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AN ANALYSIS OF VOLITIONAL LIFE

1947

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CHAPTER I.

Preparatory definition.

Undoubtedly volitional life is the part or side of our existence which has been the least investigated. Our understanding of the mind's creative activity is so far rather superficial and ineffective. This is unfortunate, because such activity or initiative represents human influence on the course of events; no knowledge is of greater consequence. However, it is no wonder that the psychological understanding of volitional life is unsatisfactory. From the first attempts at investigation it is evident that the motive forces in our striving do not manifest themselves in the observable changes we usually consider as caused by the individual self. Only in a circuitous manner can we attain to an understanding of volitional life. There seems to be no doubt that we must seek the source of volitional activity in certain organic dispositions, either innate in the individual constitution or caused by earlier events which have left their imprints on the organism.

(1) It will lead only to a superficial investigation if the notion of volition is limited to include merely the mental occurrences arising from foresight and controlled by a conscious purpose. In the daily life of every human

being occur many unpremeditated acts, spontaneous acts of choice and initiative; their motivating mental background is often very difficult to trace, though these activities undoubtedly in many cases represent either a defensive propensity or other permanent tendencies in the organism. Nor is it possible by means of the notion of passivity to limit the phenomena of volition. Who can ascertain in which cases the individual is a purely passive recipient, and when the mental motion is caused by an activated tendency? I choose to describe the phenomenon of volition as a mental activity, by which I understand any movement motivated by actual synthetic relations in the mind. For a definition of volition this limitation is no doubt too comprehensive, but it may serve as a point of departure, from where it would seem possible to arrive at a useful notion of volition by gradually eliminating certain groups of movements.

By proceeding in this way, we shall in the first instance meet with the events called mental reactions. They must undoubtedly be characterized as acts of volition. There are two contrasting types of these events: approval and disapproval of impressions or thoughts presenting themselves in the mind. By introspection we can find no other genesis of volitional movements. Mental reactions may be characterized as our fundamental initiatives, and through them the experiences concerned take on the character of positive or negative motives. These are the observable springs from which all forms of endeavour arise. Nor can we point to any other means of self-control; all governing of mental events is effectuated by means of these two kinds of reactive movement. For the practised psychologist it will be easy to discriminate the two types,

and it should in every case be possible to distinguish the one from the other; any form of approval or acceptance will have the effect of strenghtening and emphasizing the mental phenomenon concerned, whereas impressions and thoughts that are met with disapproval or denial suffer a weakening, a kind of rejection or dismissal. These partly positive, partly negative acts of volition are the simplest manifestation through which the individual reveals himself as a tending creature. 'From a psychological viewpoint it will also be comprehensible that all control of events in the mind must take place in the manner mentioned, i. e. through a strengthening of some processes and a weakening of others.

But this is only a preliminary step. Most of the volitional movements registered in the mind of adult persons are much more complicated, as they are founded on a number of auxiliary means and conditions. These traits in our mental activity will be treated by and by in the following. It should already at this point be mentioned that hypothetical suppositions will be required in a more thorough investigation of practical life. On experiential facts alone we cannot build up a sufficient understanding. We cannot even give a coherent description of the volitional movements of daily life without making use of certain hypotheses, as such descriptions are based on analyses of the events in question and therefore on ideas relative to the dynamics of mental life. Activity can arise only from antecedent events, and the comprehension of any relation of cause and effect demands certain suppositions both on static and dynamic conditions. This rule has the same validity in the mental sphere as in the physical.

Though we possess only a very superficial knowledge of the real nature of conscious life, we cannot here evade the question: What is the special feature that seems to form the key-stone of the notion of consciousness and without which at any rate the highly developed human volitional life would be unthinkable? I am here thinking of the synthetic relations subsisting between all the various processes simultaneously present in the mind. These relations between the various items in our complex experiences grow up spontaneously, they are undoubtedly an integral part of the constitution of consciousness, perhaps the very source of the life of the soul. In order to gain knowledge of the nature of these synthetic relations, it would be expedient to ask: In what does the value or meaning of our experiences consist? Both theoretically and practically this value is at all points dependent on a relation between the various items of experiences, so that in one way or the other they qualify or influence one another. Experiences whose mutual relations may be designated by such expressions as indifference or irrelevance are of no practical value, possible synthetic relations between them are of no account. In practical life we make use of our experiences to gain insight into the numerous eventualities that throng our life; we seek to find out, on the one hand, the origin of the changes that befall us, and, on the other hand, the future consequences of these changes. By acquiring knowledge of the laws governing the events in life, we are enabled to choose between the various alternatives presenting themselves in different circumstances. It can hardly be denied that the main feature in conscious life, which for us lends to this sphere of events its value and meaning, is this, that ex-

periences of different kinds and origin meet and confront each other in the mind, so that they can influence and qualify one another and form correlations. In the first instance, it is misleading and an incorrect psychological analysis to maintain that experiences influence the mind, i. e. the Me as recipient. The notion of mind does not in advance represent any known factor in the course of events; the mind of the individual shows at any given moment nothing but the present experiences and their correlations. The correct description is that the present experiences are synthetically confronted and — as we learn by subsequent observation — influence one another. Only in the second instance are we led to attribute to the mind a static side, otherwise present impressions and thoughts could not call up memories of the past. In the course of time the synthetic connections or interactions in the mind have the effect, not only that a smaller or larger number of links in the actual situation combine to form images, but also that memories from different moments and circumstances in the individual's past are combined with present events, and that certain expectations of coming events arise from the contents of consciousness and exercise their influence beforehand. Thus the individual is enabled to set himself future goals. Altogether, the phenomenon of synthesis means that the mind through combination and re-moulding of experiential material is extended to embrace an ever greater complexity, not only of events in the present moment, but also of past and coming eventualities. It may safely be maintained that the synthetic process represents the fundamental *creative* phenomenon in conscious life. It may even be asserted that consciousness consists simply in this: that

each one of the simultaneous items feel the presence of the others and are affected to a greater or smaller extent by them. A clearer or more reliable definition of the phenomenon of consciousness can hardly be given. This term always means momentary coherence, and synthetic relation is the only feature possessed in common by the different moments in consciousness. Terms such as "experiencing subject" and "experienced object" are misleading linguistic inventions without any fundamental importance in psychology or epistemology.

Whether the synthetic relation represents an interaction cannot be directly observed, but there can hardly be any doubt of this, even where mathematical relations are concerned. Any so-called necessity both in the mental and the physical sphere is concerned with events and must therefore be of dynamic nature. The underlying interaction between simultaneous mental phenomena must be presumed to consist in the feelings or thoughts indirectly influencing each other through physiological means. It is no new supposition that synthesis must mean an underlying process. No psychologist, acknowledging that synthetic relation is a special phenomenon which to a large extent determines the course of mental life, can avoid this conclusion. Otherwise no changes could derive from synthetic relations, one purpose could not check another, one supposition could not call up doubt of the reliability of another assertion. The most unequivocal testimony of the existence of a synthetic process is found in those cases where the same impression or representation undergoes variations by appearing first in one synthetic context and then in another. For instance, the concrete aesthetic values are based upon certain synthetic relations,

without which they would dissolve or take on another hue. Charm is a synthetic phenomenon. The hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that in none of the extramental spheres of events do we recognise any other source of change than interaction between simultaneous events. Both in the physical and the organic domain are the interactions indirect, i. e. they take place through changes in static factors. The synthetic process would thus seem to consist in one mental function causing changes in the static conditions of another function. Many physiologists declare without hesitation that all simultaneous events within the same organism constitute an interacting whole, continuing and interlacing from moment to moment.

In one respect a closer definition of the synthetic changes is possible. If we confine ourselves to the synthesis, that is to say if we exclude all mental changes caused by events in the sense organs, e. g. phenomena of contrast, it may be maintained that the synthetic variations taking place in our mind are not qualitative changes in the impressions or representations concerned. In the first instance at any rate, the synthetic influence causes only emotional changes of the interacting items or groups, in other words, a change in their relative potency and feeling-tone. This is consistent with what was said above, that approval entails an invigoration, an increased persistency, while disapproval entails a weakening of the synthetic link. It is also generally assumed that numerous processes in the physiological circle of activity exercise either a fortifying or a restraining influence on processes of other kinds. The synthetic interaction may be described as a kind of competition to determine which part of the mental contents are to gain predominance and control the course

of mental events from the present onwards. As a rule the various events in the mind do not meet equally advantageous conditions of growth, the most favoured group will generally ascend to supremacy and become predominant.

These considerations lead to a closer understanding of the phenomenon of mental reaction. That the mind is influenced by the appearance of a new experience can be observed only by noting that certain processes already going on in the mind undergo changes of one kind or another. Mental reactions reveal themselves through observation of changes in the existing mental contents, and we shall find that these changes consist in a variation in potency and degree of consciousness of existing impressions or thoughts. In other words, the mental reaction itself consists in synthetic acts, certain mental events influence the further development of other simultaneous events. If, for instance, I hear a mysterious sound, my attention will suddenly be concentrated in the direction from which the sound came, and this new intense interest sweeps the previous moment's impressions and thoughts out of my mind. There is a double movement: some happenings in the mind are invigorated, others are cut short. A change in the relative importance or weight of the phenomena takes place, the mind operates as a kind of balance in virtue of the spontaneous synthetic coherence.

In order to gain a closer understanding of the mental reactions, we must take into consideration the static entities forming the working basis of the mental events. It would be hopeless to deny that the mental phenomena are processes, and that these processes just as well as the physiological functions presuppose a working basis consisting

of organised living substances. It is generally assumed that this structure must be partly inherited, partly created by the individual's previous experiences. It is also generally known that our organism, especially in youth, is able to some degree to adjust certain strata of its structure to the demands which life time after time has made upon the individual. This acquiring of greater adaptability to life through practice, as well as signs of degeneration following upon abuse, prove that interaction between function and structure are one of the fundamental traits in the constitution of life. From this presupposition it would seem reasonable to assume that the above-mentioned interaction will take a harmonious course, i. e. the conditions will be advantageous for its functioning, if the organism without having deteriorated is practised in the process required. It may also be assumed that we can do our work more easily and more effectively when we are rested than when we are tired. It is evident that impressions responding to a certain need, for instance hunger or thirst, will meet with favourable conditions, and that ideas tending to promote a certain purpose will meet with approval and rise to a high degree of consciousness in the mind, whereas events acting as a disturbance to work in hand will be unwelcome. In short, it must be acknowledged that the conditions for the functioning of our daily experiences vary to a wide extent.

There can hardly be any reason to doubt that our mental reactions arise from an interaction between function and structure. Further, it should be noted that we must distinguish between two sets of functional conditions which between them determine the emotional character

of the processes, firstly, as to what degree the structural basis corresponds to the quality and the intensity of the experience involved, and, secondly, to what extent the synthetically related experiences are concordant or disharmonious in their interplay. If it can be maintained that both sets of conditions are structural in nature, the source of our mental reactions should be sought always in the actual structural state. In my opinion, the compatibility of certain given processes is despendent on structural conditions. If it were possible to determine, on the one hand, the source of an observed mental reaction and, on the other hand, its final shape, we should find that it passes through a number of phases. In the first phase, the synthetic relation is more or less scattered and chaotic and has not yet adopted a clear course. Gradually, the interplay between the various parts gains in order and direction, and, finally, the mental contents settle in the coherent attitude that we call the fully developed reaction. This chain of events is the most elementary mental activity. It is probably this movement that William James designates by the word *fiat,* and which in a more or less complete form precedes every decision and action.

(2) In the mind movements often occur which do not arise from, and are not to any considerable extent influenced by, synthetic control or direction, but which are automatic and mainly independent of mental judgment. The mind's attitude to such movements is generally considered passive. It would be unpractical to class these events among our volitional acts. It is evident that a synthetic act or choice cannot take place where an articulate complex mental content or a clearly differentiated mental background is lacking. Nor can it be assumed that new

impressions unexpectedly presenting themselves as a result of physical incitation, or new thoughts growing out of involuntary reproductive transmission, are due to synthetic directives. In the following I shall also mention some groups of processes which I propose should be excluded from volitional psychology, although they present themselves on a differentiated background and to some extent are based upon synthetic relations; the reason is that these relations are temporary and fugitive, so that they do not develop into distinguishable components of volitional life.

(a) *Discursive movement, discrimination.* Discursive movement may be described as follows: the attention or the thoughts involuntarily slip from one item or group to another, both being present in the mind but not to the same degree conscious or conspicuous. With regard to discrimination it should be noted that this phenomenon, like the act of choice, presupposes that the items simultaneously apprehended by the senses or the thoughts are not fused, but present themselves as two or more items in disparate mental positions. This separation is due in the first line to the fact that the processes take place each on its own working basis. But the sharper discrimination, whereby one item presents itself clearly apart from the other or (in discursive movement) on the background of the other, have probably developed from the attention's dwelling upon a group of appearances, unvoluntarily emphasizing alternately one or the other part of it; in other words, it has developed from a co-operation between discursive movement and discrimination.

How does discursive movement arise? This involuntary restlessness must be considered in relation to the fact that the mental processes generally run their course in a very

short time, undoubtedly because their conditions are rapidly exhausted — like fire in straw. Our thoughts cannot remain immobile, they must incessantly pass on to fresh representations in order not to ebb out; only by means of discursive movements are we able to linger over or circle round the same object for a few moments. However, the exhausted conditions are soon re-established, as the structural dispositions are reconstructed by physiological means. Especially the nerves of the senses are practised in instant restitution, so that, if a continued interest co-operates, we can prolong impressions by means of minute variations; that is voluntary attention. But this explanation is hardly sufficient, we must also ask why fresh representations or impressions take the place of the exhausted. Probably the attention is involuntarily drawn from the fading appearances to other parts of the mental contents which have not yet ascended to full conspicuousness, because the latter are more apt to absorb the attention. It probably plays a rôle also that the mind involuntarily reacts against being drained empty. In this case the attention takes on a voluntary seeking character.

The same explanation is sufficient to make the phenomenon of reflexion comprehensible. This is a special form of discursive movement, often arising involuntarily as a result of the law of least resistance. In cases where no definite purpose directs the attention or the thought transitions, it is generally the easiest to revert to representations and impressions which have a short time previously been in the mind and whose after-images are still lingering in the thought-background. Where sense impressions are concerned, the reversion often takes place because the renewal of the impression requires only a minute altera-

tion in the accommodation of the sense apparatus. Involuntary reflexive movements lead automatically to discrimination and comparison.

