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VOLUME II

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
UNFOLDING THE LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

VOLUME II

CHAPTER XIII

BODY AND MIND

I. God and Man

The contrast between God and the world which the mediaevals expressed in terms of immateriality and materiality or of immovability and movability provided them also with a basis for the distinction between metaphysics and physics. Metaphysics, as the science of things immaterial and immovable, dealt with God and His attributes, or, to use Aristotle's own definitions, it dealt with "something eternal and immovable and separable [from body]"[1] or with "being *qua* being — both what it is and the attributes which belong to it *qua* being."[2] Physics, on the other hand, dealt with the material and movable objects of the world, or, to use again Aristotle's own definition, it dealt "with things which are inseparable from bodies but not immovable."[3] It is this distinction between God and the world or metaphysics and physics which as a rule underlies the main divisions of the theoretical part of philosophy in mediaeval systematic works. In these mediaeval works, however, though logically the order of reasoning proceeds from physics to metaphysics, sometimes the order of these two topics is reversed, and metaphysics, on account of its superior importance, is placed first.[4] Thus, for instance, Avicenna in his *Al-Shifa'* and *Al-*

[1] *Metaphysics*, VI, 1, 1026a, 10–11; *De Anima*, I, 1, 403b, 15–16.

[2] *Metaphysics*, VI, 1, 1026a, 31–32.

[3] *Ibid.*, 13–14.

[4] On the order of the sciences, see my paper "The Classification of Sciences in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy," in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, I (1925), pp. 285 ff.

Najat places physics first, whereas Algazali and Shahrastani in their restatements of Avicenna's philosophy place metaphysics first. In most of these mediaeval systematic works, furthermore, the theoretical part of philosophy is preceded by a treatise on logic, which was considered as an auxiliary discipline intended to serve as an introduction to philosophy; in some instances, as in the case of Saadia's *Emunot we-De'ot*, the opening sections contain a discussion of the theory of knowledge. The same principle of division underlies also Descartes' *Principia Philosophiae*, but the First Part, though embodying a great deal of what is traditionally included under metaphysics, is described by the author himself as a discussion "Of the Principles of Human Knowledge," corresponding, evidently, to the introductory treatises on logic in mediaeval systematic works.

This variety of forms in the literary arrangement of systematic works on philosophy was especially noted by Spinoza, and while on the whole he was to divide his own systematic works into the two conventional divisions, God and the world, or metaphysics and physics, he set out to depart from the most prevalent and logical practice, though not without precedent, by treating of God first — a departure which was necessary for him in order to keep up his literary pretension that his entire philosophy was evolved from his conception of God. To Tschirnhaus this departure seemed to be of great significance, for in a conversation with Leibniz about the *Ethics* of Spinoza he is reported to have said that most philosophers begin with creatures, Descartes began with the mind, but Spinoza began with God.[1] Now in Spinoza the old contrast between God and the world as that between the immaterial

[1] Cf. K. I. Gerhardt, "Leibniz und Spinoza," in *Sitzungsberichte der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1889, p. 1077. On the plan of the *Ethics*, see R. McKeon, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, pp. 90–92.

and the material disappeared, and in its place a new contrast appeared, namely, that between the infinite and the finite. By the same token, the old Aristotelian distinction between the subject-matter of metaphysics and the subject-matter of physics as that between the immaterial and the material also disappeared. In Spinoza's new terminology the subject-matter of metaphysics would be the infinite and the subject-matter of physics would be the finite. It is in these terms, therefore, that Spinoza describes the contents of the two main divisions, God and the world, or metaphysics and physics, which constitute his *Ethics* and *Short Treatise*: "Having in the first part discoursed on God and on the universal and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treatment of particular and finite things." [1] Or, "I pass on now to explain those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of God or the Being eternal and infinite." [2]

Had Spinoza in the latter parts of these two works intended to write an encyclopaedia of the physical sciences, he would have proceeded probably along the lines of the traditional mediaeval encyclopaedists, which ultimately go back to the classification of Aristotle's writings. Corresponding to the traditional classification of the universe into translunar and sublunar regions, Spinoza would have divided his modes into infinite and finite or into general *natura naturata* and particular *natura naturata*, and just like the mediaevals, who treat of the Intelligences, of the Spheres, and of the universe as a whole under metaphysics, Spinoza would have included the treatment of the "absolutely infinite intellect," of "motion and rest," and of "the face of the whole universe" [3]

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 1.
[2] *Ethics*, II, Praef.
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 238–247.

under metaphysics. Taking only the finite modes or the particular *natura naturata* as properly belonging to the field of physics, he would have grouped them together into the three traditional realms of nature, and under each of these he would have studied the various sciences according to their traditional classification, and among these he would have included psychology, which since Aristotle had been a part of the physical sciences. Man, on the whole, would have been studied by him as a part of the animal kingdom. But in man he would have discovered a certain aspect of psychology which is peculiar to him as a human being and by which he has been traditionally set apart from the rest of the animals, and that is mind. Again, in the individual human behavior and in the social history of man he would have discovered certain peculiar elements which have given rise to the sciences known through Aristotle as ethics, economics, and politics.

These are the main topics which Spinoza would have treated in the *Ethics* had his purpose been to write a comprehensive treatise on the nature of the physical universe and on the beings that inhabit it. But the main object of Spinoza's work, after he has discussed God in the First Part, is, as he himself says, "to consider those things only which may conduct us as it were by the hand to a knowledge of the human mind and its highest happiness." [1] He therefore confines himself to those things "which concern man." [2] His subject is thus the higher phases of human psychology and certain phases of human conduct, corresponding roughly to the Third Book of Aristotle's *De Anima*, which deals with mind, and to the main problem of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is to define the meaning of human happiness.

[1] *Ethics*, II, Praef.

[2] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 1.

In singling out man from the innumerable particular things in nature, Spinoza was not motivated by the belief that man occupies a place which is unique in nature, but rather was he motivated by the belief that man is a part of nature and that he epitomizes in himself, as it were, the whole of nature. The idea of man as a miniature universe or microcosm is old in literature, and the analogy between the constitution of the human body and the universe is frequently resorted to by mediaeval philosophers. There is a suggestion of this analogy in Plato when he speaks of the world as a perfect animal in unity,[1] and refers to the structure of man as an imitation of the spherical form of the universe.[2] Aristotle, too, throws out a hint in the same direction when he speaks of animals as the "small world" (μικρῷ κόσμῳ) and of the universe as the "great one" (μεγάλῳ).[3] Similarly Plotinus refers to animals as microcosms.[4] It is probably with reference to these sources that the Iḫwan al-Ṣafa begin their detailed analogies between man and the universe by quoting from unnamed sages to the effect that the universe is a great man[5] and that man is a small universe.[6] The analogy appears in the works of many Jewish philosophers — Ibn Gabirol,[7] Joseph Ibn Ẓaddiḳ,[8] and Judah ha-Levi.[9] Most important of all is the long chapter devoted to this analogy by Maimonides.[10] These Jewish philosophers had before them not only the precedents of Greek and Arabic philosophers but also

[1] *Timaeus* 30D. [2] *Ibid.* 44D.

[3] *Physics*, VIII, 2, 252b, 26–27.

[4] *Enneads*, IV, iii, 10 (ed. Creuzer et Moser, Paris, 1855, p. 205, l. 40; ed. Volkmann, Leipzig, 1884, Vol. II, p. 22, ll. 12–13).

[5] Dieterici, *Die Lehre von der Weltseele*, p. 27.

[6] Dieterici, *Die Anthropologie der Araber*, p. 41.

[7] *Fons Vitae*, III, 2 (pp. 77, 24–78, 4); III, 58 (p. 208); *Liḳḳute Meḳor Ḥayyim*, III, 6 and 44.

[8] *'Olam Ḳaṭan*, Introduction (p. 2).

[9] *Cuzari*, IV, 3.

[10] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72. See Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 354, n. 1.

those of the rabbis, who for homiletical purposes made use of the correspondence between the parts of the universe and the parts of the human body.[1] It is my purpose to show that the first thirteen propositions in the Second Part of the *Ethics* are built on this old analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Propositions I–IX describe the macrocosm, whereas Propositions X–XIII describe the microcosm, showing wherein the two are alike and wherein they differ. Had Spinoza written his *Ethics* after the manner of rabbis and scholastics, he would have started the Second Part with a statement somewhat as follows: Part II. Chapter I. Wherein we shall discuss the nature of the human mind and its relation to body, showing that in man, the microcosm, mind and body are related to each other after the analogy of the relation between thought and extension in God, the macrocosm, blessed be He.

II. Extension and Thought in God

Like other philosophers before him, and repeating his own statement in the First Part of the *Ethics*,[2] Spinoza begins the Second Part with the proposition that "thought is an attribute of God."[3] This conception of God as thought runs throughout the history of philosophy. It is the chief characteristic of Aristotle's Prime Mover[4] as well as of Plotinus' One. To both Aristotle and Plotinus thought was not something extraneous to God's essence or inherent within His essence, but rather something identical with His essence, and to them this conception of the identity of God's essence with thought presented no difficulty at all. In the Middle

[1] *Abot de-Rabbi Nathan*, Ch. 31.
[2] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 14, Corol. 2.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 1.
[4] *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072b, 28.

Ages, however, when affirmations about God were required to have the significance of logical judgments, an overscrupulous logical conscience caused philosophers to wonder how it was possible in a logical synthetic judgment to predicate of God that which was identical with His essence. This was the crux of the problem of divine attributes.[1] The difficulty was overcome, at least by some, by the theory that though metaphysically the attribute is identical with God, logically, when used as a predicate in a proposition, it expresses only a subjective judgment of mankind about Him. In this sense also, as we have already shown,[2] Spinoza uses the term "attribute," and it is in this sense that he says here that "thought is an attribute of God" (Prop. I). But lest one of the unwary, misguided by the variegated meaning of the term "attribute," be tempted to take it to mean something added to, or inherent within, the essence of God, he immediately explains himself by saying, in effect, that by the attribute of thought he means nothing but that "God is a thinking thing" (*ibid.*).

The demonstration of Proposition I contains two parts — the Demonstration proper and a Scholium. In the Demonstration, Spinoza tries to prove the existence of thought as an attribute of God from the fact that "individual thoughts, or this and that thought," exist in the world. In the Scholium, he tries to prove the same thing "from the fact that we conceive an infinite thinking Being." What Spinoza really means to say is this: The nature of God is to be established by the same proofs that are employed for the establishment of His existence. God is that which the proofs for His existence show Him to be. He cannot be otherwise or

[1] Cf. my "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes," in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, n.s., VII (1916), 1–44, 175–221. Cf. also above, Vol. I, Chapter V.

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 146 ff.

less or more than what is warranted by these proofs. Now, the proofs of the existence of God, historically, are in a general way of two kinds, — cosmological, reasoning from effect to cause, or ontological, reasoning from the idea of God to His existence, — the latter being the kind of proof which Spinoza himself employs in Proposition XI of the First Part. So, Spinoza says here in effect, by whatever method you try to prove the existence of God, the proof will establish God as a thinking thing. If you employ the cosmological method, then the fact that there exist in the world before us individual thoughts will lead you, by the general method employed in cosmological proofs, to the existence of a prime thought which is the cause of all other thoughts — just as in Aristotle, for instance, the fact that there exist in the world individual movements will lead you to the existence of a prime mover. And if you employ the ontological method, then the very fact that we have a clear and distinct idea of an infinite thinking being proves his existence.

But while in Proposition I Spinoza merely restates the old conception of God, in Proposition II he shows wherein he differs from his predecessors. To his predecessors God was thought only, without any admixture of materiality, or extension, as Spinoza prefers to call it. To Spinoza God is both extension and thought. Hence Proposition II: "Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing." Not only individual thoughts are traceable to God as their source, but also individual extended things can be traced directly to God and can be shown to have their existence in God.

Spinoza offers no detailed argument in proof of this second proposition. He only says that its demonstration is of the same character as that of the first proposition. But let us try to work out the application of the twofold demonstration of the first proposition to this proposition.

Cosmologically, Spinoza would say, the fact that individual extended things exist in the world before us must lead us to the attribution of extension to God. Otherwise, we should be unable to account for the origin of matter or extension. Should we try to account for it, we should have to resort to the theory of a special creation *ex nihilo*, or to the theory of emanation, or to the theory of an eternal matter existing beside God and constituting, as it were, a second substance. But I have already shown that all these theories are untenable.[1] You will, of course, say that the impossibility of an infinite regress, which is the mainstay of the cosmological proof in its Aristotelian version, makes it necessary for us to assume that God is immovable and hence incorporeal. But I have already referred you to a certain Jew, named "Rab Ghasdai," who has shown how the cosmological proof can be restated without the assumption of the impossibility of an infinite regress.[2]

And if you follow the ontological argument, Spinoza would continue to say, then I maintain that our idea of God as an infinite being conceives Him to be infinite both as thought and as extension. All your arguments against the possibility of an infinite extension are due, as I have already pointed out, to a failure to make three fundamental distinctions in the conception of the infinite. According to my own view, it is possible to conceive of an infinite extension, if that infinite is infinite by its own nature, if it is infinite in the sense that it has no limits, and if it is something which can be understood even though it cannot be imagined.[3]

Having restated his conception of God as a thinking and extended thing, Spinoza now proceeds to explain the relation

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, Chapter IV.
[2] Epistola 12. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 196–197, 295, n. 1.
[3] *Ibid.* Cf. above, Vol. I, Chapter VIII.

of God to the world and His knowledge of the world. Some of the things he is going to say are again a repetition of what he has already said before. But he evidently feels the need of repeating himself in order to give a complete outline of the parallel between the macrocosm and the microcosm. We shall therefore follow in his footsteps and try to comment upon everything he says, even at the risk of repeating some of the things we have already said before in this book.

In the Middle Ages three views existed with regard to the relation of God to the world and His knowledge of it.

According to one view, God is the arbitrary creator of the world who, having created it, is the arbitrary ruler of it. The creation of the world as well as its governance is thus considered as the exercise of two faculties in God, as it were, free will and power. These two faculties of God are conceived after the manner of the faculties of free will and power in man, except that they are infinitely superior to those of man and absolutely arbitrary, being independent of any external conditions and circumstances. This view, which is primarily the uncritical opinion of the common masses of believers, was presented as a philosophical system by a certain branch of the Moslem Kalam, of which the best restatement and criticism are to be found in Maimonides.[1] According to this view, God's will and power are conceived as absolute, unlimited, and unchecked by any rule. Creation, as a free exercise of will and power, is furthermore a continuous act, and every event is a direct creation of God. Existence is a succession of specially created events. It is analogous to the theory of divine concurrence alluded to elsewhere by Spinoza,[2] though, I must say, the two views are not neces-

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 73–76; III, 17, Third Theory. Cf. the presentation of this view of the Kalam in Roth, *Spinoza, Descartes, and Maimonides*, pp. 80 ff.

[2] Appendix to *Ethics*, I. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 433.

sarily identical, for the Kalam denies not only natural causality but also uniformity of action in nature, inasmuch as it assumes God's will to be absolutely arbitrary, whereas divine concurrence does not necessarily assume God's will to be absolutely arbitrary; it is rather an intelligent will; and hence, barring the possibility of miracles, divine concurrence does not deny uniformity of action in nature.[1] Spinoza characterizes all such views as views which make everything dependent upon chance[2] and deny natural causality altogether.

As the extreme opposite of this is the view which considers God as the necessary cause of the universe and the events within it as rigidly following from Him by laws of necessity, allowing no room for chance, spontaneity, and miracles.[3] Though God is not altogether a blind cause according to this view, for self-consciousness is one of His characteristics,[4] still He has no direct knowledge of the particular things outside himself. If He knows them at all, He knows them only indirectly through His knowledge of His own self. This view is ascribed by Maimonides to Aristotle, and in its Neoplatonized form in which it is presented by Maimonides it may be restated as follows: Beginning with God as a simple being, all things emanate from Him by necessity. Now, God himself as a thinking thing has only himself as the object of His thought, but inasmuch as He is the ultimate source of the emanation of everything within the world, He has also knowledge of everything outside himself. To quote a statement from Alfarabi which is the source of many similar statements throughout Jewish philosophy: "The Prime Being has an idea of His own essence;

[1] Cf. below, pp. 333–335.
[2] Epistola 54. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 318 ff.
[3] *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, 20. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 329 ff.

but inasmuch as His own essence is in a certain respect identical with all the existent beings, by forming an idea of His own essence He forms, in a certain respect, an idea also of all the existent beings." [1] Or to quote a similar passage from Gersonides: "Inasmuch as it must be necessarily assumed that God knows His own essence according to the rank He holds in the order of existence, and inasmuch as His own essence is of such a nature that all things emanate from it according to a certain order of gradation, it must be concluded that God knows all things that emanate from Him, for if He did not know them, then His knowledge of His own essence would be a defective sort of knowledge." [2] Maimonides, too, states the same view in the following passage: "And inasmuch as He knows himself and comprehends His greatness and glory and truth, He knows everything and nothing is hidden from Him." [3] Thus also Leo Hebraeus, speaking of those who identify the actual intellect (*l'intelletto attuale* = *νοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ*) with God — by which he evidently means the Active Intellect (*l'intelletto agente* = *νοῦς ποιητικός*) [4] which according to Alexander of Aphrodisias is identical with God — says that the actual intellect or God, by comprehending himself, knows all other things (*vedendo se medesimo, tutti conosce*).[5]

Between these two opposite extremes there is the mediating view of Maimonides, which admits will in God but considers His will not as arbitrary but as intelligent and purposive and as being limited by self-imposed laws. While creation according to this view is an act of will, that will had

[1] *Sefer ha-Haṯalot* in Filipowsky's *Sefer ha-Asif* (1849), p. 4.

[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 4 (p. 138). [3] *Mishneh Ṯorah, Yesode ha-Ṯorah*, II, 9.

[4] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 404. If the *Dialoghi d'Amore* was written originally in Hebrew (cf. above, Vol. I, p. 12, n. 2), the confusion might have arisen by mistaking הפועל for בפועל in השכל הפועל.

[5] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, I, p. 42 (Bari, 1929).

a certain purpose, unknown to us, in the creation of the world, and the created world, though under direct divine providence, is still governed by laws of causality.[1] God knows all the particular things directly, but with a knowledge which is absolutely unlike ours.[2]

Disregarding Maimonides' mediating view altogether, Spinoza takes up in the Scholium to Proposition III the two extremely opposite views, those of the Kalam and Aristotle, rejecting the former and espousing the latter.

The first view is accurately restated by Spinoza in all its essential features. It conceives the "power of God" as "free will," and it compares God's power to the power "of kings." "All existent things" are accordingly considered as "contingent," that is to say, without cause, and as dependent upon chance. He describes this view as that of the "common people." Though he does not undertake a detailed refutation of it, he furnishes us with a good outline of such a refutation.

In the first place, he seems to say, if the coming of the world into being was an act of free will, then the world must have come into being in time, prior to which time it did not exist; and hence prior to that time God did not exercise His power. But, argues Spinoza, "it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that He does not exist."

In the second place, he seems to say again, if God's exercise of power is an intermittent action, as must needs be implied in the theory of creation, then by analogy of human power, with which God's power is compared by the common people, God's failure to exercise His power must be accounted for either by an inability to supply certain conditions necessary for the exercise of that power or by an inability to overcome certain obstacles. And so, argues Spinoza, "I could show besides not only that the power which the common

[1] Cf. Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 287, n. [2] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 20.

people ascribe to God is a human power (which shows that they look upon God as a man, or as being like man), but that it also involves weakness."

Both these arguments, it must be said, were known to mediaeval philosophers. In fact, they are the stock arguments which are brought up in the Middle Ages whenever the problem of creation is discussed. In Maimonides they occur in the following passages: "They also try to reduce the theory of creation to an absurdity, by saying: How could God ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in the infinite past?"[1] Furthermore, inactivity in human beings implies weakness or want of power, for "if an agent is active at one time and inactive at another, it is because of obstacles or of needs which arise or are within him. . . . As, however, God has no needs . . . and no obstacles . . . there is no reason why God should be active at one time and inactive at another. On the contrary, He must be always active in the same manner as He is always in existence."[2] Note the similarity between this last expression and the statement in Spinoza's first argument that "it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that He does not exist."

The view which Spinoza advances as his own in the same Scholium contains some points of agreement with the Neoplatonized Aristotelian view of mediaeval philosophy as well as some essential points of difference. The points in which he agrees with it are: (1) that the world follows from God by necessity and not by will and design; (2) that God knows himself; and (3) that He knows all things which follow from himself. The points on which he differs from the older view are as follows: According to the Neoplatonized Aristotelian

[1] *Ibid.*, II, 14, Seventh Method.
[2] *Ibid.*, Sixth Method.

view, God is only a thinking thing; His only activity is that He understands himself; and the only thing that follows from Him directly is a pure Intelligence or an intellect. According to Spinoza's own view, God is not only a thinking thing, but also an extended thing and an infinite number of other unknown things; His activity consists not only in that He understands himself through His being a thinking thing, but also in an infinite number of other activities which He exercises through His possessing the attribute of extension and an infinite number of other attributes; and, finally, the things that follow from Him directly consist not only in an intellect, which is only the immediate mode of thought, but also in motion and rest, which are the immediate modes of extension, and in an infinite number of other things, which are the immediate modes of the other infinite attributes. All this is implied in the following statement of the Scholium: "God does everything with that necessity with which He understands himself; that is to say, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature that God understands himself (a truth admitted by all), so by the same necessity it follows that God does an infinitude of things in infinite ways." What Spinoza means to say is this: just as according to emanationists, to whom God is pure thought, it follows from the necessity of His nature that He knows himself, so according to his own view, which conceives of God as possessing also extension and an infinite number of other attributes, it follows from the necessity of the nature of God that He does an infinite number of things. But, furthermore, God's knowledge of His essence must include, as is admitted by the mediaevals themselves, a knowledge of everything that proceeds from His essence; it follows therefore, in Proposition III, that "in God there necessarily exists the idea of His essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from His

essence." The term "idea," as we shall explain hereafter,[1] means the form of a thing which is the immediate object of cognition.

The mediaeval assertion that God knows particulars has given rise to three difficulties, due to three characteristics of particular things, namely, that they are many, that they are non-existent, and that they are material. Similar difficulties must have been felt by Spinoza to follow also from his own assertion in Proposition III that God knows not only himself but also "all things which necessarily follow from His essence." The solution of these difficulties is given by him in Propositions IV, VIII, and IX.

The first difficulty from the multiplicity of particular things is briefly formulated by Maimonides as follows: "It is impossible," he says, "that God's knowledge should include any plurality."[2] The problem is more elaborately stated by Gersonides: "If God apprehended these things, then, inasmuch as the intellect becomes actualized by what it knows and identified with it, it would follow that God instead of being simple would have an internal plurality, by reason of the plurality of the ideas which are apprehended by Him and with which His essence becomes identified."[3]

Several solutions are given of this difficulty. One solution is that God's "knowledge is directly connected with the species and only indirectly extends to individual members of the species."[4] Spinoza refers to this view in the *Short Treatise*, but rejects it on the ground that species or universals have no existence, and concludes that God's knowledge

[1] Cf. below, pp. 46 ff.

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 20.

[3] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 2 (4) (p. 122), paraphrased in *Or Adonai*, II, i, 2 (p. 29a).

[4] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 20 (cf. III, 16). Narboni *ad loc.* identifies it as the view of Avicenna.

of things which follow from Him must be a knowledge of particulars.[1]

Another solution is that while God knows the things which are outside himself, or, rather, which follow from himself, directly as particulars, He knows them by one single and simple kind of knowledge, so that they are apprehended by Him as one single idea. Two versions of this solution may be discerned, one in Maimonides and the other in Gersonides. Maimonides states it laconically as a principle that "God's knowledge is one, though it embraces many different kinds of objects," [2] and if the question is raised how this is possible, his answer is that this is one of the five ways in which God's knowledge differs from human knowledge, for, according to him, the term "knowledge" when applied to God is to be understood in a homonymous sense. Gersonides disagrees with Maimonides on the homonymity of the term "knowledge," and, in fact, on the homonymity of all the attributes, when applied to God, and though like Maimonides he admits that particular things are apprehended by God as one single idea, he maintains that in a smaller degree — an incomparably smaller degree — particular things may be so apprehended also by human beings.[3] His explanation of the process of the unification of the particular things into one single idea is given in the following passage: "From the premise that God knows [particular] things it would not necessarily have to follow that there would be a plurality in His essence. The order in which these things proceed from God reduces them to a unity, that is to say, in a certain aspect these things are one, as we have mentioned many times before. It is with reference to this aspect that God appre-

[1] *Short Treatise*, I, 6, § 7.
[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 20.
[3] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 5 (1) (p. 147).

hends them." [1] A fuller and clearer statement of the same view is contained in the following paraphrase of Gersonides' passage by Crescas: "The solution of this problem may be easily accomplished with the aid of what has just been said, namely, that God's knowledge which is identical with His essence is the cause of the existence of everything outside himself. The [idea of the] general order [2] which is in God, even though it comprehends many objects, is still one idea, inasmuch as the many objects are comprehended in it only in so far as they are successively the entelechy of one another, in which respect they are all reduced to unity. . . . It is therefore clear that God comprehends all things in a manner in which they are one in Him, and consequently no plurality occurs in His essence." [3]

In the light of these quotations, it is evident that it is in anticipation of the question how God in His simplicity of nature could comprehend a plurality of modes that Spinoza states in Proposition IV that "the idea of God, from which infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways, can be only one." It should be noted that in this proposition the statement that "infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways" from the "idea of God" is rather loosely used. More correctly it should be said, as in Proposition III, that they follow from the essence of God. We shall presently show that while the "idea of God" comprehends a knowledge of all the attributes and their modes, it is really an immediate mode only of the attribute of thought, and hence the cause only of the modes of thought, and consequently infinite

[1] *Ibid.*, III, 4 (4) (p. 141).

[2] Hebrew הסדור הכולל, which corresponds to the oft-recurrent expression הסדור המושכל אשר בנפש השם יתברך, "the conceptual order which is in God's mind" (III, 4 (3), p. 141 and elsewhere). Hence my bracketed addition in the translation of the text.

[3] *Or Adonai*, II, i, 2 (p. 29b).

numbers of *thinking* things only follow from it in infinite ways. Later in the Corollary to Proposition VII Spinoza indicates quite clearly that from the "idea of God" only ideas follow, for he says: "Whatever follows formally [i.e., objectively in the modern sense] from the infinite nature of God, follows from the idea of God, in the same order and in the same connection objectively [i.e., subjectively in the modern sense] in God." The meaning of the term "idea of God" we have explained above.[1]

Now, this "idea of His essence" which exists in God as a single "idea of God," though it is an immediate mode only of the attribute of thought,[2] comprehends a knowledge of the essence of God not only under the attribute of thought but also under the attribute of extension, as well as under all the other infinite attributes. Similarly it comprehends a knowledge of "all things which necessarily follow from His essence," [3] whether they be modes of thought or of extension or of any of the other unknown infinite attributes. This view is explicitly stated by Spinoza in the *Short Treatise* when he says that "the most immediate mode of the attribute which we call thought contains *objective* [i.e., subjectively] the formal [i.e., objective] essence of all things. . . . And since, as a matter of fact, nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predicated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows that of all this there is produced in thought an infinite idea, which apprehends *objective* [i.e., subjectively] the whole of nature just as it is *realiter*." [4] In short, this statement amounts to saying that the attribute of thought in its activity of knowing apprehends the attribute of extension as well as

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 239 ff.

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 239 ff.

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 3.

[4] *Short Treatise*. Appendix II, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 117, ll. 18 ff.).

the modes of extension. This would seem to contradict Spinoza's own previous statement that these two attributes must be conceived "as really distinct" from one another.[1] In order therefore to obviate this seeming contradiction, Spinoza proceeds in Propositions V–VII to draw a distinction between the attributes as they are conceived by us and the attributes as they really are in God. The former phase of the attributes is dealt with by him in Propositions V and VI; the latter, in Proposition VII.

The attributes as they are conceived by us are conceived by us each one "through itself (*per se*)," "as really distinct — that is to say, one without the assistance of the other." [2] God appears to us as a "thinking thing" and as an "extended thing," [3] and these two are conceived by us as if they were two natures in God, one independent of the other. From each of these independently conceived attributes there appears to us to follow by necessity, according to Spinoza, an independent series of modes. Unlike the mediaevals, to whom extended modes follow ultimately from God who is only a thinking thing, Spinoza maintains that from God as a thinking thing only thinking modes can follow; extended modes must follow from God as an extended thing; and so also must every other possible mode follow from an attribute of the same kind.

This is the contention of Propositions V and VI. God as a thinking thing, he says, "can form an idea of His own essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from it," [4] and consequently, "the formal being of ideas recognizes God for its cause in so far only as He is considered as a thinking thing." [5] But, on the other hand, "the formal being of

[1] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 10, and Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid*, II, Props. 1 and 2.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 5, Demonst.
[5] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 5.

things which are not modes of thought does not follow from the divine nature because of His prior knowledge of these things." [1] Quite the contrary, it must follow from some other attribute. The formal being of extended modes, for instance, will thus have to follow from the attribute of extension, for "just as ideas follow from the attribute of thought, in the same manner and with the same necessity the objects of ideas follow and are concluded from their attributes." [2] Consequently, "the modes of any attribute have God for a cause only in so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as He is considered under any other attribute." [3]

In God, however, Spinoza goes on to say in Proposition VII, the attributes are not something distinct from one another, for "substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways." [4] Since thought and extension, whether as attributes of substance or as modes of those attributes, are only two different aspects of one and the same thing, they form two mutually implicative series, so that "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." [5] Without acting upon one another, mind and body, by virtue of their being modes of attributes which only appear to be two but in reality are one, are so well co-ordinated that there is a perfect correspondence between their actions.[6] When therefore Spinoza says in Proposition VI that "the modes of any attribute have God for a cause only in so far as He is

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 6, Corol.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 6.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 7, Schol.
[5] *Ibid.* II, Prop. 7.
[6] Cf. below, pp. 189 ff.

considered under that attribute of which they are modes," he does not mean to imply that the attributes and their modes exist as something really distinct in the essence of God; he only means that "when things are *considered* as modes of thought, we must explain the order of the whole of nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone, and when things are *considered* as modes of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so with the other attributes." [1]

In the course of his discussion in the Scholium to Proposition VII Spinoza tries to explain how "a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways" or "manifested through different attributes" by quoting a philosophic truism "which some of the Hebrews," he says, "appear to have seen as if through a cloud" to the effect that "God, the intellect of God, and the things which are understood by God (*resque ab ipso intellectas*) are one and the same thing." The reference is to Maimonides, who speaks of the "well-known principle enunciated by the philosophers with regard to God that He is the *intellectus*, the *intelligens*, and the *intelligibile*, and that these three things in God are one and the same, and do not in any way constitute a plurality." [2] In Aristotle this principle is stated in the following passages: "As the intellect (*νοῦς*) thinks (*νοεῖ*) itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought (*νοητοῦ*); for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its object, so that thought and object of thought are the same." [3]

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 7, Schol.

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 68; cf. *Mishneh Torah*, *Yesode ha-Torah*, II, 10; Ibn Ezra's commentary on Exodus 34, 6; *Cuzari*, V, 12.

[3] *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072b, 19–21.

Again, "as, then, intellect (*νοῦς*) and the object of thought (*νοουμένου*) are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e., the act of intelligence (*νόησις*) will be one with the object of thought." [1]

Two observations in connection with this indirect reference to Maimonides are in place here.

First, in the original passage of Maimonides four terms are identified: *Deus*, *intellectus*, *intelligens*, and *intelligibile* or, as this last term is expressed in Spinoza's terminology, *res ab ipso intellectae*. In Spinoza's passage, however, only three terms are identified: *Deus*, *intellectus*, *res ab ipso intellectae;* Maimonides' term *intelligens*, for which the Greek equivalent is *νόησις* in the corresponding passage in Aristotle, is omitted by Spinoza. The explanation for this omission would seem to be that Spinoza, by removing the distinction between *intellectus potentia* and *intellectus actu* not only in God but in all beings,[2] has been using the term *intellectus* in the sense of *intelligens*, i.e., *intellectus actu*. We have already shown on other grounds that the term *intellectus* as used by Spinoza in connection with the immediate infinite and eternal mode of thought is to be understood in this sense.[3]

Second, in quoting Maimonides' statement as to the identity of *God*, *intellect*, *intelligens*, and *intelligibile*, Spinoza makes free use of it in its application to his own particular conception as to the nature of the relation of an idea of an object to the object itself. Originally in Maimonides all that the statement means is that in the case of any intellect which is in action — and God is an intellect which is always

[1] *Ibid.*, XII, 9, 1075a, 3–5. The corresponding terms in Hebrew and Arabic are: (1) *νοῦς*, שכל, عقل; (2) *νόησις*, משכיל, عاقل; (3) *νοητόν*, *νοούμενον*, מושכל, معقول.

[2] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 31, Schol. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 404 f.

[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 338 f.

in action — the idea which exists in the intellect of an external object and the act of forming that idea by the intellect are one and the same thing with the intellect itself. Maimonides illustrates it by the example of a tree existing in nature and the idea of that existing tree, the latter of which is in the human intellect when in action as it is eternally in God, who is an intellect always in action. "It is therefore clear to you that the thing comprehended is the abstract form of the tree, and at the same time it is the intellect passed into action. The intellect and the intelligible form of the tree are not two different things, for the intellect in action is nothing but that which is comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree has been turned into an intelligible and abstract object, namely, the intellectual faculty of the human soul, is undoubtedly the intellect passed into action." [1] Now, all that this statement means is that the idea, or intelligible form in Maimonides' terminology, of the tree in the actual intellect of man or in God is identical with that intellect and its action or with God and His action. It does not mean that the tree as it exists in nature and the idea of that tree in the actual human intellect or in God are one and the same thing manifested through different attributes. Quite the contrary, Maimonides would say with Aristotle, the tree which exists in nature and the idea, or rather intelligible form, of the tree are two substances, one being the concrete individual thing, which is one of the three Aristotelian substances, and the other being its form, which is likewise one of the Aristotelian substances.[2] It is only according to Spinoza's own denial of the existence of finite substances that the tree and the idea of the tree are one and the same thing manifested through different attributes. Or, to take Spiño-

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 68.

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 67, and below, p. 35.

za's own example of a circle instead of Maimonides' example of a tree, and to quote his own words: "For example, the circle existing in nature and the idea that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same thing, which is manifested through different attributes."

It is perhaps because of this his different application of the principle quoted from Maimonides that Spinoza refers to it as "a truth which some of the Hebrews appear to have seen as if through a cloud."

A second difficulty which the mediaevals have found in the attribution to God of a knowledge of particular things outside himself is that it would involve a knowledge of things which are non-existent. For particular things are transient events, now being non-existent, then coming into existence, and then again passing out of existence; but still, if God's knowledge of particular things is assumed, we must also assume "that all these new things that arise are known to Him before they take place," and so "this theory will lead to the conclusion that God's knowledge extends to things not in existence." [1] Knowledge of non-existent things, however, was objectionable to the mediaevals on two main grounds. First, it was not true knowledge, if by truth is meant the correspondence of the idea in the mind to an object outside the mind.[2] Second, in the event the non-existent object became existent, it would imply a change in the essence of the knower.[3]

Here, too, in answer to this question, Maimonides simply states the principle that God's knowledge includes things not in existence, and describes it as one of the five ways in which God's knowledge differs from human knowledge.[4] He

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 20. Cf. also 16. [2] Cf. below, p. 98.
[3] *Or Adonai*, II, i, 2 (p. 29a); *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 2 (6) (pp. 122–123).
[4] *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 20.

makes, however, the reservation that "we contend that it is not impossible that God's knowledge should have for its object a thing which does not yet exist, but the existence of which God foresees and is able to effect. It is only that which does not exist at all that is absolute non-existence for God's knowledge and cannot be the object of that knowledge, just as our own knowledge cannot have as its object that which is non-existent for us." [1] Gersonides, on the other hand, differing from Maimonides as to the nature of God's knowledge of particulars and as to the homonymity of the term "knowledge" when applied to God, explains God's knowledge of particular non-existent things on the ground that they are comprehended in the general order of nature of which God has an idea. "As for the second objection, namely, that God's knowledge would include non-existence, it is groundless according to our own conception as to the nature of God's knowledge of particulars. Our contention that God knows particulars only in so far as they are ordered makes that knowledge related to the conceptual order of these things which exists in the mind of God and which exists there always, rather than to things themselves which come into being, inasmuch as He does not acquire His knowledge from the things, but, quite the contrary, the things acquire their existence from the knowledge which He has of them, that is to say, their existence is produced as an effect from the order of these things which is conceived as an idea in the mind of God. This being the case, it does not follow that [by knowing particulars] God's knowledge would be based upon non-existence; quite the contrary, it would be based on something which exists always in the same state and without any change." [2]

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 5 (2) (pp. 147–148).

Operating with the same terms and following the same processes of reasoning, Spinoza tries to explain in Proposition VIII in what sense God can be said to know non-existent individual things. Perhaps the best way of puzzling out the meaning of this proposition is by trying to find some equivalence between the different terminologies of Spinoza and the mediaevals.

Like Maimonides, Spinoza would divide all non-existent things into those which are non-existent but capable of existence and those which are non-existent and can never become existent. These latter are those impossibilities the non-existence of which, according to both Maimonides and Spinoza, does not impair the omnipotence of God,[1] and by the same token, their unknowability to God does not impair His omniscience. For, again, according to both Maimonides and Spinoza, only those non-existent things are known to God which, while non-existent now, may become existent in the future.

Now, these kinds of possible but as yet non-existent things would be called by the mediaevals "potential things." Spinoza calls them "formal essences" (*essentiae formales*). The essence of a thing, as we have already seen, is the concept of a thing apart from its existence outside the human mind.[2] But still, while having no existence outside the human mind, non-existent things are contained in something outside the human mind. As to that something in which they are contained, there is a difference of opinion. According to the mediaevals, who considered these possible but as yet non-existent things as potential existences, their potentiality is contained in matter, which has existence outside the human mind, and the informing principle, which is ultimately to

[1] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 33; *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 15. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 312, 313.
[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 124, 383 ff.

bring these potential things into actual existence, is contained in the examplar and idea in the mind of God, or, as Gersonides states this view, it is the conceptual order of non-existent things in the mind of God which endows them with existence.[1] Spinoza, however, by discarding the distinction between matter and form as a distinction between potentiality and actuality, and by making both extension and thought, the heirs of matter and form, attributes of God, finds that "the formal essences of individual things or modes," that is to say, non-existent individual things, "are contained in the attributes of God." Then, again, according to Gersonides, God knows these possible but as yet non-existent things only in so far as they are comprehended in the "conceptual order of these things which exists in the mind of God." [2] Similarly, according to Spinoza, "the ideas of non-existent individual things or modes are apprehended in the infinite idea of God."

In contradistinction to the "formal essences" of individual things which do not exist outside the human mind and which are only "contained in the attributes of God," there are things which exist outside the human mind. These are the individual things which constantly come into being, exist for a while, and pass away; in short, the things which have duration. It is these things that are generally spoken of as existent individual things; and it is they that form the object of what is generally called knowledge. Of such existent individual things Spinoza states in the Corollary to Proposition VIII that they "are said to exist, not only in so far as they are included in God's attributes, but in so far as they are said to have duration," and "their ideas involve existence through which they are said to have duration." Whether

[1] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 4 (3) (p. 141).
[2] *Ibid.*

God knows such existent individual things and in what manner He knows them constitute the mediaeval problem of divine knowledge. To repeat briefly what we have said above: Some philosophers have maintained that God does not know particulars; that He only knows universals. This view is rejected by both Maimonides and Gersonides;[1] they both agree that God knows particulars. They differ, however, as to the manner of His knowing them. To Maimonides, God knows them *qua* particulars, but with a knowledge which is absolutely unlike human knowledge. To Gersonides, God knows them only in so far as they are united as a whole and are included in the idea in the mind of God. Spinoza, too, maintains that God knows particulars, and, like Maimonides, he openly refutes those who maintain that God knows only universals.[2] As to the manner in which God knows the particulars, his view is analogous to that of Gersonides, whose discussion on the subject, as we have been trying to show, forms the literary background of Proposition VIII.

That Spinoza's reasoning in Proposition VIII, which we have just explained, reflects the text of Gersonides may be seen from the Scholium. Spinoza is trying there to illustrate the manner in which non-existent things can be known by the example of a circle in which there is contained an infinite number of rectangles equal to one another. A similar illustration is suggested by Gersonides when he says that "our knowledge may be actual even when the object of that knowledge is non-existent, as is the case in many of the mathematical figures of which we have a knowledge even though they have no existence at all outside the soul."[3]

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 18; *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 4 (pp. 137–138).
[2] *Short Treatise*, I, 6, § 7. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 437–438.
[3] *Milḥamot Adonai*, III, 2 (2) (p. 127).

A third objection raised by the mediaevals against God's knowledge of particulars is derived from the view that the fundamental contrast between God and things is a contrast between the immaterial and the material. The immaterial, the immovable, the non-temporal, the most perfect, and the simple, it is argued, can have no knowledge of that which is material, movable, temporal, imperfect, and manifold.[1] To Spinoza, with the disappearance of the old contrast between the immaterial and the material, the objection presented itself in the form of a question as to how the infinite can have a knowledge of the finite. This question is raised by Spinoza in Proposition IX. It is analogous to the question, raised by him before in Proposition XXVIII of Part I, as to how the infinite can be the cause of the finite. The answer in both cases is the same.[2] God as the infinite immanent cause, immanent in the sense of the whole in which the infinite causally interrelated effects reside as parts,[3] is the cause of the ideas of the finite things in so far only as they are indissoluble parts of an infinite series of causes and effects within His attribute of thought. God is thus not the immediate cause of the ideas of the individual things, but rather their remote cause, in the restricted sense of the term "remote" which Spinoza has suggested elsewhere.[4] Directly, the idea of each individual thing has for its cause the idea of another individual thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. God is the cause of these individual ideas only in so far as they are united into an infinite whole. And so also He knows the individual things directly only as an infinite whole, and only indirectly as finite individuals. The solution is analogous to Gersonides' theory that God knows the particulars only in so far as they are included in the universal order which forms

[1] *Ibid.*, III, 2 (1–4) (p. 122).
[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 397–398.
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 323 ff.
[4] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 28, Schol.

a united whole. And so, starting with Proposition IX that "the idea of an individual thing actually existing has God for a cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is considered to be affected by another idea of an individual thing actually existing, of which idea also He is the cause in so far as He is affected by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*," he concludes in the Corollary that God in a similar manner knows the individual things within that infinite series, "for a knowledge of everything which happens in the individual object of any idea exists in God in so far only as He possesses the idea of that object."

III. Body and Mind in Man

With Proposition X Spinoza begins his discussion of the microcosm, trying to show the resemblances as well as the differences between man and God. Just as God is a single substance manifested through the attributes of extension and thought, so is man a single individual thing composed of the two modes of body and mind. Furthermore, just as God knows himself and through that knowledge knows the things that follow from himself, so man knows himself and through that knowledge knows the things outside himself. In the same manner he finds an analogy between the interrelation of extension and thought in God and the interrelation of body and mind in man. But there are also differences between them, and the first fundamental difference which he discusses is that between the relation of extension and thought to God and the relation of body and mind to man. God is a substance in whom extension and thought are attributes. Logically, then, God is the underlying subject of these two attributes, without himself being composed of them. But man is not a substance, and logically he is not the underlying subject of body and mind; he is rather him-

self composed of body and mind. This is the reason why Spinoza starts his discussion of man in Proposition X with the statement that "the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or, in other words, substance does not constitute the form of man." Not satisfied with a mere denial that man is a substance, he proceeds in the two Scholia and the Corollary of this proposition, as well as in the Preface to Part II of the *Short Treatise*, to refute in detail the views of his predecessors who maintained that man is a substance.

In traditional philosophy, as we have already seen, the term "substance" was applied to several things — matter, form, any concrete object consisting of matter and form, and in an equivocal sense also to God.[1] The difference between the concrete object as substance and God as substance is that the former is material and of a composite nature, whereas the latter is immaterial and of an absolutely simple nature. According to this view, man is, like any other concrete object, a substance consisting of matter and form, in fact of a hierarchy of matters and forms, and in his case there is a particular matter and form called body and soul. The relation of man to God is like that of any particular thing within the physical universe or of the physical universe as a whole, namely, the relation of the thing created to the agent that has created it. In opposition to this conception of man, Spinoza reiterates his own view that the term "substance" is to apply to God alone, that nothing that is finite can be called substance, that particular things are to be called modes, and that modes exist in the substance as particulars in a universal, in the sense that they are conceived through the substance. "I by no means think that man, in

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 67–68.

so far as he consists of spirit, soul,[1] or body, is a substance. Because, already at the beginning of this book, we proved (1) that no substance can have a beginning; (2) that one substance cannot produce another; and lastly (3) that there cannot be two like substances." [2] "Hence it follows that the essence of man consists of certain modifications of the attributes of God, for the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man (Prop. X, Pt. II). It is therefore something (Prop. XV, Pt. I) which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived, or (Corol. Prop. XXV, Pt. I) an affection or mode which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner." [3]

But Spinoza goes further than this in his argument against the traditional application of the term "substance" to man. The concrete individual man, and for that matter any concrete object, is according to the Aristotelian philosophy not only one substance but a complexity of substances. By himself, as a particular concrete object, man is what Aristotle calls a first substance, consisting of matter and form, each of which is also a substance. Then man belongs to the genus animal and the species rational, which two are also substances, the species being called by Aristotle second substance and the genus being called by him, by implication, third substance.[4] According to this view, then, man is substance not only because he is a concrete being, but also because he consists of matter and form, and belongs to a genus and species.

[1] These two terms "spirit, soul" (*geest, ziele*) probably reflect the two Latin terms *spiritus* and *anima* or *mens*. In J. Van Vloten's Latin translation of the *Short Treatise* (*Ad Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia Supplementum*, Amsterdam, 1862, p. 88) these two terms are translated by *spiritus, mens*. Cf. below, p. 44, n. 1.

[2] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 2.

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 10, Corol.

[4] *Categories*, 5, 2a, 11 and 14. Cf. Grote, *Aristotle* (1872), I, p. 96.

Matter and form, furthermore, are included by Aristotle among the causes of man: "The cause of man," he says, "is the elements in man, viz. fire and earth as matter, and the peculiar form." [1]

Spinoza criticizes one by one these various uses of the term "substance" in connection with man.

In the first place, says Spinoza, what you call the matter and form of man, that is to say, the elements out of which the human body is composed and the peculiar shape and figure it possesses, are not substances, but only modes of extension, for all that man "has of form, motion, and other things, are likewise [modes] of the other attribute which is attributed by us to God." [2] They cannot be substances, because they do not conform to Aristotle's own definition of substance. For according to Aristotle a substance by definition must possess four characteristics, namely, (*a*) it must be that which exists in itself and does not exist in a subject, or, if it does exist in a subject, (*b*) it must be the cause of the existence of that subject, (*c*) it must also constitute the limits which define the individuality of the subject, and (*d*) it must be its essence.[3] Now, we have already seen how Spinoza's formal definition of substance in Definition III of the First Part of the *Ethics* implies an argument to show that matter and form cannot be substances, on the ground that they cannot truly be said to exist in themselves.[4] Now, in his arguments that man is not a substance he is trying to show that in man matter and form cannot be substances, on the ground that they cannot truly be said to be the causes of the existence of their subject, to define individuality of it,

[1] *Metaphysics*, XII, 5, 1071a, 13–14.

[2] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 53, ll. 6–8).

[3] For these four characteristics of substance, see my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 102–103, and note 9 on pp. 573–576.

[4] Cf. above, Vol. I, Chapter III.

and to be its essence. "And although from this, [namely], that the nature of man can neither be, nor be understood, without the attributes we ourselves admit to constitute substance, some try to prove that man is substance, yet this has no other ground than false supposition. For, since the nature of matter or body existed before the form of this human body existed, that nature cannot be peculiar to the human body, because it is clear that during the time when man was not, it could never belong to the nature of man." [1] And again: "For since it is possible for more men than one to exist, therefore that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance." [2]

In the second place, continues Spinoza, man is not a substance by virtue of the genus and species which are generally supposed to constitute his definition, for genus and species, according to Spinoza's own theory of definition,[3] "do not belong to the nature of definition." Man, being only a mode, or a thing which does not exist through itself, or a thing which is created, must be defined through his proximate or efficient cause which is God, or through the attributes whose mode he is, and it is these attributes, namely extension and thought, and not the universals animality and rationality, that may be considered as the genera through which man is defined or understood, for, as says Spinoza, "the second [kind of definitions] are those [of things] which do not exist through themselves, but only through attributes whose modes they are, and through which as their genus they must be understood." [4]

But here Spinoza seems to become conscious of a difficulty. If God or His attributes of thought and extension are to

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 4. [2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 10, Schol. [1].
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 383 ff.
[4] *Short Treatise*, I, 7, § 10. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 383 ff.

take the place of the genus animality and the species rationality in forming the definition of man, then God must bear the same relation to man in Spinoza's new conception of a definition as animality and rationality in the old Aristotelian conception of a definition. Now, animality and rationality, in the old conception of a definition, are said to constitute the nature or the essence of man; they are what are called the essential attributes of man; and consequently they are said to pertain to the essence or nature of man, for according to the generally accepted view, held by those whom Spinoza describes as "they" [1] or as "many people," [2] "that pertains to the essence of a thing without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived." [3] Consequently, according to Spinoza's conception of a definition, God should pertain to the essence or nature of man. This view that man as well as all other beings is of the essence or nature of God is reflected in such statements by John Scotus Erigena as "God is the essence of all things" [4] and all things "participate in the essence" [5] of God, or in such a statement by Amalric of Bena as "God is the essence of all created beings." [6] According to Hieronymus Zanchius, the view that man is of the essence of God is traceable to the heresies of the Manichaeans and the Priscillians.[7] But Spinoza is opposed to this view, and, if his con-

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Preface, § 5 (*Opera*, I, p. 53, l. 19).

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 10, Schol. [2].

[3] *Ibid.* The same statement occurs also in the *Short Treatise* (*loc. cit.*), but with the use of the term "nature" instead of "essence."

[4] *De Divisione Naturae*, I, 3: "Ipse namque omnium essentia est."

[5] *Ibid.*, I, 12: "Est igitur Principium . . . Principium quia ex se sunt omnia, quae essentia participant."

[6] Gerson, *De Concordia Metaphysicae cum Logica* in *Opera Omnia* (Antwerpiae, 1706), Vol. IV, Col. 826 B: "Dixit [Almaricus] enim Deum esse essentiam omnium creaturarum." Cf. R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* (1927), under "Gott," Vol. I, pp. 584–585.

[7] *De Operibus Dei intra Spacium Sex Dierum Opus*, Pars III, Liber II, Caput VI: *De Unione Animae cum Corpore*, Thesis II: "At Deus non est in nobis, neque ut

ception of the relation of God to the world is to be described as pantheism, it is pantheism of a different kind. While indeed he considers man as well as all other beings as modes of the attributes of thought and extension of God, he does not consider them as being in a literal sense of the same essence as God. As we shall see later, in his definition of mind, he considers mind only as a part of the infinite intellect of God, but not of the essence of God.[1]

In answer to this difficulty Spinoza tries to show that the view commonly held by "many people" as to the meaning of pertaining to the essence of anything is erroneous even on their own ground. For those "many people" admit that "God is the sole cause both of the essence and of the existence of all things," and to prove that this is a commonly accepted view Spinoza quotes, evidently from Descartes, the scholastic expression that God is a cause both *secundum fieri* and *secundum esse*.[2] Consequently, if their conception as to the meaning of pertaining to the essence of things were correct, they would have to believe "either that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or can be conceived without God," or, "which is more probable," they would have to admit that "there is no consistency in their thought." [3]

But, concludes Spinoza, their conception of the meaning of pertaining to the essence of anything is wrong. For, argues he, to pertain to the essence of a thing implies a mutual relationship and dependence between the thing itself

materia, neque ut forma: alioqui essemus de essentia Dei: quae fuit haeresis Manichaeorum et Priscillianistarum" (3rd ed., 1602, p. 792).

[1] Cf. below, pp. 49 ff.

[2] Cf. Descartes, *Quintae Responsiones* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 369, ll. 22–23): "Deus est causa rerum creatarum, non modo secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse." See Lewis Robinson, *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik*, I, p. 295. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 382.

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 10, Schol. [2].

and that which pertains to its essence. "I say that to the essence of anything pertains that . . . without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing." [1] God, therefore, does not pertain to the essence of man or of any created thing, even though He constitutes its definition, for the causal relation between God and His creatures is not mutual, because while everything is dependent upon God for its essence and existence, God is independent of anything. In this, indeed, Spinoza reechoes an old-established principle, for one of the characteristics of God as a being whose existence is necessary *per se* is that He is a being "upon whom the existence of all things is dependent, but whose existence is independent of anything else." [2]

This seems to me to be the full meaning of the argument contained in the two Scholia and the Corollary of Proposition X as well as in the Preface to *Short Treatise*, II. But obviously the statement in the Second Scholium and the parallel statement in the *Short Treatise* that "many people say that that pertains to the essence of a thing without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and they therefore believe either that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or can be conceived without God," refers to some definite text. What text it was I have so far been unable to discover. But we can gather some idea as to its content. Probably it was some pantheistic argument where the problem of the relation of God to the universe was presented in the form of a disjunctive proposition that God is either the essence of all things or that He is outside and above all things. Or, perhaps, it was some

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Def. 2. Cf. Prop. 10, Schol. [2], and *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, §5.

[2] *Emunah Ramah*, II, i (p. 47). Cf. *Maḳaṣid al-Falasifah*, II, ii, 5–6 (pp. 139–140), quoted above, Vol. I, p. 308, n. 2.

theological treatise where the problem of Christology was presented in the form of a disjunctive proposition that the Father and the Son are either homoousious or heteroousious.

Man, then, as a whole is not a substance, nor are his soul and body, taken individually, substances. Man is a combination of two modes. "All that he has of thought are only modes of the attribute of thought," and "all that he has of form, motion, and other things, are likewise" modes of the attributes of extension.[1] Or, as he expresses it in the *Ethics*, "the essence of man consists of certain modifications of the attributes of God."[2] These modifications are mind and body, the human mind being "a part of the infinite intellect of God,"[3] and the human body being "a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as a thing extended."[4] The relation between these two is like that between the thinking substance and the extended substance; they are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways.[5] This is what Spinoza has set out to prove, and accordingly in Propositions XI–XIII he discusses with reference to man every point which he has previously discussed in Propositions I–IX with reference to God, concluding with the Corollary in Proposition XIII: "Hence it follows that man is composed of mind and body."

But what is mind, or, rather, the "human mind" (*mens humana*), as Spinoza calls it here? The answer to this question is given by Spinoza in Propositions XI, XII, and XIII. Gradually, stage by stage, he adds one statement to another,

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 3.

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 10, Corol.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 11, Corol.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, Def. 1. Cf. Meyer's Preface to *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* quoted in Epistola 24.

[5] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 7, Schol.

out of which there emerges in the end his definition of the human mind.

Spinoza begins his definition of the mind in Proposition XI with the statement that "the *first thing* which forms the *actual* being of the *human mind* is nothing else than the *idea* of an *individual* thing *actually* existing." I have italicized six terms in this proposition as being of special significance. The subject of his inquiry, as will be noticed, is described by Spinoza not as "soul" (*anima*) or "intellect" (*intellectus*), but as the "human mind" (*mens humana*). The question may therefore be asked: In what sense does Spinoza use this term "mind" qualified by the term "human"? And of this human mind he wants to know not only the thing which forms its being, but the "first thing" (*primum*) which forms its "actual" (*actuale*) being. Is there any significance in the use of these two qualifying adjectives? Then, the first thing which forms the actual being of the human mind is described by him as an "idea" (*idea*) of something. What does he mean exactly by the term "idea"? Finally, that idea which is the first thing which forms the actual being of the human mind is said by him to be the idea not merely of a thing existing but of an "individual" (*singularis*) thing "actually" (*actu*) existing. What is the purpose of the use of these two qualifying terms?

Ordinarily the term "soul" when qualified by the term "human" is used as the antithesis of both animal and vegetable soul and refers to the rational faculty of the soul, or the intellect. Such is the significance of the qualifying term "human," to mention but two examples, in Maimonides[1] and in Thomas Aquinas.[2] In the latter the term "mind"

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 1: נפש האדם באדם. From the context it is clear that it refers only to the intellect.

[2] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 75, Art. 2: "animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens."

without the qualifying adjective "human" means also the same thing,[1] though it is sometimes used by him to include also the faculties of will and memory.[2] Similarly Descartes uses the term "human soul" in the sense of "mind."[3] Among the philosophers of the Rennaisance the terms *animus* and *mens*[4] were used as designations of the individual human soul, which was considered as being of divine origin and separable from the body, in contradistinction to the term *spiritus*, which was used as a designation of the vital force which was inseparable from the body,[5] thus on the whole the term *spiritus* corresponding to the sensitive faculties in Aristotle and the terms *animus* and *mens* corresponding to the rational faculty in Aristotle. It is probably with reference to this contrast of terms that Descartes says that he prefers the term *mens* to *anima*, on the ground that the latter "is equivocal and is frequently applied to what is corporeal."[6] Verrulan, according to the testimony of Spinoza, "often uses 'intellect' (*intellectus*) for 'mind' (*mens*), in which respect he differs from Descartes."[7] Now Spinoza, as we know, rejects the existence of absolute faculties in the soul, declaring that the so-called faculties "are either altogether fictitious, or else are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities."[8]

[1] Cf. quotation in the preceding note.

[2] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Quaest. X, Art. I, ad 7: "mens non est una quaedam potentia praeter memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, sed est quoddam totum potentiale, comprehendens haec tria."

[3] Cf. *Meditationes, Synopsis* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 14, l. 16), and French version (VIII, p. 10): "Mais que l'esprit [=*mens*], ou l'ame de l'homme (ce que ie ne distingue point), est immortelle de sa nature."

[4] Cf. Telesius and Campanella in Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, § 243.3; § 246.5.

[5] Cf. *ibid.*, § 246.5.

[6] Cf. Def. 6 in *Rationes Dei Existentiam etc.* at the end of *Secundae Responsiones* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 161).

[7] Epistola 2 to Oldenburg.

[8] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol.

Nor, for aught we know, does he in the *Ethics* make any distinction between the vital and the intellectual forces of the soul as constituting different faculties, though in the *Short Treatise* he does say that man consists "of spirit (*geest* = *spiritus*), soul (*ziele* = *anima*, *mens*), or body." [1] Accordingly Spinoza uses the terms "mind" (*mens*) and "human mind" (*mens humana*) and "soul" (*anima*) in the *Ethics* [2] and the term "soul" (*anima*) throughout the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* in the most general sense, and every one of these terms is to be understood to include all those functions which traditionally were considered as constituting the faculties of the human soul.

Now, these faculties of the human soul, or, rather, of the animal soul in general, are divided by Aristotle as well as by the mediaevals into perceptive and motive. Thus says Aristotle: "There are two different characteristics by which the soul is principally defined; firstly, motion from place to place, and secondly, thinking and judging and perceiving by the senses." [3] And thus also Judah ha-Levi, speaking for the mediaevals, says that "all the faculties of a living being are either perceptive or motive." [4] Of these two classes of faculties, the perceptive are considered by Aristotle as being prior to the motive, for intelligence is one of the causes of motion. "Both these, then," says Aristotle, "are causes of locomotion, intelligence and appetency." [5] And Abraham Ibn Daud puts it more directly: "Of these two classes of

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 2. The "spirits" (*geesten*), i.e., animal spirits (*spiritus animales*), are again mentioned in *Short Treatise*, II, 11, § 2; 19, §§ 11 f.; 20, § 2, § 3, § 5; 22, § 7. Cf. *Ethics*, V, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 278, ll. 9 ff.). Cf. above, p. 35, n. 1.

[2] Cf. *Ethics*, II, Prop. 11, and Epistola 32 (*Opera*, IV, p. 174, l. 3): "mens humana"; *Ethics*, III, Prop. 57, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 187, l. 15): "idea seu anima"; V, Praef. (p. 278, l. 4): "anima seu mens."

[3] *De Anima*, III, 3, 427a, 17–19. Cf. 9, 432a, 15–17.

[4] *Cuzari*, V, 12.

[5] *De Anima*, III, 10, 433a, 13.

faculties the one which is prior in living beings is perception." [1] With this prevalent view about the priority of the perceptive faculties to the motive in the background, Spinoza significantly begins his definition of the human mind by saying that the *first thing* which forms the actual being of the human mind is not what is generally described as the motive faculties, but rather that which is described as the perceptive faculties, or which he himself describes as the idea of something. The significance of this part of his definition will appear in our discussion of Spinoza's theory of emotions.

Within perception itself, whether it be sensation or cognition, there is according to Aristotle and his followers a distinction of potential and actual perception. The difference between these two kinds of perception consists in the respectively different relations of the agent and the act of the perception to the object of the perception. In potential perception, the agent or the faculty of perceiving as well as the act of perceiving differs from the object perceived. In actual perception they are all identical. "Now actual knowledge," says Aristotle, "is identical with the thing known." [2] And again: "In a manner the soul is all existent things. For they are all either objects of sensation or objects of thought; and knowledge and sensation are in a manner identical with their respective objects." [3] This view is re-echoed by Maimonides in his statements that "the intellect in action is nothing but the thing comprehended" and that "the intellect in action is not a thing different from its action." [4]

Now, Spinoza has abolished this distinction between the actual and the potential. Mind is to him always actual, just as intellect is to him always actual. When it happened

[1] *Emunah Ramah*, I, 6 (p. 26).
[2] *De Anima*, III, 7, 431a, 1–2.
[3] *Ibid.*, 8, 431b, 21–23.
[4] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 68. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 238.

that twice in succession he used the expression "actual intellect," he at once made haste to explain that it was not meant to indicate that a potential intellect exists but rather that intellect is always actual.[1] Similarly in his definition of the term "idea" he preferred the use of the term "conception" to that of "perception," on the ground, he says, that "the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object; but the word conception seems to express the action of the mind."[2] Since the mind is thus always actual, the object of the knowledge of the mind will, according to Spinoza, always be identical with the mind. Consequently, in setting out to define "mind," Spinoza speaks of the object of the mind as that "which forms the *actual* being of the human mind," that is to say, as that which is identical with the human mind, which, according to him, is always actual.

This object of the knowledge of the mind which is identical with the mind itself is, furthermore, according to Aristotle, not the matter of a thing, but rather its form. "It follows," says Aristotle, "that the faculties must be identical, if not with the things themselves, then with their forms. The things themselves they are not, for it is not the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone."[3] The Greek word for "form" used in this passage of Aristotle is εἶδος, from which we get the Latin and our own term "idea." Now, in the Latin philosophic terminology, though the term *forma* has on the whole supplanted the term *idea* in its Aristotelian sense, still the term "idea" has been retained for that particular form which is the object of knowledge,[4] or what is

[1] *Ethics*, I, Props. 30 and 31, Schol. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 404.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, Def. 3, Expl. [3] *De Anima*, III, 8, 431b, 28–432a, 1.

[4] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 15, Art. 1: "idea enim Graece, Latine forma dicitur; unde per ideas intelleguntur formae aliarum rerum praeter ipsas res existentes."

called the intelligible form. Descartes retains the same use of the term when he says that "idea is a word by which I understand the form of any thought."[1] This meaning of the term "idea" is on the whole retained also by Spinoza when he says in Definition III of Part II, "By idea, I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing." Still it will appear in the course of our discussion that the term "idea" did assume with him a wider meaning, and it was used by him not only in the sense of *forma intelligibilis*, but also in the sense of *forma imaginabilis* and *forma sensibilis*,[2] and this despite his statement that "by ideas I do not understand images (*imagines*) which are formed at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the brain, but rather conceptions of thought (*cogitationis conceptus*)."[3] This denial of his that images are to be called ideas is therefore to be taken with some reservation and as reflecting the following statement of Descartes: "And thus it is not only images depicted in the imagination that I call ideas; nay, to such images I here decidedly refuse the title of ideas, in so far as they are pictures in the corporeal imagination, i.e., in some part of the brain. They are ideas only in so far as they constitute the form of the mind itself that is directed towards that part of the brain."[4] Consequently, following the Aristotelian view that

[1] Def. 2 in *Rationes Dei Existentiam etc.* at the end of *Secundae Responsiones* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 160).

[2] Cf. W. Hale White's translation of *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, Preface, pp. ix–x.

Klatzkin in his Hebrew translation of the *Ethics* (*Torat ha-Middot*) quite rightly translates *idea* by משכל, i.e., *intelligibile*. Though it is not an exact translation of *idea*, it renders its meaning correctly in places where *idea* stands for *forma intelligibilis* (εἶδος νοητόν, צורה משכלת).

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol.

[4] Def. 2 in *Rationes Dei Existentiam etc.* at the end of *Secundae Responsiones* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 160).

it is the form of a thing and not its matter that is identical with the soul, Spinoza says that the first thing which is identical with the actual human mind is the *idea* of a thing; the term "idea" here is used by him in the most general sense, comprehending what Aristotle would call the sensible, imaginable, and intelligible form of a thing. Since the mind or the soul is identical with the idea, Spinoza sometimes uses the expression "idea or soul" (*idea, seu anima*).[1]

This, it appears to me, is how Spinoza has arrived at his definition of the mind as the idea of the body. It is nothing but a new way of restating the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body. It is not impossible that in his use of the term "idea" instead of "form" Spinoza was influenced by Francis Glisson and John Marcus Marci, both of whom use the term "idea" in their definition of soul.[2] But, as we have seen on several other occasions, we must differentiate between the reasoning which leads Spinoza to certain conclusions and the phraseology in which he clothes those conclusions. A dependence in the latter does not necessarily mean a dependence in the former.

But that thing the form of which is the object identical with the *actual* mind, again according to Aristotle, must itself be actual, for "knowledge and sensation, then, are subdivided to correspond to things. Potential knowledge and sensation answer to things which are potential, actual knowledge and sensation to things which are actual."[3] Furthermore, that thing must be *finite*, for an infinite actual object does not exist,[4] nor can it be known.[5] Thus also Spi-

[1] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 57, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 187, l. 15).

[2] Cf. Dunin-Borkowski, *Der junge De Spinoza*, pp. 384 f., 392.

[3] *De Anima*, III, 8, 431b, 24–26.

[4] *Physics*, III, 4–8; *De Caelo*, I, 5–7; *Metaphysics*, XI, 10; *Moreh Nebukim*, II, Introduction, Prop. 1. Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 135 ff.

