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THE UNITED STATES AND *Japan*

By

Edwin O. Reischauer

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INTRODUCTION

By 1937 it must have been clear to any student of the Far Eastern scene that vast new forces—some of them still shadowy, but others already sharply defined—were rising rapidly in every part of Asia. It was equally apparent that the growing impotence of the great colonial powers of Western Europe was hastening the day when the end of the era of imperialism would be at hand.

Now Asia is engulfed in a tidal wave of political and social revolution.

Nationalism in its narrowest sense has become a driving factor throughout the Eastern world. It has, of course, for many years past been artfully stimulated by Soviet emissaries carefully trained for that purpose. There is much reason to believe that nationalism may yet prove to be a boomerang of fatal consequence to the Politburo's schemes for Moscow's domination of the Asiatic world. Yet no thinking American can fail to take stock of the situation which this nation will confront if the peoples of Asia choose the road that leads to Soviet dictatorship.

Our hopes that at the war's end a way could be found by which the forces of nationalist and of social revolution might be canalized into constructive channels as a consequence of cooperative measures undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations have for the most part vanished. Here and there, as in India and Indonesia, because of the individual genius of a few leaders, grounds for optimism as to the future are not lacking. Yet it would be idle to deny that during the past year the

horizon has been steadily darkening in the Far East in so far as the prospects for the consecration of human liberties, for democratic self-government, and for economic reconstruction are concerned.

It would almost seem as if the Government of the United States had deliberately discarded every major advantage that this country possessed in determining a foreign policy that would make for a peaceful and a safe world.

I know of no more humiliating failure in the recent history of American diplomacy than the record of American policy in China during the past four years. It has been fatally vacillating. It has apparently been formulated in ignorance of Chinese history and of Chinese psychology. It has ignored the fact that in a world in which the Soviet Union is determined to play power politics the United States cannot successfully counter Soviet measures of aggressive expansion except by playing power politics herself. It is a policy that has left a prostrate Chinese people in the hands of an alien-inspired government bent, in so far as we can now see, upon making of the Chinese nation, rich in manpower, in raw materials, and in productive capacity, a subservient satellite of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Reischauer's volume, *The United States and Japan*, makes clearer than any other book that I have read that the United States still possesses through its special position in Japan a chance to atone for its mistakes of omission and of commission in the Far East and to repair to some extent the damage that has already been done to American security and to the safety of the democratic West.

While, as Mr. Reischauer properly emphasizes, the occupation of Japan is technically the common enterprise of those members of the United Nations that joined in bringing about her defeat, the occupation is primarily an American responsibility. Granted that there are justifiable grounds for criticism of certain aspects of the occupation, it nevertheless has to its credit a brilliant record of positive achievement. Soviet Com-

munism has made but little headway among the Japanese people. Such Soviet policies as the refusal to return to Japan many hundreds of thousands of Japanese prisoners of war and their retention as slave labor have inevitably increased the realization of the Japanese people that the American occupation has been essentially humanitarian. They are traditionally suspicious of Russia's motives.

That Japan can later become a mighty bulwark against Moscow's domination of Asia can no longer be questioned. What Mr. Reischauer makes plain, however, is that the outcome will depend upon the awareness of the American people of the vital significance of the issues that are involved in this phase of their nation's foreign policy, and upon their realistic recognition of the major obstacles that they confront in making such a policy succeed.

Mr. Reischauer places a healthy emphasis on the many inherent good qualities of the Japanese people and of the progress that they had made in acquiring electoral and Parliamentary experience before the tragic days when they permitted their fanatics and their militarists to lead them into a disastrous war of aggression and to merit the hatred of their Asiatic neighbors and of the Western democracies. No one who lived in Japan, as I did, thirty-five years ago, before the Army had fastened its strangle hold upon the Japanese people, can fail to recognize the vitality of the forces of political liberalism that had sprung up among many sectors of Japanese society as an aftermath of the era of the Meiji reforms. During the past two decades those forces, it is true, have lost impetus. But they have not died. The question is whether the occupation and a sane and just peace treaty can restore that impetus and make those forces the new dominating factor in Japanese life.

At a moment when the military mentality in Washington seems to be so largely responsible for the determination of American foreign policy, it would be well for every American citizen to ponder this passage from Mr. Reischauer's book:

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"We should not forget, however, that no matter how feasible it would be to make Japan our military ally, it probably could not be done without seriously endangering Japanese democracy. In view of Japan's strong militaristic tradition and the record of recent history in which the Japanese Army played the leading role in scuttling the young and still very imperfect democratic institutions of prewar Japan, it would be too much to hope that Japan could be both a military and an ideological ally. As the former she might render the United States valuable aid, if war were to come in the next few years, but she would unquestionably render a greater disservice by driving the rest of Asia away from us and presumably into the other camp. As an ideological ally, she could be of inestimable value in strengthening the cause of democracy throughout Asia. The choice to any but the narrowest of military minds should be an obvious one."

Nor should any of us fail fully to grasp the economic problems that the Japanese people must face in the years to come or the economic problems that we ourselves confront in carrying on our present occupation policy. Since 1945 the American taxpayers have been contributing half a billion dollars a year to keeping the Japanese people from starvation and making it possible for the wheels of Japan's industry to turn again. It is inconceivable that the American taxpayers are going to be willing indefinitely to continue such a drain upon their own resources even were the Japanese themselves willing to accept the indefinite continuation of conditions under which they are condemned to live upon a foreign dole. Yet Japan cannot grow enough food to feed her own people.

As Mr. Reischauer cogently states, "All Japan has to offer on the world market is her own energy—manpower and energy of coal and water. With these she can transform imported raw materials into goods for reëxport. The slim margin of profit from this reëxport trade must be sufficient to pay for all the imports Japan must have to support her own people. To do this Japan's export trade must be huge. But where

is she to find her markets in a divided world and in a Far East disrupted by revolution and bitterly determined not to trade with her? Japan's situation is basically similar to England's, but infinitely worse."

Such staggering problems as these—the political conversion of the Japanese people into safe and coöperative members of international society and the economic reconstruction of Japan in order that the Japanese people may obtain a chance to prosper and to maintain higher living standards—are not going to be solved by sleight of hand. They can only be successfully surmounted through an American foreign policy backed by an enlightened American public opinion that keeps its sights set upon the ultimate objectives and which is prepared to devote the time and the material sacrifices that may be needed so that those objectives may ultimately be achieved.

Finally, there is one point that Mr. Reischauer brings out that seems to me to be of supreme importance, if American public opinion is to demand of its own Government that kind of policy in Japan that can promise to bring about the desired results.

Nothing could be more futile than for the American people to believe that the people of Japan can be re-created in their own image. Nothing seems to me more fantastic than for us to assume—and many are so assuming—that a new Japanese Constitution, drafted by American authority, will be retained by the Japanese people as their national charter once a peace treaty has been signed and Japan once more becomes an independent power.

If a true Japanese democracy is ever to come into being, it must be "made in Japan." American policy and the American occupation of Japan will only succeed in making the Japanese people an ideological ally of the West, and a bastion of individual freedom and self-government in the Far East, if they encourage and foster natural forces that derive their strength from the individual genius of the Japanese people themselves.

Sumner Welles

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It would be quite fruitless for me to attempt to list all the persons to whom I am indebted for information and ideas which have found some place in this work. Many and perhaps most of them I am not aware of myself. Generalizations, for all their axiomatic inaccuracy, inevitably form the heart of any book attempting to cover a broad field in short compass. But generalizations usually cannot be documented by citing chapter and verse. Those in this book are the result of a long and slow process of accretion and synthesis. All I can do is to acknowledge my great indebtedness to my many teachers, colleagues, and also students in this country and abroad and to all those who have helped amass the information on which this book has been based or who have struggled with the problem of interpreting these facts in terms of generalized concepts.

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Edwin O. Reischauer

Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 18, 1950

PART I THE PROBLEM

1. Our Neighbor Japan

Japan and the United States face each other, but across the broadest ocean of them all. Once such a body of water was almost like the space between us and the moon. Man was a land animal, crawling slowly over the land surfaces of the world and not venturing far into the surrounding seas. Even a mere five hundred years ago, the civilized world was limited to the great Eurasiatic land mass and the contiguous portions of North Africa together with a few outlying islands. England and Japan, two island lands lying close to the western and eastern coasts of this land mass, represented the two extremities of the civilized world. Beyond them lay the vast and unknown oceans, the unquestioned ends of the world. The earth was indeed flat, and Europe and the Far East lay far removed from each other at the opposite ends of its flat surface.

In that day of slow and precarious travel, the peoples of the world had significant contacts only with close-by lands. The English might fight the French, but even Poland and Hungary were too far away to be of much concern to them, while India and China were little more than fairy-book lands. The Japanese might have dealings with Korea and China, but Java and India concerned them little, and they were blissfully ignorant of the very existence of Europe. Relations were largely between immediate neighbors and usually between peoples of the same cultural and historical background, who were bound together by far more that they shared in common than they were divided by elements that distinguished them.

But in the last five hundred years all this has changed. The oceans no longer are the great barriers they once were but have become instead the mortar holding the various pieces of the earth together in one economic whole. The world has undergone a cataclysmic shrinking, in the process of which the two ends of its once flat surface have curled up and come together. Man has circled the globe, first through extending long thin tentacles of exploration around its surface and then by slowly incorporating into the civilized world, through conquest and settlement, the lands which lay between the East and West on the far side of the earth. Europe, the Far West of the Old World, has straddled one ocean and then slowly spread across the land mass of the New World, until its cultural and racial offshoots have come to stand on the shores of the Pacific, facing the Far East across but a single body of water.

Even in this day of air travel and instantaneous communications, however, the Pacific remains a very broad expanse of water. Two weeks of plowing its long swells will prove this to the sea-voyager. A trip by air reduces the time but not the distance. With the magical aid of the international date line, it is now possible to stand on Japanese and American soil on the same calendar day, but not even the motionless speed of a plane suspended above the unchanging waters of the Pacific reduces the vastness of that ocean. Your sense of time, if not your sense of sight, tells you that you have flown the distance from New York to San Francisco and then repeated it again and again. A nonstop flight from Seattle to Tokyo would be as long as a flight from Florida to Patagonia or one from Maine to the Ural Mountains.

Navigable water, however, is in no sense a barrier such as mountains, desert, ice, or even masses of people. There is no intervening obstacle to communication between us and the Japanese. No other people come between us to divert our attention from each other. We are not like two city dwellers living almost cheek by jowl, as do the peoples of Europe, but

like two country dwellers living out of sight of each other but still contiguously with no one else between them. We are perhaps the world's most distant neighbors, but neighbors nonetheless.

We have been slow and consciously reluctant to realize our special relationship to Japan, but it has been forced upon us by the irresistible sweep of history, culminating in war—the most traditional of all relationships between neighboring peoples. Though our trade with Japan ranked first in our trade with all Asia, though Japan was considered our only military rival in Asia and perhaps the chief military menace to us in the whole world, it took war and our subsequent occupation of Japan to make us realize how closely involved we had become in Japan and its problems. The Japanese, for their part, have been more conscious of what America meant to them. For many decades, the United States has been the country which more than any other represented the Occidental world to them. It had become the chief neighbor to the east, just as China had always been the major neighbor to the west. Today, with Japan under our control and tutelary supervision, the United States appears to many Japanese to be the only foreign country of vital significance to them.

Man moving eastward and man moving westward have at last met on the far side of the world in the vast expanse of the Pacific and the lands that rim its shores. The recent war in a sense represented the final shock of that meeting of forces. In this naked confrontation of the peoples of the Far East and the Far West, we find epitomized the difficulties and also the challenge of the new world—the one world in which we all now live. Man, who has never been able to solve the frictions and conflicts between neighboring peoples of common racial and cultural background, is now faced with the problem of solving the still more basic conflicts between peoples of widely divergent racial and cultural heritage.

In the meeting of Japan and the United States, the two extremities of the world, the problems, the hazards, and, pos-

sibly, the benefits of this head-on convergence of races and cultures in a shrinking world stand out in a clearer, starker light than they do in other parts of the world, where the meeting has come about more slowly and has been between less spectacularly contrasting cultures. It is perhaps no mere coincidence that Japan, the easternmost country of the old civilized world, is now the most Westernized of Asiatic lands, or that America, the westerly extension of the westernmost part of the old civilized world, has taken the lead in bringing the Occident to Japan. America and Japan have for some time now been unconscious neighbors. The war and still more the occupation have brought home to us as well as to the Japanese the somewhat unhappy realization of what very close neighbors we really are.

2. Japan and America: The Record

1. EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Japan's first direct contacts with the Western world came in the sixteenth century, a few years after Magellan had circumnavigated the globe, but centuries before the United States came into existence as a nation. In 1541 some Portuguese drifted ashore in Kyushu, the southernmost of the main islands of Japan, and two years later other Portuguese came, largely by accident, to Tanegashima, a small island lying off the southern tip of Kyushu. They were soon followed by other Portuguese and then by Spaniards, Dutchmen, and Englishmen, eager for trade with this newly discovered land. The merchant did not come alone. St. Francis Xavier, the great Jesuit missionary, arrived in Japan in 1549 and was soon followed by determined bands of other Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries from Portugal and Spain, as eager for spiritual conquests as the merchants were for economic gain.

The Japanese response to these unexpected new contacts was both immediate and enthusiastic. We do not know exactly what took place during the first Portuguese landings, but we can surmise the keen interest the Japanese showed in the firearms the Portuguese carried ashore with them at Tanegashima, for the name *Tanegashima-teppo,* "guns of Tanegashima," was for long the regular word for "gun" in Japan. A new religion was, of course, harder to assimilate than new weapons and technical skills, but here too the response was surprising. Conversions came slowly at first but soon in increasing numbers,

until, by the end of the century, there may have been as many as 300,000 Catholics in Japan, a larger percentage of the population of that time than the Christians form in Japan today.

One cannot but wonder what might have happened if the Japanese had continued these fruitful contacts with the West uninterruptedly until today. Certainly the history of the Far East and perhaps of the whole world would have been far different. In the sixteenth century, Japan, like the other countries of the Far East, was only slightly behind Europe in matters of weapons, navigation, and scientific knowledge and perhaps ahead of Europe in many other respects. If Japan had continued for the next three centuries the rich Western contacts she had in the second half of the sixteenth century, she unquestionably would have caught up with Europe and remained abreast of the other countries of the world in every way. She would have gradually settled into her natural economic and political position in the world; she would have slowly absorbed what fitted her best from among the ideas of the early modern West and the concepts and techniques the West has produced since then. There would have been no sudden reëmergence from isolation in the nineteenth century, no forced marches to catch up with the rest of the world, which have so severely taxed the Japanese capacity for assimilation and adaptation; there would have been no mushroom growth of economic and military power, which has proved so upsetting to Japan and all her neighbors. In short, this book would have had a very different story to tell.

But this is, after all, idle speculation. Japan after less than a century of contact with the West put an end to these relations and withdrew into herself for over two centuries. By 1638 direct Japanese contacts with the West had been reduced to one closely supervised Dutch outpost, which was moved three years later to the tiny island of Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. For over two hundred years this small Dutch trading post and occasional licensed Chinese traders at Nagasaki were Japan's only links with the outside world.

One naturally asks why the Japanese imposed isolation on themselves and how they were able to maintain it so long in the face of the religious and commercial zeal of the Europeans. Isolation was possible first of all because Japan was an island country, well insulated by hundreds of miles of open sea from the rest of the world. Another factor was that in the early seventeenth century whatever superiority the Europeans may have had in the military arts was more than offset by the tremendous distance from Europe to Japan. Japanese mercenaries fought in the Portuguese and Spanish garrisons in the Far East. Japanese and Chinese pirates were able to drive the Dutch out of the island of Formosa in the seventeenth century. There was not yet the vast discrepancy in military power between Europe and Asia which was to remake the map of the Far East in the nineteenth century.

But still we have the question why the Japanese wished to retreat into an isolation which in the long run was to prove so disastrous for the nation. The answer comes from domestic Japanese history. The sixteenth century witnessed the slow and painful reunification of Japan after centuries of anarchic division of the land among a welter of petty feudal lords. Three strong men in succession brought increasing unity and order out of this confusion. The first two, while contributing greatly to Japan's political reunification, did not succeed in passing on their power to their heirs. The third, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who cemented his mastery over all Japan in a great battle in the year 1600, was keenly aware of his predecessors' failures. His guiding principle, and that of his heirs as well, was the retention of power within the family. Stability became the watchword. And to achieve stability, change or the threat of change had to be eliminated. This meant a freezing of society. It also meant destroying Christianity, which was felt to be an upsetting dogma in an Asiatic land.

The Japanese stamped out Christianity through bloody persecutions; the European missionaries were either driven out or executed. In the process most of the Western traders were

expelled too, because of their association with the missionaries. The Japanese authorities even went so far as to prohibit the return of any of the thousands of Japanese then abroad, for fear that they might come back contaminated with Christianity, and they also banned the construction of large ocean-going vessels which might take Japanese abroad again. Foregoing the lucrative trade with the West and with the rest of the Far East as well was a high price to pay, but no price was considered too high for stability. That was what the Tokugawa wanted, even if it meant isolation, and that is what they got. The period from 1600 to 1868 is known as the Tokugawa Age, the period of the Tokugawa Shogun, and it was a period of unprecedented stability and peace in Japanese history.

2. THE REOPENING OF JAPAN

The West by the early nineteenth century was no longer the West that Japan had turned her back on two hundred years earlier. Western weapons, improving decade after decade, were now far superior to the antiquated firearms and swords and lances of Japan. Europe, just starting on her amazing industrial revolution, was forging an economic structure with which no Asiatic nation could compete. While Japan had been grimly preserving her political stability, the Europeans had been brawling their way to new power, until they had come to dominate virtually every corner of the globe. Now England, not Spain or Portugal, was in the forefront of European commercial and imperial expansion. English ships of a size and fire-power undreamed of two hundred years earlier and in numbers unknown in the seventeenth century were now plying Far Eastern waters. America, the western extension of Europe in the New World, was also represented in the Far East. Americans were joining in the pursuit of the fabled riches of the Canton trade and of the equally lucrative but less romantic whale.

Even before the reopening of Japan and before the span-

ning of our own continent by road and rail, the United States had begun to assume its position as Japan's Occidental neighbor. While British ships followed the traditional route between West and East around the Cape of Good Hope and the Malay Peninsula, New England clipper ships crossed the Pacific, passing close by the coasts of Japan on their way to Canton, and sturdy New Bedford whalers tossed in the cold waters off the northern shores of Japan. Americans were intrigued by the forbidding and forbidden coastal mountains of Japan. They in particular hoped for open ports in Japan in which to refit their ships and replenish their stores. Americans were shipwrecked on the rocky coasts of Japan in greater numbers than other Occidentals and were subjected to the harsh treatment of a backward feudal regime determined to keep a menacing outside world at arm's length. And with the coming of steam vessels, possible coaling stations in Japan immediately became a matter of particular interest to Americans.

Beginning in 1792, Russian, English, and American mariners frequented Japanese waters in increasing numbers, charting the coasts, attempting to open trade relations, returning Japanese castaways, or seeking shipwrecked countrymen. Between 1797 and 1809 American ships supplied the Dutch trading post at Deshima, which had been cut off from the homeland by the Napoleonic Wars. In 1837 missionaries and traders aboard the American vessel *Morrison* sought to establish amicable relations with the Japanese but instead drew the fire of coastal batteries in Edo Bay and at Nagasaki. An American naval officer, Commodore Biddle, paid another unsuccessful visit to Edo Bay in 1846, and Commodore Glynn of the American Navy visited Nagasaki three years later. Finally in 1851, the United States government decided on a full-scale effort to open the doors of Japan, and on July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry anchored his squadron at the mouth of Edo Bay. His "black ships" were unanswerable arguments, and on March 31, 1854, Perry signed with the Japanese the Treaty of Kanagawa, prying open the closed doors of Japan a crack.

Only two ports in addition to Nagasaki were opened for a limited amount of trade, but this was enough to pierce the armor of Japanese isolation. By 1858 the American Consul-General, Townsend Harris, arguing that America was a more friendly nation than the rapacious imperialists of Europe, was able to secure a full commercial treaty with Japan. Both treaties were soon followed by similar treaties between Japan and the principal European countries. The doors of Japan had been pushed wide open. America had assumed her role as Japan's Occidental neighbor and as the spearhead of Western penetration. We had established ourselves as the first and foremost Occidental friend of Japan. It is significant that the first mission which newly opened Japan sent abroad was not to her Asiatic neighbors or to the countries of Europe but to the United States to exchange treaty ratifications with us in Washington in 1860.

New wines cannot be poured into old bottles, and Western trade and diplomatic and military techniques were decidedly new wines for the old and decaying bottles of Tokugawa feudalism. Within a decade after the signing of the new trade treaties, the old order had crumbled. By 1868 a determined group of young revolutionaries—and revolutionaries they definitely were, so far as the old order was concerned—had seized the reins of government from the faltering grasp of the Tokugawa and had started to build a new and more highly centralized government in the name of the young Emperor, whose ancestors for some seven hundred years had lived in majestic but powerless dignity in their ancient capital at Kyoto. Calling the new era Meiji (1868–1912), or "Enlightened Rule," they launched Japan upon a rapid series of reforms, designed to regain in one mad dash the ground lost to the West over a period of two hundred-odd years.

The securing of military equality with the Occident was, of course, the clearest and most understandable objective of Japan's new leaders, because Japan's helplessness in the face of Western naval power had been made all too clear to them.

They were all obsessed with the fear that Japan, too, might go down the road toward colonialism already being followed by so many other Asiatic peoples. But they did not simply set their sights at military reform. With surprising perspicacity, they saw that military strength in turn depended upon industrial power, technical knowledge, and administrative efficiency and that it would not be enough merely to acquire the new Western weapons. Instead they embarked upon a broad and intensive program of economic, political, and even social reform, such as the world has rarely seen.

3. JAPANESE REFORM AND AMERICAN INFLUENCE

Fundamentally, reform meant learning as much as possible from the Occident and mastering the lesson as quickly as possible. It called for a supreme effort at self-education on a nation-wide scale, with every contact with the Western world exploited to the fullest. The United States, because of its preponderant role in the opening of Japan, took from the beginning a leading part in this Westernization of Japan. The Japanese, however, came to realize that conditions of life in the older and more tradition-bound countries of Europe approximated those of Japan more closely than did conditions in the still raw and half-settled lands of the New World. The United States in the nineteenth century, moreover, was still only a small and weak newcomer to the family of nations, lacking the prestige of the great and old powers of Europe. Quite naturally the Japanese increasingly went to England, Germany, and France for their models for military, economic, political, legal, and administrative reforms. But despite Japan's conscious effort to learn from Europe itself rather than from Europe's recent geographic extension westward, America was Japan's neighbor in a sense Europe could not be, and in the long run the Japanese probably borrowed more from the United States than from any one European nation.

Students flocked to the United States perhaps in greater numbers than to any other Occidental land. Many institutions, such as Japan's first banking system, were copied directly from America, and American business influence left an indelible mark on Japanese business practices. The colonization and development of the northern island of Hokkaido was carried out largely under the guidance of American experts, and the Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido was founded at the suggestion and under the presidency of American nationals. So strong was the American influence in Hokkaido that even the agricultural landscape there today bears a startling resemblance to that of our own rural areas.

In the all-important field of education, American influence was particularly great. Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder in 1858 of a school which was to grow into Keio University in Tokyo, accompanied the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 1860 and, after a trip to Europe two years later, again visited America in 1867. Joseph Niishima (Neesima), the founder in 1875 of Doshisha, one of Japan's earliest Christian educational institutions, and perhaps its most distinguished, secretly left Japan in 1864 to complete his studies in the United States. Dr. David Murray of Rutgers was brought to Japan in 1873 to serve as the educational advisor of the Minister of Education, and during his fruitful stay in Japan he profoundly influenced the whole Japanese educational philosophy and structure. Between 1880 and 1885 the Japanese even attempted to follow the American educational system before returning once more to European models which better fitted their needs. The Harvard zoologist, Edward Sylvester Morse, who arrived in Japan in 1877, was responsible for introducing the Japanese to the fields of zoology, anthropology, and archaeology; Ernest Fenollosa of Boston, arriving in Japan the next year, became an influential teacher of Occidental philosophy and inspired the Japanese to take renewed interest in their own art; and numerous other American schol-

ars made similar though less striking contributions to Japanese scholarship.

It was probably through Christianity and the Christian missionaries that the United States exerted its chief influence on Japan. The Occidental business community, at least until the First World War, was dominated by the British, and only in the past three decades has it become primarily American. But from the start Americans led in the missionary movement in Japan. The Protestant missionaries in particular have always been for the most part Americans. The first missionaries to reenter Japan were Americans, and three American Protestant denominations, the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Dutch Reformed, started formal missionary work in Japan in 1859. Among the first American missionaries to come to Japan were such great figures as Dr. Guido Verbeck, who was an influential advisor to the Japanese government and played a large role in the development of the institution which was to grow into Tokyo University, and Dr. J. C. Hepburn, who has left his name on what is still the most widely used romanization system, that is, the method of transliterating Japanese into Latin letters.

By 1873 the Japanese government, reversing the strict ban on Christianity of more than two centuries' standing, decided on a policy of religious toleration, thus permitting Christians to propagate their faith freely in Japan. The missionaries from the start concentrated on education and in coöperation with native believers built up many of the pioneer schools both for boys and girls, founding no less than forty-three schools for girls in the first two decades of the Meiji period. For several decades American missionary schools, particularly at the secondary level, were in the forefront of the educational movement in Japan, and only in the twentieth century did they gradually drop behind in prestige and facilities to the government institutions, which had behind them the financial power and authority of the central government.

The Protestants, off to an early start in 1859, and the Catholics, building anew on the faint traces of the once prosperous Catholic church of Western Japan, have not had the same numerical success as their Jesuit and Franciscan predecessors of three centuries earlier. Protestants and Catholics together constitute today less than one half of 1 per cent of the population. But their influence is far greater than these statistics would indicate. Because of the consistent emphasis on education in the missionary movement, Japanese Christians are almost exclusively from the better educated classes. They constitute far more than one half of 1 per cent of Japanese leadership, and few among the educated classes of Japan have not felt the influence of Christianity in one form or another. The Christian churches of Japan are among the strongest and most self-reliant of the newer church bodies of Asia. It is no accident that there is a disproportionately high percentage of Christians in the present Japanese Diet or that one of Japan's postwar premiers was a Protestant Christian. Right up to the outbreak of the recent war, the strongest of all American influences in Japan was probably that exerted by our Christian missionaries there. It was a relationship of sincere friendship and good will, and this perhaps helps explain why the common Japanese people, even when they found themselves at war with us, continued to regard Americans with admiration and sometimes even with affection.

One other major influence exerted by America on Japan in recent years has been the unexpected influence of the Nisei, the Americans of Japanese origin. Nisei went to Japan in large numbers in the 1930's, seeking higher education or a livelihood, for the doors of opportunity in this country, never so wide open to them as to Americans of Occidental ancestry, seemed to be swinging shut, as the full effects of the depression were felt. Thoroughly American by birth and environment, the Nisei had a hard time in Japan. Handicapped in language and still more in social habits and outlook, he found it extremely difficult to make the adaptation to Japanese life which was

demanded of him by his relatives and associates. Inevitably he remained to a certain extent a small island of Americanism, ultimately exerting a greater collective influence on the Japanese around him than they on him. Rejected by the country of his birth, he was nonetheless an ambassador of Americanism —an unheralded and unhonored ambassador, but still a very effective one.

There were several thousand Nisei in the cities of Japan during the decade preceding the war, and they contributed an even more specifically American flavor to the Westernization of Japan. Other factors helped. America was no longer a weak and insignificant country but a recognized giant among nations. More important, she had become not only Japan's chief Occidental neighbor but in many ways Japan's most important neighbor.

The predominantly American flavor in Japan's Westernization could be seen in many ways even before the war. If one traveled eastward from Europe through Asia, it would have been obvious during most of the trip that the dominant Occidental influences had been moving in the same direction from Europe eastward, but somewhere between South China and North China and between Indonesia and the Philippines one would have noticed that the prevailing currents had shifted and that the Occidental influences were coming from around the other side of the world. Korea and Japan, too, lay in the path of this prevailing westerly current from America.

One could see this in Japan in many fields. Baseball, or *besu-boru* as they pronounce it, has for decades been as much the national pastime of Japan as it is with us. Even in language, the American influence has been strong. The combined influence of Great Britain and the United States has made English the unchallenged second language of Japan. Far more Japanese make a sometimes desperate stab at speaking English than attempt to speak all the other foreign languages of the world together, including Chinese. The Japanese government has done its best to make it the King's English which

is spoken in Japan, rather than American English, but the effort has met with complete failure. In pronunciation, the Oxford accent has been strongly pushed, but Japanese enunciation of English is usually so far from perfect that no one could tell whether the Japanese speaker were attempting to imitate an Oxford don or a Brooklyn Dodger. Most Japanese who claim a knowledge of English speak Japanese English pure and simple, and any resemblance to an Oxford accent or any of the American accents is likely to be accidental. If a Japanese has managed to progress beyond the usual Japanese mispronunciations, the chances are perhaps nine out of ten that he speaks American English rather than Oxford English.

As to vocabulary, thousands of English words have crept into Japanese, and all too frequently they reveal their obvious American origin. In a Japanese department store, or *depato* for short, or in an office building, which they abbreviate to *biru*, one rides up in an *erebeta*, not a "lift." One uses *gasorin* and not "petrol" in one's automobile. Passing a sandlot ball field, one will see the batter approach the plate after the traditional *uomingu-appu* period, while the crowd shouts for a *homuran*. Soon the crowd shifts to yelling *boru-pitcha* in an effort to rattle the pitcher by asserting that he throws only balls, but the umpire unmovedly announces his decisions: *boru*, *sutoraiki*, *auto*, and *sefu*. Yes, English in Japan, like most other borrowings from the West, is definitely Americanized, and the Nisei deserves no little share of the credit or blame for this.

In other ways, too, the Japanese-Americans have been an important factor in bringing the United States and Japan closer, though not always in an amicable fashion. China supplied the first cheap Oriental labor to our West Coast. Chinese were brought here in large numbers immediately after the gold rush had served to draw population to California and increase the demand for labor there, but within a few decades strong prejudices had grown up against them on the part of American workers in California, and in 1882 a federal law

was passed excluding them. The Japanese then began to take their place to meet the continuing demand for cheap labor in California. By 1890 there were 2039 Japanese in the United States, and during the next two decades the number jumped first to 24,326 and then to 72,157. Meanwhile, many more had been brought under the American flag by the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. The population of Japanese origin in the continental United States before the war stood at approximately 127,000 and that of Hawaii at almost 158,000, which was more than 37 per cent of the total population of the islands.

The same prejudice which had resulted earlier in the exclusion of the Chinese immigrants began to operate against the Japanese as soon as they had become an important group on the West Coast, and discriminatory legislation began to pile up in the statute books. In 1906 a San Francisco municipal law forced Japanese children to attend special Oriental schools, and in 1913 California passed a law barring aliens from owning land. This hit the Japanese farmers very hard, for they, as Asiatics, were not eligible for naturalization. Meanwhile, in 1907 and 1908 a solution of the basic problem of Japanese immigration had been amicably arrived at in the "Gentlemen's Agreement," by which the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports to Japanese laborers seeking to come to the United States. During the next decade and a half, more Japanese men left the United States than entered it, though Japanese women married at long distance to eligible Japanese bachelors in the United States entered in considerable numbers as "picture brides." Anti-Japanese sentiment, however, continued to mount on the West Coast, and eventually in 1924 Congress passed a law excluding outright all Japanese on the basis of race, as the Chinese had been excluded forty-two years earlier. In practice this meant little actual change in the situation, but Japan, which by this time was recognized as one of the world powers, regarded it as a national insult.

Thus, the humble Japanese immigrants had unwittingly stirred up violent animosities against Japan among many

Americans, which in turn had led to a growing feeling of resentment against America in Japan. And the Japanese-Americans themselves had been left in the unhappy position of a people marooned between two cultures, removed in geography and, increasingly, in habits and thought from the race of their origin, but not accepted as equals by the country of their choice. Even their sons and daughters, born in this country, found themselves in an anomalous position. Japan embarrassingly claimed them as her own, which in language and psychology they were not; but we Americans were reluctant, on grounds of race, to accept them on terms of equality as fellow Americans, which they definitely were.

Fortunately, this situation seems to be passing. As we have seen, the Nisei, despite their unhappy lot in America, proved to be successful though unintentional American ambassadors whenever they went to Japan. They have done more than that. By building up a magnificent record of good will, loyalty, and bravery during the recent war, they apparently have won for themselves the position of equality in this country which was at first denied them, and at the same time they seem to have restored in American minds a basic respect for the Japanese and the realization that character means more than race. Their quiet and loyal acceptance of the grossly unjust treatment they received during the war is now a well-known story. There was hardly a word of complaint from them when they were moved from their homes to relocation centers, our own enlightened form of concentration camps. Even better known is the glorious story of the heroic all-Japanese 442nd Regimental Combat Team in Italy, which won wide acclaim as "the most decorated unit in the military history of the United States," and the equally heroic story of the Nisei combat interpreters with our forces in the Pacific. The Nisei paid a heavy price in blood and suffering, but there is reason to believe that their sacrifices have not been in vain. Now scattered more widely throughout the United States than they were before the war, they have found a new position of equality in our society.

More than that, they have turned a source of contention and bitterness between the United States and Japan into a bond of understanding and mutual respect. In a broader context, they have helped to bridge the wide racial and cultural gap between us and our neighbors in the Far East, between the two ends of the earth in this now unitary world.

The immigration problem was not the only complicating factor in the contacts between the United States and Japan. Economic relations between the two countries made steady and uniformly favorable progress, with America becoming the chief consumer of silk, which was Japan's prime export commodity, and Japan becoming the United States' best customer in all Asia. More and more American businessmen as well as teachers and missionaries settled in Japan, and the cultural and intellectual contacts across the Pacific became steadily closer. A warmer friendship, however, did not result from these increasing contacts as neighbors. Instead an attitude of suspicion and hostility began to characterize Japanese-American relations, as it has the relations of so many other neighbors of longer standing.

The first American reaction to Japan had been one of curiosity and then of enthusiasm. Japan, which, though our neighbor, was after all at the other end of the civilized world from America, was a fascinatingly topsy-turvy land to us, quaint and exotic beyond belief. It was a land of cherry-blossoms and charming ways—a picture postcard land of beauty and quaintness. The whole-hearted Japanese enthusiasm for learning from us was flattering. Our admiration was evoked by Japanese perseverance and success in rapidly building up a Westernized state on the fresh ruins of a feudal order, when the rest of Asia seemed to be fumbling ineptly with the problem of modernization. Little Japan's military victory in 1894 and 1895 over China, the monster sleeping dragon of Asia, was greeted with the plaudits of the entire Western world. During her uphill fight against Russia, the colossus of the north, Japan had no more sympathetic friend than President Theodore

Roosevelt, that lover of a good fight, and there was no small degree of friendship in his action in engineering a peace treaty in 1905 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, before the shaky Japanese economy gave way and robbed Japan of the fruits of her military victories over the Russians in Manchuria.

4. DETERIORATING RELATIONS

But the Russo-Japanese War marked both the high-water mark of Japanese-American friendship and a sharp turning point in our relations. Many Japanese, in an excess of nationalistic fervor, felt that Japan had been deprived of the full fruits of victory at Portsmouth and blamed the United States for this supposed diplomatic defeat. More important, the Russo-Japanese War made Japan one of the two paramount powers of the Pacific area. The other, thanks to the Spanish-American War a few years earlier and the new American hold on Hawaii and the Philippines, was the United States. The great power vacuum of the far side of the world had been filled. For better or for worse, Japan and America now stood alone in the Pacific and face to face. Henceforth the United States Navy was the hypothetical enemy for all Japanese navy men, while Japan ranked first among hypothetical enemies in our navy circles. The friendly Occidental neighbor of Japan had suddenly become the potential adversary. The charmingly quaint and admirably quick Japanese had suddenly become for us the sinister Yellow Peril.

Soon, too, the United States and Japan found themselves clashing over conflicting interests on the Asiatic mainland. Japan, starting a little tardily in the game of empire-building, was determined to make up for lost time by an aggressive foreign policy, in much the same manner as Germany, another late comer to the game. Her early seizure of Formosa and the near-by Pescadores Islands from China in 1895 was accepted by the powers as being entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times. No one could quibble over her seizure from Russia


U S S R
U. S. S. R.
SAKHALIN
1905
KURILE IS.
MANCHURIA
1931
JEHOL
1933
KWANTUNG
1905
KOREA
1910
THE
JAPANESE
EMPIRE
CHINA
RYUKYU IS.
MARIANAS
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CAROLINE
FORMOSA
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in 1905 of Southern Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Territory at the southern tip of Manchuria. There seemed to be a certain grim justness in this, for Japan had won the Kwantung Territory from China in 1895, only to be forced to disgorge it a few months later by combined pressure from Germany, France, and Russia, who cynically helped themselves to pieces of China three years later, with Russia taking the disputed Kwantung Territory for herself. Even Japan's establishment of a protectorate over Korea in 1905 and the outright annexation of that land in 1910 evoked no protests from the rest of the world.

The days of easy colonial expansion in Asia, however, were fast drawing to a close. The tragedy for Japan is that, drunk with her first spectacular successes and carried away by her desire to rival the great colonial powers of Europe, she persisted in her attempts at empire-building despite the mounting costs. A nascent nationalism in China and the other colonial and semi-colonial lands of Asia was foretelling the end of empire, and in the face of new problems the colonial powers themselves were beginning to abandon the cruder colonial concepts of the nineteenth century. Great Britain before long had started her slow retreat from empire, which was so greatly accelerated by the granting of independence to India a few years ago. We Americans had briefly joined the scramble for empire when we took the Philippines from Spain in 1898, but, returning to our more traditional belief in the right of self-determination, we soon became the open opponents of imperialism in Asia, championing instead the twin concepts of the territorial integrity of China and the "open door" policy there, meaning by that term equal economic opportunities for all foreign business enterprises throughout China. While Japan still flirted with the idea of "carving up the Chinese melon" or, perhaps, even appropriating the whole of it for herself, we sought to preserve an independent China which would be open to American business enterprise.

The clash of American and Japanese interests in China be-

came acute during the First World War. Japan, as a member of the Allied coalition, seized the German foothold and concessions in the Chinese coastal province of Shantung. She also took gigantic steps towards us across the Pacific by capturing the German-held Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Archipelagoes, strung out for more than two thousand miles north of the equator. These islands Japan later received as a Mandate at Versailles. The war in Europe, by distracting the attention of the other great powers, also gave Japan the opportunity to exact from the Chinese in 1915 the greater part of a series of concessions, known collectively as the "Twenty-One Demands."

Naval and diplomatic rivalry between the United States and Japan was perhaps eased somewhat by the Washington Conference in the winter of 1921–22 and the accompanying Sino-Japanese agreement. The Japanese agreed to withdraw from Shantung, entered into multiparty understandings regarding China, in keeping with the American policy toward that country, and accepted an inferior naval ratio of 5–5–3 with the American and British navies. The effects of the Washington Conference, however, were short-lived. As has been previously indicated, our abrogation in 1924 of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" regarding Japanese immigration produced a deeply unfavorable reaction within Japan. Five years later the world-wide depression struck, putting national tempers on edge and straining international relations to the breaking point. In 1930 the Japanese entered into a second naval agreement at the London Naval Conference, but the reaction in Japan was intensely unfavorable, and within a year, on September 19, 1931, Japan struck in Manchuria, taking the first fatal step which led eventually to another world war and her own downfall.

The return of the Japanese at this time, after sixteen years of quiescence, to the now definitely outmoded concept of imperialistic conquest was in one sense the result of developments within the social and political fabric of Japan, which we

shall consider later, but at the same time it was almost as much the product of external conditions over which the Japanese had little control. The impact of the West on Japan had brought industrialization, which in turn had resulted in a rapid growth of population and increasing dependence on the part of the Japanese people on trade with the outside world. The world-wide depression, which followed the collapse of the American stock market in 1929, seemed to threaten the very existence of Japan. As panic spread and nation after nation threw up higher tariff walls to protect those markets it itself controlled, the Japanese were faced with the specter of total exclusion from the markets of the world. Our own depression-born animosity for the mark "Made in Japan" and our fear of cheap Japanese goods flooding our stores was more than matched by Japanese fears that, denied the markets of the world, Japan would lack the exchange to purchase abroad the food and raw materials needed for the daily life of her people. It was argued with telling force in post-depression Japan that only the great empires of the world could survive a world-wide depression, great self-contained land empires like the United States and the Soviet Union or sea empires like Great Britain and France, but not small and isolated Japan.

Unfortunately for Japan, her Asiatic neighbors, and ourselves as well, her first reëntry into the game of empire-snatching was unexpectedly easy and successful. Manchuria, where she had long had dominant interests, fell into her lap like the proverbial ripe apple. China was still too feeble to retaliate with much more than an economic boycott and bitter hatred, although a protracted and entirely pointless battle was fought between Chinese nationalist forces and the Japanese in the environs of Shanghai. The European powers, through the League of Nations, futilely censured Japan, which, by ignoring the report of the Lytton Commission the League had set up and by brazenly withdrawing from the League, dealt it its first fatal blow as an effective organ of international order. The United States made clear her uncompromising disapproval

of Japanese actions in China, but did nothing more. Thus, Japan's one powerful neighbor, immersed in her own compelling economic problems and dominated by a blind belief that she could isolate herself from the problems of the rest of the world, failed to act and by this failure permitted Japan and the world to rush onward toward the catastrophe which was soon to engulf us all.

Meanwhile, Japan had in February 1932 set up a puppet regime in Manchuria and at a minimal military cost had, for all practical purposes, absorbed into her empire China's most economically valuable provinces, with their overwhelmingly Chinese population of upwards of thirty millions. After the spectacular and easy gains of the so-called "Manchurian Incident," there was no stopping the advocates of imperialistic expansion in Japan—no stopping them until they had brought down the Far East in ruins upon the heads of the Japanese people.

It is disconcerting to note that deteriorating relations between the United States and Japan produced an increasingly ostrich-like attitude on the part of Americans. The more American and Japanese interests clashed and the more acute the disagreements between our two lands became, the more deeply and carefully we should have studied Japan and the Japanese, if not in an effort to understand them, at least in an effort to thwart them. Instead, we chose to ignore them, to attempt to make Japan insignificant by refusing to recognize its importance to us. Our reaction was basically emotional rather than rational. Instead of facing our problems realistically, we were almost like a primitive people attempting to vanquish their foes by sympathetic magic.

We grasped at straws of rumor to bolster our belief in the weakness of Japan. The result was a flood of entirely unfounded stories about Japanese ineptness and stupidity, passionately believed and gloatingly repeated by our self-appointed Far Eastern experts. The Japanese were so dishonest, it was said, that they had to have Chinese tellers in their banks. They

had some mysterious visual failing which made them miserable fliers. They insisted on building top-heavy warships which constantly turned turtle. They had slavishly copied the accidental imperfections of an airplane model obtained from the British, with the result that none of the planes built on that model would fly. This last story was the best-loved tale of all, turning up in a hundred variations, all based on thin air.

On the other side, our compulsive desire to believe the worst about the Japanese pushed us towards believing only the best about the Chinese. Any Chinese success against the Japanese was magnified out of all proportion to reality. Chinese guerrilla resistance alone, we were told, would be enough to destroy the Japanese war machine. Driven by dislike of Japan as well as by a natural sympathy for a people fighting heroically to maintain their freedom, we gradually built up in our minds an idealized picture of China, which, when turned to disillusionment by later events, has done much to sour Sino-American relations.

Our Army, Navy, and Foreign Service did train a few men in the Japanese language, but the outbreak of war soon revealed how pathetically inadequate our efforts in this direction had been. More careful study of Japan probably would not have been enough to avoid the Pacific War, but it might have enabled us to delay it and thereby make its opening phases less costly to ourselves. We paid a heavy price for letting prejudice blind us to the necessity of studying our enemies as well as our friends.

After five years of consolidating her gains in Manchuria, Japan returned to the offensive in 1937. An exchange of shots between Japanese and Chinese troops at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking on the night of July 7 of that year signalized the renewal of Japanese efforts to slice off pieces of China. It was also the curtain raiser for the final climactic act. Japan was now attempting to seize parts of the heartland of Old China, and the Chinese were determined to resist to the bitter end. In a huge country like China, the bitter end can be a long way

off. Chinese armies could not stop the better equipped and better trained Japanese military machine, but neither could Japanese bayonets kill the will to resist on the part of four hundred million Chinese. This time, there was no cheap and rapid success, as in Manchuria six years earlier. Instead, Japan found herself enmeshed in a long, costly, and inconclusive war.

Seizing the coastline and the major river and rail arteries of China was not hard for the Japanese, but making these conquests pay in the face of bitter guerrilla resistance and the sullen resentment of the Chinese masses was another matter. After four years of war, Japan in 1941 seemed further from victory than she had been at the outset. Worse than that, she was dependent on foreign sources for many of the sinews of war, and these foreign sources were gradually being closed to her. Oil in particular, oil to run her ships, planes, and tanks, was being denied her by the United States and the European powers, newly awakened by the outbreak of war in Europe to the danger of allowing aggression to go unchecked. Time was running out for Japan.

At this point, a situation which had been a reality for many years finally became quite apparent to everyone. America and America alone could stop Japan, or, to put it another way, only America stood in Japan's path to empire. On the surface Japan was far less deeply embroiled with the United States than with a number of other countries. For four long years she had been engaged in the seemingly endless task of conquering China. Japanese troops glowered at Russian troops across the long frontier between Manchuria and Siberia, and twice the Russians and Japanese had tested each other out in full-scale border battles. But the Soviet Union had its own problems and was anxious to avoid any major involvement of its energies and military power in the Far East. In September 1940 Japan became the open ally of the Axis Powers, which were already engaged in a life and death struggle with England, France, and Holland. The British and French concessions in the cities of China were a thorn in the side of the conquering

armies of Japan. After the fall of France, the Japanese bullied their way into French Indo-China. The Dutch and British colonial possessions farther south had the oil and other natural resources Japan so desperately needed to continue her war effort. In reality, however, America was more than ever Japan's one great neighbor and opponent. As long as the United States gave its moral support, the Chinese had hope and would fight on. As long as America stood firm, the other powers would stand with her, in the so-called ABCD coalition of America, Britain, China, and the Dutch, to frustrate the Japanese dream of hegemony over the Far East. The Japanese understood America's dominant role. When negotiations were undertaken in 1941 in a last-minute effort to avoid war, these negotiations were exclusively between the United States and Japan. When war came, the attack was directed primarily against our forces at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines.

Historians will long discuss the might-have-beens of the recent war and the critical years that preceded it. Obviously we were psychologically ill prepared to achieve the most in our negotiations with the Japanese. At the least, we could have postponed the Japanese attack, by subterfuge if necessary, until we ourselves were better prepared for it. With a clearer understanding of the Japanese mentality and Japanese problems, we might even have been able to do more. Certainly our basic insistence that Japan first withdraw from her conquests in China before we would discuss her own legitimate or fancied grievances, though diplomatically correct, was hardly skillful diplomacy. Bargains are not arrived at by insisting that one party make major concessions before the other party has revealed its hand. Be that as it may, the Japanese-American negotiations of 1941 were the one fundamental effort to settle the Sino-Japanese conflict and avoid a general war in the Pacific. When they failed, a war involving the whole Far East and every corner of the Pacific became inevitable.

So set had we become in our psychology of avoidance with respect to the Japanese problem that it took the outbreak of

war to awaken the American public from its indifference to Japan and to make us realize how important a neighbor she had become. The war in the Pacific, though involving a score or more of nations, was essentially a Japanese-American war. Some British, Canadian, and Dutch units were engulfed in its opening phases; Australian, Indian, and Chinese troops participated in the New Guinea and Burma campaigns; the Chinese continued, as best they could, their war of slow attrition throughout the length and breadth of occupied China; and the Russians came in during the last week of the war to smash the hollow shell of the once powerful Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Otherwise, it was almost exclusively an American war with Japan. American forces took the giant strides along the island steppingstones of the Pacific, until they reached the front door of Japan. American ships, submarines, and planes destroyed the Japanese Navy and the Japanese merchant marine. American B–29's burned out the heart of Japan. When the end finally came, it was but natural that an American general should receive Japan's surrender and that the United States should undertake the occupation of the defeated nation, creating, thus, a far closer and more vexatious bond than had ever existed before between our two nations.

3. Japan and America: The Problem

1. AMERICA'S BASIC OBJECTIVES

It is not true that wars never settle problems, but they often create greater problems than those they were fought to solve. The American forces moved into Japan with the light, springy step of self-confident men. When General MacArthur received the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, on board the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, the modern name for Edo Bay, where Perry's "black ships" had forced the reopening of Japan less than a century earlier, we assumed that our troubles were over. The basic problem of the Far East seemed to have been solved by bullets and a rain of fire bombs. Japan, which had run wild through China for over a decade and had plunged half the world into war, had at last been brought to her knees. The bad boy of the Pacific had been tamed. The rest of the Far East could now return to normalcy, free from the fear of Japanese aggression. The future seemed rosy. And yet in a shorter space of time than it had taken to win the war, that rosy future darkened into a series of thunderheads more ominous than any we had ever seen before. Japan and the whole Far East appeared to be mired in a bottomless slough of new problems, more difficult than the old, and the United States was more deeply involved in the Far East and its problems than ever.

Fortunately, we started off in Japan at least in the right direction, even if we did not have an accurate idea of what the future held in store for us. There was no false start as in

Germany, the other major postwar "bad boy," where we briefly toyed with a plan to reduce Europe's leading industrial power to an agricultural and pastoral economy. Naturally we were forced to abandon this plan almost before we had started to put it into execution. During the war, the economic and cultural isolation of Japan and the consequent de-industrialization of her economy, too, had been a popular concept in America. Dressed up in the colorful but grim phrase, "Let Japan stew in her own juice," it had seemed a fitting and workable solution for the Japanese problem. Reduced to its simplest terms, "stewing in their own juice" would have meant the starvation of a few tens of millions of Japanese, specifically that portion of the population which was in excess of what an isolated and therefore largely agricultural economy could feed, clothe, and house. Luckily for us, for the Japanese, and for the whole Far East, we had already faced the problem of trying to reduce Germany to a sheep pasture before we ever put foot in Japan, and we knew better than to make the same blunder again. Our leaders had come to realize that this would be no solution of our Far Eastern problems but would leave a permanently sick Japan, which was economically a liability rather than an asset to the shaky Far Eastern community of nations, a source of infection for its neighbors, and a hopeless invalid who in desperation might welcome the brutal surgery of totalitarianism.

During the hectic summer of 1945, after Japanese surrender had become clearly imminent, our policy-makers, working through the State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee, drew up a basic guiding directive for our occupation of Japan, known as the *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.* This document, which was radioed to General MacArthur on August 29 of that year, has proved itself to be a wise and practical statement of objectives. Broad in scope and flexible in detail, it has provided us with an over-all program which has proved to be sound in concept and on the whole feasible in execution. Despite rapid changes since the war throughout

the Far East and in American understanding of what international realities actually were, this document has remained as valid for the present situation as for that which our policy-makers thought they were facing in the summer of 1945. While most other American foreign policies have required serious revision since 1945, this one has stood the test of time and change.

The *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* outlined a three-point program. First came the demilitarization of Japan to prevent her from again disrupting the Far East by military aggression. Next was the more basic objective of creating "a peaceful and responsible government" in Japan, meaning, of course, a democratic government which, because of popular control, would be less likely than an authoritarian government to embark upon a warlike course. The final point was the realization that a peaceful and democratic Japan could exist only on the basis of a viable economy, that is an economy which would "permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met." These three basic principles make as sound policy in the present ideological tug-of-war as in the spiritually united community of nations we had hoped for as a result of the war. Changing circumstances both inside and outside of Japan have produced changing interpretations of some of the specific details of the policy, but they have not altered its basic spirit or objectives.

2. JAPAN IN A DIVIDED WORLD

Where our policy-makers made a bad, but thoroughly understandable, miscalculation was not in the internal problem in Japan but in the general world situation and Japan's relationship to it. We were convinced that the only serious problem in the Far East was Japanese military aggression and that Japan's complete collapse had solved this problem. With Japan prostrate, the rest of the Far East could quickly find its way back to stability and prosperity, while we altruistically experi-

mented with reforming the troublemaker. If we were successful, some day he would be allowed to return to the society of nations, a chastened and wiser citizen. If not, so much the worse for him. We were giving him a chance to reform, but the ultimate outcome was his concern, not ours. We were not vitally concerned, because Japan, once stripped of military might, could never again menace a united world.

The only thing wrong with this concept was that a united world failed to materialize, and the Far East outside of Japan, far from marching back toward stability and prosperity, broke out in a rash of civil wars and disturbances. Korea, restored in theory to independence after forty years of cruel Japanese oppression, was in reality divided between two mutually hostile occupying forces, which left behind them, when they eventually withdrew, two separate Korean governments, kept from each other's throats only by their own weakness and the seriousness of the economic and political difficulties each faced within its own territory. China, escaping from the curse of foreign invasion, was soon plunged into an equally destructive civil war, which left her economically exhausted. The Philippine Republic, suffering from political unrest which flared from time to time into open violence, was groping its way through a haze of economic uncertainty. French Indo-China was racked with civil war between the Communist-led Viet Nam adherents and the colonial authorities. The same picture repeated itself in Malaya, where British troops were striving vainly to stamp out Communist rebels. In Indonesia, the vast colonial empire of the Dutch, Republicans and the colonial authorities alternated between periods of negotiation and shooting, while the specter of communism lurked in the background. Siam pursued its accustomed stormy course of frequent *coups d'état*, while in Burma newly won independence soon disintegrated into a chaos of political assassinations, revolutions, and tribal uprisings. The economy of the whole Far East remained chaotic. There was starvation and misery throughout Asia. And over this whole scene hung the dark cloud of Russian

and American rivalry. The great powers were again arming. Once again there was talk of world war. Every political disturbance had its overtones of two-power rivalry, heightening the discords and injecting an ominous note into the rumblings of social and political change in Asia.

Obviously no world order existed in which Japan might some day take its place again. Certainly there was no community of nations in the Far East able to control even a drastically weakened Japan. Economically destitute and torn by revolutions, the lands of the Far East were no more capable of providing a firm international order than they had been before the war. The original problem of Japanese military aggression had not been solved for the future by the growing solidarity of the rest of the world. Instead, any unreformed Japanese militarist had ample reason to gloat over the discord among and the disruption within the various countries around Japan. The future seemed to hold out promising prospects for a Japanese return to military power.

We made another miscalculation in believing that China and the other lands of the Far East would quickly catch up in economic and military power to a bomb-gutted Japan, once the war was over. However destructive the war had been to Japan, she had not lost her basic economic strength in terms of industrial assets and the technical abilities of her industrious people. Japan is still the paramount economic power of the Far East and the only significant center of potential military power in that part of the world. Her neighbors, through war damage and civil disturbances, have lost proportionately as much as Japan. They have found difficulty in restoring even their feeble prewar economies and have been entirely unable to take advantage of Japan's defeat to achieve industrial equality with her. As a potential source of military power, Japan is perhaps as far ahead of them today as she was before the war. Without doubt, she will retain much of this lead for some decades to come.

The danger of Japan's reëmergence as a military power and

of the reëstablishment of her political and economic domination over her neighbors, however, should not be overemphasized. The threat is in no sense so grave as it is in the case of Germany. Japan, unlike Germany, is not the geographic center and natural economic heart of her part of the world. Neither is Japan at present—or potentially—so powerful a nation as Germany. Unlike Germany she does not heavily outweigh most of her closest neighbors in population but instead is numerically far inferior to two of them. Her ascendancy in the Far East has been to a large extent a historical accident rather than the inevitable result of geography. The Japanese, for a combination of reasons, got off to a head start over their Asiatic neighbors in acquiring new techniques from the West. Japan will eventually lose this temporal advantage, and China, far larger in size and richer in natural resources, will inevitably outstrip her some day.

More important is the fact that a shrinking world and the appearance of military powers of a new magnitude have transformed Japan from a giant among the military pygmies of Asia into a midget between the two great powers which flank her on either side. While Germany could possibly rise again to rival the United States and Russia, it is inconceivable that Japan could ever again threaten her neighbors, so long as both the United States and the Soviet Union disapproved. For fifty years a time advantage over her Asiatic neighbors and a spatial advantage over her more distant rivals gave Japan a dominant place in East Asia. The first factor, though passing, has not yet been eliminated, but the second has disappeared, and with it has gone the possibility of Japan's ever again becoming a truly first-rate power.

But this does not mean that an unreformed Japan cannot win back a position of relative dominance over some of her neighbors. For sixty years Japan fished with consummate skill in the troubled waters of the Far East, and no one can deny that once again the waters are mightily roiled up. Japan obviously can do nothing if both the United States and Russia

oppose her, but she could do much if either lent her tacit support, or if they simply managed to neutralize each other. Over a period of years, a skillful policy of playing the two great powers off against each other might prove very profitable to Japan. In a world divided into two ideological and power camps, the Japanese might find themselves in a very favorable bargaining position and might conceivably recreate their hegemony over the Far East.

A far more likely possibility, however, is that Japan may become, not an independent military power again, but a significant part of the balance of military power in a divided world. With the active support of either the Soviet Union or the United States, this could happen almost overnight. The other lands of Asia, lacking the industrial and technological foundations on which modern military power rests, will, even under favorable conditions, take decades to develop into centers of military power such as Japan already is. Obviously Japan is not of the magnitude of the three major centers of military power in the world—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe—but she ranks close behind the fourth center, the British Isles, and far ahead of any others. For all our wishful thinking, it is the other lands of Asia that might conceivably be considered as still remaining outside the major stream of world rivalries, but certainly not Japan. With their vast populations they inevitably will come to count in the balance of power, if not within the next two decades, then perhaps in the next half century. But Japan counts right now. Like Western Europe, she is potentially part of the present balance of power—not just that of the year 2000.

Strict control of Japan can prevent a Japanese military revival, but not indefinitely. Clearly this is only a temporary expedient. In the long run the only guarantee we have against a return by Japan to aggressive expansion in the Far East or a decision on her part to throw her weight against us in the balance of world power is a Japanese society which is neither drawn from within nor driven by external forces toward either

of these courses of action. We cannot assume, as we did at first, that Japan's ultimate fate is of no great concern to us or to the rest of the world. It is of vital importance to all of us, if in the future we wish to avoid old blunders and new and more disastrous tragedies to mankind.

There have also been other reasons why we have had to abandon the concept of a Japan on probation, living apart from the rest of the world and having no influence on it. It had been hoped that the other nations of the Far East, with the aid of the transfer of machinery as reparations from Japan, would soon establish their independence of the factory power of Japan, which, when reformed, would have to find a new place for itself in a now more equalized Far Eastern economy. Reparation transfers of machinery from Japan to the countries she devastated, however, have not been carried out on any significant scale because of technical and political difficulties, and have now been stopped entirely. The economy of the Far East is still flat on its back, and there is little hope of reviving it to prewar levels, much less of raising it to levels which would maintain even minimum standards of health, education, and economic security, without the reëstablishment of normal peacetime conditions and without the aid of the Japanese manufacturing facilities and know-how.

How to get Japanese machines working again for the economic recovery of the whole Far East has proved to be about as difficult a problem as the reëstablishment of peace in the revolution-torn countries of Asia. It took almost three full years after the war for Japanese industrial production to be restored to half of what it had been almost two decades earlier and a quarter of what it had been in 1944. For a variety of reasons, Japan has recovered economically far less than any other major industrial power in the world. Most of her Asiatic neighbors have been happy to see her in this condition. They fear that an economically revived Japan would restore her wartime economic control over them. Like Japan eighty years earlier, they are anxious to build up their own factories so that

they can compete with the economies of industrialized Japan and the West. In addition, they hate Japan for what she has done to them. They prefer to trade with any other country in the world rather than with Japan.

