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HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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PREFACE

MORE than a decade has passed since the publication of the first edition of this book in England, and many changes have taken place in the field of social psychology in the intervening years. As a field of research, social psychology has really come of age. This is witnessed by the expanding number of articles, monographs, and books which annually pour off the press. As to systematic formulations, however, while some advances have been made, for the most part we still lack a well-rounded and logic-tight theory adequately buttressed by empirical findings.

Historically, social psychology has a dual parentage. Beginning with Wundt there is a long list of workers in this field recruited from psychology; and if one considers Tarde a sociologist, there is almost as long a list of workers from sociology. There is still some disparity in viewpoint and treatment of the field, depending on whether the worker is from psychology or sociology. Yet, on the whole, there has been a healthy rapprochement as to conceptual framework, topics of empirical research, and theory-building.

The present book is divided into two main sections. Part I deals with social interaction and the fundamental interrelations of the individual, group, and culture. Against a body of basic facts on motivation and learning, we examine the foundations of the personality and the rise and functioning of the social self. We then pass on to the intriguing subject of the interplay of culture and personality. The interest in this topic continues to grow and there are now two chapters devoted to it. Materials dealing with what I earlier called "social-cultural reality," including myth and legend, have been reworked and extended in the final chapter in Part I on the nature and function of belief systems.

Part II deals with collective behavior. The opening chapter treats of the human group and includes a good deal of new material from the field popularly known as "group dynamics." The chapter on leadership draws heavily on recent research, particularly on work done at Ohio State University, at the University of California, and on the findings of the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division of the Army Service Forces during World War II. The topic of crowd behavior has been enriched by the inclusion of selected reports of field investigations of mob behavior. So, too, new material bearing on the psychology

of fashion has been introduced in the chapter on that topic. The field of public opinion, including attention to the media of mass communication and propaganda, has greatly expanded since the previous edition, and seven chapters are now devoted to various facets of this field. Following a chapter on the nature and function of public opinion, there follow three on mass media: one on the newspaper and other printed matter, one on the motion picture, and one on radio and television. There is a completely new chapter on the measurement of opinion and attitude by Linton Freeman. Two chapters are given over to propaganda, in one of which the topic of censorship is reintroduced. (There was a chapter on censorship in the first edition of this book.) The broad area of conflict is covered in the final five chapters. Three of these deal with prejudice as it operates in the modern world. Then there is one chapter on the psychology of revolution and one on the psychology of war.

In the preparation of this edition I have drawn heavily on research since the prior edition and acknowledgements to authors and publishers are made at appropriate places throughout. I wish to thank Robert French, Robert F. Winch, Donald J. Lewis, and Omar K. Moore, for certain suggestions regarding the order of chapters as well as content. My contacts with these men, now or formerly colleagues at Northwestern University, chiefly through joint seminars in social psychology have enriched my grasp of the field and helped me in the formulation of some of the ideas in this edition. I also thank Linton Freeman of Syracuse University for preparing the chapter on measurement. I regard it as a sound and well-written discussion, designed for the student's introduction to social psychology.

K. Y.

Evanston, Illinois

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HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

The Nature and Scope of Social Psychology

SOCIAL psychology is concerned with the study of the interactional processes of human beings. Broadly defined, interaction refers to the fact that the response—gesture, word, or gross bodily movement—of one individual is the stimulus to another, who, in turn, responds to the first. The basic model is the dyad A $\rightleftharpoons$ B in a recurring condition of interstimulation and response contact. General psychology deals with the various relationships between man and his physical and social-cultural environment. Social psychology—as a branch of psychology—deals only with the relationships of the individual to the latter kind of environment.

Basic Patterns

Social psychology is interested in three basic interactional relationships: person-to-person, person-to-group, and group-to-group. The first of these, often called interpersonal relations, is limited in the number of individuals who can be involved. The visual, auditory, and other sensory-perceptual processes as well as the communicative process of each individual must be capable of involving in more or less direct contact all the others who make up the given social unit. There is close inter-identification among the participants. For example, where relations are friendly, individuals address each other by first names or nicknames, as well as by other symbols of personal intimacy.

In the second basic relationship—person-to-group—there is usually a group name or symbol with which the individual identifies himself. His role in the group carries with it for the individual a sense of varied expectations, of division of labor. The relationship is more conscious and deliberate than in the interpersonal situation. Yet there is an awareness of mutual participation, and a sense of solidarity develops. Moreover, such patterns are often institutionalized; that is, behavior tends to be con-

trolled by culture patterns, and this makes for stability of role expectation. Norms provide the direction and value of conduct.

Sociology classifies groups into primary and secondary in terms of degrees of intimacy, specialization of roles, and the necessity of proximity of members for adequate functioning. It has also given us a functional distinction between the in-group and the out-group. With respect to the former the person has a strong sense of attachment, solidarity, and membership. With regard to the latter his attitudes are those of indifference, avoidance, or downright hostility. By definition the existence of an in-group implies a corresponding out-group.

This dual pattern of attachment-antagonism is to be found in both primary and secondary groupings. Moreover, the groupings vary as to the degree of institutionalization. Those of the play-time relationship arise between rival groups of children, only to disappear later without ever having developed much in the way of formal structure or tradition. At the other extreme, the nation-state is one of the most important in-groups in the modern world. It has an elaborate structure, rich tradition, and a definite belief in its perpetuation and superiority. To sense its importance to us all, one need but mention the two central values around which the nation-state operates: the doctrine of sovereignty and the ethos of nationalism. Between the extremes of the children's in-group in play and the nation-state one may find many in-groups of varying degrees of structure: family groups, denominations, educational bodies, political organizations, economic associations, recreational clubs, fraternal orders, and various others. Each of these influences the members in a wide variety of ways.

Although the in-group versus out-group pattern has universal characteristics, that is, it may be found in all societies the world over, division of groups into primary and secondary reflects an historical or cultural dimension. The primary group is the basic form of human association, and its most universal example is the family. For thousands and thousands of years only primary groupings were to be found: family, play-group, neighborhood, and the small band, tribe, or community. The secondary group, on the contrary, is distinctly the result of the concentration of population in cities with the accompanying high division of labor and other forms of specialization. In other words, the secondary group is an historical emergent. Yet as an interactional aggregate, the secondary group draws heavily upon primary patterns: face-to-face relations in many situations, the moral code, and the development of friendly and congenial associations within the more formalized organizations of government, business, and industry.

Social psychology is also interested in group-to-group relationships. Historically some social psychologists took the position that there is no such "thing" as a group; there are only individuals. This view was an

outcome of a period when there was much discussion of "group mind," "collective consciousness," and the like. Today, the group is viewed as a congeries of interacting individuals and as such it may be considered and studied as a unit just as logically as one may consider and study the individual as a unit. (See below on the history of social psychology.)

Most of the concern with the group-to-group relations in social psychology has to do with the study of large populations in secondary groups. Armies in conflict and great economic organizations in competition are good illustrations. The operation of mass media in the formation of contemporary public opinion concerns large secondary groupings on a variety of issues and gives us a clue to the extent and complexity of our modern world.

Two Interactional Levels

Interaction may take place at two levels of response. One is the gross bodily kind that involves the larger musculature of the body. This is illustrated by two boys in a fist fight or two men pushing an automobile stuck in the mud or snow. The other level is that of communication. This may take the form of the expressive gestures of symbolic interaction which calls into play speech and writing. As we know, language, along with the use of tools, is the behavioral element which marks man off from the highest apes. It represents a fundamental element of culture itself.

Psychology and Sociology Contribute to Social Psychology

Some earlier writers distinguished between "individual" social psychology as deriving from psychology, and "social" or "group" social psychology as coming from sociology. Such a distinction is both misleading and inaccurate. It is true that the field called "social psychology" was developed chiefly by people labeled either psychologists or sociologists. But if it is ever to develop into a scientific discipline, it must be a unified field. (See below on historical trends.) Yet it is a fact that some features of the field rest upon general psychology and others come from sociology and cultural anthropology. From the former we draw heavily for our understanding of the processes involved in motivation, learning, perception, and language. From the latter we make use of materials bearing on social organization and culture patterns. These latter provide much of the content of what the individual learns as a member of his society or group. We might say that while our major emphasis is on the individual in interaction with others, such interaction can only be understood within the societal and cultural matrix in which it occurs.

Some Historical Trends

As an academic discipline, social psychology is old enough to provide us with certain historical trends which may help us understand the

content and boundaries of this field. What we now regard as social psychology had its beginnings in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but as an academic discipline it probably did not begin to be formally presented until the 1890's and early 1900's. J. Mark Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (1897) bore the subtitle *A Study in Social Psychology*. Using a theory of imitation, suggestion, and accommodation (habit), he traced the development of the individual. The matrix of this development, he wrote, is the "give and take between the individual and his fellows"—"the dialectic of personal growth," as he called it. Although his system implies a too logical and rational unfolding of the self under social stimulation, his work was important in the growth of social psychology. His influence on Charles H. Cooley and George H. Mead is particularly to be noted.

Cooley's chief contribution to social psychology appears in his first two books: *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902) and *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (1909). His chief thesis, like Baldwin's, is the inseparable connection between the individual and society. The two are complementary in the closest sense. The child's idea of himself is the reflection of those about him. The mistake of traditional psychology, he contended, was to separate the individual from his social and material environment and study him as an isolated unit. The mistake of the social sciences, on the other hand, was to give complete attention to institutions and social processes to the neglect of the complex personalities who carry on social life. In the first volume, Cooley traces out in considerable detail the way in which the human personality develops within the social matrix of family, play group, neighborhood, and other primary groups. In the second book, Cooley indicates the tremendous changes which occur in human personality as a result of the modern industrial age with its specialization of labor, its urbanization of population, its rapid communication, its class conflicts, and other conditions related to the breakdown of primary-group controls.

Accepting the basic premises of Baldwin and Cooley, and strongly influenced by functional and behavioristic psychology, George H. Mead gave us a more or less objective description and analysis of the processes which account for the rise and operation of the self. It was he who first indicated the high importance of imitation and role-taking in the development of personality. We shall draw heavily on Mead's work in Chapter 6, which discusses the development and function of the self.

The publication in 1908 of two textbooks in social psychology stimulated the rapid expansion of courses by this name in American colleges and universities. One was by William McDougall, a British psychologist; the other was by Edward A. Ross, an American sociologist. The former held that social behavior derived chiefly from instinctual foundations which, through learning, developed into social sentiments.

The latter, drawing on Tarde, the French social psychologist, built his discussion around the concept of imitation. Both were widely used for more than a decade until F. H. Allport published his textbook in 1924. This represented a turning point in the field. Although he abandoned the rigid theory of instincts held by McDougall, he nevertheless recognized the place of motives. Yet his main stress was upon social learning as the source of social attitudes, ideas, and responses.

In 1927 and 1930 the present writer published his first two books in social psychology.[1] In these he tried to integrate the psychological and sociological-cultural views and materials. He also attempted to strike a reasonable balance between the treatment of the rise and function of the personality and that of the place of collective behavior. This latter includes such matters as fad and fashion, crowd and audience behavior, and public opinion and propaganda. It is interesting to note that in the years since these books appeared, some writers have tended to emphasize the former phenomena and others the latter.

Since 1930 there has been a rapid expansion of instruction and research in social psychology. In the twenty-five years since that date, more than 40 textbooks have been published in English, and the volume of research publications has mounted steadily, as any examination of periodical and monographic literature will bear witness.

If one reviews the history of social psychology since the McDougall-Ross books were published, it appears that at least six important changes are worthy of note. First, as to methodology, there has been a definite shift from the qualitative, anecdotal, and later more extensive case study to the collection, processing, and interpreting of mass data in which attention is paid to sampling as well as to the construction and application of rigorously designed instruments—rating schemes, questionnaires, and tests. The present emphasis on quantification is regarded by most social psychologists as evidence that their field has finally become objective and scientific.

A second and also decisive change has been from a descriptive presentation of data to the analytic. This is particularly true with reference to the *group* and *collective* aspects. Cooley's discussion of the importance of the primary group in contrast to the secondary group and Sumner's formulations regarding the in-group versus out-group dichotomy were largely at the level of description. The same is true of the discussion of crowd behavior, fad and fashion, and of public opinion.

The third change concerns the abandonment of the theory of instinct as an explanatory concept and the substitution of learning theory, especially as the latter shows the continuing impact of behaviorism on our field. It is true, of course, that more recent learning theory has re-

[1] *Source Book for Social Psychology* (New York, Crofts, 1927); and *Social Psychology*, 1st ed. (New York, Crofts, 1930).

introduced motivation as the initial factor in much of our learning. So, too, a modification of earlier and more rigid Freudian concepts regarding instinct is found among the so-called neo-Freudians.

A fourth factor is the increasing impact of cultural anthropology upon social psychology. Work in cross-cultural comparisons has forced us out of an earlier ethnocentrism. The field known as personality and culture or similar title has become more and more the concern of social psychology as well as of anthropology.

A fifth change is the growing interplay of clinical and experimental psychology with social psychology. As the latter has come more and more to be concerned with motivation and mechanism, it has drawn upon clinical psychology (including the whole psychiatric field). So, too, there has been an ever expanding effort to apply experimental methods to group data. We shall have more to say on this later.

Finally, and by no means least important, is the growing acceptance of the concepts of interaction, role, and status as fundamental to social psychology. While the shades of individual *qua* individual and his mechanisms still lurk among those in our field who have come chiefly out of the laboratory of psychology, the recognition of the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional pattern as the unit for any model of social behavior is being more widely accepted. So, too, role-expectation and role-taking now provide a fully accepted approach to group phenomena. As a tangential remark on the group, it may be said that, with minor exceptions, the ancient debate about the group mind seems to have finally received its *coup de grâce.*

THE COVERAGE OF THE PRESENT BOOK

The content of social psychology ranges over a considerable area of human behavior. A relatively new field of study, its boundaries are somewhat hard to determine. The present volume is divided into two broad parts or sections. Social interaction is the key concept of Part I, but within that framework we shall discuss the interplay of the individual with his society and its culture. In addition to a full examination of the nature of interaction, the chapters deal with motivation, the foundations of personality, language, the rise of the self, the nature and function of belief systems, and the increasingly stimulating subject of culture and personality. Part II presents the collective aspects of the field. Here the emphasis is chiefly on the group influences on behavior. Such topics as the following are described and analyzed: the nature of group life, leadership, crowd behavior, fashion, public opinion and its chief media, propaganda, prejudice. There are also two chapters on large-group conflict—revolution and war.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

DENNIS, Wayne, *Current Trends in Social Psychology* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948), A symposium of eight lectures on a variety of topics; including, among others, group dynamics, communication, social perception, and sociometry.

HARTLEY, Eugene L., and HARTLEY, Ruth E., *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, Knopf, 1952), Ch. 1. Deals chiefly with the standpoint and research methods of the social psychologist. Contains a strong plea for objectivity.

HULETT, J. E., and STAGNER, Ross, eds., *Problems in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1952). Consists of papers and proceedings of the Allerton Conference on Social Psychology (December, 1950) conducted jointly by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Department of Psychology at the University of Illinois. Chapters 1, 2, and 21 are particularly pertinent for our discussion.

KLINEBERG, Otto, *Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1954), Ch. 1. Gives some brief historical notes and then outlines seven principal areas in the field of social psychology.

ROHRER, John H., and SHERIF, Muzafer, eds., *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York, Harper, 1951). Consists of the University of Oklahoma Lectures in Social Psychology delivered April 6–11, 1950. In the first chapter Sherif reviews the lectures with interesting comments of his own. The second chapter, by Theodore M. Newcomb, is an attempt to weld the individual and social approaches into a unified theory.

SHERIF, Muzafer, and SHERIF, Carolyn W., *An Outline of Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Harper, 1956). In contrast to the first edition, this is a much expanded volume. It contains material from the authors' important research on group formation and related matters. The book also marks an advance in the effort to link the " 'individual approach' " to the " 'group approach.' "

Part I

SOCIAL INTERACTION AND BASIC INTERRELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE

CHAPTER 2

Basic Characteristics, Motivation, and Emotion

MAN, as a biological organism, lives in an environment both physical and social. There is so persistent a relationship of man to the outside world that for some purposes we might consider organism and environment together as a unit of study. In other contexts, however, the individual alone may be used as a basic unit. Clearly, in still others, as in physiological psychology, the concern might be with some particular subdivision of man's behavior; or in anatomy the unit might be a special organ of the body. For our purposes, at the moment, we shall regard the individual as the unit of description and analysis. Later, our fundamental concern will be with the individual in interaction with other individuals.

While we must recognize man's constitutional foundation, we need not examine this fact in detail. Rather, at the outset of this chapter, we shall point out some basic and universal characteristics of human behavior. These will provide a background against which we can discuss more adequately motivation and emotion, both so important in understanding the behavior of the individual.

SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BEHAVIOR [1]

Active Response

Man is an active creature. Scientists have studied what they call the energy "output" and "input" of various "objects," including man. The term "object," as used here, means anything whatsoever which may be abstracted from its environment for purposes of study. For instance, we may choose to study a plant apart from the soil, sunshine, and rainfall.

[1] The theme of this section was worked out by Omar K. Moore, Donald J. Lewis, and the author in a seminar in social psychology in 1951. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to these two co-workers.

The word "output" means any change or modification produced in the surroundings by the activity of the object. The term "input" means any event or activity external to the object which changes this object in any way. Man, for example, is capable of storing energy derived from outside himself. He uses this energy to effect changes in his environment. In contrast, other objects such as chairs or stones do not store energy, and any changes they produce in the environment can be traced to the immediate energy from some outside source which plays upon them. Man, in a way, has his own power plant. He is not like a ball or a physical object that moves only when hit. This has been stated as follows: "Active behavior is that in which the object is the source of the energy output involved in any given specific reaction." [2]

Not all of human behavior is of the active kind, but a great deal of it falls in this category. Of course, a person might be picked up by a tornado, buffeted by a wave, or swept into a whirlpool. In these situations, man behaves in what is essentially a passive way. Here the change in environment can be accounted for by the immediate input of energy supplied from outside his own body. It is the task of the natural scientists to study the movements of the human body as affected by such forces. For the most part, social scientists, including social psychologists, are not concerned with passive behavior as the term is used in this connection.

The distinction between active and passive conduct is one which admits of certain degrees of comparison. Some behavior is relatively active; some, relatively passive. It is well to keep this fact of degree in mind. As an active creature with his own energy source or power system, man is related to, or *dependent upon*, the environment in an interesting way. Some objects—clocks, for example—are designed to be relatively insensitive to environmental changes. The less a clock is influenced by temperature, moisture, magnetic fields, the better it runs. We may say that a clock, therefore, is only loosely coupled or linked to the environment precisely because it continues to tick away in relative independence of surrounding changes. On the other hand, man is relatively *closely coupled* to his environment. Moreover, his environment includes other men. Whatever he says or does is likely to have some effect on the people around him. Their activity, in turn, may influence him.

Not all parts of the human organism are equally affected by modifications in the environment. Some special cells are so sensitive to external changes that the pressure exerted by even a single hair can serve to indicate or signal an environmental change. So, too, a single ray of light may be registered through the retina. This combination of extreme

[2] Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology," *Philosophy of Science*, 1943, 10:18–24. Quotation is from p. 18.

sensitivity plus the possession of his own energy system makes it difficult to predict what a man will do. A slight environmental change may serve to set off a large outburst of energy. For example, a red light on a signal board may start a number of firemen rushing for their proper posts. Sometimes startling environmental changes may not produce any immediate output of energy, as in the case of the well-seasoned soldier who holds his fire in the face of an advancing platoon. In summary, then, we say that man is an active creature who is closely coupled to his environment.

Purpose and Goal

It has also proved helpful to view some of man's behavior as *purposeful.* One can easily make the mistake of supposing that man has some mystical entity inside of himself which may be labeled a "purpose." This mistake we wish to avoid. Therefore, we should ask under what circumstances may we say that the man's behavior is purposeful? First, there are a number of conditions that must be satisfied. Let us look at these.

Purposeful behavior ". . . is to be attributed only to an object which forms part of a larger system, i.e., to an object that is coupled to other objects or features in the environment in such a manner that changes in these objects or features will modify its behavior." [3] The behavior of any object will be modified to some degree by its environment. The degree of modification, however, is relative. Thus, the actions of radium are so little modified by most environments in which it may be located that it makes an excellent clock or measure of time. The active behavior of a human being, in contrast, would make him a very poor clock because sometimes his response may be rapid, at other times it may be slow. In short, human beings are so closely linked to their environment that this environment must be constantly taken into account in any adequate explanation of behavior. Man is always a part of a larger system and only in this wider context can his conduct be understood.

As a second requisite condition, purposeful behavior is oriented toward, or guided to, some goal. The goal may be either dynamic or static. In order to study goal-oriented behavior we need to make a number of observations involving exposure to different initial and subsequent conditions. A goal-directed or goal-oriented object, such as man, will show what we call "restorative" behavior when deflected from its goal. That is, if some environmental obstacle intervenes between a goal and the human pursuer of that goal, the pursuer will tend to act in such a manner as to circumvent this obstacle and to seek another path to the goal in question.

[3] Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener, "Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior," *Philosophy of Science,* 1950, 17·318–326. Quotation is from p. 324, by permission.

An example of what we mean by restorative behavior should make this clear: [4]

> Suppose that in a dog track in addition to the mechanical hare and the living hounds, there is also a mechanical hound with the appropriate sense organs, and controls, so that it, like the living specimens, will follow the hare. This supposition is not unreasonable since mechanisms with positive phototropisms, and even a multiplicity of tropisms, have already been constructed.[5] Suppose, also, that the nonliving mechanisms are dressed up to resemble their living counterparts. The observation of a single run will not allow the discrimination of any differences in the behavior of the several entities concerned; nor will the observation of several runs performed under approximately equal conditions allow this discrimination. But several observations carried out under varied conditions will readily lead even a casual observer to distinguish the rigidly directed behavior of the hare, which is independent of that of the hounds, from the behavior of the latter, which is guided, under the circumstances, by that of the hare. The behavior of the mechanical hare is characterized by the fact that the mechanism does not show any tendency to return to its original path if it is detracked. The changes in the surroundings may influence its motion or path, but are not followed by a restoring [or corrective] reaction. The motions of the hounds, living and mechanical, on the other hand, are modified whenever that of the hare is changed, or whenever an influence exerted on them changes their course with respect to that of the hare. We can omit the hounds in our study of the behavior of the hare, and we shall not lose anything of significance and importance. But we cannot omit the hare in our analysis of the behavior of the hounds without losing an essential fact, namely, the fact that the hounds pursue the hare, i.e., that their behavior is purposeful.

In this example it must be noted that the distinction is not between the living and nonliving objects, because one of the hounds was mechanical. In the sense in which the term "purposeful" is used in this quotation, many mechanical devices are purposeful. In other words, man is not the only purposeful object. However, he is both *active* and *purposive*. One cannot study man effectively without taking into account the goals which he pursues. We must realize that man likewise exhibits corrective or restorative behavior when obstacles intervene between him and any goal which he seeks. Yet it must be recalled that not all of man's behavior is purposeful in this sense.

Positive Feedback

The concept *feedback* designates situations in which there is an interplay between an object and some goal in such a manner that cues or signals from the goal help or facilitate the object's attainment of that goal.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 321–322. By permission.

[5] Tropism refers to an involuntary movement of an organism or any of its parts set up either automatically or in response to stimuli. Phototropism is illustrated by the turning toward light of night-flying moths.

Feedback may be classified as either positive or negative. Positive feedback means that the signals from a goal are increased or amplified in the exchange between the goal-directed object and the goal as that goal is approached. For example, the circulation of water in the cooling system of a gasoline motor—as in automobiles—is increased as the engine gets hotter and hotter. There is a direct relationship between the cues from the given goal and the responding object or system with respect to that goal. A good illustration in human beings would be the increasing depth and speed of breathing as one climbs a mountain to higher and higher altitudes.

Negative Feedback

In negative feedback the signals are cut down or damped in the interplay between a goal-directed object and a goal as the latter is approached. Negative feedback is often necessary if a goal-directed object is to attain a goal effectively. As a goal is approached, the movements of a goal-directed object must be more and more carefully controlled if the goal is not to be overshot. In other words, cues from the goal act to restrict the output of energy which would cause the object to go beyond the goal.

There is, then, as a rule, a continual interplay between man and any goal he may be seeking. This is a good example of the close linkage of man and his environment, since the goal is a part of the environment. The negative feedback arrangement, with its provision for controlling energy output, is an important aspect of goal-directed behavior. Man and certain machines are not only active and purposeful but they show negative feedback.

Under some conditions, human beings may lose their capacity for negative feedback. This is illustrated when certain diseases attack the cerebellum, which has much to do with controlling the balance of the body and the nicety of motor skills. If a patient with a cerebellar dysfunction has the task of picking up a glass of water and drinking it, the following sequence may be observed: At rest before the act begins, such a patient shows no obvious motor disturbance. But as he carries the glass to his mouth, the hand carrying the glass will begin to oscillate; and this oscillation will increase as the glass is brought closer and closer to the mouth. The water will be spilled and the task cannot be successfully completed. What the cerebellar patient has lost and what normal human beings possess is the ability to control behavior actively directed toward a goal *during the course of that behavior.* The cerebellar patient's reactions are goal-directed, but he is unable to control his output of energy as he approaches the goal. His energy output is not properly damped; he lacks capacity for negative feedback.

Prediction

Certain human behavior is sometimes predictive. The tropisms of unicellular organisms are examples of nonpredictive responses. The amoeba, for instance, merely follows the stimulus to which it responds. There is no evidence that it foresees the path of a moving piece of food. Its behavior is not predictive. Among animals of higher order, however, predictive behavior is commonplace. A cat starting in pursuit of a running mouse does not run directly toward the spot where the mouse is at a given time but moves toward a foreseeable future position of the mouse. This, is an instance of what we call first-order prediction. The cat merely predicts the path of the mouse. Throwing a stone at a moving object or a target, in contrast, requires what we call second-order prediction. Both the path of the target and the path of the stone must be predicted or foreseen.

Man is capable of many high-order predictions. One of the chief differences between man and the higher mammals is this factor of predictability. For example, apes may build rude shelters which are used more than once, but they do not plan for the future by storing food nor do they produce and keep tools.

It is in the field of science that man has exhibited his predictive capacities most clearly and successfully. One of the aims of science is to predict and to control changes in the environment. In this connection it should be noted that certain machines, called "servo-mechanisms," are also capable of rather high-order predictions with regard to carefully delimited tasks. The use of these machines has in some ways enormously increased man's capacity to predict. An example of a servo-mechanism of high-order complexity is the electronic computer.

Homeostasis

The analysis in the previous sections which had to do with man being active, purposeful, and capable of high-order predictions and controlled responses is based upon objective observation of human beings. It is not dependent upon the reports of individuals about their purposes, their goals, or the means they intend to use to reach the goals. Such reports are valuable data for social science, and any systematic theory of human behavior must necessarily take these facts into account. However, they are outside our range of interest at present.

Up to this point, also, we have had nothing to say about the internal function of the human organism. We have only dealt with input and output objectively observed. We may ask: If an organism is to survive, what internal conditions must be maintained? The answer is that there must be some equilibrium or homeostatic state. There must be some kind of internal environment which is capable of restoring itself to a certain

degree of equilibrium among its parts. The internal environment has been the subject of much study by biologists, but it would take us too far afield even to review briefly the main features of this evolutionary story. Suffice it to say that, in the course of development of the higher forms, the mechanisms of internal homeostasis or equilibrium have remained very much the same, even though the external behavior manifestations are sharply different in terms of complexity. In other words, relatively simple forms of life have much the same kind of basic mechanism of internal equilibrium as do human beings.[6]

The purpose of these homeostatic or steady-state mechanisms is to keep the internal environment of the organism within the narrow range of conditions that are necessary for its survival. Any disturbance of the steady state of an organism will bring these mechanisms into play. They act to bring about a return to the condition of balance. If these mechanisms cannot bring about a return of balance, the organism will die. For example, the internal body temperature of man and of many other animals normally varies only slightly even though external temperatures may fluctuate widely. This steady state of internal temperature serves to protect the cells of the body from being damaged by external changes. Thus a man is able to withstand winter cold and summer heat. The nice alkaline-acid balance in the human blood stream is another example of the same process. A slight increase in alkalinity will produce convulsions, while a slight shift in acidity will result in coma and death. Similarly, there is a certain balance between sugar concentration and salinity which must be maintained.

Many of these adaptive mechanisms operate automatically and are not appreciably subject to modification through learning or experience. This is true, for instance, of the endocrine glands. Other mechanisms, however, are subject to such modificatior When there is a disruption of the homeostatic state a great many changes may take place. Not only are the adjustive mechanisms brought into play, but stimuli are produced which impinge upon the sensory centers, especially those in the viscera.

An organism subjected to such strong internal stimuli may be said to be in a state of drive. One of the results of the drive state is the movement of the muscles and activity of the glands of the organism. In short, any disruption of the homeostatic condition of an organism is likely to produce movements which bring into play the muscles and the glands. Strong stimuli, such as an electric shock, may also originate outside the body and impinge upon such receptors as the ears, eyes, or skin. This stimulation may be regarded as an external drive. Thus drives may have their source either internally or externally. The movements produced by the drive state are called responses.

[6] On internal-external balances, see W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body*, 2nd ed. (New York, Norton, 1939).

To summarize, any disruption in the homeostatic state of the organism is likely to produce strong stimulation and thus induce a state of drive. Strong stimuli coming from outside the body may likewise produce a drive. Any organism in the state of drive will tend to make responses or movements.

These responses are part of the active behavior of the organism, and such responses, especially within the social context, are of particular interest to us in social psychology. We will find that certain responses result in a cessation or reduction of the strong stimuli. Such responses are said to be drive-reducing and tend to restore the organism to a homeostatic state; they are likely to be repeated or performed whenever the organism is under a similar state of drive. Not all responses are drive-reducing. Those that are not are unlikely to be repeated. If certain responses which have been drive-reducing cease to be so, these responses also tend in time to be eliminated. This process of selection and rejection of responses on the basis of their capacity to reduce drive is central to what we call the learning process. When we say that an organism has learned to do something, we mean that it has tried various responses and has fixed upon one which is drive-reducing. This response will be the most likely one to recur. There is, thus, an intimate connection between the homeostatic state of the organism and what the organism learns to do.

MOTIVATION

Bases of Organic Development

As a biological organism, the individual is a highly complex and structured physical-chemical machine. In its adaptation to its environment this organism is constantly fluctuating between a state of equilibrium and disequilibrium. In order to understand human adjustment, it is necessary to take into account not only the organism but also the environment and the dynamic relations of one to the other.

As a result of a long evolutionary history, the various species have developed structures and functions that are transmitted by genes and chromosomes from one generation to another. These include all the fundamental organs of the body—the physical framework, the muscles, the viscera, the glands, and the nervous tissue. There are four fundamental sustaining systems: the digestive-eliminative, the circulatory-cardiac, the neuro-muscular, and the endocrine. These co-ordinate with each other to make adaptation to the external world effective. Despite their usual constancy or fixity, they also show some variation, determined in part by internal, in part by external, changes. Although the amounts of oxygen, food, liquid, and mineral salts which the organism requires are relatively constant, certain deviations may occur. On a hot day, for example,

we need more water than on a cool day. A man engaged in hard physical labor ordinarily needs more food than a clerk working in an office.

Although a certain rigidity of structure and function of the sustaining systems is essential to the preservation and on-going of life, as we go up the evolutionary scale there is clear evidence of the increasing importance of flexibility of the organism. This is fundamental to man's social life, to the building and continuing of his culture. It is the neurological system that makes this flexibility possible. Simple reflexes, in which specific response follows specific stimulus directly, as in breathing, digestion, excretion, and the avoidance of painful or noxious stimuli, do not furnish the basis for complex forms of adjustment. What is needed is a neural mechanism that permits an ever wider range of modifications between the stimulus and the response. It is the higher neural centers, the cerebrum in particular, that make this possible.

