Materialy*, p. 351.

Plan in the whole of industry was fulfilled before the deadline: in four years and nine months. When one reads the directives of the party Congress of February 20, 1961, where details of the Second Five-Year Plan are given, one can not reconcile the figures. It is stated that production of capital goods (group "A") increased by 129 per cent as against the 99 per cent foreseen by the Congress, while that of consumer goods (group "B") increased by 111 per cent as against the 88 per cent foreseen by the Congress.¹⁷

In the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965), too, emphasis would be laid on industry, with priority to heavy industry, particularly the extraction and working of minerals. On the basis of the directives of the party Congress of February 20, 1961, capital goods (group "A") should increase by 54 per cent and consumer goods (group "B") by not less than 50 per cent.¹⁸

The Albanian Party and government have always considered agricultural collectives one of the main factors in building socialism. Though they speak of Leninist principles of free will and abstention from arbitrary methods, force is being used for promotion of agrarian collectives. Of the collectivized farmers few lived well and enjoyed good incomes. Great effort was made to collectivize livestock, but here the regime met dramatic resistance on the part of the peasants: they slaughtered their livestock.

The directives of the Fourth Congress noted that in 1960 socialist agriculture in Albania comprised more than 86 per cent of the arable land and more than 80 per cent of the general agricultural and dairy production of the country. If it were true that significant works in soil improvement and irrigation had been carried out, as maintained in Hoxha's report, one would not hesitate to believe that agriculture has substantially improved, taking into consideration also that tractors and other agricultural machines have been used. By 1965 the arable land should reach 515 hectares (a hectare is 2.471 acres), or 13 per cent more than in 1960, opening some 63 thousand hectares of new land. In the state sector of agriculture, land under cultivation should increase by not less than 24 per cent.¹⁹

The policy of the regime is to favor more industry than agriculture. Hoxha informed the Fourth Congress that the workers, together with

¹⁷ *Zëri i Popullit*, February 23, 1961.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

their families, constituted approximately 22.5 per cent of the population of Albania, which in 1960 reached 1,625,000. He maintained that the country had entered the stage for the complete construction of socialism—which sounds like wishful thinking—the stage of changing it from an agricultural-industrial society into an industrial-agricultural society.

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

In all her economic development Albania had been aided until recently by the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, both materially and with expert advice. She had concluded economic agreements with the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Being relatively rich in minerals—nickel, iron ore, chrome, copper, coal, petroleum—she has to export them in order to obtain machines and manufactured goods; for, despite what her communist regime propagandizes, she is still an underdeveloped country. On August 5, 1957, a trade agreement between Albania and Czechoslovakia was signed in Prague. Czechoslovakia would export to Albania mechanical and industrial products, motor vehicles, paper, tires, and consumer goods, while Albania would export to Czechoslovakia chromium ores, copper, tobacco, fruits, and other agricultural products. A new trade agreement was signed between the two countries for 1961, Albania exporting, in addition to articles mentioned above, nickel, bitumen, and hides.

An agreement implementing the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty was signed on June 22, 1957, between Albania and Italy. The reparation of \$5 million was reduced to \$2.6 million, to be paid within two years in goods and equipment listed in an annex. In his speech of February 13, 1961, Hoxha expressed the belief that trade relations and communications could develop successfully between the two countries. On August 17, 1957, negotiations on an Albanian-Hungarian trade agreement were concluded, covering exchanges for 1958-1960 and anticipating an expansion in volume; Albania would export primarily minerals and would import industrial equipment. On June 6, 1959, a protocol was signed between Albania and Poland for the period 1961-1965. Albania would furnish Poland with, among other items, chrome, bitumen, copper, cotton and tobacco, while Poland would provide

her with ships, machinery, industrial equipment, pharmaceutical products, textiles and railway freight cars. A trade payment agreement for the period 1961-1965 was also concluded in April 1960 between Albania and East Germany, from where the first country would import mostly chemicals and agricultural machinery. On the basis of the 1960 Soviet-Albanian trade agreement, the USSR would deliver machinery, cars, pipes, wheat and other goods, and Albania would export crude oil, bitumen, copper, tobacco, olives, and canned fruits.

Trade with the free countries of the world has probably been negligible, for the Tirana government has not been in the habit of publishing any figures. However, at the fifteenth session of the European Economic Commission in Geneva (1960), the Albanian representative, Dhimitër Lamani, expressed the readiness of the Albanian government to establish trade relations with every country, and above all with the neighboring countries. Concrete proposals were made to some states within the European Economic Commission for the establishment of trade relations with Albania on the basis of mutual interests.²⁰

Aid to Albania has taken various forms. Reporting on the meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), held in East Berlin in May 1956, and of which Albania is a member, the Albanian press stated that help from the various people's democracies had been great, but that Russia's and China's assistance stood at the top. Post-1956 information, however, placed Czechoslovakia and East Germany before China.

In the joint Moscow communiqué of April 17, 1957, it was stated that the Soviet Union changed into a gift the industrial credits she had accorded Albania through the years, which amounted to 348 million rubles. Another credit of 74 million rubles which she had furnished in the form of goods and industrial equipment was also turned into a present. The Soviet government agreed to give technical assistance to Albanian agriculture and industry for 1957 and 1958. In May 1957, D. R. Rassulov, deputy minister of agriculture of the USSR, arrived in Tirana at the head of a group of specialists, to study and revise the 15-Year Prospective Plan (1961-1975) for development of Albania's economy. This plan was to be co-ordinated with similar plans of member nations of the COMECON, which had decided to accelerate the economic integration of the East bloc countries.

²⁰ Cf. Assembly of Captive European Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Soviet economic policy toward Albania thus changed into assistance in the later 1950's. Formerly Soviet investments went mostly to industries which could be exploited by the Russians in export trade. But even in Khrushchev's time there has been a sort of exploitation. In a study on price discrimination in exports to Eastern Europe by the Soviets for the year 1958, based on Soviet sources, Albania lost \$1,516,000 on twelve commodities imported from the USSR, if compared with prices in Western countries.²¹ If Khrushchev freed the Albanian government of the accumulated debt to the Soviets, it was perhaps because of all the countries within the Soviet orbit Albania was the most backward and remained a blot to socialism (communism).

However, since Tirana's siding with Peking in the communist ideological struggle the Soviet Union has withdrawn her material help to Albania, and Communist China appears to have replaced her. In 1958-1959 trade agreements were signed between the two states, the amount of credits not being disclosed. Although food shortages were acutely felt in her own land, China sent 91,000 tons of wheat to Albania. On April 23, 1961, a trade agreement was signed in Peking, whereby Red China granted Albania a credit of 112,500,000 rubles (equal to 500,000,000 old rubles). The two protocols which were signed concerned the Chinese specialists and technicians, as well as their salaries—in this way a part of the money goes into Chinese pockets—and the construction and complete furnishing of twenty-five projects in the fields of chemical, metallurgical, power, construction, and light industries. Communist China would also send tractors and other agricultural machines, food, and other goods.²² Although the communiqué made no mention of the length of time for the use of the credit, it is understood that it would be for the duration of the Third Five-Year Plan. Chinese specialists and technicians have already arrived in Albania, while their Soviet colleagues are leaving the country.

CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

In education Albania has followed the Soviet pattern. It was announced on August 16, 1957, that the Ministry of Education and

²¹ Cf. J. Wszelaki, "Soviet Discrimination in Export to East Central Europe," Sixth Session, June 7, 1960, ACEN Doc. 207 (IV), Econ., p. 4.

²² *Zëri i Popullit*, April 26, 1961.

Culture, after consultation with teachers and with the help of advisers from the Soviet Ministry of Education, had made changes in the school programs that would be effective beginning 1957-1958. But Soviet experience had shown that "polytechnical" education was best, and that it suited well the political and economic needs of Albania. The Albanian educational system, therefore, should be reorganized on the basis of closer contacts between life and school, in accordance with Khrushchev's "New School Program," introduced in the Soviet Union in December 1958. Although in the speech of February 13, 1961, Hoxha referred to "polytechnical" education, he was not eager to see Albania apply the reorganization immediately, but beginning with the school year 1963-1964, and gradually.

The regime has boasted of two accomplishments. By 1956, it was announced, illiteracy had disappeared in persons under forty years of age. Although subsequent official information pointed to the contrary, there is no doubt that progress in this direction has been great. On September 16, 1957, the first university in Albania, called the State University of Tirana, was opened. It was composed of six faculties: history-philology, law, economics, technical (mechanics, electricity, construction, and geology), natural sciences (mathematics-physics and biology-chemistry), and medicine. It was organized by V. T. Makarov, former rector of the University of Tomsk, on the Soviet pattern, and members of the faculties were Russians and Albanians, the latter mostly individuals who had studied in the USSR.

The students registered in the Tirana University for the first year numbered 3,000. Among them were students from the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. On the other hand, in 1957 there were more than 1,300 Albanians studying in universities and institutions of higher learning in the USSR and her satellites. On the basis of the Albanian-Soviet cultural agreement of February 3, 1959, the number of Soviet scholars in Albania and Albanian students in the Soviet Union was expected to rise substantially. Hoxha's statement on February 13, 1961, raised the number of Albanian students in the University of Tirana and abroad to 7,800 (in Tirana 4,300, not counting correspondence and night students). Hoxha especially praised the work of the department of history-philology at the Tirana University, which is completely Albanian. He upheld the Albanian heritage and culture, and he picked for distinction two publications of that faculty: *History of Albania*

and *History of Albanian Literature*. He directed that the studies for the 1961-1965 plan concentrate on key problems of Albanian history, literary language, and literature.

Other cultural arrangements have been made. An agreement on co-operation between the "mosfilm" studios of the USSR and the "New Albania" studios for production of a film on the Albanian National Liberation War was signed in Tirana in the spring of 1957. There were exchanges of cultural delegations between Albania and the USSR. "Literary evenings" dedicated to Albanian literature were held in Moscow, under sponsorship of VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations) and the Soviet Writers' Union, attended by Russians and Albanians. In May 1957 a congress of Albanian writers and artists took place in Tirana, in the presence of representatives from the USSR and the satellites. It was asked of them that they follow closely the party line. The party line in art and literature depended completely, of course, on what Moscow wished. Soviet "socialist realism" has not been so successful in describing the "new Albanian reality." This latter has been officially called the "Sickness of the Period of Beginnings," although it may well mark a sort of covert cultural resistance.²³ It might continue as such. Hoxha told the Fourth Congress that one of the main demands of the Party was that writers make more efforts to be nearer to the life of the people, the principal source of true inspiration.

As for religion under the Albanian communist regime, all religious bodies have been brought under government control. "Freedom of conscience and religion," "liberty of religious communities," and "separation of Church and State" are but paper guarantees.

Catholics have no organizational or economic relations with the Vatican, except concerning dogmatic matters, and then only through channels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of the two Catholic archbishoprics and four bishoprics, only two of the latter were filled in 1957, and the incumbents were advanced in age. Dioceses are mostly run by vicars, since to install new bishops contact with the Vatican and approval of the Albanian government are necessary. The Albanian Orthodox Church also has felt the heavy hand of communist oppression. But since 1951, when ties with the Moscow patriarchate became closer, it appears to have fared better. Moslems, whom

²³ Cf. *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Munich, VI (May-June 1957), 90-91.

the regime in 1945 separated into Sunni and Bektashi communities, to divide their forces and accentuate the Sunni-Bektashi opposition, were in 1957 in an intermediary position. Apparently the government left some meager property to the Moslem communities when on the basis of the 1945 land-reform law it deprived the churches of almost all their property. Now that the Tirana regime is eager to develop relations with the Arab world the Moslem communities have perhaps a better fate. The headquarters of the Sunni community, which comprises the majority of Albanian Moslems, occupies one of the most beautiful buildings in Tirana. Although all churches receive state subsidy, it is the government that decides upon the amount for each. Of 530 mosques of prewar Albania only 75 were still in use in 1957.²⁴ As for contacts with the spiritual centers of the Orient, the Moslem communities enjoy them only when the regime sees an advantage. At the time of the Suez crisis a "telegram of solidarity" was dispatched to Cairo by the Grand Mufti of Tirana.

Lately, a campaign against religion has developed. The Albanian communists were worried that despite their propaganda for "scientific atheism," the hold of religion had not weakened. Usually people like the Albanians, who are not reported to be very religious, turn to religion when life has been stripped of its appeals, when they find no worldly purpose in it. Hoxha referred to "religious prejudices," "remnants of the past" among the peasants, but he also admitted that their uprooting was a difficult and delicate matter. He counseled the organizations of the Party to show patience, intelligence, and tact, not to hurt the feelings of the people.

THE SOVIET NEW ORDER

Western journalists who visited Albania in the late 1950's—and there were very few—were struck by her Soviet appearance. The signs they saw in the waiting room of the airport were in Russian and Albanian, and soldiers, officers, and policemen in the streets wore Soviet uniforms. The Albanian government has copied much of the government system of the Soviet Union. The same sort of bureaucracy and the same secret police, functioning with the same suspicion as in the Stalinist era, are dominant. The laws are on the whole the same as in the USSR. In all branches of the government there were Russian

²⁴ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 28, 1957.

advisers and experts. Her economic life is patterned after that of the Soviet Union and to a great extent regulated by the USSR.²⁵

It would be easy for Moscow to leave a powerful imprint in such an underdeveloped country. Of all the Balkan countries Albania won her independence comparatively late—in 1912. Because of the First World War, her life as an independent state did not begin until 1920. It was too short a period to form a truly national and homogeneous culture. The prewar Albanian intellectuals had studied abroad, mostly in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy; few possessed a native culture. A variety of outside cultural currents may be beneficial to a country that has a well-established culture of its own, but it is confusing for a country striving to create and integrate its national culture. Of the pre-1945 intellectuals only a few have survived, some being still in prison and others having adapted themselves to the new situation. Culture has been diverted to serve the purposes of the regime.

The Soviet Union is stepping, therefore, into a field against scant opposition—a sort of vacuum—to further the spread of her culture. She enters with a uniform school program of her own, with her own books, her own professors—all powerful means for assimilation. The University of Tirana, from which future leaders of the country will come, is functioning according to the Soviet model. A generation is being educated in Albania that will know only Soviet culture and will consider it supreme in the world.

Despite the deterioration in Soviet-Albanian relations, Soviet cultural influence is apt to persist, if unchallenged. Chinese culture is in many aspects so alien to Albanian culture that it is not expected to be influential. The question then arises: How could the powerful influence of Soviet culture on Albania be opposed? One way is to stress Albanian native culture. There are signs that this is being done by the regime. The encouragement on the part of the Party for more studies of Albania's past, folk creations, and material culture, and for more literature that would deal with the Albanian people, and not with the workers alone, manifests such efforts. Whether the subjects of literature are treated in accordance with the principle of socialist realism or not, they should contain traits of nationalism. The second means is penetration of Western culture. Referring to

²⁵ *New York Times*, September 9-13, 1957.

Italy, in the speech at the Fourth Congress of the Party, Hoxha expressed the desire for establishing cultural relations with that country. However, Italy alone would not be adequate for the purpose. Perhaps it is time to consider whether the West should continue to shut off Albania from its influences. Albanian communist leaders have several times expressed the desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and England. It appears that they are embarrassed even before their own party members because in Europe (East Germany excluded) only the communist government of Albania is not recognized by the United States. At the Congress, Hoxha did not mention Albania by name, but declared that President Kennedy "should have expressed himself for the establishment of diplomatic relations with six socialist states of Asia and Europe" with whom the United States has no diplomatic relations. By a program of cultural exchanges Western culture might to a certain extent challenge the monopoly of Soviet culture at a moment when it has not been well rooted, particularly if supported by French culture, which is highly respected in Albania. As for the leaders of the Albanian regime, who declare themselves ardent communists, ideology is less important than security and power—and these are at present menaced.

RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD

Albania's position among the satellites has improved. With membership in the Warsaw Treaty she emerged from her isolation and strengthened her regime. Albania's prestige rose when in May 1956 Shehu presided over a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty in Prague, and when the COMECON meeting convened in May 1959 in Tirana, attended by prominent representatives of the Eastern bloc. Albania has taken part in industrial and agricultural expositions organized in the people's democracies.

Significant have been Albania's efforts to develop close relations with the Arab countries. Because of her large Moslem population and the contacts of Albanians with the Arab world during the period of the Ottoman Empire, Albania is in an advantageous position for this purpose. In his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on February 13, 1957, Hoxha dwelt long upon relations with the Arab countries. He said that the Arab people showed a

special fondness for Albania, because this country, although small and backward, was able to win her freedom and independence as a result of her armed fight and the decisive help of the Soviet Union. The example of Albania, Hoxha said, served to show to the Arab countries that Marxism-Leninism was the only future for a rich and free life of the people, that the Soviet Union was the liberator and savior of large and small countries, ready to give aid without strings.

Interest in the Arab world was manifested also in the joint Moscow statement of April 1957. Assailing the Eisenhower Doctrine as imperialistic, the Albanian government stressed that as a Mediterranean country it was interested in the preservation of peace and security in the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. The Soviet and Albanian governments agreed to foster efforts of the Middle Eastern countries in their struggle against colonialism and for independence and sovereignty, expressing readiness to develop and extend friendly relations and collaborate on an equal basis for mutual interests. In January 1959 Khrushchev promised Tirana, as a gift, the construction of a radio station four times more powerful than the existing one, which could broadcast short wave, apparently to the Middle East.

Since the Moscow statement of April 1957, the Albanian regime has not been slow in establishing contacts with the Middle Eastern countries. In May 1957, a delegation headed by First Deputy Premier Manush Myftiu visited Tunisia for celebration of the anniversary of that country's declaration of independence. A Syrian delegation of teachers, headed by Professor Basan Kurdi-Ali, arrived in Tirana in June 1957, invited by the Albanian Ministry of Public Instruction and Culture. It was announced on December 24, 1957, that Albanian observers would attend the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, and telegrams from the Albanian trade unions were dispatched to the Algerian trade unions expressing solidarity of the Albanian people with the Algerian cause. On May 3, 1958, a conference was held in Tirana which laid the foundations for an "Albanian-Arab Friendship Society." According to the Albanian press it was attended by over 600 delegates—representatives of various Albanian organizations, high Albanian officials, and the Arab countries. Minister of Justice Bilbil Klosi delivered the opening speech, praising the Arab countries, the Soviet Union, and China, and denouncing the West as imperialists.

The historical traditions which bind the Arab world with the

Albanians were reiterated in Hoxha's speech of February 13, 1961. He declared that Albania would always defend the rights of the Arabs to independence and that her sympathy and solidarity had been, in critical moments, with the peoples of Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. But he omitted mentioning the Soviet Union as "liberator" and "savior" of small countries. He expressed the decision of Albania to broaden in the future her relations of friendship and collaboration with the Arab peoples, stressing that the Mediterranean was their link.

Although Greece has not ended her long-standing "state of war" with Albania, a remnant of Fascist Italy's aggression in 1940, and has not withdrawn her claims to Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), there have been certain improvements in Athens-Tirana relations. Following an agreement between the Albanian and Greek diplomatic representatives in Moscow, Albania in 1957 began to repatriate the Greek soldiers and civilians who had landed there during the Greek rebellion. On February 8, 1958, an accord was reached between Albania and Greece for clearing mines from the northern part of the Corfu Channel, and the accord was carried out a month later. It was greeted by a portion of the Greek press as the beginning of normalization of Greek-Albanian relations. Some trade with Greece has also begun. However, before the Albanian Parliament in March 1959, Hoxha accused the King of Greece and Tito (who had just met at Corfu) of envisaging the dismemberment of Albania. In February 1961 he denounced Greece as one of the instigators of the plot for the overthrow of the regime.

As for other countries having diplomatic relations with Albania, Italy was the first Western power to recognize the Albanian regime. She had the problem of repatriation of Italian soldiers and citizens who had remained in Albania at the end of the war. She was interested also in trade. France has diplomatic relations with Albania, but nothing of consequence goes on between the two countries. Lately Finland and Austria, among the non-bloc powers, were added to the list. Four other countries have established diplomatic relations with Albania: the Sudan, the United Arab Republic, India, and Turkey. To this list Castro's Cuba has been added, and Tirana has signed an agreement of economic and cultural co-operation with the Cubans.

SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF ALBANIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION

As long as Soviet-Albanian relations were good, Albania was of considerable strategic value to the USSR. Situated opposite Italy and at the entrance of the Adriatic, she had become an advanced bastion of Soviet military power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the interior there were zones for parachuting, and airfields had been constructed where modern planes could land. The rocky island of Saseno, opposite the port of Vlorë (Valona), had been turned into a submarine base. While only a few Soviet submarines were stationed there, the base had room for more. The port of Durrës had been deepened to receive ships of oceanic tonnage, while that of Sarandë (Santi Quaranta), near the Greek frontier, had been modernized for surface ships of lower tonnage. The whole of the Albanian littoral was protected by modern batteries, as well as powerful anti-aircraft installations, guarded by a radar net. The Soviet Union exercised direct command in the military sectors, and large zones were closed even to nationals of the satellites. From here the Soviet Union could threaten the communications of NATO with Greece and Turkey. It is true that because of the distance from the Soviet Union these Albanian positions would be vulnerable and could be promptly neutralized. However, their role would not be negligible in a brief war employing modern weapons.²⁶

With the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Albania seemed to have been assigned a role of intermediary between the Soviet Union and the Arab world. When during the Suez conflict Khrushchev declared that Egypt could count on volunteer support if attacked, Albania was reported to have been chosen as a "volunteer" base by the Kremlin, both because of her proximity and her Moslem population. In Hoxha's own words at the Fourth Congress: "The whole Albanian people rose against the aggression and thousands of Albanians were ready to go as volunteers to the assistance of the heroic Egyptian people."

Albania was also used by the USSR to intimidate Italy and threaten Greece. On July 2, 1958, the Albanian government delivered a note to Italy protesting establishment of missile bases on Italian soil. On the eve of Khrushchev's arrival, in May 1959, she forwarded a similar

²⁶ Cf. Maxim Mourin, "Le Satellite isolé, l'Albanie," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, Paris (15e Année—Décembre 1959), pp. 1995-96.

note to Greece on the possible installation of NATO missile bases on her territory. But it was Khrushchev who in his speeches from Albania warned both Italy and Greece that the Soviet Union would not tolerate that situation and would build her own missile bases in the protected valleys of mountainous Albania. He proposed a Balkan zone free of nuclear weapons, a plan similar to that of Rapacki's for Central Europe. To lend weight to his warnings, the Soviet leader had Marshal Malinovsky, his minister of defense, accompanying him.

With the new turn in Soviet-Albanian relations (which also caused the recent departure of Soviet submarines from the base of Sasseno) Albania's strategic utility for the USSR has been lost.

BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING

Albania established relations with Communist China at the outset and a Chinese diplomatic mission, although small, was established in Tirana. In the Moscow joint communiqué of April 1957, the Soviet and Albanian governments protested against the opposition to Red China in the United Nations, emphasizing that "for the last seven years imperialist circles in the USA have barred China from taking her rightful place in the United Nations." They declared that they would not desist until China's membership was secured. However, China was too far away and Albania too small for their relations to grow very close. Nevertheless, the situation began to change in 1958.

The Albanian communist leaders had not looked happily on Khrushchev's efforts to woo back Tito's Yugoslavia to the communist fold. The period which followed the Tito-Cominform rupture had left bitter antagonisms between them and the Yugoslav leaders. They not only feared a return to the past—Albania becoming again Yugoslavia's subsatellite—but their own security was at stake. As long as Khrushchev was wooing Yugoslavia, they proceeded cautiously, without, however, missing any opportunity to attack her. When the program of the Yugoslav Communist Party was adopted in its Seventh Congress (April 22-26, 1958) at Ljubljana, they were in the fore of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, denouncing the Yugoslav Party for revisionism. Their salvation depended on keeping Yugoslavia outside the family of communist states.

At that time Communist China, whose leader had proclaimed "let all flowers bloom and all schools of thought contend," made an all-out attack on Yugoslav revisionism. But China's motives were different from those of Albania. The Chinese communists were afraid that Khrushchev's principle of peaceful coexistence could not only help re-establish relations with Yugoslavia, but could also bring the Soviets to an understanding with the United States, their main enemy. Their country was passing through a stage of radical social transformation. In order to keep the people under their control, Stalin's methods, rather than Khrushchev's "liberalization" policy, were necessary. In the opposition between the policies of the two Soviet chiefs, Stalin's hard line should be followed. If the Chinese communists, as leaders of a country larger than the USSR and with greater potentialities, felt reluctant to acknowledge Soviet supremacy, Yugoslav revisionism would offer them a good opportunity to affirm their independence. They attacked Yugoslav revisionism in order to attack indirectly Khrushchev's policies.

Whether it was the Red Chinese who first approached the Communist Albanians or vice-versa is not known. The fact is that Yugoslav "revisionism" brought them together. Ever since May 1958, when *Zëri i Popullit* and the *People's Daily*, the organ of the Chinese Communist Party, launched their simultaneous ideological attack on Yugoslav revisionism, the links between Albania and China have become increasingly closer. China's representation in Tirana grew numerous. Visits on both sides, at all levels, have become very frequent. In September 1958, Balluku visited China, denouncing in his speeches the "Yugoslav traitors" and "United States imperialists." Returning his visit, China's minister of defense, Marshal Peng Teh-hsi, declared on May 28, 1959, in Tirana: "Should someone dare threaten Albania . . . he should know that we shall smash his head." Khrushchev was at that time in Albania. Although in the Khrushchev-Hoxha statement of June 1, 1959, as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, the distinction between state and ideological relations was emphasized and revisionism denounced, Albania continued to strengthen her ties with China, publicizing her progress in building socialism and her important role in the socialist camp and in the world. Even the "miracles" of the people's communes in China were not ignored. An Albanian-China Friendship Society was created.

Yet it took some time for the deterioration of the Soviet-Albanian

relations to become known to the world. In June 1960, when the Third Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party, attended by the heads of the various communist parties, met in Bucharest, neither Hoxha nor Shehu were present. Hysni Kapo, a member of the Central Committee and chairman of the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Society, was the chief of the Albanian delegation.

Khrushchev's decision to ask for approval of the policy of peaceful coexistence was not the only reason for Hoxha's absence from the Bucharest Congress. It appears that another reason was added. In May-June 1960, Sophocles Venizelos, the leader of the Greek Liberal Party in opposition and an advocate of Greece's withdrawal from NATO and adoption of a neutralist line, published in the Athenian papers a long interview he had recently had with Khrushchev in Moscow. He mentioned in it that he had asked the Soviet leader to intervene with the Albanian government for the improvement of the situation of the Greek minority—they are a little more than 35,000—living in southern Albania. Khrushchev had replied that he did not know the details of the problem, but he would ask Enver Hoxha in the Bucharest meeting and would notify Venizelos as soon as possible.²⁷ An interference on the part of the Soviet premier in such a sensitive matter would be resented by both the Albanian government and the people. On September 3, 1960, *Zëri i Popullit* gave a violent answer to Venizelos, but did not refer to Khrushchev.

After Bucharest, the rift became more open. Hoxha did not come to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, where all the leaders of the satellites followed Khrushchev. He did not attend the reception given by the Soviet delegation on September 12, 1960, in Tirana, in order to celebrate the month of Soviet-Albanian friendship, but he went to the reception of the Chinese Embassy on October 1, 1960, for the commemoration of the eleventh anniversary of the establishment of the communist regime in China and delivered a long speech extolling the pure and correct Marxist-Leninist line of the Chinese. Albania was the only East Central European satellite represented in Peking on that occasion. On the other hand, Shehu, the head of the Albanian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, whose support of Communist China at the UN was much stronger than that of Khrushchev, was virtually ostracized

²⁷ "The Double-Faced Policy of the Communists," commentary of London Radio, *Flamuri* (The Flag), Rome, October 31, 1960.

by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the East Central European satellites in New York, while Khrushchev had two talks with Tito. In November 1960, when the eighty-one communist parties of the world convened in Moscow, it was reported that Hoxha harshly criticized Khrushchev and reproached the Polish delegation for having abandoned the correct road of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev took up the defense of the Poles.²⁸ It seems that it was then that the reported bitter exchange occurred in which Hoxha called Khrushchev "a traitor to the communist idea, a weakling, and a revisionist," and the communist leader retorted: "Comrade Hoxha, you have poured a bucket of dung on me and you will have to wash it."²⁹ Fear for his life was given as a reason for Hoxha's refusal to attend the Conference of the Warsaw Pact, held at the end of March 1961; instead, Beqir Balluku headed the Albanian delegation. *Zëri i Popullit* has long ceased to reproduce articles of *Pravda*; instead it republishes articles from the Chinese *People's Daily*.

The radical change in Soviet-Albanian relations which occurred between 1957 and 1961 was most strikingly exemplified in the welcome accorded to two Soviet ambassadors at their arrival in Tirana. When Vasil I. Ivanov landed at the Tirana airport in 1957, he was welcomed by First Deputy Prime Minister Gogo Nushi, Minister of Foreign Affairs Behar Shtylla, and a host of other Albanian personalities;³⁰ at the arrival of Josip V. Shikin in 1961, only the chief of protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Petrit Dishinca, was on hand at the airport to welcome him.³¹

Although the Soviet Union pretends to ignore Albania's attitude, there is no doubt that she has been hurt by it. Why does she tolerate it? Is she not in a position to overthrow the present communist leaders and bring about a change favorable to her? It seems that she has tried. It has been reported that Ambassador Ivanov had been active in creating a pro-Soviet faction or at least a pro-Soviet current in the Party with a view to exercising pressure on Hoxha and Shehu. The leader of the movement was Koço Tashko, who had been the first envoy of Communist Albania to the USSR, and the adherents were men placed high in the Party and the army. But the movement

²⁸ Cf. *Qindresa Shqiptare* (Albanian Resistance), Paris, May 15, 1961.

²⁹ *New York Times*, March 31, 1961.

³⁰ *Zëri i Popullit*, March 29, 1957.

³¹ *Ibid.*, January 20, 1961.

failed and Moscow was asked to withdraw Ambassador Ivanov. It was evidence that the control of the Party was in the hands of the pro-China leadership.

The strength of the Albanian communist leaders to challenge Moscow does not lie only in the grip they have over the Party and the armed forces, though this is a most important factor. Albania's geographic isolation from the Soviet bloc, which before the rift was a drawback, has now become an advantage to them. As none of the satellite countries borders on Albania, the USSR cannot undertake a direct or indirect action on her. To allow Yugoslavia and Greece to invade Albania would be to strengthen the regime's support by the people, who regard both countries as enemies desiring to encroach on Albanian territory. It would also be a blow to the unity of the socialist camp, and Hoxha made several references to the Warsaw Treaty organization in his speech of February 13, 1961. Economic sanctions would not be effective because Red China has already come to the assistance of Tirana. But the most important factor in the strength of the Albanian communist leaders is the Soviet Union's concern over the reaction of China to any step she might contemplate against Albania.

Still the Tirana regime is reluctant to break away from Moscow. Hoxha's speech to the Fourth Congress was a good example of communist double-talk. He often mentioned "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union" and the principle of peaceful coexistence. He stressed that the "friendship with the Soviet Union has been, is, and will be forever the cornerstone of the foreign policy of new Albania." But he never mentioned Khrushchev in the speech, while he referred five times to Stalin, twice quoting excerpts from his works and once to say that all his works had been translated into Albanian. He extolled the People's Republic of China as "a powerful fortress" and "the pride of the socialist camp." He said that friendship and collaboration with China had been strengthened still more on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, the common strife for socialism and peace, and expressed gratitude for the aid that she had given and was giving to the Albanian people. Connecting the policy of peaceful coexistence with the demagogy of the revisionists, who saw it as a policy of reconciliation with imperialism, he declared that the Marxist-Leninists did not deny the possibility of the peaceful road for the passage to socialism, but they did not understand it at all as a negation of

the class struggle. And then he added: "The Marxist parties, as stressed in the Moscow Declaration [1960], do not consider at all the peaceful road as the only possible form of the passage to socialism. On the contrary, . . . the Marxist-Leninist parties are being prepared parallelly, at the same time, for the peaceful road as well as for the seizure of power by armed revolution."

THE MOSCOW-PEKING IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AS REFLECTED IN THE TIRANA CONGRESS

Although inclined toward the Chinese point of view, Hoxha made efforts in his speech to the Fourth Congress to show that he abided by the Moscow Declaration of 1960, which was a compromise solution. When P. N. Pospelov, the chief of the Soviet delegation and a candidate for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the USSR, and Li Hsien-nien, the head of the Chinese delegation and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of Red China, delivered their speeches, they were concerned with emphasizing the viewpoints of the parties they represented within the framework of the Moscow Declaration.

Pospelov, considering the Moscow Declaration of eighty-one communist parties as a clear Marxist-Leninist program of action of the international communist movement, advocated the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, stressing that life itself had demonstrated that this "Leninist principle" was the only just and reasonable principle in international relations. He then came to the point: "Now the question is put only thus—either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war. There is no other way." Holding that the war against revisionism remained an actual and important task of the communist parties, he stressed that the interests of the strengthening of the communist movement called also for a tireless war on the other danger—dogmatism and sectarianism, main dangers in this or that stage of development of the individual parties.³²

Li Hsien-nien began by praising Communist Albania, calling her the vanguard of the war against the enemies of socialism, particularly modern Yugoslav revisionism, and a strong support for the preserva-

³² P. N. Pospelov's speech is in *Zëri i Popullit*, February 15, 1961.

tion of the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Based on the principles of the close connection between the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and practice in the country, the Albanian Communist Party applied and developed in a creative manner Marxism-Leninism. Red China, he said, considered the success of the Albanian Party and people her own. He then added: "As long as imperialism exists, there exists also the foundation for aggressive wars. The danger is not yet over, and imperialism, with the United States at the head, may give rise to a new world war . . . Therefore, today it is indispensable more than ever for the people to be vigilant." He acknowledged that the Soviet Communist Party was the vanguard Party, with the longest history and the richest experience in the international communist movement, as well as the most powerful, but he also declared that the communist parties of all the countries are independent and equal, although responsible to the interests of the international proletariat. Referring to the Moscow Declaration of 1960, he asked for war against revisionism and imperialism, and stressed the solidarity of the communist parties.³³

Significant were the greetings sent by the central committees of the communist parties of the USSR and China. In the Soviet telegram there were the customary praises for the work of the Communist Party of Albania, without a single mention of Hoxha, while in that of the Chinese not only the work of the Albanian Communist Party, with Hoxha at the head, was lauded, but it was also stated that "under extremely difficult conditions" it had carried on an

uncompromising war against modern revisionism, represented by the Titoist Yugoslav clique, and has made a distinct contribution to the struggle for the defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, for the preservation of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.³⁴

TIRANA'S ATTITUDE AND WORLD COMMUNISM

Can this independent stand of the small Albanian Communist Party have any influence on the other satellites? Perhaps up to a point. It has revealed once more that Moscow does not care about the interests of the other people's democracies, despite their common

³³ Li Hsien-nien's speech, *ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

social systems, when her own interests are involved. It has also pointed out that communists in power, when confronted with difficult situations, may exploit in their interest the nationalism of their people, which still remains a powerful force.

However, it should not be forgotten that Albania's conditions are somewhat unique. The communists in that country were not placed in power by the USSR; they seized it by their own forces. True, they were assisted by the Yugoslav communists, but they got rid of them with the Tito-Cominform break. Besides, a spirit of resistance to intrusion exists among the Albanian people, as often displayed during the five centuries of Ottoman domination. A great disadvantage for the other satellite countries, as far as attempts to independence are concerned, is the fact that they have common frontiers with the Soviet Union or with her satellites.

The case of Albania made more obvious the rivalry between the USSR and Red China. Perhaps the communist countries, whether in Europe or in Asia, need no longer feel completely at the mercy of the one or the other of the conflicting powers. However, there is a certain precariousness in the position of communist Albania, although it is in the interest of China to preserve her as a symbol of her assertion of a leading position in the communist world. As long as Albania can maintain her present position she stands as an example of defiance of Moscow's domination.*

* Recent events in relations between China, Albania and the USSR are covered in the author's article, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (April 1962), no. 3, 471-478.

10: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1954-1961

Jan Wszelaki

The purpose of this study is briefly to describe and analyze the main economic trends and developments in the seven European satellites of the Soviet Union as well as Yugoslavia between 1954 and 1961. Anyone attempting such a comprehensive analysis within the scope of a short essay faces a difficult task. The disparities among populations, natural resources and stages of economic development of the countries under discussion are reflected in economic policies on the part of their governments which, though largely parallel and animated by a common economic philosophy, are not identical. Generalizations concerning the economic evolution of an area which embraces such widely dissimilar units as East Germany and Albania cannot be stretched too far, lest they become misleading. Moreover, the statistical back-up for such a presentation continues to be inadequate.

