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
FROM METTERNICH TO BISMARCK

A TEXTBOOK OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1815-1878

BY

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German Empire.

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(*Kingdom of Italy formed*, 1861.)

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FROM METTERNICH TO BISMARCK, 1815-1878

CHAPTER I

THE METTERNICH SYSTEM

§ 1. The Year 1815. § 2. The Principle of Stability. § 3. Metternich. § 4. Alexander I. § 5. The Restoration in France. § 6. The Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. § 7. Government of the Moderates in France. § 8. Progress of Reaction in France. § 9. The Spanish Constitution. § 10. Unrest in Italy. § 11. The Conferences of Troppau and Laibach.

IN 1815 ends a period of twenty-five years during which Europe had been the theatre of almost continuous war. The influence of the French Revolution had not been confined to the country of its origin; the French people had retained the arms, assumed to defend changes in their form of government, in order to confer upon other nations the blessings of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. But such singleness of purpose early ceased to characterize the armies of the Republic. The traditions of the old monarchy revived and overcame the idealism of the Revolution; the historic struggle for the possession of the 'natural frontiers' was resumed, and the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees became the boundaries of France. Still the war continued and still its character gradually changed. The epithet 'natural' had served to reconcile the more ardent revolutionaries to the first annexations of territory, and there was plausibility in the argument that necessity justified the formation of a ring of client states to protect the frontiers. But soon all pretence of high moral justification disappeared. Napoleon, the deadliest enemy of the Revolution, stood forth as the

§ 1. The Year 1815.

heir rather of Louis XIV than of Robespierre. He shattered a political system, recognized for over a hundred years, in the interests, not of the 'rights of man', but of French glory and French supremacy.

The Napoleonic Empire.

By his victories, France won an empire touching the Baltic beyond Hamburg and the Adriatic in Illyria, fenced about with vassal states from the Vistula to the straits of Messina, calling to remembrance the dominions of Charlemagne. The maps of Germany and Italy were changed out of all recognition. The Holy Roman Empire and the States of the Church, picturesque survivals of the Middle Ages, shared the fate of Holland, the political monument of the Reformation. Everywhere kings fled or became the subject-allies of the conqueror: members of the upstart house of Bonaparte sat on the thrones of exiled monarchs; marshals of France, yesterday confounded with the mass of mankind, were now accepted as equals by the proudest families; Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Romanovs courted the favour of the Emperor of the French; the Continent murmured and submitted.

Fall of Napoleon, 1813-1815.

But the very factors which had enabled Napoleon to rise to such a height of glory led to his fall. He trod under foot the new-born sentiment of 'nationality', until it armed itself against the tyrant who had insulted it. In the War of Liberation, Germany followed the example already set by Spain; the energy of peoples rebuked the supineness of governments, and at Leipsic the 'battle of the nations' hurled the aggressor back on the Rhine and Paris. For a moment the Allies hesitated to attack the lion at bay, but at last they entered France and crowned their labours by the exile of the 'Corsican usurper'.

Congress of Vienna,

His overthrow effected, it was necessary to reconstruct the political fabric which he had destroyed. The new

order which he had created could not be permitted to endure; the rights of dispossessed sovereigns could not be ignored. And though the Allies might glory in the epithet of 'liberators of Europe', they were not sufficiently unselfish to be content to find their sole reward in the applause of an emancipated continent. The Congress of Vienna was therefore assembled to consider the restoration of the old order, and to compensate the conquerors by dividing among them the spoils of the conquered.

Nov. 1814-
June 1815.

The second part of the work of the Congress, the mere territorial settlement of Europe, though it gave rise to some disputes, was carried out with relative ease. As might have been expected, the lion's share of the booty fell to the Great Powers, and more particularly to the three eastern monarchies, since Great Britain found her reward in a colonial empire. Russia added Finland and the larger part of the Napoleonic Grand Duchy of Warsaw to her dominions. Prussia, who thus lost most of her gains in the final partition of Poland, was compensated in Saxony, Swedish Pomerania, and on the Rhine. Austria, deprived of her share in the Netherlands, recovered Tyrol, Salzburg, and the Illyrian Provinces, and gained the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Her predominance in northern and central Italy was assured by the restorations in Tuscany and Modena, and by the establishment of Marie-Louise in Parma. Great Britain kept Malta and received the protectorate of the Ionian Isles, with consequent naval control of the Mediterranean.

Territorial
settlement:
(a) gains of
the Great
Powers.

In the rest of Europe, the general principle of bringing back those rulers whom the French had expelled was adopted. But Denmark was penalized for her adherence to Napoleon by the loss of Norway, which served to reward the perfidy of Bernadotte and to balance the sacrifice of Finland. The Austrian Nether-

(b) settle-
ment of the
rest of
Europe.

lands were united with Holland to form a kingdom under the House of Orange. Bavaria gained the southern portion of the Rhenish Palatinate; half Saxony was transferred to Prussia, partly in order to punish King Frederic Augustus, who had fought on the side of the French at Leipsic. All the states of Germany were united in a confederation, the limits of which included the German territories of both Austria and Prussia. Sardinia absorbed Genoa; Cracow was declared a free city; Switzerland, the original constitution of which was restored, was neutralized.

Disregard
of 'nation-
ality'.

In this settlement the salient characteristic was disregard for the principle of 'nationality'. That ideal, the theory of the rights of peoples as opposed to the rights of sovereigns, had been brought into practical politics by the French Revolution. It had vitalized the defence of the actual, and secured the possession of the 'natural', frontiers of France. It had struck a responsive chord in the hearts of Germans, Italians, and Poles, leading them to welcome the French armies as saviours and to regard the defeats of their governments as victories for themselves. But the rule of Napoleon turned this force against him by imposing upon all nations the common burden of submission to France, and gave his opponents a weapon wherewith to bring about his downfall. Thus it might have been expected that in 1815 the Allies would have recognized the debt which they owed to 'Nationality' and have paid some regard at least to it in their restoration of order. That they signally failed to do so has been made the ground for accusing them of having acted from purely selfish motives.

Causes of
this dis-
regard.

But it may be doubted whether they could have pursued a course other than that which they did pursue. Though their final victory may be attributed mainly to

the success of their appeal to national sentiment, yet that appeal was none the less inconsistent. For, once more, 'nationality' was the product of the Revolution; it had been the greatest support of that force against which the Alliance was directed. To have accepted such a doctrine as the basis of the settlement of 1815 would have been to have countenanced the revolutionary spirit of the age. And it would perhaps have served to defeat the aims of the Allies. No principle has been more productive of strife, and if it had been taken into consideration at Vienna, the continent would not improbably have been condemned to an indefinite continuance of war.

There can be no reasonable doubt that continuance of war was the last thing desired by the Allies. Rather it was their aim to give Europe rest by producing an order of things, in which revolution should be impossible and everlasting peace no mere utopian dream. For this reason they rejected the ideal of 'nationality', the principle of the 'rights of peoples', opposing to it the principle of 'stability', founded upon recognition of the 'rights of sovereigns' and upon the establishment of a balance of power. The 'Treaties', the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, were to be the sacred and immutable basis of a new order; they were to be supported by guarantees devised not by impractical idealists but by sober diplomatists, who could recognize the fundamental conditions of international relations. In these guarantees, three main ideas appear.

In the first place, France was regarded as the chief menace to peace, and resistance to French aggression as the surest bond of union between the supporters of the *status quo*. Accordingly, while she was not unduly penalized, she was held in check. Alsace and Lorraine were left to her, despite the protests of Prussia; the

§ 2. Principle of 'stability'.

Guarantees of stability: (a) safeguards against France.

temporary occupation of her territory was merely the result of the alarming episode of the Hundred Days. But an effort was made to limit her power of aggression. In the Low Countries, a strong military state was created by the formation of the kingdom of the United Netherlands; on the Rhine, Prussia replaced the petty principalities and ecclesiastical states and barred the entrance into Germany.

(b) the
Balance of
Power.

In the second place, the practical statesmen of Vienna accepted the ambition of governments as a factor in politics. They strove rather to satisfy, than to stifle, the desire for expansion, hoping that when the legitimate aspirations of all states had, as far as possible, been gratified, the cause of war might be removed and jealousy between nations become a thing of the past. It was this hope which really dictated the territorial settlement of 1815. More especially Austria, Prussia, and Russia were, on the one hand, to be recompensed for their exertions in the common cause by the satisfaction of their ambitions, and on the other hand to be left in that relative position which they had occupied in 1789.

(c) the
Quadruple
Alliance.

But it was clear that no transfer of possessions could be devised which should be equally acceptable to all states, and the Allies recognized that, if the order created at Vienna were to be maintained, there must be some guarantee that infraction of the 'Treaties' would be punished. The mystical temperament of Alexander I led him to hope that this guarantee might be found in the basing of international relations on the precepts of the Gospel, the observance of which should be ensured by the tender solicitude and armed strength of the Great Powers. The Holy Alliance—which almost all rulers were invited to join except the Pope, as being too Chris-

The Holy
Alliance,
Sept. 1815.

tian, and the Sultan, as not being Christian enough—aimed at the substitution of fraternal love for the international rivalry of the past. But the very expansiveness of the alliance was sufficient to defeat its object, and a more real security was found in the renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont, which had been originally concluded between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia to effect the overthrow of Napoleon. The signatories pledged themselves to maintain the 'Treaties', and more especially to prevent any renewed aggression on the part of France. To carry out this treaty, it was provided that the Powers should 'renew their meetings at fixed periods' to consult as to their common interests and 'to provide for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and the maintenance of the Peace of Europe'. The Quadruple Alliance, thus confirmed, seemed to place the *status quo* under the effective guarantee of overwhelming military strength.

Renewal of
the Treaty
of Chau-
mont, Nov.
1815.

There was, however, no real unanimity between the Allies. Before the Hundred Days, such acute differences had arisen that war seemed not improbable, and at a later date the Eastern Question had been shelved owing to the obvious impossibility of agreement. Diplomats spent anxious hours in attempting to discover the sinister purport, which they believed to be hidden under the unexceptionable language of the treaty of the Holy Alliance. Great Britain was not in accord with her allies either as to the principles which should govern the future conduct of the affairs of Europe, or as to the interpretation of the Treaty of Chaumont. In fact, the history of the years which immediately follow the Peace is mainly concerned with the gradual falsifying of the hopes raised by the concord of the Powers at Vienna. Those rivalries, which had for a while been stilled in

§ 3. Metternich.

the presence of the awful majesty of the Napoleonic 'tyranny', soon revived, and there was, perhaps, only one prominent statesman who sincerely desired the coming of the projected millennium. That man, Prince Metternich, chancellor of the Austrian Empire, dominates the stage of European history for a generation, as he strives against fate and labours to breathe life into a dead past. He failed as he was bound to fail; and because he failed, because the ideals against which he contended are invested with the glamour of successful realization, he has been glorified, or degraded, into a species of political Apollyon, deliberately barring the path out of darkness into light.

Character
of
Metternich.

Yet his anxiety to maintain the *status quo* was the natural result both of his temperament and of the circumstances of his position. Distrusting all appeals to sentiment, he rejected heroic policies, and his innate conservatism was enhanced by the fact that caution and patience had won him such success as he had secured. At the same time, his vanity led him to believe that he had dictated the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, and for the settlement there devised he conceived an almost paternal affection. That it was purely the result of his diplomacy is hardly true; but it did represent his views more accurately than those of any other man. And especially the substitution of the ideal of 'stability' for that of 'nationality' was altogether acceptable to him.

Situation
of the
Austrian
Empire.

For Metternich was a patriot who desired to preserve the integrity of his master's dominions and the prestige of the House of Habsburg. But the situation of the Austrian Empire was such that any appeal to nationality, and even any unrest, was fraught with serious danger to it. Francis II ruled over Germans, Magyars, Czechs,

Poles, Ruthenians, Slavs, Croats, Roumanians, and Italians; he could rely upon no bond of union between these diverse races beyond that which might be afforded by the faith of treaties and by the desire to avoid conflict. If nationalities were admitted to possess a prescriptive right to select their own form of government, the collapse of the Austrian Empire might seem to be within sight. And further, a movement which might be harmless elsewhere was here only too likely to lead to the preaching of nationality and to consequent revolution. Rest was essential to this most heterogeneous monarchy.

Realizing this fact, Metternich could do nothing but advocate peace and even immobility. He became the apostle of the *status quo*, opposing all change, since there could be no change which might not lead to the disruption of the Habsburg dominions. He feared, and not without good cause, as the events of 1848 were to prove, that any weakening of the barriers against disorder would open the floodgates of revolution and overwhelm the Austrian monarchy. For this reason, he desired so to interpret the Quadruple Alliance that it should mean the complete control of Europe by the Allies, the maintenance, not merely of the territorial settlement of Vienna, but also of existing internal systems. He relied on his own superior diplomacy to enable him to dictate the decisions of the Allies at the periodical reunions of sovereigns and ministers. Thus the integrity of Austria and her influence in Europe would be secured and the Continent would rejoice in the attainment of long-sought repose.

Unfortunately for the success of this policy, it was not entirely agreeable to the other members of the Alliance. Great Britain could not co-operate heartily with absolutist states. Her ministers, with the ever-present fear of the House of Commons before their eyes, could not

Policy of
Metternich.

§ 4. Alex-
ander I.

lightly agree to suppress across the Channel those free institutions upon which the prosperity of England was alleged to rest. On the other hand, partial geographical isolation and the hesitancy of Castlereagh, who was unwilling openly to break with the Allies, combined to minimize for a time the effect of British policy.

Character
of Alex-
ander I.

It was far otherwise in the case of Alexander I. Ruler of a great autocratic empire, master of a supposedly invincible army, his opinions and conduct were bound to affect deeply the course of continental affairs, the more so as he enjoyed a complete ascendancy over the soul of Frederick William III. For a while the diplomatic history of Europe turns largely on the control of the mind of the Tsar, which was swayed by the most conflicting influences. Dominated for a moment by the genius of Napoleon, Alexander had been mentally 'illuminated' by the flames of Moscow, and the resultant hatred of 'the Tyrant' had been utilized by Stein to suggest the adoption of the rôle of 'liberator of Europe'. Under the influence of his own mysticism and of the teaching of Madame Krüdener, a courtesan turned prophetess, the Tsar's conception of his destiny developed. He imagined himself to be the apostle of the Millennium; he became in some measure the exponent of vaguely Liberal ideas.

Liberalism
of Alex-
ander I.

The Holy Alliance was the expression of the religious side of the imperial nature. To Metternich it was 'mere verbiage', objectionable as tending to obscure the real and necessary union between the Powers, but otherwise not much more serious than the later present of bibles to the court of Vienna. But when the Tsar went further and gave expression to his Liberalism, the outlook at once became graver. He had granted a constitution to Poland and his address to the Diet was couched in almost Jacobin

terms; 'freely elected, you must deliberate freely,' said the autocrat. He had encouraged German princes to establish 'assemblies of estates' in their dominions, and had supported Sardinia against Austria, thus preventing the realization of Metternich's ideal of a complete Habsburg control of the Italian peninsula. Worst of all, Capodistrias, the Tsar's minister and personal friend, was credibly reported to have presided at a meeting of the Carbonari, an admittedly revolutionary society.

In these circumstances it was the first object of Metternich to secure control over the imperial conscience, and for this purpose he availed himself, not unskillfully, of the character of Alexander. He alarmed his pietism by declaring that the Revolution was in essence atheistical, and developing the argument, pointed out that Liberalism was merely thinly disguised Revolution; 'morality' demanded the maintenance of the *status quo*. The 'ingratitude' of the Poles, who regularly rejected government measures in their Diet, emphasized Metternich's warnings, and Alexander was the more ready to listen as he had fallen under the influence of reactionary advisers at home. An alleged mutiny at Petersburg, and the murder of Kotzebue in Germany, completed the work of conversion. At the conference of Troppau, the Tsar made confession to the Austrian chancellor, promised amendment and received absolution.

In order to secure this triumph, Metternich had certainly condescended to exaggerate the danger of revolution and had striven to excite fears which were not altogether reasonable. He had hailed the murder of Kotzebue as an event which, properly handled, might benefit the cause of good order. The isolated act of a fanatical German student was declared to prove the existence of widespread conspiracy, and the agents of

Relations
of Alexander
with
Metternich.

§ 5. The
Restoration
in
France.

Metternich in Germany left no stone unturned in their efforts to induce the belief that 'political immorality' was increasing. But at the same time the condition of Europe might well afford food for anxious thought to the supporters of the existing order, and most of all the posture of affairs in France, the reputed forcing-house of revolution, was decidedly ominous.

Anti-
Bourbon
opposition.

The first return of Louis XVIII had hardly been hailed with enthusiasm, but had been not unpopular; it was regarded as the only possible solution. His second return, perhaps equally inevitable, was much less welcome. It seemed to involve foreign dictation to France; the king had too obviously come back 'in the baggage train of the Allies'. The monarchy had lost such hold as it had possessed on the affections of its subjects; for that hold had consisted in the fact that it had seemed to offer security against disturbance, a dream which the Hundred Days had effectually dispelled. That episode had destroyed the prestige of the Bourbons; they were henceforth regarded with indifference, and it took little to change indifference into positive hostility. Discontent was increased by the action of Louis in dissociating himself from the glories of the revolutionary period by the rejection of the tricolour, by the occupation of French soil by the Allies, and by the excesses of the royalists. At first, indeed, the 'tricolour' party, the Left, was insignificant in numbers and cowed into sullen acquiescence; but from the moment of Louis' return, France was in a very real sense divided into two nations, one of which would do nothing to keep the dynasty on the throne.

The Ultra-
royalists.

There was, however, a more immediate menace to the monarchy in the existence of the extreme royalists, the 'Ultras' or Right, whose zeal outran their discretion.

Consisting mainly of returned *émigrés* and clergy, this party regarded the Revolution as an abomination and hoped to find in the Restoration a complete return to the *ancien régime*. They wished to render the Charter nugatory, if not to abolish it; to establish a censorship of the Press, and to bring education completely under the control of the Church; to secure compensation for those whose lands had been confiscated, and to confine office to those who had made no agreement with the Revolution.

At their head was the heir to the throne, Charles, Comte d'Artois, who used his position as colonel-general of the National Guard to turn military inspectors into political agents, and whose extensive appanage enabled him to subsidize the royalist party leaders. The so-called 'Congregation', ostensibly a religious society but in effect a political club with reactionary ideals, gave the Ultras its whole-hearted support; it included the majority of the clergy and devout laymen, and its influence was increased by the 'romantic' revival, by the brilliant pen of Chateaubriand, and by the new popularity of Ultramontaniam.

Charles of Artois.

The 'Congregation'.

Louis XVIII, a Voltairean by temperament and a statesman from painful experience, realized the danger into which the excesses of these zealots were leading the monarchy. He therefore turned to the Centre party, to that mass of moderate opinion which aimed, in the phrase of one of its leaders, at nationalizing the monarchy and royalizing the nation. Loyal observance of the Charter was the key-note of the Moderate policy; the country should be led soberly along the path of constitutional progress, and so learn that the maintenance of the dynasty was not incompatible with liberty and that revolution was not the only avenue to freedom.

Policy of the King: the Centre party.

It would have been more easy to have carried out this § 6. The

Conference
of Aix-la-
Chapelle,
Oct. 1818.

policy, if it had not been that the character of the Charter was such that the extreme royalists were able to raise a serious constitutional question and to cloak their reactionary ideas under the guise of advanced Liberalism. The deputies, elected during the turmoil which followed the Hundred Days and under pressure from the Allied armies, were generally of the Ultra party, and though the King desired an amnesty, the majority compelled measures of retaliation. Ney was executed, courts of summary jurisdiction were created to deal with the supposedly disaffected, high officials of the Empire and regicides were excluded from office, and in the south a violent outburst of royalist vengeance, the 'White Terror', occurred. All this was in accord with the declared wishes of the majority of the elected of the people.

Constitutional
problem of
the Restoration.

Thus the political situation led to a constitutional struggle, which centred mainly around the question of the relationship between the Executive and the Chamber. The Charter, granted by Louis in 1814, was indecisive on this point. It provided for the creation of an hereditary House of Peers, chosen in the first instance by the Crown, and a Lower House, the members of which were to be elected by a constituency composed of those paying not less than 300 francs in direct taxes. Toleration and liberty of the Press were guaranteed; finance was to be under the control of the elective body. It remained to secure the smooth working of this constitution, and to decide whether the choice of ministers should be left to the King or be in accord with the will of the majority of the Deputies. On this point, the ideas of Louis and of the Chamber were in flat contradiction, and it was thus clear that either the electorate must be changed or the King fall into the hands of the Ultras.

Causes of

The history of the Restoration turns mainly on the

solution of this problem. Louis XVIII, realizing that the security of his dynasty demanded conciliatory measures, laboured to restrain the violence of the reaction by selecting moderate men for his advisers. But the Ultras, powerful in the Chamber, united with the Left, and even with the declared foes of their most cherished ideals, in order to compel the choice of ministers of whom they approved; and the eventual failure of the King to withstand the pressure, thus brought to bear upon him, led to a situation from which the only escape was found to be revolution. It is somewhat paradoxical, but yet true, to say that the Bourbons fell because they failed to rule in defiance of the elective Chamber.

At the time of his first restoration, Louis, on the advice of Wellington and as some kind of guarantee against too violent reaction, had accepted Talleyrand and Fouché as his ministers. But it was only natural that he should be unable to work in full accord with an ex-bishop and a Napoleonic minister of police, and he took the earliest opportunity of accepting their resignations, despite the services which Talleyrand had rendered to the Bourbon cause at the Congress of Vienna. They were replaced by a moderate cabinet, headed by Richelieu, an *émigré* who had not borne arms against his country and whose administrative capacity had been proved by his government of Odessa. But the minister was powerless in face of the Ultra majority in *La Chambre Introwable*, as Louis nicknamed his too royalist Chamber. An electoral law, which he introduced, was rejected in both houses, while the deputies approved a counter proposal put forward by the Ultras. This measure projected an extension of the franchise, an ostensibly Liberal idea, of which the real aim was, by means of indirect election, to throw all power into the hands of the local landowners.

the failure
of the
Bourbons.

Talley-
rand-
Fouché
ministry,
1814-15.

Richelieu's
first
ministry,
Sept. 1815.

Dissolution of La Chambre Introuvable, 1816. The Peers threw out this bill also, and Louis, on the advice of the Powers, met the resultant deadlock by a dissolution.

Electoral law of Richelieu, 1817. A royal ordinance, devised by the Moderates, reduced the number of deputies from 408 to 258, as it had been in 1814, and the result of the general election afforded at least a partial justification of the royal policy. Richelieu secured a majority, and was able to pass an electoral law, which provided for direct election, renewal of one fifth of the Chamber annually, and permanent reduction of its numbers. The electors were to be thirty, the Deputies forty years of age; the former were to pay 300 francs, the latter 1,000, in direct taxes. In this way, the total number of voters was reduced to 100,000, but the representation of moderate opinion was secured. This measure was followed by the suppression of the summary courts, and by the reform of the army by Gouvion St. Cyr.

Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 1818. Richelieu profited by the increased stability of the monarchy to gain his greatest triumph. By the Peace of Paris, and the concurrent agreements between the Powers, it had been provided that France should be occupied for a while by the allied armies; the date of evacuation was to be determined by a conference to be held in 1818. When it met at Aix-la-Chapelle, Richelieu, partly owing to his personal influence with the Tsar, but partly owing to the improved condition of France and the existence of an army capable of defending the monarchy, was able to

Evacuation of France, Nov. 1818. secure that the allied troops should be withdrawn by the end of the following November. The Bourbons were thus freed from the stigma of relying on foreign support, and for the first time were in a position to 'nationalize the monarchy and royalize the nation'. But Richelieu gained more than this. France was recognized as being purified from the stain of revolutionary conduct; she was rehabilitated in the eyes of Europe and formally admitted

to membership of the Alliance. From the position of a suspected criminal, she was raised to the rank of a police-constable. To Metternich, the event afforded ground for grave misgivings. He was alarmed at the inclusion of another constitutional Power in the league against disorder, and he foresaw resultant weakening of the Alliance. But he was only able to secure a secret guarantee that the Great Powers would continue to watch France; to outward appearance that country had resumed her proper place in the councils of nations.

Richelieu, who had thus gained a signal diplomatic triumph, did not long preserve his tenure of power. By one of the bitter ironies of history, his fall was in a sense the result of his success. In the work of securing internal repose, which he had undertaken, he had been fortunate enough to enjoy the support of the most brilliant section in the Chamber, the 'Doctrinaires', a group of some half-dozen independents, which included Royer-Collard and Guizot. But when this part of his work had been completed, when French soil had been freed from the presence of foreign troops, Liberalism became, as it were, once more a possible creed, and Richelieu found himself at variance with many of his former supporters. His own ideals were those of a moderate Conservative, but moderation was at a discount in the France of the Restoration and passivity unpopular. Richelieu seems always to have remembered that he had been an *émigré*, and though consistently opposed to violent royalism, he had even greater dread of revolution masquerading as reform; if driven in either direction, he would look rather to the Right than to the Left for help. But his chief colleagues—Decazes, St. Cyr, Baron Louis—favoured a frankly Liberal programme, and the Cabinet was reduced to impotence by internal dissensions.

France admitted to the Alliance, Nov. 1818.

§ 7. Government of the Moderates in France.

Growth of
Liberalism
in France.

The partial elections of 1818, which occurred while the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle yet sat, brought matters to a head. The Liberals made many gains; Lafayette and Constant, who had been prominent supporters of the Revolution, were among those returned. Richelieu, though he assured the Powers that there was no cause for alarm, secretly trembled. He took the event to prove a revival of revolutionary sentiment, and when the Ultras clamoured for electoral reform, his sympathy went out to them. But the majority of his colleagues drew entirely different conclusions. Regarding the successes of the Left as proof that France was more free to express her true opinion, they argued that the desire for progressive legislation should be gratified, and in advocating concession in lieu of repression, they had the support of Louis XVIII. Richelieu, never a glutton for office, seized the opportunity to resign.

Resigna-
tion of
Richelieu,
Dec. 1818.

Liberal
Ministry of
Decazes,
1818-20.

His nominal successor was Dessoles, but the real head of the new Cabinet was Decazes, to whom the leadership of the more moderate Liberals fell as a result alike of his undoubted capacity and of his intimate friendship with the King. Under his direction, the country entered upon a period of great political interest, during which an attempt was made to realize his aim of 'nationalizing the monarchy and royalizing the nation'. It proved impossible to attain either of these ends; the constant distrust of moderation which has characterized French political life since 1789, the constant preference for idealistic projects rather than practical reforms, was an insurmountable obstacle. Yet for a while fortune attended the efforts of the Ministry. The Conservative tendency of the House of Peers was corrected by the addition of new members, drawn from the ranks of former dignitaries of the Empire. Baron Louis, by his

skilful finance, restored national credit and thus produced an increase of material prosperity; while the substitution of annual complete budgets for the previous separate rendering of accounts by each department of state at irregular intervals, brought revenue and expenditure really under the control of the Chamber. The attitude of the Cabinet was defined by its refusal to modify the electoral law in a conservative sense, by its abolition of the censorship, and introduction of trial by jury in Press cases, and by the freeing of periodicals from all restrictions other than the giving of general security for good conduct.

Such progress along constitutional lines was interrupted first by an accident and then by a tragedy. At each election the Liberals had gained seats, until finally the Abbé Grégoire was returned for Isère. He was not merely a renegade priest; he had attacked monarchy as an institution, had used his scriptural knowledge to supply him with libellous epithets for application to Marie Antoinette, and was regarded as largely responsible for the execution of Louis XVI. His election led to universal alarm. The Powers, through their ambassadors, recommended precautionary measures, and seriously debated whether the time had not come to act on the secret clauses of the Quadruple Alliance. The Ultras hailed the event as conclusive proof of the growth of revolutionary feeling, and demanded vigorous repression. Even the moderates were filled with concern.

Louis XVIII and Decazes had a better appreciation of the significance of the event. They were well aware that no one deplored it more vehemently than its true authors, Charles of Artois and his partisans. The Ultras, hating moderation in every form and hoping to identify Liberalism with revolution, had deliberately supported

Election of
Abbé
Grégoire,
1819.

Signifi-
cance of
the event.

the candidates of the Left against those of the Ministry, so that the return of an extremist such as Grégoire proved not that France was weary of the existing order, but that there are no bounds beyond which faction will not carry its devotees. It showed, perhaps, that moderate counsels could not as yet prevail ; it hardly indicated that reactionary measures were either necessary or expedient.

Change in
the policy
of Decazes.

Realizing, as he certainly did, the true meaning of the event, Decazes might have been expected to resist the pressure of foreign diplomatists and French hypocrites, but he seems to have lost his nerve. In an effort to conciliate the Ultras, he exchanged his former consistent Liberalism for advocacy of electoral reform. But his Ministry was weakened by the resignation of Baron Louis and St. Cyr, and its prestige was shattered by its forced assent to the expulsion of Grégoire. Attempts to induce Royer-Collard to take office, and to bolster up the Government with the help of the 'Doctrinaires' failed, and though Decazes and his chief lieutenant, De Serre, battled on, they constantly lost ground in the Chamber, until a tragedy completed the ruin of the Cabinet.

Assassina-
tion of the
Duke of
Berry,
Feb. 1820.

The Duke of Berry, younger son of Charles of Artois, was assassinated by a political fanatic, and as both he and his elder brother, the Duke of Angoulême, were childless, it was easy to represent the crime as part of a calculated attempt to extinguish the elder branch of the royal family. The widowed duchess openly accused Decazes of complicity in the murder ; many who rejected this absurd suggestion considered that the Liberalism of the minister had contributed to the tragedy. Louis, bitterly reproached by his brother and his family, bowed before the storm. He accepted the resignation of his

favourite, who was consoled with a dukedom and the embassy to London.

Fall of
Decazes,
Feb. 1821

The fall of Decazes marks the end of what may be called 'the constitutional experiment' of the restored Bourbon monarchy, of the attempt to reconcile the nation with the dynasty. The failure was the result of the fact that the more violent partisans on either side hated nothing so much as moderation, and this inveterate hostility to temperate counsels drove France along the path which led to the Revolution of 1830. For a while, indeed, the King refused to submit entirely to the Ultras and tried to find a solution by securing once more the services of Richelieu, who was to French what Wellington was to English political life at this period. Richelieu might be trusted to refrain from violent measures, and, as far as possible, to pursue a national policy. But he was convinced from the first that it was beyond his power to realize his aim of conciliation and abstention from controversial legislation, and it was with extreme reluctance, and only after Charles had promised him his support, that he consented to take office.

§ 8. Pro-
gress of
reaction 1
France.

At first, however, the Ultras condescended to accept at his hands certain concessions to their views. The censorship of the Press was restored and disturbances in various parts of the kingdom met by the revival of the summary courts. The electoral law was modified; members for the *arrondissements* were to be chosen by indirect voting on signed papers, while 172 additional members for departments were to be elected by the richest constituents, who were thus endowed with a double vote. Further to guard against the return of Liberal deputies, the presidents of each electoral college were appointed by the Government.

Electoral
Law of
1820.

So far Richelieu had been supported by the Right, but

End of

Richelieu's this support was presently withdrawn. The birth of
 second a posthumous heir to the murdered Duke of Berry led to
 Ministry, an outbreak of royalist enthusiasm. The consequent
 Dec. 1821. gains made by the Ultras at the ensuing elections, in
 which they were assisted by royal proclamations in
 favour of their candidates, caused that party to press for
 more decided measures. They were further dissatisfied
 with the attitude adopted by the Ministry at Troppau
 and Laibach, where they had hoped to see France ranged
 definitely on the side of legitimacy and commissioned to
 intervene in favour of Ferdinand VII. At the same
 time, the Left, already alienated by the repressive
 measures of the Government, were disappointed that
 Richelieu failed to go to the help of the Greek insurgents.
 The Cabinet was thus assailed on all sides, and the great
 administrative capacity of De Serre did not suffice to
 save it. After making one last appeal to Charles to
 remember his promise of support, and finding that the
 prince's word of honour was valueless, Richelieu resigned.
 He had once been the victim of his conservative ten-
 dencies; now he fell because he was not conservative
 enough; in both cases, the true cause of his retirement
 was that he was a patriot, who realized that party
 violence was bound to destroy the monarchy of the
 Bourbons.

Ministry of That monarchy now hastened to its doom. Louis
 Villèle, XVIII, submitting to the influence of gout and Madame
 1821-28. Cayla, ceased to fight against the extremist views of
 those nearest to him, and allowed Villèle to form an
 Ultra-royalist ministry, bent on revenge. For the ideal
 of 'nationalizing the monarchy', that of a close union
 between Church and Crown was substituted. Villèle
 aimed deliberately at the restoration of the *ancien*
régime; he hoped to secure this by parliamentary

agency, by measures which should be invested with such validity as the assent of the elected of the people could supply. To secure that assent was not difficult. The electoral law threw the balance of political power into the hands of the landowners, who had been thoroughly alarmed by the formation of secret societies such as the *Charbonnerie*, the French counterpart of the Carbonari, and the frequency of military plots. They believed that security of property demanded repressive measures.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the 'Congregation' grew in numbers and more and more dictated the policy of the Government, which assumed a markedly ecclesiastical character. To silence expressions of opposition and to prevent the dissemination of Liberal opinions, the 'law of tendencies' was introduced. A newspaper might be found guilty of a 'tendency' towards improper conduct revealed in a series of articles, each of which might be in itself perfectly harmless, and might for this cause be suspended. The censorship was abolished, but, on the other hand, authorization was a necessary prelude to publication, Press cases ceased to be tried before a jury and Press offences were heavily punished. With the same end in view, a bishop, Fraysinous, was appointed Grand Master of the University, a preliminary step towards placing all education under the control of the Church, the Ministry of Religion being associated with that of Education. And Villèle began seriously to consider the question of compensating the *émigrés*.

Meanwhile the growth of material prosperity induced; the censorship of the Press compelled, the cessation of open criticism of the government. Though the Bourbon monarchy was already 'dancing on a volcano', the truth was realized neither at home nor abroad. On the con-

Measures
of Villèle.

Growth of
reactionary
spirit in
France.

trary, stability appeared to have been attained, and France, cured of her revolutionary heresies, to be coming more and more into line with the autocratic states. Metternich rejoiced that one of the two 'Liberal Powers' should display signs of a willingness to join in the great work of maintaining the *status quo*; he possibly felt that a reformed criminal would be sure to make an efficient police-constable.

j. 9. The
Spanish
Constitu-
tion.

And he was the more delighted at the apparent conversion of France, because the European situation was such as to rouse his gravest fears. Unrest was prevalent in all the other states bordering on the Mediterranean, and events occurring which disquieted the courts of Europe and which seemed to justify the warnings of the Conservatives in every country. It is, at first sight, remarkable that Spain should have set the example of revolution, since nowhere had the restoration been more sincerely welcomed or a reactionary policy commanded a larger measure of public support. Ferdinand VII had been idealized by his people as a martyr to the ambition of Napoleon, but he quickly lost the glamour which had been cast round the picturesque figure of the princely exile. Coarse and sensual, inconstant even in his vices, swayed by favourites of low birth and lower tastes, he was well fitted to disgust the most loyal nation under Heaven. And while the brutality of the Government offended the humanity, its inefficiency galled the pride and patriotism of the Spanish race.

Character
of the Re-
storation
in Spain.

As might have been expected, Ferdinand's first act was to abolish the Constitution of 1812, the loss of which was, in itself, no great evil, since it was utterly alien to the traditions of the people and would probably in any case have proved to be unworkable. Even the revival of the Inquisition and of the immunities of classes was not

altogether unpopular. But the complete restoration of the former governmental system bred discontent. The ministers became once more *covachuelistas*, mere clerks hidden in the vaults of the palace, and they did not even possess the merit of competent unoriginality. Garay, indeed, was for a while permitted to labour at the reform of the finances, but though the cupidity of Ferdinand was gratified by the prospect of increased revenue, the minister soon fell. Neither he nor any one else could long make headway against the intrigues of the *camarilla*, an inner clique composed of the personal favourites of the King. And while many of those who had served their country well during the struggle with Napoleon were persecuted and proscribed, Spain was reduced to a condition of extreme poverty, ignorance, and weakness. She was left without a navy, in a state bordering on bankruptcy and riddled with corruption, and with an army starving, naked, and ashamed.

Abroad Ferdinand's government offended the not too keen moral sense of the Eastern Powers, and the Tsar, though he was afterwards ready to sell worthless ships at an exorbitant price to the bankrupt King, yet at first marked his disapproval of his courses by not inviting him to enter the Holy Alliance. At home, plots multiplied, and the Freemasons, becoming a political organization, strove to spread revolutionary doctrines. The traditional loyalty of the Spanish people was long proof against all shattering of dreams. But at last the accession to office of Mataflorida, the most notorious of reactionaries, by giving promise of a more bitter tyranny, produced a crisis. The army, which had been collected at Cadiz for the reduction of the rebel American colonies, had been unable to embark owing to the lack of transports. It became infected with 'constitutional' ideas, the more readily

Growth of
opposition.

because it loathed the prospect of service across the Atlantic, and because it was left unpaid and idle. An initial plot was frustrated by the treachery of La Bisbal, the general commanding, who first won the confidence, and then revealed the plans, of the conspirators. But the traitor was rather unwisely replaced in his command by the weak and dilatory Calderon, and a second attempt met with better success.

Revolt of
Riego,
1820.

Led by Riego and Quiroga, two colonels of greater vanity than merit, and greater luck than ability, the movement fared ill at first. A march by Riego on Cordova was fruitless; the population of the districts through which he passed was apathetic and he gained few adherents. But just when all seemed lost, the simultaneous outbreak of revolt at Corunna and Barcelona, and indeed throughout the kingdom, turned the scale. Ferdinand, who was certainly under no illusions as to the extent of his popularity, was thoroughly frightened and decided to give way. He swore to the Constitution of 1812, for which the mobs had vaguely clamoured, and promised to convene a Cortes. Riego, entering Madrid, was hailed as a popular hero and as the saviour of his country.

Meeting of
the Cortes,
1820.

In due course, the estates met and an attack was instituted upon clerical privilege, as the necessary prelude to financial and social reform. But the majority in the Cortes was not content with mere redress of grievances. It hoped for a complete breach with the past, and forthwith its violence, coupled with the absurd vanity of Riego, began the alienation of public opinion from the Liberals. Ferdinand watched with satisfaction the revival of devotion to himself; he intrigued perpetually for the restoration of absolute power, relying upon two factors to secure his triumph. He believed and with

reason that Spain would ever prefer the tyranny of the Crown, which it knew, to that of a parliamentary majority, the recent creation of a moment of enthusiasm, unknown, without associations, and devoid of claims to loyalty. With all his faults, the King knew his people for what they were, at heart prone to submit to monarchical rule, because too proud to bear government by possible inferiors or even by mere equals. And the hope, which he had won from this analysis of the character of his subjects, was intensified by his conviction that the Powers, apostles of legitimacy and the *status quo*, could not long abandon him to the tender mercies of a people whose susceptibilities he had outraged and whose prosperity he had ruined.

But whereas the King's confidence in the Allies would § 10.
Unrest in
Italy.
in general have been abundantly justified, in this particular case the circumstances of the European situation made it vain. Alexander I, indeed, filled with the passionate zeal of recent conversion, was ready to march an army from Moscow to Madrid in defence of absolute rule; such an expedition would have proved his sincerity, and afforded useful occupation for soldiers tired of inaction and inclined to clamour for blood. In France the Ultra-royalists advocated war, as a means of acquiring prestige for the Bourbons and to further their designs at home. But Richelieu, who in this had the support of the Left, was averse from such action, and his constitutional timidity was intensified by the knowledge that Great Britain was avowedly hostile to all idea of intervention in the Spanish peninsula. For once in a way, Austria sided with the 'Liberal' Powers. Metternich dreaded the passage of Russian troops through the Habsburg dominions, and he feared that a successful war would rouse again in France the latent spirit of

Inaction
of the
Powers.

aggression. And he was equally reluctant either to bring possible discredit upon the Alliance, or to risk its weakening and dissolution, by using it to support a ruler condemned by the general voice of the Continent. For a while, therefore, he was led to preach the unusual doctrine of non-intervention, and the attitude which he adopted was decisive in leading the Powers rigorously to abstain from action.

State of
Italy.

It was, however, only for a while that the apostle of wide interpretation of the Treaties preached another gospel. Disturbances in the Italian peninsula soon won him back to his earlier view that Europe should be controlled by the 'moral hegemony' which the great Powers had established. Italy, reduced once more to a 'mere diplomatic expression' by the settlement of 1815, had, with the notable exception of Piedmont, become little more than a mere appanage of the Austrian Empire. The rulers of the various states were bound to the Habsburgs by ties of blood or interest; they were ready and even anxious to assist in stifling those vague yearnings for a national existence which the use of the term 'Kingdom of Italy', and the employment of Italians in the work of government, had called into being during the Revolution. Such yearnings were anathema to Metternich, for the restraint of Liberalism, in his opinion a necessity everywhere, was there doubly necessary, since Austria was touched directly and her dominions in danger of infection.

Italian
policy of
Metternich

While, therefore, he saw the danger of attempts to 'Germanize' Italy, it was the first principle of his policy to crush all national feeling. Unity, he declared, was not merely an emphatic denial of the doctrine of legitimacy and of the sacredness of the 'Treaties'; it would also lead infallibly to revolution, since the jarring interests of the various sections of the peninsula could but produce

unending conflict. In order to deaden activity of political thought, then, and to lull the Italian people into mental inertia, he advocated efficient administration and the encouragement of material prosperity; those who were 'fat and well-liking' would not disturb the peace, since disturbance would imperil their own position. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, on the whole, afforded a practical example of the working of Metternich's ideal of benevolent despotism. Government was honest, though strict; technical education was fostered and industry consequently advanced; if taxation was unduly heavy, it was still not heavy enough to destroy the industrial well-being. At the same time, would-be politicians had cause enough to complain. They were excluded from public life and rather needlessly irritated, though it must be remembered that they were at heart thoroughly disloyal to the existing order, and that their ideal involved the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. As to the other states of the peninsula, Metternich formed close alliances with most of them, but though they were thus brought under Habsburg influence, they offered less perfect illustrations of the methods of the Austrian chancellor. Tuscany and Parma were ruled with the mildness traditional in the imperial house, and in these duchies the sovereigns were generally popular. But Modena, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies presented in varying shades pictures of corrupt and unpopular administration.

Everywhere the repressive attitude of the governments led to a development of those secret societies which had first arisen during the Revolution, and which made a potent appeal to the love of intrigue inherent in the Italian character. The chief society was that of the Carbonari, which had been founded at Naples and joined after 1815

Revolution
at Naples,
1820.

by the former partisans of Murat, who had been proscribed by the restored Bourbons. It made converts throughout Italy and especially in the armies, with the result that the first outbreak due to its efforts assumed a military complexion. Morelli and Salvati, two sub-lieutenants in the Neapolitan army, raised the standard of rebellion at Nola, vaguely demanding 'the Spanish Constitution', a catchword which meant to those who used it as much and as little as 'the Laws of Edward the Confessor' meant to the agitators of twelfth-century England. The weakness of the Government prevented the movement from being nipped in the bud, and when it had been joined by Pepe, the general commanding at Naples, the King made unconditional surrender. The constitution was duly proclaimed; the political persecution of the Muratists ceased, and Ferdinand IV, while he waited for a chance of revenge, was loud in his professions of ardent devotion to the popular cause.

Revolution
of Pied-
mont, 1821.

Almost at the same time, a revolution occurred in Piedmont, which alone among the states of Italy had not made agreement with Austria. Victor Emmanuel, despite the fact that an incident known as the French Revolution had occurred, was amiable and gentle; and he had been able, with the help of Alexander I, to preserve comparative independence in his relations with the Habsburgs. His heir presumptive, Charles Albert of Carignano, was regarded as a revolutionary, and was outspoken in his hatred of the Austrians. Consequently, though the Government of Piedmont was popular, and in some respects almost Liberal, its leniency produced the same results as the barbaric severity of Ferdinand IV. The Carbonari made converts; and when news arrived of the Neapolitan revolution, a section of the people, partly civilians, partly soldiers, demanded the Spanish Con-

stitution, believing that they were acting in accord with the wishes of their future, if not with those of their actual, king.

Victor Emmanuel, realizing that Austria would not tolerate a Liberal government at her very door, and unwilling to coerce his subjects, sought refuge in abdication. Charles Albert, appointed regent for the new King, Charles Felix,¹ allowed the Constitution to be proclaimed, but safeguarded himself by declaring that the grant was subject to royal confirmation. For his vacillation on this occasion, he has been accused of the basest treachery, and even of having deliberately lured his former accomplices to their doom. It is perhaps just to say that he wavered between his personal sympathy with the revolt and his loyalty to his family; the latter sentiment eventually prevailed, because it was backed by the strong argument which the military power of Austria presented. In any case, Charles Felix was resolved on his own course. He rejected the concessions made by his cousin, and, supported by Austria, easily restored absolutism in his kingdom. Charles Albert was sent into temporary exile from the court.

Abdication
of Victor
Emmanuel,
Mar. 1821.

Accession
of Charles
Felix.

The outbreak of unrest in Italy was enough to convince Metternich that non-intervention was by no means a perfect doctrine. In a circular-letter to the Powers, he endeavoured to distinguish between the Spanish and Italian questions, urging that Austria, in virtue of her alliance with Naples, had a right to intervene, and claiming for the individual action of his government the moral support of the Allies. Alexander, however, was firm in his demand for a conference to consider the matter; and Metternich, though the danger of raising the Spanish question appeared clearly enough to him, was obliged to assent in order to avoid a breach in the concert of Europe.

§ 11. The
Confer-
ences of
Troppau
and
Laibach.

¹ Brother to Victor Emmanuel I.

Conference
of Troppau,
Oct. 1820.

The imminence of such a breach appeared as soon as the Conference of the Powers assembled at Troppau. Great Britain, represented merely by her ambassador at Vienna, refused to be a party to the coercion of Naples, and showed her real wishes by attempting to mediate between Ferdinand and his subjects; she aimed not at serving the ends of Austria, who desired to destroy Liberalism in Italy, but at removing the only plausible excuse for intervention by ending the internal divisions of the Two Sicilies. France, whose envoys had only limited powers, assumed an attitude of reserve. But, on the other hand, Metternich found that the Tsar, disgusted by his recent experiences in Poland, had been won over entirely to the Conservative cause, and that the three Eastern Powers were willing to act together. For a while, he strove to maintain at least the appearance of solidarity in the Alliance. The Troppau Protocol, a colourless document, to which even Great Britain was able to give a qualified assent, merely asserted the general principle that intervention was legitimate when internal changes threatened external disorder. The actual case of Italy was postponed to another conference, which the King of Naples was invited to attend.

Conference
of Laibach,
Jan. 1821.

Before he left his capital, Ferdinand swore with peculiar solemnity to the constitution and declared that he was going to the Conference merely as a peacemaker between his people and Europe. But as soon as he was safe under Austrian protection at Laibach, he gave vent to his true feelings, denouncing the revolution and begging for help. The Eastern Powers readily acceded to his request, and though Great Britain refused to act with them, Austria was commissioned to restore order in the peninsula.

Restora-
tion of

This restoration was speedily accomplished. The

Neapolitan rebels were defeated in a skirmish at Rieti, lost heart, and abandoned the struggle. Ferdinand, borne back to power on the arms of Austria, turned to the congenial task of revenging himself on his foes. At the same time, the revolution in Piedmont came to an inglorious end, and throughout the peninsula the ascendancy of the Habsburgs was placed on a still more assured basis. The real weakness of that ascendancy, the breach in the Alliance which had appeared at Troppau and Laibach, was not fully realized at the time; the impossibility of constant co-operation between the Western and Eastern Powers was not appreciated. Instead, the settlement of Italy seemed to assure the supremacy of Metternich and of his system of Conservatism in Europe.

absolutism
in Naples,
Mar. 1821.

End of the
revolution
in
Piedmont,
Mar. 1821.

CHAPTER II

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE

§ 1. German Policy of Metternich. § 2 The Carlsbad Decrees. § 3. State of the Ottoman Empire. § 4. Beginning of the Greek revolt. § 5. Progress of the Greek revolt. § 6. Intervention of Mehemet Ali. § 7. Policy of the Powers. § 8. Death of Alexander I. § 9. Nicholas and the Greek Question. § 10. Navarino. § 11. The Kingdom of Greece.