Biological factors, largely determined by heredity, provide both the limiting and the facilitating basis of human behavior. The fundamental capacities—sensory, motor, and the like—are essential, of course, to adaptation. As a matter of fact, learning itself represents a biologically determined capacity. We know that the intelligence quotient is, at least in part, determined by heredity. The same is true of the fundamental drives and emotions. Then, too, certain sex differences depend on inherited features of males and females respectively. In other words, the unlearned or biological factors provide the foundation upon which is built the superstructure of learned behavior. The resulting structure is the total functioning organism. Let us now examine more specifically the topic of motivation.

Nature of Motivation

The consideration of what impels the human organism to action—motivation—is central to psychology and no topic has been more thoroughly debated. As yet there is by no means full agreement as to its nature and operation. The basic requirement for survival has been described in a wide variety of terms such as needs, wants, impulses, instincts, and drives. It must be recognized that motive or drive is essentially what we call a construct, inference, or intervening variable. No one has seen a motive in operation. It is not to be observed, but rather is inferred from observable behavior. Nevertheless, some sort of concept must be postulated if we are to deal effectively with the whole question of what impels an organism to action or adjustment.

Various questions have been raised about the nature and operation of motives or drives. The listing or enumeration of motives is one of these. If attempted, should it be long or short, broad or narrow in scope? Another has had to do with the distinction between original, biologically determined drives, and the acquired motives. Also, what are the probable

biological bases—either innate or through learning—of these acquired motivations? Are there any inborn social motives, such as mothering, as some have held? In this connection, as the present author shall insist throughout this book, many psychologists, with their orientation so thoroughly toward the individual, neglect the basic fact that man is a member of a social species. As an organism he is not first a separate unit who later learns to react to social stimuli, but from birth on lives in a world of interaction with others. Certainly in the formative years of his life he could not survive without the help or intercession of another member of his own species.

Then, too, there is the question of interlocking motives—particularly the important question of the relation of acquired needs to motivations arising from within the personality. For example, someone in discussing the lack of accomplishment in another says: "The trouble with him is that he has no self-starter." Finally, there is the troublesome problem of the connection, if any, between early motives and early learning and later drives, habits, goals, and values. This has been a topic of much debate for a long time in social psychology and is not fully settled even now.[7] We shall have occasion to give some attention to it later, especially in Chapter 4.

There have been many ways of dealing with the place of motivation in behavior. In 1908 the psychologist William McDougall published his book *Social Psychology*, built largely around the concept of instinct and sentiment. McDougall defined an instinct as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular manner, or, at least to experience an impulse to such action."[8] In other words, an instinct was regarded as a broad general construct that had three aspects: the cognitive or perceptual, the emotional or affective, and the conative or action-orientation. McDougall made up a list of thirteen major instincts with corresponding emotions and then added a number of minor ones.

Following the publication of McDougall's book, it became common practice among social psychologists to invent their own lists of instincts as fundamental driving forces of behavior. It must be said, further, that there was little effort to check such lists against empirical research. Yet for more than a decade McDougall's instinct theory was regarded as basic; although curiously enough few, if any, social psychologists paid any attention to his use of the second important concept, sentiment. He viewed the sentiments as made up of combinations of original instincts and actually as the basic motivations in day-by-day life.

[7] See Harold Orlansky, "Infant Care and Personality," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1949, 46:1–48.

[8] Quotation is from p. 30 of his book.

Later, largely under the impact of behaviorism, the concept of instinct fell into disfavor, although the Freudians continued to use it in their psychoanalytic explanations of conduct. In 1924 L. L. Bernard published a full-length book criticizing the concept of instinct and attempting to give it the *coup de grâce.*[9] There followed a decade of strong emphasis upon learning and environmental factors only to be followed, in the mid-1930's, by a recognition on the part of serious students of psychology that they could not escape the need to infer motivational factors in their interpretation of human behavior.

In attempting to set up certain tests to determine the fundamental or dependable nature of motivations or drives, Otto Klineberg has employed a threefold criterion. The first of these is the factor of continuity of particular forms of behavior in man stemming from the other animals, particularly the anthropoid apes. He takes the position that if there is a continuity of an unlearned component in behavior from the higher animals to man, this is one evidence of dependability of a particular motive. The second criterion rests upon the discovery of a biochemical or physiological foundation of a specific activity. That is, he attempts to find some organic condition or predisposition for such an activity. The third significant criterion is that of universality. If he finds a form of behavior common to all human societies, despite the variation in their cultures, it is considered to be strong evidence of dependability. This last criterion, however, has to be used with much caution, as we shall see. Many common social motives arise from a universal situational factor as well as a universal organic factor.[10]

In the various discussions of motivation there have been two troublesome problems. The first of these has to do with the distinctions drawn between physiological and psychological components—that is, between what might be called innate drives and those that are definitely learned and depend upon society and culture. The other problem has to do with internal compared to external stimuli as the inciters of motivation. For a long time, certain psychologists insisted that all basic drives or impulses originated within the organism. They were to be explained in terms of biophysical or chemical changes. But common-sense observation makes it clear that some impulsations to action arise from changes in the external environment. Clear indications of this are those associated with the avoidance of noxious substances, the withdrawal from painful stimuli, the demand for warmth and comfort. Even sexual responses, which definitely have an internal foundation, are not fully and normally expressed without external interactional contact.

In addition to the physiological requirements set up by the internal or external changes, there are closely related expressive reactions. These

[9] L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1924).
[10] Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1954), pp. 69–70.

include such things as random vocalization and various overt responses related to feelings and emotions. Table 1 gives a brief classification of these organic drives or motivational factors.

Table 1. Classification of Organic Drives

A PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS SET UP BY INTERNAL CHANGES	B PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS SET UP BY EXTERNAL CHANGES	C EXPRESSIVE REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO A AND B
1. Oxygen need, respiration, circulation, and temperature stability	7. Avoidance of, and withdrawal from, painful and noxious stimuli	12. Random or rhythmic vocalization
2. Sustenance, hunger and thirst	8. Warmth, comfort, shelter, and pleasant stimulation	13. Random muscular activities; restlessness
3. Elimination of waste through respiration, defecation, urination, perspiration	9. Specific satisfactions from fulfillment of sustenance needs	14. Overt reactions arising from feelings and emotions: fear, rage, disgust, shame, etc.
4. Sleep and rest to offset effects of fatigue or of use of organs	10. Sexual pleasures induced by stimulation of external genitalia and related erogenous zones	
5. Reproduction, the need rising to full maturation at puberty	11. Sensory: sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches	
6. Possible affectional, including maternal		

This is only one of many possible classifications. Gardner Murphy's listing uses four basic categories: visceral, activity, sensory "drives," and "emergency responses," the latter covering fear, rage, and other strong emotions. In addition to covering practically the same items as above, he lists "curiosity and exploration" and "impulse to cope with, master environment" under the activity drives and "drive to exploit rhythm, climax, contrast" in the sensory column.[11]

Cycles of Activity

Motives or drives do not, of course, exist for themselves. It has long been recognized that the drive or motive is but the first step in a cycle of activity or adjustment which leads, if successful, to some reward or goal. Let us examine some aspects of this cycle.

The cycle is set in motion by a state of disequilibrium or tension that impels the individual to activity aimed ultimately at restoring a steady state or equilibrium. Moreover, the need, drive, or motive or state of tension may be described with respect to some goal or class of goals or rewards which would serve to reduce the tension. In short, the cycle

[11] Gardner Murphy, "Social Motivation," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II, p. 609.

consists of need-tension followed by effort or striving toward a rewarding goal.

This simple statement obviously calls for elaboration, at least when we are dealing with human motivation in a social context. Certainly in social interaction involving in its basic form A $\rightleftharpoons$ B, there must be some kind of mutual identification. Or if A and B are acting or communicating with reference to a physical or social object in addition to interacting with each other, there would be what T. M. Newcomb calls "co-orientation."[12] Furthermore, perceptive and other cognitive factors come into play. Whatever criticism was made of McDougall's definition of instinct, it must be realized that he was fully aware of the importance of such intellective functions as well as the emotional components in the motivational system. Also, in turn, the perceptive and cognitive factors make possible the emergence of patterns of expectation; there develops a readiness to react toward a given object or situation. Such a pattern of expectation is called *attitude*.[13]

So, too, the goal may be viewed as a type of value toward which an attitude is directed. Such goals, when obtained, serve as reinforcing agents in the learning process.

The Acquisition of Motives

In acquiring new motives we are dealing with mechanisms of learning. Although these mechanisms will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter, a number of important features of the process of building up new motivations will be indicated at this point.

1. Primary drives are not modifiable, although the original hierarchy of drives may be altered. That is to say, the preferential features of the basic drives may be changed. For instance, the basic needs for food and liquid remain with the individual throughout his life, but their urgency may be modified. So, too, we know that such a powerful drive as that of sex may be inhibited or sublimated through learned habits, attitudes, and values of a given society. This is exampled in the institutions of celibacy familiar to us in various religions among both nonliterate and civilized peoples.

2. Responses to primary drives are modifiable, however, and any number of responses may serve to reduce the same primary drive. To

[12] Theodore M. Newcomb, "Motivation in Social Behavior," in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, *Current Theory and Research in Motivation* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1953), p. 155.

[13] Newcomb, in contrast, defines attitude as "the state of readiness for motive arousal," in other words, a predisposition to be motivated. In view of the long-accepted definition of attitude as "readiness to react," it is unfortunate that this new use has been introduced in the field. It can only lead to confusion. See Newcomb's *Social Psychology* (New York, Dryden, 1950), p. 118.

use the example of hunger again, the particular feeding habits, as well as the kinds of food that will satisfy hunger, vary greatly. Another illustration is the response to pain. Under some programs of institutional training, individuals may learn "to enjoy pain." Such are the religious zealots who may walk on hot coals, pierce their limbs with sharp instruments, or suffer themselves to be beaten with whips.

3. Stimuli or cues originally neutral, when associated with primary drives, may acquire value. Weak stimuli that function in this manner may be called learned or acquired drives. How a weak or neutral stimulus may acquire drive is neatly shown by the mother who learns to respond to the merest whimper of her baby, whereas before she had a child of her own such a stimulus would have brought about little or no response.

4. Cues or stimuli that have acquired drive value may lose it, hence acquired drives have a substitutive ability. One acquired drive or motive may take the place of another. To illustrate: for a person cured of alcoholism the sight of a glass of whiskey may have little or no stimulus or cue value. In its place his interest in soft drinks may be strong.

5. There may also be substitution of a response which serves to reduce an acquired drive. The habits of a young child in the family with regard to his status therein will be quite different from the responses he learns with respect to his status as an adult.

6. Because one acquired drive may be substituted for another and because one method of reducing an acquired drive may be substituted for another, we may expect considerable variability in acquired drives among various societies.

7. On the other hand, some acquired drives are found in high frequency in all or almost all groups or societies. These we shall call common social motives. The basis for common social motives lies in the relatively invariant interactional situations to be found in all groups. Let us note briefly some of the more important of these invariant conditions.

a. Every newborn child, if it is to survive, will be dependent upon at least one older, more powerful, wiser individual, usually the child's mother.

b. Every baby will periodically be in a state of primary drive necessitating that the older, wiser, more powerful individual execute certain responses which will be drive-reducing for the baby. For instance, the mother by nursing the baby rewards him with food and thus reduces his hunger drive. The older, wiser, and more powerful individual may refrain from performing those acts in the biologically ordered time sequence, or may perform them in such a way that other drives would be initiated in the baby, for example, when the feeding experience may become painful to the mother. In short, the older, wiser, more

powerful person will function with respect to the dependent infant as a punishing as well as a rewarding agent.

c. Every infant will have a minimal interactional experience with other individuals. The response of the baby will serve as cues to the latter and, in time, the response of the other individuals will serve as cues to the infant. With few exceptions, babies have thousands of interactions with parents and others around them.

d. Finally, two or more interacting individuals constitute a social group. Therefore, every child will necessarily function as a member of such a group.

The above details show the close correlation between basic drives, learned drives, and the development of interactional patterns which, in turn, are the foundation of common social motives. Let us examine some features of these a little more closely.

8. Every child will acquire certain habit patterns, or systems of response, which he will exhibit when appropriate cues come from the older, wiser, and more powerful person. Hence, through the mechanisms of anticipatory response—patterns of expectation—the latter will come to expect certain rather stable kinds of behavior from the child. In similar ways, the child, through his anticipatory responses, will come to expect certain more or less stable actions on the part of the other individual. These more or less stable habit patterns, or systems of response, will come to be expected by others. Such a combination of habits and expectations constitute a social role. To be a member of a social group implies having and taking a role.

9. Through the interactional process, the child will gradually learn to discriminate between features of his total environment which may serve as reliable cues to drive reduction and those which do not. Some of his own responses may serve as cues in this situation and some of the responses of other individuals may serve as cues. These two classes of cues become differentially associated with the drive reduction. This distinction is the basis, in fact, for the important differentiation between the self and not-self.

Not only are there distinctions between cues, but also some differences become the basis of generalization of cues. Some aspects of this matter will be examined in the next chapter.

Various attempts have been made to list and classify the common social motives. None of these lists is completely satisfactory. In fact, there are probably hundreds and hundreds of motivations having learned and common features in various subgroups of a given larger society.

Derived Interactional Processes

Certainly there is a continuity from the primary and basic needs to those which are built up through learning into large motivational

schemes. On the foundations of the demands for food and drink, for bodily protection, and later for sexual satisfaction, there are developed various reactions, both oppositional and co-operative, that relate to dependency, love, protection, and security. These are the underpinning upon which all the later motives tend to be built.

Yet the striving to satisfy these fundamental wants and the later process of fulfilling secondary wants are not always easy or uninterrupted. The progress from demand or drive to consummation may be blocked by various factors—for example, by a scarcity of the rewards. The most obvious instance would be that resulting from a lack of natural resources such as food. Or the scarcity might be due to the monopoly of food by another member of the species. There are many possible forms of stoppage.

Confronted with such inhibiting forces, the individual may react in various ways. He may choose a frontal attack upon the situation; he may try to get at the goal by indirection and substitution; or he may withdraw from the effort. The more-or-less direct attempts to secure his reward by increased effort we call opposition, including under this term both conflict and competition. Substitute reactions often have a place in opposition. Substitution may also replace one drive by another which can be fulfilled. Withdrawal may take the form of daydreaming.

In contrast to oppositional effort is co-operation. Two or more persons may combine their knowledge and skill to secure a reward which ordinarily is shared. Whereas opposition tends to arouse hostile and anxious emotions, co-operation fosters friendly emotions and a sense of interdependency. Both opposition and co-operation are universal forms of interaction, but the culture of time and place will give them their direction and content.

Some Common Social Motives

Opposition-aggression may become such a powerful means of fulfilling various fundamental drives that it gets organized into a motive which we call *desire for mastery.* In subsequent discussions the function of this motive will become evident. In contrast, the desire for dependency, security, and protection, originated usually by the mother, spreads out to include other persons. In time it becomes generalized into a need for membership or feeling of belongingness with others. Such gregariousness, or *wish for relatedness,* becomes an important motive in innumerable human situations.

Learning and habit-formation come into play as necessary means of moving from need to goal or reward. Moreover, learning gradually changes from external habit-formation to internal controls, including ideas or concepts, emotions, attitudes, and traits. Both habits and these internal factors, in turn, become motives in their own right. For example,

the desire for knowledge—the cognitive motive or, more simply, *curiosity*—emerges as an important motive. This may take the form of desire for new experience or for aesthetic satisfactions in form, color, and the like, as well as desire for knowledge and skill. Curiosity has a conspicuous place in intellectual attainment, in invention, in artistic creation and appreciation, and in concern with philosophic and religious topics.

We have, then, a series of emerging motives. Their compelling or dependability characteristic differs, as they are linked to the fundamental physiological needs or to those which are obviously the result of man's living in a society possessed of a culture. The first-level imperatives, as they have been called, are related to *sustenance, sexual demands,* and *protection* from physical dangers. The second-level motives are those of *mastery,* or *power,* and *belongingness.* And at a third level are those which grow out of intellectual processes. These flower not only in technical skills, scientific knowledge, and common sense but also in aesthetics, religion, and philosophy.

The Freudian psychologists, who have done much to point out and interpret the dynamic nature of man's motives, often classify the major drives under two headings, *sex* and *ego.* Were we to accept these two broad categories, the first would include sexual and love demands, sympathy, co-operativeness, and need for sociability or belongingness. Demands for self-assertion, personal aggression, security, and mastery would come under the second. But, like other rigid classifications, this one seems to fail in accounting for a number of important motives. For example, aggression is not entirely bound up with the ego manifestations; and other drives including curiosity, aesthetic interests, recreation, and religion do not fall neatly into one Freudian pigeonhole or the other.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

Nature and Function of Affective Processes

Everyday experience and common language reflect the fact that certain states of the body and mind may be regarded as pleasant and satisfying at some times and as unpleasant and dissatisfying at other times. Sometimes we are in stirred-up states which we variously name anger, fear, grief, or love. In traditional psychology, such generalized reactions are called the affective or feeling-emotional processes. The affective states or reactions tend to be linked with the drives. In fact, some writers regard emotions and feelings as definitely a part of the whole motivational system.

We may summarize the common features of feelings and emotions as follows: (1) There is a perception of a situation, involving seeing, hearing, tasting, or some other sensory reception. Affective states are not

mere projections of internal changes. (2) There is a stirring up of internal activities which involve the sympathetic nervous system and the endocrine glands—both related to the basic adjustive patterns of securing sustenance, sexuality, safety and comfort, and avoiding danger. And (3) there is a sharp increase in overt activity, as is illustrated in the sexual approach, in escape, and in fighting. In general, such reactions take the form of approach or withdrawal. In short, the affective processes are linked with perception, bodily change, and overt action.

In terms of evolutionary history, the function of the emotions in adjustment seems to be that of meeting certain critical situations by mobilizing the organism for fight or flight or other strenuous activities. On the basis of this, Walter B. Cannon has developed his emergency theory of emotions.[14]

For modern man, the brute struggle for survival is so overlaid with social and cultural influences that not only are the rudimentary affective states profoundly changed, but there is some doubt as to the adaptive usefulness of certain emotions, especially fear and rage. Yet the emotions and feelings continue to play an important part in our lives and represent the physiological constancy with which man in his adjustive attempts must reckon. On many occasions the feelings and emotions, whose roots lie deep in heredity, have an important function in society, as we shall demonstrate time and again in subsequent chapters.

Common-sense observation and experimental work have shown that in the earliest years the affective responses are part of the general mass activity. This affective state has been termed excitement or startle. Such mass activity is seen in the child's crying in pain or in other bodily demonstrations of distress. Gradually, however, such mass reactions become separated into two large divisions, one to be called pleasant, the other to be called unpleasant. That is, some of the excited or upset states are associated with the sense of relaxation or well-being which we call pleasurable. Other states are linked with the unpleasant. For example, hunger pangs may be accompanied by unpleasant affective reactions, such as crying and wriggling, whereas the filling of the stomach will be accompanied by gurgling, smiling, and other evidence of relaxation and reward.

The next stage in the development of the emotions and feelings occurs when more and more situations and objects give rise to specific affective reactions. On the foundation of pleasant or unpleasant excitement are built anger, fear, and love, which seem to be the basic emotions. Loud sounds, the sensation of falling, or shaking the child vigorously when he is asleep incite fear. Anger tends to arise from restraint or frustration of free movement. Love is definitely related to the internal

[14] *Op. cit.* See also his *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage,* 2nd ed. (New York, D. Appleton–Century, 1929).

and external stimulation of sexual organs or to responses associated with the care of the young child.

The differentiation and elaboration of the emotions proceed throughout the early years of training. The perception of situations becomes linked to certain bodily or systematic reactions on the one hand, and to certain verbal terms or names on the other. In the growing child and in the adult, perception, memory, and particular bodily expressions make up a total reaction which we label according to our cultural heritage. At this level appear designations such as grief, pity, maternal affections, anxiety, and indignation.

Culture and Affective States

Even slight acquaintance with the affective expressions among nonliterate as well as civilized peoples indicates clearly the importance of cultural definitions of the affective processes. Let us first note some striking differences in the overt expression of the feelings and emotions. Many observers have commented on the stolidity and passivity of the American Plains Indians in situations which would induce in us obvious changes in voice, face, and manual gestures. Among many of these Indian tribes, a youth anxious to join a band of adult warriors had to undergo severe physical ordeals. If he showed any indications of pain or fatigue, he was counted unworthy to become a member of the adult group and was remanded to the inferior status of the child. Likewise, the passivity of the Chinese face in the presence of danger or unusual situations has led to our Western stereotype of "the inscrutable Oriental." Such people stand in sharp contrast to the volatile South European, who is full of gestures and bodily movements not only in habitual social contacts but in unfamiliar and strange situations as well.

There is no reason to assume any hereditary foundation for these differences. They are largely the result of cultural learning, although we must reckon with certain idiosyncratic variations in any given group or society. There are some Chinese who are more expressive than others, and doubtless some Italians are less volatile than their neighbors. Moreover, it is quite possible that the Chinese themselves show a different type of emotional expression to Americans and non-Chinese than they would to their own families. Sometimes associated with the notion that heredity plays a part in emotional expression is also the idea that racial factors may be responsible for these differences.

Romanzo Adams has brought this out in his report of observations in a rural district in Japan from which many of the Hawaiian-Japanese have come. He visited close relatives of those he had known in Hawaii and had the chance to observe them and their children rather closely. He comments, "The mannerisms of the old country villagers seemed to an American to show a constraint not characteristic of the Hawaiian-

Japanese. There was less self-assertiveness, less expression of individuality. Their faces, especially those of the girls, were less expressive." [15]

Adams further stresses the point made above that the Chinese may expose their emotional expressiveness differently to the white man than to their own group. He states that when a white man from Hawaii goes to California and comes in contact with the Chinese who live there, he is impressed with the notable reserve of the California Chinese. The common attitude of the Chinese on the Pacific coast is one of distrust rather than a friendly reaction to the white stranger. "The Hawaiian-Chinese are, in the presence of whites, more given to laughter and when in sorrow they may weep. In an interracial group they act as if they have a sense of really belonging." [16] Such differences probably result from the fact that the Hawaiian-Chinese are much more accepted in Hawaii and feel at home there, in contrast to the sense of isolation and separateness that one finds among the Chinese on the Pacific coast.

In some societies, individuals under great emotional excitement associated with magical and religious festivals have been known to walk barefooted on burning coals or to thrust heated skewers into their flesh without giving evidence of pain. The Christian martyrs, without flinching, endured horrible tortures for the sake of their religion. Such induced hysterical anesthesias which prevent the normal sense of pain are no doubt the result of culturized habits and attitudes.

Anger, which obviously becomes associated with many hostile reactions, is demonstrated in various ways. Otto Klineberg has examined certain classical Chinese novels in order to secure an idea of how emotions were expressed in Ancient China.[17] Anger was expressed when an individual opened his eyes very wide, changing them from the almond shape to one more like the eyes of the European. Staring was also an acceptable manner of expressing anger at another person. Or one might smile "a chill smile" to show one's irritation. So, too, a Chinese might, on occasion, faint from anger, even as the heroines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English novels collapsed from shame or fear.

The fundamental expression of grief seems to us to be tears; yet when we examine behavior in grief-provoking situations in different societies, we find a variety of responses. In some societies, on the death of a relative, professional mourners are employed to wail at the funeral while the family members remain quiet. In describing grief among the ancient Chinese, Marcel Granet, the great French scholar, remarks on what was essentially an elaborate vocal ritual of grief.[18] Grief was to be

[15] Romanzo Adams, *Inter-Racial Marriage in Hawaii* (New York, Macmillan, 1937), p. 256. By permission.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 319.

[17] Otto Klineberg, "Emotional Expression in Chinese Literature," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1938, 33:517–520.

[18] Marcel Granet, "Le Langage de la douleur d'après le ritual funéraire de la Chine classique," *J. de Psychologie*, 1922, 19:97–118.

expressed only in certain prescribed ways and amounts, in which the intensity of expressed grief was positively correlated with the status of the deceased. A young matron should mourn more for the death of her mother-in-law than for her own mother. Tears were expected at certain times only and under specified conditions.

Yet tears may mark joy as well as sorrow. In our own society, people on occasion are said to cry for joy at the reunion with long-lost loved ones. In some societies such conduct seems thoroughly culturized. Observers of the Andaman Islanders report that relatives indulge in weeping and wailing on their reunion after an absence of a few weeks or months, and this ritualistic weeping seems to have some habituated emotional significance apparently related to the sense of in-group solidarity. The New Zealand Maori also had a form of ritualized weeping, but Peter Back reports that under English influence in the schools and elsewhere it is disappearing.[19]

Just as crying is a basic and early expression of unpleasant and painful experience, so pleasant and euphoric states are evident in smiling. Though the newborn baby does not smile, it very soon expresses a pleased or satisfied condition by gurgling, grunting, and the like. And in a few weeks it shows a definite smiling response to other persons. The initial failure to smile is perhaps owing to incomplete neuromuscular maturation rather than to lack of adequate social stimulation. In other words, the biological fact of maturation underlies overt expression. The early assumption that smiling was the result of a social instinct must be revised to take into account both maturation and social interaction that begins at birth. Smiling appears to be a basic response, but it is early conditioned to specific objects by the social-cultural stimulation of the infant.

The expression of pleasure is relative to cultural norms. Lafcadio Hearn noted that in Japan the smile was a conventional expression of submission to a superior. An inferior who was rebuked must smile, not sulk, before his master.[20] When we talk of unrestrained joy, we are simply saying that we are habituated to a particular form of emotional-feeling expression. To individuals who grow up under the impress of such a cultural expectancy, it seems perfectly natural to act in an "unrestrained" manner. To act otherwise would seem strange, bizarre, and improper.

As a social-cultural expression, laughter concerns at least three types of situations, all of them related to the self-assertive aspects of personality. In the first type, laughter may be called a release of taboo, such as we experience in the joke of *double-entendre* or in the tolerated ribald jokes of vaudeville or musical comedy. The second type is related to the

[19] For an excellent review of a variety of studies on this topic, see Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, p. 187.

[20] Lafcadio Hearn, "The Japanese Smile," in *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1894), Vol. II; and his *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation* (New York, Macmillan, 1904), p. 191.

sense of security and superiority. Thomas Hobbes, the British philosopher, put it thus: "Laughter is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves." We laugh to see a dignified preacher or banker slip on any icy pavement. It is likely that the sight enhances momentarily our sense of personal dominance. A release of tensions probably also occurs. On the principle of ideomotor learning, witnessing someone else fall may set up in us bodily tensions such as we would experience if we were ourselves to start to fall. Not falling, we find a release from these incipient tensions through laughter. The third stimulus to laughter involves perceiving the incongruous in posture, speech, or gesture. But perhaps here unconscious attitudes of superiority are also aroused. Obviously, much, if not all, of our laughter is linked to our conscious and unconscious desires for power and self-expression. In wit, particularly, we are able to express hidden hostilities or to show sexual or other interests usually forbidden by the cultural norms.

Laughter is definitely conditioned not only to other persons but to particular situations. We anticipate laughter in the theater but not in the church, at a sporting event but not in a courtroom or at a directors' meeting. It is distinctly related to anticipatory reactions as these are controlled by permissive cultural patterns. Laughter at others is aggressive in meaning; laughter with others tends to be more sympathetic in tone. J. C. Gregory remarks: "The triumphant laugh of aggressive or satirical wit has an echo of war, and scorn or contempt or superiority may tinge laughter according to the relief precipitated." [22] On the other hand, conjoint laughter may not only release tension but enhance the well-being of an entire group and facilitate co-operation and consensus. A successful public speaker knows how to get audiences to laugh *at* some situation or person that is disliked and to laugh *with* him when he wants to secure approval of a point.

Many forms of wit and humor have an obvious social-control function. Ridicule of a person may not only induce a sense of inferiority but may deter him from some morally disapproved action. Irony and sarcasm may have restraining effects upon others. Ridicule which excites laughter is a rather common way of inducing shame and guilt among primitive and civilized peoples alike. Hence, though laughter in various forms is an expression of individual superiority and aggression, it may also provide an important means of communal control.

[21] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York, Dutton, 1914), p. 27.

[22] J. C. Gregory, *The Nature of Laughter* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1924), p. 221.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

ALLPORT, G. W., and VERNON, P. E., *Studies in Expressive Movement* (New York, Macmillan, 1933). An excellent review of a rather wide variety of experiments and studies in expressive movements into which emotions and feelings usually enter.

FREUD, Sigmund, *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious* (London, Fisher Unwin, 1916). See also A. A. Brill, ed., *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (New York, Random House, 1938). The classic exposition of Freud's theory of the relation of wit to the unconscious mechanisms.

JONES, Marshall R., ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, *Current Theory and Research in Motivation* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1954), Vol. 2. A collection of papers and comments on various aspects of both research and theory with regard to motivation.

KLINEBERG, Otto, *Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1954). Chapters 5 and 6 deal with motivation. Chapter 7 deals with emotions. There is a sound cross-cultural approach with ample examples.

LINDSLEY, Donald, "Emotion," in S. S. Stevens, ed., *Handbook of Experimental Psychology* (New York, Wiley, 1951), Ch. 14. A good review, with comments, of research in emotions. Suggested as providing factual background for the student of social psychology.

MCCLELLAND, DAVID C., ed., *Studies in Motivation* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955). The fifty papers in this selection provide a broad coverage, including attention to cross-cultural features.

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CHAPTER 3

Social Learning and Interaction

A CONSIDERATION of social learning is basic to the study of social psychology. Social learning refers to the acquisition of skills, facts, and values which comes about as a result of practice in our contact with other persons. The basic general concept for such contact is interaction. But before we take up certain pertinent aspects of social learning and the interactional processes, we must examine the topic of units of behavior.

UNITS OF BEHAVIOR [1]

It is helpful in studying active behavior to break it up into units. The basic unit in active behavior may be called a response. Responses are activity changes in a given direction influenced by movements of muscles or by the secretions of glands. Moreover, a response is also a movement as it is carried out in attempting to achieve some specified end or goal. There are a large number of goals, of course, such as satisfying hunger, withdrawing from a hot iron, attracting attention, earning a living, co-operating with others, trying to win a war, and so on. A great many of these goals are socially determined, or at least are affected by the social situation.

All goals, whether socially oriented or not, have one thing in common: they serve to reduce drives, which they must do if the response is to be learned and repeated. As we shall see in the next section, it is important to realize that the response is significant only when functionally connected with an antecedent event that we call a stimulus. The stimulus tends to bring forth the response. Learning theory is an attempt to explain how stimuli induce changes which, in time, become responses. We may refine our definition of response as follows: A response is a movement of muscles or a secretion of glands, activated by their own neural source, which may be said to achieve some specified end or goal and which may become functionally connected with the stimulus.

[1] The author is indebted to Professor Donald J. Lewis for help in the preparation of this section.

Types of Response

Responses may be divided into two types. First, there are instrumental responses. An instrumental response is one whose chief function is to produce immediate modification in the relationship of the organism to its external environment. Dressing, driving a car, pushing a lever, are examples of such responses. Second, there are cue-producing responses. The function of a cue-producing response is to act as a stimulus for another response. Counting numbers or using mental images to guide one's driving are instances of cue-producing responses. The difference between instrumental and cue-producing responses is important, as we shall have many occasions to note. In Chapter 5 on language we shall be particularly concerned with the function of the cue-producing responses in relation to behavior. Having distinguished these two types of response, we are now able to make specific distinction between *overt*—external and observable—activity and *covert*—or internal—activity, such as thinking.

Up to this point we have dealt chiefly with single responses. A single response involves a specific set of muscles. When the stimulus invokes the response, that set of muscles only is involved. It might appear from this that a goal is achieved always in exactly the same way; that is, that behavior must be exceedingly stereotyped and rigid. Yet we know this is not so from both common-sense observation and experimentation. In many instances, behavior can be seen to be quite variable although directed to achieving the same end. Hence we may ask, If the responses are fixed or stereotyped, how can behavior be variable? We are confronted with two problems here. We must be able to explain the variability of behavior when we know that the basic unit of response is relatively stereotyped. We also want to be able to talk about large units of activity and to proceed from a single muscle twitch to a complicated and coordinated set of activities.