[5] *Physics*, I, 4, 187b, 7; *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 16. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 139.

noza maintains here that the idea which forms the actual being of the mind must be the idea "of an *individual* thing *actually* existing." In the Demonstration he makes it quite clear that he means by it that the object cannot be a "non-existent thing" nor "an infinite thing." In these two respects, then, the microcosm differs from the macrocosm, for in the latter case the object of God's knowledge is "all things which follow necessarily from His essence," [1] the number of which is infinite,[2] and within which are also included "non-existent individual things." [3]

Since it is the idea or the form of a thing which constitutes the human mind, "it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God." [4] This reflects on the whole the view generally held in mediaeval philosophy, especially among the emanationists, according to which all forms are bestowed upon matter by the so-called Active Intellect, which is in direct line of emanation from the thinking activity of God. Judah ha-Levi expresses this view quite neatly when he says that "philosophers were forced to acknowledge that these forms could only be given by some divine being, which they call the form-giving Intelligence"; [5] though in another place he qualifies this statement by referring to "others who assert that the powers and qualities of minerals are the product of combination only, and consequently do not require forms of divine origin. The latter kinds of forms are only necessary for plants and animals to which a soul is attributed." [6] The significance of this statement of Spinoza that "the human mind is *a part of the infinite intellect of God*" is to be found both in what it directly affirms and in what it indirectly denies. It directly affirms that the human mind is what the mediaevals would describe as being of divine

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 3. [2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 4. [3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 7.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 11, Corol. [5] *Cuzari*, V, 4. [6] *Ibid.*, V, 10.

origin. But it seems indirectly to deny that it is what some mediaevals would describe as being a part of God's essence itself. It is a part only, Spinoza seems to say, of the infinite intellect of God, which corresponds to what the mediaevals call the Active Intellect. Thus also one of Spinoza's teachers, Manasseh ben Israel, argues vehemently against the view held by certain Jewish as well as non-Jewish philosophers that the human mind is a part of God's own essence, admitting only that it is a spiritual being of divine origin and of the same order of excellence as angels.[1] Of Hebrew sources for the view that the soul is a part of God's essence itself, Manasseh ben Israel mentions two Cabalistic works, *Shefa' Ṭal*, Introduction, (by Shabbethai Sheftel Horwitz), and *Pardes Rimmonim*, XXIV, 13, by Moses Cordovero. The "gentile philosophers" who were of the same view are not named by Manasseh ben Israel. But the following names occur in Albertus Magnus: Xenophanes, the Pythagoreans, Alexander (of Aphrodisias), and David of Dinant.[2] Hieronymus Zanchius similarly denies that the soul is a part of the essence of God, but evidently he would also deny that it was a part of the Active Intellect or of Spinoza's infinite intellect of God, for he explicitly denies that it is a part of the essence of angels, insisting that in each individual human being the soul is created by God *ex nihilo*.[3] In the light of this discussion one can appreciate the vagueness with which Descartes

[1] Cf. *Nishmat Ḥayyim*, II, 9. Cf. also *Emunot We-De'ot*, VI, 1.

[2] Albertus Magnus, *Summa Theologiae*, Pars II, Tract. XII, Quaest. 72, Membrum 4, Art. 2. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. II, Cap. 85: "Quod anima non est de substantia Dei."

[3] *De Operibus Dei intra Spacium Sex Dierum Creatis Opus*, Pars III, Liber II, Cap. V: *De Origine Animorum*, Thesis I: "Animae humanae neque ab Angelis, neque ex Dei substantia . . . conditae fuerunt"; Thesis II: "Singulorum hominum animas, et novas et ex nihilo creari, a Deo, probabilius est" (3rd ed., 1602, pp. 760 and 765). Cf. above, p. 39. Zanchius also denies that the soul arises "*per traducem*" (*ibid.*, after Thesis I, p. 763; cf. p. 759, before Thesis I) or "*ex traduce*" (cf.

has phrased his statement that "the human mind has in it something that we may call divine." [1]

Furthermore, the form of the thing which according to Aristotle is the object of sensation and knowledge and identical with the mind is not something static and eternally fixed like a Platonic idea; it is, rather, constantly changing, as is the matter of the thing in relation to which it is the form. It is thus that Aristotle maintains that "sensation," of which the form of a thing is the object, "consists in being moved and acted upon, for it is held to be a species of qualitative change." [2] And what is true of sensation is true also of knowledge. "The soul is said . . . to perceive and to think; and all these states are said to be motions." [3] Spinoza expresses the same view when he says in the *Short Treatise* that "as the idea comes from the existence of the object, therefore according as the object changes or perishes, so the idea must change or perish." [4] Consequently, since it is the idea of an object which constitutes the actual being of the mind, "whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind." [5] In this respect, the microcosm is like the macrocosm, for "a knowledge of everything which happens in the individual object of any idea exists in God." [6] But there is the following difference between them. God has a knowledge of them "in so far only as He possesses the idea of that object." [7]

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[1] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, IV (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 373, ll. 7–8): "Habet enim humana mens nescio quid divini."

[2] *De Anima*, II, 5, 416b, 33–35.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, 4, 408b, 2–4. A contradictory statement concerning knowledge is to be found in *Physics*, VII, 3, 247a, 16–247 b, 1. Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, note 20 on pp. 547–548.

[4] *Short Treatise*, Appendix II, § 7 (*Opera*, I, p. 118, ll. 21–24).

[5] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 12. [6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 9, Corol. [7] *Ibid.*

Man has a knowledge of them because the idea is "united with the object." [1]

But what is that individual finite thing actually existing which Spinoza has so far referred to as the primary object of the idea which constitutes the human mind? Now, Aristotle would have said that it is external objects, for sensation, which is the primary stage in the process of cognition, is impossible without external objects.[2] Indeed, Aristotle raises the question why there should not be sensation without external objects. "The question arises," he says, "why there is no sensation of the senses themselves; that is, why they produce no sensation apart from external sensibles." [3] But his answer remains in the negative. In opposition to this, Spinoza maintains that the first thing the mind is aware of, or the first thing of which the idea forms the actual being of the mind, is not external things, but man's own body. In the *Short Treatise* he states this view quite plainly when he says that of the influences that the body exercises upon the soul the most important one is "that it causes the soul to become aware of it, and through it also of other bodies," [4] so that "the first thing which the soul gets to know is the body." [5] Again, in a letter to Schuller he maintains that "the human mind can only get to know those things which the idea of an actually existing body involves, or what can be inferred from this idea." [6] If we were to restate Spinoza's view in the language quoted above from Aristotle, we could say that Spinoza maintains that there is a sensation of the senses themselves. Hence Proposition XIII: "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a cer-

[1] *Short Treatise*, Appendix II, § 7 (*Opera*, I, p. 118, l. 25).
[2] *De Anima*, II, 5, 417a, 2 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, 2–4.
[4] *Short Treatise*, II, 19, § 13.
[5] *Ibid.*, § 14.
[6] Epistola 64.

tain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else." In this, again, the microcosm is partly like the macrocosm and partly unlike it. Like God, who knows His own essence,[1] man knows his own body; but whereas God knows at once His own essence and all things which necessarily follow from His essence,[2] man knows primarily his own body, and only secondarily, as we shall see,[3] things which are external to his body. Again, God knows His own essence in all the infinity of its attribute; but the human mind as a mode of thought knows primarily only the body which is a mode of extension. For man, unlike God, is not a single substance of which mind and body are attributes, but He is "composed of mind and body." [4]

But, though man is composed of mind and body as if these two were distinct things and independent of each other, still "the human mind is united to the body," [5] that is to say, it is inseparable from it. This must be considered the essential point in Spinoza's theory of the mind — its inseparability from the body. It runs counter to the entire trend of the history of philosophy down to his time, for everybody before him, for diverse reasons, insisted upon the separability of mind from body.

This general insistence among mediaeval philosophers upon the separability of soul from body, or at least upon the separability of certain faculties of the soul from body, irrespective of their views as to the nature of the soul itself, had its origin, I believe, in three sources: first, the Biblical account of the origin of the soul as an inbreathing from God in the human body, which in post-Biblical Judaism, and

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 3.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Cf. below, Chapter XIV.
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13, Corol.
[5] *Ibid.*, Schol.

hence in Christianity, whether independently or under the influence of foreign ideas, developed into a dichotomy of soul and body; second, the Platonic view of the soul as something immaterial and eternal and distinct from body; third, the various attempts on the part of the commentators of Aristotle to make the rational faculty of the soul something separable from body — attempts which probably took rise in Aristotle's own statement that while "the soul . . . cannot be separated from the body . . . there is, however, no reason why some parts should not be separated." [1] This attempt started with Themistius, who considered the Aristotelian hylic or passive intellect (*νοῦς παθητικός*) as something separable from body.[2] An essentially similar, though much modified, view was held also by Averroes.[3] It is against the latter that Thomas Aquinas maintains "that the possible intellect of man is not a separate substance." [4] Even those who rejected this interpretation of the passive intellect have introduced between it and the active intellect the so-called acquired intellect "which is not a power inherent in the body but is separated from the body with a true separation." [5] Though this acquired intellect is not mentioned in Aristotle, it was used in mediaeval expositions of the Aristotelian psychology as an interpretation of his views, and it may be considered as an outgrowth of Aristotle's actual intellect (*νοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ* or *ἐντελεχείᾳ*), to which Spinoza has referred in Part I, Propositions XXX and XXXI, by the term *intellectus actu*.[6] It would seem that it was in accordance with the general line of the development of discussions of this kind that among the Renaissance philosophers a distinction grew up

[1] *De Anima*, II, 1, 413a, 3–7.
[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, I, 1. Cf. Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, note on pp. 306 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. II, Cap. 59.
[5] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72.
[6] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 404.

between *spiritus* and *animus* or *mens* and that those who denied the separability of *spiritus* from body admitted the separability of *animus* or *mens* from body, the latter two terms corresponding on the whole to the Aristotelian rational faculty of the soul.

Now, all these views as to the separability of the soul or of the intellect come into play in almost any discussions of the nature of the soul by mediaeval philosophers, whether writing in Arabic, in Hebrew, or in Latin, and irrespective of what the formal definition of the soul may be. The insistence upon the separability of the soul was essential for them, if they wanted to give a rational explanation of immortality. Though the separability of the soul from body does not necessarily imply its immateriality, for it can be separable from body even if it be material, provided it is of a different matter than that of the body, still the prevalent opinion among the mediaevals was that it was immaterial, and among the emanationists it was considered, like all the other forms, as directly emanating from the divine thinking.[1]

It is against this prevalent view of the separability of the soul, and especially against the emanationists' view that the soul is an emanation of God's thinking and hence separable from the body, that Spinoza comes out in his statement that the "human mind is united to the body."[2] This statement means more than a mere assertion that the soul is united to the body; it means that the soul is inseparable from the body. We can clearly see all the arguments with which this statement is charged. Spinoza seems to address his opponents as follows: You maintain that the human soul, or at least that faculty of it which you call the acquired intellect, is separable from the body. What is your reason for that? It is be-

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 218.

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13, Schol.

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cause, you say, the acquired intellect, as an emanation from God, who is pure thought and unlike body, must likewise be unlike body. Its union with the body does not make it a part of the body. It has an existence apart from the body, being an immaterial substance in contradistinction to the body which is a material substance. Now, I agree with you that the human mind, "in so far as it understands (*intelligit*)," — and according to me it always understands,[1] and is what you would call an actual or an acquired intellect, — "is an eternal mode of thought,"[2] or that it "follows from the divine nature," [3] or that it is "a part of the infinite intellect of God." [4] But so according to me is also the human body a mode of God's attribute of extension and follows from the divine nature. And consequently, according to my way of reasoning, just as in God the attribute of thought is inseparable from the attribute of extension, so in man the mode of thought, i.e., mind, is inseparable from the mode of extension, i.e., body. Thus starting with the very same premise, that soul has its origin in the divine nature, we arrive at different conclusions as to its relation to body, all because we hold fundamentally different views with regard to the nature of God.

But whether the human soul is separable from body or not, soul as such is not considered either by the mediaevals or by Spinoza as something which is unique to man. According to the Aristotelian traditions of the mediaevals, soul is a species of form (εἶδος),[5] being only an advanced stage in the hierarchy of forms which run throughout nature and of which every individual thing is possessed. It is only a special

[1] *Ibid.*, I, Prop. 31, Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 40, Schol.
[3] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 36, Schol.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 11, Corol. Cf. V, Prop. 40, Schol.
[5] *De Anima*, II, 2, 414a, 13–14.

name given to that particular form which appears in plants, animals, and men, and which is manifested by the functions of nutrition, growth, reproduction, locomotion, sensation, and reason, the last of these functions being given the special name of intellect. If therefore we define soul as the form of the body, and if we substitute the general term "form" for the special kind of form called soul, we can see how, according to Aristotle and the mediaevals, the possession of a soul in the general sense of form is not unique in man, inasmuch as everything in nature possesses some kind of form. It is in this sense that Cabalists, in a generally misunderstood passage, speak of a "mineral soul" in addition to the customary vegetable, animal, and rational souls.[1] It is in this sense also undoubtedly that Renaissance philosophers like van Helmont, Telesius, and Bruno held the doctrine of *omnia animata*. It is not to be inferred, however, that all those who espoused this doctrine necessarily meant to attribute life and consciousness to all things. Van Helmont, for one, meant by it, with reference to metals, only a certain principle of cohesion, and, with reference to plants, only a certain composite humor; it is only with reference to animals and man that he meant by it a substantial vital principle.[2] In some instances, to be sure, the expression *omnia animata* may indeed point to a doctrine of panpsychism, with its implication that all matter is living, but unless there is some definite evidence assuring the accuracy of such an interpretation the expression is to be taken as nothing more than a general annunciation that the term *anima* in a variety of different meanings denotes something which exists in all things, in the same manner as the term "form" in a variety of different meanings

[1] נפש הדומם. Ḥayyim Vital, *Sha'are Ḳedushshah*, III, 1. Cf. I. Misses, "Spinoza und die Kabbala," in *Zeitschrift fur exacte Philosophie*, VIII (1889), p. 364.

[2] Cf. G. S. Brett, *A History of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 188.

is said by Aristotle to denote something which exists in all things.

This is what I understand to lie behind Spinoza's utterance that all things are animate. Spinoza seems to address the Aristotelian philosophers as follows: If soul and intellect are merely different grades of form, what need is there for you to use these three terms? Your manner of speaking of things in the mineral kingdom as having only form, and of things in the vegetable and animal kingdoms as possessing a soul, and of man as possessing an intellect, merely tends to produce in the mind of the student and reader the impression of a discontinuity in nature, of realms standing distinct and quite apart from each other, whereas in truth these three terms merely describe a gradation of stages in the succession of forms. Would it not be better, then, to take one single term such as "mind" or "soul" and apply it to all things which in traditional philosophy would be said to possess form? And so, after his discussion of the definition of the human mind, Spinoza concludes in the Scholium to Proposition XIII that "these things which we have proved hitherto are altogether general, nor do they refer more to man than to other individuals, all of which are animate, although in different degrees." This statement that all things are animate, as we have been trying to show, does not point to a panpsychistic conception of nature. The animateness which Spinoza ascribes to all things, as we have explained, merely means that the term "soul" (*anima*), and not the implication of life and consciousness which that term has, should be applied to all things. The term "soul" as he uses it here does not necessarily imply life and consciousness. When he says in the same passage that things are animate "in different degrees" he means that certain things which he would describe as animate do not possess life and conscious-

ness. All that he means by his statement that all things are animate in different degrees is exactly what Aristotle would have meant by saying that all things have forms in different degrees. In the place of the old term "form," as we have already seen, Spinoza uses the term "idea" in the sense of the intelligible, imaginable, and sensible forms, which according to Aristotle himself are the objects respectively of cognition, imagination, and perception,[1] and it is because that of all things there are such forms or ideas in God that all things may be said to be animate. "For of everything there necessarily exists in God an idea of which He is the cause, in the same way as the idea of the human body exists in Him; and therefore everything that we have said of the idea of the human body is necessarily true of the idea of any other thing. We cannot, however, deny that ideas . . . differ from one another, and that one is more excellent and contains more reality than another." [2]

But what are the demarcations between the different degrees of animateness? The signs of demarcation between the different degrees of animateness which Spinoza assigns to all things, as well as between the different ideas of things which according to him exist in God, are not definitely explained by him. But a study of what the signs of demarcation were according to the mediaevals between the different forms which all things possessed and a comparison of them with some of the characteristic features of the human mind according to Spinoza will furnish us with a fairly clear idea of what he considered to be the differences in the degree of animateness of things and also of what he considered to be the differences in the ideas that exist of them in God. Now, according to the mediaevals, the chief stages in the hierarchy

[1] Cf. above, pp. 46–48.

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13, Schol.

of forms are, first, the form which endows matter with corporeality or tridimensionality (*forma corporeitatis*), then the form which endows the simple four elements with their specific distinguishing characteristics (*forma elementalis*), then the form of composite objects (*forma mixtionis*), then the form which endows plants with the functions of nutrition, growth, and reproduction (*forma vegetabilis*), then the form which endows animals with the power of sensation (*forma sensitiva*), and, finally, the form which endows man with the power of reason (*forma humana sive intellectiva*). There is no doubt that Spinoza would classify his ideas in some such manner as the mediaevals classified their forms, differing from them perhaps somewhat in so far as he differed from them in his conception of nature and in the classification of the objects of nature. But on the whole he would follow the same principle of classification, arranging the ideas according to the order of their corresponding objects, for, as he himself says, "we cannot, however, deny that ideas like objects themselves differ from one another,"[1] the differences between the former corresponding respectively to the differences between the latter. But it happens that on the difference between the idea or the soul of the human body and the ideas or souls of other individual things we have some definite information in Spinoza. It is consciousness. While like the ideas of all other things, which are the forms and functions and the essences of things, the form and function and essence or idea of the human body exists in God, still it differs from the idea of everything else in that it is conscious of its own body. This consciousness of the body, which the idea of the human body possesses, constitutes the first activity of the human mind, and in this the human mind or soul differs from the minds and souls of all other things, which according

[1] *Ibid.*

to Spinoza can be called animate. Just as in Aristotle the animal soul differs from the vegetable soul in that it is endowed with sensation, i.e., a consciousness of the existence of other bodies, so in Spinoza the idea of the human body which exists in God differs from the ideas of all other individual things which exist in God in that it is conscious of its own body. That consciousness is not to be imputed to all things, even though they are all described by Spinoza as being "animate," may be inferred indirectly from his discussion of the delusion of freedom in a letter to Schuller. "Conceive, if you please," he writes, "that a stone while it continues in motion thinks, and knows that it is striving as much as possible to continue in motion." [1] The implication is quite clear that the stone, though included among all things described as "animate," is not necessarily assumed to be conscious of its own body and its affections. And just as there is a difference between the idea of the human body and the idea of all other individual objects, so also there must be differences between the ideas of all those other individual objects.

Recapitulating now the main points which have so far been brought out in Spinoza's definition of soul as compared with that of the Aristotelian tradition, we find both points of resemblance and points of difference between them. His predecessors begin their investigation of the soul by asserting that all things have forms, sometimes also called by the name of ideas. Spinoza similarly begins by saying that of all things there are ideas. The forms, according to his predecessors, are of different degrees. According to Spinoza, too, the ideas are of different degrees. But whereas according to his predecessors the forms of certain things, beginning with plants, are called soul, and forms of still other things,

[1] Epistola 58 (*Opera*, IV, p. 266, ll. 13–15).

beginning with man, are called intellect, according to Spinoza all ideas may be called soul and consequently all things may be said to be animate. He retains, however, the term "intellect" as strictly applying to the ideas of man, and does not use it with reference to the ideas of beings of a lower grade. Again, according to his predecessors, the forms come directly from the divine nature, whereas the matter originates outside of the divine nature, and consequently they held that certain forms, either the human soul as a whole or certain parts of the human intellect, are separable from the human body. According to Spinoza, however, both the forms and the so-called matter come directly from the divine nature, one from the attribute of thought and the other from the attribute of extension, and consequently, since thought and extension are inseparable in God, soul and body are inseparable in man. Finally, the fundamental difference between the human soul and all other souls is that the former is conscious of its own body.

But what is it that creates these differences between the various grades of forms or ideas or souls both in Aristotelianism and in Spinoza? Or, in other words, why should the human form possess sensation and thought in addition to nutrition, growth, and reproduction and the vegetable form possess only nutrition, growth, and reproduction? and then, again, why should the mineral form be without even these last three functions? The mediaevals answer this question by the statement that the forms, though all of them of divine origin, differ in their excellence and perfection by reason of the differences in the material objects upon which they are bestowed. Though all material objects, they say, consist of the same four elements, still they become differentiated and distinguished from one another by reason of the difference in the arrangement and disposition of these elements

which are in constant change and motion. "As the fifth element in its entirety is constantly in circular motion, there arises therefrom in the elements a compulsory movement whereby they are forced out of their respective natural localities . . . so that there arises an intermixture of the elements . . . in which they act and react upon each other. The elements thus intermixed undergo a change, so that there arises from them first various kinds of vapors; afterwards the several kinds of minerals, all the species of plants, and many species of living beings, according to the complexion of the mixture." [1] Similarly Descartes says that "there is therefore but one matter within the universe . . . but all the variation in matter, or diversity in its forms, depends upon motion," and he ascribes this view to the "philosophers," i.e., Aristotle and his followers, who "have said that nature was the principle of motion and rest." [2] Now, of these various mixtures, which are the result of the motion of the elements, one is more excellent than another, and accordingly there is a difference in the excellency of their forms. "The finer this mixture is, the nobler is the form proper for it in which the divine wisdom manifests itself in a higher degree." [3] This accounts not only for the variety of forms in the inanimate world but also for the variety of souls and their faculties in the animate world. "That portion of the matter which has been purified and refined . . . has received the faculty of growth. . . . That portion of it which has been further purified . . . has received the faculty of sensation. . . . The portion which has been still further purified . . . has been endowed with the intellectual faculty." [4]

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72.
[2] *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 23. Cf. *Physics*, II, 1, 192b, 20–23.
[3] *Cuzari*, V, 10.
[4] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 17, Second Theory.

In exactly the same way Spinoza explains the differences between the various ideas of things and their superiority to one another. "We cannot, however, deny that ideas, like objects themselves, differ from one another, and that one is more excellent and contains more reality than another, just as the object of one idea is more excellent and contains more reality than another. Therefore, in order to determine the difference between the human mind and other things and its superiority over them, we must first know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human body. . . . In proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or to suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to perceive many things. . . . We can thus determine the superiority of one mind to another." This leads Spinoza to "say beforehand" what he describes as "a few words upon the nature of bodies." His discussion is given in the form of a series of Axioms, Lemmas, Definitions, a Scholium, and Postulates which are interposed by him between the Propositions XIII and XIV. We shall try to show that his "few words upon the nature of bodies" follow a certain well-defined traditional outline.

IV. The Nature of Bodies

The study of the human body in mediaeval philosophy begins with a classification of bodies in general. There are, to begin with, simple bodies. These are the four elements. The term "simple bodies" [1] by which Aristotle as well as the mediaevals designates the elements is an indication of their character. Then there are composite bodies. These are all the bodies which come under our observation in the phys-

[1] ἁπλᾶ σώματα, גשמים פשוטים. *De Caelo*, III, 1, 298a, 29. Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 337, n. 20. Cf. also *Ruaḥ Ḥen*, Ch. 8.

ical world.[1] Thus referring to this classification Aristotle says, "the body must be either simple or composite."[2] Furthermore, composite bodies consist either of similar or of dissimilar parts.[3] In fact, this is the formal division followed in some mediaeval compendiums of philosophy.

Spinoza follows the same traditional method of philosophers. The series of Axioms, Lemmas, Definitions, Scholium, and Postulates between Propositions XIII and XIV fall into three distinct divisions:

I. The first two and second two Axioms with the intervening three Lemmas deal, as he himself says, with "simplest bodies" (*de corporibus simplicissimis*).[4]

II. Beginning with the Definition and through Axiom III and Lemmas IV–VII, he deals with composite bodies consisting of similar parts. "Up to this point we have conceived an individual to be composed merely of bodies which are distinguished from one another solely by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is to say, to be composed of the most simple bodies."[5]

III. Beginning with the Scholium to Lemma VII and through the six Postulates, he deals with composite bodies consisting of dissimilar parts, or, as he himself says, with "an individual of another kind, composed of many individuals of diverse natures."[6]

These simple bodies or elements in Aristotle are conceived to be either at rest or in motion. They are at rest when they are in their proper localities; they are in motion when they are outside their proper localities.[7] "Each of the four ele-

[1] Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 163.

[2] *De Anima*, III, 12, 434b, 9–10. [3] Cf. *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 159.

[4] Axiom 2 of the second group of Axioms after Lemma 3 (*Opera*, II, p. 99, l. 23).

[5] Scholium to Lemma 7. [6] *Ibid.*

[7] As to what these proper localities are, see my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, note 64 on pp. 445–446.

ments occupies a certain position of its own assigned to it by nature . . . and they remain at rest in their natural places. When one of them is moved from its place by some external force, it returns towards its natural place as soon as that force ceases to operate. For the elements have the property of moving back to their place."[1] Furthermore, motion is either slow or fast, which is determined either by the medium through which the motion takes place or by the weight of the object in motion.[2] Finally, these simple elements are called substances, each of which consists of matter and form, which are also called substances. Thus, inasmuch as the simple elements differ in form, the differences between them may be designated as differences in respect of substance. Similarly, inasmuch as what they have in common is matter, they may be said to have a common substance.

Of these mediaeval statements Spinoza retains all those which he can make use of in his own system, even in some modified sense, but rejects all those which are incongruous with his own fundamental principles. He is thus not unwilling to say with the mediaevals that "all bodies are in a state of either motion or rest" and that "every body moves, sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly"; but still, in attributing to every body motion and rest he does not mean exactly, like the mediaevals, that the elements are at rest when in their natural places and in motion when out of their natural places, but rather, like Descartes, that "movement and rest are merely two diverse modes of a body in motion."[3] But he rejects the application of the term "substance" to matter and form and the simple bodies which consist of them. Consequently, in opposition to the mediaevals who regard their

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72. Cf. *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 141, 161; note 22 on pp. 337–338; note 23 on pp. 412–414.

[2] Cf. *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, note 32 on p. 340.

[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 27. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 242.

simple bodies, the Aristotelian four elements, as distinguished from one another both in respect to motion and in respect to substance, i.e., form, Spinoza says of his own simple bodies, molecules, or whatever else they may have been called by him, that "bodies are distinguished from one another in reepect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance." [1] Similarly the thing which the Aristotelian simple bodies have in common, i.e., matter, is not a substance; for if, indeed, "all bodies agree in some respects," [2] it is not because they all have a common substance, namely, matter, but because "they involve the conception of one and the same attribute," [3] namely, extension, and also because "they are capable generally of motion and of rest, and of motion at one time quicker and at another slower." [4]

Again, partly following the mediaevals and partly departing from them, Spinoza states in Lemma III the principle of the causality of motion. In Aristotle this principle is expressed in the statement that "it is necessary that whatever is moved should be moved by something." [5] But while that something must again be moved by something, the series of causes cannot go on infinitely,[6] for "the existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is impossible."[7] Spinoza is quite willing to agree with the mediaevals that "a body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another." [8] But in direct opposition to the mediaevals

[1] Lemma 1. [2] Lemma 2.

[3] *Ibid.*, Demonst. [4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Physics*, VII, 1, 241b, 24. Cf. *Moreh Nebukim*, II, Introduction, Prop. 17; *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 297–299, 668–675.

[6] *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 1 and 12.

[7] *Ibid.*, II, Introduction, Prop. 3. Cf. *Metaphysics*, II, 2, 994a, 1 ff.; *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 221 ff., 479 ff.

[8] Lemma 3. As for the additional term "rest," see above, Vol. I, p. 242.

who deny the possibility of an infinite series of causes he concludes his statement with "and so on *ad infinitum*."[1] As we have already seen in the proofs of the existence of God, Spinoza, like Crescas, admitted the possibility of an infinite series of causes and effects, provided the entire series was immanent within an infinite uncaused cause.[2]

The restatement of this ancient principle of the causality of motion in Lemma III leads Spinoza to restate in the Corollary to that Lemma what is known as Newton's First Law of Motion which has already been formulated by Galileo [3] and is given by Descartes under the name of the "first law of nature." [4] This again leads him to a restatement in Axioms I and II of two other laws of motion, both of which are taken from Descartes.[5]

Composite bodies, continues Spinoza, are made up of the union of simple bodies, either of a similar or of a dissimilar nature, and may be considered as complete individual aggregate units, to be distinguished from other units of the same kind by the nature of the union of the simple bodies.[6] Such composite bodies are divided by Spinoza into three classes, (1) hard, (2) soft, and (3) fluid,[7] each of these terms being described by him somewhat after the manner of Descartes.[8] The simple bodies constituting the composite body may undergo a variety of changes. If these simple

[1] *Ibid.* [2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 195 ff.

[3] *Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due Nuove Scienze*, IV, in *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei* (Firenze, 1890–1909), Vol. 8, p. 268, ll. 13 ff.

[4] *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 37; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, II, Prop. 14, Corol.

[5] The two axioms correspond respectively to the following passages in Descartes: (1) *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 45–53; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, II, Props. 24–31. (2) *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 49; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, II, Prop. 28, Rule 4.

[6] Definition. [7] Axiom 3.

[8] *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 54 ff.

constituent bodies are of a similar nature, three kinds of changes are possible in them within the composite body, and they are described by Spinoza in Lemmas IV, V, and VI. If they are of a dissimilar nature, many other kinds of changes, he says, are possible in them within the composite body.[1] But whatever changes the simple constituent body may undergo within the composite body, the latter as a whole remains unchanged in form and retains its original nature.[2] "Thus, if we advance *ad infinitum*, we may easily conceive the whole of nature to be one individual, whose parts, that is to say, all bodies, differ in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual."[3] This is a reproduction of the Cartesian principle of the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest in the universe.[4]

As with the whole of nature or the macrocosm, so also with man, the microcosm. Man is a composite individual consisting of parts which are dissimilar in nature.[5] Of these parts, some are fluid, some soft, and some hard[6] — a classification which is reminiscent of Maimonides' statement, in his comparison between the macrocosm and the microcosm, that the variety of parts of which the universe consists corresponds to the variety of parts of which man consists, namely, solid parts, humors (i.e., fluids), and gases.[7] In the remaining four postulates Spinoza enumerates some of the physiological changes that may be wrought in the human body through external bodies and, conversely, the power of man to work changes in external bodies. Man may be

[1] Scholium after Lemma 7.

[2] Lemma 7. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] Cf. *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 36; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, II, Props. 13 and 14.

[5] Postulate 1. [6] Postulate 2.

[7] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72. Literally, the last term is to be translated "spirits." On its meaning, see Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 355, n. 1.

affected in numerous ways by his contact with external bodies.[1] He may be further affected by external things through his absorption of food which is transformed into parts of his own body.[2] The effect of external bodies upon man may remain even after the cause of it has been removed.[3] Finally, just as man is affected by external bodies, man may also affect external objects by his power to move and arrange them in many ways.[4] These postulates, as we shall see in the next chapter, come into play in Spinoza's theory of imagination and memory.[5]

[1] Postulate 3.
[2] Postulate 4.
[3] Postulate 5.
[4] Postulate 6.
[5] Cf. below, pp. 80 ff.

CHAPTER XIV

THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES

In Aristotle as well as in all the mediaeval treatises on the soul which were inspired by his *De Anima*, the definition of the soul is followed by a discussion of its faculties, which are divided into two kinds, the cognitive and the motive.[1] Under the cognitive there comes first sensation. This is followed by common sense, then by imagination in its various forms, and then by memory, all of which, in mediaeval treatises, are subsumed under the general title of internal senses, corresponding to the external senses of sensation. Then comes reason, or the intellectual faculty. It is this threefold classification of the faculties of knowledge that underlies Spinoza's restatement of Descartes' division of all modes of perception (*omnes modos percipiendi*) into sensation, imagination, and pure cognition (*sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere*).[2] In some philosophical and theological treatises, furthermore, in addition to these three kinds of knowledge which have their ultimate source in external material things, there is mention also of a kind of knowledge which is not derived from external material things. This is invariably described by such terms as "intuition," "innate ideas," "prophetic gift," or "divine inspiration." Not all these kinds of knowledge are considered of equal validity, and thus a distinction is made between true knowledge and false knowledge. Finally, after the discussion of the cognitive faculty, the

[1] Cf. *De Anima*, III, 3, 427a, 17 ff.; 9, 432a, 15 ff. Cf. *Cuzari*, V, 12; *Emunah Ramah*, I, 6. Cf. above, p. 44.

[2] *Principia Philosophiae Cortesianae*, I, Prop. 15, Schol.; cf. *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 32.

discussion of the motive faculty is taken up. Under this, desire and will, as distinguished from sense and intelligence, make their appearance.

This is a brief outline of topics in their conventional order as they occur in representative works of mediaeval philosophy, and this outline, we shall see, is also followed by Spinoza in Propositions XIV–XLIX of the Second Part of the *Ethics*. Had Spinoza written the *Ethics* in the manner of rabbis and scholastics, he would have prefaced this portion of his work with the following statement:

Part II, Chapters II–V. Wherein we shall deal with what is generally called the faculties or functions of the soul, for having given in Chapter I the definition of the human mind and its relation to the body, we deem it fit to explain in Chapters II–V what its faculties or functions are. We shall deal in these four chapters with the following main topics:

A. Cognitive Faculties:
   - Ch. II. External Senses (Props. XIV–XVI); Internal Senses (Props. XVII–XVIII); Consciousness and Reason (Props. XIX–XXIII).
   - Ch. III. Truth (Props. XXIV–XL).
   - Ch. IV. The Three Kinds of Knowledge (Prop. XL, Schol. II–Prop. XLVII).

B. Motive Faculty:
   - Ch. V. Will (Props. XLVIII–XLIX).

I. Sensation

In the account of the process of sensation as given by Aristotle, three essential elements are involved. In the first place, there must be an external object to stimulate the sentient faculty into activity.[1] In the second place, the external

[1] *De Anima*, II, 5, 417a, 2 ff.; 417b, 25.

object through its contact, either directly or indirectly,[1] with the sense-organ produces a certain affection (πάθος) or movement (κίνησις), so that "sensation consists in being moved and acted upon, for it is held to be a species of qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις)."[2] In the third place, in sensation it is the sensible forms apart from their matter that are impressed upon the sense and are received by it.[3] Now all these three elements, which we have selected from Aristotle's long and intricate discussions about the process of sense-perception, stand out quite conspicuously in Spinoza's discussion of sensation in Propositions XIV-XVI. But in addition to these elements taken from Aristotle one also notices in these three propositions certain assertions which are not found in Aristotle or which are diametrically opposed to the views of Aristotle. Especially noticeable as a departure from Aristotle is Spinoza's reiteration that the mind's awareness of its own body precedes its awareness of other bodies, which is quite the opposite of what Aristotle would seem to say. These additional elements not found in Aristotle, as well as these divergences from Aristotle, we shall now try to show, can be traced to the influence of Telesius and Descartes.

Telesius himself says of his own account of sensation that it is unlike that of Aristotle.[4] But as in the case of so many others who had set out to disagree with Aristotle, the points of agreement between Telesius and Aristotle are more numerous than those on which they disagree. Often the differences between him and Aristotle, as Cicero said of the differences between Zeno and Aristotle,[5] are merely in a change

[1] *Ibid.*, II, 11, 423b, 2 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 5, 416b, 33–35.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 12, 424a, 17–19.

[4] *De Rerum Natura*, VII, 2 (Roma, 1923, Vol. III, p. 4): "Quoniam non, quo nobis modo, Aristoteli itidem sensus fieri videtur."

[5] Cicero, *De Finibus*, IV, 9, § 21.

of terminology. Corresponding to Aristotle's distinction between the Active Intellect in its interpretation according to Alexander of Aphrodisias as identical with God and the human soul as a whole, Telesius distinguishes between what he calls the divine soul in man and the natural soul or the spirit.[1] Again, like Aristotle, he maintains that it is with the latter alone that psychology is concerned, and that it is by it alone that sensation and all the other forms of natural cognition are to be explained. Indeed, Telesius departs from Aristotle's view that the sensitive faculty of the soul is located in the heart. But he is merely following Galen when he states that the location of the natural soul or spirit is in the brain.[2] The brain, however, he says, while it is the chief location of the spirit, does by no means confine it in itself, for as a matter of fact the spirit or the natural soul extends to the other parts of the body — the spinal cord, the nerves, arteries, veins, and the covering membranes of the internal organs.[3] Again, as in Aristotle, the process of sensation in Telesius is assumed to involve three elements: (1) External objects acting upon the spirit through contact with the body in which the spirit is located. (2) An affection or a responsive movement produced thereby in the spirit. (3) The perception of these by the spirit. Accordingly, Telesius defines sensation as the perception by the spirit, first, of its own affection by the external things which act upon it, and second, of the action of the external things. But unlike Aristotle, he considers the perception of the spirit's own affection by the action of the external objects to come before its perception

[1] Cf. J. Lewis McIntyre, "A Sixteenth Century Psychologist," in *The British Journal of Psychology*, I (1904), p. 66, referring to *De Rerum Natura*, I, 8, and II, 25.

[2] Cf. Galen, *De Usu Partium Corporis Humani*, Liber III, Cap. XI (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Kühn, Vol. III, p. 242); Gershon ben Solomon, *Sha'ar ha-Shamayim*, XII, 1 (p. 75b).

[3] McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

of the action of the external objects themselves. To quote: "Sense is thus the perception of the action of things and of the impulses of the air, and also the perception of the spirit's own affections and changes and movements — but especially the latter. For the spirit perceives the former [the action of things] only because it perceives itself to be affected, changed, or set in motion by them." [1]

Descartes' account of sensation bears the same relation to that of Aristotle as the account given by Telesius. Like Telesius, Descartes considers the brain as the principal seat of the mind, though the mind is united with the whole body. The mind, he says, "not only understands and imagines, but also perceives." The "perceptions of the senses, or, in common language, sensations," are explained by him as "diverse affections of our mind" which arise from certain movements which are excited in the brain "by means of the nerves which are extended like filaments from the brain to all the other members with which they are so connected that we can hardly touch any part of the human body without causing the extremities of some of the nerves spread over it to be moved." [2] He then sums up his discussion of the process of sensation in the statement that "the diversities of these sensations depend firstly on the diversity in the nerves themselves, and then on the diversities of the motions which occur in the individual nerves. We have not, however, so many individual senses as individual nerves; it is enough merely to distinguish seven chief different kinds, two of which belong to the internal sense, and five to the external." [3] What these two internal senses are he does not specify here. He speaks rather vaguely of "the passions or affections of

[1] *De Rerum Natura*, VII, 2 (Vol. III, p. 4, ll. 9–14) and McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[2] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 189; *Passions de l'Ame*, I, 12 ff.
[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 190.

the mind" and "the natural appetites." But in his correspondence he seems to include under the internal senses "imagination, memory, etc."[1] Imagination and memory are as a rule included within the ordinary mediaeval fivefold classification of the internal senses.

This, then, is the general background of Spinoza's treatment of sensation in Propositions XIV–XVII.

If in Propositions XIV–XVI we take Spinoza's "human mind" to be a substitution for Telesius' "natural soul" or "spirit," we get in them a description of the process of sensation similar to that given by Telesius. To begin with, "the human body is affected in many ways by external bodies."[2] This statement combines the first two elements of sensation as laid down by Telesius as well as by Aristotle and Descartes, namely, the action of an external object upon the soul, and an affection created in the soul or spirit by that action. Then, in the second place, "the human mind must perceive everything which happens in the human body."[3] This, again, corresponds to one part of the third element in sensation as laid down by Telesius, namely, the perception by the spirit of its own affections and movements. This perception of the human mind of the affections of the body by external bodies Spinoza would undoubtedly have called sensation, if he had wanted to use that term. Instead, however, in Proposition XIV he merely describes that process, without naming it. He says: "The human mind has an aptitude to the perception of many things, and its aptitude increases in proportion to the number of ways in which its body can be disposed."

[1] *Correspondance*, XLVI (*Oeuvres*, I, p. 263, ll. 6–8). Though Descartes does not definitely say there that imagination and memory belong to the internal senses, it may be inferred from the fact that after mentioning "les cinq sens" he proceeds to say: "L'anatomise maintenant les testes de divers animaux, pour expliquer en quoy consistent l'imagination, la memoire etc."

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 14, Demonst. [3] *Ibid.*

The similarities in expression to the passages quoted above from Descartes are quite evident. What Spinoza means to say is that the mind "not only understands and imagines, but also perceives," and that the diversities in these perceptions correspond to the diversities in the physiological processes in the body. Whether Spinoza would continue to follow Descartes and the entire philosophic tradition in reducing the diversities of sensation to the traditional five external senses, there is no way of telling. But that he has followed Descartes partly in reducing the internal senses to two will be shown later.

These varieties of sensation, Spinoza proceeds to say, are grouped together in our mind and form what is called a perception. The difference between elementary sensations and perception was known to Aristotle and his mediaeval followers. According to them, perception was attributed to a special sense which differed from the five senses to which sensation was attributed. This special sense is called by Aristotle the common sense (*κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον*, *sensus communis*), whose organ is the heart and one of whose functions is described by him as the unifying principle whereby things are perceived as wholes.[1] But Spinoza seems to have done away with this special sense, as on the whole he has done away with the dissection of the mind into distinct faculties, and with the elimination of this special sense of perception he has also eliminated the actual difference between perception and simple sensations. Sensations, according to him, do not come to us in their elementary and isolated forms; they come to us as parts of complex relations or perceptions. In his definition of sensation in Proposition XIV, therefore, he does not speak of the mind's aptitude to experience any particular

[1] *De Juventute*, 3, 469a, 11–12; *De Sensu*, 7, 449a, 3 ff. Cf. W. A. Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, Introduction, p. liii.

simple sensation, but rather of its aptitude "to the perception of many things," that is to say, to the simultaneous perception of many things. The mind's knowledge of its own body, which Spinoza has laid down as the first stage in the mind's knowledge, is therefore something composite in its nature; it is a perception which is made up of many elementary sensations. He thus says in Proposition XV: "The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but is composed of a number of ideas."

But while Spinoza, like Telesius, considers sensation, or rather perception, as beginning with a knowledge of the affections and movements within one's own body, he believes, again like Telesius, that this knowledge of the nature of one's own body involves also a knowledge of the nature of the external bodies by which one's own body is affected and by which it is set in motion. He thus says in Proposition XVI: "The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body, and at the same time the nature of the external body." From this proposition he draws two Corollaries. The First Corollary states that our knowledge of external things is to be regarded as caused by our knowledge of our own bodies: "Hence it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the nature of many bodies together with that of its own body." The emphasis in this Corollary is that the perception of the nature of the external bodies can exist only together with that of one's own body, inasmuch as the former is caused by the latter. It reflects the statement quoted above from Telesius that "the spirit perceives the former [the action of external things] only because it perceives itself to be affected, changed, or set in motion by them." It may perhaps also reflect Descartes' contention that nothing is conveyed to the brain by the

nerves from the external bodies "excepting the local motion of the nerves themselves," so that there is nothing known of the external objects by the senses but their figure, magnitude, or motion.[1] The Second Corollary states that our knowledge of external things is only relative to ourselves: "It follows, secondly, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies."

Still, though affirming that sensation is relative to ourselves and that consequently no two sensations of the same thing experienced by two different individuals can be exactly the same, Spinoza does not thereby affirm the purely subjective nature of sensation. There is always an external object, as real as we ourselves are real, that is to say, as real as modes in general are real, which are the cause of our sensations. "If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing or as present."[2] How much of the nature and reality of the external object is conveyed to us by sensation, this statement does not tell us, and it would be idle to speculate on the basis of it as to what Spinoza really thought of this problem. He may have held like Descartes that "there is nothing known of external objects by the senses but their figure, magnitude, or motion."[3] We know that like many others he held that sense-perception is not always reliable;[4] but at the same time he considered sense-perception to be a clear indication that external objects exist and are not the mere projection of our own consciousness. While the senses indeed may deceive us as to the nature of things, he argues in one place, we

[1] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 198.
[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 17.
[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 198.
[4] Cf. *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 78 (*Opera*, II, p. 30, ll. 2 ff.).

can still gain by the means of them a true knowledge of the nature of things if we only acquire a true knowledge of the senses themselves and know in what way they operate. "It is known that the senses are sometimes deceived, but it is only known confusedly. It is not known in what manner they deceive, and if after doubt we acquire a true knowledge of the senses and know in what way by their instrumentality objects are represented at a distance, doubt is again removed." [1]

II. Imagination and Memory

The seventeenth proposition, however, concludes with the proviso ". . . until the human body be affected by an affect which excludes the existence or presence of the external body," and then in the Corollary and in the Scholium Spinoza proceeds to state that the affects of the external objects upon the human body persist in the mind even after the disappearance of those external objects. In these statements Spinoza passes from his discussion of the experiences of the external senses to the experiences of the so-called internal senses. Now, the internal senses in mediaeval philosophy are variously enumerated; the most common enumeration given of them is, however, that of five, corresponding to the five external senses. But Descartes, as we have seen, speaks only of two internal senses, and these are identified by him especially with imagination and memory. And so also here in the next two propositions, wishing to deal with the internal senses, Spinoza especially discusses imagination and memory, which are the two internal senses mentioned by Descartes.

The subject-matter of Propositions XVII and XVIII is to some extent indicated by Spinoza himself. Though in Proposition XVII and in its Corollary Spinoza merely de-

[1] *Ibid.* (p. 30, ll. 6–10).

scribes a psychological process without naming it, toward the end of the Scholium he adds that "in order that we may retain the customary phraseology, we will give to those affections of the human body, the ideas of which represent to us external bodies as if they were present, the name of the images of things." Then, again, in Proposition XVIII he uses the term "remember" (*recordabitur*), and the term "memory" (*memoria*) is afterwards mentioned in the Scholium. Imagination and memory are thus by Spinoza's own designation the subject-matter of Propositions XVII and XVIII respectively. This, however, is to be taken only as a general description of the contents of these two propositions. More specifically, as we shall try to show, Proposition XVII deals with both imagination and memory, and Proposition XVIII does not deal with memory, but rather with recollection, which is a special kind of memory.

In Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages the terms "memory" and "imagination" were used to describe two mental processes which were alike in every essential respect and were only slightly distinguishable from one another. Both these terms, according to them, indicated the retention by the mind of the image of a thing which was once present to our senses but is no longer present. Moreover, "in reply to the question to what part of the soul memory is to be ascribed," Aristotle answers that "it is plain that it belongs to the same part as imagination." [1] Imagination, in fact, is according to Aristotle the source of memory. "Memory, even the memory of concepts, does not take place without an image," [2] he says, "and the objects of memory, essentially, are the same as the objects of imagination." [3] The most characteristic difference between them, however, says he, is

[1] *De Memoria*, 1, 450a, 22–23.
[2] *Ibid.*, 12–13.
[3] *Ibid.*, 23–24.

that in memory the image of the thing gone is accompanied by a consciousness that it is a copy of something actually seen before, which thus involves a perception of time, whereas in imagination there is not that consciousness.[1] Furthermore, from the various restatements of Aristotle's discussion of imagination in mediaeval Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts it appears that a distinction is to be drawn between two kinds of imagination which may be designated respectively by the terms "retentive imagination" and "compositive imagination,"[2] corresponding to what is called today reproductive and productive imagination. These two forms of imagination are briefly described by Maimonides in the following passage: "The imaginative part of the soul is that faculty which [*a*] retains the impressions of the sensibly perceived objects after the latter have ceased to be in contact with the senses which had perceived them, and [*b*] puts together some ideas with others and separates some ideas from others, as a result of which it happens that this faculty puts together things which have been perceived with things that have never been perceived and the perception of which is entirely impossible."[3] Now this definition of retentive imagination does on the whole serve also as a definition of memory, and it is for this reason, as I hope to show elsewhere, that in some Arabic and Hebrew texts retentive imagination and memory have been identified, or, rather, confused.

Suggestions of this distinction between retentive and compositive imagination may be discovered in the various

[1] *Ibid.*, 1, 449b, 24 ff.

[2] Cf. *Emunah Ramah*, I, 6 (p. 29), on difference between מצייר and מדמה ומחשב. Cf. S. Landauer, "Die Psychologie des Ibn Sina," in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, 29 (1875), p. 400, n. 4; S. Horovitz, *Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religions-Philosophen des Mittelalters*, p. 247, n. 85.

[3] *Shemonah Peraḳim*, Ch. 1.

scattered passages which occur in the writings of Spinoza, though no formal distinction is drawn by him between them. Referring to imagination as the so-called common sense,[1] with which indeed imagination is sometimes identified by Aristotle[2] and by mediaeval Arabic, Hebrew,[3] and Latin[4] writers, as well as by Descartes,[5] Spinoza defines it in three independent passages which, by the analogy of the passage quoted from Maimonides, may be reduced to two definitions of imagination, as follows: First, "an imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as present."[6] In this passage, it will be noticed, there is no implication that the thing imagined does not represent an existent object as it really is. Second, "those things . . . are commonly said to be imagined, although we clearly understand that the thing is not as we picture it to be,"[7] and furthermore "a fancy . . . arises from putting together diverse confused ideas which belong to diverse things and operations in nature."[8] In these two passages, it will be noticed, the thing imagined does not represent an existent object as it really is, but is an artificial picture made up of different things observed. It is quite obvious that the first of these two definitions is a general definition of retentive imagina-

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 82 (*Opera*, II, p. 31, ll. 9–10).

[2] *De Memoria*, 1, 450a, 10–11.

[3] To mention only two texts both of which exist in Arabic as well as in Hebrew: (1) *Mizan al-'Amal* [IV], p. 19; *Mozene Ẓedeḳ*, IV, p. 30: خيال, כח דמיוני = חכר, חוש משותף, مشترك; (2) *Cuzari*, V, 12, p. 312, ll. 17–18; p. 313, ll. 14–15: قوّة حاتمة مشتركة = כח יצורי, הרגשה משתתפת, متصوّرة.

[4] Eustachius a S. Paulo, *Summa Philosophiae*, III: *Physica*, Pars III, Tract. III, Disput. III, Quaest. III: *De sensu Communi*; quoted also by Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien*, p. 265, No. 411, and by Robinson, *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik*, I, p. 318, n.

[5] *Meditationes*, II (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 32, ll. 18–19).

[6] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 34, Demonst.

[7] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 56 (*Opera*, II, p. 21, ll. 3–5).

[8] *Ibid.*, § 64 (p. 24, ll. 26–28).

tion, whereas the second is a definition of compositive imagination.

Similarly Spinoza's conception of the relation between imagination and memory is like that we have found in the passages quoted above from Aristotle. To him as to Aristotle imagination is the source of memory, and consequently in many places of his writings Spinoza uses these two terms as alternatives, as, e.g., "imaginatur, vel recordatur,"[1] "imaginatio, sive memoria,"[2] "imaginatio, seu memoria."[3] That, following Aristotle, he considered imagination the source of memory is also made clear by Spinoza in a passage in which he says that while memory may be "strengthened by the help of the intellect," still it is not in need of the intellect, for it is also strengthened "by the force with which the imagination or that sense called common is affected by some individual corporeal thing."[4] What he means to say is exactly what we have quoted above[5] from Aristotle, that "memory, even the memory of concepts, does not take place without an image," and that "the objects of memory, essentially, are the same as the objects of imagination." Perhaps a still more apposite passage in Aristotle is this: "Consequently, memory concerns the faculty of thought accidentally and the primary power of sense essentially."[6] Still, with all these close relationships between memory and imagination, like Aristotle, Spinoza points out that memory differs from imagination in that it is associated with a consciousness of time duration: "What, then, is memory?" he asks; and he answers: "It is nothing else than the sensation of impressions on the brain

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. [1] (*Opera*, II, p. 121, ll. 26–27).
[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 2, Schol. (p. 144, l. 25).
[3] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 34, Schol. (p. 302, l. 1).
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, §§ 81–82 (*Opera*, II, p. 31, ll. 3–4, 9–11).
[5] P. 81, notes 2 and 3.
[6] *De Memoria*, 1, 450a, 13–14.

accompanied with attention to the definite duration of the sensation." [1] The corresponding passages in Aristotle read: "All memory implies a time elapsed." [2] "Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard, or learned something, he includes in this act, as we have already observed, the consciousness of 'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a distinction in time." [3]

A contrast between imagination and memory, it seems to me, can also be discovered in the following passage. "But in order that we may retain the customary phraseology," he says, "we will give to those affections of the human body, the ideas of which represent to us external bodies as if they were present, the name of the images of things (*rerum imagines*), although they do not actually reproduce (*referunt*) the figures of the things (*rerum figurae*)." [4] Now what does Spinoza mean by this contrast between *rerum imagines* and *rerum figurae*?

In answer to this question we may remark at first that in a corresponding passage in Descartes where "to imagine" is defined as "nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing (*rei corporeae figuram, seu imaginem*)" [5] the terms "image" and "figure" are used synonymously rather than antithetically. Etymologically, these two terms would seem to reflect the several terms by which Aristotle describes the form of imagination (φάντασμα) and of memory (μνημόνευμα), such as ζωγράφημα,[6] πάθος,[7] τύπος,[8] γραφή,[9] εἰκών.[10] In fact, in one of the Latin translations of

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 83 (*Opera*, II, p. 31, ll. 20–22).
[2] *De Memoria*, 1, 449b, 28.
[3] *Ibid.*, 19–22.
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 17, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 106, ll. 7–9).
[5] *Meditationes*, II (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 28, ll. 4–5).
[6] *De Memoria*, 1, 450a, 29–30.
[7] *Ibid.*, 30.
[8] *Ibid.*, 1, 450b, 16.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, 1, 451a, 15.

Aristotle, as we shall see anon, the term τύπος is translated by *figura*. Here in Spinoza, however, it would seem that the terms "image" and "figure" are not used as synonyms but rather as contrasting terms. What that contrast is may perhaps be explained by a consideration of the following passages in which Aristotle draws a distinction between imagination and memory.

Aristotle first raises the question "whether one remembers the affection (πάθος) or the thing from which the affection is derived." [1] His answer is that the memory-image is both. "In so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an object of contemplation (θεώρημα, *speculamentum*) or a phantasm (φάντασμα, *phantasma*); but when considered as relative to something else, it is, as it were, a likeness (εἰκών, *imago*) and a mnemonic token (μνημόνευμα, *memoriale*)." [2] He then concludes the definition of memory by saying that it is "the state of a phantasm (φαντάσματος, *phantasmatis*) related as a likeness (εἰκόνος, *imaginis*) to that of which it is a phantasm (φάντασμα, *phantasma*)." [3] The implication is that memory, in contradistinction to imagination, is not a mere phantasm (φάντασμα), that is to say, a mere affection (πάθος), but is the likeness (εἰκών) of a thing. But previous to these passages, in discussing the possibility that memory may only be an affection (πάθος), he speaks of it as "an impression (τύπος) or picture (γραφή) within us." [4] Now, in an old Latin translation of Aristotle which was accessible to Spinoza τύπος is translated by *figura*,[5] and the terms φαντάσματος and εἰκόνος are translated respectively by the vague and non-telling

[1] *De Memoria*, 1, 450b, 12–13.

[2] *Ibid.*, 25–27.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1, 451a, 15–16.

[4] *Ibid.*, 1, 450b, 16.

[5] *Aristotelis Omnia Quae Extant Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iuntas), Vol. VI, Pars II (1574), fol. 18va H: "Et, si est simile sicut figura aut pictura in nobis huius ipsius sensus. . . ."

phantasmatis and *imaginis*.[1] It is quite conceivable, then, that by some confusion of terms Spinoza has transformed Aristotle's contrast between φάνταομα and εἰκών into a contrast between *imago* and *figura*, or it is also possible that in some Latin reproduction of this Aristotelian passage the term εἰκών was rendered by *figura*, and thus when he says that imagination gives us only the *rerum imagines* and not the *rerum figurae* he means to say that in this respect imagination is unlike memory, for the latter, according to Aristotle, gives us the *rerum imagines* (reflecting the Greek φάντασμα) in the sense of *rerum figurae* (reflecting the Greek εἰκών), whereas the former gives us the *rerum imagines* not in the sense of *rerum figurae* but in the sense of affection (πάθος), impression (τύπος), or picture (γραφή) within us.

This, then, is in the main the outline of Spinoza's conception of imagination and memory and their relation to each other. Accordingly, when, without mentioning the word "imagination," Spinoza says in the Corollary to Proposition XVII that "the mind is able to contemplate external things by which the human body was once affected as if they were present, although they are not present and do not exist," he describes in a general way both imagination and memory.

In the Demonstration of the Corollary Spinoza gives a physiological explanation of imagination, of which he says in the Scholium: "This may indeed be produced by other causes, but I am satisfied with having here shown one cause through which I could explain it, just as if I had explained it through the true cause." Though the explanation is based upon certain physiological notions of his own time,[2] its gen-

[1] *Ibid.*, fol. 18vb, M: "Quid igitur est memoria, et meminisse dictum est, quod phantasmatis ut imaginis, cuius phantasma est habitus."

[2] Cf. Descartes' explanation of the internal sensations in *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 190.

eral outline follows that of Aristotle's explanation of imagination. The gist of Aristotle's explanation is that the affections produced in the sense-organ by an external object are communicated to the blood, where they continue to persist, and then from the blood they are conveyed to the heart, which is the seat of imagination. There they become images.[1] Except for taking the brain instead of the heart as the seat of imagination, Spinoza's explanation follows a similar outline. Through the movements of the "fluid parts of the human body," that is to say, the blood, or the animal spirits, which are the most subtle parts of the blood,[2] the affection caused in the sense-organ by an external body is retained even after the removal of the body, and "it often strikes upon the softer parts," that is to say, upon the nerves and brain. There images are formed.

The term which Spinoza uses throughout his writings for the kind of memory we have just discussed is *memoria*, and for the verb he uses *recordari*.[3] This term represents the Greek μνήμη. But Spinoza uses also another term, that of *reminiscentia*,[4] which is used in mediaeval Latin in the sense of recollection as distinguished from memory, and it represents the Greek ἀνάμνησις. Now, recollection is a conscious reproduction of a memory. According to Averroes, it differs from memory in that it is not a continuous experience and is therefore not associated with a consciousness of time or duration. "The difference between recollection and memory consists in this: Memory refers to that which has always been in the mind from the time it was comprehended in the

[1] *De Somniis*, 3, 461a, 1 ff. Cf. Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, Introduction, p. lviii.

[2] Cf. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 10.

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. [1]: "imaginatur, vel recordatur" (*Opera*, II, p. 121, ll. 26–27); cf. III, Prop. 2, Schol. (p. 144, ll. 11, 12, 13).

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 83 (*Opera*, II, p. 31, ll. 22–23).

past to the present time; recollection refers to that which has been forgotten. Recollection therefore is an interrupted memory; memory is a continuous recollection."[1] Similarly Spinoza differentiates recollection from memory by the fact that it is not associated with the consciousness of temporal duration. "For in the case of recollection the mind thinks of that sensation, but without regard to its continuous duration, and so the idea of that sensation is not the duration itself of the sensation, that is to say, the memory itself."[2] Recollection, furthermore, is explained by Aristotle as being dependent upon association. "Acts of recollection happen when one movement has by nature another that succeeds it in regular order. If this order is necessary, it is evident that whenever a subject experiences the former of two movements thus connected, it will experience the latter. . . . Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, we are experiencing certain of the antecedent movements until finally we experience the one after which customarily comes that which we seek."[3] Such associations, Aristotle further explains, are produced by three conditions, namely, (1) similarity, (2) contrast, and (3) contiguity,[4] which, according to Aristotle's use of the term "contiguous" (*σύνεγγυς*), means contiguity either of space or of time. Now, in Proposition XVIII the process of remembering dealt with is described by Spinoza as a form

[1] *Averrois Paraphrasis in Librum De Memoria et Reminiscentia* in *Aristotelis Omnia Quae Extant Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iuntas,) Vol. VI, Pars II (1574), fol. 21ra BC:

"Rememoratio autem differt a conservatione. quia conservatio est illius, quod semper fuit in anima, postquam fuit comprehensum: memoratio autem est eius, quod fuit oblitum. et ideo rememoratio est conservatio abscisa: servatio autem est rememoratio continua."

My translation of this passage follows the Hebrew text (MS. Jewish Theological Seminary), which differs somewhat in its phraseology from the Latin text.

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 83 (*Opera*, II, p. 31, ll. 22–25).

[3] *De Memoria*, 2, 451b, 10–13; 16–18.

[4] *Ibid.*, 19–20.

of association, and he especially describes the process of association by temporal contiguity:[1] "If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two or more bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will also remember (*recordabitur*) the others." Consequently, though the term used in this proposition for remembering is *recordari*, it is clear that the mental process described there is that of recollection. And so also in the Scholium, though Spinoza speaks there of *memoria*, it is quite clear that he uses that term in the sense of *reminiscentia*, for the process which he describes there in detail is that of the association of ideas. In fact, his very opening statement in the Scholium is suggestive of a statement in Aristotle's explanation of recollection. Spinoza says: "It is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas, involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, a concatenation which corresponds in the mind to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body." Aristotle similarly says: "When one wishes to recollect, this is what he will do: he will try to obtain a beginning of movement whose sequel shall be the movement which he desires to reawaken. . . . For just as things are to each other in order of succession, so also are the mnemonic movements."[2]

III. Consciousness and Reason

Knowledge of any kind, according to Aristotle, whether it be sense-perception, or imagination, or reason, has for its object a certain form. When, for instance, in actual sensation and reasoning the sensitive and rational faculties are said to be identical with their objects, it is not with the things themselves that they are identical, but rather with

[1] Cf. below, pp. 213–214.

[2] *Ibid.*, 2, 451b, 29–452a, 2.

their forms.[1] "The things themselves they are not, for it is not the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone."[2] Similarly, imagination is the persistence of these immaterial forms in the mind, "for mental images are like present sensation, except that they are immaterial."[3] So also reason has for its object certain forms, for "to the thinking soul images serve as present sensations,"[4] the images of the thinking soul, of course, being immaterial. These three stages of knowledge, viz., sensation, imagination, and reason, are so related to each other that the lower is indispensable to the higher and the higher implies the lower. "Imagination, in fact, is something different both from perception and from thought (*διανοίας*), and is never found by itself apart from sensation, any more than is belief (*ὑπόληψις*) apart from imagination."[5] Since it is the forms of things that constitute the objects of sensation and cognition, "the intellect," according to Aristotle, "is the form of forms (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*), and sensation the form of sensibles (*εἶδος αἰσθητῶν*)."[6] In this way, according to Aristotle's method of reasoning, the sensible forms may be regarded as the matter of the imaginative forms and the imaginative forms as the matter of the intelligible forms.

Moreover, according to Aristotle, consciousness is a concomitant fact of sensation no less than of knowledge. We not only see, but we are conscious of the fact that we see; we not only know, but we know that we know. The consciousness of the sensations is attributed by Aristotle to one of the activities of the common sense. "There is also a kind of

[1] *De Anima*, III, 8, 431b, 24–28.
[2] *Ibid.*, 431b, 28–432a, 1.
[3] *Ibid.*, 432a, 9–10.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 7, 431a, 14–15.
[5] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 427b, 14–16. On the meaning of "belief" (*ὑπόληψις*) in the sense of "thought" (*διάνοια*) in this passage, see Hicks, *ad loc.*
[6] *Ibid.*, III, 8, 432a, 2–3.

common faculty," says Aristotle, "that is associated with all the particular senses, by virtue of which one is conscious that one sees and hears."[1] The same he also says of knowledge: "The mind itself is included among the objects which can be thought."[2] The association of consciousness with sense-perception and thought is stated by Themistius in the following passage: "When a man perceives whiteness he is conscious of the fact that he perceives the whiteness, and when he knows that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles he is conscious of the fact that he knows it."[3] The same view is repeated in the works of mediaeval philosophers. Judah ha-Levi includes among the endowments of the soul its knowledge of itself.[4] Abraham Ibn Daud explicitly makes consciousness associated with sensation, imagination, and thought. "For the ass and the ox and the other animals, when they see, see only with their eyes, but are not conscious of the fact that they are endowed with the perfection of sight and are exercising it. When they are deprived of that perfection, they are similarly unconscious of the fact that they are missing something; they simply do not see. Similarly when they imagine, they are not conscious of the fact that it is an imagination, or when they apprehend something instinctively, they are not conscious of the fact that it is only an instinctive apprehension. Man alone thinks in abstract ideas and has an idea of his idea."[5] Similarly Shem-Ṭob Falaquera restates Aristotle's view as follows:

[1] *De Somno*, 2, 455a, 15–16; cf. *De Anima*, III, 2, 425b, 12.

[2] *De Anima*, III, 4, 430a, 2–3.

[3] *Themistii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Librum Lambda Paraphrasis*, ed. Samuel Landauer, Hebrew text, p. 29, ll. 30–32; Latin text, p. 33, ll. 33–36: "quippe homo albedinem apprehendens iam animo concepit se albedinem percepisse, pariterque cum intellegit angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus angulis rectis, *iam intellexit* percepitque hoc intellexisse."

[4] *Cuzari*, V, 12. Cf. Commentaries *Ḳol Yehudah* and *Oẓar Neḥmad, ad loc.*

[5] *Emunah Ramah*, I, 7 (p. 35).

"Reason is an immaterial substance . . . it conceives itself as an idea."[1]

Scraps of statements like those of which we have constructed the preceding two paragraphs must have been floating in the mind of Spinoza as he drew up Propositions XIX–XXIII. What he wanted to say we can easily conjecture. He wanted to say that we do not know things in themselves, but only the ideas or forms of things. Furthermore, he wanted to say that sensation is transformed and becomes reason when instead of having for its object the forms of things it has for its object the forms of forms of things or the ideas of ideas. Finally, he wanted to say that our knowledge is always associated by a consciousness of it on our part. In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* Spinoza uses terms and expressions which betray their origin in the passages we have quoted, though he does not use them in exactly the same connection. Trying there to show that the mind by its native force is an instrument for the creation of ideas, he says that we begin with a true idea, as, e.g., the idea of Peter. This on the whole corresponds to Aristotle's *εἶδος αἰσθητῶν*, though the relation of the idea to the object in this particular passage of Spinoza, as we shall see presently, is not the same as the relation of the idea or form to the sensible object in Aristotle. Then this idea of Peter becomes the object of another idea which Spinoza calls the "idea of the idea" (*idea ideae*), corresponding to Aristotle's *εἶδος εἰδῶν*. Furthermore, the idea, when it becomes the object of another idea, is described by Spinoza as "something intelligible" (*quid intelligibile*),[2] which again corresponds to *νοητὸν εἶδος*, which is implied in a passage of Aristotle[3] and which is ex-

[1] *Sefer ha-Nefesh*, Ch. 14. Cf. *De Anima*, III, 4, 430a, 2 ff.

