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THE EASTERN MARCHLANDS OF EUROPE

THE EASTERN MARCHLANDS OF EUROPE

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"*It is by the combined efforts of the weak, made under compulsion, to resist the reign of force and constant wrong, that, in the rapid change but slow progress of four hundred years, liberty has been preserved . . . and finally understood.*"

ACTON, " Lecture *on* the Beginning of the Modern State."

LONDON

GEORGE PHILIP & SON, LTD., 32 FLEET STREET, E.C.4

LIVERPOOL: PHILIP, SON & NEPHEW, LTD.

1941

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEORGE PHILIP AND SON, LIMITED, LONDON.

TO THE

OWNERS OF CHESHUNT PARK

IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION

OF MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT TO TRAVEL

AND OF

MANY WELCOMES ON RETURNING HOME

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

THE material for these studies of the marchland countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been accumulated gradually during the past nine years, mainly in such spare time as has been available from other work. As the footnotes and bibliographies to the chapters show, but few sources have been tapped which are not accessible to most readers. Nor has there been any journey connected with the work which was not practicable before the outbreak of war to anyone ready to accept the ordinary conditions of travel on the Continent. This book does not claim, therefore, to be an authoritative or original study of the marchland region, but is rather the outcome of journeying and reading, which for the last ten years have been possible for many people in Great Britain.

I should like to stress the " inexpert " character of the work, partly as a shield against many shortcomings, but also because it seems incumbent, not only upon the specialists, but also upon every man and woman in ftiese times to think more about the peoples of the European Continent than he or she has done in the past, and especially about those nations whose histories have the character of almost unrelieved tragedy. If there is to be any solidarity in Europe when the present phase of violence, destruction and famine is over, it must derive partly from the willingness of the British people to think with greater knowledge and detachment than has been shown up to now, of the past, present and future fortunes of the marchland nations.

A complete study of the borderland of Central and Eastern Europe should take in Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. These countries, however, are not included in the book for the following reason. One of the main purposes of the work was to see the result of the mixture of Machiavellian and idealistic policies apparent at the Paris Peace Conference on the small national groups which were created at that time. The four states mentioned above, although deeply affected by the peace negotiations between

1918 and 1919, emerged or re-emerged as national states a stage earlier than the countries studied in this book.

Fortunately it was feasible between 1930 and 1936 to visit not only the marchlands of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the great states to the east and west of them, Germany, Russia and Turkey. It is hardly possible to grasp the tragedy of the small nations sandwiched in between the strong powers, unless the geographic setting and historical development of those powers are familiar. Fortunately, too, the readiness of many individuals and groups in Great Britain to provide introductions, and the friendliness of the marchland peoples to most travellers make it possible on a journey through this region to study good cross-sections of the populations. With the help of even halting German (it is impossible to deny that German *is* the " lingua franca " of the marchland countries), one can meet peasants, students, business-men, doctors, teachers and magnates: one can be charmed by their unstinted hospitality, impressed by their patriotism, and dismayed by the strength of their hatred, not only of ancient foes, but also very often of their immediate neighbours and of the alien groups in their midst. Such, surely, will be the recollections of any traveller from Great Britain who has made the effort to seek out the Central and East European countries.

I hope that people with no particularly specialized knowledge of politics, history, economics or geography will be able to use this book. Some of the material has already been shaped into lecture courses in Regional and Political Geography for the Cambridge Geographical Tripos. But any treatment of the subject which would limit the scope of the book to the reading of university students only has been carefully avoided.

As far as possible the maps and diagrams have been inserted in the text at the point where they serve best to illustrate the argument. This has sometimes meant a certain amount of repetition in the maps, but in many cases an illustration which is not in close proximity to the discussion in the text loses much of its value. Pressure of space has also necessitated the reduction of many illustrations to a small scale, but even " thumb-nail " maps clarify points brought up in the text, and can be helped out by the use of a larger-scale general atlas.

The list of people who have helped in the preparation of the manuscript is necessarily a very long one. It would be

impossible to print the name of every person concerned, but the writer is none the less grateful to those who are not specifically mentioned in the following paragraphs.

In the Department of Geography at Cambridge University, I have to thank Professor Debenham, without whose help and encouragement this work could never have been completed. I have also to thank Mr. J. A. Steers and Dr. H. C. Darby for reading the manuscript, and Mr. W. W. Williams for substantial help with the maps. Mr. K. K. M. Leys of University College, Oxford, and Mrs. Leys of St. Hilda's College, gave much valuable advice upon the manuscript at various stages, and were responsible also for some very useful letters of recommendation to business people in Danzig. Professor W. J. Rose of the School of Slavonic Studies gave a very generous share of his time and trouble both in Silesia and later at Oxford. Miss Roberts, formerly Librarian in the Department of Geography, and Miss Goss of St. Margaret's School, Bushey, were kind enough to help in the correction and checking of the proofs.

Acknowledgment and thanks must also be made to the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Legations; the Polish Embassy; the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav and Turkish Legations, all of which provided introductions and travelling facilities. A number of contacts with the universities in the marchland countries were afforded by the National Union of Students, and with business agents by the Fine Cotton Spinners' and Doublers' Association and by Messrs. Ormrod, Hardcastle and Company. Letters of recommendation from the Society of Friends gave access to a number of interesting social organizations in the marchland region, and equally useful were the hospitality and experience of the members of the American Mission to the Near East, in Turkey and in the Balkan Peninsula. Thanks are due to Lady Grogan for the profit and interest of the weeks spent in Czechoslovakia, and to Colonel Woodall for the smoothness of much of the journey through Yugoslavia. Finally there should be acknowledged a considerable debt to P. R. Bodington, F. E. Moore, I. Stacey, G. C. Tyler and C. R. Wanklyn, who endured a good deal as travelling companions.

In every country a certain amount of information—in some cases the most useful of all—was accumulated through conversations with people of all classes and occupations which were afterwards written down. Rough drafts of the chapters were also sent abroad whenever possible for

criticism or revision. But in these times, unhappily, appreciation of such help is better shown by silence than by the specific mention of names.

H. G. W.

CAMBRIDGE,
January 1941.

FOREWORD

ABOVE the town of Semlin, across the River Sava from Belgrade, there stands a monument commemorating the millennium of the Magyar invasion of the Middle Danubian Plain. Until 1919 this site lay on the frontier of Croatia, and so of the Kingdom of Hungary, facing the Serbian capital which the Habsburg armies destroyed in 1914. Here the confluence of the Sava with the Danube is overlooked by the ancient fortress of Belgrade—prehistoric, Roman, Serbian, Turkish, and again Serbian. Kinglake, describing* this river frontier in 1835, wrote: " Of the men that bustled around me in the streets of Semlin there was not, perhaps, one who had ever gone down to look upon the stranger-race dwelling under the walls of that opposite castle. It is the plague, and the dread of the plague, that divide the one people from the other." Again, referring to the friends who saw him off at the river bank as he left for Belgrade: " they asked if we were perfectly certain that we had wound up all our affairs in Christendom, and whether we had no parting requests to make." This account serves to emphasize the long-continued severance of human relations by a great river in South-eastern Europe, and the millennium monument indicates that the Eastern Marchland nations which form the subject of this book have " long memories," even though many of their people still be illiterate: the basis of knowledge regarding the national heritage frequently rests upon oral tradition reaching beyond written history. Yet authentic records cover a long period. The Delegations of the Allied and Associated Powers at the Paris Peace Conference were inundated by literature emanating from these Marchlands; and the claim to this or that territory in many cases was justified by historical events many centuries old.

At the Conference these considerations were not neglected, and it was important that each Delegation possessed experts able to assign a true value to historical claims.

* In *Eōthen,* Ch. I.

But what of the electorates to whom the Delegations were ultimately responsible at home in Britain, France, Italy, Belgium or the United States? Certainly in Great Britain the general ignorance of Eastern Europe was, and still is, profound. For ignorance of the salient facts of the geography of this region there is no real excuse; but it must be admitted that it is no easy matter for those who are not scholars by nature to study and appreciate the history and the social conditions of the various national groups. The present author has at last provided the English reader with a suitable avenue of easy approach to this complex subject; and one may hope that her book will be widely read: knowledge must precede judgment. In due course these unfortunate nations will again be at the international bar and the ultimate judicial authorities will be the electorates of other nations, not least important, we may trust, those in the English-speaking world.

Vital as it is to understand how and why the present political and economic problems have their roots deep in the past, it is at least as important to understand their relations to the geographical facts of position, accessibility, and resources from field, forest, mine and factory. It is therefore good to find the stress given to these in the work before us. Moreover, geography bears on present problems both directly under existing conditions, and indirectly through human action in the past: this, perhaps chiefly but not solely, because human groups, each bound by common language and traditional culture, have suffered, or have benefited, in the past by their geographical distribution relative to the territories of their neighbours.

In the midst of war we must all be deeply concerned about the future of Europe and the way to make this " continent " *habitable* in the ideal sense, with all Europeans living well and happily. A review of the past international conflicts, and harmonies too, in the eastern danger zone is therefore specially valuable at the present time. National partnership, for instance, is a subject that merits sympathetic study. Such partnerships have lasted for very different periods, and they have ended for different reasons. The Anglo-Scottish example may well have received insufficient consideration by the members of some nations which have later sought divorce. In any case it is good to keep trying to foresee the probable consequences of political events that are at least possible. It would seem right, too, that no action taken at the last opportunity of settlement, in 1919, be

condemned without a thorough re-examination. In this, the chief question to be answered in each case should be: " did it have a fair chance ? " The answer in many cases will be found in this work, if not in all its bearings at least in salient outlines. In these Eastern Marchlands the heritage of the past is shown to have been fraught with immense burdens which could scarcely all be cast off in a full generation. But it is perhaps pertinent to recall that the monument of the Magyar Millennium at Semlin was left standing by a government which had seen its people driven from their homes and decimated during four years of bitter war.

ALAN G. OGILVIE.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THE writer wishes to acknowledge the following sources of information for the compilation of maps and diagrams: The *Atlas of Finland,* for Fig. 19; L'*Acces de Ia Pologne d Ia Mer* (Smogorewski), for Fig. 38; the *Atlas of Poland* (Romer), for Fig. 40; the *Atlas Tchicoslovaque,* for Figs. 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 61; the *Baltic Region* (Woods), for Figs. 14 and 25; *Baltische Landeskunde* (Kuppfer), for Fig. 28; the *Cambridge Medieval History* (accompanying maps), for Figs. 77 and 78; *Czechs and Germans* (Wiskemann), for Fig. 55; the *Evolution of Hungary* (Teleki), for Fig. 68; *Finland* (Van Cleef), for Fig. 13; *Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems* (Nowbigin), for Fig. 75; the *Géographic Universelle,* Vol. VII, Part 2, for Figs. 74c, 74d, 80, 85, 86; the *Geographical Review,* for Fig. 21; *Finland,* a practical guide-book (Helsinki), for Fig. 15; the *Historischer Schul-Atlas* (Putzger), for Figs. 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 27, 46, 54, 66, 82, 84; *Litauen* (Mortensen), for Figs 33 and 34; *Manuel de Ia Geographie Politique Europienne* (Ancel), for Fig. 70; the *New Balkans* (Armstrong), for Fig. 82a; the *New World* (Bowman), for Figs. 5a, 5c, 69, 79; the *Peninsule Balkanique* (Cvijic), for Figs. 74b, 76; *Peuples et Nations Des Balkans* (Ancel), for Figs. 74c and 81; *La Poméranie Polonaise* (Smogorewski), for Fig. 47; *La Regione Balcanica* (Dainelli), for Fig. 5b; *La Tchecoslovaquie* (Tibal), for Fig. 57.



FIG. 1.—The Eastern Marchland States of Europe. Scale approx. 1 : 25,000,000.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE eight countries discussed in this book form a connected strip across Europe from north to south, from the Arctic Ocean to the Adriatic Sea. They are the republics of Finland, Estonia,* Latvia* and Lithuania,* the former states of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the regency of Hungary and the kingdom of Yugoslavia. (In the chapter on Poland [illegible]

EASTERN MARCHLANPS OF EUROPE

CORRIGENDA

Page 15. For "Ctakow" read "Cracow.*'

Fig. 9 For "before the 1914-1918 War" read "in 1885.''

Fig. 58. For "Fig. 51" read "Fig. 50."

[illegible]
whicn were mainly responsible for establishing the frontiers and status of the marchland groups. In the case of some of the peace treaties, •there were many more signatories than arc mentioned here, but those other than the marchland peoples and their neighbours arc not included.

(1) The Treaty of Dorpat (Tartu), 14th October, 1920, between Russia and Finland.

(2) The Treaty of Tartu, 2nd February, 1920, between Russia and Estonia.

(3) The Treaty of Riga, nth August, 1920, between Russia and Latvia.

(4) The Treaty of Peace, 12th July, 1920, between Russia and Lithuania.

(5) The Convention of Memel, May 1924, deciding the status of Memel-land.

(6) The Treaty of Riga, 18th March, 1921, between Russia and Poland.

(7) The Treaty of Versailles, 28th June, 1919, demarcating the western frontier of Poland and detaching the ports of Danzig and Memel and the surrounding territories from Germany.

(8) The Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, 10th September, 1919, dealing with the frontiers between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary.

(9) The Treaty of Trianon, 4th June, 1920, between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania and Hungary and Yugoslavia.

of resurrection after this war, and not the first experience of political independence; Hungary, Bohemia (Western Czechoslovakia) and Poland especially, had former and notable traditions as separate states. But the opportunity afforded by the peace settlements was unique in the experience of each group; and although the territory and status of most European countries, especially in the centre and east of the continent, were deeply affected by the treaties, the position of the eight under discussion was something apart from the rest.

British people still remain almost astonishingly ignorant of this strip. Europe, east of Germany and west of Russia, is still considered by the majority of people in Great Britain under the two vague headings of " the Slavs" and " the Balkans." Neither the highly responsible parts played by British and French statesmen after the 1914-1918 War in the restoration of these countries, nor the suspicion that in this region lies the material for repeated and serious political explosions, has awakened in British men and women a systematic interest in this part of Europe. In the crisis of September 1938, for example, at least one outstanding feature was the lack of knowledge displayed in Great Britain of the Czechoslovak people, whether in official speeches, in newspaper articles or in ordinary conversation.

Admittedly, it is hard to study this strip of states. Political situations change so often that even the journalist of the daily newspaper is hard put to it to keep pace with the quick succession of events. Any book which has to go through the normal processes of printing and publishing is in these days out-of-date in one sense before it goes to press. But it is possible to argue that the true understanding of the patchwork of states east of Germany does not depend altogether, or even mainly, on the detailed knowledge of a series of political crises. There are other elements which are more constant and more important: geographical position and

(10) The Treaty of Rapallo, 12th November, 1920, between Italy and Yugoslavia, followed by the Treaty of Rome, 27th January, 1924, between the same signatories.

(11) The Treaty of Neuilly, 27th November, 1919, between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and between Yugoslavia and Greece.

(12) The Treaty of Paris, 31st July, 1926, between Yugoslavia and Albania (confirming the decisions of the Council of Ambassadors).

It is necessary to remember that the terms set down in these treaties were often followed by long and tedious negotiations through international commissions before final settlements were made. In some cases also the awards of the commissions contradicted or modified the treaty terms.

resource; historical tradition; religious, cultural and economic development. These arc the fundamentals which need thought in order to grasp the problems connected with these countries. The more the permanent characteristics of the small peace-treaty groups are made plain, the more possible it is both to understand something of the present complications, and also to realize that the dramatic happenings of the present day are but a repetition of past tragedies.

To present the main features of these states as simply and clearly as possible, is therefore the object of this book.

First of all it seems essential to point out very shortly their connection with the main episodes of European history, though an introduction of this kind must refer mainly to the groups south of the Baltic which were most of all affected by the buffer position between the Russians, Prussians, Hapsburgs and Turks.

Secondly, one can show the main geographical groups into which the eight units fall. These are four in number: Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to the Baltic region: the wide territories of the former republic of Poland are a transition-area in Europe; Czechoslovakia and Hungary belong to the group of Danube states; and Yugoslavia in a sense parallels in the south-east of Europe the transition region of Poland, with a part of its territory in Danubia and a part in the Balkans.

Lastly, within these groups one can make evident the individuality of each people, and the strength of their claim to an independent existence.

* * *

There are two " marchland " or border regions making patchworks of small states on the present map of Europe: one in the west between the French and German-speaking peoples, the other in the east, roughly between the Russian and German-speaking. The eastern marchland region between Russia and Germany is the larger and more complicated of the two, and its origins and growth are worth studying.

A chaotic distribution of physical types and language groups dates back in this part of Europe literally for thousands of years, to the days of the folk-wanderings through the continent. The human migrations of early European history are still far from completely explored, but it is known that Central and Eastern Europe especially were over centuries affected by the restless movements of primitive groups One area of disturbance was the grassland region of western

Central Asia. The causes of frequent migration thence have puzzled many scholars, whether historians or geographers or archaeologists, and are still mysterious. But for one reason or another there was from the Asiatic steppes a recurrent dispersion of nomad groups, many of whom wandered into Europe. Two other lesser centres of dispersion were also notable; one in the North European Plain between the Rhine and the Vistula, and another in the plateau region north of the Carpathians now known as Galicia.[2]

The east to west movement from the Asiatic grasslands was perhaps the most important, as pressure on the marchland regions from the east, in varying degrees of severity, was a feature of European development from prehistoric times until the Turkish advance was checked in the eighteenth century. It is necessary, however, to think back in time and to try to imagine the character of these migrations, whatever their direction, and especially those of early history. The movements of primitive peoples incline as a rule very much to the line of least resistance. Whether migrating as aggressors or as fugitives they are hampered by such natural obstacles as forest, marsh and uncleared water way, and conversely attracted by natural grassland regions. These geographical influences tend to limit movement to the repeated use of a few favourable routes. Further, though the migrations of early European history were now and then the swift movements of raiders and the hurried flight of victims, they were also the gradual and almost unconscious shiftings of herders and cultivators, seeking always the best pasture-lands and the most favourable soils.[8]

Almost by the process of elimination, then, the lines of least resistance for wanderers are traceable, though it must be remembered all the time, that such attempts at reconstruction are tentative, and concern general direction rather than detail of movement. Some evidence lies in the relief and vegetation maps of Europe (see Figs. 2 and 3), though it is difficult from modern maps to imagine the wide stretches of swamp and woodland which must have restricted early movement. It is possible to realize from such studies, however, something of the effect of the migrations on the later history of the marchland peoples.

One possible region of movement outflanked the mountains of Central Europe by crossing the " Isthmus " between the Baltic and the Black Sea. (See Fig. 2.) The southern part of it across the grasslands was easy to traverse, but the northern in the forests and swamps of the Baltic region was

FIG. 2.—Diagram of the Relief and River Systems of Central and Eastern Europe to show their effect upon the migrations of early European history.

BE = Belgrade T = Thessalonike I = Istanbul

more difficult, and depended partly on the seasonal use of the waterways. In this region, two routes are roughly traceable: one to the west crossing from the Vistula to the Dniester Basin, and one to the east between the Volkhov and

FiG. 3.—Diagram of the Vegetation Zones of Central and Eastern Europe. This map shows the distribution of tree species and *not* the actual extent of forest land in these regions. In the days of the Folk-Wanderings, however, the extent of forest land must have been such as to make a very close correlation between a map of woodland covering and a map of tree species. The mixed broad-leaf and Mediterranean forests suffered the most severely from human clearing activities. The term " desert" in this case applies both to the regions of scanty vegetation in Anatolia in the Scandinavian Highlands and in North Africa.

Dnieper systems. Separating the two routes in the watershed area was the great barrier of the Pripet Marsh. (See p. 139.) The attraction of Baltic amber to the earliest trading communities kept the eastern line of movement active through centuries.

From the western line, a second branched farther into

Europe, skirting the arc of the Carpathian Mountains. At the point known as the "Oder Gate," where the upper course of the Oder river makes a gap between the hills of Bohemia and the western Carpathians, it was possible to turn southwards by crossing the low watershed between the Oder and March valleys, and by following the latter into the fertile basin of the Middle Danube. Actually the Carpathian ranges themselves were no great barrier to movement, since in the north and north-east the Dukla and Tartar passes were easily crossed and saw many invaders pass into the plains of Hungary.

Another route led also to the Middle Danube Basin. It followed the broad plains of the Lower Danube region, though movement here was influenced in detail by the dangers of sudden flooding, and by the great marshes along the river-course. From the country now known as Wallachia, it was easier to turn north across the Carpathians by the Red Tower Pass into Transylvania, than to attempt the difficult section of the Danube valley through the Kazan Gorge.

Finally there was a great southern line of movement, in the Balkan Peninsula, along the coastal plains of Thrace and Macedonia. Thence there were possible * routes north through the trough in the highlands known as the Morava-Vardar Depression (see pages 291-294), or west through the lake region of Albania. From the coastal plains of Albania it was not difficult to cross to the heel of Italy. For those who did so, the tendency was to turn north, and by the east coast of the Italian peninsula to reach the fertile country of the Po Basin. There are traces also, however, of migratory movement along the more difficult country of the Dalmatian coast. The plains of northern Italy were attractive again to the people driven westwards from the Danube Basin. They were reached either by the lower passes of the eastern Alps, or by the break made between the Slovene and Dinaric highlands by the valley of the Sava river, and its tributary, the Kupa.

The folk-wanderings, needless to say, were not confined to the eastern marchland region. A study of a map of migratory routes shows plainly that the whole continent was affected. But it is also noticeable that the period of restlessness was much longer in Central and Eastern Europe than in the west. If that of the Turkish invasions be included, the eastern marchland groups were subject to this influence of constant movement until the eighteenth century.

The desirable regions, notably the outer rim of the Danube plains, were fiercely contested. Hence in the high-

lands, forests and marshes fringing the disputed lands and the easy lines of movement, there settled small pockets of fugitive groups, swept out of the way by later and stronger occupants of the good country, and preserving through centuries in the more inaccessible regions their own traditions and cultures. This process of migration and struggle accounts for the complicated dovetailing of Slovak and Magyar settlements in the southern foothills of the Carpathians. (See Fig. 64.) Another example of a broken language distribution due to the same process is in Macedonia. (See pp. 320-322.) In both regions, one ingredient of the modern problem of minorities is accounted for by the repeated movements of primitive groups.

Checks on raiders from the north and east were, needless to say, imposed from time to time. The Roman Empire and the medieval Byzantine Empire, by administrative and military ability, held up the movement of migratory peoples, and in some cases absorbed them into an orderly system of imperial rule. Their decline was in each case associated with sudden floods of migratory activity; the decay of the Roman Empire was followed by the period known as the " Barbarian Invasions," that of Byzantium (Constantinople) by the onrush of the Turks. The most permanent check to movement westward, from the end of the eighth century onwards was, however, given by the vigorous Teutonic domination of the section of the North European Plain and Southern Uplands to the west of a line marked roughly by the course of the Elbe river. This stream forms the western boundary of the patchwork of languages: to the north of it the Baltic Sea is the frontier, to the south the Adriatic.

By the end of the ninth century the most confused period of movement was past, and the linguistic divisions of this part of Europe were established. In the main, the distribution has not altered since. (See Fig. 4.) In the north were the weaker groups who had been pushed into the unattractive marshes and forests of the Baltic region, the Lapps, Finns, Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians: in the centre were the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Magyars and Ukrainians [4]; in the south were the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The settlement areas of the Rumanians, Bulgars, Greeks and Albanians, marchland groups not included in this study, were also roughly determined. There was absent only the later, but very important Turkish element. The occupation of the regions marked by the recent or existing frontiers of the

buffer groups is thus one of centuries and has behind it the claim of a long tradition.

It is noticeable, though, that resistance to migration from the east did not stop at defensive measures. Greek and Roman colonization in early history, German, Swedish and Italian during and after the Middle Ages, formed part of a



FIG. 4.—Linguistic Divisions of Central and Eastern Europe in the Ninth Century. All the linguistic groups except No. I are included in the Aryan family of languages. The Finno-Ugric group belongs to the Ural-Altaic family.

counter-movement from west to east which has had far-reaching effects on this part of Europe. The three last-named expansive efforts, with their origins in medieval history, were perhaps the most remarkable. (See Fig. 5, a, *b* and *c.)* In the north, the Swedes advanced steadily across the Baltic to conquer and settle the coastal plains of Finland and Kurland. In the south the Italians, especially the Venetian traders, established colonies along the narrow coastal plains of the eastern Adriatic, north of the Greek Peninsula, which were cut off from the Slav hinterland by the barrier of the Dinaric Alps.

But by far the most important expansion eastward **was** made by the Germans in Central Europe. The " Drang

nach Osten " which has been so tremendous an influence in European history dates from the medieval German thrusts against the Slav, Letto-Lithuanian, and Altaic groups,



FIG. 5a.—Swedish Expansion in the Coastal Plains of Finland. Note the contrast between the maximum extent of Swedish speech and the Swedish-•peaking region to-day. Swedish forms of the town names have been used.

FIG. 5b.—Italian Expansion in the Adriatic. Note the restriction of Italian settlement to the littoral regions. These colonies were established by Italian city states, principally the Venetian Republic. The main period of Italian settlement in the Adriatic took place some six hundred years be/ore Italian unity.

whether in the form of military conquest or of missionary or trading activity. Two features are noticeable in the German movement eastward: first its extent, German

colonies peppering the map of Europe as far east as the Volga river; secondly its vigour, the German communities here, as elsewhere, having a peculiar faculty for preserving their identity as German cultural groups even after centuries of minority existence at a distance from the land of origin.

All these eastward expansions, and especially that of the Germans, have a bearing on modern political history and geography. One type of minority group can be traced, as we have seen, back to the early days of migration from the



FIG. 5^.—German Expansion Eastward. Most of the isolated German* speaking groups in Central and Eastern Europe were established during the Middle Ages. The distribution would appear different at the present moment, because of the recall by the Nazi Government of many of the groups in Polish, Russian and Baltic territories.

north and east. A second type appears in medieval history, developing from expansion *towards* the east. In the first case the small broken and scattered groups were often weak and fugitive; in the second they were often colonies of soldiers or traders with a proud sense of superiority to the surrounding peoples, which helped to preserve their separate identity.

Bearing in mind too, the vigour and long traditions of the German push eastward, the recent removal of the Bait settlements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, is one of the most astonishing episodes of the twentieth century. The German colonies in the south-east Baltic were founded and

developed between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries and were some of the most prosperous of all. They remained distinct and influential whatever the form of political control in these regions. (See pp. 81-82, 98-99.) Their disappearance means not only the renunciation of" Lcbensraum " for the Third Reich, but also that of an ancient trading connection which has been part and parcel of the history of the German-speaking peoples for seven hundred years.

The long period of restlessness affecting the eastern buffer strip of Europe is very often termed the age of " racial M migrations It is hardly necessary to-day to point out the drawbacks of the term " racial," since the misuse in modern Germany of the most elementary principles of race study has provoked very thorough and widely-read discussions of the subject. The movement from east to west can only in a very limited sense be termed " racial " migration. The main tests which are accepted for racial classification are those of head form, skin colour and hair texture and colour. By these criteria the groups moving from Asia into Europe appear to have represented varying physical types. There was a predominance, for example, of mesoccphaly (medium to narrow skull), light hair and fair skin, amongst the Lett and Lithuanian-speaking immigrants, of brachycephaly (broad skull) and dark hair amongst the Serbs, of lank hair, small stature and yellow skins amongst the Lapps. But for obvious reasons the intermixture of types in this part of Europe has been extreme. The influences of trade, of war, and of constant movement have wiped out effectually any possibility of claiming " purity of race." The units recreated by the peace treaties were emphatically cultural and not racial ones, and dividing them were language frontiers, each frontier usually embracing a considerable variety of racial (physical) types.

The language groups of this region fall into two big divisions, Aryan and Altaic. The Aryan languages are the older of the two, and in this part of Europe comprise the Lett and Lithuanian tongues, and seven Slav tongues, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Ukrainian, Slovene, Croat and Serb. The (probably) younger group of Altaic languages belongs to the Lapps, Finns and Estonians in Northern Europe, and to the Magyars in Central Europe. The fact of big Jewish communities in many parts of the buffer strip does not really affect the language distribution, as the Jews ordinarily use the speech of the country in which they have settled. There

has never been, **unfortunately, a perfect correlation between linguistic and political frontiers. The historical past of this part of Europe has been too stormy for the development of compact cultural units, and the distribution of the German** minority groups is alone enough to show the problems of drawing frontiers on a linguistic basis. But it is important to remember that there is a long cultural tradition for all these peoples of which they are justly proud, and that the strength and claims of cultural development played a prominent part in the re-creation of their states after 1918.

FIG. 6.—The Division of Creeds in Medieval Europe. The dotted lines show approximately the frontiers between the different denominations and their spheres of activity. The main religious centres are marked. Note the relationship of the boundary between the Roman and Byzantine creeds to the MarchJand strip. The areas left blank are those where the process of conversion to Christianity was long delayed. This map might be compared with Fig. 4 to show the relationship between the linguistic groups of the Marchiandi and the religious frontiers.

During the period of European development which is known as the Middle Ages, cultural and linguistic divisions were, it is true, present and vigorous, but there was nothing like the same political importance attached to them as in later history. The world was divided into other categories. One of these, and probably the most important, was the horizontal arrangement in classes, and especially those which depended on the possession or tenure of land. An individual knew himself in his own locality as a small or great land-owner, a serf or a free man. Another was the much wider classification of creed. The known world was divided under the headings of Christian, Heathen or Jew, with Latin as the common language of Christian scholars, and a man could **label** himself readily according to his creed as according to his nationality. (See Fig. 6.)

The various groups east of Germany were gradually absorbed into Christian Europe, though into the remoter regions, and especially into the swamps and forests of the East Baltic, missionary effort penetrated only very slowly. There was, moreover, a complication with the advance of Christianity, and with it of culture. Enlightenment came from two sources, Rome and Constantinople, and in two very different forms of religious and cultural activity. The boundary between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy runs through the mapchland strip from north to south, separating the Lithuanians and Poles from the Russians, the Magyars from the Rumanians, and the western Yugoslav groups, the Croats and Slovenes, from the Serbs of the east. Between the two divisions to-day exists the " No-Man's-Land " denomination of the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church, having communion with the Roman Church but using an Eastern Orthodox Liturgy.

This frontier of creed between east and west meant, and still means, very much more than differences of doctrine and religious practice. The groups on the western side of the line imbibed from Rome not only Christianity, but an orientation towards Western Europe, and the experience of an organization of great administrative ability. On the other hand, the competence which made the Church of Rome the pattern of medieval statesmanship was less apparent in the Eastern Church. In spite of the brilliant traditions of the Byzantine Empire, the legacy of its Church in Europe was poorer than that of Rome in political and administrative example, perhaps on account of the inevitable connection between Byzantium and the Orient. The contrast in the two ecclesiastical influences was bound to be marked in a part of the continent where the population was, indeed still is, mainly composed of peasants, with a natural and traditional reverence for church organization and religious practice. The religious frontier is most obvious to-day where it runs through a single political unit like Yugoslavia, accounting largely for the difference in outlook and policy between Croats and Serbs.[4]

But in spite of this division, and before the development of the third complication of the Protestant creeds, many of the buffer states of the cast experienced in the Middle Ages their greatest political and economic stability. They were Christian states accepted as useful members of the civilized world, and had the strength to achieve both territorial expansion and internal progress. In the fourteenth century,

for example, the joint territories of Poland and Lithuania stretched almost across the Isthmus of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In Bohemia and Hungary, the capitals housed two famous universities, and were known to the best scholars and craftsmen of Europe. In the Balkan Peninsula, the fourteenth-century ruler, Stephen Dušan, was able to establish his Serb Empire, from north to south, controlling the whole of the Morava-Vardar Depression,[6] and from west to east linking the Adriatic coast with the mountainous hinterland. The border groups of the east held a position in medieval Europe never known before or since.

The medieval period of comparative prosperity has various explanations. A good deal of the strength of the buffer states at this period is accounted for by the comparative weakness of the groups to east and west of them. In the east the Russians were still a passive rather than an aggressive people, although the raids of the steppe-dwellers, and especially of the Tartars and Turks, were a recurrent threat to the Serbs and Hungarians and Poles.[7] In the west also, the German-speaking peoples, in spite of their colonizing propensities, were a collection of small groups within the Empire, and not an aggressive whole.

In the second place, the cities of the borderland region were at intervals important to the commerce of Europe.[§] (See Fig. 7.) The Polish cities of Lwow (Lemberg) and Grakow were on the main highway between the Black Sea amd the Baltic : Grakow itself was the south-eastern outpost of the famous group of Hanse cities. Belgrade, Budapest **and** Prague connected the German trading towns with the cities of the Byzantine Empire in Europe and Asia. If this commercial prosperity had had any continuity, many of the **later** problems of the eastern buffer states would never have troubled Europe.

The fate of these marchland peoples, however, was hard. In the sixteenth century the trading activity of the Old World was shifting gradually from the Mediterranean and the Near East to the west and north-west of the continent. This trend was not so much due, as was thought for centuries, to the destructive character of the Turkish conquests as **to** the positive attractions of overseas trade. The Turks were **not** intolerant of foreign trading communities, but the commercial interests of Europe began to develop beyond **the** **Old** World, and the ancient trading connections were **surpassed** rather than destroyed. Thus Lwow and **Budapest**

and Belgrade, and other cities of the marchland region, instead of acting as commercial intermediaries between Europe and Asia, found themselves well out of the main currents of economic activity.

This stagnation partly accounts for the unhealthy political development in these countries, which forms such a contrast to that of western Europe. Noticeable in Poland, Bohemia



FIG. 7.—Map of the Main Road and Shipping Routes in Medieval Europe. Note the intermediary position of the marchland towns *(a)* between the Baltic and the Black Sea, and *(b)* between the German trading towns and those of the Byzantine Empire.

and Hungary particularly, was the gulf in position and outlook between the landed nobility and landless peasantry which was not filled by a strong native middle-class of traders and craftsmen. Instead there were the German trading colonies, and growing communities of fugitive Jews. Commercial decline thus effectively hampered the growth of the most important border groups into political units of the

West European type. Added to this disadvantage there was the constant burden of the campaigns against the Ottoman armies.

Two of the marchlana peoples, the South Slavs and the Hungarians, succumbed to the Turkish conquests which devastated South-eastern Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Together with the Greeks, Rumanians and Bulgars, they had to endure the material destruction of the Moslem armies, and the scattering of settled populations before the invaders. (See Fig. 8.) The Mag-

FIG. 8.—The Maximum Extension of the Ottoman Empire. The thick black line shows the farthest limit of Turkish control (at the end of the seventeenth century). The thinner lines show the main territorial units in which South-eastern Europe was liberated from Turkish rule.

yars for a comparatively short period (a hundred and fifty years), and the South Slavs for much longer, endured all the evils of Turkish Imperial administration. Oppression, inefficiency and corruption were its characteristics, and the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire developed all the bad qualities of a crushed population. To the centuries of Turkish rule can be ascribed a good many of the familiar evils of Danubian and of Balkan politics in later history.

At the same time it is only fair to point out that Turkish rule did not compare so badly with a good deal of contemporary administration in Europe. If the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire were regarded as inferior beings, there were also appalling religious wars between

European Christians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If the Balkan and Danubian peoples were backward and poverty-stricken after four centuries of Moslem rule, so were many of those in the great empires of the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs. If the Sultans left an awkward inheritance to Europe in the psychology of the conquered peoples, so did the rulers of Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia. The difference between the Christian and Moslem Empires was partly one of degrees of oppression.

Except for the South Slavs and the Hungarians, the marchland units fell to European conquerors. Bohemia crumbled easily in the seventeenth century before the growing power of the Vienna Hapsburgs. Poland followed next in the eighteenth century, and became a prey to the acquisitive policies of Prussia, Russia and Austria. The smaller Baltic groups had much earlier become the victims of German, Swedish and Russian struggles.

In the eighteenth century also when the decay of the Turkish Empire became evident, and its western frontier was pushed steadily back out of the Middle Danube Basin, it was not those who had suffered directly or indirectly from the Turkish advance who benefited by the Turkish retreat. Hungary in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the South Slav regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the nineteenth,[9] were all absorbed into the cosmopolitan structure of the Hapsburg Empire, which reaped the greatest immediate advantage from the Turkish decline. (See FIG. 90

Territorial acquisition or land-grabbing was indeed a main plank in the policy of the rulers in Berlin, Vienna and Moscow during the three centuries of imperial development which preceded the 1914-1918 War. It is a policy which, as we know only too well, is still practised in Europe with skill and determination; and bitter experience has not yet driven home the lesson that lands and resources acquired by force are very often fatally indigestible. The practices of which Frederick the Great and the German Tzarina, Catherine, were the most famous exponents die very hard.

The profits of aggression became more evident with the economic development of the nineteenth century, as the resources of the border peoples were considerable. (See Fig. 10.) The main mineral wealth lay in the coalfields of Silesia, the varied resources of Bohemia and Bosnia, and the oil of Poland. To feed the growing urban populations there were the cornfields of Hungary and Ukraine, and

the numerous farming products of the Vistula and Bohemian basins. Agriculture could again supplement industry with the big crops of beet, hops and potatoes from Poland, Bohemia and Hungary, and with tobacco from the South

FIG. 9.—The Continental Empires of Central and Eastern Europe before the 1914-18 War. Note the lack of correlation between the political units and the linguistic groups, especially in the Hapsburg Empire.

Slav lands. Finally, in Finland and East Poland, and in the Carpathian and Balkan mountains, there were great stretches of forest land, valuable both for fuel and raw material.

In addition to the natural resources, there was in this part

of Europe a huge fund of labour upon which the nineteenth-century entrepreneurs could draw with profit. The peasants of the border groups varied considerably in efficiency for industrial purposes or for advanced farming, but almost all were endowed with great patience and industry, and everywhere a very low wage rate was accepted.

FIG. 10.—Economic Resources of the Marchland Countries. This map should be compared with Fig. 4 to show the relationship between the resources and the linguistic groups.

Such a setting was a tempting field of activity for capital and enterprise, whether Russian, Prussian or Austrian. There is no point in denying either the solid material progress in the nineteenth century of the regions in Poland which were attached to the Prussian Empire, or the economic wealth and balance of the Hapsburg Empire of the Middle Danube Basin, or the rapid growth and prosperity of the East Baltic ports, Riga and Reval, as the terminal points in the west of the big Russian trade routes. During that period of quick economic growth in Europe, the marchland groups as parts of great political units were exploited, especially in the German Empire, to a remarkable degree of efficiency.

But this exploitation cost far more eventually than its promoters had reckoned. In the first place it produced curious divisions in the population which were bound to lead in the end to political disturbance. For example, in Polish

Silesia capital and management were German and frequently Lutheran, while labour was Polish and usually Roman Catholic. South-east Baltic land-owners were German and Lutheran, the bureaucracy Russian and Eastern Orthodox, and the peasantry and artisans Estonian, Lett or Lithuanian in language, and either Lutheran or Catholic in creed. In Hungary land-owners might be German or Magyar, commercial and industrial entrepreneurs German or Jewish, and the peasants and artisans Magyar, Slovak, Ruthene, Rumanian or Croat. In many cases, difference in language was reinforced by difference in occupation, difference in class privilege and very often by difference in creed. All the elements in the life of a group which should make for union, in the greater part of this region made for bitter distinctions and separatism. It was plain, too, that though the total of productivity achieved by imperial organization might be remarkable, the bulk of the population had no great share in the profits. The standard of living amongst the subject peoples, whether urban or rural, was very often deplorable in proportion to the natural wealth of their environment.[10]

Further, it became the practice in all three Empires to attempt to reinforce political and economic control by systematic and in many cases brutal cultural domination. The forces of " Prussianization," " Russianization" and finally of " Magyarization" made colossal efforts to root out and destroy the cultural traditions of the subject peoples. The effects of this form of oppression were directly the opposite to those intended. In the first place, rebellious national movements began in almost every case with attempts to revive these martyred cultures, and throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the cause of cultural freedom was the inspiration of persistent struggles for independence.[11] In the second place the economic co-operation and material productivity which undoubtedly developed in the great land-empires were no compensation for cultural oppression. Economic interdependence merely got an unpleasant reputation in this part of Europe, whatever its concrete advantages, because it was always associated with loathed foreign rule. It was because the peoples of this patchwork region were more resentful of cultural oppression than they were impressed by economic advance, that the cosmopolitan empires of Central and Eastern Europe broke irreparably under the strain of war between 1914 and 1918.

With the political freedom achieved by the peace treaties for the former subject peoples, the emphasis on the cultural element in national life became even more marked. The most prized fruit of independence was the liberty to speak freely and use officially what had been for generations the despised languages of the conquered, and to play music, sing folk-songs or act drama which had long been condemned as seditious.

Such a reaction needs no explanation, and it was in many ways defensible. But the price paid for it was high, and it implied a general political outlook amongst the marchland peoples which was dangerous. Excessive pride in national culture formed part of a programme of general self-sufficiency amongst the resurrected states. This tendency to autarchy can also be explained as the aftermath of a policy which had often been practised in St. Petersburg, Vienna and ultimately in Budapest—that of playing off one subject people against another. The temptation to divide and rule must have been strong indeed for governments in the last difficult days of the Russian and Hapsburg Empires, but the frequent yielding to it had bad results both for the Imperial regimes and their successors.

An excess of separatism amongst the new states had disastrous though logical material consequences. Even when the damage caused by the break-up of the old economic structures, and especially that of the Hapsburg Empire, was understood, there was no active desire on the part of the component populations to revive co-operation even in a commercial form. So the total productivity of the marchland region declined in many ways with the establishment of the small units, and political solidarity never matured.

On the other hand, it is only fair to point out that self-sufficiency was by no means the monopoly of these states. In the years after the 1914-1918 War it became a platitude not only in Europe, but all over the world, that nations were willing to tighten their belts for ideals which had little connection with tangible wealth. Also it was argued in the marchland states, when the new economies began to develop, that if less were produced, what there was in the way of commodities and profits was enjoyed mainly by each unit, and more equally distributed amongst the classes of that unit. There was no longer production for the benefit of foreign land-owners or foreign industrial entrepreneurs.[11]

A more dangerous aspect of the emphasis on culture lay

in the inevitable number of minority groups. There are, as has been pointed out, traditional " islands " of population right through this marchland region, and in spite of the attempt after the 1914-1918 War to draw frontiers according to linguistic divisions, some millions of people in this part of Europe still had to remain detached from their language majorities. The treatment of subject peoples by the Magyars during the last part of the nineteenth century might have been some warning of the fate in store for many of the minorities after 1918. It had then been made clear that a linguistic group with the good fortune to achieve a fair measure of autonomy and control, could be as ungenerous in its turn as its original oppressor.

The lot of the minorities amongst the marchland states was particularly hard when these " islands " were composed of the former ruling nationalities, German, Russian, Austrian and Magyar. As Jászi, the Magyar historian, pointed out sadly ten years after the establishment of the new states, " some of the victorious nations did not learn from the tragic fate of the Hapsburg Empire, and many of the old proceedings are continued both in the educational field and in public administration.[12]

Besides the excess of cultural nationalism there was another powerful influence to account for changed economies in this strip of marchland states. All these countries were in their fresh start closely connected with the violent and extensive Agrarian Revolution which brought about vast changes in land-ownership throughout Europe in a single generation.[14] "Land-hunger" amongst the peasant class had been a social and economic problem in Central and Eastern Europe for centuries before 1914, felt most acutely where the peasantry were of one nationality and the landowners of another. Throughout the last part of the nineteenth century the struggle of the peasants to purchase their own plots also formed an important part of many nationalist movements, and in some districts, notably in the Estonian provinces of the Russian Empire, it had considerable success. The break-up of the cosmopolitan Empires during the 1914-1918 War hurried on the process of redistribution, especially in states where newly-achieved political independence meant the disappearance of a foreign land-owning aristocracy. With the exception of two countries, Poland and Hungary, there was a rapid substitution of a large peasant-proprietor class for a small number of estate-owners.

The actual methods of redistributing the land varied enormously in this part of Europe, ranging from the outright confiscation of big estates to the payment of substantial compensation. It would not do to deny, though, that in the majority of cases the former owners were left with a legitimate grievance about the extent and procedure of redistribution; and the ill-feeling resulting from the changes was formidable and persistent. Some former estate-owners migrated from the new political units altogether: others remained as a small and resentful minority, bitterly critical of the new regimes.

The early struggles to establish the system of peasant proprietorship were, of course, easy to criticize. Even with the most progressive of peasant farmers so violent a change in land-ownership in the chaotic conditions of the years after 1918 was bound to bring about a drop in productivity, and many of the peasants, especially in the south of the marchland region, were not yet very intelligent cultivators.

In some groups, notably in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Czechoslovakia, the good sense and education of the small proprietors sought successfully to replace and surpass the benefits of large-estate agriculture through the Co-operative Societies. In others, however, there was a hard struggle to regain even pre-1914 standards in the quantity and quality of production.

In progressive and backward groups alike, in spite of local variations, there were two interesting features which call for comment. In the first place intensive dairy-farming almost everywhere proved more profitable for the small owner than extensive arable farming, whether for the home or for the export market. Livestock, pastureland and forage crops rather than grain production thus had encouragement and increase. On the other hand, the redrawing of frontiers to make smaller units, and the desire for a well-balanced and self-sufficient economy within each, counteracted with some success, especially after the years of the economic crisis, the tendency to abandon arable farming.

The second feature was the ominous dependence of all these groups on foreign capital, largely from Western Europe and America, for the building and maintaining of the new economies. This became apparent with the development of the depression in 1930. The peasant-proprietor system was barely established in the marchland states when the crises between 1930 and 1934 threatened to

crush all forms of farming activity. The export possibilities for agrarian products shrank fast, and the support of foreign capital was withdrawn.

The effect in the new peasant states was most interesting if very saddening. The standard of living everywhere in the marchland strip dropped severely, as many peasants had been settled only a few years in their holdings and there were for most of them no other means of gaining a livelihood. On the other hand, the direct connection of the greater part of the population with the land stood the new governments in good stead. There was at any rate a modicum of food to be had for each family from its farm, and this palliative was important for states which could not afford public assistance to those in poverty. The wide extent of peasant-proprietorship was a great guarantee of political stability in times of appalling difficulty.

One further aspect of the marchland groups needs comment in a general introduction. Between Lithuania in the Baltic region, and the plains of Macedonia in the Balkans, have developed since the Middle Ages some of the biggest Jewish communities in the world.[16] The whole problem of Jewish settlement and activity in this continent cannot be rightly understood without acquaintance with the great ghettos of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav towns, and the Jewish village settlements of Lithuania, Podolia and Ukraine. The rôle of the majority of Jews here, both in town and village, has not been so much that of the financier or leader of the professions, but rather that of the small trader, wishing above all for peace and security in which to carry on his business and practise his religion. (See pages 144, 150, 164-166.)

It is true that Jewish activities in this part of Europe have not always had a good reputation. The peasant in many cases has been the victim of an unrelenting and disgusting usury. It is also possible to understand in some of the marchland states the dread of Jewish pre-eminence in schools and universities. But even allowing for these problems, the growth of anti-Semitism in the marchland region, especially in Poland, was one of the more unpleasant features both of the empires before 1914 and also of the newer generation of independent states. In the last few years before the present war the infection seemed to spread eastward from Germany into the region which still houses most of the Jews in the world. For all the border peoples, east of Germany and west of Russia, existence has ever been pre-

carious. For the Jews amongst them it has been doubly so, threatened from within as well as from without.

In Western Europe, the struggles of the peasant states were watched by the French government and people and by some British politicians and students with great interest and some anxiety. For France especially the establishment of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states and their successful development were major items in foreign policy after 1918. Western Poland signified to the French the actual loss of territory to Germany: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the break-up of Germany's ally, the Hapsburg Empire. Further, the series of alliances between France and the newly-emerged states meant an effective and, it was hoped, a permanent check on future German expansion. The French people therefore had a definite and direct interest in the independence of the southern members of this strip of countries.

British stakes in the prosperity of the new states were less apparent. Political atlases[14] mark the Baltic countries as belonging to the British " bloc " after 1918, but neither in official utterance nor in popular interest did British attention to the northern section of the marchland region keep pace with French activity in the south. In the first place British aloofness from continental affairs persisted, even after the gruelling lessons of the 1914-1918 War. In the second, in so far as British interest in the Baltic groups was expressed in the form of trade agreements, there was always the difficulty that the commodities involved, timber and dairy produce, were also important items of trade between Great Britain and the Dominions.[17]

During the period of the Peace Conference, however, and for a number of years after the 1914-1918 War, the peasant states of the eastern marchland had another and different interest for both Great Britain and France. East of the border region was Russia, and the establishment of a large Communist political unit was horrifying to the majority of people in Western Europe. British and French statesmen judged correctly that the peasant proprietor, once in possession of his plot, would be a most conservative element and a fierce defender of the rights of private property. The new strip of small states therefore had an interest for the west, not only because they stood for the downfall of the Central Powers, but because in their whole-hearted establishment, in all but two countries, of the peasant-proprietor system they were the antithesis of Soviet Russia.[18]

The interest of the Allied Powers in the marchland groups was thus for two reasons utilitarian. But the independence of these small states was in the third instance a searching test of an international conscience. There was seriously discussed at the Paris Peace Conference, apart from the profit of the Allies, the right of these groups to recover and retain their independence, and to work out their own salvation on the lines which seemed to them the best. The resurrection of these eight groups was, from the point of view of the idealist, an experiment to see if a small power could exist in its own right without being a cat's-paw in European politics.

It was hardly to be expected that the arrangements of the peace treaties would work out precisely on the lines desired by the conquerors in the 1914-1918 War. No territorial losses and no system of alliances could prevent, even for a generation, either the revival of Germany, or the German people from exercising a tremendous influence on European affairs. It was not likely either that the Russian peoples would persist for ever in their isolation, nor that the Soviet government would accept for all time, and without question, the terms of peace treaties which in some respects were as hard upon Russia as those of Versailles upon Germany.

The most significant test of the peace settlement achieved between 1918 and 1921 was, however, in the fortunes of the marchland peoples, whether the rest of the continent was aware of it or not. Their fate was the reflection of the European frame of mind, rather than of their own strength or weakness, material or moral.

In one sense it might be said to-day, that according to this test the European settlement after the 1914-1918 War was a failure. Czechoslovakia is for the time being wiped off the map of Europe. The republic of Poland is in ruins, that of Finland, after a struggle against impossible odds, has lost severely both in territory and military strength to the Soviet Union. The small Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are once more well within the grip of Russia, and the security of Hungary and Yugoslavia can be measured only from one day to another.

But in another sense the importance of these small groups to the European system is understood during the present war as never before. For it is the claim of the democracies of Europe and America that they are seeking primarily a different frame of mind in Europe, even though there are many who argue that to seek a better code of international morals

by force of arms is a contradiction in terms. It is realized that unless conditions prevail in which a state like Estonia with a population of just over a million is safe, then no country in Europe is really secure, whatever its resources and population, its arms and its strategic frontiers. The marchland groups east of Germany and west of Russia are but the most sensitive gauges by which the prosperity of the whole continent can be measured. What appeared to be the idealistic view of the Peace Conference at Paris has after twenty years of trial and error in international relations, and after some very dark tragedies, turned out to be the most important aspect of all.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

i. There is admittedly no agreement at the moment amongst geographers about the regions covered by the terms *' Northern Europe," " Central Europe " and " Eastern Europe." Dr. H. Ormsby in an article on " The Definition of Mittel-Europa," in the *Scottish Geographical Magazine* of 1935, explains some of the complications of this terminology. For the purposes of this study Northern Europe includes Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Central Europe, Poland and Danzig, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Danubian Yugoslavia; Eastern Europe, Balkan Yugoslavia.

2. See East, *An Historical Geography of Europe,* Chapter **III** (London: Methuen, 1935).

3. See Peisker, " The Asiatic Background," p. 356, Chapter **XII.** *Camb. Med. Hist.,* Vol. I (Camb. Univ. Press, 1911).

4. The term " Ukrainian" is somewhat confusing. The word " Ukrainia " means "frontier" and the term" Ukrainian " applies to about forty and a half million people, the great majority dwelling in the Soviet Union, the others in the former republic of Poland, in Rumania and in the extreme east of the former state of Czechoslovakia. In Russia the term " Little Russian " is also used to describe the Ukrainian-speaking peoples. This expression arose from the desire of the Imperial government to emphasize the idea that Ukrainian speech was only a dialectical variant of Great Russian and not a separate language. In Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian-speaking peoples are also known as Ruthenes, though " Ruthene " itself is derived from the word " Russin." It became " Ruthenus " by means of the dog-Latin translation of the Central European medieval scribes. See Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 207 ff. (Oxford : The Univ. Press ; under the auspices of the Royal Institute for International Affairs). (The Soviet Union annexed the Rumanian Ukraine in July 1940.)

5. See Beard and Radin, *The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia,* pp. 25-7 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929).

6. For a further discussion of that region see pp. 292-5.

7. The most destructive invasion of the marchland region from **the** east which took place in the Middle Ages was that of the Mongols in the mid-thirteenth century. The raids began in 1222 when Jenghis Khan,

the great Mongol leader, crossed the Caucasus, and were only checked in 1241 with the death of his son, Ogdai. The Mongol armies overran almost the whole of the Middle Danube Basin, though there was no permanent conquest. See Loewe, "The Mongols," *Comb. Med. Hist,* Vol. IV, Chapter XX. See also p. 141.

8. Probably the most prosperous period of commerce for the marchland towns was at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries, when the comparatively stable Tartar Empire of the steppelands gave some security to the overland routes. The best trading period succeeded a destructive raiding generation.

9. Bosnia and Herzegovina were declared under the "Protection" of Austria-Hungary in 1878, but were not annexed as part of the Hapsburg Empire until 1908.

10. See *World Agriculture,* p. 145 (Oxford : The Univ. Press).

11. The chief nationalist rebellions of the nineteenth century in which cultural movements were notable were the following: that of the Poles against Russia, 1830-31; that of the Magyars against the Hapsburgs in 1848, the "Year of Revolutions" (the Magyar rising coincided with a revolt in Austrian Poland); that of 1863 again of the Poles against Russia; and finally that of 1905 in the Russian Empire in which the Poles were joined by the subject peoples of the East Baltic.

12. See Pasvolsky, *The Economic Nationalism of the Danube States,* p. 73 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928); and Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World,* p. 15 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936).

13. See Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy,* pp. 455-6 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929).

14. See Ogg and Sharp, *The Economic Development of Modern Europe,* pp. 646-52 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926).

15. See Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World,* Chapter II (London: Macmillan, 1934).

16. See Rad6 and Rajchmann, *The Atlas of To-day and To-morrow,* p. 13, Maps 6 and 8 (London: Gollancz, 1938).

17. The difficulty of adjusting trade relations between the Baltic countries and the Dominions for the British market was evident at the Ottawa Conference. See the *Survey of International Affairs,* 1932, p. 30 (Oxford Univ. Press), for the list of countries most affected by the Ottawa agreements. See also the section on the Baltic Region for a further discussion of the foreign trade of the Baltic.

18. See *World Agriculture,* p. 151, for the political significance of peasant agriculture.

ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

(These lists contain the names of books and articles which are in many cases indispensable sources of reference for the topics discussed in the chapters, but to which no direct allusion has been made in the text or notes.)

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PART I

THE BALTIC GROUP

REGIONAL INTRODUCTION

THE four northernmost of the marchland countries—Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—are usually known as the East Baltic states. But for the purposes of political geography, though, the term " Baltic " is almost as difficult to define as " Central European."[1] (See Fig. n.)

There is an " inner ring " of Baltic units, composed of the above-mentioned countries with the addition of Sweden, but there is also an " outer ring " of states, whose location and interests are partly Baltic and partly those of other regions. To the outer ring belong Norway, really a North Sea state, but with her south-eastern coast-land commanding the Skager Rack entrance to the Baltic; Denmark, again with a North Sea commercial orientation, but with her capital and her best agricultural lands on the Baltic east coast and islands of her territories; Germany and the Polish lands, with one foot on the Baltic coast and the other in Central Europe; and Russia, with her industrial activity shifting eastward, but possessing a " window " in the Baltic, and evidently eager for renewed influence in this region.

It is plain from this list that the states on the fringe of the Baltic region are, with the exception of Sweden, generally more powerful in territory and resources than the completely Baltic lands. It is not surprising therefore to find that political development in this part of Europe has been centrifugal rather than encouraging a Baltic group.

The most vigorous attempt to establish a Baltic bloc was made by the Swedes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Fig. 12), a piece of history which it is interesting to recall in view of the somewhat cautious rôle of Sweden in the recent crisis in Northern Europe. But the extent of Swedish control during the earlier successful period is easily misunderstood. It signified the weakness of Germany, and the attention of Russia to the grassland region of the south and east, rather than the strength of Sweden. With the rise of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the status of a great European power, Finland, Estonia **and**

Latvia were all detached from Swedish control and absorbed into the territories of the Tzars.

Also, the tendency to political dispersion has been throughout strengthened by the sameness of the resources



FIG. II.—The Baltic States.

of the inner ring of Baltic states. There is considerable wealth in this region, but not enough variety to encourage local economic interdependence and a self-sufficient federation of Baltic peoples. The products of the different groups are competitive rather than complementary. This is an econ-

omic problem which must persist whatever the form of political control in the Baltic. The timber merchants of Sweden and Finland must find buyers out of the Baltic region, and the farmers of Estonia and Latvia must sell their butter to British or German or Russian industrial populations. The southern Baltic ports must look far afield



FIG. 12.—Swedish Hegemony in the Baltic. The stippled area shows the parts of the Baltic controlled by the Swedes in 1660, the year in which Swedish power in Northern Europe reached its height. The Swedish and German forms of the Baltic place-names have been used. Scale approx. 1 : 20,000,000.

for a trade hinterland beyond the meagre resources of the North European Plain. There seems little possibility of basing a political Baltic Federation on local commercial exchange.[2]

With the isolation of Russia from European affairs after 1921, Great Britain and Germany became the chief trading competitors in the East Baltic. Both were anxious to find

markets for their manufactured goods and to buy foodstuffs and raw materials in this part of Europe, and the export and import statistics of the small states show the ups and downs of their rivalry.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of it was the German success in establishing vigorous trading links in the "twenties." Economic relationships usually have some association with political sympathies, and at the close of the War the Germans were, with some reason, suspected by the East Baltic peoples only a little less than the Russians.

In all the East Baltic states the struggles for independence had followed a somewhat similar course, except that in the two southern republics, Latvia and Lithuania, the situation had been complicated by their being the scene of the Eastern Front warfare. When the Imperial regime in Russia collapsed in 1917, the results in the East Baltic region were two. In the first place there was a vigorous German advance eastward and the achievement by Germany of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia, which, if fully implemented, would have meant a great extension of German power in Northern and Eastern Europe. In the second place there was the bid for independence by the East Baltic peoples, the Finns, Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians, even though the Baltic troops had fought stoutly in the Russian Imperial armies. Within the East Baltic groups there was also an extremist element which sought inclusion for these peoples in the Soviet Union, and the revolutionary factions were naturally helped from Russia. In the winter of 1917-1918, therefore, civil war raged through the East Baltic, with the more moderate majorities helped by the Germans, and the Communist minorities by the Russians.

To a certain extent the East Baltic peoples owed their independence to Germany, as during this crucial period it was German military help which ensured their separate existence from Russia. But on the other hand, the terms of German assistance were harsh. In co-operation, especially with the Bait land-owners south of the Gulf of Finland, the German military leaders sought to establish their grip on the East Baltic by producing as new rulers members of the inexhaustible German royal families. Thus the Prince of Hesse was allocated to the Finns, the Duke of Urach to the Lithuanians and the Emperor himself was designated the overlord of Esths and Letts.

The collapse of the German armies at the end of 1918 ended this phase of German **influence, but on the with-**

drawal of the German troops a fresh Russian invasion began in the winter of 1918-1919, causing widespread devastations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It was checked partly by local troops and partly by a combination between the counter-revolutionary Russian forces (the White Army) and the German leader, Von der Goltz, who hoped out of the confusion to re-establish German influence. The final clearance, however, was made with the help of the Allies between 1919 and 1920, when the East Baltic was at last freed of both Russian and German troops. But the final recognition of the independence of the Baltic peoples was delayed by the Allies for another year. They had to be convinced that the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia were failing before they would consent to the partition of the western territories of the old Empire. Estonia was formally recognized as an independent state by Russia in February 1920; acknowledgment followed to Lithuania in July, to Latvia in August and to Finland in October.

Though no great power had a blameless record in the East Baltic, the small groups there must have had a particularly acute memory of the German, as well as the Russian rôle between 1917 and 1920. The subsequent economic success of German trading policy is therefore very interesting. The Germans were soon established as chief importers to the Baltic states, though Great Britain was the best purchaser of East Baltic products.

The German achievement was mainly accounted for by a long commercial tradition in the Baltic, and partly by a much greater awareness of the needs and purchasing power of the peasant-farmer than had developed in Great Britain. It was only after recovery from the economic crisis of 1930-34 that the situation changed and that Great Britain began to gain as an importer at Germany's expense. This change had various explanations. One was the growth of a positive trading policy in Great Britain towards the Baltic countries in spite of the Ottawa Agreement; this was expressed in the commercial treaties signed between 1933 and 1935.[2] A second reason was the growing rigidity of German commercial policy in the attempt to trade mainly by barter, and a third was the increasing apprehension in the East Baltic states of the resurrection within Germany. British economic influence therefore strengthened steadily between 1935 and 1939.

What also became apparent in the feverish economic and political activity of 1939 was that the third possibility

of a Russian revival in the Baltic could no longer be ignored. In spite of the intense anxiety of these small groups to preserve a strict neutrality in any European struggle, it became more and more evident that they would have to reckon once more with the Soviet Union, perhaps the most formidable of all the powers with a stake in the Baltic region.

In any case, the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany must have made an upheaval in the economy of the Baltic states and have necessitated a readjustment of their relationships with Russia. The whole trend of their increasing trade with Great Britain implied complete freedom of transit in the Baltic and North Seas, and this was almost wiped out in the autumn of 1939 by the activity of naval warfare. It is a hard but unescapable problem for these countries, that the western markets in which their exports are most welcome are also those which are most certain to be cut off by any disturbance in Northern Europe.

The Baltic peoples were left with two alternatives: either to cultivate the nearer German market in spite of the unwelcome political relations and the rigid conditions of trade; or to turn to the hereditary foe—Russia. They were, in fact, left with little choice of policy by the very positive steps taken by the Soviet Union. The particular effects of Russian expansion are, however, best discussed in other chapters. (See pages 50, 90-92, 106-107, 129-130, 342-343.)

It is noticeable throughout Baltic history, including the most recent events, that the Gulf of Finland forms a distinct frontier in this region. In the first place, the geographical barriers to movement and settlement are stronger north of the Gulf than to the south of it. In the second place, the Gulf also forms the southern limit to strong Swedish traditions in the East Baltic, even though Sweden has also plainly left some traces in Estonia.[4] There was nothing in motive and method to distinguish the Swedish conquerors between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries from others. They were fierce in battle and eager for gain, and the restless movements of their armies through the Baltic region were responsible for as much destruction and misery as those of any other persistent campaigners. But the Swedes seem also to have had an instinct for constructive rule.

The strength of Scandinavian influence in Finland separated her from the groups farther south, and gave to her farmers and foresters high standards in economic and cultural development, which contrasted strongly with those

of Russia in the east and those where Russian influence had been most apparent beyond the Gulf. Finland stands out therefore, in spite of her recent misfortunes, as the most advanced of the East Baltic states and also the one with the greatest power of resistance.

South of the Gulf, for a variety of reasons, the characteristics both of the lands and of the peoples are less clear-cut. The outermost zone of Swedish conquest which reached as far south as the Daugava river was affected both by German influence from the south and by Russian encroachment from the east. Therefore the plains of the south-east Baltic were the meeting-place and battlegrounds of three strong powers, and a history of continuous warfare and of varieties of foreign rule makes a confused and complicated background to the study of the smaller groups.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON THE BALTIC GROUP

i. See Bowman, *The New World,* pp. 248-50 (London: Harrap, 1928).

2. See *The Baltic States,* pp. 125-7 and 164-6 (The Royal Inst, of Int. Affairs; Oxford: The Univ. Press, 1938. (See H. A. 47, notes 4 and 10.) This difficulty has been apparent in the rather meagre results of efforts to form a Baltic Union since 1920. The main achievement in this direction was the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian treaty of 1934, but in its negotiation the competitive nature of economic production in the three countries was obvious and troublesome.

3. The following trade agreements have been concluded in recent years between Great Britain and the Baltic States: (1) Commercial Agreement with Finland in 1933, (2) Commercial Agreement with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1934 (ran for three years and was renewed). It is noticeable that whereas immediately after 1921 Great Britain was the chief buyer from the three southern Baltic states, and Germany the chief seller to them, after 1936 in every case imports from Great Britain increased substantially and those from Germany declined.

4. The constructive character of Swedish rule in the East Baltic is admitted in Estonia, but Swedish influence has been for the last generation a sore subject in Finland. See *The Estonian Year-Book,* 1927, p. 24 (Tallinn: Government Printing Office). For a further discussion of Swedish-Finnish relations see the chapter on " Finland," pp. 62-4.

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CHAPTER I

FINLAND

IN extent Finland ranks as the sixth country in Europe, with an area of roughly 134,000 square miles.[1] It occupies the whole of the north-eastern Baltic region, with a peculiar and definite outline on the map. (See Fig. 13.) To travellers coming from England, Finland hardly seems a part of Europe, or indeed of the Old World. It is like a miniature edition of the forest belt of Canada with its thousands of lakes, and its vast, sparsely populated stretches of thick woodland, still attracting pioneer settlement. But it differs from the New World because of the Finnish occupation of this territory for some eighteen hundred years, and also because of a cultural tradition which, if it owes much to Sweden, has also its own distinction, and can rival many in Europe in quality and maturity.

Within Finland's frontiers there are some regional contrasts which cannot but interest any new-comer to the country.[2] (See Fig. 13.) The most striking one is that between the narrow coastal plains of the west and south, which have been partially cleared of forest, and the thickly wooded plateau of the interior. Inland there is the further distinction between the lake region of the southern part of the plateau and the drier central region, though both are densely forested. To the north and east again the land rises gradually to low hills, and the northern forests give way to scantier birch woods and to wastes of marsh and tundra vegetation. In the extreme north-west Finnish territory includes some mountainous country; this is a small piece of the backbone of highland which runs from north-east to south-west through the Scandinavian Peninsula.

The least-known part of the country up to the period of the Russian invasion of 1939 has been the high plateau and hill region of northern Karelia along the eastern frontier between Finland and Russia. Between the northern shores of Lake Ladoga and the Arctic coast there is not to-day,



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FIG. 13.—The Natural Frontiers within Finland. The thick black line marks the political frontiers of Finland between 1920 and 1940. The thin continuous lines mark the natural frontiers formed by relief divisions, *(a)* between the coastal plains and inland plateaux and *(b)* demarcating the mountainous country in the north-east. The broken lines show the distinction between the southern lake region in the plateaux and the main forest region, and between the thicker forests of the centre and the sparser ones of the north. (See note 2 at the end of the chapter.) Scale approx. 1 : 8,500,000.

and never has been, any well-established line of communication running east and west, whether of rail or navigated waterway.[8] In this huge, sparsely populated strip of forest and marsh, Finland has the nearest approach to what might be called a "natural frontier zone" separating her from Russia, across which there has been very little movement. A geographical barrier of this kind is just as formidable between two groups as a mountain range—perhaps more so. But just as with highland country, where human movement is not checked but merely diverted to the easier passes, so in the North-eastern Baltic there has been both intercourse and strife between east and west, but confined mainly to the accessible and very important land-route of the Karelian Isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Therefore though the Finnish plateau remained throughout history more or less undisturbed, the more hospitable coastal plains felt the full force of the struggle between Swedish expansion to the east and Russian expansion to the west.

The protective character of this frontier zone was made plain at the outset of the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939. The Russian attack by land concentrated on two regions—the first was in the south-east, both on the Karelian Isthmus to the south of Lake Ladoga, which is the traditional route of invasion, and also to the north of the lake; the second was the Suomussalmi district where the east to west extent of Finland is least, and where a successful advance which achieved the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia would have had the double effect of cutting the country into two and checking help from the west.[4] In each region, but especially in the north, the possibility for a small army fighting on the defensive of holding up a larger number of invading troops has been evident. The terrain is against the easy mobility of vast numbers of troops, and throughout history neither Russian nor Swede nor Finn has encouraged artificial measures to lessen the natural difficulties of movement. Significantly also, the final costly Russian success came in the Isthmian region, the time-honoured point of entry into Finland for Russian invading armies.

There is then more difference between the coastal plain and inland plateau of Finland than that of landscape type. In the plains, which are alike more fertile and more accessible, events have taken place which comprise most of the recorded history of Finland. But until the mid-nineteenth century the prominent parts in this history were played by groups

other than the Finns. In contrast the Finnish occupation of the plateau was less eventful, a long **and** silent exploitation of a good region of refuge.

Swedish settlement in the plains dates from very early times (some scholars think before the arrival of the Finns at all),[6] though the vigorous Swedish " crusades " in Finland did not begin until the twelfth century, when the Finns were driven back almost completely into the lake region and the high lands. (See Fig. 5a.) The importance of this Scandinavian conquest and settlement in the history of the north-east Baltic is immense. The legacy of Sweden to Finland is traceable in various forms. In *physical type,* the tall, fair, narrow-headed Nordics predominate on the plains, contrasting with the short, broad-headed Finns of the interior, even though there has been a considerable amount of intermarriage between the two.[6] In *language,* about half a million people are reckoned to-day as Swedish, with the concentrations of Swedish speech north and south of Vaasa' (Vasa) on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia and between Turku (Abo) and Kotka on the shores of the Gulf of Finland.[8] On the coastlands again, almost all *place-names* have a double form, one Swedish and one Finnish. Finally, in *architecture Swedish,* influence is apparent in many ways, but especially in the line of forts, built not so much to subdue the indigenous inhabitants as to check Russian movement westward. (The forts, for strategic purposes, ran north in East Finland out of the plain and into the lake region, from Viipuri[9] (Viborg) to Savonlinna (Nyslott or Olaf's Castle).) The history of the plains is therefore that of accessibility; of Swedish invasion and settlement from the west followed by Russian encroachment from the east.

On the other hand, the lake and forest region of the centre served as an effective shelter for the Finns. Historical atlases show the *whole* of Finland as Swedish territory between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, and again the cession of the *whole* country to Russia in 1809. But in actual fact, the material and cultural influences of Sweden were limited, as we have seen, to the plains, and those of Russia between 1809 and 1918 were superficial in the extreme. Neither conquering people penetrated to any degree the truly Finnish regions of the central plateau.