Habit Families

To solve these problems, psychologists have developed the concept of *habit family* or system of responses. As we said earlier, behavior is made up of responses. The habit family is simply a class of responses; and this class, like the individual response, is defined by reference to some specified goal or end. The difference between the two is that a habit family is composed of two or more, and usually a great many, responses. What we call in this book the *social act* is a synonym for a type of habit family or system of responses directed toward a given goal, which goal is socially oriented. In other words, a social act or habit family may be viewed as a response repertoire with all the responses in the repertoire directed toward the same end.

Responses tend to lose their fixed and stereotyped nature when

they become one of a family or system of responses. That is to say, variability is possible between one response and another. The habit family permits the animal or human being to make different responses to attain the same goal. For example, if one of the responses—which may still be relatively stereotyped—in the family system is blocked, another may take its place. When we say that an organism has alternative behavioral possibilities for reaching a specified goal, we are referring to its habit family directed to that end.

Moreover, habit families tend to behave as units. Extinguishing or getting rid of one response in the habit family may generalize differentially to all members of the habit family, so that all of them may be weakened to some degree. If we are able to manipulate all the members of the habit family in the same way and at the same time, the habit family will behave like that of a single response. The laws that pertain to a single response may also pertain to a habit family. In the same way, acts, including social acts, may be described and predicted by these same laws.

There are also classes or groupings of habit families or systems of response. These may be classed together on the basis of a greater, more distant goal than is used for either single habit family or a single response within the habit family. Such a classification gives rise to a larger, more molar unit. Within this large molar unit there may be subgoals which serve to define the less-molar units of habit family. It is on the basis of our knowledge of the characteristics of a response or habit family that we are able to predict behavior.

In short, psychology has provided us with a series of laws or generalizations about responses at the level of the single response, at the level of the habit family, and at even higher unit levels of behavior. All behavior is related to a certain situation or condition in which the learning takes place. As we shall see in this book, anthropologists and sociologists frequently provide psychologists with an account of the many conditions under which learning can and does take place. In our particular study we are concerned with human learning in social situations—with situations involving the interaction of at least two individuals. As we shall see, human beings learn to interact with others in a variety of ways. Most of what we regard as significant is learned by individuals from other human beings. Each individual learns how to obtain food with the help of others, how to act toward his parents, his boss, his chiefs and medicine men. He learns what gods to worship and how to worship them. He learns what is to be considered valuable and what is worthless. He learns from others what to eat, how to cook it, and the manner in which it is eaten. Many of these things that individuals learn from other individuals are included in what is called culture, and we may

speak of the culture of an individual and of the culture of a group or society.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEARNING

In the broadest sense, human behavior may be said to be a form of adaptation or adjustment by an individual to his external environment. The capacity of an individual to make efficient or suitable adaptation to his environment may be modified by maturation and learning. Maturation refers to growth and tissue changes which occur within the individual but which are not dependent on stimuli originating outside the individual. In other words, these changes are due to what we think of as biological growth. In contrast, learning consists of changes in the individual's adjustive system that do depend on stimuli arising in the environment. Of course, not all changes in the individual's reaction come about because of either learning or maturation. For instance, what we call sensory adaptation is not referred to as learning or as maturation. Sensory adaptation is illustrated by the accommodation of the eyes to reduced light, or by the accommodation of the sense of smell to the unpleasant odors of a tannery, or by the accommodation of the sense of hearing among workers in an iron foundry to the din and noise which would bother other people. So, too, changes in behavior as a result of taking drugs lie outside of learning as we use the term. Also, the reduction in work output resulting from fatigue is not due to learning. In short, there are certain adaptive processes which are not the result of either maturation or learning.

Nature of Learning

We consider learning to be the changes in the response system of the individual brought about by deliberate or nondeliberate (unconscious) connection or linkage of new stimuli and old or new responses. The test of learning is not that a given response will occur. Rather it is that, having once taken place, a specific response will be more likely to occur again than some other response.

Over the years psychologists have carried on thousands of experiments in learning and have given much attention to various ways of interpreting these. Although no theory of learning is completely adequate at this time, that developed by Clark Hull and his co-workers provides one of the most suggestive and helpful systematic statements regarding certain important elements in learning. We shall, for the most part, follow Hull's general theory. Certain modifications with regard to social learning will be indicated later.

Hull has divided the process of learning into four fundamental

units: drive, cue, response, and reinforcement or reward. Let us look a the nature of each of these separate elements as a means for getting a more detailed picture.

Drive

We have already indicated in Chapter 2 that a drive is a strong stimulus resulting from some disequilibrium in the organism which impels it to respond or react. If strong enough, any stimulus may become a drive, and the stronger the stimulus, the more "drive function" it has. The faint sounds of distant music may have little, if any, basic or primary drive function. On the other hand, the blaring of a neighbor's radio may have a great deal.

Although any stimulus may act as a drive if it is strong enough, certain classes of stimuli provide the basis for a high percentage of motivation. These have been called the primary or innate drives. In the previous chapter we noted hunger, thirst, sexuality, and the avoidance of pain as among the more obvious innate drives. Clearly, these drives are fundamental to physical survival. Yet people living in a modern industrialized culture seldom realize the full strength of which these primary drives on occasion are capable. One of the basic purposes of any society is to provide ways of preventing primary drives from becoming so powerful as to cause individuals undue and prolonged unpleasant experience when the tensions fail to be reduced. Yet under conditions of famine, flood, fire, war, and other severe crises, modern man may experience some of the primary drives of great intensity.

The importance of the innate drive may be hidden behind social taboos. For instance, although the sex drive may be permitted to rise in strength before marriage, its overt expression may be hedged about by many controls. Frank admission that one possesses such a drive may not be tolerated by others. In some cases, the inhibitions on talking about sex drive may extend to thinking about it. In such situations, awareness of the drive tends to be weakened and, consciously at least, may be wiped out.

Under the impact of culture we all acquire a large number of secondary drives. These rest firmly on the basis of the primary ones. In adult life, secondary drives often serve as a screen behind which the primary drives are obscured. A good many of the stronger social drives probably derive from some of the more primary ones. For instance, the desire for money may be connected with the drive for food which obviously rests on a strong innate stimulus, as well as on wishes for prestige —the latter clearly, of course, derived.

The close relation of drive and learning should be self-evident. For example, without some kind of impulse or drive, students do not learn very much. One's reasons for going to college may be varied, but they

probably include the desire to prepare for a job that pays well, desire to rise in the social scale, or the wish to find a suitable mate. Or there may be still other elements in the motivation.

Cue

The term "cue" has been used by Hull and others to mean a stimulus that determines how the particular response will occur. The cue determines when, where, and which response an individual will make. The relationship between the drive and cue is important. Stimuli differ as to kind. They cover the whole sensory-perceptual apparatus. For example, there are visual stimuli, auditory stimuli, smell, taste, and touch stimuli. Stimuli also vary as to their intensity or strength. Ordinarily, bright lights, loud sounds, strong odors, serve as more effective cues than do stimuli of less-intense kind. Moreover, any strong external stimulus may have a drive value, thus motivating a person to some activity. Hot, bright sunlight "makes" one get out his sun glasses or seek the shade. By learning, however, one can come to detect—that is, develop a readiness to respond to—a stimulus of low intensity. The hunted criminal or a soldier on a dangerous reconnaissance mission becomes adept at detecting the slightest footfall. Noticing a cue can in itself be a response which may be acquired. This is what we mean when we say a person learns to pay attention.

As a rule, cues become organized into a pattern of stimuli. A driver speeding down a highway may respond differently to a combination of a sign to slow down and a motorcycle policeman seen through a rear vision mirror than he would to either the sign without the policeman or the policeman without the sign.

Since both drive and cue have their source in a stimulus, they have much in common. The cue value of a stimulus, however, arises in its *distinctiveness,* whereas that of the drive lies in its *strength.* Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, cues may serve as drives. The original hunger and sex drives, for instance, come into operation periodically. Through learning, they may be set in motion at almost any time by specific acquired cues, as by an appetizing advertisement for refreshment, or the appearance of an attractive member of the opposite sex. As Martial, the Roman epigrammatist, put it: "Man is the only animal that drinks without being thirsty and makes love at all seasons."

Response

The drive, whether original or acquired, impels the organism to respond to certain cues. At the reflex level of operation, the cues are largely innately determined and the response follows at once. Moreover, only if the response occurs can it be rewarded and learned. One of the important things in social learning is to arrange the situations or cues—

be they in the home, on the playground, in the school, or at work—in such a way that the learner will make the first correct response. This may involve not only physical conditions but adequate and fully understood directions or instructions. These latter, of course, are a form of cue. One of the difficulties in training a young child arises because the cues are not made clear to him and hence his responses may be inadequate or incorrect. Later, the individual internalizes many of his cues and the anticipatory responses associated therewith are the outgrowth of such internalization. But at the outset of learning, the infant and child must acquire his cues and responses from those around him—the mother, father, playmates, and others. As we shall see, these cues and appropriate responses are chiefly, though not entirely, derived from the culture.

The importance of response in learning is not always easy to detect. This is especially so in the case of older children and adults. When a person has already acquired a body of adaptive techniques through social learning, many of his responses will be internalized into the thinking processes, as they are called. Yet an individual cannot learn a new way of speaking or thinking until he has actually tried out a verbal statement or formulated the new thought.

The ease with which a given response can be learned in a given situation depends upon the likelihood that the cues present in the situation will call forth that particular response. If a response occurs rather often, it is easy to reinforce it and still further increase the frequency of its occurrence. If a response takes place infrequently, it will of necessity be rewarded but rarely.

Hierarchy of Response

It is possible to arrange the responses in the order of the likelihood or probability of their occurrence. There is, in fact, an initial hierarchy or ordering of responses. This ordering is related to the mutual hierarchy of the drives. The response most likely to occur we may call the dominant response in the hierarchy. The response least likely to occur we call the weakest. In other words, there is a strong linkage or connection between stimulus and dominant response, and a weak linkage between stimulus and weak response.

Learning, however, alters the order of the responses in the hierarchy, or at least it may do so. Those responses which are rewarded—reinforced—even though they be weak, will in time come to occupy dominant positions. A new ordering or hierarchy of responses emerges. For instance, we say that a man may strive for prestige or high status at a considerable sacrifice of fundamental drives of hunger and sex.

Where the order of response is primarily determined by hereditary factors, rather than by learning, we refer to the initial hierarchy as the

innate one. For example, the crying of a baby when in pain is much higher in the baby's response hierarchy than the words, "I hurt." The latter would come only later, after the acquisition of language. For most adults, the order of responses with regard to a given situation are the result of previously learned responses.

Yet one may well ask, how do new responses come into operation? N. E. Miller and John Dollard say that the new feature is added when "the particular response rewarded now occurs regularly to a specific cue, whereas previously its occurrence at just that time and place may have been exceedingly infrequent. The connection between cue and response is the new product of learning." [2] Then, too, a number of different responses may be connected to cues so that all occur together in some kind of pattern. The responses may be old, that is, they may have been present at a previous time, but the particular combination may be new.

For learning to be effective, it is important to connect the response with the new cue as soon as possible. A relatively inefficient way is illustrated in what is called trial-and-error learning. In such cases the drive calls out one response after another. As those responses high in the initial hierarchy are not reinforced or rewarded, they tend to drop out or to be extinguished and weaker responses farther down the hierarchy will appear. These are new in the sense that they do not appear until the stronger competing responses coming from the higher hierarchy are lost. If one of these later responses happens to be the correct one—for example, the one which leads to the opening of the trap door to the food—it will be rewarded and that response would become a standard. Yet such trial-and-error efforts are far from being strictly random in a statistical sense. They are determined by the initial hierarchy which may be innate but may vary from situation to situation. The hungry animal in a cage or maze from which he must escape to get food will make a wide variety of responses, but only those which lead to a successful solving of the problem will be reinforced and hence tend to recur at a later time in a like situation.

When a child learns to talk, he can use words to help him call up the correct response. Also, after the individual has learned to connect the correct responses to a given cue, or has seen another person do a given act, imitation comes into play to assist him in cutting down the amount of trial and error. We shall discuss some features of imitation later.

As we shall see, there are various ways to facilitate learning; that is, to build up the linkage of correct cues with correct responses. These ways include conditioning, insight, imitation, verbal instructions, either from others or from oneself, and reasoning. The important point to

[2] Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941), p. 25.

note is that if a response which would be rewarded does not occur, it cannot be learned.

Reinforcement

Merely repeating the same response will not advance the learning process. Some kind of strengthening reward must be present. For example, when the animal in the cage finds the escape route or door, he must be rewarded with food or in some other manner, or else the correct response will not be effectively implanted in his system. In fact, this recognition of reinforcement or reward is another way of stating what Thorndike, an earlier psychologist, called the "law of effect." In short, any event which strengthens the tendency for a response to be repeated may be called *reinforcement.* For example, relief from pain serves as a reward. Drinking water when thirsty, eating food when hungry, and going to bed when sleepy are instances of primary or innate rewards or reinforcements. As we noted in another connection, reinforcement serves to reduce the drive or, as it is often put, reward has a tension-reducing function. In this case, obviously, tension is equated to drive.

Not only is the drive-reduction function of rewards evident in the primary needs, but a great many of our reinforcing agents are learned from others. A young child does not, at first, find coins and paper money the powerful rewards which they are to older children or adults who, as we say, "have learned the value of money." Yet the child, in our society, quickly learns the usefulness of money from his parents and from other children. Other things also soon come into his experience as reward. For example, praise from the parents when being told he is a "nice child" is a type of social reward. In the same way the child soon discovers all sorts of punishing agents, both physical and social, which he learns to avoid. Some response of the child may lead to his being whipped or at least being told he is a naughty, nasty, and otherwise undesirable character.

The acquisition of all kinds of social rewards, both physical and verbal, leads to the development on the part of the growing child of various indirect means of reinforcement. The mother tells the child that he is "a good boy" when he has responded in a way approved by her. Later, the child will talk to himself as she has talked to him and this self-talking will serve as a reward. Still later, this talking to oneself may be reduced to mere subvocal responses, or what other psychologists call images and ideas. As we shall see in Chapter 5 on language, this internalization which begins with talking to oneself leads to the development and acquisition of signs and symbols that play an important part in our social life.

These four features of the process of learning—drive, cue, response, and reinforcement—represent certain fundamental features of all learn-

ing. In addition, however, there are some other aspects of the total learning process which we should review briefly, since they also have bearing on social learning—our major concern.

Extinction and Spontaneous Recovery

A reinforcing reward is essential to the acquisition of a habit. So, too, it is essential to the maintenance of a habit. If a learned response is repeated over and over again without some kind of rewarding reinforcement, in time the strength of the tendency to perform that response will undergo progressive decline. This decrement we call *extinction.* To return to the learning in the maze, the movements of the animal to open the cage in the wrong place finally disappear as he has acquired the correct responses to the latch that opens the door. According to Miller and Dollard, extinction is not to be confused with what we call forgetting. Forgetting takes place during an interval when the response is not practiced. Extinction occurs when a response is practiced but without any reinforcement. Extinction is a means by which a nonadaptive reaction can be cut down or eliminated.[3]

As might be expected, the rate of the extinction varies with the strength of the habit. Stronger habits are more resistant to extinction than weaker ones. If a habit has been well reinforced in its earlier phases, it will tend to persist. Moreover, if there was a strong drive present during the training or initial learning, it may last a long time. Thus a salesman who made money handling a certain line of merchandise when he first went into business would be disinclined to drop such a line of goods later, even though sales fell off. On the other hand, he might be directed to try to push a line of goods which did not move well at first, but which might do so at a later time.

Learned drives and learned rewards also seem to be subject to extinction. A child who has been given presents on several occasions by a guest when the latter visits his family may lose his enthusiasm for the guest if the latter subsequently fails to keep up his initial practice of bringing the child a gift. It should be noted again that mere repetition does not strengthen a habit. Extinction may be fast or slow, but if a habit is to be preserved some reinforcement is essential. Both in the experimental laboratory and in everyday life the effects of extinction tend to disappear with the passing of time. After a series of unsuccessful trips to a given stream a fisherman may give up the idea of ever returning there. Yet later on he may do so.

This tendency for a habit which has been extinguished to reappear after an interval of time is called *spontaneous recovery.* In fact, extinction may be regarded as a form of inhibition. With the passage of time the strength of the inhibiting agent may be weakened. One such agent might

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–42.

be fatigue, which would serve for a time to block a given response. Later the response would be reinstated or "recovered."

One function of extinction is to force the individual to perform new responses. If any of these new responses are reinforced, they may, in time, become so strong as to serve to eliminate an old habit. If none is reinforced, however, then there will be a tendency for the old habit to reappear.

Generalization

There is a tendency for the learning in one situation to spread or transfer to a like or similar situation. If a dog has learned, let us say, to respond to a stimulus of a mild electric shock on a given spot on his skin, the dog will later show a tendency to respond to mild shocks made on other areas of the skin, especially those near the original spot. This is called *stimulus generalization.* This seems to be a basic feature of learning. The more similar the given situation, the greater the tendency to transfer or generalize. Put more precisely, reinforcement or reward for making a specific response to a given set of cues strengthens not only the tendency for that pattern of cues to set up the response but also the tendency for other similar sets of cues to bring out the same response.

This tendency to stimulus generalization appears to be a basic and universal characteristic of all higher animals. Yet the less similar the cues, the less the transfer. This variation is called the gradient of generalization.

No two situations are ever precisely the same. It is for this reason that generalization becomes so important. If a response were completely specific to the pattern of cues associated with its reinforcement, learning would be impossible, since the specific pattern of cues would never repeat itself in precise detail. If the cues that elicit the response are completely generalized, in contrast, it would also be impossible to learn. This difficulty is resolved by what the learning theorists call "innate gradient of generalization." This means that there is a stronger tendency to respond to cues to the degree in which they are similar to those present in former situations in which a given response was rewarded. This gradation in generalization is aided by discrimination, which we will discuss later.

Life is full of examples of generalization. A child bitten by a dog may become afraid not only of other dogs but of other furry animals, such as a rabbit. Non-white natives who have learned to escape trouble with white administrators by concealing certain facts might easily transfer these habits to white anthropologists for whom they act as informants, although the latter have no intention of doing more than collecting information for scientific purposes. Formal education definitely makes use of generalization in teaching. Mastery of algebra could make possible

the handling of much simple work in elementary statistics, although the course in elementary algebra may not present material essential to the beginning statistician. There has been a long dispute in educational circles over the degree of generalization from one subject matter to another. But psychologically, the principle of generalization is a sound one. The specifics of the theories regarding educational procedures, however, do not necessarily always fulfill the pattern of generalization.

Discrimination

Failure to reinforce a generalized response tends to weaken the response. But rewarding the response to one set of cues and not rewarding the response to another set permits discrimination to be established. Discrimination enables an individual to correct maladaptive generalizations. It increases the specificity of the linkage of the cue and the response. The interplay of discrimination and generalization is neatly illustrated in the child's learning of the class names for animals. He learns first about a given cat and given dog, perhaps in his own home. He will discover from his own contact with these animals, and from his parents, to distinguish between the "bow-wow" and the "meow-meow" noises. He will learn that a cat can scratch much more effectively than a dog, and so on. Later he will generalize differences to other dogs and cats and concepts of classes of animals will develop.

Discrimination and generalization go hand in hand. The former has to do with detecting differences in cues which permit more precise and specific responses. The latter has to do with developing responses to cues which are alike in certain particulars. The less different the cues and situations, the greater the generalization.

Gradient Effects in Reinforcement

There is a certain gradation in the effects of reward. Delayed reinforcements are less effective than more immediate rewards. As a matter of actual fact, this gradation of reinforcement indicates that there is an increase in the tendency to respond the nearer the rewarding goal is approached. Moreover, it explains why we can cut down the time as we approach a given goal. Certainly in behavior beyond the most elementary reflex kind, we build up a series of subgoals which serve as reinforcements as the process goes on. Thus, as we acquire language symbols and learn to think—that is, use cue-producing responses (to be discussed below)—we are able to bridge the gap between the performance of a series of acts and the attainment of the final reinforcing reward. For instance, in our society, the thought of money and status to be secured in the future as a successful professional or business person may serve to keep a student at many unpleasant tasks connected with getting necessary training. In short, the effects of reinforcement are not limited merely

to the final cue-response sequence immediately connected with the reinforcing goal, but serve to strengthen the other cue-response linkages less directly associated with the final reinforcement.

Anticipatory Response

On the basis of the principles of stimulus generalization and gradation of reinforcement, an additional principle may be derived, namely, that responses near the point of reinforcement tend to occur before their original time in a given series of responses. That is, they tend to become anticipatory. The manner in which anticipatory responses are built up is illustrated in eating. An individual goes into a restaurant, sits down at a table, orders a steak, sees it, and then eats it. Putting a piece of the meat in the mouth elicits and reinforces salivation. On later occasions, the sight of the steak, the mere ordering of it, or merely thinking about it will set up salivation before a morsel of the meat is placed in the mouth. Another example which the reader may test is to note that salivation is likely to start when he sees a lemon or a picture of a lemon, or even when he just thinks the word "lemon."

As we shall indicate, much of our cultural learning involves generalization, gradients of reinforcement, and anticipatory responses. We not only learn to generalize from one situation to another and to develop subgoals to keep us going toward more remote goals, but much of our cultural training consists in defining and eliciting situations and responses that are considered socially proper and acceptable. Role-taking, which is so important as a part of social life, rests in large part on anticipation. Communication, the development of attitudes, and learning of purposes all have their roots in anticipatory reaction. There is in all these a certain characteristic of readiness to respond.

Cue-Producing Responses

We have already noted that individuals not only have basic or primary drives and innate rewards which serve to reinforce the connection between drive and goal, but that one of the striking features of man's life in society is his learning a wide range of new drives and new reinforcing rewards. Moreover, as the individual grows up and learns more and more at the hands of those around him, two levels of behavior emerge. First, there is a great deal of behavior which becomes more or less automatic. We respond directly and quickly to the cues in our environment and to our drives without stopping to think first. All kinds of motor skills are represented in this. In driving a car we put on the brakes at a red light, swing the car to avoid hitting another, and so on—all more or less without thinking. Such responses may have been learned slowly, but once acquired become automatic. These we call "instrumental" responses.

Yet other behavior is not so direct and automatic. The final response

follows only after a series of internal responses, called in common-sense language and older psychology "thinking" or "a train of thought." Much of our conduct, of course, is a blend of both types. In behavioristic psychology, these internal responses have been renamed to "cue-producing responses." Let us see how they operate.

A cue-producing response is one whose chief function is to induce a cue which will, in turn, serve as a part of the stimulus pattern leading to another response. Counting the coins one receives in change is a cue-producing response in that it will lead to an instrumental act of putting the change in one's purse or saying to the clerk that the change was "correct," "incorrect," or "too much." The counting of the coins may be done silently (under one's breath) or out loud. In either event it is a cue-producing act. Other illustrations are putting down numbers and doing a problem in arithmetic, setting up a train of images of persons or scenes previously experienced, or thinking by use of words and symbols. It should be noted that certain cue-producing responses may serve, first, as cues to another person, often as a substitute for an instrumental act, as in asking another person to fetch one a drink instead of getting it oneself. Or, second, the cue-producing response may supply oneself with cues, as in the example above of counting the change. It is this second use of cue-producing responses which is central to the operation of thinking, or what is traditionally called "the higher mental processes."

One important foundation of thinking is the learning of language. Not only does a child acquire verbal labels to apply to things and people, including himself, but he learns to use language as a method of getting other people to do things to and for him. At the same time, language enables him to direct the course of his own behavior because he learns to talk to himself (see Chapter 5).

Cue-producing responses of this kind aid one in generalization and in handling classes of objects as well as particular objects. Our culture provides us with thousands of words which we come to use as cue-producing responses, both directly in communication with others and internally as a means of directing our own latent instrumental responses. Without their aid, we could not make a very adequate adjustment to the social-cultural maze in which we operate with our fellows. Ample application of these principles will be presented in other sections of this book.

SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE BASIS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

Learning from Others

As pointed out in Chapter 2, man is active, purposeful, predictive, and capable of controlling his responses. Like other organisms, man is delicately balanced in the sense that he must maintain a certain homeo-

static state or perish. We have discovered, too, that man is capable of learning new responses and of combining old responses into new sequences.

Here we must turn to extend our comments on the nature of learning to social learning. It is important to remember that social learning consists largely of responses that are *learned from others.* Because of the way in which a man is coupled to the environment, it is necessary to study man's actions as part of a larger system of events. To deal effectively with larger systems, it will be necessary for us briefly to mention one of the most important concepts that has been developed in the behavioral sciences. This is the concept of *culture.* Culture is learned. Moreover, it is learned from other persons. Gradually, the culture comes to affect the individual in what he thinks, what he believes, and how he acts. Culture is an expanding and persisting accumulation of ways of doing and thinking which one generation hands down to the next. In fact, culture represents a kind of expected behavior which individuals require of those around them: parents of children, preachers of parish members, teachers of pupils, leaders of followers, and so on. At this point we are concerned largely with the manner in which the individual learns or acquires his culture and other aspects of his learned behavior.

We have used the expression "learned from" without explaining it. If we can make clear just what this expression means, we will be well on our way toward understanding the concept of social interaction. From the previous section you should have an understanding of what the word "learns" means. However, the familiar word "from" serves to convey a somewhat complicated idea. You may protest that everyone knows what it means to say, "learns from," hence there is no point in elaborating the obvious. Let us make sure that this expression is clearly understood.

The word "from" in the expression "learns from" serves to convey two ideas: first, the idea that the learned responses of at least two persons are "matched" or alike; second, the idea that the learned responses of at least one of two persons are "dependent" upon the responses of the other. Let us imagine that Mr. A has learned to do something from Mr. B, such as how to tie a knot in a piece of rope. It can be seen that Mr. A was "dependent" on Mr. B and that something Mr. B did was a necessary condition for Mr. A to acquire a learned response. In terms of learning theory we say that some of Mr. B's responses served as cues for Mr. A and these cues enabled the latter to learn to tie a knot. Further, the way Mr. A ties the knot and the way Mr. B ties the knot are sufficiently similar to allow us to say that the two ways are matched.

The expression "Mr. A learned something from Mr. B" can now be better understood. It means that the learned response of Mr. A's is matched to one of Mr. B's and that Mr. B was dependent upon Mr. A in the acquisition of the learned response. This concept of matched de-

pendent behavior becomes a basis, then, upon which we can classify certain learned responses with which we shall be concerned.

Kinds of Learned Behavior

The idea of matched dependent behavior is important enough to warrant a careful examination of the following classification.[4]

Table 2. A Classification of Learned Responses

Case I	Matched and Dependent (+) (+)	Illustrated by "cultural behavior" learned from others
Case II	Matched and Not Dependent (+) (−)	Illustrated by "same" or coenotropic behavior
Case III	Not Matched and Dependent (−) (+)	Illustrated by "personal-social behavior"
Case IV	Not Matched and Not Dependent (−) (−)	Illustrated by "personal-nonsocial behavior"

Case I covers what has been called "cultural behavior." For example, someone has acquired a skill by learning from another to tie a knot. This would be cultural learning whether a person watched another tie a knot or was instructed by another either orally or in writing. Most of the things you do have been learned in just this way.

Case II covers "same behavior," sometimes called coenotropic behavior. This would be illustrated by two independent inventions of the same way of tying a knot. In anthropology this has been called "parallel invention." In the case of responses which we would not wish to dignify with the term "invention," we sometimes just say that two persons are doing the same thing, although neither learned from the other or from anyone else. Rather they learned because of similar bodily structure and similar environment (stimulus). For example, individuals running from a fire or other disaster would come in this category also! So, too, many common social motives would fall into this class.

Case III has to do with what has been called "personal-social" behavior. This is illustrated by a person's learning to tie a knot, first using some cues from another person but devising a significantly different way of going about it. The new way could not have been devised had the knot-tier not received some cues from the other person in the first place. What in anthropology has sometimes been called "stimulus diffusion" falls into this category. A great deal of learning in infancy also falls under this category. In learning situations the infant is often dependent upon cues from the mother, but his responses are not matched either to his mother's overt behavior or to the import of her words. Many of our

[4] *Ibid.* So far as we know, N. E. Miller and John Dollard were the first to use the expression "matched dependent" behavior. Our Case I covers both what they called "matched dependent" behavior and "copying."

basic emotional responses, approach or withdrawal responses, and others are doubtless acquired in this way.

Case IV would be what we shall call "personal-nonsocial" behavior. This is illustrated by the very first invention of any way to tie a knot. Theoretically, the behavior of so-called "feral man" (wild man), insofar as it does not fall under *Case II* or "same behavior," would also be an instance of personal-nonsocial responses.

The student should not, however, get the impression that the learning process is a one-way affair. Typically, Mr. A not only learns from Mr. B but Mr. B learns from Mr. A. There is a reciprocal or mutual modification of behavior. The response of Mr. A is the stimulus to Mr. B, and the latter response, in turn, is a stimulus to Mr. A. Mr. A and Mr. B are interdependent—coupled together—and we say that they *interact*. To say that two people interact is equivalent to saying that the responses of one person in a situation serve as cues which activate responses in the second person. And the second person's responses are, in turn, cues that set off similar or further responses in the first. In this way a chain of interactions is set up.

Interaction between human beings usually involves use of cue-producing responses. These responses we make serve as cues to ourselves. In turn, we set up further responses of one kind or another. In other words, interaction between human beings is heavily modified or qualified by the use of symbols. As we indicated in the earlier example, the use of symbols in counting, talking to ourselves, and the so-called inner thought processes are illustrations of cue-producing responses. In social interaction, individuals use a wide variety of symbolic techniques which do not call for much, if any, close bodily movement. Thus, when two people talk to one another, we would say the process involved is that of social interaction although it is basically symbolic. It is obvious, of course, that in such activities as fighting or wrestling the interaction involves the gross bodily musculature.

Some learning does not involve social interaction, although the great bulk of our learning does. An individual may learn to avoid a hot substance or some danger in nature without relating himself to any other person. Actually, of course, in most situations, sooner or later some other individual does intervene.

Opposition or Co-operation

Crucial to understanding interaction that involves two or more people is the realization that the outcome of this interaction cannot be predicted unless the behavior of those concerned is seen in the context of drive-goal process. Social scientists have found it convenient to study interaction with respect to the ends or goals which are involved in the process. They have observed that the basic interaction takes one of two

major forms. It tends to be either co-operational or oppositional in character.

Whether the interaction is of one or the other kind, there are certain conditions which must obtain if any interaction is to take place: (1) The participants must be in a state of drive. If they were not, they would not perform responses which could be utilized as cues by the other person. (2) There must be a goal or goals which the participant anticipates can be reached or approached through either *striving with* or *striving against* the other. (3) There must be an inhibition of tendencies to oppose if the individuals are to co-operate, or an inhibition of tendencies to co-operate if they oppose each other. (4) Certain responses must be in the response repertoire if the participants are to oppose successfully or co-operate successfully. Briefly, then, participants must be motivated, there must be a goal, there must be inhibition of conflicting response tendencies, and there must be some means at hand—previously learned responses—to enable them to approach or reach the anticipated goal.

Co-operational and oppositional forms of interaction differ in the following respects: (1) In the case of co-operation the efforts of the participants must have the effect of increasing the likelihood that a common or related goal will be reached, by one or both. In opposition, the efforts of the participants must have the effect of decreasing the likelihood of the attainment of a goal anticipated by one or the other or both the participants. (2) In co-operation it is usual that the goal or goals may be shared and shared in somewhat equal amounts. At least people under our cultural conditions seem to co-operate more effectively when a goal can be achieved in relatively equal amounts. On the other hand, in opposition, it is usual that the goal or goals cannot be shared. People oppose each other more vigorously when the goal cannot be shared. (3) In co-operation the emotional and feeling components are generally of a sympathetic, friendly character. In opposition the affective or emotional components are generally of an unsympathetic, hostile kind.