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 34 (*Opera*, II, p. 14, l. 24).

[3] *De Anima*, III, 4, 429a, 15–18.

plicitly used by the mediaevals in the expression *forma intelligibilis*. The only apparent difference between Spinoza's use of *idea ideae* in this passage and Aristotle's use of εἶδος εἰδῶν in the passage referred to is that Spinoza uses it in the sense of one idea being the object of another idea, whereas Aristotle uses it in the sense of one idea being the form of another idea. But the difference is inconsequential, for inasmuch as Aristotle as well as Spinoza maintains that "that which thinks and that which is thought are identical,"[1] to say that one idea is the object of another and to say that one idea is the form of another is to say exactly the same thing. In fact, Spinoza himself in the *Ethics* uses the expression *idea ideae* in the sense of the "form of the idea (*forma ideae*)."[2] This *idea ideae* in the sense of both consciousness and rational knowledge is also described in Spinoza by the terms "reflective knowledge" (*cognitio reflexiva*) and "reflective idea" (*idea reflexiva*), terms which are of scholastic origin.[3] In one place he thus says: "Whence it may be gathered that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge (*cognitio reflexiva*) or the idea of an idea";[4] and in another place he says: "Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling (*gevoel, sensus*) is, we can easily see how this gives rise to a reflective idea (*weerkeerige Idea, idea reflexiva*), or the knowledge of oneself, experience, and reasoning."[5] In still another place Spinoza describes consciousness without designating it by a special term, but includes it under the general term *gevoel, sensus*, which indeed reflects the variety of meanings which historically the term *sensus* had.[6] Spinoza thus says:

[1] *Ibid.*, 430a, 3–4. [2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 21, Schol.

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Opusculum de Principio Individuationis*: "et ideo omnis cognitio sua de se ipsa proprie est reflexa."

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 38 (*Opera*, II, p. 15, ll. 29 ff.).

[5] *Short Treatise*, Appendix II, § 17 (*Opera*, I, p. 121, ll. 8–11).

[6] Cf. L. Schütz, *Thomas-Lexikon* (1895), under *sensus*. Cf. also below, p. 202: συνείδησις = *sensus*.

"And this change in us, resulting from other bodies acting upon us, cannot take place without the soul, which always changes correspondingly, becoming aware of the change. And this change is really what we call feeling (*gevoel, sensus*)."[1]

But let us now see how these views on the relation between sensation and reason and on the relation of consciousness to both of them are unfolded by Spinoza in the *Ethics* in the propositions under consideration.

Sensation, which, as Spinoza has already said, begins with a knowledge of one's own body, is the only channel through which a knowledge of the body and its existence is attained. What sensation conveys to the mind, he now wants to say, is not the body itself, or its matter, as Aristotle would say, but ideas of its affections, or, as Aristotle would say, its sensible form. This is exactly what Spinoza says in Proposition XIX: "The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through ideas of affections by which the body is affected." In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* he expresses the same view somewhat differently when he says that by means of vague experience (*experientia vaga*) "nothing of natural objects is ever perceived save accidents."[2] By "accidents" there he means what he describes here in the *Ethics* as "affections by which the body is affected."

But wishing now to say that the human mind knows not only the body but knows also itself, Spinoza reverts to his accustomed analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm. God, he says in Proposition XX, knows not only the human body but also the human mind. "There exists in God the idea or knowledge of the human mind, which fol-

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, Preface, § 2, note 1 (13) (*Opera*, I, p. 52, ll. 30–33).
[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 27 (*Opera*, II, p. 13, ll. 3–4).

lows in Him, and is related to Him in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the human body." By analogy with the macrocosm, the microcosm, too, i.e., man, has not only a knowledge of his body, but also of his own mind. He thus says in Proposition XXII: "The human mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections." But between these two propositions Spinoza has inserted Proposition XXI, in which he explains the nature of this idea or knowledge of the human mind. In the first place, the expression "idea or knowledge of the human mind (*mentis humanae . . . idea, sive cognitio*)," which he has used in Proposition XX, is explained by him in the Scholium to Proposition XXI as being identical with the expression "idea of the idea (*idea ideae*)," which, as we have seen, is of Aristotelian origin. The interchangeability of these two expressions may be explained by the fact that the idea according to both Aristotle and Spinoza is identical with the mind, on account of which, as we have seen, Spinoza has defined the mind as the idea of the body. In the second place, coming even closer to the historical use of the Aristotelian *idea ideae*, he says again, in the same Scholium, that the idea of the idea means the "form of the idea (*forma ideae*)." This use of the term "form" as a designation of a higher idea in its relation to a lower idea which is the former's object of knowledge suggests at once that the higher ideas are related to the lower ideas as forms in any successive series of forms are generally conceived by Aristotle to be related to one another, that is to say, the relation of a higher form to a lower form is analogous to the relation of form to matter or of mind to body. Spinoza thus says in Proposition XXI: "This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body."

The upshot of this discussion is that all knowledge, from

sensation to reason, barring only intuitive knowledge, of which Spinoza will speak later, and also the consciousness that is associated with sensation, imagination, and reason, have their source in sense-perception. In Aristotle this view is expressed in the following passage: "But, since apart from sensible magnitudes there is nothing, as it would seem, independently existent, it is in the sensible forms that the intelligible forms exist. . . . And for this reason, as without sensation a man would not learn or understand anything, so at the very time when he is actually thinking he must have an image before him." [1] Spinoza clinches the same view in Proposition XXIII: "The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body." By the mind's knowledge of itself in this proposition he refers to consciousness as well as to the rational activity of the mind, for the rational activity of the mind begins with the mind's ability to know itself and to conceive of general ideas as existing apart from particular bodies.[2] Spinoza thus introduces here reason, or what he calls later the second kind of knowledge. [3]

[1] *De Anima*, III, 8, 432a, 3–9.
[2] Cf. *Short Treatise*, Appendix II, § 17, and above, p. 94.
[3] Cf. below, Chapter XVI.

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CHAPTER XV

TRUTH

THE standard theory of truth in the Middle Ages is that of correspondence. It is derived from Aristotle, who gives it in many places of his writings, from among which the following passage may be quoted: "To say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true." [1] It is restated by Averroes in his *Epitome of the Metaphysics*.[2] Among Jewish philosophers it is reproduced in the oft-repeated formula that truth is the correspondence of that which is in the mind with that which is outside the mind.[3] In scholastic philosophy we have Thomas Aquinas' quotations from various authors in which the correspondence theory of truth is expressed in a variety of ways, among which is also included a quotation from Isaac Israeli's *Liber de Definitionibus* that "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." [4]

But Aristotle has another definition of truth the real significance of which has not been fully recognized. It differs from the first definition based upon the correspondence theory. Originally in Aristotle it reads as follows: "Everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself."[5]

[1] *Metaphysics*, IV, 7, 1011b, 27.

[2] "Secundo dicitur de vero, quod, scilicet, ita se habet in intellectu, quemadmodum extra intellectum." Cf. *Averrois Epitome in Librum Metaphysicae* in *Aristotelis Omnia Quae Extant Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iuntas), Vol. VIII (1574), fol. 357va I.

[3] Narboni on *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 14 (p. 31a); *Or Adonai*, II, i, 2 (p. 29a). Cf. also *'Olam Ḳaṭan*, III (p. 58): "The definition of truth is that a thing is [said to be] what it [really] is."

[4] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Quaest. I, Art. I. Cf. *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 16, Art. 2.

[5] *Analytica Priora*, I, 32, 47a, 8.

In this form it is also reproduced by Averroes [1] and Gersonides.[2] In some Hebrew texts, however, self-evidence rather than self-consistency is given as a criterion of truth. Thus Narboni defines truth as something which is self-evident.[3] Sometimes self-evidence and self-consistency are combined to form the criterion of truth. Thus Crescas says that "truth is evident by itself and consistent with itself in all points." [4] From a study of the contexts in which these definitions occur, it is clear that the internal criterion of truth, self-consistency and self-evidence, is not to be taken as contradictory to the external criterion of correspondence. It is to be taken rather as supplementary to it, applicable especially to concepts and to judgments about concepts where correspondence with reality cannot be ascertained except by such criteria as self-evidence and self-consistency. In scholastic philosophy, several definitions of truth which would come under what is called here the internal criterion of truth are reproduced by Thomas Aquinas, the most important of which for our purpose, on account of their phrasing, are Augustine's definition that "truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is" and Hilary's definition that "truth is that which makes being clear or manifest." [5]

These two theories of truth are reproduced by Spinoza separately and independently of each other in several places in his works. The first theory is reproduced by him in the statement that "a true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (*cum suo ideato*)." [6] The second theory, in its

[1] *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, ed. M. J. Müller, Arabic text, p. 7, l. 8.

[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, VI, i, 15 (p. 358).

[3] Commentary on *Moreh Nebukim*, II, Introduction, Prop. 8.

[4] Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 199, and n. 79 on p. 456.

[5] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 16, Art. 1: "Augustinus . . . *De Vera Religione*, Cap. 36 . . . Veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est; et Hilarius . . . Lib. V *De Trinitate*, ante med. . . . Verum est declarativum aut manifestativum esse."

[6] *Ethics*, I, Axiom 6.

self-evidence form, is reproduced by him in such statements as "truth is self-evident,"[1] "truth needs no mark,"[2] "truth is the standard of itself,"[3] "truth reveals itself,"[4] or "truth is the index of itself."[5] The same theory in its self-consistency form is reproduced by him in the statement that "truth does not conflict with truth."[6] A free but accurate version of the second theory, both in its self-evidence and in its self-consistency form, is given by Spinoza in the following passage: "If anybody had been led by good fortune to proceed in this way in the investigation of nature, that is to say, by acquiring ideas in their proper order according to the standard of a given true idea, he would never have doubted of their truth, because the truth, as we have shown, is self-evident and all things would have flowed spontaneously towards him."[7] The two theories of truth, the external and internal, are brought together by Spinoza in his *Cogitata Metaphysica*. After explaining that the correspondence theory of truth had its origin in popular speech, from which it "was then borrowed by philosophers for denoting the correspondence of the idea with that of which it is the idea (*cum suo ideato*)," he proceeds to enumerate what he calls "the properties of truth or of a true idea." He mentions two properties: "1. That it is clear and distinct. 2. That it is beyond all doubt, or, in a word, that it is certain."[8] "Clearness" and "distinctness" and "certainty" are nothing but

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 46 (*Opera*, II, p. 18, l. 2): "Veritas se ipsam patefacit."

[2] *Ibid.*, § 36 (p. 15, l. 15): "Veritas nullo egeat signo."

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 43, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 124, l. 38): "Veritas sui fit norma."

[4] *Short Treatise*, II, 15, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 79, l. 6): "De Waarheid, en zig zelfs . . . openbaart."

[5] Epistola 76 (*Opera*, IV, p. 320, l. 8): "Est enim verum index sui."

[6] Epistola 21 (*Opera*, IV, p. 126, l. 30): "Veritas veritati non repugnat."

[7] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 44 (*Opera*, II, p. 17, ll. 16–20).

[8] *Cogitata Metaphysica*, I, 6.

other terms for self-evidence. Similarly in a letter to de Vries, while discussing the distinction between two kinds of definition, Spinoza indirectly alludes to the two criteria of truth: "Therefore, a definition either explains a thing as it exists outside the understanding . . . or else a definition explains a thing as it is conceived or can be conceived by us."[1] Of the former, he says previously, it "ought to be true,"[2] whereas "the latter need not be," that is to say, it need not be true in the sense of corresponding to something outside the understanding, for while the truth of the former is to be tested by its correspondence to an external object, the truth of the latter consists in its internal consistency.

In the *Ethics* Spinoza designates the second kind of truth, namely, that which is tested by the internal criterion, by the term "adequate," as distinguished from the first kind of truth, which is tested by the external criterion. "By adequate idea, I understand an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, with reference to the object, has all the properties or internal signs of a true idea. I say internal, so as to exclude that which is external, the agreement, namely, of the idea with that of which it is the idea (*cum suo ideato*)."[3] In a letter to Tschirnhaus he makes this distinction between true and adequate still clearer: "I recognize no other difference between a true and an adequate idea than that the word 'true' refers only to the agreement of the idea with that of which it is the idea, while the word 'adequate' refers to the nature of the idea in itself; so that there is really no difference between a true and an adequate idea except this extrinsic relation."[4]

In this definition of adequate idea here in the *Ethics*

[1] Epistola 9 (*Opera*, IV, p. 43, ll. 11 ff.).
[2] *Ibid.* (l. 1).
[3] *Ethics*, II, Def. 4 and Expl.
[4] Epistola 60.

Spinoza only refers to "the properties or internal signs of a true idea," without telling us what they are. But in the passage quoted previously from the *Cogitata Metaphysica* he mentions two properties: (*a*) clearness and distinctness, and (*b*) certainty. Now, the first of these properties, namely, clearness and distinctness, is also used by Descartes as a criterion of truth,[1] and Spinoza refers to it indirectly in another place in the *Ethics* when he says that an adequate cause is one "whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause."[2] The second of these properties of a true idea, namely, certainty, is mentioned by Spinoza also in several other places in his works. In the *Short Treatise* he says: "Any one who is in the possession of the truth cannot doubt that he possesses it."[3] In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, in the discussion of the properties of the intellect, he similarly says: "It involves certitude, that is to say, it knows that things are formally as they are contained in it objectively."[4] In the Scholium to Proposition XLIX of the Second Part of the *Ethics*, however, he warns against the confusion of the absence of doubt, which assent to false ideas may involve, and real certainty, which is the mark of a true idea. "A false idea, therefore, in so far as it is false, does not involve certitude. Consequently, when we say that a man acquiesces in what is false and does not doubt it, we do not say that he is certain, but merely that he does not doubt, that is to say, that he acquiesces in what is false, because there are no causes sufficient to make his imagination waver."

The cumulative impression of these statements about the

[1] *Meditationes*, III (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 35, ll. 8 ff.).
[2] *Ethics*, III, Def. 1.
[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 15, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 79, ll. 9–11).
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 108 (*Opera*, II, p. 38, ll. 32–33).

internal criteria of truth — clearness and distinctness and certainty — is that they are used by Spinoza in two senses.

First, they are used by Spinoza as supplementary to the external criterion of correspondence. In this sense, they are again subdivided into two usages. In the first place, they are used as means or evidence of establishing the agreement between the idea and its ideate. Thus in the passage quoted from the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, speaking of the properties of the intellect, he says that the intellect "involves certitude, that is to say, it knows that things are formally as they are contained in it objectively."[1] In the second place, they are used to indicate a subjective necessity and conviction on the part of him who asserts the truth of correspondence. The assertion that a thing is as it really is, is in itself not a true assertion unless the one who has made it is certain of it and does not simply guess at it. "If any person says that Peter, for example, exists, and does not know that he exists, that thought, so far as that person is concerned, is false, or if it be preferred so to speak, is not true, notwithstanding that Peter may actually exist. Nor is the proposition that Peter exists true excepting for the man who knows certainly that Peter exists."[2] A similar insistence upon the consciousness of certainty as an element in truth may be also discerned in the following statements of Descartes: "But it is certain that we shall never take the false as the true if we only give our assent to things that we perceive clearly and distinctly. . . . It is also quite certain that whenever we give our assent to some reason which we do not exactly understand, we either deceive ourselves, or, if we arrive at the truth, it is only by chance, and thus we cannot be certain that we are not in error."[3]

[1] *Ibid.* [2] *Ibid.*, § 69 (p. 26, ll. 21–25).

[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 43–44.

Second, the internal criteria of truth are used by Spinoza as something independent of correspondence in its ordinary meaning of the agreement between what is in the mind with what is outside the mind. According to this sense of the internal criteria of truth, for an idea to have all the intrinsic signs of truth does not imply that it must be a copy of something which actually happens to exist outside the mind. To be sure, for an idea to be true it must agree with the reality of its ideate. But the reality with which a true idea must agree is not necessarily an external object; it may be its ideal nature conceived by the mind as something necessary in itself, or as something which follows by necessity from that which is conceived as necessary by itself, or as something which follows necessarily from its own nature and definition. While the external criterion of truth establishes the correspondence of an idea with an ideate of which it is a copy, the internal criterion of truth establishes the correspondence of an idea with an ideate in which it is implied. In the latter case, the true idea may be an idea implied as a conclusion in its premises, or as the properties of a triangle in its definition, or as the attributes of God in His essence. "For as regards what constitutes the form of truth, it is certain that true thought is distinguished from false thought not only by an external but mainly by an internal mark; as, for example, if a workman has rightly conceived any structure, although the thing has never existed and will never exist, his thought is nevertheless true, and the thought is the same whether the thing exists or not."[1] Correspondence here means agreement with the reality of its own nature, in so far as it is contained within its own nature and follows from its own nature. "Moreover, from the last thing we have said, namely, that the idea must altogether agree with

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 69 (*Opera* II, p. 26, ll. 17–21).

its formal essence, it is clear that in order that our mind may exactly reproduce the pattern of nature it must draw all its ideas from that idea which reproduces the origin and fountain of the whole of nature, so that it may also become the source of other ideas."[1] The building properly conceived by the architect is a true idea because, in so far as it is properly constructed, it is a faithful image of the nature of a building, and in fact may become the source of other ideas of buildings. There are thus true ideas, "the object of which we know with perfect certainty depends upon our power of thinking, and has no object in nature."[2] It is internal truth in this second sense that Spinoza describes as adequate in his formal definition of the term "adequate" given in the *Ethics* which we have quoted above. It is interesting to note that in almost similar terms and using the same illustration of an architect's conception of a building Thomas Aquinas describes the nature of what has been called here the internal criterion of truth: "Hence, everything is said to be absolutely, in so far as it is directed to an intellect from which it depends, and thus it is that the works of men's hands are said to be true as being directed to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind."[3] Again, "a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art."[4]

With this definition of internal truth or adequate ideas, Spinoza now proceeds to find out what ideas in our mind are true or adequate in this sense. Now, Descartes, after laying down the "general rule that all things which I per-

[1] *Ibid.*, § 42 (p. 17, ll. 3–7).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 72 (p. 27, ll. 12–13).
[3] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 16, Art. 1.
[4] *Ibid.*, Pars I, Quaest. 17, Art. 1.

ceive very clearly and very distinctly are true,"[1] raises the question, "What then were these things?"[2] He then proceeds to test one by one the things known to us in order to determine whether they are clearly and distinctly perceived. He mentions at first external things, or "objects which I apprehend by means of the senses";[3] then he mentions the general belief "that there are objects outside of me from which these ideas proceed, and to which they are entirely similar";[4] after that he mentions certain things "very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry," such as "that two and three together make five";[5] and finally he mentions the certainty of the truths that I am and that there is a God.[6] Spinoza proceeds here in a similar manner to investigate which ideas are adequate and which are not. Directly challenging Descartes, he seems to say: I agree with you that we have no clear and distinct knowledge of external things (Props. XXIV–XXVI), but I do not agree with you that we have a clear and distinct knowledge that we ourselves exist (Props. XXVII–XXXI). The only clear and distinct knowledge that we have is the following: (1) Ideas which are related to God (Prop. XXXII). (2) Simple ideas (Prop. XXXIV). (3) Common notions and the ideas which may be deduced from them (Props. XXXVII–XL).

But let us work out these propositions in detail.

To begin with, he says, the knowledge of the component parts of the human body is not adequate knowledge, that is to say, it is not a knowledge which is self-evident and clearly and distinctly understood, for all that the mind knows about them is their behavior, but not their nature, and their behavior, being the result of a complicated system of causes,

[1] *Meditationes*, III (*Oeuvres*, III, p. 35, ll. 14–15).
[2] *Ibid.* (l. 18). [3] *Ibid.* (l. 19). [4] *Ibid.* (ll. 26–27).
[5] *Ibid.* (p. 35, l. 30–p. 36, l. 2). [6] *Ibid.* (p. 36, ll. 16 ff.).

cannot be immediately known with clearness and distinctness. In fact, one must understand the entire order of nature before one is able to understand the working of the component parts of the human body.[1]

Nor does the human mind have an adequate knowledge of external bodies, for external bodies are known to us only through the affection of our own body, and then, too, only in so far as they are perceived by the senses. But there is more to be known about external bodies than what is inadequately revealed of them by sensation.[2] In fact, the very existence of external bodies is perceived by us only by the manner in which they affect our own body.[3] But inasmuch as most of the bodies which have once affected us and of which we speak as knowing them are not always present to our sensuous perception, our knowledge of them is only a sort of imagination, and such imaginary knowledge is not adequate knowledge.[4]

Since the mind has no adequate idea of the component parts of its own body nor of the external bodies which affect it, it has no adequate knowledge of its own body itself,[5] nor of the affections of its own body,[6] nor of itself or of the idea of itself.[7]

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 24: "The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body."

[2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 25: "The idea of each affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body."

[3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 26: "The human body perceives no external body as actually existing, unless through the ideas of the affections of its body."

[4] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 26, Corol.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 27: "The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself."

[6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 28: "The ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused."

[7] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 28, Schol., and Prop. 29: "The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind."

All these propositions are finally summed up by Spinoza in the statement that "the human mind, when it perceives things in the common order of nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge."[1]

The reason why the mind has no adequate idea of all these things is that it perceives them for the most part as disconnected fragments of reality and does not grasp them in their totality as part of the entire reality. This fragmentary conception of things is designated by Spinoza by the expression the "common order of nature" (*communis naturae ordo*). Under this conception of nature things appear as being related to each other externally (*externe*) by a chance coincidence (*fortuito occursu*), and not internally (*interne*) by a universal concatenation of causes by which alone many diverse things are capable of being perceived simultaneously in their mutual relations of differences, agreements, and oppositions.[2] When things are viewed as part of the common order of nature and not as depending upon their essence or upon the absolute nature of God, they are said to have duration or an indefinite continuation of existence,[3] for the continuation of existence is called indefinite when "it cannot be determined by the nature itself of the existing thing nor by the efficient cause."[4] Consequently, since the mind is said to have only inadequate knowledge both of its own body and of external bodies it also has only inadequate knowledge both of the duration of its own body[5] and of the duration of individual things which are outside its own body.[6] It is this

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 29, Corol., and cf. Schol.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 29, Schol.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 30, Demonst.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, Def. 5.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 30: "About the duration of our body we can have but a very inadequate knowledge."

[6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 31: "About the duration of individual things which are outside us we can have but a very inadequate knowledge."

method of viewing things as belonging to the common order of nature that is meant when it is said that things are contingent and corruptible. For when things are said to be contingent or corruptible it does not mean that their coming into existence or their passing out of existence comes about without a cause; it only means that we have no adequate knowledge of them in their true causal relations, that is to say, that through "a deficiency in our knowledge" we are unable to view them in their mutual relations as a whole.[1]

Having explained what ideas are inadequate, Spinoza now proceeds to explain what ideas are adequate. But inasmuch as adequate ideas are by definition ideas which are clear and distinct, and clearness and distinctness are the internal criteria of truth, he uses the term "true" in place of the term "adequate."

To begin with, the idea of God and all other ideas relating to God are true ideas. The truth of these ideas is not tested by the external standard of correspondence, for the knowledge of the existence of God is not demonstrated cosmologically, but rather ontologically, that is to say, by the self-evidence of the idea as attested by its clearness and distinctness. By this internal evidence and not by anything external do we know that God is not a fictitious being or a being of reason, but a real being. Since the truth of our idea of God depends upon the native power of the intellect alone, everything that can be deduced from the idea of God is equally true. "For if we suppose the intellect to have perceived some new being which had never existed, as some imagine the intellect of God before He created things (a perception which could not possibly arise from any object), and if we also suppose the intellect to deduce other perceptions legiti-

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 31, Corol. Cf. *Ethics*, I, Prop. 33, Schol. 1; above, Vol. I, p. 189; below, p. 160.

mately from the first, all those thoughts would be true and determined by no external object, but would depend solely on the power and the nature of the intellect."[1] And so Spinoza concludes here in Proposition XXXII that "all ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true."

Furthermore, inasmuch as our thinking is a mode of God's attribute of thought, it follows, in Proposition XXXIII, that "in ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false." What Spinoza is trying to deny by this proposition is the assumption that the mind has a certain freedom to conceive ideas arbitrarily. To assume this would be analogous to the assumption that the body has a certain freedom to act arbitrarily. The reason why Spinoza rejects the former assumption with reference to the mind is the same as that for which he rejects the latter assumption with reference to the body. It would break up the continuity and the necessary concatenation of causes in the process of nature. It would imply, as he puts it in the Preface of the Third Part of the *Ethics*, that "man disturbs rather than follows her [nature's] order." It would set the mind and the body free from the universal order of nature, from God; it would make them act independently of the infinite series of causes that proceed from God; and it would thus virtually declare them to be causes of themselves like God. This is the underlying thought of a statement in which Spinoza criticizes the view of some unnamed authors, among whom he undoubtedly also meant to include Descartes:[2] "They say that the mind can by its own strength create sensations or ideas which do not belong to things, so that in a measure they make it out to be a God."[3] This last statement is undoubt-

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 71 (*Opera*, II, p. 27, ll. 3–9).

[2] Cf. *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 31; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, I, Prop. 15, Schol.; *Meditationes*, IV.

[3] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 60 (*Opera*, II, p. 23, ll. 15–17).

edly directed against Descartes' assertion that the principle of free will "in a certain measure renders us like God in making us masters of ourselves."[1] "Moreover," says Spinoza, "they assert that we, or our mind, has such freedom that it can control us, or itself, and indeed its own freedom."[2] Spinoza denies all this, for according to him every movement of the body is a mode of the attribute of extension and every idea in the mind is a mode of the attribute of thought. In a certain sense, Spinoza's statement in Proposition XXXIII that "in ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false" may also be said to reflect the questions raised by Thomas Aquinas whether falsity exists in things and also whether it exists in the intellect.[3] Spinoza's argument in the Demonstration that there can be no falsity in ideas themselves because ideas are modes of God's thought and in God's thought there can be no falsity is similar to the argument by Thomas Aquinas that there can be no falsity in things themselves because "truth is said to exist in things by conformity to the Divine Intellect . . . in so far as it imitates it. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity."[4] Descartes expresses the same view in the statement that "our errors cannot be imputed to God."[5] Now in the light of all these passages, Proposition XXXIII assumes the form of a syllogism as follows: If in ideas there is something positive on account of which they are called

[1] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 152.

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 60 (*Opera*, II, p. 23, ll. 17–19).

[3] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 17, Art. 1: "Utrum falsitas sit in rebus"; Art. 3: "Utrum falsitas sit in intellectu."

[4] *Ibid.*, Art. 1: "3. Praeterea, verum dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum (ut supra dictum est, quaest. 16, art. 1), in quantum imitatur ipsum. Sed quaelibet res, in quantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo quaelibet res vera est absque falsitate."

[5] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 36.

false, then we must assume either that the mind has the power and freedom to conceive ideas which are false and is therefore the cause of its own actions like God, or that falsity is caused directly by God. But either of these alternatives is impossible. Therefore, "in ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false."

In the second place, Spinoza wants to say, simple ideas are true, inasmuch as they are clear and distinct. Now, in the original passage in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* where Spinoza first makes the statement about the clearness and distinctness and hence the truth of simple ideas, he does not use the expression "simple ideas"; the expression he uses there is "the idea of a simple object." "If the idea be that of an object perfectly simple (*simplicissimae*) it can only be clear and distinct."[1] In a later passage, however, he uses the expression "simple idea" (*idea simplex*), and as examples of it he mentions the ideas of a semicircle, motion, and quantity. "Hence it follows that simple thoughts cannot be other than true, such, for example, as the simple idea of the semicircle, of motion, of quantity, etc."[2] But it would seem that within these simple ideas used by him in the sense of ideas of simple objects Spinoza further distinguishes between those ideas which are formed absolutely (*absolute*) and those which are formed from other ideas, for in still another passage he distinguishes between motion and quantity, both of which have been described by him, in the passage quoted, as simple ideas, by saying that the intellect "forms the idea of quantity absolutely (*absolute*), and not by attending to other thoughts; but it forms the ideas of motion only by attending to the idea of quan-

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 63 (p. 24, ll. 20–21).

[2] *Ibid.*, § 72 (p. 27, ll. 28–30). Descartes similarly mentions "figure, extension, motion, etc.," as illustrations of a simple idea. Cf. *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, XII (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 418, ll. 17–18).

tity."[1] Here in Proposition XXXIV he evidently uses the expression "absolute idea" (*idea . . . absoluta*) as the equivalent of a simple idea in the general sense of an idea of a perfectly simple (*simplicissima*) object. He thus says: "Every idea which in us is absolute, that is to say, adequate and perfect, is true." This view as to the truth of simple ideas may be traced to the following statements of Aristotle: "The process of thinking indivisible wholes belongs to a sphere from which falsehood is excluded. . . . Falsehood, in fact, never arises except when notions are combined."[2] This Aristotelian passage is also the basis of Descartes' statements that "there can be no falsity save in the last class — that of the compounds made by the understanding itself"[3] and that "simple natures are known *per se* and are wholly free from falsity."[4] Thomas Aquinas, too, says that "falsity of the intellect is concerned with the composition of the intellect alone."[5]

Ideas which are not true are classified by Spinoza in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* into fictitious ideas (*ideae fictae*), false ideas (*ideae falsae*), and doubtful ideas (*ideae dubiae*).[6] The common element in all these untrue ideas is that they are composite and not simple and that they arise in the imagination and not in the intellect. "We have shown that fictitious, false, and other ideas derive their origin from the imagination, that is to say, from certain fortuitous (if I may so speak) and disconnected sensations, which do not arise from the power itself of the mind."[7]

[1] *Ibid.*, § 108 (p. 38, l. 34–p. 39, l. 3).

[2] *De Anima*, III, 6, 430a, 26–430b, 2.

[3] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, VIII (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 399, ll. 14–16).

[4] *Ibid.*, XII (p. 420, ll. 14–15).

[5] *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 17, Art. 3: "Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum circa compositionem intellectus est."

[6] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 77 and § 84 (*Opera*, II, p. 29, l. 19; p. 32, l. 4).

[7] *Ibid.*, § 84 (p. 32, ll. 5–8).

With respect to doubtful ideas, as with respect to fictitious and false ideas, Spinoza furthermore says that "doubt is never produced in the mind . . . if there be only a single idea in the mind." [1] Though in Proposition XXXV Spinoza deals specifically with false ideas, what he says there applies equally to the other untrue ideas.

In his explanation of what falsity is, Spinoza also explains what it is not. It is not, in the first place, anything positive. What Spinoza means by this has already been explained in Proposition XXXIII. Nor, in the second place, does it consist in absolute privation (*absoluta privatio*). What Spinoza means by this is that falsity is not a natural limitation of man as is, for instance, his inability to fly or to live under water. For it is the mind, which is capable of thinking truthfully, that sometimes thinks falsely, and not the body, which is incapable of thinking at all. A parallel passage to this is found in Descartes: "For error is not a pure negation, but is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess." [2] A still more elucidating passage in Descartes is this: "It is very true that whenever we err there is some fault in our method of action, or in the manner in which we use our freedom; but for all that there is no defect in our nature, because it is ever the same whether our judgment be true or false." [3] Nor, in the third place, does it consist in absolute ignorance (*absoluta ignoratia*). It consists rather in a knowledge which man ought to know and does know, but knows wrongly. Falsity then is error, which two terms are used interchangeably by Spinoza [4] as well as by Descartes.[5]

[1] *Ibid.*, § 78 (p. 29, ll. 26–27).

[2] *Meditationes*, IV (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 54, l. 31–p. 55, l. 3). Quoted also by Lewis Robinson, *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik*, I, p. 339.

[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 38.

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 64, note b, and § 66 (*Opera*, II, p. 24, and p. 25, ll. 20–28); *Ethics*, II, Prop. 35, Demonst.

[5] *Meditationes*, IV.

Such error or falsity cannot arise in absolute or simple ideas; [1] it arises, as do fictitious ideas, "from putting together diverse confused ideas which belong to diverse things and operations in nature." [2] In this, indeed, he follows Aristotle, whose statement we have quoted above.[3] Or again, "falsity consists solely in the affirmation concerning anything of something which is not contained in the concept we have formed of the thing." [4]

The cause of such error and falsity is relative human ignorance. Imagination has free play only where there is not the restraining control of knowledge. If the necessity or the impossibility of a thing which depends upon external causes were known to us, says Spinoza, "we could imagine nothing concerning it."[5] Or, "if any God or anything omniscient exists, it is impossible for it to fancy anything," [6] that is to say, to have erroneous knowledge based on fancy. It is for this reason that "the less men know nature, so much the more easily they can fancy many things."[7] The ignorance from which all confusion arises is of a threefold nature. First, "the mind knows a whole or a complex only in part." Second, "it does not distinguish the known from the unknown." Third, "it considers simultaneously without any distinction the many things which are contained in each object."[8] Of these three types of ignorance, the first type, which consists in knowing things only in a partial and fragmentary manner, is probably what Spinoza always refers to as mutilated ideas. Evidence for this may be found in his use of the expres-

[1] Cf. above, p. 112, in our comments on Prop. 34.
[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 64 (*Opera*, II, p. 24, ll. 27–28).
[3] Cf. above, p. 113.
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 72 (p. 27, ll. 26–28).
[5] *Ibid.*, § 53 (p. 20, ll. 4–6).
[6] *Ibid.*, § 54 (p. 20, ll. 7–8).
[7] *Ibid.*, § 58 (p. 22, ll. 21–22).
[8] *Ibid.*, § 63 (p. 24, ll. 16–20).

sion "mutilated and, as it were, fragmentary" (*mutilatas quasi, et truncatas*).[1] The second and third types, which consist in the failure to perceive distinctions between things, are probably what Spinoza always refers to as confused ideas. He thus says here in Proposition XXXV: "Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, that is to say, mutilated and confused, ideas involve." Similarly toward the end of the unfinished *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* he concludes that "false ideas and ideas of imagination . . . are considered as such solely through defect of our knowledge."[2] To illustrate how through ignorance man is led into error and falsity Spinoza cites two examples, one from the delusion of freedom and the other from the misjudgment of the distance of the sun.[3] A misjudgment about the size of the sun as an illustration of falsehood is similarly used by Aristotle in the following passage: "But there are false imaginings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a true conception. For example, the sun appears to us only a foot in diameter, but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world."[4] In the course of his remarks on the delusion of freedom Spinoza alludes to those who pretend to know what the will is and in what manner it moves the body "and devise seats and dwelling-places of the soul."[5] The allusion is principally to Descartes' theory of the pineal gland, by means of which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is said by him to be able to move the body,[6] and which is also considered by him as the seat and dwelling-place of the soul.[7]

[1] *Ibid.*, § 73 (p. 28, l. 4).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 110 (p. 40, ll. 5–7).
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 35, Schol. Cf. *Ethics*, IV, Prop. I, Schol.
[4] *De Anima*, III, 3, 428b, 2–4.
[5] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 35, Schol.
[6] *Ibid.*, V, Praef.
[7] Cf. *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 32.

Ideas then are not false in themselves. They become false only as a result of their being merely a broken-up fragment of a whole idea which in itself is true, or of their being the outcome of a confused combination of simple ideas which in themselves are true, and this mutilation and confusion of the ideas are due merely to ignorance and to a failure to see things as a whole in their mutual relationships or to a failure to analyze a complex idea into its component simple parts.[1] "For we have seen that the motion of a semicircle is false, as a disconnected affirmation in the mind, but that it is true if it be joined to the concept of a globe, or to the concept of any cause determining such motion."[2] As for the ideas themselves, which thus become mutilated or confused as a result of ignorance, they arise in our mind because our mind is a mode of God's attribute of thought. "Moreover if, as is self-evident, it belongs to the nature of a thinking being to form true or adequate thoughts, it is certain that inadequate ideas arise in us solely because we are part of some thinking being, whose thoughts, some in their completeness and others in part only, form our mind."[3] It is this which Spinoza means to say here in Proposition XXXVI: "Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas."

The third class of ideas which are true or adequate, says Spinoza, are common notions and ideas which follow by logical reasoning from common notions. This thought is developed by him in Propositions XXXVII–XL. But inasmuch as the meaning of common notions is not explained until the first Scholium to Proposition XL, we shall first discuss this Scholium and then return to the propositions.

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 63 (*Opera*, II, p. 24. ll. 20 ff.).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 73 (p. 28, ll. 5–8).
[3] *Ibid.*, § 73 (p. 28, ll. 8–13).

Demonstrative reasoning as expressed in any syllogism, according to Aristotle, must start with premises which are "true, primary, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion."[1] These premises which are the immediate propositions (*προτάσεις ἄμεσοι*) of a syllogism are called by him axioms, with which are correlated definitions, and hypotheses,[2] corresponding roughly to the first principles enumerated by Euclid at the beginning of his *Elements*. In Euclid, however, the axioms are called common notions (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*).[3] Similarly in Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts the Euclidian axioms are designated by such terms as "first notions" and "known notions."[4] In Latin philosophic texts, the expression "communes animi conceptiones" is used in place of axioms by Boethius, Casiodorus, John of Salisbury,[5] and Alanus de Insulis (or, rather, Nicolaus of Amiens).[6] Descartes, too, speaks in one place of axioms or common notions (*Axiomata sive communes notiones*)[7] and in another place refers to axioms as common notions.[8] Meyer in his Preface to Spinoza's *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* similarly speaks of "Axiomata, seu communes animi Notiones."[9]

Bearing all this in mind, Spinoza says significantly, "I have thus explained the origin of those notions which are

[1] *Analytica Posteriora*, I, 2, 71b, 21–22. [2] *Ibid.*, 72a, 1–24.

[3] Cf. T. L. Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, I, p. 221.

[4] ידיעות נודעות, ראשונות, מושכלות ראשונות (*Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 8; *Ruah Ḥen*, Ch. 3); cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 465, n. 109.

[5] Cf. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* (ed. C. C. I. Webb, Oxford, 1909), VII, 7, 649c, where references are given by the editor to Boethius, *Euclidis Geometriae Interpretatio*, I, and to Casiodorus, *De Artibus et Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum*, Ch. 6.

[6] Cf. *De Arte seu de Articulis Catholicae Fidei*, Prologus, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 210, Col. 597. Cf. below, p. 148, no. 3.

[7] *Rationes Dei existentiam . . . More Geometrico Dispositae* at end of *Secundae Responsiones* (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 164, ll. 25–27).

[8] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 13.

[9] *Opera*, I, p. 127, l. 19.

called common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning (*ratiocinii*)," and immediately after that he refers to these common notions as axioms or notions (*axiomatum, sive notionum*).[1] We have in this passage, then, a restatement of what Aristotle conceived to be demonstrative knowledge (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη).[2] But instead of Aristotle's ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη Spinoza uses here the term *ratiocinium*. Descartes, more like Aristotle, speaks of the common notion as that out of which demonstrations are framed.[3] And these foundations of reasoning, Spinoza says, again following Aristotle, are the indemonstrable common notions or axioms.

But "common notions" or "axioms" are not the only immediately known propositions which form the premises in syllogisms. There are others. Maimonides in his treatise on logical terminology enumerates four: (1) sensible perceptions, (2) first notions, (3) generally known opinions, and (4) opinions accepted on the authority of one or more of the chosen few.[4] The difference between the first two of these four and the last two is stated by Maimonides as follows: The first two are *common* to all men, whereas the last two are confined to certain groups and classes of people. From the fact that the first two kinds of immediate propositions are described by Maimonides as "common" to all men, it is quite clear that his "first notions" or "axioms" and "sensible perceptions" are subdivisions of what are otherwise called "*common* notions." The third and fourth kinds of immediately known propositions named by Maimonides correspond on the whole to what Aristotle designates as prob-

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 (*Opera*, II, p. 120, ll. 15–17).

[2] *Analytica Posteriora*, I, 2, 71b, 20.

[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 13: "Invenit etiam communes quasdam notiones, et *ex his* varias demonstrationes componit."

[4] (1) המוחשים, המורגשות [المحسوسات]; (2) המושכלות הראשונות [المعقولات الأول]; (3) המפרסמות [المشهورات]; (4) המקבלות [المقبولات].

abilities (*τὰ ἔνδοξα*), and which are described by him as those opinions "which appear to all, or to most men, or to the wise; and to these, either to all, or to the greater number, or to such as are especially renowned and illustrious." [1] Not all these four classes of immediately known propositions, adds Maimonides, are of equal usefulness in the formation of a syllogism. Those based upon common notions, both first notions and sensible perceptions, are the most useful, for they produce a demonstrative syllogism. Those based upon generally known opinions produce a dialectic syllogism. Those based upon opinions accepted on authority produce a rhetorical syllogism or the enthymeme. In addition to all these, says Maimonides, there are propositions which are ill-founded and untrue and which produce sophistic syllogisms. All these statements of Maimonides reflect on the whole Aristotle's distinction between demonstration, on the one hand, and dialectic, rhetorical, and sophistic syllogisms, on the other.[2]

Evidently bearing this chapter of Maimonides in mind, Spinoza says that he could, if he would, "distinguish those notions which are more useful than others, and those which are scarcely of any use; those which are common; those which are clear and distinct only to those persons who do not suffer from prejudice; and, finally, those which are ill-founded."[3]

But the resemblance between this Scholium of Spinoza and the chapter in the Maimonides treatise on logical terminology goes still further. Maimonides makes a distinction between axioms, or what he calls "first notions," and "second notions."[4] "First notions" are illustrated by him by three

[1] *Topics*, I, 1, 100b, 21–23.
[2] *Ibid.*, 100a, 25 ff.; *Rhetoric*, I, 2.
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1.
[4] משכלות ראשונות, משכלות שניות.

examples taken from Euclid's list of common notions and definitions: "The whole is greater than the part;[1] two is an even number;[2] things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another."[3] "By second notions," Maimonides says, "I refer to the geometrical constructions and astronomical calculations which are all true notions, for they are demonstrated by premises which for the most part approximate first notions." What he means to say is that "second notions" are the theorems of Euclid's *Elements* and of Ptolemy's *Almagest* which, while really deduced from first notions by means of a demonstration, are to be treated as if they were immediately known.[4] The expression "second notions" in the sense of conclusions derived by means of demonstration from first notions, or notions which are like first, occurs also in other Hebrew philosophic texts. For example: "And they [the first notions] are the principles of those intellectual disciplines which are arrived at by means of demonstrative reasoning. The latter are the conclusions of the former, i.e., the first notions, and are called second notions, or third [notions], or fourth [notions], or even higher than that, depending upon the number of propositions required in each case under consideration."[5] Again: "It is not to be assumed that what to the philosopher is a second notion is to the prophet a first notion, as some people think, for if that were the case, then the philosopher's knowledge of a given thing would be more perfect than that of the prophet, inasmuch as he would know the thing in its causes whereas the prophet would not know it in its causes."[6] To

[1] *Elements*, I, Common Notion 5. [2] *Ibid.*, VII, Def. 6.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, Common Notion 1.

[4] Cf. quotation from Descartes on immediately deduced conclusions, below, p. 130 n. 1.

[5] *Ruaḥ Ḥen*, Ch. 3.

[6] *Milḥamot Adonai*, Introduction (p. 4).

know a thing in its causes means here to know a thing by demonstration from self-evident premises.

Bearing again this chapter of Maimonides in mind, Spinoza makes another significant statement: "Moreover, it would be manifest whence these notions which are called second (*notiones . . . secundae*) . . . have taken their origin." In the light of our preceding discussion it is quite evident that by "notiones secundae" Spinoza means here the conclusions in demonstrative syllogisms. This makes his use of the expression *secundae notiones* unlike the scholastic use of the expressions *secundae intentiones* or *secundae notiones* with which Spinoza's expression here is generally identified.[1] The scholastic expressions refer to such concepts as genus, species, difference, and their like, by which mental relations are established between such universal concepts as man and animal, which are called by the scholastics *primae intentiones* or *primae notiones*.[2] The scholastic *secundae intentiones* or *secundae notiones* are called so because they were based upon the *primae intentiones* or *primae notiones*, which are universals. But inasmuch as universals are discussed by Spinoza later in the same Scholium without referring to them as *primae intentiones* or *primae notiones*, it is quite evident that there is no connection between his *secundae notiones* and the scholastic *secundae notiones* or *secundae intentiones*, or at least the meaning of the expression has been modified by Spinoza under the influence of its use by Maimonides. The expression "second notion" (*tweede kundigheid*) in its original scholastic meaning, however, is used by Spinoza in the *Short Treatise*.[3]

[1] Cf. note *ad loc.* in Baensch's translation of the *Ethics* (p. 283), and Lewis Robinson, *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik*, I, p. 346.

[2] Cf. P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 31–32; R. P. M. Fernandez Garcia, *Lexicon Scholastico-Theologicum*, p. 361, s.v. "intentio secunda."

[3] First Dialogue, § 10.

If we assume that Spinoza's expression "second notions" means the same as that of Maimonides and of the other Hebrew philosophic authors, then the passage following his mention of "second notions," which I have left out from mv quotation above, is to be given a meaning which is different from that which is generally given to it. The entire passage in Latin reads as follows: "Praeterea constaret, unde notiones illae, quae secundas vocant, et consequenter axiomata, *quae* in *iisdem* fundantur, suam duxerunt originem." Naturally, the italicized *quae* in the quotation is taken to refer to "axiomata" and the italicized *iisdem* to "notiones . . . secundas," and the passage is generally translated as follows: "Moreover, it would be manifest whence these notions which are called second, *and consequently the axioms which are founded upon them*, have taken their origin." But in view of the use of the expression "second notions" in Maimonides and other Hebrew writings with which I have shown Spinoza's use of the expression to agree, one would expect here the italicized statement to read *and consequently the axioms upon which they are founded.* To be sure, the text may be translated this way even as it now reads, though it would be rather awkward to take *quae* to refer to "notiones . . . secundas" and *iisdem* to "axiomata."[1] But it is not impossible that in some manner the text has been corrupted here from its original reading: *in quibus eaedem fundantur.*

Closely related to the common notions are the scholastic six transcendentals (*transcendentales*),[2] of which Spinoza mentions here only three: Being (*ens*), Thing (*res*), Something (*aliquid*). The other three transcendentals, Unity (*unum*), Truth (*verum*), and Goodness (*bonum*), are, however,

[1] Strangely enough, two translations, both in English, that of Elwes and that [of Boyle] in Everyman's Library, render the passage as here suggested.

[2] Cf. W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic* (1866), I, p. 198; Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (1867), III, p. 245.

mentioned by him elsewhere.[1] These are differentiated by Spinoza from the common notions. The transcendentals, like universals, are confused and inadequate ideas, whereas the common notions, both primary and secondary, are adequate ideas. Though both universals and common notions ultimately rest upon sense-perception, still they differ from one another. The difference between them is threefold. In the first place, the ordinary universals, "such as Man, Horse, Dog, etc.," are formed by imagination and memory[2] — a view which agrees with that of Aristotle.[3] The common notions, on the other hand, are formed by the mind itself. In the second place, the universal is not an idea of what is truly proper and common to all things, but only an image of that upon "which all of them agree in so far as the body is affected by them . . . that is to say, by each individual."[4] The common notions, on the other hand, are ideas in the mind of "that which is common and proper to the human body, and to any external bodies by which the human body is generally affected."[5] In the third place, the universals "are not formed by all persons in the same way, but they vary in each case according to the thing by which the body is more frequently affected, and which the mind more easily imagines or remembers."[6] The common notions, on the other hand, "are common to all men,"[7] that is to say, are conceived by all men in the same way. It is because of these differences between them, maintains Spinoza, that universals are confused and inadequate ideas, whereas the com-

[1] *Cogitata Metaphysica*, I, 6, and cf. end of I, 5.
[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 (*Opera*, II, p. 121, ll. 12 ff.).
[3] Cf. *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 99b, 36–100a, 14.
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 (*Opera*, II, p. 121, ll. 18–21).
[5] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 39.
[6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 (*Opera*. II, p. 121, ll. 24–27).
[7] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 38, Corol.

mon notions are clear and distinct and adequate ideas. But yet, despite these differences between "common notions" and "universals," Spinoza sometimes loosely refers to common notions as universals, as when, for instance, he describes the knowledge deduced from common notions as an inference from some universal (*ab aliquo universali*)[1] or as universal knowledge (*cognitio universalis*).[2]

The immediate propositions with which demonstrative reasoning must begin are divided by Aristotle into those which are proper only to certain special sciences and those which are common to all the sciences.[3] Inasmuch as the sciences differ according to the subject-matter of which they treat,[4] the immediate propositions within each science must be common to all the things included within that particular science. Now, it is my purpose here to show that the common notions of which Spinoza treats in Propositions XXXVII–XL are the immediate propositions which belong only to the study of bodies and not to that of God, or, as Aristotle would have said, they are the axioms of physics and not of theology or metaphysics. Evidence for this assertion is to be found in the following statement in the Scholium to Proposition XLVII, where Spinoza says that though both God and the common notions are known to all, "the reason why we do not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that which we have of common notions is, that we cannot imagine God as we can bodies." This statement makes it quite clear that Spinoza's common notions are the primary principles only of the science of bodies or of physics. Within this science of bodies, however, says Spinoza after Aristotle, the common notions are those primary principles

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 19 (*Opera*, II, p. 10, l. 18).
[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 36, Schol. Cf. below, p. 138.
[3] Cf. Grote, *Aristotle*, I, pp. 305, 309, 341.
[4] Cf. above, p. 3.

which are based upon "that which is common to everything, and which is equally in the part and in the whole" and "forms the essence of no individual thing." [1]

But what are these common notions of the science of physics? Here again we must look for aid in Aristotle. Physics, according to him, deals with things which are inseparable from bodies and are movable.[2] Bodies have certain common properties which he calls common sensibles (κοινὰ αἰσθητά), under which he includes motion, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity.[3] Now in Lemma II, to which Spinoza refers after mentioning the common notions in Proposition XXXVII, bodies are said to have three things in common: they are (1) a mode of extension, and they are capable (2) of motion and (3) of rest. Similarly in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* Spinoza says that "in the examination of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal and common to all nature — such, for instance, as motion and rest, and their laws and rules."[4] Inasmuch as it is quite clear from these passages that at least two of Aristotle's six common sensibles, namely, motion and rest, are specifically mentioned by Spinoza as common notions, and inasmuch as the remaining four, namely, figure, magnitude, number, and unity, can be regarded as modes of extension in which according to Spinoza all bodies agree, it may be inferred that Spinoza's common notions reflect Aristotle's common sensibles and that these common sensibles are used by Spinoza in the sense of the common notions or axioms of the science of physics.

These common notions, Spinoza proceeds to argue in Proposition XXXVIII, are adequately perceived, that is to say,

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 37.
[2] *Metaphysics*, VI, 1, 1026a, 13–14. Cf. above, p. 3.
[3] *De Anima*, III, 1, 425a, 14–16; cf. II, 6, 418a, 17–18.
[4] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 7 (*Opera*, III, p. 102, ll. 21–24).

they are clear and distinct and immediate. Thus also the premises in a syllogism must be according to Aristotle and Maimonides immediately perceived, and this includes also premises which are based upon sense-perception, provided the sense-perception is sound.[1] But sense-perception, according to Aristotle, may be considered in two ways: first, the act of sense-perception (*αἰσθάνεται*), and second, the content of sense-perception (*αἴσθησις*), and while the former is of the particular, the latter is of the universal, i.e., of that which is common to everything.[2] Furthermore, the universals are described by Aristotle as things which cannot be divided (*τὰ ἀμερῆ*),[3] that is to say, things which are equally in the part and in the whole. Finally, these kinds of universals which are the content of sense-perception are according to Aristotle common to all men, for out of sense-perception, which is innate in all animals, there arises in man memory, experience, and finally universals.[4] All these points are reflected in Proposition XXXVIII and the Corollary: "Those things which are common to everything, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can be only adequately perceived. . . . Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to all men."

Since the common notions are ultimately based upon sensible perceptions, they will naturally begin, as sense-perception as a whole does according to Spinoza, with a knowledge of our own body, and will include a knowledge of external things only in so far as the former is affected by the latter. Hence Proposition XXXIX: "There will exist

[1] Cf. above, pp. 119 f.

[2] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 100a, 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, 100b, 2. In the two Latin translations of Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Analytica Posteriora*, made from the Hebrew, this term is translated by (1) *quae non partitur*, and (2) *quae non dividitur*.

[4] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 99b, 36–100a, 9.

in the human mind an adequate idea of that which is common and proper to the human body, and to any external bodies by which the human body is generally affected — of that which equally in the part of each of these external bodies and in the whole is common and proper." These common notions, therefore, derived as they are from sensible perception, are not limited in number, for the elements which things have in common are far greater than we usually perceive in our limited knowledge or, rather, in our ignorance. Were our knowledge perfect we could see how all things which appear different to us unite in God. The common notions therefore grow in number with the increase of our knowledge of nature. Spinoza expresses this view very neatly in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* when he says that "the more things the mind knows the better it understands its own powers and the order of nature."[1] Here in the Corollary to Proposition XXXIX he expresses the same view in the statement, "Hence it follows that the more things the body has in common with other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive."

Summing up our discussion as to Spinoza's use of the expression "common notions," we can trace its development in the mind of Spinoza out of certain statements in the writings of Aristotle. Whether the view he had of the subject is complete and accurate and one that would be acceptable to a modern student of the subject, does not interest us. What is of importance is that it represents an impressionistic picture which Spinoza could have got by reading the works of Aristotle and Maimonides. It is a picture based upon the Aristotelian theory of syllogism as outlined by Maimonides. In the mind of Spinoza this outline presented itself in the following diagram:

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 40 (*Opera*, II, p. 16, ll. 21–22).

The foundations of our reasoning (*ratiocinii nostri fundamenta*) are immediately known premises which are divided as follows:

A. Notions common to all men:
   1. Sensible perceptions.
   2. Axioms, subdivided into
      (*a*) First notions.
      (*b*) Second notions.

B. Notions common to some men:
   1. Generally accepted opinions.
   2. Authoritatively accepted opinions.

C. Ill-founded opinions.

Of these, as we have seen, Spinoza mentions explicitly A.2 (*a*) (*b*) and alludes indirectly to B and C.

These common notions form the premises in syllogisms from which by the proper application of the rules of logic conclusions can be derived. Given in the premises common notions which are true and given a syllogism which is formally correct, the conclusion will be true, for, as says Aristotle, "from true premises it is not possible to draw a false conclusion." [1] Similarly Spinoza seems to argue that since there is an inevitable necessity of truth in a conclusion drawn from true premises, the conclusion is no less clear and distinct than the premises. Formally one may speak of the premise as being immediately known and of the conclusion as being mediately known by means of a middle term. But in reality the conclusion is known simultaneously with the premise. "If a thought be true," says Spinoza, "the mind will easily proceed to deduce without any interruption things which are true." [2] The emphasis is here on the expression "without

[1] *Analytica Priora*, II, 2, 53b, 7–8.

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 104 (*Opera*, II, p. 37, ll. 34–35).

any interruption." So also Descartes argues that though remote conclusions are known only by deduction and first principles are known by intuition, still "it is possible to say that those propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e., in a way that differs according to our point of view." [1] Again, it is one of the functions of the intellect "that it perceives some things or forms some ideas absolutely, some ideas from others." [2] Here, again, the premises which are known absolutely and the conclusions which follow from the premises are both the activity of the same function of the mind and are both perceived simultaneously. Hence Proposition XL: "Those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it." The emphasis here is that both the conclusion and premises are knowledge of the same order and validity. In Descartes there is a somewhat similar statement: "Mind perceives these and other facts to be true so long as the premises from which they are derived are attended to." [3] Furthermore, maintains Descartes, "deduction, or the pure illation of one thing from another . . . cannot be erroneous when performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational." [4]

[1] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 370, ll. 10–15).
[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 108 (p. 38, ll. 34 ff.).
[3] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 13.
[4] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, II (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 365, ll. 4–7).

CHAPTER XVI

THE STAGES OF KNOWLEDGE

In his preceding propositions Spinoza has dealt with three kinds of knowledge. Broadly speaking they are: (1) Sensation, imagination, and memory (Props. XIV–XVIII). (2) Ratiocinative knowledge (Props. XXXVII–XL), under which Spinoza enumerated its three constituent elements: (*a*) simple ideas and (*b*) common notions, both of which form the basis of ratiocination, and (*c*) conclusions drawn from them. (3) Knowledge of ideas in so far as they are related to God (Prop. XXXII). Of these three kinds of knowledge, the first was declared by him to be inadequate, whereas the second and third were declared by him to be adequate. Now as if to summarize the result of his discussion in the preceding propositions and to prepare us for his fuller description of the contents of the second and third kinds of knowledge in Propositions XLIII–XLVII, he gives us a formal classification of the three kinds of knowledge (Prop. XL, Schol. II) and an evaluation of them (Props. XLI–XLII). Similar classifications occur in the *Short Treatise*[1] and in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*.[2]

What strikes one most in these classifications is the inconsistency in the use of the terms "three" and "four." In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* Spinoza explicitly states that the modes of perception (*modos percipiendi*) are

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 1. The following two terms are used by Spinoza in describing the classes of knowledge: (1) modes (*manieren*, *modos*), *Short Treatise*, II, 4, § 1 (*Opera*, I, p. 59, l. 5); *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 18 (*Opera*, II, p. 10, l. 3); (2) kinds (*genera*), *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 122, l. 15).

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, §§ 18 ff. (*Opera*, II, p. 10).

four. In the *Ethics* he actually divides knowledge (*cognitio*) into four kinds (*genera*), but by treating the first and the second only as two modes of regarding things (*utrumque res contemplandi modum*) under one kind of knowledge designated by a single term, he refers to the first three of his original four kinds of knowledge as "these two kinds of knowledge," thus making altogether a threefold classification. In the *Short Treatise* he first enumerates only three, but by subdividing the first into two parts he really has a fourfold classification. In fact, in another place in the *Short Treatise* he refers to his division of ideas "into four kinds," [1] and in still another place he speaks of what he has previously designated the third kind of knowledge as the "fourth, and last, kind of knowledge." [2]

The explanation for this, I think, is to be found in Saadia, whose passage on the sources of knowledge will be shown in the course of our discussion to be the model upon which Spinoza formed his own classification. Saadia begins with a general statement that the sources of knowledge are three. He enumerates them as follows: (1) Sense-perception. (2) Knowledge of reason, i.e., self-evident knowledge. (3) Knowledge by [logical] necessity. But after enumerating and describing these three sources of knowledge he says, "We shall add to these a fourth source . . . namely, reliable tradition," which he describes as being based upon the first three.[3] Whatever other influences may have entered into Spinoza's discussion of his classification of knowledge, Saadia's classification is undoubtedly responsible for its

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 4, § 9. [2] *Ibid.*, II, 22, § 1.

[3] *Emunot we-De'ot*, Introduction. For similar other classifications of the sources of knowledge among Jewish philosophers, see my paper "Notes on the Proofs of the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy," in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, I (1924), pp. 578–580. The sources dealt with there are: *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot*, I, 10; *Cuzari*, V, 12; *'Olam Ḳaṭan*, I, i; *Moreh Nebukim*, II, 33, supplemented by I, 51, and *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 8.

main outline. Not only are his kinds of knowledge, as we shall show, identical with those enumerated by Saadia, but his predilection for a threefold classification, which is the result of a combination of the equivalents of Saadia's first and fourth sources of knowledge into one, reflects the method employed by Saadia, who similarly begins with a threefold classification and then as an afterthought adds a fourth class, not as an independent source of knowledge, but rather as one based upon the others. Fourfold classifications of knowledge occur in Plato.[1] Aristotle enumerates various classifications,[2] all of which, however, as we shall see in the sequel, are reducible to the threefold classification of Spinoza. Threefold classifications of knowledges seem to have been in vogue among the Jews, Moslems, and Christians alike. Thus also Algazali speaks of three kinds of knowledge: reason, religion, and sense-perception.[3] Among Christian authors threefold classifications occur in the writings of Clement of Alexandria,[4] Maximus Confessor,[5] Erigena,[6] Gilbert,[7] Hugo of St. Victor,[8] Alanus (or Nicolaus of Amiens),[9] Richard of St. Victor,[10] and Nicolaus of Cusa.[11]

[1] *Republic*, VI, 511D, and VII, 533E: *νόησις* (*νοῦς*, *ἐπιστήμη*), *διάνοια*, *πίστις*, *εἰκασία* (cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 1 (4th ed.), p. 637, n. 3).

[2] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 100b, 7–8; *δόξα*, *λογισμός*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *νοῦς*; *De Anima*, III, 3, 428a, 4–5: *αἴσθησις*, *δόξα*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *νοῦς*; *Metaphysics*, XII, 9, 1074b, 35–36; *ἐπιστήμη*, *αἴσθησις*, *δόξα*, *διάνοια*; *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139b, 16–17: *τέχνη*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *φρόνησις*, *σοφία*, *νοῦς*, *ὑπόληψις*, *δόξα* (cf. J. Geyser, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles*, p. 141).

[3] *Mizan al-'Amal* [XXIV], p. 117; *Mozene Ẓedeḳ*, XXIV, p. 150.

[4] *πίστις*, *γνῶσις*, *ἐπιστήμη*. Cf. Erdmann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, § 136.

[5] *Sensus*, *ratio*, *intellectus*. Cf. *ibid.*, § 146.

[6] *Sensus externus* and *sensus internus* (*διάνοια*), *ratio* (*λόγος*), *intellectus* or *animus* (*νοῦς*). Cf. *ibid.*, § 154.2.

[7] *ratio* (physics), *disciplinalis speculatio* (mathematics), *intellectus* (theology). Cf. *ibid.*, § 163.4.

[8] *cogitatio*, *meditatio*, *contemplatio*. Cf. *ibid.*, § 165.4.

[9] *opinio*, *fides*, *scientia*. Cf. *ibid.*, § 170.2, and see quotation below, p. 148, n. 3.

[10] *cogitatio* (*imaginatio*), *meditatio* (*ratio*), *contemplatio* (*intelligentia*). Cf. *ibid.*, § 172.3.

[11] *sensus*, *ratio*, *intellectus*. Cf. *ibid.*, § 224.2.

The first kind of knowledge, as we have seen, is subdivided by Spinoza into two forms. We shall refer to them as first form and second form, according to the order in which they occur in the *Short Treatise* and the *Ethics*. In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* their order is reversed.

The first form of the first kind of knowledge is described by Spinoza as knowledge (1) from sense-perception (*per sensus . . . perceptiones*),[1] (2) from experience (*ondervinding*),[2] or (3) from vague experience (*experientia vaga*).[3] Sense-perception is named as a source of knowledge in all the classifications in mediaeval texts which we have referred to above. The term "experience" is mentioned by Maimonides as a kind of immediate knowledge which may form the basic premise of a syllogism, though it is not included in his original list of primary and immediately known premises, which, as we have seen, includes only four, namely, sense-perception, first notions, generally known opinions, and opinions accepted on authority.[4] As an illustration of knowledge by experience Maimonides mentions the knowledge that scammony[5] causes diarrhoea and that gallnut causes constipation. These illustrations of Maimonides are in fact nothing but a specified paraphrase of Aristotle's statement that "to have a judgment that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good . . . is a matter of experience."[6] Algazali, too, mentions the illustration from scammony; but he adds two others, namely, that fire burns and that wine intoxicates.[7] Among the several illustrations given by

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2. [2] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 2.

[3] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 19 (*Opera*, II, p. 10, l. 11); *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

[4] Cf. above, p. 119.

[5] השקמוניא, אל]שקמוניא (*Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 8), السقمونيا (Algazali, *Maḳaṣid al-Falasifah*, I, 4, p. 52).

[6] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 981a, 7–9.

[7] *Loc. cit.* See above, n. 5.

Spinoza of experience there is one of a similar nature, dealing as it does with the efficacy of the application of certain means for the obtaining of certain ends: "Again through vague experience I also know that oil is the proper food for feeding flame, and that water is fit for extinguishing it."[1] Now experience (ἐμπειρία) is said by Aristotle to arise from sense-perception through memory. "So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience."[2] He distinguishes it from art in that "experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals."[3] This Aristotelian explanation of experience is generally followed by the mediaevals, but they try to show that certain experiences are the result of both sense-perception and intellect. Thus Comtino in his commentary on Maimonides' treatise on logical terminology says that "propositions based upon experience are made up of propositions based upon sensible perceptions and intellectual notions, as has been stated by Algazali, for when we say that fire burns, scammony causes diarrhoea, and wine intoxicates, while it is the senses which perceive repeatedly, time after time, that the imbibing of wine is followed by intoxication, it is reason which judges that this sequence of events must come to pass by necessity, for if it came to pass only by chance it would not occur in the majority of cases,[4] and as a result there becomes ingrained in

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 20 (*Opera*, II, p. 10, ll. 27 ff.).

[2] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 100a, 3–6. Cf. *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 980b, 28 ff.

[3] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 981a, 15–16.

[4] Cf. *Physics*, II, 5, 196b, 10–13: "First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the effect of chance be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part."

the mind a knowledge of this fact upon which it can rely."[1] Descartes, too, describes experience in a way which suggests the mediaeval modification of Aristotle's description. He says: "Matter of experience consists of what we perceive by sense, what we hear from the lips of others, and generally what reaches our intellect either from external sources or from that contemplation which our mind directs backwards on itself (*ex sui ipsius contemplatione reflexa*)."[2] Spinoza's description of experience reflects this Aristotelian description as restated by Descartes, and this is the significance of his statement that experience is "from individual things, represented by the senses . . . to the *intellect*."[3] As for the expression "vague experience," it is to be found in Bacon.[4]

The second form of the first kind of knowledge is described by Spinoza as knowledge (1) from hearsay (*hooren zeggen*),[5] (2) from hearing (*ex auditu*),[6] (3) from some sign (*ex aliquo signo*),[7] or (4) from signs (*ex signis*).[8] The expressions "from hearsay" and "from hearing" reflect Saadia's fourth source of knowledge, which we have translated above "tradition" but which literally means "saying."[9] Another Hebrew word for tradition literally means "hearing."[10] The two words "hearing" and "saying" occur together in a Talmudic passage.[11] Tradition is one of the things that Spinoza means by

[1] See Comtino's Commentary on *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 8, and *Maḳaṣid al-Falasifah*, I, 4 (pp. 52–53).

[2] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, XII (6) (*Oeuvres*, X, pp. 422, l. 25–423, l. 1).