Here the Finns have held their settlements for nearly two thousand years, very remote from the main currents of European development, but because of this remoteness able to preserve their cultural characteristics from the

strong and prosperous invaders of the plains. Though the recorded history of the plateau is insignificant, compared with that of the coastlands, there developed here the two groups, the Tavast Finns of the centre and the Karelian Finns of the east, who together form the majority of the inhabitants of Finland.[10] In economy, too, the Finns remained distinct from the conquering minority of the south and west; they persisted notably as foresters, while the Swedes in the plains cleared a certain amount of land for farming.[11]

Farther north where the forests thin out, the change in the landscape has again for centuries coincided roughly with an ethnic frontier. Here, however, the contrast is not made by the difference between plateau and plain, but by the effect of latitude and climate on vegetation type. The northern region of scattered, stunted woods and tundra has been traditionally the domain of the small but distinct population of Lapp reindeer-herders,[12] who are as different in physique, language and economy from the Finn as the Finn is from the Swede.

Within Finland, therefore, there are lesser " natural frontiers " of unusual interest. It is not often that one finds in so small an area such contrasting fortunes as have befallen the Finnish plains and the Finnish plateau in the past, nor so close an association over centuries between geographical divisions and ethnic and cultural boundaries.

In the south the " natural frontiers " have been losing their significance during the last hundred years. The annexation of Finland by Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century weakened the Swedish element in the plains, though Swedish settlement persisted. Swedish resistance to the Russian advance was, in fact, extremely half-hearted, and the only stubborn opposition came from the Finns in the form of a successful defence of the plateau. In the north the traditional connection between locality, culture and occupation has broken down more recently but rather rapidly. In both directions the tendency has been for the Finnish majority to overflow the old confines of the forest plateau, and to assert themselves most vigorously in the plains and in the far north. These trends were probable over the course of time, especially after Swedish rule in Finland ended, but they were very much encouraged also by the violent political and economic changes in Europe during the last twenty-five years.

It is necessary to remember though that however much

the political situation in Finland may alter, and however competent the economic development may be, the inhabitants, whether Finn or Swede or Lapp, must be influenced more than any other of the marchland groups by geo-



FIG. 14.—The Northern Limits of Agriculture and Forestry in the Northern Hemisphere. Note that in the Arctic regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland, the possibilities of forestry are above the average for the great land-masses of Eurasia and North America, and the possibilities of agriculture are better than in any other countries of high latitudes. Note also the freedom of the Scandinavian coast from icebergs.

graphical circumstances. There are bound to be changes in Finland, as in every other country, in the relationship of the population to the environment, but even allowing for this, there are somewhat rigid limits set to the type and extent of exploitation here, by reason of Finland's geographical position and resources.

In the first place, there is the effect of latitude. This country, lying between 60 and 70^0 N. is justly known as " the Republic Farthest North," with a third of its territory inside the Arctic Circle. It is true that the whole region known as Fenno-Scandia (Norway, Sweden and Finland) is peculiarly favoured in climate owing to the influence of the warm North Atlantic Drift, and that the average annual temperatures (see Fig. 14) in these countries are much higher than those of other lands at the same latitude. But even the influence of moderating winds from the south-west and the fact of comparatively clement conditions in the Arctic region cannot discount the effects of an extreme northerly position. One example indeed serves to show that Finland, the farthest from the open sea, is the least favoured by climate of the three Fenno-Scandian countries. While the Norwegian ports on the North Sea and Arctic coasts are open all the winter to ships, those of the more land-locked Gulf of Bothnia (though not of the small strip of the Finnish Arctic coast) are normally closed from December to April.[18] The problem of shipping is one instance of many which might be quoted to show the limits to economic activity which are set by a rigorous climate.

The region of least severe climate is the coastal plain of the south-west.[14] Here the mean annual temperatures for the three coldest months, December, January and February, are over 20^0 F. and those for June, July and August over 6o° F. The annual precipitation average is twenty-eight inches, and the snow-cover is reckoned at about a hundred days in the year. This is the part of Finland which benefits most plainly in its climatic conditions from proximity to the sea.

As one moves inland, north-east from the main ports, the climate becomes increasingly harsh. The rainfall is less, but the average duration of snow-cover is greater and the winter temperatures more extreme. The most rigorous conditions are found in Oulu (Ulea) province to the north of the Gulf of Bothnia. Here winter temperatures can drop as low as — 45^0 F., and though the rainfall average for the year is only eighteen inches, the days of snow-cover are reckoned as two hundred and ten on the lower ground and two hundred and fifty in the north-western highland.

But in the extreme north, as one approaches the Arctic coast, the influence of the North Atlantic Drift which so favours the Norwegian coast becomes apparent, and close to the Arctic Ocean the climate is more moderate than in Oulu

Province, farther south. The result is that in Finland, as in Norway and Sweden, there is no broad or continuous zone of tundra—where forest cannot survive, such as one finds farther east in Siberia. (See Fig. 14.) Patches of fir forest, although the trees are somewhat thin and stunted, reach to within a few miles of Petsamo Fiord on the Arctic, and the low cliffs overhanging the fiord are partly covered with woods of small birch trees. Small pockets of sheltered land can even produce crops of rye and potatoes north of the 69° line (the Arctic Circle is 66° 30' N.).[16] Permanent settlement here is possible if not easy, and schemes for establishing Finnish pioneer farmers and foresters are practicable in a region which traditionally belongs to the reindeer economy.

The second strong environmental influence in Finland is the predominance of the forest. Thick woodland, both coniferous and deciduous, is the natural product of climatic and soil conditions. The country is indeed almost completely within the huge forest zone which stretches right across Eurasia from ocean to ocean. In Finland small clearings have been made and maintained by human energy and skill in the coastal plains, and, as has been noted, climatic conditions make for a scantier type of vegetation in the far north. But three-quarters of the dry land[16] of Finland is still reckoned as forest, and practically the whole of Finnish economy is based on the working of forest resources.

This dependence on the forests was emphasized also for centuries by the lack of some obvious forms of natural wealth in Finland, and by ignorance of others. There is neither coal nor oil fuel in the country, and it is only recently that the resources of iron and copper ores and nickel have received their due share of attention. (See pp. 59-66.) Forestry therefore in Finland became at an early date something more than a mere adjustment to geographical conditions: it developed into an occupation of great skill and maturity, the husbanding and exploitation of the main form of natural wealth. The foresters of the plateau have therefore been for centuries in many ways the most important section of the population.[17]

It is interesting to note that more than a third of the forests in Finland are state-owned and that various forms of state control have a long tradition here. The distribution of state and private enterprise in forestry is also worth observing. The first forest-lands to be settled and exploited were, rather naturally, those along the waterways where the transport of timber was easiest.[18] This advantage of

accessibility therefore directed the first forest workings **and** the greatest number of private enterprises to the southern and western parts of the plateau, and, within these regions, to the river valleys and the lakes-edges.[19] On the other hand, crown forests, as long ago as the sixteenth-century Swedish domination of the East Baltic, were either in the bleaker, poorer land of the north, or more occasionally in the south on the watersheds between the river systems, and the same types of forest-land are state-owned to-day. In the north, besides the repulsion to early setdement of harsh climatic conditions, a long period of growth is always necessary before the profitable time of felling and sale. Large-scale forestry organized by the state has always been in these regions more practicable than private ventures. In the south the greater distance of the watershed forests from the streams left them also unexploited by the individual settler or small community. Not that the transport of timber in Finland is ever a very serious problem. So thick is the network of waterways that no forest property has more than about ten miles of haulage to a stream navigable for timber during the summer months, and the long period of snow-covering in the winter is a definite asset to such overland transport of wood as may be needed.

The annual " cut" of timber in Finland supplied before the present war three all-important needs. About a quarter fed Finnish industries for home or export markets with raw material, and the location of the towns and factories dependent on this wood was partly governed by the distributions of the varying forest species. Thus, for example, the plywood and bobbin factories, which depend on the birch forests, are in the centre and east of the plateau, and the chemical pulp and paper mills, where spruce and pine are easily accessible in the southern part of the plateau.[80]

About a tenth of the annual cut was sent out of the country every year in the form of sawn timber, which formed one important item in the Finnish export trade in wood. The other two big classes of timber export were manufactured wooden goods such as boxes and bobbins, and processed timber products such as planed soft-woods, paper, and paper-pulp. Together these made up more than 80 per cent, of Finland's total of exports.[21] This figure gives some idea of the importance of the forests to Finnish prosperity. It also shows, however, the inevitable economic weakness of the country: Finland is by force of circumstances a country of one predominant economy, because its

wealth is in the abundance of one resource rather than in variety. If by any chance the market for that particular resource is upset, then the economic distress of the country with no alternative is bound to be very severe.

Two examples of such a disturbance were experienced by the Finns in the twenty years between the two wars. The first was during the early period of Russian "dumping," when the Soviet Government's terms for selling timber undercut those of both small and large-scale producers in other countries. The second was during the years of the economic depression when the market for timber contracted so greatly. Both of these crises, however, were minor ones compared with the situation which the Finns faced on the outbreak of the European War in September 1939. No matter what had been the attitude of Russia to Finland in the subsequent months, the Finns were soon threatened with economic disaster as a result of the virtual impossibility of shipping timber freely across the Baltic and North Seas to their usual markets in North-Western Europe. Nor could they hope, like the states south of the Gulf, to find readily an alternative market in the east to compensate them for acquiescence to Russian political designs (see pages 91-92). Finnish timber, it is true, had its main trade connections with Russia up to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. But during the last twenty years the forest economies of the great Union and the small republic have become so different in methods of production and marketing as to offer hard obstacles to mutual trade agreements. The chief export commodity of the two countries, whatever the difference in size and resources between them, has become a matter for competition rather than co-operation. The armed invasion by Russia in the autumn of 1939 was thus a second blow to Finnish prosperity already damaged by the German war on neutral shipping.

In spite of the emphatic dependence of Finland on timber exports, the greater part of the Finnish harvest from the forests was, and is still likely to be, consumed in the country in the form of fuel, whether for domestic purposes, for industries or for transport. All the lake and river steamers run on wood-fuel during the months of open water-ways, and the majority of the railways do likewise throughout the year. Only the trains between the important towns in the south were before the war stoked expensively with foreign coal.

As far as the railways are concerned, this situation seems



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FIG. 15.—Road and Rail Communications in the Punkharju District in the south-east of the Lake Region. The map shows the extent to which the planners of the transport system have made use of the gravel eskers, and the necessity at times for the construction of causeways to carry roads and railways. The road route is marked by the double line and the railway by the crossed line. Scale approx. 1 : 40,000.

unlikely to change. The trains travel at a very low speed, not only on account of the wood-fuel, but because the tracks run for miles over difficult boggy country. As much use as possible in rail construction is made of the eskers, the long ridges of firm gravel which wind like great serpents amongst

the lakes and swamps" (see also Fig, 15), but many tracks must cross miles of peat-bog and marsh, and here slow travel is essential, to prevent injury by vibration to the permanent-way.

For industry and for domestic purposes in the towns, the dependence on the forests was gradually lessening in the years before the outbreak of war through the use of water-power. But at the same time many enterprises were running a supplementary plant on steam-power raised by wood-fuel, and needed an allowance of timber during the months of severe frost. It is possible also that the current difficulties in Finland may see a slackening of water-power development. Some valuable power stations in the south-east have passed into Russian hands, and all available supplies of capital may have to be diverted to other forms of restoration than that of replacing hydro-electrical systems. Further, there is the great uncertainty of the future.

Finland is potentially extremely rich in water-power. The most notable supply already in use is provided by the great rapids of the Immatra river at the south-eastern edge of the plateau, where the waters of the Saima Lake pour over into a narrow rocky channel, and where a power-station has been built to serve the Viipuri area. (See Fig. 16.) But the Immatra Falls are only one of thousands of rapids in Finland which were in the course of being harnessed by degrees for industrial purposes, especially where the river beds drop from the inland plateau to the plain.[23] If the development of Finnish water-power could have continued normally and the new fuel been made available at cheap rates, there must surely have been a tremendous and favourable change in Finnish economy, especially on the industrial side.

The influence of water-power in its more primitive form has been apparent already in Finland on the location of industry. In the early nineteenth century, a textile mill at Tampere (Tammerfors) on the south-western edge of the plateau was established by the Scot, James Finlayson, with the encouragement of the Tzar, with a view to using the falls between the Puha and Nasi Lakes to turn the machinery. And beside Finlayson's old water-mill, which still stands on the edge of the rapids, have grown up a number of other textile factories, using hydro-electrical power in the " open " months and steam-power in the winter, so that Tampere has gained the nickname of " the Manchester of Finland."

A more modern correlation between industry **and water-power in** Finland is **found** in the wood-pulp and saw-milling enterprises. For both, cheap and abundant power is a great asset, and though one influence on their location must be the type of raw material available, a second is certainly the accessibility of the new and efficient fuel.

The influence of the lake and river systems is as noticeable on transport as it is on power resources. Their effect on the distribution of state-owned and private forest properties has already been mentioned. A favourable inland water-way network is a factor which must always be important when national prosperity is based on the handling of raw material like timber, for which the selling price is low in

FIG. I 6.—The Main Lake Routes of Finland. The thick black line marks the political frontier between Finland and Russia between 1920 and 1940. In the south-west the connection between the lake system and the ports of Turku and Helsinki is completed by means of the railways. The Immatra Falls which form the greatest source of hydro-electrical power in the country are marked on the Saima system. Scale approx. 1 : 10,000,000.

proportion to its bulk. Any discussion therefore of the Finnish forests must lead inevitably to another of the Finnish water transport.

It is often said of Finland, that what is not forest is lake. Lakes, indeed, cover more than a tenth of Finnish territory and their number is reckoned at 60,000. (See Fig. 16.) The majority of these are in the south and centre of the plateau, forming a series of natural water-way routes through a large part of the country. The value of Finnish timber therefore, whether for export, home industries or fuel, is very much increased by the extent and arrangement of the lakes and rivers, although these are open on an average only eight months in the year.

Three main lake routes connect the forests of the plateau

with the coast. In the east the Saima system forms, with the help of the Saima Canal, a continuous water-way which has helped to develop the port of Viipuri on the coast, and at the northern end, Kuopio, the main town of the lake region. In the centre the long, narrow Päijänne Lake runs into the Kymi river, and makes another route to the south coast, with Kotka at the river mouth as a saw-milling and timber-exporting centre. In the west the Kokemäenjoki system helps the timber of the south-western plateau, as well as the products of the Tampere factories, to reach variously the ports of Pori (Bjorneborg), Turku and Helsinki. The one disadvantage lies in the fact that the rapids, so invaluable for developing water-power, act as obstacles to navigation. Where these have interrupted busy water routes, there has been a good deal of canal construction, notably on the Saima system in the south-east.

It may therefore be said of Finland that although prosperity must depend on the forest economy to a dangerous extent, there are normally by way of compensation some permanent and substantial encouragements to all forms of forestry and timber production—variety of tree species, abundant water-power and easy transport. It seems impossible for the Finns to escape from a one-sided economic existence, but in spite of this, it is feasible in times of peace to make the very most of the one form of raw material provided by nature.

Beside the wealth of wood and water-power, the extent and resources of farming seem very meagre. The best farming land, whether for agriculture or stock-raising, is on the coastal plains, but even here most of the cultivable soil and meadow-land has been wrested with a struggle from forest or swamp, and nowhere, even in the south and west, do farms extend very far without meeting one or the other.

The use of the land which has been cleared and drained for farming has been governed for the last generation by three influences. In the first place, as has already been emphasized, the control of climate in Finland is bound to be strict, and no occupation is more affected by it than farming. Even if cleared land and good soil were unlimited, a short growing season, a long period of snow-cover in winter and above all the liability to destructive frosts in any month of the year must hamper the cultivator and stock-raiser. Wheat production, for example, even with the appearance of the quick-ripening species, is confined to the south-west, and wheat itself can only be a

negligible proportion of the grain crop. The more important grains are the hardy ones, oats, rye and barley, while amongst the roots, the potato crop is the most valuable because it makes a good contribution to the modest supply of home-grown food. (See Fig. 17.) In this country as elsewhere in Europe, there has been a vigorous effort in recent years to increase the quality and quantity of subsistence cereals, and also those of commercial crops like sugar-beet.[24] But though the statistics of production are certainly impressive, they record a valiant struggle rather than the practical possibility of a purely Finnish food supply. Climate, soil and forest-covering all make it impossible for Finland to be anything but dependent on food imports." Wheat, rye, cattle-fodder and artificial fertilizers are some of the most important of the import items.

FIG. 17.—Proportionate Value of Crops in Finland. The crops listed above compose the bulk of the Finnish harvest. In the total yield by weight (6,475,000 metric tons in 1937) sown hay is the most important, 55% of the whole. There follow potatoes 22%, oats 11%, rye 65%, barley 2-5%, spring wheat 2-2%, and winter wheat ·9%. The small proportion of wheat to the whole is noticeable. (Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Finland.)

On this account, accordingly, the position of the Finns in time of widespread war in Europe must be a very dangerous one. They must draw the bulk of their food-supplies from abroad, either from overseas or from Russia. If the Baltic trade routes are threatened and the Soviet Union is hostile or unable to furnish the required quantities, then the chances of an adequate amount of foodstuffs reaching the country are very much restricted.

A second influence on land-utilization after 1920 was the increase in the peasant properties. The Agrarian Revolution in Finland was, for various reasons, much less violent in its effects than farther south. To begin with a certain amount of purchase took place gradually from Russian landlords during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even though the taxes on land-ownership were very burdensome for the small farmer. Then again the

farming population, which was largely Swedish, only forms an outer fringe in Finland, and the great forest regions were not nearly so much affected by the revolution as the cleared land. In the third place, a good many fair-sized estates in Finland were farmed with great intelligence and zeal before 1914, and the Finnish government recognized their usefulness. But a good deal of property in the plains was redistributed by the state to small farmers,[26] and here as elsewhere, they were anxious to find a quick and assured market for farming products.

This necessity had the same effect on land-use as a third influence, the anxiety to widen the basis of Finnish exports by the sale abroad of such commodities as meat, eggs, butter and cheese, of which the farmers could produce a small surplus. Thus, although there was an effort in the last few years before the present war to increase the extent and productivity of arable land, the farmer still made his profits largely on the sale of meat and of dairy foods to the south-western towns, and by the export of the same commodities to Great Britain and Germany.[27] Meadow-land and forage crops were thus important items in the Finnish land-utilization schemes ; and the markets for dairy produce suited a farming population in a country of hard climatic conditions, and with land reclaimed in small parcels from swamp and forest.

Two other aspects of farming in Finland are worth noticing, and they date back long before the establishment of Finnish independence. One is the gradual assumption by the Finns of a farming economy. Even in the coastal plains of farming activity, the Swedes have been for some time a minority, though they have established there their methods and standards of exploiting the land. A second is the importance to farming in Finland, and indeed to all economic activities, of the co-operative system. The success of forestry, of agriculture and of stock-rearing has been due for the last two generations largely to the intelligent use by the peasants of the co-operative societies, which have a long and honourable tradition in the country. The oldest of these is the Pellervo, which dates from 1899. It was formed in the face of opposition from St. Petersburg, where the government saw any association whatsoever as a medium for sedition. It cannot be denied either that the growth of the co-operative societies in Finland was to some extent identifiable with the struggle of the Finnish nationalists for independence. The function of the

Pellervo Society in recent years, however, has been chiefly propagandist, the making known amongst the peasants of the advantages of the co-operative movement. The other societies fall into three big groups—one set for the foresters, one for the farmers and one for the consumers of home and foreign products. For the farmers especially the co-operatives can, if well used, remedy the main weaknesses of small-scale production. They supply loans and equipment on easy terms, encourage and educate peasants to high standards of agriculture and stock-rearing for which they can provide the necessary capital, and they insist, through their marketing agencies, on good and well-graded farm products.

In northern Finland, the distinction between farmer and forester is often blurred. It is only in the south and west that farming can be a whole-time occupation, let alone a profitable one. In the forest country of the centre and the more desolate regions of the north, each family usually possesses a certain amount of farming land, cleared and drained foot by foot; but peasants will till or graze the land only to eke out their food-supply, and will turn to the forests for actual money-making. This type of economy, half-farming and half-forestry, was steadily on the increase in the north in the years before the war. Finnish settlers with their own plots, or as tenants or employees on state forest-properties, were pushing north into the region which hitherto had been held by the Lapp herders.

There has been no apparent hostility between these two groups; there is, on the contrary, intelligent and practical legislation to protect the interests of the Lapps. But in spite of this, Arctic Finland has become during recent years less and less the region of the Lapp nomad and more and more that of the Finnish settler.

The Lapp herding economy has still, it is true, a definite economic value. In winter the reindeer as a draft-animal is still the most useful means of transport in the far north, and its meat is marketable often out of the locality. There is a profit also to be made from herding, if the owners can face the enormous labour of rounding up and sorting the reindeer in autumn. But the herder's existence is inevitably a nomad one ; the quality and quantity of the stock depends on extensive roving from pasture to pasture, and this sort of life is incompatible with the settled homes and high standard of living associated now with the Finnish peasants. Thus in the north the Finns have brought a new economy with them which is very gradually over-

whelming the traditional one. They have not, as in the plains, taken over the occupations which they found established there.

The increase of the Finnish population in the Arctic was in the years before 1939 encouraged yet further by the newly discovered possibilities of the tourist trade. This region has distinct tourist value. It offers the best facilities for land-travel in northerly latitudes with the least possible effort. Partly for the benefit of the long-established



FIG. 18.—Motor Roads of Arctic Finland. The railways are marked with a continuous black line and the roads with a double line. The political frontiers show the cession of the Rybachi (Fisherman's) Peninsula by Finland to Russia in 1940. Scale approx. 1 : 8,000,000.

fishing communities of the Arctic coast, partly for the newly attracted settlers, and partly for an enthusiastic stream of summer visitors, a hard motor road was completed in 1932 over the 350 miles between Rovaniemi and Petsamo Fiord. (See Fig. 18.) Along this road in the summer months a regular bus-service connected the Arctic coast and northern inland settlements with the railway at Rovaniemi, bringing completely new interests and activities to the scanty population, who, until the new link was made, depended on winter sleigh journeys to bring them into touch with the more prosperous south.

Unfortunately the very circumstances which encouraged so much activity in Arctic Finland were the ones which also made the region of considerable interest to the Soviet Union, even though Russian eagerness to control the Arctic coast has only come to light in the course of the last troubled year. The comparatively favourable conditions, which account for both Finnish pioneer settlement and the little fishing port of Petsamo, also promote the Russian development of the White Sea coast. This outlet is all the more valuable to the Russians because the water of the Gulf of Finland freezes in winter and because the Germans control the Baltic exit. Russia is thus left with a dangerous dependence for opportunities of European sea-trade upon Murmansk in the north or upon the Black Sea ports in the south. It is plain accordingly that Russian attempts to control as far as possible the coasts approaching the Kola peninsula may recur at intervals in her foreign policy. It was apparent in the autumn of 1939, in the demand from the Finns for the Rybachi peninsula which juts out north-east of the port of Petsamo. (See Fig. 18 and p. 70.)

There is one other aspect of the economic development of Finland which has become interesting during the last few years, and which at the outset of the Russo-Finnish war was much to the fore. This is the working of the nickel of Arctic Finland after a period of active prospecting. (See Fig. 190

The existence of nickel ore has been known for a long time in Finland[28]; the most important supply is in the north, in the neighbourhood of Petsamo.[29] Nickel resources are always of some international importance, as the distribution of this mineral over the face of the earth is very unequal. Until the Finnish resources were explored it was thought that Canada had almost a monopoly of this mineral for production and export, though smaller supplies were mined and marketed from Brazil, New Caledonia and Norway. In 1935 the Finnish government granted the British Mond Nickel Company the concession for prospecting for and working the nickel near Petsamo, and the considerable value of the resources became known. The mine at Kaulatunturi looked like developing into one of the largest in the world, and was exploited by a local Finnish company as well as by the British concessionnaires. The desire for ample supplies of such a mineral, which is extremely important in the manufacture of high-grade steel, might

well prove another temptation to Russian acquisitive instincts.

The working of the nickel resources was the most important feature of a mild prospecting fever which broke out in Finland during the years of recovery between the economic crisis and the present war. This was apparent in the succession of mining laws passed by the Government after



FIG. 19.—The Mineral Resources of Finland. Note *(a)* the proximity of the nickel resources to the Russo-Finnish frontier, *(b)* the problem of the remoteness of the iron and nickel resources from the more populous regions of the south and west coastlands. The political frontiers shown are those obtaining between 1921 and 1939.

1932, and by the creation of a State Geological Commission for prospecting work. The two other minerals which received most attention were copper and iron.[80]

The copper resources in Finland are somewhat scattered. (See Fig. 19.) The most famous are in the north-west of the lake region at Outokumpu; these were mined in the days of the Russian Empire, and only regained their pre-1914 level of production in 1934. A second group is in the south-

west, at Orijärvi, which so far has not achieved the reputation of the Outokumpu supplies. There is a third at Pitkäranta on the northern shore of Lake Ladoga (since the recent Russo-Finnish Treaty in Soviet territory). More accurate prospecting revealed that the Outokumpu mines had greater than double the resources that had been estimated originally. The Finns were thus encouraged to build a smelter in connection with the great power-station at Immatra instead of sending all the copper concentrates abroad for refining. The position of the lake ores made processing within the country a more practicable proposition than in the case of the nickel. The other noticeable feature of the exploitation of the copper ore was the strength and continuity of German interest. Germany was for several years before the present war the main purchaser of the concentrates for refining.

German interest was also evident in the prospecting for the iron ore. Like the copper, this lies in three groups. The most abundant mines are in the north at Kittilä, and if these were to be worked actively, it is possible that a railway might parallel the Arctic road in order to ship the ores at Petsamo. The second group is in the south-east, one set of mines near the copper resources at Pitkäranta, another farther north at Suojärvi (both of these are in the territory ceded to Russia by Finland). The third group is in the extreme south-west, at Jussarä. (See Fig. 19.) These iron resources have been hardly touched for exploitation, and it is not yet possible to tell whether the present upheaval will encourage or hinder their development.

Given peaceful conditions, it would have been possible for the Finns to use their minerals for a fresh and varied industrial economy. In any case their export would have put the foreign trade of the country on a broader and sounder basis, and it is tragic that the years of successful prospecting should have been followed so soon by a general disturbance of trading and industrial effort.

A short outline suffices to show something of the past development of Finland, to point out the different language groups of the population, and to explain the way in which each group was associated for a long time with a geographical region and a distinct economy. It reveals too, on the one hand, the degree to which the inhabitants are bound by environmental influences, and on the other hand the possible changes in economic activity. It remains to discuss the nature of Finnish relationships with other countries, and

to see how the Finns attempted after 1918 the difficult technique of existence as a buffer state.

Finnish contacts with foreign powers up to the time of the present war fell into three categories: the first included the position of the Swedish minority in Finland, and the effect of the minority's grievances on Finnish relations with Sweden. The second and most important concerned Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union ; and the third, the negotiations with various powers which arose from Finnish dependence on foreign trade.

The problem of the Swedish minority in Finland threatened after 1920 to become a sore spot in northern Europe. It was one example of an exceedingly difficult relationship often occurring in the eastern marchland strip. Swedish activity in Finland in the past has been noted. It took the form of conquest, settlement and administration from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries, though settlement was limited to the coastal plains. Further, when the official rule of Sweden ended in 1809 with the Peace of Frederikshamn, and Finland passed to Russia, the Swedish population of the south and west remained fairly influential, especially in economic and educational enterprise. It preserved in Finland, and in spite of Finnish activity still maintains to-day, an importance out of proportion to its numbers. The influence of the Swedish minority rankled in Finland when independence was established after 1920. For one thing it had an inseparable connection with the foreign rule of the past, even though that rule was in many respects both liberal and constructive. For another the debt that the Finns owed to Swedish administration in the planting of good economic and cultural standards was felt as a reproach to Finnish achievements in comparison with the Scandinavian.

Bad feeling between the majority and minority was most open, as might have been expected, over cultural questions, such as the maintenance of Swedish schools in Finland, and the status of the Swedish language in educational, administrative and commercial circles. Fortunately, good sense and genuine culture on both sides prevented the difficulty from becoming acute to the extent of damaging Finnish political stability or economic prosperity. The problem was serious enough, but it had not the bitterness nor the disastrous results of many similar situations farther south, and one proof that the trouble was kept within bounds was the important position of Sweden in Finnish trading activi-

ties. (After Great Britain and Germany, Sweden was, during the twenty years in question, the most important country in the list of traders with Finland.[80]) A second proof was in the genuine sympathy of the Swedes for the terrible position of the Finns in the face of Russian hostility in the winter of 1939-1940. The interest in and sorrow for the Finnish ordeal were widespread and heartfelt, even if these feelings were not accurately reflected in official policy. The Finns, in point of fact, in their relations with the Swedes throughout the centuries seem to have been in the unusual position of having made the best of both worlds. They managed to preserve without question their identity and vigour as a separate group, but they also absorbed a good many solid advantages from their contact with the Swedes.

To the outer world the important question between Finns and Swedes after 1920 was not so much that of the Swedish minority in Finland as that of the disputed possession of the Aland Islands.[31] It is an interesting comment on the position of Russia in Europe at the time of the first discussion of this question in 1921, that the matter should have been one entirely between Sweden and Finland. The Aland Archipelago consists of a small group of islands controlling access to the Gulf of Bothnia. (See Fig. 20.) The economic value of the islands is negligible, but their strategic position is very important, as fortifications here would be formidable in time of war to close the entrances to the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. Moreover, when the Gulf of Bothnia is ice-free, the big trade in Swedish iron ore exported to Germany could be checked at this point. In culture and tradition the islanders are Swedish, but during the period of Russian rule in Finland from 1809-1917, they were included with the Finns in the Russian Empire. On the strength of this administrative union, the islands were awarded to Finland in 1921, as the result of international arbitration. The right to fortification, however, was denied. The controversy over the islands seemed finally and happily settled, and for seventeen years nothing more was heard of the trouble. But the prospects of disturbance in the Baltic with the resurrection of German political strength revived once more, both in Sweden and Finland, consciousness of the strategic position of the archipelago. Early in 1938 the Finns demanded the right to fortify the islands; never, it may be said quite truthfully, because they contemplated an aggressive policy, but because, both for them and for the Swedes, the conquest of the archipelago by a foreign and hostile

power would be a disaster. When the question came up for international discussion a second time, however, the main objections to fortification came from Russia.

FIG. 20.—The Strategic Importance of the Finnish Islands. The map shows the position of the Aland Islands, blocking the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia, and also some of the islands which were used by the Russians as the bases of attack on the south coast of Finland. Scale approx. i : 8,500,000.

The Aland Archipelago forms the best-known example of the potential strategic importance of the hundreds of islands which fringe the shores of Finland on the west and south. Others have in the crisis between Finland and Russia also come into prominence. (See Fig. 20.) Lappvik, near Hangö, was listed by the Soviet Union as a desirable possession in the diplomatic attacks on Finland preceding the invasion of 1939, and also Hogland (Suursaari), Tytärsaari, Lavansaari, Björkö and Seiskari. The control of these islands in a line from west to east would enable the Russians in defensive warfare to protect the Gulf of Finland from naval invasion, and in offensive warfare effectively to threaten Finland. From the Russian point of view, also, the value of the Estonian air and naval bases increases with the mastery of the islands on the northern shore of the gulf. The demand for and the final gain of the lease of Hangö, of course, involved something much more important than a strategic post. It signified the determination, and the ability, of Russia to control the only port in Finland open to winter navigation, and it meant a Russian grip over Finnish trade as well as over Finnish strategy.

Finland has had throughout her years of independence a deep mistrust of the Soviet Union, and even if the recent invasion had not taken place, it would not be difficult to account for such suspicion. This ill-feeling can be attributed partly, though not entirely, to the Finnish recollection of the hundred years during which Finland was a Grand

Duchy of the Russian Empire. Russian rule in Finland was not wholly bad. In fact during the first fifty years the results were noticeably good for both the Finnish majority and the Swedish minority within the country.[32] There was, above all, peace from the eternal struggle between the Russians and the Swedes for possession of the coastal plains. There was also the gain for Finland of the Russian market for Finnish timber, and finally a good deal of the regulation of the water-way system belongs to this period. The real trouble began here, as elsewhere in the Empire, with the attempt from St. Petersburg to plant Russian schools, churches and law-courts throughout Finland in direct opposition to the wishes of both Finns and Swedes. The bitterness which "Russification" caused was expressed in the murder of the Governor-General, Bobrikoff, in 1904, on the steps of the Senate House at Helsinki. Never was there, either, a policy more surely doomed to failure than that of "Russification" of the Imperial kind, since it encountered in this region two of the sturdiest possible indigenous cultures—the Swedish and the Finnish. But the memory of the last generations of Tzarist rule in Finland was never allowed to die, and whatever the form of government in Russia, any suspicion of Russian influence or pressure must be at all times calculated to rouse the liveliest alarm and hatred amongst the majority of Finns.

The ill-will between the two countries was not really remedied by the 1920 Treaty of Dorpat,[33] by which Russia agreed to recognize the independence of the Baltic Republics. There were, indeed, in Finland a variety of reasons for keeping alive suspicion of Russia. One was the small but certainly existent Communist party in Finland, which had been active at the time of the civil war. The Communist minority had a somewhat short shrift in Finland, especially during the period when totalitarian rule was developing fast in Europe. The antipathy of the Finnish majority to this group sprang, however, largely from the fact that Communism was associated with the possibility of Russian interference rather than from inbred political intolerance. The threat to Finland of such a minority was apparent in the recent war, when a small group of discontented Communists could be used by the Soviet for the creation of a puppet government.

Finland had two other bones of contention with the Union. One has already been described, the constant fear of Russian competition in the timber market. The other

was the fate of the Finnish group in north-eastern Karelia. (See Fig. 21.)

There were in 1918 about 200,000 of these people in scattered settlements on the Russian side of the Karelian frontier. Quite apart from the numbers of Finns involved, this frontier land has a sentimental value to all the Finns, as it is the region which is associated with the great national legend of the Kalevala, the equivalent to them of the Arthurian legends to the English. On the grounds of race, language and geographical proximity, also, the Finns had strong claims to eastern Karelia, especially as the early years of Soviet administration there gave plenty of scope for criticism.[84] The Russian government, however, in the years after the signing of the Treaty of Dorpat, absolutely refused to consider the fate of the Karelians except as a domestic issue within the Soviet Union, and no international court was strong enough to alter this determination. So after 1923 the question of the Karelian Finns was dropped in diplomatic circles, and remained only to deepen Finnish hostility to Russia.

FIG. 21.—Settlements of the Karelian Finns. Note the scattered character of the Karelian population and the extent to which it existed outside the frontier of Finland as demarcated by the Treaty of Dorpat, 1921.

In 1939 the question of eastern Karelia came to the fore again with the development of the Russo-Finnish crisis. This territory formed the compensation suggested by the Soviet government to the Finns, in exchange for the cession to Russia of the islands in the Gulf of Finland, of territory in the Arctic and of the isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the sea. The Finns had good grounds, however, for refusing this offer. In the first place, eastern Karelia, however great its sentimental value, did not approach in strategic and economic worth the land which they were called

upon to yield to Russia. In* the second place, the character of the Karelian population had changed considerably in the years between 1923 and 1939. There had been a certain amount of Russian immigration during the fifteen years, encouraged by the Soviet government. The effect therefore of the inclusion of eastern Karelia within Finland would have been to increase the pro-Russian element in the country, and to have provided the material for further interference from the Soviet Union if this had seemed profitable.

The record of Russo-Finnish relations in the twenty years between the two wars was therefore an unhappy one throughout, and the major crisis in 1939 fully justified Finnish dread. It was plain during the diplomatic negotiations of the summer of that year that Finnish fear of a possible Russian advance was greater than that of German hegemony in the Baltic, and that these instincts were correct at any rate so far as the immediate future was concerned.

There has been no fiercer struggle between the Finns and the Russians than that waged during the winter of 1939-1940. The exact reasons for the Russian attack on Finland are still obscure, and some time must elapse before the diplomatic activity which preceded and accompanied the war is fully and rightly analysed. Two motives for Soviet aggression can, however, be deduced by contemporary observers. One was the determination in Russia, not often realized in Western Europe, to obliterate the humiliating peace settlements of the years following the 1914-1918 War, and to recover both territory and prestige. The second was the anxiety to forestall German political and economic influence in Northern Europe.

After five months of strenuous fighting the war ended with the Treaty of Moscow, and the Finnish losses by this settlement were heavy. But before discussing them, it is worth noting a few of the other points of interest which emerged during the struggle.

In the first place, the whole of Europe became aware of the important strategic position of Finland on the Continent. It was realized that the political situation in that country must always be of interest to Germany, since the western land-frontier and coast of Finland were in close proximity to the resources and to the summer transport route of Swedish high-grade iron ore. It was also plain that Russia, should she wish to strengthen her connection with the warm-water ports on the Atlantic coast of Norway, could bring

pressure to bear on Finland and thus exert influence on Norway and Sweden. (See Fig. 22.) As far as Russian expansion was concerned, interest in one already existing rail-route developed, that is, in the diagonal line of railway between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Bothnia via Sortevala, Joensu, Oulu and Kemi. The Soviet government also showed its preoccupation with east-west transit possibilities, by proposing a future railway between Kandalaksha on the White Sea and Kemijaervi, ultimately to connect Russia with Northern Sweden (see Fig. 22). The whole episode of the Russo-Finnish War therefore brought to the front once more the marchland character of the smaller country.



FIG. 22.—Finnish Cessions to Russia in the Spring of 1940.

In the second place, the Finnish defence soon rightly attracted the respect and admiration of most of the peoples of Europe and America. It was a classic example of the military skill and political solidarity possible to a highly developed peasant-proprietor state confronted with a threat to its national existence. Whatever the outcome of the war, its " David and Goliath " character has made the Finns memorable in European history. In the winter of 1939-1940, this people abundantly justified the chance given them twenty years earlier to make good as an independent state.

In the third place the war made it apparent that Russian

deficiencies in military skill were, as had often been supposed, counter-balanced by the almost limitless man-power of the Soviet Union. Moreover, certain types of Russian military equipment, even if badly handled, were found to be excellent in quality and design. With a huge population accustomed to skilled propaganda and politically immature, it was possible for the Soviet government to give the Red Army its first practical experience of warfare, working on the terrible method of trial and error. At the same time the stern testing of the Russian armies and fleet was enlightening to many War Offices in Europe. The Russo-Finnish War enabled military experts in other parts of the Continent to draw conclusions as to the strength and efficiency of an armed force which had long remained a mystery, and these findings have had a marked influence on the major struggle between Germany and the Allies.

The military supremacy of the Russians over the Finns brought to the Union the following material gains from the war : Russia acquired two pieces of territory, one in the south which included Viipuri and all the country bordering Lake Ladoga, the other in the north making a salient into Finnish territory just north of the " waistline." (See Fig. 22.) The losses to Finland in the south were both strategic and economic. The Finns were left without the famous Mannerheim system of defensive communications, and those lying to the north-east of Lake Ladoga. Further, the new frontier, running roughly from Viipuri to Porosozero, has not the bottle-neck character of the former line in the sector between Lake Ladoga and the sea.

Economically the Finnish losses also were heavy. The Karelian Isthmus as a whole was one of the more densely populated parts of Finland, and the city of Viipuri, with a population of 72,755, was the second in size and importance in the country. It handled nearly a quarter of the export trade of Finland. The Finns ceded also the lake towns of Sortevala and Kakisalmi, all the lake saw-mills, the railway connecting Viipuri and Sortevala, and the newly constructed power-station at Rouhiala. The Saima Canal and power-station at Irnmatra are now so close to the Russian frontier that their value to Finland must be considerably reduced.

Apart from the loss of territory, trade outlets and plant, there was the question of finding fresh homes for more than half a million refugees, since few of the Finnish population in the ceded territory wished to remain under the Soviet government. New farms, new houses and fresh employ-

ment had to be provided in a country damaged from end to end by systematic air raids.

In the north, the Russian gains were mainly strategic. The possession of the high ground of the Salla region gives the Soviet armies at any time tactical control of the railway between Kemijaervi and the Gulf of Bothnia. If the new line from Kandalaksha were to be built, then the grip of Russia on northern Finland and Sweden would be very formidable. The Finnish obligation to refrain from fortifying Petsamo safeguards also for the Russians the sea-route to the Murmansk and White Sea ports.

The third main feature of the treaty—the lease to the Soviet Union of the port of Hangö—was almost as much resented by the Finns as the outright cession of territory. The significance of the Russian control of the town has been mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. (See p. 64 and note 13.)

The Russian insistence upon the surrender of the strategic points mentioned was ominous for the Finns. It suggested that the troubles of the winter of 1939-40 formed but a stage in the Russian programme of expansion, and that further sacrifices might be demanded from Finland, both in territory and independence. Besides, even if the treaty had not been so severe, and if there had been no threat to the future, the economic dilemma of Finland, first confronted in 1939, still persisted. If Finnish prosperity were to be restored, the country was more than ever dependent on facilities for foreign trade. But the negotiations over the trade treaty with Russia, which was part of the peace settlement, showed at once the limited possibilities of exchange between Finland and the Soviet Union.

There has been the alternative for the Finns of more trade with Germany ; but at the present time this depends on the commercial activity of a totalitarian state hard-pressed by an ever-tightening economic blockade. These conditions in Germany must affect to an increasing degree, both the amount of currency available and the range and quantity of surplus goods for export. Besides these practical difficulties, the Finns also hold the Germans mainly responsible for the Russian military success. German pressure on Norway and Sweden prevented the timely arrival of Allied help during the spring of 1940, and finally compelled the Finns to sign the Treaty of Moscow before they were defeated in the field. The Germans therefore are hardly congenial to the Finns as traders. But the accustomed market for the

Finnish products across the North Sea is no more accessible to the Finns to-day than it was in the Autumn of 1939, if we except the remote Arctic outlet in the summer months and the development of the convoy system. How much the British market means to the Finnish people can be deduced from the country's commercial history during the last generation.

During the twenty years of isolation from Russia, Finland sought vigorously in Western Europe and in the New World for trading possibilities, especially in connection with the forest resources. These developed along the lines already described in the introduction to the Baltic region, with Great Britain as chief purchaser from Finland, and Germany, until 1934, as chief importer to the country. The great needs of Finland, besides those of foodstuffs already mentioned (see p. 55), are machinery and metal goods, coal, raw materials for textile production and colonial goods and spices. For the marketing to Finland of all of these commodities, Great Britain and Germany were keen competitors.

The rank of the United States in the list of countries trading with Finland has been on an average fourth ; although the volume of trade concerned has always been considerably less than that carried on by the Finns with Great Britain, Germany and Sweden.[86] The explanation of the American commercial link with Finland lies partly in the strength of the Finnish settlements in the States. Finland, like many European countries, had periods of emigrant activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The majority of the Finns journeyed west to the United States and Canada, and in the latter country at the end of the 1914-1918 War numbered about 200,000. Van Cleef, the American geographer, comments on their instincts as immigrants which are interesting.[86] The strength of influence of the forest environment and economy is apparent on the Finns when they reach the New World. It conquers the usual tendency of the immigrant to settle in the towns and cities, and drives them into the forest zones of North and North-West America, where conditions of life, even if exacting, are more familiar and therefore more congenial. Further, while shifting from the forests of the Old World to the forests of the New, the identity of the Finns as a group and their link with Finland have been steadily preserved. One proof of this was in the steady stream of American-Finnish trade between 1919 and 1939. Another

and equally telling expression of this tie between Finland and the States was in the strength of American feeling for the Finns during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940.[37]

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON FINLAND

1. The figure in the text refers to the area of Finland after the cession of territory to Russia in March 1940. Before the outbreak of war in 1939 both Poland and Finland claimed in territory the sixth place in the list of European states.

2. The *Atlas of Finland* (Sheet 19) shows the many possible methods of making a regional analysis of the country. One can divide Finland into geographical regions on the bases of structure, climate, water-forms, vegetation, etc. The geographical regions which are emphasized especially in this chapter belong to two categories. That in the south-west is of relief. The frontier between Finn and Swede, when Swedish settlement was at its maximum (not its present) extent, was roughly coincident with the 100-metre contour line. The present boundary between the regions where arable land and forestry predominate respectively is not so much in agreement with the relief divisions. In the west, districts with a high proportion (30-45 per cent.) of arable land stretch into the plateau country behind Pori, and in the extreme south-east the proportion of tillage on the plains declines. The regional division in the north is of vegetation type. About 67^0 N. the zone known as Finnish coniferous forest ends and that of Lapp coniferous forest begins. This vegetation division corresponds to the area of Lapp speech and the region of reindeer herding, though the latter extends farther south near the eastern frontier. (See Sheet 17, Map 1, Sheet 23, Map 8 and Sheet 26, Map 11.)

3. This statement must be qualified by two comments. One is on road communications: Sheet 6 of the *Atlas of Finland* marks seven roads in the category of " high road " crossing the frontier north of Lake Ladoga. But at the same time these are all south of the 64^0 line and the standard of construction and maintenance is low. The second is on the proposal for an east-west running railway between Kandalaksha on the White Sea and Kemijaervi, mentioned in the recent Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Finland. Such a line, especially with the transit privilege suggested for Russia, would do much to neutralize the natural defensive value of northern Karelia to the Finns; it would facilitate the quick movement of Russian troops to cut off Arctic Finland from the central plateau, and to threaten Sweden and Norway.

4. The third campaigning region in the north was rather different from the other two, as it was so much associated with naval transport and co-operation.

5. See Van Cleef, *The Republic Farthest North,* p. 16 (Ohio State University Press, 1929).

6. See *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 23, Maps 1, 2 and 5.

7. In every case, except where noted, the Finnish form of the place-name is used in the text with the Swedish form in brackets.

8. See *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 23, Map 8,

9. Viipuri is not, however, a Swedish town in origin. It was a Finnish trading-station before the twelfth-century Swedish conquest for such commodities as furs and fish and timber. The great castle was built by the Swede, Torkel Knutsson, in 1203.

10. The composition **of** the Finnish **population before 1939** was generally reckoned as follows: Finns, 89-4 per cent.; Swedes, I0·I per cent.; Lapps, 0·3 per cent.; others, 0-2 per cent, (mainly Germans and exiled Russians in the towns). The total population at the 1930 census was 3,667,067. See *The Statesman's Tear-Book,* 1938 (London: Macmillan).

11. These distinct economics are, of course, largely accounted for by the difference between plain and plateau soils. The soils of the plains offer more encouragement to cultivation than any on the plateau. Also the Finns entered the country from the east, bringing with them probably very little tradition of agricultural activity in their wanderings across northern Russia. Lyde mentions the belt of land, partly old lake floor, running from east to west across the southern part of the lake region, as superior to any on the coasts. See *The Continent of Europe,* p. 416 (London: Macmillan, 1930). But this contention is not borne out by actual farming activity to-day. See also Mead, " Agriculture in Finland," *Economic Geography,* Vol. XV, pp. 125-34 and 217-39 (Clark University, 1939).

12. See maps cited in Note 6. It is probable that the area of Lapp settlement in Finland, as in Russia and the Scandinavian countries, was much greater at one time than it is to-day. The Lapps have lost both in territory and numbers to the stronger groups farther south.

13. Hängo (Hanko) in the extreme south-west is regarded as an open port, as the shipping services are maintained by ice-breakers. Hence the tragedy for the Finns of its lease to Russia. Turku and Helsinki are now also usually accessible owing to improvements in the strength of ice-breaking apparatus. It is noticeable that such disadvantages as winter freezing and a difficult hinterland have not prevented either Swedes or Finns from developing actively many forms of seamanship. They are expert fishermen both on the Arctic and Baltic coasts and well-known sea-traders. The Finnish *wind-jammers* are famous in normal times in ports all over the world.

14. See *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 10.

15. See Mead, " Agriculture in Finland," *Economic Geography,* Vol. XV, pp. 217-9.

16. " Dry land " is a term often used in a special sense in geographical descriptions of Finland. Nearly 12 per cent, of the country is covered by lakes, so that the estimates of forest, arable land, pasture land, etc., are often reckoned excluding the lake area.

17. It should be noted, however, that although some aspects of skilled forestry in Finland have a long tradition, actual forest preservation here is almost as recent as in any European country. There have been in Finland many generations of wasteful felling, of which the bad effects are obvious to-day. See *The Republic Farthest North,* p. 69.

18. *Ibid.,* p. 71, and the *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 27.

19. Sheet 28 of the *Atlas of Finland,* Maps 1, 2, 3, 4, show the many possible forms of communal forest-ownership, great and small, which are extant in Finland.

20. See *Finland: The Country, People and Institutions,* p. 353 (Helsinki: Ottava Publishing Co., 1926). There are, of course, large districts in northern Finland where birch predominates, but these supplies are not so useful as the plateau forests, because of their remoteness. See also the *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 29, Maps 8 and 9.

21. See Lingeman, *Report on Economic and Ccmnercial Conditions in Finland,* pp. 31-2 (Dept, of Trade: H.M. Stationeiy Office, 1938).

22. The best example of the use of an esker to carry both rail and road communications is at Punkarharju in the south-east of the lake region.
23. See *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 12, Map 6.
24. See *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Finland,* 1938, pp. 54-5.
25. *Ibid.,* Appendix VII, p. 82. No single food item in this list of imports is very impressive, but the total of animal food (meat, etc.), fruits and vegetables, groceries, conserves and beverages, amounts to a big proportion of the total.
26. See *The Republic Farthest North,* p. 57.
27. *Ibid.,* p. 56.
28. See *Reports on Economic Conditions in Finland,* 1933, 1935, 1938, sections on "Mining."
29. See *Atlas of Finland,* Sheet 29, Map 1.
30. See *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Finland,* 1938, p. 37.
31. The Finnish name for the archipelago is Ahuenanmaa.
32. See Askenazy, "Russia," *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. X, Chapter XIII, pp. 433 ff.
33. Dorpat is the German name for Tartu, the university town of Estonia. In reference to the Russo-Finnish Treaty of 1920, the German form is more often used than the Estonian.
34. For the terms which were granted the Finns of eastern Karelia in the Agreement of 1920, see *The New World,* p. 448.
35. See *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Finland,* pp. 37-8.
36. See *The Republic Farthest North,* Chapter XIV.
37. Alone of the many groups which borrowed money during or after the 1914-1918 War the Finns had discharged the debt by 1939. This accounted for much of the American sympathy for the Finns in the recent war between Finland and Russia.

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CHAPTER II

ESTONIA

THE small republics of the South-east Baltic are just as interesting in their own ways as Finland. The first impression, however, for the traveller who has crossed the Gulf of Finland, is rather disappointing. In spite of the fact that the Letts claim for a part of their country the title of "Livonian Switzerland," the South-east Baltic lands have, on the whole, a rather monotonous appearance, with their wide stretches of wood and marsh, meadow and sandy waste. Across them, two big, sluggish waterways run, roughly parallel with each other from south-east to north-west, as well as a number of smaller rivers. (See Fig. 23.) The more important is the Daugava[1] (Dwina), with its source in the Valdai hills of Russia, and its mouth at the southern end of the Gulf of Riga. To the south of the Daugava is the second big river, the Niemen[2] (Nemunas), rising also in the low hills of western Russia and flowing out into the Gulf of Memel. The Estonian streams of the north are smaller: the most notable is the Ema-Narva waterway, linking the Estonian lakes with the Gulf of Finland, and the second, the north-east, south-west running Pärnu, emptying into the northern corner of the Gulf of Riga.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the South-east Baltic lands is the long association of the human groups with these river basins. This is a feature of political geography which is, of course, fairly familiar. The most-quoted examples of it are those of the English and French groups with their cores of political development over centuries in the Thames and Seine basins, but it is a trait which is repeated many times in Europe, including the South-east Baltic region. Thus, the Lithuanians are the people of the middle and lower Niemen lands; the Letts of the Daugava; the Estonians of the smaller rivers, the Ema and the Pärnu, though the connection in Estonia between a tra-

ditional settlement core and the environment of a river basin is harder to trace than in the groups farther south.

The second feature of this region which deserves notice is the contrast between the actual port settlements and the



FIG. 23.—General Map of the South-east Baltic States.

interior, which is by no means the same as that between coastland and plateau in Finland. The coast bordering the South-east Baltic countries between the Estonian port of Tallinn [3] (Reval) and the German one of Memel, unlike that of the Baltic Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, is potentially

a great commercial asset. Partly owing to rather higher winter temperatures than those of Finland, and partly to the greater movement of the waters, stirred by the exposure to the westerly winds, shipping is possible on this stretch of coast right through the year, although ice-breakers are used at Tallinn and in the Gulf of Riga. The Baltic ports of the old Russian Empire, Tallinn, Pärnu[4] (Pernau), Riga, Ventispils (Windau) and Liepaja (Libau) are free from the two main hindrances to Baltic shipping, the winter-freezing of the northern waters, and the big sand-bars of the southern estuaries. Moreover, although the immediate hinterland to the ports is poor, the coastal towns, granted normal economic relations, should have commercial links farther east. (See Fig. 24.) They should export the forest products of northern Poland and western Russia, and import the needs of the western and



FIG. 24.—Rail Communications in the South-east Baltic States, showing the connection between the Baltic ports and the hinterland of West Russia before 1914. The Russian or German forms of the place-names have been kept. Note the beginning of the " sand-bar " coast at Memel.

White Russian towns, for these are set in an environment which makes them demand both food-supplies and raw materials from outside their own region. There is no doubt, therefore, that the coasts of Estonia and Latvia are favoured naturally for commercial activity.

Inland there is less to recommend these countries as far as natural wealth is concerned, but each is worth separate study.

Estonia is the smallest of the three republics, with an area of 18,632 square miles. The relief map shows its division into western coastal plain and low hill country inland, and also the depression which runs from east to west, dividing the uplands of the north from those of the Estonian-Lettish frontier. (See Fig. 23.) The three types of environment which are most distinct in Estonia, however, depend not on the relief features but on the vegetation belts which run across the country from north-east to south-west and counter to the divisions of highland and lowland. These vegetation zones are partly accounted for by the influence of climate and soil, but they are also explained by economic and political development, and by the patient experiments of the inhabitants seeking to make the best living possible out of a poor land. (See Fig. 25.) The regional distinctions are thus man-made as well as being suggested by geographical circumstances. There is, first of all, the forest-land in two belts,[5] the larger stretching right across the country in a wedge, narrow in the north and broad in the south-west; the smaller in the boggy country of the east, between the Peipsi Lake and the Gulf of Finland. Between the two forest belts is the region cleared for farming, which encroaches on the forest wherever possible. This also lies right across the country from the low plateau of the north, through the Tartu depression to the hills on the Estonian-Lettish borderland. Finally, to the north-west, is the poor hinterland of Tallinn. The soil here is too water-logged to encourage either farming or forestry even though both are attempted and achieved, and there are, alternating with the " wooded-meadow " country, stretches of barren boulder-strewn land, known as " alvarmark."

In all, one-seventh is reckoned as waste-land, and land which is called waste in Estonia is[1] hopeless indeed, if rejected by a farmer and forester population which is extremely skilled in making use of every inch of possible soil. This high proportion of useless land is a big handicap if so small a group is to live as an independent nation. It is much

greater relatively to the whole than in Finland, and Estonia, with an area only just over half that of Scotland, could between 1921 and 1939 ill-afford to abandon a seventh of the total.

Neither is a further examination of the lands recognized as



FIG. 25.—Geographical Regions of Estonia. Note that these have developed partly from environmental conditions and partly from human exploitation of resources. Scale approx. 1 : 5,000,000.

productive very encouraging. Apart from the potential wealth of the coast, and that, one may see again and again, depends mainly on relationships with Russia, the natural resources are rather meagre. The two forest belts are small in extent and yield compared with those of Finland, although here as in the north, they provide an important raw material for industry and also one of the chief export commodities.[8]

In the matter of fuel, however, there are compensations. It is true that the water-power of Estonia, potential or harnessed, is very limited. The only considerable supply is drawn from the former rapids of the lower Narva near the Russian-Estonian frontier. But there is in the north of the country a belt of oil-shale running across the country from east to west, and for the last fifteen years this has been worked vigorously to supply both railways and factories and to lessen the import of coal from abroad. (See Fig. 25.) Another mineral asset also which needs recognition is the supply of phosphorite near Tallinn. Its presence for a people whose prosperity is based on farming, and

where intensive use of the land makes fertilization essential, is invaluable.

Finally, if the sum total of natural wealth is much less in Estonia than in Finland, there is at least more variety in the national economy. For farming especially, climatic conditions are more favourable, and the export list of Estonia had in consequence during the years of independence not quite the unbalanced appearance of that of the northern republic.

In this triangle of country between the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, nine-tenths of the population is Estonian. Historical and economic influences lasting over centuries have made the Estonians a group perfectly distinct from the Finns, but both in physical appearance and in language there is quite a close connection between the two peoples. The Estonians have the broad heads, smooth, light hair, and blue eyes of the Tavast Finns of the central and southern Finnish plateau, though intermarriage with Swede, German and Slav has made for a much greater mixture of types in Estonia than in Finland. The Estonian language belongs like the Finnish to the Finno-Ugric group, and the first occupation by the Estonians of the region to the south of the Gulf of Finland was about contemporary with that of the Finnish settlement of the lake plateau of the north. For both groups, it was a halt for good, after generations of gradual migration north-west, across Russia.

The remaining tenth of the population is, however, more heterogeneous in Estonia than in remoter Finland.[7] The re-drawing of frontiers after the 1914-1918 War left a varied minority population in the southern republic, which can be divided into two categories. There are the lesser minorities, the Finns, Letts and Jews, and the larger ones, the Swedes and Russians. Further, up to the end of 1939, yet another minority, the German, was the most important of all. The Swede and Russian and recently departed German minorities are evidence of the disturbed past of Estonia, which was for seven hundred years under the rule of one foreign power or another. Their presence indicates the full danger of her geographical position. She is the buffer as well as the bridge between Slav and German; and because she possesses a coast capable of much greater exploitation than the *immediate* hinterland, she has been a constant attraction to stronger political and economic powers with less favourable outlets.

The complete history of the ups and downs of German, Swedish and Russian struggles in Estonia is complicated in the extreme, but the broad outlines of the duration and type of these foreign administrations are not beyond an elementary study of this kind.

German influence was the earliest, the most thorough and the most permanent. The South-east Baltic was between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries the chief field of expansion of the Teutonic Knights, the half-warrior, half-missionary Military Order; the knights were one element, in the steady German counter-movement eastward through Europe. They came to Estonia mainly as military conquerors, and. in their campaigns they had the help of the Danes. Their struggles with the Estonian tribes are still traceable to-day in the remains of big Danish or German castles, such as those at Tallinn, Tartu, Rakvere and Haapsalu, built to protect settlers from the west and to hold down a stubborn and resentful subject population. The knights came also as crusaders, rooting out by force as well as by persuasion the last remnants of paganism in the remote fens and forests of the East Baltic. Behind the warriors and preachers followed the traders, establishing German* commercial settlements along the Baltic coast, with such success that most of the present Baltic ports date back in time to the days of the Hanseatic League, of which they were vigorous members.[8] (See Fig. 70

German settlement here, as elsewhere in the marchland strip, has been extraordinarily persistent in its effects. Its main grip on Estonia was in the forms of land-ownership, semi-military and semi-agricultural, and of the trading colony on the Baltic coast. These two kinds of domination persisted when the power of the Teutonic Knights was broken by Sweden, and when, later, the Swedes in their turn were ousted by the Russians. German Baits composed the main land-owning class in Estonia up to the passing of the Land-Reform Law in 1919, and the German merchants were also of immense importance in the Baltic towns.

As land-owners, needless to say, the rôle of the German Baits was restricted after 1919 in a country which felt to the fullest possible extent the effects of the Agrarian Revolution. But German influence in Estonia, even so, was far from extinction. Though German management might have vanished in the country districts, it was still strong

in the towns, backed by a long tradition of commercial activity, and again by the natural possibilities of trade between Germany and Estonia.[9] The departure in 1939 of the German-Bait group was therefore of extreme historic and economic significance in the Estonian lands. Viewed from the standpoint of the historian it meant the dying out of one of the most deeply-rooted German colonies. Viewed in the light of the recent political situation, it was the prelude to a formidable expansion of the Soviet system.

The successors of the Teutonic Knights in Estonia at the end of the sixteenth century were the Swedes,[10] who held the greater part of the country for a hundred and fifty years, and who pushed their conquests beyond Estonia, south into Latvia and east into Russia, right up to the site of the future Russian capital of St. Petersburg on the Neva. In Estonia as in Finland, there is a distinction to be made between Swedish areas of settlement and Swedish rule. Indeed in the south, the area of Swedish colonization was very small indeed, mainly confined to the islands off the west coast, Hiiu Maa (Dagö) and Saare Maa (Oesel). The traces of it there are plain to-day, as the island populations are predominantly Swedish in language and appearance.[10] But on the other hand, there was not in Estonia, as in Finland, a retreat of forested plateau to check penetration from the west, so that although the Swedish population has always been small south of the Gulf, Swedish traditions were fairly firmly planted.

For the Estonians as for the Finns, the effects of Swedish rule were almost wholly good. There was a century and a half at least of liberal administration, of early attempts at agrarian reform, and of the granting of education to the peasant as well as to the more privileged classes, in fact a programme of government very far in advance of the times. Unfortunately, in Estonia, the Swedes came up, if not against geographical barriers, against a very much more effective human opposition than in Finland. Swedish administration was sufficiently popular amongst the Estonians themselves for these years to be remembered later as "the good times/' but the schemes of reform, and especially any which suggested a redistribution of land, were solidly and vigorously opposed by the German Baits. Nevertheless the Swedes contributed to the Estonian survival. They gave to this people, as to the Finns, something, though not all of the standing in culture, and in political and economic efficiency, which enabled the Estonians first to weather the

combination of German and Russian rule, and later to organize as a going concern, a genuinely peasant republic.[11]

The third and Russian influence was completely different from the two former. It had its constructive side. Under the government of the Tzars the full significance of the Russian hinterland to the Baltic ports was appreciated for the first time, and these developed in the nineteenth century with great speed, thanks partly to the enterprise and shrewdness of the German trading settlements in all the coastal towns. The type of railway system which grew up behind the ports showed the significance of the Baltic outlets to the Russian Empire. (See Fig. 25.) Tallinn, Riga, Ventespils and Liepaja were not only the terminus points of main lines from the capital, St. Petersburg, and from Moscow, but served the rail-network of the western part of the Empire. In the great ports too, which were the most accessible for foreign raw materials, and which had the possibilities of German management and a good supply of intelligent labour, industrial enterprise began to thrive. In Estonia, the most important development was that of the textile industries, partly supplied from the local flax crops and partly from imported yarn. These were established mainly at Narva, close to the recent Russian-Estonian frontier, where the great rapids of the Narva river form the best source of water-power in the country. At Narva town also, the outlet for the biggest waterway in Estonia, and on the edge of one of the forest regions, there sprang up important saw-mills. Farther west along the coast, Tallinn and Pärnu were both active in the working and export of timber, and Tallinn had some importance as a centre of heavy industry, and especially of shipbuilding.

It is also worth considering the converse of this situation. The prosperity derived by the South-east Baltic ports from the limitless hinterland of Russia was indeed remarkable; but one must notice also the corresponding parts played by the Baltic peoples in the difficult economic development of nineteenth-century Russia. The Tzars (or Tzarinas) might at any time after the middle of the eighteenth century have taken by sheer force of arms the Baltic coastlands which were so plainly a rounding-off of their western European territories. But in view of the economic standards of the Russian population, the possession of the littoral could not have meant so much to the Empire, if the rulers had not also been in command of the very much more advanced Estonian, Lett and German populations. The German

Bait estates were equal to those in East Prussia in the skill with which the owners made much out of little. Indeed, Prussian capitalists were not averse to lending funds to their own countrymen across the Russian frontier. These magnates were an influential group, if small in numbers, at the Court of the Tzar, Alexander II, and they made their mark on the agrarian legislation associated with the emancipation of the serfs. It is somewhat ironical to find those who were responsible for the highest farming efficiency within the Empire resisting the most needed land reform amongst the Russians. Yet the German Baits could plead with effect that their own estates were models of large-scale farm management. They drew their own labour supply in the Baltic region from the Estonian and Lettish peasants. To these groups also turned the Russian and German merchants and manufacturers for the dockers and factory hands of the coastal towns.

In spite of commercial and industrial progress the feeling against Russian administration was widespread and extremely bitter. Part of the trouble was the Russian support in the last resort of the German Bait land-owners, firm in their opposition to land reform.[12] Centuries of invasion and foreign rule had not crushed the Estonians as a national group, nor made them forget that their own land had been taken and kept from them by force. The elements of a peasant-proprietor class had been formed during the years of Swedish rule, and from this beginning there grew the gradual but desperately stubborn campaign of the Estonian peasants to win back piece by piece land which had been originally theirs. Where land-hunger was the main problem, therefore, the Russian bureaucracy was loathed in its encouragement of the German reactionaries.

The other sharp grievance developed from the recurrent attempts to " Russify " Estonia, partly by urging membership of the Russian Orthodox Church, and partly by attempts to stifle through force and propaganda the growing national cultural movement in the country.[18] The use of Russian was fiercely upheld by the government in the administration, in business houses, in schools, churches and law-courts. The number of nineteenth-century Russian church buildings in Estonia, many now derelict, show the determined attempt at " Russification "; and such a programme, added to official opposition to the peasant land-owner, developed in the Estonians a hatred of Russian rule which found full expression in 1917.

The futility of Russian oppression during this period is almost as obvious in Estonia as in Finland, although, on account largely of geographical position, its effects were more difficult to shake off than in the north. By 1914, in spite of many obstacles to purchase, quite 40 per cent, of the agricultural land of Estonia was in the hands of peasant-owners, although the terms of acquisition for peasants were extremely hard, and the privileges of the great land-owners exasperating. " Russification " further gave to the Estonian cultural movement the vigour of a persecuted cause; and amongst a peasantry which had absorbed and accepted Lutheranism from the liberal Swede and efficient German, the converts to Russian Orthodoxy were not very convincing in their numbers.

The character of the Russian minority in Estonia up to 1939 was further evidence that Russian traditions, *except in the development of the Baltic outlet,* had been relatively slight. The Russian group in Estonia was *numerically* the biggest minority population of all, about 91,000 in number, or 8-2 per cent, of the whole, as against the lesser 18,000 Germans. Yet Russian *influence* in the country was more or less negligible. The majority of Russians in Estonia were in peasant settlements along the eastern frontier, in the only region where illiteracy still survives, and where the standard of farming drops significantly. This type of minority group, great in numbers but weak in influence, formed a marked contrast to that of the Germans in the western towns, who were a few thousand strong only, but who played a very important part in the life of the country.

What is noticeable in studying all forms of foreign influence in Estonia, is the depression of the Estonians for seven hundred years to the status of peasants. The chance of the Estonian to rise in the professions or in trade was perhaps the greatest during the rule of the Swedes, and later, also, the Russians were glad to use the intelligent populations of the South Baltic in industry and commerce. But on the whole, whether the administration were liberal or oppressive, efficient or indolent, the terms " Estonian" and " peasant " were almost synonymous up to the tremendous upheaval of 1917. Though the Estonians were slowly emerging again as a definite national group throughout the nineteenth century, and though the effects of the 1914-1918 War were mainly to hasten violently tendencies which were already established, it was a peasant group which finally achieved the independence of Estonia, and which, without

much experience in political and economic administration, proceeded to make the framework of a new state.

The repression of the small proprietor in the past, and the fact that the new republic was one of peasants, ruled by peasants, are sufficient to explain the sweeping changes in land-ownership which took place in the first few years after 1918. By the end of 1919, agrarian legislation had consigned 96 per cent, of the land held privately in big estates to the hands of the state for redistribution. The lot of the fonner owners here was hard indeed, since no land at all was left to them for their own use, and even partial compensation for the estates was not paid until some years after the confiscation.[14] Almost all the land was divided out amongst small owners on hereditary lease, the majority of the farms being under seventeen hectares in extent.[16] Big properties were allowed only to collective owners such as communes and municipalities.

Considering the sweeping nature of agrarian reform in Estonia, the productivity of the land declined very little indeed. Geographical circumstances, as in Finland, were to some extent responsible for limiting the changes in land utilization. There never had been in Estonia a great tradition of grain crops.[16] Though climatic conditions here are not so unfavourable to arable farming as in Finland, the poverty of much of the soil, and the extent and usefulness of the forests, allows only a very moderate production of the staple cereal crops of the north, rye, oats and barley, whatever the policy of the state. There was not therefore in Estonia the occasion for the revolutionary changes from arable to stock-farming which took place in some parts of Central Europe. Moreover, the standard of Estonian peasant farming was high. Working like the Finns through the Co-operative Societies, the owners of the small properties were quickly able to show that the new farming regime was different from, rather than inferior to, the old. After the first difficult years were over, the area under cultivation for rye and barley, though less than that in the days of the great estate-owners, showed no very noticeable decline, and—what was more significant—the yield per hectare was very well maintained. The area devoted to oats, the third great crop, actually increased, and wheat, which before 1914 had been imported almost entirely from Russia, made its appearance in Estonia with some success. The greatest decline both in area and yield was in the production of the commercial crop of flax, though sufficient was kept both to feed

some of the great Kreenholm textile factories at Narva, and for a certain amount of export, largely to Western Europe.

The greatest difference between the old and new farming systems appeared in the tremendous increase after 1921 in most kinds of livestock, and especially of cattle,[17] though in many cases the numbers of the herds were more impressive than their quality. Even if the traditional grain production of Estonia was maintained, the emphasis on production in the peasant farms was markedly on dairy commodities, and especially on butter and eggs for the export market. Within a very few years the quantity and quality of the Estonian dairy exports to a great extent justified the peasant-proprietor system in that country, especially during the period of good markets for its commodities in Germany and Great Britain which prevailed between 1925 and 1929. Agrarian Reform had indeed altered the face of the land in Estonia, and the first phase of the new order gave to the peasant-proprietors at any rate, great satisfaction.

But together with agrarian reform had come another economic upheaval, inevitable indeed, but of a much less constructive order. Owing to the break-away of the Baltic Provinces from the Russian Empire, and to the peculiar economic isolation of the Soviet Union, there was a complete lapse in the connection between the great Baltic ports and the hinterland of Russia. Indeed the main commercial relationship of the Soviet Union with the small Baltic states was of a disagreeable order. In all three, the possibilities of the export of timber was restricted permanently by Russian competition. The coastal towns of the new republics were a series of minor " Viennas," of which Riga, the Latvian capital, was the most outstanding example. Here were great urban settlements, whose reason for existence had largely disappeared; behind them trailed a network of rail communications to the east, so cut by frontiers as to assume an absurd and meaningless appearance.

The result in Estonia of these violent changes in both land-ownership and commercial activity was a series of peculiar and complicated population shifts. First of all, out of the country in the years immediately after 1918 came a stream of the dispossessed, German land-owners moving westward, and Russian government officials scattering in all directions over the face of the earth. This exodus was followed, in spite of the rapid settlement of the peasant-

owners on the land, by a migration from the country into the towns. This movement had two sources. The foreign administrative system had to be replaced, and by an Estonian personnel, so that bureaucracy offered chances of employment as never before. In the second place there was a tremendous demand for cultural development, especially in the form of university education to which so many limitations had been set in the past. The old Swedish foundation of Gustavus Adolphus at Tartu was reopened as an Estonian university in 1919, and was quickly crowded to overflowing. In 1928, the peak year of prosperity after the 1914-1918 War, the university population of Estonia was, in proportion to the whole, higher than anywhere else in the world, with one student to every 220 persons in the country.