It would seem unreasonable to class the above-mentioned discursive movements with the volitional phenomena. In the changes and transitions described no particular tendency reveals itself, no pursuit of an aim, no continuous striving in a set direction. The causes that make the attention and the thoughts pass from one subject to another are only of momentary duration, changing according to the circumstances. Therefore, the phenomenon of discursive movement cannot serve as guiding motive in the definition of controlled activity. On the other hand, it must be noted that the fulfilment of a purpose and the satisfaction of material needs take place discursively by means of a series of selected transitions. Such — undoubtedly controlled — series of selected changes we find just as frequently in mental life as the uncontrolled discursive movements. Reflection arises in adults as a rule from a definite purpose.

In advance the individual does not know that consciousness exercises a leading or central control of personal life. Therefore, it is through automatic discursive movement, reflection and discrimination that our experiential material primarily presents itself and undergoes its first articulation. It is probably the order of events at this stage that Kant calls *die reine Anschauung*. Here the dimensions of place and time develop as the most important results of the automatic movements. No one will assert that the individual chooses to extend his experiential images in these dimensions or that his will directs the original discrimination between space and time. They are

automatic synthetic relations, which will inevitably appear on a basis of previously established structural conditions; in other words, they are *a priori*. The mental dimension of space (differing from the physical, which is determined by our apprehension of reality) is the primary. Originally, it comprises at any given moment all simultaneous appearances presenting themselves each in its own position. From this the dimension of time is soon differentiated. It arises from a particular feature in our constitution, which may be described as follows: each new experience leaves its special mark on the mental structure, so that for instance three identical sounds appearing successively will necessarily be apprehended as numerically diverse, — not as one impression but as three, each in its particular mental position; and they will be recalled in the same manner, as three separate reproductions, the three recollections being bound each to its own working basis. Psychologically this a prioric time difference is also disclosed by the fact that the mind generally embraces a foreground and a background, the latter comprising after-images from the immediately preceding moments; and it is not possible to change this order of events, the appearances in the foreground and in the background being bound to their time positions. Only by an associative re-moulding can the two sets of experiences be made "simultaneous", i. e. be united in one and the same mental foreground. Only the appearances in the foreground, not those in the background, can rightly be designated by the words "here" and "now". The after-images in the background seem to be more remote, not present, but belonging to the recent past; psychologically they are designated as the time background of the present. Without this distinction between

the present and the immediate past, dictated by a priori conditions, we should be unable to place our recollections in the past stream of time. Because nearly all our experiences are re-moulded, either immediately or later, we are not able to discriminate sharply between the momentary dimension in space, i. e. the simultaneous present impressions and representations, and the moment's time surroundings. Also in the physical world we are unable to draw an exact line of demarcation between space and time, as the extramental space entities continually undergo change, so that no sharp discrimination is possible between the phenomena of rest and movement.

Both the space- and time-dimensions rest upon the necessity that simultaneous mental processes, whose qualitative or numerical working bases are different, must appear apart from one another. That only three spatial dimensions exist is due to the fact that there are only three directions (up-down, left-right, perspectivical movements) in which discursive movements can develop within the same spatial complex. In the time dimension there are only two such directions, forward and backward in the progression of time. If each new step in the mental time progression did not inaugurate a new set of reproductive conditions, we should be precluded from obtaining knowledge of dynamic conditions, because our recollections would be too uncertain as regards before and after. Physical space comprises at any given moment, not only what the individual actually experiences, but also everything that in virtue of our apprehension of reality is supposed to exist in the universe as a link in the actual interaction at the moment in question.

Discursive thought movements, controlled by purpose,

we recognise when we see that selection and rejection — on a background of foresight — control the movement's direction and progress. Another criterion is that the controlled ideas undergo change of the kind designated by such words as "restrained" or "fortified". On a basis of this discrimination between automatic and controlled thought progression it may definitely be proved that Kant's *Kategorien der reinen Vernunft* are not a priori in character. Neither causal nor logical relations would permeate and dominate human thought, if an acknowledgment of the laws of the time processes were not the fundamental means by which we are enabled to direct our own existence. Only in this sense are the categories in question unavoidable: that every thinking being is inevitably impelled to seek knowledge of the course of events, because life undeniably means striving and contending against obstacles. The only thing we are able to declare, as soon as this understanding has come to our consciousness as a necessity, is that a number of postulates of identity must be acknowledged as indispensable presuppositions for epistemology. Thereby the problem of cause and effect, in the sense in which Hume treated it, drops out, as the notion of causality is included in the definition of cognition as aiming at foresight and control of events. At the same time it is undeniable that the work of cognition must include both the mental and the extramental sphere, as they are incessantly interacting and cooperating in our observation, which is always a combination of knowledge and experience. At innumerable points cognition will be insufficient if the psychological side of things is left out of consideration.

(b) *Interruption.* It is limited how wide a multiplicity

of impressions and thoughts the attention is able to embrace at one time and bring to clear consciousness. Because of this limitation it often happens that impressions or newly appearing thoughts are either interrupted or prevented from playing an effective part in the synthetic interaction. In my opinion, these interruptions are in themselve automatic incidents, but the circumstances coöperating in their formation are in many cases determined by the individual's tendencies or by his previous state of mind. If I am engrossed in thoughts that interest me, this occupation of the mind has the effect of keeping my attention insusceptible to simultaneous sense impressions, if these are not especially remarkable. It is also well known that we often fail to notice things affecting our sense organs, simply because these things do not interest us. In other cases repression takes place independently of our wishes. Intense pain makes us insensible to other simultaneous impressions. The sound of a canon shot near at hand impresses us so strongly that we feel dizzy and all thoughts are swept out of the mind. Violent anger makes us act impetuously by destroying our usual judgment.

Whether the mind is open and willing to give room to the numerous experiences presenting themselves every moment, and whether it is capable of effectively penetrating and accepting the ever new situations, will depend on many different conditions. Already at the present cultural stage it is evident that the ordinary man's capacity for mental activity is seriously deficient in relation to the tasks in hand. On the one hand, the mind is often crowded and unprepared, and, on the other hand, it is bombarded with so many new impressions from all sides that most

considerations end in confusion and the result is apathy. The question how man's mentality can be extended to embrace and master ever greater synthetic complexes at one time, and how his mental activity can be made more effective, so that his strength is not wasted in vain efforts, is one of the great and eternal problems of mankind. And to-day it is more urgent than ever. I cannot here treat this problem, but I should like to set down a few remarks. In the first line, what is required is that the individual should increase his store of practical automatic relations between impressions and representations and the coherence in his thought life, in other words: (i) associative relations, (ii) re-moulding leading to a practical general view of the most important sides of life, (iii) spontaneous relations between aim and means, (iv) ready knowledge of ways and means to a realisation of certain complicated aims. By means of such acquisitions the individual's understanding and interests will be expanded, his perseverance, endurance and patience will be increased, his mind will be more alert. And, in the second line, it should not be left to the blind forces of nature alone to create strong characters and energetic minds. It should be possible to develop a sagacity enabling normally intelligent persons to understand the profound difference between knowledge and will-power, so that through self-control it should be possible to avoid the many aberrations, which are the usual causes of the exhaustion of volitional life. In such cases advice and admonitions from others are as a rule ineffective, only the individual's own self-control can guide the slow and circumstantial progress of growth, whereby indolent or contemplative thoughts are made to become energetic. The first require-

ment is to create a real psychology of volitional life — not merely a superficial description, a naming and grouping of the phenomena, but a dynamic comprehension of the many strands that go to make up the life of the will. It is also worth mentioning that the atmosphere in which modern people live, especially where many people are crowded together, is a great hindrance to the development of personality, of minds seeking their sustenance in the profound truths and real values that are born and bred in solitude. The atmosphere of modern life was not sent from heaven, it is the produce of a multitude of petty tendencies, which against all common sense have been allowed to spread and become dominating factors. Man is not bound to gather only the poorest herbs in the garden of life.

CHAPTER 2.

Primary and secondary motive powers.

There are no special features by which we may distinguish volitional phenomena from the rest of our experiential material. By introspection we find only certain series of changes characteristic of the movements we call motives or tendencies. These changes reveal to us more or less clearly in which direction the striving tends, but they do not reveal its motive springs. It is probable that life in all its forms is determined and controlled by striving; all living beings are undoubtedly by nature purposeful, i. e. self-determining in another and higher sense than inanimate objects. But only a small part of the purposeful movements in the organism leave any perceptible trace in the individual's mental sphere, so that a certain series of changes reveal them as volitional movements, exercising a motivating influence in a set direction.

The mental changes, which to our apprehension reveal some working tendency, consist of feelings or representations and their feeling-tones, sometimes also emotions, i. e. unlocalized foggy masses of feelings with more or less definite feeling-tones. The question is whether it is possible by an interpretation of these observable facts to arrive at reliable conclusions regarding the sources or

springs of the tendencies? In my opinion, it is hopeless to try to find the dynamic origin of a volitional movement by studying the observable differences in the successive experiences concerned. There is no sense and no reasonable explanation in declaring that feelings or feeling-tones (emotions) are the cause or source of volitional movements. In order to arrive at an understanding making a coherent apprehension of volitional life possible, we have to make use of hypotheses, and these must be so extensive that they afford a basis for a satisfactory interpretation of the facts mentioned. In other words, the hypothesis has to include, not only volitional life, but also the emotional and the intellectual or qualitative side of mental life, that is, all the facts from which our conclusions are derived. Such a connection between the three sides of mental life would seem possible only if we build on the assumption that these three fundamental manifestations in our experience, the intellectual qualities, the emotional differences, and the willing or motivating influence of certain processes, represent three kinds of qualities that may be found in one single process, just as one ray of sunshine may cause three kinds of change, i. e. an impression of light, heat and weight or pressure.

No psychologist can avoid building on the supposition that the phenomena of the mind are processes, and that these processes under their short duration incessantly undergo variations in degree of consciousness and qualitative distinctness, often also in feeling-tone and synthetic weight. There is no reason to doubt the existence of these changes, even if in many cases they are vague and indeterminate. All other processes, both physical and physiological, undergo incessant change. Similarly, psycho-

logy must suppose that the mental processes are bound to an unobservable working basis of static nature, called organized mental structure. This supposition is just as warranted as the ideas of material entities that physicists are agreed to build on. It must also be assumed that the above-mentioned structural entities incessantly undergo change every time they co-operate as working basis for a mental process; this is only a parallel to what takes place in the physical world in the case of heating, melting, evaporation, combustion etc. It seems to me that the key to an understanding of volitional life must be sought in the dynamic and static changes taking place side by side in any interaction between function and structure in the mental sphere.

The hypothesis, which I shall try to verify in the following, need not here be fully described. The main traits of it can shortly be indicated as follows: The primary motive powers, which must also be regarded as the sources of the further development of volition, are assumed to be spontaneously released structural dispositions in the working basis of the mental (and with them related physiological) processes. Such agents are undoubtedly found in all kinds of mental events, but often they play no rôle to speak of in practical life. These motivating powers are released, in the first instance, by the incitements that start the process, in the second instance, by the process spontaneously transmitting itself as far as its conditions permit. Every time such activity takes place, the structural dispositions are exhausted partly or wholly; and, in order that the process may in the future keep its character as motive, the dispositions must be automatically restored by physiological means. Observation shows that by being

satisfied our motives are weakened and exhausted, in many cases permanently; but in instances where the exhaustion is only temporary, they are always restored through the physiological circulation.

A supplementary remark must be added: A tendency or a motive can only be defined (1) as a process working spontaneously towards its own completion, and (2) by the direction of its striving. We must therefore ask: What do we mean by the fulfilment of a motive? In every organism life spins on as a complex time movement, partly an interaction between simultaneous processes, which thereby undergo changes, partly a series of alternating processes within each organic unit, whereby the whole of the organism's life movement is organised into a co-operating whole. This order no doubt rests on static entities, an organisation of living substances that react adequately, i. e. in a self-preserving manner, so that the co-operation between them is protected. Each organ has one or more definite tasks, and the variously active organs create mutually conditions for their upkeep, so that the co-operation may continue unimpaired in the future. To obtain this, it is evidently necessary that the processes are carried out to such an extent that they fulfil their task in the service of the whole. There is no other criterion. That the processes are completed means that each organic link carries out its work to such an extent that the existing organisation of the individual's life as a whole is not paralysed or interrupted. The phenomena of sickness and death are always caused by some disturbance or disintegration of the static conditions of co-operation within the organism. Medical science aims only at the maintenance or re-establishment of the static dispositions upon

which tendency and the working capacity of the vital functions are dependent. The fundamental principle in the maintenance of health is that the metabolism is kept at full stretch, not only must the processes of nourishment and other reconstructing activities compensate the losses of supplies, but also the processes of consumption must work to their full extent, if the organism is to maintain its capacity.

It is no easy matter to draw a line of demarcation between the primary springs in volition and the secondary agents, acting as indispensable links in its development and organisation. Amongst the primary motive powers I have found it practical to group all the more or less complex events in the mind, designated by names such as appetite, purpose, wish, hope, need, longing, fear and similar immediate tendencies. The secondary links, which are undoubtedly of dynamic nature, will be described in later sections of the present chapter.

(1) *The spontaneous urgency of tendencies to develop; the realisation of aims.* A multitude of special tendencies reveal themselves in each individual's life. Even if in no case we are able to discern the particular constitution of these tendencies, it is often possible to determine their working direction with sufficient certainty. We shall turn at once to the question: What is the constitution of the events called the realisation of aims, the fulfilment of wishes, the satisfaction of needs? As continuous motive power and controlling influence in these events, general opinion points unanimously to those links in the momentary synthesis that represent the unaccomplished tendency. This opinion can be confirmed. It is evident that agents creating and controlling our striving cannot derive

from the future goal, as it is not yet present in the mind: the non-existent cannot exercise any influence. Also, observation shows that fulfilled wishes, satisfied appetite, accomplished purpose are no longer active motives. Fulfilled tendencies always come to rest. It is no contradiction of this rule that later on they may be renewed by the appearance of certain new situations.

We must ask, therefore: What is the observable difference between the striving process and the final accomplishment? In many instances it is possible to describe the difference so clearly that its importance is apparent. It will suffice here to point out that the experience which brings the purpose to realisation has a fuller effectivity, a more vigorous and penetrating discharge of the purposeful dispositions takes place, whereby we feel relaxation, satisfaction. The majority of our intentions consist of thought-images, and in many cases our striving aims at replacing representations by the corresponding sense impressions. These are undoubtedly both stronger and more comprehensive processes than reproductions; our representations are as a rule only suggestions — vague, indefinite and incomplete images of former more effective experiences. Reproductions awakened by sense impressions are also more forceful than representations produced by thought processes; for instance, the sight of an apple will remind me more strongly of the odour of an apple than the mere thought would be able to do. If I wish to see again a painting or hear again a piece of music which has formerly given me enjoyment, this is due to the fact that my present thought-image of the experience is unsatisfactory, and my striving is aimed at obtaining again the more effective series of impressions and reproductions

called the real experience. A hungry man cannot assuage his appetite by the mere thought of a meal, the eating of real food affects both the mind and the bodily organism more effectively than any representations. If I put a question to somebody, it means that I require some information, that I expect to complete some deficiency in the present contents of my mind; through the answer I hope to obtain a fuller understanding of, or a greater degree of certainty regarding this matter. If I have decided to apply certain means in order to further my purpose, this decision aims at creating a new situation that will bring about an approach to the final goal; my progress towards full realisation will thereby be less protracted and less laborious. These advantages explain the well-known fact that every step towards the fulfilment of a wish brings some satisfaction.

