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AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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To

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*A constantly changing bit of
psychological nature
My best Teacher*

PREFACE

Social psychology is above all others the romantic science. The youngest in years and yet the most enveloped in legend. Like a true hero of romance it has inflamed the imagination of all humanistic scholars. Not only is it cultivated by sociologists and psychologists, but its acquaintance is extensively sought by anthropologists, economists, and political scientists also.

How can we explain this assiduous pursuit of social psychology? The answer no doubt lies in the fabulous tales rumor whispers of its powers and performances. Social psychology it is believed can explain the formation of society. It understands the forces directing the destinies of history and politics. It can offer us the secrets of thought and language and the mysteries of the artistic life.

Of one thing we are certain, social psychology was born of great expectations. Those who attended at its birth foretold that it would be mighty and perform great deeds. When this science first glimpsed the dawn it was predicted that social psychology would fashion the key with which to unlock all the secret chambers of the humanistic sciences. The intricate problems concerning the nature of language, custom, morals, religion, and law were to be speedily solved by its great skill. That these promises were rudely dashed rather added to, than detracted from, its epic character.

So romantic, indeed, is social psychology that its very identity is an enigma. Is it a branch of sociology or psychology? Many believe that what masquerades as politics and economics is really social psychology. Perhaps the

mystery, here is occasioned by the fact that, like so many romantic heroes, social psychology bears upon its escutcheon the baton sinister. By whom was it sired? By philosophy, philology, anthropology, or psychology? All of these and others graced the scene of its early development.

Thus are set the problems for the present book.

All those who are interested in our subject and believe it is important will agree that we ought to know of what it really treats. Romance in science is not so desirable as information and critical thinking.

Perhaps social psychology is one of those borderline subjects which belong neither to psychology nor sociology exclusively, but to both disciplines at once. Whatever type of study it is, it ought to have a distinctive subject-matter. It is nothing less than a misfortune that the materials of so many social psychological treatises consist of mixtures of a little physiology, sociology, psychology, and anthropology in various proportions. When, as frequently happens, these ingredients are not of a satisfactory quality, misfortune turns into calamity.

As students of psychology, therefore, we deem it our task to divide off quite clearly psychological facts from the data of the other branches of the social sciences. In this work, accordingly, we attempt to keep distinct the facts of human behavior from the data of sociology, politics, anthropology, and economics with which they are all too frequently confused.

It is our aim likewise to distinguish social psychological happenings from the materials of general psychology. If social psychology is to justify its existence as a separate discipline it must deal with a distinct form of data. It is only after we have thus isolated cultural psychological events that we can study them effectively. The central task of the present volume is to present as satisfactory a statement as possible of the psychological facts of social psychology.¹

But howsoever successfully we isolate and describe social

psychological facts, we know full well that they do not thus exist alone. For after all they are only aspects of larger humanistic phenomena; that is, they are invariably set in a matrix of humanistic events. Accordingly we have devoted considerable space to the discussion of anthropic, sociological, general psychological, as well as biological phenomena, insofar as these have a bearing upon the facts of social psychology. This procedure not only enables us to distinguish the various happenings but also to take account of their relations.

Again, we have taken special pains to suggest the extreme complexity of human occurrences. No adequate knowledge of social data is possible if we regard any fact, say a sociological circumstance, as the simple result of another fact, for example a psychological happening. On the contrary, there are always many mutually influencing events whenever some human situation is involved. Sociological facts no doubt have their effects upon psychological ones, but the converse is equally true.

The writer is convinced that much of the confusion that pervades social psychology today is owing to the inadequacy of traditional psychology. As long as psychological phenomena are treated as invisible states or forces there really could be no science of psychology, nor could we distinguish the latter from any other discipline. The present work is based, therefore, upon an organismic foundation, the conception, namely, that psychological phenomena constitute interactions of persons with stimuli objects. Since social reactions consist of interactions with institutional stimuli we characterize the subject-matter of the present volume as institutional social psychology.

J. R. K.

February, 1928.

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Since some of the conceptions appearing in the present work have already been presented in a scattered series of papers in various scientific journals, the writer wishes to acknowledge their prior appearance in those Journals. The appended list gives the titles of the articles referred to, and the Journals in which they were originally published.

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"How is a Science of Social Psychology Possible?" *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 1922, 17, 62-78.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE	v
I. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY A SCIENCE OF CULTURAL CONDUCT :	1
Social Psychology a Branch of General Psychology	1
Contrast of Cultural and Non-cultural Psychological Data	9
Significance of Groups for Social Psychology	11
Relation of Social Psychology and the Social Sciences	15
5. Methods and Sources of Social Psychology	22
Development of Social Psychology	27
II. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME OUTSTANDING CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY	36
1. Social Psychology as the Study of Mob or Crowd Phenomena	37
2. Social Behavior as Responses to Persons	43
3. Social Psychology as the Study of Behavior in Groups	45
4. Social Psychology as the Study of Socialization	46
5. Social Psychology as the Study of Mental Origins and Psychic Causes	52
6. Social Psychology as the Study of Ethnic Phenomena	54
7. Social Psychology as the Study of Collectivistic Mentality	56
8. Social Psychology as the Study of Social Forces	59
9. Social Psychology as the Physiology of Complex Behavior	60

PART I.

THE PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

III. THE BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL CONDUCT	65
1. The Problem of Perspectives in Social Psychology	65
2. Biological Factors in Psychological Action	67
3. Biological and Psychological Phenomena Compared	77
4. Biological Cause versus Biological Participation	82
5. The Problem of Deeply-Rooted Action	86
6. Biology and Racial Conduct	90
7. Biological Heredity and Psychological Conduct	94
8. Biological Implications of Pathological Phenomena	97

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. THE ANTHROPIC BACKGROUND OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR	101
1. Universality of Civilization	102
2. Similarities and Dissimilarities in Anthropic Elements	108
3. Distribution and Interrelation of Cultural Traits	114
4. Specializations and Cleavages in Anthropic Systems	126
5. Changes and Growth of Anthropic Phenomena	132
V. THE ANTHROPIC BACKGROUND OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR— <i>continued</i>	139
1. Origins of Cultural Phenomena	139
2. Conditions of Anthropic Happenings	145
3. Quality and Improvement of Anthropic Systems	158
4. Relation of Individuals and Civilization	164
VI. CULTURAL BEHAVIOR AS PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA	173
1. The Nature of Objective Psychology	173
2. Scientific Implications of Organismic Psychology	177
3. The Reactional Biography	180
4. Psychological Personality	182
5. Personality and Original Nature	184
6. Personality Types	185
7. The Behavior Segment	186
8. The Reaction System	189
9. Possibilities and Limitations of Psychological Phenomena	190
10. Objective Psychology and Tests of Mentality	192

PART II.

THE DATA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

VII. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL RESPONSES	203
1. The Isolation of Cultural Reactions	203
2. Intrinsic Characteristics of Cultural Reactions	205
3. Classification of Cultural Behavior	224
VIII. THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS OR CULTURAL STIMULI	240
1. Characteristics of an Institution	240
2. Psychological and Sociological Institutions	242
3. Stability of Institutions	245
4. Conditions of Institutional Stability	248
5. Relation of Institutions and Environment	251
6. Classification of Institutions	256

CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER	PAGE
IX. CULTURALIZATION—HOW WE ACQUIRE OUR CULTURAL BEHAVIOR .	256
1. The Process of Culturalization	265
2. Significance of the Culturalization Process	269
3. Loci of Culturalization	270
4. Types of Culturalization Processes	275
5. Methods and Instruments of Culturalization	280
6. General Conditions of Culturalization	287
X. CULTURAL PERSONALITY AS HUMAN NATURE	290
1. Cultural Personality the Product of Socialization	290
2. Some Misconceptions Concerning Personality	291
3. Impermanence of Human Nature	293
4. Types of Cultural Personality	296
5. Effect of Culturalization upon Human Nature	300
6. Uniqueness of Cultural Nature	301
7. Relative Qualities of Cultural Personality	304
XI. THE MECHANISM OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT	307
1. The Problem of Institutional Mechanisms	307
2. The Nature of Institutional Mechanisms	307
3. Originating Institutional Mechanisms	310
4. Varying Modes of Engendering Institutions	313
5. Transforming Institutional Mechanisms	317
6. Modifying Institutional Mechanisms	320
7. The Qualities of Institutional Changes	326
8. Conditions Influencing Institutional Mechanisms	329

PART III.

THE RELATIVITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COLLECTIVITIES

XII. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BEHAVIOR GROUPS	337
1. The Problem of Psychological Groups	337
2. Fractionalization of Behavior Groups into Moieties or Levels	338
3. Conservation of Psychological Groups	342
4. Rise and Disappearance of Behavior Groups	346
5. Duplication of Behavior Groups	349
XIII. PERSONALITY AND CONDUCT RESTRICTIONS OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR	351
1. Problem of Behavior Restriction	351
2. Groups Constituted of Persons	353
3. Flexibility of Groups	354

CHAPTER	PAGE
4. Not All Behavior Is Cultural	354
5. Opposition of Persons and Groups	356
6. Great Number of Groups	357
7. Conflicts between Persons and Groups	358
8. Modification of Groups	360
9. Progress Based upon Persons	362

PART IV.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AS ASPECTS OF
HUMANISTIC SITUATIONS

XIV. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AS COMPONENTS OF HUMAN SITUATIONS	367
1. The Scientific Situation	370
2. The Linguistic Situation	379
3. The Aesthetic Situation	382
4. The Religious Situation	385
5. The Political Situation	390
6. The Educational Situation	394
XV. THE APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY	398

AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY A SCIENCE OF CULTURAL CONDUCT

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY A BRANCH OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

(Psychology is the study of responses to stimuli.) Naturally these reactions display outstanding differences. Hence, the isolation of diverse types of behavior by specializing students becomes the basis for dividing off from each other the various branches of psychology.

Some of the special studies are more easily delimited than are others. It is quite easy to distinguish human from animal psychology. The criteria here are behavior variations rooted in the gross morphological differences, the evolutionary development, and the reactional histories of the organisms concerned. Within the field of human psychology, distinctions are not so striking. For example, it is rather difficult to differentiate between normal and abnormal reactions. However, the discovery of a general defectiveness of personality development or some insufficiency of psychological performance aids us in characterizing a response as normal or abnormal.

In a similar way the specialist in genetic psychology marks off his domain from the general field of human behavior. He

2 AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

merely stresses the growth and development of personality, whereas the student of adult psychology emphasizes more or less completed behavior equipment.

Pertinent to our interest is the question (how to distinguish cultural or social from non-cultural psychology.) (Here the task is to achieve a distinct line of cleavage between what we call a social response and a non-cultural reaction.)

(Cultural behavior is differentiated from non-cultural responses primarily upon the basis of the stimuli to which the reactions are performed. That is, cultural behavior consists of responses to institutions.) The institutional stimuli elicit from various persons a distinct mode of common behavior. Cultural or social psychology, therefore, is the study of the individual as he develops cultural behavior equipment. This equipment (is composed of responses to stimuli that are unlike those investigated in other branches of psychology.) Such cultural reactions, along with their corresponding institutional stimuli, form the body of facts of our present study.

Social psychology, then, is a distinct field within the general psychological domain. Our first step must be to characterize as precisely as we can the nature of the cultural or social response and its distinctive stimulus. Perhaps we can best accomplish this purpose by comparing a number of diverse forms of psychological behavior, each of which displays a unique reaction picture and constitutes a different sort of psychological adaptation. From such a comparative treatment we expect to obtain useful descriptive data concerning the nature of cultural conduct. These reactional types which we differentiate on the basis of their time and mode of origin are named as follows: (1) universal, (2) basic, (3) supra-basic, (4) contingential, (5) idiosyncratic, and (6) social or cultural responses.

Universal Reactions.¹—In the earliest stages of infancy

¹ For a more extensive treatment of all these types of reaction, cf. Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, 1924, Vol. I.

before personality development has actually begun, the organism has practically no psychological equipment. It has had no contacts as yet with things around it. Accordingly in this elementary period we find only very simple types of responses (stimulated primarily by conditions within the organism itself and by mechanical contacts with things touching its external surfaces.) A somewhat later developmental stage is that in which more distant objects are reacted to through visual, auditory, and other distance stimulation. (Universal reactions are typified by simple and elementary reflex responses.) And to no small extent we may look upon such behavior phenomena as maintenance reactions. Namely, their performance brings about a better natural relationship between the organism and surrounding objects. These types of reactions are so simple as to be constant in their operation. With the increased contact of the organism with the same stimulatory objects, however, its action changes slightly by becoming more definite and better coördinated.

While universal or reflex conduct is doubtless the earliest in the life history of the human individual, this type of action remains as a permanent part of the person's equipment. For the psychological organism, no matter how complex its reactions, is always at the same time a biological organism; besides occupying a place in an infinitely complex social environment, it at the same time lives among its natural surroundings. Thus some of its responses are always exceedingly simple, in correspondence with the simplicity of natural phenomena.

No matter at what age these universal responses are performed their reactional details are conditioned at the very minimum by the biographical history of the organism. Instead, (the organism's biological characteristics, its general structural and functional organization and its specific ecological circumstances are responsible for the actual happenings.) So far as the stimuli objects are concerned they

4 AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

nothing to do with environment
perform their stimulatory functions primarily because of the natural properties which they have. Obviously from the standpoint of the general development of the psychological personality we may regard the universal reactions as its genuine behavior foundation. That is, they precede the development of all other types of conduct.

Basic Reactions.—Because of the individual's rapid development in early infancy the universal responses are soon followed by the acquisition of another type of personality equipment, namely, basic reactions. They are organized just as soon as the organism begins to have moveable contacts with surrounding objects. Among these numerous reactions are listed protective, defensive, expressive, exhibitiv, and other modes of adjustment.

As factors in the behavior life of the individual, basic reactions are in many ways more fundamental than universal responses. For it is the basic equipment which stamps the individual as a unique personality. This fact is already indicated in our suggestion of the fundamental acquisitional mechanism involved in the development of basic behavior. Namely, the number and variety of these reactions comprised in any person's equipment depend directly upon the number and kinds of objects with which the individual can have reactional contacts. Now it is because no two individuals, even in the same family, can have precisely the same reactional experiences with objects, that they perform different basic conduct. Since basic responses differ so appreciably in reactional character they constitute the foundation for individual differences of every variety. Indeed this characteristic points to their greatest differentiation from foundation or universal reactions. For the latter are performed by all individuals without any significant reactional differences, since all human animals are similar in their biological make-up.

Basic reactions derive their name from the fact that since they are acquired in the early life history of the individual

they serve as the basis for future personality development. To be more explicit, once the individual through contacts with particular objects and situations has acquired a certain form of behavior equipment, this acquisition conditions the development of any further personality traits. In this sense basic behavior equipment constitutes the essential as well as the distinguishing core of the developing personality. Basic reactions are therefore not only products of the individual's earliest reactional biography, but are also in a genuine sense determiners of the person's subsequent behavior history.

It is apparent that the objects and conditions with which individuals interact in infancy are not exclusively natural things but comprise institutional or cultural phenomena as well. For this reason, (basic behavior comprises both cultural and non-cultural reactions.) Now it is these early non-cultural behavior acquisitions which constitute the unique responses and personal traits of individuals. We refer to (the ways of speaking and walking, to the likes and dislikes,) that the person acquires away from his distinctly cultural setting.

Basic reactions of the cultural type on the other hand, do not divide persons off as unique individuals. Rather they constitute the bases for the similarity of persons as members of psychological collectivities. The only type of individuation cultural reactions bring about is the differentiation of a person as a member of certain psychological groups and not others.

Suprabasic Reactions.—Suprabasic behavior we class among the earliest of the more intimate and personal types of adult or maturing behavior equipment. These comparatively simple reactions are primarily characterized by the fact that they are developed on a direct foundation of basic behavior. What in the earlier stages of personality are mere expressive acts, now become expanded into definite communicative and referential responses. In this way, basic vocalization reactions develop into definite linguistic conduct. Again,

6 AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

~~shows organization~~
elementary preferences and dislikes on the basis of particular adult stimuli, become elaborated into complex choice and discrimination traits. While these activities are developed in interaction with maturer stimulatory circumstances, they are none the less conditioned by the early basic equipment attained in the infantile stages of personality acquisition.

Idiosyncratic Reactions.—Under this rubric we include activity developed on the basis of an elaborate personal reactional biography. Thus idiosyncratic behavior consists essentially of (unique forms of behavior traits belonging peculiarly to one individual.) In other words, the behavior equipments which operate when the person reacts idiosyncratically are not necessarily shared with any other individuals. In many cases no one else performs such action. Numbered among idiosyncratic responses are conceptions, tastes, attitudes and ways of thinking, which serve to distinguish the person from all others.)

The present type of conduct differs from basic and supra-basic action because of the different rôle played by the stimuli objects involved in their acquisition. The individual acquires basic forms of action because during his reactional history he casually happens to come across certain kinds of things and situations. We regard him as more or less dependent upon his surroundings during this process. Not so, however, in the case of acquiring idiosyncratic action. Here the person has already developed many different forms of basic behavior and accordingly takes more active attitudes toward objects. Even his prejudices and beliefs are more independently acquired than those of the person who possesses such behavior merely because it exists in his psychological environment.

Probably the most characteristic of idiosyncratic responses are those independent and individualized reactions which are the result of comparison and discrimination. In acquiring and performing this activity, the person's total reactional experience comes into play as a factor in a more or less complex

reflective and deliberative process. Thus the most typically idiosyncratic reactions constitute independent judgments, criticism, and reasoning behavior.

Again, idiosyncratic responses are unique in that the stimuli functions calling forth such actions may be regarded as independent of both the natural and cultural properties of things. Thus the essentially idiosyncratic stimuli functions of things must be accounted for by the unique character of the person who reacts to them and not by special properties found in objects. Things and conditions possess their properties of calling out idiosyncratic responses because a particular individual through his behavior endows them with those properties. Such properties may not exist for any other person. It is a common occurrence for one and the same object to elicit an idiosyncratic response from one individual and from another the most conventional cultural reaction.

Contingential Reactions.¹—The primary descriptive feature of this type of complex adult conduct is its characteristic of immediacy in occurrence. In no sense are contingential responses definitely predictable, since they are not based upon particular elements of the individual's behavior equipment, but rather upon the total series of his behavior possibilities. Nor do contingential actions constitute responses to particular types of stimulative objects. Not depending upon specific reactional equipments, contingential responses differ sharply from suprabasic and idiosyncratic behavior, while the lack of definiteness in stimuli marks them off from cultural conduct.

Contingential action is acquired and performed² at particular moments under stress of contact with specific sorts of

¹ Similar action found in the infantile stage of psychological development we call momentarily acquired behavior; cf. Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. 5 (1924).

² Since the development of contingential reactions is coincident with their performance we may regard as the essential acquisitional factor the later profiting by the experience.

behavior conditions. Such behavior is illustrated by the problem solving activities of both the merely manipulative and complex ideational type. Accordingly these are activities of occasion, immediate behavior processes. Corresponding to their occasional character the arousing stimuli are impermanent and frequently momentarily utilitarian properties of things. Accordingly, what the individual does to objects depends upon his immediate circumstances and the settings of the objects to which he reacts.

Cultural Reactions. (Probably the most distinctive mark of cultural reactions is that they are shared by sets of persons.) Such activities the individual acquires as a necessary result of his being in contact with particular objects which are already being reacted to in a specific way by various individuals. Because of the commonness of action we regard all these individuals as members of a particular group. Thus acquired, cultural conduct brands the person as a participant in some form of psychological organization; and insofar indicates his lack of uniqueness and privacy of behavior with respect to the things comprised in his stimulative milieu.) (Typical examples are the common language reactions, beliefs, habits, thought, customs, and manners which stamp the individual as a member of some psychological branch of a national, professional or other type of human association.)

(The stimuli for cultural reactions are objects and conditions which have common and generalized functions. That is, the stimuli call out identical responses in several individuals. Thus swine or cows are inedible for every member of certain communities. These common stimuli we call institutions. By this term we refer to nothing else than the functions of an object or event that are capable of eliciting a shared response from a group of persons. The significance of the term institution is merely that a certain stimulus function has become established or instituted in a particular human community.) Since we adopt the term institution as a dis-

tinctly psychological category it must not therefore be confused with a sociological use of the word.¹ It is scarcely necessary to remark that (by institution we do not mean a charitable or fraternal organization of persons, a building or club. A psychological institution is quite a different thing from a bank, hospital, university, or monarchy.)

Just as anything can serve as a general psychological stimulus, so institutions comprise the functions of all sorts of objects, conditions, circumstances, persons, actions, etc. Patent indeed are the cultural responses made to laws, customs, languages, elections, wars, opinions, attitudes, roads, streets, houses, etc. Perhaps a word of special mention may be accorded to actions as institutions. For it is the most common observation how individuals are stimulated by the way other persons act to acquire and perform certain modes of behavior. In this fashion we develop most of our manners, beliefs, customs, languages and cognate forms of cultural responses.

CONTRAST OF CULTURAL AND NON-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA

As a further preliminary characterization of the phenomena of cultural psychology we might show how (cultural reactions and stimuli generally contrast with non-cultural stimuli and responses.) Now since there is such a large number of different types of the latter it will be expedient to contrast cultural data only with such non-cultural phenomena as will throw into sharp relief the outstanding characteristics of cultural stimuli and responses.

(Institutional and Non-cultural Stimuli.) (In contrasting an institutional stimulus with a natural stimulus we may point out that the latter is some object or situation that never elicits customary or common reactions. In other words, a natural stimulus is one in which the individual responds only to the

¹ See p. 242.

natural properties of the object. When a Hindu perceives a cow, or a Jew or Mohammedan perceives a pig, we may very definitely distinguish between their non-social perceptual responses to the natural properties of these objects (particular mammal) and their social reactions to such animals (unclean or sacred animal) based upon attributed properties. In the latter case the responses are entirely conventional modes of behavior to cultural or endowed properties of the objects.¹ Observe that in the two cases we are concerned with the very same natural object, but in the one instance its natural properties alone operate, and in the other, its institutional character functions in addition. For this reason the same thing (cow or pig) serves both as a natural and an institutional stimulus function. As a natural stimulus it calls out a distinctly non-social response; as an institutional stimulus it elicits a cultural reaction.) A further example. A purely non-cultural response (contingential) to a church is that of a thief hiding in it. On the other hand, the social response to the same object is that of going to church on Sunday as one of a group of worshippers.

Social and Non-social Reactions.—Probably we can best compare social and non-social reactions by means of a concrete illustration. For instance consider a spoken word, which may be regarded as a typical social response. Why is this a social reaction? Because it is a response of a specified group of persons. (Bread and not Brot must be the linguistic reaction of an individual living in an English speaking group instead of a German one.) (The person acts as he does because he has been culturalized to do so) His behavior is conditioned by the group in which he has been domesticated.

¹ Since in even comparatively simple behavior such as perceptual reactions the process of property attribution exists we mean to emphasize here the relatively greater amount of attribution. In perceptual behavior, for example, the stimulation properties are after all closely connected with the natural properties of objects. This is in no sense necessarily the case in cultural conduct.

(Now let us consider the non-social response. A lighted match applied to a person's skin elicits the reflex act of jerking away from the hot object. This act is the same for Hindu, German, and Englishman alike, the lawyer, the laborer, the parson or business man, the man or the woman. As we have already pointed out, we all act in the same way with respect to a hot object because of our organic make-up. We draw our hand away, not because of any culturally common character of the stimulus. There is nothing cultural about the action. Non-cultural behavior is thus unconditioned by any social or group influence.)

It will add to our comparison to point out that the morphological character of cultural and non-cultural responses may be precisely the same. To illustrate, the cultural response of taking off one's hat upon entering a house may be exactly like the contingent action of removing one's head piece when a sudden gust of wind threatens to blow it away.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Since social psychology is the science of conventional reactions to institutional stimuli, and since these phenomena are inevitably connected with aggregates of individuals, the data of social psychology are *ipso facto* connected with groups. Unfortunately there are few facts in the whole field of psychology that have been as badly misinterpreted as this one. Let us therefore specify what the exact significance of the group is for the student of cultural conduct.

Nothing is more certain than that (the social psychologist has no interest in mere aggregations of individuals as has the sociologist or other social scientist.) This is true even if we do not regard groups as static phenomena, that is, as mere numerical organizations of persons. While social scientists have quite legitimate interests in the behavior of aggregations and congregations such as mobs, throngs, herds, crowds, races,

committees, boards, armies, etc., such data form no part of the psychological domain. Surely such behavior cannot be regarded as psychological conduct and in consequence must be absolutely distinguished from cultural behavior.

Any type of sociological group, however, may be the auspices for the acquisition and performance of cultural conduct. A sociological group we must insist therefore is nothing more than the locus of cultural responses. It is the place where we find the data of social psychology; in other words, a situation where institutions can arise and be maintained, and where we find the auspices under which cultural responses are acquired.

For the social psychologist, groups must be conceived of as having a particular function not found in the mere sociological organization of individuals such as civic, national, or commercial aggregations of persons. The individuals of a social psychological group must have a definite psychological characteristic in common. That is, they must have acquired a common or shared mode of reacting to some particular object. They call objects by the same name; they fear things and persons the same way, etc. But notice, the existence of this common characteristic does not constitute merely a collocation but a genuine behavior interrelationship. For the psychologist it is of no importance that such and such a number of persons buy or sell, scoff or pray. He is interested, rather, in such actions as signify that objects have a certain identical stimulatory function for specific sets of individuals. The grouping of persons in this way bespeaks a thorough behavior commutability between them. It follows that the accidental performance of similar behavior by various individuals is of no special significance for the social psychologist.

Groups with such a specific behavior function as we have outlined, we call a psychological collectivity. Doubtless a great many types of sociological organizations of persons have this sort of psychological function, in addition to their soci-

ological properties. The same persons, moreover, as statistical units of an occupational group may at the same time be members of a psychological collectivity when they share cultural conduct. Similarly, the individuals of religious, national, or other communities simultaneously constitute psychological collectivities as well as sociological groups.

So far as number of persons is concerned a psychological collectivity may be as large as the collectivity of individuals who think alike politically in an extensive national unit, or it may be as diminutive as to comprise only a small family or even two persons. The sole requirement is that the individuals share certain behavior.

To differentiate further between psychological collectivities and sociological groups we might point out that a single social unit may contain many psychological collectivities. Such is the case when a national group consists of several dialectal language units, or when the dialectal units divide off into series of persons who vary in their colloquial language behavior.

On the whole the functioning of a person as a member of a sociological group requires the presence of many other individuals. In the case of psychological collectivities, on the contrary, the component members may perform their characteristic function without any great collection of persons existing in the same place. So far as cultural conduct is concerned, contact with a single person is often quite sufficient to constitute a complete relation with a psychological collectivity. For instance much of the process of becoming culturalized occurs while the infant is in contact with a single person. Indeed the mother in the ordinary family serves as the sole point of contact of the infant with various psychological collectivities.

Again after acquiring some particular cultural reaction a single person may respond culturally with respect to some institutional object without regard to the presence of other

individuals who might react similarly. Such a situation prevails when a person moves away from a locality in which he originally acquired common behavior to an institutional stimulus and continues to respond as do the persons of his former group. Objects which functioned for him as institutional stimuli in the old situation persist in doing so despite all the differences in his circumstances. Such solitary cultural conduct is illustrated by the behavior of the pioneer who brings his conventional customs, beliefs, and other cultural conduct to his new home. As he leaves his group and moves to his own secluded life he naturally carries with him his cultural reactional equipment. In case the institutions and the corresponding behavior should cease to exist in the original place we are only exaggerating when we conceive of the individual as constituting a group of one with respect to the particular behavior under discussion. No question exists but that a large number of our cultural reactions are privately performed.

An effective mark of distinction between sociological groups and psychological collectivities is found in the fact that the latter frequently originate in the activities of single persons. This is never true for sociological units. When a number of persons begin to share the action originated by one individual the result is the development of a psychological collectivity. The collectivity as such has had nothing to do with the engendering of the response and the investiture of the object with its institutional function. Rather, the collectivity exists only by virtue of a subsequent sharing of the action. Examples of the private origin and subsequent diffusion of responses, and stimuli functions are found whenever ideas, inventions, customs, words, etc., are innovated and later become conventional.

Since the same individuals may comprise both a sociological and psychological organization it is quite true that when a collectivity originates in the action of a single person, it may later become a sociological group. For example, some person

develops an heretical conception of religion. This doctrine is later shared by other persons, and finally results in a church schism. But it is clear here that the sociological group does not come into existence until the original psychological collectivity has taken on many functions beyond the sheer sharing of a psychological reaction. The individuals must be organized to meet together, plan to maintain and spread the doctrine, acquire property, etc.

We may accept as a general criterion for distinguishing psychological collectivities from sociological groups the fact that while so tenuous a connection between persons as the sharing of a single response makes them into a psychological collectivity, no sociological group ever exists with such thin mortar to hold the individuals of the structure together.

RELATION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

From its earliest beginnings social psychology was quite naturally presumed to be very intimately related to the social sciences. More than this it has been presumed that social psychology is the foundation of other human disciplines. Even in very recent times numerous attempts have been made to reduce sociological, economic, and other human phenomena to psychological facts. This situation arose as follows.

At various times in the history of the social sciences students of complex human phenomena became convinced that the solution of their problems lay in the secrets of human nature. Why men live in groups, why some govern others, why there is property and why it is distributed so that some are poor while others are rich, why men dominate over women, etc., are problems ultimately presumed to have mental forces at their base. In this connection the work of the social scientist has on the whole centered around the investigation of the precise way in which psychic forces in the form of human nature become responsible for political or economic occur-

rences. Psychologists accordingly were called upon to produce the hidden springs of action. Now while the conceptions concerning the essence of human nature varied widely, in general, however, it was not doubted that psychologists could explain the causes of social happenings. For it was supposed that human nature constituted a series of definite social forces.

Generally speaking, neither the social psychologist nor the student of general social facts, has yet recognized that human nature and conduct are only parts of the data of social phenomena. Moreover, it is not conceded that psychological facts are themselves just as much dependent upon other human phenomena as the latter upon the former. Neglecting these points, the students of both types of human facts fail to interpret and evaluate properly psychological phenomena as over against sociological, economic, and historical data. In short, this very failure to appreciate the character of human nature and its significance for social phenomena, is responsible for the inadequate placing of psychology with respect to the human sciences. In the face of such indiscrimination it is necessary to segregate social psychology from the other human sciences and in this way indicate their relations.¹

Social Psychology and Sociology.²—From sociology, as well as from all other human sciences, (social psychology) may be separated on the ground that the latter (is concerned exclusively with concrete responses of persons to particular stimuli.) By contrast (when sociology is concerned with behavior at all,) it is regarded as mass action or the statistical description (of the behavior of persons comprising groups,) such

¹ It is readily understood that much of the difficulty in separating the disciplines arises from the fact that their data are inextricably interrelated in actual human situations.

² In the following discussion the writer has not strictly regarded traditional academic or accepted professional demarcations between the social sciences. On the contrary he has deemed it more important to make his division on the basis of the most expedient way of exhibiting the relations between social psychology and the other social sciences.

as armies, economic and charitable organizations, professions, nations, etc. (Sociological behavior is very different, then, from the specific psychological reactions of particular individuals.) It is not denied, of course, (that actions of members of sociological groups may be looked upon as psychological responses taken *en masse*), but as such they are statistical descriptive materials quite independent of psychological criteria. Statistical behavior clearly cannot be anything but actions reduced to a common denominator.' (But in such a case with one full sweep is obliterated all of the personal and intimate behavior features characterizing psychological conduct.) Furthermore it is certain that the intimate character of psychological phenomena can only be described in terms of the one-to-one correspondence of each individual reaction with its reciprocal stimulus. Thus, while sociological conduct is properly termed behavior, it is no more psychological than the behavior of chemical substances in reaction, or the behavior of ions or electrons.

Now while a sharp distinction may be made between psychological and sociological behavior, there is nothing to prevent economic, and social data from being psychological phenomena. Such data are sometimes decidedly psychological but only when they function as stimuli for specific psychological responses. For instance, historical behavior may serve as a stimulus either for non-social psychological action such as when I criticize my nation for entering a war, or for my cultural response, when I conform to the custom of enlisting in the army. Now is it not obvious that when social psychology and sociology are most closely connected, the former is concerned with responses to institutional stimuli, while sociology is interested in the stimuli themselves? Surely, group

¹ Strict psychological phenomena may of course also be handled as statistical data. In this case the statistical processes are primarily the addition or enumeration of such simple responses to stimuli which may be regarded as similar.

actions, modes of communication, ways of living, can be nothing but the stimuli for the psychological actions of persons living in given social groups.

This whole matter is well illustrated by taking the case of language. In one sense language is a body of materials and things that we may well call institutions. Such is the condition when written, printed and spoken language materials constitute the stimuli for learning to read, write, and speak, in brief, to perform these actions as members of a sociolinguistic group. But from the psychological standpoint, language must be studied as the intimate acts of persons; as such it constitutes dynamic reactional processes. On the other hand, when language is taken in the institutional sense, it is of no consequence whether it is spoken or written (reactional events) or merely exists as things (records, etc.). So far as the development of language goes, the psychological and sociological differentiation holds equally well, for language may be studied either as evolving sociological institutions, as exemplified by Elizabethan and American book English, or as the actual psychological performances of Queen Elizabeth and President Coolidge, when we regard them as speaking.

So much for the relationship between these two disciplines when they are most closely connected, that is to say, when the facts of sociology are the stimuli for psychological phenomena.) In another respect a very wide gulf separates these two types of study; for instance when sociology is concerned with phenomena not immediately connected with actions of individuals. To be explicit, when sociology deals with human organizations, with mechanisms of transportation or means of communication, or when sociology studies such facts as increase and decrease of populations, birth and death ratios, status and improvements in labor and living conditions, etc., then this science is very far removed from psychological phenomena. When the sociologist handles strikes, business cycles, recurring good and bad times, types of money, tech-

niques of economic production and distribution, it is decidedly easy to keep such a discipline distinct from social psychology.

Social Psychology and Anthropology.—In much the same way we can separate social psychology from anthropology. The latter science to a certain extent may be considered to deal with the same sorts of phenomena as sociology, with the exception perhaps that (anthropology is concerned more with the comparison of various groups with respect to their cultural elements.¹) In contrast to the sociologist, (the anthropologist in addition investigates older and more primitive units of individuals as a special field of study and does not confine himself to the complicated contemporary units of human life.) It follows from this that the anthropologist may also be more interested in the origins of cultural phenomena and behavior than he is in the existence of local developments of human facts in particular groups. Howsoever we differentiate between sociological and anthropological interests this much is certain; namely, there is a wide gap between the analysis of concrete individualized psychological actions and the study of mass or statistical ethnological phenomena. In other words, the ethnologist like the sociologist handles objects, things, and conditions as human facts independent of psychological behavior. When he is concerned with distinctly psychological phenomena, as in tracing out historical developments of individual behavior, his study is then entirely coincident with social psychology.

Social Psychology and History.—The historical sciences present us with no new facts bearing upon the relation of social psychology and the human sciences. When history

¹ Our term, "anthropology," must of course refer to cultural anthropology or ethnology. It is hardly necessary to point out the differences between social psychology and physical anthropology, although it is impossible to overlook the value to the social psychologist of knowing something about the origin and development of the variations of the anatomical and biological traits of man.

deals with human conduct it is always mass or statistical behavior and not particular reactions of individuals.

No student of history could overlook, of course, the great mass of psychological phenomena found in his domain. How much of the internal and external policies and accomplishments of nations depend upon capable rulers, clever diplomats, wise legislators, and intelligent civil and military officers! Surely the rôle of great men, whether industrial leaders or administrators, cannot be underestimated. That intriguing private men and women in particular nations also influence their nations for weal and woe is sufficiently accepted as historical fact. But most certainly these psychological phenomena from the historian's side are not unique data. They are merely incidental facts of record along with economic, geographical, or earlier historical data in a given nation, or parallel historical conditions in contemporary states. Such psychologico-historical phenomena, whether cultural or non-cultural, are therefore mere incidents in a nation's total history, just as the poverty of a nation or its prosperity may be an incident in its development of art, scientific knowledge, or geographical discoveries.

Social Psychology as a Coöperative Science.—Social psychology then we confidently assert is distinct from the other human sciences. Not only are its data unique but its methods and results are quite disparate. Certain it is too that social psychology is not basic to the other social sciences, since it cannot by itself account for the phenomena of the other humanistic disciplines.

What then is the relationship between social psychology and the remaining human sciences? Briefly, social psychology is a coöperative study. In many cases indeed we find indispensable points of contact with sociology, anthropology, and other human studies. For this reason, in order to understand human phenomena in all of their implications, the social psychologist must coöperate with the jurist, the politician, his-

torian, ethicist, economist, etc. Possibly the interrelationship of social psychology and the other human sciences is seen to greater advantage in the consideration of institutions. Social stimuli or institutions are existing things precisely as natural objects are; they likewise have histories and developments. In order therefore to understand a human fact of any degree of complexity it is necessary to study it both from the standpoint of its existence and development and its functional character as a stimulus for some specific psychological activity. For instance, when we investigate some complex human phenomenon such as a lynching situation, a religious ceremony, or a war, we cannot analyze it unless we make an investigation not only of its various historical, sociological, and economic aspects, but its psychological conditions also. All these may not only be related features but even necessary concomitants.

war phenomenon, for example, is not only a psychological fact, but a political, military, economic, historical, geographical, and technological event as well.)

The same thing is true when we turn to the field of politics or economics. Workers in these social sciences can have no justifiable interest in psychological phenomena as underlying and causing the existence of political and economic institutions. Rather, these particular social sciences can stress the psychological aspects of political and economic situations only as phenomena existing in correlation with a great mass of other types of facts. True it is that when an individual purchases an automobile he is performing a psychological reaction. But for the economist this fact is of no more significance than the fact that the person is a biological organism. Surely the person's preferences and state of knowledge are factors in the purchase of an automobile, but are they more fundamental than the economic status of his family?

Again, is a nation's history any more a result of anybody's behavior than the behavior is a result of the nation's history? In general, the attitude that psychology is somehow a basis

for the other human sciences bespeaks an attempt to discover single causal relations between the elements of complex happenings. In criticism of this attitude it is no exaggeration to say that complex human phenomena of any sort are entirely too intricate to be thrown into a simple cause and effect relationship. Are not all the factors of any human situation equal products of an investigative analysis of human circumstances localized in a particular event? The importance of social psychology lies then in the study of one of the important general components of all complex human circumstances

THE METHODS AND SOURCES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

From the nature of its data social psychology is preëminently a field study. Since the ordinary acquisition of cultural equipment and the operation of cultural personality traits are exceedingly complex phenomena, it is in the natural world of human ecology that we must observe them. Furthermore, the contacts of the individual with institutional stimuli occur as unique events and are thus very difficult to observe under rigid and controlled conditions. Social psychology in this respect differs from general psychology, for in the latter field a number of simple activities may be studied under the most stringently conditioned circumstances.

Without doubt the primary source of social psychological information is contained in the observations made upon the person's general behavior acquisition, and later reactional performances. In studying this behavior development, one learns much concerning the contacts of the individual with the institutional stimuli of his ethnic or national group, and the resulting acquisition of specific types of cultural traits. Closely related sources are the comparative observations of individuals in different communities. Here we may observe the behavior of some one person who is in contact with institutional stimuli belonging to different ethnic groups, or we can study

the cultural conduct of different persons developing in parallel ethnic communities.

Quite a distinct source of social psychological data is the observation of individuals as members of varying groups within the same national or ethnic unit. For example, we are able to study the development and operation of a person's cultural reactions under specific professional, sexual, intellectual, industrial and other group auspices. These observations may be made in the comparative manner already indicated, as well as combined with the study of the effect of one type of intraethnic influence upon the contacts of the individual with the institutions and behavior of other sub-ethnic collectivities.¹

We turn now to another source of data for social psychology which differs from those enumerated chiefly in its emphasis upon institutions rather than upon traits of behavior. In the field of history, philology, anthropology, and other human sciences we discover numerous possibilities for the origin and performance of cultural behavior, by observing the rise, development and diffusion of institutions. Here we do not study directly the individual in his cultural reactional biography, but we trace the origins and changes of his behavior through a study of the products of art, science, and technology. For instance, when we investigate the subjects treated in the literature of various communities or periods we gain considerable insight into the conventional beliefs, thoughts, and practices of the participating persons. From recent developments in the handling of sex in our own literature we learn a great deal concerning the change in the human nature of our own psychological collectivity.

Living as we do in a scientific group in which experimental

¹ It is undoubtedly an unfortunate fact that some of our social psychological information must be gleaned through the questionnaire (verbal and written) method, for frequently the persons interrogated have no useful knowledge either of the questions or of their own behavior.

institutions are prevalent, we must consider the methodological question whether social psychology can be an experimental science.¹ Can we have in the field of social behavior experimental techniques in the same manner as in the study of non-social reactions? What one is to reply to this question is not at all clear. There are two reasons for this. First, there is the fact that cultural behavior is at once so complicated and intimate that serious difficulties are inevitable. Secondly, the experimentation with social phenomena interferes too much with our prejudices and human values. Cultural phenomena in their usual occurrence transpire for the most part in a matrix of multiple conditions. Thus they operate without the regularity which suggests definite isolation and control of the variables, and subsequent formulation of general laws. Moreover, to force cultural data into an experimental mould means that the facts elicited become different than they really are because of the introduction of rigid conditions.

The complexity of cultural conduct, however, does not make experimental conditions completely impossible. Especially when we are interested in the individual's acquisition of cultural equipment, experimental methods may be employed. For instance we can devise a scheme of having an individual acquire the use of some new language. This situation might be taken to simulate the actual culturalization process. The question arises, however, whether the conditions can be controlled sufficiently to duplicate the normal method of acquiring language reactions. Perhaps this experiment reduces itself merely to a study of the individual's manner and rate of learning. And this is not especially a problem of social psychology. Again we might control the individual's ordinary institutional stimuli by moving him to a different linguistic group, and in this way determine the particular kind of cultural equipment he will acquire. This, however, would give

¹ It is understood that experimental studies may be both of the field and laboratory type.

us only the results ordinarily observed when the person is culturalized in his own group. As such it hardly satisfies the experimental requirements of manipulating the personal and historical process of acquiring cultural conduct.¹

Probably the most typical and best experiments in social psychology would meet with the greatest practical difficulties. For such experimenting would run counter to our social prejudices. For instance, a very interesting experiment could be designed to demonstrate that the particular psychological make-up of an individual is entirely owing to his institutional stimuli. For example, a male and female infant respectively might be so stimulated as to develop behavior equipment culturally belonging to the opposite sex. Or an infant from an intelligent collectivity and one from a non-intelligent level² might be exchanged with the prospect of observing the development of a different human nature or personality. Still another type of experiment could be carried out as a double source of information. If a white woman who has just given birth to a child would adopt a colored infant to bring up as a twin of her own child, we would not only learn a great deal about the process of mental development but also the value of the psychologist's prejudice concerning innate negro inferiority. In all these cases no doubt the practical difficulties would prove more or less insurmountable,³ although there is

¹ We might refer here to various interesting attempts to devise experiments in social psychology. (a) Differences in the performance of multiplication, crossing out letters, words, or numerals, and other reactions are observed both when the reactors are alone or with other individuals. (b) Observations are made when several individuals are engaged in a game or other competitive enterprise. In both types of experiments interesting facts may be elicited, but no cultural or social behavior is directly observed. In (a) we have merely the influence of a group stimulus or group setting upon the reactions made, while in (b) we may have in addition some interpersonal conduct.

² This means of course merely less intelligent.

³ What parents would allow such experimentation? Especially if they knew that the personality once formed can only with difficulty if at all be reformed. This latter point indicates the intrinsic difficulties involved in such experimentation aside from the social complications.

nothing theoretically impossible in any of the cases mentioned.

Is it not a redundancy to add that experimental difficulties in the field of social psychology do not imply that it is not a genuine science? Certain it is that we cannot require all sciences to operate in exactly the same way. In fact it is detrimental to the whole conception of science to entertain preconceived notions concerning how the work of observing and recording should proceed. Just what method and sources a science has depends upon the particular kinds of facts included within its sphere. Moreover not all sciences subsume their facts under the same sorts of laws. It is an unfortunate convention to think of all scientific principles in terms of the laws of physics. So far as the laws of social psychology are concerned, they are formulae which may be construed as statements concerning how our actions are governed, but these principles are certainly not the uniformity laws of physics. Quite the opposite, they allow for and take account of particularities and idiosyncrasies of human action.

Social psychology, as is true of general psychology, is concerned with the discovery of the uniqueness of an organism, while physics aims to find the uniformity of its objects. In contrast to physical things, which we may simplify and reduce to statistical uniformities, psychological organisms and their behavior are complex and varied. Differences of description and prediction are inevitable when we are dealing with human science as compared with the mechanical branch of physics for instance.

The validity of a science we assume must be decided on the basis of whether it critically studies some type of phenomenon. Now because psychological facts are complex we must expect our studies to be difficult and our laws intricate. Furthermore, though cultural reactions are complicated they must not for that reason be regarded as fortuitous happenings. They

can all be accounted for on the basis of specific circumstances, if only we can discover them.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY¹

What may be called the origin of social psychology as a technical discipline dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. At that period the romantic attitude which pervaded Europe led scholars to develop an intensive interest in human facts. From this time may be dated the first modern scientific studies of language, beginning with Sanskrit. This interest, stimulated by the Romantic philosophy, resulted in a search for the nature of the inner spiritual power which manifests itself in various types of ethnic and national phenomena. Thus arose the conception that language, myth, and custom were facts which could be studied and described from a psychological standpoint.²

It is hardly necessary to add that this early psychological attitude toward social phenomena signalized merely a preoccupation with psychic or mentalistic forces as means of interpreting social data. This is, of course, the only kind of

¹ In this brief exposition no attempt is made to give an accurate chronological record of development, although we have attempted to indicate the early temporally distinct origins. In the later development this temporal distinction is not obvious. Particular writers may embrace a number of different conceptions. Neither do we propose to give anything like a complete account of the development of what is already so vast a subject that its ramifications are almost coterminous with the limits of the whole set of social sciences. Materials for the study of the history of social psychology may be found in the following works. *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, essays by Goldenweiser, Young and Hankins, 1925; Davis, *Psychological Interpretation of Society*, 1909, Chapter 2; Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought*, 1922, chaps. 22, 23.

² The records of thought at this period indicate that the psychological formulation of how social phenomena operate was enormously abetted by the Herbartian doctrine of action and interaction in the apperceptive field. While the history of this phase of human thought remains to be written, the student interested in this intellectual development may glean much information from a consideration of the Herbartian influence upon the development of social psychology, especially as reflected in the writings of Steinthal and Lazarus.

psychology that could be conceived of at this time. Moreover, since these psychic forces were presumed to account for data primarily of an ethnic sort, this is the period of the group soul. (The group soul was really a poetic conception designed to explain the unique characteristics of the languages, myths, and customs of different ethnic units. As a technical psychological conception the group soul doctrine may be traced back to Wilhelm von Humboldt and other followers of the romantic Naturphilosophie, whose interests centered more particularly in the languages of different social communities. (To a brother of Wilhelm von Humboldt, the equally famous Alexander, credit has been given for the development of the name Folk Psychology (Völkerpsychologie) a term which well symbolizes the character of social psychology at that period.)

(A great impetus was given to the development of social psychology by Lazarus and Steinthal. In the year 1860 they began the publication of a journal called the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, devoted to folk psychology and especially the social psychology of language. It was these writers, notably the former, who first brought to the study of complex human behavior phenomena a technical equipment of psychological ideas. For their technical psychological conception they went to Herbart. Now it was Herbart's doctrine that the human mind consisted of mental states compounded of simpler elements or ideas brought together through mechanistic forces. In the process of tension between simple mental elements, the assimilation of congenial elements resulted in apperception or knowledge, while the clash of elements constituted feeling and will. Since it was common doctrine in their period that such phenomena as language, myth, and custom could not be the products of single minds, they merely elaborated the Herbartian Psychology. They assumed that the superindividual mind necessary here was created by an interaction between particular individual minds. Language, myth, and custom were considered the products of

such superindividual minds, just as tools and other objects could be created as individual mental products.

According to these writers, social psychology in general could be divided into two divisions. On the one hand, there was the comparative study of racial or national achievements resulting from the operation of particular group minds. For instance, the art, mythology, and language of an ethnic unit were regarded as the manifestations of that group's mind. On the other, they proposed to study language, myth, and religion in general as the universally human psychic products of mentality.

One of the most elaborate developments of social psychology in this general tradition may be attributed to Wundt, whose studies, starting with language, cover in ten volumes the field of myth, art, religion, law, politics, etc.¹ (Wundt takes as his starting point the criticism of the group mind of Steinthal and Lazarus.) Since these writers conceived of (the group mind) as that which is responsible for the development of social phenomena, (Wundt regarded it as smacking much of a metaphysical substance.) From Wundt's standpoint these writers separated the minds too much from the actual facts of language and myth. Because for Wundt psychology is a science of spiritual aspects or processes, and not of integral substances, he denied that the social mind is merely the cause of social facts which exist outside of minds. (Wundt himself thought of the group mind as simply a larger form of conscious process than an individual mind.) The latter he conceived of as a creative synthesis in the sense that a complex idea is compounded of or synthesized from simpler mentalistic components. (Thus social or group mind was for him a synthesis of individual minds, in other words, the process of individual mentalities fusing into a social mentality.) The social

¹ Published with editorial variations from 1900 to 1922 under the title *Völkerpsychologie*.

mind is the psychic material of which art, language, etc., are the expressions.

Social phenomena, then, such as language, myth, and custom constitute, according to Wundt, conscious material or psychic content, in the way that colors, sounds, and their combinations comprise the psychic materials of individual minds and individual psychology. In this psychological doctrine, no more than in the foregoing, is there any intimation that psychology is fundamentally concerned with the conduct of persons.

Wundt thought of social psychology as an auxiliary science to physiological or experimental psychology. The latter, dealing with individuals, employed the functions of the neural tissues as an explanatory basis for their operation. For the explanation of the more complex mental syntheses he used the idea of the interactions of individual mentality. Between Lazarus and Steinthal, and Wundt, the enormous development of biological studies intervened. Accordingly, for Wundt and others who followed in this train, social psychology adds the more complex facts of human behavior to the simple data of reflexes and elementary discrimination responses.

The unity to the whole psychological structure, Wundt thought, was supplied by the conception that social psychological phenomena are developed upon a basis of animal activities. Language, for example, he thought, has its ultimate origin in the cries of animals. These cries, merely expressing the psychophysiological character of animals, take on meanings and become abstract and symbolic, finally culminating in complex ideational expressions. The developmental conception according to Wundt's view has the merit of obviating the difficulties of Herbart's intellectualistic mechanism. For one thing this developmental doctrine allows for the evolution of social products, while Herbart's psychology was obliged to attribute the origin of every feature of myth and language to a separate invention. Furthermore, according to Wundt, the unity

running through from individual to social mentality makes room for a genuine affective and volitional life which he thought was lacking in the Herbartian psychology.

Up to this point the subject-matter of social psychology definitely comprised phenomena of an ethnic type. A second distinct, though not entirely unrelated development, is that in which the psychic or mental forces are presumed to account not for the phenomena of ethnic groups, but for the operation of groups of persons within ethnic units, for example, crowds, mobs, and publics. Writers on this theme, of whom (Sighele and Le Bon) may be taken to be very good representatives, were impressed with the differences in behavior between individuals acting alone and the same individuals when constituting groups. This interest led to the formulation of a conception of an over-mind or crowd mind, thought to consist of the unification of individual minds. As such it was reputed to possess characteristics quite different from the mind of the individual. While this crowd mind was presumed to be a real phenomenon, it could not of course be thought of as continuous and prolonged in its existence as the national or racial group mind. A common factor in this type of social psychology and those already examined is that the crowd or mob mind is presumed to account for the phenomena of a group of individuals in their collectivity.¹

As a third distinct variant of social psychology we shall consider the viewpoint which departs from the collective mentality or consciousness conception. Chiefly it is concerned with the discovery of mental powers or forces which account for such human phenomena as social organization, economic processes, etc. Obviously this type of social psychology is a distinctly sociological phase. An early outgrowth along this line is illustrated by (the suggestion of Bagehot concerning

¹ An interesting variant of the crowd type of social psychology is that in which collectivistic behavior is interpreted in terms of Freudian processes in the component individuals. Cf., Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, 1920.

the rôle of imitation in human affairs, and by the work of Tarde, who independently of the former writer, attempted in an elaborate manner to account for sociological phenomena on the basis of imitation.) The present form of social psychology reached its peak with the proposal that various deep-seated mental forces operate in individuals to condition the character of social phenomena.

(Without doubt the most familiar of these conceptions is that which revives the ideas of Hobbes, Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, and other English and Scottish individualistic thinkers,¹ concerning human nature and the instincts.) (Into contemporary social psychology this conception has been introduced by McDougall.) Instincts are regarded by him as "those most fundamental elements of our constitution, the innate tendencies to thought and action that constitute the native basis of the mind."²

In the case of McDougall there is no question concerning his intention to find distinct psychic elements to explain the character and events of society. But other writers dealing with instincts merely stipulate the rôle of individual psychological phenomena in social life. Indeed some of the latter merely wish to indicate the place in social behavior of natural human and animal characteristics. For instance, they want to show the influence of anatomical differences and reflex action upon social conduct.

A fourth unique phase of social psychology may be characterized by its preoccupation with the problem of the social

¹ To a considerable extent we might consider that the social psychological conception of forces resident in the individual mind and constituting the foundations of human phenomena, represent the British individualistic reaction against the Continental emphasis of the group as the predominant factor in human affairs. But there may be other interpretations of this type of development also.

² Cf. *Social Psychology*, 1910, and "The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 1922.

self. Briefly it is concerned with the interactions of persons and the groups in which they live. To sociologists and psychologists it appeared necessary to explain upon a psychological basis how it was possible for such discrete factors as individuals to compose a society and act in concert. The question here is how we can find in any given aggregation of persons a synchronous autonomy and separateness of selves, with a homogeneity and identity of minds. The social self is presumed to explain the unity of society and the coöperative action of its component individuals. (*Monthly Sociology*)

The study of the social self may be said to have two phases. On the one hand, the center of interest is the problem whether society or the individual is the dominant factor in human associations or whether there is perfect mutuality. On the other, is the question of the process whereby society makes the mind of an individual on the basis of elementary innate processes referred to as original nature. The first phase reaches back to some metaphysical conception of the world and the individual translated into biological and psychological terms. The latter emphasizes the genetic development of the individual mind under group auspices. The interest is chiefly in the individual's acquisition of his particular type of mind in the form of habits, attitudes, and intelligence as a result of his contact with the other individuals of a particular social group.¹

Clearly the present type of social psychology represents a divergence from the others which are chiefly concerned with

¹ Various types of writers including philosophers and sociologists represent this view. For example, Baldwin, *Mental Development of the Child and the Race*, 1895, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, (3), 1902, etc.; Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1917, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, etc.; Mead, "The Relation of Psychology and Philology," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1904, "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *ibid.*, 1910, "The Mechanism of Social Consciousness," *ibid.*, 1912; Royce, *Psychology*, 1903, etc.; Thomas, "The Province of Social Psychology," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, 1904, etc.; and Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, *Social Organization*, 1909, *Social Process*, 1918.

psychic powers or mental contents. Although this new phase is in no sense a complete departure from the mentalistic trend so far as psychological implications are concerned, still the mentalistic feature is not the center of interest.

The recent introduction of a more definitely psychological viewpoint into social psychology we may regard as a fifth stage in its development. A new emphasis is found here with respect to the kind of data to be dealt with by the social psychologist. Instead of dealing with essentially group mentality or the relations of individuals and groups, the problem here is the interaction of persons. This type of psychology pushes to the background the sociological implications, by stressing behavior of persons. Moreover, the more objective proponents of this conception look upon persons as organisms rather than as minds.¹ When, however, the interactional behavior is described, it is presumed to be accompanied by mind activity. Another characteristic of this type of social psychology is that an attempt is made to translate forces and mental powers into elementary biological forms of action. When native powers are made use of they are handled in terms of "prepotent reflexes." Also some writers stress the difference in the behavior of individuals when reacting to other persons and when reacting to non-personal objects.

The viewpoint of the present volume constitutes the sixth and last type in our series of social psychology developments. The claim made for the diversity of the present conception is that it is based upon a completely objective psychological system. The social psychology represented here may be called institutional, objective, or organismic. It dispenses completely with all types of mentalities or conscious processes presumed to accompany conduct. It is proposed that as students of social psychology, we are merely interested in a particular type of reaction, namely, responses to institutional stimuli.

¹ Cf. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924; Smith and Guthrie, *Chapters in General Psychology*, 1921, Chap. 7.

Summing up the development of social psychology we find that the two earliest views are both concerned with super-individual minds. The former¹ attempted to show how such ethnic facts as the common behavior of language, customs and myths originated, the latter, to explain the activity of mobs or other aggregations of persons. Our third type of social psychology aims to account for social phenomena in terms of psychological forces or powers resident in individuals. The fourth phase mentioned deals with the interactions of persons and groups in the course of which the mental life of the individual is built up. Following this development, a fifth type of social psychology stresses interactions between persons. We have indicated how this type emphasizes the study of responses to other persons as stimuli.

Finally, we come to the viewpoint of the present book, that social psychology is the study of responses to any kind of object or person functioning as an institution. In our next chapter we attempt a critical examination of various social psychological conceptions as a means of throwing into relief the favorable points of our institutional view of social psychology.



¹ An exception is Wundt's type of social psychology which in one phase is like our fifth or sixth types which are concerned with a type of action distinct from individual psychology.

CHAPTER II

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME OUTSTANDING CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

It is in no sense surprising that any branch of psychology appears unsettled or crudely defined. Especially is this condition to be expected in the case of social psychology. For not only is the subject matter entirely disagreed upon, but social psychology as a separate discipline was not even originally formulated by psychologists. Upon approaching the data of social psychology then, we find that a great number of competing viewpoints prevail with respect to the identity of the subject matter and the methods by which it should be studied. These differences of opinion may be traced primarily to two sources.

First, they may arise from the heterogeneous interests that have always contested for the mastery of the social psychological field. It is to the disadvantage of psychological science that the facts of social psychology have been primarily developed by sociologists, criminologists, jurists, philologists, philosophers, and other students of human phenomena. Historically it was these social scientists who stimulated an interest in cultural behavior, though not in its genuinely psychological aspects. It was also the interests and methods of these other scholars which shaped the materials of social psychology when psychologists first began to concern themselves with this subject. For example, the sociological regnancy over this domain has introduced the insalutary stress of that forlorn hope, the psychological (psychic) interpretation of society.

Secondly, the existence of so many varying conceptions is

probably owing more to the difficulties found in the domain of psychology itself. When psychologists cannot agree upon the character of the phenomena with which they deal, it is small wonder that they have not developed standardized conceptions concerning some of the most complex actions of the entire field. Accordingly, as psychologists have acquired an interest in social behavior, each has interpreted the data involved according to his particular school of thought and his dominant interest at the time.

It is our suggestion therefore that by analyzing the more prominent current conceptions of social psychology and bringing to light their unsatisfactory features, we may hope to secure a clearer attitude concerning the character of the data and principles of this science.

As we proceed in our inspection it will become increasingly evident that the various theories treated are not all mutually exclusive nor held by different writers. Indeed, several are phases of one general view. Our chief aim is to bring to the surface as many distinguishing aspects of social psychology as we can.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF MOB OR CROWD PHENOMENA

As we have seen in the brief statement of the development of our subject, it is the import of one of the earlier conceptions that social psychology is exclusively concerned with the behavior of mobs or other such peculiar phenomena. Thus social psychology in this light is supposed to deal only with the extraordinary behavior of persons when inflamed and incited to participate in unusual situations such as social outrages, or religious mania. By the more unscientific writers, it has been proposed that in such cases of behavior as mob action, the particular minds of the participating individuals become fused in a group consciousness, which is an entirely

different thing from the individual minds, and functions in a far different manner. The mob or crowd mind is described as irrational, hating, cruel, etc.

Such a conception may be summarily dismissed as having no connection with scientific psychology. It must be looked upon as a purely speculative attempt to find in "psychic" materials an explanation of a striking form of sociological phenomena.

A more recent, and from the standpoint of its temporal perspective, a more acceptable version of this conception, is that the conduct of groups or crowds is different from the conduct of the individuals comprising the aggregation. Crowds or mobs as such are said to be hating, cruel, intolerant, etc. No question exists, of course, that mobs and crowds appear to display such characteristics, especially when lynching bees, man hunting, or tar and feather enterprises are the phenomena investigated. Furthermore, to acknowledge this truth is to make place at once for other interesting group behavior with very different descriptive qualities. For instance, the activities of collectivities during picnics, political rallies, wedding celebrations and other mass action may be described as gay, generous, loving, conciliatory, etc.

It is undeniable that the study of mobs and crowds constitutes a very important feature of sociological science. It falls in line with the investigation of the behavior performed by armies, cities, clubs, churches, lodges, commercial and financial collectivities, boys' gangs, and other groups of people. Whether and when such phenomena are psychological, however, is another question. To study mobs and groups as such is only to study historical and statistical events and not psychological facts. We reiterate once more that the only psychological phenomenon we can investigate is the conduct of specific individuals.

Now it is possible of course to analyze the behavior of a mob into the activities of the component members. These

activities we may regard as actual psychological responses. But even here the problem arises whether or not such actions constitute social behavior. In effect we must divide off genuine social psychological conduct from equally authentic psychological behavior which does not fall into this classification. It is only by making this distinction that we can clarify our ideas concerning the subject matter of social psychology and the nature of cultural reactions.

We can quite readily convince ourselves that the psychological activities found in mob phenomena are not necessarily cultural reactions, but perhaps contingent or idiosyncratic responses. That is, each individual may be performing reactions to things and conditions having no institutional character. This much we may say of the persons in the mob who are acting as its positive components.

Since the mob is a sociological unit it is undoubtedly true that numbered among the individuals of the group are those who respond with non-cultural actions to the mob itself. For instance, they pass individual judgments upon the behavior of such collections of people.

Obviously, we do not in any way mean to deny that mass conduct cannot be comprised of cultural actions. Undoubtedly there are communities in which even lynching mob reactions are constituent features of the social behavior equipment of its members, although it is surely not true that all mob conduct consists of such cultural behavior. Mob phenomena as institutional objects certainly exist, though probably in small numbers. On the other hand, aggregational conduct of various milder forms than mob action is performed by all individuals. Crowd and other aggregational stimuli objects connected with baseball, football, gladiatorial contests and similar convocation phenomena constitute a large number of our normal institutions. It is a most common performance of cultural conduct periodically to join a congregation or throng and perform with it certain specified actions,

as churchgoing and worshipping, for example. Such conduct it must be insisted, however, constitutes after all only a very special type of social psychological data. In no sense therefore can social psychology be regarded as the exclusive study of the behavior of the individuals found in mobs or crowds.

At this juncture we must be warned most effectively against identifying cultural conduct with sheer concerted conduct. It may have nothing to do with cultural conditions. Can we discover then an infallible criterion to differentiate between these two types of behavior? Yes. We find that cultural behavior is truly homogeneous because it is developed through contact with objects possessing institutional stimulative functions. That is to say, only when the stimuli possess attributed stimulative properties which bring about commonness of action do we find cultural behavior. On the other hand, merely concerted actions are similar and appear to be homogeneous for an entirely different reason. In this case the commonness of equipment is not developed through contact with institutional objects but merely with objects having similar non-cultural properties.¹ Thus we do not have social or cultural phenomena at all. In explaining the homogeneity of conduct on the part of several persons, do we require any other principle than that similar behavior circumstances exist for them at the moment? This synchronous performance of behavior by a number of individuals can be accounted for by definite stimuli and response conditions that do not at all touch social psychological processes.

Let us consider the stimulus side first. The performance of concordant action by many individuals is largely explained by the presence of an object or situation whose immediate properties are such as to call out the observed behavior. A murder, a railway accident, a conflagration, a childbirth, are naturally endowed with stimulative properties to elicit simi-

¹ It is on this basis that Smith and Guthrie (*op. cit.*) characterize conduct as social.

lar responses in many different individuals providing only that they are near enough to be stimulated.

On the side of the persons we may account for their concerted action by the presence of their equipment of independent similar reaction systems. Why individuals get together and place themselves in the same situation can be explained by pointing out that each of these different individuals have equipments that permit it or at least do not prevent it. In other words, reactional conditions exist which make such behavior possible. It is no unusual situation that many persons may have enough similar response equipments to make possible a concert of action without having acquired them through the culturalization process which is the essential feature of social behavior. When we have striking forms of phenomena in a society, such as the various things around which crowd action centers, it is small wonder that a number of different individuals have similar reactions to them. Persons living where lynchings or land booms occur, where waterfalls, sand dunes, or caves are found, develop independently similar behavior equipments with respect to these stimuli objects.¹ It is these individuals who can and do act in concert. On the other hand, all those persons who have not acquired or built up appropriate responses will not be found in the mob or crowd. Only individuals inclined toward music or baseball are available for the performance of musical or baseball crowd behavior. Mob or crowd action, therefore, consists merely of the massing of the private behavior of persons constituting the crowd or group and not of genuine cultural conduct.

It is never to be overlooked either that no matter how

¹ The independence of the equipments is not so clear when we deal with human objects and situations as it is when natural objects are in question, since in the former case it is possible for cultural and non-cultural behavior equipments to overlap and coincide. The coincidence of behavior traits connected with natural objects is not of course entirely excluded. The best illustration of the independent acquisition of similar responses to particular types of objects are offered us when the different behavior situations are geographically far removed from each other.

simply and uniformly the conduct of a collectivity is described, the behavior of each individual really consists of many specific stimulations and responses. Aside from their collocation in place and time there may not be any definite principle of grouping them in a class. Social responses, on the other hand, are decidedly similar even when performed by persons very distantly separated in time and place.

Another problem confronts us. Is it possible that after all we must conceive of the behavior of persons under mob auspices as social conduct on the ground that such reactions are exciting and stirring? Are we required to think of the peculiar intensity, freedom and exuberance of concerted action as the qualities marking the differentia between social and non-social action?¹ We think not. In our opinion these behavior differences may be easily and entirely accounted for when we give the behavior settings their proper consideration. In performing reactions in a group setting the person's conduct is conditioned in several ways. In a mob or boisterous crowd setting one's behavior is reinforced and facilitated by the anger, storming, gayety, or exuberance of the surrounding persons. This freedom of action may be conditioned by the mere fact that everybody else is doing much the same thing. Accordingly the actions of each specific individual may be described as intense and unconstrained. In the event that some of the individuals in the collectivity display their disapproval of the action or perform other kind of behavior they modify the effect of the setting and introduce a curbing and inhibiting influence. Other stimuli settings in the situation, in addition to those provided by the presence and conduct of the rest of the collectivity, are the person's own actions, such as realization of absence of restraint, of law,

¹ At this point we may submit that we have no objection to anyone segregating the behavior phenomena involved with collectivities, even though we can find in them no unique psychological principle. Furthermore, we are entirely willing in such a case to yield the name social psychology which would then be entirely different from the term cultural psychology.

or convention, temporary freedom from fear, etc. When the behavior of the crowd or collectivity, on the other hand, is subduing and depressing, for example when reacting to a mine explosion, shipwreck, or other calamity, the setting has a dulling and dejecting influence upon the reacting individuals. In all cases as a matter of course the setting effect is itself an extension of the stimulus function and of a piece with it.

As a final suggestion of the lack of identity of cultural and crowd behavior we add that while the majority of a person's actions are cultural in character, comparatively few responses are performed as a member of a crowd or mob. That is, the person rarely acts under crowd auspices. He may never find himself in an angry mob or in a panic-stricken theatre audience. Certainly it is in no sense a descriptive requirement of social conduct that it be performed in concert or in a group. Hence there is absolutely no warrant for confining the science of social psychology to the study of mass conduct.

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS RESPONSES TO PERSONS

A conception of recent origin implies that social psychology has as its subject matter an individual's reactions to other persons as stimuli. This theory we immediately grant has the merit of being founded upon the behavior of individuals. But unfortunately at the basis of this idea there is also the influence of sociological thinking which transforms it into a misconception. From the standpoint of the sociologist it may appear important to divide off the reactions of persons to each other from their reactions to impersonal or non-personal stimuli. For this distinction may fit in with a discipline which is to a great extent concerned with the interactions of individuals. But it has no validity whatsoever either in segregating social psychology from general psychology or defining the field of the former. There is no principle of psychological science warranting the distinction between reactions on the

basis of the kinds of objects to which organisms respond. *The reductio ad absurdum* of this view is to have an animal, stone, and a water psychology each to cover responses to such objects. Naturally there are cultural reactions to persons, but so are there social responses to non-personal objects as well.

A more positive defect of this theory is the confusion of cultural conduct with a type of non-cultural action, namely interpersonal behavior.¹ There are very definite activities of persons which involve mutual give and take processes in the form of interstimulational responses. A good example is found in the activities of a fighting couple. Every movement of one individual constitutes a stimulus for the other, whose changing postures and movements in turn stimulate the first person. Many of our complex actions are of this type. For example, take the behavior of a group of opposing diplomats or attorneys in a conference, in which each watches the reactions of his opponent for a stimulational cue to his own conduct. An excellent example in a more private situation is the behavior of a pair of lovers whose mutual interstimulation results in a progressive enrichment of action. Now in these cases and all similar ones there may be cultural facts, but the activities are overwhelmingly contingent and idiosyncratic. At any rate, to identify such behavior with cultural conduct is to miss the fundamental characteristics of social action.

One more objection to this theory may be mentioned. Granted that all genuine cultural conduct in the final analysis is dependent upon a set of individuals² is it true that the actual process of acquiring cultural conduct necessarily operates through the medium of personal interstimulation? Decidedly not. To acquire cultural responses it is only necessary for the person to be stimulated by an object through its culturally attributed properties. Such impersonal contacts are

¹ For a description of this type of behavior consult the writer's *Principles of Psychology*, Chapter 24.

² We mean of course a psychological collectivity not a sociological group.

in many cases sufficient for acquiring the cultural responses connected with that object. An example in point is any case in which the person responds to some present object in an analogous manner to that in which he has responded to a similar object through more direct group influence. This situation is well illustrated in the acquisition of responses to printed words by analogy with other words. The conditions of social psychology are satisfied if the reaction when acquired constitutes a shared response to the institutional properties of things.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR IN GROUPS

Similar to the theory just examined is the sociologically founded conception implying that social psychology is the study of behavior dependent upon group auspices. While this theory is based upon facts than which none are less contestable, it provides no basis upon which to establish a science. Since no human individual can ever exist outside of groups, whether family, tribe, or nation, his conduct is practically all affected by this circumstance. But to make gregariously conditioned conduct the subject matter of social psychology is to identify all psychology with social psychology. A fatal consequence is that we would then have no distinctive criterion for any kind of human behavior. Unless we discover actual characteristic effects which specific groups have upon the behavior of particular individuals we are not doing justice to the data of our science.