The statistical blackout of the Stalin and immediate post-Stalin era has now been partly lifted, and much more data pertaining to the captive area's economy have become available. Yet, this material is incomplete and not always reliable. For example, there is little information on Albania, and less is known about Rumania than her several neighbors. Official figures regarding national income, consumption, real wages and living standards must still be regarded skeptically in the light of the communists' anxiety to submit proof of a steady and uninterrupted progress of prosperity—a condition which is not true of all captive countries. Because of these obstacles, and the limited space at the disposal of the writer, only such aspects of the problem will be discussed below as are buttressed by adequate and reasonably trustworthy statistical evidence. This includes the eight countries' achievements and trends in agriculture, industry and foreign trade, as well as some features of their living standards.

All figures and other data quoted in this study have been taken or

computed from the official national and Soviet statistics, as well as the various publications of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The reader should be warned that while it is relatively easy to collect statistical figures pertaining to an individual country's production, trade, and so on, a diligent researcher finds it very difficult—and sometimes impossible—to approximate such data for the entire area under review. One or several pieces of the puzzle are often impossible to discover, either because of the differing statistical yardsticks used by individual countries, or because some important data have never been published—a sure sign that something was amiss with the given branch of economic life. Thus, East Germany disclosed only part of the data on her agricultural output in 1959 and 1960, and on a number of other economic sectors. It is for this reason that some of the tables which follow had of necessity to be based on the 1958 data.¹

At the beginning of the present decade, six of the seven captive countries—all but Poland—planned to complete the “construction of socialism” within several years and to progress to the “construction of communism.” Three countries were to realize the two prerequisites of that goal—namely, full collectivization of agriculture and final suppression of the remnants of capitalism, *i.e.*, of privately-operated retail trade, crafts and professions—during 1960-1961: one was Czechoslovakia, the richest and most advanced country of the area; the others, paradoxically enough, were backward Albania and underdeveloped Bulgaria. Rumania was not far behind in the timetable. Hungary, where collectivization has been pressed less forcefully than in the four above countries, and East Germany, where private enterprise has been tolerated in industry and trade, planned to achieve the same stage in the course of their economic plans for 1961-1965. Early in 1961, there was as yet no such deadline for the socialization of Polish agriculture, which the Warsaw regime hoped to accomplish through extraordinary methods.

Khrushchev's advent to power signalled a modification of Moscow's policy of direct interference in the administration of the seven countries' economies. Their regimes were granted some freedom in the choice of methods leading to the achievement of the common goal. This more flexible attitude reflected in part the decentralization of

¹ Sources are quoted in the several tables but, as a rule, not in the text.

the Soviet economy, where local republican governments received more autonomy in planning and administration. More important was the fact that, after the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution and a successful throttling of would-be revisionist movements throughout East Central Europe, the seven countries' regimes could be trusted not to deviate from Soviet patterns and precedents. Khrushchev announced to them in January 1959 that they were all to approach communism "approximately in the same time," and in December 1959, in Budapest, that their leaders "must synchronize their watches."

In order to keep pace with the Soviet Union, whose economy, according to all evidence, was making rapid progress, the seven regimes were urged to increase their investments and the rate of growth of their national products, and to strive for better labor productivity and higher technical standards of production. A general tightening of economic controls and increase of production targets was observable throughout the area and, unlike in 1953-1954 and 1956-1958, less attention was being paid to an improvement of the population's living standards.

Soviet control over the area was tightened in the period under review through two principal devices. One was the instrumentality of the Moscow Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which under Khrushchev greatly increased its range of activity. The other device of control, somewhat less direct, was that of increasing the flow of trade between East Central Europe and the Soviet Union. Since 1955, the COMECON's main task has been to promote the division of labor, principally industrial, among the seven countries. The objective has been the concentration of industrial—and, to a certain extent, also agricultural—output in the countries and plants best fitted for the given branches of production, and the resulting reduction of production costs. In 1961, this development was in its first stage, and its full impact on the area's economy was likely to be felt not before the middle of the new decade. In its initial stage, the program favored the highly-industrialized parts of the area. If one assumes that the latter would forever remain politically dependent on the Soviet Union, it could be argued that the division of labor was economically justified and, in the long run, beneficial for everyone concerned. However, there was little doubt that it tended to weaken the relative balance of the several countries' economies, to render them more interdependent, and gradually more dependent on

the Soviet Union than they had been at the beginning of the past decade.

The area's economic links with the Soviet Union were strengthened, also, under the relentless hammer of forced industrialization. East Central Europe's output of foodstuffs, minerals and other basic goods lagged behind that of the industry, and could no longer meet the requirements of a greatly expanded industrial economy. In 1961, far more than ten or even five years earlier, the area's governments were grappling with the problem of where to obtain the necessary raw materials in exchange for the only goods their countries had or could have in excess, *i.e.*, industrial products. There was but one obvious answer to this problem: namely, Moscow. The Soviet Union, in the intervening years, had greatly increased its output of basic goods but, in order to implement its economic plans, required a growing volume of imported industrial investment and consumer goods.

Whether or not the Soviet Union had planned it this way, a strong economic interdependence and even a *sui generis* complementarity has developed between the USSR and its satellites—a complementarity which can be expected to increase in the future. This development was one of the Soviet bloc's basic economic facts of the last decade. Its implications were not always adequately understood by many students of the problem, who recognized East Central Europe's increasing dependence on Soviet raw materials but paid less attention to such corollary aspects as the substantial value to the Soviet economy of industrial goods imported from Eastern Europe, and the commercial benefits Moscow derived from trade with the captive area. The subject is examined in greater detail in another section of this study.

A major development in the area's economic life during the period under review was the abandonment, under the pressure of the Hungarian and Polish revolts of 1956, of the more flagrant forms of Soviet exploitation. Anxious to stem the tide of popular unrest, the Soviet Union reduced and subsequently cancelled occupation costs exacted from East Germany, and withdrew a number of financial claims on several other countries in East Central Europe. These actions entailed no expenditure of Soviet resources. In addition, the Soviet government granted several countries credits and loans in grain, equipment and currency—concessions which were addressed largely to the realization

of projects dear to the Soviet Union. Between March 1956 and the end of 1958, the total of these credits reached about \$1,440 million; the actual disbursement of this capital will in some cases take until 1965. New credits extended in 1959-1960, mainly to Bulgaria, reached only \$332 million. These credits were hardly motivated by altruism: they were to be repaid with accrued interest. However, the flow of capital from the captive area to the Soviet Union, so characteristic of the Stalin-Malenkov era, was not entirely halted, and various forms of payments for previous credits and other Soviet services continued after 1957. Between 1957 and the end of 1961, Poland was granted easy American credits in the amount of \$470 million, which helped her to overcome some current difficulties but could not materially remedy her chronically strained economy. On their part, the captive countries were forced to grant substantial amounts of goods and services for the rehabilitation of North Korea, and to extend commercial credits to mainland China and long-term credits to various underdeveloped Asian and African countries. The total of these outright grants and credits greatly exceeded \$1,000 million. Czechoslovakia alone granted credits to nine underdeveloped countries to the extent of \$347 million, not including her second large credit to Cuba early in 1961.

During the same period, Yugoslavia, thanks largely to Western, mainly American, grants and other forms of assistance, was able to overcome many of her economic ills which had resulted from grave blunders committed in the early days of Tito's regime and from her boycott by the Soviet bloc after 1948. A new organizational and institutional pattern of national economy, substantially different from that of the Soviet bloc and offering more incentives to enterprises and individuals, was gradually put in operation—with fairly good results. The real recovery of the Yugoslav economy made itself felt beginning only in 1957, and was due in part to the bumper harvests of 1957 and 1959.

An important spur to Yugoslavia's economic rise was the spirit of its people, who realized that their efforts went toward the fulfillment of a national purpose, and not the aggrandizement of others. This spirit did not mark Yugoslavia's less fortunate neighbors. To be sure, many Czechs and Bulgarians may have found it prudent, for various reasons, to accommodate Soviet control over their countries and the rigors of the local communist regimes: they seem to accept

their fate as a final verdict and strive to improve their personal lot through diligent labor. Since November 1956 the Hungarians, too, have had no alternative but to reconcile themselves to the finality of their captive status. But, prior to the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961, the East Germans had the opportunity to escape their status through physical flight, and a million of them made this choice in the period under review. And a majority of the Polish and, insofar as it can be ascertained, the Rumanian peoples have not accepted the finality of their fate. This factor goes far to explain why, under the same conditions that prevail in Hungary, they have been less responsive to their regimes' exhortations to improve their status through hard work. Their lethargy undoubtedly has had a considerable impact upon the Polish and Rumanian economies.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, despite the tyrannical nature of all East Central European regimes and their suppression of most individual rights, the countries in the area have progressed in most branches of their economies, particularly in the industrial sectors. While stating this fact, however, it is well to bear in mind that the past decade has witnessed economic progress on a global scale—that similar and even more rapid advances have been realized by many nations of the free world, which did not have to pay a prohibitive social price for their economic betterment.

AGRICULTURE

During the period under review, the governments of the captive countries made considerable investments in agriculture, with the aim of raising the low per acre yields of the preceding decade and increasing the supply of grains and other foodstuffs. This quantitative improvement of agriculture was all the more necessary because the area's population was increasing by about one million per annum, and because urbanization, highway construction, airfields and other projects imposed a tight limit on the acreage under cultivation. The supply of fertilizers more than doubled between 1954 and 1959, as did that of tractors (from about 115,000 in 1948-1952 to about 240,000 in 1957 and about 320,000 in 1959) and other farming machinery; the quality of seeds was improved, and agricultural production was enhanced in other ways. These investments resulted in a perceptible increase of yields per acre and, to a much lesser extent, of the total

yield over that mustered during the lean years 1948-1952. However, looking at the area as a whole, the prewar level of principal crops was not attained. In this respect, East Central Europe lagged behind Western Europe and the Soviet Union, as shown in Table I. In appraising this table, it should be borne in mind that the area enjoyed only one bumper harvest during the depression years 1934-1938, while there were two such harvests in 1954-1958, those of 1955 and 1957.

TABLE I
AVERAGE GRAIN AND POTATO CROPS
millions of metric tons and percentages

	A	B	C	increase in percentages	
				C:B	C:A
Captive Area	1934-38	1948-52	1954-58		
grain	43.3	36.6	41.0	13	-6
potatoes	64.7	53.8	60.9	13	-6
Yugoslavia					
grain	8.1	6.0	7.8	30	-4
Soviet Union					
grain	72.9	80.7	113.2	40	...
potatoes	49.8	75.8	83.4	10	...

Sources: *FAO Yearbook 1958* and *Monthly Magazine; Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 Godu* (Moscow, 1959).

Notes: 1. Figures for the captive area pertain to its postwar territory; they do not include Albania, whose output of all grains rose from 186,000 tons in 1938 to 293,000 tons in 1959. 2. Yugoslav data for 1958, when the harvest was low, are unavailable; Yugoslav potato crops rose from 1.6 million tons in 1934-38 to 2.6 million tons in 1955-57. 3. Soviet postwar and prewar data are not comparable because of Soviet postwar territorial acquisitions.

It can be seen that, while the area's average grain and potato crop increased by about 13 per cent between 1948-1952 and 1954-1958, it was still 6 per cent short of the prewar level; the same was true with respect to Yugoslavia. Mainly because it had placed millions of acres of virgin land under cultivation, the Soviet Union obtained much better results in its farming, but so did the advanced countries of Western Europe, despite the fact that they already enjoyed very high per-acre yields. Between 1948-1952 and 1955-1957, average grain crops increased by 25 per cent in Italy and West Germany, by 38 per cent in France, and by 47 per cent in Austria after the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops. During the latter average period, grain

crops fell short of the prewar average by 5 per cent in Hungary, 6 per cent in Poland within her postwar frontiers, 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and 13 per cent in East Germany; they exceeded the prewar average crops by 8 per cent in Rumania, by 22 per cent in Bulgaria, and by close to one half in Albania. In other words, while some progress was registered in the more backward parts of the area, the more advanced countries were unable to recover from their agricultural setbacks suffered in the years immediately following the Second World War. It should be noted that in 1959, for which complete data were not available at the time of writing, the grain and potato crop was above average in most captive countries, with the conspicuous exception of East Germany. A record harvest was gathered in 1959 in Yugoslavia and apparently also in Rumania. Harvests of 1960, not as high as those of the preceding year in the southern part of East Central Europe, were satisfactory in Poland and Czechoslovakia, less so in East Germany, which again did not disclose its results.

When describing the volume of agricultural production in prosperous Czechoslovakia, the official *Rudé Právo* said on April 4, 1961, that in comparison with 1955 it rose in 1956 by 2.5 per cent, in 1957 it decreased by 0.7 per cent, in 1958 it rose by 2.3 per cent, only to decline again in 1959 by 1.3 per cent. In the light of these and many similar figures, it is fair to conclude that, over most of the captive area, plant production was stagnating. This in turn reflected upon the meat and dairy output, which could not be increased without rising imports of fodder. Taken as a whole, the area evolved into a food-importing unit—and this despite the fact that it possesses the potential to increase its production by one third or more. Since natural conditions in the area did not change, and since agriculture was one of the main preoccupations of the communist regimes, the blame must be assigned to agrarian policies. This, of course, is not a novel phenomenon in the communist world. The history of the Soviet Union shows that agricultural output remained low during, and for some time after, the period of collectivization. If this precedent holds, then the stagnation of agriculture in the captive area is likely to continue for a number of years to come.

Beginning in 1958, the area's peasants were being pressed once again into collective farms. By the end of 1960, the percentage of agricultural land under collective and state farms approached 100 per

cent in Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and 90 per cent in Rumania and Hungary. There were indications that collectivization would be completed in the two latter countries long before 1965. In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the next stage of Soviet-type agricultural policy—the amalgamation of collective farms into fewer and much larger units—was already being promoted actively. In East Germany, all farmers were forced to join collective farms in the spring of 1960. Whereupon, tens of thousands of formerly independent farmers fled to West Germany. The seriousness of the situation was reflected in the frank estimates of the East German regime that the 1961 crop yield—and perhaps those of subsequent years—would fall below the harvests of previous years. Greatly increased food imports from the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria were planned to help overcome the shortage.

In Poland, the share of land under collective and state farms did not exceed 13 per cent at the end of 1961. The momentum under which the individual peasant's output rose in 1957-1958 was largely spent, and the prospects of further progress under the existing conditions were dim. This jeopardized the regime's plan to increase the farming output by 30 per cent from 1959 to 1965. Since the Warsaw government did not dare to revert to coercive policies, it introduced instead a program of plowing back into agricultural investments the entire revenues it realized from compulsory farm deliveries at fixed prices, amounting during six years to nearly three billion dollars (at the tourist exchange rate). Greatly increased supplies of machinery, fertilizer and other items were to be funneled to the countryside through "agricultural circles"—a traditional structure of peasant co-operation which, the regime hoped, would assume a "socialist character"; individual peasants were excluded from all such aid. The experiment was in its initial stage, and the early results were not encouraging. It was well nigh impossible to forecast the program's progress—particularly the extent to which it would ease Poland's agricultural plight, which endangered the nation's economic advance and could not, in the long run, be tolerated by her three neighboring states.

The stagnation in grain and potato output (in comparison with prewar levels) did not extend into other branches of the region's agricultural output. Sugar beet cultivation continued to be fostered throughout the area, and the production of sugar rose during six

years by 23 per cent to 3.5 million tons in 1958 (raw value). This achievement, however, must be compared with a 75 per cent rise in the output of sugar in the Soviet Union and a similar increase in Yugoslavia during the same period. Satisfactory results were achieved in the output of butter and eggs, as well as in the number of chickens. The increase in the number of cattle was extremely slow, but was compensated to some extent by the greater weight of livestock and the increased yield of dairy cows. The most notable achievement during the period was the increase in the number of pigs, which nearly doubled, reaching the vicinity of 40 million. The market supply of meat, especially pork, continued to be erratic. A serious meat shortage developed in Poland in the fall of 1959 as the result of grave planning and pricing errors. Similar though less acute shortages occurred in East Germany and Hungary in 1960-1961. Whatever improvement in animal breeding and production was achieved resulted mainly from increased fodder imports and especially the increased productivity of privately-owned animals and poultry.

INDUSTRY

Industrial expansion continued to occupy the central place in the captive countries' planning and investment during the period under review. Aside from the short-lived collapse of Hungarian industry in 1956-1957 and several other temporary or local dips, gross industrial output kept increasing at steady rates of between 9 and 11 per cent per year in the five major countries, and much more rapidly in Bulgaria (24.9 per cent in 1959) and Albania.

According to the official figures, industrial production rose between 1954 and 1960, by 128 per cent in Albania, 132 per cent in Bulgaria, 86 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 67 per cent in East Germany, 47 per cent in Hungary, 77 per cent in Poland, and 92 per cent in Rumania, the average increase in the area as a whole being in the vicinity of 72-73 per cent. It rose 109 per cent in Yugoslavia and 75 per cent in the Soviet Union. These indices, calculated by the writer on the basis of six official annual rates of industrial growth, should be taken with a large grain of salt. Academician S. G. Strumilin, the dean of Soviet economists, disclosed in 1960 that a substantial part of the very rapid growth claimed by the Soviet Union in industrial production was the result of an ever-increasing tendency towards mul-

multiple counting in computing the official index. Consequently, the official annual rates of Soviet industrial increase were higher by several percentage points than they were in reality. There is no direct proof that similar multiple counting was practiced in the captive countries and Yugoslavia, but the probability that it was—though perhaps not on the same scale as in the Soviet Union—is considerable.

Even if the above assumption is justified, there is no doubt that the eight countries' rates of industrial growth, as reflected in the greatly increased output of nearly all industrial products, are generally much higher than those prevailing in some of the more advanced Western countries—though it should be noted that they were surpassed, during certain periods of their recent boom, by West Germany, Italy and Japan. Since, during nearly all the years under review and in most captive countries, the industries producing investment goods grew more rapidly than those producing consumer goods, it may be surmised that between 1954 and 1960, the former increased by 85 to 90 per cent and the latter by 60 to 65 per cent. These approximations should be regarded as mere orders of magnitude.

Industrial production data for 1954 and 1958 or 1960 and percentages of its increase are shown in Tables II, III and IV. The first of these tables pertains to the production of basic goods; the second—less up-to-date than it might be because of the difficulty of collecting more recent information for all six countries—to selected machinery and consumer goods (the output of which increased considerably in 1959-1960); and the third to the per capita output of some basic industrial products.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these tables and other available evidence. Despite great investments made since the last war in the extraction of fuels and other minerals, their output in the area can increase only gradually and much more slowly than in the Soviet Union. Taken as a whole, the captive area's raw material base is becoming more and more inadequate in terms of the growing requirements of its processing industries. To implement their long-term plans, the captive countries have to import increasing amounts of many key primary goods (such as iron ore, non-ferrous metals, textile raw materials and, to some extent, also fuels and rolled steel), to use their own resources and imported basic materials economically, and to replace them by substitutes. This is not a new problem, but the postwar industrial expansion has made it acute. It can be solved

TABLE II

OUTPUT OF SELECTED BASIC GOODS IN SIX CAPTIVE COUNTRIES
AND YUGOSLAVIA IN 1954 AND 1960 AND INDICATORS
OF GROWTH

<i>commodity and unit</i>	<i>six</i>	<i>six</i>	<i>per-</i>		<i>Yugo-</i>	<i>Yugo-</i>	<i>per-</i>
	<i>coun-</i>	<i>coun-</i>	<i>per-</i>	<i>of in-</i>	<i>slavia</i>	<i>slavia</i>	
	<i>tries</i>	<i>tries</i>	<i>centage</i>	<i>crease</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>centage</i>
	<i>in</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>of in-</i>	<i>in the</i>	<i>1954</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>of in-</i>
	<i>1954</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>crease</i>	<i>USSR</i>			<i>crease</i>
coal (mill. tons) ¹	203	254 ²	25 ²	44	...	...	62
crude oil (mill. tons)	11.3	13.3	18	150	0.2	0.9	350
electric power (bill. kilowatt hrs.)	65.4	114.0	74	94	3.4	8.9	162
crude steel (mill. tons)	13.0	20.6	58	58	0.6	1.4	141
cement (mill. tons)	11.9	22.9	93	139	1.4	2.4	72
sulf. acid (thous. tons)	1332	2431	83	64	60	130	117

Sources: National data and publications of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Notes: 1. All coals in hard coal equivalent; this datum is not available for Yugoslavia; 2. Provisional figures.

1954 data not available for Albania, which in 1960 produced 603,000 tons of crude oil and 206,000 kilowatt-hours of power; its lignite extraction in 1959 amounted to 288,000 tons. These figures are not included in the table.

only in the way it has been solved in advanced West European countries which are also short in raw materials—namely by importing primary goods and paying for them in highly-processed industrial products. Whether or not the communist planners of the immediate postwar period duly appreciated the significance of the problem for their countries—in the opinion of the writer, they did not or were prevented from doing so—it is certain that they have learned their lesson. Faced with a stagnating agriculture and a slowly growing supply of domestic primary materials, the captive countries have but one alternative: to step up industrial production for export within and without the Soviet bloc. This alternative has been recognized for some time in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and more recently in Hungary; the remaining captive countries and, to a lesser extent, also Yugoslavia must make appropriate changes in their plans and investments or else lose the battle against poverty.

The extension and modernization of industry requires capital.

TABLE III

OUTPUT OF SELECTED MACHINERY AND CONSUMER GOODS IN THE SIX COUNTRIES IN 1954 AND 1958 AND INDICATORS OF GROWTH

<i>commodity</i>	<i>unit</i>	<i>six</i>	<i>six</i>	<i>percentage</i>	<i>percentage</i>
		<i>countries</i>	<i>countries</i>	<i>of increase</i>	<i>in the</i>
		<i>1954</i>	<i>1958</i>	<i>1958:1954</i>	<i>USSR,</i>
					<i>1958:1954</i>
machine tools	thous.	70.8	95.9	35	35
RR coaches	units	1680	2420 ¹	44	21 ²
freight cars	thous.	22.3	25.1	13	60 ²
automobiles	thous.	72.0	158.1	120	27
motorcycles	thous.	141	392	198	94
bicycles	thous.	1277	1553	22	55
radio sets	thous.	1648	2379	44	13
TV sets	thous.	56	410	632	100
sewing machines	thous.	304	612	101	110
refrigerators	thous.	27	163	500	280
leather shoes	mill. prs.	71	108	52	38
cotton fbrs.	mill. sq. ms.	1490	1594	7	39

Sources: Same as for Table II.

Notes: 1. Datum for 1957, output increased in 1958. 2. 1958 in comparison with 1953.

TABLE IV

PER CAPITA OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS IN SIX COUNTRIES AND SOVIET UNION, 1960

	<i>power</i>	<i>steel</i>	<i>cement</i>	<i>acid</i>	<i>cottons</i>	<i>paper</i>	<i>sugar</i>
	<i>(kwh.)</i>	<i>(kg.)</i>	<i>(kg.)</i>	<i>(kg.)</i>	<i>(meters)</i>	<i>(kg.)</i>	<i>(kg.)</i>
Bulgaria	593	32	202	16	28	7	22
Czechoslovakia	1788	498	376	41	33	32	65
East Germany	2330	116	289	42	14	31	..
Hungary	761	125	157	16	24	14	30
Poland	986	227	222	23	22	17	46
Rumania	416	55	170	12	12	8	21
Soviet Union	1375	220	214	25	23	11	30

Source: *Biuletyn Statystyczny* (Warsaw), 1961, no. 2.

Under present conditions, the captive countries cannot expect financial assistance from the Soviet Union, except perhaps for some projects in which Moscow has a particularly strong interest; the short period when modest but vastly over-publicized credits were extended by the Soviet Union to several captive countries is over. Capital must be found at home, and there are indications that the share of national income earmarked for investments will be increased in the coming years.

Equally important to industrial expansion are such factors as rational planning, technical progress, and better training of manpower. These factors have been impeded under communism by the lack of incentives, a cumbersome and parasitic bureaucracy, and the inexperience of the political leadership. Blunders continued to be committed in industrial planning and organization in all countries of the area. Material and manpower continued to be allocated wastefully; costs of production were inordinately high; shortages and bottlenecks recurred in many branches of industry; investment programs were not implemented on schedule; and many of the goods produced, even those for export, were of inferior quality. Some of these weaknesses, however, were being overcome, and the performance of the area's industry was favorable on the whole. With the termination, in 1955-1956, of the autarkical trend of the Stalin era and the adoption of a more enlightened economic outlook under Khrushchev, branches of industry which, until then, had been regarded as nonessential—such as the chemical, shipbuilding and household appliance industries—were given a green light, and specialization in many selected machinery products was promoted energetically under the auspices of the COMECON. The senior industrial countries were gradually restricting their production of relatively simple industrial products, and the manufacture of such items was being taken over by the industrial newcomers in the area. To cite one example, Bulgaria, which in 1954 had imported freight cars, small electric motors and most heavy chemicals, was exporting them to the more advanced countries of the region in 1959. The high share of investment goods in the 1960 exports of Czechoslovakia (45 per cent), Hungary (38 per cent), and Poland (25 per cent), as well as the lower but ascending one in the exports of Rumania (17 per cent), and Bulgaria (12 per cent), should be regarded as a proof of a rapid progress in the area's industrialization. The corresponding figure for East Germany, not available for

1960, was of course much higher. Industrial consumer goods constituted in 1960 over 20 per cent of Czech exports, over 19 per cent of the Hungarian ones, and over 11 per cent of those of Poland.

The gap between the old and new industrial countries in the captive area, however, remained as wide as before. East Germany and especially Czechoslovakia, the only country with no capital shortage, had improved their industrial production to the extent that they compare favorably in many fields of production with the advanced Western countries and the Soviet Union. In 1959, East Germany was Europe's fifth largest industrial producer, and Czechoslovakia one of the world's leading exporters of machine tools, motorcycles and other types of industrial goods. As before, Hungary and Poland formed the intermediary stratum of industrial countries. They were followed at some distance by Rumania and Bulgaria in terms of both the volume and scope of industrial output.

In 1959, plans were completed by most countries for industrial expansion in 1959-1965. Gross industrial products of the four northern countries, which jointly accounted for more than seven eighths of the area's industrial output, was expected to increase during that period on an average of about 70-75 per cent, and the priority of heavy industries producing investment goods was to be maintained. This meant that the output of the latter industries was to be doubled, at least in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The expected general increase of output could be carried out with an annual rise of less than 9 per cent—a rate which has been exceeded repeatedly by most countries in recent years; in short, the plan, though ambitious, was feasible. The chemical industry and some branches of machinery- and equipment-making were to develop more rapidly and as much as triple their output. This, again, could be achieved through relocation of resources. In addition, East Germany officially planned to outstrip West Germany in the per capita output (not the consumption) of industrial consumer goods, and Czechoslovakia announced her intention to surpass Western Europe and the United States in the per capita production of several groups of machinery and equipment. The achievement of such ambitious goals would require absolute political stability within the captive area and, among other conditions, a considerable increase in its imports of raw and basic materials.

A new plan covering the 1960-1965 period came into force in Yugoslavia in 1961, after the implementation of the preceding plan one

year ahead of schedule. It provides for an increase in industrial output of 84 per cent during the six years, or an annual increase of 13 per cent. A considerably greater rate of increase is specified in the plan for the production of industrial equipment and building materials, as well as, in particular, of chemicals. However, the output of consumer goods is supposed to grow somewhat more rapidly than that of investment goods. A special investment fund has been created for the industrialization of the two backward regions, Macedonia and Montenegro.

FOREIGN TRADE

In 1960, the seven captive countries' joint commercial turnover (imports and exports), amounting to about \$15,500 million, accounted for slightly over one half of the Sino-Soviet bloc's total foreign trade. In 1958, the last year for which data for the entire bloc are available, the corresponding figures for the trade of the seven countries, the Soviet Union, and the four Asian communist states were 48, 35, and 17 per cent respectively. In 1959, the seven countries' share declined somewhat in consequence of the more rapid rise of Soviet trade (21 per cent increase, to the seven countries 16 per cent). In 1960, however, principally because of a very considerable reduction of Sino-Soviet trade, the Soviet turnover went up only 6 per cent, while that of the dependent area rose by 12.8 per cent.

The trade figures of the seven countries, as well as those of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, during the last six years, are shown in Table V.

It can be seen that the rate of trade increase during the six years was very rapid in the area's least-developed countries—Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, whose participation in international trade, until very recently, has been insignificant. Economically, the most striking feature during the period was the expansion of Czechoslovak trade, which virtually doubled. Trade increase was somewhat slower in the three industrial states—East Germany, the Soviet Union and Hungary—and lowest in Poland, due in part to her relative self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and fuels, and in part to the reduction of the international price of coal, her most important export item.

The general geographic distribution of the seven countries' foreign trade in 1958 and 1959 is shown in Table VI.

TABLE V
DYNAMICS OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND SOVIET
FOREIGN TRADE IN 1954-1960
(in millions of current dollars)

<i>country</i>	<i>turnover</i> <i>1954</i>	<i>turnover</i> <i>1960</i>	<i>percentage</i> <i>increase</i>	<i>exports</i> <i>1954</i>	<i>exports</i> <i>1960</i>	<i>percentage</i> <i>increase</i>
Albania	45	(157)	(250)	17	48	182
Bulgaria	428	1212	183	233	580	149
Czechoslovakia	1938	3745	93	1005	1994	98
East Germany	2376	4360	84	1280	2170	70
Hungary	1038	1826	76	525	860	64
Poland	1773	2820	59	831	1326	60
Rumania	670	1395	108	350	717	105
Area Total	8268	(15515)	88	4241	7695	81
Yugoslavia	579	1394	141	240	567	136
East Central Europe Total	8948	(16909)	88	4481	8262	85
Soviet Union	6250	11079	77	3125	5506	76

Sources: Soviet and national data. Rumanian data for 1954 are UN Economic Commission for Europe's estimates. Albania's turnover in 1960 is an estimate. East German, Rumanian, and Soviet export data for 1960 were not known at the time of writing. The remaining countries' 1960 export values, and, in parentheses, the percentage increases since 1954, are as follows: Albania \$48 million (182), Bulgaria \$580 million (149), Czechoslovakia \$1994 million (98), Hungary \$860 million (64), Poland \$1326 million (60), and Yugoslavia \$567 million (136). Figures do not add exactly because of unavoidable rounding.

A significant trend between 1954 and 1960 was the gradual increase in the seven countries' trade with the Soviet Union and with the primary producing areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The latter development, although promoted by the Soviet Union for obvious political objectives, actually redounded to the economic benefit of the captive countries—at least for the more industrially developed among them who are eager to obtain raw materials abroad in return for manufactured goods. The volume of the intra-regional trade remained, on the whole, static between 1954 and 1958, while trade with Western Europe was increasing slowly. The years 1959 and 1960 witnessed a marked increase in intra-regional trade, due mainly to a considerable expansion of reciprocal deliveries of machinery and

equipment, as well as the rise in trade with the Soviet Union. Trade with all other areas remained the same; that with Western Europe, though slowly rising and representing about one fifth of the total, could be expected to decline in succeeding years as a result of the creation of the European Common Market.

Yugoslavia's foreign trade in 1958 and 1960 is shown in Table VII. Its main trends during the period under review consisted of a considerable increase in trade with the primary producing countries of Asia and Africa and a gradual decline in trade with the United States, due to the reduction of credit or assistance imports from that country. On January 1, 1961, a uniform exchange rate of 750 dinars per one US dollar was introduced. It is expected that, as a consequence of this change and a connected reform of Yugoslav state banking, the Yugoslav export products will be based on prices which will be competitive and the perennial negative balance of foreign trade will gradu-

TABLE VI
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TRADE IN 1958-1960
(in millions of dollars)

	1958		1960	
	<i>volume</i>	<i>percentage</i>	<i>volume</i>	<i>percentage</i>
total East Central European trade	11,720		15,442	
intra-regional trade	3,020	26.7	4,213	27.2
with the Soviet Union	4,340	37.0	5,740	37.0
with the Chinese orbit	770	6.6	758	4.9
intrabloc trade	8,120	69.3	10,711	69.1
with Yugoslavia	230	2.0	262	1.7
with all Socialist countries	8,350	71.3	10,973	70.8
with the rest of the world	3,370	28.7	4,542	29.2
with Western Europe,				
North America and Japan	2,445	20.8	...	...
with primary producing countries	825	7.9	...	...

Sources: Computed from *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Geneva, September 1959 and September 1960, as well as from national data. Primary producing countries include Greece and Turkey; the Chinese orbit embraces mainland China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam. Trade with Western Europe includes trade between East and West Germany.

ally disappear. The share of investment goods in Yugoslav exports was rising at a satisfactory rate for a country which is a newcomer in this field.

TABLE VII
YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN TRADE IN 1958 and 1960
(in millions of current dollars)

	1958			1960		
	<i>turnover</i>	<i>percentage</i>	<i>balance</i>	<i>turnover</i>	<i>percentage</i>	<i>balance</i>
all trade	1126		-224	1394		-260
with Soviet Union	94	8	-22	110	8	-4
with EC Europe	231	20	-39	264	20	-26
with Western Europe	520	47	-49	653	47	-140
with US	167	14	-101	123	9	-50
with primary areas	110	10	12	226	16	-33

Sources: *Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook for 1959 and Indeks*, 1961, no. 2.

Table VIII shows, in contrast with preceding years, a considerable increase in Soviet exports to the captive area (\$630 million more than in 1958)—an increase compensated only partly by the rise in Soviet imports (\$313 million more than in 1958). The main features of the captive area's trade with the Soviet Union are traced in Tables VIII and IX. The figures are taken from official Soviet statistics.

According to the same source for 1960, Soviet imports of machinery reached \$1196 million, those of industrial consumer goods \$495 million, and the adverse balance of trade in industrial finished goods \$1208 million.

Table IX illustrates the central fact of the captive countries' trade picture—namely, their dependence upon the Soviet Union for raw materials and other basic commodities. Soviet shipments in these items accounted for more than four fifths of the area's total imports from the Soviet Union and approximately 60 per cent of all its imports of such goods. However, this dependence is far from one-sided. The planned development of the Soviet economy hinges on the delivery of industrial goods from the captive area. Such imports make up nearly three quarters of all Soviet imports of investment goods and about 60 per cent of industrial consumer goods imports.

It has not been recognized generally that the captive area has come to assume the role in Soviet trade which Western Europe had played

TABLE VIII
SOVIET TRADE WITH THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES IN 1959
(in millions of dollars)

country	Soviet exports	Soviet imports	Soviet balance	turnover Soviet data	per- centage of Soviet trade	turnover national data	per- centage of country's trade
Albania	49	15	34	64	0.6	64	53
Bulgaria	290	261	29	551	5.3	552	53
Czechoslovakia	603	582	21	1185	11.3	1185	36
East Germany	1030	889	141	1920	18.3	1911	47
Hungary	260	207	53	466	4.5	459	29
Poland	486	317	170	803	7.7	765	30
Rumania	232	250	-18	482	4.7	485	47
Total	2950	2519	431	5470	52.4	5421	40

Sources: *Vneshnaya Torgovlya SSSR v 1959 Godu* (Moscow 1960). The last two columns are computed from the seven countries' national statistics. In 1960, the trade in question increased to \$5,880 million and 53 per cent of all Soviet trade.

in the commerce of pre-1914 Russia, namely, as the principal purchaser of Soviet basic commodities and the main supplier of industrial goods. It may, indeed, seem paradoxical that the world's second largest industrial power, which (on a per capita basis) produces more industrial goods than the captive area (excepting East Germany and Czechoslovakia), has made its satellites a processing center for its raw materials. Yet, this is less surprising than it appears. The Soviet Union has developed an increasingly large surplus of raw materials. More important, the planned expansion of the captive area's industry and its imports from the Soviet Union permits the latter to concentrate its investments and manpower upon the development of such branches of its national economy which it regards as most essential for the winning of its economic and power race against the West—such as energy production, heavy and precision-goods industry, air transportation, ultra-modern armaments and space exploration. Soviet uranium ore imports from the captive area, estimated in 1958 at about \$280 million, greatly contribute to the Soviet stock of fissionable materials for nuclear production.

The Soviet Union acquires the captive area's industrial goods on a barter basis, without having to spend free currency or gold. Further-

more, because of its incomparably greater bargaining power, it obtains these goods at favorable prices. Ostensibly, the period when the trade between the two areas was conducted at Soviet-imposed "special" prices was closed in 1957. Yet, Soviet trade data indicate that the Soviet Union has continued to underpay for its imports from and to

TABLE IX
SOVIET TRADE WITH THE CAPTIVE AREA IN 1959:
COMMODITY COMPOSITION
(in millions of dollars)

	<i>Soviet imports</i>	<i>percentage of imports</i>	<i>Soviet exports</i>	<i>percentage of exports</i>	<i>Soviet balance</i>
total trade	2519	100	2951	100	432
machinery and equipment	1040	41.3	368	12.5	-672
fuels	192	7.6	353	11.9	161
metals and minerals	184	7.2	715	24.2	531
other raw and basic materials	194	7.7	446	15.1	252
foodstuffs	179	7.1	607	20.7	428
industrial consumer goods	415	16.5	76	2.8	-339
finished industrial goods	1455	57.8	444	15.0	-1011
primary and basic goods	749	29.7	2121	71.9	1372
goods unaccounted for	315	12.5	385	13.0	70

Source: Computed from *Vneshnaya Torgovlya SSSR v 1959 Godu* (Moscow 1960).