In other instances the individual experiences the changes, whereby an actual tendency is accomplished, in the form of a series of perceptions or representations of varying feeling-tones. This is the case when hunger and thirst are satisfied. The enjoyment of the food changes gradually during a meal, as the various dispositions in afferent nerve organs in mouth, throat and stomach are gradually released, thus changing the structural background of the experiences. In the case of thirst, the dry feeling in mouth and throat is assuaged only after a number of swallowing movements. It must be left to physiologists to explain how it is made possible for the mind to register the variations in the different physical needs of the body.

It is explicable that many of our impressions and representations do not strive after fulfilment in the sense

here mentioned. Most of the acts through which the mind exercises a controlling influence on the individual organism and events in the environment presuppose comprehension and reflection. However, for these thought activities it is necessary only that the representations should appear clearly in the mind and that their meaning should be apprehended, they are then fully effective as a link in the deliberation and need not be replaced by perceptions. No further fulfilment is of value before the planning is completed and the moment has come to take action. As a rule only the deliberations give difficulties, while the carrying out of the plan is quite simple; therefore, the main interest is concentrated around the order and succession of the thoughts, not around their realisation. As regards our sense perceptions, they generally serve to inform us of the actual situation, but, apart from this information, we do not as a rule wish for a further fulfilment of the impressions. Other instances of a lack of tendency in thoughts and impressions shall be further treated in the following.

As regards the emotional side of the experiences it is not necessary to say much. In earlier books I have declared myself an adherent of the well-known theory, that processes advancing effectively towards fulfilment give a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction, whilst processes that are hindered by obstacles or crossed by unfavourable circumstances give a feeling of displeasure and distress. If this theory be considered in relation to the above mentioned hypothesis, it will be seen, that the emotional character of the experiences and their volitional influence are regarded as two sides of one and the same thing, two qualities or effects of the same events. And, corresponding to

the polarity of the feeling-tones, we find in volitional life two main types of tendencies, positive and negative. In the first line, our tendencies strive positively after advancement towards accomplishment; but, if this advancement meets with obstacles, reactive movements arise, attempting to counteract and remove the causes of the hindrance, in so far as they can be discerned and removed.

A mass of observations confirm that the experiences by us designated as wishes, aims and desires are unfulfilled processes, and that by being brought to consummation they undergo a number of changes, probably because their structural working basis undergoes change at every step towards full accomplishment. Everyone knows the occurrences generally labelled interruption or disturbance. These phenomena are to be found only where purposeful action is checked, and the words interruption and disturbance would have no meaning if the processes in question did not in themselves strive to develop further; consummated movements cease automatically and no longer react to obstacles. An example: During a conversation an interruption caused me to stop in the middle of a sentence. The matter discussed was of no great importance, but I had the words ready in my mind, they were on the tip of my tongue, and these movements demanded spontaneously to be carried through to their proper accomplishment — once the movement had started, they refused to be cut short. It is also frequently seen that compulsion and suppression of people's opinions, habits and rooted inclinations call up defiance, a striving to be liberated of the pressure imposed. The defiant words and acts are often rather wild, so that they do not serve to remove the hated oppression — and yet this incomplete

attempt at opposition gives to the mind a transient feeling of relief. Compulsion and oppression could not create an opposition if people did not feel that involuntary tendencies in their minds were being strangled at birth.

Spontaneously working tendencies may undergo an invigoration by meeting obstacles, in the same way as a stream swells and spreads before a dam. Pressure causes counter-pressure. These phenomena are an indication that the processes in question involuntarily strive after further development. Examples may even be observed where processes, not normally felt as wishes or purposes, take on a definite character of striving when meeting with opposition. It is generally recognised that forbidden fruit has a sweeter taste than the easily accessible. A piece of news, which at first awakened no great interest, suddenly takes on a special fascination if you are warned to keep it secret. What is the reason of this? At first the mind contemplated the news peacefully, then it was oppressed by the interdiction against publishing it abroad. This is felt as a suppression of the thought movements and has the effect of a challenge. At this tickling of the mind the thought of overstepping the restraining line becomes a temptation. Our interest in habitual benefits, of which we have long enjoyed peaceful possession, often lies dormant, but if we are in danger of losing these benefits, the interest will revive suddenly and forcefully. We are eager to explain and defend our opinions if they are attacked. Similarly, if doubts arise in the mind, we are stimulated to make renewed investigations. Doubt means that the thought relations are made uneasy. Such a vacillation between relations weakens the processes; we long for certainty, and aim at making the thoughts steady and

clear again by removing every cause of uncertainty. In our practical knowledge this feeling of assurance is the full realisation, these thoughts are not susceptible of further fulfilment. The same kind of realisation we meet in cases where curiosity is the working motive. The root of curiosity is an uncertain surmise, which by other ideas is prevented from being brought to definite certitude. On dubious ideas we cannot erect any structure, and therefore the thoughts try to attain to an assured and well-founded standpoint. From an aesthetic point of view the enigmatic, the half-perceived and half-realised will often be an active motive.

The quality designated by such words as perseverance, persistency, tenacity, is a characteristic feature in our motives. Aims and desires, if checked by unfavourable circumstances, will rise up again and resume their activity as soon as conditions change, permitting them to go forward once more. Hopes we have had to give up, and which have languished as sickly thoughts, revive if the individual's circumstances are improved and offer fresh possibilities. Many aims are only brought to fulfilment by means of a series of reconstructions after several attempts have failed. It may then be observed that the motivating idea pertinaciously remains alive in the thought-background, awaiting the reconstruction of the plan. The same tenacity is found in children who repeat their questions or renew their requests again and again, although they have been denied. Some psychologists extend the phenomenon of perseverance to include the well-known instances where a number of words or a bit of a tune keeps on appearing spontaneously in the mind at short intervals. In my opinion, these are occurrences of

quite another kind, as here it is not possible to point to any aim. They are probably due to after-images in the thought-background, which for some abnormal reason are revived after a short pause. They are undoubtedly automatic repetitions.

Besides the perseverance to be observed daily in our motives, I would emphasize the phenomenon of disappointment as positive evidence to prove that the hypothesis I have proposed is well founded. Innumerable movements in the mind are driven forward by an innate urgency to further development. Disappointment is a change in the opposite direction and evidently a functional variation, i. e. a weakening whereby the process loses its active character. It seems that only the thought movements bearing the character of hope or happy expectation can suffer disappointment. It is a breaking down of the volitional movement. The disappointment entails no other hurt for the individual than his hopes being dashed, in other words, that a working tendency is cut off and reduced to vain longing. All sorts of thought movements, being devoid of inherent striving, decline and die out, yet we do not feel the change as a disappointment.

(2) *Stamps of attention.* The phenomena we have regarded so far — synthetic movements and the mental reactions springing from them; unsatisfied feelings and representations urged forward by stimulated dispositions in their working basis — do not lead to a full understanding of volition. When an adult person undertakes an enterprise or makes a choice, his actions are largely determined by static conditions left by past individual experiences. We shall now consider some of these co-oper-

ating influences, which may be either furthering or hampering in their effect.

It can hardly be denied that the unknown factor, manifesting itself through differences and changes in our awareness, exercises influence on the momentary synthetic interplay. When experiences attract our full attention, they advance in virtue of this to a high degree of consciousness and generally present themselves in certain positions, their surroundings being perceived; whereas impressions and representations attracting only a slight degree of notice do not appear so clearly and are only vaguely localized. It can be observed unmistakably that the synthetic contact between phenomena of a high degree of consciousness is more effective than the interaction between parts of the mental contents having only a faint appearance. Things of which we are only vaguely conscious as a rule exercise no influence on the course of mental events from the present moment onward. Generally only those groups of mental contents which either are or recently have been clearly emphasized exercise a controlling influence. The individual's attentiveness plays a considerable part in his acts of choice. Which alternative is chosen will sometimes depend on the momentary distribution of attention; in order cases it depends on whether the individual is exercising self-control or not. The form of activity called voluntary attentiveness consists in aims dwelling in the mental background guiding the individual's attention in a certain direction. This search plays an indispensable rôle in volitional life.

It can also be observed that synthetically related experiences, which attract full attention, are more inclined to leave effective imprints in the mental structure than

experiences obtaining only a vague and fugitive degree of attention. Two kinds of imprints may be mentioned, associative relations and stamps of attention. Of these only the latter shall be treated here. In our representations we find varying grades of qualitative distinctiveness and lively impressiveness, and there is reason to believe that these differences are often due to the degree of attentiveness the experiences in question have formerly been able to attract. It is in agreement with the general rule of practice that the clearly and fully experienced is reproduced more definitely than the vaguely apprehended. The aim of advertisement is to catch people's attention and to imprint again and again certain impressions and ideas on the mind, so that the representations gradually take on a familiar and dominating character. The phenomenon called revival of interest and knowledge points in the same direction. It causes the representations to be reproduced more easily and to present themselves more vividly in the consciousness of the individual.

The stamps of attention probably play a rôle in the occurrences called taking a decision. The importance of this act must be sought in the fact that the individual undergoes a structural change. What is the nature of this change? The particular event whereby a decision is emphasized, in the first line, consists in one of the alternatives being preferred and accepted; it thus undergoes an invigoration, whereas the rejected alternatives are invalidated. To this is generally added, in the second line, an emphasis consisting in the mind definitely concentrating on the chosen alternative. Later on it may be noticed that this persistent concentration has left a special readiness in the intention concerned, it is reproduced at the

slightest associative touch and presents itself in the mind in a dominating manner. Last night I determined to carry out a certain decision as soon as possible; this morning the thought of it appeared spontaneously in my mind and demanded to be realised. This readiness and energy are undoubtedly after-effects of previous persistent concentration on the matter. A similar after-effect may be observed when we are trying in vain to recall the name of a person or place. Such intensive searching in memory often has the effect of making the forgotten name appear automatically in the mind at some later moment with explosive suddenness. This would hardly have happened if the search had not been so intensive.

Stamps of attention of an opposite order may also be observed. With regard to impressions and thoughts, which we have time after time found trivial, we gradually lose interest, we dismiss them from the thoughts, the mind is closed to them and finally we pass them by with indifference. That is a useful form of adjustment whereby we avoid wasting our time on things that are of no interest to us. This attitude of indifference, this manner of dismissing things from the mind, seems to be a phenomenon of attention. A similar form of economy is met with where the individual's actions and behaviour have become habits carried out almost automatically. As soon as we feel that the movements are not in need of control, we confine ourselves to following them with a minimum of attention, and through this slackening of our control the actions are reduced to routine. It is on the whole a common experience that the events of the mind are influenced by the degree of attention expended on them by the individual in the past.

(3) *Stamps of vitality, re-stamping.* Every psychologist knows that both concrete memories and abstract ideas often show feeling-tones of noticeable strength. In cases where this colour-tone of the representations cannot be due to a transmission of feeling-tone from other simultaneous processes in the mind, the colour must be due to dispositions in the reproductions concerned, in other words, emotional stamps left from earlier experiences. Feeling-tones of this origin I have named stamps of vitality. Further, there are many instances to show that the emotional character of a certain thought-group may be altered, if the thought group is met with under new circumstances where a different mood prevails. This phenomenon I call re-stamping. From these remarks it will be clear that the individual's reactions, considerations and decisions are very often determined by previous experiences.

I shall give a few examples. Everyone is aware that we have both bright and dark memories, as well as pleasant and unpleasant expectations, and there can be no doubt that these colourings are due to static conditions left by earlier experiences, the feeling-tones cannot be ascribed to the present situation. Our self-confidence and energy are strengthened by pleasant expectations and by memories of past successful undertakings, while thoughts of our failures and former humiliations make us worried and doubtful. Our judgments are often determined by previously formed convictions. If I have several times considered and accepted a certain proposition, it will thereby have undergone an invigoration, strengthening its motivation in a positive direction. This habit of trusting to already formed judgments may sometimes lead a per-

son astray, but it is more or less indispensable for the economy of mental life, we are not equal to beginning all over again every time we have to take a matter into consideration.

By meeting opposition our wishes may undergo a curbing or curtailment. The curbing factor is always another tendency, and the counteraction is a synthetic process. All deliberate control of volitional life takes place by means of conflicting motives. Wishes are abandoned, curtailed or postponed if their realisation demands costs exeeding in aggregate value the tending potency of the wish. Our various aims do not all possess the same strength, some can counterbalance only small costs, while others are able to outweigh heavy costs. If a wish is time after time checked by stronger motives, it will be enfeebled and may be brought to resign altogether. Conversely, tendencies may undergo a development whereby their intensity and scope are increased. Tendencies take on a more passionate character when they obtain greater latitude. Unbridled enjoyment sometimes creates new dispositions, making the desire ever more intensive. That motives may thus, on the one hand, be reduced to resignation and, on the other hand, develop to greater capacity, is strong proof that tendencies arise from static dispositions and that the power of the volitional movements depends on the potentiality of the dispositions.

If a hope is dashed, this is a re-stamping process. Let us imagine that a person applies to one of his acquaintances with a request and is refused. Previous to this experience the hope was alive, otherwise it could not have acted as motive power to the application. Being met with refusal, the hope undergoes an emotional change, it loses

its force and ceases to motivate further attempts. Afterwards the individual will recall the incident with regret, perhaps with a feeling of humilation. Losing confidence in someone also involves a re-stamping. The sight of this person or the memory of him takes on another colour by being combined with the thought of dishonourable acts. My interest in a matter is revived, if in a discussion I uphold my own views against opposing opinions. In the course of deliberation on a certain matter, re-stamping as a rule takes place. If one of the competing alternatives is supported by a number of favourable arguments, each of these will add to its weight. If stamps of vitality did not exist or if re-stampings did not occur, our deliberations would be waste of time, increased experience and reflection would make us no wiser.

Many of our actions seem to be motivated and guided by sense-impressions from our surroundings. But this is often so only in appearance. In reality these actions arise from what we may call the practical meaning of the impressions, i. e. revived reproductions which by virtue of their stamp of vitality represent positive or negative values. The impressions in themselves are often neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The sight of a burning house or of a person falling down in the street would not mean danger or accident to me and would not motivate action, if the sight did not call up ill-boding thoughts.