Our point is that the mere presence of a group or sheer human environment is of no significance for the study of social psychology, or any branch of the social sciences for that matter. The all-important fact about the group surroundings of an individual is that they comprise the loci of specific institutional stimuli.¹ What the social psychologist is inter-

¹ See our discussion of the significance of groups for social psychology, Chapter I, p. 11 ff.

ested in, therefore, are the differences in reactions to these institutional stimuli as they are developed in and performed under the unique psychological circumstances of particular aggregations of individuals.

Conduct is cultural then, not because it is performed within a group, but because it belongs to individuals who are in contact with and affected by specialized behavior conditions involving particular sets of persons. For example, the psychological activity of speaking as a universal performance of gregarious human animals is not cultural. Such linguistic conduct is purely individual, although it is decidedly conditioned by other persons. Accordingly we must not confuse sheer non-social vocal reactions with genuine cultural speech. The former are simply adjustments of pointing, or of calling attention to something. The latter are very specific reference responses involving words or gestures which the individual acquires through culturalization in a particular group.¹ To be cultural, actions, whether manners, morals, industrial or aesthetic practices, must be performed by persons as joint participants in unique contacts with institutions.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF SOCIALIZATION

The fundamental departure of the socialization conception of social psychology is its preoccupation with the development of the individual mind. While the popularity which this conception has always enjoyed has been based upon a number of shrewd observations, the latter have not always been correctly interpreted.

As one of the oldest of the theories of social psychology the socialization doctrine has changed its emphasis to meet the requirements of modified circumstances in the psychologi-

¹ For an elaborate analysis of the different aspects of linguistic conduct, cf. the writer's *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 2, Chapter 23.

cal field. In consequence we must distinguish between an earlier and a later form.

The adherents of the older phase looked upon the mind as a series of complex mental contents which were engendered in persons through a socialization process. Social psychology as dealing with ideas, beliefs, and speech was contrasted with individual psychology which studied the simpler mentalities represented by sensations and feelings connected with reflex responses and other physiological processes.

In its early form the socializing doctrine implies the existence of a group soul or a social consciousness which is presumed to become focalized when the individual mind is being engendered. The socializing process is thus spoken of as the development of an individual consciousness, mind or self, although it is usually implied that there is an ultimate unity between the social consciousness and the individual consciousness or mind.¹ It is this implied unity which is the source of the potencies in the socializing process.

Because this doctrine implies that psychology deals with states of consciousness detached from, though somewhat connected with, biological mechanisms we might merely say that it falls completely out of the purview of an objective psychology.

The more recent version of the socialization theory, however, is decidedly more ~~more~~ naturalistic. Its sponsors either entirely dispense with psychic materials or else do not stress them. The main emphasis is that the ideas, beliefs and attitudes constituting the individual mind are produced in persons either by the direct activities of a group upon them, or through the behavior of particular individuals representing the group. The various interactions between a group and its component individuals or between persons in the group

¹ In support of this view various well-sounding generalizing metaphors are employed, to wit, the assertion that the individual and the group are different aspects of the same thing, etc.

are supposed to result in the attainment by all of the group's peculiar mentality.

In examining this newer formulation we may pass over the criticism that after all it is only a variant of the doctrine that social psychology deals with reactions performed under group auspices. For the emphasis upon development gives the present theory an entirely different complexion.

The socialization theory in its present version disarms another criticism. Instead of the generation of pure mentality which was the doctrine in the older form, the new version is emended in such a way that social psychology becomes the study of the development of actual responses to stimuli.

And yet with this improvement the socialization doctrine is not entirely free from exceedingly serious defects. It clearly overemphasizes the development of traits of a universal human, racial, or national type. As a consequence it neglects many other activities of persons. It does not allow for the existence of professional, fraternal, and other voluntary societies, dialectal language, and sectarian religious organizations of which the individual is a member and through contacts with which he acquires cultural equipments.

What we miss especially in the socialization description of human behavior is any provision for accidental and individual development. According to this doctrine we have no place for the development of ideas, meanings, and beliefs, which depend upon specific accidental situations in the lifetime of the individual. Where in such a theory is there any room for the infinite variety of non-cultural equipments and performances of persons, in short all those actions peculiar to private individuals and developed by them independent of community conditions?

By overstressing the dependence of the person's behavior equipment upon a group it precludes the occurrence of reasoning, voluntary, intentional and other types of contingent and idiosyncratic behavior which operate as unique adapta-

tions to stimuli. Is it not true that the development of meanings, beliefs, thoughts, and inventions involve behavior which runs counter to the conventional responses of one's neighbors? These complicated types of psychological phenomena must be developed in private contacts of persons with things.¹ Interaction with other people, whether direct or through writings or products, is not necessary to develop meanings, beliefs, ideas, and conceptions of the idiosyncratic types. We must count it as a serious defect in the socialization theory that it fails to handle effectively the very types of phenomena with which it is designed to deal.

Another objection to the theory is its constant emphasis upon an individual as over against a group. As though an individual were in contact with only a single collectivity. It is entirely foreign to the socialization conception that a person is inevitably a member of a multitude of collectivities. When we take cognizance of this fact and the possibilities it affords for the person changing particular groups, we cannot regard social psychology as the study of how a person's mentality is thrust upon him by a set of individuals.

Now as we have already suggested, the socializing conception is not without its factual basis. It is undoubtedly true that there is such a process as an individual becoming socialized. But this means merely that the newcomer in a community is brought into contact with its linguistic, religious and other institutions, and as a result acquires common modes of conduct. Whether the entrant into a community be an infant or an immigrant he acquires some cultural equipment from the new group. It is only in this sense that social mentality is created or developed.

¹ Here we must distinguish between true beliefs, ideas and meanings as individual responses and the objects referred to by these names which are really factors of what the sociologist calls cultural heritage. Learning to react as others do in the sense of using their language, or, to use the terms of the proponents of the socializing theory, developing the meanings of things, is obviously merely acquiring conventional reactions.

On the whole, from the standpoint of a satisfactory psychology, we find in the socializing view a very insufficient emphasis upon stimuli conditions. It is primarily because the proponents of this theory overlook the individual's contact with his stimuli surroundings that they find it necessary to make groups (ethnic) into the sole sources of psychological behavior. Failing to stress the rôle of stimuli in developing conduct, the upholders of the socialization view are forced to locate cultural conduct in some sort of collectivistic power. Here the group instead of being a mere locus for cultural stimuli assumes a very definite entitative character. In consequence, the socializing process becomes so absolute and fixed that the group is loaded with potentialities for the development of the minds and actions of its members.

Why the sponsors of the socializing conception do not accord stimuli situations their proper sphere in the psychological scheme is clear because they are exclusively interested in the development of the mind and not in concrete modes of individual actions to correlated stimuli. Accordingly, they require only a generalized mechanism with which to develop such a mind. Also, in its final development it is presumed to operate whenever some cue (not stimulus in our sense) is present. Thus stimuli are in both instances quite superfluous. When social psychology, however, is concerned with reactions to specific objects and conditions it is plain that behavior cannot be otherwise acquired than by various interactions of persons with stimuli objects. Also at any later period the operations of such conduct depend upon the same types of connections of the person (reactions) with the identical stimuli.

Probably the stress which the sponsors of the socializing conception put upon the functions of persons in the socializing process signifies after all an unwitting tribute paid to the importance of stimuli. It is apparent here that an interstimulational mechanism is substituted for the actual rôle of stimuli

in the development of both cultural and non-cultural behavior.¹ Such a substitution, however, is not a satisfactory procedure. There is very little if anything in common between (1) the building up of actions or a mind by the inevitable operation of a group (through persons) upon an individual, and (2) the building up of cultural responses through a more or less fortuitous connection of persons with particular institutional stimuli.² And so while it is undoubtedly true that persons constitute a large share of our stimuli, and also that they are potent as stimulating occasions, this is no more than an accidental fact from the standpoint of the person's actual psychological development. It is not unlikely that by far the largest number of actual psychological stimuli functioning to make the individual build up reactions in common with members of his particular groups, are not persons, but physical things, natural objects, buildings, writings, laws, customs, etc. Moreover, the processes involved in the building up and continuation of such social stimuli need not be exclusively psychological in character, but may also be historical, political,³ social, etc.

It is almost inevitable that the socializing conception always comes dangerously near being a metaphysics. In the first instance, it is a means of accounting for the ultimate character of the general human mind. In the second place, the result is a very definite overemphasis of the group as a source of ideas and beliefs. Accordingly, the individual is made into an absolute product of some group. Even when there is a discussion of the interaction of persons with each other, the conclusion is that these individuals are really working out the

¹ To the proponents of the socializing doctrine this substitution theory merely means that cultural phenomena can only develop among human beings, but this fact, true as it is, possesses slight significance.

² Fortuitous, that is, so far as any particular type of behavior acquisition is concerned. There is no chance involved in the matter of whether reactions will be acquired when the appropriate stimuli are present.

³ This point we discuss in various chapters in Part II.

sorts of language, meanings, etc., which are the group's inherent qualities.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF MENTAL ORIGINS AND PSYCHIC CAUSES

The present theory resembles the socialization doctrine in attempting to account for the development of psychological phenomena. It is concerned, however, with the growth of the human mind at large, or at least the human mind in its ethnic proportions. As a theory concerning the human mind in general it is designed to explain the existence of religion, language, mythology, etc. These phenomena are regarded as general forms of human mentality, or products evolved through such mentality. Thus the present theory may be regarded as one form of the now generally execrated doctrine of the group mind.

In its baldest form the group mind conception is concerned with a psychic entity of universal dimensions. In detail, such a social psychology is supposed to study the effects of the collective soul or consciousness upon human phenomena. This conception is a fairly logical outgrowth of the general tradition that psychology is concerned with intangible processes which are causes of action. And so just as individual psychology studies the consciousness which results in the actions of persons, so social psychology studies the collective consciousness which is responsible for those things which antedate and are independent of individual minds such as language and laws.

Since this view has been so severely criticized, we need not comment upon it beyond characterizing it as an abortive conception. It not only does not provide us with information concerning the data of social psychology but it is not concerned with facts at all. Soul or consciousness as a substance or cause of things does not belong in the realm of natural

science but can only be properly employed in a poetic or metaphysical sense.

But even if we overlook the objectionable psychic implications of this view and only think of it as a theory to account for general human phenomena, such as language, myth, custom, law, etc., it cannot be said to be a genuine scientific conception. For we have absolutely no data concerning the origin of such large human reactions as language, myth, etc. Any attempt at making judgments with respect to the genesis of these universal human activities always results of course in extravagant speculations concerning the nature of the human mind.

In what sense is it true that anthropic phenomena such as language, myth, and customs are exclusively products of psychological phenomena? Even if we take psychological happenings to be the most rigidly naturalistic events they can in no way be cited as the exclusive causes or conditions of social phenomena. We shall later have occasion¹ to see that anthropic phenomena are just as much conditioned by cultural, historical, environmental, and other conditions as by psychological ones. Language, custom, and myth, whether actions of persons or social products, are in no sense solely the fruits of psychological happenings.

At the basis of the mental origins theory lies a very serious process of mistranslation. Ethnic objects and behavior facts are confused with psychic processes or products.

In the first place, in order to demonstrate the operation of the psychic generating process in developing language and myths, the actual human activities involved in the origin and changes of speech phenomena are generalized and made into a superindividual mentality.

Again, in order to show that language myth and other societal phenomena are really products of psychic causes they

¹ Chapter VI.

are also translated into psychic materials. Here we have the glaring conception that since recorded languages or laws are only expressions of speech and customary actions, that all languages and laws are in some sense psychic phenomena.

A striking illustration of this type of translation is the transformation of traditions and institutions into psychic stuff. Here we have the numerous variants of the group or superindividual mind such as the so-called Oxford, or Harvard "mind," the European, the female, or the workingman's mentality.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF ETHNIC PHENOMENA

Dating among the older social psychological conceptions is the theory that there is a branch or departmental discipline of psychology which investigates the psychological phenomena of particular ethnic or national groups. This is a view which plainly shows an ethnological influence. For it is based upon the assumption that the social psychologist is interested in the investigation of the differences between the social action or civilization products of particular social or national units. Thus social psychology is considered to deal with the kind of language, myth, and custom existing in some particular society.

The primary criticism of this conception is the severe limitation of the field to facts occurring under social or national auspices. What becomes of the great mass of religious, custom, linguistic, and other activities which are genuine forms of social responses, but which are neither ethnic nor national?

To appreciate the lacunae here we need only point out that as a matter of fact social behavior is never limited to such large type forms as are suggested by national or racial modes of human organization. For example it is obvious that dialects are inevitable developments in every group language. In

exactly the same way, religious, moral, and other group behavior differs very markedly from the standard forms of such conduct among some specified ethnographic moiety. We must insist therefore that the individuals who speak a dialect within a larger linguistic unit constitute a group no less than the former. Similarly, the individuals who perform a specific kind of religious activity within a larger religious group constitute a unit just as do the members of the more inclusive group. It is quite clear that the linguistic dialect and religious sect reactions may differ just as much from standard ethnic actions as any individual legal, artistic, religious, or other response varies from the general human behavior of the same name. Who speaks the language of the grammar books? Variations in the activities of sub-groups may be well illustrated by the behavior observed in a military enterprise in which the action (record) of a squad, company, or regiment may be very different from the action or record of a state, nation, or alliance as a larger unit.

Furthermore, it is no mean defect of this theory that it excludes from social psychology all the technological, professional, artistic, and other responses which individuals perform as members of collectivities which are in no sense ethnic in character. Much of our cultural conduct runs across all ethnic or national boundaries. We might go further and say that without doubt it is the smaller forms of human organization that are the main sources for the development of the phenomena of social psychology.

Social psychology, then, cannot be limited to the activities of persons characterized by a certain ethnic organization. The present conception clearly obliterates the fact that by a group the psychologist cannot mean exclusively an ethnological or national unit, but rather any series of individuals who have developed common reactions to specific kinds of stimuli.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVISTIC
MENTALITY

According to the collectivistic conception of social psychology the discipline deals with the mind of a distinct set of people. In its more restricted form a collectivity is presumed to be an ethnic or national unit, but the more inclusive aspect of this conception makes the mentality of any group the subject matter of social psychology.

The present theory undoubtedly is much more fostered by sociologists and anthropologists than by psychologists. Accordingly, in its more restricted form it is very closely related to the mental origins doctrine. Like it, the collectivistic mentality theory involves the assumption that different groups have different minds. An immediately added assumption is that these mentalities differ in quality; so that, for example, only certain groups are capable of developing a high type of civilization. It is also supposed that only the particular type of civilization found in a certain group could possibly be developed by that group because of the inherent quality of its mentality.

Insofar as the more restricted aspect of the collectivistic doctrine resembles the mental origins conception it is of course subject to the same criticisms. It is no more satisfactory, however, when it is free from the taint of a group mind or soul. For it still rests upon the questionable assumption that mentality is such a thing that it can be an inherent quality either of collectivities or persons.

Now since a collectivity is only a sociological organization, of which mobs or crowds are specific types, the collectivistic mentality theory of social psychology is vitiated by the same defects. We suggest then that the collectivity mentality theory is based upon the false presupposition that social psychology is the study of something that is really not a psychological datum. Collectivistic conduct is not a psycho-

logical fact. Rather, it is historical, legal, or political. Whenever we deal with social groups we are really dealing with some sort of human complex. This complex includes events of all sorts and human relations. Among the events are economic processes, the securing of raw material and their transformation. The activity of a collectivity is typified by the statement of how much gold the Australians produced in a given year or how much the Americans expend per annum for tobacco, schools, or for the upkeep of the navy. Or collectivistic behavior may be merely the operation of some human institution, a legal one for example, as when we say the English hanged a woman recently. Similarly, we might speak of the illegal behavior of an army, the political behavior of a party, as well as the moral conduct of the Irish or other people, but no one can be misled into regarding these as psychological phenomena.

Again when we refer to the behavior of a group we frequently mean to indicate a status or relation. A diplomatic relation illustrates such a situation, as when we say that the Turks have defied or are at war with the Germans. As a matter of historical interest we may describe the activities of the Americans during the Great War, but such action can never be considered as psychological except in a metaphorical sense. It must be obvious that the transformation of statistical, military, or historical phenomena into psychological action must result in the development of peculiar mystical entities or processes.

We submit once more that there is no such fact as the psychology of a group. From a psychological standpoint the use of such an expression always conceals some illegitimate assumption. No matter how small the collectivistic unit, or how large the range of activities performed by a group, we find all the differences in the world between the actual responses to stimuli which persons perform and whatever description we can give of any group conduct. Almost always group conduct

is a descriptive average of certain actions, such as a grammarian's report of a nation's speech or the historian's account of a typical form of behavior. Much of the difficulty in the conception of group conduct, no doubt, may be traced to the word "behavior," although it is obvious that behavior is not always a psychological term.

That the conception of a collectivistic psychology can persist may probably be accounted for by the fact that after all the behavior of persons is involved. Whenever human beings are concerned, the conduct element of sociological facts can be reduced to the behavior of particular members of the group. For example, we can reduce the behavior of an army to the specific (millions) reactions of particular persons to specific stimuli. This fact, however, merely enables us to organize a series of statistical tables; it provides no basis for a distinctly psychological science such as social psychology must be.

The point still remains that the collectivistic conception refers to the theory that social psychology constitutes an enumerative study of the traits of members of different ethnic or national communities. In this emended form the psychology of a group may justly be regarded as summarizing the facts of individual differences as found in persons living in different human communities. Now while this emended form of the theory does not merit the objection of lying outside the field of psychology it is still not a satisfactory doctrine. For it does not distinguish between general psychological activity and the more specialized types of cultural conduct. It does not, in other words, isolate the individual's traits which are acquired through contact with institutional stimuli from those developed through the stimulations of non-social stimuli objects. Should the theory then be further emended to deal with reactions acquired by persons through contact with institutional stimuli it would then be like the doctrine which makes

social psychology the study of ethnic phenomena, and thus subject to the same objections.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF SOCIAL FORCES

Jurists, sociologists, economists, and other social scientists are responsible for the development of the social psychological theory of the psychical determinants of social phenomena. Social or human occurrences are thought to be determined or conditioned by psychic forces or powers of various sorts. These are sometimes thought of as general patterns or specific instincts. Social psychology is thus looked to for basic interpretations or explanatory schemes to account for historical, economic, political, and social phenomena. No factual basis, of course, for this theory of social psychology is at hand, unless it be the observation that persons sometimes are able to control human conditions. But obviously in such cases no mysterious psychic forces are operating. Whenever individuals control and determine human circumstances, these happenings are conditioned by specific activities of persons in restricted situations, legislators enacting a law, diplomats bartering concessions, etc. Moreover, these activities are themselves conditioned by numerous human facts, the pliability of electoral constituencies, economic and military resources, etc. Whenever we have a theory, therefore, founded upon the abstraction of human action and its conversion into psychic forces, it should be placed under the heading of psychic-sociology instead of social psychology.

Another and later version of this conception operates with actual psychological processes. The latter, however, are elevated to potencies generally capable of making and marring human phenomena. For example, a massive literature exists in which all the complex humanistic phenomena of population-growth, origin and existence of institutions, inventions, production and distribution of goods, fashions, art develop-

ment, industrial crises, commercial combinations, social progress and regress, etc., in short the whole structure of humanistic phenomena, are explained upon the basis of the operation of one or more types of psychological processes, such as imitation, convention, sympathy, suggestion, fear, or conflict. Even when these processes are actual psychological phenomena, on the most consistently objective basis it must appear preposterous to believe for a single moment that such infinitely complex and involved phenomena can be attributed to the working of such comparatively elementary processes.

Such a theory represents a flagrant error of simplification. Clearly the upholders of this view are entirely misrepresenting the nature and power of psychological actions in making them serve as the causes of extremely complex phenomena. Genuine psychological activities are here violently transformed into explanations. Not only are the psychological facts misinterpreted but also the phenomena to be explained cannot be (entirely) accounted for on a psychological basis. It is quite incorrect to presume that there are not other kinds of conditions and situations besides psychological ones which condition sociological or historical group phenomena.

We might further animadvert upon this theory by suggesting that imitation, suggestion, conflict and similar processes in their own psychological sphere as genuine psychological phenomena are individual reactions and need not be at all materials for social psychology.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS THE PHYSIOLOGY OF COMPLEX BEHAVIOR *(compare with cell)*

This conception that social psychology is the study of the physiological basis of complex human behavior has its roots in a number of different circumstances. In the first place, it has developed under stress of the traditional attitude of physiologizing psychological phenomena. Secondly, this theory

represents a correction of the tradition that only the simpler psychological phenomena can be connected with physiological processes. As we have already pointed out, those who originally established social psychology, were influenced by the notion that this science was to investigate the more complex actions that could not be studied by the methods of physiological psychology. The adherents of the present view, therefore assert that there is a physiological basis for laughter, language, sympathy, etc. Another aspect of the present conception is the attempt to make acceptable various psychological mentalistic determinants of social phenomena, such as complexes and desires, which are accordingly translated into physiological terms.

In its details this theory involves the assumption that there are various prepotent biological processes that result in the development of social behavior and institutions. For instance, the family is supposedly rooted in the sexual reflexes, language in laryngeal reflexes, etc. A variant of this doctrine is the assertion that all complex human phenomena can be traced back to a limited series of desires, constituting the functions of particular tissues.

Aside from pointing out the transparent fallacy of indiscriminately making social psychological phenomena cover all forms of complex action, it is probably a sufficient commentary upon the present conception to suggest that it attempts to transform physiological facts into potencies of various sorts. But we might add that even if the potencies were not objectionable, there is no possible way of tracing complex human conduct of the cultural type back to single or simple causes. What this view overlooks is the whole historical development of social phenomena of which cultural behavior is only a part. It ignores, too, the fact that the psychological components of these human situations can only be handled in terms of much mutual interaction between persons and institutional objects. Only a general obtuseness to the genuine conditioning circum-

stances in all behavior makes possible the assumption that physiological processes are the sources of any kinds of psychological behavior. Even reflex actions, which may be regarded as the simplest types of behavior can not be described exclusively in terms of biological occurrences, but depend upon the contacts of persons with stimulative circumstances.

PART ONE

THE PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER III

THE BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL CONDUCT

THE PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The student of social psychology is confronted with **perspective problems** which in the same degree at least do **not** trouble many other investigators.¹ The complexity of psychological phenomena in general is proverbial. In addition, when an individual performs a cultural response he is at the same time **acting** as a biological organism, a general psychological being, **and** as a unit in an **anthropological** system. The most elementary contacts with **the** materials of the science, therefore, make it expedient to observe careful delimitations of the facts involved and necessitate a close scrutiny of the interrelations between social psychological phenomena proper and certain other facts connected with them. Only by observing these methodological requirements is it possible to confine ourselves to what is essentially our subject. At the same time we avoid neglecting related facts, confusing our data with other types, or indiscreetly making one type dependent upon the other for its existence or form of happening.

Another consideration. The data of social psychology are in a peculiar sense intimately connected with one's self. Owing to this circumstance one tends to inject one's own behavior

¹ To a great extent the study of human or social phenomena results in the development of a more critical attitude toward known facts rather than the acquisition of entirely new knowledge. This change in intellectual status may be described as a process of projecting oneself beyond the prejudices and ideological conventionalities of one's **professional** or general social group.

situation into the facts studied and thereby misinterprets them. Indeed it is practically impossible for students in the field of cultural phenomena to keep clear of prejudices in favor of their own civilization. We all know that speech is wholly a matter of usage and convention, yet how hard it is for us to condone the use of "bad" grammar.

Concordant with such prejudices is the assumption that the intelligence and behavior of white people are not only superior to the intelligence and behavior of other groups but also that the white culture is in a sense a standard by which all other cultural phenomena may be measured. In like fashion serious errors are made with respect to manners, ideas, beliefs, and morals of small groups within the large ethnic or national collectivities. All the more insidious is this misinterpretation when the mishandling of data in favor of one's own type of culture is perpetrated with a complete intellectual innocence on the part of those who commit such scientific traduction. The point is, that being brought up under certain cultural circumstances, and taking on certain behavior equipment through stimulation by particular kinds of institutional stimuli, one acquires fixed intellectual trends of thinking which color and shape one's attitude toward cultural phenomena.

These reflections bring us to the problem of data perspectives. Our plan is to make a preliminary survey of the facts inevitably connected with the data of social psychology. First, we deem it expedient to consider the biological implications of our data. We want to know what effects upon our cultural conduct are traceable to the circumstance that we are animals with particular morphological organizations and functions.

Secondly, we need to investigate the influences of the general facts of anthropology upon our social psychological data. The principles of the general science of man may be of great assistance in providing us with positive data that throw light upon psychological happenings. In detail it is essential for us to know what characteristics are common to all men as

cultural products and what effects cultural evolution has upon the performance of social psychological responses. Without doubt the anthropological perspective appears immediately justified. Now need we argue that as a third important requisite for successful analyses of psychological facts we require a sound psychological perspective?

Succinctly, the problem of perspectives revolves around the type of presuppositions we accept in the study of our data. For the most part this means throwing into relief the actual presuppositions with which we are working as intellectual tools. The question here is, of what facts interrelated with our social psychological data shall we take cognizance, and what use shall we make of them.¹ In the present chapter we are concerned with the biological implications of our data, leaving for the three succeeding chapters a consideration of the anthropological and psychological perspectives.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION

Every psychological organism is an animal. Therefore it is clear that whenever psychological action occurs we also have animal action. Obviously without the animal and its behavior there can be no psychological organism nor psychological conduct. Moreover, when the animal is broken or injured in any way, all of its psychological action is thereby (made) defective or different. Furthermore, the diseased condition of an animal, its alcoholic (toxic) or febrile dissocia-

¹ Illustrative of the scientific difficulties to be avoided is the radical emphasis of certain data. Specialization of knowledge or interest frequently influences those who are preoccupied with particular phenomena to conceive of them as somehow basic to other facts connected with them. For example, in the biological sciences neurologists look upon neural functioning as the primary feature of the biological activity; while those who investigate glandular functions claim the same priority for their materials. In each case, however, the phenomena favored are only phases of unitary events. The study of the psychology of scientific workers undoubtedly reveals in such circumstances a form of unwitting egocentricity.

tions, its high or low energy, influence its psychological behavior.

For our present purposes we assume there are biological influences upon subtle psychological behavior as well as upon gross movements. Even our most intimate thoughts or refined memorial reactions are conditioned by the loss of an arm, leg, or other organ. We believe we are justified in making this assumption, even though losses and defects of biological organs and functions may involve entirely negligible and even unobservable differences of action. For in the first place, we lean upon the logical proposition that any effect upon the organism must have a corresponding effect upon its behavior. And in the second place, we suggest that even if the subsequent loss of an organ has no influence upon previously acquired subtle conduct, as in the case of blindness not affecting visual imagery, such behavior would never have constituted a part of the person's equipment unless it were acquired previous to the loss. In arguing for the absolutely intrinsic relationship of the individual's biological organization and his psychological conduct we merely wish to allow each fact to preserve its own identity in our studies.

We are now prepared to consider some of the specific implications of biological phenomena for psychological conduct. First, what is the character of the influences which man's animal nature exerts upon his behavior? More particularly, what features of his action are determined by the fact that he represents a particular place on the evolutionary scale of organic beings? Does any phase of psychological conduct exist and take some particular form because of the animal nature of the individual performing the reaction?

Our first observation is that cultural conduct is impossible unless the animal has reached a certain complicated development during the course of its evolution. In order to be able to perform complicated human behavior, to develop social organization, language and social institutions, industrial (eco-

nomic) and artistic techniques, the animal must have reached a certain level of biological development. Here we have a rather obvious proposition which no one would dispute. However, we stress this point in view of the fact that it has repeatedly been misinterpreted. Namely, what is actually a sheer biological condition with respect to psychological development has been assumed to be a source or cause of psychological phenomena. It is our special aim, therefore, to point out that the possibility of human beings to develop cultural conduct incapable of being performed by lower animals, means merely that the latter are limited by a set of conditions which include biological factors. In other words, we assume that more complex animals can perform more intricate behavior than simple animals, because of the highly developed biological organization of the former.

Not merely complex cultural conduct is correlated with a particular stage of evolutionary development but also psychological conduct in general. Differences of biological components, similar to those we have been suggesting, occur in concomitance with variations in the types of conduct performed by human individuals in common with the simpler animals. That is, while the lower animals perform perceptual, attentional, affective, and other responses in common with human animals, their actions are simpler in accordance with their lower position on the evolutionary scale. Hence while we find the higher apes capable of contriving and using simple tools, their position in the developmental progression is such that they are distinctly limited in this direction. This more complicated organization places such organisms at once upon a higher level of behavior possibilities. These possibilities it must be insisted, however, have no reality or significance unless involved in actual events. Even though the organism has acquired the necessary biological equipment, as a possibility for language, say, he will not be a speaking organism unless he learns to speak. The learning events must be re-

garded as a series of absolutely essential factors interrelated with the biological conditions of the organism.

To the writer it seems very pertinent to point out that the whole matter of biological implications for conduct must be treated in a decidedly positivistic manner. Thus we must assume that the biological character of an organism must be traced back to a series of natural events. These events have all had their part in the development of the present status of the animal. What occurs henceforth with the organism having certain characteristics must be further correlated with various happenings. It is quite true that because of past events certain preparations or statuses² exist for future series of events.³ But in no sense must we regard the status of a thing as a determining potency of some kind.

Biologists working in various specialized fields have offered us numerous suggestions concerning the biological changes which correlate with the development of a complex behavior status or with the possibility of performing complex psychological conduct. Such biological changes culminating in the human level are presumed to be centered around the development of the upright posture or evolution of an arboreal mode

¹ When particular psychological actions are in question the biological conditions may be regarded as more potent as limitations than as possibilities. This means, that while without these biological factors some particular action is impossible, their presence on the other hand, implies no inevitability that such action will be performed.

² In the form, of course, of actual structures and functions.

³ A comparable situation may be pointed out in the more simple domain of chemistry. Given a portion of a chemical substance, say, nitroglycerine, we cannot think of it as the cause or determiner of an explosion even though in a specific instance it was an absolute constituent of an explosion event. We may readily assert that in this specific case the explosion could not have occurred without the chemical substance mentioned, but this assertion only places nitroglycerine in a class with a series of other objects and events, the class of things namely that can take an effective part in explosions. The same situation prevails with respect to the complexity or other properties of an organism. Neither the processes through which animals develop bisexual reproducing organs nor these organs themselves are the causes of reproducing acts, although they are indispensable factors in such actions. The reproducing action depends just as much upon other facts.

of life. Morphologists who hold to this latter view¹ point out the possibility of behavior accruing to the animal from the arboreal freeing of the forearm which makes grasping and holding possible. Also they believe the arboreal mode of life has had a great influence upon the hind limbs which have become adapted for a great many different forms of movement. With the use of the fore limbs in grasping and seizing comes a recession of the snout and jaws allowing the frontal development of the eyes and the enlargement of the brain case at the expense of the mouth region. To the frontal development of the eyes and the consequent increase of their conjugate movements, as well as to the development of auditory and vocal mechanisms are ascribed important contributions to the development of human intelligence.²

We suggest again that we must guard ourselves vigilantly against thinking that the limitations or possibilities provided by complex evolutionary biological development are teleological processes and forces which are assumed to be responsible for the existence of specific human reactions. Even rigid scientists have been guilty of this intellectual crime. It appears exceedingly easy to ascribe all sorts of particular human actions to hypothetical structures or functions, upon the presumed analogy of genuine biological conditions of psychological phenomena. This type of thinking always goes further than merely assuming that biological structures and functions account for psychological conduct in general. It presupposes in addition that specific actions are actually caused by or founded upon particular biological structures and their functions.

We recall a notable example of how behavior possibilities are translated into powers or forces of development. We refer to the theory that once was hailed as a revelation, namely

¹ Cf. F. Wood Jones, *Arboreal Man*. (2), 1918.

² Cf. G. Elliot Smith. "The Evolution of Intelligence," in *Problems of Personality*, 1925.

that man in all of his conditions of behavior is influenced by two so-called fundamental forces or biological functions, namely food and sex. While such a suggestion bespeaks an abstractionistic philosophy, its insidious influence lies precisely in the circumstance that it may be easily connected with actual facts, namely, the fundamental character of alimentary and sexual phenomena in biological events.¹ More refined misinterpretations of the same general character are the enumeration of instincts, prepotent reflexes, desires and other presumably basic processes or actions, as forces in general psychological and cultural life. These forces and biological properties, whether or not regarded as connected with specific structures, are presumed to cause not only particular positive performances but also inhibitions of action. On the basis of such thinking certain social scientists, who upon discovering the exceedingly common abhorrence of incest, hit upon an explanation in terms of some power called an incest instinct.²

Our second type of biological implication for psychological conduct refers to the correlated differences between biological structures and function and psychological conduct found in the behavior of two similar organisms, say, human individuals. My behavior as a psychological organism as compared with some other individual, is limited or enhanced by the length of my arms and legs, by the thinness or thickness of my total animal form and weight, as well as by the perfect or imperfect functioning of my heart and other viscera.

¹ The extreme abstractionistic character of such thinking manifestly lies in the fact that these are only two among many coördinate functions of animals and not in any sense superior or more essential than any others. To take into account all the activities of an organism puts a limitation upon the force-making enterprise of the abstractionist.

² This type of misinterpretation can hardly be divorced from the general attitude in social psychology and the social sciences in general, according to which forces and potencies, wholly disconnected from structures and functions, are presumed to cause human behavior. These forces are, of course, the notorious instincts. Instincts in their various guises have been treated by the writer in a paper entitled "The Problem of Instincts and its Relation to Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1923, 18, 50-77.

In the performance of psychological behavior of specialized types it is obvious that some individuals have an advantage or disadvantage over others on account of their biological make-up. Naturally such optimal biological characteristics are confined to grosser forms of behavior such as lifting, walking, running or fighting. But these biological influences are nevertheless genuine and important. Surely Napoleon at the height of his power could not have assigned a Kant, Newton, Keats, or himself, a place upon a college football team. Our illustration is well chosen if it suggests at the same time that we know of no morphological advantages for the psychological behavior of thinking or reasoning.¹ We might add that in the implication we are now considering we are not concerned with biological phenomena of different stages of evolutionary development, but merely with those found at any point on the scale.

As a third general biological implication we must mention the influence of what we may call the absolute biological characteristics of a given organism upon its behavior. By absolute characteristics we mean the individual's actual structures and functions regardless of any other animal whether of the same or some different species. In performing psychological conduct an animal is conditioned by its bilateral symmetry, the absence of more than two arms and hands, the presence of large or small hands, feet, or trunk, its upright or prone posture, etc. Such morphological characteristics not only limit the character and amount of behavior performed by an organism but also make possible certain action which could not occur were the animal differently constructed.

The physiological functions comprise a fourth type of biological limitation and possibility for psychological behavior. Along with the morphological features of an organism its internal functioning plays an intimate rôle in its psychological

¹ We assume that abnormality (structural deformity or degeneration) is ruled out or there would be no reasoning or thinking at all.

actions. Advantages and disadvantages without doubt accrue to the animal because of the specific operations of its various internal structures. The kind of circulation, digestion, respiration, neural functioning and glandular secretions found in any given animal, has its influence upon psychological conduct. But here we must repeat again that all such biological factors must be thought of as constituent elements in psychological actions and not as their causes or bases.

As a fifth and final biological factor in psychological conduct we must consider the problem of maturation. Given an animal of any species, its behavior is limited by its stage of growth toward maturity. Until an organism has achieved a certain development in its biological completion as a member of its species it cannot perform certain actions. As it happens some animals are born mature. But others go through a long period of maturation. In the human animal with its protracted period of growth we find distinct limitations upon its psychological capacities until it matures. Not until the biological organism is coördinated in its structure can it do certain things. So while it can grasp in its earliest days, only at some time later can it walk. Quite remarkable changes take place when the sexual structures mature, a circumstance which makes possible a very striking series of activities. In these five suggestions of the important place of biological factors in psychological behavior we believe the contribution of the animal's biological nature to its psychological conduct is adequately indicated.

The various misinterpretations of the relation between biological and psychological phenomena we may summarize by suggesting that they are all based upon the erroneous conception that psychological phenomena are functions of morphological structures. One of the gravest shortcomings of this conception is that it makes no allowance for any of the distinctly psychological facts pertaining to the development and

performance of responses while in contact with stimuli objects and situations. As a matter of intellectual history the conception of psychological phenomena as the functions of anatomical structures derives from those primitive days of psychology when its subject matter was presumed to be intangible psychic substances or processes. It is safe to say that no such doctrine could ever have been developed from actual observations of psychological reactions.

To the objective psychologist it is of especial interest to observe how the biologist unwittingly sponsors a rank spiritualism. An outstanding example is found in the latter's assumption of the brain as a structure whose functions are thinking and remembering, in short all of the complex psychological activities. This assumption carries over to all behavior as similar functions of neural structures. The intellectual behavior of the neurologists who develop such notions is decidedly transparent. Complex behavior is correlated with a complex animal, but since the neurologist is primarily interested in neural structures, he just assumes that the complex brain¹ is responsible for the more complex activities, as the simple brain is limited to more simple actions. It remains then for him only to assume that the subcortical neural structures have but gross movements and actions as their functions and that the subtle activities of remembering and thinking are really "mental." Once "functions" in this sense are allowed, one acquires unlimited powers of interpretation, or better said, perhaps, misinterpretation. Such inaccurate thinking does serious violence to all types of facts. A neurologist who makes use of such a conception at once ignores the fact that the nervous system has only the functions of conduction, coördination, and integration, while he at the same time converts psychological behavior into in-

¹ Namely that with larger "association" (cortex) areas, or in general with a more developed neopallium.

tangible if not mystic functions of the neural apparatus.¹

While we are primarily interested only in criticizing such misinterpretations in order to safeguard the interests of psychological observation, we cannot refrain from pointing out that this interpretation is entirely false from a biological standpoint as well. Even when behavior is thought of as the functions of structures we see no justification for singling out the brain as the primary morphological element in the total biological make-up. While it is entirely true that in the comparative study of biological and psychological phenomena we find that more complex psychological activities are correlated with more complex brains, this is only a partial fact. The same comparative complexities are found in all the other structures of the organism. Moreover, who would dare assert that the complexities in the other structures are secondary to the development of complexities in the brain? Is any other viewpoint feasible than that all these structures acquire their complexity in a unitary development and presumably because of changes in the behavior life of the individual?

Furthermore it is rather anomalous how anyone can think of psychological phenomena as functions of neural or cortical structures when every neurologist knows that no psychological fact, whether considered as mental processes or faculties, or as actual organismic behavior, can be correlated with any specific neural or cortical element. We cannot do other than conclude that selecting the brain, cortex, or any neural element as a primary organ or structure of which behavior is a function, can only be the result of a philosophic bias and not a product of scientific observation. Upon no other basis can we explain the incessant futile creation of admittedly hypothetical neural

¹ This type of thinking goes so far as the conceptual conjunction which makes both the mystic mental functions and neural processes into the same things, only looked at from different angles. From a methodological standpoint it appears to us to be a more dangerous and perverting procedure to make actual things into the carriers of potencies than frankly to invoke invisible powers.

patterns to account for the workings of psychological phenomena.

From the standpoint of psychology proper the conception of behavior as a function of structures goes far beyond the mere misinterpretation of biological facts. Namely, it does not allow room for the myriads of events which occur when psychological conduct is developed and performed. In studying actual psychological phenomena, it is impossible to overlook the numerous interactions of organisms with other organisms at any level of biological development, and the reactions or traits they build up through such contacts. Indeed when cultural conduct of the human type is under investigation we may very readily accord little potency to the individual's structures and functions. For such biological factors as we have indicated serve only as limitations and possibilities. Given the human organism biologically equipped as an individual of a certain species, the important factors in his actual development and performance of conduct are his numerous contacts with objects, persons, and situations, possessing their peculiar stimulatory functions in particular human groups or settings.

BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA COMPARED

It is quite apparent that while social psychological phenomena involve the absolute concomitance of psychological and biological facts, the two orders of data must not be confused. Accordingly we must attempt to state some of the outstanding differences between them.

Briefly summarized, biological phenomena consist of specific organizations of cellular material into tissues, organs, and in general, structures which have very distinct functions. These structures and functions must be looked upon as co-ordinate features of biological events developed through an evolutionary process. They cannot be thought of as separable unless the morphological individual is no longer a definite

biological datum but an object of physico-chemical constitution, in other words, a cadaver. Throughout the maintenance of this morphological individual as an actual (living) biological phenomenon, it interacts with such other objects as air, water, electrical and chemical phenomena, which excite the structures to perform their functions.

These things with which the organism has been in contact, summed up for convenience as the environment, operate only through activities and changes in the individual's cellular organization. In short, biological action constitutes the excitation of some function-structure event by some environmental factor. These surrounding circumstances of the organism must be looked upon as definite natural phenomena with particular properties ascribable to their physical, chemical or geological constitutions. Such an environment must be considered as relatively stable with respect to the animals with which it is in interaction. Now while under normal circumstances the organism always operates as a whole, for investigative purposes we may study the structure-function operation of some particular organ to the neglect of the rest of the organism.

When we come to psychological phenomena we find an entirely different type of situation. Here we investigate the interactions of the organism with objects on the basis of an historical relationship between the two. In other words, psychological organisms perform reactions built up in contact with objects with greater or lesser independence of the individual's morphological organization.' For example, with the same sound-making organs or structures the individual may develop an infinitely large number of different forms of linguistic action.¹ Thus the psychological behavior of an organ-

¹ In one sense one may describe this fact by saying that the organism's make-up is capable of doing all the things it actually does. But this very indeterminateness of what the structures can do indicates that the actual performances of the individual are based upon its historical contacts with objects.

ism is decidedly not the functions of its organs but is the result of historically acquired modes of mutual interaction with objects. With the growth and development of such behavior traits through the historical processes, the individual acquires capacities of performing particular actions upon the presentation of certain stimuli. These actions comprise complex behavior, intricate operations of manipulating things, thinking, or dreaming, that may be regarded as the ways in which the organism conducts itself with respect to objects which have certain stimulatory functions.

The psychological organism therefore does not interact with sheer environmental objects as the biological organism does. That is to say, what we call stimuli in biology are bare qualities or conditions (irritants) of objects which functionate structures. Contrariwise, what we call stimuli in psychology are objects which have particular stimulatory functions of eliciting certain responses because of the historical interaction of the individual with those objects.

These stimulatory properties are connected not only with the same qualities and conditions of things which function as irritants, namely electrical, chemical and pressure contacts, but also with the color, shape, and size of things, in addition to qualities which they have as elements of human situations.

While the reacting organism acquires specific responses to objects the latter take on stimulatory properties functioning in succeeding excitations of those activities. Psychological stimuli, therefore, as over against biological stimuli, constitute functions of objects, which the latter assume through interaction with the individual. Any specific object may take on a large number of these properties through many successive contacts of the same or different persons with it. The cumulative development of stimulatory functions in an object may be illustrated by the increasing significance (function) of a rifle which comes for the first time into the possession of a primitive man. With the successive develop-

ment of responses (**holding, grasping, loading, aiming, shooting, taking pride in, valuing, etc.,**) to such an object¹ it takes on the function of arousing each of these reactions under specific conditions. The stimuli features and specific reactions are absolutely reciprocal phases of unique events.

This process of increasing stimulative function of objects is excellently manifested when the objects become endowed with such functions under group auspices. For example, besides being a weapon, an ornament, as well as a piece of personal property, the rifle also becomes **something** to offer a member of a neighboring tribe in settlement of a dispute of some sort. Here it takes on a series of stimulative functions through the cumulative activities of a group (series of persons) rather than through the behavior of a single individual.² Now granting that psychological phenomena are markedly different from biological data and should be kept distinct, the question still remains whether psychological data should not be regarded as biological facts for explanatory purposes.

Here we have a serious methodological question. Can a satisfactory explanation of any event in nature be achieved by reducing it to some other kind of fact, even if the process seems to afford rigid propositions? What benefit, we may ask, can accrue to a science which gains rigidity at the expense of losing its data? The problem is raised as to what is meant by explanation. Can valid explanation be anything more than an elaboration of description? Description we take to be the specification and symbolization of qualities and conditions of objects and events as they actually exist or occur by themselves, insofar as this is possible. When this description is

¹ These reactions are cumulatively acquired on top of an already possessed hierarchy of perceptuo-motor reaction systems.

² Probably in every case the actual mechanism involves the action of some one individual (the one who thought of this particular use of a rifle) or a very few.

elaborated by correlating or comparing an event with other events we may consider the process as explanatory. Clearly no explanation is worth much that dissipates or ignores the original descriptions. To reduce an event to other events can only be accomplished by conceptual, if not verbal, manipulation. When this enterprise is esteemed to yield better results than the restricted description or more extended explanation it becomes a faulty procedure and partakes more of philosophic interpretation than scientific description. To illustrate, the biologist (physiologist) must describe his phenomena in terms of tissues and organs functioning through stimulation. These functions he may divide up into partial (and therefore different) events and then assume that physiological facts are at bottom physico-chemical or electrical action. But he can never assume that the original event is electrical.¹

That psychological phenomena are reduced for explanatory purposes to functions of animal structures is probably to be accounted for in the following manner. When psychological happenings (thinking, remembering, etc.) are not treated as interacting responses but as intangible functions they obviously cannot be matters of observation. Consequently those who hold to such a conception attempt to make it scientific by connecting such intangible things with the nervous system. Naturally their aims are defeated, for the net results of such a procedure are not only the perpetuation of mystic functions located in the operation of neural structures, but also the neurology becomes questionable. Instead of conceiving of

¹ The more complex the data the less reduction is feasible. This problem has been well discussed by anthropologists. Cf. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, 1917, p. 17ff.; Goldenweiser, *Am. J. of Sociology*, 1924, 29, p. 706. It may be of aid in recognizing the distinction we are making between biological and psychological phenomena (at the same time observing the intimate relations of the two), to notice that the ecological branch of biological science involves quite as much psychological happening as the psychological event involves biological functioning. Accordingly, the explanations of biology demonstrate that sometimes simpler phenomena must be explained in terms of more complex facts.

neural structures as biological elements performing conducting, coördinating, and integrating functions they are made into master tissues dominating the whole organism.

On the whole we must regard psychological phenomena as more complex types of interaction between an organism and the objects around it than is the case with biological phenomena. It is fair, too, to say that psychological processes begin where biological processes end. This means that after a genuine human animal has evolved as a result of evolutionary changes, then we must study its development of personal and social conduct through the infinite details of its contacts with cultural and non-cultural objects, including persons, events, and situations. In our present organization of the sciences the study of the historical details of such an evolution of distinctly human circumstances falls within the domain of ethnology or cultural anthropology. The study of the development of an individual within particular groups which have reached a certain position in this cultural evolution is the function of social psychology.

BIOLOGICAL CAUSE VERSUS BIOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION

We have already indicated that biological factors in the ordinary sense of that term, influence psychological action. It will doubtless add to our present investigation to differentiate sharply between biological influences operating in a causative manner¹ or as correlatives or participants. It is in the latter form only that biological conditions are closely involved with psychological phenomena. In detail, this means that a long animal is able to cover a certain space quicker than a short one with similar locomotor mechanisms. If the animal's morphology includes hands it can grasp when stimu-

¹ The term cause covers the conception that function is a necessary and exclusive result of the structure as well as the idea that the structure-function, together as a single fact, is the sole basis for psychological behavior.

lated; if it has a pneumo-laryngeal-buccal arrangement of a given type it is a sound making animal. To a great extent, we might look upon such anatomical or biological characteristics as conditions contributing to the general character of the psychological phenomenon (response to stimulus). For example, the contribution of my total length to the character of my tennis playing is an actual influence upon my tennis conduct. But it must be observed that this is a similar influence to and not generically different from my financial condition which enables me to purchase a fine racket or play on a good court, or indeed the cultural influence of my belonging to a tennis playing group or living where tennis playing occurs. In every case biological factors operate and influence behavior because they are (parts of) the acting¹ organism and not because as biological factors they have a determining influence upon its behavior. We must not ignore the fact that we are always dealing with a single organism in action, but its action is both biological and psychological in the same complex of behavior.

When we think in terms of biological functions as comprised in behavior situations we are on the way to an accurate description of facts, while in considering the two as separable and causally related, valid analysis of what actually happens in human behavior is completely forestalled. In other words, when we regard the organism's anatomical features (which have a place in every action) as parts (actually indivisible of course and therefore only logical parts) of an act going on, then we can account for the specific variations of action because of the size, weight, and other biological factors of a person. On the other hand, when we regard such anatomical

¹ This influence is of course in no sense to be minimized. Nor should we overlook the fact that the person's own biological make-up and functioning serve as stimuli for his own actions; e.g., organic inferiorities may stimulate us to develop paranoid ideas. This situation simulates that in which the person's own behavior stimulates the behavior of others.

features, whether definite organs, structures, or hypothetical biological factors, as determiners or foundations of conduct, then our psychological facts are inevitably misinterpreted. By all means must we avoid here the logical error of confusing a necessary condition with a cause. Surely if I am to meet my friend in Madrid next week I must be carried there by a ship, but the ship is in no sense the cause of my going or even of my getting there. As to the latter point we have a nice problem of the degrees of relevancy of contributing or participating conditions.

Let it not be overlooked either that the necessity to consider the biological functions as integral factors analyzable out of a total psychological action is only found in very simple psychological conduct. Beyond the operation of the reflexes such mention of the animal or biological contributions of the organism's make-up to psychological behavior is superfluous. When we come to any sort of distinctly social conduct the biological factors operating are negligible in description, although absolutely present in the event. The whole matter may be illustrated by a linguistic example.

A man and a woman¹ each are stimulated to perform a language response to some very specific type of stimulus. In describing minutely their reactions we may be obliged to mention pitch variations because of the varying lengths of their vocal cords, etc. On the other hand, the vocabulary used, the syntax employed as well as the expressive content and other features of the responses will be precisely alike. Now it is these latter factors that may be thought of as the distinctly psychological ones. Language responses as a whole may be studied from several different angles, a psychological, a social or institutional, and a biological angle. Even great biological variation may have no effect upon a complex, con-

¹ Our subjects we assume illustrate the point, a situation which while extremely likely, is not inevitably the case. On the other hand, the speech of two men or two women may illustrate the point perfectly.

ventional, psychological action such as language. For language as psychological conduct is decidedly not a function of biological structures. Rather it is a complex historical fact of the interaction of an organism with its cultural and individual stimuli surroundings (persons and institutions). The same is true for all complex psychological facts. What validity can attach then to the idea that specific biological structures are found in the make-up of particular individuals, which determine such individuals to develop and perform unique action?

Where shall we look for specific anatomical bases, whether regarded as hereditary or acquired, for politeness, intelligence, sentimentality, inventiveness, honesty, patriotism, musicianship, calculativeness, etc. Now when we think of these names as the symbols of psychological action and not of social institutions we must consider them as class names involving thousands upon thousands of specific actions, each of which we insist is a particular event coupled with certain stimulatory facts. The discovery of specific biological determiners of such action is impossible, howsoever easy it may be to conceive of them.

What is true for psychological activity in general is of course true for cultural conduct, and perhaps always in a more intense degree. Accordingly we may be fairly certain that biological influences upon cultural behavior are practically nil. We repeat again that what count above all, both in simple reactions to stimuli and more complex forms of cultural responses, are the reactional histories of the specific organisms concerned. These reactional biographies, to the extent we have indicated, are limited of course by concomitant biological circumstances, but are really built upon a higher level of activity. The psychological level is almost purely accidental from a morphological and physiological standpoint.

THE PROBLEM OF DEEPLY-ROOTED ACTION

A source of considerable misinterpretation concerning the connection between biological and psychological phenomena is found in the behavior facts which we shall call deep-seated action. Because we may assume that certain forms of conduct are fairly constant features of the general behavior life of human beings, writers have always believed they found support for their biological theories of psychological happenings. Thus behavior which appears with a fair degree of constancy and frequency is supposed to be a function of human nature. Furthermore, since such actions are presumed to be shared with infrahuman animals the conduct becomes not only a function of human nature but of animal nature as well. The next step is easy. The belief is accepted that at least some behavior of the human individual, constitutes properties of biological organisms. Before proceeding to investigate the fallacy of this mode of thinking we must point out that while here the structures of organisms are not especially stressed, their place in the total scheme of behavior is regarded as important. In this particular train of thought the complete organism, and not merely its structures, is emphasized.

The primary form of conduct upon which such thinking is based may be illustrated by actions of rapacity, which human individuals are presumed to perform in common with the lower animals.¹ Now we may ask if rapacity is really a universal mode of human or even animal conduct. There is no doubt that statements to this effect are among those little disputed propositions which pass with some individuals as truth. Such a statement, however, exhibits an extraordinary generalization of all kinds of conduct to fit the imposed

¹ While rapacity is selected as the example for our present purposes, the type of thinking we are discussing, as well as our criticism, applies to fear, love, hate, and other reactions as well.

category. How could anyone compare even the severe exactions of the mild mannered and philanthropic banker or industrial captain, with the conduct of a hungry wolf? We need not stop to enumerate the thousands of complex species of animals whose behavior could never be described by the term rapacious. We do suggest, however, that even the existence of a few self-sacrificing human beings, who are confirmed altruists, negates the proposition of the biological characteristics of preying behavior.¹ No one would deny the existence of many such persons in every age and period. Rapacity, then, is clearly not a constant form of human conduct.

Even the most saintly person might have been an extremely rapacious individual had he been exposed to the circumstances favoring such behavior acquisition. But this is merely to asseverate that rapacity or any other kind of behavior is a function of one's reactional biography and reciprocal surrounding circumstances. Obviously, rapacious human beings have always existed and such behavior will always persist as long as the stimulatory circumstances for such conduct are present. It will be of advantage here, as in all investigations of behavior, to study this type of conduct as a particular form of actual response. When this suggestion is followed we are led to two conclusions. First, rapacious conduct is an entirely different sort of fact in human and infrahuman animals. Secondly, the behavior predicated as rapacious in the human being is under ordinary circumstances and for the most part cultural.

As for the cultural characteristics of human rapacity, it is only possible to think of such conduct as a constant type of behavior by allowing that it is exhibited only in the form and degree which a particular civilization permits. Sometimes this term merely covers what is technically only legal preëmption

¹ This assertion is made after the analogy that as soon as a single normal white crow has been discovered, we can no longer think of blackness (concentrated pigmentation) as a biological trait of those animals.

of property. In very extraordinary situations (shipwreck, starvation) the type of action on the part of the rapacious individual is very like the non-cultural ferocious conduct of a beast, but this is so unusual a happening that it may be readily regarded as an abnormality instead of a characteristic human trait or mode of conduct.

Reverse the shield for a moment. What shall we say of the innumerable deep-seated reactions of a more temperate sort which are continuously changing? What of our religious, moral, language, and artistic attitudes and beliefs which are being constantly modified by alterations in human circumstances? Can we not accept such evidence as refuting the theory of biological characteristics? While the changes in such psychological action are extremely variable, the human animal's biological character has not materially altered in the course of hundreds of centuries.

One of the greatest differences between human and infra-human rapacity is its constancy among the latter animals when it is actually found there. Why this is the case is clear of course from the comparatively simple circumstance of infrahuman animals. For one thing, they live upon a simple plane. That is, among them biological and psychological phenomena are very close together. But even here it is in no sense true that psychological phenomena are functions of the biological structures. For the skill in stalking the prey, the frequency of doing so, and the actual movements involved, are conditioned by ecological or environmental circumstances (presence of danger, the form of other animals, day or night conditions, presence of prey) as well as by biological structures.¹

In refuting the notion of the biological character of psychological phenomena, based on the ground of the uniformity

¹ Not the least prominent among the stimuli for the animal's conduct are found in its participating biological conditions..

of some behavior among human and infrahuman animals, we may point out the infirmity of an absolutistic continuity doctrine. While man very distinctly shows in his anatomical and physiological organizations direct continuity of animal existence with the infrahuman organisms, this does not mean that he is not different. It certainly is impossible for man in any way to belie his relationship or continuity of development with other animals. But this relationship does not obliterate the fact that after all man is also his own particular type of animal, namely the kind which upon finding itself in a distinctly human environment, can build up corresponding human types of behavior. This being the case how can we suppose that the uniformity of behavior doctrine helps to establish the biological basis of conduct?

Far from providing evidence for biological bases of cultural behavior the facts of deep-seated conduct do quite the opposite. In other words, in an examination of the phenomena we call deeply-rooted behavior, we find compelling evidence that such conduct is decidedly cultural in origin and character. We discover that among the activities of individuals there are thousands of responses which in a thoroughgoing way constitute the fundamental components of mentality and which are decidedly acquired and performed by the individual through cultural conditions. Our illustrations already offered may all be used as examples of this point. We may regard the fundamental attitudes, manners, and mannerisms of persons belonging to different cultural collectivities as definite constituents of their psychological nature. There is no question, moreover, that these activities are anthropic in character. Probably the best illustrations of 'deep-rooted psychological activity which is at the same time admittedly cultural in character are linguistic responses. Language reactions in a genuine sense typify all the deep-seated forms of human conduct.

BIOLOGY AND RACIAL CONDUCT

From the study of the general biological implications for psychological behavior we may now turn to a more specialized problem. Summing up our general investigation we have found that psychological phenomena constitute a level of facts differentiated from biological phenomena. Further, there appears to be a progressively diminishing influence of biological factors upon psychological data the more complex the latter become. We assume that the largest biological conditioning upon psychological phenomena is that which makes for a differentiation between human and infrahuman animal conduct. Within the field of either human or animal behavior, however, slighter biological influences condition the actual performance of reactions. The least dependence of psychological conduct upon biological phenomena as we have seen, is found in the domain of cultural behavior. Now our special problem is whether we can find biological traits that inevitably condition types of cultural phenomena. Our present study, therefore, is essentially a practical application of this principle that we have worked out.

At once, we face the question of races. Let us ask whether just as we have a scale of animals upon which man stands as a higher development than, for example, anthropoid apes and still lower animals, do we find the same differential continuity existing within the domain of human animals? For purposes of understanding cultural conduct, perhaps we must avoid the implication that biological differentiation between human beings exists, such that some of them are higher in evolutionary development than are others. If so, is there any biological basis for the belief in the superiority of groups or aggregations of individuals? Is it possible for us to say that different types of minds exist because human organisms

have different biological properties?¹ Those who answer these questions affirmatively in our opinion fall into the error of believing in the existence of evolutionally higher and more gifted forms of human animals as well as lower ones, which are denominated higher and lower human races.²

Clearly, the evolution of the human animal as he is today has proceeded through a very definite series, so that in considering the human being intermediate between anthropoid apes and the present human animal we discover the existence of many different stages. Doubtless the Neanderthal man is a lower type of species in the biological scale than the Cro-Magnon, for example. Hence the question whether there is such a relative difference in the men inhabiting the globe today. We have no doubt that existing evidence on this point argues entirely against the acceptance of this proposition. If this attitude is verified then we must condemn the use of hypothetical biological variations to explain differences in the cultural development and conduct of races. Instead we must account for the diversities in existing developments of cultural groups on a single plane, a plane moreover involving a minimum of influencing biological factors.

What extreme differences in anatomical and physiological function do we find between different individuals in our mass of present day mankind? Let us emphasize the wide variations in color, shape, size and general appearance as biological characteristics and properties. But now the question arises how much influence do such characteristics of a distinctly

¹ It is one of the most deplorable weaknesses of sociological and anthropological literature when writers say that the particular superior achievements of human groups must be owing to their superior biological traits. A most vicious circle is always close at hand. The question usually is, are races necessarily superior, since specific superiorities are obvious? The answer is to use the admitted facts as evidence by assuming that there must be a biological basis for them.

² For an excellent statement of the difficulties encountered by the anthropologist in determining the nature of a race, cf. Hooton, "Methods of Racial Analysis," *Science*, 1926, 63, 75-81.

biological sort exert upon man's cultural behavior and social development.

Our investigation at this point involves two types of data. In the first place, we must determine whether in reality different qualities of human biological organisms exist. After eliciting the facts relevant to this issue we may then inquire concerning the influence of these anatomical and physiological factors upon the psychological behavior of individuals.

How can we study the question whether there are genuine biological differences in people? First, we may ask concerning the relative standing of the three distinct and widely different types of human organisms with respect to the apes. On the other hand, we may question whether there are genuine and well-established physiological and hygienic differences between the different types of existing men.¹

As to the first point, we find that students of this particular problem are unable to discover a continuous line of development from the apes upward through different types of men. If the black type of individual has the most prognathous jaw, the receding forehead, the broad low nose, and the short hair which appear to place him closer to the apes than the yellow and the white types, he is farther than the latter are from the lower animals in other characteristics. When it comes to relative amounts of hair it is the white type of human animal that is more like the apes than either the yellow or the black. So far as hair texture is concerned the white type, while not the closest to the ape, stands between the yellow type and black, which is farther from the lower animals in this respect. In width and color of lips, the black type of man, who usually is looked upon as closest to the apes, appears to be less like them than either the yellow or white types. The results from such observations favor the view that there are no significant differences between the different types of men. If one is more

¹ The data for this study are well summarized by Kroeber in *Anthropology*, 1923.

like the lower animals in one respect he is less so in others.

With reference to physiological and hygienic variations much the same conditions prevail. There are no well-grounded observations to indicate clear cut differences between the different types of people with regard to normal physiological functioning, or incidence of and resistance to disease. Whatever data are available here argue for environmental and cultural differences which account for the facts observed. Certain it is that our evidence so far gives us negative results with respect to the existence of different biological levels among human organisms, which can be correlated with inevitably different types of psychological conduct.

Our next step then is to consider whether there are any positive data to indicate the lack of biological influence upon psychological phenomena. Such evidence exists in great quantities, although the task of gathering and utilizing it is quite difficult. As substantiating examples we cite the well demonstrated fact that individuals of different racial groups are quite competent to acquire and perform any kind of psychological activities which are possible for the members of any other biologically different group. In other words, who with a fair reading of history can deny that the members of the black and yellow races are competent to develop aesthetic, intellectual, moral or other types of psychological action? Without doubt the most satisfactory and convincing data we have upon this point comprise the fact that what are probably the largest biological differences among human animals, namely the sex differences, militate in no sense against the development and performance of equal psychological activity¹

¹ That women do not have as good records in the history of art, science, and philosophy is on the other hand very definite evidence of the influence of cultural and psychological factors in the matter of building up psychological traits and in performing psychological conduct, rather than biological elements. It is to be counted a great fault of anthropologists not to observe the operation of these same factors in the development of particular kinds of cultural behavior and products among different groups of human beings.

by both sexes. It is idle then to ask concerning group superiority within the same level of biological evolution. Hence we may only deem groups superior because their members have been in contact with¹ and have acquired a large amount of superior cultural activities. We cannot go beyond this to native superiority of mentality.

An important result of our study of the biological implications of psychological conduct is the light it throws upon the hypotheses of the unilinear development of cultural phenomena. Ethnologists working upon the erroneous conception that human groups represent different stages in biological evolution have assumed that culture develops in a unilinear fashion just as biological organisms descend one from the other. If cultural behavior is activity developed through stimulatory circumstances and the individual's reactional biography, and not a function of biological factors, then it is at once clear that there can be no unitary development of cultural conduct on a single line of evolution. It appears to be false, as some white anthropologists have supposed, that the cultural phenomena of the white civilizations represent end points of a development which has passed through and beyond the cultural stages of the colored races.

We may now turn to heredity as another feature of biological phenomena and inquire into its influences upon general psychological and cultural conduct.

BIOLOGICAL HEREDITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDUCT

Man like all other animals is subject to the phenomena of heredity. In man as in other animals, likenesses or differences are found that are determined by his descent from his animal parents. Moreover, certain rigid and inevitable conditions

¹Is there not considerable merit in the suggestion that in the isolation and side tracking of groups of people (Negroes, Eskimos, etc.,) can be found some basis for the primitive character of their civilization?

prevail with respect to the character of this descent and distribution of traits as the animal develops and lives beyond the generation of his bipartite ancestry. Heredity thus being a central factor in the individual's biological make-up, we may trace out its influence upon behavior. This study clearly is concerned with the question of possible parallelism between the inheritance of animal characteristics and the performance of psychological conduct.

No field of scientific inquiry teems so much with inaccuracies of thought as the domain of heredity. In approaching our problem therefore we must be strictly warned to adhere to facts and avoid fictions. What do we understand by heredity? In its most rigid description, heredity means that we have a condition of stability of the characteristics or traits of organisms during the course of the parent-offspring continuity. In other words, as the life cycles of individuals continue through the process of reproduction we find characteristics of a morphologico-functional sort maintaining themselves through the stabilizing influences of a relatively constant environment. This balancing relation between individual organisms and their strictly biological environment must be considered as existing at all points of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of animal organisms.

Now it follows from this statement that the phenomena of heredity have to do with nothing but actual and specific biological characteristics, with structural forms and their functions. Heredity as the fact of the continuity of animal life processes, has no other connection with psychological phenomena than we have indicated. We may therefore correlate what we have said in discussing the general connection of biological and psychological phenomena with the specific facts of heredity. In detail we expect that because of the continuity of the individual animal through the parent-offspring life cycle, the potentiality always exists that a human offspring will be capable of developing behavior traits similar to those pos-

sessed by the parent. We speak of this potentiality in a thoroughly empirical fashion, for we reiterate our assertion that the actual development and operation of cultural conduct require in each instance a definite set of circumstances (stimulational factors and reactional history) in order that these behavior happenings may occur. Furthermore, the behavior of the individual to a specific stimulus is conditioned by its participating structures and functions insofar as they constitute continuities of the organism's biological properties. But we have already observed how slight a contribution is made by the biological characteristics of the individual to his psychological conduct.¹ We may be reminded, however, that if this is the case with the individual's personal psychological behavior, his cultural conduct has very little connection with hereditary phenomena.

An exact study of hereditary facts should obviate the employment of false conceptions in the study of human behavior. To adhere rigidly to the actual facts of heredity means that we will not assume the existence of hereditary powers, forces, and processes which determine the development and existence of psychological behavior. A study of the actual phenomena of biological heredity leaves no room for the inheritance of psychic processes or forces of any type.² There are no facts indicating the transmission of individual qualities of mind, howsoever one may insist upon the general possibility of performing psychological behavior attributable to species or

¹ The whole scandalous history of the quarrels between sociological hereditarians and environmentalists can only be ascribed to a failure to keep different levels of phenomena distinct. The quarrels referred to are evidence of the guilt of the participants in two ways. In the first place, in the proper sphere of heredity there is no question as to the general preponderance of the one or the other of two equally indispensable factors, although in a specific instance one may ask whether a certain biological fact shows a stress of one or the other. In the second place, the question is ignored whether a biological or psychological or other fact is being investigated.

² The eugenics propagandist accordingly gleans a slim harvest from either an exact study of biological heredity or from an equally exact study of psychological phenomena.

phyla.¹ Since heredity factors can only operate through the transmission of actual biological structures and their correlated functions, we find only a slight concomitance² of actual biological characteristics with the performance of behavior.

How little the exact implications of biological phenomena are appreciated is apparent in the belief that general psychological and cultural phenomena must have a basis in inherited as well as in acquired characteristics. Even when these inherited characteristics are thought of as actual biological structure-function facts (as unfortunately is not always the case) the question is in order as to what good they are. One might just as well find a basis for psychological phenomena in the chemical constitution of the acting organism. The cultural fact of rolling and lighting cigarettes is no more based upon the fact that we inherit two hands than upon the circumstance that we have oxygen and carbon in our chemical constitutions. To insist upon the inclusion of really significant factors in one's description is not merely a question of relevance, but in the present instance also a problem of avoiding the danger of translating actual biological phenomena into various forces and determiners.³

BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PATHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

As a final consideration of the implications of biological phenomena for cultural behavior we will look into some facts concerning the injuries and abnormalities of organisms. We have already pointed out that the injury and disfunctioning of the biological organism affect its behavior. Now the question is how shall we interpret these facts? Shall we assume

¹ All of such alleged facts represent either a disregard of the actual minute phenomena of reactional biographies or a deliberate falsification of them.

² One may if one likes call this an influence of biological upon psychological phenomena.

³ Cf., a review by the writer, of Bernard *Instincts*, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, 1925, 35, 429-432.

with the mentalistic psychologists that in such cases the pathological organic conditions are correlated with faulty mental or psychic functions? By no means can we accept such an explanation. In no sense does any such dualism exist, even in those situations where it seems most feasible to assert it. Even when we find gross lesions of the brain, musculature and nerves, these are not the causes of the loss of psychological action. Rather we have here a condition in which the defectiveness of the total organism precludes it from performing certain responses to stimuli. We must insist once more that psychological phenomena are not psychic concomitants of biological actions.

Although owing to the morphological construction of the individual some structures are strategic factors in the performance of an action, the legs, for example, in walking, we can in no sense think of the behavior as centered in those structures. This proposition may be generalized for all organs and actions. Seeing responses, for example, are no more localizable as functions of the eyes or cortex than walking can be so located within the legs, although the fact of greater or lesser participation of certain structures in an action is of course a genuine one. This means nothing more than to say that always in the normal state, one performs reactions as a total organism. And so having one's legs amputated means that one cannot see landscapes unless one is carried to them.

Our behavior can be just as effectively interfered with by the absence of the stimulus object, by holding or tying the individual, by poverty, fear, etc. The student of mental pathology knows full well that anaesthesias, analgesias, and paralyses of all kinds occur in dissociated persons without any specific anatomical lesions, the trouble being due entirely to psychological circumstances. In all such cases we hasten to add, however, that the difficulties concern the complete organism. From the standpoint of objective psychology the

conception of a psychogenetic origin of mental pathology is not a bit more acceptable than the theory that mental disturbances are the effects of anatomical or physiological causes. In both cases psychological phenomena are thought of as psychic processes rather than concrete stimulus-response interactions.¹ Whenever a psychological phenomenon is in question we should always insist upon the investigation of the relevant stimulus and response circumstances involved.

One more point. It is possible to overemphasize the permanence of serious behavior defects on the ground that the loss or degeneration of structures implies a biological basis for psychological conduct. But this attitude is erroneous. The factor of permanence is certainly of no greater significance than the intrinsic defect itself. Furthermore, it is not true that the permanence of a behavior defect is always correlated with an organic lesion. The permanent deprivation of stimuli is just as potent a factor in the continuance of the defective psychological condition.