§ 1. German Policy of Metternich.

MEANWHILE in Germany Metternich had secured a more or less complete triumph for his ideas. At the Congress of Vienna the restoration of the old Holy Roman Empire had been considered and rejected as impossible. The tradition upon which alone it had rested had been discredited by the gibes of Voltaire, and completely shattered by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic reconstruction of the German map; it could not revive at the bidding of the Great Powers, even if Prussia would have agreed to such increase of Habsburg prestige. On the other hand, the German states could not be left without any bond of union whatsoever. The existence of numerous enclaves, and the consequent frequency of boundary disputes, supplied an ever-present *casus belli*. The divergence in strength between the various states afforded sufficient inducement for aggression to the stronger, sufficient motives for jealousy to the weaker, to render a condition of perpetual war at least not unthinkable. And in the background rose the vision of an aggressive France, who had always found in the divisions of Germany an occasion for her own advancement. The

peace-seeking diplomatists of Vienna saw that they could not hope for stability in Europe, if this storm-centre remained uncalmed, and thus the Germanic Confederation was created.

This body was to be the necessary superior power to prevent the reign of utter anarchy and to guard against French ambition, but it was so organized that its very constitution guaranteed that it should be incapable of fulfilling the first of the purposes which it was intended to serve. The presence of Austria and Prussia, two great military states mutually distrustful and with conflicting interests, was enough to prevent the Confederation from becoming efficient, the more so as part of the territories of each of these Powers was outside the Germanic body. But inefficiency was further safeguarded. No attempt was made to decide whether the Confederation was to be a preliminary step towards the attainment of real unity, or rather to supply a means of postponing for ever the ending of that disunion which had subsisted since the Great Interregnum and which the Peace of Westphalia had recognized and perpetuated.

Inasmuch as any real union would naturally be in some measure a concession to the spirit of 'nationality', and so at least tend to destroy the *status quo* as established by the Congress of Vienna, it was clear that it would incur the determined hostility of Metternich. He was, indeed, fully resolved that the Confederation should be purely nominal. Austria, being a partially non-German state, had nothing at all to hope for from Pan-Germanism; the essence of the movement towards unity; rather the sentiment was dangerous to her. Nor could she with safety attempt to exercise direct political influence in Germany. The history of the Fürstenbund had proved that any such attempt would be resisted by Prussia, and

The
Germanic
Confedera-
tion.

Position of
Austria.

the lesson of the failure of Joseph II was not lost on his successors. The Habsburgs were bound to rely on the rivalry between the smaller states, which invited their intervention, and on the jealousy with which the ever-growing power of the Hohenzollerns was regarded. But most of all they placed their trust in the feeling of traditional loyalty to themselves as the recognized heirs of the mediaeval emperors, a feeling which twenty-five stressful years had not sufficed to eradicate. The cordiality with which Francis II was received, during his stately progress from Vienna to the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, inspired his chancellor with a lively hope that he had found the solution of the German problem. Himself welcomed as 'a new Messiah' and exalted into 'a moral force', Metternich trusted that a divided Germany would find in him, as the representative of his master, her guide in matters political and the perpetual arbiter of her destinies.

Policy of
Metternich.

But if this dream were to come true, it was necessary that all supporters of the existing order should be banded together in its defence and decided in their attitude and policy. Infirmity of purpose on the part of governments would supply an opportunity for subjects to assert their will; and it was an undoubted fact that the subjects of many rulers, attracted by the ideal of nationality, were inclined to seek by the vague paths of Liberalism for a mysterious something called 'Progress'. Left alone, it was highly probable that peoples would fail to realize how sacrosanct were the 'Treaties', or that stability and morality, Liberalism and revolution, were interchangeable terms. It was, therefore, necessary that they should be guided from above by the Powers, if the new ideas were to be combated with effect, if Prince Metternich were to remain 'a moral force in Germany' to save the world

from anarchy and atheism, from contempt for the Habsburgs and for God.

And as it happened, certain accidental circumstances both deprived Metternich's policy of that sure foundation in legality for which its author sighed and served to bring into the councils of the Powers division of opinion on the matter of Germany. Article XIII of the federal constitution provided that there should be 'assemblies of estates' and as this article was no less sacred than any other clause of the sacred Treaties, the position of the Austrian chancellor became ambiguous, his conduct open to the charge of inconsistency, when he censured those rulers who wished to perform the duty thus assigned to them. And many of the German princes had this wish. Conspicuous among them was the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, who defied Vienna and was 'immoral' enough to grant a Liberal constitution to his subjects. His example was followed by some of the southern states, with the result that Germany failed to present to the eyes of Metternich a pleasing spectacle of consistent absolutism.

Nor was the Austrian government able to protest too loudly. Alexander I, not yet forgetful of the dramatic appeal of Stein,¹ and characteristically attracted by the glamour of an apparently lofty ideal, took the nascent Liberalism of Germany under his protection and warmly approved the conduct of the reforming princes. Austria could not afford to incur the hostility of the Tsar by attacking his protégés, especially when those protégés were merely carrying out a clause of the Treaties which the Alliance was pledged to maintain. And the dilemma of Metternich was rendered more acute by another fact. Had Prussia been in full sympathy with Austria, the combined persuasion of two great states might have

Obstacles to Metternich's policy :
(a) Article XIII.

(b) Attitude of Alexander I.

¹ Cp. above, p. 16.

induced the other members of the Confederation to abstain from dangerous practices. But Frederick William III had vaguely promised a constitution to his people, and his vacillating character led him to hesitate either to break or to keep his word. Hardenberg was permitted to employ his dotage in constructing and reconstructing parliaments of ink and paper, while his master debated whether or no they should be allowed to become anything more. In these circumstances Metternich was compelled to content himself with passive resistance. He urged continually on the court of Berlin more or less ingenious plans for the technical keeping and actual breaking of the promises which it had made. At the same time, he instructed Count Buol, the Austrian delegate and president of the Diet, to impede the completion of any business. He himself waited for a chance to play the part of St. George and strike down the dragon of Liberalism.

§ 2. The
Carlsbad
Decrees.
The
Wartburg
Festival,
Oct. 1817.

His opportunity came as the result of some rather futile exhibitions by a group of extreme Liberals, the students of the University of Jena. The Wartburg Festival was held by them to celebrate the Reformation and the battle of Leipsic; it was marked by the burning of some reactionary books, a corporal's baton, and incidentally of a pair of corsets. These actions were meant to display hatred of repression, militarism, and foreign influence; they were interpreted as dangerous signs of increasing contempt for authority. Metternich pointed the moral that students should be carefully restrained; and the Wartburg exhibition and other similar displays assisted to cure Alexander of his sympathy for the German Liberals. The influence of Austria, which had been steadily growing since the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, was soon confirmed by an emphatic illustration

of the danger of indecision. Kotzebue, a Russian privy councillor, who had abandoned politics for poetry, incurred the hostility of the reforming party by his reactionary writings. He was now assassinated by a mad theological student, and the deed, which was rashly applauded by some injudicious Liberals, was followed by other attempts at murder. Metternich hailed these events with expressions of horror and feelings of secret delight; they gave him the chance for which he had waited. Everywhere his agents laboured to discover, perhaps even to invent, proofs of a general conspiracy against law and order, while the court of Vienna insisted on the absolute necessity of precautionary measures.

Murder of
Kotzebue,
Mar. 1819.

It was no longer alone in its advocacy of stern repression. Prussia had already postponed all internal change and had admonished the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar. After the death of Kotzebue, a conference between Frederic William and Metternich was held at Teplitz, and as a result the Austrian policy was fully adopted by the court of Berlin. Common measures for the maintenance of good order were concerted, and the other members of the Confederation were invited to send representatives to a special diet at Carlsbad. Here the two Great Powers found no difficulty in imposing their views on the minor states, and the Carlsbad Decrees were issued to regulate the police system of Germany. It was provided that universities should be supervised and all secret societies prohibited. Pamphlet literature was to be strictly censored; Metternich urged the direct encouragement of the national taste for books literally and figuratively ponderous, in order to gratify in a harmless manner aspirants to literary fame. A central commission was established at Frankfort to check revolutionary disturbance.

Convention
of Teplitz,
Aug. 1819.

The
Carlsbad
Decrees,
Sept. 1819.

The Vienna
Final Act,
May 1820.

The court of Vienna desired to go further and specifically to limit the powers of local estates. But the other members of the Confederation, threatened with internal discontent, declined to accept a policy which would infallibly have led to disorder, and so afforded an excuse for Austrian intervention. When the conferences of Carlsbad were resumed at Vienna, the opposition of Prussia, Bavaria, and Würtemberg compelled Metternich to agree to a compromise. The Decrees were maintained but their provisions were not extended, and though at a later date they were made permanent, the independence of the smaller states was at the same time guaranteed. On the other hand, there was no further idea of the establishment of Liberal institutions under the aegis of governments; the reforming movement in Germany became a force hostile to constituted authority, and deprived of the sympathy of Russia by the folly of many students and the crime of one, it ceased greatly to concern the advocates of absolute rule. At the same time, the new friendship between Austria and Prussia confirmed the supremacy of the former in the Diet, and all proposals for strengthening the Germanic Confederation were tacitly abandoned. If Metternich had not triumphed completely, he had none the less triumphed. The Conference of Vienna is the high-water-mark of his ascendancy in Europe.

§ 3. State
of the
Ottoman
Empire.

Almost immediately the shadow of his approaching fall darkens his path, and the menacing spectre of the Eastern Question looms large in the foreground of the political picture. Metternich had attempted in 1815 to secure a settlement of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and by placing the dominions of the Sultan under the guarantee of the Powers, to set up an effective barrier against the aggression of Russia. So vital, however, had

been the differences which appeared between the Allies that discretion was felt to be indeed the better part of valour ; to save the Concert of Europe, it was agreed to ignore a certain lack of harmony. But though the question was thus gently shelved, its pressing character was not the less fully realized. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was regarded as being merely a question of time, and a scramble for the inheritance of the Sick Man was considered to be one of the most probable events. When it came, there would be an end of the Grand Alliance ; and as a result of this, and of the additional circumstance that the issue of the scramble was felt to be extremely uncertain, even those who had but little ardent devotion to the ideal of a united Europe laboured anxiously to postpone as long as possible the inevitable crisis.

As a matter of fact, their anxiety was to some extent needless, and the illness of the Sick Man, though real enough, was much exaggerated by his doctors. This exaggeration was partly due to the character of Mahmoud II, who was something of an enigma and who was generally thought to be wholly incapable of doing anything to arrest the decline and fall of his empire. He appeared to be at one time indolent and weak, at another energetic and violent, and was constantly regarded as a typical Oriental despot, by nature lazy and incompetent, but liable to flashes of truly barbaric anger. This portrait fell short of the truth. Mahmoud was rather a man of no ordinary talent ; he pursued a clear and consistent policy, to the accomplishment of which he was altogether devoted. But he was also well aware that it was most essential for him to act with caution, availing himself of such advantages as circumstances might from time to time afford him. Only in this way

Character
of
Mahmoud
II.

could he hope to meet and to overcome the difficulties which beset him.

Difficulties
of Mah-
mond: (a)
relations
with
Russia.

Those difficulties were twofold in character. Externally Russia was an ever-present danger. Under the treaties of Kutchuk-Kainardji and Bucharest, she laid claim to certain rights over the Christian subjects of the Porte, and she had also certain grievances arising from the nonfulfilment of the later treaty. Thus if she desired to find a *casus belli*, her search need not be either long or arduous. Apart from anything else, the conduct of the sultans towards their non-Mohammedan subjects was never so ideally just as to afford no excuse for complaint.

(b) Lack of
internal
unity.

Internally the Janissaries were so powerful that their nominal master was in effect their slave, and there was no other adequate military force. In the provinces, the Pashas rendered a very shadowy obedience to Constantinople, and there could be no strength in the administration of the empire until they had been coerced or persuaded into real loyalty. Centralization, in a word, was the paramount necessity of Turkey, but Mahmoud, aiming at this, had to remember that it was only too probable that his own murder would mark the conclusion of his schemes.

Position of
the Chris-
tians.

For centralization was the last thing which the Mohammedan population of the empire desired, and the obstinate localism of the Ottomans had always imposed a species of indeterminate limitation on the theoretical absolutism of the sultans. It had also driven them to rely largely on their Christian subjects, whose interest it was to support the only power which either could or would secure them against unlimited oppression and probable massacre. Ever since 1453, the Greek patriarch had acted as a kind of viceroy over the 'rayahs', his co-religionists; the Orthodox Church was almost a depart-

ment of state, and it rendered valuable service to the Porte by inculcating the general duty of obedience. The dragoman of the fleet was frequently a Christian, and the Phanariots (Greeks holding official positions) formed almost a distinct section of the community.

In Greece itself, local administration was in the hands of the Primates, the chief men in each district, who certainly oppressed their fellow-countrymen, but were obliged to do so with more care than the Mohammedan tax-gatherers, since punishment could be less easily avoided by them. In certain districts Christian communities were allowed to bear arms; these Armatoli were employed to guard the chief passes and to check the depredations of the Klephts, bands of robbers, with whom they were as a matter of fact not infrequently leagued. On the whole, the condition of Greece, and indeed of the Christian subjects of the Porte generally, was not one of unrelieved misery. Taxation, irregular, excessive, and arbitrary as it was, did not utterly crush the people. Commerce grew and shipping increased; both were favoured by the existence of extra-territorial rights, which enabled traders to place themselves under the protection of some foreign power. Most of the Greek ships flew the Russian flag, which on occasion served to shield pirates and other criminals from the leaden pursuit of Ottoman justice.

But these favourable features in the situation of the Christians did not prevent the growth of a more or less general agitation against the Government, which was fomented by the Hetairia Philike, a secret society founded by merchants at Odessa and preaching the doctrine that the Tsar would at once assist a national movement. Its missionaries travelled through Greece, collecting adherents and cash; but though it was joined

State of Greece.

§ 4. Beginning of the Greek revolt.

The Hetairia Philike.

by most of the prominent men of the country, it accomplished very little. Its central administration was convicted of incapacity and accused of worse, and so insignificant were the results of its labours that the Ottoman government, though fully aware of its existence, did not trouble to suppress it.

The
Orthodox
Church.

More real service was rendered to the Greek cause by the Orthodox Church, which afforded the truest, if not the only, bond of union between the various sections of the country. In some measure it kept alive a sense of national identity and the use of a national language; it made possible that revival of Greek literature which was illustrated by the writings of Korais. Even more valuable ultimately was the sentimentality of Western Europe. The 'Philhellenes' believed that Greece was still inhabited by the ancient Athenians, and they formed in all countries a section which strove to rouse public opinion against the Turks and in favour of Greek independence. This sentimentality at last compelled that European intervention without which the revolt would have ended in the defeat and extermination of the rebels.

'Philhel-
lenism'.

The Greek
fleet.

Finally, the Greeks possessed an invaluable asset in their fleet. The mountainous character of their country, and the complete absence of any roads worthy of the name, made the subjugation of Greece by an enemy at all times a difficult task, and the difficulty became almost insuperable when the enemy did not possess the command of the sea. For the country was so intersected by gulfs and channels that there was no important fortress which could not be more or less readily reached by water, and thus a besieging army, unsupported by a fleet, was faced with a problem almost incapable of solution. As was seen in the case of Missolonghi, the naval inferiority of

the Turks often rendered valueless such military superiority as they might possess.

Nor was their command of the sea merely of direct value to the Greeks. They made use of it to prey on the commerce of the Aegean, and plundered indifferently the trading vessels of all nations. As a result governments were moved to take action. They might have for ever remained insensible to the supplications and tears of the friends of an oppressed people; they were bound to pay attention to the more eloquent appeal of wealthy merchants and traders who incidentally were important taxpayers. Thus when sentiment was reinforced by considerations of practical necessity, Europe suddenly discovered that it had a moral duty to perform in saving the Greeks from extermination.

Importance of the Greek fleet.

In such ways the ground was prepared for the revolt of Greece and its ultimate success made possible; a casual circumstance supplied the opportunity. Mahmoud, in his pursuit of centralization, resolved to destroy the growing independence of Ali of Janina. The latter had long held the pashalik of Epirus, and had consolidated his power by a skilful blending of diplomacy with violence and of enlightened despotism with brutality. Aware that the Sultan was planning his overthrow, he tried to prevent his fall by procuring the murder of his most prominent enemy in the capital. The attempt was only partially successful; the Sultan was hopelessly angered by such open flouting of his authority; and Ali, deprived of all prospect of pardon, went in open rebellion, trusting to his own capacity and the sympathy of his Albanian neighbours to secure him final victory.

Revolt of Ali of Janina, 1820.

For a while he made some headway. Mahmoud had no regular army and was obliged to rely on the loyalty of the pashas. But the latter concentrated their forces

War between Mahmoud and Ali, 1820-22.

with deliberation and would not readily submit to a supreme commander; each had his own commissariat, his own collection of camp followers, his own plan of campaign; each distrusted the other, and all had their private aims and private suspicions of the Sultan. So little progress was made that eventually the whole strength of the Ottoman Empire had to be exerted and the command of the army entrusted to Kurshid Pasha, governor of the Morea, whose ability was undoubted but whose withdrawal from his province at this juncture was for that very reason the more serious and the more beneficial to the Greek cause. The new commander, indeed, soon blockaded Ali in his capital, but Janina, protected by its lake, was able to stand a siege, and the attention of the Porte was still mainly concentrated on Epirus. The chance of the Greeks appeared to have come, and the Hetairists, whose leaders had been reproached for raising funds rather than standards of revolt, embraced the opportunity, which fortune seemed to have placed in their hands, of vindicating their character.

Alexander Hypsilanti. But their embrace was rather enthusiastic than discreet. They greatly exaggerated the power of Russia, believing that the Tsar could defy Europe; they were ignorant of the ties which bound Alexander to the Alliance, and they were obsessed by the idea that his devotion to their cause was so great that the first sign of a rising would lead him to arm on their behalf. And to make matters worse, they lacked competent direction. Capodistrias, whom they first invited to lead them, declined the doubtful honour; Prince Alexander Hypsilanti, who was next approached and who accepted the offer, was a kind of nineteenth-century parallel to Frederic, Elector Palatine. Of the qualities requisite for the position, he possessed none except self-confidence, and this he possessed in such

abundant measure that he devoted the greater part of his time to speculating whether he would have to be content with the reward of some subordinate, though dignified, position, or whether he would indeed be admitted into the charmed circle of reigning sovereigns. An enterprise of this kind, in which decision of action and full realization of the facts of the situation were essential, was bound to fail when led by such a man. An initial blunder made certainty more certain.

The conspirators selected as the scene of their attempt Attempt of Hypsilanti in Moldavia, Mar. 1821. Moldavia, a country in which the Greeks were cordially detested as the tyrannical rulers of a Rouman population. It was only Hypsilanti's rash assertion that he had the support of a 'Great Power', and the consequent belief that Russia had sanctioned the enterprise, that gained for him even the slight measure of success which he secured. He soon disgusted his adherents by proving his incompetence. Instead of advancing at once into Wallachia, he delayed for some weeks at Jassy, and thus gave the Sultan time to prepare forces to crush him. His ruin was speedily completed. Disowned by the Tsar and excommunicated by the Greek patriarch, he dared not await the advancing Turks; less than four months after his crossing of the Pruth, he was a discredited and disgraced fugitive in Transylvania. His attempt owes its importance to the declaration with which he began it. Despite the promptitude with which Alexander had disavowed Hypsilanti, a suspicion was created and endured that Russia hoped to 'find in the disaffection of the Greeks an excuse to forward her own sinister designs upon the Ottoman Empire.

But when the rising of Hypsilanti was presently echoed § 5. Progress of the Greek revolt. in the Morea, Europe was not greatly concerned. Most statesmen were prepared to endorse the sentiment of

Metternich that the affair was 'beyond the pale of civilization', and it seemed to matter little if Mohammedans and Christians cut one another's throats in an obscure corner of the south-east. That this attitude of Olympian indifference was not permanently maintained was in a measure originally the fault of the Turks themselves.

Revolt in
the Morea,
Apr. 1821.

The revolt had been initiated by a wholesale massacre of the Mohammedan population of the Morea; reprisals on Christians followed throughout the Ottoman Empire, and the culminating point was reached when Mahmoud

Execution
of the
Patriarch,
Apr. 1821.

ordered the execution of the patriarch Gregorios. The feelings of the Russian people were deeply moved by the death of one of the princes of the Orthodox Church; diplomatic relations between Petersburg and Constantinople were suspended, and the avoidance of actual war may be attributed mainly to the accidental circumstance that the news reached the Tsar at Laibach. Being for the moment under the direct influence of Metternich, Alexander was easily led to remember his ideal of a united Europe; his devotion to that dream, of which the Holy Alliance had been the expression, outweighed his attachment to his Church and his sympathy with his own people. Elsewhere than in Russia, opinion was enlisted on the side of the Greeks. Sentimentalists all the world over, forgetting the degeneracy of the bastard children of the ancient Hellenes, wept copiously at the thought of the misfortunes of the land of Homer and Plato, and many, translating words and feelings into action, hastened to the deliverance of the oppressed.

Policy of
Metternich.

Metternich regarded with ever-increasing concern the declining influence of his convenient dictum, and the growth of the belief that he had unduly limited the area of the civilized world. As time passed, it became more and more evident that the passivity of Europe would not

endure for ever. It had always been certain that the failure to settle the Eastern Question in 1815, owing to the conflicting interests of the Powers, made it morally hopeless to expect that the Alliance could act in this matter. The Austrian chancellor, therefore, was driven to pin his faith to a policy of delay. He trusted that fear lest a single Power should snatch an undue advantage would effectually prevent all intervention, and his trust was the greater because Castlereagh, with whom he had a conference at Hanover, agreed that at all costs peace must be preserved. It was Metternich's secret prayer that while Europe deliberated, Greece might be destroyed; deliberation should be prolonged until the Turks could effect the providential extermination of a people who, to serve some private end, had not scrupled to shake the very foundations upon which the political system of the Continent reposed.

For a moment only did it seem likely that this prayer would be heard. Though their fleet failed to prevent the massacre of the inhabitants of Chios, the Greeks retained the command of the sea. Kanaris, the most daring of their captains, burnt the Turkish flagship, and so great was the terror inspired by this exploit that the Ottoman fleet dared not stir from the safe waters of the Dardanelles. On land, temporary success for the Sultan's arms proved to be the prelude of overwhelming disaster. The reduction of Ali of Janina enabled Kurshid to undertake the conquest of Greece and from his head-quarters at Larissa a dual attack was organized. One army advanced westwards, defeated the Greeks near Arta and prepared to restore order in Epirus as a preliminary step to the siege of Missolonghi, the principal fortress north of the Gulf of Lepanto. At the same time, Ali of Drama moved through central Greece. He passed the isthmus of

Successes
of the
Greeks.

Corinth and entered the Morea, which, since the fall of Tripolitza in the sixth month of the revolt, had been practically cleared of Turks. But his over-confidence proved his ruin. Advancing to the relief of Nauplia, he neglected to secure his line of retreat ; he was defeated and his army practically annihilated. Nauplia fell into the hands of the Greeks, whose naval superiority soon afterwards enabled them to gain a further success by compelling the Turks to raise the siege of Missolonghi. It seemed probable that the liberation of Greece would be accomplished without the intervention of Western Europe.

Defeat of
Ali of
Drama,
Aug. 1822.

Relief of
Misso-
longhi,
Nov. 1822.

Greek civil
war, 1823-
24.

But the Greeks themselves threw away the advantage which the fortune of war had given them. As has so often happened, it was found more easy to destroy than to create. Uniting in the face of a common danger, the Greeks had been able to overthrow Ottoman rule and to repulse attempts to restore it, but when the immediate peril had passed, they became the prey of dissensions. Neither the military leaders nor the sea-captains would consent to the supremacy of the others, and their factious conduct sufficiently prevented the establishment of any real central government. Instead of completing the deliverance of their country by the reduction of the few remaining Turkish strongholds, the Greeks turned their arms against each other. Kolokotrones, the ablest of their generals, strove and failed to establish a military dictatorship. Meanwhile the Greek navy fell into a state of anarchy, and it was only the sluggishness and incompetence of the Ottoman commanders which prevented them from taking the opportunity to recover the lost territory. As it was, all that the Turkish fleet could do was to revictual the fortresses still held in the Morea by means of a hasty cruise ; all that the Turkish army

accomplished was singularly complete failure in a second dual attack.

It was now clear that the reduction of Greece could not be achieved by the unaided strength of the Ottoman Empire. It was necessary for the Porte to have the services of a fleet capable of securing the command of the sea, and of an army more highly trained and better disciplined than the levies already at its disposal. Mahmoud reluctantly admitted his impotence, but he was not prepared to abandon the struggle. On the contrary, he resolved to adopt an idea which had occurred to him at an earlier date, and to call in the aid of his nominal vassal, Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt.

§ 6. Inter-
vention of
Mehe-
met
Ali.

Of the value of Mehemet's help from the purely military standpoint, there could be no doubt. He had diligently formed an army, organized on European principles, and was in possession of a powerful fleet, fully capable of wresting the control of the sea from the Greeks. Mahmoud had not turned to him before, because he regarded his vassal with not undeserved suspicion. Egypt had long since ceased to pay more than nominal deference to Constantinople, and its ruler was a man of undoubted ambition. Only bitter necessity led the Sultan to pay the price which Mehemet demanded for his help, the pashalik of Crete for himself and that of the Morea for his son, Ibrahim. It was on these terms that the bargain was concluded.

Alliance of
Mahmoud
with Mehe-
met Ali,
1824.

A dramatic change in the fortunes of the war afforded the best testimony to the value of the new alliance. Inspired by the hope of victory, the Ottoman commanders displayed unwonted energy. Crete, which had revolted, was easily subdued; Psara, one of the chief bases of the Greek fleet, was destroyed; the siege of Missolonghi was again undertaken. Meanwhile Ibrahim, in command of

Victories of
the Turks,
1825-27.

Fall of
Misso-
longhi,
Apr. 1826.

Fall of the
Acropolis,
June 1827.

the forces of Mehemet Ali, landed in the Morea and captured Pylos, Navarino, and Tripolitza. Failing in an attempt to surprise Nauplia, he began to devastate the peninsula with a view to ending resistance by the extermination of its inhabitants. The effect of Egyptian intervention was still more strikingly evidenced in the case of Missolonghi. The defence, which had excited the admiring enthusiasm of Europe, ended when the besieged could no longer rely on their command of the sea, and with the capture of this fortress, western Greece was restored to the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish army, turning eastwards, reduced the Acropolis of Athens and once more extended the authority of the Sultan to the isthmus of Corinth. Only in the Morea and in the islands did resistance continue, and even there the prospect of ultimate failure was increased by the continued dissensions of the Greeks, doubly fatal since the balance of military power had been transferred to their enemies. It was, indeed, merely the tardy intervention of Europe which deprived the Sultan's arms of victory.

§ 7. Policy
of the
Powers.

Congress
of Verona,
1822.

Upon such intervention the rebels had with some reason counted from the very first. The sympathy which their cause evoked had assumed a practical character. Men, like Byron, devoted their lives and talents to Greece; volunteers flocked to the Greek armies; and the revolt had been mainly financed by loans contracted in the West. But the governments of Europe were not yet greatly susceptible to popular influence, and fear of a general war served to keep the Powers inactive. At the Congress of Verona, the Greek envoys, sent to excuse or justify the revolt, were refused a hearing. Soon afterwards, pressure from Austria and England induced the Porte to concede the private demands of the Tsar; diplomatic relations between Petersburg and Constanti-

nople were resumed ; and though dark hints were dropped that more demands remained to be made, that Russo-Turkish war to which the Greeks had confidently looked was apparently postponed indefinitely. Nor did the accession of Canning to the foreign secretaryship of Great Britain produce any immediately beneficial results. His known sympathy for Greece and for the Christian subjects of the Porte, and his 'insular' character which led him to disregard the maintenance of the Alliance, caused the Greeks to hope that England would assume the rôle which Russia had rejected. Their hope was increased when he recognized the Greek flag and so raised the rebels to the status of belligerents. But it soon appeared that his conduct was indeed 'insular', and that the policy of Great Britain was to be determined by her own interest and not by sentiment or religion.

Canning
recognizes
the Greek
flag,
Mar. 1823.

None the less, Canning's action did modify the situation to the advantage of the Greeks. The recognition of their flag, though dictated by the interests of English commerce, sufficed to place the revolt on a higher plane, since the acts of their captains were now acts of war and not mere piratical exploits. More than ever, therefore, was it impossible for the Powers entirely to ignore the Greek question. Metternich himself admitted that the establishment of the independence of Greece might well prove to be a necessary evil ; in any case, the war could no longer be regarded as 'beyond the pale of civilization'. Alexander found himself faced by a situation of extreme difficulty. He saw, or fancied that he saw, a danger that the traditional position of the Tsars as champions of the Orthodox Christians would be usurped by an alien and heretic Power, and he felt that his continued neutrality was inflicting a fatal blow on Russian prestige in the Balkan Peninsula. But he was also reluctant to break

Changed
attitude of
the Powers.

with the Alliance or to sacrifice his ideal of a concert of Europe. It was in the hope that he might be able to agree with Austria as to some common line of action that he met the Emperor Francis at Czernowitz, a meeting of which the only result was to reveal the fatal divergence in ideas between the courts of Petersburg and Vienna.

Conference
of Czerno-
witz,
Oct. 1823.

Alexander, however, made yet one more effort to settle the Greek question in union with his allies. He presented to the four Cabinets a specific proposal for the division of Greece into three principalities under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and invited the Powers to a conference at Petersburg for the discussion of this suggestion. But while the Greeks for their part loudly declared that they would never agree to the partition of their country, the governments addressed showed little inclination to consider the Tsar's scheme. Canning bluntly refused to take any part whatever in the conference; and Metternich, who was supported by Prussia and France, declined to countenance a project which was apparently calculated merely to establish Russian supremacy in the Balkans. He laid down that if Greece were to be freed at all from Turkish rule, the interest of Austria demanded it must be freed so completely as to stand in no need of the protecting arm of the Tsar. In these circumstances, the Conference naturally failed. A mere offer of mediation, unsupported by threats of intervention, was presented to the Porte and treated with the contempt which it deserved. For the rest, the only result of the Petersburg conference was to show how dead was the Grand Alliance, and to lead to an almost open rupture of the friendly relations between Alexander and Metternich.

Conference
of Peters-
burg, 1825.

§ 8. Death
of Alex-
ander I,
Dec. 1,
1825.

The sensitive, high-strung nature of the Tsar was deeply pained by this failure, and he angrily announced to the Powers that he reserved to himself complete liberty of

action in the Eastern Question. When this declaration was followed by an imperial Progress into southern Russia, war was generally considered to be imminent, and there is no doubt that Alexander was reconsidering his whole position at the moment of his death. In his pursuit of the ideal of a united Europe, he had abandoned the traditional policy of his family and had trampled on the dearest prejudices of his people. He was only too bitterly conscious of his own waning popularity, only too fully aware that he was regarded by his subjects as little better than the betrayer of the sacred cause of the Orthodox Church. And the supreme sacrifice which he had made, a sacrifice all the more real in a man of his peculiar temperament, had been of no avail. The Powers of Europe cared nothing for lofty ideals; they pursued with one accord their own selfish interests, and even Austria seemed no longer true to the creed which she had once so ably preached. Alexander remained alone, the solitary upholder of a political world fast crumbling in ruins. And so he was driven once again to reconsider his ideals, as he had been driven to reconsider them in the past by the burning of Moscow and the baseness of so-called Liberals. He debated whether he ought not to have followed where his ancestors had led, whether he had not incurred the anger of his God by allowing the blood of the slaughtered saints to cry in vain for vengeance. He questioned whether the Austrian chancellor, that enthusiastic devotee of 'morality' and 'true religion', had not been Satan's instrument to lure from the path of duty the chosen champion of the Christian faith. In the midst of such searchings of heart, death came as a welcome relief. Broken in health and spirit, tormented by visions of his murdered father and by sad memories of happier days, abandoned by his former friends and alienated from the

people whom he loved, thwarted where he had hoped, and deceived where he had trusted, Alexander gladly laid down a life which had become an intolerable burden to him. He had sought sympathy and found mistrust; he had desired love and gained hatred. His enthusiasms had been quenched, his dreams shattered; and at the close of life he found himself alone in the world which had failed to understand an idealism unsuited to it.

Doubtful
succession
in Russia.

His death removed all immediate danger of war, if such danger existed, since it plunged Russia into the throes of a severe and peculiar crisis. The natural heir to the throne was the late Tsar's brother, Constantine, who had for some years been commander of the army in Poland. The fascinations of a Polish lady, and some appreciation of his own utter incapacity for government, had led him to execute a deed renouncing his rights of succession. Alexander, for some obscure reason, had concealed, while accepting, this renunciation; the Grand Duke had continued to bear the title and receive the honours of Tsarevitch; nor had his brother Nicholas, upon whom the crown was thus to devolve, been made acquainted with the high destiny which awaited him. As a result, the Tsar's death was followed by a strange contest of self-sacrifice, hardly paralleled except in the Roman Empire after the murder of Aurelian. Constantine was at once proclaimed by Nicholas at Petersburg; with equal alacrity Nicholas was proclaimed by Constantine at Warsaw; each brother hastened to assure the other of his unalterable allegiance; and while explanations were given and received, the Russian Empire remained without any determinate head.

Disturb-
ances in
Russia.

The disaffected elements hastened to profit by this confusion. The Liberal period of Alexander's reign had favoured, the reactionary period had failed to crush, secret

societies ; and these now prepared to realize their aims. Military revolts occurred in the capital and in the southern provinces. Soldiers, by the direction of their officers, demanded 'Constantine and Constitution', without much clear understanding as to why they should desire either the one or the other. But no sooner had Nicholas realized that he was indeed called upon to rule Russia, than he proved that he was well qualified to play the part of Tsar ; in his earliest days he showed all that iron resolution and indomitable courage which were to mark him throughout life. After one brief moment of doubt, the insurrection at Petersburg ended in the submission of the rioters and the execution of their ringleaders, and the southern outbreak came to an even more inglorious conclusion. The 'revolution of December' produced little tangible result except in giving the new Tsar a profound distaste for Liberalism and confirming his constitutional belief in the merits of strong government. But it had sufficiently illustrated the fact that the new reign meant much more than a mere change in the name of the ruling sovereign. A man of iron had succeeded a man of almost feminine softness.

In no direction was the effect of this change more apparent than in the attitude of Russia towards the Greek Question. The dictum of Metternich that it passed the wit of man to foretell what the Emperor Alexander would do next remained true to the end of the Tsar's life ; he had never ceased to be torn by two conflicting emotions, to pursue from time to time two mutually destructive policies. But Nicholas took his decision and held firmly to it. He was resolved that no consideration of ideal concerts of Europe should stand in the way of his country's interests. And as the conference of Czernowitz and the fiasco of Petersburg had clearly indicated that he

§ 9. Nicholas and the Greek Question.

could not hope to secure the co-operation of Austria, he turned to England. He believed then, as he believed thirty years later, that if only Great Britain and Russia could understand each other and act together the problems of European policy would be simplicity itself.

Protocol of London, Apr. 1826. He did not at this time meet with any such rebuff as he was later to experience in somewhat similar circumstances on the eve of the Crimean War. Canning, satisfied with the practical dissolution of the Grand Alliance, was not unwilling to reach an understanding with the Tsar, and he had already made some tentative advances to Alexander. His eagerness to prevent isolated action by Russia, the dominating factor in his Eastern policy, was increased by the accession of Nicholas, and Wellington was sent to resume negotiations with the court of Petersburg. His mission resulted in the conclusion of a protocol by which the two Powers agreed to offer their mediation to the contending parties, the creation of an autonomous Greek state being accepted in principle.

Treaty of Akkerman, Oct. 1826. Further progress towards the solution of the problem was for a while interrupted by the outbreak of a war between Russia and Persia, which gave Canning cause to hope that there might be no need for him to conciliate the Tsar. This hope was falsified by the unexpectedly rapid success of the Russian arms, and it was changed into grave alarm by the vigorous policy of Nicholas. Availing himself of the fact that the destruction of the Janissaries had left the Ottoman Empire without means of resistance, he presented to the Porte an ultimatum on the matters in dispute between the two Governments. Mahmoud had no choice but to give way. By the Treaty of Akkerman, he conceded all the demands of the Tsar, more especially agreeing to recognize the autonomy of Serbia and to evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia, which

his troops had occupied since the failure of Hypsilanti's rising.

The result of this diplomatic triumph soon appeared. Canning suspected that as soon as Nicholas should be freed from the Persian war, he would settle the Greek Question in a similar manner; and England thus became anxious to continue the negotiations for joint action. The other Powers were invited to join in the offer of mediation according to the Anglo-Russian protocol. Austria, irritated by the slight upon her implied in the Tsar's rapprochement with England, refused her assent, and Prussia followed obediently the lead given from Vienna. But France, despite the arguments of Metternich, readily accepted the invitation, and the three Powers concluded the Treaty of London, by which they agreed to impose an armistice on the belligerents.

When the news of the Treaty was communicated to those most nearly concerned, it was received as might have been expected. The Greeks gladly welcomed a much-needed breathing space; their enemies naturally refused to sacrifice the advantages which their victories promised to secure them. By accident, rather than by design, their refusal proved fatal to them. The allied fleet, commanded by Codrington, appeared off Navarino and ordered Ibrahim to suspend active operations. He ignored the order; a chance shot led to a general engagement; and in a few hours the Egyptian navy was annihilated and the cause of Greek independence won.

But this fact was not fully appreciated even by the three Powers, and it was not in the least appreciated by the Porte. Canning had died just before the battle, and had been succeeded by Wellington, who was thoroughly alarmed by the unexpected turn which events had taken. Navarino, which he took occasion to describe as 'untoward'

Treaty of
London,
July 1827.

§ 10.
Navarino,
Oct. 1827.

Russo-
Turkish
War,
1828-29.

in the King's Speech, seemed to him to threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and thus to shake the keystone in the arch of British foreign policy. His apologetic attitude encouraged Mahmoud to assume an air of injured innocence, and to answer demands that he should accept the Treaty of London by counter demands for reparation. And though the ambassadors left Constantinople, Nicholas in vain urged that the victory should be followed up by a joint attack on Turkey. He was left to undertake the struggle single-handed, and it was only one of those quixotic impulses, which moved him from time to time, that led him voluntarily to free his allies from the natural consequences of their instability of purpose. To Great Britain he gave an assurance that his fleet would not operate in the Mediterranean, and to Europe in general that he would gain no private advantage, while he agreed that the French should be allowed to undertake the pacification of the Morea. On these conditions began that war which the diplomatists of Europe had so fearfully anticipated and so earnestly laboured to prevent.

Treaty of
Adriano-
ple,
Sept. 1829.

The dread of a Russo-Turkish conflict had been due largely to the confident expectation that it would result in the rapid and complete overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sick Man, as on so many other occasions before and since, showed astonishing vitality, and as the military skill of Nicholas did not equal his martial enthusiasm, the Russian army was far from enjoying the hoped-for parade to Constantinople. Indeed, the first campaign turned rather to the advantage of the Turks, the invaders being severely repulsed before Silistria. That the following year was marked by a change in fortune was due almost entirely to the successful rashness of Diebitsch, who had assumed the command in place of the Tsar. After taking Silistria, he boldly forced the passage of the

Balkans and appeared at Adrianople. His army was weak and his situation in truth desperate, but Mahmoud was ill-served by his intelligence department. He imagined that a vast Russian force was about to form the siege of Constantinople and hastened to conclude peace. By the Treaty of Adrianople, that of Akkerman was confirmed, and in addition the Sultan accepted the Treaty of London and by consequence recognized the independence of Greece.

It now remained to provide for the government and to settle the boundaries of the new state. Both questions had occupied the attention of the three Powers during the progress of the war ; both were found to present considerable difficulties. Greece had possessed, rather than enjoyed, a species of republican constitution since the early days of the revolt. Capodistrias, who had consoled himself for his dismissal from the Russian service by embracing the cause of his struggling compatriots, had secured the presidency of the republic. His position had been somewhat precarious and its advantages few ; he was extremely reluctant to resign his power at the very moment when its sweets seemed likely to cease to be bitter. But the memory of the French Revolution was still too strong for the Powers to tolerate the establishment of a republican state, even if Capodistrias had not been suspect to them as an ex-minister of the Tsar. Europe resolved on a kingdom of Greece, and the Greek president could only labour to prolong his tenure of power by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation in which a King would find himself with inadequate territory and an empty treasury. He was successful in frightening Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who had accepted the throne, into withdrawing his acceptance on the plea that the proposed state was too small to be self-supporting. It was perhaps only the opportune assassination of Capodistrias which at last induced Otto of

§ 11. The Kingdom of Greece.

Murder of Capodistrias, April 1832. Otto I, king of Greece, 1833.

Bavaria, the next selected candidate, to land in Greece. He had meanwhile secured a slightly improved frontier, the boundary being traced from Arta to Volo, and the loan necessary to enable his kingdom to enter upon its political life.

Importance of the War of Greek Independence.

The War of Greek Independence had thus ended in the addition of a new member to the family of European nations, and in the first trial of one possible solution of the perennial Eastern Question, the gradual expulsion of the Turks from Europe by the creation of independent Christian states in the Balkan peninsula. Yet it is, perhaps, in neither of these facts that the real interest or importance of the struggle and of its issue is to be found. Rather the significance of these events lay in the illustration which they afforded of the hollowness of the Quadruple Alliance and of the ultimate impossibility of controlling Europe by means of a concert of the Great Powers. The Alliance, the attempt to settle the affairs of the Continent on the basis of maintaining the *status quo* as created in 1815, had in a sense weathered both the Italian gale of 1820 and the Spanish storm of 1822; it had lost Great Britain but it still subsisted. It went down before the hurricane in the Near East.

Decline of the Metternich system.

When Canning had brought the Greek question within 'the pale of civilization', and when the close friendship of Austria and Russia had been strained to breaking point at Czernowitz and Petersburg, the doom of the Quadruple Alliance, even in its modified form, had been sealed. In place of a moral dictatorship of the three absolute monarchies, England, France, and Russia stand forth as the leaders of Europe; Austria and Prussia can merely grumble and be still. Nor was the changed situation long in receiving a dramatic illustration. The overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy and the establishment of

Belgian independence may alike be attributed partly to the success of the Greeks, which had shown that the Allies were divided and that a struggle for liberty was not always bound to fail. Circumstances were indeed destined to bring the three Eastern Powers once more into close accord, but the Treaty of London and its counterpart, the battle of Navarino, mark the first stage in the decline and fall of the Metternich system in Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

§ 1. The Congress of Verona. § 2 French intervention in Spain.
§ 3. Charles X. § 4. Ministries of Martignac and Polignac.
§ 5. The Revolution of July, 1830. § 6. Accession of Louis
Philippe. § 7. The Belgian Revolution. § 8. The Independence
of Belgium. § 9. The Polish Rebellion. § 10. Disturbances in
Italy. § 11. Significance of the Year 1830.

§ 1. The
Congress
of Verona,
Oct. 1822.

THE Metternich system, in so far as it implied complete harmony between all the four Great Powers, had already sustained an appreciable shock at the Congress of Verona. Assembled primarily for a general discussion of the affairs of Europe, that Congress had been confined mainly to a consideration of the state of Spain and of the sad condition of its king. From the very hour in which he had reluctantly sanctioned the establishment of the Constitution of 1812, Ferdinand VII had not ceased to intrigue for the restoration of his absolute power. Pathetic appeals for help had been sent to all the courts of Europe, and at home the adoption of an attitude of passive resistance had served to prevent the Ministry from quelling the incessant disturbances in the kingdom. And when the dissolution of the first Cortes was followed by the election of a violently revolutionary assembly, the King more or less openly urged his partisans to protect him from the representatives of his people. In response to this appeal, a band of royalists, who had collected at Bayonne, crossed the frontier and seized a town, which they fortified. They declared that they had come to save

Ferdinand, and created a regency of which the character was made manifest by the fact that its chief member was Mataflorida. This exploit of the so-called 'Apostolic Party' led to a mutiny in Madrid and to the formation of a Liberal ministry, neither of which events served to end the anarchy in Spain, since the King was not the less determinedly hostile to the revolution and its outcome.

In these circumstances the Congress of Verona met, and the agents of Ferdinand made one last appeal to the Powers not to abandon a legitimate sovereign to the consequences of his misdeeds. To a certain extent the appeal came at an opportune moment. Metternich had returned to his earlier policy as a result of the recent disturbances in Italy, nor could he any longer oppose intervention in Spain since Austria had intervened in Naples. He was, on the contrary, prepared to champion the doctrine that the maintenance of the 'Treaties' required the maintenance of those forms of internal government which were in existence in 1815. His willingness to agree to action in Spain, or at least his readiness to consider such action, was partly due to his hope that in this way all discussion of the critical Eastern Question might be indefinitely postponed. Alexander, too, had by now been cured of all tendency to coquet with Liberalism; he had already announced that he was prepared to assist Ferdinand, and Frederic William, as ever, played the part of the Tsar's devoted henchman.

But while the three Eastern Powers were thus prepared to listen favourably to the king's prayers, the attitude of France and England was more dubious. Villèle, indeed, was far from wishing to involve his country in a policy thoroughly distasteful to French Liberals and too obviously reminiscent of the *ancien régime*; he believed that his aim of undoing in many respects the work of the Revolution

The Spanish Question: (a) policy of the Eastern Powers.

(b) Policy of France.

would be more easily secured if it were not revealed too clearly. But Villèle was master neither of his party nor of his colleagues. The former secured the establishment of an 'army of observation' on the Spanish frontier, ostensibly in order to guard against the spread of cholera into France, really that it might be able to act effectively as soon as the signal was given. The latter, and more especially Montmorency and Chateaubriand, the French representatives at the Congress, were ardently desirous of using the army, created by St. Cyr and financed by Baron Louis, to win prestige for the monarchy by championing the cause of a member of the royal family. It was clear that the policy of France would be governed largely by circumstances.

(c) Policy
of
England.

The attitude of Great Britain was at once more and less uncertain. Both at Troppau and Laibach she had indicated her opposition to the Austrian interpretation of the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and her ambassadors now announced that she would never assent to intervention in Spain. On the other hand, Metternich confidently believed that he had converted Castlereagh to his own views. He thought that whatever might be the character of the statements of policy issued prior to the Congress, the British foreign minister would act like a 'moral' man as soon as he had fulfilled his declared intention of appearing in person at Verona. As it turned out, the suicide of Castlereagh on the eve of his departure handed over the direction of English policy to a man who was 'more insular than European'. Whether or no it is true that Canning merely followed out the line which his predecessor would have pursued, it is certain that from the very first he was determined to break with the Alliance. Wellington, who was sent to the Congress, was given only limited powers and supplied with very definite instructions

to maintain that liberty of action which was the ideal of the new foreign secretary and the despair of Metternich.

It was thus without the support of Great Britain that the Powers proceeded to take action in Spain, and it was with only partial support from France. The ambassadors of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were ordered to present identical notes to the Spanish government, demanding that the Constitution should be annulled and containing a threat that they would leave Madrid at once if their demand were not granted. The instructions of the French Ambassador were less definite, reflecting the distracted counsels of his Government. Chateaubriand, despite Villèle, had committed France to a general acceptance of the policy of the Eastern Powers, by boldly exceeding his orders. But Villèle, despite Chateaubriand, was still hopeful that war might be avoided, and he was the more anxious to maintain peace since he feared the consequences of rousing the animosity of Great Britain. The only effect of his hesitation, however, was to stultify himself. In accordance with the pledges given at Verona, the French ambassador joined his Eastern colleagues in presenting a note, but he neglected to threaten any penalty for its disregard. Thus, while diplomatic relations with Spain were presently broken off by the three Powers, France still remained on nominally friendly terms with a government which she had rebuked and which had treated her rebuke with contempt.

The immediate result of the Congress of Verona, therefore, was to reveal three highly significant facts. In the first place, it showed that the absolute monarchies were in cordial agreement as to the need for restraining Liberalism in Europe, and that they were ready to endure certain minor discomforts in order to maintain the great principle of the security of the existing order. Austria, for

Action by
the Powers

Joint Note,
Jan. 1823.