(4) *Vital connections.* It is practical to discriminate between immediate and mediate control of mental events, although these two forms of activity often co-operate. Immediate control consists of synthetic processes, whereby certain parts of the contents of consciousness undergo an invigoration by being selected or preferred, while other

parts lose their synthetic weight. These movements are in themselves devoid of foresight and cannot be said to make use of intermediaries or means to an end. With the exception of reflexive and instinctive connections, all mediate control rests on intentional connections acquired in the lifetime of the individual. It would be rash beforehand to consider these intentional connections as purely associative acquisitions. No serious psychology can be built up so long as the notions of association and volition are mixed up.

What was it that originally drove man out of "the garden of Eden", that is to say, compelled him to live with an eye to the future, full of suspicions and worries? It was those same agents in the mind that still constantly make the individual rise above the fugitive influences of the moment, think of the future and discriminate between reliable and unreliable connections. Such foresight does not arise from our satisfactory experiences, but from the innumerable curtailments and set-backs we suffer — in a word, from adversity. From a psychological viewpoint we must delve deeper to find the true cause, namely the origin of the notion of means to an end, auxiliary processes. None of the working tendencies revealing themselves as such in the mind by appearing in an unaccomplished state are able to reach their goals on the strength of their own power, simply by perseverance. Their fulfilment is dependent upon the creation of new situations, certain conditions have to be established. What the conditions are, that will help to further the tendency, cannot be known beforehand. The connection between the tendency and its means must be found through chance experiences, which prove to be successful; and the reliablity

of their assistance can only be tested sufficiently by means of a number of new varying experiences. The existence of mankind has become so complicated that the appropriate reliable methods can be found only by means of a previous analysis and understanding of the events involved. Knowledge must take the place of instincts and reflexes.

It would seem possible to trace how the connection is established between the processes we call aims or unfulfilled tendencies and the events we call means to the accomplishment of the motives. If a mental tendency is at the same time stimulated and obstructed, it will pine away. This brings about a more or less perceptible change in the state of mind called increased tension, and this spreads reactively over the whole mind, affecting both the discursive thought movements and the efferent nerve organs. The general stimulation manifests itself, in the first instance, in a certain excitement, uneasiness and in random movements, which will in a more or less fortuitous manner bring about new situations. This will bring some alleviation, as the increased activity of thoughts and muscles counteracts the unbalanced condition of the mind by diverting the attention from the unpleasant experiences. It is only a temporary relief, however. In order to overcome the obstructions to the further development of the tendency, the mind's activity must be aimed at a final removal of the causes of the adversity suffered. We shall now consider this transition from scattered and random reaction to controlled activity.

If the random movements lead to events that assuage or remove the trouble, or to thought movements that give hope of attaining a satisfactory result, attention will in-

voluntarily concentrate around these promising changes. Thus a persevering synthetic interaction is started between the adversity and the changes counteracting it. In the course of time, experience teaches us that the mind must concentrate on the (auxiliary) changes that are expected to bring help; endeavour will be effective only when it is directed towards definite measures. It is probable that in this way the employment of certain means to an end has first come into being. The method is that of trial and error, and persistency is the main feature of the method. Only languishing tendencies work in this way, still looking to the future and patiently waiting until a useful result has been attained. Luck or disappointment will determine whether the relation shall remain or be dissolved. The satisfaction obtained creates the connection by strongly accentuating it. It would be practical to designate such mental relations of conative origin by a special name, and I have called them vital connections; they may also be called purposive relations. The name given by Pavlov to these organisations established through mental events, "conditional reflexes", is unpractical, because all reflexes, also the superseded, are conditional, i. e. they are dependent on special already established dispositions.

The structural connections between a purpose and the measures taken are not purely associative dispositions. By frequent repitition in thought life they may in the course of time lose their purposeful character and become automatic reproductions; but is is undeniable that they have arisen originally as a result of working tendencies being checked by obstacles, and their main object in the life of the individual is to assist in overcoming unwelcome occurrences and unsatisfactory situations. The use of cer-

tain measures is a sign of foresight and shows that the individual has confidence in their reliability. Disappointments dissolve the connections. Associations do not possess this quality, they are established more or less accidentally by the transient meeting in the mind of the experiences involved. Considered as practical organisations, the associations are blind and loosely knit.

Vital connections permeate the whole existence of the grown-up person. Together with the innate reflexive and instinctive connections, they make up the organisation of our reactive ability. By acquiring, practising and combining these connections, we are able to employ to an ever greater extent all the possibilities nature has laid down in us of exercising self-control and of dominating the extra-mental world. At almost every moment we employ in our thought life or in our bodily behaviour some acquired vital connection. By way of these organisations we overcome obstacles, redress disappointments and losses, counteract worries and avoid future annoyances.

(5) *Variations in tension; endeavour.* It is not sufficient to establish organisations whereby aims are combined with effective measures. In order to be useful, these static arrangements must be employed. How are they revivified? Vital connections are brought into activity by being influenced by the same urgency that originally brought them into existence; they are made use of only in situations where they are needed by the individual, in all other cases they are merely misleading. In thought life our knowledge of certain means to an end are as a rule reproduced only if we plan the realisation of aims, the furtherance of which they can serve. The actual re-

alisation of the measures takes place only if the mind is concentrated on the action planned. In that case the motive power is a smaller or greater increase of tension. Some psychologists maintain that the thought of employing a certain means is always accompanied by slight indications of its realisation.

The phenomenon of increased tension has been mentioned above. We call this change exertion or effort. A weaker or stronger change of this kind always arises as a reaction against obstruction of actual tendencies, and the stimulation spreads spontaneously over the whole mind. The individual's mental powers are roused to a more intensive activity, attention is sharpened, the thoughts are animated, the motor innervations are involutarily strengthened. These variations in the state of mental tension are the only means we possess to regulate the discharge of the forces slumbering as static dispositions in the organism, and it is natural that these sources of energy are not always mobilized to the same extent, but varying according to the demands of the situation. If the expression volitional energy designates executive power, the phenomenon of increased tension is man's volitional power *par excellence.* It should be added, however, that these tensions in themselves exercise no controlling influence, the direction of our volitional activity is determined by the actual tendencies in combination with previously established vital connections and stamps of vitality.

Two sorts of changes of tension exist, on the one hand, a change from a lower to a higher degree of tension, on the other hand, relaxation, a return to mental balance. This polarity no doubt springs from the same source

as the other contrasts in emotional and volitional life: the contrasts between inclination and disinclination, pleasure and displeasure, approval and disapproval, will and will-not, persistency and renunciation, contentment and longing, trust and distrust, assurance and doubt. Similar fundamental contrasts are met with in all living beings and seem to be the outcome of indispensable static relations in the constitution of life. We are unable to describe the complicated co-operating conditions setting the line of demarcation between life and death, but it certainly seems that all living beings spontaneously strive to guard their existence unharmed, as they always protect and defend the structural conditions for co-operation between the different parts of the organism. No part of the organic structure or the vital movement can be retained unchanged, however: the processes are continually causing changes in their own working bases and they themselves undergo variations. The self-preservation of the organism can only be attained through a coherent metabolism, the physiological circulation, whereby the various organic units by means of processes of restitution re-establish their "normal condition", a certain inner balance. The motive powers assuring this continuance must be sought in the structural arrangements and dispositions; in no other way can the interaction between the processes be regulated. The fundamental contrasts in practical life and the sources of all spontaneous reactions are probably rooted in this organisation.

By psychological observation we can only attain to a superficial understanding of the origin of these changes in tension. Experience shows that certain exciting occurrences irritate the mind, and relaxation seems to be a slow

process taking place automatically through a series of imperceptible changes. It is probable that the organism as a whole co-operates in this, the organs reacting in the long run against working under a condition of strain. In sound persons the excitement and mental unrest generally subside gradually without the need of any soothing influences.

It is well-known from times immemorial that acute adversity of whatever kind summons up the mind's energy. Dangerous situations, impending threats, heavy losses are a sure antidote to slackness and idleness. Need and distress sharpen our forethought, in many persons worries are the main drive of initiative. Conversely, enjoyments and satisfying occurrences generally put the mind in a state of passive receptiveness. Such relaxation means an adjustment whereby the present sense impressions and thoughts attain to a fuller emotional effect. It is comprehensible that man should reduce his efforts when everythings goes swimmingly: — why make an effort if the situation does not demand it? Good luck and comfort do not call for strenuous action. The more satisfactory the course of events and the state of mind, the less is required of the individual in the way of control and initiative. But in difficult situations, in danger and need, we cannot passively submit to the course of fate. Suffering must be assuaged, losses and disappointments compensated; if no change is brought about, it means that the individual will continue to live under a painful strain.

Many exceptions may be cited to the rule that adversity stimulates the mind. In order to understand these deviations we must consider the phenomenon of hopelessness.

The realisation of a purpose requires sacrifices, effort or expenditure of other kinds, and in order to overcome these counterweights a driving motive is needed. In accordance with the laws of nature ruling our practical life, no expenditure can bear fruit before the sacrifice has been made; therefore, the motives in our deliberate pursuance of an aim must be foreseeing thoughts of a stimulating character. Such ideas are called hope or pleasant expectations. It is a general rule in volitional life, that every deliberate decision and action must be supported by the hope of obtaining some advantage, — either alleviation of an evil or the attainment of a positive benefit. On this background it is comprehensible that the will is paralysed if hope is dashed. It is the very nature of volition to aim at advantages; without the expectation that the motivated hope is to be fulfilled, volition cannot exist. Here we find the explanation of the fact that loss and adversity in many instances have a discouraging effect instead of stimulating the mind to greater activity. This happens if we realise at once that we are unable to resist the threatening danger or compensate the loss we have suffered. By wasting time and energy on vain endeavours, we should only add new losses to the adversity already suffered. It often falls to the lot of man to have to submit to suffering and harsh circumstances. But these events do not deny the rule that adversity always in the first line causes an increased mental tension. The hopelessness which reduces this active attitude occurs at a later stage, discouragement sets in only when the individual through deliberation finds himself unable to avoid the evil. If one of our near and dear dies, we understand at once that the loss is irrevocable. If we are

overtaken by a serious illness, patience will be a wiser reaction than any rash activity.

In my opinion, it is also in accordance with the rule mentioned that joyous events, suddenly bringing a considerable improvement in the individual's circumstances, call op a storm of excited thoughts in the mind. From the new situation a multitude of fresh hopes involuntarily spring, and these are felt as urgent problems demanding a solution. The individual must adapt himself to the new possibilities, or one or other of the new-won chances might be lost. It is probably the fear of missing some promising possibility, the spontaneous demand for preparation for the unknown future, that excites the mind.

CHAPTER 3.

Planning and execution.

Only by considering a series of events, by means of which some enterprise is planned and executed, do we understand how the various motive powers mentioned above co-operate in practical life. The incidents that make up a complex enterprise do not as a rule follow one another in unbroken succession, but occur scattered in time and space, the earlier changes in situation being necessary as a basis for the succeeding ones. The coherence between these scattered incidents exists only in the mind of the individual. We shall now consider the relations whereby the various decisions and actions are combined to form an enterprise.

In this connection two things should be borne in mind. Firstly, that every complex enterprise is furthered by two kinds of changes, partly changes in the static background of the experiences, embracing both the mental and the extramental situation, partly functional variations in the processes acting as driving forces. The static changes we find represented and grouped in the mental organisation called the scheme of the enterprise. The dynamic motive powers are the goal, in combination with the purposes representing the auxiliary processes. Both these series of

changes co-operate in helping to create and preserve the inner coherence in the enterprise, its working direction and its confines in relation to other momentary movements. Secondly, it should be borne in mind, that the scope and influence of conscious life at any given moment are limited to the synthetic interplay of actual mental processes and the physiological occurrences interwoven with them. Only the movements actually taking place in the mind can play a rôle. The past is of no consequence unless it is recalled by the individual, or if it has left behind it dispositions that are actualised at the moment. The future can co-operate only in the shape of present ideas concerning things to come. If doubt arises as to the trustworthiness of the devised plan, corroborating evidence is required to restore confidence.

(1) *The static side of plans.* Only by abstraction can we imagine cases where the contents of consciousness consist of elementary items, appearing and disappearing independently of already established static relations. The impressions and representations of adults are usually accompanied by recollections from the past; involuntarily we recognise and classify our experiences; in virtue of already acquired knowledge we apprehend groups of impressions as things, or refer them to things, not actually apprehended through our sense at the moment; our thoughts are as a rule accompanied by more or less vague ideas, indicating their practical significance in the given circumstances. Such automatic reproductions are the result of a mental growth, beginning in early childhood and continuing all through life. The advantages gained are that the mind is gradually enabled to develop and embrace a greater and more highly differentiated multiplici-

ty of appearences than before, and also that the contents of consciousness automatically present themselves in a more adequate manner.

Plans devised for our practical life serve to indicate (1) future changes, and (2) the order in which they are to take place. In the mental sphere a change can be depicted only by means of two ideas, one indicating a previous state of the thing in question, and another indicating the future state; and we know of no other means to ensure this order than an organised static relation between the two ideas, imprinted in the succession mentioned. It may be called a perspective order in the time dimension. In the mental sphere the only difference between space and time perspectives is that the latter refer to time processes. In our plans the perspective order depicts certain relations between links in events. No plan is complete until it embraces neither too little nor too much, and each change must be located in its proper place in the perspective. If it is brought to realisation at the wrong time or at the wrong place in the stream of events, the change will be wasted and may even cause disturbance.

The planning and the execution of a purpose are very different actions, the former grows out of a mental background of reflection and pondering, while the latter concentrates around more settled projects. Planning is preliminary work, usually taking place before the proper time for practical realisation has come. In this case the thought background forbids that the purpose-means relations should result in motor impulses, a *fiat* would be an error. Thus the original character of the purposive relations is to some extend altered: the purposeful pro-

cess wilfully avoids a release of its auxiliary functions, and through this control the vital relation is gradually reduced to an associative relation. The great importance of the planning is that it leaves associative dispositions behind, thus limiting the extent of the plan and determining the order and succession of the various intentions.

(2) *The dynamics of enterprise.* The core in every undertaking is an unsatisfied tendency, from this springs both the planning and the execution of the projected acts. A tendency attaining to fulfilment by spontaneous tenacity without the need of auxiliary functions (means) is no foreseeing purpose; it bears the character of an enjoyment rather than of a volitional movement. The whole of practical life is created and supported by purposes meeting with one or more conditions which, at a given moment, counteract the advancement of the purpose in question. Only tendencies needing means can be called purposes, that is to say, they aim at making future changes which will serve to overcome the impeding circumstances.