Now if it is true that the pathological phenomena of behavior, along with the other facts of psychology that we have been studying in this chapter, do not permit the interpretation of ordinary psychological behavior as functions of separate structures or even of the total biological organism then we have further evidence of the independence of cultural conduct of biological conditions.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ANTHROPIC BACKGROUND OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR

Cultural reactions are deeply rooted in a particular human soil, to which we will refer as the anthropic background of cultural conduct. Cultural responses are therefore definitely influenced in their existence and specific character by the social situations in which they occur. When I perform a linguistic response many anthropic factors constitute the components of the circumstance along with the operation of my biological apparatus and sound making functions. Particular words must be used with certain intonation, stress, and word order. Similarly, all conventional behavior, whether manners, thoughts, religious or artistic practices, or general attitudes toward life, show the result of living in a particular social milieu.

Accordingly, just as the understanding of the biological nature of the psychological organism gives the psychologist an insight into the animal details of psychological adaptations, so the study of distinctly human phenomena contributes to the comprehension of cultural behavior.

In all probability there is even a closer connection between social psychology and anthropic phenomena than exists between general psychology and biological facts. For as we have already seen, biological factors only slightly condition responses of any sort and provide comparatively few stimuli. Great quantities of the person's behavior, on the other hand, are directly derived from his particular civilization. Not only are cultural responses developed in the reactional biography

of an individual, as is the case with personal, non-social responses, but they also are intimately involved with the life of groups. Moreover, in the many forms of cultural backgrounds we find sources for the great variety of types and instances of social behavior.

For purposes of understanding cultural conduct it is necessary therefore to investigate its anthropic conditions.¹ But the plot thickens. Psychological behavior cannot be connected merely with ethnic or national groups, but also with the events connected with various sets of persons. Within a single national or ethnic unit there are thousands of psychological collectivities. Now the problem arises how is this study to be achieved. For obviously the phenomena of psychological collectivities is an inexhaustible subject. Each psychological group is the locus for a multiplex series of constantly changing circumstances.

Students of social psychology must therefore compensate for their inability to study minute psychological collectivities by acquainting themselves with the general facts of sociology and anthropology. This is of course a legitimate procedure since the data of psychological collectivities as the background of cultural behavior are themselves set in a matrix of anthropological phenomena. In consequence, an acquaintance with anthropological facts enables us to become familiar with the sources and conditions of social behavior. The present chapter and the next are devoted to a survey of anthropic data.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF CIVILIZATION

Each set of human individuals possesses a unique civilization. Included in the aggregate of these collectivities are all

¹ Throughout these anthropic background chapters we alternate between the terms anthropic and cultural. It is to be hoped that the latter term which refers to the phenomena of cultural anthropology, will not be confused with the term cultural when it stands for cultural (psychological) responses.

human organisms. Every human individual, accordingly, participates in a cultural system. There is no such thing then as a savage or barbarian, howsoever his anthropic system may differ from our own or any other taken as a standard. Hence every human community constitutes a unit of civilization, whether it be large or small, a sovereign or dominated group, and irrespective of whether its domiciliary location on the earth's surface be the frozen extremes of the globe, the torrid regions of its equator, or intermediate temperate regions.

It would be an interminable task to list all the civilizational components of any one cultural system. But it is quite possible to enumerate a series of classes of the civilizational factors of all human groups, no matter how diversified they may be in detail. Every such civilization or anthropic system we may assert includes among its variegated complexity, (a) actions of all sorts, (b) human events and circumstances, (c) organizations of personal, domestic and political relations, as well as (d) objects, and (e) processes.

(a) Of the *behavior* phases of anthropic systems we may set apart for illustrative enumeration, first, personal reactions. According to our civilizational units we believe certain things, we prefer others, we make choice and taste responses, we think, sew, hunt, swim, as well as perform innumerable varieties of artistic and industrial manipulation. Secondly, we perform much interpersonal behavior, such as conversation, sex conduct, buying, selling, and the infinity of activities involving the mutual interaction of persons. Finally, we include all the public responses of worshipping, hunting, dancing, and the general gamut of ritualistic performances connected with religious, agricultural, fraternal, political and other administrative group functions.

(b) *Events* and *circumstances* likewise constitute prominent features of anthropic phenomena. Celebrations of every variety, the glorification of the tribe or group deity, jubilation over military victories, the setting aside of holy or sacred

days for the performance of various rites, religious worship, planting, initiations, etc., are all specific components of every cultural system. Every human group counts among its civilizational resources certain time periods and intervals as unique human events and circumstances. From the psychological standpoint these occurrences function as stimuli for concerted actions of the groups' personnel, precisely as non-human happenings do.

(c) So numerous and so involved are the *human interrelationships* existing in every collectivity that they challenge our capacity to isolate them all. For illustrative purposes, however, we may start with a single individual and consider his various connections with others: Thus we have first the family descent associations with all their manifold ramifications, relations of persons to father, mother, brother, sister and to the brothers and sisters of the parents, etc. Next we may mention the sib organization, involving lines of blood relationship. Further interconnections are created by marriage relations which connect each of the persons concerned with the families or sibs of the other. Standing apart from these more personal organizations are the innumerable interconnections of individuals designed for private and public enterprise, the associations of hunters, traders, artists, teachers, healers, warriors, etc. In completing our examples we can only hint at all the obvious group relations, such as political, legal, and administrative organizations with their various implied hierarchies.

(d) Out of the exhaustless array of *objects* found in every group we may isolate classes according to the life conditions of the individuals concerned. In every human collectivity are sheltering objects of various types. Whether the community uses houses, tents, or igloos, fairly adequate provision is always made for sheltering purposes. This feature extends to clothing and other articles necessary for personal protection. Ethnologists and explorers have always noted how admirably human

organisms are able to adapt themselves to the rigors of temperature even when the civilizational character of the group is exceedingly simple or poor. So far as food conditions are concerned, every set of individuals has its plants and animals, cultivated or uncultivated, with objects (pottery, basketry) appropriate for their preparation and preservation for nutritive purposes. With respect to the most elementary animal needs there is no human organism that does not live on a plane of existence infinitely above that of an infrahuman animal. This point need not be emphasized when we consider transportation activities. For here the cultural facts are obvious. Corresponding with the needs of human organisms every group has its canoes, wagons, sleds, and other means of transportation.

Universal features of every human group are tools of all sorts adapted to the purposes of its members. Diverse implements are necessary for manufacture, hunting, and for creating art objects, etc. The universality of civilization is further illustrated by the presence in every civilizational unit of property of some sort. Listed among the human possessions of all communities are art objects and creations used for personal decoration, ritualistic and initiatory performances, or possibly for mere appreciation and enjoyment. To mention any of these objects is to demonstrate that no human group lives upon the level of bare maintenance, but that all possess objects signifying diversities of human interest and the desire for luxuries.

(e) Collective life is impossible without *methods* and *processes* for carrying on the functions of individuals and the group as a whole. Certain processes must be evolved for the preparation and preservation of things. Techniques must be developed for hunting, manufacturing, drawing and painting. Every collectivity is constantly concerned with special means of making objects necessary for the immediate maintenance of the individuals or for the production of ornaments

and decorations. No human group is without inventions.

A somewhat different type of universal cultural process are the methods and procedures of administering the affairs of a community, carrying on war and other relations with neighborly or hostile groups, and punishing and rewarding individuals within the group itself for their commendable or disesteemed actions.

It is probably quite proper to infer from the universal distribution of human traits and activities that all groups of individuals as organisms are much alike. Wherever human animals exist in their communal togetherness they develop civilizational adaptations to the natural surroundings that we have mentioned. No human community exists without language, art, science, religion, and play, irrespective of how the men in the groups may differ in size, shape, color, or other specific biological character. It is a common observation too that men of distinctly different biological traits share the same civilizational elements, while communities having similar biological traits differ in their anthropic circumstances. Whether light and dark men belong to similar or diverse types of civilization depends directly upon the life conditions and previous histories of the groups in question. In all cases, however, we may be sure that the cultural or civilizational differences between communities of men are greater and more significant than their biological variation.

What perspectival results may the psychologist glean from the universality of civilization? Unfortunately the psychological implications of this fact have not always been correctly interpreted. That all human individuals are equally members of civilized communities has been construed to signify that human organisms come into the world endowed with positive psychic powers or properties which cause them inevitably to develop and acquire qualities of civilization. Obviously such a conception does considerable violence to the nature of psychological phenomena; for this viewpoint regards psycholog-

ical facts as forces inherent in the animal organism. This doctrine we have already examined in our chapter on biological phenomena insofar as the proponents of this idea connect their inevitable psychic processes with the biological make-up of the individual. Those who adhere to this view, we have seen, regard the common psychic processes of the organism as inheritable qualities. Such is the conception propagated in the ethnological literature and symbolized by the term psychic unity of man.

For our part what the universality of civilization really means for psychology is that every individual born into a group is inevitably in contact with certain stimuli objects, processes, and actions. Thus the organism acquires reaction systems corresponding to these stimuli objects. As we have seen it must be admitted that an organism has a certain possibility for being stimulated and for acquiring these reaction systems since it belongs to a species existing at a particular point on the evolutionary scale. But as we have sufficiently pointed out, this biological status may only be regarded as a source of psychological possibilities after the person has actually acquired civilizational traits.

Indeed the possibility of developing cultural conduct has its roots just as much in the civilization of a group as in the biological organism. We may regard both sources of possibility as a series of events and conditions, which taken together are components of a more inclusive event, namely the actual acquisition by the individual of specific forms of behavior.

Rightly to understand a psychological phenomenon, one must be strictly on guard not to neglect observation of details. Notice that in each instance of behavior acquisition the individual acquires some exceedingly specific form of reaction system. His behavior traits are absolutely particularized facts, specific language responses, custom reactions, etc. Furthermore, unless the specifications of contact of the individual with his surroundings occurred he would not have any

behavior and would not be a part of the civilizational collectivity. When we overlook these specificities of contact and their importance for the existence of mentality we invariably translate them into spurious potencies. From a strictly scientific standpoint the fact that civilization is universal provides us only with a single factor in the development of mentality.

The omnipresence of culture, however, may be regarded as an important basis for the cultural nature of man, just as we may look upon the facts of man's animal species as a factor in his original nature. Each refers to actual conditions contributing to the existence of some concrete psychological fact. Mentality is the historical product of all of the conditions mentioned, and is not a preëxisting entity. We cannot adopt here the mediaeval conception of the existence of essences regardless of actual natural circumstances. Such a metaphysical attitude invariably misconstrues all the facts of complex human phenomena and falsifies the whole science of psychology.

The observed cultural similarity of men must be accounted for by the fact that they all belong to the same animal species and that they are invariably born into cultural situations which have developed through long series of anthropic conditions, probably with a common primordial origin. The barest objective approach to psychological facts overwhelmingly convinces us that there cannot be anything like psychic unity. Only in the sense that no one has any mentality before he develops it, do all have the same mentality. When we consider the positive circumstances of human individuals we learn that there are no two human individuals alike. For no two persons can pass through the same reactional histories.

SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES IN ANTHROPIC ELEMENTS

Granting that all human communities are alike as units of civilization we must regard this fact as insignificant as com-

pared with the differences between those civilizations. For it is rather the minute divergences in acts and modes of life that are important. When we take cultural phenomena at large we can only categorize and label certain types of activities and things, but we do not gain any information concerning their actual nature. To say that every community of human beings possesses a language is to tell us nothing about its phonology, vocabulary, grammar, etc. In addition to these essentials, it is necessary to point out how each feature of the language of the community has arisen out of, and functions in a particular set of human circumstances. The phenomena of civilization, then, are the particular things existing in a given community and not mere generalized facts represented by a broad category of some sort.¹

The need to emphasize the specifications of cultural data is forced upon us when we notice that anthropic phenomena with similar descriptions and names have opposing and incommensurable characteristics. A family organization of one group may be considered a lack of domestic association in another. What are describable as similar customs may be violently in opposition in their humanistic function. Social and economic administration in some community may be regarded as an absence of administration in another.

Furthermore, there is always a discrepancy between the statistical description of an anthropic element and the actual objects or happenings referred to. A wide gap always separates a grammarian's survey of language from actual speech behavior summed up. For the student of psychology it is especially important to pay due regard to the particularities of an anthropic system, since it is only the most intimate anthropic facts that concern him and which can throw light upon his problems. The psychologist, therefore, must connect the behavior features of a cultural system with actual re-

¹ It is these generalizations which lead to essences, when cultural phenomena are interpreted.

sponses of persons, while the material objects and processes he regards as stimuli in some form.

When we stress the singularities of the cultural data found in every human community, and study each anthropic element as a natural phenomenon existing in mutual interconnection with other facts, we must conclude that there are no two human groups alike, although they may have many elements in common.

Now we face the necessity of discovering some principle by means of which to handle such similarities and dissimilarities conceptually. A pragmatic principle of considerable service here is the degree of connection of the anthropic elements with sheer human ecological conditions. We may express the principle in the following manner. Anthropic objects and traits are similar precisely in the degree in which they are involved with the actual maintenance of individuals and the group as a whole. The necessity to eat, protect oneself, and to reproduce puts limitations upon the things and acts of certain groups. So far as food is concerned objects must be edible and digestible. Garments must be protective and durable. Here we have limitations put upon the cultural conditions of groups.

Insofar as the elementary requirements of biological adaptations are involved we may assume, then, that the civilizational features of various collectivities will be constant. Without doubt the greatest similarities of anthropic phenomena are found in elementary cultural behavior rather than in objects. In other words, anthropic elements resemble each other the most when they involve the operation of the organism itself for elementary purposes. Somewhat less similar are the anthropic elements when the ecological adjustments permit acts to be performed through the extension of one's own organism, as in the use of contrivances, for example. When fire is used in the preparation of food a much wider range of food culture is possible. When shelters are built instead of merely con-

cealing oneself, striking variations are introduced in civilization.

Civilizational facts may be conceived as arranged upon a graduated scale. The lower limits naturally are rooted deeply in the biological characteristics of organisms and the environmental circumstances surrounding them. The upper ranges of our hypothetical scale belong more to the process of distinctly human life.

Now as we have already suggested no human life is so poor, even in the most primitive communities, that the activities of the individuals are exclusively or perhaps even primarily concerned with elementary maintenance activities. For example, among human beings there is no such thing as sheer biological reproduction, or bare metabolic functions. Accordingly we have the basis for the development of all types of complex actions and objects which naturally are very dissimilar in different anthropic units. We may safely assert that in general the anthropic traits and elements not rooted in the biological factors of individuals greatly outweigh those bound up with maintenance phenomena. It is an indubitable fact that when the individual first comes into contact with stimuli in his human environment, the greatest number by far are cultural conditions rather than purely natural phenomena.

An important factor in the increasing dissimilarity of cultural phenomena, even on a primitive level, is the almost inevitable evolutionary development found in human situations. The term evolutionary development stands for a progressive growth of objects and techniques through the manipulations of individuals. For instance, once a technique of fishing is introduced, observations of particular happenings involved in the fishing process suggest modes of transforming the present technique. It is inconceivable that persons using some tool will not observe its deficiencies under certain circumstances, such that the possibility immediately exists for its improvement. This advancement we may regard as a changed

status of a cultural element. Similarly the multiplication of the uses of an object or tool stimulate its further modification. No civilizational unit fails to present us with a constant series of such developmental circumstances. Each object or situation therefore turns out to be an adequate stimulus for exciting transformative reactions resulting in its variation. Thus a different level of human circumstances is initiated.

Ordinarily we should not expect conditions to be the same in different human centers. Accordingly anthropic elements diverge just in proportion as conditions vary from group to group. One of the greatest influences upon the similarities of life conditions of human groups is the complexity of the civilization of the community. Many of the great diversities between the anthropic phenomena of some groups, such as the so-called high types of European cultures, merely represent massive accumulations and refinements of the types of cultural elements found in simpler civilizational units. According to this conception, we may if we like, regard the incident of a European lighting a gas range with a match as a similar fact to that of some native Australian kindling a fire to cook his meat. That is, fire-making may be considered as a universal cultural trait with an infinity of variational degrees.

On the whole, human groups live under very different types of natural surroundings. Flora and fauna are variously distributed over the earth's surface. Thus the types of food, the techniques connected with food getting and preparation, methods of transportation, soil cultivation, etc., are all dissimilar. Geographic conditions are different on various parts of the earth; certain collectivities are larger and smaller. These facts, howsoever elementary they are taken to be, afford us a sufficient basis for the differences between cultural developments and the existence of diverse anthropic units.

The facts of similarity and dissimilarity among anthropic elements suggest several implications of a psychological type.

For example, one may attempt to account for dissimilarities on the basis of unique variations in the mental capacities of individuals of different groups. But notice that there may be exceedingly little in common between individuals from even the most closely related cultural units. Within the same cultural unit we find that some individuals have more widely diversified psychological equipment than do certain individuals belonging to entirely different communities. Here we have a problem of individual psychological development, which may always occur within a cultural system when we take anthropic phenomena as actual specific facts. When we consider the individual as having a definite place in a concrete human community we discover a definite interaction between persons and the cultural systems in which they live. On the one hand, individuals may contribute to the modification of the cultural elements, while on the other, the person may not be developed up to the standard of his group. In the latter case some person may not have acquired reactions as other persons in the group have. Thus they will be different. To conceive of a culture as the result of an innate mentality of its members means to assume a mentality over and above the specific psychological phenomena of persons. So far as the historical development of an anthropic unit is concerned, we have no option but to consider the mentality of the personnel of a group and the objects of that cultural system as concomitant historical developments.

Taking psychological phenomena to be concrete responses to stimuli we have made plain that the persons of each anthropic unit are stimulated to build up reactional equipments as determined by their contacts with group stimuli objects. Hence the similarities and dissimilarities of the different psychological individuals comport with the similarities and dissimilarities of their respective cultural groups. The same thing may be said for the comparative complexity of the individuals of different collectivities. In general, the psychological prop-

erties of group members represent accumulative acquisitions of specific responses which have developed concomitantly with the changing cultural and general life conditions of their group.

THE DISTRIBUTION AND INTERRELATION OF CULTURAL TRAITS

The resemblances of and differences between anthropic traits give rise to a number of problems concerning the distribution of cultural phenomena. It is a commonplace that analogous practices and objects are distributed over a large number of communities, while certain unique elements are restricted to one or a few groups.¹ But the fact that ethnic groups living very close together have widely different ceremonials, tools, or other cultural elements immediately arrests attention. On the other hand, we meet with a distinct challenge when we endeavor to account for very similar activities and objects among groups distantly removed from each other. Why should cultural groups diverse in complexity and character of civilization share certain traits of action or material civilizational objects?

In general we may discuss the problems of cultural distribution under two heads. In the first place, we have (a) the primary distribution of civilization. This involves a distribution and interrelation of anthropic elements which imply a complete ethnic homogeneity of human individuals. Then there are (b) the secondary phenomena of anthropic distribution. Here the universality of civilization is demonstrated by the heterogeneity of anthropic factors rather than by a detailed uniformity.

Primary Cultural Distribution.—We probably do not

¹ By ethnologists, referred to as cultural traits that do not travel. An example is the Chilkat blanket of the Alaskan coast. Cf. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, 1923.

overstep the boundaries of fact when we regard certain anthropic elements as originally having been universally distributed among all human animals. Here we are really assuming that the primordial development of these cultural elements took place when the groups now so widely distributed over the earth's surface, were living closer together, and had not yet migrated and established themselves in such widely different geographical areas. It is perhaps not beyond the range of fact that in the earliest stages of cultural development there was only one group. In other words, it is a speculative possibility that the earliest origin of human organisms and their behavior took place in some particular geographic locality. It was at the hypothetical point of origin of human organisms that the general types of cultural phenomena were engendered. It is not too much to suppose that the primordial dissemination of culture is an identical fact with the rise of the human organism from his infrahuman background. Naturally we must conceive of this process as a very gradual and time-consuming series of events, but the coming of man is the same fact as the first making of fire, the preparation of food, the developing of language, the deliberate choosing of mates, and origination of customs. With the migration of individuals from the common seat of origin, anthropic elements in the form of activities and objects, became different if they persisted, or else they disappeared entirely.

What on the surface appears as a paradox is the fact that the evolution and distribution of anthropic elements are best exemplified by the behavior phases of culture. That comparatively ephemeral behavior events should be the carriers and evolutionary bases of culture is not so strange after all, since it is always the behavior of the human organism which is in question. It is entirely probable that since the primordial beginnings of authentic human animals, they have persisted practically as they originally were. Behavior events then

through their conduct function can serve as the transmitters of behavior elements of civilization, provided only that the stimuli objects for their occurrence are available. Actions, as performances of perduring biological organisms stand a much better chance of continuing in existence with infinite changes, of course, than mere objects.

All the more plausible appears the suggested rôle of behavior as the continuator of culture when we recall that the actions of individuals become formalized in the shape of products. Our talking becomes language, our ways of acting develop into customs. And our fears, beliefs and aspirations take the form of myths and legends. These products have not only a continuous existence of their own, but also serve as stimuli for other members of the group to acquire similar reaction systems. When these stimuli functions descend down through generations, the place of conduct as a distributor of anthropic elements must be regarded as secure.

With objects, especially those not involving a great deal of behavior in their development, conditions are quite different. For depending as much as they do upon environing factors they could not survive throughout the infinite vicissitudes of men and come to take their places in the organization and circumstances of the present day.¹ The survival and general distribution of component objects can be measured in terms of the balance of natural raw material and reactional transformation. Thus language, customs, and other things consisting of behavior products, have greater chances of survival and distribution than cooking utensils, clothing, etc., even when the raw materials are not extremely perishable. In the event that the raw materials lack durability, it is hardly cogent to bring them into this situation. Similarly, techniques

¹ For purposes of distribution among contemporary societies an entirely different condition prevails. For this type of situation, objects constitute the best forms of distributional elements. But here perhaps we must exclude the migration of peoples.

are for the most part not persistent insofar as they provide means of handling very specific things. When the techniques are general they are more behavioristic than environmental and can be thus carried over more easily.

Probably the greatest value as bearers of culture attaches to actions when they are dispersed and diffused by the migration of the persons who perform the behavior. Among the best culture carriers are those actions describable as techniques that are more the person's movements and gestures than the manipulation of objects. Languages and ceremonials constitute such techniques. It was through such migrational diffusion that the Aryan ancestors of the Indo-European language became dispersed as so many filial ramifications and the Latin tongue became diffused as the Romance languages.

It is in the manner that we have just outlined that we regard language, attitudes toward the unknown and incomprehensible, sexual practices, and other actions as genuine descendants and distributions of primordial anthropic elements. Through such processes of distribution may we not account for the universality of these traits and their greater or lesser similarities among different groups? Concrete language behavior, religious and sexual conduct of our own day, as they exist among an indefinite number of groups and in all their manifoldness and multiplexity are the diffused descendents of the anthropic elements developed among the early ancestors of the individuals of the present groups. The primary type of culture dispersal begins at some primordial source and moves in a series of lateral directions in space while it proceeds forward in time.

A fundamental principle involved in the original distribution of anthropic elements in space and time is that cultural factors are closely related to elementary life conditions. An excellent illustration is found in the case of sex behavior. Here the activities involve the functions of the person's stable and perduring biological organism. Furthermore, the stimuli

are located in other persons with whom there is incessant association, as well as in one's own physiological needs. Thus the possibility is ever present for a continuation of conduct throughout the modifications which time and changing surroundings make necessary.

Closely related types of perseverant cultural traits are those connected with food responses. These likewise involve the organism's physiological processes. The stimuli too are in part located in the organism itself. But here are included manipulations of things which are somewhat removed from the reacting individual. For the food objects are not only variable in their qualities, covering a fairly large range of things, but they are transformed in the course of being prepared. Accordingly, while food responses are inevitable features of all human situations they are more subject to change when they are diffused. Here environmental circumstances make variations possible because of differences in the geographic distribution of flora and fauna.

Our illustrative activities plainly belong to the cruder and simpler processes of living. There are other more subtle and complex actions which exemplify the same principle of cultural distribution. Certain forms of subtle behavior we may regard as practically inevitable once they are engendered, because of the unvarying presence of stimuli thereto. Examples in the large are classifiable as religious conduct, fears, magical practices, prejudices, ideals, and so on. These complex activities though connected with a fairly constant type of stimuli are still subject to considerable modification. Being somewhat removed from the most intimate maintenance conditions they are more subject to environmental influences. But however much they may change through their distribution they always display their historical descent throughout all their peregrinations in space and time.

Secondary Cultural Distribution.—Let us now turn to an examination of the less archaic and even contemporary types

of cultural distribution. First, we will consider the extreme differences in cultural elements found in communities that are very closely located. Within a very narrow radius in central Europe we discover differences in language, custom, religion, tradition, dress and other anthropic elements. Take such a community as the Swiss people. So small a geographic and national unit richly exemplifies the variations in the types of civilization mentioned. For another illustration we may turn to a more primitive anthropic situation. Lowie writes,¹ "in northern Arizona the Hopi Indians occupying three emplacements not more than eight miles distant from one another have no perfect uniformity of industrial knowledge. Pottery, which flourishes on the eastern Mesa, is wholly unknown as an art, though constantly used in its specimens by the people of the central Mesa; a certain type of basketry plaque is made only at Oraibi village; another type is manufactured exclusively on the central Mesa. Conditions more ideal *a priori* for a transfer of knowledge than among the practically homogeneous neighboring Hopi groups could not be conceived. Nevertheless, it has not taken place."

A very similar situation is found with respect to intellectual and knowledge phenomena in closely related communities. A common example is the wide divergence in knowledge and interpretation of the same facts by Oxford and Cambridge scholars respectively. Perhaps a still more noticeable circumstance is the marked disparity in philosophical attitudes of groups in the same university.

The striking fact about not taking over cultural elements from neighbors is that the use of certain tools and instruments, the employment of particular techniques, or the adoption of available ideas, customs, and fashions, may not only be necessary for the well being or progress of the non-progressing group but in many instances they would decidedly fit in with

¹ *Culture and Ethnology*, 1917, p. 10.

other cultural elements of that collectivity. For instance, among the more primitive anthropic units it seems a grave ineptitude for the Chukchees not to adopt the snowhouse building complex from the neighboring Eskimos instead of burdening themselves with the ill-adapted hide tent, or for the Eskimos not to adopt from the Chukchees the reindeer as a transportational element.

Among ourselves it seems preposterous not to expect philosophers of a community which has originated, participated in, and contributed to the development of science and rigid control of phenomena, to give up commerce with the supernatural and what they themselves define as the unknowable. Nevertheless, in the most enlightened communities philosophers still occupy themselves with absolutes and ultimates, while scientists are not immune to religious and magical superstitions. Pride themselves as they may upon their rationality and scientific achievements as civilizational communities the *soi disant* most enlightened European groups possess no fewer superstitions and intellectual deficiencies, in proportion to population and cultural opportunities, than the most ill-esteemed community separated from them in the greatest geographical extremes. Despite all favoring circumstances, enlightened economic, sexual or political organizations are not to be found among many complex anthropic units. Our most complexly civilized communities, whether international or social, do not take over from each other cultural elements that perhaps they most need to have.¹

Such discrepancies in the distribution of cultural elements among closely related groups may involve only the presence or absence of a single or few cultural traits or objects. Or the differences in the neighboring civilizations may be char-

¹ The distributional problem at this point connects with the general phenomenon of human progress. It is well known that no inevitability exists at all that a most valuable invention or new idea will be adopted and propagated. Conversely, the positive suppression and discouragement of inventions or even patents are no unusual features of a civilization.

acterized by a general divergence in cultural circumstances. The latter situation is illustrated by the nations of Europe. Even a casual study of particular cultural elements convinces us of the striking differences between the French and German civilizations, or between the English and the Russian.

The particular distribution and interrelation of cultural factors among closely related groups depend upon various conditions. Prominent among these circumstances is the political or administrative organization of neighboring groups. Tribal or national control of opportunities, as manifested in tariff boundaries, is an effective determiner of just what traits will be distributed. Neighboring ethnic units have a powerful influence exerted upon them by transportation and commercial ties connecting them with other groups. Ethnic position is a similar determiner. When a group borders upon two other communities, each with diverse customs and anthropic objects, the general tendencies of adopting or borrowing between the bordering units are weakened or strengthened for particular elements. Frequently, historical circumstances pull different nations apart culturally despite their apparent commonness of economic, military and other interests. Of no mean importance as determiners of cultural distribution are psychological factors of various sorts. The latter are especially noticeable in the distribution of ideas among groups within national or even trade union or university borders. All of these determiners in their coöperative influence upon the diffusion of anthropic elements combine to make culture or civilization into a closed system of objective happenings.

Next let us consider the distribution of similar anthropic elements among groups widely removed geographically. A surprising and even baffling instance is the custom called Couvade which was practised among groups so widely separated as the Basque peasants, the Caribs of Guiana and the Indians of Brazil. According to this tradition the male parent of a newly born child goes to bed and observes various dietary

and other taboos while the female parent proceeds with her customary activities. Ethnological literature offers us numerous instances of similar stories and legends found in communities far removed from each other. For instance the primitive tale of "The Mink and the Sun" is regarded as a version of the Greek story of "Phaeton and Phoebus Apollo."¹

Other examples of literary distribution are the stories of the "Magic Flight,"² and creations and legends³ of floods and other cataclysmic happenings. An anthropic behavior trait of equally extended distribution, is the mother-in-law taboo found in such widely separated collectivities as the Zulus of South Africa, the Australians and the Crow Indians of North America. In like manner, the employment of tobacco and certain vegetable products, totemism, the use of the horse and other animals, constitute widely distributed cultural factors.

In order to account for such distribution, ethnologists have engendered the conception of a psychic unity of the participating individuals or communities. It is assumed that human mentality is uniform and everywhere the same; so that at different times and places it is to be expected that certain manifestations of mind should appear in the form of these widely distributed cultural elements. Now such a doctrine immediately provokes a number of denials. In the first place it wrongly assumes that complex cultural phenomena can be explained on a psychological and even a "psychic" basis. In the second place, this theory presupposes that anthropic phenomena may be regarded as the products of psychical processes. Here again we have a serious error of interpretation. We have frequently pointed out that no complex human phenomenon is exclusively based upon psychological condi-

¹ Cf. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, 1925, p. 25 f.

² Boas, "Mythology and Folk-tales of North American Indians" in *Anthropology in North America*.

³ Cf. Kroeber and Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, 1920, p. 516 ff.

tions. Once more we must urge the methodological requirement of not explaining a complex phenomenon in terms of one unit of the whole.

What the anthropologist calls the phenomenon of marginal areas illustrates an instructive series of distributive facts. Between any two divergent but communicating civilizations are always found collectivities which participate in the cultural phenomena of both limiting cultures. In those communities living between the divergent groups we discover a compound set of civilizational objects derivable from both of the neighboring collectivities. When the flanking cultural systems are close together, the intervening 'cultural phenomena may be very evenly divided as to their derivation from the neighboring cultures, or may successfully supplant each other.¹ Furthermore, when the middle community is farther removed from one than from the other we may expect a gradual reduction in the number of anthropic elements passing from the cultural community more distantly separated in space. The anthropic elements supplied by the more closely connected cultural unit will of course outweigh in number the cultural factors derived from the more remote neighbor. It is obvious that these distributional events involve only very particular articles, tools, customs, etc. Furthermore, it is probably true that there is always a reciprocal movement between different communities. The ethnic group we call the marginal one in turn radiates ethnic factors in the same directions from which it received cultural elements. That is, it serves as a relay point for anthropic elements migrating from one of the flanking groups to another.

A distributional phenomenon which strongly stresses the close interrelationship of even widely separated collectivities is observable in the process of anthropic migration. Whether

¹ As in the case of French and German languages replacing each other in Swiss villages.

human culture originated in one place or several, in either case there must have been tremendous movements of anthropic elements in order that culture should be so widespread. Remarkable also is the cultural transmission or diffusion of anthropic elements over smaller or larger geographic areas which make for a commonness or at least a connection between many otherwise very different anthropic systems. An example of such migration of cultural factors is the origin of the alphabet among the Phoenicians and its spread from community to community through the Greek and Roman domains to all those groups who use it today. A somewhat slighter example is the migration of the building arch, and wheel from community to community. Equally instructive is the anthropic migration attributed to the "Tar Baby" story which was supposed to have originated in Spain and Portugal and to have then moved to Africa, and from there to America with the negroes or directly to Mexico and the Philippines. The same type of migration of cultural elements or complexes is contained in the record of the dog and horse cultures presumed to have originated in Asia and transplanted across the greatest distances. The comparatively recent migrations of Indian maize and tobacco to Europe and elsewhere definitely shows the interrelations of the most distantly located human collectivities.

When, as in the case of tobacco and maize, we can clearly trace out comparatively simple ethnological transmissions, we may regard them as continuous diffusions, while migration involving transplantation and settlement in a place for long periods we may call discontinuous migration. So far as general historical processes are concerned the distribution treated of here is mediated through contact of communities and the carrying of the anthropic elements by individuals passing from one group to another.¹ In the latter case the specialized be-

² E.g. the Spaniard bringing the horse to the Western Hemisphere.

havioristic agency of transmission fits in and is motivated by many other conditions of an economic, military, or general social type. In the contacts of collectivities the non-behavioristic factors operate primarily. In working out some detailed migrational process we are instructed concerning the relative potencies of behavioristic and non-behavioristic factors and the generally intimate operation of anthropic phenomena.

The student of psychology exploring the anthropological perspective must never lose sight of the fact that all distributional phenomena center around the activities of individuals. It is the behavior of persons in carrying things from place to place during trading, wandering, fighting, etc., which brings about the movement of materials. The original existence of cultural elements depends upon the interests and inventive manipulations of persons. For the preservation of anthropic factors we must assume that persons cling to the civilizational situations of their tribe, nation, family or clan. Knowledge of what other groups have originated or borrowed depends too upon the discoveries of persons. When things are borrowed from a neighboring group it is because persons esteem them as more attractive, more useful or more easily appropriated. Or their adoption may make one an honored or admired member of one's group. Such a meagre beginning of an appropriation of a neighboring cultural element may become the source of a general civilizational movement in a particular direction.

The primacy of the personalistic influence, however, merely overshadows but does not preclude the operation of other conditions. Among the prominent influences of an impersonal type is the fact of systematization of cultural elements. The question how much individuals can do in the way of modifying a cultural system by introducing new anthropic elements depends upon how well the new factors fit in with the older features of the cultural system. In other words, the newer elements must be assimilable to the religious, economic, social,

associational and other factors of the older system. Naturally the degree of assimilation varies with the likenesses between newer and older elements. For instance the clashing of religious practices is a greater preventative of assimilation than a conflict between an economic and a religious factor. Naturally, assimilation or systematization of anthropic factors always has a wide latitude. Since no cultural system is a simple phenomenon there is room in it for many kinds of anthropic complexes. Especially is this true for non-primitive cultural systems, although to a smaller degree this proposition holds good for primitive civilizations also. There is never any dearth of possibilities for explaining the specific facts of cultural distribution.

SPECIALIZATIONS AND CLEAVAGES IN ANTHROPIC SYSTEMS

An invariable feature of all cultural systems is the progressive severance of the units of ethnic organization into minuter levels. Here we have a divisional process, which unlike the distributional phenomena discussed in our last section, is not primarily connected with things, actions and techniques, but involves predominantly the division of the personnel of an ethnic unit. Of course when the group is divided into smaller units there is a correlated distribution of cultural objects or complexes, especially when the personnel is divided along functional lines. But in this case cultural elements are dispersed within a single community and not among various anthropic systems.

The cleavage groups may be regarded as originating in two ways. The first is the breaking up of the total anthropic unit into subdivisions. Every group of individuals is divided and subdivided into smaller moieties, with the result that there is a spread and specialization of the functions and statuses of the persons constituting the anthropic unit. Accordingly each human organization comprises smaller divisions of individuals

along numerous cleavage lines. Even among primitive groups there are sex divisions, age groups, ranks and castes, military organizations, occupational groups, exclusive fraternal societies, etc. In part we include here particular family and sib organizations, for these constitute genuine cleavages among the individuals of a group. Family organizations form specialized units within more inclusive collectivities.

The second form of cleavage arises from the voluntary adhesion of particular individuals to make subgroups within the larger unit. Here the connections between individuals introduce a diremption of the collectivities. Among such organizations are marriage associations and a great variety of voluntary groupings of persons for fraternal, commercial, exploration and other purposes. A very interesting example of social cleavage among primitive groups is the diminutive association of as few as two non-blood related individuals in a permanent union of mutual support and comradeship as well as the infinite segregations of persons in complex civilizations. Ethnologists¹ point out the existence of connecting ties separating off a few individuals from the rest of the primitive groups because they share some "supernatural" experience, such as seeing visions, a type of association which has much in common with religious sects or reform organizations of complex collectivities.

It is to be expected of course that among the more intricate anthropic organizations the greater number of activities and more intense specializations of conduct result in an inordinate multiplication of divisions and subdivisions of social units. This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of ethnic sectionalization, namely, the bifurcation of the personnel of an anthropic unit into functional and status divisions. The former is a divarication based upon the individual's function in the group and the latter a division founded upon his value

¹ Cf. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 1920.

or acquired status. We must hasten to add that while among the larger and more complex collectivities the distribution between status and functional cleavages are more marked they are not lacking in simpler societies. On the whole, however, it is safe to say that probably simpler groups show an emphasis of functional cleavage. Persons are divided more on the basis of their activities, the rulers from the ruled, the men from the women, the warriors from those engaged in pacific pursuits, the initiated from the uninitiated, the counselors from the young and inexperienced, etc. While, as we have said, there is an extreme intensification of functional specialization among more complex groups, the difference between them and simpler societies is perhaps symbolized more by the great preponderance of status and caste divisions among more intricate collectivities. For example, political and property differences between persons in the complex group constitute large sources of stratification. Also the great prevalence of educational and industrial civilizations make place for many status levels.

So prominent are the status levels in complex societies, that they may be said to divide the ethnic unit into moieties. To illustrate, a certain complex linguistic-national group may be stratified into a series of economic-social levels such as the conventional lower, middle, and upper classes. But perhaps each is just as definitely segregated from any other because of corresponding difference in education, manners, morals, etc. In these latter circumstances there is more resemblance between the upper and lower levels than is found between the middle level and either of the other two. This is because the upper and lower levels find in their respective circumstances greater opportunities for variation from the middle group. It is notorious, for example, that in the matter of sexual irregularity there is greater similarity between the upper and lower classes than is found when we compare either of the other two with the conservative middle class group.

On the whole, of course, the transfusion of cultural elements provides mixtures of subgroups and boundary crossings of various sorts. The social strata, of which there are really great numbers and not ever just three, intermingle for specific purposes. For example, the professional units of the three or more strata may be very close together. Or the business men may be associated for commercial purposes in a very inclusive group but in no other respects.

As compared with simpler collectivities the functional divisions in complex society are very striking. The exigencies of industrial and commercial life result in a very involved distribution of work among various specialized groups. Similarly, the professional, artistic, and ecclesiastic exigencies of complex society provide the necessity for innumerable stratifications of persons among unit anthropic organizations. These moieties and subdivisions may be regarded as beaded upon a horizontal thread dividing off clergymen from business men, physicians from lawyers, teachers from laborers, etc. Each of these groups as we have said above, may also be stratified upon the status basis. Then in addition, they may be further separated hierarchially. Instances are the military, academic, and ecclesiastical hierarchies found in the horizontal moiety divisions.

To cast even this brief glance over the phenomena of group sundering affords the student of psychology considerable information concerning the correlated psychological facts. We find that in any complex civilizational unit there are certain activities which are exclusively present in the members of particular moieties. Salient here is the distinction between the intellectual capacities of members of the different strata and functional hierarchy units. Individuals belonging to these different subdivisions of the complex anthropic system may be just as different from each other as persons belonging respectively to primitive and complex civilizations. For instance, some of them may have excellent intellectual orienta-

tions with respect to human and non-human phenomena, while others by comparison stand close to a lower animal level. Similarly, in every complex society individuals belonging to the different cultural moieties are divided from each other on the basis of variations in intelligence. Such individuals also differ from each other with respect to other features of their personality equipment, for instance in their tastes, desires, prejudices, use of language, ideals and temperamental qualities.

The facts of human organization offer us a significant *aperçu* concerning the use of psychological principles as explanatory factors in the field of anthropology. In observing the multiplication of moieties within a particular group we see how the exigencies of living provide circumstances which make them both possible and necessary. For example, it is inevitable that different life conditions will result in a fractionalization of a unit into psychologically diverse individuals. The kind of work itself brings about particular attitudes and capacities in the individuals concerned. Conversely, belonging to some functional or status moiety prevents one from acquiring activities excluded from the circumstances of the specific anthropic unit in question. Cultural circumstances then account satisfactorily for the variations in mentality.

And yet it has always been customary to suppose that the segregation of persons into moieties must be explained upon the basis of variously existing psychological or psychic factors. For example, ethnologists account for the fact, that among primitive groups men congregate in associations while women do not join in societies or at least not in the same degree, by supposing an innately slighter gregariousness as a trait of female mentality. In this particular instance it happens that there is no fact to explain, since other ethnologists can easily show that as a matter of fact there are female associations of various sorts, as well as a mixing of men and women in the same social and religious organizations. In every case it is found that not only do psychic factors never

explain anything but they are always found in inveterate concomitance with the neglect or denial of facts. Indeed they are usually founded upon illegitimate generalizations. An instance or type of occurrence is made into a universal manifestation of a principle or process. An equally reprehensible interpretation is to explain the fact that both men and women collect in societies because both forms of the human species have a gregarious instinct or impulse which manifests itself in such organizations of persons. In the type of phenomena represented by specialization and compartition we notice, however, the operation of numerous empirical conditioning factors of both actual psychological and non-psychological types.

It is true of course as we have seen that individuals may join in the formation of specific groups because of various common interests or abilities. Through the possession of certain psychological qualities, persons may achieve a status or functional level in a given society. But this fact never obliges us to assume any inherent psychic perfection or lack of perfection. Without doubt these various psychological qualities or traits are acquired through various concrete human circumstances. Later such traits may be stimuli for associating together on the basis of tradition, industrial, commercial or military circumstances.

That no innate mentality may be assumed as the cause of one's occupying a position in an upper stratum, appears clear from the fact that many of those so favorably situated in society really have no such qualities. A king may be a puppet, a scholar or scientist may only be such by unearned repute. Furthermore, even when individuals are mentally equal to their position they may have required the influence of others to reach their level in the group. Observe, too, the fact that individuals attain to a genuinely high psychological level through various opportunities that they find. For instance they come into possession of certain property which they are

able to increase and to put to such use as to establish themselves on a particular social, aesthetic and intellectual level. Such circumstances may originally involve skills, good health, strength, bravery, the backing of friends, the suppression of the "voice of conscience," persistent application, social accidents, and favorable opportunities, but not any superior mentality. Later, however, the person's new social level may be a decided factor in his acquiring superior mental characteristics.

CHANGES AND GROWTH OF ANTHROPIC PHENOMENA

Nothing is constant but change. So runs a popular scientific generalization, to which may be added the specification that the rate of change follows an upward trend from physical to biological and psychological phenomena. Anthropic phenomena, prominently comprising psychological facts, are strikingly characterized by modifications and metamorphoses. So constantly and subtle are the changes taking place in communities that it is exceedingly difficult to discover definite principles of transformation. Moreover, these alterations are so complex that cultural elements are most frequently describable as undergoing a number of variational processes at the same time. We shall attempt, however, to indicate under a series of categories some of the most outstanding methods of transforming civilization.

Evolution.—Some phases of given cultures certainly, and in all probabilities some complete systems of culture, may be said to evolve, sometimes with extreme slowness and at other periods with noticeable celerity. As most striking among such evolutions we quote the expansion and variation of industrial techniques and circumstances which have occurred in the Western European civilization upon the initiation and development of machinery. Turning our attention to the tools and methods of transportation we must regard as nothing short of remarkable the changes observed in this domain. From the oar

propelled boat to the sail boat and steamer, is a line of evolution as notable as it is progressive. Similarly, the development of railways, their equipment and manipulation represent a distinct growth. These evolutions coincide directly, of course, with the invention and use of the steam principle. Our modern machine age is fairly replete with illustrations of such cultural evolution. Now while our examples are all specific in the form of particular techniques, objects, and their uses, they represent the fact of a progressive series of modifications occurring in large blocks of anthropic phenomena. In our various industrial civilizations the development of comforts and luxuries, founded upon the use and dispersion of mechanical appliances, are systematized and spread throughout whole ranges of certain levels in a given community. Since we are dealing here with objects of material culture the possibilities for the diffusion of such elements are extremely large.

While the most telling examples of cultural evolution are found in the domain of mechanical inventions, no feature of cultural life exists without such evolutionary change. Social organization, the administration of justice, methods of trade, military tactics, and practically every other element of human association are subject to evolutionary alteration. But these more material elements of culture need not develop *pari passu* with the more subtle human forms of anthropic phenomena. The development of intellect, taste, appreciation of beauty, intelligence, and other behavioristic modes of culture, in many cases show wider divergence than, for example, the phenomena of group organization. Especially is this true in newer civilizational communities.

Many evolutional changes constitute genuine transformations in the direction of perfection, greater utility, or aesthetic value. Tools, pottery, and art objects may be evolved until they are infinitely better than they originally were. This is obviously the case with every new invention which reaches a degree of technical perfection after its principles are first

utilized. Or possibly the changes amount merely to improvement from the standpoint of an immediate adaptation. That is to say, the cultural element becomes better fitted for an immediate purpose of the community. While the criteria for behavior, and especially for such subtle performances as concepts, beliefs, etc., are not easy to determine, there is probably no bar to progressive evolution here.

Cultural evolution of another distinct type constitutes merely a more intensive distribution and occurrence of some cultural element. For instance, freedom and privilege are spread throughout a larger range than their previous existence. The same kind of anthropic growth characterizes the spread of tools, techniques, grains, animals, and the uses of all these elements. Through the same principle also, cultural phenomena are evolved that are regarded as harmful, deleterious, or are merely disapproved of. For instance, the scorn of beauty and ideas, the spread of militarism, superstition, intolerance, etc.

Such an evolutionary process, applying as it does to definite occurrences under very specific circumstances, cannot in any sense be confused with the general evolution of culture. Ethnologists of an earlier day have developed the theory that an evolutionary process exists within the human domain, constituting a continuation of biological evolution. The early English anthropologists especially, fired with the enthusiasm of the biological evolutionists, erroneously regarded the various races of men as successive stages in an evolutionary scale continuing the development whereby man was evolved from the lower animals. In accordance with this conception, cultural facts, were falsely considered as stages in a unilinear development on the basis of the principles of uniformity, gradual development, and progress. The study of anthropic phenomena in their concrete specificities, however, is clearly convincing that there is no such universal principle as a

unilinear evolution of anthropic objects and processes.¹ This theory is obviously founded upon a faulty analogical conception rather than upon the facts of culture.

Devolution.—A series of definite processes of anthropic changes may be subsumed under the general caption of devolution. In particular communities we find that cultural elements in the form of organizations, objects of all sorts, ideas and techniques of every variety display a true degeneration from a higher to a lower type. Such a process may go on to the point that the specific art, practice, custom, ritualistic or other cultural complex may disappear entirely. History of human phenomena illustrates copiously the retrogression and disappearance of necessary and useful techniques, along with civilizational elements of all types. Communities may also be deprived of cultural elements without any visible deterioration. Through the vicissitudes of group life such anthropic elements fall into disuse and drop out of the cultural scheme.

The numerous lost arts are to be equally deplored for their utilitarian importance as for their artistic value. In many cases this sort of degeneration and extinction of culture is connected with the interrelationship between different groups. The conquering of one group by another without a combination of the two cultures may result in the loss of cultural elements which existed and flourished in the conquering or conquered group. Language, laws, and customs in great profusion are thus historically recorded as disappearing from the cultural scene. In particular communities the degeneration of arts and techniques proceed because of the establishment of some form of influencing cultural elements. Thus in European cultural systems most of the handicraft techniques have

¹ For a criticism of the universal evolutionary theory see the work of Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, 1911, and that of his students, especially Goldenweiser, "Early Civilization," 1922, and "Cultural Anthropology," in the *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, 1925, hereafter to be referred to as C.A.

fallen into disuse and dropped away through the dominance of machine culture.

Obviously the retrogression and disappearance of cultural elements do not always affect objects that are useful or important or that result in any deficiency in a cultural system. We are merely referring to the actual process by which changes take place in cultural groups or in the anthropic scheme as a whole. Necessarily some of the disappearances of cultural objects may be to the distinct advantage of particular communities. In fact many cultural elements are deliberately destroyed by individuals or groups acting in concert.¹

Divergence.—This type of change, unlike the others already considered involves a comparison of related anthropic materials located in the same or different cultural systems. Within any particular anthropic unit we find that objects and traits of culture diverge more and more from each other until they become different elements. For instance, various groups borrow cultural elements from each other, so that a set of particular cultural traits common to the exchanging groups becomes increasingly alike, while deviating from the other non-shared cultural elements. A typical example of divergence is found in practically all of the Eastern European communities in which many scientific ideas and techniques develop more and more alike in the different communities, whereas language, art, and industrial processes remain unique for each group in question. Consider the differences in language, art and industry, say in the British and Russian national anthropic units, as compared with the intellectual and scientific civilization of the same groups. An imposing example is the civilization divergence in Japan occasioned by its taking over European military and industrial cultural ele-

¹ For a study of anthropic devolution cf., Freeman, *Social Decay and Degeneration*, 1921; and Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*, 1904.

ments, while at the same time retaining its own religion, customs, and manners.

Similar cultural divarications are exemplified by the increasing differences in cultural elements which were originally the same. This sort of distributional divergence is well shown by the varying characteristics taken on by the German and English branches of the Germanic languages, or by the discrepancies developing within the American and English branches of the English language.

Confluence.—When a certain civilizational element becomes established in a community, many or all of the other cultural features take on characteristics influenced by the new factor. This phenomenon we call the confluence of cultural elements. A striking example is the tendency of various American cultural elements to become homogeneous through the influence of pioneering traits.

A similar situation is found in the changes in thought and manners of communities that have fallen into the machine type of industrialism. The attitudes of people, customs, fashions, and other cultural phenomena take on characteristics of standardization and uniformity, qualities of the machine industrialism mentioned. Veblen¹ has given us a vivid picture of how the workers under the regime of the machine industry are induced to build specific kinds of reaction systems; so that on the whole "there results a standardization of the workman's intellectual life in terms of mechanical processes, which is more unmitigated and precise, the more comprehensive and consummate the industrial process in which he plays a part." If we insist on recognizing the invariable mutuality of psychological and non-psychological human facts we find many excellent suggestions in the processes of confluence to illuminate the facts concerning particular types of mental development.

¹ *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, 1904.

Unqualified Change.—Numerous elements are constantly modified and changed but without any direction or characterizing goal. Activities and their products merely become different from time to time. Typical of such changes in cultural elements are the ordinary variations in language, customs, manners, fashions, and religious behavior. Probably the inability to point out any characterizing feature of the change is owing to the fact that such cultural elements may vary widely between limits without visibly affecting the cultural or psychological life of the individuals involved. Perhaps the changes are owing to some requirements of momentary adjustment, but leave no immediate impression upon the anthropic system or its parts. In other words, they do not symbolize any anthropic trend. But we may be sure, however, that these alterations in cultural factors are not without influence upon the collectivity in which they are found. Doubtless in happenings of this type lie concealed those subtly working circumstances that condition anthropic phenomena and which baffle us in providing an interpretation. These invisible effectors of cultural phenomena constitute the ore, from which if we knew how, we could extract many precious metals of explanation for changes in language, ideas, ceremonials, manners, etc.

CHAPTER V

THE ANTHROPIC BACKGROUND OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR—*Continued.*

THE ORIGIN OF CULTURAL PHENOMENA

Courage of no mean order is an inevitable prerequisite for an inquiry into the origins of anthropic phenomena. For such a study involves one at once in a complex maze of human circumstances. When human facts are to be accounted for no shortcuts are possible, nor any widespread generalizations. To enter into a serious investigation of origins, details piled upon details must be boldly encountered and judiciously handled. It is needless to add that such investigations are presided over by more or less lenient arbiters of fortune, so that studies of origins are more or less successful. Perhaps in most cases the investigation of genesis soon runs into the irrevocable. This means to say that studies of origins sooner or later carry us beyond the point where actual data are available. How are we to discover the beginnings of language, the family, or of magic? In the end all problems of cultural origins are lost in a labyrinth from which to extricate ourselves no Ariadne can supply us a thread.

Generally speaking, the problem of cultural origins is dichotomized into two distinct inquiries. The first is concerned with some given anthropic element in a particular civilizational system. Whence has come this object, technique, or social organization? This is essentially a concrete and specific study of the rise of a particular phase of a cultural system.

The second problem, which attains speculative proportions, concerns the question as to how in all cultural systems the same general institutions or human functions arise. This is the question of the general origin of language, the family, law, the state, and even civilization itself. We can of course only examine problems of the first type.

With respect to the genesis of any specific anthropic element in a cultural system we may conclude at once that it is derived from some previous cultural element or from a complex of such anthropic factors. In this sense all the phenomena of culture consist of modifications of other cultural elements. Tools and implements are modified forms of the same general type of object. Customs are merely variants of other related actions. In other words, any new object or process has a distinct historical background which might be traced in its most intimate details. Or when these minutiae are lacking in part, we may safely infer something concerning its antecedents. At any rate we may be entirely satisfied that if the stages of historical growth were available for our investigative inquiries, the development of the anthropic element could be definitely traced. Here we are assuming that no striking novelty characterizes the cultural element in question.

However, when the cultural factor displays marked innovation we may be required to look for its beginnings in either one or the other of two sources. Either it has been borrowed in its entirety from some other anthropic system or else it is produced by a combination of several older elements. If the former is the case then we must begin a regressive research in order to recover the facts of its migration. This investigative procedure means carrying over our study into another cultural system instead of tracing back the history of the element in its present anthropic surroundings.

When the anthropic factor is the result of some combination of older elements then it is our task to discover the progres-

sive steps in its transformation into a new product. Similarly, if we are studying a civilizational unit as a whole, some type of interrelationship of cultural systems may be looked to for information concerning the rise of new civilizational systems. The development of the American cultural system is a case in point. Essentially, the problem is one of determining the relative contribution of Dutch, English, French, Spanish, Indian, and Negro components to the making of the whole.

It is well to add here that many concrete anthropic origins combine the transformative and migrational conditions. Thus when one anthropic unit borrows a cultural element, the borrowed factor may undergo many changes before it can be assimilated into the new anthropic setting. An example is the transformation of laws, religions, or languages when they are translated from one group to another. To a great extent of course these transformations might take place even when the anthropic elements remain in their own original environment.

Of the greatest interest to the student of psychology is the question of the origin of similar elements in widely differing cultural systems. In many cases these anthropic units are located so far apart that a migration may hardly be assumed. The psychological implications of this problem are evident when we ask whether it is possible that two or more identical cultural traits can develop independently in time and space. Examples have already been met in our study of anthropic distribution. Others are the copper axe heads found both in Egypt and Peru, the phenomenon of totemism obtaining both in Australia and among the Eskimos of North America, and such a fact as the Shoshoni and the Greek both developing the dual in their languages.

By those anthropologists referred to as diffusionists, it is assumed that no cultural element, either a technique, an idea or an implement, could have any but a single origin in some particular place and then be carried over or diffused to other

communities. Thus when a similar story is found in two communities more or less widely geographically distributed, the assumption is made that somehow this cultural element must have been transported to the other location no matter how distant. This position is held even when no means of crossing over between the different communities are available and when conditions make it entirely plausible that a repeated and independent engendering of a cultural element is possible.

The diffusionistic notion concerning the origin of cultural elements is naturally entertained in connection with a type of psychological theory concerning the inventive capacities of human individuals. It is supposed that invention is a very uncommon and difficult type of activity, and further that it is impossible to repeat an invention. Quite appropriately there are ethnologists who are rigidly opposed to the assertion of such a lack of inventive capacity among peoples. These social scientists enforce their argument with a fulsome array of examples, which to the impartial judge seem to carry great weight. To the unbiased observer there cannot be any doubt that different cultural groups may start with dissimilar cultural elements and by developing them finally produce anthropic materials that are practically like those invented by the members of another collectivity.

Similarities in objects are traceable in part to a circumstance which Goldenweiser¹ refers to as "the principle of limited possibilities." This principle implies that the functions of things determine the character of objects wherever they may have developed. Furthermore there are mechanical limitations for objects. "Many different kinds of pots are known, but a pot is a pot, that is, a vessel or container." This function sets a limit to its formal variations. To a certain degree one pot is and must be like another.² Likewise in the case of language it is not hard to believe that since dual references

¹ See references given by this writer, in *C.A.*, p. 225.

² Goldenweiser, *C.A.*, p. 237.

are made by all speakers, several linguistic systems will hit upon similar grammatical devices. If only we look to the concrete details of human life, a series of possibilities will always be found for the duplications of cultural elements that actually exist. No inconceivable conditions are in dispute such as two identical versions of the same language built up under different cultural circumstances.

As Goldenweiser¹ indicates no one denies the capacity of any cultural group to invent and thus engender dissimilar elements of culture. Accordingly it is evident that the denial of parallel origin of similar objects can only be made in support of a theory of cultural origins and not as an interpretation of facts. To the argument that cultural similarities must always be borrowed a factual objection is found in the actual observation of the development of such parallel phenomena. Especially are such evidences prominent in the field of linguistics. Convergent cultural processes are discoverable in the analytical character of Chinese and English grammatical processes. Now from an objective psychological standpoint, circumstances do not present a single reason to doubt that cultural elements may be independently originated. Given the same general stimulative possibilities we may expect similar types of behavior to develop without regard to place. Naturally this behavior includes imaginative and inventive conduct and results in products constituting cultural elements. What must be taken into consideration is the possibility of the same combination of circumstances in different civilizational units. Such stimulative possibilities we may expect to find among many, if not all, human communities. Suppose a vessel is required for storing liquid food. What human situation is bereft of patterns for the invention of such receptacles. If water puddles or craters of ice are lacking, there may be gourds, cocoanuts or other natural vegetable containers.

¹ C.A., p. 237.

The close observation of every inventive process, which is merely the controlled accumulation of changes in things, amply testifies that there is never any dearth of suggestions for constructive psychological conduct. When a railway strike interferes with the transportation of a seriously needed coal supply it is only natural that dreams of broadcasting heat by radio will be stimulated. Specific properties of invented things also elicit particular constructive reactions. When inventive products consist of clay or wood, these materials themselves determine how they shall be worked and to a great extent what the products will be like, as well as changes in the functions of the things we propose to invent. Probably a more telling factor for the explanation of cultural objects than the presence of behavior possibilities for making new things is the absence of interfering conditions such as traditions and prior lines of cultural development.

At the basis of the disagreement of ethnologists in respect to the problem of cultural origins lies an inadequate psychological conception. The extreme diffusionists especially, seem to regard the mind (or psychological actions) as a more or less fixed quantity with given capacities. Here we meet with the unfounded doctrine of original mental nature, the psychic unity of man, etc. The historical ethnologists as anti-diffusionists are interested in independent developments, but they merely mean that aesthetic or general creative impulses can work out in different ways because of variations in circumstances. But they too accept the faulty conception of a "psychic spring which feeds all the creations of human culture." Neither side to the controversy appears to realize that psychological phenomena are in no sense fixed precedents of the things invented but rather are themselves developed in mutual interaction with the things, as constituents of human situations. Both psychological and ethnological phenomena develop and occur in an indissoluble relationship.

CONDITIONS OF ANTHROPIC HAPPENINGS

Throughout an examination of the anthropic background of cultural conduct we are vividly reminded of the methodological dangers lurking in the attempt to simplify our data. Especially in the study of causes or conditions of anthropic events we must avoid the abstracting procedure of the physical sciences. It is impossible when dealing with complex human facts to isolate single interrelated conditions which may be regarded as directly responsible for a particular event. Whenever we attribute the original development of any specific anthropic element, its distribution among various communities or its changes, to some cause we are bound to misinterpret the whole situation.

The avoidance of the error of simplification must not, however, be construed as building up a barrier between cultural and say, physical phenomena. As happenings in nature there is no difference between them. Even simple physical (non-human) events cannot be attributed to single causes. But what we are able to do when we try to explain simple physical facts, namely reduce them to simple cause and effect relations, is an impossible procedure when we deal with anthropic data. For it is precisely the numerous intimate details of human events that provide the authentic descriptive handling of human facts. The only safe methodological procedure therefore is to look upon every human fact as a fiber interwoven in an intricate texture of human events. As compared then with the physicist, the social scientist in his investigation is not influenced by the goal of finding universal principles of explaining a series of apparently homogeneous events but rather he endeavors to discover the laws governing unique phenomena.

It follows therefore that in our study of anthropic occurrences we can do no more than to isolate a number of general causative or conditioning factors. In the present section then

we pass in review a few of the many possible conditions that have a determining effect upon the occurrence of human phenomena.

Cultural Trends.—As potent determiners of anthropic phenomena cultural trends will at once be accorded a prominent place. A cultural trend we may think of as a typical or characteristic human development which persists among certain collectivities. For example, we regard a certain primitive group as nomadic, another as warlike. In more complex human associations some ethnic units may be considered as more musical, others predominantly sea or land folk, etc. Still different anthropic tendencies stamp collectivities as agricultural, industrial, or commercial. Cultural bents of a more subtle type are discovered in the vivacity and preciseness of French speech and thought, the thoroughness of the Germans, the mysticism of the Orientals, the artistic proclivities of certain communities, and the arrogance or unreliability of others. When these cultural trends are ethnic they unify particular civilizations and divide them off from other anthropic systems. Subethnic trends or more particularized bents of civilization, such as are found in numerous array in complex communities, merely systematize cultural elements along certain lines.

Of such particularized anthropic trends all kinds exist. There are intellectual, artistic, economic, scientific, religious and linguistic forms. The number as well as the types, of course, depend upon the size and complexity of the ethnic unity. Each type of trend not only operates in its own sphere, as in the case of language trends conditioning speech, or religious trends conditioning the religious circumstances of a group, but they also function in departments of life really foreign to them. For instance, religious trends may interfere with scientific thinking or vice versa. Again, notice that not always do these trends operate in isolation. Several of them

or all those existing in a particular community may in conjunction influence the life and action of that group.

In two ways do such cultural trends condition the civilization of collectivities. First, they exert a positive influence, in the sense that the religious trend determines what kind of religious conduct persons shall exclusively perform. Secondly, trends of action affect individuals negatively by stimulating them to revolt against and renounce accepted traditions. It is not an uncommon occurrence either for conflicts between these trends to bring about the development of new cultural elements, thus engendering a fresh anthropic trend. When a moral trend runs counter to a commercial tradition, the chances are that a new moral sentiment will arise in a given civilizational center.

Generally speaking, cultural trends determine the conservation of cultural elements as totalities by influencing the group to resist an alteration in its manners, laws, language, or customs. Also they prevent the acceptance of new anthropic elements, or the assimilation of inharmonic factors which have already achieved a foothold in a particular cultural system. Although these cultural trends are themselves not always permanent anthropic phenomena, they nevertheless exert powerful influences. Where a certain idea has become established no other conception can gain a footing without a strong force to support it. As we have already suggested we may regard such anthropic trends as the basis for the cohesion of anthropic systems. One of their most remarkable features is that they arise and persist without regard to any utilitarian, logical, or other criterion, and irrespective of the needs and desires of the personnel of the anthropic communities in which they are found.

For the greater part the more specialized trends have a more powerful rôle as causes of culture. This situation doubtless is owing to the more limited range of circumstances involved and especially to the smaller number of persons con-

cerned. On approaching any ethnic cultural situation, therefore, one observes innumerable variations from prevailing cultural tendencies. No absolute homogeneity of cultural elements is to be found. All groups contain sufficient negative instances—unconformities and inequalities—to serve as the exception proving the rule of cultural trends.

Not all members of militaristic groups are militaristic. Not all individuals of a progressive collectivity are progressive. This situation is inevitable when human persons are concerned. Anthropropic trends must never be considered as other than decidedly empirical events, tendencies that are analyzed out of human situations. Because they are not metaphysical processes they are never to be thought of as absolute. It is clear then that cultural trends themselves are determined and conditioned by other factors with which they coexist in a human situation, for example the conduct of members of the anthropic units in which they are found. That anthropic tendencies are subject to modification does not detract, however, from their capacity not only to condition the quality of certain civilizations but also to influence their rate of transformation.

Historical Conditions.—An influence upon anthropic phenomena ~~similar to the~~ cultural trends, but in a way basic to them, is that of the historical position of a cultural unit. The nature of an anthropic system is to a great extent conditioned by its historical origin and development. The conditions here may be generalized as the interrelation of cultural units. To illustrate, the civilization of the Latin ethnic units are decidedly colored in their linguistic and religious aspects by their descent from or contact with the Roman cultural system. In more recent times differences in these anthropic units have been induced by their differential contacts with other ethnic groups. Spanish culture reveals its historical contact with Moorish civilization, French with Germanic, Roumanian with Slavic, etc. The study of each anthropic unit

demonstrates the contribution to every cultural complex of elements derived from historical contacts with other units.

It is not difficult to conclude then that historical conditions are in part responsible for the general scope and complexion of a particular civilization or for some specific trend. The civilization of the people of the United States as an anthropic unit, for instance, may be traced out in its details according to its historical contacts. The chief cultural trends issue from England, while the language and other particular elements are derived partially from Indian, Negro, and other contacts. It is believed that the Chinese derived their use of the horse, donkey and camel, and the practice of felt and rug weaving from encounters with the Turkish and Tongus civilizations. Despite the long-time connotation of the term historical, the processes of historical contacts can be observed at any time. We need give attention only to the trade and military contacts of nations to see to what an extent historical conditions influence particular features of intercommunicating civilizations.

Life Conditions.—A fertile source of anthropic causes is to be found in the actual living conditions of human organisms. Minute human ecological details determine the civilizational circumstances of families, sibs, tribes, nations, etc. The accidents and incidents of health, war, slavery, colonization, the existence or non-existence of roads, hospitals, industries, condition the kind of institutions, language, laws, customs, etc., that a particular collectivity will have. To illustrate, the rigors of economic life in a certain community result in the origination of an infanticide institution. Infanticide in turn may provoke changes in marriage relations; in brief it may bring about the institution of polyandry. Among life conditions we must distinguish, of course, between occasional circumstances such as famines, invasions, and other crises, and the more or less fixed periodic natural events such as the overflowing of rivers, changes in seasons, the biological phenomena of puberty, catamenia, pregnancy, climacteric, old age, etc. Some

of the constant and contingent conditions naturally involve one another and thus neutralize or intensify each others' influences.

A striking example of the influence of life conditions upon anthropic phenomena is their effect upon language. Ethnologists have convincingly demonstrated that particular types of vocabulary, grammatical processes and refinements depend upon the function of the language in meeting the life conditions of particular groups. It is found that the lack of numbers or symbols for many objects is owing to the groups not dealing with large quantities of things. Again, the multiplication and refinement of terms for what appear to be practically the same thing may be explained on the basis of the ecological circumstances of the linguistic group in question. None other than the necessities of changing life conditions are enlarging the Japanese and other peoples' languages to accommodate themselves to European references to things. Similarly, the altering life circumstances of the Chinese people are inducing that group to seek for an alphabetical substitution for their present written language. Again, ecological circumstances restricted to the scientific field are stimulating scientists to attempt the establishment of a universal language. Obviously, since language is merely a behavior instrument for intercourse between individuals, in other words a behavior method of referring to things, we find that every specific instance of language manifests in an unmistakable way the life circumstances of individuals.

What is true of language is equally true of law, religion, family and social organization, and other anthropic elements. No special examples are required here, for whoever pays the slightest attention to the modifications in these apparently permanent features of civilization will see the numerous influences upon them of the particular exigencies of living.

Environmental Conditions.—Quite a distinct set of anthropic determiners may be located in the environmental

surroundings of human societies. We confine the term environment to the natural auspices under which human organisms live. Foremost are the general surface or topographical conditions surrounding the community. The proximity of rivers, lakes, or other water, the smoothness or hilliness of the country, also the availability of particular plants and animals, metals, stones and other types of natural resources, rigidly condition the type of cultural elements developed. Climate, altitude and other telluric phenomena make plausible or prevent the development of anthropic facts as well as hasten or retard the evolution of cultural complexes.

Unhappily the environmental influences upon culture have been made the unfortunate pawns in a struggle between different types of anthropological absolutists. On the one hand, there are those who regard environment as a sole cause for the development of cultures in all their respects. Clearly it is an irrational extremity of scientific interpretation to make climate or geography a single cause for the existence of any cultural system or any of its divisions. A telling objection to such a limiting theory is that in some instances the same type of environment surrounds entirely different cultural systems. On the opposite side, it is contended that environmental features of a group have no influence at all upon its cultural factors.

Between these two contradictory viewpoints the actual function of environmental features as conditions of anthropic development has been misprized. True it is, of course, that they are not complete or sole determiners of perhaps any feature of a cultural system. But surely they play no insignificant part as partial conditioners of anthropic factors. Certainly environmental features make possible or impossible the existence of specific human phenomena. While it is true that among collectivities living in the same region, one group builds snow houses while the other does not, this differentiation would not occur were it not for the snow environment. With-

out woody surroundings no collectivity could develop a wood-employing technique or possess wood products as part of its anthropic system. A primary consideration here for the detailed student of anthropic phenomena is the fact that environmental features in their essential details must be present in order to serve as stimuli for the activities of the individual members of the collectivities. For instance, inventions, in one of their aspects at least, depend upon the presence of environmental factors which not only suggest reactions of a certain type but have a potent influence upon the elaboration of any inventive development.

Here is another occasion to honor the inviolable precept of the social sciences, namely to occupy ourselves with actual details of the facts we study. In complying with this requirement of the logic of science we do not disregard certain conditions merely because they are not the sole causes of the occurrence of particular phenomena. It is undeniable that environmental influences in the form of specific objects and conditions, in conjunction with all the various other determiners, play an important rôle in shaping the anthropic complexes in every cultural system.

Psychological Conditions.—It is only natural to expect psychological factors to be of great significance as causes of cultural phenomena. For these types of determining influences are intimately involved with the persons who constitute the kernel of the anthropic system. In spite of the fact, however, that the whole anthropic system revolves around the psychological activities of the group, it is to be urged immediately that in no sense can the fortunes of cultural phenomena be attributed exclusively to the operation of psychological facts. Rather, psychological happenings coöperate with many other kinds of circumstances. No psychological process can take place without the environmental circumstances that constitute the basis for the stimuli functions which provoke action. And it is inconceivable that the stim-

uli functions can exist without connection with particular properties of objects, the existence of various geographic factors, besides raw materials, etc. Neither can psychological facts exist without tools, social organization, traditions, etc., which condition their occurrence.