The result of all this has been a Japan living on American food and a Far East in the economic doldrums. Japan's factories, instead of providing her Asiatic neighbors with the manufactured goods they so badly need in return for the food and other raw materials Japan requires, have been lying idle and unrepaired. Somehow the normal flow of Far Eastern trade must be revived. The logical place to start is in Japan, with the restoration of Japanese factory power with which to produce immediately needed consumer goods for her neighbors and eventually the machinery they will require for their own industrialization. But there are two factors which make this no simple matter. There is the danger of again permitting the sort of economic exploitation of the less industrialized nations of the area which Japan attempted in the past. There is also the prejudice of many of Japan's Far Eastern neighbors against trading with her. Any investment in the industrial rehabilitation of Japan, before the economies of the other Far Eastern countries are fully restored, would naturally meet their determined opposition. We are confronted with a dilemma which may have no completely satisfactory solution. But, in any case, it is now quite clear that Japan cannot be cut off economically from the rest of the world if we want to see the Far East recover. However distasteful it may be to us, we cannot escape the conclusion that, even in defeat, Japan remains the pivot of Far Eastern economy.

In the political field, we have held strictly to the concept that Japan is an international pariah to be excluded from world society until reform has made her a fit associate for the other nations of the world. Our occupation authorities have rigorously isolated Japan from normal international contacts, while they pushed through reform after reform, designed to bring Japan up to a hypothetical world standard. But the unrealities

behind these assumptions are now all too apparent. There is no accepted world standard. The only policy all the victor nations share with regard to Japan is the purely negative one of demilitarization. The United States has been true to its ideals in attempting to shape a democratic Japan, with emphasis on the inalienable rights of the individual, a government responsible to the people, and as much free enterprise as can be reconstructed in the economic chaos of postwar Japan. But these are hardly Soviet standards. The Russians, with their rigid view of clear-cut spheres of influence, have apparently been willing to defer to the United States on most decisions affecting Japan, but, through the Communist movement within Japan, they have steadily fought our basic policies there. From the Communist point of view, the United States is not attempting to bring Japan up to a recognized world standard but is simply attempting to create an ideological ally, more or less resembling itself.

3. JAPAN IN ASIA

When we compare American objectives in Japan with political realities elsewhere in Asia, the discrepancy between actuality and theory is still greater. Even before the war, Japan was the only significantly industrialized nation in Asia, the only one with a well-established system of universal education, and the Asiatic country with the greatest practical experience in democratic forms of government. Aided by the catharsis of military defeat and the tonic of American reform policies, she now shows more promise of approximating Occidental standards of democracy within the foreseeable future than do any of her Asiatic neighbors. Instead of attempting to bring her up to a standard commonly accepted by the nations of the Far East, we are in reality attempting to push her even further ahead of them and closer to the standards of the Western democratic world. Japan, as the disturber of the peace of the Far East, is obviously in need of reform in a way the other

countries of Asia are not, but her very ability to be the aggressor in Asia was the result of her greater advancement in Western techniques over her neighbors. She is still the pioneer in Asia, economically, educationally, and, if democracy has any future in Asia, then in the political field as well.

Viewed in this light, the American reform program in Japan cannot be considered to be merely an altruistic experiment, the outcome of which is of little direct concern to us. Unless we are willing to let Japan go her own way, or else to try to force her down to the low economic levels and confused political standards of her Asiatic neighbors, or perhaps to abandon her to the all too clear standards of the Communists, we are obviously committed to attempting to bring her up to our own democratic standards. The Russians are right in believing that we seek to make Japan an ideological ally. Believing in our system and deploring the Soviet, the only thing we can honestly do is to work for a Japan conforming as much as possible to democratic principles, even if these are not universally accepted standards. Japan is a great ideological battleground, and the outcome of the battle there has the greatest significance for us. We are anxious to prove that democracy is an article for export, that it can work and will work beyond the borders of the few really democratic states of today. We want to prove that the rest of the world does not have to turn to the seemingly simpler totalitarian panaceas of communism or fascism. We are anxious to have another people firmly on the side of democracy, one more nation to help keep the preponderant weight of the world behind the ideals of individual freedom and the acceptance of majority decisions in both domestic and international affairs.

This same ideological struggle repeats itself in various lands of Europe, but in Japan it has added significance. No one doubts that, if the Dutch and Finns can be thoroughly democratic, so also can the Germans and Poles. Their basic cultural backgrounds are sufficiently close. But Asia is a different matter. No non-Caucasian people has ever made democracy oper-

ate successfully. Throughout Asia democracy is given much lip service, but democracy, in terms of the direct control of government by all the people of a nation through the agency of direct and free elections of those who have political power, seems something of a chimera, an admirable ideal, perhaps valid in the West, but at best of only limited applicability in countries where the masses are illiterate and primarily concerned with finding their next meal. Democracy to many in Asia, while a glamorous concept, seems to be a rather peculiar political product of one of the more peculiar corners of the world. Obviously the people of northwestern Europe, with their blue eyes and "red" hair, are different from men in general. Is it surprising that they and their cultural and racial extensions overseas should have a peculiar type of society which does not fit the more normal people of the world? Unquestionably many of Asia's leaders understand and sincerely believe in democracy, but even to some of them it often seems a rather distant and uncertain goal, while benevolent despotism, always the Asiatic ideal and now provided with a startling array of powerful new techniques, stands ready at hand as an inviting and apparently easy short-cut. There is far more need for a demonstration that democracy works in Asia than there is in Europe, and this is what makes the whole experiment we are embarked on in Japan so important to us and to the world.

We Americans have only slowly begun to be aware of the significance of the task of reforming Japan we assumed so blithely in 1945. Whether we like it or not, we are engaged in a great experiment to prove that democracy is better than communism in Japan and, more than that, to prove that democracy holds out promise for all of Asia. Whether or not we recognize the nature of the experiment makes no difference. Every Japanese understands the situation; every Communist is watching what we are doing in Japan and is hoping we will fail; and the billion-odd people of Asia, while unconscious of the momentous experiment, will be profoundly influenced in the long run by the demonstrated success or failure of

democracy in Japan. We may feign indifference to the outcome, but it affects us deeply. If we fail, we had better revise drastically our hopes for all of Asia. The collapse of our policy in China showed clearly that American foreign policy is bankrupt when the choice is only between two different brands of authoritarianism. If democracy is impossible in Asia, we must resign ourselves to the prospect of the democracies remaining permanently a numerical minority in the world. If democracy does hold out hope for Asia, then we shall have to prove the point first in Japan. Our reform program there is not being carried out in a vacuum, isolated from the rest of the world. We and the Japanese are standing together on the stage of history, and the eyes of the people of the whole world are on us.

Perhaps the best way to understand how deeply concerned we are with the success of our program in Japan is to consider briefly what are the alternatives to success. The simplest and perhaps the most likely form of failure would be a situation in which American-inspired reforms, though partially successful, failed in the long run to maintain living standards at a tolerable level or failed to operate efficiently enough to win the mass of the people to a continued support of democratic institutions. Even though unrest did not develop to the point of revolution or result in drastic revision of the democratic political framework we have given Japan, still, if economic conditions were intolerable, if society were unstable and people restive, if the government were corrupt or merely ineffectual, America would be judged to have failed in Japan. Worse than that, democracy might be judged, at least by some, to have failed in Asia. Asia would tend to turn away, all the more, from the way of life we believe in and which we hope to see spread more widely in the world.

Such a state of semi-failure of our reforms could very well develop into a situation even more repugnant to us and disastrous to American foreign policy. A frustrated and disillusioned Japan could all too easily revert to the authoritarian

and militaristic concepts of the past and resume the pompous march down the glittering road toward totalitarianism. The details of a revived totalitarian system might differ from those of the prewar years; the symbols, the names, even the theories might be changed; but, as long as it meant rejection of the realities of democracy and a return to militarism and authoritarianism, it would be a catastrophic defeat for American policy, recognized as such by all Asia. Nothing could discredit America more in the eyes of the people of the Far East than to have American reforms end up by producing a revamped dictatorial and militaristic Japan.

This disastrous situation could result as easily from a bad choice on our part as from the failure of our policies. Some Americans, obsessed with their fear of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and mindful of the demonstrated fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier, dream of Japan as a military ally of America or at least of Japanese mercenaries fighting for the United States. To a military man, whose primary concern is to prepare for the wars we hope we do not have to fight, such concepts do not necessarily sound unreasonable. They are perfectly feasible, because the Japanese for the most part dislike Russia and admire the United States and would be only too glad for a chance to fight their way back into the good graces of at least part of the world.

We should not forget, however, that no matter how feasible it would be to make Japan our military ally, it probably could not be done without seriously endangering Japanese democracy. In view of Japan's strong militaristic tradition and the record of recent history in which the Japanese Army played the leading role in scuttling the young and still very imperfect democratic institutions of prewar Japan, it would be too much to hope that Japan could be both a military and an ideological ally. As the former, she might render the United States valuable aid, if war were to come in the next few years, but she would unquestionably render us a greater disservice by driving the rest of Asia away from us and presumably into

the other camp. As an ideological ally, she could be of inestimable value in strengthening the cause of democracy throughout Asia. The choice to any but the narrowest of military minds should be an obvious one. No matter how devoted a military ally Japan might be, if we were to sacrifice democracy in Japan and the friendship of the rest of Asia to make her this, we would have made a sorry bargain indeed.

A third way in which we might fail in Japan would be if she abandoned the path of democracy for the more easily followed road to communism. This could come about as a result of frustration and gradual disillusionment with democracy within Japan and the consequent espousal of the Communist creed by the desperate masses as a more promising way to prosperity and happiness. In Japan, with its strong authoritarian traditions, this picture is not a difficult one to conjure up. Communism could also come to Japan as a result of Soviet pressure or, conceivably, invasion. This second possibility, though perhaps remote today, indicates still another aspect of our involvement in Japan. As long as Japan remains militarily defenseless, as she is now, and as long as there is no real international order, it would be folly to leave her exposed to invasion or foreign coercion. If she is to lack arms herself —and there are, as we have seen, good reasons why she should be denied them—someone else, presumably ourselves, may have to undertake certain defense commitments.

In any case, no matter how communism might come to Japan, the Japanese acceptance of it in place of democracy would be a signal defeat for United States foreign policy and for democracy in general. There would be serious repercussions throughout Asia both for us as a nation with world-wide interests and for democracy as a way of life for all peoples. More than that, Japan, which is still Asia's only major industrial nation and the only potential military force of major significance, would then be arrayed in the opposite camp. We may not be able to revive Japan's military power, even if we wished to, for fear of killing democracy there, but the

Communists would be faced with no such problem. Militarism and communism go perfectly together. A Communist Japan would not only be a major political defeat for the United States, but it would also be an added menace to the security of our country and the whole democratic world.

4. JAPAN AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM

Some may feel that this analysis of our problem in Japan errs in making it an American rather than an international problem. The occupation of Japan is in theory an allied occupation, and General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP, is actually an international figure and not merely an American administrator. The supreme policy-making body for Japan is not the United States government, but the thirteen-power Far Eastern Commission in Washington. What of China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Australia, the Philippines, India, the Netherlands, France, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Burma? Ten of these states have been members of the Far Eastern Commission since its inception, and Pakistan and Burma became members on November 17, 1949. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China share with us the veto power in this body, and the same three powers also sit with us in the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo. Large contingents of Australian troops and some from New Zealand and India, acting in behalf of the whole British Commonwealth, have also taken part in the military occupation of Japan. Why then consider the reform of Japan purely or even primarily an American commitment? Why assume that the failure of the reforms would discredit the United States any more than Great Britain, China, or the Soviet Union?

Perhaps the best answer to all this is, "Would that it weren't so, but it is." We might be better off today if the reform of Japan were really an international project, but the simple truth is that, behind the sham façade of international control,

the occupation of Japan has been and still is essentially an American venture. Of course, the whole world is concerned more or less directly in the result, and the other democracies share with us a very specific interest in its success, but there is no denying the bald fact that from the start the occupation has been an American show.

General MacArthur, despite his glorified international title of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, is also the Commander-in-Chief of all United States forces in the Far East and has made no pretense of not being essentially an American pro-consul in Japan. American troops have had the primary responsibility for taking over and policing Japan. Chinese and Russian units were to have joined them in this task but never did, because of civil war in China and mutual distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union. British Empire forces did come to Japan to undertake the military control of an important sector of western Japan, but they remained only a minority element among the tactical troops in Japan, without any direct involvement in the execution of the all-important reform program. MacArthur's huge staff of experts and advisers in Tokyo has always been overwhelmingly American, and so also have been the military government teams scattered throughout the nation. The few individual exceptions—a lone Australian Brigadier among the higher echelons in Tokyo, an occasional British oil expert, Italian scholar, or French secretary in the huge bureaucracy of the occupation—have only served to highlight the obvious fact that the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is almost as exclusively American as the average federal agency in Washington.

More important than the personnel in Japan is the fact that all occupation policies have been based on or have grown out of the *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*, which, while conforming to the simple terms of two international pronouncements—the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, and the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945—is essen-

tially an American policy statement. The Far Eastern Commission came into being only as a result of the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, four months after the United States had started to implement her own policies in Japan. Although the Far Eastern Commission was made in theory the supreme policy-making body, with the right to review all of General MacArthur's actions and directives as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, its hands were tied from the start. The United States' veto power in the Commission could effectively block any attempt to censure General MacArthur or make him reverse actions already taken. Similarly, no established United States policy for Japan, even if not yet implemented, could be changed without American consent. The United States could even continue to make new policy decisions unilaterally, because the Moscow Agreement stated that "the United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission."

Thus, in reality, the Far Eastern Commission could do little more than discuss and then approve, but not disapprove, previous American policy decisions. On June 19, 1947, it eventually adopted, with only minor changes, the *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* as its own basic policy. The Commission has exercised a certain restraining influence on American policy-makers, but only infrequently has it had any positive influence on the formulation of major policies. Desiring to preserve the dignity of international organizations, if not their efficacy, the members of the Far Eastern Commission have accepted its frustrating and impotent position with surprising good grace. The sessions of the Commission have been unusually amicable for a postwar international body and the veto has been used infrequently. The Far Eastern Commission has gradually settled down to a genteel position of pompous futility. It has powers which would make it difficult for the United States on its own initiative to modify fundamentally

the nature of the occupation or to terminate it, but the Commission has never had the capacity itself to control the occupation or formulate basic policies for it.

The case of the Allied Council for Japan is even sadder. Limited in its duties largely to consultation with and advice to the Supreme Commander, it degenerated almost at once into a debating society, in which the American and Russian members carried on an acrimonious argument in front of the embarrassed British and Chinese representatives. Then it lapsed into a moribund state. W. Macmahon Ball, for a year and a half the British member of the Council, has placed the blame for its failure primarily on us. He accuses General MacArthur's representative on the Council of having "treated it with frivolous derision" and General MacArthur himself of having "omitted to consult it on many major questions." Mr. Ball concludes that, "In these circumstances, it was inevitable that the Council should have been on balance a failure, and at times a fiasco." *

Despite the list of international controlling bodies and the theory of international participation, neither we nor our Allies on the Far Eastern Commission have had any illusions about the essentially American nature of the occupation. Throughout the world it is frankly regarded as an American undertaking, the success or failure of which will be chalked up in large letters to the credit or debit side of American foreign policy. Particularly in Japan, where omnipresent realities outweigh the verbiage of international documents, the man in the street never thinks of the occupation as being international. How could it be, when it is so manifestly and so completely American? For better or for worse, Japan is in our hands, perhaps as a sort of unregulated trusteeship on behalf of the Allied powers as a whole, but still in our hands and no one else's. Our position there is not very different from that of Russia in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, however dissimilar our motives may be. Economic collapse or revolution

* W. Macmahon Ball, *Japan, Enemy or Ally?* (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), p. 33.

in Poland or Hungary would, of course, be interpreted as a failure of Russia and of communism. In Japan they would as clearly mean a defeat for America and for democracy.

Perhaps it would have been wiser if we had never had the temerity to assume the whole responsibility for Japan ourselves, but it is too late to change this, now that the reform program has crystallized into law and has reached the crucial stage of testing through practical experience. The record of four-power control in Germany does not indicate that thirteen-power or even four-power control in Japan would have been as good for Japan herself as has been our undivided responsibility for the situation, but it might have been better for us. It might have saved us from our present crucial involvement in the future of Japan. We would not now be in danger of suffering a colossal foreign policy defeat as a result of failure there. In other words, we would not be so far out on what is at best a very slender and brittle limb.

But how precarious, then, is our position in Japan? How likely are we to fail outright or, at least, to fall short of full success? Ever since the end of the war our ears have been filled with the alternate shouts of triumph of the optimists over the obvious success of democracy in Japan and the dismal moans of the pessimists over the complete failure of our reforms. What is one to believe? General MacArthur and his aides have never lacked positiveness in their claims of success, and they unquestionably have had a remarkable degree of success to point to. The occupation has gone more smoothly than anyone would have thought possible. The Japanese have welcomed us with almost embarrassing friendliness and disquieting docility. Reform legislation has been adopted swiftly, easily, and in monumental quantity. On the surface, certainly, things are going very well. On the other hand, there are tremendous obstacles in the path of democracy in Japan, which, taken together, make an easy optimism seem puerile.

First of all, there is the problem of whether or not Japan, regardless of the political and economic system she eventually

chooses, can maintain any satisfactory standard of living in the future. She cannot grow enough food to feed all her people. She cannot produce the greater part of the fibers from which she must spin clothes for her millions. She has very little oil or iron and is lacking in adequate quantities of most of the other minerals and raw materials needed to maintain a modern industrial economy. Nylon has destroyed most of the demand for silk, the one major export item she produced entirely within her own boundaries. All she has to offer on the world market is her own energy—manpower and the energy of coal and water. With these she can transform imported raw materials into goods for reëxport. The slim margin of profit from this reëxport trade must be sufficient to pay for all the imports Japan must have to support her own people. To do this, Japan's export trade must be huge. But where is she to find her markets in a divided world and in a Far East disrupted by revolutions and bitterly determined not to trade with her? Japan's situation is basically similar to England's but infinitely worse. She is far less richly endowed with the vital resources of coal and iron than are the British Isles. She is less highly industrialized. She has no overseas empire to aid her but instead an international legacy of distrust and hate. And she has almost twice the population of Great Britain to support on her more meager resources. The economic situation in Japan may be fundamentally so unsound that no policies, no matter how wise, can save her from slow economic starvation and all the concomitant political and social ills that situation would produce.

There are other reasons for pessimism. History tells of no case in which an occupation of one country by another produced within a short span of years a sincere conversion to the beliefs of the conquerors on the part of the conquered. Many would say categorically that military occupation can never be successful. Of course, history perhaps has no precedent for the curious relationship existing between the United States and Japan. There have been many cases of conquest of closely related and associated people by each other; there have been

colonial conquests by people of one culture with clearly superior military power over a people of another culture; civilized peoples have been overrun by barbarian hordes; but never has an Occidental land conquered and occupied an Oriental land of comparable military, economic, and intellectual advancement. There are no exact precedents, but the less specific parallels in history offer no cause for optimism.

Japan's particular cultural background, also, suggests that democracy may find it very barren soil. Once already within the past half century it has been tried and rejected there. The unparalleled docility of the Japanese masses and their willingness to follow any strong leadership, while giving us a false sense of rapid success in Japan, make a poor basis for democracy. Few people in modern times have reveled so openly in blatant militarism as the Japanese. Few, if any, have subscribed so wholeheartedly to the authoritarian ideal. Elements of a culture cannot be interchanged any more easily than parts between different makes of automobiles. Either democracy fits in with a whole complex of factors in Japanese society, or else it doesn't fit at all. There is little evidence in Japanese history that democracy will find in Japan a congenial milieu already made for it. It takes no anthropologist to tell us that there will be difficulties.

After our policy blunder in China, no one can look at the situation in Japan without misgivings. Have we stumbled blindly into another hopeless situation? Are we facing another costly policy defeat? We believe that, if we are successful, the cause of democracy will be tremendously aided throughout Asia. But, if we fail, the cost for us in Asia will be colossal. There can be no turning back at this point. All we can do is to see it through as wisely and as vigorously as we can.

But in the meantime, the vital question remains, "What are our prospects for success?" We Americans have usually attempted to answer this question primarily on the basis of our varied estimates of what we ourselves have done in Japan since

the war. Because of ignorance about the Japanese and a natural egocentrism, we have often overlooked an even more vital factor—the Japanese themselves. The materials are as important as the plans of the architect. You cannot build a skyscraper with mud and wattle. Some peoples in the world today, though inherently no different from the rest of us, are utterly incapable of living democratically, simply because well-entrenched habits of conduct and thought produce a social environment in which democratic institutions could not survive. They are not necessarily inferior to us because of this. They are simply different, and the differences are so great that they cannot be overcome quickly.

Are the obvious differences of the Japanese from us and the rest of the Western world so great and of such a nature as to make democracy unworkable in Japan? Will the Japanese be capable of maintaining a democratic society even after we have decreed one for them by fiat? Will they even want to have a democratic system? No one has a sure answer to these questions, but, in order to be able to make a reasonably intelligent guess, we should first look at the basic economic and social framework of Japanese life, at the physical realities of the livelihood of the Japanese and their psychology and habits of thought, and then consider the postwar record in Japan in the light of these fundamentals.

PART II THE PHYSICAL SETTING

4. People and Land

1. INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE

Japan and the United States in many ways make a curious pair. The discrepancy in size alone between these trans-Pacific neighbors makes them seem not like just a Mutt and Jeff combination but more like two lands which are so different in size as to be different in species. Japan, with less than 150,000 square miles of land surface, could be fitted into the continental United States twenty times over. The state of California alone could accommodate the whole of Japan, though a fairer comparison might be to the combined areas of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. But this is, of course, a crude two-dimensional comparison of a sort which would dwarf Great Britain beside the dead vastness of Greenland and equate France with Madagascar. National size is not simply length by breadth but has the added dimensions of natural resources, population, technical skills, and productive capacity. In fact, in measuring the strength of countries, population is certainly more significant than land surface, and productive capacity, which, in a sense, is the product of the multiplication of population times technical skills times natural resources, gives the clearest single figure for relative national size.

In thinking of countries, we tend to visualize maps, which by their very nature represent land surfaces rather than these

other dimensions. We should have more maps showing population, natural resources, and productive capacity. Perhaps frankly distorted maps depicting each area in proportion to its population or productive power would help to correct the distorted picture in our minds of the relative size of the lands of the world. Such maps would immediately show small Japan to be one of the larger countries of the world, not so large, of course, as the United States, but ranking not far behind her. A considerably pruned postwar Japan still stands fifth or sixth in population in the world, surpassed only by such colossi as China, India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Before the war she did not rank much lower than this in the key category of industrial production. Here she outstripped both China and India, but yielded place to Germany, Great Britain, and France, as well as to the United States and the Soviet Union. But rank her fifth, sixth, or, because of her notable weakness in natural resources, even as low as tenth; Japan still is one of the great countries of the world, even though, next to Great Britain, she is the smallest in land area of all the great powers. The United States and Japan, though by no means evenly matched, do not make the elephant and mouse combination our maps would show.

Thus, Japan is, in a way, a giant among nations, but she is an unhappily misshapen one in that her people far outbalance her land and natural resources. Today over 80,000,000 people are crowded into her narrow islands, or rather, into the narrow valleys of her narrow islands. Japan's precipitous mountains make beautiful scenery but leave little space for her farmers. In fact, even today only about 16 per cent of the land is cultivated. No country, not even the teeming lands of India, China, or Java, equals Japan's record of almost 1900 members of the purely agricultural population to each square mile of cultivated land. The average Japanese farmer has less than one-fifth as much land to cultivate as the average farmer in Belgium, the West's most densely populated country. Include Japan's huge cities, and she has more than 3400 people per

square mile of cultivable land, putting her far above all competitors as the world's most crowded land. She has more than twelve times as many people to feed per square mile of farm land as the United States and approximately one-third more people to feed per acre than a thoroughly industrialized and urbanized land like Great Britain, which depends heavily on imports to meet her food needs.

Of course, even in agriculture, length and breadth are not the only dimensions. One must also take into consideration the fertility of the soil, the amount of rainfall or other water resources, the length and intensity of the growing season, and the efficiency of the agricultural methods employed. Japanese soils, on the whole, are not very fertile and would probably be left in part unworked, if they were found in countries more generously provided with agricultural terrain. The rainfall in Japan, however, is plentiful, the growing season is both long and intense, and the Japanese have applied to their agricultural problems unstinting labor and agricultural skills which, while seemingly backward when compared with the mechanized farming of our country, have succeeded in grubbing from the soil as close to its maximum possible yield as man has ever been capable of producing.

There is ample rainfall in most parts of Japan, but the industrious Japanese, not content with this alone, have utilized the heavy water run-off from their rugged mountains for irrigation wherever feasible. Rain-soaked fields, which could grow good crops of wheat or barley, can, through irrigation, grow even more solid fields of wet-field rice, the grain which gives the largest yield per acre. The investment in labor is great, but it is worth it to the Japanese, if a larger crop can be realized from Japan's minuscule fields. As a result, virtually all of the flat bottom lands of Japan are inundated by a network of small channels and dikes to form wide stretches of rice paddies, and smaller patches of flooded rice fields creep up most small valleys and ravines, and wherever water is available even climb the steep slopes of the hills in progressively

narrower and higher terraces. Every scrap of land which can be made into a paddy field has been converted into a miniature swamp. The Japanese, by extending irrigation to its physical limits, have made the best use of their great asset of water and have thus added another dimension to their narrow fields.

With all this emphasis on paddy fields and rice, the Japanese inevitably are rice-eaters, as are most of the other peoples of southern and eastern Asia. Since prehistoric times rice has been an important crop in Japan, and today about half of the cultivated area is given over to rice for at least part of the year, and it constitutes well over half of the total value of farm produce. "Cooked rice" and "a meal" are actually the same word in Japanese. A Japanese feels that he must have rice three times a day and plenty of it. Lacking the variety and richness of the American diet, he depends on rice in quantities which would seem ludicrously excessive to most Americans to provide him with energy for his daily tasks.

Despite the extremely deep snows of northern Japan, most of the country is subtropical. Lying on the eastern fringe of the Eurasiatic land mass, it enjoys roughly similar climatic conditions to the comparable latitudes of our own East Coast, which has the same general relationship to the North American continent. The one major difference is that Japan, being an island country, has a somewhat more oceanic and less continental climate. Cold snaps tend to be less severe than on our East Coast and rainfall heavier. But, on the whole, the northern island of Hokkaido approximates New England in climate, northern Honshu our middle Atlantic States, and the bulk of Japan the South Atlantic States from North Carolina to Georgia. Saved from our devastating cold snaps, much of Japan thus enjoys a very long growing season, and double cropping is practiced extensively both in upland fields and in rice paddies wherever it is possible to drain them adequately in winter. While double cropping is impossible in the extreme north, in some sections of southern Japan virtually every field bears two crops a year. This, of course, means more back-


JAPAN
COMPARATIVE LATITUDE and PRINCIPAL CITIES
80°
75°
70°
W. of G.
65°
45°
40°
35°
30°
140°
130°
E. of G.
135°
Tokyo 6,581,000
Osaka 3,394,000
Nagoya 1,247,000
Kyoto 1,177,000
Kobe 1,006,000
Yokohama 866,000
Cities 100,000-400,000
(1939 Figures)

breaking labor, but it adds still another dimension to the meager land resources of Japan.

Japanese methods of agriculture, involving as they do an immense amount of arduous hand labor, seem primitive and inefficient to most Americans. With our simple faith in machinery, we often feel that mechanization of agriculture in Japan would not only save labor but would also increase production. Unfortunately, saving labor in a densely populated land like Japan means nothing unless the labor saved can be profitably employed in other tasks, and the concept that production can be increased by mechanizing farming is a complete fallacy as far as Japan is concerned. Tractors are used to a slight extent in the island of Hokkaido, but they are of little use in the narrow hillside terraces and tiny paddy fields that make up so much of Japan's farm land. And even on the broader stretches of flat fields, mechanization of the sort common in this country would on the whole decrease the yield rather than increase it. Machines have not been invented which till the soil as effectively as the great Japanese hoe with its two-foot blade. Nor have machines been invented which can equal the skill and loving care of the individual farm wife transplanting rice seedlings by hand. It would be as practical to mechanize the growing of flowers around an average suburban home in this country as to mechanize a Japanese farm. Japanese farming is really gardening, with the prolific farmer and his family lavishing as much work and care on each square yard of their land as an American family would on its prize flower bed. Farming by tractor could only make sense in Japan if two-thirds or more of her present farm population could be gainfully employed elsewhere and if great new sources of food were available to her.

Actually, Japanese farming stands at a high level of achievement, given the special relationship of man to land existing in Japan. The tools and techniques used, while recklessly extravagant of manpower, make the most of every cultivable scrap of land, which is as it must be wherever men are overabun-

dant and land is scarce. Machines are used on a small scale for certain farm tasks but only where they do not reduce the yield. With government aid, better seeds have been developed and are utilized widely. Most important of all, fertilizer, which is essential to make Japan's infertile and overworked soil produce, is used lavishly and when available in close to maximum quantities, considering the cost of fertilizers, which has in recent years risen to about 20 per cent of the total cost of agricultural production in Japan. While chemical fertilizers and soybean cakes from Manchuria were commonly used before the war, the most universally available and therefore most widely used fertilizer in Japan, as in most of Asia, still is night soil. In the tight Japanese economy nothing can be wasted. As the cities grow, they require more food, but at least they produce in return more night soil with which to grow more crops and incidentally to impart that unfortunate olfactory atmosphere to Japan's farm lands which contrasts so sharply with their pleasant visual impression. All in all, Japanese farming techniques, though backbreaking and literally malodorous, produce virtually all that Japan's poor land could possibly grow under present conditions of scientific knowledge. Because of these intensive gardening methods, as well as Japan's plentiful rainfall and long and hot growing season, farmers throughout most of Japan produce two or three times as much per acre as most farmers in the drier, colder, and less labor-saturated lands of western Europe.

There is little hope that the yields from Japan's present farm lands could be greatly expanded in the near future or that food crops could be increased at the expense of less essential agricultural products. Already the grim struggle of man for food has forced the Japanese to a greater concentration on direct food crops than in almost any other land. An isolated Japan once produced her own cotton and hemp, but world trade now permits her to import most of her clothing fibers and devote the land once used for them to food. The only non-food crop of any importance in Japan is mulberry leaves,

used to feed silk-worms, and these are grown largely on sandy upland soils, which, although capable of producing good sweet potato crops, could not grow much rice.

Japan does not even devote a large part of her area to the indirect and less efficient production of food through the growing of fodder for meat and dairy animals. That is a luxury she cannot afford. Instead, the Japanese eat fish, caught in the rich coastal and deep-sea fisheries around the islands, which, in a sense, extend their economic area by many thousands of square miles. What little land the Japanese have must be devoted to the production of the maximum number of calories, which means rice wherever possible and the other grains and vegetables where rice cannot be grown. It also means cultivating every plot of land, however small or barren, and coaxing from it the highest possible yield, no matter how prodigious the expenditure of labor required.

2. THE RATIO OF MEN TO LAND

Japan's food resources cannot be greatly increased by expanding her farm lands. Japan, in sharp contrast to the United States, has been a densely populated land for hundreds of years. In 1800, after almost two centuries of very slow population growth, she had close to 30,000,000 inhabitants, which was about three times as many as England and Wales at that time. The vast majority of these people were peasants, who even then occupied the arable land of Japan as fully as do their descendants today. The present agricultural population of Japan is considerably larger, but it has proportionately more to support it. There are the new fields of the frontier island of Hokkaido, which land-hungry Japanese peasants have gobbled up only in the past century. There are also larger yields per acre as a result of new manufactured and imported fertilizers, better seeds, more scientific knowledge, and better tools.

With the exception of Hokkaido, Japan's farm land has been

fully exploited for centuries. In fact, in their desperate effort to wring from the land the last bushel of rice or pound of sweet potatoes, the Japanese have long since passed the reasonable limit of profitable cultivation of the soil. No scrap of land is too small to be ignored. An abandoned roadway, the triangle formed by the convergence of two railroad tracks, the space between the foundation stones of a burned-out house—all are used to produce their quota of food. The indefatigable Japanese peasants have hacked their way up their boulder-strewn hills, leveling off with painstaking care pathetic yard-wide fields several hundred feet up the precipitous slopes. They have cut back the lower fringes of the hills to broaden the fields below. They have converted their tidal swamps into rice fields in a slow, bitter battle against nature. Ambitious drainage projects might add a few more square miles to Japan's farms, but no measures, however heroic, could possibly expand tillable acreage at the rate her population has been increasing. Japan was agriculturally an overpopulated land two or three centuries ago. The unbalance between man and land is even more drastic today.

During the two and a half centuries of rule by the Tokugawa Shogun, the population remained almost as stable as Japanese politics. An isolated Japan, dependent upon her own food resources, had hit the Malthusian limit. The poverty-stricken peasants were forced to practice a type of *ex post facto* birth control. This was called *mabiki*, an agricultural term meaning "thinning out," which referred to the tragic necessity of thinning out the children in a family through infanticide. Japan's reëntry into the world and her subsequent industrialization made it possible for her to concentrate her energies on her most productive specialties and to trade her manufactured goods for food from abroad. The Malthusian limit was raised, with the result that the population spurted from around 30,000,000 to more than 80,000,000 in less than a century. But there could be no comparable increase in arable land or the over-all productivity of Japanese agriculture.

Population growth has followed hard on the heels of the advancing Japanese economy and has far outstripped Japan's ability to feed her people from domestic sources. Japan today, with all the benefits of modern science and all the hard work of her industrious peasants, simply cannot produce enough food to feed 80,000,000 people, except at the barest starvation levels. She must feed approximately five people per acre of her infertile soil. For many decades now there has been a fairly steady deficiency of about 15 per cent in Japan's domestic food supplies, which has had to be met by imports. As Japan's population continues to grow, a more efficient and scientific agricultural system might conceivably prevent that percentage from increasing but it probably cannot diminish it. Japan, like England, faces a permanent food deficiency, and therefore, again like England, she is a country which depends directly and unequivocally on large-scale world trade to feed her people.

This heavy proportion of men to land over a long period of time has had profound social effects in Japan. For one thing, it has kept the farmers desperately poor. The rural population, which just before the war still formed virtually half of the total, is largely made up of a poverty-ridden peasantry, lagging decidedly behind the rest of the nation in its march toward modernization. Japan's new factories have not been able to draw to the cities more than the yearly increase in population. They could not drain the excess population from the farms. While Japan as a whole became a modernized and industrialized nation, her peasant masses were left behind, living not far above the miserable economic levels of feudal days. Moreover, by threatening to glut the labor market, they kept urban labor down to these same pitiful levels. The result has been something new and as yet unique in the world—an industrialized nation supported by the toil of people living not far above the subsistence level. We have yet to see how typical this picture may become of Asia as a whole and what the consequences will be for the rest of us if it does become the general pattern for the Asiatic half of the world.

An excess of men and a dearth of land have produced high rent rates in Japan. These have been accompanied by the inordinately high taxes on agricultural land through which the government was able during the past century to finance much of Japan's spectacular industrialization and the modernization of her war machine. High taxes tended to force peasants to mortgage part of their lands in bad years, and high rent rates often forced them then to sell the rest. The result has been an alarming growth of tenancy. High rents, however, have not been the result of any unusual depravity on the part of Japanese landlords but have been merely the normal outcome of Japan's particular economic conditions. Where labor is plentiful and land scarce, the agricultural worker has little bargaining power, and the landowner holds the cards. With rents averaging well over half of the annual crop, the rich grew richer and the poor poorer, until they hit the bedrock of the existence level. Japanese farms average only two and a half acres in size, even including the relatively large farms of the less productive north, but many peasants could not maintain their hold on even these miniature patrimonies. Before the war, almost half the arable land was tenant-operated and over a quarter of the peasants owned no land at all. At the other end of the scale, less than a tenth of the landowners held over half of the farm land. There was a dangerous dichotomy in rural society between a fairly small class of well-to-do landowners and the mass of the impoverished peasants. The minority controlled the majority not only economically but politically and spiritually as well. The bulk of the rural population simply continued the age-old pattern of following without question those who so clearly dominated their destinies.

The pattern and history of landownership in modern Japan, however, should not be compared, as it so often is, to that of the great feudal estates of eastern Europe before the war. With less than 1 per cent of Japan's landowners possessing as much as 125 acres of farm land, few if any of these agricultural holdings resembled in any way the Junker estates of Prussia

or the broad lands of the Polish and Hungarian nobility. Nor were they often owned by nobles or descendants of the privileged classes of feudal times. The Japanese feudal lords of a century ago depended largely and often almost exclusively on the agricultural productivity of their domains. The privileged samurai class of hereditary warriors, who served as officers and retainers under these feudal lords, were usually paid in turn in the rice produced from their lord's domains, but they did not normally have any direct control over specific tracts of land. Moreover, when the lords and samurai surrendered their feudal privileges in the early Meiji period, they were paid off in government bonds and cash, thus losing for the most part all direct contact with the land.

Even under the Tokugawa, the peasants' payments to their lords amounted virtually to taxes, and they were effectively used as such by the early Meiji government, after it had abolished the feudal framework. Capitalism was already so far advanced in late feudal Japan that many peasants had lost full title to their lands through mortgages to a rising landowner class, consisting of richer peasants and petty industrial entrepreneurs of the rural areas. The outright ownership of these lands by this new class was legally recognized by the Meiji government, anxious to abolish all feudal claims on the land and to create a uniform and simple system of landownership. As early as 1873, about 31 per cent of the land was tenant-operated, and the rate of tenancy grew steadily under the combined pressure of high taxes and high rents, until it reached 48 per cent in 1929. Since then its growth has been checked, and in the 1930's tenancy even receded slightly to 47 per cent as a result of national legislation by a government which had finally become aroused to the plight of the peasants.

The grinding poverty of the lives of Japan's peasants, however, remains unchanged and, perhaps, unchangeable. Tenancy itself may be diminished or even abolished by law, but the conditions which created it cannot be altered so easily. Some of the symptoms may be eliminated, but the basic disease will

remain. A two-and-a-half-acre farm is too small to support a family at a reasonable level of well-being. And there are not even enough two-and-a-half-acre farms for all the farmers who need them in Japan or to produce the food to feed 80,000,000 people. Japan's land problem is insoluble in and of itself. Inevitably the Japanese have been forced to approach the problem from its reverse side as a population problem, because if the land and the food it produces are not elastic quantities, the solution to the problem must be sought by somehow reducing or at least limiting the number of people the land must support.

3. THE POPULATION PROBLEM

The population problem has long been a tragic one in Japan. Today, with Japan's economic and political place in the world greatly reduced, it is more terrifying in size and baffling in complexity than ever before. Various solutions have been proposed for Japan's population problem, some of them speciously by protagonists who utilized it as a justification for Japan's foreign aggressions. To them the simple fact that Japan had too many people was excuse enough for her to conquer her overpopulated neighbors and appropriate for her own people the positions of wealth and authority these countries could provide. But even at its height, the Japanese Empire offered only a partial and temporary cure for Japan's basic ill, while spreading a new and more virulent infection abroad. Japan's foreign conquests did absorb a significant number of men with technical education, who, if left jobless at home, might have been a source of social and political unrest within Japan. They drained off some of the more adventurous and less tractable citizens of the land who might have been troublemakers at home. But they did not reduce overpopulation in the Japanese islands. Even with strong government backing, few Japanese farmers wished to emigrate to Korea, Formosa, or Manchuria to compete with Korean and Chinese peasants accustomed to a still lower standard of living than the Japanese. Even at the

height of the war, with about 6,000,000 soldiers and civilians abroad, the pressure on the overworked soil of Japan was not eased. And, in any case, how could Japanese overpopulation justify the exploitation of the people of other overpopulated lands for the benefit of the Japanese?

Japanese emigration without the aid of the flag has been no more successful than empire snatching as a solution for the population problem. It is inconceivable that Japanese immigration would be permitted anywhere in the world on a large enough scale to change the balance between men and land in Japan. The experience with Japanese immigration into the United States is perhaps typical. The entrance over a period of twenty-odd years of a few tens of thousands of Japanese, perhaps as many people altogether as are added to Japan's population every month or so, was enough to embitter Japanese-American relations for decades and bring war that much closer. Even the thinly populated lands of South America have been willing to take only very limited numbers of Japanese and a half-empty country like Australia almost none. Clearly the more established lands of the world will not absorb Japan's excess population.

The case of the underdeveloped and underpopulated colonial lands of the tropics is not so clear-cut. As seen from the Japanese point of view, there is no reason why the English-speaking peoples, who have actually multiplied during the last century and a half at a far more rapid rate than the Japanese, should have had the right to appropriate for themselves most of the lightly populated parts of the world which enjoyed a desirable climate, while the Japanese are excluded not only from these areas but also from the less desirable and still empty lands of the tropics, simply because they became candidates for emigration a century or two later than the English-speaking peoples. They naturally look toward the great unexploited islands south of them, such as New Guinea and Borneo, and dream of a New Japan which will redress the unhappy balance of the old. But, whatever may be the ultimate justice of the division

of land and riches among the various peoples of the world, there is little possibility that Borneo or New Guinea will ever solve Japan's population problem. For one thing, there is the simple political reality that other peoples, including the present inhabitants, have prior claims to these areas. And, even assuming that they were thrown open to all peoples, immigration from other overpopulated Asiatic lands might leave little room for the Japanese. In any case, the difficulties and cost of successful emigration to the tropics would necessitate so slow a movement of people as to make possible only an insignificant reduction of the population pressures already built up within Japan's tight little islands.

In the long run, the only possible solution of the land-population problem in Japan is population control. If the land cannot be expanded, the population will simply have to be tailored to fit it. This can be done in four ways—by the age-old automatic controls of disease and famine, by conscious control through infanticide, as during the Tokugawa period, by the automatic reduction of births by changing social customs, such as the postponement of marriage, or by the reduction of births by artificial methods of birth control, against which the Japanese may have social prejudices but no religious scruples. One or more of these factors will inevitably become operative to keep the Japanese population within the inexorable bounds set by geography.

The one bright spot in the dismal population picture in Japan is offered by the graphs showing that the birth rate and, with it, the rate of population increase may be beginning to drop. Perhaps Japan too will follow the population curve already established by the more thoroughly industrialized lands of the West, like England. England's rate of population-increase during her period of rapidly expanding industrialization and urbanization equaled any records Japan has been able to produce more recently but then gradually leveled off. Social changes incidental to urbanization and industrialization are usually given the credit for this process. If these same forces

operate in Japan and if she follows this same course, some day her population may automatically stabilize itself. If not, there can be nothing but disaster ahead for the Japanese people.

But even if a balance between births and deaths is finally achieved, this will not come about until well after the 100,000,000 mark has been reached—until the unbalance between land and people is just that much worse than it is today. There already is a big overhang of population beyond the agricultural foundations of the land, which can be only supported by foreign trade. That overhang will inevitably grow far greater before it reaches stabilization. Already Japan's national structure rests heavily on industry as well as on agriculture. In the future, industry must bear an even greater share of the load, because agriculture can carry no more. With a fixed agricultural base and a growing population, the vital question for Japan is the future of her industry and foreign trade.

5. Men and Machines

1. NATURAL RESOURCES

The miracle of modern Japan has been her rapid and dramatic industrialization during the past century. Her fate during the next several decades depends on the ability of her industries to continue to bear the increasing load of population, which agriculture cannot carry. An industrially growing Japan might be able to maintain reasonable standards of living for an expanding Japanese population—a foundation of well-being without which no democratic structure could long stand. An industrially stagnant Japan could only mean starvation and unrest. The agricultural potential in Japan is an all too rigidly fixed quantity. Population growth is an alarming but predictable hazard. The future of Japanese industry is the unknown factor which spells the difference between a healthy nation and chaos.

Modern industry depends on three essential elements—men to operate machines, power to run them, and materials to be worked on by them. Japan is adequately supplied with only the first two. She lacks the materials to feed her machines, and in this lack lies the great question mark regarding the future of Japanese industry and of Japan herself. Japan's whole imperialistic course over the past several decades and the recent war itself can be interpreted as an effort by the Japanese to snatch from others the materials she herself lacked. Defeat and the altered balance of power in the world have put a permanent end to this attempt by the Japanese to build a solid

basis for Japanese industry at the expense of other peoples. We have yet to see if any other solution of the problem is possible and if Japan, with only men and power at her disposal, can compete industrially with countries which have men, power, and materials.

Japan is lavishly supplied with men, but her sources of power, though sufficient to have enabled her to become a first-class industrial nation, are far from abundant. As in every other important manufacturing area of the world, coal has been the major source of power in modern Japan, accounting for over nine-tenths of Japan's power fifty years ago and perhaps two-thirds of it before the war. Without relatively large quantities of easily accessible coal, primarily in northern Kyushu, Hokkaido, and along the coast of Honshu north of Tokyo, Japan could never have started on her amazing climb to industrialization. But her coal resources fall far below those of her major industrial competitors. Although she is at present the greatest coal-producing country of East Asia, her per capita reserves are only about one-fortieth those of Germany or Great Britain and an infinitesimal fraction of those of the United States. Even at her present rate of consumption, they will last only a century or two. If in the future her industries require much more coal than in the past, or if the Japanese were to abandon their Spartan custom of living in virtually unheated houses all winter and were to start to use coal for domestic heating purposes, the reserves would vanish far more quickly. Moreover, much of Japan's coal is of poor quality and occurs in very narrow and broken seams, which are both difficult and costly to work. She is deficient in anthracite and was forced in the past to import coking coal for her steel industry. Thus, Japan, though possessing fairly large reserves of coal, had to look before the war to Korea, Manchuria, China, and French Indo-China for roughly 10 per cent of the coal she consumed.

The situation with regard to petroleum, another major power source, is much worse. With only small fields along

the northwestern coast of Honshu and in Hokkaido, Japan could not supply even one-tenth of her prewar needs. Although much of this prewar demand was for her army and navy, even a completely demilitarized Japan will require heavy imports of oil. The Japanese do not have tractors but wield the less costly hoe. They do not have the luxury of private automobiles for commuting and pleasure-riding but rely on trains, streetcars, busses, and the ubiquitous bicycle. They have few trucks and very few good roads for transporting interurban freight but utilize instead cheap coastal and inter-island water transportation and their efficient rail system. But they still cannot get away from the internal combustion engine altogether. Municipal and rural bus lines and some short-distance trucking are unavoidable in any modern nation. Wartime conversion of taxis, busses, and trucks to cumbersome charcoal-burning devices offers no permanent escape from the need for gasoline. And in other fields the demand for oil is even more pressing. Industrial lubricants will still be required, and Japan's huge fishing fleet, which has made the high seas a passable substitute for the prairies and steppes of broader lands, runs for the most part on imported petroleum. Oil is a vital deficiency in the Japanese economy, and it must be supplied from abroad.

The third source of power in Japan affords a more optimistic picture. This is water power, which, while quantitatively limited, fortunately is inexhaustible over the years. Japan's rivers, which are all short, shallow, and subject to extreme seasonal variation of flow, are for the most part worthless as communication channels, but, in their precipitous descent from the mountainous core of Japan, they provide a cheap source of power which the country desperately needs. The heavy rainfall on Japan's mountains, thus, can first be utilized for hydroelectric power before it fills the irrigation ditches of the lower valleys and narrow coastal plains. The Japanese were quick to exploit this power source and have harnessed a high percentage of their streams over a large part of their exploitable descent.

Japanese hydroelectric dams and power stations are quite different from those of the United States. There are no Boulder Dams or even any long and massive barriers like those on the Tennessee. There are few large reservoirs. Instead, their dams are usually unimpressively small but efficiently placed barriers to trap the waters of a mountain stream, which are then piped along the side of the steeply descending valley until the pipes suddenly drop down to a small hydroelectric station near the stream-bed below. Almost at once another dam snatches the water out of its normal channel, and the process is repeated. Japan's longest river, the Shinanogawa, has ninety such plants along its 229-mile course. Japan, thus, has hundreds of hydroelectric power plants, which, though usually tiny in scale, in the aggregate make Japan probably the world's fourth largest producer of hydroelectric power, surpassed only by the United States, Canada, and perhaps the Soviet Union, which are all lands of far grander scale and incomparably greater rivers.

Over four-fifths of Japanese electricity is generated by water power, while coal-burning thermoelectric plants are utilized to a large extent as auxiliary stations, primarily to offset the deficiencies of hydroelectric power during the drier months. Japan's balance between hydroelectric and thermoelectric power, thus, reverses that of the other major industrial nations, easing in this way the strain on her indifferent coal supplies. Cheap hydroelectric power, over half of which is applied directly to industrial purposes, has come to provide about one-quarter of her total power supplies. Next to Japan's abundant population, it is perhaps Japan's single greatest industrial asset, without which her industrial future would indeed be black.

If coal is the major source of power for industry, iron is its most essential material. Mankind entered the iron age more than two thousand years ago, and we still today live in a civilization held together by steel girders. All of the great industrialized areas of the world, almost by definition, have

great supplies of iron ore—that is, all except Japan. Her known resources of iron ore are so small that they would not last the United States three months, and most of them are found in deposits so insignificant and so scattered throughout her rugged terrain as to be scarcely worth mining. In recent years more than six-sevenths of her iron ore has come from abroad, largely from Korea, China, the Philippines, and Malaya. This means very long haulage, but, since much of Japan's coal is found virtually at tidewater, the over-all transportation costs are probably no greater than the combined water and rail hauls to bring iron ore and coal together in the United States or the shorter rail hauls in parts of industrial Europe. There remains, however, Japan's need to purchase large quantities of iron ore abroad if she does not wish to make even more costly outlays for pig iron or steel.

Japan's shortage of iron ore is not offset by rich supplies of any other industrial minerals. Her hydroelectric capacity makes her a natural producer of aluminum, but she is dependent upon foreign sources for the necessary bauxite. For many centuries, including even her period of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world, she was an exporter of copper, but in recent years domestic demand has caught up to the output of her low-grade mines. She has some gold and silver and an exportable surplus of sulphur, but is markedly deficient in virtually all of the other minerals, importing about two-thirds of her zinc, three-quarters of her tin, and nine-tenths of her lead. A demilitarized Japan may have less demand for iron ore and some of the other metals, but she will clearly remain a heavy importer of ores and minerals.

Japan's supply of materials for light industry is only slightly better than in the case of the heavy industries. Until recently, spinning and weaving were the backbone of her machine production, employing about half of her factory workers two decades ago and accounting at that time for almost two-thirds of her exports. Japan, however, does not produce a large part of the fibers she uses. Once she grew her own cotton, but the

opening of Japanese markets after 1858 to cotton grown in countries far better suited to its cultivation rapidly drove out the domestic product, and the land once used for cotton has long since been shifted to food crops. Cotton spinning and weaving, Japan's two largest industries a decade or so ago, depended entirely on imported raw materials. The smaller woolen weaving industry also had to be fed from abroad, for Japan never has produced wool. Only in silk did she produce her own fibers. Her hardworking peasants, living off the stony uplands of the central mountain massif of Honshu, proved to be the most efficient producers of silk in the world, and Japan soon captured a major share of the world trade in silk. Unfortunately for her, however, silk makes a relatively costly fabric, and the demand for it has always been limited and in recent years has almost vanished as the result of the development of rayon, nylon, and other artificial fibers. With silk no longer a major article of foreign trade, Japan faces the prospect of becoming even more dependent than formerly on foreign sources of raw material for whatever she can salvage of her textile industry.

Of course, Japan can manufacture at least some of the artificial fibers which are threatening her silk market. Before the war she was for a short period the world's largest producer of rayon. Rayon and staple fiber goods, however, are made from wood pulp, and Japan, even before losing the southern half of the island of Sakhalin to the Soviet Union as a result of the war, was dependent on the United States, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries for some of the pulp she consumed. The problem of wood pulp brings us to the larger and more vital problem of Japan's over-all wood resources.

Next to men and the power resources of coal and water, wood is probably Japan's greatest natural resource. With over half the land devoted to forest, Japan is among the more heavily forested of the civilized countries of the world and unquestionably the most heavily forested of the populous lands. Her poverty in agricultural land has meant a larger proportion of

terrain preserved from the farmer's hoe. The country is rugged, but little of it is too high for forest growth, and relatively warm temperatures throughout most of the forest lands plus ample rainfall everywhere mean excellent growing conditions.

But the ratio of men to forest land in narrow Japan, while not so disastrous as the ratio of men to agricultural land, is precarious. The per capita acreage of forest land is only about one-fifth that of the United States. With timber lands so limited and with so little else to treasure, the Japanese have been forced to tend their forests with a care undreamed of in a land like ours, which has been more bountifully provided by nature. Up until the outbreak of war with China, attempts were made to cut no more than the annual growth, and reforestation over the years had gradually expanded the forest area. In the three southern islands, artificially planted forests account for about one-fifth of the total, making curious patterns of symmetrical rows of conifers, like some great corn field, in the mountain fastnesses of Japan. Careful cutting and planting practices have spread over the hills a patchwork pattern of different types and sizes of timber, resembling the patchwork patterns of agricultural land. The ratio of men to land in Japan has left man's imprint even on her wild mountains and rugged hills.

Japan is almost as dependent on a maximum yield from her forest lands as from her farms. While far richer in wood than are many of the lands of Asia and Europe, she depends upon her wood supply for greater and more vital services than does any other nation. The chief of these is for building material. Eighty million Japanese live in houses built primarily of wood. Despite tile, thatch, or tin roofs, mat floors, paper and glass sliding partitions, and walls made in part of mud plastered on bamboo lattice, wood forms the framework and bulk of the building materials in every house. The frequency of serious earthquakes throughout the land makes the utilization of stone or brick for houses somewhat hazardous. Lightly built wooden houses will sway safely with the motion of the tremor, where

more rigid walls of stone or brick crack and fall. Only steel-framed office buildings and reinforced concrete offer a better answer to the earthquake menace than wood. With inexhaustible supplies of cement and sand available, the Japanese can build permanent concrete structures which will gradually replace many of their wooden buildings, thus relieving their forests of the necessity of providing materials for the periodic reconstruction of their flimsy wooden houses, which are destroyed in huge numbers by disastrous urban fires and more slowly but also more inevitably every few decades by the elements. In time, then, this major drain on Japan's wood resources can perhaps be diminished, but other demands will remain and even grow.

As an industrialized nation, Japan needs huge quantities of wood for railroad ties, telegraph poles, and mine timbers. The petty handicraft uses of wood and bamboo, which must be classed with it as a forest product, are numberless. Short of other materials, the Japanese use wood and bamboo for a thousand things for which we can afford to employ more costly materials. Japanese buckets may not be oaken but they are still made of wood. Simple wooden chopsticks take the place of our more complicated cutlery. Bamboo, an unbelievably versatile material, turns up in hundreds of surprising and ingenious uses. Japan also depends on wood, normally converted into charcoal, for what little heating her houses have and for cooking fuel wherever city gas supplies, made from coal, are not available. The Japanese, by holding their hands and wrists over charcoal braziers or by placing their feet in or close to specially designed heating devices, derive a considerable amount of warmth and cheer from a tiny spot of heat in an otherwise frigid house. But even this niggardly use of charcoal, when 80,000,000 people are involved, means a great demand for wood. This in turn necessitates scrub growths suitable for making charcoal on many mountain lands which might otherwise grow real timber.

And over and above these direct uses of forest products is

the growing demand for wood pulp. The Japanese have had a famous paper industry for about a thousand years and have developed some ingenious uses for paper. Pasted on sliding partitions and screens, it is an important architectural material. Long ago the Japanese, who suffer a great deal from winter colds, developed the sanitary use of fine paper tissues in place of the handkerchief. As a nation of voracious readers today, they absorb huge quantities of paper for books, magazines, and newspapers and would use far more if they could get it. As a great producer of paper as well as rayon, Japan's capacity for pulp consumption is almost unlimited.

With such demands for both wood and pulp, Japan inevitably needs more than she can produce. As already noted, she has had to purchase some of her pulp abroad, and she has been importing roughly one-quarter of her lumber. Wood is a major Japanese resource, but, as in the case of her domestic supplies of food, there may be a permanent shortage. In time, further reforestation and more scientific forestry can increase the yield considerably, but, even with a reduction of wood consumption in domestic architecture, the over-all demands for wood and pulp may remain in excess of production.

2. INDUSTRIALIZATION

Such a listing of Japan's industrial assets inevitably emphasizes her deficiencies instead. The wonder is that the Japanese were able to industrialize at all in the face of these lacks. Her tremendous manpower resources in no way distinguished her from the other major lands of Asia, and, in any case, excess population has often operated rather as a hindrance than as an aid to industrialization. Her power resources were meager by the standards of the other industrialized nations and her material resources wholly inadequate by any standards. And, despite these drawbacks, Japanese industry has been forced to provide, in the face of determined competition abroad, sufficient salable exports to pay not only for her deficiencies in food, cotton,

wood, rubber, iron, and various other vital materials to be consumed at home but also for the vast bulk of the materials out of which her exports were fashioned. How under these circumstances was Japan able to outstrip all the other Asiatic lands in the rapidity and thoroughness of her industrialization and make herself a rival of the major manufacturing nations of the West?

This question is by no means easy to answer. The more difficult the problem of industrialization becomes for Japan's Asiatic neighbors, the more miraculous her success appears. Perhaps part of the answer lies in the rather nebulous field of national characteristics. As we shall see, the Japanese have done much to make their dogged belief in the superiority of will power over matter seem plausible. Another part of the answer may lie in the realm of basic historical factors. The Japanese somehow were better able than the other Asiatic peoples to make a smooth transition from relative isolation to membership in a world society dominated by the economic and political patterns of the West. They were able to devote all their efforts to reconstructing Japan, while their Asiatic neighbors were dissipating their energies in perhaps unavoidable but certainly profitless friction. The result was a temporal advantage for Japan over the other Asiatic lands which Japan was quick to exploit. The best explanation of Japan's success is the head start she got over her neighbors. If China, for instance, had somehow managed to industrialize first, Japan might have found her own industrialization a much slower and more painful process.

Two seemingly minor factors contributed greatly to Japan's vital head start. One was that Japan's coal resources, though not particularly rich, were close to the sea and therefore could be transported cheaply. If an extensive rail system had been necessary before this essential power source could be exploited, Japan's industrialization might have been considerably delayed. The other factor was silk. A contagious silkworm disease had blighted the silk industry of Europe shortly before the opening

of Japan, and thus there was an immediate demand for Japanese silk and silkworms when Japan was first opened. Silk reeling also happens to be an industry which can be mechanized quickly and cheaply. Hundreds of small filatures soon sprang up throughout central Japan, producing a uniform product which was definitely superior to the hand-reeled silk of the other Asiatic countries. A great cash export was thus provided Japan just when she needed it most to pay for the early stages of industrialization. If the European silk blight had not come just when it did, if silk reeling were not an easily mechanized industry, or if present silk substitutes had existed eighty years ago, the Japanese attempt to industrialize might have encountered insuperable financial obstacles.

With the quick start provided her by coal and silk, Japan went on determinedly and rapidly to expand her industrial base. She built up a communications network which far excelled that of any other Asiatic land. She concentrated heavily on cotton spinning and weaving, which are relatively easy industries to establish. Building up these and the other light industries at a fantastic rate after 1880, she soon found herself far ahead of her neighbors in industrial skills, experience, and equipment, at a time when they were taking only their first hesitant steps towards industrialization. She also lengthened her industrial lead by utilizing the military power it gave her to seize near-by territories, which she exploited in such a way as to derive from them maximum support for her own economy.

But the industrial advantages of a quick start could not be maintained indefinitely. Japan enjoyed no permanent economic advantages which could prevent her neighbors from eventually establishing their own light industries which would inevitably cut deeply into Japan's essential export trade. To keep her advantage, she was forced to forge ahead into new and more complicated industrial fields, which her less experienced neighbors could not develop as rapidly as they could the light industries. For this fundamental reason and also because of a

more immediate desire to build up her war machine in preparation for further conquests, Japan, during the 1930's, swung rapidly from light industry as her primary manufacturing base to heavy industry, the chemical industries, and the manufacturing of fine machinery. In this way she developed a new type of export market which might not be lost so quickly as her textile markets.