Every link in a plan becomes a purpose by virtue of a new stamp of vitality in connection with the tendency motivating the inception of the plan. If later on I fail to carry out the plan, it is felt as a repression of the purpose, and this failure produces a depression in the mind; the depression causes the mind to react by means of an increased tension, the purpose is thus stimulated, making it easier to overcome the hindrances. At every point in the realisation of the plan I am faced with the choice, either to give up the purpose, or to take certain measures. This dynamic interplay between the purpose and the means clearly shows that the purpose is weighed

against the measures to be taken, and that it is the primary motive power in the realisation. How should the idea of the purpose get sufficient strength to overcome the expenditure, if not from immanent dispositions working towards the accomplishment of the aim? Within the mental sphere the realisation of the means has no other consequence than just this: that the aim is attained in as effective a manner as possible.

It is a general rule that we try to reach our goals with as little effort and as few sacrifices as possible. As soon as we find that a required change can be carried out by an easier means than we have hitherto used, we dismiss the more difficult method and adopt the easier instead. This change in our plans takes place in virtue of new stamps of vitality. By comparing the old and the new, by rejecting the one and preferring the other, both undergo a re-stamping. Altogether, negative and positive stamps of vitality play a considerable part in our daily deliberations and activities, because the greater or smaller positive and negative weight of our representations influence the synthetic interaction, thus giving rise to our reactions and decisions.

How is it possible that a purpose, which does not aim at causing changes in the individual's own life, can be the motive power, as in the case of unselfish acts of devotion? This would be impossible, if the purpose did not bring about changes in the future life of both the individual and his fellow-creature; only motives in the individual's own mind can determine his behaviour. Altruistic feelings have a particular origin, however. They arise when the individual puts himself in the place of others, i. e. remembers his own experiences in similar circum-

stances. These recollections of experienced prosperity or adversity will inevitably be coloured by positive or negative stamps of vitality and thus become motive powers. At the same time, it is undeniable that these motives cannot be satisfied by egoistical acts on the part of the individual. The distress and suffering of others can be counteracted only by changes in the life of these beings. But it will be apparent that acts having this effect will at the same time bring about a change in the individual's thoughts regarding the circumstances of his fellow-being, and thereby his compassion will be fulfilled.

There are no exceptions to the rule that only motives in the individual's own mind can determine his behaviour. If someone wishes to compel me to carry out an action that I object to, he can realise his purpose by awakening positive or negative motives in my mind strong enough to overrule my objection, for instance by promising me some considerable benefit as a compensation, or by threatening me with some unpleasantness if I refuse to comply with his demand. In both cases my own wishes determine my choice of alternative. The influence of the person who is compelling me is confined to imposing upon me the unpleasant alternatives.

Envy becomes a motive because the individual, seeing the superior ability or happier fate of other people, feels his own existence overshadowed and reduced in comparison. From this humiliation arises the wish to remove the source of the depressing feelings. The motivating power of hate arises when the individual feels the success of his efforts or the assurance of his hopes threatened by the competitive actions of other people. The wish to be free of these annoyances is quite natural and cannot be

condemned, but the motive has got an ill repute because persons who feel hate will often, when legitimate means fail, be tempted to take recourse to unjustifiable methods.

Revenge is sweet because it entails a change whereby the source of hate is removed. The punishment of a criminal is felt as a satisfaction because it is supposed to prevent similar crimes in the future, the mind is set at rest.

How can a purpose activate the mind and guide the thoughts towards the construction of a plan and later to its realisation? The first and foremost condition is that the unfulfilled purposeful process, the aim, is present in the mind. Observation shows, however, that our attention and our thoughts, while we are seeking means to carry out the purpose, do not concentrate on the aim, but on changes serving its furtherance. The idea of the purpose is nontheless present, but only as a more or less vague after-image in the thought-background. This prolonged lingering in the mind is due to the persevering character commonly shown by unfulfilled processes. The above-mentioned feeble movement in the thought-background is, however, capable of giving the thought movements in the thought-foreground a seeking character and a definite direction, i. e. of exercising influence on the synthetic interaction of the representations. That the thought movements are seeking, means that certain representations are approved and emphasized while others are rejected. This choosing and rejecting is in itself a synthetic act, the abiding purpose in the thought-background selects and invigorates those representations that enliven it by imbuing it with hopefulness. These events can easily be observed. The thought movements in the thought-foreground are

controlled by the individual's knowledge of the cause-effect relations (vital connections).

The purpose and the means required are weighed against each other, the mind — or rather the synthetic interaction — acting as scales. If the purpose weighs more than the necessary means, the latter will be turned into intentions. This is a re-stamping taking place as a result of the surplus weight of the purpose. In other words, if the plan as a whole is approved and its accomplishment is considered advantageous, this means that the expend-
is considered advantageous, this means that the expendi-
ture and trouble will be more than compensated, they itures become acceptable.

If the necessary means weigh more heavily than the aim, the result of the synthetic interaction will be that the purposeful power of the tendency is repressed and stifled. Such re-stamping is well known under the name of relinquishment, giving up. Other re-stampings take place in the course of the realisation of the plan. Gradually, as the means are brought into action assisting the purpose a step forward, they lose their character of intentions and become passive representations. Similarly, the aim loses its purposeful tendency by attaining to fulfilment. If aims retain their motivating power after being satisfied, this is due to expectations on the part of the individual that they will become active again in the future. We know, for instance, that to-morrow we shall again need food, drink, shelter and many other things; therefore, the thought of these things retains its character as a purpose. This is no contradiction of the rule that wishes lose their motivating urgency when they are fulfilled.

It appears indisputable that volitional life in general — beginning with synthetic interactions and reactions and ending with the planning and accomplishment of activities — has its source in a competitive weighing or a wrestling between simultaneous processes working in different directions, and the results are dependent on the purposeful strength and perseverance of the processes. Two things should particularly be noted. (1) Competition, the vanquishing of opposition, is the special criterion of volitional movemets, and (2) it is the nature of volition to seek advantages; we have the strength to carry out only such acts as promise us some benefit, the advantages must be more weighty than the costs entailed. Further, every undertaking demands a preponderant confidence that the realisation will be successful and will not break down on the way. This short psychological definition of the phenomenon of volition should in my opinion be adequate.

It is evident that we cannot always in advance appraise the value, either of the future benefit to be obtained by the realisation of the purpose, or the cumulative weight of the costs. Both pro et contra must be taken at a rough estimate, and we often risk that our appraisement will fail at some point. For instance, the individual may die before he has time to enjoy the expected benefits, or unforeseen events in the surrounding world may prevent the realisation of his aim; no one enjoys the benefits of all his efforts. Various kinds of self-delusion may occur, or too hasty deliberation may make our estimates unreliable. We may fall for temptations, immediately obtainable values may be over-estimated in comparison with benefits to be gained only in

the distant future. All human foresight is liable to failure at times.

How is the increased mental tension brought about which is necessary for the fulfilment of a plan? We may understand it on the background of the fact that the completed plan represents an acquired value, i. e. a step in the direction of the realisation of the purpose. Wishes having found no way to future realisation bear the character of languishing thoughts, they have come to a deadlock, their fate is to die of starvation every time they are revived. The completed plan brings some degree of liberation from this obstruction, the wish can now expand itself in expectations, not merely as dreams but as promising purposes. When we know the way and the direction, the wish becomes a hope and shows more patience than before. This value is lost if the means are not realised as soon as the situation is prepared and the favourable moment for action has come. Postponing or abandoning a plan by neglecting to act at the right moment means a loss, the hope is disappointed. The mind reacts against this deterioration. The objection to abandoning the planned purpose and to forfeiting the proper moment calls up the tension and concentration of the mind necessary to discharge the impulses through which action is set going. The notions of practical motivation and expenditure are correlative. Synthetic co-operation and spontaneous reactions are not due to causes revealing themselves in the mind. Work of this kind is not based on the expectation of future recompense and is therefore not affected by doubt or fear of the consequences. Only the activity based on foresight and involving expenditure or risk is dependent on a motivation promising future benefits. Our

unpleasant experiences, such as disappointments, losses, all kinds of adversity and waste of values constitute the background for our demand for reliability in our schemes and undertakings.

In the case of any action based on definite expectations, the individual's will power is not only dependent on whether the purpose outweighs the costs, confidence in the reliability of the methods chosen is also required as a means to the accomplishment of the purpose. It is in the last instance a question of infallible comprehension of the time process both in the mental and the extramental sphere. The fulfilments of our aims are ultimately events in the mind. The indispensability of a reliable control of practical life is in every individual the constant background, motivating the wish to possess sure knowledge of the course of events to as wide an extent as possible. There is reason to touch upon the question of the validity of cognition here, because the solution is in the last instance a matter of volition.

Everybody is agreed that scientific knowledge must be universally valid and therefore must be built up on a foundation which is the same for all and which does not undergo change from generation to generation. But this demand can be made so exacting that it becomes impracticable. It will suffice to point out that we are unable to apprehend anything but changes, as our apparatus of apprehension, human consciousness, can be affected only by processes, whose static effects present themselves as changes brought about in the state of the mind. Therefore it is impossible for us to penetrate to a thorough or absolutely guaranteed apprehension of the static factors in our existence. We can never thoroughly

apprehend either physical matter or the working basis of the mental processes. These continuing factors are in themselves unobservable and can only be defined indirectly through dynamic investigation. It is everywhere the dynamic investigation that finds new ways, while static comparison, whereby the logic connections are found, moves in the already known strata. All kinds of phenomena of change are from a logical viewpoint paradoxial. Logical understanding everywhere builds on identification of static factors which are in themselves unobservable. It is true that dynamic investigation is partly logical in nature, as the classification of kinds of change, leading to a knowledge of the laws of events, rests on the identification of static units. But it would be rash to assert that the ultimate logical relations, which are needed as fundamental presuppositions for every kind of investigation both in the physical and the mental sphere, may be ascertained by inference from experience. That would surpass the power even of human imagination. It is one of the utopian pretences that for too long have maimed philosophical thinking. The reason why philosophy still at the present day consists of a disorganised multiplicity of views and assertions, is the still prevalent idea that epistemology should aim at a completely coherent logical understanding of the universe, where man is placed as a participating factor. Nature has set a limit to our powers of apprehension, constraining us to be content to know only more or less reliable laws for the time movements.

There is only one way of establishing the ultimate logical relations on which the work of apprehension can build, that is to adopt a number of postulates of identity embracing both the mental and the extramental sphere

of events. The problem of apprehension is in the last instance concentrated around these postulates, and the adoption of them must be characterised as an act of volition, a choice between alternatives. That is certainly a kind of pragmatism, but by thus deciding whether the postulate of identity is to be adopted or rejected as the foundation of scientific research, no room is left for the old accusation that apprehension is dependent on the subjective pleasure of man. Anyone is free to suggest another and better foundation for the work of epistemology and to try to find more infallible laws of events than those acknowledged so far. But it is just as difficult to build up an unassailable scepticism as to compile scientific knowledge unassailable by doubt. At any rate, it is impossible to abolish the ingrown relation between theoretical investigation and practical life. Not only the plain man will be bound to choose the line of action which in his opinion best serves the development and safety of practical life, but also the student will have to acknowledge the practical consequences of the opinions he holds. So far, no sceptic has tried to miscredit the laws of events which in the long run have proved of saticfactory service in daily life. Although present-day research has at no point penetrated so far into the time process that a perfect logical understanding has been attained, it may safely be maintained that the postulates of identity have come up to expectations. Their rejection would mean, in the first line, that all acknowledged science would be rendered null and void, and, in the second line, a fatal breakdown of practical life. In any case, the choice between the alternatives is unquestionably an act of volition.

CHAPTER 4.

Some particular aspects of human striving.

(1) *Aesthetic activity.* An understanding of the special characteristics of the aesthetic values is a key to the explanation of the efforts due to earlier experiences of such values. Our first point must therefore be a definition of the phenomena classified as aesthetic.

Most students in this domain are agreed that the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences cannot be defined by comparison of the existing experiential material, link by link. The differences found, for instance, between a group of pleasant sensations of taste or smell on the one side, and, on the other side, the sight of a beautiful vase or the succession of sounds constituting a delightful piece of music, cannot be ascribed to the actual material in the impressions, the details apprehended through our senses, but must be due to other reasons. If by the material of the experiences we understand, not merely the intellectual characteristics of the impressions or representations, but also the feeling-tones and the innate tendencies, only one possibility seems left: that the special character or value of the aesthetic experiences must be a product of the synthetic interaction between the mental processes concerned. This is no new

assumption. In his work: "Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland" p. 265, Herman Lotze writes: "Sehr einstimmig hat die Aesthetik Schönheit nur dem verbundenen Mannigfachen, nicht dem Einfachen zugeschrieben". But not all kinds of synthetic interaction create positive or negative aesthetic values. We have seen in the previous chapters that also volitional life is developed from synthetic interaction. What is the difference between volitional synthesis and aesthetic coherence?

Kant has given important contributions to a definition of the synthetic coherences that give us aesthetic pleasure or displeasure. Particularly he has drawn a line of demarcation between the momentary relations in the mind, wherefrom the volitional movements arise, and those that assume an aesthetic colour. The former are prescient, striving beyond the immediately given in virtue of previously established tendencies; they are movements which more or less sacrifice the present for the sake of the future. Whereas the aesthetic relations rest in the already given, the actual mental contents, they are of a lingering character and are not burdened by worries about coming things. This endows the aesthetic experiences with a tasting or enjoying character, called by *Kant* "Unmittelbarkeit". He further adds the remark that aesthetic enjoyment is independent of any interest as to whether the mental processes involved represent real things and events or not. We enjoy all sorts of fictions just as much as the thoughts of existing objects and occurrences. Volitional life, however, is dependent upon the fact that the events thought of belong to real life, so that they are able to bring about changes in the future.

The above contributions to a definition can hardly

be considered sufficient. They do not lead to an understanding of the aesthetic activity, a kind of striving whose existence cannot be doubted. The notions of value and tendency represent processes, movements in certain directions, and so far it remains somewhat obscure what the aesthetic values consist in. In the previous chapters we have met only with values representing a furtherance of tending processes which have not exhausted their functional capacity, leaving a part of their structural dispositions unreleased. The origin of the aesthetic values is not comprehensible in this way. Only in the second instance, after previous experience of certain enjoyments, can they consist in a release of tendencies. Altogether it will be difficult to avoid the question whether there exists values of any other kind than the furtherance of previously created tendencies. To this the answer obviously is that we can very well imagine a number of values of other kinds. They may consist in habitual processes, well-known experiences, happening in some special situation to meet with more exuberant functional conditions than hitherto, thus undergoing an increase to a wider synthetic capacity, greater vigour and scope than formerly. Or the increase may consist in the combination of simultaneous experiences exercising a stimulating effect, thus involuntarily extending the mind to embrace richer and livelier contents than usual. In both cases new structural conditions are created, by means of which the processes may later on adopt a tending character. Everybody is familiar with occurrences of this nature.