The psychological influences upon anthropic phenomena may be divided into two types. First we may refer to the actual behavior of persons. Such activity consists of the wants, desires, imagination, habits, beliefs, loves, jealousies, and other action of individuals which function as the bases for cultural development and degeneration. Possibly these psychological factors condition primarily cultural elements of the more personal type, those, namely, touching the phenomena of patriotism, prejudices, ideals, craftsmanship and domestic relations. Such psychological conditions, however, need not be restricted in their operation to these particular features of civilization.

More potent than the behavior of persons as determiners of anthropic phenomena are psychological processes. To illustrate, the nature of a specific cultural system depends to some extent upon the process of habituation. Once individuals have built up a series of responses they become behavioristically inert. They are not susceptible to possible modifications in their institutions. Customs, laws, forms of thought or worship remain relatively fixed. The group as a whole may then become inhospitable to cultural borrowings from other groups. Again, the processes of intelligence may operate. When persons of certain collectivities acquire particular capacities or many capacities they become more efficient and as a consequence their civilization may take on a progressive aspect. The existence of inventive processes, the development of imaginative power and reasoning among persons of given communities undoubtedly make for an advanced form of civilization.

In similar fashion all the various psychological processes

involved in the acquisition of behavior equipments¹ have their share in the sway of cultural formation. We are really pointing out here the causal conditions residing in the principle of personality development. Since the acquisition of reaction systems makes individuals into particular types it necessarily has a powerful influence upon cultural events. To these primarily personal factors we must add the principles of social psychology. Here the process of culturalization, the development of cultural traits, stands supreme. The more successfully the culturalization processes operate the more static and conservative are the groups concerned.

Institutional Circumstances.²—The institutional character of any cultural unit presents us with a definite set of influences upon its civilizational system. Institutions we may regard as small scale trends of a cultural type, or as particularities manifesting the larger trends we have already treated. A favorite illustration of institutional influence upon cultural phenomena is found in the dominance of Aristotelian science in the Mediaeval and early modern intellectual periods. It is thought that established Aristotelian institutions have prevented the development of newer scientific ideas and principles. As a matter of fact even if the solid foundation of an intellectual or scientific institution does not wholly prevent newer ideas from coming into existence it at least hinders the rapidity with which they come to prevail.

When we pass to inventions the ease and rapidity with which they are made are owing to the existence or non-existence of institutions of an intellectual or mechanical sort which favor or deter their development. In an anthropic system in which institutions of cheapness and commonness are strongly intrenched there is no call for the invention of fine things or laborious processes for producing them.

¹ For nature of behavior equipment, see Chapter VI.

² We are referring here of course to sociological and not psychological institutions.

In the domain of art, it is well appreciated how the prior establishment of institutions, in the form of technical manners and modes, prevents the advent of new techniques and styles. Hence the constant railing at academic traditions and their blighting influence upon spontaneity and free expression among the younger artists. Similarly, in the field of language the frequent references made to pedants and other conservators of use and wont indicate the general appreciation of the influence of rigid rules of speech and spelling as stable institutions.

Institutions of dress and manners offer us an abundance of illustrative conditions influencing the acceleration of cultural changes. The field of fashion in complex societies is completely dominated by institutions of change. Garments must be periodically modified, in fact each season, and the shorter the season the more influential the institution. This accelerating type of institutional influence suggests that probably no institution functions exclusively as an inhibiting condition. Possibly every institutional establishment serves two functions, namely, to inhibit the development of certain anthropic phenomena, and to promote others. Certain types of institutions, however, may be regarded as primarily inhibitors, as in the case of church institutions. Indeed clothes and church institutions might be cited as examples of the two extremes. The former as we have indicated are responsible for rapidly changing circumstances prevailing in a society. The latter make for the immobility and rigidity of mores as exemplified in the preservation of Latin, Hebrew, and old Slavonic as the languages employed in church ritual, although they have no other living function in the particular society harboring them. Institutions of the church variety may cause various practices having no function or significance to persist in the life of a collectivity.

Human Conditions.—Many influences upon cultural phenomena especially in more complex societies, are traceable

to human conditions. Under this term we include economic and political circumstances. These we may regard as more ephemeral human situations than we discussed under the heading of life conditions. The present influences constitute in a sense the immediate status of the group. For instance, the particular political and economic circumstances of a community at some specific time may stimulate or favor the encouragement of scientific work, the establishment of institutions of learning, and in other ways serve as the direct or indirect causes of various anthropic conditions. In similar fashion the social and moral circumstances of a group promote or retard the development of science, art, and intelligence among populations. An excellent illustration is found in the influence of religious life of the mediaeval community favoring the building of cathedrals and the development of religious art. Again, wherever there are good roads, rapid means of transportation, cheap and abundant newspapers, there are means for the dissemination of knowledge, principles and practices of various arts, the borrowing of ideas and objects, the spread of customs, etc. It is notorious, too, how the industrial conditions of a cultural collectivity accelerate the development of inventions connected with industrial processes. Again, to observe the styles in literary and dramatic products is to note how temporal human conditions influence the cultural life of a community. From time to time as conditions change, novels and dramas are based upon specific problems, the freedom of women, the dangers of venereal diseases, the servility of labor, etc. It is hardly necessary to add that such ephemeral life conditions probably influence more the primarily temporal aspects of culture. But it is really impossible to draw such fine lines as to enable us to say that the influence here does not extend to all the phases of anthropic existence.

In concluding our discussion of the conditions for the origin and maintenance of anthropic elements we must not neglect

to suggest the interrelation of the various causal conditions. We should be yielding to the simplifying temptation if we overlooked the conjoint operation of these influencing factors. Life conditions alone, without mutual interconnection with psychological and other facts, do not account for the existence of linguistic, religious, or law traditions. Rather, all of these institutions and cultural elements are modified and developed through the instrumentality and influence of an intermixture of such causal or conditioning factors.

Let us look too to the relative place of the psychological and environmental factors. If the kind of cultural objects which exist in a group are the products of psychological actions, these actions can only be regarded as responses to certain raw materials existing in that group's environment. Again, the skill and craft capacities of the individuals concerned are directly dependent upon the amount of stimulation by both natural and cultural objects. Obviously, then, both psychological and environmental facts are mutually necessary as conditioning factors of civilization. This point may be generalized for all of the conditions of anthropic happenings.

Our survey further indicates the need to analyze any anthropic situation into a series of interrelated facts each of which must be investigated by those versed in the study of such happenings. The description of the phenomena involved must represent therefore a synthetic statement composed of the various contributing propositions of specialized investigators. Such a synthetic interpretation of anthropic happenings might prevent scholars from assuming that in an adjoining science to their own there are ultimate explanations of certain facts. For example, a philologist in pointing out the presence of linguistic patterns as isolating, inflectional, agglutinative, etc., remarks that for the ultimate explanation of this morphology the psychologist must be held responsible. The fact is, however, that the psychological aspects of the cultural situation are also specific empirical conditions. The synthetic

statement therefore constitutes the organization of all the naturalistic factors, and the exclusion of ultimates whether innocent abstractions or metaphysical absolutes.

THE QUALITY AND IMPROVEMENT OF ANTHROPIC SYSTEMS

It is common observation that as a rule persons regard their own culture as the best and most valuable. Upon reflection we find, of course, that conditions could hardly be otherwise. To live with individuals who act in a certain way and to be constantly in contact with particular kinds of objects brings about an intimacy which, when brought to articulation, constitutes ipso-facto a judgment of high evaluation and unqualified approval.

The certainty of one's opinion concerning one's own anthropic system naturally depends upon a person's range of contact with other civilizations. The fewer contacts with different groups the surer one is of the importance and value of one's own. Assuredly a person who has not seen other social organizations, techniques, and manners of life can no more have a criterion of comparison than he can possess knowledge of other cultural systems. His own culture therefore is not only best so far as his attitude is concerned, but it is the only one really having any existence for him. When persons have only a very limited acquaintance with culture they cannot have any valid judgments, to say nothing of being openminded or rational. Who would think of asking a Sunday school class who had never heard of Buddah, or Mohammed, how these religious figures compare with Christ?

That judgments entertained by those not acquainted with cultures are not worthy of consideration is obvious. But unfortunately the opinions of those most favorably situated are frequently not much more valid. For even here various psychological conditions influence the value of one's judgments. It is almost impossible to overcome the prejudices

developed with the early acquisition of tastes, preferences, and cognitive intimacies through an invariable association with one's own institutions. Everyone is familiar with the claims made by Europeans concerning the absolute superiority of the Western over the Eastern civilizations, claims which are exactly duplicated by the attitudes of the Easterners with respect to the Occidentals. Most remarkable it is that even ethnologists participate in such expressions of judgments of civilizational superiority. For instance, anthropologists are actually willing to ascribe superiority to Nordic civilizations over other Occidental types. When all the white cultures are taken *en masse* then there seems to be no limit to the confidence expressed in the superiority of such civilizations. This view may or may not be coupled with the idea that such superiorities are the inevitable results of a race factor. The question arises, therefore, how to satisfy the conflict between the different judgments of approval. Certainly not all the cultures asserted to be the best (a circumstance which includes them all respectively) can possibly be the most superior. Especially is this true when we observe how widely varied are the different civilizations. Is a militant form of culture superior to a pacific one, a republican to an imperialistic one? Or can we decide the comparative merits of a civilization in which male ascendancy is prevalent as over against one in which the female is predominant?

The staggering problem here is the discovery of a touchstone upon which to make our evaluation. Such a criterion perhaps can be found in the possibilities which anthropic systems contain for the adaptability or welfare of the individuals concerned, or of the group as a whole. Immediately we are assured by the facts in the case that probably each anthropic system is best for its own collectivity and human circumstances. Without doubt the simple and crude civilization of the Eskimos taken as a whole is quite as well adapted to their own circumstances as the French ethnic system is to its

conditions. Surely those who live under one set of circumstances may not underrate the civilization of the other group, for no culture can be as good for the life conditions of another community as it is for the community in which it is actually found. In short, no culture can prove serviceable in the adaptation of human beings unless it is built up under and adapted to a particular set of conditions. Now since these situations always change as we move from community to community, no two cultures can be equally adapted to a certain complex of human situations. Does it not appear futile then to ask the question as to which civilization is superior?

Our comparison of cultures *in situ* does not preclude the possibility that some elements in a particular cultural system could profitably be incorporated in another group's civilization. But would such a transfer of cultural elements always go in one direction? Decidedly not, although some statistical preponderance of borrowings might be conceived to exist. But even if this should turn out to be the case on the basis of a rigid adaptation criterion we have shifted our problem from complete anthropic systems to cultural specificities.

Unfortunately, for those who must evaluate culture, the entire foundation for making value judgments concerning the comparative qualities of civilizations stands upon a sandy foundation. Are all the elements of a cultural system or the cultural systems themselves adaptation phenomena? Clearly the cultural life of a community is not exclusively bound up with maintenance and environmental adaptations. We can hardly conceive of religion, especially when differentiated from magic, as being intimately involved with maintenance circumstances. In the field of art and ornamentation the anthropic elements are still farther removed from any immediate adaptive purposes. We have already mentioned the erroneous assumption that even the most primitive collectivities are primarily occupied with activities which are motivated by sheer biological existence. When we turn to cul-

tural groups of any degree of complexity we find a preponderant series of anthropic factors which are many levels removed from simple adaptive conditions. It follows then that we must have aesthetic, intellectual and other criteria in addition to the test of usefulness.

We do not by any means intend to imply that it is impossible to have a standard of cultural value and perfection. It is not. For example, it is entirely feasible, with the present cultural materials to draw upon, to select specimens of the best tools, art works, social organizations, etc., and combine them into a cultural system better than any which prevails. But the obvious artificial manipulations involved in such a procedure prevent us from confusing such a utopian anthropic system with an actually existing culture. We realize that under actual human circumstances such a human situation could never be contrived. This possibility of logically organizing a superior anthropic system, may, however, be accepted as an inferential basis for drawing conclusions about cultures. But even here we must resist the temptation to base our preferences upon judgments derived from our own cultural surroundings.

Though he possess the best will in the world, the Oriental brought up to seek art in an intense spiritual calm, cannot be expected to accord the same value to the Venus de Milo, which an Occidental does. This is only one illustration which exemplifies the situation throughout every phase and feature of civilization. To what extent is it possible for the protagonist in the arena of modern practical life, where the amassing of material goods is at least the primary if not the sole end of being, to see clearly the merits of entirely different planes of existence? How can such a person weigh fairly the Greek pursuit of wisdom, perfection, and beauty, or the mediaeval aspiration toward supramundane values? And so our hypothetically perfect system could probably at best be perfect only for the perfector. Our speculation has sufficiently

served our purpose in reducing to an absurdity the search for best cultures so far as actual human circumstances are concerned.

As an example of the sort of predicament to be avoided in judging the value of a cultural system we may refer to a current misconception that substitutes complexity or novelty for superiority. Little reflection is required to make certain that neither of these qualities, whether the complication or increase of cultural elements or processes, or the adoption of new ones, actually makes the cultural system better than it has previously been. To refer to a modern example, what basis exists for saying that a cultural system has changed for the better, when a local industrial situation, in which individuals made required articles by hand out of available materials, is transformed into an enormously complex industrial system? What special merit is there in developing such a complex situation that raw materials available in certain places are transported for hundreds and even thousands of miles to another district to be manufactured into articles and then transported back to the original place where the raw material originated? Passing to another illustration, is a civilization improved when it becomes so complicated as to involve such enormous specialization of industrial processes that no craftsmen are needed, or when the multiplexity increases to the point of producing a wasteful irrelation between the selling and making of goods? Of course it must be noted that the type of economic process and social organization mentioned fits well into the industrial cultural system. But this merely means that a certain culture and its elements exist and not that it is superior or inferior.

One more point. Even if we confine our evaluation to particular subdivisions of a single cultural system it is still difficult to measure their significance. In the first place, by what means could one arrange in a scale of values the different activities and objects of a civilization? Are scientific pursuits

more valuable than artistic activities? Is scientific knowledge more important than art? Again, is the science or art of a civilization more valuable than the daily practices of ordinary life? Naturally any attempt to make such judgments involves comparable factors in each series. That is to say, the best practices of ordinary life must be matched with the best art and so forth.

Let us push this point a little farther. Subdivide our anthropic system into as small units as possible, we cannot judge any such fraction of culture as a whole, but must go down to very minute instances. Succinctly stated, there is no artistic division of a culture which is not replete with inartistic elements. There is no scientific department of any culture which is not gorged with fallacies and obscurantisms.¹ And this suggestion holds as well for every other cultural division. Certainly the domains of science and art are no exceptions to the general rule that we must inevitably go back to particular workers and specific products. This being the case we have another obstacle in the pathway of those who attempt to measure the relative significance or value of anthropic systems.

Our conclusion, then, reduces itself to the fact that it is only particular civilizational elements which are subject to any genuine qualitative evaluation. Furthermore, these qualitative evaluations are based upon numerous criteria each fitting into its own particular place. Some criteria are derived from the adaptability of the individuals using the cultural elements; others are founded on the aesthetic, economic, and logical qualities of the civilizational factors. And in every case these various criteria must only be employed insofar as they are actually serviceable in comparing civilizational ele-

¹ Think only of how mathematical methods and results have been magicized, and unwittingly made into cloaks of ignorance and shrouds for the most errant nonsense.

ments with respect to the actual human conditions under which they are found.

Concerning the improvement of an anthropic system this contingency is always to be regarded as feasible. The need for such emendation can be discovered in the circumstances of the given system from the standpoint of the members of the collectivity, or from a comparison of different systems. Here, too, in every instance the genuine improvement of a civilization refers only to some of its elements. Such actual advancements we frequently observe among groups on the basis of the interchange or borrowing of specific anthropic elements.

RELATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND CIVILIZATION

As the concluding topic in our survey of the anthropic background of social psychology we may glance at some problems concerning the relations existing between individuals and civilization. This aspect of the cultural perspective is of especial importance to the psychologist. For the issues involved bring to the front a number of facts concerning the character of psychological phenomena and their general place in the scheme of civilization. We isolate, for our purpose, three distinct problems. So thoroughly interrelated are they, however, that we may quite appropriately regard them as merely three phases of the same problem.

The first is the problem of social destiny. Here the emphasis is upon the origin and changes in civilization. Those who believe in social destiny look upon civilization as a closed system. It is an absolute entity which exists independently of the power and influences of human beings. Civilization is thus regarded as a set of superorganic phenomena beyond the facts of biology, psychology, or the concrete happenings of human life. As to the relation of man to civilization, he is merely a feature of specific anthropic systems carried along

in a stream with other objects, but with no effective resistance against or influence upon the general current.

The proponents of this conception naturally base their doctrine upon those anthropic facts which appear to minimize the power of individuals. For instance, they argue that there is nothing in the biological nature of man to determine what sort of civilization should exist, nor to condition what types of society he shall belong to. There is not, in other words, any racial basis of civilization. From a psychological standpoint they indicate that an individual is powerless to develop a language, but has one imposed upon him by his civilizational system. Without knowing anything of grammar he uses certain words, in a certain order, and in general without his consent or knowledge has thrust upon him a linguistic civilization. Similarly, it is declared that inventions are forced upon people by the exigencies of cultural life and cannot be brought into existence by individuals. As support for these propositions the fact is adduced that many individuals always have a part in inventions or in the general development of new things. Accordingly novel civilizational developments are regarded as inevitable in human affairs without reference to specific persons. In the same way it is declared that man is at the mercy of every aspect of his civilization and must accept the art standards, tastes and judgments of his time, the ideas and sciences of his group, and the religion and manners of his society.

Those who oppose the conception of social destiny rest their case upon the fact that after all, all inventions, changes in languages and religion, progress in art and manners must in the final analysis originate with and be carried out by individuals. As a particular case, the opponents of cultural destiny say that scientific ideas are definitely influenced by persons. Indeed it is only shortsight that leads to an undervaluation of the rôle played by politicians of the scientific domain in affecting the scientific fashions of a particular

group. In point of fact, such persons with their use of coöperative enterprises, propaganda, as well as other methods, decidedly influence the course of scientific thinking. Are not the manners and customs of a society modified by the advertising campaigns of persons carried out for their own purposes? These examples typify conditions in every department of civilization. Changes in the musical or other artistic life of people, with the possible development of new cultural tendencies, are frequently furthered by cliques, personal intrigues, and other deliberate influences. It is of course admitted that the efforts of persons in changing civilization frequently are abetted by war conditions, industrial, political and commercial circumstances. But these it is retorted are not forces entirely independent of human individuals. And certainly they cannot be regarded as forces of social destiny.

A more popular version of the social destiny theory concerns the events localized within political and historical circumstances. The upholders of the doctrine say that historical facts roll on without any interference of individuals. Heroes or the great figures of history are believed to arise at particular moments in the current of affairs of a particular group, but are considered as playing their part only insofar as such a course of human circumstances permits, after which they drop out of the field. It is further indicated how great figures always have supports in other individuals, who themselves have sources of power located in inevitable, political, economic, social and military circumstances. In general it is asserted that historical events like languages, religions and art have a power within them in complete disregard of the desires or choice of individuals,

The champions of the hero theory on the other hand, stress the power and force resident in an individual enabling him to direct the course of human events. The great figures in history, the political heroes, dictators, diplomats, liberators,

and other striking personalities are regarded as sources of genuine determiners of the destinies of nations.

There seems to be no doubt that both the proponents and opponents of the social destiny theory have considerable truth on their respective sides. But it seems equally clear that both sets of contenders magnify their facts into forces and also assume sharp divisions to exist in human circumstances. Thus, certain factual elements are not only overstressed but are made into empty absolutes. The entire basis for the controversy concerning social destiny lies in a process of fallacious abstraction. Why put a hypothetical individual over against a purely conceptual group or civilization? No science is really concerned with such things. Besides, the collectivities to which individuals belong are actually numbered by the thousands. There is in fact no such thing as a single group either in complex or more simple civilizations. Thus there really is no one group or specific civilization to set over against the individual.

Possibly the motive for developing these abstractions is traceable to a desire to explain and evaluate human phenomena at one stroke. On the one hand, the anthropologist, inclined toward mass phenomena and historical units, will interpret all human events as factors in a civilization existing beyond the specific actions of persons. Ethnologists with psychological interests, on the other hand, demand an explanation of human phenomena in terms of the behavior of persons to the neglect of the larger social factors. If this is the case, the question arises as to how valid such explanations can be. Nothing is more certain than that one cannot explain concrete things by abstractions. And surely the only realities in the field of social phenomena are specific happenings.

On the side of the individual there are no facts over and above the actual details of psychological, sociological and biological events. So far as society is concerned we may agree that culture is a closed system, but this means only

for example that the totality of civilizational conditions can not be explained in terms of the behavior of persons. Also to be considered are the environmental circumstances, the presence or absence of plants, animals, metals, streams, etc. By all means must we accord the slow development of cultural objects and process throughout generations a distinct place in civilization. Thus, given individuals are born into closed anthropic systems. But this does not mean that the actions of persons have no counter effect upon their civilization. We suggest then that all the data in the field of the human sciences should be explained in terms of concrete facts rather than in terms of any form of empty abstractions.

Our second problem concerns the question of the submergence of a person in his civilization. Here the psychological implications emerge somewhat more definitely, for at this point are stressed the source of origin of mentality development and of general human qualities. The question is asked, can individuals in any sense develop independently of their anthropic systems? Or to go still farther, can an individual be superior to his community in matters of intelligence, moral thought and conduct, or aesthetic appreciation and creation?

On the whole it is quite true that individuals acquire their civilizational qualities as members of particular groups. From the standpoint of an infant it is beyond question that the group enjoys a prior existence. It is granted, too, that when the infant is born into a society he must adapt himself to it by developing certain necessary qualities before he can take his place among his fellow participants in the community. Certain it is that if we consider the number of group phenomena that are set over against the individual, collectivities must be regarded as gigantic factors in human circumstances. So far then the person is pretty well submerged in his groups.

Nevertheless there are omnipresent opposing facts. Can not individuals in the course of their domestication develop

contrary traits of thought and action? Protestants of all types and those who renounce the ordinary modes of living are in no wise to be dismissed as spurious manifestations of culture. With respect to intellectual matters it is obvious that persons may develop knowledge and capacities which not only represent an emancipation from the trammels of society but also signalize the transcendence of the group level. Are there not even in the simplest societies strong individualists, persons who stand out of their groups in knowledge and capacities and even in opposition to the community? In our own complex civilizations there are numerous examples to illustrate this situation. Intellectual history records many cases in which persons have been infinitely superior to their human surroundings. An instructive example is that of Cavendish who according to his biographer, sat calmly by with knowledge gained from his scientific experiments, watching the hopeless stumbling of his scientific confrères into error after error. Though it is a fact that an individual cannot be entirely separated from his human surroundings, who shall deny that persons can develop capacities which contradict the theory of the absolute domination of the individual by society as a whole, or by particular collectivities?

That individuals can develop independent traits is immediately apparent from a consideration of the details of psychological processes. Once we concern ourselves with the particularities of human societies we discover many conditions making it possible for objects, actions, and other civilizational elements to affect individuals differently. Thus they can build up traits of action which are to a great extent unique from the standpoint of the mass. Also contacts with persons and objects from different societies enable a person to acquire progressively different reactions than are ordinarily found in a particular collectivity. Such variations in behavior are not limited to subtle activities called attitudes, knowledge, or reasoning processes, but include all types of practices. Ac-

cordingly individuals can develop idiosyncratic action of all types. Perhaps in most cases the individual really shares such independent traits with small groups such as families or schools, but whether he does or not a total submergence of persons in societies is nowise an absolute condition.

Our third problem is concerned with the "organic whole," or an attempt to account for the sources of civilizational qualities. The question emphasized is in what way do groups and individuals contribute to each others' development. It is to be observed at once that the very formulation of this problem indicates a rejection of either society or the individual as the sole source of social phenomena. This amounts to a compromise viewpoint.

The sponsors of the "organic whole" doctrine assert that civilizations and individuals are constantly reciprocating in their action upon each other. Individuals are presumed to be the sources of many forms of innate powers which are developed through the action upon them of the society in which they live. After innate characteristics are developed into social traits, they exert influences upon and transform the phenomena of civilization.

Now it occurs to the writer that a compromise position, when it brings together two unacceptable views, can be no more useful than the separate doctrines. The "organic whole" theory represents an abstracting process which results in the creating of two explanatory entities, a substantive society on the one hand, and an absolute person on the other. Both of these abstractions together, no more than each separately, can give us any satisfactory picture of the relations of persons and civilizations.

Yet, there is after all something to be said in approval of this compromise position, for it does undoubtedly suggest the constant interaction that goes on during the mutual conditioning of persons and the groups in which they live. The "organic whole" problem requires, then, only to be emended so that both

men and cultures are regarded as very specific things and events.

On the side of the individual. Instead of assuming that the person, when he is born into a society consists of a congeries of sheer civilizational possibilities, we regard him as a factor in a complex series of human developments. First, the person comes into the world as a biological organism continuing the life of certain members of a definite species—a species that has evolved to the point of being civilized animals as all human beings are. Thus occupying a given place on the biological scale, the organism is prepared to become civilized. The process of civilization is the acquisition, through contacts with cultural objects, of language, beliefs, ideas, and the achievement of the capacity to perform all other activities of social beings. Moreover, as we have already suggested, the organism can develop capacities which may result in the modification of his social system.

On the side of civilization. Let us substitute for an abstract society a system of objects, institutions, and persons each of which constitutes a development in the long life of individuals in their succeeding generations. Civilizational objects, when they are farthest removed from biological phenomena, are physical objects shaped and organized through the activities of psychological organisms. No phase of civilization is then beyond biological and psychological levels of existence, except the sheerest raw materials of cultural objects, or ultimate biological structures and functions of man, and the flora and fauna of his surroundings. On the other hand, probably most of the constituents of civilization include human actions, the organizations of persons, techniques, and other products which exist quite upon a psychological level. On the whole, it would appear therefore that the nature and development of the anthropic qualities of man and society may both be sought in an elaborate series of very specific human events.

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CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL BEHAVIOR AS PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

For the study of social conduct no perspective is more important than the psychological background. It is exceedingly essential, therefore, to have a correct notion as to the nature of psychological facts.

In placing cultural activities in their proper psychological setting we need to observe at the outset that the science of psychology at the present time is undergoing a series of transformations. These changes amount to no less than a revolution in our conceptions concerning the nature of mental life. Psychology is attempting at last to free itself from many of the traditional theories that have served in an exceedingly unfortunate way to obscure our understanding of psychological happenings. Briefly, psychology has for some time been receding from commerce with "psychic" states and has developed an objective method of interpretation of its data.

Since we have already found it necessary to refer to some of the characteristics of psychological phenomena our present aim is merely to stress the points which have not yet been emphasized. We turn then to a brief statement of the general character of objective psychology.

THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Objective¹ psychology has for its data nothing but the con-

¹ The term objective as used here refers to organismic psychology as developed in Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, 1924-26.

crete interaction of psychological organisms with the actual objects with which they are in contact. These objects interact with organisms by stimulating them to action. Here we have a type of interaction that in every sense parallels the interaction of objects as they are studied in any natural science. As a matter of fact, in specific instances psychological data are merely types of facts built upon and developed from observations of exactly the same events which provide data for some of the other natural sciences. To illustrate, we observe a person kicking a ball. This event may be studied (1) as a physical fact, the interaction of objects, namely the person and the ball, (2) as a biological fact, or the operation of irritable and conductive tissues (person) when mechanically stimulated by something (ball) and (3) as the psychological fact of a person responding to (by placing where it belongs) some object which has the property of stimulating certain action.

The physical scientist handles the event on the basis of a formula of equivalence of forces. He considers the two interacting objects each as composed of definite physico-chemical organizations having various effects upon each other when they come into contact. All of this is in terms of masses and velocities.

The biologist, on the other hand, studies the same event in a different way. He takes account of the diverse and peculiar organization of one of the two interacting things. He observes that the event happens differently than when the two objects are both of the type of organization studied by the physical scientist. For example, because the reacting organism is capable of growing and storing up energy, it performs a type of activity which may be described as irritability; that is to say, its responses are entirely out of proportion to the influence upon it of the other object. Instead of this event constituting an instance of the equivalent operation of forces it may be described as the response of one object to the other.

A further investigation of the reacting object from the biological standpoint elicits the fact that its irritability constitutes a specific series of movements depending upon its structural organization. In plain terms, what the reacting object does, is contingent upon its anatomical and physiological organization. Thus its activities are constant in their operation. The function of the stimulating object is merely to call out in each instance a specific biological (anatomical and physiological) response based upon definite mechanisms. In short, the stimulus object puts the mechanisms or reactions into play.

Turning now to the observation of the event from the psychological standpoint we find that the activity is always especially adapted to the particular stimulating situation. In other words, the action is decidedly differential. Not only does the organism very definitely discriminate between objects on the basis of their natural properties, but the form of its reaction is also determined by the fact that the object which elicits the response does so because of the organism's previous experience with it. In other words, the psychological response depends upon the individual's historical and biographical relationship with objects. In detail this means that the reacting organism has built up what we may call behavior or reactional equipment; so that what the individual has previously acquired as types of action are now performed.

The historical nature of psychological phenomena is clearly revealed in considering the case of language. Notice, that my ability to speak the kind of language I use, and to refer linguistically to things, events, and persons, depends upon my previous historical relationship with such things. All the facts of language as psychological phenomena are the result of my acquiring psychological responses to specific stimuli objects and conditions.

On the side of the stimuli we have explained several times that in the historical interaction of the individual with objects, the latter take on what we call stimulatory functions.

Correlative with the individual's development of behavior equipment the object is endowed with stimulatory capacities. The ball is kickable (may now be kicked), rollable, throwable,¹ etc. These functions operate to arouse the correlated behavior equipment of kicking, etc. It is possible now for the reacting organism to perform a large number of particular activities with respect to objects corresponding with the exact historical experience that the person has had with them.

The question as to what type of response or which of the individual's numerous reaction equipments will operate at any particular time, depends upon a number of circumstances. It is contingent to a great extent upon the surroundings in which the object is found. To take a language example again, what I say out of all the things that I might say, depends upon the regard I have for social proprieties and upon the consideration of my advantages and disadvantages, etc. Further, whether I say anything or not is possibly the result of being at the same time in contact with other objects to which I might perform preferential responses. Instead of speaking, I may do any one of a number of different acts. The particular reactions I have acquired and perform at any time are further conditioned by my biological and hygienic conditions at the moment.

The absolutely essential point here is that we have an uncompromising naturalistic description of psychological facts. In psychology as in the physical and biological divisions of study, we merely describe what occurs. Just as in the physical sciences we say that the equivalent interaction of bodies is owing to physico-chemical properties, and, as in the biological field we call the metabolic, contractile and irritable actions, biological properties, so, in the case of psychological

¹ These objects as natural (non-humanistic) objects have of course always had these properties, or as humanistic objects are produced in such a way as to have them, but not from the standpoint of a newly acting organism.

facts we designate what happens as events attributable to the psychological properties of organisms. The properties here too are really generalizations concerning the actual differential conduct of organisms with respect to stimuli objects.¹ Each of these orders of facts are genuine and autonomous. So far as the objects are concerned that perform the actions they may be considered as placed upon a single line made up of points, each representing elements in an ascending series of complexities. The inorganic object constitutes, of course, the simplest in the series, and the complicated psychological organism the most complex, with protoplasmic structures fitting into a middle position between the two.

The studies of organismic psychology begin and end with the actual observable interactions between organisms and the objects stimulating them to act. Speculation as to how or why such phenomena should exist is hardly in order but it may be suggested that the general origin of psychological phenomena be looked for in the complicated evolution of animals. Certainly one cannot explain the existence of psychological activity by merely pointing to the presence of a brain or even the total complex nervous apparatus. A basis for psychological phenomena must be sought in nothing less than the complete evolution of the entire organism and its historical contact with environmental circumstances.

SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS OF ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY

One of the first conclusions derived from an objective and naturalistic description of psychological events is that no mind-body problem is involved at any point. This is, however, not a mere neglect to consider the issue. In reality there never has been any necessity to look upon a psychological organism as a body or a biological mechanism to which is

¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the psychological properties, called differentiation, variability, modifiability, cf. Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, ch. I.

somehow attached psychic or spiritual powers controlling or accompanying its activities. This entire mind-body problem, with its ostensible supports in physiological or neurological data, was never based upon actual observations, but represents a sheer traditional interpretation fostered by cultural attitudes.

We are convinced of this when we devote our attention to the general development of psychological science. For at every point we find that its scientific conceptions are influenced by cultural phenomena. A study of scientific history warrants the assumption that if psychology had continued the development forecasted in the psychological interpretations of the Greeks, it would have entirely avoided that phase of its historical evolution which is bound up with the mentalistic viewpoint, namely, that the psychologist deals with intangible elements or processes, somehow connected with the tangible elements of the biological organism. This conception owes its origin to the fact that psychology was developed under the auspices of the occult attitudes of the Orient rather than the rationalistic ideas of the Greeks. Organismic psychology accordingly stands for the complete extrusion of all conceptions of parallelism and interactionism. The only factual basis that has ever existed for these conceptions reduces to the circumstance that every act of a psychological individual is at the same time the behavior of a biological organism, namely the functioning of certain structures.

From the standpoint of a strictly objective psychology the two features of an event demanded by science as the interacting constituents of a fact, are the actual psychological individual, an animal or human being on the one hand, and the stimulus object, whether a physical thing, an animal or person, on the other. Essentially, this objective position is founded upon the notion that whenever any form of psychological action occurs, whether it be crude or subtle, there is a complete and total operation of the animal organism. The differences in responses are due in particular to the functions of

the stimulus situations and in general to the adaptation predicament. Naturally in some cases the organism's responses are more clearly in evidence but this merely constitutes an accidental fact of ease of observation. The investigation of psychological phenomena, therefore, is limited to the observation and inferential study of the details of the reciprocal actions of organisms and stimuli objects, and in addition the history of such interactions.

In the interest of scientific orientation we urge that even within the field of psychological studies it is sometimes necessary for practical purposes to regard the biological components of a response as operating by themselves. Especially is this the case if the need arises to work out correlations of events when abnormalities and malfunctioning of responses are being investigated. Such an isolation of factors from a total situation is entirely comparable with the detaching of detailed physico-chemical reactions from the inclusive digestive process. We must never lose sight of the fact that such descriptions of events are merely distinctions in description which involve what is frequently an entirely logical separation and neglect of other indispensable features of the total happening. To keep this fact alive means that we will never inject into our psychological interpretations any sort of animatistic forces or powers. In detail we will not regard ideas, intelligence, or memory as psychic forces correlated with the operation of neurons or any other feature of the anatomical organism. It is such reifications of subtle behavior which have led to the unscientific doctrines of psychic causes and determiners presumed to operate in human conduct.

For the benefit of those who may find an objective science of psychology a difficult creed we must insist that our naturalistic attitude toward psychological phenomena in no sense leads us to exclude from the field any actual facts or events that actually occur therein. We are not overlooking a single phenomenon, no matter how subtle its operation or how in-

discernible its performance. The naturalistic viewpoint of psychology does not exclude the most refined desires, the heights of passion or anguish, the most intricate inventive processes nor the deepest speculations in which persons indulge. On the contrary, it is only such an objective and naturalistic psychology that can give such phenomena the descriptive and interpretative handling they require.

THE REACTIONAL BIOGRAPHY

One of the most fundamental conceptions of objective psychology is that of reactional biography. We recall that this conception refers to the individual's actual development of behavior. Since only responses are psychological facts every element of psychological science is developed in the person's progressive contacts with objects and situations. These interactions constitute his reactional history or biography. When reactions are simple the development occurs in a momentary fashion without much effort or expenditure of time. The more complicated responses on the other hand, develop under very different conditions. That an action can occur at any particular moment means that it has a reactional background in the previous contacts of the individual with the present stimulatory circumstances.

The conception of reactional biography likewise serves as an excellent tool for the study of individual differences. It is precisely in different reactional biographies that we discover the basis for the psychological uniqueness of every person no matter how similar he may be to other individuals biologically. In the same way we learn what are the actual psychological circumstances involved in a person becoming a part of various human groups.

When we ask how it happens that this person can make things while another cannot, or why that individual reads when such action is impossible for someone else, there is no other

explanation than that found in the different circumstances of the reactional biographies of the respective individuals. That one individual performs reading activities is so because he developed a system of responses including the mere perceptual discrimination of letters or words, and the acquisition of the referential responses involved in connecting the words with the objects to which they refer. Our reading illustration carries over to all psychological phenomena. For every specific psychological fact goes back to a similar origin. We may further assert that the perfectibility or expertness of reactions are likewise contingent upon the reactional biography of the acting organism. In this case the question is not so much sheer contact with things, but rather the number and success of the contacts.

Since one's reactional biography is clearly a matter of development psychological phenomena are therefore in no sense absolute or predestined. Each specific element has its own naturalistic origin and evolution. Every fact of psychology is dependent for its existence upon the multitude of actual circumstances through which it has come into existence. These circumstances go back to the very earliest developments of the acting organism, and continue to the particular time and place circumstances in which the responses eventuate. Thus, we may consider the reactional biography in its totality as a series of levels each superimposed upon the preceding one.

A good illustration is the planning of a structure by an architect. Present abilities and performances go back to proximate preceding situations in which similar plans were drawn for comparable buildings, a level which is itself based upon the apprentice period in which only partial plans were worked upon. The latter may be traced farther down to the training period of the architectural school level, which is in turn founded upon the stage of elementary drawing and appreciation of various objects. These suggestions serve merely to remind us of the infinite series of circumstances which

have had a part in the inception and evolution of every particular psychological fact. While it is always easier to assume intangible states and processes rather than to attempt to recover the multiplexity of details which have preceded the existence of some psychological happening, it is only the latter method which gives us the sort of information which is considered acceptable in any other science.

Our discussion has emphasized primarily those features of the reactional biography of organisms which have been most favorable to the development of psychological behavior, but we must not fail to take account also of unfavorable circumstances which hinder or prevent an individual's performance of psychological conduct. Lack of necessary or desirable abilities with the consequent failure of the person to perform appropriate actions, have their causal conditions likewise located in the circumstances of the individual's reactional history.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONALITY

Whenever the organism performs particular reactions to things these responses not only constitute immediate events but they may reoccur in the future contacts with these things. Every organism accordingly develops during the course of its reactional history a complement of specific reaction systems which we call the personality equipment. This behavior equipment, as potential responses capable of being actualized into movements, postures, attitudes, speech, or thought, constitutes the psychological personality.

Since the individual never ceases to have contacts with objects and conditions, his personality equipment is in never-ceasing process of development. Hence he is constantly acquiring new ways of responding to surrounding things. Those activities which are not repeated and which do not comprise constant performances do not become part of the person's equipment. Without doubt, this personality develop-

ment begins as early as the later stages of the intrauterine life of the individual. In that period the organism acquires some of the simpler modes of differential sensitivity to things, which we have indicated under the heading of universal responses. Immediately after birth the organism's contact with his surroundings are simple enough to continue the development of these universal forms of responses which are characterized mainly by the biological nature of the individual and the natural properties of objects.

As soon, however, as the organism becomes more mature and biologically mobile enough to enter into and change its relations with respect to objects, it develops behavior equipment of the type we have called basic. Such reactional acquisitions are in part cultural and non-cultural. With the continuation of the individual's maturation, the more specifically idiosyncratic and contingent activities are performed, and thus he adds to his behavior equipment more complex and personal types of action.

The different movements, postures, and attitudes of the organism can be organized into a series of types of psychological conduct. These may be named maintenance responses, skills, knowledge, abilities, tastes, intelligence, manners, thinking, and so on. To complete such a catalogue of reactional equipments or behavior traits means to mention every type of response which we may expect any given person to perform.

Since the personality equipment of an individual depends so rigidly upon his reactional biography the similarity or dissimilarity of psychological personalities is a result of the commonness or uncommonness of their behavior experiences. Thus, through the homogeneity of certain features of the lives of all human organisms, all personalities have some personality elements in common. But for the most part each personality is decidedly different from every other one. For not only are different individuals in contact with different things and diverse features of the same things, but they interact with these

stimuli objects and conditions at different times. These circumstances make possible many variations in personality development, even with a fairly similar set of general surroundings.

Similarities of surroundings comprise not merely the environs consisting of natural objects but cultural objects and social situations as well. Aside from the commonness in natural surroundings of persons the basis for most of the human similarities of traits are attributable to the inevitable organization of individuals into specific groups. Here of course we have a different type of homogeneity of personality. In the non-cultural situation personality similarities comprise only very simple activities and there are no barriers between individuals from the most remote places on earth. With respect to the cultural situation, however, the commonness has a limited extent, marked by the boundaries of a specific collectivity.

PERSONALITY AND ORIGINAL NATURE

An objective psychological study makes plain that personality does not include any factor ordinarily referred to as original nature. If we can only accept as observable facts the acquisition and later performance of responses to stimuli there is no place left for predetermined personality traits. We must quite frankly assert that this original nature is an occult conception. It goes back to the attitude that at the basis of human mind or action there is some sort of metaphysical substance or process. Whether one means by original nature a transcendental self or spirit or a unified consciousness there is always a reference to something totally dissociated from any observable fact. At least one may be referring to a verbal metaphor in the fashion of the "spirit of the time" or a "gift of the gods." When we confine our studies to actual responses to stimuli there is no room at all for such a notion.

It must be admitted of course that many of those who are

inclined toward the conception of original nature mean only potentialities resident in the biological organization of individuals. Such a suggestion is not unreasonable, but as we have shown in the chapter on biological implications, such potentialities are exceedingly limited. So meagre indeed are the biological possibilities here that they cannot even suggest an original endowment of definite ways of acting culturally. We have no recourse but to agree that traits and characteristics of any particular personality are a function in a mathematical sense of the particular events and situations connected with a person's reactional history.

Besides biological potentiality we may add another suggestion for the meaning of original nature. By this term one might refer to the successively preceding stages of a person's personality equipment. Since at any given moment a person's equipment may be traced back to a previous reactional status, we may from the standpoint of his present development refer to this previous behavior equipment as his original nature. As we have already pointed out from the time that the individual emerges from his status of a sheer biological organism in his earliest infancy, his personality consists of cumulatively developing levels of psychological activities. We may say if we like that these cumulative developments take place as a hierarchal series of natures.

PERSONALITY TYPES

Personality is inevitably a matter of behavior. We may well expect, therefore, that even personalities which in the final analysis are entirely unlike each other, may have so much equipment in common that they incline toward types.

Generally speaking, the personalities that develop in particular anthropic collectivities become typical of those groups. For instance, the individuals from some given community in their linguistic equipment, intellectual attitudes and beliefs,

resemble each other much more than they do individuals from other collectivities. Out of the innumerable personality types we mention as examples the primarily professional, occupational, logical or illogical, affective or non-affective, reserved and unreserved forms. Since the basis for the classification lies in the predominance of some particular form of reactional equipment, it is possible to have personality types of every variety.

Because we are dealing here with actual facts of behavior it is evident that these classes are not absolute forms but may shift and change according to the restricting and expanding experiences of the individuals concerned. How long, as a matter of fact, these typifications of personality perdure depends definitely upon the number of reaction systems involved and the length of time they have constituted a part of the individual's equipment. In other words, an individual who has many feminine traits and by force of social circumstances is constantly required to perform them will always be that type of person. An individual on the other hand, who has hardly become initiated in the legal profession when he leaves it, will not have strongly enough engrained in him the attitudes and language that mark the legal personality. On the whole, the idea of personality types must not be regarded as anything but a practical classifying procedure for very restricted purposes. Otherwise we are very liable to turn away from actual behavior phenomena to metaphysical abstractions.

THE BEHAVIOR SEGMENT

Probably the central feature of psychology as the study of natural and historical events is the behavior segment. A behavior segment constitutes the smallest descriptive unit of an organism's responses to a stimulus. It consists of two reciprocal actions. On the one hand, we have some sort of movement, posture, attitude, or secretion of the person or

organism, while on the other, appears the action of the stimulus object in eliciting the response. These two features of the behavior event are reciprocal in two senses. In the first place, the response and the stimulus-function are absolutely correlated. While as a rule the individual may be able to perform a large number of responses with respect to some particular object, every specific reaction consists of a very definite adjustment. Each response elicited by an object is absolutely commutual with one of its many stimuli functions. In the second place, the reciprocal character of the two events is a result of a previous historical connection between the organism and the object. This historical situation as we have seen accounts for the fact that the object can call out a specific response in an individual and at the same time explains why he performs a particular type of reaction to it. These two functions, namely, the individual's action and the function of the stimulus object are therefore reciprocal both in origin and actual operation.

As we may well expect, behavior segments are of all varieties. Individuals in their reactional biographies acquire innumerable types of responses to objects, while the objects in turn take on all sorts of stimulatory functions. A decidedly useful distinction marks off behavior segments as simple and complex. This division is made on the basis of how little or how much action may be included in one unit of psychological description. In some behavior segments the movements or postures of the individual are exceedingly simple; that is the individual does not perform much action to his stimulus object. A typical example is the reflex behavior segment which may consist of a single jerk of the hand away from some hot object. In other behavior segments the individual performs considerable action as a single adjustment. Whenever this occurs we can regard the reaction as itself composed of a number of units, though indivisibly interrelated in one single pattern of adjustment. In such cases the person

distinctly attends to some object, perceives it, and then performs a definitive response to it. The definitive act may be regarded as the final phase of the response pattern, while the preceding movements constitute the precurrent phases.

Besides the descriptive distinction of simple and complex behavior segments we may otherwise differentiate between such action units on the basis of the type of relationship between the individual and the objects to which they react. Some responses constitute immediate adaptation to objects, as in our reflex example; or the reactions may be delayed in their final operation as in the case of memory. Still other distinctions may be made on the basis of whether the response is an informational, knowledge, or a performative reaction, or whether the behavior segments are intelligent and rational adjustments or unwitting and unintelligent adaptations to things.

Correlated with these various modes of action are the differences in the way stimuli objects operate. Sometimes they function directly, such as when one is pricked by a pin which calls out an immediate reaction on the basis of this simple stimulatory contact. Or objects operate by substitution; for instance, this hat reminds me of some other one with which I have had some sort of previous experience. A more complicated example of this type of substitutional function is the stimulating effect of objects that elicit imaginative and inventive activities. Indeed the stimuli functions residing in our own organisms and their functions are probably among the most direct that we find.

While obviously we cannot assume that all the details of even the simplest psychological act are known or can be described, we may still confidently assert that the behavior segment exhausts the entire series of features of a psychological happening. In other words, we cannot admit into our psychological descriptions any mysterious processes which might be added to the responses of the organism or to the stimulus

object. Organismic psychology stands squarely against any conception of an unknowable mental or spiritual process which is manifested either in the general behavior of organisms, or through the workings of the nervous system.

THE REACTION SYSTEM

In furtherance of our exposition of an objective psychological science we may describe in a little more detail the nature of a psychological action. Our procedure here constitutes merely an attempt to single out the factors of the simplest unit of behavior which we call a reaction system.

For practical purposes we may analyze every response into a series of components such as muscle action, gland action, bone action, neural functioning, discriminating, attending, and the excitedness or pleasingness of the organisms' contact with a stimulus, and so on.¹

Because of the differences in the character of reaction systems some of their factors are more emphasized than others. In crude movements glandular and muscular elements seem to play the more prominent rôle. When we remember, think, or reflect, however, such gross features are on the surface not so obvious. In these cases the attending and discriminating components are easily observed either in one's own or some other person's action. The more subtle components on the other hand, one can observe better in oneself than in others. No question, however, exists but that each component of the reaction system is in operation whenever the organism meets with any kind of object which elicits a response from him.

Serviceable distinctions between reaction systems may be made upon the basis of their time of origin, their duration as components of the personality equipment, and their observability while being performed. Reaction systems which occur

¹ For a comprehensive analysis of a response cf. Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Ch. 2.

very early in the lifetime of organisms we refer to as primary. Some of the most simple systems, such as the reflex reaction systems, are based to a large extent upon the individual's biological organization. Accordingly when simple contacts with objects first occur reflex reaction systems are organized early and without any elaborate development. These types of activities are also persistent. On the other hand, there are many types of reaction systems which the individual acquires under specific stimulatory circumstances and which he may perform frequently over a period of time, but which finally disappear, never again to be part of the individual's reactional equipment.

As we have already implied in the discussion of stimuli objects some reaction systems function while the individual is in overt connection with objects, while others operate implicitly, that is, are performed in the absence of the original objects to which they have been developed. In this case they are elicited through substitute stimuli. Many of these implicit responses are inapparent to the observer, and hence may be looked upon as hidden movements or actions. It is also possible that the individual who performs the reactions may not himself know that he is performing them. This is obviously true of course for overt reaction systems as well as implicit ones.

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

Our study of the reactional biography and personality has made it sufficiently plain that the existence of psychological facts is dependent upon very specific influencing circumstances. We may reiterate once more that these influences are found only to a very slight extent in the biological make-up of persons. Considerably more importance must be accorded to stimuli circumstances. But by far the most significant in-

fluences upon psychological behavior are found in the anthropic conditions of persons. Let us consider a few of the general effects of such conditioning factors.

(1) In the first place, these conditions result in the origination of all types and qualities of psychological personality. Human individuals living under different circumstances develop different types of mentality. Thus we find individuals responding to many things in a mystical and supernatural way as compared with persons of other groups. Other variations occur in belief, knowledge, inventiveness, speech, and so on. Now despite the difficulties encountered in choosing standards for human conduct we may regard some behavior as superior to others. Aesthetic conduct may be more or less artistic, and logical action more or less rational.

The rôle of anthropic circumstances in conditioning types of action may be illustrated by a concrete example. Certain tribes of Eskimos possess a superior skill in sewing absolutely water tight boots out of skins. Can we look to any other source of this intelligence than the stimulation found in the life conditions and cultural traditions of the Eskimos? The existence of inventive capacities and practices of all sorts may be attributed exclusively to just such circumstances. In fact, it is such skills, capacities, among other actions that constitute psychological phenomena. Were such conditions as we have been indicating lacking for the development of these behavior traits, they would not occur.

(2) Next we may examine the loss or disappearance of psychological capacities and traits through changes of human circumstances. When arts disappear and conventions are destroyed the mentality connected with such human factors drops out also. An illuminating example is the loss of the general intelligence of artisanship which resulted from the introduction of machine processes. Formerly, the necessities which prompted the personal production of an article, with attendant knowledge of requisite material, and skill in crafts-

manship, gave origin to and supported much psychological behavior which today has vanished.

Concomitant with the origin, existence, and disappearance of psychological actions and traits are series of modifications in type of personality. For example, the anthropic complex which we may label the machine age, affords numerous possibilities and limitations of the kind discussed. Equipments are acquired which transform persons into self-reliant and self-confident individuals rather than the opposite. Again it is a machine age which inevitably produces increased inventive capacities.

In concluding this section we may be reminded that in the chapters on anthropic phenomena we have had occasion to indicate the influence of psychological processes upon anthropic processes. Here we take account of the counterbalancing influences of anthropic happenings on the development and disappearance of psychological events. It is apparent that human circumstances and psychological phenomena are mutually occurring and mutually influencing facts.

OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TESTS OF MENTALITY

Mental tests have for some time ceased to be the focal point of psychological interest. And yet it is most fitting that we should conclude our psychological perspective with a brief inquiry into this subject, since the problems of mental tests are very closely connected with the issues of social psychology.

Generally speaking, mental tests are associated with social psychological issues through the various uses made of the conception of innate mental capacity. For example, it is because of tests that social psychologists and other students of social phenomena retain their belief in the uniqueness of group mentality. There are psychologists and sociologists who still believe that mental tests demonstrate the absolute

inferiority of certain groups to others. So-called Alpines are presumed to be lower in native mental capacity than the *soi-disant* Nordics. Even those who abjure this belief still cling to the notion that mental tests show the absolute superiority of white to negro mentality.

Again, those anthropologists who reject the notions of superiority just mentioned still think that by means of mental tests they can study the problems of racial (really cultural) mentality, especially by way of discovering whether or not there are pure races.

Into our present purview mental tests enter because certain sociologists believe that they comprise the tools by means of which scientists have finally established the truth of Aristotle's political theory that some men are born to rule others.

Now while these various assumptions concerning tests are couched in sociological and ethnic terms, it is obvious that they are readily translatable into the question whether members of psychological collectivities are endowed with certain types of innate mental qualities. The question is, do mental tests really measure innate mentality? For the psychologist the problem cuts still deeper. It reaches down to whether mentality is something in the nature of an internal force or whether it comprises responses to stimuli. In a sense the inquiry into mental testing constitutes a crucial test of objective psychology. Let us determine then what are mental tests and what they measure.

Possibly we can best pursue our inquiry by glancing briefly at the origin of the test movement. For the beginnings of the present tradition we must go back to the work of Galton. He it was who, living very close to the sources and developments of the species-evolution movement, became interested in applying those conceptions to the human organism. Galton, a supreme philanthropist, and at the same time a rational religionist who believed that man should look upon himself as possessing a power to shape the course of humanity, de-

sired to improve the human race. Accordingly, he attempted to isolate specific characteristics of individuals in order to control their lines of descent. From his work may be dated the most serious attempt toward what has become universally known as eugenics.

Galton, of course, lived in a mentalistic age. It is obvious, then, that he could not but believe that mentality, or what we call the reactional character of persons, consists of qualities of the individual. By qualities he understood traits of organisms analogous to their biological qualities, namely species characteristics. In consequence, he accepted as hereditary such qualities as moral awareness, gregariousness, coyness and caprice, criminal traits, madness, etc.

The psychological implications here are extremely clear. Because Galton, as well as other psychologists of the time, was heavily laboring under the weight of the dualistic tradition, he attempted to place in parallel columns what was regarded on the one hand as hereditary intellectual and moral faculties, and on the other, physical or bodily traits.

The Galtonian science of psychometrics did not develop very far. And the reason possibly was that it failed to show expected results. According to the prevalent evolutionary conception at that time it was assumed that persons of so-called civilized and uncivilized groups possessed different grades of mentality. Galton's tests, which consisted of such determinations as visual and auditory acuity, failed, however, to differentiate between persons from these two groups. Mental tests seemed to promise nothing concerning differences in mentality.

A new beginning of the test movement arose with Binet who was interested in the learning problem of school children. Binet devised a series of tests to discover the character of native intelligence. These tests ranged from merely pointing to the nose, mouth and other organs, to definition and the discovery of absurdities in statements. It was these alleged

measures of native mentality in the form of intelligence which took the psychological world by storm.

Now obviously the testing in both phases of the test movement consists of having persons perform responses to various questions or other stimuli. Mentality expressed as intelligence, capacity, capabilities or abilities are however presumed to be some force aside from the performances. Clearly, these forces are gratuitous assumptions. Words such as qualities and traits help out here to propagate the conception of manifested powers. Performances are confused with abilities or powers which are thought to be shown in the performance but yet are not the performances.

As we have already intimated psychologists have shifted their ground considerably under the stress of critical bombardment, but the changes in position are mostly verbal. For example, testers do not like to admit that they test pure intelligence, but insist rather that through statistical methods they are able to infer native capacity. But such thinking still retains occult faculties, considering that what is tested is still presumed not to be acquired. For otherwise how can one preserve the distinction between capacity or abilities, and achievement, which is practically always done?

Again, testers have retreated from the statement that the tests measure native intelligence, toward the position that intelligence means merely what the tests test. Were this a sincere move all would be well. For then tests would merely be supposed to measure responses or performances which obviously must be developed. No taint of occult mentality would be involved in this conception, but, unfortunately, those who make this statement still believe in general intelligence or capacities undetermined by specific things or tasks. Along with such native capacities they may or may not harbor in their thinking about testing systems, specific innate abilities. The occult character of unacquired special abilities is of course on a par with that of the more general capacities.

Genuinely to give up these mystic powers means that one eschews commerce with native genius, and with innate mental deficiency, or normality. Too many psychologists are convinced that tests have shown ultimate mental inferiority of negroes to enable us to regard mental testers as having actually renounced innate mental powers.

The various shifts and dodges with which the test literature is replete testify eloquently to the general recognition of the conceptual difficulties involved. We may refer then to the most favorite of these subterfuges, namely that those who wish to avoid the stigma of occultism turn to biological structures of the organism. In no sense is it permissible, however, to reduce intelligence, ability, or capacity to simple physiological functions. The disguise here is too thin. Whenever we speak of any actual fact and use the term capacity, ability or intelligence, we are referring to a complex action that varies absolutely with the things to which we react. Moreover, in our discussion of the biological bases or causes for psychological phenomena, we have sufficiently seen that to conceive of mentality in this fashion is a wholly gratuitous enterprise. Psychological phenomena even of the simplest and crudest sort, say reflexes, are not functions of biological structures; rather, they are acts of the organism.

May we repeat once more that the term mentality properly employed is nothing but a name for action, an action which is a very specific historical response developed in the reactional biography of the individual. The same conclusion we must come to, with respect to the terms ability, capacity, intelligence, etc.

Tests, therefore, as tools employed in objective psychology can be nothing more than stimuli to elicit responses or performances which the organism has acquired throughout his reactional biography. It is these acts of the organism as summing up its behavior equipment that exhaust all that one may properly speak of as mentality. Only through tests conceived

in this way can we deal with the factual materials that comprise all that we may legitimately regard as the person's behavior status, his intelligence, or his capabilities. To discover through tests the intricate behavior facts of a person it would seem that one would need to design them differently for each individual. Only in this way can the results be significant. One might, of course, be interested only in comparing persons so far as some given routine task is concerned. Group tests of this type may be easily contrived, and employed with satisfactory results.

Now just as in the case of non-cultural reactions we discover through tests the types of individual histories the person has had, so we may employ tests to reveal the kind of cultural conduct a person has acquired in the loci in which he has lived. By drawing up a series of test stimuli we may elicit to our complete satisfaction the nature of the cultural equipments the individual possesses and the sources from which they have been derived. This assumes that we can connect his responses with various collectivities. In every case of course we may expect that all the qualities or traits of mentality of the individual, in the sense of reactional equipments, are inextricably connected.

Before asking what applications can be made of tests for the solution of problems beyond the domain of cultural psychology, we must remind ourselves of some results obtained from our biological perspective. When we ask if tests can be devised to discover the inherent mental qualities or races we recall that anthropologists are unable to discover any such entity as distinct types of men to which the name race can be properly applied. Either because there is no such fact as race in the sense of a biological distinction between men, in other words, there is only one species of individuals however they may differ in their color and size, or because there is no such thing as an unmixed race, it is impossible for us to conceive of racial tests. It is futile to seek for distinct

types of original or ultimate mentality even if there were such things.

In view of the fact that psychological phenomena are all reactions developed by individuals in their reactional histories it is idle to design tests of ethnic mentality. Valid psychological tests can only be used to elicit responses developed by persons under cultural psychological circumstances, and not as members of national or ethnic groups as such. Moreover, all tests to test individuals from different psychological groups must be designed from the standpoint of their respective groups, for it has become transparent how fallacious it is to attempt to test an individual with tests constituting stimuli belonging to another cultural collectivity.

The participants in test controversies definitely reflect the influences upon their thinking of various cultural circumstances. In other words, the culturalization of the contenders definitely determine their arguments and mental test theories. We mention but one instance.

In brief, mental test controversies are thoroughly permeated with political preconceptions. On the one hand, test opponents accuse the testers of involving themselves with theological problems of predestination and infant damnation. This charge is entirely beside the point when applied to those workers who regard tests as stimuli tasks to elicit performances of some definite sort. But for those testers who harbor conceptions of occult powers and abilities the charge remains to be disproved.

On the other hand, testers accuse those who object to the doctrine of innate intelligence or ability, of confusing the political doctrine of equality with the psychological doctrine of equality. As a basis for this statement the testers point to the fact that persons actually are different. In this case the accusation against the anti-testers is beside the point, since no evidence is forthcoming that any inevitable psychological differences can be found in normal human individuals. No

one denies that individuals are different. The question is whether these variations represent differences in personality equipment developed through varying reactional biographies or are accounted for by ultimate differences in mental constitution, whatever that term may mean. Furthermore, the truth sometimes quoted by testers that an individual's psychological status cannot be changed after it is developed cannot be hurled against the test objector as a proof of inherent psychological inequality. For in the traditional doctrine of psychological habit formation it has always been recognized that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible to get rid of habits once formed.

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PART TWO

THE DATA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL RESPONSES

THE ISOLATION OF CULTURAL REACTIONS

Cultural reactions are not morphologically unique types of reaction systems. On the contrary, in their behavior forms they may be entirely similar to non-cultural responses.¹ For instance, I may perform a cultural reflex action which in all respects is like a typical universal response. To illustrate, when I throw my left hand out while stopping an automobile my action morphologically is exactly like throwing my hand out in attempting to avoid a missile. Furthermore, the morphological character of my idiosyncratic action of believing that this is good tobacco that I am smoking is the same as the morphological character of my cultural act of believing that a democracy is a good form of government. That is, as belief responses these two actions, when dissociated from their specific stimuli settings, differ little if at all. When we include their respective stimulatory conditions, however, the variation between them is tremendous.

Naturally, cultural reactions may vary from non-cultural responses as widely as praying activities differ from the performance of pain reflexes. But the primary distinction between these two types of activities is functional rather than morphological. In other words, it is the type of contact be-

¹ Every response, of course, is a singular act. Even what is conventionally regarded as the same act is never performed absolutely twice alike. We need only insist that between any two responses (whether cultural or non-cultural) to what we regard as the same stimulatory function there is a general adjustmental identity.

tween the person and the stimulus object which determines the form of response and not what the individual does as a biological mechanism. Tipping one's hat to a woman and to a man are morphologically equivalent performances. Culturally they are vastly different. Therefore, in spite of the fact that what the person does when performing a cultural reaction may be an exact duplicate of what happens when he performs a non-cultural response, the two adaptations as psychological facts vary enormously.

We recall that two types of criteria characterize cultural responses and mark them off sharply from other types of psychological behavior. In the first place, cultural reactions are stimulated by common or conventional stimuli (institutions). When such an institutional stimulus function is in operation it is quite independent of the natural properties of the stimulus object. It must be added, too, that the commonness of the stimulus function of a cultural object is not an accidental result of two or more persons reacting the same way to it. Rather, cultural stimuli have common functions because series of persons have endowed them with special properties.

In the second place, we mark off cultural from other responses because they are acquired through a culturalization process operating under specific group circumstances.

So far as non-cultural action is concerned my contact with the stimulus object results in a private and unique experience and the acquisition of a purely personal mode of conduct. If, as we have already shown, it is a universal type of action, the response developed depends upon the natural properties of the object and the biological characteristics of the individual,¹ plus some slight influence by the person's reactional biography pertaining to such situations and the particular circumstances of the moment. If the reaction is idiosyncratic,

¹ The development of conformity reaction equipment characterizes cultural responses more than their independence of biological conditions.

the types of development are much more closely connected with the person's intimate reactional history.

Contrariwise, my contact with a cultural stimulus or situation is quite different. In that case, the reactions I perform are owing to a definite cultural or social experience with the result that my behavior conforms to that of a particular set of persons. Why I have this reaction and why it operates is explained on the basis that I as a particular individual have acquired my behavior equipment under certain social or cultural auspices. These auspices in detail amount to the fact that the individuals with whom I live or have lived have in the course of contact with their surroundings built up specific types of behavior. Thus if I had been a German of 1913 I most likely would have possessed as part of my equipment the belief that a monarchy is the best form of government. How entirely natural, that is to say, how much a matter of interaction of persons and stimuli conditions, cultural conduct really is, we may observe from the fact that not all Germans had this belief as a part of their equipment. Nor do all Americans now believe that monarchy is the poorest form of government. What is true of this specific illustration is true of every cultural response. Here we have merely run into the fact that there are all sorts of cultural groups existing in any particular community and that these groups overlap and interpenetrate. Through contact with all of these varying cultural collectivities whether they be large or small, the individual acquires his equipment of national, sexual, racial, occupational and other group responses in what is always a natural and usually an imperceptible manner.

INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURAL REACTIONS

By way of more sharply defining cultural or social behavior as distinct psychological phenomena we may isolate a series of their characteristics or properties. These qualities

belong to them by virtue of their genetic development and specific operation within psychological behavior situations. But before proceeding with this catalogue, the student of cultural behavior must be warned that these descriptive characteristics are not absolute marks of differentiation between cultural and non-cultural responses. That is, these characteristics do not belong exclusively to cultural action nor are they qualities of every cultural response. Taken as a whole, however, they serve well as a descriptive summary.

Because of the large number and complexity of cultural reactions our enumeration of their characteristics must be based upon several different criteria.

(A) First, we may consider the descriptive qualities of cultural responses which arise from their restriction to and evolution in some particular group.

Cultural behavior is artificial.—They have no biological (survival), environmental (geological, geographical), humanistic (economic or social), or rational bases. Such artificiality is exceedingly well shown in considering what the person does by way of eating, dressing and sleeping. Here we see that the selection and presence of food, its preparation, method of eating, (the use of utensils, tableware) etc., have no necessary relation to one's biological needs, the ease of procuring food or any other elemental circumstance. Also the mode of dressing, selecting and preferring the kind, cut, and quality of clothes involve activities unrelated to natural phenomena.¹ Similarly, the activities performed in sheltering oneself appear just as close to blind tradition as they are far from the re-

¹ Though our speech is inexact it does not betray us. Nothing is more natural than the occurrence of cultural human events as they happen. Nor can any one declare that they should not occur. There is, however, no objection to drawing up a contrast between cultural and natural phenomena as we are doing in the interest of our description and interpretation. Let it be remarked, too, that the cultural variations from biological and other adaptations may be superior as well as inferior forms of action upon whatever standard we may choose our comparison.

quirements of natural adaptation. Nevertheless they are performed because they are culturally dictated.

What function as aesthetic reactions may not be aesthetic; rational actions may not be reasonable; economic responses not economically advantageous, industrial processes, tools and principles not mechanically sound, hygienic reactions not conducive to health, etc. Moreover, we cannot escape the observation that the more complex the civilization of the individual's community the more intensified is the artificiality of his cultural behavior. When we compare groups living close to nature, such as the more primitive Eskimos, Indians, and Australians, with the more complex Asiatic or European peoples we observe the increasing artificiality of the behavior of the latter. In fact there is a positive correlation between the existence of anthropic complexity and the performance of artificial psychological conduct.

It would be a false impression to assume the existence of any condition driving cultural conduct away from natural circumstances. Nor is it possible for cultural conduct to be absolutely opposed to all natural (biological for example) conditions. Nevertheless there is no mistaking the wide gulf between cultural behavior and natural events. The former go on with great disregard of natural circumstances, but always, we should insist, in close connection with particular facts and situations. Certainly we may safely assert at this point that cultural behavior follows the anthropic traditions more than the biological or geographical circumstances of animal existence.¹

When we turn to types of activity farther removed from natural life conditions, we find an even greater artificiality in

¹ The artificial characteristic of social behavior can be better observed against a background of the more intimate collectivities within an anthropic system, than against a large ethnic system. Not only are the former closer to psychological facts but they attain to a complexity of development which better illustrates humanistic conditions.

cultural conduct. Thus the beliefs, ideas, and imaginative behavior not directly connected with food, shelter, and clothing phenomena, take on the most unexpected and aberrant qualities from an ecological standpoint. What individuals believe and think as group members has absolutely no relationship to actual experiences. As long as stimuli are present to induce activities of this sort the behavior occurs with a remarkable indifference to actual adaptations to existing circumstances. Accordingly, among more primitive individuals we find all sorts of mystic behavior, while among more complex persons, beliefs and ideas exist concerning the nature of things and events, the way to cure diseases, the potency and virtues of rulers and popular leaders, methods of preventing sterility or fecundity, etc., all of which are absolutely incommensurable with actual phenomena.

We have already referred to the artificiality of cultural responses resident in the fact that the cultural stimuli functions of objects are incommensurable with their natural properties. This is the case whether such stimuli objects are natural things or human phenomena existing in the surroundings of the individual. Once more, cultural reactions are responses to attributed characteristics of things which sets of particular persons have bestowed upon them. Hence the general process of building up cultural conduct means the endowment of objects with properties which need have nothing to do with their actual or prior constitution. A political party and its governmental policies may be absolutely detrimental to the welfare of a political group, but this in no wise prevents the individuals of the community from developing a belief in their efficiency and perfectibility. Similarly artificial is the ascription of virtues to herbs, or potencies to stones and sticks. That these objects have no powers or qualities such as the cultural behavior presupposes, weighs nothing in comparison to the fact that a certain group of individuals has somehow originated this type of cultural conduct and carries it on.

Moreover, these cultural responses are independent of changes and transformations of whatever surroundings the individuals performing such behavior happen to be in.

No less artificial is our cultural conduct to contrived or fashioned objects. Is there any correlation between the actual character of the facial make-up of a young woman and the beauty which she believes to achieve thereby? Do the conventional stimulations of the facial mask have any necessary connection with genuine beauty?

Social behavior is accidental. From the foregoing we gather that it is quite possible for cultural responses to be accidentally originated. First, from the standpoint of the individual who performs the behavior, it is a sheer accident of being born into a particular community that determines whether he should wear trousers or skirts, cut his hair long or short, wear a beard or shave his face, eat oysters or abhor their sight. It is primarily in view of the many possibilities for acquiring one's cultural equipment that we call cultural behavior accidental, for ordinarily being born into a particular group is indeed no accident. On the other hand, how accidental one's social equipment may really be is gathered from the case of an emigrating family who finally lands in a different country than the one to which they originally intended going. All the members, and especially the future ones, may count as quite fortuitous the cultural personality equipment that they will acquire.

When we consider the cultural conduct belonging to smaller and more restricted groups such as occupational and professional collectivities, especially as we find them in the United States where classes and castes are still in the course of organization, the possession of particular cultural equipments looms up as quite a chance affair. The acquisition of social behavior such as various ideas, beliefs, and practices may be entirely the result of a combination of indifferent circumstances quite unpredictable in the case of any particular individual.

From the standpoint of any specific cultural action regarded as a particular form of psychological adjustment, we find the accidental character is owing to the indeterministic or multiple contribution of geographical, biological, psychological and human (economic and commercial) circumstances to its origin. To illustrate, why certain food is eaten or certain clothing is worn may be accounted for by the fact that these things belong to a cultural complex which has come to play a part in the cultural life of a set of persons. When a group takes over an object of dress or food it may also adopt the method of wearing the garment, or of preparing or eating the food. Ordinarily the borrowing of a cultural object means *ipso facto* taking over the name. When the object is derived from one of several possible groups it is quite accidental whether one or another name is used for it. It may be quite accidental, too, that a cultural element has been acquired from one group rather than from another. While it is the apothecary with his multiple system of synonyms who best observes the accidental performance of cultural naming reactions, the existence of numerous couples such as violin-fiddle amply illustrates the prevalence of this phenomenon. In general, the entire process of naming as a branch of the linguistic field richly illustrates the accidental character of cultural reactions.