Notes: The repartition of Soviet imports from the captive area not accounted for in Soviet statistics by individual countries in millions of dollars: Albania 1.5, Bulgaria 4.6, Czechoslovakia 62.3, East Germany 155.5 (mainly uranium ore), Hungary 18.3, Poland 42.1, and Rumania 27.5. The same figures for Soviet exports to the individual countries: Albania 1.9, Bulgaria 58.1, Czechoslovakia 79.9, East Germany 99.5, Hungary 22.1, Poland 99.6 and Rumania 22.0 million dollars.

It is essential to bear in mind that, according to the Soviet commodity classification, many industrial finished goods, such as steel tubes, railroad switches and other metal goods, cable, automobile tires and many chemicals, are classified as "basic materials." The import of these commodities by the Soviet Union from the captive countries by far exceeds their export. This being the case, and taking into consideration that probably about one half of undisclosed Soviet imports consists of finished industrial commodities, the percentage of the latter in all Soviet imports from the captive area might well have exceeded two thirds of the total, and the adverse Soviet balance of trade in these goods might have reached or exceeded \$1200 million.

overcharge for its exports to the captive area, in comparison with the prices prevailing in its trade with Western Europe and other parts of the free world. Indeed, Soviet trade statistics show that the overpayment by the captive area for Soviet export goods has more than tripled between 1957 and 1959.

An economist of the RAND Corporation, Dr. Horst Mendershausen, has compared the prices of a number of commodities sold by the Soviet Union to the captive area and purchased from the latter with the commensurate prices prevailing in Soviet trade with Western Europe. He has calculated that the *prima facie* losses by the captive countries during 1955-1958 amounted to the equivalent of \$645 million.²

This writer has assessed the pricing of Soviet exports to the captive area. Having compared official prices of forty-eight basic commodities sold to that area and to all countries of the free world in 1957 and 1958, and of fifty such commodities in 1959, he has concluded that the net overpayment by the captive area amounted to the equivalent of \$104 million in 1957, \$162 million in 1958, and \$350 million in 1959.³ In 1960 it amounted to \$377 million.

Table X contains a comparison of the prices at which the Soviet Union sold, within and without the captive area, thirty-five basic commodities, the export value of which exceeded \$5 million each in 1958 and/or 1959.

² Horst Mendershausen, "Terms of Trade between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-57," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (May 1959), pp. 106-118; and "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," *ibid.* (May 1960), p. 162 ff.

³ In round figures, the latter total was composed, among others (in parentheses, corresponding figures for 1958), of \$130 million overpayments for metallic ores and metals (\$47 million), \$116 million for fuels and their derivatives (\$68 million), \$74 million for cotton, timber, rubber and other raw materials of vegetable origin (\$24 million), and \$30 million for foodstuffs (\$16 million). East Germany suffered a *prima facie* loss of \$137 million (\$69 million in 1958), Czechoslovakia of \$68 million (\$24.5 million), Poland of \$52 million (\$10 million), Rumania of \$40 million (\$23 million), Hungary of \$36 million (\$24.5 million), Bulgaria of \$13 million (\$9 million), and Albania of \$1.5 million, as in 1958. The average discrimination on all forty-eight commodities amounted to 11.2 per cent over the price the Soviet Union would have obtained in 1958 had it sold the same goods outside the captive area. In 1959, the average discrimination was close to 20 per cent, and in 1960 it amounted to 20.7 per cent.

TABLE X
PRICES CHARGED BY THE SOVIET UNION
FOR 35 BASIC COMMODITIES SOLD TO THE
CAPTIVE AREA IN 1958 AND 1959
(average prices charged to world's free countries equal to 100)

<i>commodity</i>	<i>price</i> 1958	<i>price</i> 1959	<i>commodity</i>	<i>price</i> 1958	<i>price</i> 1959
wheat**	104.5	119.5	lubricating oils	241	228
rye	110	105	iron ore**	78	93
barley	121	114	manganese ore*	97	118.5
oats	113.5	113	pig iron*	108	154
maize	114	98	rolled steel**	136.5	167.5
butter*	...	70.5	copper	...	97
softwood timber**	120.5	132	zinc	134	100.5
roundwood	134	136	lead	135.5	160
cellulose	145	143	tin	106.5	98
cotton**	103	153	aluminum	121	117
flax	124	153	apatite concentrates	100	134
rubber*	...	112	asbestos	107	146
coal*	119.5	142	tractors*	212	152
anthracite	116	120	trucks	70	53
coke*	146	155	passenger cars*	95	118
crude oil**	142	167	bicycles	110.5	130
gasoline*	99	97	televisors	120	147
diesel oil*	127.5	124			

Sources: *Vneshnaya Torgovlya SSSR v 1958 Godu* (Moscow 1959), and the same yearbook for 1959 (Moscow 1960).

Notes: The table includes all Soviet commodities the sales of which to the captive area exceeded \$5 million in one or both years under consideration. Commodities the sales of which exceeded \$25 million are marked with one, and those which exceeded \$100 million with two asterisks. It should be noted that the exports of Soviet iron ore outside the captive area were insignificant (245,000 tons as against 13,201,000 tons delivered to the captive nations), as were those of butter (600 tons as against 79,400 tons), in the light of which the prima facie gain on these commodities, totalling \$37 million, does not appear to be convincing. Statistical evidence for the comparable prices of Soviet meat and wool is not sufficient. Data for the prices of Soviet-exported machinery and industrial equipment are not available or not comparable.

Data for fifteen lesser Soviet commodities, the sales of which to the captive area did not reach \$5 million in either of the years under consideration, have been omitted from the table so as to make it simpler. The comparable prices of these commodities fluctuated in 1959 from 91 per cent of the price charged to the free world for benzol to 143 per cent for fuel oil, 150 per cent for plywood, 152 per cent for chrome ore, and 257 per cent for hemp.

Some American authorities question the validity of the conclusions which are most readily drawn from the figures shown in Table X. There is no proof, they contend, that the high prices the captive area pays for Soviet raw and basic materials are not counterbalanced by low prices it may pay for Soviet machinery or by high prices which it may obtain for its exports to the Soviet Union, in particular for its industrial equipment. This argument may seem valid in theory, yet it is less substantial than the interpretation which it is supposed to refute. While nothing is known about the prices of industrial equipment sold or purchased by the Soviet Union, there are indications that, in some cases, Moscow dumped upon the captive countries equipment which was obsolete or second-hand and of no use in Soviet industry; conversely, Soviet inspectors fastidiously appraise items in the satellites ticketed for export to the Soviet Union, and reject those deemed "inferior."

Between 1954 and 1960, the value of all industrial goods exported by the captive area to the Soviet Union exceeded \$7,250 million, an impressive figure even by world standards. Such exports consisted mainly of transportation items (ships, locomotives, rolling stock, buses), equipment for various types of light and chemical industry, as well as machine tools, precision instruments and equipment for energy generation and heavy industry. Among the consumer goods, textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture were the most important items.

Machinery and equipment exported to the Soviet Union represented in 1958 about 39 per cent of all the captive area's exports of such goods, which amounted to \$2,165 million (full data for 1959 were not available at the time of writing), and exports to mainland China and countries in her orbit another 15 per cent of this total. The latter, estimated at \$345 million (three quarters of all exports to that area), almost equaled the highly-publicized Soviet machinery exports to her Eastern allies, which totaled \$366 million in 1958. However, the Soviet Union greatly increased its machinery export to mainland China, while such deliveries from the captive countries rose only slightly. In 1960, however, both these areas' industrial exports to China were greatly reduced in consequence of the collapse of her exports and incapacity of paying for her imports. The dependent area's machinery exports to other primary producing countries reached about 12-13 per cent of the 1958 total, while those to Western Europe

barely attained \$66 million, or about 3 per cent of the total, not including the intra-German trade.

Trade between the Soviet Union and the European captive countries, members of the COMECON, is planned to rise by 70 per cent between 1958 and 1965, and thus to reach, in the latter year, the vicinity of \$7,700 million. In several agreements with the captive countries, signed in 1960, the Soviet Union committed itself greatly to increase its deliveries of basic materials. Between 1961 and 1965, it will deliver to the captive countries 102 million tons of iron ore, as well as, very approximately, 40 million tons of crude oil, 36 million tons of coal and 17 million tons of coke, 26 million tons of rolled steel, 1.6 million tons of cotton, and an unknown but very large volume of grain. In addition, it is supposed to supply a number of complete industrial plants and a considerable volume of machinery, especially to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland.

Because they are physically unable to increase their present exports of basic materials, the captive countries will have to repay the Soviet Union with more industrial goods. The *Economic Bulletin for Europe* in its June 1959 issue, suggested that deliveries to the Soviet Union of investment goods in 1965 will be twice or three times their volume in 1958—that is, they will reach the value of between two and three billion dollars. This writer's estimate, based upon plans drawn up by individual captive countries, is that such exports will reach a minimum of \$2,150 million in 1965, in addition to industrial consumer goods in the amount of approximately \$1,000 million. According to another set of estimates, based upon the figures quoted in the long-term agreements, the dependent area will deliver to the Soviet Union, between 1961 and 1965, about \$8,500 million worth of machinery and transportation goods, including \$4,000 million worth from East Germany and more than \$2,500 million from Czechoslovakia.

This huge volume will comprise scores of complete plants, especially sugar refineries and cement plants, about 18,000 metal-cutting machine tools, many of them automatic, close to 1,000 electric and diesel locomotives, several thousand railroad coaches, sleepers and diners, and tens of thousands of freight cars. Among the other machinery, the Soviet Union is supposed to import a great volume of chemical industry equipment (close to a half billion dollars' worth from Czechoslovakia alone, and even more from East Germany), and of light industry equipment. One of the largest import items will be

over 700 ships, more than half of them ocean-going—a fleet of several million tons capacity; the Gdansk (Danzig) shipyard in Poland alone will deliver close to one million tons of ships. The present volume of Polish coal and coke and of Rumanian oil products will continue to be exported throughout the five years. Finally, the captive countries will deliver to the Soviet Union all uranium ore they will extract, and a great deal of industrial consumer goods, including probably about 100 million pairs of leather shoes.

The division of industrial labor among the captive countries referred to earlier is expected to result in a substantial reduction of industrial costs and prices of industrial products. It is not difficult to infer that the principal beneficiaries of this reform will be the Soviet Union and China. Without reducing the prices of the basic goods they export to the captive areas, they will be able to purchase investment and other industrial goods from the area at lower prices than hitherto.

LIVING STANDARDS

The area's living standards, which, as a result of the frantic industrialization after the war and, indirectly, of the Korean conflict, had sunk perceptibly between 1948 and 1952, began to rise during the so-called "New Course" period following Stalin's death, the East German rising of 1953, and the settlement of the Korean War. Concessions were made to the consumers throughout the captive area, the rate of investments was scaled down, and a larger share of them was earmarked for the expansion of agriculture and light industry. This consumer benefit program lasted for about a year; then the vise was tightened once again, and consumer goods including foodstuffs were in short supply until the summer of 1956. The Poznan uprising served as a warning to Moscow that the decline in living standards had reached the danger point. Thus, consumption was given a second and more energetic boost in late 1956. The campaign began to flag in 1959, when only very limited improvements of living standards were projected for the duration of the present series of long-term economic plans, stretching into 1965. However, the peoples in most of the captive countries have been promised that a new prosperity will be theirs in the next decade—a prosperity spearheaded by the Soviet Union,

which by then will have overtaken the United States in the output of most foodstuffs and some industrial consumer goods.

The picture sketched above could be illustrated by statistical data now more abundant behind the Iron Curtain. However, the picture is distorted by the differences in statistical yardsticks used by the individual countries; moreover, the data are spotty and often outdated. For these reasons, a detailed analysis will not be attempted here. Those interested in the matter will find a great deal of relevant material in the publications of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in which the figures supplied by the captive countries' governments are collated and occasionally interpreted. This material, however, should be assessed with caution, for official evaluations of real wages and consumption are invariably tinted with propaganda. Besides, a statistical picture of a country tends to be incomplete and at variance with true conditions. Travelers in the captive countries have returned with impressions which often clash with the rosy images conveyed by official statistics. This disparity between government figures and first-hand observations in the past two years has been especially marked with respect to Poland and Rumania.

With these caveats in mind, it should be acknowledged that, in the period under review, the supply of foodstuffs in the satellites improved to the extent that the captive peoples are now provided with the basic necessities of life. The per capita caloric value of the foods consumed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany approximates that of Western Europe, and the remaining countries of the area do not lag far behind. In particular, the consumption of sugar, meat and dairy products has increased perceptibly throughout the area (and in Yugoslavia)—a rise due in part to the reduction of exports and the increased imports of fodder. Contrariwise, the vitamin content of the foods consumed has hardly improved; in fact, it may have deteriorated because of the shortage of vegetables and fruit as well as of changing food habits (such as a rapid increase in the consumption of inferior factory-made white bread in lieu of the highly-nourishing coarse rye bread, resulting in a growing incidence of rickets and tooth decay in the countryside). Moreover, because of the inefficient state distribution apparatus, shortages of foodstuffs, especially meat and fruit, continued to recur periodically in many parts of the area, just as

they still did in the Soviet Union after thirty years of planned economy. The supply of foodstuffs varies greatly between individual countries and their various provinces, with the capital cities, important industrial and tourist centers, and rich farming regions faring much better than the less privileged urban areas and rural districts.

The volume of sales to the population of industrial goods also increased, although prices remained extremely high and the supply of such items was considerably less than that in Western Europe and even in the Soviet Union. The increase was due partly to the trade offensive in the uncommitted countries. Thanks to the cotton purchases from Egypt, for example, more cotton was now available for the captive area's textile mills, and the light industries in general profited from the increased imports of raw materials from the Near East, Asia and Latin America. Because of the reduced emphasis by the Soviets on the manufacture of conventional arms, some ordnance plants were allowed to use part of their capacities for the manufacture of house appliances and similar consumer goods. The statistical evidence required for a comparison of the area's apparent consumption of various industrial goods with such consumption in other regions was too scant to allow for more than a few approximations. One such approximation, however, indicates that the consumption of a number of industrial articles in the captive area lagged behind Soviet consumption. Thus, about 4.8 television sets, eighteen bicycles and thirteen domestic sewing machines per 1,000 inhabitants were produced and presumably sold in the Soviet Union in 1958, as compared with 4.2 television sets, less than sixteen bicycles and six sewing machines for an equal number of people in the captive area. The apparent consumption of leather shoes was 0.9 pairs per capita in the latter, contrasted with 1.8 pairs in the Soviet Union, which imported millions of pairs of Czech and Hungarian footwear. No significant increases in the consumer goods supply were planned by the area's governments by 1965, and such standard items of Western equipment as telephones and small family cars apparently were to be manufactured during that period only for the benefit of the area's small "new class."

The area's severe housing problem was not alleviated appreciably during the period under review, and there were no indications that substantial relief would be in sight by 1965. Some improvement of the housing situation was visible in East Germany, but this was due

not so much to new construction programs as to the continued flow of refugees to the West; many cities were actually losing population. Elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain however, the problem was serious: Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Lodz, and Cracow were among the most congested cities of Europe. Because of the widely different criteria used in the individual countries for housing statistics, only a rough calculation could be made of the area's rate of new construction. This writer's estimate is that the average figure for the area was somewhat over four dwellings per 1,000 persons in 1957 and 1958, as compared with 10.2 such dwellings for the same number of people in the Soviet Union. At the current rate of new construction, the Soviet Union could expect to solve its housing problem within less than a generation. No such prospect was in sight for the captive area.

OUTLOOK FOR THE SIXTIES

A prognosis of economic developments in East Central Europe for the next five or ten years is, at best, hazardous, as is any prophecy. Yet, to the extent that economic trends in socialist societies reflect central planning based on known human and material resources, tentative forecasts concerning them can be advanced with less risk than about countries whose economic progress is subject to the diverse tugs of a free enterprise system. Plans for 1961-1965 have already been adopted by all captive countries; other inputs into the prognosis can be derived from the past record of socialist planning.

An important point to consider is the future relationship between the human resources of the eight countries reviewed and the rate of their economic expansion. For several years after 1960, the flow of young adults into the labor market will sink to the lowest postwar level, for during the Second World War relatively few children were born in all countries under review. This situation will change with the appearance on the labor market, beginning in 1962-63, of greatly increased numbers of young men and women born after 1945.

In such economically underpopulated countries as East Germany and Czechoslovakia (and to a lesser extent also in Hungary), this increase in manpower will stimulate economic development—just as it may be expected to do in the Soviet Union, North America, and most countries of Western Europe. In the remaining captive countries and Yugoslavia, however, all of which suffer from underinvestment

and economic overpopulation, the effect in all probability will be the reverse. Numerous young men and women seeking employment will find themselves competing with former peasants shunted from collectivized farms.

Great disparities in the standard of living have always existed within East Central Europe. The Czechs have enjoyed a high standard of living, and East German standards, similarly high except for the bleak period from 1945 to 1954, have improved perceptibly since the abolition of reparations and other forms of direct Soviet exploitation. Czechoslovakia has been able to raise the living standards of the Slovaks almost to the level of her Czech population and no longer requires outside aid for further economic development. East Germany also is able to move forward independently unless the Soviet Union imposes upon her economic tasks far beyond her present capacity. A continuing expansion of the industrial economy of these two countries and improvement in their living standards may be expected—trends which are in part due to their capacity for earning sizable export surpluses.

The same does not apply to the remaining six countries, although the situations under which they labor vary widely. Hungary has hovered on the borderline between the "have" and "have-not" countries for the last two generations. Provided that her government does not commit any more of the major economic blunders which characterized the Rákosi era and her economic planners can either secure a net trade balance or procure credits within the bloc, Hungary may well cross, within the next decade or so, the line dividing the poor countries from the prosperous ones. A relative rise in living standards may also occur in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania because they hold natural resources which can be exploited more intensively than before. There is no ready answer to the question whether the present economic dynamism of these three countries can keep pace with the massive population increase anticipated during the next decade.

The economic outlook is bleakest for Rumania and Poland. These two countries are plagued by underinvestment, economic overpopulation and endemic unemployment. Despite the incontrovertible rise of their industrial production, both Poland and Rumania will continue to face the hard choice between the necessity of further massive investments in the national economy (without which they have no prospect of joining the company of the "have" countries) and the

maintenance, let alone the raising, of their present low living standards. Even if they solve this problem temporarily, they may lose the race between economic improvement and increased population. Their dilemma is basically the same—though on a far higher plane of economic development—as that which faces many other underdeveloped nations in other parts of the world, including the four Asian members of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The Poles, who are still allowed a certain freedom in expressing their misgivings, are aware that their economic development has been less rapid than that of their three more prosperous neighbors. They realize, moreover, that their problem will become more acute in the sixties. In their search for solutions, they have been trying to discover the real meaning of Khrushchev's dictum concerning the simultaneous approach to communism by all socialist countries. A mere elimination of the last remnants of capitalism in the national economies of the captive countries—if this is what the Russian leader meant—would not solve the problem. Could he have meant (as is sometimes alluded to in Soviet theoretical publications) an approximate alignment of the "economic front" of all socialist countries—or, at least, the equalization of the annual rate at which their national product and per capita consumption should increase? If the socialist bloc is the "fraternal" community of nations which Khrushchev claims it to be, the more advanced and prosperous nations should logically help their retarded neighbors. The three prosperous members of the bloc—namely, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany—planned to spend about 270 billion rubles on capital investments in their economies in 1960. A mere 2 per cent of this huge total, if transferred in one way or another to the lagging members of the bloc, would go a long way toward solving their outstanding problems. On more than one occasion, Wladyslaw Gomulka insisted in his 1960 speeches that the less prosperous members of the COMECON will lag behind the richer ones in their "march towards socialism" unless the latter help them to finance the necessary investments in their economy.

There were very few signs that moves of this sort were in the offing at the time when the various economic plans for 1961-1965 were being finally adopted in the dependent area. To be sure, Czechoslovakia and East Germany extended long-term credits to Poland for the opening of newly-discovered mineral deposits; the credits

were to be repaid in kind, generally after 1965. Equally, the area's four northern countries granted moderate investment credits to the three southern ones. At the beginning of a new decade, however, it was plain that the Soviet leadership deemed it more important to grant credits to the lesser Asian socialist states bordering upon China, and to finance its campaign of economic warfare against the West in the Near East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, than to help its European wards. In 1960 alone, Soviet assistance to Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam—new credits granted and old ones written off—amounted to \$596 million, and credits to the countries outside the Soviet bloc to \$960 million, as against the sole credit to Bulgaria of \$162 million. In May 1961 the Soviet Union granted a \$515 million commodity credit to East Germany, but this was essentially a politically motivated deal, the aim of which was to strengthen the tense East German economy on the eve of a forthcoming Berlin crisis. During this same period, as shown earlier, the Soviet Union exacted an increasing tribute from the area by overcharging countries, especially the poorer ones, for her exports. Should this policy be continued throughout the sixties, the disparity in production capacities and living standards between the more and the less prosperous bloc members is likely to widen even more.

In view of the expected population increase of about 12-13 per cent during the sixties and the planned improvement in nutritional standards, the area should increase its food supply by a factor of at least one fourth. Barring such an increase, the captive countries will have to resort to even more sizable imports of grain and meat, thus aggravating unfavorable balances of payments. To be sure, the captive countries plan to meet this problem by expanding their domestic food production. In the past, before the collectivization of agriculture, such ambitious plans rarely were achieved. Will the impending completion (in all dependent countries except Poland) of the collectivization program result in an increased food supply? This is highly doubtful, at least in the near future, during which various steps will undoubtedly be taken to bring the area's agricultural system into line with the Soviet model. Many years will be necessary for the stabilization of the area's agricultural production on a new, yet changing, legal and economic basis. From the consumer's viewpoint, the coming years may well be lean ones. Shortages in meat and butter may be alleviated somewhat through increased imports from

the Soviet Union, which is attempting, on the whole successfully, to increase its output of these items. It is far more doubtful, however, that the Soviet Union can substantially increase shipments of grain to the captive area.

The industrial prospects for East Central Europe are much brighter. The present industrialization program is certain to be continued without substantial modifications until 1965 and beyond that date. We can expect to witness a continuous increase of industrial production in all countries of the area and a very gradual rise of their share of world production. Whether this progress will be as rapid as in the last decade will depend largely, as stated earlier, upon the volume of new investment.

Yet, other factors will determine the rate of industrial progress. One of these is the availability of an increased supply of raw materials. The area's gradually growing domestic output, together with imports from primary producing areas both within and without the Soviet bloc, will meet many of its industrial requirements, yet the Soviet Union will remain the only source for the bulk of certain basic materials. The latter has been able to increase its deliveries of these materials to the dependent countries by about 10 per cent per year throughout the past decade. No one can predict, however, whether the USSR can maintain this delivery schedule indefinitely.

An influential school of American experts on the Soviet economy forecast in the early fifties that the Soviet Union would encounter difficulties in meeting its own raw material requirements and would, therefore, be forced not only to curtail exports but to begin importing raw materials from abroad. This thesis has been disproved thus far by the continued and even accelerating rise in Soviet primary production. It is possible, nevertheless, that the Soviets, in the more distant future, will be hard-put to supply adequately the captive countries with certain raw materials—not so much because of shortages within the Soviet Union, but because of the increasing difficulty of transporting, mainly by rail, the huge volume of such commodities required by the expanding industries of the dependent area.

It is in order to overcome this difficulty that the trunk railroads leading from the Soviet boundaries into Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been or are being rapidly electrified, so as to acquire a greater carrying capacity, and that a system of pipelines, now under construction, will carry crude oil from the Soviet fields beyond the

Volga across Poland to East Germany, as well as to Slovakia and Hungary. When terminated in 1963-1964, the pipelines will accomplish the double purpose of relieving the railroad and tanker traffic and of further integrating the four countries' economy with that of the Soviet Union. This integration is also being pursued by other means, such as the linking of the area's and Soviet electric grid networks, the various improvements in the East-West waterways, especially the Danube, and the impending installation of automatic telephone connections between Moscow and the six capital cities of East Central Europe. These innovations are expected to further accelerate the rate of the area's industrialization.

Another factor which will largely determine the area's industrial progress is a more intensive rationalization of industry in the individual dependent countries and Yugoslavia, and in the area as an entity. The many shortcomings under which industry has been suffering, especially in the "junior" countries, already have been discussed. It is fairly certain that most of these shortcomings can and will be overcome in time—as they have been, after years of fumbling, in the Soviet Union. Several million former peasant lads in East Central Europe, who were transformed into industrial workers less than a decade ago, have by now gained skill and experience. New industrial establishments in the area, which in nearly all cases have been planned rationally enough, could also be turned into profitable enterprises through better organization of work. The delivery and installation of industrial equipment sold abroad, especially to less developed countries, also will be improved, although it is difficult to tell whether the volume of such deliveries will rise rapidly during the coming decade.

The above estimates apply to the rationalization of industrial production within individual East Central European countries, including Yugoslavia. In the dependent area considered as a unit, industrial production and, to a lesser extent, other fields of economic activity will be guided more and more by the COMECON—that is, indirectly by Soviet planners. From its modest origins, the COMECON has evolved into a powerful regulatory organism which is gradually assuming a supranational character. One of its current tasks is the preparation of a co-ordinated, so-called perspective plan of economic development during 1960-1980 for the entire Soviet bloc in Europe. The devising of such a blueprint will have to overcome enormous

difficulties such as the problem of planning for a huge area composed of several states of unequal development, the economic interests of which occasionally clash, and, in particular, the nonexistence within the bloc of a commonly-agreed pricing system. The latter issue is likely to remain unsolved in the coming years, principally because of the theoretical difficulty of adapting it to the present mandatory interpretation of the Marxist theory of value. Consequently, progress towards integration can only be achieved gradually, through a piecemeal solution of the many practical problems. However, such progress is being made, and the possible emergence of a centrally-directed, closely-knit economic unit of 315 million people in 1961 (and perhaps as many as 380 million in 1980) can no longer be dismissed as a mere planners' fancy.

To summarize these all too brief remarks, the forecast for the dependent area is that, under the COMECON's direction, it will expand considerably its industrial output during the next decade and harmonize it with Soviet production. Economic interdependence between the area and the Soviet Union will increase under the impact of joint planning and ever-growing mutual commodity deliveries. Domestic food supplies in all probability will lag behind industrial progress. The gaps in the standards of living among the various dependent countries are certain to widen unless countermeasures are taken.

11: CHINA: A NEW POWER IN EUROPE

Joseph L. Sutton

Among the many new facets of recent Chinese political participation in world politics, by far the most novel has been the Communist Chinese state's intervention in the affairs of the East Central European people's democracies. This role of course has been noticed by Western observers, but it has not received the attention that it in fact deserves. As a new pattern of relationships, it represents one of the major *démarches* in the history of modern international relations. Since the eighteenth century the West has played an important role in Chinese affairs. China played largely the passive part of a "prize" in European affairs. At no time did China take an active role as a power in European politics, until the successful completion of the communist conquest of the mainland in October 1949.

There now has been a major reorientation of Chinese foreign relations. The most obvious change was the redirection of Chinese trade and cultural and political relations away from traditional contacts with the West and toward the Soviet Union. There has been much speculation regarding this relationship with the USSR. In many ways, however, it is a traditional relationship between an underdeveloped China and a highly developed European power. China has had many of the problems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries repeated. How, for example, can the relatively weak Chinese state develop a pattern of independent international conduct while depending upon a European power for financial, political and military support? In fact, many of the tensions discernible just below the surface of Chinese-Soviet relations are akin to former tensions between Nationalist China and the Western powers. Still, there are a number of differences. Although China is weak and dependent upon the Soviet Union, she has been able to develop greater independence than any previous modern Chinese government. With this new strength China has been able to play a new role in Europe.

Never in the long history of China's relations with the West did

she develop any elaborate relations with the states of East Central Europe. In fact most of these states were caught between Russia and the dominant state in Europe. The nature of European politics was such that these states were involved in painful and largely unsuccessful efforts to win freedom from domination and had little opportunity to conduct colonial adventures in Asia or, for that matter, to develop any extensive trade outside of Europe. Thus, these states and China had no history of significant relations, and the current scene of intimate contacts between them represents a historical "first."

The most obvious explanation for the evolution of close relations between China and the European satellites is their mutual bond of communism. However, the nature of the relationship is determined by several factors besides a common ideological bond. There is good reason to suppose that the communist victory in China was not an unmixed blessing from the Soviet point of view. Although the success of communism in the world's most populous state at once denied the West and bestowed upon the Soviets the greatest propaganda and political advantage in the cold war, it also required large-scale Soviet economic support which was difficult to provide. China was forced to embark upon a major and immediate massive effort of self-help, and the Soviets had to attempt to find ways of supporting the Chinese effort which would not overburden the Soviet economy. The obvious instrument at hand was the agglomeration of captive economies of the East Central European people's democracies.

In the following pages, the economic role of East Central Europe in China's development will be outlined in some detail, but it is important to note that the East Central European nations were given a considerable share of China's burden. Most immediately involved were the highly industrial economies of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and Hungary. The other satellites have all been assigned some roles. Reliable facts about these relations are difficult to come by, and occasional surfacing of differences in the communist camp supplies us only with hints. The participation of East Central Europe was planned by the Soviet Union, and the exchange programs of students, technicians and artists are all within the bounds of good international communism. What the Soviets did not anticipate was the development of political relations between China and East Central Europe which go beyond the normal relations among the lesser states of the Soviet bloc. To

be sure, China and the satellites had reason for making common cause. All had been the targets of power politics, both from Russia and the West. This shared misery unquestionably led to shared suspicions that individual interests might be sacrificed at any time for "big power" considerations. And China had good cause to champion the concept that communist revolutions can and should develop along different lines according to local needs. As the Chinese revolution developed differently from that of the Soviet Union and as China sought independence, she has on occasion been the champion of independence and different development in the satellite states. A case in point was the Chinese championing of Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland in the early days of his struggle with Khrushchev. Such political co-operation for aims at variance with those of the Soviet Union was perhaps unanticipated by Moscow.

There are other reasons for Chinese participation in East Central European politics. Although the Chinese have been champions of a measure of independence for East Central Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, they have also been concerned that the independent lines of these states not vary in such a way as to jeopardize China's own position. The industrialization of the vast Chinese mainland turns upon the success of her agricultural program and upon her ability to keep the attentions of the masses fastened upon Western "imperialism" as an external threat so great that the mass regimentation of the populace of China will be possible. Certain developments in East Central Europe have threatened these two pillars of the communist program in China.

Another basis for China's intervention in East Central European affairs has been her relations with the Western powers. There is evidence that China strongly resists any move on the part of the satellites to draw closer to the West. A strong case in point is the open disagreement with Kremlin policy over the attempted rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Here is a case not only of open intervention by China in the field of European politics but of success in changing Soviet policy in Europe. Then too, the Chinese may desire to have influence among European satellites as a counter to Soviet efforts to dominate North Korea and North Vietnam. There is evidence that the struggle for control of these communist states in Asia is still going on. Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang also are areas of Russian-Chinese competition.

The spectacular reorientation of Chinese relations with East Central Europe is most clear in the area of foreign trade. Prior to 1950 trade between these two areas was so small as to be insignificant. In the period from 1950 to 1956, the commodity exchange between East Central Europe and China increased 19 times in terms of value and has continued to increase steadily since.¹ A further indication is the comparison of the figures in dollars for the years 1953 and 1958. In 1953 the dollar value of this trade was \$345 million, which rose to \$550 million by 1958. Although the over-all percentage of increase seems to be slowing, trade has been growing annually and accounts for over 22 per cent of Red China's foreign trade. Thus, although the Soviet Union accounts for over half of China's total foreign trade, the European satellites contribute major and heretofore unheard-of amounts.

China's chief sources of foreign trade in East Central Europe have been East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, in that order. Ninety per cent of East German exports to China has been in the form of machinery, equipment, raw materials and semi-finished products, and mass consumer goods designed to aid the Chinese in the development of their own industry or to relieve the pressure for consumer goods until Chinese industry can take over. Fifty-four per cent of imports from Poland fall into similar categories, as well as a large part of the imports from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.² A partial list of commodities imported from East Central Europe includes items such as transport machinery, metal-cutting machines, precision tools, optical goods, engineering equipment, chemical equipment, mining machinery, motor vehicles, tractors, ships, drilling equipment, petroleum equipment, agricultural machinery, and tools.

In addition to such machinery and equipment the satellites deliver complete equipment and semi-finished products for new Chinese enterprises. This trade often involves the export of entire factories plus technicians to aid in their installation. Such exports include fertilizer plants, coal-enriching factories, electric power plants, and refrigerator plants.

China's main exports to the East Central European states have been

¹ US Joint Publications Research Service, trans., A. A. Netrusov, *Foreign Economic Relations of the People's Republic of China* (New York, 1959), p. 12.

² *Loc. cit.*

mainly in the form of foodstuffs and minerals. Foodstuffs, for example, have amounted to over 70 per cent of China's exports to East Germany and over 45 per cent of her exports to Poland.³ In sum, China has become a principal trading partner with the East Central European satellites and has replaced much of the earlier Western-oriented trade.

China has also played an important role in East Central European affairs by extending credit in the form of long-term, low-interest loans. After the 1956 revolution in Hungary, China extended 100 million rubles of credit to Hungary over a ten-year period, to begin in 1960 and to be repaid at an annual interest rate of 2 per cent. Earlier, China delivered some 30 million rubles of goods to Hungary as a direct grant-in-aid as part of the general communist effort to get wayward Hungary back on her feet. Now China has taken over the support of Albania in place of the Soviet Union. The appearance of China as a creditor nation in Europe is certainly a reversal of her previous role.

In addition to this growing exchange of commodities, China has entered into agreements with the East Central European satellites for the exchange of technical information and training. East Germany has supplied technical documents relating to optical apparatus, machine tools, typographical machinery, and ships. The Czechs have supplied information on prefabricated hydraulic structures and antibiotics; Hungary on radios, production of cable, lead, motor vehicles and tractors; Rumania on production of petroleum and related matters. China, in turn, has sent similar information to the satellites in fields where she has had superior experience. In conjunction with such exchanges there has been a considerable exchange of technicians for special training and of students in fields of technical education. Similar exchange arrangements have been worked out for scientific information and personnel.

Such extensive economic interdependence and broad personal contacts at various levels were bound to affect the complex political relationships among the states of the communist bloc. Further, the similarity of historical experiences, however slight, between China and the East Central European states inevitably influences the delicate balance-of-power relationships among the states clustered around

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

the Soviet Union. At no time did such influences become more obvious than in the Gomulka affair in 1956.

The European events of 1956 severely tested the unity of the Soviet bloc. The well-publicized "secret" speech of Khrushchev denouncing Stalin was the signal for the undercurrents of unrest in the satellite countries to break into the open. It was during this period that China's new role as a power to be reckoned with in Europe so clearly emerged. China's role began after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism. Although the East Central European states regarded the speech as an opportunity to exert their own independence, China regarded it with suspicion. While agreeing that Stalin had committed some excesses, the Chinese clung to the idea that Stalin "creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism."⁴

Naturally no one can be sure why the Chinese have turned more Stalinist than Stalin; the reasons for such variance with the present-day Soviet line are buried in the inner circle of the Chinese Party. It is possible that the stringent measures attributed to Stalin were deemed necessary in China and that a total denunciation of Stalinism would have undermined Chinese domestic policy.⁵ For whatever reason, China seized the opportunity to disagree with the Soviet Union in public and to intrude in an interesting way into the political tensions between the USSR and its European satellites.

It must be recalled that in 1956 the Soviet Union was in the midst of great internal changes. The long regime of Stalin had ended and the short honeymoon of Malenkov had drawn to a sudden close. Khrushchev and Bulganin were seeking to solidify their respective positions with much maneuvering. The Chinese had labored long under indifferent and perhaps hostile association with Stalin's Russia, and no doubt welcomed the chance to play an important role at Russia's expense. Still, their hopes lay with the communist camp, which they regarded as the only correct one. The question remained: how did one exploit the opportunity without danger? They sought to take advantage of the disintegrating situation in East Central Europe to advance their own prestige while upholding the validity of the "Camp of World Communism."