Results of
the Con-
gress of
Verona.

example, was prepared to risk an increase of French prestige rather than tolerate a continuance of revolutionary disorder. In the second place, France appeared to be following timidly in the wake of her more despotic sisters, seemingly anxious but afraid to pursue the strait path of absolutism, tentatively returning to the foreign policy of the eighteenth century and to the dream of a 'Family Compact'.

Canning
and the
Spanish
Colonies.

And finally, the breach between Great Britain and the Allies was complete. Indeed, Canning took occasion to emphasize the 'insularity' of his attitude, and to leave no doubt as to his resolve to free his country from the leading-strings of the European Concert. He would not actually intervene to prevent the restoration of absolutism in Spain, but he declared in no uncertain terms that he would not permit the Powers to extend their benevolent services to the recovery of the revolted Spanish colonies. As President Monroe held the same language in that famous message to Congress which contained the doctrine that bears his name, the English protest was the more effective. The South American republics came into being officially as well as actually, and a happy era of constant wars and revolutions dawned on the 'new' world, which Canning fondly hoped would 'redress the balance of the old'.

The
Monroe
Doctrine,
Dec. 1823.

Canning
and Portu-
gal, 1826.

But if its results across the Atlantic were hardly gratifying, the decision of Great Britain had the designed effect in Europe. It was followed by the despatch of a fleet to the Tagus in support of the constitutional régime which Pedro had established when he abdicated in favour of his daughter Maria, and which had been attacked by the absolutists under the leadership of Miguel, the regent, and uncle of the Queen. These two facts, taken together, showed plainly that the Alliance could no longer be held

to include all the Great Powers. They led the Liberals of the Continent to believe that they had at least one friend, however passive the attitude of that friend might generally be.

After the Congress of Verona, therefore, it remained § 2. French intervention in Spain. to prove whether the Metternich system could be maintained despite the destruction of the solidarity of the Alliance; whether the three despotic monarchies, with such help as France might give them, could continue to police the Continent in the interest of reactionary government. So far as the immediate question of the moment was concerned, the answer appeared to be in the affirmative. The French ambassador at Madrid finally followed the example of his colleagues and demanded his passports; and within a month of the delivery of the joint note, Jan. 1823. Louis XVIII, with the cordial approval of his allies, declared war. The Eastern Powers admitted that France had a prior right to undertake the noble task of coercing the Spanish Government in order to restore the absolute power of the Spanish King.

Of the ability of the French to perform this task there was no doubt. Spain was in no condition to resist attack, even if she had been united in her desire to do so, and even if Ferdinand had not done all in his power to paralyse the executive. Her army had been too long neglected to be able to cope with the splendidly efficient force which now crossed the frontier. Within a month after crossing the Bidassoa, the Duke of Angoulême entered Madrid, his progress having been generally assisted by the hints which Wellington had given him as to the character of the country and the best line of march. At his approach, the Spanish ministers retired, dragging the wretched King with them, first to Seville and then to Cadíz. During their flight to the latter place, Angoulême enters Spain, Apr. 1823.

they put forward the convenient theory that Ferdinand must be mad to desire to dispense with their services, and in accordance with the Constitution they proclaimed a regency to provide for the defence of the country. But the Spanish people were not yet cured of their inveterate loyalty to the throne. Angoulême was joined by numbers of Spaniards and, so far from meeting with hatred as an invader, he everywhere won popularity by his conciliatory conduct and by the services which he was rendering to the King. His advance from Madrid southwards was as much a parade as his advance from the frontier to the capital had been. Cadiz surrendered after a short siege, and in less than six months from the beginning of the invasion, Ferdinand was once more free and in full enjoyment of the plenitude of absolute power.

Fall of
Cadiz,
Oct. 1823.

Tyranny of
Ferdinand.

Angoulême, who had already found it necessary to forbid the arrest of Liberals except by French troops, recommended that the victory should be used with moderation. But his advice fell on deaf ears, and while he left the country in disgust, Ferdinand gave full rein to his vengeance. The Constitution was, of course, again abolished; the old Council of State was restored. Its most prominent member was Calomarde, Minister of Justice, who held office for the next ten years and has given his name to this period of Spanish history owing to the zeal with which he carried out, or anticipated, his master's wishes for the destruction of his late tormentors. Beginning with the almost deserved execution of the fatuous Riego, a wholesale proscription of the Liberals, or rather of all who were not devoted ultra-royalists, took place and became practically the sole business of the Government. The rule of Ferdinand had in the past been mild by comparison with the severity which now marked it.

So great, indeed, was that severity that Russia and France entered solemn protests, and Angoulême, repenting of his share in producing such a situation, devised schemes for proving the sincerity of his repentance by undoing the work which he had done. In the face of such foreign pressure, Ferdinand published an amnesty, to which, however, the exceptions were so numerous that it was little more than nominal. The King, who was accustomed to boast of his victory over his subjects, seemed resolved to destroy the possibility of a further triumph by leaving himself no one over whom the triumph might be won. On the other hand, his conduct was far from exciting that general disgust which it might have been expected to produce. The enthusiasm with which he was welcomed during a progress through northern Spain was remarkable. It may be true that those provinces were more devotedly loyal than the remainder of the kingdom, but it is certainly also true that the people as a whole still preferred to be ruled by an absolute monarch. The chief opposition to the Government came from those who desired not less but more repression, who lamented the softness of the King in not restoring the Inquisition fully and in not displaying to happy crowds the delightful spectacle of an auto-da-fé. A party arose which wished to cure Ferdinand of his fatal leniency and which formed the basis of the later Carlist movement.

Meanwhile, across the Pyrenees, the elder branch of the House of Bourbon suffered the consequences of its too successful intervention in favour of the younger. Despite the fact that the sympathy of at least a large section of the Spanish people had greatly simplified the task of Angoulême, the returned soldiers were hailed as heroes in France, and the result was seen in the issue of

State of Spain.

§ 3.
Charles X,
1824-30.

*La
Chambre
Retrouvée.*
Feb. 1824.

the general election. Less than twenty Liberals secured seats, and the Ministry, or rather the Ultras, found themselves in possession of so overwhelming a majority that the Chamber was nicknamed *La Chambre Retrouvée*. Chateaubriand regarded the situation as the direct outcome of his work at Verona and as proving to the hilt his theory that, if the dynasty could but once acquire military prestige, a return to absolutism would be not merely quite possible but even highly probable. He began to press for a more vigorous foreign policy, dreaming of a recovery of the Rhine frontier and of a resumption of the schemes of Louis XIV. But he met with firm opposition from Villèle, who had a clearer appreciation of the dread with which any sign of French aggression was regarded, and who was anxious to use the majority to realize his aim of restoring the *ancien régime* by cautious legislation and in a parliamentary manner. Chateaubriand, detected in his intrigues against his nominal leader, was forced to resign, and at the moment of the death of Louis XVIII Villèle appeared to be supreme and his policy triumphant.

Accession
of
Charles X,
Sept. 1824.

But the accession of Charles X was fatal to all counsels of moderation. The new King, who indicated his views by reviving such ancient titles as that of Dauphin, had long been the true leader of the most violent royalists, and the Ultras were thus encouraged to press upon Villèle the adoption of definitely reactionary measures. The minister hoped to retain office, if not power, by concessions to the extremists; perhaps he hoped also to save his country from the results which would inevitably ensue if the control of the government fell into the hands of the too zealous royalists. In deference to the King, his policy assumed a markedly ecclesiastical tinge. While Charles displayed his attachment to ancient rites by

a solemn consecration at Rheims, a law of sacrilege was passed, so stringent as to rouse the opposition even of such sincere Catholics as Chateaubriand. Nor were the *émigrés* forgotten in the enthusiasm for the Church. A scheme of compensation for those who had lost their lands as a result of the Revolution had long been a darling project with Villèle. He believed that he could win general acceptance for it by pointing out that it would incidentally mean security of tenure for the holders of confiscated property. But when the measure was introduced it was opposed on all sides, being attacked by the Liberals as too reactionary and by the Ultras as not being reactionary enough. It passed into law, but by a majority which showed that the hold of the minister upon the Chamber was not so firm as had been supposed. And warnings appeared to show that the majority of Deputies did not represent the majority of their countrymen. An attack on the Liberal press, forced on Villèle by the Ultras, was followed by popular demonstrations at the funeral of one of his most vigorous opponents. An attempt to establish primogeniture in defiance of all the most cherished sentiments of the nation was actually defeated amid universal rejoicings, and daily complaints grew louder at the 'despotism of hypocrisy' which the Government was alleged to be creating. The position of Villèle was not improved by the indiscretion of Frayssinous, minister of religion and education, who admitted the existence of the 'Congregation' and justified the return of the Jesuits to France.

As a matter of fact, the minister now hastened to his fall. Against his own wishes, but in accord with those of Charles and of the majority of Deputies, he introduced a measure to prevent the publication of any newspaper or pamphlet which had not been authorized five days

Law
against
sacrilege,
1826.

Compensa-
tion for
émigrés,
1825.

Fall of
Villèle,
1827.

beforehand. It was amended and passed by the Chamber, but was rejected by the Peers. So unpopular did the Ministry become that it was found necessary to disband the National Guard, which had been filled with picked men and which might be regarded as reflecting the general trend of public opinion when it demanded the dismissal of Villèle. And while the reactionary policy of the Ministry produced more and more hostility in the country at large, it still failed to satisfy the extremists. They formed an alliance with the Left, which threatened to destroy the ministerial majority. As a final expedient, Villèle dissolved the Chamber and attempted to swamp the opposition of the Peers by lavish new creations. His action was approved by the King, who was deceived by his personal popularity, and was partly due to the hope that the news of Navarino would assist the Government candidates. But the election resulted in the utter defeat of the Ministry, and Villèle was forced to resign. His failure, like that of Decazes, must be attributed largely to the violence of faction and to the hatred of the extremists for any trace of moderation, rather than to any particular objection to his actual measures on the part of the Deputies or in the country. France, rapidly growing rich and prosperous, was content to tolerate reaction, provided that it was not too excessive. But within the Chamber extreme measures were alone popular, and the fall of Villèle proved that the Ultras, at any rate, could not be won over by conciliation. He had made constant sacrifices to their prejudices, but because he would not adopt their policy in its entirety—because some measure of political wisdom, some political caution remained to him—they destroyed him.

Elections
of
Nov. 1827.

§ 4. Minis-
tries of

And at first they were far from profiting by their victory. The majority in the new Chamber was un-

certain, but it was rather Liberal than anything else. Charles X was not yet prepared openly to defy the opinion of the electorate. Martignac, a moderate Liberal, succeeded Villèle, assuming a position which was utterly hopeless from the first. He had no secure majority in the Chamber; the alliance which had defeated his predecessor, though for the present dissolved, might at any moment revive, and the hour of its revival would assuredly be the hour of the new minister's fall. This was the more certain because he possessed neither the affection nor the support of the King. Only with extreme difficulty did he secure the assent of Charles to the passing of a few tentatively Liberal measures, and he was himself fully conscious that he owed his appointment to necessity rather than to goodwill. This consciousness produced the situation which resulted in his fall. The Left had been ready to support such concessions to their views as the separation of the offices of the ministers of religion and education, the public revision of voting lists, and a more liberal Press law. But they were angered at his refusal to join in an attack on Villèle, and demanded amendments, which in view of the King's opposition could not be adopted, to his measure for the extension of popular influence in the councils of departments and communes. They therefore turned once more to the extreme Ultras; the alliance was renewed, and when Martignac had abandoned his measure in despair, the King readily seized the opportunity to dismiss him.

Martignac
and
Polignac,
1827-30.

Fall of
Martignac,
1829.

Charles, indeed, had always believed that of all possible policies, a policy of conciliation was the worst, and he welcomed Martignac's failure as conclusive evidence of the accuracy of his view. He would now be fully justified in putting his own opinions into practice and in curing the Chamber of its factious Liberalism by repression and

Ministry of
Polignac,
1829-30.

determined assertion of the royal prerogative. As a preliminary to the adoption of this new system, he entrusted Polignac, a man after his own heart, with the task of forming a ministry. No choice could have indicated more open defiance of the wishes of the Chamber. Polignac was probably more profoundly unpopular than any of his contemporaries; he was regarded as the incarnation of treason to his country, as the personification of national shame. 'Coblentz! Waterloo! 1815!' were said to be his watchwords, implying sympathy with the *émigrés* who had borne arms against France and with the foreign enemies who had closed the most glorious period in the military annals of his country and who had reimposed upon her the dynasty which she had expelled. Such a minister was bound to rouse opposition, and it was therefore somewhat unfortunate for the Bourbon monarchy that Polignac was eminently unsuited to defeat opposition when roused. He possessed, among other moral virtues, the most charming sincerity, and with this political vice he coupled most of the other faults which are fatal in a statesman. To short-sightedness and over-confidence he joined dullness and obstinacy; to a great capacity for annoying he united a striking incapacity for the exercise of tact.

Growth of
opposition.

The significance of his appointment was clearly understood both in France and in Europe generally. To Metternich it was 'a counter-revolution', worthy of all praise if brought to a successful conclusion. To France it was an insult and worse than an insult, a disgrace. Opposition was rapidly organized, since the certainty of an attack on constitutional government was realized, and now men seriously questioned whether the Bourbons were not in truth impossible. A society, with the attractive title '*Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*', which had been formed to

defend liberty in general, began to devote itself to the promotion of a change in government in particular, though at present it was undecided as to what that change of government should involve. While some of its members, such as Guizot, were already advocates of an Orleanist monarchy, others, such as Cavaignac, were republicans. All its members, however, were equally convinced that the elder branch of the Bourbons had forfeited any claim to consideration. Nor was this conviction confined to mere political societies in Paris. Lafayette, journeying in southern France, was everywhere hailed with enthusiasm; 'the embodiment of the Revolution,' he was felt to be a potential saviour of his country, threatened with the restoration of the *ancien régime*. Even such calm observers of men and matters as Talleyrand and such experienced statesmen as Baron Louis recognized, and not silently, that the substitution of Louis-Philippe for Charles X was more than merely within the range of practical politics. And in face of such general opposition the Government did nothing effective. A few changes in the personnel of the ministry were made, apparently with the idea of reassuring the mind of France, a vain attempt as long as Polignac retained his position. It would, perhaps, have been a wiser policy to have silenced the opposition Press and to have modified the electoral law by royal ordinance, since the ministry could not become popular and could only hope to succeed in defiance of public opinion. But the cabinet was not even united; Guernon-Ranville, minister of education, in particular, resisted all decisive action.

Thus when the Chamber met, the ministry had to face it without having taken any precautions against exhibitions of hostility or made any provision as to its line of action in the crisis which a very moderate political intelligence

The
address of
the 221,
March
1830.

could have foreseen. It relied on chance and on the result of the expedition which it dispatched to punish the Dey of Algiers for his disregard of the majesty of France; and the chances of the ministry mastering the Chamber were even slighter than the probability that a mere victory over half-civilized Arabs would lead men to forget that Polignac had rejoiced while his country wept at the defeat of her hero. The King's speech reflected the political blindness of the Government, being calculated to offend any who were not already offended. It expressed the royal determination to meet any opposition by an appeal to that sentiment of loyalty which had always characterized the French nation. It might be true that the words of Charles were constitutionally those of Polignac, but the definite assertion of an intention of disregarding the views of the parliamentary majority was at least injudicious. And the fact that the ministry, in effect, took as their battle-cry 'The throne in danger!' simply served to draw the monarchy, as an institution, into the arena of political conflict. From the very first the opposition declined to be terrorized. Under the direction of Royer-Collard and Guizot, an address was prepared in answer to the speech from the throne; it complained bitterly that the ministry was defying the electorate and troubling the peace of France; and it gained the support of 221 Deputies. Though expressions of loyal devotion duly appeared in the address, Charles identified himself with his ministers and chose to regard the attack on them as an attack on himself. Despite the warnings of Metternich, a sincere friend to a king so likely to prove a valuable upholder of the *status quo*, and of Nicholas I, always ardent in defence of divine right, the Chamber was prorogued. Prorogation was followed by a dissolution, and the whole influence of the Crown

was directed to ensure a ministerial victory. Thus the real point at issue was whether the constitutional monarchy should be permitted to transform itself into a despotism. Only the King and Polignac doubted what the result would be; Talleyrand, always a master of phrases, summed up the situation by announcing that he was about to invest in landed property in Switzerland. The Liberals, who had to contend merely against an unpopular minister, were sufficiently well organized to have overcome greater difficulties, and their cry 'Re-elect the 221!' was received with enthusiasm in the country. Only nineteen of those who had voted for the address were defeated; the ministry found itself in a minority of almost two to one in the new Chamber. The capture of Algiers came too late to influence the election; it came soon enough to encourage Charles in his chosen line of conduct.

Chamber,
May 1830.

Liberal
victory,
July.

Fall of
Algiers,
July.

He now availed himself of a provision of the Charter which allowed the King to make 'regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and for the security of the State'. Four Ordinances were issued. The first abolished the liberty of the Press by instituting preliminary authorization of all publications, renewable every three months. By the remaining three the newly elected Chamber, which had not even met, was dissolved; the number of Deputies was reduced to 259; and as the franchise was made to depend on the payment of the land tax, the manufacturers and indeed nearly three-fourths of the electorate were deprived of their votes; September was fixed as the date for new elections. Such regulations amounted to a *coup d'état*, but no precautions were taken to crush resistance. Charles believed that the capture of Algiers had revived the popularity of the monarchy, that the growth of

§ 5. The
Revolution
of July
1830.

The Ordin-
ances,
July 26.

material prosperity had led to indifference on political questions, and that the Paris mob would never rise in order to save the votes of the *bourgeoisie* or to preserve newspapers which it could not read. Encouraged by Polignac's optimism, he lulled himself into a state of false security.

Revolution at Paris, July 26-29. His disillusionment was not long delayed, and when it came was singularly complete. Within a week his reign had ended; within three weeks he and his family were refugees in England. Events, indeed, moved with such rapidity as utterly to disconcert the Government. The Ordinances were published on July 26, and on the same day the journalists issued a declaration, drawn up by Thiers, against the restriction of the Press; this protest was approved by the lower courts of law. On July 27, the populace began to move and barricades to rise. Paris was declared to be in a state of siege, but in the desultory fighting which followed, the soldiers suffered severely enough to lead Marmont, their commander, to urge the merit of concession. His message reached the King at St. Cloud on July 28 and was ignored; a second and more urgent request for some definite instructions only evoked the answer that he should wait until the following day. By the following day it was too late for mere concessions to be of any avail. In the meantime, the Revolution had developed under the direction of Cavaignac. On July 28 the rebels had become masters of eastern Paris, the tricolour had appeared, and the loyalty of the troops had begun to falter; before the afternoon of July 29, the military had been defeated and the city was lost to Charles. Angoulême, who had been appointed to replace Marmont, recognized the hopelessness of the situation; his father, who had previously relied on the reassuring messages of Polignac, became

convinced that he must give way. The Ordinances were withdrawn and the ministry replaced by one of a more popular complexion. But neither these concessions, nor the subsequent abdication of Charles, could save the crown for the elder branch of the Bourbons. The leaders of the Revolution had resolved on a change of dynasty; a demonstration by the National Guard towards Rambouillet, where the King yet lingered, terrified the royal family, and Charles, trembling for his life, fled to the coast and thence to England.

Abdication
of Charles,
Aug. 2,
1830.

Charles
leaves
France,
Aug. 14.

The demonstration had been deliberately intended to produce this result and to facilitate the accession of the Duke of Orleans to the vacant throne. That this should be the issue of the Revolution had not been the desire of its original authors, nor were the opponents of Charles X unanimous in their support of Louis-Philippe. Cavaignac, upon whom the leadership of the movement had first devolved, was a declared republican, and his eventual acceptance of the Orleanist monarchy was due, as he himself said, to necessity and not to choice. It was obvious to him and to all sober observers of the situation that the establishment of a republic was impossible. The Powers would be sufficiently angered and alarmed by the mere overthrow of the reigning king; it would be fatal to excite their suspicions further, as such action would only lead to an invasion of France by the armies of the Quadruple Alliance. This fact was skillfully utilized by the leaders of the Orleanist party, Lafayette, Laffitte, Casimir-Périer, and their friends. They had formed a provisional government at the Hôtel de Ville; and their position was the stronger since they had the support of the regiments which had deserted Marmont. While they took care to exaggerate the differences which divided Charles X from his subjects, refusing to receive

§ 6. Acces-
sion of
Louis
Philippe,
1830.

Manifesto
of Thiers,
July 30.

his offers of concession and insisting on the fact that he had shed the blood of Frenchmen, they employed Thiers to set forth the claims of Louis-Philippe to the affection and to the government of the nation. In an able pamphlet, he pointed out that by tradition and inclination the Orleanist branch was essentially distinct from the elder line of the House of Bourbon, and that its present representative deserved well of France as a sympathizer with the Revolution of 1789.

Louis-
Philippe
Lieutenant-
General,
July 30.

While the ground was being thus prepared, the provisional government conferred the office of 'Lieutenant-General' on Louis-Philippe and invited him to Paris. He reached the capital on the following day and was received by Lafayette at the Hôtel de Ville, on the balcony of which a touching scene was enacted. The two appeared locked in a close embrace and affectionately kissing each other to the accompaniment of popular applause. The 'embodiment of the Revolution' had accepted the Orleanist monarchy, and from this moment the accession of Louis-Philippe was assured. The duke formed an interim ministry with Guizot at its head and summoned the Chambers to meet on the day originally appointed, as though no dissolution had taken place. He opened the session with a speech in which he mentioned the abdication of Charles and of Angoulême, but omitted to allude to the fact that these acts of renunciation had been executed in favour of the infant Duke of Bordeaux or to his own equivocal attitude towards his cousins, whom he had assured of his devotion the better to betray them.

Meeting of
the
Chambers,
Aug. 3.

Revision
of the
Charter.

The Chamber, as if anxious to show that there had really been a revolution, set zealously to work to revise the Charter, which it declared to be 'imposed' and not 'granted'. The substitution of life for hereditary peerages, the abolition of the censorship of the Press and of the

royal power to suspend the operation of a law, the revival of the National Guard, and the assertion that Catholicism was merely the religion professed by the majority of Frenchmen, sum up the changes made. When he had sworn to observe the 'revised' Charter, Louis-Philippe received the crown, making some concession to revolutionary sentiment and exaggerating the difference between the new monarchy and the old by the adoption of the tricolour as the national flag and of 'King of the French' as the title of the sovereign. Such was the Revolution of July, a series of incidents which altered the personnel rather than the character of the Government, and which was accomplished without rousing much opposition or enthusiasm. Indifference permitted the Orleanist Monarchy to be created; it eventually permitted its destruction.

Louis-Philippe, King of the French, Aug. 7.

Slight indeed would have been the importance of the Revolution of July, if it had only affected France. But it bore this degree of resemblance to its more famous prototype of 1789, that it agitated other countries and that the waves of its influence swept away something of the existing political system of the Continent. It was the overthrow of Charles X that enabled the Liberals of Portugal to restore that constitution which, maintained for a while by the 'insular' policy of Canning and the guns of an English fleet, had been destroyed by Miguel, one of the world's 'wicked uncles' and the close ally of the reactionary party in France. Of infinitely greater importance was the effect of the Revolution on Belgium.

§ 7. The Belgian Revolution, 1830.

Liberal victory in Portugal, 1831-34.

The Kingdom of the United Netherlands had been the *chef-d'œuvre* of the Congress of Vienna and was in a measure the corner-stone of the political edifice there erected. It appeared to solve a problem, which had exercised the diplomatic mind of Europe since the de-

The Kingdom of the United Netherlands.

cline of Spanish power in the second half of the seventeenth century, by creating an effective barrier against French aggression in the Low Countries. And more than this, it seemed to promote the interest of those most concerned. The Dutch were mainly a commercial, the Belgians a manufacturing and agricultural people; to unite them would assuredly be to create a prosperous and self-supporting community. The diplomatists of Vienna might well consider that they had with success combined national and international interests.

Grievances
of the
Belgians.

But they had unfortunately failed to make allowance for the most important factors in the situation. Race, religion, language, and tradition divided the two peoples which the Powers had united, and this moral division led to much sentimental objection to political union. King William aspired to be the sun that should dissipate those clouds of superstition which darkened the lives of his Belgian subjects and obscured their intelligence, but the Belgians greatly loved the darkness and showed no desire to see the light of the sun. They hated also the harsh accents of that Dutch tongue which was heard in the law courts and in the States General of the kingdom; they hated to find The Hague exalted at the expense of their own historic capital. Nor were their griefs purely sentimental. The Constitution established by William gave the shadow of power to the representatives of the united nation; it carefully preserved the substance to the King. He controlled the executive, and his considerable share in legislative power was increased by the fact that the southern provinces, with twice the population, returned only the same number of deputies as the northern. Indeed, the south was actually in a perpetual minority, since its members were not, like those of the north, unanimous in their votes and opinions. The Dutch were

thus enabled to introduce into legislation the alleged fault of their commercial policy, 'giving too little, and asking too much'; and while the incidence of taxation penalized the agriculture of the south to the profit of the trade of the north, the north was also favoured in the distribution of political loaves and fishes. And as the Government displayed a constantly increasing tendency to consider the welfare and to consult the views of its Protestant and Dutch, rather than of its Catholic and Belgian subjects, a powerful opposition arose. Spiritual and temporal interest, patriotism and prejudice, combined to produce an alliance between the Church and the Liberals. It only needed a favourable opportunity for this coalition to lead the nation along the path of revolt.

Thus when the glorious news of the failure of attempted despotism at Paris reached the Belgian capital, when it was known that five vivid days had sufficed to accomplish the destruction of the monarchy of Charles X, the fire of revolution, already smouldering, burst into open flame. A riot soon became a rebellion; the standard of Brabant was adopted as a national flag; and the movement was assisted by the dubious attitude of the Crown Prince, nominally the representative of his father. He was secretly pleased at the thought of an independent Belgium, since he was more devoted to his immediate than to his ultimate interests, and flattered himself that he would secure the crown of the new state. Posing as a mediator, he rather encouraged than opposed a revolution which filled him with deceptive hopes. And the King, on his side, failed to grasp the need for conciliation. The rebels at first only demanded a species of home rule; it was the rejection of this demand that led to a cry for complete separation. French agitators swarmed across the frontier to support the more violent party; the bombardment of

Outbreak
of Revolution,
Aug.
1830.

Bombard-
ment of
Antwerp,
Oct. 1830.

Belgian
national
Congress,
Nov. 1830.

Antwerp by the Dutch completed the alienation of the Belgians. By the time that William had made up his mind to accept a merely personal union between the two countries, a national Congress at Brussels was already drawing up a constitution for an independent state, and royal authority in the south had been practically extinguished. That it should be restored with the free assent of the Belgian people was unthinkable; that it could be restored by force of arms was doubtful; and the King was thus led to trust in action by the Powers of Europe, to whom he addressed a formal appeal.

§ 8. The
Independence of
Belgium.

This appeal was dictated both by interest and by necessity. Apart from the fact that he was related to the Tsar and to the King of Prussia, William had some reason to hope that any intervention would be favourable to him. The Belgian Revolution attacked both the settlement of Vienna and the divine right of kings. To maintain the former was the life's work of Metternich, who still controlled the policy of Austria; to maintain the latter was the greatest enthusiasm of Nicholas, who disposed of all the might of Russia. And as the Court of Berlin would follow where that of Vienna led, Holland could count on the sympathy of the three eastern monarchies. Nor was it to be expected that Great Britain would tamely permit the disruption of a kingdom in the construction of which she had played no small part. Such a disruption would naturally tend to increase in the Low Countries that French influence which she had combated for centuries and any increase of which had always been to her a source of profound alarm. Thus William was not reluctant that the Powers should have the settlement of the Belgian question, though, as a matter of fact, however great his reluctance might have been, he would still have been compelled to acquiesce in European

intervention. The Conference of London, assembled to arrange the affairs of Greece, was sitting when the revolution began, and it at once proceeded to take this new problem into consideration.

Accidental circumstances falsified the hopes of the Dutch King. At the critical moment, the outbreak of revolt in Poland tied the hands of the Tsar; increasing age and Italian disturbances weakened the influence of Metternich; and as Prussia dared not act without allies, the decision of the question fell into the hands of the two western Powers. Of these the attitude of Great Britain was determined by that of France. The French people were enthusiastic for Belgian independence, and their King, insecure on a throne which he owed mainly to good luck, could not afford to risk his position by defying the will of his subjects. Hazardous as war might be, it did not involve that certain destruction which would have fallen on him if he had permitted the restoration of Dutch power by English arms. Louis-Philippe, therefore, was bound to do anything rather than allow the Belgian revolution to fail, and as Great Britain was not prepared to fight to prevent the disruption of the United Netherlands, unless that disruption was to mean the annexation of the provinces by France, armed intervention in favour of the House of Orange was out of the question.

Diplomatic intervention remained, and to this the Conference of London turned its attention. Even so, the scope of its work was limited. In view of the attitude of France, the independence of Belgium was at once accepted in principle and the most important matter was thus settled beforehand. Details alone remained, but they presented unexpected difficulties. To the impossible demand of Holland that the kingdom should be reunited, Belgium opposed an equally impossible demand for the frontier of

Impossi-
bility of
armed
inter-
vention.

Diplomatic
inter-
vention.

Protocols
of Jan.
1831.

the Scheldt and the duchies of Luxemburg and Limburg. The process of striking a mean between these two extremes occupied some two years. By their first decision, the Powers gave the Dutch their frontier of 1790, with the addition of Luxemburg, and this settlement was accepted by William. But the Luxemburgers had declared for incorporation in the new state, and the Belgian Congress protested that the wish of a people should override all other considerations. Desiring to elect a king who would add to the strength of their cause, they naturally turned first to France, offering their crown to Louis-Philippe for his second son. But though that devoted father eagerly desired to advance the material interests of his children, he dared not accept an offer which would have brought upon him the wrath of all Europe. Repulsed in one quarter, the Belgians had better fortune in another. They elected Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, a cosmopolitan prince, especially agreeable to Great Britain and Prussia and objectionable to no one. The effect of this politic election was seen in the terms of the Treaty of London, by which the original settlement was so far modified that the Luxemburg question was postponed for future decision, enclaves were to be exchanged, and the national debt of the united kingdom to be divided equitably between the two new states.

Election of
Leopold,
June 1831.

First
Treaty of
London,
June 1831.

Dutch in-
vasion of
Belgium,
Aug. 1831.

Second
Treaty of

Meanwhile, however, the Dutch had been encouraged by the obstinacy of the Belgians to hope that the latter had alienated their friends and that Europe would permit the restoration of the United Netherlands by force of arms. Belgium was invaded and several victories won, Antwerp and other places being occupied; though France soon turned the fortune of war against the Dutch, the Powers were not slow to prove their lack of pity for the conquered cause. By the second Treaty of London

Luxemburg and Limburg were divided between the two kingdoms, the debt was partitioned with less regard for justice and more regard for Holland, and the Dutch were granted tolls on the navigation of the Scheldt. The Belgian Congress protested and submitted; William resisted, since the Tsar declared that he ought not to be coerced, and refused to evacuate Antwerp. But Russia could not maintain her opinion by the effective argument of force; an English fleet and a French army came to the help of the Belgians; the garrison was compelled to surrender, and the kingdom of Belgium was at last constituted on the lines laid down in the second Treaty of London.

London,
Oct. 1831.

Fall of
Antwerp,
Dec. 1831.

The failure of Nicholas more actively to assist his relative was not merely the result of the hard facts of geography; his hands were also tied by the rebellion of Poland. Declared a kingdom in 1815, it had been granted a constitution by Alexander, who nowhere adopted Liberal courses with higher hopes and nowhere held more firmly to them. But he suffered from the defects of his temperament. Conscious of his own sincerity, he could not understand the opposition with which measures devised by him for his people's good were met, and he was cut to the heart by the 'ingratitude' of the Poles. In the speech with which he opened the first Diet he used words inspired by the Bible, according to Madame Krüdener; in closing the session he congratulated the opposition on the fact that it had opposed. Even in his address to the second Diet, which met when Kotzebue was already dead, Alexander only mingled the sentiments of Metternich with those of Christian Liberals. But he was irritated by the continuance of opposition and by the growth of secret societies, and the third Diet, at which he did not appear, saw interference with elections and enough terrorism by Government to silence all discussion. By the end of

§ 9. The
Polish Re-
bellion,
1830-31.

First Diet,
1818.

Second
Diet, 1820

Third Diet,
1825.

Coronation
of Nicho-
las, 1829.
Fourth
Diet, 1830.

Alexander's reign the Polish Constitution had failed, and though Nicholas swore to observe it, assenting to a coronation at Warsaw and opening the fourth Diet in person, there were already signs of the coming storm. The Polish army was not employed in the Turkish war, and this fact, due to Constantine's fear that it might spoil the uniforms of his soldiers, was taken to indicate suspicion. The coronation was marked rather by absence of open hostility than by the presence of enthusiasm, and Nicholas, who on his first visit to Warsaw refused a full amnesty to political offenders, on his second had cause to complain that the Poles were more patriotic than polite.

The Secret
Societies in
Poland.

But the blame for the failure of the experiment does not rest wholly, or perhaps even mainly, with the Tsars. As a matter of fact, the Poles had no real wish to make the Constitution a success; they would not be satisfied with anything short of complete independence. This discontent was fanned by the secret societies; divided in their methods but not in their ultimate aims, the 'Whites' placed their trust in constitutional agitation, hoping to free Poland by means of legislation in the Diet and failing to understand that the Constitution was so much waste paper compared with the determination of Russia to hold the kingdom. The 'Reds' were fully alive to this fact, and believed that they could best popularize their cause and prove its justice by the wholesale murder of their enemies; liberty was to be reached by the avenue of assassination.

Outbreak
of revo-
lution.

But the two sections were united in welcoming with enthusiasm the news of the Revolution of July and in raising at once the standard of constitutional rebellion. A provisional government was organized, and while Constantine, filled with groundless fears that his brother would prove weak, hastened to Petersburg to rouse him

to vengeance, the Whites proceeded to present their demands to their king. They might have spared themselves the trouble. Nicholas had already ordered the Russian army to mobilize, and he would not even receive the envoys of a people who dared to attempt the imposition of conditions on their legitimate sovereign. The Poles were left to choose between unconditional surrender and armed resistance; they chose the latter, declared the Tsar deposed, and appealed to Europe to save them.

Their appeal roused sympathy and produced little other tangible result. France, under Louis-Philippe, was disinclined to undertake an active policy; England would not be a party to the breach of the 'Treaties'; Austria, who for a moment dreamed of a Poland under a Habsburg king, could not act without allies, and feared to rouse racial feeling in her own dominions. Some gentle remonstrances to Petersburg were received with the slight attention which they deserved. Indeed, from the first it was clear that by her own strength alone could Poland be delivered, and that strength was hopelessly unequal to the task. Diebitsch was certainly checked for a while, but his victory at Ostrolenka enabled his successor, Paskievitch, to quell the revolt. Forcing the passage of the Vistula, he produced a panic and a brief reign of terror in Warsaw, to which he laid siege. When it fell, Polish resistance was at an end. While many of the rebels emigrated to plot happily in other lands, the Constitution of their country was extinguished. The Diet vanished; the government was placed in the hands of officials responsible to the Russian ministers; and only the bare name of 'kingdom' remained to preserve the memory and to emphasize the failure of the last of Alexander's idealistic schemes.

Russian invasion of Poland, Jan. 1831.

Fall of Warsaw, Sept. 1831. The 'Organic Institution,' Feb. 1832.

While the Poles were thus paying the penalty for loving

§ 10. Dis- patriotism better than good manners, Italy was the scene
 turbances of similar and more justifiable disturbances. The govern-
 in Italy. ment of Modena and of the Papal States was such that
 Francis IV rebellion against it was almost a virtue. Francis IV of
 of Modena. Modena at first crushed the Carbonari with exceptional
 vigour, creating a tribunal of which the sole function was
 to try and to put to death the politically disaffected. But
 when he had been disappointed in his hope of replacing
 Charles Albert as heir to the Sardinian throne, the Duke
 resolved to adopt all the 'immoral' practices of his
 successful rival, apparently feeling that, as virtue went un-
 rewarded, vice was doubly attractive. A tyrant became
 a Liberal; the persecutor of the secret societies aspired to
 lead a crusade for the realization of their aims. Metternich,
 however, could not allow such a fall from grace, and his
 fatherly admonitions soon reclaimed the straying lamb.
 But to the Modenese Liberals, the salvation of Francis
 appeared to be apostasy; and when their persecution was
 resumed, their resentment was embittered by the memory
 of brief immunity. The duchy was soon ripe for revolt.

The Papal Yet Francis IV had at least the merit of promoting the
 States. industrial prosperity of his dominions, a remark which does
 not apply to the government of the States of the Church.
 Leo XII and Pius VIII cared more for the spiritual than
 for the temporal welfare of their subjects. They had
 neither the capacity nor the virtues requisite for earthly
 rule, and the cardinals were ill-suited to administer
 provinces. Here, it is true, there was no question of
 wavering, no suspicion of apostasy; the Papal govern-
 ment was never slack in the work of repression. But its
 subjects were not won to love by the thought of its
 admirable consistency; they were, on the contrary, ready
 to welcome a more capricious rule which offered hope of
 intervals of leniency.

As in Belgium or Poland, so in Italy, the news of the overthrow of Charles X caused discontent to find expression in open rebellion, though here the movement received rather more direct and immediate encouragement. Lafayette professed his sympathy with the project; Laffitte declared that France would never tolerate foreign intervention, and from this latter statement the Italian Liberals drew the incorrect conclusion that Louis-Philippe would save their darling from the power of the Austrian dog. Modena set the example; Bologna, where the Pope was deposed, and Parma, whence the amiable Marie-Louise was driven, soon followed it; in a week the three districts were 'free'. Within a month, they were once more 'enslaved'. France, after all, would not move. Laffitte would have kept his half-promise, and a scheme for a Franco-Turkish Alliance, reminiscent of the days of Francis I and Charles V, was mooted. But Louis-Philippe suffered little from delusions; he realized that war was out of the question, and induced or compelled the resignation of his minister, who left office lamenting that he had believed in a middle-class king. Casimir-Périer, who succeeded, sought peace and ensued it; as far as he was concerned, the Italians might work out their own salvation. In the peninsula itself, disorder did not spread. Tuscany remained passive under the lazy, kindly rule of its Grand Duke; the Two Sicilies had no desire to experience again the sorrows of 1821; an outbreak in Piedmont was happily quelled by Charles Felix. Nor did the rebellious provinces organize a common defence; Modena and the Papal States each set up an individual government. In such circumstances, the inevitable Austrian intervention was speedily successful. On the request of Gregory XIV an army crossed the Po; Marie-Louise was borne back to Parma; the Modenese levies

Outbreak
of revolts
in Central
Italy, 1831.

were defeated; Ancona, where the revolutionary government of the Papal States had established its head-quarters, was forced to capitulate; and order was everywhere restored.

§ 11. Signi-
ficance of
the Year
1830.

The year 1830 was thus marked by two successful and two abortive revolutionary movements, and its significance consists in the latter no less than in the former. The overthrow of the restored Bourbon monarchy and the disruption of the kingdom of the United Netherlands both appeared to be events of prime importance, since they were both serious infringements of the 'Treaties'. That the Powers made no move in favour of Charles X, that they accepted the *fait accompli* in the Low Countries, showed that the Eastern Question had killed, and indeed buried, the Quadruple Alliance. But otherwise the importance of the revolutions in France and Belgium has been exaggerated. The former country had never quite come into line with the despotic monarchies; she had never quite ceased to be a 'Liberal' Power, or to be rather suspect in the eyes of Metternich. That her king should be deposed was an attack on the settlement of 1815; that nothing worse occurred, that monarchy was retained, was evidence of the continuance of that anti-revolutionary spirit upon which the friends of the existing order mainly relied. In the same way, the disruption of the United Netherlands was, from Metternich's point of view, an event of less gravity than might have been supposed. The kingdom had been a constitutional state, and its fall struck only at the territorial settlement of Vienna and not at the root principle upon which that settlement was based. For 'stability', though the hindering of French aggression might assist its maintenance, ultimately rested on the one foundation of absolutism. So long as the domain of absolutism was not invaded

the Metternich system had a chance at least of partial survival.

It is because the events of this year, and of those which immediately follow, defined the limits of that domain that they are extremely significant. Henceforth West and East are definitely ranged against each other in the conflict of ideals: the former is pledged to Liberalism. By the overthrow of Charles X, the reactionary tendency in France was checked, and the change of French foreign policy appears in the incident of Ancona. The Austrian troops had left the Papal States when order had been restored; they returned on the renewal of disturbance, and a suspicion arose that Metternich intended their presence to be permanent. But this France would not allow. Casimir-Périer had declined to assist the Italian rebels; he declined equally to pass over Habsburg aggression. A French army was sent to Ancona to assert the right of their country to share in the settlement of Italian affairs, and war was only averted by the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Pope's dominions.

But while the government of Louis-Philippe thus followed, however cautiously, along the path pointed out by Canning, and united with England in the support of Liberal ideas, the three Eastern Powers held firmly to the policy of reaction. The Polish rebellion served to knit those monarchies together more closely. By the Convention of Münchengrätz, Austria and Russia came to an agreement on their policy towards the Ottoman Empire and thus removed the chief cause of friction between them. By the Convention of Berlin, Prussia joined with her allies in reaffirming the right of intervention and in secretly proclaiming once more the doctrines of the Quadruple Alliance. It remained to break up this union or to weaken its influence by spreading the theory of

Liberalism
in the West.

French
occupation
of Ancona,
1832.

Reaction in
Eastern
Europe.

Convention
of Mün-
chengrätz,
Sept. 1833.

Convention
of Berlin,
Oct. 1833.

'nationality' in the dominions of the autocrats. When this should be done, the destruction of the ideal of 'stability' would be assured, and because the year 1830 showed what had to be done in order to accomplish this end, it marks an important stage in the decline of the Metternich system.

CHAPTER IV

THE FALL OF METTERNICH

§ 1. Character of the Years 1830-1848. § 2. Socialism. § 3. The Monarchy of Louis-Philippe. § 4. Supremacy of the Party of Resistance. § 5. Mehemet Ali. § 6. Second attack of Mehemet Ali on the Sultan. § 7. Affairs of Spain. § 8. The Sonderbund in Switzerland. § 9. Fall of Louis-Philippe. § 10. State of the Austrian Empire. § 11. Fall of Metternich.

EIGHTEEN years were still to pass before the final overthrow of the Metternich system was effected, eighteen years of unreality, of apparent stagnation and of actual preparation. In these years, mutterings of the coming storm are heard; men, without quite knowing why, anticipate the approaching 'deluge'; there is a vague sense of foreboding, a vague understanding of the hollowness of the existing peace. But diplomatists continue to intrigue and court labours to outwit court; rulers and their ministers fondly trust that treaties will endure for ever, that peoples will be for ever restrained by conventions between governments. And all the while, beneath the surface, the volcanic flames of revolution burn daily more fiercely, gathering that strength which is to enable them to consume the poor marionettes who dance above them to the slow music of an Austrian pipe. And as when a crater has for centuries been closed the eventual eruption is all the more violent, so the very success which appeared to wait upon the repressive policy of European rulers made the cataclysm, when it came, all the more terrible and all the more complete.

For political discontent, driven to hide itself, was

§ 1. Character of the Years 1830-48.

Effects of
repression.

intensified. Men, who might otherwise have been mere Liberals and reformers, became extreme radicals and revolutionaries. To express an opinion even mildly uncomplimentary to government was dangerous; to increase the violence of the opinion did not greatly increase the danger and was in itself attractive, because it roused more interest and had a more dramatic flavour. And as those who had much to lose feared to take a risk, declining to barter the certainty of present good for the doubtful prospect of future gain, the agitation against the existing order fell largely into the hands of men, desperate because despairing, extreme in opinion because moderate in intellect. They did not think of reconstruction; to such enthusiastic minds, half-measures were anathema. They would overthrow, root out; and they were the more eager, not counting the cost, since in no case could it fall on them to pay the price. To them, there was an irresistible charm in such catchwords as 'Nationality' and 'Progress', 'Freedom' and 'the Rights of Man'; they greeted with innocent and heartfelt applause simple plans for the immediate establishment of unattainable Utopias. But as they had also suffered hunger and seen poverty face to face, as they had been very tired, they were drawn insensibly to mingle the practical with the ideal, demanding relief from material distress in the sacred name of Liberty. And so political discontent gave rise to two distinct movements. The first, originating in the study of the philosopher and lighted by the student's lamp, sought abstract rights and claimed the inalienable heritage of mankind. The second, more human, born in distress and nurtured in the hovels and workshops of the poor, vitalized by agony and bathed in the blood and sweat of toilers, asked for bread and was ill-content to receive only the hard stone of mere enfranchisement.

'National-
ism.'

'Social-
ism.'

Philosophy has never lacked words, and, as was natural, the philosophic movement found expression first. Based originally upon the abstract theory of 'the Rights of Man', it became a general assertion of the principle of 'Nationality', a vague doctrine involving different conclusions in different countries. It served to justify the conquest of the 'natural' frontiers of France and the republican crusade for the deliverance of afflicted peoples; it inspired the resistance of Spain, and dignified the War of Liberation in Germany. But prior to 1815 its meaning is obscure. To the Spaniards, it implied objection to the treatment meted out to them by Napoleon, desire for their national king; it did not imply opposition to absolute, or even to corrupt, government. Even to the Germans, a more intellectual and a more metaphysical race, it meant but little beyond deliverance from the French invader. Its champions were sober, responsible men—Stein, minister of Prussia; Stadion, Austrian chancellor; Alexander I, autocrat, member of the Holy, and of the Quadruple, Alliance.

But after the Peace the character of the movement changes and the movement itself develops. That alliance between the champions of legitimate rule and of national rights which common misfortune had called into being dissolved with the removal of the danger which it had been designed to meet. European rulers generally adopted the principles of Metternich, the most determined enemy of all enthusiastic creeds and the apostle of 'stability'. As a result, the nationalist movement came into conflict with government, and in the conflict won strength and definition. While still philosophically the vague advocacy of the 'rights of peoples', it found a practical basis in a demand for specific reforms, and above all for representative institutions. Nationalism

The 'Nationalist' agitation.

Nationalism after 1815.

and Liberalism became identified, not merely in the prejudiced view of Metternich, but really, and by the necessities of the situation, since repression compelled the union of all forces opposed to the *status quo*. And the spread of the doctrine was assisted by the convenient forgetfulness of its exponents. They omitted to define a 'people', and this omission enabled almost any group of individuals to arrogate to itself the name of 'nation'. The cry for 'national rights' was thus popularized, and the movement gathered force, infecting a constantly increasing area.

Progress of
National-
ism.

Its progress, indeed, was almost surprisingly rapid. Five years after the Congress of Vienna, it appeared in its new constitutional dress in Spain and Italy, being more definite in the former country than in the latter, because the Spaniards better understood the meaning of that phrase which the Italians, parrot-like, repeated. Ten years later it inspired the Belgian revolution and the Polish rebellion; 'nationality' and 'constitutional liberty' being in each country inextricably blended. Nor did the Austrian Empire, the citadel of sobriety, wholly escape its drunken embrace. The efforts of the Poles were eagerly watched across the frontier; Magyars and Czechs dreamed of Polish success and saw visions of an independent Poland imitated in Hungary and Bohemia. The visionaries were recalled to reality by the fall of Warsaw; Paskievitch and Nicholas turned their dreams into nightmares. But the danger of infection was not the less realized by the political physician of Vienna who still laboured to preserve from disease the system which he believed that he had brought into the European world.

§ 2. Social-
ism.

Unfortunately the carefully applied remedies of Metternich rather aggravated than cured the growing illness. His repressive policy led to an ominous alliance between

the two sides of the opposition to his methods, combining the 'nationalist' with the 'socialistic' movements. The latter agitation was for long inarticulate. While philosophers debated volubly and students noisily clamoured for political rights, the proletariat, the masses of the people, were filled with growing discontent, and became constantly more impatient. But their impatience did not at first find expression in words. The masses were politically dumb, having no share in the franchise, no organization, no Press. And the very simplicity of their would-be prayer made its utterance harder. They desired, and realized that they desired, to eat, but no desire was more difficult to make known. It made no appeal to sentiment, it urged no high ideals, it did not stir the imagination of enthusiasts. And to the suppliants it seemed not to need expression; of course they desired to eat, and equally of course all men did so and did so in vain. It was hardly worth while to say anything so obvious as 'We want bread', and in the absence of speech, governments might be expected to disregard, if indeed they could be expected to see, the gnawing emptiness which afflicted their subjects.