Japan's industrial progress, thus, has been no steady, inevitable growth, based solidly on obvious economic advantages, as in the case of America's rise to industrial leadership. It has been more like the erratic progress of a broken-field runner, fighting his way against great odds by a quick getaway, brilliant improvisations, and daring reversals of the field. Utilizing to the fullest her one advantage over the West of cheap manpower and her one advantage over Asia of greater industrial skills, she has threaded her precarious way toward industrialization between the far greater industrial potential of the West and the still cheaper labor of the rest of Asia. With her industry-swollen population, there can be no turning back. She cannot even stand still, for her less industrialized neighbors are always threatening to catch up with her and wipe out the technical advantages on which her people now live. The Japanese are engaged in a desperate "Alice in Wonderland" race with time, and there is no end in sight. To stay where they are, to live at all, they must keep forging ahead industrially to ever greater productive levels and higher technical skills.

Japanese industry, which has only men and power to support it, will inevitably be forced more and more into the fields in which materials count least and labor and skills count most. Japan must go increasingly into the fields in which her cheaper labor costs give her an advantage over the West while the greater skills of her workers give her the edge over the rest of Asia. This means less emphasis on textiles and a growing emphasis on industrial art products, precision instruments, fine machinery, shipbuilding and ship repairing, and the like, which

require a high ratio of skilled labor to materials. But even with the most careful rationalization of her industrial potential, the future of Japanese industry is certainly precarious. Even with determined efforts to maintain technical leadership over the rest of Asia on one side, balanced on the other by a willingness to accept a far lower standard of living than the industrialized peoples of the West, the Japanese have ahead of them, at best, a very uncertain future.

But, whatever may be the ultimate fate of Japanese industry, it has already laid a heavy imprint on Japan and the Japanese. It has made Japan into a land of huge cities and sprawling factories, of whirring machines and crowded commuters' trains. Today Japan boasts two of the eight or nine largest cities of the world and four more which have around a million residents.

Urbanization, however, is not a strictly new phenomenon in Japan. It has merely been greatly accelerated by the industrialization of the past century. Even under the outwardly feudal regime of the Tokugawa, Japan had her great and small cities. Edo, the modern Tokyo, had a population of about one million at the beginning of the nineteenth century, making it then, as now, one of the three or four largest cities of the world. Such a huge city in a supposedly feudal land can be explained only by the high degree of political centralization which underlay the feudal façade. Each feudal lord was forced to maintain at least one mansion in Edo, where he spent about half of his time and his family remained permanently, while the Shogun, in addition to maintaining his tremendous castle, the central core of which at present forms the spacious Imperial Palace grounds in Tokyo, supported a vast and complicated governmental structure to administer his own broad lands and supervise the other feudal domains, which collectively ruled over almost 30,000,000 people.

Another great city, Osaka, showed the extent to which domestic commerce and handicraft industries had grown beyond the bounds of a feudal economy. Although a purely

commercial city, Osaka before the opening of Japan had a population approaching a million. Then, there was Kyoto, the ancient capital of the emperors, dating back to the end of the eighth century, which survived as a city of fine handicrafts after its decline as a political center. And all the many castle headquarters of the feudal lords were surrounded by thriving administrative and commercial towns, which have grown into the medium-sized cities of today. Japan in 1800, though an outwardly feudal land, was almost as urbanized as were the leading industrial countries of the West at that time. It is not surprising that, with the advent of machines, Japanese cities have kept pace with the cities of the Western world in size.

The cities of Japan tend to be more geographically concentrated than those of most other lands. All her great cities and the vast bulk of her industries lie in a narrow coastal strip on the southern shores of Honshu from Tokyo to the tip of the island and then continuing along the north coast of Kyushu. If you draw a straight line from Tokyo 540 miles down the Inland Sea to the northwestern tip of Kyushu, you will find that within forty miles of this line and either on the sea or close to it are located thirty-three of Japan's forty-seven cities of more than 100,000 and thirty-two of her fifty-six cities of between 50,000 and 100,000. One reason for this unusual concentration of cities and industries is that along this same strip were located the chief centers of population before modern times, and, with men her chief industrial asset, industries naturally grew up where labor was the most plentiful. Moreover, this narrow belt has the advantages of cheap maritime transportation and closeness to the major sources of power. North Kyushu has the richest coal supplies of Japan, and the whole Inland Sea area up to the great complex of cities at its head can easily draw on these supplies. Farther east, the industrial centers along this line lie close to the rich hydroelectric resources of the central massif of Honshu.

Even within this long coastal strip there are several nodes of still more highly concentrated population and industry.

The northeastern corner of Kyushu, with its coal fields and blast furnaces, is one. Another is the great industrial city of Nagoya in central Honshu. But the two largest remain the old population centers of Tokyo and Osaka. Tokyo early in the war reached the 7,000,000 mark, and its port of Yokohama has for long been close to 1,000,000. There are also no less than thirty-seven other cities of over 20,000 population clustered around Tokyo and Yokohama, making this one of the greatest concentrations of population in the world. Another similar concentration is found at the head of the Inland Sea. It consists of Osaka with well over 3,000,000 population, Kyoto and the port of Kobe, each with around 1,000,000, and four other near-by cities, each with more than 100,000. But even where these large urban nodes occur, the strip of heavy population and roaring factories remains narrow. A few miles from any of these cities one will find sparsely inhabited mountains and tiny farms which look little different from those of feudal times.

3. THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER

Men with machines in their hands produce far more than hoe-wielding peasants, and productive power means more wealth. Industrialization in Japan, however, has not brought significantly higher wages to the Japanese worker or put more food upon his table. Pitifully low wage scales apply not only to the industrial laborers themselves but also to all wage and salary earners in Japan. White-collar workers and technicians receive proportionately no more than manual laborers. All down the line workers receive only a small fraction of what their services would be worth in the United States.

One explanation of this situation is that the high profits taken by selfish industrialists have robbed the workers of their rightful share. Instead of building up a healthy local market for their produce and permitting an equitable division of wealth to ensure adequate purchasing power at home, Japan's indus-

trialists are said to have concentrated on the more lucrative production of export goods to be sold in markets where purchasing power already existed. Whatever may be the validity of this concept—and we have no clear evidence that profits in Japan were in excess of those in comparable fields with comparable risks elsewhere at the time—it is at best only a small part of the truth. A more important factor, as we have seen, was Japan's inescapable need for large-scale exports to pay for large-scale imports. We need no hypothesis of unnatural cupidity on the part of Japan's businessmen to explain her large export trade. Then, there was the need for Japanese industry to make lower labor costs compensate for her lack of materials. Another factor was the reinvestment of an unusually large percentage of the profits of industry to expand the industrial plant. Japan's rapid industrialization during the past seventy years has depended primarily on the reinvestment of profits instead of their consumption either by capitalists or by their employees. Still another factor was the diversion through taxation of as much of the national income as possible to a long-range and eventually disastrous investment in military power. And behind all these factors stood the inescapable economic laws of supply and demand, which apply as well to labor as to goods.

The excess farm population has been and still is the chief reason why the wages of Japan's industrial workers have been kept down to the barest minimum. With the burgeoning rural population always ready to provide more workers than industry could absorb, Japan's urban laborers have had little more bargaining power than their country cousins. In so far as skilled labor was involved, bargaining was sometimes possible, but only for brief periods and at very low levels. By and large, the industrial proletariat has been so closely tied to the economic levels of the peasantry as to constitute a sort of urban peasantry itself, basically no better off than the tenant farmers of rural areas.

The close interrelationship between peasants and workers

in Japan is seen in many ways. Although the city dwellers of Tokugawa times account for a certain proportion of the present urban population, most city folk are in origin country people or the sons or grandsons of country people who have been forced from the farms by the excess of births over deaths and drawn to the cities by an expanding labor market in industry. Typically only the eldest son of a family remains on the farm; his younger brothers must go to the city to seek their fortune. These urbanized peasants maintain close contacts with their relatives in the countryside and tend to return to the farms to live at a subsistence level whenever they lose their means of livelihood in the cities. In fact, Japan, despite its great urbanization, has so far been spared the cost of social security programs by this more primitive system of letting the jobless be cast back upon their rural relatives for support.

In some cases, there is no real line between peasants and industrial workers, for a large number of the latter are at the same time peasants. Silk filatures, located as they are in the countryside close to the supply of cocoons, have naturally operated on the excess labor supply of these rural areas, while hundreds of simple industrial processes, either complete in themselves or else parts of some more complicated process, are farmed out to rural families to be performed on a piecework basis. Moreover, many peasants commute by train to city factories. Thousands of peasant girls in their late teens also go to the cities to work for a few years in light industries, either to help salvage family finances or else to build up a dowry for marriage. Living in compounds under strict supervision, these girls often are little better than indentured laborers, providing Japan with an extraordinarily cheap supply of workers but helping to keep urban wage scales tied to the miserable living standard of her farmers.

Low wages, factory girls living in company dormitories, and sweatshop practices have earned for Japanese industry the epithet of "feudal." The word "feudal," in its modern journalistic use as a broadside term of condemnation, certainly does

apply, but not as any exact comparison with the economic, social, and political patterns of feudal Europe or feudal Japan. There is no historical connection between modern Japanese factory practices and Japan's feudal past. In fact, the rise of industry in Japan under the Tokugawa had as disastrous an influence on Japanese feudalism as it did on the feudalism of Europe. Certainly none of the major evils of the Japanese industrial system is based upon feudal concepts or feudal patterns of life. They are thoroughly modern phenomena. Perhaps they are the inevitable outcome of the meeting of machines and masses of people living at the subsistence level. If the pattern of labor exploitation set by Japan were merely a Japanese phenomenon, growing out of Japanese feudalism, it would still be distressing, but it would not be alarming for the world at large. Unfortunately, the other Asiatic lands with no feudal past are beginning to show many of these same characteristics, as they start to industrialize. One comes to the gloomy conclusion that, wherever the basic factors of overpopulation and grinding poverty exist, the results of industrialization may not be very different from what they were in Japan.

The one element in Japan's modern industrial practices which might be traceable to feudalism is by no means its worst feature. This is the strong emphasis on personal relationships between employer and employee in Japan. All the way down the line management expects more personal loyalty from employees than in the United States and in return takes a more paternalistic attitude toward its workers than is common in this country. The size of a worker's family is considered an important factor in determining his wage, and once employed the worker is felt to have a lifetime right to his job. Often the mere lack of work to be done is not considered adequate reason for dismissing a man from a no longer existent job. This emphasis on personal relationships, as a holdover from Japan's close feudal past with its dominant emphasis on personal obligations, has all the unpleasant connotations of a master and servant relationship, but at the same time it injects a certain

note of humanity into an otherwise ruthless exploitation of labor and keeps alive the personal factor, which we are attempting to recapture in American industry today.

The low scale of pay in Japanese factories does not mean that industrialization has not benefited the people of Japan at all. Although most of the direct profits which industry has brought to Japan have been turned to the creation of more industry and a profitless war machine, nevertheless industrialization and the modernization of government based on it have enriched the Japanese people in many ways which do not appear in wage tabulations, and it is these benefits which have put the Japanese standard of living markedly above that of the other Asiatic lands. Extensive hydroelectric power has meant cheap electricity, with the result that in Japan perhaps a higher percentage of the homes have electric lights than in any other of the major countries of the world. Before the war Japan had excellent and cheap train service as well as equally good postal and telegraph service and the other basic services of a modern country. The government afforded extensive police protection and more medical and sanitary services than are enjoyed by any other Asiatic people. There is also a widespread and highly specialized school system, with free education at the elementary level, which actually accommodates a higher percentage of the children of elementary school age than we have as yet been able to put in school in the United States. And factories mean cheap industrial goods to take the place of the more costly products of hand industries and foreign imports. The rubber boots and bicycle of the modern Japanese peasant or laborer are clear indications of a higher standard of living than his father enjoyed, even though the money in his purse and the rice in his bowl may be no more plentiful.

4. THE "ZAIBATSU" SYSTEM

The statement that a high percentage of the profits from Japanese industry was not consumed by either the capitalists

or by their workers but was reinvested in capital expansion perhaps needs some explanation. Limitation of consumption is possible in countries like the Soviet Union, in which the government controls all industry and therefore can determine what percentage of the profits will be diverted to reinvestment, but how could Japan, just emerging from feudalism and innocent of both socialist theory and practice, accomplish this feat? Part of the answer lies in the government's zealous efforts to build up industry, but another factor was the heavy concentration of Japanese industry in the hands of a very few individuals, which resulted in the accumulation of wealth in such great quantities that the owners were unable to consume it all and almost automatically plowed a large part of the profits back into industry.

The early Meiji government pioneered in virtually all of the major industrial fields in Japan. This was not because of any predilection for government-owned industries, though government ownership of some of the means of production has always been common in the Far East, but rather because the need was urgent and private capital too weak and also too timid to meet the demand. Japan herself lay defenseless before the warships of the West, and her handicraft industries were equally defenseless before the machine products of the Occident. With the example of European colonialism throughout Asia before them, the Japanese were not eager to call in foreign capital, even if European bankers had felt that Japanese industry was a good risk. At the beginning of the Meiji period, the only possible course for the Japanese, if they were to build up industry in order to save their economy from foreign goods and their independence from foreign guns, was to pay for new industries out of taxes and government credit, which meant tax receipts in advance.

Placing the tax burden squarely on agriculture, the government started building Japan's rail network and factories in various industrial fields. Some of these were munitions plants, which were an end in themselves, but others were model plants,

designed to demonstrate the feasibility of new industrial processes and smooth the way for private capitalists with more limited financial resources than the government. Only in silk reeling, where mechanization was cheap and easy, was such direct governmental encouragement largely unnecessary. But all this was at a time when most Japanese factories were not yet bringing in a profit. It was only later, certainly well after 1880, that industry really began to pay, and by that time the government was out of most of the industrial fields, maintaining its leadership for the most part only in the field of railroads, still largely a government monopoly, some of the armament industries connected directly with military strength, and monopolies for revenue purposes, such as tobacco.

The chief credit for the process of capital reinvestment, which so markedly accelerated the speed of industrialization in Japan, goes to the peculiar concentration of Japanese industry and commerce in the hands of a few great families—in other words the *zaibatsu* system, which has been in many ways the curse of modern Japan but at the same time a factor which greatly increased the speed of her industrialization. Nowhere in the world, before the appearance of the totalitarian governments, has such a large percentage of national industrial power been controlled by so few people, and possibly nowhere else has industrialization been achieved so rapidly.

It has been a world-wide phenomenon during the past century that the number of independent industrial enterprises has been decreasing, while a few giants have come to control the production of an entire industry among themselves. The steel industry in this country, the oil industry, and the manufacturing of automobiles clearly illustrate this tendency. The individual Japanese companies, with the exception of the almost monopolistic Oji paper interests, rarely controlled greater percentages of the particular industry in which they were engaged than did comparable companies in the United States. What made big business in Japan different from big business in America was the association of huge companies, operating in

many different fields, in a single giant combine, to a large extent owned and definitely controlled by one family and its immediate and loyal henchmen. It was as if United States Steel, General Motors, General Electric, Standard Oil, the Du Pont interests, several of our major banks, a few of the major shipping and export firms, and a host of less well-known but equally important companies in less prominent fields were all owned and controlled by a single American family. In Japan the component companies were not as large as the American industrial giants listed above, but they were proportionately as important to the Japanese economy as United States Steel or General Motors are to the American economy. At least two of these fantastic combines numbered their employees in the millions.

Obviously the profits of such combines were far greater than their owners could reasonably spend, particularly in Japan where the people tend to be frugal. Where ten thousand or even a thousand owning families might well have spent most of the profits for moderately luxurious living, one family obviously could not, and so a large surplus could be turned back into new capital investment. Moreover, the collective financial strength of such great combines meant adequate resources for pioneering in new industries. A series of well-established and profitable ventures could be used to support within the framework of the combine the great financial risks entailed by each new industrial undertaking.

The *zaibatsu* system has played such a significant role in Japanese industrialization and has been so dominant a factor in the shaping of modern Japan that many people have assumed that it was deliberately created during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of Japanese government planners, anxious to establish a centralized big business system to parallel the centralized political system they were building. But, of course, such theories presuppose an understanding of economics and a capacity for long-range planning on the part of the statesmen of the Meiji period such as no statesmen elsewhere had ever exhibited before. These men were confronted

with immediate financial and industrial problems of the greatest difficulty. Their chief concern in the economic field was to build up industry as fast as possible without reducing Japan's finances to chaos. They were willing to try anything that promised to achieve this result, and they frequently changed their course. It seems much more reasonable to suppose that, in their concern with immediate problems, they had little realization of what the long-range effects of their acts would be and that, in this sense, the development of the *zaibatsu* system was to a large extent accidental and not a premeditated plot on the part of the Meiji statesmen.

The chief factor which lay behind the development of the *zaibatsu* system was the paucity of private capital in Japan at the beginning of the modern period. During the Tokugawa era, a rich merchant class had grown up and had come to dominate the culture as well as the finances of this politically feudal land, but the accumulations of capital were relatively small and largely in the hands of men more accustomed to trade and moneylending than to industrial production. At the beginning of the Meiji period, the merchant class was understandably reluctant to leave its accustomed field and risk its modest capital in pioneer work in hitherto unheard-of industrial enterprises. Most of what little private capital there was for industrial ventures came from the former feudal classes, the old feudal lords and the higher ranking samurai, who in the 1870's were paid off in cash and government bonds in return for the relinquishment of their old feudal privileges. Some of these men founded modern banking enterprises with these new assets or moved cautiously into the industrial field. But even this new private capital based on government credit was not great. Thus, the total amount of private capital was limited, and the few merchants or samurai who had a little capital and daring were in a position to gain rich profits from successful industrial and commercial ventures. Where labor is plentiful and capital scarce, profits inevitably are high, and those who got a head start under such circumstances were in

a position to accumulate wealth rapidly. Moreover, the government, anxious to see industry advance, gave them direct and indirect assistance of a sort which would now be branded as patently scandalous.

An important step in the creation of the *zaibatsu* system was the government's sale during the 1880's of many of the industrial plants it had built. Japan at the time was facing a financial crisis, and most of these factories were still a drain on the government's budget. It was felt, therefore, that the government would have to unload most of these significant but costly ventures for whatever prices could be obtained and concentrate on the more specifically military industries, leaving the bulk of the other industries to private capital to develop as best it could. In the course of the 1880's, plant after plant was sold, often at ridiculously low prices. In some cases these prices were the result of collusion between government officials and businessmen, but usually the low prices simply meant that no one had been willing to pay the higher prices first demanded. Naturally the buyers of these plants were the very few men who had some money. Shortly after this transfer of government factories at extremely low prices, Japanese industry for the first time really began to pay. The few owners of modern industrial and commercial enterprises in Japan had started on their rapid growth to become some of the greatest financial and industrial magnates in the world.

Once well established there was no stopping the *zaibatsu*. They entered one new field after another, until the roster of the interests of the bigger *zaibatsu* combines was virtually a catalogue of the full extent of the Japanese economy. With their immense and varied resources they could engage in price slashing which would have been suicidal for smaller competitors. They grew by gobbling up their smaller business rivals, until the Japanese economy came to be divided for the most part between the *zaibatsu* combines themselves, with only the crumbs of less profitable and small-scale industries left to the independent businessman. The *zaibatsu* all along had profited

immensely from government patronage, and they always did their best to stay close to the political powers for protection and for further favors. By providing bureaucrats with lucrative positions and politicians with campaign funds, they maintained their close relations with the government long after they had outgrown all need for direct government assistance. In fact, they increasingly became the patrons and the politicians their grateful beneficiaries. With the passing of time and the growth of Japanese industry and trade, the *zaibatsu* system became ever more entrenched.

An obvious question is how the *zaibatsu* combines were able to hold together over the years despite their unreasonable size and extraordinarily diverse interests. Several factors account for this. Originally, each had been owned and controlled by a single family, with its own strict laws carefully formulated to assure the continuance of family solidarity and family control of the sprawling industrial and commercial empire it had created. But, in time, the growing complexity of economic problems and the inevitable ups and downs of business talent within a single family put the immediate control of most *zaibatsu* enterprises into the hands of a managerial class of business executives with no blood ties to the family.

This process was well advanced by the 1930's, but the *zaibatsu* combines showed no signs of falling apart. For one thing, there were great advantages in the association of many powerful business enterprises together for the sake of protecting themselves and exerting influence on the government. There was also the centralized selling technique of the *zaibatsu* combines, which kept the member companies dependent for the sale of their products on the combine's trading organs. Another factor was the careful hierarchical arrangement of the component companies. At the top was a holding company, normally owned by the family itself, which more or less controlled through the stocks it held certain major affiliates, which in turn controlled lesser affiliates, and so on down the line. But this control was not merely a matter of majority ownership of

stocks, for frequently this was not the case. More important than the formal structure was the strength of personal bonds within the organization. Here, perhaps, was another holdover from the feudal emphasis on personal obligations. Young men, upon graduation from university, would enter the service of a *zaibatsu* company, and, though they might be shifted from company to company as they advanced, they expected to remain with that particular combine for life. Only by giving it their full loyalty could they expect to get ahead, and, by the time they had reached the top as high executives, they were almost as much a part of the combine as the *zaibatsu* family itself. These men could be trusted to hold the combine together, even if the family no longer had the executive talent to do so. The top executives, through a complicated system of interlocking directorates and an invisible bond of personal loyalty and club feeling, were the real links which held the combines together even more than the stocks owned by the *zaibatsu* family.

It has never been established just which combines were large enough to be called *zaibatsu* and which were not. The Japanese often refer to the old and the new *zaibatsu*, meaning by the latter the combines which came to prominence after the Manchurian venture of 1931. These, on the whole, tended to be less widely spread in different industrial and trading fields than were the older combines. The big four among the *zaibatsu* have always been Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, and among these the first two are the greatest of all and really form a class by themselves.

Mitsui grew out of a Tokugawa merchant firm, which had its humble beginnings in the early seventeenth century as a *saké* brewery. In time, it grew into a prosperous dry goods and money-lending enterprise, which made loans to the Shogun and to the Imperial court. During the Meiji Restoration, the Mitsui family gave strong financial support to the new regime, and presently, in keeping with the spirit of modernization of the times, they changed their old money-lending firm into

Japan's first modern banking corporation. They also rapidly modernized their commercial interests into great trading companies and entered the mining field and various industries. By 1933 they had established some degree of control over no less than 130 different companies. Before the war the chief Mitsui affiliates were in trading and commerce, mining, banking, shipping, steel, machinery, textiles, food products, chemicals, aircraft, light metals, lumber, and building and warehousing.

Mitsubishi had a very different origin from Mitsui. It was founded shortly after the Restoration by a samurai called Iwasaki, who had been the financial administrator of the Lord of Tosa, an important fief on the island of Shikoku. Iwasaki started in the shipping business and provided transportation facilities for the expedition sent by the government in 1874 against the aborigines of Formosa, ostensibly to punish them for having killed some mariners from the Ryukyu Islands but really to test out the European game of empire-building. As a reward for this service, he received from the government the extraordinary gift of thirteen steamships, originally purchased by the government for $1,568,000. He also derived huge profits from the transportation of government troops during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, and eventually his shipping interests grew into the great merchant fleet of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. The rest of the story is much like that of the Mitsui. The Mitsubishi interests were extended to other fields—notably heavy industries, mining, commerce, banking, chemicals, and electric goods—and in time the Iwasaki came to control almost as many different companies as the Mitsui.

The *zaibatsu* system may have had a vital role in building up Japanese industry, but it has also left a legacy of major political and social ills. If the uneven division of ownership of Japan's agricultural land is cause for concern, the vastly more lopsided division of economic strength in industry and commerce can hardly be condoned. Obviously, the concentration of so much economic power in the hands of so very few

people could have nothing but a deleterious influence on attempts to build up democracy in Japan. The enormous differences in wealth produced by such a system were also not a healthy social phenomenon and engendered bitter resentment against the *zaibatsu* on the part of large groups in Japan, particularly intellectuals, low-paid government workers, and army and navy officers. The term *zaibatsu* itself is proof of this attitude, for it is a pejorative, meaning "financial clique" and carrying with it all the venom with which many Americans use the term "Wall Street."

Even before the war there was growing resentment in Japan against the *zaibatsu*, and we Americans have singled out the whole combine system as one of our major targets for postwar reform, but still the *zaibatsu* should not be denied their historical due. They did have a mighty part in the industrialization of Japan; because of the very size of their enterprises, they were able to inject some diversity of point of view into the monolithic totalitarian system Japan's bureaucrats and militarists were attempting to create before and during the war; and they gave an over-all integration to Japanese industry and commerce which the Japanese will find hard to replace today. Many economists feel that the combines were not really economically efficient organizations but were overly diffuse in their ramified interests. That may well be correct, but the combines, at the same time, afforded an integration in Japanese industry which may not be replaceable except by a system involving a high degree of governmental control.

However unfortunate a social and political influence the *zaibatsu* have been, the industry they built remains as the main support of the Japanese economy today. Japan must continue to be a highly industrialized land, and, if she is to attain even moderately adequate living standards, her factories must be constantly expanded and the skills of her workers continuously improved. Japanese industry faces a most uncertain future, but it is Japan's only hope. The Japanese people, who have almost trebled in number because of the greater economic

opportunities industrialization has given them, now are entirely dependent on industry to live, and industry in turn depends on foreign markets. The history of modern Japan is the story of expanding industry, permitting an expanding population, which in turn has resulted in an increasing dependence on foreign trade. The inexorable laws of economic necessity have forced the Japanese to choose one of two diametrically opposed courses to secure the trade they must have. Either they must fight for empire, or else they must be champions of peace, world order, and more international trade. The unalterable factors of geography and economics have given them these two alternatives, but other considerations besides geography and economics have determined their varying choices in the past and will do so again in the future.

PART III THE JAPANESE CHARACTER

6. The Japanese and the Outside World

1. GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION

The economic realities of modern Japan stand out in an all too stark and ugly light, but a nation is not merely a huge economic unit. It is made up of millions of individuals with well-established patterns of conduct and habits of thought. The outer limits of their activities may be defined by unchangeable geographic factors, but within these broad bounds there is room for a thousand significant variations, primarily determined by other more subtle but equally important influences. Even when given similar geographic environments and comparable economic opportunities, the various peoples of the world have met their problems in a bewildering variety of ways. A hundred minor variations have produced in permutation a myriad differing patterns of society, sometimes contrasting sharply with one another despite their similar physical backgrounds. The steppe lands of the western part of our own country support an entirely different civilization from that found in the steppe lands of Central Asia or North Africa. The Canadians and the Russians are two very different peoples; Brazil and India have little more than geographic and climatic resemblances in common; and the Japanese have fashioned a very different society with very different potentialities from the societies built up by other peoples in somewhat

similar areas—say the Italians or the English, the inhabitants of our own East Coast, or even Japan's closer neighbors in Korea and China.

Culture, civilization, national character, whatever you wish to call it, is not subject to the same clear measurements that can be applied to geography and economics. You can say that one people has twice the per capita coal resources of another, but it does not mean anything to say that one people has one-half the per capita bravery or loyalty or honesty of another people. You can only make vague generalizations which not only are statistically unverifiable but are even based on undefined and perhaps undefinable standards. The very concepts of honesty, bravery, and loyalty and the types of situations in which they are considered applicable may differ so radically between cultures as to offer little basis for comparison. And within any large national grouping the individual variations with regard to such qualities are so great as to make any concept of per capita averages meaningless. All one can do is to say that, in terms of the accepted standards of one people, these qualities appear on the whole to be deficient or in excess, to a greater or lesser degree, in another people. For example, we can note those qualities of the Japanese which seem to be sufficiently exaggerated or minimized in many, if not most, Japanese as to strike an American as being departures from his own norms. This, of course, involves no value judgments, for the process in reverse would reveal many American characteristics unduly stressed or minimized when measured against Japanese norms. It also does not imply any invariable uniformity with regard to these characteristics on the part of any individual Japanese. Such comparisons merely provide an arbitrary means of expressing broad cultural differences which might make the Japanese react differently from Americans to any given situation and which, therefore, must be kept in mind by Americans whenever they attempt to evaluate what has happened or is happening in Japan and still more when they attempt to predict future developments there.

It is never safe to state unequivocally that certain geographic influences have produced certain specific cultural characteristics. One can so easily find other places in the world where similar geographic conditions had no such result. And, in any case, a culture is not a series of unrelated phenomena but is always a complicated pattern, in which a large number of different factors so act upon one another as to achieve a total balance. One geographic factor, however, stands out as a dominant one in Japan's cultural heritage and an element which distinguished Japan from all the other older civilized lands of the world. This factor is isolation. In pre-modern times, no other important group of people consciously participating in the rich culture of the Eurasiatic land mass lived so far removed from all the other civilized peoples. The straits between Japan and Korea are five times as wide as the Straits of Dover, which have had a significant influence in shaping England's history and the character of her people. The distance between Japan and China, the homeland of her civilization, is even greater. Only in recent centuries have peoples of the civilized world come to live at greater distances from the Eurasiatic land mass, and by that time vastly improved techniques of navigation and, now, instantaneous communications have wiped out the factor of isolation.

One obvious influence of isolation on Japan has been the creation of a highly homogeneous race of people there and, what is more important, a very homogeneous culture. The Japanese as a race are primarily a Mongoloid people, as are all the major groups of that part of the world. They differ no more from Koreans and Chinese than Englishmen differ from Frenchmen or Germans. Statistically certain physical variations appear between the Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese. The Japanese show more signs of negritic and proto-Caucasoid admixtures than do their continental neighbors. It is impossible, however, to be certain on purely physical grounds that any given individual is a Japanese rather than a Chinese or Korean. Clothing, even of Western style, and, still more, haircuts and

mannerisms often differentiate them clearly, but not any invariable physical characteristics.

The problem of the origin of the Japanese has fascinated a great many scholars and casual students of Japan and has led to many pseudo-scientific attempts to explain the Japanese in terms of racial origins. Some have been intrigued by the continued existence in Hokkaido of small settlements of Ainu, a people who obviously were once more widespread in the islands and probably account for the proto-Caucasoid strain in Japanese blood, which evinces itself in the ability of many Japanese to grow more luxuriant mustaches and beards than their continental neighbors. Other scholars hold strongly to the view that the Japanese are most closely akin to the peoples of Malaysia and the islands of the Pacific. There certainly are strong cultural similarities between Japan and the islands to the south in their seafaring habits, their lightly constructed houses, their mythology, and many other things, but no crude theory of the movement of peoples from the south into Japan stands up under the test of archaeology. Possibly a diffusion of peoples, perhaps from South China into the islands to the south and to Japan by way of Korea, accounts for some of these resemblances. Other scholars emphasize the well-authenticated movement of peoples from Northeast Asia down through the Korean Peninsula into Japan. The archaeological evidence for this is clear. At least one important element in the Japanese race and the group which slowly built up the Japanese state of early historical times came to Japan from Korea and had close cultural resemblances to the peoples of Northeast Asia.

The Japanese, thus, like all other peoples, are a blend of many diverse elements, but their exact racial composition is, in fact, little known and makes less difference. What is important is that there have been no significant additions of blood to the Japanese race for well over a thousand years. They have had plenty of time to become thoroughly mixed together to form as unified a people as exist anywhere in the world.

Their culture, though repeatedly enriched by foreign borrowings, has also had time to become extremely homogeneous, particularly during the two centuries of Tokugawa isolation. The Japanese culture of the mid-nineteenth century was perhaps more uniform than the culture of any European country of comparable size. Some observers feel that the Japanese have achieved greater cultural uniformity throughout the length and breadth of the land and throughout the vertical stratifications of their society than has ever been achieved in a country of Japan's size, and they compare Japanese cultural homogeneity to that of a primitive tribe.

But it is doubtful that this, if true formerly, still holds today. The rapid influx of Western ideas and techniques during the past century has injected a time differential into contemporary Japanese culture. Certain classes and certain areas have been affected more rapidly and more thoroughly by these new influences than others, the intellectuals notably more than laborers, for instance, and the city people more than the peasants. Although the Japanese do not have the great geographic differences of a broad country like ours or the differences we inherit from immigrant forefathers of differing races, cultures, and religions, there are tremendous contrasts in conduct and in thought as well as in external ways of life between a university professor in Tokyo and a peasant in southern Kyushu. These differences, though far less obvious, are not much less profound than the differences between a New York broker of Yankee stock and a Negro sharecropper in Mississippi.

Some observers, struck by the startling mixture of East and West in the daily life of the urban Japanese, have gone to the other extreme and attributed to the Japanese a sort of cultural schizophrenia. They feel it incongruous to find cultural elements with which they themselves are familiar mixed in with what is to them strange and bizarre. They feel that a Japanese who dresses in a business suit on weekdays and a kimono over the weekend or eats his luncheon with knife and fork at an Occidental type of restaurant and his breakfast and supper

with chopsticks while kneeling on the floor at home must feel as self-conscious over these contrasts as they would themselves if they were suddenly forced to adopt Japanese ways for part of each day. But actually the diverse origin of these various elements in their culture disturbs the Japanese no more than the mixed use of Latin letters and Arabic numerals disturbs the average European. It seems no stranger to a Japanese to alternate between a business suit and kimono, depending on the occasion, than it does to an American woman to don a kimono at night after having worn slacks all day. The Japanese have had railroads, telegraphs, electric lights, and printing presses about as long as any of us and feel just as much at home with them as we do. It is no more incongruous or upsetting to them to wear a ski hat or eat a dish of ice cream than it is for an Englishman to drink a cup of tea.

Another clear influence of geographic isolation on Japan has been the infrequency of close contacts with foreign lands throughout Japanese history and, conversely, the heavy waves of influence from abroad whenever close contacts did exist. Most other parts of the civilized world have been subject throughout history to a continuous stream of foreign influences, so steady and uniform as to have gone virtually unnoticed most of the time. In Japan, however, the very paucity of such influences at most times meant that, whenever close contacts were feasible, there was likely to be heavy, almost frantic borrowing from abroad. The first such period was from the beginning of the seventh century through the first half of the ninth, when the still very backward and primitive Japanese state, in an amazing display of energy and ambition, attempted to model itself after the T'ang dynasty of China, which at that time was unquestionably the richest, strongest, and, in many ways, the most advanced state in the world. Then came several centuries of only desultory contacts between Japan and the outside world, followed in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries by a period of increasingly close relations with China and Korea, culminating in a few decades of con-

tacts with the Western world in the second half of the sixteenth century. This time there was no conscious effort to remodel Japan on the pattern of either China or Europe, but foreign influences, nevertheless, were strong. The swing of the pendulum then brought two centuries of almost complete isolation during the Tokugawa period, followed in turn by the frantic period of Westernization during the past hundred years. For a second time in her history, Japan was consciously attempting to follow a foreign model.

Even within this last period there have been ups and downs in the rate of borrowing. It started with the mad rush Japan made during the Meiji period to catch up with the West. This gradually slowed down, until by the 1930's the Japanese were self-consciously rejecting everything Western which was not already well entrenched in Japan. Their defeat has made them eager once more to learn from the West, meaning specifically the United States this time, and at least for the moment there is again an unquestioning acceptance of anything from abroad.

It is doubtful whether Japan's jerky start-and-stop method of learning from the outside world has resulted in any greater sum total of foreign influences than are to be found in any other land of comparable size. In fact, a good case could be made for the opposite thesis. It can be argued that, in almost every phase, Japanese culture differs more from other cultures than, say, the cultures of Germany, Persia, or Siam from those of their respective neighbors. Japan's graphic arts, her industrial arts, writing systems, poetry, prose styles, drama, culinary arts, domestic architecture, clothing, political and social institutions, and even her religions and philosophy show, for better or for worse, a distinctiveness that few if any other lands can boast.

But the alternation of periods of rapid borrowing and comparative isolation has resulted in a clear awareness on the part of the Japanese of the whole process of borrowing. They have been so acutely conscious of this wholesale learning from abroad during certain periods in the past and have so empha-

sized this aspect of their history that they have helped create the myth that they are nothing but a race of copiers, a monkey-like people lacking any originality or creative powers themselves. Their careful labeling of this element in their culture as having come from Korea in the sixteenth century and that from China in the eighth has left little but the most primitive elements to be cherished as "native," thus strengthening the impression gained by foreigners during the past century of heavy borrowing from the West that nothing Japanese is really "Japanese" at all and that they, unlike other peoples, can only copy but not create.

While forced by geographic isolation to develop alone more of their own civilization than have most other peoples, they have been overwhelmed with the concept of borrowing from abroad and have, in compensation, emphasized supposed "native" elements more than other nations have. A clear-cut contrast between Western influences and the native culture before the impact of the West exists throughout Asia, and the nativistic reactions in Japan to this contrast have not differed from those of other Asiatic lands and, for that matter, have been only greater in degree but not different in type from the nativistic reactions of America at various times in its history. The Japanese, however, are unique in having kept alive a distinction between what is considered to have been natively Japanese before the seventh century and what resulted from the contacts with China from that time on. It is as if the French were obsessed with the idea that only that part of their culture which was derived from pre-Roman Gaul was native and labeled all else as foreign borrowings. Such an attempt would send the British back to the druids for their native culture. Naturally, in Japan, it has resulted in a ridiculous emphasis on the primitive and an impossible search in the only hazily known early years of Japanese history for some mysterious source for Japan's later greatness. It has also been the background for a great deal of mystical nonsense about Japan and the Japanese, which has been used to justify a host of absurd political and

social doctrines and a particular virulent brand of nationalistic dogma.

There has been, however, one very good result of Japan's consciousness of foreign borrowing. The Japanese take the process of acculturation for granted and are not afraid or ashamed, when circumstances dictate, to borrow whatever they need from abroad. Without the historical example of Japan's heavy borrowing from China a thousand years earlier, it might have been more difficult than it was for the Meiji leaders to conceive the idea of repatterning Japan on Western models and to justify this course of action both to themselves and to their people. Certainly that concept came much more slowly and far more painfully to most of the other peoples of Asia. The Chinese, with their age-old belief that China was the unique civilized land of the world, surrounded by barbarians of varying degrees of inferiority and loyalty to China, found it particularly difficult to accept the idea that anything important could be learned from the West, much less that the Chinese economic and political structure would have to be remade on Western lines. But in Japan it seemed evident that, if the land had been converted into a miniature China in the seventh and eighth centuries, it could be made into an Asiatic England or Germany in the nineteenth. Even today, the concept of another great transformation, dictated this time from abroad, seems less strange and less repugnant to the Japanese than it would to most peoples.

By and large, isolation may have had the curious effect of making the Japanese more ready to accept new things from abroad than were most other peoples—and they certainly have always demonstrated a great enthusiasm for the new—but at the same time isolation has also permitted them to cling more persistently than other nations to the old. The result is Japan's particular form of conservatism, which is the cherishing of the old and outmoded while enthusiastically embracing the new. Perhaps because international friction was less intense in this isolated corner of the globe and the struggle for cultural sur-

vival, therefore, less acute, many of the outmoded aspects of Japanese civilization could continue to exist side by side with the new. The Imperial institution itself is a case in point. The Emperors of Japan by the twelfth century had become incongruous survivals of an earlier age. Almost anywhere else in the world, the struggle for national survival would have forced the abandonment of such outgrown forms, but Japanese isolation permitted the coexistence of the old political institutions in theory and the new feudal institutions in practice. Another example in the cultural field is the survival until today of virtually every aspect of religion that has ever existed in Japan. Where other lands have seen new religions or new religious movements sweep the whole land bare of many earlier religious forms, in Japan each new religious movement has simply taken its place beside the old. Drama is an even more surprising case in point. The Japanese still enjoy the *No* theater, which they perfected in the fifteenth century, along with the puppet theater of the seventeenth, the *Kabuki* theater of the eighteenth, and their still feeble attempts at Western dramatic forms and their vastly popular adaptations of Hollywood techniques. The Japanese are like us in that they are always ready and even eager to adopt the new, but at the same time they are very unlike us in their strong tendency to preserve the old and outmoded.

2. NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

The Japanese concern with what is "native" and what is borrowed in their culture shows a heavy self-consciousness which may also be associated with isolation. They are figuratively, as well as literally, an insular people, like the English, but in a very different way. The British are conscious of themselves with a certain air of self-satisfaction, which is by no means wholly unjustified. Japanese self-consciousness contains a large degree of embarrassment and the fear of inferiority. Perhaps the difference is that between a people isolated

enough to feel slightly set apart and a people so isolated throughout their history as to have feared that they did not belong at all.

The Japanese attitude has certainly been strengthened by the painfully obvious contrast throughout most of their history between small, backward, remote, and young Japan as opposed to China, the admitted home of civilization, which was far larger, far older, and far grander than Japan could ever hope to be. It was as if the British had always been set off against a unified continent held together by a continuing Roman Empire. Perhaps the contrast with China in size, age, and prestige was enough to give the Japanese collectively a certain sense of inferiority with respect to the outside world, though, as we shall see, the existence of this same pattern on an individual scale within Japan suggests the possibility of an entirely different origin for it. Conceivably, their shortness of stature as compared with the European peoples or even the Koreans and northern Chinese has also contributed to their feeling of inferiority. In any case, the Japanese show a national self-consciousness and a sense of inferiority which, while not altogether unknown in a self-assertive America just emerging from a position of cultural inferiority to Europe, is far more ingrained and compulsive with the Japanese than with us. Where we are inordinately interested but also amused by the unending flow of half-truths about ourselves from visiting English pundits, the Japanese evince an unquenchable and decidedly morbid interest in every expression of opinion on Japan by any foreigner, no matter how poorly informed or unqualified he may be to render judgment.

The Japanese have reflected these characteristics in the alternating periods in their history between abject humility toward outside civilizations and arrogant cultural independence and self-assertiveness. The hero of one period is the broad-minded leader who openly condemns Japanese failings and extols the virtues of foreign cultures. Sooner or later he is replaced by a very different type of hero who points

out the corrupting influences of inferior foreign civilizations and calls for a return to native Japanese virtues. But, whichever type dominates a period, both are equally conscious of the contrast between Japan and the outside world. The hundred miles of open sea between Japan and Korea, still more the five hundred miles of water which lie between western Kyushu and China, seem to cut the Japanese off from the rest of the human race. The classification "Japanese" seems almost a more significant classification than "human being." The native-born Japanese abroad rarely loses himself in another civilization. He remains always a self-conscious representative of Japanese culture, never quite able to forget his national identity. Even the Japanese at home, with no foreign contacts to stimulate his national consciousness, maintains an unusual awareness of a surrounding alien world. The fellow villagers of an Olympic swimming champion are not just proud of the hometown boy who made good. They are proud of him as a Japanese who has demonstrated Japan's superiority to the outside world. The gulf which the Japanese feel between themselves and their fellow men is almost as real as the water barrier that isolates their land.

This national self-consciousness has strongly influenced Japanese reactions at home as well as abroad. However pugnaciously self-assertive the Japanese may be or however insistent upon the unique virtues of Japanese culture, there is never any self-complacency about them. They are usually either engaged in an attempt to catch up with some other country or else are vigorously trying to demonstrate their superiority to an unconvinced world. They feel the eyes of the world are always upon them, not only when they venture abroad but also in their life at home. To the average Japanese, the actual indifference of the rest of the world to Japan would seem incredible. He assumes that the whole world is aware of and marvels at Japan's high rate of school attendance or whatever else he takes pride in and that all foreigners are equally conscious and scornful of Japan's various shortcom-

ings. Exposed, as the Japanese assume themselves to be, to the merciless light of world-wide publicity, they can never relax but must always play to the grandstands. If an unsympathetic audience fails to applaud them for their obvious virtues, at least they will force the audience to gasp at their derring-do.

All this stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese, who, except for a small group of strongly Westernized apologists, have until recently tended to remain blandly secure in their knowledge of China's long superiority over all her neighbors and content to let the outside barbarians discover China's virtues for themselves. Conquering hordes have come to China many times in the past but have always been absorbed eventually by the superior Chinese culture—always except for the Mongols who were driven out again after a mere century of rule. The inconsequential military superiority of the crass Europeans or the even more despicable Japanese was, therefore, nothing to become hysterical about. China, the "central land," would always remain the center of civilization. Thus, the Chinese, with their easy-going assumption of superiority, have appeared to the rest of the world relaxed and genial, whereas the Japanese, fearful of the scorn of the outside world and eager for its plaudits, have made others vaguely ill at ease by their self-consciousness and definitely annoyed by their insistent demand for appreciation.

National self-consciousness has probably also contributed to the Japanese inability to see a problem from another people's point of view. Of course, it is futile to make comparisons between the relative inabilities of various peoples to put themselves in some other people's shoes or sandals. Man, individually and collectively, demonstrates a determined adherence to his own particular point of view. But the Japanese do seem at times a little less able than some to recognize the possibility that other people can have honest differences of opinion from themselves. Any point of view but the Japanese is likely to bring from them the boringly repetitious charge of "insincerity." The absurd doctrine of the white man's burden was

maintained in the West only so long as the colored peoples of the world remained stunned into silence. The Japanese managed to retain faith in the justness and practicability of Japanese hegemony over Asia in the face of the uproarious opposition of all the peoples who were supposedly being benefited by the Pax Japonica. They repeatedly guessed wrong about the reactions of the Chinese people. In fact, the whole eight-year war with China and most of its major campaigns were fought with the mistaken expectation of an imminent collapse of Chinese opposition as a result of continued Japanese successes.

Similarly, the Japanese decision to fight the United States was based on a colossal misjudgment of the American people. The Japanese government knew perfectly well that we had the material resources to crush them, but they seem to have assumed that we did not have the will power to deny ourselves new automobiles and all the gadgets we love so dearly in order to devote our industrial energies to a distant war. Japanese will power, they felt, would thus triumph over American material superiority, and on the basis of this reasoning they launched a brilliantly successful attack which instantaneously created among all Americans a determination so strong that it was more than enough to see us through to the complete destruction of Japan. Misjudgments of this sort lie at the heart of most international strife, but the Japanese in recent years have made more than their share of such disastrous blunders.

3. NATIONALISM

A national sense of inferiority might also be associated with the early appearance of nationalism in Japan. Nationalism, as opposed to a primary loyalty to religious groupings, as in India, or a cultural grouping like that of traditional China, has become a significant force in the greater part of Asia only in the last few decades, but it was a dominant influence in Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century and was an important

factor in Japanese history at least as far back as the thirteenth century. This early rise of nationalism was partly the result of the clear-cut geographic and linguistic delimitations of Japan, which have set it apart as a separate country ever since early days, but another factor seems to have been the sense of inferiority. A study of nationalism which included the early experience of Japan might reveal that a sense of inferiority—the contrast of the lesser unit with the obviously greater unit—has had a larger share in the shaping of this tremendous modern force than has often been recognized. Certainly in Europe, nationalism grew fastest in the peripheral areas of the classic world and perhaps had its most spectacular growth in small and isolated England. In the United States, periods of galling inferiority to Great Britain or Europe in general gave rise to some of the most blatant expressions of American nationalism. And in Japan, ever since the thirteenth century, nationalism has been expressed primarily in terms of mystical national traits of superiority—the divine origin of the Japanese people or the divinity of the land itself—which were conjured up in an effort to compensate for China's indisputable superiority in size, power, age, and prestige.

Whatever isolation may have had to do with the early rise of Japanese nationalism, there can be no doubt that nationalism deserves a large share of the credit for Japan's recent Cinderella success story. An essential ingredient of the modern nation-state naturally is nationalism itself, and it is no mere accident that the one Asiatic land with a strong national consciousness in the early nineteenth century far outstripped all the others in the speed of its modernization along Western lines. A ready-made nationalism provided the nucleus around which the Japanese could concentrate their energies in their drive toward modernization. In the other Asiatic lands, basic Westernization was virtually impossible until this binding force had been slowly and painfully developed. If any one factor is to be singled out to explain the difference between Japan's rapid modernization and the slowness of the process in the rest of

Asia, this factor is nationalism. Similarly, one of the chief distinctions between Japan today and the rest of Asia is the greater maturity of her nationalism. In most of Asia, nationalism is a dynamic new force with creative and destructive potentialities which are as yet incalculable. In Japan, as in America and Europe, it is a tremendous force but nothing new. It has long since demonstrated its terrible power. It is a known quantity and not a new and unpredictable force upsetting the previous balance of society.

All in all, isolation has probably contributed as greatly to the formation of Japanese culture as any single identifiable external factor, and it certainly has done much to determine the relations of the Japanese to other people. It has permitted them to live apart from the rest of the world more than any other major people. It has also meant relatively less experience in relations of either an amicable or warlike nature with other people. Little accustomed to foreign contacts, the Japanese, recently thrown into the international maelstrom of the modern world, have shown very little finesse in their dealings with other nations. They have been like the one child in a group which is not accustomed to playing with other children—uninhibitedly selfish, uncertain of what is expected of him or what effect his acts will have on others, and always painfully self-conscious. Like all self-conscious people, the Japanese have an unhappy suspicion that they are always putting their worst foot forward, and, in their case, this suspicion is not altogether unjustified.

Perhaps these are all only minor surface characteristics which should not have much influence on the Japanese at home, but the Japanese cannot withdraw again into their isolation of former days. The modern world does not permit that luxury to any nation, and the Japanese, above all other peoples, are unable to cut themselves off again from the rest of the world but must buy and sell abroad to live. Gross ineptness in their dealings with foreign peoples, culminating in a disastrous war against all their neighbors near and far and a goodly number

of nations at the other end of the world, has contributed heavily to the sad plight in which the Japanese find themselves today. No people in the world, with the possible exception of the Germans, have earned so much ill will from their fellow men. Somehow the Japanese must overcome this disadvantage and the poor start it has given them. They must learn how to earn the good will of other peoples, so that they can again trade without discrimination abroad, for, if they do not do this, they will certainly starve at home.

7. Emotion and Conformity

1. EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION

As Ruth Benedict has pointed out in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, there seem to be a number of absurd contradictions in Japanese character—that is, absurd contradictions when one presupposes American norms.* They are contradictions to us only because we do not understand the substratum of forces within Japanese culture which has produced the particular surface patterns which we see in Japanese behavior. There are contradictory forces in all societies which tend to hold one another in a dynamic balance. Those in Japanese society may not be, on the whole, any more contradictory than those in other civilizations, but, in so far as they differ from the underlying forces in our society, their tensions and points of balance will be different, resulting in what may seem to us contradictions and irreconcilable traits within the Japanese character.

Among such underlying forces, two which tend to balance each other, but with a markedly different degree of tension and point of equilibrium in different lands, are, on the one hand, the basic emotional drive toward self-expression and the counterbalancing social force of conformity. The dynamic balance between these two forces is as fundamental to our civilization as to that of Japan, but the degree of tension created between these two forces seems in some respects to be greater in Japan and their point of balance there seems to us decidedly

* Houghton Mifflin Company (Boston, 1946), pp. 1–2.

off-center. The emotional drive toward self-expression appears to be, if anything, greater among the Japanese than with us, but at the same time the Japanese have developed a counter-force of social conformity which is far stronger than anything with which we are familiar. They have seen fit to bridle their free emotional expression as severely as any major people in the world, thus establishing a tension between these two forces and a point of balance between them which are sufficiently strange to us to create in our eyes many apparent inconsistencies in their conduct.

The Japanese so successfully submerge their spontaneous emotional expressions or so warp them to fit their rigid rules of conduct that they have won for themselves the reputation of being a race of "deadpan" robots, and many casual observers consider them as deficient in feeling as any people could be. The man whose only reaction to a suicidal order is a flat, stereotyped statement of acceptance, who submits to an unjustified berating without changing expression, or who giggles nervously when telling of his wife's death that morning seems to have no emotions at all. We are likely to be so misled by the concealing mask of conformity which the average Japanese wears that we cannot see beneath its unchanging lines the heavy play of emotion in his heart. Of course, relative degrees of emotional drives are not easily measured, particularly between national groups each of which shows tremendous variation within itself. Some people who express their emotions readily may have fewer strong emotional drives than others who so conceal them as to seem virtually emotionless. This is as true of peoples as of individuals. But any close study of the Japanese will reveal that the Japanese are an emotional people or at least a people whose emotions are so pent up by other forces as to have more explosive powers than we would consider normal.

All the peoples of the Far East, when studied closely, seem by our standards to be highly emotional and, as we would say, frequently irrational. Northrop's characterization of East-

ern civilization as primarily aesthetic in contrast to the theoretic bias of Western civilization has much to recommend it, at least in so far as it applies to the Far East.* The peoples of East Asia have consistently given a greater place in their higher culture to direct emotive response to outside stimuli and have shown far less interest than we in systems of logic. A graphic example carries far more weight with them than the neatest syllogism. Emotional expression in art or poetry is more their forte than a reasoned analysis. Throughout their history, they have placed a greater emphasis on graphic arts and poetry than have we in the West. Of course, we, too, have our art and literature, which may or may not be greater than theirs, but increasingly we have left it to poets and artists, masters and specialists, to produce our art and poetry for us. In the Far East, these are not the prerogatives of the specially talented but are the common coin of all cultivated men.

No matter how "deadpan" a Japanese crowd may be, no matter how monotonously they stick to their formalistic routines, their whole history betrays their basic emotionalism. Our earliest clear picture of the Japanese, in the seventh and eighth centuries, shows them responding with startling enthusiasm to the more advanced civilization of China and particularly to Buddhism, the popular Chinese religion of the day. The Japanese drank eagerly and deeply at the springs of Buddhism, which offered not only far more satisfactory spiritual concepts than any they had previously known but provided them with an emotionally satisfying pageantry and new fields and new techniques of artistic expression, which appealed to the Japanese more directly and more strongly than the philosophy which lay behind them. They embraced first the new religion and then the whole Chinese culture in which it was embedded with the enthusiasm of faddists, which they have ever since shown themselves to be. There has never been anything lethargic about their responses. In the nineteenth century, as

* F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946).

in the seventh, they showed a wild enthusiasm for the wholesale adoption of a foreign civilization. Crazes have repeatedly swept the land, whether they were new sleeve lengths for kimonos, new twists to poetry, or the recent world-wide crazes of skiing, amateur photography, or even existentialism. The Japanese are not the phlegmatic conservatives they appear to be but a people given to fads and enthusiasms.

It was only centuries after the introduction of Buddhism that the Japanese began to make notable philosophic contributions to the new religion, but they mastered almost at once the Buddhist arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting. Some of the buildings of the Horyuji, a monastery erected in the seventh century near the old capital of Nara, still stand as the oldest wooden structures in the world and the best surviving examples of Far Eastern architecture of the T'ang period; and the "Golden Hall" of the monastery is crowded with superb pieces of religious sculpture in bronze and wood, dating from the same time. It also has some of the world's finest religious murals, which survived the ravages of time, only to be badly disfigured in 1949 by a fire, resulting, ironically enough, from modern electric equipment. Near by, in the old capital of Nara itself, stand many other beautiful Buddhist monasteries with more paintings and magnificent Buddhist statues, providing even more lavish proof of the extent of Japanese artistic production in the eighth century and the consummate mastery the Japanese exhibited even at that early date in adopting the sophisticated artistic language of China and adapting it to their own use.

From then on, each new age, each century, produced a wealth of great new artistic works. In some periods, the Japanese showed their creative genius by developing brilliant new aspects of art. In other periods, they drew new inspiration from the ample artistic springs of China. Every major aspect of Chinese art has its parallels and interesting variations in Japan, and there are in addition the largely native developments, such as the highly original domestic architecture evolved in early

medieval times and the picture scrolls of the same period which portray, in a distinctly native style called *Yamato-e*, continuous scenes of breath-taking motion, illustrating the episodic development of a battle, the history of a monastery, or the life of a saint. There were also the late medieval arts, such as landscape gardening and flower arrangement, which, though originally of Chinese inspiration, were completely reshaped and brought to greater perfection in Japan, whence they have recently spread to the Western world. There was also the realistic genre painting of Tokugawa times and the wood-block prints which developed from it and which were greatly admired in the West in the late nineteenth century. The Tokugawa wood-block prints of beautiful landscapes and famous actors represent one of mankind's earliest and most successful attempts at producing fine artistic works at cheap prices for the general public. One might conclude from this that there was, perhaps, a larger and more discriminating popular demand for pictorial art in Japan at this time than in any other country in the world.

It is dangerous to say that one people has more artistic genius or a greater aesthetic bent than another, but certainly the speed and skill with which the Japanese adopted the highly developed art of China contrasts sharply with the slowness and clumsiness of the north European attempt to master the arts of the classic world. And throughout their history the Japanese have shown an enthusiasm for beauty in all its forms which is almost unique. An inordinate passion for the beauties of nature has filled their literature since earliest times and is an important part of Japanese character today. They flock to their "famous" beauty spots the way we throng to football games, and no part of the world is more amply provided by nature with scenic beauty. The Japanese are keenly aware of the play of the seasons on nature around them. Cherry blossom viewing is a national pastime, and the chrysanthemums and maples receive their due in the fall.

The Japanese show a flare for designs and color combina-

tions in clothing which excite the admiration even of those who inherit a very different artistic tradition. They exhibit an amazing refinement of taste in their interior decorating. The wicker basket which a humble craftsman makes or the cheapest pottery bowl shaped and painted by the simplest artisan is often a veritable work of art. The Japanese in their adaptations from the West often show a distressing misunderstanding of our artistic canons, but, from the top to the bottom of their society, they exhibit a high artistic appreciation for what is in their own tradition and uniformly good taste in a myriad of intimate details of their daily life. There is relatively little of the dichotomy we find in our own culture between the self-conscious good taste of the self-appointed artistic minority and the bad taste and artistic vulgarity which they so deplore in others.

Naturally, artistic creativeness and good taste are not merely unrestricted expressions of the emotions. The Japanese, too, have their strict artistic canons, but the fact that Japanese art has never been reduced simply to sterile imitativeness indicates the depths of the emotional springs which feed it. The Japanese passion for natural beauty, their repeated triumphs since ancient times in the field of art, and the high level of artistic taste exhibited throughout the nation give strong evidence of their basic emotionalism, however devoid of feeling they may seem to be superficially.

2. LITERATURE

Most foreign observers of Japan would perhaps agree that her graphic arts are the finest aesthetic expression of her culture, but the Japanese themselves might point to poetry instead. Throughout the Far East, poetry has always been considered the greatest of the literary forms, and it is certainly the earliest true literary expression we find in Japan. During the seventh to ninth centuries, the Japanese seemed willing to substitute almost anything Chinese for their older heritage and

were particularly enamored of the Chinese written tradition, so much so, in fact, that for several centuries thereafter educated Japanese felt it beneath their dignity to write in their native tongue, but their love for their own poetry remained unchanged, and the Sinophile Japanese courtiers of the day still fell back on pure Japanese poetry for the most sincere expressions of their emotions. The *Manyoshu*, a collection of about 4500 contemporary or earlier poems, was compiled shortly after the year 759, attesting to the popularity of Japanese poetry at the very height of the period of borrowing from China. The *Kokinshu*, another great anthology of about 1100 poems, was compiled in 905 by Imperial command, and twenty similar Imperial anthologies were compiled during the next five centuries, representing one of the few significant activities the Imperial court continued after it had been replaced politically by the feudal structure of medieval times.

Japanese poetry is always emotive, rather than didactic, impressionistic, rather than expository. It thus shows the primary concern of the Japanese for aesthetic rather than rational expression. Its very form, as well as long established tradition, has helped to preserve its impressionistic, emotive bent. Ever since the time of the *Manyoshu*, the standard poetic form has been the *tanka*, or "short poem," consisting of thirty-one syllables, arranged in five verses of 5–7–5–7–7 syllables respectively. Since Japanese is a polysyllabic language of very simple phonetic structure, this allows only a very few words per poem, far fewer than we can cram into a thirty-four-syllable limerick. If much is to be expressed, it must be through suggestion—the creation in the mind's eye of a vivid scene by a brief mention of its key detail and the stimulation of an emotional response by a mere symbol or the juxtaposition of two contrasting images. The typical Japanese poem tersely conjures up a picture, usually a beautiful scene from nature, and then by a deft turn transforms the visual impression into a surge of emotion.