Acquisition of Role

As the infant and child gradually learns to interact with others, either co-operationally or oppositionally, he builds up within himself responses or groups of responses (habit families) which he exhibits whenever he enters a new social situation. Any particular habit family or set of habit families derived from earlier learned responses constitute what we shall call a *role*. In the course of an individual's life a number of these roles are built up, depending upon the nature and variety of the interactional situations to which he is exposed. Frequently one role may come into conflict with another, and if this happens one role may be lost. This would be a case of extinction. Or, in some conflicts of roles, neurotic patterns may emerge.

People come to anticipate that a given individual will typically interact in a certain way, that is, he will play a certain role in a certain kind of social situation. Cultural learning has a large part in the building of roles, which often begins in the dependent relations of the young child to the parent.

A person is ordinarily not free to elaborate just any kind of role. The responses of others will serve to restrict one's own role. In certain societies, roles are so completely mapped out that any given individual has little or no opportunity to change them or to develop new ones. These are ascribed roles in contrast to achieved roles which one learns voluntarily. We shall return to the whole subject of role and status in another connection.

The ways of interacting which an individual learns from others as a part of his culture are among the most important of all his learned range of responses. In fact, one of the basic functions of culture is to canalize and direct the interactional processes. Although we shall have plenty of opportunity to examine this fact in detail, we mention one instance now by way of illustration. In our own society we put heavy stress on oppositional patterns, particularly competitive ones which are related to our upward striving for higher status. In some other societies, the emphasis is on co-operating and less-competitive procedures in satisfying basic and acquired needs. The habits and values of individuals brought up in such different societies will certainly affect differently the personality structure of those concerned.

SOME ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIAL LEARNING

There are certain special instances of interactional effects which must be taken into account in social psychology. We have examined those related to imitation, opposition, and co-operation. There remain the important factor of suggestion, the place of praise and blame, and certain related factors which may serve to facilitate or restrain particular kinds of interactional adaptation.

Suggestion

Many writers distinguish between suggestion and suggestibility. Suggestion may be considered the cue or stimulus, and suggestibility the internal readiness to react which is related to this cue. In any event, suggestion falls within the broader concept of interaction at the symbolic level, and certainly both internal and external factors play a part in its functioning.

Suggestion may be defined as a form of symbolic communication—by words, pictures, or some similar device—aimed at inducing ac-

ceptance. The acceptance or rejection of the proposed symbol is determined by the stimulus and by the internal conditions operating together. In this sense, suggestibility is really a phase of anticipatory activity which we have already discussed. In short, suggestion is a device to short-circuit logical analysis, to inhibit critical restraint, and to lead at once to some desired response or act. The type of response that a suggested cue will arouse depends, in large part, upon one's cultural training. Once the image or idea and the accompanying attitude are set up, response tends to flow in the "suggested" direction. In this connection some of the important cues are those which are related to the emotions or feelings rather than to rationality. In this sense, suggestion and motivation operate together.

Among the external conditions influencing suggestibility are such things as bright colors, pleasant tones, rhythmic and monotonous stimuli, and certain qualities of instruction or statements themselves. So, too, prestige-bearing individuals add their weight to suggestibility.

Internal conditions which favor suggestibility include both physiological ones, such as fatigue and the effects of narcotics or intoxicants or prolonged fasting, and the psychological ones which derive from prior training in submission to authority, in acceptance of principles of moral conduct, or in prejudice about class differences or superiority to one's own group or society. Especially pertinent are emotional disturbances such as a developed dissociation, giving rise to free fantasies and uncontrolled associations, or disturbances in the form of a release of elemental impulses of hostility, fear, and sexuality. When we examine the behavior of people in mobs we shall see how suggestibility operates. It also operates in fashion changes, in propaganda, and in other forms of collective behavior. Since the emotions arise most easily in severe crisis, any dislocation in economic or social structure or in everyday living, such as comes with flood, famine, financial panic, religious revival, crime wave, or war, produces an excellent setting for the operation of suggestion.

Some suggestions are direct, others indirect. Some are positive, some negative. Direct suggestions are illustrated by commercial advertising, or by the appeal to thrift or to high social status. Indirect suggestion is found in veiled or hidden propaganda, where the aim is to undermine one value or slowly to build up another value without the individual knowing who is conducting the propaganda or its ultimate aim, or even being aware that he has been subjected to propaganda. Positive suggestions are those which induce one to act at once, such as the advertising slogan, "Eventually, why not now?" Negative suggestions stimulate one to avoid an act or thought. Campaigns for public safety are of this kind. Many commercial advertisements use both a negative and a positive ap-

proach. Those dealing with body odor or bad teeth often combine stimulation of avoidance and fear with some positive proposal of how to overcome or offset the unfortunate trait or condition.

Suggestion has been classified as of three types: idiomotor, prestige, and autosuggestion. The first is found at the sensory-perceptual level and was the subject of much research in an earlier day. One experiment by Alfred Binet, the distinguished French psychologist who invented the mental test, is well known. He presented a number of children with a series of lines progressively approaching the same length. As might be expected, he discovered that, far more often than chance would allow, a child judged the lines which were the same length to be different, or lines of a slightly different length to be the same, depending upon at what point these were introduced in the total test series.

Idiomotor suggestion is often identified with empathy. A spectator watching a high jump and lifting one leg as the jumper goes over the bar, is an illustration. Much of this kind of suggestion takes place below the level of consciousness. Here, of course, imitation and suggestion merge into one another.

Prestige suggestion is evident everywhere. A speaker may sway his audience because he has a great name. People flock to the motion picture in which a prominent actor or actress appears, often without inquiring into the merit of the picture itself. In advertising, one of the neatest illustrations of prestige suggestion is the kind which states that Mrs. Astorbilt sleeps on a certain brand-name mattress, having first cleansed her face with a well-known facial cream. Another illustration of prestige suggestion is indicated in certain experiments with musical compositions. In one such by P. A. Sorokin and J. W. Boldyreff the students listened to the playing of a series of selections and were told which were superior and which was less superior. They were also told in another part of the experiment that identical records were different. In every case, the students tended to follow, overwhelmingly, the suggestions laid down in the instructions.[5]

In autosuggestion the individual directs his own train of thought and action. This process is easy to understand in terms of role-taking. Just as we talk to ourselves, giving advice, scolding or blaming, rationalizing, or thinking out loud, so we may set up suggestions for ourselves to follow. In fact, the whole concept of ego-ideal, developed by Sigmund Freud, rests upon autosuggestion. The values that an individual sets up in his mind, the image of an admired individual or an ideal toward which he strives—these are examples of autosuggestion.

Finally, we must say something about the common misunderstand-

[5] P. A. Sorokin and J. W. Boldyreff, "An Experimental Study of the Influence of Suggestion on Discrimination and the Valuation of People," *Amer. J. of Sociology*, 1932, 37:720–737.

ings of suggestion. First of all, suggestion is not a special mental or interactional mechanism. It is closely related to the process of identification. In the second place, it is not a special or general trait of the total personality, though the evidence that people may differ in their readiness to accept suggestions does give rise to the possibility that it may be correlated with some particular personality trait or type. In the third place, it is not an explanatory concept but rather a descriptive one, involving a combination of cues and anticipatory responses. And fourth, culture plays a large part in predetermining the readiness to accept and follow suggestion. As an example of the latter, the Mohave Indian in our Southwest is taught to expect—as a phase of his growing up—a vision from the gods of his tribe. Moreover, this is thought to influence practically all his subsequent conduct. Among the Malay natives, an individual is trained to undergo certain severe ordeals, such as walking over hot coals, or passing hot skewers through the flesh, as phases of certain religious and magical rituals. He does this without outward evidence of pain. These types of suggestion are laid down in the culture. In our own cultural history so-called mental epidemics—such as land booms and gold rushes—and highly emotional religious revivals illustrate the same process. In other words, although the mechanisms of suggestion rest on psychological foundations, their peculiar direction and meaning are largely controlled by the social and cultural forces which impinge upon the person.

Praise and Blame

Learning is also affected by encouragement or discouragement. This is but a special instance of symbolic reward or reinforcement or its reverse of punishment, which has become accepted in our society. Both praise and blame are in constant use in the home, on the playground, in the school, in the office or factory, or in other situations where training goes on. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" is an old aphorism in child training, but like much folk wisdom it is countered by advice which stresses positive rewards rather than punishment—"You catch more flies with honey than vinegar." A number of studies on the effect of praise and blame have shown that these may influence schoolwork or performance of certain kinds of activities. However, the results are not always consistent. Also, the presence or absence of other people, the presence or absence of co-workers, the effect of having to compete or co-operate all have their peculiar influences upon learning.

Cultural-Social Change and Learning

In concluding this chapter, it is well to indicate that learning and relearning are fundamental mechanisms in social and cultural change. Such changes, of course, may be of varied import with regard to the

individual and the given group or society. What are known in sociology as social movements are usually descriptions of large-scale cultural changes brought about by revolution, or the adoption of some new type of technology as illustrated in the phrase "Industrial Revolution." One problem to bear in mind in interpreting such large-scale changes is that all new learning is based upon previous learning. Secondly, new learning may be either incidental and minor, or it may involve a rather rapid and complete shift of a large block of habit families in the individual. Sometimes, of course, the individual's habits and attitudes seem to be almost completely reversed. Typical of the latter are religious or other conversions. Whole sets of new drive-cue-response-reinforcement patterns are set up and the individual comes to have, in effect, what is often said to be a new life.

Conversion or convertibility has not been extensively explored by either experimental or social psychologists. However, it probably represents some basic factors in human personality. We do know that the particular and usable or routine habit patterns represent only a part of the total repertoire of the individual. This means that he has learned many things which are not now in use or which have been repressed or suppressed. The contributions of Freud in this connection have been tremendous. More than any other writer in the field, he has contributed to the knowledge that we have in our make-up many, many traits which have been held back or otherwise kept in leash in the full process of developing habits and attitudes conforming with the social-cultural demands of our group or society. The breakdown or change of these is illustrated in what we know as a dissociation mechanism. This is evidenced in the more severe cases in schizophrenia or in the hysteric cases of dual personalities.[6]

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CRAFTS, L. W., SCHNEIRLA, and others, *Recent Experiments in Psychology,* 2nd ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1950). Chapter 4 presents both experimental and cross-cultural material on co-operation and competition. Will serve to fill out the discussion here. Chapter 24 is on the motor theory of learning. This theory has, in some ways, stood the test of time better than any other.

DOLLARD, John, and MILLER, Neal E., *Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1950). A revised and briefer statement of what is found in Miller and Dollard below. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are most pertinent for the discussion in the present chapter.

HILGARD, Ernest R., *Theories of Learning,* 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956). An excellent and critical review of the chief learning

[6] For a discussion of this topic, see Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment,* 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), Ch. 23.

theories now current. Both the sound points and the limitations of the various schools are brought out.

HOVLAND, Carl I., "Human Learning and Retention," in S. S. Stevens, ed., *Handbook of Experimental Psychology* (New York, Wiley, 1951), Ch. 17. A technical review with sound comments on the chief features of human learning. Useful as background for students of social psychology.

MILLER, Neal E., and DOLLARD, John, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941). A serious effort to link together much of Hull's learning theory with material from sociology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology. Certain sections of the present chapter have drawn heavily on this book. It has become something of a classic in social psychology.

CHAPTER 4

Foundations of Personality

THE popular idea of personality may be quite misleading. One may hear that "John has a terrific personality," or that "Mary isn't getting anywhere with the boys. You see, she just doesn't seem to have any personality." From the standpoint of social psychology these statements are inadequate, since they emphasize only the external or stimulus value of one person for another. A scientific view of personality will take the internal and other factors into account.

For our purposes we may define personality as a more or less patterned body of habits, traits, attitudes, and ideas of an individual as these are organized externally into roles and statuses, and as they relate internally to motivation, goals, and various aspects of selfhood. Personality, then, has two aspects: role and status with respect to conduct affecting others, and life organization or selfhood with regard to internal motivation, goals, and the ways of viewing one's own behavior as well as the behavior of others. Briefly, it concerns *overt action* and *meaning.* The source of roles and statuses with their supporting ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits is a person's differential participation in various groups and their culture patterns. Some of his characteristics as a personality will have much in common with those of his fellows. These may be regarded as the feature of conformity. Other features will be quite distinctive and idiosyncratic. Some writers in the field of social psychology tend to emphasize the conformity aspects of personality, others the unique.

The present chapter will deal (1) with the function of social perception, (2) with the nature of our traits, attitudes, ideas, and other structural elements of personality, (3) with the forms of thinking as they affect life organization, (4) with role and status, and (5) with socialization. In brief, the basic features of this chapter will have to do with the internal organization of personality as this is related to basic external interactional processes.

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

The Nature of Perception

Perception refers to the activity of sensing, interpreting, and appreciating objects both physical and social. Sensing the world around us depends upon both physical and social stimuli which constitute the environment. Moreover, the sensing is first of all determined by the particular sensory process that we use at any given time. The major sensory processes are those of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the muscle sense. The factor of interpretation involves, in part, the manner in which the organism as an active and dynamic unit organizes its perceptions. It also involves past experience or meaning. David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, following Gestalt theory, contend that because of neurological organization, even the simplest perceptions of the infant take on structure and meaning.[1] Other people do not hold this view. In any case, the young child soon begins to organize his perceptions. Certainly the perceptions of the adult are largely the result of learning, and in this learning organic factors such as the nature of the neurological system play an important part. The third factor, appreciation or evaluation, is really a sub-aspect of interpretation. It refers to the significance of the perception in the larger social and cultural context in which it occurs. It is really much the same as what W. I. Thomas called the "definition of the situation." As we shall see, there are both individual and cultural differences in social perception. In order to understand social perception, however, it must be realized that this is but one aspect of the total cognitive process of perception. There is no special social perception as such.

Moreover, perception is related to motivation or needs. What we see or hear will be partly determined by the particular motive or drive at the moment, as well as by what we have learned about this particular object or situation. Of the four features in the learning process discussed in the previous chapter, perception belongs with the second; that is, it falls in the field of cues or stimuli. Leo Postman has developed what he calls a concept of "perceptual response disposition" which he says is anchored, on the one side, in "selected manipulations of the stimulus and in manipulations of the organism which must include an instruction stimulus." On the other hand, the perceptual response disposition depends upon "consequent side in two or more classes of restricted responses." [2]

[1] David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 84–85.

[2] Leo Postman, "The Experimental Analysis of Motivational Factors in Perception," in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, *Current Theory and Research in Motivation* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1953), p. 65.

There are a number of important factors that enter into the organization and functioning of perception. Among them are selectivity, perceptual organization and accentuation or emphasis, stabilization or fixation, and mental set. All of these are influenced both by individual and cultural differences. Let us examine these more closely with particular reference to the social factors involved. Throughout what follows it is important to bear in mind that we are discussing the role of the perceiver or person in the process of perception and that the person is largely a social and cultural product.

Selectivity

In his contact with the world around him the individual cannot respond to everything at once. There is a certain selectivity among the stimuli. This may be regarded in fact as a compromise between excitation of sensory processes set up by the stimulus and "what the organism is set to see or wants to see, or even, what the organism wants to avoid seeing." [3]

A good illustration of selectivity is found in a study of Leo Postman, J. S. Bruner, and Elliott McGinnies. The subjects of this experiment were 25 students of Harvard and Radcliffe. They were shown 36 words, one at a time and very briefly, in a modified Dodge tachistoscope, a standard exposure apparatus. The words, shown in capital letters, were chosen to represent the six-value system of Eduard Spranger as worked out in the Allport-Vernon study of values. These were: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious. The 36 words had been carefully selected by independent judges from a preliminary list of 96 words equally distributed among the six values.

In order to secure an independent measure of personal value orientation, the Allport-Vernon test was administered individually to each subject. This test was given either some weeks in advance of the perceptual experiment or after the experiment.

The experiment clearly demonstrated that the subjects tended to recognize the words to which they were exposed largely in terms of their particular value orientations. The subjects were told to report everything that they saw or thought they saw as they looked at these words shown them serially in the tachistoscope. An analysis of the recognition thresholds showed that there was a definite positive correlation between the personal value orientation of the individual and the recognition of the words. For example, those people who were high on the religious section of the Allport-Vernon scale tended to recognize words of religious meaning more quickly and adequately than others. Those high on the

[3] J. S. Bruner and Leo Postman, "An Approach to Social Perception," in Wayne Dennis, ed., *Current Trends in Social Psychology* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948), p. 85.

political value orientation tended to recognize words of political import. Even in their errors individuals tended to interpret the words in terms of their value orientation. For example, one person high on the religious value scale, when shown the word "sacred," said he saw the word "Easter." To the word "reverence" he reported the word "divinity."

In interpreting their findings, the authors propose three complementary selective mechanisms: the first of these they call selective sensitization. That is, individuals tend to perceive more accurately and rapidly words which fall into their value orientation. In the second place, there is a mechanism which they call perceptual defense. Here the value orientation not only contributes to the selectivity and accentuation of certain precepts, but it acts to erect barriers against precepts that are incongruent or threatening to the individual's values. This is illustrated by the fact that one of the subjects who had very little interest in religious values, when confronted with the word "sacred," saw it as "sucked," "sacked," "shock," and finally correctly as "sacred." Another who lacked aesthetic values saw "hypocrisy" for "elegant." In the third case, there is what the authors call value resonance. This is otherwise called the pre-solution hypothesis. As the authors put it, "When stimulus words reflecting the same values as the subject's preferred hypotheses are presented to him, they are recognized more rapidly since they conform to, or are resonant with, his general set to respond in terms of his major values." [4]

McGinnies has ably demonstrated the role of perceptual defense in another piece of research. Again the operation involved excluding certain stimuli; that is, the perceiver "denatures the stimuli" or fails to get the meaning of the stimuli which are disliked or felt to be threatening to him. McGinnies made up a list of 18 words, seven of which were words that had strong emotional denotations and connotations in our society. Among these words were "raped," "whore," and "bitch." The subjects of the experiments were eight male and eight female undergraduates, selected from an introductory psychology class at the University of Alabama. All were naive as to the intention of the experiment. The words were exposed in a tachistoscope. To the subject's palms were strapped electrodes which would measure the galvanic skin response. The subject's threshold was first determined for four trial words in order to accustom him to the apparatus and to allow his level of resistance to become stabilized. In all cases, thresholds were determined by exposing the stimulus words, first for .01 of a second and then at .02 of a second and so on for increasingly longer time periods until the given word was correctly reported by the subject. Prior to the experiment, the subjects

[4] Leo Postman, J S Bruner, and Elliott McGinnies, "Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception." *J of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1948, 43:142–152. Quotation is from p 153.

were told that they would be shown words they might not be able to recognize at first, but they were told to report whatever they saw at each exposure regardless of what it was.

The results show, both for the threshold of recognition as well as the galvanic skin response, that the reactions to the emotionally toned words was sharply greater than to the neutral words. There were no marked sex differences in the responses of this group; both men and women subjects gave clear evidence of perceptual defense with regard to the seven loaded words. As McGinnies puts it: "Perceptions are structured not only with respect to the limiting stimulus conditions, but also with regard to the possibilities of reward, need fulfillment, attitudinal orientation, potential anxiety, symbolic value, and release from tension, to mention just a few." [5]

It is clear from these studies that the objects or stimuli which are selected or accentuated have something to do with the purpose of a perceiving individual. A number of studies have shown, for example, that ambiguous figures exposed in a tachistoscope to subjects who have been kept hungry for some hours tend to be perceived as food objects. Other illustrations of like effects will be given later in this chapter.

Organization and Emphasis

Perceptual organization represents a compromise between what is present in the way of the stimulus and what the organism is trying to perceive. It is clear that the greater the ambiguity of the stimulus, the greater the place of preperception or intention in the organizational operation. For example, a subject would reveal his needs and traits more readily in the perception of an ambiguous Rorschach card than in describing a sharply focused photograph before him. Into this perceptual organization there enters, of course, the intention or *Einstellung*. The intent itself will be modified in terms of needs and mental set. Then, too, there is the content of the organized field of perception. By this we mean what is actually seen, heard, tasted, smelled, and so on. It is clear that selection and organization go together.

As a matter of fact, perceptual organization has often been regarded as an important key to the organization of personality itself. For instance, students of the Rorschach test have shown that certain kinds of shading dominate the perceptual organization of individuals who are anxiety-ridden. Or they have shown that certain extratensive individuals prefer colors to form and that many neurotics experience color shock in trying to interpret the Rorschach ink blots. Actually, of course, the basic reasons for these particular personality reactions have not yet been ex-

[5] Elliott McGinnies, "Emotionality and Perceptual Defense," *Psychological Review*, 1949, 56:244–251. Quotation is from p. 244.

posed. They probably lie deep in the unconscious, and we need additional research on these particular points.

Another classic study of the nature of perceptual organization is Muzafer Sherif's study of autokinetic movement. This study will be discussed in Chapter 10 where we deal with the topic of group norms. Also, the manner in which cultural factors play a part in organization will be demonstrated later in this section.

By perceptual accentuation or emphasis we refer to the differential interpretation of various parts of the total perceptual field. It is really a phase of organization. In dealing with emphasis, however, we must not neglect the equally important matter of constancy of perception. There are, after all, relatively stable factors of size, shape, color, and brightness with reference to certain physical objects. In terms of the physical stimulus, we have learned to accept these constancies even though there are variations in the position of the objects, the degree of illumination, and in other factors. Thus, there are many nonsocial elements that operate to determine such constancies. On the other hand, it is true that often these factors themselves are partially influenced by the subjective state of the perceiving person.

A much-quoted experiment which indicates this subjective factor is that of J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman who attempted to demonstrate that in perception the greater the social value of an object, or the greater the need for an object, the greater will be its vividness and accentuation.[6] These authors had as subjects 30 ten-year-old children, half of whom, called the "rich group," were from prosperous business and professional families and half of whom, the "poor group," were from a settlement house located in one of Boston's slums. They were set the task of adjusting a circular patch of light so as to equate it to what they believed to be the size of various coins and discs of about the same size as the coins. The coins ranged from a penny through a half dollar. The children were first asked to estimate the size of these coins from memory and then to estimate the size of the coins by adjusting the disc when the coins were present.

The authors found that the coins which were socially valued were judged to be larger in size than the corresponding cardboard discs. In the second place, they found that the greater the value of the coin, the greater the degree of overestimation of size, with the exception of the half dollar. It was shown further that the poor children tended to overestimate the size of the coins considerably more than did the rich children.

The repetition of this study by L. F. Carter and K. Schooler did not

[6] J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman, "Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1947, 42:33–44.

confirm the results of the original study. Using the same kind of apparatus, they provided the subjects with 36 aluminum discs. Five of these were of nearly the same diameter as a penny, dime, nickel, quarter, and half dollar. Also five cardboard discs, light gray in color, of about the same size as the coins, were used; and also five real coins of the proper denominations. The subjects were 48 children aged nine to eleven years. Twenty-four came from a poor group secured from a settlement house, and of these one-third were Negro children. Twenty-four were fourth-graders from a well-to-do suburb. The subjects were put through a variety of combinations of exercises with the discs and the coins present and also from memory. Using the method of average error as did the original experimenters, Carter and Schooler found a number of interesting differences. First, "Differences between the judgments of the rich and of the poor group are so small as to be insignificant in those cases where the coin is present and also where judgments were made regarding the aluminum discs and the cardboard discs." Second, when "the data for memory are combined and subjected to analysis of variance the differences between the rich and the poor groups are significant at the 1 per cent level, although the differences for each separate denomination are not significant at this level." Third, when the physical coin was present as a standard, no significant differences were found. Fourth, it should be noted also that "the judgments made from memory by the rich groups fall very close to the judgments made while the coin was present. Thus it seems that the difference in the rich and the poor group's judgment made from memory is due to the significant overestimation of the poor group, while the rich group's judgments are similar to the coin-present judgments." Finally, in general, the larger metal discs tended to be overestimated and the smaller discs to be underestimated. Also this holds true for real coins, carboard discs, and for memory of the size of the coins.

The authors modify the Bruner and Goodman findings in the direction of indicating a caution in the original hypothesis. They do, however, believe with the original authors that the poor children's judgment is influenced by their need system and that they imagine coins to be larger than they really are. "Rich children, on the other hand, perhaps having less need for money and also presumably more familiar with coins than poor children, make judgments from memory which correspond closely with similar judgments made with the coins present." [7]

[7] L. F. Carter and K. Schooler, "Value, Need, and Other Factors in Perception," *Psychological Review*, 1949, 56:200–207. Quotations are from pp. 202, 202–203, 204, and 205. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

Stabilization

There is, furthermore, a tendency to stabilize our perceptions and hence our world. This we refer to as perceptual fixation. Probably some form of stimulus generalization is at work in the process. This means, then, some form of reinforcement in expectation, but just how this happens we do not know. Certainly it is related to the anticipatory reaction which we discussed in the previous chapter. The classic experiment in fixation is that conducted by C. W. Perky. She exposed some very faint images of bananas and other things on a screen and signaled her subjects when a faint image was to appear and then asked them to tell her what they saw. She kept reducing the illumination until the images were no longer present, but on signaling, the subjects continued to report seeing these various objects.[8] Not only is there some form of stimulus generalization present, but it is well to indicate once more the dynamic nature of perception. We may say that the individual is not a passive recipient but goes out to meet his world. R. S. Woodworth has put this well in the following words: ". . . Perception is always driven by a direct, inherent motive which might be called the will to perceive. . . . It is impossible to look without trying to see, to listen without trying to hear." [9]

Yet a certain inertia is present. We are the victims of habit, and old-line perceptions break down only when we are forced to reorganize them. R. H. Thouless illustrated this well when he contrasted artists and non-artists, the latter being mechanics. He found that artists are what he called stimulus-bound to objects. Mechanics were more concerned with real sizes as illustrated in fitting a nut to a bolt. There again, however, the cultural training comes into play. The individual learns what to expect and what to perceive.[10]

Mental Set

Let us now examine what factors enter into the mental set as it affects selection and organization of perception. First we will consider some cross-cultural comparisons. At the turn of the century, a group of psychologists went to the Torres Straits to study the psychological reactions of the people native to that area. They were concerned with a large variety of questions involving both sensory and motor responses. In a

[8] Cheves W. Perky, "An Experimental Study of Imagination," *American J. of Psychology*, 1910, 21:422–452. See also D. G. Ellson, "Experimental Extinction of an Hallucination Produced by Sensory Conditioning," *J. of Experimental Psychology*, 1941, 28:350–361. Ellson used tones and got much the same results.

[9] R. S. Woodworth, "Reinforcement of Perception," *American J. of Psychology*, 1947, 60:119–124. Quotation is from p. 123.

[10] R. H. Thouless, "Individual Differences in Phenomenal Regression," *British J. of Psychology*, 1932, 22:216–241.

study of visual illusions, it was found that the Müller-Lyer illusion, a familiar one in Western society, was interpreted as a complex type of fishhook because it resembled such a thing in their culture.[11]

Another example of mental set and interpretation is shown in a study by E. M. Siipola.[12] She exposed a group of words mixed with nonsense syllables or words to two groups of subjects. Group A-B were told that the words had to do with either animals or birds. Group T-T were told that the words had to do with travel or transportation problems. Among other words in the list that get a differential interpretation are the following:

Supposed word	*Group A-B*	*Group T-T*
chack	chick; chuck	check
sael	seal	sail
wharl	whale	wharf
pasrort	parrot	passport
dack	duck	deck

An earlier study of this kind was made by H. Ansbacher who exposed American and Canadian stamps to American school children. The American and Canadian stamps were exactly the same size and had the same denominations, two and three cents. The children, almost without exception, tended to overestimate the size of the American stamps in contrast to the Canadian stamps—a neat illustration of ethnocentrism.[13] There are many other studies of perception which show the influence of culture, but the above examples will suffice for our purposes.[14]

Age, Sex, and Class Differentials

Not only are there broad cultural differences between societies, but mental set may be affected by differential group membership within a given society; that is, subcultural influences may play a part. Among other differentials are those associated with age, sex, and class. In regard to age factors, the small child in our society perceives his role and status quite differently than does the adolescent. The latter often sees himself in terms of his peer group and as in conflict with his parents. The parents, in turn, may regard the adolescent as still a child. So, too, in old age people take a different view of the aged than they did in their

[11] See W. H. R. Rivers, *Report of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1901), Vol. 2.

[12] E. M. Siipola, "A Group Study of Some Effects of Preparatory Set," *Psychological Monographs*, 1935, 46:27–38.

[13] H. Ansbacher, "Perception of Number as Affected by the Monetary Value of the Objects: A Critical Study of the Method Used in Extended Constancy Phenomena," *Archives of Psychology*, 1937, No. 215.

[14] The student interested in further pursuit of this interesting topic should read Clyde Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, Ch. 25, especially pp. 931–937.

middle years. Clearly the expectations of one's roles and statuses will vary in terms of particular age groups.

The Horowitzs have shown the manner in which socially standardized expectations may distort perception with particular reference to race prejudice. Their subjects were pupils from grades 1 through 10, to whom ten pictures were shown. These pictures were mounted on pages of a large scrapbook and presented to the children individually. Questions having to do with each picture were asked and answers recorded before proceeding to the next picture. Some of the pictures had nothing to do with the problem of race prejudice. These were simply to throw the students off the track, lest they suspect the purpose of the particular study. Other pictures showed schoolroom scenes with teacher and four boys, one of whom was a Negro; another picture showed a group of naval officers and young ladies being served tea by a Filipino; and other pictures showed white groups or Negroes in white groups.

The results show conclusively that the children tended to distort many of the features of these particular pictures in reporting what they saw. To cite one example: Picture 2 was a schoolroom scene of a teacher and four boys, one of whom was a Negro. This same picture was used for Number 9 except that a white boy replaced the Negro. In each grade the children were asked whether the teacher was pleased with the work of the central character. In one picture the central figure was a white boy and in the other it was a Negro boy. For nearly every grade there was a much higher percentage who thought the teacher was not pleased with the work of the colored boy in the picture, compared with the work of the white boy.

Another section of the test gave more direct evidence concerning the frame of reference of the children regarding Negroes. Picture 4 in the series showed a library scene in which four white boys were reading. After exposure the children were asked, "What is the colored man in the corner doing?" The results show that a very high proportion of the children reported that the nonexistent Negro man in the library picture was engaged in some kind of menial activity. In fact, an increase was found in the percentage so reporting with the lowest percentage in grade 1 and the highest in grade 10.

This is a good example of the way in which community norms are expressed in the social attitudes of the children. The study was made in an East Tennessee community in which both Negro and white families lived.[18]

Sex typing likewise induces certain changes in perception. The cultural training of the sexes in their respective roles is an illustration of this. Little girls are supposed to wear dresses, to play with dolls, and

[18] Eugene L. Horowitz and Ruth E Horowitz, "Development of Social Attitudes in Children," *Sociometry*, 1938, 1:301–338.

to engage in activities which more or less take on the character of domestic and feminine activity. Little boys are trained to handle mechanical toys, to dress differently from girls, and to anticipate and build up roles associated with masculine activities in our society. Since World War II there has been an increased confusion in sex role among adolescents and adults. As women have increasingly moved into the men's world they have taken to wearing slacks and to imitating men in other ways. This is an illustration of a modification in role.

Socioeconomic status or class status is clearly reflected in the variation in perception. The Bruner and Goodman experiment on perception of size of coins by rich and poor children—although qualified by the replication by Carter and Schooler—shows that there is a relationship between economic status and perception. Certainly members of the upper classes tend to regard their role and status in the world in a different way than do those in the lower strata.