Along with Yugoslavia, Albania, and Vietnam, Communist China represented the only Communist Party that had risen to power with-

⁴ A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York, 1960), p. 350.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

out the support of the Soviet Army. This, plus the enormous Chinese potential, had long given the Chinese a special status within the communist bloc. Evidence abounds that their unique status gave them a certain attraction to the states of East Central Europe and the latter states were not loathe to appeal to China's status when the opportunity presented itself. The background had been laid in East Central Europe (particularly Poland) by events in China itself. Chinese communist statements following the "Polish October"—particularly the statements made concerning "big power chauvinism"—seemed to vindicate the hope that support from Mao's government could be counted on in the struggle for some independence from Soviet control. On November 1, 1956, Radio Peking broadcast to an eager audience the following: "Because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle, it often happens that certain personnel of socialist countries neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual relations. Such a mistake, particularly the mistake of chauvinism by a big country, inevitably results in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of the socialist countries."⁶ Such a comment could only have been construed as support for Poland's struggle for less dependence on the Soviet Union.

Even the Chinese response to the outbreak of trouble in Europe was in this vein. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had initially welcomed the Hungarian uprising. And Mao's abortive "hundred flowers" statement and his thesis on the contradictions between the masses and the leaders seemed evidence that China's support could be counted upon against the Soviet Union. All of this appears to have aroused great interest in China among the Poles, and led the Poles and Hungarians to believe that Europe had a new champion against the Russians. According to one source, "In 1957 they [the Poles] took up Chinese themes with enthusiasm; since the time of the Physiocrats no European country had displayed so much interest in Chinese affairs."⁷

At the height of the tense situation between Poland and the Russians, the Chinese seemed to be on the side of the angels. Brzezinski believes that sometime between October 20 and 22, 1956, when the

⁶ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 276-277.

⁷ Leopold Labedz, "Poland: The Small Leap Sideways," *China Quarterly*, no. 3 (1960), 92-103.

situation was fraught with the danger of Russian intervention, the Chinese contacted the Russians and urged patience in their treatment of Warsaw.⁸ According to the *New York Times*, Mao Tse-tung as early as September instructed a prominent Polish leader, Edward Ochab, that the Poles should "obtain internal independence and . . . develop their own socialism as the Yugoslavs had done."⁹ All in all, China in 1956 erupted into the Soviet bloc and European politics in a fashion unique in the history of the world, and acted skillfully and in her own interest.

Just what the Chinese had in mind at the outset of this era of China's influence in European politics is a matter of guesswork. It is logical that they sought to establish themselves as partners in the Soviet bloc rather than in the role of a servile member which characterized the Stalin period. They could achieve this object by developing influence among the restive states of East Central Europe and then emerge as the great mediator of the Soviet bloc. The Hungarian crisis, however, following the dramatic events of the Polish October, made apparent the dangerous effects of this new latitude of freedom for the communist bloc. The Soviets found themselves embroiled in a bloody revolution in Hungary and were able to keep control of the Poles only as the result of compromises heretofore unheard of in communist-bloc relations. Only the Chinese Party seemed to have the prestige and freedom of maneuver required to end the danger of a general rupture of intrabloc relations. This, of course, may have suited the plans of the Chinese communist leadership perfectly. They could negotiate the compromises required to end the crises and emerge as a partner of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the schemes of the Chinese, they did in fact emerge as a major influence in resolving the disputes. The Chinese formula was calculated to rectify two "contradictions" in communist-bloc relations, namely the "tendency toward great-nation chauvinism and excessive small-nation nationalism."¹⁰ In January 1957, Chou En-lai rushed to East Central Europe where he continued to make statements against big-power chauvinism while at the same time referring to "the socialist countries headed by the USSR."¹¹ After returning

⁸ Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁹ Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

¹¹ Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

to Moscow in the same month he joined the Russians in a declaration to the effect that "the Socialist countries are independent and sovereign states and relations between them are based upon the Leninist principle of national equality."¹² These and other statements issued during 1957 disclosed that Chinese prestige in East Central Europe was heavily counted upon by the Soviet Union for the improvement of relations within what had always been the Soviet bailiwick. Unquestionably Chinese popularity and influence within the bloc increased greatly, and Mao's statements on contradictions and his "hundred flowers" pronouncement of 1957 seemed to Russia's satellites to promise continued support from a powerful and friendly China.

Enthusiasm for China rose markedly. East Germany indicated an interest beyond mere trade. One writer notes that there are a number of parallels between East Germany and China: among these are need for recognition, the problem of two governments, the enclaves of Berlin and Quemoy and Matsu. Further, the same source notes that some East German techniques appear to have been copied from Chinese experience.¹³ Bulgaria, too, is believed to have followed Chinese developments with careful interest. Again, similar problems seem to exist in both societies; both were based on peasant agricultural economies with almost no industry. China's experience with the substitution of labor for investment capital is believed to be attractive to Sofia, although the Bulgarian Party has been staunchly loyal to Moscow.¹⁴

In any case, China's position on the question of intrabloc relations in the years 1956-1957 seemed hopeful to those elements within the East Central European states that sought to lessen Soviet control over their affairs. For the first time since the Mongol invasion, Asia was playing an important role in the affairs of European states.

The important role was to continue, but the hopes of those who counted China among the "liberal" communist powers of the world were doomed to disappointment. The year 1958 brought what appeared to be a reversal of China's earlier role in intrabloc affairs.

¹² Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

¹³ M. J. Esslin, "East Germany: Peking-Pankow Axis," *China Quarterly*, no. 3 (1960), 85-88.

¹⁴ Liliana Brisby, "Bulgaria: Leaping Forward without Communes," *ibid.*, pp. 80-96.

The occasion was the Yugoslav Party's Draft Program issued in that year. There had been some indications in 1957 of a hardening of the Chinese line toward different roads to socialism, but the blast against the Yugoslavs in 1958 brought into the open the changed Chinese attitude. Essentially, the Chinese and the Russians charged Tito with revisionism and a virtual sellout to the "imperialist powers." Although Russia and China heaped accusations on the Yugoslavs, the Chinese attacks were much more fierce and ominous. The Yugoslavs and others have charged that the Chinese forced the Russians into a more stern position and that Russia broke off her rapprochement with the Yugoslavs at Chinese instigation. Whatever the truth of these charges, in 1958 appeared the spectacle of a rift between China and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the increasing severity of the Chinese line, particularly over the question of the necessity of war, began to dull the charm which China held for the European satellites. Instead of Mao, Khrushchev began to emerge as the voice of reason and the Chinese began to appear as a menace.

The reasons for the about-face on the part of the Chinese in their attitude toward a softer line in Europe can be considered only briefly. Some were suggested in earlier pages and relate to China's fear of any lessening of difficulties with the West. It might be said that at this stage of her development China needs the West as an enemy almost as desperately as she needs Russia for a friend. A second reason may well be her fear that any relaxations of internal control in East Central Europe, at a time when her own internal control is so severe, would create intrabloc contradictions and embarrass her at home. A third reason might be her fear that any breakup of the bloc at this time might lead to a general disintegration of the communist camp and thus to a weakening of her own international position. In any case, recent months have disclosed that (with the exception of Albania) the Soviet Union has been able to reassert leadership in East Central Europe and that Chinese influence has correspondingly diminished.

Word leaking from the Bucharest Conference of June 1960 and again from the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties in November of the same year indicates that all but one of the European satellites has come to rest again in their accustomed positions in the Soviet camp. No doubt this was in response to considerable Soviet pressure, and there is reason to believe

that in some quarters there still can be found sympathy for the Chinese line. East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have shown friendly tendencies toward China, but according to one writer have been forced to give up their flirtation with the Chinese because "they need Soviet support against their own restive populations."¹⁵ Gomulka is said to support Khrushchev because of a real rejection of Chinese extremism and because his support gains him a greater degree of internal and external maneuver.¹⁶

Currently, China's sole avowed ally in Europe is, as was mentioned, Albania. The reasons for the conjoining of Albania and China in their quarrel with the Soviet Union are complex and have their beginnings in earlier and unrelated events. Albania became communist under the direction and domination of the Yugoslav Party. This domination even led to a suggestion on the part of Stalin that Albania be incorporated into Yugoslavia. Such a step was averted by the break between Tito and the Soviet Union, and it has remained in Albania's interest to see that this break remains unhealed. Albanian concern with Khrushchev's leadership began in 1955 when it appeared that the Soviets were about to accept Tito back in the camp of world communism. Albania's strong fears of Yugoslavia and constant attacks upon Titoist revisionism coincided with China's own views. Despite concern, however, Albania did not openly oppose the Soviet Union until the debate between the Chinese and Russian parties became an open quarrel.

The Albanian Party Congress of February 1961 discussed the defeat of a foreign plot to overthrow the regime and hinted that it was Soviet-inspired. Events throughout the year 1961 all led to an increasing breakdown in Soviet-Albanian relations. The Soviets expelled the Albanian embassy staff from Moscow, and returned all Albanian students from the USSR. This move was preceded by a heavy-handed denunciation of Enver Hoxha by Khrushchev and the Twenty-second Party Congress. Though the Soviets have not declared Albania to be out of the communist camp they have severed all state-to-state relations and have secured the public support of other members of the European communist states in denouncing the Hoxha regime.

China's response has been one of continuous support for Albania.

¹⁵ William E. Griffith, "An International Communism?" *East Europe*, X, 7 (July 1961), 9.

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*

Since the rift between themselves and the Soviet Union over matters of international strategy and internal policy opened, they have increasingly turned to Albania as an ally and foil for criticism of the Khrushchev leadership of world communism. Within twenty-four hours of Khrushchev's denunciation of Albania at the Party Congress in Moscow, there was a statement from Peking hailing Chinese-Albanian friendship.¹⁷ All through 1961, as the Soviets diminished and finally ceased aid to Albania, the Chinese stepped in to replace Soviet economic support. Chinese technicians replaced those the Soviet Union called home. When the Albanians suffered a crop failure, the Chinese supplied Canadian wheat, bought because of similar difficulties in their own agricultural sector.¹⁸ Earlier in 1960 they extended to Albania a \$2,500,000 credit for the purchase of grain from France. In November 1961 the third Albanian delegation of that year arrived in Peking to negotiate Chinese-Albanian economic and trade relations for 1962. In earlier meetings China agreed to support twenty-five building projects in the chemical, metallurgical, and construction materials fields. Peking also promised tractors and other agricultural machines.

On November 7, 1961, at a meeting celebrating the anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party, Hoxha made a powerful attack on Khrushchev, referring to him in terms of such opprobrium as to raise doubts whether the breach between himself and Khrushchev can ever be healed. He tried to make a distinction between Khrushchev and the Soviet people and emphasized that his quarrel was with Khrushchev. Friendship with the USSR, he held, "has never been, is not and never will be breached by imperialist maneuvers; by the intrigues of Tito's renegade bands; or by the calumnies, blackmail or blockade of Nikita Khrushchev." In another part of his speech and in the same vein he referred to his support from China as follows: "The guarantee for our future victories will be our support and friendship with the Soviet peoples, with the great Chinese people, with all peoples who are our friends . . ." On the same day the Chinese released a message of congratulation to the Albanian Party in which they praised it in fulsome terms and made plain their support for Hoxha. The message said in part:

¹⁷ *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1961.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1961.

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese peoples have always followed with interest the struggle and achievements made by the fraternal Albanian Workers Party and the fraternal Albanian people. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people admire from the bottom of their hearts the revolutionary spirit of the Albanian Workers Party and the Albanian people. The two parties of China and Albania and the people of the two countries have formed a profound comradeship in arms in their common struggle against imperialism and for safeguarding world peace and building socialism. We are deeply convinced that the great friendship and unity of the peoples of China and Albania, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, will assuredly be further consolidated and developed.¹⁹

As if to further emphasize their support and to tie their statement more directly to Hoxha's speech, they quoted a passage from the speech in their own message to the Albanian Party. They also stressed their support of Albania in its struggle against revisionist Yugoslavia. They were joined in their support by North Korea and North Vietnam, each of which sent similar messages to Tirana. Also, lest there be any room for misunderstanding of their position, they published the entire text of Hoxha's denunciatory speech in their principal party organ, the *Jenmin Jih Pao*.

Whether or not Chinese support will suffice to keep Albania independent of Moscow and safe from Soviet vengeance remains to be seen. It has been suggested that Tito may be urged by Khrushchev to complete the takeover of Albania proposed earlier by Stalin. Should he seek to do so the Chinese would find the rendering of military support for Albania difficult if not impossible. Yet short of military intervention on behalf of Albania the Chinese appear absolutely committed. According to one source, since China aspires to a position of influence within the world communist movement, it cannot abandon Albania, for to do so "would make clear to all Communist parties that continuation of Chinese support to a rebellious party cannot be counted upon in the face of Soviet demands for its cessation."²⁰ Rather than in its influence on the future of Albania, the importance of the incident lies in the role which China has come to play within the communist bloc and in Europe.

Whatever its outcome, the present split between Albania and the

¹⁹ New China News Agency, Peking, November 7, 1961.

²⁰ Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Soviet Union should lay to rest the assumption that the struggle between China and Russia is illusory or at best a short-lived phenomenon. The fact is that China has emerged as a power within the communist bloc and will remain a competitor of the Soviet Union within the foreseeable future. The communist movement has become a vehicle not only for Soviet international influence but for Chinese influence as well. Apart from ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China, what has occurred is the emergence of another powerful state within the communist bloc. The fact that Russia is no longer the sole major power and no longer can force her views upon other members of the bloc unchallenged, represents a fundamental change in the structure of the bloc itself. As the stresses and strains of domestic dilemmas and international crises impinge upon the bloc, there will probably be new shifts of allegiance between Russia and China on the part of the lesser states within the bloc. As long as China continues to develop internally at the rate she has, and so long as the Party in China remains firmly in power, then so long will China continue to be an alternative source of support within the bloc. But it is unlikely that the present dispute will lead to a breakup of the communist bloc; as Brzezinski mentions, the talk of a Soviet-American alliance against China "merely illustrates a profound misconception of the essence of the historical phenomenon of Communism. . . ." ²¹

In sum, events since 1949 have brought a hitherto unheard-of relationship between China and the people's democracies of East Central Europe. At times the role of China in this area has even eclipsed that of the Soviet Union. At first Chinese intervention was welcomed by the communist parties of these states. But with the exception of Albania, Russia's paramount position seems to be clearly re-established. Regardless of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations, it is now clear that China can play an important part in European affairs. Perhaps even now China affects European politics by forcing the Russians to follow a more severe line than they would like. Similar forms of Chinese influence will most likely continue and increase as China assumes more and more the role of "the other major power" in the communist bloc.

²¹ Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (rev. ed., New York, 1961), p. 435.

PART TWO

ON THE PERIPHERY OF
THE SOVIET ORBIT



12: TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA IN KHRUSHCHEV'S ERA

Milorad M. Drachkovitch

From Nikita Khrushchev's "Canossa" trip to Belgrade, in May 1955, until the midsummer of 1961 when this chapter was written, Tito's Yugoslavia pursued a sinuous path in which, as Tito himself once said, Yugoslavia belonged to the Socialist "world" but not to the Socialist "bloc." What this meant in the field of internal political, socioeconomic, and intellectual matters, as well as in Yugoslavia's foreign policy, is the task of the following essay to outline.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF TITOISM

The Milovan Djilas affair and the revolutionary events in East Central Europe in the fall of 1956 convinced the leaders of the League of Communists (LCY) that the "democratization" of Yugoslavia—the main theme of their resistance to Stalin's pressure—should never touch the communists' monopoly of political power.¹ Each of the most important political affairs during 1958, 1959, and 1960 attended by the top leaders² stressed emphatically a basic point formulated in the LCY program: "The Communists will continue the struggle for keeping key positions of state authority in firm

¹ In this connection it is relevant to quote Tito's words in January 1954 at the third (extraordinary) plenary session of the Central Committee of the LCY, which was devoted entirely to discussing Djilas' writings: "If we were to permit this [unrestricted spreading of Djilas' criticism], within one year our socialist reality would cease to exist." *Komunist*, organ of the CC of the LCY, 1-2 (January-February 1954), 8-9.

² These were the Seventh Congress of the League (April 1958), congresses of the six republican communist parties held during 1959 in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the second plenary session of the Central Committee of the LCY (November 1959), and the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) in April 1960.

revolutionary hands.”³ This statement deserves elaboration for it reveals the following fundamental characteristics of the LCY’s unrelenting political domination over Yugoslavia: the nature of its top leadership, the scope of the League’s control over state and society, the peculiar features of its growth, and the new problems it confronts.

On the first count, the top leadership of the LCY continues to be composed of the old-time, hardened communists who directed the LCY revolutionary work during its three most significant phases: in prewar illegality, in the partisan struggle during the war, and in the postwar shaping of a new, communist Yugoslavia. This is eminently clear from some figures which were given on the occasion of the LCY’s Seventh Congress by a commission verifying delegates’ mandates. Statistics show that out of 1,806 delegates regularly elected to represent various LCY organizations there were 453 delegates who were LCY members before the war; 1,018 joined the LCY during the war, and only 335 became LCY members after the war. The delegates’ average length of membership in the LCY was 15 years, 10 months and 5 days. As for the delegates’ social composition, there were 690 workers, 180 peasants, 109 engineers, technicians, educational and cultural workers, 643 other intellectuals and employees, 175 officers of the Army, and 9 others.⁴ These figures have a two-fold significance. They demonstrate, on the one hand, that the LCY is ruled by an overwhelming majority of “bolsheviks” and “partisans,” people who had been politically educated and emotionally conditioned either under the prewar iron discipline of an obedient section of the Comintern, or in the revolutionary fire of the antifascist and civil war during the occupation. Their spectacular postwar social advance was tied exclusively to their belonging to the victorious Party. The fact, on the other hand, that over half of the congress delegates belonged to other social categories than workers and peasants, indicates the “managerial” character of the top leadership, which is concentrated in the controlling posts of administration and society.

This hard, experienced leadership of the LCY has devoted particular attention to putting its trusted members in the most important

³ *Yugoslavia’s Way: Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia* (New York, 1958), p. 122. (Hereafter cited: *Yugoslavia’s Way*.)

⁴ *VII Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije*, Ljubljana 22-26 aprila 1958, stenografske beleške (Belgrade, 1958), p. 261.

posts of every important organization in the country. (In this connection "decentralization," the most popular tenet of "Titoism," actually consisted in transferring LCY members from some posts to others, but not in relinquishing their encompassing control.) Thus, according to Aleksandar Rankovic, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the LCY in 1958: "Eighty-three per cent of the members of district people's committees and 60 per cent of the members of communal people's committees are members of the League of Communists. The situation is similar in all other organs." ⁵ Indeed, similar percentages can be found among deputies in the Federal Assembly and the republican assemblies, as well as in institutions and organizations such as the officer corps of the Yugoslav Army, workers' councils, the trade union leadership, the youth organization, and so on. The most conspicuous example in this regard is the case of the Socialist Alliance (the former People's Front), which with its 6,398,915 members on December 31, 1959, was, in Tito's words, "an organizational form through which the role of the conscious socialist forces of our country finds full expression." ⁶ Immediately after winding up its Fifth Congress in 1960, the newly elected federal board of the Alliance held its first session, electing a president, secretary general, executive committee, and secretariat. Tito himself was re-elected president of the Alliance; Aleksandar Rankovic was elected secretary general; 32 of the 35 members of the Alliance's Executive Committee were at the same time members of the Central Committee of the LCY, while all the 13 members of the secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Alliance were members of the CC of the LCY.⁷

Still, in the last few years this characteristic of the LCY has been modified under the influence, first, of a large and intentional increase of its rank and file, and second, under the pressure of a changing socioeconomic environment within Yugoslavia. As for membership, its growth has been conspicuous between 1958 and 1960, in comparison with the situation existing between the Sixth (November 1952) and the Seventh congresses of the League: June 1952,⁸ 799,385

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

⁶ *Peti Kongres Socijalističkog Saveza Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1960), p. 14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 317-18.

⁸ *VI Kongres Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije (Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije)*, 2-7 Novembre 1952, stenografske beleške (Belgrade, 1953), p. 71.

members; December 1957,⁹ 755,056; December 1958,¹⁰ 829,953; and December 1959,¹¹ 935,856.

As for the social composition of the membership of the LCY, the official figures are as follows:

<i>Social category</i>	<i>December 31, 1957</i> ¹²	<i>December 31, 1959</i> ¹³
Workers	243,819—32.29%	325,369—34.77%
Peasants	130,783—17.32	134,862—14.41
Office Workers	244,592—32.39	289,539—31.90
Students and Pupils	27,455— 3.64	44,082— 4.71
Others	108,417—14.36	133,004—14.21

These figures, which indicate that workers represent only one third of a "working-class" League, show a quantitative increase and particularly an influx of young people.¹⁴ Instead of rejuvenating the League, however, this new blood has been the cause of much concern to the League's leadership, for a new and disturbing spirit seems evident. At the second plenary session of the Central Committee of the LCY, Tito reprovingly designated this as a spirit of "economism."¹⁵ To assess the real meaning of this reproach, one has to turn to some other aspects of the most recent history of Titoism.

THE CONTROVERSIAL IDEOLOGY OF TITOISM

The initial, Stalinist blueprint for Yugoslav communism was modified with the introduction of the first reforms in the summer of 1950, but Titoism as a distinctive communist ideological interpretation emerged only in April 1958 with the adoption of the program of the LCY at its Seventh Congress. Its "schismatic" interest results from the fact that although it was criticized in world communist headquarters for containing "many theses that are clearly in contradiction with the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism," or for being "an

⁹ *VII Kongres* . . . , p. 139.

¹⁰ *Yugoslav Survey*, a Record of Facts and Information, Belgrade, I, 2 (July-September 1960), 160.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *VII Kongres* . . . , p. 139.

¹³ *Yugoslav Survey*, p. 161.

¹⁴ According to *Yugoslav Survey*, p. 162, of all the new members admitted in the LCY in 1959 more than 63 per cent were under 25 years of age.

¹⁵ *Drugi Plenum Centralnog Komiteta Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1959), p. 7.

anti-Marxist-Leninist, out-and-out revisionist program,"¹⁶ these criticisms did not shake the authors of the indicted document. For them the program of the LCY not only was not an ideological deviation, but on the contrary represented an original and creative contribution to the Marxist analysis of the modern world. As they saw it, and wanted others to see it, Titoism is a legitimate theoretical heir of Leninism, a progressive doctrine opposed to the Stalinist "pragmatic revision" of Marxism-Leninism. In that sense, as viewed from Belgrade, while Leninism analyzed capitalist society in the phase of imperialist monopolism, Titoism offered a Marxist analysis of the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. Written in ritualistic Marxist jargon, the program emphasized simultaneously the historically inevitable collapse of capitalism and its replacement by socialism on a world scale, via a variety of different roads.¹⁷ Insisting on the inexorable process through which "humanity is moving deep into the era of socialism," but explaining also that it is through its own contradictions that socialism moves forward, Yugoslav theoreticians actually presented their position in an orthodox, dialectical way. They set the "thesis" of modern Western "state capitalism" (which grew out of the earlier monopoly capitalism) against the "antithesis" of bureaucratism and statism in the Stalinist form. Out of this union of opposites emerged the higher, but universally valid, Yugoslav "synthesis." Its originality is claimed to inhere in the merging of the Marxist principle of the withering away of the state with the modern Yugoslav experiment of workers' self-management.

The first of the basic pillars of Titoist "direct democracy," according to the program, are the Workers' Councils, "the democratic economic-political organs of social self-management through which direct producers independently manage enterprises and take a decisive part in the development of the forces of production."¹⁸ The Communes, "the basic political territorial organization of self-manage-

¹⁶ The first, and milder, critical statement concerning the program of the LCY is from *Kommunist* (Moscow), 6 (April 19, 1958). The second, harsher indictment was published in Chinese *Jen-min Jih-pao* (The People's Daily, Peiping), May 5, 1958. The English text of both articles may be found in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record*, edited by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (New York, 1959), pp. 142, 172.

¹⁷ *Yugoslavia's Way*, p. 24.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

ment of the working people,"¹⁹ form the second support. Such a new social and political system, putting into practice social ownership over the means of production, thereby realizing the basic Marxist condition for the emancipation of labor, postulates the rejection of both bourgeois democracy, as "reactionary, unscientific and refuted in life," and "bureaucratism," that Stalinist danger to socialism in the transition period.

To appraise the practical value of these abstract claims of Marxist-Leninist-Titoist "synthesis," it is necessary to survey the functioning of Titoism in the field of its own most vigorously asserted economic achievements.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN OVER-ALL SURVEY

The economic life of Yugoslavia, characterized during the immediate postwar period by a frantic drive toward industrialization and rigid economic planning, began gradually to change its Soviet style when a kind of "new economic policy" was inaugurated in the summer of 1950. The main features of this "liberalization" were abolition of the detailed system of central planning and its replacement by a new type of planning which outlined only the basic targets of economic development and recognized the principle of independent operation of enterprises after their fulfillment of certain, essentially fiscal, obligations toward the community. These pragmatic innovations, which actually helped the regime avoid full bankruptcy of its Stalinist phase, aimed at achieving a peculiar, "mixed" economic system. It consisted of putting in the service of economic collectivism a certain number of classical economic incentives. Thus, to increase their productivity and raise the standard of living of the workers, socialized enterprises were allowed to compete in a market where prices were determined by a more or less free law of supply and demand.²⁰ This aberration from accepted socialist practice was officially presented as a creative application of Marxism-Leninism.

The early experimentation with an unorthodox socialist economy, in spite of some positive results, brought new and difficult problems. In a rather gloomy report entitled "On Our Economic Problems,"

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁰ Cf. Egon Neuberger, "General Survey of the Yugoslav Economy," chap. X of *Yugoslavia*, a volume in the Mid-European Studies Center Series (New York, 1957).

delivered in November 1955 at the fourth plenary session of the Federal Council of the SAWPY, Tito depicted the following elements as the main economic afflictions: inflationary pressure caused by low labor productivity, the monopoly exercised by some enterprises whose arbitrary price policy hurt the consumers, weaknesses in social planning, waste and megalomania in building, local chauvinism, economic criminality (scarcity of goods and leaps in prices having made the country, in Tito's words, "an Eldorado for speculators"), poor prospects for agriculture, and above all the extremely unfavorable balance in foreign trade.²¹

An enlarged meeting of the executive committee of the LCY, at its sessions of September 28, 1955, and November 6, 1956, adopted new measures to reorient the Yugoslav economy, and in particular the policy of investments, which was to be implemented in the new Five Year Plan (1957-1961). The avowed aim of the plan was to eliminate disproportions in the development of productive forces through allocation of a greater share of investment to industries producing consumer goods and increasing investments in agriculture, hitherto the most neglected field of the economy. In its policy of distribution of the national income the plan stressed the necessity of adjusting the relations between accumulation and consumption so as to secure a steady growth of personal consumption and rise in the standard of living. With this in view, the plan modified the fiscal burden of the economic organizations.²²

This last stage in the liberalization of the Yugoslav economy made possible a rapid rate of development, so much so that the major tasks and aims of the plan were fulfilled a year in advance, by the end of 1960. The following official statistics show the changing rate of growth in the period between 1948 and 1960. (The figures represent the average rates of growth in per cent):²³

	1948-1952	1953-1956	1957-1960	1948-1960
National income	1.9	8.4	13.0	7.2
Industrial production	6.4	12.8	14.2	10.7
Agricultural production	-1.5	4.1	10.5	4.9

²¹ *Komunist*, 11-12 (1955), 587-609.

²² Cf. Tito's report at the Seventh Congress of the LCY, *VII Kongres . . .*, pp. 59-60. An over-all survey of the Five Year Plan can be found in *Yugoslav Survey*, I, 1 (April 1960), 47-57.

²³ *Društveni plan privrednog razvitka Jugoslavije od 1961 do 1965 godine* (Belgrade, 1961), p. 50.

These statistics of speedy growth should, however, be qualified by some specific considerations. One is that the percentage increase in total production was disproportionally influenced both by the production of certain articles which previously were not produced in Yugoslavia at all and by the relative advance of some formerly underdeveloped branches of the economy. Second, one must take into account the huge sums of Western, and especially American, aid to Yugoslavia, either in the form of direct aid (gifts), or as long-term credits and loans received under favorable conditions.²⁴ Third, there were still some grave and unsolved economic problems. These included a steady pressure of needs and claims in excess of the actual level of production and the continued unfavorable balance of foreign trade. Agriculture also was in bad shape. There were shortages in the development of livestock breeding, high prices, inadequate transportation facilities, and poor technical equipment for the marketing network and storage facilities. Finally, as the best evidence that, in spite of the gleaming statistics, the Yugoslav economic system was far from satisfactory, a full-fledged train of economic reforms was initiated at the very end of 1960 and hastily approved by the National Assembly in February-March 1961.

THE LAST STAGE OF ECONOMIC REFORM

It is practically impossible to analyze here the more than thirty complex measures voted by the Assembly in launching the economic reforms, which are designed to facilitate fulfilling the latest Five Year Plan (1961-1965) adopted at the end of December 1960. What can be done, at best, is to outline the targets of these reforms. The first was a currency and tariff reform, scheduled to begin January 1, 1961. Instead of the hitherto unrealistic rate of exchange—300 dinars for

²⁴ According to statistics compiled by Radio Free Europe, from 1945 up to April 1961 Yugoslavia had received from the West, especially from the United States, more than \$3.5 billion. To this sum (which includes \$424,800,000 received immediately after the war from UNRRA, and \$724,168,000 of American military aid) one should add US aid to Yugoslavia by means of so-called convertible dinars, i.e., Americans agreed to sell goods to Yugoslavia (mostly agricultural products) receiving instead of dollars, Yugoslav dinars. This means, if one takes the pre-1961 rate of exchange, that Yugoslavia received an additional \$777,910,000 in US aid. In his book, *Titostism in Action* (Berkeley, 1958), Professor Fred Warner Neal states that "total Soviet assistance [to Yugoslavia] of all sorts from July 1, 1955 to December 31, 1957, was valued at \$465,000,000." (p. 269)

an official US dollar and 600 dinars for a tourist dollar—a new and uniform rate of 750 dinars for one dollar was introduced. This monetary reform, made possible by means of International Monetary Fund credits of \$275 million, of which the United States provided \$100 million, is aimed at stabilizing local currency. Likewise, the tariff reform provides for ending export subsidies, sets a standard protective tariff system and liberalizes the program of imports. The goal of both operations is to make it possible for Yugoslavia to compete with foreign producers and qualify her to apply for full membership in the GATT. The hope is that the perennial foreign trade deficit will be left behind.

A second set of internal economic reforms concerns a new system of distributing both enterprise and workers' income. The principle is that the working collectives, or the staffs of economic organizations, will have an income corresponding to the amount of invested labor and the success of business operations, while every individual in the collectives will receive returns in accordance with his own productivity and the success of his whole collective.²⁵ This means that the enterprises will in the future pay out only 45 per cent (15 per cent to the central government, 16 per cent to the local, district or republican organs, 14 per cent to the social insurance fund) instead of 80 per cent from their gross income. They will be free to use the remaining 55 per cent of net earnings for purchasing new equipment, amortization, reserves and extra wage payments. In return, however, contrary to the earlier practice of getting investment capital from a general investment fund, every enterprise will have to provide for its own investment. As for individual income, in every enterprise and every institution (in farms, hospitals, schools and laboratories as well as in factories) there will be a systematic application of the system of remuneration according to the output of every individual, his production unit (department or workshop), and his enterprise as a whole.

A third series of reforms relate to further decentralization of the

²⁵ For a general discussion of the meaning of economic reforms see the report of Mijalko Todorovic, vice-president of the Yugoslav federal executive council (Government), submitted to the National Assembly on February 28, 1961, *Komunist*, March 2, 1961. For a brief account in English about the same problem see the front-page article in the monthly paper, *Yugoslav Life*, Belgrade, no. 53-54 (February-March 1961).

banking and credit system. The crux of the reform is the new role of the central National Bank, which will give credit in the future as a kind of "banker's bank" to specialized banks (the industrial-trade bank, agricultural bank, and foreign trade) which in their turn will have transactions with the communal banks. The latter, according to the legislative intent, should become the basic credit institution of the entire Yugoslav banking system. To do so, they would do business directly with enterprises which exist on the territory of a commune, and thus become a kind of "common treasury of every commune." Control over the entire circuit of credit operations would be exercised by the National Bank.²⁶

It is too early to make any comment about the workings and results of the new system.²⁷ What can be noted as one of the basic characteristics of Tito's Yugoslavia in the last few years is the legislators' intent and the reactions of economic agents. Countless pronouncements by leading figures in Yugoslav public life, and even more numerous articles in newspapers and reviews extol the virtues of these reforms as further progress in the development of socialist social relations. What matters is that the word "incentives" has become a key word in the vocabulary of today's Yugoslavia; and, in an obviously different context it reminds one of the Guizot's famous slogan, "*enrichissez-vous*." The socialist version of the same principle was bluntly stated by Mijalko Todorovic when he spoke before the Central Committee of the LCY in November 1959. He talked of the necessity of "accustoming our people to strive so much and so intensely to acquire and to spend that their own yearning for gain will push them to work better."²⁸ In this connection, the obsession with productivity and

²⁶ For more details about the new banking and credit system, see *Komunist*, October 27, 1960, and *Borba*, November 11 and 13, 1960.

²⁷ The accumulated evidence—particularly for the second half of 1961—indicates further economic shortcomings and problems. In addition to the hotly-debated sharp rise in prices that took place in March and the inflation worries that arose in June, a poor harvest led to serious deterioration in the agricultural situation. Industrial production also failed to meet the requirements set for it; and Yugoslav exports likewise lagged far behind. Lack of harmony between production and consumption led authorities to consider new administrative measures to cope with the imbalances. More important, however, were indications of an emerging factional dispute within the LCY at the third plenary session of the League's Central Committee November 27, 1961.

²⁸ *Drugi Plenum* . . . , p. 62.

efficiency completely mutes the ideological considerations of justice and equality. It is exactly in this spirit that one should understand Tito's words—a reproach to his colleagues in the Central Committee—that “one gets the impression that among the discussants there are two groups: the economists and the communists, the latter being greatly outnumbered.”²⁹ These words again lead into further examination of Yugoslavia's social scene today.

A PECULIAR ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY

For any evaluation of the Titoist regime it is necessary to indicate some broad social problems and phenomena. Their significance is to be found in the fact that they mirror forces and relationships which will have critical importance in shaping the future destiny of the regime. Let us begin with two facts. The first one, a consequence of rapid industrialization, is the substantial change in the composition of the population. According to official statistics, while in 1953 the agricultural population amounted to 60 per cent of the total population, during 1960 the farm population was expected to equal the nonagricultural population. Together with the increase in the industrial and urban population, the regime has introduced new measures of socialization. For example, in December 1958 the Federal Assembly voted a law nationalizing all apartment houses containing more than two large or three small dwelling units and all land for building sites in urban areas. Also, during 1959, measures were taken to carry out a law forbidding private medical practice.

The acquisitive instinct within a collectivist environment could not produce classical capitalist features. Instead, new relationships emerged in Yugoslavia, profoundly reshaping individual mentalities and behavior. To start with the lives of many individual citizens, the persistent discrepancy between low salaries and high prices, accentuated by a greater display of commodities, has created a widespread practice of “moonlighting.” “In these second jobs,” wrote a competent observer, “earnings are often substantially higher than official wages. The saying is that the workers need the official job for the social security which it alone can offer, and the second job in order to survive. . . . The world of printed statistics and the one in which

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

the Yugoslavs really live are only distantly related.”³⁰ Likewise the relative improvement in the standard of living³¹ has resulted in a kind of frantic striving for a better material life at any price. The often savage, legal and illegal, fight to secure suitable living accommodations (still largely inadequate), the cult of possessing a car or making a trip abroad, not to speak about such mundane things as the purchase of TV sets, washing machines, better suits, or vacationing in relatively expensive sea resorts, are some of the manifestations of a life which has considerably improved from the drabness and privations of earlier years; but for the great majority, appetite still exceeds opportunity. This explains, at least partly, why the papers are full of “economic crimes.” This also is one reason why a noted young film critic has recently bitterly scored his countrymen as the “DINARic race,” using a play on words to suggest that the proud “Dinaric” ethnic type is today becoming the worshiper of the “dinar.” He said, in addition, “the principle of remuneration according to output corrupts those men who interpret the new principle as in actuality a return to the old, free competition—*homo homini lupus*.”³²

There is another and more important aspect of the process created by the unleashing of incentives. Put in its simplest way it is the problem of investments, or the disproportion between available capital goods and everybody’s preoccupation with economic gain. Testimony from the highest LCY bodies down to the daily newspapers show the tensions and contradictions among competitors. Who are these opposed parties? At the top there are representatives of the republics who quarrel among themselves—even within the forum of the Central Committee of the LCY³³—about who should get more: the

³⁰ Adolf Sturmthal, “Yugoslavia’s Split Personality,” *New Leader*, November 30, 1959, p. 20.