It is quite apparent that when a person responds to an institutional object his action is determined by some chance circumstance connected with it. Stimulational properties inhere in objects perhaps because of some connection they may have with other things. When we attempt to account for our social conduct toward women we may well be perplexed by the question whether European women above the peasant groups possess the qualities of delicacy and refinement because of a segregation of the sexes or whether the segregation exists because of these qualities. Clearly we might decide either way. In each case, of course, the causal condition is not independent of numerous anthropic events.

And we know further that the number of these conditions is usually unlimited. It is this very multiplicity and indeterminateness of the conditions underlying the stimuli functions of objects that give our cultural conduct its accidental character. We regard it as a chance circumstance that aesthetic objects should carry with them particular economic cultural qualities and vice versa, and that intellectual objects are complicated with political or social characteristics when they are responded to by persons of particular cultural collectivities.

Cultural Reactions Are Historical and Continuative.
Social reactions may be aptly described as historical. However long or short the period that they exist such actions are performed for no other apparent reason than that no interruption has occurred in their continuity. The answer to the question why much of our cultural behavior exists or occurs as it does is simply that such things are done and moreover done in a particular way. Here we have behavior trends similar to the general cultural trends referred to in our anthropic survey. Certain things we eat at the beginning of a meal while others are only consumed at the end.

Doubtless the continuative character of the more permanent forms of cultural conduct may be traced back to the close connection existing between psychological and anthropic phenomena. Social conduct continues its existence as a factor in a total historical complex because certain things and circumstances persist in anthropic systems. Thus cultural responses, along with the anthropic systems in general, just descend with various changes from generation to generation. Without question there are thousands of beliefs, attitudes and ideas continuously performed because they cluster around persisting religious, political and social institutions.

When such historical conduct is thoroughly imbedded in the traditions of a certain ethnic community we can only assume that they have been derived from other similar types

of behavior far back in the lives of those communities. Hence we may say that cultural actions are performed only because they have occurred in the past. They are the heritage of individuals at a particular time just as they have been for former sets of persons.

Cultural Responses Are Arbitrary—By this we mean that they operate without the limits of fixed or accepted standards. That is to say, the performance of the actions themselves constitutes the standard no matter how much they conflict with other actions even in the same cultural system. On the one hand, we believe in political freedom, but on the other we condemn and suppress those who advocate diverse action. We value and pride ourselves upon our intelligence and education, and at the same time abhor novelty and discovery. Being otherwise rational individuals and knowing the dyshygienic risks of wearing exposing clothes in the winter or furs in the summer, our sartorial conformities still prevail upon us and we act in disregard of such knowledge.

Although violent anti-vivisectionists we are not necessarily pacific and may even glory in war and its butcheries. We may be the greatest egotists and utterly selfish but we do not spare ourselves when custom under the name of duty calls. We fight for democracy even when that really means the most oppressive despotism. This arbitrariness and inconsistency of conduct is not owing to ignorance of what we are doing, but is entirely a matter of acquiring certain cultural behavior traits and acting accordingly. Our action is simply dominated and conditioned by the institutional stimuli which our cultural background has forced upon us.

Such arbitrariness appears very striking even in the clash and conflict of responses in the same cultural system. Much more arbitrariness, however, is exhibited when we compare different social reactions to the same objects on the part of individuals belonging to different cultural groups. Whereas to read books may in some groups be considered as a mark

of distinction, in others it is regarded as a sheer waste of time. In both groups, however, there is the institution of self-improvement and of employing one's time well. In observing comparative cultural reactions to stimuli objects we always find a veritable riot of inconsistencies with respect to beliefs, attitudes, customs and other practices. These differences constitute the basis for members of different groups looking down upon and despising each other. The whole gamut of national, racial, or even professional prejudices provides a glaring example of arbitrary social conduct.

In many cases the comparative arbitrariness of cultural behavior results from its connection with other features of an anthropic system. Thus because the French anthropic system includes a two gender language, Frenchmen always respond to inanimate objects with a sex reference. Because Englishmen have a triple gender language they regard this activity as arbitrary.

The same kind of arbitrary reference is of course found in groups using a triple gender. A German when referring to a woman as it, or to a turnip as she, may look upon his behavior as quite capricious, and from the standpoint of his own cultural system, too. As in the other language example the present arbitrariness results from the connection of linguistic actions with either linguistic or non-linguistic institutions.

As a general principle arbitrariness of social conduct is based upon the fact that such behavior is merely grounded in a complex of human circumstances. Here we find no compliance with the exigencies of nature or the wisdom developed through experimentation and human contrivance. Our cultural responses are quite uninfluenced by the many experiences of our reactional history nor do they aid us in pursuing some goal or end.

Cultural Conduct Is Stable.—Despite the fact that cultural responses are artificial and arbitrary, they appear to be

inflexible. Probably because they are performed by a number of people they maintain a constant character.¹ Although as we shall see in another section, they are not in any sense immutable; they do maintain their form. Cultural activities appear to be independent of slight changes, and being distributed they keep their identity through repeated performance. Naturally the stability of cultural conduct is directly connected with its distribution, as instanced in the case of language. Accordingly, stability depends upon the generality of distribution, that is, upon the number of individuals participating in the performance. Thus when cultural conduct is distributed over a large number of individuals, such as ethnic or national groups, it is decidedly persistent.

Less stable in a degree are the activities which belong to smaller groups such as professional or occupational collectivities, but even some of these appear to have solid roots in the "nature of things." For example, the unreflecting lawyer who draws up legal instruments in a particular way cannot conceive of anyone questioning the appropriateness and necessity of doing it otherwise. Physicians who are not familiar with changes in the methods of diagnosis and treatment, but who proceed in accordance with their original learning, cannot but have the feeling that skills and techniques are absolute and immutable. This apparent fixity and irrevocable character of cultural performances are especially illustrated in the attitudes of pedagogues. No professionalized individual of any guild or academy escapes it. To the pedagogue especially, grammar is grammar and a lack of conformity in speech is an inexcusable liberty taken with the immutable order of things.

It is not surprising that the stability of cultural conduct

¹ This description of course applies equally to conventional behavior variation. To be original and different may be decidedly the fashion. Truly there is nothing so constant as change in behavior situations where innovation wears the crown.

creates marked differentiation between individuals. The rigidity of our own manner of behaving accounts for the strangeness of other ways of doing things. The stability of our conduct makes us suspicious of new activity. For the same reason we condemn the action of individuals from other groups as queer and eccentric. Thus even within a limited collectivity such as among scholars, new ideas which threaten to upset or displace old ones seem to possess unsatisfactory and disagreeable qualities because they suggest an interference with the inherent harmony of one's previous ideational conduct.¹

It might be added that the stability of cultural conduct varies not only with its distribution or the size of the group which performs such behavior, but also with its temporality. Naturally when cultural conduct is merely temporary, its stability is not so marked a quality. But behavior most limited in time, however, takes on absolute and rigid characteristics during the period of its performance. Accordingly it matters little how soon a certain fashion passes away since up to the time of such an eventuality, the rigor with which one abides by the dictates of this fashion, gives the action a sovereignty not to be ignored.

How stable certain cultural conduct becomes also depends upon the nature of its stimulus. The indefinite and pervasive character of ideas, beliefs, and other such stimuli lend considerable stability to social activity. Again, when the stimuli are subject to frequent changes, the stability of the reciprocal cultural responses is correspondingly curtailed.

Social Reactions Are Formal.—Since cultural responses are very frequently acquired as reactions to sociological institutions, many of them operate as definite and fixed response patterns. Moreover, such reactions in their morphological

¹ This situation simulates the resistance to change in one's idiosyncratic conduct, though here the disturbance is not in the stability of cultural behavior but in the authority and correctness of one's own reflection.

character may be exceedingly rigid. Especially is this the case when they involve the use of some kind of instrument or tool. An instance of this we find in the limitations set upon one's manner of eating, in the sense that certain things must be handled with a knife and others with a fork. The same formality applies to modes of dressing. Not only are particular garments worn but they are put on in certain ways, and at certain times. This formality and standardization of cultural conduct is especially exemplified in activities called customs. Practically all of our behavior, to which we may refer as the amenities and severities of social intercourse, consists of standard modes of adapting ourselves to persons and things.

As we move from group to group we observe that although actions differ they all have this formal and organized character. Here we must first be introduced before speaking. There the peasant takes off his cap upon entering a shop. Similar formalities in behavior pattern are displayed in all professional and occupational groups. Frequently the formality with which particular activities are performed are minutely though not deliberately prescribed by the group in which, such actions are found. Such enjoined usages extend to the most specific details of conduct resulting in a very rigid reactional format. At once one thinks of grammatical language behavior whether conforming to the grammar of the pedant or to group usage.

Cultural Responses Are Distributive.—Possibly the most typical characteristic of cultural conduct is that it is limited in range of distribution. Such a distribution means that a particular type of conduct is strictly confined to a set of given persons. This is the same thing as saying that by observing the various limitations of the occurrences of particular activities we may identify and organize distinct cultural behavior collectivities. Thus art, religious, and linguistic responses, though they may be ascribed to a great portion of

all human individuals are performed in various specific ways according to particular sets of persons.

To illustrate, granting that English is spoken by a certain percentage of the earth's population, we find that these English reactions are distributed among smaller and smaller units. Each of these reactional collectivities performs English language responses by using particular modes of English expression. Thus certain idioms and grammatical forms are distributed only among particular and limited dialectal groups. The only basis for the larger anthropic organizations lies in the existence of the English language institutions in a sociological or anthropical sense. .

The psychological group distribution of responses to cultural objects follows of course their anthropic distribution. In other words, the stimulations functions of anthropic institutions become different for different sets of people. For instance, the objects and ideas of the scientific community take on different stimulations properties for smaller divisions of the sociological group. Namely, the beliefs and practices with respect to scientific doctrine become more and more specialized.

It is only when these differences are minimized and the activities are made general and abstract that communal limitations fade out. And it is precisely in the degree that we permit this to occur that we leave the field of psychological happenings and occupy ourselves with statistical or anthropic phenomena. The only safe guide therefore for those who wish to keep close to the facts of psychological cultural conduct is to center their observations around the behavior of particular persons.

(B) A second series of descriptive traits of cultural responses may be isolated upon the basis of the influences of a collectivity upon the actions of persons.

Social Behavior Is Distinctive. By their cultural conduct individuals are distinguished as belonging to one group

rather than another. A person's speech, manners, and ideas stigmatize him as a member of a particular occupational unit, of an intellectual or non-intellectual community, of a linguistic-dialectal collectivity, etc. An enumeration of all the different cultural responses that the person performs affords information regarding all the groups in which he acquires social conduct.

Cultural Responses Are Powerful—The unmistakable strength and imperiousness which characterize cultural reactions are reminiscent of the manner and place in which they were developed. This point is obvious when the collectivity in which the person is building up his behavior corresponds to an ethnic or national group. Because language and manners are acquired as necessary participants in a certain community these cultural reactions possess a decided inevitability and strength. Cultural religious beliefs are notoriously impervious to the onslaught of logic or the influence of general experience. Magical beliefs and practices are powerful enough to resist any sort of an attack. Customs and manner reactions too are performed as though the person must act in this wise and no other. Such inevitability is not merely a passive characteristic resisting change and preventing opposition, but it gives the person's actions a decided trend and force.

Only slightly diminished in strength are cultural responses when they are not acquired under such inevitable auspices as the national or ethnic group. Even when one's social behavior is the result of belonging to professional or fraternal organizations, the traits acquired show a marked strength as compared with most of the activities developed on the basis of one's own experience with things.

Cultural Behavior Is Dominant—Because cultural conduct is shared it appears to dominate the individual's behavior-life. It determines to a great extent the kind of personality that he shall be. There is more involved here than a mere

tagging of the individual as a member of a certain series of collectivities. When one reacts culturally one's conduct is determined in the sense that one does what his group does rather than what circumstances require. Instead of independently acquiring tastes, manners, and beliefs, through his own experiences, the person is dominated in performing such actions by the influence of various psychological collectivities.

To be submerged by groups to the extent of taking on social habits, beliefs, language, manners, thought, etc., places great limitations upon the individual. He may be regarded as acting under compulsion, and with respect to complex activities without thought or deliberation. In view of the great number of cultural responses comprised in our behavior equipment the extent of the person's dominance is strikingly apparent. Whether we regard it to his advantage or disadvantage is another question.

(C) When we turn to the consideration of the influences which individuals exert upon cultural reactions, both while acquiring and performing them we discover a third descriptive basis for such responses. It is certain that the acquisition of cultural conduct by individuals is in no sense a passive process. Especially when persons already possess a particular type of cultural or even non-cultural equipment, the additional social conduct they acquire is accordingly influenced. In a sense the characteristics elicited upon the basis of this criterion display reverse descriptive features from those listed under the two criteria already discussed, and especially the latter.

Social Reactions Are Modifiable.—When a new member of a given collectivity acquires reactions he inevitably introduces certain specific changes in the quality of the responses. That is, if a stranger enters a psychological collectivity, either by birth or migration, the chances exist that the responses he will share with the older members will be slightly different from theirs. Indeed, in not a few cases the induction of such modifications are practically inevitable. Cultural be-

havior, therefore, no matter how fundamental in the life of the individual, nor how imperiously it operates when acquired, is subject to various modifications during the acquisitional process. Such alterations as occur, naturally develop over a period of time, and so on the whole, there is not at any particular moment any interference with the formality and continuity qualities of cultural behavior traits.

How these variations in cultural actions take place may be observed, for example, when the individual acquires his language behavior. When succeeding generations of persons are inducted into a language group they are responsible for some slight changes in the speech concerned. These variations may be exceedingly small or quite large. Every living language thus takes on different characteristics in the course of time. In this connection it may be observed how rapidly and markedly the French language has recently been changing.¹

Cultural Behavior Is Transient.—The cumulative effect of changes in cultural conduct over a long period of time suggests that social behavior is impermanent. Despite its rigorous patterning and formality, however, cultural action like all human phenomena is temporary and transient. In other words, it arises under definite conditions, undergoes a series of developments and then disappears. Although the name of the behavior and its general adjustmental circumstances may continue to exist, the specific response types go out of existence.

The permanency of behavior forms follows the constancy

¹ A recent writer declares that "Colloquial French is at present in a state of flux. Its vocabulary and pronunciation change imperceptibly from year to year, so that the spoken French of 1922 is in some respects a different language from that of 1890. Not since the middle of the seventeenth century have such rapid and important alterations taken place." Again he writes, "Certain letters which were pronounced half a century ago are sounded no longer. In this manner the very commonest words have been affected; one might say that two or three letters out of every hundred have disappeared in common speech." Cf. Cowley, *Literary Rev.*, July 1, 1922.

of the social institutions and the human circumstances involved. Accordingly, linguistic and religious behavior and in general conduct connected with ethnic, national or large group phenomena are more lasting. Behavior involving smaller collectivities and personal institutions are generally speaking more transient in character. Striking examples of the latter type are obviously fads, and styles. When institutions themselves shift and change, then the responses to them naturally do not long remain part of the person's equipment.

(D) Still another criterion for the isolation of cultural behavior characteristics may be discerned in the peculiar relationship which the individual sustains to the various collectivities during the process of acquiring cultural conduct. In this relation the person may be regarded as being operated upon by the collectivity.

Cultural Responses Are Imposed.—We are not exaggerating when we say that cultural responses are practically forced upon the individual by the various groups of which he is a component member. In other words, by virtue of being in a certain community it is determined that the individual shall acquire numerous cultural responses. For the most part there is nothing intentional on the side of the group. The person merely as a matter of course must respond in a manner consonant with the group's reactional conditions. Whatever compulsion exists may be entirely summed up in the necessity to build up certain equipment if the person is to have effective contact with other members of the same group. This situation is exceptionally easy to observe when the collectivities are large national or ethnic units, but it is demonstrated by smaller aggregations as well.

Cultural equipment may, however, be deliberately imposed upon persons. This is sometimes the case with national groups, the members of which insist that all participants of the community shall behave in a particular way. Sometimes this means merely an insistence upon outward conformity, as was

the case in the Greek and Roman communities with respect to religious observance, or it may be a demand for thorough similarity of action, as when governments attempt to control the thinking and believing of the individuals in the nation. The prescription may be overtly proclaimed or insidiously suggested.

Social Responses Are Unwittingly Acquired.—For the most part persons take on cultural behavior more or less automatically and without the knowledge that they are doing so. Reactions are simply acquired and performed. It is only when persons culturalized in a certain way come into contact with members of other groups that they discover that their behavior is distinctive and subject to comparison.

On the other hand, cultural reactions acquired in voluntary associations are not only wittingly but intentionally acquired, and sometimes not without the exertion of great effort.

(E) Finally we may characterize cultural responses as features of the personality equipment of the individual. At this point will emerge various comparisons between cultural and non-cultural reactions as components of the total behavior equipment of a given personality.

Disproportionate Number of Social Responses.—Relative to non-cultural activities cultural responses constitute the greatest number of psychological adaptations. It is not unlikely that perhaps nine-tenths or even more of our reactions consist of these arbitrary and accidental modes of adaptation which we acquire from the psychological groups in which we live.

The specific elements of our reactional equipments are proportioned according to the stimuli objects and situations with which we are in contact. Now it happens that because of the number of institutions about us and their effect upon our behavior we ordinarily respond to most objects and situations with cultural rather than non-cultural reactions. It is rare

for most persons, even in thinking behavior situations, to react idiosyncratically, or to display independence of action. And even when one's thinking behavior is not wholly conventional, it is for the most part still cultural. Since this is true of thinking responses which afford the greatest scope for uniqueness of contact with stimuli, the rest of one's reactions must be cultural in an overwhelming majority.

Confirmatory data are found also in the field of affective conduct. While we might well expect persons to build up idiosyncratic responses of pity, fear, admiration, and contempt, we find instead that affective attitudes are predominately cultural in character. Things and persons are responded to as institutions instead of as private surrounding objects. We conclude that on the whole then human behavior is disproportionately cultural, even when other conditions are possible.

Social Conduct Is Prominent and Important.—Since cultural responses overshadow all other types of behavior equipment they are more prominent and even appear to be more important than other types of reactions.

This importance, however, can only be ascribed to cultural conduct from specific standpoints. Certainly, as sheer conformity and conventional reactions, cultural behavior cannot compete in moment with idiosyncratic responses. But, unfortunately, the latter are not very common in the behavior of human individuals in general. For this reason cultural responses stand out more conspicuously and even seem more significant. Of a surety it is cultural reactions that on the whole distinguish individuals from each other, seeing that they cover more noticeable features of the individual's behavior life than any other types of action. For example, whether one is culturalized as a member of only one national or ethnic group or of several, his cultural activities comprise a better basis for distinguishing between him and other persons than any other behavior form, for each individual is a mem-

ber of numerous professional, religious, occupational, social, and other kinds of cultural psychological organizations.

CLASSIFICATION OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR

Our study of cultural phenomena surely carries with it the impression that cultural responses constitute an infinite array of specific activities. In view of this fact, some form of classification might add materially to our understanding of them.

But as always happens with facts so complex, their organization amounts to no less than a form of description. It is not as though the materials were all ready to hand for grouping and arranging. Thus the choice of a classificatory method presents us with almost insuperable difficulties. The data are too intricate to lend themselves to any sort of definite logical arrangement; they have too many facets to allow an orderly division on the basis of some obvious quality or character. We shall find it expedient therefore to organize the data of cultural conduct on the basis of a four-fold arrangement.

First, we separate off cultural responses from each other according to the type of anthropic or sociological group in which they operate. In this instance we take as the basis of our classification the group circumstances or auspices in which the actions arise and function. The question here is the derivation of the person's cultural actions. Is the behavior derived from a religious association, that is, from a collectivity of believers or unbelievers, from an intellectual or intelligent group, from an occupational unit, or from a linguistic community, etc. In each case, of course we are dealing with particular units of persons who share in the performance of certain actions. While we are referring here to ethnic and sociological organizations the emphasis is entirely upon the locus of the behavior, and not upon any ethnic, national, or geographical fact.

In the *second* place, we may classify cultural responses by throwing into relief the type of stimulation or institution which elicits them. Are they reactions to ideas, customs, laws, beliefs, or to other actions, or records and prescriptions of behavior? Or are the cultural responses made to objects (canoes, houses, trees); persons (chiefs, priests); and conditions (holidays or taboos), belonging to a specified aggregation of individuals? Not the type of group is now stressed but things which have taken on specific cultural stimulatory functions and which now call out responses of reverence, awe, intelligence, loyalty, skill, hate, disapproval, etc.

The type of psychological collectivity forms our *third* basis of classification. Since psychological units are merely persons who share in the performance of specific conventional responses we are really referring here to a kind of psychological equipment. These acts or equipments constitute very specialized ways of handling tools and weapons, knowing definite things, performing very specific types of moral belief and custom actions, in addition to thinking and attitudinizing in particular manners.

Our *fourth* classificatory foundation is erected upon the particular psychological forms of our cultural behavior. We have elsewhere made it clear that cultural responses may comprise every morphological form of action. Our present classifying basis is therefore designed to emphasize that cultural responses include every variety of reaction system that the individual performs. Accordingly we now question whether the response is an overt manipulation of some sort, or an implicit one distantly removed from the adjustment stimuli objects. The enumeration of the particular responses in this class therefore will include very fundamental and elementary activities, such as specific responses of eating, sexual activities, groaning, grieving, sighing, walking, singing, gesturing, as well as the most complicated forms involving subtle and inapparent reaction systems. Nor can this classi-

fication exclude the intricate reactions ordinarily referred to as talent and temperament, as well as feelings, dreamings, and imaginings. In brief, cultural conduct consists of all the types of actions represented by the categories of general psychology from reflexes up to the most intricate conceptual conduct.

Whenever we point to any one specific response as an illustration of cultural behavior we invariably find that it exemplifies each of the four features that we have mentioned as a basis of classification. This is obvious of course since each feature is only a selected aspect derived from a single complex datum. Nevertheless, it appears most expedient to emphasize the group auspices under which cultural responses arise, letting the other features fall naturally into place.

Since cultural responses occur in every possible type of human organization it turns out that the classification of actions according to the groups in which they are found amounts to the enumeration of all the human groups to which an individual belongs. This is an entirely superfluous if not an impossible enterprise. Our catalogue of classificatory groups must of necessity be exceedingly fragmentary but we trust carries a sufficient number of actions to be suggestive of the character of cultural behavior.

Ethnic Conduct.—Social psychologists have always been most impressed by ethnic data. Indeed, as we have indicated, the whole subject of social psychology began its history with observations of ethnic facts. Nothing is more obvious than the differences in the language, myths, manners and customs of different races or ethnic units. The human circumstances surrounding racial groups make it inevitable that the persons constituting these human organizations should act in unique ways. Our present task is to suggest illustrations of psychological collectivities developing in and existing under ethnic auspices. Religious collectivities are represented by persons performing Mohammedan, Buddhistic and Christian responses. Marriage, taboo and other custom collectivities as well as

linguistic ones, are suggested by the Eskimo, Japanese, Bushmen and Chinese ethnic environments. Naturally, the names may stand for actions performed by collectivities synonymous with the ethnic community or subordinate to it.

Cultural responses of the ethnic variety are not in any sense confined exclusively to linguistic, religious, and custom types. Besides these classes of action there are thinking, believing, striving, sex, and feeling responses which are shared by numbers of persons as definite organizations under ethnic auspices.

National Conduct.—National organizations of various sorts are also conducive to the development of common social behavior. According to the geographic, military, and administrative boundaries, different conventional responses are acquired. Religious, linguistic, and custom reactions have a place here as well as among the ethnic examples. Most prominent nationalistic behavior are patriotic acts and beliefs, and the innumerable loyalty reactions to rules, administrations, military leaders and national traditions.

Communal Conduct.—Within nations there always exist numerous specializations of sociological organizations, such as civic, tribal, and communal units. Within each of these are all sorts of psychological collectivities performing actions tending toward the maintenance and improvement of the things and conditions of the communities. Specific examples are competitive responses, reactions of grandeur, as well as acts of pride and prejudice.

Sex Behavior.—In complex cultural organizations at least the most striking and outstanding behavior distinguishes individuals as belonging to one or the other of the sexual groups. Indeed, the conduct of men and women vary tremendously in almost every department of activity. For instance, many objects acquire a differential linguistic stimulation and function for the male and female members respectively. Immediately we think, too, of all the differences in the kind of work, play, and intellectual conduct indulged in by men and women.

To enumerate some of the sex divergences which we find in our own society we may consider different religious behavior. It is a commonplace that women are more frequently in contact with religious institutions and also perform a larger number of responses of this sort. With regard to intellectual behavior the belief is well grounded that men are generally more logical than are the women of the collectivity. This difference points directly to the disparities in the daily activities of the male and female groups. In most cases the men of the community are more in contact with situations demanding stricter relationships with things. As a result, the personal conduct of men and women varies also. For instance, women are more concealed and retiring and in general more distantly removed from the burdens and conflicts of life.

Probably the most radical differences between the behavior of the sex groups are those involving actual sex conduct. Here the male is aggressive, bold, and takes the rôle of the pursuer, while in most cases, the female is coy, shy, and hesitant even to the point of shrinking from sex relationships. Equally informing instances of reactional variation are found in all the branches of the respective behavior of the two sex groups. Men are free-spoken with respect to the stories they may tell while women as a rule do not indulge in such liberties. Similarly, swearing is predominantly a masculine trait. So distinct, in fact, is the respective conduct of the male and female groups that they have different languages. In the first place, the vocabularies indicating contacts with environing things are different, while with respect to the same objects, women employ euphuisms and concealments of the actual object referred to. In short, woman's conduct is genteel, to the point where her delicacy of response leads to much blushing and considerable fainting in the presence of objects which stimulate men to approach and handle them in more effective ways.

Very instructive for the student of social psychology are the constant modifications in the relative behavior of the members

of sex groups. Because of the perpetual social, economic, and other changes taking place in society, we find the cultural behavior of men and women groups diverging more and more. Frequently they come very close together. Especially instructive are the various transferences of reactions from one sex group to another. For example, the cultivation of the arts in our own civilization is shifting from the male to the female group.

Occupational Reactions.—Occupational collectivities of all varieties constitute definite centers or loci for the development and operation of cultural behavior. Let us suggest the techniques of sailors, plumbers, bankers and agriculturalists, the skills of workers in stone, metal or other materials, as examples of such intrinsic occupational response conventions. The individuals belonging to all these occupational groups possess in addition special linguistic equipments not shared by outsiders; they likewise acquire specific intelligence activities correlated with their unique object institutions. Nor does occupational membership fail to confer upon the individual's behavior, traits of an ideational sort in the form of beliefs and ideas. These distinguish his occupational equipment from the rest of his behavior make-up and at the same time mark him off from the individuals of another group. Familiar illustrations are the particular superstitious reactions of sailors and gamblers and the mythological attitudes of husbandmen.

Sport and Play Groups.—No individual is without specific behavior equipments that symbolize his participation in sport and play groups. From contact with the institutions of these units he acquires distinct shared play behavior. Not only does he perform particular conduct in the form of skills, knacks, etc., which are characteristic of each specific group, but also language, ideational, and aesthetic reactions. Golf players, fishermen, horsemen, athletes and hunters have common technical behavior entirely different from each other as members of specific sport collectivities. Their individual

equipments, however, comprise also distinct admiration and worship responses to play and sport institutions as well as numerous aesthetic reactions. The group auspices for these activities constitute definite subdivisions of practically all anthropic systems. It is quite clear then that these play and sport social groups possess a status and distinctness equal to the national and political collectivities which are all too frequently regarded as the exclusive reactional associations.

Linguistic Conduct.—We have already referred to numerous types of conventional linguistic reactions. We may add then that because language responses are among the most common and typical forms of human behavior, particular kinds of language acts are performed by persons as participants in every form of psychological organization. Linguistic organizations themselves must be regarded as loci for institutions stimulating the development and performance of distinct varieties of cultural responses. Among these cultural reactions are the infinitude of pronunciation, vocabulary, stress, intonation, word order and other purely linguistic acts. But these do not exhaust the conventional reactions sponsored by linguistic associations. Here arise many common modes of social thinking, intellectual attitudes, etc.; induced by the existence of various linguistic customs and other institutions. Perhaps these suggestions will suffice to point to the great influence of language upon social conduct.

Religious Conduct.—Religious associations as the environment of religious institutions make place for a tremendous array of specific cultural conduct. Because of the solid establishment of innumerable religious phenomena in practically all human societies such conventional responses are extremely prominent in marking off persons as members of psychological collectivities. No one is exempt from the performance of many positive or negative religious activities in common with other individuals. Accordingly, religious convictions, beliefs, attitudes and practices partake of every variety of pattern

correlating with the many types of atheistic, theistic, and deistic institutions.

Conspicuous cultural religious conduct comprises a wide variety of intellectual attitudes and speculative activities. These are closely intertwined with religious creeds and their establishment, as well as involved in disproving the value of the beliefs of others and the existence of objects stimulating such convictions. Ideas and practices having to do with the institution of salvation, with prayers, and pilgrimages are very frequently striking behavior forms and in many cases dominate the complete behavior lives of individuals of given groups. In addition to all these religious behavior equipments are the customary practices of sacrificing, feasting and fasting, connected with church and ecclesiastical hierarchies. All of these types of cultural responses amount to a tremendous percentage of the reactional experiences of individuals, especially when we consider the influence upon other cultural activities of religious behavior. Here we refer to the particular forms which educational, scientific, political, and custom behavior take on because of a religious influence.

Aesthetic Behavior.—The field of aesthetic behavior though ordinarily a restricted type of activity, sums up in its aggregate a great mass of specific conventional restrictions. Aesthetic responses are after all distributed throughout the behavior equipments of all persons. Everybody has aesthetic tastes and interests though they may be unknown as such. It follows then that these aesthetic reactions are for most people purely cultural. Idiosyncratic aesthetic responses are comparatively rare.

Probably the most outstanding types of aesthetic behavior are those which divide off persons who are interested in natural and created types of beauty from those who are not. By virtue of reacting in these opposite ways, persons constitute members of different types of psychological collectivities. Within the more distinctly aesthetic groups we find all sorts

of different types of appreciative and creative acts. According to the particular aesthetic dictates of one's group one develops and practices many techniques along with the discrimination and enjoyment of musical, pictorial, dramatic and other species of beauty.

Illustrative of the contrasts in aesthetic cultural activities is the breach between the Oriental taste for the ethereal and refined forms of beauty and the Occidental delight in what the Oriental calls fleshy and mundane. How numerous the aesthetic activities are within any acknowledged aesthetic group is illustrated by the existence of all types of conventions and schools. In painting, one thinks of the many differences in tastes, appreciation, and constructive techniques marking off the various members of the expressionistic, impressionistic, futuristic and classical groups. The details of these schools offer intimations as to the different color, composition, and drawing institutions among others, around which the schools are organized.

In the vocal arts, different cultural activities exemplify various modes of singing, phrasing, enunciating, etc. The use of consonant and dissonant sounds illustrates the variety of institutions found among different musical collectivities. When we consider the large interpenetration of the aesthetic and religious phases of civilization, at once a whole host of varying aesthetic behavior conventions is suggested.

Intellectual Behavior.—The behavior aspects of intellectual life provide many classes of cultural conduct. Every complex anthropic unit is replete with numerous intellectual associations harboring intellectual psychological collectivities. Just as in the case of aesthetic conduct so in the intellectual field the outstanding groups are the intellectual and non-intellectual associations. Of the former we may regard the members of different philosophical schools as the most extreme types. Then there are simpler and more common intellectual collectivities, reading clubs, groups of people interested in

geography, travel, birds, etc. In each of these sets people build up as parts of their cultural personality equipment, certain ideas, notions, knowledge, suppositions and intellectual attitudes. Naturally these intellectual communities are divided and subdivided into more particular groups in which specific institutions are developed and certain behavior equipments organized. While the so-called technical intellectual behavior of the philosopher and scientist is the easiest to refer to, our greatest source of conventional intellectual activity must be looked for among everyday circumstances where opinions, attitudes, and assumptions are performed.

Temperamental Activity.—Among the most subtle conventional responses are temperamental reactions. Naturally the most easily observed are those responses developed under ethnic or national auspices. There is no mistaking the Oriental and Occidental temperaments. But conventional temperamental responses are not limited to collectivities and connected only with such large group organizations. Easily recognizable are temperamental responses developed in occupational and aesthetic organizations. For instance, according to their cultural auspices persons assume various feeling attitudes and perform many types of gesture responses both of the facial and other forms.

Economic Conduct.—Without falling into the error of making economic activities in any sense more fundamental than others in the lives of human individuals we must give some attention to a few of the numerous economic groups from which we derive our economic cultural equipment. Consider the specialized activities which individuals perform as members of trade unions. More particularly we refer to the acts and attitudes of bargaining, the conservation and defense of one's interests, the adherence to certain rules and regulations, and the practice of loyal and supporting activities to specific institutions of the general labor union group. Corresponding activities of the employers' associations serve

similar functions in the general domain of the production and distribution of goods.

Commercial pursuits under the heading of economic behavior suggest immediately many familiar conventional activities involved in the marketing of products and their transportation and delivery. Such behavior becomes specialized according to groups of institutional stimuli. Quite easily can we compare commercial methods and activities in different ethnic units or in different trades and industries in any particular ethnic organization.

Looming large in the field of social conduct are the tremendously multiplied and varying activities constituting salesmanship. So important does this series of reactions appear on the part of sellers and buyers of things that a whole branch of psychology is devoted to the study of such behavior. Not all these responses of course are cultural in character, but every complex civilization, and especially our own, offers innumerable instances of well-organized cultural associations of individuals, each member of which is equipped with a great number of cultural responses to selling or marketing institutions. Particular salesmanship groups are fully accoutered with their own ritual, customs, mysteries, faiths, practices, and deities; so that aspirants to memberships in these groups must undergo a rigid course of behavior acquisition, precisely as is the case with novitiates in various religious cults.

Professional Behavior.—Especially distinctive are the activities which individuals perform as members of particular professional groups. Such behavior is distinguishing not only in the sense of identifying persons who perform such action but also as giving a definiteness and particularity to the groups themselves.

The outer forms of professional conduct, such as manners and customs, lend dignity and cultural tone to the participating individuals. Professional behavior is ordinarily manifested by distinctive dress, speech, and general deportment of the

members of these groups. Though it is difficult to formulate in words, there is no mistaking the unique personal deportment of the physician, the lawyer, the teacher, and scholar. We have all observed the professional man's calmness and frequently his detachedness of attitudes which, doubtless with less palpable modes of behavior, constitute what is popularly referred to as the professional air.

More concrete in description are ethical customs and professional standards as they are revealed among the members of professional collectivities. Every professional group has its code of conduct which prescribes behavior. Such is the ethical conduct of physicians or the draftsmanship standards of the painter or sculptor.

Many of the subtle cultural activities performed by professional individuals take the form of ideas and attitudes that are responses to the specific stimuli of particular professional groups. Some of this behavior patently marks the adherence of individuals to particular schools of thought and professional practice, such as the homeopaths and allopaths in medicine. Besides this more intrinsic subtle conduct the various members exhibit attitudes of participation and unity peculiar to their professional group and which distinguish them from individuals of other walks of life. Not to be ignored also are the arrogance and authoritativeness marking the professional personality.

Political Conduct.—Both the dependence of action and the blind following and unreflective loyalty of individuals in the performance of political behavior suggest at once conventional differences of cultural conduct. The behavior performed in political groups covers a large range of responses constituting participation in the administrative functions of human organization. Besides the voting and supporting of candidates for office, the more subtle activities of reflection and belief with respect to the character of government, the necessity for supporting it and the methods and possibilities of changing

it, give us further instances of cultural conduct that are probably more imposed upon individuals than most of the other types of social behavior. Besides being more general and inevitable such behavior is inescapable, since it touches upon the life of an individual by the mere fact of his living in a community. For this reason the classes of political behavior groups not only include loci of positive conduct of all sorts but also negative attitudes and responses that mark off individuals as participants in specialized political organizations. Politicians and reformers in the field of political life are tremendously agitated over the social custom of not voting. From a psychological standpoint of course persons performing such behavior constitute members of numerous groups, since the political fact of not voting really comprises large numbers of diverse psychological circumstances.

Legal Behavior.—Exceedingly common are the myriads of specific cultural responses that individuals are constantly performing to the legal institutions of their groups. Every form of human society is literally replete with legal enactments and traditions which place limitations upon the activities of individuals for the actual or presumed benefit of others, as well as for the individual himself. Accordingly we find numerous actions performed daily which may be generally described as obedience or disobedience to various specific legal institutions. Individuals, as members of particular groups, dress, speak, and otherwise conduct themselves according to prescriptions of all sorts. No better can this whole situation be illustrated than by the inspection of one's own action while driving a motor car. Learning to drive is not merely a process of developing individual adjustment responses to a machine but also a matter of being initiated into a group which reacts to a variety of traffic laws and customs.

The conventional character of legal performances is especially apparent when individuals protest against acting in a prescribed manner, for instance, when undesirable laws come

into existence. Laws exemplify a deliberate culturalization of persons so that their acts will conform to those of a legal group, either by positive performance of action or the inhibition of certain responses. Obviously very specific personal acts are involved.

Caste and Status Behavior.—Social equipments correlated with status groups present us with additional patterns of important cultural conduct. From a sociological standpoint we may describe these responses as duties, rights, obligations and responsibilities. Specifically they extend over reactions one performs to persons of superior or inferior status in one's group, for example, activities which acknowledge inferiority or superiority in a military hierarchy. Such behavior is well exemplified in speech conduct, such as the use of salutations "Sir," "Your Honor," etc. In more subtle ways these responses occur in economic and welfare situations in which individuals participate in certain groups as stewards with respect to other individuals. In complex society, groups exist whose members conventionally regard themselves as responsible for supplying other members with maintenance, hospital service, schools, research institutions, etc. Correspondingly, other groups consist of members who perform the reciprocal social conduct of receiving what is due them or of obtaining benefits conferred upon them by individuals of the steward groups.

Learning Conduct.—Wherever in human society the complexity of life makes knowledge and information the definite concerns of individuals we have great numbers of educational institutions and corresponding social educational conduct. In the first place, there are numerous conventional practices of acquiring information and employing it. Classes arise marking off the learned from the unlearned. The learned classes themselves again divide off into groups with superior and inferior orientation toward their respective milieux. Typical conditions here are the presence or absence of superstitions

or the performance of rational behavior. Very frequently the learned are different from the unlearned in performing different forms of conventional irrational responses or adjusting to the surroundings with different superstitious attitudes.

Domestic Conduct.—As our final illustration of the classificatory organization of cultural conduct we may consider some of the most interesting of all cultural equipments, namely, domestic cultural activities. Much interest attaches to these behavior types because to a great extent they are responses to persons. Even though in family relations or inter-personal activities it is possible to have elaborate idiosyncratic behavior, we find as a matter of fact a predominance of conventional responses. Typical examples are the cultural reactions of admiration, love and obedience which individuals blindly perform with respect to each other as husband and wife or parents and children, without regard to the qualities of the persons involved. Husbands and wives conform in loving and admiring each other without questioning whether they actually do so. Children respect and adore their parents simply because they are responding to the institutional necessities of the situation rather than because they have the kind of likes, dislikes and knowledge which would make such behavior plausible or because the parents manifest traits which really call out such responses.

Especially instructive are the various conventional responses to children. These reactions have to do with the actual practices and beliefs with respect to how many children a family should or might have and their function in the family group. In some communities it is the conventional attitude that children are the complete or partial supports of the family and its status. Thus they are considered as workers, hands necessary for the maintenance of the family and for meeting what circumstances may arise. In other communities the attitude prevails that children exist in order to support the parents in their old age, while others on the contrary regard

children as autonomous human beings destined to lead their own independent lives.

In conclusion, we must emphasize, what we have already suggested, namely, that groups are constantly interpenetrating each other. That is to say, the behavior performed to a particular type of stimulus occurs under many different circumstances. Thus our conventional political behavior is not confined to what are ordinarily political situations but prevails also in the field of science and religion. We have already indicated that the essentially religious types of conduct are found in scientific and political behavior situations as well as in those ordinarily called religious. The resulting instability and lack of definition of groups is, however, far from a hindrance to the conceptions of the psychologist. Being exclusively interested in the specific behavior of individuals, he accordingly follows the fortunes of any type of conduct, in whatever human situations they may lead him. As long as the psychologist can observe the conduct of persons he does not lose sight of his investigative objects, even though the rigid description of his data may sometimes be impossible.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS OR CULTURAL STIMULI

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN INSTITUTION

Any thing, condition, person, or situation endowed with stimulational qualities which serve as common stimuli, is an institution. A house, a church, a work of art, a king or citizen, an action, an event, a date (1492), a day (Fourth of July), or actual time periods (Middle Ages, Periclean Age) are all stimuli objects whose stimuli functions call out common reactions in the members of a particular group. These things therefore are institutions in a psychological sense because they have the property of stimulating the reactions of sets of persons. Strictly speaking, of course, it is the action-eliciting properties themselves rather than the things possessing such qualities which are the institutions. Accordingly, it is possible for a single object to comprise a number of different and varying institutions because in it inhere many stimulational properties.

In social psychology, therefore, the term institution¹ symbolizes the endowment of an object or condition with stimulational functions by virtue of the fact that individuals have acquired various cultural actions with respect to them. This endowment process is ordinarily a non-deliberative procedure, for the most part occurring in the general process of human

¹ The significance of using the term institution lies in the occasions it affords us to stress the humanistic basis and origin of social psychological stimuli functions.

living. Nevertheless, in many instances objects and situations take on their cultural or institutional properties through definite design.

Social psychological institutions are purely events. They are, in effect, happenings constituting commutual occurrences with the responses they elicit. We call them properties and look upon them as perduring phenomena because we are able to predict their successive reoccurrences. Knowing how these stimulatory properties (institutions) have been built up in reciprocal connection with common responses in members of particular collectivities, and observing them function periodically, we may predict their operation when such individuals again come into contact with the objects in which these institutional functions inhere. The stability and continuity of psychological institutions naturally are based upon their connection with objects. In other words, institutional functions are merely the way things work when in contact with members of particular collectivities.

The cultural stimulatory properties of objects are no different as properties from their natural characteristics which they possess simply as objects in nature. The social functions of a thing, of course, have no different structural foundation than functions belonging to objects as natural things. For the most part, however, we have seen that the functional nature of institutions does not necessarily coincide with their natural properties; that is, some very harmless object in nature, for instance, may be responded to socially as very injurious. The most nourishing and succulent meats and vegetables may be tabooed as food objects. It is obvious that this distinction between natural and institutional functions of objects always parallels the differentiation between the organism as an original fact in nature and as performing specific social activities.

It might be of some benefit to enlarge somewhat upon the differences between institutional properties of objects and

their normal or ordinary qualities. Even in the individual's first contact with institutional objects they are fraught with definite human attributes. In other words, we are paying tribute once more to the fact that social psychological phenomena are set in a humanistic matrix. Thus, snow may or may not be material from which houses are built, or blue may not be the color utilized for men's dress shirts, or colored persons are or are not people with whom white folks go to school or work beside, and all because of human circumstances.

Such variations in our cultural institutions depend entirely upon numerous anthropic conditions which lie at the foundation of all social phenomena. Hence, objects develop their institutional stimulation properties through contact with individuals of given communities or aggregations. Institutional properties therefore are definitely human accretions to the general complement of natural properties which objects possess. Thus it is easy to see why institutions so frequently inhere in contrived objects. Whenever group circumstances make it necessary or desirable to reconstruct natural objects, they practically always take on institutional functions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONS

While cultural stimuli may inhere in natural objects and persons, most of them perhaps are resident in sociological things. But since institutional stimuli or psychological institutions are derived from the same intricate humanistic complex as sociological phenomena, we must sharply distinguish psychological from sociological institutions.

A University, for instance, as a sociological institution is describable as an object organized for a particular purpose—an intellectual center—in short, the peak of the state school system. In this light we think of it as an anthropic instrument for the training of persons in particular techniques or

information. For example, it may be an instrument for the improvement of agriculture, technology or the commerce of the state. Now since a psychological institution is a stimulus function, a property of educing responses, our illustrative University may be the locus of a great variety of social psychological institutions. It may have innumerable properties of eliciting the responses of persons belonging to various social psychological groups. The members of some of these collectivities react to the University as a conservator of ideological traditions, others respond to it as a center of research, while still others react to it as a breeder of discontent, etc.

Possibly no one will confuse an institution as a cultural stimulus function with a sociological institution object. In actual practice of course there is no difficulty in keeping such sociological objects as monuments, hospitals, bridges, lodges, tools, and organizations of persons distinct from their psychological functions. But how lies the case with the social functions of anthropic objects? Here is where discrimination must be made. For the reactions of persons when in contact with sociological institutions may be very like the responses of those who react to such institutions as sources of cultural stimuli functions. Thus attending a University, in the sense of taking advantage of its educational possibilities, may be regarded as the same action as merely residing within its precincts. In the latter case, one's action consists simply in remaining a member of the University population just as he continues to live in a city or state.¹

Generally speaking, a use of an object is a property it has of being passive in the sense of having something done to it or with it. A stimulus function on the other hand, is an active property of doing something, namely, calling out responses. These uses and functions need not be confused when we realize that stimulations functions inhere equally

¹ For the distinction between psychological action and non-psychological mass action, *ct.* Chap. II, p. 37 ff.

in the uses of things as well as in their structures, forms, or textures.

Perhaps the differences between the uses or sociological operation of objects and their cultural stimuli functions may be best demonstrated when they call out contrary types of action. An army, as a sociological military institution, has the use or function of gathering together and drilling men for particular kinds of activities, killing enemies, seizing territory, etc. As a psychological institution, however, the army may call out in a particular group only responses of protest and derision, although the men of the group through fear and compulsion actually perform the required actions of soldiers.

Another consideration arises. May not both the above opposing reactions constitute conventional responses to an army? Most decidedly. But in that case we should say that in addition to its uses, the army as a sociological institution serves as several different psychological stimuli. For instance, the army group contains militant individuals who react to armies as necessary and useful elements of civilization, as well as members of pacifistic collectivities who respond to armies as remnants of barbarism and sheer engines of destruction.

On the whole it should not be difficult to distinguish the use of an object from its stimulating character. For even when the use of a thing arouses action, it may call out only non-social psychological conduct. This is never the case with institutional stimuli. Probably the most prominent non-social reactions called out by anthropic institutions or their uses are those of the idiosyncratic type. An illustration is the behavior of a student who studies such anthropic institutions as scientific data. His reactions in this instance may be wholly private intellectual or knowledge actions.

In any anthropic unit we invariably find a far greater number of cultural stimuli than anthropic institutions. Indeed the latter are comparatively limited in number. No matter how simple the civilization is, however, the number of cultural

stimuli is always an exceedingly large one. On the whole, too, sociological institutions belong to the relatively static features of human life, while cultural institutions constitute always most precarious functions. The former may exist for centuries, while the latter, even as cultural qualities of the same objects, succeed each other with greater or lesser frequency. Again sociological institutions may exist quite independently of some of the members of an anthropic unit, whereas social stimuli are functions absolutely dependent upon the behavior of every member of a psychological collectivity.

Finally, we can separate in still another way anthropic institutions and their uses from the cultural stimuli which inhere in them. Briefly, we may trace out chronological and even causal connections between psychological and anthropic institutions. For instance, first, capitalistic institutions come into existence and have their sociological uses and disuses. Then they acquire institutional psychological functions stimulating belief in their value. Later these same sociological institutions and their uses may take on the functions of inducing different and even opposite psychological responses. This is the case when socialistic and communistic groups arise with conventional condemnations of the harmful character of capitalistic institutions. Perhaps it is precisely in the changes in stimuli functions and perpetuation of the sociological institutions that the distinction between the two elements is best discovered.

THE STABILITY OF INSTITUTIONS

Institutions vary in fixity and duration. First, we are concerned with the mere temporal continuation of a cultural stimulus. Naturally enough we find that an institution persists just as long as it educes common reactions from a set of individuals. Being a function commutual with a response it perseveres just as long as the correlated reactions are elicited. Next we inquire about the relative subsistence of in-

stitutions, or the actual lastingness of some compared with others. This issue is clearly a more particularized inquiry than the former, and forces us to give heed to the specific rise and decline of given cultural stimuli.

Both of these phases of our investigation may be generalized in the question as to how long some object or condition continues to perform a particular stimulatory function. The continuity of a cultural stimulus may of course be entirely independent of the continued existence of the object in which it inheres. To illustrate, up to a certain period, namely, November 11, 1918, the German army for various psychological collectivities in Germany and other nations was a powerful instrument and force. The individuals of these groups performed knowledge and belief as well as more definite manipulatory responses to the German army institution as a stimulus. After the date mentioned, however, the German army, retaining all its other properties, lost the particular institutional function mentioned. This change resulted from the cessation of certain cultural behavior.

Such observations plainly reveal the precarious character of all types of institutions. For instance, when individuals cease thinking of the British Empire as an existing fact or even as a beneficent influence in the political world, that Empire as a cultural institution will immediately cease to function. Similarly, when the persons constituting the Indian group no longer accept British dominance as an established condition, the institution of British rule in India will no longer persist.¹ It is because of this very instability of institutions as cultural phenomena and the influence that their change in status has upon other social characteristics, that

¹ A nice question may be raised here as to how much or how little power the members of various collectivities have, to change either their own overt or implicit cultural conduct. To alter an anthropic situation, requires more than mere psychological conditions. We must never forget that social psychological phenomena always exist in and are conditioned by the anthropic and historical circumstances which constitute their matrix.

the leaders of governments are so eager to prevent alterations of cultural attitudes and practice on the part of political groups. For this reason, too, political and other human collectivities through their constituted authorities carry on elaborate programs of education and propaganda in order to control the cultural conduct of the members of such associations.

Despite their inevitable transiency most social institutions continue their existence with marked persistency. Even though our behavior life is full of instances of social stimuli that are established at a particular time and soon thereafter pass away, there is, on the other hand, so much conventional conduct which appears more or less permanent that we cannot but conclude that the majority of institutions enjoy a long life.

Nevertheless, since institutional stimuli are after all phases of very particular events they are constantly subject to alteration in specified particulars. If it were possible to place ourselves outside of our own behavior circumstances we would readily observe the incessant modifications that go on in our cultural stimuli and our correlated behavior.

While it is exceedingly difficult to compare institutions with respect to their stability it is probably true that of fairly tangible things, humanistic objects do not maintain their stimulatory functions as long as do natural objects. Nor do the latter persist in performing cultural stimulatory functions with the same tenacity that is true of circumstances and conditions. It is quite apparent that the cultural stimuli inhering in customs and conventions are more rigid and stable than those resident in other types of things.

How persistent are the so-called moral and religious values because of their indefiniteness and value quality. Hence the more nebulous the organization of a tradition the more tenacious its institutional character. Without interruption, innumerable intangible ideals and values hover like a mist over

particular communities. To such institutions group members respond in blind conformity, without knowledge or understanding. Among the most stable institutions are those connected with the commands of gods,¹ the honors of nations, the requirements of decency and the good life, the opinions of the public, or of one's neighbors, etc.

CONDITIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY

It is no haphazard suggestion that in general the conditions of institutional stability are to be sought in the anthropic background of social psychological phenomena. Among the more specific conditions we may suggest the fact of institutional establishment. When persons perform responses to an institutional stimulus the new members of a group find it a fixed feature of that collectivity. While this is not the exclusive circumstance governing the stability of institutions it is probably the most dominant one. The established institution persists to a great extent because there is no other alternative. One simply acquires correlated responses and continues to act that way.

How institutions maintain their anchorage through the fact of mere establishment is exceedingly well illustrated by the behavior of individuals who can see no merit nor necessity for novelties in any department of human conduct. The old religion is good enough. Customs become hallowed by establishment. In general, one's fixed prejudices and beliefs effectively resist the acquisition of new ways of looking at things.

Doubtless the most striking forms of the stabilization of an

¹ Thus, the daily papers report that a preacher was listened to with disdain when he declared that since in New York City every third man was unmistakably a Jew and possibly every other third man a Catholic, the Protestant Christian has no right to force Sunday observance laws upon the whole people. All others present declared that it was "not a matter of man's viewpoint but of God's word."

institution are exemplified in the fields of scientific behavior. In this domain where the primary motive is the discovery of truth and the validation of knowledge and interpretations, we find that once an institution becomes established it thereby attains perpetuation entirely out of proportion to its actual merit.

In consequence, we frequently observe the fight for scientific fact and reason. In many cases, this merely amounts to a contention in favor or disfavor of fixed institutions. All too frequently it happens that new knowledge and advanced scientific work have no chance of becoming features of a particular scientific collectivity, because of their divergence from established competitors. Fresh suggestions and ideas appear merely as subjective opinion when compared with recognized knowledge, which because of its establishment, has an immutable value. The free development of living ideas as a general rule has no power as a combatant with the concepts already solidly ensconced as the cultural equipment of a group.

Objectivity, we add as another condition of institutional stability. When the things in which institutions inhere are objective or appear to have an existence independent of persons who react to them they are more stable. For instance, moral and conventional institutions seem to exist quite aside from individuals, and in an overwhelming manner dominate their conduct. To such a degree are conventions and laws given and fixed features of the life of the community that individuals appear hopeless with respect to modifying them. This situation is very clear in the case of industrial and technical institutions. Processes and techniques of various sorts are simply accepted factors of the work life of people. Thus it is not easy for accidents to demonstrate the superiority of new institutions or to indicate comparisons which invite modifications tending to reduce the stability of the older ones.

Strangely enough, ignorance concerning an institution's establishment is a powerful stabilizing condition. The less

the individuals of a group know about the institution's origin the more solidly enshrined it appears. Consider the extreme opposition to the early daylight savings legislation. Such interferences with "God's time" were beyond understanding.

The size of the group in which the institution functions also influences its fixation. The larger the number of persons who react to a certain stimulus function the more certain it is to continue. Hence ethnic institutions are more permanent than those connected with smaller collectivities.

What we might call the intimacy of institutions also counts in their preservation. Most persistent are the stimuli calling out ideas of the superiorities of one's race, or belief in the perfection of the moral attitudes of one's group. Indeed, the institutions to which race, religious and other group prejudices are the responses are almost immutable. Or at least it may be said that these institutions are as persistent as it is possible for any to be.

We must not fail to mention the many cases in which the permanence of institutions depends upon embodiments. We have already stated that vague and intangible institutions are the most persistent, but it frequently happens that institutional stability is the result of some kind of symbol. Attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge responses of a cultural sort continue to exist longer if the stimulating institutions are connected with a building, a song, a written or printed document, or represented by a monument, a medal, or some other material form. To the conventional person a college education without tangible certification by diploma does not seem so worthwhile, nor a marriage relation so holy as when permanently attested by a printed document.

And finally, we point to those institutions that cling because of their relations to other institutions. As we have already indicated, many cultural stimuli may inhere in a single object or situation. Now if for any reason one or more of these institutions should be firmly established, the possibilities are

that others in the cluster, or all perhaps, will perdure through the accident of conjunction. Thus when a scientific idea stimulates us to accept it as correct, we likewise tend to believe in its exclusiveness and inevitability. Quite obviously these stimulating functions achieve their longevity because of the reinforcing effect of the other qualities.

THE RELATION OF INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENT

That institutions are psychological functions has been the constantly recurring theme of the present chapter. We have also sufficiently differentiated cultural stimuli from the sociological institutions in which they frequently inhere. Nor have we neglected to take account of the connections that exist between these institutions and the natural or cultural objects and conditions in which they reside.

An important task still remains. Namely, we must indicate the relation of institutions to environment. This is necessary in order to straighten out a very confused problem. We must first be sure that institutions are not environment. Secondly, we must determine what are the actual relations between the two.

Contentions concerning environmental influences upon human phenomena have always been heatedly discussed. On the one hand, environment has been made the absolute source of the character of a civilization, while on the other, it has been regarded as of no moment whatsoever. Certainly, this is an instance in which great simplification has hindered our humanistic studies. Accordingly, our goal in the present section is to indicate how institutions are related to the various surroundings of individuals.

At the outset we must submit that persons live in at least three kinds of environments, each consisting of a great series of things and situations. It is possible to regard these environments as stratified layers. The lowest or biological tier

is composed of the extensive array of circumstances which form the essential conditions of the animal existence of the personnel of the human species.

The next or middle level of surrounding things comprises the anthropic elements of civilization. These are the objects and circumstances with which man as a distinctly human type of animal interacts. In short, this is the field of civilization or culture. The objects and actions included here are of course, rooted in biological soil, but these biological circumstances do not interfere with the freedom of development of human phenomena. Such events, therefore, are distinctly human and very different from basic biological facts.

Thirdly, there is the psychological level of phenomena. The present series of objects and situations are both biological and cultural, but they are endowed with distinct properties through the behavior of persons. Natural and human phenomena thus take on psychological characteristics which diverge very widely from their original qualities.

We assume that it is well known that the term environment originally belonged to biology and still refers mainly to biological facts. In general, environment constitutes the physical surroundings to which the organism (plant or animal) has to adapt itself. In brief, it comprises such things as water, wind, air, other animals and plants, trees, earth, etc. In more restricted biological terms environment stands for food and shelter objects, as composing the inevitable correlates of the biological structures and functions (cells, tissues, organs, and physiological processes) of the organism. No datum of a living organism can be conceived of unless it somehow includes both of these interacting aspects of biological events. For the explanation of certain biological happenings, however, we may look into the relative influence of these factors. For instance, when a crop falls short of our expectations we may ask whether the difficulty is located primarily in the structure-function factor, namely in the seed, or in the environ-

mental features, the soil, moisture or sunshine. In all such situations the two factors are operating but perhaps in unequal degrees.

Civilizational facts all fit inside such biological situations and are somewhat conditioned by them. Nevertheless, they are quite distinct. What precisely are the relations then between these different orders of facts?

We need only refer to the abundant illustrations which we have already offered of the slight influence of natural environment upon anthropic systems. Let us add, however, one more example in which total biological structures are connected with anthropic circumstances. This illustration we find in the biological facts of sex.

Anthropic phenomena are inevitably conditioned by biological sex differences and functions. But how? Surely the presence of such facts does not determine what the sexual aspect of civilization shall be like in any detail. Thus anthropic systems in which sexual phenomena participate differ most extremely. The same biological conditions constitute phases of entirely different kinds of anthropic situations. All human collectivities are composed of men and women, but what effect has this on the division of labor, on marriage customs and regulations, on family or other social organizations, on customs such as clothes wearing, style of ornamentation, or on sex morality or sex convention? Who can fail to agree that because there are many possible cultural variations connected with these absolute biological sex factors that cultural phenomena are very different facts from natural circumstances?

The biological and anthropic features of any complex sociological fact we must regard, therefore, as very different aspects of the same situation. Furthermore, on the whole, biological happenings and civilizational phenomena merely coincide and influence each other. Never do they efface each other. If biological sex factors influence cultural phenomena,

so do cultural events condition biological facts. We refer to the effects of civilization upon the differences in the structural and functional properties of men and women.

No amount of asseveration can make these propositions more plausible. Let us turn next to a consideration of the light these facts throw upon the great distance which removes psychological phenomena from the biological environment in which they are inevitably set. For observe that social psychological events usually have anthropic phenomena between them and the biological surroundings.

Lest we overlook any significant fact we must indicate that biological surroundings do exert some influence upon psychological phenomena. In the chapter on biological implications for psychological conduct we have already discovered that structure-function factors of organisms have merely a limiting influence upon their behavior. We may accordingly expect a similar connection to exist between the environmental factors and psychological phenomena. Surely the surrounding circumstances, objects, and conditions constituting the natural environment of persons, can influence behavior no further than the availability and number of stimuli functions. To illustrate, in parts of the world where no snow or ice exists it is impossible to have institutions connected with ice or snow. In other words, there can be no behavior having as its stimulus any snow institution. Psychological phenomena of the tropics, insofar as they are conditioned by natural circumstances, cannot be like the behavior of the Arctic regions of the earth. From the standpoint of sheer environment it is absolutely impossible that an individual in the torrid zone should believe that water can be solidified. So far do natural surroundings limit the existence of institutional functions.

We call attention now to a somewhat different type of environing influence. Whenever an object is involved in a psychological activity, either as a stimulus or as a product of action, the behavior is conditioned by the object's natural

constitution as an environmental fact. For example, the anthropic and social psychological responses to food are necessarily governed by its perishability or non-perishability. Or, to take another example, whether we use knives or forks in handling our food, is a fact entirely independent of our environment. But obviously we cannot use a fork when we partake of liquid food. Again, whether a certain collectivity shall or shall not use aluminum is entirely independent of its presence in their environment, but when they do utilize aluminum they can only handle it according to its natural properties.

Psychological conduct then is certainly limited by environmental facts. Nevertheless, this does not preclude a great independence of psychological phenomena of the environment. Now, how stands the case between psychological institutional functions and anthropic facts? Here we must conclude again that the former are quite independent of the latter. While psychological institutions always exist in an anthropic milieu and are very frequently founded upon anthropic material still they are never absolutely determined by humanistic environment.

We propose two considerations. In the first place, take any complex anthropic system. Within it we find uniform ethnic and national objects. But how varied are the responses to them as performed by the members of different psychological collectivities within the large group unit. Thus, sociological facts show enormous variations in their stimulatory functions.

In the second place, our study has already quite clearly indicated that the characteristics of cultural phenomena are very definitely determined by psychological factors, among others. Surely this does not indicate that anthropic phenomena constitute an inevitably determining environment for psychological happenings. A conclusive illustration we find in the case of language. No cultural influence upon persons can be so determining as the linguistic one, and yet while all

members of a particular anthropic unit speak the same language they invariably divide themselves off into smaller and smaller dialectal and colloquial groups. While this effect is surely not an exclusively psychological one, it cannot but demonstrate the independence of psychological phenomena.

If we are to understand rightly social psychological facts we must always take account of the intimate details of the person's behavior to his stimulating objects. It is only in this way that we can appreciate the infinite possibilities for the particular endowment of objects with stimulatory functions. Things may operate in psychological situations in ways that have no manner of similitude to that in which they function in nature or in civilization.

CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS

As in the case of cultural reactions the attempt to classify institutions proves to be instructive with respect to their characteristics. Generally speaking we may isolate four features as the bases of our classification.

Institutions Classified by Reactions.—Because the great majority of our activities are cultural we must expect that institutions as cultural stimuli elicit behavior of every possible variety. Institutions may then be differentiated from each other on the basis of the specific types of reactions they actually elicit. Do they elicit intellectual, custom, religious, economic, sexual, or some other form of conventional reaction system? It follows then that an organization of institutions on this basis consists of the enumeration of practically every form of action that individuals perform. So numerous in fact are the types of institutions that it is not necessary further to specify them. We might add, however, that such behavior may take the form of very private acts such as opinions, beliefs, judgments, likes and dislikes, or it is performed in a more obvious way and in visible concert with other individuals,

as in the case of worshipping together, performing customary greeting responses, etc.

Institutions Classified by Groups.—A second criterion for differentiating between institutions is the question as to the kind of groups in which they are found. For instance, do they belong to human associations of a simple or complex type? Some institutions are found only in primitive or simple groups. Either the institutions possess a character which enables them to fit in only with a particular kind of civilizational complex or the objects in which they inhere are absent from the simpler collectivity. For example, among simpler civilizations we find institutions stimulating conduct of frankness and openness which are not ordinarily found in more complex civilizations. Again, in simpler cultural systems institutions call out reactions to property, its accumulation and use, which differ markedly from the institutions of other groups. For classificatory purposes such institutions may be called simple or complex on the basis of whether they arouse simple or complex behavior.

Cultural stimuli of other sorts of groups may also be isolated. Ethnic institutions separate themselves from social stimuli of a national character. Each of these types in turn is divided off from administrative and religious institutions. Still other classificatory directions are made in isolating the cultural stimuli of smaller intellectual, professional, sex, or occupational groups. Such an organization of institutions suggests the distribution of intimate stimuli functions among all the various psychological collectivities, whether they exist under ethnic and national auspices or whether they are found in smaller group environments (professions, occupations) located within larger human associations.

Institutions as features of certain anthropic collectivities may be further segregated on the basis of whether they are indigenous to any given group or whether they have been borrowed. In some cases an institution is assumed by a certain

group as a new psychological function for an object already possessed, or the institution is taken over along with an object entirely novel to the borrowing group.

The distribution of institutions among different groups is well illustrated by the variety of name responses called out by the same objects in different collectivities. Note how the various human anatomical parts stimulate diverse responses in the members of the medical as over against the non-medical group.

Classification of Institutions According to Inherence.—Another distinct criterion for organizing institutions is the kind of objects in which they inhere. Is the stimulus function a property of a person, thing, or condition?

Object and Thing Institutions.—Objects may elicit cultural responses according to their intrinsic characteristics. That is, individuals are stimulated to perform common responses to objects which are definite adaptations to these things. For example, stones are used for building materials but the specific cultural functions which inhere in stones call out in individuals of different groups particular ways of handling them in the process of building. On the other hand, another group may not endow stones with such stimulatory functions at all. Thus all varieties of behavior possibilities are found in various cultural groups.

In some collectivities, objects call out cultural conduct which is entirely independent of any kind of adaptation situation, such as when stones are worshipped or stimulate conduct of a religious or intellectual nature. We need only add that every possible variety of object or thing, whether found ready-made in the surroundings of individuals or whether contrived, constructed, or transformed from some other type of object, has inhering in it stimulatory functions eliciting a wide range of cultural conduct. Thus rain stimulates some people to pray and others merely to measure it, or to move from a lower to a higher country.

Innumerable institutional functions reside in various linguis-

tic objects. First we think of the actual printed page in the form of vocabulary symbols as in dictionaries, stories, verses, or other verbal material. Then we note the linguistic rules or standards stimulating spelling, pronunciation, and other phases of social linguistic conduct. Among the most complex and important functions of vocabulary objects are those which substitute for non-existing things.

Very striking cultural behavior is that performed to religious, political, legendary, and other objects which have no existence save in the form of a representing word (democracy, liberty, national honor, brotherhood of man). That is, such objects may never have had any actual existence other than being substituted for by spoken or printed words. Reactions to such things we may well expect to be subtle on the whole, such as belief and other intellectual responses. However, they may also constitute gross apparent conduct of the most effective sort.

To complete our suggestion for thing and object institutions we may add the cultural stimulative function of churches, schools, newspapers, cities, and other complex contrived objects. To these may be appended all the objects pertaining to artistic (concordance in music, harmony in color), industrial, commercial, and military activities. Social phenomena of all sorts are also things which perform cultural functions. For example, social organizations, political associations, professional societies, and other collectivities or groups of people call out cultural responses of loyalty, adherence, approval, faith, and other types of common interrelated behavior. Similarly the customs, traditions, holidays, ideals, values, and legends of groups stimulate cultural conduct just as much as do organizations and associations of persons.

Institutional Action.—From the standpoint of number, actions as institutions stand very close to things. An enormous amount of cultural conduct is stimulated by the behavior of persons. This great mass of action institutions we may

divide into two large types, on the one hand, institutional actions of individuals, and on the other, institutional actions of groups. As examples of the former we refer to the grosser activities of custom and manner behavior as well as the more subtle activities of thinking and believing. To a certain extent the correlated conduct of the grosser kinds of action institutions are similar gross responses, while the reactions to the more subtle type are correspondingly subtle intellectual conduct. However, this is not an invariable rule.

Of the grosser type of individual institutional actions we suggest the apparent responses of worshipping, speaking, ways of purchasing, manner of teaching, etc. Individuals are members of particular groups by virtue of the fact that they are stimulated by these actions to build up corresponding behavior. Typical of the more subtle action institutions are the prejudices, taste and superstitions which stimulate the dislike and detestation of individuals of one group for those of another. Race prejudice is an example. Attitudes of patriotism, social and moral evaluations of acts and objects, are none the less potent institutional phenomena of the behavior type.

Concepts, ideas, and thoughts, although among the least apparent activities of individuals, stimulate other persons to perform cultural responses no less than the grossest conduct. We instance here the ideas and beliefs concerning social, moral, and religious life. The belief of members of particular groups in the superiority of their customs and conventions, constitutes a definite institution functioning in the life of that community. Equally strong is the operation of subtle intellectual activities in the form of conceptions and beliefs found in particular scientific and intellectual groups of individuals. The belief in the inheritance of mental and social traits constitutes just such an institution in the eugenics group.

We must insist that subtle action institutions inhere in the actual responses of persons. That is to say, we must not con-

fuse here the stimulus function of an intellectual response for example, with stimuli resident in statistical organizations of acts. Members of a psychological collectivity respond to the actual ideas and concepts of a statesman, priest, or soldier. The members of these communities react to individual responses as institutional objects. This is a different kind of stimulus object from a series of accumulated actions taken *en bloc*. Not to discriminate between these different phenomena is like confounding a concrete particular act of modesty with modesty as a characteristic of a social community. The latter, of course, constitutes instances of prescribed behavior.

Cumulative actions, it must be granted are also institutions. In other words, the actions of anthropic groups in speaking English, dressing and walking in specific ways, eating particular things, believing, hoping, and performing other intellectual activities, considered as organized or statistical behavior phenomena also stimulate shared conduct. But there should be no difficulty in distinguishing between the two kinds of facts. As behavior these activities may be regarded as identical happenings, but looked at from different angles. On the psychological side we deal with individual responses of persons to specific stimuli, whereas in the sociological case we have merely a record of the activity of numbers of individuals without special regard to the stimuli objects to which they are responding. In the latter instance we think of the group action stimuli as consisting of ideal systems, doctrines, conventional behavior, legal enactments, and acquiescence to rules and regulations.

Institutional Situations.—Situation institutions, while not offering us as many examples, are none the less effective in arousing cultural conduct. Probably the most striking types in this class are various social phenomena. The status of human relations and achievements of different sorts operate to call out specific types of shared reactions. Let us observe the conventional responses made to the economic situation in

which usury is not permitted. These reactions are both of the practical and intellectual sort. For instance, such a situation stimulates the economic practice of avoiding the law as well as beliefs and arguments in its condemnation.

In a similar way social situations of all sorts, whether connected with economic, political, religious, or intellectual circumstances, stimulate corresponding forms of behavior. The fact that teachers are compensated at much smaller rates than plumbers or other types of tradesmen is an occurrence which assumes a definite stimulatory function for the groups of individuals involved. Other situations operating as cultural stimuli are all sorts of relations between groups, such as war and peace, as well as the lack or plenitude of necessities and comforts. All these have inhering in them stimuli for conventional human behavior.