Since all the syllables in ancient Japanese were open syl-

lables ending in one of the five Japanese vowels, *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, or *u*, rhyme was too boringly inevitable to have any significance, and, since there is no stress accent like ours in the language, meter, as we know it, was impossible. Instead, the Japanese rely for interest in their poetry on skillful plays on words and deftness in the sleight of hand which transforms a few overworked verbal symbols into living scenes and poignant emotions. All this, together with the tremendous linguistic, as well as psychological, differences between Japanese and English, makes it almost impossible to translate a Japanese poem literally without making gibberish or pedantry out of it, but the following simple and, to us, particularly understandable example, taken from the *Kokinshu* and presented in transliteration and parallel translation, may give some idea of what the *tanka* is like:

Haru tateba	When spring comes
kiyuru kōri no	the melting ice
nokori naku	leaves no trace;
Kimi ga kokoro mo	Would that your heart too
Ware ni tokenan	melted thus toward me.

In ancient times, the Japanese sometimes composed longer poems than the *tanka*, and they were always thoroughly familiar with the more elaborate poetry of China, but they remained true to their own short poetic form. The only significant development in later times was its further abbreviation to seventeen syllables by the omission of the last two verses. This form, known variously as *haiku*, *haikai*, and *hokku*, reached full maturity in the seventeenth century and became the favorite poetic form of the Tokugawa period, but in the last several decades the *tanka* has returned to its traditional place of preference. The *haiku*, while retaining the basic approach of the *tanka*, required even greater density: a scene tersely suggested by two or three words, with the emotional impact, which in the *haiku* frequently was humor, carried by an equally terse juxtaposition of unexpected concepts or merely by an over-

tone. Some idea of the genre may be gained from the following simple examples, which illustrate a few of the aspects of the *haiku*—wit, mood, and the sudden spark of insight:

Tsuki ni e o
sashitaraba yoki
uchiwa kana

To the moon, a handle
add—a good
fan indeed.

Kare eda ni
karasu no tomarikeri
aki no kure

On a withered branch
a crow rested
—the autumn dusk.

Asagao ni
kyō wa miyuran
waga yo kana

In a morning-glory
today I seem to see it
—my life!

Japanese poetry may strike us as a highly restricted medium, but it has never lacked popularity among the Japanese, who have found in its channeled emotionalism a needed medium for self-expression. In ancient times, poetic ability was perhaps more highly prized by the upper classes than any other skill. Love-making without the composing of poems at each meeting and parting was unthinkable. Poetry was as indispensable for all other types of social contact and was an important tool in government itself. In time, other forms of literature became popular—by the late tenth century the sentimental diary and romantic novel, by the thirteenth century the romanticized accounts of the exploits of warriors, by the fifteenth century the deeply Buddhistic *No* plays, and in the seventeenth century the more dramatic and realistic but equally emotional puppet and *Kabuki* plays and a new type of romantic novel—but, throughout, poetry remained the most highly regarded literary expression of each age. In time, more and more people adopted the aristocratic affectation of composing poetry on all memorable occasions. Today, the Japanese find nothing unusual in the holding of an annual national poetry contest, sponsored and participated in by the Emperor himself. Every educated man is expected to be able to compose an appropriate poem on demand. A gathering of old friends

may end with the inscribing of poems in a special book the host keeps for such occasions. The successful politician returning home is likely to be asked by the local paper to write a poem for it to publish. Poetry is an important emotional outlet for the Japanese, and they continue to show for it an enthusiasm that the richer and more varied poetries of other lands have rarely evoked.

Anyone reared in our own rich musical tradition will naturally wonder about the position of music in Japanese culture. It has had much the same place with them as with us, appearing in all the roles which we have given it—folk music and the more elaborate music of the court and the cultivated classes, the music of religion, and the music of the stage, both instrumental and vocal. In Japan, however, and for that matter in the whole Far East, there has not been the same rapid development of music which the West has seen in the last few centuries. Like the Chinese, the Japanese failed to explore the possibilities of harmony and polyphony. Their graphic arts in some respects have been far ahead of ours both technically and in aesthetic development, but their music has technically lagged behind ours in modern times. As a result, although their tradition of painting still stands, for the most part, little affected by Occidental artistic traditions, Japanese music is on the verge of rout before our music. Put a pencil in the hands of an educated Japanese, and what he draws will probably be unmistakably Oriental. Ask him to sing a tune, and he is as likely as not to essay "Home Sweet Home."

3. RELIGION

Religion has been a major emotional release for people everywhere, and the Japanese are no exception. In fact, they have shown a consistently greater interest in religion than their Far Eastern neighbors, on the one hand, and, on the other, have stressed the purely emotional aspects of religion more than we have. Their religions have usually been so thor-

oughly emotive that it is often hard to see in their culture where aesthetics leaves off and religion begins.

Shinto, the religion of the primitive Japanese and the backbone of Japanese religion today, is in essence a nature cult. Its typical cult deities are natural phenomena which by their superb beauty or their mysterious power create a sense of awe in the breast of the onlooker. The term for deity in Japan (there is no word for "god" as we understand it) is *kami*, which means simply "superior." Peerless Fuji or any other lofty peak is perforce a deity. So is any waterfall or any stately tree. One of the commonest sights in the Japanese countryside is a miniature shrine before some towering cryptomeria or perhaps just a sacred straw rope around a gnarled oak. Every Shinto shrine stands in a place of beauty—if nothing else, at least an ancient grove of trees. The thunder and the storm are, of course, deities, as are also the vital forces of fertility, sometimes symbolized by that sly and mysterious creature of the fields, the fox. What could be more natural than that the sun itself is the supreme deity, personified as Amaterasu-omikami, the "Sun Goddess" and progenitress of the Imperial family? There is no line separating man from nature. Awesome and superior men, too, are *kami*—the storied ancestors of old, the heroes who have died in battle, or the mysteriously remote Emperor.

Primitive Shinto went little beyond the simple appreciation of nature and a sense of awe before its more fearsome manifestations. It brought together the local community through common membership in the village shrine group and joint participation in the local festivals. There was attached to it also a primitive mythology, which was preserved in writing in all its naive crudity by the courtiers of the early eighth century, who, even in that age of immoderate admiration for all things Chinese, sought to fashion out of Japan's mythology a history which could rival China's glorious past and, in doing so, unfortunately created a series of national myths which have cast a shadow over rational thought in Japan ever

since. Primitive Shinto's closest approach to ethical concepts was the stress it placed on ritual purity, which entailed a great deal of bathing and bodily cleanliness along with avoidance of the ritually impure. It was almost more an aesthetic concept than an ethical one. To the love of beauty, thus, the Japanese added the love of cleanliness, which in Japan never needed to be justified by hygiene or bracketed for emphasis with godliness. The Japanese have always loved bathing, making a virtual cult out of their nightly scalding baths. As a result, they have probably been throughout history one of the most washed and cleanest people in the world, and only recently has the bathtub and shower mania of us Americans, coupled with the wartime lack of fuel and soap in Japan, pushed them into second place.

During the ages, Shinto witnessed many new developments —the influence of Buddhist philosophy and ecclesiastic organization and repercussions from various other forces in the culture—but the main stream has remained little changed. That is why almost every Japanese is to some degree a Shintoist, close to nature and awed by its majesty. But above this simple foundation has been reared in recent time a superstructure of very different aspect. During the nineteenth century, individual religious leaders, some of them women, founded a series of so-called Shinto sects, which were really eclectic religious movements, called Shinto largely because of the Shinto origin of their principal deities. Many of them are openly nationalistic, and several stress faith healing. The adherents of some of these so-called Shinto sects number in the millions, but, despite their popularity, they have had very little influence on the simple main theme of Shinto itself.

An even more spectacular outgrowth of Shinto has been the utilization of its shrines and symbols for blatant nationalistic propaganda. There is nothing inherently nationalistic about primitive Shinto, but, in so far as it is identified with the oldest native tradition of Japan and with the land itself, it has naturally been used by the self-conscious Japanese throughout their

history as something native to which to point with pride in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the outside world. Time after time, zealots have turned to Shinto for evidence to support their nationalistic prejudices. The work of such propagandists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries helped create interest in Amaterasu-omikami and still more in the long-ignored line of Emperors descended from her, who in ancient times had walked out of the haze of mythology onto the stage of history. The Imperial line provided a rallying point for all the dissatisfied elements in Tokugawa Japan—rival feudal clansmen, reformers, or reactionaries. When Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris pushed open the doors of Japan and thereby unwittingly undermined Tokugawa feudalism, these men quickly raised the cry of an "Imperial Restoration" and soon brought down the feudal edifice in ruins. Jealously guarding the Emperor as their symbol of unity, they marched on Edo, renamed it Tokyo, the "Eastern Capital," and started the amazing series of reforms which was to transform Japan during the Meiji period.

The Japanese were already a more nationalistic people than any other in Asia, but that was not enough. A far greater nationalistic drive and a fanatical willingness for self-sacrifice were necessary if a suspicious and reluctant people were to be driven through the startling and upsetting reforms needed to change a feudal country into a modern nation-state. The emotional force of Shinto lay ready at hand for the new leaders to exploit. They carefully reshaped the major Shinto cults, turning them slowly into instruments of nationalism. With unlimited resources for pageantry and propaganda at the government's disposal, it was possible to develop a new cult, Emperor worship, and make it the greatest cult of the land. School children were indoctrinated through compulsory visits to the leading shrines, which were now regarded as holy places of nationalism. Small shrines, containing pictures of the Emperor and Empress, were erected in every school, and the children were taught to bow whenever they passed them.

Where the Nazis made a ridiculous attempt to revive the long dead cults of the Teutonic gods, the Japanese found comparable cults still vigorously alive and merely needed to warp them to fit their own nationalistic ends. Thus, so-called State Shinto was created during the last few decades and, to meet the objections of Buddhists and Christians, was defined as being non-religious. Cults of hypernationalism are not unknown even in the democratic lands of the West, but State Shinto was unique in that it tapped the chief religious current of the land. It was a typically modern perversion of the religious instinct, diverting it away from its original bed and into nationalistic channels. State Shinto has been an essential part of the hypernationalism of modern Japan, but, if once this unnatural link is broken, Shinto itself should return to its normal course of appreciation and wonder before the beauty and mystery of nature.

Though Shinto has remained the backbone of Japanese religion, Buddhism has formed most of its flesh and blood for over a thousand years. Buddhism, as it was developed in India almost two and a half millenniums ago, was a religion based on a number of premises which the Japanese and the other Far Easterners have never fully accepted. The Indians believed in an endless cycle of lives and the transmigration of the ego from one life to the next through an endless chain of *karma* causality. They also took it for granted that life was indisputably painful. The Buddha sought to break the chain of causality by cutting the individual's attachment to life and thus allowing him to escape from the never-ending cycle of existence to *nirvana,* which literally meant "extinction" and was compared to the going out of a candle but was, somehow, something more than mere nothingness. To achieve the necessary state of enlightenment, the Indian Buddhist practiced austerities and held, if possible, to a monastic life of celibacy.

Nothing that man could conceive is more remote and incomprehensible to the Far Easterner, with his love of life and sense of family continuity, than these Indian ideas. Buddhism could never have spread to China or Japan or survived in the

latter country as its greatest religion if it had not been profoundly modified. The Japanese of the seventh century were attracted by the magnificent ritual of Buddhism, its glorious art, the worldly wisdom of its continental missionaries and of the Japanese monks who had studied abroad, and the power of the many deities it had acquired on its long journey to Japan. Unknown though these gods were to early Buddhism, they had taken on far greater powers by the seventh century than were ever attributed by the Japanese to their own simple deities. So powerful were they, in fact, that they began at once to swallow the whole Shinto pantheon. The old, familiar deities of Japan, it was explained, were merely the local manifestations of the universal Buddhist deities. The two were not at all incompatible but existed simply on two different levels —the local and familiar, the universal and supreme—and, ever since, most Japanese have considered themselves to be both Shintoist and Buddhist without any sense of incongruity or conflict.

Buddhism spread only slowly from the Sinophile court circles down to the people at large, but by the eleventh century it had so worked itself into the whole culture as to have produced a religious excitement among the people, which grew with a rising crescendo until it exploded in a great outburst of religious fervor, reflected in the creation in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries of a number of new, popular Buddhist sects. But in this great Buddhist awakening of medieval Japan, everything that was stressed was diametrically opposed to the teachings of early Indian Buddhism. *Nirvana* had become a beautiful paradise, a glorious afterlife, which compensated for the pain of the life on earth. And the way to paradise was no lonely road of self-denial and mortification of the flesh. *Bodhisattvas*, enlightened creatures who, though infinitely wise, had themselves postponed entrance into *nirvana* in order to help their weaker fellow creatures, stood ready to save anyone who but called on them. The ideal of *jiriki*, salvation through one's "own strength," had been replaced by the easier

doctrine of *tariki,* salvation through "the strength of another." Amida, the Buddha of the "Western Paradise," had vowed to save all sentient beings. It was enough merely to chant *Namu Amida Butsu,* "Hail to the Buddha Amida." The layman could hope for salvation as well as the cleric. There was no need to turn away from this life. The priests of most sects were allowed to marry and raise families, as nature had ordained. Buddhism had become a happy, positive religion, which, while destroying none of the older Japanese religious beliefs, had added a great new dimension to religious experience in Japan.

The *Bodhisattva* concept of service to others created a great ethical ideal of social service, but there was no idea of mortal sin—in fact no clear doctrine of sin at all. Buddhism encouraged good works but did not insist on any restricting ethical code. A single expression of belief was enough to win salvation from the compassionate gods. There was no rigid dogma. All things were encompassed within Buddhism—the hairsplitting metaphysics of the Indians or the simple faith and hope of the medieval Japanese. The Shinto love of nature could also be added. Everything fitted into the tolerant comprehensiveness of Buddhism. The Zen sect, drawing heavily on the naturalistic Taoist philosophers of China, as well as on the Japanese love of nature, became the most important Buddhist movement of late medieval times. Emphasizing meditation and the sudden flash of intuitive knowledge which transcends all rational perception, the Zen practitioners sought to achieve a oneness with nature, an understanding of the basic principle of the universe, through intuitive understanding of one of its humble natural manifestations. Zen, which is undefiledly aesthetic in its approach and belligerently opposed to all that smacks of the theoretic, was the final distillation of the alien Buddhist doctrines over the fires of Chinese Taoism and Japanese nature worship.

Thus, religion in Japan, whether Shinto or Buddhist in form, is largely aesthetic in expression. A code of ethics and a system of philosophy are secondary, or perhaps entirely irrel-

evant. What is important is the sense of awe and wonder, the act of worship, the comforting sense of belief. Religion means the gay shrine festivals, where *saké* flows freely to help break down the emotional inhibitions of the celebrants. Religion means a feeling of awe before the plunging waterfall and the half-instinctive bowing of one's head and clapping of one's hands before something superior, with little thought of direct benefit or any clear rationale for one's act. Religion means praying before a mysterious image of the Buddha, while the priests chant the liturgy and the beauty of serenity enters one's heart to match the beauty of the world outside.

Art, poetry, and religion are some of the more important outlets the Japanese use for the expression of the emotionalism they so carefully hide in most of their daily life, but there are also other permitted channels of emotional expression in Japanese society. They lavish a love on little children which contrasts sharply with the formality they show in most relations between adults. They drink without reserve but rather with a carefree desire to get as much emotional release as possible out of a very small quantity of *saké*. As a result, there tends to be a great deal of boisterous conviviality in Japan with only an inconsequential amount of alcoholism. They are far freer about sexual matters than are we in the West, where sex and sin are so closely linked. Japanese men feel little but economic restraints against extramarital relations, and throughout Japanese history homosexuality and masturbation have been accepted with no sense of shock. They also allow themselves a great deal more sentimentality than we do, crying on occasions when we would suppress tears, and assuming a degree of sentimental attachment to home, friends, school, and all other old associations which we would stoutly deny if we felt. Their language has a much used set of words expressing nostalgic longing, which find no parallel in common English speech. They are as inveterate lovers of sensationalism as are the readers of an American tabloid. They show the same wild enthusiasm for the subject of suicide that

we devote to crime, although the suicide rate of Japan, like the crime rate of America, is no higher than that of several other lands less engrossed by these subjects.

In their literature, in particular, the Japanese show their love of the sentimental. It has permeated their literature ever since the great *Tale of Genji,* written shortly after the year 1000, and is often found to a degree we would consider cloying. Modern writers frequently indulge in morbid introspection, which the reading public laps up. The Japanese, though probably no better able than the average American to understand the great Russian writers, devour their descriptions of the emotional conflicts and outbursts of their characters with an enthusiasm known here only to a small coterie of devotees. And the whole Japanese theater drips with emotion. The Japanese do not want happy endings. They go to the theater to weep over frustrated lovers who finally die in a love suicide. They go to see actors struggle visibly under their emotions, faces taut and voices cracking, in a way the members of the audience never permit themselves to act, regardless of the emotional strain.

4. SOCIAL CONFORMITY

Thus, in a great variety of ways, the Japanese show themselves to be a strongly emotional people, but what strikes the foreign observer first is not at all their emotionalism but rather the heavy cloak of conformity which so covers the surface of Japanese society as to all but conceal the lines of emotion below. How is it that such emotional people have been able to so control their emotions as to transform themselves into an ant-like society of willing coöperators? Why are the Japanese not like the Koreans, whom they resembled so closely in the early days of their history and who still stand closer to the Japanese, culturally as well as racially, than any other people? Anyone will admit that the Koreans are emotional. They are erratic individualists—self-assertive sometimes to the

point of anarchy. No one has accused them of conformity or of blind obedience.

The contrast between the Japanese and Koreans in this respect may actually be of fairly recent origin. The Japanese, too, seem to have been an openly emotional and unrepressed people during much of their history, perhaps until as late as the sixteenth or seventeenth century. The unending quest for love and beauty on the part of the hero of the *Tale of Genji* typified the courtier of ancient times. Murder and treachery, uprisings and feuding, passionate outbursts and equally passionate devotion characterized the feudal age. The Confucian insistence on decorum and the "doctrine of the mean," though perhaps the keystone of the Chinese system which they sought to borrow, made relatively little impression on the ancient Japanese. There was nothing moderate about them. The Portuguese and Spaniards in the sixteenth century did not find them unduly repressed emotionally or more prone to conformity than the Europeans themselves.

The two centuries of stability and peace of the Tokugawa period, however, seem to have brought a great change in Japanese society. The land was filled up by then. There were great cities, densely packed with humanity. For a long period people lived in close proximity to one another under the stern and watchful eye of an oppressive regime. Perhaps in a heavily crowded land such as Japan has been since the seventeenth century, established patterns of conduct must be more rigidly observed than in lands where people live with more room about them and a wilderness to conquer. The contrast between us Americans and our more law-abiding and class-conscious cousins in Europe may be a case in point. The lack of privacy within the Japanese house may also have contributed to the growth of social conformity in Japan. With sliding partitions of flimsy paper taking the place of solid walls, the niceties of genteel living within the family depend upon careful observance of mutually understood rules of conduct. Japanese observers of the West have been amazed by the locks on the doors

inside our homes and have correlated locked doors with individualism. Flimsy paper partitions should, perhaps, be correlated with conformity. But, whatever the cause, the modern Japanese, unlike their more remote ancestors, are a nation of conformists, of followers of the rule books, and the book of rules in Japan is amazingly detailed and explicit.

It is significant that, with the advent of Tokugawa stability, the Japanese suddenly took a much greater interest in Confucianism than ever before. The Tokugawa period is the golden age of Confucianism in Japan. A stable, peaceful Japan needed a detailed book of rules, the way a war-torn land did not. Confucianism, heavy with the wisdom and prestige of China, fitted the need admirably, providing a perhaps overly emotional people with the external controls they required to form a well-regulated, peaceful society.

Confucianism, the way of life taught by the Chinese sage and his disciples more than two millenniums ago, emphasized etiquette and ceremony. It exploited the sound psychological principle that one learns proper attitudes by starting out with proper conduct. There were Confucian virtues, but the heart of Confucianism, as it had evolved through the ages, was the strict outer form, the almost ritualistic embodiment of the virtues in specific patterns of conduct. These were a great boon to the emotional Japanese. It is easier to conform to an outer pattern than to a general precept. Strict rules allowed no chance for doubt, whereas vague virtues alone would have left room for the emotions to slip back in and determine the course of action. The use of ritualistic etiquette as a curb for the emotions was by no means new in Japan, but this aspect of her culture was greatly strengthened in the Tokugawa period through a conscious reëmphasizing of Confucian rules of conduct, backed up by a ruthlessly severe and ever watchful government.

Confucianism stressed human relationships and the creation of a more perfect society on earth through the proper regulation of these relationships. The combination of inner upright-

ness with external etiquette, they taught, would produce the supreme virtue, *jen*. *Jen* is a homophone for the Chinese word for "man" and is written in Chinese with the character 仁, which is made up of the two parallel lines of the symbol for "two" and the character for "man" or "human being" on the left. Thus it clearly means "humaneness" in the sense of the proper conduct between two men—the way human beings should treat each other. But this does not mean simply benevolence or love, as it might according to our Christian ideas. Confucianism emphasized the "five relationships," which were those between ruler and ruled, husband and wife, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, and friend and friend. Significantly, all but the last of these relationships is between a superior and an inferior, and they all are particular relationships, not general ones. Here is the fundamental ethical difference between the Far East and Europe. In the West we have tended to build up a universalistic ethic which equates all individuals in their relationship to God or to society. In the Far East, all relationships tend to be specific. Proper ethical conduct cannot be generalized but depends upon the particular relationship between the two individuals involved. Is the other man your ruler, your father, an uncle, an older cousin, a younger brother, a neighbor, an acquaintance, or a stranger? The way you treat him should differ accordingly. Treating a stranger as a cousin would be doing an injustice to your cousins. Treating an acquaintance as your father would be insulting to your parents.

The particularistic bent of Confucian ethics merely strengthened the natural tendencies within the feudal society of Japan. Any feudal society is, by definition, a society of many very specific personal relationships—a great pyramid of individual rights and obligations. The loyalty due a feudal lord is different from that due a friend. The rights of a peasant are not the same as those of a knight or samurai. There is no universal ethic. Proper conduct depends upon the specific status of the one man and his particular relationship to the other. With such

a feudal background, it was natural that Tokugawa ethics became phrased largely in terms of specific obligations—obligations to feudal lord, to parents, to family, and, perhaps most important of all, to oneself, in the sense that one must properly play the role assigned to one by fate in a society of hereditary status. Life entailed a complicated mass of obligations on every side—to those above, to those below, and also to one's own position.

There could be no general guideposts equally valid for all men. Such vague virtues as faith, hope, and charity all had their place in Buddhism—and the Tokugawa, for security purposes, forced all persons to be registered as parishioners of some Buddhist temple—but these Buddhist virtues had no more to do with the normal obligations of society than did the Shinto love of natural beauty. If each man were to perform his specific obligations properly, he must have detailed and explicit instructions, not just general guiding virtues. Each situation must have its specific rule for each category of person. Generalized rules applicable to all would lead only to confusion and conflict in a society in which status, and therefore obligations, differed so radically from individual to individual.

The result of all this has been a far more rigid adherence to a detailed set of social rules than we know in the West. This is what makes the Japanese seem to be the politest people on earth, though they may be essentially no more courteous than we, but simply more punctilious. The Japanese are sticklers for etiquette. Each situation calls for an exactly correct act or a precisely prescribed phrase. Following the rule book exactly should see anyone through any situation, however complicated or unpleasant. To us, with our more individualistic concepts and the high premium we place on originality, such an inflexible adherence to rule appears slightly ludicrous. The endless stereotyped phrases of polite conversation, the machine-like alternation of bows between two friends in a solemn greeting on the street, the painfully exact exchange of presents, and a thousand other rigid formalities of Japanese daily life seem

to us excessive and even absurd. Though not different in spirit from our own daily stereotypes, they occupy a much greater share of normal social life than they do with us. This is, of course, stultifying to what we would consider normal friendly relations, smothering them under a heavy blanket of time-consuming and sometimes expensive formalities. But, at the same time, it provides the sensitive, emotional Japanese with a protective armor of acceptable responses for all occasions. There need be no embarrassing situations, no painful quandaries.

This, of course, does not mean that there are no conflicts within Japanese society. There are occasional clashes even between obligations, as in the famous story of the "Forty-Seven *Ronin*." In this historical incident, which occurred in the years 1701 to 1703 and became at once a favorite theme of Japanese literature, a group of samurai broke their obligation to the Tokugawa regime to keep the peace in order to fulfill their obligation of vengeance to their dead lord. Their lord had been insulted by another lord and had drawn his sword in anger within the castle grounds of Edo. As punishment he was forced to commit suicide. The forty-seven samurai, made *ronin*, or unemployed samurai, by their lord's demise, paid their obligation to him by taking his enemy's head, and then made amends to the regime by committing suicide themselves.

An even more common conflict in Japanese society is the clash between obligation and "human feeling," as they call their emotions. This conflict between *giri* and *ninjo*, to use their terms, is typified by the love suicide or by the samurai who sacrifices his dear ones to fulfill some higher obligation. The Japanese are aware of this conflict and dote on it in their novels and plays. They also realize that *ninjo* should temper *giri* and that *giri* should modify *ninjo*. At the same time they try to minimize the conflict between *ninjo* and *giri* in actual life by attempting to keep them in separate compartments. The emotions are directed into accepted channels where they will not wash against the social structure. A man may visit courte-

sans and prostitutes all he wishes and make whatever romantic attachments he can financially afford, but, when it comes to marriage, the family will choose a proper mate for him. He has religion, poetry, and art in which to express his emotions, but the serious business of life is no place for him to exhibit temperament. He may weep over the beauty of the moon and pour out his soul in verse, but he should never betray upsetting anger or excitement before his family or friends.

The system works well enough. The Japanese manage to live their formalistic lives with perhaps no greater emotional tensions than we in the West who have left room in our cultures for a far less fettered play of the emotions. There is, however, one great weakness in the system. The Japanese who ventures out beyond the boundaries of his rule book is more completely lost than those of us who live by more generalized precepts and fewer exact rules. When he enters another culture, he is baffled by the vagueness of its rules of conduct. If he sticks to his own precise rules, he appears ridiculous. If he seeks to follow the other man's rules as strictly as he follows his own, he is little better off.

Still worse is the unexpected situation not accounted for in his formal training. The unaccustomed human relationships created by war mean a clearer break with all past experience for the modern Japanese soldier than for our G.I.'s. Our peacetime virtues may seem to lose some of their validity in battle, but his more meticulous code of conduct becomes clearly inapplicable in many of the situations he meets and he consequently may disregard it completely. Whereas at home he is far less given to physical violence than are we in the United States, on the battlefield brutality comes as less of a shock to him than to us. Torture in war and meticulous politeness in peace seem less of a contradiction to him than organized mass murder and simple friendliness under our more universalistic ethic. The loyal Japanese soldier, who was never prepared for the possibility of capture, had nothing to guide him, if, by any chance, he did fall into our hands. The prisoner who had par-

ticipated willingly in the suicide charge of the night before saw nothing inconsistent in volunteering his services to aid the Americans the next day. The unforeseen had happened, and obviously none of the old rules were any longer applicable.

On the other hand, this same situational ethic also permits more rapid adjustments to new situations and a sensible flexibility of conduct which we sometimes lack. Perhaps this tendency has been strengthened by a basic fatalism conditioned by the uncontrollable ferocity of nature, which periodically ravages the Japanese islands. Few parts of the world are more subject to devastating earthquakes or are more frequently visited by destructive hurricanes—the dread typhoons of the Far East. Probably more than 100,000 persons were killed in the great Tokyo earthquake and fire of September 1, 1923, the greatest natural cataclysm that mankind has ever suffered. Repeatedly the Japanese have had to pick themselves out of the wreckage of their cities or farms and patiently start over again.

But whether or not natural disasters have forced the Japanese to show greater flexibility in their conduct, there can be no doubt that their situational ethics has often permitted them to reverse their attitudes suddenly when convinced that the situation required a new approach. The bitterly anti-foreign sentiment of the late Tokugawa period was transformed almost overnight into a wild enthusiasm for learning from the West, once the Japanese became convinced that the outside world could no longer be kept at arm's length. As invasion and ultimate defeat in the recent war began to stare the Japanese in the face, almost to a man they remained calmly determined to go down fighting—to resist to the end, even if it meant opposing our heavy armor with nothing more than sharpened bamboo sticks. That was their duty to Emperor and country, and there could be no doubt about it. And then came the surrender, correctly arranged by their leaders according to the rules. The situation had changed. There was no longer any virtue in suicidal resistance. Now it was their duty to show

friendliness toward the Americans and wholehearted coöperation. It was not a matter of emotion but of two different sets of duties to meet two different situations. The change was incomprehensible to us who were fighting, not out of duty so much as because we were "fighting mad" with righteous indignation.

But, as we have seen, the Japanese, if they ever lose their ethical bearings, are perhaps more helplessly at sea than we would be. They are accustomed to a narrow prescribed course. We have more often ventured out upon uncharted waters. Deprived of their familiar situational guideposts, they seem to fall into panic somewhat more easily than we. How else can one explain the slaughter of Koreans by the usually polite and law-abiding citizens of Tokyo after the great earthquake of 1923? Although not different in spirit from the race riots and lynchings of our own country, the massacre of Koreans in Tokyo was on a far larger scale. Thrown off balance by the horror and devastation of the earthquake, the ordinarily mild and good-natured city crowds were transformed by entirely groundless and absurd rumors into blood-crazy packs of predatory animals, butchering defenseless Koreans on sight. The specific situational code of the Japanese works well enough on ordinary occasions, perhaps with less friction and strain than our own more individualistic code of conduct, but it seems to break down more completely than our more generalized ethics when confronted with the unexpected, throwing the Japanese back on their unguided instincts.

8. Shame, Obedience, and Will Power

1. SHAME AND SELF-RESPECT

The Japanese, as we have seen, are an emotional people, but their drives for self-expression are not bridled by any clear concept of sin or any categorical religious sanctions. How, then, can one explain the power of social conformity in Japan and the rigid adherence to specific rules of conduct? What is the power which enforces these rules and prevents willful and socially disruptive self-expression, if religion offers no firm precepts and conscience does not curb the passions with a sense of guilt? In the West, an emotional people with no sense of sin and no religious sanctions might be undisciplined and anarchistic libertines, but this description hardly fits the Japanese. They obviously have a substitute for our Western religious sanctions and our sense of guilt as means of preventing individual infractions of ethical codes. This substitute is a sense of shame before society. In their culture shame enforces the ethical system and inhibits individual deviations from acceptable conduct. Guilt and shame, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Both are known in Japan as well as in the West, but, where the sense of guilt carries the major load in our own sin-conscious society, shame is the primary force in the honor-conscious society of Japan.

"Good child" and "bad child" are important conditioning phrases for Japanese children, just as "good girl" and "bad boy" are for our own, but "good" and "bad" in the West soon become linked with a series of abstract but absolute virtues and

sins, while in Japan the criterion always remains primarily the approval or disapproval of society in general. Worse than the phrase "bad child" is the more explicit statement, "People will laugh at you." The child is taught not to eschew sin but to avoid *faux pas*, embarrassing or costly errors which would cause others to laugh at him or his family to be ashamed. Although he is taught to acquire certain general virtues, the emphasis is on winning specific approval and praise. His family's devoted admiration serves as a substitute for the approval of society only in his early years. By the time the child starts to go to school, family approbation and disapproval merely mirror the judgment of society. The family instead of offering the child protection from the scorn of society, blames the child for having brought shame on the family. There is no crying and running to mama. The family uses the harsh judgments of society to teach the child conformity and obedience.

This emphasis on the judgment of society makes the individual Japanese a very self-conscious person. "What will they think of me?" is always his first thought, not "What do I think of them?" Even the most humble Japanese feels himself to be on a stage before his fellow countrymen and the whole world. More than that, he has a keen awareness of playing a role on the stage of history. As true Far Easterners, the Japanese have a much stronger sense of history than we do in the West. The individual soldier who stubbornly sought death alone in the jungle was steeled to his act by the feeling that, even if no compatriot were there to report his deed, it was illuminated by the footlights of history. The Japanese are taught to feel shame before society and to fear it. The result is a self-consciousness which borders on an inferiority complex. This could be part of the origin of the national sense of inferiority the Japanese sometimes exhibit toward the outside world. But it does not seem to have produced among individuals in Japan much overt aggressiveness, largely because individual aggressiveness is strongly condemned by society.

With the approval or disapproval of society the ultimate

criterion by which he judges himself, the Japanese, however, is inevitably a highly competitive individual. Life for him is one great competition—competition to win more approval than the next man. Competition so pervades life that the Japanese tend to avoid any dramatization of it. They love our Western competitive sports but decry their effect. They make entrance into all schools beyond the elementary level a brutally competitive matter and then minimize further competition between students once they have been admitted. They are far more rank-conscious than we in America, but are afraid of promotions by merit, preferring to stick wherever possible to the less competitive system of promotion by age. They encourage individuals to measure up to fixed standards or to improve their own records as a stimulus to work, leaving competition with others the ultimate but unmentioned measure of success. Thus, they try to avoid overt competition, but they cannot eliminate their strong competitive spirit or the bitterness of failure, which they perhaps feel as keenly as any other people on earth. Every Japanese has his stories of officials who took their own lives when they failed to perform acceptably their appointed tasks and of students who committed suicide when they failed in their entrance examinations.

To avoid shame and win approval the Japanese must preserve "face" and self-respect. He must avoid errors; he must fulfill all his obligations however onerous; and, above all, he must live up to his own concept of his position and duties. Anything else would be to lose "face" and self-respect, if not openly before others, at least inwardly to himself. A sense of shame and the need for self-respect provide the Japanese with much the same individual driving force that we derive from conscience and a sense of guilt. Self-respect can be as hard a taskmaster for them as conscience was for the Puritans. To persons raised in our guilt-conscious society, they appear to be in some respects undisciplined and licentious and in other respects rigid adherents to pointlessly strict rules of conduct. To them, reared as they are in a society which stresses shame,

we appear at times amazingly prudish and at other times strangely lacking in discipline and self-respect.

We Americans are thoroughly familiar with the concept of saving "face," even though we have borrowed an Oriental term to express it, but we profess to consider the desire to save "face" more of an amusing weakness than a virtue. To the Japanese, it is a basic aspect of their ethics. Without it, the whole ethical structure would collapse. The individual must have a strong fear of aberrations from accepted standards which others will laugh at or condemn. He must also have a compelling desire to win praise by excelling in approved patterns of conduct. Sensitivity to the judgments of society is the chief ethical sanction in Japan.

With "face" such an important matter, one should no more deny another "face" than willingly sacrifice it oneself. No one should be made to appear ludicrous, whatever happens. No one should be shown to be in error, because to look silly or to be wrong is too damaging to the personality in a society which stresses the avoidance of error or ridicule as we stress the avoidance of sin. The Japanese language not only is lacking in blasphemy but does not even have many terms of abuse or revilement. Omission of the proper honorific expressions is usually as close as the Japanese permits himself to come to open insult, not because he feels anger less keenly but because ridicule and abuse are far more serious offenses in Japan than in the West. To laugh at another man or to expose his errors is to show no knowledge of human nature and deserves the devastating condemnation of "insincerity." A man who allows himself to do such things is patently not living up to the rules of the game. He is not just impolite. He is striking at the roots of the other man's character.

If laughing at a man is such a terrible thing, Japan is obviously no place for practical jokes or hearty laughs at another's expense. The Japanese do not laugh easily with strangers or even acquaintances and as a result have won for themselves the reputation of being humorless. Their punctilious observ-

ance of etiquette and their sometimes curious adaptations of borrowings from the West strike us as being amusing, and we do not see why they do not join in the joke. But the Japanese, although they do not always laugh at the things we find funny, have their own well-developed sense of humor. Their literature since ancient times has had a broad stream of humor in it, which has shown no sign of shrinking. Even their art has its humorous aspects. Japan eight centuries ago had her Walt Disney, who painted delightfully satirical animal scrolls, depicting fat, solemn frogs as pompous monks and religious dignitaries. The Japanese dote on puns and plays on words of every kind. They can be hilariously funny among their friends, but except when with the most intimate of comrades they do not laugh at others or participate in the good-natured but insulting banter and chaff we enjoy.

The Japanese have developed many stratagems whereby the normal business of life can be accomplished without causing anyone to lose "face." The whole formalism of their social and official relationships is part of this system. If strict routines of conduct are always followed, no one can be embarrassed by unexpected developments. The insistence in Japanese domestic propaganda during the war that every development was what had been expected is an indication of how deeply they fear the unforeseen. A business call in Japan will normally start and close with polite conversation which serves as a sugar coating for the unpleasant necessity of making a request and possibly being refused. And one never makes a simple refusal in Japan. There must always be an excuse, however transparent, to make it appear to be not unwillingness to comply but rather a reluctant bowing to fate. But the best loved stratagem is the go-between—that is the use of a third party or, often enough, two third parties to bargain and make arrangements in behalf of the principals, so that the latter will not be forced to lose "face" or be impolite to each other. This is how marriages are arranged, how most embarrassing or important requests are made, and how many business deals are transacted. It is a cum-

bersome system, but it is highly effective in minimizing the unpleasant personal contacts which occur in all societies but are particularly distasteful to the Japanese.

In Japan, which was an essentially feudal land until less than a century ago, "face" and self-respect have created a concept of "honor" not unlike that of feudal Europe and a corresponding need for revenge, not so much to wipe out insult as to wipe out shame. The man who proves you wrong may not have insulted you by our standards, but he has caused you shame according to theirs, and revenge may be called for. But anger or chagrin alone are not enough reason for revenge. To be bested by someone who is admittedly superior to you is no cause for shame. The Japanese were maddened before the war by our refusal to take them very seriously, because our obliviousness to the Japanese threat implied a certain degree of contempt. But our victory over them produced a very different reaction. We had proved ourselves to be unquestionably superior. Losing to us was no cause for shame. The Japanese need for self-respect, instead, has induced them to magnify our virtues and picture us as a race of supermen, and many an American in Japan, overwhelmed by the power and prestige of his position in an occupied country, has accepted the new role without a blush.

Despite the glorification of the revenge motive in Japan, particularly in such well-loved feudal tales as that of the "Forty-Seven *Ronin*," revenge plays only a very minor part in daily life. Today the Japanese are much more likely to turn resentment inward against themselves. Perhaps something of this is to be seen in their masochistic self-mortification since the war and the insistent admissions of guilt so many Japanese now indulge in. The result of such inverted resentment is often morbidity or even suicide. In fact, in modern Japan suicide is glorified far more than revenge. It is not a sin to them but something almost romantic. It is the one sure way to wipe out shame, to find escape from any situation. Suicide, however, is not entirely an inversion of resentment. It also has a positive

function, as when a Japanese man committed suicide in front of our embassy in Tokyo in protest against the Exclusion Act of 1924. To commit suicide on your enemy's doorstep is to put the finger of shame on him for having driven another to such a desperate act, and he, of course, loses "face."

But "face" is not merely keeping up appearances and avoiding embarrassment. As we use the word in English, it is exclusively a matter of outward appearances. But in Japan it also means self-respect. Maintaining "face" to oneself is far more important than maintaining "face" before others. One must fulfill one's obligations, even if they are unknown to the world and one's sacrifices unappreciated by others. One must live up to one's position, regardless of how unpleasant or even embarrassing the immediate consequences may be. "Face" is something you win or lose yourself rather than an attribute others can bestow or steal. The Japanese, unlike the Chinese, do not put great emphasis on the concept of "giving 'face.'" It is better to accept insults than to lose self-respect by showing anger. The man who undergoes indignities with composure gains "face." The man who loses his temper also loses "face," no matter how justified his anger or effective his tongue or fists.

There are a myriad obligations which must be meticulously fulfilled, if self-respect is to be maintained. Among the most burdensome is the obligation to one's family. The child inevitably becomes heavily indebted to his parents and his family in general, and a life of selfless service to family interests is not too much repayment. In feudal times there was also the primary obligation to one's lord, which necessitated unwavering and unquestioning loyalty at all times. This obligation has been transformed in modern times into unlimited loyalty to the Emperor, serving as the personification of the state. The individual, as the recipient of the heritage of a long civilization, is unendingly indebted to society, usually thought of as the state and symbolized by the Emperor. No sacrifice, however great, can be more than partial payment of this debt. Absolute and

fanatical devotion to the service of the state is thus built into the foundations of Japan's ethical code.

Such obligations to family and state are unlimited, and the individual Japanese is willing to bear a very heavy burden in their name, but in addition there are many other specific obligations which differ from individual to individual. Any benefit received from another carries with it obligations which should, if possible, be repaid. One's teachers deserve unending loyalty. Once a disciple always a disciple, and the disciple never doubts or corrects his master. One's employer or supervisor is due his share of loyal service, if he in turn has lived up to his obligations. The bond between master and servant is likely to develop into a lifelong exchange of patronage for loyalty. In fact this is the pattern for all relationships between superiors and inferiors. Between equals a careful balance of favors must be maintained. Gifts are not to be received with casual thanks. They must be paid in kind if one is to maintain self-respect. A present for a present is the inflexible rule in Japan. The language itself reflects their heavy consciousness of indebtedness. Where we easily wipe out a minor favor or kindness with a casual "Thank you," the Japanese emphasize their indebtedness by using phrases which literally mean, "It is hard to have," "This calls for awe," "I am indebted to you," or "I have caused you trouble." It may not be more blessed to give than to receive in Japan, but it certainly is much more pleasant. Nowhere in the world are people more determined to repay casual favors as well as real indebtednesses, and nowhere else are they more capable of devoted loyalty to those who have aided or befriended them.

Self-respect in Japan calls for "sincerity." But "sincerity" is by no means to be associated with frankness, as it is in the United States. Frankness to the Japanese often appears to be nothing more than rudeness. "Sincerity" to them means knowing what is expected of one, or rather what one should expect of oneself to maintain self-respect, and then having the strength of will to do it. It means being too "big" to act improperly, no

matter what the other man does. To be sincere one must know the rules—that is, one must recognize the authority of the rules and be obedient to them—and one must also have the will power to live up to the rules in the face of any difficulty.

The whole Japanese ethic is based on the individual's unquestioning acceptance of society's judgment of him and his assumption of fixed obligations within society. An outside authority is taken for granted. There is no concept of a social contract; no premium placed on individual freedom; no emphasis on personal initiative. Instead, each member of society is expected to accept without question already established rules and obligations. The individual has no responsibility *for* these rules and obligations, but he is completely responsible *to* them.

One can even say that in Japan the individual is less the unit of society than in the West. In theory the individual does not even exist as an individual but only as a member of certain larger groupings—family, school, community, or nation. There are no individuals but only sons and fathers, students and teachers, citizens and officials, subjects and rulers. The interests of society are not just the collective interests of its individual members. Nor is the judgment of society merely a tabulation of individual preferences. The Japanese whenever possible avoids individual decisions and individual responsibility. Group decisions and group responsibility seem to him the way to achieve group interests.

2. THE ACCEPTANCE OF AUTHORITY

Every society depends to some degree on the willingness of the individual to subordinate his interests to those of the group and his acceptance of the authority of society, but, on the whole, the Far Easterners perhaps show a greater readiness to submerge themselves in society and to accept its authority than we in the West, at least in modern times. The authority of tradition, for instance, weighs far more heavily with them than with us. Their whole emphasis on history and its value as

a guidebook for human conduct is evidence of this. Where our thinkers boast of their creative concepts, even when they are merely revamping old ideas, the philosophers of China consider themselves to be antiquarian scholars who have rediscovered the true ideas of the ancients, even when they are blazing new intellectual trails.

Some would trace the more ready acceptance of authority in the Far East to the so-called "Asiatic" type of society which was characteristic of the ancient centers of civilization in Asia as well as in Egypt. According to this theory, for example, a fundamental, shaping influence on Chinese society is to be found in the necessity since ancient times of maintaining large-scale public projects on the plains of North China, the homeland of the culture, in order to prevent the Yellow River from flooding and to control irrigation. These large-scale enterprises, it is assumed, made it necessary for the few to organize and direct the labor of the many, producing in turn a clear division since ancient times between a small ruling class and the masses and leading by the end of the third century B.C. to the creation of a unified empire under an all-powerful Emperor, a form of monolithic, authoritarian state which has remained until recent decades the Chinese political ideal and the political reality during most of the intervening centuries.

This theory may have some validity for China, but it has little direct applicability to Japan. No large-scale water-control projects were needed there, and only rarely before modern times did the Japanese succeed in achieving a truly unitary state like the Chinese empire. The Buddhist church was able to maintain much greater independence and authority in Japan than in China; the Emperors, who were always considered to be the ultimate source of all temporal authority, exercised none during most of Japanese history; and even the military rulers of Japan were divided into warring factions as often as they were united under a single authority. Authority throughout Japanese history has been no more unified than in a typical European land. The emphasis on obedience to authority, how-

ever, may well have been brought to Japan from China as part of the Chinese culture which Japan borrowed, and in this sense Japan may have become a stepchild of the "Asiatic" type of society.

Another basic reason for the greater readiness on the part of the Far Easterners to accept authority is found by some in the Chinese writing system. If, as most scholars believe, the Sanskrit alphabet, like those of Greece and Rome, derives from the ancient Phoenician alphabet, which in turn was derived ultimately from Egyptian hieroglyphics, then all the living systems of writing in the world, except for the Chinese and its derivatives, stem from a single source. Only in the Far East has a pre-alphabetic system of writing survived in competition with the more efficient phonetic notations invented in the ancient Near East. Chinese characters are the greatest unifying bond in Far Eastern civilization and at the same time the greatest element of cultural distinction between the Far East and the rest of the world.

The Chinese writing system, like that of ancient Egypt, is pictographic in origin, but our earliest remaining examples of it, dating from more than three millenniums ago, show that it had already by that time developed into a highly complex and sophisticated system. Over two thousand years ago the Chinese characters had become established in essentially their present form, with few if any suggesting to the uninitiated any pictographic element at all. Ever since earliest times, however, the basic principle of the Chinese writing system has been that each word, or, in cases of polysyllabic words, each syllable of a word, should be represented by a separate character. Naturally there have been irregularities in the system. Semantic developments and graphic substitutions have resulted in some characters having two or more independent meanings and sometimes more than one pronunciation, but, by and large, the Chinese have kept to the principle of a different character for each lexical element. This means that several thousand symbols are required to write Chinese, as opposed to our

twenty-six letters, and because of their very number many of these symbols must be extremely complex. Whereas none of our letters requires more than four strokes, as the Chinese would count them, hundreds of Chinese characters are written with more than twenty strokes.

Such a complicated writing system has inevitably had a profound influence on Chinese culture. It has been a serious limiting factor, making the recording and transmission of knowledge and ideas harder than in India or the West. It has also made the learning process essentially one of rote memory work. There has been less room in Chinese education for reasoning or the exercise of judgment. Instead, education has been primarily the painful and literally endless task of accumulating characters—of adding piece by piece to the store of factual knowledge about characters and their uses, which only a teacher can impart and which the student must accept without question. Knowledge and wisdom have become essentially the accumulation of facts from books and teachers, not a dual process of study and thought.

The very difficulty of writing has given great prestige and authority to that which is written and also to the few who are literate. All cultures have tended to attribute special merits to the surviving literature of antiquity, but nowhere in the world is this truer than in China, where the so-called Classics have enjoyed the prestige and authority most other people reserve for their most honored religious books. Even today the average Chinese regards the written word with an awe which we, conditioned by the gibberish of printed advertisements, find ludicrous. And with education limited to the privileged few who have the time and opportunity to learn the difficult writing system, those who can control the magic of the characters tend to have greater power and prestige than we in the West have ever been willing to give to the educated. The scribe or even the scholar has been a relatively humble member of our civilization, but in China the social and political ideal for more than two thousand years has been rule by

the best educated. Empires, there too, were won by the sword, but the only justification for rule has been moral superiority, always closely associated in the Chinese mind with education. Thus, the prestige of writing and education in China has produced a more willing acceptance of tradition and a higher degree of obedience to the authority of the learned than we know in the West.

The use of Chinese characters has produced much the same result in Japan and many additional problems as well. Perhaps the greatest single misfortune in the history of Japan was that, because of her geographic position, Chinese characters and not one of the Western alphabets became the basis of her writing system. The Near Eastern alphabets spread north of China through Central Asia as far as Manchuria. The Indian alphabet spread south of China to Siam and Malaysia. The ancient Japanese, however, although aware of alphabetic systems of writing, derived so much of their higher culture and its vocabulary directly from China that they inevitably came to adopt the Chinese writing system along with the rest. But Japanese, which structurally bears a close resemblance to the Altaic languages of north Asia, such as Korean, Mongolian, and Turkish, is a polysyllabic language characterized by the addition of one inflection after another at the end of words through a process of agglutination. Not only did the Chinese characters, each representing a Chinese word, fit the Japanese vocabulary only very imperfectly, but the Chinese writing system offered no way of recording the Japanese inflected endings.

It was probably more difficult for the ancient Japanese to write their language in Chinese characters than it would be for us to write English that way today. The Latin alphabet could have been adapted almost overnight to the needs of Japanese, but it took centuries of painful effort before the Japanese evolved from Chinese a workable though highly inefficient method of writing their language. For long the Japanese evaded the problem by writing only in the Chinese language and not

attempting to write Japanese. Then they developed from the Chinese characters two different and at first chaotic phonetic systems, known as *kana,* in which highly abbreviated characters represented individual syllables of the Japanese phonetic system. But their cultural heritage was expressed so largely through Chinese characters that it was hard for them to write on any technical or scholarly subject without the use of characters. Eventually they combined these two radically different systems of writing, using characters for most uninflected words and for the roots of the inflected words and reserving the *kana* to write inflected endings and all words for which reasonable character substitutes did not exist.

This mixed writing system, which is still used today, has the advantage over the Chinese system of having the supplementary phonetic scripts. These have made possible the gradual elimination of the less commonly used characters, until the number used in most standard printing projects had been reduced before the war to less than two thousand. There is, however, the tremendous disadvantage in this system of multiple readings for most characters. A Chinese word, represented by a single character, sometimes corresponds to several different words in Japanese, resulting in several different readings for the character. Conversely, a single Japanese word sometimes spreads in meaning over several Chinese words, with the result that it can be written with as many different characters. Moreover, during the past fourteen hundred years the Japanese have borrowed a huge number of words from Chinese, just as we have from Latin, Greek, and French. These are written in Chinese characters and are pronounced according to the traditional Japanese rendering of the original Chinese word. Thus each Chinese character will have a Japanese pronunciation derived from Chinese—and usually there are two or more readings of this type representing geographic and historical variations in Chinese pronunciation—and at the same time most of the characters will correspond to one or more and sometimes as many as six or seven different native words. With

only context determining the proper reading of each character, the deciphering of even the simplest Japanese sentence takes on some of the aspects of solving a puzzle. The net result is probably the most difficult writing system which is still in use anywhere in the world.

The important point in all this is that education in Japan, as in China, requires a tremendous amount of memory work, which seems to have had the same result in Japan of strengthening the authority of tradition and the emphasis on obedience. In any case, there can be no doubt that in modern Japan there has been unconscious emphasis on indoctrination in education and a conscious effort to utilize the educational system as a tool for inculcating obedience. Even in the early years of the Meiji period the government used the schools to teach new and as yet generally unpopular ideas—Western concepts of hygiene, new economic ideas, compulsory military service, and absolute devotion and obedience to the state. The cult of Emperor worship was spread primarily through the school system, and in recent decades school children have drunk in a virulent brand of jingoistic hyper-nationalism with every character they mastered. The propagandistic use of an educational system has become a thoroughly familiar totalitarian device, and Japan is certainly not unique in this respect. The Japanese, however, have been not just copying the West in this but have been, if anything, pioneers in this unsavory field. It may well be that the nature of the reading and writing problem in Japan, tied as it is to the slow process of learning Chinese characters by rote memory, makes education there more susceptible than in the West to use for purposes of propaganda.

3. HEREDITARY AUTHORITY

The emphasis on obedience to authority is very similar in China and Japan, but the nature of authority in the two lands is not. Over two thousand years ago China began to progress from the concept of strictly hereditary authority to that of

authority because of individual merit. True, the supreme position of Emperor has always been primarily hereditary in China, but ever since a man of humble origin established the great Han dynasty in 202 B.C., few dynasties have attempted to prove their right to rule because of descent from former rulers. Chinese Emperors theoretically ruled because they had *t'ien-ming*, "the mandate of Heaven," demonstrated by their moral superiority and the willingness of the people to obey them. Below the Emperors, no offices or posts were in theory hereditary. The Chinese ideal has been that superior persons, regardless of origin, would distinguish themselves and rise to the top. For over a thousand years this theory has been institutionalized in an elaborate system of government-administered examinations for the selection of superior men. Naturally, practice and theory always diverged to some extent, but the Chinese remained true to the concept that authority was not inherited but was won by demonstrated superiority.

The Japanese have been much more like the post-Classic Europeans in their attitude toward authority. They have a strong aristocratic tradition and have always looked upon heredity as the basic source for authority. Most of the peoples who, during the past few thousand years, have radiated out from the central steppe lands of the Eurasiatic land mass have shown a tendency toward a tribal, aristocratic society. This was true of our own Indo-European ancestors, whose hereditary tribal chieftains developed into hereditary kings. Only in recent centuries has the divine right of kings given way in Europe to other more modern ideas. The Altaic peoples of the steppe lands, such as the Mongols, have always had an aristocratic form of society and have emphasized hereditary rule, and it seems probable that the continental invaders of ancient Japan who eventually set up the historical Japanese state brought with them from Korea not only the long straight North Asiatic sword and the equestrian habits of northern Asia but also this same concept of hereditary rule. But hereditary authority is also characteristic of Polynesian society

which, as we have seen, may be related in some way to primitive Japanese society. In any case, all our evidence indicates that Japanese society from earliest times showed a strong emphasis on hereditary authority and class distinctions. Chinese records tell us that in the third century of the Christian era Japan was divided among a number of small tribes, each controlled by a hereditary high-priest or in many cases a high-priestess, for matriarchy was probably once the rule among the Japanese. Rulers were buried in huge tumuli, some of which are the largest man-made tombs in the world, and servants and followers were once buried alive with their masters. Workers were organized into hereditary groups, and the primitive Japanese state was simply a hierarchic association of such hereditary functional units.

The borrowing of the Chinese system in the seventh and eighth centuries made the priest-chief into a full-fledged temporal ruler. Ever since, the Japanese Emperor has been in theory both a Japanese high-priest and a Chinese type of temporal potentate, but the concept of hereditary authority—the unbroken line from ages eternal—remained unaltered. Even when the Emperors lost all their powers, no one dared usurp their throne. Or perhaps it was not a matter of daring. Usurpation in Japan was simply unthinkable. The Chinese system of selecting men of talent by examination for government posts, though outwardly copied in Japan, had little actual influence. Almost all appointments continued to be determined by hereditary prestige and not by merit. Many posts were frankly hereditary. Prime Ministers had to be descendants of the ancient clan of the Fujiwara. Almost all of the later feudal lords speciously claimed descent from the Fujiwara or more often from the Minamoto or Taira, two offshots of the Imperial clan. In fact, it became a tradition that only descendants of the Minamoto could become Shogun, even though this was clearly a post won by the sword.

This emphasis on hereditary right in political matters is perfectly understandable to Westerners with their own aristocratic

traditions, but the Japanese went even beyond the Europeans of pre-modern days. They have kept their genealogies far more carefully, with the result that many aristocratic families can trace their lineage with complete reliability back to the sixth century. They also have insisted on the hereditary principle in various fields in which we consider heredity could scarcely play any great role. Schools of poetry, acting, painting, and all the lesser arts and skills have usually been organized along family lines, even though the transmission from father to adopted son or disciple is more common than that from father to natural son. Even Buddhist sects and schools of philosophy have their "family" genealogies of successive generations of masters and disciples. The Japanese have been able to place so much emphasis on hereditary rights in part because they pay little attention to actual blood descent. A family line, like an artistic school, can be maintained as satisfactorily by adoption as by the birth of a legitimate heir. The important thing is the transmission of hereditary rights, not the continuance of a blood line.

Strong hereditary rights inevitably have meant rigid hereditary class distinctions in Japan. It has never been easy in China for members of the lower classes to rise to the top, but the theory for long has been that the peasant with sufficient ability could become Prime Minister. In feudal Japan, the peasant could no more become an aristocrat than he could in medieval Europe. One's status in society tended to be fixed by birth, not by ability or even by wealth.

The highest social class has always consisted of the Imperial family and the old aristocratic families around it, who emerged into the light of history in the sixth century as the rulers of Japan and maintained this position for the next five or six centuries. During the past thousand years the old court nobility has had virtually no political power and has for the most part lived in relative poverty, but even today no one questions its social supremacy. Next came the warrior class, or perhaps one should say the "new" warrior class, for the old court aristoc-

racy had in its heyday been the military power of the land. The "new" warrior class came to prominence from the eleventh century on, winning its supremacy through its monopoly of the martial arts. Men of early feudal Japan, like those of Europe, fought in armor on horseback. The cost of a soldier's equipment made it an aristocratic profession and set up a clear functional distinction between the military ruling class and the peasantry. From the former came the Shogunal lines, all of the later feudal lords, and the samurai who were their administrators and soldiers.

The appearance of the foot soldier as the backbone of Japanese armies some time before the sixteenth century actually wiped out the fundamental basis for this class distinction, and the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a result witnessed a period of unprecedented social mobility, with men of low birth, such as Hideyoshi in the late sixteenth century, fighting their way to the top of the political heap, though scarcely to the top of the social pyramid. The Tokugawa, however, with their primary emphasis on stability, reimposed stricter class distinctions in the seventeenth century. They borrowed the ancient Confucian concept of four classes, which placed the merchants at the bottom, the artisans next, the peasants third, and the scholar-administrator class, which in Japan was of course the warrior-scholar-administrator class, at the top. But this theory hardly squared with the facts. The city merchants were obviously superior to the artisans they employed and also to the impoverished peasants, and, in any case, there were no strict class lines between merchants, artisans, and peasants. The theory, however, did help to maintain a strong barrier between the samurai and the mass of the people, despite the poverty of many samurai and their growing indebtedness to the city merchants.

The adoption of the Western pattern during the Meiji period meant for the most part the abandonment of hereditary authority and the lowering of class barriers. This was accomplished with amazing ease, in part because both hereditary

authority and class distinctions had in reality been undermined during the Tokugawa period (1600–1867). The Tokugawa administration was in the hands of feudal lords and samurai, but these men had been selected from among their social equals because of ability, not because of heredity. Similarly, most of the feudal domains were administered, not by the lords or their hereditary high officials, but by lesser samurai of outstanding ability, and these were the men who came to the fore in the Meiji Restoration. More important, the two-class society was already breaking down. Despite rigid laws, rich merchants were marrying their daughters into samurai families, and poor samurai were dropping to the status of commoners. When the Meiji reformers swept away the old restrictions, Japanese society rapidly readjusted itself to new levels, not unlike those of a modern European country.

A new nobility was created, consisting of the old court nobles, the former feudal lords, the ambitious samurai who had carried through the Meiji reforms, and an occasional merchant leader, like Mitsui, but except for the last two groups of newly risen men, the nobility enjoyed far more prestige than power. Some of the samurai and city merchants and a few men of still humbler origin pushed their way up to positions of leadership in government, business, and the intellectual life of the land. Although most of the samurai, who had constituted something over 5 per cent of the population, sank back into the lower classes, a far larger percentage of the samurai than of the other classes achieved positions of leadership, because they had behind them prestige, influential connections, more education, and the tradition of leadership. With each generation greater social mobility was achieved, with some institutions, such as the army and navy, serving as particularly effective mediums for bringing talent from the lower classes to positions of high authority. Social mobility in modern Japan has never equaled that of the United States but has perhaps been more like the social mobility of England or Germany during the same period.

The Japanese feeling for class distinctions and for hereditary authority, however, remains strong. The Japanese has a much clearer sense of belonging to a class than does the American. The *eta*, or so-called "outcasts," have enjoyed full legal equality with other Japanese for many decades, but social discrimination against them still remains severe. Constituting perhaps 2 per cent of the population, the *eta* appear to be Japanese who during earlier centuries came to be despised by their countrymen on account of their trades, which, because they involved butchering or the working of animal products such as leather, fell under the Buddhist prejudice against the taking of animal life. The Japanese also maintain a strong awareness of the family standing and occupation of all their fellow citizens. If a son can follow his father as the principal of a school, everyone is delighted. They show a deference to the wellborn, regardless of their actual position in society, which is rare in this country. Conversely, the wellborn and those who would appear to be wellborn attempt to live up to a high standard of *noblesse oblige*, showing remarkable graciousness and tolerance toward their servants and subordinates. In Japan, as in the comparably aristocratic society of England, there is relatively little of the ostentatious display of wealth and authority which has been a by-product of social egalitarianism in China and also in the United States.