[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

[4] Cf. *Novum Organum*, I, c. Cf. W. Hale White's translation of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, Preface, p. xii, n. 1.

[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 2.

[6] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 19 (*Opera*, II, p. 10, l. 9).

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

[9] הגדה.

[10] מפי השמועה, *Sanhedrin* 88a.

[11] אין אומרים שמועה והגדה. *Mo'ed Ḳatan* 23a.

"hearing" and "hearsay." The term "sign" in the sense of words heard or written, and hence of the ideas formed of them, has been ascribed to Occam, from whom, it has been suggested, Spinoza borrowed it.[1] But there is a passage in Aristotle which may be considered the source of Occam as well as of Spinoza. "Spoken words," says Aristotle, "are the signs (*σύμβολα*, *signa* in the Latin translations accessible to Spinoza) of mental experience, and written words are the signs of spoken words."[2] Similarly Hobbes speaks of names as the "signs" of our "conceptions."[3] What is more significant still is the fact that Hobbes calls them arbitrary (*arbitraria*) signs in contradistinction to natural (*naturalia*) signs.[4] So also Spinoza qualifies his "from some sign" in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* by the statement "which everyone may name as he pleases (*quod vocant ad placitum*)."[5] Descartes, too, without using the word "sign," seems to refer to what Aristotle and Spinoza call signs when he says that "we observe that words, whether uttered by voice or merely written, excite in our minds all sorts of thoughts and emotions."[6] Spinoza's contemporary Locke likewise says: "There are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz., ideas and words."[7] The fullest explanation of signs is given by Spinoza in the following passage. After stating that "words are part of the imagination, that is to say, we form many conceptions according to the manner in which words

[1] *Quaestiones super Analytica Posteriora*, I, 37, p. 403 A, quoted by W. Eichberg in his *Untersuchungen uber die Beziehungen der Erkenntnislehre Spinozas zur Scholastik mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Schule Okkams* (Borna-Leipzig, 1910), p. 20, n. 19.

[2] *De Interpretatione*, 1, 16a, 3–4.

[3] "Nomina, ut definitum est, disposita in oratione, signa sunt conceptuum." *Elementa Philosophiae*, Pars I, Cap. II, § 5, p. 15 (*Opera*, I, London, 1839).

[4] *Ibid.*, § 2, p. 13.

[5] § 19 (*Opera*, II, p. 12, ll. 9–10).

[6] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 197.

[7] *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 5, § 2.

are loosely combined in the memory from some disposition of the body," he adds: "It is to be noted also that they are formed according to the caprice and notions of the vulgar, so that they are nothing but signs of things as they exist in the imagination, and not as they exist in the intellect."[1]

The second kind of knowledge, while mentioned in the *Short Treatise*, given a name, and illustrated by an example, is not described there. The nearest we get there to a description of this kind of knowledge is the statement that it is not confined to "the experience of a few particulars" and that it examines things "in the light of true reason."[2] But in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* it is introduced first by the general statement that this kind of knowledge arises "when the essence of a thing is deduced from another thing." Then this kind of deduction is subdivided into two forms: (1) "when we . . . infer the cause from the effect," and (2) "when we make an inference from some universal which is always accompanied by some property." In the *Ethics* it is described by a statement which is to be taken as a parallel to the second form of deduction mentioned in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. It reads as follows: "From our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things." The expression "common notions" in this passage of the *Ethics* is undoubtedly the same as the expression "some universal" in the passage in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. It is therefore with reference to this second form of deduction that Spinoza describes the second kind of knowledge as universal knowledge (*cognitio universalis*) in the Scholium to Proposition XXXVI of the Fifth Part of the *Ethics*.[3]

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, §§ 88–89 (*Opera*, II, p. 33, ll. 8–15). Cf. below, p. 174, n. 2.

[2] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 55, ll. 4–6).

[3] *Opera*, II, p. 303, l. 19. Cf. below, p. 150, n. 5.

The first form of deduction under Spinoza's second kind of knowledge, the deduction of cause from effect, corresponds exactly to what Saadia in his classification of the sources of knowledge describes as knowledge by [logical] necessity. Saadia illustrates it by many examples, the simplest of which is that where there is smoke there is fire.[1] Another example cited by Saadia reads as follows: "As, e.g., in order not to deny the plainly evident functioning of the soul [i.e., sensation, etc.] we are forced to admit that man has a soul, even though we do not perceive it."[2] Similarly Spinoza illustrates the deduction of cause from effect in the second kind of knowledge as follows: "We deduce from some other thing in this way: when we clearly perceive that we are sensible of a particular body and no other, then we clearly deduce, I say, from that perception that our mind is united to that body, and that the union is the cause of that sensation." In a note explaining this passage Spinoza comes still closer to Saadia's statement. "By that union," he says, "we understand nothing except the sensation itself, which is an effect, from which we conclude a cause of which we understand nothing."[3] Furthermore, Saadia, after mentioning a few other complicated examples which require a knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, concludes with the following words of warning: "Having explained the nature of logically necessary knowledge, we deem it fit to mention some precautions which would safeguard this kind of knowledge from fallacies, for most of the discords among men and the diversity of their arguments arise in and from this kind of reasoning."[4] Similarly Spinoza comments in a note to his illus-

[1] *Emunot we-De'ot*, Introduction.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 21 and note g (*Opera*, II, p. 11, ll. 3–7).

[4] *Emunot we-De'ot*, Introduction.

tration of the deduction of cause from effect that "such a conclusion, although it may be certain, is nevertheless not sufficiently safe, unless great precautions are taken."[1]

The second form of deduction under Spinoza's second kind of knowledge, namely, the deduction of a conclusion from a premise in a syllogism, is described by him, as we have seen, in two passages. In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* he describes it as "an inference from some universal which is always accompanied by some property."[2] This passage seems to be simply a description of the composition of the major premise of a syllogism, such as "all men are mortal," in which "all men" is Spinoza's "some universal" and "mortal" is his "some property" by which the universal is accompanied. The passage in the *Ethics*, namely, "from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things,"[3] is similarly a description of the major premise, with the added emphasis that the relation of the predicate to the subject in it must be adequately known, that is to say, immediately known and in need of no demonstration. The statement in Proposition XL of the Second Part of the *Ethics* that "those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it" evidently refers to this second form of deduction, namely, the deduction of a conclusion from a premise.

The third kind of knowledge is described in the *Short Treatise* as that which is the "result of clear and distinct conception." In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* it is described as that which arises "when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause." In Scholium II to Proposition XL of the

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 21, note h (*Opera*, II, p. 11).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 19 (p. 10, ll. 18–19).
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

Second Part of the *Ethics* it is called intuitive science (*scientia intuitiva*), and is described as knowledge which advances "from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." The same description is repeated almost verbatim in the Demonstration of Proposition XXV of the Fifth Part of the *Ethics*, and it is restated in the Scholium to Proposition XXXVI of the Fifth Part of the *Ethics* as a knowledge which follows "from the divine nature, and continuously depends upon God." In the Scholium to Proposition XLVII of the Second Part of the *Ethics* it is described as follows: "Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all; and since all things are in God and are conceived through Him, it follows that we deduce from this knowledge many things which we can know adequately, and that we can thus form that third kind of knowledge."

Taking all these passages together, we get four characteristics of the third kind of knowledge. *First*, it is knowledge which is deduced from "an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God" or from "the divine nature" or from "the infinite essence and the eternity of God." *Second*, it arises "when a thing is perceived through its essence alone." *Third*, it arises when a thing is perceived "through the knowledge of its proximate cause." *Fourth*, it is the "result of clear and distinct conception." Now we shall try to show that when Spinoza says in the *second* of these characteristics that it is the knowledge of a thing when perceived "through its essence alone" he means the same as when he says in various ways in the *first* of these characteristics that it is a knowledge of God or His attributes, that when he says in the *third* of these characteristics that it is the knowledge of a thing when perceived "through the knowledge of its proximate cause" he means here by "proxi-

mate cause" God or His attributes, and that when he says in the *fourth* of these characteristics that it is the "result of clear and distinct conception" he means it to be a summary of all the other three characteristics. Finally, we shall try to show that by all these characterizations of the third kind of knowledge Spinoza means to say that it is knowledge attained from what he would call a true definition.

The passage by which I shall try to prove my statements in the preceding paragraph is Spinoza's discussion of the nature of a definition in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* and its parallel discussion in the *Short Treatise*. In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* Spinoza distinguishes between the definition of an uncreated thing and the definition of a created thing.[1] By an uncreated thing he means a thing that is in itself (*in se*) or is the cause of itself (*causa sui*).[2] This, of course, refers to God and His attributes. In the *Short Treatise* this kind of definition is explicitly said to be "of those attributes which pertain to a self-subsisting being . . . for, since they exist as attributes of a self-subsisting being, they also become known through themselves."[3] Furthermore, this kind of definition is said to be of a thing which is "understood through its essence alone."[4] From all this it is clearly seen that the *second* characteristic mentioned above of the third kind of knowledge, namely, that it is the knowledge of a thing when perceived "through its essence alone," is identical with its *first* characteristic, namely, that it is knowledge deduced "from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God" or "from the divine nature" or from "the infinite essence and the eternity of God."

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, §§ 96 ff. (*Opera*, II, p. 35).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 92 (p. 34, ll. 10–11).
[3] *Short Treatise*, I, 7, § 10.
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 92 (*Opera*, II, p. 34, ll. 11–12).

By a created thing, which is the subject of the other kind of definition, Spinoza means any mode or particular thing, using here, of course, the term "created" not in its specific sense of creation but in the general sense of having a cause for its existence. We have already shown that this use of the term is made by Spinoza elsewhere.[1] Of the definition of created things Spinoza simply says that it must "include the proximate cause."[2] But what does he mean by proximate cause? In the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* he illustrates it by the definition of a circle, which is defined "as a figure which is described by any line of which one extremity is fixed and the other movable."[3] This would seem to imply that Spinoza means by this kind of definition what is generally known as a genetic, constructive, or causal kind of definition, or whatever else this kind of definition is called. Accordingly, by a proximate cause he would seem to mean the process by which a thing is produced. In the *Short Treatise*, however, he narrows it down to only one kind of causal definition. He describes it there as the definition of things "which do not exist through themselves, but only through the attributes whose modes they are."[4] The context of the passage makes it quite clear that by "attributes" he means the attributes of God. Accordingly, by a proximate cause he would seem to mean God and His attributes, who is the cause of all things and is their proximate and not their remote cause.[5]

This apparent inconsistency between these two quoted passages, however, can be removed by the distinction which Spinoza makes, though with not as much clearness as one

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 350–351, 383.
[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 96 (*Opera*, II, p. 35, ll. 12–13).
[3] *Ibid.*, § 96 (p. 35, ll. 13–15).
[4] *Short Treatise*, I, 7, § 10.
[5] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 28, Schol.

would have wished him to make, between figures and other entities of reason (*figurae, et caetera entia rationis*) and physical entities and realities (*entia physica, et realia*).[1] In the case of the former, such as the definition of a circle, the proximate cause means the process by which the circle is produced. In the case of the latter, the proximate cause means God and His attributes, who is "the cause of all things."[2] Spinoza thus argues that we may deduce "all our ideas from things physical or from real entities, by advancing as strictly as possible according to the sequence of causes from one real entity to another real entity,"[3] for "it is apparent we can understand nothing of nature without at the same time making our knowledge of the first cause, that is to say, of God, more ample."[4]

It is evident, therefore, that by the *third* characteristic mentioned above of the third kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of a thing when perceived "through the knowledge of its proximate cause," Spinoza means the knowledge of a thing attained through the knowledge of God and His attributes.

It is thus the knowledge attained from the definition of a thing, either the definition of an uncreated thing or the definition of created things, that forms knowledge of the third kind. It is these two definitions that are reproduced by Spinoza in disguised languages in the passages collected above from the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, the *Ethics*, and the *Short Treatise*. When he says in the *first* and *second* characteristics mentioned above that the third kind of knowledge is knowledge deduced from "an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God"[5] or from

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 95 (*Opera*, II, p. 35, ll. 5–6).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 99 (p. 36, l. 10).
[3] *Ibid.*, § 99 (p. 36, ll. 10–17).
[4] *Ibid.*, § 92, note f (p. 34).
[5] Cf. above, p. 141.

"the divine nature"[1] or from "the infinite essence and the eternity of God,"[1] or that it arises "when a thing is perceived through its essence alone,"[1] he means by all these statements that it is knowledge derived from the definition of a thing uncreated. When, on the other hand, he says in the *third* characteristic that it is knowledge arising when a thing is perceived "through the knowledge of its proximate cause," he means by it that it is knowledge derived from the definition of things created. But when he says in the *fourth* characteristic that it is the "result of clear and distinct conceptions,"[1] he means by it knowledge derived from a definition in general, be it a definition of a thing uncreated or of things created.

These three kinds of knowledge are described by Spinoza by the following groups of terms: (1) Belief (*geloof*),[2] opinion (*waan, opinio*),[3] or imagination (*imaginatio*).[4] (2) True belief (*waar geloof*),[5] belief,[6] or reason (*reeden, ratio*).[7] (3) Clear knowledge (*klaare kennisse*),[8] knowledge (*weten, kennisse*)[9] or intuitive science (*scientia intuitiva*).[10] All these terms can be shown to have been used by other philosophers in the senses in which Spinoza used them.

The terms "belief" and "opinion" reflect respectively the Greek ὑπόληψις and δόξα, which, like Spinoza's first kind of knowledge, are used by Aristotle as designations of a knowledge which is based upon sense-perception and imagination

[1] Cf. above, p. 141.
[2] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 2.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, 2, §§ 1–2; *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.
[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 2, and 14, § 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 77, l. 4).
[6] *Ibid.*, II, 2, §§ 1–2.
[7] *Ibid.*, II, 14, § 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 77, l. 4).
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 2, §§ 1–2.
[9] *Ibid.*, II, 4, § 1, note 1 (*Opera*, I, p. 59, l. 28), and 14, § 1 (p. 77, l. 7).
[10] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

and hence may be false.[1] The term "belief" alone may reflect also Plato's πίστις.[2] The terms "imagination" and "opinion" reflect the Greek λογισμός and δόξα, which, as we shall see later,[3] have been translated into Latin by "imagination" and "opinion" and were used by Aristotle as designations of a kind of knowledge which, again like Spinoza's first kind of knowledge, may be false. If we are right in assuming that Aristotle's ὑπόληψις and δόξα are etymologically the sources of Spinoza's "belief" and "opinion," then the contrast between Spinoza's first and second kinds of knowledge corresponds to Aristotle's contrast between ὑπόληψις, δόξα and τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς.[4] Furthermore, within the last five Aristotelian terms one may also discover some suggestion for Spinoza's distinction between the second and third kinds of knowledge, ἐπιστήμη, corresponding to the second kind of knowledge, and νοῦς, corresponding to the third kind of knowledge.

The term "belief" which is used by Spinoza for the first kind of knowledge is also used by him, either with or without the qualifying adjective "true," as a designation for the second kind of knowledge. If, as we have suggested, "belief" reflects Aristotle's ὑπόληψις, then the twofold use of this term by Spinoza reflects the twofold meaning of ὑπόληψις in Aristotle. In one sense, ὑπόληψις means approximately the same as δόξα, and it corresponds therefore to the first kind of knowledge in Spinoza. In another sense, it means scientific or demonstrative knowledge, and it corresponds therefore to the second kind of knowledge in Spinoza.[5] Spinoza's

[1] *De Anima*, III, 3, 427b, 14–16; *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139b, 17–18. Cf. J. Geyser, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles*, pp. 141–142.

[2] Cf. above, p. 133, n. 1. [3] See below, p. 151.

[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139b, 15 ff.

[5] Cf. J. Geyser, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles*, pp. 147 ff.; R. D. Hicks on *De Anima*, III, 3, 427b, 16.

qualified expression "true belief," accordingly, will reflect Aristotle's expression "vehement belief" (*ὑπόληψις σφοδρά*), and Spinoza's description of "belief" in its second sense as "things . . . known to us through the *conviction* or *persuasion* (*overtuyginge*) of our understanding that it must be so and not otherwise"[1] will reflect Aristotle's identification of *πίστις* with *ὑπόληψις σφοδρά*.[2] By the same token, if one wishes to push the inquiry still further, the expression "true belief" may also reflect Plato's *δόξα ἀληθής*.[3] It is also possible, as has been suggested by Joël,[4] that the use of the expression "true belief" as a designation for the second kind of knowledge with the definition that "belief is a strong proof based on reasons, whereby I am convinced in my mind that the thing is really, and just such, outside my understanding, as I am convinced in my mind that it is," [5] is based upon Crescas' statement that "belief is nothing but the conviction that the thing is outside the soul as it is in the soul," [6] or as Maimonides says: "By belief we do not understand that which is uttered with the lips but that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction that the object [of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended." [7] This conception of "belief," which in Maimonides is explicitly applied to matters religious, seems to me to be in opposition to Descartes' statement that "belief (*fides*) in these things [i.e. matters that have been divinely revealed], as all belief in obscure matters, is an action not of our intelligence (*ingenii*), but of our will." [8]

The term "reason" (*ratio*) in Spinoza's second kind of

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 2, § 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 55, ll. 23–26).
[2] *Topics*, IV, 5, 126b, 18. Cf. Geyser, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
[3] *Timaeus* 51D.
[4] Joël, *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's*, pp. 63–64.
[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 4, § 1, note 1 (*Opera*, I, p. 59, ll. 23–25).
[6] *Or Adonai*, II, v, 4 (p. 49b).
[7] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 50.
[8] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 370, ll. 21–22).

knowledge represents the Greek λόγος, which in the sense of ratiocination is the basis of Aristotle's scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), that is to say, knowledge based upon demonstrative reasoning.

The term "knowledge" or "clear knowledge" used by Spinoza for his third kind of knowledge etymologically reflects the Greek ἐπιστήμη, which is used by Aristotle in the sense of Spinoza's second kind of knowledge. Evidently Spinoza uses this term loosely as the equivalent of Aristotle's νοῦς in the sense of immediate knowledge. Or it may reflect Plato's use of the term ἐπιστήμη as the equivalent of νοῦς.[1]

The term "intuitive science" in Spinoza's third kind of knowledge is borrowed directly from Descartes, who uses the term "intuitus" as the opposite of both "inductio" and "deductio."[2]

These three terms, "opinion," "belief," and "knowledge," as designations of three stages of knowledge, arranged in the same order as in Spinoza but used in a different sense, are found in the following passage of Alanus (or Nicolaus of Amiens): "Belief (*fides*) stands therefore at least above opinion (*opinio*), but below knowledge (*scientia*)."[3]

In a conversation with Leibniz about Spinoza's *Ethics*, Tschirnhaus designates the three kinds of knowledge by *sensualis*, *pragmativa* (*-ca*?), and *intuitiva*.[4] The first and third

[1] Cf. above, p. 133, n. 1.

[2] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 368, ll. 12–13); IV (p. 372, l. 16).

[3] "Fides igitur utique super opinionem sed infra scientiam." *De Arte seu Articulis Catholicae Fidei*, I, xvii, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 210, Col. 601. This work is now ascribed to Nicolaus of Amiens. Cf. M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (1911), II, pp. 459 ff.

[4] The conversation was published by K. I. Gerhardt, "Leibniz und Spinoza," in *Sitzungsberichte der koniglich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1889, pp. 175 ff. Cf. p. 177: "nam aliam esse sensualem, aliam pragmativam (-cam?), aliam intuitivam."

terms are quite clear. As for the second term, *pragmativa*, if it is not a corruption of some such term as *ratiocinativa*, it may have here the meaning of laborious or demonstrative knowledge, i.e., mediate knowledge arrived at by a process of reasoning as opposed to the immediate knowledge of *intuitiva*, after the analogy of the various shades of meanings of πραγματεία, *a philosophical argument*, πραγματευτέος, *to be labored at*, the Byzantine meaning of πραγματικός, *arduous*, *difficult*, *troublesome*, and the *pragmaticus* of the Roman writers used in the sense of one who suggested arguments to public speakers and advocates.[1] In a similar connection does the Latin equivalent of πρᾶγμα, *negotium*, occur in Ibn Gabirol's *Fons Vitae*, where the immediate or intuitive knowledge of the intellect is described as a knowledge *sine inquisitione, sine negotio*.[2] Int he corresponding passage in the Epitome Campililiensis of the *Fons Vitae*, instead of *sine negotio* the expression used is *sine . . . fatigatione*.[3]

There are certain distinguishing characteristics which differentiate the three kinds of knowledge from one another. The first kind of knowledge is based upon sense-perception and is formed by means of imagination and memory. The second kind of knowledge, which consists of common notions and of conclusions derived from common notions, is likewise based upon sense-perception, but it is formed by the activity of the mind itself. The third kind of knowledge is entirely free from sense-perception and is formed both in the mind and by the mind. Again, like the first kind of knowledge and like the common notions in the second kind of knowledge, the third kind of knowledge is also a direct and

[1] Cf. Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 7th ed.; E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*.

[2] *Fons Vitae*, III, 48 (p. 187); cf. below, p. 156.

[3] *Ibid.* (p. 369).

immediate sort of knowledge. It differs, however, from conclusions in the second kind of knowledge in that the latter is mediate knowledge, deduced by syllogistic reasoning and by means of a middle term from common notions, whereas the former is immediate knowledge which is implicit in the very nature and essence of the thing. Spinoza seems to express this distinction by saying, evidently with reference to the distinction between the second and the third kinds of knowledge, that in the former we reason "from universal axioms alone (*ab axiomatibus solis universalibus*)," whereas in the latter we form our thoughts "from some given definition (*ex data aliqua definitione*)."[1] Now, the difference between drawing conclusions from "universal axioms" and forming thoughts from "some given definition," according to Aristotle, is this: In the case of the former, the knowledge is derived indirectly, syllogistically, and by means of a middle term; in the case of the latter it is derived directly as the unfolding of something which is implicit in the definition.[2] Furthermore, an axiom is a universal, whereas a definition, according to Aristotle, is neither a particular nor a universal.[3] Spinoza says somewhat in a similar way that the definition deals with some particular affirmative essence (*essentia aliqua particularis affirmativa*),[4] whereas axioms are described by him as being universal. Hence in another place he refers to the third kind of knowledge as knowledge of individual objects (*rerum singularium cognitio*) and to the second kind of knowledge as universal knowledge (*cognitio universalis*).[5]

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, §§ 93–94 (*Opera*, II, p. 34, ll. 20–24).

[2] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 10, 94a, 10 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, 10, 77a, 4.

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 93 and § 98 (*Opera*, II, p. 34, l. 19; p. 36, ll. 3–4).

[5] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 36, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 303, ll. 17 and 19). Cf. above, p. 138.

The evaluation of the validity of these three kinds of knowledge is given by Spinoza in Proposition XLI: "Knowledge of the first kind alone is the cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third orders is necessarily true." This proposition re-echoes the general view of philosophers throughout history which is formulated by Aristotle in the following statement: "Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error — δόξα, for instance, and λογισμός, whereas ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς are always true."[1] The exact meaning of some of the Greek terms in this passage is a debatable point, and they have been variously translated. But in two Latin translations made from the Hebrew of Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Analytica Posteriora*, published with Aristotle's works, the following Latin translations of the Greek terms are given: δόξα, *phantasia, imaginatio;* λογισμός, *opinio, computatio;* ἐπιστήμη, *sapientia, scientia;* νοῦς, *intellectus.*[2] From this commentary of Averroes, which was accessible in many editions, the passage quoted from Aristotle was taken to mean that imagination and opinion (δόξα and λογισμός), i.e., Spinoza's first kind of knowledge, admit of error, whereas discoursive knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and intuition (νοῦς), i.e.,

[1] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 100b, 5–8. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139b, 15–18.

[2] The two Latin translations, one by Abraham de Balmes and the other by Giovanni Francesco Burana, of Averroes' interpretation of the Aristotelian passage in question read as follows:

ABRAHAM DE BALMES

"Habitus autem qui in mente sunt, qui veraces sunt, quidam eorum sunt semper veraces; et quidam sunt, qui mendacium admittunt, prout sunt phantasia et opinio. Qui vero semper est verax, ipse est intellectus, et sapientia."

BURANA

"Ex habitibus vero, qui sunt in intellectu, quibus verificamus, aliqui sunt veri semper, aliqui vero suscipiunt falsum, quemadmodum imaginatio et computatio: verus autem semper est intellectus et scientia."

(*Aristotelis Omnia Quae Extant Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iuntas), Vol. I, Pars II (1574), fol. 567 r).

Spinoza's second and third kinds of knowledge, are unfailingly true.

But note that Spinoza does not say in Proposition XLI that the first kind of knowledge is false. He only says that it is the cause of falsity (*falsitatis causa*), that is to say, it may lead to falsity. Similarly in the *Short Treatise* he describes it as being merely "subject to error."[1] Aristotle, too, says of the two terms δόξα and λογισμός, which he includes under what corresponds to Spinoza's first kind of knowledge, that they only admit of falsity (ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος).[2] Descartes, too, while speaking of deduction and intuition, which correspond to Spinoza's second and third kinds of knowledge, as "the most certain routes to knowledge," refers to all the other modes of knowledge, which Spinoza would put under his first kind of knowledge, merely "as suspect of error and dangerous."[3] Sense-perception, imagination, and opinion Spinoza would admit are not always false. They only *may* be false, owing to the unreliability of our senses. What is it then that serves as a judge to decide which of our sense-perceptions, or imaginations, or opinions are true and which are false? It is not the first kind of knowledge itself, says Spinoza, which verifies its own perceptions, but it is the second and third kinds of knowledge. Hence Proposition XLII: "It is the knowledge of the second and third, and not that of the first kind, which teaches us to distinguish the true from the false." Thus the second and third kinds of knowledge are not only sources of true knowledge by their own right, but they are also the criteria of the truth of the knowledge of the first kind.

But while the second and the third kinds of knowledge are the criteria of the first kind, Spinoza now wants to say in

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 1, § 2. [2] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 100b, 7.
[3] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 370, ll. 16–19).

Proposition XLIII that the mind itself is the criterion of the second and third kinds of knowledge. But before we take up this proposition we shall first discuss a passage in Aristotle which may be considered as the source of this proposition, and then we shall discuss certain passages in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* which seem to reflect that source.

Demonstrative knowledge, the kind of knowledge which Spinoza describes as second, must, according to Aristotle, begin with certain principles which are undemonstrable and immediately known. Were it not so, he argues, then one demonstration would require another demonstration, and the other still another, and so on to infinity, which is impossible.[1] The primary premises of syllogisms must therefore be known immediately by the intellect (*νοῦς*).[2] As a result of this, "intellect (*νοῦς*, intuition) will be the originative source of demonstrative knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*)."[3]

Spinoza proceeds in the same manner to prove that his second kind of knowledge rests ultimately upon the third kind, i.e., the power of the mind itself. Like Aristotle he denies the possibility of an infinite regress of demonstrations. "To this end, we must first consider that there is here no search *ad infinitum;* that is to say, in order that the best method of discovering the truth may be found, there is no need of another method for investigating the method of investigating the truth, and in order that the second method may be investigated there is no need of a third, and so on *ad infinitum*, for in this way we shall never arrive at a knowledge of the truth, nor indeed at any knowledge."[4] This second kind of knowledge must ultimately rest upon the intellect,

[1] *Analytica Posteriora*, I, 3, 72b, 5–22; cf. II, 19, 100b, 12–14.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, 19, 100b, 12.
[3] *Ibid.*, 100b, 15.
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 30 (*Opera*, II, p. 13, ll. 17–23).

which "by its own native force forms for itself intellectual instruments by which it acquires additional strength for other intellectual works, and from these works other instruments or power of further discovery, and thus by degrees advances until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom."[1] But "there must before everything else exist in us a true idea which is as it were an innate instrument."[2] The test of such a true idea is its self-evidence, and the certainty which it provokes in the mind of those who possess it, for "the mind acts according to certain laws, and as if, so to speak, it were a sort of spiritual automaton,"[3] with the result that one of the functions of the mind is "that it involves certitude,"[4] that is to say, it knows truth when it presents itself to it. Consequently, "if anybody had been led by good fortune to proceed in this way in the investigation of nature, that is to say, by acquiring ideas in their proper order according to the standard of a given true idea, he would never have doubted of their truth, because the truth, as we have shown, is self-evident and all things would have flowed spontaneously towards him." [5]

All this reasoning, the Aristotelian background and his own statements in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, lies behind Proposition XLIII: "He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt the truth of the thing." In the Scholium to this proposition he explains the nature of the internal criterion of truth as distinguished from the external, and he uses phrases and expressions which are similar to those used by him in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*.

[1] *Ibid.*, § 31 (p. 14, ll. 4–7).
[2] *Ibid.*, § 39 (p. 16, ll. 13–14).
[3] *Ibid.*, § 85 (p. 32, ll. 24–25).
[4] *Ibid.*, § 108 (p. 38, l. 32).
[5] *Ibid.*, § 44 (p. 17, ll. 16–20). Cf. above, pp. 99 ff.

There is, however, a difference between the second and the third kind of knowledge. Although both these kinds of knowledge are formed by the mind and are tested by the mind itself for their validity and truth, still they differ in one fundamental respect. The common notions of Spinoza's second kind of knowledge, like the immediate premises in Aristotle's demonstrative knowledge,[1] are ultimately in their final analysis traceable to sense-perception. They are considered to be the work of the intellect only because it is the intellect which transforms these sense-perceptions into scientific universal notions. Spinoza's third kind of knowledge, however, is of a different nature. It has no connection with sense-perception at all. It is "formed purely by the mind," says Spinoza, "and not by fortuitous movements of the body."[2] It is generated within the mind itself, because the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God. "We must remember, besides," says Spinoza, "that our mind, in so far as it truly perceives things, is part of the infinite intellect of God (Corol. Prop. XI, Pt. II), and therefore it must be that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as true as those of God."[3]

Now what is the nature of this third kind of knowledge? The term "intuitive" by which it is described merely explains that it is immediate. Immediacy, according to Descartes, is the essential characteristic of intuition as a source of knowledge.[4] But what is its source, and how does it arise?

The so-called innate ideas would naturally suggest themselves to our mind as something similar to Spinoza's third kind of knowledge. However, the term innate ideas is in itself

[1] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 99b, 20 ff.
[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 91 (*Opera*, II, p. 34, ll. 3–4).
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 43, Schol.
[4] Cf. *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 368, ll. 14 ff.).

a vague term and has been used by historians as a description for a variety of kinds of knowledge which differ in origin and nature. First, Aristotle's primary principles (ἀρχαί) or immediate premises (προτάσεις ἄμεσοι) are sometimes spoken of as innate despite the fact that he himself definitely says that they are neither inherent (ἐνοῦσαι) nor not-inherent (οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι)[1] in us, but that they are developed by our mind out of our capacity of sense-perception. Second, Plato's theory of reminiscence is also sometimes spoken of as a theory of innate ideas,[2] though Plato's knowledge has a definite external, though a super-sensible, source, namely, the world of ideas. Third, Cicero speaks of the idea of God as being innate in the sense that it is generated in the mind itself, it is congenital with man, and has neither an external sensible or external super-sensible source.[3] In the Middle Ages Jewish philosophers, too, speak of a sort of immediate knowledge which is generated in the mind and is independent of sense-perception. Thus Ibn Gabirol says that "the action of the intellect is the apprehension of all the intelligible forms in no-time and in no-place, without any investigation (*inquisitione*), without any labor (*negotio*), and without any other cause except its own essence, for it is completely perfect."[4] But even this passage does not definitely make it clear that there is no external super-sensible source of this knowledge of the intellect, for the intelligible forms which the intellect comprehends seem to have come from somewhere and are not generated by the mind itself. Similarly other Jewish philosophers, speaking of Aristotle's immediate propositions or axioms or primary notions, as they call them, say that they come to the mind by divine inspira-

[1] *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 19, 99b, 25 and 30–32.

[2] Cf. P. Janet et G. Séailles, *Histoire de la Philosophie* (12th ed., Paris, 1921), p. 118.

[3] *De Natura Deorum*, I, 17, § 44; II, 4, § 12.

[4] *Fons Vitae*, III, 48 (p. 187); *Likḳute Meḳor Ḥayyim*, III, 30.

tion.[1] But here, again, does this mean that they are implanted in the mind by God, or does it mean that they are formed out of sense-perception with the assistance of divine inspiration? In either case, they have an external source, though, as in Plato, it may be only a super-sensible external source. The same is probably also true of the innate ideas which are mentioned by the Schoolmen. Even with regard to the chief exponent of innate ideas in modern philosophy, Descartes, we cannot be altogether certain what he means by them. One of his innate ideas, at least, the idea of God, has a super-sensible external source, namely, God.

Now, what is the exact meaning of Spinoza's third kind of knowledge? It is quite certain that, unlike the so-called innate ideas of Aristotle, it has no external sensible source. But is it like the innate ideas of Plato and of the mediaevals, which have a super-sensible external source? Or is it like the Ciceronian innate ideas, having no external source at all? No direct answer to this question is given by Spinoza. The only passage which seems to have a bearing upon it is that in which he denies the Platonic theory of recollection,[2] from which it may be inferred positively that the third kind of knowledge is not a form of recollection, but it sheds no light on the question as to whether it is without any super-sensible external source at all. The cumulative effect of Spinoza's utterances on this subject, however, is that his third kind of knowledge combines in itself elements of both these meanings of innate ideas. In so far as the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God, it gets its ideas from God; the ideas of the third kind of knowledge are thus the equivalent of those kinds of innate ideas which have a super-sensible

[1] *Cuzari*, V, 12; *Emunah Ramah*, II, iv, 1 (pp. 58 and 60). Cf. my paper "Notes on the Proofs of the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy" in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, I (1924), pp. 581–582.

[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 23, Schol. Cf. below, p. 296.

source. Spinoza thus says in his description of the third kind of knowledge that "we must remember, besides, that our mind, in so far as it truly perceives things, is a part of the infinite intellect of God (Corol. Prop. XI, Pt. II), and therefore it must be that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as true as those of God." [1] But on the other hand, inasmuch as the God of Spinoza is not an external cause from whom the human mind emanates or by whom it is created, but is rather an immanent cause within which the human mind is contained [2] or a whole of which the human mind is a part, to say that the human mind gets its ideas from God means that the ideas are generated within it and do not come from any source which may be called external in any sense whatsoever.

With this explanation of the nature of the second and third kinds of knowledge, Spinoza proceeds to enumerate the things which are included under these two kinds of knowledge.[3] Under the second kind of knowledge he is going to mention only the common notions [4] which form the basis of knowledge derived from them by the art of reasoning. Now these common notions, as we have already shown, when taken only with regard to physical bodies, are the modes of extension, i.e., motion and rest and their laws and rules, which are common to all things.[5] Motion and rest are what Spinoza calls the immediate infinite and eternal modes of extension, and they are also called by him the fixed and eternal things.[6] It is these which in Propositions XLIV–XLVI Spinoza identifies with the common notions — one of the three subject-matters of the second kind of knowledge. The task of enumerating the subject-matter of the third class

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 43, Schol. [2] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 323.
[3] For the subject-matter of the first kind of knowledge, see above, pp. 106–109.
[4] For simple ideas and conclusions, see above, pp. 112–113, 117, 129–130.
[5] Cf. above, p. 126. [6] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 242, 251.

of knowledge is not a long one, for, as Spinoza says elsewhere, "the things which I can as yet understand by this kind of knowledge are very few." [1] This statement seems to be directly aimed at Descartes, who, after enumerating several examples of intuitive knowledge, such as man's knowledge of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, and the sphere by a single superficies, concludes that "facts of such a kind are far more numerous than many people think, disdaining as they do to direct their attention upon such simple matters." [2] Spinoza does not seem to think that the objects of the third kind of knowledge are numerous. Leaving out mathematical concepts and other entities of reason, of which he treats elsewhere and gives several illustrations,[3] especially that of the rule of three,[4] and confining himself to what he calls elsewhere "physical entities and realities,"[5] he mentions in Proposition XLVII the "knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God."

But let us now work out the details of Propositions XLIV–XLVII. From the time of Aristotle particular sublunar things were regarded as having a double aspect. In themselves they were regarded as transient things, generated and corruptible, subject to chance and accident, and hence by their own nature only contingent. But regarded as part of the entire universe they are both eternal and necessary. Their matter is an eternal matter and their motion is an eternal motion, and that eternal motion of theirs proceeds directly by necessity from the Prime Mover, and follows

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 22 (*Opera*, II, p. 11, ll. 18–19).

[2] *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, III (*Oeuvres*, X, p. 368, ll. 22–27).

[3] Cf. above, p. 144.

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 22 (*Opera*, II, p. 12, ll. 7–14). *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

[5] Cf. above, pp. 126, 144.

thence by an unbroken causal nexus. When we call something accidental or contingent we do not mean that it has no cause, but that its cause is an indefinite one or that it cannot be definitely determined by our knowledge.[1] In the Middle Ages that sort of double aspect of things is spoken of as a distinction in things between their being possible in themselves and their being necessary with reference to their cause — a distinction which we have discussed before on several occasions and to which, as we have seen, Spinoza makes several references.[2]

Now, this way of viewing things in their causal connection, as something necessary and eternal, is the act of the intellect, which, says Maimonides, represents things "in their true form as well as in their causal relations," whereas "imagination," he continues, "has none of these functions, for it only perceives the individual and the compound in that aggregate condition in which it presents itself to the senses."[3] Spinoza draws a similar distinction between intellect and imagination. Imagination sees things only in their fragmentary and unrelated condition, or it puts together "diverse confused ideas which belong to diverse things and operations in nature."[4] It is the imagination, too, through which "we look upon things as contingent with reference to both the past and the future."[5] But reason (*ratio*), which is one of Spinoza's technical terms for the second kind of knowledge,[6] sees things in their necessary and eternal aspect. Hence Proposition XLIV and Corollary II:

[1] *Metaphysics*, V, 30, 1025a, 24. Cf. above, p. 109, and Vol. I, p. 189.

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 188 ff.; 310.

[3] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 73, note to Prop. 10.

[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 64 (*Opera*, II, p. 24, ll. 27–28). Cf. above, pp. 82 ff.

[5] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 44, Corol. 1.

[6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2. Cf. above, p. 145.

"It is not of the nature of reason to consider things as contingent, but as necessary" and "it is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (*sub quadam aeternitatis specie*)."

These necessary and eternal aspects of things, Spinoza proceeds to say, are the immediate infinite modes: motion and rest under extension, and the absolutely infinite intellect under thought. These infinite modes, again, are what Spinoza calls the "fixed and eternal things," without which, as without substance, individual things "can neither be nor be conceived," and which, "on account of their presence everywhere and their extensive power, will be like universals to us, or, so to speak, the *genera* of the definitions of individual mutable things, and the proximate causes of all things." [1] What he means to say is that the infinite modes are related to all things as genera in the traditional conception of a definition are related to the things defined in terms of genus and species, or as proximate causes in Spinoza's own conception of a definition are related to things defined in terms of proximate causation.[2] Hence Proposition XLV: "Every idea of any body or actual existing thing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God," or, as he states it more specifically elsewhere, the "idea of the body neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God than extension and thought."[3] It is through these infinite modes or the "fixed and eternal things" that the individual things are best known and understood, for "while it seems to be by no means easy to arrive at a knowledge of these individual things, for to conceive all things simultaneously is a work far beyond the strength of the human intellect,"[4] it is possible for man to

[1] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 101 (*Opera*, II, p. 37, ll. 4–9).
[2] Cf. above, Vol. 1, pp. 383 ff. [3] Epistola 64.
[4] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 102 (*Opera*, II, p. 37, ll. 10–12).

have an adequate and perfect knowledge of the necessary and eternal aspect of the individual things, of the so-called "fixed and eternal things," or the motion and rest of bodies and their laws and rules, and even of the minds of bodies. Hence Proposition XLVI: "The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect." This, then, constitutes the subject-matter of the second kind of knowledge.

As for the subject-matter of the third kind of knowledge, it is the knowledge of God. Such a knowledge is immediate, clear, and distinct, for we could have no true knowledge at all unless we possessed a "standard of truth," which is, "in fact, a being single and infinite, in other words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being found."[1] We know that such a being exists by proofs generally called ontological, which really means that we know Him immediately and directly and on the principle that "if such a Being did not exist, it could never be produced"[2] in our mind. Hence Proposition XLVII: "The human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." This is the subject-matter of the third kind of knowledge.

In conclusion Spinoza tries to show the difference between our knowledge of the common notions, which belongs to the second kind of knowledge, and our knowledge of God, which belongs to the third kind of knowledge. Both are immediate knowledge. Both are knowledge which is formed by the mind. Both are knowledge which is common to all men.[3] But still there is a difference between them. The common notions are formed by the mind from that which the body has in common with other bodies,[4] whereas the idea of God arises in the

[1] *Ibid.*, § 76 (p. 29, ll. 16–18). [2] *Ibid.*, § 76, note a (p. 29).
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 38, Corol., and Prop. 47, Schol.
[4] *Ibid.*, Prop. 39.

mind itself by virtue of its being a part of the infinite intellect of God. It is because of this that "men do not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that which they have of common notions," for "they cannot imagine God as they can bodies." The ordinary knowledge that men have of God is erroneous knowledge, arising as it does from their habit of attaching "the name of God to the images of things which they are accustomed to see, an error they can hardly avoid, inasmuch as they are continually affected by external bodies." [1]

Let us now outline the result of our discussion in these last two chapters of Spinoza's classification of the various types of knowledge:

A. Inadequate knowledge, which includes:
  I. First kind of knowledge, consisting of
    (*a*) Sense perception, experience, vague experience;
    (*b*) Hearsay, hearing, some sign, signs.
B. Adequate knowledge, which includes:
  II. Second kind of knowledge, consisting of
    (*a*) Simple ideas and
    (*b*) Common notions, and
    (*c*) Deductions drawn therefrom, either as
      (1) Cause from effect or as
      (2) Conclusion from premises.
  III. Third kind of knowledge, derived either from the
    (*a*) Definition of a created thing, or from the
    (*b*) Definition of an uncreated thing, i.e., the idea of God and ideas related to God.

[1] *Ibid.*, Prop. 47, Schol.

CHAPTER XVII

WILL

In the plan which Spinoza had in mind for the *Ethics*, the Second Part, which deals with man, was to conclude with a denial of human freedom of the will, just as the First Part of the *Ethics*, which deals with God, concludes with a denial of divine will, its freedom and its purposiveness. But in order to deny freedom of the will one must first explain what is generally meant by will. And so in the remaining two propositions of the Second Part Spinoza begins in Proposition XLVIII with a statement of his main topic, namely, the denial of the freedom of the will, and then passes on, in the Scholium to this proposition and in Proposition XLIX, to a discussion of the general nature of will. In our presentation of the views of Spinoza on these two points, we shall start with the latter point. In fact, this is Spinoza's method of procedure in the corresponding chapters in the *Short Treatise* (Part II, Chapters XVI–XVIII). Before we try to ascertain whether the "well-being of a perfect man" is attained "voluntarily or of necessity," he says, "it is necessary to inquire what the will is." [1]

In Aristotle the nature of will is determined by its relation to sensation and thought, on the one hand, and to desire, on the other. Neither sensation nor thought, according to Aristotle, affirms or negates. Sensation merely asserts that there is an object, and thought merely asserts that there is an image of an object. "Sensation, then," says Aristotle, "is analogous to simple assertion or to simple ap-

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 1.

prehension by thought," [1] and "to the thinking soul images serve as present sensations." [2] "The speculative intellect," he says again, "thinks nothing that is practical and makes no assertion about what is to be avoided or pursued." [3] It is desire which converts the simple assertions of the sense and of the intellect into affirmations and negations, and it is this which prompts pursuit and avoidance. Now the original Greek term ὄρεξις, for which we have used the English "desire" as a translation, literally means propension or inclination, and it is this literal meaning of the term which describes its nature according to Aristotle. Desire itself is an inclination to and hence a pursuit of what has already been determined for it as pleasant, or as good, or as true; and, contrariwise, it is an avoidance of what has already been determined for it as painful, or as evil, or as false. But that which determines whether a thing is pleasant, good, or true is not desire itself, but rather sensation, imagination, or intellect. Sensation or imagination determines whether a thing is pleasant or painful, the practical intellect determines whether a thing is good or evil, and the speculative intellect determines whether a thing is true or false.[4] The determination by the rational part of the soul, i.e., the practical or speculative intellect, that a thing is good or true is called will (βούλησις), whereas the determination by the irrational part of the soul, i.e., sensation and imagination, that a thing is pleasant is called concupiscence (ἐπιθυμία).[5] But as the pleasant may be bad and false and still the soul unguided by the rational faculty may pursue it, concupiscence is called an irrational desire, as contrasted with will

[1] *De Anima*, III, 7, 431a, 8.
[2] *Ibid.*, 14–15.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, 9, 432b, 27–28.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 7, 431b, 6–12; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 2, 1139a, 27–31.
[5] *De Anima*, III, 9, 432b, 5–6.

which is a rational desire. Neither of these two, however, is distinct either from sense and intellect, on the one hand, or from desire, on the other. Only in the manner of their being (*τὸ εἶναι*) do they differ, that is to say, the differences between them are only essential or logical.[1]

These Aristotelian views on will are reflected in Spinoza. On the whole, we may reduce all of Spinoza's utterances on will to three main assertions. (1) There is a difference in some respect between will and desire. (2) Will is only a universal concept, and not a real entity. (3) Will is identical with intellect. All these three assertions, we shall try to show, are directly taken from Aristotle or can be indirectly traced to him.

In the first place, Spinoza reproduces in *Short Treatise*, II, 17, Aristotle's views on the meaning of *ὄρεξις*, *βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία*. Using for these three Greek terms respectively the Latin terms *cupiditas*, *voluntas*, and *voluptas*, he says quite properly, though with some hesitation as to its accurateness, that "according to Aristotle's definition, desire appears to be a genus containing two species . . . whence it appears to me that by desire (or *cupiditas* [= *ὄρεξις*]) he means any inclination, be it towards good, be it towards evil; but when the inclination is only towards what is or appears to be good . . . he calls it *voluntas* [= *βούλησις*] or good will; while, if it is bad . . . he calls it *voluptas* [= *ἐπιθυμία*] or bad will." This fundamental distinction between will and desire as that between an affirmation of what is good and a mere inclination toward it, which Spinoza reproduces in this chapter of the *Short Treatise* in the name of Aristotle, runs throughout his statements in its preceding

[1] *Ibid.*, III, 7, 431a, 13–14, 19–20. For the meaning of *τὸ εἶναι*, see G. Rodier's note on *De Anima*, II, 1, 412b, 11, in his *Aristote, Traité de l'Ame* (1900), Vol. II, p. 180.

chapter. "The power to affirm and deny is called will," [1] whereas "desire, we have said, is the inclination which the soul has towards something which it chooses as a good." [2] The will, he says again, is "regarded as affirmation or decision." [3] Finally, in a long passage in which he restates the view of "those who maintain that there is a will," he says that the will "is only the activity of the understanding whereby we affirm or deny something about a thing, with regard to good or evil . . . while desire is the inclination, which we only subsequently feel, to advance it." [4] Thus also Descartes states that "the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun it)." [5]

In the *Ethics* Spinoza similarly restates the same fundamental distinction between will (*voluntas*) and desire (*cupiditas*), though it would seem that, unlike his statements in the *Short Treatise*, where the affirmations and denials of the will are those concerned with good and evil, or what Aristotle would call the affirmations and denials of the practical intellect, in the *Ethics* the affirmations and denials of the will are those concerned with truth and falsehood, or what Aristotle would call the affirmations and denials of the speculative intellect. Spinoza thus says: "By the will (*voluntas*) I understand a faculty . . . by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or false, and not a desire (*cupiditas*) by which the mind seeks a thing or turns away from it." [6]

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 80, ll. 22–23).

[2] *Ibid.*, § 2 (p. 80, ll. 18–19).

[3] *Ibid.*, § 2, note 1 (p. 80, l. 24). In this note he tries to show how will differs from the first and second kinds of knowledge.

[4] *Ibid.*, § 8 (p. 84, ll. 18–28).

[5] *Meditationes*, IV (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 57, ll. 21–23). Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 406.

[6] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol.

It is this restriction of will to decisions of the speculative intellect with regard to questions of truth and falsehood that is hinted at by Spinoza in the following passage: "This effort (*conatus*), when it is related to mind alone, is called will (*voluntas*), but when it is related at the same time to mind and body, is called appetite (*appetitus*)," which, as he proceeds to explain, does not differ in its essential meaning from desire (*cupiditas*).[1] But even in the *Ethics* he occasionally uses "will" with reference to the decisions of the practical intellect, as when he uses, for instance, the expression "will (*voluntas*) or desire (*appetitus*) of doing good." [2]

The second point that Spinoza tries to make about the nature of will is to deny that it exists as something real in nature. As real entities in nature there are only certain individual volitions, for which the term "will" is used only as a general name. In the *Short Treatise* he describes will, and sometimes also intellect, invariably as "an *ens rationis*, and not an *ens reale*," [3] or as "not a thing in nature, but only a fiction (*verzieringe*)," [4] or as a universal.[5] And what is true of will, he says in the *Ethics*, is also true of understanding (*intelligendi*), desiring (*cupiendi*), loving (*amandi*), and the other faculties. They are "either altogether fictitious (*fictitias*), or else are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities (*entia metaphysica, vel universalia*)." [6] "The intellect and will, therefore, are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or that rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul." [7] This conception of intellect and will as universals of the anti-realistic type is not to be

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 9, Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 27, Corol. 3, Schol.
[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 4 (*Opera*, I, p. 83, l. 4).
[4] *Ibid.*, § 4 (ll. 6–7).
[5] *Ibid.*, § 3, note 2 (p. 81, l. 19).
[6] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol.
[7] *Ibid.*; cf. Epistola 2 (*Opera*, IV, p. 9, ll. 14–16).

taken as something in opposition to Aristotle, but rather as an interpretation and development of Aristotle's views. Despite his use of the term "faculty" (*δύναμις*) in connection with intellect and will, Aristotle did not consider them to have any greater reality than such universals as rockiness and man. His rejection of Plato's conception of the trichotomy of the soul,[1] his insistence upon the unity of the soul,[2] his statement that there is no soul apart from the powers of the soul such as nutrition, appetency, sensation, locomotion, and understanding, any more than there is figure apart from triangle, quadrilateral, and the rest,[3] and finally his contention that the appetitive function (*ὀρεκτικόν*) and will (*βούλησις*) are only essentially or logically different from the sensitive faculty and the faculty of thought (*διανοητική*)[4] — out of all these one could develop the view upheld by Spinoza that the faculties of will and understanding are only universals. This view that the soul and its faculties are nothing but universals and, to use Spinoza's pointed characterization, "are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or that rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul," [5] could have also been inferred from Aristotle's statement that "in a manner the soul is all existent things, for they are all either objects of sensation or objects of thought; and knowledge and sensation are in a manner identical with their respective objects." [6]

It is also the Aristotelian contention that rational desire or will is only essentially or logically distinguished from thought that must have given rise to Spinoza's third point

[1] *De Anima*, I, 5, 411b, 5 ff.; III, 9, 432b, 3 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, 2, 413b, 13 ff.; II, 3, 414b, 20 ff.
[3] Cf. *ibid.*, II, 3, 414b, 20–22; I, 1, 402b, 5–8.
[4] Cf. *ibid.*, III, 7, 431a, 13–20; III, 9, 432b, 3–6.
[5] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol. [6] *De Anima*, III, 8, 431b, 21–23.

about will, namely, that "the will and intellect are one and the same." [1] When Aristotle says, for instance, that "pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the intellect," [2] and when he further says that "with speculative thought, which is not concerned with action and production, right and wrong functioning consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood respectively," [3] it is quite legitimate to infer from his statements that the will, which is defined by Spinoza in the *Ethics* as the faculty "by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or false," [4] is "only a certain mode of thought, like the intellect," [5] and that "in the mind there is no volition or affirmation and negation excepting that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves."[6] The full explanation of this view is clearly given in the Demonstration of Proposition XLIX of the Second Part of the *Ethics*. In the *Short Treatise* he states it in the following terms: "The understanding is purely passive; it is an awareness, in the soul, of the essense and existence of things; so that it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that affirms or denies, in us, something of itself." [7] The first part of this passage is only a restatement of the view we reproduced above from Aristotle that intellect itself neither affirms nor denies, but that it merely asserts the existence of an image of an object.[8]

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49, Corol.

[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 2, 1139a, 21–22.

[3] *Ibid.*, 27–29.

[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48, Schol. Cf. above, p. 167.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, Prop. 32, Demonst. That will is only a mode of thought is also maintained by Descartes. Cf. *Correspondance*, LXXIII bis (*Oeuvres*, I, p. 366, ll. 3–5): "Car vouloir, entendre, imaginer, sentir, etc., ne sont que des diverses façons de penser."

[6] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 49.

[7] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 5 (*Opera*, I, p. 83, ll. 13–17).

[8] Cf. above, pp. 164–165.

In the light of what we have shown before, as may be recalled, that in mediaeval philosophy will and intellect are as a rule identified in God, and that Spinoza refers to this as the view of "those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and power are one and the same thing," [1] his insistence here upon the identity of will and intellect in man assumes the form of a challenge to his opponents. You say, he argues, that will and intellect, though identical in God, are still two distinct faculties in man. I contend that in man no less than in God they are identical, for by the very same proof-texts from Aristotle that you can justify their identity in God I can also justify their identity in man.

In the *Short Treatise*, however, he goes still further and discusses the view of those who would have intellect and will two different faculties in man. According to his restatement of this view, — and he must have had Descartes, among others, in mind,[2] — understanding and will are regarded by its proponents as "necessarily distinct, and really distinct substances." But "as the soul is said to direct these two substances," Spinoza argues, "it must be a third substance." But "all these things are so confused," he says, "that it is impossible to have a clear and distinct conception about them."[3] The main trend of his criticism of this view is to show that by conceiving soul, understanding, and will as distinct entities or substances it will be difficult to establish a satisfactory relation between them and to explain adequately how they act upon one another and are acted upon by one another.[4]

These, then, are three points which Spinoza established with regard to the nature of the will. First, will, as dis-

[1] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 17, Schol. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 317.
[2] Cf. *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 32–35.
[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 3, note 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 81, ll. 21–26).
[4] *Ibid.*, § 3, note 2 (p. 81, l. 27–p. 82, l. 21).

tinguished from desire, is the faculty of the affirmation or denial of that which is true or false. Second, like intellect, will is only a universal of the anti-realistic type: there is no will apart from the individual volitions, just as there is no intellect apart from the individual ideas. Third, will and intellect are one and the same thing. Spinoza now returns to his main problem, to show that the will is not free,[1] and with this also to deny the freedom of other faculties, such as understanding, desiring, loving, etc.,[2] all of which, like will, are only modes of thought.[3]

The argument by which Spinoza proves here the impossibility of freedom is the stock argument of the mediaevals, which has already been used by him in the Demonstration of Proposition XXXII of the First Part of the *Ethics*. The argument is based upon the principle of causality. It is summed up in the statement that every affirmation or act of the will must be determined by a cause, which must in its turn be determined by another cause, and so on *ad infinitum*.[4] This necessarily leads to the conclusion that all affirmations and acts of the will are caused not by themselves but by God, who is the ultimate cause of everything.[5] This conception of God as the cause of all things does not imply a belief in God as creator, for even if creation is denied and the world is assumed to be eternal, God is still to be conceived of as the cause of the world, for "the same activity is required of God in order to maintain a thing in existence as to create it."[6] Since no affirmation or act of the will can be brought about without a cause, the will is not free, for

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48. [2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 48, Demonst. [3] *Ibid.*, II, Axiom 3.

[4] Cf. *ibid.*, II, Prop. 48, Demonst.; *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 81, l. 4–p. 82, l. 2); Epistola 2 (*Opera*, IV, p. 9, ll. 16–20).

[5] Cf. above, pp. 110 ff.

[6] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 3, note 2 (*Opera*, I, p. 82, ll. 24–25). Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 203–204.

by definition "that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone." [1] This argument, which Spinoza applies first to will, is applied by him also to understanding, desire, and the other modes of thought. In the *Ethics* he simply says concerning the latter that "in the same manner it is demonstrated that in the mind there exists no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc." [2] In the *Short Treatise*, however, he restates the argument in its special application to desire.[3] The conclusion at which he arrives is that there is no freedom either in the conceptions formed by the mind, or in the affirmations or denials about the truth or falsehood of these conceptions, or in the pursuit or avoidance by the mind of good or evil. [4]

The Scholium to Proposition XLIX with which the Second Part concludes corresponds to the Appendix with which the First Part concludes. In the symmetrical construction of the first two parts of the *Ethics*, the First Part, about God, concludes with a discussion of design, which is a certain phase of the alleged freedom of the divine will, and the Second Part, about man, similarly concludes with a discussion of certain phases of the alleged freedom of the human will. That in the First Part the concluding discussion is called Appendix and in the Second Part it is called Scholium makes only a verbal difference. We have shown above that with the exception of the first paragraph in the Appendix, which discusses the general problem of the First Part, the Appendix is really a Scholium to the last proposition. Similarly, here, though the Scholium belongs to the last proposition, or rather to the last two propositions, the opening of it is really an Appendix to the Second Part, discussing as it does its

[1] *Ethics*, I, Def. 7.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 48, Demonst.
[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 17, § 5.
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49.

central problem, namely, that of truth and falsehood. Furthermore, just as the Appendix was divided by Spinoza himself into three parts, so the Scholium here is divided by him into three parts: I. A few additional remarks on the question of freedom. II. Objections and answers with regard to Spinoza's own view on freedom. III. Some advantages of his own view on freedom.

In his additional remarks he points out that one of the reasons why men are led to the belief in the freedom of the will, and especially to the belief in the freedom of affirming and denying, is their failure to distinguish between images, words, and ideas.[1] Elsewhere he has succinctly summarized the relation between these three terms in his statement that words "are nothing but signs of things as they exist in the imagination, and not as they exist in the intellect." [2]

The objections against his view on will and its freedom which Spinoza discusses here are four in number.

The first objection is based upon the assumption that will extends more widely than the intellect, and is directed against Spinoza's view that will is indistinguishable from the intellect. Here in the *Ethics* Spinoza reproduces this assumption anonymously, but in letters to Oldenburg [3] and Blyenbergh [4] he describes it as the view of Descartes.[5] His answer to this objection is twofold. First, while admitting that "will extends itself more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect we understand only clear and distinct ideas," he denies that it extends itself more widely "than the perceptions or the faculty of conception (*perceptiones, sive*

[1] *Ibid.*, II, 16, § 6 (*Opera*, I, p. 83, ll. 18–30).

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 89 (*Opera*, II, p. 33, ll. 13–15). Cf. above, pp. 137–138.

[3] Epistola 2 (*Opera*, IV, p. 9, ll. 5–6).

[4] Epistola 21 (*Opera*, IV, p. 129, ll. 28–32).

[5] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 35; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, I, Prop. 15, Schol.; *Meditationes*, IV (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 56, l. 26–p. 57, l. 5).

concipiendi facultas)" or that it is to be assumed "to be infinite any more than the faculty of feeling (*sentiendi facultas*)." What he means to say is that will may extend itself more widely than intellect, if the term "intellect" is taken in its narrow sense of the thinking faculty, but it does not extend itself more widely than intellect if this term is taken in the general sense of mind (*mens*) or soul (*anima*) with which it is identified by Spinoza.[1] Second, he shows that the assumption, starting out with a failure to distinguish between will as a universal and will as a real entity or faculty of the soul, lapses into the further fallacy of transferring the implications of the term taken in the former sense to the term taken in its latter sense.

The second objection, directly aimed at the denial of the freedom of the will, belongs to that class of arguments in favor of the freedom of the will which are generally described, whenever the problem is discussed, as arguments from experience. Thus Crescas describes one class of arguments for freedom as being based upon the common observation that many things depend upon will,[2] and similarly Suarez introduces his second class of arguments for freedom by the statement: "*Secundo argumentari possumus ab experientia.*"[3] The particular argument from observation or experience which Spinoza reproduces here anonymously is again, in a letter to Blyenbergh,[4] ascribed by him to Descartes.[5] It is based upon the generally accepted belief as to "the possibility of suspending our judgment, so as not to assent to the things we perceive." In answer to this objection, Spinoza denies that "we have the power of suspending judgment,"

[1] Cf. above, pp. 43–44.

[2] *Or Adonai*, II, v, 3 (p. 47b).

[3] *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disp. XIX, Sec. II, XIV.

[4] Epistola 21 (*Opera*, IV, p. 131, l. 33–p. 132, l. 1).

[5] *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 39; *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, I, Prop. 15, Schol.

and declares that the suspension of judgment "is in truth a perception and not free will."

The third objection is aimed at his view that the affirmation or the denial of truth or goodness about a thing is the act of a will which is identical with the intellect,[1] that is to say, it is involved in the idea of the thing and is not, as is maintained by Descartes,[2] the act of a will within us outside the intellect and the idea of the thing. Now, the objection runs, ideas differ with respect to their perfection, reality, or truth — a view maintained by Descartes [3] and reproduced previously by Spinoza.[4] Accordingly, if affirmations of truth and falsehood about a thing were involved in the idea of the thing, one affirmation should contain more reality than another. Furthermore, the affirmation of something that is true should require a greater power than the affirmation of something that is false. But this is not so, for "one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another," and "it does not appear that we need a greater power for affirming a thing to be true which is true than for affirming a thing to be true which is false." And so Spinoza concludes: "This also seems to point to a difference between the will and the intellect." In his answer Spinoza first denies the assertion that one affirmation does not contain more reality than another, maintaining that in some respect "the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas differ." He then also denies the assertion that the power of thinking required for the affirmation of that which is false is equal to the power of thinking required for the affirmation of that which is true.

[1] Cf. *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49, Demonst.; *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 2. "Goodness" only is mentioned in *Short Treatise*, but see above, pp. 167–168.

[2] *Notae in Programma* (*Oeuvres*, VIII, p. 363, ll. 16–20): "ipsum actum judicandi, qui non nisi in assensu, hoc est, in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non retuli ad perceptionem intellectus, sed ad determinationem voluntatis."

[3] *Meditationes*, III (*Oeuvres*, VII, p. 40, ll. 7 ff.). [4] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 9.

Falsity, he rephrases a previous statement, is non-being, or, as he has phrased it previously, it "consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, that is to say, mutilated and confused, ideas involve." [1] The affirmation of that which is false to be true, therefore, does not require any power at all, inasmuch as it consists only of a privation of knowledge.

A similar objection against the same view, though differently stated, is given in the *Short Treatise* as follows: "If it is not we, but the thing itself, that makes the affirmation and denial about itself in us, then nothing can be affirmed or denied except what is in agreement with the thing; and consequently there is no falsity." [2] The answer given there by Spinoza is the same as here. Falsity, he says, consists in the fact that "when we happen to know something or a part of an object, we imagine that the object (although we only know very little of it) nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a whole," [3] or in other words, "falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, that is to say, mutilated and confused, ideas involve." [4] This passage in the *Short Treatise*, II, which occurs in Chapter XVI, where the question of the freedom of the will is discussed, is, according to Freudenthal,[5] to be transferred to Chapter XV, where the question of truth and falsehood is discussed. But, as we have seen, the substance of this passage is analogous to that of Spinoza's third objection and answer which occurs in the *Ethics* in connection with the problem of the freedom of the will. So we have reason to believe that this passage in the *Short Treatise* rightly belongs in Chapter XVI.

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 35.

[2] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 7 (*Opera*, I, p. 83, ll. 30–34).

[3] *Ibid.*, § 7 (p. 84, ll. 5–10). [4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 35.

[5] "Spinozastudien," in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 108 (1896), p. 278.

The fourth objection against free will is the famous argument from an ass perishing of hunger and thirst when placed at an equal distance from food and drink, which is attributed to Johannes Buridanus. The argument is reproduced by Spinoza also in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (Part II, Chapter XII), where he summarizes philosophic views without necessarily subscribing to them. The gist of the argument as restated here by Spinoza is that since a man placed in such a state of equilibrium would not perish, man must be endowed with free will. In answer to this objection, Spinoza contends that given a man placed in such a state of equilibrium and without any internal or external motives or incentives or causes to determine his action, the man, like the ass, would certainly perish of hunger and thirst. But — and here we may conclude the unfinished argument of Spinoza — inasmuch as there will always be present other external motives or incentives or causes to determine action, and especially the internal motive of the conatus for self-preservation,[1] neither ass nor man will perish under such circumstances. In the case a man does perish under such circumstances, says Spinoza, then "if you ask me whether such a man would not be thought an ass rather than a man, I reply I do not know; nor do I know what ought to be thought of a man who hangs himself, or of children, fools, and madmen." The mention of "a man who hangs himself" is an allusion to his view that there is no conatus for self-destruction as there is for self-preservation, and that every act of self-destruction must be explained on the ground of external circumstance.[2] The mention of "children, fools, and madmen" as examples of persons acting in an irresponsible manner seems to reflect the stereotyped Talmudic phrase "deaf-mute, madman, and

[1] Cf. below, pp. 195 ff.

[1] Cf. below, pp. 197–198, 237.

child" [1] which is constantly used as an illustration of an irresponsible agent. But the direct source of these three examples of unintelligent human beings is to be found in Maimonides' statement that while the doctrine of the incorporeality of God is to be explained to every trained and intelligent person according to his capacity, it is to be taught only as a matter of tradition to "children, women, fools, and those who are bereft of reason." [2] Barring "women," the three examples used by Spinoza are identical with those used by Maimonides, and are given by him in the same order.

That these four objections are not all that can be urged against his denial of free will is admitted by Spinoza himself when he says that "there may be other objections besides these." Some such additional objections are to be found in a letter addressed to Spinoza by Tschirnhaus[3] and in Spinoza's answer to that letter addressed to Schuller,[4] and also in the *Short Treatise*.[5]

The third part of the Scholium is described by Spinoza himself as dealing with "some of the advantages of this doctrine" or as showing "what service to our own lives a knowledge of this doctrine is." In the corresponding chapter of the *Short Treatise* (Part II, Chapter XVIII), "this doctrine" is more fully explained by the proposition that man, "being a part of the whole nature, on which he depends, and by which also he is governed, cannot of himself do anything for his happiness and well-being."

[1] חרש שוטה וקטן. Cf. *Mishnah*, *Baba Ḳama*, VIII, 4.

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 35. The terms used by Maimonides are: לקטנים, ולנשים, ולחסרי השכל, ולסכלים. The terms used by Spinoza are: "pueri, stulti, vesani, etc." (*Opera*, II, p. 135, ll. 30–31).