But at the same time that the would-be students and administrators were moving into the towns, one section of the urban population was beginning to decline rapidly in numbers, and in circumstances of great distress. Without the great hinterland of the Russian Empire, the Baltic ports were idle. The spacious quays, built to accommodate numbers of Russian and foreign ships, were empty. Without capital backing, raw materials or markets, except for those associated with a small peasant population, the great industrial enterprises also had failed to recover from the dislocation between 1914 and 1918. The traditional supplies and markets which derived from membership of the Russian Empire were lost, the needs of the home market were very few, and foreign buyers of manufactured goods were not easily found, so that both in commerce and industry, unemployment soon became serious. The natural tendency for the workless during this period of readjustment was to leave the towns and seek a living from the land, especially as after the great redistribution, almost every citizen had some property-owning relative, however humble.

After 1930, the shift from town to country became more and more marked. The economic weakness of Estonia became very apparent during the years of widespread economic crisis, though it was of a different character from that of Finland. Estonian resources whether for internal activity or for foreign trade are certainly more varied than those of Finland. But the fact remains that peasant proprietors form the bulk of the Estonian population, and these people were very severely hit by the drop in the demand

and prices for all farming products, and by the sudden contraction in foreign trade.[18]

Back from the university and technical schools, therefore, came numbers of students, unable to afford the expenses of higher education, though these at Tartu were moderate enough, and hopeless in times of such economic distress of ever qualifying for, or making a living by, trade or the professions. The greatest skill and intelligence on the part of both government and people could not prevent a marked drop in the standards of living and purchasing power. In one sense Estonia became more than ever a peasant state, with each family living almost entirely on the products of its own farm, and having very few cash transactions.

However, if the new order in Estonia was justified in the " twenties " by economic prosperity, it should also have credit for the weathering of the bad times between 1930 and 1934, and for the subsequent revival. Considering the shortness of the period that many of the peasants had worked their farms, and the severity of the economic crisis, the Estonians came through the first trials of their independent existence very well.

A certain amount of revision in the economic system after the years of the crisis were past was noticeable, but of necessity changes in policy were on rather restricted lines. It was possible for the Estonians, within certain degrees, to produce and export more or less, as seemed advisable, of their staple commodities, butter, eggs, flax, sawn timber and cellulose, and to rearrange if feasible their trading connections; but radical changes were out of the question because of the very limited resources of the country. There was only one conceivable development which could substantially alter the economy of Estonia, and which eventually took place between 1939 and 1940 in very peculiar circumstances—the revival of trade relations with Russia. That phenomenon, however, is worth separate consideration later (see pages 90-92). The small-scale readjustments which occurred after the economic crisis had also one or two interesting features which deserve attention. In the first place, there was a noticeable attempt to increase as much as possible the grain production of the country, and in addition to grain, the potato crops which were essential to the national food-supply. This effort was made in order to eliminate as far as possible the expense of importing corn. In the second place, the quantity and value of the butter exports was kept deliberately within

certain limits. The drop in prices, and the sudden failing of the British and German markets between 1931 and 1934, had made the farmers and co-operative societies suitably cautious. In the third place, after the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933 it was found cheaper to import certain raw materials into Estonia, notably for the textile and chemical industries, and to achieve manufacture within the country, rather than to depend so much on the import of finished products. This encouragement to Estonian enterprise was accompanied also by another kind of industrial revival, depending on the varied if modest home resources. The decline in flax production was checked by the renewed demand for it in the local textile mills, the shale and phosphate resources were worked more vigorously, the building firms working with local supplies of stone, cement and timber were more active. In fact one aspect of Estonian economic existence, the industrial, which had been very much in the shadow since the establishment of the republic, began once more to count for something.

It might indeed have been said before the outbreak of war in 1939, that the one-time coastal province of the Russian Empire had been shaped in a generation, and by the process of trial and error, to meet the needs and aims of its population. It was a less wealthy region than before 1914, and less active commercially and industrially, but there was fair economic prosperity within the country and undoubted satisfaction amongst the people with the social and economic system.

On the whole the survival of the Estonian people through the centuries of foreign rule and the organization of the peasant republic was a more notable achievement than the Finnish resurrection. The Finns had the great asset of an effective region of refuge in the lake plateau: the Estonians had none. They had to meet the full force of invasion and of political and economic management from both the east and from the west. That they should have maintained any sort of existence as a distinct group is remarkable: that they should have been able when the opportunity came to develop a state, however limited its activity, and however great the threats to its existence, was one of the political achievements of the generation between the two wars.

The relationships between Russia and Estonia, and between Russia and Latvia, had between September, 1939, and July, 1940, two aspects, one strategic and the other

economic.[19] It was the former which was so thoroughly distasteful to these peoples, that is the establishment of the military, naval and air bases by Soviet forces in their countries. Whatever the ultimate aims of the Union in checking German influence at that time or later in the Baltic, it was concessions such as those wrung from Estonia and Latvia which began to deny their existence as fully independent groups. (See also pp. 342-344.)

In Estonia, on the islands of Hiiu Maa and Saare Maa, and at the outport of Paldiski (Baltiski), the Russians took possession of triple bases for their army, navy and air forces. In the case of the islands also, it must be remembered that these armies of occupation were cheek by jowl with Swedish and not with Estonian peasants.[20] The bases for the army only were placed in three groups down the west coast (see Fig. 23), and those for the air force only, farther inland.

The material danger arising from the presence of Russian troops was in itself a source of anxiety to the Estonians and Letts, since these forces put certain parts of the two states into the category of military objectives for any enemy of Russia. Psychologically also the Russian armies were hateful to the Baltic peoples, since their occupation was a partial negation of the independence for which Estonians and Letts struggled so long, and which they developed with such pride for twenty years.

Economically the situation was somewhat hopeful. The agreements of the Soviet Union with the three South-east Baltic States suggested increased commercial activity, and in this respect these countries were in a different position from Finland. In the first place, their farming products could find a possible market in the Soviet Union, whereas Finnish timber was competitive; in the second place, there was the hope of renewed activity in the ports which are much more valuable south of the Gulf of Finland than they are north of it.[21] In view of the fact that the western outlet for South-east Baltic goods had been largely cut off in 1939 by the naval war, the alternative of markets in the east, in the forest towns of White Russia was possibly some small compensation to the Estonians and Letts for the harsh terms of the agreements. The question of the revival of the ports was and is affected by the war. It is possible that the Estonian and Lettish coastal towns might attain a part of their former activity, if Soviet supplies to Germany were to be effected by means of transit trade through the South-

east Baltic lands, but blockade of the Baltic Sea and the insecurity of shipping in the North Sea must for the time being limit the range of trade. With the further substantial expansion of Russian influence in the East Baltic, it will be interesting to see if the ports between Tallinn and Liepaja resume ultimately their old rôle in European commercial history.

It became also a matter of anxiety for the Estonians and Letts alike, whether the renewed contact with Russia was likely to lead to an undermining of the system of peasant proprietorship. In the case of these two small countries, the economic excuse for such an attack is non-existent. The maximum is being wrung from the soil, if not from the ports, by small-scale activity, and the quantity and quality of farming production can well stand comparison with the large-scale system farther east.

If the rigorous establishment of the Soviet system in the South-east Baltic were to be exacted by Russia on political grounds, sheer force on the part of the Union could achieve it at the expense of appalling suffering amongst the peasant proprietors. But any attack on the small-owner or on the cultural or religious liberties of the Estonians and Letts, whatever the official version of such an upheaval, would arouse such fierce antagonism, that the most ruthless of governments might hesitate fully to awaken it. It is difficult to see either, that populations who have been for centuries economically and culturally so far in advance of the Russians, and who have regarded the Russians so long as their traditional enemies, could ever genuinely accept the Soviet system, even when the years of transition were over. If the establishment of collectivism caused so much opposition and such destruction to life and property amongst the comparatively primitive peasants of the Russian grasslands, it is difficult to estimate the horrors of such a struggle amongst the Baltic peoples, with a different history and a different culture from that of their Russian neighbours. Finally, in so far as this attack develops, so also part of the marchland zone of conservative peasant proprietorship between Russia and Western Europe disappears for good or for ill.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON ESTONIA

1. The name in brackets (" Dwina ") is the Russian one for the Daugava river, and it is this which is most familiar on atlases. Daugavpils, the town on the river in the east of Latvia, has the

corresponding Russian name of Dwinsk. The German forms, " Düna " for the river and " Dünaburg " for the town, are also fairly widely used.

2. The Russian name for this river is so widely used that it seems better to leave it. The Lithuanian name is " Nemunas." The same comment applies to the use of the German name " Memel " for the port instead of the Lithuanian " Klaipeda." It is confusing that the Germans also call the Niemen river, the Memel.

3. The name in brackets is the Danish one, though this is also adopted in Germany. The core of the city of Tallinn is the old Danish castle, built after the Danish victory over the Estonians in 1219, and called Reval. The name Tallinn is derived from the Estonian name for the fortress and settlement, *Taani linn,* i.e. Danish City.

4. The names in brackets are the German ones, which are the most familiar in Western Europe. Paldiski, west of Tallinn, founded in the reign of Peter the Great, was meant to be the out-port of St. Petersburg, and plays the part now for Tallinn. Ventispils has a similar importance for Riga.

5. The western zone is often described as moor and forest. The richest part of it is in the south-west, in what is known as the Pärnu Depression. The eastern and smaller belt is often termed bog and forest.

6. See Gallienne, *Report on Economic Conditions in Estonia,* Appendix III (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1939).

7. The composition of the Estonian population in 1939 was reckoned: Estonians, 88·2 per cent.; Russians, 8*2 per cent.; Germans, 1*5 per cent.; Swedes, -07 per cent.; Jews, 04 per cent.; others, 2·09 per cent, (mainly Finns and Letts and a very small Polish population). The total population of the country at the last census (1934) was 1,126,413.

8. Reval, Pernau, Riga, Windau and Memel are all marked as Hanse towns. See Putzger's *Historischer Schul-Atlas* (Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1924).

9. See *Report on Economic Conditions,* etc., 1935, Appendix I, p. 29, and 1939, Appendices I and II, p. 31.

10. The Swedish administration of Estonia began in 1583 with the Swedes' victory over the Russian armies advancing from the east, though the conquests of this year did not include the whole of Estonia. Swedish rule ended with the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, when the Baltic provinces passed altogether to Russia.

11. See the references to Swedish rule in *The Estonian Tear Book, 1927,* p. 24 (Tallinn: Government Printing Office).

12. The Russian attitude to land-reform, and also to the German Baits, varied a good deal. The Germans were by no means consistendy popular amongst the Russian bureaucracy, and the discontent of the Estonian peasantry was sometimes used by the Russians against the Bait land-owners. However, in the face of systematic revolt, such as occurred in 1905, the bureaucracy and the land-owners stood firmly together. (See *The Baltic States,* pp. 15, 16; London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs; Oxford University Press, 1938.)

13. The same comment really applies to the persecution of Estonian culture. This was spasmodically very severe, but it depended largely on the personal attitude of the Tsars, and there were liberal as well as oppressive reigns in this respect.

14. The actual amount of land confiscated from private properties was reckoned as 2,346,494 hectares, 25 per cent, of the whole country. (One hectare = 2*47 acres.) (See *Estonian Tear Book.)* The great

complaint of the dispossessed owners, here as elsewhere, was that even if partial compensation were forthcoming, the payments were very tardy and in depreciated currency.

15. *Ibid.,* p. 109.

16. See *The Baltic States,* p. 109.

17. *Ibid.,* p. 112.

18. *Ibid.,* p. 143.

19. In discussing the recent expansion of Russian control in the South-east Baltic, the relationships between the Soviet Union and Estonia and Latvia can sensibly bo considered as one topic. Russian influence in Lithuania, however, has always been, and in the recent Baltic crisis still remained, different in character from that in the two republics to the north. (See pp. 117 and 343.)

20. It is reported that the Soviet government requested the removal of the Swedish inhabitants of the islands, so that there shall be no contact between the Russian garrisons and peasants of Scandinavian extraction.

21. It is worth while remembering in this respect the terms of the 1920 Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Estonia which are quoted in Bowman's *New World,* p. 440. While the main impression during the last twenty years has been of the absence in the South-east Baltic of commercial relationships with Russia, the terms of this treaty allowed for a considerable revival if the Soviet Union should consider this profitable at any time.

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CHAPTER III

LATVIA

LATVIA, with its territory of 24,440 square miles, is the largest of the three south-eastern republics. An account of its historical and political development is in many ways inevitably a repetition of the chapter on Estonia. The fundamental influences of history on the two peoples, and the difficulties confronting them in modern times, are very similar. In Latvia, as in Estonia, a small indigenous group was depressed for seven centuries to the status of peasants, and subjected to the rule of Germans, Swedes and Slavs. Further, the Letts, like the Estonians, were successful after the 1914-1918 War in reviving the political existence of a peasant population and in building up a small republic. They too had to pay the price of political independence in the sacrifice of old economic ties, since the coastal cities and industrial and commercial wealth of Latvia declined like those farther north. The courses of development since the recognition of their independence in 1920 have been very much the same also for both republics; they both began with the successful establishment of the peasant farms and the building up of foreign markets for their products: they continued to a second stage of economic distress and they both emerged to a third of cautious revival. They are now affected alike by the westward thrust of the Soviet Union.

But in detail, whether of geographical feature or of historical and economic tradition, there are differences between the two countries which are extremely interesting and which entitle each to a separate study.

Of the three south-eastern republics, Latvia, between 1921 and 1939, gave the impression of greatest variety. This may have been due partly to a larger territory, but there is also another possible explanation. The economic standards of Latvia at the time of establishing the republic were not exactly lower than those in Estonia, but they were very uneven. The lack of uniform competence

FIG. 26.—General Map of Latvia. The political frontiers obtaining between 1921 and 1939 are marked with thick black lines. Scale approx. 1 : 4,500,000.

amongst the Letts to exploit their environment thus made certain contrasts within the country which caught the eye, though by 1939 these were beginning to disappear after twenty years of fairly continuous progress.

The middle and lower Daugava Basin is the core of Latvia, and the course of the main stream from Daugavpils on the south-eastern frontier to Riga at the river mouth, cuts the country diagonally into two, separating Livland[1] in the north from Kurland in the south. (See Fig. 26.) The river itself flows through three fairly distinct types of landscape. In the east it divides the poor country of Latgale, with its forests and sandy wastes where wheeled traffic has often to run on lines of planks, from the more prosperous hilly Zemgale in the south. At Jekabpils[2] (Jakobstadt), about half-way between the frontier and the coast, the Daugava begins to run between low cliffs which make access to the water rather difficult. On the right bank are the Livonian Heights,[8] the low hills which stretch north-east to the Estonian frontier, and on the left the uplands of Zemgale continue. The cliffs come to an end only at the junction of the Ogre with the Daugava, about twenty miles above Riga, and from that point onwards the river flows through the flat coastal plain to the Gulf.

Two other rivers enter the Gulf quite close to the Daugava,

To the north is the Gauja, or Livonian Aa.[4] The basin of the Gauja forms the greater part of the north-western region of Latvia, and the river runs for most of its course between steep low cliffs. East of the Aa valley are the low hills of Lemsal-Volmar and the rather narrow coastal plains of Livland. On the other side of the Daugava estuary, a few miles only to the south-west of it, is the mouth of the Lielupe, with its huge fan of tributaries. These rise in the semi-circle of hills behind the Gulf of Riga and flow across the flat plains between the uplands and the sea which are known as the Riga-Jelgava [6] Depression.

Finally, to the east is the country which has a "Baltic" rather than a " Gulf" orientation. This region is drained by the Venta [6] river, which rises across the frontier in Lithuania and works its way through the Kurzeme Hills to the Kurish plains and the Baltic port of Ventispils.

These geographical features justify mention because reference to them is often necessary when commenting on the historical and economic development of Latvia. They explain also some of the contrasts which are still apparent within her frontiers.

The most ancient man-made division in Latvia is that north of the Daugava, between east and west, that is, between the original habitats of the Letts and Li vs.[7] This separateness belongs to the very early days of settlement in this region. The traditional contrast between the two groups was occupational. The Livs were originally the fisher-folk of the western shores of the Gulf, the land between the Lemsal-Volmar Heights and the sea and at the tip of the peninsula of Kurland. (See Fig. 4.) They had their own name " latvis " for the tribes of the interior, which means " forest-clearers." They bequeathed to the country the provincial name for the land north of the Daugava, Livland, though this term to-day covers a very much larger area than that of actual Liv settlement; also their description of the forest-folk provided the word from which " Latvia," the name of the whole republic, is derived.

For some centuries there were racial and linguistic distinctions as well as occupational ones between Livs and Letts. The Livs were a minority with the racial characteristics and speech of the Finno-Ugric groups farther north. They were probably pushed south-westward out of the land now known as Estonia and settled the coasts of the Gulf as fishermen. To-day, however, the Liv racial type is almost indistinguishable, except in the extreme

north-west, so long and thoroughly has this minority mixed with the Lett majority. Almost all Livs also own Lettish as their native tongue. But the isolated cases remain to show the original contrast. The Letts are a taller, narrower-headed people than the Livs and Finns, though skin and hair colour are fair in the case of all three groups. They appear to be the survivors of a population who, judging from skeletal remains, were once very numerous in the grasslands of Russia, but who were gradually pushed north-west by stronger groups.[8] The Lettish language is Aryan, not Altaic like those of the northern peoples, and together with the Lithuanian it ranks as one of the most ancient in Europe.

In commenting on the medieval and modern history of Latvia, the question of the geographical position of the whole country is also very important. From the point of view of political and economic development it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the southerly position of Latvia as compared with that of Estonia, has been in many ways a disadvantage.

To begin with, it meant that Latvia was on the very outside edge of the sphere of Swedish influence in the Baltic. Thus, when the rule of the Teutonic Knights began to weaken in the fifteenth century, the struggle between their successors over the regions south of Estonia became very confused. (See Fig. 27.)

The Letts were affected by a domination which barely touched Estonia, that of the Poles, which people over-ran the whole of what is now Latvia, pushing north as far as the depression in southern Estonia. In the northern part of Latvia, however, their rule was comparatively short, as the whole of Livland with the exception of Latgale was taken by the Swedes between 1620 and 1630. Kurland remained nominally Polish until this state was divided up at the end of the eighteenth century. In central and west Kurland, however, the German land-owners and traders kept their grip as they did in Estonia, whatever the nominal administration, so that Polish influence is really only traceable in Latvia in two forms. At the time of the establishment of the Latvian Republic there were still in the east of its territories a few Polish land-owners, whose properties suffered the same fate as those of the other aristocracies in the new peasant states. In addition Polish rule had left its impress on the population of Latgale. Here is the Roman Catholic stronghold in Latvia, in contrast with the

Lutherans of the north and west; the peasants of Latgale still adhere in creed and practice to the example of the Poles, who are famous as the most fervent Romanist group in northern Central Europe.

FIG,—The Extension of Foreign Rule in Latvia between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries. This map shows the confusion of foreign dominations in this region after the control of the Teutonic Knights weakened in the fifteenth century. It is noticeable that in many cases the frontiers established by different rulers in succession are almost identical. This is accounted for largely by respect for geographical feature ; and to realize this point, this map should be compared with Figs. 23 and 26. The use of the Daugava River and its north bank tributaries for political divisions is apparent and also that of the high ground separating Lithuania from Kurland and Zemgale.

The Swedish occupation of Livland ended, as in Estonia, with the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, when all the Swedish possessions south of the Gulf of Finland were ceded to Russia. Northern Latvia had thus less than a century of a comparatively "liberal" administration before becoming a part of the Russian Empire.

The lack of a really constructive period in Lettish history became apparent in the effort to create the Latvian Repub-

lie. For example, in spite of a long struggle in the nineteenth century, the average position of the peasants here was distinctly worse in 1920 than in Estonia. About two-thirds of Latvia was in the hands of foreign estate-owners, as compared with just over a half of Estonia, and the prevailing standard of peasant farming in the south was lower.[10] The reaction of the Letts people to past social and economic hardship, evident in the passing and administration of the Land Laws (1920 and 1924), was correspondingly severe. Although former estate-owners were allowed to keep a small portion of their properties for personal use, no compensation at all was allowed, so that in Latvia agrarian reform was not so much a matter of purchase for redistribution as of confiscation.[11]

A position farther south in the Baltic plains also plainly served to involve the Letts in the actual devastations of war more often and more violently than the Estonians. One instance of it has just been cited, that of the successive Polish and Swedish conquests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Another of recent memory, and the most savage of all, was the destruction suffered in the 1914-1918 war. All the Baltic States, it is true, were involved in the struggles of those years, prolonged in this part of Europe until 1920, but any map of the " Eastern Front " shows the intensity of the fighting throughout Lithuania and in Latvia west of a line from Riga to Daugavpils (the ancient frontier between Kurland and Livland).[12] In the first years of independence, therefore, the Letts had to cope with a burden of war devastation which was considerably heavier than that of the north. At the end of the five years' fighting, coastal trade was practically at a standstill, large areas of land had gone out of cultivation, many of the forests were laid waste and numbers of Lettish people had fled abroad as refugees. It was literally upon the ruins of the past that the Letts had to build their new republic.

In the attempt to do so, the third noticeable disadvantage of the position of Latvia became apparent. In Estonia, whatever the handicaps to progress, there was some appearance of homogeneity in the land, in culture, in creed and in economic standards. In Latvia, because the country was in a position to suffer from an even greater confusion of influences, there was the initial problem of diversities in a small state.

In the first place it was not surprising between 1921 and 1939 to find larger minorities than in Estonia. In 1939,

out of a total population of two million, only 75 per cent, were Lettish, though after the departure of the Germans the minority proportion dropped below 25 per cent. The minority question, however, was somewhat the same as in the north. The Russian group is the largest, 12 per cent, of the whole, mainly in peasant settlements in the south-eastern frontier districts, but also including the exiles from the Soviet regime in the towns. The Germans, who formed 3 per cent, of the whole, were again the most vigorous of the minority peoples. What has been noticeable though, and what is almost absent from Estonia, is an active Jewish population in the towns (4 per cent, of the whole); the Jews have been responsible for as much as 40 per cent, of the trade of Latvia, and their centre is Daugavpils, the frontier and garrison town of the south-east.

In the second place, the standards and interests of the various peasant groups in Latvia were not at first entirely harmonious. There was the same contrast as in Estonia between town and country and between the life of the ports and that of the interior, but in addition to that, the efficiency and outlook of the inland farming population varied considerably from district to district.

Some of these contrasts, it is true, were due to environmental influences. Like the rest of the Baltic region, the greater part of Latvia was in its natural state thickly wooded. But human settlement here, as in the north, by the process of trial and error, has made distinctions between one region and another. (See page 78.) Some lands have been cleared for profitable farming, some left (and now preserved) as forest, and some appear as a test of the endurance or perhaps as evidence of the desperation of the peasants who attempt to scratch out a living from them.

The highest standard of peasant farming belonged traditionally, and still belongs, to the outer rim of the Lielupe Basin in Central Kurland. This is partly accounted for by good soils,[13] but also, one must admit, by the influence of German efficiency, however much the Bait land-owners were detested. In the early days of the republic, the opposite extreme was in the south-east, where, in comparison with western Kurland, the methods and achievements of peasant farming, whether Lett or Russian, were somewhat deplorable. The poor yields of the small patches of cleared land in Latgale were not only due to soil conditions, but also to centuries of very primitive exploitation. The standards of

farming in Latvia in 1920 indeed coincided very closely with those of literacy in the various districts.

The difficulties of establishing a reasonable degree of political and economic order in Latvia were thus considerable. Even the Lettish majority were at different stages of economic and cultural development, and the eastern and western parts of the country professed two contrasting forms of Christianity. There were also minority groups to be appeased and incorporated into the new regime, and one of these, the German, was prepared to be very critical indeed. The destruction of five years' warfare had made the resources of the republic very much less than normal, and, whatever the wisdom or unwisdom of the policy, there was no avoiding the addition to all these problems of the question of land-reform, so fierce was the demand from the peasants.

After the inevitable confusion of the start, however, the new regime was established, and the various regions of Latvia contributed what they could to the prosperity of the new republic.

There was more emphasis than in Estonia on the forest resources. Latvia has a higher proportion of forest land to the whole than either of the other South-east Baltic states (nearly a third, as compared with a fifth in Estonia and Lithuania). This land-use is from necessity rather than choice. The great fir woods which cover the country are on soils which are unattractive to cultivation or grazing, so that the temptation to clearance has not been very strong.[14]

The forests lie in three great blocks across the country, and after the establishment of the republic almost all were taken over by the state. (See Fig. 28.) The first is in the south-east, covering most of Latgale. The second surrounds the Gulf in a belt of varying width, and is broken only at the mouth of the Daugava by the clearances round Riga. For both these forest regions the Daugava river is valuable for transport. In both cases, too, the forest vegetation has been undisturbed because of the poor sandy soils. The third zone is on the western peninsula between the Gulf and the open sea.

For the first few years after 1920, the tax on the forest resources of Latvia looked like exceeding their strength. A great deal of damage had been done to them during the war years, and to this destruction was now added the burden pf the outlay on the new state. A tremendous amount of



FIG. 28.—Distribution of forest land in Latvia. The percentages given show the proportion of forest land to the total area of the region. Note the extent of the forest clearance in the fertile Lielupe Basin. Scale approx. 1 : 5,000,000.

reparation for existing housing was essential, and also the provision of farm buildings for the new little properties. Since throughout the country wood is obviously the cheapest and most suitable building material, the demand on Latvian timber was severe. At the same time forest commodities were needed to furnish in value about a third of the export trade.[15] Finally, the market for dairy products abroad also implied increasing " cuts " of timber for the casks in which the cheese and butter were packed. Indeed for about ten years from 1921-1931, the amount of timber felled in Latvia exceeded the amount planted and the strain on the forests might have proved very serious if during the period of the economic crisis all these demands had not suddenly slackened. By that time the building needs of the country were about completed and the requirements for export became suddenly less, as neither timber nor dairy produce was sold in such big quantities. The slump had in one respect, therefore, a little compensation for Latvia in allowing the timber supplies to accumulate once more.

Interspersed with the forest regions were the cleared lands of varying economic worth. The two upland districts of the Livonian Heights in the north and the Kurzeme plateau in the south-west developed into the main regions of stock-rearing and dairy-farming, and the outer part of the Lielupe Basin kept its high reputation for the

best crops, whether for food or forage. In Livland the tradition of flax cultivation was maintained in scattered districts, though not in the abundance of the days before 1914. In Latgale, in the limited areas where forest-land did not prevail, there was a certain amount of poor cultivation and of sheep-rearing.

There is much plainly in this description of the establishment of peasant proprietorship in Latvia which recalls the modern economic history of Estonia. The " twenties " saw in Latvia also a rise in the numbers of livestock and an attempt to maintain the standard of arable farming. Like the Estonians the Letts laid emphasis on the export of dairy products and timber, and became dependent on Germany for imports and on Great Britain for a market.

On the whole, however, the cost of readjustment in Latvia was higher than in Estonia, because Latvia contained Riga, the greatest of the South-east Baltic cities.[16] Settlements like Tallinn and Pärnu in Estonia were substantial towns, and their distress, when industry and the transit trade failed, was severe enough. But Riga was more than a town: it was a great commercial and industrial city of half a million people. In spite of the one disadvantage of its site, the position in the stiller waters of the Gulf which makes for frequent winter freezing, Riga had up to 1914 the greatest commercial tradition and prosperity of all the Russian Baltic ports except St. Petersburg. But after the disasters of the war years and the abrupt break with Russia, the case of Riga was desperate. Her activities were reduced to a fraction of their former scope, depending largely on the sawing and shipping of the timber floated down the Daugava and on the manufacture of the butter and cheese casks. The establishment and maintenance of the peasant economy of the interior was indeed bought at a price.

It was partly the depressing situation in Riga and the two smaller ports, Ventispils and Liepaja, which for a period steered the course of Latvian foreign relations rather differently from that of the Estonians. The Letts shared with the other Baltic peoples the suspicion of Communist influence from the east, but their relationships with the Soviet government showed, on the whole, sounder commercial instincts than those of the two northern states. They made vigorous efforts, especially between 1927 and 1932, to revive the Baltic ports and the industries of Riga by the renewal of trade with Russia.[17] The common sense of this attitude is not really contradicted by recent events in the South-east

Baltic States. If Latvian efforts had been more successful, the crises of July, 1940, in the small republics might have been less painful.

A second explanation of this policy, which was certainly the exception in the East Baltic, lay in the strength of the Jewish trading community in Latvia. There was a business element in the country which, though largely composed of small merchants, was shrewd, experienced and less provincial in outlook than the bulk of the population; these people could see after 1920 the solid economic advantages of better relations with Russia.

Indeed, from the point of view of establishing firmer foundations to Latvian economy, there was much to be said at the time in favour of Lettish efforts to revive the Russian connection. The main difficulties in the scheme were first, the suspicion that it created amongst the other Baltic groups, particularly the Estonians, and secondly the financial obstacles which finally quenched the attempt altogether. The statistics of trade between Russia and Latvia during the period of the Commercial Treaty (1927-1932) show a quick increase, especially in the volume of Lettish exports to the Soviet Union, and then a sudden and depressing decline, largely owing to the Russian attitude to the question of commercial credits.[18] This failure was the more regrettable because it occurred in the midst of the economic depression, when the export trade of Latvia and Estonia to the western markets was at its lowest ebb. There was no marked attempt to renew trade negotiations until the somewhat violent approaches from Russia in the autumn of 1939.

It was again in detail only that the measures taken in Latvia to revive prosperity after the economic crisis differed from those in Estonia. There was fundamentally an identical policy in the two countries mainly noticeable in the increases in cereal and root-crop production and in the caution over the export activities. Latvia also experienced the same modest revival of industry as Estonia.

In Latvia, however, one crop increased very much in the last few years before the war with great success, that of sugar beet.[19] It was far more popular in Latvia than in Estonia and its production was an asset both to a home-grown food supply and to industrial activity. In other industrial enterprises also, Lettish activities were different in various particulars from Estonian. There was on the whole, by reason of the tradition of Riga, a greater natural

interest in industry in Latvia than in the north. But the effort between 1934 and 1939 was to decentralize it, to break away from the great agglomeration in the capital, and where raw materials allowed, to distribute small enterprises more evenly over the countryside.[20]

For both republics the main raw material was timber, and both had to depend too on the contributions of farming to industry in the form of hides and flax and potatoes. But where Estonia for secondary activities relied, apart from imports, upon her oil-shale, phosphorites, gypsum and limestone, the main Latvian enterprises were in brick and glass manufacture, drawing on local supplies of clay and sand.[21]

In the matter of fuel Latvia was at a disadvantage throughout the twenty years between 1919 and 1939. She had not the oil-shale resources of Estonia, and had to depend accordingly on imported fuel and on her own timber and peat. However by 1939 the first scheme for hydro-electrical development, using the Dole rapids on the Daugava river, was approaching completion, and, provided that the necessary capital were forthcoming, this might be the forerunner of several plants on the Latvian rivers.[22] It might well be that with the full use of her " white coal," the supply of power in Latvia could become the best in the South-east Baltic.

In reviewing the political development of Latvia in the last generation, there are two features which stand out. One is the success in welding together the various groups within the country. This was not easy either during the first years of the establishment of the peasant proprietor system, or later during the period of economic depression. There were many circumstances in Latvia which might have given rise to disunion even in times of comparative peace and prosperity, but the solidarity of the republic stood the test of some troubled history very well.

The other feature has been the recognition in Latvia of the significance of Russian trade. It is true that for the Letts, no less than for the other Baltic peoples, the Russian determination to-day to control the Baltic must be antipathetic. All the trade in the world has been no real compensation to Latvia for the planting by the Russians of military bases on the peninsula of Kurland between Piza and Ventispils (see Fig. 23) nor for the naval bases near Ventispils and Liepaja. Much less could direct commercial links with the Soviet Union make amends to the small

republic for the second stage of Russian control which is discussed at the end of the book (see pp. 333-334). But one must recognize amongst the Letts, whose history has taken shape in one of the greatest trading regions of Northern Europe, an instinctive awareness of the hinterlands to the east and west of Latvia. This instinct was apparent between 1921 and 1939. The problem is that the renewal of the commercial relationship with the Russians has brought with it such political accompaniments for the Lettish people.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON LATVIA

1. The terms " Li viand " and " Livonia " are synonymous.
2. Jekabpils is the Lett form, Jakobstadt the German.
3. The term " Livonian Heights " is so much used that it seems better to keep it. In Latvia these uplands are known as the Vidzeme Plateau.
4. In Germany, by very confusing terminology, the northern river, which has the Lettish name " Gauja," is known as the " Livlandischer Aa," and the southern river which the Letts call " Lielupe" is in German the " Kurischer Aa."
5. Jelgava is the Lettish name for the town on the Lielupe river, and also for the surrounding lowland. Mitau is the German name which is more familiar.
6. Venta is the Lettish name, Windau the German. The German word applies both to the river and the port at the mouth; the Letts calls the town Ventispils.
7. See Kuppfer, *Baltische Landeskunde,* pp. 373, 391, 392.
8. See Haddon, *The Races of Man,* p. 65 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1929).
9. See Zolmanis, *Latvia among the Baltic States,* p. 115 (Riga, 1931).

Before the departure of the Germans the Lutherans in Latvia formed 57 per cent, of the whole population, and the Catholics 25 per cent.; the remainder were composed of Eastern Orthodox adherents, 14 per cent., and Jewish congregations, 4 per cent. In contrast, in Estonia 79 per cent, were Lutherans, the Catholics were negligible, and the main religious minority was the Eastern Orthodox, in the towns amongst the White Russian exiles and also on the eastern frontier amongst the Russian peasants. The Lutheran majority was slightly decreased by the exodus of the Germans, but remains still predominant in both countries.

10. *Ibid.,* p. 42.
11. See *The Baltic States,* p. 29.
12. See, for example, Putzger's *Historischer Schul-Atlas,* p. 140.
13. See Woods, *The Baltic Region,* p. 381.
14. *Ibid.,* pp. 386, 387.
15. See *The Baltic States,* p. 123, Table 23.
16. The percentage of urban population to the whole in Latvia is higher than amongst the other groups. The 1931 statistics gave 34 per cent, as the proportion for Latvia, 30 per cent, for Estonia and 13 per cent, for Lithuania. The higher percentage in Latvia is mainly accounted for by the size of Riga. TheSe figures have been altered recently by the following events: (1) In Lithuania, the loss of Memel and the gain of Vilna, the total effect being to raise the percentage of

urban settlement in that country; (2) The loss in all three countries of the German minorities mainly from the towns. The main relationships between the three states remain the same, Latvia still having the highest percentage and Lithuania the lowest.

17. See Sobolevitch, *Les itats Baltes et Ia Russie Soviitique,* p. 184 (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1928). See also *The Baltic States,* p. 127.

18. *Ibid.,* p. 126, Table 1.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 147.

20. See Hobson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Latvia, p.* 33 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1938).

21. See Zolmanis, *Latvia among the Baltic States,* p. 97.

22. See Hobson, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Latvia,* P-45-

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CHAPTER IV

LITHUANIA

THE outline of Lithuania on the map of Europe, with and without Memel-land and the Vilna region, is perhaps more familiar to English people than that of the two small northern republics. (See Fig. 29.) The reason for this is that four times during the last two years Lithuania has had headline value in the newspapers. The first occasion was in the spring of 1938 when the Polish-Lithuanian frontier was opened for the first time for eighteen years, but by rather forcible methods : the Poles threatened to invade Lithuania if normal relations were not established.[1] The second episode was that of the German pounce on Klaipeda Territory or Memel-land[2] in the spring of 1939, an incident which would have received more attention if the world had not been dumb-struck by the recent occupation of Czechoslovakia. The third was the return to Lithuania of the disputed Vilna region by the Agreement of Moscow in October 1939, which was part of the general division of Polish territory. The last was the return of the Lithuanian people to the control of Great Russia in July 1940.

It is not often realized, however, that the framework of the Lithuanian state is in miniature identical with that of Poland. In both regions there is the conflict for priority in political and economic development between a river basin unit and a sea unit. One can imagine the growth of a small but vigorous state, in the middle and lower Niemen lands, with an outlet on the Baltic through the Kurish harbour. But rivalling this form of state development there has been for centuries German expansion along the Baltic coasts, especially in a north-easterly direction, claiming the ports and estuaries as the field of German activity and cramping thus the growth of the river communities.

These circumstances are present indeed in the lower Daugava, the lower Niemen and the lower Vistula lands. In the Daugava region, though German settlement per-



FIG. 29.—General Map of Lithuania. Scale 1 : 4,250,000.

sisted until the drastic population shifts of 1939, political influence was not strong enough to prevent the Russians from controlling the coastlands, nor to stop the river group, the Letts, from recovering their hold on Baltic shores for at least one generation after the 1914-1918 War. In the Vistula Basin the grip of the river people, the Poles, has been sufficient to provoke colossal struggles over the possession of the estuarine lands. In the Niemen Basin the river nation, the Lithuanians had to yield once more in the spring of 1939 to the stronger forces of German coastal settlement and development. It is hardly common sense to ascribe this conflict simply to German aggressive instincts. This is a geographical setting for recurrent battles for control, and it is duplicated in other parts of Europe, notably in the Adriatic. The situation in the Baltic is but one example of the problem. It is difficult also to believe that even if German interest in this region was formally renounced in the autumn of 1939, and even if the token of renunciation was the complete removal of the German minorities in the South-east Baltic states, the last has been heard of German influence north of Memel-land.

In Lithuania itself the fortunes of the Niemen people **are**

extremely interesting, even though disaster overtook them after a generation of independence, as many had foretold. Their individuality is noticeable especially to the traveller coming from Estonia and Latvia, where, of necessity, both before and after the 1914-1918 War, the course of events was rather similar. In Lithuania, one must admit, the main features which at first made this country different from the other two were a more primitive economy, and lower standards of living. But apart from these less worthy distinctions which were disappearing by 1939, the Lithuanian countryside, and the political and economic history of these people have an attractive character of their own.

The first Lithuanian occupation of the middle and lower Niemen lands is hard to date. Historians usually describe it with caution, as belonging to " the earliest times." One view is that both Lithuanians and Letts inhabited first the lands farther south between the Oder and Vistula, but that by the end of the sixth century B.G. they had already been pushed north by the Teutonic tribes.[8] Mortensen [4] thinks that they entered from the east, and that for centuries the Lithuanian area of settlement was limited in the east by the Polish-Lithuanian Heights, which formed the frontier between them and the Slavs. He points out, too, the historic connection between the Lithuanian people and the Niemen system, as the first settlements belonged almost exclusively to the neighbourhood of the waterways.

The relation between the Letts and Lithuanians is parallel to that between the Finns and Estonians. The two southern peoples have the same racial characteristics, and languages which are akin to each other, though Lithuanian is the older of the two. But just as in the case of the two groups farther north, the influences of geography and history have given the Lett and Lithuanian peoples very different fortunes.

The Lithuanians settled a region which, as has been mentioned, was one of reasonable promise if it had not been for the strength of the competing coastal activity. Through it runs the main stream of the Niemen, the " axis " of the country just as the Daugava divides Latvia. (See Fig. 29.) From its source near the Russian town of Minsk, the river flows mainly in a westerly direction to the point now marked by the Polish town of Grodno. There it turns north to wind in zig-zag fashion through what is to-day southern Lithuania. This middle course is, like that of the Daugava, between cliff walls, and the stream is broken constantly by rapids. On either side is the upland country through

which ran the controversial Polish-Lithuanian frontier. On the west are the hills of the Suvalki area, and on the east the more extensive high ground of the Polish-Lithuanian Heights (the Vilna region). This southern and eastern part of the country containing the middle course of the Niemen river and the highlands is sometimes called Upper Lithuania [5] to distinguish it from the low-lying country of the centre and west.

The open course of the Niemen, however, does not coincide with the general division between eastern highland and western lowland. The cliff walls overhanging the river end only some miles below Kaunas,[6] about halfway between the capital and the Memel-land frontier, so that the last section with easy access to the water is short. Further, where the middle course of the river has the defect of frequent rapids from the point of view of navigation, the lower course has its own problem of awkward sandbanks.

The western lowland country through which the Niemen main-stream runs is known as South Zemaičiai, or in the more familiar German form, Sud-Zemaiten.[7] It ends finally in the almost land-locked piece of water known as the Kurish Harbour, which is closed on the west by the long, narrow, sandy spit of the Kurish Peninsula. To the north-east of the Niemen plains there is a second piece of lowland country in the Nevežis Basin, the area drained by the big right-bank tributary of the Niemen.

Lower Lithuania includes besides the Niemen plains the north-western block of upland country, the low hills of Siauliai and Telsiai (Hoch-Zemaiten), which cut off the Nevežis Basin from the coastal plains of Memel-land, and in which rise the north-flowing rivers running through Lettish Kurland.

A discussion of the resources and possibilities of this country is really more relevant a little later, in connection with the modern history of Lithuania (see pp. 120-130). It is enough now to say that there is potentially sufficient fertility and variety in product to give the necessary economic support to a stable political unit. It is noticeable, for example, that Lithuania with a smaller territory than Latvia, with fewer towns and with less traditional skill in making the most of natural resources, has always been able to support a larger population.[8]

The frontier which must inevitably limit the development of the Niemen unit was established, however, as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, when the Teutonic

Knights conquered and held the coastal strip which to-day is known as Memel-land. The dividing line between Memel-land and the interior runs from north to south, from a point on the coast a few miles below the Baltic fishing village of Palanga to the Niemen settlement of Smalininkai.[9] Except for the twenty years between 1923 and 1938, it has always separated the coastal lands and Niemen outlet, known as Lithuania Minor or Memel-land, from the bulk of Lithuanian territory inland, which goes by the name of Lithuania Major.

But a map of the German conquests in the Baltic shows the peculiar nature of the territory held by the Teutonic Knights in Lithuania.[10] (See Fig. 27.) The coastal strip was the first of the acquisitions made by the Order working north-eastwards from Prussia ; but in comparison with their possessions in Latvia and Estonia the belt actually dominated by the knights was very narrow, a tiny corridor indeed between East Prussia and Kurland. Partly the difficult country of the lower and middle Niemen Basin, with its earlier abundant covering of forest and marsh vegetation, and partly the fighting qualities of the Lithuanians, prevented the Germans from pushing inland for systematic settlement much beyond the Jura and Šešupė tributaries of the Niemen. They turned north instead along the coasts of Latvia and Estonia, which for trading purposes were more profitable. The district east of this corridor, known to the Germans as Zemogaiten, that is, between the Jura and Sventa rivers, is indeed marked as an acquisition of the Teutonic Knights between 1384 and 1422, but there was not here the thorough occupancy of the lands farther north. The real rulers of Zemogaiten were the Lithuanian Princes from their capital of Vilna.

East of the Memel-land frontier the history of the Lithuanians was very different from that of the other Baltic peoples. They not only put up a stout and effective resistance to the German Military Order, but they were an aggressive people with military capacity which gave them considerable control in the forest regions far to the south-east actual Lithuanian settlement.[11] (See Fig. 30.)

From the fourteenth century onwards their fortunes were inseparably connected with those of the Poles, and it is interesting to study the close alliance for centuries between peoples who between 1919 and 1939 were the bitterest enemies. There was indeed in the circumstances of both groups much to make for union. There is no outstanding



FIG. 30.—Expansion of Lithuania in the Middle Ages. The " Wildnis " region marked on the map is discussed in Note 10 at the end of the chapter on Lithuania and the significance of the Polish-Lithuanian Heights in Notes 4 and 10. This map should also be compared with Figs. 40 and 45. The two together illustrate the difficulty of establishing either the exact limits of expansion of the joint Polish and Lithuanian groups, or the individual strength and achievement of each group. Note the westward shift of Lithuanian settlement since the fifteenth century.

geographical barrier between them beyond the general difficulty of movement in the big forests of the North-east European Plain; they had common foes—the Germans to the west, the Russians to the east—and a common faith—Roman Catholicism—to draw them together. The very problem of establishing the Polish-Lithuanian frontier after 1918 was evidence of the tendency of these two groups to intermingle freely and for the linguistic frontiers between them to become blurred.

In 1386 the crowns were united by a marriage alliance, and the King of Poland became also the Grand-duke of Lithuania, although apart from the ruler each unit remained distinct. This first stage of union was followed by the most

prosperous years in the history of either group. During the fifteenth century, the two peoples controlled the Isthmus of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the vigorous traffic of the Niemen waterway showed the full possibilities of this east and west route. Kaunas, at the junction of the Niemen and the Vilja, and farther east, Vilna, were the two main trading centres in flax, fur, wood and wax ; and along the banks of the Lower Niemen small trading settlements sprang up, still represented by river villages.[1*] These are at regular intervals of about thirty miles, the length of a day's journey for a trading vessel moving downstream towards the Kurish harbour.

In 1569 the second stage of union took place, with the establishment of a common Diet or Parliament, and the Lithuanians, who had prospered in the best days of Poland, were inevitably involved in her decline. The last stage of complete amalgamation took place in 1791, just before the second Treaty of Partition removed another slice of Poland temporarily from the map of Europe. It was as a single political unit that the whole of Lithuania (excepting Memel-land) and the central provinces of Poland were absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1793.

The following hundred and fifty years of foreign rule really revived the differences between Poles and Lithuanians. The stimulus of oppression made all subject peoples increasingly conscious of a distinct entity, and the Lithuanians were no exception in developing a national movement. This was not only anti-Russian, but also apart from Polish nationalism. It is worth noting, however, that in the three great revolts against Russian rule in 1831, 1863 and 1905, the Poles and Lithuanians made common cause against the oppressor, and it was not until the miserable dispute over the Vilna and Suvalki territories between 1919 and 1920 that the two peoples became sworn enemies. (See Fig. 31.)

The linguistic distributions of this southern and eastern upland region might well cause trouble in the event of drawing fresh frontiers, as the Polish and Lithuanian settlement areas do not represent compact sections of country, but a much more complicated arrangement of rural and urban populations. The towns are Polish and Jewish, and the countryside is Lithuanian and White Russian. Moreover, the main city, Vilna, is regarded by the Lithuanians as their traditional capital, but by the Poles also as one of the famous Polish cultural centres, the equivalent in the Polish view of the English Stratford-on-Avon.[13] The same type of prob-



Fig. 31.—The Vilna-Suvalki Region.

lematical town-and-country distribution is present in the Polish Ukraine and in Transylvania.

The circumstances in which the Vilna and Suvalki districts finally fell to Poland were dramatic and shocking. International arbitration (the Military Control Commission of the League of Nations) had awarded Suvalki to the Poles and the town and region of Vilna to the Lithuanians, and on the 7th of October, 1920, the Polish government had signed a treaty agreeing to this arrangement. Two days later Vilna was attacked and seized by a Polish force under General Zeligowski, in much the same way that the frontier port of Fiume between Italy and Yugoslavia was seized by D'Annunzio. The Polish government disowned the raid, but made no attempt to recall the troops, nor was the Polish possession of Vilna and Suvalki disturbed until the first months of the present war. About two years after Zeligowski's "coup" (January 1922) the Polish ownership of these areas was confirmed by the Conference of Ambassadors in contradiction of the award, of the League.

The results of this frontier episode were far-reaching. In the first place the Lithuanians, like the Finns, were made to realize at a very early stage of their career as an independent

people that the great powers in the League of Nations, or in the Conference of Ambassadors, or at the International Court of Justice, or on any other body representing international order, could and would " look the other way " if it were more convenient to ignore aggression. In the second place, if anything could have stimulated the Lithuanians to continue an existence completely separate from that of the Poles it was Zeligowski's snatch-and-grab raid on the south-eastern frontier. The whole affair infuriated the Lithuanians to such a degree that the tradition of co-operation with Poland, which had been so strong from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century, was absolutely killed. Polish possession of the disputed territory was never recognized in Lithuania, and the frontier between the two countries remained closed for eighteen years.

In the third place the episode drove the Lithuanians towards the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that they had only just emerged from a struggle to separate themselves from the Russians, the Lithuanians sought almost immediately a reconciliation with their former rulers. They realized the traditional enmity between the Russians and Poles, and they hoped always to profit from it in the end. This hope persisted in spite of some periods of bad feeling between Lithuania and the Soviet Union in the course of the following twenty years. This feature in Lithuanian foreign policy should not be forgotten to-day.

Finally, Zeligowski's snatch at Vilna proved as contrary to Polish interests in the long run as the taking of the Russian-settled territory east of the Curzon Line. (See p. 161.) The Polish-Lithuanian borderlands formed an obvious weak place in the Polish defence when the Russian advance westward began in the autumn of 1939. By the Agreement of Moscow drawn up in the October the Lithuanians at long last came into possession of the Vilna region. The Russians made over to them the traditional capital and a long narrow strip of country to the north and south of the town. (See Fig. 31.) The award gave the Lithuanians a common frontier with Russia; they gained also an increase of about two and a half thousand square miles of territory and a population of nearly half a million. The smaller Suvalki territory in the west which had also been disputed between the Poles and Lithuanians was, however, included within the frontiers of East Prussia by the same agreement. The delight in Lithuania over the restoration of Vilna knew no bounds. It was not even dimmed by the demand by the

Soviet Union for certain rights of military occupation. For the southernmost of the Baltic states, therefore, the compensations of Russian expansion westward were at the end of 1939 greater than the alarms.

It might be said, however, that the tactics which the Lithuanians resented so much in the east of their territory they themselves employed in the west in Memel-land. Here they, like the Poles, achieved a " coup " which was later recognized by the Allies, although the Lithuanian raid did not go against a previous award. Memel-land had been ceded by the Germans to the Allies in 1919, and the obvious allocation of this territory was to Lithuania. The claims of the Niemen people to the coastlands were two. The first was based on the persistence of a Lithuanian majority in Memel-land throughout the centuries of German occupation. These Lithuanians, like the Letts and Estonians farther north, had become the depressed class of the region, a body of peasant-farmers, but they had kept their identity as a linguistic group.

The second claim rested on the necessity for an outlet to the sea. What Poland desired in the establishment of the Corridor and the special status of Danzig, the Lithuanians sought to achieve in Memel.

The negotiations about the territory, however, dragged on endlessly after 1919, with a French High Commissioner exercising a temporary administrative authority in the port and surrounding district. As the various possibilities for the future of Memel-land were discussed, the Lithuanians became justifiably nervous that this " plum " might also be snatched from them as Vilna and Suvalki had been. In 1923, therefore, they resorted to the methods of a " coup " and sent Lithuanian troops suddenly into Memel-land to occupy the town and territory. Their possession of it was confirmed by the Allies in the following year by the Memel Convention, but at the same time a substantial amount of autonomy was secured to the region, in the hope that by this means a small and economically advanced German minority would not suffer too much at the hands of a large and less advanced majority. Thus for the first time for seven hundred years the complete river unit was established at the expense of the German coastal one.

The main problem for the Lithuanian government was that of breaking through the long-established frontier zone so that there should be a reasonable amount of political and economic harmony between the coastlands and interior.

But the obstacles to such a union were colossal. The two different courses of political and economic development had left ineffaceable marks upon the Niemen lands. To the east of the frontier the coastland had been cleared of forest, and the soils, though poor in quality, were farmed according to the standards and practices of Germany. The western territory also included inevitably a vigorous German minority, mainly in the town of Memel.[14] The frontier zone was marked by a strip of thick forest some miles in width. To the east of it was a mixed region of forest and farming, more populous than either Latvia or Estonia, but with far more primitive economic standards than the countries to the north or the coastlands to the west.

It was most unfortunate for the future of Lithuania that the immediate economic victim of the closed frontier with Poland should have been the port of Memel. This town was in origin a German trading settlement. It was built not actually at the mouth of the Niemen waterway, but farther north at the narrow entrance to the Kurish harbour between the mainland and the long, narrow spit of the Kurish "Peninsula; here the greater movement of the water makes the disadvantage of winter freezing less than in the estuary itself. Memel's importance before 1914 was largely based on its activity as an outlet for Baltic timber and on the amber trade. It tapped for its hinterland not only the limited forests of Lithuania Major, but the far greater resources of White Russia and Russian Poland. From the latter regions, the timber rafts made a brisk traffic downstream on the Niemen and its tributaries in spite of the German-Russian frontier-line.

This activity had very naturally been checked between 1914 and 1918, and it ceased altogether with the closing of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, except for the very restricted supplies of the Lithuanian forests. The Polish timber once sent through Memel was mainly diverted to the Vistula river system to the benefit of Danzig. This commercial collapse was doubly regrettable : the Lithuanian government had enough to do without destroying such trading links as were still available. Further, the chief sufferers were the merchants of the German minority in Memel, who in spite of the compensations of some autonomy were only too anxious to prove their existence unbearable under Lithuanian administration.

In actual fact Memel survived this crisis with tolerable success. It was true that for years her chief export com-

modity failed. From 1920 until 1932, when a most welcome agreement for the transit and export of wood was concluded between the Memel Timber Syndicate and the Russian government, the traditional source of wealth for Memel port dwindled to a small fraction of its pre-1914 value. But at the same time, by the change in frontiers, Memel, instead of being the extreme north-eastern port of Germany, depending on two export commodities, became the general and only centre of export and import for Lithuania. It began to house also new and quite flourishing industries, mainly in paper and cellulose. After a very difficult period of readjustment the activity of Memel therefore revived and on very much more stable lines, with varied exports and imports in small quantities, rather than dependence on the extent of two. From the point of view of material prosperity, Memel gained rather than lost by the change in its function, though it was too much to expect an acknowledgment of these advantages by the disgruntled Germans in the city population.

In order to support the town in this new rôle, two forms of economic development inland were essential: one was the establishment of adequate east-west road and rail communications, and the other the improvement of peasant farming for export purposes and of peasant purchasing power through a higher standard of living. It was natural that communications across the old Russian-German frontier should have been scanty for strategic reasons, but the absence of them was a very awkward legacy for the Lithuanians. (See Fig. 32.) For example, until the new railway between Telsiai and Kretinga was completed in the autumn of 1932, there was no means of rail travel between the capital, Kaunas, and the chief port, Memel, except by going out of the country, north to Priekuli in Latvia, or south to Tilsit in Germany.

Nor was there until recently any hard road running from east to west. The drive inland from Memel along the Niemen valley was a striking example of the barriers which one human group can develop against another. From the port a good hard highway ran inland up to the forest belt of the frontier, with cleared, carefully exploited country on either side of it. At the forest it stopped abruptly and travellers had to make their way as best they could along the soft, sandy track through the thick woods, emerging finally on to the very indifferent roads of Lithuania Major. Throughout the journey the slow, winding stream of the Niemen was

visible at intervals, a reminder that Lithuania is a geographic unit if the setting of the river basin for economic and political development were allowed.

The further task of bringing Lithuania Major economically into line with the standards and activity of the coastland was beyond the scope of one generation, however zealous the reformers. But the effort here to create a



FIG 32.—Rail Communication in Lithuania. Political frontiers between 1921 and 1939 marked with a thick black line. Note the importance of the railway between Kretinga and Siauliai, which completes the east-west line of communications in the country. Scale approx. 1 : 5,000,000.

peasant-proprietor state is extremely interesting to study, if only because it is so different from those farther north.

The contrast is apparent at once in the character of the Agrarian Revolution in Lithuania. To begin with, the amount of land handled by the Lithuanian government was smaller (747,201 hectares, as against 3,850,342 hectares in Latvia, and 2,346,494 hectares in Estonia).[15] The tradition of the great estate, though present in Lithuania, was weaker than in the north, and that of the small-owner accepted more easily even though many peasant properties were too meagre for profitable farming. These different conditions were partly accounted for by the extent of forest-land in Lithuania

during the period of Russian acquisition. This explanation is not apparent to-day because the clearances have been very rapid over the last fifty years: for example, in 1880, 35 per cent, of Lithuania was forested, in 1900, 25 per cent., in 1914, 20 per cent., and in 1930, 18 per cent. But the forests were widespread at the time when the foreign aristocracy might have established their grip on the farming land, and accordingly the redistribution after 1918 was not



FIG. 33.—Soils of Lithuania. Political frontiers between 1921 and 1939 are marked with a continuous black line. The frontier between Lithuania Major and Memel-land is marked with a dotted line. If this figure is compared with 34, it will be seen that the wooded land and the regions of high-grade soils are in some places identical, especially near the Memel-land frontier. In the neighbourhood of Ukmerge the fertile land has been more systematically cleared. Scale 1 : 4,000,000.

on such a colossal scale as in Latvia and Estonia. The peasants were eager enough for fresh land and had been so for generations. The process of the change in ownership here was more gradual, however, and partial compensation (though in a depreciated currency) was allowed the former owners as well as the retention of eighty hectares of land.[16]

The really baffling problem, if peasant proprietorship were to be encouraged as the basis of the economic system in Lithuania, was the traditional standard of farming, whether on the small properties of long standing or on the

great estates. Interesting evidence of this is found **in the** soil and vegetation maps of Lithuania compiled just after the 1914-1918 War. (See Figs. 33 and 34.) There was not in Lithuania, as in the northern republics, the same correlation between the preservation of forest and the poor soils, and the clearances in the regions of good soils. The districts reckoned as first-class for farming purposes are three in number, one between Siauliai on the north-western



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FIG. 34.—Distribution of Woodland in Lithuania. The marking of the political frontiers and the scale are the same as in Fig. 33. Note the coincidence between the woodland and the old Russian-German frontier.

upland and Ukmerge on the Sventa river, another north-east of Ukmerge and towards the Latvian frontier, and a third in the west, in the Jura and Šešupe regions, along and a little to the east of the Memel-land boundary. But these are marked also on the forest maps as areas of plentiful wood covering. There has not been, therefore, in the southern republic, in spite of the fellings of the last fifty years, the same energy in discovering, clearing and farming the most profitable land in the country, as one finds in Estonia and Latvia.

In the case of the big estates the contrast with the **north** was particularly marked. Where the German **Baits in** Estonia and Latvia, even if oppressive, had been **in many**

instances zealous and efficient farmers, the Russian owners of Lithuanian estates had been much too often of the absentee variety. Though the soils of a great part of the Niemen Basin were as good as, and in some cases better than, those of East Prussia, the average yields per hectare of the big property as well as those of the poor peasant farm, could not bear comparison with the achievements of the German, Estonian and Lettish farmers to the west and north.[17]

Finally, to add to the tale of past neglect and of a very indifferent tradition of farming, there were the ravages of the war years to be repaired; these had been as terrible in Lithuania as in Latvia to cultivation and stock-rearing, housing and woodlands. During the twenty years after 1918, however, the efforts to make good these defects were as strenuous as in the other republics, and the economic progress of Lithuania until the loss of Memel-land was fairly steady. There were a number of features in this advancement which repay attention, if only because they serve as very interesting contrasts to the countries farther north.

In the first place the dependence on the success of the farming system was more absolute in Lithuania than in either Estonia or Latvia. There was in the southernmost group none of the tradition of commerce, industry and shipping which, if it declined in the northern states after 1920, always served, and could to some extent be revived, to establish a balance in their economies. Statistics of a very simple kind illustrate this point. In Lithuania in 1931, 79 per cent, of the population was reckoned as occupied in "farming" (these figures include fishing and forestry), compared with 68 per cent, in Latvia and 66 per cent, in Estonia.[18] The numbers for those engaged in industry and commerce were 9 per cent, for Lithuania and 17 per cent, for Latvia and Estonia. If it be remembered that the figures for Lithuania included Memel-land, and that with the exception of Kaunas, the capital, and the port of Memel there were no towns of any size in the republic, the overwhelming dependence of Lithuanian prosperity on the efficiency of peasant-farming becomes apparent.*

One aspect of Lithuanian farming cannot fail to impress

* As fair as numbers are concerned, the acquisition of Vilna, with a population of 196,000, more than balances the loss of Memel, with a population of approximately 38,000, but Vilna, an inland town, so long cramped by a closed frontier, cannot serve the same commercial rôle as Memel.

any traveller passing through the country, and it is perhaps worth mentioning. It is the conspicuous frequency of the isolated farm, both in peasant plots of very old standing, and in those which have been established since the redistribution of property. These are not, of course, invariable, but they are abundant enough to be remarkable, especially since there is noticeable also the declared preference of the Lithuanian peasant for a farm of this type.[19] Various explanations are offered by scholars who have studied the subject, and these are interesting, though all are suggestions rather than accepted facts. Isolated settlements may be the result of the kind of water-supply; the persistence of clustering may originate in defensive purposes, or in traditional agricultural practice. But one significance attached to isolation which is often mentioned by Lithuanians to-day is also interesting, although it has nothing to do with the primary motives for this kind of population distribution. The detached farm in its own acres is now a distinguishing mark of the Gentile. In Lithuania, not only are the town populations mainly Jewish, a feature which is fairly common in this part of Europe, but also what are known in Germany as the " Städtchen," what we should describe in England as big villages.[20] Even hamlets sometimes have a distinctively Jewish character. The isolated farm is therefore to-day, in the consciousness of many Lithuanian peasants, the sign of a Roman Catholic farmer in contrast to the Jewish trader.

The products of these farms, whether in dispersed settlements or in little groups, are rather different from those in the northern republics. The quantitative increase in all forms of production since 1920, whether of food, forage crop or livestock, is very marked indeed by the evidence of statistical tables[21]; but this represents not so much greater prosperity than in Estonia and Latvia, as more in the way of arrears to be remedied. The specialities of farming in Lithuania are however different from those in the other republics. It is noticeable in the first place that Lithuania is the one member of the East Baltic states in which the trade returns always show very little grain import, but rather an increasing quantity of such crops as rye, oats, wheat, barley and clover-seed for export.[22] Such a position in grain production is a reflection on the fertility of Lithuanian soils compared with those of the northern states, and also of the decreasing limitations of climate on farming from north to south in this part of Europe. Mortensen,

the German geographer, comments on another feature of peasant proprietorship which is again familiar to travellers: " Great is the number of the pigs. They are indeed all over the place in Lithuania, in all the coppices, in every stubble-field and patch of land, skinny, long-legged, dark-coloured animals running around, much more like the wild than the domesticated species." [23] Pig-rearing is profitable and universal in Lithuania, as is natural in country of plentiful and varied woodland covering. But the development of the bacon trade after 1920, after the Danish pattern, meant to Lithuania what the building up of the butter exports did to the two northern states. Colossal efforts were made to bring the standard of pig-rearing and bacon-production up to the requirements of the Western European market, and especially to meet the needs of Great Britain. Perhaps the most practical measure on the part of the Lithuanian government was the invitation to small colonies of Danish settlers to serve as farming experts, a scheme which recalls Catherine the Great's experiments in the eighteenth century of planting German peasants on the Volga lands as agricultural models to the Russian *moujiks.*

The two other farming products which were emphasized in Lithuania were flax and poultry. The flax-growing region was in the north-centre and east and, in contrast with the northern states, interest in flax production was maintained fairly steadily after separation from the Russian Empire. Most of the flax was sold abroad as raw material to Great Britain until 1939, and more spasmodically to Germany and Latvia.[24] The success of poultry-farming for the export of chickens and eggs, like that of the pig-rearing, depended largely on the efficiency of the Co-operative Societies which developed very rapidly after 1920. They were able to achieve a sufficient standard in grading for markets to make the poultry products acceptable to German buyers, though the German market for these, as for other commodities, rose and fell most erratically in accordance with the political relationships between the two countries.

In one respect the lower standards of production and living in Lithuania were an asset to the republic during the crisis years between 1930 and 1935. It was noticeable that the crisis here came later, and that the distress throughout was much less than in the northern states; also that except for the decline in timber exports the foreign markets were rather better in the years of depression for Lithuanian goods than for Estonian or Latvian. Lithuanian dairy products,

for example, which in the first years after 1920 had not had a very high reputation abroad, began, during the years of the slump and in the subsequent revival, to compete successfully with those of the northern countries in European markets.[25]

The Lithuanian escape from the worst effects of the economic crisis had two explanations. In the first place the systematic establishment of peasant farming had been much more gradual than in the north, owing to the less advanced condition of most of the farming population. By the time therefore that the new economic order was beginning to be active, the Lithuanian government was in a position to profit from some of the mistakes made by its northern neighbours. In the second place, since the standard of living of the Lithuanian peasants was lower than that in the north, it was possible for them to sell abroad at prices which were considered too meagre by the Estonian and Latvian Co-operatives.

With the period of revival, the deficiencies of the southern republic became apparent once more. There was not the setting for the sturdy, if limited, industrial revival which took place in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania was no better off for mineral raw materials than Latvia, and in addition was not able to make the fullest use of such local supplies of clay, sand and lime which could serve small-scale building, glass and chemical enterprises. Nor was there in Lithuania the tradition of industrial activity on the basis of imported raw materials. The dependence on farming and forestry therefore again became very apparent.

The least satisfactory aspect of the development between 1920 and 1938 was that of forestry. As has been mentioned, the forests are not so much in compact blocks of country which have escaped clearing for farming, as in an even distribution, although there are two regions, one in the northwestern uplands and the other on the south-eastern frontier, which are more scantily covered than the average. (See Fig. 340 .

The felling of timber after 1918 was as extensive as in Latvia, and as much in excess of the re-afforestation. Much of the annual crop was devoted, as in the north, to the reparations of war-time damage and to new buildings. But the use of the forests did not also result in a fairly stable and well-managed export trade such as developed in Latvia. Timber exports, it is true, figured largely on the Lithuanian

trade-returns of the " twenties," and besides exploiting the obvious openings for trade with Great Britain and Germany, there were attempts at establishing a connection with Belgium and Holland. But the poor marketing and shipping facilities in Lithuania put her timber at a disadvantage to that of the northern states, especially when in the years of depression the demand for wood of all kinds declined steadily. Timber offered almost the only instance of Lithuanian goods suffering more in the foreign market during the slump than those of Latvia and Estonia.[26] Forestry cannot help but be an important item in the Lithuanian economic system, but there are not the standards in sawn and processed timber for export, nor the activity in the feeding of home industries, which one associates with similar resources in Latvia and Estonia.

On the whole the record of the Lithuanian peasant state in the last generation was one of material progress. The most forcible criticism that can be made of its policy is of the risks that were run in persisting with the closed frontier with Poland. The Lithuanian Republic was not in a position to afford the simmering ill-will belonging to such a situation. Its fragility was plain, considerably before the Soviet advance, during the crises with Poland and Germany in 1938 and 1939.

The opening of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier during the European crisis of 1938 was in itself by no means a matter for regret, as there was little gained by either country during the eighteen-year period of abnormal relations. It was rather the tactics employed by Poland which showed up only too plainly the dangerous and helpless position of the Lithuanians.

The German attack from the west in the spring of 1939 was much more deadly, but the full effects of the German annexation of Memel-land were never really appreciable. The losses to Lithuania were hardly estimated when the whole political and economic order of the continent was overturned. Thus the following comments on cession of the port and territory to Germany can only be very limited.

Out of a whole territory of 21,489 square miles, Lithuania handed over in Memel-land about 1,099 square miles; out of a population of 2,400,000, she had to part with approximately 150,000, the majority of whom were Lithuanian, although the 38,000 inhabitants of Memel port were almost exclusively German. The big sum of money expended on the Telsiai-Kretinga railway was without its due reward

when Memel passed into German hands, and also that allocated to the building of the hard road between Memel and Kaunas, which was only completed in 1938. In addition the Lithuanians had lost their sole port, and one of the only two considerable towns then in the republic. In compensation they received the promise of a free zone in the port, and the guarantee of the integrity of the rest of their territory (for what it was worth). For the Germans, the seizing of Memel meant not only another triumph over the hated peace treaties, but also the hope of the Lithuanian food exports and a step towards the encirclement of Poland.

What steps the Lithuanian Republic could have taken to repair this damage must remain for the present hypothetical. They might have continued to use Memel under German management as their main outlet; they might have diverted traffic by rail to the Latvian port of Liepaja, though it is doubtful whether this would have survived the disapproval of the Third Reich; they might have sought, like the Poles, to make an outlet of their own, using the Baltic fishing village of Palanga to make a miniature Gdynia. In any case the financial loss and dislocation of trade must have been considerable. These and other problems will need consideration if and when the trade between Lithuania and North-western Europe is revived again.

What also would have been the reaction of the Memel merchants, had not the whole of the Baltic region passed so quickly into quite abnormal conditions ? What would have become of the port which had been adjusted so painfully from the needs of a coastal unit to those of a river unit if Lithuanian trade had passed eventually into northern channels ? Would the resumption of the old commercial rôle have been satisfactory to the citizens when the first exhilarating effect of membership of the Reich had begun to wear off, and when the satisfaction of revenge on the Lithuanians was over ?

In point of fact, the situation in this south-eastern corner of the Baltic was fundamentally changed by the temporary disappearance of Poland and by the sudden advance of the Soviet Union. The cession of Memel to Germany made a break in the link between Lithuania and the west. This separation was completed six months later by the destruction of all the Baltic trade-routes. It was confirmed in July, 1940, with the inclusion of Lithuania in the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that Lithuanian commercial orientation must now be to the east, the loss of the

port and its immediate hinterland is not so severe. As long also as the Soviet Union respected in Lithuania both the peasant-proprietor system and Lithuanian cultural autonomy, the Russian advance had its advantages for the smaller people. It removed temporarily the threat of German pressure on the small republic. An instance of this relief to Lithuania was the German agreement to the Soviet request at the end of 1939 to demilitarize Memel-land. It brought also the return of Vilna and the surrounding territory. From a position which in the spring of that year looked very ominous indeed, the Lithuanians, by a combination of circumstances, arrived for a short period at a better one, of comparative safety and even of territorial gain. But the fate of a country whose security depends mainly on the course of Russo-German relations is precarious to an extent which is once more painfully obvious. (See also pp. 342-343.)

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON LITHUANIA

1. March 15th-2ist, 1938.

2. Klaipeda Territory is the Lithuanian name for the coastal strip, and Klaipeda for the actual port. The German forms, Memel-land and Memel Territory for the strip and Memel for the town, are almost always used.

3. See Bang, " The Expansion of the Teutons," ***Cambridge Medieval History,*** **Chapter VII, p. 184.**

4. Mortensen's account of the early settlement and history of Lithuania ia different from the version in the ***Cambridge Medieval History.*** **He thinks that the Lithuanian tribes were gradually driven westward by the advancing Slavs and reached the Niemen lands about the fifth century A.D., using the Polish-Lithuanian Heights as a defence against the stronger eastern groups. See** ***Litauen*** **:** ***Grundzuge einer Landeskunde*** **(Hamburg: Friedrichsen, 1926). For the comments on the connection between the early Lithuanian settlements and the waterways, see pp. 81 ff.**

5. See d'Almeida, " Les États de Ia Banque," p. 31, ***Ghgraphie Universelle,*** **Vol. V.**

6. Kaunas is the Lithuanian name for the capital city, and it ***if*** **now used almost exclusively. The Russian form is Kovno, the Polish, Kowno, and the German, Kauen.**

7. The names " Samaiten " and " Zemogaiten " are also used in Germany.

8. Latvia has a territory of 25,395 square miles, a population of 1,950,502 and a density to the square mile of 78. Lithuania (without Memel-land and with the Vilna region) has a territory of 23,040 square miles and a population of 2,800,575, with a density of 121 to the square mile. These statistics are interesting to compare with those of the Scandinavian states and Finland: Sweden 40 to the square mile, Finland 27 and Norway 23. Figures from the ***Statesman's Tear-Book, 1*****938, and, in the case of Lithuania, calculated from** ***Geopress,*** **No. 243 (9/64).**

g. The German name for this frontier village, which is often used, is Schmalleningken.