Status differences are also evident in the relationships of majority to minority groups. In fact, minority-majority relations take on many of the characteristics of the prejudice and intolerance found between the classes. John Dollard brings this out neatly in his study of the social structure in the South. He contrasts social perceptions as related to color-caste relationships in these words: [16]

> Defensive beliefs in a society, like rationalizations of the individual, make possible the avoidance of the actual situation; they tend to eliminate the problematic, offensive, inconsistent, or hostile facts of life. One clings to the defense and avoids the traumatic perception of social reality.
>
> The master defense against accurate social perception and change is always and in every society the tremendous conviction of rightness about any behavior form which exists. Southern people share this conviction. What is done is *de facto* right and is justified by the consideration that it has not been invented by current culture bearers but comes to them through sacred tradition; exercising independent perception against it is unwise and even impious. So compelling is the traditional order that each and every sharer in it acts *as if* he had a mass of impartially seen experience to support his view. The negative cases and contradictions are overlooked, often without even realizing that an exception to the general view is being stated. Southerners will say, for example, that all "niggers" are worthless and lazy, but that "Spade" is really the manager of the place; he has never been given any responsibility which he did not carry out. The ancestors are right and "Spade" is an insignificant exception. Since any new perception requires energy and courage, rare human qualities, this persistence of tradition probably is based on a fundamental human indolence and timorousness which prefer the historical routine of behavior to an active and independent perception of social fact. If inertia of habit and fixity of complex play a role on the pleasure side, social fear and wishes for security are equally important in stabilizing the ancestral routine. Realistic social perception is specifically *not* cultivated; rather every precaution seems

[16] John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, pp. 366–367. By permission of the publishers (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937).

taken that it will not occur, and that the folkways and mores will persist. Only acute crisis in a group, such as the defeat of the Southern armies, forces a recanvass of the situation and the gradual stylization of new social perception. This impotence in the grip of custom, always tangible in persons and personal relations, is the primary defense.

Another study showing how socially accepted stereotypes affect perceptions was made by Gregory Razran. One hundred college students—50 men and 50 women—and 50 non-college men when shown photographs of 30 young women, strangers to them, were asked to rank each photograph on a five-point scale which would indicate their general liking for the girl, her beauty, her character, her intelligence, her ambition, and her "entertainingness." Two months later the same group of students were again shown the same photographs but with surnames added. For some of the photographs Jewish names were given, such as Finkelstein and Rabinowitz. A second group received Italian surnames, such as Grisolia and Scadano. A third group got Irish surnames, such as O'Shaughnessy and McGillicuddy. And still a fourth group were given old American names, such as Adams and Clark. Razran clearly demonstrated that the labeling of the photographs with these various surnames had a definite effect upon the manner in which these photographs were perceived. The addition of Jewish and Italian names, for example, resulted in a substantial drop in general liking and a smaller drop in the judgment of beauty and character. It also resulted in a rise in the ratings for ambition, more marked in the case of the Jewish surnames than in others. It is clear from this that stereotypes associated with ethnic and racial groups have a definite effect upon the perception of the photographs and upon the consequent judgment of the characteristics assigned to the girls in the pictures.[17]

A good example of cultural influence on perception and memory from the field of political ideology is to be found in the study by J. M. Levine and Gardner Murphy on how students dealt with controversial materials bearing on Soviet Russia. Two groups of students from City College in New York, five in each, were given certain readings bearing on the Soviet Union. One body of material was favorable to the U.S.S.R. and the other was very critical. One group of these students was known to be highly pro-communist; the other anti-communist. Both groups held strongly to their particular beliefs regarding Russia. Each subject was examined alone and was given these instructions: "Read over the paragraph twice at your normal reading rate." After the passage was read, fifteen minutes elapsed before the first recall. During the fifteen minutes the experimenter and the subject talked about topics not concerned with the experiment. Then the subject was told: "Reproduce as accurately

[17] Gregory Razran, "Ethnic Dislikes and Stereotypes: A Laboratory Study," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1950, 45:7–27.

as possible the paragraph which was presented to you. Make an effort to make your reproduction as accurate and as nearly identical with the original paragraph as you possibly can. Be sure to have your reproduction not only accurate, but as complete as the original paragraph." After several minutes the entire procedure was repeated with the second paragraph. This routine was repeated at weekly intervals for four weeks. Then at weekly intervals for five weeks, recall of the paragraph was tested without resubmitting the paragraph to the subject. The first part of the total time was termed the "learning period"; the second the "forgetting period."

The result shows strikingly that the predisposition of the subjects determines very largely how they interpreted the particular material they had read. With regard to the learning period, the pro-communist group learned more material from the pro-communist selection than did the anti-communists. The latter learned more of the anti-communist material. By the same token, in the forgetting period the pro-communists tended to remember more of the favorable material than did the anti-communists, and again the latter retained more of the unfavorable matter. This study, like others, reveals not only the selective nature of perception and recall but also the influence of motivation and background beliefs on perception.[18]

Culture and Time and Space

Perception of space and time is likewise influenced by variations in culture. The cultural determination of spatial perceptions has been amply demonstrated. Our four-point orientation is a cultural product. Other peoples use different systems of noting spatial relations. The Japanese conceive of the universe as defined by eight points. Dante's conception of the cosmos in the *Divine Comedy* certainly was unlike ours today. Among some Australian tribes, space was systematized not according to geography or geometry but into separate regions according to the number of totemic clans in the tribe. The Zuñis divided universal space into seven sections, following the partition of the tribe into seven clans; in fact, the villages were laid out in seven districts, and the whole political and religious life of the Zuñi community was minutely ordered in line with this sevenfold division of space and people.

The development of the sense of time follows somewhat the same general form. For the young child, sequences of time are definitely tied to action and objects. Night and day do not stand alone but are associated with going to bed, getting up, and with all the activities of the

[18] J. M. Levine and Gardner Murphy, "The Learning and Forgetting of Controversial Literature," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1943, 38:508–517. This is reprinted in C. A. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1952), pp. 402–409.

waking period. Young children usually divide the day not into minutes and hours but into important events, such as breakfast, lunch, and supper, or perhaps into bathing, washing, and training in bodily habits. So, too, months and seasons are associated with activities. Winter literally means to a child in our northern climate snow, ice, and cold weather activities. Months are often associated with special holidays or with family events, such as birthdays. Many children believe that the calendar makes time: Sunday is the day which is red on the calendar and weekdays those which are black. Embedded as it is in everyday events, time is regarded as a material object and as discontinuous. His birthday often means to a child that on that day he actually becomes a year older and perhaps a different person. The personal role-taking in this connection is obvious, as witness the boy who is given his own key to the house on his twelfth birthday. Such an event may mark a considerable change in his interests and in his self-regard.[19]

Adults often follow similar patterns. Our dairy farmers divide the day into "milking time," "watering time," and other chore times. Many primitive peoples divide the year into cycles according to the blossoming of fruits, ripening of fruits, and the harvesting period. Others, who live by hunting and fishing, separate the seasons according to seasonal activities. The Trobriand Islanders have an elaborate system of "gardening time." For example, they will say: "this happened *o takaywa,* during the cutting of the scrub; . . . *wa supa,* in planting time; . . . *o tayo-yuwa,* during the harvest proper." [20]

Yet the Trobrianders, like many other primitive peoples, reckon time also by lunar months and by certain broad seasons of activity, such as festivals and periods of trading with other tribes. These concrete, time-in-action periods, though somewhat inconsistent, worked well enough. In cultural development a careful counting of time by lunar changes came only with more advanced demands and the rise of early mathematics. So, too, it was only much later that civilized man learned to make use of solar changes as a measure of time. Our use of clocks and calendars to determine our daily routine is evidence of the dominance of the machine in our society.

In a similar way the perception of size, colors, and other qualities is more or less controlled by our social-cultural milieu and not by any direct contact with the world. Children are slow to distinguish and name colors. They do learn in time by discriminative action with respect to

[19] While the present author would differ somewhat in the interpretation of his findings, the contribution of Jean Piaget to this whole topic remains significant. Among others, see his *The Language and Thought of the Child* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1926). See also *Introduction to the Child's Conception of the World* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929).

[20] B. Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic* (New York, American Book, 1935), Vol. 1, p. 53.

colors and by naming the differentiating experiences. As late as entrance into the first grade, pupils often confuse red and orange, blue and violet, violet and purple. In our society most people learn, in school and outside, to name and distinguish the seven major colors, but it is well known that many never go beyond these broad categories. Men in our society are notoriously less well-trained than women to distinguish fine hues and nuances in the colors of clothes. For most people, colors, like other sensory-perceptual qualities, are linked to day-by-day judgments of concrete objects. Only the expert tends to segregate these into fine discriminatory detail.

From the material presented above it should be clear that perception is influenced not only by the nature of the physical stimuli but by the condition of the perceiving organism as this is affected by cultural and social learning. As G. T. W. Patrick, the psychologist, well said, "We see things, not as they are, but as we are."

Imagery and Memory

Not only is perception affected by social-cultural factors but so are imagery and memory. This has already been illustrated in some of the experiments cited above. Not only what we see, smell, hear, or otherwise perceive is affected by time, space, and circumstances, but what we are able to remember. Moreover, the dynamic, changing nature of the internal processes is well brought out in the findings of various writers on retention and recall. Studies of recall show that our memory images are subject to falsification by the introduction of new matter, by the substitution of one memory item for another, by transpositions of time and place, and by condensation, dramatization, and other distortions.

F. C. Bartlett's studies of the reproduction of stories are informative on this subject. For example, in one series of experiments the subjects were given stories about mythological characters. Each subject repeated the story he had heard to another subject, and the latter, in turn, to a third, and so on. The results showed, among other things, a definite tendency to remake the material into more concrete form, to condense much of the detail, to make the styles of the stories more nearly uniform, to rationalize or explain the account, and to elaborate by adding new matter.

Bartlett has also reported observations on the memory functions of different tribes. For instance, he compared the African Swazis and Zulus. The former are a pacific, cattle-raising tribe; the latter are warlike and given to organized banditry. In recounting military engagements between these two tribes, individuals of the former tended to report incidents in a quiet and stolid fashion. In contrast, the Zulus retold the same events with emotional excitement and gusto. It is obvious that there is no original organic difference in emotion or memory function

between these two racially close tribes. Different attitudes and values have given different meanings to common experiences.[21]

Not only are perceptions and memories affected by social images and by what we have learned, but so, too, is concept formation. Concept formation, as we shall indicate in Chapter 5, is much affected by the growth of language and the use of symbolic interaction. Some of the learning processes concerned with conceptualization will be reviewed there. At this point we wish to show how social-cultural factors play a part in this.

Concept-Formation

The psychological basis of concept-formation lies in learning as it is related to qualities, part-processes, and relationships rather than to total actional or perceptual items. The development of concepts may be seen in studies from child psychology which show the emergence of true concepts from the larger perceptual reactions under the impress of cultural demands. We shall note these changes with reference to definitions, classification, number concepts, relationships, and causal relations.

At the outset a child defines objects largely in terms of concrete actions and uses. For example, in our society, most children of five or six years would define a chair as "something to sit on," a bottle as "something to put milk in" or "something to get milk out of," and an apple as "something to eat." Earl Barnes found among a large sample of six-year-old children that 82 per cent of the definitions of common terms were of this kind. For a similar group of fifteen-year-olds, only a third of the definitions were of this concrete character.[22]

The emergence of classification systems follows a similar shift from highly perceptual and immediate associations to those which indicate an awareness of difference and likeness in terms of qualities, forms, and relations of parts. A number of experiments have shown that in matching unrealistic, geometrical colored forms, as in the Lotto test, children in our society tend to classify by color rather than by geometric form. In matching realistic objects, however, the initial classification tends to follow form rather than color.[23]

As William Stern points out, the rise of the concept of a quality common to a number of diverse objects is often preceded by an awareness of plurality of act or feature. For example, Stern's little girl of three and a half years always asked, when she saw a different bird in her

[21] F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1932).

[22] Earl Barnes, "A Study of Children's Interests," *Stanford University Studies in Education*, 1897, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 203–212.

[23] For a review of experiments, see Heinz Werner, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development*, translated by E. B. Garside (New York, Harper, 1940), pp. 235–237.

book of animals, "Does this bird lay eggs, too?" [24] Apparently at about the age of four or five, most children in our society begin to develop a rudimentary ability to classify common objects—horses, chairs, automobiles, and the like—in terms of their more general utilitarian characteristics.

Number concepts arise in a somewhat similar way. At first, objects, either single or plural, stand within a total context. Gradually, in terms of generalization and differentiation—likeness and unlikeness—the child learns to cut the number loose from the perceptual totality and acquires some scheme for ordering objects by numbering. For example, counting begins with specific objects, such as fingers or persons. So, too, simple addition or subtraction is learned in the same way.

The self-reference with regard to numbers is neatly shown in Jean Piaget's report on the difficulty that young children have in telling just how many siblings each brother or sister in their own families have. In fact, up to the age of ten years, three-quarters of all the children studied could not give the correct information. For instance, one child had correctly said that there were two brothers in his family. He was then asked, "And how many brothers have you got?" to which the lad replied correctly, "One, Paul." When asked further, "And has Paul got a brother?" the boy answered "No." A still further query was made: "But you are his brother, aren't you?" to which he said, "Yes." But when asked, "Then he has a brother?" the boy replied, "No." [25]

Obviously the culture to which the child is exposed provides him with the manner in which he will order his arithmetical concepts. It is easy for us to assume that all peoples, counting the 10 fingers, "just naturally" develop a system based on 10. But anyone even slightly familiar with the number systems of nonliterate peoples knows that this is not so. The Mayans counted by 20 digits, using toes and fingers.[26] Yet the decimal and vigesimal systems are not the only possibilities. A. W. Howitt states that the native tribes of southeastern Australia used a system that could run up to 30. It began with the five fingers of one hand, then went on with 6 for "the hollow formed by the end of the radius and the wrist," 7 for the "swelling of the flexor muscle of the forearm," 8 for "the inside of the elbow-joint," and so up the arm, through points on the shoulder, neck, and head, to 15 at the crown of the skull, and thence down the other side.[27]

From a numerical system we go on, by a further abstraction, to

[24] See William Stern and Clara Stern, *Psychology of Early Childhood Up to the Sixth Year of Age* (New York, Holt, 1924).

[25] Jean Piaget, *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1928), p. 217. By permission of the publisher.

[26] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1923), p. 231.

[27] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (New York, Macmillan, 1904), pp. 697–698.

algebraic concepts. Obviously, culture—in the form of courses in school —provides us with this step and, as we know, many individuals never make much headway at this level of abstraction. For most of us the simpler forms of arithmetic serve our needs.

Further development of concepts is shown in tests of word associations. In the completion-test pair, wash-face: sweep- ——, younger children tend to fill in the blank with broom. Here the association is still rooted in the total context of everyday experience. Only gradually does the child learn to abstract out of this the conceptual relationship demanded in this instance.

In like manner the concept of causality is slow to develop. At the outset, the emotionalized ego-centered world is such that causation is considered in terms of one's immediate and more obvious experiences. When asked why it always gets dark in the evening, a five-year-old boy said, "It's because the people get tired and want to sleep." [28] Yet even at such an early age the social-cultural influences are felt. The same lad said that it rained because the angels wished to clean the heavens "with their brooms and lots of water." It should not be assumed that children get their anthropomorphism spontaneously. The roots of such associations lie within their concrete day-by-day perceptions, but the verbal elaborations are usually furnished them by older children or adults. Most of us got our first explanations of thunder in just such a manner, from older persons.

Immediate associations, resembling fantasy, are apparent in many instances. One child, who had long been promised a trip to a museum, arrived there late on a Saturday afternoon and found that the guards had just locked the doors. At the instant the father rattled the door there was a sudden clap of loud thunder, accompanied by a sudden shower. The child asked, "Did the thunder and rain make the doors lock?"

Piaget states that this rudimentary stage is followed by what he terms a "naive dynamism," a kind of animism which assumes that events happen because of forces that reside inherently in the objects or situations. Often words play a part in this. The word is considered to be the source of the power. Such a stage is followed, says Piaget, by a third, more realistic one, beginning at about the age of seven or eight.

The development is illustrated in I. Huang's experiment. Children from five to nine years old were shown a small open cardboard box to the four corners of which pieces of string were attached. Into this box a penny was put. When asked what would happen if the box were turned upside down, all answered correctly. Then the experimenter, holding the strings together, whirled the box about his head with sufficient velocity so that the penny did not fall out. When asked to explain why the coin did not fall out, the younger children made such replies as "Because it's

[28] Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

in a corner" and "Because it gets in the corner like that and sticks there." The somewhat older youngsters remarked that the "box is going too fast." A few of the older ones got nearer the correct explanation in saying that "the box turns so fast that the penny doesn't have time to fall out." [29]

As a matter of fact, many adults would not get beyond this stage; or, even if they should use such an adult term as "centrifugal force," they would not really be able to explain it. The arrival at the highest stage of causal reasoning in terms of universal and necessary causes is difficult and slow. Such a combination of native mental ability and cultural training relatively few attain.

It would be easy to fall into the old error of drawing a parallel between the conceptualization of children in our culture and that of adults in nonliterate societies. Such an association reflects a misunderstanding of the relation between mental development and culture. The conceptual systems of non-European peoples differ from ours not because they lack the innate intellectual capabilities but rather because their culture is less complex and hence the demand for what we call higher logic is not present. Within the framework of his institutions and culturized adjustments, nonliterate man possesses sufficient conceptual tools for his everyday needs. The native African cattleman may not be able to count abstractly beyond a few numbers, but he may own and manage large herds. By various devices of identification and classification in terms of age, sex, and color, he is able to keep track of his stock. Although the categories of plant and animal life of savage peoples do not resemble ours, for their purposes they suffice. From our standpoint primitive man is ignorant, but he is not stupid. For that matter, the mass of mankind in Occidental society, despite popular education, operates intellectually pretty much at an elementary level of logic. Most of their so-called mental adjustments are handled in terms of verbal habits that they have previously learned in concrete situations or by sheer rote. Anyone who has had experience in interpreting intelligence tests given to adults knows how few of us are trained in objective, logical thinking. Most people, even in our sophisticated world, operate in intellectual matters on the basis of habit and emotionalized attitudes.

ATTITUDES, TRAITS, AND RELATED ASPECTS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

Attitudes

The concept *attitude* has had a varied career among psychologists. It was first used to mean a motor-mental predisposition to action. Later it

[29] I. Huang, "Children's Explanation of Strange Phenomena," *Psychologische Forschungen*, 1930, cited by Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

was used in a somewhat broader way to designate a specific or general reaction tendency which qualified and controlled the response to situations. Some writers have gone so far as to use the term to cover the entire baggage of the inner life of the individual. We shall use the term in a narrower and stricter sense to mean a predisposition to action. An attitude is essentially a form of anticipatory response, a beginning of action which is not necessarily completed. This readiness to react, moreover, implies some kind of stimulating situation, either specific or general. Also, attitudes tend to have stability and persistence.

Since the layman, as well as some psychologists, frequently confuses opinion and attitude, it will be well to distinguish opinion from attitude. Opinion refers to what we believe or hold to be true. It is a conviction short of full proof regarding some particular item in our experience. On the other hand, the word "attitude" represents what we are prepared to do. However, as has been pointed out by Norman Cameron and others, attitude must not be confused with response itself. In order to make this distinction, Cameron distinguishes between attitude and response, regarding both as aspects of a reaction. The attitude functions, he says, "as a behavioral background which prepares for, supports, and prolongs certain responses, but not others." [80]

Attitudes possess certain features which may be regarded as criteria for determining their presence or absence. Let us indicate the most important of these.

1. An attitude is characterized by its readiness or preparatory set toward some action but is not to be confused with motive or response itself. It has a certain stability and consistency. This does not mean, however, that an attitude does not or may not change, but unlike some other elements in personality there is considerable stability and consistency.

2. An attitude implies some individual-to-object relationship. The objects may be income, automobile, some particular place or person, such as one's home or family members or teacher; or they may be groups of people, such as playmates or minority groups in the community; or institutions, such as school, church, or club; or socially established and standardized values or norms, such as the national anthem, the flag, the Constitution, and democracy. An important aspect of individual-object relationship is that an attitude always shows some directionality. This is indicated in the like-dislike, approve-disapprove type of category.

3. An attitude is learned, and learned in relation to, objects, persons, and values which may or may not, at first, have motivational features. Attitudes are the product of what Otto Klineberg called the

[80] Norman Cameron, "Perceptual Organization and Behavior Pathology," in R. R. Blake and G. W. Ramsey, eds., *Perception: An Approach to Personality* (New York, Ronald, 1951), p. 286.

"accretion of experience," that is, the linking together of a number of specific responses of a similar type. Attitudes may be formed also by some traumatic or shock situation in which there is a great deal of emotion. In addition, selectivity and other elements of perception play a part in the development of attitude. Not only does the attitude have some close relationship with perception, but it has other cognitive features as well. That is, it is a part not only of perceptual but conceptual operation with reference to the particular objects, persons, or values around which, or toward which, it is directed.

4. Attitudes are often related to feelings and emotions. Some of the affective properties of attitudes arise out of the original close relationship between strong drives, such as hunger, sex, and certain experiences that are built into the attitude. On the other hand, there are some nonmotivational sources, such as liking for a certain food or the emergence of some social value out of one's culture that originally had no drive aspect. Membership or participation in the group itself, of course, is a value, and hence comes to play a part in the building up of all sorts of attitudes, both negative and positive. The strength of affect in attitude is shown in the relation of in-groups to out-groups, especially in the more intensive conflictive situations.

5. Then, too, there is the range of specificity or generality. As with traits, there has been a long discussion as to the generalizability of attitudes. Some psychologists are skeptical on this topic and hold that attitudes, like traits, are highly specific to given situations. On the other hand, there is much evidence of their generalizability.

L. W. Ferguson's study of certain attitudes is a classic in the field. Using a wide range of Thurstone tests, he found three clusters or sets of factors. The first of these, which he called "religionism," he derived from the scale on the belief in the reality of God and the attitudes toward evolution and birth control. The second, which he called "humanitarianism," he found illustrated in the attitudes toward war, capital punishment, and the treatment of criminals. The third cluster he called "nationalism," and this he determined chiefly through the scale for measuring attitudes toward law, censorship, patriotism, and communism. The technique of factor analysis, which he used, may be regarded as a method of getting at generalizability.[31]

Other studies on liberalism and race prejudice emphasize the generality of attitudes. Some writers have held that if an individual had strong negative attitudes, let us say toward the Negro, that he would be less likely to be prejudiced toward other minority groups or other peoples. E. L. Hartley found this not to be the case, but rather the opposite.[32]

Finally, attitudes must be related to the larger aspects of personality.

[31] L. W. Ferguson, "Primary Social Attitudes," *J. of Psychology*, 1939, 8:217–223.
[32] E. L. Hartley, *Problems in Prejudice* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1946).

First, if we consider intelligence as a component of personality, a variety of studies have shown that more intelligent people, at least as measured by educational status, are more liberal in politics, less religious, and more favorable to the Negro. The correlation coefficients here range from .10 to .40.[33]

Other studies have shown a certain correlation between attitudes and elements of rigidity and flexibility in personality. H. T. Moore's early study found conservatives to be more rigid and more suggestible than liberals.[34] Howells found religious conservatives not only more suggestible but able to stand less pain in the experimental situation.[35] Studies in authoritarian personality have shown that the more prejudiced persons are likely to be the more rigid and inflexible. It is quite evident from these studies that persons who hold more extreme attitudes are probably the more rigid and inflexible. The two factors may be a part of a deeper single component. Some of these deeper components have been brought out by Freud and various clinical psychologists. Some studies have shown that radicals tend to be recruited from persons who have strong parental hostility, particularly toward the father or father figures. H. D. Lasswell has investigated this line by using case studies.[36] Certainly attitudes do have their source and origin in the family and tend to generalize to other groups later. The newborn child and the young infant do not have attitudes in the proper sense, but these are learned by day-to-day participation in the family, the play group, and later in the larger society. It is well to bear in mind that the culture itself carries thousands of attitudes which are passed on to us from our parents, teachers, and others. Yet the bases of these are not known to us at all. This is particularly true of a number of the intolerant, prejudiced attitudes that we will examine in Chapter 21.

The Nature of Traits

Psychologists have long used the term "trait" to classify and describe certain persistent and fundamental human characteristics, both learned and original. Some confuse it with attitude, but it is rather a term applying to a highly generalized aspect of personality organization which is relatively independent of any particular object. In this sense, however, a trait is akin to a general attitude, but traits lack the directionality of attitudes. The latter are reaction tendencies for or against, favorable or unfavorable, of like or dislike. Traits have no such features.

[33] See T. M. Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York, Dryden, 1943).

[34] H. T. Moore, "Innate Factors in Radicalism and Conservatism," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1929, 35:220–238.

[35] T. H. Howells, "An Experimental Study of Persistence," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1933, 28:14–29.

[36] H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932).

Our concepts of them are expressed largely in adjectival form. For instance, we speak of this woman as neat, of that man as persistent, and of another as domineering. Such units or elements may be considered as distinguishing structural features of a personality. Dynamically, we assume that on the basis of knowledge of traits we can predict an individual's behavior in situations calling for an overt expression of this or that characteristic.

People may have general traits of punctuality or of ascendancy, for example, but in actual situations they express themselves in reference to a particular stimulus and hence take on a certain direction. The point is that such reactions tend to be general, persistent, and consistent within the limits which the group expects or which the culture demands or permits. These attitudes and traits are distinctly bound up with individuality and type reactions, and these in turn are qualified by social and cultural training.

Sentiments

Closely related to both traits and attitudes is the emotionally toned conviction we call sentiment. The term is applied to such trait-like combinations of emotion and idea as love, hate, pity, remorse, joy, and grief. These all resemble somewhat the generalized features of the trait but are aroused by particular objects. On the other hand, sentiments are closely linked to predispositions or attitudes in certain areas of thought and action. With regard to morality, art, science, economics, politics, and other fields of human interest, certain ideas and beliefs have a strong and abiding feeling-emotional tone. For example, our moral sentiments are related to attitudes of approval and disapproval. Sentiments are products of cultural conditioning; they may be closely allied to our fundamental values, or they may be relatively fleeting in their strength and importance.

Values and Ideals

Another phase of internalization into which cultural conditioning enters is the development of values. The individual learns that some motives and goals are preferable to others. We say that he values this object more than that one. In terms of motivation, such preferences have their initial roots in the hierarchy of drives. Do men prefer food to sexual satisfaction, or safety and food to prestige, or is there some other order of choice or merit? Judgment of this kind will depend in large part upon the situation and the state of the individual. Obviously the needs of hunger and bodily safety cannot long be put off, but the satisfaction of the desire for sexual expression or for human companionship or for mastery may be long delayed, or the desire may be considerably sublimated.

It is out of such a hierarchy of potency of desires that values arise. Values represent objects toward which we direct our desires and attitudes. Through socialization we invest them with moral or ethical rationalizations. Such moral justifications make possible actions which people with other cultural conditioning may not understand. Americans do not understand the values which the Russian communists hold in high regard, and vice versa. Out of such divergences are born prejudice and conflict.

Closely related to values are ideals. These represent long-range drives or ends toward which we may strive. Ideals, growing out of the cultural norms of a society, are anticipatory projections of the future conduct of the individual or the group. Purposes, aims, or ideals are not something mystic and unexperienced. They are born of imagination and are rooted in man's daily life and desires, but they represent an expectation of some goal that is not immediately bound to the rudimentary demands for food, shelter, and bodily protection.

Frames of Reference and Integrated Purposes

One measure of the maturity of the individual is the degree to which his traits, attitudes, sentiments, values, and ideals become integrated into a larger philosophy of life, a general frame of reference by which he judges his own acts, words, and thoughts and the acts and words of others. Such an individual style may come to characterize one's entire life. It is born of all the elements, inherited and learned, which have gone into one's personality. The two major forces in its development, aside from the constitutional foundation which comes from heredity and early maturation, are the cultural force which makes for qualities held in common with the members of one's society and the difference in personal-social and cultural conditioning which makes for uniqueness and an individualized style of life.

Not everyone, of course, has a highly integrated pattern of living. Some persons go through life with rather diffused and sometimes contradictory values and philosophies. Others arrive at a fairly stable and persistent organization.

Our basic reaction patterns are tied together into larger frames of reference. It is also true that habits, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference develop a certain autonomy or independence of their own. The autonomous character of many of our habits is the basic fact behind Gordon W. Allport's theory of the fundamental uniqueness of the personality.[37] Not only do habits often tend to act as a drive or foundation for other habits, but their very independence makes for certain distinctiveness in the life organization of each individual. Each person develops his own peculiar

[37] Gordon W. Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Holt, 1937).

set of habits and related ideas, attitudes, and traits. This interrelation of autonomy and independence of organization is fundamental to what might be called a style of life—that is, the particular life organization of each individual which sets him apart from his fellows despite more or less common social and cultural influences.

The uniqueness of the individual, what is called the idiosyncratic element, does not imply a lack of order and unity. These are present in the mature adult. Individual differences in style of life do not run counter to the adaptive advantage of learning a minimal or an ordered set of reactions.

Another aspect of this is the development of purposes, aims, or ideas as means to certain ends. In the course of adaptation of the individual to the social and cultural world, he learns, as the basis of a line of action, to project or thrust forward into the future some of his internalized and anticipatory responses. These are what we mean by ideals, purposes, or ambitions. They are learned but are internally determined as the individual grows older. In short, when we talk of ends or ideals we are but stating in another way the principle of internal drive as directed to some goal, but an internal drive which is acquired in the course of living with our fellows. These are not, in essence, something special, nor are they distinct from more rudimentary drives; but they do serve to set off men's short-run activities, the final goal of which may be very remote. The boy who aims to be a lawyer, engineer, or doctor must set out upon a long-range cycle of activity within which will be hundreds of subsidiary cycles, all of which are directed, if he keeps to his ideal, to the long-time end, or purpose, of his life work.

Finally, we must take into account the contact of the person with the external world. The internal organization, which is built through the processes we have been discussing, becomes one part of a bipolar relationship found in interaction with other persons and with the physical world outside.

In the process of adaptation to one's fellows and to the world outside, it often happens that what society and its culture demands differs from what the individual wishes or wants. A person may define a given social situation, let us say, in terms of his deeper wishes for power, whereas society, the community, or some special group within the larger society has laid down other definitions of the situation. The demands of behavior from these groups run quite opposite to the power wishes of the person himself. Hence we speak of the opposition between an individual's personal definition of a situation and the social or cultural definition of the same situation. Not that personal definitions are developed in a vacuum or without reference to social interaction—they usually are so developed, but the individual definition expresses more completely the deeper, less sublimated, and more rudimentary drives. In

the formulation of these drives, personal-social training—that is, learning not culturally determined—often plays a predominant part. It is not that these early acquired drives are unaffected by social contact; rather it is that they are the outgrowth of the earliest relations of the child to his mother, father, and siblings. As he grows up in society, every man has definitions laid upon him which tend to inhibit his impulses to express these more rudimentary interests. The personal definition of the situation is but another way of saying that we have a unique style of life as individuals. In short, to understand the person, his manner of meeting crises and other situations and the nature of his satisfactions, it is necessary always to know his inner life as well as to know about his overt conduct.

FORMS OF THINKING: FANTASY AND LOGIC

The interplay of language, thought, and emotion has been a subject of considerable discussion in psychology and philosophy. As we shall see in Chapter 5 on language, communication of any high order depends on symbolic interaction. Any social interaction that is not direct and overt depends upon such substitute responses. Overt and direct behavior is limited to time and space of the moment. Language permits us to manipulate the world—past, present, and future. It also permits us to deal with relationships, quantities, qualities, and categories of objects. Sometimes the abstract symbols of mathematics seem completely remote from physical actions and events, yet the final test of most abstract language and logic of the mathematician, scientist, or inventor is its relation to physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural events. For most of us, of course, language serves the more immediate purpose of day-by-day communication with our fellows. But it also provokes emotions and feelings and incites us to action or inhibits our impulses. The range of thought and language with respect to man's adaptation to his physical and social world extends from fantasy to logical and objective thinking. Let us look at some of the important aspects of these two forms of thought.