It was repression which made the masses articulate by enabling their simple prayer to be cloaked in the garment of attractive verbiage. In order to silence opposition, governments stifled the Press, and the ranks of the would-be eaters were swelled by the inclusion of journalists out of work. They became hungry also, and they were both as verbose as the philosophers and as anxious to get bread as the masses. More than this, they were men of ingenuity, quick to grasp the needs of the situation and to devise means for the gratification of their craving. Alone they were insignificant; united with the proletariat, they would be powerful. And therefore they determined to

exploit hunger, to organize the people, to make them articulate by supplying the necessary catchwords. The journalists were well aware that the proletariat would never frame simple syllables with confidence, nor would they stultify themselves by uttering phrases which they could understand. But they might be induced to cry 'We want liberty', a cry which to them would be attractive because high-sounding and meaningless; and once they had cried, governments would sooner or later be affected by the mere clamour of numbers. Nor was this all. To move the proletariat would mean eventual success, but the journalists would not be satisfied with a distant prospect of victory. More direct pressure must be brought to bear on the governments of Europe, pressure from the possessors of votes, the payers of taxes. Such men were not to be influenced by the thought of mere hunger; they were not bakers, that they should give bread to men. To appeal to them, to move them, more idealistic arguments had to be urged. And thus the journalists took over wholesale the propaganda of the 'nationalist' movement.

Effect of
the union
of the two
move-
ments.

It is in this that the importance of the philosophic agitation really lies. Philosophers could not agitate with success; their feelings were too delicate, their ties with the world at once too slender and too close. They had a natural repugnance for the crudities of practical politics; they could not forget that they belonged to the classes; their susceptibilities were too easily outraged by the violence of the masses. No Government has yet shown much fear of mere academic discussion; it is the unintelligent shouting of a crowd which breaks in upon the orderly silence of a chancellery and hurls ministers from place and power, which causes crowns to tremble and thrones to shake. But the inventor of phrases plays

his part. A crowd must have a cry. Parliamentary reform in England might have been indefinitely postponed, if it had not been for the convenient phrase 'The Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill,' which struck a responsive chord in the great soul of the People by reminding it of a familiar feature in its everyday life. And in contemporary Europe, the masses, greatly desiring, to eat, obeyed the bidding of the journalists; they shouted for 'Liberty' and 'Justice', they demanded 'Rights' and a 'Constitution'; in the full conviction that, by so doing, they would fill a most material and aching void. As a matter of fact, they were as silent as ever upon the topic of their real need. It was not that they would not talk, now that they had been taught the value of speech, but that they could not. The journalists shouted; the masses did little more than fulfil the function of echo.

Nowhere does this appear more clearly than in the France of Louis-Philippe. The Paris crowds wanted loaves of bread; they received a citizen king, his family, cash-boxes, and umbrella. This last item stamped the Monarchy of July; it was eminently respectable, eminently dull, eminently middle-class, headed by a ruler who was far too obviously guilty of the uninspiring vices of nepotism and avarice to make any appeal whatever to the sentiment or enthusiasm of his people. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the masses were dissatisfied with the results of the Revolution of July, that they were not even calmed when their jovial King eagerly accepted glasses of wine at their hands, that they continued to agitate and to shout the parrot-cries which they had learned. Indeed, the 'umbrella régime' would probably have come to a speedier end, if it had not been that the people were still imperfectly organized,

§ 3. The Monarchy of Louis-Philippe, 1830-48.

and that the *bourgeoisie* regarded Louis-Philippe as the sole guarantee against positive evil. France was less concerned to maintain him on his throne than to avoid the 'Red Republic'; she preferred a system to which she was indifferent to one which she feared, and hated because she feared. Thus the history of the July Monarchy is the history of the avoidance of revolution, and of party quarrels as to the means for attaining this end.

Political parties in France :
(a) the party of action ;

(b) the party of resistance.

For the two parties which disputed political supremacy in the reign of Louis-Philippe were cordially united in opposition to revolution: neither had any desire to satisfy popular desires. They differed as to the principles of successful delusion, not as to the need for such delusion. On the one hand, the 'party of action' trusted to apparent concessions at home and to a policy of prestige-hunting abroad. It believed that it could delude the masses by seeming to bow to their omnipotent will, by volunteering to express in words the deep longings of a people's soul. And it hoped eventually to stifle political and material hunger by creating in the hungry a thirst for national glory. On the other hand, the 'party of resistance', while equally a band of mighty hunters in the sphere of foreign politics, was candidly alarmed at the outcome of the 'July days'. It had originated, or at least supported, a movement which had been intended merely to change a few names and to remove a few personages, and which had developed into an attempt to effect far more vital alterations. It was resolved that no such calamity should occur, that the proletariat should be taught not to intrude their vulgar clamourings upon the ruling class. It would have the masses learn to look hopefully, but above all very patiently, to the operation of the virtue of the 'Citizen King'. In a word, it was determined that 'France should be governed'.

That France needed government was admitted on all sides, and had any one been inclined to scepticism, his doubt would have been quickly dispelled by the ocular and aural evidence supplied by the Paris mob. The masses were disappointed and angered at the discovery that the much-lauded glories of the 'glorious Revolution' were spiritual rather than material, and that however completely the beautiful phrases of their self-constituted guides might remove their mental anguish, those phrases were singularly inadequate for the curing of physical distress. And as they had been taught that the ministers of Charles X were their most deadly foes, they wished to apply the lesson. It seemed to them that hunger must inevitably continue while a Polignac yet encumbered the earth, and they wished to perfect the remedy by a sacrifice of blood, clamouring for the death of the late ministers.

In itself, this demand was not a matter of supreme moment; it became so when the clamour disturbed the repose of the journalist-given king and of his ministers. Such base ingratitude could not be tolerated even by the party of action, which had at first secured political power as the just reward for the services rendered to the Orleanist cause by its leader, Laffitte. It is true that he protested his wish to allow 'the consequences of July' to work themselves out, that he was professedly only the leader of the Many, the devoted servant of the public. But he wished to decide the conditions of his service, and he had his own idea as to what should be the 'necessary consequences'. While accepting the theory that government should be in accordance with expressed public opinion, he sought for the organ of that opinion, not in the Paris mob, but in the revived National Guard, which for the moment adored its commandant, Lafayette.

Riots in
Paris, 1830

Repression
of disorder
by Laffitte,
1830.

Thus public opinion was found to be entirely favourable to the Orleanist monarchy and to the ministry of Laffitte; and when riot followed in the wake of revolution, there was no need to ascertain the grievances or wishes of the rioters. They were crushed and dispersed by the citizen army, called upon to rally round the throne of the citizen king; the party of action defied the populace and restored order; and Louis-Philippe could dramatically embrace and thank his 'saviour'.

Fall of
Laffitte,
1831.

But the King was not entirely happy in his state of salvation, and it was only with reluctance that he submitted to its continuance. He wished to rule, and Laffitte had the same desire, so that a conflict between them was almost certain. And the dispute was not confined to the question of the real control of the state; it extended also to the principles upon which the monarchy should rest. Louis-Philippe had found expressions of devotion to revolutionary principles invaluable as Duke of Orleans; he found them unsuited to the lips of the King of the French. Longing, as he did, to clear himself of the stigma of being a usurper, longing to become a 'legitimate' sovereign, he was more than irritated at the conduct of the minister who compelled him to glory in his shame, who seemed to delight in mocking at the most essential points in the theory of Divine Right. Thus, from the first, Louis-Philippe was anxious to free himself from the tyrannous service of his too powerful supporter, and he seized the opportunity which that supporter's foreign policy afforded him. When Italy and Poland rose in revolt, Laffitte proposed open action in favour of a sister revolution; the King, as his European position forced him to do, refused his sanction, and gladly accepted the inevitable resignation.

That resignation involved the transference of political

power to the party of resistance, by whom it was retained § 4. Supremacy of the party of resistance, 1831-48. Casimir-Périer, 1831-32.

practically for the rest of the reign and for whom the main lines of policy were defined by their first leader, Casimir-Périer. He had been included in the late Ministry, and at home his measures were similar to those of Laffitte. Order was to be maintained, ebullitions of popular discontent prevented, the secret societies destroyed. Abroad, on the other hand, he at once abandoned the vigorous and pro-revolutionary policy of his predecessor; rebellion met with no sympathy from him, and no help was given to it either in Italy or in Poland. But Liberalism found favour in his eyes, when it was not inconsistent with legitimate rule; France tended to associate herself rather with Great Britain than with the Eastern Powers. And above all, prestige was to be maintained, while no aggressive action was attempted; in the later phrase of Disraeli, the Government sought 'Peace with Honour', and thanks to a certain politic daring coupled with keen appreciation of the perils of rashness, as long as Casimir-Périer lived, the search was not unsuccessful. It was a French army which chastised the Dutch invaders of Belgium, a French fleet which assisted at Lisbon in the maintenance of the Portuguese Constitution. France secured inclusion in the alliance of England, Spain, and Portugal for the repression of Don Miguel, and in Italy an act, wholly contrary to the elementary principles of international law, raised her reputation and humiliated her historic rival. The occupation of Ancona almost led to a war, which, if it had occurred, would probably have anticipated the events of 1848; that it did not produce a war was due to the military inferiority of Austria, and as this was generally recognized, the Government of Louis-Philippe profited accordingly. The lesson was not forgotten in France, and thus while order

The Quadruple Alliance, 1834.

was maintained at home, prestige continued to be sought abroad.

Divisions
in the party
of resis-
tance.

Unfortunately, however, for the success of these ideas, the Minister's death made room for men with less capacity and less of the quick intelligence needed to carry them out. And to make matters worse, that national unity which was essential to the successful pursuit of a rather risky foreign policy was destroyed by the division in the party of resistance. Those divisions were due to no new cause; the old quarrel of the Restoration period was resumed under the Monarchy of July. On the one hand, the Left Centre, a group led by Thiers, held that Ministers should be chosen from the ranks of the dominant party in the Chamber; on the other hand, the Right Centre, led by Guizot, believed that the King, though bound by the letter of the Constitutional Charter, should be free to select the members of the Executive. The result was ultimately fatal to the system which both sections desired to maintain. Occupied with their own disputes, the Ministers failed to realize that the mere maintenance of the Orleanist monarchy was a task calculated to tax all their powers. They allowed themselves to be lulled into a sense of false security at home, and abroad embarked on a course of action, disastrous because no care had been taken to prevent disaster.

Aims of
Louis-
Philippe.

The blame, however, does not rest wholly on the Ministers; the King has also to bear his share. In many ways, the reign of Louis-Philippe is very similar to that of George III. In each case the King wished to rule and was thus led to unite too closely with a particular party; in each case, after experiencing varying fortune, he seemed at last to have succeeded, only to find that success spelt ruin. In each case, also, short ministries follow each other, as the King feels his way; and

parallels to Rockingham, Bute, Chatham, and North are supplied by Thiers, Molé, Soult, and Guizot. Even the difference in the eventual result was due rather to differences in the character of the two Kings than to essential differences in circumstances; Louis-Philippe was a coward, George III was not; and the superior political foresight and tact of the former did not make up for his inferiority in commoner virtues.

That he possessed some sense of the realities of the situation is proved by his choice of Thiers as successor to Casimir-Périer, and his tactful geniality was illustrated by his hearty use of 'my dear Adolphe' when addressing his minister. But even so, when Thiers fell, Louis-Philippe went too fast, replacing him by Molé, a personal friend, and experiencing the certain failure due to an attempt at too direct personal rule; a violent protest was raised against 'Court government'. Nor was the experiment of a colourless ministry more satisfactory. Soult failed to maintain his position despite his military reputation, and the King was driven once more to employ Thiers. But when he fell a second time, the desired minister was found at last. Guizot was Louis-Philippe's North, a man of some ability and pronounced personal integrity, willing to follow where his master led, and to bear the consequences of that master's possible failure. Indeed, his own views were such that to obey the King's wishes, to allow him to rule secretly, was altogether to follow his own predilections. And a certain moral obliquity, curious in a man so noted for probity, enabled him to adopt questionable methods in order to secure a laudable result. Guizot relied, as Villèle had relied, on a mechanical parliamentary majority; he failed, as Villèle had failed, to understand that mere approval by any chance collection of so-called representatives of the people

Succession
of Minis-
tries,
1832-40.

Molé,
1836.

Soult,
1839.

Guizot,
1840.

does not involve true popular sanction. He therefore set to work to secure the only approval which he considered to be necessary. The distribution of places and pensions gained for him a perpetual majority in the Chamber, and he was able to carry on his policy of doing nothing and of neglecting, rather than opposing, the reforms for which France was more and more inclined to ask.

France
under
Guizot's
ministry.

Superficially, his success was considerable, and an atmosphere of profound restfulness was produced. But it was purely superficial. At heart the country was bored by the dullness of life; it wanted any kind of change, any relief from the monotonous respectability of the existing order. The shadow of the 'umbrella' had fallen upon the monarchy and from it the monarchy, despite its best endeavours, could not escape. At the same time, annoyance was increased by the situation abroad. While all Europe was seething with delightful unrest, and waiting only for the signal to give way to a saturnalia of political vice, France seemed to have abandoned her rightful position as the champion of revolutionary disturbance. She was caught in the slough of conventionality, and her efforts to emerge from it only involved her in charges of ordinary deceit without giving her the pleasant reputation of being irreclaimably immoral. And the ordinary vices served to leave her as isolated as more serious crimes would have done. A successful foreign policy might have saved the Orleanist monarchy, but it was precisely in foreign policy that it achieved its most conspicuous failure.

§ 5.
Mehemet
Ali.

That failure may be attributed in some measure to the character of the monarchy itself. However loudly Louis-Philippe might protest that he had assumed the crown in defence of, not in defiance of, the hereditary principle, he was not the less regarded as a usurper by the auto-

crats who worshipped the theory of Divine Right. His accession had been the source of general alarm in Europe, and that alarm was coupled with intense dislike in the case of the Eastern Powers. To save himself from the consequences of such hatred, an ally was necessary, an ally strong enough and of good enough reputation to be able to cast the protecting aegis of its virtue over the questionable reputation of the Citizen King. And while it was clear that Great Britain alone could fulfil the function of social sponsor to the Monarchy of July, circumstances arose which alienated her from her prospective protégé. The Eastern Question once more arose on the political horizon and French enthusiasm for Mehemet Ali led to disregard for the necessities of the King.

That enthusiasm had first been aroused by the veneration of civilization produced by Mehemet in Egypt; it was increased a thousandfold by the military successes which the Pasha was fortunate enough to win. He had felt some natural disgust at the result of his intervention in the war of Greek Independence, for though he retained Crete, he had failed to secure the Morea. Mahmoud, indeed, had half-promised Ibrahim the pashalik of Syria by way of compensation, but he had failed to keep his word, and it was primarily with the idea of forcing him to do so that Mehemet Ali began the war. His success was as rapid as might have been expected, when it is remembered that he possessed the only real army in the East. Ibrahim, who commanded the Egyptian forces, overran Syria with ease, capturing Acre and Damascus and crushing the Ottoman troops at Hama and Homs. Not content with these victories, he crossed Mount Taurus, descended upon Asia Minor, and at Konieh utterly routed the last Turkish army. It seemed not improbable that he would overthrow the Ottoman Empire entirely.

First war
between
Mehemet
Ali and the
Sultan,
1832-33.

Battle of
Konieh,
1832.

Appeal of
Mahmoud
to the
Powers.

In the path, however, to the achievement of such a result stood Europe with drawn sword. Mahmoud, who had called upon Mehemet to save him from the Greeks, called upon the Powers to save him from the ultimate results of his original appeal. And he received a ready assurance of sympathy from Nicholas, who was sincerely anxious that the Sultan should not be destroyed, however interested the motives of his desire may have been. Nor was Russia alone in her willingness to check Mehemet. Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia were also prepared to use their good offices on behalf of the Sick Man, viewing with the gravest suspicion the display of Russian affection for the invalid. But for the Powers to act effectively was soon found to be impossible. France joined, indeed, in efforts to induce Mehemet to come to terms, but at the same time she was unwilling to threaten him and thus joint action was really out of the question.

Reasons
for the
policy of
France.

It was, perhaps, beyond the power of the Government of Louis-Philippe to adopt a more decided attitude. The capture of Acre had been magnified by the picturesque imagination of the French into a feat of arms beside which the greatest military exploits of the past paled into insignificance. It was remembered that Napoleon himself had failed here, and it would have meant certain overthrow for a minister if he had suggested taking action against that popular hero, Ibrahim. Thiers, therefore, could not join in any real scheme for joint action, though France was equally unable to do anything for her protégé. Europe was fully determined that the Ottoman Empire should be preserved, and Louis-Philippe, peace-loving at all times, could not be expected to enter upon a war which would have placed him in opposition to all the Powers.

Effects of

Consequently Russia alone profited from the action of

France; she was enabled by it to pose as the only real French friend of the Porte. For while Ibrahim gradually drew nearer to Constantinople, Mahmoud's pathetic appeals to London and Paris brought him no effective help, and he was compelled reluctantly to turn to Nicholas, whose friendship might be dangerous but was at least certain. The arrival of a Russian fleet and army saved the capital from a siege, and Mehemet, fearing the loss of that which he had already won, hastened to come to terms at Kutaya. But the Sultan's ally now demanded the reward for his services and obtained the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The two signatories agreed to aid each other by sea and land if attacked; by secret clauses, it was further stipulated that Russia would not claim such assistance, on condition that in time of war the Dardanelles should be closed to all except Russian ships. In the eyes of Europe, this amounted to the establishment of a protectorate over the Ottoman Empire, nor was the alarm aroused much lessened by the fact that Nicholas professed his complete altruism and promised Metternich that Austrian mediation should be invited before the treaty was put into actual operation.

French policy.

Peace of Kutaya, 1833.

Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833.

Into actual operation the treaty never came, owing to the conduct of Mehemet Ali. Despite the fact that by the peace of Kutaya he retained Crete and acquired not only Syria but also the district of Adana and the command of the passes into Asia Minor, his ambition was not yet satiated, while Mahmoud, on his side, longed for revenge. A commercial treaty, which he concluded with Great Britain and which struck at Egyptian commerce, indicated the real feelings of the Sultan, and was the immediate cause of renewed war. Once more the Ottoman troops, though now led by Prussian officers destined at a later date to win laurels against France, were quite

§ 6. Second attack of Mehemet Ali on the Sultan, 1839.

Death
of Mah-
moud II,
1839.

unable to resist the advance of Ibrahim. A decisive victory at Nisib opened the road to Constantinople, and the Egyptians advanced rapidly through Asia Minor, the apparent aim of their commander being the overthrow of the House of Othman and the transference of the throne to his father or himself. The death, at this critical juncture, of the able and wily Mahmoud assisted his cause; the Turkish fleet, sailing to Alexandria, surrendered to Mehemet; and Abdul Medjid, the new Sultan, a mere boy, was powerless to stay the progress of the invader.

Inter-
vention of
the Powers.

Once more, however, Europe came to the rescue. Great Britain, fearing above all things that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would be invoked, was eager for concerted action; more especially she hoped to secure the cooperation of France, that the Egyptian Question might be settled as the Greek Question had been before it. But Ibrahim was still the darling of Paris, and so far from giving way to the blandishments of the Court of St. James, Thiers actually proposed to assist Mehemet. His warlike preparations were checked by a curt message from London, since in no circumstances would Louis-Philippe risk war; the minister fell and was replaced by Guizot and the peace party. But it was now too late for France either to hasten or to hinder the salvation of the Ottoman Empire and the downfall of her protégé. Nicholas was filled with a most cordial hatred for the middle-class make-believe king who sat upon the Bourbon throne, and he took the opportunity to humiliate him, even at the cost of some sacrifice of his own interests. Abandoning the special privileges which he had secured at Unkiar Skelessi, he hastily came to an agreement with the other Powers for the settlement of the Egyptian Question.

The result was seen in the speedy overthrow of the power of Mehemet. The allied fleets captured Beirût and Acre and threatened to bombard Alexandria; the Pasha was forced to abandon his original idea of defying Europe, and ordered the evacuation of Syria; and it only remained to decide what treatment should be accorded to him. Deposition would have been his fate had Great Britain and Russia had their way, but France was not destined to suffer such an extreme of vicarious humiliation. Even the pacific Government of Louis-Philippe could not for ever turn the other cheek; public opinion would have driven it to resent so profound an insult. But the danger of war was averted by the action of Metternich. Supported by Prussia, he contended for more lenient terms, and eventually Mehemet, though obliged to resign both Crete and Syria, was granted the hereditary pashalik of Egypt, with the title of Khedive, and practical independence. French diplomacy might thus appear to have gained a modified triumph, but it was fully recognized that the success belonged rather to Austria than to France. Metternich, indeed, appears on this occasion for the last time as practical arbiter of Europe, playing the part which he had for a moment tried to play, a generation before, on the morrow of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, and showing to an almost astonished Continent that there was yet virtue in the magic of one who was rapidly coming to be regarded as a mere expert phrase-maker. On the other hand, Louis-Philippe paid a heavy price for his deference to popular sentiment. His policy had been dictated by fear of the Paris journalists; its result was first to isolate and then to shame his country.

Nor was it ever found possible really to deliver France from this isolation: rather the nepotism of the King and Guizot's pursuit of prestige made it more complete and

Fall of Mehemet, Ali, 1840.

Treaty of London, 1840.

§ 7. Affairs of Spain.

more disastrous. For while the eager correspondence, which began between the semi-royal product of the Revolution and the Viennese apostle of the *status quo*, did not secure the admission of the former into the exclusive society of Eastern autocrats, the growing friendship between France and Great Britain was shattered. That friendship, or at least a co-operation from which friendship might develop, had been based originally on community of action and interest in the Iberian Peninsula. Ferdinand VII, in his latter days, had been half-converted to Liberalism, owing to the ardent love which he had conceived for his fair nieces, Carlotta and Cristina of Naples. The first of these ladies was his favourite, but was already married; the second was sufficiently charming and ambitious to become his fourth wife. She used her influence to mitigate the violence of her husband and presently to secure the succession for her daughter, Isabella, persuading him to adopt mildly progressive measures and to issue a Pragmatic Sanction, revoking the Salic Law in the interest of his child. But the Ultra-royalists had been already pained by the leniency which Ferdinand had shown after his restoration by Angoulême, and had long sighed for the coming of that happy day when Don Carlos, his brother, should ascend the throne and chastise their enemies, not with political whips but with ecclesiastical scorpions. They were by no means content to submit to the ruin of all their hopes, and the strong opposition which arose was only increased by the Liberalism of Cristina, displayed while she acted as regent during her husband's illness. This opposition united all the conservative elements in Spain: those who longed for the continuance of old abuses, the ultra-clericals who hoped to see the Inquisition restored to full power, and the reactionaries who longed to take vengeance on the

Fourth
marriage of
Ferdinand
VII, 1829.

The
Pragmatic
Sanction,
1833.

Liberals, all placed their trust in Don Carlos. They were encouraged by the attitude of the Eastern Powers; who at Münchengrätz declared that they would admit no interference with the sacred principle of legitimacy. Only the unflinching loyalty of his brother prevented the outbreak of trouble before the death of Ferdinand; only the accidental absence of the Pretender prevented his proclamation in Madrid as soon as the king was dead.

Death of
Ferdinand
VII, 1833.

Cristina, therefore, hastened to adopt a Liberal policy in order to win some measure of support. Zea Bermudez was commissioned to frame a Constitution, but unfortunately he was more expert in depicting passions on the stage than in calming them in political life. The Royal Statute, a practical translation of the French Charter of 1814, threw all power into the hands of the propertied classes, while reserving to the Crown the right to settle the subjects of debate. It marked a distinct advance by admitting the doctrine of assent to legislation and taxation, and providing for annual parliaments; but it served only to increase the troubles of the Government, whose alleged friends clamoured for more substantial concessions. And meanwhile the Carlists had taken up arms. The Basque Provinces, loyal to a fault, wedded to any old abuses and instinctively conservative because tenacious of local privileges, were ardently devoted to the Pretender; their resistance became formidable owing to the military genius of their leader, Zumalacarregui. Indeed, if it had not been for the incompetence of Don Carlos and the appearance on the side of the Regency of a military reformer, Espartero, the rebellion would probably have succeeded. As it was, an attack on Bilbao displayed the weakness of the Carlist army and cost the life of its general, just at the moment when the

The Royal
Statute,
1834.

The
Carlist
War,
1834-39.

Government was able to put forward greater efforts. The war dragged on, but the eventual result was certain, the more so as circumstances left its decision mainly to the Spaniards themselves.*

Policy of
the Powers.

That this would be so had not at first seemed likely. While the Eastern Powers were wholly in sympathy with the Pretender, those of the West had shown signs of acting effectively on behalf of the nascent Liberalism of the Peninsula. The Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, France, and the two Iberian kingdoms had driven Don Miguel from Portugal and assisted Don Pedro to restore his daughter Maria to her throne; and Don Carlos, who had served in his nephew's army, was removed to England. But when he returned to Spain to lead the rebellion, the conservatism of Great Britain and her rooted objection to intervention reasserted themselves; she declined to take action, and Thiers, who proposed a French expedition to establish Isabella, was obliged to resign, since Louis-Philippe would not further alienate the Eastern Powers. As at the same time Metternich recognized the inevitable, and succeeded in restraining the zeal of his allies for the legitimist cause, Spain was left to work out her own salvation.

Anarchy in
Spain.

Fall of
Cristina,
1840.

Constitu-
tion of
1837.

She did not accomplish the task with any particular success. When the danger from the Carlists passed, other dangers appeared. Cristina was driven from the country by a military outbreak; Espartero became dictator and produced a new Constitution and more confusion; *pronunciamentos* were frequent, and the remainder of the Queen's minority was filled with unceasing struggles for power between the various distinguished generals, as the country travelled painfully along the thorny Constitutional path. Nor did Isabella's coming of age give peace to Spain, since Louis-Philippe and Guizot, pursuing an

advantage which proved to be illusory, succeeded in perpetuating anarchy across the Pyrenees. The fatherly affection of the King of the French led him to desire the Queen's hand for one of his children, the more so as his eldest son, rejected by an Austrian archduchess, had been obliged to content himself with a minor German princess. And his Minister was overpoweringly attracted by the vista of illimitable prestige to be won by such a master-stroke of diplomacy. An intrigue was begun for the marriage of Isabella to the Duc de Montpensier, the King's fifth son, but the strong opposition of England proved fatal to this scheme. It was therefore modified. With the consent of Palmerston, it was arranged that the Queen's sister, Luisa, should marry the French prince, on the understanding that the succession to the Spanish throne should be first secured by the birth of an heir to Isabella. Guizot, however, thought that he might yet secure his end without breaking the letter of his bond. He secured the marriage of the Queen to her cousin, Francis d'Assisi, a man known to be unfitted for marriage, and on the same day that of Luisa to Montpensier. The sharp practice of Guizot did not produce the intended result of securing the Spanish succession for the descendants of Louis-Philippe; instead, it disgraced France by making her break her word and appear as a party to a scandalous marriage, and it isolated her in Europe by alienating her only friend, England.

The alienation, indeed, was so complete that Palmerston desired nothing more than to revenge himself on Guizot, and his opportunity soon came. Since the restoration of its original Constitution in 1815, the Swiss Confederation had gradually become the prey of the divisions between the Protestant and Catholic cantons. The former were Liberal and desired the expulsion of the Jesuits, who were

The Spanish Marriages, 1846.

§ 8. The Sonderbund in Switzerland, 1847.

supposed to be acquiring political power ; the latter took their stand on the Treaties of Vienna, forming a league, the Sonderbund, with its head-quarters at Lucerne, to resist all change. War soon broke out between the two parties and the attention of Europe was necessarily attracted, since the federal Constitution had been definitively guaranteed by the Powers.

Failure of
Guizot's
policy.

This fact seemed to Guizot to produce a situation full of hope. Intervention could hardly be avoided, since it was actually provided for by the Treaties ; he therefore proposed a congress to discuss the affairs of Switzerland. He believed that he could thus increase French prestige by appearing as the leader of Europe, and that he could reconcile the July Monarchy with the Eastern Powers by posing as the foremost advocate of legitimate rule. But his scheme was ruined by Palmerston, who, while urging the Swiss Liberals to hasten their operations, delayed his answer to the invitation until it was too late. Lucerne had fallen and the Sonderbund had been dissolved before the tardy assent of Great Britain was received, and that assent was now valueless, since it was hardly worth while to assemble a formal Congress in order to accept a *fait accompli*. Thus Guizot had merely contrived to make himself the laughing-stock of Europe and to bring odium upon France without gaining any compensating advantage ; the Government of Louis-Philippe, in fact, had committed the fatal crime of championing an unpopular and defeated cause.

§ 9. Fall of
Louis-
Philippe.

This crime was especially serious since the internal policy of the Minister was daily winning a larger measure of unpopularity. The Government had never really escaped from the consequences of its accidental creation ; no one had particularly desired its birth, except a few journalist agitators, and it had never gained the affection

of any class except the *bourgeoisie*. While the old legitimist party, after a futile outburst in La Vendée, had fallen into a state of grumbling submissiveness, the masses continued to agitate for the satisfaction of their material needs. Open disturbances, such as the great outbreak of weavers at Lyons, filled the first nine years of the reign, and were met by severely repressive measures on the part of the Ministers, who by the 'Laws of September' effectually silenced all open criticism of their conduct. While the Press was thus placed under restrictions more complete than any which had existed in the period of the Restoration Monarchy, the Government only succeeded in proving the non-revolutionary character of a régime ostensibly based on revolution. Superficial good order, indeed, was produced by the Ministers' abandonment of consistency, but the agitation grew greater, rather than less. Driven below the surface and deprived of its ordinary safety-valve, it became constantly more violent in character. The secret societies, such as that of the 'Rights of Man', which had organized the earlier outbreaks, became more secret, and from increased secrecy acquired increased popularity and more extreme opinions.

Those opinions were soon marked by 'Socialistic' tendencies. While there were many who only wanted a change of ministry, and many who would have been content with a commonplace republic, others, such as Cavaignac, sought a new Utopia and actually dreamed of attempts to meet the needs of the masses. And though they preached the 'social revolution' too vaguely and philosophically to win much support from crowds who could not understand them, it was not long before the new theories were clothed in language of transparent clearness. Louis Blanc published his *Organization of Labour*, which laid down that the 'Right to Work' was

Riot of Weavers at Lyons, 1834.

'Laws of September,' 1835

Growth of Socialism in France.

The Organization

of Labour,
1831. an inalienable privilege of all citizens, and that the State was morally bound to supply employment and satisfactory wages to all its members. That their rights might be recognized, the workers should organize their forces in opposition to the tyranny of a selfish and capitalist governing-clique. The Parisian artisan listened and approved; here at last seemed to open a long vista of larger dinners, and though work might be a mixed blessing, yet to have much to eat was altogether good. The political sea remained superficially calm, but a strong undercurrent of revolutionary opinion began to flow, and to flow not towards mere constitutional change but towards the remodelling of the whole economic structure of society.

*Agitation
for Reform,*
1845-48. Even on the surface there were ripples of discontent, quite apart from six attempts on the life of that beloved citizen, the King of the French. An agitation for Parliamentary Reform began and with it an agitation against the prevailing corruption of political life. That both reforms were needed could hardly be doubted, but Guizot was well content with things as they were. A mechanical majority threw out all motions in favour of change, and the minister was able to soothe his political conscience, which he never allowed to pass out of his control, by the thought that his conduct always received the best sanction which a representative system could give it.

*The
Reform
Banquets,*
1848. Consequently the reformers were driven to turn from the Chambers to the People, and appropriately enough they appealed to the latter by means of banquets. The masses, desiring to eat, should at least be shown that the reformers desiring to vote had no conscientious objection to hearty meals. Thiers, always an inveterate busy-body, Odillon Barrot, and Duvergier de Hauranne and their friends displayed their eloquence and appetites to

admiring audiences. At the same time, Lamartine used all the poetic fervour which he possessed to strike a more sentimental chord in the great living heart of the French nation. And the folly of Guizot completed the work begun by his enemies. He forbade a banquet, which had been extensively advertised, and it was abandoned. But Barrot proceeded to impeach the Minister; popular excitement was roused because the people had been deprived of the innocent pleasure of watching a spectacle in which their souls delighted, and perhaps because it was felt that Ministers who would not even allow these eloquent gentlemen to eat in peace, must surely be responsible for the hunger of humbler crowds. Guizot lost his nerve and resigned in haste; his panic fear communicated itself to the whole Government, and when Molé had failed to form a ministry, Louis-Philippe threw himself into the arms of the Opposition and Thiers and Barrot assumed office. But such a *volte face*, which a little earlier would at any rate have satisfied the banqueters and probably served to pacify the mob by depriving it of leaders, now came too late. A few barricades had been raised rather as a jest than with any serious intentions; some soldiers without orders fired upon the crowd; a cry for vengeance and the Social Revolution arose; the Republic was demanded. The Citizen King abdicated without attempting resistance, and the Orleanist Monarchy, middle-class to the last, left Paris in a four-wheeled cab.

Feb. 1848.

Resignation of Guizot, Feb. 1848.

Abdication of Louis-Philippe, Feb. 1848.

The mere fact that the French people not only shouted for but also secured a republic is enough to show the remarkable change which had come over Europe in eighteen years. But the change is still more strikingly illustrated by the events which followed in the stronghold of good order, the very citadel of restfulness and peace. Metternich still held sway at Vienna, but now he

§ 10. State of the Austrian Empire.

Metternich saw that 'riot would soon become revolution', bowed and resigned. He was soon compelled to leave Austria and to hasten westwards in disguise, for the Viennese Liberals proved their deep love for personal liberty by setting a price on his head. There is a certain grim irony in the fact that he could find no refuge except in England, which he had always regarded as the home of the ideas against which he strove, and as the most bitter of his enemies.

Reception
of the news
in Europe.

Thus fell Prince Metternich, who for nearly forty years had controlled the destinies of the Austrian Empire, and who for more than thirty years had been the most imposing, if not the most noble, figure in European politics. His life's work had ended in failure; the peace for which he had laboured gave place to confusion worse confounded; and his name, so far from being honoured, has been handed down as symbolical of all that is most oppressive in government, of all that is most hostile to the progress of the human race. Enthusiastic Liberals throughout the world greeted the news of his overthrow with hymns of triumphant rejoicing; their very children lisped the joy-bringing words, 'Metternich is fallen, is fallen!' Nor have historians failed to echo this contemporary verdict. In the pages of many books it is recorded that he long held the fair goddess of Liberty fast bound in misery and iron; that by his fall the chains were struck from those bruised and bleeding limbs.

Estimate
of Metter-
nich's work
in Austria.

To correct the verdict of history is always dangerous, and never more so than when the verdict has gained the approval of the most vocal and successful portion of mankind. But it may be suggested that with all his egoism, all his love of phrases, all his pettiness of mind, Metternich was at least sincere. In the supreme moment of crisis, having faced the mob which thirsted for his blood, and

awed them into momentary silence, he told them that his life might be summed up in the one word 'Devotion'. Devoted he was; devoted to the Austrian monarchy, perhaps devoted also to the ideal of stability and of a world delivered from war. And he had at least done something for the country which he loved. Assuming office at a moment when Austria was draining to the dregs the cup of shame held to her lips by Napoleon, he had made her the arbiter of Europe and raised her to a pitch of glory unsurpassed in all her long annals. And he had accomplished this without having recourse to the physical methods of a Frederic the Great, by diplomacy, by mere strength of personality, patience and steadfastness. Since his day, national feeling has greatly developed in the Empire which he ruled; it has hardly increased either the power or the prosperity or the peace of that Empire. If Metternich were indeed a political Apollyon, then it would seem that the services of an angel of darkness are in politics sometimes more valuable than those of bright angels of light.

CHAPTER V

THE YEAR 1848

§ 1. State of Italy: the Literary Movement. § 2. Mazzini.
§ 3. Charles Albert. § 4. Pius IX. § 5. Constitutional movement
in Italy. § 6. National movements in the Austrian Empire. § 7.
The Slav movement. § 8. Anarchy in the Austrian Empire.
§ 9. Revolutions in Germany. § 10. The Ante-Parliament. § 11.
Significance of the year 1848.

§ 1. State
of Italy:
the Literary
Movement.

THE fall of Metternich was no isolated event ; it was one of a series of incidents which involved the general, though often temporary, substitution of political angels of light for the servants of that Viennese prince of darkness. Throughout Europe there were revolutions ; everywhere the walls of reaction fell before the trumpet-call of Liberty and Freedom, national and personal. Nor were these outbreaks the expression of any sudden change in the political temper of the Continent. They were the result of eighteen preparatory years, and they had been so fully anticipated that a biographer of the Austrian chancellor had been able, fourteen years earlier, to write that Metternich himself recognized the certainty of his ultimate failure. And the causes are not far to seek. The very success with which 'stability' had been pursued undermined the foundation upon which 'stability' reposed. Europe had been given peace, or at least immunity from serious war, and having tasted the sweet cup of quietude, she had been drugged into insensibility of the danger of revolution. Moral hearts no longer trembled at the word 'Republic', at Jacobin phrases such as 'the Rights of Man' ; advocacy of 'the People's Rule' was no longer reprobrated by all godly men. And this calmness in the face of the spectres of the past was not due merely to

a feeling of fancied security. It was the result also of growing independence of opinion, which took the lead out of the hands of those who had much and placed it in the hands of those who had little. Just as in England the Industrial Revolution and the Reform Bill transferred the balance of political power from the holders of property to the possessors of votes, making it needful to cajole and to bribe with promises an incorruptible and unintelligent electorate, so on the Continent men were less and less inclined to be silent and still in the presence of the awful majesty of constituted authority. Rather they listened greedily to the flattering phrases, the inspiring compliments of the new literary school, which, despite censorship and opposition, preached to the masses in a tongue which touched their hearts by conjuring up dazzling visions of gloriously impossible paradises.

To the enthusiastic temperament of the Italian race, ^{The} such heavenly messages appealed with double force. ^{Literary} The ^{Movement.} warm sun of the south clothed fantasies with the garb of complete reality, and so in Italy the literary movement gained its greatest hold and produced the largest measure of unrest. The peninsula, indeed, usurped the place of France, stifled into good behaviour by the all-pervading umbrella of a most virtuous revolution. Gallic idealism seemed to have taken refuge in Italy, and yet nowhere was the hopelessness of such idealism better realized. The futility of reform and revolution alike was accepted; of the first, because where government was in general utterly bad, the chances of any voluntary improvement seemed to be utterly negligible; of the second, because the might of Austria was overwhelming, because opinion as to methods was so divided, because in a country without common nationality, the national spirit was somewhat weak.

Massimo
d'Azeglio.

These almost insuperable difficulties were pointed out by the writers of the period, whose prevailing note was pessimism tinged with that extravagant optimism which utter hopelessness can alone inspire. The pessimistic note was struck softly by Massimo d'Azeglio, whose position as a servant of the quasi-beneficent House of Savoy possibly inclined him to advocate those methods of peaceful resistance of which he was the exponent, and the futility of which must have been apparent to a man of his intelligence. Cesare Balbo played the same tune in a louder key. He argued that a kingdom, a confederation, and a republic were all equally unattainable, and that Italian unity must wait patiently until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire should make it possible by affording Austria adequate compensation for the loss of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. And here the wild hopefulness of despair appears. Balbo regarded the partition of Turkey as probable, the renunciation of their Italian provinces by the Habsburgs as not unlikely. The attainment of Italian unity could be allowed to depend upon the settlement of the most difficult question in European politics and upon the sudden conversion to altruism of a by no means unselfish dynasty.

Cesare
Balbo.

Durando
and
Gioberti.

That Italian unity could only be the result of some profound change was true enough, and the obstacles in its path—Austria, the Pope, and racial divisions—were seen by the more sober observers. Durando, indeed, was so conscious of the centrifugal tendencies which existed that he proposed to humour them ; his unitary aspirations only led him to hope for a triple alliance of States, corresponding to the spheres of influence of Sardinia, the Papacy, and Naples. Gioberti was more optimistic, and up to a certain point more practical. A confederation of the existing States would avoid the raising of many perilous questions

as to interests and rights ; it might be the prelude to more complete union. But in suggesting a head for this league, he seemed carefully to ignore both the tendencies of the age and the past history of his country. Alfieri had long since given utterance to a widely held opinion that the Papacy had suffered moral decline owing to the sinking of the spiritual in the temporal office. But Gioberti, declaring that this view was disproved by Papal heroism in the face of Napoleonic threats, put forward the successor of St. Peter as leader of his proposed federation. As all Italy could not rule the Pope, the Pope should rule all Italy.

But his rule was to be exalted and refined by idealism. Italy should resume her true position ; becoming once more the intellectual centre of the world, she should exercise again that moral sway which she had wielded in the days of an Innocent III. And here a new, a most important note was struck. As long as Italians despaired of themselves, union was but an idle dream ; enthusiasm was needed to counteract the inertia bred of depression, and the enthusiastic spirit, found in Gioberti, was more effectually expressed by the most influential, if not the wisest, of the earlier workers for the cause of Italian unity. Joseph Mazzini illustrates in a remarkable manner the intimate connexion between political optimism and personal pessimism. As he himself remarks, all share in the truest life was denied him ; he could not enjoy the blessings of woman's love, and his intense misery drove him to worship at a less material shrine. Not possessing happiness himself, almost 'hating happiness', he strove all his days to secure it for his fellow-countrymen. A happy Italy was his ideal ; a politically united Italy the means by which he sought to attain it.

§ 2.
Mazzini.

His
idealism.

And a profound conviction of its sacred character dignified his quest. Like Cromwell before him, like Metternich in his own time, he believed most implicitly that he was doing God service ; he sought inspiration from above, he was filled with unfaltering faith in the creed which he professed. It was no mere political theory that he preached ; he was the apostle of a new religion, and himself bearing an intolerable burden of anguish, he laboured to give to others a lively hope for the future. His faults were many, his mistakes frequent ; securing for his country the shadow, he perhaps deprived her of the substance, of unity. But it was his cry of ' God and the People ', his invigorating belief in mankind and his unbounded confidence in himself, which enabled him to rouse Italy to a sense of her own identity, to overcome the deadening pessimism, to fill Italians with that faith without which works cannot be accomplished. Casting aside all half-solutions, boldly ignoring the difficulties which beset him, refusing to see the practical, and ever pursuing the ideal, Mazzini gave his countrymen strength to face death and to bear torture. The very name of his society of ' Young Italy ', and the regulations which governed it, reflect his considered opinion. Membership was confined to men under forty years of age, Mazzini believing that the future was to inexperience and that the wise caution of the old was but an obstacle in the path to victory. Success could only be the reward of enthusiastic rashness, the outcome of deep sentiment.

His
enthusiasm
for the
poor.

Yet he was not blind to the 'merits of unsentimental inducements ; he did not appeal merely to the spiritual and enthusiastic side of the Italian nature. At the end of all his soul-stirring addresses, there sounds a more practical note. Austria represents, indeed, the prostitution of all that is highest and best in human life to

the aliens' lust for power; but she represents also the denial of material good to the people, her tyranny means hungry children, it means agony of body as well as agony of mind. And it was, perhaps, to this side of his teaching that the influence of Mazzini was really due. While he ennobled simple prayers by infusing into them something of his own deeply religious spirit, while he moved generous hearts by the burning words in which he denounced a system that strove to destroy the soul as well as to fetter the body, he was still above all the advocate of the poor, the friend of those who suffered want. Through him, Italian unity became something more than the mere creed of politicians deprived of chances of distinction, something more than the dream of a few thinkers who saw the glorious past of their country reproduced in the future. It grew into a vital belief, moving the mind of the people, filling the poor with hope that in political union they would find sustenance for their starving babes and the happiness for which they yearned. And it is in this that the value of Mazzini's work consists. His very extravagance was of service, since in so desperate a situation only the faith which believes the impossible to be attainable could bring the attainable within the bounds of possibility.

At the same time there was much in his doctrines which bordered upon the absurd, and more especially his republicanism was harmful to the cause which he advocated. By making a particular type of government the panacea for all the ills to which Italian flesh was heir, he alienated many possible sympathizers, and was perhaps ultimately responsible for the failure of United Italy. Indeed, he was not always blind himself to the danger of his teaching, and though the virtue of the masses was to make his country the heaven on earth of which he

His mistakes.

dreamed, he inclined on occasion to place trust in the virtue of mere princes. For a moment he believed that Charles Albert of Sardinia might yet justify the hopes which had been formed of him; for a moment he looked to Pius IX to disprove the theory that Catholicism and Liberalism were incompatible.

§ 3. Charles Albert. The expectations which he formed of these two rulers were shared by less enthusiastic minds. But the King was easily outdistanced by the Priest in the race for the favour of those who were ostensibly foes of all clerical rule. Charles Albert was suspect to the reactionaries and 'immoral' in the eyes of Metternich, but these testimonials to his character could not obliterate the memory of his dubious conduct as Prince of Carignano. And his peculiar temperament made it hard for him to overcome the distrust with which the Liberals regarded him. He lacked the living faith which can lead a man onwards without faltering; he had but scant confidence in his own destiny, and his inherent pessimism caused him to realize very vividly the difficulties which faced him.

His difficulties. Nor were those difficulties mere figments of a morbid imagination. However 'national' the House of Savoy might have become as the result of centuries of rule in Italy, Piedmont was still a partially alien state. And while she was viewed with misgivings by patriots on account of the selfishness of her historical policy, she had won from the other States of the peninsula that jealousy with which successful double-dealing is generally regarded by less fortunate exponents of the deceptive art. Nor could the views of Austria be lightly ignored; she was at once too near and too powerful a neighbour. Charles Albert, for whose exclusion from the throne the Court of Vienna had intrigued, had been compelled at the moment

of his accession to promise to maintain his absolute power, and there was no doubt that Metternich would be quick to resent any breach of this contract. Finally, the traditional policy of his family helped to deter the Sardinian king from any decisive action. To absorb Lombardy like an artichoke, leaf by leaf, was not an heroic line of conduct, but it was one likely to fascinate a deliberate and self-distrustful monarch.

None the less, Charles Albert never ceased to aspire to the leadership of an anti-Habsburg crusade, nor was d'Azeglio unjustified in looking on his king as a sincere friend to the cause of independence. But the path was arduous and the goal seemed ever more distant. The King was obliged to labour to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of his prospective fellow-workers, and yet to adopt measures to secure himself from immediate danger. The marriage of his son to a Habsburg archduchess appeared as the prelude to a return to the Metternich fold, and his reforms hardly sufficed to counterbalance so specific an act of conciliation. The reorganization of the army, the reform of the legal code, a mildly Liberal tone in administration, though admirable in themselves, were not the desired grant of a Constitution, and 'the hesitating King' was thoroughly hostile to secret societies, repressing the agitation which Mazzini sought to foment by an incursion into Savoy. Even when he at last ventured to enter upon a tariff war with Austria, though he gained the plaudits of a congress of politicians, disguised as naturalists, he failed to satisfy the leaders of Young Italy. They looked rather to Rome than to Turin, and Charles Albert sought wearily for a chance to follow the path along which the Pope seemed to be leading Italian patriots.

His
reforms.

Mazzini's
attack on
Savoy,
1833.

Tariff War
with
Austria,
1846.

For even sober politicians inclined to believe that the

§ 4.
Pius IX.

Vicar of Christ was at heart the champion of liberty, and the wildest hopes were aroused by the apparently startling change in the character of the Papal Government. No district had groaned more heavily under the burden of corrupt administration than the States of the Church, nowhere had repression been more consistent, tyranny more debased and debasing. Metternich himself admitted that here reform was advisable, though he would not coerce the Holy Father. But when Gregory XVI died, the hopes of Liberals suddenly revived. They dared to put forward a candidate for the Papal chair in the person of Cardinal Gizzi, an avowed if moderate sympathizer with their ideas. He was not elected, but the choice of the Sacred College fell upon a man who for a while seemed likely to realize the dreams of Gioberti.

Election of
Pius IX,
1846.

His
reforms.

Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, who took the name of Pius IX, was almost unknown at the moment of his election; his chief title to fame was his honourable conduct as governor of Imola during the Austrian occupation. Thus, as his character was matter for speculation, extraordinary hopes were formed as the result of his earliest acts. Signs of sympathy with reform were hailed with unbounded enthusiasm, and the Pope, perhaps affected by his popularity, travelled further along the same path. Cardinal Gizzi was appointed Secretary of State; laymen were admitted to membership in the newly created municipality of Rome; a civic guard was formed; and these measures, mild enough in actual fact, acquired an exaggerated significance because they were taken by the Pope. Pius IX became the hero of Italian Liberals; demonstrations in his honour were organized throughout Italy; and even when advance was not so rapid as had been hoped, the halting progress of the Holy Father was attributed not to any lack of will on his part but to

the malign influence of evil advisers. So alarmed was the Court of Vienna at the conduct of the Pope that Metternich was actually accused of plotting against his life; and the Austrian Government seized the pretext which vague evidence of disorder afforded to occupy Ferrara in flagrant violation of all the principles of international law. But such violence served only to draw a protest from Rome and to encourage the English ambassador openly to support the Liberal movement. Though the clear insight of Metternich led him cheerfully to declare that a Liberal Pope was unthinkable, this optimism or pessimism was not shared by less astute observers. Men forgot the eternal *non possumus* with which the Papacy has always met cries for radical reform; and as the illusory nature of the hopes formed of Pius was not realized, enthusiasm grew apace.

And as it spread over Italy, it led to the outbreak of a veritable epidemic of Constitutionalism. The example was set in Sicily, where a half-detected conspiracy proved successful and led to the proclamation of a Constitution both at Palermo and Naples. Leopold of Tuscany, who had already freed the Press, was terrified by an *émeute* at Leghorn into following suit, and finally a 'Fundamental Statute' was issued to regulate the temporal government of the States of the Church. Two Chambers were established at Rome and responsibility of Ministers admitted; but the College of Cardinals retained a veto and a most disappointing monopoly of all real power, Pius declaring that he could proceed no further along the Liberal path. Then at last a Constitution was granted to Piedmont, in the form of a royal *Statute*, embodying in the main those reforms which had been proposed by Count Cavour, a journalist rising to fame owing to his articles in the *Risorgimento*. There was indeed a 'resur-

Occupation
of Ferrara,
1847.

§ 5. Con-
stitutional
movement
in Italy,
1848.

rection' throughout Italy, and only in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom did absolutism hold its own.

State of
the
Austrian
provinces.

There was, perhaps, less need for representative institutions, less need for Liberalism at all, in the Austrian provinces than in any other part of Italy. Good government, in the sense of efficiency and honesty of administration, and care for the well-being of the people, was an integral part of the Metternich system, and if the Emperor did draw a vast income from his Italian provinces, this was at least evidence that those provinces were prospering under his rule. It is true that gruesome tales were told of the horrors of the Spielberg, the dungeon in which exiles from Lombardy were confined, but those horrors were endured as punishment for high-souled devotion to the task of overthrowing Austrian rule in Italy, a devotion which was not really appreciated by its prospective victims. Nor was it the wish of Metternich to use such drastic measures. He would gladly have employed softer agencies; having himself succumbed to the fascinations of an actress, he hoped that he might calm the political unrest of Lombardy in a like sweet embrace. The theatre of Milan would have been the scene of the triumphs of the attractive Fanny Elsler, had not the pleasure-loving Milanese remained at home lest they should be constrained to applaud an importation from Vienna. Still Metternich congratulated himself that a well-fed population would remain contented with abundance of good things, and pay no heed to hungry 'patriots'.

Disaffec-
tion in
Lombardy.

But he had failed to make allowance for the influence of sentiment and for the activity of journalists. Viennese censorship failed wholly to stifle political writing; in season and out of season the cause of abstract good was exalted at the expense of the present good which men

enjoyed, and an ingenious race found no difficulty in proving that Austrian benefits were injuries. In the local assemblies, which had been allowed to survive, a demand was heard for an increase of their powers, for a revision of taxation, for a lightening of the burdens of the poor, and as time went on these demands became more insistent. The disaffected hoped that the death of the 'Imperial Gaoler', under which euphemism they described the Emperor Francis, would result in a change of system, that the Habsburgs would deliberately prepare the disintegration of their dominions. But when these expectations were not realized political unrest increased, and was enhanced by the return of exiled agitators who undertook its direction. Specific demands for reform were made; they remained unheard, and the patriotic party resolved to adopt heroic measures. Tobacco was a Government monopoly; the Milanese bound themselves not to smoke. Soon they went further and attacked Austrian soldiers, who were less abstemious; riots ensued in various towns. The shooting of a few rioters, the accidental death of some harmless spectators, the momentary violence of an irritated soldiery, were magnified into a wholesale and deliberate massacre, so that when the news of Metternich's fall arrived, Lombardy and Venetia burst into revolt. Radetzky, commanding the imperial forces, was compelled to retire behind the lines of the Quadrilateral, and when Charles Albert declared war, when the armies of the other States hastened to the help of Sardinia, when the Austrians were actually beaten in the field at Goito, the overthrow of Habsburg power in Italy seemed to be imminent, if not complete.

Tobacco
riots, Jan.
1848.

Revolt of
Lombardy.

War
between
Austria and
Sardinia.

Nor could help be sent from Vienna, since upon the whole Austrian Empire burst the storm which had been brewing for nearly a hundred years. Joseph II had pursued

§ 6.
National
movements
in the

Austrian
Empire.

the ideal of centralization not wisely but too furiously; he had accentuated diversity in his search for uniformity, and his successors reaped the fruit of his unwisdom. Those differences in race, religion, and language, which have always been the bane of his dynasty, had been constantly deepened since his death, and now the removal of the personification of repose freed the pent-up stream of 'Progress'. No sooner had Metternich fallen, than decorum gave place to licence, and all trace of political sobriety vanished in a bacchanalian orgy of triumphant virtue. The whole machinery of government was paralysed, and while an epileptic Emperor wandered helplessly in a maze of apology and rebuke, the dominant and subject races of his dominions competed for the prize of political ascendancy. While the Germans strove to retain their historical supremacy, the Magyars demanded exclusive privileges and the Slavs equal rights, the contest producing an atmosphere of entire confusion, in which perhaps only one thing appears clearly—the complete selfishness of the exponents of patriotism and the profoundly reactionary character of the more ardent Liberals.

The
Magyar
movement.

And this is especially evident in Hungary, a country dominated by a dull and boorish aristocracy, which usurped attractive epithets only rightly applied to a free and freedom-loving race. The Magyars formed a section of the population, more clamorous and turbulent, more conservative and corrupt, more influential but less numerous than the subject races over which they tyrannized. They had a safety-valve in a Diet and many cauldrons in which discontent might seethe in the shape of local assemblies. Rather unwisely, the Imperial Government had shut the safety-valve by suspending the sittings of the central body, and so political agitation fermented more vigorously in the smaller gatherings. The effect

was to increase the power of the less responsible leaders ; men like Szechenyi, who devised the famous suspension bridge of Buda-Pest and who would have been content with economic progress, were replaced by more advanced agitators, men of the type of Kossuth, Deák, and Eötvös, who had become filled with Western phrases and pseudo-Western ideas. Thus, when the Diet was revived, the opposition assumed a new character. In the Upper House, the Magnates, the dominant aristocracy, continued to press only for the maintenance of their exclusive privileges, as they had done under Maria Theresa and Joseph. But in the Lower House, the delegates of the local bodies advocated equality of taxation, freedom of the Press, removal of the peasants' burdens, and, most important of all, recognition of Magyar nationality. Strenuous opposition to the use of Latin in the Diet led the Imperial Government to permit debates to be conducted in the Hungarian tongue ; this initial victory was followed by a strengthening of opposition as the result of an error on the part of Metternich. Resistance to the Court of Vienna had been at first rather half-hearted because its leaders could not agree as to whether the Diet or the county assemblies should be made the centre of political life. But when the latter bodies were dissolved and replaced by nominated administrators on the instructions of the Austrian Chancellor, all sections united, and in the universal anger, Kossuth found his opportunity.

This ardent patriot had first figured as editor of a Kossuth. Liberal paper, the *Pesti Hírlap*, and, being fortunate enough to annoy the Government, was for a time imprisoned. On his release, he availed himself of so excellent an opportunity for entering upon a political career, and in this new sphere his eloquence was invaluable, both as a means of rousing enthusiasm and as a convenient

cloak for his inconsistency. Ostensibly he was the champion of Liberalism in general, joining with Deák in setting out a definite programme of reform, which proposed taxation for all classes, yearly Diets, triennial elections, more representation for towns, and the abolition of the disabilities of the peasants. Actually, he stood for Magyar predominance; there was nothing really sincere in the 'baptismal speech' in which he urged all friends of progress to unite, and in which he insisted that their interests were identical.

§ 7. The
Slav move-
ment : (i)
the Illyrian
provinces ;

His inconsistency first appeared in his attitude towards the parallel agitation among the subject races of the Austrian Empire. The Slavs were divided into two main sections, the Czechs of Bohemia and the Serbs and Croats of the south-western provinces. Prague was the capital of the former; the latter found a more dubious centre in Agram, the seat of their provincial Diet. But Croatia and her allied provinces were attached to the Hungarian monarchy, and were duly repressed by the dominant Magyars, repression being the more easy since, despite Napoleon, 'Illyrian' nationality was something too elusive for the uneducated imagination of the more backward races. Gradually, however, a sense of identity arose. Gaj published an 'Illyrian Gazette' for the provinces, in an attempt to stimulate the new unitary sentiment. But at once the Magyars rose in defence of their sacred monopoly of 'nationality'. They induced the Imperial Government to order that the title of the paper should be so changed as to emphasize differences rather than unity; and when Serbs and Croats claimed to share in the new freedom of Hungary, their demands were rejected. Kossuth pointed out that Liberty could only mean the maintenance of Magyar supremacy, and, as a matter of fact, the patriotic party placed the delegates

from Agram in a hopeless position in the Diet of Pressburg. When Latin ceased to be the language of debate, the Croatian representatives were obliged either to learn a foreign and difficult tongue or to remain for ever silent.

It was this insistence by the Magyars on the supremacy (ii) in Bohemia. of their own language which led to the development of the Slav agitation. Bohemia was at once a Slav country and unified; she had the advantage of a definite historical existence apart from either Austria or Hungary. In addition, she numbered among her population patriotic professors with a taste for forgery; she was soon supplied with an adequate Czech literature, and enough archaic poetry was produced to place Bohemia on a literary equality with Hungary. And finding to their surprise that their ancestors had been veritable heroes, the Slavs were roused to enthusiastic opposition to the exclusive tendencies of the Magyars; Pan-Slavism came into being, and the struggle of nationalities began to divide the opposition to the Imperial Government.

Had that Government possessed even a moderate degree § 8. of competence, it might have used the rivalry between Anarchy in the Austrian Empire. Magyars and Slavs to establish its own supremacy; it had rarely had a better opportunity for putting into practice the Habsburg motto *Divide et impera*. But the fall of Metternich gave political power, or rather political office, to a group of utter nonentities. The Administration was not even consistent in submitting to the terrorism of the Vienna mob; it nullified the possible merit of concession by a half-hearted return to the principles of the fallen Chancellor. Ferdinand, in one interval of sanity, contradicted the orders which he had given when last he had been capable of giving orders at all; in the more frequent periods, during which he was a mental and physical wreck, the Archdukes imitated his example.

A constitution was promised; Windischgrätz was appointed dictator; more concessions were proposed, and finally, when the offer of a Constitution to all the Habsburg dominions except Hungary produced a riot, Ferdinand fled to Innsbruck. From this safe retreat he issued more promises, but no attempt was made either to keep them or to make their observance unnecessary. Indeed, the Government of Vienna showed a complete inability to adopt any course at all; terrified by unexpected disorder, it would not realize the true strength of its position as potential arbiter between the two conflicting nationalities; it could not gather courage to play off Slav against Magyar. Thus, though it recognized Jellacic, an ardent 'Illyrian', as Ban of Croatia, without waiting for approval from the Hungarian Diet, it nullified its action by granting a responsible Ministry to Hungary. This amounted to a practical acceptance of the disruption of the monarchy, and however impossible it may have been for the Emperor at this juncture to coerce his loyal subjects beyond the Theiss, it would have been better by far to have faced even civil war at once. As it was, the weakness of the Government threw a shadow of legality over the revolutionary proceedings of the Magyars.

Flight of Ferdinand, May 1848.

Jellacic, Ban of Croatia, Mar. 1848.

Responsible Ministry in Hungary, Mar. 1848.

State of the Empire in June 1848.

But in the circumstances nothing else could be expected. The Vienna mob really controlled the situation, and being itself infected with Pan-Germanism was eager to foster any movement likely to lead to the sacrifice of the non-Teutonic dominions of the Habsburgs. Thus the nationalist agitations daily grew more violent, and within six months of Metternich's fall, the Austrian Empire, which was to have been saved by his resignation, appeared to stand upon the brink of ruin. Ferdinand was powerless for good and extremely powerful for evil; sane enough to make appalling mistakes, he lacked the sanity necessary

to enable him to realize either the mistakes which he made or the hollowness of those Liberal triumphs which so alarmed him. Austria itself was thus allowed to fall under the control of an ignorant and unpatriotic mob, which had received an excellent musical training as the result of the care of Metternich and the genius of Beethoven, but had never secured even a superficial acquaintance with the art of politics. In Hungary, an independent Ministry laboured to put the finishing touches to its separatist work and to establish the complete domination of the Magyar race. In Croatia, Jellacic, abandoned by the Emperor in a moment of distrustful fear, ruled as a practical dictator and was ready to fight to the death against German or Hungarian aggression. And elsewhere the star of 'fortunate Austria' seemed to be waxing dim. Italy was in revolt and the issue of the struggle yet doubtful; Germany appeared to have passed for ever out of Habsburg tutelage.

The Austrian Government, indeed, had no time to concern itself with the affairs of the Germanic Confederation, especially as her influence over it had long been exercised with increasing difficulty. Metternich had found himself less and less able to check the growth of Liberalism; he protested vainly against the pernicious tendencies of Frederic William IV, whose ill-balanced mind responded with little cordiality to the warnings of his would-be mentor. And though there shone in Germany a few bright particular stars of reaction, such as Ernest of Hanover, the destroyer of a Constitution, the 'morality' of most rulers was sadly to seek. 'Progress' was the cry, was the atmosphere, in the south; representative institutions sprang up like mushrooms on the news of the latest French Revolution, even before the apostle of stability had fallen; and, worst of all, nationalist

§ 9. Revolutions in Germany.

sentiments and demands for the reform of the Confederation echoed loudly through the German States.

Disturbances at Berlin, Mar. 1848.

And while Metternich, hunted for his life, fled in disguise through the land which had once welcomed him as 'a new Messiah', the last bulwarks of reaction, Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia, gave way before the waves of the Viennese storm. Frederic William IV, faced by the same alternatives that faced Ferdinand, was equally unwilling to enter upon a struggle. When a riot at Berlin had resulted in bloodshed, he promised a United Diet of his dominions; and 'wandering star' as he was, he presently went further and gave signs of approving a movement directed to overthrow the Metternich system root and branch.

§ 10. The Ante-Parliament, Mar. 1848.

For while the pressure of public opinion secured the repeal of the Carlsbad Decrees, the more advanced progressives attempted to put into practice the theories which had been advocated in their many earlier gatherings. The Ante-Parliament, a species of committee of prominent Liberals, containing most of those who had suffered persecution during the years of repression, was assembled, and its advocacy of a revision of the Constitution seemed to win the favour of Frederic William. The King decorated himself in the colours of the old Holy Roman Empire, took part in a theatrically absurd procession through the streets of his capital, and gave vent to some equally futile remarks. He even wrote to Nicholas, expressing his delight at the 'glorious German Revolution' which was in progress, and though his wild conduct was not matter for serious concern, it was perhaps only the divisions of the reformers which prevented some substantial reforms from being accomplished.

Divisions in the

But those divisions were acute, and appeared clearly in the debates of the Ante-Parliament, though the session of

that body was confined to a few days. Its more ardent members sought salvation in the creation of a German republic; disregarding such trivial obstacles as armies and kings, they believed that their enthusiasm unaided would be able to overcome the hostility of mere governments. Other deputies, more cautious and possessed of greater glimmerings of political intelligence, saw that the decisions of a debating society, however representative of the intellect of Germany, would not bind Prussia or Bavaria, even if Austria were obliged to remain for ever passive, and even if the minor States sincerely preferred some new order to the old. The arguments of these saner members were directed to conciliate inevitable opposition by the advocacy of monarchical institutions.

They prevailed in debate and the enthusiasts were driven to resort to more irregular courses. Following the most approved French models, they agitated eagerly for the conversion of the Ante-Parliament into a National Convention, pending the meeting of the projected General Assembly. They hoped so to secure for themselves that control of the 'revolution' which had been secured by the extremists in the Reign of Terror; and they fomented riots in order to gain their ends. But unlike their French prototypes, they failed to be successfully violent, and their failure ruined the cause of republicanism. The Ante-Parliament separated, leaving a committee of fifty to prepare a Constitution for the regular German Assembly to consider. It had accomplished little beyond illustrating the renunciation of those principles upon which the Metternich system was based.

Nor was the renunciation of those principles confined to Germany; from Paris to Buda-Pest, from Palermo to Berlin, political 'immorality' was triumphant. And though that triumph was short-lived, though heavy retri-

Ante-Parliament.

Triumph of the monarchical party in the Ante-Parliament.

§ 11. Significance of the year 1848.

bution fell upon its authors, and though the laughter of Liberals was speedily turned to bitterest weeping, the effect of the momentary victory remained. Europe had still to wait many years to see Italy become a Mazzinian heaven, to behold the dazzling vision of united Germany, to rejoice with the 'high-spirited' Magyars in their freedom, and to congratulate the Czechs on the unfettered use of their language. Yet the Metternich system was none the less destroyed. Based on honesty, in so far as its author never permitted himself to play at Liberalism or claimed to represent the sacred sovereignty of a free and enlightened people, it could only rest upon one permanent foundation, the voluntary submission of the Many to the direction of the Few.

Growth of
independ-
ence of
opinion.

And such submission could no longer be secured. Men had tasted of the tree of political knowledge and had learned that they might eat of it and not surely die. Henceforth they would debate, they would speculate, and from their debates and speculations would win conviction of their monopoly of political virtue, of their superior knowledge of the art of ruling. Such experts could not be expected tamely to submit to deprivation of all voice in their own government, and thus absolute power could no longer rest on consent. If it were to continue at all, it must be based either on force or fraud.

Govern-
ment by
deception.

But rule by terror is at best a temporary expedient; force and fear can never be the permanent basis of a State. Thus the only alternative to genuine popular government, while the Many so greatly desired to manage their own affairs, was found in that fraudulent system of which Napoleon III was the most gifted exponent. The people were to be flattered and deceived, given a semblance of omnipotent power, sedulously corrupted, and skilfully debased. A *plébiscite* should justify all acts; the voice of

the people should on all occasions be heard and obeyed. But the voice must be trained to speak words good in the ears of the ruler; the hands must learn to vote in the one right way. For Metternich's frank repression of all manifestations of popular feeling, his honest disregard for the wishes of his subjects, there was substituted a new system. The democracy, no longer ignored, should be led and used. And meanwhile the masses, sick and weary of the disappointments which they had endured, as hungry as ever and as cold, eagerly welcomed further deception, eagerly embraced the idealism preached to them, and toiled, fought, endured, and died for their betrayers.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESTORATION OF ORDER

§ 1. The Second Republic. § 2. Louis Napoleon. § 3. The War between Austria and Sardinia. § 4. The Venetian and Roman Republics. § 5. Restoration of order in Austria. § 6. The Magyars and Croats. § 7. The Fall of Hungary. § 8. The Frankfort Parliament. § 9. Failure of the Frankfort Parliament. § 10. Affairs of Prussia. § 11. Restoration of the Germanic Confederation.

§ 1. The
Second
Republic.

IT is hardly an exaggeration to say that the masses have rarely been so effectively betrayed as they were by the leaders of the movements of 1848. They had been induced to enter upon the hazardous paths of conspiracy and revolution by an appeal to their most deep-seated emotions; and they had found that these paths led not to the haven where they would be, but to a goal hardly to be distinguished from the starting-point. They had been taught that if only they would remove Tweedledum and accept the rule of Tweedledee, then no Utopia would be beyond realization; any dreams might be translated into facts. But whether Lamartine or Mazzini or Kossuth preached the sermon, and whatever might be the chosen text, one final word was never left unspoken. Theories of politics and ideas of 'nationality' were expounded freely and fully; the glories of representative institutions and the value of 'popular rights' were set forth in glowing terms. But those who heard interpreted all such teaching in the light of the material idealism of a Louis Blanc; knowing only the 'good' of a bountiful table, the Many could not understand that, on the lips of a poet or a journalist-politician, the promise of all good things merely

implied the blessing of the full rights of citizenship. The Parisian artisan, the Italian maker of macaroni, the Austrian and German producers of the beer-mugs of the happy, alike embraced the cause of liberty, alike championed the rights of peoples, because they saw the sunken cheeks of their children prospectively shining with rudest health, because they believed implicitly in the close relationship between 'nationality' and bread, between representative government and cheese.

Nor were their leaders altogether reluctant that they should hold this most convenient belief. Whether sincerely or no, the approach of economic miracles was persistently foretold; there was little hesitation in prophesying the coming of a carnal millennium. More especially did Lamartine depict in most brilliant colours the glories of that paradise of which his poetic republicanism dreamed, and when Louis Blanc had mistranslated the poet into prose, the Many could no longer be in doubt as to the essential features of that Elysium. A heaven of loaves and fishes would be open to them when the incubus of the Orleanist monarchy had been removed, when the people had been freed for ever from the burden of aristocratic government. And, as when Charles X had been driven forth the masses had anticipated a series of Gargantuan feasts, so when Louis-Philippe had hired his fatal cab, the Second Republic was acclaimed as the provider of an abundance of generous dinners. To secure that most desirable result was to be the task of the new Administration, which was appropriately composed of elements so divergent that it was assuredly bound to accomplish all things or nothing.

In it, cheek by jowl, sat Lamartine, whose food was ambrosia and whose mind was filled with godlike dreams, and Louis Blanc, thinking in terms of butchers' shops

Expectations of the French people.

Lamartine and Louis Blanc.

and artisan dwellings. The first believed that a republic would end all distress, for his distress was as ideal as his happiness; the second was firmly convinced that the revolution was social as well as political, since he could not conceive of value in mere Constitutional advance. And as both men were possessed of exemplary sincerity, to that sincerity they and their Republic and the masses fell victims. For they strove to redeem the pledges given by the makers of the revolution to their agents, the Many, and would not realize until too late that redemption was impossible, that poverty and unemployment will yield to no political magician, however sweet his accents, however brutally direct his methods. The poet, upon whose lips all France for the moment hung, could not deny the omnipotent virtue of his chosen panacea; he was therefore led to unite with Louis Blanc in one of the most ill-advised and disastrous of many futile strivings after the perfection of honesty in politics.

The
National
Work-
shops,
Mar. 1848.

For the rulers of the Second Republic were aware that the masses desired material blessings, and as honest men they could not refrain from attempting to gratify this desire. And Louis Blanc had his remedy ready to hand: the source of distress was unemployment, citizens had the right to work, the State the duty of supplying work to be done. Thus the National Workshops came into being, produced by a brain ignorant of economics and sanctioned by a genius dwelling ever in an atmosphere of unreality. To the Parisian artisans, clamouring for bread, the Government answered that it accepted the obligation of affording it, that it would employ all seeking employment. Forthwith from east and west, from north and south, hungry crowds flocked to share in the cornucopia which had been so miraculously discovered; not the capital alone, but all France wished to eat and be filled. The result

was as might have been foreseen, had the devisers of the scheme even condescended to examine the working of Gilbert's law in England and the blessings of the abolition of the workhouse test. Not controlling all the agents of production, the Government could not 'organize' labour or put an end to the evils of competition; the first necessity for the success of such a socialistic project was lacking, even if some magic wand had been in the hand of Lamartine to enable him in an instant to produce complete fluidity of labour. Restraint of immigration to Paris, the completion of all half-completed public undertakings, the reduction of the hours of labour and the payment merely of a half-day wage were insufficient to make the scheme workable. Soon the employees in the National Workshops were numbered not in thousands but in hundreds of thousands; France was rapidly drifting into a state of bankrupt pauperization, and the Government was faced with the alternatives of financial and economic ruin or of salvation by breach of faith and the abandonment of its most obvious title to existence.

It chose the latter course, as it was bound to do. The National Workshops were closed, and when the disappointed hungry rioted, they were crushed by Cavaignac, invested with dictatorial powers for the purpose. Order, economic and political, was re-established, and the country saved from the financial maelstrom into which it had plunged headlong. But none the less the Second Republic did not escape shipwreck. It had been created to give bread to men and it had not done so. To the masses, therefore, cheated of their hoped-for paradise as they had been cheated by the umbrella of Louis-Philippe, the existing order ceased to appeal, and it needed only a man to seize the opportunity for another *coup d'État*. Cavaignac might have played the part, but he was

Dictator-
ship of
Cavaignac,
June 1848.

obsessed by the conviction that he resembled the Roman dictator who so truly loved his plough. Like Cincinnatus, his work done, he laid down his office unobtrusively, and left the field open for one who should have less zeal for political virtue and more care for his own welfare. And such a man was at hand, ready to profit by misplaced Puritan self-abnegation.

§ 2. Louis
Napoleon.

Yet this man was not easily recognized as being destined to do that which Cavaignac would not do. There was little thought that the destruction of a régime, fortified by the eloquence of Lamartine and dignified by an epithet well calculated to bring back to mind the politically luscious orgies of the Reign of Terror, would be completed by a prominent, but unsuccessful, low-comedy actor. And Louis Napoleon, the man of destiny, was regarded at first as a very second-rate performer on the political stage. He had twice attempted to rouse France to a better appreciation of his capacity; on each occasion, his only reward had been to bring a smile to the face of a nation critical of wit. But he had the quality of perseverance, and he had also a valuable asset in the growth of a most abiding legend. Under the Orleanist Monarchy, it had ceased to be improper to mention the name of Napoleon. On the contrary, his ashes had been brought back to France and reinterred amid the jeers of Thackeray and the enthusiasm of Paris; and a tradition had rapidly arisen, partly as the result of some fictional works masquerading as histories, which converted 'the Corsican Tyrant', personification of evil into the 'Little Corporal', an amiable gentleman possessing considerable military skill and a collection of virtuous qualities which would probably have disgusted their supposed possessor.

His
character.

And Louis Napoleon was qualified to profit by the advantage thus conferred upon him. He certainly did

not lack astuteness; he was fully aware that his own personality could hardly rouse the enthusiasm necessary to his success as an adventurer. Suspected of cowardice and guilty of a tendency to procrastinate; cunning rather than wise, and subtle rather than clever, his great merits were a certain capacity for the production of obscure, but well-sounding phrases, and a keen sense of his own limitations. Having no false pride and much healthy ambition, having also a commendable lack of scruples, he was perfectly content to shroud his own valueless identity in that of his namesake, and to become merely the authorized exponent of a non-existent 'Napoleonic system', devised actually by enthusiastic writers of fiction, elaborated by the new adventurer, and fathered on the dead Emperor. Louis Napoleon had all Diocletian's sense of the advantage of partial withdrawal from the public gaze; he had John Wilkes's understanding of the use of popularity, however ridiculous and however ill-founded. From the very first he set to work deliberately to deceive France and indeed the continent of Europe. To his own country, he became an enigma, most attractive by reason of the contrast which it offered to the boring obviousness of a Louis-Philippe, guaranteed to afford at least excitement because full of contradictions. And his success was the direct result of his intentional obscurity. He focused the gaze of the world on himself, and as long as he could do this he was able to carry out his policy of posing as a sincere champion of liberty, and ruling with absolute power by means of a calculated veiling of his methods and objects.

From the very first he submitted himself modestly to the will of the people, whom he never intended to serve, whom he did intend to induce to crown him. When the Orleanist Monarchy had fallen, he hastened back to

Louis
Napoleon
elected
President,
Dec. 1848.

France, humbly asking to be allowed to help his beloved country, nor would he profit by the affection of Frenchmen until they had legalized his position by permitting the return of his family. Such calculated modesty was as effective as could have been wished. He was repatriated and elected a member of the legislature. To the Government, he seemed to be a harmless nonentity; to the people he rapidly became the embodiment of the virtue of the first Napoleon without his one undeniable vice of ambition. And thus, while his candidature for the presidency of the Republic was a source of amusement to more superficial observers, to those who were to choose the president it was a source of admiration; for a Napoleon to solicit, where he might have demanded, was indeed most delightful flattery. The honest Cavaignac, the socialistic Ledru-Rollin, had no prospect of success against such subtle hypocrisy, such a forcible appeal to imagination. Louis Napoleon was elected President by an overwhelming majority, and France ceased to be a Republic except in name; nothing was more certain than that the formal restoration of the Empire was only a question of time. The new ruler was perfectly content to wait, using the interval to reassure the *bourgeoisie* and Europe as to the meaning of the Bonapartism which he preached, and to reduce to order the factious elements in France.

§ 3. The
War
between
Austria and
Sardinia.

Thus the election of Louis Napoleon was really a victory in the cause of reaction and good order. An idealistic Republic had been tried and had failed; it culminated not in a popularly governed Utopia, but in a return to the most despotic régime that had ever existed in France; sentiment had failed as the basis of political society. And it was found equally unsatisfactory in Italy, where it proved inadequate to make up for the lack

of more material strength. The struggle against Austria was begun with hopes rather than with resources; the prevalent despair produced that wild optimism which is its usual outcome. Charles Albert, in particular, having for a moment escaped his extreme depression, and having for once taken a definite resolve, permitted himself to ignore all difficulties and to forget the critical situation in which he had placed his country, his friends, and himself. Because loud-voiced Liberalism had destroyed the oppressive political silence, because no one talked of any issue for the struggle except complete success, because the Austrians worked in silence, the King believed that all Italy was united in the sacred cause and that unanimity of opposition to the Habsburgs reigned throughout the peninsula.

Actually, the Italians, whatever else they might be, were not unanimous, and the example of making an agreement with Austria and with reaction was first set by the Vicar of Christ. Pius XI had that sincere horror of the clash of arms which befitted his sacred office; he aspired to play the rôle of peacemaker, nor would he sink the priest in the politician; and perhaps he feared also for the future of the Holy See if patriots of doubtful orthodoxy should gain a complete triumph. Thus, as soon as the hour for decisive action arrived, as soon as it was clear that not even the moral prestige of the Papacy could induce men to moderate their righteous anger, the temporary hero of the Liberals became the champion of reaction. Pius issued an Allocution, in which he announced in definite terms that he was unable to sanctify with his blessing the Holy War against Austria, and the appearance of Rome on the side of the legitimists strengthened the hands of that seemingly routed party. The cause of liberty and nationality was doomed unless

Allocution
of Pius IX,
Apr. 1848.

its leader could show remarkable vigour and remarkable capacity for leadership.

Incapacity
of Charles
Albert.

And Charles Albert, though certainly remarkable as a leader, was not distinguished by any exceptional energy or capacity. He failed entirely to understand that time was fighting for the Habsburgs, that the Austrian Empire was by no means dissolved. The loyalty of the imperial army was unshaken, its devotion to the Emperor unabated, and in its ranks the rivalries of different nations were forgotten. Nor did the leaders of the nationalist movements wish to weaken the hand of the Government of Vienna when it was dealing with mere Italian patriotism. Kossuth himself supported the retention of the Hungarian army in Italy, and this action, partly due to the Constitutional pose which he had adopted, and partly to his wish to be free from the embarrassing presence of national, but Croat, regiments, was also due in some measure to a sense of respect for his King. And as the Imperial forces were not weakened, the superior skill of their commander, Radetzky, had full play; and that skill was more valuable because unsuspected, because its possessor was regarded by his enemies as a ridiculous and half-witted buffoon. The Austrian marshal concentrated his strength and re-organized it, while the Italians quarrelled as to the form of government which they should establish, and while the Sardinian king marched up and down, for all the world like the historical Duke of York.

Course of
the War.

Charles Albert, indeed, had entered on the war without a plan, without stores, without consideration. He might have made up for his inferiority in actual resources by falling at once on the Austrians, while they were still disheartened by the success of the rising at Milan. But though he gained an initial success at Goito, he failed

altogether to profit by this advantage. While he aimed at crushing the republican element in the revolted provinces and at inducing them to accept union with Piedmont, and while he strenuously refused to receive French aid or admit British mediation, he did nothing to justify the confidence which he demanded from his supporters. His utter lack of idea enabled the Austrians to consolidate their position in the Quadrilateral; the victory of Curtatone restored the prestige of the Imperial arms; and the capitulation of the papal forces at Vicenza both gave back an important fortress to the Habsburgs and damped the somewhat faint enthusiasm of the other Italian States for their Sardinian leader. It was not revived by the proof which that leader gave of his original theories on the art of war by laying siege to the almost impregnable fortress of Mantua without artillery. Indeed the Italian cause rapidly drifted to destruction, and the useless marches of Charles Albert presently culminated in the utter overthrow of Custoza. His army was practically annihilated; he was compelled to beg for an armistice, to abandon Milan and to evacuate Lombardy, and for all practical purposes the war was ended.

Curtatone,
May 1848

Custoza,
Aug. 1848.

But the King had become a confirmed optimist; he was not yet reconciled to the inevitable, he would not yet recognize that his strength and capacity were alike unequal to the task which he had undertaken. The open revolt of Hungary led him to hope that the embarrassments of the Habsburgs might be turned to his advantage; the visions of an enthusiastic nun offered, in his opinion, a heaven-sent plan of campaign. When the armistice expired, he hastened to put into the field an army composed of unwilling conscripts and untrained recruits, commanded by an unpopular alien, and without any adequate resources. Radetzky hardly troubled to plan

Second
campaign,
1849.

the defeat of so contemptible an enemy, and had the Sardinian king's military capacity been even half as great as his optimism, the Austrians might have sustained a serious reverse. But the marshal was justified by results. At Novara, the Sardinians were defeated even more decisively than at Custoza ; the King was once more driven to sue for peace, but now his hope had vanished and he laid down his crown as the last sacrifice which he could make for the cause which he loved not wisely but quite well. While his son and successor, Victor Emmanuel, inaugurated his reign by the conclusion of a humiliating peace, and while the last trace of opposition to Austria was removed by the surrender of Brescia, Charles Albert left Italy to die, the broken-hearted victim of indecision and of hopeless optimism.

Novara,
Mar. 1849.

Abdication
of Charles
Albert.

§ 4. The
Venetian
and Roman
Republics.

Vain optimism, which believed that sentimental ardour could make up for the lack of material resources, was indeed fatal to the Italian cause throughout the peninsula, and most of all it was fatal at Venice and Rome. The former city had revolted simultaneously with Milan, but no real effort was made to unite the two movements or by joint action to cut the communications between Radetzky and Vienna. On the contrary, the Venetian revolt fell under the direction of Manin, a most eloquent and patriotic lawyer, whose good sense was somewhat obscured by his idealism. To him, as to Mazzini, a republic was the one thing needful for any true progress, and he rejected at first all idea of compromising his Utopia by admitting any sort of agreement with the Sardinian Government, which was degraded because monarchical. And thus he was viewed with suspicion by Charles Albert, and not less so because he showed a marked inclination to lean upon the support of the sister-republic of France. The progress of the Austrians, indeed, somewhat modified Manin's ideas;

on the morrow of Custoza, when the step no longer possessed any value, and when the Imperial forces were already beginning to close round the doomed city, Venice decided for union with Piedmont. But it was now too late to prevent the catastrophe; the defence, though signalized by some heroic deeds and invested with interest by the presence of Garibaldi, was hopeless from the first. The city soon capitulated, and Manin, a refugee in Paris, was able to devote his remaining years to the task of discovering how misplaced was his pursuit of perfection. Failure to co-operate with Sardinia had destroyed any chance of success which the rebels might have had, since it secured the defeat of the only army which might have won a victory.

Fall of
Venice,
Aug. 1849.

And the shock of the Sardinian defeats was felt equally in Central Italy. The battle of Novara decided the fate of the rebellion in Tuscany, where Mazzini intensified grand-ducal vengeance by the extravagance of his propaganda at Leghorn, in Modena, and in Parma. The arms of Austria bore the expelled princes back to power, and since the Governments, after their restoration, were on the whole rather more tyrannical than before, the situation was hardly changed for the better. Habsburg ascendancy was rather more complete, for the rulers, conscious of the lack of love in the hearts of their subjects, depended more than ever upon foreign support, and only the operation of international jealousy prevented Austrian control of the whole peninsula. As it was, not Imperial but Republican kindness gave back to the Pope his lost temporal authority.

The
Restoration
in the
Central
States.

That authority had been destroyed when Pius IX ceased to be the adored of all Liberal adorers, and the very gem of progressive virtue. Despite his condemnation of the war, the Pope had for a while continued to attempt

Flight of
Pius IX,
Nov. 1848.

the impossible task of maintaining the existing control of his dominions by the cardinals, and avoiding any open breach with orthodox and reactionary Governments, while making concessions to the reforming spirit. But he soon found that this policy was too illogical to be successful, and that he was bound either to follow in the train of possibly atheistical revolutionaries or to sacrifice his pleasant popularity by entering into a contest with his people. Any hesitation as to the course which he must adopt was removed by the murder of his minister, Rossi; such violence appalled the gentle bishop, and he fled from his blood-stained capital to the arms of the King of Naples at Gaeta.

The
Roman
Republic,
Feb. 1849.

His flight was regarded by the Roman populace as tantamount to abdication of his temporal power. A Republic was proclaimed; a somewhat disorderly mob assumed control of the city; and the inevitable Mazzini appeared to give his blessing and to clothe in high-sounding language the new revolutionary Government. He was joined by another subject of Charles Albert, Garibaldi, whose services had been declined by his king because his opinions savoured of the irregular, and who became from that moment a free-lance in the noble army of liberators. Committed in this way to the care of a hare-brained enthusiast and a guerrilla captain, the fate of the Roman Republic was sealed; and the seal was strengthened by the triumph of Austrian arms in the Lombard plain and the revival of French jealousy of Habsburg power. While the Imperial forces occupied Ferrara and advanced upon Rome from the north, an expedition from France landed at Civita Vecchia, and two Powers, one absolutist, one republican, contended for the honour of restoring a Pope. The French won in the contest, partly because the incident of Novara distracted Austrian attention, partly because

they had a satisfactory handicap in the matter of distance, partly because the Roman people preferred to fall into the hands of a sister republic. Rome capitulated to Oudinot, the French general; the Papal Government received a fresh lease of life and was granted the protection of a Republican Power; and the Habsburgs were forced to accept this limitation upon their sphere of influence in Italy. Pius IX returned to his capital, having seen his Neapolitan friends return to absolute government and cured for ever of all tendency to coquet with the fascinating siren of popularity. The reaction in Italy was complete, and Metternich could smile contentedly at the justification of his assertion that, if emperors disappear, it is only when they have despaired of themselves.

Surrender
of Rome,
July 1849.

Absolutism
restored at
Naples,
May 1849.

And the ex-Chancellor must have viewed with peculiar satisfaction the collapse of the Italian revolution, since that collapse completed the salvation of the Austrian Empire. The weakness of the Imperial Government had been due largely to lack of adequate military force, since the army was loyal, and, if freed from Italian complications, quite capable of crushing all attempts at revolt. And that this was the one need of the Government was well illustrated by the course of the Bohemian revolution. Beginning as a more or less loyal demand for autonomy, it was first met by concessions on the part of the Emperor, but these concessions were not enough for Czech patriots. Discontent was increased by the appointment of a new governor of Prague, Windischgrätz, who had already shown his lack of sympathy with revolution and his immunity from sentimental weakness during a brief dictatorship at Vienna. Riots followed, and for a few days the mob, assuming the title of a Provisional Government, controlled the Bohemian capital. But Windischgrätz had that determination of mind which most of the

§ 5.
Restoration
of order in
Austria.

Windischgrätz takes Prague, June 1848. Austrian commanders lacked; he turned his artillery upon Prague and was soon able to report to Vienna that the Czechs had been converted once more into loyal and peaceful subjects of the Imperial crown.

State of Vienna. The methods which he had employed might have been applied almost immediately to Vienna also, had it not been that the Ministers lacked decision of character, and still more lacked leadership. Ferdinand was not yet reconciled to the idea of meeting violence by force; he had not yet learned that 'if concession be made to riot, riot becomes revolution'. Thus the real control of the capital was allowed to fall into the hands of the mob; the Cabinet openly admitted that it could not maintain order, and a Committee of Public Safety, created with its consent, really governed Vienna. The Emperor lay in his palace, the victim of fear and illness, not daring to fly from a situation which he could not face, a pitiable spectacle of incapacity and weakness; and the Austrian Parliament was equally powerless to organize any systematic government.

The rising of Oct. 1848. This state of practical anarchy culminated in another violent outbreak. Hunger had been increasing among the poor of the city as the year advanced, and the ranks of the disaffected were swelled by soldiers unwilling to obey orders to march against the Hungarians. More rioting ensued; Latour, the Minister of War, was murdered by an infuriated crowd; and Ferdinand, trembling more than ever, fled, or was hurried by his advisers, to Olmütz. Though the Assembly continued formally to sit, and though the presence of a solitary Minister might seem to invest it with some semblance of legality, all government was really at an end; the Cabinet had followed the Emperor, and a large number of Deputies had imitated this example.

Flight of Ferdinand to Olmütz.

In such a situation, Windischgrätz found an opportunity after his own heart. Declaring that he was determined to restore the authority of Ferdinand, he advanced upon Vienna and received on his way belated Imperial sanction for his action. The task which he had so boldly assumed was rendered more easy of accomplishment by the conduct of the Assembly, which he had resolved to crush. In place of seeking the help of the Hungarians, who might have saved them, the Deputies indulged in some mild play-acting. They could not believe that the rude hands of a soldier would touch their sacred persons; they were filled with an almost pathetic confidence in the efficacy of mere forms and words. Brought face to face with facts, when Windischgrätz approached the suburbs of the capital, they called upon Hungary to save them; Jellacic defeated the advancing Magyars at Schwechat; and a short bombardment placed Vienna at the mercy of the conqueror of Prague. A military dictatorship was established, and its character pointedly marked by the execution of Blum, who, having come to Vienna as ambassador of the Frankfort Parliament, had remained to bear his part in the defence of anarchy, and whose death was a dramatic warning to German nationalists. It was clear enough that as soon as the Habsburgs had set their own house in order, they would take the field as the champions of conservatism in Germany.

The process of setting that house in order now proceeded rapidly, for the Government, possessing once more the necessary military strength, found also a man capable of using that strength without hesitation. While the Parliament was requested to transfer its valuable deliberations to Kremsier, an obscure Moravian town, Prince Schwarzenberg assumed the office of chief Minister. He was fully alive to the realities of the situation; he saw that

Windischgrätz attacks Vienna.

Battle of Schwechat, Oct. 1848.

Execution of Blum, Nov. 1848.

The Kremsier Parliament, Nov. 1848-Mar. 1849.

under a trembling Emperor, the Empire would also tremble always on the verge of dissolution, and therefore his first care was to find an efficient substitute for the incapable Ferdinand. The imperial invalid was induced to care for his many infirmities in a less prominent position than on the throne of the Habsburgs; the next heir resigned his rights of succession, and the crown passed to Francis Joseph, who was young enough to make it reasonable to expect that he would reign under the guidance of his Minister. Having thus removed the most trying obstacle in his path, Schwarzenberg dissolved the Kresmier Parliament and published the Unitary Edict, by which equal constitutional rights were nominally conferred upon all dominions of the House of Austria. This concession, however, was hardly intended to disguise the military rule which was to be established, and even had it been meant as a serious measure of reform, its working would none the less have been impracticable owing to the attitude adopted by Hungary.

Abdication
of
Ferdinand,
Dec. 1848.

The
Unitary
Edict,
Mar. 1849.

§ 6. The
Magyars
and Croats.

For the practical answer to the Unitary Edict was Kossuth's declaration of Hungarian independence, and the partial union of those elements upon the division of which the Imperial Government had relied, in so far as it pursued any consistent plan. But neither consistency nor firmness had characterized the policy of the Court of Vienna towards the agitations in the non-Austrian provinces; since the recognition of the responsible Ministry in Hungary it had vacillated perpetually between two conflicting courses. At one time, Ferdinand seemed resolved to abide by his promises and loyally to support the Magyar Ministers, even when they left Pressburg for Pest and so fell under the influence of disorderly, enthusiastic, half-educated students. At another time, he appeared to place his trust in the services of the Ban of

Croatia, and to be ready to use them to crush the growing independence of Hungary. The truth is, perhaps, that as long as the Italian war continued, it was felt to be of paramount importance to retain in Lombardy every available regiment, and for this purpose to conciliate both Magyars and Croats.

Thus Ferdinand constantly gave way to the pressure of those nearest to him. He granted all the prayers of Batthyány, the Hungarian Premier, when he complained that the Ban was threatening Magyar domination over non-Magyar provinces and dignifying a mere Slav agitation by the sacred term 'national'; and he turned a ready ear to the persuasive accents of Jellacic, when he pointed out what services he could render to the cause of Habsburg supremacy. At one moment, Hrabowsky, commanding the Hungarian army, was ordered to reduce the Slavs; when he had been defeated by the revolted Serbs, the Imperial Government cautiously applauded successful resistance to its orders.

But a more determined attitude became possible as soon as the battle of Custoza had definitely turned the tide against Charles Albert. While Kossuth at Pest was advocating the cause of repression across the Adriatic and finding plausible excuses for destroying in other lands that national existence which he claimed so eloquently for his own country, Jellacic had succeeded in convincing the Imperial Ministers that he was their truest friend. Recognized as ruler of Croatia, he advanced into Hungary; the Court of Vienna, far from disowning him, declared that the Magyar Ministry had no legal standing, and sent Lamberg to Buda-Pest that, by taking over the command of all the forces of the Hungarian Monarchy, he might make resistance to the Ban impossible. The murder of the new commander

Indecision
of the
Emperor.

Effect of
Custoza.

Murder of
Lamberg,
Sept. 1848.

Dictator-
ship of
Jellacic,
Oct. 1848.

Prepara-
tions for
war.

Windisch-
grätz takes
Pest, Jan.
1849.

§ 7. The
fall of
Hungary.

did not cause the Imperial Government to falter; on the contrary, it led Ferdinand to take one of the few decisive steps of his most indecisive life. While the Parliament of Hungary was abolished, the dictatorship of that country was conferred upon Jellacic, and the Emperor definitely joined the side of the Slavs. But such vigour did not meet with its merited reward. The Croats were speedily expelled from Hungary; the October riots in Vienna prevented further action against the Hungarians, and that people now fell, with the retirement of the moderate Batthyány, under the guidance of Kossuth and the extremists.

Though a formal proclamation of independence was delayed it was already frequently suggested, and the refusal of the Parliament of Buda-Pest to recognize Francis Joseph amounted to a practical declaration of war against Austria. Forces, indeed, were organized by both parties. Windischgrätz and Jellacic prepared to attack Hungary on two sides; the Roumans of Transylvania made ready to revenge themselves on their hated tyrants. To meet so overwhelming an attack, the strength of Hungary at first proved insufficient; not even the capacity of Gorgei, who commanded the Magyar forces, could compensate for the divisions in the councils of the rebels. Windischgrätz repeated at Pest his exploits at Prague and Vienna; Kossuth, jealous of the independent attitude of Gorgei, substituted an incompetent Pole, Dembinski, in the command; the Austrians gained success after success, and flattered themselves that the reduction of the country was complete.

It was at this moment that the Unitary Edict was issued, and forthwith the Magyar cause began to revive. Hitherto the subject-races in the Hungarian kingdom had looked to the Habsburgs to save them from tyranny;

now it became evident that, whatever might be the ultimate intentions of Schwarzenberg, he was at least not the devoted champion of Slav nationality. It was true that representative institutions had been promised in the Edict, but the dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament was a definite act far more convincing than any words. Nor could the nationalist agitators for a moment accept the establishment of equality between the different races; they desired not liberty for all, but supremacy for one, people, and Croats and Magyars were agreed in wishing to tyrannize over some one. The Slavs began to desert the cause of the Emperor and to support that of their late enemies.