Institutional Events.—Happenings and events of both natural and human types likewise provoke conventional conduct. Such occurrences as fires, floods, storms of all sorts, abundance or failure of crops, etc., are potent sources of stimulation for many kinds of cultural behavior among localized sets of individuals. Wars, revolutions, games, and other human proceedings perform corresponding stimulatory functions and have human phenomena as the basis of the inherence of their stimulatory properties. We may also include here such human facts as social and political customs. The tradition of going away at certain periods of the year, for instance, stimulates many sorts of cultural action.

Institutional Persons.—Prominent among cultural stimulatory functions are those lodged in persons. In the first place individuals stimulate cultural conduct exactly as do other kinds of objects, by calling out conventional responses of contact and aversion. But persons are institutionalized in a still more elaborate manner. In this instance individuals may be regarded as objects directly endowed with many complicated

properties. For example, they possess certain rights and are liable to distinct obligations. Individuals as centers of political and scientific authority or as beings endowed with knowledge, occult and natural powers represent special types of human existence. Accordingly persons are endowed with a tremendously large number of complex institutional functions which elicit correspondingly complicated responses.

Institutions Classified by Quality.—Our final criterion for the organization of institutions refers to their qualities, or the way in which they call out correlated reactions.

For example, institutions may operate subtly or crudely. Naturally this quality of a stimulus is correlated with the type of object in which the stimulus function inheres. Ordinarily institutions implanted in tangible objects such as tools, weapons, etc., stimulate the individual in a bald and gross manner, whereas stimulation by intangible objects takes place in a more subtle fashion. Such is the effect upon individuals in cultural groups of insidious whisperings and undefined rumors. During the war, observers frequently noted the tremendous influence of such intangible phenomena. Quite striking also is the effect produced by an awarding jury upon one's reactions of expectancy and uncertainty or other subtle intellectual attitudes. Competing candidates for some prize, or brokers awaiting a government report suggest typical psychological situations in which such evanescent institutions function.

In this same category we place also those vague social ideas and beliefs which are well described as "being in the air." No better illustration need be sought than the notion of evolution as expressed by Tennyson for example, and which stimulated cultural responses prior to its crystallization by the work of Darwin and Wallace.

Whether or not an institution is avowed, known, or recognized, may also be regarded as one of its qualities. While a

stimulus is not affected in its mere character as a psychological element by being known, that fact often conditions the specific way it operates. We have already indicated that ignorance of an institution may increase the intensity of its functioning. We may now add that sometimes its effect is reduced.

CHAPTER IX

CULTURALIZATION—HOW WE ACQUIRE OUR CULTURAL BEHAVIOR

THE PROCESS OF CULTURALIZATION

Every individual acquires his cultural behavior equipment through a definite process. This process we call culturalization. It comprises the means by which we develop those traits of reactional equipment which make us into particular types of social personalities. Thus the study of any individual's culturalization provides us with a record of the entire development of his distinctly human nature. In effect, the culturalization process constitutes the happenings to the individual during his various contacts with the institutions of the groups in which he finds himself. Being stimulated by these institutions he builds up cultural responses to them. Indeed we must regard the person in his cultural aspects as a definite product of the institutions around him. Therefore, if we take a list of traits of a certain individual we can correlate them with the institutional stimuli of the human groups in which he develops and carries on his conduct.

Synonyms for culturalization are domestication or socialization. In other words, the making of a cultural personality consists in stimulating the individual to become in his behavior like the persons of certain groups. Such domestication gives him a definite identity as a member of distinct psychological collectivities. Through contact with all sorts of different institutions the individual acquires behavior traits which in some respects make him resemble certain persons

and not others. Culturalization then comprises a series of mechanisms by which those qualities called cultural human nature are produced.

For example, as a result of the operation of the culturalization process the individual assumes a definite set of conventional manners, ideals, knowledge, attitudes, and habits. At the same time he takes on traits of social intelligence, artistry, and morality. In detail, the culturalization process accounts for the fact that one talks, thinks, eats, and otherwise behaves in particular ways. Since we cannot escape assuming the kind of equipments forced upon us by surrounding institutions, the domesticating procedure is fairly absolute.

Let us notice that the culturalization process differs from the ordinary manner of behavior acquisition. Compare it with the idiosyncratic situation, for example. In the latter case, the stimulational functions of objects are developed at the same time that the person acquires his personal behavior with respect to such objects. Not so in the case of culturalization. For here the stimuli are institutions which exist prior to the contact of the person with the objects in which they inhere.

What kind of social behavior equipment the individual acquires is practically determined then by his anthropic circumstances. But this fact indicates no inevitability from a strictly psychological standpoint. That is, if it were possible for the person to place himself in the thousands of cultural conditions required to develop his equipment and to choose all the groups of which he becomes a member he could control his socialization and become a person according to his own pattern.

From the psychological standpoint, therefore, our cultural development is quite accidental. It depends wholly upon the particular process of domestication to which we are subjected. Any person might indifferently take on Chinese or Bantu

traits. This refers to speech, mannerisms, and intellectual attitudes. What is required to bring about such a result is merely to have a person brought up exclusively in contact with Chinese or Bantu institutions. The culturalization process, therefore, must be regarded as resulting in determinate products, depending upon the particular institutions involved.

The character and modes of operation of culturalization processes are strikingly illustrated by pointing out that even our intimate sex behavior, and the traits correlated with our biological male or female sex characters are built up and not born in us. It is perfectly possible, aside from organic structure, of course, to culturalize a girl to be a boy, or vice versa. It is only a convention that little girls must not climb trees nor perform the boisterous pranks that small boys are allowed to do. Similarly, the popularly known "negro-emotion" (superstition, fear, etc.) is all built up, just as the emotionality of women is acquired by our young girls during the early family period. Is it not clear then that culturalization is purely an artificial process, though one that leaves a product that cannot be easily cast off? In sum, whenever we have an individual before us and inquire why he is a Methodist or Catholic, a republican or democrat, masculine or feminine in behavior make-up, we may be entirely certain that the answer lies in the culturalization processes through which he has passed.

Our exposition has already proceeded far enough to suggest that culturalization involves an exceedingly complicated personality development. It would be an error in consequence to think that because one's parents are religious or belong to a particular religious collectivity, for example, one must also be religious. Not at all. Even when one is in contact with certain situations one may react negatively as well as positively. Despite the attempt of parents to culturalize their

child to be religious, the latter may build up quite opposite traits. He may become an atheist. Quite often the effort of parents to domesticate their children to be conservative, to love and cherish the things they love and cherish, may be entirely frustrated. The children, of course, will inevitably become culturalized, but not necessarily in the mold provided by parents. The question arises then as to the specific ways in which the culturalization process operates.

In every specific case it is important to isolate the actual conditions which make stimuli objects work positively or negatively. We may suggest that if certain objects or actions are forced too strongly upon children, especially when they want to play, they will certainly rebel. We are dealing here with a very dynamic sort of thing, for the particular culturalization results depend upon how the stimuli are presented. Further, the attitude of the parents is significant. Angry persons baulk and subdue the children around them. As a result the offered stimuli do not call out the desired positive reactions. These are conditions which have to do with deliberate attempts at culturalization.

Let us now take the case of positive or negative stimulation when no resistance to the efforts of other persons are present. Individuals may react negatively to institutions because of traits already developed at other points in their domestication. Obviously, whenever any specific culturalization process operates upon an individual he may have already acquired a set of cultural and non-cultural equipments. The already formed behavior then constitutes refractory material from the standpoint of the present domestication mechanisms. In many instances these equipments consist of very resistant materials. These prior products of culturalization as well as the behavior results of the person's previous non-cultural reactional biography influence the individual to respond negatively to certain institutions.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CULTURALIZATION PROCESS

As a process of behavior acquisition culturalization stands squarely as a factual source of social characteristics. It contrasts decidedly with any conception which proposes that an individual is endowed with powers or forces making him what he is at any particular time. The question here is: do we have our specific human natures because of certain driving forces inherent in us or do we possess our psychological characteristics and traits as a result of contacts with institutions? Are we born with a conscience or is conscience merely a behavioristic reflection of institutions that have surrounded our developing years?

One of the prominent nativistic conceptions opposing the culturalization doctrine is the instinct theory. The forces that are alleged to make human beings what they are, are called instincts. Nor are these instinct forces confined to social psychology. Accordingly, all human nature is regarded by the proponents of this theory to be the working out of a limited number of such powers. Whether instincts are regarded as metaphysical forces or particular kinds of biological conditions it is impossible to ascribe any one of our complex cultural responses to a single impulse or biological characteristic. In no sense can we go beyond actual responses to specific stimuli. On the basis of the best interpretation of an instinct theory one could only explain the similarity of all people. The problem of social psychology, on the contrary, is to discover precisely why groups of people are different. The process of domestication, we submit, is quite capable of accounting for this fact on a definite factual basis.

Culturalization, it should be quite clear, can only account for certain phases of human nature. For the behavior with which it deals constitutes only one form of human conduct. Human nature, of course, involves besides cultural behavior

a number of other sorts, such as idiosyncratic, universal, and contingent reactions.

THE LOCI OF CULTURALIZATION

As a process of behavior acquisition culturalization takes place wherever institutions are located—to be plain, wherever there are psychological collectivities. Considering that there are thousands upon thousands of such collectivities it is obviously impossible to discuss all of the loci where culturalization occurs. Accordingly, in order to indicate the auspices under which the individual acquires his social behavior equipment we must select several type locations.

But to study the group in which culturalization takes place is in general an objectionable procedure. For it places too great an emphasis upon the traits acquired and the group in which it is built up, and not enough upon the person and his part in the process.

Now in order to study the individual as he develops his cultural traits, we will regard as the loci of his culturalization the different types of situations through which he passes during his ordinary psychological development. In particular we propose to divide the reactional biography of individuals into two distinct phases. We might arbitrarily consider the first period to be that of infancy and childhood and the second phase that of maturation and adulthood. For expository purposes we shall refer to these two periods as the early and later stages of culturalization.

Loci of Early Culturalization.—On the whole it is clear that the earliest culturalization of the individual takes place in the family surroundings. It is here that one probably acquires one's most outstanding cultural behavior qualities. While all the person's traits are from a strictly psychological standpoint equally fundamental, some appear to be more essential than others. For example, the equipments developed

in the earliest loci of culturalization are the most difficult to transform or change. Indeed, these earliest cultural traits are so ingrained that they stimulate the ideas of original nature. To indicate the fundamental character of the early culturalization equipment we need only mention that we are referring here to the simplest and most fundamental reactions, —gait, carriage, ways of using hands, characteristic modulation and tone of voice, mannerisms, manners, etc. These are the equipments that give us knowledge concerning the parentage or intimate nurses of children. In short, they stamp the culturalized person with the socializer's conduct die. That the early culturalization is so typical and deep-seated is owing to the fact that under early family auspices one first begins to develop behavior equipment at all.

Not only does the individual acquire the most elementary reactional equipment under family culturalization auspices, but also many of the more complex responses which characterize him as a member of particular cultural groups. Among these behavior traits are reactions of cleanliness, ways of eating, talking, gesturing, etc. Still more complex cultural traits acquired at this time are responses which may be referred to as ideals, beliefs, and aspirations which are reactions to distinctly family institutions.

Through these early family contacts the individual undergoing culturalization is also put into reactional contact with institutions that are not of a strictly family type, but belong rather to more inclusive collectivities. In other words, even during the very early years of reactional development in the primary family group, one is brought into contact with institutions of national, religious, occupational, ethnic, and other types of psychological collectivities. When girls are made to take on feminine traits through family culturalization and when boys acquire traits of sturdiness, masculinity, etc., we have a process of domestication that reaches out to ethnic groups, though it takes place in the family circle and through

family circumstances. Under group family influences children undergo such marked ethnic socialization that they take on the traditional stolidity of the Indians, the thriftiness of Germans, the musicianship of the Italians, the gayety of the Austrians, etc. It is also through family culturalization processes that individuals acquire cultural language responses, religious beliefs, moral and conventional attitudes, respect for law, etc.

Family life, therefore, is the locus for both immediate and mediate contacts with general ethnic and national group institutions. The immediate type of contact is made possible by the continuous existence of certain institutions in both the family and more inclusive groups. Simply because the members of a family are at the same time members of more inclusive groups, they harbor in the home, institutions common to larger units, and perform responses stimulating the younger members of the family to take on cultural equipment characteristic of the more inclusive group. Through family socialization, therefore, the individual not only acquires the traits of his family group but of national and ethnic communities also. That is, he adopts the language, manners, beliefs, and customs of the larger collectivities.

On the other hand, the more mediate contacts with the inclusive group are brought about by the reading of books and journals found in the home and by participating in family travels and visits to other groups. In this last instance we observe that the contacts of the younger individuals with non-family institutions are conditioned by members of the immediate family.

Playmate Contacts.—A second prominent locus of early culturalization centers around the contacts of children as playmates. This stepping out of the home immediately enables individuals to interact with a wider range of institutions. On the one hand, the child comes into contact with acts and objects which stimulate the development of reactions to other

and larger groups than that of the family. On the other hand, since each child represents a product of different family culturalization processes the number of stimuli contacts are greatly increased through playmates. While these playmates may be similarly culturalized as members of one ethnic, linguistic or national group, they have each been in contact with different family institutions. Thus through the acquisition of different social conduct they are capable of stimulating each other with different cultural stimuli.

School Contacts.—The school situation marks off a definite stage of psychological development which we call our third locus of culturalization. To a considerable extent the stimuli presented here bring about the development of more formal types of responses than in the two previous cases. Hence, in this culturalization setting the child acquires mainly informational responses. That is, he takes on intellectual attitudes which are common to all of the individuals attending a particular school.

It goes without saying that the family, playmate and school types of culturalization may all transpire at the same time, each influencing the other more or less. We must not draw, therefore, too sharp a line here, by way of regarding these culturalizations as distinctly different processes. What the child learns at home, what behavior he derives from his playmate contacts and his school acquisitions are parallel conditions influencing each other. In other words, culturalization means the building up of a vast conglomeration of cultural reaction systems built up to all kinds of mixed institutional stimuli located in particular psychological group situations. On the whole this mixed type of interaction with things produces a cultural individual that we may call an autonomous psychological personality, in that he is somewhat different from the members of either the parental, family, the school, or playmate group.

Loci of Later Culturalization.—Having already intimated

that the process of culturalization continues throughout the behavior life of the individual we may now differentiate between the childhood acquisition of social equipment and the mature assumption of cultural traits. In the adult loci of culturalization the individual continues the active equipment acquisition through his contacts with the psychological collectivities of which he is a member. He becomes a particular type of cultural personality according to such stimuli as are found in business, professional, church, economic, custom and other situations. An individual entering upon a law training or practice becomes culturalized as a lawyer. Similarly a person becomes socialized as a teacher, physician or other occupational or professional personality type. Thus arise the behavior traits of thinking legally, anatomically, artistically, mechanically, or in terms of dollars and cents. During the adult period of socialization, traits are of course built up in just as stable a manner as are the responses of childhood. We may add, however, that adult culturalization constitutes at once a more thorough and mature contact with institutional stimuli. Among the reactions acquired are various manners of doing things, handling objects, using techniques, judging and evaluating things, persons and circumstances, etc. Naturally, the later and earlier culturalization processes are different in detail. Not only does one's later culturalization involve one's original acquisition of cultural reactions, but it demands also the transformation or replacement of earlier cultural responses. Very frequently the individual drops or changes in the adult period former behavior traits. It is to be especially noticed that when the later loci of culturalization are exerting their influences upon the individual, he may voluntarily enter social or cultural groups. To a considerable extent then culturalization in the later periods and the resulting behavior acquisition depends upon whether the individual desires to undergo certain domestication.

TYPES OF CULTURALIZATION PROCESSES

The details of the culturalization process vary enormously. Contacts with institutional stimuli are brought about by various means. Each period of the individual's social reactional biography involves a number of specific conditions. We have already indicated that sometimes the person merely finds himself inevitably in the presence of particular institutions, while in other cases he may himself choose to come into relation with certain cultural stimuli objects. Following this lead we may divide off the types of culturalization into two large divisions, namely, the casual and deliberative forms. By considering each type in relation with the earlier and later loci of culturalization we have in all four types of domestication.

Early Casual Culturalization.—Probably in the earliest culturalization period all the individual's contacts with his institutions are casual. The sheer presence of the kind of acts and objects around him induces the acquisition of particular kinds of responses. Hence all of the person's early reactional equipment is unwittingly acquired and without effort. At this stage of development the dynamic organism is extremely active and quick to perform all sorts of responses. Again, the simple behavior circumstances of the individual preclude the existence of competing qualities of cultural objects. Thus the culturalization results are inevitable. There is no other way to refer to things except in the language of the parents or nurse. Nor is there any alternative to acting in the manner observed. The exception here decidedly establishes the rule. When a child is partly in the keeping of a nurse whose culturalization differs from that of the parents there are various inhibiting conditions. Hence, the culturalization of the child may be a cross between that of the two types of responses performed by the parents and the nurse.

When the parents are artistic and the home surroundings include aesthetic materials such as original or reproduced art objects, pictures, statuary, music, etc., the personality undergoing development will inevitably include aesthetic reactional equipments. Original tastes, appreciations, and aesthetic attitudes have their insidious origin in this early developmental situation. An interesting observation here is the infantile development of the child of literary parents. To such a child the handling of books seems to be the most obvious and necessary event in the world. Long before the infant can read, books become definite features of his behavior world, beginning first with the perusal of illustrations. Children of musical parents make playthings of musical instruments. Hence we read in so many musical biographies that the individual undergoing socialization learns to use instruments without formal training. Similarly, the child constantly surrounded by mechanical objects manipulates them, centers his play about them and very early develops a mechanical bent or personality.

Other illustrations in great numbers, exemplifying this casual type of culturalization, may be observed by anyone studying the genetic development of an infant. Quite casually the individual assumes most of his more lasting and identifying behavior traits. In addition to becoming a particular kind of linguistic, artistic, or inventive personality, he may acquire characteristics of politeness, criminality, self-assertiveness, and so on. While no doubt most of the traits that the individual possesses when his personality development is complete are cultural in character, his social equipment develops along with his non-cultural psychological equipment. In fact, these different types of personality acquisition reinforce each other, and as we shall see, also exert modifying influences upon each other.¹

¹ It is interesting to compare this casual process with a similar development of idiosyncratic reactions. Consider the child whose parents carelessly leave various sums of money lying around. The child takes some, is not observed, develops traits of cunning, and gradually "criminal" responses are built up.

Early Deliberate Culturalization.—The deliberate form of early culturalization we may regard as fairly coincident with what is called in every-day language, child training. Essentially, this is a situation in which the older members of cultural groups (in this case the primary parental group), attempt to control the genesis of the personality equipment of the younger members. To a very considerable extent the process is one of prescribing what should or should not be done. Attempts are constantly made to induce children to acquire conventional conduct. They must be clean and neat, obedient, deferent to their elders, speak grammatically, etc. On the other hand, children must not appropriate things belonging to others nor destroy anything, and so on. In all the innumerable training situations parents or nurses function as agents for the induction of their charges into the proper psychological collectivities.

Another variety of the deliberative type of early culturalization consists of the studied attempts of parents and guardians to provide examples of the cultural behavior of the sorts of groups to which they desire the children to belong. It is in this connection that older members of the parental group deliberately alter their own personalities in the presence of children in order to keep before the developing individual the modes of conduct which it is desirable for them to emulate. From our standpoint this activity on their part is a process of putting the children into contact with behavior institutions. It is entirely analogous to the situation in which parents contrive to expose their children to particular kinds of institutional stimulations by putting them into certain schools or sending them abroad.

An extremely interesting situation occurs when the control of culturalization remains on the side of the developing personality. Naturally this form of domestication cannot be found in the very earliest periods of personality growth. Frequently, children deliberately strive to imitate persons they

admire and thus acquire similar conduct. In this case notice that owing to the ignorance of the child concerning the kind of behavior equipment acquired, the actual acquisitional process may readily be idiosyncratic. It is only in the resulting cultural personality, therefore, that we have here an illustration of the development of cultural behavior equipment. It is important, however, for us to take note of this particular situation since it indicates the close connection between cultural and non-cultural types of psychological phenomena.

Adult Casual Culturalization.—Casual adult culturalization is well observed in migrational situations. In such cases, the culturalization stimulates somewhat the corresponding type in the earlier period. When an individual moves from one group to another he comes into contact with various institutions to which he acquires corresponding social conduct. The general result is a type of conformity to the cultural existence of the new group without question or deliberate effort on the part of the already culturalized individual. To consider first national and ethnic migration, the person is culturalized by acquiring the dress, speech, and manner reactions of the new group. The sheer availability of new stimulative objects brings about new casual culturalization. Unlike the case of early casual domestication, adult individuals are aware of the circumstances they are in and appreciate the development they are undergoing, at least to a certain extent. The difference in the situation, however, must be regarded as the basis for a very different type of psychological phenomenon, but this is not meant to deny that in certain instances adult casual culturalization corresponds very directly to the casual development of equipment in the earlier stages. On the whole, the adult phase is very unimportant in comparison with the total process of early domestication. This is apparent of course from the fact that after all, migration is a restricted circumstance in the psychological life of persons.

The most striking as well as the most important casual

culturalization of the adult type occurs when the individual enters some of the numerous collectivities within the large national or ethnic groups. Upon becoming a member of a professional or occupational unit, contacts with the institutions of those collectivities induce the building up of cultural personality equipment in an essentially casual manner.

Adult Deliberate Culturalization.—Deliberate adult culturalization may be divided into prescribed and intentional personality development. In entering a political, professional, or occupational group, for instance, we discover a definite attempt on the part of a collectivity, of particular individuals, to force upon the new member responses represented by the etiquette, ethics, professional and occupational techniques, of those groups. One cannot be an acceptable member of these organizations without conforming very definitely to their customs, beliefs, attitudes, and other ways of acting. When we consider all of the associations to which individuals must as a matter of course belong, we observe adults constantly undergoing prescribed culturalization. In other words, whether our societies are simple or complex, persons are constantly building up traits which are forced upon them.

Among the best examples of intentional acquisition of cultural traits are those in which individuals form associations to escape the culturalization they would be compelled to undergo in other groups. To illustrate, during a war, collectivities develop, who under the slogan of conscientious objection, dissociate themselves from those who submit to the institutions of the war group. It is possible that this phenomenon really consists of a solidification of a non-closely knit association of individuals into a more definite collectivity because of the need for resistance to what are regarded as obnoxious institutions.

We may look upon this whole situation in the following manner. Frequently persons are members of certain associations, to the institutions of which they conform more or

less, as long as the conformity is not made overt. Such persons are loyal when no strict test of cohesion with national or other groups is made. But as in the case of war, when actual loyalty conflicts with another type of culturalization, or with some non-cultural form of behavior, then resistance is shown. It is in this sense that the loose connection with a certain type of institution and group is completely broken or solidified in the manner indicated.

Comparable situations are found in many different forms of human activities. Religious groups are frequently formed, merely to escape the culturalization that would be forced upon one if one remained in a distasteful religious group. Among such voluntary organizations are also to be listed lodges, fraternities, political parties, clubs, etc.

METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CULTURALIZATION

It is quite plain that culturalization in its details constitutes a series of ubiquitous and unceasing processes. Now it is quite to be expected then that we might discover more or less definite methods of their operation. By methods of culturalization we can properly mean nothing more than that culturalization occurs in a decided and distinctive way. At most we can say that in a certain situation culturalization takes place in a comparatively different manner than in some other.

The process of culturalization may also be said to entail the employment of instruments. Especially in some of the deliberate culturalization situations we may isolate definite instruments which are used to make individuals build up particular types of cultural behavior. At first blush one hesitates to believe that human organisms during their behavior acquisition can be so effectively handled as the use of tools would imply, but this is undoubtedly the case.

Of course, instruments of culturalization are not what we

ordinarily mean by the word. Institutions are not always things as in other situations. They may be merely the subtle whisperings of approval or disapproval. In this case, the tools of domestication consist of behavior, though most effective in their use. Such tools are distinguished, too, by the lack of necessary intention in their employment. They frequently are manipulated without the express knowledge even of the user.

Because we are dealing with behavior situations it is not surprising that frequently the methods of culturalization cannot be distinguished from instruments. Both merge with the stimulus and response background to constitute the socialization circumstance. In many instances, however, definite things serve as instruments which are manipulated with a succinct method for the production of desired types of cultural personality. As such an instrument we may cite a school curriculum and its employment as a distinct socialization method.

Early Culturalization Methods and Instruments.—Because in early infancy domestication is practically identical with the individual's psychological development we may hardly speak of methods at this period. Certainly there is no more intentional handling of the infant beyond providing him with particular cultural objects and situations in the way of an ordinary human environment. However, since the individual's traits and attitudes are none the less determined, we may regard the use of methods as having its beginnings here. As instruments we may consider the particular objects about the home, such as toys, dress, food, pictures, etc. The contacts of infants with these objects must, of course, be entirely casual.

Somewhat beyond the very earliest of these culturalization months more definite socialization methods are discernible. For example, in inducing infants to assume certain manners such as not interrupting conversation, greeting people properly, not being shy, being quiet and reserved, more concrete

instruments are employed. Corporal punishment plays its part here, as well as frightening children in various ways. An especially effective method is the invocation of rivalry and achievement motives. These different forms of inducing cultural development are supplemented by various types of bargaining and cajolery. It is evident that all these culturalization methods are the same as are employed in the general parental supervision of behavior acquisition.

Upon reaching the distinctly childhood period, culturalization tools take on a decidedly definite form. Here the schools constitute the principal and most effective instruments. From a psychological standpoint the school in complex collectivities is almost exclusively an instrument designed on a grand scale to induce individuals to build up behavior of conformity with the group. It is through the school that individuals become like others in their intellectual capacities (whether high or low), in their group pride and loyalty, conventional tastes, etc. An observation of the school curriculum in various groups, either the democratic sameness of public schools or the privileged exclusion of private establishments, indicates what schools are designed to accomplish. In the insistence of Catholic collectivities upon their own schools, in which individuals are made to supplement their book learning or skills with the acquisition of moral and religious traits, we have a definite example of the instrumental character of the school.

Close competitors to the school as instruments of socialization are various ceremonials and rituals which function in all societies and operate throughout the development and behavior life of individuals. Probably the best instances are observed in simpler societies in which such ritualistic practices really preëempt a place occupied by schools in more complex communities. In much simpler civilizations we find that ceremonials are deliberately made use of by the group in order to force upon younger members very distinct and valued traits of conduct. By such means the individual is

made to take on the essential characteristics of bravery, courage, wisdom, dignity, and responsibility which mark him as a worthy member of the collectivity in question.

Notice, however, that in complex societies, ceremonials function just as effectively in the process of culturalization. Intricate societies of every variety have their full complement of initiations, confirmations, graduations, and other rituals and ceremonials, which keep members of specific communities alert to the necessities of their personal requirements and mark the successes with which they achieve the desired domestication.

Statues and monuments correlate very closely with ceremonials and rituals as instruments of socialization. For such objects serve to induce in individuals love and reverence for persons who as members of certain groups have performed feats of valor, justice, etc. These objects as well as other commemorative and celebrative symbols are set up primarily to achieve unity and loyalty in a group. They operate, however, as definite implements of behavior development.

Late Culturalization Methods and Instruments.—Among the instruments for adult culturalization we find both general and specific varieties. The former serve to induce general responses of conformity to the collectivities in which the individual finds himself. For instance, through the use of various culturalization tools it is designed to form the character, ideals, tastes, aesthetic attitudes and moral habits of individuals. The existence of these instruments is made especially evident when one fails to heed their function. However, they are none the less definite means of inducing individuals to achieve certain types of behavior traits regarded as necessary or desirable in a particular collectivity.

Although one is never overtly told what one must do in the way of developing personality equipment, there is no mistaking the reward of approval or the lash of disapproval on the part of certain members of the group. On the basis

of one's amenability to culturalization one is ostracized or socially accepted by other individuals. All of those subtle factors referred to by sociologists as intangible forces of social control constitute the machinery for adult culturalization. They not only induce the acquisition of general social attitudes but they determine that the individual must develop specific forms of behavior. The power of public opinion as a socialization instrument requires no special descriptive elaboration. Its effect is no whit minimized even if it is true that what is regarded as public opinion is something set up as such by the individuals concerned.

Supreme among the tools of adult culturalization is the printing press and its products. While the products include books and journals the newspaper properly stands at the head of the list of social instruments. It is quite unnecessary to point out how the ideals, beliefs, loyalties and other traits of a distinctly cultural type are forced upon individuals through the reading of newspapers. Let us notice that their powerful effect is derived from the fact that without them there would be no stimuli for a great many actions at all. It is only through the printed page that the majority of individuals have any contact with political, social, economic, and other types of objects. It is quite readily seen, then, that the newspaper can function as a definite instrument to induce the acquisition of attitudes, beliefs, habits, and thought with respect to all phases of human circumstances.

Various sociological organizations such as trade unions, churches, lodges, and fraternities likewise assume a prominent place in our list of socialization instruments. These organizations are not only objects in which cultural stimuli inhere for certain psychological collectivities but they are also tools for inducing ideas, ideals, and other modes of conduct. The culturalizing character of these anthropic objects is an independent property, though interrelated with their unique sociological qualities as well as with their functions in stimulating

behavior. No one can overlook the striking effect they have in inducing conventional conduct, such as the acquisition of loyalty, reverence, protection, etc., with respect to religious traditions, workers' ideals, or to the general human values of military, scholastic or other collectivities.

Families and clans employ symbols and traditions as definite means of moulding cultural personalities. Through such tools persons are made to acquire behavior centering around a web of traditions and values calling for loyalties, conformities, and other activities designed for the preservation and continuity of the family or clan.

It is impossible to overlook the powerful instrumental nature of economic advantage or control for the achievement of specific culturalization effects. These tools are employed by the men who own or control industries in such a way that they have power to train and educate the people along specified lines. Such training, however, goes beyond the acquisition of capacities or techniques for the purposes of industry. It forces individuals to think and act along political lines both with respect to government (democrats or republicans) and industrial control (unionists or anti-unionists).

In recent years it has become a common observation that propaganda of various types constitutes a formidable element of social life. It is inescapable therefore that propaganda in the sense of a deliberate attempt to spread information and induce ideas and beliefs should become one of the most potent of all instruments of culturalization. It is obviously one of the most deliberate forms of developing psychological traits. As a distinctly psychological fact, propaganda consists of the process of forcing stimulating conditions upon persons in an extremely large variety of ways. Advertising in its various forms, the searching out and spreading of information, the establishment of museums and less permanent exhibitions, are all forms of culturalization instruments. It is probably not necessary to specify that propaganda includes all ranges

of stimulation from the subtle suggestion of veiled insinuations to the most blatant announcements. But we might add that propaganda is equally instrumental in producing rapid and temporary results, as in the case of socializing persons to believe in a military campaign, as well as in achieving durable and even permanent effects.

The treatment of propaganda as a culturalization instrument leads us to consider the great influence of language as a tool of domestication. To be sure, propaganda in many ways is itself a type of linguistic implement. Language as such must also be regarded as a similar instrument. For the spread of ideas and the induction of feelings through information and personal discussion is an important feature of the deliberate culturalization process. Besides we must include here the highly organized forms of linguistic tools as found in teaching, preaching, and lecturing, in which individuals bring about in others desired attitudes as well as the acquisition of custom and social habit responses. In these various fashions are built up tolerances, intolerances, loyalties, disloyalties, so-called spiritual and religious tendencies, etc. On the whole we might consider the linguistic type of instrument as one of the most important of all the culturalization tools, whether we insist upon its autonomy as a direct instrument or whether we think of it as an indirect mechanism having a place in every type of culturalization process.

It will probably appear somewhat far-fetched to think of laws and codes as instruments of culturalization. But we must not ignore the fact that laws and codes can have no existence or viability without the reciprocal acceptance and obedience by individuals. Accordingly, they perform distinctly psychological functions. Whether laws are regarded as the formulation of custom and usages already existing or whether they are prescriptions for new forms of behavior, in either case they stimulate the development and continuation of particular forms of cultural behavior. In consequence, we

must look upon them as definite culturalization instruments. As compared with laws, which are concerned with more restricted governmental group behavior, codes cover a wider range of specific traits of conduct. Codes prescribing the ethical standards of the professions or dictating the behavior of commercial and industrial organizations definitely lead individuals to enter into a particular social status.

Unintentional but none the less effective instruments of socialization are found in many of the anthropic conditions of sets of persons. Thus for example we have already had occasion to refer to the effect which machine industry and processes have in building up types of cultural mentality. A most effective agency for determining the social mentality of persons is the isolation of groups and their lack of communication with other collectivities. Such segregation definitely conditions the anthropic character of a group. The presence or absence of certain actions or institutional objects, determines in turn the type of temporary or permanent traits the individuals in question will have.

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF CULTURALIZATION

Cultural personality development as an incessant feature of the socialization process is naturally subject to certain general hindering and aiding conditions. It is quite fitting therefore to close our chapter on culturalization with a brief enumeration of some of the more prominent conditions operating to further or retard the development of cultural qualities. We may apportion our discussion on the basis of the stimulus and response circumstances.

On the response side we must mention first that the present personality status of any individual may serve effectively to promote the culturalization process. On the whole, as we have already had occasion to remark, the absence of traits of any kind means a rapid and smooth development of some par-

ticular type of cultural equipment. In such a case the individual is prepared for any kind of personality development. The absence of equipment is therefore a sort of negative aid in culturalization. In case the individual has already acquired considerable personality equipment, these traits are possibly similar to those to be taken on. In such an instance the previously possessed equipment constitutes a favorable condition for the assimilation of a given form of social conduct. Culturalization on this basis is a much quicker and more effective process than otherwise would be the case. For instance, it is much easier to acquire ideas and language responses, in short, every type of cultural reaction, when they resemble closely the responses one has already learned. Agreeable equipments, even when non-cultural in character, are quite liable to function as helpful circumstances in culturalization.

On the stimulus or institutional side we find aids for cultural development of a negative type in the absence of disturbing or hostile institutions. If everyone about us accepts some sort of religious creed we cannot be prevented from acquiring belief in such an institution ourselves. More positive conditions are the presence in our cultural milieu of stable and more accepted institutions of many kinds. In such cases we have already seen that the culturalization of the individual along certain lines is practically inevitable. Opportunities to be in contact with certain institutions and knowledge of their existence are, of course, necessary and favorable conditions for the development of particular cultural traits.

A somewhat more extraneous type of culturalization condition we find in the circumstances which make our contacts with certain institutions possible or impossible. If we are socially unable to belong to a particular collectivity we cannot take on the behavior traits of the members of that group since we have no opportunity to be influenced by their special institutions. Economic conditions and circumstances likewise provide or prevent opportunities for coming into contact with institutions. Those who cannot afford to go to college, to

travel, and purchase books only encounter the institutions in their immediate surroundings. On the whole, if a college is near at hand persons are more likely to attend it than if they are at some distance from it. Thus the fact of accessibility of a certain set of institutions has a tremendous influence upon the type of cultural personality one becomes.

Hindrances of culturalization are of the same general types, but opposite in their effect. On the personality side, an individual who has already acquired opposing responses to certain objects cannot readily if at all take on certain forms of behavior equipment. Already being a Methodist, it is not as easy to acquire the religious traits of a Catholic as it would be without such traits. An atheistical person cannot easily be won over to any particular form of religious group. A scientist confirmed in the beliefs of a certain school cannot be induced to acquire favorable attitudes toward a contrary doctrine. Generally speaking, too, idiosyncratic behavior equipment constitutes a decided obstacle in an individual's socialization.

Furthermore, the person who is in contact with many collectivities and who is therefore subject to many kinds of contrary stimulation is very liable not to be culturalized in any particular way. Not being dominated by any specific kind of socialization process, such individuals find themselves outside the pale of restricting culturalization. As such they are surrounded by the optimum conditions for developing unique idiosyncratic personality equipment rather than conventional behavior traits. It must be added, however, that contacts with several types of institutions, when not too numerous, may result in the development of personality equipment representing crosses between various forms of collectivities.

Patent hindrances of socialization inhere in various conditions and circumstances that in general interfere with a person's psychological development. Here we may cite the biological factors such as maldevelopment and underdevelopment or general ill health.

CHAPTER X

CULTURAL PERSONALITY AS HUMAN NATURE

CULTURAL PERSONALITY THE PRODUCT OF SOCIALIZATION

Personality we have already learned is nothing but the sum total of the response equipment which the individual accumulates throughout his reactional experience.¹ The underlying fact of psychological personality is the coördination of specific acts and particular stimulations functions.

Cultural personality we may call human nature in its cultural aspects. Human nature as a psychological fact consists of the entire behavior equipment of a given individual. From a psychological standpoint therefore human nature is synonymous with personality. But human nature is of course not only cultural, but idiosyncratic as well. As cultural, human nature comprises only the sum of the intellectual, aesthetic, custom and other reactions which the person has acquired through the various socialization processes of which he is a product. Cultural personality therefore is a single though the largest phase of human nature.

Whenever we use the term personality it is understood of course that we refer to the behavior characteristics of an individual rather than to his momentary conduct. Cultural nature refers then to traits of action. Thus cultural personality is in a genuine sense a product of the culturalization process.

Let us suggest, too, that human nature can only be regarded as the particular traits of some specific person. There is no

¹ Cf. Chapter VI.

such thing as human nature in general, unless indeed one means to symbolize by the term the general differences between human and infrahuman animals. To have any scientific significance the term human nature must refer to specific phenomena. In its cultural aspects, human nature or personality refers to the complete and exclusive cultural behavior equipment of some given individual.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PERSONALITY

Misconceptions concerning human nature and personality are so rife that it will repay us well to take cognizance of some of them.

First, we may glance at the notion that human nature consists of various innate powers, forces and capacities. This theory has been exploited in a great variety of ways. Human individuals are presumed to be natively equipped with different ultimate capacities of intelligence, with primordial likes and dislikes, or absolute desires. These are understood to make persons act in given ways and even to be the causes for the development of particular sorts of civilization.

Probably the most popular form of this notion is that concerned with instincts. Men are assumed to be endowed with an instinct to fight, a perennial spring of action which manifests itself in the pugnacity of children and in the military exploits of adult life. That we have children, live in cities, feel inferior or superior are all expressions of native forces in persons. Those who do not like the conception of native force have attempted to modify it by disguising it in terms of ultimate or prepotent reflexes. Thus it is asserted that the family is based upon sex reflexes. Again, a withdrawing reflex leads to learning and thought. In short, the whole drama of human behavior and social life is made the effect of a few potent reflexes.

Such a conception of personality and human existence re-

quires only a brief inspection to dissipate it into the sheer abstraction that it is. These powers, instincts, and feelings are all variations of *Fata Morgana* invented to account quickly for all sorts of complex human phenomena. What is achieved by such explanatory means is merely the evasion of all the myriads of actual happenings which have a part in the shaping of psychological social phenomena.

In recent years the facts of personality or human nature have become involved with the notion of the unconscious. The proponents of this conception hit upon the fact that individuals perform activities of which they are themselves not cognizant and which frequently constitute imperious modes of behavior. These facts have been interpreted to mean that personality or human nature is therefore a large force or mental entity, manifesting itself in all the specific forms of action. From the other theory just discussed the present notion varies in positing a single general force instead of many specific ones. It is easily recognized as a version of the older doctrine of the will to live.

Both of these theories and many others of the absolutistic type make of human nature an absolute entity or series of forces. Such a human nature is not only presumed to be a permanent factor in human life but also the source of all the facts and conditions constituting human behavior and civilization. Simple theories these are in more ways than one.

What they overlook and even conceal is the absolute interaction of human nature with civilizational facts. To take cognizance of this interaction is to discover that human nature in its cultural aspects is for the most part a definite product of the facts and forces of civilization.

What these and similar theories refer to is the fact that persons insidiously acquire series of reaction equipment throughout their reactional biographies. True it is then that we may suddenly discover that we speak prose or have likes and dislikes that are conventional for the groups in which

we live. But to account for and describe these circumstances, we need only refer back to the intimate details of our reactional biography during the course of which we have acquired these personality traits. In considering the culturalization features of our behavior history we see why it is that a Christian cannot think beyond the Christian way of thinking, why an Englishman speaks English, or why a certain scientist cannot understand any other way of looking at particular phenomena than in terms of his own particular school. The force and unknown drive for particular sorts of action reduces to the fact of conventional socialization.

IMPERMANENCE OF HUMAN NATURE²

Aside from the universal forms of response our cultural behavior equipment is obviously the most enduring. But even these equipments do not prevent human nature from being a highly impermanent fact.¹ Indeed such a circumstance is only to be expected when we are concerned with any psychological phenomenon.

Those who believe in the permanence of human nature appear to overlook the detailed responses of individuals. They look upon human behavior only in its statistical aspects. It is true that persons summed up as particular social groups always perform typical actions. Thus Russians always live in Russia, are orthodox, and speak Russian, but such generalization informs us at once that we are not on psychological ground. Here there is on the surface a permanence of action and circumstance. But no such diuturnity of psychological phenomena is admissible when we are concerned with actual psychological adjustments. In such phenomena we observe numerous and constant changes. The cultural equipment of

¹ How quickly human nature can change is excellently illustrated by the rapidity with which pacifistic people become violent warriors in the events of a national crisis even when the crisis exists only in propaganda.

persons is forever varying commutually with changes in their correlated stimuli functions.

Of course one cannot deny that some individuals change comparatively little. In such cases we almost always find that these persons live in isolation and do not come into contact with situations capable of changing their reactional equipments. But even the most enduring personalities leave no room for the belief in immutable entities or qualities.

When we study actual behavior conditions we accomplish two things. In the first place, we learn just what the conditions and circumstances are, under which human nature develops in both its cultural and non-cultural phases. We learn further that the less intricate the personality the less likelihood there is of changing. Those individuals who live in simpler ethnic and national collectivities and who are accordingly in contact with fewer institutions do not have as many opportunities to alter their psychological natures as those living in more complex civilizations.

Probably the doctrine of permanent human nature is also kept alive by the confusion of psychological facts with anatomical characteristics. For the most part the anatomical make-up of individuals remains relatively fixed, especially when we compare members of different racial or national communities. Even here, however, careful study indicates the great variability in general appearance, size and shape of head and other biological characteristics. On the whole, too, such changes are traceable to the altered behavior life of such persons although the detailed correlations are not available for enumeration.

Now it is not to be denied that there is a factor of human nature which is subject to very little alteration. These are of course the reflex elements of the universal behavior equipment. Clearly such reactions, being based upon the biological characteristics of individuals and the natural properties of objects, always remain much as they are in the beginning.

But of course these are such simple actions that they are hardly representative of the individual's total personality. If those who believe in the permanence of human nature base their attitude upon the constancy of reflex action we must be somewhat sympathetic with their view. The indiscrimination involved, however, does nothing to mitigate the ineptness of the interpretation when applied to the whole of human nature.

Were human nature invariable it would be impossible for individuals to move from one group and be reculturized in another. We must appeal to the myriads of cases in which persons not only take on new and enlarged personality equipments but discard the old. What psychologically active individual has not been frequently reborn intellectually? What we may ask is the meaning of religious conversion if not a fundamental change in cultural personality? Is it an infrequent phenomenon for an individual to lose the language of his youth and to be inured as a member of another ethnic or national linguistic community? What can higher education genuinely signify but a transformation of the cognitive personality? We cannot allow the argument that because these are only partial metamorphoses they do not signify that human nature is changed. For in the first place, these types of equipment are of the very essence of psychological nature and the question whether more or less alteration occurs does not gainsay the genuineness of the personality transformation. In the second place, there is no type of personality change that does not occur, nor is there any limit to the amount of the person's nature that can be transformed.

It has already been suggested that the alteration of social personality is a function of the modifications in the institutional surroundings of the individual. In general we may point out two main conditions underlying the changes in human nature. In the first place, there is the modification of the institutions themselves among which the individual lives. By whatever means the institutions surrounding the

individual become different through that method the cultural personality of the person will take on marked differences. On the other hand, the individual may move from one institutional location to another so that his change of personality character will consist primarily of substituting newer for older behavior equipment.

TYPES OF CULTURAL PERSONALITY

Cultural personalities as products of socialization may be segregated into types. These types consist of classes of persons who share a given form of social nature. Each member of such a class possesses certain behavior equipment characterizing him as a psychological derivative of some specific psychological collectivity. Types of cultural personality then constitute series of persons with similar outstanding behavior traits. Their particular kinds of religious attitudes or intellectual responses plainly show the influence upon them of certain psychological institutions.

None other than the fact of cultural personality constitutes the psychological basis for any valid conception of race and national psychology. Thus one may select certain ethnic or national groups and enumerate various behavior traits which characterize the individual members. Such observations are made only on a comparative basis. For instance, one compares the feelings, attitudes, and practices of certain communities as over against the corresponding behavior of others. We may find that members of certain collectivities believe that the earth is flat and not elliptical or entertain the idea that there is a personal maker or ruler of the universe which others do not accept. Such differences in psychological nature must all refer to specific activities whether intellectual, artistic, or manual practices. Naturally such differences in action may be more or less general. For instance, members of mystical groups will perform many mystical actions not shared

by persons of non-mystical collectivities. Beliefs in mystic powers coördinate with mystic practices, etc.

In studying human nature we must guard against falling into the erroneous belief that the human mind is a substance or an entity of some sort and that such different entities manifest themselves by causing persons to act differently. Popular thought is replete with such inept attitudes. On such a basis it is asserted that the British mentality is inherently imperial and maritime, while the Greek is constitutionally a trader, and the black man intrinsically a subject of political and economic exploitation.

Some of the most striking personality types that have been exploited are those contrasting so-called primitive and civilized persons. This comparison is the source of a whole branch of psychology devoted to the explanation of the differences between primitive and civilized minds. It is obviously possible to show that great differences exist between the behavior of persons from primitive and from more complex human groups. Such observations have led to various theories of mentality. Some assert that while fundamental differences in mental qualities exist between the so-called primitive and other more complex people, that the differences are not established. Others more bold in their pronouncements point out absolute differences in the mental qualities of primitive and non-primitive groups. Thus the most striking recent theory declares that the primitive mind is illogical. Whereas civilized men think according to cause and effect, primitive man has no conception of contradiction and explains everything in an occult or mystic manner.¹ As it happens in this case, the conception of an ultimate difference in mental qualities is not borne out by the facts. Primitive men are not illogical² as is made out nor are civilized men universally as logical as this sharp contrast would seem to indicate.

¹ Cf. Levy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, 1923; *How Natives Think*, 1926.

² Cf. Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, 1927.

From an objective psychological standpoint it is evident that whatever differences one may sum up as characteristic of certain peoples are only differences in actual behavior and equipment, built up through contact with particular institutions. Genuine typifying variations exist of course in different individuals, but these are not absolute differences. Now is it likely that any given form of behavior is totally absent from any collectivity? We must remind ourselves once more that the psychological type differences we are describing are activities which characterize a certain collectivity, but the same responses may be performed by persons of other groups as idiosyncratic or contingent behavior.

National types of personality constitute the next most striking form. Accordingly one might draw up large lists of behavior traits characterizing the persons of certain national groups. The taciturnity of Englishmen, the vivacity of Frenchmen, the melancholy of the Persian, are cases in point. As we have already seen, the collectivities of the national type all harbor institutions which stimulate persons to build up distinctive behavior traits. The members of these groups accordingly perform characteristic actions ranging from distinctive ways of walking and talking to reasoning and producing art objects. In each national group there are psychological collectivities whose socialization produces varying personalities. Hence we have all sorts of superstitious, illiterate, irresponsible, quick-witted, cruel, humble, mercenary, arrogant, and sly personalities.

Consonant with the entire trend of our study is the observation that it is a mistake to limit cultural personality types to those exhibiting what is usually regarded as national or ethnic traits. Persons stressing even one form of behavior of the groups we have enumerated in the chapter on cultural reactions, must be regarded as exhibiting distinct social personality patterns. We need only refer to that series of behavior groups for a large number of personality types. It is

only necessary to remember that while in chapter seven we were interested in reactions, at the present time we are stressing the persons who perform the behavior.

We submit therefore that among the prominent personality types are the masculine and feminine forms. Clearly, the variations in behavior between such individuals are genuinely socially acquired responses to institutional stimuli. Doubtless there are great numbers of intermediate types between these two. The latter as well as the extreme forms can be isolated on the basis of such traits as shyness, boldness, emotionality, refinement, etc.

Then there are the intellectual, artistic, and intelligent personalities. These traits may be decidedly cultural in character. What we must do here is to think of particular human circumstances. One may or may not be conventionally artistic. Within the artistic field one may be socialized as an impressionist, realist, or post-impressionist.

Intellectual personalities are just as definitely the results of socialization. Here again the question whether one is intellectual or not may be decidedly determined by one's contacts with institutional stimuli. Examples of specialized intellectual personalities are the various forms of idealists, realists, the prejudiced, the bigoted, the mediaevalists, and modernists, the pessimists and optimists.

Ordinarily, intelligence is not regarded as a cultural trait, but a study of the socialization processes leaves no question that it is. As in every other case, intelligence is not exclusively cultural. But it is undoubtedly true that one may or may not be intelligent because of contacts or lack of contacts with intelligent institutions. Who can deny that much school work and many school systems constitute agencies for bringing or keeping persons to a fairly low stage of intelligence. It is deplorable that all too frequently school critics make out a good case to the effect that the school deadens spontaneity and mechanizes the mentality of its victims. We may complete

our illustrative list of personality types with those individuals who are products of custom and moral socialization. The stoical, egotistic, the cruel and self-sacrificing personalities spring forth from the pages of human life as glaring examples. Both large and small aggregations of human individuals may be regarded as the sources of such types.

EFFECT OF CULTURALIZATION UPON HUMAN NATURE

Since culturalization traits constitute so large and powerful a feature of personality we cannot but expect culturalization to have a tremendous effect upon individuals. Among the most striking of these results is the interference with one's idiosyncratic behavior. Especially does culturalization obstruct an individual's thinking. Because of the experiences of persons we should expect them to be independent in their intellectual attitudes and in general adapt themselves intellectually to their surroundings on the basis of their surrounding circumstances. But no, culturalization in certain forms prevents such adaptation. To illustrate, a scientist has been in contact with certain phenomena. Instead of describing them on an objective basis the influence of his culturalization in a certain ethnic or professional group imposes upon him a biased description and interpretation. This condition may go so far as to make him entirely illogical. In many instances although the individual may know the objection to his attitude he still cannot help clinging to it because of his socialization. A psychologist, though thoroughly imbued with the spirit of objective observation cannot forsake the idea that he is dealing with occult things. Here is the basis for fashions and traditions in science.

But not only do professional and ethnic groups influence a scientist but his religious culturalization likewise colors his intellectual conduct. So, also do aesthetic, and other types of socialization sway his thinking and other intellectual con-

duct. In fact, all the behavior of persons is so influenced. Even our elementary no less than our complex perceptual conduct is very profoundly conditioned by our socialization. Perceptual responses accordingly, are reactions to both cultural and natural properties of things.

In the same way our aesthetic responses are notoriously affected by the particular way we have been socialized. Persons do not therefore react purely to aesthetic objects but to the qualities with which they have been invested by members of certain groups. Aesthetic judgments and appreciation are universally warped by the trend of culturalization. It is for this reason as much as the differences in training and experience, that persons from different groups cannot agree upon the beauty of things.

Nor does our moral behavior escape the extreme limitations put upon it by the way we have been socialized. How impossible it is for persons to appreciate the viewpoint and the practices of those who have been differently culturalized. Logic in such cases has neither standing nor authority.

As a final illustration of the great limitations placed upon personality adjustments we mention the effect of our linguistic socialization. Long after circumstances change, the same linguistic references persist. The names of our sciences and their materials continue though the things referred to are no longer present. For instance, psychology is not a descriptive name for the reactions that we actually study. And we continue to say the sun rises and sets though we know it does neither of these things.

UNIQUENESS OF CULTURAL NATURE

The cornerstone of all psychological science is the fundamental law of individual differences. Every individual is a unique personality with respect to cultural behavior as well as every other kind. Even though cultural behavior consti-

tutes shared conduct it does not interfere with this law. Even those individuals who are practically entirely products of culturalization and who have the smallest amount of non-cultural equipment are individually different. For each specific individual is the unique product of his own series of socialization processes. Thus every individual is really constituted of a variety of cultural personalities. Among each person's behavior equipments there are many kinds of reaction systems acquired through contact with many different types of institutional stimuli. Hence it is an absolute impossibility for any person to share every detail of his equipment with any other individual.

In consequence each instance of human nature represents a unique organization of cultural traits. Compare several individuals among whose behavior equipment certain traits are exceedingly prominent. As alike as two scientists may be in their scientific behavior, they are very unlike in other behavior respects. One individual may have musical or other artistic tastes and capacities, whereas others have no appreciation of such things. A still better illustration is the differentiation between two scientists both of whom have practically identical attitudes and technical responses, but one of whom is a logician whereas the other has no equipment for spontaneous criticism and thinking. Instructive examples of the individual differences in cultural conduct are afforded by those scientific individuals who are split personalities. They are culturalized as scientists on the one hand, but are the products of the most backward religious socialization on the other.

An artist may be culturalized very effectively in some general or special aesthetic collectivity so far as technique is concerned, but he may not have had the advantage of contact with a school or group so as to have acquired talent, spontaneity, or originality. Similarly, some artistic personality equipments include considerable intellectual or general in-

formational characteristics, whereas others lack any large complement of such reactional traits.

When we turn to less specialized forms of cultural traits we find every possible variety of equipmental organization. This is only to be expected with all the myriads of cultural collectivities existing which constitute loci for the socialization of persons. Personality patterns are an intricate web of varying customs, ideas, habits, beliefs and other traits that could only be shared by persons if it were possible for them to belong to precisely the same behavior groups. Surely an impossible circumstance. Among the differences to which we are now referring are such as mark persons as stoical, epicurean, considerate, selfish, "cultural," critical, uncritical, complex or simple, effective or ineffective, "magnetic," etc. In general, these individual differences make for variation in what is ordinarily called human character. And the variations are without limit.

An interesting phenomenon of cultural individual differences is that certain traits for some individuals are cultural that for others are not so at all. Thus for some persons technological activities are predominantly social, while for others they are not. Still other individuals perform predominantly cultural reactions in domestic circumstances in contrast to those who react non-culturally to such situations. The most striking individual differences in the performance of cultural conduct are illustrated by those persons who even in matters of ordinary custom and usage contrive to be individual and independent of their associated collectivities. In all of these circumstances, of course, the kind of reactions performed are limited by definite conditions. Thus linguistic actions must be overwhelmingly cultural for everyone.

A distinct feature of individual differences of cultural personality is the question as to the homogeneity and harmony of the various traits of the personality pattern. As a member of so many collectivities it is almost inevitable that some of

the individual's traits will not harmonize well, at least from the standpoint of an outside observer. Some of these conflicting types we have already referred to in pointing to the uncritical scientist or the unaesthetic artist. Other examples in restricted situations are the mechanical biologist, one namely who reduces his biological facts to some sort of simple formula, or the spiritualistic psychologist, that is to say, one who misinterprets the reactions he studies because of some traditional attitude. Disharmonies in cultural personality pattern are inevitably fostered by stepping out of one's immediately surrounding collectivities and taking on cultural equipment from neighboring groups. It appears quite clear on the whole then that cultural behavior makes for individual differentiation rather than preventing such a condition.

RELATIVE QUALITIES OF CULTURAL PERSONALITY

Wherever differences are found the spirit of comparison thrives. And so the question arises as to the relative qualities of cultural personalities.

As we everywhere expect in the field of psychology, the criterion for comparison lies close to the question of adaptation or adjustment. Now since cultural responses are conventional activities it is obvious that we are not concerned here with specific social responses. Clearly all cultural conduct adjusts the person superlatively to the specific groups in which they belong, for cultural responses are reactions of participation. Their very acquisition means that the person fits into the psychological group. What our problem really refers to is the question whether some given individual is aided or hindered by his cultural equipment in his adjustment to particular situations.

A person may be unable to adapt himself to some situation because his equipment was built up under very different circumstances. In consequence his behavior will be different and

thus inadequate. War arises. Those persons whose culturalization has been pacifistic cannot think of war as justifiable. They also naturally do not share the enthusiasm of those militaristically socialized. Now when such thinking and enthusiasm is regarded as requisite for the war situation, some personalities are unable to adapt themselves as efficiently as some others.

Rather than merely possessing different requisite equipment, persons may simply lack responses necessary for some special circumstance. Of two persons whose business capacities equally recommend them for promotion, one is simply impossible because he lacks the conventional manners, deference, obeisance, which are regarded as necessary for the situation. One might just as well lack the language necessary for speaking to certain people.

Relative adaptational qualities of individuals are likewise illustrated by the person who has acquired cultural equipment which totally unfits him for some circumstance. Referring again to our promotional illustration, one individual may be entirely unable to adapt himself because he has acquired positively wrong manners. That person who speaks "ungrammatically" or who has assumed undesirable gestures cannot compete at all with other individuals.

So far we have differentiated the relative qualities of cultural personalities on the basis of adjusting to some existing condition. In these instances the question of superiority or inferiority lies in the effectiveness of adaptation

There is another basis for judging. Is or is not the individual's cultural personality such as to interfere with his general advancement? Probably with most people culturalization equipment brings with it perfect adaptation and an utter satisfaction. The best adapted individual may be one whose culturalization prevents him from doing more and becoming more, as judged by some idealistic standard. One factor in such a situation may be the complete submergence of

the idiosyncratic individual by his cultural personality. Now in view of the fact that whatever human progress there is must have its origin in particular individuals, those who are best adapted culturally may be counted as the most inferior from a general human standpoint.

CHAPTER XI

THE MECHANISM OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Institutional mechanisms are the processes by which things are invested with institutional or stimuli functions. The study of these mechanisms is an essential feature of social psychology, since it informs us first of the origin and disappearance of one of the fundamental features of social psychological data, namely institutions. Secondly, the investigation of cultural mechanisms teaches us much concerning the development of cultural personality. For as our study of culturalization has disclosed, the person's contact with institutions determines the nature of his particular complement of behavior equipment.

THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM

Institutional mechanisms consist essentially of processes in which responses and stimuli are coördinated under specified conditions. When persons perform shared reactions to given objects these things take on definite cultural stimuli functions. It is the specific behavior contacts of the individual with objects which are developing cultural stimuli functions that constitute the institutional mechanisms. Similarly, every change in or disappearance of a cultural stimulus function of an object or situation can only occur through a mutual interaction between the object or situation in which the modify-

ing institutional functions inhere, and the individuals who are responding to it.

Now after institutions have come into existence they may be regarded as autonomously existing. This means to say that when a child is born into a psychological collectivity, objects are already endowed with stimulating functions which the individual discovers and which induce him to build up corresponding traits of reaction. For example, in an English speaking collectivity an apple already has inhering in it the stimulus function of calling out the word apple as a reference response.

The study of institutional mechanisms then involves the process of abstracting and emphasizing one or the other of the two features of the inevitable stimulus and response couple. The reactional features are emphasized when persons through their behavior, originate institutions or introduce changes in them. For instance, it is through sharing the name that a power vehicle becomes an automobile or a Kraftwagen. Also by virtue of not responding to certain institutions they disappear, or by a modification of shared behavior, institutional functions change their form. Thus, while as cultural personalities we are the products of action institutions, these very institutions in turn depend upon us for their existence and development.

Observe too that the study of institutional mechanisms proceeds historically. While it is a fact that, on the whole, cultural stimuli exist before my particular advent into a group and later become elicitors of my responses in common with other people, these stimuli functions have themselves arisen through former behavior circumstances. Hence, institutions are in a sense the products of previous behavior conditions. Though such action is distantly removed from my own behavior, it is behavior nevertheless, and quite identical with the action I now perform to these institutions.

The process of institutional development could not of course

occur anywhere but within the restricted confines of particular anthropic groups. Institutions have no existence or meaning outside groups, and it is only through their agency that institutions possess any sort of durational character. Now it is quite plain that the viability and relative permanence of the psychological group find their support in the human conditions surrounding sets of persons. In the final analysis then the mechanisms for institutional development are founded upon the various political, economic, and social exigencies constituting the living conditions of groups of individuals. It is essentially in such complexes of human circumstances that we find the various stimulus-response interrelationships which form the background of institutional development.

A significant point to keep in mind is that while the phenomena of institutions and their changes are absolutely psychological and not anthropic or sociological happenings, they are at the same time most intimately tied up with the latter. We have here another specific illustration of the point frequently made before, that psychological phenomena of the social type merge more closely than other forms with their anthropic background.

In order to describe the phenomena of institutional mechanisms most effectively we will divide our study into three general divisions. First, we will consider the mechanism concerned in the origin of institutions. This phase of our study involves the question of how objects take on cultural stimulative functions in the first place.

Secondly, we will investigate the mechanisms through which things vary their stimuli functions. This is as much a mechanism of institutional deterioration and termination as the first type is one of institutional origin and development. That is, we are concerned here with the loss by objects of their institutional properties and the assumption of new stimulative qualities.

Our third and last type of institutional mechanism may be

regarded as a variation of the second. Here the objects take on new stimulatory properties, but the new responses may be regarded as a continuation of the old action, while the stimuli eliciting them are interrelated with the displaced stimuli functions.

ORIGINATING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

When the originating form of institutional mechanism operates, objects or situations are for the first time endowed with cultural properties. Originating mechanisms then are in a genuine sense institutionalizing. It is not surprising therefore, that of the several types of institutional mechanisms the present one taxes our knowledge resources most severely. Either the institutionalizing process operates with a subtlety and casualness which defy analytic and observational detection or else the instauration of cultural functions has occurred in the remote past without leaving records. The first beginnings of many institutions are imbedded in irrecoverable historical events. There are whole series of institutional phenomena, especially of the type that function in large ethnic and national groups, of whose origin we cannot possibly know anything. How and why certain objects like the planetary bodies or systems should have taken on their religious properties we simply do not know. Howsoever well we may be pleased with our anthropological guesses we are not actually able to determine why a river has become sacred. Similarly, when we consider the various stimulatory characteristics of persons who function as institutions in political, social and domestic organizations, we are overwhelmed by our ignorance concerning these matters. Hypotheses, of course, we may draw up with a certain assurance of correctness because of various observable analogies, but actual mechanisms are irretrievably lost to us.

The same conditions prevail with respect to the institutional properties of things which are humanly contrived as over

against naturally existing objects. The actual origin of particular linguistic institutions defies our most insistent curiosity to discover their genesis. The development of certain languages with their specific stimulatory functions we may be sure has definite psychological events at its basis, at least in part. But precisely because we are dealing with past events we cannot say exactly what these were like. To a certain extent we get some suggestions from the connection of the institutional mechanism with anthropological and philological data, but this cannot help us to recover the actual psychological processes involved. The difficulties here are patent when we recall that what we require to know is how a particular vocabulary (sound, intonation, and stress), word order, gender system and other grammatical processes become established as a distinctive language system.

When we turn to institutions of smaller groups, especially those having a limited period of existence, we can very definitely observe the mechanisms whereby objects are institutionalized. Indeed they are copiously illustrated in every domain of cultural behavior. Let us examine a few examples of the stimulatory investiture of both naturally existing and contrived objects with commercial institutional functions. Within the boundaries of commercial life we observe daily how some natural object, such as land in a particular place, is endowed with all types of economic cultural functions which induce actions in a large number of individuals. Through a systematic culturalization process, lands take on the properties of desirability, value, saleability, etc. Similarly, bits of stone such as jewelry are institutionalized to call out reactions of personal adornment, or are cherished and appreciated. Especially numerous are such institutionalizing activities when certain raw materials are transformed into contrived objects of all sorts. It is a decided feature of the commercial life of our civilization for persons and firms to be constantly on the *qui vive* for the possibilities of populariz-

ing certain manufactured things (clothing, furniture, soap), as the basis for fads and fashions. The whole complicated story may be told in a sentence when reference is made to the institutionalizing mechanisms involved with advertising.

The scientific field affords us a plethora of exemplars showing how various natural objects and processes become institutionalized and stimulate common responses in individuals belonging not only to restricted scientific groups but also to larger intellectual organizations. Such objects even become national and ethnic institutions. Recent examples are the institutionalizing of vitamins, internal secretions, and the sex functions and conduct of individuals (Freudianism). Persons in the scientific domain take on all types of institutional functions as wizards and gnostic authorities, through either the casual or deliberative reactions of others to them. Such institutionalization of individuals is paralleled in many human situations. For instance, many persons become distinguished by success in industry, invention, war, sport, aviation, or art, and in consequence acquire the definite institutional functions of stimulating shared responses of appreciation, approval, emulation, envy, and even worship. Those who share this behavior with respect to such famous personages constitute a definite psychological collectivity.

We cannot proceed far without mentioning those institutional mechanisms which result in the transformation of objects of natural beauty or grandeur into very definite types of institutional things. When attractive falls, canyons, and mountain peaks are discovered or made available, interested persons immediately proceed to endow them with institutional properties. The latter lead to the conventional conduct of pilgrimages and the sacred conservation of such objects and their surroundings in the form of shrines and parks.¹

¹ It is to be hoped that the coincidence of these objects simultaneously becoming sociological and psychological institutions will not obscure the distinction between these different kinds of humanistic facts.

Something must be said for the distinctly contrived objects which are accoutered with the functions of arousing common responses in persons of specific associations. We will only pause long enough to mention the more striking illustrations of contrived myths and legends concerning persons, happenings, and conversation. These soon become wide-spread enough to call out specific conformity responses in sets of persons. Most instructive are such institutionalizing mechanisms when they become stimuli for several groups, for instance, an accepting and cherishing group (Lincoln or Napoleon lovers) and a rejecting, denying, or deriding group (Lincoln or Napoleon traducers).

Turning from the institutionalizing of objects we may consider the investiture of situations, events and conditions with cultural stimuli functions. First, there are the cases of non-human phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and other terrestrial events. The conventional behavior elicited by such stimuli is naturally quite varied. Possibly it is the intellectual conduct of scientific groups, or common fear and apprehension behavior in individuals who live close to the scene of these happenings. In the latter case, the stimuli may educe conduct in the form of practices of protection and prevention of all sorts. In our own type of complex civilization it is not surprising that happenings and situations of a distinctly human type are more frequently invested with institutional stimuli than are such non-human events.

VARYING MODES OF ENGENDERING INSTITUTIONS

The very intricacy of the institutionalizing process suggests that it must operate in diverse ways. Many institutions are culturally endowed without the knowledge of individuals that such a process is operating. On the other hand, the investiture of stimulating functions may transpire as a decidedly intentional form of action.

Casual Origin of Institutions.—It is almost obvious that most institutions are casually engendered. Indeed this process is ordinarily too subtle to be controlled by individuals. It even detects observation. In addition, there are so many contributing factors involved in the rise of institutions that any form of rigid control is frequently inconceivable.

Deliberate Origin of Institutions.—Probably the best illustrations of the deliberate form of institutional endowment of objects are found in various commercial enterprises. Many stimuli operating to call out responses for wearing certain kinds of clothes or using certain kinds of cosmetics, etc., are deliberately contrived. Slighter stimuli to arouse belief and thought actions in the political domain may be attributed to the plotting of persons.

Naturally each deliberate attempt to endow objects with institutional functions must go on with very strict regard to surrounding human circumstances. What objects can be endowed with the stimulation to purchase and wear them is conditioned by various other institutions, as well as by non-psychological circumstances in the group concerned. In many cases, too, we find that objects deliberately contrived as the mere development of an individual's caprice or interest may become a center for many institutional stimuli without the foresight of the originator. This may be the case with the inventor of some legend, or one who coins some particular word or phrase. When such objects become invested with stimulatory functions for a group of individuals they might be considered to have been in part deliberately invested with their functions and partially not.

Individual and Collective Origin of Institutions.—The deliberative instauration of institutions supplies an easy transition to another problem. Here the question arises whether institutions are originated by single individuals or by aggregations of persons. Now while the institution-engendering activities of a single individual can best be observed, in many

cases institutions are definitely originated through the joint and combined action of series of individuals. Common instances are represented by the establishment of stimuli functions through various forms of common consent. New forms of shared action are performed by agreement, as in voting upon a constitutional amendment, or in partaking in some form of voluntary enlistment.

We can never escape the fact, however, that no matter how large a place we ascribe to a collectivity in engendering institutions, the fundamental activity is that of single persons. Possibly it is wise then merely to indicate that in the origin of institutions we always find a relatively greater or lesser participation of many persons. Perhaps the situation here may be best summed up by saying that while institutions cannot originate without the behavior of single persons they cannot exist except through the activities of series of individuals.

The Migrational Origin of Institutions.—Institutions also originate through migration. This means that in a given psychological collectivity new cultural stimuli are introduced by the migrators. Such new institutions may inhere in natural objects, tools, weapons, and art materials, or in more subtle things such as ideals, beliefs, etc. Let us note that the present type of origination differs from the others merely in that it does not involve an absolutely new form of stimulation connected with entirely novel modes of conduct. From a psychological standpoint, however, the mechanism is the same as in the other case; namely, institutions are newly engendered that did not exist before in a specific psychological collectivity. No different is the institutionalizing process when the objects coming in to the new group call out the same reactions as in the collectivities from which they are imported. When things have the same stimulating function in the new and older group it is, of course, because the cultural properties of the objects in question are closely related to their

anthropic and natural qualities. When the rifle was introduced into the Indian civilization, even though it stimulated similar cultural reactions, we might, from the standpoint of the Indian group, regard it as the origination of a new stimulus function.

For the most part, however, objects and actions introduced into the new group are invested with entirely new functions which represent an attempt at the domestication of the objects by making them conform to the general civilizational system of the new collectivity. The introduction of military organization and objects into another national group must mean a greater or lesser variation in the institutional functions of such objects depending upon the likenesses and differences between the groups from and to which the objects have been transferred.

It is important to note that the introductory type of institutional development operates between specific psychological collectivities within a single ethnic community as well as between behavior collectivities in different national units. As an instance of the former situation, objects or ideas, are constantly passing from one to another professional, religious, and intellectual group of a single national unit. An exceedingly good example is the institutional mechanism by which the Bible becomes literature. That is, the Bible passes from a group in which it is a religious object and symbol into one in which the religious motives are less compelling. As a result, while the book is still cherished and valued, it also possesses functions of calling out literary reactions by having attributed to it the additional qualities of fine secular literature. In other cases, the mere shift of ideas or objects from one type of psychological group to another may result in the endowment of the object with entirely new stimulatory functions with corresponding differences in the behavior of individuals toward such objects. An example here is the translation of worship from a religious to a business group. The stimuli

functions change from calling out religious reverence and awe to the arousal of materially profitable responses.