Objective Thought

Objective thinking, or reasoning, is fundamentally a logical and controlled association of events and their symbols. It is open to verification by others. It rests essentially on our experience in manipulating objects or persons outside ourselves and bringing them under our control. The objects of the situational complexes may be checked against a certain consistency of motion and force, the external world for which we construct symbols to represent cause and effect relations. These are anchored in actual concrete experiences in the world of men and in

objects outside ourselves. This gives rise to what Karl Pearson aptly called "disciplined imagination," and it is essential, not only to scientific discoveries, but to new inventions and to great art as well.[38]

Wishful Thinking

Fantasy, on the other hand, arises from associations that are free-ranging, uncontrolled and, from a standpoint of formal logic, illogical. In fantasy thinking, personal wishes and emotions tend to dominate our internal functions. Such associations grow out of mere contiguity of terms, of events, or of persons and have no necessary objective cause-and-effect relationship. The association of similars or opposites and the linkages of contiguity of time and space are employed, as in reasoned thinking, but in fantasy these associations are undisciplined and apparently free-floating. This is evidenced in daydreaming and in the practices of magic in which the name comes to stand for the object. For example, among primitive or peasant peoples the medicine man, or a witch, may cast a spell over an individual by the use of his name, or a clay or wax effigy of the person may be used to invoke evil power believed to be injurious to the person's health or fortune. For the personality, this association may be as significant as though the linkage were scientifically verifiable. Although conditioning in the field of fantasy takes place more in the realm of free-imagery and verbal concepts than in the terms of objects and situations for which these images and words stand, the contrast of fantasy and logical thinking rests fundamentally upon the cultural acceptance of the responses and upon its place in the organization of the self, not upon the mechanisms themselves. The manner in which these stimuli are integrated toward some socially meaningful behavior determines the differences between the two forms of thought.

Both logical and fantasy thinking emerge as the child wends his way about in his material and social world. In early childhood, only gradually do the differences between the word as an object, and the word as a symbol, develop. In fact, it is just this point that makes the distinction between the two forms of thinking important.

Culture and Fantasy

At first a child's acts and thoughts are focused pretty thoroughly on his own immediate drives and rewards and on his need to adapt himself to his surroundings in order to satisfy his wants. His is a concrete world of action, surcharged with emotions and feelings and with an immediateness of stimulus and response. His inner tensions and incipient responses are not separated from the outer world of stimulus and reward. In other words, there is little or no distinction between the inner wish, the dream, the daydream, the overt act, and the external environment of things and

[38] Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (New York, Macmillan, 1892).

persons. The point is illustrated in the stories which children tell of their own experiences.

For instance, a number of small children spent an afternoon at a zoo. While there they looked at Annie the elephant and listened to her keeper tell stories of what elephants know and do, including their service as domesticated animals in the far parts of the earth. Later that day, at the supper table, John, one of the children, when asked what he had done that afternoon, said that he had been to Vilas Park and had had a wonderful ride on Annie the elephant. The parents and the two older children all labeled this talk as lying. But to John, who had daydreamed about the wonders of elephants, the daydream, the discussion with the keeper, and the wish to ride had become intertwined.

Gradually, in response to the demands of external adjustment, a child learns to distinguish between his world of daydreams and his world of concrete habits—that is, between fantasy and logical, objective thinking. Let us examine some of the important steps in this development. Some aspects of this we have already discussed in connection with perception, imagery, memory, and the rise of conceptual thinking.

The many bodily habits that must be acquired play a part in the rise of the self. These have to do with feeding, elimination, sleeping, managing one's clothes, washing, bathing, and other actions involving the personal toilet. There is a definite relationship between the demands of others and the rewards or punishments which follow. In terms of the building of the self, the impulse or drive pattern becomes constantly qualified by the learning of actions imitative of others. That is, a child takes roles from those around him. In time a series of habits, actual or expected, is built up between the child and his parents and other persons. This provides a certain consensus, an agreement and a common expectancy.

Along with the formation of these habits, and of habits related to social adjustment to parents, siblings, and others, the concrete object and the thoughts about it become separated. Imagination comes into play, influencing adaptation at many points.

Three children—Helen and Betty, aged five, and Henry, aged three and a half—were playing on the lawn. There was the usual assortment of dolls, carriages, wagons, toy furniture, and dishes. Helen and Betty decided to play at having a large dinner party. A place was marked off on the lawn and the "table" set. When the toy dishes and the few odds and ends of adult kitchenware were used up, Helen began tearing up some brown wrapping paper into shapes resembling plates, cups, and saucers. To this Betty objected, saying, "Go in the house and get some real dishes." This Helen refused to do on the ground that her mother would not approve. When Betty insisted, however, a discussion arose as to the continuance of the play. Helen maintained that it was all make-

believe anyway and hence that paper would do for plates, while Betty said she would refuse to play unless they could have "real" dishes. When, after much argument, Helen still refused to get the house dishes, Betty, fulfilling her threat, refused to play and left for her own home across the street. Henry, who had not entered into the argument, joined Helen in going on with the play. The two girls had arrived at the stage of distinguishing between an inner and an outer world, but they differed as to the satisfaction to be derived from a make-believe world.

The fantasies of children and adults tend to take certain directions in relation to those around them. Some daydreams involve private imagery and subvocal talking to oneself; others may be brought into the social or interactional frame by means of communication. The first kind, seen in the fantasies of young and old alike, serves as a means of evading the demands of the physical and social world by "building castles in Spain" in line with one's secret wishes for power, beauty, romance, or what not. Even the past, if considered unpleasant, may be the topic of daydreams. One of the commonest of these in our society is apparently the foster-child fantasy. E. S. Conklin found, in a sample of nearly 1,000 high-school and college students, that about a fourth had at one time or another imagined that they were the children of other than their real parents. Many who had had such fantasies believed them due to a sense of avoidance and rejection or of injustice and punishment at the hand of their parents.[39]

Fantasies may also anticipate the future, taking on an intensity and a freedom unhampered by practical considerations. A boy's daydream of being a jet plane pilot may be remote from anything overt. If he never makes any effort to carry his plans and anticipations into actuality, his wish becomes a pure fantasy. It may not do him any harm, provided he has concrete duties, obligations, and skills. If it absorbs his whole attention, to the neglect of the social and physical demands of normal adaptation, he becomes a pathological person.

Fear may have a place in stimulating fantasies. Neurotic anxieties are largely worries about imaginary dangers to health, fortune, social success, and other matters. All sorts of avoidant reactions may be set up, and elaborate means may be taken to prevent fearful fancies from becoming realities. William Stern puts it well: "Thus the terrifying fancies are twisted into causes for not desiring (to do a thing), while in reality they are the effects of not being able to desire it."[40]

Children and adults alike may bring their fantasies back into contact with others and thus socialize them. One child, beginning in the

[39] E. S. Conklin, *The Foster-Child Fantasy* (Eugene, University of Oregon Publications, 1922). See also his "The Foster-Child Fantasy," *American J. of Psychology*, 1920, 31:59–76.

[40] William Stern, *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint*, translated by H. D. Spoerl (New York, Macmillan, 1938), p. 335.

lower grades to write elaborate dramas, projected them onto her playmates, inducing them to play various roles or to aid in the preparation of the stage settings. Some children bring out their daydreams by painting pictures, carving wood, or modeling clay. If the boy who dreams of being a pilot turns to making airplane models, and later to studying aeronautics and learning to fly, his childish fantasy may become an important motive in real life. Literature, invention, and science are partially the products of creative fantasies. In these instances the daydreams are brought back to acceptable cultural relations, first, because other persons become involved in their realization, and second, because in order to write out or act out one's fantasies one must learn to handle certain media of expression, such as wood, clay, paints, pencil and paper, and the rules of composition. In the same way the fantasies of the would-be inventor or scientist must sooner or later be put up against the standards of usefulness and logical verification.

An interesting therapeutic application of this direction of fantasy back into the stream of interaction and culture is seen in the well-known benefits derived from getting shut-in, highly introverted persons to express their wishes, fears, and anxieties through poems, plays, painting, music, or in mechanical or other form. Remarkable cures have been effected in children and older persons once they learn to communicate their inner world to others, making it a shared social act.

It is clear, then, that society and culture provide the setting in which both objective and fantasy thinking arise and that this determines the direction our thinking will take. We build some of our roles, with their accompanying ideas, habits, attitudes, and values, around situations demanding objective thought. The most obvious instances are those of personal day-by-day habits, our routine skills, and our handling of persons. At more specialized levels, leaders in science, arts, and management develop a variety of objective techniques for solving the problems before them. Other roles are built around mixtures of fantasy and objectivity. Many of our common-sense reactions to public questions are of this character. Still other roles—usually the more intimate, private ones—are developed around private fantasies that we may never divulge to others at all. The latter may be as bizarre and as violent as we care to make them so long as we do not respond overtly in this way. If we do so, we are labeled psychopathic and are usually put under some sort of control so that we shall not harm others or ourselves.

In short, we must not imagine that fantasy thinking is pathological, childish, or primitive. It is as normal as the more logical cause-and-effect thinking. The social psychologist is interested in its rise, in its significance for the individual, and especially in its impact upon group life as creative persons project their fantasies upon their fellows.

Fantasy thinking, built on free associations that are largely self-

centered, uncritical, often diffuse and holophrastic, stands in sharp contrast to the impersonal, critical, exactly logical and experimental method of science. Yet in everyday life most of us fluctuate between these two extremes, seldom reaching either limit. In some situations we employ common sense and habituated logical analysis to aid us in our work or play. In others we may indulge rather freely in the daydreams of our own private making. In still others we operate, with our fellows, on the basis of forms of thought which are a mixture of logic and fantasy, put together in terms of our values and the requirements of social-cultural adjustment. Much of our interpretation of political and economic life, and especially of religious and artistic life and play, is of this mixed sort.

ROLE AND STATUS

Interrelation of Role and Status

In every society and every group each member has some function or activity with which he is associated and which carries with it some degree of power or prestige. What the individual does or performs we call his role. The degree of prestige or power we refer to as his status. Both of these develop and are affected at all times by the interactional process. Roles may be regarded, as Ralph Linton puts it, as of two types: the ascribed role and attendant status, and the achieved role and status.[41] Ascribed roles have to do with those which are more or less determined in advance by the cultural situation. The best examples in our own society probably are the roles and statuses associated with age differences and sex differences. Achieved role and accompanying status are those which the individual attains through his own efforts. Certainly achieved roles would only be possible in a society which permits a high degree of personal achievement and social mobility. The class status would be, in large part, another instance of ascribed role, though in our society the movement up and down the social scale would indicate the relationship of this particular kind of role and status to achievement.

There are really two aspects of role which we should examine briefly. There is, on the one hand, *role expectation*. This arises from what other people anticipate of us or from us in the way of action and is signified by the ideals which are set down in terms of roles and the accompanying status. This is definitely a social product and depends upon how others view us and our potential operations. On the other hand, in relation to this, there is what we call *role-taking*, or what is sometimes referred to as role enactment or role assumption. This is the particular performance as it is actually carried out. In turn, role enactment or role-taking is either of a specific sort with reference to a given

[41] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936).

object or situation, or of a kind which comes with generalization of role into a larger unit of activity. Specific and general roles will be discussed in Chapter 6 on the self.

SOCIALIZATION

In the closing section of the present chapter we shall deal briefly with the nature of socialization in the development of personality. More specific aspects of socialization will be dealt with in Chapter 6.

Nature of Socialization

While the term "socialization" has been used in various ways by psychologist, anthropologist, and sociologist, for our purposes it will mean the process of inducting the individual into the social and cultural world; of making him a participant member in society and its various groups and inducing him to accept the norms and values of that society. Socialization is definitely a matter of learning and not of biologic inheritance. It means that the individual learns the folkways, mores, laws, and other features of his culture, as well as the skills and other necessary habits which enable him to become a functioning member of society. He learns to identify himself with the aims and values of his family, neighborhood, class, and community. He may likewise develop competitive and oppositional responses of his own in-group with regard to various outgroups. In short, the whole process of socialization falls within the scope of interaction or the social act.

Of the various agents of socialization within society, the family is the most important, and within the family there is no doubt that the mother and father are ordinarily the most significant individuals. In this connection it is generally believed that the early socialization is basic and more fundamental than anything that is learned later. However, this has been a subject of considerable debate and we need not enter into it here. But in terms of cumulative effects of social-cultural learning upon the personality, it seems a reasonable assumption to hold that the earliest years are in this sense the most important. Other agents of socialization are the neighborhood, relatives, and members of the other primary groups as well as later membership in secondary groups.

Then, too, there are the various means of socialization in which approval, disapproval, and punishment loom large. This is the field of moral norms which we shall treat later.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

ALLPORT, Gordon W., *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Holt, 1937). While the orientation is largely that of William Stern's personalistic psychology rather than of more traditional American social psy-

chology, this volume is highly informative. On the whole, the author stresses the unique rather than the common and conforming features of human personality.

BLAKE, Robert B., and RAMSEY, Glenn V., eds., *Perception: An Approach to Personality* (New York, Ronald, 1951). A collection of papers which cover various aspects of perception as it may bear on personality. For readers of the present volume, the most important chapters are probably 4 on learning and perception by Hilgard; 5 on personality dynamics and the perceptive process by Bruner; 6 on cultural and developmental factors by Dennis; 9 on unconscious processes and perception; and 13 on personality theory and perception by Frenkel-Brunswik.

BRUNER, J. S., and TAGUIRI, R., "The Perception of People," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, Ch. 17. This is a highly competent review of research in certain aspects of social perception, but more particularly with regard to judgments of emotions from facial and other expressive movements, judgment of personality traits from various external clues, and the formation of impressions of others. There is an extensive bibliography.

MURPHY, GARDNER, *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York, Harper, 1947). The orientation is largely that of individualistic psychology with only a modicum of real recognition of social and cultural components in personality. Yet the book has not only a wealth of facts but a keen insight into many of the important mechanisms involved in human behavior.

MURRAY, Henry A., and others, *Explorations in Personality* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938). Based on an exhaustive clinical and experimental study of fifty college men, this book has become a classic. It is highly stimulating and insightful.

SMITH, M. Brewster, and BRUNER, J. S., *Opinions and Personality* (New York, Wiley, 1956). A collection of ten case studies of normal adult men. The analysis indicates the central place of attitudes and values in understanding motivation and behavior.

CHAPTER 5

Language: Basis of Symbolic Interaction

AS we have noted in Chapter 3, communication is a phase of the total response system of the individual. This response system consists, first, of the overt behavior which is observable by other persons. Such behavior involves the gross and peripheral muscles and bony structure of the one reacting. In the second place, there is symbolic behavior or communication which is one of the most important features of group life. This is linguistic interaction and includes not only talking but the making of meaningful gestures of the face, hands, arms, or other parts of the body. In discussing the place of language in inducing and maintaining group solidarity, some writers use the expression "speech community." The third aspect of one's response system is concerned with the covert or internalized reactions. This consists of the inner organization of needs, attitudes, ideas, and values. The operation of the internalized features of behavior are demonstrable only through the previously mentioned behavioral aspects. This was discussed in Chapter 4.

FUNDAMENTALS OF LANGUAGE

Three Functions

As part of the symbolic system, there are three chief functions of language: (1) There is the social function which is concerned with two particular aspects of the communication process—the transmission of ideas, and the persuasive and imperative functions. The former is related to man's cognitive functions. The latter has to do with the more or less direct control of others. The former is illustrated by the lecture of a professor, anxious to carry a point to students; the latter by an adult's command to a child to stop some activity. (2) There are the expressive and cathartic functions of language. The expressive function may be re-

garded as basically an overt manifestation of emotion and feeling through expressive verbal response. The cathartic function is one from which the individual receives some therapeutic benefit from linguistic response. Profanity used under emotional stress would be a good illustration of such release. Both expressive and cathartic functions are also communicative in the sense that other persons may react to such responses. (3) Finally, language plays a part in thinking. Many psychologists believe that thinking is largely a matter of subvocal talking. John Dewey long ago pointed out the dramatic character of thought, and there is much evidence that in many people, if not all, minimal vocal responses come into play when they are thinking. In any event, words and combinations of words are important elements in our thought processes.

Sign and Symbol

Symbolic interaction is so basic to the understanding of human behavior, and it plays such an important part in thinking and meaning, that the distinction must be made between certain kinds of vocal or verbal responses and those which are truly symbolic. Writers in this field frequently distinguish between sign and symbol. The sign is the learned cue that sets off a response, usually in the form of a vocal or other gesture. Thus, in training a dog to respond to the whistle of his master in anticipation of being fed, the sounds become a sign, or substitute stimulus, to feeding. As we shall see shortly, signs are an important element in communication among the mammalian and other social species.

In contrast, a symbol is a stimulus—largely verbal, pictorial, or material—which stands in place of, or suggests, or represents, some object, situation, or relationship, by reason of some association of the two in experience. The symbol is actually an abbreviated substitute for something else. The relationship to the something else is analogous to the relationship of a part to a whole. In theory, as Dewey says, "We care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent." [1] Furthermore, this signification and representation must find a center in not one but in two or more responding individuals. Although the symbol is essentially a representation of something else, in the development of linguistic habits, as we shall see, symbols come to have values in themselves. This is particularly true in some of the expressive and cathartic uses of language.

Stated otherwise, we may say that a symbol is a special kind of sign which has social consensus and convention to back it up. That is, it has social meaning. Words as symbols are more effective than other gestures because they more specifically locate objects and situations in time and space. They characterize and qualify them as to number, kind,

[1] John Dewey, *How We Think* (Boston, Heath, 1910), p. 171.

and relationship, or indicate interrelations of persons, of things, or of things and persons. The relationship of symbols, especially words, to the thought processes will be examined later in this chapter. Let us now turn briefly to the foundations of communication in the lower forms of life.

COMMUNICATION IN PREHUMAN SPECIES

As we know from animal biology, there are two great branches of animal life in the world: the invertebrates and the vertebrates. Some of the most highly advanced forms of the invertebrates are the social insects, such as the bee and the ant. These insects have developed a social organization in which communication plays an important part. It would be a far-fetched idea to attribute what we call culture to these insects, and yet they do have forms of social solidarity and organization as well as rather elaborate forms of communication. Studies of the behavior of the bee have shown that one member of the hive may communicate to others the location of new sources of honey and other factors related to the survival of the hive. By going through certain forms of "wagging dance," one bee is able to convey by signs to others a number of important factors, such as direction and distance, with regard to the location of the new source of supply. However this conveyance of a message may be interpreted—and no one has so far a satisfactory explanation—it is clear that other bees are able to find the food source.[2]

Bird Studies

The other great series of animal species are the vertebrates, of which man is the most highly developed member. Not far removed from him in some ways, though not in direct line of descent, are the avian species, or the birds. They, too, have developed an elaborate system of communication, and the classic studies made many years ago by Wallace Craig reveal a highly developed form of sign communication. Craig found that a wide variety of vocal signs were used in interstimulation and response. He classified as follows the various aims which he believed these vocal signs or songs revealed: (1) the control of the male over his mate; (2) a nest-call coo which summons the mate, or a challenge-coo which causes an enemy to flee from the nest; (3) a kind of interstimulation as when the male and female interact at the mating period, inducing oviposition in the female; (4) certain inhibitory signs, such as those which block the intrusion of another pair into a nesting site, or which inhibit copulation out of season or copulation between

[2] For a critical review of this and other studies of animal psychology, see D. O. Hebb and W. R. Thompson, "The Social Significance of Animal Studies," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 1, Ch. 15.

members of two pairs that have already set up "housekeeping"; (5) possible vocal signs which lead to co-ordination in spatial relationships—occupancy of the same nest by male and female. Also there are certain signs having to do with co-ordination in time, such as those leading the male and female to go through the brooding activities simultaneously. (6) In addition, there are a number of other types of vocal signs such as those which designate the species of the given bird, its sex, its individual identity, and what might be called its "rights," in such matters as nesting habits and feeding places. (7) Finally there are vocal signs inducing a certain amount of social learning, as when an experienced bird is mated to an inexperienced one and the former takes the lead in the whole mating procedure.[3]

It is tempting to see in these communicative activities something resembling human communication. The rudimentary forms are there, but there is no evidence of true symbols such as human beings use to designate or represent objects and classes of objects.

Communication Among Apes

Observations on the communicative relations of the apes are more important as prototypes of human communication than are those of insects or birds. The studies of the social life of apes made by Wolfgang Köhler and especially by Robert M. Yerkes and his students have been highly significant. The apes use a wide series of vocal signs as gestures in their social contacts. Human beings soon learn to detect differences in the vocal expression of rage, terror, despair, grief, breeding-desire, greeting, and playfulness. Yet, as Köhler points out, this gamut of phonetic responses is entirely "subjective" and can only express emotions but never "designate or describe objects." The same thing is true of bodily or facial gestures. Contrary to some writers, Köhler states that he has never seen any evidence of responses which we would call weeping or laughing on the part of the ape, although sometimes the particular facial gestures would suggest a human smile. He also found that in periods of sexual excitement certain movement of the eyes would seem to convey something from one ape to the other.[4]

The whole gamut of vocal signs, moreover, is largely tied to the perceptual present. The signs are, as is true of other ape behavior, stimulus-bound. There is no indication of the sense of past, present, and future or of the designation of objects, classification of objects, or of relationships. This whole matter of the perceptual present is neatly illustrated in the responses of the apes to the cries of a member that is

[3] Wallace Craig, "The Voices of Pigeons Regarded as a Means of Social Control," *American J. of Sociology*, 1908, 14:86–100.

[4] Wolfgang Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, 2nd ed. (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927).

being removed from the compound. At times when an ape became ill or needed some special attention, it would be removed from the community enclosure. The other apes would then set up a great hubbub of cries and try to pull the animal away from the keepers. When the gates were closed but the cries of the member being removed continued, the apes in the compound persisted in their crying and in making other indications of emotional response; yet as soon as it was out of sight and sound they returned to their ordinary occupations and paid no more attention to the particular event which had momentarily distressed them. One is reminded of the aphorism, "Out of sight, out of mind." This seems to be further indication of the sensory-perceptual nature of the interactional process and shows clearly a limiting factor which must be borne in mind in discussing whether the apes have true speech and true symbolic interaction.

There is still further evidence on this matter in the study which the Kelloggs made of Gua, an ape, and Donald, their child. The ape and child were brought up together for several months in the home of the Kelloggs at Bloomington, Indiana. While Gua was able to perform many remarkable motor activities and, in fact, was much superior to Donald in most motor reactions, it never acquired any true speech. It was able to respond to various imperative commands such as to stop or go, to get down, and so on, but there is no evidence that it ever was able to connect a vocal response as word or true symbol with a given object or class of objects.[5]

The difference between this kind of limited or situation-bound communication and the human, purposive kind is nicely stated by D. O. Hebb and W. E. Thompson: "The essence of purposive communication is that the sender remains sensitive to the receiver's responses, during sending, and by modification of his sending shows that his behavior is, in fact, guided by the intention (expectancy) of achieving a particular behavioral effect in the receiver." [6] Among the apes we get the beginnings of such intent, as in the teasing behavior cited by Hebb and Thompson, or by the distraction technique often observed wherein one ape distracts the attention of a fellow-ape as a means of securing food or some other wanted object. But beyond this they do not go.

The lack of language in the ape is not due to inadequate vocal apparatus but rather to the lack of sufficient cortical development. Man is distinguished from the lower forms particularly by the higher development of the cerebral cortex, making symbolic associations and finer motor co-ordinations possible.

Nevertheless, in closing this section we must emphasize that vocal

[5] See W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933).

[6] Hebb and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 538. By permission.

signs play a large part in the group life of the monkeys, apes, and certainly of the birds. We are concerned with this fact as showing, first of all, evidence of continuity of the biosocial process and, second, as representing a more rudimentary form from which our human vocal interactional patterns must have developed.

LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE

Of all the various aspects of culture, none reveals the importance of patterning more than does language. It has certain distinctive elements and structures. These are the major concern of the science of linguistics. Earlier students of linguistic form tended to stress the static features of grammar, but modern research has led scholars to investigate how individuals actually talk and otherwise use language. This more realistic approach has brought about considerable change in the description and interpretation of linguistic structure. For our purposes we need not pursue this work beyond presenting a few important general findings.

Elements of Language

Students of linguistics deal with two broad descriptive elements: the *phoneme* and the *morpheme*. Broadly considered, phonemes are the sound elements in a language, the more or less stable features. The language development of the child, for example, illustrates how the elements of sound, particularly combinations of vowels and consonants, are learned. Of course, actual speech has been shown to vary in terms of individual differences, educational level, class position, and region of origin and residence. Moreover, there seem to be a somewhat limited number of phonemic elements in each language and unless those who would engage in conversation know how to handle these there can be no symbolic intercourse.

The second unit, the morpheme, is broadly defined as the *word* element. At least in English most, though not all, morphemes are words. For instance, the word "going" consists of two morphemes: the root *go* and the suffix, *ing*. In some languages it is hard to distinguish precisely what a word is but, using the spoken language as a source, linguists have been able to isolate the phonemes and then trace the way in which these combine to form morphemes. This phase of their work is called the morphology of language. Some writers hold that while the phoneme is the irreducible element of sound, the morpheme is the irreducible element of meaning, but this is not too accurate. Students of linguistics, using actual speech, have tried to discover the basic structure of the morpheme "without reference to meaning or signification." [7] Z. S. Harris has catalogued all the sequences of phonemes as they form patterns or

[7] For a review of the work in this field, see George A. Miller, "Psycholinguistics," in Gardner Lindzey, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, Ch. 19, p. 696.

reveal fundamental features. The aim is to get at the *root* or stem of words and at the *affixes* (prefixes, suffixes, and infixes). In fact, in some languages it is hard to determine just what a word is, hence the student is not concerned, at this juncture, with making up a vocabulary but rather a lexicon of morphemes of a given language.[8] While this has its place in formal linguistics, the social psychologist is interested in the meaning of language.

Syntax

Linguists do not stop with a study of morphemes. They want to know how these combine into phrases and sentences. In short, they are concerned with syntax, which is basic to getting at linguistic meaning, that is, meaning as related to structure. The arrangement or combination of words into sentences varies from one language to another, although for the most part we continue to regard a subject and predicate as the necessary and essential condition of any sentence. Yet the trend is to neglect the formal grammar of an earlier day and to study the actuality of what are called "utterance units" as they appear in conversation, that is, in verbal interaction. In studying conversation, however, not only is the utterance unit taken into account but the social situation and the kind of response—that is, whether it is concerned with the transmission of ideas, the control of others through persuasion or demand, or whether it has to do with the expressive functions of speech.

In place of the older division into parts of speech, the present trend toward objective, behavioristic analysis of language has developed a fourfold classification of utterance units. These correspond fairly closely to nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. In addition there are what C. C. Fries calls "function words." The latter, of which there are about 150 in English and which make up one-third of all the words we use, permit expansion and elaboration of simpler sentence forms. They serve to continue a conversation, not to initiate it. Examples of function words are: *the, not, yes, of, if, and, what, very, but,* and the like. Many of these introduce qualifications and modifications. For example, *and* serves to indicate additional matter to be added to what has been said; *if* clauses introduce qualifications of possible or probable situations or events not carried in the straightforward declarative or other sentence; *but* is a brake or stop-signal word which functions to introduce alternative or other statements or qualifications.[9]

Types of Language

From various comparative studies it was found that two languages may be similar in structure although not connected historically in any

[8] See Z. S. Harris, *Methods in Structural Linguistics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951).

[9] C. C. Fries, *The Structure of English* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1952).

way. On the basis of this and other factors, languages have been classified into types. One widely accepted classification is into *agglutinative, isolating,* and *inflecting* types. The first is distinguished by very long words and elaborate declensions. Finnish and Turkish are examples. In the second type, illustrated by Chinese, the words are strung together in sentences but without any change in form. Variations depend on the order of words. In the inflecting type, the function of the word in the sentence is largely determined by the affixes attached to the root term. Most of the Indo-European languages are of this type, as is the Semitic. Sometimes a fourth class is added, the *polysynthetic,* found among the American Indians. Here we find an extreme elaboration of the word. There are other typologies and none is fully acceptable except for purposes of providing very broad categories.

Finally, it must be emphasized that despite rather wide differences in linguistic structure, it is well accepted by scholars in this field that any idea or concept can be expressed in any language. Certainly there is no evidence of a scale of superior-inferior languages. Such a notion was once widely held, but it belongs to the prescientific era of a parallel conviction that there were sharp and determinable differences in the mental abilities of various races. In fact, the idea that the Indo-European languages were more complex and superior to other languages was part of the whole racist dogma which thrived in the nineteenth century.

RISE OF LANGUAGE IN THE INDIVIDUAL

True language develops within the social situation, that is, within interaction. At the outset the infant may vocalize at the experience of pain; later he may express a pleasurable state through vocal expression. Such vocal responses are related, no doubt, to emotional states and basic drives, such as hunger, painful reactions to wet or cold, to a prickly blanket, or to some sharp object. However, these natural responses to a basic need become social almost from the outset. The mother, for example, responds to the child's cries not only by picking him up, feeding him, carrying him about, or by removing a wet diaper, but pours into his ear all kinds of sounds, comforting and otherwise.

This situation sets the model of all communication. Not only does the child hear its own cries—an important aspect of vocalization and later of true speech—but these sounds become quickly associated with the mother's vocal response which the child also hears. As we shall see shortly, true speech and meaning arise in communication when there is a combination of the child's own responses and the responses of others. That is, the meaning of communication is determined by the social world of other individuals who surround the child plus his own associated response system. Sounds, which begin merely as responses associated

with needs and emotions, soon become communicative. On the basis of learning within a social situation which at the outset usually involves child and mother, "these sounds," as Leonard W. Doob puts it, "gradually become instrumental responses that lead to the more efficient satisfaction of these needs," [10] Obviously this falls within a system of interaction and the development of mediating responses (see Chapter 3).

Against the background of this general social situation, let us examine the stages of language development in the child. The data which we will discuss are drawn largely from the culture of our own society and, particularly, from middle-class families. Moreover, the subjects have usually been children of professors who are interested in linguistic development. It is regrettable that we have little or no data on this topic for cross-cultural comparisons. As a matter of fact, we have only limited materials from other classes than the middle group in our own society. Some implications of this situation will be touched on later. At the moment, let us trace out briefly the principal stages of the linguistic development in the young child in our society.

Most students of these developmental features have divided them into four phases. The first is the prelinguistic, second, the babbling stage, third, the phase of simple imitation, and fourth, the rise of true speech. Before indicating some details regarding these, we should enter some basic cautions.

Limitations

First, it must be recalled that speech arises within the larger interactional system and that interaction is older phylogenetically and ontogenetically than the use of true speech. Second, when we speak of phases or stages of development we are really breaking up a continuous process for purposes of descriptive analysis. These stages flow easily from one to the other, yet there are certain broad chronological measures which may serve as bench marks in the analysis of this development. Third, all too frequently students of linguistic development in the child fail to realize that it is closely associated with the rise of the self. While we shall take up this particular topic in Chapter 6, we must bear in mind that the development of language is intimately linked to the growth of selfhood. Then, too, we must repeat that our data are almost entirely drawn from European and American middle-class families. Finally, we must emphasize that while the infant produces sounds of all kinds, a large fraction of which never appear in his own speech community of adults, nevertheless he must learn, sometimes with great effort, a wide range of sounds which go into his growing vocabulary. A. W. Lynip, in fact, on the basis of research findings derived from the use of magnetic recordings and a sound spectograph, reports, for a sample of young

[10] Leonard W. Doob, *Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1952), p. 110.

children, that during the first year not a single vowel or consonant was expressed which was comparable to adult vowels and consonants. Even in the babbling and imitative stages the young child only approximates "the equivalent of an adult sound." [11] This highly critical finding somewhat undermines earlier reports which depended on the hearing capacities of the observers.