In these circumstances, if Kossuth had possessed more political foresight, it is possible that Hungary might yet have secured the recognition of her semi-independent position. Since the subject-races were now alienated from Francis Joseph, the rebel generals had little difficulty in recovering the ground lost. Bem reconquered Transylvania, in which the Roumans had for a moment secured supremacy; Gorgei, once more in command, defeated Windischgrätz and drove the Austrians across the frontier. The cause of the Habsburgs, which seemed a few months before to have triumphed completely, seemed now to be as utterly lost. But it was saved by the ambitious unwisdom of a journalist-politician and the intervention of a champion of legitimacy.

Kossuth seized such an apparently favourable opportunity for accomplishing his long-planned scheme. He had always aspired to be the founder of an independent State, always aimed at the practical destruction of the ties which bound Hungary to Austria; it is possible that he was alive to the fact that such a benefactor, as he would thus be, might expect to receive his merited

Successes
of the
Hun-
garians,
Apr. 1849.

Declara-
tion of
Hungarian
inde-
pendence,
Apr. 1849.

reward. When the Unitary Edict had been issued, his influence secured the proclamation of Hungarian independence, and thus was ultimately responsible for the failure of the cause which he had so dearly at heart. The army was in general loyal to the person of the Emperor and to the tradition of Imperial rule; it was far from desiring to see the government of the country transferred to a mere newspaper editor with a gift for writing and speaking, and a lamentable ignorance of the art of war. Thus the revolutionary forces were reduced in strength by desertion, and to make matters worse the Slavs were hopelessly alienated. For a moment, the subject-races had believed that their late tyrants had been miraculously changed into gentle friends; now it was made clear to them that if they continued to resist the Austrians, they would experience the questionable blessing of being handed over to the uncovenanted mercies of the Magyars. Any fate was preferable to this, and the Croats and Serbs were resolved not to endure it. At the very moment when Hungary was assailed by a power which she could not resist, her own internal dissensions were made more fatal by the dissolution of the short-lived alliance between the various peoples who inhabited her borders.

Inter-
vention of
Russia.

It is indeed probable that Austria would sooner or later have subdued the revolt even if she had relied entirely upon her own resources. But the success of Gorgei alarmed the Imperial Government; the task of reducing Hungary seemed to be beyond its power, and thus Francis Joseph was led to accept an offer of help, which had been made to Ferdinand before him and then for a while politely declined. Nicholas I was far too devoted a champion of the cause of Divine Right patiently to watch the general overthrow of legitimate rule; he

was more than ready to unsheathe his sword in defence of any royal house afflicted by the insubordination of its subjects, and he was especially ready to do so on behalf of the Habsburgs, the traditional allies of Russia. He hastened to answer the appeal of Francis Joseph; while an Austrian army entered Hungary from the west, the Russians poured across the frontier of Transylvania. The struggle was not prolonged. Pest was occupied and the incompetent Dembinski was defeated at Czoreg; Bem was crushed at Temesvar, and finally Gorgez, with the last Hungarian army, capitulated to the foreign invaders at Villagos. The cause of Magyar predominance was lost; Kossuth had already fled from the country upon which he had brought disaster, and the vengeance of the Habsburgs fell upon less prominent leaders. Throughout the Austrian dominions, imperial authority was restored; the reaction had gained a most signal triumph, and Metternich, returning to his beloved Vienna, had the satisfaction of feeling that he had been proved a true prophet. Freed from the anxiety which had oppressed him during his final days of office, he could spend his last years in adorning the salons of a society freed from all suspicion of Liberalism, all tendency to think that peoples had a right to share in their own government.

Capitulation of Villagos, Aug. 1849.

And the effect of the triumph of Conservatism in the Austrian Empire was at once observed in the collapse of the nationalist movement in Germany. Here, as in Italy and Hungary, the divisions in the ranks of the devotees of 'Progress' were fatal to the success of the revolution. While all parties not corrupted by Conservative poison were agreed in desiring representative institutions and some type of national existence, there was an extreme divergence of opinion as to the character of the Germany

§ 8. The Frankfort Parliament.

which was to be called into existence. On the one hand, the 'Great Germans' would have embodied the whole Austrian Empire in the new state, regardless of the fact that many provinces of that Empire were entirely non-German. On the other hand, the 'Little Germans' wished to confine the blessings of unity to their own people; Austria proper might be included, Hungary and other alien districts must certainly be excluded.

Debates
in the
Frankfort
Parliament.

And when the German National Assembly met at Frankfort this division of opinion served to paralyse its action. If it had availed itself of the prevailing enthusiasm in Germany, and immediately produced a definitive Constitution, it is possible that moral strength might have secured its success. But the details of the new Constitution were matter for angry debate, and in no case has the genius of the German people for delay appeared more clearly. Interminable discussions on the first principles of political science wasted the time and exhausted the energy of the deputies, while the forces of reaction gathered strength. Such practical measures as the election of an 'Administrator of the Empire', in the person of the Habsburg archduke John, and the formation of a Ministry under Schmerling, were rendered nugatory by the constant ignoring of the lack of all compelling force, other than sentiment, behind the assembly. The result was that it was led to destroy its own credit, as well as to waste the precious months in which something really effective might have been done.

§ 9. Failure
of the
Frankfort
Parliament:
(i) the
Schleswig-
Holstein
question.

Its reputation was first impaired by its attempt to extend the blessings of German unity to the widest possible area. Schleswig-Holstein, a district under the Danish crown, had declared in favour of union with the new Germanic body; its adhesion had been accepted and its deputies welcomed by the national Parliament at Frank-

fort, but the King of Denmark declined to submit tamely to such a partition of his dominions and proceeded to employ force to prevent it. Forthwith Frederic William appeared as the champion of the German cause; a Prussian army entered the duchies to support their freedom. But just as the Frankfort Parliament seemed to be about to win a triumph through the loyal support of Prussia, it became apparent that the King's action was not dictated by real sympathy with unitary ideas. Already tending towards reaction himself, and alarmed at the prospect of international complications, he concluded the truce of Malmö with Denmark, by which Schleswig-Holstein was to be administered provisionally by the Danish Government with Prussian assistance. The Frankfort Parliament indignantly rejected such a sacrifice of popular aspirations; it refused to sanction the truce and decreed intervention. But its decree was so much waste paper; it had no army and its fleet was still in process of construction; and it consequently found itself in the humiliating position of having to confess its impotence by accepting the arrangement which it had repudiated.

Truce of
Malmö,
Aug. 1848.

Nor was this the worst. It was not even master in its own house. As its philosophical debates dragged on through weary months, the citizens of Frankfort began to murmur at its failure to accomplish anything; they rose in revolt and the very lives of the chosen representatives of the German people were in danger. It was evident that so far from being able to control all Germany, the Parliament could not even keep order in a single city; it was equally evident that unless something were done towards the practical solution of the problems which it had met to solve, its existence would be ended from mere annoyance at its inactivity. In these circumstances, the discussion of political theory was abandoned; a Constitu-

(ii) Dis-
turbances
at
Frankfort.
Sept. 1848.

Issue of a
Constitu-
tion, Jan.
1849.

tion was at last produced. By its second article, the debate as to the extent of the new state was decided in favour of the ' Little Germans ' ; it was provided that if a ruler governed both German and non-German provinces, only the former should be included in the new Germanic body. And the equally critical question as to the headship of the federation, upon which point violent debates had occurred, was tentatively solved by a decision in favour of a single man bearing the title of Emperor.

§ 10. Affairs
of Prussia.

Had this decision been reached some months before, it might have possessed practical utility. Now, however, it was too late. Prussia had already ceased to champion the German cause ; her King had begun to realize that of his many enthusiasms that for legitimacy was probably the strongest. From the very moment of the meeting of the Prussian Assembly, disorder had been rampant in Berlin, where the mob terrorized the representatives of the people. And while Frederic William was at heart opposed to all revolution and only momentarily carried away by thoughts of leading a popular movement, the army was resolved to save the King even from himself. This last factor proved to be the death-blow to Liberalism in Prussia. An attempt by the Assembly to interfere in military matters angered the King, who placed himself in the hands of Count Brandenburg, the Prussian counterpart to Schwarzenberg. The new minister acted on the same principles as the Austrian ; the Parliament was ordered to remove from Berlin to Brandenburg and, when it resisted, was forcibly expelled by the soldiers. A dissolution followed, and as public opinion was conciliated by the grant of a Constitution by edict, no great hostility was aroused by the return of Prussia to mildly reactionary courses.

Dissolution
of the
Prussian
Assembly,
Dec. 1848.

German
crown
offered to

But that return was fatal to the cause of German nationalism, since it coincided with the revival of vigour in

the councils of the Court of Vienna. Schwarzenberg protested against the attempt of the Frankfort Parliament to dictate the relations which should exist between the Imperial Government and its subjects ; he announced that Austria would never agree to any system by which she was deprived of her legitimate predominance in Germany, and he won the support of several states. When this announcement was followed by the issue of the Unitary Edict, it became clear that the Habsburgs would never support the unification of the German race, and the Frankfort Parliament retorted by decreeing the exclusion of Austria from Germany and offering the imperial crown to the King of Prussia.

Frederic
William,
Mar. 1849.

The rejection of this offer was a foregone conclusion. Frederic William would not so far depart from monarchical principles as to accept a crown at the hands of a mere representative assembly ; he dared not face the hostility of Austria, he feared to incur the anger of Nicholas, and he was becoming more and more disgusted with the Frankfort Parliament, which seemed determined to flout legitimate government. And his refusal of the crown, coupled as it was with the declaration that no union could be valid unless sanctioned by existing states, was followed by the abandonment of the National Assembly by all the states except a few minor principalities. Lack of military force, and the violence of its partisans at Dresden and Baden, proved the final blow to the Frankfort Parliament. The deputies of Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover withdrew ; the rump of the Assembly in vain removed to Stuttgart, and when it was quietly dispersed by the troops of Würtemberg, ' not even a dog ' lamented the downfall of a body which had been intended to inaugurate the millennium in Germany.

End of the
Frankfort
Parliament,
June 1849.

That downfall was welcomed by Frederic William, who

§ 11.
Restoration
of the
Germanic
Confedera-
tion.

still hoped that he might become the monarch of a new empire. He requested the Governments of the Confederation to send representatives to Berlin for the discussion of a scheme of union, and secured the apparent adhesion of Saxony and Hanover. A league between Prussia and these two states was formed; a draft Constitution was issued, several members of the dissolved Frankfort Parliament expressed their approval of the scheme, and the minor states joined in supporting it.

Inter-
vention of
Austria.

But Austria was now free to act, and this made the success of any project of union an impossibility. Prince Schwarzenberg proclaimed the restoration of the old Diet; Bavaria and other states gave him their support; Frederic William in vain appealed to the good offices of Russia to save him from the alternatives of war or humiliation. While Nicholas declared his approval of Austrian policy, an *émeute* in Hesse-Cassel afforded the necessary opportunity to the Court of Vienna for forcing the situation. Bavarian troops hastened to the support of the Elector, whose people relied on Prussia to support their adhesion to the new confederation. Schwarzenberg presented an ultimatum at Berlin, demanding under threat of war the immediate abandonment of Frederic William's scheme; Manteuffel, the Prussian minister, having humbly begged for an interview, hastened to Olmütz in the hope of securing some consideration from the Austrian minister for the susceptibilities of his master. But Schwarzenberg would accept nothing but the most unconditional submission; Manteuffel gave way, and the old Germanic Confederation was restored.

Interview
of Olmütz,
Nov. 1850.

Unreality
of the
triumph of
reaction.

Thus at the bidding of one determined champion of reaction, the dream of a united Germany seemed to have faded away; the old order appeared to have triumphed from the Baltic to the Straits of Messina, sentimental

enthusiasm to have failed before gross material force, and the unrest of 'Progress' to have been stilled for ever by the calming influence of 'Stability'. The calm, however, was as deceptive as the sentiment which had produced the unrest. For a moment, the union of Austria and Russia, the craven fear of Frederic William IV, and the caution of Louis Napoleon sufficed to maintain a semblance of peace. But absolute government no longer rested on any basis of assent, it had been deprived of all secure foundation; and therefore the revival of nationalist movements was as certain as the dawning of a new day. Nor was the subtle intriguer, now feeling his way to power in France, long in realizing that he might exploit the heartfelt longings of peoples in the interest of his own ambition. Louis Napoleon stands forth as the champion of the nationalist cause; forthwith there is an end of quietude in Europe. For the peoples of the Continent, desiring happiness, fall an easy prey to those who conjure up fair visions of delight as the necessary outcome of political change.

CHAPTER VII

THE UNION OF ITALY

§ 1. The Presidency of Louis Napoleon. § 2. The Second Empire. § 3. The Eastern Question. § 4. The Crimean War. § 5. The Congress of Paris. § 6. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. § 7. The Franco-Austrian War. § 8. Villafranca. § 9. Garibaldi. § 10. The Kingdom of Italy. § 11. The Zenith of the Second Empire.

§ 1. The
Presidency
of Louis
Napoleon.

AMONG those who secured advancement by the gentle arts of deception, who beguiled trustful nations with glorious visions of the happiness which might be their lot, by far the most subtle and convincing was Prince Louis Napoleon. He professed ardent enthusiasm for Republican institutions, altruistic devotion to the interests of the masses; but from the very hour of his election to the Presidency, he laboured to subvert the Second Republic and to raise upon its ruins the edifice of his own absolute power. And for a while his success was proportionate to his insincerity, and of insincerity he was a past master. Posing as the testamentary legatee of his uncle's alleged political ideals, and possibly believing that he was in truth 'the man of destiny', he used the legend of the first to obscure the ambition of the third Napoleon. The Constitution was violated, the Republic overthrown, the Second Empire established, with the expressed approval of a people trained to worship at the altar of a non-existent deity, the giver of all political good. In the supple hands of this master-workman, 'Bonapartism' was moulded to be that which the artificer desired; it was exalted into a religion, whose blind devotees hardly

realized that they were dancing to a tune which they had not called. Deception has won few more striking victories than that which it gained on the day when Napoleon III, hailed as champion of the People, was acclaimed as Emperor of the French, when the self-seeking ally of every reactionary force was greeted as the incarnation of the spirit of progress.

The victory, moreover, was gained in the teeth of serious, if rather ill-organized, opposition. It had been no small achievement to overcome the ridicule excited by earlier and most futile exploits; to persuade France that the reputed low comedian was actually a genius in whom Democracy might with profit find embodiment was a far more remarkable exploit. And even when he had gained sufficient hold on the imagination of the French people to secure election to the Presidency, Louis Napoleon had still to face the fact that a real Republican and a real Monarchical party existed, while the Napoleonic party was yet to be created. But he faced these facts with determination, however obscured that determination might be; by patient cunning and steadfast deceit, rather than by heroic daring, he led a nation to unite to produce a result which it did not desire. By slow stages, he accomplished the division and destruction of his enemies; he transferred to them the odium of the political crimes of which he was the guilty author, and so formed public opinion that Clericals and Liberals, Republicans and Monarchists, the peaceful and the warlike, agreed to find in him the only hope of realizing their cherished dreams.

And of the stages by which this peculiar result was reached, the expedition to Rome was the first and most significant. The Republican party was the greatest obstacle in the path to Empire, since it appealed to

Obstacles
in his path.

Signi-
ficance of
the expedi-
tion to
Rome.

sentiment and to enthusiasm, and had promised specifically that Utopia for which the Many hungered. And though the closing of the National Workshops had been an object-lesson on the failure of idealists as practical politicians, yet the people were still more than inclined to consider a true republican experiment worthy of trial. Before all things it was necessary that this tentative preference for honesty should be checked. But to check it Louis Napoleon needed allies, and therefore turned to the Catholic Church, never a friend to that anarchy of opinion towards which Republicanism always tends. For this reason the expedition to Rome was undertaken; the Constitution was professedly broken in the interests of French prestige and as an incident in the secular contest with the Habsburgs, but in reality in the interests of Bonapartism. The significance of the event was obvious enough. It meant the alliance of Louis Napoleon with the Church; it meant that the head of the state had little care for the Constitution of which he was the guardian; it was a declaration of war between the President and the Republic.

Overthrow
of the
Republican
party.

But the Republicans, as a party, hardly realized this fact, and Louis Napoleon found it easy to quell the disorder fomented by his more extreme opponents. Representing the rioting of his enemies as 'demagogic conspiracies' against all government, he secured the help of every one who feared the 'Red Republic', and as had been the case twenty years before, so now revolution was followed by the vigorous exertion of the executive power in the interests of law and order. The leading Republicans, including Ledru-Rollin, went into exile; the Republican Press was muzzled, political meetings forbidden, and the Many obediently applauded such acts as precautions necessary to save France from anarchy.

Open force had thus crushed one section of the opposition; the Monarchists were next overthrown by fraud. In their alarm at the universal rioting, they had lent a willing ear to the tempting suggestions of Louis Napoleon; they used their parliamentary majority to pass restrictive measures, limiting the franchise and preventing the free expression of opinion. These measures served a double purpose. They were certainly used, as the Monarchists wished, to crush Republicanism; but the President used them also in a more ingenious manner. He publicly regretted the non-democratic tendencies of the legislature, more than hinting that if only he could have his own way the People would not find themselves so betrayed by their chosen representatives. Such duplicity was too subtle for the opposition, divided as it was into adherents of the elder line of the Bourbons, Orleanists, and 'Fusionists', and containing many inclined to prefer the rule even of a Napoleon to that of the People. No effective answer could be made to the President, when he appeared as the champion of popular rights against legislative tyranny. A dispute as to the prolongation of his term of office embittered the conflict, and in it Louis Napoleon, possessed of a magic name, the advocate of good order and of free institutions, found the French nation on his side.

He was thus emboldened to end the struggle by a *coup d'État*. Having prepared the ground by giving office to men like Saint-Arnaud, Minister of War, and Morny, Minister of Police, whose devotion to himself was greater than their scrupulousness, and having won over even more honest men, such as Magnan, commander of the garrison of Paris, he was able to act with decision when the appointed day came. One night the chief leaders of the opposition were quietly arrested; the printing presses

§ 2. The
Second
Empire.

*Coup
d'État*
of Dec.
1851.

were seized, the mob overawed by a display of armed force; and when a few harmless individuals had been accidentally killed, the *coup d'État* had been accomplished. France, invited to decide by a popular vote, willingly accepted the 'embodiment of democracy'. A *plébiscite* approved the revised Constitution which Louis Napoleon produced, and a year later another vote definitely converted the Republic into the Second Empire.

Louis
Napoleon,
Emperor of
the French,
Dec. 2,
1852.

Internal
policy of
Napoleon
III.

This result had been secured by fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation was the basis upon which the new system reposed. The forms of popular government were carefully maintained; the Constitution, though modelled on that of the Consulate, admitted the existence of a chamber directly elected by the people and established universal suffrage. But every care was taken to prevent the people from embarrassing the central authority by any expression of their own opinion. The debates in the Chamber were not published; absolute secrecy was frequently secured. Government candidates, supported by the whole weight of officialdom, appeared in all constituencies; the electoral map was carefully devised to destroy the political influence of the artisans; and the mayors, who had control of the ballot boxes, could be relied on to prevent any such unfortunate accident as a true expression of public opinion. Nor did Napoleon III rely merely on such careful manipulation of the electoral machine. The Press, freed from censorship, was hampered by the regulation that nothing might be published until authorized; and its offences were placed under the control of courts of summary jurisdiction. At the same time, dangerous individuals were carefully supervised by the secret police; a garrulous old woman who expressed her belief that the vines might again suffer from blight was

warned to keep her ill-omened tongue under better control. In such circumstances, all liberty of political thought was destroyed; selfish devotion to material interests was directly encouraged, and the Emperor relied upon his great public works to satisfy his subjects.

But such internal autocracy needed some external support, and that support had to be found in a vigorous foreign policy. Bearing a name which involved certain ideas, the ruler of France had to show that the glory of his country was more than merely safe in his hands; it must be increased, and Napoleon III prove that he was indeed the heir of the 'Little Corporal'. Nor was he unwilling to do so. On the contrary, he was anxious to offer a brilliant contrast to the dull respectability of Louis-Philippe, and he saw that the French nation might in this way be more easily deceived. Not only would their attention be distracted from internal affairs, but the Emperor, appearing as the champion of struggling peoples abroad, would more easily convince his subjects of his sincere devotion to Liberalism. In short, a brilliant and active foreign policy was to be used to subserve the internal aims of Louis Napoleon, and as long as he did maintain his reputation abroad, his position at home benefited. France, delighted to have once more a ruler whose every act was watched with anxious concern by the Continent, was for a while content to forget broken promises and to allow her eyes to be blinded.

But as the Government of Louis-Philippe had found to its cost, the power of France was limited and there was a danger that extreme prominence might lead to disastrous humiliation. Napoleon III was as fully alive to the limitations of his country's might as he had been to the limitations of his own genius; he advanced as cautiously towards his ultimate goal in foreign politics

Foreign
policy of
Napoleon
III.

§ 3. The
Eastern
Question.

as he had towards the acquisition of supreme power; he took his first steps with the friendly hand of England to guide them. For he had at once determined to restore that *entente cordiale* which had been shattered by the affair of the Spanish Marriages, and here fortune stood his friend by raising the Eastern Question in a form which enabled him to act with startling vigour and with the alliance of Great Britain. The overthrow of Mehemet Ali had not solved the perennial problem of the Sick Man's inheritance. While Reshid Pasha vainly attempted to cure the illness of the Ottoman Empire by introducing reforms unsuited to the genius of a Mohammedan people, Nicholas, having humiliated the middle-class usurper of Paris, sighed for the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and wondered whether he had not bought his triumph at too dear a price. He reverted once more to his idea of solving the whole problem by means of co-operation with England; in conversations with the British ambassador at Petersburg, he set forth frankly his ideas for joint action, and, though these overtures were disregarded, he failed to understand how obsessed were the English people by the twin ideas of resisting Russian aggression and maintaining the integrity of the moribund Ottoman Empire.

Dispute
about the
Holy
Places,
1853.

He was therefore led to take vigorous action at Constantinople, in response to the Emperor of the French. Napoleon III had gained a mild diplomatic triumph by terrorizing the wretched Abdul-Medjid into conceding to the Latin Christians the guardianship of the 'Holy Places', a concession which conflicted with the rights of the Orthodox Church. Nicholas determined to humiliate the Second Empire as he had humiliated the Orleanist Monarchy; Menshikov was sent to Constantinople as special envoy to assert the rights of Russia in general, to

Mission of
Menshikov,
1853.

recover the control of the Sepulchre for the Greeks, and to secure the definite recognition of the Tsar's protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. But it so happened that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador, was a convinced opponent of Russia; he assumed the practical direction of Turkish foreign policy, secured the granting of the moderate and the rejection of the immoderate demands of the Tsar, and the refusal of the ultimatum which Menshikov rashly presented. From this moment, war between England and Russia was in sight; if the peace-loving Cabinet of London would attempt the avoidance of war, Napoleon III was determined that Nicholas should either be driven to fight or so humbled that his prestige would never recover from the blow. While Russian troops occupied the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, the English and French fleets moved to Besika Bay in order to protect the Turkish capital.

Fleets at
Besika
Bay, July,
1853.

In such circumstances a conflict could only be avoided by decided action on the part of Austria and Prussia, which might make the question one for decision by all the Powers. But no such decided action was taken. A conference of ambassadors at Vienna did indeed produce a joint note to Russia and Turkey, proposing a vague settlement of the points at issue. But when the Porte refused the note, the logical step of compelling its acceptance was not taken; instead, modifications were introduced which convinced the Tsar that the Powers were acting in bad faith; and when Omar Pasha, commanding the Ottoman forces on the Danube, had demanded the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, the Russians retorted by destroying the Turkish fleet at Sinope. This action, justified by the fact that the Sultan had already in effect declared war, was hailed in England


The
Vienna
Note,
Aug. 1853.

as a massacre ; Napoleon III, protesting his pacific views in a letter to Nicholas, maintained his bellicose attitude ; the Russian fleet was ordered to return to Sebastopol at the bidding of the Western Powers, and the inevitable refusal was followed by the departure of the English and French ambassadors from Petersburg.

§ 4. The
Crimean
War.

Even now the seriousness and duration of the war might have been reduced if the Courts of Paris and

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA.



G. V. Colburn, Oxford, 1910

London had been content to secure merely their professed objects. Austria mobilized an army and announced her intention of insisting upon the evacuation of the Principalities ; the Turks successfully defended Silistria against the invaders, and Nicholas, making a virtue of necessity, withdrew his troops across the Pruth. All immediate menace to the Ottoman Empire

was thus removed, and the settlement of the dispute might well have been left in the hands of diplomatists. But the 'massacre' of Sinope had struck the imagination of the British public, rousing all its latent fear of Russian aggression, and Napoleon would not be content with a triumph shared with Francis Joseph and Frederic William. He had convinced himself that, without serious exertion, a real increase of prestige might be gained; he hoped that if England and France held on their course the other Powers would follow suit and Russia give way, and he succeeded in persuading the British Ministry to join with him in an attempt to remove all prospect of danger from Russia in the future. It was determined to destroy Sebastopol, the base of the Russian Black Sea fleet, it being plausibly argued that Constantinople could never be safe as long as the Tsar possessed a stronghold within such reasonable striking distance. Upon these grounds, the allied armies which had been landed at Varna to protect the Turkish capital were ordered to invade the Crimea.

That invasion was undertaken without adequate preparation, in ignorance of the country, and at an unfavourable season of the year, nor was the incompetence, which signalized its beginning, removed as time went on. Landing unopposed at Eupatoria, the allies advanced upon Sebastopol from the north, defeated the Russians at the Alma, and might possibly have taken the town by an immediate assault. But Saint-Arnaud, the French general, prevailed in his advocacy of an attack from the south; a lengthy march was executed round Sebastopol, and positions taken up for the new plan of attack. Meanwhile, however, the town had been converted into a fortress by the energy and genius of Todleben, and when the bombardment was begun, it was found that the

Invasion of
the Crimea,
1854.

Battle of
the Alma,
Sept.

defenders could more than hold their own. Nothing remained but to undertake a regular siege, and to this the allies now devoted themselves. Menshikov, commanding the Russian army outside the fortress, twice attempted to relieve it. At Balaclava, an attack on the English base was repulsed, the battle being rendered memorable by the brilliantly futile charge of the Light Brigade. At Inkerman, the heavy Russian columns hurled themselves in vain against the British lines. But the latter battle, owing to the heavy losses suffered by the victors, made it vain to hope that the town would fall immediately, and it became necessary for the allies to prepare to winter in the Crimea.

Balaclava,
Oct.

Inkerman,
Nov.

Death of
Nicholas,
Mar. 1855.

Conference
of Vienna,
March-
April 1855.

And now the rashness with which the expedition had been undertaken became doubly apparent. Having no proper protection from the cold, and being ill supplied with food, the allied army fell an easy prey to the ravages of disease; perhaps the only redeeming feature was the opportunity afforded to Miss Florence Nightingale to show the devotion of which woman is capable. But the same winter which decimated the English and French forces also prepared the way for peace. The iron constitution of Tsar Nicholas broke down under the severity of the winter and the bitterness of defeat, and his death made peace a possibility. Its immediate result was seen in the meeting of the Conference of Vienna, at which the allies formulated the Four Points which they regarded as the necessary basis of peace. They required the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Principalities and over the Christian subjects of the Porte, the freeing of the navigation of the Danube, and the destruction of Russian predominance in the Black Sea. Upon the last point negotiations broke down, the Russian Minister declaring that he could never

assent to any interference with his country's control of that sea.

The failure of these negotiations had been due very largely to the fact that Russia was by no means crushed. While Sebastopol still held out, the Turks had suffered reverses in Asia Minor, and two combined Anglo-French fleets had failed to effect anything worthy of note in the Baltic. If the Tsar were to be humbled, it was therefore necessary to inflict upon him some more serious damage, and thus in the spring the allied army, strengthened by the arrival of a Sardinian contingent, resumed the campaign with vigour. Progress, however, was at first rather slow; Canrobert, the French general, was more distinguished for personal courage than for the qualities of command, and more than one effort of the allies failed owing to distracted counsels. But at last, when a final attempt at relief had been frustrated at the battle of Tchernaya, and when Pélissier had replaced Canrobert, the Malakoff Fort, the key to the Russian position, was stormed, and three days later the long siege ended. Sebastopol, reduced by its defenders to a mass of smoking ruins, was evacuated, and the object of the expedition apparently achieved.

Fall of
Sebasto-
pol, Sept.
1855.

Tchernaya
Aug. 1855

But the success was singularly barren of practical result. The season of the year was too late for it to be followed up with decisive effect, and if Russia had sustained heavy losses and if her strength were well-nigh exhausted, Napoleon III was equally anxious for peace. He had entered upon the war to secure reputation and popularity for the Second Empire; it had hardly brought him either in great measure, and the French people inclined to murmur at the long duration of an apparently objectless contest. Knowledge of this fact was decisive with the Emperor, who was well aware that discontent

§ 5. The
Congress
of Paris.

breeds criticism, and that the fraudulent character of his government might easily be exposed under any critical examination. He was determined not to risk any such testing of his system and therefore readily agreed to the suggestions of Austria and Prussia for the conclusion of the war, conveniently forgetting that he had entered that war with an ally.

Austrian
ultimatum
to Russia,
Dec. 1855.

For it was without the consent of England that Napoleon accepted the basis of peace embodied in the ultimatum which the Court of Vienna now presented at Petersburg. The Tsar was required to concede the 'Four Points', under threat of an Austrian attack, and Alexander II, who had none of his father's obstinate determination to resist to the bitter end, was perhaps not unwilling to bow to such a display of superior force. And as soon as the basis of peace had been accepted by Russia, the conclusion of a definitive treaty was not long delayed. Napoleon III gained one more advantage, such as it was, by securing that Paris should be the scene of negotiations; for the rest, he might well rejoice at deliverance from the complications in which he had become involved.

Peace of
Paris,
Mar. 1856.

For after some three years of conflict, the Crimean War ended in a peace which left the Eastern Question as far from solution as ever. The Treaty of Paris restored the territorial *status quo* as between Russia and the Ottoman Empire; the integrity of the latter was guaranteed, and it was laid down that the Powers would not take action in future on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Principalities and Servia were granted self-government under the suzerainty of the Sultan and the protection of Europe; Russia was excluded from the Danube by a slight alteration of her frontier, and the Black Sea was neutralized. In the course of the next

twenty years the futility of this peace was amply illustrated ; it was found to be utterly impossible to maintain the integrity of the Sultan's dominions or to ignore the complaints of his Christian subjects or to prevent Russia from using Sebastopol as a naval base.

Indeed, the importance of the Crimean War does not lie in its effect upon the Eastern Question, or even in its effect upon the actual belligerents. It did serve to illustrate the essential insincerity of the French Emperor, who, following the example of England at Utrecht, acted throughout the negotiations as the friend of his enemy. But such illustration was hardly needed, and the interest of the war lies rather in its influence upon the position of Austria. The Court of Vienna had been guilty of the fatal error of indecision. It had effectually alienated Russia by its occupation of the Principalities and by its final ultimatum ; it had failed to win the affection of the Western Powers since it had taken no active part in the struggle. And as a result, Austria remained isolated in Europe, and the effect of her isolation at once appeared. Sardinia secured the right to be represented at the Congress of Paris in the teeth of protests from Vienna ; Cavour shared in the debates as the equal of the minister of the Habsburgs. And it was this knowledge of Austrian isolation which paved the way for the events which followed in Italy and in Germany. A State has seldom committed a more fatal blunder than that committed by the ministers of Francis Joseph when they sacrificed the invaluable friendship of Russia to their fear of that Power's aggression in the Near East.

But the blunders of Austria would have been far less serious had there not been ready at hand two men capable of turning them to account against the Habsburgs and in the interests of the enemies of that House. Few

Importance of the War.

§ 6. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour.

kings have ascended a throne in more unfortunate circumstances than did Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. His father, crushed at Novara, had abandoned his crown and country; the new sovereign was compelled to begin his reign by concluding a hasty peace with a victorious foe, and was left to face difficulties stupendous enough to have broken a less steadfast heart. But Victor Emmanuel possessed the very qualities needed in his position. Somewhat cold and unenthusiastic, clear-sighted rather than far-sighted, alive to facts rather than wedded to ideals, he had all that firmness of will which had been so fatally lacking in Charles Albert. And this firmness enabled him, with a bankrupt treasury and a discredited army, to adopt a definite policy and to hold to it through all perils and in the face of all evil report. Setting the achievement of Italian unity and the securing of revenge on Austria before him as his ultimate goal, he prepared the way by maintaining constitutionalism in his kingdom, despite the blandishments of the Court of Vienna, and by pursuing a Liberal course in the affairs of Church and State, despite the complaints and threats of Pius IX and the pessimism of such Conservatives as d'Azeglio.

Cavour.

And he was fortunate in finding a minister equally capable of realizing necessities and of sacrificing unattainable ideals in order to secure practical good. Mazzini may excite admiration by his lofty enthusiasm, Garibaldi by his heroic daring, and both did something, perhaps did much, to promote the union of Italy. But that union would certainly have been very slowly accomplished if it had depended for completion on the efforts of the journalist and the free-lance; it was the cold-blooded statesmanship of Cavour which brought a dream within the range of practical politics. The minister was indeed the necessary counterpart to the King. Rather

more idealistic, somewhat more inspiring than Victor Emmanuel, he had also that calm good sense which enabled him to see the limitations of Sardinia. He knew well enough that the reputation of his country in Italy could only be preserved by a consistently Liberal policy, that any concession to reaction would revive those memories of the Prince of Carignano which the devotion of Charles Albert had but recently obliterated. And he was equally aware that Sardinia unaided could never drive the Austrians from Lombardy, that an ally must be secured, and that to secure an ally a price must be paid. Thus the policy which he adopted centred round two main points; the pursuit of Liberal ideals at home and the gaining of the necessary alliance abroad.

It was in order to secure the latter point that Cavour entered into the Crimean War. Some obscure disputes with Russia, or even an altruistic solicitude for the welfare of the Ottoman Empire, could not afford a reasonable *casus belli*; but the opportunity for raising the reputation of his country was too favourable to be lost. If Sardinia were to make friends it was necessary that she should show that her friendship and enmity were alike worthy of regard, and this she did show. Tchernaya, to some extent, wiped out the stain of Custozza and Novara; the soldiers, trained by La Marmora, bore well comparison with those of Victoria and Napoleon III. Nor did the advantage of the intervention end here. Sardinia attracted the attention of Europe and more especially of England and France, the only Powers which could be expected to sympathize with her aims; she gained a diplomatic triumph over Austria by the admission of her representative to the Congress of Paris; and most of all, she was able to raise the whole question of the state of Italy. In no uncertain language Cavour

Interven-
tion of
Sardinia
in the
Crimean
War.

pointed out that Austrian rule was as unpopular as it was severe, and that the abuse of government throughout the peninsula was mainly to be attributed to the sinister influence of Vienna. And while his tactful conduct won him the respect of the assembled diplomatists, the Sardinian minister succeeded in arousing the sympathetic interest of both the Western Powers.

§ 7. The
Franco-
Austrian
War.

In the case of England, to whom Cavour first turned, that interest was merely sentimental; the Cabinet of London gave Sardinia good wishes, but confessed itself unable to offer more material aid. Napoleon III, however, was greatly impressed by the sad tale of Italian wrongs; the sentimental side of his nature was moved, the practical side saw a new chance of advancing the interest of the Emperor of the French. To go to the help of Sardinia, to wage a successful war with Austria, might well gratify French Liberals, prove his own devotion to the cause of the oppressed, and display him as pursuing the historical foreign policy of France. At the Congress of Paris he asked Cavour what might be done for Italy, and from that moment he drifted towards alliance with Sardinia.

Orsini's
attempt,
Jan. 1858.

But hesitating and cautious as always, he drifted slowly, until an event which caused Cavour to despair hastened the imperial progress. Orsini, an Italian, attempted the life of the French Emperor, and angry remonstrances were addressed to Turin from Paris. But if the would-be murderer had indeed intended, as he declared, to punish Napoleon for his failure to deliver the enslaved peninsula, he was successful beyond all expectation. The Emperor was thoroughly alarmed; he feared a repetition of the attempt, and his faltering resolution was confirmed. In an interview with Cavour at Plombières he came to a vague agreement with the Sardinian Minister; and though


Interview
of Plom-
bières,
May, 1858.

at this time no treaty was concluded, it was understood that France would protect Sardinia from attack, and it is possible that the secret undertakings of Napoleon committed him more definitely to the Italian cause. In any case, Cavour hastened to prepare for war and to secure the necessary definite alliance with France.

In a few months success crowned his efforts. Napoleon undertook to come to the help of Sardinia against Austria, provided that the latter were the aggressor, and, in return for the cession of Savoy and Nice, to free Italy 'from the

Outbreak
of war,
April,
1859.

THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN ITALY 1859.



Alps to the Adriatic'. The Cabinet of Vienna now realized the imminence of war and proceeded to arm, at the same time demanding an explanation from Turin. Cavour replied by offering the solution of mutual disarmament; Austria made the mistake of dispatching an ultimatum requiring the immediate suspension of the Sardinian preparations and of following up the ultimatum by declaring war. The necessary condition was now fulfilled; France ranged herself on the side of Sardinia, and Napoleon III marched in person to the deliverance of Italy.

By a fatal lack of military foresight, the Austrians failed to act with decision or to attempt the overthrow of

Course of
the War.

Magenta,
June 1859.
Solferino,
June 1859.

Sardinia before the arrival of the French. And as a result the victory of Napoleon was rapidly secured and was comparatively decisive. The victory of Magenta gave Milan to the allies; that of Solferino freed Lombardy from the Austrians; and though both battles were hard fought, it seemed inevitable that the pledges of the French Emperor would be redeemed by the conquest of Venetia. But at the critical moment the instability of Napoleon's character was revealed. He had shuddered in the hour of triumph at the sight of the blood shed to gain it, and he had more tangible reasons for hesitating to complete a work which had approached completion far more rapidly and nearly than he had expected. Not only had his army sustained heavy losses, but French opinion was turning against the war. The Clericals viewed with alarm a movement which appeared to threaten the Papacy; the rebellions in central Italy, which promised the creation of a powerful state on the south-eastern frontier of France, roused fear in the hearts of statesmen. And Napoleon himself, who had aimed only at a moderate extension of Sardinian territory, was unwilling to become the creator of a really united Italy; he was determined not to face a general European war for the sake of the Italians, and the mobilization of the Prussian army seemed to suggest the possibility of such a war.

§ 8. Villa-
franca.

Truce of
Villa-
franca,
July 1859.

Thus on the morrow of Solferino the Emperor of the French betrayed the cause which he had adopted. Characteristically, he allowed his ally to remain in ignorance of his intentions and to expect further military operations; he had interviewed Francis Joseph at Villafranca and concluded an armistice before Victor Emmanuel was aware that a cessation of hostilities was even contemplated. By the terms of the truce, later converted into a definitive peace, Lombardy, with the exception of Mantua and

Peschiera, was ceded to France on the tacit understanding that it should be transferred to Sardinia; Venetia was left to Austria; the rulers of Tuscany and Modena were to be restored, and the two Powers were to favour the confederation of Italy under the Pope. In other words, Napoleon had broken faith with his ally and had deliberately failed to free Italy 'from the Alps to the Adriatic'.

And throughout the peninsula his name was execrated as that of a traitor. Cavour, disgusted at the apparent falsifying of his hopes, resigned, and it was only the stern resolution of Victor Emmanuel which secured the acceptance of the truce by Sardinia. But the King's temperament was sane; he realized both the difficulties of his ally and the value of a *fait accompli*. He knew that whatever might be the terms of peace between Austria and France, nothing would undo work once done, and he realized that the revolt of the central Italian states involved their absorption in his projected Italian kingdom. And his confidence, shown by his acceptance of the truce of Villafranca, was justified by results. Though by the Peace of Zürich the expelled rulers were to be restored and a confederation under the Pope to be established, no means were taken to enforce either decision. Napoleon III dared not go so far as to coerce the rebellious provinces; he pronounced in favour of a *plébiscite*, an expedient which had served him so well in France, and this pronouncement was equivalent to assent to the union of central Italy with Sardinia. Tuscany and Modena voted for annexation by overwhelming majorities, and Cavour was able to return to office feeling that after all his work had not been in vain. Though Savoy and Nice, the stipulated price for the freeing of Italy, had to be ceded in return for Lombardy, Victor Emmanuel was none the less able to open an almost Italian Parliament at Turin.

Union of
central
Italy with
Sardinia,
1860.

Peace of
Zürich,
Nov. 1859.

Cession of
Savoy and
Nice to
France,
1860.

§ 9. Garibaldi.

Conquest of Naples and Sicily, May-Sept. 1860.

And meanwhile the rest of Italy was delivered in a more dramatic and more irregular manner. Garibaldi had raised his famous 'Thousand', a corps of ardent enthusiasts for the Italian cause, obeying no leader but the hero who enlisted them. On the news of a rising in Sicily he hastened thither, and having mastered the island in a few weeks, crossed to Naples and easily overthrew the Bourbon monarchy. A provisional government was organized, with Garibaldi at its head; Francis II was forced to take refuge in the stronghold of Gaeta, under the guns of a French squadron; and the conqueror of the south prepared to complete the deliverance of his country by seizing Rome. He announced that he would proclaim Victor Emmanuel in the Eternal City.

Castel Fidardo, Sept. 1860.

But here he came into conflict with the Sardinian Government. The Pope was protected by France, and it appeared to Cavour that an attack on Rome would lead certainly to war with Napoleon III, who was already anxious to conciliate the Clericals whom he had alienated. To prevent Garibaldi from compromising the new form of government, the Italian army invaded the Romagna; a victory at Castel Fidardo and the surrender of the French mercenaries at Ancona gave Victor Emmanuel control of the States of the Church; and the adventurer, always loyal to his King, consented to his proclamation in Naples and Sicily. With the exception of Rome and Venetia, all Italy was united under one ruler as it had not been since the days of Theodoric the Ostrogoth.

§ 10. The Kingdom of Italy.

But without Rome the union of Italy was no real thing, nor were the difficulties of Victor Emmanuel by any means ended. He was faced by the problem of the relationship between the Pope and the new kingdom; he was troubled by the unwisdom of enthusiasts; and at the critical juncture lost the services of Cavour. The states-

man's death removed the one minister who might have guided Italy safely along the path of constitutional development ; no one could replace him, and the Government, deprived of adequate leadership, was unable to cope with its many embarrassments.

Death of
Cavour,
June 1861.

Of those embarrassments the earnest Republicanism of Mazzini was not the least, for that ardent patriot divided opinion at the very moment when unity of opinion was essential to political unity. But Garibaldi was an even more serious trial. Believing that vigorous daring was alone needed to secure the real completion of the work begun, he invaded the Romagna with his volunteers and compelled the Italian Government to intervene, and by forcing him to surrender at Aspromonte, to sacrifice much of its popularity.

Aspro-
monte,
Aug. 1862.

Yet the real weakness of the new kingdom was neither its lack of completion nor the insubordination of the enthusiasts. It was due to the fact that united Italy was the outcome of sentiment ; a burst of enthusiasm had swept away the Governments among which the peninsula had been partitioned, but it had not produced true union. Sardinia, strong enough to take the lead, was too weak to compel obedience ; she had been forced to call in French aid, and for this she suffered. The ardent patriots mourned the cession of Savoy and Nice ; they would not understand the stern necessities of practical politics ; they regretted bitterly the acceptance of the truce of Villafranca. And in these circumstances the Government could not overcome the latent antipathy of the south for an alien dynasty, being less able to do so because it was obliged to burden the people with heavy taxation for the maintenance of the armaments required in order to free Italy from the too pressing attention of her friend, the Emperor of the French. As a matter

Weakness
of the
Kingdom
of Italy.

of fact, though without French aid the accomplishment of Italian unity would certainly have been postponed, it may be questioned whether such postponement would not have been ultimately beneficial to the Italian cause. It would in any case have saved the new kingdom from beginning its political life as the debtor of Napoleon III.

§ 11. Zenith
of the
Second
Empire.

For Napoleon III regarded Italy as his own creation, and was regarded in Europe as the liberator of that peninsula, so that the end of the Austrian war marks the zenith of his power. To all seeming he was supreme in France, the effectual champion of the oppressed, and the most potent factor in continental politics. His every motion was watched with eager expectancy; the chancelleries of the Powers yet thrilled at his lightest word. Triumphant over Republicanism at home and over Russia and Austria abroad, the saviour of the Porte and the guardian of the Pope, the generous protector of nascent Italian liberty, he had indeed risen far above the lowly plane of comic adventurer upon which he had stood some ten years before.

Real weak-
ness of
Napoleon's
position:
(1) at
home.

But in reality his downfall was already approaching; men were beginning to appreciate him at his true worth, and anything in the nature of truth was most detrimental to the Emperor of the French. At home, the Clerical party, formerly his firmest supporters, were offended by his Italian policy and by a disregard for the interests of the Vicar of Christ impossible in a sincere Catholic. Nor had Napoleon found compensation in the affection of Liberals. He had recalled the exiles only to discover that they remembered past injuries rather than present benefits, that they paid more regard to the General Security Act, by which their friends had been imprisoned without trial, than to imperial professions, that they refused to be deceived by the reiteration of their pet

catchwords, and that they were by no means reconciled to the disguised autocracy.

And abroad his position was almost more unsatisfactory. The Crimean War had not afforded that convenient and glorious military parade which it had been intended to provide; the Austrian War had produced a situation from which the Emperor was only able partially to escape by sacrificing his reputation for common honesty. He had cooled the ardour of England by his conduct at the Congress of Paris; he had lost his chance of winning the undying devotion of the Italian people. But he had gained suspicion and distrust; he had exposed his infirmity of purpose and raised doubts as to the substantiality of the golden image which he had so laboriously erected. In fact it only needed a man, not obsessed by the magic of that name which the Emperor bore, to tear away the garb of fraudulent greatness in which Napoleon III had clothed himself and to expose in all its puny nakedness the figure of the fictitious 'Man of Destiny'.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FALL OF AUSTRIA

§ 1. Bismarck. § 2. State of Germany. § 3. The Zollverein. § 4. Schleswig-Holstein. § 5. The Convention of Gastein. § 6. State of Austria. § 7. The Seven Weeks' War. § 8. The Peace of Prague. § 9. The Dual Monarchy. § 10. The North German Confederation. § 11. The Eve of Union.

§ 1. Bis-
marck.

IN order to tear away from the puny figure of the Emperor of the French that giant's robe of deceit in which it was so deftly enshrouded, and to expose to the astonished gaze of Europe the insignificant proportions of that Colossus before whom a continent had trembled, a man was required dishonest enough to discover the fraudulence of another and willing to reveal his discovery. Such a man was found in Otto von Bismarck, Prussian chancellor, unmasker of the fictitious 'Man of Destiny', destroyer of the empire of insincerity, creator of a new empire of frank self-seeking. His very defects contributed to his success, since they were joined with and corrected by singular clearness of political vision. Less sincere than Metternich, he escaped the Austrian chancellor's error of allowing his supreme contempt for sentimentality and for the rights of peoples to blind him to the importance and influence of enthusiasm. Lacking Mazzini's loftiness of purpose, he was able, unlike the founder of 'Young Italy', to realize that idealism, however exalted, may strive in vain if unsupported by material strength. Deficient in ardour, he was not guilty of that rash contempt for the devious paths of diplomacy which characterized the ardent Garibaldi; inferior in subtlety to

Napoleon III, he was free from that exaggerated belief in hypocrisy which marred the promising career of the imperial comedian. Profoundly convinced that in politics there is a time for lying and a time for truth-telling, a time for sentiment and a time for cynicism, he considered that to use all means to gain the desired end, to despise no agency, however contemptible, is the part of the practical statesman.

And Bismarck was before all a practical statesman. Others might believe in the high destiny of the German race and in its sacred mission for the regeneration of fallen humanity; such distant ideals were not for him. For mere unity he felt but a qualified enthusiasm; it was for unity under Prussian leadership that he longed with all his heart, for which he strove with all his might. Attainment of this end might or might not benefit Germany as a whole; it would assuredly benefit the kingdom of the Hohenzollerns, and therefore attainment was to be desired. Bismarck set one clearly defined object before him; he would secure for his country and for his master that imperial crown which Frederic William IV had declined to receive at the hands of the revolutionaries of Frankfort. And pursuing this object, he would not allow his eyes to be blinded by idealistic visions or his heart to be tormented by sentimental regrets.