Thus, the Japanese, while moving away from a society of hereditary status, retain many of the attitudes of such a society. Although the achievement of a position of leadership in Japan today depends, as with us and the Chinese, primarily on the ability of the individual to prove superiority, authority in Japan continues to retain much of the absolutism which it naturally had when heredity was the only criterion. Throughout Japanese society, authority is accepted with the unquestioning obedience one would expect only if the right to authority were unqualified and not merely a matter of comparative superiority. If a man reaches a position of authority by demonstrating better qualifications for that position, then theo-

retically he should retain it only so long as he continues to demonstrate this superiority, but in Japan, once the authority is achieved in free competition, it tends to become more absolute than in our society.

4. HIERARCHY

With obedience to authority so stressed throughout Japanese society, a primary problem is that of hierarchy among the different types of authority. No major people in the world places greater emphasis on hierarchy than do the Japanese. *Nippon-ichi*, "the first in Japan," is a ubiquitous phrase applied to anything or anyone from the nation's leading poet down to the biggest eater of raw fish. Proficiency in *judo* wrestling or the minor arts is graded and regulated like our Masonic orders. Almost anyone can tell you the order of prestige of the Japanese universities. Each person, each thing, fits into an accepted order of prestige and power. Position on this scale must be clear so that one can distinguish the superior from the inferior and know where authority lies. A committee without its chairman, a delegation without its chief makes the Japanese uneasy and unhappy. They, like the Germans, love titles and use them wherever possible, not only on the calling cards they exchange on every conceivable occasion but also in direct address, for titles take the place of pronouns in polite conversation. Their whole language, with its precise gradations of politeness, implies a hierarchical society, even though most humble forms today merely denote "I," "me," and "mine," and polite forms "you" and "yours." Some students of Japan even feel that the Japanese emphasis on strict hierarchic order influenced them to attempt to fight their way up in a hypothetical international hierarchy. In any case, they are certainly highly conscious of the relative prestige of the countries of the world and are as insistent for the moment on calling Japan a third-rate or even sixth-rate nation as they once were on proclaiming her a first-rate power.

There are many different types of hierarchy in Japan, but perhaps the most fundamental are those of age and sex. Age is, of course, a source of authority in all cultures, particularly in family relations, but in Japan the authority of parents tends to continue throughout life, and age carries with it much greater prestige and power than with us. Youth, far from being a time of self-assurance and exuberance, as it is in the United States, means to the Japanese strict obedience and unlimited deference to the authority of parents, teachers, the boss, and the forces of authority in general.

As we have seen, Japan, with a Sun-Goddess as her supreme native deity, probably once was a matriarchy, and until the middle of the eighth century many women occupied the throne in their own rights. Even as late as early feudal times, women could inherit property and feudal privileges, but in the course of the last several hundred years, probably under the influence of Chinese concepts, women have been pushed down to a position of legal and social inferiority to men. Traditionally a Japanese housewife walks a few feet behind her lord and master, carrying the baby or the bundles, while he strides unburdened ahead of her. It often takes a discerning eye to distinguish the mistress of the household from a servant by the treatment accorded them. And what few social contacts upper-class men and women have in Japan are usually characterized by male domination of the conversation and appreciative tittering on the part of the women. The modern Japanese have followed the Chinese dictum, perhaps more literally than the Chinese themselves, that a woman obeys her father in her childhood, her husband in middle life, and her son in old age.

Such relations of clear superiority and inferiority between the sexes and different age groups have produced in Japan a strictly authoritarian type of family, such as is to be found in China today and was by no means unknown in the United States a few decades ago. Primogeniture has been the rule since medieval times, and each member of the Japanese family has a clearly defined position in a hierarchical order. So clear are

the status implications of family relationships that hierarchical relationships throughout Japanese society are often expressed in these terms.

The Japanese family, however, does not have the complicated relationships of authority between different generations and distant branches which one finds in the extended family system of China. When great family power was involved, as in the leading families of feudal days or even among the *zaibatsu* in more recent times, highly complicated and far extended family relationships were maintained, and both feudal and *zaibatsu* families had their own domestic laws which determined family relationships and individual conduct. For the vast majority of modern Japanese, however, active family relationships are no more complicated than those of the American family of a few decades ago. The group living together tend to be husband, wife, and children, with perhaps a grandparent or two and possibly a nephew living with them while he goes to school. The Japanese expect somewhat more economic coöperation between close relatives than we do today, and they hold family councils far more frequently, but rarely does such close coöperation involve persons more distantly related than first cousins, and the decisions of such family councils have little more authority than they would in the United States. The typical modern Japanese family unit, while not so small or so loosely bound together as the contemporary American family, is closer to it than to the sprawling extended family unit of the Chinese upper classes.

There are many other types of hierarchy in Japan, which affect different individuals—business, religious, social, intellectual, and artistic hierarchies—but the one which takes precedence over all others is the political hierarchy. In late feudal times the supreme loyalty, the supreme obligation, was due one's feudal lord and through him the Shogun. The family as a unit was definitely inferior to the feudal realm. The real moral of the story of the "Forty-Seven *Ronin*," when viewed in the context of the Far Eastern milieu, is that these forty-seven men

ruthlessly sacrificed their families, in some cases sending wives and daughters into prostitution, in order to fulfill their obligations to their lord. The clash between family and national interests is not unknown in China, but few Chinese before contemporary times would have accepted such complete submergence of family interests to those of the ruler. But centuries ago the superiority of the political unit over the family had been clearly established in Japanese ethics. The chief battle of the modern nation-state had already been won. The Meiji reformers did not face the major obstacle to Westernization which the family-centered ethics of China has proved to be on the continent. Expanding the basic political unit from the feudal realm to the nation during the past century in Japan has proved to be a far easier task than establishing the superiority of national interests over those of the family in China.

No difference between China and Japan is more fundamental or has had more profound influences on the history of these two lands in modern times. Japan has emphasized family relations far more than the modern West and has held to a more particularistic, situational type of ethics. But the Japanese family was smaller than the Chinese family and weaker in relation to the government, and Japanese concepts of ethics, at least in so far as family-state relations were concerned, were more universalistic and like those of the West. One reason for this may possibly have been the greater influence of Buddhism in Japan than in China, for Buddhism, like Christianity, emphasizes the individual and his personal relationship to the problem of salvation. Japanese religious leaders have often stressed the Occidental-sounding concept of the equality of all men in the "Law," as they often call Buddhism.

Another reason for this basic difference between China and Japan may be Japanese feudalism itself, for it inevitably placed strong emphasis on legal rights and obligations. With his feudal rights, a man inherited his feudal obligations, which normally made his relationship to his lord far more important than his relations with his brothers and relatives. Since

ancient times in China, laws have been considered simply the regulations a ruler made to enforce obedience from his subjects. They had no higher validity and were, therefore, subject to sudden revision at any time and were always subordinate to the personal opinions of the judge or administrator. Feudal Japan developed a far stricter concept of law, because society and government depended entirely on the maintenance of feudal rights and obligations. With their Chinese cultural background, the Japanese never went on to formulate the clear legal concepts of the West and always permitted broader discretionary powers on the part of the judge. High motives often were allowed to redeem specific infractions—as could be seen as late as the 1930's, when ultra-nationalistic political assassins were given ridiculously light sentences because they had been motivated by the "praiseworthy" desire to rid the Emperor of "bad" advisors. The Japanese, however, entered the past century of rapid Westernization with a concept of law far more like that of Europe than was Chinese legal theory and a belief in the supremacy of the political unit which resembled that of the modern West and contrasted sharply with the family-centered social and political concepts of China. These factors are obviously part of the explanation of the great difference between the Japanese and Chinese reactions to the problem of Westernization.

With the government the supreme authority in Japanese society, there has been a tendency to tie in all the lesser hierarchies under the political. Government recognition, in fact, established many of them. Since ancient times the placing of members of the Imperial family as abbots in certain monasteries helped bring the religious hierarchy into line, and in modern as well as ancient Japan a complicated system of court ranks was used to place those of prestige in all fields in proper sequence within a single hierarchic system controlled by the government. The bureaucrat, the diplomat, the army officer, the leading doctor, the university professor, all fitted into the same scale and were neatly tabbed so that every-

one might know the authority and prestige each rightly had. As in China, connection with the government, either through direct service or through official recognition of this sort, carries with it particular prestige. There is a strong cleavage between those who belong in this way to the government and the mere common people. Even the poor policeman, post office employee, or stationmaster on the government railways derives considerable prestige and authority from his uniform and connections with the government. The Japanese show a respect—one might almost say reverence—for the government and its officials, both high and low, which, though known in many parts of Europe, is entirely foreign to the United States. The prestige and power of the official and the meek subservience of the common citizen make a psychological soil in the Far East which is not congenial to the growth of democracy.

The government functionary who has enjoyed the greatest prestige in modern Japan has been the soldier. We in the West have seen enough of this in our own cultures not to be surprised, especially in view of Japan's recent feudal past, when the whole ruling class as well as all government officials were first of all military men. With close to a thousand years of warrior leadership behind them, it is small wonder that the Japanese have continued to give a special measure of respect to their military men or that the Japanese army felt that it was not just an arm of the government but was itself directly responsible for the physical and moral well-being of the nation. Even the kings of contemporary Europe masquerade in military uniform. Naturally the Japanese Emperor, too, wore a uniform and reviewed his troops astride his white steed. Since primitive times in Japan, the sword has been one of the so-called Three Imperial Regalia, the three sacred objects which were the symbols of Imperial authority; feudal Japan gloried in the sword—and incidentally produced some of the finest blades the world has ever seen—and in recent years the sword has been revived again as Japan's primary symbol. The cumbersome long samurai swords which the Japanese officers lugged

into battle in the recent war were as much their standards as the sun flag itself.

The military hierarchy has been perhaps the single most important hierarchy in modern Japan. In feudal days it was reserved for a limited hereditary group, and the common citizen could only hope to rise in some other hierarchy—perhaps that of business. But in the more mobile society of modern Japan, the reverse has become the situation. Entrance into the civil bureaucracy and the intellectual and professional fields depends on advanced education, limited largely to those who can afford to pay for it. Business depends somewhat on hereditary wealth and associations. But the army represented a hierarchic ladder reaching down to the peasant masses of Japan. The bulk of the officers were drawn from the lower middle classes of the countryside, the sons of small landowners or well-to-do peasants, who commonly started their official military schooling at the end of the sixth grade, after passing stiff competitive examinations, on the basis of which sometimes as few as one in sixty of the overly abundant applicants were accepted.

The conscripts too came overwhelmingly from rural Japan. Man power was always in excess of demand for the standing army in Japan, and as a result the more rugged and tractable peasant boys could, for the most part, displace the less hardened and more sophisticated city boys in the ranks. The army was the peasant boy's best road to escape from the humdrum poverty of farm life. For two years he became part of a uniformed hierarchy reaching up to the uniformed Emperor himself. He was a part of the government—a hero to his family and friends. For the remainder of his life, as a reservist and a member of the Ex-Service Men's Association, he had special status in his community. With far more Japanese actively participating in this particular hierarchy and with most Japanese predisposed by tradition to accept the military man as a selfless servant of the Emperor and state, in contrast to the greedy businessman and self-interested politician, the army had pres-

tige and power unequaled by any other group in modern Japan.

Since Japan is an island country, like England her pride and strength in recent decades has been her navy, but strangely the navy has not played a role comparable to that of the army in modern Japanese politics and society. For one thing it lacked the mass base of the army, being inevitably a smaller and more select organization. The army, on the other hand, was in close touch with a far larger segment of the population than was the navy and, in keeping with the national emphasis on indoctrination and propaganda in education, concentrated on the indoctrination of its recruits and of Japanese students in general. It went into the business of propaganda heavily and, perhaps more than any other group in Japan, became the victim of its own propaganda. Developing a more virulent brand of jingoism year by year, it succeeded brilliantly in convincing the peasants of Japan, whose ancestors for centuries had been denied the right to own or use swords, that they were a warrior race, but in the process the officers of the Japanese army drew the blinders of propaganda before their own eyes until they themselves could see only the single path which eventually led them to destruction.

Japanese navy officers, far less involved in nation-wide propaganda, remained a more technically efficient group, retaining a commendable breadth of vision and sense of reality. While army extremists continuously pushed for war, navy spokesmen tended to be understandably reluctant and pessimistic. In contrast to the rantings of a Tojo, navy leaders usually spoke in the more restrained vein of Admiral Yamamoto. The ill-fated Admiral, whose plane was intercepted and shot down by American fliers in the Solomons, was vilified in America during the early years of the war for having boasted that he would dictate peace terms in the White House. The real purport of his famous statement, which is far more in keeping with his own personality and the attitude of the Japanese navy, was that Japan should not start a war with the United States

unless she were prepared to see it through to a dictated peace at the White House—in other words, Japan could not count on an easy, localized victory in the Pacific but would have to perform the virtually impossible feat of conquering the United States in order to win. Japanese army leaders, however, ignored his daring warning, and Yamamoto lost his life in what he had predicted would be a hopeless cause.

Hierarchy must have a beginning and an end. Some supreme figure, some starting point, is as essential to a hierarchy as the number one is to a numerical system. The political hierarchy and all other hierarchies below it in Japan find their ultimate apex in the Emperor. That is why even today most Japanese literally cannot conceive of a political and social system in Japan without an Emperor to give it its basic orientation. To them, Japan without an Emperor would not be Japan. Thus, millions of Japanese have been willing to accept any changes we wished to make in Japan so long as we did not do away with the Imperial system. They have been indifferent to constitutional changes which deprived the Emperor of all power but have insisted that at least a purely figurehead Emperor remain as the theoretical apex of Japan's hierarchic system.

The Emperor has, perhaps, been a particularly necessary element in the Japanese system during the past century, simply because rapid changes have seriously upset the old order and produced conflicts in authority which were hard to solve. Of course, a major reason why the Meiji statesmen and their successors did all in their power to build up Imperial prestige was that the old loyalties to feudal lords could be more easily transferred to the person of the Emperor than to the abstract concept of the state, and the blind devotion of the people to their Emperor gave the men who controlled him unprecedented power. At the same time, however, the Japanese people themselves contributed to the building up of the modern Emperor myth because of their desire to find some fixed and unchanging source of authority in an unstable time. As Japan

modernized herself, the interests and attitudes of military officers, civil officials, politicians, industrialists, and intellectuals diverged more and more, and it became increasingly difficult to maintain a single standard of authority. Who was right when there were differences of opinion—the army, the civil government, the business interests, scholars and literary men, or even the representatives of the people in the Diet?

Japan's unilinear system of hierarchy was breaking down. It was necessary that all the divergent groups be held together by the supreme authority of the Emperor. It made no difference that in reality this authority was merely a fiction—that the Emperor in practice expressed no opinions but acted only at the instigation of his advisors. In fact it was better to have his supposed supreme authority preserved in the noncontroversial atmosphere of theory. The more divergent the sources of authority became in Japan, the more the Japanese felt the need for a single and unquestioned symbol of authority. The Japanese ethical system demanded uniform obedience and conversely unitary authority. Even more than the underlying pragmatism of modern Occidental thought, the rapid political, economic, and social changes which Westernization brought Japan have shaken the foundations of united authority there. This ethical earthquake has made the essentially obedient Japanese cling all the more blindly to the supreme, mystical authority of the Emperor.

5. SELF-DISCIPLINE

As we have seen, Japan's shame ethic depends on the one hand on a strong sense of obedience to authority, but at the same time the maintenance of self-respect also calls for the exercise of will power. More important than external conformity to avoid ridicule and shame is the inner force of will power to bolster self-respect. Self-discipline parallels obedience as a fundamental force shaping Japanese character. The self-respecting Japanese can find no more satisfaction in hidden

shame than the God-fearing Westerner in concealed sin. The "sincere," self-respecting man must have will power, and to achieve will power he must employ self-discipline.

The aesthetic Japanese glories in the Spartan virtues. Poet, artist, nature lover though he be, at the same time he believes in subjecting himself to an ascetic regime in the name of self-discipline. Cold baths in winter, strict dietary limitations, and other such dismal austerities are the stuff of which will power is made. Army recruits are hardened by being denied sleep for several days. Where we Americans follow medical regimes to strengthen our bodies, the Japanese perform physically damaging austerities to strengthen their will power. Much of the theory and even the details of such ascetic practices stem from Indian mysticism, but the motivation is essentially different. Where the Indian mortifies his body in order to overcome the desires of life and escape beyond the suffering of this world, the Japanese performs his austerities in an effort to perfect his personality and thus to get the most out of life. All special skills, the Japanese believe, start with self-discipline. Expertness in calligraphy or fencing, painting or *judo*, depends on the ability to place an iron control over the emotions. The emphasis in archery is more on the self-composure of the archer than on his ability to hit the target. Complete self-discipline will raise the individual above the troubling doubts of shame or the fear of failure. Miracles can be accomplished by the man who knows self-discipline and has true will power.

The Japanese have an idealistic belief in the power of will over matter, which reminds one of the German idealists and stands in sharp contrast to the pragmatism of the Chinese. They can on occasion come down to earth with cold realism, as after their recent defeat. But the whole history of modern Japan is the story of a people who, with little more than sheer energy and determination to support them, came close to carving out what might have been the greatest empire the world had ever seen. Their expectations of victory

over us were based on their belief that their will power would triumph over our greater material resources. Accustomed to a grim and sometimes brutal cultivation of self-discipline in order to develop will power, they could not believe that Americans, with their dislike of unnecessary self-denial, could have any will power at all. Believing that they could not lose because they refused to lose, they calamitously misjudged their own and their adversary's strength. Repeatedly the Japanese will to win resulted in battle reports which so consistently substituted determination for results that higher echelons often had a drastically erroneous picture of the progress of battle.

And yet, although this belief in will power has been in certain situations a Japanese weakness, it is at the same time their greatest strength. It has carried them to amazing accomplishments in the past and keeps them buoyed up now in what would otherwise be a sea of despair. The British in a far less unfavorable situation display one of their finest qualities in their dogged determination to "muddle through" somehow. The Japanese, faced with economic and political problems of unparalleled grimness, remain supremely confident that they will be able to fight their way upstream. They feel certain that they can solve any problem, so long as they can maintain their self-discipline and rally their will power.

This concept of will power has contributed to the Japanese emphasis on personal responsibility. This emphasis is perhaps to be traced to the old Chinese practice of holding individuals personally responsible for whatever occurred under their jurisdiction, whether or not they would be held legally or even morally responsible according to Occidental ideas. The Chinese believed that the mistakes of subordinates or even unseasonable acts of nature were a reflection of character defects in the ruler. The Japanese belief in will power complemented these ideas —although the Japanese have carefully placed the Emperor above the realm of personal responsibility. For all other men, failure of any sort is obviously a sign of a character defect—a lack of will power. An inadvertent slip, an error by a subordi-

nate, even a natural catastrophe can be blamed on the individual who did not have enough strength of will to prepare for every eventuality.

The Japanese emphasis on self-discipline, combined with the essential poverty of the land and the narrow margin of life, has resulted in a veritable cult of neatness and a love of the small and the simple. The physical devastation and moral corrosion of the war years have left behind today a far from tidy Japan, but under more normal circumstances the average Japanese shows a passion for meticulous order which contrasts sharply with Chinese obliviousness to neatness and American love of large-scale grandeur at the expense of detail.

The very nature of life in Japan helps to enforce neatness. The peasant learns it from his farm, where he must devote painstaking care to each square foot of soil. The amount of uncultivated land around an American farmhouse is often as large as an entire Japanese farm. Where fields are measured by the square yard and not by the acre, the farmer learns to leave no weedy margins to his paths and no rounded corners in his fields. The Japanese city home and garden offer the same general picture of necessary neatness. Most houses are small, crowded, and flimsy, and their occupants must observe habits of extraordinary neatness unless they wish to live in squalor. With gardens sometimes as small as three or four square yards —and the nature-loving Japanese always prefer even such miniature gardens to nothing—each twig or blade of grass is treated with individual care and each fallen leaf is scrupulously removed.

This love of neatness, thus, grows from the environment, but the Japanese have made it part of their philosophy. Like all neat people they feel the satisfaction of perfection, even though it be only in one small part of their lives, but, more than that, they consider the discipline of neatness, of maintaining perfect order in some restricted area, a way of developing will power. Neatness is not just a commendable habit but is an indispensable part of character-building.

The Japanese have developed the love of neatness into a cult of the small and simple. They have done wonders with dwarfed trees, some of which are many centuries old, and they have developed the amazing minor arts of tray landscapes, made either with sand or colored clays. Their love of disciplined simplicity is perhaps best shown in their concept of flower arrangement, which in recent years has become a world-wide craze. Where we in the West usually gather the floral beauties of the fields and stuff them by the armful into vases, the Japanese create works of art with a mere handful of blossoms or sprays. Instead of relying simply on the prodigal floral wealth their islands provide, they create beauty by a sparing use of flowers and a lavish use of disciplined skill.

The Japanese concept of interior decorating is the opposite of either the Victorian or baroque ideals. They use plain unpainted woods in their houses, relying on natural textures and the rustic charm of nature's masterful symmetries and infinite variations. They derive beauty from the natural grains or twisted shapes of trees, where Europeans have sought to improve on nature with the knife, chisel, and paint brush. Artistic adornments, instead of choking every corner and dripping from all the walls, are limited to a few carefully selected items, placed in a special alcove where they can really be seen and their beauty enjoyed.

The Japanese, who have produced rich, varied porcelains of dazzling beauty, themselves look upon *temmoku*, a rough, dark brown, and often slightly misshapen ware produced in South China some five or six centuries ago, as the finest product of the potter's art. The slow rhythmic ritual of the tea ceremony, with its disciplined movements and concentration on a few simple objects of beauty, represents this artistic theme of simplicity translated into action. Japanese kimonos show an astounding combination of daring and good taste, both in color and in design, but there is no harsher word of criticism in the Japanese artistic lexicon than "showy" and no higher praise

than *jimi*, which might be translated "restrained," "sober," or merely "plain."

This cult of the simple, as the meeting point of aesthetic and ethical concepts in Japan, has deeply influenced basic attitudes as well as art and literature. The Japanese have a fundamental suspicion and dislike of ostentatiousness and even of wealth. The contempt of the impoverished samurai for the wealthy merchant of feudal times has been continued as a general hostility toward the rich and a disdain for the profit motive. There can be no greater contrast anywhere than that between the Chinese passion for gambling and the Japanese scorn for even more legitimate means of amassing money. Wealth itself is not necessarily bad, but yielding to the morally enervating enjoyment of wealth is. Frugal living, if not poverty itself, builds strong character.

The Japanese ideal is that of loyal, disinterested service, based on Spartan self-discipline. In feudal times this was represented by the fearless, self-sacrificing samurai, who bolstered up his will power with the strict mental and physical discipline of Zen. In modern times, it has been represented best by the military hero or by the poor but respected civil servant or scholar, but not by the rich and powerful men of business who created the industrialized Japan of today. The typical hero is a General Nogi, who, although made a viscount after his fabled exploits in the Russo-Japanese War, continued to live a simple life of devotion to the Meiji Emperor and with his wife followed the Emperor in death by committing suicide. The shame-conscious Japanese may place a heavy emphasis on "face" and on success, but their highest respect goes not to the man who displays wealth and authority or even the man who has been successful in amassing riches and power, but to the man who has rendered great services to the state and taken little in return for himself, thereby demonstrating his superior self-discipline and will power.

9. Change and Conflict

1. WESTERNIZATION

Any account of the Japanese which gives the impression that theirs is an unchangeable or even unchanging society would be extremely misleading. All the major cultures of the world, at least in modern times, have been characterized by a rapid and, it would seem, accelerating rate of change. This is understandable to anyone in the United States, where change, particularly in the form of "progress," is a familiar and cherished concept. But the Japanese have unquestionably changed more rapidly during the past hundred years than we have ourselves. The Japanese of today are in no sense the Japanese of earlier times. In some respects they resemble the contemporary Europeans more than their own ancestors of the Tokugawa era. Naturally certain Japanese traits have persisted, at least in modified form, giving to their culture the continuity and distinctiveness which have made it characteristically Japanese from primitive times until today. Despite the growing uniformity of our modern world cultures, the Japanese as a people are not likely to become indistinguishable from the Chinese, Italians, or Americans. Japanese society, however, is a society in rapid motion. No aspect of it is immutable.

Change has brought with it extreme diversity and also startling contradictions. Not all Japanese have changed in the same way or at the same speed, nor have all aspects of the culture adjusted in perfect timing with one another. Japan today is a land of vivid contrasts and fundamental conflicts.

Obviously she will continue to change and change rapidly, until a far more stable balance has been struck than exists today. No one can be certain of what further changes will take place, but the direction of the motion is as important an indication of what Japan will be in the future as are historical characteristics, however basic, and present realities, however pervasive.

Japan in the past hundred years has witnessed not just superficial modifications but a fundamental social as well as economic and political transformation. Many students of the Far East have held that Japan has borrowed only the outer forms of Western civilization but has failed to understand or appreciate the inner content of our culture, and they even contrast the superficiality of Japanese Westernization with the more basic influences the Occident is said to have had on other Asiatic countries.

Behind this theory is the contrast between the Japanese intellectuals of today and many of the intellectuals of China and India, for instance. The Japanese, though thoroughly familiar with the history, philosophy, and literature of the West, has received his education in the Japanese language in Japanese schools and universities, whereas his Chinese or Indian counterpart, in so far as he is well versed in Occidental lore, probably has received a good part of his education in the English language and some of it in the Occident. The linguistic barrier, if nothing else, makes the Japanese intellectual seem less Westernized than the Indian or Chinese. But this is no measure of the degree of Westernization in these lands. The Japanese receives his training about the West as part of a normal Japanese education. The Indian or Chinese must go outside of his native culture to learn much about the West. While tens of thousands of Chinese students and even some Indians have gone to Japan during the past fifty years to learn the science of the West, no Japanese have gone to China or India for that purpose. And below the intellectual classes, the Japanese office worker or shopkeeper, laborer or peasant, not only knows vastly more about Western culture than his counterpart in China or India

but is far more deeply affected by Western influences in his daily life and even in his thought.

The very idea that there is a distinction between the outer forms and the inner content of a civilization is a curious misconception. The Meiji leaders may have had this misconception too; they probably never dreamed how profoundly their reforms would remake the Japanese people. Of course, Japan remains in many ways essentially Japanese, and yet industrialization, universal education, and all the other external innovations from the West could not leave the Japanese basically unchanged. The Oxford-trained Indian and the Chinese with a Columbia Ph.D. may be more obviously Westernized than the graduate in English literature from Tokyo University, who, though well read in Shakespeare and Milton, has never been abroad or even had many opportunities to speak English, but the Japanese people from Cabinet Minister down to the humblest peasant have been influenced by the West in a way that is entirely unknown among the masses of India or China.

A great deal is heard today of the titanic social revolution which is beginning to sweep Asia, but it should be remembered that the initial convulsions of this continent-shaking revolution swept through the Japanese islands decades ago. The nationalistic awakening, industrialization, the spread of education, the revolutionary concept that the common man should participate in and perhaps even control government, all hit Japan long before the rest of Asia, but, perhaps because of some basic difference in the underlying geologic formations of society, the upheaval was less destructive in the islands than on the continent and passed almost unnoticed by the rest of the world. Japan for long has been a thoroughly nationalistic country; she has already made her adjustment to the machine age; her society has been transformed by universal education; and the Japanese have had a longer history of encouraging successes and disheartening failures in the field of representative government than any other people in Asia. While most of the rest of Asia is being shaken to the core by these same forces and the

ultimate outcome is far from clear, Japanese society has adjusted quickly and easily, yielding to the force of the upheaval the way the light, frame buildings of Japan move with the motion of an earthquake, instead of standing rigid until cracked and thrown to the ground like the brick walls of China.

But these were only the initial shocks of the temblor. Japan weathered them gallantly, only to be faced with the new and even more complex problems of an industrialized and modernized state, such as face the countries of Europe. The clashes of contemporary Japan, while carrying Asiatic overtones, are basically not unlike the discords of modern Europe. Her problems find a closer parallel in England or Italy and still more perhaps in Germany than in neighboring China or Korea.

It seems safe to assume that the other lands of Asia, too, will find their present travail simply a prelude to new and equally difficult problems. The Japanese experience should make it clear that industrialization and universal education, however necessary or desirable they may be, offer no panacea for Asia. But the Japanese experience can certainly not be taken as any exact forecast of future developments in the rest of Asia. The very speed of the early stages of the revolution in Japan shows that there are fundamental differences between her and her Asiatic neighbors—differences which may affect their respective courses in the future as much as they have during the past hundred years.

Many have explained the greater speed of the Japanese reaction to the Western impact as a result of Japan's smallness and insular position, which made her more susceptible to rapid physical penetration by Western influences than were the vast stretches of China's landlocked interior provinces. This geographic factor, however, was probably not the major one. More important were Japan's ready acceptance of the concept of borrowing from abroad, her long established nationalism, her experience during feudal times with legal concepts somewhat similar to those of the West, and other basic points of resemblance to Europe. Japan in the early nineteenth century,

far from having achieved the monolithic ideal of China, actually came closer to approximating the early modern states of Europe in her multiple authorities and her social as well as political diversity. She had also laid a firmer foundation than China for the development of a capitalistic economy, which, together with nationalism, serves as a cornerstone of modern Western civilization.

Japanese feudalism, in theory, had no more room for capitalism than had the feudalism of Europe, and yet Japanese feudal lords and retainers were heavily in debt to capitalistic moneylenders, and the feudal realms financed themselves by selling their surplus rice in a national market and by collaborating with businessmen in setting up trade or production monopolies. Many feudal realms maintained financial agents at Osaka to sell their rice and arrange for necessary purchases. The great rice markets at Osaka and Edo, with their dealings in futures and their delicately synchronized fluctuations in prices, closely resembled the major wheat markets of post-feudal Western Europe. The influence of the Chinese attitude of contempt for trade and the trader had strengthened Japanese feudal prejudices, resulting in the preposterous theory that the merchant class was the lowest social grouping, but in reality the city merchants dominated not only the economy but also the literature and art of the late Tokugawa period. Culturally a bourgeois revolution had already taken place in Japan, and the economy, despite the feudal façade, was in many ways an early capitalistic economy, not unlike that of Western Europe in early modern times.

Small wonder then that the Japanese rapidly adopted and exploited the capitalistic practices of the West. Small rural entrepreneurs quickly saw the advantages of capital investments to mechanize silk reeling and thus created Japan's first truly successful export industry; merchants cautiously converted their enterprises into modern banking or merchandising firms; and former feudal lords and samurai used their government bonds to become modern industrialists and bankers. While

the capital of China for the most part remained tied by tradition and governmental caprice to the land or to short-term investments, Japanese capitalists were building up some of the greatest economic empires the world has ever seen.

Why the Japanese alone among the peoples of the eastern periphery of the Old World had these basic resemblances to the peoples of the western periphery is not a question which can be easily answered, nor has anyone seriously sought to answer it. Certain possible explanations, however, suggest themselves as worthy of further study. For one thing, Japan resembles Western Europe geographically and climatically more than do the other countries of Asia, with the single exception of her close neighbor, Korea. Even more significant is the complex of fundamental traits which followed one another in somewhat the same order in both Japan and Europe. Appearing independently of each other at the two opposite ends of the Old World, these parallel groupings and sequences of cultural characteristics suggest interesting causal relationships. Behind nationalism and an at least incipient capitalism in both areas lay a feudal experience, which in fundamental characteristics was amazingly similar in Japan and Europe; and behind feudalism lay the meeting in each case of an aristocratic, tribal society with a universal religion of salvation and a classic civilization which stressed a unified, authoritarian state. In most of Western Europe the tribesmen absorbed some of the classic civilization in the process of conquering and destroying it. In Japan they imbibed deeper draughts of the classic civilization by the more unusual procedure of consciously importing it to their own land. The process was different, but the basic ingredients were by no means wholly dissimilar.

Thus, behind Japan's spectacular Westernization in recent years lay earlier resemblances to the West. Perhaps Japan is not merely the most Westernized land of Asia but is more significantly the most "Western" land of Asia. It is fundamentally and unmistakably a cultural daughter of China—an integral part of the civilization of the Far East—but at the same time

it has been the country which has diverged the most consistently and markedly from Far Eastern norms, and these points of difference have been, by and large, points of basic resemblance to the West.

2. TOTALITARIANISM

If this is true, then it is not surprising that Japan, in contrast to the rest of Asia, survived the initial shock of the Western impact with relative ease, only to run headlong into the problems which grip the West today. These are not only the economic problems of the industrialized and specialized economies of the West—serious enough though they be, particularly in countries like Japan and England, which are entirely dependent for life on the maintenance of a huge import and export trade. As we have seen, the rise in productive power resulting from specialization and industrialization permitted a spectacular growth in Japan's population, which in turn made Japan pitifully dependent on foreign trade. The economic problems which industrialization has brought Japan are far more complex and baffling than any a pre-industrialized Japan ever faced. A vastly more difficult problem which Westernization has brought Japan, however, has been the clash, or perhaps more properly the conflicting pull, of the two great forces produced by the modern techniques of machine production and universal education—the pull toward greater individual freedom, toward intellectual independence and democratic political rights, and the often conflicting pull toward a stricter integration of society, toward governmental controls over economy, and enforced totalitarian uniformity.

We lack terms both comprehensive and precise enough to describe this sharply drawn and pervasive struggle within modern civilization. Perhaps "democracy" and "totalitarianism" come closest to being the terms we need, but both convey too little in exact scope and at the same time too much in emotional overtones. But the clash exists and nowhere more

clearly than in Japan. It is surprising how quickly and strongly these two forces manifested themselves in Japan after the introduction of Western ideas and techniques and how completely they dominate the history of modern Japan. In fact, modern Japanese history can be interpreted without great distortion primarily in terms of a curiously ambivalent and fitful progress in these two different directions and growing swings of the pendulum between these two roads of simultaneous advance as they increasingly diverged from each other.

The authoritarian background of Chinese political theory and Tokugawa practices gave from the start a totalitarian flavor to the new Japanese government. The newly centralized political structure was in the hands of a small group of men dedicated to the task of remaking Japan in the image of a militarily powerful Western state. The vision was different, but the process was not unlike the Russian Revolution of exactly a half-century later. The enlightened few were determined to reform the unregenerate many, who were usually apathetic and often openly hostile. Every possible pressure, from wholesale propaganda to naked force, was brought into play. Heads did not roll in the street, but social classes were liquidated nonetheless. The feudal lords quietly passed off the stage of history grasping their fat bundles of government bonds, but the samurai, who received only trifling monetary compensation for their loss of feudal income and privilege, often tried to fight it out with the new regime. A series of unsuccessful samurai revolts finally culminated in the great Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, in which it was proved, once and for all, that there was no road back to feudalism. Hereditary privilege and feudal diversity were rapidly leveled by the steam-roller tactics of the new regime, and the whole people were pressed into the same molds of compulsory education and military service. Japan began to approach closer to the Chinese ideal of a unitary society and a fully centralized government than she ever had when consciously following the Chinese model.

The early years of reform were the most dangerous. Each

successful reform gave the government greater security—a new weapon with which to enforce its will. The modernization of the organs of government gave it new efficiency and strength. A modern postal system, telegraphs, and railways drew the whole nation close to the watchful eye of the central government. The centralized French prefectural system of local government permitted a uniform and detailed control over all parts of the nation which contrasted sharply with the indirect control of most of the land in Tokugawa times. The Tokugawa system of secret police was broadened into a modern police organization, which spread its tentacles into every city alleyway and remote mountain valley. Closely associated with the police was the new army, which in its early days was designed more for the maintenance of peace at home than for the conquests abroad that later became its major task. Industrialization gave a sounder economic basis for the new government, strengthening it militarily as well as financially. And universal education, presaged in the Educational Code of 1872, provided the central government with a means of shaping its subjects' minds, which in the long run was a vastly more effective force than external supervision and control by army, police, and an all-pervasive civil bureaucracy.

Thus, the long road toward centralization which Europe has traveled during the past few centuries was covered in as many decades by the Japanese. For the first time modern Western techniques of organization and control had been superimposed on the age-old authoritarian traditions of Asia, and the mixture inevitably had a strong totalitarian tinge. Theories of governmental omnipotence—of abject obedience on the part of the common man and of unlimited sacrifice by the people for the sake of the state—came naturally in an Asiatic setting, even in Japan, where centralized authority has often been relatively weak. And now for the first time the new Western techniques made it possible for the government to approach omnipotence in fact as well as in theory. The Occident provided the rulers of Japan with better tools than they had ever known before

to enforce abject obedience and, more important, to inculcate blind loyalty. The Meiji reformers rapidly coalesced into a band of oligarchs who enjoyed far greater actual power than any Japanese ever had before them.

Perhaps modern Japan does not offer an accurate picture of what Westernization will mean in the rest of Asia, but in this one respect there can be little doubt that the Japanese pattern is part of a broader Asiatic pattern. Oriental authoritarianism plus the Western techniques of mass education and propaganda, centralization, and police supervision add up to something very close to the modern Occidental phenomenon of totalitarianism. Throughout most of Asia the drift in that direction has been an inescapable corollary of Westernization.

3. DEMOCRACY

But the new Western techniques led in another direction also—toward social freedom, economic independence, and even toward democratic liberties and privileges. The Meiji reforms made it possible for men of ability to rise from the lower classes more easily than ever before. Men of humble birth became leading politicians and honored generals. Merchants and samurai, protected by the new laws, built up business empires which in wealth and economic power rivaled the feudal realms and principalities of earlier ages. And there even rose a swelling cry for the right to participate in government.

At first this cry was merely the demand of ambitious samurai who had been excluded from the Meiji oligarchy for some share in the power and prestige of government. Associated as this movement was in its early years with samurai unrest and reaction and producing as an offshoot in later years the chauvinistic patriotic societies, such as the Black Dragon Society, the samurai demand for a place in government obviously was no purely democratic movement. But in only a few years, under the inspiring leadership of men like the Tosa samurai, Itagaki, it began to transform itself into a democratic ground

swell, such as had rocked the ships of state in Europe somewhat earlier. Businessmen and landowners of the countryside took up the cry for a part in government and started to flock into organizations which were really incipient political parties. A popular demand for democratic forms of government was fast taking shape.

The democratic movement, however, was still very weak and might have been eliminated completely if it had not been for one accidental factor, which incidentally distinguishes the Japanese case history from that of the other lands of Asia today. Unlike the Chinese Communists of our time, the Meiji leaders assumed that parliamentarianism was an integral and indispensable part of the Western system. The fact that the strongest and most advanced of the countries of the West had parliaments was proof enough for them that a parliament helped make a country strong. In the spring of 1868, before the new government had consolidated its power, the group around the throne had the young Emperor issue a "Charter Oath," in which he promised that an "assembly" would be established and all measures would be "decided by public discussion." Even a decade and more later, when the oligarchy was well entrenched and the police, army, and other organs of government made it invincible, some of the oligarchs believed in the value of a parliament and others felt it to be at least a necessary nuisance, which would serve to divert popular discontent into harmless channels. In 1881 the government promised to establish a national assembly by 1890, and in 1889 the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, creating a bicameral and largely elective Diet to participate in affairs of state. Ito, the primary framer of the Constitution and an open opponent of parliamentary rule, saw to it that the document did more to enhance Imperial prestige and, through the Emperor, the power of the oligarchy, than to grant rights and powers to the people. The Emperor was expressly described as being "sacred and inviolable" and "invested with sovereign power," and he retained sufficient specific powers to give the oligarchy which con-

trolled him complete dominance over the representatives of the people. But the idea of popular participation in government had been accepted and had been given expression in modern Japan's most sacred document.

The first Diet, which was elected in 1890, was a small and frail opening wedge, but it was enough. The concept of popular government, aided by the stimulus of universal education, produced a steadily growing demand for more democratic rights. Within a few years it had become a runaway force which would have appalled the cautious Meiji statesmen had they still been alive. Japan crowded into the four decades between the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution and the 1920's much of the same history of parliamentary growth which European nations had experienced over the centuries. A stiff tax qualification limited the first electorate for the Lower House to a mere 450,000 out of a total population of 42,000,000. But as education spread, there was constant pressure for lowering the tax qualifications and increasing the number of voters. By 1919 the electorate had increased from 450,000 to 3,000,000 and in 1925, after a long and bitter fight, universal manhood suffrage was adopted.

More significant, the powers of the Diet expanded year by year. From the start it refused to be the simple safety valve for public discontent which the oligarchs had planned. It made a major nuisance of itself, until Ito himself decided it would be easier to work with the Diet rather than against it and in 1900 founded the Seiyukai, which for the next four decades was to be Japan's leading political party. The next year he decided to retire from the troublesome forefront of political life, and thenceforth he let his political protégé, the court noble Saionji, take his place as premier and head of the Seiyukai party. By 1918 Saionji had passed on the premiership to Hara, who was in no sense an aristocrat or oligarch but a simple commoner and Seiyukai politician. Hara, a product of the ballot box and parliamentary give and take, formed the first strictly party cabinet. The Diet in gaining control over the

cabinet had won a slow but nonetheless spectacular victory over the oligarchy.

By the 1920's the new forces unleashed by the Meiji reforms —one might better say the Meiji Revolution—were finally felt in their full power, and at the same time the growing divergence of the two paths down which they were leading Japan became apparent. Until the First World War the ultimate leadership had been in the hands of the old oligarchs, themselves products of the feudal age, who had started the revolution and had not been created by it. But with their disappearance from the stage, the Japanese Revolution came to full fruition, as leadership passed into the hands of men who were products of the revolution. The link with the past suddenly melted away. Japan was clearly out of sight of the stability of feudal times, and there was no way back. More important, the unity which the common samurai background of the Meiji leaders had given Japan suddenly vanished. The second generation of leaders had no such bond of common experience. They were the products of different backgrounds—of party politics, of *zaibatsu* business enterprises, of the rigid civil bureaucracy, or the regimented ranks of the military.

In this sense, the disappearance of the Meiji oligarchy marked a crucial turning point in the Japanese Revolution—a turning point which its more recent Russian counterpart has not yet fully reached. The Meiji oligarchs—one might even call them the "old revolutionaries"—dominated the scene for five decades, first as titular heads of the government and then in the less precise but more highly venerated role of *genro* or "elder statesmen." The *genro* system was typically Japanese—a product of the Japanese respect for age and dislike of the ostentatious display of power or of positions involving individual responsibility. Time after time in Japanese history, the real leaders have been a group of men behind the figurehead ruler or possibly behind a whole series of figureheads. It was altogether in keeping with the Japanese tradition for Ito and his colleagues to withdraw behind the scenes as "elder statesmen" in order

to avoid the petty annoyances and dangers of public life while still retaining ultimate control over the premiers and cabinets which held the limelight. But the oligarchs could not live forever. Ito himself was assassinated by a Korean in 1909. General Yamagata, the chief builder of the modern Japanese army, died in 1922 and Matsukata, the last of the original oligarchs, two years later, leaving only Saionji, Ito's younger protégé, as the last remaining *genro* until his death in 1940. As long as he lived, Saionji, like the Emperor, remained a unifying force in Japanese politics, helping to gloss over the fundamental fissure in Japanese society, but all attempts to create a new body of "elder statesmen" to continue this function met with failure. The products of the new age, politician and admiral alike, were themselves part of the dichotomy of forces which was rending Japan.

The First World War, coinciding as it did with the disappearance of the older leadership, gave tremendous impetus to the drive toward democracy and greater individual freedom. The victory of the three great democracies of the West—Great Britain, France, and the United States—and the collapse of the three more authoritarian states—the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires—seemed positive proof that democracy was the vital force behind the amazing strength of the West. A wave of enthusiasm for democracy and internationalism swept Japan, bringing with it not only Hara's rise to the Premiership and the adoption of universal manhood suffrage but also Japanese withdrawal from Shantung and the Maritime Province of Siberia and the reduction in 1925 of the standing army by four divisions.

Perhaps more important than the First World War was the full-fledged development by this time of a significant new class which had been created by fifty years of Westernization. This was the urban white-collar class, or, as the Japanese more accurately call it, the *sarari-man* ("salary man") class, produced by the need for technically competent and educated men in business, government, and the professions. Ranging from the uni-

versity professor, doctor, and lawyer down to the shop clerk and office worker, this new urban class has dominated the culture of modern Japan even more completely than its cultural predecessor, the merchant class, dominated the arts and letters of Tokugawa times. Under its patronage the great city dailies, centered in Tokyo and Osaka, developed into powerful organs with circulations in the millions. Magazines of every degree of sophistication or vulgarity and every shade of opinion made their appearance together with a vast flood of books, as Japan became a nation of avid readers. Every artistic or philosophic current in the Western world produced its own little eddy in Japan. The urban intellectuals and white-collar workers found that education had opened for them the doors to the outside world, and they happily rushed out to bask in the light of a common world culture.

This was not merely a spiritual awakening. Growing intellectual independence inevitably produced in turn social individualism. Family authority began to disintegrate, as young people questioned the right of the family to choose their mates for them, thereby creating one of the most difficult of Japan's contemporary social problems. The younger generation joined in a world-wide social revolt, and Japanese flappers and their male companions, known respectively as *moga* and *mobo*, standing for the English words "modern girl" and "modern boy," delighted in shocking their elders. Some intellectuals began to question all authority, and a series of small radical movements sprang into existence. The spirit seeped down to members of the urban proletariat, another new class created by the Meiji reforms, and for a few years after the war Japanese industry was racked by strikes and labor disputes. Communism made its appearance among small groups of intellectuals, city workers, and even in some peasant communities. And in each successive election after the adoption of universal manhood suffrage, the white-collar residents of the cities showed their growing independence and disdain for established author-

ity by voting in constantly growing numbers for socialist candidates.

4. THE CLASH OF FORCES

A casual visitor to Japan in the 1920's might have concluded that the drift away from authoritarian traditions and toward political democracy and beyond that toward socialism would go on unchecked, as Japan followed the road blazed by the British in recent decades, but appearances were deceptive. Social individualism and political independence were largely confined to the cities, and democracy was infinitely feebler than in England. The Diet had won intermittent control over the cabinet, but its powers were still strictly limited. Even during the 1920's some cabinets were frankly nonparty governments, and, despite the limitation of naval expansion at the Washington Conference and the reduction of the standing army in 1925, there was doubt as to how fully the Diet and party cabinets could control the army, navy, or even parts of the civil bureaucracy. Still worse, the party system rested on a relatively narrow base and was sufficiently inefficient and corrupt to estrange the sympathies of many public-spirited Japanese. Electoral dishonesty was rampant, and Diet members were often venal servants of *zaibatsu* interests. And, in any case, the Diet for the most part represented only one narrow segment of the population, the small landowners and businessmen of the countryside, rather than the people as a whole. The backward peasantry and the equally impoverished city proletariat were unable to take full advantage of the vote, even when finally given it, and the city white-collar classes, while politically vocal, were inexperienced latecomers to the game of politics.

Thus, despite the obvious strength of the pull toward individual liberties and democratic rights, the conflicting pull toward closer integration and greater authoritarian control

of society proved the stronger of the two forces which emerged from Westernization. However emancipated, intellectually and socially, the better educated residents of the cities might be, the mass of Japanese tenant farmers and day laborers unconsciously continued in the old paths of quiet obedience and deference to authority, and the vast weight of tradition still stood firmly in the way of democratic growth. Perhaps even more important was the mounting strength of the new forces of authority and conformity which Westernization itself had fostered—the highly centralized economic empires of the *zaibatsu*, the huge and omnipresent civil bureaucracy, the all-seeing, all-knowing police, and, worst of all, the closely knit and fanatical corps of army officers.

All of these enjoyed more or less independence of the forces of democracy as manifested in the Diet. The *zaibatsu* scarcely feared it, for they bought and sold Diet members themselves. And the fiction that the Emperor actually ruled and that the civil bureaucracy, army, and navy were his direct representatives gave the latter not only theoretical but often actual freedom from Diet control. The remaining *genro*, the Privy Council, and the whole high bureaucracy, which had succeeded the Meiji oligarchs as the men around the throne, stood both in theory and in practice above the elected representatives of the people. Through their figurehead, the Emperor, they had the power to choose premiers and to issue Imperial Ordinances. The Diet did not even have complete control over the purse strings, for the budget of the previous year continued in effect if the Diet refused to grant the government its new budget. Yamagata, the army builder and determined opponent of parliamentary government, had seen to it that the army and navy retained their independence. As early as 1895 a ruling was established that only active generals or lieutenant generals could serve as army ministers and similarly only active admirals or vice-admirals as navy ministers. This ruling, confirmed on two later occasions, gave the army and navy each a veto over any cabinet. By refusing to let one of their officers

join it or remain in it, they could destroy any cabinet, whatever its backing in the Diet or bureaucracy.

The army perhaps best represented the totalitarian tendencies within the new Japan. Inheriting the warrior traditions of the samurai and all the prestige that a thousand years of feudal rule had given the soldier, it was a major link with Japan's authoritarian past, but more significantly it was an entirely modern product of Westernization and a chief shaper of modern Japanese totalitarianism. The new army of peasant recruits crushed the samurai revolts; it, more than any other major institution, broke down the old social classes and created a hierarchy of merit in which the sons of peasants could rise to the top; and finally it espoused many of the theories of socialism, championing the cause of the impoverished peasant against the wealthy urban industrialist. In short, the Japanese army, as seen against the background of Japanese feudalism, was almost as revolutionary an institution as the Diet itself.

Thus, the army that Yamagata and the other samurai generals of the Meiji period created was thoroughly modern. It had no place for class distinctions or hereditary power. It depended for solidarity on no vague forces such as common social background but created its own solidarity by indoctrination. Officer candidates were selected young and subjected to long and intensive indoctrination. Indoctrination of the conscripts was considered as important as military training and was carried on intensively in the barracks and before that in the school rooms. Building on the strong foundations of the habitual obedience of the feudal Japanese and utilizing the propaganda techniques of the modern West, the Japanese army built itself up into as solid a pyramid of hierarchic authority as the world has ever seen. While this organization was in the hands of the samurai generals of Meiji times, it could be made a harmonious part of the total power structure of the state. But when its own propaganda-fed products began to reach the top, cooperation between the army and the Diet or even between the army and civil bureaucracy became difficult. The army

officer simply lived in a different world from that of the party politician or civil servant.

Perhaps the most important area in which the two conflicting forces of democracy and totalitarianism met in Japan was in the field of education. Education was in a sense the key to Westernization itself. Universal primary education, advanced technical training, and all the associated means of spreading information through the printed word, moving pictures, and the radio, which collectively make up modern education, are what produced the technical skills on which industrialization, modernized forms of government, and the new army and navy depended. Unfettered education not only taught men new skills but opened their eyes and made them think. It inevitably produced a growing demand for democracy in Japan, as it already had in the West. It was the factor which made modern democracy so different from all earlier forms of democracy, in which some privileged group, but not the people as a whole, used electoral processes in government.

But education at the same time was perhaps the greatest of all the modern forces producing uniformity and regimentation in Japan. Controlled education, through the schools and the various modern media of information, could standardize thought and regulate society. In the hands of unscrupulous leaders it was a far more powerful weapon for enforcing obedience than guns or prisons. Education in its broad modern sense is perhaps the chief factor which makes totalitarianism something more than the many types of authoritarianism which the world has known in the past. As the Japanese army discovered all too soon, indoctrination through modern educational facilities was an invaluable weapon for gaining power.

While education, thus, had helped produce the pull toward democracy in Japan, it was at the same time the strongest weapon in the arsenal of Japanese totalitarianism and the factor which above all others made any return to the feudal patterns of earlier times out of the question. Through the Ministry of Education the central government directly controlled

the curriculums and teaching materials in every private as well as public school throughout the country. The key struggle between democracy and totalitarianism in modern Japan was the slow, hidden fight in the schools and newspaper offices. As education was gradually forced into the strait jacket of indoctrination, the triumph of totalitarianism became certain.

During the 1930's, the fight between the forces of democracy and totalitarianism came into the open in Japan, but only after the issue had already been settled. Despite the liberal, international flavor of city life during the 1920's, there had appeared unchallenged new dogmas of nationalism and new concepts of mystical authority, which were all the more powerful because of their vagueness. "Japanese spirit," "national polity" (*kokutai*), and other empty terms had been built up into solid realities in the public mind, and the violation of their undefined principles had been accepted as a heinous crime. Accusation of such a violation was enough to discredit the accused, for neither guilt nor innocence of such mystical crimes was susceptible of proof. People also had come to believe that there was such a thing as the "Imperial will," even though the Emperor carefully followed the dictates of his supposed advisors. A political fanatic or assassin could claim that he was following the "Imperial will" in opposing or even murdering the Emperor's ministers, and the public would condone his act.

Still worse, the inexperienced supporters of parliamentary rule in Japan saw no reason to defend the rights of minority groups. They saw no danger in the utilization of the powerful Home Ministry and the efficient, centralized police force it controlled to stifle freedom of speech, when beliefs they themselves did not share were involved. They even permitted the bureaucrats and police to establish the principle that it was a crime to think "dangerous thoughts." The so-called "Peace Preservation Laws," which were the government's chief means of suppressing all supposedly dangerous movements, were greatly strengthened in 1928, accelerating the persecution of labor organizations and leftist political sympathizers, which

had been mounting ever since the wave of strikes at the end of the First World War. The incipient labor movement had already been crushed, and now all "labor" and "peasant" parties were banned. The weight of police control fell especially heavily on Japanese students, who because of their schooling tended to be more independent in their thinking than their less educated compatriots. Since Japanese police methods included torture and indefinite detention merely on the grounds of suspicion, the weight of police control could indeed be heavy, and thousands of Japanese university students were imprisoned and tortured until they recanted the "dangerous thoughts" they were accused of harboring.

With the battle of intellectual freedom already lost, there was little hope that the forces of democracy would win, but even then the fight was long and confused. Other factors tended to overlie it and conceal the more essential struggle beneath. There was, for example, the dispute over foreign policy, which was in a sense merely one manifestation of the clash between these two forces. As we have seen, the world depression made the problem of Japanese foreign trade and empire more pressing, but the groups which favored foreign conquest were essentially the elements favoring totalitarianism within Japan, and the opposition was primarily the social groupings which stood behind democracy. The clash was precipitated by the dispute over the best methods of maintaining Japan's foreign trade, but behind it lay the more fundamental dispute over the basic organization of Japanese government and society.

The army's independence of the civil government permitted it to embark upon the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the conquest of all China in 1937, without the prior approval of government authorities or the people. The jingoistic fervor these wars of foreign aggression engendered then permitted the army and the other forces of totalitarianism to sweep aside all democratic opposition and transform the Diet into a meaningless rubber stamp—another of Japan's many anachronistic sur-

vivals from earlier days. The army stubbornly clung to its costly and inconclusive Chinese venture because it was aware that not just a foreign policy but a whole system of rule was at stake. It realized that, if Japan could disentangle herself from China once war had broken out in Europe, she would be in a favorable position to make solid economic and political gains, such as she had achieved under similar circumstances during the First World War. But retreat from China was impossible, because it would have been an admission of failure on the part of the army and might have permitted a resurgence of the democratic forces at home.

Another overtone of the great struggle was the nativistic reaction at this time against internationalism and Westernization. The Japanese were experiencing a perhaps unavoidable reaction to many decades of rapid borrowing from the West. But one should not conclude that this meant any return to the feudal past. That was definitely and irretrievably dead, and no revival of primitive symbols of nationalism or Confucian and feudal virtues could give it life. Instead, the reaction attached itself to the army and the totalitarian ideal it was fostering as the more acceptable of the two products of Westernization. The result was a strange mixture of mystical Shinto doctrines, feudal mouthings, socialistic dogma, and army discipline, unified only negatively by the common antipathy for democracy and Western liberalism in general.

The economic overtones of the struggle were perhaps as confusing to the American observer as any aspect of the clash. We tend to visualize modern political and economic theory in a single dimension from right to left, not utilizing even the two dimensions of the paper on which we usually record our thoughts. The result is an obvious confusion between political and economic "rightism" and "leftism." The extreme left and right take on a curious identity in communism, and the gulf between a leftist England and a leftist Russia is vastly though inexplicably greater than the distance between a socialist England and a capitalistic United States. The use of

two dimensions instead of one, though resulting still in an absurd oversimplification, permits a somewhat clearer picture both for Japan and the West. With the vertical axis running from democracy down to dictatorship and the horizontal from socialism to capitalism, we find Communists, Nazis, and wartime Japanese regimes all near the bottom of the graph, while Great Britain, the United States, and the other democracies, though some distance apart on the left to right scale, remain near the top of the graph. Over the decades both the democracies and the totalitarian regimes appear to be moving from right to left, that is away from pure capitalism and closer to pure socialism, but while the one group appears to be slowly rising in the graph toward complete democracy, the other appears to be sinking closer and closer to absolute dictatorship. The fundamental dichotomy of modern society immediately shows itself to be on the vertical scale rather than the horizontal, and the socialist leanings of the authoritarian Japanese army are seen to be a thoroughly typical modern phenomenon.

The Japanese army, drawing its strength from the less privileged rural classes, understandably became the champion of the peasants and the poorer classes in general. The army ideal was the traditional Japanese ideal of service rather than profit. Rich industrialists seemed to be wicked men to the Spartan army officers and their peasant recruits. The corruption of the Diet made possible an easy identification of avaricious capitalists with degenerate politicians, to the detriment of both. While the urban white-collar worker himself was drifting toward socialistic ideals, the rural radical distrusted the "city-slicker" socialist and tended to throw in his lot with the army. At the same time, capitalistic *zaibatsu* interests, while distrustful of army fanaticism and apprehensive about the military's program of foreign conquests, were more interested in suppressing popular radicalism and the labor movement than in forestalling the army's rise to power. Thus, the socialist-capitalist cleavage, though an important one in modern Japan,

was not the principal rift in Japanese society. In the great struggle of the 1930's, socialists and capitalists stood firmly on both sides of the fence or attempted hopefully to straddle it. The real struggle was between democratic and authoritarian forms of government, as the bewildered and disorganized politicians of the older, conservative parties together with urban socialists bowed before anti-capitalistic army officers, supported grudgingly by pro-capitalistic bureaucrats and the great *zaibatsu* interests themselves.

It is disheartening to note how small a shift in the balance of forces within modern Japan produced the tremendous swing from the democratic tendencies of the early 1920's to the totalitarianism of the so-called Showa Restoration in the 1930's. The army, without changing its basic views but merely by increasing its intransigence, started the whole kaleidoscopic regrouping of forces to form an entirely new pattern. Secure in its virtual independence of the civil government and emboldened by the growing economic crisis in the world and the success of totalitarian ideas in Europe, the army began to knock the props from under democratic government by "direct action." "Direct action" abroad meant undeclared wars, which stirred up chauvinistic support for the army within Japan. "Direct action" at home meant political assassinations conveniently committed by a lunatic fringe of officers and civilians but benefiting the whole army's cause by intimidating the potential opposition, party leaders, high bureaucrats, and *zaibatsu* executives alike. The army had the tacit support of the public, excited by the wars and as much blinded as enlightened by the half-propagandistic education it had received, and public opinion was hard to resist in Japan, where right and wrong were admittedly determined by the judgment of society.