Early Vocalisms

The prelinguistic phase is marked by so-called natural vocalisms. These appear almost from the outset of birth and last for a few months. The initial vocalism of the infant is that between the vowel and consonant, between sounds made with the vocal tract open and those made when it is closed. This difference enables the child to say the *a* vowel as in *Mama* in conjunction with such consonants as *m* or *b*. A second step is taken in the distinction among consonants made possible by the stoppage of the vocal tract as contrasted to a labial stoppage—the latter leaving a side path open through the nose. This oral versus nasal opposition permits the child to use *p* and *b* sounds in contrast to *m*. The next step seems to be differentiating between the labial and dental consonants—the stoppage here being at the lips or teeth. Now the child can tell *p* from *t* and *m* from *n*. Experts in comparative linguistics tell us that these two distinctive characteristics, the oral-nasal and the labial-dental, make possible a basic differentiation of consonants common to all languages. The fourth phase appears when the child is able to oppose open and closed vowels as the *a* in *papa* and the *i* in *pipi*. Further differentiation in the production of vowels follows. It may either take the form of distinguishing between palatal and velar closed vowels or the appearance of a medium degree of closure. The former of these fifth differentiations make possible the *papa, pipi, pupu* "triangle" or the "linear vocalism" as in *papa, pepe, pipi*. Once more, such a vowel differentiation is common to all languages.[12]

From these first differentiations and oppositions, the child will learn the particular combinations to be found in the language of his own society. Some of the original sounds, such as clicks and glottal stops, that have no place in English, for example, completely disappear because they are subject to extinction rather than to reinforcement. This means that such sounds do not persist because there is no call to practice them.

As noted above, these early vowel and consonant vocalisms are re-

[11] A. W. Lynip, "The Use of Magnetic Devices in the Collection and Analysis of Preverbal Utterances of an Infant," *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, 1951, 44:221–262. Quotation is from p. 246. See also Kurt Goldstein, *Language and Language Disturbances* (New York, Grune and Stratton, 1948).

[12] R. Jakobson, C. G. Fant, and M. Halle, *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis: The Distinctive Features and Their Correlates* (Cambridge, Acoustics Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952).

lated to needs and emotions. Although purely expressive at first, they shortly become tied to social interaction. From the standpoint of organic adjustment, these vocalisms are closely bound up with the pain-pleasure economy of the moment. As M. M. Lewis remarks: "The basis of all language lies in the child's earliest expressive sounds. Within a few hours after birth he begins to utter a cry when discomfited—the characteristic cry of all children, the bleat of the human infant. In a few weeks another kind of expressive utterance begins to appear: sounds expressive of comfort, again characteristic and more or less alike in all infants." [13] Lewis has also reported that back consonants, which appear early, occur in states of satiety and comfort in connection with swallowing and belching, as associated with feeding. In contrast, he found that *m*, *p*, and *b*, and other front consonants were common in states of discomfort, especially those associated with hunger. While Lewis's observations were very thorough, they were made on only one child. We need other studies to discover if his generalizations would hold for an appropriate sample of infants.

Then, too, it should be pointed out that vocalizations of the kind just described are not the only gestures in which an infant indulges. Facial gestures, movements of hands, legs, and arms may be regarded as expressive movements at the outset, but in time they become stimuli for interaction with the parent or other person.

At first the infant cannot distinguish between human sounds and those made by mechanical devices. But within the first months of life discrimination between his own sounds and those of things and of other individuals, between his own bodily sensations and the outside world, begins to emerge. We have no really adequate data on this matter, but these early responses probably serve as the foundation for the distinction between self and not-self which becomes an important phase in the development of the personality (see Chapter 6 on the self).

Babbling

The second or babbling phase is sometimes referred to as the stage of circular response. This ranges from the end of the third month to the ninth. Apparently there is a wide variation in the age when babbling begins. This again would be related to such factors as social stimulation and physical maturation. There are certain limitations on vocalisms because of limitations of physical maturation. Some sounds are not possible at all until the jaw and mouth parts, as well as the vocal organs proper, have had certain further development.[14]

[13] M. M. Lewis, *Language in Society: The Linguistic Revolution and Social Change* (New York, Social Sciences Publisher, 1948), p. 15.

[14] See Otto Jesperson, *Language, Its Nature, Development, and Origin* (New York, Macmillan, 1922).

This second phase is marked by extensive cooing, crowing, and babbling. Often at first the babbling is shrill, loud, and somewhat unpleasant but later gives way to more pleasant sounds as the child approaches true speech. The importance of this phase is that the child gets practice in a wide range of sounds. We have all heard babies repeatedly cooing or crowing over and over again certain sound combinations.

Yet this is not all. The mother or another person may begin cooing or babbling with the child, giving it further stimulation at the interactional level. Thus the child not only hears himself vocalizing but hears another person making somewhat similar sounds. He associates his own sounds with those of others. At this stage we may regard these vocalizations as more or less reflexive and not yet closely linked with social interaction at the symbolic level. This is just the beginning of such interstimulation and response. However, it is important to stress that this babbling stage gets associated with the imitative phase which follows. The child connects in his repertoire the hearing of his own voice and the hearing of the sounds uttered by those around him. Such interplay is really laying the foundation for linguistic social interaction. As M. M. Shirley remarks, on the basis of observations of children, "The babies definitely babble to the examiners at the median age of twenty-five weeks. Reports from the mothers gave a much earlier age for this reaction.[15]

Imitation

On the basis of such responses the child moves easily into the imitative phase of speech. This represents a structuring of the babbling as it definitely shifts to imitative vocalization of the stimuli or cues which the child picks up from its social environment. Such imitation may occur as early as the beginning of the tenth month, or it may not be apparent until the child is thirteen or fourteen months of age. There is a good deal of variation in this, based partly on maturation and partly, no doubt, on the categories set up by the observers themselves. Whether such simple sounds in our particular speech community as "Mama," "Papa," and "Bye-bye" should be considered merely imitative or evidence of the beginning of true language depends, in part, on the criteria of the observers.

The extent to which the child may automatically parrot sounds rather than indulge in true imitation is nicely brought out by the author's observation of his own daughter toward the end of her first year. A certain game developed between the parent and the child in which the father would say such long words as "Constantinople," and "Afghanistan," and ask the child to repeat these. Obviously the child had no idea as to what these words meant yet performed remarkably well in repeating

[15] M. M. Shirley, *The First Two Years: A Study of Twenty-five Babies* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1933), Vol. 2, p. 51.

them. It must not be overlooked that even such parroting provided a certain amount of practice in the speech sounds of our culture. In short, in this period the child not only begins to organize his own sounds in a more structured fashion but some sounds are practiced or reinforced more often and others are dropped out or extinguished because social stimulation favors certain sound combinations and not others.

True Language

Finally, true speech comes into being. Usually this is during the first six months of the second year. Some children utter their first words before the end of the first year, but again reports vary and it is quite possible that parents frequently project on to their own child comprehension and usage which is not yet really in the child's vocabulary.

It is important to realize that the child frequently comes to comprehend words spoken to him before he is able to use them himself. There is a stage of comprehension in which the child learns to obey orders not to touch things or to go certain places or to do certain things which probably provides the transition from sign language to true symbol usage. It is true that we can train a dog to do very much the same kind of thing the child would do in these situations. The true language really begins when the child links a sound combination to an object. When he associates his "Mama" or "Papa" with the presence or absence of the respective parent, we have the beginnings of true speech. Moreover, when the child uses these sounds when the parent is not present, the uttering of such sounds may bring the parent to the child's side. This response of the other to the child's sounds reinforces the association between the vocal sound and the presence or absence of the parent. By the same token the child will learn to refer to balls, toys, and other objects in his environment in much the same way. Probably the earliest naming words are not strictly nouns but may be what the Germans have called *rhemes*. The *rheme* is a kind of combination of action and object, in other words a combination of verb and noun.

Sometimes children in their second year develop a lot of particular words or combinations of sounds for objects which are not understood by other persons. These tend to drop out because they are not reinforced with the adequate response of the other individual. Later, of course, children at play may develop just such linguistic patterns of their own. "Pig Latin," in fact, is a kind of culturalization of this sort of speech and represents a rudimentary form of argot to which we refer later.

Clearly language is learned within the social-cultural context in which there is a combination of discrimination and generalization. Moreover, reinforcement occurs when the child is rewarded for the successful usage of some words by pats, pleasant sounds, and actual physical things such as food. On the other hand, some words are dropped out

either from lack of practice, as in the case of clicks or gutturals, or from punishment which follows when the child uses words not approved by the parents or others in control. For example, the child may learn certain four-letter words associated with some of his basic biological processes only to be punished by the parent for expressing these later in the presence of other adults. As we know from the studies of the effects of punishment, however, this does not mean that the child loses these words. Rather he learns to use them only with his playmates in situations where "he can get away with it."

Another important phase of linguistic development is the generalization which goes on as words, in relationship to a given sensory object, pass from the purely perceptual present to usage for classification in relationships, qualities, quantities, and so on. The relationship of such advanced use of words to our particular cultural context will be indicated in a later section of this chapter.

Vocabulary

The naming of the world around one and the naming of one's own physical and mental processes, or what might be called the inner world of one's self, is bound up in the development of basic vocabulary. We need not go into detail regarding the large number of studies on the growth of vocabulary among children. It remains first of all simply to note that the criteria of a vocabulary are not always easy to set down. Secondly, adequate controls which should be used by observers are frequently wanting. Certainly in most studies of vocabulary there has been little attention to the question of sampling, or to the effects of differences in age, sex, and especially in class backgrounds.

Children quickly acquire a comprehension vocabulary of rather astounding proportions. There is a popular superstition abroad that children and the ordinary lower-class person have vocabularies of only a few hundred words. M. B. Smith has made a summary of various studies of vocabulary of preschool children, 278 in number. She reports that for 52 cases at one year of age the average vocabulary was three words; at eighteen months for 14 cases it was 22 words; at two years for 25 children it was 272 words; at two and a half years for 14 cases it was 446 words. At the age of six years, although there were only nine cases, the average vocabulary was over 2,500 words. That word usage and comprehension are tied up with class factors will be indicated.

Our own particular speech community is marked by a tendency to reduce the length of words for certain purposes—for example, the word "gas" from gasoline, "movies" from motion pictures, and so on. G. K. Zipf has taken the position that there is a relationship between frequency in the use of words and this tendency to abbreviation. This may apply only to words in highly common use. Sometimes these abbreviations

constitute merely temporary adaptations and sometimes they are of a more durable sort. This function of abbreviation is also related to a certain tendency toward substitution of short words for long. Zipf contends that part of this whole process is related to the borrowing of words and to the development of new words in the field of technology in contrast to the stability of words which are deeply imbedded in our speech community. He points out that such words as bowl, arrow, wheel, and plow belong to a far more remote past than words such as railroad, battleship, percolator, and the like.[16]

Abbreviation is related also to the question of vocabulary differences between social classes and between other groups. A certain jargon may be regarded as the mark of distinction, the badge of belonging. This is true of technical vocabularies, such as one finds in engineering and especially in medicine.

The argot of the gypsies and like groups, usually regarded as beyond the pale of law and proper speech, are illustrations of another kind of specialization. The purpose of argot is first of all to insure secrecy. Secondly, it furnishes a certain reduction in the descriptive and discriminative aspects of language. The use of argot among soldiers is a good illustration of certain tendencies to abbreviation, on the one hand, and certain tendencies to an all-inclusive use of words, on the other. This is neatly shown in Frederick Elkin's study of soldier slang in World War II. On the basis of the language habits observed for American soldiers, Elkin divided these into three categories; The first he called "convenience" expressions; the second, "fashion" expressions; and the third, "habitual."

Convenience expressions were abbreviations of long and cumbersome words to shorter ones. Thus "sun-tans" meant any cotton or khaki uniforms; OP stood for observation post, etc. Fashion expressions are those which had become common to certain groups as they relate to unique experiences or demands. Certain of these became common in foreign countries. For example, American soldiers stationed in England spoke of "torches," "queues," and "Piccadilly commandos." Or sometimes a unit made up of men who had come from academic and university circles soon came to use the expression "Ph.D." for "post-hole diggers."

Habitual expressions were those which depicted the soldier's image of himself and of his fellows and the relationship of these images to in-group solidarity. One of the most interesting illustrations of the in-group solidarity is the acceptance of the expression "G.I." which had its origin in the term "General Issue" and which referred to the material, clothes, and equipment which the soldier received from the Army. But "G.I." became the identifying symbol of the enlisted man generally.

[16] G. K. Zipf, *The Psycho-biology of Language* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1935).

Other terms expressed strength and virility. Such expressions as to "sweat it out" meant to wait anxiously for some event over which one had no control. To "shack up" meant to spend the night or a longer period with some girl. Many of the expressions were definitely obscene. The use of these, in turn, was related to certain freedoms from restraint in which the soldier made use of profanity to provide an offset to discipline and control.[17]

This whole process—both abbreviation and the omnibus use of certain terms—illustrates a certain functional adaptation at the level of conformity and sheer habit. There is, in truth, good evidence that the connotative aspect of language sometimes becomes more important than the denotative aspects (see below).

The professional language of scientists, medical men, engineers, and others is a further illustration of the special jargon or lingo which tends to solidify the group, to set it apart, and to provide a technical vocabulary more accurate and precise in meaning than ordinary words. For the layman, however, the secrecy and status factors frequently overshadow the technical advantages that perhaps account for the development of such specialized language. Quite generally, the lay public considers the use of technical vocabulary by medical men and scientists as more or less an attempt to show off or indicate superior status.

From this whole discussion it must be clear that meaning rests essentially upon general consensus of the relationship of words and sentences to physical or social situations. As Ernst Cassirer says, "Man lives in a symbolic universe." [18] The fundamental features of his culture with all its wide ramifications rests firmly upon his speech community. Language is surely a *sine qua non* of human culture, and without language culture could not exist or operate.

INTERRELATIONS OF COMMUNICATION, LANGUAGE, AND MEANING

In human conduct, action precedes thinking. Thought processes and their attendant verbal forms are really an internalization of what has gone on previously in person-to-person stimulation and response (see Chapter 4). There are two aspects of the relationship of interaction to meaning which must be noted. In the first place, if two or more persons expect to understand each other, to hold some kind of meaningful discussion, they must have a common object or event to which their words refer. Secondly, in terms of control of movement of the other individual

[17] Frederick Elkin, "The Soldier's Language," *American J. of Sociology*, 1946, 51:414–422.

[18] Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944), p. 25.

as well as of the person himself, words set up an incipient action or expectation in both persons—the one speaking and the one spoken to. This happens because, as speakers, we stimulate ourselves as we stimulate others. This double aspect of speech is important for the adjustment of one individual to another. The anticipation we set up in others by our gestures and our verbal responses provides the foundation of that common-sense prediction of behavior without which we could not operate as social beings. Whenever we react toward another person, either overtly or in communication, we set up in him certain expectancies regarding ourselves. If we offer a child a piece of candy, he responds as if we were going to give it to him. If he does not get it, he becomes frustrated and emotionally upset. While the first linguistic responses are closely linked up with the percept or overt response to given objects or situations, its extension in the field of generalization and discrimination leads, of course, to the formation of concepts. Concepts or ideas are further aids in one's adaptation to his world. Concept-formation is closely linked to the growth of language and represents the highest level of intellectual development.

Denotation and Connotation

Meaning has two features: the objective reference which we call *denotation,* that is, the location of the object with its properties and qualities perceived or conceived in time or space; and *connotation,* or the suggested and implied ideas and feelings which cluster about the word. Science and logic are loaded with denotative terminology, and the whole effort there is to keep the individual and his linguistic operations oriented toward denotative or propositional concepts. Moreover, in symbolic logic one symbol may be replaced for another and in this way it may become a reference, as shown in Figure 1.

In contrast, in social situations involving political, economic, recreational, and religious life, the connotations are frequently far more important than the denotations. One of the important features of the vagaries of stereotypes is that the connotative implications of these words are almost limitless. Politicians using stereotypes, such as *democracy, truth, honesty,* and so on, are frequently not concerned with careful definitions of these terms in the denotative sense but rather with the emotional overtones which these words arouse. We shall have ample opportunity to see how these operate in our discussion of mass persuasion and propaganda (see Chapters 19 and 20).

Function of Symbols

As we pointed out in Chapter 4 in discussing concept-formation, there are two levels of reaction to the environment, both of which in man involve the use of words. The first is the perceptual-manipulatory,



FIG. 1. The Interrelationships of Object, Thought, Symbol, and Person.

in which there is a close linkage of perception and the overt muscular reactions to the social and physical world. The second is the conceptual-symbolic, which has been called "representational" or "propositional" language. Here the words stand for or represent categories, generalizations, and abstractions from concrete perceptual experience. Or the words permit us to say something or designate "objects and situations *independently*" of a "subjective state or an action context." [19] As Scheerer goes on to point out, "concepts are psychologically operative" when certain "invariant" relationships "between the properties of an object, an action, or an idea is grasped, and when the communality of characteristics that is invariant can be abstracted from a variety of changing aspects." [20]

Words, of course, at least in our language, do not stand alone but are combined into sentences or utterance units of some sort. As we noted above, it is the syntactical arrangement which makes the meaning complete. Moreover, this arrangement and consequent meaning depends not on the temporal order of the words but on the set or organization or *Aufgabe* which controls and directs the relational meaning of the words and sentences involved in any such communication.

Clinical observations confirm these facts. The examination of individuals who have suffered damage to those areas of the cerebral cortex

[19] Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," in Gardner Lindzey, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 126.
[20] *Ibid.*

which control language and the higher thought process show clearly the close relation of the higher centers and the proper use of conceptual symbols. Many of these aphasics, while they do not lose their perceptual capacities, do lose the ability to use concepts for classification, part-whole relationships, and the like. Their use of language tends to be restricted to perceptual and simpler cognitive operations. At the same time, the personality as a whole seems to become constricted to a more elementary level of organization.[21]

The development of abstract concepts is related to the higher development of the self and self-control. Although we shall discuss the emergence and function of the self in Chapter 6, at this point we may mention the fact that, as a part of the internalization of his conceptual organization, the mature individual arrives at a stage of self-direction and self-instruction. Here the person voluntarily gives directions to himself and then carries them out. This is clearly a high-level aspect of role expectation and role-taking, both important components of the personality.

There has been a long-continuing discussion of the most adequate psychological theory to explain concept-formation and the use of symbols. The behaviorists like Clark L. Hull tend to view this as a special case of stimulus generalization, although Hull has admitted a place for purpose and insight in considering the function of symbols in human behavior. Others, less wedded to behaviorism, are not satisfied with the simpler thesis of stimulus-response organization and reinforcement. It would take us too far afield to discuss these matters.[22] We need but recognize that symbolic devices mark man's highest intellectual development and without them he would not have been able to invent, develop, and carry forward his culture.

Let us now discuss more specifically the interrelation of symbol, object, thought, and overt action. Put otherwise, we need to study the interplay of the object, the reflection or thought, the word or symbol, and the self or person who reacts. A diagram of this interrelationship is shown in Figure 1.

First, there is the object or thing which, following certain logicians, we call the *referent* or *designatum*. This is what is pointed to or denoted, and is ultimately the object to be manipulated or otherwise dealt with; it is the nonlinguistic element, the environment that is handled, or the desire responded to, and so on. Second, there is the word or picture or other vehicle of communication which stands for the object. This we call the *symbol*. Third, there is the inner arena of thought or reflection

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[22] For a review of the main lines of this discussion, see Scheerer, *ibid.* See also C. L. Hull, *A Behavior System* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952); and Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951).

which may involve emotional wish, fantasy, and logic. Sometimes this is called the *reference* or the *interpretant*—that is, habit and attitude concerned with interpretation. Finally, there is the person, or *actor*, or more specifically the action with respect to the object, the symbol, or the reflection. Using a behavioristic frame of reference, we may say that the course from S, the stimulus, to R, the response, is qualified, modified, and given meaning in terms of the symbol, *s* and the reflection, *r*. This may be diagramed thus:

$$S - s - r - R$$

This is, of course, but another way of showing that the stimulus, be it internal or external in origin, is mediated through inner processes before it reaches the final response or reward.

Three Modes of Operation

The interplay of these factors varies greatly. For our purposes we may classify it under three modes: the logical mode; the common-sense or everyday mode; and the mode of fantasy.

At the logical level we are concerned with the universal and general symbols used in necessary correlations of events, and in cause-and-effect relations. In such usage, says Charles W. Morris: (1) There must be some impersonal universal symbol vehicle such as *a, b, c . . . x*. (2) There must be some specified form of expression, such as is found in the syllogism or other expressions of the logical relations of A and B, etc. (3) There is also, implicit or explicit, some general denotation or extension of terms which indicate consistency and recurrence in the events symbolized. (4) There is some standard pattern of habit and attitude of interpretation which may empirically be considered as preparatory to the test of actual action or operation (this Morris calls the interpretant). Finally, (5) there is some social generality, some agreement and consensus, some acceptance and expectancy, built into the culture. In fact, of course, points 4 and 5 are closely bound together.[23]

Such an interplay of thing, reflection, and symbol must be completely divorced from personal wish and emotion. The symbols constitute what Rudolf Carnap calls "thing language," [24] or what above we called representational or propositional symbol. However, as every student of logic knows, in logical analysis a "thing" symbol may be replaced by another symbol. Yet the final test of logic is experiment or practical application to events in nature or society. No matter what flights mathematical logic may take, the empirical or pragmatic test is: Will it work under the stated conditions?

[23] See Charles W. Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938), Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1–59.

[24] See Rudolf Carnap, "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," *ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 42–62.

At the common-sense adjustment level, the interplay of these factors is, first of all, on a more perceptual and simple classificatory basis. We noted in an earlier section that in ordinary circumstances most adults use concrete definitions of objects and react linguistically pretty much in terms of everyday habits. Of course, thing-language is used in certain skills that are necessary for material and social adjustments. In addition to these, and around them, are a host of connotative or intensional symbols and meanings, often charged with emotional and fantastic associations.

Most of our day-by-day social intercourse is filled with declarations, commands, threats, entreaties, persuasion, and suggestion. Here we find convention, manners, morals, and law in operation. This is the mixed objective-fantasy section of our thought, the world of half-logic, half-fancy in which most of us live.

From this middle ground we shift rather easily to the more thoroughly and more obviously emotional, self-centered, fantasy level of thought and language. In terms of our four factors, we note, first, that the symbols themselves often replace the objects, or referents. That is, they stand alone as significant and powerful objects of attention and action. Second, the symbols are loaded with emotion and wishful associations, as we saw in discussing fantasy in Chapter 4. In these instances, the connotations and sound associations almost completely replace the denotative and extensional functions of language. The referent disappears, and reference, or reflection, is guided not by logic but by conscious and unconscious wishes. If such a shift is extreme, it reduces the possible communicability of individuals and thus removes words from their normal function. Language, instead of being a phase of social interaction, becomes short-circuited into the world of inner, self-centered conversation. If such practice continues, it may result in mental and social isolation of the person from those about him. Any participation with others may be reduced to most elemental forms. Such instances are found in catatonic stupor, in which the patient may indulge in fantasies but externally remains completely passive and dependent on others for survival.

Yet in no case are the relations of symbol, referent, and reference independent of the person or actor. Normally all these operations have some implication, sooner or later, for interaction with others. The individual mobilizes the object, the symbol, and the reference when he comes into contact with others. Unless he does so, he will tend in the direction of isolation noted above. In short, community of speech or writing is fundamental. It is most evident in the mixed level but does not always seem so clear with regard to logical thought, nor is it apparent in some forms of schizoid fantasy.

We must not forget that science and logic rest on a cultural base.

Some philosophers may argue the point but for our purposes we take the instrumental view that thought, language, and action—even with regard to the physical universe—do not necessarily represent a point-to-point picture of the nature of the universe. This is a technical topic for the logician and the metaphysician. Certainly symbols such as "—1" and "the point at infinity" are to be considered not as corresponding to any nonlinguistic structures in the alleged "real world" outside but rather as convenient symbols or mental devices for dealing with certain aspects of generality and universality. Our common-sense use of the word "not" illustrates this point. It has practical use in permitting us to refer to something other than the thing specified without stating what this "other" is. It is clear in modern physics that the nature of cosmic forces—that is, the meaning we give them—depends upon the premises, the logic, and the experimental tools we use. For example, physicists can "demonstrate" either the corpuscular or the undulatory nature of light, depending on how they go about it. And yet Einstein later brought both under one mathematical rubric.

It is clear that language is related to what we call expectancy or anticipatory response. Speech is both a response and a cue which, in turn, serves to set up a like response in the other. So, too, language has a dual reference: one toward the objective situation or *referent,* the other toward the internal *reference* or reflective operation. The symbol provides a way of mediating between these two.

CULTURAL SETTING OF SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Symbolic behavior is expressed or demonstrated through communication. The importance of interaction and consensus is nicely illustrated in the very meaning of the word "communication," which has the same roots as the terms "community" and "communion." They come from the Latin word meaning "to act or think in common," that is, together. The whole operation of language and meaning has no significance unless we recognize that it rests fundamentally upon social consensus.

Language and Reality

Consensus, which operates through culture, involves certain assumptions. First, we may name and converse together about objects and events. Second, through language and its associated thinking processes, we may classify and relate objects and events. And third, we assume that such naming, classifying, and relating permit more effective manipulation of the environment, both physical and social.

Some students of language as it relates to reality have contended that there is a naive and natural logic which assumes that somehow or other consensus about events and objects may exist independently

of linguistic form. In contrast to this view, one of the most important contributions of Edward Sapir and Benjamin L. Whorf to social psychology has been to show that the grammar of a given language provides a common cultural frame of reference from which the individual necessarily views and understands his society and its culture. Such concepts as the "things" which have definable attributes, or the idea of "causality" in nature, or the belief that there are certain relationships and comparisons among objects and events, are all closely bound up with the very structure of the language. In fact, it is Whorf's position that it is language and its associated forms of thought that determine the nature of the world, not the world of nature that determines our language and thinking. As Whorf puts it, talking is "supposed only to express what is essentially already formulated nonlinguistically," that is, formulation is a process independent of language. Whorf contends that this is quite contrary to fact. Our own logic is itself bound up so intimately with the grammar and structure of our language that we have difficulty in shaking loose from it. Only the study of linguistics in a cross-cultural framework can free us from such restriction. However, this view does not mean that there is no physical or social world outside us. The point is that this world tends to be defined in terms of our particular vocabulary and linguistic structure.[25]

Illustrations of Cultural Variability

The ways in which culture defines behavior, including forms of communication, are many and to us sometimes curious. Let us examine some of these.

We have already noted that gestures are the foundation of true language. Not only vocal but manual gestures become imbedded in the given culture of time and place. Thus one anthropologist tells the story of having offered a piece of candy to a small native boy in West Africa. He gestured in the usual American fashion of crooking his finger and pulling the hand toward his own body. At the sight of this gesture the child took to his heels and disappeared into a hut. Later this anthropologist, upon inquiry, was told that the meaning of this gesture

[25] Whorf's most important publications are found in Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Four Articles on Metalinguistics* (Washington, Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1952). One paper by Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," is reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1947), pp. 210–218. See in the same volume a reprint of D. D. Lee, "A Linguistic Approach to a System of Values," pp. 219–224.

For a discussion of the concept of time as related to linguistic structure, see Clyde Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, pp. 933–937. Sapir's views are scattered through a wide range of his writings. For convenience, see Edward Sapir, "Language," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), Vol. 9, pp. 155–168. See also David G. Mandelbaum, ed., *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1949).

to the child's tribe was "go away and make yourself scarce." The come-nearer-in-order-to-receive-a-gift gesture is the exact opposite—the pushing of the hand away from the body.

The culture variability in gestures is enormous, as Weston LaBarre's cross-cultural survey has shown. There is also D. Efron's study contrasting the gestures of the assimilated Eastern Jews and the assimilated Southern Italians in New York City, and his contrasting these gestures, in turn, with recently arrived, unassimilated members of the two populations. He also shows clearly that gestures show individual variations within a given cultural context.[26]

Among the Abyssinians one says "No" by jerking his head to the right shoulder. One says "Yes" by raising the head and chin. In contrast the Sicilians say "No" in about the same way as the Abyssinians say "Yes."

By the same token, laughter is regarded as of different character in some societies than in our own. Geoffrey Gorer has pointed out that laughter is often used in some parts of Negro territories to show surprise, wonder, even discomfort, and embarrassment. It is not necessarily and even not often a sign of amusement.[27]

Among the Andaman Islanders when two friends or relatives, who have been separated from each other for some time, meet, their greeting proceeds as follows: They sit down facing each other with their arms around each other's neck and wail or weep for two or three minutes. This probably expresses some idea of group solidarity. In contrast, when two friends depart from each other, one of them lifts the hand of the other toward his mouth and gently blows on it.[28]

As a matter of fact, cross-cultural examination of gestures as of language itself will show that almost any meaning can be given to any vocal, facial, or other gesture. There is no sacred or inevitable basis for the particular communication system to which we are accustomed.

George Herzog, in discussing some aspects of this problem, has pointed out that lisping is interpreted variously in different societies. For example, in Central Europe about a generation or so ago, lisping on the part of a young woman during courtship was regarded as a highly attractive reaction, especially if she were also good looking. In this society, in fact, it was a serious breach of etiquette for a homely woman to lisp. It was regarded as a crude affectation. On the other hand, if a man

[26] Weston LaBarre, "The Cultural Basis of Emotions and Gestures," *J. of Personality*, 1947, 16:49–68; and D. Efron, *Gesture and Environment* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1941).

[27] Geoffrey Gorer, *African Dances: A Book About West African Negroes* (New York, Knopf, 1935), p. 10.

[28] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *The Andaman Islanders* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 117.

lisped other people got suspicious of him. He was regarded as being effeminate.

Herzog points out further that lisping has played an unexpected part in the process by which a foreigner acquires the English language. If a foreigner has trouble with the English *th* as in "thick" or "health" he might be able to handle this sound if he remembers how to lisp. A lisp of an *s* is exactly what you have in a *th* sound. Many Germans have been told quite correctly that English *th* sounds are related to their *s* and *z* sounds. They sometimes make conscious efforts to make their *z* and *s* sounds do the job. The result is a curious half-lisp which we find characteristic of the heavy German accent.[29]

Definition of Nature

The manner in which the grammar of a given language helps to define one's world is described by Whorf in pointing out that in English our basic division in words is between class I, the noun, and class II, the verb. He writes: [30]

> Our language thus gives us a bipolar division of nature. But nature herself is not thus polarized. If it be said that strike, turn, run, are verbs because they denote temporary or short-lasting events, i.e., actions, why then is fist a noun? It is also a temporary event. Why are lightning, spark, wave, eddy, pulsation, flame, storm, phase, cycle, spasm, noise, emotion, nouns? They are temporary events. If man and house are nouns because they are long-lasting and stable events, i.e., things, what then are keep, adhere, extend, project, continue, persist, grow, dwell, and so on, doing among the verbs? If it be objected that possess, adhere, are verbs because they are stable relationships rather than stable percepts, why then should equilibrium, pressure, current, peace, group, nation, society, tribe, sister or any kinship term be among the nouns? It will be found that an "event" to *us* means "what our language classes as a verb" or something analogized therefrom.

The Hopi language has a special classification of events by duration. Events of necessarily brief duration—lightning, wave, flame, puff of smoke—are verbs. The Hopi use one noun for insect, airplane, and aviator. They feel no problem in thus classifying these together. By the same token, the Eskimo has different words for falling snow, snow on the ground, snow packed hard like ice, slushy snow, drifting snow, and so on. An Eskimo would be completely baffled in attempting to handle his experience with snow by the use of one word only.

Such large generalizations as time, velocity, and matter are concepts

[29] George Herzog, "Linguistic Approaches to Culture and Personality," in S. S. Sargent and Marian W. Smith, eds., *Culture and Personality* (New York, Viking Fund —now Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc.—1949), pp. 93–102.

[30] Benjamin L. Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," *The Technology Review*, 1940, 42:6. All quotations by permission.

belonging largely to our Western world. In contrast, by means of certain aspects and modes the Hopi grammar makes possible a distinction "between momentary, continued, and repeated occurrences, and to indicate the sequence of reported events." In other words, the universe may be described without using the concept of dimensional time. "Hopi may be called a timeless language." [31]

The Navajo language illustrates another aspect of this whole subject, namely, a difference in the manner of how one travels. When the Navajo speak of a person going somewhere they always classify precisely as to whether the individual went on foot, riding a horse or mule, by wagon, or by train, auto, or airplane. For each means of transportation there is a different term.