When we see beautiful ensembles made in the workshop of nature, or the productions of artists, it is noticeable that the aesthetic values are often due to a certain

combination of the component parts. A unit will seem more vivid, colourful and expressive when seen on the background of certain others; all the parts of the whole gain in fullness, depth and variation by their momentary relations. Beauty always means that the experiences involved gain a fuller development and often a closer coherence than usual, *latent forces are released which would otherwise not be awakened.* Through this growth new dispositions are created, and these may later on act as impulses to aesthetic activity. It will be seen that this understanding of the aesthetic activity follows the line of the interpretation of the volitional movements given in the above chapters. The phenomena of growth here described are of a similar character to the realisation of a purpose.

I shall now turn to the volitional movements in the mind that may be observed as a result of previously experienced aesthetic pleasure or displeasure. If it is true that aesthetic values are immediate, i. e. arise spontaneously from the synthetic interaction of the moment, mediate activity would seem to be superfluous here. But it is evident that positive as well as negative aesthetic experiences, also in cases where the enjoyment appears to be purely contemplative, call forth a lively activity in the mind, generally described as tentative or selecting, a form of activity that should undoubtedly be classed under volitional life.

It is difficult, however, to distinguish this activity from the discursive movements, arising from the fact that our attention and our thoughts are by nature wandering and unable to remain motionless. The tentative and selecting acts mentioned seem to derive from a feeling that, if the discursive movements are not controlled and directed

into satisfactory channels, the already obtained aesthetic enjoyment will be dissolved and lost. The voluntary direction of the momentary synthetic interaction should thus be a reaction against a commencing dissolution of an actual aesthetic pleasure: an aesthetic reaction. Another spontaneous reaction of an aesthetic kind consists in the attention and the thoughts turning away from impressions and representations with which the mind is satiated: in their place the mind seeks fresh experiences. On the strength of such motives we strive to eliminate all dull and superfluous components in order to circumscribe an aesthetic ensemble within which our attention and thoughts may move without loss of the mental exhilaration. This endeavour often leads to new links being added to the ensemble when they mean an improvement of the whole.

In other cases the aesthetic activity is motivated by the given synthesis being so complicated that the mind cannot comprise it all at once, but must try to reform this multiplicity by means of controlling movements. These reactions are rare, however, in the case of negative aesthetic values. To repulsive impressions and thought relations we generally react by averting or avoiding movements, whereby the ensemble as a whole is rejected.

If I am looking at a painting, a sculpture or a landscape, my eyes will involuntarily move from part to part, while again and again I combine the impressions in various groups and try to gather them into a whole, first from one point of view and then from another. By means of this twining together of fresh ensembles and the controlling guidance bringing about coherence, the enjoyment can be continued until I feel satiated. When I am

listening to a piece of music something similar takes place. Here it is especially evident that the aesthetic values are dissolved if the recipient is not continually combining the new impressions with the previous parts remaining in the thought-background. The less the recipient keeps the earlier parts present in his thought-background, the more will the musical values be dissipated, the tones will lose their significance and become mere sounds. It is a general rule that the aesthetic values disappear if the mind of the apprehending individual remains passive.

We do not recognise the aesthetic values before we have experienced them personally. Originally man has met with them in the form of chance coincidences, combinations of impressions and thoughts that unexpectedly give the mind an immediate stimulation and exhilaration. Only in the second instance are we led, on the background of such experiences, to undertake aesthetic activity with a view to retaining the connections or trying to enhance the enjoyment by extending the ensemble. The activity of the creative artist appears at a later stage, in persons upon whose mind certain aesthetic experiences have impressed themselves in a particularly clear and incisive manner, and who have retained a vivid memory of them. Only thought-images of previous experiences can make a person create works of art, or serve to guide him in their realisation. At a still later stage the contemplation of already existing works of art may act as a stimulus and controlling thought-background. It should be stressed, however, that the artist's manner of proceeding must always be tentative. The values are irrational. It is not possible by means of intellectual

notions to foretell which combinations will give exactly the aesthetic effect desired.

On the basis of the above short description it should be possible to arrive at some measure of understanding of the "irrational" coherence between the various links in an aesthetic ensemble. This coherence is often described by the paradoxical expression "unity in multiplicity". If the multiplicity originally presents itself at once, intuitively, the coherence consists merely in the synthetically combined components enhancing one another, whereby a surplus value is created; no other "unity" can be observed in these cases. The more complicated ensembles, whose "complexity" surpasses what the mind is able to embrace at once, are built up successively around a nucleus, which by its immediate value as well as by its mental surroundings act as an inspiration to the completing activity. This ulterior striving makes the various promising indications — the food of inspiration — present themselves more definitely and with greater fullness by making the mind concentrate on them and combine them with the nucleus lingering in the thought-background. These movements are governed by an exquisite spirit of choice and a subtle tact of omission, whereby new aesthetic values make their appearance and join themselves harmoniously to the whole. This is aesthetic growth, a realisation of aesthetic ideas. The limitation of the ensemble depends upon whether the attempted additions have an enhancing or a distracting effect. The work of completion is interrupted at all points where the mind experiences a deterioration instead of an expansion. The basis of the inner "unity in multiplicity" built up in this manner is in the first instance the synthetic aesthetic values, whose

superior power lies in the fact that every link of the whole serves as a means for the others, as it is indispensable for the preservation of the value. Thus vital connections are established, a kind of will to guard the coherence obtained. Furthermore, a net of associative relations are established through the movements described. This explanation of the mystery "unity in multiplicity" at least applies to phenomena whose existence is well known from other domains of experience.

As demonstrated by Kant, the aesthetic judgments are not universally valid. For instance, two persons at the same time contemplating a certain landscape or a building are not likely to experience the impressions in the same order and succession; nor will the reproductions and the aesthetic reactions called forth be the same in both persons. Even if it should happen that the experiential material did not show any particular differences, it is probable that the aesthetic feelings would differ because of the individual's subjective receptivity and varying mental background. But in spite of these and other differences in the personal results, we can in the aesthetic experiences find a number of features common to all, e. g. the general criterion that every part of an aesthetic ensemble is coloured by its synthetic surroundings and undergoes an extraordinary stimulation by appearing on the background of certain other parts. Psychological teaching on the aesthetic phenomena will have to limit itself to such general traits.

The slogan "art for art's sake" aims at a separation of aesthetic life from that part of emotional and volitional life whose source and motivation must be sought in ingrown positive and negative tendencies. This is a rather unnatural pretention. It is true that prejudices often ex-

ercise a seductive influence on the aesthetic experiences, interrupting their growth and dispersing already formed synthetic combinations. But is is hopeless to try to impose upon the man in the street the rule that his aesthetic interests must be kept apart from all other wishes and intentions active in the same mind. Such confusion cannot be prohibited. The plain man's aesthetic self-control is seldom of the same rigid force as that of the aesthetic expert. Also artists and critics are more or less prejudiced on account of their special doctrines and interests. We cannot expect either the plastic arts, poetry or other aesthetic literature to be cleansed of ingredients tending in, for instance, a moral or patriotic direction.

Some students have affirmed that aesthetic activity represents the final and highest acquisition, the last word in the art of living. Only in a certain limited sense can this opinion be maintained. It is true that man is to a considerable extent able to arrange his future experiences and their attendant circumstances in such a way that one thing, from an aesthetic point of view, forms a favourable background for another, whereby things and situations gain in value. However, these plans and preparations will be successful only on condition that the individual's volitional life undergoes no great changes in the interim, then the expected additional advantages will probably be the highest this person can attain to. But the continued development of volitional life may create motives of a non-aesthetic kind leading to still higher goals.

(2) *The source and aim of morals.* Among modern physiologists the view is gaining ground that the synthetic processes whereby inanimate material is changed into living substance cannot be produced or studied in test-tubes,

these metamorphoses are met with only in living cells. Even if many organic materials can be produced in the chemist's laboratories, the methods employed here are different from the processes taking place in living organisms. All higher syntheses must come about step by step, each new stage requiring special conditions; the whole process must therefore be conducted and limited inside a common circumscribed sphere of action, otherwise the separate reactions will counteract one another, so that the synthesis fails. The unknown control in the organism, upon which the co-operation between the various processes depends, is called auto-regulation. A great variety of such regulations are required in order to keep up the ordinary life of the healthy person. Some of these reactions are internal functions in the cells, other regulations take place by means of interaction between various kinds of organic links. To the latter group undoubtedly belong all reactions observable as events in the mind.

The highest sphere of reaction to be distinguished in human life is formed by the synthetic mental relations; with varying effectivity they affect the events in the individual's mind in waking condition. The most important issues of these continually shifting relations are, firstly, the involuntary mental reactions and instinctive acts; secondly, every actualising of the individual's voluntarily acquired vital connections. The latter are always auxiliary functions, called forth by working needs or wishes as a means to their furtherance. In most cases the result is harmonious co-operation between the unsatisfied motive and the auxiliary function, but sometimes a conflict arises when it becomes clear to the individual that the realisation of the means as planned will counteract certain other

wishes in the mind of the same person. Thus the rival motives become opponents trying to overcome one another. Such wrestling between different wishes seems to impair the unity and solidarity in the individual's life. On the other hand, it appears on closer inspection that conflicts among motives are not only useful but indispensable regulations in man's existence. This practical necessity may be further considered from various points of view.

Biological research during later years has led to the assumption that the controversies between functions of various origins revert very far back in the history of evolution; phenomena of this kind are to be found in organisms that seem devoid of conscious life. Cytologists speak of a law of co-operation, without which no living creature of a complicated construction would be able to thrive. It is a question of an organisatory influence acting from cell to cell, regulating all growth and in fully developed individuals also every process of healing. In undamaged organisms this influence is a self-regulation, acting as a protection by restraining and preventing excesses. All living and vigorous cells have from earlier stages in their evolution inherited a tendency to grow and multiply as much as in any way possible. But this tendency is as a rule restrained by other cells within the organism, so that the inner order and harmony are maintained. It sometimes happens, however, for some unknown reason that the tendency to grow is too strong in some cells, which get out of control. This is the case, for instance, in cancer cells, they may be likened to criminals eating their way into the inner order of the vital activities and dissolving the positive co-operation. Though the above mentioned

processes of regulation are as yet somewhat obscure, it can hardly be doubted that they are due to an interaction between influences working in opposite directions.

In the higher volitional life, which rests on conscious deliberation and choice between alternatives, interaction between motives in opposition to one another is the only form af self-control to be found. Such controversies arise every time we weigh the costs of carrying out a certain purpose against the values we hope to gain by it, or when we see that a wish can be realised only by making use of means which will cause changes whereby another aim we have in view will become impracticable or be seriously hindered. In both cases the comparative weights of the contrasting motives will be decisive in the issue of the conflict. Many times every day we are compelled to give up one thing in favour of another, or to postpone less pressing matters for others of greater importance in the actual situation. It is also by means of conflicting motives that we withstand temptations, prevent our passions from leading us into excesses or perpetrating unjust acts that would bring us into miscredit. Self-control is required to an enormous extent in normal human life. The individual's many different wishes as well as his relations with his surroundings make is necessary for him time after time to restrain his natural tendencies and undertake disagreable tasks to keep his existence in proper order and to guard it unimpaired.

These strugles between different endeavours within the same self show a considerable credit-side also in other respects. It is highly probable that valuable qualities such as courage, perseverance, cheerfulness in adversity, steadfastness in danger, are rooted in and derive their daily

nourishment from the conflicts between notives, in which we are all practised since childhood. When suffering adversity, temptations, injuries and humiliations, it is not only a struggle to maintain the self unharmed, balanced and cheerful, it is also for everyone who bears such trials without succumbing a school where the mind of the individual gains both in depth, height and breadth, a development to greater ripeness and wider scope of activity hardly to be attained through a comfortable and easy life. Everyday experience shows that our energy is goaded and expanded when we meet with serious hindrances or dangers, contradiction is inciting, adversity stimulating. The difficulties in our existence increase our energy and keep us wide awake in the face of the continual stream of events.

It may even be presumed that man's development to the possession of a higher volitional life, i. e. a striving after future goals on the background of the knowledge of a multiplicity of possible alternatives, has arisen from reciprocal trials of strength between rival motives in the individual's mind. Such processes are fruitful in several respects. They lead to a deeper and clearer discrimination between the various alternatives and, in the second line, to the aims being united by more articulated thought perspectives into the future. The alternatives can be weighed against one another only by alternately turning the attention from the one to the other, as no comparison of the relative weights of the aims is possible through simultaneous apprehension. The alternation of the motives in the mind arises when the one suppresses the other, whereupon the threatened purpose reacts to this treatment by releasing a higher mental tension; thus the latter

gains the upper hand in the mind, as soon as the threatening aim is momentarily exhausted and has to linger for a moment in the thought-background in order to gather new strength. Both motives are spurred on by being counteracted and are exercised in perseverance by being again and again stimulated by the opponent's attacks. Finally, the victorious aim is further strengthened by its rise to triumphant preponderance in the ultimate foreseeing thought concentration called the decision.

The incisive rôle played by the conflicts of motives in the higher volitional life seems to confirm the hypothesis mentioned in an earlier chapter regarding the intrinsic nature of our motives. If an actual motive is not an unfulfilled vital function spontaneously working towards continuation until the urgency in question is exhausted, the conflicts of motives would seem to be, not only incomprehensible, but quite unreasonable phenomena. One wish could not systematically hinder another and keep it suppressed, a hope could not be checked by obstacles and automatically awaken to new life as soon as these obstacles were removed, different purposes could not be rivals, broken promises would not mean that hopes were dashed, unsettled problems could not remain pending, doubt could not last from one day to the next; in a word, the higher volitional life would dissolve itself into a multiplicity of incoherent changes. Such words as endeavour, purpose or aim would be false designations.

Regarding the special question as to the aim of the moral commandments, I must absolutely deny the assumption that they are in the first line a demand on our neighbour. It is true that the tendency to criticise our neighbours and interfere with their existence is wide-

spread, but such tendencies cannot be respected by any serious person. The individual cannot with any authority demand another and higher form of morality of his neighbour than he himself is prepared to uphold in his own behaviour. Every reaction of the conscience is in the last instance a personal self-regulation and must primarily aim at the individual's own welfare, otherwise the demands would not be sufficiently deep-rooted.

Just as ridiculous is the wide-spread opinion that a person's progress in morals may be measured by the extension of his altruism and the number of sacrifices he makes for the benefit of others. During nearly two thousand years the preachers of Christianity have by wonderful promises and the most terrible threats tried to convert man from being to his inmost heart egoistical — as he was created by the hand of nature — and to make him live as the follower of Christ by taking upon himself and expiating the sins of others; but so far, if we disregard all selfish delusions and judge by the deep and genuine feeling of the conversion only, the results have been meagre. And we may safely add that the task is hopeless, because man's constitution precludes him from experiencing anything beyond his own vital processes; each of us can experience only his own personal impressions, thoughts, feelings and endeavours. The only thing we can possibly do is to influence our own future experiences in a certain direction.