[3] Epistola 57.

[4] Epistola 58.

[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 16, § 8 (*Opera*, I, p. 84, ll. 14 ff.).

CHAPTER XVIII

EMOTIONS

IMAGINE that the impish spirit which had induced Spinoza to break up his orderly, systematic, and clear-cut thinking into disconnected and mystifying geometric propositions had still further induced him to write the last three parts of the *Ethics* in some cryptic language, so that we were now faced with the task of deciphering these propositions in addition to explaining them. But imagine also that by some sane promptings Spinoza had included within parentheses after all the technical terms in these parts of his work their respective equivalents in some language in which the traditional vocabulary of European philosophy has been preserved — say, Greek, Latin, Arabic, or Hebrew. Then, even before we could read a single word in them, we should have been able to determine the nature of these parts of the *Ethics* and the type of literature to which they belong, and this by merely observing the terms included within the parentheses. We should at once have placed them among books on ethics which from the time of Aristotle down to Spinoza's own time dealt with the emotions of the soul, its virtues and vices, and the final happiness of man. Whatever book of that type of literature we take, — be it Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; the various books containing the teachings of the Stoics, such as the philosophical writings of Cicero, Diogenes Laertius' life of Zeno, or Stobaeus' *Eclogae*; the numerous mediaeval ethical works written in Hebrew and Latin; or the works of philosophers after the mediaeval period, such, for instance, as the First Part of Hobbes' *Leviathan* or the Second and Third Parts of Descartes' *Les Passions de l'Ame*,

— we shall find in it lists of emotions and virtues which are practically the same as those enumerated here by Spinoza.

But if, following the methods pursued by Grotefend and Champollion in their discoveries of the keys to the Babylonian cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphic, we ultimately succeeded in deciphering this imaginary cryptic language of Spinoza, we should soon discover that despite the sameness of terminology there is a great difference in these specifically ethical parts of the *Ethics* and the traditional ethical works which served Spinoza as a model. The difference is stated by Spinoza himself in his Preface to the Third Part. His predecessors, he says, considered actions and appetites as virtues and vices which are to be bewailed, laughed at, mocked, or detested.[1] He is to consider them as certain facts in the causality of nature which are to be studied and understood. "I shall consider human actions and appetites," he says, "just as if I were considering lines, planes, or bodies."[2]

This method, however, as Spinoza himself avers, is not altogether new. He refers to "very eminent men . . . to whose labor and industry" he confesses himself to be "much indebted,"[3] and he mentions especially Descartes, who, he says, strove "to explain human emotions by their primary causes."[4] The reference is to *Les Passions de l'Ame*, which he mentions later in the Preface to the Fifth Part by the title of its Latin translation, *Passiones Animae*. Among the "very eminent men" he undoubtedly meant to include also Aristotle and the mediaeval philosophical writers on ethics, all of whom, as a rule, tried to trace human conduct to its psychological basis, carrying out Aristotle's dictum that the

[1] *Ethics*, III, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 137, ll. 15–18).
[2] *Ibid.* (p. 138, ll. 26–27).
[3] *Ibid.* (p. 137, ll. 20–22.)
[4] *Ibid.* (p. 138, ll. 1–2).

student of politics, and for that matter also the student of ethics in general, must know the facts about the soul.[1]

But traditional philosophy from Aristotle to Descartes, even when it treated emotions as "natural things which follow the common laws of nature," [2] and even when it tried to find a psychological basis for human conduct, still differentiated between emotions and virtues. The difference between these two is stated by Aristotle himself. We are called good or bad, and we are praised or blamed, he says, on the ground of our virtues or vices, but we are neither called good or bad nor praised or blamed on the ground of our emotions (πάθη).[3] That this is to be so, says Aristotle further, is to be explained by the fact that the emotions do not imply choice (προαίρεσις), which is deliberate desire or will (βούλησις),[4] whereas virtue and vice are the result of choice and will.[5] But while Aristotle perhaps may not have meant by "choice" the existence of a will which is free and autonomous, his successors made freedom of the will the basis of human conduct and of virtue and vice. Thus Descartes, evidently reflecting Aristotle's definition of virtue, maintains that "it is for those actions alone which depend on this free will that we may with reason be praised or blamed."[6] It is with reference to this that Spinoza argues that inasmuch as Descartes believed in the freedom of the will, he "believed that the mind is absolute master over its own actions," [7] and therefore actions, as differentiated from emotions, constituted virtues and vices, to be called good or bad and to be praised or blamed. The difference between emotions and virtues and vices is also

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 13, 1102a, 18–19.
[2] *Ethics*, III, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 137, ll. 8–10).
[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 5, 1105b, 25–1106a, 2.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 1113a, 9–10.
[5] *Ibid.*, II, 5, 1106a, 2–4.
[6] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 152. Cf. *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 37.
[7] *Ethics*, III, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 137, l. 26–p. 138, l. 1).

implied in many other statements of Descartes, as, for example, when he says that "pride and abjection are not only vices, but also passions," [1] whereas ingratitude is not a passion but only a vice.[2] But, argues Spinoza, if the freedom of the will is denied, the difference between emotions and virtues automatically disappears. Human actions, like human emotions, are inevitably determined by causes. They are not to be detested or scoffed at, but rather to be understood "by the universal laws and rules of nature."[3]

What we have, then, are not natural and causally determined phenomena called emotions, on the one hand, and free actions called virtues and vices, on the other, but rather the welter of blind emotions in conflict with one another and the victory of some of them over others. There is no vice, "for nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to any vice of nature, for she is always the same and everywhere one." [4] And man, in respect to what is generally called vice as well as in all other respects, is a part of nature; [5] he is not within her as "a kingdom within a kingdom" nor as one who "disturbs rather than follows her order." [6] What men call vice is simply "impotence (*impotentia*) and want of stability," [7] and this "impotence of man to govern or restrain the effects I call servitude." [8] By the same token, what men call virtue is simply power (*potentia*), for by "virtue and power, I understand the same thing; that is to say (Prop. VII, Part III), virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is the essence itself or nature of the man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain things which can be

[1] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 160.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, 194.
[3] *Ethics*, III, Praef. (*Opera*, II, 138, ll. 17–18).
[4] *Ibid.* (ll. 11–13).
[5] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 4.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 137, ll. 11–12).
[7] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.
[8] *Ibid.*, IV, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 205, ll. 7–8).

understood through the laws of its nature alone." [1] Since the determining factor in this conflict between the emotions is reason, or mind, or intellect, the difference "between true virtue and impotence may, from what has already been said, be easily seen to be this — that true virtue consists in living according to the guidance of reason alone; and that impotence therefore consists in this alone — that man allows himself to be led by things which are outside himself, and by them to be determined to such actions as the common constitution of external things demands, and not to such as his own nature considered in itself alone demands." [2] "Impotence" and "passion" are therefore sometimes used by Spinoza as synonymous terms.[3] It may be remarked that the term "servitude" (*servitus*) used by Spinoza as a description of what is generally called "vice" or "sin" and what he calls "impotence," just as its opposite term "liberty" used by him later,[4] is borrowed from New Testament as well as rabbinic theology and reflects the expression "servant of sin" (*servus peccati* in the Vulgate).[5]

Had Spinoza written his *Ethics* in the manner of the rabbis and scholastics, he would have prefaced the last three parts of the *Ethics* with a statement somewhat as follows:

Having dealt in the previous parts of our work with what is generally known as theoretical philosophy, we shall now

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Def. 8. [2] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 20, Schol.: "impotentia, seu passio" (*Opera*, II, p. 293, l. 26).

[4] Cf. below, p. 311.

[5] John 8, 34; Romans 6, 17. Cf. also *Sukkah* 52b and Rashi's and Gersonides' commentaries on Proverbs 29, 21, according to which the verse is to be translated and interpreted as follows: "He that delicately bringeth up his *servant* (i.e., his Evil *Yezer* or Impulse; cf. below, p. 326) from a child shall have him become a *master* at the length." In Gersonides, still more closely analogous to Spinoza's use of the term "servitude," the terms "servant" and "master" in this verse are taken to refer not to the theological "Evil *Yezer*" but rather to the psychological "appetitive faculty bent on pursuit of bodily desires" as opposed to "reason" by which man, he adds, ought to let himself be guided.

deal with practical philosophy, or what is known as ethics, politics, and economics. Following the order of topics which are generally included under ethics, we shall divide the subject into three parts: first, the emotions (Part III); second, the so-called virtues and vices (Part IV); third, final bliss (Part V). In fact, such an outline of the last three parts of the *Ethics*, though differently phrased, occurs toward the end of the Preface to Part III. It reads as follows: "I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the [*a*] nature [Part III] and [*b*] strength [Part IV] of the emotions and [*c*] the power of the mind over them [Part V] which I pursued in our previous discussion of God [Part I] and the mind [Part II], and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes, or bodies." [1]

The fifty-nine propositions of the Third Part of the *Ethics* fall into four groups, dealing with the following topics:

I. Actions and Passions (Props. I–III).

II. The Conatus and the Primary Passive Emotions (Props. IV–XI).

III. Derivative Passive Emotions (Props. XII–LVII).

IV. Active Emotions (Props. LVIII–LIX).

I. Actions and Passions

In his treatise on *Les Passions de l'Ame* Descartes begins his discussion of the emotions with a definition of the terms "action" and "passion." Following Aristotle, he defines the two terms as referring to one and the same event occurring or happening anew which with respect to the agent is called an action and with respect to the recipient or patient is called a passion.[2] The distinction between action and passion is to be found also in the thoughts which constitute the func-

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Praef., end.

[2] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 1.

tions of the soul. The actions of the soul are "all forms of one will (*volontez, voluntates*), because we find by experience that they proceed directly from our soul, and appear to depend on it alone." The passions of the soul are "all those kinds of perception or forms of knowledge which are found in us, because it is often not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things which are represented by them." [1]

Among these passions of the soul Descartes further distinguishes two classes: (1) those which have the soul itself as a cause, such as the perception of that which is willed or imagined by the action of the soul itself, and (2) those which have the body as a cause,[2] especially those which "come to the soul by the intermission of the nerves." [3]

Those which have the body as a cause are again divided by Descartes into three classes: (1) those which relate to things which are external to us, such as the various sense perceptions, (2) those which relate to our body, or to some of its parts, such as hunger, thirst, and pain, and (3) those which relate to the soul only as if they were in the soul itself,[4] although "they are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits." [5] By the "spirits" he means the "animal spirits" or the "very subtle parts of the blood." [6]

It is this last subdivision of the passions, namely, that which has the body as a cause but is related solely to the soul, that Descartes specifically identifies with the emotions. The passions of the soul are therefore defined by him as "perceptions, or sensations, or emotions of the soul which are related especially to it, and which are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits." [7]

[1] *Ibid.*, I, 17.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 19.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, 21 and 22.
[4] *Ibid.*, I, 23, 24 and 25.
[5] *Ibid.*, I, 29.
[6] *Ibid.*, I, 10.
[7] *Ibid.*, I, 27, quoted in *Ethics*, V, Praef.

Inasmuch as the passions of the soul are caused by the body, and "what in the soul is a passion is in the body commonly speaking an action," Descartes proceeds to examine "the difference which exists between soul and body in order to know to which of the two we must attribute each one of the functions which are within us." [1] The method by which this difference can be ascertained is formulated by him as follows: "All that we experience as being in us, and that to observation may exist in wholly inanimate bodies, must be attributed to our body alone," but "all that which is in us, and which we cannot in any way conceive as possibly pertaining to a body, must be attributed to our soul." [2]

With these preliminary remarks Descartes proceeds to explain the functions of the body and their relation to the functions of the mind. Denying at the very outset that the soul supplies movement and heat to the body,[3] he proceeds to give a brief but detailed description of "the whole method in which the bodily machine is composed," [4] and of "all the functions which pertain to the body alone." [5] On the whole, movement is the function of the body and thought is the function of the mind, and the two are independent of each other. Still, by the movements of the animal spirits in the pineal gland an interaction between mind and body is established. The body causes certain emotions in the soul, and the soul in its turn causes certain movements in the body.[6]

It is as a criticism of these views of Descartes that the Definitions at the beginning of the Third Part of the *Ethics* and the first three propositions are to be understood. Beginning with a criticism of Descartes' use of the terms "actions" and "passions" (Prop. I) and of his conception

[1] *Ibid.*, I, 2. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 3. [3] *Ibid.*, I, 5.
[4] *Ibid.*, I, 7. [5] *Ibid.*, I, 17. [6] *Ibid.*, I, 34.

of the relation between mind and body (Props. II–III), he then passes on to the discussion of the emotions (Props. IV ff.).

To begin with, Spinoza gives a new meaning to the terms "action" and "passion." Action and passion, he seems to argue, do not refer to one and the same thing, which is termed an action in respect to him who causes it to occur and a passion in respect of the subject to which it occurs; they refer rather to two different things, the difference between which consists in their relation to their respective causes. For causes are of two kinds: an adequate cause (*causa adaequata*), and an inadequate or partial cause (*causa inadaequata, seu partialis*) — a distinction which may be traced to the distinction between *causa totalis* and *causa partialis* in Duns Scotus [1] and Heereboord,[2] or to the distinction between *causa efficiens sola efficit* and *cum aliis* in Petrus Ramus,[3] or to similar distinctions which can be found in the history of logic since Plato.[4] As defined by Spinoza an adequate cause is one "whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause." An inadequate or partial cause is one "whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause alone." [5] It is with reference to these two kinds of causes that effects are called either actions or passions. "I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or without us, of which we are the adequate cause. . . . On the other hand, I say that we suffer when anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature, of which

[1] *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum*, Liber II, Quaest. 8, No. 5 (cf. R. P. M. Fernandez Garcia, *Lexicon Scholasticum*, p. 126, Col. 1).

[2] *Meletemata Philosophica, Disputationes ex Philosophia Selectae*, Vol. II, Disp. XX, IV.

[3] Cf. *Dialecticae libri duo. . . . Cum Commentariis Georgii Dounami Annexis* (London, 1669), Lib. I, Cap. 4.

[4] See Dounamus' commentary, *ad loc.*

[5] *Ethics*, III, Def. 1.

we are not the cause excepting partially." [1] Inasmuch as in our mind some ideas are adequate and some are mutilated and confused,[2] "our mind acts at times and at times suffers: in so far as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts; and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily suffers." [3]

Then, in the next place, Spinoza proceeds to criticize Descartes' conception of the relation between mind and body. Though Descartes considers mind and body as two independent substances which cannot act upon one another, still, in the language of Spinoza himself, "he affirms that the soul or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain called the pineal gland, which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to move in different ways, and by whose help the mind perceives all the movements which are excited in the body and external objects." [4] This pineal gland is characterized by Spinoza as "a certain small portion of extended matter," [5] and consequently, he argues, when Descartes and his followers maintain that the mind is able to move the pineal gland in different ways, they really maintain that "solely at the bidding of the mind, the body moves or rests, and does a number of things which depend upon the will of the mind alone, and upon the power of thought." [6]

Furthermore, Descartes confidently declares that we shall not find much difficulty in discovering the peculiar and distinctive functions of the soul and of the body and their relations to each other "if we realize that all that we experience as being in us, and that to observation may exist in wholly inanimate bodies, must be attributed to our body alone." [7]

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Def. 2.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 1, Demonst., referring to *Ethics*, II, Prop. 40, Schol. [1].
[3] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 1.
[4] *Ibid.*, V, Praef.
[5] *Ibid.*: "cuidam quantitatis portiunculae" (*Opera*, II, p. 279, l. 27).
[6] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 2, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 142, ll. 2–4).
[7] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 3.

Against this Spinoza argues as follows: "For what the body can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught no one hitherto what the body, without being determined by the mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws of nature alone, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal." [1]

Again, "in order to render this more intelligible," says Descartes, "I shall here explain in a few words the whole method in which the bodily machine is composed," [2] and after having explained the structure of the body, Descartes claims to have considered "all the functions which pertain to the body alone." [3] It is evidently in answer to this that Spinoza says: "For no one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions." [4]

Finally, concludes Spinoza, Descartes has not explained "by what means or by what method the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to the body, nor with what speed it can move the body." [5] The conclusion is that Descartes and his followers "do nothing but confess with pretentious words that they know nothing about the cause of the action, and see nothing in it to wonder at." [6]

Against this denial of the mind's action upon the body Spinoza now quotes three objections in the name of unspecified opponents. First, it is a matter of common observation that the mind does influence the motion of the body. Second, it is also a matter of common observation that the mind

[1] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 2, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 142, ll. 4–8).
[2] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 7.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, 17.
[4] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 2, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 142, ll. 8–10).
[5] *Ibid.* (l. 14). Cf. *Ethics*, V, Praef.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 2, Schol. (ll. 19–20).

does originate certain actions in the body, such, for instance, as speech and silence. This argument is analogous to Saadia's argument for the freedom of man's will from the fact that "man feels that he can speak or remain silent." [1] Third, without the guidance of the mind, by the mere mechanical motions of the body, certain purposive actions, such as generally come under the designation of human art, could not have originated in men. This argument, too, is analogous to Saadia's argument for the belief that man is the crown of creation from the fact that he has been endowed by God with superior intelligence to be able to produce the various arts and sciences. He mentions among them, as does here Spinoza, the art of building.[2]

In answer to the first objection, Spinoza points out, as indeed it was pointed out before him by Aristotle,[3] that just as mind is observed to influence the motions of the body, so also is the body observed to influence the actions of the mind. The conclusion Spinoza evidently wants us to draw from this is that just as the latter fact is not taken by his opponents to prove that the body determines the actions of the mind, so the former fact cannot be taken by them to prove that the mind determines the motions of the body. All that we observe is that there is a certain coincidence between the actions of the mind and those of the body, of which his own explanation is as valid as that of his opponents, and, in fact, more valid, inasmuch as it is consistent in excluding the action of the mind upon the body as well as the action of the body upon the mind. In answer to the second objection, he restates his earlier view that all our conceptions as to the mind's freedom to originate action are a delusion based

[1] *Emunot we-De'ot*, IV, 4. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 427.
[2] *Ibid.*, IV, 1.
[3] *De Anima*, I, 1, 403a, 3 ff.

upon our ignorance of the infinite causes by which every seemingly free act is determined. In answer to the third objection, he maintains that his opponents are not justified in assuming to have a knowledge of what the body by its own motion could or could not do.

With his new definition of the terms "action" and "passion," and with his rejection of any kind of interaction between mind and body, Spinoza also discards Descartes' statement that the actions of the soul are all "forms of will" [1] and that the passions of the soul are divided into (*a*) those which have the soul itself as a cause and (*b*) those which have the body as a cause.[2] "The actions of the mind," Spinoza argues, are not forms of the will, but "arise from adequate ideas alone." [3] Nor are there any passions of the mind which have the soul itself as a cause, for "the passions [of the mind] depend upon those [ideas] alone which are inadequate," [3] and inadequate ideas are not caused by the mind itself. [4] Furthermore, Descartes is wrong in his statement that "what in the soul is a passion is in the body commonly speaking an action," [5] for "I could show that passions are referred to individual things in the same manner as they are referred to the mind." [6] By individual things (*res singulares*) here he means bodies, just as the term thing (*res*) in Proposition V is explained later in the Demonstration of Proposition X to mean our body (*corpus nostrum*).

Similarly Descartes' definition of the emotions and their identification with the passions of the soul which are caused by the body must likewise be rejected. A new definition of the emotions is now given by Spinoza — one in accord with

[1] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 17; cf. above, p. 186, n. 1.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 19; cf. above, p. 186, notes 2 and 3.
[3] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 3. [4] Cf. above, pp. 106 ff.
[5] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, 2; cf. above, p. 187, n. 1.
[6] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 3, Schol.

his own use of the terms "action" and "passion" and with his own conception of the relation between body and soul.

In accordance with his own peculiar definition of the terms "action" and "passion," Spinoza dissociates the emotions for which the Latin term used by him is *commotiones* [1] from the term *passiones* and identifies them with the term *affectus*. To understand the significance of this step taken by Spinoza we must explain the use of the terms *passio*, *affectus*, and *affectio* by Spinoza as well as by his predecessors. According to Augustine, the emotions of the soul (*animi motus*) are called by the Greeks πάθη, "while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them *perturbationes*, some *affectiones* or *affectus*, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, *passiones*." [2] On the whole, mediaeval authors use these three terms *passio*, *affectus*, and *affectio* synonymously.[3] Descartes, however, uses *affectio* as synonymous with *qualitas*, whereas the term *affectus* is used by him in the sense of *passio*,[4] or, rather, the passions of the soul, i.e., emotions. Again, the term *passio*, as we have seen,[5] in addition to its being used by Descartes in the sense of the emotions of the soul, is also used by him in the general sense of suffering action and as the opposite of action. All these usages of the three terms by Descartes may be traced, I think, to the following three senses of the term πάθος in Aristotle: (1) in the general sense of accident (συμβεβηκός),[6] (2) in the sense of the emotions (κινήσεις) [7] of the soul, which are also called by him

[1] *Ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 27, Expl. (*Opera*, II, p. 197, l. 18); V, Praef.: "Commotiones animae" (*Opera*, II, p. 279, l. 7); V, Prop. 2: "animi commotionem"; cf. V, Prop. 20, Schol.: "affici, sive moveri" (*Opera*, II, p. 293, l. 23).

[2] *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 4.

[3] See L. Schütz, *Thomas-Lexikon* (1895), s.v.

[4] See E. Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien*, p. 9.

[5] Cf. above, p. 185.

[6] *De Generatione et Corruptione*, I, 4, 320a, 1. Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 516, n. 9.

[7] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 5, 1105b, 20; *De Anima*, I, 4, 408b, 4.

the qualities (ποιότητες)[1] of the soul, and (3) in the general sense of suffering as the opposite of ἔργον.[2] Returning now to Spinoza, we find that the term *affectio* is used by him, as by Descartes, in the sense of accident, mode, or modification,[3] that is to say, the equivalent of πάθος in the sense of συμβεβηκός. The term *passio*, as we have seen, is defined by Spinoza in a sense unlike that in which it is used by Descartes, and for that matter unlike any of the senses in which its Greek equivalent πάθος is used by Aristotle. But the term *affectus* is used by him in the same sense as it is used by Augustine and Descartes, that is to say, as the equivalent of πάθος in the sense of the emotions of the soul. Of course, exceptions to these usages of the terms occur occasionally in Spinoza. Thus *affectus* is sometimes used by him in the sense of *affectio*,[4] *affectio* is used by him in the sense of *affectus*,[5] and *passio* is used by him in the Cartesian sense of emotion.[6]

Again, in opposition to Descartes' view as to the interaction between soul and body, and in accordance with his own view as to the parallelism between the order and connection of ideas and the order and connection of things, Spinoza defines the emotions, or, as he calls them, the affects, as the affections of the body together with the ideas of these affections. But inasmuch as "affections" is a general term designating any kind of mode or accident or modification of the body, whether its power of acting is increased or diminished by it or whether it is neither increased nor diminished, it is only those affections of the body by which the power of act-

[1] *Categories*, 8, 9b, 36. [2] *De Anima*, I, 1, 403b, 12.

[3] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 4. Cf. G. T. Richter, *Spinozas Philosophische Terminologie* (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 82 ff.

[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 17.

[5] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 20, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 293, ll. 10–13); cf. editor's note (*Textgestaltung*, p. 390) *ad loc.*, quoting Camerer, *Lehre Spinozas*, p. 280.

[6] *Ibid.* (l. 26): "impotentia autem, seu passio." Cf. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 3 (*Opera*, III, p. 46, l. 29).

ing of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these affections, that form what are called affects or emotions. Furthermore, inasmuch as we can be either the adequate cause of any of these affections or their inadequate or partial cause, the emotions, again in opposition to Descartes, may be either actions or passions.[1]

II. Conatus and Primary Passive Emotions

But increase and diminution imply a certain standard of measurement. What the standard is by which the affections of the body are measured, to ascertain whether the acting power of the body is increased or diminished by them, is explained by Spinoza in Propositions IV–X. The standard of measurement, he says, is the conatus (effort, impulse) by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being. Every affection of the body is said to increase the acting power of the body in so far as it increases that endeavor for self-preservation; it diminishes the acting power of the body in so far as it diminishes that endeavor. This endeavor for self-preservation is the first law of nature and is the basis of all our emotions.

The antiquity of the principle of self-preservation as the first law of nature is well known.[2] The Stoics are generally credited with the view that "an animal's first impulse (ὁρμήν, *appetionem*) . . . is to self-preservation."[3] According to Cicero this view is nothing but a repetition of the Peripatetic view, which in his restatement reads: "Every natural organism aims at (*vult*) being its own preserver."[4]

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Def. 3 and Post. 1.

[2] Cf. Pollock, *Spinoza*, p. 117; Eisler, *Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* (1927), under "Erhaltung."

[3] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus Clarorum Philosophorum*, VII, 85.

[4] *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, IV, 7, § 16.

Augustine devotes a chapter in his *De Civitate Dei* to showing how all things in nature wish to exist (*se esse velle*) or to conserve their existence (*suum . . . esse conseruent*).[1] Thomas Aquinas reproduces this principle in the statement that "every natural thing aims at (*appetit*) self-conservation."[2] Duns Scotus similarly says that "every natural being desires (*appetit*) with a natural desire to continue in existence."[3] Dante expresses the same sentiment in his statement that "everything which exists desires (*appetat*) its own existence."[4] Telesius similarly sets forth self-preservation as that at which all things aim (*appetens*),[5] and the same principle is restated by other philosophers of the Renaissance. At the time of Spinoza the principle of self-preservation became a commonplace of popular wisdom, so much so that in the Hebrew collection of sermons by his teacher Rabbi Saul Levi Morteira one of the sermons begins with the statement that "Nature, mother of all created beings, has implanted in them a will and impulse to strive for their self-preservation."[6]

Now, in all these quotations, it will have been noticed, self-preservation is spoken of as a sort of wish or will or desire expressed by such terms as *vult, velle, appetit*. These terms may all be traced to the Greek ὁρμή which is used in the passage quoted above. But ὁρμή, as we shall see, can also be translated by *conatus*. Cicero himself uses *conatus* and *appetitio* as synonymous terms, and considers both of them as Latin equivalents of the Greek ὁρμή.[7] Furthermore, ac-

[1] *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 27.

[2] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, Quaest. V, Art. I, 13.

[3] *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum*, Lib. I, Quaest. 22, No. 6: "Quodlibet ens naturale appetit seipsum permanere appetitu naturali." Cf. R. P. M. Fernandez Garcia, *Lexicon Scholasticum*, p. 850, col. 2.

[4] *De Monarchia*, I, 13 (or 15): "Omne quod est appetat suum esse."

[5] *De Rerum Naturae*, IX, 3, beginning.

[6] *Gibe'at Sha'ul*, XVIII.

[7] *De Natura Deorum*, II, 22, § 58; cf. II, 47, § 122.

cording to Hobbes, the term *appetitus* or *cupido*, which he uses as the Latin equivalent of the Greek ὁρμή, is a form of *conatus*,[1] so that subsequently, in the following passage, he uses the verb *conor* in connection with the striving for self-preservation: "And in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation . . . [they] endeavor (*conatur*) to destroy, or subdue one another."[2] From whatever source, therefore, Spinoza has directly drawn his formulation of the principle of self-preservation, there is a historical connection between the term *conatus* and the term ὁρμή. Besides *conatus* Spinoza sometimes uses simply the term "force" (*vis*)[3] or the expression "natural love" (*natuurlyke Liefde*).[4] The expression "natural love" may be traced to a combination of two sets of sources. In the first place, Augustine describes the universal principle of self-preservation by the term "love" (*amor*).[5] In the second place, as an example of the effort for self-preservation in inanimate bodies, Augustine mentions the fact that they all "either seek the upper air or sink deep."[6] Now, this natural tendency of bodies to move upward or downward is described by Thomas Aquinas and Leo Hebraeus as natural love (*amor naturalis*).[7]

In the formulation of the Stoic principle of self-preservation both by Cicero and by Diogenes Laertius it is to be noticed that in addition to an affirmation of the principle of self-preservation there is also a denial of the existence of a natural desire for self-destruction. Cicero says definitely that "immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself,

[1] *Leviathan*, I, 6.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 13.
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 45, Schol.; *Cogitata Metaphysica*, II, 6.
[4] *Short Treatise*, Appendix II, § 6 (*Opera*, I, p. 118, l. 7).
[5] *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 27–28.
[6] *Ibid.*, XI, 27.
[7] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 26, Art. 1; *Dialoghi d'Amore*, II, p. 67 (Bari, 1929). Cf. below, p. 201.

and an impulse to preserve itself . . . while on the other hand it recoils from death, and from all that seems to induce death." [1] Similarly Diogenes Laertius denies in the name of Zeno that there is a natural instinct for self-destruction, "for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself." [2] Evidently following these or similar sources, Spinoza restates the principle of self-preservation in both these forms. Beginning with a negative formulation of the principle, he denies that there is a natural impulse for self-destruction. If we do observe that men malinger and destroy themselves, he says, it is due to external causes (Props. IV–V). Or, as he says elsewhere, "no one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a necessity of his nature, but only when forced by external causes." [3] Then, restating the principle in its positive form, he says that "each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors (*conatur*) to persevere in its being" (Prop. VI). This conatus for self-preservation is not an act of free will; it is rather determined from the necessity of the divine nature by which all things exist and act (Prop. VII). Or, as Spinoza again says elsewhere, "they need the same power to enable them to go on existing as to enable them to begin to exist. From which it follows, that the power, by which natural things exist, and therefore that by which they operate, can be no other than the external power of God itself." [4] The conatus for self-preservation, then, is identical with the existence of a thing which Spinoza calls here the actual essence (*essentia actualis*) of a thing (Prop. VII) or the given essence (*essentia data*) of a thing (*ibid.*, Demonst.), as contrasted with the ideal essence (*es-*

[1] *De Finibus*, III, 5, § 16..

[2] *De Vitis*, VII, 85.

[3] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 20, Schol. Cf. Prop. 18, Schol; Prop. 19; above, p. 178; below p. 237.

[4] *Tractatus Politicus*, Ch. 2, § 2. Cf. *Ethics*, II, Prop. 45, Schol., end.

sentia idealis).[1] By the ideal essence of a thing he means the conception of a thing in the mind, irrespective of its existence or inexistence outside the mind — a contrast which in a letter to de Vries is formulated by Spinoza as a contrast between one kind of definition which "explains a thing as it exists outside the intellect" and another kind of definition which "explains a thing as it is conceived or can be conceived by us."[2] This identity of the conatus with the existence of a thing itself is stressed by Spinoza in the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, I, 6, in his argument against those who "distinguish between the thing itself and its conatus, by which each object is conserved." And inasmuch as the conatus for self-preservation follows from the necessity of the eternal power of God itself, this conatus does not involve finite but indefinite time (Prop. VIII). If a thing does happen to cease to exist, it is not by its own nature, but rather by an external cause.

So far Spinoza has developed his own conception of the conatus along the lines of the principle of self-preservation as laid down by the Stoics.

There is, however, a difference between the Stoic conception of the conatus for self-preservation and that of Spinoza. To the Stoics the conatus for self-preservation is confined only to animal beings. Both Diogenes and Cicero speak of animals (τὸ ζῷον, *animal*). Diogenes, furthermore, says definitely that although nature regulates the life of plants too, in their case there is no conatus (ὁρμῆς).[3] And so also Cicero, after mentioning the term "animal," remarks parenthetically, "for that is the proper point to start from."[4] To Spinoza, however, to whom all things may be called animate,[5] the conatus for self-preservation is to be found in everything.

[1] *Tractatus Politicus*, Ch. 2, § 2.
[2] Epistola 9 (*Opera*, IV, p. 43, ll. 11 ff.).
[3] *De Vitis*, VII, 86.
[4] *De Finibus*, III, 5, § 16.
[5] Cf. above, p. 58.

Throughout Propositions IV–VIII, it will have been noticed, he speaks of things, and of "each thing" at that, and not of animals. In the philosophy of Spinoza the distinction between animate and inanimate things plays no part; instead there is in it a distinction between bodies and minds, that is to say, between modes of extension and modes of thought. By the "thing" and the "each thing" of which he has so far spoken in Propositions IV–VIII is meant "body," as becomes evident from the opening statement in the Demonstration of Proposition X. What Spinoza has therefore maintained so far is that there is a conatus for self-preservation in bodies. Now, the main activities of bodies as modes of the attribute of extension are, according to Spinoza, motion and rest, and consequently in this additional non-Stoic element in his theory of the conatus Spinoza may be said to reflect the view of Augustine, who extends the principle of self-preservation not only to plants but also to inanimate objects, and identifies their tendency toward self-preservation with their natural movements upward and downward or with their being balanced in an intermediate position,[1] which means to say, with their motion and rest. In general, it may be said to reflect the view of the philosophers of the Renaissance, such as Telesius and Campanella, who saw an effort of self-preservation even in matter.[2] More specifically do we see in it the influence of Hobbes, who defines the *conatus* as "these small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions," [3] and perhaps still more directly may we discern in it the influence of Descartes' first law of nature, that is, the first law of motion, which Spinoza

[1] *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 27.

[2] Cf. R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* (1927), under "Erhaltung."

[3] *Leviathan*, I, 6.

has reproduced before.[1] In *Cogitata Metaphysica*, I, 6, Spinoza draws an analogy between Descartes' first law of nature and the conatus of self-preservation, which he also calls there the conatus of self-movement (*conatus se movendi*),[2] though he concedes "that this conatus of self-movement is something more than the laws and nature of motion." This conatus of self-movement seems also to reflect what Augustine indirectly and Thomas Aquinas and Leo Hebraeus directly call natural love (*amor naturalis*), which according to all of them applies to inanimate objects. Augustine illustrates it by the fact that inanimate bodies "either seek the upper air, or sink deep, or are balanced in an intermediate position," [3] Thomas Aquinas illustrates it by the "connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre," [4] and similarly Leo Hebraeus illustrates it by the tendency of "heavy bodies to move downward and of light bodies to move upward."[5] This expression "natural love," as we have pointed out above,[6] is also used by Spinoza in the *Short Treatise* as synonymous with "conatus."

Having first explained the conatus of the body, Spinoza then proceeds to explain the conatus of the mind. If the conatus of the body is to the perseverance in self-movement, the conatus of the mind is to the perseverance in thought, and this irrespective of whether the object of the thought is clear and distinct ideas or only confused ideas. Furthermore, inasmuch as the distinguishing characteristic of the human

[1] *Ethics*, II, Corol. to Lemma III after Prop. 13. Cf. above, p. 68, and Pollock, *Spinoza*, p. 218.

[2] Cf. expression "conatus ad motum" in *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, III, Def. 3. For a modern interpretation of this expression, see R. McKeon, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, p. 121.

[3] *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 27. Cf. also 28.

[4] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 26, Art. 1.

[5] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, II, p. 67 (Bari, 1929).

[6] Cf. above, p. 197.

mind is consciousness, the mind, unlike the body, is conscious (*conscia*) of its conatus to preserve its own being. Both these characteristics of the conatus of the mind are stated in Proposition IX: "The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persevere in its being for an indefinite time, and is conscious of this effort." Finally, a third characteristic of the conatus of the mind is this. Just as the conatus of the body is only toward self-preservation, and not toward self-destruction, so the conatus of the mind toward the preservation of its own being implies that the mind only affirms the existence of the body, but does not exclude it. Hence, "there is no idea in the mind which excludes the existence of the body, for such an idea is contrary to the mind" (Prop. X).[1] Later Spinoza seems to describe this conatus of the mind to affirm the existence of the body as the "desire by which each person endeavors from the dictates of reason to preserve his own being,"[2] or as the demand of "reason" that "every person should love himself" and "should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to preserve his own being."[3] In this Spinoza approaches again the view of the Stoics, who, having confined the conatus of self-preservation to sentient beings or animals, maintain that the conatus of animals to preserve themselves implies a consciousness (*συνείδησις, sensus*) of their constitution (*σύστασις, status*) and a feeling of affection (*οἰκειῶσαι, se diligerent*) for it.[4] By the same token, since the mind is conscious of the body and of everything that happens in the body, and since also there is a parallelism between the order and connection of ideas and the order and connection of things, it follows that "if any-

[1] See latter part of Schol. to Prop. 11.

[2] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 59, Schol.

[3] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.

[4] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 85; Cicero, *De Finibus*, III, 5, § 16.

thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power of thought" (Prop. XI). These "affections of the body, by which the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these affections," is what Spinoza calls affect or emotion.[1]

The conatus, then, which is the effort of self-preservation in the most general sense, may apply to the body alone (Props. IV–VIII) or to the mind alone (Prop. IX) or to both the mind and the body taken together (Props. X–XI). For the last two cases Spinoza now gives two specific terms. When related to the mind alone, the conatus is called will (*voluntas*), but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and to the body, it is called appetite (*appetitus*).[2] It will be recalled that in the passages restating the principle of self-preservation quoted above various forms of *voluntas* and *appetitus* are used instead of the *conatus* which is used by Spinoza. Thus Spinoza's substitution here of the terms *voluntas* and *appetitus* for *conatus* is not without a historical justification. In addition to these three terms there is also the term *cupiditas*, which is used by Hobbes as synonymous with *appetitus* and as one of the forms of *conatus*.[3] And so Spinoza says here that desire (*cupiditas*), like appetite, is the conatus related at the same time both to the mind and to the body, but it differs from appetite in that it is related to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetites.

[1] *Ethics*, III, Def. 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 9, Schol. Logically this Scholium should follow Prop. 10. But so also the latter part of Scholium to Prop. 11, according to Spinoza himself, is an explanation of Prop. 10, and could therefore be an independent Scholium to Prop. 10. Evidently Spinoza was not always careful about placing the Scholia after the propositions to which they belong. Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 116, 258, n. 3.

[3] Cf. above, p. 197.

Later, however, when Spinoza discusses the active emotions and the conatus of the mind to persevere in its own being, he also identifies desire with that kind of conatus, and "therefore desire also is related to us in so far as we think." [1] These two senses of desire are also given by him in his discussion of desire in the Appendix to Part IV.[2]

Thus "conatus," "will," "appetite," and "desire" are all taken by Spinoza as related terms. They all have in common, according to him, the general meaning of a striving for self-preservation and of a pursuance of the means to further the attainment of this self-preservation. This striving is not a free act by which an affirmation or denial is made, but rather an act which follows from the necessity of the eternal nature of God. Desire, then, is not a pursuit of something which has already been adjudged as good, for such a judgment follows rather than precedes this kind of desire. "We neither strive for (*conari*), wish (*velle*), seek (*appetare*) nor desire (*cupere*) anything because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it." [3] And since to Spinoza any object which affects us with pleasure is called good,[4] what he has said of good applies also to pleasant, that is to say, we do not desire a thing because it is pleasant, but, on the contrary, a thing is pleasant because we desire it. Still, inasmuch as desire is inseparable from pleasure and goodness, Spinoza sometimes speaks of desire as arising from pleasure and pain,[5] from hatred and love,[6] from the recollection of something delightful,[7] and from a true knowledge of good and evil.[8]

[1] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 58, Demonst.
[2] Cf. *Ethics*, IV, Appendix, § 2.
[3] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 9, Schol.
[4] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 8, Demonst.; cf. Prop. 41.
[5] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 37; IV, Props. 18 and 60.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 37.
[7] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 36.
[8] *Ibid.*, IV, Props. 15, 16, and 17.

If we are correct in our judgment that to Spinoza not only the good but also the pleasant is the consequent and not the cause of desire, then this view of his can be traced to the Stoics, and perhaps also to Aristotle. Both Cicero and Diogenes Laertius refer to the question whether pleasure (ἡδονή, *voluptas*) is the object to which the first impulse (ὁρμή) of animals is directed.[1] Their conclusion is that pleasure is not the object to which the conatus is directed, but rather something superadded (ἐπιγέννημα) thereto and a result or consequent of it.[2] Similarly Aristotle, in his discussion of the problem whether pleasure is the supreme good, arrives at the conclusion that it is not the supreme good at which all things aim, but that it completes the activity of the senses in the fulfilment of their proper functions. This statement, however, he immediately qualifies by saying that pleasure completes that activity not as a state inherent in it (ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα) but rather as a superadded or resultant perfection (ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος).[3] Though Aristotle speaks elsewhere of the pleasant (ἡδύ) as an object of choice,[4] it is probably an intellectual kind of pleasure that is meant there, as may be judged from the context, where pleasure is associated with the noble (καλόν) and the advantageous (συμφέρον). Further proof of the sameness of the Aristotelian and the Stoic view on this point is the fact that Zeno, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, compares the relation of pleasure to the conatus of self-preservation to the relation of cheerfulness to animals and of bloom to plants, just as Aristotle compares the relation of pleasure to the activity of the senses in the fulfilment of their proper functions to the rela-

[1] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 85–86; Cicero, *De Finibus*, III, 5, § 17.
[2] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 86.
[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 4, 1174b, 14–33.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, 3, 1104b, 30–31.

tion of the bloom of youth to the young and vigorous.[1] It is therefore clear that both Aristotle and Zeno define pleasure in the same way, except that the former defines it with reference to the activity of the senses in the fulfilment of their proper functions and the latter defines it with reference to the activity of the conatus in animals in the preservation of life. In fact, Aristotle himself has raised the question whether pleasure cannot in a similar way be related to the activity of life, inasmuch as all men aim at life.[2] Now, in his definition of pleasure, Aristotle says that "each of the pleasures is bound up with the activity it perfects" and that "an activity is increased by its proper pleasure."[3] Out of all these, we may assume, have come Spinoza's definitions of desire (*cupiditas*), pleasure (*laetitia*), and pain (*tristitia*). Desire itself is the activity conducive to self-preservation; pleasure is the increase of that activity; pain is the decrease of it.[4] The conception of pleasure as an increase in the activity toward self-preservation may be also detected in Hobbes' definition of pleasure (*voluptas*) as a help to vital motion (*motus vitalis adjutor*).[5]

The terms *laetitia* and *tristitia* used here and elsewhere by Spinoza are taken directly from the Latin translation of Descartes' *Les Passions de l'Ame* (II, 101–102), where the corresponding original French terms are *Ioye* and *Tristesse*. But they reflect the Greek ἡδονή and λύπη respectively, and are one of the many pairs of Latin terms which have been used in translating those two Greek terms. Thus in three Latin translations of Aristotle's *De Anima* printed in the same volume the terms ἡδύ and λυπηρόν are translated by

[1] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 86; *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 4, 1174b, 33.
[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 4, 1175a, 10 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, X, 5, 1175a, 29–31.
[4] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 11, Schol.; *Affectuum Definitiones*, 1 and 2.
[5] *Leviathan*, I, 6.

(1) *laetum* and *triste*, (2) *iucundam* and *molestam*, and (3) *delectabile* and *contrista*.[1] Thus also Cicero sometimes expresses a preference for the use of the Latin *laetitia* as the equivalent of the Greek ἡδονή,[2] and sometimes he prefers the use of the Latin *voluptas*.[3] The term *voluptas*, as we have seen, is used by Spinoza as the equivalent of the Greek ἐπιθυμία.[4] Since the terms *laetitia* and *tristitia* represent the Greek ἡδονή and λύπη, they are to be translated according to their primary meanings of "pleasure" and "pain," though in some places they may also mean "joy" and "sorrow."[5] The term *dolor*,[6] which also represents the Greek λύπη, is evidently used by Spinoza in the sense of "grief."

These three emotions are what Spinoza calls "primitive or primary emotions (*affectus primitivos, seu primarios*)";[7] and it is in direct opposition to Descartes, who recognizes six "simple and primitive" passions, namely, wonder (*admiratio*), love, hatred, desire, pleasure, and pain,[8] that Spinoza emphasizes that "besides these three — pleasure, pain, and desire — I know of no other primary emotions."[9] Descartes' sixfold classification of the primary emotions and Spinoza's threefold classification may be compared with the fourfold classification of the Stoics, namely, desire (ἐπιθυμία), pleasure (ἡδονή), pain (λύπη), and fear (φόβος).[10] The three primary emotions of Spinoza are taken directly from Des-

[1] *De Anima*, III, 7, 431b, 9. Cf. *Aristotelis De Anima* in *Aristotelis Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iunta), Vol. 6 (1574), fol. 173v, D–E.

[2] *De Finibus*, III, 10, § 35.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 4, § 12.

[4] Cf. above, p. 166.

[5] As, e.g., *Ethics*, V, Prop. 17.

[6] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 11, Schol. Cf. *dolor* (*doleur*) in *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 94.

[7] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 4, Expl.

[8] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 69.

[9] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 11, Schol.; *Affectuum Definitiones*, 4, Expl.

[10] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 111; Stobaeus, *Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae*, II, 7 (ed. C. Wachsmuth, Vol. II, p. 88); Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, IV, 6, § 11; *De Finibus*, III, 10, § 35.

cartes' six, and are designated by the same Latin terms, *cupiditas*, *laetitia*, *tristitia*. They reflect on the whole three of the four Stoic primary emotions, though the "desire" in the Stoic list is used in the narrow sense of sensual desire, and though, also, in the history of the transmission of the Stoic in Latin translations other terms are used. Thus, for instance, Cicero uses the terms *libido*, *laetitia*, and *aegritudo*;[1] the Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius' *De Vitis* uses the terms *concupiscentia*, *voluptas*, and *dolor*,[2] whereas the Latin translation of Stobaeus' *Eclogae* uses the terms *cupiditas*, *voluptas*, and *dolor*.[3] Descartes himself opposes his own six-fold classification of the emotions to the scholastic twofold classification into concupiscent (*concupiscibilis*) and irascible (*irascibilis*).[4]

III. Derivative Passive Emotions

From these three primary emotions, says Spinoza here, spring (*oriri*) all the other emotions.[5] But later he explains that they spring from the primary emotions in two ways — namely, either, like the wavering of the mind (*animi fluctuatio*), they are composed (*componitur*) of them, or, like love, hatred, hope, and fear, they are derived (*derivatur*) from them.[6] This corresponds to Descartes' statement that all the other passions "are composed (*componi*) of some of these six, or are species (*species*) of them."[7] A list of forty-eight emotions, including the three primary ones, is given by Spinoza at the end of Part III under the heading of *Affectuum Definitiones*. Of these forty-eight emotions the first forty-

[1] See above, p. 207, n. 10.

[2] See above, p. 207, n. 10, and cf. n. 6.

[3] See above, p. 207, n. 10, and cf. *Joannis Stobaei Eclogarum Libri duo . . . interprete Gulielmo Cantero . . .* (Antverpiae, 1775), p. 175.

[4] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 68. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 81, Art. 2.

[5] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 11, Schol.

[6] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 56.

[7] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 69.

three are taken from Descartes and with but a few slight exceptions are designated by Spinoza by the same terms that occur in the Latin translation of *Les Passions de l'Ame*.[1]

[1] In this list of terms, which are found both in Spinoza and in Descartes, the number to the right of each term refers to *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, and the number to the left refers to *Les Passions de l'Ame*. The numbers within parentheses refer to the *Short Treatise*. A comparative list of emotions in *Short Treatise* and *Les Passions de l'Ame* is given also in A. Wolf, *Spinoza's Short Treatise*, p. 207.

1. *Cupiditas*, II, 57 and 86. (II, 7.)
2. *Laetitia*, II, 91. (II, 7.)
3. *Tristitia*, II, 61 and 92. (II, 7.)
4. *Admiratio*, II, 53. (II, 3.)
5. *Contemptus*, II, 54. (II, 8, § 2.)
6–7. *Amor*, *Odium*, II, 56 and 79. (II, 3, 5, and 6.)
9. *Aversio*, II, 85 and 89. (II, 6, § 4.)
10. *Devotio*, II, 83.
11. *Irrisio*, II, 62; III, 178. (II, 11.)
12–13. *Spes*, *Metus*, II, 58; III, 165. (II, 9, § 3.)
14–15. *Securitas*, *Desperatio*, II, 58; III, 166. (II, 9, § 3.)
16. *Gaudium*, II, 61.
17. *Conscientiae Morsus*, II, 60; III, 177. (II, 10.)
18. *Commiseratio*, II, 62; III, 185.
19. *Favor*, II, 64; III, 192. (II, 13.)
20. *Indignatio*, II, 65 and 127; III, 195. (II, 11, § 3.)
21. *Existimatio*, II, 54; III, 149.
22. *Despectus*, II, 55; III, 149.
23. *Invidia*, II, 62; III, 82. (II, 11, § 3.)
24. *Misericordia*, III, 186.
25. *Acquiescentia in se ipso*, II, 63; III, 190. (II, 8, § 3: *Edelmoedigheid*.)
26. *Humilitas*, II, 54; III, 155. (II, 8, § 4.)
27. *Poenitentia*, II, 63; III, 191. (II, 10.)
28. *Superbia*, II, 54; III, 157. (II, 8, § 5.)
29. *Abjectio*, II, 54; III, 159 and 164. (II, 8, § 6.)
30. *Gloria*, II, 66 and 88; III, 204. (II, 12: *Eer*.)
31. *Pudor*, II, 66; III, 205. (II, 12.)
32. *Desiderium*, II, 67; III, 209. (II, 14.)
33. *Aemulatio*, II, 59; III, 177. (II, 9, § 5.)
34. *Gratitudo*, II, 64; III, 193. (II, 13.)
35. *Benevolentia*, II, 81 and 83.
36. *Ira*, II, 65; III, 199. (II, 11, § 3.)
37. *Vindicta*, II, 88.
38. *Crudelitas*, III, 207.
39. *Timor*, II, 58.
40. *Audacia*, II, 59; III, 171. (II, 9, § 5.)

Similarly the terms of which Spinoza says in these *Affectuum Definitiones* that he passes them by,[1] as well as most of the terms which he happens to define in Scholia to certain propositions, are also found in Descartes.[2] The forty-eight terms in the *Affectuum Definitiones*, it may be further noted, are arranged according to the following scheme: I. The three primary emotions (1–3). II. Two emotions mentioned by Descartes which Spinoza himself does not regard as emotions (4–5). III. Derivative emotions of pleasure and pain (6–31). Derivative emotions of desire (32–48).

The terms in the last five definitions (Defs. 44–48), namely, *ambitio*, *luxuria*, *ebrietas*, *avaritia*, and *libido*, are not taken from Descartes, and according to Spinoza's own statement they constitute a group by themselves and are distinguished from the other emotions in that they have no contraries.[3] The last three of them occur together in Diogenes Laertius thus: φιλαργυρία (*avaritia*), μέθη (*ebrietas*), ἀκολασία (*intemperantia*).[4] Of these three terms, the first two are rendered in the Latin translation accessible to Spinoza by

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41. *Pusillanimitas*, II, 59; III, 174. (II, 9, § 5.)
42. *Consternatio*, II, 59; III, 174. (II, 9, § 5.)
43. *Modestia*, III, 205.

The exceptions are the following:

8. *Propensio* for *Complacentia*, II, 85, or *inclinatio*, II, 90.
31. Expl., *Verecundia*, not in Descartes, but cf. *Inverecundia*, III, 207.
38. *Crudelitas, seu Saevitia. Saevitia* not in Descartes.
38. Expl., *Clementia* for *Commiseratio*, III, 207.
43. *Humanitas, seu Modestia. Humanitas* not in Descartes, but cf. *Modestiae aut Humilitatis* in III, 205.

[1] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 5, Expl.: "*Veneratio et Dedignatio.*" Cf. *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 162–163.

[2] Prop. 11, Schol., *Dolor*, II, 94; *Hilaritas*, II, 67; III, 210; *Titilatio*, II, 94.
Prop. 17, Schol., *Animi Fluctuatio*, II, 59; III, 170. (*Short Treatise*, II, 9, § 5.)
Prop. 29, Schol., *Laus et Vituperium*, II, 157; III, 206.
Prop. 35, Schol., *Zylotypia*, II, 58; III, 167. (*Short Treatise*, II, 9, § 5.)

[3] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 56, Schol.; *Affectuum Definitiones*, 48, Expl.

[4] *De Vitis*, VII, 111.

avaritia and *ebrietas*, exactly the terms used here by Spinoza, but the third is translated by *intemperantia* as against *libido* used here by Spinoza. In a later revised translation, however, which was published after the death of Spinoza, *libido* is substituted for *intemperantia*.[1] But it would seem that all the five terms are taken from one single source, and some day perhaps some one will stumble upon it.

The emotions enumerated and discussed by Spinoza are those which can be found in any traditional work on ethics that was accessible to him. Still, his definitions of certain individual emotions show some departures from his predecessors. In some instances one can detect in his phraseology certain veiled and indirect criticisms of current definitions. A detailed historical study of each of these definitions, including a minute investigation into the variety of Latin renderings of Greek terms, would yield important results for the student of the history of philosophy. But such a study is too complicated and too important for its own sake to be made a sort of appendage to a study of Spinoza. For our immediate purpose it is sufficient to have indicated in a general way the nature of the problem and to have determined the immediate source of Spinoza's selection of the terms. We shall now add some statement as to what seems to us to be the scheme of the classification of these derivative emotions as given by Spinoza in Propositions XII–LVII, particularly attempting to show the logical order in which Spinoza proceeds in these seemingly disconnected propositions.

As is to be expected, Spinoza begins in Propositions XII–XIII with a general statement as to the essential difference

[1] Ed. Amsterdam, 1692. I have not before me the editions of 1602, 1615, 1662, and 1663, to see what term is used there. These three emotions occur together also in Stobaeus' *Eclogae*, II, 7 (ed. Wachsmuth, Vol. II, p. 93), but in Canter's Latin translation (p. 177; see above, p. 208, n. 3) the three Greek terms, φιλογυνία, φιλοινία, φιλαργυρία, are reproduced in their original form without a translation.

between primary and derivative emotions. An emotion is primary, he seems to say, when the pleasure and pain which we experience are caused by an external object which is present and as a result of which we either desire that object, that is to say, "we endeavor absolutely to make it exist," or we do not desire that object, that is to say, "we endeavor to destroy or remove it from us." [1] These are the primary emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire. But sometimes we experience pleasure and pain caused by things which are not present but which are imagined by the mind as being present. Similarly the mind in its imagination desires the preservation of the imaginary presence of things which cause us pleasure and the exclusion of the imaginary presence of those things which cause us pain. These constitute the derivative emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire. (Props. XII, XIII and Corol.) But, Spinoza proceeds to say, when the pleasure or pain is caused not by the actual presence of an external cause but rather by the idea of it, then the pleasure and pain are called respectively love and hatred. Though he does not mention Hobbes here in this connection, it would seem that it is in direct opposition to Hobbes, who distinguishes between desire and aversion on the one hand and love and hatred on the other, in that the former signify the absence of the object whereas the latter signify the presence of the object,[2] that Spinoza defines love and hatred as the pleasure or pain accompanied by the *idea* of an external cause. And so also, though the name of Descartes is not mentioned, it would seem that it was Descartes' conception of love as "the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object" [3] that Spinoza meant to repudiate in his contention

[1] Cf. *Ethics*, III, Prop. 28, Demonst., where references are given to earlier propositions.

[2] *Leviathan*, I, 6.

[3] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 6. Cf. *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 79, and below, pp. 276–277, 279–280.

that love and hatred as distinguished from pleasure and pain do not signify the actual presence of the external cause but only the idea of it. Moreover, maintains Spinoza, like any other experience of pleasure and pain, the experience of love and hatred is inseparable from the endeavor "to keep present and preserve that which one loves" or "to remove and destroy the thing one hates" (Prop. XIII, Schol.).

Now this act of the mind in imagining causes of pleasure and pain and preserving them and destroying them is not an arbitrary act. It follows certain rules and is ultimately determined by actually existing external causes. The rules by which the imagination acts are explained by Spinoza in the subsequent propositions.

First, there is the law of the association of emotions (Props. XIV–XVII). An object which has never caused us pleasure, pain, or desire may become a cause of all these emotions by its being associated in our mind with something which did cause us pleasure and pain and desire. The term "association" is not used here by Spinoza, but what we should call association is described by Spinoza as an accidental (*per accidens*) cause (Prop. XV). Now, the laws of association, as enumerated by Aristotle, are based upon three conditions: (1) similarity, (2) contrast, and (3) contiguity (*σύνεγγυς*),[1] which, according to Aristotle's use of the term, refers both to contiguity of place and to contiguity of time. Of these three Aristotelian laws of association, two, similarity and temporal contiguity, are described by Spinoza in *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* as "the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it."[2] Above in the Second Part of the *Ethics* Spinoza de-

[1] *De Memoria*, 2, 451b, 19–20.

[2] Ch. 4 (*Opera*, III, p. 58, ll. 1–3).

scribed only association by temporal contiguity.[1] Here, again, as in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, he describes two kinds of association of ideas, or rather of emotions, that of temporal contiguity in Proposition XIV and that of similarity in Proposition XVI.

The discussion of association by similarity in Proposition XVI leads Spinoza to the discussion of what he calls, after the Latin translation of Descartes' *Les Passions de l'Ame*, "*Animi fluctuatio*," [2] i.e., wavering of the mind, for the first kind of this *animi fluctuatio* mentioned by Spinoza, as we shall see, is based upon association by similarity. The original French term used by Descartes for this kind of emotions is "irresolution." Spinoza similarly describes these emotions as inconstant (*non . . . constantes*)[3] and as emotions involving doubt or something like doubt.[4] In Propositions XVII–XVIII and their Scholia, Spinoza enumerates three kinds of such *animi fluctuatio*. The first kind is described by him as a sort of conflict of emotions arising from "causes which bring about one of the emotions essentially (*per se*) and the other accidentally (*per accidens*)," [5] that is to say, by the association of ideas, as, for instance, when an object which causes us pain is similar to another object which causes us pleasure (Prop. XVII). The second kind of *animi fluctuatio* is described by him as arising from "an object which is the efficient cause of both emotions," [6] that is to say, is the essential cause of two opposite emotions. The third kind of *animi fluctuatio* is described by Spinoza as arising from the "image of a past or future thing" (Prop. XVIII), inasmuch

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 18. Cf. above, pp. 89–90.

[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 17, Schol. Cf. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 59; III, 170.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 18, Schol. I. (*Opera*, II, p. 155, l. 3).

[4] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 17, Schol.; Prop. 18, Schol. I.

[5] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 17, Schol. [6] *Ibid.*

as "it generally happens that those who possess much experience hesitate when they think of a thing as past or future, and doubt greatly concerning its issue," and "therefore the emotions which spring from such images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things" (Schol. I).

Second, there is the law of the imitation of emotions (Props. XIX-XXXII). Though Spinoza uses the expression "imitation of emotions" (*affectuum imitatio*) only with reference to the subject discussed in Proposition XXVII, it may be taken as his explanation of everything discussed in Propositions XIX-XXXII. According to this law, an object which is neither an essential nor an accidental cause of pleasure or pain or desire may become a cause of all these emotions if it happens to cause them to other human beings whose emotions we naturally tend to imitate. In discussing the imitation of emotions Spinoza divides the subject into two parts: First, the imitation of the emotions of those whom we love or hate (Props. XIX-XXVI). Second, the imitation of the emotions of other human beings in general, whom we neither love nor hate (Props. XXVII-XXXII).

The imitation of emotions, however, is used by Spinoza as a very comprehensive principle which manifests itself in various forms of action.

In the first place, we participate in the emotions of those whom we love or hate. The underlying cause for this kind of emotions is that we are pained or pleased at the destruction or preservation of those whom we love (Prop. XIX), and if we are not completely pained at the preservation of those whom we hate, — for even those whom we hate are human beings and we have natural sympathy for them,[1] — we are still partially pleased at their destruction (Prop. XX).

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 23, Schol.

As a result of this emotion of pleasure and pain we are also affected by the pleasure and pain of those whom we love (Prop. XXI), and we love or hate those who cause pleasure and pain to those whom we love (Prop. XXII). Similarly we are partially pained and pleased respectively at the pleasure and pain of those whom we hate (Prop. XXIII), and we hate or love a person according as he causes pleasure or pain to those whom we hate (Prop. XXIV). All this may be called the Participation of Emotions.

In the second place, we endeavor to affirm concerning those whom we love, as we do concerning ourselves, that which we imagine to produce pleasure, and to deny of them that which we imagine to produce pain (Prop. XXV). Conversely, too, we endeavor to affirm concerning those whom we hate that which we imagine to produce pain, and to deny of them that which we imagine to produce pleasure (Prop. XXVI). This may be called the Affirmation and Denial of Emotions.

These two forms of the imitation of emotions, namely, the Participation of Emotions and the Affirmation and Denial of Emotions, are provoked not only by those whom we love or hate but also by those whom we regard with no emotion whatever, for every human being, by the mere fact that he is like ourselves, will cause us to participate in his emotions and to affirm of him that which we imagine to produce pleasure and to deny of him that which we imagine to produce pain (Prop. XXVII).

Furthermore, there are other forms of the imitation of emotions. In the first place, there is a sort of altruistic emotion, by which we endeavor to do that which we imagine to cause pleasure to others and to desist from doing that which we imagine to cause them pain (Props. XXVIII–XXIX). This altruistic emotion, Spinoza would seem to say, is to be

regarded as a form of imitation, for our effort to cause pleasure to others is nothing but an effort on our part to cause others to imitate our own emotions of pleasure. Then, this altruistic emotion reacts upon us and produces in us an imitation of it (Prop. XXX). Moreover, by the imitation of the emotion of others toward an object, our own emotion toward that object, if it is of the same kind, will become intensified, and, if it is of the opposite kind, will come in conflict with it and hence produce a wavering of the mind, *animi fluctuatio* (Prop. XXXI). Finally, emotions which have been produced in us by the imitation of the emotion of others may result in our becoming inimical to the enjoyment by those others of the very same emotions which have originally inspired our own emotions (Prop. XXXII).

This, I believe, is the logical reconstruction of Propositions XIX–XXXII. All of them deal with the theory of the imitation of emotions in its various phases.

The remaining propositions dealing with derivative passive emotions fall into the following groups:

I. Emotions of love and hatred (Props. XXXIII–XLIX).

II. Imaginary hope and fear (Prop. L).

III. Relativity of emotions (Prop. LI).

IV. Wonder (*admiratio*), which, in opposition to Descartes, Spinoza does not consider an emotion,[1] and its derivatives (Prop. LII).

V. Emotions arising from the mind's contemplation of itself (Props. LIII–LV).

VI. The indefiniteness of the number of derivative emotions (Prop. LVI).

VII. Individual and generic differences within each particular emotion (Props. LVII and Schol.).

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 4, Expl.

IV. Active Emotions

These passive emotions which Spinoza also calls the passiveness of the soul (*pathema animi*)[1] or the passion of the soul (*passio animi*)[2] are characterized chiefly by the fact that there is always an external cause which produces them, and that man himself is therefore only their inadequate or partial cause. As against these there are the active emotions, or, as Spinoza describes them, "emotions which are related to the mind in so far as it acts" [3] and of which man is the adequate cause. In contradistinction to the three primary passive emotions there are only two primary active emotions, desire and pleasure, for pain is always a passive emotion. As active emotions, desire is the effort to self-preservation by the dictates of reason, and pleasure is the enjoyment experienced from the mind's contemplation of itself whenever it conceives a true or adequate idea. Truly speaking, these distinctions between the active and passive emotions of desire and pleasure are nothing more than Spinoza's way of reproducing in his own terms the old Aristotelian distinction between rational and irrational desire[4] and between the pleasures of the intellect and the pleasures of the senses.[5] All the actions which follow from these active emotions are ascribed by Spinoza to *fortitudo*, which he divides into *animositas* and *generositas*.

There is a story behind this combination of terms. The term *fortitudo* is generally used as the Latin translation of the Greek ἀνδρεία.[6] According to Thomas Aquinas the term *fortitudo* can be taken in two ways. "First, as simply de-

[1] *Ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Generalis Definitio.*
[2] *Ibid.*, Expl.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 59.
[4] *De Anima*, III, 9, 432b, 3–6.
[5] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 5, 1175a, 26–28.
[6] *Ibid.*, III, 6, 1115a, 6 ff.

noting a certain firmness of mind; and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since, as the Philosopher states in *Ethics*, II, it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably.[1] Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely, in certain grave dangers. . . . In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter."[2] The term *animositas* is taken by Spinoza from the Latin translation of Descartes' *Les Passions de l'Ame*, where the corresponding French term is *courage*,[3] and consequently it is also a translation of the Greek ἀνδρεία. Similarly the term *generositas* is taken from the same work of Descartes, where it is said to be the equivalent of the scholastic *magnanimitas*[4] and hence a translation of the Greek μεγαλοψυχία.[5] Now, *magnanimitas* is said by Thomas Aquinas to be either identical with *fortitudo*, according to Seneca and Cicero, or a part of *fortitudo*, according to Macrobius.[6] Evidently having all this in the back of his mind, Spinoza says that he ascribes all the actions which follow from the active emotions to *fortitudo*, which he uses as simply denoting what Thomas Aquinas describes as a certain firmness of the mind which is a condition of every virtue. This he then divides into *animositas* and *generositas*, the former of which, as we have seen, is *fortitudo* in the sense of what Thomas Aquinas describes as a special virtue, such as "bearing and withstanding" difficulties in great danger, and the latter of which, being the equivalent of *magnanimitas*, is likewise related to *fortitudo*, being either a kind of *fortitudo* or a part of it.

[1] Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 4, 1105a, 32–33.
[2] *Summa Theologica*, Secunda Secundae, Quaest. 123, Art. 2.
[3] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 59.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, 161; cf. II, 54.
[5] *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 3, 1123a, 34 ff.
[6] *Summa Theologica*, Secunda Secundae, Quaest. 129, Art. 5.

Though the terms *animositas* and *generositas* are both taken by Spinoza from Descartes, it is only the former term that is defined by him as it is defined by Descartes. *Animositas* is defined by Descartes as "a certain heat or agitation which disposes the soul forcibly to bend itself powerfully to the execution of the things which it desires to do." [1] Similarly, Spinoza defines it here with some modifications as "the desire by which each person endeavors from the dictates of reason to preserve his own being." [2] *Generositas* is explained by Descartes in two places. In one place, he simply changes the term *generositas* which appears in the heading of the chapter to the term *magnanimitas* which appears within the text of the chapter, and explains the latter to mean pride (*superbia*),[3] which, of course, is to be taken in the sense of justifiable pride, as its corresponding Greek term μεγαλοψυχία is explained by Aristotle.[4] In another place, he similarly explains *generositas* as "that which causes us only to esteem ourselves at a just value." [5] Spinoza, however, uses it in its derivative sense of the good man, which is already given by Aristotle in his discussion of μεγαλοψυχία,[6] and defines it as "the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavors to help other people and to join them to him in friendship." [7] Finally, just as Descartes says of *generositas* that it is the "key of all other virtues, and a general remedy for all the disorders of the passions," [8] so Spinoza says of both *generositas* and *animositas* that "nothing can be opposed to these emotions but *generositas* and *animositas*." [9]

[1] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 171.
[2] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 59, Schol.
[3] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 54.
[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 3, 1123b, 2 ff.
[5] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 161.
[6] *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 3, 1123b, 26 ff.
[7] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 59, Schol.
[8] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 161.
[9] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 48, Expl.