10. The exact nature of the penetration of Lithuania by the Teutonic Knights is a controversial subject. German historians are naturally inclined to make the most of the conquests of the Order, while Lithuanian accounts emphasize the degree to which the Germans were kept at bay. There is little doubt, however, that the Lithuanian tribes were very formidable fighters. See Bruce-Boswell, " The Teutonic Order," pp. 257 ff., *Cambridge Medieval History,* Chapter IX, Vol. VII. Even the German accounts point to invasions of Lithuania from the north, *after* Latvia had been conquered. Bruce-Boswell and Mortensen *(Litauen,* pp. 60 ff.) are both of the opinion, however, that Lithuanian settlement during the time of the expansion of the Teutonic Knights was limited on the west by the Niemen river in Upper Lithuania, and in Lower Lithuania by a line running between the Dubysa and Jura tributaries ; they maintain that on the seaward side of this frontier there was an uninhabited territory, which Mortensen describes as *' Wildnis." The undoubted Lithuanian settlement to the west of this line to-day is attributed to expansion after the fifteenth century.

11 The actual extent of Lithuanian expansion with and without Polish co-operation is again a matter for conjecture, but most historians agree that their military ability and also their powers of quick movement were exceptional. See Bruce-Boswell, " Poland and Lithuania in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," p. 559, *Cambridge Medieval History,* Chapter XVIII, Vol. VIII. It seems, however, that neither their numbers nor their powers of settlement were equal to their capacity for military raids, and that though the warriors may have penetrated far beyond the Niemen lands, it was not with any lasting effect.

The further question of the relationships between Poland and Lithuania during the most successful period of the Union also presents problems. German historians are apt to dismiss it, as nothing more nor less than the Polish annexation of Lithuania. See *Litauen,* p. 40, *' Der unierte polnische-litauische Staat war in Wirklichkeit nichts weiter als ein vergrössertes Polen," etc., etc. On the other hand, the Lithuanians are careful to comment on the opposition of many of their princes to the marriage alliance which united the crowns, and on the continued identity of the Lithuanian group. In any case it is certain that the political and military strength of Poland in the fifteenth century was immensely increased by the acquisition of the Lithuanian ally, and further history seems to have proved that the Lithuanian people were capable of keeping their distinction as a unit.

12. See *Litauen,* p. 156.

13. Vilna was chosen as the Lithuanian capital in the fourteenth century by one of the most eminent of the medieval Grand-Dukes of Lithuania, Gediminas. The Poles associate the town with the poet and patriot, Adam Mickiewicz.

14. The German minority in the republic of Lithuania between 1923 and 1938 constituted 4 per cent, of the total population. The majority of the Germans were in the town of Memel itself.

15. See Harrison, *Lithuania,* p. 171 (London: Hazell, Watson & Viney, 1928). Compare with the figures in *Latvia among the Baltic States,* p. 43, and *The Estonian Tear-Book,* p. 107.

16. See *Lithuania,* p. 171.

17. See *The Baltic States,* p. 107.

18. See *Latvia among the Baltic States,* p. 12.

19. This preference is borne out by Mortensen's map (*Litauen, p: 111*) of *new* settlement areas with dispersed farms.

20. See *Litauen,* p. 54. The table gives 31 per cent, of the Jewish group as being in the " Städtchen." The Jews form 8 per cent, of the total of the Lithuanian population. Ruppin estimates that there are in Lithuania between two and three thousand Jewish families engaged in farming on very small plots (averaging under 30 acres). This is seldom whole-time farming, as the returns are so small that supplementary occupations such as those of carrier and trader are often practised. The families existing on this basis form about 10 per cent, of the Jews in Lithuania. See *The Jew in the Modern World,* p. 166. The proportion of Jews in the population of Lithuania increased with the acquisition of Vilna, and with a northward movement from Poland after the German occupation.

21. See *The Baltic States,* p. no, Table 16.

22. See Preston, *Economic Conditions in Lithuania,* Table on p. 31, and *The Baltic States,* Tables on pp. 123-4 and 160-1.

23. See *Litauen,* p. 169.

24. See *Report on Economic Conditions in Lithuania,* Appendix 3, p. 27.

25. See *The Baltic States,* pp. 148-9.

26. *Ibid.,* p. 164.

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Survey of International Affairs, 1932, Part IV, Chapter IV. "The Relations between Germany and Lithuania over the Memel Treaty."

The following are specimens of the highly controversial literature which has been plentiful on the subject of Memel and Memel-land.

Jahn, *Memel as Hafen und Handelstadt, 1913-1922* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1926).

Kapust, *Die Entwicklung der Memellandischen Wirtschaft seit der Abtrennung vom Deutschen Reiche,* 1928.

PART II

THE TRANSITIONAL REGION OF NORTH CENTRAL EUROPE

CHAPTER V

POLAND AND THE CITY OF DANZIG

THE Polish people inhabit a transition region in every sense of the term.[1] They share with the small Baltic groups to the north the rôle of bridge or buffer between Russia and Germany as circumstances dictate. But they dwell also in the lands which form the link between north and south, between Baltic and Danube interests, with territories stretching from the Baltic coast to the great ranges of the Carpathians and to the key region of the Silesian watershed. (See Figs. 35 and 36.) Moreover the Polish population includes human activities at all stages of progress, from the primitive settlements of the Pripet Marsh in the east, to the industrial groups of Polish Silesia and the once active commercial community of Gdynia port. Geographical position, good resources and weight of numbers thus combine to make the Poles one of the most important groups of the marchland strip; and though they have lost their political independence in the past and again to-day, they have counted, especially since 1918, as a positive rather than a negative element in European politics. In discussing the environment and development of the Poles, therefore, the scale of existence and activities to be borne in mind is quite different from that in the northern republics. For the same reason, in a chapter of limited compass it is possible to comment only on the most outstanding features of the development of the Polish people. Where it is the details of geography, history and economics which count in dealing with the northern republics it is the bolder outlines which must suffice in the case of Poland.

In spite of this contrast in size and influence with the northern republics, the main impression given by the geographical setting of Poland is that it lacks precision. There is nothing in the environment of this people to suggest the easy development of a strong political unit. In relief, the

country appears in its main features as a cross-section of the big divisions of Central Europe. (Sec Fig. 36.) In the north, running from east to west is the coastal plain, which in extent covers more than half the area of Polish settlement. It is broken by low ridges of hills in the Kashube country of the Polish Corridor, in Mazuria, across on the former frontier between East Prussia and Poland, and in the Suvalki territory where Polish, German and Lithuanian speech meet. The north-eastern provinces also contain the upland tracts of the Baltic Heights which continue eastward into White Russia. In the centre of the country is an extensive plateau region with one broken area of higher ground in the west in Lesser Poland, and another larger and

FIG. 35.—The Position of Poland in Europe. The frontiers shown are those of the Polish Republic between 1921 and 1939. The oudine of England and Wales is drawn to give an idea of the extent of the territory of the Republic.

more compact towards the east in Podolia. The Podolian plateau stretches like the north-eastern upland over the frontier into Soviet territory. In the south of Poland are the great ranges of the Carpathians which divide the Polish from the Slovak-speaking peoples. At the eastern end of this mountain region, however, the Ukrainian-speaking groups inhabit the whole width of the ranges from north to south. In the west the southern frontier of Polish speech runs through the controversial region of Silesia which contains the low watershed between the Baltic and Danubian river systems. The whole step-like relief system of the Polish lands is broken only by the valley of the Vistula and its chief tributaries, the San and the Bug rivers. The main stream flows in great curves from the north-western ranges of

the Carpathian mountains to the Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic.

The main contrasts are between richer south and poorer north, and again between developed west and primitive east. The lack of natural wealth in the northern plain is particularly significant, as the poverty of the hinterland immediately behind the coast must influence the trade connections of the south Baltic ports.



FIG. 36.—The Relief System of Eastern Central Europe. The frontiers marked for Poland are those of the Republic between 1921 and 1939. Scale approximately 1 : 10,000,000.

The best Polish resources are in the mountain and plateau country. (See Fig. 37.) In the extreme south-west is the substantial mineral wealth of Silesia, with one of the richest coal-beds in Europe, as well as supplies of iron, lead, zinc and silver. East of Silesia are the rock-salt deposits of Pogórze and the great forests of the Carpathians. In the Polish Ukraine the mountains are bordered on the north by the famous oil-wells, though it seems that the days of their most ample production are over. In the Ukraine also, the fertile loess soil of the Podolian

plateau makes this region of extreme importance for grain and beet production.

In the lowland country of the north, the distinction between poverty and wealth is less the result of natural

FIG. 37.—Economic Resources of Poland.

resources and more that of variations of human skill. Towards the frontier region of Polish and German speech, especially in the Vistula and Warta (Warthe) valleys, the land has been largely cleared of its original forest covering and farmed to produce in normal times a considerable proportion of the Polish food-supply of grain crops, roots and livestock. Where there are variations in productivity they are almost always traceable to farming traditions, rather than to good or bad soils or to climatic conditions. The one region in the west where natural poverty is undisguisable, and which seems to have defeated even German energy, is the coastal district of Pomorze (Pomerania), where the density of population has always remained low.

In the east of the plain most of the abundant forest-covering still remains. Part of the forest land is valuable, especially that of the provinces of Biatystok and Nowogrodek, but the southern districts of Polesia and the northern ones of Volhynia belong to the poor Pripet Marsh region. This swamp, which is as big as Belgium, is crossed by the tributaries of the Dnieper river, flowing east and then south to the Black Sea. It is a vast expanse of dreary unproductive land, from which small isolated groups of peasants extract some sort of living as hunters, farmers and foresters. Only the western half of it was in Poland between 1921 and 1939 as the Polish-Russian frontier ran through the marsh from north to south.

The unifying influence over the whole of this region is the Vistula water-way.[2] Its great right-bank tributary, the Bug, has its source far away in south-eastern Galicia, so that the two streams, both of which are navigable over a great part of their courses, make big highways through Poland, north



FIG. 38.—The Inland Water-ways of Poland.

and south, east and west. Moreover, the relief features of central Poland are so gentle that it has been easy by means of canal construction to link up the Bug tributary with the Pripet system going south to the Black Sea, and the Vistula

itself with the right-bank tributaries of the Oder and the left-bank tributaries of the Niemen. The Vistula system is thus not only valuable to Poland but is also a link in the great network of water-way communication that spreads right across the plain of northern Europe, and over the isthmus between the Baltic and the Black Sea.* (See Fig. 38.)

The connection of the Poles with the Vistula Basin is as traditional as that of the Letts and Lithuanians with the Daugava and the Niemen. It is older than historic record, though the Vistula region was certainly not the first core of Slav settlement, and the Poles were not the earliest occupants of the river lands.[4] The variety in appearance of the existing population indicates that the areas of Polish occupation to-day have been settled by successive groups of different physical types with a considerable amount of intermixture between them ; this is the kind of racial history that we should expect of a transition country containing some of the main European migratory routes.[5] The prevalent type to-day is brachycephalous, and fairly short in stature. It probably represents in part the descendants of groups who settled in the Vistula Basin before the coming of the Slav-speaking immigrants. Colouring is usually darker in the southern highlands than in the northern plains, where there has been a good deal of mixture with the tall and fair Nordic people migrating from the Baltic region at an early date, and also coming later as organized settlers from north Germany. There are, of course, much greater varieties in physical appearance than those mentioned here, if one allows for the minority groups which were included in the Polish state after 1918. Only 68 per cent, of the population of the republic was reckoned as Polish-speaking, and there were important settlements of Germans, Jews, Little Russians and White Russians within its frontiers.[6] Even though linguistic variations did not necessarily imply corresponding physical differences, to discuss the racial characteristics of all the minorities would be too long a task here.

Not only can we recognize the settlement of the Vistula valley by Slav-speaking peoples as of very long standing, but we can note also its persistence here in spite of the later and very thorough Germanization of western Poland and the Baltic Plain. The Slavonic character' of the Lower Vistula rural districts is an undeniable tradition which is the fundamental problem of the Polish Corridor. (See pp. 150-155.) The earliest records so far of a Polish state are, however, much

later than those of Slav occupancy ; they belong to the tenth century, showing a core of settlement between the Middle Vistula and the Warta rivers with a capital at Gniezno (Gnesen).[7] It is interesting to notice that the Czech unit in Bohemia appears at the same time. Pressed by the Germans on the west and by recurrent raids from the steppes on the east, the stronger Slav groups of this period, like the Poles and Czechs, were stimulated for purposes of self-preservation into some sort of political unit which made the basis of a state, while weaker peoples, like the Wends and Moravians, were submerged.[8]

FIG. 39.—The Kingdom of Poland between the Eleventh and Fourteenth Centuries. It is plain from the following figure (40) that the frontiers were far from constant. In the north the Teutonic Knights' acquisitions in Pomerania and Prussia are marked.

In the eleventh century the centre of Polish activity shifted south to the Upper Vistula region, with the town of Cracow as capital. (See Fig. 39.) Cracow owns all the qualities for a successful capital; a good strategic position where the river makes a gap between the Beskid ranges of the Carpathians and the uplands of Cracow-Teczyn, which form the southern part of the plateau of Lesser Poland. It also has an excellent trading site both for local and trans-continental exchanges. For three hundred years it was the chief town of Poland. It was the core of Polish strength through the very difficult period of the early Middle Ages, when the country was harried by raids of the Prussians and Lithuanians, and inundated by German immigration both to town and countryside. From Cracow also, the Polish kings maintained in the early thirteenth century their desperate defensive campaigns against the Tartars. They

could not, however, prevent the hordes from sweeping west almost to the borders of German-speaking Europe.[9] The legacy in the city of beautiful medieval architecture, in church and market-place, in royal palace and citadel, is the proof of its importance in Polish history. But its development was cut short at the end of the sixteenth century by the shifting of the capital to Warsaw[10] and by the gradual decay of East European trade.

From Cracow, Polish influence gradually spread north and east during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries far beyond the Vistula Basin, until, together with the Lithuanians, the Poles were in control of the Isthmus of Europe and of the Baltic-Black Sea trade routes. This period of expansion, however, left its own problems. The core of a Polish state and the vigorous existence of a Polish unit in European history are undoubted, but the outer limits have always been ill-defined. (See Fig. 40.) Polish settlement penetrated, as we have seen, into Lithuanian territory, dominating the little towns, but hardly touching the countryside (see pp. 113-118), and this form of control was repeated again in the Polish Ukraine in the south-east. In the Pripet Marsh region and the uplands to the north of it, the frontiers between Poland and White Russia were equally vague.

The confusion in German and Polish settlement in the west has rather a different explanation. German immigration has been a feature of a great part of Polish history, and long before the rise of Prussia as a kingdom, the diplomacy of Polish rulers had to adjust itself from time to time to this pressure from the west. Even during the period of growing prosperity in the fourteenth century, the ablest king of Poland, Casimir the Great, saw the impossibility of an aggressive attitude in the west, and sought compensation in expansion in the opposite direction.[11] This more passive policy, of course, had its exceptions; early in the fifteenth century, for example, the Poles and Lithuanians, together with the Russians, inflicted a smashing defeat on the German Order of Teutonic Knights in East Prussia.[12] But on the whole the ethnographic problems of the Polish frontiers are the legacy of a period of expansion in the east and the tradition of a more defensive attitude in the west.

The distinguishing mark of Polish settlement and influence in a region where every type of frontier lacks precision has really been that of creed. (See Fig. 6.) In geographical setting there is no emphatic feature to divide the Poles from the peoples to east and west; in language there is much in



FIG. 40.—The Expansion of Poland in the Later Middle Ages. This map should be compared with Figs. 30 and 45. The indefinite character of the Polish frontiers and the extent of the non-Polish population often included within the old state of Poland are apparent.

common between them and Russians; in economy also there is great similarity between the peasants of the eastern forests of Poland and those of White Russia. But the Poles have been throughout their history as a Christian state fervent Roman Catholics,[13] and this devotion to Rome has kept them sharply apart from the Lutheran communities of Germany and East Prussia, and the Eastern Orthodox groups, or to-day the atheists, of Russia. Only in the south-east does the compromise institution of the Uniate Church (recognized in 1596) blur this religious frontier.

This natural and deeply rooted piety of the Polish people is an aspect of the present struggle in the Polish lands which cannot be ignored. In the east the Soviet government is faced with a theory and practice of religion, whether amongst the Ukrainian Uniate group or amongst the Polish Roman Catholic minorities, which are much more vigorous than those of the former Russian Orthodox Church.

To the Ukrainian peasants, also, there is little that is not known of persecution and a defiance of terrorism which might give any invader food for thought. In the centre and west the Roman Catholic population of Poland has all the solidarity of a group in close touch with Rome, and all the consciousness of being part of a greater whole. The Prussian government was confronted in the nineteenth century with the coalition between Roman Catholicism and Polish nationalism (see p. 150), and it is probable that the same alliance will resist the Third Reich.

The extreme importance of the Roman Catholic element in Polish history should not obscure, however, the part played by another religious group—the Jews. Jewish communities have been present in the Isthmian region throughout the whole course of European history, but their numbers in Poland increased steadily during the Middle Ages. Some Jewish immigrants came then from the west at the invitation of the great magnates to act on their estates partly as tax-gatherers and partly as merchants. Others followed in the wake of the German colonists, as traders in the varied resources of the marchland strip, in timber, furs, flax, minerals and grain. Great numbers came also fleeing from the periodic outbursts of persecution in Western Europe. By the end of the Middle Ages about half the total population of world Jewry was assembled in the Kingdom of Poland.

Throughout this period, Poland and especially the Polish cities throve on the transitional position between east and west. (See Fig. 7.) They were the intermediaries between Western Asia and Europe and between Muscovy and Europe. It is worth noting throughout, though, that even in the days of most prosperous trading the great Polish centres—Cracow, Lwow (Lemberg), Poznan (Posen) and Plock—were very far from housing purely Polish populations. In the south, especially in Lwow, the Armenian traders were most important, and in the north and west the German and Jewish. Much also of the law and administration of all the trading communities was borrowed from the ubiquitous colonies of Germans.[14]

The great trading period for overland routes to Asia was at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries, when the strength of the Tartar Empire ensured security for, and encouragement to, travelling merchants. When this empire broke up, trade from the south-

east for the Polish cities grew more uncertain. At the same time also, the pressure of the Turks on the southern march-land peoples began to be noticeable. Thus before the Polish state had really reached its best standing in Europe, two influences which contributed to its downfall were becoming apparent—commercial stagnation and the recurrent threat of the Turks.

These alone were not enough, however, to account for the downfall of Poland, nor did they operate very fast. As late as the sixteenth century, though the greatest economic activity of Europe was obviously shifting to the north-west of the continent, Poland appears as an active and vigorous state with a high reputation in Europe both for culture and for military strength.

But the strain of persistent warfare was very heavy. The chief function of the Polish people during the period in which commercial development was so active in Western Europe was that of constant fighting against the Ottoman armies, and these struggles taxed both the wealth and population of Poland beyond their capacity. The emphasis on warfare also meant that one class; the nobility, which provided the natural military leaders, had an influence in the country which was too strong to be healthy. It was an influence, moreover, which was unduly increased by the dying-out in 1572 of the traditional royal house of the Jagellons, so that the choice of each monarch gave opportunity for dynastic squabbles. In an environment which was in many ways favourable to regionalism, the local authority of each land-owner, small or great, became a curse to the Polish people as a whole, and put Poland at the mercy of quarrelling factions of nobles. Thus the political theories which were held in Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were completely out of harmony with those developing in western Europe. On the one hand there was neither the absolutism which made Prussia into a splendidly efficient fighting and economic unit, nor on the other, the democratic growth based on the strength of a trading middle class, by which the Dutch, the English and ultimately the French struggled through to some form of parliamentary government. In Poland there was only the control of an aristocracy of military leaders, with a tradition of regional independence. Their privilege of the *liberum veto,* which entitled any noble in the legislative assembly to obstruct a measure by a single vote, is one example of the weakness of the old

kingdom's political system which was suited neither to the perils of the time nor to the peculiar position of Poland in Europe.

Thus, exhausted by generations of warfare on her southern frontier, torn by quarrels between the factions of the nobility, and left far behind in the struggle for economic prosperity and advance, Poland fell in the eighteenth century an easy prey to the stronger neighbours who had arisen to the east and west. By the three Partition Treaties of 1772, 1793 and 1795 Poland was divided between Russia, Prussia and the Hapsburgs. (See Fig. 41 *(a).)* Russia's portion was eastern Poland as well as the old Baltic provinces of Lithuania and part of Latvia, whose connection with Poland involved them in her tragedy. Prussia seized the provinces of Pomerania and Poznan (Poznania), and the district known as Masovia which lies immediately south of East Prussia ; her acquisitions included Warsaw. The Hapsburgs gained the smaller but wealthy regions of Podolia and Lesser Poland. Each of these three parts of Poland under different administrations was destined to develop on its own lines, and to make the later problem of reunion appallingly hard.

Between the last Partition Treaty and the end of the 1914-1918 War the brightest ray of hope for the Poles came in 1807, when, as the result of Napoleon's triumphant sweep through Europe, the independent Duchy of Warsaw was created with a south German prince as ruler. (See Fig. 41 (£).) The life of the Duchy was, however, a very short one. When the affairs of Europe were rearranged in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, the Duchy, with its frontiers considerably shrunken, was converted into what was known as the Congress Kingdom with the Tzar of Russia as overlord. (See Fig. 41 *(c).)* Such a puppet state had naturally very little chance of a prolonged life. In 1831 the first Polish rebellion gave the Russian government the opportunity to get rid of this semi-autonomous creation. Its status was forfeited as the penalty for revolt, and the Congress Kingdom disappeared into the Russian Empire. The Russian share of Poland was thus increased to include Warsaw and the eastern fringes of Silesia.

The 1831 insurrection was followed by a great flight of political refugees to Western Europe and even to America, and in some respects this scattering of exiles had its advantages. They kept alive mainly in Paris, but also in London, and in the cities of the United States, through an age which was growing every year more aware of the fact and import-



Fio. 41.—The Partitions of Poland, (a) The Partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1793. *(b)* The Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 1810-1815. *(c)* The Congress Kingdom of Poland, 1815-1831. *(d)* The Partition of Poland in **1939. For** a discussion of the " Curzon Line " frontier see p. 161 of the text. **This map** should also be **compared** with Fig. 45.

ance of nationalism, the remembrance of the tragedy of Poland and the possibility of her future liberty.

Throughout the century, also, emigration of a different kind continued from all parts of Poland, especially when the pace of industrial development in Europe and in the New World began to increase. The majority of emigrants were peasants who, tempted by better prospects than offered in Poland, set off abroad to form, with the Italians, the supply of cheap labour in Western Europe, in Canada, in the United States and in the Argentine.

The second Polish rising against the Russians in 1863 **had**

somewhat different results from the first. The revolt was again crushed with great severity, but the direction of exile was to Siberia rather than to Western Europe or the New World. In the following year came the liberation of the serfs throughout the Russian Empire. Welcome as it was as a measure of social reform, in a sense it also told against the Polish cause of independence ; it tended to weaken still further in Poland the position of the traditional political leaders, the great land-owners.

The energies of those of the upper class who survived the revolts were in some cases directed into new and more useful channels than the ancient ones. On account of their status as a subject people the Poles could not take political and administrative posts as freely as the Russians. Therefore, during the age of growing industrialism, Polish enterprise as well as Polish labour found some scope in business for lack of other occupations.[15] The best example of such development was in the town of Lodz, south-west of Warsaw ; although it must be owned that the textile factories of Lodz, like many other nominally Polish industrial enterprises, were due originally to German and Jewish initiative. Lodz grew during the mid-nineteenth century from a small village to a vast town, having markets for its textiles all over Russian Poland and farther east into Russia itself. Lodz itself is perhaps hardly a good advertisement for any form of economic progress; the greater part of the city has still the appearance of a huge, hideous slum. But its rapid growth and activity represented the creation of something fresh and essential to the Polish people, a class with business experience, able to make a solid contribution to the political and economic stability of the country.

Over the greater part of Russian Poland, however, progress of any kind, and especially amongst the peasants, was painfully slow. Volhynia, Polesia and Nowogr6dek are certainly not amongst the best endowed of the Polish provinces; but it was not natural poverty alone which left them in 1921 with a population more primitive and more illiterate than in any other part of the reunited Polish territories. Russian administration had on the whole done little to improve the fortunes of the subject peoples.

For the first half of the nineteenth century, the rule of the Hapsburgs in southern Poland was not much better than that of the Romanoffs in the east. The dominating spirit in the Hapsburg administration was that of the reactionary,

Metternich; and with his policy of denying the national existence of subject peoples, the Poles of Galicia had as miserable an existence as those under the Tzar. But during the latter part of the century the Austrians were in no position to be tyrannical. Their military security and political confidence had been severely shaken by the Prussian victory over the Austrian armies at Sadowa in 1866, and the weakness of the Empire had been openly admitted by the Austrians in their acceptance of the Magyar group in Hungary as dual rulers. The centre of oppression in the Hapsburg Empire really shifted from Vienna to Budapest, the Magyar capital. While the Hungarians tried to cure the growing national consciousness of the subject peoples with increasing repression, the Austrian administrators turned desperately and too late to liberalism and compromise to patch up the cracks in the heterogeneous Empire.

The result for Austrian Poland was a considerable measure of self-government, Lwow became the administrative centre, a local capital with its own Parliament. This privilege of partial autonomy was accompanied also by an increase in Galician prosperity and importance to the Empire, because of the discovery and working of the oil-fields of the Carpathian foothills, Lwow was the marketing centre for the oil, as well as for the wheat, potatoes and sugar-beet of the loess lands and the timber of the Carpathians. It was Austrian policy also to make Lwow into a cultural centre for Ukrainian as well as for Polish scholars, so that its rôle before 1914 as capital, as a commercial town and as a university was certainly vigorous.

For the Poles themselves the fruits of Austrian conciliation were both good and bad. They gained some experience in administration and so realized once more the difficulties besides the desirability of power. Further, the possibility of cultural development at the Universities of Cracow and fcwow left Galicia incomparably ahead of Russian Poland when the three portions of the country were reunited later. But on the other hand, what are recognised as some of the worst traits in the old Polish political and social system persisted in the local government of Galicia. Here above all was preserved the huge estate and here remained the wide gulf between land-owner and peasant. The fact that the land-owners were Poles and Roman Catholic, and the peasants in the east Ukrainian and Uniate, increased the distinction between the classes. Here again, the incentive to the Poles to undertake business of any kind

was weak, so that **the Jewish trading and industrial population** was proportionately strong and **the** feeling between Pole and Jew and Ukrainian peasant far from friendly. It is a depressing reflection that many of the most serious problems of the Polish Republic after 1921 belonged to the region which in many respect had the most liberal treatment from its foreign rulers.

The history of Prussian Poland has also its own characteristics. There was neither neglect as in Russia, nor conciliation as in Austria. Prussian Poland, especially after 1871, was developed with the same thoroughness and discipline as every other region which came under north German rule.

The policy of Prussia was to Germanize the region to the fullest possible extent. The methods of achieving this aim were many, but four were of particular significance. Firstly, in the country districts the numbers of Prussian peasant settlers was increased by all possible means at the expense of the Polish rural population; secondly, in the region of great mineral wealth, Silesia, Prussian capital and enterprise were mainly responsible for industrial development; thirdly, in Prussian Poland as a whole the influence of the municipalities, the main centres of Prussian settlement, was encouraged against that of the rural areas, where some Polish landowners still clung to their estates ; and fourthly, there was steady governmental hostility to the Polish Roman Catholic organizations.

The most industrious body for promoting the settlement of Prussian peasants in Poland was the Ostmarkenverein. This was founded in 1894, and its purpose was to urge on the work of the earlier Colonization Commission of 1886. Through the Ostmarkenverein Prussian colonists were established with special favours in the way of land, loans, farming implements and marketing possibilities. But in trying to stamp out the Polish character of the Vistula Corridor, German administration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was attempting the impossible. In 1913 the Ostmarkenverein published a map of the province of Pomorze which was really a confession of failure.[16] (See Fig. 42.) It illustrated the proportions of German and Polish populations there, and admitted the persistent strength of Polish settlement in spite of a generation of effort. It was meant to urge a further stream of German emigration into this region where Germany did not feel sure enough of her ascendancy. As a matter of fact, the **map** served a very different purpose from **that originally intended.**



FIG. 42.—The Polish-speaking Population of the "Corridor" Region in 1913. The percentages are taken from the map published by the Ostmarkenverein, which was issued to urge the necessity for further German settlement in the "Corridor." Scale approx. 1 : 3,000,000.

It contributed very substantially after 1918 to the argument for awarding the Corridor to the Poles and the attempt of the German government to call in the copies of

the map while the peace treaty negotiations were in progress shows that its evidence was damning to German claims.

It appears that one feature of the present German occupation of western Poland is an attempt to achieve with great speed and ruthlessness the programme which proved too much for the Colonizing Commission and the Ostmarkenverein. The Germans desire—and one can understand their aims even while condemning their methods—to stamp out the Polish character of the Lower Vistula lands. It is also conceivable, though by no means certain, that a ruthless government, in an age which has seen many drastic shifts in population, might achieve by a mixture of extreme violence and determination a solid block of German settlement in the Corridor, and a complete deportation of the Poles. This objective appears to be one of the chief reasons for the appalling German policy in the Vistula region to-day.

If such a wholesale forced migration takes place, the questions raised at any future conference to arrange a settlement will be vital in their importance and probably violent in discussion. They may affect not only the German-Polish borderlands, but also act as precedents for other frontier revision.

It is probable in the first place that European statesmen will prefer not to see again the awkward frontier demarcation which gave the Poles access to the sea by detaching a minor piece of German territory from the bulk of the German lands. The broken distribution of Polish and German speech, which was one important reason for creating the Corridor, has proved intolerable in twentieth-century Europe.

International opinion also will probably favour strongly the award to Poland of access to the Baltic coast in some form or another. Hypothetically, a coastal outlet cannot be argued as an essential to the political and economic well-being of a state, though it is usually a solid advantage. There are too many instances in European history, past and present, of vigorous land-locked countries and of maritime states with feeble development, to insist that access to the sea is a fundamental condition of well-being. But in the case of Poland the claim to an outlet on the Baltic is a strong one. Apart from historic tradition, it derives mainly from the fact that if the Poles do not possess a Baltic port or ports, their sea-borne trade in the north, which is of vital importance to the economic activity of the Polish lands, must pass

altogether through German territory. In view of what has happened in this war and in times past, it would be too much to expect the Poles to resign themselves to such dependence on Germany.

What, then, are the possibilities of granting the Poles access to the sea and at the same time avoiding the old troublesome frontier demarcation of the Corridor and East Prussia ?

On a hypothetical basis again, two alternatives suggest themselves. The first is to acquiesce in the present deportation of Poles from the Lower Vistula region and to leave the Germans in possession of Gdynia and Danzig. Polish compensation might be sought farther east in the port of Königsberg, though this would involve a further movement of Germans from the eastern part of East Prussia. By this means a more compact linguistic distribution would prevail, and the Poles would also be the possessors of a Baltic port.

The objections to such a solution, however, make a long list. It would be clean against Polish tradition in settlement and economic aim. It would break completely the potential political and economic unity of the Vistula Basin. It would ignore the Polish effort during the last twenty years to build up a second and very necessary port as an outlet to the Vistula lands, and their achievement of the rail connection from the Baltic coast to Silesia. It would mean the construction of a fresh system of canal and rail communications between port and hinterland in the east without the assistance of an excellent natural water-way. It might mean that Danzig and Gdynia would never recover their prosperity. Further, such a settlement might give an impression of the success of German violence, and an altogether misleading idea of the character of the recent German immigration to the Corridor. For the unfortunate German colonists from the small Baltic republics and eastern Poland in their return to the lands ruled by the Reich are only to be pitied one degree less than the Polish fugitives whose property has been taken from them and who have been driven eastwards into central Poland.

The other alternative is the cession by Germany of all East Prussia to Poland with the three ports of Königsberg, Elbing and Danzig, as well as the restitution of Gdynia. This could only be accompanied by a drastic migration of German peasants and townspeople back into Germany.[17] It implies further the surrender by Germany of Memel-land

to Lithuania, to avoid a north-eastern " island " of Prussians, and a similar if lesser transportation of Germans from Memel port and the immediate hinterland. One can envisage possible compensation to Germany for East Prussia and a settlement area for the unfortunate emigrants in the western part of the province of Poznania, which according to the demarcation of the Versailles Treaty made something of a salient into German territory. (See Fig. 36.)

This second arrangement even in imagination is a revolution in the historical geography of Europe. Yet the following arguments are worth calling to mind. In area East Prussia looks considerable; in population density, however, it is much less impressive owing to the poverty of the soil.[18] One should draw conclusions as to the number of German people involved and the value of the land (other than its provision of access to the sea) chiefly from comparing population densities. Further, the reversal of the policy of German expansion eastwards was a step first taken by the Nazi government and, hideous as the consequences may be for the populations concerned, the migration of Germans from East Prussia would be but a logical sequence to the previous enforced shifts from the Baltic republics and eastern Poland.

If the second plan should prevail, then tentative forecasts about the development of East Prussia are interesting. It is unlikely in the first place that the traditional Prussian exploitation of the region would persist. Prussian economy here has two features. One is the importance of the town settlements owing both to the emphasis on the ports and to the fact that the soil will not support a dense population.[19] The other is the masterly use of such agricultural and pastoral resources as do exist, a tribute to German farming which one must allow. East Prussia could not stand a big immigration of Polish peasants with more primitive farming methods than the German: and the standard of Polish agriculture and pastoralism is likely to have dropped still lower after the war. The population of a Polish East Prussia would therefore probably be sparser than that of German tradition, and the yields from the soil smaller. Again, in the first years after an exhausting war, and with a population predominantly rural in its settlement instincts, it would not be easy for the Poles forthwith to maintain the four ports and the inland towns. The immediate gains from such fundamental changes in ownership and settlement in East Prussia would be therefore those of compactness in

language groups and of greater security for the Poles on the Baltic coast. The economic revival of this luckless part of Europe would necessarily mean years of patient and laborious effort, and it is possible that the German level of achievement might never be equalled. It is beginning to dawn on the peoples of Europe, however, that the utmost of efficiency in economic exploitation is not necessarily the be-all and end-all of a state's existence.

At the outbreak of war in 1939 both the territorial adjustments of the Polish-German problem suggested above might have been discussed with some detachment. But the circumstances have since been altered irreparably in conquered Poland by the horrors of German administration. Even while realizing that future frontier-drawing in this region must not take place on a basis of revenge, it is difficult not to contemplate as the more palatable arrangement the German yielding of the whole of East Prussia to Poland. It is impossible to leave out of account even of a long-term settlement the wanton cruelty and destruction which has been organized by the Third Reich in the German-Polish borderlands; and it is inevitable that such policy should make the later settlement a costly one for the Germans.

Whatever the arrangement, even if the maximum of rough justice is achieved, no one can contemplate it without dread. There is no fundamental revision of frontiers here which can take place without unspeakable suffering both material and psychological to Polish and German populations alike, most of whom have neither accurate knowledge of, nor responsibility for, the violent disturbances of the past and present.

Before 1914 the Prussian development of Silesia, the region of abundant and varied mineral wealth, was on different lines from that of the Corridor. Long before the discovery of its full mining and industrial possibilities, Silesia had had a complicated history. The region that bears this name lies between the Sudeten mountains on the west, the Beskid ranges of the Carpathians on the south and the plateau of Lesser Poland on the east. (See Fig. 43 *(a).)* The greater part of the region is drained by the main-stream and tributaries of the Oder in its upper course, but Silesia also includes the watershed country between the Oder and March rivers, the latter flowing south to the Danube. What is known as Lower Silesia is the northern part of the Upper Oder Basin, and it consists of the present administrative districts served by the towns of Breslau and Liegnitz. This area in Silesia is

FIG. 43.—Silesia. (*a*) General Map of Silesia.



(*b*) Coal and Iron Resources of Silesia. Note the extent of the coalfields acquired by the Polish Republic.

traditionally and undeniably German in settlement and character.

The ethnography of the southern district, however, has always been more complicated. The ease of movement across the watershed caused the Oder-March route to be used againand again by migratory peoples (see pp. 6-7), and throughout European history Upper Silesia has been the meeting-place of German, Czech and Pole. (See Fig- 43 (00 Mixed Polish and German settlement has been characteristic of the Oppeln area, east of the Oder, for centuries, and farther towards the plateau the Polish majorities in the population increase steadily. The whole of Upper Silesia, however, even those regions with a pronounced Polish majority, has been very much affected by German immigration since medieval times.



(c) Linguistic Map of Silesia.

For **the** Hapsburgs and for the eighteenth-century kings of Prussia, Silesia was estimated as a region of moderate fertility and of active metal working. There were some repaying soils in the river valleys, especially in the districts south-west of the Oder, but much of the land was too swampy or sandy for tilling, and the stretches of forest which still persist in this region show that it never has had great attraction for farming settlement.[20] It was strategic position above all which in early days made it so valuable. But from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards[21] Silesia had quite a different significance. This lay in the energetic exploitation of the coal-beds of Upper Silesia and in the development of the metallurgical industries. (See Fig. 43 *(b).)* Mining and industry were most active in Prussian Silesia, though, in the south, the Austrians also built up a great manufacturing area towards Teschen and in northern Moravia. The chief influences at work were German in the matters of capital, managers and foremen, although the labour was mainly Polish. Silesia rapidly became a Black Country in which the nucleus towns,[28] and others, ceased to be separate urban groups; they spread over the mining region, forming one vast industrial settlement, though here and there small farms and patches of woodland survived, to witness that Silesia was once a peasant country.

In one sense the development of Prussian Silesia was a triumph. It represented an achievement in economic efficiency and diligence, and a power to use to the full the natural wealth, both rural and industrial, of any region, of which no other people is perhaps capable to the same degree. No wonder that the Germans, having lost the greater part of Upper Silesia in the awards following the 1914-1918 War, should protest with fierce bitterness: " Deutscher Fleiss hat ailes geschaffen." (German diligence created all this.)



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FIG. 44.—The Development of Rail Communications in Poland. The east-west trend of construction is noticeable except for the railway built after the establishment of the Polish Republic. The political frontiers shown are those of the Republic between 1921 and 1939.

The exploitation by Germany of Polish natural resources in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was of course accompanied by very active railway construction, and the routes planned and built are of considerable interest. (See Fig. 44.) With one notable exception, the recently constructed railway from Katowice to Gdynia, the framework of railway communication is the same to-day, and it shows the dominant idea behind the Prussian programme. The railways centre on Berlin, and cross the German-Polish plain and plateaux mainly in an east-west direction, the trunk lines running from Berlin to Danzig and the East Prussian ports, from Berlin to Warsaw, and from Berlin to

the Silesian coalfields. This policy developed Poznsln as a great junction. The possibilities of land communication across the North European Plain, and the link between Germany and East Prussia and Germany and West Poland are emphasized; the north-south route of the Vistula valley and the connection between Poland and the Baltic ports is weak. This legacy in railway construction was an awkward problem for the Poles after the establishment of the republic, and it will be necessary in due course to refer to it again. (See pages 170-171.)

By the time war broke out in 1914, each of the three Polands was deeply branded with the mark of a foreign administration. Russian Poland was comparatively backward and illiterate; Austrian Poland was semi-autonomous, but inheriting much of the weakness of the old kingdom; German Poland was economically advanced, but its culture was cruelly oppressed. In each part of Poland also, the cause of independence was damped by the section of the Polish population which had decided to throw in its lot with the foreign rulers. For those who still believed in and worked for the resurrection of Poland—and in the end they proved the stronger—the agony of destruction and separation reached its climax in 1914. Then with Russia in one camp, and Austria and Germany in another, the Poles of one empire were called upon to fight the Poles of the other two, with their own country as the battlefield. In many ways the first two years of the 1914-1918 War were the darkest hours of all in the history of the Polish people.

In the third year, however, the prospect improved. Russian Poland, it is true, was over-run and laid waste by the armies of the Central Powers, but both Germany and Austria were conscious of their respective portions of Poland as danger spots. Each of these imperial governments, as the strain of the war increased, held out to their own Poles the promise of some form of increased autonomy within the empires, and suggested even more substantial concessions to the Russian Poles whose territory they had conquered.

It was the collapse of the Russian Empire, however, which finally cleared the path for Polish claims. The Allies had been willing from the first to consider the appeals of the Prussian and Austrian Poles; but the position of Russia as a leading member of the Allied Front for the first two years of the war made it impossible to press for the independence of Russian Poland. Once, however, the Revolution had

destroyed Russia's military usefulness to the Allies, there **were** not the same scruples about preserving her territory intact, and the Polish leaders had a good hearing in the Allied capitals and later at the Paris Peace Conference.

FIG. 45.—Linguistic Divisions of Poland. Note the scattered distribution of the German groups amongst the Poles in the west, and of the Polish groups amongst the Russians and Lithuanians in the east. The very considerable Jewish groups are not marked on this linguistic map. It would be difficult to illustrate the distribution of the Jews cartographically because they are very widely scattered—a minority in most urban and village populations. The recent violent and enforced migrations of the Polish Jews also preclude any possibility of mapping their settlement areas at the moment.

The Polish Republic was established, not only as a matter of right, but as a useful feature in the programme of the victorious powers.

As has been pointed out, the difficulties of defining the limits of Polish territory were very considerable, and for two years

after the signing of the peace treaties Polish frontier claims were continually disputed and her security threatened by actual invasion. The most serious struggle was in the east, over the settlement with Russia. The frontier suggested at the Peace Conference followed roughly the linguistic division between the White Russians and Poles, but less exactly that between the Ukrainians and Poles. (See Figs. 41 and 45.) A small but noticeable Ukrainian population was left within the frontiers of Poland. This proposed frontier became known as the " Curzon Line." The Poles did not accept it, and there followed a further period of war between Poland and Russia. At the end of the summer of 1920, Warsaw itself was threatened by the Bolshevik armies, and was saved mainly by Pilsudski's military skill. After the Polish military victory, the final demarcation of the frontier which was accepted by the Russians at the Treaty of Riga was much more favourable to the Poles than the " Curzon Line." But while from the Polish point of view it might be argued that it was desirable to push the eastern frontier as nearly as possible to the line of 1772 before the first Partition Treaty, it was doubtful wisdom on their part to press for the inclusion within the republic of big non-Polish populations. Whenever the revival of military power in Russia occurred, such a frontier was certain to be called into question, in spite of the historic claims of the Poles. Moreover, Russian claims to such territory would always have some justification on the grounds of the language tie. What might have been expected indeed took place. The second Treaty of Brest-Li tovsk of September 1939, which divided Poland again between Germany and Russia, certainly included big Polish groups within the Soviet Union. (See Fig. 41 (d).) But with full acknowledgment of the horrible circumstances of the fourth Partition, the new demarcation approximates the " Curzon Line" more closely than did the eastern frontier of the Polish Republic. The Poles by the settlement of the Treaty of Riga were undeniably buying trouble for the future. Therefore, however bitter such an arrangement might seem to the Poles, it seems doubtful whether any restoration of the republic should include the former White Russian and Ukrainian majority regions. The deliberate creation of big minority groups, whatever the traditions of the past, is a mistake that should not be repeated a second time. The gain of a frontier more fundamentally in accord with the linguistic divisions would perhaps be worth the price to the Polish people as a whole.

In other directions also after 1918 frontier problems bristled with difficulties. In the west there was the major question of a Polish-German settlement, on the coast, in the Corridor and in Silesia. In the north there was the scuffle

FIG. 46.—The Frontier Regions disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia. The thick black line shows the frontier eventually decided by the award of the Council of Ambassadors. Scale approx. 1 : 4,000,000.

with the Lithuanians over Vilna and Suvalki (see pp. 115-118), and in the south both Poles and Czechs laid claim to the industrial region of Teschen, and to the upland districts farther east of Orava and Spiš. (See Fig. 46.) In Poland itself, at the same time, distress of every kind was horribly apparent. By 1921 the whole of the centre and east of the country had been battered by armies for seven devastating years. In their wake was a trail of destruction and famine, and the latter brought fierce outbreaks of typhus and the prevalence of tuberculosis which affected the population long after the fighting had ceased. The new Polish state for the first years of its existence seemed anything but prosperous.

The outstanding problem for the new republic was perhaps the handling of the big minority groups, since both in the east and the west it affected the relationships of the Poles with foreign powers, and also had a close connection with Poland's economic well-being.

In the east the most formidable minority population in regions claimed as Polish was that of the Ukrainians who form the peasantry of a considerable part of eastern Galicia and southern Volhynia. (See Fig. 45.) The fact of a minority group of nearly four million Ukrainians in Poland was not in itself so very disturbing. Other countries have equally large foreign populations settled within their frontiers. The difficulty lay in the Polish Ukrainians' position as the extreme western wedge of the much larger population of the Soviet Ukraine, which numbers over thirty-one millions. To the south of Poland is another

Ukrainian region, Ruthenia (one-time eastern Czechoslovakia), and to the south-east, the former Ukrainian district of Rumania. The whole Ukrainian population in Russia, Poland, Ruthenia and Rumania amounts to nearly 40,000,000, and it is sufficiently distinct in culture from other groups to have some claim to a separate existence as yet another European state.[23] From time to time these claims were voiced very vigorously by these minorities both in Russia and in Poland, and the possibility of their separatism becoming practical politics was naturally dreaded by Russian and Polish governments alike. Disintegration of this kind meant in each case much more than the mere loss of territory or man-power. Economically the products of the Ukraines are immensely important whether to the great Union or the smaller Polish group, for in them are the most important regions of food-supply for Russia-in-Europe and Poland, and for the latter also the main stores of oil.

In Russia the Ukrainians were able to hold their own with moderate success. By sheer weight of numbers, and because the resources of the Soviet Ukraine are vital to the Union, this group was able to secure for itself, at any rate for some years, greater autonomy than was achieved by any other nationality belonging to the Socialist Republics. But the fate of the Ukrainians in Poland was very different. There they formed not quite 4 per cent, of the whole population, and their claims to any existence as a distinct group were felt by the Poles to be a threat to the new republic. Much might be said to explain the Polish attitude. The invasion of the Bolshevik armies in 1920 was a memory which died hard, the ideal of a separate Ukrainian state was no secret, and the Polish state was conscious of its weakness and nervous of any strain on its unity. The Poles dreaded both the complete break-away of the Ukraine with all its wealth, and the infection of Poland with Communist doctrines through the Ukrainian population. But the fact remains that the Poles in their anxiety treated the Ukrainian minority throughout the period after 1921 as unwisely as they themselves had been handled by Russian, Prussian or Austrian governments. Some slight check was put on oppression by the minority treaties, which enabled the League of Nations in its more successful days to inquire into the grievances of subject peoples, but in most respects, and particularly in the matter of cultural freedom, the lot of the Ukrainians in Poland was miserable. The result, of course, was no different in Poland from that in any other country. Per-

secution gave the Ukrainians the added consciousness and solidarity of a martyr group, and the severity of the Poles increased the insecurity of the south-eastern frontier of the republic. The continued discontent of the Ukrainians was an advantage both to Germany and the Soviet Union, which was exploited in 1939.

Southern and eastern Poland held additionally the problem of the big proportion of Jewish inhabitants.[84] About 8 per cent, of the the total population of the Polish Republic was reckoned as Jewish, but this figure was very much higher in the old Austrian and Russian provinces. During the last troubled period of the old state of Poland and the century of foreign rule the Jewish population of the Isthmian region had increased enormously in numbers. The area of their greatest concentration was the east, because the Russian-Polish lands had formed part of the Paie of Settlement for the Jews within the Russian Empire. The proportion of Jews to the whole population was also high in Galicia. It was reckoned in this region that the provinces of Cracow and Lwow contained two-thirds of all the Jews in the Hapsburg Empire. The part of Poland where the Jews were least in evidence was the north and west which had been taken by Prussia. There had been thence a considerable migration to other parts of Germany and to Western Europe.

In spite of the enormous movement of Jews from the Pale of Settlement and from Galicia to the New World during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and up to the outbreak of war in 1914, the main settlements of Jewry were still in Poland after the establishment of the republic. As a minority people amongst the Poles, the Jews were divided into two groups. There was the smaller number of wealthy Jews, who were anxious for influence in Polish affairs, and there was the much larger section of small merchants and professional men, who had very little interest in politics provided that they were left in peace to follow their callings. Both groups played a very important part in the economic reconstruction of the Polish Republic. The comparative weakness of the co-operative societies in Poland kept the Jews in contact with the peasant producers. Further, Jewish capital and enterprise were prominent in the development of new industrial ventures.

Yet between the thousands of small traders and the peasants, and between the Jew and Gentile in the professions there was in Poland after 1918 a recurrent hostility which was always dangerous. The Jews practised a certain

amount of usury amongst the peasants, and they were shrewder and more successful at making money than the country people; on all counts they were considered as enemies and as fair game for baiting. This bad feeling was evident also in all the universities, especially at Lwow, where the numbers and competence of the Jewish students were long-standing grievances to the Gentiles.

For the Jewish small-trader, professional man and financier alike, the outlook darkened with the rise of the Nazis in Germany. The Nazi movement developed logically enough after the period of economic crisis, and the strain of these years had been particularly severe in the marchland strip, especially in countries which had not achieved the stability of widespread peasant-ownership of land. In Poland the years of economic depression had already caused the Jews to be regarded with disfavour by a population who lived near the margin of existence. But after the rise of the Third Reich the general hostility to the Jews, endemic in Central and Eastern Europe, became much more open; indeed persecution of them became a horrible commonplace, so that outbreaks which ten years previously would have provoked indignant and forcible protests from many European powers, grew gradually to be considered as a matter of course, however disgusting.

This deterioration was accompanied, however, by a recognition on the part of a certain section of the Poles of Jewish economic competence. When the drive towards a fresh stage of industrial development in Poland began after 1936, there was evident a much more intelligent realization of Jewish skill and industry. Accordingly, one of the worst aspects of the German annexation of western and central Poland was the fresh calamity to the Jews. Not only did it bring under the jurisdiction of the most anti-Semitic of governments the biggest Jewish communities in Europe; but it occurred just when a certain number of Jews, if only a minority, were beginning to gain acceptance as a genuine and respected group in Polish economic life. The effect of German conquest that has been most noticeable so far, although it is impossible to make any definite comment, is of an increase of the Jewish population in the Polish-speaking lands. This is due to the renewed driving of the Jews eastward from Germany. Further, within the parts of Poland annexed by Germany, there has also been a forced eastward movement of the Jews to the Lublin region near the new German-Russian frontier. The long-term result

of the German annexation of Poland, besides that of violent redistributions of the Jewish groups, must also surely be a decline in the Semitic population as a whole, whether amongst the German or Polish-speaking sections. The character of German policy leaves no doubt of the intention to destroy East European Jewry as far as it is in the power of the Third Reich to do so.

North of the Ukraine in the sparsely populated forests and marshes in the east of the Polish Republic was the White Russian minority group. In numbers the White Russians are much less than the Ukrainians, being but one and a quarter millions, and compared with the southern minority they were a passive, subject people. Their chief grievance with Polish administration was over the question of land-settlement.

The character of Polish White Russia, that is the provinces of Nowogrodek and northern Polesia, changed somewhat in the years after 1921, as the Poles spread fairly rapidly eastward there with a policy of land-colonization. The complaint of the White Russian peasants, even though there was room for immigrants, was of the special favours shown to the new-comers by the Polish government; this gave them an advantage over the original inhabitants and encouraged (as was intended) still more immigration. Over cultural questions there was little ill-feeling. White Russian culture is neither so advanced nor so articulate as Ukrainian, and Polish predominance was accepted with very little question. The three creeds—Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and that of the Uniate Church—were all held in Polish White Russia, so that serious grievances along religious lines did not arise.[25] The new-comers served mainly to increase the Romanist element.

At the same time, the mere fact that a White Russian minority existed in the Polish Republic made one pretext for the fatal invasion from the east which sealed the fate of the Polish armies in 1939. The real interests of the White Russian peasants were not considered very carefully by the Soviet government, but their grievances against Polish land-owners and Polish immigrants made easier the task of the Russian troops and propagandists.

Polish policy towards the German minority of just over a million in the west was necessarily completely different from that towards the eastern peoples. In the west the German population was culturally in advance of and economically more efficient than the Polish. The Poles could

hardly help remembering the oppression of past years; the Germans inevitably felt to the full the humiliation of the changed positions in Prussian Poland. There was every inducement to recurrent enmity between Poles and Germans, and expectations of trouble were amply fulfilled.

The relationships between Poland and Germany were inseparably bound up with two questions of great economic importance, the development of Silesia and the access of Poland to the sea. In Silesia a very mature economic region was divided in 1921 after a period of endless and bitter discussion, *against* the evidence of a plebiscite, and by the award of the Council of the League of Nations, between Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. (See Fig. 43 *(c).)* The great gain to Poland was the lion's share of the raw materials and a good deal of the industrial plant. The blow to Germany was not only the loss of the mines and factories which had gone to Poland, but the fact that in the part of Silesia remaining to her the proportion of raw material to plant was very small; many enterprises therefore were cut off from the supplies with which they had always been associated.

An attempt was made to salvage the economic unity of the region by the obligation laid upon the Poles and Germans to draw up and put into practice a convention for the administration of Upper Silesia to last for fifteen years. For five years also the Germans were forced to import annually a fixed quantity of products from Polish Silesia. But when this period of compulsory purchase was over in 1925, German feeling towards Poland was forcibly expressed by establishing a strict boycott in Germany of Polish goods, in spite of the convention. The division of Silesia was therefore in one respect recklessly completed by the Germans themselves.

From the point of view of the Poles, after the first difficult years of readjustment were over, the barriers set up by the Germans (which were not officially removed until the Commercial treaty of 1930) were in some respects a gain.* With the ample mineral wealth in the country it was possible to complete in time new and Polish-owned enterprises. The products of many of the new Polish factories had a natural market, given normal economic prosperity, in the big peasant population all over the country. The redrawing of frontiers between 1918 and 1921 had left Poland potentially a well-balanced if undeveloped state, with complementary resources in minerals, forests and farming land; the years,

therefore, of economic isolation from Germany gave a peculiar form of protection to her young industries.

The passing of a part of Upper Silesia to Poland, and its development on different lines, was also bound to affect the system of communications in the Vistula Basin. It was natural in the first place that the Poles should not wish to depend exclusively on the existing network of railway lines which emphasized the old link with Germany. In the second, Polish trade connections demanded a north and south communication line between the Silesian hinterland and the Baltic outlet. Iron from Sweden and cotton and wool from overseas were necessary imports, and coal and timber important exports. But unfortunately the strip of Polish settlement which ran north to the coast did not include the port which had developed at the Vistula mouth, the famous city of Danzig. Instead, it ran to the west of the delta and touched the Baltic coast at the peninsula of Hei.

From the economic standpoint there could be no doubt as to the suitability of Danzig for the rôle of entrepôt for Polish overseas trade. But by no stretch of imagination could it be called in the twentieth century a Polish city, or the immediate surroundings described as anything but German in character. Its past history bears witness to the struggle for its possession between Pole and German. Twice it has been under Polish rule (997-1308, 1454-1793), three times under German rule (1308-1454, 1793-1807, 1813-1919), and twice a self-governing city state (1807-1813,1919-1939). The most significant years of development were undeniably those of Prussian rule whether in the first period, when Danzig was a stronghold of the Teutonic Knights and a flourishing member of the Hanseatic League of cities, or in the third when the port shared in the tremendous economic advance of all the German territories. Further, the city was furnished in the nineteenth century with a system of rail communications inland which emphasized her connection with the west rather than with the south. In 1919, therefore, there was no contradicting the German nature of the population and their links with the Fatherland, however plainly the city's economic prosperity tied it to Poland as a result of frontier changes.

The attempt in the peace treaties to solve the linguistic and economic claims of Poland and Germany on the coastal plain resulted in a settlement of considerable complication. Polish predominance in the strip of the Middle and Lower Vistula was acknowledged, thereby making a connected

strip of territory between Polish Silesia and the Baltic, but separating East Prussia inconveniently from Germany. Danzig itself with a few miles of surrounding territory was established as an autonomous city with a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. The economic needs of the Poles would be appeased, it was hoped, by special privileges and control in the port, and the connection



Fig. 47.—The Railways of" Privileged Transit" across the Polish Corridor. The political frontiers shown are those obtaining between 1921 and 1939. Scale approx. 1 ; 5,000,000.

between East Prussia and Germany maintained by extra facilities on the railways crossing the Corridor.[27] (See Fig. 470

The Poles, however, in the atmosphere of twentieth-century Europe did not feel safe when depending entirely on a port-town populated mainly by disgruntled Germans. Moreover, their suspicions had some foundation, since during the Russian invasion of Poland in 1919 the Danzig dockers had struck, and had refused to unload the arms sent from abroad to help the Poles. This incident gave an excuse for embarking on a scheme which every year became more attractive to the Polish government, the construction of a new north and south railway between Katowice in Silesia and the Polish Baltic coast, developing at the same time the small fishing village of Gdynia as the main and purely Polish port.[26] This line was finished in 1933 and its construction, together with the intensive development of Gdynia, was a

huge task for a country in the economic circumstances of post-war Poland. (See Fig. 44.)

The whole scheme provoked some criticism outside Poland. In Danzig it caused consternation, as it was feared that the economic link with the Poles, upon which the merchants depended for the port's activity, would gradually weaken and break altogether. More detached observers pointed out that the costs had been enormous; that Poland was not for the time being a wealthy country; that the extreme narrowness of the Corridor made Gdynia strategically quite impossible to defend, so that the Poles were no safer than before. Further, the railway had been built partly at the expense of neglecting the shipping possibilities on the Vistula, and this river was, in view of many of the cheap and bulky commodities passing north and south, a good natural means of transport, which should not have been so much ignored. On strategic grounds criticism has been justified. Access to the sea made very little serious difference to the fortunes of the Poles during the German invasion of 1939. The methods adopted by the Polish government of meeting the costs and technical difficulties of construction were also interesting. The necessary capital was borrowed from France, and the equipment for the port was mainly German. These features served to show the strength of French interest in Polish well-being and particularly in the question of Polish access to the Baltic. They proved, too, both the strength of the German trading connection in the marchland strip in spite of political difficulties and, for the time being, the economic immaturity of Poland.

Whatever the cost and whatever the economic wisdom or unwisdom, the Poles were determined to have both port and railway. It gave them a sense of achievement which had a value apart from material considerations, and they were justified in pointing out that the full economic development of Poland would provide ample trade to keep two ports busy. They could also show that whereas before 1914 the trade of the various divisions of Poland was conducted almost exclusively along the east and west land-routes, that of reunited Poland had changed enormously in character and orientation, the whole emphasis lying on the north and south line of trade with dependence on the sea outlets.

Of the whole Polish-German settlement, it may be said that it was intricate but not technically unworkable. It depended, however, for its success on political conditions which were not necessarily in any way connected with the

frontier localities. It is rarely, if ever, that the actual population of a problem territory is deeply responsible for recurrent trouble. In the case of the Polish-German frontier the grievances about the port and industrial region expanded and shrank according to the relationships between Berlin and Warsaw. Between 1933 and 1938, for example, friction was noticeably absent because good political understanding suited both Poland and Germany.[89] But if for any reason German-Polish hostility should arise, then there was the everlasting possibility of trouble in Upper Silesia, or over the port of Danzig, or over the separation of East Prussia from Germany by the Corridor. Danzig indeed will go down to history for a rôle in 1939 which is comparable to that of Sarajevo in 1914. Quite in conflict with the economic well-being of the city, the possibilities of an outbreak there had been nursed carefully in Berlin after 1933, and they ripened to order six years later.

There is, indeed, a permanent setting in the German-Polish border-lands for political and economic struggles; first on account of the strength of the river unit, which can make effective the claim to a north and south line of activity to rival that of the east and west line of expansion; secondly because of the broken distribution of language and culture, and the persistence through centuries of the long narrow strip of Polish settlement along the line of the Vistula; and thirdly because of the economic wealth of Upper Silesia. These are circumstances which are not altered easily by time nor by the most ferocious of wars, nor by a succession of different administrations. And because of these conditions, no political settlement of these regions has ever been, or looks like being, of very long duration. The chief victims, though not the prime movers of the disturbances, are the local populations for whom the economic possibilities of this part of Europe are always clouded by the fear of violent change. On their behalf, accordingly, such adjustments as are possible to human ingenuity to improve the ragged character of these settlement areas should be thought out as carefully as may be with a view to future peace treaties.

It is at this point relevant to say something of the economic development of the Polish Republic as a whole between 1921 and 1939, since the entire country and not only the province of mineral wealth were of vital interest to the two ports of Danzig and Gdynia.

The years of separation in the past, and the big contrasts in economic standards between the three Polands, made it

very much more difficult for this country to achieve the solidarity at home which was so impressive in the small northern republics. Also there was the question, not only of bringing into line with one another the sections of Poland which had developed under three varieties of foreign rule, but of handling those class interests inside the country which were absent in the northern groups.

Foreign administration had in every case partially destroyed the Polish land-owning class; in German Poland especially, the peasant proprietors whether German or Polish had been deliberately encouraged to counterbalance the influence of the landed nobility, where these had remained in the country. Thus in the three Polands altogether in 1914, about half the land was already held in small lots. But after 1921 further distribution proceeded very slowly compared with the programmes in the north.*[0] It was not that agrarian reform was unnecessary. Land-hunger in Poland in 1939 was still acute; many of the peasant farms were too small for profitable cultivation, and every year the average increase by half-a-million of the population in Poland was mainly in the class of landless peasants. Moreover, the old solution of wholesale emigration was no longer possible. It was neither class selfishness amongst the Polish nobility nor disregard for the interests of the state which were the chief hindrances to land reform. The necessary laws were passed and many families who had held estates for generations would have parted without complaint with property which they could no longer afford to develop properly. The need was there, and a good deal of land was, in one sense, available for redistribution; it was the actual machinery for purchase and redivision which was feeble. The section of the land-owning class which remained after 1921 was, unlike those of the northern republics, native and not foreign except in Galicia and White Russia. It was a class, too, which had always held a strong position in Poland even through the years of partition, and which remained respected and at times influential. There could be no question therefore of confiscating estates, nor of compulsory purchase with only part-compensation for the land. But the state was too poor to buy freely large areas of land at the full price for redistribution, and the peasants were, in the majority of cases, unable to pay directly for smaller properties. Thus, for lack of means, and because there was no argument in Poland for the ruthlessness of the north, agrarian reform lagged behind.

Had Poland survived the political crisis of 1939, and had she been able to continue her normal course of development, the problem of land-hunger could not have been shelved indefinitely. The position of the peasantry who formed over 60 per cent, of the total population was, on the whole, much less satisfactory than in the Baltic republics, or in the Czech lands before the German annexation in 1939. The rapid increase of population in Poland could not but have increased annually the desperation of the peasant group, and reform was overdue if the contentment and prosperity of the farmers were to be assured %o the state.

The failure to solve this problem again weakened the position of Poland in her eastern territories. Neither the Ukrainian nor the White Russian groups felt the tie of tradition, sentiments and language which bound together the Polish peasants and estate owners, and to the minorities the Soviet campaign against the Poles must in some respects have been congenial. Whether these populations with their long-standing desire for substantial peasant plots will take kindly to the more drastic system of collective farming is another matter. If the Russian administration of these lands is to mean the application of the farming systems prevailing within the Soviet Union, there may well be a repetition on a small scale of the terrible years of adjustment to collectivism which meant so much destruction to life and property in the Russian grasslands between 1929 and 1933.

The circumstances of the peasant population in German-ruled Poland, from such accounts as are available, are now approaching desperation. The fact that the whole of western and central Poland was a battlefield in the autumn of 1939 inevitably meant considerable destruction to farming land and implements. Further, large-scale expropriations of land and the transference of big stocks of produce as well as of peasant labour must have damaged the very foundations of small farming in Poland. Subsistence farming is still very prevalent in the country, and there are few alternatives to this existence and very little margin for catastrophe. The peasant majority of the Polish population was not in a position to stand any violent dislocation of rural economy, let alone the devastations of actual warfare and the terrible programme of German revenge.

The upheaval of 1939 was all the more tragic when it is borne in mind that there was one palliative in the Polish Republic for a growing population, which is absent from any marchland group except Yugoslavia and possibly Finland.

That was the enormous possibility of industrial development, and this remedy up to the outbreak of war was being applied with all possible vigour.

The most marked feature of industrial scheming was a programme evolved after the difficult years of the economic depression, and which was known as the National Development Plan. The region chosen for its working was the area christened by the Poles the " strategic triangle " in Galicia, between the Vistula and its right-bank tributary, the San.[81] (See Figs. 36, 37 and 38.) This district has many advantages for the state enterprises conceived. It is close to the best supplies of raw materials;—timber, salt (for chemical industries), lead and zinc; it is within reach of the coal and oil fuels and water-power resources, and the main lines of communication by rail and water. There is an all too abundant supply of peasant labour near to hand, and there are neighbouring food-supplies in Podolia to feed big industrial concentrations. Strategically, the position was dangerous, because of its nearness to the southern frontier of Polish settlement, but it may be said that no part of Poland has ever been very secure from attack. The " triangle " was better off in this respect, at any rate, than Upper Silesia, the value of which as an industrial region has always been lessened by its extremity position in any unit.

If the " strategic triangle " could have prospered on the lines desired by the Poles, it would have meant, not only a partial solution of demographic problems, but also the achievement of a new and far more advanced stage of economic existence. Given the resources which were included within their frontiers after the 1914-1918 War, it was not difficult for them, even in the first years of economic readjustment to attain a fairly satisfactory position in world markets as exporters of raw materials, coal, timber, zinc and of farming products. The Poles had good trading connections in a number of countries, especially Sweden, Austria, the Low Countries and Czechoslovakia.[88] Industrial enterprise also began to cater in manufactured goods for the peasants at home. But this economic rôle was nothing like that potentially open to them if conditions favoured a further advance.

For a number of years they did not. Between 1929 and 1935 it was not even possible to maintain vigorously the more simple economic system already in force, let alone to branch out on fresh lines. It was only in the last three years before the present war that the Polish people were able to

embark upon the programme which could have changed their status in Europe as producers and traders. The object of the industrial activity since 1936 both in the " strategic triangle " and all over the country in fresh enterprises was not only to absorb the increasing peasant population and to cater for the peasant markets : it aimed also at greater independence of imported manufactured goods, and at gaining in time for the Poles the reputation of successful manufacturers for foreign markets. It was one of the tragedies of the Polish collapse that the country's economic prosperity, which was so painfully built up after 1921, and which was just about to develop on new and vigorous lines, should have been shattered once more by invasion from the west. The whole laborious effort of twenty years was lost in a few destructive weeks.

The achievement of some sort of economic uniformity and progress in Poland in the generation after 1921 was laborious. It was, however, easier than the political task of establishing any form of parliamentary government, and it is hardly surprising to find that after some highly unsuccessful experiments the attempt was abandoned as hopeless. As has been pointed out, there was little in the historical development of the Polish state to favour the growth of political instincts or of democratic government after the French or English pattern, and the constitution which was drawn up for the republic after the 1914-1918 War was rather the expression of a hope than of practical value. The plight of Poland to-day must awaken the sympathy of the whole world apart from the direct enemies of the republic, but it is useless to claim that the Polish political structure between 1921 and 1929 was essentially that of a stable and successful democracy. The obstructionist tactics, which were a byword in the old state of Poland, cropped up again speedily with the establishment of the new one, and the first years of independence gave aggravations of this kind every opportunity to flourish. Austrian Poland in particular stood to lose by centralization from Warsaw. The liberalism of the last years of the Hapsburg Empire had given this part of the country in one sense more independence than could possibly be expected in a reunited republic, and the southern Poles grudged the importance to Warsaw which had once belonged in part to fcwow and Cracow. Dictatorship has now ceased to be a very palatable form of government to many European groups, but undeniably it was more or less

inevitable in Poland in 1926 when Marshal Pilsudski, with the help of a section of the army, seized control of the administration and held it to the day of his death. Government by the military authorities in Poland certainly meant the end of some forms of maladministration. At the best it provided a rough-and-ready solidarity, which was vital to the Poles if they were to struggle for survival as an independent unit. It left unsolved, however, many of the major problems of the country, the position of the minorities, the insecurity of the Jews and the needs of the peasants; it also emphasized the continued defects of the Poles as a political group.

The foreign policy which accompanied this regime was most interesting, mainly because it showed the instinctive realization by the Poles of their perilous position in Europe. They ranged during their years of existence as an independent people from a close alliance with France as the basis of foreign relations, to a period of friendship with Germany, and to co-operation again with Great Britain and France. The most constant element in Polish foreign policy, perhaps, was the continued suspicion of the Soviet Union.

The episode which was least attractive in this record of diplomatic agility was that of the seizure of Teschen from the Czechs in the autumn of 1938. The district of Teschen, it will be remembered, is in the southernmost corner of the controversial area of upper Silesia: it contains mines of bituminous and lignite coal of varying value. (See pages 220, 235.) The mines of best quality are in the north, in the districts which have undoubted Polish majorities in the population, and these were duly awarded to the Poles by the Council of Ambassadors appointed after the Paris Peace Conference. The coal of southern Teschen which was left to Czechoslovakia is poorer in grade, but here also are considerable though scattered patches of Polish settlement, so that the Czechoslovak part of Teschen contained a big minority population.[88] In the general scramble for Czechoslovak territory which attended the Munich Settlement in 1938, the Poles with German compliance claimed and secured the remaining part of Teschen which had been denied them by the peace treaties, but the territorial and economic gains in these circumstances were hardly a matter for pride. Further the possession of southern Teschen was short-lived. When the Polish lands were parcelled out once more in the autumn of 1939, the Teschen area in dispute, together with some small fragments of

territory farther east, were awarded to the Slovak Protectorate.

The policy of quick change, however, which on the part of many groups might be condemned as rank and sometimes unwise opportunism, is bound to be a permanent temptation to the Poles. For with good reason they never feel safe. Weight of numbers, good resources in regions of Polish settlement and long traditions certainly make it probable that the *Polish group* will always survive as a cultural entity in Europe. Where the smaller groups in the north have been successful in maintaining such an existence, it is impossible that the Poles should fail. But, on the other hand, on account of their geographical position and the peculiar distribution of their settlements, a *Polish state* seems doomed always to insecurity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON POLAND

1. See De Martonne, "L'Europe Centrale," *Geógraphie Universelle,* p. 623, Vol. IV, Part II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1931).