In the above I have not yet touched upon the main difficulty of attaining to a serviceable and justifiable moral teaching. Its rules must be generally valid, unprejudiced and impartial, or they could not be recognised as being scientific in structure and so be accepted as the

basis of legislative authority. Experience shows that individuals differ widely from one another as to their dominant motives, in the scope of their endeavours, in their mutual relations, in their innate and acquired characteristics, so it is a difficult task indeed to find a general principle for the control of the volitional life of all human beings. It is simply necessary to limit the domain of morals to the number of self-regulations whose general validity and impartiality can be demonstrated without doubt. It is my opinion that the only possible solution of the moral problem will be the negative commandment that every practical self-contradiction in the individual's mode of life must be rejected as immoral. In other words, the aim of moral law is to watch over the inner coherence and harmony in the individual's volitional life, whereby all the motives of the self are made to co-operate, so that the personality will attain to as high a degree of firmness, continuity and inner solidarity as is possible under the given conditions of life. Self-control of this kind aims at the always renewed task of developing and maintaining the organisation of the self in the best possible state as a foundation for the individual's future, from a practical point of view. Above and beyond the many contradictory personal motives, which are constantly threatening to disintegrate and disturb the self, an ever-renewed self-regulation must take place, arising from the inevitable fact that the motives are entertained by one and the same individual, and that they cannot thrive unless they are brought into harmonious co-operation. Every sensible person must recognise this demand as a natural and indispensable element in our constitution.

(3) *Altruistic motives.* Even if man from the hand

of nature is utterly egoistical, this does not preclude the existence of altruistic motives, which may rightfully bear this name. The explanation is simple. Our experiences involuntarily adopt different feeling-tones according to their agreeable or disagreeable qualities, or whether they augur good or evil for us in the future. These cheerful or depressing qualities or colour-tones are repeated in our memory and imagination, thus enabling us to imagine ourselves "in somebody else's shoes", whenever the good or bad befalling our neighbours is brought to our knowledge. All pity and sympathy for others is a more or less involuntary reflection of our own previously experienced prosperity or adversity. Even if our participation in the joys and sorrows of our fellow-beings are only thought constructions, these altruistic thought- and feeling-movements are just as real as our own joyful and sorrowful experiences. But our sympathy will be deep and genuine only if with sincere understanding we imagine what our fellow-being must feel and think in these circumstances. My sympathy will be superficial and vague if my first thought is the realisation that it is not I personally who must bear this gain or loss. Between our feelings regarding our own dispensations and our sympathy with those of others there is generally the difference that we find it easier to disregard and forget what has happened to others than our own joys and adversities. Other people's troubles do not penetrate so deeply into my existence and do not so inevitably pursue me in the future as my own torments.

Custom, general usage, the habits of ordinary politeness or other conditions based on reciprocity may motivate reasonable demands for altruistic actions; but pity, charity

or sacrifices for others cannot as a general rule be imposed upon everybody. Reciprocal help may appear to be an attractive ideal, but in real life it will always be practised in an arbitrary and partial manner; and therefore altruistic services should be considered as voluntary sacrifices, a sort of gift. The fact that love of your neighbour has through the centuries been preached as a duty on a basis of religious dogmas cannot alter the matter.

As some degree of altruistic interest is met with in nearly all people, also among the irreligious, we must presume the existence of purely human tendencies, inciting to unselfish endeavour. How can true sympathy lead to a willingness to sacrifice something for the benefit of others? The explanation is that my understanding of my neighbour's good luck or bad luck simply consists in vital processes in my organism, and therefore these exercise a cheering or depressing influence on my mind. Although my sympathy has originally adopted its colour from my own adversities, my altruistic feelings, if they are genuine, are inevitably motive powers in my mind, just as my thoughts regarding my own fate. When I harbour altruistic feelings, it means that I gradually cultivate a number of motives in my mind beyond the amount required to provide for my own personal needs. This is an enrichment of the Me, an extension of my sources of enjoyment, as I naturally feel it pleasant to have my altruistic interests satisfied, just as I enjoy having my egoistical wishes fulfilled. Progress in love of our neighbour means progress in culture, and this gain is of value to me in so far as I have acquired it voluntarily and as the result of a lively sympathy.

It should not be concealed, but on the contrary openly

declared, that altruistic tendencies in the last instance are egoistical motives. We are by nature so constructed that our feelings for our neighbour can only be satisfied by processes in the self and not in the least by what is experienced by others. It is only apparently that love of our neighbour aims at changes in the lives of others as its ultimate goal. When a vagabond begs me for money for a drink, my action to help him has not attained its aim when he quenches his thirst, but only when I feel assured that the vagabond with my gift in his hand has received the help he required. If the preachers and followers of Christianity try to bring their neighbourly love and charity to an ever richer flowering, not because these experiences in themselves are felt as the highest in life, but because they thereby hope to obtain pardon for their sins or a greater assurance of a better life after this, then the motives forming the source and basis of religion must be said to be egoistical. The same holds if the interest in the welfare of our fellows is maintained because in return for our charity we may gain social advantages such as the esteem and confidence of our surroundings.

Although the cultural values springing from all kinds of unselfish motives are rooted in egoism, they cannot be said to be false or hypocritical. They deserve the appreciation of both the individual himself and his fellows, like everything else that is honest and genuine. The advantages gained are not as a rule of a material kind, but will chiefly entail that the individual's personal daily life is expanded and embellished in innumerable ways. Within reasonable limits it is no burden, but a source of strength and endurance to pursue a number of interests and to have various tasks to attend to. Most people

who maintain a sincere interest in a larger or smaller circle of their fellow-beings will admit that their existence would become narrow, poor and monotonous, if they were content to concentrate merely on their own selfish needs and desires; they would feel much more lonely and shut off from the world of living beings outside their own narrow personal domain. As a rule it is a feeling of genuine sympathy with the anxieties, hopes, fears and expectations of others which forms a lasting bond between the individual and his fellow-beings.

CHAPTER 5.

On the scope of human volition.

Several interesting problems are closely related to the intrinsic nature of volition. As a supplement to the previous remarks I shall touch upon a few points that may serve to throw light upon human striving as a whole.

It lies in the nature of volition to acquire gains. Every premediated enterprise aims at some future change which, compared with existing conditions and circumstances, is considered by the individual to be advantageous. Also our spontaneous striving is bent on safeguarding the existence of the self and avoiding deterioration. In all living creatures every organic process has a positive tendency, obstacles being due to counteraction on the part of other processes. Even our negative tendencies, every kind of counteraction and avoidance, aim at bringing about improvements, such as alleviation of pain, prevention of threatening occurrences, overcoming hindrances, liberation from humiliations. By virtue of life's constitution all volitional movements represent attempts to further a greater or smaller number of vital functions. Satisfaction of hunger and thirst, rest after exertion, the fulfilment of hopes, aesthetic enjoyment, — in a word, every kind of satisfaction means that vital processes undergo a functional growth in the form of maintenance or increased value.

But this thoroughgoing positivity in our striving is only one side of our experience, other forces in our sphere of existence counteract the organic tendencies and are frequently strong enough to cause disappointment, loss, debilitation and decline.

If this interpretation of the general working tendency of volitional life is tenable, Schopenhauer's pessimistic view of human endeavour must rest on a misconstruction. It is not necessary here to adjoin any reservation to his two main theses to the effect (1) that any hindrance of our volitional movements causes us suffering, and (2) that every tendency, as soon as it is fulfilled, loses its stimulating influence on the mind and gives place to indifference, tedium, disgust, dejection. Even if these assertions are commonly recognised, they are insufficient to justify a general pessimism and disdain of the conditions of human life. Schopenhauer seems to have fixed his attention too exclusively on the static moments in our existence. Volitional life is not a contemplative looking back on the past, but acitivity turned to the future. Sound persons are not in the habit of dwelling on results already attained or on obstacles too difficult to overcome; they turn their minds to fresh enterprises and acquirements. The credit side in existence must be sought mainly in practical activity, in our creative thoughts and acts. The feeling of satisfaction and encouragement that makes life worth living and recompenses us for our exertions is caused by the mental changes experienced every time we succeed in carrying out our intentions and gaining advantages in some respect. Not the finished acts, but the advancement of our endeavour and desires towards their fulfilment constitutes the real joy of life. Schopen-

hauer has not grasped the great problem arising from the nature of volitional life. Neither is it a question whether our victories and defeats in the struggle with the untold difficulties in existence balance favourably or unfavourably; to this no generally valid answer can be given, it depends on what tasks the individual sets himself and whether he is able to solve them. The great general problem of life springs from the fugitive nature of happiness.

On the background of the given interpretation of the volitional phenomena, this transientness is easily comprehensible. Satisfied needs, fulfilled desires, expired longings and blunted interests have lost their force and are no longer sources of profitable activity, unless they are renewed. A vegetative, stagnant life, which is not to a wide extent swayed and kept alive by keen and far-reaching interests, but is content merely to seek comfort within a narrow circle of benefits already obtained, will in the long run lead to dulness and dissolution. Easy pursuits followed day after day and year after year will leave dispositions tending to strangle any effort to expand the mental domain. Shallowness and narrowmindedness have laid waste more human happiness than hate, envy and malice.

In order to maintain the mental tension and stimulation, widespread renewal and prolongation of volitional life is necessary. The motive powers that nourish our activity will gradually be exhausted. Not only purposes and expectations lose their impulsive force by being realised, also many of our thought activities come to rest by being accomplished. I shall give a few examples. An embryo idea is a vague combination of suppositions, which on account of their indefiniteness involuntarily seek furth-

er development. Such an idea works tentatively by stimulating certain reproductive processes, the tendency aiming at finding thought relations that will make the vague suppositions assume a definite and clear form. This motive power is exhausted as soon as the idea is sufficiently formed, and the process of development here described will not be renewed, the result obtained will on later occasions present itself in the individual's mind as acquired knowledge. Mere recollections of the plan will be more or less dull. Experience shows that many other thought activities may through a similar passivity become habitual and uninteresting. Inquisitiveness regarding a certain matter ceases to be a questioning as soon as the tendency is satisfied. Processes of comprehension when carried so far that they seem fullgrown no longer possess a tending power. Observations of a sort we have often previously met with no longer stimulate our interest. On the whole, thought activity aiming at some spiritual acquisition will gradually decrease as its fruits become accustomed possessions. The same holds of improvements in the material conditions of life, if the individual merely accepts them and does not make use of them as the starting point for new acquirements. It would lead too far to enumerate the many changes whereby the conditions necessary to maintain our mental energy are automatically exhausted in virtue of the progression of our thoughts and acts. It should be evident that volitional life on account of its creative nature needs constant renewal if our experiences are not to be dulled.

To some extent the exhausted motive powers are involuntarily replaced in the course of time. This happens mainly in two ways. Our material needs do not expire

by being satisfied but are automatically revived at shorter or longer intervals. Hunger and thirst are revived several times every day, and many other vital necessities maintain their stimulating power more or less constantly. These various needs goad us on to a multiplicity of progressive thoughts and acts, which as a rule give us satisfastion because we are able to fulfil their demands successfully. Another source giving rise to unsought motives is met with in the cases of adversity that every person from time to time has to face. They stimulate our mental energy and counteract the tendency to lapse into idleness. Evil dispensations are not welcome, but they are nonetheless often valuable because the individual is faced with urgent tasks which for a period spur him on to a refreshing activity.

However, even these sources of renewed exertion are in most cases insufficient to keep the individual's mind alive and active to its full extent all through life. As soon as the natural freshness and thirst for knowledge are past, the most urgent necessaries of life secured, and everyday experiences are becoming familiar, things begin to settle down in a more or less habitual round. This is the most serious time of crisis for the adult person, then it is decided whether the growth of the mind is to cease and gradually give way to stereotyped views and inert repetitions, or whether it is to be continued by the development of new interests and the enterprise of new tasks. It is not my intension here to enlarge upon how such continued growth can be brought about nor what difficulties will be met with. I shall now turn to the question indicated in the heading of this chapter. This is of importance, not only for the existence of the individual, but aso for

the life of the nations and races, as each new generation builds on the conditions of existence left by their forefathers.

To what extent is the scope of human volition unlimited? Is there not a probability that the number of great and engrossing tasks will some day be exhausted? Will the forms of human life as we know them to-day necessarily lose their richness in the course of time by virtue of their own process of development, so that a new basis for culture will have to be created through a radical remoulding of volitional life, as it has been prophesied by Oswald Spengler? For mankind as well as for the individual the hope of the future is a factor of great significance, and in times of trouble and anxiety more so than ever. We who are living now may ask ourselves the question: Can we with reason expect that the fundamental problems facing western civilization today, when solved, will represent lasting values, benefits that will remain imperishable as long as the earth is inhabited — or must we renounce such far-reaching hopes and expectations? As far as the present generation is concerned, there can be no doubt that such hopes play an important part, they are one of the main sources of strength and courage, and they indicate the direction of our endeavours. In an attempt to answer this question we shall in the following consider a number of purposes of a higher order already inaugurated and shall try to judge of their probable range.

By purposes of a higher order I understand enterprises whose realisation will bring about such conditions that a number of more primary pursuits will be made more fruitful. For instance, the invention of the microscope

permitted many new kinds of research, and this increase of knowledge led to numerous benefits having ameliorated the existence of millions. At the present moment we are aware that a multitude of similar problems are awaiting their solution. Each of these projects aims at creating more favourable conditions for innumerable experiments. A few shall be mentioned.

Let us in the first line turn to the moral values with which the moral laws are concerned. As far back as the history of humanity extends, attempts have been made to formulate a code of morals; the results have always been unsatisfactory, and the problem is still urgent. Many diverging opinions have been put forward as to which particular values moral judgment should watch over. However, here we need only select one of these views, and I shall presume to make use of my own definition of the meaning of morality. In earlier books I have tried to show that the task of moral law should be to set up and assure a self-control serving, in the first instance, to guard the inner coherence and harmony between the individual's various purposes, so that one motive is not advanced by acts whose consequences will impede the fulfilment of other motives; and, in the second instance, leading to a justifiable social order, so that conflicts between the individual and his fellow-beings will be reduced to a minimum. In a word, the meaning of morality should be to help man to live in harmony with himself and with his neighbour.