CHAPTER XIX

VIRTUES

In the religion upon which Spinoza was brought up the course of human conduct was plotted out for men by a Law which was held to be of divine origin. The expression of an arbitrary will of God, that Law was regarded as an imposition as well as a restraint upon the natural impulses of men. Obedience to it was virtue; disobedience was vice. As man was believed to be free to choose between obedience and disobedience, he was to be rewarded or punished in accordance with his actions. Man was urged, however, not to choose obedience in the hope of receiving the expected reward, nor to eschew disobedience for fear of the threatened punishment. The Law was to be fulfilled for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any other external motive.

As he grew older and began to study the mediaeval theologians, especially Maimonides, Spinoza learned of another conception of the Law. Of divine origin it still was, but not arbitrary and purposeless and contrary to human nature. With the exception of certain precepts for which no obvious reason could be discovered by the human mind — though that by no means precluded the possibility of some reason — the Law as a whole had a double purpose. In the first place, it was to help man to attain the highest moral and intellectual perfection of which as a human being he was capable, and in the second place, it was to bring about the establishment of an ideal social order in which the individual might find the most advantageous conditions for the development of the highest

capacities.[1] Such expressions as "rational precepts"[2] and "natural law"[3] as a designation of the divinely revealed precepts and ordinances then came into being. This method of rationalization, Spinoza discovered, was common to both Jewish and Christian theologians, and was continued almost to his own time even by such political thinkers as Grotius[4] and Hobbes.

Upon his becoming acquainted with the works of the ancient pagan philosophers, especially Aristotle, Spinoza recognized in these various attempts to interpret the laws of the Scriptures as laws of nature or of reason merely an application of the ethical speculations of ancient philosophers to the laws of Moses. In the writings of Aristotle and in the works which transmitted the teachings of the Stoics he found the origin of those views which are only faintly reflected in the works of the rationalist Jewish and Christian theologians. To this method of rationalization as a whole he was not averse, and in his own way he has made use of it in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. In his *Ethics*, however, he chose to follow the method of Aristotle and the other pagan moralists and to present the problems of conduct independently of the Scriptural teachings.

A fault which Spinoza finds alike in the naïve traditional conception of the revealed Law as something arbitrary and in the rationalistic conception of it as something purposive is that they both set up an absolute conception of perfection and goodness. To both of them the revealed Law was an ideal standard for human conduct. The perfect action of man, which by the original use of the term "perfection"

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27 ff. Cf. below, pp. 326–328.

[2] מצות שכליות, *Emunot we-De'ot*, III, 2.

[3] דת טבעית, *'Iḳḳarim*, I, 7.

[4] On Grotius, cf. I. Husik, "The Law of Nature, Hugo Grotius, and the Bible," in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, II (1925), pp. 381 ff.

in the sense of "completeness" and of not lacking anything required by one's own nature should mean a maximum attainment of "his power of action, in so far as it is understood by his own nature," [1] has thus come to mean action in conformity with some external code of conduct drawn up either contrary to the nature of man or for a human nature supposed to be ideally conceived in the mind of God and to which man must strive to attain by struggling against his real nature. Similarly goodness, which according to an old philosophic definition adopted by Spinoza means "that which we certainly know is useful to us," [2] has come to mean obedience to the commands of a revealed religion which we are told is useful to us. It is this which has induced men to give "the name good" not only "to everything which leads to health" but also, and very often primarily, to that which leads to "the worship of God." [3]

But even the old pagan philosophers were not completely acceptable to Spinoza. They all speak of virtue and vice as something distinct from emotions. Whatever their metaphysical conception of human freedom is, they all maintain that virtue and vice are voluntary, that our actions originate in ourselves, and that hence we are to be praised for our virtues and blamed for our vices.[4] Spinoza is to disagree with this. Our virtues and vices, he is to argue, are not voluntary, our actions do not originate in ourselves, and hence we are not to be praised for our virtues nor blamed for our vices.

Had Spinoza written his *Ethics* after the manner of the rabbis and scholastics he would have prefaced its Fourth

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 208, ll. 28–29). Cf. *Short Treatise*, II, 4, § 5.

[2] *Ethics*, IV, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 208, ll. 18–20); Def. 1; *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6, 1096b, 14 ff.; Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 94.

[3] *Ethics*, I, Appendix (*Opera*, II, p. 81, ll. 34–35).

[4] Cf. above, p. 182, and below, pp. 224–225.

Part with a statement which would have read somewhat as follows:

Part IV. Wherein we shall discuss the nature of what is known among the philosophers as virtues and vices, for having discussed in Part III the nature of the emotions, we deem it proper to discuss after that the nature of virtue and vice. We shall divide this Part into two main sections. First, wherein we shall show that the distinction made by the philosophers between emotions and virtues is untenable (Props. I–XVIII). Secondly, wherein we shall outline our own conception of human conduct, based indeed on the writings of the philosophers, but presented in a way which is our own (Scholium to Prop. XVIII–Prop. LXXIII). This second section we shall further subdivide into three topics: (*a*) the relation of happiness to virtue (Scholium to Prop. XVIII–Prop. XXVIII), (*b*) the origin and nature of society (Props. XXIX–XL), and (*c*) the meaning of virtue in general and of certain individual virtues in particular (Props. XLI–LXXIII).

I. Emotions and Virtues

The freedom which to his philosophic predecessors determined the nature of virtue and vice was expressed in two terms, "knowledge" and "will." Sometimes only one of these terms is mentioned, as, for instance, when Socrates says that all virtue is knowledge [1] or when Cicero says that all virtues are dependent on the will,[2] but sometimes the two terms are joined together in one single term, as when, for instance, Aristotle defines virtue as that which is related to choice, and then defines choice as deliberate desire or will, from which he infers that if the choice is to be good both the

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 13, 1144b, 17 ff. Cf. Plato, *Laches* 194D.
[2] *De Finibus*, V, 13, § 36.

reasoning must be true and the desire must be right.[1] The fine points of difference between statements that virtue depends upon knowledge and statements that virtue depends upon will do not concern Spinoza for his present purpose. To him, with his own view that intellect and will are identical, there is no difference between these two kinds of statements. What is of interest to him is the general agreement of philosophers that right or wrong conduct for which man is to be praised or blamed is determined by his knowledge or his will, and that man is a free agent to choose his course of action. It is with a criticism of this view that he opens up the Fourth Part of the *Ethics*.

His argument may be outlined as follows. You say that virtue differs from emotion in that the former is dependent upon free will whereas the latter is determined by causes. But I have already shown that there is no free will and that actions, like emotions, are determined by external causes. Now, since in the case of emotions it must be admitted that an emotion which has been determined by an external cause cannot be removed by mere knowledge (Prop. I) or by mere will (Props. II–VII), the same must also be true in the case of actions, namely, that no action which has been determined by an external cause can be changed by mere knowledge or by mere will. There is no difference therefore between virtue and emotion, or, to be more exact, between what is called virtue and vice and the emotions of pleasure and pain (Prop. VIII). The only way in which an emotion can be removed is by another emotion, provided it is stronger than the first on account of its being caused by external causes which are stronger than those which caused the first emotion (Props. IX–XVIII). And so also, I contend, the only way in which an action can be changed is by another action which is

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 2, 1139a, 22 ff. Cf. II, 6, 1106b, 36 ff.

stronger than the first on account of its being caused by external causes which are stronger than those which caused the first action. Now, among the external forces which determine action as well as emotions is the power of reason, or that kind of knowledge which I call the second. It is a power within us, or, if you prefer, I will call it virtue, for the original meaning of the term "virtue" is power, and that power or virtue, when once fully developed within us, acts as do our physiological reflexes, without any intervention of what you call free will. In this sense I admit with you that virtue is dependent upon knowledge, or rather upon reason, and thus, following your example, I too shall make a catalogue of virtues (Scholium to Prop. XVIII–Prop. LXXIII).

But let us now see how this argument which we have put in the mouth of Spinoza unfolds itself in its own propositions.

In the first place, he argues in Proposition I, an emotion cannot be removed by knowledge. Any emotion (*affectus*) which is a passiveness or a passion of the soul (*animi pathema*, *animi passio*) has already been described as a confused idea (*confusa idea*),[1] and it may therefore be described also as a false idea (*idea falsa*).[2] Now a confused or false idea is like an imagination (*imaginatio*)[3] in that it indicates the present constitution of the human body rather than the nature of the external body which produces the passive emotion.[4] Still, while this kind of knowledge of the external body, being only a confused or false idea of it, is only negative, the emotion itself may be considered as something positive. Thus when we look at the sun and imagine its distance from us to be about two hundred feet, that idea or imagination of its distance, to be sure, is confused and false; still the

[1] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Generalis Definitio.*
[2] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. I.
[3] *Ibid.*, Schol.
[4] *Ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Generalis Definitio*, and IV, Prop. I, Schol.

emotion produced by the effect of the sun's heat and light upon us which gives us the impression of nearness is something positive and cannot be removed by a mere knowledge of the sun's true distance. It can be removed only when the sun happens to be shut out by a passing cloud which produces in us a different emotion, based perhaps upon the false imagination that the sun has been swallowed up by some invisible dragon, but still an imagination which is stronger than the first imagination, thus producing upon us a new and stronger impression which removes the first impression of the sun's nearness to us. Consequently, "nothing contained in a false idea is removed by the presence of the true in so far as it is true";[1] it is removed only when "other imaginations arise which are stronger, and which exclude the present existence of the objects we imagine."[2] Or, as he says later in Proposition XIV, the mere knowledge of the truth of a thing will not remove the present emotion produced by the effect of the thing upon us unless that knowledge itself is transformed into an emotion, and a stronger emotion at that.

In the second place, Spinoza argues in Propositions II–VII, an emotion cannot be removed by will. Will, like appetite and desire, has already been defined by him to mean essentially the conatus to persevere in existence,[3] and consequently in these propositions instead of using the term "will" Spinoza uses the term "conatus" or some form of it. The argument contained in these propositions is closely knit. It may be reproduced as follows: Man is not only a mode or part of God or of the eternal and infinite order of nature, but he is also a part of the common order of nature, an individual thing among many other individual things, all of

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 1.
[2] *Ibid.*, Schol.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 9, Schol.

which act upon him as external causes, for "it is impossible that a man should not be a part of nature and should not follow her common order; but if he be placed amongst individuals who agree with his nature, his power of action will by that very fact be assisted and supported. But if, on the contrary, he be placed amongst individuals who do not in the least agree with his nature, he will scarcely be able without great change on his part to accommodate himself to them."[1] Consequently, "we suffer in so far as we are a part of [the common order of] nature,[2] which part cannot be conceived by itself nor without the other parts" (Prop. II). Indeed, "the force by which man perseveres in existence" is the actual power of God, that is, of the eternal and infinite order of nature, but not in so far as that power is infinite, but only in so far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of man, that is to say, in so far as it is finite (*ibid.*, Demonst.). That power or conatus is therefore "limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes" (Prop. III). Since this is so, "it is impossible that a man should not be a part of [the common order of] nature, and that he should suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause" (Prop. IV). This consequently leads to the conclusion that "a man is necessarily always subject to passions" (*ibid.*, Corol.). "The force and increase" of any of these passions or emotions are limited only "by the power of an external cause compared with our own power" (Prop. V), and "may so far surpass the rest of the actions or the power of a man that the emotion may obstinately cling to him" (Prop. VI). Once any of these emotions clings to a man

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Appendix, 7.

[2] That the term "nature" in this proposition means the "common order of nature" becomes evident upon comparison with the preceding quotation.

it "cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger emotion" (Prop. VII).

With the elimination of the difference between emotion and virtue the difference between physical and moral good and evil likewise disappears. In the philosophic writings with which Spinoza was acquainted the good was always discussed in connection with the useful and the pleasant. Socrates maintained that goodness is utility.[1] Aristotle speaks of the "good, or pleasant, or useful," and adds that the "useful may be taken to mean productive of some good or of pleasure." [2] Or he distinguishes between things good in themselves and things useful, and among the former he includes certain pleasures.[3] The Stoics argue that the good cannot be identified with pleasure; still it is identified by them with the advantageous.[4] Spinoza combines all these utilitarian and hedonistic conceptions of the good into his various definitions of the term. He sometimes speaks of the good as consisting of "every kind of pleasure (*laetitiae*)," [5] and sometimes he says that the good is "that which we certainly know is useful to us." [6] In this he is merely following the well-established philosophic tradition, using it, as we have suggested above, in opposition to the traditional religious conception that the good is that which conforms to the precepts of the revealed Law. But while he follows the phraseology of the old philosophic tradition, he in no way accepts its implication. For to his philosophic predecessors the good, however defined, whether as pleasure or as utility, was an object of deliberate desire or choice or will. "There are three objects of choice," says Aristotle, "the noble, the

[1] Plato, *Protagoras* 333D.
[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 2, 1155b, 19–20.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, 6, 1096b, 14–18.
[4] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 94.
[5] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 39, Schol.
[6] *Ibid.*, IV, Def. 1.

advantageous, the pleasant." [1] But to Spinoza the element of choice or will is eliminated. Only that of consciousness is present. "Knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the emotion of pleasure and pain in so far as we are conscious of it" (Prop. VIII). Good, whether physical or moral, is a consciousness of pleasure; evil, again whether physical or moral, is a consciousness of pain.

Spinoza has thus in the first eight propositions laid down the general principle that emotions, and for that matter also actions, are not determined by mere knowledge or will, and he has also defined the meaning of good and evil. Now in the next ten propositions (IX–XVIII) he undertakes to show how in the conflict of emotions, without any knowledge or will on the part of him who suffers the emotions, weaker emotions are removed by stronger emotions. These ten propositions fall into two equal groups of five each. Each of these two groups begins with a proposition which may be considered as introductory. The subject of the first group is the conflict between emotions toward objects which differ either with reference to the future, present, or past time of their existence, or with reference to the necessity, contingency, or possibility of their existence (Props. X–XIII). This is introduced by the general statement that an emotion is stronger if its cause is imagined to be present than if it is not imagined to be present (Prop. IX). The subject of the second group is the conflict of desires, in which either only one of the conflicting desires (Prop. XV) or both conflicting desires (Props. XVI–XVII) spring from a true knowledge of good and evil, i.e., from the consciousness of pleasure and pain (Props. XV–XVII), or one of the conflicting desires springs from pleasure and the other from pain (Prop. XVIII). This is introduced by the general statement that the knowl-

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 3, 1104b, 30–31.

edge of good and evil can be a determining factor in the conflict of desires only in so far as it is considered as an emotion, i.e., as a consciousness of pleasure and pain (Prop. XIV).

Thus an emotion cannot be removed by mere knowledge or will, but only by another emotion which happens to be stronger. The emotions, like other physical forces in nature, follow from the necessity of the eternal order of the universe. The emotions sometimes cross one another and come into conflict with one another just as do any other physical forces of nature. When such a conflict arises, the stronger emotion will subdue the weaker just as in the conflict of any other physical forces of nature. And just as in the case of the conflict of the physical forces of nature man may suffer evil, so in the case of the conflict of his emotions and the inevitable victory of the stronger emotion over the weaker man may suffer evil or pain or a diminution of his power of action toward his self-preservation. This is what Spinoza describes as "human impotence and want of stability" [1] or that "impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions" which constitutes his "servitude," inasmuch as a man who is at the mercy of his emotions "is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him." [2]

Man, however, is not left unprotected against his own emotions any more than he is left unprotected against the physical forces of nature. Reason, and the knowledge which springs from reason, is a means whereby man can not only master the adverse forces of nature but can also overcome the assaults of his own emotions. In its capacity as an instrument for self-preservation, reason overcomes the ad-

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*, IV, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 205, ll. 7–12).

verse forces of nature by setting up against them favorable forces which are stronger. Similarly, in its capacity as an instrument for self-mastery, it overcomes the emotions which are passive by producing against them stronger emotions which are active. In either case reason is the blind tool of nature, and not an instrument wielded by man as a free agent. Reason (*ratio*) is that which Spinoza calls the second kind of knowledge. It is a knowledge of the rules of the game of nature. It is not confused or false knowledge, nor is it even true knowledge of an isolated single fact. It is the knowledge of the common notions and the adequate ideas of the properties of things and of the true deductions from these common notions.[1] To act according to reason, however, does not imply freedom of the will. Reason itself is a part of nature, and it follows from the necessity of the attribute of thought. When Spinoza urges man to act according to reason, then, unlike all his predecessors who had similarly used this phraseology in prescribing human conduct, he does not mean thereby an exhortation to man to exercise his free will; with him it is only an exhortation to man to acquire the proper kind of knowledge upon which reason is nurtured, so that it may grow in strength and assert itself in its full power when called into action. At the challenge of the emotions reason springs into action in the same manner as our eyelids close at the sudden approach of danger to our eyes. In this sense indeed knowledge is virtue, and a life according to virtue will be a life according to reason — a kind of reason which follows by necessity from one's true knowledge. How reason works for the well-being of man against the assaults of his own emotions is explained by Spinoza in what he calls the "Dictates of Reason" (Prop. XVIII, Schol. ff.).

[1] Cf. above, pp. 117 ff., 138–140, 149.

II. Happiness and Virtue

In his "Dictates of Reason," the problems which Spinoza has set himself, the answers which he gives, and the methods by which he proceeds all reflect the common tradition of religious and philosophical writings. Like Socrates and Aristotle, he starts out with the question of what happiness is and what virtue is. Taking up again the philosophic commonplace that the primary conatus of every person is towards self-preservation, he arrives at the conclusion that happiness consists in man's ability to preserve his own being. Together with Aristotle, the Stoics, and the masters of his own religion, he repeats that virtue is to be desired for its own sake. Then in the Scholium to Proposition XVIII and in a series of propositions to the end of the Fourth Part he deals with certain stock problems of ethical philosophy in the following order:

I. Happiness and Virtue (Props. XIX–XXVIII).
II. Society and the State (Props. XXIX–XL).
III. Catalogue of Virtues (Props. XLI–LXXIII).

It is, however, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which has served Spinoza as the basic and direct source of his succeeding propositions, especially Propositions XIX–XXVIII. He seems to have had in his mind, while drawing up these propositions, a topical outline of that book, and upon it he has modelled his own discussions of goodness, virtue, happiness, and of the life in accordance with reason. He seems to have followed that outline quite closely, agreeing with certain parts of it while disagreeing with others. That outline, we may assume, must have run as follows:

Everything aims at some good. The good is therefore that at which all things aim (ἐφίεται). The good is also pleasant

and useful,[1] and it is called the end (τέλος),[2] or that "for the sake of which everything else is done." [3]

In order to know what the good of man consists in, and especially his highest good, it must be first determined whether man has any function, and, if so, what that function is, "for, as with a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in fact anybody who has a definite function and action, his goodness and efficiency seem to lie in his function, so it would seem to be with man, if indeed he has a definite function." [4] Now, man has a definite function, just as each of the various members of the body manifestly has a certain function of its own. This definite function of man may seem to be the mere act of living, but it is not, for this is shared even by plants, whereas what we are looking for is the function which is peculiar to man. Nor is sentient life the peculiar function of man, for this is shared by animals. The peculiar function of man as man pertains to that which is peculiar to man alone. It is the activity of soul in accordance with reason. This, however, is only the general function of man as a human being. Besides this, there are certain particular functions which belong to individual human beings as individuals, for just as one harpist may play the harp better than another, so there are certain individual human beings who may perform the general function of man better than others. The particular form of goodness or proficiency with which an individual man is capable of performing his general human function is called his virtue (ἀρετή), and a man is therefore said to perform his general human function successfully if he performs it in accordance with his own proper virtue. The good of man as an individual human being is

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 1, 1094a, 1–3.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 2, 1094a, 18 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, 7, 1097a, 18–19.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1097b, 25–28.

therefore defined as "an activity of soul in accordance with virtue." [1]

Goods are many, and among them there is one which is the highest good. This highest good is spoken of by "both the multitude and persons of refinement" as happiness (εὐδαιμονία), and "they conceive that to live well (εὖ ζῆν, *bene vivere*), or to do well (εὖ πράττειν, *bene agere*), is the same thing as to be happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν, *felicem esse*)." [2]

Happiness, then, is some form of activity. It is an activity according to virtue, which is also according to reason. Being an activity according to virtue, happiness is an activity desirable in itself, since "this is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake." [3]

The definition of goodness as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue leaves still one question unsolved. Virtues are twofold, moral and intellectual, determined by activities of different parts of the soul. Which of these virtues, then, will characterize the highest good of man? Aristotle's answer is that it is the virtue of the best part of us, that is, of reason. The highest good of man is contemplative activity. In proof of this he shows that contemplation is the highest form of activity, that it is the most continuous, that it is the most pleasant, that it is the most self-sufficient, and, finally, that it is the activity of the divine in man.[4]

This is a topical outline of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as it must have presented itself in the mind of Spinoza. Let us now see how Spinoza reproduces it and modifies it.

Like Aristotle, Spinoza begins with the general statement that "according to the laws of his own nature each person aims (*appetit*) at that which he considers to be good" (Prop.

[1] *Ibid.*, 1098a, 16–17.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 4, 1095a, 19–20.
[3] *Ibid.*, X, 6, 1176b, 7–9.
[4] *Ibid.*, X, 7.

XIX). The term *appetit* here, which I have translated by "aims at," reflects the Greek ἐφίεται in the corresponding passage of Aristotle, for so also in the Latin version of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Nicomachean Ethics* is that Greek term translated by *appetunt*. As that which all things aim at is also called by Aristotle the end, Spinoza says that "by end (*finis*, τέλος), for the sake of which we do anything, I understand appetite (*appetitum*)," [1] that is to say, that which is aimed at. That Spinoza is consciously imitating Aristotle in his discussion of the problem of the highest good and happiness may be gathered also from the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, where he follows Aristotle still further in enumerating three things, outside contemplation, which are generally considered by men as the highest good, namely, riches, honor, and pleasure.[2] In the course of his discussion here in the *Ethics* he also repeats his own view, for which, as we have seen, there are philosophical precedents,[3] that the good is also pleasant and useful.[4] In all this, he is following Aristotle.

But when he comes to define what the good is, he departs from Aristotle. In opposition to Aristotle, he seems to contend that in order to find out what the good is at which all men by the necessity of their nature aim we must not ascertain what the particular function of man as a rational being is, nor even what his more general functions as a sentient and living being are, but rather what his function as a mere being, as a part of nature, is. Taking up again the old principle of self-preservation which originally was used by the Stoics in connection with animate beings but which Spinoza,

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Def. 7.

[2] *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 3 (*Opera*, II, pp. 5–6); cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 5.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 229, 233–234.

[4] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.; Prop. 19, Demonst.; Prop. 20.

as we have seen, preceded by others, extended to include inanimate objects,[1] he now repeats it with special application to man, namely, that the good at which each man aims is the preservation of his being (Prop. XX). This striving for self-preservation is described by him again as the love of each person of himself.[2] Again as before,[3] he restates this principle also negatively, namely, that each person by the laws of his own nature necessarily avoids that which is painful, evil, and leading to self-destruction, and that if we sometimes notice that a man acts contrary to this natural conatus, it is due to some physical or psychological compulsion, both of which are to be considered as external (Props. XIX, XX, and Schol.).

While this natural force of self-preservation runs throughout all individual human beings, some of them are capable of effecting it with greater proficiency and excellency than others. The degree of power a man possesses to effect his self-preservation is called his virtue in the sense in which Aristotle, as we have seen, has used its Greek equivalent, ἀρετή, and a man is said to act in accordance with virtue if he effects his self-preservation in accordance with the full powers of his nature. It is in this sense that Spinoza uses "virtue" (*virtus*) and "power" (*potentia*) as synonymous terms and defines virtue, in so far as it is related to man, as "the essence itself or nature of the man in so far as it has the ability (*potestas*) of effecting something which can be understood through the laws of that nature alone,"[4] or, as he paraphrases it afterwards, "virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of our own nature."[5] And so he says now: "The more

[1] Cf. above, pp. 199–201.
[2] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol. Cf. above, p. 197.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 178, 197–198.
[4] *Ethics*, IV, Def. 8.
[5] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.

each person strives and is able to seek what is useful to him, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects what is useful to him, that is to say, neglects to preserve his own being, is he impotent" (Prop. XX).

Since self-preservation is the ultimate good at which all men aim, it is to be identified with what, according to Aristotle, is spoken of by both the multitude and persons of refinement as happiness. It follows therefore, says Spinoza, "that happiness (*felicitas*, εὐδαιμονία) consists in this — that a man can preserve his own being." [1] And consequently, "no one can desire to be happy (*beatum esse*), to act well (*bene agere*), and live well (*bene vivere*), who does not at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to say, actually to exist" (Prop. XXI). Note how these three expressions *beatum esse*, *bene agere*, and *bene vivere* are literal translations of Aristotle's εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὖ πράττειν, and εὖ ζῆν, which we have quoted above. The last two expressions, it will be further noted, are reproduced by Spinoza in exactly the same language in which they occur in the Latin version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* printed by the Juntas. In the first expression the term used there is *felicem* instead of *beatum*. Spinoza may have changed *felicem* to *beatum* in order to give it a theological tinge.[2] Being the ultimate good, this "conatus after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue" (Prop. XXII, Corol.),[3] and "no virtue can be conceived prior to this" (Prop. XXII). All other virtues or powers of man by which he strives and is able to seek certain benefits for himself are ultimately prompted by the conatus of self-preservation. The ethical truism, then, that man should act in conformity with virtue really means

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Cf. below, p. 311, n. 3.

[3] Cf. also *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.

that he should act in conformity with this conatus for self-preservation.

Still, for man to act in conformity with virtue means more than this. He must act in conformity with his own virtue, which, by definition, means that his action must follow from the laws of his own nature alone, and hence must be determined by reason. To act in conformity with virtue, then, is to be said only when a man is determined to action because he understands (*intelligit*) (Prop. XXIII). Properly speaking, therefore, such stock phrases as "to act absolutely in conformity with virtue," "to act, to live, and preserve our being in accordance with the dictates of reason," "to seek what is useful to one's self," all mean the same thing (Prop. XXIV). This conatus for self-preservation which is the foundation of virtue is also the ultimate end of virtue. Spinoza applies to it the Aristotelian saying made popular by the Stoics that "virtue is to be desired for its own sake," [1] for "no one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another object" (Prop. XXV).

The life the preservation of which is an end in itself, continues Spinoza, is what Aristotle calls the life of reason, or perhaps more literally the life according to reason (*κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος*).[2] In trying to prove this view in the next three propositions Spinoza follows closely Aristotle's arguments in proof that the contemplative activity (*ἐνέργεια θεωρητική*) or the life according to reason is the highest good or happiness, and that it is this activity which is said to be in accordance with virtue. One argument given by Aristotle is that "the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result

[1] *Ibid.* Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 6, 1176b, 7–9; Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 127.

[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1178a, 6–7.

beyond the actual fact of contemplation." [1] So also here says Spinoza: "All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges nothing as useful to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding" (Prop. XXVI). Another argument given by Aristotle is that "the activity of reason is felt . . . to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself," [2] or that "the life according to reason is the best and the pleasantest life for man." [3] So also using the term "good" for Aristotle's "pleasant," Spinoza says here: "We do not know that anything is certainly good . . . excepting that which truly conduces to understanding" (Prop. XXVII). A third argument given by Aristotle for the supremacy of the life of reason is the fact that "man will achieve such a life not in virtue of his humanity but in virtue of some divine element within him, and the superiority of this activity to the activity of any other virtue will be proportionate to the superiority of this divine element in man to his composite nature. If then reason is divine . . . the life according to reason is divine." [4] It is with this passage in view that Spinoza concludes that "the highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God" (Prop. XXVIII), for it is the knowledge of God which renders the life according to reason divine.

III. Society and the State

Towards the end of his discussion of the superiority of the intellectual virtues and of the life of reason Aristotle says that the means of attaining these virtues and of achieving this life are supplied by the state. And thus he shows how closely the state is related to the individual or politics to

[1] *Ibid.*, X, 7, 1177b, 1–2.
[2] *Ibid.*, 19–21.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1178a, 6–7.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1177b, 27–31.

ethics.[1] Still the state and politics are not dealt with by him in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, but rather in his special work on *Politics*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in Books VIII and IX, which deal with friendship, he confines himself to what may be called the sociological aspects of the state, or rather to the social instinct in man which is the foundation of the state. Similarly Spinoza in the book which he calls by the name of Aristotle's chief work on ethics, after stating the superiority of the life of reason, passes on to a discussion of the foundations of social life. The transition from the problem of individual life to that of society is explained by Spinoza in his statement that the life of reason cannot fully flourish except in society — a good Aristotelian principle which is made much of also by Maimonides.[2] "Indeed," says Spinoza, "so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were alone, and understood nothing but itself." [3] The study of society is thus a proper subject to be included in the *Ethics*. The study of the state, however, as a special kind of human society is dealt with by him, again as in Aristotle, in two separate works, in the last five chapters of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and in the *Tractatus Politicus*. The limits of his treatment of society in the *Ethics* are indicated by him in his *Tractatus Politicus* (Ch. II, § 1), where he says: "In our *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* we have treated of natural and civil right, and in our *Ethics* have explained the nature of wrong-doing, merit, justice, injustice."

His theory of society is unfolded in a systematic and logical manner in Propositions XXIX–XL, and this is preceded by a general outline of the subject in the Scholium to Proposition XVIII.

[1] *Ibid.*, X, 9.

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27 ff.

[3] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.

He begins in Propositions XXIX–XXXI by stating certain laws of the individual organism.

In nature, which in its common order is a system of interrelated causes and effects, no individual thing can exist or be determined to action unless it be determined to existence and action by another cause.[1] The nature of that cause must be understood by the same attribute as that by means of which the object affected by it is conceived.[2] A body can affect another body, and a mind can affect another mind, but no mind can affect a body, and no body can affect a mind. No object, therefore, can determine the existence and action of another object if their natures are altogether different. But, on the other hand, the contrary is also true, namely, that no object can determine the existence and action of another if they are absolutely the same, for if they are absolutely the same they are one and the same thing and there can be no relation of cause and effect between them, unless in the sense of being *causa sui*. For an object, therefore, to determine the existence and action of another object it must have something in common with the other object, that is, it must be a mode of the same attribute, and it must also differ in something from the other object, that is, it must differ from it in those individual differentia which distinguish one mode from another. This is advanced by Spinoza as a general law of nature which applies equally to man who is a part of nature. For like any other individual thing in nature, man's existence and action are determined by other individual things, food, drink, air, and in general the things which he absorbs and the things which he comes in contact with, for "the human body needs for its preservation many bodies by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated."[3] These

[1] *Ibid.*, I, Prop. 28.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 6.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, Post. 4 after Prop. 13.

external bodies which our body absorbs or comes in contact with sometimes agree with our body and sometimes are contrary to it. They agree with our body in so far as they have something in common with it; they are contrary to it in so far as they differ from it. In so far as a thing is contrary to our body it is evil; but in so far as it agrees with our body it is necessarily good. This is advanced by Spinoza as a general physiological law of the human body, probably derived from the common observation of the ordinary processes of the assimilation and absorption of food. This is the substance of the argument contained in Propositions XXIX–XXXI.

Now in Propositions XXXII–XXXVII Spinoza applies, by analogy, these general laws of the individual organism to the social organism.

Man needs for his preservation not only food and drink and air and clothes but also the society of other men, for of all the things "outside us which are useful to us . . . none more excellent can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our nature," that is to say, human beings who are like ourselves, and "nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man." [1] But, still, though all men are alike in so far as they are human beings and modes of the attributes of extension and thought, there is something with respect to which they differ in nature. They differ in nature in so far as they are subject to passion (Prop. XXXII). In this, too, there is an analogy between the social organism and the individual organism, for men who are assailed by passions may become different in nature from one another in the same way as an individual man under similar circumstances may undergo conflicting changes in his own nature, for "men may differ in nature from one another in so far as they are assailed by affects which are passions, and in so far also as

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.

one and the same man is assailed by passions is he changeable and inconstant" (Prop. XXXIII). And, consequently, in so far as men differ in nature they can also become contrary to one another (Prop. XXXIV). Men remain, however, like one another, and always agree in their nature, if they live in conformity with the guidance of reason (Prop. XXXV). They cannot then be contrary to one another, for the highest good of those who live in conformity with the guidance of reason and who follow after virtue is the knowledge of God or the life of reason, and this is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it (Prop. XXXVI). Furthermore, it is characteristic of this knowledge of God or the life of reason that he who seeks it for himself will also desire it for other men, and this altruistic desire will be greater in proportion as one has a greater knowledge of God (Prop. XXXVII). This desire on the part of man to have others share in the true knowledge of God and to have them rejoice in the good in which he rejoices,[1] adds Spinoza in the first Scholium, is not to be confused with intolerance and persecution and the attempts by man "to make others love what he himself loves, and to make others live according to his way of thinking (*ex ipsius ingenio*)." The former is based on reason and it endeavors to lead others by reason. Spinoza calls it piety.[2] The latter is based on emotion and it acts from mere impulse (*impetus*). It is called by Spinoza ambition.[2] It is in this activity of reason that Spinoza finds the origin of religion, piety, and honor (*honestas*), the last of which is the basis of friendship (*amicitia*), which in its turn is the foundation of a state (*civitas*).[3]

In Spinoza's explanation of the origin and nature of society three main principles are discernible. First, the exist-

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Demonst. 2. [2] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 4, Schol.
[3] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1. Cf. below p. 246.

ence of a natural social impulse which gives rise to society. Second, the organic conception of society and the analogy between the individual organism and the social organism. Third, the conception that likeness of kind is the basis of social coherence. All these principles reflect the discussion about the nature of society which are to be found in the works of the ancient philosophers as well as in the works of philosophers who lived immediately before Spinoza.

In declaring that there exists a natural social impulse in man and that man has a natural desire to have others rejoice (*gaudere*) in the good in which he rejoices, Spinoza has aligned himself with Aristotle, the Stoics, and Grotius, as against the Epicureans and Hobbes, for Hobbes, like the Epicureans, maintains that "men have no pleasure (*voluptas*), but on the contrary a great deal of grief (*molestia*), in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all." [1] Spinoza himself quotes Aristotle's dictum that man is a social animal (*animal sociale*, πολιτικὸν ζῷον).[2] When he illustrates, however, the benefits of society by saying that "if, for example, two individuals of exactly the same nature are joined together, they make up a single individual, doubly stronger than each alone," [3] he seems to reflect the sayings of Seneca in a similar connection that "by concord small things increase," [4] and that man, "who, being alone and separated, was the least and feeblest of all the rest, is become [by union with others] the master of all things." [5] Similarly his qualifying statement that "a proper regard, indeed, to what is useful to us teaches us the necessity of uniting ourselves with men, but not with beasts, nor with things whose nature is

[1] *Leviathan*, I, 13.
[2] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 35, Schol. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2, 1253a, 3.
[3] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.
[4] *Epistulae Morales*, Epist. 94, § 46.
[5] *De Beneficiis*, IV, 18, § 2.

different from human nature," [1] seems to reflect the Stoic teaching that "there can be no question of right as between man and the other animals, because of their unlikeness." [2]

So also the organic conception of society and the analogy between the social organism and the individual organism were current in literature. Marcus Aurelius declares that "the principle which obtains where limbs and body unite to form one organism, holds good also for rational things with their separate individualities, constituted as they are to work in conjunction," [3] and Hobbes begins the *Leviathan* by calling the state an artificial man, and by comparing it to the human body.

Finally, the principle advanced by Spinoza that likeness of kind is the basis of social coherence reflects Aristotle's discussion as to the nature of friendship whether it is based on likeness or on unlikeness,[4] and his conclusion that the perfect form of friendship is that which is based upon a likeness in virtue, and which exists between good men.[5] Such a kind of friendship, as we have seen, is called by Spinoza a friendship (*amicitia*, Aristotle's φιλία)[6] based on honor (*honestas*, Aristotle's τὸ καλόν), which he considers the foundation of the state (*civitas*, Aristotle's πόλις). And so also Marcus Aurelius, reflecting the Stoic view, explains social coherence on the basis of the universal principle of like flowing to like.[7]

While society in its natural state (*statu naturali*) is based upon the social instinct of man and is a natural form of organization, the special form of society called "state" (*civitas*)

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1.
[2] Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 129. Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, III, 20, § 67.
[3] *Meditations*, VII, 13. Cf. II, 1.
[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 1.
[5] *Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 1156b, 7–8.
[6] Cf. below, p. 304 n. 1.
[7] *Meditations*, IX, 9.

or society in its civil state (*statu civili*) is an artificial product, the result of an agreement, or contract, or compact. In this, then, Spinoza follows the ancient doctrine of the Epicureans and what was in his time the recent doctrine of Hobbes. The civil state is not a natural structure. It grows out of a contract which men enter into with each other in order that they may put an end to what Hobbes calls the war of everyone against everyone (*bellum omnium contra omnes*),[1] so that, as Spinoza puts it, "they will do nothing by which one can injure the other." [2] But there is the following difference between Hobbes and Spinoza. According to Hobbes the war of everyone against everyone expresses the original nature of man: the state of peace is due only to "fear of death" and to a "desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them"; [3] according to Spinoza it is a vitiation of the original nature of man by emotions which surpass his native power or virtue. To Hobbes, again, the civil state with its laws is to serve as a curb upon the native impulse of man; to Spinoza it is an instrument whereby man is enabled to live according to his native impulses. All this goes back to the more fundamental difference between them. To Hobbes, the self which man's first impulse endeavors to preserve is of a purely egotistic nature and excludes other beings; to Spinoza the self of self-preservation is an expanded self of which the need of the society of others is a constituent part.

Still, the civil state is an artificial organism and the laws by which it is governed are man-made laws, which are to be contrasted with the laws existing in the state of nature. The contrast is expressed by Spinoza as that between the right of

[1] *Leviathan*, I, 13.
[2] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 238, ll. 1–2).
[3] *Leviathan*, I, 13.

nature (*jus naturae*)[1] and the right of the state (*jus civitatis*),[2] or that between the "law of nature" (*lex naturae*)[3] and "law" (*lex*) unqualified.[4] Similarly, corresponding to good and evil in the state of nature there is a good and evil in the civil state, "where it is decided by universal consent what is good and what is evil, and where everyone is bound to obey the state."[5] It is where legislated conceptions of good and evil exist and where obedience to law is enforced that the conceptions of sin (*peccatum*) and merit (*meritum*) are to be found, the former meaning disobedience, the latter meaning obedience. The term *peccatum* is used by Spinoza both in the religious sense of sin and in the civil sense of crime,[6] just as he uses the term *delictum* also in the sense of sin against God.[7] The conception of sin or crime, as Spinoza defines it, exists only "under dominion" (*in imperio*), whether it be a state or a church, where the conceptions of good and evil have been arbitrarily determined and set down in the form of law.[8] Without such legislated conceptions of good and evil, to act contrary to the dictates of reason, to violate the eternal decrees of nature or of God, cannot properly be called sin or crime; the proper designation is "weakness of the mind" or "servitude."[9] If the laws of the state or of the church happen to agree with the dictates of reason and the eternal decrees of nature or of God, then the violation of these dictates of reason and eternal decrees of nature can be called sin or

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 237, ll. 20 and 34).

[2] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 (*Opera*, II, p. 238, l. 27); Prop. 73, Demonst. (p. 265, l. 9).

[3] *Ibid.*, III, Praef. (p. 137, l. 9); Prop. 2, Schol. (p. 142, l. 34).

[4] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 (p. 238, ll. 10 and 15); Appendix, 24. Evidently Spinoza makes no distinction between the terms *jus* and *lex* such as is made by Hobbes (*Leviathan*, I, 14).

[5] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2.

[6] See "peccatum" against God in Epistola 19.

[7] Epistola 21 (*Opera*, IV, p. 131, l. 18).

[8] *Tractatus Politicus*, Ch. 2, § 19.

[9] Cf. above, p. 184.

crime in an indirect sense, in the sense that it is a violation of what happens to be also the conventional law of the state or the church.[1]

Artificial though the state may be in its form, it is still essentially based upon a natural social impulse. It may therefore be considered as something organic and it may be compared to the individual organism. That is good for the state which is good for the body. In the case of the human body we consider that as useful or good for it which enables the body to be completely adapted to its physical environment and to function properly in all its powers, that is to say, "to be affected in many ways, and to affect other bodies" (Prop. XXXVIII); we consider also that as useful or good for the body which enables it not only to continue its physical existence but also to maintain the identity of its personality, that is to say, "to preserve the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body bear to each other" (Prop. XXXIX). For death, Spinoza adds in the Scholium, does not come when the body "is changed into a corpse"; a man may be called dead if he "undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be said to be the same man," even though physiologically he is still alive. Anything contrary to this is evil. So also in the case of the state. Good is that which makes for complete harmony between the individual members of the state and for the stability of the state as an organic unit. "Whatever conduces to the universal fellowship of man, that is to say, whatever causes men to live in harmony with one another, is useful, and, on the contrary, whatever brings discord into the state is evil" (Prop. XL). Spinoza's analogy is somewhat reminiscent of Plato's analogy between justice in the state and bodily health.[2]

Though Spinoza does not carry out the implied analogy

[1] *Ibid.*, §§ 20–22.

[2] *Republic*, IV, 444 C–D.

between what he considers the death of an individual, mentioned by him in the Scholium to Proposition XXXIX, and what he would consider the death of the state, we can continue his reasoning for him. The life of the state, like the life of the individual, he would say, does not end only with the physical disappearance of its people. It ends with the disappearance of the institutions by which it has enjoyed historical continuity as an individual entity. It is because of this view, which here in the *Ethics* is only implied, that Spinoza elsewhere explicitly expresses his opinion that "every state should retain its form of government, and, indeed, cannot change it without danger of the utter ruin of the whole state." [1] In this Spinoza seems to reflect Aristotle's view that "since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of the government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same," [2] for "the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution." [3] And what is true of the state, Spinoza would undoubtedly say, is true of any other form of group life. A people dies and disappears not when it is physically exterminated but when its national culture and institutions are radically changed. Speaking of his own people, Spinoza says that the Jews have maintained their historical continuity as a people because they have preserved the historical continuity of certain institutions, and he refers to the fact that a number of Jews in Spain who have broken away from their past have disappeared as Jews, even though they were not physically exterminated.[4] The national existence of a people, Spinoza would conclude, is preserved in the continuity of its social inheritance and not in its mere biological continuity.

[1] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 18 (*Opera*, III, p. 228, ll. 11–13).
[2] *Politics*, III, 3, 1276b, 1–4. [3] *Ibid.*, 10–11.
[4] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 3 (*Opera*, III, p. 56, ll. 20 ff.).

IV. Catalogue of Virtues

If, as we have been trying to show, the group of propositions from XIX to XXVIII in the Fourth Part of Spinoza's *Ethics* correspond to the discussion of the highest good or happiness in the First and Tenth Books of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the group of propositions from XXIX to XL correspond to Aristotle's discussion of friendship in the Eighth and Ninth Books of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, enlarged to be sure by the discussion of the origin and nature of society and the state by other writers, then the next group of propositions from XLI to LXXIII correspond to Aristotle's catalogue (διαγραφή)[1] of virtues in Books II, 7–VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, enlarged and modified, again, by the influence of discussions of the same subject in other works.

The nature of goodness or virtue is, according to Aristotle, determined in two ways. In the first place, it is "the mean rather than the excess (ὑπερβολήν) or deficiency." In the second place, "the mean is such as right reason prescribes" (ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει).[2] Of these two ways of determining goodness, the first, namely, that it is not excessive nor deficient, is only indirectly suggested by Spinoza in such statements as "hilarity can never be excessive (*excessum*), but is always good" (Prop. XLII), "titillation may be excessive and evil" (Prop. XLIII), "love and desire (*cupiditas*) may be excessive" (Prop. XLIV), and "a desire (*cupiditas*) which springs from reason can never be in excess" (Prop. LXI). But the second determination of goodness given by Aristotle, namely, that which right reason prescribes, is the one directly adopted by Spinoza. An emotion

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 7, 1107a, 33.
[2] *Ibid.*, VI, 1, 1138b, 18–20.

is good which is according to the guidance (*ex ductu*) or the dictate (*ex dictamine*) of reason (Props. XLVI, L, LXII, LXV, LXVI), or agrees (*convenire*) with reason (Prop. LI), or arises (*oriri*) from reason (Props. LI–LIV, LVIII, LXI), or is determined (*determinari*) or led (*ducitur*) by reason (Props. LIX, LXIII). The same definition of virtue is also implied in his statement in the *Short Treatise* (II, 26) that "without virtue or (to express it better) without the guidance of the understanding, all tends to ruin." All these expressions reflect the Aristotelian expression ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, quoted above, which in the Latin translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is rendered by "sicut ratio recta *praescribit*" and in the Latin translation of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* is paraphrased by "et terminus medij *convenit* cum termino rationis sanae." An exact reproduction of the Latin translation of the Greek occurs in the Scholium to Proposition XVIII: "quod ratio nobis *praescribit*," [1] and the term *convenit* used in the Latin translation of Averroes is reproduced in the term *convenire* used in Proposition LI quoted above. Now, the right reason which prescribes the mean or goodness is said by Aristotle to be the calculative (λογιστικόν) or deliberative (βουλευτικόν) part of the rational (λόγον ἔχον) part of the soul [2] by means of practical wisdom or prudence (φρόνησις). Prudence is one of the five means by which the soul arrives at truth, the other four being art (τέχνη), scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), philosophic wisdom (σοφία), and intelligence (νοῦς), and all these five are contrasted with the following two, conjecture (ὑπόληψις, *existimatio*, *putatio*) and opinion (δόξα), in which, he says, there is the possibility of error.[3] This contrast between the former five and the latter

[1] *Opera*, II, p. 222, l. 12.
[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 1, 1139a, 3–15.
[3] *Ibid.*, VI, 3, 1139b, 15–17. Cf. above, p. 151.

two kinds of knowledge corresponds respectively, as we have already suggested,[1] to Spinoza's second kind of knowledge and his first kind of knowledge. Spinoza is thus following the Aristotelian tradition when he says that goodness is that which is according to the guidance of "reason" (*ratio*), "ratio" being his technical designation for the second kind of knowledge. In the *Short Treatise* (II, 2, § 3) he expresses it more explicitly when he says that "from the first [kind of knowledge] proceed all the passions which are opposed to good reason; from the second, the good desires."

There seems to be no significance in the number of virtues and vices selected by Spinoza for special discussion in these propositions nor in the order in which they are arranged. Similarly the form in which they are couched and the sentiment which they express seem on the whole to be devoid of any individuality. They carry to us a familiar ring of the proverbial wisdom of all the sages who have ever tried to express in pithy sayings the universal morality of the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule. Had these propositions been written by a pagan in about the first century of the Christian era their author would undoubtedly have been declared to be a Stoic, if he had happened to live in Alexandria or Rome, or a disciple of the rabbis, if he had happened to live in Jerusalem. But having been written in the seventeenth century by a Jew acquainted also with the teachings of Christianity, these propositions as well as the Appendix at the end of Part IV are significant only in so far as they were used by Spinoza to adorn certain points in his own philosophy.

Still it would be of importance to collect a complete catena of parallel sayings from the entire ethical and proverbial literature accessible to Spinoza. Perhaps, then, by a close

[1] Cf. above, p. 146.

comparison of phraseology we could determine the immediate sources of some of his utterances; also one could discover in some variation of phraseology or in some uncalled-for emphasis of statement a certain new element of philosophical or ethical significance. When Spinoza declares, for instance, that "repentance (*poenitentia*) is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from reason; on the contrary, the man who repents of what he has done is doubly wretched or impotent" (Prop. LIV), we may wonder what significance to attach to this declaration. It may be nothing but a paraphrase of Descartes' contention that repentance is often the experience of feeble minds (*imbecilliores animi*) and that it is "an imperfection in them deserving pity." [1] Spinoza's subsequent statement in the Demonstration that the penitent "allows himself to be overcome first by a depraved desire and then by pain (*tristitia*)" seems, furthermore, to reflect two sources — first, Descartes' statement that repentance is a "species of pain (*tristitiae*)," [2] and second, Seneca's statement that repentance (*paenitentia*), fear (*timor*), and wavering of the mind (*animi iactatio*) come to men "because they can neither rule nor obey their desires." [3] That there is a connection between the statements of Seneca and those of Descartes may be shown by the fact that, just like Seneca, who groups repentance, fear, and wavering of the mind (or irresolution) together, Descartes suggests that the remedies of repentance are "the same as those which serve to remove wavering of the mind (*irresolution, fluctuationi*)." [4] But it may also be that in this proposition, while verbally it is a copy of the statements of Seneca and Descartes, Spinoza meant to inveigh against the great emphasis laid upon repentance in both Judaism and Christianity. His

[1] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 191.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *De Tranquilitate Animi*, Ch. 2, § 8.
[4] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 191.

apology in the Scholium for the commendation of repentance by the Prophets would seem to indicate that this was the intention of the proposition. Further still, is it not also possible to discover in this decrial of repentance some biographical element of personal experience? This is merely an indication of what can be done with these propositions if studied in connection with their sources.

The last seven propositions of this Part (Props. LXVII–LXXIII), however, owe some of their external literary form to a source which can be easily identified. These seven propositions are written in the form of an apotheosis of the free man (*homo liber*) corresponding to the Stoic apotheosis of the wise man (*τὸ σοφός*, *sapiens*). In each one of these seven propositions the expression "free man" occurs, and the propositions were undoubtedly meant to constitute an independent group by themselves and to form a sort of epilogue to Part IV. The use of the adjective "free" as a description of the man who lives according to the guidance of reason is sufficiently explained by Spinoza's use of the term "servitude" as a description of "the impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions." [1] But it may also be explained as a reminiscence of the Stoic teaching that the wise man is free from all passions or perturbations of the mind ("illum [= sapientem] enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum"),[2] from vanity, pretense, business care, and the like. Or, perhaps, it may also be a reminiscence of the saying of the rabbis that the sage is the only man who can be called free.[3] While the virtues enumerated in these seven propositions are those with which the ideally good and wise men everywhere are generally accredited, their description con-

[1] *Ethics*, IV, Praef., beginning.

[2] Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, IV, 27, § 58. Cf. IV, 4, §§ 7–9, and Diogenes Laertius, *De Vitis*, VII, 117.

[3] *Abot*, VI, 2.

tains certain terms and phrases which indicate some connection with the writings of Seneca. We shall make brief comment upon these propositions merely in order to show what could be done with Spinoza's lists of emotions and virtues in the Third and Fourth Parts of the *Ethics* if a complete catena of parallel lists were gotten together.

Proposition LXVII attributes to the free man the rule of conduct which has previously been recommended by Spinoza in Proposition LXIII. In that earlier proposition and its Corollary Spinoza inveighs against the pious moralists of all religions, designated by him "the superstitious (*superstitiosi*)," "who know better how to rail at vice than to teach virtue," and he has laid down there as a guiding principle of conduct the rule of reason that "we follow good directly and avoid evil indirectly." Now, in this proposition, he says of the free man who lives according to the dictates of reason that in his actions he "is not led by the fear of death . . . but directly desires the good," so that his "wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life." His statement "ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est" seems to be a direct challenge to Thomas à Kempis' counsel to meditate on death (*De Meditatione Mortis*)[1] and always to remember the end (*memento semper finis*).[2]

Some Christian theological exegesis of the story of the fall of Adam in the Book of Genesis is undoubtedly the direct source of Proposition LXVIII. The Scholium seems to indicate such a source. The allegorical explanation of the fall of Adam as symbolizing man's backsliding from the dictates of reason by succumbing to the lure of sensation, symbolized by Eve, through the influence of pleasure, symbolized by the serpent, goes back to Philo.[3]

[1] *De Imitatione Christi*, I, 23, title. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 25, § 11.

[3] *Sacrarum Legum Allegoriarum post Sex Dierum Opus*, II, xviii, 71 ff.

Aristotle's and Seneca's discussion of courage is the literary background of Proposition LXIX. Courage (*ἀνδρεία*, *fortitudo*) is according to Aristotle the mean between fear (*φόβος*, *timor*) and confidence (*θάρρη*, *fiducia*, *audacia*). The excess of fear is cowardice (*δειλία*, *ignavia*, *timiditas*), and the excess of confidence is rashness or foolhardiness (*θράσος*, *audacia*, *procacitas*).[1] The courageous man is defined by Aristotle as "he who fearlessly confronts a noble death, or some sudden peril that threatens death; and the perils of war answer this description most fully. . . . Also courage is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valor or die nobly."[2] Seneca, in his discussion of courage, argues that courage does not mean the confronting of danger but rather the avoidance of it. "As it seems to you, says he, a courageous man shall thrust himself into dangers. No, he shall not fear them, but shall avoid (*vitabit*) them. Wariness (*cautio*), not fear (*timor*), becomes him. . . . It [*fortitudo*, courage] is not unadvised rashness (*temeritas*), not love of dangers, nor a desire of fearful things. It is a science that distinguishes good from evil."[3] Evidently drawing upon these discussions of courage, Spinoza says here that the courage (*animi virtus*, *seu fortitudo* = *animositas*) "which is required to restrain rashness (*audacia*) must be equally great with that which is required to restrain fear (*metus*)," so that courage is "as great in avoiding (*declinandis*) danger as in overcoming it" (Prop. LXIX and Demonst.). Courage is caution, for "a free man chooses flight by the same courage (*animositas*) or presence of mind as that by which he chooses battle" (Corol.) — which reminds us of the lines:

"For he who fights and runs away
May live to fight another day."

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 7, 1107a, 33 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, III, 6, 1115a, 32 ff.
[3] *Epistulae Morales*, Epist. 85, §§ 26 and 28.

Proposition LXX reflects Seneca's discussion of the question whether favors (*beneficia*) should be received from everybody. His answer is in the negative. Reason, he says, which must be our guide, first of all will advise us this: "That we ought not to receive a favor at every man's hands. From whom then shall we receive? To answer thee in a word: It is from those to whom we should have given," for "it is a grievous torment to be indebted and obliged to him, to whom thou wouldst owe nothing." This does not counsel discrimination against any of "those truly wise and virtuous men," but against "these imperfect men." The reason of it is that the acceptance of favors unites men in friendship, which "friendship must continue and flourish between us," and consequently "the law of friendship admonishes me, that I receive not a kindness from any that is unworthy." [1] To this general rule an exception is to be made in the case where a present is given by a tyrant who will consider a refusal as "an injury and indignity"; the rule is thus "not intended in a case of great violence and fear, because where these prevail, election perisheth." [2] The similarity as well as the differences between this proposition and Seneca are obvious. The term "ignorant" (*ignaros*) used by Spinoza in this proposition needs an explanation. The terms used by Seneca in the corresponding passages are "imperfect" (*imperfectis*) [3] and "unworthy" (*indignum*).[4] But among the many terms by which the Stoic wise man and foolish man are respectively designated there are also the terms "learned" (*eruditus*, *sciens*) and "ignorant" (*nesciens*), which are used by Seneca himself.[5] The contrast between

[1] *De Beneficiis*, II, 18, § 6.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, 18, §§ 6–7.
[3] *Ibid.*, II, 18, § 4.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, 18, § 5.
[5] *Epistulae Morales*, Epist. 94, § 11. Cf. Adolf Dyroff, "Die Ethik der Alten Stoa," in *Berliner Studien fur classische Philologie und Archaeologie*, N. F. 2 (1897), p. 186, n. 3.

the terms "wise man" (*sapiens*) and "ignorant man" (*ignarus*) is also used by Spinoza later in the Preface to Part V of the *Ethics* [1] and elsewhere.[2]

The next proposition (LXXI), which deals with gratitude, likewise reflects Seneca's discussion of gratitude in the *De Beneficiis*, where it follows immediately upon his discussion of the acceptance of benefits from the unworthy [3] and is continued intermittently throughout the rest of the book.

The virtue of honesty and good faith has been extolled in every copy-book, and it is therefore not surprising to find it one of the characteristics of Spinoza's free man (Prop. LXXII). Nor are we to look for any special significance in Spinoza's metaphysical proof that honesty is the best policy. But the practical question raised by him in the Scholium whether a man is allowed to break faith in order to escape from the danger of instant death seems to reflect some actual discussion of a similar problem in some work on casuistry which some one may accidentally stumble upon some day. Spinoza's negative answer seems to reflect the following sentiment expressed by Seneca: "Fidelity (*fides*) is the holiest good that may be in a man's breast; by no necessity is it constrained to deceive; it is corrupted by no reward. 'Burn,' says she, 'beat, kill, I will not betray; but how the more pain shall seek to discover secret things, by so much will I the more deeply hide them.'" [4]

Participation in the organized life of society is recommended to the philosopher by Aristotle and to the scholar by the rabbis. Among the Stoics, according to Seneca and others, it was considered one of the characteristic virtues of

[1] *Opera*, II, p. 277, l. 12.
[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 42, Schol.
[3] *De Beneficiis*, II, 24 ff.
[4] *Epistulae Morales*, Epist. 88, § 29.

the wise man.[1] It was therefore logical for Spinoza to put it at the end of his list of virtues which characterize his free man. "A man who is guided by reason is freer in a state where he lives according to the common laws than he is in solitude, where he obeys himself alone" (Prop. LXXIII).

[1] Seneca, *De Otio*, III, 2. Cf. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III. 1 (4th ed.), p. 300, n. 4.

CHAPTER XX

LOVE, IMMORTALITY, AND BLESSEDNESS

I. A Metaphysic for Bilious Souls

The last three parts of the *Ethics* may be considered as a discussion of what Spinoza calls in the *Short Treatise* (II, 2) the "effects" of the three kinds of knowledge. The enumeration of these three kinds of knowledge, it will be recalled, occurs toward the end of the Second Part. Part III and Part IV to Proposition XVIII deal with the effects of the first kind of knowledge, which are described in the *Short Treatise* as "the passions which are opposed to good reason." [1] The remaining propositions in Part IV (Props. XIX–LXXIII) deal with the effects of the second kind of knowledge, which are described in the *Short Treatise* as "the good desires." [2] The first ten propositions of Part V continue to deal with the effects of the second kind of knowledge. But beginning with Proposition XI of Part V, the *Ethics* takes up the discussion of the effects of the third kind of knowledge, which in the *Short Treatise* are described as "true and sincere love with all its offshoots." [3] In an earlier statement in the *Ethics* Spinoza has already prepared us for what we are to find in Part V. It is to speak of the "excellence and value" of the third kind of knowledge,[4] it is to show the "principal advantages" which his system of philosophy, especially his doctrine of necessity,[5] has for man,[6] and finally it is to ex-

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 2, § 3.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 47, Schol.
[5] Cf. *Short Treatise*, II, 18, §§ 1–2.
[6] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 131, ll. 28–29, and p. 135, ll. 32 ff.).

plain in what degree the things which are injurious or useful to the human body may also "injure or profit the mind." [1] From the context, it is clear that this last statement refers to the second kind of knowledge and hence to the first ten propositions of Part V.

Now in the preface of the Fifth Part Spinoza again gives an outline of Part V. Its chief purpose concerns "the method or way which leads to liberty." With this as its general purpose it is to treat of two main topics. First, in opposition to those who believe in will and its freedom, of whom the Stoics and Descartes are mentioned specifically, it is to show how the power (*potentia*) or knowledge (*cognitio*) of the mind (*mentis*) or reason (*rationis*) itself, without any will and the freedom of the will, but as determined by intelligence (*intelligentia*) alone, can to some extent, though not absolutely, restrain and govern the emotions. This evidently refers to the second kind of knowledge the effects of which are dealt with in the first ten propositions. Second, it is to explain what freedom of mind and blessedness (*beatitudo*) is and how everything which relates to the blessedness of the mind is deduced from the mere knowledge of the mind. This evidently refers to the third kind of knowledge the effects of which are dealt with in the rest of Part V. The Fifth Part furthermore falls into three sections, the first two of which are described by Spinoza himself. The first deals with matters "relating to this present life" [2] (Props. I–XX), the second deals "with those matters which appertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body" [3] (Props. XXI–XL), and the third, which is not described by Spinoza, deals with general observations on the religion of reason (Props. XLI–XLII).

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 39, Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 20, Schol., end.
[3] *Ibid.*; cf. also *ibid.*, V, Prop. 40, Schol.

The special phase of the second kind of knowledge, or the power of reason which Spinoza is now to deal with in the first ten propositions, is of a practical nature. Having explained in Part IV how by the guidance of reason the emotions of desire and pleasure are no longer passions but are rather actions by which one may attain the preservation of his own being (Props. XIX–XXVIII) as well as the preservation of the being of others and the joining of men in friendship (Props. XXIX–XXXVII), and having also given a list of emotions which are the effects of reason (Props. XXXVIII–LXXIII), he is now to give a few practical hints as to how a man can prevent himself from becoming a victim of his passions. He refers to these practical hints as "remedies (*remedia*) against the emotions," [1] and the irrational emotions themselves are described by him as a sickness of the mind (*animi aegritudo*).[2] In Tschirnhaus' conversation with Leibniz, furthermore, the last part of the *Ethics* is described as "de . . . beatitudine seu perfecti hominis idea, de Medicina mentis, de Medicina corporis." [3] This use of medical terminology reflects the attitude of moralists throughout history that vice is a disease of the soul and like the diseases of the body can be cured as well as prevented. Cicero refers to the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, who "give themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind have to those of the body," and though he dismisses "all that they say as of little consequence" [4] and makes use of that analogy "more sparingly than the Stoics," [5] he still tries to find "what remedies (*remedia*) there are

[1] *Ibid.*, V, Praef., end.

[2] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 10, Schol. (*Opera*, II, p. 288, ll. 26–27).

[3] Cf. K. I. Gerhardt, "Leibniz und Spinoza," in *Sitzungsberichte der konigliche preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1889), p. 1076.

[4] *Tusculanae Disputationes*, IV, 10, § 23.

[5] *Ibid.*, IV, 12, § 27.

which may be applied by philosophy to the diseases of the mind (*morbis animorum*)." [1] Similarly Maimonides, quoting the ancients, whom he does not specify, says that "there is a health and sickness of the soul as there is a health and sickness of the body," [2] and that "the improvement of the virtues is nothing but the therapeutics of the soul and its faculties." [3] Descartes, too, speaks of a remedy (*remedium*) for the disorders of the passions (*Affectuum vitiis, dereglemens des Passions*).[4]

The view that the emotions are remediable has its root in the principle laid down by Aristotle that "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit." [5] Everything therefore that goes into the formation of habit must enter as an ingredient into the specific that is to cure the weaknesses of the soul and to bring out its virtues and powers. Right thinking as is taught in logic and right living as is taught in medicine are both regarded as the foundations of habit and virtue. In fact those theologians who tried to transform the social customs and inherited beliefs of religion into a rational system of a revealed philosophy have found in the ceremonials and dogmas of the religion of the Bible an ideal manual of instruction for the formation of good habits and the development of moral virtues.[6] Spinoza is in agreement with all this. He is even willing to admit that the laws of the Bible and the morality it teaches are in agreement with reason, though he will not admit that the same is true of the purely ceremonial law and of the purely speculative teachings of the Bible.[7] But here in the *Ethics* he is not to deal with these problems. Mentioning specifically logic and

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, 27, § 58.
[2] *Shemonah Peraḳim*, Ch. 3.
[3] *Ibid.*, Ch. 1.
[4] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, III, 161, end.
[5] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1, 1103a, 17.
[6] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27 ff.
[7] Cf. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 15, *et passim*.

medicine, he says he has nothing to do with them here.[1] We know, however, that logic, in so far as it leads to the improvement of the understanding, is dealt with by him in his unfinished *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*,[2] and that the system of morality of the Bible is also dealt with by him in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Here in the Preface, he says, he is to confine himself to remedies which he thinks "every one experiences, but does not accurately observe nor distinctly see."[3] Later in the Scholium to Proposition XX he further says that he has "included all the remedies for the emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them." The remedies offered by him are indeed such as popular wisdom in the past has reduced to the form of proverbs, which are writ large on the pages of copy-books. In our own time they have been garbed in a technical nomenclature and reduced to a science, and are administered in the form of incantations. Spinoza prescribes them as a metaphysic and dispenses them in geometric propositions.

The metaphysic of the remedy is given in Proposition I. It is the assertion that despite the principle that mind and body do not act upon each other the mind can control the affections of the body. Justification for this assertion is found in the view that there is a parallelism between mind and body, that the mind is the idea or form of the body, and furthermore that the mind has knowledge of its body and through it of other bodies. From all this it follows that "the order and connection of ideas in the mind is according to the

[1] *Ethics*, V, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 277, ll. 12–16).

[2] In this work, though he confines it to logic, Spinoza refers also to the importance of moral philosophy, the science of the education of children, medicine, and mechanics as aids in the attainment of human perfection. Cf. *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, § 15 (*Opera*, II, p. 9, ll. 3–10).

[3] *Ethics*, V, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 280, ll. 23–24).

order and connection of the affections of the body," and, "*vice versa*, the order and connection of the affections of the body is according to the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and ideas of things." The result of this is that the mind, which in its own sphere is independent of the body, deriving as it does its power of thinking from the attribute of thought, can harmonize the order and connection of the bodily affection with the order and connection of its own ideas. Reason, then, can guide and control the body and even dictate to it. The remedial value of this metaphysic for the weakness of the mind or the passive emotions is that by the exercise of reason the passions become actions and irrational desires are transformed into desires which are rational.

The remedies are described in Propositions II–XX. An outline of these propositions is given by Spinoza himself in the Scholium to Proposition XX. But this outline, as his other similar outlines of propositions which occasionally occur in the *Ethics*, was not meant by him to be a complete analysis of the propositions or of the arguments contained in them. Logically these propositions fall into two groups: first, Propositions II–X, which enumerate and describe the remedies, and second, Propositions XI–XX, in which the remedies are reduced to one sovereign remedy, namely, the love for God. Altogether, six remedies are enumerated by Spinoza in the first group of propositions, although in his outline in the Scholium to Proposition XX he mentions only five. All these remedies are based upon the principle, laid down by Spinoza himself, that emotions can be destroyed by other emotions which are stronger and more powerful.