³¹ When speaking of the standard of living and the regime’s boast about increases in per capita expenditure for consumer goods, one should take into account the alarming dimensions of consumer credit, which amounted to 52 billion dinars in the first eight months of 1959.

³² Dejan Djurkovic at the colloquy “Razgovor o domaćem filmu” (Conversation on domestic movies), *Delo*, 3 (March 1961), 341. This entire colloquy is a curious example of several “angry young men” criticizing Yugoslav social conformism.

³³ In his closing speech at the second plenum (November 1959) Tito termed as “unworthy of communists” a quarrel among the members of the CC on the

richer to become more prosperous, or the poorer to escape their underdevelopment? Similar tensions occur on lower levels: between more and less naturally and economically favored regions within single republics; between districts and communes because of the still hazy delimitation of their administrative and economic authority; between "rich" and "poor" communes; between advanced enterprises, able to make greater profits, and their less favored competitors. The intensity of the competition favors another phenomenon, flagrantly at odds with the official dogma of workers' self-government: "managerialism" persists in decentralized enterprises; decisions are made by directors in connivance with the local authorities under the quiet acquiescence of the workers' councils themselves, which theoretically are masters of the factories.³⁴

These manifestations of acquisitiveness and competition, which explain Yugoslavia's economic dynamism and rapid development, do not leave the rulers of the country blind to the dangers of this, in Tito's words, "megalomaniac breathlessness" in economic life. This explains why in recent years there were so many measures of "economic reform and retreat,"³⁵ and why the partisans of "administrative" direction instead of further liberalization are to be found everywhere, including the Central Committee of the LCY. In summing up what has been described in the previous pages, it is necessary to stress again two elements which more than anything else distinguish Tito's Yugoslavia: one is the hectic and clearly experimental character of its economic life, with its far-reaching impact on

problem of investment among various republics. He spoke in the same connection of the dangers of "localism," which seems at times to become "national chauvinism," *Drugi plenum* . . . , pp. 15, 12.

³⁴ It is interesting to quote in this connection the words of the leading Montenegrin communist, Blazo Jovanovic, pronounced at the plenary session of the CC of the LCY of Montenegro, on November 22, 1960: "We will not advance very much," he warned, "if the policy of our enterprises continues to be determined solely by the directors in agreement with the organs of people's committees. Therefore, the problems of our enterprises must arouse the interest of all collectives. . . . We have enough people who realize very well many weaknesses, but they do not criticize for fear of our leading men. This is intolerable in our social system." *Borba*, November 23, 1960.

³⁵ Cf. John Michael Montias' article under the same title in *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII, 2 (January 1959). See on the same subject chap. X of Charles P. McVickers' book, *Titoism: Pattern for International Communism* (New York, 1957).

the social life of the people; the second and fundamental element is the behavior of the political monolith and monopolist—the League of Communists—which plays with unorthodox reforms in the hope that citizens whose economic status is improving will forget about their lost freedom of internal self-determination.

IDEOLOGICAL EROSION AND THE NEW GENERATION

There is a final field which must be included in this survey of the internal aspects of Titoism during the last six years. It concerns the maturation of a phenomenon which might be termed “ideological erosion.” This process began as a consequence of the traumatic experiences with Stalinism and the subsequent pragmatic de-Stalinization. Although the official indoctrination with Marxism-Leninism-Titoism continues at all levels, it is neutralized in part by the aforementioned impact of “economism” and a widespread realization that doctrinal precepts are one thing and concrete human and social relations a very different one. This discrepancy between theory and practice, around which turned the basic theses of Djilas’ *New Class*, received supreme confirmation in the famous open letter of the executive committee of the LCY, published in all newspapers February 6, 1958. Its self-critical contents stressed the urgent necessity of the struggle “for the elimination of negative features in the political, economic and social life, as well as the elimination of weaknesses in the work of the League of Communists.” It went into detail to analyze the main negative traits, both of the society at large and of the LCY, which were assembled under the following terms: “bureaucratism, privileges, protection, weaknesses in the work of economic organizations, irregularities in working compensations, particularist and chauvinistic tendencies, weaknesses in the work of trade unions.”⁸⁶

Developments in the realm of the intellectual, public information, and artistic life also merit mention. Here again, in spite of attempts to prevent the spread of anything anti-Marxist, the social sciences and particularly sociology show signs not only of methodological innovations (along Western, and especially American, lines) but also

⁸⁶ *Komunist*, February 28, 1958. The lasting importance of this letter is shown by its being frequently mentioned at the plenary session of the CC of the LCY in November 1959 as a basic document whose conclusions were not yet implemented.

beginnings in the study and publications of the findings in such delicate fields as the LCY role in society, or social stratification in general.³⁷ As for the plastic arts, the artists are left free to be as "abstract" or "realist" as they want. This is not the case in the field of public information: journalism (particularly in the treatment of internal problems), radio and TV, and the film industry are controlled either by members of the LCY occupying key posts, or by other people who follow the LCY line and instructions. But the most interesting case is that of literature. To start with, there has never been under Titoism anything resembling the open display of intellectual ferment as in Hungary and Poland in 1955 and 1956, or in the first post-October year under Gomulka. The fact that the writers know in advance the regime's sensitivity and vigilance explains very largely the following three phenomena: first, there is a striking lack of literary works—novels, drama, particularly comedy—searching into the present society and its pressing problems. A noted Slovenian writer expressed it in the following way: "Our time does not live in our literature. People do not dare to write about it. Writers have not yet learned to say the truth."³⁸ This leads to a second phenomenon that is rapidly spreading, particularly among the older and politically orthodox writers: aware that "socialist realism" is dead and buried, and that the society around them presents many unpleasant and even dangerous features, they return to the recent past and write novels about the partisan war. The most significant is the third phenomenon, the case of the young writers. They are in large part uninhibited by ideological pressures. As poets, novelists, or literary critics they are overwhelmingly attracted by Western nonobjectivist masters and it is easy to discover in their works the influence of Joyce, Kafka, Camus, Beckett, Faulkner, Hemingway and even Françoise Sagan. Since the regime considers them politically innocuous it tolerates their "blackness," but official critics frequently attack their ways of thinking and writing.³⁹

³⁷ Cf. the review *Sociologija*, organ of the Yugoslav Sociological Society, Belgrade, and the publications of the Institute for Social Management in Zagreb.

³⁸ Jus Kozak in Grozdana Olujic's book of interviews, *Pisci o sebi* (Writers about themselves) (Belgrade, 1959), p. 70. A large majority of the Yugoslav writers interviewed agreed on the same point.

³⁹ Criticizing sharply the last novels of four prominent young Serbian writers, Pavao Broz in *Komunist*, January 1, 1958, concludes: "Personalities of these works live in a circle from which there is no way out. A world in a mousetrap. An

The last couple of years also testify to a diffuse but growing malaise among the intellectuals. Its sources, motivations and manifestations are, of course, manifold. One rather widespread source of the malaise is the disillusionment with the emerging social realities, with a "DINARic" society in which the moral and material status of the writers is inadequate and declining.⁴⁰ Another source is a deep yearning for intellectual freedom. Some disparate but clear indications of this are the following items: the suppression of the review *Besede* (Discourses), edited by a group of young Slovenian intellectuals, after only a few issues; the wave of national mysticism among young Serbian poets who write in the old-Slavic style of medieval chroniclers; the frustrations of young film directors who see their favorite scenarios rejected; the exclusion from the LCY of Branko Copic, once a partisan political commissar and one of the postwar era's most gifted and popular writers; the suicide of another highly talented poet, Branko Miljkovic. All these facts do not, to be sure, point to a spirit of real rebelliousness, but they certainly indicate a significant degree of alienation within the young intellectual elite.

In this connection a final word should be said about the growing indifference among youth in general toward communist ideology and practice. In his introductory remarks at the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee of the LCY, held in March 1956 and entirely devoted to Yugoslavia's young generation, Tito made the following statement: "As regards youth the situation is not rosy. . . . We have somehow lost our youth, so that it has ceased to exist as a political organization, as a political factor in social life."⁴¹ If this admission is related to the real fascination for Western ways (and unfortunately not always the best ways) which influence young people, one can better understand the anxiety of the communist regime before the less than promising "relay of generations." Tito's own long, public, and bitter speech on May 21, 1959, before a delegation of the official "People's Youth" and the rectors of Yugoslav univer-

imprisoned world. A world which does not know the youth of the heart, or an inspiring romanticism of feeling."

⁴⁰ Cf. the roundtable discussion in *Borba* of October 30, 1960, about the "writers and editors," showing many highly unsatisfactory sides of writers' conditions. The same, but with greater bitterness, may be found in an inquiry among the writers organized by the weekly *Književne novine* (Literary Gazette) beginning with issue no. 128, September 23, 1960.

⁴¹ *Borba*, March 14, 1956.

sities, which stigmatized the massive student demonstrations in Zagreb and Skopje, is only another aspect of the same phenomenon. Recent polls among the students show a mood of coolness towards Marxism,⁴² coinciding with studies which would secure a higher social status and greater economic advantage.⁴³ It might also be said that the aforementioned influx of young people into the ranks of the LCY means less their readiness to serve a revolutionary cause or the socialist idea than their realization that to belong to the LCY offers far greater chances for personal advancement. As in the case of the intellectuals, the withering away of ideological commitment among the youth does not threaten the regime directly. But it certainly testifies that the "post-partisan" generation of Yugoslavia does not look at communism with the same eyes as Tito and the leaders of the LCY.

FOREIGN POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The foreign political course of Tito's Yugoslavia has been, and continues to be, conditioned by three elements: internal political interests of the ruling communist group, Tito's conception about the best way to promote a world-wide movement toward communism, and the Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia. Since the last element presents the greatest practical interest, the complex Tito-Khrushchev relationship merits particular attention.

THE RECONCILIATION WITH MOSCOW: 1955-1957

Nikita Khrushchev's spectacular visit to Yugoslavia in the late spring of 1955 swept away, at least temporarily, the heavy clouds which had accumulated during the years of Stalin's vituperations against Tito. Stalin's heir and Yugoslavia's "triumphant heretic"

⁴² According to a Zagreb weekly, *Vjesnik u srijedu* (April 5, 1961), which took a poll at Zagreb University, less than half of the 3,291 participants in the survey were willing to subscribe to the officially proper answer that Yugoslavia represents the "best form of contemporary democracy."

⁴³ Commenting sarcastically on the results of an inquiry among 2,855 high school graduates throughout Yugoslavia about their future university studies (which showed a discrepancy between what they would like and what they actually will be studying), another "angry young man" scorned in the weekly *Mladost* (January 18, 1961) those "who in their 18th year have adopted a middle-aged resignation and an old-age security."

achieved an understanding based on a compromise. Yugoslavia adopted the basic current line of Soviet foreign policy, while the Soviets signed the joint Belgrade declaration of June 2, 1955, thus accepting Tito's own conception of the relations between socialist states.⁴⁴ Because Moscow did not ask for Yugoslavia's formal adherence to the Warsaw Pact (concluded May 14, 1955), the new pattern of relations with the USSR perfectly corresponded to Tito's ideas and interests. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's "cult of personality," preceded and followed by some measures of administrative and economic decentralization within the USSR, seemed a sign of victory for Titoism in Moscow itself. Tito's triumphal visit to Russia in June 1956 and a new Moscow declaration, confirming the Belgrade declaration, seemed to indicate that, next to Khrushchev, Tito had become one of the leaders of the communist world. It is in this sense that one should understand Tito's enthusiastic words pronounced in Stalin-grad, June 11, 1956: "In time of war as well as in time of peace, Yugoslavia marches shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people toward the same goal—the victory of Socialism."⁴⁵

Moreover, convinced that things in the USSR had changed basically since Stalin's death, and especially since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Tito felt able to concentrate his energies in an active foreign political role. His close ties with the "uncommitted" countries of Asia and Africa were certainly instrumental in Khrushchev's spectacular successes in those regions in 1955 and 1956.⁴⁶ Within the satellite realm, Tito's ambitions have been to accomplish a de-Stalinization following the Yugoslav line, which would make the regimes more popular and thus politically more stable, through the introduction of "workers' self-management," and to reshape Soviet-satellite relations on the basis of the Belgrade declaration. The result of such reforms could only give to the communist movement greater effi-

⁴⁴ The essentially Titoist postulate was formulated in the following sentence of the declaration: "Compliance with the principle of mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because questions of internal organization, or differences in social systems and of different forms of socialist development, are solely the concern of the individual countries." *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy*, p. 57.

⁴⁵ Tito, *Govori, i članci* (Speeches and articles) (Zagreb, 1959), vol. XI, p. 111.

⁴⁶ Cf. Slobodan M. Draskovich, *Tito: Moscow's Trojan Horse* (Chicago, 1957), chaps. XI and XIII.

ency on a world scale. What was destroyed by Stalin's rigidity could be regained by a new flexibility. The aim remained, but the methods had to change.

The main impediment to such an endeavor was that the entire situation in Eastern Europe at that time was highly unstable. The restive peoples aspired to genuine freedom and not to the Titoist sweetening of communism. Leadership in the satellite countries remained largely in the hands of Stalinists, Tito's old foes, who were unwilling to follow a course inspired by a former "imperialist spy." The revolutionary events in Hungary strained the apparently genuine reconciliation between Tito and Khrushchev. Tito's famous Pula speech of November 11, 1956, was revealing.⁴⁷ As long as it seemed that Imre Nagy was successful in controlling events and keeping a monopoly of power for the Communist Party, Tito sympathized with him and was opposed to the first Soviet intervention. When, however, in the second phase of the revolution, Nagy made a decisive step toward a real political democratization, forming an authentic coalition government, abolishing the one-party system and promising free elections, Tito felt that events in Hungary had moved beyond "national" communism and toward the liquidation of communist rule. Realizing that such a trend might spread and engulf his own regime, he excused the second Soviet intervention.⁴⁸

The events of the fall of 1956, the interpretations of their immediate causes, and the search for a scapegoat led to new disagreements and polemics between Moscow and Belgrade. This time it was Tito who insisted upon eliminating the "misunderstandings," confident of getting along with the "liberal" Khrushchev, still engaged in fighting Stalinist elements at home. The purge of the "anti-Party" group in the USSR came shortly before a Tito-Khrushchev meeting in Bucharest (in early August 1957). A communiqué issued after the talks emphasized the "special importance of continuing to strengthen the unity and fraternal cooperation existing between communist and workers' parties and peoples of all socialist countries."⁴⁹

⁴⁷ The full text of this speech is reproduced in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy*, pp. 68-74.

⁴⁸ In an interesting article entitled "The Secret History of Tito's Affair with Khrushchev," *The New Leader*, October 6, 1958, Richard Lowenthal tried to prove that Tito gave his advance consent to the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution.

⁴⁹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), 178 (Sept. 1, 1957), 21.

The Bucharest meeting was followed by a series of gestures from the Yugoslav side, indicating its foreign political alignment with Moscow. These were: a Polish-Yugoslav declaration issued during Gomulka's visit in September which emphasized the principle of "proletarian internationalism";⁵⁰ recognition by Yugoslavia on October 15 of the regime in East Germany; the same attitude as the Soviet bloc on the Hungarian issue in the United Nations; and finally, sharp criticism in the Yugoslav press of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East.⁵¹

Thus, during the second half of 1957, Soviet-Yugoslav relations seemed again as close as a year earlier. But still one element remained unresolved. Despite all the concessions in the diplomatic field, Tito was willing neither to adhere to the Warsaw Pact, nor to accept the re-establishment of a compulsory central communist discipline. He calculated that with Khrushchev's and Mao Tse-tung's "liberalism"⁵² he would become one of the focal points of a post-Stalinist "poly-centric communism." Such a formulation suited his interests perfectly: it would not threaten his power within Yugoslavia, and it would smooth and accelerate the expansion of communism elsewhere in the world. Although Khrushchev and Mao actually had played with similar ideas at times (for example, Khrushchev's flirtation with Tito, and Mao's initial support of Gomulka, as well as his early 1957 theory of the "hundred flowers"), in November 1957 they tightened inter-communist discipline. Thus began a new crisis in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

THE SECOND SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE: 1957-1958

The direct cause of the worsening of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was the Soviet draft for the declaration of principles to be signed by the ruling communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 during the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The basic characteristic of the draft was its militantly anti-Western

⁵⁰ For a detailed study of Tito-Gomulka relations at that time cf. Adam Bromke and Milorad Drachkovitch, "Poland and Yugoslavia: The Abortive Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, X, 2 (March-April 1961).

⁵¹ Tito's own article in the October 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is the best example of the pro-Soviet orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy.

⁵² In his television interview with Edward R. Murrow, Tito declared that his views on the different national paths to communism were "to a great extent identical to those of Mao Tse-tung." *New York Times*, July 1, 1957.

tone, evidenced by boastfulness about the inevitable communist victory and stress on an even "closer unity" between socialist countries "united in a single community." Enumerating "a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course," the draft implied the leading role of the USSR ("the first and the mightiest socialist power") and put particular emphasis on the need to combat "revisionism" as the main danger to socialist unity.⁵³ As a consequence of such unacceptable formulations, Tito became diplomatically ill and did not go to Moscow as planned. His closest collaborators, Kardelj and Rankovic, who went to the celebration, refused to sign the declaration of the twelve communist parties in power, but signed, together with sixty-four other communist parties of various countries, the so-called Peace Manifesto, which "endorsed every major foreign policy proposal of the Soviet Union."⁵⁴

As in the case of the Hungarian Revolution, the ambiguity of the Titoist position was again demonstrated. By signing the Peace Manifesto, the Yugoslavs wanted to show their solidarity with other communist parties. By designating the Moscow declaration as contrary to the Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956) agreements, Tito particularly criticized the abandonment of the principle of "bilateral relations" between socialist states, which was, according to him, the most efficient way "to mobilize all the forces of socialism."⁵⁵ More precisely, "the conflict between the traditional Soviet dichotomic image of the world and the Yugoslav version of an interrelated, world-wide, and largely organic development toward socialism was not resolved."⁵⁶ In fact, Tito was aware that by signing the Moscow declaration he would certainly alienate the West with its important economic and indirect political support. Additionally, he would submit himself to collective discipline, formulated this time exclusively by Moscow and Peking. He was not willing to risk another Cominform adventure.

The November 1957 disagreement did not lead immediately to a

⁵³ For the full text of the Moscow Declaration, see *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute. Full text of Main Documents, April-June 1958*. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1959), pp. 12-25.

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, November 23, 1957.

⁵⁵ From Tito's report at the Seventh Congress of the LCY. *VII Kongres . . .*, p. 51.

⁵⁶ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 312-13.

new dispute. The latter came in March 1958, when the LCY sent the draft of its future program to all communist parties for advance examination, in view of its Seventh Congress to be held a month later. The parts of the draft concerning international problems dealt with three main themes. One was a criticism of Western diplomacy, of NATO and of those "most reactionary circles of capitalism and imperialism [which] have not yet renounced plans for an aggressive crusade against Communism and the socialist countries." The second censured tendencies toward "ideological monopolism" and "political hegemonism" ⁵⁷ within the socialist camp, and advocated bilateral and, in specific cases, multilateral co-operation between communist parties, while preserving the freedom of socialist development in every country. Finally, in a kind of "constructive" part, the draft opposed the division of the world into politico-military blocs and asked for a determined struggle for peace and universal disarmament. Formulating Yugoslavia's own conception of foreign relations, the draft rejected the notion of "national communism" and upheld "the great idea of proletarian socialist internationalism" as its guiding principle. It explained the key concept of Yugoslav policy, namely "active coexistence" which "should rest on respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries." In the name of these ideas and because of the necessity of overcoming the existing division of the world into blocs, socialist Yugoslavia, according to the draft, standing outside the military and political blocs, would continue, together with the uncommitted countries, to fight for peace and co-operation among peoples.⁵⁸

These equilibristic formulations, with anti-Western traits but also with a clear deviation from the general line prescribed in Moscow the previous November, were criticized by the Soviets just before the Seventh Congress opened. The delegations of communist parties which were expected to attend the congress cancelled their visits at the last moment. Moscow's *Kommunist* in its issue of April 19, published a long article, friendly in general tone but strongly critical of the Yugoslav draft. Emphasizing the draft's mistaken analysis of the world situation and relations between socialist countries, the article blamed it for fostering disunity in the socialist camp and for failing

⁵⁷ These two words were omitted from the final text of the program.

⁵⁸ Cf. *Yugoslavia's Way*, chaps. II and III.

to understand that, "under certain circumstances, proletarian internationalism demands the subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a worldwide scale."⁵⁹

The Seventh Congress' adoption of the criticized program with only slight modifications opened a new series of attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism," with the sternest attitude adopted by the Chinese. On May 5, the Peking *People's Daily* not only harshly attacked the LCY program but stated that the Cominform resolution of June 1948 was "basically correct."⁶⁰ The high point of the new anti-Tito campaign was reached during the early summer of 1958. On May 27, the Soviet government formally advised Yugoslavia that it was "postponing" for five years two investment credits totaling \$285 million. On June 3, speaking at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Khrushchev made his strongest attack on Yugoslav revisionism, calling it the "Trojan horse" of imperialism in the socialist camp.⁶¹ On June 17, Imre Nagy was executed. The announcement of the sentence by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice stressed the role played by the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest in November 1956, which allegedly served as a basis for Nagy's "underground subversive work."⁶²

Tito and the Yugoslav press answered these attacks immediately. In a speech at Labin on June 15, Tito complained about the "poor understanding on the part of the leaders of countries building Socialism." He pointed out that the main reason for the new campaign was not the program of the LCY, but his refusal either to sign the declaration of the twelve parties in Moscow or to join the socialist bloc. Tito defended his attitude on all lines, denied ever having attacked the Soviet Union or having made any concessions to the United States. He compared Chinese foreign policy with that of "the most reactionary warmongering elements in the West," and accused Khrushchev of supporting an "unprincipled campaign against Socialist Yugoslavia." He boasted again of the fidelity of the LCY to Marxism-Leninism, saying proudly that "it appears to us that history bestowed on us this hard road to preserve the development of Socialism

⁵⁹ *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy*, pp. 158-59.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-76.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-200.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 215-19.

from degeneration.”⁶³ It looked as though the new feud were to evolve along the same lines as ten years before.

1959-1961: A PECULIAR PATTERN OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

As if to prove that history never repeats itself in an identical way, Khrushchev's handling of Tito's case was quite different in tactic than Stalin's had been. Its three most significant features emerged during the summer and fall of 1958 and remained the same thereafter. In the first place, in his speech at the congress of the German Socialist Unity Party on July 11, 1958, Khrushchev declared that "in our struggle for the Communist cause, we should not devote greater attention to the Yugoslav revisionists than they actually deserve."⁶⁴ The clear implication was that, contrary to the practice under Stalin, Yugoslavia should be treated with indifference rather than with indignation. In a speech made on November 11, during Gomulka's prolonged visit to the Soviet capital, Khrushchev outlined two more points of his attitude toward Yugoslavia. One was that: "We will strive to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia along state lines, and encourage trade and cultural ties"; the second point was: "As for our disagreement on ideological questions, we have waged and will continue to wage an irreconcilable struggle against distortions of Marxism-Leninism."⁶⁵

These modes of conduct meant a major reversal in the tactic of dealing with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev was no longer the rather harried leader of a trembling empire that he seemed in 1956 and 1957. The sputnik triumph heralded a new period of self-confidence. His speech at the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU, January 27, 1959, also clearly indicated a new Soviet formula for control over East Central Europe through economic integration directed by the Council on Mutual Economic Aid. His theory of "simultaneous entrance of all socialist countries into the higher phase of communist society"⁶⁶ meant further isolation of Tito's Yugoslavia. The latter's application to be included in the COMECON work as an observer was twice turned down. For all these reasons, Khrushchev did not need to woo

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 202-14.

⁶⁴ *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, p. 215.

⁶⁵ For English translation of his speech, cf. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, X, 45 (December 17, 1958), 7-10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, XI, 5 (March 11, 1959), 17.

Tito any more. On the contrary, he set up a new strategy of attrition. It aimed not only at driving Tito into a permanent defensive position and forestalling the impact of Titoism on the satellites, but also at utilizing the influence of a communist, but unattached, Yugoslavia among the noncommitted countries in order to move them farther away from the West. The aim was, thus, to end Titoism as a liability in the communist world and turn it into an asset in the cold war against the West, and in the meantime patiently waiting for Tito to pass from the scene, when the chances of Yugoslavia's reintegration in the socialist bloc would be greatly enhanced.

Confronted with the changed temper and behavior of his onetime "partner," Tito reacted as Khrushchev probably anticipated he would. Khrushchev's first point of "ignoring" Yugoslavia unquestionably hurt Tito's pride and his ambition to influence Soviet policy. Nothing, however, remained to him in this field but to complain⁶⁷ and to continue pretending that "the entire world looks at Yugoslavia."⁶⁸ On the second count, interstate relations were not only maintained on a more or less formal basis, but trade relations between Yugoslavia and other countries of the "bloc" (with the exception of China and Albania) were increased. Long-term trade agreements for the period 1961-1965 were concluded in December 1960 with Rumania, Poland and East Germany, as well as several trade agreements for varying periods with Bulgaria and Hungary. On March 30, 1961, a new Soviet-Yugoslav long-term trade agreement was signed in Belgrade, covering the period 1961-1965 and calling for an increase in trade between the two countries by twice the 1960 volume. As the trade situation now stands, 30 per cent of Yugoslavia's exports and 26 per cent of her imports are with the communist bloc. Contacts in other fields took place alongside the extension of trade relations: cultural, trade-union, sport, and youth delegations are regularly and frequently exchanged between Yugoslavia and other communist countries (again with the exception of China and Albania).

⁶⁷ In a speech in Zagreb, December 12, 1959, Tito uttered a petulant kind of complaint, speaking about relations with other communist countries: "... recently these attacks have been reduced. But there is another system of keeping quiet about and ignoring any of our important statements, declarations, and even the national holiday which we had. The press did not take any notice. This is not very nice. This should not be done."

⁶⁸ Tito's words to a youth delegation which visited him in Belgrade on the occasion of his 69th birthday, May 24th, 1961.

In the field of ideology, the Soviet bloc's attacks on Tito's Yugoslavia continued, with a notable difference in tone evident between Soviet and Chinese charges. A united voice was achieved, however, in the declaration of representatives of eighty-one communist parties who deliberated, behind closed doors, for several weeks in November 1960. One passage of that declaration, called by some commentators a "new communist manifesto," condemned the "subversive work" of the LCY against the socialist camp and the world communist movement. It emphasized particularly that "further exposure of the leaders of the Yugoslav revisionists, and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remain among the essential tasks of the Marxist-Leninist parties."⁶⁹ This attack was not left unanswered in Yugoslavia. A special session of the enlarged executive committee of the LCY took place on February 10, 1961, to hear a long report by Veljko Vlahovic, one of the leading Yugoslav communists, who refuted the theses of Moscow's declaration, restated the position of the LCY, and strongly attacked the Chinese and especially the Albanian attitude toward Yugoslavia.⁷⁰

The trend of recent Soviet-Yugoslav relations offers other and no less important aspects. Despite his ideological quarrels with Moscow, Tito has continued to support consistently the main tenets of Khrushchev's foreign policy. This support was amply shown in two of his recent and most important speeches, one before the Assembly of the United Nations in New York on September 22, 1960, and again before the Yugoslav Parliament on December 26 of that year. In the latter speech Tito scored the West as a major source of world discord; in New York he appeared anxious to come to terms with Khrushchev on world problems.⁷¹ Regarding his speech before the United Nations, a prominent American commentator observed: "Listening to Tito, nobody could doubt that he is positively pro-Soviet and icily neutral toward us."⁷²

This "appeasement" policy toward Khrushchev appears even more

⁶⁹ *New York Times*, December 7, 1960.

⁷⁰ *Komunist* of February 23, 1961, contains Vlahovic's report which subsequently was published as a special pamphlet.

⁷¹ Cf. *New York Times*, September 29 and 30, 1960.

⁷² Max Ascoli, "Khrushchev's Blunder at the U.N.," *Reporter*, October 13, 1960, p. 21.

significant if observed in connection with the verbal feud raging between Belgrade and Peking. A series of articles entitled "Socialism and war," written by Edvard Kardelj and published first in *Borba* (August 12-20, 1960) and later as a book, is a systematic criticism of Chinese "pseudorevolutionary ultraradicalism" becoming "the worst kind of opportunism,"⁷³ from the viewpoint of Titoist-Marxist orthodoxy. As such, Kardelj's work, though attacked in Moscow also, gives in fact indirect and uninvited support to Khrushchev's conception of international problems as opposed to that of Mao Tse-tung. But if the geographical distance makes the Belgrade-Peking quarrel academic, the relations between Belgrade and Tirana had reached in the spring of 1961 a degree of mutual disparagement and vituperation reminiscent of the worst days of the Cominform-Tito hostility.⁷⁴

Another, and in a way the most significant, aspect of Tito's foreign policy is its militant anticolonialism. For reasons of ideology and power, it has become the cornerstone of today's Yugoslav diplomacy. Since in the mind of its authors Titoism is an "exportable" doctrine with precise political and economic blueprints (but one that has failed to influence intercommunist relations), Titoism tries hard to present itself as the answer to the problems of the world's underdeveloped countries. Striving to gain the sympathy of the latter, Belgrade's government gives unconditional support to the policies of Souvanna Phouma in Laos, the FLN in Algeria, Lumumbist forces in the Congo, and Fidel Castro in Cuba. It is also in the first rank of the accusers of Western imperialism everywhere. But it goes a step further. Tito's declarations and the stories in the Yugoslav press during and after his recent seventy-day tour of West and North African countries⁷⁵ clearly indicate the conviction of the LCY that

⁷³ *Socijalizam i rat* (Belgrade, 1960), pp. 23-24.

⁷⁴ Enver Hoxha's assertions at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian communist party, in February 1961, that certain Albanian traitors, both inside Albania and in Yugoslavia, in collaboration with Yugoslavia, Greece and the American Sixth Fleet had tried to overthrow his regime in July 1960, inflamed relations between Tirana and Belgrade. The latter denied vehemently having planned any subversive action against Hoxha. But the death sentences at Tirana's spy trial in May 1961 provoked a wave of Yugoslav press attacks on Hoxha's "terroristic" reign.

⁷⁵ This trip, ending April 26, 1961, included Tito's visits to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, the Mali Republic, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

its program corresponds to the necessities of the emerging nations. At the same time Yugoslavia's highly advertised intimacy with some of the most important Asian and African "neutralists" serves another purpose. It provides additional assurance that Moscow, which also woos the "neutralists," will abstain from any action which could directly threaten the established power in Yugoslavia.

The climax of Titoist pro-Soviet foreign policy has been reached at the "Conference of Unaligned Nations" held in Belgrade between September 1-6, 1961. At that gathering of chief representatives from twenty-five countries, mainly Asian, African, and Latin-American, Yugoslavia, together with Cuba, was the leading protagonist of a pro-Soviet line. In his speech to the Conference on September 3, Tito not only supported the basic tenets of Soviet policies (on disarmament, Berlin, and anticolonialism), but, in line with the usual Moscow pronouncements, he employed in his report a militant Marxist interpretation, particularly on problems of Germany and peaceful coexistence. He even expressed his "understanding" of the reasons which prompted the Soviet government to resume atomic testing, regretting only that it was done on the very day when the Belgrade Conference began its work.⁷⁶

UNITED STATES-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS 1955-1961

While relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after Stalin's death passed through many dramatic fluctuations, US-Yugoslav relations during the same period did not change from the pattern established in 1949-1950 when the United States began extending economic and military aid to Yugoslavia. There were, of course, moments when the US official policy toward Tito's regime was submitted to reappraisal, particularly during the intensive Tito-Khrushchev flirtations.

With the realization that Stalin was asking for their heads, and that the economic situation of Yugoslavia was facing a complete breakdown, Yugoslav communists became fully aware that Western

⁷⁶ Cf. *Borba*, September 4, 1961. Reporting from Belgrade on the Conference, an American newspaperman, George Bailey, stated that "The fitting of the Marxist formula onto the natural anti-colonial reaction is the greatest service the Yugoslav regime has made to the Communist cause." He quoted also a Western observer who termed Titoist foreign policy, demonstrated at the Conference, "a useful refinement of Soviet foreign policy." *Reporter*, September 28, 1961.

and particularly American aid was vital to their survival. Consequently, since 1949 they have tried to reconcile the need for aid from capitalist countries with their doctrinal Marxist-Leninist purity. As good disciples of Lenin, they have used the money of the "class enemy" in order to preserve their own communist power. Criticized by Khrushchev for doing so, they have always pointed out that Khrushchev himself and other communist leaders would do the same if the circumstances permitted. They have also insisted that Western aid was obtained because of Stalin's enmity and that they had never made any political concessions to the West.⁷⁷ Finally, as already stated, one of the reasons why they refused to re-enter the socialist camp in 1957 was in order to remain eligible for American dollars.

The US rationale for aiding a communist regime—while not endorsing the form of government in Yugoslavia or the philosophy upon which Tito's regime was based—was founded on the fact that Yugoslavia had become and still remained independent of Soviet control and that this justified the assistance, which would strengthen the economic base of the Yugoslav defense effort. The argument ran that a militarily strong and economically efficient Titoist regime would also encourage the other satellites to seek greater independence from Moscow.⁷⁸

Six months after Khrushchev's pilgrimage to Belgrade, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Tito at Brioni (November 6, 1955). After the meeting the Secretary declared to a press conference: "The final subject of our talk was the problem of the States in Eastern Europe. We reached common accord on recognizing the importance of independence for these States, noninterference from the outside in their internal affairs, and their right to develop their own social and economic order in ways of their own choice."⁷⁹ This declaration, which expressed US policy toward the problem of the Soviet satellites, had certainly a different meaning for Tito,⁸⁰ then engaged,

⁷⁷ Cf. Tito's report to the Seventh Congress of the LCY, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

⁷⁸ Cf. "A Review of United States Foreign Policy," by Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, Department of State *Bulletin*, XXXV (1956), 722. (The Department of State *Bulletin* is cited hereafter as *Bulletin*.)

⁷⁹ *Bulletin*, XXXIII (1955), 833.

⁸⁰ A typical example of this is an article entitled "After the Brioni Talks," published in the Yugoslav *Review of International Affairs*, VI, 135 (November 16, 1955), 9-10, where one can read: "The two statesmen did not discuss any question which could produce some practical consequences. According to what Mr.

as mentioned earlier, in "de-Stalinizing" the satellites in order to make the communist regimes there more efficient.

The intimate Tito-Khrushchev relations during the summer of 1956 had as a consequence the reduction of American military aid to small, routine and long-planned deliveries of equipment. Later in the year, on October 16, President Eisenhower clarified the problem of aid to Yugoslavia in a letter to Congress. The President showed concern about the "more subtle" designs of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, which perhaps were not "adequately appreciated, or defended against, by Yugoslavia." He considered, however, that Yugoslavia remained independent of control by the USSR and desired to continue to be independent. Thus he concluded that it was in the interest of US national security "to continue to furnish at least limited assistance to Yugoslavia" in order to make her able to maintain her independence. All this actually meant was the continuation of economic aid to Yugoslavia, with "the non-delivery of jet planes and other items of heavy equipment to be maintained until the situation can be more accurately appraised during the days to come."⁸¹

After the events in the fall of 1956 and the resultant Soviet-Yugoslav tension, the State Department planned to invite Tito for an official visit to America, but unusually strong protests from various circles in the US Congress and among the public caused Tito himself to call off the visit. In May 1957, the State Department partly confirmed and modified the president's directives of the previous October. The conclusions reached indicated that in the eyes of US foreign policy makers, the intervening events in East Central Europe had confirmed the president's finding that Yugoslavia "is and firmly intends to remain independent." The new appraisal stated that the suspension of certain American shipments to Yugoslavia had produced serious disadvantages and that it would be both appropriate and desirable to resume the shipments of various arms (including jet aircraft). Now, however, the deliveries would have to be at a more modest rate than previously planned.⁸²

The problem of aid to communist Yugoslavia, which has always

Dulles said at a press conference on Brioni, they only discussed important international problems and exchanged their opinions without taking any joint decisions or agreeing to take joint steps for the solving of such problems."

⁸¹ *Bulletin*, XXXV (1956), 664-65.

⁸² *Bulletin*, XXXVI (1957), 939-40.

had strong critics in the US, was subjected to still another reappraisal in late October 1957, when the "cumulative evidence of [Tito's] over-zealous desire to please Moscow"⁸³ again appeared. This time, however, it was Tito who, irritated by these "reappraisals" and the critical attitude of American public opinion, and feeling that Yugoslavia was not threatened by the East, requested in early December the termination of the US military aid. Economic aid, as shown above, continued throughout. The second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the emergence of new patterns of relations between Moscow and Belgrade have contributed to the maintenance of an unchanged US policy toward Tito's regime. During his stay in New York Tito met with President Eisenhower, but the September 22, 1960, meeting was not followed by an invitation to visit the White House as an official guest.