Revival Origin of Institutions.—The resumption and restoration of stimuli functions is a distinct form of begetting institutions. A certain object previously invested with particular institutional functions loses them through the failure of individuals to perform corresponding behavior. Later these institutional functions are reinstated by the renewed performance of the older type of social response. From a strict psychological standpoint this is a definite example of institutional origination. Such instauration may be the result of deliberate or casual circumstances, but in either case we need not hesitate to consider the new psychological happening as a unique and distinct illustration of the originaive type of institutional mechanism.

TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Transforming institutional mechanisms consist of stimulus-response interconnections which result in changes in the way objects stimulate shared behavior. The process is one of reinvestiture. Objects or conditions which formerly have been endowed with stimulatory qualities that have operated up to a certain time, now change their institutional character. As we have already pointed out, this type of institutional mechanism is not merely the origination of a new stimulus property, as in the first mechanism studied, but a process of replacing one which inhered in the object before.

Here as everywhere in the study of cultural conduct, linguistic situations spring to our aid as valuable illustrations. In the sudden or gradual change of the connotational or referential function of words we find this transforming mechanism operating. For instance, the word "king" in some specific political collectivity loses its old social reference character and takes on new stimulatory functions. In our own political circumstances the same thing has happened in the varia-

tions in the functions of the words "republican" and "democrat." Think of the differences in these terms in the American political landscape from the time of Jefferson down to the present day.¹

Numerous illustrations of stimulus substitution may be gleaned from the field of natural objects. Vegetables and fruits that are first institutionalized as non-edible objects or even invested with the cultural properties of being poisonous or harmful, are reinstitutionalized as palatable and even delicious articles of diet. Similarly, wood, stone, mud and other potential building materials are made into elements of sheltering structures. On the other hand, they may be reinstitutionalized to lose this property. The same type of transforming mechanism is responsible for the reaction to women as soldiers, students, and business people, whereas previously women were not invested with such cultural characteristics. The hair length of men and women in similar fashion has become endowed with cultural properties different from what they previously had in the same psychological collectivity. Our reactions to short hair on women especially signifies a change in institutional function.

Turning to the domain of contrived objects we find an equally striking situation. Articles of dress, textiles, and all the decorative schemes connected with clothing, are constantly undergoing the endowment of fresh stimulative qualities. The observation of styles and their changes over a given period of time alone suffices to indicate the reinvesting of institutions which call out new and different types of responses.

Art, in all of its institutional phases, is a field of unceasing transformation. At once we may refer to the infinity of changes in the coordinating stimuli and responses involved with the perpetually revised standards of artistic production and appreciation. In music, dissonant and unmelodious com-

¹ Consult Greenough and Kittredge, *Words and Their Ways in English Speech*, as a rich treasury of stimuli transformations in words.

positions become liked, approved of, and valued as the particular elements concerned alter their cultural functions. In painting, the stimulative properties of technique, material, and subject matter change until the objects are transformed and retransformed, finally becoming quite different as psychological phenomena.

The world of technology and the industrial crafts offers us a liberal series of instances of the cessation of institutional stimuli and the substitutions of others. What materials are used for certain purposes and their displacement by new ones, as well as the tools and methods by which they are handled, supply the sources for many alterations in institutional function.

It is axiomatic that the stimulating properties inhering in sociological institutions are constantly undergoing revision. Whether we are dealing with a political party or some other organization of persons, with objects like a hospital, newspaper, or college, or some action, they are constantly losing older stimulating functions for new ones. Although some building may endure from a material standpoint over an extended period of time or some organization retain its anthropic form, both nevertheless are subject without interruption to a series of changes in their psychological properties.

Psychological institutions are altered when a group of individuals no longer regard war as the inevitable and inviolable right of nations, or when war no longer is considered to be a profitable or an honorable national occupation. When a law is no longer respected but rather despised and violated, its institutional position is considerably altered. Let us add to our examples the supplanting stimulative properties in family institutions. Changes in the stimulating character of the family are correlated with new modes of behavior. These altered stimuli and responses are symbolized by the family's loss of influence upon the marriage and occupation of the younger members, and further by the general shift of the

character of the family as a clan or dynastical unit to a mere social organization and protectorate of the very young.

Institutional changes in churches demonstrate the same point. No longer in certain groups is a church reacted to as the source of a mystically spiritual life but as a locus of social contacts or the patron of social regeneration. That the church has discontinued to call out obedient and dependent responses signifies its fertility as the ground for the cessation of old and the development of new incitements to social psychological responses.

While it is much easier to illustrate the phenomena of institutional alteration by changes in large sociological objects, this should not becloud the fact that the same thing occurs with respect to more subtle institutions as well. The cultural properties of ideas and beliefs are equally subject to transformation. Particular psychological collectivities may no longer find in their national, professional, or ethnic ideas, and beliefs, the stimulation to respect or abide by them. Perhaps most people only accept and cherish the slogan of "fighting for democracy" during a war, for afterwards this sociological belief-institution becomes invested with quite different stimulative qualities.

MODIFYING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Our third institutional mechanism differs considerably from the other two. It would seem that the processes of engendering and replacing stimuli functions exhaust the possibilities of institutional mechanisms. Indeed the term modifying mechanism is misleading, for it is quite plain that a stimulus function cannot undergo modification; it either exists or it does not. Such institutional modification therefore is in fact not a change in older function, for that function disappears. And yet it is necessary to account for a process by which institutions, though undergoing change, still retain a continuity between their past and present influences upon persons.

Now the question arises as to how it is possible for this


continuity to exist and in what way it can be accounted for by the modifying institutional mechanisms. First, let us make clear that the modifying mechanisms only occur when the object in which the stimulus function inheres is a sociological institution. That is, it only operates in those cases where the institution itself undergoes change and therefore demands a corresponding modification of its stimulus function. A modifying institutional mechanism, then, is a phenomenon involving collateral variation in the stimuli functions and in the sociological institutions in which they inhere.

Corresponding changes in behavior, howsoever large they may be, may still be considered as directly continuous activities throughout the whole development of the sociological and psychological institution. Our present mechanism, then, we might call one of development. Our best illustration here probably is the mechanism by which linguistic objects and actions as sociological phenomena become modified in their stimulatory functions and consequently call out reactions somewhat different than those previously performed. Quite easily can the mechanism of institutional development be followed throughout the whole course of human phenomena during which a language becomes different from what it originally was. Thus it is possible inferentially to trace through a continuous course of stimulus-response modification from the time of King Alfred's English down to our present day English language situation. The same sort of development is evident in the changing situations in the field of customs, laws, and other distinctly social phenomena, as they go on from generation to generation. These observations are, of course, much easier to make when the development takes place through shorter intervals of time, for example, in the domain of fads and styles. The mechanisms of institutional development, it may be added, operate to modify subtle and intangible institutions, such as ideas, beliefs, and other refined actions as well as to change objects or situations.

The developmental type of institutional mechanism is very

closely interrelated with the culturalization process. Accordingly at the same time that institutions operate in domesticating an individual, the person in turn modifies the stimulating institution. There can be no question but that this institutional modifying process is a vital element in bringing about changes in conduct between succeeding generations of human individuals. Such psychological processes, along with others, are responsible for the divergent levels of behavior phenomena over periods of time.

Because of this mutually conditioning process, culturalization in a given community, say a national or linguistic one, proceeds throughout a series of generations as a definite stratification of behavior levels. By a behavior level, therefore, we mean a particular stage of interaction between a stimulus (institution) and a culturalizing response. Thus while a person is being culturalized to a particular institution some change may be expected to occur in the stimulus function of the object, for the next set of persons who react to it. In the culturalization process then we have a horizontal time level which has an influence upon later horizontal levels. In short, while a person is being culturalized, he at the same time influences the future culturalization of others in a definite way. A diagram may serve to relieve the abstruseness of this description.



The horizontal lines R1-S1, R2-S2, R3-S3, represent the culturalization process upon succeeding levels as indicated by the vertical arrows. The horizontal arrows indicate that the individual comes into contact with existing institutions and is affected by them. Now in the culturalization process not only does the person become different in acquiring a new mode of behavior but the objects become different by being endowed with a slightly dissimilar stimulus function. The latter is true because the behavior the person acquires will not be absolutely identical with that previously performed by individuals in the same connection. Accordingly, the oblique line R1-S2 symbolizes a mutual change or development in responses and stimuli when involving a time procession. The same conditions are found in the R2-S2 and following levels in an infinite progression.

Perhaps an hypothetical illustration representing great institutional changes may still further illuminate these institutional mechanisms. Assume that Luther in his culturization acquired his religious responses from contact with stimuli inherent in distinctly Catholic institutions (sociological). Through various historical circumstances Luther's Catholic institutional stimuli, according to anthropic records, had evolved from previous levels in parallel changes with the sociological institutions, going far back to Hebrew, Egyptian, Greek, and other levels. Similar parallel changes in anthropic and psychological circumstances have been going on since Luther's time, until now we have in different religious groups numerous psychological institutions developed through the mutual process of culturalization and institutional development.

Lest our discussion of the mechanisms of institutional development be thought of as limited exclusively to large temporally successive periods, we hasten to indicate that various successive levels may take place within the same generation and within the limit of small time intervals. Such are the

events transpiring in a single family. For instance, in a German family group in America the children are socialized with respect to the English language in the course of their play and in school. In turn, the children culturalize the family group at home. Thus a hierarchy of English culturalization processes results, and as a consequence new institutions are constantly being formed for the family as a whole. Through such an institutionalizing mechanism different levels of culturalization are produced and with each level institutions are developed and modified. Specific illustrations of institutional development are found in every particular domain of cultural conduct.

An especially striking example may be observed in religious groups. Ideas, beliefs, and practices, although they maintain their general identity as sociological institutions, gradually become modified in their sociological character and at the same time change by degrees their institutional functions. Just how this process operates is clearly revealed in the various phenomena of religious liberalization. Any specific religious group consists of a great number of individuals of various intellectual levels. Obviously, religious sociological institutions are invested with slightly different institutional functions for individuals of respective levels. The graduates of so-called liberal divinity schools accept posts as religious leaders of certain congregations. They then face the problem of how they can adjust and reconcile their own liberal attitude toward religious forms, ceremonies, and doctrines, with the entirely different reactions of the community members. Heresy trials exemplify in a similar way the stratification of cultural stimuli and responses among the various members of a particular anthropic group.

Dialectal and colloquial hierarchies in linguistic groups display great numbers of very definite institutional changes. Here the sociological (philological) institutions continue to operate indefinitely as general features of the human circum-

stances but slight changes are constantly going on. Modifications are made possible by virtue of the continuity of the language institutions.

Academic titles as sociological phenomena provide us with an equally obvious institutional history. At one time the title Doctor of Philosophy symbolized a particular status of scholastic training and achievement. In consequence the title stimulated members of certain psychological collectivities to respect and covet it. Through various circumstances,¹ however, the Ph.D. title takes on various anthropic modifications. Assume only that its decreasing rarity makes it lose its social value. As a result the title gradually assumes the stimulating functions of inducing shared reactions in the form of overt conduct and intellectual attitudes somewhat different from those previously found in the group in question.

In the same way slight changes are constantly taking place in practically every sociological institution located in particular associations of individuals. Consider the minute variations in labor institutions, in the family, in women's rights, in public morals, which parallel various changes in the human conditions surrounding such institutions. Each of these anthropic facts display numerous modifications in their sociological character, which have correlated with them psychological institutional changes and reciprocal cultural behavior modifications. Legal institutions in the form of ideas and conceptions, as well as practices, do not escape the operation of developmental mechanisms. No less striking as examples of institutional growth are the changes in the conception of slavery in the American milieu depending upon the various surrounding economic, political, military, and other human phenomena. Commercial and financial life is equally subject

¹ For instance, the multiplication of bodies granting the degree, the increase in the number of possessors of the title, through competition among university departments (because of the need to have a record of Ph. D.s turned out), and the demand for Ph. D.s occasioned by the fashion that all faculty members shall be equipped with such ornaments.

to institutional change. One of the most interesting of these developments is connected with the phenomena of usury or interest. From a despised and prohibited feudal institution, usury shifts to the most valued backbone of a capitalistic society. The change in name from usury to interest represents only one of the striking variations of the responses to the same institution.

THE QUALITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Our discussion of the mechanisms of institutional development has of necessity partially taken the form of a recital of the changes occurring in the institutions themselves. Now we may turn to a consideration of the characteristics of these changes. Are the variations to be regarded as improvements or deteriorations in the stimulating properties?

Such an inquiry obviously must be pursued in terms of reactions. It is only in this way that we can have any concrete basis for observation. Moreover, this is our sole means of hitting upon a standard or criterion for judging institutions.

Now as to the standard of stimulation changes, it clearly must be if possible a matter of idiosyncratic determination. Since cultural conduct is arbitrary and artificial we must base our standards upon such facts as the actual advantages to the individuals concerned, or the development or maintenance of valuable things. To a great extent we may regard changes in stimuli functions as improvements when the objects in which these functions inhere show an upward progression from a state of nature to a place in intelligent and rational human environments.

Whatever standard we adopt we find that not only do institutional changes result in either better or poorer conduct but also there are sheer changes of direction without discernible movement toward a more or less approved goal. Now since the same institutions belong to different psychological

collectivities in the same sociological community any specific change may be regarded as partaking of all three qualities. The standard here is a comparative one and the decision is made by reference to other psychological groups.

Our complex civilized collectivities display abundant examples of improvements when institutions change. When the family has the stimulating property of calling out an ideational response to itself as a rational association of human individuals instead of as an instance of a particular form of animal existence, the institution has not only altered its direction but has undergone a qualitative improvement. This improved character may be thought of as a refinement of the institution, even though we have no fixed standards nor assurance that such an institutional change will result in any permanent human gain in the form of better living.

An especially important related example is the phenomenon of sex behavior which in our own day is changing in some groups from an unmentionable necessity of nature to an important factor in human life. Correlated with the unmistakable variations in the cultural function of sex phenomena are better thought and practice with respect to sex behavior.

Labor phenomena, as actual work, as the development of methods and regulations, and the place of the workers in society, have taken on different and better stimulative functions. Today, labor stimulates ideas concerning its worth and dignity which sometime before was impossible. The same thing may be said of war phenomena in all its phases. When war stimulates a group not to admire and applaud destruction we may well speak of an improvement in its stimulative character.

Nor does the field of commerce fail to exhibit numerous possibilities for more advanced cultural stimulation. When the processes and functions of business are thought of as organizations of wants and supplies on the basis of genuine economic circumstances rather than on the studied intention

to deceive and profit, then the institutional properties are considerably better. When railroads are mechanisms for the gathering together and distribution of goods according to the needs of people only, rather than the tools of financial profits and competitive conquests, we have similarly superior situations.

Especially in voluntary cultural groups we find unlimited possibilities for the improvement of the qualities of cultural institutions. For instance, certain stimuli are purposely instituted to meet the desires and needs of the individuals concerned. Objects and situations are endowed with those sorts of stimulative properties that will further the interests and improve the conditions of the particular association of persons in question. In the absence of fixed standards we cannot mean here some absolute improvement. It is sufficient that the members of the group which harbor the institutions or some outside collectivity consider the change a progressive one.

The deterioration and corruption of the institutional stimulation of objects need not detain us. For we may easily pass from those functions inciting advantageous behavior to those eliciting the opposite form of action. A few examples will suffice. Students of social phenomena are constantly pointing out the increasing waste and economic disadvantage in the behavior concerned with advertising. It is said that in this field we have been moving from the comparatively simple processes of making announcements to a complex mechanism of exploitative propaganda. If then it is true that advertising stimulates us to act so that a great deal of labor and money is lost along with the means of making announcements, then we must agree that advertising institutions have deteriorated. The same judgment must be passed if advertising has developed new functions resulting in untruthfully describing and praising certain goods, in the general increase of price, and decrease of economic advantage.

Similar deterioration of institutions occur in the changed functioning of political processes; so that they are no longer reacted to as genuine administrative agencies but rather as exploitative activities of office-holding and maladministration of public funds.

Changes in mere duration of institutional stimuli require no further elaboration. Here there is only a variation of stimulus function and the corresponding behavior. Examples of such institutional changes are probably best shown by the various phenomena of modes and fashions.

CONDITIONS INFLUENCING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Stimuli are factors of reactional events. Now it is only to be expected that their rise and development are intimately connected with all sorts of mutually influencing conditions. Indeed, we have already intimated what some of these are, but the importance of these data warrants a résumé and elaboration.

Obviously the number and type of such conditions are exceedingly large. We shall find it expedient therefore to classify them on the basis of definite criteria. Among the latter we select first the question of the directness or indirectness of the influence.

Direct conditions intimately concern the stimulus and response factors of the institutional mechanism. Indirect conditions affect first the general life conditions of the group in which the institutional development takes place and then in a somewhat more remote way operate upon the involved stimuli and responses.

A second criterion for organizing the influences upon institutional mechanisms is the question whether or not these direct and indirect conditions are psychological.

On the one hand, we will group together the distinctly psychological happenings inducing institutional development,

while on the other, we will organize the conditions which are distinctly non-psychological in character.

Direct Institutional Conditions: Psychological.—Let us start first with direct psychological conditions which affect the stimulus side of the mechanism. First there is the question of whether any interferences of stimuli conditions exist. For instance, in a rigid scientific collectivity one does not expect to find inhering in events a stimulus calling out at the same time belief and disbelief in their causal character. Again, in a religious collectivity one does not ordinarily discover some object with two conflicting stimuli, of which one is correlated with the power and the other with the helplessness of God to produce such an object. In these cases the institutional qualities are in harmony, or they reinforce each other.

On the other hand, somewhat unrelated stimuli functions may tend either to reinforce or inhibit each other. To a certain extent a number of institutions may comprise a more or less homogeneous system. The institutions may adapt themselves to each other through the medium of the behavior of the individuals of the group. In an industrial society we find that scientific institutions change and develop to fit in with the prevailing types of industrial situations. Owing to the particular industrial slant, for instance, beliefs and opinions are stimulated that scientific work is pragmatic in character, and that the main if not the sole function of science is to further the welfare of group members. In such a collectivity the line between applied and theoretical science is very distinctly drawn. Indeed every group situation presents an inter-related mass of mutually influencing factors. Commercial institutions give color to intellectual ones, political to scientific, scientific to religious, and vice versa throughout a list of institutions.

On the response side of institutional mechanisms we find also these reinforcing and inhibiting influencing factors. As

we have seen when the person is undergoing culturalization, the older responses may interfere with or aid in behavior acquisition. Both through primarily individual responses which spread over large behavior areas, and the concerted action of individuals, very striking influences may thus be brought to bear upon institutional mechanisms. These modifying conditions of institutions are probably the most constantly operating and certainly the most inevitable.

Now even in discussing these most intrinsic factors of institutional mechanisms we must be warned that we are not concerned here with general principles. We must regard ourselves as dealing with specific instances of stimuli development. In view of the purely conventional character of social behavior we should not expect any thoroughgoing interference of contrary action. In fact the opposite is quite as often the case.

Non-psychological.—Among the non-psychological conditions influencing the institutional mechanisms may be mentioned the steady rise and decline of sociological institutions. The constant modifications in usages, customs, and fashions in ethnic groups and the variations in conventional knowledge and information in professional organizations are the direct concomitants of modifications in sociological institutions. The greater rapidity in behavior changes in smaller occupational and other kinds of associations as over against national or ethnic groups corresponds likewise to relatively greater changes in social institutions in the two situations.

In specific circumstances stimuli develop corresponding to natural or non-social objects. The origin and maintenance of certain institutions may depend upon the specific properties of the conditioning objects. For instance, groups to which certain natural resources are unavailable, cannot have certain types of building, clothing, and household utensils. Consequently, for these groups cultural institutions do not exist which inhere in such contrived objects. In the same way,

modifications in institutions are determined by the properties of objects. The various styles of wearing apparel can only be modified insofar as the materials out of which they are fashioned lend themselves to the desired patterns.

The dependence of institutional mechanisms upon certain specific conditions is excellently illustrated when these conditions are actions. Since behavior is constantly modifiable the institutions inhering in them must perforce undergo many changes. Take the case in which the rise and fall of the intensity of hatred toward the enemy stimulates various common responses, with a total subsidence of such stimulation and response after peace has been declared.

Indirect Institutional Conditions: Psychological.—The indirect psychological factors conditioning institutions center wholly around action. First the personal activities of individuals, and secondly their cultural conduct as members of psychological groups, exert telling effects upon institutional development. Here we need only refer to the points already examined in our study of anthropic phenomena, namely, that individuals have a large place in the origin, maintenance, and transformation of all features of civilization.¹ Among the personal activities we number the sheer inclination of individuals to perform certain kinds of action. Common instances are the disinclinations of particular individuals to go to the polls to vote. Such lack of interest, or purely private conflicts of interests, may in the end have a decided influence upon the stimulatory functions of the voting process.

Such personal behavior with its potency to alter institutions may in turn have its basis in some other conditions, for example, health, fatigue, or preoccupation. Persons may simply not find it convenient to vote because of business or play engagements.

Activities and achievements of inventors or thinkers constitute more important personal psychological conduct affect-

¹ Chap. V, p. 164 ff.

ing institutions. The invention by some person of some particular technique may precipitate a complete shift in the institutions of a psychological collectivity. Personal likes and reflections of individuals as potent factors here are observed when the attitudes of a judge affect common lay institutions.

Such names as Darwin, Napoleon, Marx, Alexander, and Lenin superbly represent the influences of personal psychological conduct upon intellectual, political, and social institutions.

Persons likewise set their mark upon institutions as carriers of culture. Individuals who move from group to group transfer institutions or objects with their cultural functions. Thus from one collectivity to another are carried over such civilizational features as works of art, ideas, techniques, and particular objects in the form of weapons and manufactured things. This type of institutional transmission through the activities of individuals is well illustrated by the frequently given example of De Ponta bringing Italian intellectual civilization to America or Voltaire carrying English scientific ideas to France, and Raleigh introducing tobacco smoking institutions into England.

Among the indirect collectivistic psychological influences upon institutions may be mentioned the fears, hopes, aspirations and beliefs of sets of particular individuals. These types of cultural conduct whether related to some particular situation, as in the case of wars, or commercial competition may prevent the inception of institutions or result in their elimination. Similarly, cultural pride prevents linguistic institutions from being established or maintained, as illustrated by the German resistance to Roman type in printing, and the similar Irish and English insistence upon the abolition of Gaelic type. When the hopes of new politically self-determining groups to establish their own social organization, political system, and language, materialize they exemplify the same point.

Non-psychological.—Humanistic events and happenings which promote changes in the general life conditions of an anthropic group constitute some of the non-psychological indirect conditions influencing institutions. War, military and commercial conquests, and exploration have considerable effect upon ethnic or national institutions. Through such happenings new objects are brought to the group; fresh resources are made available. In general, there is an interchange, and modification of sociological and psychological institutions.

Natural events, whether of the favorable sort making for large crops and abundant food supplies, or destructive and disadvantageous conditions, such as famines, crop failures, earthquakes and droughts, or crises of various sorts, the exhaustion of natural resources for instance, do not fail to determine collective conduct and its stimulative functions. All of these conditions and events operate directly to originate cultural institutions or indirectly through the rise and development of anthropological institutions.

In concluding, we must be warned against assuming that it is possible in even a comparatively simple situation to discover a single type of condition which counts for the origin or change of even a single stimulative function. In every case no doubt a large number of factors go to influence any institutional mechanism. Only one method therefore presents itself, namely, to select some single instance of operation and to analyze the components involved.

PART THREE

**THE RELATIVITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COLLECTIVITIES**

CHAPTER XII

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BEHAVIOR GROUPS

THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUPS

So far in our investigation of social psychology we have been handling what may be called the more elementary facts of the subject. We have isolated the fundamental datum consisting of the Response and Stimulus. Furthermore, in our treatment of Culturalization we have described the method by which the individual acquires social forms of conduct. This led to the study of the Nature of Cultural Personality as a product of Culturalization. Finally, we attempted a minute description of the conditions under which are developed the stimuli functions or Institutions constituting the counterparts of the individual's behavior in social psychological events.

But this series of studies by no means exhaust the fundamental data of social psychology. There still remains the investigation of the psychological collectivity. In effect we are now shifting the focus of our attention from the responses of individuals to the sets of persons who share cultural reactions. This transfer of data serves to bring to the foreground a number of important considerations which have not yet received their due emphasis. It is only by studying sets of persons and units that we can obtain certain desirable information with respect to social psychological behavior. For the most part we may add that this information concerns the relation of the persons within the collectivity.

FRACTIONALIZATION OF BEHAVIOR GROUPS INTO MOIETIES OR LEVELS

Probably the most striking characteristics of psychological collectivities is their atomization. Great variability exists in the way particular instances of cultural behavior are performed in any specified behavior collectivity. Two persons perform the same belief reactions to the "value of democracy" as a stimulus. Both believe that only a democratic form of government can save the race, but what a difference there may be in the reactions. Assume merely that one of the individuals is more highly educated than the other and the possibilities are glaring. Psychological groups therefore are so unstable as always to be fractionalized into moieties or levels of persons.

As we have so frequently found in the study of social psychology our best illustrative materials can be found in the field of language behavior. Let us choose any particular cultural group on the basis of sound, accent, pronunciation, vocabulary or any other language factor, and we observe at once that these "same" responses to a particular stimulus function vary in greater or lesser detail. So pronounced are these differences in the levels of a group that by means of them we may distinguish between different persons of a single psychological collectivity. But also the same person at different times may perform this varying behavior.

No type of cultural conduct escapes this net of variation. Whether we choose as our illustrative behavior some action of worship, belief, knowledge, or prejudice, we invariably find variations in the way persons perform their shared reactions.

This fractionalization of groups may be accounted for upon two general grounds. In the first place, persons perform the "same" behavior differently because of their varied behavior equipments. In spite of all similarities in the psychological nature of individuals every psychological act is performed by

a unique personality. To speak only of social behavior equipment, no two persons ever go through just the same culturalization processes. Thus every individual has a certain amount of behavior equipment not shared with others. Our present point is that the person's unshared or unique reactional biography influences his performance of shared behavior. When we consider that collectivities are composed of men and women, adults and children, literate and illiterate individuals we realize more forcibly that psychological group phenomena could not present other than an infinite web of variation.

A second basis for the atomization of psychological groups resides in the general conditions that effect changes in institutions. The various members of a psychological collectivity cannot all be in contact with the same anthropic circumstances accompanying institutional changes. Their responses are bound to be different owing to contacts with diverse geographic, economic, military, or other situations. Hence we find in such facts numerous possibilities for the splitting of groups into levels.

Granting that what we call the same cultural reaction to a given stimulus function may vary more or less when performed by different persons, one might ask whether there are any special forms that these variations assume. Generally speaking, it is impossible to enumerate types of levels or moieties among cultural behavior groups. Where all is so fluid and changing it is impossible to fix definite boundaries or even directions of change. Classification therefore is unthinkable.

If, however, we permit ourselves to be tempted by the perennial lure of perfection we may find it suggestive to single out two general directions in which groups may be fractionalized. We are able to distinguish horizontal or quantitative moieties from vertical or qualitative levels. Now the vertical levels may be regarded as progressively superior in an ascending scale. To illustrate with types of intelligence responses

may clarify somewhat this present distinction. For instance, when we can determine that certain cultural responses belong to a given intelligence group, it is frequently possible to isolate superior and inferior instances. Upon the basis of a fairly acceptable standard of conduct the responses become stratified as better or more effective. The conventionally intelligent or reasonable action may be more or less reasonable or intelligent. Similarly, the pitying or charitable responses performed by moieties of the same behavior group may be more pitying or more charitable, or fall below a compared member.

In contrast to such vertical levels the moieties of intelligent actions may be distributed horizontally. In this case the differences in behavior have to do with quantitative features or with intensity, with more or less intelligence, pity, or charity. We may regard the comparable responses as having a greater or lesser amount of the quality in question.

It is quite apparent that we can only look for criteria for inferior and superior actions in such fields of behavior as intelligent or rational conduct, moral or affective reactions. In these cases certain facts in the stimuli objects may enable us to formulate a fairly workable standard of comparison. But when we come to such activities as religious responses or linguistic behavior we are at a total loss to discover satisfactory vertical levels. It is well nigh impossible to say what stress, accent or pronunciation should be considered as superior or inferior. Religious conduct, again, as belief or prayer behavior, offers no suitable criteria for ranking in a vertical scale. When religious conduct consists of sacrifices whether of animals, persons, or property, in other words, when it involves human welfare, we may then find a standard of comparison. Generally speaking, cultural reactions consisting of manipulative conduct, are more subject to order in a scale of superiority than the less overt reactions of thinking, feeling, or some form of speaking.

The entire phenomenon of group fractionalization is well illuminated when we turn from actual cultural responses to the cumulative results which they bring about in the character of individuals. Observe a specific group of scientists. Whether their behavior consists of perceiving, comparing, judging, or inferring, they perform conventionally similar reactions to particular things. Under these general headings the members of the scientific collectivity share specific responses to their correlated stimuli objects. But with what a difference. In some cases the scientist's investigation constitutes an absolute form of behavior. He is concerned with fixed methods and techniques, and is thus constantly moving toward a prescribed form of interpretation. Of another type of scientist, however, the study reactions are of a very different sort. The whole series of acts are free investigations and not stilted routines. That is, he aims to orient himself intellectually. He constantly faces the possibility of working out new methods and reaching fresh interpretations. Such variations in the groups concerned may tend toward a decided stratification and the final development of new groups. One unit may stand for a series of genuine science activities, expert investigations of phenomena, while the other tends toward a mere worshipful ascertainment of elementary facts.

In our scientific illustration the upper levels constitute the action of persons who have more and superior equipment which influences any particular response, while the opposite is true for the individuals belonging to the lower levels or strata. Because the individuals of the upper levels are intellectually better equipped they are persons of understanding and wider cultural perspective. In contrast, the lower levels number among their personnel, mere workers, those who carry out the plans and hypotheses which others have formulated. By no means a wayward illustration is discovered in the scientific stratification of teacher and pupil. The latter, while learning performs the same scientific work as the master

minus the understanding and initiative which characterizes the comparable actions of the teacher.

A more humble form of collectivity also illustrates the atomization of psychological groups. View the spectacle of a backwoods parent-teachers' association in action. A school principal, teachers, and parents all of low grade mentality enter vigorously upon the discussion of weighty educational problems. Because of the similarity between the conceptual and linguistic responses performed, these actions are grouped with the behavior of scholars, highgrade educators and philosophic parents, but how ineffaceable are the lines of cleavage between them.

The issue of the whole phenomenon of group atomization is, that in any psychological collectivity there is an incessant movement away from the mass or average toward personalistic action. Or rather, we should say there is an invariable pull and tension between numbers of persons at one end and single individuals at the other. It is to be expected accordingly that the larger and more complex the group the greater the opportunity for fractionalization. A family psychological group is naturally limited in its variations because of the few persons altogether concerned.

Psychological collectivities set in anthropic groups in which human life is comparatively uncomplicated generally have fewer moieties and levels. In a simple primitive community, the life circumstances of individuals are such that there are few possibilities for an individual to vary his conduct from his fellows. In such situations cultural conduct is relatively more permanent.

THE CONSERVATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUPS

Psychological groups persist. Despite the omnipresence and great effect of fractionalization, some behavior collectivities endure. Never forgetting that we are speaking of events,

we may say that thoughts, feelings, desires, and more overt actions remain in existence throughout long periods of time. The same ways of thinking, believing, speaking, and eating persist throughout generations and centuries. Hence arises the expression of popular wisdom which declares that man's nature is always and everywhere the same.

This fact we have of course already observed in our study of institutional stability. At present, however, we are concerned with the continuation of behavior groups as conditioned by the relations of the individuals who share the reactions in question. Durability of behavior collectivities is essentially a problem of the cohesion of persons. Now our problem is, what are the conditions that sustain the sharing of certain responses by various individuals?

Foremost among the cohering influences is the effect of culturalization. Through this process persons simply become alike. Henceforth, they believe identically because they partake of the same types of human nature. This sameness is the cohering element.

Another exceedingly important factor is that so much of cultural conduct is at the same time stimulus and response. To speak, pray, walk, think or feel in a certain way not only constitute the reactions of persons but simulate others to act in the same way. Here we have a very potent mutual influence of individuals upon each other. Such mutual interaction cannot but serve to continue particular behavior groups.

So far we have spoken only of cultural interaction as a factor in the maintenance of psychological collectivities. Note also that idiosyncratic actions operate to prolong the life of behavior units. The latter may perhaps be best illustrated by the actions of those who presume to control the culturalization of others. For instance, politicians influence groups to vote in a certain way. Similarly, merchants sway the members of groups to value jewels or spend money conspicuously. Governors induce collectivities to preserve and exercise their

patriotism, while preachers control the beliefs of worshippers.

Not to be ignored is the rôle of general life conditions of members of particular activities in the continuation of behavior groups.¹ To suggest only a few of these influences we first mention the domestic and family contribution to the sustenance of moral units. It is the exigencies of family life that demand innumerable loyalties and obediences. Then there is the effect of the economic status of persons upon religious conduct. Is there not an undeniable relation between the impotence of poverty, and the self-debasing conduct of formal religious practices? Again, economic rivalry and conflicts perpetuate those collectivities performing professional, national, and racial prejudices.

From the life conditions of individuals we turn to the effect of general anthropic circumstances upon cultural groups. These anthropic conditions, of course, are organized sociological situations. Social organization itself operates to maintain an aggregation of individuals. Various simple human associations provide occasion for the performance of conventional responses. In the same way, longevity of psychological collectivities is secured by certain persisting objects and techniques found in every human society. We need only suggest the effects that such sociological phenomena have upon every variety of linguistic, psychological collectivity from colloquial through dialectal to ethnic language associations.

To be added to the other maintaining influences of cultural behavior, though not as unimportant coördinate circumstances, are many natural and historical factors. Though these are more indirect conditions from a psychological standpoint, they still are responsible in no small way for the con-

¹ Since responses are the reciprocals of stimuli functions, the conditions involved in influencing the origin and continuation of groups must correlate with and overlap the conditions affecting the origin and maintenance of institutions. This fact is the extenuation for some possible reiteration of points.

servation of psychological groups. To begin with, we may mention the conserving influences of natural barriers of various sorts. Just as zoölogists find in the isolating circumstances of topography the basis for species formation and maintenance, and similarly sociologists the condition for different social organization and language, so may the psychologist regard natural barriers as prominent features in the continuation of cultural behavior. A convincing example often quoted is the conservation of the Basque speech as a linguistic island surrounded by other unsimilar tongues.

The sheer geographic distribution of psychological groups is a further factor in their maintenance. For when the members of a collectivity are widely distributed, the disintegrating factors cannot operate simultaneously and with equal force upon all of them. Thus the behavior in question persists.

To cosmic happenings may be attributed the persistence of many psychological collectivities. Much influence is exerted upon thought and belief by earthquakes and volcanoes, or by favorable or unfavorable weather conditions. Superstitions among sailors and farmers, as well as so-called primitive men, also the happy-go-lucky psychological nature of those who live close to the natural elements undauntedly continue because of cosmic events. Since the topographical and telluric factors spoken of here cannot very well be differentiated, possibly there is some truth in the theories of geographic and climatic influences upon mental life. There is no question that, despite the overemphasis of Taine, certain cosmic and topographic circumstances have aided in determining the character of the art behavior of the men of various nations.

The extent to which historical facts conserve psychological groups need hardly be pointed out. Nothing is more familiar than the way land discoveries, wars, conquests, and military expeditions spread and maintain psychological collectivities along with sociological institutions and other elements of complex anthropic systems.

THE RISE AND DISAPPEARANCE OF BEHAVIOR GROUPS

Our inquiry must now be directed toward the question of what happens in the relation of persons when behavior groups are inaugurated and pass out of existence. In other words, we turn to the internal history of psychological collectivities.

For purposes of expediency we shall assume that there are two general ways in which groups arise. The first, which we call primary, is that in which groups originate *de novo*, or as near this description as possible. The secondary origin has to do more with modification or changes in older groups.

What we call the primary origin of a psychological collectivity may be illustrated as follows. Some scientist develops a new idea or belief concerning an event that he has been the first to observe. This he publishes, or informs others about it. Thus a new mode of shared conduct may be recorded as existing. Similarly, an artist achieves a new technique or conception which others may later become aware of or about which they are convinced. The new mode of action becomes the common behavior of a new psychological collectivity.

Generally speaking, the most fertile source for the origin of new groups is found in fields where the most originality is possible.¹ The detailed mechanism here is the engendering of a cohesion between persons on the basis of some response to an institutional object. Thus a behavior affinity between persons is established by the rise of a new linguistic collectivity whose members share a certain referential response to a new object.

Just what conditions determine the coherence of persons may be detected in specific instances. Sometimes the authority of the person who originates the new belief is an in-

¹ In this connection it is interesting to note that frequently persons from widely distant fields make contributions to other domains by suggesting ideas transported from their own. Thus Malthusian sociological ideas enriched Darwinian biological conceptions. Physiological ideas have likewise produced revolutionary effects upon psychology.

fluent factor. For example, the psychological expert of a government developing a policy of colonial expansion may acquire the notion of the absolute inferiority of primitive to civilized mentality. The weight of his official position may be the cause of others sharing the belief. The official himself may have no desire or intention to bring such a condition about. On the other hand, literary stylists, academists, who must improve speech, thought, and manners are more deliberate agents for the formation of behavior collectivities.

So much for the group origin in which the dominant influence is that of one individual upon one or many others. Another primary group genesis in which there is a simultaneous influence of various individuals upon each other occurs when persons observe that they are all frequently or constantly performing a certain kind of behavior. Hence that action gradually takes on characteristics of traditional and conventional behavior. This sort of situation is referred to as the "consciousness of kind" and is presumed to be a prominent factor in cementing sociological groups.

Secondary behavior groups arise either successively or collaterally. In the first case, the new group springs out of another which is totally superseded and consequently disappears. Here we have a definite evolution of one collectivity from another.¹ On the other hand, as the term collateral origin intimates, persons acquire speech, belief, or thought reactions by collectively varying their behavior from others thus breaking away from the association which continues the previously shared action in the old manner.

Among the best illustrations of the successive origin of groups are linguistic examples. Every language situation discloses a distinct record of succeeding collectivities. Sets of persons continually modify the linguistic forms and mean-

¹ It should not, of course, be necessary to add that simple differentiation is here in question. There is not the slightest suggestion of qualitative improvement in the successive groups.

ings which they employ in their referential behavior.¹ The way groups use words varies in an apparently inevitable and constant manner. We must confess forthwith that while there is no mistake about the psychological phenomena here, the actual circumstances conditioning the changes are sufficiently subtle to defy observational detection. Successive origins of fashion and belief reactions, however, are more amenable to investigative attack. For instance, the events occurring just before the United States entered the War showed us a number of sequences in the shared belief and practice responses of groups of persons.

A decidedly unique type of successive group origin consists of the reappearance of modes of thinking, speaking, believing, or other types of cultural response after they have passed through a period of non-operation. The revival of sets of people performing particular behavior is in a sense a mode of group origin which may be regarded as a disjunctive form of the successive type. Very fine examples of the reappearance of behavior groups we find in the restoration of attitudes, beliefs, and other more performative actions with respect to foreign nations and their peoples before, during, and after a war. Again, we have waves of democratic feeling and action succeeding each other in political behavior, or trends of romanticism and rationalism in the general life currents of psychological and sociological collectivities.

The correlational development of new groups constitutes primarily an effective shading off in the way certain individuals in a collectivity react as compared with the other members. Such variations in behavior create moieties and levels in a collectivity which become crystallized and established to form new groups, while the original collectivity persists. Especially good examples may be cited in the religious do-

¹ Since the first origins of groups and their institutions may be initiated by individuals, so changes in these phenomena may likewise be introduced by single persons.

main. The coexistence of every variety of believer in any form of religious unit exemplifies the correlated origin of psychological associations.

The disappearance of behavior groups may occur through the same process as we have been indicating. Let us suggest only that a person develops a disbelief concerning some fact and then communicates his response to others. As a result we may have a number of individuals agreeing and the former belief group disappears.

We have already suggested that the intercommunication of persons, which we regard as an effective instrument for the development or disappearance of behavior collectivities, need not be as direct as face to face contacts, but may take place through printed publication. We may add, too, that it is not necessary that persons deliberately appreciate these differences or the relative merits of the varying actions, although some time a cultural group is decidedly the result of the appreciation by several persons of the value or advantage accruing to them in the performance of a certain kind of behavior, or of sharing it with other persons.

DUPLICATION OF BEHAVIOR GROUPS

In several places throughout this volume we have already touched, by implication at least, upon a number of facts concerning the distribution of behavior groups. We have had numerous occasions to observe that sets of persons widely distributed in both place and time harbor the same institutions, and in consequence perform similar types of action. In brief, certain elements of civilization are common to all human individuals.¹ Accordingly, human circumstances farthest removed from each other make possible the development of common types of activity.

¹ Chap. IV, p. 102 ff.

Whether persons belong to so-called primitive or highly civilized communities or whether they have lived in the remotest antiquity or in the immediate present, they may be regarded as sharing reactions. For example, the ideas, beliefs, and practices of prehistoric men may be performed in common with members of present day groups. Much of our behavior we share with the Greeks and Romans, with the ancient Persians and Chinese.

Such widely distributed groups must, of course, be regarded as duplications of each other, since it is impossible to assume that all the individuals concerned belong to the same collectivity. For the latter to be true, it is necessary that they should have been culturalized in the same group. In other words, individuals can only be regarded as sharing conduct with those with whom they are or have been in actual contact. Now unless we regard all of the instances of similar conduct as originating in some particular place and being distributed, we have no option but to consider this distributed conduct as duplicated and not all belonging to an original single group.

Despite the great differences in the other behavior of the persons concerned we have no choice but to look upon this distributed conduct as the same in quality. For example, the faith reactions or the frankly occult beliefs of scientists are qualitatively no better because they are performed by scientists than by the most primitive individuals. Conversely, the reflections of a so-called primitive person as specific responses, are just as valid as those of some other advanced personality. No other condition could exist with respect to conventional modes of response.

Duplication in a sense is the converse of fractionalization. Whereas the former phenomenon represents a tendency on the part of persons to be similar and cohere, fractionalization as we have seen, is an index of deviation of behavior.

CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY AND CONDUCT RESTRICTIONS OF CULTURAL BEHAVIOR

THE PROBLEM OF BEHAVIOR RESTRICTION

That man is a social animal now passes as one of the tritest of sociological truisms. That a person is in many ways a product of his anthropic groups and dependent upon them has also been more than sufficiently reiterated in humanistic literature.

Social psychology apparently reinforces these beliefs. For we have learned that individuals during their culturalization and while developing their cultural personality equipment are from the very instant of birth dominated by numerous behavior groups. What kind of persons they are empirically destined to become and how they shall conduct themselves even to the minutest details of their behavior life are restricted by the institutional circumstances with which they are in contact.

Let us review briefly some of the psychological conditions for the behavior restriction to which we refer. In an important sense the cultural equipment is the fundamental core of the psychological personality, involving all types of psychological adaptation. Since, as we have seen, cultural conduct covers by far the largest number of actual responses that the person performs, it would seem that he is decidedly hedged about by the groups of which he is a member.

We entertain a picture of the individual as falling in with the habits, customs, attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs of vari-

ous communities harboring specific cultural institutions. In this sense much of the person's behavior may be predicted if only one knows beforehand to what particular groups he belongs and hence with what institutions he will be in contact.

And yet we are constrained to ask, does this story of the person's domination by groups give us an adequate description of his relation to various congeries of individuals with which he is inevitably and inseverably connected? Can a person really not go beyond the social intelligence of his various groups or respond with better or more effective intellectual reactions than those represented by his cultural milieu? Is it not possible for an individual's art appreciation, religious thought and beliefs to vary from or transcend his own immediate civilization? Are individuals forever destined to be controlled in their morals and manners by the social surroundings in which they find themselves? Though it may be true that most people are mere shadowy reflections of the groups to which they belong and that most actions of all persons are group conformity responses, still the behavior restriction of individuals is neither absolute nor inevitable.

Certain it is that the psychologist who is interested in the concrete behavior life of persons cannot be satisfied with any simple generalization.¹ Instead he must regard his problem to be the study of the detailed facts of a person's behavior life. Accordingly, we devote the present chapter to marshaling such evidence as will indicate the actual dependence and independence of persons from the standpoint of psychological collectivities.

¹ By entertaining such generalizations the sociologist indicates that his discipline is still dominated by an old-fashioned type of absolutistic philosophy. When the American sociologist raises the problem of group versus individual or when he embraces the conception of the dominance of the former, he is illustrating an acceptance of the German idealistic philosophy as an antidote to the discredited individualism of British empiricism.

GROUPS CONSTITUTED OF PERSONS

Every group is always a specific collection of persons. This very fact creates a strong presumption against the view that persons are absolutely dominated by groups. Surely the association of individuals cannot completely destroy the fluctuating character of their psychological behavior.

Every instance of psychological conduct is a unique event. Moreover, it is an event pregnant with potentialities for changes in all of the persons in a group, or in other words in the group as a whole. It must therefore be a bit of faulty abstractionism to interpret persons as absolutely moulded by groups. If, as no one can deny, all human action is either in its origin or later operation inseparably connected with human persons and events, that fact does not grant any license to insist upon the absolute submergence of particular acts or persons.

An illustration may help to clarify the point. I have just observed a peculiar action of a protozoan under my microscope. This is an observation that has never been made before by any one. I at once proceed to make notes definitely describing the phenomenon with a view to publishing the observation. Now so far as the psychological responses I am performing are concerned they are unique and specific events. True enough I could not have made this observation unless I had been a member of a microscope-using group, and also of an organization which has discovered and been interested in protozoans and their behavior. Furthermore, the language in which I record the observation is a type of phenomenon developed by a group of individuals. And yet it would be an extreme fault if we did not allow for the uniqueness and independence of the psychological happenings involved.

THE FLEXIBILITY OF GROUPS

Another point arguing for the relativity of persons and groups is the extreme flexibility of all human collectivities. Since we are not dealing with metaphysical entities, groups cannot be regarded as fixed and rigid objects. As we have seen in our anthropic perspective, human groups are exceedingly dynamic and unstable. Groups change incessantly and are coming in or going out of existence. Certainly, the psychological collectivities existing in such anthropic milieux are decidedly not the least variable and shifting of the many dynamic factors involved.

Whatever fixity is found in group phenomena is doubtless owing to the objects in which group institutions inhere. But cultural stimuli do not exclusively or even for the most part, inhere in natural objects or situations. Quite as frequently they belong to human, anthropological, and sociological institutions. We have already emphasized the fact that social psychological institutions are dependent for their existence and function upon human circumstances. Even when natural objects supply the bases for such institutions, their stimulative function is conditioned to a great extent by prescribed or human properties of such objects.

NOT ALL BEHAVIOR IS CULTURAL

Essentially, it is cultural behavior which of all psychological facts lends plausibility to the view of the absolute group restriction of the individual's conduct. True enough were cultural conduct the exclusive type of psychological action individuals would be quite severely limited in their responses.

Let us recall, however, that in addition to performing cultural conduct the person also responds with suprabasic, contingent, and idiosyncratic behavior. The relative inde-

pendence of these three types of non-cultural conduct we will consider briefly.

With respect to suprabasic conduct it must be admitted that it adds relatively little to the freedom and autonomy of the individual's behavior. In a former chapter we have pointed out that it is definitely built up on the basis of equipment which has been acquired with a close regard to the surroundings of the individual. The basic conduct underlying the suprabasic equipment is to a great extent cultural behavior acquired during the infancy and childhood of the person. And yet even here there is room for autonomous behavior of an elementary sort.

Contingential responses, however, depending primarily upon fortuitous and unforeseen situations, immediately suggest a large place for autonomous and independent activity. Not being primarily equipmental, contingential conduct is quite far removed from the behavior of other persons. As a result it allows for a wide differentiation between the individual's activities and the behavior character of any of the groups to which he belongs. It would be a metaphysical conception of the most palpable sort that would assume that such events are absolutely dominated by group phenomena.

Idiosyncratic behavior, founded as it is on the cumulative experience of the individual, naturally provides the broadest basis for free and autonomous responses. This type of action, be it recalled, may be quite unrelated to any of the groups to which the person belongs. All complex intelligent action, voluntary conduct, critical reactions, as well as creative and inventive behavior, practically always run counter to established and conventional ways of acting. Marking the variations of persons from other single or massed individuals, idiosyncratic behavior decidedly argues for the non-submergence of persons in collectivities.

OPPOSITION OF PERSONS AND GROUPS

The proposition that individuals are not dominated and controlled by the groups in which they live is demonstrated also by the actual resistance of persons to group phenomena. At this point we refer again to the modifications which individuals effect in institutions during their culturalization period. Through such resistances institutions become different and take on new cultural properties. In such a process, of course, we have definite demonstration of the casual domination of the psychological group by the individual. In the phenomenon of culturalization also we see how various conflicts and hindrances arise through the differing equipments that the individual has in his personality organization. Here again are conditions for the mitigation of the group's domination upon the individual undergoing socialization. It is chiefly the person's resistance and interference during the culturalization process that make for the instability of groups and their stratification into levels.

All of the bases for the relativity of individuals and groups that we have been discussing so far are definitely psychological in character. To these we must add certain non-psychological circumstances which likewise mitigate the influence of groups. These conditions either operate directly upon the situation or they first influence various psychological circumstances of the persons concerned. Very important, for example, are the individual's economic, and hygienic circumstances in that they may interfere with his normal compliance with group prescriptions and conformities. Under what might be called normal conditions the individual definitely acquiesces to the dictates of the group and abides by the common institutions and standards governing the use of property, but with interference with these so-called ordinary circumstances the person cuts himself off from his group.

GREAT NUMBER OF GROUPS

Doubtless by far the most important argument for the relativity of persons and groups is the great number of collectivities to which any individual actually belongs. Being a member of many psychological organizations the person takes on all kinds of varying equipment which fit him at once for a position of psychological independence. Such an extremely large number of responses does more. It makes the individual capable of comparing and criticizing institutions.

In the first instance, of course, we are referring to psychological groups. But the observation carries to all sorts of collectivities. How many groups we actually belong to may be gathered from the fact that sharing a single reaction with others constitutes a specific group membership. To acquire behavior equipment in numerous groups means automatically serving any absolute connection with any particular one.

Let us choose an illustration which exemplifies this point with respect to both psychological and anthropic groups. When a person is a member of several linguistic groups he is automatically released thereby from the restrictions of any particular set of linguistic institutions. Moreover, his linguistic conduct is richer and makes him decidedly more adaptable in linguistic situations. The personality equipment of such an individual is larger and more important with respect to any particular group or all of the groups of which he is a member. As it happens the individual is more restricted in linguistic situations than in practically any other case. In other than linguistic circumstances the individual can develop very definitely a capacity to modify group phenomena. This is especially noticeable in the case of manners, customs, morals, and social usages of all varieties.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN PERSONS AND GROUPS

The study of the various conflicts between the behavior of persons and the conduct conventions of their groups throws into direct relief the characteristics of human behavior as natural occurrences.

Here is an individual, a member of a family, a man of affairs, doing business or engaged in some profession and participating in various civic, political and philanthropic enterprises. Sometimes his business or professional activities may interfere with his functions as a member of a family, he may neglect his wife and children, be unable to provide them with the kind of home and environment they once had or to which they are accustomed. Specifically he may find it necessary or desirable to deprive his family of his society or reduce their economic or social status. As a husband he may transfer his affections to another woman and violate his pledge and obligations toward his wife. Or in another case, the needs and requirements of his family, augmented by his love and ambitions for them, prompt him to take advantage of his business partners, to violate some phase of his professional code, or, crassly though regretfully, commit some crime against the laws of his state.

In short, in the course of a person's living, whether through negligence, the collocation of circumstances, or the stimulation of a private ambition, things happen that interfere with his utter conformity to collectivities. Nor need we go to the extreme of asserting that it is the person without an occupation and at the point of starvation who will rebel against the moral¹ and legal usages of his human environs. Even if persons in breaking conventions inevitably face a future period of remorse or atonement they nevertheless indulge in independence of conduct.²

¹ In a conventional sense, of course.

² That social and legal penalties prevent much rebellious behavior is a sociological fact emphasizing the autonomy of psychological happenings.

Not that an individual deliberately rejects group institutions. He may suffer keenly from the necessity of not complying with usages and customs, but the sheer necessity of the situation forces a kind of action on his part which may weaken and even destroy the behavior restraint put upon him. The behavior life of every individual is replete with circumstances which make it impossible for one to be absolutely at the mercy of a group and quite necessary for him to assert his behavior independence.

In every sphere of human action we have abundant illustrations of persons tearing themselves free from the fetters of civilization that originally bind them. A glance at the whole mass of criminal life, whether against property or persons, shows us those who not only reject a code as a social or legal entity but also withdraw their behavior from that of the remainder of their fellows. How far a man can be an anarchist is a great question, but effective withdrawal from authority is by no means rare. Even if a person does in fact conform in his conduct to group action, his verbal or intellectual protest and his self-pity and hatred mark him off from others as a man apart.

To the mental pathologist the question occurs with increasing perplexity how many of our obviously queer and frequently unfortunate abnormals are none other than sheer protestants. These are people who are biologically intact and in function normal but who cannot or will not adjust themselves to others. From our present standpoint we may place such persons in a class with the martyrs, heretics, and iconoclasts who prevent the smooth flow of civilization.

These suggestions will no doubt be associated by the reader with radicals and protestants in the intellectual domain. It is perhaps here that our best examples are found. Immediately we think of a Walt Whitman who once was practically universally condemned as a degenerate who had broken into print, only to become a revered world figure in literature. The

life of Darwin, too, exemplifies a thinker timidly sowing seeds which, despite the hate and despal of orthodoxy, later developed into conventional doctrine.

THE MODIFICATION OF GROUPS

What power lies in individuals in withstanding the domination of groups is manifested in their capacity to modify and destroy groups. In the final analysis all changes in the sociological and psychological status of human organizations have their foundation in the conditions and behavior of persons. Some of these changes are wrought in a casual and undeliberate manner. The person merely acts in conformity with the exigencies of life, entirely unaware of the modifications he is introducing, say, in the linguistic and religious behavior of his community.

In many cases the individual's behavior is negative in character. For some reason he fails to conform to the behavior of the group and in this way weakens and destroys institutions both sociological and psychological. The great force of the person in modifying his civilization lies, of course, in the spread of his conduct to other people in the group.

More positive methods of altering social conditions are illustrated by the person who plans an enlargement of his own economic responses and deliberately develops an industrial culture in a community that has hitherto been exclusively agricultural. In the wake of this self-seeking and self-effecting behavior a new civilizational complexion of the person's group appears. Such deliberate activity, however, is not in this case designed to alter institutions. When the latter is true the results tend to be much more immediate; that is, the person is successful in his activity. For instance, new ideas, beliefs, and social practices have sprung up in amazingly short time in the guise of a new religion.

Another process involved when persons alter group phe-

nomena is based upon conflicts of culturalization in individuals. We may have here what is really a conflict of different cultural systems whose competition results in the elimination of one or the other, but it all takes place through the activity of specific persons.

Through culturalization in one of his groups the individual acquires various beliefs, practices and ideas which interfere with his functioning in another of his collectivities. For example, the type of ethical usages which he becomes acquainted with in his professional group may not work very well with respect to some domestic organization to which he belongs. This conflict of cultural traits may result in the alteration of the institutions in one of the collectivities. Acquiring cultural traits of criticism and scepticism in some intellectual association may be the starting point for the individual's operation on some other set of persons, in the end making for a conformity of the two sets of individuals, although they previously were very different.

Finally, we may suggest that idiosyncratic or other non-cultural conduct of the individual may result in the total destruction of a group. To begin with, through such behavior the individual stands out as a decided variant within the collectivity to which he originally conformed. For example, within certain cultural organizations individuals develop personal ideals and ambitions which are hampered and interfered with by conformity to group phenomena. Thus the individual criticizes and jeers at the activities of the other members. In some cases, such activity may result in the total transformation of certain actions and institutions. In this general type of individual influence upon cultural phenomena are included the activities of scientific discovery and mechanical invention which are distinct non-cultural personal activities but which in many cases have a tremendous effect upon cultural phenomena not only of intellectual organizations but other types of cultural groups.

PROGRESS BASED UPON PERSONS

How changes take place in simpler societies is comparatively easy to observe. Accordingly, it is a current doctrine among anthropologists that all progress in society must originate in and be fostered by individuals. It is entirely immaterial what standard we adopt for our judgments concerning improvements in the behavior, objects, and organizations of a society, for in any case, such improvements must have their origin in the activity of some individual from whom it spreads like a contagion throughout the entire community. Let us recall that all invention and creative conduct is in the first instance invariably the behavior of some person.

The individual basis of group improvement holds even if it is merely a case in which a person brings something into a group from some other collectivity or carries something over from a moiety or level of one group into another level. Whether one looks upon invention and creative conduct as an influence of a person or a collectivity, or as the effect wrought by one moiety upon another, in either case one cannot regard the person as an inevitable group product or as absolutely restricted by groups.

That persons are independent of groups is more strikingly established when our problem is shifted to the regression of groups or their disintegration. May not individuals be responsible for the disappearance of groups? Are we going to treat man and his relations with others as an absolute and abstract circumstance or as a concrete datum. If the latter, no serious doubt can exist as to interchange of influences between persons and groups.

Nevertheless, it is still pertinent to ask the question, why, if the person is so potent a factor in human affairs, he cannot do more to bring about the progress that is so vitally necessary for every community. The answer seems to be that since every complex human occurrence consists of a congeries of

specific phenomena, the psychological element cannot outweigh the other features. The person bent on improving his group must contend with non-psychological institutions and phenomena of all sorts. Again, there are innumerable conflicts of interests, so that if some improvement were carried out, it might be resisted by other members of the group as conflicting with their advantages.

The results are clear. A canvass of available data leaves no doubt that persons are not merciless materials or inevitable products of psychological or anthropological processes.

The protestant personality is a genuine fact of human society. Not even a rigid social organization nor an efficient culturalization process can prevent the development and existence of independent critics and non-conformists. Of course, as has often been said we must always come down from specific instances to actual persons. We cannot be misled by statistical conceptions.

The cosmopolitan is no illusion. While no one can escape culturalization one is not limited to any city or nation. One may also deliberately and voluntarily step out of groups and their influences and develop universal attitudes, or better still, private and personal behavior equipment.

Intelligent and rational persons clearly illustrate the lack of absolute dominance of individuals by collectivities. For in a genuine sense intelligence and rationality are to a great extent the opposite of conformity. These are qualities that represent variability and heterodoxy. How else than by being unique and self-possessed can one be psychologically alert and efficient? Here one must be independent of things and the ideas and beliefs of other persons. To be psychologically dominated by circumstances or by a group is *ipso facto* not to be intelligent. To be intelligent one must be different even though one may be wrong. To be reasonable one must decide a problem oneself even though one is in danger of starting from the wrong premises.

Genuine morality is not public custom. Unless we are prepared to say that there is no genuine moral action we must admit that persons are not always and inevitably at the mercy of group prescriptions. Actions may be independent though not capricious. We can decide when we ought to do something, and do it without being ruthlessly dominated at every point by the laws and sanctions of crowds or other social organizations. Genuine moral conduct is personal deviation and the setting of oneself over against others rather than blind conformity. Genuine moral conduct like all idiosyncratic behavior represents a condition of pull or strain, between a person and others, which may be regarded as the group standing against the individual.

PART FOUR

**SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AS ASPECTS
OF HUMANISTIC SITUATIONS**

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AS COMPONENTS OF HUMAN SITUATIONS

Up to this point we have studied social psychological phenomena as isolated events. In thus separating social reactions from the human situations in which they occur we have been treating them as autonomous. And yet it is impossible to disregard the fact that cultural responses are only aspects of larger events. Every happening involving social psychological phenomena comprises in addition a number of other factors.

Our isolating procedure therefore is entirely misleading. While it is necessary artificially to isolate social psychological data in order to study them, it is quite impossible to understand them without relating them with the other facts with which they are inevitably connected. Indeed we have already pointed out that social psychological and other aspects of humanistic phenomena influence each other. For example, we have indicated that the origin of certain sociological and economic institutions is to a certain extent owing to psychological conditions. Human phenomena of every sort, be they political, historical, or anthropological are in a genuine sense constituted in part of psychological activities.

On the other hand, we have already discovered that psychological occurrences of every variety are dependent upon humanistic events. Not to stress this point would mean that social psychological facts would be treated as though they were entities. Thus when we ask whence come such facts the obvious answer is that psychological phenomena are de-

veloped in the interaction of persons with sociological, political, and historical happenings. It has also been suggested that psychological occurrences have numerous possibilities and limitations located in such humanistic data. In short, when we study human phenomena in intimate interrelationship we learn that human nature is not only a product of human circumstances, but also a factor conditioning these events.

But we must go still further. In order to deal adequately with social psychological phenomena we must not only refrain from disjoining them from other psychological and non-psychological facts with which they are inevitably connected, but in addition we must show the actual interrelationships existing between these different sets of data.

Now a difficulty confronts us. How is it possible to bring so many different elements together in a single description? Immediately the suggestion occurs that we might show how the cultural personality performs behavior in various political, economic, intellectual, moral and other specific human situations. But this itself necessitates an isolating procedure, for concrete human situations are not marked off as purely economic, intellectual, or political.

Our best plan under the circumstances therefore is to choose a series of situations and attempt an analytic description of the various coördinate factors present. An example will indicate the program.

Buying a watch is a situation replete with both psychological and non-psychological factors. Among the former we discover all of the six types of behavior we have enumerated in the first chapter of this volume. For instance, purchasing a timepiece involves contingent action stimulated by the exigencies of personal circumstances. Obviously all sorts of cultural behavior also play a part in the situation. The necessity and desire to be punctual constitute distinct conformity responses to my occupational, social, and ethnic groups. Buying only a certain size watch, though another size might

suit my non-cultural purposes better, illustrates my having been culturalized to share certain reactions. The effect of this socialization upon me is no less strong than that dictating the use of a watch at all. Idiosyncratic reactions are exemplified by the choice of style and pattern, made possible by the fact that I can perform some behavior independently of culturalization. That is, my watch will symbolize my personal tastes to a certain though perhaps a very slight extent. Other psychological adjustments in the situation comprise perceptions, inquiries, deliberations, choices, decisions, etc. Since these reactions constitute the behavior of a single individual there are no absolute barriers between them. Rather they are harmonious phases of a single person's conduct.

The non-psychological factors of our situation we may separate into (1) natural, (2) sociological and civilizational, and (3) historical types.

Among the natural conditions involved in buying a watch we note, for example, that the plenitude or scarcity of certain minerals determines directly the type and utility of the articles I will have an opportunity to see and purchase. As a more remote naturalistic feature we should include the person's biological construction as a participative factor in such an event.

The mere fact of buying a watch presupposes a whole host of anthropological and sociological conditions as components of our situation. The invention, existence, and use of timepieces, are dependent upon a very specific system of complicated anthropological circumstances.

Especially do the economic conditions force themselves upon our consideration. These, with the social organization factors, determining whether I purchase my watch in a department store, jeweler's shop, or by post, suggest some of the sociological elements connected with the behavior data.

We come finally to the interrelated occurrence of general historical facts with cultural conduct. At any particular mo-

ment I may be compelled to purchase a particular kind of watch because historical circumstances prevent my doing otherwise. War interferes with trade. Accordingly, when certain countries are engaged in making history, only certain brands of goods are available. Such an illustration may be cited as representative of innumerable historical components of particular human situations.

It is plain that our study cannot be made in terms of such simple circumstances as our watch illustration. Accordingly, it will be our task in the present chapter to analyze a number of type situations, such as scientific, linguistic, political, religious, and aesthetic behavior events. As components of these happenings, we generalize a number of factors under the rubrics of individual and cultural conduct, anthropological, sociological, historical, and natural circumstances.

THE SCIENTIFIC SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—Individual psychological activities analyzed out of scientific situations may be roughly divided into two types. First, we have purely intellectual conduct. All scientific behavior centers about the interest and curiosity in discovering the nature of a fact, or the attempt to gain orientation for oneself with respect to certain phenomena. Generally speaking, the person's behavior is replete with knowledge, imagination, and thinking activities in addition to the perceptual responses involved. To these activities may be added all the responses concerned with the development of tools and techniques for the manipulation of the things, events, and circumstances constituting the stimuli of scientific responses. Probably the most important type of activity here is the idiosyncratic kind. For we assume that the individual is working out some problem or is engaged in some investigation which challenges him. Contingential reactions follow as a very close second.

Remote, to say the least, is the ideal that scientific work is detached from the personal needs and desires of scientists. Howsoever extraneous they may be to the interests of knowledge and discovery, scientific activity is never free from personal economic pressures or from conditions stimulating personal ambition. Accordingly, our most abstract intellectual attitudes are conditioned by our professional interests. Being scientists we must succeed, and to succeed we must be productive. To be productive one's work must be acceptable to those in power. How many scientific papers have been rejected by official journals because they did not conform, we only learn because some of them later become representatives of acceptable doctrines.¹

Then there is the sad story of scientific politics and dishonor. Authorities cannot accept those whose ideas would upset their own hard-won successes. They are not to be blamed for thinking that newer ideas are inferior or unintelligible. The whole drama of the new versus the old is enacted in science as well as in every other field of human endeavor. The politics, jealousies, and intrigues that go to make up the sordid details of the several acts are familiar to all the actors involved. Posts and prizes go to the faithful and those who are intelligent enough to understand established truths. Scientific situations must perforce be cluttered up with intrigue and cunning as the career of Huxley amply illustrates. Thus he writes concerning his memoir "On the Morphology of the Cephalus Mollusca,"

"I told you I was very busy, and I must tell you what I am about and you will believe me. I have just finished a Memoir for the Royal Society, which has taken me a world of time, thought, and reading, and is, perhaps, the best thing I have done yet. It will not be read till May, and I do not know

¹ For an excellent treatment of this phase of science, cf. Murray, *Science and Scientists in the 19th Century*, 1925.

whether they will print it or not afterwards; that will require care and a little manœuvring on my part. You have no notion of the intrigues that go on in this blessed world of science. Science is, I fear, no purer than any other region of human activity; though it should be. Merit alone is very little good; it must be backed by tact and knowledge of the world to do very much.

"For instance, I know that the paper I have just sent in is very original and of some importance, and I am equally sure that if it is referred to the judgment of my 'particular friend' ——— that it will not be published. He won't be able to say a word against it, but he will pooh-pooh it to a dead certainty.

"You will ask with some wonderment, Why? Because for the last twenty years ——— has been regarded as the great authority on these matters, and has had no one to tread on his heels, until at last, I think, he has come to look upon the Natural World as his special preserve, and 'no poachers allowed'. So I must manœuvre a little to get my poor memoir kept out of his hands.

"The necessity for these little stratagems utterly disgusts me. I would so willingly reverence and trust any man of high standing and ability. I am so utterly unable to comprehend this petty greediness. And yet withal you will smile at my perversity. I have a certain pleasure in overcoming these obstacles, and fighting these folks with their own weapons. I do so long to be able to trust men implicitly. I have such a horror of all this literary pettifogging. I could be so content myself, if the necessity of making a position would allow it, to work on anonymously, but ——— I see is determined not to let either me or any one else rise if he can help it. Let him beware. On my own subjects I am his master, and am quite ready to fight half a dozen dragons. And although he has a bitter pen, I flatter myself that on occasions I can match him in that department also."¹

¹ L. Huxley, *Life and Letters of Thomas H. Huxley*; Vol. II, p. 106. Reprinted with the kind permission of D. Appleton and Co. New York.

Social Psychological Factors.—Let the individual be ever so strongly bent upon solving his problem with regard only to his scientific interests and the character of this data, and let him be free also of political entanglement, his activity still shows him tugging at the chains of convention. Various inevitable culturalization factors grip him. Though we pursue our natural science thinking to its limits, the limits are prescribed by various group considerations, both of an ethnic or national form, or by smaller collectivities of a professional type.

What a spectacle. Behold the study of natural phenomena prejudiced by the fact that the scientist is a Continental or a British Islander. Historically this difference in origin was responsible for the dichotomy between so-called empiricists and rationalists. In the distinctly psychological field this sort of cultural influence determined that the English Locke should be an associationist, while the German Leibnitz should be an apperceptionist.

Within the particular scientific domain we find numerous examples of the way thinkers are influenced by culturalization. Here is a problem involving a physiological datum. We may predict at once that chemically trained students will envisage the situation from the physico-chemical standpoint. Likewise, those biologists culturalized more as naturalists will be distinctly determined by their biological or botanical training.

The student of psychology will be interested in several examples from his own field. Here it is plain that investigations of natural phenomena are prejudiced by the fact that the individual has been culturalized as a mentalistic or behavioristic psychologist. The result is a typifying of the investigation according to the previous socialization of the scientific worker.

Social psychological components of another sort may be analyzed out of psychological situations. This we call the

experimentalistic bias. Every activity which represents a manipulation of things, no matter how trivial, is always regarded as eminently worthwhile and as fulfilling the conditions of scientific study. Such a culturalization may condition the whole complexion of the science, leading to a great neglect of those important phenomena which do not lend themselves readily to manipulative techniques. Cultural emphasis upon exactness of observation and demonstration rather favors the retention of epiphenomena and other non-observable elements rather than their extrusion from a particular scientific field. Scientific culturalization makes one forget that alchemists were most scrupulous in their manipulations and most insistent upon their exactitude.

Culturalization influences in the psychological domain of science are similarly illustrated by calculative prejudices. Only that which is stateable in mathematical terms is deemed to be certain and worth while. But in the meantime calculations are substituted for facts and the actual data are not pursued because they cannot be mathematically treated.

Psychological science offers still another example. Even after neural explanations are shown to be exceedingly worthless for the handling of psychological phenomena, psychologists still persist in throwing their data into imaginary neural patterns. Culturalization, therefore, very decidedly leads to a shifting and fitting of facts to meet institutional ideas and conceptions, rather than correlating them with the nature of the phenomena themselves. In such circumstances we see worked out to the fullest extent the arbitrary and artificial characteristics of cultural psychological behavior.

Culturalized belief in native powers and forces we take as our final illustrative conventional factor in psychological scientific situations. This belief may be regarded as a fashion or convention which persists although its specific form undergoes numerous changes to fit newer circumstances.

Sociological Factors.—Every scientific situation is located

in some particular society. This fact affords us numerous suggestions concerning the sociological contributions to these situations. In a complex society we expect a larger number of scientific problems and pursuits than can be provided by a simpler community. An industrial society frequently contributes an absolutistic feature to its science, since technical processes and products of an industrial milieu make for stability and uniformity. An agricultural community on the other hand, provides circumstances more favorable to contingent and tentative scientific activity. Again, a progressive and expanding society injects a definite pragmatic element into its scientific attitudes and methods; namely, they are more experimental than is the case in a fixed and conservative community.