The other power groups in modern Japanese society either adjusted to the army's strengthened stand or meekly gave way before it. The high civil bureaucrats, the chief spiritual inheritors of the Meiji oligarchy, had for decades been con-

cerned primarily with the problem of curbing the democratic upsurge by riding with the tide and controlling it. Now the bureaucrats sought to retain their supremacy in the face of the new menace by employing the same subtle, conciliatory tactics on the army, but each successive government saw the bureaucrats a little weaker and the army men a little stronger, until finally in the autumn of 1941 General Tojo became premier, and the army's totalitarian program at home and aggressive plans abroad became accepted national policy. *Zaibatsu* suspicion of military extremism gradually thawed before the expanding economic opportunities which the army's Manchurian conquests gave them, while the army swallowed its dislike of the *zaibatsu* once it discovered that its own economic inexperience made *zaibatsu* aid imperative for the exploitation of Manchuria and the development of heavy industry in Japan. The conservative democratic parties and their rural middle-class backing, which had the most to lose from the collapse of representative government, were swept by the chauvinistic tide of war into weak acquiescence in their own destruction. Only the urban, white-collar classes remained for the most part firm though timidly silent advocates of democracy, voting heavily for the few liberal candidates who were still allowed to run in the now meaningless elections, but even in this group there were serious defections, as many intellectuals climbed aboard the army's militaristic band wagon and the urban socialist parties took on a strongly totalitarian hue. And the masses of the people—the peasants and city workers—simply stood apathetically by, ready to follow whatever leaders should emerge.

The strange multi-cornered struggle in prewar Japan between army officers, civil bureaucrats, *zaibatsu* executives, party politicians, terroristic demagogues, and liberal intellectuals offers a uniquely Japanese picture, but, after all the curious Oriental detail, such as Shinto mumbo-jumbo, "Imperial will," and samurai prestige, have been removed, the stark outlines of the picture bear an all too clear resemblance to the

major outlines of Western history in recent decades. In fact, the Japanese picture perhaps helps to sharpen our own myopic vision and enable us to see behind the bewildering surface patterns of intense nationalistic rivalries the outlines of the titanic struggle between the forces of democracy and totalitarianism in our own half of the world—and for that matter wherever the complexities of machine production have resulted in high standards of popular education and the close integration of society on a national scale. The conflict is not always so clear-cut or so evenly balanced as it was in prewar Japan, but it exists in some form or another throughout the whole political spectrum of the modern world. The extreme integration of society in the modern totalitarian state depends on education, and education inevitably tends to breed the desire for individual freedom. On the other hand, education and the economic basis for individual freedom as we know it today depend on the extreme integration of an industrialized society, and integration in turn tends to produce limitations on individual freedom. The strongly democratic lands of the West all show a rapid and apparently irresistible drift toward greater governmental controls over individual freedom of action, while each totalitarian regime ostentatiously maintains a show of democratic electoral procedures and is vociferous about its democratic aims. The point of conflict is different, but the nature of the conflict is basically the same. The two forces of democracy and totalitarianism are inevitable concomitants of machine production and universal education, and their harmonious reconciliation is no easy matter.

The struggle between democracy and totalitarianism was not merely a passing phase of prewar Japanese history. The fires of war and the surgery of defeat have brought physical and spiritual changes within the body politic of Japan, but this fundamental struggle goes on. The American occupation itself, with its educational programs and external controls, inevitably pulls in both directions. And when the occupation is ended, the struggle will continue in one form or another,

determining in large measure the future of Japan and the role she will play in the world. In turning our attention to the occupation and our prospects for successfully achieving our objectives in Japan, we must bear in mind not only the physical framework within which Japanese society lives and the spiritual heritage which is its life blood but also the power of these two related but antagonistic forces within modern Japanese society.

PART IV THE OCCUPATION

10. The Victors and the Vanquished

1. THE WOUNDS OF WAR

The history of the American occupation of Japan will some day form one of the most fascinating and important chapters in the history of the world in modern times, telling a story which is both dramatically unique and universally significant. Whether a success or failure, the occupation will stand as one of the most crucial phases of the clash between the forces of totalitarianism and democracy in modern society and at the same time one of the most important as well as spectacular episodes in the epochal meeting of East and West, which may become increasingly the dominant theme in the history of mankind in our age, recasting or even overshadowing the present ideological cleavage which rends the world.

For Japan herself, the fifth decade of the twentieth century will probably prove to be the most momentous in all her long history. Never before in such a short space of years has so much that was old and accepted been burned out of Japanese society and so much that was new and unfamiliar been poured in. Each individual phase of the process represents a cataclysmic change in itself—the gutting of her cities by the blinding flash of atomic power and the less spectacular but equally destructive force of thousands of tiny fire bombs; the shearing off of a huge empire; the arrival on Japanese soil of a conquering army for the first time in recorded history; and the dynamic enforcement in rapid succession of a whole flood

of reforms, remaking the government and economy and reshaping the whole social structure.

The story of each one of these destructive or constructive modifications of Japanese society can be related in full, but not the history of the decade as a whole. It is evident that old forces have been destroyed and new ones created, but no one can say what the new balance of forces will be. Some of the details of the picture may be clear enough, but we still cannot make out the composition as a whole. Some small innovation, almost unnoticed now because of the momentous events which overshadow it, may serve as the catalyst for a great social transformation, while many of our most vaunted reforms may prove to be no more than sand castles, which will be washed away by the high tides of nationalistic reaction or the storms of war. A century of rapid movement within Japanese society has culminated in a decade of still more frenzied change. No final description of the course covered is possible so long as the forward motion remains so precipitous and unpredictable. The best that one can hope for now and for some years to come is a progress report on Japan's tortured convolutions and her apparent direction of forward motion—an attempt to determine on the basis of her known past which are the main underlying currents today and which are just the eddies and surface countercurrents.

While the major ingredients which make up postwar Japan are essentially the same as those which formed the Japan of earlier years, one should not underestimate the fundamental changes which Japan has undergone during the past decade. The soldiers who embarked for China in the summer of 1937 or set sail for the conquest of the Philippines and Singapore in the declining months of 1941 returned after the war to a Japan changed physically and spiritually almost beyond recognition. Even for those who stayed at home there is a strong before-and-after feeling—a clear break in their lives which came when the physical world they had known disappeared in fire and when the spiritual world they had inhabited van-

ished as suddenly in the stunning blow of defeat. The physical and moral destruction of the recent war and the bewilderment of surrender and occupation by an enemy power are as much facts which shape the Japan of today as are the older samurai heritage or the timeless poverty of the peasants. Defeat struck the average Japanese with the speed of lightning, but its effects have lingered on year after year, burning themselves ever more deeply into the Japanese soul. It has been a traumatic experience, and its effects have remained long after the numbness of the shock began to wear off—the burned-out cities, the daily scramble for a few sweet potatoes to eat, the American flag floating proudly in the breeze, while for three and a half years no one was allowed to display the Japanese flag, the railway car reserved for Allied personnel, looking clean and empty beside the other dirty and overcrowded cars in the train, with their broken windows boarded up and people hanging from the doors. Japan is not and cannot be the same country it was before the war. Defeat and the occupation which followed have altered it permanently. They too are now part of the ineradicable heritage of Japan.

Physical destruction alone was enough to change Japan permanently. It is estimated that 1,850,000 Japanese lost their lives during the war, 668,000 of them in Japan proper as a result of air raids. During the first few years after the war, over 6,000,000 soldiers and civilians who had been abroad, many of them for decades, were dumped back in Japan, providing just that many more mouths for the overtaxed land to feed. Forty per cent of Japan's aggregate urban area was destroyed or damaged, and some 2,252,000 buildings were totally destroyed. Hiroshima was wiped out by a single atomic bomb with the loss of perhaps as many as 100,000 lives; but Hiroshima was a small city, and its destruction came after most Japanese had been numbed by repeated disasters. More of them remember with far greater poignancy the two great fire-bomb raids on Tokyo in the spring of 1945. As each B–29 unloaded its bombs, a wide swath of houses burst into flames. The panic-stricken

citizens of Tokyo, fleeing from one fiery outburst, would suddenly find a new wall of fire blocking their path. A hundred thousand civilians may have been burned to death in a single night; in all the various raids it suffered, Tokyo lost a total of some 695,000 buildings. The population shrank from about 6,700,000 to around 2,800,000, as destitute bomb victims and their terrified neighbors fled to the country. The same tragic drama was repeated on a smaller scale in every other major city in Japan, with the single exception of Kyoto, the ancient capital, which fortunately was as insignificant strategically as it was important culturally. Osaka, Japan's second largest city, shrank from a population of over 3,000,000 to approximately one-third that size, while two other great cities, Nagoya and Kobe, lost more than half of their population, and scores of smaller cities suffered proportionately greater destruction.

The Japanese houses, unlike the stone structures of Europe, burned to the ground, leaving no traces except for foundation stones, an occasional safe, and brick chimneys and mud-walled storage houses where the rich had once lived. Built of wood and closely packed together, thousands of Japanese homes burned as the result of a single bomb load. The terrible possibilities of total war, only partially realized in Europe, were demonstrated far more vividly in Japan, where a mere handful of airmen were able to destroy whole cities, thus undermining the human base on which industrial production and military power rested. But the Japanese, with their passion for neatness, soon started the sad work of cleaning up the wreckage; showing the same courage and resignation they have always evinced before the destructive powers of nature, they bravely and almost cheerfully set about the herculean task of reconstructing their ravaged cities. A scum of temporary shacks soon spread over the bomb-made deserts which marked the central portions of virtually all the cities of Japan. The better residential sections could not be rebuilt so quickly, because the universal lack of money and materials prevented the reconstruc-

tion of the more substantial homes of prewar days, but in these areas the land-hungry Japanese soon planted vegetable gardens, which softened the jagged lines of broken walls and fire-chipped foundations. Today, war damage is far less in evidence in Japan than in many parts of Europe, but only because it was more complete. For miles on end in the larger cities of Japan everything was so thoroughly destroyed that there are no ruins to see today—only the endless rows of new shanties, which make a superficially pleasanter but essentially more sobering sight than the partially destroyed and partially rebuilt cities of Europe.

But the destruction of Japan's cities, while bitter enough for the millions who lost relatives and all their worldly possessions to the flames, was not as serious for the nation as the collapse of the economy at the end of the war. The same tragic story is found in virtually every graph showing industrial production of any sort. Industrial production as a whole had more than doubled between 1930 and 1941, but in 1946 it sank to less than a third of the 1930 total and a mere seventh of the 1941 figure. In terms of monthly production, the picture was even worse. The production of coal, Japan's largest source of power, had fallen by November 1945 to one-eighth of the monthly average of 1940. Pig-iron production that same month was only about one-twentieth of what it had been in January of that year and a seventieth of the monthly average in 1942. Textile production at the beginning of 1946 was scarcely more than a twentieth of what it had been in 1937. Less than a tenth as many electric motors and truck chassis were being made at the beginning of 1946 as in 1939 and 1941 respectively. Machine production, which is so indispensable to the livelihood of the modern Japanese, had come virtually to a halt, and the nation had been thrown back on agriculture as its sole support.

The collapse of Japanese industry is not to be blamed primarily on war destruction. Even in the more seriously damaged industries, such as machine tools and rolling stock, direct and indirect war damage together accounted for the destruc-

tion of only a quarter of the productive facilities. The lack of adequate maintenance during the war seriously impaired the efficiency of the industrial plant, and wartime bombing hindered essential communications and often scattered the working force. Far more serious, however, were the starvation of Japanese industry toward the end of the war because of the lack of materials and its complete disruption following the surrender. In some cases production was forcibly stopped by the occupation authorities on account of the military nature of the product, and in the coal industry production fell drastically because the surrender brought release and eventual repatriation to thousands of Korean laborers who had been forced into the mines, where they had constituted 32 per cent of the working force. In most industries, however, production had started to drop sharply even before the surrender, not so much because of bombing raids as because materials were lacking. After the surrender the decline became even worse because the materials still were lacking and Japanese industrial leaders were too confused and too apprehensive in the face of threatened reparations and the American reform program to attempt to rehabilitate their enterprises.

The disappearance of the Japanese merchant marine, largely in the year 1944, was in reality the death warrant for Japanese industry. Month by month during that fateful year the toll of Japanese ships mounted, as American submarines roamed the waters of the Pacific in increasing numbers and American planes began to scour the seas and mine the harbors of the Far East. By January 1945 virtually the whole of the once great Japanese merchant fleet had sunk beneath the waves. Oil, rubber, ores, coal, and cotton ceased to flow into Japan, and stockpiles began to shrink rapidly. Japanese industry was living on borrowed time, and by the summer of 1945 that time was running out. Years before, the wartime conversion of industry to military production had put an end to Japan's normal export trade. Now her imports too had stopped, and the tremendous foreign trade on which modern Japan had

been living was at an end. Still worse, war and revolution abroad combined to destroy Japan's former markets in the Far East, and war-born animosities and new patterns of trade threatened to prevent the revival of her trade elsewhere as well. Japan's foreign trade had not just been temporarily suspended; it was for all practical purposes dead. And with its death, the heart of the Japanese economy almost stopped beating, and Japan sank into an economic coma, from which only a strong revived flow of life-giving foreign trade can ever raise her.

With industrial production almost at a standstill and the cities of Japan in large part destroyed, the wealth of the nation was reduced for the most part to the agricultural land and its products. The Japanese peasant, while producing no more food, suddenly found himself in possession of a far greater proportion of the national wealth than ever before. His house stood intact, and his bombed-out city relatives were clamoring for admittance to it. During the first few years after the surrender he was actually producing less than before the war, because there were no longer any imported fertilizers, and the production of chemical fertilizers in Japan had fallen as low as all other industrial production. But the city dwellers were producing almost nothing, and, with foreign trade at an end, they depended all the more desperately on the food the Japanese farmer grew. The government program for the collection of foodstuffs from farmers and their rationed distribution to consumers was already beginning to falter as Japan staggered toward defeat, and after the surrender had undermined government authority it broke down still more. Food rations decreased dangerously, while the price of food in the black market began to soar. The peasant found that he could reap greater profits than ever before in his life merely by selling a part of his produce through illicit channels. Money was fast losing its value, and so he often accumulated fancy kimonos and family heirlooms from the desperate city folk in payment for his food. And he ate comparatively well—per-

haps better than ever before—while his urban compatriots sank to near starvation levels.

The relative prosperity of the peasants was merely a sign of the disastrous collapse of living standards in the city. Fire had destroyed almost half of the property the city dwellers had owned, and long months of refugeeing in the country had eaten into their savings. Slowly they drifted back to their old homes to live in shacks a mere fraction of the size of their former houses, small though those had usually been. They found little fuel for cooking and virtually none for heating or bathing purposes. Even electric lighting often failed them. Commuting in the few dilapidated and perilously overcrowded trains, streetcars, and busses which remained at the end of the war had become a prolonged nightmare each morning and evening.

But worst of all was the desperate search for food. The government ration at reasonable prices often amounted to less than a thousand calories a day and was never enough to sustain life adequately. Virtually all city people were forced to resort to the black market for some of the food they needed, but few could afford to purchase enough from this source because of the prohibitive prices demanded. The desperateness of the situation is revealed by the cold statistics, which show that while more than 60 per cent of the income of the urban family went for food during the first few years after the surrender, only rarely did consumption rise as high as 2000 calories per capita and at times it sank below 1500. Those who could find a scrap of land to cultivate attempted to grow some of their own food, planting rows of vegetables between the foundations of their former homes or hacking out fields on the precipitous slopes of near-by hills. School teachers spent much of their energy cultivating patches of sweet potatoes. Office workers appropriated the margins of the roads in front of their homes to raise a few vegetables. Thousands of others took exhausting weekly trips by train to remote rural areas to trade clothes and household furnishings for a rucksack full

of sweet potatoes. They wryly called it a "bamboo-shoot existence" or else "onion existence," comparing the piecemeal trading of their remaining possessions for food to the process of peeling off the successive layers of a bamboo-shoot or onion until little or nothing was left.

The drastic fall in production inevitably resulted in a runaway inflation. It had started during the war but accelerated rapidly with the collapse of industry and the loss of public confidence in the government after the surrender. In the weeks between the surrender and the formal occupation of Japan, the authorities gave added impetus to the financial rout. Money in circulation rose rapidly as the government paid off war workers with handsome bonuses. The army, in anticipation of the blow it knew would fall and anxious to placate the disgruntled public, hastily liquidated its holdings, permitting the vast stores of goods it owned to pass into private hands and thence to the black market. As money rapidly depreciated in value, the postal savings and bank deposits which millions of frugal Japanese had laboriously amassed became virtually worthless paper. Inflation also meant a precipitous drop in the real value of all salaries and wages, despite repeated spectacular raises which always turned out to be too little and too late. The man who had lived comfortably before the war on a salary of a hundred yen a month came in time to receive ten thousand or even twenty thousand yen but still could not support his family on it. The city man was sinking helplessly in the financial mire of postwar Japan, and only increased industrial production could give him again the firm footing he so badly needed.

Only the black market flourished, as it always does when production is low and a country disorganized. Shady operators and minor racketeers prospered as inflation profiteers and soon came to be the only group in the nation with ready money. Themselves unfit to lead the economic regeneration of Japan, they drained the energies of the nation like some cancerous growth, sapping the economy of its remaining vitality.

A complicating factor has been the presence in Japan of hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Koreans who at first after the surrender refused to recognize the authority of the Japanese government and thus helped to nullify attempts to stifle the black market and regulate trade. Although repatriation of all such foreigners in Japan was offered by the occupation authorities and well over a million persons, mostly impressed Korean laborers, returned to their homelands, large numbers of Chinese and Koreans elected to stay in Japan, and many Koreans, discouraged by the conditions they discovered at home, later attempted to return illegally to Japan. The Chinese, who were largely merchants of long residence in Japan, showed their customary business acumen by taking advantage of their position as victors to ignore government restrictions on native traders, with the result that they quickly won ownership of a significant proportion of the retail trade in the cities. The remaining Koreans, who numbered some 600,000, were for the most part day laborers, but, claiming the status of quasi-victors, many of them flouted Japanese law and brazenly entered the black market. Thus, both groups have constituted a serious problem in postwar Japan, aggravating the menace of the black market and winning the animosity of large sections of the Japanese public.

Laborious reconstruction and slow economic recovery are gradually hiding the physical destruction and economic wounds of the last few years, but other injuries which Japanese society suffered during the war and defeat cannot be repaired so quickly. These are the grave injuries to morale and the moral fiber, which, though largely invisible, have perhaps been more harmful to Japan than any of the external damage.

It started with the black market, which made its appearance during the war and erupted into feverish activity after the surrender. The meticulously law-abiding Japanese found it increasingly necessary to patronize illegal dealers in order to live. The occasional incorruptible soul who tried to obey the law died of malnutrition. As conditions deteriorated, numerous

other petty infractions of the law became necessary. Common sense justified all these minor departures from strictly legal behavior, but to the Japanese, with his emphasis on detail rather than on general ethical precepts, any conscious violation of the rules cut at the foundation of his character. He took the only possible course, but the damage to morale and self-respect was serious.

The impossibility of maintaining cleanliness and neatness during the war and postwar years was almost as injurious to morale, for the Japanese value perfection in physical detail as much as in ethical codes. Soap all but disappeared; bathhouses were closed for lack of fuel; and the Japanese went dirty for the first time in history. Japanese crowds on trains and busses began to smell. With all national energies and resources being devoted to the war effort, everything deteriorated from industrial plants and railways to parks and private homes. Clothing disappeared from the stores, and the individual Japanese became shabbier year by year and his suit more threadbare and soiled. As the cities burned, the women's beautiful kimonos burned with them. During the war many women changed from kimonos to the ugly *mompei* trousers which peasant women wear in the fields, and after the surrender they shifted to ill-fitting Western dresses or to sweaters and slacks, which do not enhance the beauty of their short and often stubby figures. Even in the countryside old army uniforms have in part replaced the traditional peasant attire, and throughout Japan the kimono, like the peasant garbs of Europe some decades earlier, is beginning to disappear, as the more utilitarian costume of the West displaces what was one of the most beautiful but least practical garments man ever devised for himself.

Courtesy fell victim to the war as much in Japan as in the other participant nations, but in Japan, where etiquette is such a major part of morality, the results were more serious. People fighting over a toehold on a streetcar or scrambling for food for their families become oblivious to the niceties of

life, and in Japan this meant becoming callous to one of the fundamentals of ethics. The more informal and casual manners of the American occupation forces also created a new standard for personal relations, which, while attractive to many younger Japanese, undermined long-accepted precepts of conduct. In Japan the flippant bellhop and the boy and girl nuzzling each other in the public park are not just showing the callowness and bad taste of youth. They are challenging the authority of age and family and threatening the whole social order.

The black market not only sapped the moral stamina of its patrons but it also bred open lawlessness on the part of those who prospered from it. Gangsterism grew at an alarming rate after the surrender, as powerful black marketeers defied the police and terrorized honest tradesmen. New recruits were brought into the underworld, as inflation and industrial collapse robbed thousands of any possibility of making an honest living. Petty crimes and juvenile delinquency increased rapidly. Close police surveillance, strict parental authority, and popular respect for law had made Japan as free of petty crime and juvenile delinquency before the war as any major country in the world. Unguarded baggage was reasonably safe in a city railway station, and a package forgotten on a streetcar was likely to turn up in the lost and found department. But nothing movable was safe in postwar Japan. Professional criminals broke into locked houses, and bands of hoodlums smashed the windows of parked cars belonging to occupation officials and rifled them.

One of the most terrifying phenomena of postwar Japan was the rapid spread of gangs made up of the *oyabun*, or "big shot," and his *kobun*, or "little shots." Originally a widespread type of organization, particularly among artisans and day laborers, resembling the organizations of the Italian padrones, the *oyabun-kobun* groups became identified with gangsterism in postwar Japan. Protection rackets became widespread, and many such gangs terrorized whole neighborhoods and could

only be brought to heel by direct intervention on the part of the occupation authorities.

Behind the rise of gangsterism was the collapse of police power and prestige in postwar Japan. The once all-powerful and arrogant police found that the surrender of the government they represented had pulled their pedestal from under their feet. They also were singled out by the occupation for drastic reform, many of their number being purged and their national organization being atomized to the municipal level. Suffering from the same economic ills as other salaried Japanese, many policemen fell to taking bribes, and all, demoralized to the core, presented a sorry spectacle of pusillanimity and ineffectualness.

Perhaps even more serious than rampant lawlessness was the public collapse of morale. The inconceivable defeat of Japan and the exposure of their most cherished beliefs as the figments of deceitful propaganda shook the confidence of most Japanese in all authority, even though the acceptance of authority was a kingpin in their whole ethical system. They showed their disillusionment in their contempt for the once feared police, their ridicule of the returning soldiers who had left home as heroes, their scorn for Tojo and his bungling attempt at suicide, and their abundant abuse of Japanese political leaders both past and present. But nothing took the place of the lost authority, except the new alien authority and the still vague and inapplicable ideal of democracy. Democracy was on everyone's lips, but the word had little specific meaning to most Japanese, and to others the liberties of the new age meant only license.

The normally disciplined and determined Japanese seemed confused and even dazed. Forgetting their belief in the strength of will power over matter, many of them became apathetic and dispirited. Lotteries of every sort flourished, although few of the frugal and sober Japanese had ever shown much interest in such speculative sports before. Graft and corruption, which had always existed in government circles, multiplied danger-

ously. Worst of all, the resourceful and hard-working Japanese even lost their self-confidence. Before the war many Japanese had been perhaps a little too self-assured and certainly too self-important, but now they became pathetically willing to believe the worst about themselves and to assume that others were always right. They often carried this attitude to ludicrous extremes, accepting the word of ill-informed Americans as if spoken by an oracle and even assuming that they themselves had failed to understand correctly when an American's statements became too obviously inaccurate or absurd. Of course, thousands of tough-minded military officers, bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders maintained their self-confidence and clung to their old ideas, responding to the new situation by subsiding into watchful silence, waiting for the day of resurgence, or else fighting guilefully to protect their individual interests by affable deference to the wishes of the occupation authorities and carefully concealed sabotage of their efforts, but to the vast majority of Japanese surrender brought with it a disastrous collapse of morale and a dangerous loss of bearings.

2. SAVING VIRTUES

At the same time, many of the best qualities of the Japanese also came to the fore and helped them to survive these years of shame and anguish with surprising dignity and even self-respect. They stoically accepted the catastrophes that had overtaken them, and displayed an amazing capacity for cold realism. Wasting little time or emotional energy on mourning what might have been, they quietly accepted the finality of defeat and resigned themselves to occupation as the expected and unavoidable result of surrender. History had dealt them a new and very different hand, and they concentrated their attention entirely upon it and its possibilities, without a glance back at the far more promising hand they had just lost.

The Japanese showed this laudable realism individually as well as collectively. They spent no time on useless and cor-

roding self-pity. They did not even permit themselves the luxury of blaming their woes on scapegoats. They had lost respect for Tojo and the government, for the police and the army, but they did not make them shoulder the whole blame. Most Japanese were ready to admit that they personally had believed all the jingoistic twaddle of prewar years and had enthusiastically supported the war. They were willing to accept their share of the blame for the disastrous war Japan had forced on the world. When, finally, almost three and a half years after the surrender, Tojo and his major colleagues received their sentences from the international tribunal judging them, the reaction of the Japanese man in the street was overwhelmingly one of pity, for had not they all shared the same delusions? Why should these few old men alone forfeit their lives or be imprisoned, while their younger compatriots went free?

This Japanese attitude contrasts significantly with the eagerness of most Germans after their defeat to place the blame on someone else, arguing that they personally were never in sympathy with Nazi ideas. Where the average German seems to have retained throughout Hitler's regime an uneasy feeling that Nazi doctrines might not be right and therefore apparently emerged from the war with a guilt complex which has made him both resentful and somewhat intractable, the ordinary Japanese believed naively and wholeheartedly in the propaganda he was fed but avoided any guilt complex after the war by frankly admitting his former folly. All that he had been taught in school, all that he had read in the newspapers, made it seem that Japan was right and the rest of the world unfair and deceitful. Under the circumstances, who could have believed otherwise? But now the situation had changed, and he had discovered how mistaken he had been before. Naturally he must change his attitude and admit his former errors, but there was no reason for shame or resentment. Instead he should do his best to profit from the new situation to discover all his past errors and correct them.

This attitude on the part of the Japanese is one of the reasons

for the unexpected coöperativeness they have shown the American occupation authorities—a coöperativeness so amazing, in fact, that many Americans have interpreted it as the result of a vast, diabolical scheme to trick us into complacency and then to outwit us when we were off guard. Naturally there are thousands of Japanese who think in these terms, and they are probably found in the greatest numbers among the old ruling groups, who have the most to lose from the changes surrender has brought Japan. Our occupation authorities from the start have had to be on guard against concealed opposition and subtle sabotage from these men. Still more have readily accepted our leadership with the cynical realization that the more coöperative they were the sooner the occupation would end. But it is absurd to think that the coöperative attitude of the vast masses of Japanese since the war has been the result of a carefully laid plot. Such a theory is a reversion to wartime concepts of the Japanese as supermen, for it would take supermen indeed to carry out such a complicated scheme, particularly in the face of the disruption of government and the collapse of morale which accompanied the surrender.

The sincerity of the attitude of most Japanese since the end of the war is clearly proved by the very differences in their points of view. While the ideas of most Japanese changed markedly after the war, the various types of Japanese reacted in ways which were entirely consistent with their own particular backgrounds, the professional and white-collar classes differently from businessmen, students differently from bureaucrats, and urban laborers differently from peasants. Most groups have been coöperative and basically friendly toward us, not mechanically in accordance with some formal plan, but spontaneously and genuinely.

As we have seen, there are many factors which may explain the coöperativeness of the Japanese since the surrender: their situational ethics, which permitted a sharp about-face; their respect for power and authority of any sort; the fact that they were fighting the war primarily out of a sense of duty and

not because of personal hatred or fear; the underlying friendship and admiration in Japan for the United States, despite recent years of mounting friction; the realism of the Japanese, which made them recognize that coöperation was the only practical course; and their admirable willingness to accept new knowledge and admit past errors. But, whatever the causes for this coöperativeness, there can be no denying that it has been the single most important factor in the history of the occupation, accounting in large part for the degree of success we have had in Japan and helping to explain why this is the first military occupation in history which has met with the expressed approval and appreciation of the vanquished.

Another Japanese virtue which has been much in evidence since the surrender and has strengthened their coöperative attitude has been their appreciation of favors, even when they came from former enemies, and their desire to repay these favors or at least to show themselves worthy of them. To most people the presence of hated enemy soldiers on their native soil would overshadow every other consideration, but the Japanese from the start showed no more personal animosity toward our G.I.'s than they would have shown toward a storm cloud, but instead they emphasized the good our soldiers did and even the evil that they avoided. Convinced that the victorious American troops would give themselves over to pillage and rape in the traditional manner of conquering armies, the Japanese were visibly relieved and openly appreciative of the discipline and good will our soldiers demonstrated, while the latter, half expecting at first to feel knives in their backs, were puzzled and then charmed by the essentially well-mannered and law-abiding Japanese. The result was a strange fraternization between American battle veterans, who often had a bitter hatred of the Japanese they had just been fighting, and Japanese civilians who had lost loved ones and all their possessions in American air raids.

As the fundamentally just and humanitarian objectives of the occupation became known, the Japanese man in the street be-

came increasingly grateful to his conqueror. He had steeled himself to accept cruelty and injustice. But the Americans were obviously trying to be fair and to work for what they considered the betterment of Japan. As the sorry story of the conduct of the Japanese soldiers at Nanking and Bataan and a hundred other places came to light, Japanese gratitude was strengthened by the humiliating contrast between the conduct of American and Japanese soldiers in victory. What is more, the Americans brought food and gave it to the Japanese, thousands of tons of American wheat, which for long years spelled the difference between short rations and outright starvation in all the cities of Japan. Overlooking the many irritations and indignities which were inevitable in any occupation, the Japanese attitude toward their conquerors became primarily one of gratefulness and admiration. Because of their strong sense of obligation for favors received, which is one of the most admirable and also the most unusual of Japanese traits, many Japanese came to feel that they must repay the United States in some way, if not by future monetary recompense, at least by striving to live up to American expectations. A relatively small investment in effort and goods—small as compared to what we have poured into the far less populous countries of Western Europe since the war—has paid off in Japan in a spectacular amount of good will.

Naturally some of this good will has been worn thin by the disappointments and frustrations of long years of foreign occupation and economic chaos. Many Japanese have come to resent the assignment year after year of between a quarter and a fifth of their national budget to defray the costs of the occupation; they have become increasingly disillusioned with many of our policies and restive under American controls; they resent the luxurious homes we have commandeered from them for our occupation officials or the snug new bungalows we have built at Japanese expense, while most Japanese continue to live in pitifully inadequate quarters; they resent the more than ample heating of occupation homes and offices, while they all live

and work without heat; they resent the comparative luxury of the Allied trains and a hundred other special privileges which the victors have naturally arrogated to themselves. But, despite all these irritations—irritations of a sort which have always bred bitter hatred for the conqueror in other defeated lands—the Japanese have remained essentially well disposed toward us and determined to coöperate as best they can and to repay us in some measure for the fundamental fairness and generosity of our conduct as conquerors.

The Japanese, despite their many adversities, have also succeeded in recovering their basic sense of optimism. Encouraged by the helping hand the occupation has proved to be, they have remained essentially cheerful and have slowly regained some of their confidence in themselves. They have displayed amazing energy in tackling the discouraging tasks of reconstruction. They have come again to believe that determination and will power will see them through. They cannot hide from themselves the blackness of Japan's future prospects—her tragically unsound economic position and her political isolation in a still hostile world—but their very determination injects the one ray of hope into the picture. If the Japanese do manage to regain a reasonable degree of prosperity and to make their country a stable and respected member of the family of nations, it will be primarily because there is something to their belief that will power is stronger than matter.

3. MAC ARTHUR AND HIS STAFF

The Japanese people may have largely determined the atmosphere of the occupation, but it has been the American authorities who have guided the course of postwar Japan. Although they numbered only a few thousand individuals, backed at first by a sizable army of occupation troops but later by no more than a token force of 100,000 men or less, they have dominated the scene, making themselves an indelible part of Japanese history in one of its most crucial phases. A

mere handful of men, they have vigorously and confidently undertaken the task of remaking a nation of eighty million people. The nineteen million Japanese school children and students alone roughly equal the total population of the United States zone of Germany. Except in sprawling India and China, nowhere else has so large a national group ever come under the rule of a single foreign conqueror. Never before has such a small group of men set out to work such fundamental changes in so large a mass of people. The undertaking has been gigantic. But the doughty members of the occupation approached their tasks with an enthusiasm and a firmness of purpose which made it seem almost easy.

The tone of the American occupation has been set by General MacArthur, who, by his firm domination of his own occupation personnel and the entire Japanese nation as well, has given the whole undertaking a strongly personal flavor. As conscious as the Japanese themselves of the tremendous drama of history, General MacArthur is the one great military figure of the recent conflict who has written his name on its pages in even larger letters in peace than he did in war. It will stand as one of the great names in Japanese history, surpassed by few in Japan's long annals and unrivaled by any since the stirring days of the Meiji period.

Few men who have found themselves in history's spotlight have better fitted the roles which destiny has given them than General MacArthur in his capacity as American proconsul in Japan and benevolent but absolute master of the fate of eighty million people. He has shown all the virtues which the Japanese admire. His strength of will rivals that of the strongest Japanese hero; his dignity and the firmness of his authority are all that they could hope for in their leaders; his austerity is only matched by his capacity for hard work; his insistence on strict obedience is paralleled by his own careful adherence to the orders which have governed his actions in Japan; even his insistence on unwavering personal loyalty on the part of his subordinates and his impatience with any form of criticism

are qualities which the Japanese, with their own feeling for personal loyalty, understand and admire.

More important, General MacArthur provided the Japanese with the leadership and also the hope they so desperately needed in their hour of confusion and despair. Just when all hierarchy seemed to be crumbling, all discipline and will power melting away, and the individual Japanese was being cast adrift in the meaningless chaos into which society was disintegrating, there appeared from the least expected quarter a leader who with justness and determination began to create a new and presumably better order and put new purpose into life for the average Japanese. When things seemed blackest, he spoke out in ringing terms, giving a new hope to the Japanese and dignifying their suffering by pointing to the great historical advances to which it might lead. His flair for the dramatic, his thundering phrases, his appreciation of the tremendous historical significance of his own acts, all had a strong emotional appeal for the Japanese. Here was a leader who combined emotional depth with firmness of will.

General MacArthur became to the Japanese the symbol of perfection, the inspired leader, the knight in shining armor, and they repaid him, foreign conqueror though he was, with unlimited respect and often enough with adulation. His quick daily trips by car between his home in the former American Embassy and his headquarters in the Daiichi Building across the moat from the Emperor's burned-out palace in Tokyo drew crowds of admiring Japanese. They showered petitions upon him. While making him the personification of the power of the United States and regarding him as the sole source of all occupation policy, they also looked up to him as the prophet of the future Japan and their own national hero.

This is no time to make a final estimate of General MacArthur's unique role in postwar history. As one of America's principal wartime leaders, he has remained a somewhat controversial figure, and wartime attitudes toward him have often influenced personal judgments of his record in Japan. Some

of his qualities are less admired by Americans than by Japanese. His insistence on personal loyalty and his intolerance of criticism have irritated American and Allied colleagues and subordinates far more than the Japanese. In the broad interpretations of his guiding instructions he has undoubtedly made some errors and shown certain blind spots. He has been subject to severe and sometimes justified attacks from various quarters, although the heavy cross fire from both right and left suggests that he has tended to remain not too far from the center of the road which he had been instructed to follow.

Certainly General MacArthur's role has not been so significant during the later years of the occupation as at first. As the Japanese, inspired by his strong stand, began to regain their self-confidence and to take hope in the prospect of a democratic Japan, they became less dependent upon him and his resounding phrases. This has been demonstrated by the gradual decline of popular interest in him in Japan. In time fewer Japanese than Americans gathered around the entrance of the Daiichi Building to watch him enter or leave. The respect remained, but the adulation was gone. It is even possible that some of the traits which had made General MacArthur a peerless leader in the first postwar years have become more of a hindrance than aid to the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. The development of responsible democratic leadership in Japan may well have been inhibited by General MacArthur's unchallenged authority and prestige, and his very greatness as a leader has perhaps helped to perpetuate Japanese habits of blind obedience to authority.

There can be no denying, however, that General MacArthur has been one of the great figures of the postwar world and may have accomplished more in Japan than any other man could have. Certainly none of the other leaders of occupation forces elsewhere in the world have accomplished proportionately as much, even in their more restricted tasks, and none of the men who were suggested at the end of the war as possible substitutes for General MacArthur had the combination of

personal traits which fitted him so ideally for the post. Thus, as a great military hero in his own land and a still greater peacetime hero in the land he helped to conquer, his place among the great names of history is doubly secure.

General MacArthur is, of course, not the only hero of the occupation. There are literally thousands of others among his headquarters staff, the Military Government teams in the prefectures, and even among the tactical troops who first entered Japan. The latter, battle veterans all, won the admiration of the Japanese for their honesty, discipline, and fairness. From the start there was only a negligible number of cases of violence or disorder to be attributed to the conquering army and virtually no instances of violence by natives against the American soldiers. The Japanese found moral lessons in the unself-conscious friendliness of the G.I.'s and in their insistence on fair play. When they would indignantly force men to get up on the streetcar and give their seats to baby-burdened mothers, they were as much missionaries of a new ethics as the more self-conscious American reformers in the occupation offices in Tokyo.

Unfortunately, the good work of the first occupation troops has not been continued by the teen-age postwar draftees who gradually replaced them. The adolescent antics of some of these soldiers disgusted the Japanese, just at a time when they were becoming more discerning and critical in their estimate of Americans. The Japanese commuting crowds were not edified by the drunken sickness of an unshaven boy or the lighthearted vandalism of his older associates. Every Japanese who had occasion to meet or see Allied soldiers came to have his own petty "atrocity" stories—a harmless old man knocked down by a drunken soldier, a ten-year-old boy robbed of his fishing pole, and occasional incidents of a more serious nature. Naturally, the great majority of Allied troops in Japan have remained well behaved, and the Japanese have shown great admiration for the polite efficiency and spit-and-polish showmanship of the Military Police, but as a group the troops in

Japan in recent years, by serving as a needless irritant to the Japanese public, have tended to undermine rather than strengthen the reform program of the United States.

General MacArthur's staff of experts in Tokyo and on the Military Government teams throughout Japan has turned in a performance which has been uniformly good and sometimes brilliant. Stimulated by the drama of the situation and driven by the desire to do a good job, the great majority of the members of the occupation have risen to the occasion, shouldering responsibilities far greater than they have ever known before and trying by sheer effort and enthusiasm to make up for their lack of knowledge and experience. There were among them many who from prewar experience or because of wartime training had some knowledge of Japan and her problems and others who, though uninformed on Japan, were men of the highest caliber and of wide experience in government, business, or the professions in the United States. The occupation forces were also well supplied with Nisei and other American interpreters especially trained during the war for combat and occupation duties. But all in all the story of the occupation has been that of the schoolteacher who found himself in charge of the educational system of an entire nation, the bank teller who became the economic czar of a prefecture with several million inhabitants, or the small-town doctor who was suddenly faced with the problem of controlling epidemics and improving health standards in one of the world's largest cities. Normally the entire human resources of a nation must be culled to find leadership capable of handling that nation's problems. That reasonably adequate leadership for a war-torn Japan could be improvised from the limited human resources available to General MacArthur is a tribute to the versatility and good judgment of the average American. A group which for the most part could never hope to achieve positions of comparable responsibility at home, the occupation authorities have acquitted themselves well in a vastly complicated and difficult undertaking.

The chief reason for their success has been their own attitude. Most have shown sincere enthusiasm for the great experiment upon which they are embarked. They are as devoted a band of "revolutionaries" as the world has ever seen, even though the "revolution" they are leading is for the immediate benefit of another people. Most of them are entirely convinced that the particular reform or reorganization they themselves are concerned with—industrial deconcentration, land redistribution, local self-government, textbook revision, or whatever else it may be—is vital to the success of the whole experiment. Their enthusiasm and fundamental optimism have carried them over many formidable obstacles. Their essential good will has won the respect and willing coöperation of their Japanese colleagues, even though the latter have come to feel that the Americans sometimes insist on making absurd and costly errors. Their enthusiasm for their work often grew into a sympathetic interest in the Japanese and certain aspects of their culture—their drama, art, or history. It is hard to imagine a conquering army that could have undertaken the physical and spiritual rehabilitation of the erstwhile enemy with greater good will and deeper sincerity. The American authorities in Japan deserve the respect and gratitude both of the Japanese and of their compatriots for a job well done.

4. THE PROBLEMS OF THE OCCUPATION

A series of problems, however, has plagued the occupation and inevitably impaired its effectiveness. One has been the very complexity of the undertaking. The *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* made it amply clear that General MacArthur was to "exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies" and was not to attempt to set up a military government for the whole of Japan. The policy was "to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it." Although this decision has often been criticized as enabling the old Japanese governing groups to retain

enough power to nullify in the long run our reform program, no other decision was possible. Even with the aid of all our allies it would have been quite impossible to bring to Japan enough men with the requisite technical skills and linguistic competence to govern the eighty million people of Japan at both the national and local levels. Any such attempt would have quickly ended in chaos. Our only choice was to utilize the Japanese machinery of government, reserving for ourselves the much more restricted task of policy direction.

But even this was a huge job. General MacArthur's headquarters staff in Tokyo gradually grew into a tremendous organization. There were the four G's, the General Staff sections, some of which, such as G–2, the intelligence section, were necessarily huge organizations in themselves. Then there were the various technical staff sections, eventually some eighteen in number, some of which, such as the Economic and Scientific Section, the Civil Information and Education Section, the Natural Resources Section, and the Government Section, were during most of the period large and well-staffed groups. Policy decisions emanating from the staff sections were transmitted by way of the Eighth Army, with its headquarters at Yokohama, to the First Corps at Kyoto and the Ninth Corps at Sendai and thence to the Military Government teams, which were the eyes, ears, and also the multifold mouths of the occupation in the forty-six prefectures which constitute postwar Japan.

Liaison with the Japanese authorities grew up at every level, the Emperor occasionally calling on General MacArthur, Cabinet Ministers seeking out Section chiefs, and the rural school principal seeking advice from the lonely education officer on the prefectural Military Government team. There was ample room for confusion when a few thousand men, all comparatively new at their jobs, sought to guide the activities of a bureaucracy more than a hundred times their number and through it a nation of eighty million people, all demoralized by defeat and confused by the rapid changes which were

sweeping over them. Our representatives in the prefectures were often embarrassed by local Japanese officials, who had been informed by their colleagues of American policy decisions in Tokyo long before word was transmitted through our circuitous military channels to the interested officers on the Military Government teams. At all levels there was ample reason for feelings of frustration, as the red tape of two parallel bureaucracies became snarled. Frequently, uncoöperative and recalcitrant Japanese officials "dragged their feet," and more frequently the frightened confusion of demoralized Japanese bureaucrats proved even more troublesome than concealed opposition. Dependent on the Japanese for so much of their information and for the final execution of their policies, many American officials felt themselves sinking into a quagmire of Japanese misunderstanding, inefficiency, and even sabotage.

Another major problem has been the difficulty of procuring and retaining adequate personnel for all the highly technical and difficult jobs the occupation entails. The first occupation authorities were the military and naval officers already in General MacArthur's command, but in time, as living conditions in Japan gradually improved and the strictly military phase of the occupation receded into the background, a large proportion of the technical jobs were handed over to civilians. Many of these were the same men, their costumes changed from khaki to mufti, who had held these posts before, but a whole stream of new civilian recruits, both men and women, also started to come from the United States. The occupation began to take on a strongly civilian flavor, with offices filled with girl typists and shirt-sleeved bureaucrats, even though all heads of Military Government teams and most Tokyo Section chiefs remained in uniform. But, whether the staff was primarily military or civilian, General MacArthur has had difficulty in retaining the services of many of his best men, with the result that the occupation has seen a slow but steady decline in the quality of its personnel.

This situation has perhaps been inevitable. The outright

civilians and the civilians in uniform have tended to grow restive after a year or so and to return to the United States. In fact, the more important the man's normal position was at home or the more ambitious he was to get ahead in his own chosen field, the more likely he was to resign and return to the United States, for, however glorified his post might be in Japan, the occupation was professionally a blind alley, a self-liquidating venture which eventually would leave its members stranded. Moreover, there was the feeling that General MacArthur, with his strong sense of personal loyalty, relied most heavily on his older associates, the so-called "Bataan boys," who included some of the ablest but also some of the most controversial figures in the occupation. Many civilians and non-professional officers also became dissatisfied with the military restrictions and discipline of the occupation and preferred to return home to freer though almost invariably less important and less interesting jobs.

Nothing has been able to stop the heavy turnover of occupation personnel or its slow deterioration in quality. As housing became available, the higher civilian officials and all officers and certain noncommissioned officers were allowed to bring their families out to Japan—their "dependents" as the Army calls them. Civil service ratings commonly a full rank above what they could expect to receive in Washington, bolstered for several years by overseas differential pay, gave many of them relatively high incomes, which were further aided by reasonable housing costs, commissary privileges, and extremely cheap domestic service by so-called "indigenous personnel," in other words the Japanese. But still there was a constant drift of good men away from Japan. Of course, many of the best of the occupation officials have stuck by their fascinating jobs, and new recruits have always brought a fresh outburst of enthusiasm and often new talents. Special commissions of carefully selected experts have also been sent out in large numbers to Japan and have attempted to make up by their virtuosity for the shortness of their sojourn in the country. But the prob-

lem of adequate personnel has remained throughout a growing difficulty for the occupation.

The most subtle but perhaps the most persistent problem of the occupation has been the inevitably corrupting influence of any occupation on its members. Living under conditions of great luxury by postwar Japanese standards, they inescapably constitute a class set apart—a superior breed of conquerors. They enjoy the use of the Japanese telephone network without charge. All the best hotels, the best private homes, the best trains, the best facilities of every sort are theirs by right of conquest. Everywhere signs tell the Japanese not to do this "by order of the Allied Army," to keep away from that section of the station platform, to keep off the best cars, not to ride on the best elevators, even to stay out of certain public toilets. To parallel his greatly augmented prestige, the average American in Japan enjoys vastly more power than he has ever had before and most likely will ever have again. He is always right, and the Japanese officials always wrong. He gives orders to officials whose American counterparts would probably not deign to grant him an interview. The sudden access of power and prestige is enough to sweep an even moderately well-balanced man off his feet.

That the corruption of conquest has not eaten more deeply into the occupation forces is a tribute to the balance and honesty of most of its members. Some high-ranking officers have been accused of accepting favors from prominent Japanese which amounted virtually to bribes. Some Nisei members of the occupation, whom the Japanese tend to resent more than their Caucasian compatriots, have been accused of taking advantage of their position as interpreters to extort money from the Japanese and to enter the black market. Black market activities for a while after the surrender were common among all ranks of the occupying forces. Many children of American officials and some of the less mentally mature adults have developed habits of overbearing arrogance toward the defenseless Japanese. Mild cases of an "infallibility complex" are a

common disease in many American offices in Tokyo. But, by and large, the American officials in Japan have been saved by their enthusiasm for their work from the most damaging effects of the corrupting influence of power and privilege.

Thus, the occupation has had its difficulties but has not been submerged by them. The eventual outcome is still too uncertain to permit any sure judgments of the occupation, but, whatever the final result, one can say that the Americans in Japan for the most part seem to have been particularly well adapted to their task. We Americans have the self-confidence such a job demands without being excessively arrogant. We are full of enthusiasm and ready to work hard. While inflexibly set in our own ways, often to the point of provincialism, we tend to be tolerant and friendly toward others. We have a broad humanitarian streak and a sense of fair play. And, perhaps most important, we tend to be genial and generous winners, if not always good losers.

The truly surprising success of the American occupation of Japan to date might be partially explained in terms of the particular qualifications of the Americans and Japanese for their respective roles. The concept is at best vague and hardly susceptible of proof, but an imaginary substitution of roles will help to indicate its validity. The Japanese, who have shown some extraordinary virtues in defeat, demonstrated all too clearly in China and the Philippines how overbearing, unsympathetic, and cruel they would have been in victory. We Americans, who have played our part as victors with surprising altruism and good will, would scarcely have made tractable or coöperative losers.

11. Retribution and Reform

1. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE EMPIRE

As we have seen, the American program for drawing Japan's fangs and rehabilitating her as a peaceful member of the society of nations falls into three general areas: demilitarization, democratization, and the maintenance of a reasonable degree of economic well-being. The first of these major aims, being largely negative, has been the simplest to accomplish. It has entailed not only the destruction of the Japanese army and navy and the reduction of Japan's war-making potential by the elimination of all industrial power not considered absolutely essential to the peacetime economy of Japan but also the geographic limitation of Japan to the home islands.

This last objective, which has been motivated not only by the wish to reduce Japan's war-making potential but still more by the desire to rectify old wrongs, was actually the first of the Allied aims to be clearly formulated. On December 1, 1943, at the close of the Cairo Conference, the United States, China, and Great Britain issued a statement describing their war aims as being "to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan" and amplifying this purely negative pronouncement by listing the areas which Japan would be forced to disgorge—the Pacific Islands, which she, as one of the Allies, had taken from Germany after the First World War; Korea, which was "in due course" to become "free and independent"; and Manchuria, Formosa, and the near-by Pescadores Islands, which she had taken from China.

The Potsdam Proclamation, which the same three powers issued on July 26, 1945, and which was subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union, referred to the Cairo statement and specified the limitation of postwar Japan "to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." Thus, the paring down of the Japanese Empire became one of the conditions enumerated in the Potsdam Proclamation for the "unconditional surrender" of Japan.

It might be said in passing that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" had been repeatedly enunciated by President Roosevelt and other American leaders, who remembered the unfortunate effects of the belief in Germany after the First World War that Germany had not really been defeated by the Allies. But the phrase "unconditional surrender" unquestionably helped to keep alive the Japanese determination to fight to the bitter end. In the Potsdam Proclamation, without admitting what we were doing, we wisely abandoned this unsound doctrine, allowing it to shrink to the phrase, "the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces," and appealed to Japan to "follow the path of reason." Not only did we enumerate our conditions for surrender, but we also made definite promises–promises that "the Japanese military forces . . . shall be permitted to return to their homes," that "we do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation," that "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy," and that "the occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government." When the Japanese, addressing us through the Swiss, quibbled on one of the terms, we obligingly clarified its meaning. None of the terms was any more or less than what we considered just and wise, but, by disregarding the unfortunate phrase "unconditional surrender" and by clearly

stating our conditions, we helped to ensure the early surrender of Japan, with all that meant in terms of American and Japanese lives saved and the avoidance of further costly destruction.

The *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* did not further elaborate the future geographic limits of Japan, and the Far Eastern Commission has been expressly denied the right to discuss territorial adjustments. Thus, the future boundaries of Japan will probably not be defined until a peace treaty is signed. The general nature of these territorial adjustments, however, has been clear ever since the surrender, and Japan's overseas possessions for all practical purposes have already been shorn from her.

Korea has achieved her independence of Japan, but a divided Korea, with rival regimes set up by the Soviet and American armies of occupation before their formal withdrawal, is not yet a truly "free and independent" nation. China has already taken over Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands, though Soviet rights in Manchuria, including the lease of Port Arthur at its southern extremity, seriously impair Chinese sovereignty in this area, and the maladministration and exploitation of Formosa by mainland Chinese after the war has sometimes made this island appear to be more like a foreign colony won by conquest than a province returned to the motherland. Although Japan has sound legal claims to her former Pacific Mandates—the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas—and also to the Bonin Islands which have been hers undisputedly since 1875, these various islands will unquestionably remain in the hands of the United States as Trusteeship territories of one sort or another.

The case of the Ryukyu Islands, stretching between Kyushu and Formosa, is not as clear cut. They are inhabited by more than half a million people, who cannot be treated with the same cavalier disregard for their own interests or aspirations as the tiny populations of the minuscule islands of the North Pacific. However, the Ryukyuans are too few and too weak to form an independent nation, and the poverty of the islands

makes it improbable that they can be fully self-supporting in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the location of the islands, screening as they do so much of the Chinese coast, means that strategic considerations cannot be overlooked.

Since independence is probably not feasible, there are only two reasonable solutions for the problem. One is to make the Ryukyu Islands an integral part of some larger neighboring state. That country, however, could only be Japan, for the Ryukyuans are closely related to the Japanese, linguistically and culturally, and the inhabitants of the northern islands of the chain are almost indistinguishable from the Japanese. Although their kings for centuries paid tribute to China, the Ryukyuans are in no sense Chinese, and annexation to China could hardly be squared with the principle of self-determination. Moreover, the Ryukyu Islands have been politically tied to Japan for a long time. The southern Kyushu fief of Satsuma exercised control over them from the early years of the seventeenth century until they were made an integral part of Japan early in the Meiji period. On the other hand, the Ryukyuans have felt themselves to be discriminated against by the Japanese as second-class citizens, exploited at home by Japanese administrators and treated as social and economic inferiors when they migrated to Japan proper. Many feel resentment toward Japan, and more than 167,000 Ryukyuans residing in Japan proper at the end of the war chose "repatriation" when the opportunity was afforded by the occupation authorities.

The only other reasonable solution besides return to Japan would be for the Ryukyu Islands to become a trusteeship territory, presumably of the United States. The American Navy has maintained a base in Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyus, ever since the closing months of the war, and the area has been administered directly by United States authorities ever since, as if it had already been taken from Japan. An American trusteeship in the Ryukyus would have certain strategic advantages for the United States. It would also have the disadvantages of making a large body of unassimilable aliens economic and politi-

cal wards of the United States and of relegating the Ryukyuans indefinitely to the status of a colonial people. Reunited to Japan, they would have more chance of achieving self-respecting social and political equality than they would as dependents of the United States. It would seem desirable, therefore, to keep any Ryukyu trusteeship as small as possible and to return the other islands, and particularly the northern ones, to Japan.

There is little question about the remaining islands around the four main islands of Japan. Despite Korean claims, there is no doubt that Tsushima, between Kyushu and Korea, has been exclusively Japanese since earliest times. The same is true of the other islands lying off the coast of Honshu and Kyushu and the Seven Islands of Izu stretching out into the Pacific south of Tokyo Bay. To take any of these from Japan could hardly be justified on moral or practical grounds. That they will be included in postwar Japan, as they have been administratively in occupation Japan, is a foregone conclusion.

It is equally certain that the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin will pass to the Soviet Union, because that was agreed upon at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The Russians have a moral claim to Southern Sakhalin, for Japan took it from the Czars as one of the spoils of war in 1905. The only justification the Russians have for taking the Kuriles is the strategic one that they screen a large part of the Siberian coast. Otherwise, Japanese rights to the Kuriles are incontestable. In an amicable agreement in 1875 the Russians relinquished all claims to the Kuriles in return for Japanese relinquishment of claims to Sakhalin. But at Yalta, President Roosevelt, in return for a promise on the part of the Russians to enter the war against Japan "two or three months after Germany has surrendered," agreed to give the Soviet Union both Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles together with the various rights in Manchuria which Japan had won from the Russians in 1905 and which Russia had previously extorted from the Chinese.

Soviet claims to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles may be as valid as our own to the Pacific Mandates and the Ryukyus,

but the wisdom of the Yalta bargain is another matter. Even in February of 1945 it was beginning to become clear that Japan could be defeated without Soviet aid, and, as events worked out, the Soviet entrance into the war on August 8, like the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, was only a minor incident, perhaps hastening the Japanese surrender by a few days but not determining it. The Japanese leaders in the late spring of 1945 had come to realize that defeat was inevitable and the extermination of a large part of the Japanese people all too probable if the war were continued until American troops had invaded and conquered the home islands of Japan. Japanese soldiers and civilians would soon be reduced to fighting American tanks and planes with antiquated rifles and swords, and famine was sure to kill many more than bullets. After desperate soul-searching and frantic intrigues, the Japanese government naively decided to seek peace through Soviet mediation, but the Russian authorities, backed by the highly advantageous agreement they had signed with the United States and Great Britain at Yalta, were the last people in the world to desire the war to end before they had a chance to enter it. Thus the summer of 1945 witnessed one of the strangest races in history, a race between the Japanese trying to get out of the war and the Russians trying to get in, but, since only the Russians fully realized that a race was on, they of course won.

As it worked out, the Yalta agreement was a bad bargain on our part, but we should not judge President Roosevelt and his advisors too harshly. Certainly there was no assurance in February 1945 that the Japanese would ever surrender, and up to the very end many American leaders retained their doubts as to whether the Japanese forces overseas would respect a surrender made by the Tokyo authorities. Our representatives made the Yalta agreement with the hope of saving American lives which might otherwise be expended in rooting out bitter-end resistance in Manchuria, Korea, and North China. The bargain proved to be based on inaccurate premises, but these

premises seemed reasonable enough when it was made. In any case, the Yalta agreement, backed by the cold fact of Soviet occupation and *de facto* annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, stands as one of the great blows of the axe which have shorn off Japan's overseas possessions. Once stretching a sixth of the way around the globe from northern Manchuria to the eastern extremities of the Marshalls, the Japanese Empire has been reduced to a thin sliver, scarcely one eighth of its former width and less than half its former length.

Drastic reduction of the geographic spread of Japan has been accompanied by the forced return of virtually all Japanese abroad to their homeland. In part this was a humanitarian move, promised in the Potsdam Proclamation, in order to permit Japanese soldiers to return to their families, but an equally important reason was the desire to root out all Japanese influences in neighboring countries, so that Japan could not easily reëstablish political or even economic control over parts of her former empire or lands she had conquered during the war. With great thoroughness and efficiency, the Japanese were rounded up, packed aboard ships, and poured back into Japan in a swelling stream. By the end of 1947, almost six million Japanese had been returned home. Destitute, confused, and usually jobless, they further taxed Japan's collapsing economy and proved to be a disrupting force in Japanese society, but the tremendous transfer of people, probably unmatched in the whole history of maritime transportation, was accomplished with brilliant technical success, and the major aim was achieved. The Far East was for the most part swept bare of all Japanese.

In some respects, however, the program had its flaws. For one thing, the concept of immediate compulsory repatriation was applied somewhat too ruthlessly to all Japanese, regardless of humanitarian considerations and the long-range interests of the countries in which they resided. Civilians and their families who had been legitimate, permanent residents in overseas areas for decades and sometimes for their whole lives were deported on essentially the same terms as soldiers and camp followers.

Limited to an inconsequential amount of currency and what personal effects they could themselves carry, they lost virtually all their possessions as well as their means of livelihood and were dumped back into the chaos of postwar Japan to start life entirely anew. Many of these Japanese were technicians essential to the successful operation of industrial plants in Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, and even China proper, and their sudden enforced departure often resulted in the deterioration and sometimes the disintegration of the factories they had served. Only in rare cases did Chinese authorities succeed in persuading the United States to spare certain key Japanese technicians temporarily from the grim efficiency of our repatriation efforts. Although the vast majority of the Japanese unquestionably should have been repatriated and desired repatriation on almost any terms, a less sweeping and more individualized policy for civilian repatriation, while adding greatly to administrative difficulties, would probably have been worth while, not only as a means of strengthening the concept of individual human rights but also because of the crucial aid to the Korean and Chinese economies which some Japanese technicians could have rendered if they had been retained temporarily to work in behalf of the peoples Japan had so long exploited.

Another flaw in the repatriation program has been the failure of the Russians to return many of the Japanese they captured. At the end of 1947, it was estimated that some 767,000 Japanese were still to be repatriated, and that more than 99 per cent of these were in Soviet hands. The trifling remainder, who may never be repatriated, consist primarily of small groups of Japanese soldiers who had been detained by their captors on the continent to fight in the civil wars in China and Indo-China. An intermittent flow of Japanese repatriates from Soviet areas has cut these over-all estimates, but in early 1950 the Japanese claimed that 376,000 men were still to be repatriated, while the Soviet authorities declared that repatriation was ended. The discrepancy between these figures can be variously attributed to the unreliability of Japanese statistics, to Soviet duplicity, or

to a frightful death toll in Soviet prison camps. In any case, the supposed unwillingness to return some Japanese prisoners and their tardiness in returning others have served to create deep resentment on the part of the Japanese against the Russians, which was not lessened by the discovery that Japanese repatriated in 1949 were to a large extent a selected group of indoctrinated Communist sympathizers determined to make trouble for both the Japanese and occupation authorities as soon as they had disembarked in Japan.

2. THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE HOME ISLANDS

The cutting off of Japan's overseas possessions and the repatriation of all Japanese abroad greatly reduced her military potential through a few bold surgical strokes, but the main power of Japanese military expansion has always been generated within the home islands of Japan proper. Reducing this power without killing the patient called for more delicate handling. But one operation was simple enough. This was the destruction of the existing army and navy. Arsenals and factories engaged in producing military weapons were all closed at once by the occupation. Naval bases were destroyed, and Kure near Hiroshima, where the world's two largest battleships were built, was turned into a junk heap of monumental proportions. Over two million officers and men in Japan were demobilized in the opening months of the occupation, after which, in December 1945, the Army and Navy Ministries were transformed into the First and Second Demobilization Ministries. By the following June even these last vestiges of the central organs of the Japanese army and navy were abolished. The repatriation and return to civilian life of more than three million members of the armed services still overseas had, of course, not yet been completed, but they have been handled in recent years entirely by civilian authorities. Obviously the attitudes and aspirations of a large proportion of former army

and navy officers and many of the enlisted men have not been altered by defeat and demobilization. Rumors are rife of minor military units which in rural areas have secretly maintained their entity after demobilization. Formally, however, and to all outward appearances the Japanese army and navy have disappeared, leaving no other trace than the fragments of military uniforms which still are an important part of the costumes of many Japanese.

The Potsdam Proclamation did not envisage simply demilitarization of a formal nature but expressly stated, "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest." On the basis of this broader concept a thoroughgoing purge of Japanese leadership was carried out.

The most spectacular aspect of this program has been the war crimes trials and sentences. The trial and punishment of many hundreds of atrocity culprits hardly come under this category, for they have been undertaken by the Allied authorities and accepted by the Japanese public as routine criminal procedures, but the trial in Tokyo of a select group of Japanese leaders, headed by Tojo himself, was specifically undertaken to prove that these men were personally responsible for Japan's aggressive wars and subject, therefore, to individual punishments for this crime against humanity. Whether the ponderously slow but impressively staged Tokyo trials established these legal points is a matter for future students of international law to decide. The Japanese public obviously was not convinced. When finally in December 1948 punishment was meted out to the twenty-five defendants, and seven were hanged, and all but two of the others were consigned to life imprisonment, the Japanese were glad that the unhappy matter was finished in time to leave the slate for the new year unsullied, but they seemed to feel only pity for the twenty-five old men and especially for a civilian like former Premier Hirota, who was hanged by the victorious powers as an arch-

conspirator but who seemed to many Japanese to have played a compromising role such as many other Japanese bureaucrats might have played in his place. With a realistic appraisal of Japanese politics in the years before the war, the Japanese realized how impossible it was to decide which twenty-five or even which twenty-five hundred men were primarily responsible for the war, and many of them felt that, but for their own obscurity, they might be in Hirota's shoes.

A far more important aspect of the program than the trials was the broad purge directive issued by the occupation authorities in January 1946. Lacking any clear label, such as membership in the Nazi party had been in Germany, to aid in the task of separating the sheep from the goats, the authorities were forced to couch the directive in rather vague but sweeping terms. It called for the dissolution of all organizations which advocated militaristic or imperialistic ideas and the dismissal from public office of any individual "who has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression" as well as large groups who were assumed to hold such views because of the positions they had occupied. Such catch-all categories, which accounted for the vast majority of the Japanese purged, included all persons who had ever been commissioned officers in the regular army or navy, all those who had held important posts in the nationalistic political associations founded after the start of the war with China, and all who had held important offices in occupied territories or in development organizations connected with their exploitation. Under these provisions some 1300 organizations were dissolved and almost 200,000 persons barred from public office. A year later the purge was extended down to the local government level and to the influential officers in 246 major Japanese companies, since it was to be assumed that "any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in industry, finance, commerce and agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression." Purged business leaders were of course debarred

from private business posts as well as from government office. A purge of teachers in all the schools of Japan was also undertaken, but few were actually dismissed as a result of the screening process, although a large percentage of the Japanese teachers, either frightened by the prospects of the purge or else discouraged by the economic plight of teachers, left the profession before screening procedures were carried out.

Naturally the attempt to eliminate Japan's former militaristic and imperialistic leadership has not been entirely successful nor has it avoided serious injustices. Our sweeping purge measures have unquestionably caught a large number of the less desirable Japanese leaders, but they have as clearly missed a still larger group who, while of like mind with the fallen leaders, stood a rung or two below the purge levels and thus were spared. These men at times secretly seek the advice of the purged political and business leaders, thus permitting the latter to maintain informal but sometimes effective control of the offices or business empires they once directed. Perhaps it would have been well to extend the purge further down into the political and business bureaucracies in an effort to weed out the younger men who, though less known, were essentially no better than their purged elders.

On the other hand, our purge measures have also caught many who were no more and perhaps no less advocates of militarism and imperialism than practically any other Japanese at the time and a few men who, while occupying posts of prominence because of patriotism or personal ambition, were not in basic sympathy with Japan's aggressive course. Appeal procedures have been difficult and were useless for those purged on account of the posts they had held, regardless of what their personal views might have been. We certainly have not strengthened the concept of individual human rights in Japan by sweeping purges by category which paid no attention to individual differences within these groups. We perhaps should have avoided that type of purge or at least instituted adequate appeal mechanisms from the start, so that all those

who had been purged could individually seek to clear their names on the basis of their personal acts and statements. The purge has done much to break the power of Japan's former leaders, but the injustices it has worked on individuals need to be righted if positive support is to be given to the concept of individual democratic rights.

Another obvious approach to the broader problem of demilitarization has been through the reduction of the economic base for Japanese military power. Of course, the Japanese economy could not be reduced too much without undermining our efforts at democratic reform in Japan. Moreover, Japan's loss of all her overseas possessions had seriously impaired her industrial as well as her strategic position. Our policy-makers, however, felt that the Japanese home islands still had many industrial plants which served to increase Japan's military potential and at the same time were not absolutely essential to her peacetime economy. An ambitious program of industrial limitation was, therefore, undertaken. We eliminated Japan's whole aircraft industry as well as such industries as synthetic oil and synthetic rubber, which were justified only by wartime conditions. We stopped atomic research and banned certain small industries, such as the production of bearings, which are important for military as well as civilian uses. We went still further by putting drastic limits on major industries, such as steel, chemicals, and machine tools, which, while necessary for a peacetime economy, had in the past been devoted in large part to direct military purposes. In setting levels for Japanese industry, we chose as a yardstick the per capita civilian consumption during the years 1930–1934, when Japanese industry was still suffering from the depression and the great shift to heavy industry had not yet taken place, and we made plans to reduce to these levels all industrial facilities of any great military significance.

This theoretically sound approach to the problem of Japan's future military and economic potential has determined the American attitude toward the more controversial problem of

reparations, which is so closely related to it. It was realized that the tremendous costs of modern war and the desperate economic plight of a bomb-battered and pared-down Japan made it entirely unrealistic to hope for enough reparations from Japan to meet any appreciable portion of Allied war costs or even to compensate for any significant part of the direct war damages suffered by Allied nations. Obviously it was more sensible to let measures designed to prevent a repetition of the war take precedence over entirely useless attempts to make Japan pay for the one just concluded. Thus, reparations proposals have been formulated not so much in terms of what the Allied nations might wish to get from Japan as in terms of what should be taken away from Japan as part of the demilitarization program. Specifically, the problem has been to determine which industrial plants should be removed and then to decide upon a basis for dividing these between the victor nations.

Few actual transfers of equipment, however, have resulted from these proposals. The plants to be removed from Japan were primarily in the field of heavy industry and, therefore, for the most part could be transported from Japan and installed abroad only at prohibitive costs. Furthermore, the countries which were most eager to receive these plants were ill prepared to set them up and operate them successfully, especially under the conditions of economic and political disruption which have prevailed in most countries of the Far East since the end of the war. Worst of all, no agreement could be reached among the Allied powers as to a fair division of Japanese reparations payments, the chief bone of contention having been whether the Soviet Union had already taken most of her share when at the end of the war she removed huge quantities of industrial equipment from Manchuria at China's expense under the guise of "war booty." In 1946 the Far Eastern Commission did agree upon an interim removals program, under which some 1100 plants were at one time marked for reparations, and the United States unilaterally authorized the

removal of up to 30 per cent of the facilities set aside for this purpose, half to go to China and the remainder to the Philippines and the British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. The United States, however, announced on May 12, 1949, that she would make no further reparations removals of this sort, and consequently the whole reparations program came to a virtual end at that time.

The change in the American attitude toward reparations removals of industrial facilities resulted from a reappraisal of the situation. For one thing, the major military powers since the end of the war had been busily producing new weapons which made Japan's wartime armaments seem puny by comparison. It was realized that Japan, unlike Germany, does not have the natural resources to permit her ever again to become an independent military power of major proportions. Experience had also shown that the value of the transfer of old and sometimes obsolescent Japanese industrial facilities to other Far Eastern nations was negligible. Moreover, it had become clear since the end of the war that the problem in Japan was rather whether she could live at all than whether she could wage aggressive war again. Her industrial plant had deteriorated so greatly and her economic plight had become so desperate that few factories, except those devoted specifically to munitions, could be considered to be in excess of her barest needs. Attaining even the production levels of the depression years of 1930–1934 now seemed difficult enough and achieving adequate living standards for Japan's eighty million people well nigh impossible. Naturally there is no thought of permitting Japan to reëstablish strictly military industries, but the emphasis has inevitably swung from the elimination of other supposedly excess factory power to an attempt to stimulate Japanese industrial production to levels which will afford a minimum subsistence for the Japanese people.

Although thought has at various times been given to exacting reparations from current industrial production in Japan, this course has never been adopted. One reason has been the

fear that this would recreate Japanese economic hegemony over the rest of the Far East by encouraging Japan's neighbors to depend too much upon her for their manufactured goods. Another reason has been the inability of the Japanese economy since the war to pay even for necessary food imports to Japan, much less for a reparations program over and above such import needs. There has been no justification for a reparations program from current production so long as the cost eventually would be borne by the American tax payer—and that certainly has been the situation in Japan ever since the surrender. If Japan's neighbors need the sort of help they could get from Japanese reparations payments from current production, it would be better to finance such aid directly from the United States rather than indirectly from us through Japanese reparations.

Although reparations payments from Japan herself have amounted to little, some of the nations she despoiled have received rich Japanese assets nonetheless. It was agreed, of course, that looted property should be returned to the nation from which it was taken, but, far more important, all Japanese assets located in Allied countries or liberated areas have become the property of the country in which they are found. Thus, the Koreans and Chinese have received vast capital investments built up over the decades by the Japanese government and private investors in Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, and China proper. The Soviet Union also acquired rich repayment for her brief war effort in the form of Japanese assets in Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles as well as the industrial "war booty" she removed from Manchuria. The distribution of Japanese assets abroad is a *fait accompli* and will undoubtedly constitute the only significant aspect of Japanese reparations payments.

As we have seen, much has been done to demilitarize Japan permanently, but this may mean little in the long run unless the Japanese abandon their militaristic penchant of prewar days. The problem is basically one of reëducation and is there-

fore closely associated with our whole long-range reform program. One very specific step, however, has been taken which may have considerable bearing on future Japanese attitudes toward war. This is the renunciation "forever" of war and "the right of belligerency" and the corollary promise never to maintain "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential," which have been made Article Nine of the new Japanese Constitution.

Naturally much skeptical comment has been directed at this portion of the Constitution. Many factors over which the Japanese have no control will unquestionably be far more decisive than this idealistic statement in determining whether or not Japan will ever again resort to war or maintain military forces. At this stage in history, renunciation of war "forever" is clearly nothing more than a pious hope. At the same time the inclusion of this article in the Constitution may have an important influence in shaping future Japanese attitudes. The Japanese, anxious for admiration, have found a new and wholly laudable way of distinguishing themselves. If permanent peace should be achieved, then Japan will be in the forefront of the nations as the first to renounce war unequivocally. If not, then this will probably not be the only part of the new Constitution which will undergo drastic revision. There is, of course, a certain amount of sheer histrionics in the Japanese renunciation of war, both on the part of the occupation authorities who supported it and the Japanese themselves, but it is perhaps justified histrionics. It has caught the Japanese imagination. The loser in war has become the leader in peace. If the militaristic Japanese should become a truly pacifistic people, perhaps this impractical ideal may be in no small measure responsible for the transformation.

But, regardless of Japan's formal renunciation of war, there is no question that she is now and will continue for some time to be a defenseless nation. She has no army or navy. She no longer makes armaments or airplanes of any sort. Her economy is too disrupted to be able to restore her former war ma-

chine rapidly. Even the police force has been so divided and reduced in power and prestige as to be incapable of coping with serious domestic disturbances, much less foreign invasion. Her disciplined people, of course, remain a potential reservoir of first-class fighting men, and her industrial skills, under favorable economic conditions, could in time be converted again into military power, but for the immediate future Japan must depend for safety entirely upon international agreement or, lacking that, on foreign troops or military guarantees.

3. POLITICAL REFORMS

The democratization of Japan is as slow and amorphous a process as demilitarization has been rapid and clear-cut. Laws can be changed with ease and political institutions modified, but such acts cannot make the Japanese people democratic. They merely set up the rules whereby they can conduct their affairs in a democratic way, if and when they develop democratic attitudes and acquire democratic habits. The latter will require not years but decades. The occupation has been a crucial period in which we have attempted through careful legal revision, education, and even sweeping social revolution to tip the scales in favor of democracy in Japan. The real test, however, can only come over the decades, when the Japanese see whether or not they can or wish to run their own affairs, in good times and in bad, according to basically democratic procedures.

The first task for the occupation authorities was to revise the formal Japanese political and legal structure, modifying or eliminating every law and institution that stood in the way of democratic development and making new rules which would foster democratic habits. Much of the demilitarization program was also an integral part of the attempt to democratize Japan. When we destroyed the army and navy, we at the same time were eliminating powerful institutions which not only had stood in the way of the development of democratic attitudes

but had also played a large role in prewar Japan in undermining parliamentary power and nullifying earlier democratic gains. The purge program was carried out as much to clear the decks for the development of a new democratic leadership as to rid Japan of its old militaristic leaders. In outlawing large numbers of undesirable organizations we sought to cut out one of the most noxious sources of anti-democratic infection in Japanese society—the ultra-nationalistic and so-called "secret" societies, which through mystical dogmas and terroristic tactics had helped to stifle free speech and independent thought in Japan. Somewhat similar acts were dissolution early in the occupation of the "special police," who had been in charge of "thought control," and the abrogation of all laws which limited freedom of thought or expression. These all were primarily negative acts. Our positive efforts to substitute more democratic political institutions for the old, centered around the reform of the Constitution itself.

General MacArthur wisely decided to achieve constitutional reform through the procedures established in the original Meiji Constitution, which required the initiation of amendments by Imperial Ordinance and subsequent Diet approval. With prodding by the occupation authorities, the Japanese government tackled the problem in the autumn of 1945, but its first efforts at revision obviously fell short of what were desired, and direct suggestion if not dictation by the occupation authorities accounted for a large part of the draft Constitution. This was finally announced to the public at the "command" of the Emperor and with the "full approval" of General MacArthur on March 6, 1946, and was adopted with only minor modifications and finally went into effect on May 3, 1947. We may never know exactly which portions of this document originated with the Japanese independently, which were the result of American suggestion or insistence, and which may have been simply drafted by the occupation authorities themselves. Many Japanese believe that the whole document was drafted in English and then translated into Japanese. In so far as this is true,

the new Japanese government cannot be said to have "been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," as was promised in the Potsdam Proclamation, and, in so far as the Japanese believe that their new Constitution was dictated by the occupation authorities, they may at some future date be tempted to reject it as a foreign imposition.

On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Japanese government early in 1946 was itself representative of the will of the Japanese people. Perhaps in a period of rapidly changing ideas and attitudes, such as the first postwar years inevitably were, no Japanese group could have been sufficiently representative of the popular will, as it was developing, to draw up a Constitution which would fit the Japanese people a few years later, after the effect of our other reforms and our educational program had been felt. The new Constitution, thus, has been one of our major reform measures, welcomed and supported by a large part of the Japanese but, strictly speaking, not established by them. "The freely expressed will of the Japanese people" is still to be seen. The real test of the new Constitution will be its ability over the years to meet the needs of the Japanese people.

The most revolutionary doctrine in the new Constitution is that sovereignty lies with the people and not with the Emperor. In phrases reminiscent of the American Constitution and other famous documents of our own political heritage, it commences with the statement: "We, the Japanese people . . . do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people. . . . Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind."

No less than thirty-one articles, guaranteeing the rights of the people in an expanded and detailed "Bill of Rights," further emphasize the democratic orientation of the new Con-

stitution. There are blanket guarantees, such as, "The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights," and, "Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall . . . be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs." Many more specific rights are also expressly detailed—equality under the law, which has entailed the scrapping of the whole peerage, the people's "inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them," "the right to own or to hold property," "freedom of thought and conscience," "freedom of religion," "freedom of assembly," "academic freedom," freedom of the individual "to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation," and even the equal rights of men and women in marriage, which "shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes" and "shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis." There are, of course, all the legal and judicial guarantees we are familiar with in our own country, and in addition there are certain newer rights which our founding fathers did not think of—"the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," "the right to receive an equal education," "the right and the obligation to work," and "the right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively."

A more important practical innovation in the new Constitution than the changed locus of sovereignty is the clear shift of power from the executive organs, formerly under the Emperor, to the Diet, elected by the people. The new Constitution expressly calls the Diet "the highest organ of state power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State." The Diet consists as before of two houses, but both are now entirely elective and the electorate for both is unlimited by status, income, or sex. The House of Representatives, which is the new name in English for the old Lower House, is elected for a four-year term, and the House of Councillors, which has superseded the old House of Peers, is elected for a six-year term. Accord-

ing to supplementary legislation, the House of Representatives consists of 466 members elected from 117 multiple member electoral districts, and the House of Councillors of 250 members, 100 elected by the nation at large and the remainder from the 46 prefectures into which Japan is divided. The House of Councillors is inferior in legislative powers to the House of Representatives, since bills which it opposes or upon which it fails to act become law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives.

The Premier and his Cabinet, in keeping with British parliamentary usage and Japan's own abortive parliamentary experience a quarter century ago, are merely the executive organs of the Diet. The Premier is chosen by the Diet from among its own members, and the majority of his Cabinet members must also be from the Diet. As in Great Britain, the Premier and his Cabinet are fully responsible to the Diet, though he can, if he wishes, dissolve the House of Representatives and thus force a new election. Through the Premier and his Cabinet, the vast central bureaucracy is thus subordinated to the Diet, which not only controls its money sources but also the men who are at its head. Naturally Diet inexperience and the old bureaucratic habit of independent leadership and supercilious contempt for the legislative branch of the government make the actual transfer of leadership from the government bureaus to the Diet halls a more complicated and doubtful procedure than it seems on paper. However, a new civil service code has been enacted in an effort to adapt the bureaucracy to its now subordinate role, and the Constitution has at least established the legal framework for a full parliamentary form of government.

The new Constitution shifts from the British to the American system in setting up the judiciary. While under the old order the executive exercised broad judicial powers and the whole court system was little more than an appendage of the Ministry of Justice, the new Constitution creates an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, which "is vested

with the rule-making power" for the whole judicial system and "is the court of last resort with powers to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act." The judges of inferior courts are "appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court." The members of the latter, fifteen in number according to supplementary legislation, are chosen by the Cabinet, but their appointments "must be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment" and subsequently at ten-year intervals.

A truly independent judiciary and a strengthened legislature, thus, have deprived the executive of its unchallenged supremacy at the national level, and determined efforts have also been made to lessen the actual powers of the central bureaucracy over the people and to strengthen popular support for democracy by increasing local self-government. This has been attempted through three principal measures. The first was based on the Constitutional provision that "chief executive officers of all local public entities . . . shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities." Prefectural governors have thus been made elective officials instead of appointees of the infamous Home Ministry, and the direct control of Tokyo over the local governments has been cut at this vital link.

The second measure was to eliminate the compulsory neighborhood associations, which had passed on central government orders directly to the people, and to break up the centrally controlled police force, which had once been the effective tool of the Home Ministry, not only for maintaining public order but often enough for controlling elections and for molding the people to the will of the government. The Home Ministry itself has been abolished, and the police force divided between the cities, towns, and villages, except for a residual force of 30,000 men, who have been placed under the operational control of the prefectural governors to police sparsely populated rural

areas. As has been noted previously, the breakup of the police force has been so effective that the central government now lacks adequate forces to deal with a major domestic emergency, much less to attempt the careful police supervision over the lives and thoughts of its citizens which it once maintained.

The third measure was the allocation of far broader legislative powers to the elected assemblies of the prefectural and municipal governments. Before the war such assemblies had only negligible powers, could be dissolved by the higher authorities who were themselves nonelective officials, and could have the laws they passed declared *ultra vires* by these authorities. It is doubtful, however, that the local assemblies will make much use of their new powers. The Japanese, unfamiliar with the concept of broad local self-government, have so far shown little interest in the increased powers of their local assemblies and have continued to look to Tokyo for leadership even in matters on which local bodies are now empowered to take independent action.

The most controversial aspect of the new Constitution, both in Japan and abroad, has been the place it accorded the Emperor. Following the precedent of the document it superseded, the new Constitution devotes its first several articles to the Emperor, but only to strip him of all the vast powers the Meiji Constitution had reserved for him. The latter had described the Emperor as "sacred and inviolable" and "the head of the Empire . . . invested with sovereign power" and had specified among numerous other powers that he "gives sanction to laws," "issues . . . Ordinances," "determines the organization of the different branches of the administration," and "has the supreme command of the Army and Navy." In sharp contrast, the new Constitution in its very first article rules, "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." Two further articles make clear that he has no powers whatsoever: "The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the

Emperor in matters of state," and he "shall not have powers related to government."

Actually these three statements describe with considerable accuracy the Emperor's real position even before the war. For almost a thousand years no Japanese Emperor has actually ruled. Even the Meiji Emperor never exercised the powers assigned him in the Meiji Constitution, and his feeble-minded son, the Taisho Emperor (1912–1926), obviously could take no part in government decisions. The latter's son, the present incumbent, has conducted himself throughout in the spirit of the contemporary British monarchy. A painfully shy and nervous man, he has been far happier in his self-chosen role of naturalist than in his inherited role of Emperor. He never showed any enthusiasm for the extravagant nationalism and chauvinism which characterized the first two decades of his reign, and, except for occasional statements to his leading officials that he preferred peaceful policies to war, his only known effort to influence government decisions was his courageous stand in favor of immediate surrender, which made possible the ending of the war. Thus, the revision of the Emperor's position in the new Constitution, while theoretically drastic, is in fact in general conformity with the present Emperor's own preferences and with accepted Japanese practice over the past several decades.

Many conservative Japanese, however, have been more disturbed about this theoretical change than they have been about any of the tremendous shifts in actual political power in postwar Japan. In fact, the purely theoretical sovereignty of the Japanese Emperor loomed so large in official Japanese thinking at the end of the war that the Japanese authorities, in first announcing acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation on August 10, 1945, singled it out as the one point on which they wished clarification, stating that it was their "understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." The somewhat equivocal American reply

the next day was that "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers" and that the Emperor would have to ensure the actual surrender of his government and armed forces. The moral of this little side play is that, even when no practical issue was at stake, the Japanese placed tremendous emphasis on the theory of Imperial rule. It indicates, perhaps, the importance to the Japanese of the Emperor as the personification of national unity in an age of division and conflict and also shows how tenaciously they have clung to this one fixed point of unchanging hierarchic order in a time of rapid change.

In the West and particularly in the United States much criticism has been directed at the retention of the Emperor in any capacity, and many have advocated his trial as a war criminal. In part this attitude has been based on a misunderstanding of the Emperor's actual role in prewar Japan. In part it has been the result of a justifiable fear that even an Emperor reduced both in theory and in practice to the status of a mere symbol would still provide the Japanese with a rallying point for the type of mystical and jingoistic nationalism which centered around him before the war and that irrational and terroristic acts, such as were committed in his name in the past, could as easily be performed in behalf of an admittedly figurehead Emperor as for one who was a figurehead only in reality. In view of the key role of the Imperial institution in the creation of a militaristic and totalitarian Japan before the war, the innocuous and powerless Emperor conceivably is still a potentially dangerous symbol in postwar Japan.

The chief answer to this argument is that, in the Potsdam Proclamation and our reply on August 11 to the Japanese inquiry regarding the sovereignty of the Emperor, we clearly implied that we would permit the Japanese to continue the Imperial institution in some form, if that was what they wished. The Japanese probably would not have surrendered otherwise, and in a sense we made a clear bargain with them—immediate

surrender in return for a promise not to insist that the Japanese throne be abolished entirely, in other words, American lives for an emasculated monarchy.

It can also be argued that, regardless of this bargain, we did well not to insist that the Japanese give up their Emperor. Polls have consistently shown that over 90 per cent of the people have continued to support the Imperial institution ever since the end of the war. With our stated policy "to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it," we left the door open for a republican revolution, but of course nothing of the sort happened. Among the political parties, only the Communists ever espoused abolition of the monarchy, and this stand proved to be so unpopular that even they were forced to abandon it as an immediate issue. Insistence upon abolition of the throne would have won us the determined opposition of the bulk of the Japanese people. We would have been setting our course directly into the teeth of the strong emotional head winds of loyalty to the Emperor. Obviously we have been wiser to forge ahead by tacking, aided rather than blown backwards by these winds.

The recent history of Japan also shows that the danger of the Imperial institution does not lie in the acts of the Emperor but in the attitude of his subjects toward him, and this would not be changed by removing the Emperor and his family by foreign dictate. In fact, the removal of the already remote and mysterious Imperial line to an even more remote exile would have made the institution, in so far as it is an attitude of mind, almost impervious to change. The concept of the "Imperial will," the myth of Imperial sacredness, the burning devotion of the average subject to the Imperial symbol, all could survive as easily without an actual Emperor on the throne. We have far more chance of reducing these attitudes to safe proportions—of changing mystical devotion to simple affection and respect—with an Emperor on the scene toward whom the Japanese can develop new attitudes. The argument applies as well to the problem of abdication as to complete abolition of

the institution. Some Japanese feel that, in accordance with Oriental concepts of personal responsibility, the present Emperor should abdicate in favor of his son as a measure to strengthen the throne. As long as the heir apparent is a minor, however, abdication would in a sense put the throne out of public sight and thus help to preserve it unaltered during this crucial period of rapid change.

Actually much has already been accomplished in creating new attitudes toward the throne in Japan. The Emperor's denial of his own "divinity," in an Imperial Rescript on January 1, 1946, created hardly a stir in Japan, because the Japanese, lacking our concept of "divinity," never had believed him to be "divine" as we use the term. His dignified acceptance of the surrender, however, did have a profound influence on his people, as did also his unfeigned friendliness toward the American conquerors, his obvious approval of many of the reforms we have undertaken, and, most important, his determined though sometimes clumsy efforts at coming down from the mysterious pedestal on which he had been placed and becoming a very human and entirely nonpolitical father of his people. He unquestionably has done much already to help cut down the exalted Imperial institution of Japan to the status of a modern constitutional monarchy and in the process has perhaps won more real affection from his people by his embarrassed but well-meant efforts than any Japanese Emperor has ever enjoyed.

4. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

However spectacular the political changes we have instituted in Japan, our whole reform effort is fundamentally a long-range educational program, and the success or failure of our educational efforts may well determine the ultimate fate of the whole undertaking. We must teach the Japanese people new attitudes as well as new techniques. Democracy depends as much on independence of judgment and a spirit

of mature skepticism as on sound electoral procedures and broad Parliamentary experience.

Fortunately for our educational efforts, the Japanese are a literate, newspaper-reading, radio-listening people. There are ample means of bringing new information and new ideas before them. Moreover they are at present extremely receptive to new ideas, because the completeness of their defeat has shaken the masses out of their intellectual lethargy and freed them from many of their old concepts. There is a vast intellectual ferment in Japan. Despite the economic chaos of the early postwar years, the Japanese public snatched as hungrily at reading matter as at food. The publishing industry was the one business which prospered, and thousands of intelligent Japanese eagerly presented new ideas to the equally eager millions of the reading public. Under such circumstances we have naturally had considerable initial success in our educational program. Utilizing the great facilities at our disposal for spreading information, we have found it a relatively easy task to convince the vast majority of the Japanese that they were grossly misled by their prewar rulers and were following an unsound and unjustified course in attempting to conquer their neighbors. It has been easy to win from most of them lip service and a vague yearning for democracy to replace the old order which had failed so miserably. We have greatly influenced their thinking in numberless specific matters and have implanted ideas which will have a profound influence in shaping the Japan of the future.

At the same time our greatest single failure in Japan has perhaps been our failure to exploit this situation as fully as we could have. We have been held back by several factors. One was the essential conflict in motives between our desire to carry through a specific and immediate reform program and our long-term interest in fostering independence of thought on the part of the Japanese public. We have inevitably tended more to preach specific concepts than to teach habits of independent thought, substituting often our own dogmas for the

authoritarian tradition of prewar Japan. Another problem has been that virtually all Americans in Japan, civilians and military alike, came under a strictly military chain of command and, therefore, were themselves not in a position to voice independent judgments and set an example of fearless freedom in speech. Another problem has been the inevitable security mindedness of a military organization. Fearful of what an entirely free press might say, our authorities have prohibited any criticism of occupation measures or of any of the allied countries, resorting to a system of post-publication censorship which in practice has proved more limiting to free expression of opinion than a frank pre-publication censorship would have been. Determined to exclude dangerous and subversive doctrines and propaganda from Japan, we have exercised rigid controls over the importation of printed matter from abroad and the translation of foreign books into Japanese. Communistic propaganda, which presumably was what the authorities wished most to keep out of Japan, has poured in clandestinely, but the flow of other materials from abroad, despite an excellent program of American information libraries in the major cities, has at times been little more than a trickle. Because of economic conditions, until the summer of 1949 almost no Japanese were permitted or were able to go abroad to learn about the rest of the world, and nonofficial visitors to Japan were kept to a minimum. Thus, full freedom of expression has not been achieved, and Japan for long was kept to a certain extent intellectually isolated from the rest of the world at a time when the Japanese people desperately needed knowledge and ideas from abroad and freedom to develop habits of independent judgment.

One of our major objectives in the educational field has been the improvement of methods for spreading knowledge, both in formal education and in other ways, in order that the Japanese people may become better prepared to exercise the independence of judgment on which democracy depends. We have, therefore, attempted to raise newspaper standards and develop

better radio techniques and also to improve the school system and the school curriculum.

The prewar Japanese educational system, based primarily on the continental European model, was made up of a six-year compulsory and coeducational elementary school, followed for boys by a five-year middle school, a three-year higher school, and a three- or four-year university. Girls usually did not go beyond a girl's higher school, which paralleled the boy's middle school, and at the middle school and higher school levels there were various specialized terminal schools for those who were going no further in their education.

The seventeen- or eighteen-year program leading to graduation from the university produced men who in their technical training were more like American postgraduate students than like our college graduates, but it was estimated at the end of the war that only about 3½ per cent of the students who graduated from the sixth year of the elementary school went beyond the eleventh grade and only half of 1 per cent went on to the university. Thus, merely a select few received a real education, and, as Japanese society was organized before the war, only these few could hope to achieve positions of prestige and importance. The middle schools, which were a necessary step in the education of a would-be university candidate, accommodated only 6 per cent of the elementary school graduates, and less than a tenth of these found their way into the higher schools which prepared students for the university. The vast majority of Japanese children were forced to leave the main educational ladder which led to the all-important university at the end of the sixth grade or else at the end of the eleventh. They could read and write and had some practical training, but they could not become leaders, nor did they usually have enough education to become intelligent citizens.

We have attempted to change this situation in several ways. First of all we have extended the period of compulsory education to nine years. Since over nine-tenths of Japanese children were already taking some form of schooling beyond the

sixth grade and an extension of the period of compulsory education to eight years had already been adopted by the Japanese government, though not enforced because of the war, this part of our program was fully justified and will undoubtedly succeed.

Another measure has been to equalize schools at all levels so that children will not be prevented from going on with their education simply because they had been forced to enter a school which did not qualify its graduates for the next educational level. In the process we have entirely scrapped the old school system above the elementary level, creating in its place a three-year compulsory junior high school, a three-year senior high school, and a four-year college—in other words the American educational system. Japanese educators, however, are for the most part entirely unfamiliar with the American system, and considerable confusion has inevitably resulted. The changeover to the new system has forced middle schools to add a year to cover the senior high school level and higher schools to add two years to come up to the four-year college level. Lacking adequate facilities, staff, and funds, most schools have accomplished this only by lowering standards.

In making schools at each level more uniform, we have been forced to broaden their curriculums so that a single type of school could prepare students for the next educational level and at the same time serve as a suitable terminal training for those who went no further. The advantages of such a system for training democratic citizens and ensuring a maximum opportunity for the best potential leadership to rise to the top are offset somewhat in a poor country like Japan by the necessity of supporting a greatly expanded educational program. Before the war education was efficiently but ruthlessly limited to the barest minimum needed to teach the technical skills required by each individual in performing his specific function in society. In the new, more generalized system, more years of schooling will be required to teach the specific skills each group needs, because more time will be spent in giving

all groups a common education. The four-year college will probably not prove adequate for professional training, and an extensive system of graduate education will be needed above it. Whether Japan is rich enough to support this extended system is still to be seen.

One of our biggest educational tasks was to change the teaching methods and materials which had made the Japanese school system such an effective tool for nationalistic propaganda and for inculcating in the people blind obedience to their leaders. We have, of course, removed from all schools the small shrines which housed pictures of the Emperor and Empress and have stopped enforced visits by school children to Shinto Shrines. We have eliminated certain courses, such as the standard courses on "morals" or "ethics," which were in large part used for nationalistic indoctrination, substituting social studies in their place. We have also rewritten or at least revised all the textbooks in order to weed out the false propaganda and nationalistic indoctrination which saturated their pages. Writing new textbooks on controversial subjects, however, has been no easy task. Any treatment of history was sure to hurt the national feelings of one Allied people or another, and anything that touched on religion or politics was even more delicate. Thus, in a few instances we failed for some time to produce any textbook at all.

We have also introduced new teaching methods in an effort to broaden education beyond the confines of pure memory work and to develop independent inquiry and thought on the part of the student. Even in the elementary grades children have been taught to carry out study projects of their own, and the Japanese student for the first time is beginning to ask embarrassing questions of his teachers. Naturally, the children have enjoyed these changes more than their teachers, who, trained in the old system, are baffled and often dismayed by the new approach.

One of the dangers of the old school system was its extreme centralization under the Ministry of Education, which, as we

have seen, prescribed for private as well as public schools what courses should be taught in each grade and which textbooks were to be used. We have tried to break down this excessive central control by placing a large part of the responsibility for local schools in the hands of municipal school boards, inaugurating the new system with school board elections in the autumn of 1948. However, in one way the Japanese educational system is even more completely a governmental system today than it was before the war. The many private secondary schools and universities which once formed an important part of Japan's educational facilities are all in serious economic straits because of the collapse of the moneyed classes which once supported them. In Article 89 of the new Constitution it is stated that no public funds can be used for any charitable, educational, or religious institution. This provision was aimed at eliminating state support for the Shinto Shrines, which have now been thrown back on whatever popular support they can find. Unfortunately, however, it also prevents the government from helping to salvage the private educational institutions which have rendered such valuable service in the past, and there is danger that some private schools will be forced to close and the remainder will be even less than before to offer the healthy competition to government institutions which the Japanese educational system needs.

Because of the unique difficulty of the Japanese writing system, much thought has been given by the occupation authorities, and by the Japanese as well, to the problem of writing reform. So much of the Japanese student's time and effort goes into merely learning to read and write that he has less time than his Occidental counterpart for his other studies. Tests also show that many children soon after leaving school lose their ability to read or write except at the most elementary level. There has been much talk of "language reform," but, except for the elimination of certain archaic grammatical forms in newspapers and official documents, there has been no thought of tackling the impossible and pointless task of "re-

forming" the Japanese language, but only of simplifying the writing system, which is a gigantic task in itself.

The most drastic proposal, which has been supported by certain occupation authorities, was to abandon the use of Chinese characters and the native phonetic syllabaries in favor of the use of the Latin alphabet, known in Japan as Romaji or "the Roman letters." This would probably be in the long run the best solution, because spoken Japanese can be written perfectly with only seventeen letters and one or two diacritical marks, and in this form could be mastered by the Japanese child in as many months as it now takes years. There has been strong opposition to this proposal, however, because of Japanese aesthetic attachment to the Chinese characters and because it would mean something of a cultural break with the past and would necessitate an extensive modification of the technical vocabulary, which is full of homophones that are indistinguishable in the Latin alphabet. Only half-hearted attempts have been made since the war to utilize Romaji in place of the traditional writing system. Instead, most postwar writing reform has followed earlier precedents in further simplifying the existing system. Spellings in the *kana* syllabaries have been made strictly phonetic; variant readings for characters have been reduced in number; standard abbreviations have been substituted for some of the more complicated characters; and, most important, the number of characters to be used in newspapers and official documents has been limited to 1850 and the number to be taught in the nine years of compulsory education to a mere 1300—a large dose for the child to absorb, but considerably less than previous generations attempted to swallow and digest in the same number of years.

5. SOCIAL REFORMS

Our attempt to democratize Japan did not stop with political and educational measures but also entered the more fundamental and also more controversial field of social reform.

We do not usually think of ourselves today as being social revolutionaries, nor does this term figure among the epithets hurled so freely at our heads by our enemies. And yet social revolution has formed an integral and essential part of our reform program in Japan. There has been none of the violence, the brutal liquidation of individuals, which has accompanied so many social and political revolutions in recent years. But we have made fundamental shifts in the economic and political balance of power among the various social groupings in Japan. It is still to be seen whether the Chinese Communists, for all of their more violent methods, can or dare carry through as sweeping a social revolution in China as we already have in Japan.

It comes as something of a shock to find ourselves in this role. We have become so complacently accustomed to our own ideals that they seem anything but revolutionary. We have taken a defensive attitude toward the charge of being nineteenth-century liberals but twentieth-century reactionaries. And yet when one compares the impact of American ideals on Japan with that of Communist ideals on China, there can be no doubt that in an Asiatic setting ours are the more revolutionary. The Communist concept of a paternalistic dictatorship is nothing new to Asia. The Chinese Communists' attempt to substitute an individual ethic for a family ethic still falls far short of what has already been accomplished in Japan. Their goals of education for the people and industrialization for the nation represent the starting point of our reforms for Japan. Our attitude toward human rights both in individual and collective terms and our righting of the balance of economic and political power in Japan go far beyond anything the Chinese Communists can at present attempt or perhaps even conceive. American democratic concepts as they have continued to grow through the decades represent an ideal to Asia which makes Communist theories seem old-fashioned and unimaginative by comparison.

Our social revolution reached down to the family itself

and the relations between the sexes and age groups. Starting with the concept of the individual right to equality, the framers of the Constitution adopted the fundamental equality of men and women as a basic premise. Women were given the franchise and legal equality. Educational opportunities for men and women were equalized. And the women of Japan responded eagerly to their new rights. Broadened economic opportunities in an industrialized society and the urgent wartime demand for women workers in business and industry had given Japanese women some of the economic independence which had helped produce legal equality in the West. Since the war, Japanese women have participated in elections in larger numbers than their menfolk, and they have elected many more of their sex to elective bodies, from municipal school boards to the national Diet, than have ever been elected to comparable bodies in the United States. Many deeply ingrained habits of conduct must be changed before Japanese women achieve full social equality with men, but some of these habits are visibly changing. Women more frequently walk abreast of their husbands, and the latter more frequently carry their share of babies and bundles. There is a long road ahead of them, but the women of Japan, with the laws now giving them an equal chance, seem to be determined to achieve full equality and take their rightful part in society and politics.

Increasing individual independence and responsibility also means giving greater freedom to the younger age groups and therefore minimizing family controls. The legal power of family heads over adult members of the family has been eliminated. The schools now seek to develop greater intellectual independence on the part of the child, so that the young adult can take his place in a democratic society as an independent and responsible individual. It is more a matter of attitudes and habits than of law. How far it has succeeded is a matter of conjecture, but there is behind this attempted reform a long history of incipient revolt by Japanese youth against the tyranny of age and family, and there are signs of fundamental change

today. From all parts of the country, both urban and rural, come reports of a rapid shift in the whole concept of marriage from a family-dominated match to a matter of personal choice on the part of the two principals. Young people in many communities are even flaunting tradition by enthusiastically taking up ballroom dancing or square dancing, depending on the individual preferences of their particular American mentors. Japanese society is unquestionably in rapid motion, and the most apparent direction of this motion is toward the freeing of women and young people to become independent individuals, politically and socially the equals of their husbands and fathers.

A more important aspect of our social revolution was the attempt to readjust the balance of power between different economic and social groupings by improving the economic status and stimulating the political development of certain huge underprivileged classes, notably the peasants and urban laborers, and concomitantly reducing the inordinate economic and political power of certain other smaller groups, particularly the great industrialists and the rural landowners. Aiding the underprivileged is, of course, in full accord with our own ideals, but the corollary measure of depriving certain groups of their legally acquired wealth without due compensation does not square with democratic concepts. It does not even square with the new Japanese Constitution, and, consequently, if certain of our reforms are to stand in Japan it can only be on the basis that measures adopted at the insistence of the occupation authorities are legalized by the terms of the surrender and therefore need not be subjected to the normal test of Constitutionality.

We see in this situation a slight tinge of the dangerous theory that the ends justify the means, which has turned Russian communism into such a travesty of Marxist ideals. On the other hand, there is the valid argument that in Japan the privileged were so rich and powerful and the underprivileged so poor and helpless that more violent measures were called for than

we would accept in our own country. There was also a feeling that after the end of the occupation a swing of the pendulum could be expected, and therefore we should be overly drastic in these reforms while we had the opportunity. These seem to be the reasons why we carried through a program of peaceful social revolution in Japan rather than one simply of evolutionary social reform.

A major problem which the occupation faced was the concentration of a large percentage of Japan's industrial and commercial wealth and power in the hands of a few very rich families and their loyal business executives. It is doubtful that the *zaibatsu* system itself is to be blamed as the chief reason for Japanese imperialism and aggression. This theory was popular in the United States at the end of the war, perhaps on the somewhat Marxian premise that all evil is ultimately traceable to economic villains, but it does not bear very close historical scrutiny. But the *zaibatsu* system certainly did not stand in the way of Japanese imperialism, and it unquestionably created an economic and social atmosphere uncongenial to the growth of democracy. Even in the United States undue concentration of economic power in the hands of a few is looked upon as an unhealthy situation, tending to limit the growth of economic and political freedom on the part of the average citizen. In Japan, where the concentration of wealth and power was proportionately much greater and where democracy had far weaker roots, the perpetuation of this situation would have seriously impaired the chances of democracy to survive. It was agreed that the *zaibatsu* families must be reduced in power and their great combines broken up and that, conversely, encouragement should be given to a "wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade."

Restrictions were placed on the financial activities of the *zaibatsu* families, the holding companies, and some 1200 of their subsidiary companies. Subsequently, purge measures forced the members of the *zaibatsu* families and the leading

executives of their concerns to sever connections with business enterprises in which they had been active and also barred them from all public posts. The central holding companies were dissolved, and their securities as well as those held directly by the *zaibatsu* families were taken into custody by the government in preparation for their sale to a broader group of "more desirable" owners. The remaining assets of the *zaibatsu* families were frozen, and a heavy capital levy drastically reduced these and all other private concentrations of capital. Starting at 25 per cent for individual holdings over 100,000 yen, it ascended to 90 per cent on holdings in excess of 15,000,000 yen. With the value of the yen dropping rapidly in the early postwar years from around thirty cents to a mere fraction of a cent, this meant the reduction of even modest accumulations of money and the virtual confiscation of all fortunes. Moreover, steeply graduated income taxes and inheritance taxes have been adopted to prevent in the future the accumulation of similar concentrations of wealth. So long as these laws remain in force, it seems improbable that either the *zaibatsu* families or any other individuals or groups can again amass fortunes at all comparable to those of the *zaibatsu* in prewar days.

The dissolution of the holding companies along with the family fortunes behind them brought to an end the great Japanese combines by eliminating their central organs, and laws have been passed to prevent their re-creation. Our occupation authorities, however, decided to go beyond this and to break up corporations which could be considered excessive concentrations of economic power and therefore hindrances to the development of a freely competitive economy. In other words, we embarked upon a trust-busting program comparable to but much more thoroughgoing than similar operations in the United States. But after an imposing start, the occupation authorities scaled down the program in the face of the apparent inability of the Japanese economy to recuperate even without further major surgical operations. By the summer of 1949,

the list of 325 corporations originally slated for possible dissolution had been reduced to a mere 19.

The so-called *zaibatsu* program, while in general successful, has encountered several difficulties. No one can say how far the old loyalties within the former *zaibatsu* combines still hold elements of these combines together in an informal association permitting former executives and members of *zaibatsu* families to exercise control over their old economic empires. On the whole, however, this danger has perhaps been exaggerated in a dynamic situation such as we find in Japan today, and it can be safely assumed that, so long as legal barriers remain, the old combines cannot be effectively reconstituted.

Another problem has been that the purge of the top business leaders and the dissolution of the combines together with the resultant uncertainty that has hung over the whole business world in Japan have appreciably reduced the efficiency of Japanese industrial organization and that we consequently have paid a heavy price economically for this particular reform. But this is a passing situation. The industrial deconcentration program has virtually ended, and a relaxation of purge measures and the emergence of new business leaders should in the near future combine to produce effective Japanese business leadership again. Throughout 1949 Japanese industrial production mounted steadily, indicating that Japanese business had survived the shock of the reforms and was beginning to regain the vitality lost during the war and early postwar years.

A more serious problem is the question of the future ownership and control of Japanese big business, because it involves the fundamental question of whether Japan will have a partially socialistic or an entirely competitive economy. For one thing, the resale of former *zaibatsu* assets to new owners has not proved an easy task. Few have had capital to invest in this way, and those who did were usually black marketeers who would have made even less desirable owners than the old *zaibatsu* families. The concept that these assets might be disposed of at nominal prices to "desirable" groups was hard to

apply because of the difficulty of agreeing on the "desirable" groups to be so benefited. The simplest solution would be to permit them to remain in the hands of the state, but this, while not repugnant to most Japanese, has been a solution that was distasteful to the occupation authorities and raised the specter in some eyes of a rejuvenated statism in Japan. At the same time, we have to a large extent been forced to continue the wartime organizations for controlling prices, production, and allocations of scarce materials in the various industries and have often converted these into more official bodies than they were before. In other words, we have in many instances increased rather than decreased government control over certain areas of the Japanese economy and have contributed to an even more complete integration of the Japanese economy on an industry-wide basis in place of the old and more haphazard integration through the combines. During the last year or two there has been considerable relaxation of rationing and some of the other controls over the economy, but, by and large there seems to be a drift toward greater state controls over industry which we have done little to combat and which probably cannot be checked, even if the Japanese wish to do so, until the Japanese economy is in a far healthier condition than it is today.

The other half of the industrial picture has been our attempt to better the economic status of labor and give it a greater stake and voice in politics. This we have tried to do through the traditional technique of labor unions. Laws were revised to give the trade union movement much the same legal status it has in the United States, and the Japanese urban workers responded enthusiastically. Unions had been active at two earlier periods in Japanese history—for a short while following the First World War and again after depression conditions had started to spread over Japan in 1927—but both times workers had for the most part joined the unions only during actual strikes, and the unions, faced with severe police repression and general apathy among the workers, had not become strong, permanent organizations and eventually had withered away

completely. Under the occupation, however, they have enjoyed not only a mushroom growth but have become accepted by labor and management alike as a recognized part of the industrial scene. Starting from almost nothing, the labor unions enrolled more than four and a half million workers in the single year of 1946 alone, and by 1950 their membership was leveling off at about seven millions.

The problems of a rapidly growing labor movement in a politically and economically disrupted Japan have been manifold. The rate of growth was too fast for entirely healthy development and surrounding conditions too chaotic to permit Japanese unions to play the same valuable role they have in our more prosperous and politically more stable society. For one thing, the collapsing economy and the virtual bankruptcy of most employers created extremely unfavorable conditions for normal collective bargaining. It was all but useless for workers to attempt to keep up with the inflationary spiral through pressure on individual employers or industries, especially since government wage controls rather than private salary scales were commonly at stake. While labor unions did seek to achieve their political ends through the ballot box, throwing their weight behind Socialist and Communist candidates, this seemed to many Japanese workers a very slow and ineffectual procedure in a time of rapid political change and equally rapid deterioration of the economic situation. The whole philosophy of trade unionism was not clear to the average union member.

Most Japanese workers knew little about labor organization, and the control of many unions passed into the hands of a determined minority of Communist sympathizers, more interested in direct political action than in what we consider traditional trade union activities. Many of the early postwar strikes, some of which were carried out by the peculiarly Japanese technique of taking over a factory and operating it more productively than had the management, were actually attempts to shift policy control of an industry from the owners and

managers to the workers themselves. On the national scene, labor unions often showed more interest in attaining their objectives immediately by direct pressure on the government, rather than by slower electoral processes, staging monster demonstrations in an effort to influence government policy or to force the resignation of the cabinet.

The labor movement thus quite naturally created a fundamental conflict of objectives in our own thinking. Strong trade unionism was desired to help redress the old economic and political balance. At the same time, the sometimes violent attempts of many labor unions to exert direct pressure on the government struck at the root of democratic electoral procedures. The occupation authorities, becoming ever more alarmed by Japan's economic plight, were also loath to see labor discord further diminish Japan's industrial output. Moreover, they increasingly displayed the natural distaste of a disciplined military organization for an uninhibited and somewhat obstreperous labor movement. As a result, in occupation thinking a desire to curb the labor movement began to loom larger than our earlier interest in building it up.

We already had discouraged attempts by labor unions to take the policy direction of industries away from their rightful owners. In January 1947 a much more important step was taken when a projected anti-government strike on a nationwide scale was stopped by the occupation. A still more serious situation came to a head in the spring and summer of 1949. At occupation insistence, government agencies started to dismiss 25 per cent of their employees as an economy measure designed to eliminate unnecessary workers. Since government agencies included, in addition to postal and telegraphic communications, most of the railways and monopolies such as tobacco, huge numbers of workers were involved. The policy also went against the traditional Japanese concept that workers are not dismissed simply because there is no work for them to do. Throughout Japan financially harassed employers had felt obliged to rehire former employees after the war, often

employing two or three men to do a job which no longer required the full services of one. Our economy measures, therefore, were not generally popular, and the Communist-dominated unions fought them bitterly. By summer they were resorting to sabotage of the railways, and in July the Director of the Government Railways, who was in charge of the dismissal of some 90,000 workers, was murdered under mysterious circumstances. But the Communists had overplayed their hand. Popular support for them declined, and resistance to the dismissals subsided. The occupation had won a second head-on clash with the labor movement which it had created.

The future of the labor movement in Japan is as dubious as it is vital to the final political and economic outcome. Labor unions unquestionably face severe tests. Collective bargaining activities cannot mean much until Japanese employers are interested in expanding rather than reducing their working forces. Still worse, the line between justifiable political activities and undemocratic direct action is a harder one to maintain in Japan than in the United States, because in Japan the government employs more workers and takes a larger part in controlling all wages. Moreover, the general atmosphere in Japan is not entirely favorable to the peaceful development of unions. The prevailing tradition in Japan is one of hostility toward them, and the occupation authorities have gradually become more their opponent than their patron. And yet the labor movement has shown extraordinary vigor since the war. Its roots are still shallow, but they are vastly more numerous than ever before. It will take time for a healthy and stable labor movement to develop in Japan, but, given reasonably favorable circumstances, it seems probable that trade unions will make a significant contribution to the Japan of the future.

The least controversial but from the American point of view the most surprising of our major reforms has been our land reform program. Our measures have been almost as sweeping as those of the Chinese Communists which originally won them the support of the peasant masses in China, but they have been

accomplished far more smoothly and without any violence. At the same time our objectives have gone far beyond those of the Chinese Communists. We were aiming not only at bettering the pitiable economic conditions of the peasant half of Japan's population but also at increasing their interest in and influence over their government. We were trying to give them at least a tiny margin of security which would free them from complete subservience to the landowners and moneylenders and create in them a desire to defend through intelligent participation in democratic procedures the rights they had won.

As we have seen, there were no feudal estates in Japan like those of Eastern Europe and few enough large landholdings, but the land reform program we sponsored encompassed every piece of agricultural property owned by absentee landlords, no matter how small, and in most parts of Japan it affected most other holdings of more than two and a half acres. Absentee landlords were forced to sell all their land to the government and in most parts of Japan all non-cultivating landlords living in the local community had to sell the land they owned above two and a half acres. The lands thus acquired were then resold to the former tenants who had operated them. Cultivating landlords were permitted to keep two and a half acres of tenant-operated land together with the area they and their families cultivated, which was presumed to be no more than about seven and a half acres. Thus, in most of Japan even farmers could not own more than about ten acres of agricultural land and other persons in rural communities no more than two and a half acres. In the less productive northern island of Hokkaido the principle was the same as elsewhere in Japan, but the acreage standards were made four times as large.

Since government purchase and resale prices were based primarily on prewar monetary values, without allowances for Japan's runaway inflation, they amounted to virtual confiscation for the former owners, and the tenant farmers had no difficulty in paying for the land outright or meeting the easy credit terms arranged. The reform was slow in getting under

way, but, once started in 1948, efficient local committees elected from among the landlords, owner-cultivators, and tenant farmers rushed it through to virtual completion before the end of the year. Postwar food shortages and inflation had combined to give the rural debtor class temporary surcease from its chronic financial plight, and farm debts had for the most part been liquidated. Now, with the land reform, most tenants easily became peasant owners. The remainder, perhaps a quarter of the number of tenants before the war, had their rents reduced by law to approximately half of what they had been, with rent ceilings established at 25 per cent of the value of the crop on rice paddies and 15 per cent on dry fields. The remaining tenants have also been granted the security of written contracts, and credit has been made available to them and other peasants on reasonable terms. Thus, the tenancy problem, which was for long one of the most difficult and pressing of the many problems facing Japan, has been reduced almost to the vanishing point.

Our land reform has been, to say the least, drastic, but it has met only with praise. The sincerest compliment it has received has been the effort on the part of many Communist politicians in Japan to give the impression that the Communist party was responsible for it. At the same time, the land reform has created some new problems. The former owners did not receive "just compensation" for their losses, and consequently the reform cannot clear the Constitutional hurdle but can only pass through the loophole created by the terms of surrender. Since the formal registration of the land under the names of the new owners is a tedious process which will take years to complete, it is still possible that legal or legislative action may reverse some of the reform measures. The land reform also has caused considerable social dislocation by reducing to the common level a large part of the less impoverished rural families, and it has produced certain economic dislocations by breaking up the larger holdings which once served as units for economic coöperation. A further development of rural coöperatives,

however, will probably soon compensate for these dislocations, if it has not done so already.

The land reform has been an unquestioned success, and yet it has not touched Japan's real agricultural problem. The farms cannot produce enough food to feed the nation; they remain too small to give a decent living even to the owner-farmer; and there are still too many people who lack even such tiny farms. There is also no guarantee that the land reform will develop in the peasant masses the intelligent interest in politics and their own rights on which a healthy democracy depends. Like so many of the basic goals of our reform program, it is a hope, a calculated effort, but not an accomplished fact. Our reforms, by and large, have been daringly conceived and forcefully executed. But Japan's problems remain grave and her future far from certain.

12. Hopes and Fears

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE OCCUPATION

It is far easier to catalogue the successes and failures of our many specific reform measures than to estimate the success or failure of our over-all effort to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Element by element what is happening *in* Japan may be fairly clear, but the total picture of what is happening *to* Japan is by no means so evident. Arrange them as you will, the pieces do not fit together to form a simple picture. The situation is dynamic. Each factor, influenced by all the other factors and exerting in return an influence on each of them, is constantly changing. It is a pattern of motion in which old and new are still in the process of readjustment to one another. Any interpretation of the picture as a whole depends upon one's philosophy of acculturation or of social change itself. A philosophy of this sort inevitably underlies all that we have attempted to do in our occupation of Japan, but it is never itself discussed or even mentioned. It never reaches the surface, though its subsurface configurations can usually be detected in the sharply contrasting conclusions and interpretations which different observers draw from the same body of facts concerning Japan.

Perhaps the commonest concept of our undertaking in Japan is the feeling that everything about pre-surrender Japan was bad and that the occupation authorities had the task of wiping the slate clean and constructing a new society virtually from

scratch. This attitude has given rise to two very different estimates of the success of the occupation, one strongly pessimistic and the other as strongly optimistic.

The pessimistic interpretation lies behind much of the severest criticism of our occupation efforts, especially criticism by those of leftist sympathies. Any retention of native customs and institutions appeared to these critics to be a highly dangerous compromise with the evil past. The reform of Japan, they felt, must be thoroughgoing—even ruthless, if necessary. The diabolical cunning and unmatched virulence of the evil institutions of prewar Japan made it necessary to achieve virtual perfection in the new system, for anything less than perfection would leave the door open for the return of the old and would thus spell ultimate disaster. It seemed to those who held these views that the occupation authorities made fatal blunders time after time, and there was much in the history of postwar Japan which they viewed with the greatest alarm.

Only a slight twist of this same philosophy has produced a completely optimistic view of postwar Japan and its future. Starting with the same assumption that everything in prewar Japan was bad and that the occupation authorities were creating an entirely new Japan, the optimists marveled at the extent of our success in reforming Japan in so short a period. They gave us all the credit for the successful adoption of democratic procedures since the war, forgetting completely the half century of electoral and parliamentary experience the Japanese had had before the war and the influence of a considerable body of strong supporters of democracy within Japan. They assumed that we were entirely responsible for the labor movement in postwar Japan, ignoring the fact that they could have done little without the aid of a corps of experienced and devoted labor leaders who had been active in Japan for several decades. The rapid change in the status of women they attributed solely to American words of wisdom, rather than to the slow improvement of the economic and educational opportunities for women in Japan over the better part of a century. If

so much could have been accomplished so quickly, they felt, there was no reason to entertain doubts about the ultimate success of our efforts to democratize Japan. A miracle had been accomplished in changing black into white, and they were willing to accept credit where credit, they felt, was due.

A reaction to this absurdly exaggerated concept of the accomplishments of the occupation has slowly been growing up, especially among the more sophisticated of the observers of postwar Japan. This has taken the form of a return to the Kipling philosophy of "East is East and West is West." Japan is and always will be essentially Japanese, they hold, and reform measures imposed from without are therefore essentially meaningless. The whole occupation effort to reform Japan has been sheer folly. No fundamental change is to be expected, nor is it even possible. The dream is over, and we should return to a common sense acceptance of Japan as she is.

This philosophy breaks down into at least three variants, all united by the central theme that Japan cannot or at least need not be changed. One might be called the anthropological approach in which the terms "good" and "bad" are studiously avoided and hence the concept of "reform" itself is taboo. The second is the military approach in which it is argued that the only thing good or bad about Japan is whether or not she is our friend or enemy; that the Japanese are a militaristic people and this situation cannot and need not be changed; and that our major objective should be to get the Japanese back on their feet and effective in the world struggle as our allies. The third and most popular approach is that of many businessmen and old Japan hands. While admitting that some things may have been bad in prewar Japan, they also find that much was good, and, in any case, they feel that not much can be done about it, good or bad. Consequently, they view with skepticism all of our reform measures and with unconcealed anxiety and irritation those reforms which they feel were designed to reform that which did not need reforming and therefore created chaos instead. Many American businessmen, while not deeply con-

cerned with most of our program in Japan, are vehement in their condemnation of American reforms which have ruined their business colleagues and customers and sometimes even their own subsidiaries in Japan.

There is, of course, something to be said for each of these various points of view, and yet the basic concept that we can remake an entirely bad Japan within a few years is naive, and the idea that all societies are immutable entities is not historically accurate. History shows us that societies do change, sometimes radically, and that change can come as a result of external influence as well as from internal evolution. Nowhere is this clearer than in Japan itself during the past century. After we had forced the doors of Japan open in 1854, she could not be the same country that she had been before. Similarly, a thoroughly defeated Japan today cannot be the same country that it was before the war, and the occupation too is unquestionably changing Japan still more.