The change of administration in Washington did not seem to indicate a modification of the US attitude toward Yugoslavia. The choice of George F. Kennan as ambassador in Belgrade, approved unanimously by the Senate on March 6, 1961, was reportedly made in order to put an expert on Soviet affairs "in a strategic listening post for following developments both in the Sino-Soviet bloc and in the neutralist camp."⁸⁴ During his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kennan declared that the United States should continue to help in the development of Yugoslavia in order to encourage Tito to maintain his independence from Moscow. He said also that such aid should not carry "a political price tag."⁸⁵ The outcome of the aforementioned Belgrade Conference provoked, however, a storm of criticism in the American public opinion, as well as in many official circles. As a result, it was reported that the Kennedy administration planned an over-all review of US policy toward Yugoslavia.⁸⁶ These reports stirred strong reaction in Belgrade's official circles and Tito, in a speech in Skopljje on November 13, 1961, charged the United States with exerting pressure on Yugoslavia. It soon became evident, however, that the "disappointment" expressed in official US circles over Tito's attitudes at the Belgrade Conference would probably not be translated into any policy changes.

⁸³ *New York Times*, October 24, 1957.

⁸⁴ *New York Times* editorial, January 26, 1961.

⁸⁵ *New York Times*, March 7, 1961.

⁸⁶ According to the leading article in the *New Republic* of October 16, 1961,

Two kinds of considerations might be appropriate at the end of this topic. On the one hand, US economic and military aid to Yugoslavia has certainly proved of paramount importance for the maintenance of Tito's regime and the betterment of economic conditions in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, however, the fact is that Titoism has not produced disruptive effects in the satellites and that Tito himself has been reduced to a defensive role before Khrushchev's dynamism. This places in question a policy of unconditional help to a communist regime which denies to its citizens basic political rights⁸⁷ and is busily engaged in undermining Western positions and conceptions around the world.

TITOISM WITHOUT TITO?

The image of Yugoslavia between 1955 and 1961 that emerges from this survey is composed of four ingredients: monolithic internal control exercised by the LCY, an eclectic but proselytizing ideology, unorthodox (from the Marxist viewpoint) socioeconomic experimentation, and both a defensive and offensive foreign policy. Such an amalgam is the result of Titoism's Stalinist origins, Western influences following the excommunication of 1948, the pragmatic requirements of life, and the boundless ambitions of a charismatic leader. Thus Yugoslavia appears as a state ruled by the iron hand of a communist monocracy which has lost its ideological absoluteness; the

President Kennedy had stated on September 4 that "in the administration of [foreign aid] funds, we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis."

⁸⁷ "One thing that always bothered me about our aid to Tito was this: In no other country that I have been in, did I find people who were more friendly disposed toward the United States than in Yugoslavia. This is especially true among the Serbs. Yet we were giving aid to their bitter enemy. Even that they could take, provided we would give them some good reason why we were doing so. Tito was doing something of the kind, in reverse, by telling his people: 'Well, I am getting aid from the West, sure, but I have not sold out to the West. I am still loyal to Communist goals, et cetera.' I should have wished—I recommended this a number of times—that we tell the Yugoslav people quite frankly in radio broadcasts and otherwise: 'Yes, we are giving aid to Tito because this is part of a larger problem of dealing with Soviet expansionism. We are not giving it to him because we like him. We know your aspirations for freedom. We hope one of these days that you, too, will be free.'" Dr. Alex N. Dragnich, former head of the US Information Service in Belgrade (1947-1950), in his testimony before US House Committee on Un-American Activities, September 15, 1958.

totalitarian substance is corroded by economic experimentation, while the dictator, after having failed under both Stalin and Khrushchev to be recognized by them as one of the leaders of world communism, continues simultancously to resist pressures from the communist bloc and to preach his peculiar Marxist gospel to the uncommitted states in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Tito's leadership remains a major factor. Since December 1937 when this small and inglorious Comintern *apparatchik* was put at the helm of a moribund Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and increasingly till the very day when these lines are written, Tito was and remains the incarnation of the destiny of communism in Yugoslavia. As he entered his seventieth year in 1961, he faced the most difficult problem of his life: his own political succession. Object of a systematic "cult of personality" and supreme arbiter within the LCY, Tito rules over a country full of internal contradictions and external uncertainties. Will his successor (or successors), who now live under the protective shade of his charisma, be able to maintain LCY unity? Will they succeed in preventing Yugoslavia's internal contradictions from becoming "antagonistic"? Will they be willing or able to resist Soviet pressure, continuing to appeal to the neutralists while retaining Yugoslavia's uneasy position between the two European blocs? Only the future will answer those questions. It would, however, be highly important for US policy makers to ponder the problem of Tito's succession, for one may be certain that the Kremlin's leaders will do their utmost to promote and profit from a post-Tito crisis.

13: FINLAND

John H. Wuorinen

Finland's position and status since the Second World War have been sufficiently unique, not to say baffling, to have invited a good deal of comment and attempts at explanation. This is not surprising in view of the facts in the case. Finland had been invaded by the Soviet Union in November 1939. Despite heroic and amazingly successful fighting, the Finns had to sue for peace in March 1940. The provisions of the treaty that ended the war on March 12, 1940, called for substantial territorial cessions but left the nation's independence intact. This was not the end of the Soviet menace, however. In June 1941, immediately after Hitler's invasion of the USSR began, and while Finland was still resolved to remain neutral, the Soviets again attacked. The second phase of the Russo-Finnish War continued until September 1944, when the Finns were forced to accept Russian-dictated terms. The terms were considerably harsher than those of 1940 and appeared not only to jeopardize the immediate future of the nation but to prepare the way to increasing control by the USSR.

This pessimistic conclusion was modified, to be sure, by certain aspects of Finland's situation even after the exacting peace terms had been accepted. Neither in 1940 nor in 1944 did Finland's resistance to Soviet invasion result in complete military defeat, unconditional surrender and occupation by enemy forces. The reasons why Soviet military operations were not continued long enough to destroy Finnish capacity to resist, or why unconditional surrender was not demanded and occupation not attempted, are matters of conjecture. It appears correct to conclude that by virtue of not having been occupied, Finland was saved from a Soviet-sponsored communist government.

The next several years clearly showed that Finland's trials were not over and that its freedom and independence were far from secure. The expanding Soviet-controlled domain in Europe that brought the communist threat to the very heart of the Continent inevitably raised

the question whether the new borders of Finland, defined by the armistice of 1944 and the peace treaty of 1947, would be respected by the USSR. Would the Finnish dike against communism turn out to be high enough, solid enough and sufficiently broad of base to hold where other, seemingly strong ramparts had crumbled?

The post-1945 period furnished a partial answer to this and related questions but left many others to future historians. As the 1960's opened, however, one basic fact stood out in sharp relief: Finland was still a democratic, sovereign and free republic. And there was nothing in the record of the recent past or in the signs indicating events in the foreseeable future that suggested that this area of the Scandinavian North would be torn from its anchorage in the free West to which it has belonged throughout its recorded history. Much as the Iron Curtain thickened during the past decade, it still ran, as far as Finland was concerned, along the eastern border of the republic.

The whys and wherefores of the situation can be understood only by surveying the main aspects of Finnish-Soviet relations during the past two decades, rather than by taking note merely of the trends since Stalin's death in 1953. The circumstances that have contributed to the preservation of democracy and independence of this northern republic were, it appears, fixed by the early 1950's. They are worth close scrutiny because they furnish an indication of the factors that should at least partly decide the outcome of the contest between the democracy of the West and the communism of the East.

THE GENERAL SETTING

By August 1939, when the Hitler-Stalin pact providing for the division of some of the spoils of the impending war was signed, there was nothing in Finnish-Soviet relations suggesting that the USSR would shortly begin a war against Finland. In 1918, the Bolshevik government had lent a hand to Finnish Reds attempting to set up a communist regime in the country. The effort failed, and a peace treaty was concluded by the Finnish Republic and the Bolsheviks in 1920. Since then, no serious controversies between the two countries emerged. Democratic Finland had no unsettled territorial claims upon her neighbor, and Moscow gave no sign of warlike intentions toward Finland.

To be sure, the peaceful relations of the post-1920 era never became close or really cordial. The reasons are obvious. Russian-sponsored militant communism, of whose purpose and activities in Finland mounting evidence accumulated over the years, was the main obstacle. And Moscow stubbornly persisted in considering Finland as little more than an instrument in the hands of "Western capitalist warmongers" allegedly determined to destroy the USSR, and frequently labelled the small republic an imperialist nation intent upon the conquest of parts of Soviet territory. Yet by 1939, both countries had outlawed war as "an instrument" of national policy; both were members of the League of Nations. In 1932 they had signed a nonaggression pact and agreed to the peaceful settlement of all disputes that might disturb their relations in the future. In 1934 these pacts, presumably assuring peaceful relations, were extended to the close of 1945. Meanwhile Finland repeatedly made it clear that her foreign policy was, in all particulars, part and parcel of the policy of neutrality traditionally associated with the Scandinavian states. This purpose and determination was given exceptionally sharp definition in December 1935, when the Finnish Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution expressing this foreign-policy orientation of the republic in terms that left no doubt as to their meaning. "Peaceful coexistence" appeared fully secured by Finnish purposes and policies. On the eve of the Second World War any serious analysis of the factors that might have been considered as threats to peaceful coexistence would unavoidably have had to center attention on Moscow and not Helsinki.

The fact that Moscow and not Helsinki would be the source of aggressive designs if and when such were to appear was actually revealed in 1938. Well over a year before Hitler invaded Poland and German-Soviet partnership in aggression placed Finland, along with the nations south of the Gulf of Finland, in the danger zone dominated by the two dictatorships, certain Soviet territorial aspirations were disclosed in confidential discussions begun in Helsinki by the Kremlin. The record of Soviet purposes revealed by the discussions remained secret—at Soviet insistence—and was not disclosed until after the outbreak of the war. It throws a flood of light on Soviet policy toward Finland. Of the new policy, the purposes revealed in 1938 were merely the beginning. The rest was unfolded in 1939-1940.

The core of the policy was the suggestion that certain parts of Finnish territory be ceded to the USSR.

The discussions were initiated on April 14, 1938, by the Second Secretary of the Soviet Legation, Boris Yartsev.¹ Bypassing his superior, the Chief of Mission Vladimir Derevyanski, he called on the then Foreign Minister of Finland, Rudolf Holsti, and presented the Soviet proposals. They were politely rejected. After a lapse of several months, in December, Anastas I. Mikoyan spoke of the same matters in Moscow. In the spring of 1939, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov took up his government's earlier proposals with the Finnish envoy in Moscow. None of the talks succeeded in convincing the Finnish government that the demands presented could be accepted without sacrificing the nation's neutrality and endangering its independence.

In view of the connection between the Soviet purposes revealed in these intermittent and secret discussions and the policy of Moscow openly followed in the autumn of 1939, the objectives sought, and the justifications offered to support them, must be briefly noted.

The basic premise of Moscow was that Hitlerite Germany would probably invade the USSR, that Finland's territory would be used by the Germans in the invasion and that Finland would be unwilling or unable to prevent the violation of her territory and its use against the USSR. Therefore Finland should agree to accept Soviet military aid on Finnish soil and should lease or cede certain territories, among them islands in the Gulf of Finland, to the USSR, the islands in question (all of them demilitarized after 1920, in accordance with international agreement) to be fortified by the USSR. The clear implication of the Soviet proposals was that the nonaggression pact of 1932-1934, in force till 1945, would be transformed into a mutual military assistance pact. Such a pact would mean, in the Finnish view, the abandonment of strict neutrality, especially because of the alarming likelihood that if Germany should undertake a war against the Soviet Union, Soviet forces would in all probability use the pact to justify marching into Finland. Military occupation would become a fact. That the nation's independence would be lost in the process appeared clear to the men who at the time had to decide for or

¹ See the summary of the discussions in John H. Wuorinen, ed., *Finland and World War II* (New York, 1948), pp. 44-48; V. Tanncr, *The Winter War* (Stanford, 1957), pp. 3-16.

against the Russian suggestions and demands. The conclusion that the Soviet proposals could not be accepted appears in retrospect to have been sound, especially in view of the role Russian military occupation was to play after 1945, in preparing the ground for the expanding Soviet domain in East Central Europe.

If the Soviet purposes disclosed by the 1938 discussion had been known in the autumn of 1939, Finnish public opinion would no doubt have been better prepared to face, without surprise, the stiffer demands of Moscow after Poland was defeated and the USSR collected its share of the loot. It is more than doubtful, however, that knowledge of the discussions would have changed the Finns' reaction in October-November to the Soviet demands for territory on the Karelian Isthmus and a naval base on Finland's southern coast. But be that as it may, the fact is that while some territory was offered on the Isthmus in order to meet insistent Soviet claims that Leningrad's security required a rectification of the border, the main demands were rejected. The fact that no ultimatum had been presented by Moscow during the October-November negotiations appeared to justify the optimistic belief that further discussion and not force would provide a way out of the difficulty which the Soviet government alone had created.

ORDEAL BY PEACE

The Winter War of November 30, 1939-March 12, 1940, was brought to a close by a short treaty of nine paragraphs and a protocol. Its terms provided among other things for the cession of the Karelian Isthmus and a part of southeast Finland, and the leasing for thirty years of the Hanko peninsula "for the establishment of a naval base" by the USSR. The treaty also stated that both countries were "to refrain from all acts of aggression" directed against the other signatory.²

The peace thus established turned out to be only a brief truce between the Winter War and the second phase of the war that began in June 1941. This fifteen-month period sufficed, however, to provide ample illustrations of the determination of the USSR to press for advantages and concessions that went far beyond the gains recorded

² John H. Wuorinen, "The Finnish Treaty," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* (May 1948), pp. 87-96.

in the peace treaty. The shooting war having ended, the subjugation of Finland was now to be accomplished, it appeared, by other means. The "ordeal by peace" to which the republic was exposed in 1940-1941, meant a lengthening list of demands for a variety of advantages, several instances of open interference with Finnish foreign policy or internal political and economic matters. They unavoidably raised the question, almost immediately after peace had been concluded, whether the treaty of March 12, 1940, was really considered by Moscow as binding upon the USSR no less than upon Finland. By the end of 1940, the answer to the question appeared clearly to be in the negative.

A few illustrations suffice to show the objectives of Soviet policy during this period, the pressures used to reach them, and the effects upon Finland's internal conditions and international position.

Soviet interference in Finnish internal affairs covered a wide range. Official protests were repeatedly lodged with the Finnish government against newspapers printing allegedly anti-Soviet articles and likewise against memoirs and other literature dealing with the background and events of the Winter War. Cabinet ministers who did not find favor in Moscow's eyes were attacked and their resignations demanded. The resignation on August 6, 1940, of Väinö Tanner, the well-known veteran labor leader, was the most striking illustration of Russian interference in this area. Tanner left the cabinet because the Soviet government had demanded his withdrawal as a condition for continued "friendly relations" between the two countries.

Another instance of interference was recorded in connection with the December 1940 presidential election. While claiming no desire to limit the Finns' freedom of action and decision-making in their own internal affairs, Molotov informed the Finnish minister in Moscow that if any one of four named persons were elected president, the choice would be interpreted as evidence of Finland's decision not to observe the peace treaty. Among the four was Marshal K. G. Mannerheim who later (in August 1944) became president. It is interesting to note that Mannerheim, in the presidential office in 1944, was not considered an obstacle to the conclusion of the armistice of September 19, 1944, which ended the second phase of the Russo-Finnish War.

New and unexpected economic demands were likewise presented. They ranged all the way from the claim that private property re-

moved by Finnish refugees from their homes in the ceded areas and brought within the new borders of Finland must be returned, to open and sustained endeavors to force the Finns to turn over to the USSR important mining and other properties. The outstanding case was that of the Petsamo nickel mine in the far north. Petsamo held the richest nickel deposits in Europe. Finland had leased the property shortly before the war to the De Mond Company, an English subsidiary of the International Nickel Company of Sudbury, Ontario. Disregarding the binding contract and other commitments involved in the arrangements, the Soviets insisted on compliance with its wishes. The negotiations were never completed and Moscow was unable to lay its hands on the Petsamo nickel by the time Hitler's invasion of the USSR began in June 1941. The mine did not fall into Soviet hands until 1944 when Finland was forced to cede Petsamo and Salla and accepted once again the rest of the borders defined in the treaty of March 12, 1940.

Still another aspect of Soviet pressure during this period was disclosed in the Kremlin's meddling with Finnish foreign policy. Shortly before Finland decided to accept the onerous peace terms of March 12, 1940, she asked Sweden and Norway whether they were inclined to consider a defense pact for the joint protection of the three nations. The replies received were in the affirmative. It was clearly understood that the contemplated pact would come only after Russo-Finnish hostilities had officially ceased.

Nothing came of the plan. The Soviets chose to see in it, in disregard of obvious facts, merely an aggressive Scandinavian alliance directed against the USSR. Finnish and Swedish explanations to the effect that nothing but a defense league was contemplated and that it could in no way conflict with the strict neutrality policy which these small democracies were firmly resolved to follow, were to no avail. The unyielding opposition of the Soviets, buttressed by arbitrary claims and baffling interpretations, led to the abandonment of the scheme. One of the Soviet charges, inflexibly held despite Finnish attempts to explain and to persuade, was that Finland's participation in the pact would mean nothing less than a clear violation of the recent peace of Moscow. As regards Sweden and Norway, Molotov put the matter as follows in a speech delivered on March 29, 1940: "The participation of Norway and Sweden in an alliance with Finland would mean that these countries have abandoned their

traditional policy of neutrality for a new foreign policy from which it would be impossible for the USSR not to draw the obvious conclusions.”³

The occupation of Denmark and Norway a few weeks later completely removed the plan from the realm of the possible. After that occupation Sweden and Finland found themselves even more ominously isolated and seemingly more exposed to dangers originating either in the USSR or in Germany. Faced by this precarious situation, the Swedes and the Finns proceeded to consider another form of co-operation. In the fall of 1940, the Finns suggested to Stockholm that a Swedish-Finnish defense treaty be concluded. During the discussions that followed, Sweden held that a military pact would not by itself suffice and that some form of political union or federation should be considered. Common defense measures would of necessity require, at least in part, a common foreign policy. The same also applied to some areas of economic policy. It was clearly understood and stated that Finland did not in any way expect that the arrangements under discussion would be used to recover the territories lost in 1940 or to cancel any other parts of the March 1940 treaty. Finland had made it abundantly clear that she accepted the verdict of the Winter War and would do nothing to disturb her relations with the Soviets.

These plans the USSR also chose to interpret as the beginning of a dangerous conspiracy. Moscow saw in them nothing less than a deliberate Finnish challenge to the peace treaty. The scheme therefore collapsed in the preliminary discussion phase.

It seems clear that the Soviet government could not accept any kind of Swedish-Finnish regional plan because it would have meant an obstacle to its own designs. These designs were kept a closely guarded secret at the time. After the war it was disclosed that Molotov's visit to Berlin, November 12-13, 1940, had meant, among other things, an attempt to obtain Hitler's consent to proceed to the business of bringing Finland completely under Soviet domination. Hitler refused on the grounds that the territorial status quo in the Baltic

³ Quoted in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy* (New York, 1941), p. 45. The essential documents relating to the Finnish-Norwegian-Swedish discussions are given on pp. 40-45. The seventy-four documents of this compilation more than suffice to indicate the pressures and exactions to which the nation was exposed during March 1940-June 1941.

area must not be disturbed. The failure to accommodate the USSR in this matter appears in retrospect to have been one of the early indications of the Hitlerite plans that were to lead to the German attack on the USSR in June 1941.

Meantime the Soviet extortion of special rights and concessions from Finland continued unabated. One of the most ominous was the demand for transit rights on Finnish railways to and from Hanko, now in Soviet hands. This meant the right of way through more than half of the main south Finland railroad artery. The peace treaty offered no basis for the demand. Having no alternative, Finland agreed to it on September 9 after two months of negotiations, despite the obvious violation of the country's territorial integrity that it implied.

THE YEARS OF DANGER

It was noted above that on the first day of Hitler's invasion of the USSR, June 22, 1941, the Soviets began military operations against Finland. Available evidence shows that Finland desired to remain neutral and fully outside the conflict. Continuing Soviet attacks changed the situation, and on June 25, the Finnish government declared that a state of war once again existed between Finland and the USSR.

The war that thus began ended with the signing of an armistice on September 19, 1944 (fighting had actually ceased on September 4) and a peace treaty on February 10, 1947. The terms were considerably more harsh than those of the March 1940 treaty. They repeated the territorial arrangements of 1940, but added to them the cession of Petsamo and Salla. While Hanko was returned to Finland, the Porkkala area within a dozen miles of Helsinki was leased instead. A paralyzing reparations burden was also included, and the obligation to disarm and oust the German troops in the country. (This provision led to war between Finland and Germany; it lasted from September 15, 1944, until April 27, 1945.) Finland agreed to "collaborate with the Allied powers in the apprehension of persons accused of war crimes and in their trial." These and other exactions create a strong presumption favoring the conclusion that the Soviet government—the sole author of the peace terms, although they were also signed by Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Union

of South Africa, India, and two Soviet republics—considered them merely a device which would assure Finland's failure to fulfill the treaty and thereby justify, in due time, whatever coercion Moscow would deem necessary to bring Finland to heel. To subvert the nation's independence and bring it into the communist fold was the ultimate purpose.

This conclusion appeared altogether unavoidable in 1945-1948 when the nation was exposed to mounting Soviet demands and pressures. The attacks were directed against democratic institutions and normal political processes. They extended to the independent judiciary and repeatedly disturbed the country's economy, thus placing it in double jeopardy because of the danger of interrupting reparations deliveries. They invaded and corroded traditionally inviolate areas of individual liberty. Under the auspices of Finnish communists, at all times supported by Moscow, and as a consequence of continuing Soviet pressure exerted in a multitude of ways, a sustained offensive against the broad front of democracy was initiated and energetically continued. The years 1945-1948 became a period of the greatest danger to the republic.⁴ That it survived the attack with all the essentials of democratic self-government intact and without being tied to the Soviet foreign-policy chariot represents an achievement that could only have been recorded by a people resolved to resist communist subversion no less firmly than subjugation by communist arms.

Outstanding among the many indications of the direction in which the icy winds from Moscow were blowing was the case of the "war responsables" in 1945-1946. In accepting the Soviets' terms in September 1944, Finland agreed, among many other things, as noted above, to "collaborate with the Allied powers in the apprehension of persons accused of war crimes, and in their trial." The Allied Control Commission—the Commission was a purely Soviet organ, despite its name—demanded on October 19, 1944, that the Finnish government apprehend sixty-one military personnel on the charge that they were guilty of war crimes. Two score of them were incarcerated, and other arrests followed. The real "war responsables" problem did not emerge, however, until early in 1945, and did not assume ominous dimensions until after June of the same year.

⁴ L. Hyvämäki's *Vaaran Vuodet 1944-1948* (Helsinki, 1957) gives an admirable objective summary of the events of the period he aptly calls "The years of danger."

The demand meant, fundamentally, an effort to label as war criminals and as policy makers responsible for Finland's involvement in the war, many of the leading personages of the war years. The effort was sparked by Finnish communists. It was supported by a miscellaneous assortment of men in stations high and low who felt, for a variety of reasons, that Finland's precarious international situation left no choice but to yield to Moscow's suggestions and demands that "war responsables" be identified, tried and punished. The Paasikivi government, then in office, which included three communists, yielded to the pressure and presented a bill in Parliament on August 23 providing for the punishment of persons "who had decisively influenced, in the Government, Finland's involvement in the war . . . or had acted during the war to prevent the re-establishment of peace. . . ." The law was accepted September 11, 1945, by a vote of 129 to 12. Earlier in the day the (Soviet) Control Commission had issued a public statement contending that the "war criminals" category mentioned in the armistice included also persons who belonged in the group suggested by the words cited.

Soviet coercion had thus resulted in a law that was clearly unconstitutional. It was so because it was retroactive; it classified as punishable, acts that had not been punishable by any law at the time when violations of the law had allegedly occurred. That the communists, ever ready to do the bidding of the Kremlin, had played a conspicuous and noisy part in setting the stage for a decision that the great majority of Finns considered a travesty of justice, merely served to underscore the exceptional conditions that prevailed in the country after a lost war. The law lacked all moral sanction, except in the eyes of the faithful followers of the gospel of St. Marx, Soviet version.

The list of "war responsables" was made public on November 6, 1945. It included eight names. Among them was former President R. Ryti; six former cabinet ministers and the wartime minister of Finland to Berlin accounted for the rest. They were tried by a special court (also unconstitutional) that began its session on November 15. Its verdict was delivered on February 21, 1946: former President Ryti, ten years; the rest of the sentences ranged from two to eight years. In each case the court divided eight to seven. Actually the defendants served approximately half of their respective sentences. Nor did the verdict of guilty brand the defendants. V. Tanner, for in-

stance, re-entered politics in 1951 and was elected to the Parliament where he had sat since 1906. He also served for several years as chairman of the Social Democratic Party, long under especially virulent Soviet attack. E. Linkomies, a distinguished scholar who had served as premier in 1945, returned to his duties at the University of Helsinki and served as the Rector Magnificus of that institution after 1956.

A significant indication of the trend of the times and of the seeming success of the communists in obtaining control of important sectors of Finnish life was afforded by the state police. Under the communist Minister of the Interior, Y. Leino, it became a Communist Party police force. Under the actual control of a tested and tried agent of Moscow, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Finnish Communist Party, the state police functioned for several years in a manner appropriate to the minions of the law in a police state. By the spring of 1948, rumors circulated that a communist coup was imminent. Czechoslovakia had been taken over by the communists in February. In the following month a leading Finnish communist was reported by the main organ of the party as saying that Czechoslovakia's "way is also our way." New parliamentary elections were scheduled for July, and the approaching electoral contest caused much discussion and not a little excitement long before the appointed day.

In the midst of the uncertainties and rumors regarding a possible communist uprising, a cabinet crisis developed and resulted in a resounding communist defeat. Minister of the Interior Y. Leino was given a vote of no confidence in the Parliament on May 19. Three days later he was dismissed from his post on the grounds that a cabinet minister must, according to the constitution of the republic, enjoy the confidence of the legislature. A basic principle of parliamentary government, solidly imbedded in Finland's Constitution, thus sufficed to free the government from a leading representative of the new dispensation emanating from Moscow. Threats and ominous predictions from communists and fellow travelers failed to change the verdict delivered by the Parliament and put into effect by the president of the republic.

The defeat of the communist cause in this case turned out to be a preliminary to a larger defeat in July. The July election resulted in substantial communist losses—despite the fact that the USSR reduced Finland's remaining reparations bill by \$73.5 million about

a month before the nation went to the polls. The reduction was widely considered as a last-minute bribe in support of the SKDL, the Finnish Peoples Democratic League (the party organization set up by the communists and their fellow travelers in 1945), its program and its candidates in the election. If that was the purpose, it failed. The SKDL group in the Parliament dropped from 49 to 38, while the Social Democrats captured 54 seats, the Agrarians 56, the Conservatives 33, the Swede-Finns 14 and the Liberals 5.

Not the least significant result of the election was the government that took office after the new Parliament convened on July 22. The government appointed on July 27 was headed by the Social Democrat K. A. Fagerholm, and its whole membership came from the Social Democratic ranks. The fact that the cabinet was a minority government existing on the sufferance of elements in the legislature that it could not directly control was in itself an interesting illustration of prevailing political conditions. More important, however, was the fact that the communists were ousted from the seats of power, despite dire predictions in some quarters of the dangerous consequences of such "bold" action.

The decision not to admit communists within the gates of government in July 1948 has held since. At the time of this writing (spring, 1961) the communists are still knocking at the door through which they freely walked during the "years of danger" but which has remained closed for over a decade despite continuing efforts to open or to unhinge it. The political police, incidentally, were disbanded after the election and thus ceased to be a menace to the safety of the citizens and the orderly functioning of democratic institutions.

As the cold war between the Western democracies and the USSR became a major aspect of East-West relations, the question of mutual defense pacts between the Soviet Union and its Western satellites came to the fore. Two such pacts were signed by Moscow in February 1948, the first with Rumania and the other with Hungary. Meantime, rumors regarding a similar Soviet-Finnish treaty circulated both in Finland and abroad. The Swedish press in particular devoted considerable attention to the question. Some Stockholm observers professed to see Finland gradually drawn into a "danger zone" that could only imperil the future of the nation.

It was clear, of course, that Finland's precarious position in 1948

was especially evident in the field of foreign relations. By that time the conduct of Finnish foreign affairs was dominated as never before by an overriding determination to avoid everything that might offend the USSR. In 1947-1948, when the Scandinavian democracies were discussing the question of forming a neutral bloc free from big-power affiliations, the Soviets preferred to see in the plan a military coalition serving Western "imperialist" purposes. Finland's participation was especially offensive to Moscow. The result of the Soviet objections was Helsinki's conspicuous absence from the negotiations. Finland's unambiguous pre-1939 Scandinavian orientation had been thus diluted. Under anything like normal conditions Finland would undoubtedly have been in the forefront of efforts to work out security arrangements for the Scandinavian North.

The situation was clarified and given a new dimension on February 23, 1948, by a letter from Stalin to President Paasikivi. It referred to the pacts concluded earlier in the month with Hungary and Rumania, and stated that he assumed that Finland was no less interested than these two countries allegedly had been in concluding "a mutual assistance pact with the USSR against a possible German attack." He also suggested that "in the event that Finland has no objection," appropriate delegations be appointed to discuss the question.

The proposal caused extensive discussion in Finland after it had been made public on February 28. The discussion proceeded against the somber background of the events in Czechoslovakia, where an internal political crisis a week earlier had set the stage for a communist coup. There was no doubt that public opinion in the country—excepting the communists—was apprehensive and opposed to a pact. After consulting the cabinet and parliamentary leaders, President Paasikivi accepted Stalin's suggestion, the country obviously having no alternative. Negotiations in Moscow followed and resulted in the signing on April 6 of a ten-year "Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance."

The treaty provided that if "Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory" is attacked by Germany or any state allied with Germany, "Finland will fight . . . to repel the attack . . . within the borders of Finland . . . and, if necessary, with the assistance of or together with the Soviet Union." The question of when Soviet aid would be given was to be decided by "mutual agreement." If a

threat of military attack appeared, the two countries were to "consult each other." The two governments also agreed "loyally to participate" in all measures for keeping the peace in accordance "with the aims and principles" of the UN. Alliances or coalitions directed against the other party were forbidden. Both governments pledged "to observe the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and that of noninterference in the internal affairs" of the other signatory.

Since 1948, the mutual assistance pact has frequently been mentioned as the cornerstone of Finland's postwar foreign policy. Its meaning and implications have therefore been scrutinized often and with care. Especially during the years immediately after 1948, many observers concluded that the treaty made Finland a member of the Soviet-dominated East European bloc; that the USSR's and not Finland's interpretation of "attack," "assistance," "through Finnish territory" and other elastic phrases will prevail to the detriment of Finland; and that Soviet pledges of noninterference in Finland's internal affairs are worthless guaranties upon which no reliance can be placed.

The events of the past decade have clarified the matter in many important respects. It has become clear that much of the earlier pessimistic analysis and surmise was wide of the mark. The 1948 treaty appears actually to have changed no significant aspect of Finland's position in the postwar period. It appears doubtful that the Russian note of October 30, 1961, and the attempt to apply the treaty to the cold war situation at the time will challenge this conclusion.

That Finland would fight against Germany or any other power in the event of an armed attack is clear, treaty or no treaty. There is nothing in Finland's record to date that challenges this conclusion. The provision in the treaty that "Finland will fight" therefore spells out no commitment at variance with what would happen anyway if an invasion were attempted. As regards possible Soviet assistance after "mutual agreement," it is probably safe to say that this provision added nothing of real substance to the situation that has existed since 1944. Either "mutual agreement" will furnish the basis for co-operation in repelling an invader, or Finland will have been reduced by the time an invasion comes to a servitude that leaves the decision altogether in Soviet hands.

The pact clearly forestalls Finnish military commitments to the

West but does not limit other relations with Western nations. Finland's neutrality in the East-West alignment remains intact, and her control of the army and general foreign policy is unimpaired. Finnish foreign policy before 1948 had been conspicuously dominated by an effort to avoid all things that might arouse suspicions or give offense in Moscow. Both before 1939 and before the treaty of 1948, strict neutrality and no alliances or commitments implying involvement in big-power conflicts were the core of Finland's foreign policy. The treaty brought no change in this respect. Its renewal for twenty years in 1955 was accepted in Finland (the proposal to extend the treaty had come from Moscow) with equanimity largely because its real meaning had by then come to be seen more clearly than in 1948. In fine, the treaty still leaves Finland outside the area blighted by Soviet control. This situation remained unchanged as the decade of the 1960's opened. By that time several developments had recorded marked improvement and not deterioration in Finland's international as well as internal circumstances.

FINLAND IN THE POST-STALIN ERA

By the time Stalin died in 1953, Finland had paid in full the huge reparations exacted by the USSR. The last reparations deliveries were made in September 1952. They ended a period of economic blood-letting that had not only inflicted losses running into hundreds of millions of dollars in the way of exports to the Soviets—for which no equivalent was received—but had caused the expenditure of immense amounts for expanding or creating industrial capacity to meet exacting reparations schedules. The direct costs involved were in some respects literally incalculable; they probably exceeded \$600 million by a substantial margin. This was now a thing of the past. Economic stability and progress would no longer be hampered by the potential servitude the reparations payments had meant for eight long years, when the possibility of default inevitably raised the specter of Soviet retaliatory measures including, conceivably, occupation.⁵

⁵ Foreign observers have on occasion contended that the economic independence of the USSR, which the completion of reparations payments made possible, is largely illusory and that the nation therefore is at the mercy of the Soviets because a substantial part of Finland's economy, it is alleged, is dependent on the USSR. The metal industry, it is claimed, is a particularly vulnerable part of the republic's

The years since 1953 have witnessed other events and developments that marked further improvement in Finland's position. Outstanding among them was the return, in 1956, of the Porkkala enclave to Finland. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Porkkala removed a galling and ominous threat to Helsinki, the Finnish capital, and to the country as a whole. If the renewal (in 1955) of the 1948 mutual assistance treaty for twenty years is considered as the price for Soviet withdrawal, it is a moderate price for ending a territorial arrangement considered offensive and dangerous by all Finns except the communists.

Freer winds have also been blowing in other fields. Finland's membership in the UN since December 1955, blocked for several years by the USSR, is one indication of the trend. Another is Finland's contacts and relations with her northern sister democracies. They have become closer and more diversified than could have been foreseen, in view of Soviet suspicions and demands, in the late 1940's. Membership in the Nordic Council provides a measure of the vast distance Finland has travelled since that time.

The Nordic Council was established in 1953 by Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. At the time, Finland did not feel free to join, but participated unofficially in it until 1956 when she became a full member. The Council is a most important agency for the consideration of common cultural, economic, political and other questions of interest or concern to the Scandinavian peoples. Its annual conference meets alternately in the five national capitals. Although its function is advisory and consultative and results in legislation only if and when its recommendations are translated into law by the national legislatures, the Council stands forth as an impressive illustra-

economy and illustrates its dangerous exposure to the caprice and purposes of the policy makers in Moscow.

The contention misses the mark on several counts. Most of the production of the metal industries is for the domestic market, only 15 per cent being exported; the pre-1945 rate of expansion in this field was such as to indicate strongly that even without the stimulus of reparations production the industry would have reached, by the late 1950's, the dimensions it then had; the whole industry—mining included—employed only some 70,000 workers more in 1959 than in 1939, which is a small enough figure to spell no real difficulty if Soviet markets were suddenly lost. See the *Statistical Yearbook of Finland*, 1958, Tables 110, 112, 113, 115.

tion of the Scandinavian nations' readiness and capacity for many-sided co-operation.

Finland's membership in the Nordic Council—Helsinki was host to its Conference in 1957—has meant, among other things, an affiliation that clearly identifies Finland, in the eyes of the outside world, as part of the free Scandinavian North. This circumstance, among others, has made participation in the Council most welcome and congenial to the Finns, excepting the communists and their fellow travelers. It has also meant a direct sharing in the developments that have led in recent years to an increase in common social and related legislation. A common Scandinavian labor market has existed since 1956; passports have been abolished; the benefits of social legislation covering a wide field have been extended by four of these nations (Iceland is not included) to resident nationals of the other Northern states, etc., and the creation of a common Scandinavian market, by eliminating all customs barriers, has been extensively discussed since 1954. The common-market discussions have had no results to date. Instead, Sweden, Norway and Denmark joined, on November 30, 1959, the Outer Seven. Finland did not join, but indicated readiness to accept "associate membership" in the larger free-trade group and became "affiliated" with it in 1961. Among the reasons for the decision not to join directly was the fact that Soviet comment had condemned the Outer Seven as a regional organization reflecting Western endeavors likely to perpetuate the East-West cleavage in Europe.