Nor was he one whit less practical in his realization of difficulties and his devising of means by which his end should be gained. Like Cavour, he recognized that in politics only a limited perfection is attainable, that lesser evils must be endured if greater evils are to be escaped. But unlike Cavour, because he was less prone to idealism and more clear sighted, he was patient and able to avoid the pitfalls into which too hasty progress would have plunged him as it plunged the great Sardinian. Had he

been Minister to Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon III would never have appeared as the deliverer of Italy, nor would the Pope by continued residence in Rome have distracted the new kingdom. For Bismarck could wait; he preferred the most heart-breaking delay in gaining his objects to their rapid but imperfect attainment. He was determined that when unity was secured it should be real and complete, founded on the sure basis of ultimate power of compulsion, the outcome of superior strength. His Germany was to be no palace of sentiment; there should be no half-measures, no concessions, no sharing of power, no foreign help. Prussia would unite the Fatherland by force; she would dictate her own terms, and overawe rather than conciliate any opposition which might arise. And thus a necessary first step was to secure for the Hohenzollerns that commanding position which should enable them to work their will in Germany.

§ 2. State of
Germany.

But at the moment of his accession to power, Bismarck found little in the situation to lead him to hope for immediate success. When the storm of revolution had spent itself, and the brief saturnalia of Liberalism had ended in the triumph of Schwarzenberg at Olmütz, reaction had run riot in the Confederation. Austria, no longer satisfied with that 'moral supremacy' which had been Metternich's ideal, aimed at complete ascendancy, and found ready allies in the lesser states who viewed with mingled distrust and jealousy the recent self-assertion of Prussia. Nor did that Power offer any serious opposition to the Court of Vienna. Frederic William IV, never a man of powerful intellect, had been reduced to a condition of pitiable weakness by the turmoil of the year of revolutions; and while Manteuffel feared to enter upon any vigorous policy, the King tended in his declining days more and more to give way to that curious fascination

which the Habsburgs from time to time exercise over their neighbours of Berlin. And though the Constitution of Prussia was retained, it failed to inspire Liberals with confidence, and did little more than afford opportunity for violent strife between the Progressive and Feudal parties in the state.

None the less there were signs of approaching improvement. The unitary sentiment, though repressed and discouraged, had not expired; the Frankfort Parliament had stirred the imagination of a race whose superficial stolidity is but the cloak of a poetic temperament, and its failure was less remembered than the hopes which had been built upon its meeting. As Germany slowly recovered from the political paralysis which had fallen on her with the return to reaction, leagues were formed to promote the cause apparently so lost. The 'National Union' undertook the advocacy of a closer federation under the leadership of Prussia; the 'Union of Reform', unwilling to deliver the German subjects of Francis Joseph into the hands of Magyars and Slavs, proposed to include their Austrian compatriots in the united Fatherland. And though such diversity of opinion somewhat impaired the efficiency of the agitation, the two leagues served a useful purpose by keeping alive the idea of unity and by making the reform of the Germanic Confederation a theme for constant discussion.

Perma-
nence of th
unitary
sentiment.

And the prospect of such discussion producing a tangible result was appreciably increased when the restless soul of Frederic William IV at last found peace first in imbecility and then in the grave. The government of Prussia passed into the hands of his brother William, a man of sterner mould and greater stability of character. He possessed neither striking mental capacity nor remarkable originality; his natural enthusiasm had been

William I
of Prussia.

diminished by the advance of years; he was perhaps incapable of devising a policy or of inspiring a crusade. But he was endowed with a large measure of good sense; not very wise himself, he could appreciate wisdom in others; and above all, he was loyal to his servants and steadfast in support of any course which he had once approved. Nor was the limited intelligence of the King altogether a disadvantage. Had his mind been more active, William I might have found it impossible to submit to direction by a minister; as it was, he recognized Bismarck for his mental superior, was content to rely upon him and to co-operate heartily in carrying out the policy of his servant.

Reform
of the
Prussian
army,
1860-3.

Such abnegation was more easy because the Chancellor was at one with his master on the solitary point concerning which that master held decided opinions. William, who had been the hope of the militarist party in the days of revolution, was above all things anxious to reform the Prussian army, in which serious defects were revealed when it was mobilized to support Austria against Napoleon III. Thus, even before he had actually ascended the throne, he undertook the carrying out of such changes in the military system as might give to the monarchy that armed strength which was the tradition of the days of Frederic the Great, and which Bismarck considered as one of the most necessary preliminaries to the realization of his aims. A genuine universal conscription was established, and though the Parliament refused to sanction the creation of new permanent regiments, those new regiments, secured provisionally as a result of the mobilization, were none the less embodied. Forthwith a constitutional crisis arose. The Lower House protested that it alone could grant the necessary supplies; the King fell back upon the theory of his divine right and upon the powers possessed by him as 'war-lord'.

It was to solve the deadlock, thus created, that Bismarck was called to office, and it was his success in this task which secured him permanence of power. His methods were direct and characteristic. While declaring that the claim of the Lower House was unjustified by the Constitution and proceeding to raise revenue with the assent of the Upper House and by intervention of the royal prerogative, he undertook also the destruction of an irritating and inconvenient opposition. Secure in the devotion of the army, he borrowed the methods of Napoleon III; official candidates were forced on the electorate, the Press was stifled, and the angry protests of enthusiastic meetings were ignored. This vigorous action proved completely successful. Parliamentary resistance to his policy ceased to be important; the reform of the military system was completed; Prussia became, beyond all question, the possessor of the most efficient army in Germany, and one great requisite for the attainment of his ultimate aim was secured.

Yet, valuable as this efficient army was, it was not the most valuable asset possessed by Bismarck. Still more important was the Zollverein, the Customs Union between Prussia and the other German states. Founded soon after the Congress of Vienna by some of the smaller members of the Confederation, it had been gradually extended until Austria was the only state which stood outside it. Her non-inclusion had been due in the first instance to the blindness of Metternich, who had long failed to understand that by allowing the Zollverein to develop under the aegis of Prussia he was preparing the way for her political, by conceding to her commercial, leadership in Germany. And when the Court of Vienna at last saw the danger, the question of the non-German territories of the Habsburgs proved a bar to her admission,

Bismarck
and the
Prussian
Parliament,
1862-3.

§ 3. The
Zollverein.

Reorgan-
ization of
the Zoll-
verein,
1860.
Commer-
cial treaty
with
France,
1862.

despite the readiness of many members of the league to welcome her adhesion. Protracted negotiations ensued, but the influence of Prussia was used to render them futile. As Austria was irrevocably committed to a policy of high protection, the Zollverein was reorganized on a free-trade basis, and this stroke was soon followed by the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the members of the league and France. A divergence in commercial interests was thus produced between the German states and the Habsburg monarchy, while Prussia, able decisively to affect the material welfare of the Confederation, possessed a powerful magnet by which to draw her neighbours into political union with her.

The 'Con-
gress of
Princes',
Aug. 1863.

But though in this way she had improved her prospects of securing the headship of united Germany, the conduct of Prussia served also to bring into relief the strength of Habsburg prestige. The smaller states were ill content to see their traditional leader treated less favourably than their traditional foe; they lamented that advantages, accorded to mere Frenchmen, should be denied to the millions of good Germans included in the motley array of nationalities under the sceptre of Francis Joseph. And their sympathetic grief was intensified when Austria, abandoning her old preference for reaction, appeared as the champion of reform in Germany. The Court of Vienna invited the various princes to meet at Frankfort and to consider a scheme for the reorganization of the Confederation, which was to be placed under the direction of six states, including Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria, assisted by a federal council and an elective general assembly. Twenty-four Governments accepted this proposal with enthusiasm; the obstinate hostility of Prussia caused her to appear as the advocate of reaction, and though the scheme necessarily failed, its production

served to revive the waning popularity of the Habsburgs in Germany. Bismarck, who had been early cured, by his experiences in the Federal Diet, of any partiality for Austria, and who had become a convinced supporter of her exclusion from the Confederation, saw that he must find means for breaking down the sentimental bond which united Germany with Vienna.

And he found his opportunity in the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein question. These two duchies, together with that of Lauenburg, were possessions of the King, but not part of the kingdom, of Denmark; and the succession to them was disputed between Frederic of Augustenburg and Christian of Glücksburg. The latter, who represented on the female side the elder branch of the Danish royal family, had been recognized as heir to all the territories of King Frederic VII by the Powers in the Convention of London, and England and France had guaranteed the integrity of his dominions. But this decision had not been accepted in the duchies, which claimed that in them the Salic Law prevailed and that Frederic of Augustenburg was therefore rightful heir to the dukedom as representing the direct male line. And this resistance to the declared will of Europe was complicated by the ulterior aims of Schleswig-Holstein. It desired and demanded autonomy, which was threatened by the centralizing policy of the Danish King; in reality it aimed at independence. Nor was this the only complication. Holstein was a member of the Germanic Confederation, and Schleswig was indissolubly united with Holstein; the Liberals of Germany wished to absorb both duchies, and in any case were resolved not to sacrifice their compatriots to the Danes.

Matters therefore remained in a critical condition despite the Convention of London, and on the death of Frederic VII, 1863.

§ 4.
Schleswig-
Holstein.

Conven-
tion of
London,
1852.

Frederic VII a crisis occurred. While Christian was duly proclaimed at Copenhagen, the duchies declared in favour of 'Frederic VIII'; they insisted on their right to local independence, and they demanded that their Estates should be convened. And when the Danes looked to the Western Powers for help their enemies turned to Germany, where sympathy for the duchies was great and so vigorously expressed as to stir to action even the slow-moving Diet of Frankfort. In response to pressure from the legislatures of the various states, the Germanic Confederation pronounced itself officially in favour of the Augustenburg candidate, and a committee of thirty-six was appointed to superintend the enforcement of this decision and to organize, if necessary, the federal forces for a campaign against Denmark.

Interven-
tion of
Prussia and
Austria.

But Bismarck had no intention of allowing the question to be settled without his assistance. He realized how much Prussia might gain in naval power by the annexation of the duchies or of their seaports; he saw also an admirable opportunity for embroiling Austria with her friends, the German states. And he was successful in persuading the Court of Vienna to join with him in urging Christian to grant autonomy to Schleswig, and when this suggestion was ignored, in occupying the duchies. A brief campaign ended in the triumph of the two Powers; the Danes, appealing to the guarantors of their territory, received only mild diplomatic support; and the Treaty of Vienna was concluded, by which Christian ceded his rights in Schleswig-Holstein to the allies. Those allies conveniently forgot the claims of Frederic of Augustenburg, in whose cause they had been professedly fighting, and organized a provisional administration for the duchies without regard either for the wishes of the inhabitants or for the rights of either claimant.

Treaty of
Vienna,
1864.

It was, however, found more easy to dispossess the Danes of territories than to settle the future of the occupied land. Bismarck, secretly resolved on annexation, would not agree to any other practical suggestion; his initial proposal for the recognition of Frederic was obviously insincere since it was coupled with conditions, such as the cession of Kiel, which would have rendered the duchies incapable of preserving even the semblance of independent existence. The Duke of Augustenburg declined to accept the proposal unless it were ratified by the Estates of Schleswig-Holstein, a reservation which was tantamount to rejection, since the Prussians had become thoroughly unpopular in the occupied territory. And Austria was equally unwilling to agree to the next suggestion of the Court of Berlin, an open proposal for annexation, with the result that the two Powers were soon on the verge of war. While the Prussian member of the provisional Government laboured to advance the interests of his own country, his Austrian colleague showed signs of wishing to fulfil the moral obligation to secure the accession of the Duke of Augustenburg.

If Bismarck had had a free hand, Austria would have been punished for her tentative honesty by an immediate declaration of war; nothing would induce the Prussian Chancellor to forgo his expectations of advantage from his action in Schleswig-Holstein and least of all would qualms of conscience do so. But the influence of William for a while preserved peace, and his Minister was obliged to content himself with a mere diplomatic victory. He induced Austria to sign the Convention of Gastein, by which Schleswig was handed over to Prussia, Holstein and Lauenburg to her ally, the latter duchy being immediately sold to the Prussian King. Formal an-

§ 5. The
Convention
of Gastein.

Convention
of Gastein,
Aug. 1865.

nexation was not announced, but it had in effect been accomplished.

Irritation
of the
German
States.

And once more the Court of Vienna had been guilty of a fatal blunder. Her action in the duchies had already brought her into conflict with the federal army, which the Diet had sent to support Frederic, and had offended the sentiment of Germany. Now the Convention of Gastein was hailed not merely as an outrageous breach of faith but also as a deliberate violation of the Constitution of the Confederation. The smaller states expressed their anger in protests at Frankfort; the two Powers threatened to punish such impertinence, and forthwith the Habsburgs lost much of that sympathy which would have been invaluable in the struggle which was to ensue. Austria, in fact, had been utterly outwitted. She had been led, in pursuit of a supposed immediate advantage, to impair the true basis of her influence in Germany, and when the hour of conflict came, in place of finding behind her a united body of opinion, she with difficulty secured the support of a bare majority of the states of the Confederation. Moral influence had been her greatest asset; her immorality at Gastein lessened that influence at the very moment when she most needed it, and when it would have been most valuable to her.

§ 6. State
of the
Austrian
Empire.

For her position at home was not such as might enable her to face war with equanimity. She had indeed escaped the imminent peril of dissolution which had faced her, and under the firm guidance of Schwarzenberg she had temporarily restored order throughout her dominions. But that good order had not long endured. The death of its creator had thrown power into less capable hands; his successor Bach, though continuing his system, had not realized to the same extent that it was upon force and force alone that reliance could be placed, that the army was

Ministry of
Bach,
1852-9.

the only basis of the existing order. While adopting to the full the idea of merging all the conflicting races of the Empire in one centralized state and while repressing with vigour all manifestations of national sentiment, he also believed in a close alliance with the Church. By the Concordat which he concluded with Pius IX, the supremacy of the Emperor in ecclesiastical affairs, established by Joseph II, was abandoned, and by creating the impression that they were devoted to the maintenance of Catholic ascendancy the Habsburgs added to their many other difficulties the alienation of their non-Catholic subjects. More unpopular than ever, the Government maintained a precarious existence with the help of an army already faltering in its devotion.

The Concordat,
1855.

And thus the Government fell as a result of the shock of its defeats in Italy. Bach resigned; Francis Joseph announced the prospective grant of reforms, and finding that the mere inclusion of representatives from provincial diets in a central assembly at Vienna was not enough to conciliate his Liberal subjects, he restored, by the Diploma, the powers of local national assemblies and revived the institution of separate Ministries for Hungary. But the Magyars were not yet content. No sooner had they regained their own Diet than they declared that they would only recognize the Constitution which Ferdinand had accepted, they hinted that Francis Joseph had never been received as King at Buda-Pest, and ignoring the central committee which was to represent and to govern the whole Empire, they reverted to passive resistance. The Austrian dominions appeared to be fast returning to that state of anarchy which had followed the fall of Metternich.

Constitution of
1860.

But Francis Joseph was at once firm and optimistic. Refusing to concede the demands of the Magyars, he tried

Constitution of
1861.

the experiment of a new Constitution. While the local diets for each country in the Empire were retained, a general Parliament of two chambers was created to represent the whole monarchy. But when it met at Vienna its failure was at once obvious. If the advocates of unity had been satisfied, those who desired federation were profoundly disgusted. Hungary, Venetia, and Croatia declined to elect deputies, and in the first of these countries the agitation was serious enough to necessitate the proclamation of martial law. Francis Joseph realized that unity was at present unattainable; he recognized also that with a discredited army and in view of the increasingly hostile attitude of Prussia, the Magyars' could hardly be held down by force. In these circumstances, he suspended the new Constitution as unworkable, and accepting 'dualism', the slackening of the bonds between Austria and Hungary until only the kingship of the Emperor united them, he opened negotiations with his 'high-spirited' subjects upon this basis. These negotiations were still proceeding when war with Prussia broke out.

Constitu-
tion sus-
pended,
1865.

§ 7. The
Seven
Weeks'
War, 1866.

Of this conflict the ostensible cause was the support given by the Austrian administrator of Holstein to the Augustenburg party and to the agitation for independence. But in reality it was the result of Bismarck's determination to exclude the Habsburgs from the united Germany which he projected, and the war would have occurred even if Schleswig-Holstein had never existed. For the struggle was no sudden event; the Prussian Chancellor had prepared the way for it with all his accustomed thoroughness and all his accustomed realization of the needs of the situation. Aware that Austria single-handed was no match for the reformed Prussian army, he laboured to deprive her of all possible help.

Prepara-
tions of

And his labour had been crowned with success. By

concluding a military convention with Russia for the suppression of the Polish rebellion, he had won the gratitude of Alexander II, who could not fail to contrast, and that with advantage to the Court of Berlin, the friendly attitude of William I with the more dubious conduct of Francis Joseph. And having thus disarmed the possible hostility of the Tsar, Bismarck turned his attention to the even more congenial task of deceiving the arch-deceiver. In an interview at Biarritz, and in a private conversation with Napoleon III, of which the details were not committed to writing and are therefore unknown, he succeeded in convincing the French Emperor that he would do well to allow Prussia a free hand against Austria. It is probable that he led his dupe to imagine that he would receive assistance from Berlin in an attempt to annex Luxemburg. In any case France remained neutral, and Italy, who would hardly have dared to enter upon war without the implied sanction of Napoleon, was left free to bid for the completion of her unity by throwing in her lot with Prussia.

Bismarck.
Convention
with
Russia,
1863.

Interview
of Biarritz,
1865.

Alliance
of Prussia
and Italy,
April
1866.

Thus Austria was isolated in Europe. A belated attempt to disarm Italian hostility by the offer of Venetia failed, and in the final struggle the Habsburgs could rely only upon the assistance of the minor German states. That assistance, such as it was, she received. When the Prussians, professing that Austria had broken the Convention of Gastein, denounced that treaty and expelled their late allies from Holstein, the Diet decreed federal execution against the Hohenzollerns. The recent misconduct of the Court of Vienna was forgotten, nor did the minor states allow the attractive scheme of reform, which was published from Berlin, to blind their eyes to the danger of Prussian aggression. Yet the effect of Austrian folly was seen in the doubtful character of the

Outbreak
of war,
June 1866.

majority by which help was granted to her, and that help proved to be small compensation for the lack of any more substantial alliance.

The Seven
Weeks'
War, 1866.

Indeed a large part of the federal army took the field so late that the war had been decided before they entered upon the scene of action. Prussia acted with such decision as utterly to disconcert her more leisurely foes. Placing three armies in the field, she had assumed the offensive while her opponents were still discovering that war had broken out, and the decisive victory had been gained long before the allied forces had completed their concentration. The opposition of the northern states ended with the capitulation of the Hanoverian army at Langensalza, and Berlin was delivered from all peril. In the south, the Bavarians were defeated and Frankfort occupied with the greatest ease, the federal capital being treated with exceptional harshness, as though the victors desired to emphasize the decease of the long moribund Germanic Confederation.

Langen-
salza, June.

König-
grätz, July
1866.

But meanwhile the real issue had already been decided by the overthrow of Austria herself. Having conquered Saxony without a battle, the Prussian armies almost surprised Benedek, the Austrian general, who was slowly advancing northwards, by their sudden invasion of Bohemia. The defenders of that country fell back in some disorder upon Königgrätz, where Benedek, hampered by instructions from Vienna and deprived of all initiative, was reluctantly compelled to give battle. The needle-gun, with which the Prussians had been rearmed, proved fatally effective, and at the end of the day, Austria had ceased to be a German Power.

The War
in Italy.

And her defeat in Bohemia cost her also her position in Italy, neutralizing the effects of the victories which had there crowned her arms. While the Prussians were

pouring across the Saxon frontier, the Italians had invaded Venetia, but at Custozza their military inferiority was once more painfully exemplified and their army hurled back in confusion. Nor did they fare better at sea. A projected attack on Triest was defeated at Lissa, where their fleet, though of superior strength and more modern construction, was easily dispersed by Tegetthoff. Such gleams of success smoothed the path which Francis Joseph was forced to tread, but they could not save him from pursuing it. Königgrätz made the Peace of Prague inevitable.

For with the Prussians almost within striking distance of Vienna, further resistance was hardly possible. Only with the help of Hungary could the war be continued, and the relations between Hungary and Austria were not so cordial as to encourage Francis Joseph to emulate Maria Theresa and throw himself on the generosity of the Magyars. Even if he had been assured of an equally favourable response, he would have been reluctant to appeal to subjects recently on the verge of rebellion, and it was by no means certain that the response would have been favourable. Though Hungary had loyally refrained from embarrassing the Government during the war, Kossuth, supposed representative of the noblest and most influential section of his race, was urging the Italians to capture Triest and thus give the signal for a new revolution at Buda-Pest. And though the exiled patriot possibly misunderstood his countrymen this once, Francis Joseph determined not to risk the addition of civil war to his other calamities. He invited Napoleon III to mediate between him and Victor Emmanuel, ceding Venetia to France as a first step along the road to peace.

And since Bismarck was almost equally anxious to end the war, progress along that road was rapid. The Prussian

Custozza,
June.

Lissa,
July.

§ 8. The
Peace of
Prague.

Mediation
of Napo-
leon III,
July 1866.

Moderation
of
Bismarck.

Chancellor had aimed at the exclusion of Austria from Germany; having realized this aim, he was wise enough to understand that he would probably rather lose than gain by pressing his advantage. For Napoleon III was already gnawing at the diplomatic net in which he had been entangled; he was beginning to debate whether he had not been deceived at Biarritz; signs were not wanting that he contemplated a reversal of his policy. And Bismarck, being by no means anxious to involve himself in a second war before he had garnered the harvest of victory in the first, was also convinced that if German unity had an enemy, that enemy was to be found rather in Paris than in Vienna; he foresaw the inevitable contest with France; he felt that a hopelessly alienated Austria might intervene in that contest with fatal effect, and he believed it to be to his interest to avoid such hopeless alienation by judicious leniency in his hour of triumph.

Peace of
Prague,
Aug. 1866.

In these circumstances, it was not hard to reach an agreement; under the nominal mediation of the French Emperor, preliminaries of peace were arranged at Nikolsburg and were soon converted into the definitive Treaty of Prague. Francis Joseph was not greatly humiliated; no indemnity was exacted from him nor was he compelled to cede any territory, Venetia having been already surrendered. But he was obliged to retire from all participation in German affairs; to assent to the annexation by Prussia of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort; and to the formation of a North German Confederation, which was to include Saxony and all the states north of the Main. In other words, Austria had suffered final defeat in that struggle with the Hohenzollerns for the leadership of Germany which had raged intermittently since the days of Frederic the Great and Joseph II.

And her defeat in this struggle decided the issue of another and almost equally time-honoured contest. Deprived of her German position, she was unable further to resist Magyar demands, and when the negotiations, interrupted during the war, were resumed after Königgrätz their result was a foregone conclusion. The cause of unity had been lost on the Bohemian battle-field; the dispute was no longer between a unitary and separatist party, but between the two wings of the latter. The question to be decided was whether the alleged blessings of local independence should be confined to the Magyars or extended to the Slav races also; whether the dominions of the Habsburgs were to be organized as a dual monarchy or as a federation under a common sovereign.

The advocates of the dual monarchy triumphed and their triumph was the work of a Magyar patriot and a Saxon professional statesman. Francis Deák was free from the extravagant localism of Kossuth, whose declaration of independence he had condemned; he believed that devotion to Hungary was not necessarily inconsistent with loyalty to the Habsburgs. But at the same time, he was Magyar enough to oppose with all his might any concessions to mere Czechs and Croats; there might be a Parliament at Vienna and at Buda-Pest, but there ought not to be a parliament at Prague and there most decidedly should not be one at Agram. And under his influence, Dualism carried the day in the Hungarian Diet, and as that body was almost in a position to dictate its own terms, Dualism was perforce accepted as the basis of settlement.

But the details of that settlement remained, and their arrangement was entrusted on the side of Austria to Beust, whom Francis Joseph summoned to Vienna after the Peace of Prague, much as Dion invited Plato to Syracuse. A

Establish-
ment of
Dualism,
1867.

professional organizer of States, the new minister was given a free hand to reorganize the tottering Habsburg monarchy and more especially to determine the conditions which Austria might secure from Hungary. He performed his arduous task with credit. The strength of the State was to some extent maintained by the establishment of common ministries for foreign affairs, the services and finance, in so far as the last concerned expenditure for common objects; its material prosperity was protected by a system of consultation and periodical agreements on commercial questions. If Dualism has succeeded, its success must be attributed to Beust; if it has failed, its failure has been due to the reactionary character of the system.

§ 10. The
North
German
Confedera-
tion.

For at the very moment when Austria and Hungary were thus agreeing to differ and amicably drawing up a separation order, the unitary movement was advancing rapidly across the frontier. Freed from the embarrassing presence of the Habsburgs, strengthened by the addition of those lands which she had annexed, Prussia found herself in the position to hasten towards the goal of her ambitions. And Bismarck did not neglect to avail himself of the advantages which had been secured. The North German Confederation, including all the States except Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt, was immediately organized under the presidency of King William. To Prussia an overwhelming superiority was secured; for the control of the federation was vested in a Federal Council in which, while each State possessed in theory equal voting power, she was allowed to exercise also the votes of those districts which she had recently incorporated. Nor was there any danger that the Elective Assembly, for which provision was also made, would hamper the Executive; its powers were duly limited and

it was unlikely ever to agree with the Federal Council. Thus the North German Confederation, dominated by Prussia and irrevocably united with her, was a valuable agent for the completion of German unity.

Still Germany was not yet united. The Southern States, expressly excluded from the new league, were by no means anxious to submit to Prussian leadership, and the enemies of German unity even trusted that they would form an alliance in opposition to the North German Confederation. Such indeed had been the expectation of Napoleon III when he insisted that the Main should form a dividing line ; he believed that in this way he had for ever postponed the completion of Bismarck's work, and even prepared for the substitution of France for Austria as guardian of centrifugal tendencies in Germany.

That his expectation was falsified and his belief proved vain was the result of the ingenuity of the Prussian chancellor and the dire necessity of the Southern States. Immediately after the end of the war, realizing that they could not stand alone, they had concluded secret military conventions with the Court of Berlin, which placed their forces as much at the disposal of William as the army of Saxony. And this step towards eventual union was soon followed by another. Appreciating the value of commercial ties and that to accustom the South to joint action with the North would assuredly advance his cause, Bismarck suddenly denounced the Zollverein, and refused to allow the Southern States to re-enter it except on his own terms. Threatened with economic ruin, the four governments gave way, assented to the creation of a general tariff parliament, and thus abandoned much of their aloofness of attitude. Union, in fact, was within sight.

Yet Bismarck knew that union was still far from

§ 11. The
eve of the
Union.

accomplished. Though the Southern States had conceded some part of their independence, they had only done so under compulsion; they were not the less hostile to Prussia because their hostile feelings had to be concealed; they were not less desirous of preserving their aloofness because their aloofness was threatened. And even if they had been inspired with a lively desire for union under Prussian leadership, their separate existence would still have been the care of Napoleon. III, who was ready to take up arms in order to undo that which he had so unwisely assisted to do.

Requisites
for the
completion
of unity.

There were thus two requisites for the final completion of Bismarck's work. It was essential to create in the South a sense of its ultimate identity with the North, and it was essential to overthrow the Emperor of the French. And the Chancellor conceived that he could best secure both these requisites by a war with France, which, necessary for the destruction of Napoleon III, appeared also to offer the readiest means of rousing in Germany so vigorous a sentiment of unity that the antipathy of the Southern States for Prussia might vanish away. In the years following the Peace of Prague, Bismarck devoted all his energy to the production of a situation which might enable King William to appear as the champion of German nationality against French aggression.

Errors of
Napoleon
III.

And his greatest helper was his destined victim. Napoleon III was perhaps conscious of all his limitations save one. Having gained an imperial crown by cunning and absolute power by subtle deception, he believed himself to be the veritable embodiment of successful fraud, and so immune from all danger of being defrauded. Convinced that he could deceive all men, he never dreamed that he might be deceived; hypocritical to the core, he was unsuspecting of hypocrisy in others. And

so he fell an easy prey to the beguiling arts of one who was clear-sighted enough to pierce the heroic mist that concealed the comic actor, and skilful enough to offer convincingly the homage of forced sincerity. In dealing with the Emperor of the French, Bismarck seemed to confess that he had met his superior in craft, that all pretence was useless, that honesty was the best policy because dishonesty could not deceive. And such flattery, the deference of a great rogue for a greater, blinded the eyes of Napoleon III, so that he allowed himself to be guided like a child along the winding road to Sedan. By easy stages, he was led to offend every Power in Europe, to trample upon every susceptibility, to arouse every antagonistic feeling, and all the while he believed that he was shaping the future of the Continent and playing to perfection the glorious part of 'Man of Destiny'. Only at the eleventh hour was the veil torn from his eyes; only then did he behold himself as he was, divested of his fair cloak of deceit, standing before France and Europe a discredited and friendless charlatan.

CHAPTER IX

THE FALL OF FRANCE

§ 1. Internal System of Napoleon III. § 2. Decline of the Second Empire. § 3. The 'Liberal Empire'. § 4. Foreign Policy of Napoleon III. § 5. Napoleon III and Bismarck. § 6. The Preliminaries of the Franco-German War. § 7. The Franco-German War. § 8. The Provisional Government. § 9. Bazaine and Gambetta. § 10. The Peace of Frankfort. § 11. The German Empire.

§ 1.
Internal
System of
Napoleon
III.

THE very brilliance of that part which the Emperor of the French had undertaken to play, almost ensured the eventual detection of his charlatanism. As 'Man of Destiny,' he was compelled to stand constantly in the full glare of French and of European criticism, nor could it be expected that the eyes of his critics would be for ever dazzled by the flashlight radiance of the *coup d'état* and of the Congress of Paris, that those eyes would never penetrate the mask of Napoleonic paint and powder under which the true features of the actor were concealed. And when once that mask had been pierced, the day of successful play-acting was over; with the discovery of the true character of its creator, the very basis of the Imperial system was destroyed. For, resting apparently on the army, the Church, and the commercial class, seemingly owing its success to the favour of these adherents and to the dull indifference of the rural population, the Second Empire was in truth founded upon deceit and maintained by fraud. Its friends were attached to it, less by sincere affection than by a lively hope that from it they would win the accomplishment of their dearest wishes, a hope created and fostered by the Emperor, who canvassed

wildly the support of all, and even of divergent, interests. Naturally prone to wide generalizations, he conferred upon the more attractive of his broad assertions the epithet 'Napoleonic', and alike in his voluminous writings and in his innumerable public speeches, he explained that the Empire 'meant' everything delightful, from national glory to buying pocket-books, from peace to plenty.

And as these generalizations were indeed wide, and from their width gained no small measure of obscurity, the Empire 'meant' all things to all men. To the army, it implied a return of the glorious days of the first Napoleon; to the Church, an almost ultramontane government; to the commercial class, unlimited opportunities for rapid money-making; to the people at large, the eventual dawning of the long-delayed era of universal content. Having sighed for eighteen years under the shadow of the respectable Orleanist umbrella, France revelled in the possession of a ruler who might be trusted to outrage the susceptibilities of politically pious Metternichs and yet, a veritable enigma, might be trusted also never to say or to do that which was expected of him. Thus as long as the Empire thrilled, it succeeded; when its novelty wore off, when it ceased to thrill, it failed. The generalizations, which had made deception possible, were no longer received with the needful unflinching faith; doubts arose, questions were asked. And more especially the validity of Napoleon's claim to embody democracy was contested; it was pointed out that if this claim were just, then Democracy was a term sadly in need of re-definition.

For the whole internal system of the Second Empire was the very negation of popular government. The Chamber, hardly a representative body, might not initiate legislation; its control over finance was largely illusory,

Causes of
success and
failure.

Autocratic
character
of the
Second
Empire.

since the budget was voted by departments and not in detail, the Executive might transfer sums from one ministry to another, and the Emperor, possessing the power of concluding commercial treaties, was able to modify the tariff by prerogative. The Press, hampered by the necessity for authorization, was further crushed by the right of prefects of police to 'warn' papers which showed signs of not admiring the existing order and to suspend any twice-warned publication. Education, equally controlled by the Government, was carefully restricted to non-political subjects, and the Emperor hoped that a race of clean-shaven professors of language and science, having shed their disturbing theories with their moustaches, might keep in the spirit, as well as in the letter, the oath of allegiance which they were obliged to take. Nor was individual liberty sacred; advantage was taken of Orsini's attempt¹ to produce the General Security Act, which permitted the imprisonment or transportation without trial of those suspect to the Government, and which, as administered by Espinasse, was used to terrorize the people by the summary banishment of a reasonable percentage of the population in each department.

General
Security
Act, 1858.

Stagnation
of political
life.

Yet this system, autocratic as it was, did not at first excite resistance, partly because it was accompanied by a most satisfying development of material wealth, partly because such opposition as there was wanted unity, leadership, and tact. The Monarchists, divided into Legitimists and Orleanists, dissipated their strength by internecine disputes; the politically wise programme of the Fusionists, who aimed at the alliance of the two branches of the Bourbon House, was rejected through the obstinacy of the claimants and the determination of Thiers; and the supporters of the younger line, who were better

¹ Cp. p. 200. •

equipped for an attack, neutralized their advantages by frank advocacy of aristocratic franchise. And the Republicans were not in much better plight. Their leaders had been exiled; their newspapers were insignificant, their financial resources small, their frequent plots, which were easily discovered by the Imperial agents, rather benefited the Government by keeping alive in the minds of the *bourgeoisie* a terror of anarchy and pillage. The weakness of the opposition was illustrated by the results of the first general election under the Empire; the original Chamber was returned almost *en bloc*, and the Republican cause was represented only by 'the Five' Deputies, among whom Jules Favre and Ollivier were the most important. Nor was the tranquillity of the country greatly interrupted by the republican outbreak at Angers or by the half-dozen attempts on the life of the Emperor; the real events of the first eleven years of the reign were industrial and commercial. Material advance was assisted by the formation of the *Crédit foncier*, to facilitate the securing of capital for agriculture; by the development of railways and of steamship lines, and by the public works of Napoleon, whose enthusiasm for building was not always misdirected by his architect, Viollet-le-Duc, to the faulty restoration of mediæval fortresses. The progress made was strikingly illustrated by the great Paris Exhibition, evidence of the prevailing peace. Indeed, if absence of history constitutes the happiness of a nation, then during this period France was in a state of almost perfect bliss.

Such political stagnation was for a while counter-balanced by the vigorous foreign policy of the Emperor, which excited the interest and distracted the attention of his subjects. But when an epidemic of cholera was followed by widespread floods and other national calamities, the masses, after their wont, sought for the political

'The Five'
1857.

Outbreak
at Angers,
1855.

*Crédit
foncier*,
1852.

Paris
Exhibition,
1855.

§ 2.
Decline of
the Second
Empire.

cause of such material disasters, and their rising discontent was peculiarly unfortunate since it coincided with the alienation from the Empire of its earlier friends. Napoleon III succeeded in offending both the Church and the commercial classes, and in his isolation was led to turn to the Liberals, hoping that he might convince them of his sincere love for democracy and rally them to the defence of autocracy in the name of liberty. This hope proved vain, and consequently the loss of its first friends was fatal to the Imperial system. Napoleon, in fact, fell a victim to the rash inconsistency of his professions; he perished in a futile attempt to reconcile ultramontanism and nationalism, cosmopolitanism and protection, an attempt which only involved him in a contest with the forces both of reaction and reform.

Clerical
opposition.

Treaty of
Turin,
1860.

It was with the forces of reaction that the Emperor first came into conflict. He was offended by the refusal of Pius IX to pass the Alps and to dignify the Imperial Coronation by his presence and benediction, and he retorted by giving but a cool reception to the newly promulgated doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. The quarrel, thus begun, was embittered by the French-Sardinian alliance and the Austrian war; it reached the stage of open rupture when by the Treaty of Turin the Emperor received Savoy and Nice and, in effect, recognized the new Kingdom of Italy. It was in vain that Napoleon strove to conciliate clerical opposition by piously supporting a federation of the peninsula under the Pope, and by defending the relics of the temporal power from the sacrilegious hands of Cavour and Garibaldi; it was in vain that he suppressed the chief Catholic newspaper. The Government was attacked in the Senate; and the Emperor, distracted by the counter-arguments of the clericalist Empress Eugénie and his anti-clerical

cousin, Prince Napoleon, could find no better defence than the most violent oscillation between two mutually destructive policies. He had signally failed in his effort to gratify at once the ultramontane party in the Church and the friends of Italian unity; he had rather angered both by his consistent inconsistency.

Nor was he more fortunate in his attempt to combine those cosmopolitan theories which he had set forth so eloquently in his statement of the Napoleonic theory, with the interests, or supposed interests, of his commercial friends. The manufacturers stoutly opposed the free-trade doctrines which the Emperor preached, and for a while Napoleon was compelled to bow to a storm of protest. But he reverted to the same idea when the exigencies of the Italian situation made an alliance with the English friends of Italy advisable; he used his treaty-making prerogative to conclude a commercial agreement with England, and thus took a definite step in the direction of free trade. Forthwith the manufacturers rose in opposition; the Emperor was roundly denounced as the betrayer of his country, and as the Treaty had been made without consulting the Chambers, the hostility to the Imperial economist presently merged in a general attack on his whole political system.

The attack was directly assisted by the Emperor's own conduct. Deserted by his former allies and having special need for support in his quarrel with the Church, he granted an amnesty to the exiled Liberals, hoping that they would be won over to his side by his Italian policy. But he merely supplied the opposition with efficient leadership, nor was this error repaired by the commission of a second blunder. The Emperor became alarmed at the prominence which he had deliberately sought and gained; fear of responsibility seized upon his soul; and the 'Man of

Commer-
cial oppo-
sition.

Commer-
cial Treaty
with
England,
1860.

Liberal
revival.

Destiny' shuddered at the sudden realization of the magnitude of his part. And thus he sought relief, sought to share with some one the onerous burden which he had assumed so lightly; he desired to throw some of the responsibility, or rather all the blame for failure, if failure there was to be, on to the representatives of the people. By an Imperial decree, he announced that in future free discussion of an Address to the Throne should be allowed, and that Ministers without other duties should be charged with the task of answering criticism and of defending the policy of the Executive. He trusted that the Chamber, always remaining subservient, would never embarrass the Government, and at the same time that he would be able to fortify himself against attack by alleging the expressed approval of the Deputies.

The
Decree of
1860.

Opposition
in the
Chamber.

As far as the actual Chamber was concerned, his calculations proved tolerably accurate. In the divisions of that body, the republican opposition, still confined to 'the Five', could exercise no real influence, and at first sight more was to be feared from the clericalist and commercial parties. The former remained bitterly hostile, despite the continued occupation of Rome by French troops, the breach of the *entente* with Victor Emmanuel after the affair of Aspromonte, and the appointment of Drouyn de Lhuys, a known sympathizer with the Pope, as foreign minister. The commercialists complained with justice of the disordered state of the finances; expenditure and taxation were increasing, the deficit was perpetual. So serious was the situation revealed by Fould in a memorandum to the Emperor that Napoleon was sufficiently alarmed to make his mentor Minister of Finance and resigning the right of transfer, to agree to the production of a genuine budget. But these concessions gave little satisfaction, since they were coupled with reserva-

Financial
conces-
sions, 1861.

tions which destroyed much of their value, and the opposition in the Chambers did not cease.

That opposition, however, though it irritated and embarrassed, hardly threatened the continued existence of the Empire, which appeared to be no less safe than it had been ten years before. It was the growth of resistance outside the Chamber which prepared the way for the downfall of the autocratic system, and so for the eventual destruction of Napoleon III. And the growth of this resistance was the direct result of that increased freedom of debate which was now permitted, and which led to a revival of popular interest in political questions. The fiery eloquence of Favre, the more studied criticism of Ollivier, could not influence a single Deputy to vote against the Government; the Chamber was far too effectually corrupted for convictions to have any weight in it. But 'the Five' educated opinion even among the representatives of the people, and their definite programme of reform, urged in season and out of season, attracted attention and rapidly gained adherents in the country at large. The republican demands were studiously moderate; they asked for little more than that the spirit of the Constitution should be observed by the abandonment of official candidature, the repeal of the General Security Act, the establishment of responsibility of Ministers and of the control of the Chamber over finance. Even their supplementary requests for the rights of public meeting and free association could hardly be considered outrageous by a professedly democratic Emperor.

Yet if Napoleon III had been a more acute political observer, he would have realized that the very moderation of his most deadly foes made their enmity doubly serious. For it rendered useless the cry 'Beware of the Red Republic', upon which he relied to save himself; the

§ 3. The
'Liberal
Empire'.

General
election of
1863.

gentle revolutionaries of the Second Empire roared so softly that they did not even inspire fear in the timorous breasts of the Clericals and *bourgeoisie*. On the contrary, the second general election found the opposition united as far as Liberalism and Ultramontanism could unite ; it found Thiers as the advocate of high protection and the temporal power ; it found the Monarchists, their old attitude of passive resistance abandoned, actively joining in the attack on the Empire. And the result of the attack was highly favourable to the attacking forces ; the numbers of the opposition rose to thirty-five and, most significant of all, seventeen Republicans were elected and Paris declared against Napoleon III. From this moment, the fall of absolutism was assured, and since an erring 'Man of Destiny' seemed to be almost a contradiction, the play-acting was wellnigh finished.

Mistaken
Policy of
Napoleon
III.

It was not, perhaps, because he realized that to admit a mistake would be fatal to his bubble reputation that the Emperor ignored such signs of approaching change ; rather his conduct in the next six years seems to show that he had come near convincing himself of his own greatness and at the same time lost such decision of character as he had once possessed. Faced with two possible alternatives, open resistance and frank concession, he declined to adopt either. He made mild attempts to regain the lost affection of the Clericals, he made tentative advances in all insincerity to the Liberals, and strove thus to deceive them into agreement with the maintenance of autocracy. His efforts were futile and only served to increase the hostility of both parties in the opposition. As a matter of fact, Napoleon's cloak was threadbare, but its wearer only drew it more tightly to him, never realizing that so its gaping seams displayed his nakedness the more clearly. The day for successful

lying had passed ; unsuccessful lying only aggravated the evils of a situation in which truth had become the only feasible policy.

But of frankness the Emperor was utterly incapable ; deceit had become an integral part of his nature ; his constitutional preference for tortuous paths and opportunist counsels had been rather confirmed than corrected by advancing years. And this love of indecision led him to meet the crisis, produced by the election, by refusing to face it ; he adopted first one policy and then another, and so discredited himself and alienated his friends, without conciliating a single convinced opponent. To cope with the increased strength of the opposition, he appointed a single chief Minister to defend the Government in the Chamber ; Rouher, who presently received this office, was a known supporter of the existing régime and his name seemed a sufficient guarantee against concession or reform. But as though resolved to prove that upon his leadership no reliance could be placed, Napoleon followed up this apparent declaration in favour of resistance by making advances to the opposition. When Thiers exposed in moderate terms the utter disorganization of the state, the Emperor answered by legalizing strikes ; he then neutralized this concession by pronouncing against trade unions, and declaring that parliamentary government, 'a more or less ingenious theory,' was unsuited to practical conditions. At the same time, by concluding a convention with Victor Emmanuel for the withdrawal of the garrison from Rome and by forbidding the publication of the 'Syllabus' in France, he widened the gulf between himself and the Clericals. Nor was he able to accept a favourable opportunity for ending that isolation into which he was drifting. When Ollivier, who had already so far succumbed to imperial blandishments as to abandon

Increase of
Opposition,
1863-5.

Legaliza-
tion of
Strikes,
1863.

Convention
with Victor
Emmanuel,
1864.

The Third Party, 1865. 'the Five', formed a new party of moderate progressives, advocating the combination of the dynasty and good order with increased liberty, Rouher was permitted to reply by a *senatus-consultum* forbidding all discussion of the fundamentals of constitution. Thenceforward, all hope of voluntary reform passed away; the era of revolution was dawning.

Fall of the Autocratic System, 1867-9. For political discontent was no longer the monopoly of the deputies and the educated classes. Socialism, almost extinct since the days of the National Workshops, revived as the unreality of the hopes formed of the Empire appeared; the masses began to organize, and their organization and resistance were invigorated by the growth of a literary opposition. Napoleon, prematurely aged and stricken with illness, suddenly realized that his popularity was gone and that the throne of his son was in danger. Making one more supreme effort to deceive,

Decree of 1867. he issued a decree allowing the Chamber to question Ministers on their conduct, and explained that the right of public meeting and liberty of the Press were about to be established. But at the same time the doctrine of responsibility of Ministers was denied and Rouher retained power; the projected reforms were not made, and the nation was merely angered by such palpable insincerity. Nor did the alacrity with which Napoleon

Reoccupation of Rome, 1867. hastened to defend Rome, again threatened by Garibaldi, improve the situation at home, the Clerical opposition continued and the Republicans, encouraged by the vigorous pen of Rochefort, now openly declared their hostility to the Empire. The agitation culminated in

General Election of 1869. the second general election, a reverse not merely for the Ministers but for the whole Napoleonic system. Such moderate Liberals as Ollivier were rejected; forty avowed enemies of the Empire were returned; a hundred and

sixteen Deputies supported a demand for real parliamentary government. Napoleon, disheartened and self-distrustful, felt that it was hopeless to resist further; a *senatus-consultum* granted initiative in legislation to the Chamber, established a proper budget, and recognized responsibility of Ministers.

It was soon evident that these concessions were also hopeless; they came too late, since no one desired a reformed Empire. Absolutism had its friends, a republic had more friends; no one loved the safe counsels of moderation. Paris answered the advances of the Emperor by electing his personal enemy Rochefort; incipient revolution everywhere prevailed, and even the selection of Ollivier as Minister did not calm the growing unrest. For the part of 'Man of Destiny' was played out; France had ceased to trust the 'embodiment of democracy', and 'the Liberal Empire' was recognized for what it was, a mere makeshift to enable the forces of reaction to rally. Discredited at home, Napoleon saw that he had one last chance of saving his dynasty; by a brilliant stroke in foreign policy he might yet bring back the halcyon days of successful deception; in no other way could he do so.

But the foreign policy of the Second Empire was based upon fraud no less than its internal system; that fraud had been equally detected, and thus success was no longer possible. Aided by almost incredible good fortune, Napoleon III had been able to play a part in continental politics altogether disproportionate either to his own diplomatic skill or to the real strength of France. He had appeared as the humiliator of Russia, the arbiter of Europe, the liberator of Italy, the saviour of the Pope; for a moment he had seemed almost comparable to his uncle. Yet his very success was fatal to

The
'Liberal
Empire',
1869-70.

§4. Foreign
Policy of
Napoleon
III.

him. He had done so much in so short a space of time that France had been thrilled and Europe astonished; and he was left to discover means for repeating the thrills and increasing the astonishment. But he found none. When Italy had been united and a limit set upon her unity, no obvious task remained for performance; there were no more oppressed nations to deliver, or if there were, their deliverance was too dangerous an occupation even for a 'Man of Destiny'. As it was, his Italian policy had almost involved him in war with Prussia; if he were to continue the remodelling of Europe, it was clear that he must be prepared to meet a possible coalition against French aggression. And since he did not feel equal to this, he was led to adopt half-measures and wild projects which ended in the ruin of his reputation and the exposure of his weakness.

The
Mexican
Expedition,
1862-7.

Indeed, the decline of his reputation dated almost from the very hour on which it reached its culminating point at Solferino. The truce of Villafranca was a confession of failure; the hesitancy of his later Italian policy raised doubts as to the stability of his character and the skill of his diplomacy. And an attempt to find in the New World those opportunities for brilliant action which were denied him in the Old ended in even more obvious disaster. The republic of Mexico had been the scene of one of those periodical civil wars in which Latin America delights; Juarez, who had restored order and assumed a dictatorship, had become involved in a dispute with Great Britain, France, and Spain, and the combined fleets of the three Powers had blockaded the Mexican coast in order to enforce their claims. But Napoleon III conceived that he might gain an easy triumph by separating himself from his allies and by adopting the cause of the domestic enemies of Juarez; he was encouraged in this view by

the prayers of the Catholic party, offended by the Church policy of the dictator, and by the outbreak of civil war in the United States, which seemed to preclude all possibility of an assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. France, therefore, recognized the Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico; an army was sent to support him, and a momentary success was gained. But no sooner had the American civil war ended than the Government of Washington bluntly demanded the withdrawal of the French forces; Napoleon, unable to make war on the United States, gave way with some precipitancy; and the unfortunate Maximilian, abandoned to his fate but refusing to abandon his friends, was captured and shot by the supporters of Juarez. In place of winning glory, the Emperor of the French had covered himself with shame and dishonour.