At the same time we should not overestimate the amount of change or the type of change which can be accomplished through external pressure in a few years' time. Any idea that we have started from scratch to make an entirely new Japan is obviously absurd. In terms of the total culture, the amount of change is not likely to be great, and specific changes, if they are to last, must be in general conformity with the over-all pattern of the society as it is slowly evolving. The American occupation obviously could not make of Japan a new nation or a little United States. All we could ever hope to do is to make some specific readjustments which, while leaving many of the basic elements little changed, would contribute to the creation of some fundamentally new patterns in Japanese society. In other words, we could forcefully tip the scales a bit, hoping that while we were doing so a new balance would be struck which would maintain itself after our hand had been removed. In so far as our efforts have been in harmony with natural developments within Japanese society, there is hope that they will succeed. In so far as they have little foundation

or support within Japanese society as it exists today, they will of course fail.

Viewed in this light our efforts in Japan have had very limited and also very realistic objectives—to readjust the balance so that in the future the peaceful and democratic forces within Japanese society will gradually win out over the militaristic and authoritarian forces, reversing the history of the 1930's when the balance turned in favor of the latter. The assumption, of course, has been that there already were strong peaceful and democratic tendencies in Japan and that a slight readjustment of the rules and a temporary weighting of the scales in their favor would give them a chance to become the dominant tendencies. This is the unstated philosophy which lies behind the *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* and probably accounts for its statesmanlike tone. The validity of the thesis is to be tested as much by the history of prewar Japan as by the crucial years since the surrender.

With such limited objectives, perfection is, of course, as unnecessary as it is unattainable. All that we must achieve is a slight preponderance of power for the forces of peace and democracy, with the assumption that, once attained, this preponderance under favorable circumstances will tend to increase decade by decade as it has elsewhere in the democratic part of the world. No one reform and no single aspect of any reform is in itself essential to success. Some obviously are more crucial than others, but all that counts in the long run is the sum total —the preponderance of forces. We can expect the undoing of a part of all of our reforms and perhaps the complete abandonment of some. To some extent this process will be a healthy shaking down of the imposed changes to make them fit into the social pattern as a whole. What does not fit will inevitably be eliminated. That test must come sooner or later, and until it is met no one can say for sure what will survive or what will be sloughed off. But in any case there is little that we can do about it at that stage. Either an essential minimum of our reforms will survive because they are basically in conformity

with natural developments within modern Japanese society, or else we have been building on sand and nothing in the long run can bolster up our reform edifice. Only history gives us a clue as to which we have been doing, and only history, as it slowly unfolds, will give a full answer to the question.

2. POSTWAR POLITICAL TRENDS

The period since the end of the war has been far too short and too confused to offer any clear indication of what will be the eventual fate of democracy in Japan. Optimists have found much to point to with triumph. Pessimists have with equal ease found crucial signs of disaster. If there is anything to the concept that we are attempting to redress the balance between conflicting forces within Japanese society, then we must take for granted that there will be ample indications of these different forces—encouraging signs of the growth of democratic tendencies and discouraging indications that authoritarian patterns and militaristic inclinations linger on. These conflicting forces are obviously still at work in Japan today, and they appear to be fairly evenly matched.

The chief reaction of the Japanese people to the defeat and occupation has been one of confusion and uncertainty. Under these circumstances, too much emphasis should not be placed on political trends during the past few years. The swings from left to right in elections have been no more than surface patterns, reflecting moods and reactions to personalities and specific situations. The fate of democracy in Japan will be determined by much more basic factors, such as the economic well-being of the individual voter and the fundamental attitudes of the masses of people toward one another and toward their government. These attitudes are still in the process of formation and have not evinced themselves clearly in politics. Surface political developments should be watched carefully, but as yet they are grounds for neither despair nor elation.

The first discernible political trend after the surrender was

toward the extreme left. This was a natural reaction to defeat and surrender, for the most radical members of Japanese society were those who could most easily prove that they were not contaminated by the discredited past, and they knew where they stood and what they could hope for far more clearly than their more conservative compatriots, who were not sure to what extent their beliefs had been discredited by defeat and they themselves would be penalized by the occupation authorities. In the stunned silence of post-surrender Japan, the leftists could stand up and loudly proclaim that they alone had opposed the evil old order and therefore only they could lead the way to a new Japan. This was a plausible and stimulating idea to many Japanese, and there was an enthusiastic response to it. Communist leaders as they emerged from long years in jail or returned from foreign exile were treated as national heroes. Communist publications suddenly appeared in large numbers and were eagerly read. Concentrated largely in the cities, the Communists and their many sympathizers made their presence felt in clamorous demonstrations, which gave the impression of greater popular support than they actually enjoyed.

The Communist bubble was pricked by the first postwar general election, held on April 10, 1946, in which the Communists won only 3.8 per cent of the vote and no more than five of the 466 seats in the House of Representatives. By that time it had become clear to the Japanese that the Americans in liberating Communist leaders were not endorsing communism and that communism therefore was not necessarily the "wave of the future." Traditional anti-Russian prejudices had reasserted themselves to the detriment of the Communist cause, and more conservative groups were beginning to dare to fight back against the Communist attack. The Communists were even losing ground in the labor movement, and they were gradually forced to give up their noisy pretense of being the only democratic force in Japan and to retire into the background as a disgruntled but powerless minority faction.

The election which saw the collapse of the Communist

bubble indicated a new trend toward socialism. The postwar Socialist Party, or Social Democratic Party as it calls itself in English, inherited strong white-collar support in the cities of Japan from the various semi-socialistic parties of the 1920's and 1930's, which had increased in popular vote in each election during that period. With close to ten million votes in April 1946, the Socialists won 17.8 per cent of the electorate and 92 seats in the House of Representatives to become virtually tied for second place in the Diet with one of the two large conservative parties.

With Japan's long tradition of government control over and participation in business, socialist ideas were congenial to most Japanese and seemed to fit the needs of the time, for economic collapse had necessitated a continuance of strict governmental controls over the economy. Lacking any bargaining power against his bankrupt employer, the individual laborer tended to turn toward socialism as the only hope for bettering his own economic status. Moreover the leadership of the Socialist Party included many men and women who were closely identified with the United States and American influence and consequently shared in the prestige of all things American. Mr. Katayama, the party's leader, is a Protestant Christian. Toyohiko Kagawa, who for a time was active in the party, was often in the United States before the war and was usually received there with acclaim as one of the great Christian social reformers of our time. Mrs. Kato, the former Baroness Ishimoto, is also known in the United States as the founder of the birth control movement in Japan.

The Socialist star was in the ascendant. In the second postwar national election of April 25, 1947, the Socialist Party won 25.8 per cent of the popular vote, which, through the splitting of 52.3 per cent of the votes between its two chief conservative rivals, gave it 143 seats in the House of Representatives to 131 and 124 respectively for the two conservative parties. The Socialist Party had become the largest party in the Diet, and Katayama became the new Premier on June 1, 1947, with a

Cabinet composed of right-wing Socialists, an equal number of members of the Democratic Party, which of the two major conservative parties was the one most inclined toward compromise with Socialist ideas, and two representatives of the small People's Coöperative Party.

But Katayama had led his party into an untenable position by taking office at a time when American direction of Japanese affairs made it quite impossible for the Socialists to attempt to carry out their announced program. Moreover, their Diet majority rested on a coalition with more conservative groups, thus accentuating the cleavage within the party between right- and left-wing factions. Lacking a chance to test their ideas, they remained internally divided by theoretical differences and powerless to win more adherents by a positive program. Instead, the natural resentments of a disappointed and disillusioned people were turned against them. They were blamed for continued economic stagnation. They were accused of being the running dogs of the occupation. Month by month their popularity waned. In February 1948 Katayama was forced to resign, and Ashida, head of the Democratic Party, took over as Premier in a new coalition Democratic-Socialist Cabinet. Finally in October Ashida too resigned under heavy fire for alleged corruption, and the Socialists, thoroughly discredited, left the government, as Yoshida and his very conservative Liberal Party returned to the leadership, strengthened by more than a year of recuperation on the opposition benches.

The third major stage of postwar politics had started—a drift away from the center and toward the two extremes of left and right and particularly toward the latter. This political polarization became particularly evident in the third general election, which was held on January 23, 1949. The Democratic-Liberals, as the Liberal Party then called itself after having been joined by a large number of former Democrats, won 264 seats, an outright majority of the 466 seats in the House of Representatives. This gain was largely at the expense of the middle-of-the-road Democrats and Socialists. At the same time,

the Communists, who had dropped to a mere 3.4 per cent of the vote in 1947, virtually tripled their popular support, largely at the expense of the Socialists, winning 9.6 per cent of the electorate and jumping from four to thirty-five seats in the House of Representatives.

This resurgence of the Communists was no flash-in-the-pan movement, such as their early popularity after the surrender. Political polarization was inevitable under the circumstances. The economic situation in Japan remained desperate and the political situation humiliating. Successive middle-of-the-road governments had been no more than rubber stamps for the occupation, unable to determine major policies and therefore unwilling to assume the responsibility even for minor decisions. In this frustrating atmosphere, many who were slightly left of center naturally drifted farther to the left, just as many who were right of center were drifting farther to the right.

Moreover, the Communists, despite the supposedly international ideal of world communism and the Russian domination of the movement in most parts of the world, managed to win adherents through a frankly nationalistic appeal. As the only vocal political group which stood in open opposition to the occupation authorities, they claimed to be the only champions of Japanese nationalism, and they struck heavily at their chief rivals, the Socialists, by accusing them of being the camp followers of the Americans. The Communist appeal was particularly strong to intellectuals and university students, who were for the most part in unhappy economic circumstances and, because of their knowledge and independence of judgment, were least prone to accept American domination without resentment. Accustomed to thinking in theoretical terms, these groups were disappointed at the failure of the American authorities to present a clear and comprehensive philosophy which would explain their actions and clarify their objectives. They were disillusioned by the piecemeal explanations offered by the members of the occupation, who like most other Americans took the major tenets of their democratic faith so much

for granted that they were unable to formulate them as a coherent philosophy. We had left an intellectual vacuum which the neatly packaged and labeled dialectical materialism of the Communists quickly filled, and many Japanese intellectuals accepted the mid-nineteenth-century theorizing of Marx as the latest and therefore the most advanced concepts of Western civilization.

Since the elections of January 1949 the open hostility of the occupation authorities and the Yoshida government to communism and the excesses committed by the Communists themselves during the labor disputes of the spring and summer of that year seem to have cut the Communist following again. The cracks which opened early in 1950 between the Japanese Communists and their Russian patrons may further weaken the movement in Japan. But the hard core of ardent believers remains strong and obviously much larger than it was in the first months after the surrender.

The swing to the right was on the whole more impressive than that to the left. The two major parties of the right, despite kaleidoscopic shifts in personnel and even in party names, were the direct political heirs of the two major political parties of prewar days, the Seiyukai and the Minseito. Although the purges which preceded the first election deprived them of most of their former leaders and Diet members, their organizations in the countryside remained intact and they were supported by a great majority of the most experienced politicians who remained unpurged. These included, in addition to Yoshida and Ashida, veteran statesmen like Shidehara, who was Yoshida's predecessor as Premier and leader of the Liberal Party. All three of these men, significantly enough, were trained for their role as Premiers under the occupation by long experience as foreign diplomats. Though they and other conservative leaders are, according to contemporary standards, definitely conservative in their political and economic views, they were for the most part the men who had been called "liberals" in the 1920's and 1930's for having, in general, favored parliamentary pro-

cedures in government, civilian rule rather than military domination, and a peaceful as opposed to an openly aggressive foreign policy.

In the first general election of April 1946, the two major conservative parties, then known as the Liberals and Progressives, together with various minor parties and independents who were also largely conservative, won almost exactly three-quarters of the popular vote and of the seats in the House of Representatives. In April 1947, with the minor parties and independents greatly reduced in strength, these same conservative groups won only 63.6 per cent of the vote and about 61 per cent of the House seats, but at much the same time conservative independents were winning a majority of the Prefectural Governorships and an overwhelming majority of the mayoralties and posts in the local assemblies. It is not surprising, therefore, that, with the decline of the center parties after 1947, the Democratic-Liberals were able to win 264 seats in the House of Representatives in January 1949 to 68 for the Democrats and 49 for the Socialists. Thus, the Japanese electorate has remained predominantly conservative ever since the end of the war, and the trend has been, if anything, away from the ambiguous position of the independents and the centrist position of the Democrats toward the frankly conservative concepts of laissez-faire economics of the Liberals.

Future developments in Japanese politics are as unpredictable as the internal and external factors on which they depend. However, it seems safe to assume that the vote will remain predominantly conservative for some time and that the tendency toward polarization will continue, at least as long as the Japanese Diet remains largely a rubber stamp for the occupation with little responsibility for major policy decisions. It is also probable that the present head-on clash between right and left in Japanese politics will continue. Signs of this have been the liquidation by the government of certain obstreperous leftist organizations and the dismissal of Communists and supposed leftist sympathizers among teachers and other govern-

ment employees, as part of the economy measures which the government is carrying out on American insistence. Such frontal attacks will perhaps grow in intensity, as the conservative government gathers confidence and receives continued encouragement from the occupation authorities, who have become increasingly alarmed by the Communist threat in Japan.

One of the chief imponderables in the political future of Japan is the ultimate position and strength of the essentially militaristic and imperialistic elements. So far they have for the most part remained silent and politically inactive, but they might begin to reassert themselves at any time. Aligned with the present conservative parties in a coalition slightly reminiscent of the political line-up of the 1920's and 1930's, they might further intensify the drive against the Communists until the latter are completely broken up and driven underground, in much the same way that the far weaker Communist movement of the 1920's was all but exterminated. On the other hand, these groups, attracted by the authoritarian organization of the Communists and hopeful that alignment with the Soviet Union might give Japan a bigger international role, could conceivably join forces with the Communists, as many individuals of these groups already have. The anti-capitalist prejudices of the prewar army and the socialistic inclinations of many of its officers suggest the possibility that militaristic groups could serve as a bridge between the extreme right and extreme left and that a frankly nationalistic and authoritarian coalition of these elements could be formed which might outweigh the democratic parties on the far side of the political circle.

These are all gloomy possibilities. A more hopeful possibility, and perhaps a more likely one, is that Japanese politics will gradually evolve into a contest between conservative and semi-socialist forces, each possibly represented by one major party. There are signs of a return to a two-party system, although the Japanese electoral system, by making it possible for minority groups to be represented in the Diet, encourages

the existence of splinter parties, thus making the development of a two-party system more difficult. In any case, the Japanese parties, with their continued emphasis on personal loyalties and their organization as clubs of professional politicians, are not likely to approximate closely the parties of either the United States or Great Britain. Japanese politics will undoubtedly remain distinctively Japanese; but the real question is whether or not it will also remain basically democratic.

3. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Economic developments in the long run may answer this question more decisively than developments in the strictly political field. As was clearly envisaged in the *United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*, unless the Japanese achieve a certain degree of economic well-being and security, there is little hope that they will become either a democratic or a peaceful people. Economic recovery, however, has lagged far behind demilitarization and democratization, the two other major aspects of our program in Japan, even though it is recognized as being in a sense a prerequisite for both. Japan, as we have seen, cannot grow enough food to feed her enormous population, and her industries since the war have not recovered to the point where they can produce enough salable exports to pay for the inescapable 15 per cent food deficit or for the many other imports the Japanese must have if they are to reëstablish even their very inadequate living standards of prewar days.

The only thing that has saved the Japanese from widespread starvation since the war has been large shipments of foodstuffs from the United States. Ever since the surrender, Japan has been living on an American dole of close to half a billion dollars a year. At first, while wartime attitudes remained strong, this policy of feeding a former enemy people was justified on the grounds that widespread starvation would cause disease and unrest in Japan, which would in turn endanger the occu-

pation forces. In time, the feeding of the Japanese became accepted as an inescapable concomitant of our efforts to reform and rehabilitate the country. But it is at best only a temporary solution of the problem.

For one thing, the United States, in view of its world-wide financial commitments and the possibility that emergencies may either increase other expenditures or decrease government revenue, cannot permit the indefinite continuance of this sort of drain on its resources. The sum total expended in Japan has not been great in terms of the government budget nor even when compared with what we have spent on the economic rehabilitation of Europe. As an annual expenditure it has been only a small fraction of the sums paid out under the European Recovery Program, and, in terms of the populations affected, it has been far less per person than what we have been giving even to such groups as the Western Germans or the Italians. But, large or small, the Japanese economic deficit obviously cannot be borne permanently by the citizens of the United States. Nor, for that matter, would such a solution of the problem be any more acceptable to the Japanese than to us. They are not happy receivers of largess, and the prolongation of this situation would eventually become intolerable to them and would force them to seek some more self-respecting solution of their problems.

Ultimately, the question is whether Japan can develop sufficient foreign markets to pay for necessary imports. This, as we have seen, is the most crucial and also the most discouraging problem which Japan faces. There are all too many reasons why she may not be able to solve it, especially in the framework of a divided and suspicious world. Some of her former customers, remembering the outrages committed by the Japanese during the war, are unwilling to resume trade with her. Many of her best foreign markets have been destroyed by civil war and economic stagnation. Worst of all, a large part of the area with which she carried on her greatest trade before the war is now on the other side of the "iron curtain." It is not

likely that Japan can recover economically without the restoration of trade with Northern Korea, Manchuria, and China proper. And yet it is not difficult to visualize the continuation of the present situation in which trade with these areas is all but nonexistent. It is conceivable that the United States might refuse to let the Japanese participate in such trade, even though this would leave us with a permanently bankrupt Japan on our hands. It is equally possible that the Russians or the inhabitants of these areas themselves might be unwilling to permit trade with Japan, even though Japan is obviously the best potential source of the industrial equipment which is so desperately needed to develop these areas. For any one of many reasons or more probably for a combination of several, the Japanese may not be able to reëstablish their all-important export trade.

And even if Japan should be able to restore normal trade relations with the rest of the world, it is still not certain that she can reëstablish a viable economy. Before the war she had the advantage of a large empire, which not only gave her far greater natural resources than she now has but also tens of millions of subject peoples who, living at a lower economic level than the Japanese, were forced to contribute their labor to the wealth and power of the empire. Now the Japanese no longer have the fisheries of the Kuriles, the pulp of Sakhalin, the sugar and rice of Formosa, or the rich minerals and agricultural products of Korea and Manchuria. These areas are no longer economic tributaries to Japan, and the Japanese cannot exploit them for their own benefit.

Japan, like Great Britain, is also fast losing the time advantage of early industrialization which she once enjoyed over her neighbors. Her traditional export trade of textiles and other products of light industry can never be fully restored, because most of the other countries of the world are building up their own light industries as fast as they can. Japan, unlike Great Britain, has also lost virtually all of her invisible items of export. For instance, her vast investments overseas are entirely gone, and her merchant marine hardly exists any longer. Add

to this situation the heavy cost of rebuilding her cities and reconstructing her damaged and disrupted industries, and the resulting picture is one of almost unrelieved gloom.

There are, however, some brighter aspects to the situation. Before the war the Japanese economy was able to support one of the strongest armies in the world and the third largest navy and at the same time was able to pay for heavy capital investments in Manchuria and other overseas areas. In fact, capital investments abroad may have more than counterbalanced direct economic gains to Japan from her empire. Now, a demilitarized Japan, shorn of her empire, has had her expenditures reduced perhaps as drastically as her income. By avoiding costly military expenditures and devoting her remaining resources entirely to the support of her people, she may be able to maintain the living standards to which they were accustomed. Japan's loss of textile and other light industry markets may also be in large measure offset by the development of new markets for her heavy industries. Her neighbors in seeking to develop light industries must import machinery and other capital goods on a larger scale than before, and these goods they can probably obtain more cheaply and easily from Japan than anywhere else in the world.

Japan's merchant marine also may in time be revived. Experience since the end of the war has shown conclusively that the Japanese cannot profitably trade with the rest of the world if they must pay others for the service of hauling raw materials to Japan and manufactured goods from Japan. The margin of profit in their reëxport trade is too small to permit the paying of the much higher transport costs charged by American or other non-Japanese ships. Either these goods must, for the most part, be carried in Japanese bottoms or else they cannot profitably be carried at all. The restoration of the Japanese merchant marine is an absolute prerequisite for the restoration of the Japanese economy and fortunately one which Japan's shipbuilding capacity and shipping experience make relatively easy to achieve.

Japan's immediate economic problems may be capable of solution after all, but behind them looms the even more basic problem of population growth. The sudden dumping of six million Japanese from abroad into the Japanese islands and the spurt in births which resulted from the reunification of families after the war dealt the Japanese economy a body blow. And the population is continuing to grow at the rate of more than a million a year, outstripping all efforts to increase agricultural yields or to expand industrial production.

Unable to emigrate and hard put to it to increase production at home, the Japanese have become the first Asiatic people to realize that population control of one sort or another is absolutely essential if they are to solve their economic problems in the long run. The American authorities have agreed with them in theory but have refused to follow the matter further. Birth control is so controversial a subject in the United States that no American official wishes to take a public stand on it. But, while we have been studiously ignoring the problem, the Japanese themselves have gone ahead. In the spring of 1949 they passed a law legalizing abortion and permitting the sale of contraceptives. There are signs that either because of this law or for more fundamental reasons, or probably because of both, the rate of population increase is slowing down, though it as yet is impossible to say how soon or to what extent the population curve will begin to level off. In any case, it seems likely that Japan's population will climb to well over 100,000,000 before it stops growing, if it ever does, and it is equally certain that, if it continues to grow indefinitely, at some point it will exceed the potentialities of the land to support it even under optimum conditions. No one knows what this point may be, but the economic dikes can only be raised to a limited height, and, if the population river rises beyond that point, disaster is sure to inundate Japan.

Faced with these immediate economic problems and a still more foreboding future, it is small wonder that the attention of the occupation authorities and the Japanese alike has been

drawn to the problem of economic recovery, sometimes to the neglect of other aspects of occupation policy. While in the first two years after the surrender economic recovery was all but forgotten in our enthusiasm for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, in time we became more and more alarmed at the continued economic collapse of the country and distressed at the prospect of an indefinite drain on our resources to pay for a bankrupt Japan.

In theory the new emphasis on economic recovery did not require any diminution of our various reform efforts, but in practice reform and recovery met in head-on collision at various levels. If Japanese industry was to be restored to levels able to support the nation, a halt had to be called at some place to the dismantling of factories for reparations, the breaking up of going business concerns into smaller and untested units, the purging of experienced business leaders, and many other reforms felt to be desirable for social and political reasons but injurious to the economy as it existed. A serious divergence of opinion immediately developed over the proper balance to be struck between the two highly desirable but inevitably conflicting objectives of reform and recovery. Some feel that we have abandoned too much of the original reform program to be sure of success for any part of it. Others feel that we were far too slow in calling a halt to politically unnecessary and economically disastrous reforms. The large amount of criticism from both sides suggests that perhaps the actual balance struck was not an unreasonable one.

Another aspect of the problem has been the attempt to bring the Japanese budget within bounds by drastically reducing government expenditures. During the course of 1949, the occupation authorities forced the Japanese government to curtail its activities and to dismiss large numbers of government employees. The budget as a result was balanced, the inflationary spiral was largely checked, and the black market virtually eliminated, but not without some counterbalancing losses. The austerity program may have been pushed too far in some

respects, changing inflation directly into deflation. Moreover, many desirable government undertakings which were contributory to the reform program had to be eliminated or reduced. The labor unions, which opposed the dismissals, were soundly defeated, losing some of the prestige and influence we had been at such pains to give them. And the dismissals were in some cases turned into a convenient means of getting rid of employees or teachers who were considered troublesome leftist sympathizers. Thus, academic freedom was threatened and respect for individual rights undermined.

One item in the Japanese budget which we have not been able to reduce much is the cost of the occupation itself. The Japanese government ever since the surrender has borne all the expenses of the occupation which could be paid in yen—the housing of offices and personnel, the building of installations, the furnishing of transportation and communication facilities, the providing of coal for heating, and the usual public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity, which the Americans in Japan have consumed in prodigious quantities according to Japanese standards, and the furnishing of "indigenous personnel" for everything from housemaids and jeep drivers to free orchestras for Allied billets. All this has been adding up to between a quarter and a fifth of the annual budget, which is an enormous amount to pay for the maintenance of a directional group over and above the regular organs of government. There naturally has been considerable resentment among the Japanese over the costs of the occupation and a feeling that it was just another economic millstone around the necks of the Japanese people. Efforts were started in 1949 to reduce the costs in various ways, but only a complete recasting of the functions of the Supreme Commander and his associates could produce any very great reduction in this item in the Japanese budget.

Taken in the aggregate, the economic problems facing Japan constitute a formidable barrier across the road Japan must travel if she is to become a peaceful and useful member of the

community of nations. No one can say whether or not she can successfully surmount this barrier. On the answer to that question depends to a large degree the future of democracy in Japan and, for that matter, the future of Japan itself and possibly of the whole Far East. If the Japanese cannot solve their economic problems as a peaceful people ideologically aligned with the democratic peoples of the world, they will undoubtedly seek to solve them by other means—perhaps by aligning themselves with the Communist nations and attempting to pay their way by the industrial and possibly also the military contributions they are capable of making to the Soviet bloc. There are many pitfalls in the way of their progress toward peace and democracy, but the most immediate and possibly the greatest of all is the economic chasm that all but surrounds them.

4. THE NEXT MOVE

Considering the many difficulties, from psychological hazards and unfavorable social patterns to food deficits and the loss of foreign markets, which our occupation authorities have been facing, they have indeed done well to have steered Japan as far as she has come on the road to rehabilitation. The situation in Japan, however, has been changing ever since the surrender, and it is still changing now. The methods which were applicable at one stage become outmoded and unworkable at another, just as educational methods must change with the advancing age of the student. We have constantly been forced to ask ourselves, "What should we do next?" This question is particularly important and difficult to answer right now, because we have obviously come to a major turning point in the occupation and in our whole relationship with Japan. General MacArthur has announced that, with the fiscal reforms of 1949, the main reform policies have all been put into execution. The occupation authorities have virtually completed the task they set out to accomplish, and, in so far as they have

been successful, they have worked themselves out of their jobs. In any case, we have already long since run into a situation of diminishing returns. The same effort on our part simply cannot produce the same results it did during the period of political and social fluidity immediately after the war. Everyone agrees that the time has come to reconsider the whole situation in Japan and particularly the future of the occupation.

As we have seen, all of our reform measures in Japan must be achieved at two successive levels. The first is the formal revision of laws and procedures, making possible new patterns of conduct and new relationships. At this stage, now virtually completed, our firm guidance and leadership have been necessary if these reforms were to be achieved as quickly as we and our Allies desired. Next comes the stage in which the Japanese through practice learn to conduct themselves according to the new patterns, making such adjustments and changes as are necessary to fit them into the society as a whole. Clearly this is the stage we have now entered. At this stage the outside mentor becomes perhaps more of a liability than an asset. If he has lost his prestige and authority, his presence can be nothing more than an irritant to the Japanese. If he still retains his prestige and authority, he will keep the Japanese too dependent upon him, inhibiting them from learning to conduct themselves according to the new rules. In either case, as the proud author of the reforms being tested, he will inevitably be distressed at any modification of them, however essential, and will attempt to block the vital process of readjustment and integration. In short, the reforms cannot be fully translated from formal laws into operating social patterns so long as the foreign teacher continues his domination or even his guidance of the pupil. Once the lesson has been thoroughly demonstrated, there is no further profit in the pupil's continuing to watch the teacher do it. The time has come for the pupil really to learn the lesson by trying it himself. This no doubt is what General MacArthur had in mind when early in the occupation he indicated that our control of Japan should not extend

beyond about three years and when more recently he urged the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible.

While individual reforms can perhaps become integral parts of Japanese society even though the occupation should continue for decades, the reform as a whole, which is the creation in Japan of a peaceful and democratic society, can never be fully achieved so long as we stay there. There is a fundamental contradiction between our attempt to reform the Japanese and our desire that they become a democratic people, determining their own fate by democratic procedures. Redressing the balance of forces in Japan by the intrusion of external force was perhaps a necessary part of the process, but democracy can only become a living reality when the Japanese begin to act in a democratic way on their own volition. We have in a sense been guiding the hands of the Japanese, but there is a limit to what can be accomplished by this. The time has perhaps come when the guiding hand, instead of being an aid, is actually hindering the pupil from perfecting the skills we are attempting to teach him.

This can perhaps be seen best in the field of politics itself. We have instituted an excellent electoral system in Japan and devised a parliamentary system in which the directly elected representatives of the people can control the whole government in behalf of their constituents. The Japanese have followed out the motions of this system faithfully and meticulously, going to the polls in greater numbers than we do ourselves. But democratic politics has not really come alive in Japan, because, with all major policies determined by the occupation authorities, the procedure is basically meaningless. It has made little difference whether the Japanese elected a Diet which was predominantly conservative or Socialist. The final results in legislation were sure to be what the American authorities wished. Voting was only an expression of opinion, not part of a system of self-rule. The Diet, though not subservient to any other body within the Japanese government, was still merely a tool of a nonelective bureaucratic group—

the occupation authorities themselves. Elections and parliamentary procedures can become meaningful only when the Diet truly begins to determine policy. Only then will the Japanese be learning democracy by practicing it.

Most observers of Japan, therefore, would agree that the time has come to change the occupation; some would say it had already come a year or two ago. Of course, we can never be sure that, when we lift our hand from the controls, the Japanese will continue to conduct themselves in an essentially democratic way. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that, if we continue to control the situation longer, the Japanese will be any more likely to become democratic when we eventually do let go. In fact, we now run the danger of losing more than we gain by continuance of the old controls. While much can still be done in perfecting the details of the reforms, our continued presence in Japan at this stage is stifling the enthusiasm for democracy which the Japanese showed in the early days of the occupation and is reënforcing the old Japanese concept of control of the Diet by a nonelective bureaucracy.

The economic situation is often cited as another reason for hastening the change. Not only is the occupation economically costly, but the double bureaucratic control of a foreign administration superimposed on the Japanese government has proved inhibiting to foreign trade and the restoration of the economy as a whole. Red tape has increased to the point where it seriously impedes trade, and American officials, while doing their best to serve as middlemen for trade between Japan and the rest of the world, have probably accomplished far less than the Japanese would be able to do themselves if they could deal directly with foreign purchasers and suppliers of goods. The consensus of opinion is definitely that the sooner our control of Japan can be dropped or at least drastically reduced the better for all concerned.

The problem really is what sort of change exactly should be made and how can it best be accomplished. One possibility

might be a gradual process of surrendering powers from the occupation authorities to the Japanese government. This has already started on a small scale, but is not so easy or so effective a process as it may appear. The vital question would be who has the ultimate power for major policy decisions—the occupation authorities or the Japanese government. If it continues to be the former, then the surrendering of lesser powers to the Japanese would not really help the situation. If it should be the latter, then whatever remains of the occupation would be put in an anomalous and ultimately intolerable position. The only power which makes any difference is the right to make major policy decisions, and when that power is transferred to the Japanese all minor aspects of authority must go with it.

Another more feasible possibility might be to return all directional control to the Japanese government, but to create some organ in behalf of the Allied Powers or of the United States alone which would retain a negative control over the decisions of the Japanese government in the form of a veto applicable to any decisions which broke the original terms of surrender or whatever controlling documents were agreed upon. Such a negative control would presumably depend upon the complete economic dependence of Japan on trade with the outside world and the overwhelming superiority of American military power over any military strength the Japanese are capable of re-creating. An objection to this suggestion would be that, since these sanctions are inherent in the situation, they scarcely need to be formalized in this way. In fact, a board of Allied or American legislative censors in Tokyo would probably not increase the actual control we or our Allies had over Japan. At best it would be a cumbersome device of very dubious value, and at worst it might do more harm than good by serving as a useless irritant to the Japanese people.

The best and most feasible move, therefore, would be to bring a complete end to occupation controls and to restore

Japan to a status of real independence, limited only by the rules of international law and the universal principles of mankind as expressed through the United Nations and enforced by the community of nations. This, of course, can be accomplished only by a multilateral peace treaty. In fact, even a lesser change in the status of the occupation could be achieved only as a result of international agreement. Although we have completely dominated the occupation, General MacArthur has remained at least in theory an international figure—the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers—and in setting up the Far Eastern Commission we expressly agreed that "any directives dealing with fundamental changes . . . in the regime of control . . . will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission." Thus, although we have in practice been free of international control in our occupation of Japan, we cannot terminate it without international agreement. For the first time we are forced to win the agreement of our allies before we can take the next major step.

This situation has created a dilemma for us. We are agreed that in order to achieve what we set out to do we should bring an end to the occupation as soon as possible, but at the same time we can terminate it only through agreement with a group of nations some of which either do not interpret the situation as we do or else are not in basic agreement with our objectives. We want and need a peace treaty with Japan, but we cannot afford to agree to a treaty which will imperil the results of our reform efforts. Japan's economic and political future is so uncertain that even small blunders in a peace treaty might prove disastrous. The occupation definitely should be terminated, but a bad treaty would be even worse than its continuation.

We are possibly in part responsible for the failure of some of our allies to agree with us as to what the terms of a peace treaty with Japan should be. Great Britain and some of the other powers throughout have shown forbearing and loyal

support for our whole occupation venture and have aided us more than hindered us by their friendly criticism, but we have inevitably made some of our allies resentful of our actions and suspicious of our motives by effectively excluding them from meaningful participation in the occupation and by disregarding some of their legitimate interests. We have also prevented them from coming to grips with realities in Japan, and the result has been that in some cases they have retained attitudes toward the Japanese and their problems which we once held ourselves but later abandoned because of the knowledge and experience we gained through our closer contact with the situation in Japan.

This is particularly true of the Australians and Filipinos. Deeply embittered against the Japanese and still fearful of Japan's potential military power, they have tended to preserve a high degree of skepticism toward our reform program and a somewhat unrealistic attitude toward Japan's economic problems, ranging from outright advocacy of the principle that we should let them "stew in their own juice" to insistence that they should at least be prohibited from having much heavy industry or a merchant marine. True international control of the occupation would unquestionably have been less efficient than our unilateral determination and execution of policy, but this drawback might actually have been more than compensated for at this crucial stage by greater sympathy on the part of our allies toward our efforts in Japan and broader understanding of the problems Japan faces.

A more serious difficulty is presented by the Soviet Union and also by China, which is now for all practical purposes Russia's satellite in international matters. While the basic objectives of the Australians and Filipinos with regard to Japan are the same as ours, this cannot be said of the Soviet Union or Communist China. They want to produce by a peace treaty conditions which they feel are conducive to the growth and eventual triumph of communism in Japan. These conditions, as they envisage them, are not likely to be identical with the con-

ditions we consider necessary to ensure the continued growth of democracy in Japan. This conflict of aims lies behind the Soviet insistence on the veto right at any Japanese peace conference and our own reluctance to grant them that right.

This clash of interests was immediately revealed in the early efforts to call a peace conference to terminate the occupation. In 1947 the United States suggested a preliminary conference of the nations represented in the Far Eastern Commission to discuss a peace treaty. The Soviet Union immediately objected to this procedure, holding that a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and China was the proper organ to consider the matter. This, however, would have excluded countries like the Philippines, which had suffered from the war with Japan far more than the Soviet Union, and countries like Australia, which over the long period may have contributed more than Russia to stopping Japanese aggression and bringing about the surrender. The Soviet proposal, therefore, was entirely inacceptable to the United States and the other members of the Far Eastern Commission. But the Soviet Union again in May 1949 urged that the great powers take up the matter. Perhaps in reply, Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Minister Bevin a few months later indicated that the governments of the United States and Great Britain were interested in the early drafting of a peace treaty with Japan, presumably by all of the countries in the Far Eastern Commission.

Behind these proposals and counterproposals looms the fundamental question of Soviet participation in a peace treaty with Japan. Efforts to reach peace settlements concerning Germany and Austria have shown all too clearly the difficulty of agreement when the Soviet Union enjoys the veto power. Obviously there is little hope that a workable treaty would emerge from a four-power conference or even from a thirteen-power conference at which the Soviet Union had the right to a veto. Conferences of this sort would probably be protracted and almost certainly futile, doing more harm than good. And

meanwhile, time would be running against us in Japan. The decision that must be made, therefore, is whether we and the other non-Communist members of the Far Eastern Commission are ready to go ahead with a peace conference without anyone's having the veto—which very likely would also mean without the Soviet Union.

This question, of course, like all difficult problems, can be argued both ways. Unquestionably a peace conference without Soviet participation would be another blow to world unity, but perhaps the world is so completely divided already that one more blow can make little difference anyway. It could also be used for propaganda purposes against us, because we did agree with our Allies not to seek a separate peace, but this, of course, had primary reference to the terms upon which hostilities were to cease and did not mean that after the termination of the war each ally would continue indefinitely to exercise a veto power over the relations of the other powers to their former enemies. The Japanese would, of course, be placed in an embarrassing position in their relations with the Soviet Union if the latter continued to regard them technically as enemies while most of the rest of us had made peace with them, but in any case this embarrassing relationship is likely to exist in actual practice so long as the "cold war" continues and Japan remains ideologically oriented toward the democratic half of the world. The fact that China has now become a Communist nation complicates the situation without changing it essentially. Two vetoes are the same as one, and, so long as the Soviet Union abstains from a peace treaty, it makes little difference if her satellites abstain also. In any case, trade relations with China are what count, and these are likely to be determined by more practical considerations than mere technical recognition.

Thus, the drawbacks to a peace treaty without Communist participation, though very real, may not outweigh the disadvantages of continuing the present situation. Neither is a truly satisfactory prospect, and every effort should be made to win

Soviet and Chinese acceptance of a workable peace treaty, but, if this proves impossible, as is all too likely, we should not permit ourselves to be caught indefinitely on the horns of this dilemma. We should certainly explore the possibility of a peace conference participated in by the other eleven members of the Far Eastern Commission with a view to producing a treaty which is satisfactory to this group and to the rest of the non-Communist states of the world. There will be serious difficulties even in doing this, but, since our objectives are fundamentally the same, a careful study of the facts should help to iron out differences of opinion and bring us all to essential agreement on reasonable terms for a Japanese peace treaty or some substitute for a peace treaty, if the latter proves to be unattainable.

The three major categories of problems to be settled in a peace treaty or any other major shift in our relationship with Japan are the same as the three major aspects of our occupation policy—political, military, and economic. Of these, the economic problems will probably be the most hotly debated. Some nations may favor the continuance of severe limitations over those parts of the Japanese economy which can be easily transformed into military strength—that is to say, most of Japan's heavy industries and probably also her overseas shipping. There is much to recommend this approach, and we, too, might support it if there were any possibility that Japan could live on agriculture and light industry alone. Unfortunately, this obviously is not the case. Japan inevitably is becoming more and more dependent on her heavy industries to maintain her population above starvation levels. She has to have a merchant marine to live at all. Purely military industries, such as munitions, and also possibly aircraft construction should be denied her, but this ban cannot be extended into large segments of the chemical industries or steel and machinery without so crippling the Japanese economy that we would be driving the Japanese in desperation either into the arms of the Commu-

nists or else back to their old militaristic ideas. These economic limitations on Japan in the long run would not be workable and in the meantime would do just what they were intended to prevent. The facts are clear, and eventual agreement, therefore, should not be difficult.

At the same time, a reappraisal of the military situation in the postwar world should serve to calm the fears of the Filipinos and the Australians at the prospect of a resurgent Japan. Japan, it is true, has at present the only economic base in the whole Far East capable of producing great military power, but she can never be a major military force in the world again, except as an ally of one or the other of the two great world factions. She, unlike Germany, does not have the natural resources which could make her ever again a serious competitor of either the United States or the Soviet Union. So long as there is any semblance of a world order or even a simple balance of power between the two major factions of the world, Japan cannot again play the role of a world power as she did before the war. Only if the world should fall into chaos could she again win military domination over the Far East, and in that event who will be worrying about one more nation on the warpath?

A reappraisal of the economic situation in the Far East should also show that from a strictly economic point of view a Japan with highly developed heavy industries is more to be desired for the area as a whole than a Japan concentrating only on light industries. To be the latter, she would have to attempt to pour her consumer goods into the countries which are now striving to build up their own light industries. If she succeeded in this, she would undermine their efforts at industrialization; if not, she herself would of course go under. What those nations want and need most from Japan is machinery and other capital goods. As a country limited to light industry, Japan would stand in the way of the economic development of her neighbors. As a nation tending more and more to heavy

industry, Japan will fit perfectly into the developing economy of the Far East and will be best able to contribute to the economic advancement of her neighbors.

The political and social problems to be faced in writing a peace treaty will be less controversial. The chief problem will be to what extent the perpetuation of the reforms accomplished by the occupation should be made terms of the treaty. Since the same arguments against the continuation of occupational controls apply to their continuation in written form in a treaty, there will probably be general agreement that any detailed enumeration of the reforms in the treaty would be undesirable. On the other hand, there is no reason why the treaty should not include guarantees of fundamental human rights and essential democratic processes. These increasingly are being written into international agreements, and the Japanese would probably consider it an honor rather than a limitation to be among the first to have these principles included in their treaties with other nations.

The military problems to be faced in a peace treaty, though perhaps not so complicated as the economic, are as crucial. Japan is at present an entirely defenseless nation, and the world still does not offer international security. Lying on the frontier between the two great world power blocs, an undefended Japan would invite aggression and counteraggression. In the event that one bloc is not signatory to the peace treaty, clear provisions for the defense of Japan are all the more necessary.

One solution of this problem would be to have the Japanese rearm for their own defense, presumably with our encouragement and aid. This, however, would give some basis to Australian and Filipino fears that a reindustrialized Japan would be a military menace to them. It would also be the death blow to Japanese pacifistic idealism, which is one of the chief reasons for optimism regarding Japan's future position in the world. The Japanese with our encouragement renounced war and the maintenance of armed forces forever in their Constitution. If now we cynically insist that they rearm, they could scarcely

maintain any belief in our sincerity or in the validity of the ideal of world peace. Worse than that, a restored army and navy in Japan might overbalance the scales against democracy. The army in particular was a strong force working against democracy in prewar Japan. It and its officers enjoyed great prestige and authority. Its revival within the generation, while the prewar army officers are still alive and active, would seriously endanger the whole attempt to make the Japanese a peaceful and democratic people. Japan might thereby be made secure from Soviet aggression—she might even become a useful military ally for us—but, if she meanwhile became a militaristic and authoritarian state again, her friendship would probably prove much more of a liability than an asset to us.

But Japan cannot be left entirely defenseless. For one thing she will have to have more of a coast guard than she now has, to protect her waters and prevent smuggling, and some sort of a national police force to maintain order within Japan. In addition, pending the creation of a more stable world order and more effective international guarantees of peace, Japan will also need some sort of specific guarantee from the nations which sign a peace treaty with her. Very possibly this will have to be implemented in the form of foreign military installations on her soil. The Japanese themselves would probably welcome this, at least for a while. But, however necessary, the stationing of foreign troops on Japanese soil after the conclusion of a peace treaty is not a desirable solution of the problem, and it is to be hoped that it would last only a relatively short period and that international guarantees, backed by the prestige and power of the United Nations, will some day make all weak or defenseless lands safe from aggression.

There are, thus, many difficult problems to be decided in a peace treaty, and the nature of that document and its time of signature are among the many variables which make any exact predictions concerning Japan's future so difficult. Through the occupation, we have done what we could to foster peace and democracy in Japan. Granting the inevitable margin of human

error, we perhaps did all that could have been accomplished under the circumstances. Certainly there is little more that we can do by such means. The future of Japan is now being shaped by more fundamental and more powerful forces beyond our control.

One of these is Japanese society itself. We should not forget that the ultimate decision in Japan will be made by the Japanese and not by us. All we could ever do was to make certain external changes. The real question is whether or not Japanese society is capable of growing in the direction of peace and democracy. Our hand has been tipping the scale, but the Japanese themselves must make the readjustments which will keep the scales tipped one way or the other. If the Japanese succeed in maintaining a viable economy, despite all their economic difficulties, and on the basis of that a peaceful and democratic society, we can perhaps take a midwife's credit for assisting at the birth, but the real triumph will be that of the Japanese people, who will have demonstrated their ability to grow and develop socially and politically in rhythm with the growth of man's knowledge and the development of his skills.

Another great force now shaping the future of Japan is one over which even the Japanese have little control. This is the influence of the world situation on Japan. The greatest variable in Japan's future and one which completely overshadows all that we have attempted to do in Japan and even what the Japanese themselves may wish to do is the future of the world itself. Japan today is an integral part of a world culture, a world economy, and a world order or lack of order. What happens to the world as a whole will determine the future of Japan even more than what has happened in Japan until now. If a united world emerges from the present travail, Japan unquestionably will go along with the rest of the world toward democracy or totalitarianism—whichever concept emerges triumphant. If war engulfs the world it will engulf Japan too, destroying most of what we and the Japanese sought to accomplish during the past several years. If the present cleavage

between the Communist and democratic halves of the world continues, Japan will be drawn both ways, and the fate of democracy in Japan will be closely linked with the course of the world-wide struggle.

The eventual fate of Japan, after all, is that of the world as a whole. Japan is of concern to us only as an element in a world order. In working for a peaceful and democratic Japan, we have been contributing to the creation of a peaceful and democratic world. Perhaps the contribution we have made with the aid of the Japanese is more than at present seems evident. But Japan is still only part of a larger picture. If we and our international associates fail in our effort to achieve a peaceful and predominantly democratic world, we shall no doubt fail in Japan too. If we succeed in creating a peaceful and democratic world, then we can look for the eventual development of a truly peaceful and essentially democratic Japan.

Appendix I. The Potsdam Proclamation

July 26, 1945

(1) WE—THE PRESIDENT of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and in-

fluence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Appendix II. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*

August 29, 1945

PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate U. S. departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

PART I—ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(*a*) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(*b*) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but

* Prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department and approved by the President on September 6, 1945. The document in substance was sent to General MacArthur by radio on August 29 and, after approval by the President, by messenger on September 6.

it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

(*a*) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(*b*) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(*c*) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(*d*) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

Part II—Allied Authority

1. *Military Occupation*

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

2. *Relationship to Japanese Government*

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

3. *Publicity as to Policies*

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfilment.

PART III—POLITICAL

1. *Disarmament and Demilitarization*

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with

determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval matériel, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultra-nationalism, in doctrine and practice, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. *War Criminals*

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. *Encouragement of Desire for Individual Liberties and Democratic Processes*

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Jap-

anese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees and regulations which establish discriminations on ground of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part III and thereafter shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

Part IV—Economic

1. *Economic Demilitarization*

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful require-

ments, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. *Promotion of Democratic Forces*

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

(*a*) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and

(*b*) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

3. *Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity*

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected

without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

(*a*) To avoid acute economic distress.

(*b*) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

(*c*) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.

(*d*) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

4. *Reparations and Restitution*

Reparations

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made:

(*a*) Through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.

(*b*) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

Restitution

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.

5. *Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies*

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit

policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

6. *International Trade and Financial Relations*

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs.

7. *Japanese Property Located Abroad*

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

8. *Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan*

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

9. *Imperial Household Property*

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

Appendix III. The Constitution of Japan

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Chapter I. The Emperor

Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.

Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.

Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.

The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law.

Article 5. When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of state in the Emperor's name. In this case, paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable.

Article 6. The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet.

The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.

Article 7. The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people:

Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties.

Convocation of the Diet.

Dissolution of the House of Representatives.

Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet.

Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers.

Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Awarding of honors.

Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.

Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers.

Performance of ceremonial functions.

Article 8. No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People

Article 10. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

Article 11. The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights.

Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Article 14. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations, because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.

Peers and peerage shall not be recognized.

No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

Article 15. The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them.

All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof.

Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.

In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A

voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.

Article 16. Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of damage, for the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, ordinances or regulations and for other matters; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.

Article 17. Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.

Article 18. No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.

Article 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.

Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.

No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.

The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Article 21. Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.

No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.

Article 22. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.

Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

Article 23. Academic freedom is guaranteed.

Article 24. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.

With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.

Article 25. All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.

In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.

Article 26. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.

All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free.

Article 27. All people shall have the right and the obligation to work.

Standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law.

Children shall not be exploited.

Article 28. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.

Article 29. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable.

Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.

Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.

Article 30. The people shall be liable to taxation as provided by law.

Article 31. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

Article 32. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

Article 33. No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense being committed.

Article 34. No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel.

Article 35. The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 33.

Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent judicial officer.

Article 36. The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.

Article 37. In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.

He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense.

At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State.

Article 38. No person shall be compelled to testify against himself.

Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence.

No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.

Article 39. No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.

Article 40. Any person, in case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may sue the State for redress as provided by law.

Chapter IV. The Diet

Article 41. The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.

Article 42. The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

Article 43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.

The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law.

Article 44. The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.

Article 45. The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the House of Representatives is dissolved.

Article 46. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for half the members shall take place every three years.

Article 47. Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law.

Article 48. No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously.

Article 49. Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with law.

Article 50. Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from apprehension while the Diet is in session, and any members apprehended before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the House.

Article 51. Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House.

Article 52. An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year.

Article 53. The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on such convocation.

Article 54. When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the election.

When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session.

Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.

Article 55. Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

Article 56. Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one-third or more of total membership is present.

All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the presiding officer shall decide the issue.

Article 57. Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution therefor.

Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be deemed to require secrecy.

Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.

Article 58. Each House shall select its own president and other officials.

Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution thereon.

Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.

A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.

Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.

Article 60. The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.

Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 61. The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties.

Article 62. Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.

Article 63. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations.

Article 64. The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted.

Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.

Chapter V. The Cabinet

Article 65. Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

Article 66. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.

The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.

The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

Article 67. The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business.

If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 68. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet.

The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.

Article 69. If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days.

Article 70. When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general elec-

tion of members of the House of Representatives, the Cabinet shall resign en masse.

Article 71. In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed.

Article 72. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches.

Article 73. The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:

Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state.

Manage foreign affairs.

Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet.

Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law.

Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet.

Enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.

Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Article 74. All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister.

Article 75. The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.

Chapter VI. Judiciary

Article 76. The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.

No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.

All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.

Article 77. The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.

Public procurators shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts.

Article 78. Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency.

Article 79. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.

The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter.

In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.

Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law.

The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 80. The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.

Article 82. Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.

Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases

wherein the rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.

Chapter VII. Finance

Article 83. The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine.

Article 84. No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as law may prescribe.

Article 85. No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as authorized by the Diet.

Article 86. The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each fiscal year.

Article 87. In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet must get subsequent approval of the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund.

Article 88. All property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State. All expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget.

Article 89. No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority.

Article 90. Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be audited annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, together with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law.

Article 91. At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances.

Chapter VIII. Local Self-Government

Article 92. Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.

Article 93. The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, in accordance with law.

The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their assemblies, and such other local officials as may be

determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.

Article 94. Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law.

Article 95. A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

Chapter IX. Amendments

Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

Chapter X. Supreme Law

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

Chapter XI. Supplementary Provisions

Article 100. This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation.

The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of members of the House of Councillors

and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

Article 101. If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall function as the Diet until such time as the House of Councillors shall be constituted.

Article 102. The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this category shall be determined in accordance with law.

Article 103. The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives and judges in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution shall not forfeit their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or appointed under the provisions of this Constitution, they shall forfeit their positions as a matter of course.

Appendix IV. Suggested Reading

It is not easy to draw up a well-rounded list of readings on Japan. Relatively little has appeared in the English language and much of what has been published is now outdated or else is not available in most American libraries. On a few aspects of the subject there is a wealth of material which makes selection difficult; but in other equally important fields there is almost nothing that can be recommended. As a result, this list is inevitably spotty in coverage and extremely uneven in quality.

For those who wish to enter upon a serious study of Japan or some aspect of her culture, a convenient starting point would be *A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French, and German* (American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, 1940), which was compiled by Hugh Borton, Serge Elisséeff, and myself. It lists more than 800 titles, including some more comprehensive bibliographies, which will lead the student still further into the subject. This handy guide has been seriously outdated by the flood of books on Japan let loose by the war and its aftermath, but a revised and enlarged edition will probably be brought out by the Harvard University Press before the end of 1950.

We are fortunate in having an excellent cultural history of Japan which tells the story of Japan's development until the early nineteenth century. This is Sir George Sansom's *Japan. A Short Cultural History* (Appleton-Century, New York, 1943). No book of comparable scope covers the more modern period. Sir George himself has continued the story down to 1894 in *The Western World and Japan* (Knopf, New York, 1950), telling of the impact of Western civilization on Japanese society and thus setting the stage for more recent developments. Chitoshi Yanaga's *Japan Since Perry* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949) covers in detail the whole period since the reopening of Japan, but, because of its heavy emphasis on facts rather than on interpretations, it is not easy for the beginner to use. Briefer over-all accounts of the political history of

modern Japan are to be found in Paul Hibbert Clyde, *The Far East. A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia* (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1948) and Paul E. Eckel, *The Far East Since 1500* (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1948). None of these works attempts to cover both the early and modern periods, but a brief interpretive history of Japan from ancient times until the end of the recent war can be found in my *Japan Past and Present* (Knopf, New York, 1946).

Several books, although not giving a full history of modern Japan, treat specific aspects of the subject. Payson Jackson Treat's *Japan and the United States 1853–1921, revised and continued to 1928* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1928) and his three volumes entitled *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1932 and 1938), although somewhat apologistic in tone, are still the standard works on Japanese-American relations; E. Herbert Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1940) is an excellent study of certain aspects of the early Meiji period; Harold Scott Quigley's *Japanese Government and Politics* (The Century Political Science Series, New York, 1932) is a standard work on Japanese political developments; my brother, Robert K. Reischauer, published a very convenient briefer account of the same subject in *Japan. Government–Politics* (Thomas Nelson, New York, 1939); Kenneth Wallace Colegrove's *Militarism in Japan* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1936) and Hillis Lory's *Japan's Military Masters* (The Viking Press, New York, 1943) are valuable accounts of modern Japanese militarism; Hugh Borton covers the prewar decade in *Japan Since 1931–Its Social and Political Development* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1940); Hugh Byas, in *Government by Assassination* (Knopf, New York, 1942), gives a very readable account of the rise of mystical nationalism in recent years, and the same subject is given more scholarly treatment in D. C. Holtom's *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947) and interesting documentation in *Kokutai no hongi* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1949), translated by John Owen Gauntlett and edited by Robert King Hall.

We are not so well supplied with books on Japanese culture and society as on history. In the important field of literature there are no good surveys in the English language and few satisfactory translations. W. G. Aston's *A History of Japanese Literature* (Appleton-Century, London, 1933 [first edition 1899]) might best be ignored in favor of the few readable translations we have from the Japanese.

For poetry there is Arthur Waley's *Japanese Poetry. The 'Uta'* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1919) and Harold Gould Henderson's *The Bamboo Broom. An Introduction to Japanese Haiku* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1934). For the classical *No* drama we have Arthur Waley's translations of twenty plays under the title *The No Plays of Japan* (Knopf, New York, 1922). For prose one might best read two others of Arthur Waley's great translations, *The Tale of Genji* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1935, and in six volumes by Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1925–1933) and *The Pillow Book of Lady Sei Shonagon* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1929). One might also read *Diaries of Court Ladies of Old Japan* (Kenkyusha, Tokyo, 1935) translated by Annie Shepley Omori and Kochi Doi, and Arthur Lindsay Sadler's translations of *The Ten Foot Square Hut and Tales of the Heike* (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1928). Unfortunately the only reasonably good translations of modern prose works which are readily available in this country are not the best or the most typical examples of modern Japanese writing. They are Toyohiko Kawaga, *Before the Dawn* (translated by I. Fukumoto and T. Satchell, Doran, New York, 1925), Tadayoshi Sakurai, *Human Bullets. A Soldier's Story of Port Arthur* (translated by Masajiro Honda and Alice Mabel Bacon, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1907), and Ashihei Hino, *Wheat and Soldiers* (translated by Baroness Shidzue Ishimoto, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1937).

In the field of religion, we have an admirable survey in Masaharu Anesaki's *History of Japanese Religion* (Kegan Paul, London, 1930). On Buddhism there is Sir Charles Norton Edgecumbe Eliot's *Japanese Buddhism* (Arnold, London, 1935) and a shorter work by my father, August Karl Reischauer, entitled *Studies in Japanese Buddhism* (Macmillan, New York, 1925). On Shinto there is D. C. Holtom's *The National Faith of Japan. A Study of Modern Shinto* (Kegan Paul, London, 1938).

In the field of art H. Minamoto's *An Illustrated History of Japanese Art* (translated by Harold G. Henderson, Hoshino, Kyoto, 1935) and Noritake Tsuda's *Handbook of Japanese Art* (Sanseido, Tokyo, 1935) constitute convenient and well-illustrated, one-volume histories of the subject. There are also a number of excellent books on specific aspects of Japanese art, particularly on woodblock prints. The collections of Japanese art in American museums for the most part are inferior to the magnificent collections of Chinese art in this country, but the Japanese art collection in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston is recognized as the finest collection of its sort outside Japan.

Little has been written on Japanese society in the English lan-

guage. John F. Embree's *The Japanese Nation* (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1945) is a convenient and informative summary of many aspects of Japanese life of the prewar years. Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1946) is a stimulating analysis of certain phases of Japanese character. Among older books, Basil Hall Chamberlain's *Things Japanese* (sixth revised edition, Thompson, Kobe, 1939) is a mine of illuminating information on Japan of a few decades ago. The many beautifully illustrated small volumes on everything from the tea cult and coiffures to castles and scenery, published by the Japan Tourist Bureau as the *Japanese Tourist Library*, form handy introductions to many aspects of Japanese life.

The geographical background for Japanese civilization is treated both comprehensively and authoritatively in Glenn Thomas Trewartha's *Japan. A Physical, Cultural and Regional Geography* (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1945, superseding his earlier *A Reconnaissance Geography of Japan*), and I gratefully acknowledge my reliance on this work for many of the factual statements made in Chapters 4 and 5. The history of the economic growth which the Japanese have achieved in modern times on this geographic base is told clearly and succinctly by G. C. Allen in *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan 1867–1937* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1946). An authoritative study of the Japanese economy during the prewar decade is to be found in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchuria 1930–1940* (Macmillan, New York, 1940) by E. B. Schumpeter, D. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, and E. F. Penrose, and an equally detailed study of the Japanese economy during the recent war and the first postwar years is presented by Jerome B. Cohen in *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949).

The American occupation of Japan has brought forth a large number of official and private publications on the postwar period. The major official publication has been the thirty-five-volume series entitled *Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan*, a large and comprehensive monthly summary of occupation activities, replete with statistics and graphs, issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The concluding volume of this series covers the month of August 1948. Numerous specialized publications have also been issued by SCAP. These include the excellent series on Japan's natural resources and industries, prepared by the Natural Resources Section of SCAP, and the two-volume study entitled *Education in the New Japan* and a smaller study

entitled *Religions in Japan,* both compiled by the Civil Information and Education Section.

Edwin M. Martin in *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1948) provides a brief but authoritative statement of American postwar policies toward Japan, which makes a convenient starting point for any consideration of the occupation. W. Macmahon Ball, for a year and a half the British Empire member of the Allied Council for Japan, has given a critical appraisal of the occupation from a non-American point of view in *Japan. Enemy or Ally?* (John Day, New York, 1949). An ambitious but not altogether successful attempt to explain postwar Japan in terms of prewar conditions is made by Harold Wakefield in *New Paths for Japan* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1948), while Russel Brines in *MacArthur's Japan* (Lippincott, Philadelphia and New York, 1948) has given us a superficial but readable, brief survey of postwar Japan as seen by the outsider. T. A. Bisson's *Prospects for Democracy in Japan* (Macmillan, New York, 1949) is a relatively narrow account of political and economic developments in postwar Japan, as seen from a definitely leftist point of view. Perhaps the most interesting book on postwar Japan that has appeared up to date is Mark Gayn's *Japan Diary* (William Sloane, New York, 1948), which is a most illuminating piece of careful reporting on early postwar conditions, weakened unfortunately by the author's somewhat dogmatic and unreliable interpretations of what he has seen and heard.

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