Finland's post-1953 relations with the West, outside the Scandinavian nations, have long since returned to the order of things that prevailed before 1939. No serious problems or clashes of interest have emerged to disturb the spirit of friendship and cordiality that has characterized this broad sector of Finnish foreign policy and relations. The realities of Finland's situation since the end of the Second World War have been clearly seen and properly understood by the West, with the result that Finnish neutralism, for instance, has been perceived for what it is: an aspect of the resolute effort to remain free and democratic in the face of the dangers that Soviet subversion or the threat of possible direct aggression represents. This appears to be no less true of the United States and other leading members of NATO than of neutrals outside the big-power alignments.

The problem of Finnish-Soviet relations extends considerably beyond the circumstances and developments that account for the improvement in Finland's position since 1948. In Finland, the problem involves a grim and continuing contest between freedom and the pretensions of communist authoritarianism. The contest has taken many forms. The cabinet crisis of 1958-1959 throws a flood of light on Moscow's purposes and on the procedures used in the attempt to persuade, coerce and subvert.

The July 1958 elections resulted in a coalition cabinet headed by the veteran Social Democrat leader, K. A. Fagerholm. Fagerholm had headed the government in 1948 which effected the exclusion of communists from the government, after four years of participation in postwar cabinets. In 1958, the Fagerholm ministry also included no communists, but all other parties were represented in it. The foreign minister was J. Virolainen, an Agrarian, as was President U. Kekkonen. Thus two of the main architects of Finland's foreign policy belonged to the party which was to play a startling role in the cabinet crisis and the situation that emerged from it.

Shortly after Fagerholm became premier, his government ran into difficulties. He was frequently attacked by Finnish communists. They charged over and over again that the "Rightist" Cabinet of Fagerholm could not possibly succeed in convincing the USSR that Finland's policy of friendship toward her eastern neighbor was to continue unchanged. When the Soviet ambassador left Helsinki and did not return to his post, communist critics interpreted the situation as an indication of Soviet displeasure over the political situation in Finland. Trade negotiations carried on at the time with the USSR were not speedily concluded; according to noisy communist claims, the reason was Soviet rejection of the "reactionary" and "dangerous" policies of the "Rightist" Fagerholm ministry whose foreign policy was labelled irresponsible and destructive of good relations with the USSR.

These claims and interpretations were soon echoed by the Soviet press and radio. The fact that Fagerholm and other Finnish leaders made repeated and emphatic statements to the effect that the government and the parties represented in it would under no circumstances deviate from a genuine good neighbor policy was to no avail. President Kekkonen stated in a radio address that Finnish-Soviet relations is "the question that dominates everything else in the field of our

foreign affairs. This question is our only real foreign relations problem and upon it depends the future of our people." Nothing must be done that could in any way be considered to imply purposes or action "directed against the USSR, and we must convince our eastern neighbor that this is our firm resolve." The press of the country spoke with one voice in support of these views, as it had for years before 1958. Spokesmen of every party subscribed to them but this appeared to make no impression whatever in Moscow.

The result was the collapse of the Fagerholm government. Apparently seriously disturbed by continuing communist attacks and allegations, the Agrarian foreign minister and his Agrarian colleagues resigned on November 27, 1958. Premier Fagerholm thereupon offered his resignation. He was succeeded on January 13, 1959, by V. J. Sukselainen who headed a purely Agrarian minority cabinet (in the 1958 elections the Agrarians captured 48 out of 200 seats in Parliament).

The Soviet views and purposes in the situation were suggested less than two weeks later by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. Speaking in Leningrad during an "unofficial" visit by President Kekkonen, he reviewed recent Finnish-Russian relations. Professing not to desire any interference in the internal affairs of Finland, he claimed that a "freeze" had set in with the coming of the Fagerholm Cabinet, led and backed as it was by Social Democrats "who are known for their hatred of the Soviet Union." The statement made it clear that it was the composition of the Fagerholm government, and not any of its policies, that was considered in Moscow as the reason why the USSR "could not expect anything good" for Finnish-Soviet relations to come from the Fagerholm ministry. "Certain Finnish newspaper men and publications" were also tarred with the brush of disapproval because they are "possibly" in the pay of "outside powers interested in worsening" the relations between the two countries. If these "negative influences" were to continue to operate in Finland, "a great deal of damage" to the relations would result. President Kekkonen did not challenge or repudiate Khrushchev's charges. After the account of Khrushchev's speech reached Finland, sharp and prolonged criticism was precipitated in all segments of Finland's press except that of the communist.

Although Premier Sukselainen made it clear upon assuming office that his government represented merely a temporary arrangement

and would be replaced by a majority cabinet in the not too distant future, the Agrarian ministry remains in office at the time of this writing. The reasons for this surprising situation are many. The exceptional circumstances under which it emerged have given Suk-selainen the advantage of allegedly enjoying the special confidence, in the all-important area of foreign policy, of Moscow. The spokesmen and defenders of his cabinet have repeatedly claimed that at least for the present no other government can be assumed to have the capacity to keep Finnish-Russian relations on an even keel. It should therefore be kept in office, the argument runs, undisturbed by the obvious fact that it is a minority government in the strictest sense of the term.

Present indications are that the Cabinet stands a good chance of remaining in office till the next general election in 1962. The Cabinet's position in Parliament has turned out to be unique. It has escaped a vote of no confidence because an interpellation would, in all probability, bring to its support not only the communists but a group of fourteen dissident Social Democrats who have broken away from the party and on some issues side against it. The Agrarian Cabinet, placed in office by circumstances for which communist agitation and Moscow's intercession were responsible, thus draws strength from the fact that the other noncommunist parties have been unwilling to accept the consequences of a vote of no confidence. Among the possible consequences is the likelihood that the communists, having stepped forth to save the Agrarian Cabinet, could not be kept out of the reconstituted government that would probably emerge after such a test of strength in Parliament. The implications involved invite the surmise that the real purpose behind the communist machinations which led to the resignation of Fagerholm was to open the door to communist participation in the government.

In view of the role that Finland's foreign policy toward the USSR played in the 1958-1959 cabinet crisis, the question arises whether and to what extent the Agrarian Government has changed that policy of its predecessor which communist comment had branded as a danger to good Finnish-Soviet relations.

The answer to the question is that to date no change has occurred. It is safe to say that Finland has never followed any foreign policy other than that of friendship and cordiality toward the USSR. This policy has been clearly—and even anxiously—defined and pur-

sued since the last war. Fagerholm and his colleagues were no exception in this regard. Sukselainen's Cabinet has followed the same path. It is difficult to imagine any new departure initiated by Sukselainen, especially since Agrarians were likewise most prominent in determining foreign policy under Fagerholm. The only difference is that the communists attacked Fagerholm for allegedly failing to maintain good relations, while Sukselainen has been saved from such charges. Without any change in policy, he has enjoyed an immunity denied to his predecessor. The reason appears to be the changing tactics used in pursuit of the goals large and small that international communism has set for itself. The distortion of realities and the twisting of facts to suit the purposes sought is part of the tactic.

The record of Finnish-Soviet relations by 1961 raises the question of the ultimate intentions and goals the USSR is pursuing. The question is in some respects difficult to answer, for many of the details involved are obscure or contradictory. Yet the basic facts are clear enough.

A recent foreign policy study, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a Columbia-Harvard Research Group under the direction of Professor Henry L. Roberts of Columbia University, presents a challenging survey of United States policy "in the USSR and Eastern Europe." In discussing the objectives and principles of United States foreign policy in this area, the study indicates what the fundamental Soviet purposes are, and how they differ from those of the United States.

The main feature of Soviet policy is, the authors of the study conclude, the commitment

to work by all possible means toward the conversion of non-Communist states, toward their inclusion in the 'Socialist camp' and toward their ultimate transformation along the lines of the Soviet model. This must be taken as fundamental, as constant for the immediately foreseeable future, and as a basic factor in any aspect of the international situation.⁶

There is nothing in the record to date proving that this interpretation of Soviet objectives is off the mark or that it does not apply to Soviet objectives in Finland.

In the pursuit of these objectives, Moscow can count on the sup-

⁶ *United States Foreign Policy. U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe* (Washington, 1960), p. 53.

port and endeavors of Finnish communists. These enemies of the republic and of the democratic institutions of a free society function freely, enjoying the privileges of citizens guaranteed by a liberal constitution (and, presumably, able to count on Soviet support in their undertakings). They have polled 21-25 per cent of the vote in the four elections since 1945, capturing 50 of 200 seats in Parliament in 1958. The communist group in Parliament is thus relatively large, and the Party as a whole has fared surprisingly well in recommending itself to the electorate.

It is doubtful, however, that the communists will be given an opportunity to assume a role in the conduct of Finland's affairs that is larger than that which they have played since 1948. It appears quite unlikely that they will be permitted to return to the heady days of 1945-1948 when communists were in control of some of the most important aspects of government authority. So long as the Soviets' Finnish policy continues to be limited to "pressures" and subversion, the situation that has prevailed for the past decade and more is not likely to change. Finnish democracy will successfully resist the attempts to extend the blessings of a "people's democracy" to Finland. As regards the specific problem of the Sukselainen government and its alleged superior custodianship of "safe and friendly" relations with the USSR, the nation's voters will pronounce their verdict in the elections of 1962, unless, contrary to indications discernible early in 1961, the Parliament is dissolved before. But whenever it comes, the verdict is unlikely to change any important aspect of the political alignment of the years since 1948. It is equally unlikely that it will in any way modify the unqualified commitment of the nation to the idea that friendly relations with the USSR are a must.⁷ If and when contrary claims regarding Finnish foreign-policy preferences are again insistently presented by Finnish communists or the spokesmen of

⁷ One aspect of this policy deserves special mention. Since the war, the non-communist press has displayed conspicuous restraint in commenting on the USSR, its domestic and foreign problems. The resulting sobriety in approach and idiom reflects a high degree of self-discipline which is in itself a contribution to "friendly" relations and should be recognized as such in Moscow. Domestic communism and its leaders, on the other hand, enjoy no immunity. Their purposes and procedures are exposed to continuing critical analysis and appraisal that is quite sufficient to identify the communists and their program as threats to the nation's democratic order and independence.

Moscow, they will in all likelihood mark the beginning of still another attempt at indirect aggression. Meantime Finland will continue to serve as an exhibit of the resources and strength that even a small nation can muster in the face of subversive efforts to undermine its independence, if only its citizens are firmly resolved to remain free.⁸

⁸Parliament was dissolved in December 1961 following the discussion precipitated by the Soviet note of October 30. The February 1962 elections resulted in a setback for the communists (their representation declined from 50 to 47), a gain of six for the Agrarians (up from 47 to 53 seats), and some other minor shifts favoring the center and the right. All parties once again clearly endorsed a foreign policy that has been emphatically asserted over the years: neutrality in "big-power" conflicts and friendship toward all, with special emphasis on cordial relations with the USSR. See J. H. Wuorinen's "Finland and the USSR, 1945-1961," in *Journal of International Affairs*, XVI, no. 1 (March 1962), 38-46.

14: AUSTRIA, 1955-1961

R. John Rath

The signing of the state treaty between Austria and Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and France on May 15, 1955, ushered in a new chapter in the history of the Austrian Republic. After seventeen years of foreign occupation the Austrian people were again free. On July 27, 1955, the Allied Council, which had exercised supervisory control over Austrian affairs since September 11, 1945, held its final session. The last French occupation soldiers left Austrian soil on September 9. The Russians departed on September 19. The British completed their troop withdrawals on October 13, and the Americans on the 15th. To symbolize Austria's age-old cultural tradition, the gala reopening of the Viennese State Opera, which had been badly damaged during the war, was turned into a semiofficial celebration of Austria's newly granted freedom. With a delicate Austrian touch, the management chose Beethoven's *Fidelio* for the opening performance. No other spectacle could have been more fitting for the occasion.

After the departure of the Allied occupation forces the government was faced with providing for national defense. At the outset the only available military forces consisted of a few border guards and some gendarme battalions that had previously been trained and equipped by the Americans. Early in September 1955, Parliament passed a law subjecting all able-bodied men between eighteen and fifty to nine months of service in the army. In the summer of 1956 a ministry of defense was created. In the fall the first contingent of draftees reported for duty. By September 1957, 38,000 men were on active duty. Since 1958 the army has regularly maintained its full allotted strength of 45,000 soldiers.

No one believes that this army can stop the Russians, but people hope that it may prevent little incidents from turning into big ones. Furthermore, at the time they signed the state treaty, the Austrians promised to be perpetually neutral and also pledged the defense of

their neutrality. To implement these obligations, Parliament passed a constitutional law on October 26, 1955, stipulating that the Austrian government would guarantee perpetual neutrality and that Austria would never enter any military alliances, nor allow foreign countries to establish military bases on her territory.

At first there were almost as many definitions of neutrality as there were Austrians. Austrian communists, of course, interpreted neutrality as precluding every possible association with the West while embracing the closest ties with the East. Neutralists of all hues—left-wing Socialists, monarchists, Slavophiles, anti-Germans, exponents of a Danubian confederation, opportunists—insisted that neutrality meant that their countrymen must be neutral in thought as well as in action and must refrain from all association with other nations, whether it be political, cultural, or economic. However, the Austrian government and the majority of Austrians have taken the attitude that neutrality is strictly a military question and not a state of mind. Although they have refused to join NATO and other similar political combinations with military connotations, they have taken an active part in the United Nations (which the Swiss have refused to do) and the Council of Europe, and have made multilateral economic agreements with various countries. In 1960 they sent a first-aid team, composed of volunteers, and a postal unit to the Congo. Officially the Austrians are neutral, but their sympathies are strongly pro-Western.

Their strong anticommunist feelings were amply demonstrated during the Hungarian revolt in October 1956. Undeterred by threats of reprisal from Budapest and Moscow, sympathetic Viennese hurried to the border to help refugees across the frontier and lead them to food and shelter. Austrians from all walks of life dug deep into their pocketbooks to give help to their wretched guests. Although in time the United States and other countries granted generous assistance, initially the brunt of the burden fell upon the Austrians. By the end of 1957 more than 178,000 Hungarians had fled across the border to Austria. Still others came during the ensuing two years. Although the large majority emigrated to other countries, in July 1959, more than 20,000 registered Hungarian refugees were still in Austria, of whom 13,400 lived in officially provided camps. To complicate the refugee problem, beginning in 1956 an increasing number of Yugoslavs illegally crossed the Austrian border in search of a better chance in life. In 1957 approximately 15,000 came. The genu-

ine political refugees and as many others as the government could find jobs for were granted asylum; the rest were sent back.

The open aid which the Austrians gave Hungarian escapees and even the courageous note which the Austrians sent the Soviet government five days after the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt asking the Russians to stop their military actions in Hungary did not seriously impair Austro-Soviet relations. They resulted in nothing more drastic than a violent anti-Austrian press campaign in Moscow and angry denunciations in the United Nations. The soothing words uttered by Mikoyan in Vienna in 1957 and by Khrushchev in June 1961, the cordial reception accorded Chancellor Raab in Moscow in 1958 and President Schaerf in 1959, and Khrushchev's emphatic, though embarrassing, assertions in Vienna in July 1960 that the Russians would protect Austrian neutrality, give ample testimony that, for the moment at least, the Russians want to be known as good friends of the little republic.

Perhaps one reason, among many others, is that the Austrians have punctiliously delivered to the Russians the annual quotas of \$25,000,000 in goods, which were to be completed in 1961, and of 1,000,000 tons of crude oil, which are to end in 1965, that they had promised in the spring of 1955 in return for Soviet assent to the state treaty. Although the Soviet government agreed in July 1958 to cut the still outstanding yearly oil payments by half, the Austrian government still had to allot \$36,400,000 in the 1959 budget and \$38,200,000 in the 1960 budget for deliveries to the Soviet Union.

While the treaty payments to Russia have been made with a surprising amount of cordiality on both sides, the articles in the 1955 treaty which forbade the return of German property worth more than \$10,400 to German citizens aroused angry criticisms in Germany. It was not until June 1957 that an understanding was reached which settled the thorny problem of exactly how the expropriated German citizens were to be paid. Since then the West Germans and Austrians have lived next to each other on the best of terms.

With their Italian neighbors to the southwest, however, the Austrians have become involved in a serious dispute over South Tyrol. Under Allied pressure, the Italian government signed an agreement with the Austrians in Paris on September 5, 1946, in which they promised to grant autonomy and full cultural, political, and economic equality to persons belonging to the German ethnic group in South

Tyrol. Supposedly to implement the first part of the treaty, the Italians, in January 1948, turned Bolzano and Trentino into an autonomous region. Since a substantial majority of the inhabitants of Trentino, the more populous of the two provinces, are Italian, the Italians have a 60 per cent majority representation in the regional council; hence the Germans have denounced this arrangement as a travesty of the 1946 accord. They insist that the Italians must give complete autonomy to Bolzano, where two thirds of the population is German.

The Tyrolese maintain that the Italians have failed to carry out other articles of the Paris treaty. They say that Italian is still the official language in the area and German is merely an auxiliary language. Most civil service positions are monopolized by Italians. For instance, according to the Austrians, in the whole province of Bolzano only six members of the police force are German. In the provincial hospital of Bolzano all 57 nurses are Italian, only one of whom has a ready command of German. A small number of officials speak German, and there are no interpreters in most of the government offices.

More important, the German-speaking inhabitants of the area feel that they are being systematically excluded from the best jobs. They insist that they have merely 7 per cent of all public posts; 23 per cent are in business, commerce, and industry; 70 per cent make their living by farming. Of the Italians only 5 per cent live by agriculture, while 52 per cent are public servants. Since the income of farmers in the area is less than two-fifths that of the rest of the population, the Tyrolese and their Austrian sympathizers believe that the Italians are reducing them to a life of poverty.

The Italian government has taken the stand that with the creation of the autonomous region of Trentino-Bolzano it has carried out its part of the 1946 bargain. Furthermore, the Italians assert that the Tyrol problem is strictly an internal Italian affair of no concern to Austria. The Austrians argue that as a partner in the 1946 treaty they are duty-bound to protect the rights of the South Tyrolese. After protesting against alleged Italian violations of the Paris accord, the Austrian government, in October 1956, proposed the formation of a combined Italian-Austrian commission of experts to recommend terms for solving all disputed issues in the Tyrol—a suggestion which the Italians rejected. After a fruitless exchange of diplomatic notes the Austrians brought the dispute before the Council of Europe in April 1959. In the fall of the same year their foreign minister served

notice to the United Nations that if the Italian government refused to implement the Paris agreement Austria would bring the matter up for formal consideration by that body.

In the summer of 1960 the Austrian foreign minister asked the secretary general of the United Nations to put the South Tyrolean problem on the agenda of the General Assembly. After considering the matter in an atmosphere of tension during which nationalistic Italian youth staged anti-Austrian demonstrations in various Italian cities, the General Assembly approved a resolution on October 31 recognizing the need to guarantee equality to the German-speaking inhabitants of Bolzano and asking the Italian and Austrian governments again to conduct negotiations that would lead to a mutually satisfactory implementation of the 1946 treaty. These negotiations began in Milan on January 27, 1961, but were broken off two days later when, amidst more anti-Austrian demonstrations by Italian students, the Italian representatives rejected the principle of autonomy for the province of Bolzano. During the summer of 1961 a series of bombing attacks on the South Tyrol were claimed by the Italians to have been planned in Austrian territory. In November the United Nations again directed the Austrians and Italians to resume talks that could lead to a solution of the dispute.

Relations between the United States and Austria have, for the most part, been decidedly friendly. The Americans have distributed large amounts of surplus agricultural products and made substantial counterpart funds and industrial loans available to the Austrians. In addition, they have disbursed, cost-free to the Austrian army, between \$20 and \$30 million worth of military supplies. Two relatively minor issues, however, have ruffled a few circles in both countries. When United States military planes flew across western Austria on their way to Lebanon in July 1958, the Austrians strongly protested against this violation of their neutrality. After the American government expressed its sincere regret over the incident, the Austrians considered the issue closed. Of a more serious nature has been the hard feeling aroused over the demands of Anglo-American oil interests for compensation for properties in Austria confiscated by the Nazis in 1938. In the Vienna memorandum signed in May 1955 in connection with the state treaty, the Austrians promised to give these companies satisfactory indemnity for the losses suffered. By 1959 certain American groups were voicing their exasperation over the delaying tactics of

the Austrians in settling the relatively small claims of these oil companies, while Austrian Socialist groups angrily denounced the Americans for driving too hard a bargain and accused the United States Government of being subservient to oil interests. In spite of these mutual recriminations, an agreement was finally signed between the Anglo-American oil companies and the Austrian Petroleum Administration on December 22, 1959, according to which the Austrians promised to pay the Anglo-American interests \$13,700,000 for the loss of their prospecting rights in Lower Austria in 1938. The Anglo-American companies promised to use a large part of this sum for financing prospecting activities in regions of Upper Austria in which they own concessions. The cordial relations between the United States and Austria which were furthered by the signing of the oil contract were still further improved when, after several months of negotiations, accompanied by a heated quarrel between the two major Austrian parties over exactly how the funds were to be used, an agreement was signed in March 1961 for the United States to turn over all of the \$423 million worth of still unused counterpart funds to the Austrians.

The government which haltingly pursued the long drawn-out negotiations with the oil companies and the return of the counterpart funds is basically the same coalition government which has ruled over Austria since the fall of 1945. In 1953, after elections in which the People's Party managed to secure just one more seat in the *Nationalrat* than the Socialists, Julius Raab, former president of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, was appointed chancellor. He managed to stay in power until April 1961, although he reshuffled his cabinet twice in eight years.

The first cabinet change took place a year after the signing of the state treaty, when the governing coalition disagreed over whether or not the number of state-owned industries should be increased. The People's Party also accused the Socialists of using the state-controlled broadcasting system for propaganda purposes. As a result of elections held on May 13, 1956, the People's Party increased its representation in the lower house of parliament from 74 to 82, and the Socialists theirs from 73 to 74. The Communists lost one seat, and the representation of the Freedom Party (the former League of Independents) declined from 14 to 6.

After a month of difficult negotiations, Raab succeeded in form-

ing another coalition ministry. The key jobs in the government were allotted to the two parties in proportion to their relative strength in Parliament. The broadcasting system was turned over to the supervision of a four-member committee, composed of two Socialist and two People's Party ministers. The management of the nationalized industries (except for the nationalized banks, which still remained under the control of the Minister of Finance) was removed from the socialist-dominated Ministry of Commerce and Nationalized Industries, which was now renamed Ministry of Commerce and Hydroelectric Power, and handed over to a newly created Industry and Mining Administration Company, the chairman of which was the chancellor himself.

The signal advantages gained by the People's Party in the negotiations in regard to the formation of the new government were partly offset a year later when Adolf Schaerf, leader of the Socialist Party and vice-chancellor of the government, was elected president of the Republic. Bruno Pittermann replaced Schaerf as vice-chancellor and head of the Socialist Party.

The new ministry continued the conservative economic policies of its predecessors. Firmly believing that both economic progress and a satisfactory standard of living depended upon a stable currency, the government set the stabilization of the Austrian schilling as its primary goal. Such other objectives as promoting economic expansion, increasing capital investments, reducing taxes, maintaining full employment, promoting social welfare, and balancing the budget were strictly subordinated to the maintenance of a hard currency.

There is no doubt that the government's conservative financial policies have been at least partly responsible for the "economic miracle" accomplished in Austria since the end of the war. True, the large industrial facilities built in Austria between 1938 and 1945 by the Nazis (the gigantic iron and steel works, the fertilizer and aluminum factories, and the oil refineries), the successful pump-priming activities of the United States and other countries during the immediate postwar years, and the general prosperity of other parts of Europe have contributed immensely to the Austrian economy, but the main efforts came from the Austrian people, aided by the careful, sound planning of their government.

In January 1947 industrial production was at the low level of 28.9 per cent of the 1937 rate. According to the Austrian Institute for

Economic Research, it rose to 169.9 per cent of the 1937 figure in 1953; to 225.3 per cent, in 1955; to 234.5 per cent, in 1956; to 247.8 per cent, in 1957; to 254.9 per cent, in 1958; and to 265 per cent, in 1959. For the first nine months of 1960 the index stood at 281.56. Even the recession in the late 1950's did not seriously reduce Austrian production but merely slowed down the rate of growth from a phenomenal to a good, steady pace. Trade lost in exports was offset by increased domestic consumption, which was in large part the result of economic measures taken by the government to stimulate commerce and industry.

According to figures released by the United Nations, the rate of industrial expansion in Austria between 1953 and 1959 was 36 per cent higher than in Great Britain and 41 per cent higher than in the United States. It was appreciably exceeded only in Pakistan, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Japan, and Bulgaria. In France, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Free China (Formosa) the rate was only a fraction larger.

The rapid expansion in productivity has increased the number of jobs available. In spite of the fact that the Austrian economy has had to absorb thousands of Hungarian and Yugoslav refugees since 1956, unemployment is at a minimum and limited almost wholly to seasonal workers and elderly white-collar personnel.

The increase in production has varied considerably from industry to industry. It is the greatest in the basic raw materials and machinery, and the smallest in the consumer-goods industries. In 1959 Austria produced 19 times as much aluminum ore and 23 times as much copper ore as in 1937. The amount of cement and antimony was 6 times as large. The iron production rate was 5 times, that of steel 4 times, that of tractors 13 times, and that of machines $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as great as during the last year before the *Anschluss*. The output of the iron and steel industry in 1960 was 25 per cent higher than for 1959. In 1960 Austria's steel production was 443 per cent that during the immediate prewar years. During the same period that of the United States has increased by only 110 per cent, that of the Soviet Union by a little less than 270 per cent, and that of Japan by about 280 per cent.

Such rapid expansion of heavy industry could not have taken place without a simultaneous increase in power resources. True, the amount of coal and lignite mined in Austria in 1958 was somewhat

less than twice that in 1937, and close to 40 per cent of the needed coal supply was imported; however, in 1958 Austrian industry depended on coal and lignite for only 43.5 per cent of its power. The rest was supplied by hydroelectric energy (42.3 per cent) and crude oil and gas (14.2 per cent). In 1958 approximately 5 times as much hydroelectric power, 86 times as much crude oil, and 2,800 times as much gas were produced in Austria as in 1937. During the same year the Austrians were producing 87 per cent of their total power requirements. In 1959, 8 times as much hydroelectric power, 75 times as much crude oil, and 3,900 times as much gas were produced as in 1937. The large sums of money recently invested in dams and power installations give promise that the hydroelectric power available will be considerably expanded during the coming years.

In contrast, the rate of production of crude oil has been steadily declining since 1955, when Austria ranked after Rumania as the second largest European producer west of Russia. In 1955, 3,665,001 tons of crude oil were extracted. This amount was reduced by 7 per cent in 1956 and by another 7 per cent in 1957, when West Germany forged ahead of Austria. The 1958 production (2,836,397 tons) was 11 per cent less than that in 1957. During 1959, 13.3 per cent less oil (2,458,784 tons) was pumped than during the previous year. The Matzen field, from which 80 per cent of the 1956 supply came, is definitely playing out. Although test wells have been sunk in other parts of Lower Austria and in Upper Austria, the amount of oil found thus far is small. Fortunately, the supply of natural gas has rapidly increased during recent years. While the 1957 production was only about $1\frac{1}{3}$ per cent higher than in 1955, the 1958 rate was almost 9 per cent higher than in 1957. In 1959 it was 37.5 per cent greater than during the previous year.

The rapid expansion of Austrian industry has gone hand in hand with the mechanization of agriculture. By 1958 more than 80 per cent of all farms were supplied with electricity. The number of tractors in use increased from 1,000 in 1937 to 31,000 in 1953, to 98,000 in 1958, and to 113,000 in 1959. Today Austria ranks next to the United States and Sweden in number of tractors employed. Because of more efficient farming methods, the average yield of many crops has substantially improved. As a consequence, although there are now only 85 per cent as many agricultural workers as in 1937, they are producing 10 per cent more food. Although immediately after the war Aus-

tria grew only about half of the foodstuffs needed domestically, the percentage has now risen to 86 per cent.

Today close to one third of the goods produced by Austrian industry is exported. In the 1930's the proportion was only about 20 per cent. The increase in both exports and imports during recent years has been impressive. The quantity of products exported in 1955 was two-thirds greater than in 1937; in 1958 it was more than twice as large. In 1959 exports were 6.4 per cent higher than during the previous year. In 1960 they were close to 16 per cent higher than in 1959. Imports have risen just as sharply. The chief exports are iron and steel products, lumber, paper and cellulose, machines, chemicals, magnesite, and textiles. The main imports are coal, raw materials, foodstuffs, and numerous finished goods, many of which compete with domestic wares.

In 1937, 40 per cent of all imports came from Eastern Europe and 33 per cent of all exports went there. In 1959 these countries, including Russia, took only 13.4 per cent of Austria's exports and were responsible for only 11.3 per cent of her imports. Two thirds of all Austria's foreign trade, both imports and exports, was with OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) nations, particularly Germany and Italy, and approximately one fifth was with overseas areas, especially the United States.

Imports, which amounted to \$922,720,000 in 1955, to \$1,190,382,000 in 1959, and to \$1,472,480,000 in 1960, have been larger than exports (\$724,680,000 in 1955, \$1,006,437,000 in 1959, and \$1,164,760,000 in 1960) every year since the war; however, with the exception of 1955, Austria has had a favorable balance of foreign exchange payments every year since 1953, largely because during recent years the tourist trade has become, next to iron and steel exports, the largest single source of foreign exchange earnings. After France and Italy, Austria has become the most important tourist center on the European continent. In 1959 tourists spent \$208,587,200—slightly more than twice as much as in 1955.

During the past few years Austria's finances have been in a healthy condition. True, next to the West Germans, Austrians pay the highest taxes in Europe. Even though the government has reduced income tax rates three times during the last decade (the last time on January 1, 1958), taxes and welfare costs together amount to more than 30 per cent of the gross national income. Federal expenditures are

also high. The federal budget more than doubled between 1925 and 1955, and the 1960 budget (estimated expenditures: \$1,690,823,320; estimated receipts: \$1,646,522,120) was 66 per cent higher than the one for 1955 (estimated expenditures: \$990,960,000; estimated receipts: \$886,960,000). However, expenditures have risen little more than the national income, which increased 66.6 per cent between 1945 and 1955 and 32.5 per cent between 1955 and 1959. Furthermore, the national debt is low. In 1959 it amounted to only \$623,000,000, which was 40 per cent of the 1959 budget and 14 per cent of the national income that year. In 1937 it was equal to 168 per cent of the budget and 41 per cent of the national income. The 1959 debt of \$65 per capita compared favorably to that of \$84 in West Germany, \$195 in Switzerland, \$1,430 in Great Britain, and \$1,600 in the United States. It was more than counterbalanced by the savings deposits of Austrian citizens, which increased 418 per cent between 1948 and 1957 and reached \$848 million by the end of 1958. Also, during recent years large foreign loans have been made to Austria for industrial development purposes. The Austrian schilling, which in 1958 was more than 100 per cent covered in gold and foreign gold-based currency, is reputed to be one of the most stable in Europe.

Austria's financial stability can be attributed neither to the socialists nor to the champions of free enterprise, for the country's economic structure is decidedly mixed. About a quarter of the industries, including most of the basic ones, are state-controlled. The destruction during the war, the need for making large-scale investment plans, the lack of private capital during the immediate postwar years, and the appropriation by the state of the so-called "German assets," including the USIA (Administration for Soviet Property in Eastern Austria) enterprises which were returned to the Austrians by the Russians in August 1955, all contributed to the nationalization of most of Austria's big industries. Of the remaining industrial establishments, many, although they are organized like private businesses, are actually owned by two big state-run banks, the *Creditanstalt* and the *Länderbank*.

Austrian nationalized heavy industries and state-controlled financial institutions coexist with private light industries, retail establishments, and small banks. The state is the dominant factor in the economy and will probably continue to be so for some time, for there is not

enough capital available to expand the private sector of the economy and alter the balance of power.

This system has proved workable, profitable, and popular, since competition of the American type has not been fashionable in Austria. For a long time chambers of commerce and a guild system, designed to keep marginal concerns solvent, have effectively shielded businessmen from the most brutal operations of the law of supply and demand.

Most Austrians approve of their part-socialistic, part-capitalistic economy because, despite low wages, they are better off today than at any time since 1914. Although the cost of living went up 14 per cent between 1953 and 1958, the net earnings of Austrian industrial workers increased 35 per cent and those of white collar workers 49 per cent during the same period. As a consequence, the Austrian today eats better, buys more and finer clothing and household appliances, smokes more, sees more motion pictures and operas, uses more electric current and gas, and buys more cars than ever before.

The majority of the Austrian people have also been quite happy with their government, to whose sound economic and financial policies they have attributed much of their prosperity. During the past few years, however, there has been some grumbling about the shortcomings of the government. In part, this is due to the fact that, in actuality, the Austrian coalition is not really a coalition, but rather a patchwork of innumerable compromises. Party leaders have attained a power never intended by the Austrian constitution. Real authority lies not in the chancellor or parliament but in the coalition committee and the party chiefs. The highest state offices have become party domains, shuffled about after considerable haggling. On account of the prevailing system of proportional representation, voters do not elect individual deputies to the *Nationalrat* but choose party tickets. As a consequence, since the political future of a member of parliament depends on his position on the party list, deputies usually vote according to the directions given to them by their leaders. Changes in the ministry are generally brought about because party heads have become dissatisfied with the results of a bargain which they had previously made.

What worries critics of the prevailing coalition system most is its strange offspring, the "proporz" system, which has been worked out

by common agreement between the two major parties. After each election the leaders of the two coalition parties have divided the ministries between them. From the key positions down to the most lowly secretarial and janitorial posts the jobs have been allocated according to the strength of each party as indicated by the most recent elections. This apportioning of political plums extends to the managerial positions in the large state-owned banks, the state-owned railways and hydroelectric plants, and the nationalized industries. This scheme of distributing state-controlled posts has been exceedingly wasteful. As the government's critics say, there are now three men for every job: a Socialist, a People's Party member, and the man who does the work.

Although the two partners in the coalition have thus far kept hidden the fundamental ideological cleavages between them, which led to bitter animosities in the 1920's and 1930's, each party still holds to a definite ideology to which most of its followers pay at least lip service. Although after the 1953 elections the Socialists deleted from their party program all references to class warfare and the dictatorship of the proletariat, most of the members still feel that they constitute what is essentially a worker's party and are convinced of the necessity of increasing the number of nationalized industries. The People's Party, whose chief strength lies in the nonindustrialized and agricultural areas of the country and among businessmen, still emphasizes Catholic interests and believes more or less in a modified Austrian form of the free enterprise system.

Naturally, the nationalized enterprises have become a serious bone of contention between the Socialist and People's parties. The Socialists wish to extend them further. The People's Party, following the pattern in West Germany, wants to return some of them to a limited form of private ownership and to allow the people to become a partner in the state industries. This is to be accomplished by selling "people's shares" in the nationalized concerns. A start was made in 1956, when 40 per cent of the shares in the two big state-owned banks were sold. Since then, "people's shares" in several industrial enterprises have also been offered for sale.

Late in 1958, after the disputes between the two parties became more acrimonious, they agreed to hold new elections the following May 10. These elections, in which the main issue was whether or not a greater sphere of activity should be accorded the private sector of

the economy, resulted in what was essentially a victory, though by no means a clear-cut one, for the Socialists. The Socialists, who won about 26,000 more votes than the People's Party, increased their representation in the *Nationalrat* from 74 to 78. The People's Party, which lost three mandates, had 79 deputies. The Freedom Party won eight seats—two more than formerly—and the Communists, who had held three seats, failed to elect a single member.

The Socialists used their augmented strength to demand important concessions as a price for their continued support of the coalition government. As a consequence, nine weeks of political jockeying followed before differences were settled, but in the end both parties decided that this was no time for divorce.

The chief issues at stake were defense, foreign affairs, and control of the nationalized industries. The Socialists insisted that the defense ministry be dissolved and responsibility for the armed forces be handed over to the federal chancellery. At the same time, they asked that the direction of foreign affairs, hitherto handled by a state secretary in the chancellor's office, be assigned to an independent department, with a Socialist minister. Most important of all, they demanded control of the Ministry of Finance and of the nationalized industries.

Raab's willingness to compromise in regard to the nationalized industries and banks brought on a revolt within his own party of conservative business groups, who feared that Socialist control of the nationalized concerns would give the Socialists command of the economic life of the country. In the end, after President Schaerf's direct intervention, a compromise was arranged whereby the People's Party kept the Ministry of National Defense, but an independent Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created, with a Socialist in charge. The People's Party was able to retain its very able Dr. Reinhard Kamitz in his important post as minister of finance; however, except for the fact that they still administered the state-owned banks, they lost their paramount influence in the direction of the nationalized industries, the supervision of which was turned over to a newly created Ministry of Nationalized Industries headed by the Socialist Vice-Chancellor Dr. Pittermann.