2. See *Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries: Monograph No.* 1, p. 3 (University of Birmingham, 1936).

3. The Polish canals which take advantage of these easy reliefs are the following: (1) The *Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) Canal* connects the Vistula and the Oder by means of the Noteć and Brda tributaries. This canal was built in the eighteenth century by the Prussians (1775) and reconstructed during the 1914-1918 War. It was mainly used for cargo passing between East Prussia and Germany. (2) The *Nogat Canal* is an eastern section of the northern plain water-way system which links the Vistula with the Niemen. The Nogat water-way runs into the almost landlocked "Frisches Haff" of the Gulf of Danzig, and then by means of the Pregel river and its tributary the Dejma north-east to the Kurish Harbour and the Niemen estuary. (3) The *Augustov Canal* was built at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the intention of connecting the Middle Niemen and Vistula rivers. The Vistula tributaries used, the Biebrza and the Narew, are, however, not regulated for navigation, so that the usefulness of the canal is limited to timber floating. (4) The *Oginski Canal* was built during the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries to connect the Niemen and Dnieper river systems. The junction is made through the Szczara and Pripet tributaries, and the main use again is for timber floating. (5) The *Royal Canal* was built in the middle of the nineteenth century to connect the Vistula and Dnieper systems by means of the Bug and Pripet tributaries. See *Jahrbuch für Polen,* pp. 413-5 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy "Bibljoteka Polska," 1930).

4. See Peisker, "The Expansion of the Slavs," *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. II, Chapter XIV.

5. See Haddon, *The Races of Man,* pp. 65, 66.

6. The total population of **Poland at the last** census (1931) was reckoned 33,418,000. Of these **69 per cent,** were **Polish** and the remainder was

composed of various nationalities. The bigger minorities were reckoned as follows: Ukrainians, approx. 4,000,000; Jews, 3,000,000; White Russians, just over 1,000,000; Germans, just over 1,000,000; Lithuanians, approx. 72,000. Figures from the *Statesman's Year-Book,* 1938 (London: Macmillan). Mention here should also be made of the Kashube minority. There are only a few thousands of these people, but they occupy a strategically vital piece of territory on the western side of the Polish Corridor in the hinterland of the port of Gdynia. This district on account of the poverty of the soil is, and always has been, very sparsely populated. The peasants inhabiting it are the descendants in language, at any rate, of a group whose occupation of this coastal region was before that either of Pole or German. Their speech counts as a Slav tongue, but it is distinct from the Polish. The Kashubes have, since 1918, received an attention which is out of proportion to their numbers. Both Poles and Germans vigorously asserted their claims to this territory, and many strange tales of the ethnological and cultural history of the Kashubes arose in consequence.

7. See Dyboski, *Outlines of Polish History,* p. 17.

8. *Ibid.,* pp. 13, 14.

9. It is interesting to note that the Polish name for the crop, buckwheat, is *tatarka.* Buckwheat is a hardy and quick-ripening plant, and the Tartars were able on their raiding expeditions to sow it, abandon it and reap it on return. For the Poles this crop never lost its association with the Tartar bands.

10. Sigismund III (1587-1632), who moved the administrative centre of the Polish kingdom from Cracow to Warsaw, had been educated in Sweden at a time when Swedish culture was very much tinged with German influence. The more northerly town in Poland was in closer touch for the ruler with the lands of his upbringing than the traditional capital.

11. See Bruce-Boswell," Poland and Lithuania in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VIII, Chapter XVIII, pp. 558-61.

12. This reference is to the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg is the German name) in 1410; the joint Polish, Lithuanian and Russian forces here defeated the armies of the Teutonic Knights. The presence of Czech and Tartar bands *is* also recorded. On the same battlefield a part of the Russian army was annihilated by the Germans between the 27th and 29th of August 1914. It was this episode which was to have been celebrated by the Germans twenty-five years later in August 1939, when the proclamation of the Russian-German Pact made such a commemoration out of place.

13. See *Outlines of Polish History,* p. 65, and " L'Europe Centrale," *Giographie Universelle,* p. 621.

14. See *Outlines of Polish History,* pp. 32-5 and 50-2.

15. *Ibid.,* p. 203.

16. See Smogorewski, *La Pomiranie Polonaise,* p. 155 (Paris: Gebethner & Wolf, 1932).

17. With reference to the migration of towns-people, it is worth recalling how often the observation was made between 1919 and 1939 that the merchants of Danzig, though not enthusiastic about the Polish regime, recognized the economic affinity of their port with the Polish hinterland. They would probably have come to satisfactory terms of existence alongside the Polish Republic if it had not been for the

trouble fermented from Berlin. (See pp. 170-1.) Whether, in the case of a complete transference of East Prussia to the Poles, the German inhabitants of the ports would choose to throw in their lot with Poland is difficult to forecast, especially in view of the much more antagonistic feeling between Pole and German engendered by the present German policy. Whether the Poles in command of East Prussia would tolerate a German population in the ports at all is also doubtful.

18. De Martonne gives the density of population in East Prussia according to the 1925 census; it was then reckoned as 60·91 to the square kilometre. That for the whole of Germany at the same date was 133*14 to the square kilometre, so that the average density for the province in question was less than half that of the whole country. The total population for East Prussia at that date was 2,256,349. Of these, 41,000 were Masurians of Slavonic speech. See " L'Europe Centrale," *Giographie Universelle.*

19. The seven chief towns, Königsberg, Tilsit, Elbing, Insterburg, Allenstein, Marienburg and Gumbinnen, together contained about a quarter of the population of East Prussia between 1919 and 1939. The port towns are the largest (Königsberg, 316,072: Elbing, 72,409). On the other hand it must be remembered that a high proportion of urban to rural settlement is characteristic of the German-speaking lands as a whole from the end of the 19th century onwards. East Prussia in relation to other German Provinces is one where farming economies predominate : in relation to most Polish provinces it is urban in character.

20. See *Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries: Monograph No.* 1, p. 6.

21. Economic historians usually regard the year 1848 as the significant date in the industrial development of Silesia. W. J. Rose in *The Drama of Upper Silesia,* pp. 58-66 (London: Williams & Norgate, 1936), describes the circumstances making for drastic changes in this region at that time. Clapham in *The Economic Development of France and Germany,* p. 90 (Cambridge : The Univ. Press, 1928), comments on the late industrialization of Silesia compared with that of the Rhineland or Saxony. But Rose mentions also the extremely interesting rdle of the Silesian mines and foundries earlier in the century, when the armament production of Silesia was a solid asset to the Prussians in the struggle against Napoleon. See *The Drama of Upper Silesia*, pp. 38 and 39.

22. These towns have double place names. Gleiwitz on the German side of the frontier has the Polish form, Gliwice; the German form of Katowice is Kattowitz, and of Chorzow, Königshütte.

23. The possibility of an Ukrainian political unit has been discussed more than once since 1918. In view of these propositions, the following comments are perhaps necessary. In the first place there is no tradition in history of such a state. The peoples speaking this language have always formed parts of other political groups. Secondly there was until the Bolshevik Revolution a marked difference in creed between the Russian and non-Russian Ukrainians. Those of Russia belonged before the days of the Soviet regime to the Eastern Orthodox Church; those of the upland territories, that is the plateau of Podolia and the Carpathians, to the Uniate Church. This distinction is important amongst groups composed mainly of peasants. In the third place the suggestions for the formation of a separate Ukrainian unit have mainly come from quarters

which have been interested in the weakening of the Polish or Soviet political structures. German propaganda has been the most active; it has had some success in the Polish Ukraine, on account of the Polish persecution there, but very little in the Soviet Ukraine, where the chief memory of the Germans is still that of the invading armies during the later years of the 1914-1918 War. See the *Bulletin of International News,* 14th January 1939, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

24. For the position of the Jews in Poland, see Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World,* pp. 155 and 211-12.

25. See *Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries: Monograph No.* 2, p. 24.

26. See Kimens, *Report on the Economic Situation in Poland,* 1927, p. 27 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1928).

27. The rights accorded to Poland in the City State of Danzig by the Convention of 1920 and the Agreement of 1921 were: (1) the conduct of the foreign relations of Danzig; (2) the establishment of postal and telegraph offices having direct communication with Poland; (3) the inclusion of the City within the Polish customs frontier; (4) the anchoring of Polish warships in Danzig harbour and the defence of the City by Polish forces if police control should become inadequate.

The lines of " privileged transit " for goods and passengers between Germany and East Prussia across the Corridor are indicated on Fig. 42. The German complaint was always that the insistence on specially sealed trains for this purpose made the working of the communication system for Germany both inconvenient and costly.

28. Gdynia is about ten miles west of Danzig. Up to 1924 it was only a fishing village, but the site, although without the natural encouragement for port development which belongs to that of Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula, is not without assets. The new basins for the port were constructed in the natural deepening made by old river channels, and the town and harbour are sheltered by the Hei Peninsula. In 1936 46 per cent, of Polish exports passed through Gdynia and 33 percent, of imports. In comparison, 31 per cent, of Polish exports went through Danzig and 15 per cent, of imports. In spite of the larger figure of the trade of Gdynia, it was noticeable that Danzig was one of the few ports in the south-east Baltic which enjoyed a steady trade increase after 1918. This is a tribute to the possibilities of the north and south line of activity in the republic, and to the commercial and economic possibilities of Polish-settled territories.

29. For the circumstances which led to the period of friendly relations between the Third Reich and Poland, see King-Hall, *Our Own Times,* pp. 712-4 (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1938).

30. The Agrarian Reform Bill of 1920 provided, as in the northern groups, for a maximum limit to properties, and for the redistribution of the land thus left available into peasant holdings by the state. This bill was superseded by another in 1925, before much redistribution had taken place, substituting the voluntary sale of land by the owners for the former arrangement of compulsory sale. The institution of the Agricultural Banks in 1927 was intended to facilitate this more gradual process of land reform. The reports on economic conditions in Poland published by H.M. Stationery Office in 1927, 1928 and 1931, record annual redistributions of an average of 200,000 hectares, with an exceptional figure in 1927 of 300,000 hectares.

31. See Merry, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Poland,* p. 30 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1938).

32. *Ibid.,* p. 43. See also *Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries: Monograph No.* 5.

33. The total population of Czechoslovak Teschen was estimated at approximately 257,399. Of these the Czech majority formed 120,639 and the Polish minority 76,230. See Ancel, *Manuel Geographique de Ia Politique Europienne* (Paris: Librairie Delagravc, 1936).

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PART III

THE DANUBE LANDS

REGIONAL INTRODUCTION

THE Danube Basin covers an immense part of Central and South-east Europe, and the great river itself flows through five states. (See Fig. 48.) German-controlled territory includes the whole of the Upper Danube lands, and the parts of the Middle Danube Basin which are Austrian, Czech and Slovak in settlement. The eastern course of the Middle Danube is through Hungary and Yugoslavia, while the lower river on its journey to the Black Sea forms for more than a hundred miles the frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania. Rumania for the time being is also within the German sphere of management.

FIG. 48.—The Danube Basin. Note the extent of the Danube drainage area and the sharp division made by the mountains between the Middle and Lower Danube Basins. The thick lines show the political boundaries.

The Danube lands are for the most part potentially wealthy. There are in this part of Europe rich supplies of minerals, of good agricultural and grazing land, of forests and of water-power. (See Fig. 49.) Its inhabitants could make a very big contribution to the prosperity and stability of the continent. There are here also, more evident than in the Baltic region, the material necessities for economic

federation; that is to say, a variety of raw materials and **the** possibilities of both farming and industrial activity.[1] This economic balance could be developed both in the Danube lands as a whole and within them, in the smaller but well-endowed region of the Middle Danube Basin.



FIG. 49—Economic Resources of the Danube Basin. The drainage area is white.

Yet, looking back over the history of the Danube countries, one is struck partly by the neglect, and partly by the misuse of their wealth. In spite of all the possibilities of this region, the Danube peoples as a whole have been a perpetual source of disturbance in Europe, and those of the eastern lands are to-day economically poor and culturally backward.[1]

There are various explanations of this failure to live up to the possibilities of the Danube lands. In the first place, the actual geographical features make for a certain amount of separatism between the human groups. Especially marked is the mountain barrier between the Middle and Lower Danube regions, which affects the main stream of the Danube at the difficult Kazan gorge. Just east of the gorge also occurs the dreaded rock sill of the Iron Gate. (See Fig. 48.) These obstacles hamper the products of eastern Rumania and Bulgaria from finding a commercial outlet other than that of the Black Sea. Again, the Danube water-way is cursed with almost all the natural hindrances to shipping that can beset a river : a difficult channel, water-levels varying widely in different seasons, winter freezing and a strong current over parts of the course;

this last disadvantage makes up-stream transport extremely expensive. In spite of all human effort, natural obstacles are always likely to impede on this river the exchange of the industrial products of the west with the agricultural goods and raw materials of the east. Indeed, a glance at the communication map of this region shows the extent to which the man-made tracks of rail and road have superseded that of the water-way.[8]

Economic interchange is naturally most favoured in the Middle Danube plains and uplands; but here, where geographical features favour union, cultural divisions proved stronger than any material ties. They destroyed in the last generation that notable experiment in material interdependence, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A broken linguistic distribution therefore makes for separatism in the part of the Danube Basin which in other respects is the most promising for economic co-operation.

Finally, the potential wealth of the Middle and Eastern Danube countries has been in one sense the cause of their undoing. On account of their resources, these regions signify to the great powers of Europe marketing possibilities and sources of raw material, rather than political entities confronting difficulties which need detached consideration. The Danube peoples have never been free from outside interference because their lands offer too good a field of expansion to foreign capital and enterprise.

In the last twenty years the separatism of the Danube groups has been especially noticeable. It is partly, as has been already stated, an inheritance of the past (see pp.21-22): economic co-operation was associated by these peoples with the old Hapsburg dominion. Separatism is again the result of the rivalry in the Danube region of the great powers farther west. It had been part of the policy of the Hapsburgs before 1914 to encourage friction now and then between the subject peoples, and to play off one group against another.[4] After 1918 it was also possible for powers outside the Middle Danube lands to manipulate the tendency to disunion in this part of Europe : they did so in the attempt to establish here a balance of power and even spheres of influence.[5] For example, the natural hostility between truncated Hungary and the surrounding states of the Little Entente was thus perpetuated during a period when both economic and political security demanded the quickest possible end to the feud.

It was this tendency to friction amongst the Danube

groups and the rival elements without which made possible the successive German swoops on Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the case of each " coup " it was the lack of solidarity between the marchland groups which was so obvious; the full awakening to the dangers of separatism came only when German control, military, economic and political, had penetrated with the annexation of Czechoslovakia right into the heart of the marchland region.

Perhaps the most vital step in the German move eastward after the establishment of the Third Reich was the first, that of the Anschluss of March 1938, because it gave the most vigorous and aggressive of the German-speaking groups the control of the key-city of Vienna. This town, though placed at the western extremity of the Middle Danube Basin, has always been the traditional commercial core of that particular region. More than that, it is the most important point of route-intersection in southern Central Europe. From Vienna, the lines of communication stretch, not only into the surrounding plains and highlands, but by means of the routes now followed by the trunk-railways right through the continent in all directions: to Sofia and Istanbul, to Warsaw and Moscow, to Prague and Berlin, to Munich and Paris, and to Trieste and the Adriatic. The annexation of the city by the North Germans meant not only their control over the Austrian capital, but also their mastery of one of the key-points of the continent.[6] From Vienna, Germany was at once able to increase formidably her pressure on the three marchland groups, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

The second acquisition of immense strategic and economic importance for Germany was that of the Bohemian Basin. The first stage of this conquest was achieved through the Munich Agreement of October 1938, and the second stage by the German annexation of March 1939. Whether ultimately the German attempt to control this wedge of Slav-settled territory will not prove to have been the beginning of the Nazi government's major blunders in foreign policy is still uncertain. History may show that even the immense and undoubted material and strategic assets of this region could never outweigh the liability of local hatred and the disgust of the whole European continent provoked by German policy towards the Czech group. But this particular phase of German expansion at any rate awakened Europe to some awareness of the position and resources of the Czechoslovak people. In spite of their misfortunes, it is

not illogical to claim for the Czech groups of the former republic the reputation of having created after 1918 the most outstanding political and economic unit of the whole marchland region.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DANUBE LANDS

1. See pp. 34-5.
2. See De Martonne, " L'Europe Centrale," *Giographie Universelle,* Vol. IV, Pt. II, p. 817.
3. See Ormsby, " The Danube as a Waterway," *Scottish Geographical Magazine,* Vol. XXXIX, 1923, p. 103.
4. See Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World,* p. 16 (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1936).
5. *Ibid.,* pp. 39 ff., and also Ancel, *Manuel Giographique de Ia "Politique Europienne,* Vol. I, "L'Europe Centrale," pp. 77 ff. (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1936).
6. See Partsch, *Central Europe,* p. 212 (London : Henry Frowde, 1905).

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CHAPTER VI

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DURING the six months between October 1938 and April 1939, the republic of Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map of Europe. The memory of its curious lozenge-shaped outline in the very heart of the continent is, however, a very strong one in the minds of most students of European politics. They must be aware also that no political and military changes in Central Europe can easily alter the traditional strength of Slav settlement either in the Bohemian Basin or in the foothills of the Middle Danube Basin. The Czech and Slovak occupations of these regions are as historic and as strong as that of the Poles in the Vistula lands.

A study of the linguistic map of Europe shows the very peculiar distribution of the Czechoslovak peoples, and the eternal possibilities of strife arising from it. (See Fig. 4, and pp. 12-13.) Czech Bohemia is a wedge of Slav country thrust right into German-speaking Europe, between Saxony and Silesia in the north and between Bavaria and Austria in the south. It is also wise, however, to look at the opposite view of this situation. From the standpoint of the Slavs, Lower Silesia is a German thrust eastward between the regions of traditional Polish and Czech occupation, and Austria a parallel wedge in the south with Czech territory on the north of it, Magyar on the east and Slovene on the south. Each side must therefore regard the other as the intruder.

The position of the Slovaks is just as problematical as that of the Czechs, but it is very different. They occupy the southern slopes of the Carpathians, with a natural economic orientation to the south which derives from the interdependence between plain and mountain; but at the same time they have a cultural link with the Czechs to the west.

There are therefore two fundamental problems to be borne in mind when studying the fortunes of the Czechoslovak groups. One is the strength at all times and the

success periodically of Czech settlement in Bohemia; this salient of the Slavs into Central Europe must be a potential source of irritation to the surrounding Germans. The second is the abiding distraction in Slovakia between the economic orientation southwards and the political and cultural orientation westwards.



FIG. 50.—The Natural Regions of Czechoslovakia. Note the emphasis on relief and hydrography in determining these regions. The English names are given to the highlands of Bohemia (see p. 191).

The settlement area of the Czechoslovak peoples was roughly though by no means precisely indicated by the frontiers of the republic founded after the 1914-1918 War. Their lands are a curious combination, both politically and economically, of great weakness and great strength. Within these Slav-speaking territories there are four main geographic regions, determined largely by relief; each has distinctive natural features and each is of very different economic value. (See Fig. 50.) In the west is the Bohemian Basin, the real core of the Czech group, and from every aspect its most important stronghold. East of Bohemia is Moravia, the passage-way region of the March Basin which leads southward to the Danube Plains. North-east of Moravia is the Czechoslovak part of Silesia, which includes the upper course of the Oder river, and which has thus a northward orientation. Finally, away to the east is the long, straggling tail of Carpathian highland. In this last region the boundary in the north between Slovaks and Poles is roughly determined by the watershed of the high central range of the Carpathians; while in the south the linguistic frontier of the Slovaks with the Magyars runs through the plains and foothills bordering the Middle Danube Basin. In the extreme east of the highland, the Ukrainian-speaking groups occupy both the northern and southern ranges of the Carpathians. They predominated

in the Czechoslovak Republic in the territory to the east of the Uh river, one of the tributary streams of the Tisza. (See Figs. 50 and 57.)

The weaknesses of a political unit intended to correspond with the area of Czechoslovak speech are very apparent. In the first place, it must be completely land-locked; this can be a strategic disadvantage, and it is also a commercial one for a people of great trading propensities like the Czechs. In the second place, the extent of frontier in proportion to the whole region must inevitably be enormous. In the third, the narrowness of the strip of Slovak settlement from north to south is such as to make a state confined to the limits of Czechoslovak speech strategically indefensible. The Czechoslovak peoples must therefore depend always to an abnormal degree on the goodwill of surrounding countries. Further, the attachment of the eastern mountain regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia to the western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia is in many respects difficult to justify. There is certainly between Czechs and Slovaks a cultural link which is very strong. It was the basis of the pronunciation of May 1918 by which the Slovaks declared that they would combine with the Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia to form one political unit.[1] But from the point of view of past tradition and present economic development, the orientation of the Slovaks and of the Ruthene (Ukrainian) group of the extreme east is not towards Bohemia and the Czechs but south towards the Magyar plains, however fiercely the old links with Budapest may be repudiated. It was an ominous sign that in order to make the union between Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenes practicable at all, the southern frontier of the republic had to include some considerable Magyar-settled lowland regions.

Finally, though good relations with all its neighbours must be desperately important to a Czechoslovak unit, those with Germany are the most vital of all, because it is Bohemia, the core and strength of such a state, which is almost surrounded by German speaking peoples. Czechoslovak political existence is always doubly threatened, because the region most immediately exposed to invasion and disruption is that most essential to its prosperity.

But given peaceful relations with Germany, and excepting the fact that it has no direct access to the sea, Bohemia is, on a small scale, an almost perfect political and economic unit with every quality for strength and prosperity.

It is a well-defined basin state, sheltered by mountain ranges on all sides; there are the Sumava Hills to the south-west, the Krusné Hory to the north-west, the three groups of hills to the north-east which are better known by their German name of the Sudeten Mountains, and the Moravian Heights to the south-east. (See Fig. 47.) Yet while these mountains make a distinct frame to Bohemia, they do not isolate her from the rest of Europe. The main outlet for the Bohemian region is in the north by the upper course of the Elbe river, through which water-way Czech trade should have a useful link with the North Sea port of Hamburg. A second route northward is possible across the Moravian Heights making use of the Oder valley to reach the Baltic ports; east of the heights also, the March valley leads south to the Danube Plains. Provided therefore—and it is an important provision—that the goodwill of Germany is assured, there is no bar to commercial activity for the Czechs of Bohemia.

Moreover, in the Bohemian Basin there is every encouragement to intensive development both agricultural and industrial. The heavy rainfall on the surrounding hills, especially in the north, has produced great forests, with ample supplies of timber for fuel and raw material. (See Fig. 48.) In spite of the clearances which have been in progress for centuries, the forest ring round Bohemia is still impressive. The same hills also shelter the basin from wind and rain. Its inner slopes and the plains of the Vltava and Elbe rivers are therefore much drier than the surrounding highland. The annual average temperatures are higher, and there are greater differences between the summer and winter seasons. (For example, the Elbe Plain registers — 1-5°C. in January and 19-5° C. in July; the Liberec region in the north-west — 7^{0} C. in January and 8° C. in July.) These climatic conditions within the Bohemian Basin are quite favourable to farming activity of many kinds.

The fertility of the soil in Bohemia varies considerably. There is a general distinction to be made between the soils of the north and south of the basin in favour of the former, and in this northern part the loess lands of the Elbe valley are the best of all for cultivation. The long tradition of good farming methods throughout Bohemia gives the impression perhaps of richer soils than are actually found; but even so it is justifiable to say that geographic conditions in this region favour both the abundance and the variety of farming products. (See Fig. 51 A.)



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FIG. 51 (a), *(b)* and *(c)*.—The Mineral and Farming Resources of Czechoslovakia. The frontiers marked on the three diagrams are those of the Czechoslovak Republic between 1919 and 1938. Note in map *(a)* that the Slovak and Ruthcne supplies of timber and minerals duplicate the resources of Bohemia. (See p. 228.) Map *(b)* shows the small rich areas of intensively farmed land in the Elbe valley, and the wider areas with lower yields in Slovakia on the edge of the Magyar plains. Map *(c)* shows the wide distribution of potato production.

Nor are the minerals lacking. The name " Ore Mountains " for the north-western range shows its reputation for mineral wealth; here are found brown coal, iron and silver,



FIG. 52 (a), *(b)* and *(c)*.—The Commercial Crops and Pastoral Regions of Czechoslovakia. These maps should also be studied with pp. 213 and 227 of the text, which are concerned with the economic development of the Historic Provinces in the nineteenth century, and with the adjustment of farming in Czechoslovakia to changed conditions after the 1914-1918 War. Map *(c)* shows that it is the western regions of intensive forming in Bohemia which support the majority of the cattle in the Czechoslovak lands, and in contrasts the eastern regions with less advanced methods which are responsible for the greater number of sheep. Both east and west support the industries of towns such as Brno and Zlin in Moravia with supplies of wool, hides, and skins. In the more primitive farming country of Slovakia the eastern region of grain production and the western area of sheep farming overlap, (See Map 51 *(b)*, 52 *(a)*.)

and the radium which makes the Krusn6 Hory one of the most important producing regions of this commodity in the world. Farther east, on the inner slopes of the Krkonoše Mountains, there are iron and copper, and the sand for the manufacture of the famous Bohemian glass. South again in the Sumava Mountains are lignite, graphite, and anthracite coal. Nearer the centre of the basin are other important minerals; the coal of the Plzen (Pilsen) and Kladno

areas, and in close proximity to it the iron ore between Prague and Plzen. (See Fig. 51 0.)

Finally, to exploit the minerals and the fertility of the soil, there is a Czech and German population of pronounced intelligence and industry. Bohemia, therefore, though it has known times of economic crisis, is endowed naturally with splendid possibilities.

Farther east this marked natural wealth lessens, though Silesia and Moravia are both valuable regions. Southern Silesia contained the greatest coal resources of the Czechoslovak Republic as well as some iron ore, though there is not in the Upper Oder region the choice and richness of industrial and farming possibilities which are so impressive in Bohemia. The wealth of Moravia lies mainly in the development of transit trade, since this region contains what might be one of the busiest commercial routes in Europe, between Silesia and the Danube Plains.[2] Agriculturally also Moravia is important for its big crops of beet and of the hardier cereals, rye, barley and oats, even though it has not the shelter from the north-east which favours many of the Bohemian farms. In southern Moravia the presence of high-grade coal west of Brno, and of lignite in the Dubnany region, has brought a certain amount of mining activity. Brno, itself on the Svratka tributary of the March, has a long tradition of textile manufacture. (See Figs. 51 *a, b,* and *c.)*

The diminution in richness and variety from the economic standpoint appears much more emphatic in the eastern regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia. It is obvious that the population is sparser and that in it predominate the primitive cultivator and pastoralist. But the poorer economies of the east should not be taken as wholly accurate reflections of their natural wealth, at any rate when considering Slovakia. In the triangle between the Murán and Hornád rivers (both belong to the Tisza drainage area) there is another region of mineral wealth, where iron and copper ores are found. Iron and salt occur again in Ruthenia; the former belongs to the district south-east of the little group of hills known as Velity Dil, and the latter to the Teresoa river lands. (See Figs. 51 *a* and *c.)*

Slovakia has indeed a long history as a mining region, but of an uneven nature. In the Middle Ages German colonists worked actively the great variety of minerals in the Slovak Carpathians, though none are abundant enough for modern needs but iron and copper. Gold, silver, copper,

tin and other ores were mined and exported. The **Germans** left their mark on the countryside in the founding **of the little highland** towns whose original reason for existence has long since disappeared. Also a German-speaking group dating from this period of early mining persists in the north Carpathian region of Spiš.[8] In modern times, neither Magyar nor Czech administration has made the most of the iron and copper and salt of Slovakia and Ruthenia, but the reasons for this neglect are better discussed later. (See pp. 213, 227 and 260-261,)

Apart from the minerals, the main resources of Slovakia and Ruthenia are the forests and high pastures of the Carpathians. To these may be added the fertile soils of the northern plains of the Tisza Basin, which have always been worked by Magyar farmers. The wealth of both highland and lowland is considerable, but again it has not, under any regime, been developed to its fullest extent. This failure to make substantial use of natural possibilities accounts partly for the low standard of living in the mountain villages, and a traditional and excessive dependence of the highland communities on the plains both for supplies and employment. As one observer has written: " The poverty of most of the Slovak peasants is terrifying. Semi-starvation is almost common, actual starvation by no means rare." [4]

The contrast accordingly between the standards and economies of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia on the one hand, and Slovakia and Ruthenia on the other hand, is depressing. So also is the difference between the Slovak and Ruthene peasants of the eastern hills on the one hand and the German vineyard farmers of the foothills and the Magyar peasants of the plains on the other. But they are distinctions which are only partly explained by environment, and which are also due to a most unhappy political and economic history.

As in the case of the Vistula lands, there are many traces in Bohemia and in the Middle Danube Basin of human settlement before the coming of the Slavs. **It** seems that the Slav-speaking groups were pushed south from the country between the Vistula and the Oder by the Teutons about the sixth century B.C., and that for centuries afterwards they pressed slowly into the Danube Plains, at first in small bands and later in great numbers. In their occupancy of the Danube lands they were disturbed from time to time by vigorous invasions from the east; but at the

beginning of the ninth century, the lands now known as Czechoslovak seem to have been predominantly Slav, and the Slovak area of settlement stretched far south of its present limits. The Czechs were probably the last of the Slav immigrant groups to enter this part of Europe; they appear to have setded the Upper Elbe lands and a part of the Middle Danube lands about the fifth century A.D., and they were the most vigorous of all the western Slav peoples.[5]

The traces of various racial settlements are not so plain in Czechoslovakia to-day as in Poland, since in physical appearance the inhabitants are fairly uniform. The majority of them have broad heads and rather dark colouring, and are medium to tall in stature.[6] Such exceptions as occur, whether in individuals or communities, are partly accounted for by the inclusion of so many mountain groups within the Czechoslovak linguistic frontiers. In the eastern regions, generations of isolation have tended to preserve local differences in appearance and economy.

The historic record of the Czechoslovaks, however, resembles that of the Poles in its early stages. There are in the Middle Danube Plains and in the Bohemian Basin accounts of Slav settlement for several hundred years before the formation of a real political unit. The earliest mention of a Czechoslovak state refers to the kingdom of the passage-region of Moravia in the ninth century[7] (see Fig. 53). It is also interesting to note that this first kingdom of Great Moravia was Byzantine and not Roman in its cultural orientation, receiving its two famous missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, from Constantinople. It was soon apparent, however, that the basin of the March river was not the geographical setting in which a state could develop, especially in the period of European history when the big migratory routes were the scenes of constant disturbance. The Magyar invasion of the Danube Plains at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth centuries scattered the Czech and Slovak settlements north and west. The Slovaks shifted north into the Carpathian highland region of refuge, remaining thereafter the people of the hills, while wedges of Magyar settlement penetrated the Slovak retreat by means of the bigger valleys. In the west the centre of Czech activity shifted from Moravia to Bohemia: there the Czech group established a firm control over a fertile and well-marked geographical unit.

For both groups this flight from Magyar invasion and

settlement had important consequences. One notable result for Czechs and Slovaks alike was the break in the connection with the old ecclesiastical centre of Constantinople. There developed instead the orientation of both peoples towards the Roman Church and Western European culture.[8] For the Slovaks, however, the Magyar incursion



FIG. 53.—The Moravian kingdom in the Ninth Century and the Medieval Kingdom of Bohemia. This map shows *(a)* the lack of correlation between the Czechoslovak area o£ settlement in the Middle Ages and what is known of the early political units; *(b)* the concentration of the settlements in the river basins; *(c)* the extent to which rivers at that time formed political frontiers; *(d)* the coincidence between political frontiers and the highland rim of Bohemia; *(e)* the setdement of the Danube Plains by the Slavs before the incursions of the Magyars.

was really a disaster which shadowed all their history. It limited their environment to the poorer uplands, and both on account of proximity and the inevitable interdependence of the mountain groups upon the neighbouring plains tied them for centuries to the Magyars who were culturally apart and in their rule oppressive. It also meant for the Slovaks their complete separation from the Czechs, until the two peoples made common cause at the end of the nine-

teenth century. The cultural tie between them remained, for the Czech and Slovak languages are very similar. But in economic and historical development the two groups were inevitably parted. The history of these western branches of the Slavs, therefore, between the time of the Magyar invasion and that of the awakening of Slovak nationalism in the nineteenth century is necessarily that mainly of the more vigorous and successful people, the Czechs of the Historic Provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and southern Silesia.

For the Czechs the shift westward was both good and bad. Bohemia is plainly a far stronger natural core for political growth than Moravia, and it is thanks in part to settlement there that the Czechs became a vigorous and enduring cultural group. In Bohemia they developed their historic capital of Prague, just as in the Upper Vistula region the Poles exploited the splendid position of Cracow. Prague itself lies at the junction of the Beroun and Vltava (Moldau) rivers, and its site is the natural centre of Bohemia, whether from the point of view of administrative or of economic strength.[9] On the high ground of the left Ijank of the Vltava grew up the fortress, churches and first markets of the old capital, while the flatter ground of the opposite shore gave ample space for continuous commercial and industrial growth through the centuries.

But, on the other hand, the setting of Bohemia had its own drawbacks. It has never been possible for the people holding this region to dissociate themselves from the struggles of the German-speaking groups. The Czechs were thus from the earliest days of the Bohemian kingdom perpetually entangled in the intrigues of that curious, clumsy, political structure, the Holy Roman Empire. Where the Poles suffered at times from too much isolation from the political and commercial fashions of Europe, the Czechs were involuntarily, and because of their geographical position, too often involved in the ups and downs of the German groups.

It is not surprising, therefore, to read throughout Czech history of the powerful influences and various forms of German immigration. The part played by the Germans in the development of the Historic Provinces was as vigorous as their r61e in Poland, possibly more so; and from the point of view of European stability as a whole, the study of the growth of the German minority in Bohemia, Moravia and Czech Silesia is of vital interest, Its importance is indeed

the justification for making the historical discussion in this chapter rather longer than in the others.

For the sake of clarity the phases of German penetration into these regions can be divided roughly into four: the first of the early Middle Ages, the second of the Luxembourg rulers, the third of Austrian domination both before and after the crushing of Czech autonomy in the early seventeenth century, and the fourth which belongs to the period of rapid industrial development.

In the early Middle Ages, German influence amongst the Czechs was of two kinds, religious and economic. The ecclesiastics were the first-comers, since the doctrines and practices of the Roman Church reached the inhabitants of Bohemia in the tenth century for the second time through German missionaries. For example, the bishopric of Prague, founded in 973, was under the jurisdiction of the archbishopric of Mainz.[10]

Strange as it may now seem to read of the policy of inviting German settlers, this measure was freely taken by the medieval rulers of Bohemia; and it accounts for a considerable part of the present Teutonic population of the surrounding highlands. German immigrants were frankly welcome in the " Rand-Gebieten " (border-territories), in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for their skill as miners, metal-workers and traders, and to a lesser extent as agriculturists. They entered and settled mainly along the lines of the rivers, and exploited the various mineral resources, but especially those of copper and silver. In so doing they formed a German-speaking ring round Bohemia, on the north and west and south.[11] The density of settlement achieved by these enterprising and industrious immigrants was greater than might have been expected, since much of the highland surrounding the Upper Elbe Basin is difficult for local transport, poor in soil and dour in climate. Travellers in winter in the Krkonoše or Krusne Hory Mountains cannot but wonder even to-day at the thick distribution of little farmsteads, forges and hamlets which cover not only the valley lands but also the snowy slopes of the ranges and even the summits of the lower hills. Thus at a very early date German settlement in its persistence and efficiency called into question what appear to be the natural highland frontiers of the Bohemian Basin; by the means of trading colonies also, the Germans penetrated right into the heart of Czech territory.

Historians indeed record Bohemia's position as a vassal

state to German rulers from the earliest days of a Czech political unit. There exists an authentic account that even in the days of the Moravian kingdom, before the Magyar invasion, the Slav leader, Svatopluk, was obliged to pay tribute to the Frankish Emperor Charlemagne. But much greater pressure was put upon the Czechs of Bohemia fifty years later by the first of the Saxon Emperors, Henry the Fowler, who in 929 marched on the stronghold of Prague, and forced the Bohemian ruler, Wenceslas, to swear allegiance to the Imperial crown. The Czechs never managed to shake off this enforced connection with the Holy Roman Empire, although they made many attempts to do so. Historical atlases accordingly have justification for marking the Historic Provinces from the early Middle Ages as territory within German jurisdiction.[12] (See Fig. 54.)

The authority of the local ruler was, however, an essential feature of the Empire, and up to the beginning of the fourteenth century the real masters of Bohemia were undoubtedly the Premyslovči. This Czech family provided a succession of kings who could hold their own quite easily in the politics of the Empire, and who were respected for their military usefulness, especially during the Tartar menace of the thirteenth century.[18]

Ottokar II, the Premyslovči king of the late thirteenth century, was indeed sufficiently strong during the years when the Imperial throne was in dispute, to begin upon a vigorous policy of annexation to the south of Bohemia. He seized the dukedom of Austria, which was mainly German in population, as well as Styria and Carinthia. But these possessions were too valuable to remain undisputed for long, and within a generation Ottokar's conquests had brought the Premyslovči rulers into collision with the first Hapsburg ruler, Rudolph.[14] Czech expansion based on the temporary weakness of Imperial rule was doomed to failure, and the newly-won possessions were quickly lost again.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Premyslovči dynasty failed, and during a period of European history, when a succession of able military rulers was essential to a state, this break was disastrous for the Czechs. The succession passed to the house of Luxemburg, and for four generations this family ruled the Czech lands. One of this line of kings, Charles IV (1347-1378), was outstanding in ability, and in his care for the interests of Bohemia; but at the same time the fortunes of the Czechs



FIG. 54.—The Position of the Historic Provinces within the Holy Roman Empire.

were hopelessly compromised by the fact that Charles and the two following Luxemburg princes, Wenceslas and Sigismund, were not only the kings of the Czechs, but also Emperors. In such a position, the interests of the Holy Roman Empire naturally came before those of the kingdom, and the Czechs suffered a good deal from neglect and

from being the centre of a larger and most unwieldy realm.

Nevertheless, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were notable ones for the Czechs both in cultural and economic prosperity. Prague in Bohemia, and Brno and Jihlava in Moravia, developed as trading centres, although in these towns, as in those of Poland, the proportion of German settlers was large and commercial law largely borrowed from German custom. The fourteenth century also was the great period of building in Prague, where during the reign of Charles IV the splendid Hradcany or citadel was completed, and with it the beautiful cathedral of St. Vitus. The main drawback for the Czechs of the policy of the " golden " king, as Charles came to be known to future generations, was the second phase of German immigration, mainly to the towns. The German element naturally had royal encouragement, as it strengthened the hand of the ruler, whether as Bohemian king or Imperial overlord, against the difficult class of the Czech nobility.

Many scholars have wondered, however, whether, given a prolonged period of peace, the fourteenth-century Historic Provinces might not have developed successfully into a mixed Czech and German state with the distinction between the two groups gradually fading. There was indeed at that period every encouragement to material prosperity and cultural achievement if the restlessness of Imperial politics had not intervened.[15]

The separateness of the Czechs from the Germans showed itself from the fourteenth century onwards in a peculiar form which has made Bohemia and Moravia famous in the world of religious controversy. The university at Prague founded by Charles in 134.8 was crowded with notable scholars, and the growing consciousness of political and cultural entities is shown by its division into four " nations,'[5] Bohemian, Polish, Bavarian and Saxon. A further distinctiveness was given to these groups by Czech preoccupation with theological controversy. This in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries produced an early movement for religious reform, which owed something to the Lollard activity in England. The connection between English and Czech religious outbursts at this period was fairly close, as the marriage in 1382 of the Bohemian Princess Anne to the English King, Richard II, brought a train of Czech scholars to England, into contact with the ideas and writings of John Wycliffe and his followers.[16]

The Bohemian parallel of Wycliffe was John Hus, the rector of Prague University. He was, like Wycliffe, a genuine religious zealot, protesting against the abuses of the Church of his day. But his doctrines and his following quickly became associated with causes far more turbulent than that of religious reform. The Hussite movement grew more and more identifiable with local Czech interests and with Czech antipathy to the growing influence of the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia. It also meant that the Czechs were, at a very early stage and for a very long period, plunged into the exhausting and complicated wars of religion which raged in Europe for over a hundred and fifty years.[17]

In these struggles which disturbed the Historic Provinces from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the number of conflicting elements was great and their interaction most complicated. There were present here, as in every country in Europe in which the wars were long and bitter, personalities representing all types of thought and activity: there were outright reformers and theologians, like Hus and John Augusta, and John Comenius, who was the founder of the famous Moravian Brotherhood; there were military leaders, like Ziska with his fortress of Czech patriots at Tabor, and George Podiebrad, the Bohemian noble, who in the middle of the fifteenth century was elected king. Opposing the champions of reformed religion and Czech national sentiment were the later Luxemburg rulers and the Hapsburgs, standing alike for the authority of the Church of Rome and for the predominance of the South German element in the Historic Provinces.

The religious wars also bring to light the component classes of the Czech people during the generations which preceded the fateful battle of the White Mountain in 1620. It is interesting to see that in spite of the strength of German settlement in the trading centres, there was also (in contrast to Poland) a strong Czech urban population and trading class. It was from this section in the towns that the greatest support came, both for religious reform and for resistance to German influence, and the strength of the German element declined noticeably during the short period of Hussite activities in the fifteenth century.[18] The religious leaders were almost all of humble origin and their preaching had a special appeal for the town populations. The part played by the nobility was depressing. With a few notable exceptions, for example, George Podiebrad, the magnates were content

to intrigue for their own ends, and failing in solidarity and in able military leadership, hastened the end of Bohemian autonomy.[19] Remote in outlook and economic status from the aristocracy and the townspeople was the bulk of the population, composed of thousands of landless, illiterate peasants. They suffered untold wretchedness from the perpetual rovings of the different armies, and fought in numbers under the local leaders, but they had little influence in the policies of Bohemia. It may indeed be said that the miserable position of the Czech peasantry which persisted up to the end of the 1914-1918 War dates back not to the Hapsburg domination of the seventeenth century but to the earlier insecurity and poverty caused by the Wars of Religion.

Czech resistance had ultimately little hope against the much stronger forces of the Hapsburgs. It is noticeable, in the first place, that in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, political and religious issues tended to become both confused and contradictory. On the whole, these obscurities lessened the chances for the Czechs of preserving some form of autonomy. In the days of the Hussite movement, when the struggles over religious reform had been precocious and localized outbreaks, cultural and theological interests had been largely identical. It had been a question of Hussite Czech against Romanist German. But as the sixteenth century progressed, much of Germany" became Lutheran, and the sympathies of the professors of one creed with another were greater than cultural differences. The House of Hapsburg and the South German element continued to represent the authority of Rome, but from northern Germany to Bohemia came many religious fugitives, and the bond between North German and Czech was at that time stronger than at any other period in history. The Protestant German element in Bohemia thus had the chance to develop without opposition. Conversely, Protestant Czechs and Germans suffered together when later the Counter-Reformation movement grew in strength and activity.[20]

In the second place, the struggle with the Turks, which reached its most desperate stage during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, absorbed much of Polish energy and cost the life of the Hungarian kingdom. Even if the desire for co-operation had been active, there was therefore no possibility of these three marchland groups achieving any sort of combination against the Hapsburgs.

The final blow to Bohemian autonomy came at **the** beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Czechs were crushed in 1620 by the Imperial armies at the Battle of the White Mountain near Prague. (See Fig. 54.) This episode is perhaps the parallel in Czech history of the Battle of Culloden in Scottish, and as in the story of the defeat of the Stewarts, it is necessary to distinguish between the contemporary importance of the battle and its romantic association for later generations. The Battle of the White Mountain meant to Czech patriots of succeeding centuries the extinction of national independence. When the Czechoslovak Republic was formed in 1918, the tradition of an autonomous Czech state was revived in the eyes of its citizens after a lapse of almost exactly three centuries.

The contemporary significance of the battle was, however, rather different. It implied in the first place the annihilation of the Czech nobility. The ruling element in the Historic Provinces from the seventeenth century onwards was a Catholic, absolutist, South-German monarch, instead of an oligarchy of nobles, some Catholic, some Protestant, some German in culture and some Czech. They were replaced largely by Austrian estate-owners, and the unfor-



FIG. 55.—German Immigration into Bohemia. This map shows that the infiltration of the German minority into Bohemia was a gradual process, even if the medieval phases of German immigration are left out of account.

tunate Czech peasants who had been sacrificed in great numbers during the Bohemian resistance to the Hapsburgs were also supplemented by German immigrant labourers. Thus the White Mountain episode also initiated another period of German settlement. (See Fig. 55.) This immigration was partly religious in character with an emphasis on Roman Catholic land-owners and peasants, and partly economic. The position of the Czech peasantry under the new regime was probably no worse than it had been before the national defeat. The Bohemian nobility had been hard masters, and the new land-owners were more effectively controlled by the crown than the old. But three centuries later the existence of a foreign land-owning class, whose establishment had coincided with the years of national humiliation, understandably provoked a harsh agrarian policy from the Czechoslovak Republic.

For the rest, the defeat at the White Mountain meant the extermination of the active Protestant group * in the Historic Provinces whether by death or imprisonment or by exile. The thoroughness of the Counter-Reformation in these lands probably accounts for the Catholic majority in the Czech population to-day. But whereas this vigorous persecution had its effect on religious profession in the Historic Provinces, it could not efface the stubborn individualism of the Czechs. The spirit of Hussite reform remained a characteristic of this people even when the Protestant organizations were crushed out of existence.

During the three centuries which signified for the Czechs a period of national extinction, certain episodes stand out which are worth remembering. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the brilliant military successes of the Protestant king, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, revived the hopes of all those who professed the reformed creeds in Central Europe, but they did not have a sufficiently lasting effect to alter the lot of the persecuted. The position of the Protestants in Bohemia, however, and the prosperity of the Czechs as a whole improved considerably under the liberal rule of the eighteenth-century Hapsburg, Joseph II (1765-1790), who inherited from his mother, Maria Theresa, a genuine desire to better the fortunes of the subject peoples of his Empire.[21] In his reign came the solid advantages of the Edict of Toleration (1781) for the Protestants, and the permission for the serf population to move freely from one estate to another.

It was a tragedy that the desire to simplify Imperial

administration over a large and heterogeneous population should have led both these rulers to insist on the official use of German throughout the Empire. It was a measure which, though understandable from the point of view of the administrators, and not designed to oppress, was bitterly resented by the subject peoples. The Czechs of the Historic Provinces were amongst those who complained most vigorously. The majority of the population here persisted as Slav in speech and outlook in spite of a hundred and fifty years of Austrian rule. Amongst them also there was a strong remembrance of the past, which had not been dulled by the material gains of Hapsburg administration.

The fortunes of the Czechs were not affected so directly by Napoleon's activities as those of the Poles. It was not that Napoleon lacked interest in the strategic and economic possibilities of the Danube region. In the most successful years of his campaigning the French armies were familiar with the east-west line of communication through the uplands of Central Europe which is provided by the upper valley of the Danube. In 1805 also, one of the most important engagements between the French and Austrian armies was fought out at Austerlitz in the passage-land of Moravia, a few miles east of Brno. (See Fig. 53.) The successful French campaign, of which the battle of Austerlitz was the chief feature, also shook the authority of the Hapsburgs severely. It marked the end of the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire, and from 1806 to 1867 the Hapsburg rulers were known only as the Emperors of Austria. But the loss of territory and prestige to the Emperors concerned the German-speaking lands north and west of Bohemia and of the Mark of Austria, rather than the Slav regions. The position of the Historic Provinces in spite of the weakened authority of the Hapsburgs was not altered either during the period of Napoleon's ascendancy or during the subsequent discussion of European frontiers at the Congress of Vienna. The French conqueror had championed the cause of Polish independence, not because he had any genuine sympathy for the Poles, but because the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw suited his policy. The Czech peoples were not in the position to favour the French programme of the moment and the disturbances throughout Europe thus affected them much less.

In the years which elapsed between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the series of disturbances in 1848, two

developments in the Historic Provinces are worth noting. One is the growth of a Czech cultural movement mainly through the inspiration of the historian Paladky. The other is the attempt of the land-owning and administrative classes to evolve in the Czech-settled lands what was described as a " Bohemian " outlook, as distinct from Czech or German." It was hoped that a fusion of interests cultural and material, associated with the Bohemian environment rather than with either of the two principal groups within it, might solve the recurring problem of Czech-German relations.

The upheavals of 1848, however, showed the growing national consciousness of the Slavs, whether Czechs, Poles, Croats or Slovenes. They were fully aware of the difficult position of the Hapsburg rulers in nineteenth-century Europe. Austria had been since 1815 the leading member of the Confederation of German States, but Prussia to the north was a serious rival, and within the Imperial frontiers the South German group was a decided minority. For one section of political thinkers amongst the Slav subject peoples of the Austrian Empire the dream of a Pan-Slav federation under Russian leadership seemed at times attractive. For another section the idea of a Hapsburg federation of states detached from the Germanic Confederation had an appeal : in the latter scheme the western Slav groups by reason of their numbers could demand a considerable share of influence.[28]

The hopes of the subject peoples in 1848 were, however, crushed by the successful reassertion of Austrian authority (largely with Russian help) not only within her own frontiers, but also throughout the Germanic Confederation. The material gains for them, from that period of violent disturbance, were two only. The agrarian legislation which Joseph II had introduced in the previous century to allow of the personal freedom of the serf was extended in 1848. In that year the forced services on the great estates were abolished, and some mild measures for the redistribution of land were considered.

The immediate effect of this attempted liberalism was, as is often the case, different from that intended. The wealthier peasants were able to pay the money rents demanded, and had sufficient property to make their holdings economically profitable when separated from the big estates. The poorer could neither pay for, nor live on, the smaller plots; in many cases they drifted into the towns to find employment in the rapidly growing industrial enterprises. But though the

agrarian laws of 1848 thus only touched upon the huge problem of peasant land-hunger, they nevertheless formed a milestone in the struggle of the subject peoples for better conditions.

The second achievement of that year was the recognition of the Czech language in the Historic Provinces, as of equal status with the German. This concession was, however, unfortunately withdrawn during the period of reaction which set in after the 1848 disturbances were crushed.

From the point of view of the persistent problem of Czech-German relationships also, a most interesting relic of the year of Revolutions was the Constitution for the Austrian lands which was drawn up at Kremsier in 1849. (See Fig. 53.) The tolerance and commonsense of this proposed basis of government, with its recognition of the claims of the subject peoples, might, if it had been put into practice, have prevented later the complete dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire. But with the success of the reactionary element, both in the Empire and the Germanic Confederation, the Constitution remained merely an interesting " might-have-been."

A few years later, in 1866, the hostility between Prussia and Austria brought about the situation which many Slavs within the Hapsburg Empire had desired. From the slowly developing rivalry between the Empire and the northern kingdom throughout the nineteenth century, and from the immediate cause of friction between them, the fate of the annexed Danish provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, came a marked change in the balance of power in Central Europe. The Hapsburg armies were defeated by the Prussians at Sadowa in Bohemia itself, while southwards across the Alps, Prussia's ally, the young Italian state, successfully annexed the Hapsburg territory of Venetia. From the new North German Confederation led by Prussia and destined in a few years to become the German Empire, Austria was the outcast. Both the weakness of the South German group, and the possibilities for militant nationalist movements were thus plain to the various minorities within the Austrian Empire.

The Historic Provinces were so placed geographically that the Austrian-Prussian struggle might have led to divided loyalties amongst the German minority group. (See Figs. 50, 54.) The long-distance commercial orientation of Bohemia, in so far as ease of transit was concerned, was towards the north. Further, even though the local economic

life within the Bohemian basin gravitated towards Prague, that of much of the northern highland turned to the Saxon town of Dresden. The inclination of Moravia and of Southern Silesia, however, was mainly towards Vienna, although Brno in Moravia and Bratislava (Pressburg)[24] on the Danube were increasing in importance as local centres. Fortunately for the later development of the Czechs, the German and Slav populations of Bohemia in 1866 favoured remaining within the Austrian Empire. The administration from Vienna under the last of the Hapsburg rulers was far from perfect, but it was on the whole preferable to that from Berlin.

Those who gained from the disasters to the Hapsburgs in 1866 were, however, not the Slavs in the Empire but the Magyars. The " Compromise " of 1867 established them formally as dual rulers in the Empire with the Austrians, and a huge part of the Middle Danube Basin came thenceforward under their direct administration. (See pages 258-259.) This settlement was most unpopular amongst the Czechs. The fact that the Magyar group should have acquired privileges which were denied to the Slavs of the Historic Provinces was never forgiven.[25]

The Magyar sphere of government included Slovak and Carpathian Ruthenia, which were thus more than ever divided from the Czech lands. Moreover, Magyar methods of administration were reactionary, while the Czechs under the direction of Vienna were allowed a certain amount of autonomy. In cultural and economic development also the disparity between Czechs and Slovaks widened after 1866.

In the three Czech provinces indeed, industrial growth had been rapid since 1851 when the local tariff barriers within the Hapsburg Empire were abolished for a period.[26] From that year until 1914, the material abundance of the Middle Danube Basin and of the tributary regions was more evident than at any other time in history although, as has been mentioned earlier in this book, the total of production was more apparent than the prosperity of the producers.

The Historic Provinces during the last years of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century became the main industrial regions for an Empire of nearly fifty million people. In all three Provinces, but especially in Bohemia and Silesia, the urban groups increased enormously with the development of various forms of mining and manufacturing.

Three groups of towns grew up as the result of the energetic working of the coal measures: one in western Bohemia with its centre at Plzen (Pilsen); another to the north-west of Prague, with Kladno as the chief settlement; and a third in southern Silesia with the core of Moravska-Ostrava (Mahrisch-Ostrau[27]). (See Fig. 52 *a.)* All three industrial regions were noted for metallurgical as well as mining enterprises, though Moravska-Ostrava was by far the most important. In northern Bohemia, Jablonec (Gablonz) became the marketing-centre for the famous glass of the cottage industries, since the peasants had easy access to abundant wood-fuel. Close to Jablonec, the town of Liberec (Reichenberg) played a similar part in textile production, collecting the wares of its own factories and those of the surrounding region, and using imported cotton as the chief raw material. Farther south-east the Moravian town of Brno also began to make its modern reputation ; textile manufactures here were based on the local crops of hemp, flax and wool, and on the import of jute. The co-operation of agriculture with industry was also evident in the huge supplies of sugar beet, potatoes and hops, for which Bohemia and Moravia became famous. The most notable beet crops were in the northern districts of the Bohemian Basin, in the valley of the March river near Olomouc (Olmiitz) and, (under Hungarian administration) in the valleys of the Vah and Nitra rivers, which run parallel with the March to join the Danube at Komarno. Potatoes were supplied mainly from Moravia and western Slovakia, and hops from the north-western corner of the farming lands within the Bohemian Basin. (See Fig. 52c.) Both the highland regions of the Historic Provinces and of Slovakia furnished hides for leather industries of all kinds, which grew up mainly in the big towns, Prague and Plzen and Brno. Finally, the forests provided a huge and diverse supply of raw material, which fed industrial enterprise throughout the Czech and Slovak lands. It was noticeable, however, that in spite of the productive wealth of the Czech regions, economic activity, especially for commercial and financial transactions, had its main centre at Vienna.

The progress of the Czech people during this thorough development of the wealth of Bohemia was that which might have been expected. Naturally intelligent and thrifty, and stimulated by the demands of the huge population of the Empire, they became an industrial and agricultural group of quite unusual efficiency, not only for the provision of

working-class labour, but for business enterprise and organization.

Two aspects of German-Czech relationships during this period of economic activity are worth comment. One is the outward move of the Czechs from the regions of their predominance within the Bohemian Basin to the more German industrial districts of the extremities, and especially towards the north. The second is the development in the industrial areas of a situation nearly comparable to that in Prussian Silesia; the economic distinction between employer and employed coincided often with the linguistic difference between German and Czech.

During the same period, the fortunes of the Slovaks and the Ruthenes in the northern and eastern highlands fringing the Middle Danube Basin were very different. Amongst the peasants, even though the large estate prevailed alike in the Historic Provinces and in Slovakia and Ruthenia, the standard of living in the east was much lower. The means of subsistence in the Carpathian villages were indeed so small that many of the inhabitants had for generations supplemented their living by migrating every summer to work in the harvest fields of Hungary.[28] This practice perished after 1918 on account of the political bad feeling between the Slav mountain and Magyar plain peoples. It is difficult to believe, however, that it is gone for good, especially as the most conscientious administration on the part of the Czechs could not compensate for the economic damage and the distress amongst the Slovak and Ruthene peasants which resulted from their separation from the plains.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century also, there was the alternative for the eastern mountain peasants of industrial employment, as well as of seasonal work on the Magyar farms. The government at Budapest began to develop the mineral resources of Slovakia, and the surrounding highlands provided a good supply of cheap labour. (See pages 258-259.) Probably the last generation of Magyar administration saw the greatest exploitation of the Slovak minerals which has ever occurred. The distressing aspect of this mining and industrial activity was, however, the lack of a corresponding improvement in the standard of living in the highlands. The statistics of productivity for the mines and factories of Slovakia under Magyar administration are impressive. The progress of the Slovaks and Ruthenes was very small indeed.

In these circumstances of historical and economic development, it is not difficult to understand that Slovak nationalist feeling was a feeble growth compared with that of the Czechs. The influences of geographic setting and of economic necessity had, as we have seen, thrown the Slovaks and Ruthenes into dependence on the Magyars rather than into co-operation with the Czechs. Religious practice again strengthened these tendencies. (See Fig. 56.) The Slovaks and Ruthenes never experienced the religious disturbances which distracted the western provinces literally for centuries. They had not either, for many reasons, the intellectual independence of outlook which strengthened Czech political growth. Where the Czechs as a group remained Hussite in attitude to foreign administration, even though many were professing Catholics, the Slovaks and Ruthenes were much more passive. Both these eastern groups, the one Romanist and the other Greek Catholic, had in many ways more in common with the equally devout and illiterate Magyar peasant population to the south of them, than with the progressive and somewhat sceptical Czechs in the west.

Slovak nationalism would, according to many observers, gradually have died out if it had not been for the upheaval of the 1914-1918 War.[29] It had had a brief period of activity



FIG. 56.—The Distribution of Greeds in Czechoslovakia. Note that the Ruthenes are distinct in language and creed from the Czechoslovaks. See abo Fig. 57.

in the restless years between 1848 and 1867, and had remained the cause of a devoted though very small minority during the following period of violent Magyarization amongst the Carpathian groups. There was sufficient vigour in the movement for the Czech nationalists under the inspiration

of Masaryk to contemplate at the end of the nineteenth century the idea of a Czechoslovak unit within the structure of the Hapsburg Empire. But it is doubtful whether, apart from the abnormal circumstances of war and revolution, the recognition of the Slovaks and Ruthenes as political groups and the complete detachment of the Slovak highlands from the Magyar lowlands would have been considered practicable. This comment implies no justification of the Magyar rule in Slovakia, which could hardly have been worse. Nor does it excuse the circumstances in which the Czechoslovak Republic disappeared between 1938 and 1939. But even admitting the immense improvements in the highlands, in the social and educational services, which were mainly achieved by Czech energy after 1918, the detached observer is bound to take into account the arguments against as well as in favour of the structure of this unfortunate republic. One of the most cogent of these is, that without doubt the cause of Slovak nationalism before 1914 was losing rather than gaining in strength, and that the abnormal circumstances of its revival boded ill for the future.

The long-standing hostility between the Czechs and Germans became evident again on the outbreak of war in 1914, and the Czech programme of action was varied and effective. Many of the Czech troops who had been mobilized into the Imperial armies deserted to the Russian camps. Their defection was especially resented by the Sudeten population as the German recruits from the Historic Provinces provided some of the best regiments in the Austro-Hungarian forces.

In Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia the Slav civil population showed increasingly their opposition to the cause of the Central Powers, while in the Allied capitals the Czech leaders, Masaryk and Benes, worked energetically to provoke interest in and sympathy for the cause of a Czechoslovak state.[30]

The fortunes of the Czech troops who went over to Russia are worth noting; they sound more like a fantastic adventure story than sober fact. With the rapid development of the Russian Revolution in 1917, their position in the Russian army became impossible. Cut off by the forces of the Central Powers from any withdrawal to the Historic Provinces, they were forced to march, and often to fight their way across Siberia to the Pacific port of Vladivostok, and to journey round the world to get back to their own country.

The Odyssey of the Czech army through Asia and America is indeed one of the most incredible episodes both of the 1914-1918 War and of the Russian Revolution.[81]

At the end of the War, the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire gave to the Czechoslovak peoples more than their leaders had originally contemplated in the way of political autonomy. The early years of the twentieth century, it is true, had seen the development of the more extreme nationalists who desired a complete break with the Empire. But up to the catastrophe of 1914, the majority of Czech patriots had been satisfied with the goal of full self-government within the Hapsburg unit.[32] In 1918, however, the Czech and Slovak groups were united in one independent republic, and to this state on certain conditions was added the Ukrainian region of Ruthenia in the east.

In some respects the new republic started with a considerable advantage over either Poland in the north or the other Danube countries to the south and east. Czechoslovakia had never been an actual battlefield during the 1914-1918 War.[33] The economic prosperity of the Czech and Slovak lands had inevitably been shaken by the general dislocation of world trade, and by the open enmity between the Czech and German inhabitants, but there was no question of widespread destruction, famine and disease such as burdened Poland or Yugoslavia. The new state was assured also of the economic wealth of Bohemia, Moravia and southern Silesia and of the enterprise to use it.

But apart from these assets, the immense difficulty of organizing and maintaining the republic was immediately apparent. It had the advantage of linguistic unity between the Czechs and Slovaks, but in other respects the state defied historical and economic tradition. This is not in any way to deny the rights of the Czechoslovak group to existence as an independent state. Cultural ties are very strong and were especially so in 1918, but the geographical distribution of Czech and Slovak settlement makes it extremely difficult to shape a unit which is practicable from the economic and strategic standpoint.

The straggling formation of the Czechoslovak lands was partly, though not altogether, responsible for frontier demarcations which left within the republic dangerously big and hostile majority groups. (See Fig. 57.)[34] This type of frontier, in which the strategic and economic necessities of the Czechs and Slovaks were given preference over the wishes of other cultural groups, was most

noticeable in the line separating Slovakia from Hungary. The economic problem to be solved was the question of east-west communications between the Historic Provinces and Slovakia. The cultural and political claims which clashed with the economic were those of the Magyar groups



FIG. 57.—The Linguistic Groups within the Czechoslovak Republic. The area left blank within the frontiers of the Republic are predominantly Czecho or Slovak. This map should be compared with the following one, Fig. 58, to see the connection between the minority problem and the question of rail and water communication in Czechoslovakia.

interspersed with the Slovaks in the northern part of the Middle Danube Basin.

The question of communications was indeed acute. (See Fig. 58.) Within Bohemia there was a workable railway network with Prague as the main centre, and there was adequate rail connection also between Bohemia and Moravia, and Bohemia and Silesia. But in Slovakia and Ruthenia the lines of communication were essentially based on a completely different system, with a centre at Budapest. There were left to the eastern regions in the new republic after the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire mainly the tail ends of these lines radiating from the Hungarian capital. Economic interchange between plain and mountain had naturally developed such a network, and construction on this spider-web pattern was plainly easier and cheaper than strengthening the difficult routes east and west through the southern ranges of the Carpathians.

It was not, in fact, possible to arrange for any line of rail communication running east and west through the republic, or to give the Czechoslovak people the necessary access to

the river trade-route of the Danube, without extending the frontiers of the new state to include Magyar populations which would in all likelihood form a constant element of disturbance.[86]

The necessity of securing for Czechoslovakia these means



Fio. 58.—Rail and Water Communication in Czechoslovakia. This **map** should be compared with Fig. 51 to show the difficulties offered by the relief system to extending the pattern of east and west rail communications in the Republic.

of communication was clear. It was considered at the time of the Paris Peace Conference that such an award was justified on strategic as well as on economic grounds. The control of Ruthenia and of the east-west railway gave the Czechs and Slovaks access theoretically to their most important allies, the Rumanians. But it was true also that the Magyars in the plains immediately to the south of the Carpathians did not get as much consideration as the Czechoslovaks, because they belonged to the defeated Central Powers. Owing to the traditional and dovetailed settlement here of Slovaks in the hills and Magyars in the plains, it was admittedly impossible to draw a completely satisfactory linguistic frontier. But between Bratislava and Komarno on the Danube, and farther east between Čop and Berehovo, there are two fairly solid blocks of Magyar population which were sacrificed in order to improve the economic and military security of the Czechoslovak state. The gain to the Czechoslovak people was qualified also; they had indeed rail communication between east and west, strengthening the bond between the core of Bohemia and the outlying eastern regions, but the railway ran for a considerable part of its course right along the frontier

demarcated in 1918, and through the main settlements of disgruntled Magyar groups. To keep open this line in case of attack from the south could at no time have been a strategic possibility.[36]

The question of the German minority group in the west was even more difficult than that of the Magyars in the south. In numbers alone the Germans were far more formidable than the Magyars, though the statistics discussed at the Conference revealed so much prejudice amongst the compilers that it was difficult to draw the right conclusions from such evidence.[37] Detached observers estimated that nearly three-quarters of a million Magyars were included in the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, but that the German group numbered as many as 3,200,000. Of these about two and a quarter millions were in Bohemia and about three-quarters of a million in Moravia and Silesia. The remainder of the Germans were in the Slovak towns. The German minority of the Historic Provinces was, as we have seen, partly distributed in compact blocks on the mountainous rim of the Bohemian Basin, and partly, as a logical outcome of Central European history, in scattered groups all over the Czech lands, but especially in the towns.

The nature of the Czech-German problem in the Historic Provinces after the Peace of Versailles was, however, quite different from that of the Czechoslovak-Magyar problem in southern Slovakia. The latter, it might be said, was due to the demarcation of new frontiers, the wisdom or unwisdom of which has already been discussed. The Czech-German problem was due, not to the decision of twentieth-century statesmen to carve out fresh political divisions in this part of Europe, but to their maintenance in this particular case of frontiers which are amongst the oldest in the continent. In Bohemia itself, the boundaries between the head of the Neisse river in the north-east of the basin rim and the head of the Vltava river in the south-west of it, which were so fiercely reviled in 1938 as the fruits of the Versailles Treaty, had stood practically untouched since the early Middle Ages. Those of the Historic Lands as a whole, that is of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, had been determined by the great dynastic wars of the eighteenth century. The problem which arose at the Peace Conference in 1918-1919 was not so much that of the demarcation of new and artificial frontiers in the Czech lands, as that of preserving, in view of German protests, boundaries which had the strength of tradition to a degree which is rare in Europe.[38] The existence and the

grievances of the German group in the Historic Lands after the 1914-1918 War are undeniable, but as we have seen, this minority was not the product of the Peace Treaties, but of many and varied influences spread over the course of a thousand years of European history.

Indeed, the main territorial change in the frontiers of the Historic Lands was adverse to the Czechs, since the award of the northern parts of Teschen to Poland placed in the northern republic a region which had long had an administrative connection with the south. (See Fig. 45, and p. 162.) The demarcation in this case was made according to linguistic interests. The Polish majorities with the more valuable mines were in the north, the Czech with the less valuable in the south. The language frontier between the two groups here is, however, very blurred, and the final settlement left a minority group of something like 75,000 Poles in Czech territory, who were to prove a perpetual source of ill-feeling between the two republics. (See p. 176.)

In the extreme east, the small Ruthenian groups had thrown in their lot with the Czechoslovaks on the understanding that substantial local autonomy should be allowed them. In the years after 1918, however, the attempt to make practicable this pledge of self-government was a failure.[89] The difficult relationship between the Czechs and Ruthenians was indeed an extreme form of a somewhat similar situation between the Czechs and Slovaks. The task which lay before the Czechs was that of arranging equal political and economic status within the republic for peoples who were far apart in economic theory, tradition and practice. The disparity between the Czechs and Slovaks was marked, but it was not so excessive as that between the Czechs and Ruthenes.

It is impossible to deny that in practice the Prague policy differed materially from the precepts which had been announced when the Czech-Slovak-Ruthenian union had been proclaimed. Local autonomy for the Ruthenians was reduced to the merest shadow, and there was an influx of Czech officials into the Slovak towns and countryside. The actual course of events in the republic gave some substance to the repeated and bitter complaints in Slovakia and Ruthenia, and also in Hungary, that the Czech pledges of 1918 had been blatantly disregarded.

But on the other hand the position of the Czechs was very difficult. Autonomy would only have been possible for

Slovakia and Ruthenia if these regions had been content with an economic and cultural existence completely different from and far more primitive than that of the west. Indeed, once the connection with Hungary had been broken, it is difficult to imagine how autonomous Slovak and Ruthene units could have survived at all in the material sense. The Ruthenes were perhaps the poorest and most illiterate group under Magyar administration between 1866 and 1914. Their country had also much less natural wealth than the other regions of Ukrainian population in Poland or in Russia. They could not have contributed at once, or indeed for a long period, an administrative class to provide stable and prosperous self-government, and the same comment applies with some modifications to the Slovak group farther west. Some degree of Czech control was essential if either of the eastern regions was to share at all in the economic activity of the whole republic.

In addition, Czech administration, though by no means perfect, was very much the best of its kind in Central Europe. The Slovak and Ruthene groups, though certainly not autonomous, had far better prospects in many ways under government from Prague than they would have had from continued Magyar or any other administration. There could be no doubt of Czech efficiency and impartiality, nor of the great strides in education and culture which took place in Slovakia and Ruthenia between 1918 and 1938.

But the fact remained that the solidarity of the Czechoslovak Republic was weakened invariably by the recurrent threat of Slovak and Ruthene discontent. That of the Slovaks was the more formidable because they were the larger and wealthier group, and more susceptible to agitation from abroad. This disaffection was mainly expressed in complaints of the extent of Czech bureaucracy in the east. That there were some grounds for grievance is true, but the Slovak and Ruthene protests did not give an accurate reflection of the difficulties.

A good deal of the trouble between the eastern and western groups in the republic was caused by the presence of the big Magyar minorities in the east. On the one hand, the Magyars were considerably indebted to the Czechs, because the application to them of the Minority Laws drawn up at Geneva was very much more conscientious from Prague, than it would have been if the Slovaks had had unchecked control over their one-time Magyar masters. On

the other hand, there was always the temptation to the Magyar groups to excite the possibilities of bad feeling between the three main nationalities of the Czechoslovak Republic.[40]

Their criticism of Czech administration, open or concealed, was made more telling by economic difficulties in Slovakia and Ruthenia. The very best that the Prague government could offer in conscientious zeal could not compensate the Slovaks and Ruthenes for the economic break with Hungary. The lot of the eastern mountain communities before 1914 had been hard, and the Magyar government had been hated. But a reckoning of their gains and losses under Magyar and Czech rule would show that their poverty in the republic was on the whole harsher than their poverty in the Hapsburg Empire. A thorough treatment of this topic is really more in place, however, as part of a general discussion of the economies of the Czechoslovak Republic. (See pp. 226-229.)