It may without hesitation be asserted that this purpose is universally valid. No human being could wish to increase the cost and trouble of seeing his own desires fulfilled, this would be contrary to the very nature of voli-

tion. Inner conflicts, vacillation and doubt are in themselves unwelcome and elicit reactions aiming at their removal. If my deliberation leads to a decision which I come to regret later on, my judgment of the situation is shown up as a delusion, a mistaken form of self-control. Moral disapproval as well as moral sanction thus grow out of the individual's understanding of his interests. Morality therefore reveals itself as a demand for inner coherènce and harmony in the practical life of the self, immorality as a self-contradictory form of life. Both good and bad conscience will in the last instance be dictated by the nature of volition. It is also evident that no person directly wishes for conflicts with his fellows, such controversies are in themselves a hindrance and a disturbance to the individual's thinking and acting. Undoubtedly it would be a great advantage if a certain definition of moral control could be recognised and if the moral precepts were followed both in personal life and in the intercourse between people. An enormous waste of values would be prevented, much bitterness and worry could be avoided. This would in the first line mean that more mental energy and a greater fund of means would be liberated for the furtherance of fruitful purposes, in the second line that better conditions for the production and acquisition of material values would be established. Thus unnumbered vital functions would attain to a more satisfactory development.

Although serious efforts and heavy sacrifices have been made through thousands of years in an attempt to educate mankind to a better understanding of its own interests, the moral idea to-day still presents innumerable unsolved problems, both in the personal sphere of life and in social

and international intercourse. The vegetable and animal kingdoms have flourished on earth; humanity has never, with the exception of a few individuals, attained to so high a development. Everywhere and at all times brute force, dissimulation, oppression and prejudice have ravaged the world; justice has always been the weaker part. Controversies, destruction of values, disturbances and uncertainty have ever kept the majority of the inhabitants of the earth languishing in poverty and impotence. To change this radically will be a very slow process — and the sluggishness and narrowness of the human mind will be the most serious impediment. As a matter of fact, the task is unending because it begins anew with each succeeding generation. Equally interminable is the moral task of a purely private nature which existence imposes upon each one of us, the task of freeing the personality from every sort of inner contradiction due to short-sightedness, self-delusion or cowardice. The dream of peace within the heart is as utopian as the dream of peace on earth. Probably no human being has ever existed who attained to so high a degree of inner clarity and reflection that all its numerous purposes and opinions were in harmony with one another. Nearly all people lead a more or less casual and thoughtless existence. A good many upright characters are found, but very few personalities who can really be described as adult human beings. Our span of life is too short for us to attain to this state.

Besides moral control, volitional life has another side just as old and equally universal. It holds for all human beings that illness and mutilation of the body are misfortunes we involuntarily try to relieve; our endeavours to counteract pain, disability and weakness are reactions of

primary volitional life. From these embryos have grown the two extensive fields of research to-day known as medical science and hygiene. We are ever searching for new methods to control the interaction between the various links in the organism. This regulating and stabilizing of the physiological processes supporting our existence is a counterpart to moral control. These two widely ramified forms of endeavour both co-operate to reach the distant goal of a sound mind in a sound body. Both spheres of interest are probably inexhaustible, and they are equally fundamental for all the peoples on the earth. They will for an indefinite future be sources of hope and trust.

A third sphere of interest comparable to the afore-mentioned is the utilization of the natural riches found in earth, water and air. Much has already been done in this respect, but no doubt many hidden treasures are still left that might be employed in the service of mankind. Our knowledge of physical and chemical interaction is still at its beginnings. It will be possible to make use of many more raw materials and thus obtain further advantages. Also the vegetable and animal world can be further developed and made to serve the requirements of mankind in a better manner. The ever renewed forces of nature such as the rays of the sun, the currents of the winds, the waves of the sea, will be rich sources of energy as soon as methods have been invented to utilize them. It is the privilege of man to rise above present conditions and turn his thoughts the future.

Many other aspects of human activity appear to extend into an unlimited future, the problems ever retaining their motivating power. As examples may be mentioned a further development of the means of transport and the

technique of production. In the following I shall confine myself to touching upon a few of the many wishes that can be realised only if the future development of culture is guided with more understanding and foresight than has hitherto been the case.

Mental hygiene can hardly be said to exist to-day except in name, even a primary knowledge of its practice is generally lacking. A method often used is ridicule; this may satisfy the passers-by, but is a rather hopeless treatment for the patient. In the mental sphere a hygienic cleansing always means an act of self-discipline serving to alter dispositions that are leading volitional life astray. Two kinds of problems shall be mentioned here: firstly, the overcoming of thought entanglements causing desires and efforts to stagnate, and, secondly, the clearing up of disproportions. It is a sound rule for the development of mental life that the individual shall in the main build on his successful pursuits and take the consequences of his failures. The difficulties of keeping to this rule are greatest when negative motives are involved, because it is an easier form of self-restraint to give up positive advantages which have not yet become habitual, than to adjust oneself to losses and retrenchments that cannot be restored. It is unhealthy to keep worrying over unpleasant facts that cannot be altered. What is the use of envy, malice or suppressed rancour? It is better to forget past adversity and humiliation than to nourish a barren resentment. The best way of overcoming such troubles is by turning to new and positive tasks that lie within one's power, such activity frees the mind of bitterness. Vain laments over the misery of this world and contempt of our fellow-creatures lead nowhere. Just as unhygienic as

useless worries are vain delusions and arrogant pretensions serving only to support an assumed self-assertion.

In practical life there are two kinds of disproportions: exaggeration and negligence. Often it is difficult to judge in such cases, because the individual's personal characteristics may cause a special preference for some tasks and a lack of interest in others; but there is no doubt that we all commit numerous errors of both kinds. If a certain tendency is given free reins so that it grows to a passion, this will often mean that a number of vital necessities are pushed aside and neglected, as the mind is blinded to or hardened against needs and duties which hinder the satisfaction of the passion. For similar reasons fanaticism has got an ill repute; on the one side it leads to narrowmindedness, and on the other side to a heedless sweeping aside of other claims. Conscientiousness may be exaggerated so as to become a finicky fussiness that is not worth while. Laziness is a vice when it causes omission and an unworthy passivity. Cowardice generally reduces a person's effective activity to a minimum, it is degrading to hold back on account of timidity. Such avoiding reactions leave in the long run weakening dispositions whereby the personality loses its determination and erectness.

A constantly renewed revision of the hygienic status of the self is required all through life. We are extremely complicated beings who have to commit many errors before we find a definite standpoint. Both the real world and the real self are difficult to know. Counsellors cannot help us much in these matters, only through our own experiences do we obtain sufficient warning that the laws of life are strict. Children often believe that they can get on with the help of unreliable stepping-stones, but

most elderly people have learnt that the road to a wasted life is paved with deceit and self-delusion. An understanding of real life is the principal need of volitional life. In practical life the task of gaining this is unending, and it is almost completely renewed with each new generation.

Another purpose, that imposes itself upon everybody and which is mainly dependent upon individual mental characteristics, aims at establishing fruitful relations between the self and the surrounding world. I shall here treat only the intercourse between the individual and his fellow-beings. By nature a wide chasm exists between the Me and any other person. Nothing but a complex mutual understanding can create an intimate relation between human beings, as they are bound to build partially on deviating presuppositions. Every essential difference between individuals may be a cause of offence, and a reconciliation can be brought about only on a basis of traits common to all humanity. It is a harsh but undeniable fact that the old idea of true fraternity between men has made but little progress in the course of thousands of years. The majority of people still seem to be ignorant that the foremost condition for tolerance is the absence of every kind of coercion, of all compulsory guidance. Love of your neighbour cannot be upheld as a duty; it must be at the same time voluntarily yielded and desired by the recipient. Altruism comes into the world when men feel that it is a value, an enrichment and an expansion of the mind, and as a gift it must be met with understanding and goodwill on the part of others. Its further advancement is unfortunately impeded by the fact that it is contradicted by many of our everyday experiences.

This should not be denied or concealed, for it will always be so. But this is only the first step to mutual understanding. There are other requirements. All contradictions and contrasts causing division or antipathy between men should be lifted up on a higher plane by being regarded in the light of our general imperfection and frailty. We are all fragmentary beings, more or less deformed, bearing the scars of the hardships we have met with. To-day *your* defeat, to-morrow *mine*. He who is himself impure should not throw stones at others. The consciousness of my own shortcomings and oddities should make me lenient to the errors and rough sides of my neighbours. This does not mean that understanding is the same as forgiving, but that we should judge others by the same measure that we apply to ourselves. Selfrighteousness and standing on one's own merits are false forms of judgment. To exalt yourself at the cost of others is a challenge. On the other hand, it would be a serious misconception if this fraternity of mutual forbearance were to be regarded as a solidarity permitting the one to take advantage of the other's willingness to make sacrifices.

Altogether the task of winning the ready confidence and goodwill of others is almost endless. It should be evident that from the time when the individual has reached an age of reason all education must be self-education. The authority of others will in most cases have merely a superficial influence. Where self-help is possible, it should not be replaced by help from others, this is misunderstood love of your neighbour — equally unsound for both parties. Too many people are in the habit of blaming others and excusing themselves. The chief means of educating adults is by upholding personal responsibi-

lity. Thus calumny would in most cases be meaningless. The attempt has never been made in any community to inculcate a clear distinction between yours and mine. Such a course would greatly favour the advancement of humanity.

Finally, it should be noted that the favourable advance of culture need not necessarily lead to man's existence becoming more superficial because an ever greater number of problems are satisfactorily solved. What does it mean that life loses "its salt" and becomes dull? This tediousness sets in when the force and the excitement of the experiences are reduced because the mind is no longer moving among emphatic differences. It is not brobable, however, that such a slackening will befall the races whose mental growth continues to advance to a greater comprehension of life. The constant expansion and invigoration of the mind will mean that many experiences gain in richness and depth. With the wider scope of thought-life existence will become more interesting, new possibilities and fresh problems vill arise. As long as the mind and the body retain their freshness, an increased development is not likely to entail a greater amount of relaxation than of invigoration. Hitherto it has always been a lack of development that caused life to degenerate and become a dull treadmill. Dullness can be counteracted in various ways. One kind of renewal consists in the introduction of a fresh mental background whereby the experiences are invigorated. As time passes it gives us, through the changes caused by its progress, a number of fresh impulses. We ought not to complain because light and shadow alternate in our life or because unadulterated happiness does not exist. The problem of

evil is more complicated than generally assumed. The constant changes in our life and the many knocks and buffets we have to bear in this world to a large extent serve to give "new salt" to our experiences. Disappointments and troubles have a tendency to divert our thoughts from their accustomed rut and turn them in new directions — give them a new turn. Persons who have stagnated in self-complacency, self-sufficiency, prejudice and material comfort may by meeting harsh adversity be shaken out of their lethargy. If we were free of all griefs and worries, our joys would lack the dark background against which they appear so bright. The hard necessities imposed upon us by existence constitute a useful antidote to dullness and indifference, keep us from being spoiled and pampered. We could scarcely do without this blending of good and evil in life.

If the individual fate does not bring sufficient alteration and remoulding, we can make use of the wisdom of the ancients. Blessed are the poor and the humble! That means here: try to throw off your pride, your usual arrogance, your slothful prejudices, any mental attitude that tempts you to judge too hastily and harshly. The exhortation to humility is the simple and profound teaching that life must again and again revert to its sources in order to maintain its freshness and fullness. Our impressions and our understanding must now and then reestablish relations with their origins, start afresh at their beginnings. Thus "purity of heart" and the immediate sensitiveness of the mind may be regained. This recreation of experiences is the key to many enigmatic exhortations. "He who humbles himself shall be elevated", "the least shall be the greatest".

The few examples of far-reaching purposes mentioned do not by any means enumerate all that man's hopes of the future may involve. These suggestions should, however, suffice as a background to the question whether at the present stage it would be reasonable or unreasonable to make prophecies regarding the future decline and fall of western civilization. Culture is one of the products of volitional life, a fruit of the universal wish of mankind to advance to better conditions than existence in the past has furnished. This striving is simply an involuntary consequence of the nature of human volition and would therefore appear to be imperishable as long as mankind exists.

The historical fact that the cultural striving of several races has degenerated and to-day seems to be exhausted cannot be denied. But the question as to what are the causes of these phenomena of decline has only been vaguely and imperfectly answered by historians. It is probable that no satisfactory explanation can be given. Subsequent generations will hardly be able to probe deeply enough into the thoughts and acts of past times to supply an answer. From a psychological viewpoint it is difficult to accept Oswald Spengler's dogma that each particular form of culture must be based on some fundamental characteristic in the race concerned. It seems more reasonable to seek the explanation in phenomena of mental stagnation. Who has understood quietism so well that it can be declared an insurmountable obstacle? Nobody knows whether earlier forms of culture, now stagnant, have fallen into decline because their growth to all intents and purposes had been consummated, had passed its maturity.

There is every reason to be sucpicious of the notion: death of a culture. The propagation and continuation of cultural interest are at all times dependent upon the energy and ability of the individuals to carry them on. If the nations who should continue the development are gradually debilitated and degenerated, the great traditions will crumble in spite of an abundance of unsolved tasks. The core of the matter is in this case the failure of the individuals, and the decline of culture follows inevitably as an after-effect. If this view holds good, the sources of the degeneration of nations should be the main question for historical research to answer.

The chief means to ensure the invigoration and growth of the life of the soul is voluntary activity, an ever increasing spirit of enterprise. The best method of maintaining the mental energy developed is a continued activity, a wider view of life, the extension of existing interests and a deepening of knowledge. Over-strain, whereby the organism is in the long run worn out, should, however, be avoided. A sound development on the lines indicated is borne up by its own results. Successful enterprises and deeper understanding will spur the individual on to new endeavours and fresh hopes. To this is added an ever clearer comprehension that the bread on which man truly lives must be sought in his own creative thoughts and acts. The fulfilment of his aims is the natural nourishment and encouragement of the mind.

In a cultural sense it is of the greatest importance to distinguish between passive and active enjoyments. Material satisfaction generally puts the mind in a mood of passive receptivity, the pleasure felt is an automatic result of the impressions received, and no effort to speak

of is required on the part of the individual. These pleasures are seductive because they are so easily enjoyed and immediately imbibed. The possession of abundant material means and comforts, an existence passed in surroundings of sensual luxury, involve a constant temptation to prefer such delights rather than satisfactions brought about mainly by mental activity and accruing from interests of a higher order. It may be observed that in periods of cultural flourishing mental growth is a dominant requirement and active pleasures are preferred to more lazy enjoyments. In times of cultural decline the contrary is seen, the sensual joys have come into prominence, and as a consequence, greediness, the desire for material benefits, are the dominant traits in social life. Self-indulgence, sensual passions, slackness and loose living thrive. Such usages have bad after-effects, debauch and vice fester. Such a style of life is generally found to be the background of cultural decline. Nations devastated by such vices easily fall into debility and quietism.

If cultural decline is as a rule due to these causes, the psychological law for the development of volitional life will probably in the long run be the following: The main condition for a continued advance is a mental growth assuring the dominance of active pleasures over passive enjoyments. The necessary self-control must rest on the understanding that lasting happiness can be built only on a basis of mental energy and a harmonious and fruitful activity. In so far as these conditions are upheld and the bodily health of the individuals is maintained, the scope of volitional life would seem to be unlimited.