The coalition was thus saved, but at a price which augured ill for the chancellor in his own party. Conservative groups chided Raab for agreeing to hold elections too soon and censured him for compro-

missing too much and receiving the short end of the bargain. They feared that unless energetic steps were immediately taken to curb the Socialists, their coalition partners would in the end succeed in reducing the capitalistic sector of the national economy to impotence. In February 1960 this conservative reform wing prevailed upon Chancellor Raab at a party meeting in Vienna to step down as party leader and concentrate on his job as head of the government. Dr. Alfons Gorbach, chairman of the party in Styria, was chosen as Raab's successor. A year later Raab announced that, on account of his poor health, he would resign from the chancellorship on April 11. He recommended Gorbach as his successor—a choice which his party readily accepted. When Gorbach took over the chancellorship on April 11, 1961, he retained all the former cabinet ministers except the ministers of finance and defense and the state secretaries in the ministries of interior and of foreign affairs.


The compromise reached between the Socialists and the People's Party in the summer of 1959 did not stave off further dissension between them. In October 1960 the two parties failed to reach agreement in regard to the next year's budget. The main issue between them was the financing of a proposed increase in old age pensions. As a consequence, the government resigned. Exercising his constitutional prerogatives to accept or refuse a government resignation, President Schaerf instructed Chancellor Raab to make another effort to resolve the disagreements between the two coalition partners. After the budget negotiations were resumed, the differences between the two parties were successfully reconciled.

It is unlikely that these developments in the People's Party and the quarrel between the People's and Socialist parties over the financing of pensions presage the breakup of the coalition in the near future. In all likelihood the coalition will continue unless either of the two major parties wins a substantial majority, which seems rather improbable at the present time, or one of the two minor parties makes a strong enough showing to tempt either the Socialist or the People's Party to desert its former partner for a new political ally, which is also unlikely.

Although the coalition has had difficulties and some critics have had misgivings about it, on the whole it has succeeded quite well, and the majority of Austrians approve of it. It has worked far better, for instance, than the shaky parliamentary governments of several other

European countries like Italy and France. Under their coalition government the Austrians have acquired a will to exist, developed a pronounced feeling of nationalism, regained their independence, and accomplished an "economic miracle." Even though some of them may worry about the course their economy is taking, the Austrians as a whole have a growing conviction that all is right in Austria.

PART THREE
THE WEST AND
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE



15: AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARD EAST CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE STALIN

Robert F. Byrnes

At the death of Stalin in March 1953, the various states and peoples of East Central Europe, except for Yugoslavia, were under apparently firm and efficient Soviet control. During the years after the Second World War, the political parties, national leaders, and opposition classes and groups had been smashed and pulverized. All sources of Western influence had been uprooted or cut off. The communists had made considerable progress in reshaping the isolated societies; and Soviet control over the instruments of rule—the communist parties, governments, bureaucracies, police, and armed forces—grew ever tighter. Finally, a series of Soviet ties bound each state and people firmly to the Soviet system. Outside observers were aware of the brooding discontent which affected this most unhappy part of the Soviet empire, but even the author of the containment theory himself anticipated no benefits or advantages for the satellite populations.

American policy toward the Soviet Union and East Central Europe after 1947 was dominated by the idea of containment. Under this policy, the United States and its allies were to increase their military strength and determination so as to contain Soviet expansive tendencies “with unalterable counter-force at every point where they [the Russians] show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.” The author of this policy argued that economically and politically healthy Atlantic states, alert and true to the basic spiritual values of civilized society, would serve “to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”

Containment by the time of Stalin's death had achieved a number

of successes: communist expansion after the spring of 1948 was checked, Western Europe was revived and made great progress toward unity, Tito's Yugoslavia was assisted in its effort to remain free from Soviet rule, and hope was kept alive for the ultimate freedom of the captive peoples, affected by nationalistic memories, resentment, and pride.

In spite of the progress made, to many Americans and West Europeans the policy of containment seemed a distinct failure by 1953. East Central Europe was more thoroughly than ever under communist control; the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the Korean War stalemate, the heavy cost of the alliance system and of the military aid program, the development of new weapons and the portents of still more revolutionary designs, and general bafflement, impatience, and disappointment led to a popular flirtation with the idea of liberation, which was generally believed to mean increased application of external pressure upon the Soviet system to hasten its collapse and effect the emancipation of the peoples of East Central Europe.

So far as can be determined, American talk about a rollback and about liberation had no influence upon Soviet policy, although it did frighten America's allies, stimulate anti-Americanism, and contribute to the Soviet Union's remarkable achievement in portraying the United States as an aggressor state. Indeed, the liberation theme, most prominent in the months before the 1952 elections, disappeared from the American vocabulary by late 1954, when new Soviet policies had begun to appear.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1956 CRISES

Shortly after the death of Stalin, the new Soviet rulers apparently decided to reduce or eliminate the political liabilities they had inherited from their old master. In the summer of 1953 they ended the Korean War. Within the Soviet Union they spoke of collective leadership, relaxed the severely repressive system, gradually reduced the prison camp population, and promised more consumer goods. In East Central Europe the period after Stalin's death witnessed the birth of a new policy called the New Course, which consisted of a slight political relaxation, releases of political prisoners, and revision of economic plans to allow for production of more consumer goods.

Above all Stalin's successors adopted a new policy toward Yugoslavia.

It is clear that the Soviet leaders were convinced that ousting Tito's Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948 had been a serious mistake, one upon which the Western allies had skillfully capitalized. They apparently believed that Tito would return to the position he had held before June 1948. They also must have believed that this mission must be accomplished to end the heresy of national communism, to destroy the symbol of Tito as an independent communist, to ensure Soviet control over East Central Europe, and to advance the refurbished "peaceful co-existence" propaganda line throughout the world, especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

In any case, in the spring of 1953 the new Soviet policy of wooing Tito was launched. Step by step, diplomatic relations were resumed; Soviet jamming of Yugoslav broadcasts and Soviet radio war against Tito were abandoned; border skirmishes and threats ceased; trade was resumed; easy credits were granted. Finally, on May 26, 1955, the principal Soviet leaders, led by Khrushchev but not including Molotov, visited Tito in Belgrade, confessed that Tito had been wronged in 1948, assigned responsibility to Beria, and sought to resume the old party and governmental relationships.

The greatest surprises were yet to come. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, the campaign of de-Stalinization reached its peak, particularly in the long "secret" speech by Khrushchev which ridiculed Stalin, blamed him for many economic and military disasters and for the death of many leading communists, and assigned to him responsibility for the break with Tito. Knowledge of this assault on the charismatic leader of the Soviet Union, published in the Western press early in June 1956, caused shock and confusion among millions of communists who had been educated to revere Stalin. This party Congress also introduced several crucial doctrinal shifts—there are several roads to socialism, war is not inevitable, and communists can use peaceful means in democratic states to attain rule. In June 1956, in the course of a triumphal visit by Tito to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders signed an agreement recognizing that Tito's stand was not heresy, that the Soviet Union had no monopoly on methods of attaining socialism, and that relations between communist parties should be "equal, frank, and free."

AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN POLICIES

The calculated risk the Soviet leaders took toward Tito and toward relaxing control over East Central Europe led to a chain reaction culminating in a successful Polish revolution which limited Soviet control and in a bloody revolt in Hungary, which was crushed in November 1956 only through the use of thousands of Soviet troops and tanks. These developments came as a great surprise to even the most astute Western observers. In the 1956 election campaign in the United States, both major parties urged "that the spirit of freedom be kept alive," but neither urged the satellite governments to become more independent or "national." Indeed, George Kennan, the author of the containment theory, noted in the spring of 1956 that there was "a finality, for better or worse, about what has happened in Eastern Europe." In October 1956, observing events in Poland and Hungary, he described these developments as "an extensive disintegration of Moscow's authority within the Soviet orbit."

The Western contribution to the Soviet problems in 1956 was not direct and visible, except for provision of diplomatic support and military and economic aid to Tito's Yugoslavia. Perhaps the most important contribution the United States and the free states of Western Europe made toward assisting the peoples of the captive states was the picture of growing strength and unity which they displayed, a reminder to the peoples in the satellites that liberty had not been destroyed, that hope remained.

Except for this massive support, the United States and its allies provided little aid. Their efforts in political warfare, particularly through the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, were hampered by inadequate knowledge and experience, and most broadcasts were quite effectively jammed. Indeed, the peoples of East Central Europe were so completely isolated from their fellows in the West that free balloons were used to help put information into the hands of the captive peoples.

Western restrictive trade policies proved similarly ineffective. Designed to exert pressure upon the Soviet government and its puppets and to restrict the growth of the communist economies, these policies often proved cumbersome. In one of the great ironies of recent times, the Soviet government, which has full control over Soviet trade and which uses Soviet economic strength freely as a political weapon,

was able to create divisions among the Western states over restrictive trade policies with regard to trade with the Soviet bloc.

In other words, the troubles which afflicted the Soviet Union in East Central Europe were due to the depth of national feelings, the existence of a free and stronger West Europe, and the serious policy errors of the Soviet rulers.

THE CRISES

The disorders broke out first in Poland, where the Party, influenced by Soviet relaxation, the de-Stalinization campaign, and the Soviet flirtation with Tito, had relaxed its controls over intellectuals in particular. In June riots broke out in Poznan, sparked originally by workers' resentment at new norms but soon spreading into an attack upon the secret police and the government. They reflected dissatisfaction with living conditions, the ancient and honorable Polish anti-Russian tradition, the hatred felt for Russian actions since 1939, and the remarkable relaxation of communist rule. The trials of those who had attacked the secret police in Poznan were public, the accused were allowed to defend themselves, confessions extorted by the police were withdrawn in the court, and many grievances were aired.

A month later, on October 19, at the eighth meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, the Stalinist members were ousted, and a national communist, Wladyslaw Gomulka, imprisoned for almost four years, was restored to the Central Committee and the Politburo and made secretary of the Party. Moreover, Marshal Rokossovsky was ousted from the Politburo and the Central Committee, soon afterward removed as head of the Polish armed forces, and returned to the Soviet Union. These actions were carried out in the face of Soviet threats. Indeed, "our friends," Khrushchev, Zhukov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Konev, and Antonov, flew to Warsaw at the height of the crisis to order reversal of this process, but failed before the firmness of the Polish leaders, supported enthusiastically by the Party and the country at large.

The rise to power of Gomulka was followed by the removal of Soviet officers and advisers from positions in the Polish armed forces and administration, the retirement of many Stalinists from positions in the Communist Party and the government, the release of Cardinal Wyszyński from prison, negotiation of a new agreement between the Church and the State, and negotiations in Moscow between the

Poles and the Russians. In this agreement the Soviet Union recognized Polish "full independence and sovereignty," pledged Soviet noninterference in Polish politics, provided substantial economic assistance, promised the repatriation of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union, assured that Soviet troops were to remain in Poland only until a German settlement had been reached, and gave Poland control over the location and movement of these troops.

Developments in Hungary, affected by the relaxed Soviet policy, the new Soviet attitude toward Tito, and the success of the Poles, followed the pattern of those in Poland until late October, when the movement went beyond a palace revolution within the Communist Party and became a popular and powerful anticommunist revolt, with workers and students in conflict with the secret police. When the Stalinist Hungarian government called in Russian troops, Hungarian communists and Hungarians in general then demanded the return to the Politburo of Imre Nagy, the party leader who had earlier sought to give emphasis to consumer goods and who had a reputation as a national communist. Nagy arrived in power too late to bring the popular forces under control, and nationalist pressure then sought the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Hungary, equal relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union, Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, neutrality under UN protection, the end of the communist political monopoly, and the end of collectivization. The Russians agreed to discuss troop withdrawal and announced willingness to establish a "Commonwealth of Nations," only to launch a sudden heavy attack upon Budapest on November 4.

In the conflict against 200,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 Soviet tanks, the Hungarians were crushed. Nagy sought sanctuary in the Yugoslav Embassy, and was replaced by a Soviet puppet, Kádár, who alternated promises and threats in an effort to obtain compliance with Soviet rule. While the outside world watched in horror, the Soviet forces ground down Hungarian resistance and refused to allow UN observers into the country. Almost 200,000 Hungarians fled after the revolt.

Throughout the crisis which afflicted the communist world in the second half of 1956, the United States and the nations of Western Europe stood by helplessly. The Suez crisis, which developed also early in November, hampered the West, but even before that issue arose, the West had seemed paralyzed. Many observers thought that action could have been taken by the UN between October 29 or 30

and November 4 to put Hungary under UN protection; some suggested economic and diplomatic sanctions; others advocated, in the heart of the crisis, that the NATO states should propose the withdrawal of American and British forces from the Continent in return for the establishment of full freedom in East Central Europe.

In fact, nothing was done. President Eisenhower on October 31 said that he hoped the new Hungary would enjoy "full and free nationhood," that the United States was prepared to provide economic aid, and that there was no interest in using Hungary as an ally. On November 4, he wrote to Soviet Premier Bulganin that he was "inexpressibly shocked" by Soviet actions. Vice-president Nixon the next month wryly commented that "our only weapon here was moral condemnation," but that the communists in Budapest had won a battle and lost a war. In the UN over the next three years, the United States and the states of Western Europe consistently sponsored and supported General Assembly resolutions condemning Soviet policy in Hungary, seeking to get UN observers into Hungary, asking the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops, and reiterating their faith in the eventual freedom of all the peoples in East Central Europe. These steps, plus some economic assistance to Poland beginning in the summer of 1957, represented all that the Western states could do; they were as powerless to affect Soviet policy as they had been in the grim days of 1948-1953, although they were able to expose Soviet actions to the world in a way not before possible.

RESULTS

Developments in 1956 occupy a central position in any analysis of Western policy toward East Central Europe. The skill and rapidity with which the Soviet Union has recovered from the various forms of disaster which threatened it then, shed a great deal of illumination upon Western policy and Western weaknesses.

Generally, most Western observers, including this one, considered the successful Polish revolt and the tragic Hungarian Revolution political disasters of the first magnitude for the Soviet Union. Some wrote that we might be witnessing the disintegration or the breakup of the communist empire; Milovan Djilas considered Hungary the beginning of the end of communism. Some saw 1956 as a mark of the military power and the spiritual weakness of the Soviet system. Others noted that the darlings of the communists, the workers, the

intellectuals, and the students, had led the revolts, and saw this as proof that the influence of communist doctrine and control had been vastly overrated by those living outside the bloc. Indeed, "the children of '56" in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union itself were seen as future carriers of infection, no longer immune to the forces and ideas affecting more open areas of the world.

While East Central Europe obviously retained its strategic significance for the Soviet Union, its value, it was believed, had declined. Larger Soviet forces would be needed in occupation at a time of growing manpower shortage. The satellite armed forces could no longer be considered reliable. In addition, Soviet economic aid and credits would be necessary to prevent increased dissatisfaction and to remedy the onerous shortcomings of the various national economies.

Finally, 1956 had a fearful impact upon the international communist movement, with most parties outside the bloc divided over Soviet policy in Hungary, and with many prominent leaders leaving the Party. Communism in Western Europe in particular suffered a spiritual crisis which threatened for some time to put a permanent blight upon its prospects. Throughout the world the carefully nurtured campaign for "peaceful co-existence" was apparently dealt a massive blow. Developments in Hungary in particular destroyed many illusions and educated many peoples and their leaders concerning the realities of communist rule.

Developments in East Central Europe, however, were a cause of almost as much dissatisfaction and uneasiness in the West as in the communist bloc. The fissure in the Soviet system developed at a time when the West was deeply divided and unprepared. In spite of all the talk about policy-planning, seizing the initiative, and helping the captive peoples to freedom, the Western states, it developed, had no policies and were perilously slow in defining their program. Surprised by the skill and determination of the peoples of Poland and Hungary, the United States and its Western European allies fell back upon rhetoric and charity, neither effective substitutes for policy. Indeed, ineptness in this great opportunity rescued the communists from their greatest dilemma and enabled them soon to recover their poise, overcome the handicaps with which these disasters had saddled them, and again seize the initiative in other parts of the world.

In modern European history, 1956 may turn out to be a most signi-

ficant watershed, denoting clearly the limitations imposed on the people of East Central Europe in their efforts to free themselves, identifying the degree of deviation which the Soviet rulers will tolerate, and defining the limits of the capacity and will of the United States and its Western European allies to assist others to gain their freedom. That year may mark the end of an era in European history and the appearance of a new level or stage, in which some of the main forces affecting Europe and the Soviet Union will come from Asia and Africa.

SINCE 1956

An analysis of American and West European policy toward East Central Europe since 1956 must begin with a description of Soviet policy—if only to show how drab and dull and unimaginative Western policy has been in comparison.

Since the bitter day in November 1956 when Soviet troops completed the destruction of the Hungarian rebellion, the most startling and remarkable development in world affairs has been the extraordinary Soviet recovery from its serious blunders and the skill and effectiveness with which the Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev, have leap-frogged into a position of far greater power and promise than at any time earlier.

The motive forces of the Soviet thrust have been the continuing growth of the Soviet economy, the dramatic achievements of Soviet science and technology, particularly in outer space, and the skill and daring of Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Union has also been remarkably astute and successful in its recovery in East Central Europe. Hungary remains a millstone, but economic aid, staunch support, and a diplomatic offensive which has scored triumphs in other parts of the world have clothed the disaster in respectable tones.

The Soviet achievement in Poland in many ways has been even more remarkable because the situation there was far more delicate. Khrushchev allowed Poland to apply for and accept American economic aid, tolerated a degree of intellectual freedom and a flow of ideas and information from the West unknown in a communist state since the early 1920's, refrained from interfering when the Poles failed consistently to promote collectivization, and even endorsed Polish agricultural policy in July 1959, allowed Rapacki to introduce

a Polish disengagement plan in August 1957, and cautiously beamed when Gomulka reasserted party policy and control over most aspects of Polish life. Gomulka denounced Tito in June 1958 as Khrushchev had just done, he approved the disgraceful execution of Imre Nagy in the same month, in 1959 he dissolved the workers' councils, and he went about as far as a Pole can go in July of that year when he approved the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939, which served as the prelude to the invasion and division of Poland as well as to the Second World War. In other words, Poland has retreated considerably from the advances made during and after October 1956, but not so rapidly or so far as to raise the specter of new storms.

Khrushchev has continually rejected Western suggestions, generally made by Americans, that free elections be held in East Central Europe, while at the same time successfully speaking in other parts of the world for national self-determination. He has managed to quiet the memories and the disappointments which linger in the minds of the peoples, especially those individuals who remember better and freer times, and he obviously relies on new cadres and the powerful drive to transform each country to reduce the danger of future troubles. Finally, the expansion of trade between the Soviet Union and each of the states of East Central Europe and the closer integration of the economies with that of the Soviet Union after April 1958, help to reduce the opportunities for satellite freedom. In addition, the Soviet government has sought to increase the significance and effectiveness of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Aid), particularly by making co-ordination of bloc programs and policies of more utility to the states in East Central Europe.

The Yugoslav problem has been handled just as skillfully. After the effort to woo Tito had clearly failed and Tito had irritated the Muscovite rulers with a party program which criticized Soviet as well as Western policies, Khrushchev and his satellite henchmen attacked Tito and his "revisionist" ideas. While denouncing Western states for granting aid with conditions, Khrushchev in June 1958 unilaterally suspended until 1969 \$244 million in economic aid promised to Yugoslavia in earlier treaties. Henceforth, the Yugoslav communists shared with the West German leaders the honor of being the principal European targets for Soviet political warfare.

Thus, within a year or two after the 1956 disasters, the Soviet leaders had succeeded in tidying up East Central Europe. Their great-

est achievement, though, was in turning world attention from these unpleasant developments by spectacular successes elsewhere. The dramatic first two sputniks on October 4 and November 3, 1957, followed by even more impressive ballistic missile and rocket triumphs (including the rocket which pinned a Soviet pennant to the moon on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in the early fall of 1959 and Gagarin's and Titov's trips in outer space in April and August 1961), gave the Soviet Union and the communist system a boost which quickly overshadowed earlier political disasters. These immense achievements not only signaled to the world the quality of Soviet science and technology in critical fields, but also served to warn men and women everywhere that the military balance of power might have shifted to the Soviet side.

Khrushchev and his fellows demonstrated impressive skill by coupling these conquests with dramatic proposals for "banning the bomb" and complete disarmament, and with a free-wheeling, world-wide campaign for peaceful co-existence and for expanded trade and cultural, educational and technical exchange. The ebullient Khrushchev flitted around the world speaking of peace and at the same time excited Asian and African nationalism against the West. His aides worked out an economic aid program which was a parody of the larger and older American program, but which was aimed carefully at particular target countries, provided low interest rates, and relied upon quick and discreet action.

Meanwhile within the Soviet Union itself, other developments, while perhaps not so dramatic, bolstered Soviet power and prestige. Khrushchev boldly decentralized the administration of industry, re-organized education, abolished the machine tractor stations, replaced a five-year plan with a new one for seven years, opened up the virgin lands of Central Asia, changed the price structure to the benefit of the collective farmers, tolerated increasing numbers of foreign visitors, and launched his country in a vigorous drive to overtake and surpass the United States by 1970.

While this impressive display of power and agility was bewitching and dazzling the world, Khrushchev on occasion descended from his whirlwind to impress his demands for Berlin upon the Western European states and the United States. In a speech in Moscow on November 10, 1958, followed by notes sent to the three major Western powers on November 27, Khrushchev gave the Western states six

months to leave West Berlin and help set up a new "free city" or face the prospect of negotiating with the puppet East German state for the right of transit across its territory. The pressure on Berlin in the next thirty months waxed and waned, but the cold and brutal threat of war over Berlin remained to frighten Western Europe and its allies. Indeed, in early summer, 1961, Soviet insistence on obtaining control over Berlin within six months raised the specter that the world would totter on the brink of war in that fall and winter.

AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN POLICY

Basically, Western policy since 1956 has been a new version of containment, with the liberation flirtation forgotten. So far as East Central Europe itself is concerned, the American and other Western governments have stood by the established principle of national self-determination and have consistently reiterated "the right [of the captive peoples] to choose the form of government under which they would live." They have frequently reaffirmed their position on German unity and on West Berlin and refused to negotiate over West Berlin under threat. The Western states annually have helped persuade large majorities in the UN General Assembly to condemn Soviet action in Hungary and plead for the Hungarians' right to rule themselves. The almost 200,000 Hungarian refugees were received with warmth and affection. Poland has been granted somewhat more than \$470 million worth of economic aid, mostly in the form of surplus foods, and American foundations and private citizens have helped hundreds of Poles to travel abroad and to re-establish old ties with the Western world. Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, and other Western broadcasting agencies have taken advantage of the gap in the Iron Curtain which grew when Poland ceased to jam Western broadcasts, but these and other informational activities have not been as skillfully and knowledgeably directed as they should have been. Moreover, the effort to portray the West as "peoples' capitalism" has been a dismal failure.

American policy since 1956 has been based on the view that there is no predictable date of maximum danger and that the power and resolution which the communists possess confront the United States and its allies with a long struggle, such as that over the Eastern question or that involved in the defense of the frontiers of the Roman Empire against the barbarians. The Western states seek to prevent

war, prevent the expansion of communist power, strengthen the areas of the world most susceptible to communist pressures, persuade the communist rulers that the Western states will resist expansion—by war if necessary—but will not attack the communist states, and direct the energies of all the peoples and governments of the world away from war and toward the constructive endeavors of peace which may be the most important goal of all.

This new version of containment rests on faith in Western civilization. It has abandoned the search for a sudden "violent upthrust of liberty," and instead relies upon sustained Western firmness and progress to contribute to the slow modification of the Soviet system. It assumes the continued survival of communism and of communist governments, and it clearly indicates that the United States will not attempt the violent overthrow of the Soviet government or forceful ejection of Soviet authority from East Central Europe.

This policy rests on the maintenance of the American capability to destroy bases of Soviet strength as the principal deterrent to aggression. It emphasizes deterrent power, with the deterrent selected to match the need. It reflects the hope that military expenditures can be reduced to something like a plateau, high enough to prevent war and to make containment an effective policy and yet not so high as to be unbearable in the long years ahead.

The United States and its European allies continue to emphasize the maintenance and expansion of the alliance system. Indeed, in 1961, the United States was allied to more than forty other states in various parts of the world. NATO has grown in power even though its military force levels have never been met, and eleven years of joint effort have laid solid foundations for co-operation in political and economic affairs as well.

Unfortunately, American and West European performance so far as Western unity, resolution, and resourcefulness are concerned is not as impressive as the brief description of the main lines of policy would imply. Western Europe has enjoyed remarkable economic recovery and growth, and relations within the large and cumbrous alliance are much better than a European in 1940 could have imagined. The blossoming of Franco-German relations, particularly since the fall of 1958, has been one of the most hopeful developments in recent times.

But NATO totters along with far less air, naval, and ground

strength than most observers think minimally necessary. Many believe that the effectiveness of containment is seriously threatened by overemphasis upon nuclear and air power and the reduced ability of the allies to prevent or fight the most likely kind of war. Many are convinced that NATO is now an "uncertain trumpet" and that the "delicate balance of terror" may slide against us because of our inability to provide "direct and local opposition to aggression" without nuclear weapons. These critics point out, among other gloomy facts, that American ground strength in 1960 only approximated that of 1950, before the Korean War broke out. Others are dismayed by the failure of the allies to co-operate more effectively in military research and development, to promote co-operation in nonmilitary fields, and to contribute to their abilities in building the West's military strength and in keeping the underdeveloped countries out of the Soviet orbit.

While budget considerations each year since 1957 have eroded America's balanced military power, Soviet missile strength has perhaps put the West in second place for some time. This dangerous development, which was accepted with equanimity by most American leaders until 1961, seemed to others to place the nation's very survival in peril. Moreover, the general assumption in many parts of the world that the Soviet Union is already the supreme military power may very seriously erode American will to resist in crisis and may destroy the United States' ability to stir faith and hope in Eastern Europe or to affect Soviet policy anywhere in the world.

Western policy toward East Central Europe has also been weakened by the popularity, in 1957 and 1958 in particular, of the idea of disengagement. Advocated in the United States by George Kennan, popular with the British Labor Party, the German Socialist Party, some other socialist groups on the Continent and in Scandinavia, and supported by a large number of intellectuals, the idea of creating a "thinned out zone" or a "mutual withdrawal from the heart of Europe" has attracted many persons convinced that some way must be found to reduce tension and armament. Since disengagement would also involve disarming the Germans—concerning whom a great deal of suspicion and fear remains—it naturally attracted support among peoples who had fought Germany in the Second World War. For obvious reasons, the Soviet Union has skillfully and discreetly supported this thesis.

Disengagement also served to create distrust among the allies, espe-

cially the British and the West Germans. Thus, when Harold Macmillan agreed in Moscow early in 1959 that it would be useful to study "some method of limitation of forces and weapons, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection," Adenauer and other West Germans foresaw a British betrayal of its West German NATO ally.

Disengagement was attractive but shallow. It was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would and could safely withdraw its forces from East Germany and Poland, surely an assumption no sensible Soviet leader would support. It rested on the belief that the presence of rival armed forces in Central Europe was the principal cause of tension, neglecting to note Soviet aims and ambitions in every part of the world and to recognize that the communists confront the free world everywhere. Mutual withdrawal from Central Europe, even if possible, would create a vacuum and a neutral Germany living in far greater uncertainty and tension than does any European state now. Moreover, withdrawal of United States forces, once begun, would almost certainly continue until Europe had no American forces and lay helpless before the Soviet Union, a situation which would increase immeasurably the likelihood of war.

Attractive Soviet disarmament proposals also weaken Western firmness and resolution. Given the tensions and dangers, vaguely-phrased calls to "ban the bomb" and to attain universal disarmament in four years naturally have attracted some, particularly because progress towards disarmament is inevitably slow and complicated, more so when the Western position, properly, is so specific, precise, and dull. The long months of unsuccessful and painful negotiation in the UN and at Geneva strengthen the wish for complete disarmament, which the Russians skillfully promote. The British campaign for nuclear disarmament, led by such prominent men as Bertrand Russell, J. B. Priestley, Michael Foot, and Kingsley Martin, urges that Britain unilaterally abandon its nuclear arms and refuse defense by American nuclear weapons. This position resembles the situation in 1938 when Russell urged his fellow Englishmen not to fight the Nazis and to greet German paratroopers as though they were tourists. This attitude not only weakens Western policy with regard to East Central Europe, but may encourage the very kind of aggression it wishes to prevent.

Finally, the Western approach to East Central Europe has been

weakened by the serious strains which weaken the alliance. Suez, in the fall of 1956, almost ripped NATO to pieces, and other issues, such as Cyprus and Algeria, are almost as serious. The most pressing problems, however, have arisen because of political crises and national ambitions in France and the suspicion which bedevils relations between Britain and West Germany.

France since the Second World War has enjoyed a remarkable economic recovery, but the bitter loss of one part of her empire after another and the running infection of war in Algeria destroyed the Fourth Republic in the early summer of 1958. Under the leadership of General de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic has adopted long-needed austere economic policies but has not resolved the Algerian crisis (or brought the French Army fully under control). Moreover, as France has recovered economic strength and turned to the mystique of General de Gaulle, it has adopted policies clearly threatening the unity and effectiveness of NATO. France now refuses to accept integrated air defense commands or to allow missile bases on French territory; it has withdrawn its Mediterranean fleet from NATO control; it seeks to create three-power leadership in NATO; and it has ignored numerous protests in its successful effort to join the nuclear club.

While de Gaulle's France, independent and proud, harasses most of its NATO allies, it has formed a firm alliance with West Germany, which has been in some disagreement with Britain. These two great countries have been driven to suspicion and quarrels by what the British consider the frozen position of the Adenauer government as far as Berlin and East Central Europe are concerned; by the virtual veto which Adenauer wielded over NATO policy, while Eisenhower was president; by the rapid economic and military recovery of West Germany; and by the apparent eagerness of some British leaders to flirt with disengagement, and therefore with the disarming and neutralizing of West Germany, and to seek solutions to the Berlin problem which might leave Berlin at the mercy of East Germany.

The main problem, however, and the most serious one for all of Western Europe has been the conflict between the European Economic Community (the Common Market) and the European Free Trade Association. The Common Market, which was launched in 1957 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, seeks to establish political and economic unity on the Continent over a

period of twelve to fifteen years by gradually abolishing tariffs among the members and by establishing a uniform external tariff. The British government until August 1961 refused to join the Common Market and instead helped establish a rival group of seven European states—Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal—with the aim of eliminating tariffs among themselves completely, without affecting external tariffs. The goal of the association, indeed, was a single free-trade area for nonagricultural goods by 1970. The powerful rivalry between these two groupings threatened the economic and political unity of Western Europe, and therefore placed in jeopardy the very foundations upon which any American and West European policy towards East Central Europe must be built. The decision of the British government late in the summer of 1961 to request membership in the Common Market raised hopes for establishing sound political and economic bases on which a united and powerful European union might be built; but the problems present in 1961 still were formidable.

CONCLUSIONS

It is easy to criticize the policies, or absence of them, on the part of the United States and her West European allies as far as East Central Europe is concerned, but one should appreciate the enormous difficulties under which Western statesmen and peoples have operated. The Soviet Union, after all, has control over East Central Europe, and not only can deny the area its complete freedom and veto German unification, but can also use it as a threat to the rest of Europe. American and allied statesmen are handicapped by the very values and institutions they seek to preserve, while communist leaders are uninhibited in strategy and tactics. In addition, the Western positions on Berlin, German unity, and disarmament inevitably appear to be a dull reiteration of stolid positions, on which the communists can act and talk in an irresponsible way. Finally, allied leaders must be sensitive to the wishes of the peoples of all the allied states, which makes the formation and application of policy a time-consuming, difficult, and often delicate operation.

While the Soviet Union has achieved a remarkable series of successes in various fields in the last few years, there have been some Soviet failures. NATO and the Western alliance system stand firm

in spite of all the rifts and frictions and in spite of the communists' determination to destroy the alliance. West Berlin is still free, the West is united basically on its policies toward East Germany in general and on Berlin in particular, and the communist parties in Western Europe no longer constitute a serious threat. Yugoslavia remains free from Soviet control and as much a thorn in the side of orthodox Soviet communism as earlier. Eastern Europe is still restive under Soviet rule, and no communist has discovered the secret for making satellite status attractive to the captive peoples. Moreover, the new Soviet emphasis upon "trade and aid" with the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa places the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West in the field where the West would most prefer to struggle. The policy of containment has had its successes as well as its failures.

American and West European policy towards East Central Europe, nevertheless, suffers in comparison with Soviet policies towards the rest of the world. By and large, the United States has failed to provide stimulating and exacting leadership, and Western policy has been complacent, confused, and often even incoherent. Allied policy making has suffered from the absence of a sense of purpose and of a long-term program. The Western position has often been negative and defensive, generally designed to meet an immediate crisis created by the communists. The Western allies are always being trapped into short spurts at inconvenient times when they should be prepared for long-distance running. Most surprising of all, in a period when traditional American isolationism has apparently died and its leaders have disappeared from the political scene, the American government has failed to lead American and allied peoples to new levels of understanding and action. The number of exciting ideas in the field of world affairs produced in this country and Western Europe in the last decade is impressive, but these ideas have not always affected government thinking or policy.

The last few years have been marked by the continued decline of both Western Europe and Eastern Europe as factors in world politics; by some decline of American economic, political and military power, relative to that of the Soviet Union and of the rest of the world; and by the gradual evaporation of the faith in Western superiority. This loss of confidence, apparent throughout the world, may be the most significant development of the 1950's; it has already had a powerful

impact on American capabilities and intentions with regard to East Central Europe. The major issues in 1960 were Cuba, Laos, the Congo, outer space, and communist economic growth, all pushing East Central Europe far down the list of priorities for the United States and her allies.

The immense shift in power and opinion is due in part to the way in which the United States has allowed the free world to drift, in part to the erosion of American economic and military power, in part to the development and production of new weapons and the resultant change in the probable nature of war, in part to the rise of new areas and countries in the world. It also reflects serious distortions in American and Western policy. Containment, originally defined in generous terms and reflected in its early years in constructive proposals such as the Marshall Plan, in the course of the 1950's degenerated into a defensive world-wide anticommunist program with a heavily negative content. The United States sank to a policy of condemning, deploring, and denouncing, at a time when the leaders of the Soviet monolith were active in devising devilish new programs for problems such as disarmament, cessation of nuclear bomb tests, and aid to underdeveloped countries.

By 1961, American and West European policy towards East Central Europe demonstrated several obvious needs. The basic requirement is that of a new concept to replace the outmoded and defensive over-concentration upon the Soviet Union and the communist menace. The intellectual framework in which Western policy has been conceived since 1947 cannot be effective in the 1960's, and Western policy must rise to new levels to meet the new issues.

Secondly, the United States and its allies must press forward in a new effort to rebuild the economic, political, and spiritual unity of Western Europe and indeed of the Atlantic community. No Western policy towards East Central Europe and towards the Soviet Union can be successful until Western Europe and the Atlantic world have achieved a strength and unity which can serve as a magnet to pull East Central Europe free from Soviet control. NATO in particular must be strengthened and tightened. Its armed forces must have improved conventional weapons, larger ground forces, and reserve capacity and mobility.

Thirdly, the United States must seize the lead in creating a new supranational organization designed to meet the long-range economic

challenge the Soviet Union has now posed, and to compete effectively with the communists in the so-called uncommitted areas. This new organization, which communist states should be invited to join, should set out in a co-operative way to reduce the growing gap between the industrially developed nations, growing ever richer, and the less developed and generally newer states, sagging behind each year but consumed by the desire to become prosperous and powerful. In the words of the report prepared for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate by Professors Alexander Dallin, Henry Roberts, and Marshall Shulman, the "central focus of our policy should be the political growth and economic improvement of the non-Communist world. This forward movement, inspired by a vision of democratic progress, is essential to the creation of a world environment favorable to the survival and development of free institutions. It is also the course of action most likely to lead to a modification of Soviet policies over the long run."

Finally, the West should seek to extend the concept of the open world wherever men live. The competition should be made one of ideas in freedom rather than of power and living standards. The West should seek to expand freedom of information, and continue to emphasize the rights of peoples everywhere to the governments of their own choosing.

Above all, of course, the United States and its allies must remain strong and united. Western power and resolution, demonstrated in a humane, patient, and imaginative way, will preserve its own freedoms and may help restore those of the peoples of East Central Europe.

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- Countries under control of the U.S.S.R.
— so-called Iron Curtain countries
- Territorial gains of Yugoslavia from Italy
- ▨ Territorial gains of Poland from Germany, and of Bulgaria from Rumania
- ▨ Territorial gains of the U.S.S.R. from Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Rumania, Baltic States
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