It was in keeping with the past history of this part of Europe that the relations between the Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians should have been concerned also with religious questions. The majority of the Czechoslovak population is Roman Catholic, in spite of the reforming tradition of the Historic Provinces. There are, however, substantial communities of Protestants, especially in the south, and big congregations also of practising Jews. In the east the Ruthenian group are Greek Catholic.

In Slovakia amongst the devout communities of mountain peasants the control of the Roman Catholic priests was particularly strong, in spite of their traditional support of the Magyar government. The Church in Slovakia thus tended to be constantly in opposition to the new administration in Prague. The struggle was sharpened by the fact that a strong element in the Czech government was against religious influence of any kind, let alone that of a priesthood which represented the past association with Vienna and Budapest. The dispute over the position of the churches in the new state was most apparent in the educational system, as there was bitter opposition from the priests to the Czech determination to organize non-sectarian schools throughout the country. The controversy aroused over the status of the Roman Catholic Church in the republic looked for a time indeed as though it might form yet another threat to the unity of Czechoslovakia. It was thus in an attempt to dissociate as far as possible the connection between religious

organizations and foreign rule, that the Czech National Church was established in 1920.

This body adhered in fundamentals to the doctrines and practices of the Roman Church, but its organization was felt to be more in accordance with the new-found independence of the republic. The following of the National Church was small, however, in proportion to the whole population; the majority of Czechoslovak Catholics continued to belong to the Roman Church in its non-national form. A more satisfactory arrangement was the compromise with the Vatican achieved in 1928. This settlement recognized the loyalties of the Czechoslovak clergy to the new state as well as to Rome, and after that date the strongly anti-clerical attitude of the Prague Government began to be less evident.[41]

During the generation after the 1914-1918 War, the influence of the clergy in the Historic Provinces and in Slovakia was therefore checked; but it was by no means altogether extinct. In studying the dealings between Czechs and Slovaks from 1918 to 1938, it is noticeable that the active participants in Slovak politics have clerical titles. Father Hlinka, the owner of the newspaper, *Slovak,* Father Jehlicka and Father Tiso, are three outstanding examples of Roman Catholic priests who have played a prominent part in the stormy course of Czech-Slovak relationships. Clerical influence was apparent in 1918 to urge the union between Slovakia and the Historic Provinces, and again in later years to manipulate the recurrent and finally fatal Slovak agitation for separation from the Czechs.[42]

In Ruthenia ecclesiastical problems were somewhat different from those in the republic as a whole. The majority of the Ruthenians in 1918 belonged to the Uniate Church, which, south of the Carpathians, was as definitely Magyar in its character and policy as the Roman Church in Slovakia. After 1918, however, two further influences appeared to disturb the peace. The first was that of the Russian Orthodox Church, since hundreds of Great Russian priests, fugitives from the Bolshevik Revolution, sought a fresh field of activity in Ruthenia. Their religious teaching, and to a lesser extent their political propaganda, had some success amongst the peasants, and ,there were many converts to the Orthodox confession. The second influence came with a fresh wave of refugees from the Polish Ukraine, because the government at Warsaw was laying a heavy hand on all supporters of Ukrainian autonomy, whether cultural or

religious. The second set of immigrants sought with as much activity as the Great Russians to impress the Ruthenians with their doctrines and politics. On the whole, the Ruthenian population passively accepted the presence of both parties of fugitives, and the Czech government regarded the various claims of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches with great detachment, provided that neither organization was unduly disturbing of the peace.

If ecclesiastical problems in Czechoslovakia were hard to solve after 1918, economic difficulties were far more so. In spite of the great wealth of the republic, the task of making prosperous the straggling line of Czech and Slovak and Ruthene lands was almost impossible in view of European conditions after the 1914-1918 War.

From the map of Czechoslovak resources (see Fig. 52a), it is plain that these lands are divided into the eastern regions where farming interests predominate and the western regions where the emphasis is on industry. At the same time one must remember that industry is also practicable in Slovakia if the raw materials of iron and timber are exploited, and that skilled farming is a tradition in the Historic Provinces. It is further evident that the productive and purchasing capacity of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia has always been, and is likely for all time to be, a good deal bigger than that of Slovakia and Ruthenia.

In both parts of the country, but especially in the east, the question of land-reform was urgent in 1918. Although the historical accuracy of their opinion may be questioned, the whole Czech people regarded the intrusion of the Austrian estate-owners in the seventeenth century as a piece of spoliation on the part of the Hapsburgs which could not be rectified too quickly.[48] The Magyar landlords were equally resented by the Slovaks.

The lack of accurate statistical evidence for the period immediately before 1914 makes it difficult to judge correctly of the grievances of the small peasant proprietors and landless labourers.*[4] It is certain, however, that the size of the estates of the Austrian nobility in the Historic Provinces and of the Magyar nobility in Slovakia was as a rule excessive in proportion to that of most peasant properties, and to the number of landless agricultural workers.

The Agrarian Laws of 1919 adjusted the position in theory, though it was some time before the redistributions of land actually took place. The main effect was to increase in number the properties between two and five hectares, and

those between five and twenty hectares at the expense of the *latifundia* or very large estates. Politically the land laws signified the triumph in the republic of the Agrarian Party, with its ideal of peasant proprietorship, over the Socialist Party with its more radical conceptions of collective and state-owned farms.[45]

Throughout, the government at Prague aimed at the creation of properties which would be sufficient in size and resources to support peasant families, but which would not regularly need hired labour. In the west, where there was a tradition of intensive farming, the plots averaged six to ten hectares in size: in the eastern regions of more primitive methods, they ran usually from fifteen to eighteen hectares. A good deal of useful work was also carried through by the Land Office in the way of commassation or the consolidating of scattered strips of peasant land into compact blocks. By these measures the amount of arable land in many regions was increased in three or four years by as much as a quarter.[4*]

A good deal of land in the western industrial districts was also doled out temporarily in very small allotments so that town as well as rural workers could eke out an existence, which in days of such violent economic readjustment was very precarious. As conditions improved and the price of foodstuffs dropped, the necessity for a double source of supply from wages and from an allotment lessened, and a good deal of the property so parcelled out was taken back by the Land Office. In the long run of course this exploitation of the land was not profitable, but the temporary allotments served a useful purpose over the first difficult years.

Agrarian reform in Czechoslovakia as elsewhere brought a storm of protest from the dispossessed and from the minorities.[47] The former owners of large estates, whether foreign, as was mostly the case, or nationals, had some grounds for complaint. Compensation for the forfeited estates was estimated and paid, it is true, but while the property which remained to the owners was taxed according to its value in the currency of the Hapsburg Empire, the compensation was paid in the depreciated Czech crown. The agrarian settlement was not entirely just and it left a sense of injury which did the Czechoslovak Republic no good. But both the poverty of the new state and the murmurings of the peasants, now thoroughly aware of the oppression of centuries, made these forms of confiscation almost inevitable.

It was perhaps natural also, that the new government should have wished to strengthen the Czechoslovak element in the frontier regions peopled largely by the minority groups by encouraging peasant immigrants. There was certainly a good deal of official incitement to Czech peasants to settle in the western highlands where German estates had in part been forfeited, and to Czechs and Slovaks to move south into the Magyar strongholds. The numbers involved in these migratory movements were not very great, not substantial enough at any rate to satisfy the government, which had had high hopes of the activities of the Czechoslovak peasants returned from America after the establishment of the republic. But the fact that the deliberate immigration of nationals into the minority regions had taken place at all provoked an outcry from the Magyars and Germans. The German protests were especially vigorous, even though these people had stubbornly resisted all efforts from Prague to obtain their co-operation in the whole programme of Agrarian Reform.[48]

After the first years of reorganization the standard of farming in the west not only recovered from the effects of the upheaval but also showed an improvement on the pre-war years. Between 1926 and the period of the economic crisis the statistics of crop production showed on the whole a creditable increase. There was a very general rise in yields with the exception of one crop, sugar-beet.[49] Beet cultivation, though less important than in the days of the old Empire, still remained, however, a feature of Czech agriculture. The republic was noted as one of the great beet-producing countries of the world, and ranked high also for crops of potatoes and hops.[50] The main change in farming methods was in the increase of grain production (wheat and barley), both in the extent of land devoted to its cultivation and in the yields per hectare. (See Fig. 52.)

In the east, the efforts of the Agrarian Party were energetic but only moderately successful. There was genuine zeal in Prague for the improvement of the lot of the Slovak and Ruthene farmers. The government was anxious both to raise the standard of living in the highlands as quickly as possible, and to keep it at a satisfactory level by assuring the peasants a certain market for their produce. The plans for land-reform and the actual redistribution of the big estates were certainly welcome in this part of the country. But in the long run, neither the good intentions of the Czechs nor the provision of bigger peasant plots could counter-

balance the abnormal economic position of Slovakia and Ruthenia.

The possibilities of peasant migration for seasonal work were limited after 1918 to the small areas of plain included within the southern frontiers of Slovakia, and these were populated by hostile Magyar minorities. The market for the Slovak and Ruthene forests had been in Hungary, and this was permanently damaged by the new frontiers. Within the republic, it was difficult for the more primitive forestry of the eastern highlands to compete with the skilled enterprises of Bohemia. In Slovakia also, both the working of the iron ore and the industries which had grown up in the mineral region under the Magyars steadily declined. The industrial element in the new republic was already developed out of proportion to the needs of the population as a whole, and there was no inducement in Prague to encourage this form of economic activity farther east. Slovakia, the inhabitants protested, was reduced even more than in the days of Magyar government to furnishing the more advanced regions in the west with food and raw materials ; they complained, moreover, that the markets for these goods were not so easily found as in former years.

The degree of this dislocation was seen in widespread Slovak and Ruthene emigration abroad after 1918, and especially to the United States. This movement continued even after the Immigration Restrictions Act of 1921 had checked a free reaction to economic distress. (See Fig. 59.) The flight from the eastern regions must not wholly be ascribed, however, to Czech mismanagement. Emigration has been at all times and in many states the natural response to violent political and economic upheavals even when these are followed by periods of great prosperity. But the abandonment of the homelands was a sign in Slovakia and Ruthenia that membership of the republic had disappointed the first wild expectations of the inhabitants.

A more ominous sign of economic difficulty was the necessity for supplying Czech peasants to settle the new plots of land available in the eastern regions. This form of local migration was to some extent evidence that the official scheme of agrarian reform was ahead of the eastern peasants' economic capacity, especially in the case of the Ruthenes. They could not settle and exploit successfully the land which was offered them. The allotment of the



FIG. 59.—Industrial and Emigration Areas in the Czechoslovak Republic. It is noticeable that the areas from which there was migration abroad between 1921 and 1938 were the eastern ones of Slovak and Ruthene settlement. For the discussion in the text of the significance of the industrial areas see p. 230. This map should also be compared with Fig. 57.

lands instead to Czech farmers provoked the rather unreasonable but inevitable comment in Hungary that the Prague government had broken up the eastern estates for the benefit of the western peasants.[51]

The existence of the majority of Slovaks and Ruthenes was thus precarious enough in times of fair prosperity, and it sank to miserable levels during the years of the economic crisis. But at no time was this distress due to lack of attention from Prague. The policy of the Agrarian Party might on many occasions have been judged unwise, but it was never neglectful. The welfare of the whole farming population, and especially that of the east, was the constant preoccupation of the government.[62]

The reasons for this attention were very substantial. It was hoped in the first place that an increase in prosperity amongst the peasant groups of the highlands would strengthen their loyalty to the republic. Further, with an eye ever on the strategic weakness of the country, the Czechs were anxious to encourage, to the farthest limits, the quantity and variety of farming products. Thus the influence of the Agrarian Party in the Czechoslovak Parliament continued strong, and both government and Co-operative Societies did their utmost to improve and secure the position of the small farmer.

But all their efforts were not proof against the peculiar formation of the republic, nor against the economic crisis of 1930-1934, which shook the stability of states with much

longer traditions and with a more normal economic balance than Czechoslovakia. Moreover, it became apparent both before 1930, and again with terrible force during the years of crisis, that the concentration on the interests of the peasant proprietor had been costly in the extreme. The policy of the Agrarian Party was one explanation, though by no means the only one, of the continuous distress in the industrial regions of the Historic Provinces, which was never completely relieved even in the boom periods of the twenty years between the wars.

It is generally admitted that in any case the economically mature western regions must have experienced some severe readjustment and some economic loss with the establishment of a Czechoslovak state. The old links both in transport and market were broken by new frontiers and by separatist instincts. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, which had been developed to supply an Empire of fifty millions, could not play the same role in a nationalist state of thirteen millions in which a great part of the population consisted of peasants of no great wealth. The guaranteeing by the peace treaties of special privileges to Czechoslovakia in the Elbe ports of Magdeburg and Hamburg, in the Oder port of Stettin, and on the Danube waterway to increase her foreign trade facilities, could not really compensate the industrial districts for the *economic* dislocation which prevailed all over the territories of the dismembered empire.[6]* Nor was the Czech government responsible for the tremendous fluctuations in economic prosperity which were a feature of world history after 1918.[54] Indeed, during the worst years of depression, the position in Czechoslovakia was yet another instance of the advantages of agrarian reform. There, as in the northern states, although purchasing power was reduced to a minimum, the connection of so many of the inhabitants with the land ensured better feeding than would have been possible by unemployment relief in cash or kind.

But admitting the extreme difficulty of adjusting industrial and agricultural interests in Czechoslovakia, and that the government had to cope with problems far beyond the control of a single country, it must be agreed that distress in the industrial areas was increased by the policy of the powerful Agrarian Party. In no circumstances could the rural population in the republic have become numerous or rich enough to consume the amount of manufactured products necessary to keep the western enterprises pros-

perous ; and at the same time the high tariffs protecting Czechoslovak farming lost foreign markets for Czech manufactured goods."

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this policy was the extent to which all classes of the western German minority population were the victims of this continued slump. (See Fig. 57.) The regions most affected were those where German settlement predominated. Thus the natural German antipathy to Czech rule was intensified by the misery of continued unemployment, and by the inevitable limitations of the relief system which necessitated a wretched standard of living. This association of the German minority with the most unsuccessful side of Czechoslovak economic organization was partly responsible for the growing truculence of the Sudeten Germans. Their grievances were to some extent beyond Czech control, but the Agrarian Party was largely responsible for the rather ruthless attempt to balance the economies of the eastern and western parts of the republic.

But it should always be remembered that the hard fortunes of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia did not in any way mean the deliberate choice by the government of a minority group to bear the brunt of economic loss. In their treatment of the minority populations, whether German, Magyar or Pole, the Czechoslovak administrators, although not always irreproachable, were conspicuous amongst the new rulers in common sense, tolerance and absence of spite and small revenges. The open revolt of the German group in Czechoslovakia in 1938 could be accounted for only to a minor degree by local grievances. It was to a much greater extent another proof of the theory that minority troubles are mainly stimulated from without; in this case Berlin was once more responsible.

It might be said in criticism of Czechoslovak foreign policy after 1918, that her leaders did not play as vigorous a part as they might have done in an attempt to initiate cooperation amongst the peoples who had formerly composed the Hapsburg Empire. Hesitation on the part of all the "successor" states was natural. Every one of them, including the Czechoslovaks, had an instinctive distrust of Austria and Hungary, and it was inevitable that the traditional economic and political links between the two former ruling countries and the subject groups should have weakened. The Little Entente Alliance between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, formed with

the encouragement of France, had thus a strong anti-Hapsburg aspect, as well as a more constructive side.*[6]

The Czechs, to their credit, saw at an early date after 1918 the dangers which might arise from the continued separation of the core countries of the old Empire from the surrounding states. They were readier than most of the former victims of Hapsburg expansion to bury the hatchet. The tragedy was that good intentions did not and perhaps could not mature successfully into a solid combination of the Middle Danube lands. Because no effective co-operation in this region, inspired either from the Danube countries themselves or from Western Europe, replaced the old Hapsburg unit, it was possible for a reviving Germany to contemplate and achieve both the actual possession of Austria and economic pressure on Hungary.

The wisdom of a second feature of Czechoslovak foreign policy, the alliance with the Soviet Union, is also difficult to assess, especially in the light of recent events in Europe.[87] The relationship meant that the Czechs at any rate recognized the Union as a powerful element in European politics, and this policy was shrewd. If such an attitude had been more general in Europe, then Russian resentment of the rest of the continent might not recently have taken so difficult a form. It meant, further, that the Czechs were negotiating for a possible military ally, whose strength was partly derived from the atmosphere of mystery surrounding her. Finally, the Czechs shared with the French in 1935 the anxiety lest a German-Soviet alliance should be maturing. But at the same time, while German fanaticism kept its violent anti-Russian tinge, the prospects of friction between the small republic and the Third Reich became steadily more inevitable. The slogan of anti-Bolshevism was the pretext used by Germany to destroy the Czechoslovak Republic, whether by employing the method of agitation through the Sudeten group, or by economic war, or by actual military invasion.

In the attempt to ward off the second threat of economic strangulation, the Czechoslovak government showed great agility. As can easily be imagined, it was not simple at any time during the period between 1918 and 1938 for the Czech and Slovak groups to negotiate trading connections when the traditional links with the Danube Plains had been broken. Though the relations between the former members of the Hapsburg Empire varied in their commercial value, the old economic ties were never

fully revived. Therefore, like many of the marchland groups, Czechoslovakia was obliged to turn to Germany for a number of years as her main customer and source of supply. The leading position of the Reich in Czechoslovak trade was indeed marked even in the last reports produced before the 1938 crisis.[68]

But at the same time the republic was negotiating for increased economic independence of Central Europe. By the summer of 1938 the Czechoslovak people were self-sufficient in foodstuffs to a degree undreamed of twenty years earlier. The only agricultural import of vital importance was that of chemical fertilizers.[59] This self-sufficiency was partly the aim of the government's agrarian policy; it was also due to the necessity for replacing beet and hop production by various kinds of grain for home consumption, when the market for the old commercial crops declined during the economic crisis.

Trade connections outside Central Europe had also developed. The fostering of links of this kind with the Allied countries had been a consistent feature of Czechoslovak policy since 1918 and, although these commercial contacts had suffered during the economic crisis, they revived again after 1934. The most important trade agreements were with the United Kingdom, the United States and France. In 1936 trade with the Soviet Union was also increasing vigorously.[69] Between 1936 and the 1938 political crisis the tendency was for Czech commercial connections with Germany to weaken in favour of those with powers outside Central Europe, even though Germany did not lose her place as first trader with Czechoslovakia. This change, as in the Baltic republics, was accounted for partly by the rigidity of German economic policy, and partly by political anxieties. The Czechs sought to avoid excessive dependence on trading regions which were rapidly falling under Nazi control.

Unfortunately Czechoslovak diplomacy during these years mainly served to show once more the desperate position of the republic when confronted with German pressure, whether political, cultural or economic. On the one hand, Czechoslovak foreign markets and sources of supply were fairly well distributed. On the other hand, her imports and exports had to travel through Germany or through countries under German influence. The only other possibilities of transport in 1938 were the route through Poland and the Vistula valley, using the port of

Gdynia, and that by the Danube Plains and the Black Sea ports. In the latter case, the great length of the journey would have made the transport of Czech goods to Western European or American markets highly expensive. From this German strangling of the Czechoslovak Republic through the control of her trade exits and entrances there seemed no escape, especially after the Austro-German Anschluss of March 1938. The encirclement of Czechoslovakia was then complete.

The crisis in Czechoslovak-German relations came to a head in the late summer and autumn of 1938, and with this climax the threat to Europe of a general war. Because no other course was open to them, the Czech, Slovak and Ruthene groups by the Munich Agreement surrendered a substantial part of the territory, population and wealth of the republic to the German Reich. Separate settlements in the same year also revised the frontiers of Czechoslovakia with Hungary and Poland. (See Fig. 60.)



FIG. 60.—Czechoslovak Cessions to Germany, Poland and Hungary in 1938 and 1939. This map should be compared with Fig. 52, to show the economic effects of the cessions of territory, and with Fig. 57 to show the connection with the minority problems.

The cessions to Germany were the most outstanding and are outlined on Fig. 58. These were made ostensibly on the basis of cultural " self-determination " to ensure the return of the vast majority of the Germans in the Historic Provinces to the Reich. It is doubtful, however, whether even on linguistic grounds the new frontiers were correctly drawn. German threats and the need for a speedy settlement were the chief influences at work in their demarcation.

From every point of view the losses to the republic were crippling. The German possession of the ranges surrounding the Bohemian Basin and Moravia left the Czechs strategically helpless. Both the natural defences based on the command of the highlands, and the artificial reinforcement of the hill frontiers by excellent military fortifications, were taken from them. In Moravia also the German annexations in the north and south were so great as to leave a strip of territory no more than twenty miles in extent to connect Bohemia and Moravia.

In resources the Historic Provinces lost the forest lands of the highland rim, besides the minerals of the Ore Mountains; gone, too, were the glass-manufacturing regions of Jablonec and the textile factories of Liberec. The two great cities of Plzen and Brno were placed so close to the frontier by the new settlements as to lose much of their value as industrial centres.

For those who remembered the history of the Czech Provinces the break with tradition made by the frontier changes was perhaps the most impressive feature of the Munich settlement. Since medieval times the Bohemian unit, whether as a kingdom in the Holy Roman Empire or as a province under the Hapsburgs, had had the same geographic formation, a basin state in a setting of hills. The mutilated territory which emerged from the negotiations of October 1938 looked the more monstrous on the map of Europe because the former frontiers were so familiar throughout the pages of historical atlases.

The territorial losses of Czechoslovakia to Hungary were also considerable, although at the same time it is worth remembering that frontier revision between these two states had been considered advisable by detached and impartial observers. The Magyar minority, like the German, had certain claims, though not so great as to justify the 1938 annexations. In terms of resources the lands ceded to Hungary included the best grain-growing regions in Slovakia and Ruthenia, where big crops of barley and maize were produced. But economically the effect of the southern frontier changes was more noticeable in its effect on the communication system than on production. The essential east-west railway link through Slovakia and Ruthenia was destroyed. In addition, these regions were cut off from direct access to the Danube water-route east of Bratislava, and the river port of Komarno, so carefully fostered by the Czechs since 1918, passed into

Magyar hands. In the north the small mining district of south Teschen was ceded to the Poles. (See page 176.)

If the most desolate aspect of the Munich Agreement to students of European history was the destruction of the historic frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the tragedy of the eastern settlements was the attitude to Czechoslovakia of the marchland groups to north and south. Hungary no doubt had her grievances against the Czechoslovak Republic, and so had Poland. But the time and circumstances in which both Magyars and Poles sought to improve their territories were depressing in the extreme to those political thinkers who realized the importance and who desired the solidarity of the marchland peoples. The Magyar and Polish claims on Czechoslovakia could not have emphasized more heavily the complete lack of a common front amongst the Middle Danube and Carpathian groups. It was small wonder that the rulers of the Third Reich should have acquired the idea at the end of 1938 that eastward expansion in Europe was practical politics.

If economic stability in the Czechoslovak Republic as planned in 1918 was hard to achieve, in its attenuated ghost in 1938 it was quite impossible. Much of the wealth of the Historic Provinces was forfeited and the eastern regions were more than ever economic absurdities. But the republic did not survive long enough to experience the full effects of her losses. Six months after the Munich Agreement, and using the pretext of Slovak discontent, the German invasion took place. The Czechoslovak Republic dissolved in March 1939 into the German protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia.

By this second German thrust eastward, Hungary gained further territory. At the end of March 1939, and by agreement with Germany, she annexed the whole of Ruthenia. At the beginning of April in the same year she also added a small wedge of Slovakia to her lands, the Vihorlat hill region west of the Uh river. (See Fig. 60.) These eastern settlements (if so dignified a phrase can be given to a piecemeal distribution of peasant countries) were accompanied both in 1938 and 1939 by guerrilla fighting between bands of farmers, police and regular soldiers.

By the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Hungary had attained in the north-east her 1914 territorial limits. She also gained for a few short months her avowed desire for a common frontier with Poland. But at the same time, by the

German occupation of Slovakia, she was confronted on the north as well as on the east by the armed might and economic pressure of the Third Reich. By the end of the year also, the Soviet Union had replaced Poland as Hungary's neighbour in the north-east. The territory gained at the expense of the Czechoslovaks was thus costly and possibly insecure (see page 273).

The liquidation of Czechoslovakia by Germany in defiance of all the pledges given at Munich horrified Europe. Indeed the terrible results for the whole continent of the German annexation of non-German territory have been rehearsed over and over again in the course of 1939 by scholars and politicians of all kinds and creeds. But in a study limited to the marchland region it is the following aspect of the problem which calls for most attention.

It is certain that the fundamental hindrances to stability in the Czech and Slovak lands have not been removed by the German destruction of the former peace treaty arrangements. There still remains to puzzle European statesmen a region of strong Slav settlement wedged firmly into German-speaking territory, and inhabited by a group with ancient traditions, a high standard of living and great political consciousness. This is not the type of " island " group, either, which can be eliminated by the modern practice of arbitrarily shifting populations away from their traditional haunts to new and untried surroundings. Czech associations with Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia are too strong, and their economies too mature to allow of such a solution.

Nor did the German pounce in 1939 solve the difficulty of economic existence for the long, thin strip of Slovakia. Slovak territory was certainly strategically useful to the Germans as a base from which troops of the Reich could dominate Poland, but the control of Slovakia from Germany is no more practicable from the economic point of view than the former union between the Czechs and Slovaks—indeed far less so.

It is widely accepted in many European countries that in due course the question of the restoration of Czechoslovakia must appear before the statesmen of Europe. When it is discussed, there will come under consideration not only the liberation from Germany of the protectorates formed in 1939, but also the terms of the Munich Agreement and those of the eastern settlements. Further, it is possible that the political experiments and economies attempted in Czecho-

Slovakia between 1918 and 1938 may prove useful as guides to future peace treaties.

Though many Czechs and Slovaks would protest loudly at such a suggestion, there seem some arguments for considering, at any rate, the permanent separation of Slovakia and Ruthenia from the Historic Provinces. The water-shed frontier between the March and Vah drainage areas in the north and that of the March river in the south, which formed the Czech-Slovak boundary within the 1918 republic, might still serve as the demarcation line. (See Fig. 61.)



FIG. 61.—The Czech-Slovak Frontier. The map shows the extent to which this frontier is emphasized by the physical features of the water-shed and water-way.

Even if the union of Czechs and Slovaks was justified in 1918, at any rate as an experiment, it can hardly be described as successful. The economic existence of the state so formed was never satisfactory, and the strenuous attempts to make the union workable were partly responsible for the continued enmity of the Germans and Magyars. Without the Slovak and Ruthene groups, there is the setting in the Historic Provinces for a more compact political unit. Admittedly, the Czechs would lose their direct access to the resources of the Carpathians and also their close connection with the Danube water-way. But against these one could reckon relief from economic embarrassment and strategic anxiety, which the union of the Czech, Slovak and Ruthene peoples must entail to the most efficient of the three.

The prospects of Slovakia and Ruthenia detached from the western regions must naturally be less palatable as far as political autonomy is concerned. Their greatest material

need seems to be the maximum of economic connection with the Danube Plains. But unless the temper and circumstances of the European peoples are very different at the next Peace Conference from those evident during the 1918-1919 discussions, the economic and cultural claims of these Carpathian peoples will be incompatible. In this case there appears to lie before the Slovaks and Ruthenes the hard choice between a close economic link with their traditional foes, the Magyars, and another attempt to justify the cultural tie with the Czechs. The experience of the years 1918-1938 might well cause all three groups to reflect whether the awkward combination between the inhabitants of the Bohemian Basin, the March Basin and the northern Carpathians was worth the effort and sacrifice expended on it.

For the Ruthenes, the position must certainly be affected by the present Soviet mastery of the whole Ukrainian population, except for the groups in their own Sub-Carpathian Russia. From the economic point of view, it seems plain that Ruthene fortunes are inevitably bound up with the Danube Plains. But the presence of the mighty Ukrainian majority under the control of Moscow in close proximity to Ruthenia gives a fresh importance to the poor and primitive communities of that region. If through this area of Ukrainian settlement the influence and interests of the Soviet Union were to penetrate south of the Carpathian arc into the Middle Danube Basin, a completely fresh chapter of political and economic history might open for Central Europe.

In the west the question of the frontiers of the Historic Provinces can never be settled easily after the upheavals of the Munich Agreement and the subsequent invasion. There are many who would like to see the ancient boundaries restored, but the claims of tradition and geographic features must not be the only considerations. It is certain that the Munich frontiers left these lands strategically defenceless; but even so, no mountain rim nor modern fortification could provide an effective guarantee of security for the Czechs in the face of determined German enmity fomenting the discontent of the German minorities. There is an argument perhaps in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia for the systematic migration into Germany of the one-time minority groups. But in spite of the fact that this remedy is now in fashion, it is a tragic prospect for the three million people concerned. The grimness of the proposal is increased when

the population in question has a long tradition in the region, high economic efficiency and possibly generations of experience in one particular occupation.

One fact alone is clear. No political group in the marchland strip in Europe is better entitled to restoration and prosperity than the Czech. The years between 1918 and 1939, in spite of mistaken policies and a tragic collapse, showed the distinction of the people in every aspect of political and economic life. It was the Czechoslovak Republic which most of all justified the award after 1918 of political independence to the small groups who had so long been subjected to foreign rule.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. Declaration of the Slovak National Party, 29th May, 1918 :
" The Slovak National Party adopts the point of view that the Slovak race has the absolute and unconditional right to self-determination, on the basis of which it claims for the Slovak nation a share in the creation of an independent Slovak State to consist of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia."

2. See De Martonne, " L'Europe Centrale," p. 573, *Giographie Universelle,* Vol. IV, Part II.

3. *Ibid.,* p. 585. See also Ancel, " L'Europe Centrale," p. *66, Manuel de Ia Giographie Politique,* Vol. I.

4. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 80 (Oxford: The University Press; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937).

5. See Bang, " The Expansion of the Teutons," *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. I, Chapter VII; and Krofta, " Bohemia to the Extinction of the Premyslids," p. 422, *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VI, Chapter XIII *(a).*

6. See Haddon, *The Races of Man,* p. 67.

7. See " Bohemia to the Extinction of the Premyslids " (see note 5), p. 423-

8. See Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* p. 3 (Oxford: The University Press; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938.)

9. See Partsch, *Central Europe,* p. 215 (London: Henry Frowde, 1905).

10. See *Czechs and Germans,* p. 3.

11. See *Manuel de Ia Giographie Politique,* p. 107.

12. See " Bohemia to the Extinction of the Premyslids " (see note 5), p. 426.

13. See Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire,* p. 180 (London: Macmillan, 1922).

14. Rudolph of Hapsburg was the first of this famous family to be crowned Emperor, but the undisputed hereditary succession to the Imperial throne did not pass to the Hapsburgs until the sixteenth century.

15. See *Czechs and Germans,* pp. 6-7.

16. See Manning, " Edward II, Edward III and Richard II, " p. 465, *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VII, Chapter XV. Wycliffe died about fourteen years after the birth of John Hus. Hus was the most outstanding, but not the first of the religious reformers of Bohemia.

17. See Krofta, "John Hus," p. 64, *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VIII, Chapter II.

18. See *Czechs and Germans,* pp. 7-9.

19. See Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century,* p. 112 (London: Black, 1930-

20. See *Czechs and Germans,* p. 9.

21. See Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy,* Chapters X and XI (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929).

22. See *Czechs and Germans,* p. 9.

23. See *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy,* p. 89.

24. Bratislava is the Slav name for this town and Pressburg the German. The Magyar name is Pozony.

25. See *Czechs and Germans,* p. 36.

26. See *The Dissolution of thi Hapsburg Monarchy,* p. 102. This customs union in the Hapsburg Empire was modified in theory in 1867, when the Hungarian government at Budapest was given the right to impose tariffs to protect the territories under Magyar jurisdiction. But the limitations on free trade within the Empire developed in fact only towards the end of the century (1880). The occasion for the tariffs was a fall in grain prices, but such a policy also signified the long-standing determination of the Hungarian government that the Magyar lands should have industrial activity and an economic balance of their own. The idea of limiting the economic rôle of Hungary to the furnishing of raw material and food to the Austrian lands was resented in Budapest.

27. In this paragraph the Slav names for the towns are used in the text, and the German names are in brackets.

28. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 81.

29. See Street, *Slovakia Past and Present,* pp. 14-15 (London: The Czech Society of Great Britain ; P. S. King & Son), 1928 ; and *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 94.

30. See Benes, *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1917).

31. See Prokeš, *Histoire Tchdcoslovaque,* pp. 353-60 (Prague: Orbis, 1927)-

32. *Ibid.,* pp. 324-5.

33. The devastations of the Hungarian Red Army in Slovakia in the short period of Communist ascendancy in 1919 were, however, very formidable. They affected especially the region of the former Hungarian industrial development, where plant and machinery were ruthlessly plundered. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 127.

34. The following minority populations were reckoned in 1931 in the Czechoslovak Republic:

		per cent.
Germans . . .	3,231,688	22-3
Magyars . . .	691,923	4-8
Jews	186,642	1-3
Poles	81,737	0-6
Others (foreign residents)	299,607	—

See Tibal, *La Tchkoslovaquu,* p. 67 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1935)" The Ruthenians are not included in this list, since they entered the republic on special conditions.

35. See Macartney, *National States and National Minorities,* p. 201 (Oxford: The University Press; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934).

36. Just as the fate of Poland in the autumn of 1939 was not altered by Polish possession of the " Corridor " to the Baltic, so that of Czechoslovakia in the crises of 1938 and 1939 was unchanged by Czech control of the territory connecting the Historic Provinces with their Rumanian ally. The provision of a strategic link between the two successor states did not have the effect intended.

37. See *Czechs and Germans,* pp. 87-8.

38. See *National States and National Minorities,* p. 200.

39. For the whole question of Czech policy towards Ruthenia see *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 200-46.

40. See Vondraček, "The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 191ft-1935," PP. 377-8, *Studies in History, Economics, etc., No. 426* (New York: Colombia University, 1937).

41. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 135.

42. See "The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia", p. 377. In the case of Father Hlinka, once the Czech relationship with the Catholic Church was adjusted, there was no question of a wavering allegiance on his part to the republic. On more than one occasion, and notably in 1934, Hlinka's public and downright profession of Slovak adherence to the Czechoslovak state caused great disappointment and anger in Budapest, where it was hoped that clerical activity might help the cause of Hungarian Revisionism.

43. See Tcxtor, *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia,* pp. 17-19 (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1923).

44. Textor gives a very dramatic description of the inequities in land tenure in the Czechoslovak lands before 1918. See *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia,* pp. 15-16. But the grievances of the peasants and the subsequent redistribution of land are discussed rather differently by Brdlik in '* Czechoslovak Agriculture," pp. 100-2, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933). Brdlik explains that the " inequity of land distribution was not so much due to the fact that large holdings compared with other states occupied a disproportionately large area, as that full 60 per cent, of the large estate area (above 100 hectares), were in latifundia (estates over 1,000 hectares); in the western provinces over 73 per cent.

45. See *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia,* Chapter II.

46. *Ibid.,* p. 115.

47. *Ibid.,* pp. 98-102.

48. See *Czechs and Germans,* pp. 156-7; and *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 198.

49. See *La Tchicoslovaquie,* pp. 104-5.

50. See " Czechoslovak Agriculture," pp. n7-8 (see note 42).

51. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 235-6.

52. See Kershaw, *Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia,* p. 40 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1935).

53. See Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danube States,* Chapter X (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1939).

54. The exception to the industrial depression in Czechoslovakia, which was at its worst between 1931 and 1933, was the Bata enterprise at Zlin in Moravia. The methods employed in building up this very remarkable undertaking are described in the monograph *Working Conditions in a Rationalised Undertaking: the Bata System and its Social Consequences* (Geneva: The International Labour Office, 1930).

55. See Kershaw, *Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia,* pp. 9-10 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1931).

56. See Macartney, *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," p. 337 (London: Benn, 1934).

57. Czechoslovakia was one of the first states to try to establish normal relations with Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. See Vondraček's account of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1922. The Czechoslovak-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact were signed in 1935 and ratified in 1936.

58. See Spinks, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Czechoslovakia,* Appendices VIII and IX, pp. 42-3 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1937).

59. See *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Czechoslovakia, 1937*, PP. 12-18.

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CHAPTER VII

HUNGARY

THE position of the Danubian state of Hungary[1] is unique among the marchland countries. In 1920, by the Treaty of Trianon, this country gained for the first time for nearly four hundred years complete independence as a political unit. The influence of Vienna was at last destroyed, and this, even in the days of " Dual Control," had been resented by all patriotic Magyars. After the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire, Hungary, like the other component parts of this extraordinary political structure, was in one sense free as never before to develop her own national existence.

But the Magyar attitude to the Trianon Treaty was one of fierce resentment. " No, NO, NEVER " was the national slogan after 1920, and it expressed absolute and bitter repudiation of the terms on which Hungary regained complete autonomy. The collapse of the Hapsburg Empire meant really to Hungary military defeat, the loss of territory



FIG. *62a.*—The Frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Eleventh Century.

and resources formerly under Magyar administration, the humiliation of large Magyar groups placed under the rule of former subject peoples and the complete political isolation

of the country in Central Europe. In the light of these disasters the re-emergence of an independent Magyar state was no matter for congratulation.

The frontiers of Hungary as demarcated by the Trianon

FIG. *62b*—The Frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary in the late Fourteenth Century.

Treaty were indeed a peculiarity in the history of the Danube lands. In the case of Germany and Austria the frontiers shrank after 1918 partly because these powers had in the previous hundred and fifty years indulged in quite substan-

FIG. 62 c.—The Frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Nineteenth Century.

tial policies of aggression. But it is a very long tradition of Danubian history that the frontiers of Magyar administration, except for the years of direct Turkish and Austrian domination, should stretch far beyond the regions of actual

Magyar settlement. [2] If maps of Hungary in the eleventh, the fifteenth and the late nineteenth centuries be compared, the extent of the kingdom appears roughly the same in each case. (See Figs. 620, *b* and *c.)* From north-west to south-east it runs from the junction of March with the Danube to the point at which the latter river reaches the Kazan Gorge, and from north to south, from the Carpathian ranges to the Croatian highlands. On the grounds of tradition also, Hungary has strong claims to the control of the transition land of Croatia, through which, by means of the Sava valley, the products of the Middle Danube Plains have access to the Adriatic ports.

In this kingdom six natural regions, two lowland, one of broken upland country and three highland, are easily distinguishable, and at the beginning of the twentieth century each had a definite contribution to make to' the Austro-Hungarian economic unit.[8] (See Fig. 63.)



FIG. 63.—The Natural Regions of Hungary. The numbers indicate the main geographical regions in the old kingdom, i is the Great Alfold ; 2, the Little Alföld ; 3, Trans-Danubia ; 4, the Northern Carpathian Highland ; 5, the Eastern Highland of Transylvania, and 6, the Uplands of Croatia. This map should be compared with Fig. 64 to show the relationship between physical feature and linguistic divisions, and with Fig. 51 to see the contrasts and similarities between the Transylvanian and Bohemian Basins mentioned on pp. 248-249.

The most important lowland region is the Great Alföld (Great Plain), lying between the Danube and the Transylvanian highlands and drained by the Tisza river. This plain has seen various economies, thanks to the very disturbed history of the Middle Danube lands. At the beginning

of the nineteenth century it was mostly natural grassland, inhabited by herdsmen, but during the following generations of intense economic activity it developed into one of the great arable regions of Central Europe. This transformation was due to the skill of man as well as to the wealth of the soil. The natural fertility of the Alföld is indeed very uneven. There are patches of good loess soil (some of the best of these are now within the Rumanian and Yugoslav frontiers), and others of alluvium. But there are also stretches of swamp and sand-dune between the Tisza and the Danube in the region known as Little Cumania, and to the north-east of the town of Debrecen. Moreover, farmers in the Great Alföld must reckon with two other geographic problems. One is the risk of flooding from the rivers, which may occur with the melting of the Carpathian snows in spring. The second is the " continental " severity of the climate with the possibilities of extreme winter cold and of summer heat and drought.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, almost all of the great lowland had been reclaimed, to yield varied and plentiful crops. The richest soils were used for grain (wheat, rye and maize) and tobacco; the sandy soils of the dune country were planted with vines. Only in the marshy lands near the river, which were too difficult to drain, and in the poorer country north-east of Debrecen, were there survivals of the old pastoral economy. Agricultural skill reacting to the differences in soil and to the possibilities of drainage, thus made of a steppe-land of great monotony a country where the richness and varieties of the crops were most impressive. It is not hard to realize therefore that by 1914 the Great Alföld region was of considerable importance to the Hapsburg economic organization.

To the north-west of the Great Alföld is the smaller lowland or Little Alföld, cut off from the eastern region by low ridges of hills. This second lowland area, of which the southern part only is now Hungarian territory, never acquired the agricultural fame of the Great Alföld; it was, however, known and prized for its crops of sugar-beet.

South of the Little Alföld, between the Bakony Hills and the Danube main-stream is the region known as Trans-Danubia. It is not a level, featureless plain, like those to the north and east, but broken country of hill and plateau and valley, of very ancient settlement and of varied farming.

On the Danube river between the Great Alföld and the south-western broken country is the Magyar capital,

Budapest. It lies a little to the south of the river's emergence from the course between the Bakony and Visegrad Hills, and the features of its site are common to many old cities which have had for centuries to combine the functions of fortress and market. On the natural citadel of the higher western bank developed the earlier settlements and the fortress of Buda. On the flatter land opposite there grew up the modern commercial city of Pest. At this point also the river is comparatively easy to bridge before it begins its difficult marshy course through the plains farther south, and for early settlers the building stone and wood of the neighbouring Bakony Hills were attractions.[4] Budapest is in its general geographical position a possible rival to Vienna as a trade centre for the Middle Danube Basin; but it has never developed the same strategic and commercial importance as the Austrian capital for long-distance communications.

The regions of the Great and Little Plains and Trans-Danubia together form roughly the main areas of Magyar settlement. And although they have been economically associated with the surrounding highland groups, the Magyars of the Danube lowlands have always been distinct from the upland communities in occupation, in language and in culture. The coincidence between Magyar speech and lowland settlement in the Middle Danube lands has always been impressive.

Of the Carpathian mountain region to the north something has already been said, because it is the area of Slovak and Ruthene settlement included in Czechoslovakia after 1918. The higher forested country of the Carpathians was extremely valuable to the population of the Hungarian plains as these are poor in woodland; the lower hill-slopes provided also some of the best vineyards and potato crops in the old Hungarian Kingdom. Of immense importance also was the control by the Budapest administration of the upper course of the Tisza and its tributaries. As mentioned above, these rivers are extremely liable to flood in spring with the melting of the snows in the Carpathians,[6] and there are very few lakes in the mountains which can act as natural reservoirs for swollen streams. One precaution against destructive floods in the Danube and Tisza Plains therefore is the careful regulation of timber-felling in the hills, as indiscriminate cutting makes the run-off of water still more unmanageable. The essential co-operation between plain and mountain communities, whether for

economic resources or for flood-control, is best effected by a single administration of the whole Tisza region: for the river regulation especially, the quick working of a telephone system of flood-warnings is vital.[6]

Far wealthier than the northern Carpathians is the second highland area of the Transylvanian Basin in the east. Here is the greatest extent of Magyar settlement away from the plains; and the result is a minority separated from the majority by a thick band of Rumanian-speaking groups. Transylvania has something of the overflowing abundance of Bohemia. On the surrounding mountains there are thick forests and good pasture-lands; on the lower slopes there are favourable conditions for hardy crops—potatoes and hemp and rye; in many valleys, rich soils and the shelter for the cultivation of wheat and maize. In the south-west the Bihar ranges correspond to the Ore Mountains of Bohemia; coal, lignite, iron, gold, silver, copper and salt are the most important items in a long list of mineral products. They were vital to Hungarian economy before 1914, since the plains are as badly off for minerals as for forests.[7]

But it is noticeable that all the natural wealth of Transylvania has not so far brought to this region the political and economic importance of Bohemia. There are two geographical features of the eastern basin which may account for this contrast. The first is that of general position; Transylvania has not the accessibility of Bohemia to the traders of many nations. Both local and long-distance communications are immature, because of Transylvania's remoter position in the east of Central Europe. The second is the division of this region between two river systems, that of the Szamos in the north and that of the Maroš in the south. Both these rivers eventually flow west to join the Tisza, but their courses out of the Transylvanian Basin are in opposite directions. There is not the centralizing effect of a single river system with the chief tributaries converging on the main stream within a short distance of each other such as occurs in the Upper Elbe system. There is no town in Transylvania, therefore, to parallel the Bohemian political centre of Prague. The great similarity in the human and political geography of the Bohemian and Transylvanian Basins is in the broken language-distribution of the surrounding highlands. But whereas in the west, it might be said that the group with the more advanced economy, the Germans, invaded the highlands, leaving the less advanced, the Czechs, in possession of the centre of the

basin, in the east it is the primitive communities of Rumanians who people the hills, while the Magyar settlements are on the lower slopes and in the valleys. A second point in common between Bohemia and Transylvania is the attraction of both to the medieval communities of German traders and miners. The little towns in the Transylvanian Ore Mountains, and also the larger settlements to the north and east, have the same German traditions as many of those in the Upper Elbe Basin.[8]

Finally in the south-west of traditional Hungary is the third highland region formed by the mountains of Croatia. It is valuable not only for timber and minerals, but because in these highlands are the passes which connect the Middle Danube Basin with the Adriatic. The gap made by the Sava valley provides an important route from east to west, on the traffic of which developed the port of Fiume and much of the prosperity of Zagreb (Agram).[9]

These highland regions with the possible exception of Transylvania are distinct from the plains in traditional Hungary, largely because they were the settlement areas of the subject peoples, chased out of the more attractive lands by the strong Magyar group. (Fig. 64.)



FIG. 64.—Linguistic Divisions in the Old Kingdom of Hungary. This map should be compared with Fig. 63 to show the correlation between the lowland regions and those of Magyar settlement. It should also be compared with Fig. 49 to show the extent to which the Magyars were dependent on raw materials and labour outside the Magyar-speaking region for industrial development. The map shows also that the frontiers imposed by the Treaty of Trianon excluded Magyar populations to the north and east.

It is apparent from an outline of the resources of old Hungary that the whole area had great possibilities. Its weakness lay in the poverty of the mineral and forest resources in the plains. They were insufficient to balance the farming wealth. But if dependence on the surrounding highlands was practicable, then the old kingdom was well endowed.

Within this kingdom the proportion of Magyars to all the inhabitants was about half. Thus in 1914 the population of the Hapsburg Empire under Magyar administration numbered about twenty millions and the Magyars themselves only ten. In contrast Hungary, as demarcated by the Treaty of Trianon, represented a fairly solid region of Magyar speech, though admittedly these frontiers might have been expanded in some directions without altering the correlation between the state and the linguistic unit.

Thus in theory there seems some argument for this demarcation, even if the economic price were high for such an adjustment. If the small-scale frontier revisions discussed later could have been achieved peacefully, then Hungary might have formed an example of the political unit based on language divisions which was in such demand after the 1914-1918 War. (See pp. 21-22.) The only persistent problem would have been the Magyar minority in Transylvania.

But such considerations could have little weight with the Magyars. They resented the peace treaty because Hungary, confined to the areas of Magyar settlement, was clean against the historic traditions of the Middle Danube lands. Trianon Hungary was a completely new structure of a most distressing kind from the economic point of view. Such a state could not maintain the ancient interests and ties of the Magyar group. Thus, in considering the position of Hungary after 1920, it is absolutely necessary to bear the old kingdom always in mind.

With the exception of the Turks, the Magyars were the latest comers from the Asiatic grasslands into Europe. They appear to be connected both in physical type and in language with the groups who much earlier settled in Finland and Estonia.[10] There is, however, both in the racial and cultural characteristics of the Magyars a Turkish strain which is absent from the northern peoples.

It is possible to trace the Magyar movement westward all through the ninth century. Their settlements in the Don and Dnieper Basins in southern Russia seem to have been

disturbed by the raids of the Petcheneg tribes farther east, and the Magyars, like others before them, migrated farther into Europe. Although not very numerous, they were strong enough to seize and hold the pasture-lands they needed. They probably reached the Middle Danube plains about the end of the ninth century, using the easy routes through the passes of the north-east Carpathian ranges. They were powerful enough at this stage to conquer the Avar settlements in the plains, and to chase the Slav groups on the fringes of the lowlands right up into the hills. They held for five hundred years—until the Turkish conquests—one of the most fertile regions of Central Europe, which for centuries had been the passage-way of migratory tribes.

From this conquest and settlement of the Danube Plains by the Magyars, there developed under the dynasty which took its name from the great tribal leader, Arpad, another successful frontier kingdom. In its characteristics, medieval Hungary had a good deal in common with Poland and Bohemia. All three states were linked to Europe by the missionary activity of the Roman Church; all came into contact with the political disturbances of the Holy Roman Empire; and all were military outposts for Christian Europe against the periodic raids of the Tartars and Turks. The Hungarian kingdom was peculiar, however, on account of the number of alien groups permanently within its frontiers.

The Magyars were also more directly affected than any other frontier kingdom by the threat of invasion from the east. One outstanding instance of this danger was the hideous devastation of the Danube Plains by the Tartar hordes in 1241.[11] It is not surprising, therefore, to find both before and after this catastrophe the vigorous development in Hungary of frontier settlements for military defence against raids from the east. Such colonies were a marked feature of the policy of the medieval Magyar kings.[12]

These frontier settlements were especially noticeable in the eastern upland region of Transylvania, where immigrants of all kinds were made welcome if they were of military and commercial worth. The mysterious Szekely group in Transylvania to-day can be accounted for by this encouragement to immigration. (See Fig. 64.) Although it is often hotly disputed whether the Szekely can be classed as Magyars or Rumanians, their name means " frontiersmen," and the purpose for which they came to Transylvania

is clear.[18] Protected by the military outposts in Transylvania, there followed inevitably strong groups of German miners and traders. They established so firm a grip over the commercial development of Transylvania, that most of the towns there have German names of long standing and wide recognition. Both the military and commercial policies of the medieval rulers were therefore partly responsible for the mixture of linguistic groups in the old Hungarian kingdom.

In the fourteenth century Hungary was cursed like Bohemia with the extinction of the native dynasty. The Magyar nobles, like those of Bohemia, were obliged to seek a suitable ruling house from another country. In the case of Hungary the choice fell upon the French House of Anjou, and the first two Angevin kings, Charles and Louis, reigned for more than seventy years (1308-1382).[14] In many respects the Angevin period of Hungarian history was as brilliant as that of the Golden King in Bohemia. Under the rule of the French kings there was the greatest territorial expansion of the Hungarian kingdom, and a very high degree of prosperity and culture in the Middle Danube lands. (See Fig. 65.) The Magyars were able to profit, if only for a few generations, by the ability and ambition of the House of Anjou. It is noticeable, however, that with the exception of Croatia, Magyar expansion beyond the Middle Danube Basin was always of a temporary

FIG. 65.—Expansion of Hungary in the Fourteenth Century. Note the inclusion of Bosnia, Wallachia and Moldavia within the frontiers of the Kingdom.

nature. It depended on the weakness of the surrounding states rather than on the power of the Magyars.

When the second Angevin king died without an heir in 1382, the Hungarian throne again was in dispute, and this

time, after some contention, the House of Luxembourg provided a king. The ruler in question was Sigismund, the son of the Luxemburg Emperor, Charles IV, and the Emperor, it will be remembered, was also king of Bohemia. (See pp. 202-203.) The union of Hungary with the Holy Roman Empire through the Luxemburg ruler thus began to involve the country like Bohemia in the unrest of western Central Europe. The political complications increased when in 1411 Sigismund succeeded both to the Imperial throne and to that of Bohemia; for nearly fifty years the Czech and Magyar kingdoms shared the same king.

Throughout the period of Luxemburg rule in Hungary, the grip of the Turks on south-eastern Europe had steadily increased. It was therefore a tragedy for the Hungarian kingdom that at this particular time the monarch should have been unable to concentrate effectively on thwarting the Ottoman advance, on account of his preoccupation with the struggles within the Empire.[16] The chief military strength of the state lay indeed in the activity of the Hunyadi family, who were amongst the leaders of the Magyar aristocracy, and who played a very notable part in the last days of the Hungarian kingdom. John Hunyadi was elected Regent of Hungary during the minority of Sigismund's grandson, Ladislas, and he was the real ruler of the Middle Danube lands during the critical years which followed the Turkish siege and capture of Constantinople. In 1458, his son, Matthias, though still a minor, was elected king. The Hungarians thus achieved a national ruler again after a lapse of a hundred and fifty years.

Under Matthias, Hungary saw her last period of prosperity before the terrible disasters of the sixteenth century. The Hunyadi king was enough of a general to hold the Turks in check, at any rate for a generation, and the peace and order of his administration encouraged another advance of Hungarian culture.

On his death in 1490 there was again no heir to the Hungarian throne. It seems to have been the peculiar blight of the Hungarian state that three times over the line of the ruling house should have failed when a strong king was most needed. The lack of a competent ruler on this occasion meant the outbreak of destructive rivalries amongst the nobility. When therefore the Turks made their assault on the Danube Plains at the beginning of the sixteenth century, they were faced by a people very much weakened by these oligarchic struggles. The Polish prince who had

been chosen as Hungarian king after the death of Matthias had not the control over the aristocracy which had made the Hunyadi family so successful, and Hungary, like Bohemia and Poland, was destroyed as much by the factions of the magnates as by enemies from abroad.

But at the beginning of the sixteenth century the Hungarians must in any case have had a hard struggle against the Turks. They had to face a vigorous political and military theocracy in which successive rulers were noted both as generals and as administrators ; the Ottoman sultans of that period were bound to be formidable foes for any state.[16]

It was at Mohács on the Danube, not far from the present town of Pécs, that the Hungarian armies were destroyed by the Turks in 1526, and the king himself drowned during the battle. There was no barrier then to the rapid Turkish conquest and occupation of the whole

FIG. *66.*—The Turkish Occupation of Hungary. The long narrow strip of land in the west went to the Hapsburgs. The Highlands of Transylvania in the north-east were nominally Turkish but in actual fact ruled by the Hungarian nobility.

of the Middle Danube Plain east of the low hills which divide the Little and Great Alföld. (See Fig. 66.) In two regions only were the Magyars able to keep their hold. In the Middle Danube lands, west of the Bakony and Visegrad Hills, they retained part of Trans-Danubia and the Little Alföld lowlands which protected Vienna, although the city was threatened more than once in the seventeenth century by Turkish armies. In the east they defied the Turks in the highland region of Transylvania.[17]

In the Great Alföld and eastern Trans-Danubia, the two centuries of Turkish occupation had a curious and long-lasting effect, especially on the settlement pattern and the

movements of population. In the south-east of the Great Alföld, to the east of the town of Szeged, for example, the clotting of the population, which is still apparent to-day, dates from the period of Turkish rule.[18] Whole villages of peasant families were destroyed by the invading armies, never to recover. In many parts of the plains also the single farms of dispersed settlement disappeared for centuries. Peasants gathered instead into large "village-towns," because they dared not dwell in solitary farms ; they walked



FIG. 67.—The Pattern of Rural Settlement in Turkish-occupied Hungary. The exaggeration of nucleated settlement in the eastern part of the Great Alf¨old is still apparent to-day, although modern maps show a more recent distribution of dispersed farms. The village-town pattern shown here is copied from a map published in Budapest in 1871.

or rode miles every day to cultivate patches of land out in the country or to take flocks and herds to pasture. (See Fig. 67.) The actual slaughter of the village inhabitants and the abandonment of thousands of farms, also meant that a

great deal of land went out of cultivation until the era of nineteenth-century reclamation.

It is noticeable, further, that if the abandoned lands of the dead or fugitive Magyars were resettled at all, they were occupied mainly by non-Turkish immigrants. In the Lower Tisza region especially, Rumanian colonists from the east and Serbs from the south formed new islands of minority settlement.[19] This process of migration was repeated two hundred years later, when the decay of the Ottoman Empire enabled the Hapsburg armies to drive the invaders out of the plains. The departure of the Turks left a vacuum both in settlement and control, and the Hapsburg rulers were ready to fill it as governors. Like the Turks, however, they favoured a policy of encouraging heterogeneous immigrants.

The Hapsburgs were indeed the immediate successors to the Turks in Hungary,[20] and it was to the advantage of the Austrians as they gradually pushed eastward the frontier of the Turkish Empire to weaken within the Danube Plains the influence of the Magyar population. For it was from the Magyars that the protest at having exchanged Turkish masters for German was most likely to arise. Hence every kind of immigrant was welcomed by the Austrian government, and between 1720 and 1760 the stream of foreigners entering and settling the Middle Danube lowlands was remarkable. Germans and Serbs were prominent in southern Hungary[2]; more Rumanians came from Moldavia and Wallachia ; Croats and Slovenes, Bulgarians and Ruthenes were all admitted by the Viennese administration to counteract the Magyar elements. (See Fig. 60.)

Though the resettlement of the Danube lands by non-Magyar groups in the eighteenth century is very noticeable, it is necessary also to look at the Hapsburg point of view. In the first place, it is probable that the Austrian policy of fostering foreign settlers was much less deliberate than has been supposed by later Magyar nationalist historians. Colonization movements of that period in any country usually had conspicuously litde planning attached to them. In the second place, even if the Hapsburgs had been quite disinterested in their reorganization of the Danube lands, the fearful destruction of the Magyar peasantry by the Turks must have compelled immigration of some kind. There were not at that period enough Magyars to inhabit the vacant lands.*[1]



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FIG. 68.—Minority Problems in Hungary. The map shows the broken distribution of language groups east of the Tisza River in South-east Hungary. The confusion of settlement here dates from periods of colonization following the Turkish advance into, and the Turkish retreat from, the Danube Plains. Scale approx. I : 2,000,000.

Whatever the reasons for the cosmopolitan resettlement of the Magyar Plains, its consequences troubled Europe. The old Hungarian kingdom had been an area of broken language groups; in Hapsburg Hungary the complications were several times increased, since by the end of the eighteenth century even the lowland regions had lost their exclusively Magyar character.

The Magyar group remained the most numerous and most vigorous in the plains, as it had always been, but the dotting amongst these people of small minorities of divers languages and cultures proved a most unfortunate legacy for the future.

It is worth noting that during this period the minority question was made further intricate by the steady immigration of the Jews which continued up to 1914. Persecution in the Austrian Mark within the Hapsburg Empire, and farther east in Russia and Rumania, drove thousands of Jews to take refuge in Hungary, There were periodic outbursts of anti-Semitism in Hungary as in other countries, but on the whole the inhabitants of the Middle Danube lands were less ferocious in their treatment of the

Jews than were many of the Gentile peoples. Also, as has been pointed out," the lordly Magyar warrior and the laborious and thrifty Hebrew complement each other's needs and proclivities in so providential a fashion . . . that if the Hungarian Jew had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent him." [22] The growth of the Jewish element in the population was therefore very marked. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was noticeable not only in the big towns, but also in the villages, where about fifteen per cent, of the inhabitants were Semitic. The greater part of commercial enterprise in Hungary was in Jewish hands.

The main Magyar resistance to the Hapsburgs came from Transylvania, through the leadership of the Bethlen and Rakoczy families. These prominent members of the nobility had kept some continuity in the Magyar political tradition during the years of Turkish rule. They had, rather naturally, no desire to submit themselves to the Austrians when the Ottoman Empire declined. Throughout the end of the eighteenth century and all through the nineteenth century, there was therefore recurrent friction between the Hungarian nobility and the Imperial government at Vienna. It was unfortunate, however, for the Hungarian population as a whole, that the cause of Hungarian independence was mainly in the hands of a class whose political ability and social outlook were very limited. The Magyar aristocracy, it is true, hankered after Hungarian liberty, and this made its members preach opposition to any measure introduced from Vienna. But these protests became in time automatic and unreasoned, savagely resisting the good as well as the oppressive. The unintelligent conservatism of the Magyar leaders in the middle of the nineteenth century was revealed in the management of their properties in the Danube Plains and in Transylvania.

It was from the lesser nobility, and indeed from a family of Slovak origin, that the outstanding hero of the nineteenth-century nationalist movement arose. Louis Kossuth was the prominent personality in the Magyar revolt of 1848, and amongst the risings in that time of disturbances throughout Europe, the one in Hungary was very formidable. Kossuth's revolt, supported by a large number of Magyar nationalists, lasted for a year, and it was only with Russian help that the government at Vienna eventually gained the upper hand. What the Magyars had not been able to achieve by a nationalist rising, however, the Prussians gained for them

a few years later. As a result of the Prussian-Austrian War of 1866 (see p. 210), the Austrians decided to come to terms with the non-German people of the greatest numerical strength within the Empire in order to consolidate their position in the Danube lands. They accepted the Magyars as joint rulers on an equal footing with themselves. By what was known as the "Compromise" of 1867, the position of Hungary within the Empire was completely changed. The parliament and executive at Budapest had full control over the territories placed under Magyar jurisdiction, and joint management with the government at Vienna over the foreign affairs and the military and naval policy of the Empire ; the lands which were placed under Magyar administration were also, in the main, those of the old Hungarian Kingdom before they were despoiled by the Turkish advance.[88] (See Fig. *62c.)* As a public acknowledgment of this equality, the Emperor of Austria was solemnly crowned in Budapest as King of Hungary.

If this step had been taken twenty years earlier, before the outbreaks of 1848, and as a gesture of Austrian strength rather than of weakness, there might have been some hope of its success. Actually the Compromise did as much harm as good. According to the new constitution, Hungary was the equal of Austria in the Empire; in the opinion of the Austrians she was the " poor relation," and the Magyars of all classes were deeply resentful of Austrian superiority. Count Teleki in *The Evolution of Hungary* records the comment of a Magyar hussar during the 1914-1918 War, which expresses the prevalent feeling of the Magyars towards the Austrians between 1867 and 1914—" Now we shall finish quickly with these Serbians, to turn then to those rascals of Russians who attacked us in the rear, but when we finish with them, then we shall give the last blow to those damned Austrians." [24]

The Compromise therefore failed in its main objective of cementing the bond between the German and Magyar groups in the Hapsburg Empire. But besides that the actual nature of Magyar government was a serious problem. It is true that the fifty years following the Compromise saw a steady increase of economic production in Hungary. During the last half of the nineteenth century there was a growing demand within the Empire and in industrial regions in other countries for foodstuffs, which provided a great stimulus to farming. In the Danube Plains, therefore, all the patient industry of the peasants was bent towards

reclaiming and developing the soil for subsistence and commercial crops, and to improving the stock-rearing of the grasslands. As a result the Magyar lowlands had a definite and specialized economic significance, both in the Empire and in the European continent.

The same years also saw the growth of industry in Hungary, though on rather peculiar lines. These are worth studying, since they reflect something of the political outlook of the Magyars during the last years of the existence of the Hapsburg Empire. One feature of industrial growth in the old kingdom was its non-Magyar character, and this is not difficult to explain. In the first place, apart from the capital city of Budapest, which attracted a certain amount of manufacturing activity, most of the ingredients for such enterprise in Hungary were outside the regions of Magyar settlement. Minerals, fuels, timber and water-power were mainly in the highlands to the north, east and south. (See Figs. 48 and 63.)

Accordingly from the highland communities, and not from those of the Magyar plains, there developed gradually as much of a proletariat as the kingdom possessed by the beginning of the twentieth century. For one thing cheap labour from the mountain villages was close to hand and the inhabitants were eager for work. For another, the lowland Magyar peasants were slow to adjust themselves, even to a limited degree, to industrialization. They had (and still appear to have) a natural distaste for urban existence, even if the earnings attached to it were greater than those of farming employment. Also, since most of the peasants were employed on the great estates, and the land-owners were anxious to keep an ample supply of agricultural labour, there was no great inducement to the tillers and herdsmen to leave the land. Hungarian industry in the last years of the nineteenth century was therefore decidedly cosmopolitan in its labour supply ; it depended chiefly on the activities of the Jewish entrepreneur, on the diligence of the subject peoples—Slovaks, Ruthenes, Croats and Serbs—and on the raw materials of the highland fringe.[16]

Another feature of Hungarian industrial development was its slow growth compared with that of many European countries of the period. It was only in the last few years before the outbreak of war in 1914 that this side of the kingdom's economy appeared to be making strides. Magyar nationalists often attribute this delay to the ill-will of Vienna. Nor is it difficult to see why such an accusation

should have arisen. From the point of view of the Austrian government, industrial activity in the Hapsburg Empire was sufficiently represented by rapid exploitation of Vienna and of the Historic Provinces. Viewing the Empire as a whole, the food-producing possibilities of Hungary were much more attractive to the Austrians than the prospect of Hungarian industrial growth to compete with that in the west.

But Austrian hostility was not as much of an explanation of the economic stultification in Hungary as has sometimes been suggested. After 1867 the government at Budapest was theoretically free to impose such tariffs as it thought necessary to protect Hungarian industries, and after 1880 protectionist measures were very rapid and very vigorous. But there were, it is worth noting, strong objections to the high tariffs from the great land-owners, who wished to sell their produce abroad as freely as possible. The commercial needs of the farming estates ran counter to those of the small industrialist group.

Such progress as was made in industry was also definitely influenced by political aims. It was quite possible for Magyar patriots to point out that the resources of the Hungarian Kingdom were such as to justify complete separation from Austria. The abundant wealth lay in agriculture and pastoralism, but there was also quite enough in the way of fuels and raw materials to establish an economic balance in course of time. Whereas, therefore, the communication system and the commercial activity radiating from Vienna was remarkable for its long-distance importance, the railway system and trading activities emanating from Budapest emphasized the close association of the immediate plains and surrounding highlands with the city.[28] (See Fig. 49.) The railway network illustrated the aim of a compact political and economic unit, developing round the Magyar core. This desire to emphasize the connection of the surrounding plains and highlands with Budapest was partly responsible for the terrible economic dislocation when the frontiers of the Old Kingdom contracted in 1920.

Whether in farming or in industry, however, it was all too plain in Hungary that the increase in production was not reflected in the well-being of the population. The total wealth of the kingdom increased enormously between 1867 and 1914, but the status and the prosperity of the Magyar peasants who formed the bulk of the population were very little improved. In the surrounding uplands also, the lot

of the subject peoples, whether Slovak, Ruthene, Rumanian or Serb, and whether peasants or industrial workers, was very wretched. There was hope neither for material improvement nor for cultural freedom.[27] The large increase of political and economic freedom which the Magyars had secured for themselves, partly by good fortune and partly by their own exertions, they fiercely denied to the minority groups within their frontiers. In consequence, a fearful pile of grudges began to accumulate against them.

This misgovernment was a tragedy because the legislation which accompanied the famous Compromise might, if honestly enacted, have served to prevent the disasters which followed. The Nationalities Law drawn up in 1868, a year after the Magyars had become joint rulers in the Empire with the Austrians, was both generous and shrewd. It was the misfortune of the Danube lands that this law was to remain a dead letter like the earlier Constitution of Kremsier. (See p. 210.)

Therefore at the outbreak of war in 1914 two features in the Hungarian kingdom were noticeable. One was the tendency to stress Hungarian self-sufficiency in economic matters in order to justify, eventually, independence of Austria. The other was the steady and much resented " Magyarization " of the subject peoples. Both boded ill for the Magyars in the future.

During the struggle between 1914 and 1918, however, it was the Austrian part of the Hapsburg structure which first showed signs of disintegration. When the desertion of many of the Austrian regiments (composed of the disaffected subject peoples) threatened defeat, it was the Hungarian armies which were called upon again and again to fill the gaps. It was only after three years of war that the combined effects of military disaster and economic hardship began to be reflected in the Hungarian Kingdom in the form of political discontent.

But the upheaval in Hungary, once set in motion, was very thorough. In November 1918 the Emperor Charles abdicated and a Socialist republic was proclaimed in Budapest with a Magyar noble, Count Michael Karolyi, as President. But Karolyi's administration was unable to keep order during the terrible months for the defeated Central Powers of the negotiations over the terms of the peace treaties. As the extent of the Magyar losses became known, the despair and distress of the people knew no bounds. Karolyi's government broke down, and the control of the

country was seized by the extreme Communist leader, Bela Kun.[28]

In the summer of 1919 the misery of the Middle Danube lands was increased by the invasion of .the Rumanian armies from the east. Their advance was made, partly with a view to overthrowing the Communist government in Budapest, and partly to secure for Rumania all the territory that had been assigned to her by the Trianon Treaty. It must be allowed that Kun, the Communist leader, did his best to rally the Hungarian armies against the invasion, but without success. At the same time the reactionary party under the Hapsburg Archduke Joseph began a separate attempt both to establish some sort of order in Hungary, and to check the looting expeditions of the Rumanian troops. After Bela Kun's failure against the Rumanians, the " White " party gradually gained the ascendancy, although, owing to pressure from the Allies, the Archduke himself was obliged to withdraw from Hungary and the leadership of the country passed to Admiral Horthy. Both during the period of Communist control and the later months of the success of the counter-revolutionary party, there were terrible loss of life and destruction to property, largely on account of political reprisals. In view of the miseries of violent party warfare and of the additional excesses of the Rumanian troops the chaos in the Magyar lands indeed seemed almost irreparable.

Thus in circumstances of utmost disaster and humiliation both in their own estimation and in the eyes of other nations did the Magyars resume once more their status of a separate and independent political group amongst the peoples of Europe. By the terms of the Trianon Treaty they lost more than half of their traditional territories. Of the six geographical regions which could be reckoned in the old kingdom, the three highland ones were ceded completely. (See Fig. 69.) The northern Carpathian territories went to Czechoslovakia; the eastern Transylvanian Basin with its historic associations as well as its material wealth to Rumania; and the southern Croatian Highlands to Yugoslavia. Nor were the plains and the broken country of Trans-Danubia left intact." In the north, Czechoslovak acquisitions included parts of the Little and the Great Alföld. In the east and south the new Rumanian and Yugoslav frontiers took in a considerable part of the Great Alföld, while in the west the Austrians acquired the Burgenland region which had been a part of the old

Hungarian Kingdom. With these territories went a large proportion of the natural resources of Hapsburg Hungary, the value of which was just beginning to be realized before 1914. By the Trianon Treaty the best of Hungarian wealth in timber, oil, salt, iron, coal and water-power passed to the surrounding subject peoples.



FIG. 69.—Hungarian Losses after the 1914-18 War. This map should be compared with Figs. 49 and 63 to see the toll of Hungarian resources. The solid black area indicates the Hungarian Regency between 1920 and 1939.

The population of the new state also was less than half that of the old kingdom, just over eight millions, as against the former twenty millions; and although with the change in frontiers the government at Budapest had lost the administration of many poverty-stricken mountain communities, it had also forfeited a considerable part of the labour supply for industry.

Within the new frontiers of Hungary the complete dislocation of economic existence was very noticeable. Just as in Austria, all kinds of industrial enterprises—saw-mills, tobacco factories, beet-sugar factories and flour-mills—were cut off by political divisions both from their traditional sources of supply and from their old markets. In fact, Budapest and Vienna, after the revision of the boundaries of their respective states, each presented the abnormal spectacle of a capital city with a population in excessive proportion to the total figure for the country, although in Hungary the absurdity was less pronounced.