Maximilian,
Emperor
of Mexico,
1864.

Maximilian
shot, 1867.

And meanwhile in Europe his prestige had been seriously impaired. The hopes of Poland had been revived and disappointed by the mingled leniency and severity of Alexander II; an attempt to quell the resultant discontent, by drafting the disaffected into the army, led to a useless rebellion; and Napoleon III believed that he had found another oppressed people whom he might deliver. But the other Powers were less sympathetic. Prussia, having Polish subjects of her own and needing Russian friendship, concluded a military convention with the oppressor; Austria was content to explain her platonic disapproval of the Tsar. Great Britain, protesting more vigorously, none the less declined to agree to the French suggestion for a Congress to settle the question; and thus Napoleon, who had attacked Russia in unmeasured terms, was left either to enter upon war single-handed or to allow his protestations of righteous anger to remain mere protestations. He chose

Rebellion
of Poland,
1862-4.

the latter course, and so succeeded in irritating Alexander by his original violence, disgusting the Poles by his present inaction, and reducing his prestige by his inconsistency.

§ 5. Napo-
leon III
and
Bismarck.

Indeed, when he was brought into conflict with the man who was destined to lure him to destruction, the Emperor of the French had already ceased to inspire either fear or respect; Europe was no longer blind to the imperfections of the Imperial actor, and least of all was Bismarck impressed by the air of mysterious power which that actor assumed. While Ambassador in Paris, the Prussian Chancellor had taken the measure of his rival; he had found means by which to deceive the arch-deceiver. In conversations with Bismarck, Napoleon had suggested that Prussia should assist him to secure a rectification of the French frontier; the polite attention of the Ambassador was taken to mean assent, and the whole foreign policy of France was henceforth dictated by a fatuous belief in Prussian friendship. It was this belief that led Napoleon tamely to acquiesce in the coercion of Denmark; it was the same belief which enabled Bismarck at Biarritz to secure French neutrality and the Italian alliance.

Napoleon
III and
the Seven
Weeks'
War.

Nor did the Emperor realize his error until Austria had fallen and the unification of Germany been rendered inevitable, until his neutrality had lost its value, and until he had fatally compromised his position towards the South German states. On the eve of war he had asked for his reward; his request had not been definitely answered, but neutrality was now the only possible policy, and he made a virtue of necessity, announcing his unalterable love for peace. Perhaps Napoleon hoped that the coming struggle would be prolonged and that he would be able to intervene with decisive effect; if so, all his calculations were roughly upset by the battle of Königgrätz, nor did the

request for his mediation compensate him for his failure to secure any more material advantage. It was indeed the occasion for fresh deception. Because Bismarck hinted vaguely that the time had now come for France to gain something somewhere, Napoleon agreed to the Prussian annexations in northern Germany and to the formation of the North German Confederation. Even when Bismarck had shown his disregard for French interests by publishing the negotiations between the Courts of Paris and Berlin and making known the fact that Napoleon had demanded the cession of the Bavarian Palatinate, the Emperor still continued to pin his faith on the vaguest professions of goodwill and to ignore the damning evidence of facts.

For the next twelve months, therefore, Napoleon continued his frantic endeavours to secure some kind of reward for his neutrality during the Seven Weeks' War, and to disprove Thiers' assertion that he had been fatally outwitted. In rapid succession demands were put forward for compensation on the Rhine, in Belgium, in Luxembourg; in each case Bismarck answered by an almost papal *non-possumus*. And only in the case of the last-named district did Napoleon's efforts even appear likely to succeed. The King of Holland agreed to hand over his rights in the grand-duchy; but Luxembourg was part of the old Germanic Confederation, the Parliament of the North German Confederation was furiously indignant at the idea of its absorption by France, and Bismarck was able to express his deep regret that he could not run counter to the wishes of his allies. Immediately afterwards, the Powers put an end to all thoughts of French expansion in this particular direction by the Treaty of London, which neutralized the district and placed its independence under the guarantee of Europe.

Napoleon's
Schemes for
Expansion,
1866-7.

The
Luxem-
burg
Question,
Feb.-May
1867.

Treaty of
London,
May 1867.

§ 6. Preliminaries of the Franco-German War.

On all sides Napoleon III had failed, and he was no longer permitted to doubt that he had been hopelessly deceived. It only remained to seek revenge, to attempt to undo that which had been done and to prevent, even at the eleventh hour, the completion of German unity. And as this could only be done by war, war with Prussia was now inevitable. But Napoleon was only too well aware that his strength was unequal to such a contest; and all his efforts were therefore directed to secure an alliance.

Napoleon's Search for Allies:
(i) Austria.

And here he suffered the nemesis of deceit. Posing as the political heir of the great Napoleon, he had not hesitated to trample on the prejudices of all Europe; he had boldly attacked Russia in the Crimea and offended her by his Polish policy; he had opposed Austria in Italy, and denied to Italy her capital; and he had won no friendship to counterbalance such hostility. For a moment, indeed, it seemed that Beust might be ready to support him, but the Austrian monarchy was now a dual state and the Hungarian Minister, Andrassy, was reluctant to do anything to restore that German connexion which had been the greatest obstacle to the realization of Magyar hopes; a vigorous correspondence between Napoleon III and Francis Joseph only produced a vague understanding.

(ii) Italy.

Nor, when he turned to Italy, did the French Emperor meet with better success. That power had been alienated by the French occupation of Rome; her alienation was intensified when, after a new attempt by Garibaldi to give Italy her capital had been defeated at Mentana, Rouher openly declared that France would never permit the complete destruction of the temporal power. And as Russia was allied with Prussia, and as Great Britain would not stir, France was left isolated in Europe.

Mentana,
Nov. 1867.

It was possibly a sense of this isolation which led

Napoleon to stake everything on one desperate throw, and to hasten the crisis which was to prove fatal to him. The immediate occasion was afforded by the raising of the question of the Spanish succession. Isabella II had been driven from her throne by Prim and a republic had been proclaimed. But that form of government proved unpopular; the Spanish people desired a King, and among the number of the candidates who appeared was Leopold, a cadet of the Hohenzollern House. France had already raised objections to his candidature, and when he was elected, Napoleon announced that his accession would be regarded as a *casus belli*. Leopold, of his own accord, retired; the Emperor was able to congratulate himself on having at last secured a diplomatic triumph; and the incident appeared to be closed.

The Spanish Succession, 1870.

Election of Leopold, July 1870.

But Napoleon was not content with the success which he had won. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, was instructed to demand a guarantee that the candidature would not be renewed; King William answered that the actions of Leopold had not been and would not be dictated by Prussia; and when he was pressed for a more definite reply, he sent a message to the Ambassador to the effect that he had said his last word. This news was telegraphed from Ems to Bismarck at Berlin; the Chancellor deliberately published the telegram in a somewhat abbreviated form; the German Press announced that the King had insulted the Ambassador. And since feeling ran high in both countries, Paris believed that William had publicly turned his back on Benedetti; excitement rose to fever pitch, and after a council which lasted far into the night, Napoleon III decided on war.

The Ems Telegram, July 13.

Napoleon III decides on War, July 14.

It would appear that he did so against his own better judgement, and that he was overcome by the passionate entreaties of Eugénie, who trembled for her son's throne if

§ 7. The Franco-German War.

the lost popularity of her husband were not regained, and by the blind optimism of his advisers. Gramont, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was confident that Austria would hasten to avenge Königgrätz, and that Italy would not forget Solferino; he did not realize that the Dual Monarchy was menaced by Russia or that the liberated peninsula remembered Villafranca and Mentana. The two Powers were, it is true, gently sympathetic; they would readily have shared in a French triumph, but they would not risk sharing in a French defeat. And if Gramont's optimism was rash, that of Le Boëuf, Minister of War, was criminal. Forgetting that the army was ill-armed, ill-equipped, ill-organized, and without communications or any other requisites for rapid mobilization, he fancied that Prussia would be as dilatory as Austria, and placed all his hope in a sudden attack which should paralyse German resistance and unite the Southern States in support of a welcome invader.

Disasters
of the
French,
Aug. 1870.

The futility of such roseate dreams soon appeared. Bismarck afterwards claimed that he selected the very hour for the declaration of war, and however that may be, certainly Prussia was fully prepared. Her armies, reinforced by those of all Germany, advanced according to a carefully thought-out plan; the French, scattered in weak divisions without any real leadership, were attacked and overthrown in detail; and within a month of the first engagement, the issue of the war had been decided. Crossing the frontier at three points, the invaders gained their initial success at Weissenburg, where the vanguard of MacMahon's army was driven back, and two days later the tardily proposed concentration of the French forces was prevented by the victories of Wörth and Spicheren. While MacMahon, with one army, fell back upon Châlons and the line of the Marne, Bazaine, with the second, retreated

Weissen-
burg,
Aug. 4.

Wörth and
Spicheren,
Aug. 6.

upon Metz, and the Emperor, who had taken the field in person, seemed incapable of deciding upon any sort of plan. Even when he handed over the supreme command to Bazaine matters did not improve. The marshal determined on joining hands with MacMahon, but it was now too late, since the Germans had already thrown themselves between the two armies. Successive defeats at Vionville, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte compelled the French to take refuge under the guns of Metz, where they were presently blockaded by Prince Frederic Charles.

Vionville,
Mars-la-
Tour, and
Gravelotte,
Aug.
16-18.

A fortnight later the crowning disaster occurred. Napoleon, forced to remain at the front by his wife and practically allowing her to direct the campaign from Paris, overrode the wishes of MacMahon and ordered him to relieve Metz. But he was checked at Beaumont and caught by the Prussians at Sedan; almost surrounded and subjected to a furious cannonade, the bravery of the French was vain, and the Emperor, never well able to bear the sight of bloodshed, begged for an armistice. Bismarck and Moltke insisted upon unconditional surrender; 83,000 soldiers became prisoners of war, and Napoleon himself passed into captivity; the army of Bazaine was left to represent the military strength of France.

Sedan,
Sept. 1.

And Sedan was decisive of the fate of the Second Empire. The first defeats had been followed by the fall of the Ministry; this last reverse led to a revolution. When the news reached Paris, the mob attacked the Chamber; the Deputies were compelled to abandon the Executive; and the Empress, laying down the regency, fled to England. A Provisional Government, headed by Trochu, Governor of Paris, Jules Favre, and Gambetta, was created; the example of the capital was anticipated rather than followed in the provinces; everywhere the republic was proclaimed.

§ 8. The
Provisional
Govern-
ment,
Sept. 4,
1870.

The
National
Resistance.

It was charged with the sacred duty of freeing French soil from the invaders, and its optimistic leaders thoroughly believed that the glories of the Convention were about to be repeated. Favre announced to Bismarck that not an inch of territory would be ceded, and while the Prussians advanced upon Paris, preparations were made not merely for the defence of the capital but also for the organization of national resistance. It seemed almost a degradation that Thiers should be allowed to depart on a diplomatic begging tour round the Courts of Europe; foreign assistance seemed unnecessary; a republic alone was needed to hurl back the invaders.

Causes of
French
Failure.

But all this optimism was rendered vain by two facts. That sentiment of nationalism which had inspired the victors of Jemappes and Valmy now inspired the victors of Gravelotte and Sedan. And the sterilizing influence of political stagnation had made itself felt in France, the invigorating influence of new-found political life had roused the enthusiasm of Germany. It is possible that a really national resistance might have yet turned the fortune of war, but it was impossible that such resistance should be made.

§9. Bazaine
and Gam-
betta.

And its impossibility was soon illustrated. While Gambetta, escaping from the blockaded capital, formed a second centre of Government at Tours, and by his endless energy and determination called new armies into being, Bazaine at Metz remained the passive spectator of his country's ruin. He had apparently hoped that the overthrow of Napoleon III would leave him master of the situation, and he now attempted to play the part which Monk had played in England. Instead of making some real effort to harass the enemy, instead of making an attempt to cut his way through to Paris, instead even of devoting all his attention to prolonging the siege of Metz, he entered

into communications with Bismarck and strove to secure for himself permission 'to restore order in France'. The result was as might have been anticipated. After two months of fruitless negotiations Bazaine found that his supplies were running short; a final effort to secure lenient terms from the Prussians failed; he and his whole army of 173,000 men surrendered unconditionally; and while Prince Frederic Charles was enabled to join in the attack on Paris, the last regular French army disappeared.

Fall of Metz, Oct. 27.

In such circumstances, the heroic defence of Strassburg and Belfort and all the efforts of Gambetta were alike fruitless. The recovery of Orleans and a victory at Coulmiers availed nothing; a month later the tide of success turned definitely in favour of the invaders. Orleans was retaken; attempted joint operations between the garrison of Paris and the army without the walls were defeated; the north of France was reduced by the victories of Amiens and St. Quentin; the Provisional Government was forced to retire to Bordeaux.

Final Defeats of the French, Dec. 1870-Jan. 1871.

The fall of Paris was now inevitable, and after a siege of one hundred and thirty days famine compelled surrender. With that surrender the war ended. Preliminaries of peace were arranged between Bismarck and Thiers at Versailles, and, despite the opposition of Gambetta, a National Assembly accepted the terms offered. By the Peace of Frankfort, France ceded Alsace (with the exception of Belfort), and German Lorraine to Prussia, or rather to the newly formed German Empire; Paris was occupied for two days, and an indemnity of five milliards of francs was exacted.

§ 10. Peace of Frankfort.

Fall of Paris, Jan. 28.

Peace of Frankfort, May 10.

But it is not in the actual terms of peace that the significance of the Franco-German War is to be found. It lies rather in the fact that through it the work begun in the War of Liberation, continued in the Ante-Parliament

§ 11. The German Empire.

Proclama-
tion of the
German
Empire,
Jan. 18,
1871.

and at Königgrätz, reached its final consummation. Ten days before the capitulation of Paris, and in the great Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the King of Prussia accepted that crown which his brother had declined; the German Empire was proclaimed, and the unity which had been so long desired was apparently attained with the hearty assent of all the princes of Germany. And though the cordiality of that assent has possibly been exaggerated, though Bavaria was still reluctant, and though the Southern States would not surrender all their cherished independence, none the less the triumph of Bismarck was almost complete.

Causes of
Bismarck's
Success.

Attempts have been made to draw an instructive moral lesson from this triumph. It has been alleged that the victory of Germany was the victory of manliness and virtue over decadence and vice, and Bismarck has been pictured as a god-fearing hero reaping the just reward of the righteous. God-fearing he no doubt was, but he never allowed his fear of God to hamper him in political life, nor did any considerations of conscience prevent him from uttering diplomatic lies. In point of honesty there is little to choose between Napoleon III and Bismarck; the advantage of the latter lay not in his greater regard for truth but in the more cautious nature of his lying. The Emperor of the French had attempted to deceive on too great a scale; the very magnificence of his conception of the possibilities latent in fraud produced his failure. The Prussian Chancellor was a less soaring exponent of the deceptive art, and his humility gained its reward. Napoleon III had aimed at ruling a continent by play-acting and the audience had hissed him off the stage; Bismarck was content to appear as the founder of a mere empire, and by playing that part successfully he won for himself the plaudits of that very audience which the 'Man of Destiny' had failed to convince.

CHAPTER X

THE BISMARCK SYSTEM

§ 1. Constitution of the German Empire. § 2. The Commune of Paris. § 3. The Third Republic. § 4. The League of the Three Emperors. § 5. Bosnia and Bulgaria. § 6. The Turco-Russian War. § 7. The Treaty of San Stefano. § 8. The Treaty of Berlin. § 9. The Year 1878. § 10. The Bismarck System. § 11. Metternich and Bismarck.

CREATOR of a new empire, restorer of unity to a long-divided race, conqueror of his country's hated foe, Bismarck appeared well to merit all the plaudits, all the honours showered upon him, to have gained a triumph such as it has fallen to the lot of but few men to secure. Yet neither was he content nor did he taste the gladness of perfect realization. The German Empire was founded; to all seeming it was broad-based upon a people's will, welded together by the sacred fire of nationality, confirmed by sorrow and by joy, maintained by the blessed union of hearts that throbbed as one. Fair was the prospect, unclouded the brightness of the dawn, sure the hope of everlasting life. But it was not given to all to know with what reluctance King Ludwig of Bavaria had parted for ever with the secular dream of the House of Wittelsbach, how unwillingly he had given utterance to the wishes of his fellow princes, with what doubtings he had implored William to accept an imperial crown. Nor did there appear on the surface that rancour which lay deep-rooted in Bavarian and Saxon hearts, a rancour not the less permanent because momentarily forgotten in the fever of high emotion, because that forgetfulness had led to so

§ 1. The Constitution of the German Empire.

untoward, so fatal a result. Minds, filled with the glamour of the dramatic climax at Versailles, found it impossible to understand how jealously the skeleton of local independence was guarded against the too fortunate Hohenzollerns; ears, deafened by paeans of victory, could not hear the dull murmurings of ill-omened dissent; nor did the eyes of entranced beholders pierce the bright sunshine of success.

Incom-
pleteness of
Bismarck's
Triumph.

But Bismarck's eyes were not dazzled and the clearness of his political vision remained undimmed by the enthusiasm of that supreme moment. To eye-witnesses of the scene, he appeared to be 'uplifted' by the wonder of ultimate triumph; perhaps, he was rather depressed by the conviction of the incompleteness of that triumph. For Germany was only partially united; the Empire was only a federated State. King William had inclined to abdicate rather than agree to anything short of the complete triumph of Prussia; the Crown Prince had urged the forcible suppression of every vestige of local independence. But the masterful tact of the Chancellor had overborne the opposition of both father and son; he had seen how necessary it was to seize the golden hour while Germans were triumphing over Frenchmen; he did not forget the moral ascendancy of the Habsburgs or that Vienna was more German than Berlin. An attempt to secure all might well involve the loss of that which could be gained, and the half loaf of federation was better than utter denial of the bread of unity, peace, and concord.

Constitu-
tion of the
Empire.

The German Empire was therefore, and is, a compromise. It is neither co-extensive with the true 'Fatherland', since the millions of good Teutons on the Danube are excluded, nor is it a purely German paradise, since the Prussianization of Posen is not even now complete. It is neither a federation of free States, as

was the old *Bund*, nor a centralized monarchy, such as William and probably Bismarck desired. The King of Prussia is German Emperor, not Emperor of Germany; he is in theory the President among the Princes of the Empire. Supreme in time of war, powerful in time of peace, he yet may not infringe those local rights which are guaranteed even to such petty States as Lippe-Detmold. And though for ordinary purposes the Prussian vote carries the day in the *Bundesrat*, the federal council in which the individual members of the Empire are represented, still no change can be made in the Constitution in face of the united opposition of the Southern States. It is, perhaps, not unwise that the deliberations of this council are decently hidden from the gaze of the vulgar, that publicity is confined to the less vital debates of the *Reichstag*, a Lower House elected by manhood suffrage, which may imagine but imagines wrongly that it governs the German Empire. If the disputes within the *Bundesrat* were equally public, it would possibly be more obvious than it is that the new unity of Germany is really maintained by the armed might of Prussia, and that the throbbing heart of the united German people is not immune from inharmonious palpitations.

And if Bismarck did not attain full realization of his ideals at home, he was still more subjected to bitter disappointment abroad. Imagining that he had for ever, or at least for a generation, crushed the power of France, and that he had laid the sure foundation of a long era of undisputed Teutonic supremacy by the overthrow of the leading Latin State, he was sadly undeceived by the wonderful recovery of his beaten foe. On the morrow of the capitulation of Paris, France seemed rapidly to be drifting towards a condition of utter anarchy; within five years, the State had been reorganized upon a far securer

§ 2. The
Commune
of Paris.

basis than any which had been devised since the fall of the *ancien régime*. And with this reorganization, the prospects of German ascendancy were somewhat overclouded, the labours of Bismarck rendered less fruitful than he had hoped. Expecting the establishment of the 'Red Republic', which should be a splendid foil to the good order of the German Empire, the Chancellor found that the republic established was no less white than the system which it had replaced.

The
Commune
established,
Mar. 1871.

For the revolution produced by the overthrow of Napoleon and the calamities of the French arms, ran the same course as the revolutions which had driven forth Charles X and Louis-Philippe. Once again sober politicians were content merely to change the name of the Government ; once again a more enthusiastic party aimed at a complete revolution. They, the *communards*, wished to abandon that centralization which had hitherto prevailed ; they hoped by granting autonomy to the local communes to establish the complete supremacy of the original Commune of Paris, reviving that ascendancy of the capital which had been enjoyed during the Revolution. Supported by mutinous soldiers and the National Guard, favoured by the masses, who desired as ever redress of material grievances, they were able to seize the Hôtel de Ville, drive Thiers, 'head of the State,' and the Government of the National Assembly, to Versailles, and acquire control of part of Paris. The red flag of the social revolution replaced the dull tricolour of milk-and-water republicanism ; a revolutionary commune came into being, and a pale simulation of the glorious Reign of Terror was inaugurated. The regeneration of France was begun.

Second
Siege of
Paris,

Such regeneration had only reached the stage of massacre and licensed arson, which the Commune was

powerless to prevent, when the forces of order, rallying at Versailles and laying siege to Paris, reasserted the authority of the National Assembly. Paris was once more captured; the would-be remakers of society were condemned as society's foes; those taken with arms were shot as criminals, the rest were transported or imprisoned. Never had such vigour been displayed by a French Executive, never such severity; the streets were red with blood, and in horror the second siege far surpassed the first. France has hardly yet forgotten the last effort of idealists and self-seekers to unite for the forcible creation of a 'pure' régime.

And in such horrors the Third Republic came to its birth. The Bordeaux Assembly had early decreed the deposition of Napoleon III and the abolition of the Second Empire; a Republican Government had been formed provisionally, and Thiers had been elected 'head of the State'. But it remained to elaborate a Constitution, and here parties were sharply divided. The Monarchists, possessing a majority, would have recalled a representative of the Bourbon House, but at first could not agree upon the representative to be recalled; the Republicans were not wholly satisfied with the validity of an Assembly elected while France was occupied by Germans, and loving the Republic with unfeigned sincerity, by disputing upon this question did their utmost to destroy that Republic. It was the work of Thiers to hold the balance between the two extremist parties and gradually to form a moderate group prepared to bring back good order to the State.

He succeeded in his task, though he did not himself place the coping-stone upon the edifice of the new order. For a while, factious opposition kept France in a condition not unlike one of anarchy; the Government was in theory

April-
May 1871

§ 3. The
Third
Republic.

Presidency
of Thiers,
1871-3.

only provisional, and to Royalists and 'pure' Republicans alike it was of primary importance to delay all definition. But gradually it became clear, as Thiers, now elected President, pointed out, that the existing order could only be changed by revolution; revolution was not desired by the moderates of either wing of the Assembly, and their coalition enabled the Executive to stamp out disorder. France was freed from the presence of German troops by the prompt payment of the war indemnity; the army was reorganized on the system which had given victory to Prussia; the revenue was regulated and increased; and the National Guard, that historic storm-centre, was abolished. Such reorganization brought its reward. Though Gambetta somewhat dimmed the great reputation won by his zeal in the cause of national defence, by conducting an equally energetic campaign in favour of 'sovereignty of the people'; though the Royalist sections intrigued for the return of the Comte de Chambord, Thiers was able to give his country more or less stable government and to hold in check the latent forces of disorder. When, however, his efforts to induce the Assembly to vote a definitive Constitution only resulted in a limitation of his own powers and the defeat of his Ministers, he abandoned hope and resigned.

Presidency
of Mac-
Mahon,
1873-9.

The result of his resignation was to throw power into the hands of the Monarchists, who had united in accepting the representative of the elder line and who hoped by delay to bring about a restoration. They secured the election of MacMahon as president; the Marshal, as a soldier, felt himself in honour bound to forward the interests of those who had elected him, and the head of the State consistently supported those who planned his overthrow. Endless discussions on the form of the projected Constitution wasted the time of the Assembly, and meanwhile

every effort was made to dissipate the idea that France had in anywise committed herself to a republican form of government.

But the Royalists were too weak to force the issue; many were alienated by the declaration of the Comte de Chambord against the tricolour; signs of a Bonapartist revival alarmed all sections; the debate on the Constitution suddenly ceased. An amendment, formally recognizing that the head of the Executive was 'President of the Republic', really ended the chances of a restoration, and it was speedily followed by the definitive establishment of that system which still maintains. Organized in close imitation of the Belgian Constitution, the Third Republic is governed by a President, elected for seven years by the two Chambers, by responsible Ministers, and by a Senate and Chamber of Deputies; its general character is conservative and to its conservatism—to the compromise which it embodies between monarchical and extreme republican ideas—its success has been due. At times, its existence has been imperilled; under MacMahon and since it has trembled on the brink of a *coup d'état*; but it has shown unexpected vitality and has already existed longer than any form of government possessed by France since the Constituent Assembly of 1789 set the example of constitution-mongering.

And to Bismarck such conservatism was most disheartening. He had roundly rebuked the German ambassador at Paris for showing sympathy with the Bonapartists; he desired nothing more than the very reddest of 'red' republics across the Rhine. Such a Government would alienate the Monarchical Powers, it would lend weight to his warnings of the danger of socialism and of anarchy. And it was upon these warnings that he relied to enable him to escape a 'repetition of Tilsit', to prevent

Constitution of 1875.

§ 4. League of the Three Emperors.

that union of Russia and France which was the persistent nightmare of the Cabinet of Berlin. To prevent such a coalition, which threatened to grind Germany to powder between an upper and a nether millstone, was the Chancellor's most cherished aim ; the eventual formation of such a coalition is the index of his relative failure in foreign politics.

Bismarck
and Alex-
ander II.

For a moment, however, despite the lamentable recovery of France, he secured a measure of success ; friends were forthcoming, and a league was formed recalling to mind the days of Troppau and Verona. Alexander II, as though haunted by some premonition of that nitro-glycerine bomb which was eventually to bring his reign to so abrupt a conclusion, feared revolution with a deadly fear ; and this fear, stimulated by the German Chancellor, served to strengthen those cordial relations which had subsisted between the Courts of Petersburg and Berlin since the days of the Polish rebellion. Before the Tsar's blinking eyes, Bismarck conjured up gaunt spectres, red-handed socialism and blood-stained anarchy triumphant ; to trembling prayers for advice, he answered by pointing out the one true way of salvation, by urging with insistence the need for a monarchical league to hold in check the prevalent tendency to disorder. And Alexander, hearing, remembered.

Bismarck
and
Austria.

At the same time, that reconciliation between Prussia and Austria, for which Bismarck's moderation after Königgrätz had prepared, was completed. To the Magyars, the establishment of German unity under the Hohenzollerns had always appeared desirable ; nothing could more contribute to the attainment of their own ends. And now, when the acceptance of dualism and the ceremony at Versailles had for ever relegated to the land of dreams all hope of a revived Habsburg ascendancy in Germany, the Austrians were won over to the Hungarian

view. They realized that the dominant races in the Dual Monarchy were threatened by the Pan-Slav movement, and that the enemy to be feared was rather at Petersburg than at Berlin. The resultant change of feeling was indicated by the fall of the anti-Prussian Beust, and by the accession to office of Andrassy, the leading exponent of the policy of a German alliance. A willing ear was thus lent to the friendly overtures of Bismarck, and a *rapprochement* between the two Courts naturally ensued.

Fall of
Beust,
1871.

The hostility of Austria having been thus overcome, Bismarck was able to bring about a meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin. And though neither this conference nor other similar conferences led to the conclusion of any definitive alliance, the three Eastern Powers did reach a general understanding upon the principles which should govern their policy. They prepared to resist revolution in all its forms, concerting measures for the repression of unauthorized nationalist agitations and for the prevention of 'socialistic' outbursts. The Prussian Chancellor was relieved from any immediate anxiety, and his feeling of security was increased by the practical adhesion of Italy to the so-called 'League of the Three Emperors'. Victor Emmanuel, as a result of the fall of Napoleon III, had won his capital and the undying hatred of Pius IX. But that hatred had been almost equally incurred by Francis Joseph, who had adopted a liberal ecclesiastical policy which the Pope characterized as 'sane nefanda', and by Bismarck, who in the Kulturkampf, a controversy brought on by the promulgation of the dogma of Papal Infallibility, had favoured the dissident Catholics. The three Courts were thus drawn together, and it seemed as if a new Quadruple Alliance was about to assume the direction of Central and Eastern Europe.

League of
the Three
Emperors,
1872.

But such harmony was not of long duration; the new

§ 5. Bosnia
and Bul-
garia.

league was soon shipwrecked upon the fatal Ottoman rock. For the manifold problems which constitute the Eastern Question had in no sense been solved by the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris ; rather, the vanity of the fancied settlement had been abundantly demonstrated. That union of Wallachia and Moldavia against which Great Britain had then laboured to provide, had none the less been effected and the principality of Roumania been created ; Alexander II, seizing the occasion of the Franco-German War, had denounced the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty ; and above all, the Porte had proved conclusively how empty were the promises of reform in which the Western Powers had placed such touching confidence. Turks continued to oppress, Christians to revolt ; disturbances in Crete troubled the Powers, a massacre in Lebanon produced French intervention ; all things continued as they had been since the decay of the Ottoman Empire produced that fear which begets tyranny.

Revolt in
Herzego-
vina, 1875.

Nor did the eternal question grow less acute as the years passed away ; on the contrary, its difficulty was increased by the introduction of a new disturbing element. Encouraged by the ' progressive ' party in Russia and by the success of parallel movements in Italy and Germany, perhaps influenced also by the establishment of dualism across the Danube, the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula, those ' scattered remnants of nations ' for whom Bismarck cared so little, began to see visions and to dream dreams of union. They conceived that they might dominate south-eastern Europe, and the consequent agitation speedily led to a storm. A bad harvest in Herzegovina supplied the immediate cause or excuse ; the tax-gatherers refused to forgo their dues ; the tax-payers preferred death in battle to death by starvation ; a revolt began in

this district and spread rapidly to Bosnia ; Serbia and Montenegro grew restless ; and Europe was compelled once more to attempt the achievement of the impossible.

And as had been the case during the War of Greek Independence, the first aim of the Powers was to prevent isolated action by Russia. Bismarck, though he contemptuously asserted that 'the whole Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier', feared for the fate of that harmony which he had so laboriously produced ; Andrassy had the true Austrian dread of nationalist manifestations and of Russian aggression ; and both these statesmen therefore laboured to hold the Tsar true to his implied obligation only to act in concert with the Courts of Berlin and Vienna. For a time their efforts were successful. Alexander II, hating Pan-Slavism as a type of revolution and constitutionally averse from war, was only concerned not to offend the sentiment of his people. He did not venture to ignore the tears of his co-religionists, but he hoped that he might profit from the errors of his uncle and of his father, that he might avoid the Scylla of unpopularity no less than the Charybdis of conflict with the other Powers. Thus when Andrassy produced a scheme of necessary reforms, the Tsar readily agreed to support his recommendations ; England and France gave a less cordial assent, and the 'Andrassy Note' was duly presented to the Porte. But its influence was somewhat impaired by the fact that it did not assume a collective form, and though the Ottoman Government accepted the advice, with one reservation, nothing at all was done in the way of acting upon it. Indeed, so far from the question being settled, it entered almost immediately upon a more acute phase.

For perhaps as a result of the Turkish victories in Bosnia, the unrest in Montenegro and Serbia increased ;

The
'Andrassy
Note',
Dec. 1875.

The
Berlin

Memorandum,
May 1876. rebellion spread to Bulgaria, and the customary massacres assumed a more serious character when the Mohammedans murdered the German and French consuls at Saloniki. More decisive measures became necessary; the Eastern Powers agreed upon the 'Berlin Memorandum', to impose an armistice on the Porte and to intervene if the grievances were not redressed within two months. But England declined to be a party to any course so hostile to the Ottoman Government; she emphasized her disapproval by sending her fleet to Besika Bay, and from this moment all chance of concerted action disappeared.

Revolution at Constantinople,
May-Aug. 1876. A revolution at Constantinople intensified the difficulty of the situation. Abdul Aziz, weak and a conciliator of the Powers, was deposed: his successor, Murad V, speedily returned to that obscurity from which he had half-emerged; Abdul Hamid II began his eventful reign. But such events afforded a golden opportunity to the disaffected; Servia and Montenegro declared war upon the Sultan; their armies were recruited by Russian volunteers; and while the whole Balkan Peninsula thus flamed into revolt, the intervention of Europe, or at least of the Tsar, could no longer be confined to the mere giving of unpalatable and unaccepted advice. Finding that in event of a conflict with Austria, he could only count upon German hostility and not upon German gratitude, Alexander II resolved to act in union with Francis Joseph; the two Emperors met and came to an agreement at Reichstadt, and though diplomatic efforts continued, the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey was merely a question of time.

Conference of Reichstadt,
July 1876.

The 'Bulgarian Atrocities',
May 1876. And meanwhile the Turks did their best to alienate the sympathy of England. Alarmed at the general character of the risings, the Ottoman Government determined to crush the unrest in Bulgaria before it reached a head; the

methods adopted were more than usually barbarous, and though the 'atrocities' may have been exaggerated, the sensation created was more than justified by the facts. It was in vain that Disraeli attempted to dismiss the reports as 'mere coffee-house babbling'; England paid more attention to Gladstone, who used all the fiery eloquence of which he was master to denounce the pro-Turkish policy of the Government. The result was seen in an offer of British mediation, and the mild suggestion that an ultimatum might some day follow its rejection; the Porte replied by its customary promise of reform. But the patience of Alexander was almost exhausted; a definite threat of war compelled the Sultan to suspend military operations; and while the Tsar, protesting his devotion to peace, strove to reassure English opinion, the labours of the diplomatists became increasingly hopeless.

Their hopelessness was increased by the action of Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield. While inviting the Powers to a conference at Constantinople for the discussion of the whole problem, he permitted himself to hint in rather unguarded language at the divergence of interest between England and Russia, and a bellicose speech at the Guildhall was at once effectively answered at Moscow. Alexander appealed to his subjects to give him the support necessary for the work of saving the Christians in the Ottoman Empire; he followed up this by ordering the mobilization of his army.

In such circumstances, the Conference of Constantinople could but fail. Though a project of reform, supported by all the Powers, was duly presented to the Porte, the latter paid more attention to assurances received from its ambassador in London; the growing rivalry between England and Russia was hailed with satisfaction by the Sultan; and in place of accepting the suggestions offered,

§ 6, The
Turco-
Russian
War.

Conference
of Constan-
tinople,
Dec. 1876.

Abdul Hamid sought to gain time by the startling announcement that he was about to grant a Constitution on the most approved western model to the whole Ottoman Empire. But such promises were disregarded; a further conference in London resulted in a collective note insisting upon immediate reform, and to this note was appended a Russian ultimatum. In vain the Porte assembled the first Turkish Parliament and pathetically complained that the unsympathetic attitude of Europe would ruin its efforts to establish representative government; in vain it announced its noble resolve not to be content with that half-liberty for Christians which was all that Europe desired. Alexander held to his course, and treating the Turkish answer as a rejection of his ultimatum, immediately declared war. The other Powers at once proclaimed that they would not interfere, though Great Britain added a stipulation that her interests must not be threatened by the occupation of Constantinople or by any infringement of the neutrality of Egypt.

Declara-
tion of
War,
April 1877.

Siege of
Plevna,
July-Dec.
1877.

The occupation of Constantinople at first seemed to be well within the bounds of possibility; it appeared that Russia was about to enjoy that easy triumph which she has always been expected to secure in her contests with Turkey, and which she has always failed to win. Boldly ignoring the Ottoman army, which was posted in the strongholds north of the Balkans, and crossing the mountains by an unexpected route, Gourko turned the Shipka Pass and advanced into Roumelia. But the tide of success soon turned. With the arrival of Turkish reinforcements, the Russians were compelled to retreat, and at the same time Plevna, hastily entrenched by Osman Pasha, was the scene of heavy reverses for the Imperial troops. During nearly six months the town withstood all attacks successfully; the whole strength of the Russian

Empire was hurled in vain against one minor Bulgarian fortress. The Turks, however, failed to profit by their victories; Plevna at last fell, and the Shipka Pass being still in the hands of the invaders, the advance on Constantinople was immediately undertaken. At Philippopolis, the Ottoman army was crushingly defeated; Adrianople was occupied, and the Porte, which had already sought European mediation, now treated for peace.

Battle of
Philippopolis,
Jan. 1878

Alexander II was not disinclined to end the war. The advance of his army towards the Turkish capital had troubled the English Government; it is not impossible that if the Beaconsfield Cabinet had been united in opinion, Great Britain would have actively intervened. Even as it was, Parliament was invited to make a special grant of money, and the speeches in which this request was supported showed that war with Russia was probable. Nor was the danger reduced by the terms of the Convention of Adrianople; the Russians were permitted to advance within sight of Constantinople, the British fleet passed the Dardanelles, and the situation became critical in the extreme. It was saved by the necessities of the Tsar and the determination of Andrassy. While Beaconsfield was almost openly provocative, the Hungarian statesman insisted that the Convention could not be allowed to form the basis of a definite Peace, and proposed that a Congress should be assembled; and to this proposition Russia, unable to face a general war, agreed.

§ 7. The
Treaty of
San
Stefano.

Conventic
of Adrian
ople,
Jan. 1878

Meanwhile the Porte had been obliged to accept terms of peace well-calculated to offend Europe. By the Treaty of San Stefano, the independence of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro was recognized; the two latter States were to receive an extension of territory; Bosnia and

Treaty of
San
Stefano,
March.

Herzegovina were to be autonomous, Crete to be administered, and Armenia to have special privileges. Certain fortresses were to be handed over to Russia, whose frontier was once more to be advanced to the Danube, Roumania exchanging Bessarabia for the Dobrudsha taken from Turkey. And finally, Bulgaria, including Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia, was to be erected into a self-governing State, temporarily occupied by Russia and guaranteed by her.

Attitude of
England
and
Austria.

But such terms could not be accepted either by Great Britain, who saw all her worst nightmares of Russians in India realized, or by Austria, who saw her cherished dream of a port on the Aegean for ever falsified. Andrassy prepared to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to mobilize the army of the Dual Monarchy; Beaconsfield, his Cabinet now united, denounced the Treaty and prepared for war, concluding a secret convention with Turkey by which England guaranteed the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan and was to occupy Cyprus as a pledge of her good faith. But the struggle which appeared inevitable was averted. Alexander could not fight, Bismarck was enthusiastic in the cause of peace; the long delayed Congress at last met, and the success of its deliberations saved Europe from war.

§ 8. The
Treaty of
Berlin,
July 1878.

For as a result of the Congress the terms of peace agreed upon at San Stefano were sensibly modified. Bulgaria was restricted to the territory north of the Balkans, Eastern Roumelia being granted mere self-government, and Macedonia left to the Sultan absolutely. Bosnia and Herzegovina were entrusted to Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer; Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro were declared independent, and Samos was erected into an autonomous principality. But in order that the Dual Monarchy might still have an outlet

for southward expansion, Montenegro was deprived of the desirable ports granted her at San Stefano; and the sandjak of Novi Bazar, left in possession of the Ottomans, formed a wedge between the two Slav States. In the matter of Greece, who had unwisely attempted to press her claims by war, the Powers contented themselves with making a pious recommendation to the Sultan that something should be ceded to the Hellenic kingdom. Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty, England published her convention with Turkey and occupied Cyprus, thus morally binding herself to oppose any further dissipation of the inheritance of the Sick Man.

Peace was thus preserved in Europe, but the Treaty of Berlin, like the Treaties of Adrianople and Paris before it, failed to solve the Eastern Question. Failure of the Treaty of Berlin. And the cause of that failure is not hard to find; the treaty was an attempt to steer between the two logical extremes of maintaining and of destroying the Ottoman Empire, and it therefore suffered the fate of all half-solutions. Yet it was difficult to see how a more logical course could have been pursued. The Turks themselves precluded the possibility of a European maintenance of their Empire; a declining race, they were filled with that distrust which a sense of weakness must produce, and they could no more abstain from oppressing Christians than the Christians could abstain from efforts to deliver themselves from the humiliating position assigned to them by the Koran. And in so far as the Treaty of Berlin expressed hope of an Ottoman revival, it has not been justified by later events; even the recent triumph of progress at Constantinople gives no very sure ground for hope. Beaconsfield 'brought back peace' from Berlin; the 'honour' of which he boasted was more dubious. England occupied and still retains Cyprus; the Ottoman Empire has lost

Eastern Roumelia and Crete, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been annexed to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria has proclaimed her independence.

Impossibility of a permanent Settlement.

Yet if the maintenance of Turkish integrity be impossible, the contrary solution presents almost more insurmountable difficulties. Any tampering with the territorial *status quo* was rendered extremely dangerous by the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the Powers ; but even if Great Britain could have forgotten her distrust and Russia and Austria their ambition, the ' bag and baggage ' policy would none the less have been far from assuring peace. For when the last Turk had crossed the Bosphorus, the conflict of nationalities in the Balkan Peninsula would only have begun, and the task of reconciling the conflicting interests of those ' remnants of nations ' would have passed the wit of the wisest diplomatists. If the Treaty of Berlin failed to provide a permanent solution for the Eastern Question, it was largely because no solution could be provided which would not bear fruitful seeds of future discord.

§ 9. The Year 1878.

The importance of the treaty is thus rather indirect than direct, consisting in the illustration afforded by it of the motives which governed the conduct of statesmen in 1878. The nineteenth century has been somewhat generally regarded as the era of the triumph of ' Nationality ', but if this view be correct, then between victory and defeat there is a most marked similarity. For while ' the rights of peoples ' have nowhere secured perfect recognition, in numerous instances they have not been recognized even imperfectly. Greece still longs for her islands and Belgium for Luxemburg ; Italy sighs for her ' unredeemed ' provinces of Dalmatia, Istria, and Trent ; even Germany is obliged to remember with regret that her language is the language of millions obeying the

Habsburg sceptre. And at the same time, Czechs and Croats, Roumans and Poles, Bulgars and Serbs, watch in vain for the dawning of a bright day of unity and freedom; the subject-races of south-eastern Europe feel little content in the contemplation of a Magyar triumph. In short, 'Nationality' has by no means been accepted as a principle upon which Europe should be remodelled.

Nor is it very difficult to explain this fact. Few European nations possess a population so homogeneous that the principle could be applied to them without peril to their very existence; the intermingling of races is often so complete that the recognition of the rights of one people almost necessarily involves the sacrifice of another. And though the theorists who championed 'Nationality', and who popularized that doctrine, probably overlooked such trifles and sincerely believed in the practicability of the creed which they preached, such delusions have hardly been shared by serious politicians. To them, the doctrine was convenient; it might afford a well-sounding catchword wherewith to attract; it might supply a cloak for the concealment of less respectable ambitions and more selfish aims. They hoped to use it to assist them in the accomplishment of their designs; they hoped to discard it when it had served its purpose.

Of those who trusted so to make use of 'Nationality', Bismarck was the most prominent and skilful. He realized with his wonted perspicacity that the day of frank repression had passed; he realized that the masses were hardly enthusiasts on behalf of that ideal of national power which he set ever before him. But he did not for that despair of gaining the help of the Many; he believed that, whether or no the People could be corrupted, they could most certainly be deceived. He knew that the wish of the masses was for relief from material distress,

Causes of
the Failure
of 'Nation-
ality'.

§ 10. The
Bismarck
System.

that they had been taught by Mazzini and by other idealists to look for such relief in political unity and to expect from alien rule pangs of hunger. And of this knowledge he availed himself to win popular approval for the methods which he adopted in order to establish Prussian ascendancy in Germany and German ascendancy in Europe. Taxes were increased, conscription enforced, Parliamentary Government reduced to a formality, in the sacred cause of unity, or, as the Many understood it, in the cause of the hungry. So far from openly flouting the wishes of the people, Bismarck professedly appeared as the champion of a popular cause, as labouring to secure for the masses all that they most desired.

Failure of
the System.

And at first he met with complete success; Germany was unified under Prussian leadership and assumed a foremost place in the councils of the Continent. But unfortunately the Bismarck system laboured under one fatal disadvantage. The cry for bread was a real cry, expressing a deeply felt need, nor could it be stilled either by the most eloquent appeals to lofty sentiment or by the attainment of the fullest measure of national glory. And when the masses discovered, as they discovered only too soon both in Italy and in Germany, that the boasted advantages of union were so elusive as to require explanation; when they found that so far from bringing abundance of food, unity brought rather abundance of taxes and of drills, their enthusiasm for 'Nationality' was somewhat abated, and they lent a ready ear to the preachers of another gospel. Cosmopolitan ideas became prevalent; Socialism, in all its myriad forms, gained adherents; and the new agitation, like the old, found its ultimate basis in that permanent desire for more to eat and for more to drink which has ever lain at the root of all political unrest. Bismarck viewed with alarm the growth

of theories which he regarded as hostile to the development of national power; he became the enemy of those popular movements which he had once applauded; he advocated repression and urged resistance to the 'Revolution' with an ardour worthy of Metternich himself.

Indeed, between the presiding genius of the Congress of Vienna and the presiding genius of the Congress of Berlin, the difference in policy and in principles is so slight that those who loudly acclaim the political progress of the nineteenth century may well restrain their optimistic feelings. It is true Bismarck did not, as Metternich had done, bluntly declare his contempt for the wishes of peoples, but Poles and Alsations, Hanoverians and Hessians and Danes could bear testimony to the slight regard which he had shown for their aspirations and for their prejudices. It is true that he did not attempt that complete repression of all political life which had been the ideal of the Austrian Chancellor, that he never openly advocated despotism or condemned Constitutional government. But the Prussian Parliament learnt from him that freedom must be subordinate to higher considerations, and the German people found that their unity involved the strictest obedience to their 'Warlord'. And if Metternich had his Quadruple Alliance to maintain 'morality' and the *status quo*, Bismarck strove to form a 'League of Emperors' to support the self-same cause; the conferences of sovereigns at Berlin reproduced with some exactness the Conferences of Troppau and Laibach.

And if political progress consists in something more vital than the mere formation of unified States, the half-recognition of 'Nationality', and the bare acceptance of representative institutions—if political progress is a good in any true sense, then the boasted advance since the days

§ II. Metternich and Bismarck.

Europe, 1815-78.

of Metternich becomes shadowy and vague. The sum-total of human happiness has been but obscurely increased; the ardour which statesmen feel for the mitigation of human woe is delicately concealed; and the Christmas message of goodwill is heard as faintly as ever amid the clash of jarring interests. Unity and freedom have been bought—bought at a price, a price paid in broken hearts and scalding tears of blood; and the dear purchase has done little to remove the soul-destroying tale of poverty and distress. Indeed, the liberated masses still cry in vain for bread; the crushing burden of armaments weighs daily more heavily upon the groaning peoples of the Continent; many a peasant sighs for some relief from the oppressive glory of his united nation, many a conscript would welcome alien rule if so he could gain power to bring comfort to a sorrowing mother. And the prevailing calm but thinly disguises the ever-present danger of storm, which hourly threatens to devastate a Europe enjoying more liberty, more taxes, and less assurance of peace.

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
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
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THE HOUSE OF SAVOY.



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
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




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
English Miles
 0 100 200 300 400 500

Boundary of Ottoman Empire.....
 Boundary after Peace of Kutaya.....+ + + + +



**THE
UNION OF ITALY
1859-70**

Piedmont Sardinia in April 1860
 Added in November 1859
 Added in March 1860
 Added October November 1860
 Added October 1866
 Added October 1870
 Lost March 1860:
 Italian districts claimed by Italy 1860





**The
FRANCO GERMAN
WAR
1870 - I**

English Miles
0 50 100 150

Ceded to Germany 1871

Battlefields near Metz





S. Switzerland
 M. Montenegro
 B. Belgium
 N. Netherlands
 H. Herzegovina
 E. Eastern Roumelia

EUROPE
 in 1878
 English Miles
 0 200 400 600