In the same way the economic circumstances of a sociological group provide their quota of scientific elements. A rich society has the means of promoting investigation, for it is able to furnish facilities for study. Only a wealthy community, for example, can afford laboratories, research stations, scientific expeditions, and investigating and well-equipped hospitals.

Economic factors likewise supply a direction and goal to scientific pursuits. The wealth of a society is derived from particular sources. At once we discover interests which force science to take certain moulds. In order that agricultural science shall flourish in a given society it is necessary that it shall have large agrarian interests. A primarily industrial community forces the study of physics and chemistry. Medical scientists in an acquisitive society do not stress those conditions of health that make for a good life and the pursuit of happiness, but attempt to make persons into economically useful members of society.

Anthropological Factors.—Science in our own civilization has not always been an object of worship as it is today and in many communities it is still dispensable. Anthropic or

civilizational circumstances either promote or prevent the development of scientific situations. That is, anthropological conditions determine whether or not scientific or organized reflections will exist at all. The pursuit of knowledge and the development of intellectual attitudes from an anthropological standpoint is a matter of fashion.¹

¹ 'The aspiration to be 'scientific' is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided subjective interest which it is. But as a matter of fact, few even of the cultivated members of the race have shared it; it was invented but a generation or two ago. In the middle ages it meant only impious magic; and the way in which it even now strikes orientals is charmingly shown in the letter of a Turkish *cadi* to an English traveller asking him for statistical information, which Sir A. Layard prints at the end of his 'Nineveh and Babylon.' The document is too full of edification not to be given in full. It runs thus: 'My Illustrious Friend, and Joy of my Liver!

'The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But, above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it.

'O my soul! O my lamb! seek not after the things which concern thee not. Thou camest unto us and we welcomed thee: go in peace.

'Of a truth thou hast spoken many words; and there is no harm done. For the speaker is one and the listener is another. After the fashion of thy people thou hast wandered from one place to another, until thou art happy and content in none. We (praise be to God) were born here, and never desire to quit it. Is it possible, then, that the idea of a general intercourse between mankind should make any impression on our understandings? God forbid!

'Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God! He created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years! Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it.

'But thou wilt say unto me, Stand aside, O man, for I am more learned than thou art, and have seen more things. If thou thinkest that thou art in this respect better than I am, thou art welcome. I praise God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in the things I care not for; and as for that which thou hast seen, I

By contrast with such an attitude our own civilization today demands that nothing in heaven or on earth shall be excluded from scientific research. So fashionable is science that even churchmen insist that God and the Bible shall be scientifically investigated.

Anthropic factors similarly determine the specific forms of scientific problems. Ideas and experiments must wait upon particular anthropic developments. Thus scientific problems shift. At one time in the development of western European civilization it was quite unheard of for science to be investigating anything but the most objective physical qualities of things. The study of human action and personality, and the nature of human society are enterprises that have had to wait for a number of civilizational conditions to make them important or even feasible.

Within specific domains of science also, anthropic conditions have their distinctive place. What the dominant issues shall be in the fields of chemistry, medicine, or social science, is a matter of fashion dictated by definite anthropological conditions and circumstances. The history of every individual science indicates the varied positions that certain problems have held in a given field at different time periods.

Historical Factors.—Only by avoiding the analysis of specific scientific situations can we escape their historical factors. Human changes, triumphs, and vicissitudes are mirrored in the activities and products of scientists. Chemistry, medicine, psychology, and physics, as well as the distinctly human sciences, all show their historic interaction. We need

spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek Paradise with thine eyes?

'O my friend! if thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but God! Do no evil, and thus wilt thou fear neither man nor death; for surely thine hour will come!

The meek in spirit (El Fakir)

Imaum Ali Zadi.'

Reprinted—from James. *Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 640-641, footnote, with the kind permission of Henry Holt & Co., New York.

only go back to the recent war to see the effect of political and historical conditions upon the development of new problems and techniques. Such are the new chemicals, the new cures, and the new thought. Or think how colonization instigates scientific investigations. Colonial expansion makes necessary research in malaria and sleeping sickness. Again, every student of psychology is familiar with the impetus given to the whole testing movement by the military activities of the recent war.

More general suggestions of the place of history in science are found in the scientific changes which correlate point by point with historical events. In the ancient world scientific conditions differed from those of the mediaeval period, as both of these have varied from those of the renaissance and modern times. With respect to particular sciences, we may easily trace out their successive pagan, mohammedan and christian characteristics as correlated with discoveries, conquests, and the dominations and alliances of nations.

Naturalistic Factors.—The contribution to scientific situations of natural phenomena hardly needs to be emphasized. For physical, biological and human objects and their conditions constitute the irreducible minima of scientific materials. The study of nature is obviously an indispensable feature of scientific enterprises even if it is true that thinkers sometimes reject the existence of natural phenomena because such things do not fit in with traditional doctrines.

Natural things must always be crude data for science. It is an absolute requirement that for such existing things nothing else be substituted. Upon the foundation of crude facts, of course, it is possible to erect all sorts of improbable superstructures. Sometimes the crude data themselves may force a variety of interpretations. But always the scientific situation must be built up around natural phenomena. For one scientist, light is undulation of ether, while for the other it is a series of emitted particles. Now in each case, the inter-

pretation is conditioned by culturalization and perhaps even by personal considerations. Each, however, is a reaction to natural phenomena. Neither of these theories would be scientific if it did not in some fashion hold the mirror up to nature.

THE LINGUISTIC SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—Of all human situations the linguistic one presents the most difficulty in isolating its numerous factors. Probably this is because the linguistic event is comprehensible in comparatively simple actions of persons. Of this we are certain, however, that the individual psychological components comprise definite adjustmental responses to simultaneously operating stimuli. The fundamental activity in language is simultaneously performing a reaction to some thing, event, or person, as referent and to some person (oneself or some other individual) as referee.¹ When I ask you to bring me the book pointed to, you as referee serve as an auxiliary stimulus to the book (referent) which is regarded as the adjustment stimulus.¹ The character of linguistic responses may be of almost any describable form, such as ordinary verbal reactions, vocal, facial, or manual gesturing, or grosser movements of various sorts.

Coupled with these essentially linguistic activities are various other responses. Here we may point out the reaction of appreciating the need to refer to something or the necessity to have some work accomplished which is carried out in part by one's speech activity. Also included here are the responses constituting consent to speak or the decision that it is worth while to say something.

Social Psychological Factors.—Under ordinary circumstances the mutuality of the linguistic situation conditions it

¹ For an exhaustive analysis of linguistic phenomena see Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, Chap. 23.

in a very definite way. One must necessarily speak as a member of some psychological collectivity. This means that the individual is bound to use a particular vocabulary with definite intonation and corresponding gestures of all sorts which fit into the scheme of the particular collectivity. Language is also cultural behavior in that a certain group determines the word order, the type of gender, time, and number references, etc. Therefore, it is quite permissible to say that from the standpoint of an immediate linguistic event the entire circumstance involves large numbers of cultural behavior factors. When we recall that the genesis of language gives us a picture exclusively social, there can be no question of the cultural behavior components of linguistic situations.

Sociological Factors.—Conjoined with the numerous other phases of the linguistic event are myriads of circumstances having to do with the various societies in which the language action takes place. The organization of the community, its industrial and economic circumstances, determine the form and character of linguistic activity. Tersely put, the sociological features provide the numerous specific occasions for speaking. Social conditions make possible what the person is talking about as well as determine how he performs the reaction. The multiplication of objects, techniques, and events in a particular group means that reference responses and various symbols will have to be developed in order to refer to them. A society without science has no terminology for the handling of that type of referent. Further, whatever sociological factors are not directly connected with the behavior side of the linguistic situation are concerned with its stimuli circumstances.

Anthropological Factors.—We may look to the anthropological factors of linguistic situations for the traditional forms which constitute both the standards and records of speech in a given anthropic unit. Anthropological factors mould the language activities into certain patterns. All of the characteristics of speech in the way of vocabulary, word order, in-

flection, etc. constitute conditions imposed upon the speaking individual by the cultural development of the community in which he lives. Moreover, the changes and transformations of speech, such as ungrammatical language, slang, etc., testify to the operation of the anthropological concomitants of group stratification and culturalization changes in linguistic circumstances.

Historical Factors.—No linguistic situation may be regarded as sufficiently described without referring to the interrelations between groups, whether ethnic, national, or sociological. It is these factors which lie at the basis of the changes and transformations of language systems. Although English and German have a common parentage, historical circumstances have brought about marked differences between them. Similarly the specific kind of English and German one speaks is determined by numerous conquests, migrations, and group mixtures. The many vicissitudes undergone by Latin as spoken by different sets of persons correspond to the historical experiences of the several peoples who speak the various Romance languages derived from the Latin ancestor. In the study of language some of the most important factors are the conditions which separate off and isolate groups with the resulting development of dialects and even smaller linguistic divisions. Such conditions make for gross modifications in linguistic character and performance.

Natural Phenomena.—Beyond the evolution of vocalizing and gesturing, linguistic situations derive very little from natural circumstances. This proposition refers of course to actual linguistic action, and is valid because language is a kind of human activity which individuals perform without the use of tools or materials. Our proposition requires modifications when we turn from verbal or gestural speech to writing. For the latter activity is quite dependent upon natural sources for tools and materials upon which to write. The same thing applies, of course, to printing. Perhaps the origin and de-

velopment of writing and printing has been favored by the presence of natural phenomena at certain times and places. At once the problematic connection between the papyrus of Egypt, and the origin and spread of writing reactions is suggested.

THE AESTHETIC SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—We may summarize what are essentially aesthetic responses as either creation, appreciation, criticism, or evaluation. It is not at all unusual that aesthetic behavior may include all of these types of responses at once. Perhaps in most cases, however, one or a combination of several operates.

Motivation reactions of varying description constitute closely related individual behavior factors. Numerous suggestions have been made as to the motives dominating the creation and appreciation of art objects. In this rôle are mentioned desires of various sorts and such responses as are summed up as the attempt to escape from reality. Other suggestions are made to the effect that art creation is essentially sublimated and metamorphosed sex conduct. Undoubtedly, these activities are all found in aesthetic situations, among innumerable others that are not so prominently featured. From a strictly psychological standpoint there is no special reason why we should exclude as behavior elements in aesthetic circumstances the activities of making a living, or sheerly engaging in some satisfactory occupation.

Social Psychological Factors.—Although aesthetic activities are among the most individualistic of behavior we find that at every point they are dominated and influenced by various forms of culturalization. While aesthetic situations give freest rein to imaginative and inventive activity a study of aesthetic products reveals the heavy hand of convention. Starting with aesthetic conceptions and passing through all the stages of technique and choice of medium, the artist shows

himself to be a member of a psychological collectivity. Aesthetic creation appears to be inevitably conditioned by culturalization of an occupational and professional sort; so that the marks of school and tendency are prominent features of aesthetic products. Still more, our aesthetic conduct is quite definitely acquired in contact with ethnic, sociological and nationalistic groups. Hence it is obviously cultural. These stigmatizing features characterize the artist as exceedingly sensitive to institutional stimuli in the form of standards and prescriptions of all sorts. These stimulate his reactions of taste, subject matter, style, composition, and technique.

That culturalization sweetens or poisons the springs of appreciation we have already had occasion to see. Thus great variations exist between the admiration and judgments of beauty of persons culturalized in different ethnic communities, while those socialized in the same groups respond with a wearisome uniformity.

Sociological Factors.—Every aesthetic situation varies according to contributing sociological conditions. In a sense certain economic circumstances interpenetrate with the other factors in aesthetic situations. Especially in complex societies the existence of objects and materials depends decidedly upon the economic status of the group. In order that contrived beauty should prevail at all, it seems that a certain amount of wealth should exist, either concentrated in the hands of patrons or in some community generally. Quite convincingly does the history of art indicate that the flourishing periods are those in which economic conditions make possible the leisure to pursue aesthetic work. The existence of art museums implies a unique economic factor in aesthetic situations. When a community is prosperous it can build and maintain such permanent repositories for artistic patterns and models. Whether it is true that these institutions operate for woe, as agencies in the perpetuation of wrong standards and techniques, or for weal, in making access possible to great works,

they unquestionably play an important rôle in the aesthetic life of persons and groups.

Social organization supplies its threads to the general web of the aesthetic circumstances. Thus in a simple society we do not find decided differentiation between the artist and other members of the group as is true in a complex society. Rather, we have situations in which every one is both a craftsman and an artist. Everyone participates in the production of the tools, weapons, and other accoutrements of the group. In the most casual fashion the enhancement and decoration of these objects supply stimuli for the development of essentially artistic products.

Anthropological Factors.—Anthropic components bring civilizational pattern to aesthetic situations. Depending upon the particular anthropic circumstances, art objects and techniques conform in great detail to certain models. Such models represent aesthetic traditions. And so we have Greek, Hellenistic, Byzantine, Italian, and other aesthetic civilizations.

If it is true that the North Europeans or the Americans are developing a new architecture we may regard this event as in part a process of new anthropological conditions effecting a displacement of the thoroughly established classic and Gothic traditions. It is only aesthetic tradition which decrees that the Semites shall not employ the human figure as an aesthetic motif. Hence Arabian architectural decoration is limited to mosaics and Arabesques of every variety depending upon the nature of the materials they use. Again, were not anthropic traditions responsible for the mediaeval and early renaissance painting taking the form of religious decoration as contrasted with pagan motifs? Very strikingly are civilization patterns demonstrated when artists of different periods or places depict some particular subject. How vastly different is the Eastern Christ with its oriental features from the Western Christ with its occidental traits! Similarly, an object which in a Greek aesthetic situation attains to the most idealistic notion

of perfection, is in the eyes of a Hindu not aesthetic at all.

Historical Factors.—It is evident that the constant changes in human circumstances brought about by group contacts leave their mark upon aesthetic situations, in the same manner that we encountered in scientific and linguistic situations. For illustrative purposes, it suffices to mention the various waves of tradition that have swept over the American group from the time that it was a British colony through its enlarging contacts with other European peoples.

Natural Factors.—Phenomena of nature make greater contributions to aesthetic than to other situations, for natural conditions especially affect aesthetic materials and techniques, as well as appreciative responses. Each separate aesthetic domain, of course, supplies different naturalistic concomitants. For example, in painting, the natural influence upon subject matter is decidedly emphasized. The type of natural surroundings undoubtedly stimulates the development of different conceptions and in general supplies a very distinct form to the art inspiration of different nations. In the field of music the availability of materials for the development of instruments determines the musical products. Similarly, climate and geological formation undoubtedly condition the form and medium with which the architect works.

A rather extraneous but telling influence of natural surroundings upon many aspects of the aesthetic situation concerns the preservation of art objects. It is impossible to overestimate the preservative character of the Egyptian climate, since it has made possible the prolonged existence of so many monuments. After all these centuries they serve as genuine motifs for present day aesthetic activities.

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—Before attempting to isolate the individual behavior components of religious situa-

tions it is necessary to define the religious field. For there are no sharp lines to be drawn here. We shall assume then that within the religious domain is comprised all that contrasts with the everyday world. The religious realm then is different from all that exists, is known, or is subject to man's control. Since this conception requires so much to be defended we submit that it at least allows for the constant and universal presence of religious phenomena in human society.

So far as existence and knowledge are concerned the religious domain contrasts with science as the home of the mystical and supernatural. All ultimate forces, creative powers, and mysterious and supernatural objects find their abode there. Again, the religious field is the fountain head of supreme authority. Whenever man regards some idea or suggestion especially worth while, he finds it sanctioned when he can use the expression, "Thus sayeth the Lord." Furthermore, the religious world is regarded as the source and goal of all man's highest aspirations and ideals. It is the home of "something not ourselves which makes for righteousness."

Religion as we have delimited it may be called personal. It is from that source that we select our examples of individual conduct. In this way we can avoid to a certain extent confusing religious behavior with political or legal action. We must recall that in the period when the priest was scholar, law giver and diplomat, we could not very well distinguish a religious response from an action conforming to the religious organization of society. A church in such a situation was not merely a religious institution; it was at the same time a court of law, a school, and an instrument of social and political administration.

Individual religious responses fall under various headings, such as intellectual and affective attitudes, and behavior habits. As intellectual attitudes we include the numerous beliefs in the existence of powers and forces. Here, too, we have various forms of speculation and reflection concerning

the nature and possibilities of these powers and personalities which one cannot know but which are presumed somehow to manifest their existence and omnipotence.

Prominent among the affectively surcharged attitudes are the responses of awe and reverence. The former may be regarded as types of pleasurable dejection and self-effacement in the presence of a gigantic power or personality. Reverential reactions take the form of exaltation and affective appreciation of the greatness and grandeur of the religious object. Closely connected with these reactions are the attitudes of mystic union with and dependence upon unknowable forces, and the faith and fear responses which are likewise conduct components of religious situations. Of the innumerable religious practices acts of worship, praise and adoration suggest themselves. The multitude of responses which find a place under these categories obviously take every possible form, as the students of various anthropic groups report. In a series they might be arranged from the sacrifice of human beings, through the killing of animals, down to the gregarious hymning of appraising songs. Nor should such a list exclude various indulgences or ascetic practices. Think only of the fastings, self-torturing, and simple acts of self-denial. We conclude our list with acts of prayer in all its forms. These include sheer attempts to commune with the unknown, as well as bargaining and begging.

Social Psychological Factors.—Religious culturalization is doubtless among the strongest and most enduring. No society is free from an omnipresent religious aura. Every individual is gradually and imperceptibly led into a psychological religious unit in much the same fashion as he enters a linguistic collectivity. This is true especially of general ethnic religious socialization. Besides, there exist in every group many forms of particularized religious institutions harbored by special cults to which individuals acquire responses.

The prominent place of social psychological factors in re-

ligious situations is suggested by the existence of numerous initiations and admission ceremonies connected with culturalization by professional religious groups, as well as by the processes of excommunication. Whether a person belongs to an orthodox collectivity, or has undergone the socialization of a heterodox organization with an overt departure from some previous religious culturalization, his participation in a religious situation involves many cultural behavior elements. Whatever religious actions the person performs are moulded and shaped by the conventions of his numerous psychological collectivities.

Sociological Factors.—Whether religious activity is personal or entirely communal the sociological contribution is presupposed. For instance, in a simple society, religious phenomena consist mainly of organized group practices such as dances and sacrifices. In a more complex community, on the other hand, religious responses tend to be more private. Among other sociological aspects are the admixtures of faith and reason and the character of religion as social service or aesthetic experience.

Generally speaking, the social organization of a particular society contributes a distinctive quality of religious behavior. When there is little or no specialization of religious function, as was the case in mediaeval Europe, our religious situation is entirely different than when religious life is a distinct and separate feature of social existence. It is essential to recall that the church might be a state, or that religious organizations, in varying degrees, may perform social functions which sometimes are the activities of a state. For instance, the church in modern society cares for the poor and sick when the state does not provide institutions for such a purpose. Religious organizations also establish schools and colleges for the propagation of both sacred and secular learning.

Anthropological Factors.—While suggesting the anthropic institutions that in part compose religious situations, we will

refer to two general types. On the one hand, there is a general institution to which we may refer as the Sacred or Holy, corresponding to the mystic and unknowable powers which we have previously mentioned. These powers, operating through the medium of ceremonies and legends, serve as stimuli for awe and worship responses. Cathedrals, temples, and various religious institutions concretely and permanently embody these legends.

A second type of religious institution centers about persons. Surveying the whole range of religious situations we find that in some ultimate fashion they are connected with an impersonal personality such as God the Father, or some other personalized form of the unknowable. A considerably more concrete situation arises when powerful individuals are accepted or imagined as the fathers of a clan or group, or as personalities in whom reside the heroism and support of the anthropic collectivity. An example is the whole troop of Greek deities, who in their Olympian behavior were thought to aid, justify and reward the community in their various activities. Practically all religions have a multiplicity of great leaders, prophets, and saints who constitute mediators between the concrete world of human affairs and the impalpable region of the beyond. Here the names of Moses, Zoroaster, Christ, Mohammed, and the Virgin Mary are immediately suggested. Conspicuous also in contributing to the character of religious situations are the civilizational qualities resident in the actual shepherds of the flocks, the priests and ministers who always occupy a large place in the religious world.

Historical Factors.—The contribution of history to religious situations, at least in more complex societies, is primarily though not entirely genetic. Historical factors are not so prominent in current religious happenings; that is, they do not affect greatly the present-day religious life of complex groups. In no case would it be possible for religious institutions and behavior to be as profoundly conditioned as they

were in their formative stages. To determine to what an extent historical factors have influenced European religion it is only necessary to recall that all of its fundamental features are derived from Oriental sources rather than from Occidental ones. Early historical connections between the East and West have left their complicated effects upon all the religious phenomena of Western European civilization.

Natural Phenomena.—Because religious situations are of such an intimate and humanistic character we must expect natural happenings to play a rather indirect rôle in this domain. Natural phenomena, however, do supply the occasions for belief in uncontrollable forces. The inabilities of man to control life and growth, to stem tides and floods or prevent earthquakes, serve as stimuli for the belief in supernatural powers. Also, the conflicts and frustrations of civil life bring to the fore the helplessness of man and provoke attitudes concerning better and more permanent circumstances in some other than the present existence.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—Despite the fact that political phenomena are inevitably tied up with all varieties of economic and sociological facts, they are after all very definite types of humanistic data. The limits marking off the political field circumscribe all the facts concerned with the administration of a territory or group of individuals.

Hence, individual political behavior may be summed up under such headings as voting, tax-paying, law making, and law obeying, all regarded as either coequal or hierarchial organizations of functions, having as their end the living together of persons. Such activities are primarily internal with respect to a given unit. Other responses connected with the interrelations of political groups take the form of diplomatic, protective, and aggressive military acts.

These activities are merely suggestions of classes of action covering an enormous number of particular responses. It is hardly necessary to draw up elaborate tables of the specific activities comprised under these class headings. We should not neglect, however, to point out that they not only include overt forms of conduct but also more subtle adjustments, such as believing and thinking. In other words, political behavior embraces all manner of adjustments which have as their stimuli the circumstances connected with the relations of men. Nor do we exclude from the political situation those borderline responses between political conduct proper and the economic phases of political life. These consist of actions involved in discovery, and colonization as aspects of extended political administration.

Social Psychological Factors.—Whatever may be the actual circumstances which divide off the persons of a political unit into various collectivities, it is a truism that political life presents very definite and imperious culturalizing conditions. Depending upon the character of the political group, individuals are inevitably socialized as one or another type of political thinker or actor. When political organization is an issue, parties arise defending and objecting to the existing order. Thus we have royalists and republicans side by side. These parties, so far as their influence upon the culturalization of persons is concerned, operate as imperiously as a linguistic or an ethnic group. Traits of thinking and acting are forced upon people which constitute fundamental features of their personality make-up and determine the nature of most of their other forms of activity. In a republican group where the form of organization is not questioned, the large sub-organizations may center about some kind of economic issue such as a tariff, but here, too, the influence of the political situation is just as compelling.

Similar to all other groups, political units undergo all types of fractionalization. Individuals are politically attached and

organized in just as blind and imperious a way as they belong to some religious collectivity. They need neither know what are the political issues nor why they prefer one form of solution to another. On the other hand, other levels in the collectivity may be regarded as more intelligent. At least interest may be manifested in political phenomena. In still higher levels, the individuals may actually have intelligent opinions concerning the nature of the smaller collectivity and the inclusive political unit.

Sociological Factors.—Since the political situation centers about a definite administrative organization it is heavily dowered with social organization components. The many variations in political thought, actions, and institutions directly correspond to the differences between a confederation, a single state, a province, district, a territory, colony, or municipality. In these different administrative units the behavior elements involved may have to do with the relations between individuals in the sense of certain rights and obligations of a personal sort, or with the relations of numbers of people with respect to another aggregate of individuals. In the municipality we approach closer and closer to the former sort of situation. That is, political events arise because of very intimate connections between single persons, or between individuals and the rest of the municipality. Contrariwise, political phenomena in a colony or territory are conditioned by various relations involving groups of persons on both sides.

Whereas in the matter of political organization, rights and agreements concerning boundaries and tributes are stressed as features of the administrative circumstance, in the municipal situation, behavior is more concerned with questions of economic advantage or the development of articles and conditions necessary for maintenance and welfare. In this latter circumstance one's thinking and voting have reference to advantages and disadvantages in general life conditions, whereas

with respect to organizational conditions the issues center about power, dignity, or national group honor. Naturally, these two lines of political circumstances meet at a common point when tariff problems are concerned.

Anthropological Factors.—A large number of ethnic factors are usually involved in the problems of human relationship as found in large political units, such as nations, colonies, and territories. Such anthropological traditions are represented by the oriental institutions of personal rule and hierarchical domination of individuals, and the, theoretically at least, more equalized and formal distribution of sovereignty among western groups. Other cultural tendencies grant or deny political functions and powers to women as compared with men. These anthropological factors along with all sorts of tangible and intangible instruments for control and exploitation, take their place as influencing elements in any political situation.

Historical Factors.—Since no administrative unit is without constant stress and strain incidental to interaction with other units, the presence of historical factors in political situations needs no amplification. But even when a single unit is alone involved certain historical features present themselves, in the form of internal movements and development. Such circumstances of course involve the interaction of administrative sub-units or parties. The vicissitudes of such a political group include the various forms of party strife localizable within a single collectivity.

Natural Factors.—For the most part the contribution of natural phenomena to political situations concerns geographic and topographic circumstances which make for the cohesion of a certain number of persons into a unit and their separation from other groups. Such natural phenomena almost inevitably supply the bases for all sorts of differences between various types of political groups.

Lands, oil, minerals, or other materials of commerce or exploitation provide the naturalistic sources of administrative

problems and disputes. Quite frequently the causes of good or bad relations existing between adjoining political units or interrelated dominant and dependent administrative groups may be attributed to natural phenomena. Were there no advantages to be derived from colonies there would probably be no scramble for them, nor would quarrels between colonists and colonizers arise. Such natural circumstances may of course be secondary and indirect conditions for the disputes concerning power and authority among nations. The effects of such natural phenomena upon political cultural reactions are nevertheless definite.

THE EDUCATIONAL SITUATION

Individual Psychological Factors.—The behavior factors of our present situation are confined to the activities of the person being educated and not to the responses of those who use education as a means of treating other persons. In brief, the fundamental individual responses of which we speak are the deliberate activities of acquiring reaction systems. This is a process of adding all varieties of responses to one's behavior equipment. Educational behavior results in the acquisition of ideas, processes of thinking, skills, and techniques. But this is not all. The individual also learns to make responses of social adjustment. He must fit himself to live harmoniously with his fellows. Numbered among the stimuli for educational behavior are first, objects and tools of learning in the form of books and lectures, secondly, the persons connected with the learning situation, such as teachers, and fellow pupils, and finally the situations which made a demand for learning activities.

Social Psychological Factors.—How large a phase culturalization components occupy in learning situations is manifested by the fact that what individuals learn and the rate and effectiveness of learning are all determined by collectivis-

tic influences. Education and learning are for the most part matters of convention.

To illustrate, because the past culturalization of an individual serves as a deterrent to the acquisition of particular activities it functions as a discriminative factor of learning. In other words, culturalization conditions determine the interests of an individual in making certain things appear worth the learning. For this reason certain persons are influenced to choose opposing types of learning behavior from others. For example, individuals from certain culturalization levels are interested only in vocational education, or that which will make for their economic and social advantages, while others take more to what are ordinarily called cultivating and accomplishing subjects. Or the contribution of culturalization to the learning situation may operate in quite the opposite way. That is to say, some individuals whose social and economic circumstances necessitate a life of hard work, may choose to be culturalized as a person of accomplishment, whereas those who may well look forward to a life of leisure are attracted by a practical sort of education.

Culturalization, as the determiner of the intelligence level of individuals, plays its part in the conditioning of the efficiency with which the educational process goes on. Individuals coming from a group in which is found an elaborate intellectual orientation may prove to be better scholars than is otherwise the case.

Sociological Factors.—When equipment in the form of buildings and teachers is necessary, economic conditions decidedly condition the character of the educational situation. Naturally, that society which can afford adequate equipment can anticipate better educational results. As it happens, economic conditions are such that the educational process goes on much like an elaborate system of industrial mass production. Children are brought in large numbers into a single building and all of them treated as indifferent units in a class

which is handled exactly the same way with regard to curriculum, discipline, etc. On the other hand, those children more fortunately placed, are considered as individuals by some teacher whose methods and procedures are adapted to the individual rather than to a large group.

Social organization, too, determines the character of the educational situation. In a Protestant society where a great gap exists between church and state, the emphasis in state schools is entirely on book learning and in general on the acquisition of knowledge and skills, whereas in societies in which the church functions in close connection with administrative activities children are also given religious training in the school.

Anthropological Factors.—Anthropological factors contribute standards and aims to educational traditions. Such factors also determine to a great extent what kind of teaching situations shall exist. It is the anthropological circumstances which dictate whether education shall be the domestic and initiatory process of simple societies, or the complex techniques of intricate social life. Education in both cases is a process of initiating an individual into society. For the most part, then, it is a process of making individuals conform to a group of their elders. Individuals must be made into the image of the parents, or some kind of generalized model. Because of this conformity the educational reformer is all the more conspicuous a figure with his attitude of modifying standard conditions. Through the cultural traditions of a group certain studies and forms of behavior assume value. These conventions indicate or dictate what should be taught.

Were it not for the operation of cultural traditions in our educational system there would be no such absence of sex education as exists today. When a society is prudish in the sense of not admitting the discussion of sex matters, the educational situation is left without any provision for the teaching of sex knowledge.

Historical Factors.—Upon analyzing educational situations we discover that much that transpires within them is attributable to historical conditions. While these features may occupy a rather indirect place they do, however, contribute their quota of components. Think only of the changes and uncertainties introduced into the educational world by wars, conquests, and annexations. With change of nationality and transformation in general life conditions, the problems and processes of education become quite altered. Thus the questions why one speaks a certain language, acquires certain manners, particular loyalties or disloyalties are traceable to various historical circumstances.

Natural Factors.—Only very limited contributions are made by natural phenomena to the educational complex. They function mostly in simpler civilizations. On the whole, such factors operate in all types of vocational education rather than in the intellectual type. Obviously, naturalistic factors have to do with the manipulation of things and various direct contacts with natural phenomena. As in most other situations, natural phenomena provide, of course, innumerable stimuli for all sorts of responses.

In concluding this chapter, we refer once more to the impossibility of indicating how each reaction, belonging to the various fields we have canvassed, displays all these different aspects. We must submit, however, that no question exists but that every instance of a humanistic event comprises a large number of psychological, anthropological, sociological and naturalistic factors of the types that we have been suggesting. What the student of human phenomena must do is to choose some specific happening and exercise his analytic and synthetic acumen upon it. Perhaps our former watch illustration will serve as a suggestive paradigm for such a study.

CHAPTER XV

THE APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Now that we have finished our preliminary studies of social psychology it would be going contrary to the strongest of usages not to inquire after the issue of our investigation.

Cultural reactions have been isolated as specific types of psychological happenings. Our studies have revealed to us their character and origin. We have learned, too, that they always occur in conjunction with other forms of human events. Now what are the possibilities for applying this information?¹

As in all fields of learning, the applications of social psychology are of two distinct forms. The first concerns investigative procedure. The results of our social psychological studies provide a tool with which to approach humanistic problems. Here is a political revolution. One historian looks upon this event as a conflict of political ideals. Another reduces the situation to an interplay of economic forces. Still another finds but the downfall of a weak and exhausted government. Again, political revolutions are treated as merely psychological phenomena. Of the many possible variables in a situation one or more may appear as dominating the whole event. In our revolution example, the ruthlessness of the revolutionist's behavior and his destructive activities may ap-

¹ Let it be announced forthwith that an application in science is not a simple exploitation of a discovered fact or principle. This is the way not of science but of technique. Rather, as we have pointed out elsewhere, applications in science constitute the verification of information and the process by which it is acquired, by fitting such knowledge back into the situations from which it is derived.

pear to sum up the whole circumstance. Human events as problems may thus be interpreted mainly as disharmonies of the various factors involved.

Now we must regard it as a valuable application of our study if it dictates a more thorough analysis of any complex situation than these attitudes indicate. For we have learned that not only are psychological phenomena always interrelated with numerous humanistic and other types of facts but that it is an indispensable requisite of scientific investigation to discover all essential elements in a situation.

After investigation comes explanation. When our analysis of a problematic situation has revealed its relevant factors, explanation demands the synthetic organization of the various elements to emphasize their interrelationship. Explanation, in other words, is describing a series of variables in terms of each other while simple description is merely the specification of the various pertinent variables.¹ Explanation is certainly not taking a single factor in a situation as an isolated cause or effect of some happening. Elements are only segregated by description but are not found so in the original circumstances. Simplicity in nature is always artifact. It is a trap set by understanding to ensnare events.

In the humanistic sciences in particular, explanation is a process of organizing such fact systems as we have indicated in the preceding chapter; so that each has its appropriate place in the totality.² Here we have our second valuable application of social psychology, namely, to discover in each case the precise part played in the total complex by social psychological factors.

One general methodological gain of great value stands out

¹ Obviously then, as we have seen, explanation is in no sense a reduction of a complex series of variables to one or another type.

² By contrast with explanation which is an immediate solution of a problem or the attainment of a satisfactory attitude with respect to a given situation, a law in the same field is the discovery of a somewhat more permanent organization of fact systems.

in the application of social psychology. Namely, we are forced to emphasize the specific circumstances of any problematic situation. If any part of it involves psychological factors, and what humanistic situation does not, we must take into account the activities of particular persons. Inevitably, this means handling each situation as a very concrete and unique instance. For if there is one striking principle that has emerged from our entire study it is that psychological phenomena are specific responses of individuals. Furthermore, we have learned that psychological phenomena only originate and exist through a mutual interaction of persons and their surroundings. The mind is not the sort of thing which exists independently of the contact of persons with objects and situations.

Now as we should expect, upon examining various humanistic problems the various factors are not all represented in the same proportion. In some cases the psychological elements are more prominent; in others, economic, social, or natural components appear more important.¹ When psychological factors are conspicuous it may be that either cultural or non-cultural behavior stands in the foreground. Thus while studying a "crime wave," if we are interested more in the results to society than the effect upon persons, non-psychological factors take the lead; whereas when the latter feature attracts us more, psychological factors are stressed. In any particular study, too, the centre of gravity shifts. Depending upon the purposes and practices of the investigator, the stress of research may drift from one type of component to another. We have only to remember, however, that all the components are there and go to make up the total circumstance. We turn now to some illustrative situations that will indicate various investigative and explanatory problems.

Consider first the increase of suicides. Obviously, every

¹ How prominent these various factors are no doubt depends upon our investigative interests.

suicide phenomenon must be localized in a certain place. To take account of this fact leads us at once to the discovery of a series of national or historical factors. Suicide phenomena are likewise very frequently correlated with economic conditions. When such a close connection really exists natural circumstances must also be seriously taken into account. Perhaps the untoward economic contingencies disclose some natural catastrophe—a crop failure, or an earthquake. Most assuredly, also, certain culturalization conditions exist in suicide events. Here is where psychological factors come into play. Only persons who are behavioristically equipped for such an act commit suicide. What is poverty to one individual is not such to another. What consumes one person with suffering leaves another cold. To commit suicide requires a particular type of mentality. One must have certain ideas and beliefs and be free from obstructing prejudices and fears. The person who can beg and live upon the alms received does not destroy himself. Again, while to him who is culturalized in one way death constitutes the loss of all this world and the next, for one otherwise socialized it is not so at all. For the latter to die by one's own hand is a simple and obvious method of avoiding dishonor and discomfort.

Not only must we look for general culturalization factors among the components of suicide situations, but we discover, too, that they may involve some very specific socialization elements. There are numerous instances of persons deliberately developing psychological collectivities with self-destruction as the primary institution. Such are the suicide groups reported in Russia after the early revolution. Culturalization factors of this type must be distinguished from the ordinary culturalization element which inheres in suicide situations because of underlying anthropological conditions.

Now when we have selected our specific suicide event we will best pursue our investigation by sifting out and weighing carefully the concatenated circumstances. Fortune favoring

we might so arrange these in good enough order and relation to achieve an explanation.

Increasing frequency of divorces is a further problem exemplifying intricate intermingling of psychological and other humanistic facts. Directly we approach the issue we discover that multiplication of divorces is correlated with social and anthropic upheavals. Great changes in the character of society are reflected in divorce rates. Surely these conditions invariably imply concomitant culturalization changes.

Let us illustrate: Current American society displays great variations in family organization. Family ties hamper but do not bind. The erstwhile economic dominance of the husband no longer prevails. Whether or not the family shall include children and how many are questions symbolizing the replacement of the old family by the new. The absence of children alone makes divorce a simpler matter.

Unless great modifications take place in the culturalization of persons can the family be such a loose and dispensable organization? Without the development of certain requisite institutions such conditions are inconceivable. Socialization then surely has its effect upon divorces. It remains only to remember that social and anthropic changes affect culturalization. It is most dangerous of course to risk general assertions as to what arrangement of factors satisfy explanatory propensities. But is there any doubt that a critical investigation of specific instances of divorce permits serviceable arrangement of causal relations?

The economic conditions that play so large a part in the modification of family life operate in various ways. Poverty is an inducement for couples to cling together. Husband and wife each plays the buffer against hard conditions for the other. Divorce statistics grow higher with prosperous periods. On the other hand, however, poverty makes for limitation of family size. And we have already learned that those whom few children have joined together can easily be put

asunder. Whether or not economic circumstances limit families is regulated by convention. It depends upon the nature of the people concerned. It depends upon knowledge of birth control, and the existence of attitudes sanctioning its practice. The effect of economic complications upon looseness of family organization is a matter of the type of mentality with which we are dealing. Here we meet again the ubiquitous culturalization factor.

In the correlation of divorce with types of occupation we see quite obviously the interrelation of the various contributing components. That divorces are more frequent among actors, commercial travellers, and musicians than among agricultural laborers, or clergymen, tells a story that involves more than mere variation in opportunity and occasion for divorce. It implies different moral, religious, and intellectual behavior equipment.

Let us turn now to the commixture of culturalization factors with religious elements in divorce situations. Members of certain religious organizations could not even think of divorce as a remedy for unsatisfactory domestic conditions. Howsoever strongly mutual incompatibility and even detestation may argue for a severance of martial ties, some people could not entertain the thought. Let economic circumstances, the absence of children or the attraction of those one really loves, protest ever so eloquently against the irrational marriage fetters, to become divorced would not occur to certain religious individuals. Not merely, mark you, because it is interdicted, but because these unhappy couples have built up that kind of conventional behavior equipment.

An exceptionally favorable field for social psychological application we find in problems of public opinion. Let us invoke at once our principle of specificity. It is quite true that there is no such entity as a public. That is to say, unless we consider the public to be some particular factor in a limited human situation there is no such thing at all. Where shall we

look for the omniscient and omnipotent divinity that shapes our human acts or destinies? And yet I do not neglect to pay my bills. Little may I regard the censure of the village merchants or their credit managers, but I cannot brave the disgrace and condemnation of my townsmen. To be sensitive to gossip and rumor is human. Unless indeed one is otherwise socialized or possesses idiosyncratic defenses.

Now on the whole we find that the public may be regarded as a collectivity standing in the relation to me of a definite stimulus object. It is something that calls out my responses of fear, desire, ambition, and other behavior of a cultural or non-cultural type. Whether such an actual organization of persons exists or not, it is quite plain that I respond as if such a definite collectivity were hard at my heels. Those of us who are culturalized to defy and to disregard the public perhaps are more fortunate than those who react to it as a prescriptive barometer of conduct. Indeed on the whole it is an important factor in our economic, political, intellectual and aesthetic life.

But the public serves not only as stimulus for my reaction but responds to my stimulation as well. Public opinions constitute to a great extent an organization of conventional attitudes. Accordingly, the creation and manipulation of public opinion is a matter of engendering in some limited situation a particular trend of thinking or believing. Essentially this is a problem of culturalization.

Again, the control of public opinion may involve the ascertainment of the person's culturalization elements and the eliciting of certain ones. It is only in the measure in which these individuals are known and fit in with the purposes of those controlling public opinion that there is such a phenomenon at all. Whether or not opinions can be controlled depends of course upon all the other humanistic and natural phenomena correlated with the cultural and individual psychological factors of particular situations. Accordingly, whoever

would shape public opinions must have a keen regard for the economic, social, and general conventional circumstances environing particular human complexes.

We are easily convinced that public opinion is a reality when it is required to reverse or transform it. We may play upon the members of some sociological collectivity and by resorting to certain procedures reculturalize them so as to constitute a different psychological collectivity. Efficient and successful leaders need only be followers of herds until they discover what types of persons they compose. Then they may work their will upon them. Herds may be made to love both war and peace, freedom or slavery, the good or the evil. All this of course with due regard to the humanistic and natural circumstances involved. We have here only the well-known phenomena of statesmen, merchants, captains, and preachers dealing with their various publics. The methods are to work upon these persons, play upon their hopes and fears, or to capitalize their ignorance. The instruments may be variously called education, advertising, or propaganda. But even here the issue is not exhausted by the sociological and naturalistic factors alone.

We face the question as to whether or not it is possible to culturalize individuals as absolute opponents of war. This inquiry of course is quite aside from any values that wars may have. At the moment we are only interested in the possibility of so correlating humanistic and natural phenomena with culturalization or psychological factors that such a result might be brought about.

For example, we may ask whether in the final analysis such a problem of war abolition is not reducible to the question of the intelligence of the persons who bring about war and carry it on, as well as the type of mentality of those who are employed in such enterprises. If such is the case then the conditions are clear, for the fact of intelligence is entirely one of culturalization. Let us suggest at this point that while

in this case one might overemphasize the psychological factors in the situation, this does not mean that the phenomenon of war is reduced to mental states. War, no more than poverty, can be reduced to colorless, formless spirits floating upon a spaceless void. Surely at this stage of our studies it is impossible to think of psychological phenomena as disjointed from all sorts of concrete human and natural conditions.

And so the question arises, what if war reaches down to the lowest level of existence? A community must make war to preserve itself. When its present home cannot yield the minimum of subsistence must it not attack another group and annex its territory? Even here several culturalization queries suggest themselves. Perhaps the persons involved might be domesticated either to increase the yield of present food, or learn to modify their menus. Again may not wars be eliminated when individuals are culturalized rather to die than to carry on bellicose activities? It is not an unknown convention for collectivities to face extinction rather than to indulge in certain actions.

When the war problem centers about political and other group relations its investigation and solution involves a similar set of psychological, humanistic, and natural facts. Amidst the din of anti-war discussion one seldom fails to hear the note sounding the immutability of human nature. Indeed this undertone is more often a roar than a murmur. All too many believe that the waging of war is a fundamental and unalterable characteristic of humanity. Others indeed are as firmly convinced that the opposite is true. Now if our social psychological studies have yielded us any information at all, we have learned that in order to alter human nature our modifying process can only be achieved by a concrete reference to the social, political, and anthropological conditions surrounding the individuals concerned.

From the large number of problems which the field of economics offers for social psychological application let us choose

for examination the problem of waste. Here we see the absolute impossibility of disjoining psychological from other humanistic phenomena. For example, it is frequently pointed out that standardization of products makes for economy in production and consumption. Accordingly, the elimination of waste is a problem of standardizing products. But we are prompted to ask whether waste, which it is proposed thus simply and easily to eliminate, is really what the name seems to imply. Does it not connote not only a standardization of products but of the tastes and wants of persons? Again we face the problem of culturalization, and to a slighter extent that of individual psychology as well. After all, in what way can one eliminate preferences and desires from an economic situation? Are not these psychological factors as fundamental as the biological, natural, or humanistic components? ¹

The securing of the kind of products which one wants (which differs with different individuals and different collectivities) is a factor which, if eliminated, transforms the whole situation instead of solving the original problem. The original issue may, however, be solved by manipulation of the psychological factors. Here the method chosen is to standardize desires and tastes. Clearly this is a matter of controlled culturalization of individuals which is indissolubly connected with economic and natural factors.

Political scientists are perturbed by the small percentage of voters who turn out to cast their ballots. This circumstance is looked upon as a serious political problem, in that it suggests a symptom of the breaking down of prized political institutions. If persons do not vote then governmental offices are arbitrarily filled by persons or organizations who have power to do so. Incidentally it is thought that such a situation always involves much dishonesty and in general an

¹ We take it that the psychological factors are indispensable elements in the situation, even if we are dealing with the conventions of "conspicuous waste," as studied by Veblen in the "Theory of the Leisure Class."

unsatisfactory government. In some political units indeed the problem has led to legislation requiring persons to participate in elections.

Now what on the surface appears as a purely political issue turns out upon investigation to involve a number of questions of a psychological type. Is non-voting a matter of lack of interest? Are balloting situations thought to be important or do they seem to be but trivial incidents? In addition to these personal psychological aspects a number of culturalization issues can always be analyzed out of the non-voting situation. For instance, we find the shared attitudes that one's vote counts for very little and that the political system operates more or less without one's help.

Those who permit themselves to reduce situations to particular aspects may translate the whole political problem into an educational one. Non-voting may then be regarded entirely as a matter of knowledge and training. That people do not vote merely means that they are not only ignorant of the candidates but do not understand the mechanism of government and the participation of persons in the political process.

Probably this problem more than most others forces the necessity to consider some very specific situation. Obviously the fact of non-voting is not the same at different times or in disparate places. Surely the facts vary with municipal, state, and national elections. This consideration necessarily leads in each case to a different investigational attitude. Depending upon what kind of situation we confront we are stimulated to look for a different set of factors. In some local situations it is possible to connect up the voting process with an economic and industrial situation. It sometimes happens that an industrial organization may dominate municipal or state politics to such an extent that one's job, one's residence in a community, and domestic security depend upon whether or not one votes in a prescribed fashion. In such a situation it

might very easily be an expedient way of avoiding a disagreeable situation to refrain from voting at all.

To investigate such a phenomenon as non-voting demands the scrupulous analysis of all the factors operating in a localized circumstance. To explain why persons do not vote means the harmonization of all the cultural circumstances involved. Nor can an explanation of any non-voting circumstance be made unless one emphasizes its particular political institutions. Not infrequently this means the discovery that the political institutions we start with, turn out upon examination, either to be religious or economic, or prominently manifest such aspects.

Possibly no one would deny that every problem to which we can apply our social psychological data or principles contains at the same time all the classes of components which we have mentioned in the preceding chapter. By this time it must be apparent also that in every particular situation these various components operate in specific and unique ways. We may now add that the character of the problems themselves vary enormously. In one case we ask why persons do or do not do some particular thing. Here our problem involves individuals standing over against a group or civilization. In other instances, they concern some particular drift in the civilization itself, that is, certain changes in some civilizational factor. Naturally, the entire process of application must conform with the details of the problematic circumstances.

When we investigate the decay or development of an intellectual or aesthetic tradition we are facing a problem of cultural drift. Thus when we observe the rise and growth of an idealistic philosophy, which in its turn has been superseded by a realistic and pragmatic tradition, we may well ask what psychological and humanistic conditions comprise these prescriptive waves. The legitimate interests of the humanistic sciences dictate the investigation of recurrent rationalism or romanticism in thought and literature, and classicism and

impressionism in painting and other aesthetic fields. This means discovering what psychological, conventional, and anthropic circumstances attend such variations and exchanges in complex human values.

What human conditions make possible or necessary such alterations in the ideas and techniques of painters as coincide with the birth of a new school? How can we organize these factors to constitute an explanation of specific events in the movements of thought or the history of art? No one can possibly question that these components of aesthetic and intellectual tradition exist and operate. The only difficulty is to discover and relate them.

Even when we concentrate upon a fairly specific event—for such events are not easily delimited—we have trouble to diagnose and explain. But let us try. In the rise of the Pre-Raphaelites in England we find a fairly definite situation. What is the significance of their protest against existing traditions?

Perhaps it is true that the Pre-Raphaelites discerned alarming symptoms of a too materialistic wave threatening to inundate the English aesthetic scene. Need we argue for a series of personal psychological factors, attitudes of discrimination and protest against the current trends of painting? Is there any question that these personal elements are closely linked with the social and economic conditions of England which apparently were exercising their unsatisfactory effect upon aesthetic ideas and techniques. Perhaps the Pre-Raphaelites were themselves inspired by a conception that needed expression. Here perhaps we might discern in the operation of these painters, an aesthetic tradition which was being threatened by the social circumstances surrounding them. Was it this circumstance which contributed to an imitative resurrection of an older technique?

Here we must again look to the culturalization phenomena. How and why has the aesthetic culturalization of this group

become unstable? What stimulated them to attempt a revival of mediaeval art? Innumerable questions arise concerning motive and taste. We are moved to inquire what are the conditions that lead artists to prefer and create the particular sort of work they do. Let us merely suggest that the humanistic elements involved must be sought first in the circumstances of intellectual and aesthetic culturalization. Economic and social conditions may be more remote from the center of the problem though they have their indubitable places on the margins and borders. As to general anthropological elements, it is possibly because the Pre-Raphaelite techniques and conceptions had their proper origin in an entirely different type of civilization, that this movement left so ugly a blotch upon the aesthetic history of England in the nineteenth century.

Similar problems of cultural drift are found in abundance in the scientific domain. Thus if we inquire why scientific progress is so slow or why certain knowledge and discoveries are passed over, we must seek for the answer in the same type of human maze. Or, being interested in the secularity of science, and asking why science, which should be a unified attack upon phenomena, is so frequently divided up along national and school lines, or why there are so many mystical attitudes in the scientific field, our inquiry starts us off in hot pursuit of a different arrangement and prominence of factors than those we have hitherto observed.

As a pragmatic method of procedure we might dichotomize any given scientific problem into the personal and non-personal elements. On the personal side we may examine both the individual and cultural behavior factors. Are there any individual behavior conditions favoring the slow progress of science? Does any person, either by his authority in science or his interest in a church or business, counteract the influences of discovery and thus keep the scientific traditions more or less fixed or even retrogressive? This question stimulates the inquiry concerning the rôle of the hero in general

historical phenomena. Again, we may ask whether at some particular time persons exist who are equipped to make discoveries or to aid in their acceptance. There is a possibility that even when other conditions are propitious for working out new scientific ideas strong men are required to make them prevail. There are those who believe that Darwin absolutely needed Huxley and Haeckel to make his conception carry.

Next, a study of the culturalization factors may be suggested. Unless culturalization allows, it is very difficult for scientific ideas to make progress. Perhaps this point is well illustrated by the fact that frequently culturalization makes possible certain scientific ideas but not others. Boyle and Newton could be critical and rigid in their attitudes toward physical phenomena but not with respect to other types of facts. Even today the great discrepancy between the so-called natural and social sciences shows the telling effect of culturalization on scientific progress. Who can estimate the potency of prejudices as an acceleration or hindrance of progress in the social disciplines? For instance, who can say how much harm has been done to the study of humanistic phenomena by the belief that such data should be treated by the absolutistic method of mechanics?

To students of the physical sciences it is no secret how much their progress has been impeded by early Renaissance culturalization. Even though the Arabs brought medicine to Europe the prevailing Christian culturalization divided the world into the spiritual and material, the effects of which are still hindering scientific advancement. Generally speaking, the existence of mystic forces in science are to be accounted for by the effects of culturalization, although there are individualistic behavior conditions which may serve as counters in the situation.

Let us look for a moment at the great influence of social circumstances on thought. Scientists can no more accept ideas developed out of their culturalization than a capitalist

can endorse the attitude of laborers or vice-versa. Perhaps this same principle as much as anything accounts for the disagreements among scientists and their ignorance of the work and discoveries of others. Similarly, perhaps, culturalization phenomena account for schools and schisms, along with the effect of personal advantages of various sorts.

Turning now to non-personal conditions affecting the advancement of science and the passing over of certain ideas, we may consider the factor of scientific capacity. Every science is inevitably bound to ignore certain data because they cannot be accommodated within the scientific system of the time. For example, the early mechano-mathematical science of the Renaissance may not only be looked upon as a period of extremely great scientific stir and development but also one of neglect and misinterpretation. Renaissance physics took on a mechanical and mathematical aspect rather than some other. Was this because the scientific systems of the time were unable to handle the facts generally referred to as secondary qualities? Whatever the circumstances were, colors, sounds, and all of the phenomena referred to as secondary qualities were excluded from the science of physics. Later when physics became expanded to take in such data, mathematical tradition developed in such a way that sound, color, and similar phenomena became mathematicized. Thus color and sound are reduced to vibration. Elaborating our scientific problems to include humanistic and natural conditions, we only multiply illustrative demonstrations of how these factors contribute their effects to the total set of circumstances. They warn us likewise of the necessities and difficulties lurking in scientific situations when we attempt to develop explanations.

As a final example of the application of social psychology we choose the problem of minimum wages, as reflected in a recent supreme court decision. This problem commends itself because we have here concrete data supplied by an actual situation. Again this is an issue which very admirably ex-

hibits the interplay of economic, moral, legal, and psychological factors.

As a basis for our examination let us recall the grounds upon which the supreme court declared unconstitutional an act of Congress fixing minimum wages for women and minor girls in the District of Columbia.

In the first place, it was contended by the judge who handed down the decision that, while laws could be enforced to regulate working conditions, to wit, the fixing of hours of labor, and prescribing the character, methods and time for payment of wages, the employer and the employed must be free of restraint in determining between themselves what wages are acceptable. The judge declared that the minimum wage law authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The right to contract about one's affairs, it was contended, is part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause. The fact was settled by the decisions of the court and is no longer open to question. In making labor contracts the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as a result of private bargaining.

The concurring judges also attacked the law because the price fixed by the board (set up to administer its provisions), need have no relations to the capacity or earnings of the employes, the number of hours which may happen to constitute a day's work, the character of the place where the work is to be done, or the circumstances or surroundings of the employment. The minimum wages these judges insisted would be based wholly on the opinion of the members of the board and their advisors or perhaps on an average of their opinion if they did not precisely agree as to what would be necessary to provide a living for a woman, keep her in health, and preserve her morals.

Whether we take the argument for right of contract as an

attempt to make legal institutions prevail over economic conditions or whether we regard the legal institutions as taking cognizance and providing for economic circumstances, in either case, we find here an apparent disharmony between these different phases of a humanistic situation. Furthermore, whether we regard the judges as legal personalities or as representatives of the public, in both instances we see the operation of the culturalization processes or their results. A person acting strictly as a legal personality tends to over-emphasize the authority and majesty of a legal institution.¹ On the other hand, the non-legal personalities might tend to emphasize one or another attitude toward the legal institution from an economic standpoint. The employers, because it is to their advantage, might in this case stress the sanctity of contractual rights, while the employees are influenced to set aside the right of contract in order to satisfy economic requirements.

How much this minimum wage problem is a matter of economic circumstance and private advantage is suggested by the fact that the judges criticizing the minimum wage law have already indicated that the right of contract is abrogated in certain instances already mentioned, as well as in cases in which contracts involve the performance of public work or some public interest. At any rate we see that our problem here involves a clash of factors, which require to be somewhat harmonized.

A further illustration of the interrelationship and discord between different humanistic circumstances is found in the contention of the opposing judges that the minimum wage law requires that employers furnish pay to workers without regard to the nature of their business or the kind of work the employees must do. In this argument the judges are

¹ Perhaps it is not overstepping bounds to inquire what effects are produced upon legal decisions by the fact that judicial personalities belong more to the employer's caste than to that of the employe.

declaring in effect that no legal institution can operate which runs counter to economic circumstances. Here again we can indicate the different attitudes assumed by individuals impressed with opposing conditions in any situation. On the one hand, since the employer is only required to pay a minimum wage when the person is actually employed and is not necessarily forced to employ the individual, it might be said that the law assumes that the employing institution is a going concern and it is only a question of the employee receiving a sufficient wage to provide a living. That we have here a strife of interest, culturalization, and social and economic conditions is attested by the fact that our present example involves only a vote of five to four to nullify the congressional act.

When the judges assert that in their opinion the morals of women are dependent upon the wages they receive, the assumption is that the moral conduct of an individual in this particular instance is entirely a matter of culturalization. The judges in effect are saying that whether a woman is moral or not depends upon her training and ideals. In other words, we face a psychological circumstance, rather than an economic one. This type of argument, therefore, obviously overlooks the interrelationship between psychological and other humanistic phenomena. In other words, these judges fail to appreciate that the individual's culturalization depends upon social and economic circumstances.

We submit as our final comment upon this illustrative situation that other humanistic factors, as well as natural components of various sorts are suggested by the fact that this enactment is an act to regulate wages for women and not men. But we need not multiply our instances. We might add merely that whether a person's morals are or are not dependent upon humanistic conditions is itself a problem that illustrates the investigative need to ferret out all relative factors and the harmonization of them for explanatory purposes.

INDEX

- Adult, culturalization of, 273f.; 278ff.; 283ff.
- Aesthetic behavior, 231f.
- Aesthetic situation, analysis of the, 382ff.
- Allport, 34n.
- Anatomical characteristics, and psychological conduct, 82ff.; and the doctrine of permanent human nature, 294f.
- Animal nature, and psychological conduct, 68ff.
- Anthropic conditions of cultural behavior, 101ff.
- Anthropic facts, relation of to biological facts, 253f.; relation of to psychological facts, 254f.
- Anthropic systems, components of, 103ff.; similarities and dissimilarities of, 108ff.; carried by behavior, 115ff.; evolution of, 115ff.; specializations and cleavages in, 126ff.; changes and growth of, 132ff.; origins of, 139ff.; conditions of, 145ff.; quality and improvement of, 158ff.
- Anthropological factors, in scientific situations, 375f.; in linguistic situations, 380f.; in aesthetic situations, 384; in religious situations, 388f.; in political situations, 393f.; in educational situations, 396
- Anthropology, and social psychology, 19
- Application of social psychology, 398
- Bagley, 199
- Baldwin, 33n.
- Basic behavior, 4f.
- Behavior, versus structure-function, 74f.; as a continuator of culture, 115ff.; levels of, 323ff.; restrictions of, 351ff.
- Behavior or psychological groups, significance of, for social psychology, 11f.; problem of, 337; fractionalization of, 338ff.; conservation of, 342 ff.; duplication of, 349; flexibility of, 354; opposition of persons and, 356; great number of, 357, conflict between persons and, 358f.; modification of cultural, 360f.
- Behavior segments, 186ff.
- Biological and psychological phenomena compared, 77f.
- Biological cause versus biological participation, 82ff.
- Biological character of psychological phenomena refuted, 86f.
- Biological differences of races, 91ff.
- Biological factors in psychological action, 67ff.
- Biological heredity, and psychological conduct, 94ff.
- Biological implications, for social psychology, 65f.
- Biological processes, as sources of social behavior, 60ff.
- Biology and racial conduct, 90ff.
- Boas, 122; 135
- Bogardus, 27n.
- Brain, the, and complexities of behavior, 75ff.
- Burt, 199
- Ceremonials, as culturalization instruments, 282f.
- Child, culturalization of the, 270ff.; 275ff.; 281ff.
- Civilization, universality of, 102ff.; classification of components of, 103ff.; and cultural trends, 147; and individuals, 164ff.
- Collectivistic conduct, not necessarily psychological, 56ff.
- Conduct, communal, 227; restrictions of, 351ff.
- Conflict of persons and groups, 358f.
- Coaklin, 199
- Contingential reactions, 7f.
- Cooley, 33n.
- Crowd psychology, 37ff.
- Crowd mind, 31
- Cultural behavior, 8f.; biological influences upon, 84ff.; unilinear development of, refuted, 94; anthropic background of, 101ff.; as psychological phenomena, 173ff.; isolation of, 203ff.; intrinsic characteristics of, 205ff.; classification of, 224ff.; development of, 265ff.; accidental nature of, 266f.
- Cultural drifts, psychological factors of, 409ff.
- Cultural groups, see behavior groups.
- Cultural personality, as human nature, 290ff.; as the product of socialization, 290f.; impermanence of, 293f.; con-

- ditions of change in, 295f.; types of, 296ff.; as a product of culturalization, 300f.; uniqueness of, 301f.; disharmonies in, 303f.; relative qualities of, 304f.
- Cultural phenomena, origins of, 139ff.; institutional conditions of, 154f.
- Cultural traits, distribution and interrelation of, 144ff.
- Cultural trends, 146ff.
- Culturalization, principles of, 265ff.; accidental nature of, 266f.; significance of, 269; loci of, 270f.; of child, 270ff.; of adult, 273ff.; types of processes involved in, 275ff.; methods and instruments of, 280ff.; general conditions of, 287f.; effect upon human nature, 300f.
- Davis, 27n.
- Deep-seated action, nature of, 86f.
- Dewey, 33n.
- Divorce phenomena, psychological factors in, 402
- Domestic conduct, 238f.
- Domestication, see culturalization
- Domination of individual by groups, refuted, 352ff.
- Economic conduct, 233f.
- Educational situation, the, analysis of, 394ff.
- Environment, and institutions, 251ff.; three kinds of, 251ff.
- Environmental influences, upon anthropic events, 150ff.; upon human phenomena, 251f.
- Ethnic conduct, 226f.
- Ethnic phenomena, and social psychology, 54ff.
- Evolutionary development of cultural phenomena, 111f.; 132ff.
- Experimental method, in social psychology, 24f.
- Explanation, in social psychology, 399.
- Family culturalization, 270ff.
- Folk psychology, 28
- Freedom of individual, from groups, 352ff.
- Freeman, 136; 199
- Galton, 193f.
- Gates, 199
- Gobineau, 199
- Goldenweiser, 27n.; 81; 135; 142
- Gregarious instinct, fallacy of, 131f.
- Greenough, 318
- Groups, (see also behavior groups), significance of for social psychology, 11f.; behavior in, 45ff.; as inevitable surroundings of individuals, 45; mentality of, 56ff.; as psychological collectivities, 337ff.; fractionalization of, 338ff.; domination of individual by, 351; not completely restricted by, 352ff.
- Group conduct, misconception of, 57f.
- Group mind or group soul theory, 52ff.
- Hankins, 199
- Herbart, 28
- Heredity, influence upon cultural conduct, 95ff.
- Historical conditions of anthropic events, 148f.
- Historical factors, in scientific situations, 37f.; in aesthetic situations, 385; in religious situations, 389f.; in political situations, 393
- Hobbes, 32
- Holmes, 199
- Hooton, 91
- Human conditions of cultural phenomena, 155ff.
- Human interrelationships, as components of civilization, 104
- Human nature, and infrahuman behavior, 88f.; as cultural personality, 290f.; misconceptions of, 291ff.; impermanence of, 293ff.; effect of culturalization upon, 300f.; uniqueness of, 301ff.
- Humanistic situations, various components of, 367ff.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 28; Alexander von, 28
- Hutcheson, 32
- Huxley, 372
- Idiosyncratic behavior, effect of culturalization upon, 6f.; versus conventional behavior, 355, 361
- Implicit reactions, 190
- Improvement of anthropic systems, 158ff.
- Individuals and civilization, 164ff.
- Individual differences of cultural personality, 301f.
- Individual psychological factors, in scientific situations, 370f.; in linguistic situations, 379; in aesthetic situations, 382; in religious situations, 385f.; in political situations, 390f.; in educational situations, 394f.
- Individual, the, versus the group, 352ff.
- Infant, the culturalization of, 281f.
- Infrahuman and human conduct, 88f.
- Injury, effect of upon psychological conduct, 67r.; 97f.
- Institutional development, 307ff.
- Institutional mechanisms, nature of, 307ff.; originating, 310ff.; transforming, 317ff.; modifying, 320ff.; conditions influencing, 329ff.
- Institutional stimuli, versus non-cultural stimuli, 9ff.

- Instincts, 72, 269, and human nature, 291f.
- Institutions, characteristics of as cultural stimuli, 240ff.; psychological versus sociological, 242ff.; cultural versus anthropic, 244f.; stability of, 245ff.; and environment, 251ff.; classification of, 256ff.; casual origin of, 316; deliberate origin of, 314; migrational origin of, 315f.; revival origin of, 316; quality of changes in, 326ff.
- Intellectual behavior, 232f.; 299
- Intelligence, as a cultural trait, 299; and group dominance, 363
- Interaction conception of psychology, 175f.; 178; correlated with physical and biological interactions, 174f.
- Invention, 142
- James, 199, 377
- Jennings, 199
- Jones, 71n.
- Kroeber, 92, 122
- Language, and psychic origins, 53; and life conditions, 150
- Language groups, fractionalization of, 338
- Lazarus, 27n.; 28f.
- Learning conduct, 237f.
- Le Bon, 31
- Legal behavior, 236f.
- Life conditions of anthropic events, 149f.
- Linguistic conduct, individual versus cultural, 46; biological and psychological elements in, 84f.; 230; effect of culturalization upon, 301
- Linguistic situation, analysis of the, 379ff.
- Lippman, 199
- Lowie, 81, 127
- MacCurdy, 199
- McDougall, 32
- Martin, 31n.
- Maturation, and psychological behavior, 74
- Mead, 33n.
- Mental origins theory, 52f.
- Mental tests, 192ff.
- Mentality, collectivistic theory of, 56ff.; as a historical product, 108, 113; primitive versus civilized, 297
- Mind, and the doctrine of socialization, 46ff.; in its ethnic aspect, 52f.
- Mind-body problem, 177f.
- Mob psychology, 37f.
- Morality, and group conformity, 364
- Myth, psychological origins of, 53f.
- National conduct, 54, 227
- National personality types, 298
- Native behavior, 86
- Naturalistic factors, in scientific situations, 378f.; in linguistic situations, 381; in aesthetic situations, 385; in religious situations, 390; in political situations, 393
- Neural factors, as explanatory of psychological behavior, 75
- Newspaper, as culturalization tool, 284
- Non-psychological factors of humanistic situations, 369
- Oaksmith, 199
- Objective psychology, nature of, 173ff.; scientific implications of, 177ff.; and tests of mentality, 192ff.
- Objects of civilization, as institutions, 104f.
- Occupational reactions, 229
- Organismic psychology, 173f.
- Origin of groups, 346ff.
- Original nature, 184f.
- Osborn, 199
- Pathological phenomena, biological and psychological implications of, 97f.
- Permanency of human nature refuted, 293f.
- Personality, cultural, 290ff.; misconceptions of, 291ff.
- Personality development, see culturalization
- Personality, psychological, 82f.; and original nature, 184f.; types of, 185f.; restrictions of, 351f.
- Perspectives of social psychology, 65f.
- Peterson, 199
- Physiological processes, as causes of social behavior, 60ff.; as biological limitation for psychological behavior, 73f.
- Physiological variations, and races, 93
- Pintner, 199
- Play groups, 229f.
- Playmate culturalization, 272f.
- Political conduct, 235f.
- Political situation, the analysis of, 390ff.; psychological factors in, 408f.
- Porteus, 199
- Prejudice, and cultural phenomena, 158f.
- Primitive versus civilized personality, types, 297
- Professional behavior, 234f.
- Progress, based upon persons, 362f.; in science, 411ff.
- Propaganda, as culturalization instrument, 285f.
- Psychic causes, 52f.; 130f.
- Psychic forces, 59f.; 96
- Psychic unity of man, fallacy of, 122
- Psychological conditions of anthropic phenomena, 152ff.

- Psychological groups, see behavior groups
 Psychological institutions, versus sociological, 242ff.; relation to anthropic facts, 255
 Psychological phenomena, as functions of neural structures, 75ff.; compared with biological phenomena, 77ff.; possibilities and limitations of, 190ff.; and biological surroundings, 254f.
 Psychological processes, as interpretation of human facts, 59f.
 Public opinion, psychological factors in, 403f.
 Races, fallacy of superiority of, 66, 93f.; biological differences of, 91f.; so-called higher and lower, 90f.; mental testing of, 197f.
 Racial conduct, 90f.
 Rapacity, illustrative of native behavior, 86ff.
 Reaction system, the, 189f.
 Reactional biography, 180ff.; 292f.
 Relativity of anthropic systems, 158ff.
 Religious conduct, 230f.
 Religious situation, the analysis of, 385ff.
 School culturalization, 282
 Scientific implications of objective psychology, 177ff.
 Scientific situation, analysis of, 370ff.; personal and non-personal factors in the, 411ff.
 Scientist, the, and his culturalization, 300f.
 Sex behavior, 227ff.
 Sex factors and cultural phenomena, 253ff.; 267
 Shaftsbury, 32
 Sighele, 31
 Smith and Guthrie, 34n.
 Smith, G. Elliot, 71n.; 100
 Social and non-social reactions, 10f.
 Social forces, 59ff.
 Social personality, see cultural personality
 Social psychological factors, in the scientific situation, 373; in linguistic situations, 379f.; in aesthetic situations, 382f.; in religious situations, 387f.; in political situations, 391f.; in educational situations, 394f.
 Social psychology, a branch of general psychology, 1; and the social sciences, 15ff.; and sociology, 16ff.; and anthropology, 19; and history, 19f.; as a coöperative science, 20ff.; methods and sources of, 22ff.; development of, 27ff.; organismic conception of, 34f.; outstanding conceptions of, 36ff.; as mob or crowd phenomena, 37ff.; as responses to persons, 43f.; as behavior in groups, 45ff.; as socialization, 46ff.; as the study of mental origins, and psychic causes, 52ff.; as ethnic phenomena, 54ff.; as social forces, 59ff.; as physiology of complex behavior, 60ff.
 Socialization, see culturalization
 Socialization doctrine of social psychology, 46ff.
 Sociological factors, in scientific situations, 374f.; in linguistic situations, 380; in aesthetic situations, 383f.; in religious situations, 388; in political situations, 392; in educational situations, 395f.
 Sociological groups versus psychological groups, 12f.
 Sociological, institutions versus psychological, 242ff.
 Sociology and social psychology, 16ff.
 Spearman, 199
 Sport and play groups, 229f.
 Standards of cultural systems, 161
 Statistical facts versus psychological, 57
 Steinthal, 27n.; 28ff.
 Stimuli, for biological and psychological action, 79
 Stimuli functions, natural and institutional, 241; 307
 Structure function versus behavior, 74ff.
 Suicide phenomena, psychological factors in, 401
 Superiority of races and groups, fallacy of, 66, 93f.
 Suprabasic reactions, 5f.
 Temperament as social conduct, 233
 Terman, 199
 Tests of mentality, 192ff.
 Thomas, 33n.
 Thompson, 99
 Thorndike, 99, 199
 Tozzer, 122
 Unconscious, the, and personality, 292
 Uniformity of behavior doctrine, 88f.
 Unilinear development of culture, fallacy of, 94, 134f.
 Universality of civilization, 102ff.; psychological implication of, 106ff.
 Veblen, 136f.
 War, social psychological factors in, 405f.
 Watson, 199
 Weiss, 199
 Wilder, 199
 Wissler, 114
 Wood, 199
 Woodworth, 199