In the Great Alfbld the division of the Tisza river system by the new frontiers also proved disadvantageous to the Magyars. The old administrative area with its carefully arranged precautions against destructive flooding was now

divided amongst three different states. The Slovaks and Ruthenes in the highlands had no special consideration for the dwellers in the plains. Reckless timber-felling in the upland parts of the river basins as well as very imperfect communications for flood-warnings increased the risk to the Great Alföld of disasters in the spring.

No detached observer would deny that the plight of the Magyar lands after 1920 was appalling, nor that, even in view of past misgovernment, the Magyar people had less than justice from the Allied Powers. But the course of events in Hungary since the beginning of Admiral Horthy's regency has justified some limiting of the area under Magyar control. On the one hand, the Regency has been responsible for some interesting departures from traditional policy. On the other hand, there has been a remarkable clinging to some of the most questionable features of Magyar rule in the days before 1914.

The general course of political and economic history in Hungary after 1920 was similar to that of most of the marchland countries. The Middle Danube Plains, like other farming regions in this strip, struggled back to some prosperity within new frontiers. Hungary, in spite of her more limited economy, flourished with the rest of the new states until 1929, went through a period of great economic distress between 1930 and 1934 and then once more enjoyed better conditions until the events of 1938 gave rise to widespread political anxiety. But in this succession of slump and boom, security and danger, there were naturally features peculiar to the Magyar lands.

In the first place the economic distress and confusion after 1920 were such that international financial help was necessary to enable the population to start afresh. Recovery was achieved largely by means of a loan borrowed through and administered by the League of Nations. This financial reconstruction was one of the most important pieces of international work carried through after the 1914-1918 War.[80]

In the second place it is notable that the reconstruction of agricultural and pastoral prosperity in Hungary took place without the accompaniment of extensive agrarian reform. Agrarian legislation was indeed drawn up by the Magyar Parliament; the number of landless labourers was somewhat reduced, and some of the very small peasant properties were increased in size. But in comparison with the surrounding states, the redistribution of land was negli-

gible.[31] (See Fig. 70.) Magyar policy could not escape comment. The peasant population in Hungary was as predominant in proportion to the whole as in most of the marchland countries. Agrarian reform was the fashion, or recognized as inevitable, not only east of Germany but throughout Europe, and the states fringing the Magyar Regency had based their political systems on peasant-proprietorship. Therefore, no piece of conservatism on the part of Admiral Horthy's government showed more plainly the difference in outlook between Hungary and her neighbours. In the majority of the marchland groups, agrarian legislation emphasized the limitations to big properties. In the Magyar Regency the professed aim was to make the peasant plots large enough to be economically stable, but to leave untouched the existing agrarian system. In this different conception of land-ownership and tenure lies the explanation of much of the incompatibility between Hungary and her " successors " after the 1914-1918 War.



FIG. 70.—County Distribution of Latifundia in Hungary. The figures indicate the proportion of land held in big estates in the Regency of Hungary. The statistics were calculated for the year 1919, but it is not apparent that any widespread redistribution of land has taken place since that date. The " big estate " is here reckoned as over 1,000 hectares.

The danger of ignoring the need for social and economic change, though always present, was more apparent in Hungary after 1933 than in the early years of Horthy's rule. When the Third Reich began to be formidable in Europe, all the peasant countries of the marchland strip

had recently experienced great economic hardship during the slump years, and in some cases were still finding it difficult to gain markets for farming products. All were impressed by the growth of the Nazi system in Germany, and in some cases there were attempts to copy Nazi technique. But while in the countries with a basis of small owners there was fair political solidarity, among the most likely converts to National Socialism were the landless labourer in Hungary and the Magyar peasant proprietor whose position was depressed by the predominance of the great land-owner.

It is difficult to condone the inequities of the Magyar agrarian system, however long its tradition; and the economic and political status of the peasant population which resulted from it laid Hungary very much open to Nazi propaganda. The degree to which this country began to depend on German trading connections after the economic crisis also increased its liability to Nazi influences. (See p. 272.) In discussing this commercial development we come to the third feature in Trianon Hungary which is interesting, the attempt to repair the possibilities for foreign trade damaged by the new frontiers.

During the first years of recovery the trend in Hungarian commerce, in spite of political ill-will, was that of reviving the pre-1914 connections. Hungarian foodstuffs continued to go largely to Austria and Czechoslovakia in exchange for manufactured goods. This movement of goods persisted in spite of the fact that in the latter country an active programme of farming development was in prospect, and in defiance of the difficulties over the Slovak-Magyar frontier. The links with Rumania and Yugoslavia were weaker, partly because these countries were more intolerant than Czechoslovakia towards the past misrule of Hungary, and partly also because agricultural export was extremely important in their own economic systems. But at the same time the Magyars held their traditional markets in these states for the manufactured goods of the Budapest factories. On the whole, therefore, the period between 1922 and 1929 saw a partial restoration of the old economic ties between the plains and highlands of the Middle Danube Basin.[81]

The political co-operation which might have accompanied trading activity during this period was hampered by various difficulties. One was the continued and outspoken resentment in Hungary against the Trianon settlement. Another was the alarm in the surrounding states that at any

time there might be a Magyar attempt to restore the Hapsburgs. Such a " coup " had in fact been tried in 1919 by the Archduke Joseph, during the double confusion of civil war and the Rumanian invasion. And the fact that the Magyars under Horthy had established a regency and not a republic was in itself suggestive of a further attempt. The fears of Hungary's neighbours were therefore thoroughly aroused when a second plot developed in 1921. This time the Emperor Charles himself appeared suddenly in the country. Had Charles actually gained control in Hungary, there is no doubt that the armies of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia would have invaded the Magyar plains. But the Allied Powers were also convinced that an effort to restore the Hapsburgs would mean war in the Danube lands. Pressure from the British diplomatic representative in Budapest therefore persuaded the Emperor to leave Hungary, this time for ever.[88]

But the nervousness of the neighbouring states was not soothed. It was expressed in positive form in the Little Entente Alliance between Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It was also apparent in a more negative way in the continued absence of any solid combination in the Middle Danube Basin to include both victors and vanquished in the 1914-1918 War. The persistent ill-will between these two sets of states in the Danube lands was in fact a vicious circle. Resentment between the various Danubian peoples was inevitable during the first years of the disintegration of the Empire, and it was easily exploited from Germany, Italy and France. Once this manipulation from without had begun, the chances of its being crushed by co-operation between the Danube states were very small indeed.

The result of this political failure was a tedious and depressing history of local strife and external interference which foreshadowed the disruption to come. For example, it is noticeable that the attempts of Germany in 1933 to negotiate for a union with Austria produced farther east, not the united opposition of the Danube peoples, but a development in the machinery and activity of the Little Entente only.

While the Magyar government had tried in the years after 1920 to repair some of the old trade connections within the Danube lands, it had also had more distant markets in prospect. The most important of these were in Germany and Italy. In the case of Germany these ex-

changes had undeniably a natural economic basis of interdependence. The Germans needed the foodstuffs which the Magyars were anxious to export, and in return there was the demand in Hungary for German manufactured goods. The geographical and economic case for trade connections with Italy has never been so clear. It could be argued that Italy was naturally obliged to import grain; but it was difficult for the Fascist government to encourage the market for Magyar foodstuffs and at the same time to preach and practise a vigorous campaign for increased agricultural production within the peninsula. Moreover, the Italian exports had not so obvious an appeal to the Magyars as the German. Italy did not and could not specialize to the extent of the Third Reich in supplying other countries with cheap manufactured goods, machinery and coal.[84]

There was indeed political as well as economic design behind the German and Italian interest in Hungarian prosperity. It was true that all three states, Germany, Italy and Hungary, had resented the peace treaties, and had an instinctive antipathy to the marchland states which had benefited by them. All of them disliked also the extent of French influence in Central and South-eastern Europe. This could explain the commercial agreements up to a point. But German and Italian policies were competitive as well as allied in Hungary, just as they were farther west in Austria. Neither Germany nor Italy could afford to see the other predominate in the Middle Danube lands, though both were anxious to see French importance there decline. The temptation to the Nazi and Fascist dictators to meddle in the persistent local strife in the Danube states, and to bind the isolated Austrian and Hungarian groups to them by economic ties, was therefore irresistible. The attraction of such a sphere of influence to the great Central European Powers is undeniable. The resources mean so much to the states who are troubled by a shortage of foodstuffs, and even if the Danube Plains were unimportant in production, the control of their lines of communication would be worth a struggle.

The attention in Hungary to long distance rather than to immediate trading connections became more marked after the economic crisis. This development was partly due to developments within the Little Entente countries. Even though political ill-will was abating a little, self-sufficiency in manufactured goods and agrarian reform had made

great strides since 1918 in all the states surrounding the Magyar lands, and the dependence on Magyar products was accordingly much less. Czechoslovakia was capable of producing most of her own food. Rumania and Yugoslavia were anxious to protect newly established industries.[86] Only the Austrian connection kept its traditional importance for Hungary. It was essential for the Magyars therefore to replace these markets, whether they had been lost by the gradual change in the economy of the surrounding states or owing to the desperate circumstances of the crisis years. The experiences of the Magyars between 1931 and 1934 had indeed made them welcome any buyer of farming products, even if the rigid conditions of exchange associated with the totalitarian states were imposed.

The association between Germany and Hungary therefore increased steadily. It could not fail to be strengthened, either, by the tremendous growth of German political influence in Europe in 1933, which was largely at the expense of the French. The Third Reich was in a position to make its economic needs and policy felt in the Danube lands with some effect, and particularly in countries whose resources were complementary to those of the German people.

The development of German influence in Hungary after 1933 was for a time paralleled by Fascist efforts. Italian relations with Hungary were indeed favoured throughout by the memory of the historic struggles of the nineteenth century which the Italians in common with the Magyars had had against German oppression. Moreover, in so far as Italian interest in the Danube lands included Austria as well as Hungary, there was a fairly sound economic basis to the commercial agreements and joint activities of the three countries. They did not together form a very obvious block for trade or for political alliances. Indeed, the ties between Italy, Austria and Hungary had always a negative character (the checkmating of Germany) rather than a constructive one. But from the point of view of economic geography there was more to be said for the combination of the three states than for the bond between Italy and Hungary alone. The Rome Protocols of 1934 which regulated the relationships between Italy and the two Danubian countries were a distinct success for Fascist influence in the Middle Danube lands, and were supported by a considerable amount of trade.[34] The Italo-Austrian combination was strengthened

again in 1935 when the government at Vienna refused to accept the policy of sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian War.



FIG. 71.—The Possibilities of Economic Interchange between Italy, Austria and Hungary. This map shows the similarity in natural resources between Italy and the Regency of Hungary contained within the frontiers of the Trianon Treaty. It also shows the very limited communications between the two states across the corner of Yugoslavia. With the inclusion of Austria in this trading combination, there is noticeable the addition of iron, timber and water-power which are meagre in the two other states apart from the hydro-electrical supplies of the Italian Alps, and also the advantage of the southern half of the railway system radiating from Vienna. The absence of abundant high-grade coal in all three states is marked.

Italian preoccupations in the Mediterranean and in North-eastern Africa, however, ultimately smoothed the way for German predominance in the Middle Danube lands. It

was the Magyar-German connection, and not the Magyar-Italian, which was so obvious in the troubled period preceding the present war.

The full extent of German influence was realized in Hungary after the Anschluss "coup" in March 1938. After 1935 the first place in Magyar trade had unquestionably belonged to the Third Reich. The statistics for the import and export of goods between Germany and Hungary for those years are most impressive. The second trader with Hungary was Austria.[87] When therefore the Anschluss between Germany and the Austrian Republic was forcibly achieved in 1938, the economic and political effect on Hungary was bound to be drastic. An enormous proportion of her foreign trade was by this upheaval tied to one powerful state, and the unification of all the German-speaking peoples under the control of the Third Reich had brought the mightiest of the Central European powers into immediate contact with the Magyars.[88]

This process of the economic attachment of Hungary to Germany was continued, whether the Magyars were anxious for it or not, by the German demolition of Czechoslovakia. In the autumn of 1938 the " Sudeten " territories of the Historic Provinces were ceded to Germany, and it had been for the industrial populations of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia that the government at Prague still required Hungarian foodstuffs.[89] These Czech markets could therefore only be maintained by a still further increased dependence of Hungary on Germany. Finally, in March 1939, the division of the Czechoslovak Republic into its component parts, all under German influence, more than doubled the length of the Magyar-German frontier. On the west and north Hungary is now bounded by the Third Reich or by territories completely under German influence.

This problem of German domination, both on account of proximity and of commercial ties, had its compensations for the Magyars in an increase of territories. (See Fig. 60, and pp. 234-236.) Hungary gained at the expense of Czechoslovakia, both in the autumn of 1938 and in the spring of 1939. Though the value of the spoil in proportion to the risks entailed may be doubted, the expansion of the Hungarian frontiers to the north was acclaimed with joy and triumph in Budapest. It was the first gratification of the Hungarian demand for revision of the terms of the Trianon Treaty. The settlements of 1938 and 1939 could not decently be called peace treaty revision. The Hungar-

ian acquisitions were the result of a piecemeal destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic rather than of considered international action. But they represented to the Magyar peoples the first reward of a long and bitter campaign against " Trianon." It is this persistent note of protest that forms the thread of continuity in Hungarian foreign policy between 1920 and 1939.

" Revisionism," as the Magyar aims were christened, certainly had some justification. There were very few observers acquainted with this part of Europe who could honestly have maintained that the frontiers of the Hungarian state did not need amending. But although these claims had substance, there were a good many obstacles to prevent their receiving effective attention. One was due to an unfortunate piece of Magyar conservatism which rivalled the agrarian policy of the Regency in its lack of wisdom. There had been left within the 1920 frontiers of Hungary a few minority groups, although the bulk of the population was Magyar. But the handling of the non-Magyar peoples by Admiral Horthy's government seemed to involve an intensification of all the oppression applied to the subject peoples before 1914.[40] The government was determined that the whole population remaining to Hungary should at least be thoroughly Magyarized, in spite of provisions of the League of Nations[5] Minority Treaties. Such treatment of non-Magyar groups within the frontiers of Hungary did not recommend the extension of the Hungarian state to include any more aliens.

A greater obstacle to the policy of " Revisionism," however, was the dread in Western Europe of an alteration in the *status quo* of the settlements established after the 1914-1918 War. It was feared that the disturbances resulting from the effort to appease claims which were recognized as reasonable might be more costly than continued injustice; as a result, Hungarian expansion, now that it has taken place, has been on lines quite different from those which would have resulted from a genuine international settlement. An intelligent policy of revision would certainly have resulted in a change in the Magyar-Czechoslovak frontiers established in 1920. The extent to which Magyar groups were included in Slovakia for purely economic reasons has already been discussed in the chapter on Czechoslovakia (pp. 217-219), and some adjustment in this region was plainly necessary. The northern frontier also was the one which the Magyars themselves most urgently desired to see

altered. Small-scale revision was also desirable in the south-east, where in the region between the towns of Zenta and Szabadka a big Magyar minority had passed under Yugoslav administration. (See Fig. 68.)

But the area in which Magyar claims needed attention most was in the east, in the region between the Great Alföld and the highlands of the Transylvanian Basin. (See Fig. 72.) This strip of country is divided into the districts of Maramures in the north, Crišana in the centre and the Banat in the south. The western lowland part of them is fertile country containing an undoubted Magyar majority in the population. The strip also contains three considerable towns, Oradea Mare, Arad and Timisoara,[41] but these, like many urban centres in Hungary, are not so much Magyar as Jewish in character.

FIG. 72.—The Rumanian-Magyar Frontier. The thick black lines indicate the political frontiers between 1920 and 1939. The crossed lines show the direction of the railways. Scale approx. 1 : 6,000,000.

The economic existence of this region, which depends naturally on the interchange between the Transylvanian Highlands and the Great Alföld, and the transit trade in minerals between the Bihar mines and Budapest, must have suffered from any frontier drawn through it from north to south. The line of demarcation fixed by the Trianon Treaty gave the Rumanians the possession of the north-south railway between Satu-Mare and Vršac. It was a piece of frontier-drawing similar to that between the Slovaks and Magyars in the north. Admittedly the problem

of communications in the enlarged Rumanian state was a hard one. The country was divided from north to south by the Carpathian arc, and two separate communication systems were necessary, one on either side of the mountains. It would have been difficult on the Transylvanian side to build a north-south railway east of that between Satu-Mare and Vršac on account of the highland spurs running into the lowlands. But in this region, as in Czechoslovakia, the economic and strategic claims of the Rumanians were given precedence over the wishes of the Magyar majority and over the prosperity of the towns. The lot of these urban groups, if there has to be a choice between the Great Alfbld and Transylvania, falls more naturally with the plains than with the mountains.

The Magyar grievance over the Transylvanian frontier was certainly as clear as that over Slovakia, possibly more so. The numbers of Magyars and the extent of the farming resources affected were about the same in each case. In the north also the Magyars lost the valuable ores of the highlands. But on the whole the favouring of Rumania in the revision of frontiers after the 1914-1918 War was less justifiable than that of Slovakia. In the first place the need for the rail communication involved in each settlement was less vital for Rumania than for Czechoslovakia. The Satu-Mare-Vršac railway may have been very important to the Rumanians, but was not after all the only through line of communication in the kingdom. It had not the significance which the *east-west* line in the northern region had to the Czechoslovaks. Further, the ability of the new owners to make use of the railway and of the huge extent of territory and resources allotted to them was certainly more open to question than in the case of the Czechoslovaks.

The expansion of the northern frontiers of Hungary has already been discussed. (See pp. 234-236.) The agricultural land of Slovakia has returned to the Magyars: so also have the salt mines, factories and beech woods of Ruthenia. Further, the general upheaval in the European continent after the outbreak of war in 1939 was bound to provoke at intervals during the first year of a reopening of the Magyar-Rumanian question considered in the preceding paragraphs. This resulted after a year of uneasy negotiations in an expansion of the frontiers of Hungary in Transylvania, similar in character to the Magyar acquisitions in Slovakia and Ruthenia. It is not so much a case of frontier revision as of an arbitrary slicing-up of territory imposed from with-

out, lacking regard for the geographic features, resources and traditions of the region concerned, and induced largely by the development of events outside the Danube Basin. The territory ceded in August 1940 by Rumania to Hungary is not that which could justifiably be claimed by the Magyars on the grounds of language and economic interest. (For a further discussion of this point see pp. 344-345.)

But in spite of recent changes in territory and policies it would not be unreasonable to suppose that in a future European settlement the question of the frontiers of Hungary must again appear for discussion. In that case there would be a strong argument for confirming the small-scale alterations in the north-east and south already described, so that as far as possible the Magyar groups adjacent to Hungary, but separated from her for a generation, should be returned to or retained in the country of their own language and traditions. But a further rectification to increase Hungary's economic resources, which would involve additions to the non-Magyar population, is much less easy to defend. In view of the past record of the Magyars in the treatment of subject peoples, it would hardly be possible to propose augmenting the minorities in Hungary without guarantees of their well-being very much more effective than those provided by the recent international treaties.

Besides, the events of the last generation might well provoke some reflection on the time-honoured principles of the economic geography of the Danube lands. How far must the Danube peoples really hark back to the Hapsburg system of economic interdependence in order to use their natural resources to the maximum ? Is the encouragement of close co-operation in the Middle Danube Basin and between the Middle and Lower Danube states indeed a maxim for all time ? Or is it sprung largely from the tradition of the Hapsburg unit, and from the retention amongst many of the former subject peoples of very primitive economies ? The economic balance of the Hapsburg Empire depended on different *stages* of material progress as well as on varied resources, and this necessity may well have caused over-emphasis both on the farming character of the eastern regions and on their rôle of providers of raw materials for Western European, German and Italian industry.

The last twenty years have seen some very drastic departures from former commercial and economic traditions in the Danube lands. These on the whole have tended to develop the trading connections of the Danubian peoples

farther afield than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was an inclination brought about in the first place by the violent collapse of the Hapsburg unit, and it was strengthened by the wish of the more powerful states farther west to increase their authority in the Danube region. But it was also due to a very natural and necessary instinct on the part of the Danubian peoples themselves to build up more advanced and more complicated economies within their own frontiers. Such growth was bound to lead to some self-sufficiency, and there was accordingly a proportionate sacrifice of the old commercial co-operation which had been marked under the Hapsburgs. The experiments in greater autarchy were not justified in every case. In Slovakia and Ruthenia, as has been mentioned, there is certainly an argument for the restoration of something like the old northern frontiers of the Hungarian Kingdom, in spite of the political and linguistic difficulties involved. But in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and in Hungary itself, the stimulus to develop economically on lines other than those blessed by tradition had its healthy side, and the results of such efforts are to some extent irrevocable.

Thus, from the economic standpoint it would hardly be practical at any Peace Conference to discuss the problem of Magyar frontiers or of any other Danubian political units in the sense in which they were considered twenty years ago, when the Hapsburg unit was a recent memory. There were definite wrongs done to the Magyars in the frontier demarcations after the 1914-1918 War which should be righted. But the restoration of the old Hungarian Kingdom is another matter. It is true that in recent years many of the peace treaty settlements have been destroyed. Further, the record of political units formed from the Hapsburg Empire has not been perfect, and three of the " successors " have met with terrible misfortune. But at the same time the colossal effort and industry involved in the establishment of these states and in their maintenance during the last twenty years cannot be wiped out. The strides made both in political consciousness and in economic development amongst the former subject peoples of the Hapsburg Empire preclude entirely the revival of a Middle Danube unit under the single control of Vienna or Budapest, or on the basis of the dual system. Such a restoration would be as intolerable as the present clutch of the Third Reich on the Danube lands.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON HUNGARY

1. There are two adjectives in common use for the inhabitants of Hungary, "Hungarian" and "Magyar." They are so often interchanged that it may seem pedantic to distinguish between them. The complications of history have, however, developed a use for each term. Magyar should describe the group of that language who now form the majority of the population of the regency of Hungary. They were the ruling people in the Old Kingdom. Hungarian is the collective adjective for the population of that kingdom and, as mentioned in this chapter (see p. 251), less than half the Hungarians were Magyars. Hungarian is a term which did not apply with any precision to the inhabitants of Hungary between 1914 and 1938, though it could come into current use again now that Ruthenia and part of Slovakia are included within the frontiers of the regency. There is only the one proper name, Hungary, both for the traditional kingdom of many linguistic groups and for the unit created by the Treaty of Trianon.

2. See Kadlec, "The Empire and its Northern Neighbours," pp. 210 ff., *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. IV, Chapter VII; and Macartney, *Hungary*, p. 52 ("The Modern World Series").

3. See Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary,* p. 11 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923).

4. See De Martonne, "L'Europe Centrale," pp. 524-6, *Giographie Universelle,* Vol. IV, Part II).

See also *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," p. 323.

5. Partsch gives the following explanation of the problem of spring floods in the plains of the Lower Tisza. "The Danube and Theiss (the German name for the Tisza) run parallel through the whole width of the lowlands from north to south—two sisters differing in size and character. The fall of the Theiss in this part is scarcely half that of the larger river. The lower reach, in particular, from Segedin (Szeged) to the end of the Theiss—150 miles—has the minimum fall of only 15 feet. Any considerable rising of the Danube, therefore, at once drives back the Theiss. When the snows melt in the Carpathians around the Theiss basin, serious consequences soon ensue; through all the watercourses from the Hernad to the Samosh (Szamos) and the Körösh (Körös) come vast quantities of water flowing simultaneously into the Theiss, while exactly at Segedin, the third river of Transylvania, the Marosh (Maros) falls in and further increases the flood. It was in such a conjunction that on the 12th of March, 1879, Segedin was destroyed by an inundation." See *Central Europe,* p. 55 (London: Frowde, 1905).

6. See the *Evolution of Hungary,* pp. 93-7.

7. It is inaccurate to suppose, however, that the Magyar lands are *quite* devoid of mineral wealth and of forests. The most important mineral resource is the bauxite of Central Hungary. In 1932 this country ranked as the third in the world for the production of bauxite, and in 1934, as the second. See *The Mineral Raw Materials,* pp. 28, 32. Issued by the Staff of Foreign Minerals Division, U.S. Bureau of Mines (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937).

Lignite is mined in the north, as well as a little iron, and there is a moderate supply of coal near P6cs in the extreme south. There is a certain amount of forest-land in the Bakony Hills, but sufficient only to supply a small proportion of the country's needs.

8. The German-speaking group in Transylvania are usually known as

the "Saxons." This term, however, is misleading. Most of the German immigrants into Transylvania came from the Rhineland, from the uplands of Eifel and Sauerland and from Luxembourg. The mining colonies of the Bihar region of Transylvania date from the eleventh century. In the twelfth century farming settlements were established farther east in the valleys of the Great and Little Tarnava rivers, and at the same time the German element began to be noticeable in most of the Transylvanian towns. The German group in Transylvania to-day is mostly confined to the towns. The strongest German minorities are in the south with a total of about 200,000 and there are between 30,000 and 40,000 in the north, mainly in the neighbourhood of Bistrita and in the towns of the Maramures region. See *UEurope Centrale,* p. 705.

9. See Sion, "Pays Balkaniques," pp. 423-4, *Giographie Universelle,* Vol. VII, Part II. Zagreb is the Croat name, Agram the German.

10. See "The Empire and its Northern Neighbours," pp. 194 ff., for the controversy over the racial origin of the Magyars and over the sources of their language.

11. See Leger, "Hungary 1000-1301," pp. 468-9, *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VI, Chapter XII (C).

12. See *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," p. 54.

13. See "Hungary 1000-1301," p. 471.

14. See Homan, "Hungary 1301-1490," *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. VIII, Chapter XIX. Charles Robert of Anjou had a claim to the Hungarian throne through his mother. She was a princess of the House of Arpad, and had married the Angevin King of Naples.

15. See *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," pp. 72-6.

16. It should be remembered that from the west there was little support for the marchland states, which were suffering from the full effects of the Turkish advance. For example, the hostility between the French kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire at this time had reached the point when the French ruler could make advances to the Sultan, the official foe of Christendom, in order to threaten the possessions of the Empire. The luckless marchland peoples were the chief victims of such intrigues. For an account of this episode see Bury, "The Ottoman Conquest," pp. 94-5, *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. I, Chapter III. There is mentioned in this chapter the letter written by Francis I from Madrid, where he was prisoner in the hands of the Emperor, Charles V, suggesting that the Sultan should attack the King of Hungary.

17. The highlands of Transylvania are usually marked as part of the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth century, but as in so many regions of difficult communications, Turkish power was nominal here rather than effective. See *The Evolution of Hungary,* p. 61.

18. *Ibid.,* p. 59.

19. *Ibid., pp.* 59-60.

20. There are two interesting and different views put forward by historians on the eighteenth-century extension of Hapsburg power in the Middle Danube lands. One is that the Austrian rulers reaped a rich harvest from the Turkish decline at the expense of the Magyars. For example, Lodge refers to the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 as a triumph "which finally freed Europe from the Turkish terror, and which assured to the Austrian Hapsburgs a foremost place among the Great Powers." See "Austria, Poland and Turkey," p. 364, *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. V, Chapter XII. Beside this comment may be set Toynbee's

discussion of the effect of the Turkish withdrawal on Hapsburg fortunes. Toynbee points out that the pressure of the Turkish advance had stimulated the Hapsburg unit into heroic activity, and that when that pressure was removed the gradual decay of the Austrian political unit was likely. Before its maximum of territorial expansion and of economic activity had been achieved, the disintegrating elements had already begun to work. See Toynbee, *The Study of History,* Vol. II, pp. 177-90.

si. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 10 note.

22. See *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," p. 208.

23. The only subject people placed under Magyar administration in 1867, who received special treatment, were the Croats. But in spite of a fair amount of local autonomy, they were not any more content under the administration of Budapest than the other minorities. For one thing, they complained constantly that the limited amount of self-government given them in theory by the Constitution was not forthcoming in practice. For another, the intention of both Austrian and Magyar Governments to separate the Croats as far as possible from the other South Slav groups, the Slovenes and the Serbs, was obvious.

24. See *The Evolution of Hungary,* pp. 128, 131.

25. See *Hungary,* "The Modern World Series," p. 254.

26. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 29; also Seton-Watson, *The Future of Austria-Hungary,* p. 68 (London: Constable, 1907).

27. See *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy,* Part IV, Chapter II.

28. It was extremely unfortunate for the future of the whole Jewish community in Hungary that Kun was a Jew. The violence of the short Communist regime, and the fact that its policy was directed by a Jewish group, brought all the Semitics in Hungary into bad odour. Indeed, on account of this episode the supposed association of the Jews with revolutionary movements went far beyond the frontiers of Hungary. Kun's revolution added yet another grudge against a most unfortunate people, the vast majority of whom were innocent of any subversive activities.

29. The fact that in southern Hungary the frontiers between the reconstructed Magyar state, Rumania and Yugoslavia, were pushed so far into the plains is partly explained by the following circumstances. While awaiting the result of the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, the French generals in command of the Balkan armies extended their area of occupation into the Danube Plains. The discussions were so long drawn-out, especially in the case of the Trianon settlement, that the northernmost limit of the area of military occupation by the Balkan armies began to acquire something of the standing of a permanent frontier. It affected the final demarcation of political boundaries in the south-eastern part of the Danube Plains.

30. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 465. All accounts of the recovery of Hungary between 1924 and 1929 show the extent to which it was dependent both on the influx of capital from abroad and on an assured market in other countries for Magyar foodstuffs. When both of these were lacking after 1929, the situation of Hungary was desperate.

31. See *Manuel de Ia Giographie Politique Europienne,* pp. 389-92.

32. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 467; also Humphreys, *Report on the Commercial and Industrial Situation in Hungary,* Appendix V, p. 34 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1923); and Mullock, *Economic Conditions in Hungary* (1928-9), Appendices III (A) and III (B), pp. 33-5 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1930).

33. See Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs,* p. 77 (Oxford: The Univ. Press, Royal Institute International Affairs, 1934). The particular difficulty of the Hapsburg succession in Hungary was solved by legislation in Budapest in the same year (1921). The Emperor Charles was by this act formally excluded from the throne, and any future king in Hungary was to take the crown on an elective and not a hereditary basis. The right of Hungary to a monarchical government was, however, maintained. This legislation did something to satisfy the anxieties of the Little Entente states. It was drawn up by the Magyar Parliament at the desire of the Allies, who did not wish to see the question of the rights of the Hapsburgs perpetually recurring to disturb the Danube lands.

34. See *Hungary,* " The Modern World Series," p. 342.

35. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 475-8.

36. See Edwards, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Hungary,* p. 19; and Appendices III (A) and III (B), pp. 41, 42 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1938).

37. *Ibid.,* Appendices III (A) and III (B).

38. See Chambers, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Hungary,* pp. 1-2, Appendices III (A) and III (B), p. 43.

39. *Ibid.,* p. 1. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* p. 447.

40. See *Hungary,* " The Modern World Series," pp. 327-8.

41. The names of the towns given here are Rumanian; the Magyar name for Oradea Mare is Nagy Várad and for Timisoara, Temesvár.

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PART IV
YUGOSLAVIA

CHAPTER VIII

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAVIA,[1] like Poland, is a transition country with its interests partly in Central and partly in South-eastern Europe. The capital, Belgrade, is a Danubian city, and the richest agricultural land in the country is in the Middle Danube Plain between the Croatian Highlands and the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. Yet the greater part of Yugoslav territory is not Danubian but Balkan, and **the** dominant group within the country, the Serbs, are Balkan rather than Central European. Therefore in studying the evolution of Yugoslavia as a state, a fresh geographical setting needs consideration, that of the Balkan Peninsula.

The actual composition of the Kingdom of the Serbs,

Fio. 73.—The Component Parts of the Serb-Groat-Slovene Kingdom.

Croats and Slovenes is proof of the troubled past. The state proclaimed in December 1918 consisted certainly of groups with a marked degree of language unity; but from the

historical point of view the new unit was a collection of odd pieces. (See Fig. 73.) Two kingdoms were included in it, that is, the pre-1914 monarchy of Serbia, which is really the core of Yugoslavia, and the little southern one of Montenegro. The north-western part of Yugoslavia was carved out of the Hapsburg Empire. From Austrian territory, Slovenia was ceded, and the Balkan mountain provinces of Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. From Hungary, the South Slavs gained Croatia-Slavonia, and the Danube province of Voivodina.[2]. Finally in the south-east were the salients in Macedonia which were taken from the luckless Bulgarians, Timok, Tsaribrod, Bosiligrad and Strumitza.

The natural features of the present kingdom in some cases emphasize and in others contradict the former political fragmentation of the South Slav lands. It is interesting, therefore, to examine, next, something of the geographic setting of Yugoslavia. (See Figs. 740, *b,* and *c.)*



FIG. 74*a*.—The Climatic Divisions of Yugoslavia.



FIG. 74*b*.—The Relief Divisions of Yugoslavia.



FIG. 74*c*.—Forest and Mineral Resources of Yugoslavia. Note the extent to which mineral and forest wealth is distributed in highland country, difficult of access.



Fio. 74d.—Agricultural and Livestock Resources of Yugoslavia. Note the concentration of all forms of farming, whether agricultural or pastoral, in the northern lowlands, except for sheep rearing. Note that the line which divides the regions of pig rearing from the economy of the south is also the line dividing the wholly Christian setdement area of the north from that of the Moslem groups scattered throughout the south.

Figs. 74c and *d* show the wealth of central and eastern Yugoslavia compared with the Adriatic Littoral.

In general geographic position the greater part of the Balkan peninsula is in the Mediterranean region, and it looks superficially as though the climatic term " Mediterranean " could also be used to describe the temperature and rainfall conditions of the Balkan lands. But in fact the littoral regions of the peninsula, in some cases narrow strips of plain, and in others stretches of steep cliff, are the only areas which can truly be classed as " Mediterranean " in climate, with mild wet winters and hot dry summers. Over the greater part of Yugoslavia and in the other Balkan states, the inland country, partly on account of the great extent of highland, and partly because the Balkan region is close to the big land-mass of Asia, has the severer climatic conditions known as " Central European," with much greater extremes of temperature than on the coast and with rainfall maxima

in summer and autumn.[3] Within the general term "Central European," however, there are naturally wide variations in the local climatic conditions of the Balkan countries. (See Fig. 74a.)

In Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean climatic zone is confined to the narrow littoral of the Adriatic. Here there are the usual Mediterranean crops, citrus fruit, olives, grain and vines, but, as is often the case in the Mediterranean lands, the existence of the peasant cultivator is a hard one for many reasons. The cultivable area is small. The coastal plain is at the best a mere strip and sometimes ceases altogether, as for long stretches the hills drop sharply to the sea. Moreover much of the littoral is a limestone region, so that the rain drains quickly through the rock-cracks, leaving a barren and waterless landscape with only small pockets of cultivable soil.

The life of this region is therefore mainly concentrated in the coastal cities. For such trading centres, the broken, island-studded coast has provided a number of splendid natural harbours. These have given shelter for centuries to traders and fishermen from the violent storms blown up by the cold Bora winds. The best of these harbours is at Kotor in Dalmatia, where large ships can pass through the deep narrow entrance at Herčegnovi, and up the sheltered arms of the gulf as much as five miles from the open sea. Both the ease with which the entrance can be defended and the depth of the water give the Gulf of Kotor great strategic value, and these qualities were recognized by the Austrian government, since by 1914 this inlet was recognized as one of the most important naval bases of the Hapsburg Empire. The town of Kotor also has a long tradition as a small but active trading centre, a reputation in European history which it shares with many others of the Adriatic ports (Dubrovnik, Split and Šibenik,[4] for example). All have the same characteristic, that their trading links are naturally with the west rather than with the east. Only the more modern port of Fiume has access to the Danube Plains, by means of the Kupa valley, a right-bank tributary of the Sava. Between this break in the north and that in the south which is really known as the Albanian Gap beyond the Slav lands, the Dinaric Mountains lie in steep ranges parallel with the coast. (See Fig. 74A.) They form a tremendous barrier to communications between the littoral and interior, not only because of their height and the direction of the ranges, but because the western hills are bleak, sparsely populated

country attractive neither to settlement nor trade. The result of the difficult mountain system has been to make the link between the eastern and western coasts of the Adriatic stronger than that between the Croat and Dalmatian ports and the eastern hinterland. The sea unit here has also inevitably attracted settlement from the Italian Peninsula to the opposite shore. It was proof of the geographical and traditional one-ness of this maritime region, that even in the first years after 1918, when diplomatic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were at their worst, the Croat and Dalmatian ports still looked to Italy for the bulk of their trade.*

The region of Mediterranean climate in the South Slav lands thus coincides with one historical frontier. It was over centuries the zone of Italian settlement (see pp. 9 and 302) ; it is still the area with an interest in Italian trade. It did not, however, correspond to any of the political divisions of the western Balkan Peninsula before 1914. The Mediterranean climatic region comprised western Croatia and Dalmatia, the one under Hungary and the other under Austria. The eastern part of both these provinces stretched inland to the great mass of highland with Central European climatic conditions which now forms central Yugoslavia.

The Adriatic littoral, besides being a separate climatic region, was also in structure the westernmost of the three belts of Karst or limestone country which stretch from Slovenia in the north to Montenegro in the south. (See Fig. 74A.) The Karst land of Yugoslavia varies in width from sixty to ninety miles, and behind the littoral or *primorje* it is divided into two highland areas. That immediately to the east is known as the *zagora,* and it is this bare mountainous country lacking both resources and population which forms the main obstacle to contacts between the ports and the Slav hinterland already described.

There is the same scanty existence amongst the peasants in the *zagora* as prevails in much of the littoral, with cultivation carried on in small patches amid the rocky limestone hills. But in contrast there is none of the activity of the trading towns which provides on the coast an alternative economy to farming. The *zcigora* strip of the Karst is in consequence one of the most poverty-stricken regions of Yugoslavia, and the Hapsburg provinces which belonged to this region were a poor heritage for the South Slav kingdom. These were central Slovenia, central Croatia, eastern

Dalmatia and almost all Herzegovina. The greater part of the old kingdom of Montenegro also came into the same unenviable category.

The higher mountains behind the *zagora* form the third strip of Karst country, and are known to the South Slavs as the *planina* zone. They reinforce the *zagora* barrier to movement between east and west, but the *planina* highlands in Yugoslavia are not so desolate in appearance as the lower hills farther west. They have great possibilities for seasonal settlement, with their abundant forests and with their wide pastures for summer occupation. (See Fig. 74c.) The Austrians therefore valued the Slovene province of Carniola, and the corresponding region in western Bosnia ; the Magyars also looked to the *planina* mountains of Croatia for a part of their timber supply. (See p. 249.)

Indeed once the *planina* zone is reached in a journey inland from the Adriatic, the contrast between poorer west and richer east in the South Slav lands becomes very marked. The *planina* mountains are better endowed than the *zagora* ; and beyond them, where the hills slope more gently east towards the Morava Basin and north-east towards the Danube Plains, the natural wealth of the South Slav lands becomes impressive. In the Raška region of Serbia, the eastern uplands, which are no longer in the Karst zone, provide, where there is enough shelter, varied crops of maize and rye, oats and alfalfa. The Raška, eastern Bosnia and eastern Slovenia are all rich in minerals also. The most notable of these resources are the Bosnian copper and iron, but there is a wide assortment of others, especially in the two southern regions : zinc, lead, manganese, chromite, antimony and salt. There is a large amount of lignite in eastern Slovenia and Bosnia, although the Yugoslavs also depend on the resources of brown coal in the Timok valley on the farther side of the Morava-Vardar Depression. In contrast to the mineral wealth on the inland side of the mountain barrier, the Adriatic coastlands can furnish only the bauxite which is found near the ports of Šibenik, Metković and Kotor, and the limestone and clay for cement production. In the east and west of Yugoslavia alike, however, the minerals are still awaiting their full exploitation, with the exception of those in Slovenia. Their extent is not yet known with great accuracy and the wealth associated with them is potential rather than actual. The Raška region of the old kingdom of Serbia, and the Austrian territories of eastern Bosnia and eastern Slovenia, contribute handsomely,

however, to the economic prosperity of the new state. (See Fig. *74c.)*

East of the region of mineral wealth is the great north- and south-running trough of the Morava-Vardar Depression. This "through-way" comprises three regions: the Raška country of the watershed between the two river systems, the southern drainage area of the Vardar Basin and the northern one of the Morava Basin. Each of these areas needs separate comment on account of distinctive features, but the three together also have a collective interest because of the great route which traverses them all. Some mention of this line of movement has already been made in the General Introduction (see p. 7), but it deserves rather more detailed treatment in this section.



FIG. 75.—Roman Road and Modern Rail Communications in Yugoslavia. This map shows *(a)* the tendency of the man-made routes of the Balkan Peninsula to follow certain well-marked lines in general direction owing to the extent of the difficult highland country; *(b)* the importance of the Morava-Vardar Trough: the scanty character of rail communications east and west across the Dinaric Highlands.

This trough is one of the great highways of south-eastern Europe, the connecting link between the Danube Plains and the coast of the Ægean. From the earliest days of primitive

migration to the modern ones of railway construction, the Morava-Vardar Depression has been one of the great routes of penetration through the Balkans. It is evidence of the active but dangerous rôle of these lands as the bridge between Europe and the Near East. (See Fig. 75.) But it is worth noticing—that if in general direction the line of communication has always been north and south through the trough, there has been variation in detail in the choice of routes. For example, the main Roman road from Thessalonica (Thessalonike) to Singidunum[7] (Belgrade) followed the Vardar valley up to Scupi (Skoplje)[8]; it then turned north-west and after crossing the Raška watershed followed the line of the Ibar valley to the site of the present town of Mitrovica, whence it ran north-west again to Sarajevo. Before reaching Mitrovica the road crossed at Ulpiana another running east from Lissus (the modern Alessio, just south of Scutari in Albania). The Lissus road continued east, over the watershed between the Ibar and Morava valleys, to reach Naissus (Niš) just above the junction of the Nišava and Morava rivers. From Naissus, it followed the Morava valley up to Singidunum.* The main north-south route, which is still marked by a poor road, varies considerably from that of the railway in the crossing of the Morava-Vardar watershed. The latter uses the eastern gap between Skoplje and Niš, following the line of the Morava river in its upper course. This concentration on the eastern crossing of the watershed is indeed an innovation of the nineteenth century, and is due largely to political influence. The stimulus behind railroad construction during this period was that of the Austrian government, and the aim of the Hapsburgs was to strengthen the connection between Vienna and South-eastern Europe, without granting the Serb population of the Morava-Vardar trough easy access to the Adriatic* The use of the western crossing of the Raška watershed might have provoked Serb plans for a connection running east and west through Bosnia and Herzegovina on the lines of the old Roman and medieval road-routes. The eastern line of communication was therefore chosen, and the question of rail contact between the Morava-Vardar Depression and the Adriatic still awaits solution.

At Niš, where the old road from Scutari joined the Morava valley, the main railway line from Belgrade to Istanbul turns south-east from the trough to follow the

* For a further discussion of the Roman roads see pp. 298-299.

NiSava river, upstream. The railway then runs south-eastwards by the Maritza valley to Adrianople and across the plains of Thrace to Istanbul.

The concentration over centuries on these routes has not unnaturally had a marked effect on the town development of the Balkan lands.[10] At the northern end of the Morava-Vardar trough has grown up the Danube city of Belgrade; at the southern, the great port of Thessaloniki. These terminal points, together with Istanbul in the east, form the apexes of what is known as the " strategic triangle " of the Balkan Peninsula, the sides of the triangle being formed by the great routes. Control of any or all of the city points of the triangle has been one feature of the successive struggles for mastery in the Balkan lands. But apart from the terminal points, other cities have sprung up as a result of the importance of these routes: Skoplje in southern Serbia, where the lines of communication to Niš, by the Ibar valley or by the Morava valley, divide; Niš, where the traveller turns east to Istanbul; and Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, which commands the watershed region between the Nišava and Maritza valleys.

Of the three regions in Yugoslavia which make up the Morava-Vardar Depression, the watershed one of the Raška, is perhaps the most interesting. Its economic wealth lies partly in the possibilities for the peasant farmer, even though much of the country is rugged. It also includes in its western part one of the areas of mineral wealth already described. But apart from natural resources the Raška has great historical significance. It has the distinction of being the ancient centre of the South Slav unit, the core of the medieval Serb state, from which later expansion developed.[11] (See pp. 304-305.)

In the Vardar Basin to the south, the highlands gradually give place to the plains of Macedonia. In this southern extremity of the South Slav kingdom, the influence of Mediterranean climatic conditions just begins to be apparent once more, although Yugoslav territories do not reach the jEgean coast. The hills are less thickly wooded than in the Raška, and the streams are often only seasonal, fed by rain in spring and early winter. Once again the Mediterranean products begin to appear, grain, silk and olives, as well as tobacco, but in the Vardar Basin, however, agriculture is more favoured than in the Adriatic littoral, as both the extent and the quality of cultivable soil are greater. There is also a cultural separateness from the rest of Yugoslavia

in the Vardar lands with human frontiers coinciding roughly with the drainage area. The orientation of this part of the South Slav lands has always been towards the south, and accordingly there penetrated into the Vardar Basin, which provided the easiest route inland from the busy and cosmopolitan Ægean coast, a good deal of the culture which is often described as Byzantine. (See Fig. 76.) This was overlaid later by the influences of Turkish occupation and government. The result of this accessibility to the south is noticeable in various forms: in the patterns of village settlement, in housing type, in farming practice and in dialect. The southern extremity of the Serbian kingdom thus linked the South Slavs with the more complicated activity of the Ægean and the Levant.



FIG. 76.—Zones of Byzantine, Italian and Turkish Civilization in the Balkan Peninsula. Note the coincidence *(a)* of the Turkish distributions with the main river valleys; *(b)* of the Italian with the Adriatic Littoral; *(c)* of the Byzantine with the Vardar Basin. The regions of patriarchal economy are those of the high ranges. The dotted line shows the former northern limit of the " ciflik " or Turkish feudal estate. Scale approx. 1 : 10,000,000.

The eastern limit of Serbian speech in the Vardar Basin is extremely vague. The political frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to-day runs through the highlands

which rise beyond the Vardar valley, and which separate this river system from that of the Struma. But these hills have not the height and desolation of the Dinaric ranges farther west, and in consequence the movement of peoples and economies has been frequent. On account of its political and economic significance this region farthest east in the Yugoslav kingdom needs attention, but such comments come more suitably in the section on the minority problems. (See pp. 319-322.)

In the north the Morava Basin opens out into the Sumadija region, once thickly forested and now almost cleared. It is one of the most valuable regions for farming resources in the kingdom; the slopes of the hills are the great districts of pig and cattle rearing, and the valleys of fruit production. It is a country, too, which has historic associations for the Serbs. The medieval history of the South Slavs was, it is true, mainly concerned with the Raška region. But it was in the Šumadija that the Serbs first gained some sort of independence within the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it was from the Šumadijan principality that the modern kingdom of Serbia was formed in 1878."

Farther to the north and west is the last geographic region of the Yugoslav state, the southern fringe of the Danube Plains, which were ceded by the Magyars as part of the Trianon settlement. These lowlands include in the extreme north-east some of the difficult marsh and dune land of the Lower Tisza, but the fertility of Voivodina and Slavonia is on the whole magnificent. It is on these regions that the South Slavs depend for their best crops of maize and wheat. (See Fig. 74d.)

It is apparent from this outline that the former division of the South Slav lands between the Hapsburg Empire and the two small kingdoms had no great reference to geographical feature, whether in structure or climate, vegetation or resources. The region of Italian tradition coincided with that of Mediterranean climate, but the Italian zone in 1914 was included in the Hapsburg lands. The Serb kingdom after the Balkan War of 1912 roughly corresponded to the Morava-Vardar trough, but the southern part of the Vardar Basin was excluded. The political divisions were on the whole contrary to, rather than influenced by, the geographical regions.

There was no great respect, either, for geographical feature in the peace treaty settlements in 1918-1920. The

Morava-Vardar trough is still divided between two states and the lack of unified control over this route is always a problem. In the south-east the frontier between Yugoslavia and Albania (now between Yugoslav and Italian territory) cuts right through the difficult highland of the Parun Dagh. In the north the political limits of the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom run far north of the Morava Basin into the Danube lands. (See Fig. 746.)

Territorial limits unsupported by definite geographical features are thus a problem for the South Slavs as they have been for the Poles who inhabit the transition region farther north. Moreover, in Yugoslavia the difficulty is increased by the fact that the linguistic frontiers have not in many cases got historic tradition to strengthen them. Political fragmentation has had a long and rather destructive influence in this part of Europe.

A survey of Yugoslavia shows also the problems of economic and political regionalism. There is no doubt of the natural wealth of the country both in minerals and in farming resources. But in the first place these riches are very unevenly distributed amongst the various territories; and in the second, there is the problem of uniting east and west across the barriers between the Morava-Vardar trough and the Adriatic coast. Human agencies in the nineteenth century undoubtedly exploited the difficulties of transport. During the age of railway development in Europe, there was the anxiety on the part of those who had interests in the Balkan lands to magnify the difficulty of movement in the Karst Highlands and to divert economic activity to the easternmost route between Belgrade and Thessaloniké. The use of the roads running east and west which was fairly vigorous in the north-west of the Balkan Peninsula in classical and medieval times was conveniently forgotten at the end of the nineteenth century.

In the first years after the 1914-1918 War also, the influence of geographical regionalism and the separatist instincts of centuries seemed to be as strong amongst the South Slavs as the desire to use the opportunities for unification given them by the Allied victory. In consequence, even when the Adriatic ports, the western highlands and the greater part of the Morava-Vardar line of communication were bound together under the same administration, there were still many obstacles to the full exploitation of the Yugoslav regions.

There is the same problem in Yugoslavia as there is in

the Baltic countries, that the present state is not strongly supported by historic tradition. The South Slavs have in one sense struggled to political independence in spite of, and not because of, their history. The existence of a Serb-Croat-Slovene population in the north-west Balkan Peninsula over centuries is undoubted, and the record of the Serb group, troubled though it is, gives some sort of continuity to the story of South Slav political development. But the fortunes of the peoples who compose the present kingdom of Yugoslavia have often been bound up with those of the many powers who competed for control in the Balkan Peninsula and in the Danube Plains. Therefore, one can pick out certain episodes in the history of South-eastern Europe which have deeply influenced the South Slavs, but one cannot trace the type of historical tradition which belongs to the Magyars, the Czechs and the Poles.

There is evidence in this part of the Balkan Peninsula of a succession of human migrations and settlements before the coming of the Slavonic-speaking tribes whose descendants now form the bulk of the population.[18] The most important predecessors of the Slavs were the groups speaking the Illyrian tongue, who seem to have been predominant in the Balkans when the peninsula was invaded by the Celts in the third century B.C. Illyrian speech survives to-day in Albania, and it is reckoned as one of the most ancient of the European languages. It does not seem to have been affected by the invasion of the Celtic-speaking peoples, since these wanderers passed through the peninsula leaving to it as a permanent inheritance nothing more than a few place-names. It also persisted in spite of the skeleton Roman occupation of the Balkans, which began in the second century B.C.

Both during and after the days of Roman rule, the eastern part of what is now Yugoslavia, which contains the great Morava-Vardar route, was troubled by a number of invasions. The Goths and Huns swept through the country on their destructive raids, and the Goths held for a time the northern part of the Morava-Vardar trough. The western part of the peninsula was better protected for the Illyrian people by the great barrier of the Dinaric mountains.

The Slavs moved south in the sixth century A.D., pushed out of the Danube Basin, which was the scene of constant disturbances until the Magyars conquered it in the ninth century. The Slav immigrants settled in three main blocks in the Balkan Peninsula.[14] In the north they peopled

the southern part of the old Roman province of Pannonia, especially the north- and south-running valleys made by the right-bank tributaries of the Sava river; beyond this, they held the Raška watershed region, and to the south again the basins of the Albanian Drin rivers.[16] In the first two regions the predominance of the South Slavs has always been marked.

In view of the successive settlements of these regions in early history, and because the north-western part of the Balkan Peninsula is the type of country which preserves lonely communities, it is not surprising to find noticeable varieties in physical appearance to-day within the frontiers of the South Slav speech.[15] There is the common trait over almost the whole country of brachycephaly, but in Dalmatia fair colouring is common, and it contrasts strongly with the medium colouring of the Croats in the north and the swarthiness of the Serbs in the east. The Serbs naturally show some traces of intermarriage with the Turks, especially in the town populations, but these are more limited than one might suppose from the length of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The history and geography of this part of Europe have indeed had two opposite effects on the racial characteristics of the inhabitants. Constant invasion and the resulting migrations stimulated the frequent contact of group with group; but the inaccessibility of much of the country tended also to isolate and preserve physical and cultural traits from generation to generation.

The South Slav tribes entering the Balkans in the sixth century inherited lands which had been strongly, though somewhat unevenly, influenced by Roman administration. All along the Adriatic coast there still remain architectural traces of the Roman occupation. At Split, for example, the great palace of the third-century Emperor Diocletian, who was a native of Dalmatia, dominates the port to-day, with the facade of the building overlooking the quay. Again, at Solin, a few miles out of Split, archaeologists have been able partially to restore the ruins of the big Roman settlement of Salonae.

Even more apparent is the usual legacy of Rome—the skeleton of a road system. (See Fig. 75.) Roman military and economic intelligence was naturally quick to make use of the obvious lines of communication. The conquerors developed the peripheral routes of the Balkans, in the west along the Adriatic coast, and in the north along the Sava route, from Aquilea in northern Italy to Singidunum at the

junction of the Sava and the Danube. They also built transversal roads, a north and south one through the Morava-Vardar Depression linking Singidunum with Thessalonica, and a second one running east and west through the Albanian Gap from Thessalonica to Dyrrhachium (Durazzo). The Romans further attempted to create the far more difficult link between the coast and the Singidunum-Thessalonica route across the Karst highlands. They achieved a road from the little town of Narona which followed the steep Naretva valley to what is now Sarajevo. One road went on east from Sarajevo to reach Niš, as has been described (see p. 292). Another branched north, to join the Sava valley above Belgrade. The Roman roads had an immense advantage over the modern developments in Balkan communications in the directness and simplicity of their function.[17] They represented the control, even if it were somewhat superficial, of one single military and economic influence on the peninsula, in contrast to the later intricate and jealous designs of many powers. Thus neither the general plan nor the details of the Roman network of communications were spoilt in construction and use by political intrigue.

This framework of an administrative and transport system which the Romans established in the Balkan Peninsula had lost some of its effectiveness before the coming of the Slavs. At the end of the fourth century (A.D. 364 and 395) the division of the Roman Empire into eastern and western parts had deeply affected the Balkan lands.[18] (See Fig. 77.) The frontier between them ran straight through what is now central Yugoslavia. It followed mainly the line of the Drina river from the Montenegrin Mountains to the Danube, and it proved to be one of the most significant political divisions in history. On the western side of it in the Balkan Peninsula were the Dinaric Mountains and the Adriatic littoral, and the inhabitants on the seaward side of the highlands took their pattern of existence and their outlook from the west. On the eastern side were the lands owing allegiance to Constantinople. The double administration of the Empire from the eastern and western capitals lasted for nearly a hundred years, and then for the next four centuries, Constantinople alone owned an Emperor. When in the fifth century Christianity became the recognized religion of the Empire, the ecclesiastical boundary between the Patriarchates of Rome and Constantinople also ran through the lands of future South Slav settlement, though it

did not exactly correspond to the political frontier. (See Fig. 76.)



FIG. 77.—The Frontier between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, and the Frontier between the Patriarchate of Rome and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This map should be compared with Fig. 74b to see the relationship of these frontiers to the physical features of the Balkan Peninsula.

The control of the Emperors at Constantinople over the Balkan lands was very variable in efficiency and extent. For example, it was not possible for the imperial administration to check the steady pressure of the Slavs and Avars in the sixth and seventh centuries, when they over-ran the peninsula, first in a north to south movement, which brought them into the plains of Thrace, and then in a westward and northward invasion into the Illyrian country. Here as in other parts of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, however, the barbarian invaders absorbed something of the civilizations which they battered. The South Slav peoples noticeably inherited the religious frontier between the eastern and western parts of the Empire.[19] The Serb groups of the Morava-Vardar lands and of the eastern slopes of the Dinaric mountains were christianized from Constantinople and were attached to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Croats and Slovenes in the west and north, however, looked to Rome. These contrasts in religion and culture, which **derived** from the political bisection of the Roman Empire,

were emphasized again in the Middle Ages. During that period western influence was renewed through the medium of Venetian trade and settlement in the Adriatic, and that of the east through the intermittent control of the Byzantine Empire under the Phrygian, Macedonian and Comneni rulers.

Although they were affected by these external elements, the South Slavs also kept a good deal of their own tribal administration and economy. They established themselves in the peninsula during the break-up of the Roman Empire and in the early Middle Ages by means of the patriarchal unit of the *zadruga,* and this social and economic organization survived in the mountainous parts of the South Slav lands the pressure of more advanced civilizations and of military invasion. It is vigorous in the remoter Dinaric highlands to-day.

But from the earliest period of Slav settlement in the peninsula, the hindrances to stable political growth have been plain. There has always been, on the one hand, the accessibility of the Balkan lands to invaders from without who could establish military and commercial control over the periphery and over the through routes, but who could not penetrate into the great stretches of highland country. On the other hand, there has been the difficulty of founding and maintaining any strong local authority, owing to the geographical hindrances to communications apart from a few well-marked lines of movement.

During the first centuries of the Slav occupation of the Balkan Peninsula, the struggle for control between the various external influences was much more apparent than any growth of a Slav state. In three regions the rule of the Slav tribal leaders was acknowledged, but only within very limited bounds. The most notable of the Slav units was that of the Raška, which later, in the twelfth century, became a strong Serb state. A second centre was in the west on the rocky coast of what is now Montenegro; the third was in the highlands of Bosnia. In the east, however, the control of the Byzantine Empire through the early part of the Middle Ages was quite substantial, even if it did not penetrate into the remoter highlands. In the north German influence, and also the periodic expansion of the Magyars, had their effects upon the South Slav lands.

The Slovene regions of Carniola and Carinthia passed under the jurisdiction of the Frankish-German Emperors in the ninth century, and were not detached from South

German influence until after the 1914-1918 War. The Magyars conquered and absorbed northern Croatia, which from the beginning of the twelfth century onwards was included in the old kingdom of Hungary. (See Fig. 65.) Twice in the Middle Ages also (in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries) the Hungarian kings established a temporary hold over Dalmatia, Bosnia and northern Serbia.

The Slovene and northern Croat groups were thus detached from the rest of the South Slavs at an early date. Indeed, there was always confronting the inhabitants of this part of the Balkans the situation that proved so difficult for the Czechs and Slovaks farther north. For centuries the northern Yugoslav peoples had a political and economic development of an entirely different kind from those farther south. They had therefore no common tradition with the bulk of the South Slav population. The economic attachment of the Slovenes and northern Croats to the Hapsburg unit was not so vital as that of the Slovaks; plainly the change in administration after 1918 was not so fatal to material prosperity in northern Yugoslavia as in the Slovak part of the Danube Basin; but the lack of an historical tie between the north and south has been a source of weakness to the present Serb-Croat-Slovene state.

The foreign influence with greatest effect and the longest tradition in the western Balkans was that of Venice. It began to be formidable in the tenth century and survived the Turkish occupation, although with many limitations in territory and control. Venetian mastery of the Dalmatian coast was indeed broken only by the disturbances of the Napoleonic Wars.[20]

The Venetian colonies, at the time of their greatest extent in the fourteenth century, stretched right down the eastern shores of the Adriatic from the Istrian Peninsula to the Gulf of Kotor and beyond the South Slav lands into the Greek Peninsula and the Ægean Islands. (See Fig. 56.) The effect of this occupation is still apparent, mainly in the languages and architecture of western Croatia and Dalmatia. The inhabitants of the ports are bi-lingual, speaking and understanding Italian as well as Serbo-Croat, even though their relationships with Italy may vary sharply between cordiality and hostility. Further, in many of the ports, it is easy to pick out the square tablets built into the stone-work of harbours and buildings, which bear on them the Lion of St. Mark, and which are evidence of a past colony of Venetian traders.

On the Adriatic littoral there grew up also the city state of Dubrovnik, which owed a nominal allegiance to the Venetian Republic but which was practically an autonomous Slav trading unit. The harbour at Dubrovnik has not the spectacular scenery and shipping facilities of the Gulf of Kotor, but it is sheltered from the open sea by the island of Lokrum and was sufficiently large for medieval trading requirements. Moreover, a little north of Dubrovnik there was the possibility for pack animals of travelling inland by the Naretva route to Sarajevo. This line of penetration was easier for merchants than the extremely steep track inland from Kotor.

Dubrovnik was famous in the commercial world, especially during the Crusading period, when all the commercial links between Western Europe and the Near and Middle East were actively developed. Its ships were known and respected in all the eastern Mediterranean ports, and farther afield in Spain and in Northern Europe. Settlements of Dubrovnik traders were to be found also in all the Balkan cities, in Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia and Adrianople and even as far north as the trading centres of the Ukraine.

Dubrovnik, like the Venetian territories, kept its independence of Turkey.[21] It only succumbed to France with the rest of Illyria during the struggle for the mastery of the Adriatic which was a feature of the Napoleonic Wars. During the periods of its greatest prosperity there was vigorous movement between the coast and the interior. Both the Dubrovnik traders and those of the Italian cities farther north sent their goods inland by the old Roman road to Sarajevo, or by the southern route from Durazzo to Monastir and Thessaloniké. There was a steady traffic in cloth, silk, metal goods and leather, by pack transport over the difficult roads of the Dinaric Highlands.

Beyond the mountains, a strong Slav kingdom flourished throughout the later Middle Ages. The Serb unit in the Raška region had been a recognized state within the Byzantine Empire since the beginning of the twelfth century, and the chances for its expansion during the next two hundred years were quite substantial. In the east the Byzantine Empire had been weakened by the disastrous diversion of the Fourth Crusade which ended in the capture of Constantinople by the Christian armies, and in the north the Hungarians were absorbed by the terrible scourge of the Tartar invasions. There was only the Italian occupation

of the Adriatic therefore to check the growth of the Raška kingdom.

There was also in southern Serbia a succession of competent rulers who could make the most of the weaknesses of usually powerful neighbours. Stephen Dušan's reign in the early fourteenth century was the most glorious of the Nemanja dynasty. His kingdom stretched from north to south, from the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth, and from west to east from the Adriatic to the Struma valley. (See Fig. 78.) It did not include the Serbs of Bosnia, nor the northern Croats and Slovenes, but in the south Dušan ruled a big non-Serb population of Albanians, Greeks and Bulgars.



FIG. 78.—Stephen Dušan's Kingdom in 1340. The thick black line shows the limits of this kingdom, and the double line, the old Roman road through the Albanian Gap which formed the main means of communication between east and west. Scale approx. 1 : 12,000,000.

There were features about this unit which deserve attention in the light of later attempts to establish a South Slav state. Dušan's kingdom had in its favour the inclusion within its frontiers of the complete western side of the strategic triangle from Belgrade to Salonika. This ruler also controlled the east-west route through the Albanian Gap, between the Adriatic and the Ægean.[22] With a little good fortune his state might have had a longer lease of life

than it actually secured. But on the other hand there was within it the weakness that is noticeable again and again in the political units of this region. There was no obvious capital to act as a traditional centre for military, administrative or economic purposes. The rulers of the medieval kingdom shifted from Ras on the Ibar Basin to Pristina, from Priština to Prizren and from Prizren to Skoplje. There was no town in the Raška kingdom which had the standing of Budapest or of Prague.

Dušan himself died in 1355, still a young man, and murdered, it was said, by poisoners. After his death his conquests melted rapidly away, partly for lack of an able successor, and partly because of the ever-increasing pressure of the Turks. Dušan left his mark on South Slav history, both as a conqueror and an administrator. His reign marks the climax of the period which provided this people with the best of their historic traditions. There were not the conditions in South-eastern Europe, however, to give his kingdom any durability.[28]

The history of the South Slav lands, like that of the rest of the Balkan Peninsula, was dominated from the fourteenth century onwards by the Turkish conquest and occupation. At the height of Turkish power, the whole peninsula came within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, except for Croatia and Dalmatia. (See Fig. 8.) The Turkish conquest of the Balkans was also very much more far-reaching in its effects than that of the Middle Danube Basin. In Hungary the Turkish occupation lasted only a hundred and seventy years, but in the Balkan lands the Turks were in control for more than five centuries.

The parts of the peninsula most deeply affected were naturally the through-routes and attractive lowlands, since the Turks were no more able than any other invader of the Balkans to penetrate thoroughly the mountain retreats of the Christian population. Thus regions like the Albanian and Montenegrin Highlands, though nominally included within the Ottoman Empire, kept a considerable amount of independence. Moreover the Turkish conquerors were soldiers and pastoralists rather than cultivators or traders. They held the towns as forts, leaving the trading possibilities to be exploited mainly by the Greeks and Jews ; and they used the rural lowlands in the form of the *čifliks* or estates, with Christian peasants as serf-cultivators.

Their direct influence on the inhabitants of the western Balkan Peninsula was perhaps most remarkable in the form

of religion. Mohammedanism spread more rapidly than actual Turkish settlement, and has left to-day some communities in Bosnia and Albania whose religious zeal is proverbial[24] (See Fig. 79.)



FIG. 79.—Distribution of Creeds in Yugoslavia. Scale approx. 1 : 8,000,000.

The indirect effects of Ottoman rule in the South Slav lands were very important. One of these was the tendency amongst the subject peoples between the fourteenth and the twentieth centuries to constant migration within the peninsula. Before the various onslaughts of the Turks, whether during their first advance, or during the recruiting drives for the Janissaries, or in fear of punitive raids, the unfortunate Christians were constantly on the move.[25] The most noticeable result of this restlessness to-day is a broken language distribution in many parts of the Balkans which is comparable to that in Hungary. (See Fig. 83.) The geographic divisions of the peninsula tend in consequence to separate occupations and sometimes creeds rather than tongues, so that the establishment of the political frontiers

of the Balkan groups has for long been productive of disputes. But for the future of South Slav history, this



FIG. *SO.*—Linguistic Divisions in Yugoslavia. This maps shows the linguistic fragmentation in Northern Yugoslavia and in Macedonia. The bulk of the population in Yugoslav Macedonia, which is not Serbo-Croat in speech, uses the Bulgar language. The map also illustrates the wide distribution of Serb speech in Yugoslavia.

frequent shifting of populations had its compensation. The people most affected were the Serbs, and rather naturally their main direction of migration was north and west, away from the pressure of the Turks. During the centuries of Ottoman rule, they began to enter and settle regions which hitherto had been predominantly Croat, and they also came into contact with western influences. When the nationalist Serbo-Croat movement developed later, in the nineteenth century, the advantages of this dispersion became apparent. It meant, that although the core of Serb political and cultural activity remained in the eastern part of the South Slav lands, Serb settlements and interests were scattered over the whole of the north-west of the Balkan Peninsula. The wide distribution of Serb influence had a marked effect on the formation of a Yugoslav state after the 1914-1918 War." (See Fig. 80.)

Another indirect result of Ottoman rule was to preserve a numerous highland population much beyond the normal

period. There was not in the Balkans the natural drift from mountain to plain which is marked in the rest of Europe in the nineteenth century. In South-eastern Europe political insecurity kept the peasant population up in the hills, and the inaccessibility of many communities also helped to preserve social and economic systems which were far more primitive than those of the rest of the continent. In the mountains the old patriarchal organization persisted, and also the wide-spread practice of nomad pastoralism. Flocks and herds were forms of property which could be moved beyond the reach of the raider and tax-gatherer more easily than crops. Thus on account of political unrest the primitive economies of the uplands lasted on. At the same time the poverty of the highlands did not form any great contrast to that of the plains, which were blighted by the inefficiency and corruption of Turkish rule.

With the decline of Turkish power in the peninsula throughout the nineteenth century, the political situation became ever more complicated. Three elements were plain in the struggle for mastery. The first was that of the Ottoman government making violent attempts from time to time to retain its hold on the Balkan peoples, and up to the end showing spasmodic and unexpected powers of revival. The second element was formed by the rival great powers of Europe, who throughout the nineteenth century were increasingly aware that the control of the peninsula was of considerable importance, not only to colonial and economic enterprise in the Near East, but also to the holding of the sea-route to India. Thus Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia all thrust with growing eagerness a finger in the Balkan pie. Thirdly, the subject peoples themselves became every year more conscious of their individuality as cultural groups, of their sufferings in the past and of their hopes of independence in the future.

The South Slav struggle for freedom lasted for more than a hundred years. The real leaders throughout were the Serbs, although the part played by the Montenegrins was also highly important.[27] In the nineteenth-century attempt to form a Serb state two features had considerable interest. One was the growth of the northern centre of Serb activity ; the core of the state remained in the Morava-Vardar trough, but it was in the Sumadija region instead of in the Raška watershed country. (See Fig. 81.) This change from the medieval to the modern nucleus was due to the migratory

activity of the previous centuries. Another new feature was the interest of Russia in the Serb cause during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was an example of the complication described in the previous paragraph. Russian intrigue often took the form of a professed desire to protect the community of Eastern Orthodox Slavs within the Moslem theocracy. Also as Pan-Slavism developed as a conscious policy of the Russian Government during the nineteenth century, the fortunes of the Serbs could not be without political significance for the most powerful of the Slav peoples.

FIG. 81.—The Development of the Serbian Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century. This map should be compared with Fig. 80 to show the shift of the Serb centre of activity towards the north.

The first recognition by the Turks of a Serb state within the Ottoman Empire was made in 1817, when the subject people had managed after a long struggle to make some capital out of the enmity between the Sultan and the Pasha

of Belgrade. Twelve years later, and at the same time that Greek independence was secured, the existence of the principality of Serbia under the Obrenovič dynasty was again confirmed, although the small state still remained a part of the Empire. The principality was still confined also to the northern part of the Morava Basin, and it was this period of Serb political development which resulted in the fixing of the capital at Belgrade, in the northern extremity of the Yugoslav lands.

During the hundred years after 1827, Serb acquisitions in the south began to bring the greater part of the Morava-Vardar Depression back into the state. In 1833 the frontier was pushed south-east as far as, but excluding, the Raška region; in 1878, by the Treaty of Berlin, the Serb unit was recognized as an independent kingdom, outside the Ottoman Empire, and the north-eastern part of the Raška was added to it; in 1913, the spoils of the Balkan Wars added the southern and western parts of the Raška and the northern extremity of the Vardar Basin. Much of the territory of Stephen Dušan was thus reclaimed after five centuries of Turkish occupation. In 1878 also Montenegrin territory was increased. These gains included a small strip of the Adriatic coast, and the inland districts of Niksič and Podgorica.