By definition a passive emotion is a confused idea.[1] The first way, therefore, of remedying a passive emotion is to remove the confusion of the idea and to transform it into an

[1] *Ethics*, III, Def. 3, and *Affectuum Generalis Definitio*.

idea which is clear and distinct. To accomplish this, we must study our emotions and try to get a clear understanding of their nature. By so doing, we shall find that many of our emotions are spurious emotions, perverted forms of emotions which are of an entirely different and opposite nature. It is, in fact, these spurious and perverted emotions which usually run to excess and become ailments of the soul. To desire what we really desire, to love whom we really love, and to hate whom we really hate, does not as a rule cause us serious trouble. We are troubled in our spirit only when we seem to desire what we really spurn or when we seem to love and hate whom we really do not love and do not hate. As an illustration of a spurious emotion Spinoza mentions intolerance, which he himself calls ambition and describes as a form of pride. Intolerance or ambition arises from the fact "that human nature is so constituted that every one desires that other people should live according to his way of thinking" (Prop. IV, Schol.). In its excessive form this desire manifests itself in the persecution of others for the differences in their beliefs and practices, which causes pain both to those who persecute and to those who are persecuted. But this causing of pain to ourselves and to others does not really express the true nature of the emotion, which, on the contrary, consists in a desire on the part of each man to cause others to rejoice in the good in which he rejoices. Were man, therefore, only to realize the true nature of this particular emotion, then ambition, in Spinoza's terminology, would give place to what he calls piety, and he who is now ambitious, instead of forcing others against their own will to live according to his way of thinking, would act with piety and "endeavor to lead others by reason" and to treat them "with humanity and kindness." [1] In the knowledge itself of the

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, Demonst. 2 and Schol. 1, reference to which is given in V, Prop. 5, Schol.

emotions, then, are the emotions to be remedied (Props. III–IV).[1]

A knowledge of the true nature of our emotions, furthermore, would enable us to detach them from the external cause with which, again, by definition,[2] an emotion must be connected. This constitutes the second remedy (Prop. II). The specific set of emotions to which Spinoza applies this remedy is described by him in a general way as "love or hatred towards the external cause, and the fluctuations of the mind which arise from these emotions" (*ibid.*). His use of the expression "love or hatred" rather than "love and hatred" indicates that he means love and hatred which go together, as, for instance, in frustrated love, which is described by him elsewhere as turning into hatred[3] or as engendering hatred.[4] Similarly by the "fluctuations of the mind which arise from these emotions" he means jealousy and envy, which are described by him elsewhere as arising from love and hatred when they are felt together.[5] The remedy prescribed by Spinoza for this special kind of ailment is to detach the emotion of love, and the hatred and the jealousy and envy which arise from it, "from the thought of an external cause and connect it with other thoughts" (Prop. II). Later, for "other thoughts" he uses the expression "true thoughts" (Prop. IV, Schol.). What Spinoza means to say is this: While it is true that by definition love is caused by an "idea of an external cause,"[6] the idea of any particular cause which happens to evoke love is not essential to love itself, and the loss of that external cause, therefore, does not change the love into hatred and produce the fluctua-

[1] Spinoza himself in his outline in the Scholium to Prop. 20 puts this remedy, described in Props. 3–4, before the next remedy, which is described in Prop. 2.

[2] *Ethics*, III, Def. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 35.

[4] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 38.

[5] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 35, Schol.

[6] *Ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 6.

tions of the mind out of the conflict of the two. The particular external cause in any experience of love is only accidental and can be replaced by some other cause, less troublesome.

The evil to which some of our emotions give rise is often due to our erroneous belief that certain single and free causes are solely responsible for whatever happens to us. To eradicate this evil, therefore, we must bring ourselves to realize that no cause can be singled out as being solely responsible for whatever happens and that nothing happens but by the necessity of an infinite series of causes. In connection with this remedy (Props. V–VI) Spinoza especially mentions the emotions of love and hatred and pity, and indirectly refers to the emotion of disappointment. We love and hate a person, he says elsewhere, because we think that he is the sole cause [1] or the free cause [2] of our pleasure or pain. The remedy for this, he adds now, is to be found in the knowledge that those we love or hate are neither the sole nor the free causes of pleasure or pain. Disappointment (*conscientiae morsus*), he says again elsewhere, is a "pain with the accompanying idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened." [3] To cure this feeling of disappointment, he says now, we must realize that all things happen by necessity and as the consequence of an uncontrollable concatenation of causes, "for we see that pain caused by the loss of anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it considers that it could not by any possibility have been preserved" (Prop. VI, Schol.). Similarly pity (*commiseratio*), which is defined by Spinoza elsewhere as "pain with the accompanying idea of evil which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves," [4] will disappear

[1] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 48.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 49.
[3] *Ibid.*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 17.
[4] *Ibid.*, 18.

if we consider the evil which has befallen him who is the object of our pity as something as inevitable and universal as the infant's inability to speak, to walk, or to reason (Prop. VI, Schol.). In conclusion Spinoza adds that "many other facts of a similar kind we might observe" (*ibid.*).

Pains and pleasures and desires produced by actual causes which exist before us and stare us in the face are perhaps less numerous and not so disturbing to our peace of mind as are those emotions of which the causes are intangible and absent. Examples of this type of emotion are included by Spinoza in his list of emotions at the end of the Third Part of the *Ethics*. Among these are fear, despair, disappointment, and regret. The common characteristic of all these emotions, as Spinoza says here in Proposition VII, is that they "are related to individual objects which we contemplate as absent." By his own definitions, fear (*metus*) is related to the "idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt";[1] despair (*desperatio*) is related to the "idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed";[2] disappointment (*conscientiae morsus*) is related to the "idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened";[3] regret (*desiderium*) is related to an object of memory.[4] These ailments of the soul cannot be cured by directly attacking their causes, for their causes are not bodily present; only their ghosts haunt our mind. The cure for these, says Spinoza, is to expel the ghosts by peopling our mind with living beings. The mind's capacity is limited, and can hold so much and no more, and if we fill it with one kind of content there will be no room for another kind. Now the idea of almost anything that is real and present may become the catharsis of our fears and worries; but if in this

[1] *Ibid.*, 13.
[2] *Ibid.*, 15.
[3] *Ibid.*, 17.
[4] *Ibid.*, 32.

embarrassment of riches we are at a loss to know which to choose, there is always the universe of the common properties of things before us. They are real and always present, and, by becoming the object of our contemplation, will cause the disappearance of our fears and worries about things unreal and absent, for "the emotions which spring from reason or which are excited by it are, if time be taken into account, more powerful than those which are related to individual objects which we contemplate as absent" (Prop. VII). While contemplation on the laws that govern the stars may not cure a toothache, it may expel worries and anxieties and the spectres of things inexistent that haunt the vacant spaces of our mind.

But one does not have to go to the common properties of things in order to find a puissant object of contemplation to expel the emotions that assail us. The emotions themselves may become such an object of contemplation. The ailments which the emotions bring in their train are often due to the fact that we brood over them without knowing their causes, or that we misunderstand their nature by attributing them to a single cause which happens to come to our attention. To be sure, "an emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused" (Prop. VIII); still a knowledge of the multiplicity and unavoidableness of the causes of the emotion together with an understanding of the nature of the emotion itself will remove the sting and pang of the emotion (Prop. IX). Were we only to know the nature of our emotions in all their bearings and in their relation to all their causes, the emotions themselves would become an object of intellectual contemplation and would thereby cease to be passions. The pain they cause us would be forgotten in the pleasure afforded by the very act of our understanding them. We

should cease to be the slaves of our passions and become their masters, for "if we are affected by an emotion which is related to many and different causes, which the mind contemplates at the same time with the emotion itself, we are less injured, suffer less from it, and are less affected therefore towards each cause than if we were affected by another emotion equally great which is related to one cause only or to fewer causes" (Prop. IX).

Finally, says Spinoza, all these remedies are more effective as preventive measures than as cures. In our moral economy as in the management of our worldly affairs we must always plan ahead. We must not allow ourselves to drift and to be caught unprepared. In fair weather we must prepare for rainy days, and in time of peace of mind we must prepare for war on the emotions. Ere we are faced by a problem of conduct, and while the serenity of our mind is still undisturbed, we must map out a plan of action and a method of attack. The emotions are treacherous enemies. They lie in ambush, waiting for our moments of weakness, when we are off our guard, to spring their fury upon us. We must be fully armed beforehand, so that when they come down upon us they will be met by the fire of our reason, for "so long as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary to our nature do we possess the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect" (Prop. X).

The therapeutic principle in all these remedies is that they produce in us an active emotion which is more powerful than the particular passive emotion to which we happen to be slaves; the active emotion overwhelms the passive and replaces it. By one emotion being more powerful than another, Spinoza seems to say here, two things are meant: first, it is more constant or presents itself more frequently than the

other, and second, it occupies the mind more than the other, and, furthermore, he seems to say, that which makes an emotion more powerful in both these two meanings is the greater number of objects to which it is related (Prop. XI). These objects, he then says, restating his own previous views, may be either "things which we clearly and distinctly understand" (Prop. XII), that is to say, "the common properties of things or what are deduced from them" (*ibid.*, Demonst.), or any other individual things (Prop. XIII). But since whatever is, is in God, he finally concludes, it is the emotion evoked in us by the idea of God, or what is generally called the love for God, that constitutes the most powerful emotion which can occupy our minds fully, to the exclusion of all other emotions (Props. XIV–XV). The love for God is thus the sovereign remedy for the ailments of the soul.

This sovereign remedy for the ailments of the soul is really nothing but the old consolation held out to its faithful by every religion. Spinoza's advice to men to have all the affections of their body or the images of things related to the idea of God (Prop. XV) reads like the old teachings about faith and trust in God. "Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and He will sustain thee." [1] God is the great provider, the great comforter, the rock of our salvation, the refuge in the day of evil. Or, to quote the following characteristic description of the benefits of the old-fashioned trust in God: "As for the benefits which accrue to one in the present life as a result of trust in God, there is to begin with the peace of the heart as it rests from worldly cares and the relief from the fluctuations of the mind and its anxiety over its disappointments in its bodily desires and the feeling of ease and comfort and rest in the life allotted to one." [2] Spinoza's

[1] Psalms 55, 23.

[2] *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot*, IV, Introduction.

sovereign remedy, that of having all the affections of the body or the images of things related to the idea of God, does not seem to promise to men in the present life more than this trust in the old-fashioned God, and it would seem rather strange that after all his skirmishes with rabbis and schoolmen, after all his searches for a new philosophy, he should land in the same old mystic circle, the refuge in God. But perhaps Spinoza did not mean to promise more than that, for he did not set out to prove that the consolation of his own philosophy is greater than the consolation of the old religion. His contest with the theologians was not an old-fashioned contest between the followers of Dagon and the followers of Jehovah to see which god was the mightier and more bountiful. What he did set out to do was to establish certain truths about the nature of God, to deny of Him certain elements of personality with which He has been invested even by the most speculative of theologians, and to show that such a God, depersonalized as He is, does not cease to be a force and a power for goodness in man's life. He has already shown how his God can be like the God of tradition, a rock of our salvation and a refuge in the day of evil. He now proceeds to show still further how great the power of his depersonalized God may be in human life.

II. Love and Impersonality of God

One can see distinctly the clear and sharp outlines of the syllogisms as they unroll themselves in the remaining propositions of this group. Spinoza seems to say to his opponents: What do you mean when you speak of the personality of God? "Although we are not ignorant of the term [personality, *personalitas*], we are ignorant of its significance, and unable to form any clear concept of its content." [1] If it

[1] *Cogitata Metaphysica*, II, 8.

means anything at all, you may mean by it two things. In the first place, you may mean that you behave yourselves towards God as if He were a person like yourselves. In the second place, you may mean that God behaves himself towards you as if He were a person like yourselves. Now I am going to show that it is only the first sense of personality that has any meaning at all, and in that sense even my God may be said to have personality. The second sense in which you say God has personality, I am going to show, has no meaning at all, and is a mere empty phrase even when you use it with reference to your own God.

In the Hebrew Bible and throughout post-Biblical Hebrew literature the religious attitude of man towards God is described by two terms, fear and love. Whatever the relative position of these two elements of the religious attitude may have been in the early history of the Jewish religion, in the course of its subsequent development fear was gradually relegated to the background and love emerged as the highest motive in religious worship. The rabbis of the Talmud speak of those who worship out of fear and those who worship out of love and proclaim the superiority of the latter over the former.[1] The mediaeval speculative theologians try to define the nature of these two religious elements and their relation to each other. According to Baḥya, the fear of God is a necessary preliminary stage in man's spiritual development, for it is impossible for man to attain the love of God without having first purged his heart of passions through the fear of God.[2] According to Maimonides, the prescribed practices of the Law, which to him are of lesser importance than the right knowledge of God, inculcate into man's heart the fear of God, whereas the true knowledge of God's nature creates

[1] *Soṭah* 31a. Cf. *Sifre* on Deuteronomy (ed. Friedmann), § 32.
[2] *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot*, X, Introduction.

in him the love of God.[1] Crescas, who unlike Maimonides does not place a higher value upon right knowledge than upon right action, also makes the love of God, from which he seems not to differentiate the true fear of God, the final goal of the religious life.[2] In Christianity, where the love of God as a religious principle was introduced after it had already gained complete ascendancy in Judaism, it has subsequently developed, under the influence of philosophy, along the same lines as in Judaism. A parallel development of the principle of the love of God is to be found also in Islam.[3]

From the widespread discussions of the love of God throughout the religious literatures in the languages accessible to Spinoza, and especially in Hebrew, we may gather four distinct characteristics of the nature of love in general and of the love of God in particular which, as we shall see anon, stand out as the main assumptions of Spinoza's treatment of the subject.

In the first place, love means a union with the object of love. Says Crescas: "From the nature of love in general it is clear that the love for God results in a union with God, for even in the case of physical objects it is evident that love and concord among them are the causes of their perfection and unity. In fact, one of the ancients was of the opinion that the origin of generation is love and union, whereas the origin of decay is hatred and separation. If this is so in the case of physical objects, how much more must it be so in the case of spiritual beings, namely, that union and unity result from love and concord between them." [4] Meir ibn Gabbai similarly says: "Love means true unity, and true unity is that which is called love. . . . And it is incumbent upon

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 52, end.

[2] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 53b).

[3] Cf. I. Goldziher, "Die Gottesliebe in der islamischen Theologie," in *Islam*, IX (1919), pp. 144 ff.; J. Obermann, *Der philosophische und religiose Subjektivismus Ghazalis*, pp. 272 ff.

[4] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 55a).

man to love God and become united with Him, for the desired end of all created nature is to bring all things into union. This is what is meant by love. There must be no sign of division and separation in nature, and still less in man himself, whose purpose is to become united with his Creator and to show no sign of division in himself." [1] This conception of love as union which Crescas in the passage quoted from him ascribes to one of the ancients, meaning Empedocles,[2] is ascribed by Aristotle also to the Symposium and Aristophanes.[3] It is discussed by Thomas Aquinas,[4] by Leo Hebraeus,[5] and by Descartes.[6]

In the second place, love may be divided into different kinds, in accordance with the variation in the perfection of the object loved. Says Crescas again: "In proportion to the perfection of the object desired is the love and the pleasure of the desire. . . . For according to the degree of goodness of the object loved is the degree of the love." [7] The origin and the history of the classification of love will be discussed later in connection with the intellectual love of God.[8]

[1] *'Abodat ha-Ḳodesh*, I, 27.

[2] Crescas may have got his knowledge of Empedocles from Aristotle's references to him, such as in *De Anima*, III, 6, 430a, 28 ff.

[3] *Politics*, II, 4, 1262b, 10 ff.

[4] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 28, Art. 1.

[5] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, I, p. 45 (Bari, 1929). On Leo Hebraeus and his relation to Spinoza, see B. Zimmels, *Leo Hebraus, etc.* (Breslau, 1886), p. 74, n. 3; Edmondo Solmi, *Benedetto Spinoza e Leone Ebreo* (Modena, 1903); Carl Gebhardt, "Spinoza und der Platonismus," in *Chronicon Spinozanum*, I (1921), pp. 178 ff.; Giovanni Gentile, "Leone Ebreo e Spinoza," in *Studii sul Rinascimento* (Firenze, 1923), pp. 96 ff.; Heinz Pflaum, *Die Idee der Liebe: Leone Ebreo* (Tubingen, 1926); Joseph Klausner, "Don Jehudah Abarbanel u-Filosofiat ha-Ahabah Shelo," in *Tarbiz*, III (Jerusalem, 1932), pp. 67 ff.

On the whole, Leo Hebraeus' influence upon Spinoza has been unduly exaggerated. The passages from the *Dialoghi d'Amore* examined by us in connection with Spinoza have all proved to be philosophic commonplaces. Nor has it been possible to establish any direct literary relationship between these passages and Spinoza.

[6] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 79.

[7] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 54b).

[8] Cf. below, pp. 302 ff.

In the third place, this love of God is said to spring from the knowledge of God. We have already quoted one statement from Maimonides in which the knowledge of God's existence and unity, that is to say, His nature as far as it can be known, leads to the love of God. A still more explicit statement by Maimonides is the following: "One cannot love God except through the knowledge with which one knows Him, and the love is in proportion with the knowledge; the less of the latter the less of the former, and the more of the latter the more of the former." [1] Again, "we have already shown in the *Mishneh Torah* [2] that this love is only possible when we comprehend the real nature of things and understand the divine wisdom displayed therein." [3] The question whether knowledge is the cause of love is discussed with reference to love in general by Thomas Aquinas, who quotes earlier authorities, and the answer given is in the affirmative.[4] In Crescas, however, there is a denial that love is connected with intelligence, and he lays down the principle that "love and pleasure are in the will without any act of intelligence." [5] This statement, however, is not to be taken as a denial of the principle that love is based on knowledge. It only means to say that love is independent of the act of intelligence, that is, of reason and of knowledge based upon reason, which Spinoza calls the second kind of knowledge. It seems to me also that it is with reference to this contention of Crescas that Leo Hebraeus argues that "even though in corporeal objects love differs from intelli-

[1] *Mishneh Torah, Teshubah*, X, 6.

[2] *Ibid., Yesode ha-Torah*, II, 2.

[3] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 28.

[4] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 27, Art. 2.

[5] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 54b). In connection with the relation of Maimonides' and Crescas' discussion of love to that of Spinoza, cf. Joël, *Spinoza's Theologisch-Politischer Traktat*, p. ix and pp. 44 ff.

gence . . . in intellectual and immaterial essences they exist together." [1]

In the fourth place, this love for God ought to occupy one's entire mind so that no room is left for any other desires. Thus describes Baḥya Ibn Pakuda the state of the human soul after she has attained love for God. "She devotes herself exclusively to God; her heart is wholly given to Him, to love Him, to trust in Him, to long for Him. She has no other occupation than that of serving Him, she has no thought of anybody but Him. . . . If He deals kindly with her, she is thankful, and if He afflicts her, she endures with patience, and despite everything that happens to her, her love for Him and her trust in Him increase." [2] So also Maimonides: "It is well known and quite evident that the love for God cannot strike deep root in the heart of man unless it occupies his mind constantly so that nothing in the world matters to him but this love for God." [3]

These four characteristics of love are all found in Spinoza.

In the first place, he discusses the problem whether love implies a will to union with the object of love. In the formal definition of love as given by him in the *Short Treatise* love is said to be nothing else "than the enjoyment of a thing and union therewith." [4] This definition is directly taken from Descartes.[5] In the *Ethics*, however, where the first part of the definition is given as "pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause," the second part, which is given as "the will of the lover to unite himself to

[1] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, III, p. 373 (Bari, 1929): "Giá sai che, se bene ne le cose corporee l'amore è diverso da l'intellezione . . . che ne l'essenzie intellettuali e immateriali stanno insieme."

[2] *Ḥobot ha-Lebabot*, X, 1.

[3] *Mishneh Torah, Teshubah*, X, 6.

[4] *Short Treatise*, II, 5, § 1.

[5] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 79. Cf. Sigwart, *Benedict de Spinoza's Kurze Tractat, etc., ad loc.*

the beloved object" and is attributed to some authors (*auctorum, auctoribus*), is said to express "not the essence (*essentia*) of love but a property (*proprietas*) thereof." [1] This, on the whole, agrees with Thomas Aquinas, who treats of union under the effects (*effectus*) of love as contrasted with the cause (*causa*) of love,[2] though Spinoza's contrast here between the "essence" and the "property" of love would seem to be based upon Descartes' statement that the distinction between the love of benevolence and the love of concupiscence "concerns the effects of love alone, and not its essence." [3] Still the phraseology of Crescas is discernible even in this discussion of the *Ethics* which is entirely based upon Descartes. In his comment upon the statement with which he agrees that "it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object" he says that he does not understand by will (*voluntas*) "a consent or deliberation, that is to say, a free decree of the mind." This is directly aimed at Descartes' statement that "by the word will I do not here intend to talk of desire . . . but of the consent, etc." [4] But when Spinoza goes on to say that "by will I understand the satisfaction (*acquiescentia*) that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported," he seems to reflect Crescas' statement that love is a pleasure or satisfaction in the will. The formal definition of love as given by Crescas is expressed in the phrase "agreeableness of will." [5] It would seem that it is in this sense that Spinoza uses the term "will" here.

[1] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 6.

[2] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 28, and cf. Quaest. 27.

[3] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 81.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, 80.

[5] ערבות הרצון, *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5 (p. 27a), or ערבות החפץ, *ibid.*, II, vi, 1 (p. 54b).

In the second place, Spinoza also speaks of love as being divided according to the qualities or perfections of its objects. The objects of love are classified by him into three kinds, eternal, transient, and those which are transient by their own nature but eternal by virtue of their cause.[1] The origin of this classification has already been discussed above.[2] Of the various kinds of love the highest is that of God who is eternal, and whom he designates also as Truth — a divine appellation which is common in Arabic and Hebrew [3] as well as in scholastic [4] literature. As synonymous with the "love of God," Spinoza repeatedly uses the expression "union with God." [5]

All this, however, occurs only in the *Short Treatise*. In the *Ethics* there is no definite statement either as to the division of love in accordance with its object or as to the union with God. But even in the *Ethics* there is an indirect allusion to both these views in the statement that the love for God is a love "towards an immutable and eternal object (see Prop. XV, Part V) of which we are really partakers (see Prop. XLV, Part II)." [6] To say that the love towards God is a love "towards an immutable and eternal object" undoubtedly reflects his division of love into the love of something eternal, of something transient, and of something which is eternal only by virtue of its cause. Then also to say that "we are really partakers" of the immutable and eternal

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 5, §§ 1 ff.

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 252–253.

[3] *Al-Najat*, III: *Metaphysics*, II (p.63); *Shahrastani*, p. 375; *'Olam Ḳatan*, III (p. 58); *Emunah Ramah*, II, iii (p. 54); *Mishneh Torah*, *Yesode ha-Torah*, I, 4; *'Iḳḳarim*, II, 27. Cf. D. Kaufmann, *Geschichte de Attributenlehre*, p. 333, n. 204.

[4] Cf. Augustine, *De Cognitione Verae Vitae*, Ch. 7 (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 40, Col. 1011); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Quaest. 16, Art. 5.

[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 4, § 10, 19, § 14, and 22, §§ 2 ff.

[6] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 20, Schol.

objects which we love necessarily implies that the love of God is a union with God.

In the third place, following the common philosophic tradition, Spinoza makes the general statement that man loves God "solely because he has a knowledge of God," [1] or that the love for God springs (*oritur*)[2] or flows forth (*profluit*)[3] or flows (*fluit*)[4] from the knowledge of God. But as knowledge according to Spinoza is a general term, including three different kinds, it is only the third kind of knowledge which leads directly to the love of God, as he makes quite clear subsequently in Propositions XXVII–XXXIII. It is the intuitive and immediate kind of knowledge and not reason (*ratio*) that is the source of the love of God, though, of course, the second kind of knowlege may lead to the third and hence to the love of God. Spinoza thus reflects Crescas' statement quoted above that love is without intelligence, which we have explained to mean that it is without any kind of knowledge which arises from reason. An indirect allusion to this view that it is only the third or the immediate kind of knowledge that leads to love for God may be found in the *Short Treatise* in the statement that we come to love God and to be united with Him "if once we get to know God, at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we also know the body," [5] that is to say, with an immediate kind of knowledge. It is in the light of this discussion that we can see the logical sequence between Proposition XIV and Proposition XV. Stating first that "the mind can cause all the affections of the body or the images of things to be related to the idea of God" (Prop. XIV), that is to say, to know

[1] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 4 (*Opera*, III, p. 60, l. 33).
[2] *Ibid.* (p. 61, l. 30).
[3] Epistola 19 (*Opera*, IV, p. 94, l. 15).
[4] Epistola 21 (*Opera*, IV, p. 128, l. 1).
[5] *Short Treatise*, II, 19, § 14 (*Opera*, I, p. 93, ll. 20–22).

them by the third kind of knowledge, he proceeds to say that "he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and loves Him better the better he understands himself and his emotions" (Prop. XV), which view he later restates by saying that this kind of knowledge "begets a love towards an immutable and eternal object (see Prop. XV)." [1]

In the fourth place, again following tradition, Spinoza says that this love for God, which rises out of man's having a clear and distinct knowledge of himself and his emotions, or, as he has put it in Proposition XIV, of his relating them to the idea of God, becomes better the better man understands himself and his emotions (Prop. XV), and, furthermore, that "this love to God above everything else ought to occupy the mind" (Prop. XVI).

So far Spinoza has been merely applying the common utterances of traditional theology about the God of tradition to his own God. His own God, he was arguing in effect, has as much personality as the God of tradition, if by personality is meant a personal relation on the part of man toward God as it expresses itself in the attitude of love. But now he wants to show wherein his God differs from the God of tradition. He differs from the latter, he is going to say, in that He cannot be conceived, as the traditional God is generally conceived, as acting like a person in His relation to man, that is to say, in having personality in the sense that He behaves himself toward man as if He were a person.

In traditional philosophy, just as the personal attitude of man towards God is described by the phrase "love for God," so the personal attitude of God towards man is described by applying to Him the terms "pleasure" or "joy," "pain" or "sorrow," and "love." The attempt to find the first trace of

[1] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 20, Schol.

personality in God in the fact that He has the experience of pleasure has already been made by Aristotle, in his statement that the incessant actual contemplation of God is an activity which is pleasure (ἡδονή) and is the most pleasant (ἥδιστον) activity.[1] In Jewish philosophy, especially in Crescas,[2] it is argued that even though no other "passion"[3] can be attributed to God, the attribution of pleasure or joy[4] is permissible, inasmuch as the term is applied to God throughout the Prophetic and the Talmudic writings. As for the term "pain" or "sorrow,"[5] Crescas refers to the "ancients," evidently including Maimonides, who allowed its application to God only in a figurative sense, on the principle that Scripture speaketh in accordance with the language of man.[6] But even the attribution of pleasure or joy to God, argues Crescas, is permissible only in a figurative sense, for there is no analogy at all between our pleasure or joy and the pleasure or joy attributed to God. Our pleasure or joy consists in the passing from a lesser perfection to a greater perfection, as, e.g., from ignorance to knowledge, whereas in the case of God, in whom no change or transition of any kind is possible, pleasure or joy is only that feeling which is associated with His love — a love which is but an exercise of goodness and a desire to allow His goodness to overflow. This view is reflected also in the Hymn of Unity: "Joy and sorrow occur not in Thee."[7] Love then alone can be attributed to God, and just as man ought to love God, God loves man, so that in the Scriptures the patriarchs are said to have loved God and God is said to have loved the patriarchs.[8] The

[1] *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072b, 16 and 24.
[2] *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5. Cf. also *'Iḳḳarim*, II, 15.
[3] הפעלות, πάθος. [4] שמחה. [5] עצבון.
[6] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 29.
[7] *Shir ha-Yiḥud*, III.
[8] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 54b).

reciprocal love between man and God is explained also by Meir ibn Gabbai as follows: "We have already stated that love for the one God consists in man's complete unity with Him . . . and so as a result of his love for the one God man is loved by God in return . . . for he who conceives of God's unity in this way causes pleasure to his Creator, so that the latter loves him after the manner of those who are pleased with one another, in which case each one is pleased with the other and each one loves the other. In this way it is possible that there should be reciprocal love between God and Israel. In another way, too, is it possible that there should be reciprocal love between God and Israel, namely, after the manner of the love of a father for his son, for Israel is a part of God and is in close relationship to Him." [1] But here again these two loves are of a different nature, for the love of God for man is nothing but the love of the perfect Good to exercise His goodness, and is identical with the essence of God itself.[2]

The upshot of all this is that God may be spoken of as being affected by the emotions of pleasure and pain and love, but all these are to be taken in a sense in which the terms in question are not ordinarily understood. We can readily see the objections that Spinoza raised in his mind against such a view — objections of the kind he has raised on several occasions before against the homonymous use of terms in their application to God. If pleasure and pain and love and all other similar emotions are to be applied to God in a sense entirely divorced from their original meaning, why not say that God is not pleased and is not pained and does not love? And so Spinoza, with such reasoning in his mind, says, "God is free from passions, nor is He affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain" (Prop. XVII), for "God can

[1] *'Abodat ha-Ḳodesh*, I, 28.

[2] *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5 (p. 27a), and II, vi, 1 (p. 54b).

neither pass to a greater nor to a less perfection" (Demonst.), and so also, "properly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one" (Corol.). In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza summarizes his objections to God's love for man in two arguments: "In the first place, we have said that to God no modes of thought can be ascribed except those which are in creatures; therefore, it cannot be said that God loves mankind, much less [can it be said] that He should love them because they love Him, or hate them because they hate Him. . . . Besides, this would necessarily involve nothing less than a great mutability on the part of God, who, though neither loved nor hated before, would now have to begin to love and to hate, and would be induced or made to do so by something supposed to be outside Him; but this is absurdity itself." [1] Now, it will be observed that these arguments were not unknown to the mediaevals and that they anticipated them by declaring that God's love for man is unlike the love which we find in the creatures. But here, as on many other occasions, Spinoza dismisses the distinctions of the mediaevals as mere quibbling and revives against them their own arguments.

The denial of God's love for man and in general the denial of any personal reciprocal relations between God and man will eliminate certain difficulties which are bound to come up if one affirms such a relation between God and man. Spinoza enumerates three such difficulties which are now eliminated by him.

In the first place, says Spinoza, the affirmation that God is pleased or is sorry or that He loves, however attenuated these terms may become by the explanations they undergo, must inevitably imply that His pleasure and sorrow and love are called forth by the manner in which men behave them-

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 24, § 2.

selves towards Him. The entire conception of obedience and disobedience and of reward and punishment in every revealed religion is based upon the fundamental belief that God is variously affected by the conduct of man and that there is a certain relation between desert and retribution. But the facts are against this, and God seems to be angry at those with whom He should be pleased and to hate those whom He should love. The problem of evil and of divine injustice must thus inevitably come up as a result of this fundamental belief of all religions. Of course, theology tries to answer such difficulties and to free God from all charges of injustice by arguing that He is not directly responsible for evil.[1] But there is no escaping from the conclusion that if God is affected by human conduct, and if He is capable of pain and grief and anger as well as of pleasure and love, He must be directly the author of evil as well as of good. Man who suffers unjustly is bound to rebel against God and to hate Him. All those qualities which religion tries to inculcate in man — acquiescence, resignation, contentment, and peace of mind — by its preaching the doctrine that man must love God thus disappear as a result of its preaching also the doctrine that God loves man. But if you deny outright that God is affected by human conduct or that He is pleased or pained at man's action or that He loves man, then "no one can hate God" (Prop. XVIII), and "love to God cannot be turned into hatred" (Corol.), and we do not hold God responsible for pain and sorrow (Schol.). In the *Short Treatise*, the existence of a causal relation between God's love for man and man's love for God is rejected on the ground that it would imply freedom of the will on the part of man, "for in that case we should have to suppose that people do so [love God] of their own free will, and that they do not de-

[1] Cf. *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 10; *Emunot we-De'ot*, I, 3, Fifth Theory, end.

pend on a first cause; which we have already before proved to be false." [1]

In the second place, the assertion that God loves man must inevitably lead man to love God in expectation of being loved by Him in return. Of course, religion preaches that the love for God must be a disinterested love, and that nothing is to be expected in return, for then and then only will the love for God be the ultimate and highest happiness. But this, Spinoza seems to argue, is humanly impossible. If God can love man, then man will love God in expectation that God will love him in return. The love for God thus ceases to be the highest good; it becomes a commodity in trade. But if you deny outright that God can love man, then "he who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return" (Prop. XIX).

Finally, Spinoza seems to repeat his previous contention that the conception of an impersonal God "contributes to the welfare of our social existence, since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no one, and to envy no one." [2] All these purposes are defeated by the conception of a God who loves mankind, for if He loves them, He must necessarily reveal His law to them,[3] and He must reveal it to them in different ways and in different places. Man's love for God, which according to the teachings of all religions should lead to men's love for one another, thus leads to dissension among men, and all because the God whom they are bidden to love is conceived to love mankind in return. But if you deny outright that God can love man, then "this love to God cannot be defiled by the emotion either of envy or of jealousy, but is the more fostered the more people we imagine to be connected with God by the same bond of love" (Prop. XX).

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 24, § 2. [2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 49, Schol.
[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 24, § 4. Cf. below, pp. 225–226.

III. Immortality and Intellectual Love of God

The transition from the subject-matter discussed in the preceding propositions and the subject-matter discussed in the propositions which are to follow is explained by Spinoza himself. "I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present life. . . . It is time, therefore, that I should now pass to those matters which appertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body." [1] But Spinoza also had before him a literary model in which the immortality of the soul was connected with the love of God. Crescas, whose discussion of the love of God, as we have seen, must have been one of the many possible sources on which Spinoza could have drawn for his own treatment of the subject, similarly proceeds from the discussion of the love of God to the discussion of the immortality of the soul, stating his conclusion that "philosophic speculation is in agreement with what has been shown to be the view according to the teachings of Scripture and tradition, namely, that true love is that which is conducive to the final end of the eternal remaining-in-existence of the soul which is an accepted belief of our people, upon which we have been brought up, concerning which Scripture has enlightened our eyes, and with which, in addition, philosophic speculation is in agreement, being opposed to nothing in it." [2]

The belief in the immortality of the soul is naturally dependent upon a belief that the soul is something different from and independent of the body. If the soul, for instance, were conceived of as what Aristotle describes as a kind of harmony (ἁρμονία τις),[3] that is to say, a physiological process

[1] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 20, Schol., end.
[2] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 55a).
[3] *De Anima*, I, 4, 407b, 30 ff.

of the body, there could be no belief in its immortality. Assuming, then, that the soul in order to be immortal must be something distinct from body, it was considered by some as a self-subsisting spiritual substance contrasted with body which is a self-subsisting material substance, and by others as a sort of inseparable form of the body of which only a certain part, called the hylic intellect, may acquire self-subsisting substantiality and become what is known as the acquired intellect. This is a broad statement of two contrasting views under each of which all other views may be subsumed. Immortality is possible according to the proponents of both of these views, but the immortality is differently conceived by them. To those who consider the soul to be a self-subsisting spiritual substance which happens to exist for a certain tract of time in the body but is never part of it, the soul in its entirety is said to be immortal. But to those who consider the soul to be an inseparable form of the body, the soul as a whole is destroyed with body and only that part of it which becomes a self-subsisting spiritual substance, namely, the acquired intellect, remains immortal. This latter view is clearly expressed by Ibn Ezra in the following passage: "For the spirit of man by which he lives and experiences sensation is the same as that of beasts; as the one dies, so dies the other, except for that supernal part wherein a man has a pre-eminence above a beast." [1] Even in the rational part of the soul Maimonides denies immortality to the hylic intellect and confines it only to the acquired intellect. He says: "The form of the soul [i.e., the acquired intellect] is not composed of the elements, and consequently it does not have to resolve into them. Nor is it a faculty of the soul which stands in need of the soul as the soul in its turn stands in need of the body. It is rather something which comes

[1] Commentary on Genesis 3, 6. Cf. *Cuzari*, V, 12.

from God above. Therefore, when the body, which is composed of the elements, dissolves, and the soul, on account of its having existence only together with the body and on account also of its standing in need of the body in all its functions, likewise perishes, the form of the soul [i.e., the acquired intellect] is not destroyed, inasmuch as it does not stand in need of the soul in any of its functions, but of its own nature knows and comprehends ideas apart from bodies and knows the Creator of the universe. It thus continues in its existence eternally." [1] Similarly Gersonides, after enumerating different opinions as to whether the hylic intellect is immortal,[2] concludes, like Avicenna and Maimonides, that only the acquired intellect is immortal.[3] Spinoza's own teacher, Manasseh ben Israel, in a special treatise on the immortality of the soul, reproduces Maimonides' view with approval.[4] The view that immortality is to be attributed only to the rational part of the soul and not to its other functions may be traced throughout the history of philosophy back to Plato, though, it has been pointed out, Plato himself is inconsistent in his statements on this question.[5]

Spinoza's view as to the nature of the soul or mind, as we have already seen, is more like the second of the two views we have stated. The mind is inseparable from the body; and consequently some of its functions, like imagination and memory, which are dependent upon sensation, must disappear with the disappearance of the body. Still the mind, according to Spinoza, is not merely a physiological function of the body which is born with the body and which must

[1] *Mishneh Torah*, *Yesode ha-Torah*, IV, 9. The terms used in this passage are: שכל נקנה = הדעה שהשיגה מהבורא והשיגה הדעות הנפרדות = צורת הנפש; נשמה = הנשמה הצריכה לגוף. Cf. *Mishneh Torah*, *Teshubah*, VIII, 3, and below, p. 314, n. 2.

[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, I, 8.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, 10.

[4] *Nishmat Ḥayyim*, II, 1.

[5] Cf. Grote, *Plato* (1867), II, p. 160.

completely disappear with it. This is only true of some of its functions. But in its thinking essence it comes from above, like the acquired intellect in the passage we have quoted from Maimonides; it is a mode of the eternal and infinite attribute of thought. That part of mind existed from eternity prior to the existence of its particular body, and it remains to eternity even after the death of the body.

This is the substance of Spinoza's argument in Propositions XXI–XXIII, which we shall now try to unfold.

Mind and body, begins Spinoza, are indeed inseparable, and consequently as long as one of them is said to exist the other also must be said to exist. But existence is of two kinds. One kind of existence is said of things which are conceived of as actual in so far as they are conceived to exist in relation to a fixed time and place. The other kind of existence is said of things which are conceived of as actual in so far as they are conceived to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature.[1] Spinoza variously describes these two kinds of existence by calling the former existence (*existentia*),[2] formal being (*esse formalis*),[3] actual essence (*essentia actualis*),[4] or given essence (*essentia data*),[5] and the latter essence (*essentia*),[6] ideas of non-existent things (*ideae rerum non existentium*),[7] ideal essence (*essentia idealis*),[8] or formal essence (*essentia formalis*).[9] In both these cases of existence the mind is inseparable from the body, and both the mind and the body are said to exist with the same kind of existence. The mind of an actually existent body has actual existence which is characterized by its posses-

[1] Cf. *Ethics*, II, Prop. 8, Corol., and V, Prop. 29, Schol.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, Prop. 24; V, Prop. 22, Demonst.; *Cogitata Metaphysica*, I, 2.
[3] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 5.
[4] *Tractatus Politicus*, Ch. 2, § 2. Cf. above, p. 198.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Cf. above, n. 2.
[7] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 8. Cf. above, p. 29.
[8] Cf. above, n. 4.
[9] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 17, Schol.; II, Prop. 8. Cf. above, p. 29.

sion of the powers of imagination and memory, both of which are based upon sensation. With the cessation of the actual existence of the body, these powers of the mind also cease to exist, for "the mind can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body endures" (Prop. XXI). But even after the body has actually ceased to exist, it still has ideal existence, for "in God, nevertheless, there is necessarily granted an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity" (Prop. XXII). This idea or conception in God which expresses the essence of the human body is something which pertains to the essence of the human mind, for the human body is the object of the idea constituting the human mind.[1] He thus concludes that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal" (Prop. XXIII). That something is the thinking essence of the mind which after the death of the body returns to unite itself with the attribute of thought whence it came,[2] even as the acquired intellect, according to mediaeval philosophers, returns after the death of the body to unite itself with the Active Intellect, or with God.

The existence, then, which is attributed to that part of the mind which remains eternal after the destruction of the body is not the same kind of existence that is attributed to it during the existence of the body. For one thing, it does not know its own body. For another thing, it does not know other bodies. And without its knowledge of bodies, it does not experience all the pleasures that arise from such knowledge. It is only the element of thought in the mind that continues to exist after death as a part of the attribute of thought — a thought stripped of sensation, memory, imagination, and everything that goes with them. Now, it could be argued

[1] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13.

[2] Cf. *Short Treatise*, II, 23.

that an eternal existence of that kind could also be attributed to the body. Death brings destruction only to the particular shape and form of the human body, the frame in which it is encased and the earthly qualities with which it is endowed, but its essence, which is extension, remains as a part of the attribute of extension and continues to exist with a kind of existence which is related to the existence of the body prior to death as the existence of human thought after death is related to the existence of the human mind before death. Both mind and body, Spinoza will admit, come from God, and unto God shall they return. This being the case, it may be asked, why should not Spinoza speak of the immortality of the body as well as of the immortality of the soul?[1] It is well for those who believe that God is immaterial and hence pure thought to speak only of the immortality of the soul, for to them it is only the soul that comes directly from God; body does not come directly from God; and consequently to them it is only the soul that returns unto God. If they do sometimes say that the body is to live again, it is only in the sense that in some miraculous way it will be resurrected to a new life. But as for Spinoza, to whom both soul and body are modes of God's attributes of thought and extension and to whom the essential extension of the body is not more destructible than the essential thought of the mind, why should he speak of the immortality of the soul rather than of the immortality of the body?

We can reason out how Spinoza would answer this question if it were actually raised against him.

In the first place, he would say, by immortality is not meant the mere conservation of thought or extension in the universe. In that general sense of immortality, both thought and extension, to be sure, may be said to be equally con-

[1] Cf. Pollock, *Spinoza*, p. 295.

served, for the death of the individual does not diminish the total amount of extension in the universe any more than it diminishes the total amount of thought. Nothing is lost in nature; there is only a change in form. But immortality means more than that. It means the eternal preservation of something that was peculiar to a particular human being during his lifetime. In this respect, Spinoza would say, there is a difference between mind and body. The thought element of the mind that survives death bears the particular characteristics of the individual during his lifetime, for, as we shall see, the immortality of the soul, according to Spinoza, is personal and individual.[1] There are, however, no such particular characteristics of the individual in the extension element of the body that remains after death. Consequently, while it is proper to retain the traditional vocabulary and speak of the immortality of the soul, there is no ground for speaking in the same sense of the immortality of the body.

In the second place, Spinoza would say, what is that ideal existence which both the thought element of the human mind and the extension element of the human body have after the death of the individual? Is it not the conception or the idea which necessarily exists in God and expresses the essence of this or that human body?[2] Now this conception or idea which God has of the extension of the human body is different from the conception or idea which He has of the thought of the human mind. Of the latter it is direct, but of the former it is indirect, for the conception or idea which God has of extension is something which directly pertains to the essence of the human mind.[3] The inference to be drawn from this is that the body is said to have an eternal

[1] Cf. below, pp. 318 ff.
[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 22.
[3] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 23, Demonst., referring to *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13.

essence not because of the eternity of the extension of which it is a mode but rather because of the eternity of its mind from which it is inseparable and which is a conception or idea in God. Extension itself, in fact, is said to have such an ideal existence only because in God there exists an idea of it, for "in God there necessarily exists an idea of His essence." [1] Consequently, if we were to say that there is an immortality of the body in the same sense as there is an immortality of the mind, the immortality of the former would be due to the immortality of the latter, for "this idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity is, as we have said, a certain mode of thought which pertains to the essence of the mind." [2]

In Judaism the immortality of the soul was quite independent of its pre-existence. If the soul of each human being was not necessarily created with each individual body, it was created at the creation of the world. Immortality merely meant the eternity of the soul *a parte post* but not *a parte ante*. Spinoza's conception of immortality, however, included its pre-existence. A similarity to the Platonic conception of the soul thus suggests itself. That Spinoza was conscious of this similarity is evident from the fact that he tries to disclaim the assumption that from his belief in the eternity of the soul, or rather in its pre-existence, one may infer the doctrine of recollection. It is quite evident that it is against Plato that he argues that "it is impossible, however, that we should recollect that we existed before the body, because there are no traces of any such existence in the body" (Prop. XXIII, Schol.). But, continues he, although "we do not recollect that we existed before the body, we feel that our mind . . . is eternal." This statement, we shall now

[1] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 3.
[2] *Ibid*, V, Prop. 23, Schol.

try to show, is Spinoza's own introduction to the next group of propositions, which are to deal, as we shall see, with the question to what extent immortality is personal and individual.

The mediaeval conception of immortality as a sort of union of the acquired intellect with God gives rise to a series of questions. The first question is whether such immortality is personal or not, that is to say, whether that sort of immortality is affected by the individual's character during his lifetime. If it is affected, the next question is whether these individual differences continue to exist among the immortal souls. Again, if it is affected by the individual's character during his lifetime, the question is whether it is affected only by his intellectual attainments or also by his moral conduct. Then also the question may be raised whether the soul after the death of the body can acquire new knowledge or not. If not, the question is, How can its existence be described as eternal bliss, when any kind of pleasure or satisfaction is possible only when there is a transition from a less perfect state to a more perfect?

All these questions, the discussion of which is to be found in mediaeval authors, Spinoza now tries to answer in connection with his own conception of immortality. He seems to say as follows: It is idle to speculate about the actual state of the human mind after the dissolution of the body. Still, we can have some inkling of it, for even during our lifetime we can experience that state of immortality which I sometimes describe as the union with God, and sometimes, especially in the *Ethics*, as the love for God, and which is a state of mind in which one experiences the highest possible peace. Now this experience of immortality during our lifetime is personal and individual, as is everything else we experience during our lifetime. It is attained by knowledge, of

the kind which I call the third (Props. XXIV ff.). It means a union with God, or, as I prefer to call it in the *Ethics*, a love for God (Prop. XXXII, Corol. ff.). Though it is a static sort of perfection and there is in it no transition from the less perfect to the more perfect, still I call it blessedness, by which I mean an eternal state of pleasure (Prop. XXXIII, Schol.). Finally, though it is attained principally by knowledge, still right conduct, as I understand it, is essential to it (Props. XXXIX–XL).

But let us work out the details of the propositions in which these views of Spinoza are developed.

Though Spinoza believes that we have a direct, intuitive knowledge of the existence of God, he still admits with Maimonides, who was in fact expressing a common attitude, that "a man must devote himself to the knowledge and understanding of the sciences dealing with things so that he may understand God in so far as it is in the power of man to know and comprehend Him." [1] Spinoza expresses the same sentiment in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* when he says that "we have greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena," and "the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God." [2] And so also here in the *Ethics* he says: "The more we understand individual objects, the more we understand God" (Prop. XXIV). Still, this kind of knowledge is only preliminary to the highest kind of knowledge which he has designated knowledge of the third kind, that is, the direct and intuitive knowledge of God. For that kind of knowledge the mind has a natural impulse, a conatus like that which all things have for the preservation of their self (Prop. XXV). The certainty

[1] *Mishneh Torah, Teshubah*, X, 6.

[2] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 4 (*Opera*, III, p. 60, ll. 6–11).

with which Spinoza makes this statement seems to have its basis in Aristotle's view that "all men by nature desire to know," [1] which means, as Cicero puts it, "the mind possesses an innate love of knowledge." [2] Descartes identifies this love of knowledge with curiosity (*curiositas*), and he considers it a species of desire (*cupiditas*).[3] Reflecting these views, Spinoza says here that this conatus of the mind to know things by the third kind of knowledge is a conscious effort or a desire (*cupiditas*), that is to say, it is a determination to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, and the more apt the mind becomes for that kind of knowledge by the development of its powers through a greater understanding of individual objects, the more it desires to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (Prop. XXVI). The mind is thus always in a restless state of endeavor for the fulfilment of a certain desire, for the attainment of the longed-for third kind of knowledge. Once this kind of knowledge is attained, man thereby attains his greatest peace and satisfaction of the mind, for "from this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of the mind — *summa, quae dari potest, Mentis acquiescentia*" [4] (Prop. XXVII). This peace of mind, which the third kind of knowledge brings to us during our lifetime, Spinoza seems to say, is a foretaste of the eternal blessedness which awaits us after death. Here, again, Spinoza reflects certain ideas which had been current throughout the history of philosophy. That the state of immortality is a state of eternal peace and satisfaction, and that even during our lifetime the possession of knowledge is a satisfaction to the soul, were commonly expressed views, as will be shown in the course of our subse-

[1] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 980a, 21.
[2] *De Finibus*, IV, 7, § 18.
[3] *Les Passions de l'Ame*, II, 88.
[4] Cf. "*Gerustheid des gemoeds*" in *Short Treatise*, II, 24, § 1.

quent discussion. But a few statements from Ibn Gabirol may prove illuminating in this connection. The blessedness which awaits the righteous during their immortal state is described by Ibn Gabirol as an "eternal delight" [1] or "infinite pleasure," [2] and the Throne of Glory in which the immortal souls abide is described by him as a place where "those who failed of strength may here find repose" [3] and as a place of "rest." [4] Furthermore, even during our lifetime, says Ibn Gabirol, "the understanding of the simple substances and the apprehension as much as is possible for us of the knowledge of those substances constitute the greatest peace (*requies*)[5] and the maximum pleasure (*suavitas*)[6] of the rational soul, and in proportion to the strength of the soul in the knowledge of these simple substances, its diffusion through them, its comprehension of their forms and properties, and its understanding of their actions and passions, will be its strength in the knowledge of God and its union with Him." [7]

But what is that third kind of knowledge? Though Spinoza has already discussed this kind of knowledge toward the end of the Second Part, he restates here his explanation briefly and with a few additional points and a new emphasis. Previously (Prop. XXIV) he has stated that the understanding of individual things will be helpful toward the attainment

[1] תענוג עולם. *Keter Malkut*, l. 50, in *Selected Religious Poems by Solomon Ibn Gabirol*, translated into English verse by Israel Zangwill from a critical text edited by Israel Davidson, 1923. (L. 32, in *Shire Shelomoh Ben Yehudah Ibn Gabirol*, III, edited by Ḥ. N. Bialik and J. Ḥ. Rawnitzki, *Tel-Aviv*, 1928.)

[2] נעם בלי תכלית וקצבה. *Ibid.*, l. 330. (L. 223, *ibid.*)

[3] ושם ינוחו יגיעי כח. *Ibid.*, l. 329. (Ll. 222–223, *ibid.*)

[4] זאת המנוחה. *Ibid.*, l. 336. (L. 227, *ibid.*)

[5] מנוחה. [6] תענוג.

[7] *Fons Vitae*, III, 49 (p. 189, l. 24–p. 190, l. 7); *Likḳutim min Sefer Meḳor Ḥayyim*, III, 31. Cf. I. Heinemann, *Die Lehre von der Zweckbestimmung des Menschen im griechisch-romisch Altertum un im jüdischen Mittelalter*, p. 52, n. 5.

of the third kind of knowledge. The emphasis in that statement is upon the term "understanding," or, rather, in the form in which the term is used in that proposition, "we understand (*intelligimus*)." It is only when we have adequate ideas of individual things, as when we know their common properties or when we know them in their mutual relations, that we understand them, and it is only such an understanding that will lead to the highest kind of knowledge. To have only mutilated and confused ideas of individual things is of no help in the attainment of that highest kind of knowledge. And so when Spinoza says that the mind has a conatus (Prop. XXV) or a desire (Prop. XXVI) to know things by the third kind of knowledge, that conatus or desire "cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge" (Prop. XXVIII).

Now it is the nature of the mind in its second kind of knowledge, or, as it is called by Spinoza, reason (*ratio*), to see things under the form of eternity.[1] Furthermore, the mind cannot know external bodies except through the knowledge of its own body.[2] Consequently, if the mind knows external things under the form of eternity, it must know them only through its knowledge of its own body under the form of eternity, for "everything which the mind understands under the form of eternity, it understands not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity" (Prop. XXIX). And so also, of course, must the mind know itself under the form of eternity. Knowing, then, itself and the body under the form of eternity, the mind "necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through Him" (Prop. XXX). This knowledge of

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 160–161.
[2] Cf. above, p. 78.

God and of one's being in God and of one's being conceived through God is the subject-matter of the third kind of knowledge.[1] Consequently the third kind of knowledge, which depends upon the mind as its formal cause, implies that the mind itself is eternal (Prop. XXXI). But inasmuch as Spinoza has shown before (Prop. XXVI) that the third kind of knowledge is the object of the conscious effort and desire of the mind during its existence in the human body, he has thereby also shown that during our lifetime we are conscious of the eternity of our mind. This possibility of experiencing the pleasure of the union with God during our lifetime is also suggested in the passages quoted later from Abraham Ibn Ezra[2] and Maimonides.[3]

Spinoza now returns to his previous statement that from the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible satisfaction of the mind (Prop. XXXII), and elaborates it more fully. In the Corollary of this thirty-second proposition he introduces the phrase "the intellectual love of God" (*amor Dei intellectualis*). Probably no phrase in Spinoza's philosophy is so well known as this one, and no phrase of his lends itself to so many homiletical interpretations. But the meaning of the phrase as well as its form may be best explained by a reconstruction of the idea which it tries to convey.

Ever since the time of Aristotle it has been an accepted principle in philosophy that the acquisition of any kind of knowledge, from the lowest form of sensation to the highest form of intelligence, is associated with a feeling of pleasure. "There is a pleasure," says Aristotle, "in respect of all sensation, and similarly in respect of thought and contemplation."[4] As proof of our natural desire for knowledge Aristotle

[1] Cf. above, pp. 140 ff.
[2] Cf. below, pp. 313–315. Cf. above, p. 300.
[3] Cf. below, p. 310, n. 1.
[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 4, 1174b, 20–21.

refers to the delight (ἀγάπησις, *dilectio*) we take in our senses.[1] Similarly Gersonides speaks of the joy and agreeableness that accompany the acquisition of knowledge,[2] and Crescas says succinctly that "comprehension is agreeable to those who comprehend." [3] But this pleasure which is associated with the experience of knowledge, it is generally agreed, varies in accordance with the object of knowledge. Here again Aristotle advances the view that "pleasures differ in kind," for "the activities of thought differ from those of the senses, and both differ among themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleasures that complete them." [4] Similarly Crescas, among many others, repeats that "the nobler the comprehension of things is, the greater is the agreeableness and joy which accompany the comprehension." [5]

There is thus a pleasure of the senses and a pleasure of the intellect, and Aristotle speaks definitely of the contrast between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul,[6] the latter undoubtedly referring to all the faculties of the soul, including the intellectual. Thus Descartes, evidently on the basis of those Aristotelian distinctions, uses the expression "intellectual joy" (*gaudium intellectualis*).[7] Now, since love cannot be dissociated from pleasure, and it is defined by Spinoza either, after Descartes, as the "enjoyment of a thing and union therewith," [8] or, against Descartes, as "pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause," [9] one would naturally expect a classification of love similar to that

[1] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 980a, 21–22.
[2] *Milḥamot Adonai*, I, 4 (p. 26).
[3] *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5 (p. 26b, end).
[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 5, 1175a, 21–28.
[5] *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5 (pp. 26–27).
[6] *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 10, 1117b, 28–29.
[7] *Principia Philosophiae*, IV, 190.
[8] *Short Treatise*, II, 5, § 1. Cf. above, p. 279.
[9] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 6. Cf. above, pp. 279–280.

of pleasure. In fact, Aristotle's classification of φιλία, friendship, which may also mean love, into that of utility, that of pleasure, and that of virtue,[1] reflects a classification similar to his own classification of pleasure quoted above, and thus his friendship of virtue refers both to moral and to intellectual virtue, with the implication that there is a friendship as well as a love which may be called intellectual. Leo Hebraeus, in a classification of love which seems to be an elaboration of Aristotle's classification of friendship, describes that which Aristotle would call friendship of virtue as love based upon both moral and intellectual virtue (*virtù morali e intellettuali*) and as proceeding from right reason (*retta ragione*).[2] Similarly Jehiel of Pisa, who was a younger contemporary of Leo Hebraeus, classifies love,[3] in direct imitation of Aristotle's classification of friendship, into love of pleasure,[4] love of utility,[5] and true love,[6] by the last of which he evidently means what Aristotle calls friendship of virtue, describing it, partly as Leo Hebraeus, in terms of intellectual virtue, to wit, a love "which is caused by and is associated with the principles of spiritual ideas of the mind" and "is dependent upon the eternal things which proceed from the transparency of the knowledge of the true intellectual concepts."[7] A model classification of love in which intellectual love is included is given by Thomas Aquinas. He distinguishes be-

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 3. In Hillel of Verona's Hebrew version of this classification of friendship, the term φιλία is rendered by "love" (אהבה). Cf. Miscellany in the printed edition of *Tagmule ha-Nefesh*, p. 42b. Similarly in the Hebrew translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the term used is "love." Cf. *Sefer ha-Middot le-Aristoteles*, VIII, 3. In the Latin translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with Averroes' Middle Commentary, the terms "love" (*dilectio*) and "friendship" (*amicitia*) are used indiscriminately. Cf. *Aristotelis Omnia Quae Extant Opera* . . . (Venetiis, apud Iuntas), Vol. III (1574), fols. 112 ff. Cf. above, p. 246, n. 6.

[2] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, II, pp. 66–67 (Bari, 1929).

[3] האהבה.

[4] אהבת הערב.

[5] אהבת המועיל.

[6] האהבה האמתית.

[7] *Minḥat Ḳena'ot*, p. 1. Cf. N. Sokolow, *Baruch Spinoza u-Zemano*, p. 49, n. 28.

tween (*a*) natural love (*amor naturalis*) which exists even in inanimate objects, (*b*) sensitive or animal love (*amor sensitivus, animalis*), and (*c*) intellectual, rational, or spiritual love (*amor intellectivus, intellectualis, rationalis, spiritualis*).[1] It is this classification of Thomas Aquinas which seems to be the origin of Leo Hebraeus' threefold classification of love into natural, sensitive, and rational and voluntary (*naturale, sensitivo, et rationale volontario*).[2] The last kind of love is also called by him mental love (*l'amore mentale*),[3] or, as in Thomas Aquinas, intellectual love (*l'amore intellettivo, intellettuale*).[4] Thus the expression "intellectual love" has been generally used as a description of that kind of love which could not properly be described as sensitive or animal love. Inasmuch as the love for God which has been recommended in every religious book since the Bible as the highest goal in the religious life of man could not be taken in the sense of sensitive or animal love, it naturally had to be understood in the sense of intellectual love.

We return now to Spinoza. The highest pleasure, according to him, consists in that acquiescence of the mind which he has shown previously in Proposition XXVII to arise in the third kind of knowledge. Drawing therefore upon Aristotle's statement that we take delight (ἀγάπησις, *dilectio*) in every form of knowledge, Spinoza says here with special reference to the third kind of knowledge that "we delight (*delectamur*) in whatever we understand by the third kind of

[1] *Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Quaest. 26, Art. 1; Quaest. 27, Art. 2; Secunda Secundae, Quaest. 26, Art. 3. For other references, see L. Schutz, *Thomas-Lexikon* (1895), under "Amor" a) 4.

A somewhat similar classification of love is to be found in Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 27–28.

[2] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, II, p. 67 (Bari, 1929).

[3] *Ibid.*, I, p. 45 (Bari, 1929).

[4] *Ibid.*, III, p. 373 and p. 378 (Bari, 1929). Cf. B. Zimmels, *Leo Hebraus*, p. 76, note.

knowledge" (Prop. XXXII). But this delight "is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause" (*ibid.*). It may therefore be called love, for by definition "love is pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause." [1] As the object of the love is God, it is called the love of God. Furthermore, as the love of God is not an animal love or a sensitive love, it is to be called, according to the conventional phraseology of the time, the intellectual love of God (*amor Dei intellectualis*) (*ibid.*, Corol.). This is the origin and history and meaning of this phrase. It is useless to speculate from whom Spinoza took it; it was as common a property of philosophy as the term "substance." He could have taken it from various sources, and had he had no sources to guide him he could have coined it himself to describe what was generally meant by the love of God.

That by the expression "intellectual love of God" Spinoza means nothing but a love which cannot be called animal love or sensitive love may be further inferred from his kindred expression "intellectual knowledge of God" (*intellectualis Dei cognitio*) [2] which is hardly ever referred to. By the "intellectual knowledge of God" he means, as he himself explains, a knowledge which is not based upon imagination, still less upon the external senses. It is the accurate [3] and true [4] knowledge attained only by philosophers of the absolute essence of God [5] or of any attribute of God which expresses His absolute essence,[6] in contrast to the knowledge of God's divine justice and charity,[7] that is, the knowledge of His relation to created things,[8] or in contrast to the knowl-

[1] *Ethics*, III, *Affectuum Definitiones*, 6.

[2] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 13 (*Opera*, III, p. 168, l. 28, and p. 171, l. 25).

[3] *Ibid.* (p. 168, l. 28).

[4] *Ibid.* (p. 172, l. 25).

[5] *Ibid.* (p. 169, l. 8).

[6] *Ibid.* (p. 169, ll. 22–23).

[7] *Ibid.* (p. 168, l. 32).

[8] *Ibid.*, (p. 169, l. 9).

edge of God's "deeds and promises, that is, the knowledge of His power, as manifested in visible things," [1] which was attained by the prophets, who were "gifted with extraordinary powers of imagination, but not of understanding (*intelligendi*)." [2]

The intellectual love of God, Spinoza proceeds to say, is eternal (Prop. XXXIII). It is eternal in two of the senses which the term "eternity," as we have shown before, had in the history of philosophy.[3] In the first place, it "has no beginning" (*ibid.*, Schol.), and, for that matter, no end, for it is not born with the body, nor does it end with the body. In the second place, during its beginningless and endless existence it is in a uniform state of being within which there is no change or motion or transition from the less perfect to the more perfect. The delight which is inseparably associated with the intellectual love of God and the third kind of knowledge, out of which both the delight and the love arise,[4] are likewise in the same permanent state of being without undergoing any change or transition, for "the mind has eternally possessed these same perfections which we imagined as now accruing to it" (*ibid.*, Schol.).

But here Spinoza becomes conscious of a difficulty. Pleasure has always been understood, as he himself has defined it, to consist in the transition to a greater perfection.[5] So also Crescas, re-echoing a common opinion, maintains that "the delight we take in comprehension is to be experienced only in the act of causing it to pass from potentiality to actuality," and he proves it by the fact that "we experience no pleasure in the possession of the primary notions." [6] How then can

[1] *Ibid.* (p. 169, ll. 23–24).
[2] *Ibid.* (p. 167, l. 7).
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 358 ff.
[4] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 32, and Demonst. and Corol.
[5] *Ibid.*, III, Prop. 11, Schol.
[6] *Or Adonai*, I, iii, 5 (p. 27a).

any pleasure be associated with the intellectual love of God, which love is immutable and arises in the third kind of knowledge which is perfection itself and in which there is not any transition?

The answer given by Crescas and others in connection with a similar question is that there is a certain kind of pleasure which is *sui generis* and consists in the permanency of its state of being, in the constancy of its perfection, and in the freedom from any change and transition. Of this nature, for instance, says Crescas, is the pleasure of God, if pleasure is attributed to Him.[1] Thus also those who conceive immortality to accrue to the acquired intellect by reason of its being in possession of knowledge explain eternal bliss to consist in the pleasure experienced by the immortal souls in their continuous possession of perfect knowledge.[2] This kind of pleasure is also that which Aristotle attributes to God, a pleasure which consists in being forever in a state of actuality and in the actual possession of the object of thought.[3] The same kind of answer is also given here by Spinoza. He has already explained that pleasure which is related to the mind in so far as we act does not consist in a transition to a greater perfection but rather in the mind's contemplation of itself and of its own power of acting.[4] Of the same nature, he now says, is the pleasure associated with the intellectual love of God. It is *sui generis;* and he calls it by the traditional name of Blessedness (*beatitudo*). Unlike ordinary pleasure, there is no transition to a greater perfection in it, for "if pleasure consists in a transition to a greater perfection, blessedness must indeed consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself" (*ibid.*, Schol.).

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, II, vi, 1 (p. 52b).

[3] *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072b, 14 ff.

[4] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 58.

The pre-existence of the mind and its immortality make the short tract of time during which it is encased in a body only an episode in its history. During that episode, indeed, "the mind is subject to emotions which are related to passions" (Prop. XXXIV), but these passive emotions, among which there are all kinds of bodily and sensitive loves, are not of the nature of the mind itself; they appear with the body and disappear with it. Only one kind of love belongs to the mind itself and is co-eternal with the mind, and that is the love which is called intellectual (*ibid.*, Corol.). Sometime even during the lifetime of our body we experience that kind of intellectual love, as when, for instance, by philosophic contemplation we understand things by the third kind of knowledge, and then, rising above all the passive emotions of the body, we attain "the highest possible peace of mind." [1] This is one way in which Spinoza proves that we are conscious of the eternity of our mind. Another way in which he proves it is from the "common opinion of men," whose beliefs in immortality, crude as they are, indicate that "they are conscious of the eternity of their mind," though in their usual manner they confuse the true blessedness of the eternal mind with the temporary emotions arising from imagination and memory which are experienced by us during the lifetime of our body. As a result of this confusion, the common mass of people conceive of immortality as merely a continuation of our present experience. "If we look at the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds, but they confound it with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe remain after death." [2] This view, of course, is condemned by Spinoza as a specimen of the confused thinking

[1] Cf. *Ethics*, V, Prop. 27.
[2] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 34, Schol.

which characterizes the common opinion of men. So did also Maimonides enumerate and condemn the various crude beliefs of the common people as to the nature of the life of the soul in the hereafter, which he explains as being due to the fact that during our lifetime we cannot comprehend the nature of spiritual pleasures, at least not "immediately, but only after a long process of reasoning."[1] Maimonides' conclusion, like that of Spinoza's here, is that the bliss and happiness of the immortal souls consist in the delight they take in the knowledge of the essence of God, and in proof of this he quotes rabbinic passages.

Such a conception of immortality, Spinoza is now anxious to show, is nothing supernatural. It is the logical consequence of his own natural philosophy. Given a God who through His attribute of thought is self-conscious of His infinite perfection and of the fact that He is the cause of himself, such a God must love himself with an infinite intellectual love (Prop. XXXV). Then, given again a mind which is only a part of God's attribute of thought, such a mind will love God, and its love will be "part of the infinite love with which God loves himself" (Prop. XXXVI). In this sense, Spinoza now tries to reverse or at least to qualify his previous position and to maintain that in a certain sense God can be said to love men. While "properly speaking," as he has said before, "God loves no one,"[2] that is to say, if you mean by love a passive affection, still, he says now, "in so far as He loves himself, He loves men" (*ibid.*, Corol.). Indeed, some mediaevals have said the same thing, for Crescas, in an attempt to show that God's love for men is the greatest love possible, maintains that the object of that love is God's own esssence and that He loves men through His

[1] Introduction to *Perek Ḥelek* (ed. J. Holzer), p. 12.