The Serb struggle for independence during this period was overshadowed by two problems. One was the violent and destructive feud between the two families in the Serb state from whom the rulers were drawn, the Obrenovič and the Karageorgevič. Their strife was a classic example of the quick tendency to violence and atrocity in Balkan politics. The second which also affected the Montenegrins was the growing pressure from the Hapsburgs in the north which competed with that of Russia. It was plain that the same process threatened in the South Slav lands as had taken shape in Hungary after the Turkish withdrawal. The Hapsburgs sought to inherit the Balkans, as they had the Middle Danube Basin, from the Ottoman Empire; and in this programme of further expansion they were encouraged by the Prussians, who saw in the Hapsburg control of the strategic triangle a good opening for the German command of the main rail routes to the Near East.

The main obstacle to this plan was the growth of a strong South Slav unit; a puppet kingdom of Serbia freed from the Turks was tolerable to Vienna, Budapest and Berlin, but not the inclusion of the whole South Slav population within

one state, because this might seriously hamper German progress towards the south-east, and Magyar influence in the Adriatic. Therefore the advantages to the Serbs of the settlement at Berlin in 1878 were largely counterbalanced by the establishment of Austrian " protection " by the same treaty over Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sandjak of Novipazar. This "protection" developed in 1908 into complete annexation, to the extreme alarm and resentment of the government at Belgrade.

Austrian control over these highland territories thus thrust in a wedge between the Serb kingdom and the Adriatic coast, and between Serbia and Montenegro. The separatism suggested by the mountain barrier was emphasized to the full by Hapsburg policy. It was particularly apparent in the repressive attitude of the Austrian Government towards the growth of any communication system between the Adriatic and the Morava-Vardar trough.[28]

The economic pressure of Austria on the small kingdom did not stop, either, at the thwarting of an adequate railway network. The traditional economic link of the Morava lands was with the Danube Plains, based on an active export trade in pigs and in fruit. The dependence of the Serbs on this market was manipulated by the Austrians in the attempt to control Serb policy in the Balkans, and when in the first years of the twentieth century Austrian hostility took the form of a punitive tariff, the results for the Serbs were disastrous.[19] The need to find markets other than those in the Danube lands, however, later stood the Serbs in good stead. It stimulated, as far as geographic limitations would allow, a policy of hunting for trade links far afield, in Russia and in Western Europe, not only for the farming products of the Šumadija, but eventually for the minerals of the Raška region. The break with the Hapsburg economic unit had thus begun in the Morava lands before the 1914 War and the subsequent collapse of the Empire.

In 1912, the alliance of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece in the Balkan League caused the great powers some anxiety. It was the kind of combination dreaded most in Berlin and Vienna and St. Petersburg, because the initiative in Balkan politics was taken in the peninsula itself and not in the capitals farther north. Their alarm was increased when the League achieved a resounding and unexpected military victory over the Turks, chasing their armies through Macedonia and Thrace.

In order to thwart once again Serb determination on

an Adriatic outlet, the Austrian government met the situation by encouraging the formation of an independent state of Albania with its territories stretching across the " Gap " and so over the good through-route from Durazzo to Salonika. In the balancing of the Albanian and Montenegrin groups against the Serbs, the Hapsburgs hoped to disperse the political energy of the South Slavs. Further, in this policy of separation, the Hapsburgs in the twentieth century had the support of Italy, to whom also the development of a powerful South Slav state on the opposite shores of the Adriatic was unwelcome. The weakness of the Balkan combination was, however, patent as soon as the victory over the Turks was achieved. The members of the League turned savagely on each other over the division of the spoils won from Turkey, and the prospects of a united opposition to German pressure from the north grew dim again.

It was apparent in the two generations before 1914 that the Balkan Peninsula was one of the chief centres of political interest in Europe. In the little capitals of Getinje and Durazzo, as well as in the larger Danube city of Belgrade, the legations of all the European powers could be found, with diplomats watching every turn of events, and ready to pounce on opportunities with aggressive or obstructive intent.

A great deal of study has been expended on the last fatal episode of that period when in July 1914 the heir to the Imperial throne, the Hapsburg Archduke Ferdinand, was murdered at Sarajevo. The number of people and political movements involved in the affair was considerable and the issues very complicated, but one element in the tragedy was clearly that of Serb nationalism.[30]

After the success of the Balkan League against the Turks, there had been a noticeable increase in the activity of the Slav group in the Balkan Peninsula and southern Danube lands known as the Serb-Croat coalition. This nationalist movement was the equivalent in the southern territories of the Hapsburg Empire of the Czech-Slovak group in the north. One Hapsburg measure to weaken this agitation for a complete South Slav union was a policy of conciliation towards the Catholic Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the Empire; it was hoped thus to emphasize the difference in outlook between them and the Orthodox Serbs of the independent kingdom.

This liberalism was very much feared by the vigorous nationalist group in Serbia and Bosnia, who were right in

regarding it as the most effective measure against South Slav unity. The Archduke Ferdinand was known to be strongly in favour of this approach to the Slavs of the north and west, and was accordingly detested by the Orthodox Serbs. One motive in the plot for his death was therefore supplied by Serb nationalism, although it was not the only one.

In the huge upheaval which followed the assassination, the Serbs suffered as severely as any of the marchland peoples, with the possible exception of the Poles and the Letts. The Serb army was pushed southwards by the Austrians in 1915 right through the Morava-Vardar Depression (see Fig. 82), and in this drive through the country, famine, sickness and destruction to property were widespread. Moreover, the South Slavs, like the Poles, were faced with the dilemma of fighting their own people. Those of the Hapsburg armies were facing the people of their own language and culture in Serbia.

There was another likeness also between the problems of the Poles and the South Slavs during the war years. The prospects of an independent Polish state were darkened for a time by the Allies' uncertainty about the course of events in Russia. (See pp. 159-160.) In the same way, the plans for a South Slav unit were affected by the terms on which Italy was induced to come into the war against the Central Powers. (See p. 315.) But in 1917 the Manifesto issued at Corfu, by the Serb government and the Yugoslav committee, proclaimed the South Slav project for a Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom under the Karageorgevič dynasty. Two years later, at the Paris Peace Conference, the establishment of the new kingdom was assured.

It did not take long, however, to show that the unifying forces within Yugoslavia were hardly, if any, stronger than the disruptive ones. As in Czechoslovakia, the link between the Serb, Croat and Slovene groups was cultural only. The historical and economic traditions of the Croats and Slovenes had been for centuries different from those of the Serbs. The last-named people were definitely, and probably rightly, the dominant group in the new kingdom. Serb culture and economy were less advanced than the Croat or Slovene, and the Serb peasant population was poor and illiterate. But the Serbs had behind them, at any rate, the experience of two generations of actual government.[81] This rule had certainly been true to Balkan type, but it meant something more than mere dissent from authority. Under the crudity of the administration from Belgrade, however*

the middle and upper classes of the Croats and Slovenes suffered agonies. Their tradition of autonomy was less than that of the Serbs, as even in the period of conciliatory policy in the Hapsburg Empire self-government for the Balkan provinces had always been limited.[82] They were thus better grumblers than administrators. But their former Hapsburg rulers, if overbearing, had been of a polished order, and Croats and Slovenes in their culture approximated to Budapest and Vienna rather than to Belgrade. Therefore, in the attempt to combine the Serb, Croat and Slovene groups, the old differences in creed, and the resulting contrasts in political and cultural outlook, were uncomfortably obvious.

Thus in Yugoslavia, as in Poland, it was not surprising that the excellent and democratic paper constitution, which had been prepared for the country after 1918, should have proved unworkable. Because of their geographical setting, their traditions and their varied economies, the successful government of the South Slav lands implies the greatest possible degree of local autonomy. The programme of violent centralization attempted by the Serbs produced, therefore, alarming friction between east and west. The struggles between the factions were carried on with the terrorism characteristic of Balkan politics. In 1928 the Croat leader, Stepan Radić, was shot in the Parliament at Belgrade, and in the following year the Serb king, Alexander, established a royal dictatorship in the hopes of quelling the opposition of the Croats and Slovenes. With the end of a genuine attempt at Parliamentary government the strife in Yugoslavia certainly became less open, but the continued ascendancy of the Serbs was bitterly resented in the north and west of the country. Also in spite of the appearance of greater tranquillity, terrorism, official and unofficial, continued among political opponents. People whose views were for some reason or to some party unacceptable still " disappeared," either abroad or into prison or out of life itself. The unfortunate Alexander, who was assassinated in Marseilles in 1934, was only one of a host of political victims to the reckless traditions of the Balkans.

Indeed, in the first years after 1918, it was only the awareness of enemies on every side which kept the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes together at all. The South Slavs were on bad terms with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and of all the neighbouring countries, Rumania alone could be counted as an ally. In the interests of self-

preservation, therefore, some limit had to be set to civil strife.

Italian enmity was on the whole the most serious, and the Allied Powers were in the first place responsible for its development. The discussions at the Paris Peace Conference revealed the terms the secret Treaty of London negotiated between Italy and the Allies in 1915. By this treaty Italy was induced to enter the war against the Central Powers: and she was promised the possession of Trieste, the Istrian Peninsula and half the Dalmatian coast as well as the South Tyrol. (See Fig. 82.) The terms of this treaty clashed hopelessly with the promises to the South Slavs of an independent state, but the Italians were not disposed to retire quietly. Also the tradition of Venetian settlement down the Eastern Adriatic, with its plain traces in the life of the region, gave some foundation to their claims.

The most furious dispute after 1918 was over the Croatian port of Fiume, which up to 1914 had been the property of Hungary.[32] Fiume is on the eastern side of the Istrian Peninsula at the head of the Quarnero Gulf. Its prosperity as a port dated from the economic activity in Hungary which followed the Compromise Agreement of 1867, since the Hungarians were anxious to have an outlet on the Adriatic which was specifically theirs, rather than rely upon the Austrian port of Trieste on the other side of the Istrian Peninsula.

There followed accordingly the necessary rail connections between Fiume and the Danube Basin. One line ran north to join the route from Trieste to Llubljana, the capital of Slovenia, and another, by means of the Kupa valley, connected the port with Karlovač and Zagreb. (See Fig- 75) Fiume, therefore, in economic functions was neither an Italian nor a Balkan port, but a Danubian one, as almost the whole of its trade hinterland was the western part of this river basin. The South Slavs, as the possessors of Croatia and Slavonia after 1918, had thus some good claims to the town on economic grounds. Culturally the question of Yugoslav and Italian ownership was more difficult to decide. The actual population of the town had an Italian majority, but the region surrounding the port, and indeed the greater part of Istria, was undoubtedly Croat and Slovene in speech.

These considerations, however, did not deter the Italians, who were sore from many disappointments at the Peace Conference. At the end of the summer of 1919 a band of



FIG. 82.—Recent Italian Expansion in the Adriatic. The solid black lines show the political frontiers recognized between 1924 and 1939. The dotted line shows the extent of Italian claims in the Balkans recognized in the Treaty of London, 1915. The names of pieces of territory eventually awarded to Italy are underlined. The light dotted lines mark the main Italian shipping routes in the Adriatic. There are marked in Albania the regions, Albanian in settlement, which Italy was prepared to cede to Yugoslavia and Greece in the negotiations after the 1914-1918 War. The strategic position of the final Italian gains, in the islands and on the coast of the Adriatic, are plain from this map.

FIG. 82a.—The Division of Fiume between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1924. This map shows the artificial character of the frontier running through the actual urban settlement.

Italian soldiers under the poet, D'Annunzio, attacked and seized the town, though the exploit was disowned by the Italian government. The incident ended with rather more pretensions to justice than the comparable one of Vilna in

the north, though with sad consequences to the prosperity of the port. Fiume was made at first a free city, but in 1924 the greater part of the town passed under the direct control of Italy. To the South Slavs were conceded the suburb of Sušak, the Baroš basin and the delta of the Rečina river. (See Fig. 82, inset.)

For Fiume the results were economically disastrous. They could not really be remedied, either, by subsequent treaties between Italy and Yugoslavia, nor by the periods of better feeling between the two countries, which at times relieved the wearisome hostility. In any case, the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire must have lessened the customary stream of trade between the Danube Plains and the ports of Trieste and Fiume, but the remaining trickle which might have come from Slovenia and Croatia was almost dried up after the Yugoslav concessions to Italy. Further, a port whose streets are divided by a frontier line is so indefensible strategically as to lessen its worth considerably to either party. Local Italian opinion, indeed, soon summed up the situation in Fiume by christening the town, " citta morta."[34]

In view of the recurrent ill-will between Italy and Yugoslavia, the development of the Dalmatian ports south of Fiume during the last twenty years has been interesting. All of them were in 1914 subnormal in activity in proportion to the resources of the South Slav lands, because it had been the deliberate policy of the Hapsburgs to stultify any but the northern oudets to the Danube Plains and the centre of the Balkan Peninsula.

After 1918 two of the smaller ports developed very quickly. The most important was Split, where the volume of trade in 1929 was nearly three times that of 1913, although this high level of prosperity was not held during the years of the economic crisis." Split benefited considerably from the diversion of trade from Fiume, and also by the Slav distaste for the outlet at Zara after this town also had become Italian property. The second port to develop was Dubrovnik, even if the old harbour of medieval fame was discarded in favour of Gruž, a little to the north of the main town. The other Adriatic ports, Sibenik, Omiš, Metkovič and Kotor were insignificant in comparison.

In every case the commercial link of these towns with Italy remained strong whatever the state of political feeling between the two countries. On an average, 25 per cent, of Yugoslav exports went to Italy between the years 1921 and

1931, and about 10 per cent, of Yugoslav imports were drawn from Italy.[20] For this trade the Adriatic centres were largely responsible. The situation was disturbed only by the imposition of sanctions on Italy during the Abyssinian War of 1935-1936. Moreover, efforts were made on both sides after the sanctions policy was abandoned to repair the Adriatic trade, although these were not very successful.[87] The commodities of timber, livestock and dairy products have a natural market in the Italian Peninsula via the Dalmatian and Croatian ports, and from Italy, textiles, colonial wares, vegetables and fruits are welcome in Yugoslavia. The trade of the Adriatic, even though the volume is not very great, has thus had sufficiently good economic foundations to survive some serious political crises. (See also p. 289.)

The Treaty of Rome in 1924, as well as providing a settlement for the Fiume dispute, had awarded to Italy several other fragments of territory in the Adriatic. These were Zara on the mainland of Dalmatia, the islands of Cherso, Lussin and Lagbsta, and the island of Sasseno off the Albanian coast. These Italian gains were insignificant in extent of territory, but they were a direct strategic threat to the South Slavs. The Yugoslav navy never was, and is not now, a match for the Italian, so that with the control of certain carefully selected points, the Adriatic Sea became after 1918 what Italy desired, virtually an Italian lake.

Further, the award to Italy of the port of Valona and of the island of Sasseno was a tacit recognition of her claims to expansion in the Balkan Peninsula.[38] With the exception of the years of the economic crisis, Italian capital and enterprise were extremely active in Albania, and this "peaceful penetration" was most unpopular with the greater part of the Albanian population and universally in Yugoslavia. The South Slavs felt cheated of Fiume by Italian aggression, threatened by the Italian navy from the islands and haunted by the possibility of Italian control in Albania.

How well grounded were these fears was proved by the Italian pounce on Albania in the spring of 1939, an incident which followed hard on the heels of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The alarm of the South Slavs was further increased by the fact that no amount of imagination could suggest that Italian policy in Albania had a purely economic motive.[88] In spite of the free expenditure of Italian funds both before and after the economic crisis, the oil

wells of the little state remained disappointingly barren, the crop production for export negligible and the forests inaccessible. The Italian move eastward was plainly strategic, and Yugoslavia appeared as a likely victim of encirclement. Once the control of Albania was completed, only the plains of Greek Macedonia divided Italy from the Bulgarians; and in Bulgaria there was great hostility to the South Slav state over the question of the Macedonian frontier, and also an Italian princess married to the Saxe-Coburg king.[40] The Italian advance in April 1939 was no new departure in policy; it was the culmination of years of patient diplomacy in the Balkans and of considerable economic outlay; it was also the nightmare of the Yugoslavs and Greeks come true.

That the Bulgars on the eastern side of the Yugoslav state should always be potential enemies of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is due partly to the unlucky history of the whole peninsula and partly to Yugoslav clumsiness after 1918. Looking at a linguistic map of the .Balkan peninsula it is legitimate to ask why the Bulgarians, who can be included in the category of South Slav peoples, never amalgamated with the rest to form a single political unit.[41] (See Fig. 86.) The prospects of stability in the Balkans would have been very much brighter if the language tie between the Serbs and Bulgars could have produced a corresponding political link. There might have been a state stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and from the Danube to the Ægean. Unfortunately, the influence of geographical position worked throughout history to prevent such a union. Whereas the Serbs in the western extremity of the Balkans were only a border people in the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgars farther east were more thoroughly subjected to the control of Constantinople. Where the Turks in later history only partially subdued the Serb and Croat peoples, the Bulgars were ruthlessly oppressed. Later, when German influence in the peninsula began to predominate, it was the policy of the Prussian and Austrian powers to play off the Bulgars in the east against the Serbs in the west. A possible cultural link was not strong enough to survive these persistent separatist influences.

In the years preceding the peace treaty settlements of 1918, the Bulgars also had been extremely unlucky. The peasant community in that country has qualities of industry and honesty which make them perhaps the most attractive of the Balkan peoples, but in the wars of the twentieth cen-

tury their rulers seem to have had a talent for backing the losing side. In 1913 the treaty which ended the second Balkan War deprived Bulgaria of her coastline on the Ægean, and the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 made over to Yugoslavia the four salients in Bulgarian Macedonia. (See Fig. 84.)

FIG. 83.—Bulgarian Losses to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Neuilly. The dotted line shows the frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia in 1914. The solid line shows the modern frontier. Scale approx. 1 : 3,000,000.

The word "Macedonia" is the epitome of all the problems which Europe associates with the Balkan Peninsula, and one great threat to Yugoslav solidarity lies in the fact that the actual line of Italian advance, and the potential sphere of Italian influence farther east, is in the Macedonian region. Indeed, Macedonia is, in the Balkan Peninsula, the equivalent for political disturbances of Silesia in Central Europe. As a geographical area, it is hard to define, and the name Macedonia has been differently interpreted from age to age. The following frontiers, however, are usually accepted to-day as a basis for the discussion of its problems. (See Fig. 84.) The eastern limits are the Rhodope Mountains and the Mesta Basin, beyond which lie the Maritza lands and the plains of Thrace. The northern boundary is the Orna Gora mountain range, which means that Macedonia includes part of the historic Raška region of Serbia and one of the ancient Serb capitals. The western frontier is formed by the Sar Planina Mountains in the borderland between Yugoslavia and Albania; it then runs south through the lake region of the Albanian Gap, and through the basin of the Vistritza river to the Ægean in the neighbourhood of Mount Olympus. The lowlands behind Thessaloniké and Kavala, and the peninsula of Khalkidike, are also included in Macedonia.



FIG. 84.—General Map of Macedonia.

There is a rough geographical division in this region between southern coastal lowland and inland mountain country, and a less distinct one between east and west. In the lake region of western Macedonia, on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, the influences of highland environment are marked and the means of subsistence limited. Farther east, on the Serb-Bulgar borderland, there is greater scope both for agriculture and pastoralism, and for a settled rather than a migratory existence.

Of necessity Macedonia is a country of broken language groups beyond the average even for the Balkan Peninsula. It is a patchwork like the Lower Tisza lands in the Danube Basin. It lies at the point of entry for invaders or emigrants from the east to the routes north through the Morava-Vardar Depression and west through the Albanian " Gap." Moreover, partly on account of political insecurity and partly on account of geographic feature, there is a very strong tradition here of pastoral migration. This affected all the linguistic groups, the Vlakhs " and Albanians, who use the ancient Illyrian tongues, and the Serbs and Bulgars. Throughout the centuries of Turkish rule, the movement of the pastoralists was very little restricted. Except for the threat of periodic raids from the Turkish armies, the mountain communities were able to migrate from plain to highland and back again, and from one mountain pasture to another according to custom[1] and to need.

But after 1919 the restrictions on movement in this region imposed by the redrawing of frontiers between Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece caused any amount of trouble. The pastoralist groups were, if aggravated, capable of a lawlessness which could defy any administration, and there was throughout the twenty years following the peace treaties plenty of material for conflagrations. There were the inevitable difficulties of adjusting the pasture lands to the new political divisions; there were also attempts on the part of the new governments, especially in Yugoslavia, to enforce law and order in remote districts which had never known continuous control from without; and, again, there was the ill-will aroused by the fact that many of these restless upland communities were language minorities with a great sense of injury.

In its handling both of the Albanian groups in the west and the Bulgarian groups in the east, which were settled after 1919 within Yugoslav frontiers, the government at Belgrade was far from gentle. Rough treatment was the approved policy towards political opponents even of South Slav nationality, and complaining minorities had even less consideration.[48] But the extent and violence of terrorism in south-eastern Macedonia exceeded even the expectations of Balkan Europe. The Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier became a by-word at frequent intervals for vendettas of the fiercest kind.

In view of the Macedonian problem, any pressure from the west must be exceedingly dangerous for the South Slavs. There is no tradition of political stability on their southern frontiers, and their state must inevitably include Illyrian and Bulgar minorities. If these are discontented and are provoked by Italian agitation, the prospects for the Serbs are alarming to say the least.

For some years after 1919 the general tendency to disturbance in Macedonia was increased by the struggle between the Yugoslavs and the Greeks over the use of the port of Thessalonikė and the railway connecting it with Belgrade. The last few miles of the vital Morava-Vardar route and the Ægean port itself were in Greek hands, although both were plainly of the utmost importance to Serb commercial interests. The need of the South Slav lands for the outlet at Thessalonikė was, however, recognized at the Peace Conference, and a Free Zone in the port, leased from Greece for a hundred and fifty years, was arranged for Yugoslavia. But neither Greeks nor Yugoslavs were satisfied by the

settlement in the port or by the conditions for transit on the railway between the frontier town of Ghevgeli and the coast. In spite of the fact that the Ægean outlet was essential for the Serb trade which belonged to the eastern side of the Dinaric Highlands, and that the greatest possible amount of transit trade through Thessaloniké was desirable for the Greeks, the wrangle over the Yugoslav rights there was not settled until 1929.

In the north the resentment of the Magyars and Austrians against the Yugoslavs was more or less taken for granted. The attitude of the former ruling peoples could hardly be different when so large a part of their territories and so much of their wealth had passed into the hands of their subjects. Both Slovenia and the triangle between the Tisza and the Danube which had been awarded to the Yugoslavs contained Magyar and German groups, so that the sufferings of these minorities also aggravated the governments at Vienna and Budapest. The relationships between Yugoslavia and her northern neighbours were not improved either by the continued interest of the Italians in the woes of the Austrians and Magyars.

Thus for the greater part of its history the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom has been able to count upon one friendly state only amongst the surrounding groups—Rumania in the north-east. And the ties with Rumania are based rather upon a common dislike of the Magyars and upon the desire to see the peace treaty conditions upheld, than upon any solid economic foundations.

This melancholy tale of general ill-will had some compensations, however. It kept the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from attempting complete separation, in the sure knowledge that a break-up of the new kingdom into its main linguistic divisions could only result in the destruction of each part by enemies from without. The stimulus to solidarity, both within the kingdom and further with neighbouring states in the Adriatic and the iEgean regions, also increased with the sudden development of German pressure. But before discussing this last phase of Yugoslav political development, it is necessary to say something of the economy of the new state.

It might, perhaps, be argued that the history of Yugoslav economic development has yet to be made. This comment certainly applies to the use of the minerals, which in many cases are not yet fully exploited either for export purposes or for the industrial development of the country.[44] Mining

activity in the South Slav lands has concentrated on these resources:—lignite and brown coal, copper, iron and lead-zinc ores. Two other minerals also need mention, chrome ore and bauxite. (See Fig. 74c) In the production of all of them there has been a steady rise since 1919, if allowance is made for the difficult years between 1931 and 1934. But the system of working and marketing these minerals is significant. The lignite and brown coal are indeed mined by Yugoslav enterprise and mainly sold in the country, but other enterprises have been very dependent on foreign capital, management and markets.[45] British capital has been responsible for the lead-zinc ore production and for the chrome ore mining in southern Serbia. A French company controlled, until 1940, the main copper mines in Bosnia and Serbia. Germany has been responsible for some years for the main purchase of the bauxite. This tendency to depend on foreign capital and management is hard to alter. For one thing, the supplies of capital and of skilled labour in a country whose population consists mainly of peasants are very limited. For another, the resources of good coal fuel or of oil are very small in proportion to the ores: there is an abundance of low-grade brown coal and lignite but very little anthracite or coking coal. This difficulty may be eased in time with the development of water-power, especially in Slovenia and Bosnia, but the lack of easily accessible fuels within the kingdom has so far been a handicap. Thirdly, the natural difficulty of communications in Yugoslavia and the very primitive state of road and rail development do not encourage the use of the minerals within the country. Whatever the resources of this nation, there are so many obstacles to uniting the fuel with the ores, the raw materials with labour and the finished products with local or foreign markets. Some progress in the development of the metallurgical industry was, indeed, made in the years of recovery after the economic crisis. In 1936 and 1937 French and British companies established iron, copper and lead smelters to process the ore within the country, and aluminium is now being produced by the South Slavs as well as their despatching the bauxite abroad. More significant still is the erection of the state steel works at Zenica in Bosnia.[46] But in spite of these recent achievements, the greater part of the metallurgical products used in Yugoslavia still come from abroad.

Two other natural resources of the South Slav lands have been exploited somewhat erratically during the last twenty

years, and again in connection with foreign markets rather than with local industry. The first is the cement produced from the working of the limestone and clay of the Dalmatian coast. This activity, in spite of the building boom in Yugoslavia after 1919, always depended largely on the Italian market.[47] The cement trade, however, never fully recovered its vigour after the 1931-1934 depression. The years of the economic crisis were followed too soon by the period of sanctions, and then by the severe competition of German products.

The second resource of timber is potentially valuable for export and for industry, but, as in many countries, this particular form of enterprise in Yugoslavia has known many ups and downs. Italy has been the main purchaser of the timber, whether raw or processed, though France and Greece have also ranked as good customers. But in the first years after 1919 the Italo-Yugoslav timber trade was hampered by currency complications and by the competition of Russian timber. Then came the years of the economic crisis followed by the complete loss of the Italian market during the Abyssinian War. These successive difficulties were followed, however, by fairly good exports in 1937 and 1938 both to Italy and Hungary. On an average, the timber resources of Yugoslavia between 1919 and 1929 provided about 25 per cent, of her annual export total in value, and between 1930 and 1938 they dropped to about 15 per cent.[48] These figures, especially during the latter period, reflect the uncertainties of foreign markets rather than limited resources in Yugoslavia.

Industrial development within the country has concentrated mainly on textile production and on the enterprises based on agricultural raw materials. The latter are the more important. British, Swiss and Czech capital was available for the establishment of textile factories in the years after 1919, and under the shelter of a protective tariflF those concerns were able to survive even the bad years of the economic crisis.[49] Neither the problem of fuel, nor that of communications, nor that of skilled labour, was as insoluble in the case of the textile industries as in that of metallurgical production. Textile manufacture has not been strictly localized; some factories are in Slovenia depending on the water-power supplies; some are in the towns of the Danube plains, north of Belgrade; some are in Bosnia and others in South Serbia. All depend mainly on imported raw materials, and the demand for raw wool and cotton and

for yarns has made quite a vigorous commercial link between Yugoslavia and some parts of the British Empire. Peasant clothes still depend to a certain extent on local wool and flax, and on home-spinning and weaving, but the cheap goods of the textile factories have been able to secure a steady and increasing market. The most important local raw material for textiles is probably the hemp of the Bačka region north of the Danube. About half the crop is processed in Yugoslavia and the rest exported, largely to Germany.

The other raw materials for Yugoslav industry are mainly provided by three crops, beet, tobacco and fruit. The possibility of sugar-beet production was inherited from Hungary, as most of the beet crop is drawn from the former Hungarian province of Voivodina, and the sugar refineries are also there.[50] This form of industrial enterprise, however, has been hampered throughout by the government excise duty, which has made sugar a luxury product beyond the purchasing power of most peasants.[61]

Tobacco is one of the most important crops of southern Serbia and is also popular in Voivodina. Most of the crop is exported in leaf form, and the most important purchasers up to 1939 were Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. The tobacco crop gives a certain stimulus to Yugoslav industry, however, as there are small factories all over the country for cigarette, cigar and tobacco manufacture; the main problem for producers has been the competition of Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. In the Sumadija region in the north are the famous fruit orchards already mentioned. (See p. 295.) The plum crop is the most important, and much of it is sent abroad every year in the form of fresh fruit. A good deal, however, is dried before export; and a certain quantity is also manufactured into the *slivovitz* or plum brandy for which northern Yugoslavia is famous.[52]

The last three forms of production are reminders of the importance of the peasant population of Yugoslavia. Of the total population of fifteen millions, 75 percent, are reckoned as engaged in farming, and of these the vast majority are peasants. There are thus over eleven million people in Yugoslavia engaged in farming as against the 700,000 employed in industry. And it must also be remembered that it is the derivatives of agriculture, flour-milling, sugar-refining, tobacco-packing and brandy-making, which account for a good deal of industrial enterprise.

The prosperity of the peasants varies enormously between

one region and another. The differences in environment and tradition are still obvious in farming methods, since these have not yet been subjected much to the standardizing effects of capital and communications. In the greater part of the country, however, the economic and cultural attainments of the peasant groups are unsatisfactory. To raise them is essential if full use is to be made of the natural possibilities of the land.

The depressed state of the peasant population in 1918 was partly due to the effects of the continuous strife which had troubled the South Slav lands since 1912. Coupled with this distressing aftermath of war was the insistent demand for agrarian reform.[63] The question of the redistribution of land in Yugoslavia was, however, different from, and perhaps more complicated than, that in the other marchland countries. The peasants' grievance over the big estates affected seriously one region only, the Danube lands taken from Hungary. Altogether in the new kingdom less than 10 per cent, of the total arable land was parcelled out afresh, and this occurred mainly in Slavonia and Voivodina.[54] Farther south there were also the relics of the Turkish system of land-tenure which needed reform. But the main problem in Yugoslavia which called for attention was not so much the redistribution of the land as the condition of the peasant properties already in existence. Many of these in the hands of individual owners were too small to provide a livelihood, although in so varied a country as Yugoslavia the necessary minimum of land was bound to alter from region to region. In almost all the peasant farms, and in the big stretches of country farmed by the *zadruga* or patriarchal communities, the level of production was extremely poor. The government, therefore, has not only been concerned with the division of the former magnates' estates, but with the necessary additions to tiny peasant plots and with the attempt to raise the economic standards of peasant proprietorship.

Agrarian reform, although it took several years to accomplish, brought a good deal of satisfaction to the population and therefore also some political solidarity. But it did not fulfil the main need which was for a quick and substantial increase in the yields of the farms, nor did it lessen the regional contrasts in peasant economies.

The extremes of peasant poverty and of primitive farming persist in Dalmatia, Montenegro and parts of southern Serbia. In the first two regions, there has always been

and must always be, a struggle with a difficult environment. In the third, political insecurity and bad government have blocked the way of progressive farming methods.

The meagre existence of these lands is evident in various ways. The Karst Highlands of Dalmatia and Montenegro are the regions where sheep arc the main form of livestock and rye the predQminant cereal. Both are indicative in Yugoslavia of a poor standard of living. Another proof is in the feeble activity of the banks.[55] In central and southern Yugoslavia there arc very few farmers who have any transactions at all with institutions of this kind, except for periodical applications for loans. These requests are accompanied by promises of repayment when the harvest has been gathered. If the debtors default, the bank either receives payment in kind, that is, in grain or in livestock, or the services of the peasants are commandeered for the benefit of property owned by the bank until the sums with their very high rates of interest are cleared.



FIG. 85.—Densities of Population in Yugoslavia. This map should be compared with Figs. 746, *c* and *d* to realize the association between the population densities, the relief features and the resources.

A third sign of poverty in the south and west is the strongly established tradition of migration. This may take various forms. There is the type familiar to Balkan exist-

ence of the seasonal journeys for fresh pastures for the flocks and herds. This means the acquiescence of the mountain communities to one of the hardships of highland existence, the need to exploit two zones of farming resources in order to make a livelihood. But there has also been in the Dinaric Highlands and in parts of Serbia since the end of the nineteenth century a complete abandonment of the country of origin. As long as immigration facilities lasted, the chief stream of South Slav emigrants to Canada, the United States, Brazil and the Argentine came mainly from the already thinly settled Adriatic region and from the undeveloped south. (See Fig. 85.)

A third type of migration after 1919 was that of peasants from the Dinaric Highlands to the northern plains, where there were possibilities of new farming land. This was a movement which belonged to the general scheme for agrarian reform, and, as has been mentioned already, the immediate effect on farming production was disturbing to say the least (see p. 24). Such an upheaval was largely inevitable. Even skilled peasant farming could not have avoided the losses of the transition period, and many of those who took new lands in the former Hungarian territories had but poor traditions in agriculture and pastoralism. But the actual schemes for redistribution also deserved the criticism which they attracted; they were hastily planned and badly administered, and the general farming wealth of the country was affected as a result.

It is stoutly denied in Yugoslavia that the crop-yields in the country declined in any way as the result of agrarian reform. It was noticeable, however, that the yields of cereals per hectare in the first years of Yugoslav independence were, as a rule, very much lower than those in Central and Western Europe.[68] Also, although they increased with the gradual adjustment to new conditions after 1925, farming progress was checked by lack of capital and by the tradition of the past, in spite of the energetic efforts of the Co-operative Societies, which developed rapidly in the new kingdom.

But in spite of the upheavals between 1914 and 1919, the peasant economy of the Danube lands in Yugoslavia was, and still is, wealthy compared with that of the Dinaric Highlands. The farms are larger in the north, the yields more abundant, the methods of production more advanced, and the interest of the peasant is in the export market for his crops as well as in subsistence farming. From this region

come the main export commodities of the country, apart from the timber of the highlands. Maize is the chief crop, and during the last ten years it has formed in value nearly 10 per cent, of the export total.[57] Of the other cereals, wheat is the most important. It is the northern part of Yugoslavia also, which is the most successful in stock-rearing for the foreign market. Pigs, catde and horses are all well tended here. It is natural that the great herds of pigs should belong to the regions which lie to the north of that of prolonged Moslem occupation. (See Fig. 74^.) Catde and horse-breeding for export predominate in the upland pastures south and west of the Danube Plains. The live-stock and fresh meat products which are thus mainly from the old Hapsburg territories contribute very substantially to Yugoslav foreign trade.[68]

The markets abroad for Yugoslav resources have developed mainly under two influences. The first and the most important is that of the communication system within the country; and the development of roads and railways is a question which is bound to come to the fore in any discussion of the economic possibilities of the South Slav lands.

Something has already been said of the problems of road and rail construction (see pp. 288 and 292). The main difficulty now besetting these forms of transport is that of expense. The barrier of the Dinaric Highlands can be conquered by engineering skill: the famous Lovčen road built by the Austrians between Kotor on the Dalmatian coast and Cetinje in Montenegro is one proof of this, and the extent of railway building across the mountains between 1919 and 1939 is another.[59] But these man-made links mean immense financial outlay, and accordingly a search for foreign loans. Further, when the routes have been constructed, the costs of maintenance are high, and the use of coal and oil necessarily extravagant in proportion to the loads carried. No government can escape these fundamental difficulties. Road and rail construction certainly suffered from Hapsburg repression in the past, but no administration can make them cheap forms of enterprise in Yugoslavia.

Also, except in the north, Yugoslavia is badly off for inland water-ways which can form convenient and inexpensive means of transport. In the rugged country of Croatia and Dalmatia the rivers rush down to the sea as great torrents, or trickle along the rocky beds, according to season, but they are always useless for navigation. Nor in most

cases do their valleys form suitable gaps in the mountains for the building of road and rail tracks.

In the Danube Basin the water-ways are better. The Yugoslavs can use three rivers under international administration, the Danube, the Drave and the Tisza. Three other water-ways might also be developed for transport, the Sava, of which the transport possibilities have been so far ruined by the competition of a parallel rail-route, the Drina and the Morava.

This distribution of good water-ways in the north and the hindrances to man-made routes farther south have had a direct effect on the trade streams of the South Slav lands. Fertility of soil and favourable climatic conditions coincide with the easy gradients and navigable rivers of Danubian Yugoslavia. Accordingly, in spite of the market for the minerals of the interior abroad, there has always been a concentration by the South Slavs on farming products and on the possibilities of moving export commodities which are large in bulk and low in value. Further, the most important resource for export which comes from the mountainous interior is timber, which also demands cheap transport by river routes if possible. It is the timber and farming products despatched abroad, and the coal for import, which therefore compose most of the Yugoslav traffic on the southern water-ways of the Danube Basin. It is also this region of productive lowland which is commercially the most active in the kingdom.

Both the type of surplus for export most easily achieved and the problem of communications suggest a market north, whatever the political situation. Hence before 1914 Serb exports went mainly to Austria and Hungary, except when the punitive tariffs led to a search for other buyers (see page 311). Even after the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire, the South Slav connection with Austria (though not with Hungary) continued strong, and northward, trade links developed with Czechoslovakia and also Germany.[60] The exception to this northern orientation of trade routes was the Dalmatian traffic, which depended on Italy.

At the mention of these foreign markets one should renew the study of influences on Yugoslav trade. But before going on to discuss the effect on Yugoslav commercial connections of political changes in Europe, there are some further internal aspects of the communication problem which deserve notice.

One is the effect of a poor road and rail network on

Yugoslav production as a whole. The difficulty of moving people and goods cheaply and easily about the country is likely to have the following results upon the national economy, which will be difficult to alter. The first has already been noted, the tendency to export the mineral wealth of the country instead of using it to develop local industry. The other is to prolong the life of primitive subsistence farming in the remoter highlands. The unsatisfactory regional *inequalities* of economic and cultural standards will thus persist, as well as the regional *diversities* which are good.

The latter problem of the enduring of primitive peasant economies is bound up with a third, the question of education in the remoter parts of Yugoslavia. In 1919, when the new kingdom was established, the American consul in Belgrade reckoned that in South Serbia only 16 per cent, of the population was literate; although the figures for Slovenia in the north were as high as 86 per cent.[61] Twenty years of energetic and fairly successful educational reform have done much to improve the situation in the highlands of the south and west. But the fact remains, that a great number of peasant children escape elementary schooling and the very practical help of the agricultural colleges for the lack of cheap transport facilities. And until local communications are good enough to make the elementary education system a reality in the southern and western mountains, as well as in the towns and the plains, the economy of Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and South Serbia must remain at its present unsatisfactory standard. Moreover, unless the mountain resources of forest, farm and mine—above all the farm—can be given their right share in the national economy, the strongest and the most immediate influence of education might well be that of depopulating the highlands very fast. The younger generation of peasants who have come into contact with more advanced practices at school will not be content with the ancient traditions of farming; but the most powerful instinct in them will be to seek a fresh environment rather than to alter the old.

Upon the solution of the communication question, therefore, hangs a good deal of Yugoslav progress in the future. The limitations to movement influence the forms of production and the choice of foreign market; they affect cultural standards and population distribution. What has been achieved in the last twenty years with foreign capital,

and foreign and local enterprise, is good, but it has only scratched the surface of the transport problem in Yugoslavia.

If the communication system, or rather the lack of it, has been one influence on Yugoslav foreign trade since 1919, the economic and political history of Central Europe has been the other, and the trend of events during the past few years has been to thrust Yugoslavia, like Hungary, more and more into the arms of Germany. Even the territorial advance of Italy did not affect Yugoslav economic existence as much as the growing pressure of the Third Reich.

This control began to be noticeable during the economic crisis, when the main exporting regions of Yugoslavia were suffering because of the absence of a market for farming products.[61] But Germany was in a position to purchase from the South Slavs, since the active export of manufactured goods to the Balkan states over preceding years had given her a good credit in these countries. Statistics show plainly how first German imports from Yugoslavia and then her exports to that country leapt up between 1933 and 1936. When German credits in this state were exhausted, the Third Reich still bought freely farming products, timber and mineral raw materials, but at the cost of piling up debts. Ultimately, in payment for such purchases, the Yugoslav, like the other Balkan and Danubian peoples, could only hope for German exports of a quantity and kind ordained by the Third Reich. There was also a continuous effort in Germany to earmark huge quantities of food and raw materials from these peasant states over a number of years, This prevented any plan in the marchland states for selling substantially to other countries, and it also tied the price of certain commodities down to the low level required by Nazi purchasers.

The course of events in Yugoslavia in other ways also played into German hands. When recovery from the economic crisis began to be noticeable in 1934, the Rome Agreements between Italy, Austria and Hungary were signed; these negotiations emphasized the trade links between the Italian Peninsula and the Hapsburg ruling peoples at the expense of those between Italy and Yugoslavia. Following on the Rome Agreements came the imposition of sanctions on Italy; and Yugoslavia, which had lost to Austria and Hungary in 1934, ceded more of her Italian trade to Germany in 1935. The Third Reich pounced upon the commercial links with Italy, which Yugoslavia,

like other countries, had broken during the Abyssinian War.

Finally, Germany inherited in 1938 and 1939 the connections of Austria and Czechoslovakia with the South Slav lands. These were important, not only on account of the volume of trade concerned, but also because a certain amount of Austrian and Czech capital was invested in Yugoslav industrial and mining enterprises.[68] Thus by 1939 no other foreign state had so great an influence or such outstanding interests in Yugoslavia as Germany. Great Britain and France had achieved a certain increase in trade with the South Slavs in spite of the difficulties of clearing agreements, but their connection was slight compared with that of the Third Reich.

There was no illusion amongst the Yugoslavs, however, as to the political significance of German economic interest. The situation became steadily more alarming for them after 1936, when the Berlin-Rome Axis developed in vigour and in aggressive policy. After that year it was not easy to play off German claims against Italian ones in the Balkans, and from sheer force of circumstances the Yugoslavs had to accept German commercial advances, and also make political overtures to Italy. The climax of discomfort for the Yugoslav state was reached with the Italian annexation of Albania.

This sum of dangers from without was the most effective influence in closing the ranks within the Serbo-Croat-Slovene kingdom. During the troubled summer months of 1939 there was a greater effort to solve the problem of Croat separatism than ever before in the history of the state. It was also accompanied by more obvious good-will between all the Balkan countries than was normally detectable. Unfortunately the third stage of friendly relations between the Balkan peoples as a whole and the Italians did not develop from the first two, although the apparent detachment of Italy from Germany at the beginning of the war brought about a temporary improvement. The opportunism of Italy is too plain to allow of this final effort at stability.

A Balkan " bloc " had indeed been proclaimed as early as 1934; and the Balkan Pact signed in that year was the outcome of the annual though unofficial Balkan conferences which had been held since 1931. The 1934 agreement included Rumania, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia with provisions for the later adherence of Bulgaria and Albania. The jolt given to South-eastern Europe by the German

annexation of Austria in 1938, assured the Balkan Entente of the support of Bulgaria, although certain conditions were imposed. The disarmament enforced on this country by the Treaty of Neuilly was remitted, and Bulgarian dissatisfaction with the *status quo* of the political frontiers was recognized; it was agreed, however, that none of these should be changed by force.



Fig. 86.—Linguistic Divisions in the Baltic Peninsula. These maps show (*a*) the area of South Slav speech between the Adriatic and Ægean Seas; (*b*) the regions of linguistic fragmentation in Macedonia and in Northern Yugoslavia; (*c*) the wide distribution (see Fig. 80) of Serb speech in Yugoslavia. It is plain how formidable a unit the South Slav could become if the linguistic tie between the Yugoslavs and Bulgars had a corresponding political unit.

For such a combination of states, the course of Yugoslav development and the choice of Yugoslav policy are important. This kingdom has enough in the way of territory, wealth and population to be a great steadying influence in the Balkan Peninsula. This stability depends mainly on the awareness of the predominant Serb group of the peculiar setting of the South Slav lands. In some cases the natural regionalism of the kingdom needs respect, and in some cases it must be overcome. In a shrewd mixture of unification and of decentralization, rests the hope of Yugoslav strength in South-eastern Europe.

NOTES AND REFERENCES ON YUGOSLAVIA

1. Yugoslavia is the recognized shorter title for this state; the official name is the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The word "Yugoslav " means " South Slav."

2. The following regions are recognized within Voivodina: the westernmost district between the Drave and the Danube is known as the Baránya; that between the Danube and the Tisza is known as Bačka; and that to the east of the Tisza is known as the Banat. Only the western part of the Banat was awarded to Yugoslavia after 1918; the upland area of this region with the chief town, Timisoara, went to Rumania.

3. See Cvijić, *La Pininsule Balkanique,* Chapter IV (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1918).

4. The Italian forms for the names of the Dalmatian ports are often printed: Ragusa for Dubrovnik; Cattaro for Kotor; Sebenico for Sibenik; Spalato for Split.

5. See Aranitovic, *Les Ressources et l'Activite Economique de Ia Yougoslavie,* pp. 479-81 (Paris: Bossuet, 1930).

6. It is confusing that two tributaries of the Danube river bear the same name, Morava. The left-bank Morava tributary is in Central Europe flowing through the Czech and Magyar-settled lands to join the Danube at Bratislava. For the purposes of clarity in this book, the name "March," which is very often used for this river, has been kept throughout. (See Chapter VII.) The other river of the same name is a right-bank tributary of the Danube, and joins the mainstream just below Belgrade. The name Morava means "frontier," and it is plain that both rivers pass through transitional lands and through regions of outstanding importance in the history of human migrations.

7. Singidunum is the Celtic name for Belgrade. It was one of the few place-names which the Celts left to the Balkan Peninsula, and it was in use until the seventh century A.D.

8. Skoplje is the Serb name for this town; Uskub, the Turkish.

9. See Newbigin, *Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems,* p. 101 (London: Constable, 1915).

10. See *La Pininsule Balkanique,* p. 20.

11. See Ancel, *Manuel de Ia Giographie Politique Europeenne,* p. 288.

12. *Ibid.,* p. 293.

13. See Forbes, "Bulgaria and Serbia," *The Balkans: A History* (compilation). (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1915.)

14. See *La Pininsule Balkanique,* p. 92.

15. It is also confusing that in the west of the Balkan Peninsula two Drin rivers and a Drina river are in close proximity to one another. The Black Drin flows in a big arc round Albania, rising in Lake Ochrida and entering the sea at Alessio ; it is joined in northeastern Albania by the White Drin which flows southward from the Serbian highlands. The Drina river is a right-bank tributary of the Sava, but its head waters in Montenegro are not far from those of the Black Drin. All three river lands were affected by early Slav settlement.

16. Cvijić, in discussing the ethnographical affinities of the Balkan Peninsula, suggests that the main differences between one people and another lie neither in physical traits, nor in language, nor in creed, but in what he terms *types psychiques.* He points out that these are formed by a variety of influences, both environmental and human, and that distinctive temperaments are now so apparent in the inhabitants of the Balkans, that the different groups are recognizable to the expert at a glance. He distinguishes in this way between the Dinaric type, the Central Balkan type, the East Balkan type, and the Pannonic type. The first, second and fourth are included within the Yugoslav frontiers. See *La Peninsule Balkanique,* p. 278.

17. See Marriott, *The Eastern Question.* (Oxford : at the Clarendon Press, 1917.)

18. See *The Balkans: A History,* p. 15.

19. *Ibid.,* pp. 82-3. See also Patterson, *Yugoslavia,* p. 18 (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1936). It is well to remember that during the first centuries of the Slav occupation of the peninsula, much of the population of the highland country remained pagan. The Patriarchate of Constantinople during the eleventh and twelfth centuries was also alarmed at the spreading of the primitive and democratic form of Christianity which was known as Bogomil heresy amongst the Eastern Orthodox Serbs.

The distinction between the two creeds which has had the most troublesome results in everyday existence has been that of the two alphabets. Although the spoken language is very similar throughout the South Slav lands, the Eastern Orthodox population uses the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Roman Catholic, the Latin.

20. The Venetian territories in the Adriatic were allotted to the Hapsburgs by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797.

21. The sixteenth century saw in fact a second period of great prosperity in Dubrovnik under the protection of the Sultans, to whom the city paid tribute. During this hundred years the town was an active commercial centre with something like a monopoly of Balkan trade; it was also a religious sanctuary for Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christians alike; and it was lastly a sort of intellectual refuge where Serb culture flourished during the first centuries of Turkish domination. The real blow to the prosperity of the port was not from human but from natural agencies. In the great earthquake of 1667, more than one-fifth of the population perished, and from this catastrophe there was no real revival.

In 1805 the Dalmatian lands of the Hapsburg Empire passed to France, and became the administrative units of the Illyrian Provinces. The French armies entered Dubrovnik in 1806, and the ancient city state thus lost its independence after a long and notable record. When the Congress of Vienna in 1815 restored the Illyrian Provinces to the Hapsburgs, Dubrovnik was included with them, and remained under Austrian rule until after the 1914-1918 War. See *The Balkans: A History,* **pp. 103, 117.**

22. In this kingdom, Durazzo in the west was a Neapolitan colony, and Salonika in the east, a Venetian one.

23. See Miller, "The Balkan States: the Zenith of Bulgaria and Serbia," *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. IV, pp. 550-51.

24. It should be remembered that the Turkish occupation of the Balkans according to the standards of the age was not marked by outstanding religious intolerance. Those who accepted the Moslem creed were often admitted to social and political equality with the ruling race. Those who remained Christian could practise their creed, but were relegated to a lower order. Therewere recurrent periods of religious persecution on the part of the Turks, but not a systematic and sustained effort to wipe out Christianity. In consequence, the relationships between Turk and Christian in the Ottoman Empire compared quite favourably with those between the various Christian professions in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The chief religious denominations in Yugoslavia to-day are reckoned as follows:

		Per cent, of the whole
Serb Orthodox . .	6,785,501	48'70
Roman Catholic .	5,217,847	37'45
Moslems . . .	1,561,166	11-20
Jews . . .	68,405	0'49

These figures are taken from the 1931 census, and are quoted in *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 76 (Oxford : The Univ. Press, 1939. Royal Institute of International Affairs). The actual numbers have changed in the last eight years, since the total population is now well over the 15,000,000 mark, but the percentages of the creeds are probably the same.

25. See *La Péninsule Balkanique,* Chapter X. Cvijič adopted as an adjective for this constant restlessness the word *mdtanastasique,* which comes from the Greek, *metanastasis*—change of habitat.

26. See *Manuel de Ia Gdographie Politique Europienne,* 291—3, for discussion and cartographical illustration of this point.

27. The Montenegrins, although not the foremost people in the South Slav struggle against the Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburgs, could claim to be the first to achieve some kind of independence. They had maintained a good deal of freedom during the whole of the Turkish occupation under the rule of the *Vladikas* or Prince-Bishops in the fortress monastery in Cetinje, and this semi-ecclesiastical, semi-military rule was responsible for two noteworthy episodes in South Slav history. One was the defeat of the Turks in 1796, when the Ottoman armies were pushed south to Scutari. It was this achievement which won for the Montenegrins the recognition of independence from Constantinople. The other was the strong link established between the *Vladikas* and Russia. This connection, begun in the days of Peter the Great, made the first foothold for Russia in her course of expansion towards the Balkans. The rule of the prince-bishops came to an end in the early nineteenth century, when the reigning Vladika changed his ecclesiastical title for that of Prince of Montenegro.

28. See *The Balkans: A History,* p. 135.

29. See *Yugoslavia,* pp. 46-7. The Austro-Serb dispute over the question of Serb exports between 1906 and 1911 was known as the " pig war."

30. See Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy,* Chapter XVII.

31. See Beard and Radin, *The Balkan Pivot,* p. 15.

32. There is a distinction to be made in this general comment between Slovenia and Croatia-Slavonia. The Slovenes under Austrian administration had had more experience of local government than the Croats and Serbs ruled from Budapest. Also there was not in Slovenia the constant friction with Vienna which characterized the relationships between Croatia-Slavonia and the Magyar capital. See *The Balkan Pivot,* pp. 16-19.

33. See Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 438-44.

34. It is only fair to point out that after the first years of dislocation there was a partial recovery in Fiume and in the former western rival of the Hungarian port, the city of Trieste. " Città morta " was a phrase that certainly applied to each of these towns in the years immediately after 1919, but trade had recovered to a limited extent by 1929, though it dwindled again sadly in the years of the economic crisis. The trade figures for the years after 1929 are given in the *Manuel de Ia Giographie Politique Europienne,* p. 363. Moreover, even if Fiume as a

whole suffered, Sušak, the Yugoslav portion of the town, gained at the expense of the main port, although Split profited most by the general disturbance in the northern outlets.

35. See the *Manuel de la Geographie Politique Europeenne,* p. 362, and *Les Ressources et l'Activite Economique de la Yougoslavie,* pp. 466 ff. Aranitovic notes that in 1927, 71 per cent, of the goods leaving Yugoslav ports were taken in Italian ships, and only 19-3 per cent, in Yugoslav; of goods entering the country, 33 per cent, came in Italian ships and 43 per cent, in Yugoslav. The difference between the import and export shipping figures was largely accounted for by the import of coal from Great Britain, which came partly in Yugoslav ships and largely to the Adriatic ports. The whole position had changed considerably, however, in 1934. In that year, although the total volume of trade was smaller than in the boom years, 76 per cent, of the tonnage arriving at the Yugoslav ports was carried in Yugoslav ships and only 19 per cent, in Italian. See Sturrock, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Yugoslavia,* p. 33 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1936). The competition of the Yugoslav ports and of Yugoslav mercantile shipping which the Italians dreaded had therefore become a fact.

36. Of the goods which went from Yugoslavia to Italy, a high proportion was re-exported to other countries, and especially to Spain. The Yugoslav imports from Italy have always been less than the exports to this state. Political ill-will made 'the Yugoslavs substitute Czechoslovak imports for Italian whenever possible. The economic satisfaction to Italy of the Yugoslav exports and of the consequent transit trade was, however, greater than the hostility between Italy and Yugoslavia. See *Les Ressources et l'Activite Economique de la Yougoslavie,* p. 197. The balance of trade was adjusted more evenly after 1932, by the increase of tariffs in Italy and by the drop in the prices for Yugoslav agricultural produce. See Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World,* pp. 81-2.

37. See Sturrock, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Yugoslavia,* p. 13 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1938).

38. See *South-Eastern Europe,* pp. 18-20.

39. *Ibid.,* pp. 153-4.

40. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Goburg became the ruler of the independent kingdom of Bulgaria in 1886. His son, the present king, married in 1930 the Princess Giovanna of Savoy, a daughter of the king of Italy.

41. The Bulgar group was not originally South Slav in speech, but probably Finno-Ugric. It seems that it absorbed the language of the surrounding majority after a period of settlement in the Lower Danube lands. See Haddon, *The Races of Man,* p. 68. It is interesting to remember also, that the Bulgarian political unit of the tenth century (893-972) was also a notable South Slav state. It stretched from the Black Sea almost to the Albanian coast and from the Danube to the coastal plains of Thrace and Macedonia; it penetrated south into Greek territory as far as the Pindus Mountains. Like the later empire of Stephen Dušan, it included in the south a big non-Serb population. It also overlapped the later territory of Dušan's Empire, by containing the Morava-Vardar trough and the country of the Albanian Gap. It depended for its existence, however, on the weakness of the Byzantine Empire, and with the sudden revival of this unit under the Emperor John Tzimisces, the Bulgarian possessions were quickly overrun and partitioned.

There was the chance for another union between the South Slavs, when the Bulgarian kingdom revived in the twelfth century, at the same time as that of Serbia. But it is necessary to remember that the kingdom of Stephen Dušan did not include the majority of the Catholic Slavs in the north-west. These had at no time any particular affinity with the Bulgarians.

42. The Vlakhs are a group in the Balkan and Danube countries, whose ethnography is still rather mysterious. Ancel suggests that during the period of successive invasions into the south-east of Europe, between the third and sixth centuries, the Romanized tribes of the Lower Danube lands were inevitably somewhat scattered. The bulk remained in the regions now recognized as Rumanian, but a small group was pushed south to the Balkans and formed the wandering pastoral peoples, the majority of whom now speak Illyrian, Slav or Greek dialects. The generic name " Vlakhs " for the whole group had a connection with the Rumanian region of Wallachia, and the use of the term " Aromounes " for these pastoralists also refers to their former habitat in the north. They are a section of the Balkan population which has recently declined very much in numbers with the restrictions on pastoral migrations due to the new frontiers.

43. The following minorities are recorded in Yugoslavia, though it is difficult to obtain up-to-date figures.

By the 1931 census: *

		Per cent, of the population
German . . .	499,326	3-39
Magyars . . .	468,185	3·36
Italians . . .	9,396	—
Albanians . . .	324,000	2·16

See *Yugoslavia,* p. 122.

It was reckoned at the time of the demarcation of the new Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers that the Bulgar population passing to Yugoslavia was about 63,000. See *The New World,* p. 387. If the figures for the 1931 census are accurate, it is interesting to note the decline in numbers of the German and Magyar minorities in the ten years between the two censuses. See *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 76, for the 1921 figures.

Macartney notes that the attitude of the Serbs to the minority populations in the kingdom differs from that of the other successor states. Yugoslav policy can be criticized for its unintelligence and brutality, but there is throughout the country a general lack of interest in the fortunes of the small foreign groups, because of preoccupation with the difficult internal dissensions. The violence of Serb-Bulgar relations was really an exception in Yugoslav minority policy. See *Hungary and Her Successors,* pp. 408-10.

44. See the comments on mining and metallurgical industries made in the reports on economic conditions in Yugoslavia, published by the Department of Trade and printed by H.M. Stationery Office (1928, 1934, 1936 and 1939).

45. See *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 142.

46. The equipment of the Zenica steel-works was supplied by Germany.

47. See *Reports on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Yugoslavia,* 1936, p. 26, and 1938, p. 26.

48. See *Les Ressources et l'Activite Economique de Ia Yougoslavie,* p. 189, and *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 140.

49. See Sturrock, *Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia,* p. 34 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1934).
50. See *Les Ressources et l'Activite Économique de Ia Tougoslavie,* p. 18.
51. See *Reports on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Yugoslavia, 1*936, P. 26, and 1938, p. 26.
52. See Stoykovitch, " The Economic Position and Future of the Agriculture of Yugoslavia," *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe,* Chapter VII, p. 371.
53. See *The Balkan Pivot,* p. 226.
54. See *World Agriculture,* p. 149.,
55. See *Les Ressources et l'Activite Economique de Ia Tougoslavie,* p. 325.
56. See *The Balkan Pivot,* p. 230.
57. See *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 140.
58. *Ibid.*
59. See *Reports on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Yugoslavia,* 1936, p. 32, and 1938, p. 30.
60. See *The Balkan States,* pp. 30-2 (compilation) (Oxford: The Univ. Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936).
61. See *The Balkan Pivot,* p. 256. The estimate given by a Slav scholar at the same date records the following figures for illiteracy: the whole of Serbia, 75 per cent, illiterate; Croatia-Slavonia, 45 per cent.; Voivodina, 35 per cent.; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 85 per cent.; Dalmatia, 80 per cent.; Montenegro, 75 per cent.; Slovenia, 10 per cent. This estimate gives an average of 58 per cent, of illiteracy for the new kingdom.
62. See Schacher, *Germany Pushes South-east,* Chapters XI and XII (London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1937).
63. See *South-Eastern Europe,* p. 150.

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CONCLUSION

THE year 1940 has inevitably seen some substantial changes in the circumstances of the marchland peoples, and there must needs be some mention of them at the close of this book. The most important developments are those connected with the sudden expansion of Russian influence both in the Baltic region and in the Balkan Peninsula, and with the check to that advance from Germany. There have been substantial exchanges of territory also in the Middle Danube basin; and in the Adriatic, yet another proof of Italian anxiety to dominate at any rate the southern extremity of the marchland strip.

Even before the outbreak of war, the renewed interest of Russia in the marchland zone had been recognized as an clement which would count for much in the coming struggle, and that anticipation was justified by the events of the following twelve months. In the north, the three small Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were incorporated during July 1940 into the Soviet Union. This advance on the part of the Soviet government was quite different from the Russian march into Poland of September 1939. Then the Soviet armies were overrunning territory predominantly Russian in population. With the absorption of the small Baltic groups, the control of Moscow now extends west of the Russian lands into non-Russian territory, as well as east and south into Soviet Asia.

It is for the moment difficult to comment intelligently on this event, although it is hardly possible to accept without question the Russian official version of the " voluntary " adherence of the South-east Baltic peoples to the U.S.S.R. Shortly after their declaration of Union with the Soviet Republics, there came the announcement of the imminent nationalization of the land in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. If this redistribution were to be enforced as systematically as in Russia proper, it could scarcely be without great material hardship for the peasant-proprietor populations, accompanied by much bitterness of feeling. The small Baltic peoples, so proud of their successful struggle before

1917 against the German land-owners and Russian bureaucracy, and so conscious that the peasant-farmer element was the basis of the new order achieved between 1921 and 1939, could hardly resign themselves to that degree of control over their economic existence from Moscow.

It is worth remembering, however, that the Soviet government, the Axis Powers, and the democratic states, wide as the gulf may be between their political and economic aims, realize alike that the era of complete sovereignty for any unit, large or small, is at an end. Further, it has been pointed out more than once (see pp. 20, 83-84, 104-107) how greatly the commercial and industrial exploitation of the South-east Baltic coast depends on the support of Russian economic activity, and how naturally the Estonians and Latvians are the trading intermediaries between Russia and the West. If the Russians can feel sufficiently secure of their control of the East Baltic to leave undisturbed the cultural and religious liberties of the coastal peoples, and to meet the peasant farmers half-way over the question of the tenure and use of the land, then the fate of the small republics need not be intolerable.

People in Great Britain, separated from the U.S.S.R. by the lands under the control of the Axis Powers, cannot tell with any accuracy to what extent the Great Russians are determined to enforce adherence to the Soviet system in the Baltic states. It seems safe to assume, however, that in the immediate future the Lithuanians will suffer less in their readjustment to a new political orientation than the Estonians and Letts. Their affinity with Russia has always been more marked than that of the two peoples farther north (see page 117), and the contrasts between their economic and cultural standards and those of Western Russia are less noticeable than with the other two states.

The future of Finland is uncertain, but there are signs that the Soviet government would like to see the Finns as well as the smaller East Baltic peoples more closely bound to the U.S.S.R. On all occasions, however, the distinction between Finland and the smaller South-eastern republics has been clearly demonstrated. Whatever may be the intentions of the Russians towards the Finns, negotiations with the northernmost of the marchland peoples must tax both the diplomatic and military resources of the U.S.S.R. to a far greater extent than the handling of the more accessible and helpless groups south of the Gulf.

In the South-east of Europe, Russian influence has also

been active. The Soviet government has regained Bessarabia for Russia, and by the annexation of Rumanian Bukovina has reached beyond the frontiers of the former Empire. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria a partial revival of Pan-Slav consciousness has been apparent. Nor is it surprising that the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bulgars should turn with less antipathy to the great power with whom they have at least a linguistic tie than to the German and Italian systems. The majority of the South Slavs would prefer to seek solidarity by negotiations with Russia, whatever the political gyrations of their leaders, rather than resign themselves to the new order in Europe proposed by the Axis.

Soviet interest in the fate of Transylvania has also been apparent, even though there is no question here of Russian territorial claims. If it be correct to assume that the Soviet government has been anxious to avoid the quick settlement of frontier disputes in the Danube lands according to German and Italian dictates, then the summary division of Transylvania can hardly have been palatable to the Russians in spite of their official acquiescence.

The partition of Transylvania between Hungary and Rumania, arranged by Germany at the Vienna meeting in August 1940, was a curious transaction. Much more was involved than the interests of the local populations, which indeed were not seriously considered by the prime mover of the negotiations, the government of the Third Reich. German strategic and economic objectives were in the forefront both in the discussions at Vienna and in the final settlement. Further, any changes in the frontiers of Transylvania cannot be ignored by those who are thinking of the future solidarity of Europe, since the Transylvanian Basin is one of those controversial regions which provide the best breeding-ground for disastrous "incidents."

On the grounds of linguistic affinity and economic interest, the Magyars seemed entitled to a slight revision of almost the whole of their eastern frontier as demarcated by the Treaty of Trianon (see pp. 274-276 and Figs. 64 and 72). Such small-scale revision would indeed have left out of Hungarian territory the scattered groups of Magyars in the valleys of the Szamos Basin in northern Transylvania and the Szekely population of the eastern ranges, who, the Magyars claim, are bound to them in language and tradition (see pp. 251-252). Short of the migration of these extraneous Magyar groups to Hungary, however, there seemed to be no justifiable alternative to their minority existence.

But by the terms of the recent settlement, the whole of the Szamoš Basin up to the 1914 frontier has been ceded by Rumania to Hungary as well as the northern part of the Maroš Basin. The Vienna award thus provides for the inclusion within Magyar territory of the northern and predominantly Magyar lands of Maramureš including the towns of Satu Mare and Oradea Mare (see Fig. 72), but not of the Magyar region in Crišana and the Banat. The " Saxon " town of Cluj is within the ceded region as well as the Szekely Highlands in the east. With these Magyar and German groups rule a very large Rumanian population is transferred to Magyar, mainly in the upland districts of the Szamoš Basin.* As far as the economic resources of Transylvania are concerned, the balance remains in favour of the Rumanians, since they have kept the Bihar mountain region with its mineral wealth. But the much discussed Satu Mare-Vrsač railway is now bisected, and its usefulness to the Rumanians must be impaired accordingly.

It is difficult to believe that this territorial settlement can have any permanency. It gives to the Rumanians a considerable grievance in the enforced surrender of territory, population, farming resources, railways and military fortifications. It fails to provide, however, a solution for the problem of the Magyar minorities in Rumania south of Oradea Mare. It has the appearance of being designed to meet the momentary needs of the totalitarian powers rather than of being the basis for a genuine settlement of Magyar-Rumanian frontier disputes. German influence which was behind the Vienna award may accordingly be responsible for further changes in the frontiers and status of Rumania, should the occasion demand it.[1]

In the west of the Balkan Peninsula, the growth of bad feeling between Italy and Greece over Albania is bound also to affect the Yugoslavs. It is difficult indeed to suggest any limits in this region to the disturbances which might develop from frontier incidents such as those of the early

*** Rumania has lost to Hungary in the surrender of Transylvania about 2,750,000 inhabitants. Of these 1,500,000 are Rumanian and 1,000,000 Magyar. The agrarian significance of the transfer of northern Transylvania is also considerable. The redistribution of land in Rumania after the 1914-1918 war was as drastic as in any country in Europe except the Soviet Union, and in Transylvania the dispossessed owners were in many cases Magyar. The Magyars who have looked askance at agrarian reform, whether in their own country or abroad, are now by the Vienna award the masters of a region of newly established peasant proprietors.**

part of August 1940. Yugoslavia, like Greece, has its Albanian minority settlements, and there is always the possibility of the Italians stirring up trouble both in the Raška and in Macedonia as they have done farther south (see pp. 319-320). Moreover, even if the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom were able to avoid open hostilities, an attempt to control the port of Thessaloniké by any power other than Greece would have serious consequences for it. Any threat to this town by one belligerent or another would damage severely the Morava-Vardar route, over which a precarious traffic has been maintained during the last twelve months. It would also tend to limit Yugoslav trade outlets to those in the north and west towards German and Italian-controlled territory.[2]

Such sudden and violent changes in the European continent and especially in the marchland strip have naturally complicated the preparation of these studies for the press. In many paragraphs " is " has given place to " was " and " may be " to " might have been." Throughout the whole work, also, the uncertainties. of a year of struggle have tended to create an atmosphere of unreality. The pattern of development for the marchland countries has become, in one sense, more imaginary than real. On the other hand, it has been interesting to see how often alterations in tense and phrasing, and in detail of mapping, have met a changed situation. That this should be so is logical, since stupendous as the events of the last year may have seemed to those who took part in them or who watched them, they were not unprecedented. The present miserable circumstances of the peoples crushed between Germany, Italy and Russia are but the latest phase of an ancient and unremitting conflict in this part of Europe.

Future historians will probably present the years between 1918 and 1939 as an uneasy interlude between two great and destructive wars. If this be a correct interpretation, it may have seemed out of proportion to have devoted so much attention to the course of events in the marchland countries during this period. Why, it may be asked, attempt a definite and in some cases a detailed picture of these states even down to the particulars of the Latvian crops, and the little industries of Yugoslavia, when the whole European order is plainly and inevitably in a state of flux ?

There are two reasons for placing on record the political and economic experiments of the marchland countries during the last generation. One has already been stated in

the early pages of this book (see pp. 2 and 22-28). The years in question, viewed from the standpoint of a historian of the whole continent, form an interim period of great unrest and of violent economic fluctuation. But they provided also, for the small border peoples of the east, the first taste of political liberty after centuries of servitude. They gave the chance to make good as independent states which Jiad been nursed and awaited from generation to generation.

The second reason for setting down an account of this period in the marchland strip arises out of the present course of German domination in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It remains to be seen whether Soviet rule in the South-east Baltic is going to develop on similar lines. One result of totalitarian victory over the Poles and Czechs has been the German effort to obliterate as far as possible traces of their independent existence during the last twenty years and to ensure that there shall be no possibility of revival. This policy has not been simple for the Nazis to follow. The attempt alone to stamp out the elements of past and future Czech and Polish states has involved a programme before which many conquerors might have hesitated: the slaughter and imprisonment of the educated classes, the crushing of religious organizations, the deportation of peasants and workmen, the altering of the relationships between natural resources and productive effort. Nor, if the lessons of history are correct, has such ferocity any guarantee of permanent success.

But it must be admitted that the political and economic structures built up in Poland and Czechoslovakia between the two wars have been levelled to the ground. So also, if rather less violently, have those of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These units were far from perfect; it has been easier, perhaps, to count the mistakes in them than to acclaim the achievements. But they did at least represent the genuine attempt of each group to organize a national life from within rather than to submit to a domination from without. On this account the patterns of existence in the marchland groups between 1920 and 1939 must not be forgotten.

It would be difficult to insist that in any post-war reconstruction there should be an attempt to rebuild these units on lines similar to those evolved after the 1914-1918 War. The shortcomings of that settlement were only too plain, and the price paid for the mistaken diplomacy of that period too heavy for the peoples of Europe to contemplate

anything like a reconstitution of the " Versailles " system. But it is certain that the marchland peoples, whose identity has been preserved after so many centuries of troubled history, will survive the present ordeal, and also that they must play their part in a new European order. Inevitably their countries must serve once more as the testing grounds of European security. If the marchland groups are able to work and to travel, to study and to worship as seems best to them within established frontiers, whether as members of [an European federation or as sovereign states, their prosperity and liberty will form one sure proof of the peace and order of the continent. But if they are to continue as the pawns of the powers with wider territories or greater resources than their own, it is one ominous sign of persisting struggles for mastery in Europe which reach their climax in the chaos and destruction of war.

NOTES

i. That the Vienna Award was but the prelude to further German activity in Danubia was made plain in the October following by the German military occupation of the remaining territory of the Rumanian kingdom.

2. Predictions of further trouble in the Balkan Peninsula were fulfilled by the Italian declaration of war on Greece on the 28th October 1940.

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