[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 17, Corol.

love of His own essence.[1] But still, Spinoza would argue, the love which the mediaevals attribute to God, though explained by them as part of God's own love for himself, is after all a love which is affected by man's attitude towards God, and it gives rise to revelation and retribution.

Thus Spinoza has arrived at the conclusion that the state of immortality, by whatever name it is called, salvation (*salus*, σωτηρία), blessedness (*beatitudo*, μακαρισμός), liberty (*libertas*, ἐλευθερία),[2] or regeneration (*Wedergeboorte*, παλιγγενεσία),[3] consists in the reciprocal love of God and man. This, Spinoza was quite aware, was nothing new; theologians before him had said it. But, as we have pointed out before, it was not Spinoza's intention to lead men to a new way of salvation. To show that he was merely reaffirming an old traditional belief, Spinoza adds that "this love or blessedness is called Glory in the sacred writings, and not without reason."[4]

Now, to what particular passage in the Bible does Spinoza have reference here when he says that "glory" means this blessedness or love or union or peace of mind?

The verse "the whole earth is full of His glory" (Isaiah 6, 3) is generally taken to be the reference.[5] But there is

[1] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 54b). [2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 36, Schol.

[3] *Short Treatise*, II, 22, § 7. These four terms, three in Latin and one in Dutch, are traceable to the New Testament, from which I have taken the Greek equivalents reproduced in the text. The Latin terms agree with those used in the Vulgate. Cf. Luke 19, 9; Romans 4, 6; James 1, 25; Matthew 19, 28. It is interesting to note that Maimonides, too, gives a list of terms by which the state of immortality is designated in The Old Testament: "This future blessedness is referred to by many names, as, for instance, 'the mountain of the Lord,' 'His holy place,' 'the way of holiness,' 'the courts of the Lord,' 'the graciousness of the Lord,' 'the tabernacle of the Lord,' 'the temple of the Lord,' 'the house of the Lord,' and 'the gate of the Lord.' Among the rabbis this blessedness which is in store for the righteous is referred to metaphorically as a 'feast'; but more frequently they refer to it as 'the world to come'" (*Mishneh Torah*, *Teshubah*, VIII, 4).

[4] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 36, Schol.

[5] Baensch's note *ad loc.* in his German translation of the *Ethics*; Gebhardt, "Spinoza und der Platonism," in *Chronicon Spinozanum*, I (1921), p. 220.

nothing in the context of that verse to make it more applicable to Spinoza's particular purpose here than any of the other one hundred and ninety-odd passages in the Old Testament in which the word *kabod*[1] occurs, or the one hundred and fifty-odd passages in the New Testament in which the word δόξα occurs. Furthermore, an alleged source of Spinoza's statement here has been identified in Leo Hebraeus' *Dialoghi d'Amore*, I, where the author is supposed to describe the "atto coppulativo de l'intima cognizione divina" by the Biblical expression "eterna gloria."[2] This is wrong. Leo Hebraeus does not describe the union with God by any such Biblical expression as "eterna gloria." Quite the contrary, what Leo Hebraeus says is that Scripture, speaking of the final end, "says: 'But cleave unto the Lord your God' [Joshua 23, 8], and in another place, promising the final happiness, it only says: 'and unto Him shall ye cleave' [Deut. 13, 5], without promising any other thing, such as life, eternal glory, highest pleasure, infinite joy and light, and other similar things."[3]

Now, in order to identify the exact Biblical passage which Spinoza had in mind, it is not sufficient to pick out in the Bible the first Hebrew word for "glory" that happens to strike our eye. We must look for a passage in which glory is associated with love and joy and eternal bliss, and if there is no such passage, we must find a passage which might have been taken by Spinoza to suggest such an association. The most likely passage that might have carried to Spinoza such a suggestion is to be found in Psalms 16, 8–11:

[1] כבוד. [2] Gebhardt, *loc. cit.*

[3] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, I, p. 46 (Bari, 1929): "E per questo la sacra scrittura . . . dice, per ultimo fine: *Pertanto con esso Dio vi coppulate;* e in un' altra parte, promettendo l'ultima felicitá, solamente dice: *Et con esso Dio vi coppularete;* senza promettere nissuna altra cosa, come vita, eterna gloria, somma dilettazione, allegrezza e luce infinita, e altre simili."

"8. I have set the Lord always before me;
Surely He is at my right hand, I shall not be moved.
"9. Therefore my heart is glad, and my *glory* rejoiceth;
My flesh also dwelleth in safety;
"10. For Thou wilt not abandon my soul to the netherworld;
Neither wilt Thou suffer Thy godly one to see the pit.
"11. Thou makest me know the path of life;
In Thy presence is fulness of joy,
In Thy right hand bliss for evermore." [1]

The context of this passage is quite appropriate for our purpose. It speaks of the fulness of joy and the eternal bliss in the presence of God, and may therefore be taken to refer to immortality. Furthermore, in connection with these it mentions the term "glory."

Still we feel that this is not quite sufficient for our purpose. What we need is a passage where the term "glory" itself means, or could have been taken by Spinoza to mean, love or blessedness, which, as he says, "may be properly called acquiescence of spirit." Let us then consult the Hebrew commentators to see if they have interpreted these verses for Spinoza so as to enable him to find in the term "glory" love and blessedness and acquiescence of spirit. It happens that Abraham Ibn Ezra in his commentary gives us the answer to this question. Says he in interpretation of these verses:

"8. *I have set the Lord always before me.* The counsel and instruction [referred to previously in verse 7] have caused him to set the Lord before him day and night, with the result that his rational soul has become united with its Creator even before its separation from the body, and since *I have set the Lord . . . before me . . . at my right hand, I shall not be*

[1] Jewish Publication Society version.

moved — that is to say, he will not go astray from the path of righteousness.

"9. *Therefore my heart is glad. Heart* means the common sense (*sensus communis*).[1]

"*My glory rejoiceth. Glory* means the rational soul.[2]

"*My flesh also. Flesh* means the body.

"The meaning of the entire verse is as follows: Inasmuch as he is united with the Supernal Power, his soul [3] rejoiceth. Similarly his union with the Supernal Power will guard him against sicknesses in the change of seasons. Consequently his body also dwelleth in safety in the present world.

"10. *For.* He now states the reason for his rational soul's [glory's] rejoicing: it is because it will not perish and come to nought.

"11. *Thou makest me know, etc.* The meaning of the entire verse is as follows: When the body dies, then *Thou makest me know the path of life*, that is to say, the path whereby I ascend to heaven to be there with the celestial angels.

"*Thou makest me know.* That is to say, it is then that Thou dost wean away the soul from the affairs of the world, and it sees the truth eye to eye.

[1] The Hebrew term used here is שכל הדעת, literally, *knowing intelligence*. But I take it to have been used here by Ibn Ezra in the technical sense of *sensus communis*, and this is my reason. In his commentary on Ecclesiastes 7, 3, after enumerating the three souls in man, Ibn Ezra says: "And God has implanted in man an intelligence (שכל), called heart (לב), which is to bring to fulfilment the purpose of each soul in its time." From his description of *intelligence* in this passage it is clear that he means by it the *sensus communis*. The reason why Ibn Ezra calls the *sensus communis* "heart" may be explained by the fact that according to Aristotle the heart is the seat of the *sensus communis* (cf. *De Juventute*, 3, 469a, 11–12).

[2] נשמה. By this Hebrew term Ibn Ezra designates the rational soul in his commentary on Ecclesiastes 7, 3, and elsewhere. Cf. also *Emunot we-De'ot*, VI, 3; *Hegyon ha-Nefesh*, II, p. 11a; *Emunah Ramah*, I, 6 (p. 33). Maimonides, however, uses this term to include the lower faculties of the soul (cf. above, p. 291, n. 1).

[3] נפשו, which is used here as a general term for soul.

"*In Thy presence is fulness of joy.* That is to say, he will partake in the enjoyment of the splendor of the divine Shekinah.

"*In Thy right hand bliss.* That is to say, the soul will enjoy itself in God.

"*In Thy right hand bliss.* That is to say, as if the Lord will be distributing with His right hand blissful gifts to those who love Him.

"*For evermore.* That is to say, His gifts will never stop.

"Thus the reward of the righteous is fully described in this Psalm."

Ibn Ezra's interpretation makes it quite clear that the expression "my glory rejoiceth" means that the soul rejoices in its eternal union with God which takes place during the lifetime of the body and continues forever after the death of the body. Similar interpretations of the term "glory" occur also in other Hebrew works. Thus in Ibn Yaḥya's commentary on the Psalms the terms "my heart," "my glory," and "my flesh" in this verse are taken to refer respectively to the rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls. According to Abraham Shalom these three terms refer respectively to the appetitive, the rational, and the sensitive faculties of the soul.[1]

Another Scriptural verse, again according to Ibn Ezra's commentary, similarly uses the term "glory" in the sense of immortality and blessedness. The verse is Psalms 73, 24. Ibn Ezra suggests two possible interpretations of the verse, the second of which is followed by the English Authorized Version, which, incidentally, explains its departure from the rendering of the Vulgate. It reads as follows: "Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory." In commenting upon this verse, Ibn Ezra says:

[1] *Neweh Shalom*, VIII, 5 (p. 132a).

"The word 'receive' (literally: 'take'), when it does not refer to death by plague,[1] refers to the union of the soul of the righteous with the supernal beings who are incorporeal and immortal. Thus the verse concerning Enoch, which reads: 'And Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him' (Genesis 5, 24), means that he had accustomed himself to walk with the angels, with the result that God took him (i.e., transformed him into an angel)." The verse under consideration is thus interpreted by him as follows: "And afterward Thou shalt take me and I shall be 'glory' like one of the angels."

One more question, however, still remains in connection with this statement of Spinoza. After having said that "this love or blessedness is called Glory in the sacred writings," he continues to say that "whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may properly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Defs. XXV and XXX of the Emotions) is, in truth, not distinguished from glory." What he wants to say is quite clear. He wants to say that whether we take "love" in the sense of God's love for men or whether we take it in the sense of men's love for God, that love, which is an acquiescence of spirit, is not distinguished from "glory," by which name it is called in the sacred writings. But why should Spinoza want to say this? It would seem that unless there was some doubt as to which of these two kinds of love the term "glory" in the Biblical passage in question applied to, there was no need for this statement of his.

But this, too, it seems to me, can be explained by a discussion which occurs in the philosophic and Cabalistic Hebrew literature as to the meaning of the term "glory," es-

[1] Literally: "taking away without a plague." לקיחה בלא דבר. Ibn Ezra alludes here to Ezekiel 24, 16: "I take away from thee the desire of thine eyes with a stroke." Cf. Ibn Ezra on Genesis 5, 24.

pecially in the expression "the glory of the Lord" (Exodus 24, 16). According to some, "glory" refers to the essence of God, and it is thus used as a surrogate to God. According to others, it refers to something emanated from God's essence. I have elsewhere traced the history of this discussion from Philo to Crescas.[1] With the possibility of these two meanings of the term "glory" before him, Spinoza could readily see that the expression "my glory rejoiceth" in Psalms 16, 9, which Ibn Ezra and others interpreted as "my soul rejoiceth," might also mean "my God rejoiceth." Drawing then upon these two possible explanations of "glory," Spinoza says here that "whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may properly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Defs. XXV and XXX of the Emotions) is, in truth, not distinguished from glory," for the Biblical expression "my glory rejoiceth" may mean either "my God rejoiceth" or "my mind rejoiceth."

On the whole, then, Spinoza's conception of immortality is that which was commonly held by mediaeval philosophers. It is a union with God which in the *Ethics* he calls the love of God. But still the mediaeval philosophers, who insist upon the traditional beliefs of reward and punishment and who consequently look upon this union as a sort of reward, consider it also possible for the soul to be punished by its not becoming united with God, so that in course of time it would be utterly destroyed and come to nought. Thus Crescas, representing this view, says: "The soul of the transgressor, the disobedient, after its departure from the body, suffers keen anguish in that it remains in darkness contrary to its nature. Traditional utterances have compared it to the agony of being burned and have named it hell-fire." To the question how such punishment can be explained by

[1] Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 459–462.

reason, Crescas makes the following answer: "Inasmuch as the soul is a spiritual substance, it is quite evident that it attains the highest possible joy and pleasure when it becomes united with something spiritual for which by its very nature it has had a longing. . . . But, on the other hand, when it does not attain that for which by its very nature it has had a longing, it suffers thereby such keen anguish that in course of time there may result to it therefrom utter destruction." [1] It is against this view that Spinoza comes out now. He aligns himself with those who since Plato have held that the soul, or at least part of it, is by its very nature eternal and hence indestructible. "This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind, in so far as it is considered, through the nature of God, as an eternal truth" (Prop. XXXVII, Demonst.), and consequently, "there is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can destroy it" (Prop. XXXVII).

Still, though all souls are immortal and all of them are united with God, there exist certain differences between the individual souls which remain after death. They do not all merge in one universal soul. Immortality is in a certain sense personal and individual. In the Middle Ages, among those who conceived immortality as a union with God, the individual differences of the immortal souls were explained as resulting from the differences in the nature and degree of the intellectual attainments of the individual persons during their lifetime. Says Gersonides: "The cause of this difference is to be found in the difference between men in the acquisition of conceptions both qualitatively and quantitatively. When a person has acquired many conceptions of a certain science, the unity which these conceptions form in his acquired intellect after death will differ from the unity

[1] *Or Adonai*, III, iii, 1 (p. 73a).

formed in the acquired intellect of another person who has acquired fewer conceptions of the same science. Similarly, in the case of him who has acquired conceptions of a certain science which differs from the science of which another person has acquired conceptions, his acquired intellect will thereby be different from the acquired intellect of the other person. In this way there is a vast variety of differences between the various degrees of those who have attained blessedness." [1] In Crescas, this view is summed up in the following words: "Some of them believe that this blessedness will be greater the greater the numbers of things conceived by the mind, be they corporeal or incorporeal things . . . others believe that only that which the human intellect conceives in a true manner of the existence of God and His angels will remain immortal." [2] Re-echoing these statements, Spinoza says that "the essence of the mind consists of knowledge . . .; therefore, the more things the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater is that part of it which remains" (Prop. XXXVIII, Demonst.).

These individual differences which exist between the disembodied souls after death exist between them also while they are in bodies during the lifetime of men. As Spinoza has already said before, we get a foretaste of the bliss of immortality even during our lifetime in the peace of mind which comes to us from the third kind of knowledge, and in part also from the second kind, which leads to the third. This peace of mind renders us impassive to evil emotions and frees us from the fear of death. This foretaste of immortality, too, differs in different individuals in accordance with their intellectual attainments, for "the more objects the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowl-

[1] *Milḥamot Adonai*, I, 13 (p. 90).
[2] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 52b).

edge, the less it suffers from those emotions which are evil, and the less it fears death" (Prop. XXXVIII).

So far Spinoza has been speaking of knowledge as the only condition of immortality. He now revives the old question, common to the speculative theology of all religions, as to how much action counts among the factors which make for immortality. In Jewish philosophy the problem assumes the form of an investigation as to the relative importance of right opinions about the nature of God and the world and right conduct in matters pertaining to the observance of the Law. Maimonides deals with the question after the manner of Aristotle's treatment of the relation between moral and intellectual virtues, and like Aristotle he makes the moral virtues subordinate to the intellectual. "The general object of the Law," he says, "is twofold: the well-being of the soul and the well-being of the body. Of these two objects, the one, the well-being of the soul . . . comes absolutely first in rank. . . . For it has already been found that man has a double perfection: the first perfection is that of the body, and the second perfection is that of the soul. The first consists in his being healthy and in the best possible bodily condition. . . . The second perfection of man consists in his becoming an actually intelligent being; i.e., he knows about things in existence all that a person most perfectly developed is capable of knowing. It is evident that this second perfection does not include any actions and moral virtues, but only intellectual conceptions, which are arrived at by speculation and are the result of reasoning. It is also evident that the second and superior kind of perfection can only be attained when the first perfection has been acquired. . . . But when a person is in possession of the first perfection, then he may possibly acquire the second perfection, which is undoubtedly of a superior kind, and is alone the source of

eternal life." [1] Crescas, rightly or wrongly, finds this view "destructive of the principles of both Scripture and tradition," for "it is one of the principles of Scripture and tradition," he says, "that it is by the performance of the commands of the Law that man attains life everlasting." [2] Leo Hebraeus re-echoes the opinion of Aristotle and Maimonides when he says that "moral virtue is the necessary road to happiness, but the appropriate subject of it is wisdom, which, however, cannot be attained without moral virtue." [3]

Spinoza strips the problem of its theological aspect and treats it simply as a question of whether the perfection of the body contributes anything to the perfection and hence the eternity of the mind. His answer, like that which would have been given by Aristotle or Maimonides, is in the affirmative. "He who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal" (Prop. XXXIX). Not only does such a body contribute to the eternity of our mind that remains after death, but it also helps our mind to experience during our lifetime that peace and satisfaction which frees us from the fear of death and renders us unaffected by those emotions which are related to memory or imagination (*ibid.*, Schol.). This potential fitness of the body for many things becomes an actual perfection by acts that the body performs, for, as he could have quoted from what Aristotle says of virtues, "we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit." [4] But there is a reciprocal relation, adds Spinoza, between perfection and the activity which forms habit. "The more perfection a thing

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27.

[2] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1 (p. 52b).

[3] *Dialoghi d'Amore*, I, p. 36 (Bari, 1929): "Le virtú morali son vie necessarie per la felicitá; ma il proprio suggetto di quelle è la sapienzia, la quale non saria possibile averla senza le virtú morali."

[4] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1, 1103a, 25–26.

possesses, the more it acts and the less it suffers, and conversely the more it acts the more perfect it is" (Prop. XL). From this it follows that that part of our mind through which alone we are said to act is the most perfect part in us (*ibid.*, Corol.), and that part is the intellect as distinguished from the imagination and the other functions of the mind. Consequently, while action may lead to the perfection of the intellect, it is in the activity of the intellect, as said Aristotle and Maimonides, that the highest happiness is to be found.[1]

We have thus seen that Spinoza's conception of the immortality of the soul, in its main outline, does not go beyond that of any rationalist theology, and like that of any rationalist theology it may be regarded with respect to other conceptions of the hereafter as either an affirmation of immortality or a denial of it. In so far as it denies that the soul continues to exist after death in its entirety and as an individual entity, it is a denial of immortality; in so far, however, as it denies the utter destructibility of the soul, it is an affirmation of immortality. Now whenever we meet with such a bifarious doctrine in the work of any author, we must find out what the opposite doctrine was against which the author in question aimed his own doctrine in order to be able to determine which of its two possible aspects he meant to emphasize. In the case of Maimonides, for instance, we know definitely against what kind of opposition his own doctrine of immortality was aimed. It was aimed against all the crude forms of commonly held popular beliefs about the hereafter which he enumerates, describes, and criticizes.[2] So emphatic was he in his rejection of all such popular beliefs that he was accused of denying the traditional doctrine of resurrection, against which accusation he felt called upon

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, X, 7.

[2] Cf. Introduction to *Pereḳ Ḥeleḳ*. Cf. above, p. 310.

to defend himself.[1] But in the case of Spinoza it is not clear what particular view of the hereafter he meant to counteract by his own theory of immortality. There can be no denying the fact that in some respect he aimed it against popular conceptions of eschatology.[2] But this, I believe, was only incidental to the main object of his theory of immortality. Its main object was to affirm the immortality of the soul against those of his own time who denied it. The principal target of the implied criticism of his statements, as I shall try to show, was Uriel Acosta, whose arguments against immortality have come down to us in the *Tratado da Immortalidade da Alma* (Amsterdam, 1623) of his opponent Samuel da Silva.[3] We shall thus find Spinoza in the unblemished company of Samuel da Silva and Manasseh ben Israel [4] battling on the side of tradition in defence of immortality against the heretical onslaughts of Uriel Acosta.

In his arguments against immortality Acosta identifies the human soul with the vital spirit situated in the blood, and maintains that the only difference between the human soul and the animal soul is that the former is endowed with reason.[5] This soul, he further maintains, is inseparable from the body,[6] and it dies with the body, for "it cannot be proven from the Law that the human soul is immortal." [7]

Spinoza's recorded utterances on the subject of the immortality of the soul will be found upon examination to have

[1] Cf. *Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim*, in *Ḳobeẓ Teshubot ha-Rambam we-Iggerotaw* (Leipzig, 1859).

[2] Cf. above, p. 309.

[3] Reprinted with German translation in Carl Gebhardt, *Die Schriften des Uriel da Costa* (1922), pp. 35–101. References to Acosta given below are to this work.

[4] *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* (Amsterdam, 1636). Sections of this work which contain answers to Acosta are reproduced with German translation in Carl Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–195. But also his Hebrew work *Nishmat Ḥayyim* (Amsterdam, 1651), which is a defence of immortality, contains in its Introduction an allusion to Acosta.

[5] Pp. 35 and 65.

[6] P. 36, ll. 19 ff.; p. 66, ll. 26 ff.

[7] P. 37, ll. 10–11; p. 67, ll. 22–23.

literary relationship to those of Acosta. In his youth he shocked the Jewish community in Amsterdam by declaring: "With regard to the soul, wherever Scripture speaks of it the word soul is used simply to express life, or anything that is living. It would be useless to search for any passage in support of its immortality." [1] This, as can be readily recognized, is nothing but an echo of what Acosta has said. He similarly re-echoes Acosta when he declares in the *Ethics* that the soul is inseparable from the body, or, as he expresses himself in positive terms, "the human mind is united to the body." [2] But then he seems to turn against Acosta. Whereas Acosta denies the immortality of the soul in any sense whatsoever, maintaining that man "is not the image of God in immortality, for this is a property of God and not of man," [3] Spinoza argues that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal," [4] and, furthermore, that that something which remains is eternal because, again in opposition to Acosta, "the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God," [5] or that it "follows from the divine nature." [6] The direct opposition to Acosta is still further evident in the following statements: Acosta declares that the soul has no immortality whatsoever, even in the sense of another kind of life which is "blessed (*bem aventurada*), eternal, and reposeful (*descansada*)," [7] and, furthermore, that "it cannot be proven from the Law . . . that another life, pain, or glory (*gloria*) is reserved for it." [8] Spinoza, in opposition to this, identifies immortality with "salvation, or blessed-

[1] Lucas, *La Vie de feu Monsieur de Spinoza* in A. Wolf, *The Oldest Biography of Spinoza*, pp. 46 and 98.

[2] *Ethics*, II, Prop. 13, Schol. Cf. above, p. 55.

[3] P. 44, ll. 14–15; p. 76, ll. 12–14.

[4] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 23.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, Prop. 11, Corol.; V, Prop. 40, Schol.

[6] *Ibid.*, V, Prop. 36, Schol.

[7] P. 40, ll. 32–33; p. 72, ll. 6–9.

[8] P. 37, ll. 10–12; p. 67, ll. 22–24.

ness (*beatitudo*), or liberty," which "may properly be called repose (*acquiescentia*) of spirit" [1] and may be regarded as consisting "in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men," which "love or blessedness is called glory (*gloria*) in the sacred writings." [2] That Spinoza's statements are directed against Acosta is quite evident from his enumeration of those conditions of the eternal life which Acosta explicitly denies, namely, that it is "blessed" and "reposeful" and is called "glory," and, furthermore, that "glory" as a description of eternal life is to be found in the "sacred writings" or, as Acosta would say, in the "Law." [3]

IV. The Religion of Reason

Historically the problems of the love of God, of immortality, and of revelation are interwoven. They are especially so in Crescas. The love of God is that which leads to immortality, and it is through His love for men that God has caused His Law to be revealed to them, the purpose of which Law is to guide men in the attainment of the love for God. The three problems are dealt with by him in the same group of chapters.[4] We have seen how in this part of the *Ethics* Spinoza likewise proceeds from the discussion of the love of God to that of immortality. In the *Short Treatise* (II, 24) he similarly combines the love of man for God with immortality, and then, as if he meant directly to contradict Crescas,

[1] Spinoza's indiscriminate use of *mens* (*Ethics*, V, Prop. 27) and *animus* (here) with *acquiescentia* reflects Acosta's use of *alma* and *espirito* with *descansada*.

[2] *Ethics*, V, Prop. 36, Schol.

[3] Acosta's use of the term "Law" in his statement, "It cannot be proven from the Law that the human soul is immortal," refers to the rabbinic contention that there is evidence for resurrection in the "Law (*Torah*)," as, for instance, in such expressions as "He who says that the resurrection of the dead is not intimated in the Law" (*Mishnah*, *Sanhedrin*, X, 1) and "Whence is it proven that the resurrection of the dead is intimated in the Law?" (*Sanhedrin* 90b.)

[4] *Or Adonai*, II, vi, 1–5.

he concludes from his own denial of God's love for man "that God gives no laws to men so as to reward them when they fulfil them and to punish them when they transgress them." [1] But instead of divine laws which are revealed through prophets he discusses there his own conception of divine laws which are stamped by God on nature. It is in accordance with these literary models of Crescas and with his own treatment of the subject in the *Short Treatise* that at the conclusion of his discussion of love and immortality he proceeds to explain in the last two propositions of the *Ethics* his own conception of divine law as contrasted with that of revealed religion.

Now, revealed religion is always of two types, that of the multitude and that of philosophers. Spinoza sketches before us in the Scholium to Proposition XLI, rather grotesquely, the salient features of what he describes as the general creed of the multitude (*communis vulgi persuasio*). According to this general creed of the multitude, by which he especially means the creed of the average Jew, the natural impulse of man is to do evil or to follow the inclination of his heart, for, as he could have quoted Scripture, "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually" (Genesis 6, 5), which is interpreted by the rabbis as referring to the evil impulse (*yeẓer ha-ra'*) in man.[2] Spinoza infers from this that "most persons seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is allowed to them to obey their lusts." The purpose of the revealed Law was therefore to curb these natural inclinations of man, and consequently men think "that they give up a portion of their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commands of divine Law." The Law is therefore called by them a "burden

[1] *Short Treatise*, II, 24, § 4.

[2] On the "Evil Impulse" (יצר הרע), see S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 242 ff.; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, pp. 478 ff.

(*onus*)." This is a reference to the Hebrew term "yoke"[1] which is sometimes applied in rabbinic literature to the Law, though not in a derogatory sense.[2] It is because of this conception of the Law as a burden or a yoke, Spinoza continues, that men "hope to be able to lay [it] aside after death." This is again a reference to the rabbinic interpretation of the Biblical expression "free among the dead" (Psalms 88, 6) as meaning that "as soon as a man dies he becomes free of the Law and the commands."[3] Furthermore, concludes Spinoza, the common believer does good in the hope of receiving some reward in the hereafter, and eschews evil for fear of punishment.

The philosophic conception of the divine Law, to which Spinoza makes no allusion here, is, however, different. The Law is not a burden, but rather a joy.[4] The Law is not imposed upon man arbitrarily from above as something which is contrary to his nature, but it is a Law based upon reason, and all its commands, according to Maimonides, can be explained to have a twofold purpose which may be subdivided into three. "It aims *first* at the establishment of good mutual relations among men by removing injustice, and by the acquisition of excellent moral virtues so that [*a*] the orderly life of the people of a country may continue uninterruptedly and [*b*] every individual may acquire his first perfection [i.e., the well-being of the body]. *Secondly*, it seeks to train us in

[1] עול, *Abot*, III, 5. Cf. the term ζυγός (*jugum*) as applied to the ordinances of the Law in Acts 15, 10 and Galatians 5, 1. Spinoza's use here of *onus* instead of *jugum* may be accounted for by the fact that in Matthew 11, 30 *jugum* and *onus* (φορτίον) are used as equivalent terms and, furthermore, that the term *onus* is used as a description of the legal ordinances in Matthew 23, 4 and Luke 11, 46.

[2] On the meaning of the "Yoke of the Law," see S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 70 ff.; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 465; II, pp. 86, 166, 173.

[3] *Shabbat* 30a.

[4] Cf. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, Ch. XI: "The Joy of the Law," pp. 148 ff.

correct beliefs and to impart to us true opinions whereby we may attain the last perfection [i.e., the well-being of the soul]." [1] Furthermore, the hope of reward and the fear of punishment are not to be the motives for obedience of the Law. The classic utterance on this point is: "Be not like servants that serve their master with the view of receiving reward." [2] The love of God, a disinterested love, is to be the motive for the obedience of the Law.

Now, the religion of reason which Spinoza briefly outlines for us here is nothing but a modified form of the philosophic conception of Judaism as described by Maimonides. The chief points of difference between them are two. In the first place, Spinoza eliminates the element of revelation. In the second place, he narrows down the scope of religion to what Maimonides considers to be the first object of the Law, namely, right living, and eliminates from it right thinking, which according to Maimonides is a second object of the Law. In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, aiming his remarks explicitly against Maimonides, he maintains that the purpose of Scripture is to teach only moral virtue, and not philosophic truth.[3] But within its limited sphere of practical wisdom the religion of Spinoza, which here in the *Ethics* is presented as independent of Scripture, contains the two elements which Maimonides finds in the ethical part of the religion of Scripture. These two elements are called by Spinoza strength of mind (*animositas*) and generosity (*generositas*).[4] The former consists of individual virtue, and is defined by Spinoza "as the desire by which each person endeavors from the dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being." [5] The latter consists in social virtue, and is de-

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27. [2] *Abot*, I, 3.

[3] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Chs. 7, 13, 15, *et passim*.

[4] On the meaning of these terms, see above, pp. 218–220.

[5] *Ethics*, III, Prop. 59, Schol.

fined by Spinoza as "the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavors to help other people and to join them to him in friendship." [1] The two of them correspond on the whole to the two aspects of the perfection of the body mentioned by Maimonides, namely, individual well-being and social well-being, and also to the two ways mentioned, again, by Maimonides, of preserving the social well-being, namely, the highly moral character of each individual and the maintenance of good relations between the different individuals.[2] Such a religion of personal and social virtue and of everything which is related to "strength of mind and generosity," says Spinoza, is a religion of reason and is not the work of revelation. Furthermore, such a religion of reason and virtue would be regarded by us as of primary importance even if we did not know that our mind is eternal (Prop. XLI), for the eternity of our mind and the blessedness that goes with it is not a reward of virtue, but is virtue itself (Prop. XLII). Nor is the practice of virtue to be considered as an exercise of our freedom of will in restraining our lusts (*libidines*), for there is no freedom of the will, and our lusts can be conquered only, as has been said above,[3] by the force of some other emotion which is greater and more powerful. But our lusts as well as all our other emotions will be subdued and will disappear of themselves once we experience the joy of the virtuous life, and this because the joy of the virtuous life constitutes one of the greatest of all emotions (*ibid.*).

With this the *Ethics* ends. But the philosophy of Spinoza does not end here. The religion of reason based upon individual and social virtue to which almost the entire *Ethics* is a sort of philosophic preamble would have been an effective

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, III, 27.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 230 ff., 272–273.

instrument of education only for a new-born race of men placed under the tutelage of philosophers like Spinoza. But the world in which Spinoza wanted to make the practical lesson of his philosophy effective was an old world in which rooted institutions and beliefs held sway and truths were embodied in writings which were regarded as sacred. Made of sterner stuff and living a few centuries later, Spinoza would have perhaps demanded the overthrow of the old order with its effete institutions so as to build upon its ruins a new society of a new generation raised on his new philosophy. He would then perhaps have become one of the first apostles of rebellion. But being what he was and living at a time when belief in the potency of reformation had not yet been shaken by doubt, he chose to follow in the footsteps of rationalizers throughout history. The story of his rationalization is the story of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, but that is another book and another story.

CHAPTER XXI

WHAT IS NEW IN SPINOZA?

NOVELTY in philosophy is often a matter of daring rather than of invention. In thought, as in nature, there is no creation from absolute nothing, nor are there any leaps. Often what appears to be new and original is nothing but the establishment of a long-envisaged truth by the intrepidity of some one who dared to face the consequences of his reasoning. Now the long-envisaged truth which was established by the intrepidity and daring of Spinoza was the principle of the unity of nature, which in its double aspect meant the homogeneity of the material of which it is constituted and the uniformity of the laws by which it is dominated. But his predecessors, who formulated that principle and openly avowed it or rhapsodized about it, as a rule failed to adhere to it. To all of them there was a break somewhere in that unity. Man was believed by them to be, as Spinoza aptly puts it, an empire within an empire,[1] and God, as he could have put it quite as aptly, a super-empire. The difficulty of maintaining this logical anomaly of asserting the uniformity of the laws of nature, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, asserting the autonomy of man within nature and the suzerainty of God over nature was keenly felt by them, but all they did toward overcoming this difficulty was to try to patch it up somehow, never daring to cross the boundaries set up by tradition. It was Spinoza who first dared to cross these boundaries, and by the skilful use of weapons accumulated in the arsenals of philosophy itself he succeeded in

[1] *Ethics*, II, Praef. (*Opera*, II, p. 137, ll. 11–12).

bringing both God and man under the universal rule of nature and thus establishing its unity.[1] In attempting, therefore, to sum up what is new in Spinoza, we shall describe his contributions as acts of daring.

The search of the early Greek philosophers for a single element to serve as a substratum of which all the other bodies were modifications may be regarded as the first recorded step in the history of European philosophy toward the establishment of the principle of the homogeneity of the constituent materials of nature. The next step may be found in the introduction of an underlying formless and potential matter which, with the adoption of four simple elements, came to be considered the ultimate substratum of these four simple elements as well as of all the bodies which were composed of them. From that time on and to the very time of Spinoza, matter was looked upon as the principle which formed the homogeneity of nature. Indeed, in certain quarters, a distinction was drawn between the matter of the terrestrial bodies and the matter of the celestial bodies. But that distinction was abolished by Crescas' contention that the same matter, not in the Aristotelian sense of pure potentiality but as something actual, underlies the terrestrial as well as the celestial bodies.[2] In a similar vein Bruno argued for an identical matter throughout the universe, below the moon as well as above the moon.[3] By the time of Descartes, it would seem, this principle of the homogeneity of matter was already fully established, so that he could declare with positiveness and without any argument that "the matter of the heavens and of the earth is one and the same."[4] Still, to all these philosophers the homogeneity of

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 33–34.
[2] Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 103–104, 119, 120, 261, 594–598.
[3] *De Immenso et Innumerabilibus*, IV, 1–2.
[4] *Principia Philosophiae*, II, 22.

matter did not establish the homogeneity of the nature of the entire universe, for material bodies, according to them, constituted only one part of the universe. Besides bodies, their universe contained beings which were without bodies and which had nothing in common with bodies, not having matter as their substratum. To some of them the soul of man was such an independent and immaterial being. To others, who followed Aristotle in considering soul as something inseparable from body, there were immaterial beings outside the body, called angels or Intelligences. To still others, who like Ibn Gabirol denied the immateriality of angels or Intelligences,[1] there was at least one being who was immaterial, and that was God, and while God was spoken of metaphorically as outside and beyond the universe, He was really a part of it in so far as He was considered its ruler and governor, if not also its creator. Thus, however much the principle of materiality was extended to the various parts of the universe, the universe as a whole was still divided into two distinct realms, a material world and an immaterial God.

By declaring that God has the attribute of extension as well as of thought, Spinoza has thus removed the break in the principle of the homogeneity of nature. This is his first act of daring.

So also with the principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature, which, though long recognized as prevailing in the physical universe, Spinoza has extended to include God.

When Aristotle reduced all the changes that come under our observation to four kinds of motion, and further reduced these four kinds of motion to locomotion, and then traced this locomotion to the prime mover which was itself immovable, he established systematically the principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature. Later, with the identification

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 223.

of the God of Scriptural tradition with this prime mover, God became a cognomen of the universal laws of nature and the source of their uniformity. Indeed, God still continued to be spoken of as governor and ruler, and still continued to be described as most powerful, but He was shorn of that arbitrariness which was His characteristic as a primitive deity. He became now a constitutional monarch, whose powers were limited by the laws of His own nature, unable to change the nature and behavior of things which He himself had laid down from eternity. Theologians were vying with each other to declare that God cannot make a square whose diagonal shall be equal to one of its sides, or that He cannot cause one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties.[1] But the constitution by which according to the rationalist theologians God had limited His own power was only partly written and known to us. A great part of it was unwritten and unknown to us, and therefore by certain prerogatives retained by Him God could do many things which according to our way of thinking would seem to be arbitrary and a subversion of what we consider the laws of nature. Thus to them it was conceivable that God could create the world *ex nihilo*, that He could know individual things, that He could have a foreknowledge of what man would do without depriving him of freedom of choice, that He could change His will while remaining immutable, and that He could perform all kinds of miracles. The inconsistencies of these beliefs with the conception of God as a constitutional monarch limited by eternal and immutable laws were generally recognized, widely discussed, and somehow reconciled, but all the attempts at their reconciliation were really nothing more than a declaration that a part of the divine constitution was never communicated to man and that we are ignorant of

[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 75; II, 13. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 312.

the laws by which God operates in the universe. This was the general attitude of all the theologians, even of those who went to the farthest extremes in their rational explanation of religion. It was left for Spinoza to do away with the unwritten and unknown part of the constitutional privileges of God's rule. God to him is law without any loophole and without any escape to ignorance. The laws of nature which are operative in the universe from eternity, he declares, can never be upset by a power above them for a purpose unknown to us.

By denying design and purpose in God Spinoza has thus removed the break in the principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature. This is his second act of daring.

With his denial of the immateriality of God, Spinoza also denies the separability of soul from body in man. For the separability of soul from body, either of soul as a whole or of a certain part of the soul, may be considered a corollary of the immateriality of God. Soul, either in whole or in part, was generally spoken of as of divine origin and as having been joined to the body only for the brief period of its existence. Now, as long as God was assumed to be immaterial and to exist apart from bodies, the soul, or at least that part of it which was held to be of divine origin, could not be considered a part of the body and inseparable from it even during the period of their conjoint existence. It had to be something separable from body, and as separable from it as God was considered to be from the world, thus breaking up the continuity of nature within the physical world itself. But when Spinoza assumed God to be both extension and thought, either one of which was inseparable from the other, and when he further assumed man to be a mode of God, his body being a mode of God's attribute of extension and his soul being a mode of God's attribute of thought, then in man

soul had to be inseparable from body just as in God thought was inseparable from extension.[1]

Spinoza's insistence upon the complete inseparability of soul from body has thus removed another break in the homogeneity of nature. This is his third act of daring.

But what is soul?

In the philosophy against which Spinoza took the field, soul was generally described as consisting of a certain number of functions which it performed and by which its existence was known. These functions were nutrition, growth, sensation, imagination, memory, consciousness, will, and intellect or, rather, understanding. Now, as Spinoza's purpose was to discuss those functions of the soul which are peculiar to man, epitomized by him in the term "human mind," he did not bother about the functions of nutrition and growth, which are also common to plants and animals. Confining himself, then, to the functions of sensation, imagination, memory, consciousness, will, and intellect, he defined mind or the human soul, in departure from most of his predecessors, as one's consciousness of one's own body,[2] and then he reduced sensation, imagination, and memory to the mind's consciousness of its body and intellect to the mind's consciousness of itself,[3] and, following out the reasoning of his predecessors, he identified will with intellect.[4] But at the same time, having always in view his main purpose, namely, the establishment of the principle of the unity of nature, he endeavored to show that consciousness, which we know to exist in man, must also exist in God,[5] and that will as something independent of intellect exists neither in God nor in man.[6] This is how we are to understand the main drift of

[1] Cf. above, p. 52, but see pp. 76 ff.
[2] Cf. above, Chapter XIII.
[3] Cf. above, Chapter XIV.
[4] Cf. above, Chapter XVII.
[5] Cf. above, pp. 166, 169 ff.
[6] Cf. above, Chapters XII and XVII.

Spinoza's discussion of mind in its bearing upon the main thesis of his philosophy.

Now, to define mind as one's consciousness of one's own body, all that Spinoza had to do was to state that one's consciousness of one's own body is prior to one's consciousness of other bodies, and that that consciousness of one's own body, which constitutes the being of mind, is associated with the mind's consciousness of itself. To reduce sensation, imagination, and memory to consciousness of one's own body, again, all he had to do was to explain them physiologically as consequences of such consciousness and as accidental facts in the history of the mind, and not of its essence. Intellect or understanding and all the other functions of thought are similarly explained by him as arising from the mind's consciousness of itself. But consciousness, which is an observed fact in man, must also be assumed to exist in God, for on the principle of the unity of nature God must contain in His essence everything that is found in particular things, and consequently, just as Spinoza was forced to assume extension in God because of the existence of matter in the world of our observation, so was he also forced to assume consciousness in God because of the existence of mind in man. This principle, however, does not demand that everything that is found in God should be found in every particular thing, and consequently Spinoza does not assume that every particular thing within the universe has consciousness, and this despite his repetition of the assertion common among certain philosophers that all things are animate.[1]

To make will identical with intellect, again, all that Spinoza had to do was to eliminate a distinction made by Aristotle and the mediaevals between the practical and the theoretical intellects and between the human and divine

[1] Cf. above, pp. 56 ff.

intellects. The practical intellect, according to Aristotle, acts toward an external end, and because of that it must be conjoined with the appetitive faculty or will in order to produce action, for intellect by itself is only a cognitive faculty and cannot of itself produce action. The theoretical intellect, on the other hand, finds its end in its own activity, and therefore does not involve will. This distinction between practical and theoretical intellect Aristotle finds only in man and not in God, and accordingly, while the uniformity in human actions is ascribed by him to the purposive actions of the will, the uniformity in the motions of the universe as a whole is ascribed by him to the eternal necessity of God's purposeless activity. As against this, the mediaevals, reasoning from the analogy of the Aristotelian explanation of the uniform actions of man, explain the uniform and orderly laws of nature as determined by a divine will, though, unlike the human will, which is distinct from intellect, they identify the divine will with the divine intellect. Now Spinoza reverses the mediaeval reasoning [1] and, proceeding from the Aristotelian explanation of the orderly processes of nature as a whole, explains the orderly and seemingly purposive actions of man as determined by an eternal law of necessity. He calls that law the conatus for self-preservation. In its universality this law applies to every individual thing within the universe, man as well as beast, and in a certain sense also to inanimate objects.[2] Each particular thing within the universe, by the eternal necessity of the nature of the universe as a whole of which it is a part, strives to maintain its existence, which is life in the case of living beings and motion in the case of non-living beings. It is this eternal necessity, and not will and its free exercise, that makes man's actions,

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 424.

[2] Cf. above, pp. 199–201.

and the actions of non-living beings too, assume a tendency toward a certain end as if guided by an intellect and carried out by a will.

Spinoza's insistence upon the elimination of freedom of the will from human actions has thus removed another break in the uniformity of the laws of nature. This is his fourth act of daring.

Genetically, it may be said, the first philosophic conception of nature as an organic whole began with an analogy between the universe and man, the macrocosm and the microcosm, and historically, it may be further said, there is no conception of nature which cannot be presented in the form of such an analogy. Spinoza himself makes an attempt at such an analogy, covertly and indirectly, to be sure, in one place of his *Ethics*,[1] but had he wished it he could have epitomized his entire philosophy by drawing, like Maimonides,[2] a parallel between man and the universe. He would probably have proceeded somewhat as follows: Know that this universe, in its entirety, is nothing but one individual being, like Tom, Dick, or Harry. All the particular things within the universe are like the organs and members of the human body intricately connected with one another to form a united whole. Man is composed of body and mind, and all his modes of behavior are either forms of motion, which constitutes the action of his body, or forms of knowing, which constitutes the action of his mind. So also the universe consists of extension and thought, and all the modes of the behavior of things within the universe are either forms of motion, which constitutes the action of extension, or forms of intellect or understanding, which constitutes the action of thought. And in this manner he could have spun out his analogy to cover the minutest detail of his philosophy.

[1] Cf. above, pp. 7 ff.

[2] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 72.

But Spinoza labored under the disadvantages of tradition. His philosophy is not written in the form of direct philosophic observations on nature, but in the form of animadversions on books about the philosophy of nature. In presenting his case he had to follow an order which had already been prepared for him by his predecessors; he had to discuss their views, meet their arguments, and use their terminology. Using, therefore, the terminology of the time, he describes the universe in which we live and which we know and which consists of the things of which we ourselves are parts as "the face of the whole universe" [1] — an inadequate expression, indeed, since the universe to Spinoza, as to all his contemporaries, was infinite in extent. The two forms of activity which we observe in this "face of the whole universe" he describes quite appropriately as "motion" and "intellect," for the latter using also such terms as "absolutely infinite Intellect," "an infinite power of thought," and "idea of God." [2] But these two observable forms of activity, he maintains, are only two aspects of something transcending the universe of our experience, which something in its entire and true nature is unknown to us. That unknown transcendent something is given by Spinoza the familiar name of "substance" or "God" or "nature," contrasted with which all other things, the universe of our experience as a whole, its observed forms of activity, and the particular things of which it consists, are called "modes." In contradistinction to modes, which need causes for their existence, substance is the cause of itself. That such a substance exists and is not a figment of our imagination is asserted by Spinoza to be a fact of our immediate knowledge, which assertion he presents in the traditional form of proofs of the existence of

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 244 ff.
[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 238–242.

God. The aspects under which substance appears to us are given by him the conventional name of "attribute," and since substance appears to us under the aspect of two forms of activity, motion and intellect, he calls these respectively the attributes of extension and thought. These two attributes, however, according to Spinoza, do not exhaust the entire nature of substance. It has other attributes, infinite in number, which are unknown to us and perhaps also unknowable, though in one place he seems to suggest that more than the two now known attributes may become known to us.[1] The relation of substance to modes is conceived by Spinoza after the manner of the relation of a cause to its effects, and he speaks of modes as "following" from God or as being "produced" by God.[2] He thus describes "motion" and "intellect" (or the equivalent terms of the latter) as "immediate infinite modes," the "face of the whole universe" as a "mediate infinite mode," and the particular things as "finite modes."

If we examine closely the concept of substance used by Spinoza in his philosophy, we shall find that it contains four characteristics. In the first place, it is a transcendent whole which serves to hold together as within a logical shell the individual parts which make up the universe of our observation. In the second place, unlike the individual things within the universe, which require causes for their existence, substance is causeless. In the third place, the relation of substance to the universe of our observation is conceived after the manner of cause and effect. In the fourth place, substance is infinite, in the sense that the entirety of its nature is unknown to us and that only two of its infinite attributes manifest themselves to us in the universe of our observation.

[1] Cf. *Short Treatise*, I, 1, § 8, note 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 17, ll. 36–38): "We have *so far* not been able to discover more than two attributes which belong to this all-perfect being."

[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 373.

Now, of these four characteristics of substance, Spinoza was logically quite justified in assuming the first, second, and third. His very conception of the eternity of the universe necessarily compelled him to conceive of substance as a whole which transcended the mere aggregate of parts that made up the universe, and to conceive of it also as being *causa sui*. For to explain the universe as eternal, he had to resort to one of three possibilities. He had to assume, with Aristotle, the existence of an immaterial cause, or he had to assume, with Epicurean atomism, that the universe is an automaton and its eternity is due to the action of its constituent parts, or, else, he had to assume that eternity, while it could not be explained by anything in the nature of the parts, could be explained by something in the nature of the whole. But since Spinoza rejected the Aristotelian conception of an immaterial cause,[1] and since he also rejected Epicureanism on the ground that it was a denial of causality and an affirmation that things happened by chance,[2] he necessarily had to resort to the third possibility and declare substance to be a transcendent and causeless whole. That this was his reasoning can be gathered from his arguments in his Dialogues for the distinction of the whole from the sum of its parts,[3] and from his approval in one of his letters to Meyer of Crescas' argument that an infinite series of causes and effects was possible provided we assumed that the totality of the series forms a whole which is causeless.[4] By the same token, he was also logically justified in characterizing his substance as cause in the conventional sense in which a transcendent whole had been spoken of by philosophers as cause, namely, an immanent cause. But there would seem

[1] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 222.
[2] Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 318.
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 323–328.
[4] Epistola 12. Cf. above, Vol. I, p. 196.

to be no logical justification at all for his fourth characteristic of substance. For if it is assumed that the universe must have a logical shell within which to be enclosed, why not assume also that that shell is known to us in its entirety through its manifestation in the universe? Why not assume that the two attributes through which it is known to us exhaust its entire nature, and it has no other attributes? Beyond his statement in his definition of God that he understands by the term "God" a "Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes," [1] and similar statements elsewhere, Spinoza does not try to prove the infinity of God's attributes. Even his proofs for the existence of God which are supposed to establish the existence of "God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes" [2] assume only an immediate knowledge on our part of God as a being whose essence involves existence (First Proof), or as a being whose existence is necessary *per se* (Second Proof), or as a being who is most powerful (Fourth Proof). They do not assume that our immediate knowledge of God conceives Him as a being who has an infinite number of attributes, though, of course, Spinoza could have started with such an assumption and given us a fourth form of the ontological proof in which the term "infinity" would have been substituted for the terms "essence involving existence," "necessary existence *per se*," and "most powerful." [3] In fact, in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza seems to state that the conception of infinite attributes is involved in our immediate knowledge of God as a perfect being.[4] "Perfection," as will be recalled, is one of the three terms round which Descartes builds his ontological proofs.[5]

[1] *Ethics*, I, Def. 6. [2] *Ibid.*, I, Prop. 11.
[3] Cf. above, Vol. I, pp. 177 ff., 213.
[4] *Short Treatise*, I, 1, § 8, note 3 (*Opera*, I, p. 17, ll. 36–47).
[5] Cf. above, pp. 180, 207.

The fact is, however, that it is not logical reasons but rather psychological ones that we must look for in trying to explain Spinoza's characterizations of substance. Two motives seem to have been at play in Spinoza's philosophy — one that of criticism, and another that of interpretation. On the one hand, he was trying to show that God was material, that He worked for no external purpose, that the soul was inseparable from the body, and that man was not endowed with freedom — the four points which are to be regarded as cardinal in his philosophy. But, on the other hand, he was also trying to show that these were by no means contrary to what was true and essential in past beliefs of man about God and his own self. Like all rationalists, Spinoza felt that the idea of God which was intuitive in man and which existed as a universal belief under various forms must contain a germ of truth which the philosopher had only to disentangle from the crudities in which it had become enmeshed. Now, God was conceived by the primitive mind as a body like any other body within the universe. Of course, God is not a body, said Spinoza; but still there is truth in that primitive conception of God as something which is not totally unlike the things which constitute the universe — in fact, more truth than in the sophisticated theological conception of God as something totally different from the universe. Why not restate this truth by the assertion that God has the attributes of both extension and thought? God has always been considered as a cause. Why not continue to speak of Him as cause — a cause, indeed, not in the sense of creator, maker, and governor, but in that attenuated sense known as immanent cause? God has been spoken of by theologians as infinite and unknowable. Why not retain the infinity of God and His unknowability? For do we really know the universe as it is, in all its powers and possibilities? Is not

our knowledge of it commensurate with our knowledge of natural phenomena, and thus capable of growth?[1] God has always been called a living God, living in the sense of having consciousness and of acting for a purpose. Of course, God cannot act for a purpose, but still He can be conscious. In fact, the assumption of God's consciousness is required on independent ground, in order to maintain the principle of the unity of nature. Finally, God has always been spoken of as the last refuge of man in time of trouble. His own God, Spinoza concludes, is no less powerful to answer to this human need.[2]

Still, attempting though he did to accommodate his philosophy to the traditional conceptions and vocabulary of religion, Spinoza marked a radical departure from the traditional theologies of the three revealed religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. In the traditional conceptions of God of these three religions, however variedly stated, there was one common element which was considered essential. It was the element of the personality of God, by which was meant the existence of a certain reciprocal relation between the conduct of man toward God and the conduct of God toward man, commonly expressed in terms of mutual love. Theologians may have openly rejected primitive anthropomorphism, they may have vehemently affirmed their belief in the immateriality of God, His immutability, His unlikeness to man, His independence of the world, His indifference to human conduct, but despite all this God is conceived after the manner of human personality — He is a creator, a governor, a lawgiver; He acts by will and design; He is responsive to human needs; He rewards and punishes; He loves men and expects to be loved by them. Spinoza denies all this. His substance with which he identifies the

[1] Cf. above, pp. 128, 298.

[2] Cf. above, pp. 273 ff.

traditional God is nothing but a logical shell holding the particular things of the universe together, conceived as acting by the necessity of its own nature, an eternal machine incapable of changing the course of its own action, still less the action of others.

In its most essential feature, the theology of Spinoza may be regarded as a return to the theology of Aristotle, with its conception of an impersonal deity devoid of will and acting by necessity, against which the mediaevals constantly argued. Now when Aristotle began to apply the term "God" to his impersonal prime mover, and ere he endowed it with thought, he felt a certain impropriety in his identifying it with the god of Greek popular religion, and he asked himself: "If it thinks nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps." [1] He eased his intellectual conscience, however, by endowing his prime mover with thought of itself, and, having done so, he was quite pleased with his performance and believed that he had thereby succeeded in transforming it into a "living being, eternal, most good." [2] Perhaps Spinoza, too, felt some qualms of intellectual conscience when he identified the God of Scriptural tradition with his substance, and perhaps, like Aristotle, he justified himself by endowing his substance with consciousness and believed that thereby his substance was transformed into a "living being, eternal, most good." But still, the life which characterizes the Scriptural conception of God and which theologians, Jewish, Christian, and Mohammedan, who wished to remain true to Scriptural tradition tried to preserve, often in violation of their logic, was not the life of an eternal paralytic, who is conscious and sees all and hears all and knows all, but is helpless to do anything at will; it was the life which, after the analogy of our own life, meant a capacity for

[1] *Metaphysics*, XII, 9, 1074b, 17–18. [2] *Ibid.*, XII, 7, 1072b, 29.

change and a consciousness of freedom of action. It is the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms of the Scriptures, which theologians tried to explain away, just as much as the monotheism, which they were so eager to justify, that constitute, historically, the essential character of the Scriptural God, and it was for this reason that theologians throughout the ages tried to save as much of these anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms as possible, even though sometimes what they succeeded in saving was only the empty sounds of words. By depriving God of this kind of life, by exploding even the fiction that such a kind of life was attributed to Him when words to that effect were used, by openly disclaiming the need of maintaining such a fiction, Spinoza broke away from the traditional theology and started a new kind of theology and a new kind of rationalization.

Had this breaking away from tradition been deliberately intended as such by Spinoza it could have been regarded as a fifth act of daring on his part. But Spinoza seems to have been under the delusion that he was merely spinning on the traditions of religion and that he was only seeing in a truer light that which others before him had seen, to use his own expression, "as if through a mist." [1] The true nature of his new theology, however, was more accurately understood by others than by himself. The contemporaries of Spinoza, those theologians who openly attacked him in their writings, instinctively felt this departure, and hence they condemned him, despite his use of the term "God," as a denier of God, for, imbued as they were with the spirit of theological traditions, they knew that Scripture, which contrasts its own God, as a "living God" (Joshua 3, 10), "a saviour" (Isaiah 45, 21), and "our help and our shield" (Psalms 33,

[1] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 7, Schol.

20), with gods that are "dead" (Psalms 106, 28), that "cannot save" (Isaiah 45, 20), and that "do not profit" (Jeremiah 2, 8), would place Spinoza's substance among gods which it calls "no-gods" (Jeremiah 2, 11). That Spinoza himself was not fully conscious of his own radical departure, that he speaks of the opposition to his views as due to "the prejudices of the theologians" [1] and of the "atheism" with which the common people accused him as an untrue accusation,[2] that he continues to consider himself a successor of the religious thinkers of the past who tried to discover the truth that lay hidden in the pages of Scripture, and that he occasionally speaks of his God in the pious phrases of tradition — all this is due to the inherent tendency of men to rationalize and to accommodate old beliefs to their own thought. His reputed God-intoxication was really nothing but a hang-over of an earlier religious jag.

This tendency toward rationalization with its resulting attempt to show that his new philosophy can be put to work in this fixed and established world of ours without disturbing its order is evidenced also in Spinoza's treatment of the dictates of reason. Tradition has always considered man to be master of his own fate. Man is pictured in Scripture as standing at the parting of the ways, on the one side the way of life and on the other the way of death. Being free, he is assumed to be able to choose which way to follow. To guide him, he has a Law revealed to him by God. Now, Spinoza has deprived man of freedom of choice and of a God who could reveal to him His word. But still he is anxious to show that he has not deprived him of the guidance which revelation is supposed to furnish him with and of the power which freedom of choice is supposed to confer upon him. Spinoza offers substitutes for both revelation and the freedom of

[1] Epistola 30 (*Opera*, IV, p. 166, l. 22).

[2] *Ibid.* (ll. 25–26).

the will, and these are what he calls the Dictates of Reason. There are tens of commandments and golden rules, he argues, which are not any the less effective as guides to man for their being the revelation of the human mind and not of God. Guided by the principle of self-preservation and helped by the power of reason, man can work out those very same laws of conduct which have been hitherto attributed to a divine revelation. Indeed, reason has no messengers, like the God of old, to enforce its dictates, and man, though not free, can be tempted away from them by the new Satan, ignorance, without even having his old power of saying, "Get thee behind me." Still, though not free, man can condition himself by knowledge against this new Tempter. Not that knowledge itself is power, but it is the fuel on which the light of reason feeds.[1]

A similar mode of rationalization may also be discerned in Spinoza's treatment of immortality.

The indestructibility of the mind could have been treated by Spinoza purely as a philosophic principle. He could have spoken of it with the same unconcerned objectivity that a scientist speaks of the conservation of matter and energy. But in his treatment of the subject Spinoza goes beyond that and uses his own principle of the indestructibility of the soul as an interpretation of the traditional religious belief in the immortality of the soul. Now as a religious principle of belief the immortality of the soul did not consist in the mere fact of its indestructibility; it consisted primarily in the fact that its survival was conditioned upon the conduct of the individual man during his lifetime. Whether conduct only was necessary, or also intellectual attainments, was a debatable point, but the essential point was that immortality was considered a matter of reward for

[1] Cf. above, pp. 226, 231–232.

the obedient, and the withholding of immortality, which was held to be possible, was considered a matter of punishment for the disobedient. And for this reason, when Plato wanted to give to his purely philosophic notion of the indestructibility of the soul a religious tinge, he had to borrow from popular religion the theories of reward and punishment and the transmigration of souls, though these were hardly warranted by his own philosophy. Similarly Spinoza, merely out of the desire to accommodate his philosophy to tradition, adopts certain phases of popular conceptions of immortality. He speaks of conduct and intellectual attainments as conditions of immortality. But at the same time, on the mere grounds of his philosophy, he is bound to affirm the indestructibility of any soul irrespective of the conduct and the intellectual attainments of the individual. Nor does he make it clear how the individual souls after death will differ as a result of the differences in their life during their mundane existence. Spinoza also uses religious terms in describing the eternal happiness enjoyed by the soul after death, and he even speaks of our foretaste of it during our lifetime. Philosophically, however, all he can assume is that the indestructible mind on becoming reunited with God after the death of the individual will have consciousness, since God has consciousness, but that that consciousness is not a continuation of the consciousness of the individual during his lifetime. As I have shown above,[1] some of the most significant expressions in Spinoza's discussion of immortality bear the unmistakable evidence of having been meant as a direct criticism of Uriel Acosta's open denial of that traditional doctrine.

Spinoza is represented by those who knew him as having lived a life of retirement, though one not devoid of friendship.

[1] Cf. above, pp. 323 ff.

We should like to agree with his biographers that he was guided into this mode of life by his philosophy, but unfortunately recluses are not made by philosophies, not even by philosophies which, unlike the philosophy of Spinoza, preach retirement from life as an ideal virtue; they are made, rather, by the inhospitableness of the social environment and by the ineptitude of their own individual selves. But for the circumstances, environmental and personal, which had cut his normal contacts with society, Spinoza, who defined man, after Aristotle, as a social animal,[1] would undoubtedly have guided himself by the same dictate of reason that he had prescribed for others — by his maxim that man is freer when he participates in the life of society than when he lives in solitude.[2] In conformity with this maxim of his, then, he would undoubtedly have joined in the active life of the communities in which he lived after his departure from his native Amsterdam — Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and The Hague; he would have become a substantial, respectable, and public-spirited burgher and a pillar of society. Perhaps, also, despite differences in theology, he would have joined the Lutheran church of his friend Doctor Cordes in The Hague. And I can picture him, once of a Sunday, at the invitation of the good old Doctor, taking the services in the church. He preaches a sermon which is an invective against what he styles "the prejudices of the theologians of our time." [3] In it he inveighs against prevailing credulous beliefs in the spirituality of God, His personal relation to men, His direct guidance of human affairs, the divine origin of the Scriptures, human freedom of the will, the separability of soul from body, and the survival of the soul after death as an

[1] Cf. above, p. 245. [2] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 73.

[3] Cf. Epistola 30 (*Opera*, IV, p. 166, l. 22): "præjudicia theologorum"; Epistola 6 (p. 36, l. 16): "theologi nostri temporis."

individual entity. The sermon over, he pauses and says, "Now let us pray." And in his prayer he thanks God, "the creator of the universe," for His bountiful goodness; he begs for the forgiveness of "our sins," asks for divine enlightenment in the true understanding of "Thy revealed Word," and petitions for divine grace in "guiding us" in the paths of righteousness, to the end that "we may inherit" life everlasting and enjoy eternal bliss in the presence of "Thy glory." As he is about to close his prayer, he catches a glimpse of the congregation and suddenly realizes that he is in a Christian church. Immediately he adds: "In the name of Christ, the mouth of God,[1] whose spirit is the idea of God,[2] which alone leads us unto liberty, salvation, blessedness, and regeneration.[3] Amen."

These observations on what is new in Spinoza may be finally clinched by a formal summary, complete though brief, of the philosophy of Spinoza as it unfolds itself in the pages of this work. Beginning with the traditional definition of "substance," Spinoza applies that term only to God, designating all the other so-called substances as well as all the so-called accidents by the term "mode," under which he includes the physical world as a whole and the variety of individual things of which it consists (Chapter III). This in itself would seem to be merely a verbal difference. But a real difference appears when he afterwards contends that God must be material, or extended, as he calls it, on the ground that the theory of an immaterial God would inevitably lead to all the insurmountable difficulties to which any conceivable attempt at the explanation of the origin of the material world would necessarily give rise (Chapter IV).

[1] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 4 (*Opera*, III, p. 64, l. 19): "os Dei."

[2] *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 68, Schol.: "Spiritu Christi, hoc est, Dei idea, a qua sola pendet, ut homo liber sit."

[3] Cf. above, p. 311.

This material God, however, continues to be described by Spinoza by all the terms by which the traditional immaterial God has been described: He is necessary existence or *causa sui* in whom there is no distinction of essence and existence; He is infinite in the sense that He is unknowable in His essence; He is known only through His attributes, that is to say, by the manner in which He manifests himself to our mind in the physical universe as it is perceived by us (Chapter V). But while His essence is unknown, the fact of His existence, that He is a real being and not a mere figment of our imagination, is known to us — and it is known to us by a direct and immediate kind of knowledge which of all the kinds of knowledge is the most valid (Chapter VI).

Of the infinite number of attributes which God in the traditional conception of Him is supposed to possess there are only two through which He manifests himself to us in the world, and these two are the two conventional constituent elements of the world, matter and form, or, as Spinoza prefers to call them, extension and thought (Chapter VII). The attribution of extension to God, to which Spinoza has been driven by the difficulties of the old problem of creation, becomes all the easier for him because, in departure from the older tradition of philosophy, though not altogether without a precedent, he considered extension to be infinite (Chapter VIII). Since Spinoza's God, unlike the traditional conception of Him, is material, the old conventional saying that all things are in God ceases to be a mere pious expression of praise and glorification and assumes a meaning which corresponds exactly to the literal meaning of its words. Again, following tradition, Spinoza continues to speak of God as cause, but with his attribution of extension to God he is enabled to use with greater accuracy and with more logical consistency all the conventional terms by which the causality

of God has always been described, such as "universal," "efficient," "first," "principal," and "free"; and, moreover, he is led to reject the description of God as transeunt cause, which term in the restricted sense of separate or immaterial cause has been explicitly stated to be applicable to God, and to make Him exclusively an immanent cause in the special sense in which he uses the term "immanent" (Chapter IX). Similarly, in the manner of tradition, He describes God also by the term "eternal" in all the three senses in which the term "eternal" has been generally used in its application to God, though "eternal" in the sense of immutable is not, according to him, an exclusive property of God (Chapter X). Admitting with tradition that God is a conscious cause, he contends, without precedent since Aristotle, that God has no will and acts without design, so that the modes, which to him are not outside of God but within God (Chapter XI), are produced by the necessity of God's nature and without any purpose (Chapter XII).

Man, of course, is a part of nature, a mode like any other mode, consisting of what is commonly known as body and mind; and, following the traditional phraseology, Spinoza speaks of mind as being of divine origin, but, inasmuch as according to his own view body can be equally spoken of as being of divine origin, he declares, in opposition to tradition, that mind is inseparable from body (Chapter XIII). He continues to follow tradition in his description of the various functions of the mind: sensation, imagination, memory, consciousness, and reason (Chapter XIV), all of which constitute the sources of the greater part of our knowledge — knowledge as a whole being divided, as it has always been, into three kinds, of which one kind, he declares in common with others, may be false and two kinds are true (Chapter XVI), using as his criteria of truth two definitions of the

term which have come down from Aristotle (Chapter XV). No less traditional is his description of the human will, but he opposes tradition by eliminating from it any kind of freedom (Chapter XVII). With this denial of the freedom of the will in man, the old traditional distinction between emotions and virtues disappears; but still Spinoza's treatment of emotions and virtues is only a variation of the traditional manner of treatment; what is commonly considered as good and evil continue to be with him good and evil, though their definitions are somewhat modified; man, though unable to choose, will still by the guidance of reason continue to act in pursuit of what is good and in avoidance of what is evil; and instruction in the ways of good and evil will still continue to be profitable to man (Chapters XVIII–XIX). God, though no longer endowed with will and design, can still continue to play His old traditional part of the supreme object of satisfaction to the human mind and the supreme power for goodness in human conduct; the soul, though no longer separable from the body, can still be immortal after the manner in which immortality was conceived by religious philosophers; and, finally, though the revelation of a law by God is no longer thinkable, still a religion of reason can be built up which in all essential respects would be like the rational religion of theologians (Chapter XX).

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