By the same token, we find that some nonliterate peoples have no notion of causation in the sense of the Western world. This does not mean that they lack a sense of time or change from one period to another, but they do not have our concept of causation. Rather they have only an idea of simple sequence. So, too, they lack concepts of progressive change which are common in our own cultural repertoire. The Trobriand Islanders, for example, have no sense of relatedness in their language but rather their sentences are a series of self-sufficient words with practically no morphological mechanisms to relate one to another. Moreover, this reflects their view on the world as a series of events more or less complete and disparate one from another. They have little sense of past, present, and future as we have in our own society and culture.[32]

Certainly we must avoid assuming that our particular verbal frame of reference which gives basis to our view of the universe is the only one through which we could state material and social events. The recent advances in philosophy and science alike should make us cautious in any belief that we have the final word in our analysis of the universe in which we live.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BLOOMFIELD, Leonard, *Language* (New York, Holt, 1933). Long a classic and still good.

CARROLL, J. B., ed., *Language, Thought, and Reality* (Jointly, Wiley, New York, and Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956). The selected writings of Benjamin L. Wharf with an "Introduction" by Carroll.

FRIES, C. C., *The Structure of English* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1952). Represents a new approach to the study of English sentence structure. By the use of mechanical recordings he secured the conversations of various individuals in Ann Arbor, Michigan. From an analysis of these recordings —amounting to over 250,000 "running words"—he has worked out a novel classification of English sentences.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.
[32] D. D. Lee, *op. cit.*

HARRIS, Zellig S., *Methods in Structural Linguistics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951). A study of the structure of language by recording sequences of phonemes, working out the recurrent patterns, and grouping them into certain classes of utterances. This method does not deny the importance of meaning, but does not use meaning as the basis of structural analysis.

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SAPIR, Edward, *Language* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1921). Another classic, and still important.

SAPIR, Edward, "Language," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), Vol. 9, pp. 155–168. One of the best over-all discussions of language in English.

WHORF, Benjamin L., *Four Articles on Metalinguistics* (Washington, Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1952). The most important publications of this brilliant and stimulating student of Sapir. He was cut down early in his career, but his influence has been very considerable, as has that of his mentor.

CHAPTER 6

The Self: Its Development and Function

A CENTRAL and basic feature of the human personality is the sense of self or self-awareness. This grows up with the development of language and becomes an important feature of the behavioral system of the individual. In this chapter we shall indicate briefly the family setting for the rise of the self and then give some details on how the self emerges out of social interaction.

BASIC INTERACTIONS: FAMILY AND CHILD RELATIONS

In Chapter 3, on social learning, we indicated the general features of social or interactional training. In Chapter 4 we dealt briefly with that aspect of social learning which is called socialization. By socialization we mean the process by means of which the child learns to become a functioning and participating member of his society or group. This is chiefly the Case I described in the paradigm on learning in Chapter 3, p. 49. Some writers distinguish between socialization and enculturation. The latter is thought to refer to the whole cultural training and especially those aspects of it which are continuous through life.[1] For our purposes this distinction is unnecessary. At present we are concerned more particularly with the way in which the individual, through social learning, becomes a member of a group and learns to take on certain roles and their related statuses.

Forms of Social Learning

There are really two types of social learning. The first of these may be called cultural conditioning. This has to do with the manner in which the family members and particularly the mother and father induct the child

[1] See M. J. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York, Knopf, 1955), pp. 326–327.

into the fundamental culture patterns of a given society. This would include techniques of handling his physical and social obligations, motor and social skills of all kinds, and cognitive and emotional orientation to persons and things along the lines that the culture requires. As we saw in the previous chapter, the direction which these take is bound up with the whole language structure as well as with the physical world to which the child is linked. Also, from the cultural point of view the child learns to react to various individuals in terms of age and sex differences, to give deference to some persons in terms of power, and to take certain attitudes of dominance with reference to others. In the latter case, for example, the older child learns to assume a certain superiority toward younger members of the family.

Outside the family, the child gradually becomes indoctrinated with an awareness of family differences, particularly with those which affect class structure. Toward children born on the "wrong side of the tracks" he learns to assume attitudes of dominance and superiority, whereas with reference to people in his own social class he learns to take attitudes of equality and congeniality.

In fact, during this whole period, attitudes and habits relating the in-group toward the out-group are built up. The child identifies himself with a whole series of in-groups of which he is a member. Toward various out-groups he learns certain negative attitudes and habits. The class function is simply a special instance of the in-group versus out-group relationship along structurally predetermined lines.

The second kind of socialization arises from what I call personal-social learning. This is social learning which occurs outside the scope or framework of culture proper. It is largely the Case III type of not-matched but dependent learning described in Chapter 3. Edward Sapir referred to the early phases of such social learning as "pre-cultural." [2] But I use the concept of personal-social learning to cover the whole range of non-cultural but nonetheless social learning. It is true that the bulk of such acquisition occurs in the first years of life. In these situations the child learns to respond to others and hence later to react toward himself in rather varied and sometimes unpredictable ways. A clear example of this are the differences which arise in terms of age. Thus an older child who is physically stronger, mentally more matured, and with more experience may easily come to dominate a younger child who has not yet learned as much. There arises in such situations a dominance-submission pattern which may have nothing to do with the particular cultural frame into which the family fits. To be more concrete, an older child, son of a domestic in an upper or upper-middle class family, may dominate a younger child, son of the employer. Or, to take another instance, a mother

[2] Edward Sapir, "Personality," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), Vol. 12, p. 86. This entire article is a classic in the field.

may recurrently react emotionally toward a young child, one time favorably, another time unfavorably, so that the child acquires cues and responses to such parental behavior which make it possible for him to adjust quickly to coming stormy or pleasant social climate. Moreover, such techniques of handling quickly the changing moods of another may generalize later in the individual's mastery of the art of exploiting other adults. In a similar vein, a crippled child, no matter what the particular cultural definition of his condition may be, will be handicapped with reference to other children on the playground. Not being able to run so fast or do various other things in the way of play, such a child may develop certain withdrawal tendencies. This would mark his personality and surely influence the responses of others toward him.

Theoretically, this concept of personal-social learning is important because it provides a means of dealing with those forms of social learning which are not closely tied up with culture. As a matter of actual fact, many of the creative aspects of learning in social situations often fall in the framework of this personal-social conditioning. Surely it has a place in invention and creativity.

Building Basic Interactional Patterns

Within the family situation, the basic interactional matrix is that between the child and the mother. Feeding will serve as the model. On the part of the child there is the basic drive of hunger. The child experiences certain needs or tensions which he himself cannot gratify or relieve. In other words, *the process from drive through cue and response to reinforcement or reward requires the intercession of another individual.* In this case, it is the mother. We have here the development of the fundamental reaction pattern described in Chapter 3. This basic drive of the child may be gratified—that is, lead to reinforcement—only when the mother puts the child to her breast and feeds him. In other words, these drive tensions of hunger are reduced by the taking in of milk at the breast of the mother. She, too, has certain tensions built up due to her breast filling up with milk. She will be gratified or rewarded when the child takes a full meal, thus relaxing her own muscle tensions. The child cannot satisfy his fundamental drives without this help or co-operation from the mother. This interactional schema of mother and child is shown in Figure 2 from R. R. Sears. He remarks: "The care of children during their early years involves repeated contact between parent and child, and many of these contacts are the environmental events required for the satisfaction of primary drives."

Then, too, during the feeding period, the mother may indulge in a great deal of affectionate care, stroking the child's body, uttering sweet nothings into his ear, and so on. Thus arise certain expectations on the part of the child for indulgence, affection, protection, and care.

On the other hand the mother, because of her particular cultural training and idiosyncratic patterns, may impose certain regularity, discipline, and inhibition upon the child. For example, in our society we may put the child upon a certain fixed schedule of feeding. The natural rhythm, for example, might be hunger pangs at intervals of two hours,



From Robert R. Sears, "Personality Development in Contemporary Culture," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 1948, 92:365. By permission. Quotation above, p. 367.

FIG. 2. Instrumental Interaction Sequence: The Basic Unit of Social Behavior.

but the mother might put the child on a four-hour feeding schedule. This would imply some restraint or control imposed upon the child. In order for the latter to get his full satisfaction or reinforcement, he would have to conform to these social demands of the mother. Thus is introduced a second aspect of basic training, namely, the function of deprivation, discipline, and authority.

Then, too, the child may acquire other cues, such as the sight of the mother, which calls for her attention. That is, the child may come to cry not because he is hungry but because the sight of the mother sets up demands for being picked up, carried about, fondled, and otherwise given attention. This, in turn, may lead to many learned reinforcements other than a full stomach. Among these are desire for approval, mothering, and other evidences of social care. In fact, these latter often become so important that the more natural or primary drive cue-response-reward patterns are overlaid with learned responses of high drive significance. Some aspects of this were discussed in Chapter 3.

We may summarize some of the factors which enter into the modification of early behavior in the following way: (1) There is a time factor, with the growing extension of the period between need and reinforcement. This is illustrated by the imposition of certain feeding schedules. (2) There may be, or usually is, an imposition of control. An example would be the regulation by the mother of the child's eliminative processes which would bring this activity into the field of social interaction. Unlike the feeding response, the child may carry on his eliminative responses without the intercession of another person. But in actual fact, again in terms of cultural demands, the child is taught to keep clean and certain regularities with regard to the eliminative processes are laid down for him. With respect to this, as well as the expression of sexuality, the heavy

hand of discipline often comes into operation at fairly early ages. In some societies, firm regulations regarding elimination may be imposed upon the child. In other societies, with different cultural expectations, this training may come much later. (3) There is the emergence of learned cues in relation to needs. Such things as the sight of the mother and demand for attention rather than for satisfaction of direct and primary needs for food are cases in point. And (4) there is the addition of new reinforcing agents aside from the natural ones. These include social approval and other evidences of social tuition.

Additional Aspects of Socialization

Some special problems related to socialization may be noted before we take up the manner in which self-awareness or sense of self emerges. These represent background factors which become important in the development and functioning of the self. First, there may be a certain withdrawal of affection, or what is called parental rejection. For a variety of reasons, the parent may not care for the child and the child may have a sense of being rejected. This may happen when the appearance of a second child means that the mother must give much attention to the new baby. The older child may believe and act as if the mother had suddenly lost all affectionate interest in him. Frequently, of course, there is no basis in fact for this; but this is not the point. It is how the child feels and reacts that will be significant in his own responses to the changed situation. In other instances, because of antagonism toward the husband and father, or for various other reasons, the mother may reject the child whether there are other children or not. Sometimes the father may reject a child because it symbolizes a hated brother.

In contrast to parental withdrawal of affection, we have the instances of overprotectiveness on the part of the parent. In such situations the parent and child become so closely linked that the child remains in a state of dependence and the mother in a state of protection far beyond the time when these relationships are essential to the child's growth. As a matter of fact, protection and affection which may be quite pertinent to the first few months and years of life may later become a serious handicap to the development of the child's personality. Protection, when overdone and extended beyond the proper time, may mean that in the child's own contact with other people, his undue identification with others outside the family may keep him from becoming a mature self.

Other problems arise with reference to frustration and aggression. Frequently the temper tantrums of the child, or his stubbornness, are simply devices to get his own way and are used to force the parent to give him additional attention. The failure to deal with these kinds of behavior on a realistic basis may lead to the development of habits which encourage the use of negativism and temper tantrums as power devices

long after childhood. Negativism and temper tantrums are most frequently seen in children from the ages of three to six or seven years. Their use after that tapers off. Yet, in sublimated and displaced form, we all know people who resort to what is essentially a negativistic attitude or a verbal temper tantrum when they cannot get their own way. Such continuity of infantile and childish responses proves a handicap in more normal social intercourse of adults.

Then, too, the child may indulge in fantasy or daydreaming as a substitute response when he cannot get what he wishes. The function of fantasy in the whole repertoire of thinking has been examined in Chapter 4 and need not be repeated here. It need only be said that the objects of fantasy tend to reflect clearly the types of frustrations or doubts of the child. In Chapter 4 we mentioned Conklin's study of foster-child fantasies. He reported that a considerable fraction of children thought themselves to be orphans and not really belonging to their families. Some imagined they had come from other families of superior class. These fantasies were admittedly quite vague and probably did not mean much in the child's development.[3]

Another common type of problem related to socialization is the development of a sense of inferiority. This is essentially a depreciation of the status feelings of the child. When the child has been made to feel that he is not wanted, as in the case of parental rejection, or when he is handicapped by some physical ailment, or when he otherwise gets a position of inferiority, he may suffer a real sense of not being wanted and not belonging to the group. This may have serious repercussions upon the development of the sense of self. Sometimes inferiority leads to feelings of frustration and aggression, sometimes to docility and escape. The particular direction in which inferiority feelings may lead will vary with the individual and with the social situation to which he is exposed.

RISE AND FUNCTION OF THE SELF

The Self Arises in the Social Act

By social act we mean social interaction, either at the gross bodily or at the symbolic level, as indicated in our earlier discussion. The self has its roots in the overt relations of the child with others. Gradually these become internalized to form the foundation of his symbol system. The sense of self depends upon identification or, more strictly speaking, upon introjection and expectancy. *Introjection* refers to the capacity of the organism to take up into itself as a perception and later as a memory not

[3] See E. S. Conklin, "The Foster-Child Fantasy," *American J. of Psychology*, 1920, 31:59–76. See also his *The Foster-Child Fantasy* (Eugene, University of Oregon Publications, 1922).

only its own activities but the acts of others toward its own responses. When we say that a child introjects his mother, we mean that her act toward him becomes an image associated with his act toward her. In the rise of the self, the process of introjection consists in our taking the responses of others into ourselves and associating them with our own responses. We learn to act toward ourselves, moreover, as others have reacted toward us. As George H. Mead puts it, it is a case of "stimulus that affects him as it affects somebody else." Put otherwise, the content of the other, or B, which enters into A's personality is the response in the individual A which his gesture or words calls out in the other person. To quote Mead again, "He becomes a self insofar as he can take the attitude of another and act toward himself as others act." [4]

There are many illustrations of this interactional interplay in everyday life. If we reach out our hand to greet a person, we are already beginning to respond within ourselves to his handshake. Our gesture serves as an anticipatory cue. If he turns away and does not recognize us, we may realize that we have made a mistake in our anticipation. Or we may realize that the man is no longer friendly. In any event, we make a gesture and this gesture is followed in our own case by a certain anticipatory response that his reactions will be of a certain kind. When we speak to another person we already begin to react to what we expect he will say. In a sense, you can demand a particular reaction from others if you take a certain attitude. This arises from the fact that our anticipation of the other person's response is based upon previous learning. The fundamental features of this are described in the interactional paradigm discussed in Chapter 3.

To take an example: the drive of the child for food is rewarded by the mother giving it sweetmeats. On the next occasion that the child is in the presence of the mother and there is a drive for food or a learned desire for approval, the child will begin to react as if the parent is already giving it some candy. Some of the problems of so-called regularity and consistency of training are bound up with this very matter. As we noted above, if in one situation we fulfill the anticipations of the child by giving him sweetmeats, and in a subsequent but similar situation we do not, we may build up in the child certain ambivalent and conflictive attitudes so that he is never quite certain how we will respond. The resulting conflict within may result in disturbances of more far-reaching consequences than those immediately associated with the situation. In the whole process of identification and introjection, regularity and consistency become important in the development of subsequent response patterns. Only on this basis are we able to predict behavior.

Put in terms of role-taking, we say that the child learns to play cer-

[4] George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 161, 171.

tain parts or roles because of the images which he receives of himself and of responses from others. We perceive our own acts in terms of the approval, or punishment, or avoidance, or indifference of other people toward our particular responses.

An illustration of how this operates at a simple level is the sex typing which takes place in our society. We give a little boy certain kinds of mechanical toys, we dress him up in certain clothes, we talk about him being a little man, and he begins to take these roles because, if he does not, he will not be rewarded. Conformity to our expectations sets the stage for his particular roles. In the same manner, we talk about a little girl being cute or pretty, give her dolls or other feminine toys, and when she fulfills the expected performance we reward her. If she does not, we punish or avoid her.

It is in the intimate context of such interactions that the sense of self arises. The inner source of this is probably the very dramatic character of speaking or thinking that we discussed in the previous chapter. What James Mark Baldwin, an earlier psychologist, called "the dialectic of personal growth" is simply a statement of the fact that in building up our sense of self we talk to ourselves as other people talk to us, we respond to ourselves as other people have responded to us, or later, as we anticipate how other people will respond to us.

Put in a more formal way, we may say that the rise of the self depends upon the capacity of the individual to be an object to itself. To refer back to Figure 1, Chapter 5, page 108, we say that the individual becomes the reference to himself, and the symbol which is associated with him, on the one hand, may be a reflection or reference taking up into ourselves the views of other people on his behavior, as well as his view of his own behavior. In other words, we can put the rise of the self into the diagram which indicated schematically the interrelationships of objects, thought, symbol, and person.

The process of becoming an object to one's self depends then upon the capacity to internalize our own reaction system built up of the responses of another person to us and of ours to him. For example, one perceives himself only after he has perceived others. In this activity, language plays an important part. As Mead remarks, it is only through language that the individual may become an object to himself. That is, only language provides a way for a person to respond to himself as others have responded. Perhaps the commonest form of this is that one talks "to one's self as one would talk to another person." [5] This is clearly evident when the child assumes or expresses the mother's words, pronunciation, tone, and overt gestures. In short, he takes over into himself, as far as possible, the role of the mother. The various activities of another individual toward him are absorbed into and associated with his own responses. This is essen-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

tially what we mean by the development of the ability to take or play a role. There is a close analogy to the taking of parts in a drama. We say the child acts first one part and then another. He can do this because he has associated the reactions of others with his own needs. Moreover, the role-taking is a part of his expressive activity which is related to the expectations of others as to what he will do. For example, a little girl is, psychologically, her mother when she plays with dolls. A little boy is a father or an adult male when he manipulates his toys in a certain fashion. In Mead's words, "The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitudes or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond." [6]

There is no doubt that this response of the child toward himself in the forms of the others involves the whole sensory-perceptual system, including hearing himself speak, seeing his own body, sensing his own kinesthetic responses, and so on. These rest upon the imagery which the child has developed in his interactions with others. Let us now examine more closely the significance of role-taking in the development of the self.

Specific Role-Taking

At the outset the child playing the role of the other is in a highly specific situation. We have already noted that in our society the little girl is provided dolls with which to play while her brother is given mechanical toys.

The whole function of role-taking is nicely illustrated in play. Although, at the outset, the child plays by himself and in a sense is an isolate, nevertheless, common sense as well as systematic observations show that there is often a social element even in this early phase. He talks to himself as others have talked to him or he to them. He says, "Now I am doing this or doing that." Certainly, by the time the child has arrived at preschool age, he has become sufficiently dependent upon other children that their play will be largely a forecast of their adult-life activities.

For example, a child may play at one moment the role of the customer in a store, and at the next moment he is the clerk waiting on the customer. If he plays at being on a train, at one moment he is the conductor collecting tickets and at the next moment the passenger giving up his ticket. The particulars of this kind of play will obviously depend on the child's experience in a store, in travel, and elsewhere. The content of his play is almost certain to be culture bound.

In the play situations in many societies we find that older children take the role of the parents or other adults and the younger ones play

[6] George H. Mead, "Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *J. of Philosophy*, 1922, 19:160.

at being themselves or babies. Thus, an older child playing with a younger child may scold the latter as a parent might or otherwise punish him if he gets his clothes dirty or does not do as he is told. Or if he obeys he may be rewarded by praise in the adult manner. Such activities serve to reinforce the basic training which the parents themselves give the child.

Obviously, fantasy or imaginary play depends upon the development of language. As we have said, we begin with overt acts and not with thoughts or words. But as the child acquires speech habits in the social matrix of the family and elsewhere, he then duplicates these by talking to himself. Through language he is able to indulge in a wide range of fantasy, peopling his imaginary social world with all sorts of dramatic characters, good and evil, old and young. Such play provides further learning of roles. Moreover, the creative projection of such activities in fairy stories—ancient and modern—furnishes still more of the same experience. This, for instance, is the function of the superman-type comics.

General Roles

As children grow up they begin to generalize from the many specific roles which they have taken. Such generalization will take place, first, with respect to some recurrent need or drive and the sequences of cues, responses, and rewards which follow. This sequence is illustrated by such items as the repeated demands to satisfy hunger, in which situation the mother or other adult has a distinctive part. The regularity and consistency of the adult in the situation serves as a model for consistency on the part of the child. Then, too, the generalization might grow out of the recurrence of some acquired drive such as the wish for social approval. From these repeated situations some kind of generalization of role-taking emerges. In the second place, generalization may arise from the fact that some elements in a given specific role-taking are similar to those in another specific activity. This is the familiar psychological phenomenon of part-whole association.

The growth of the general role, or "generalized other" as Mead called it, is further stimulated by the child's engaging in co-operative activities. This is found in games where teamwork is essential. In baseball the child learns to play pitcher, catcher, batter, first-baseman, and so on, and his taking these specific roles from time to time enables him later to become a baseball player. To be the latter he must be able, at least in imagination, to take momentarily the role of another. For example, the first baseman watching his pitcher throw a ball to a batter must be able to image the actions of pitcher, batter, and catcher—at least these three—in order to be able subsequently to play his own role as first baseman if the batter hits the ball. These internal responses as other players—which serve as cues—become highly abbreviated and habitual and, in fact, often drop below the level of consciousness. A professional ballplayer's ability or

inability to perform as a member of a team may become conscious to him in some crisis. The signal of the catcher to the pitcher which the first-baseman may also see, the windup of the pitcher, the movement of the batter, and so on, are all a series of related cues which the first-baseman must take into account in deciding how far away from the base to stand. This, in turn, might be followed by the batter striking the ball and starting toward first base. These movements would serve as cues for the next responses of the first-baseman who might catch the ball from the pitcher who fielded it and so put the runner out at first base.

As Mead points out, team games have certain rules, and these rules are nothing but a set of cues and associated responses which the particular role requires. An inexperienced player who does not know the rules, that is, the anticipated patterns of action, may confuse his teammates as well as the opposing team. So, too, learning to play by the rules of a society enables the child, the adolescent, and the adult to organize the cues and responses into some kind of unity or generalized pattern.

The emergence of the general role or a series of related general roles is the basis of the integration of the personality. As adults we represent a combination of specific roles—those required in our vocation—with the more general roles of good provider, good father, good citizen, prominent scientist, and the like.

In a society such as ours, our high division of labor may result in such specialization of roles as to block the development of the more general roles which might appear in a less complicated and simpler society. Some aspects of this will be discussed when we consider the moral role or the superego.

Anchorage Points of the Self

There has been considerable discussion as to just how the individual locates or images the self within the whole repertoire of his activities. Is it the physical body only? Or are there other and perhaps even more important anchorage points for the personality?

Without doubt, one of the most significant of these is the individual's name, both his given and his family name. With us the family name provides a symbol with which we may easily identify and from which we get a feeling of security, both as a protection and as a shared experience with others in the family. The personal name accumulates a host of associations with various roles. The refrain of an old poem entitled "Jest 'Fore Christmas" is an illustration: [7]

> Father calls me William,
> Mother calls me Will,
> Sister calls me Willy;
> But the fellers call me Bill.

[7] Eugene Field, "Jest 'Fore Christmas," from the *Writings in Prose and Verse of Eugene Field* (New York, Scribner, 1894), Vol. 4, *Love Songs of Childhood*. By permission of the publisher.

One other example will suffice to make clear the importance of the personal name as the seat of self-perception and self-conception. Edward Clodd cites the case of a Jamaican Negro, Quamina, who had contracted a debt. Before this was repaid he became a convert to Christianity, was baptized, and was given a new name, Timothy. Later, when his creditor asked for repayment, the Negro was amazed and contended that the money had been loaned to Quamina who was now dead. He, Timothy, was a new man—as the Church had told him—and should not be expected to pay a dead man's obligations.[8] In our terms, the man had been reborn into another self and the old one no longer existed.

Not only are the body and its organs, and the name, cues to self-perception, but so too are clothing, shoes, neckties, decorations and honorific titles, and other things closely associated with one's personal habits and status. These become self-symbols, however, because the child, the adolescent, and the adult introject their worth from what others think about them. The child is rewarded by having a new suit and for keeping it tidy and clean. It thus symbolizes his role as a "nice" child. One may become attached to shoes, neckties, scarfs because they acquire a self-oriented meaning. Honorific titles and decorations provide an expansion of the self in social relations and hence give enhancement to self-regard.

Other important anchorage points are found in the membership role and in the status of various groups. Class position is surely one of the most important symbols of personal identification. From his family and friends the upper-class child soon learns to look down upon and avoid individuals in social strata below him. The obverse of this is the sense of inferiority and deference on the part of the lower-class person who looks up to members of classes above his station.

Any in-group from family to nation-state may serve, in terms of identification and participation, as an anchorage point for the self; but most significant, perhaps, are those intimately associated with the name, the body, and personal belongings.

THE RISE AND FUNCTION OF THE MORAL SELF

Learning the moral codes and patterns of conduct of one's society is a central aim of early training. The moral attitudes, values, and habits constitute an important core of the social self.

How the Moral Self Develops

Like the other roles, those related to proper conduct begin in overt identification and gradually become introjected into the inner life organization as the conscience, or, as Sigmund Freud termed it, the "super-ego." The initial identification is derived from the child's assumption of

[8] Edward Clodd, *Magic in Names and Other Things* (London, Chapman and Hall, 1920), p. 169.

the role of punisher of acts which others consider improper. He simply reacts to his own acts as others do. Children have been observed to slap themselves in punishment of an act for which they had previously been slapped by another. Even more common than such completely overt identification is the common practice of children scolding themselves for their acts. They may use the third-person form, "Johnny mustn't do that," or address themselves in the direct second-person command, "You mustn't do that." But, the particular verbal form aside, the main point is that they check specific acts by taking the attitude of others. From these overt beginnings they introject the patterns of control, which is to say that they develop a self-punishing mechanism or conscience.

This conscience operates by the introduction of one set of roles which counteracts or blocks another. The psychological mechanism for this is the familiar one of inhibition. One role, the approved one, is first rewarded by others and later by the sense of self-righteous approval. The tabooed one is met by pain, deprivation, or other punishment, and later by personal shame and sense of guilt. The pleasant feelings and emotions are tied to acts which are morally approved, and unpleasant ones to those which are not. Shame and sense of guilt are degradations of the self, a reduction of one's sense of approved participation with others. In one form or another, shame or guilt or both appear in all societies and are powerful devices of social control.

One of the main functions of moral roles is the repression of the more primitive and less socialized impulses. Ordinarily, in the adult and the older adolescent, the more elemental features of the self are inhibited. But in severe crises, such as a race riot or a lynching, in revolutionary mobs, in wartime hysteria, in fad and craze, or in religious frenzy these repressions may be overcome by the elemental drives and roles. One function of the moral aspect of socialization is to fortify the individual against such outbreaks. Shame and the sense of guilt are the watchdogs of what we are taught to consider right and proper.

The moral controls of society are built up largely through institutions which are external coercive and persuasive devices for regulating conduct. The institution is a kind of "generalized other," and those which have to do with the mores, laws, and related controls fall within the larger framework of generalized patterns. One function of such institutions is moral instruction.

The social function of such instruction is, of course, to build up moral roles in advance of the situations calling for particular conduct. In doing this many societies have recourse to extensive verbal training in morality. Emotionalized words are frequently used to define situations for the child or the adolescent long before he comes in contact with them. Very often this verbal training is aimed at the generalization of moral roles in advance of any emergence of a general role from recurrent

day-by-day experience. This anticipatory use of language is but a special instance of the defining function of words.

Acts and persons are defined as good or bad, proper or improper. The verbal aspects of the moral "me" are conveyed in such terms as "You're a bad boy" and "You're a good girl." At adult levels we get positive definitions of the "good citizen," the "loyal soldier," the "good provider," and the "true Christian." On the negative side we ascribe unpleasant and disapproved characteristics to members of the out-group, such as "dirty nigger," "sly Jew," or "scheming wop." Such derogatory terms are part of our baggage of definitions for the disliked, the feared, and the disapproved.

In building the moral self, as in building other features of the personality, we begin with acts, not with words or thoughts. The aim of moral instruction, as of much of education, is to reverse this process. That is, by use of words and other symbols we attempt to build up strong, emotionally toned ideas, sentiments, and values which will define and hence control overt action in advance. The moral man—that is, the man of character—knows what to do in most situations involving morality without giving thought to his acts. Of course, as George H. Mead would have put it, it is not always possible to predict completely what the overt expression of even the most moral man will be. Yet, if the training has been sound, the man of character will probably abide by the moral codes.

Moral Ideals and Actual Conduct

What men say about their moral codes and beliefs often does not correspond with what they do. Verbal responses seldom correspond completely to overt actions, except in exact science and its applications. Using a statistical or probability concept, we may say that one of the aims of moral ideals and codes is to set a norm which individuals may approach as a limit. However, in many situations, a verbal profession will satisfy the moral demands of the moment by setting up expectancies and acceptances in others.

On the other hand, too great a deviation of overt conduct from the norm leads to a dissociation in life organization which may prove disastrous, even to the point of being labeled by others as criminal or psychopathic. In our society we have two moralities, one derived from Christianity and the Golden Rule, and the other from business enterprise, where sharp dealing and cutthroat competition are considered virtuous practices. Sometimes the strain induced in persons who are culturally indoctrinated in both codes results in schizoid, or split, personality. Some aspects of this will be discussed in the next section.

DISSOCIATION AND INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

Ideally, out of our basic drives and the recurrent means of satisfying them, and from the generalization of roles, we should develop a co-ordinated or integrated pattern of life which would tie together the many diffuse lines of day-by-day adjustment. Yet people vary in the degree to which they are able to co-ordinate their activities around a central theme. More often than not we find both dissociation and integration.

Source of Dissociation

As we pointed out above, the young child is rewarded for some kinds of adaptation and punished for others not considered adequate or proper by his mother or other persons. Sometimes the child purchases approval at considerable cost in original impulse. This leaves him frustrated in certain reactions though satisfied in others. The discipline and authority of the parent may lead him to feelings of fear and rage. Such a condition may produce internal conflict, for the approved drives and outlets are reinforced by the rewards, and the disapproved drives, often very potent, are not. Such conflicting roles, or attitudes, tend to split the child's reaction system with respect to the introjected images of the mother and father. One set of roles is marked by pleasant toning and the fulfillment of certain wishes, the other by unpleasantness, aggression, and other negative attitudes. The first the parents label as "good," "proper," and "nice"; the second as "bad," "improper," and "naughty." Each develops its own phase within the emerging set of selves. The first, linked to approval, pleasantness, love, sympathy, and other affectional reactions, conflicts with the opposite responses of the second. The former may grow into strong habits and tend to become generalized; the latter is permitted certain mild expression, or is repressed, or is displaced upon other persons or situations.

Another source of dissociation in role-taking is the competition and conflict of siblings for parental affection, for toys or other objects for which all may strive. In fact, there is some evidence that a child's first strong reactions against his mother may arise when a newborn infant tends to replace him in her attention.

As a consequence of this division of reactions, one socially approved and rewarded, the other repressed or punished, there is a division in the child's environment, for the meaning of the social-cultural environment is determined in large part by just such actions and attitudes. Some roles of the developing self stand out as satisfactory to the self and to others, while other roles are hidden away along with their inciting motives. Yet the accumulated aggression is not entirely lost. Moreover, the very nature of our interactional patterns permits considerable culturally approved

deflection of the accumulated aggressions. This is the function of fantasy, compensation, and sublimation; it is clear in our projective mechanism, and it is most apparent in conflict and competition with other members of one's in-group and especially with members of out-groups.

It might be imagined that such splitting of the patterns of life organization would altogether disorganize the personality. This is by no means so. The outlets just noted are of vast importance. Some, like fantasy, are internal; others, such as compensation and sublimation, are verbal or overt or both. Especially significant is one's positive identification with the aims, symbols, values, and activities of an in-group in opposition to those of members of an out-group.

Integration

Such ambivalence permits a balance or integration between inner organization and outer conduct which has many implications for many phases of personality and for wider group relations. Such dual but coordinated responses, moreover, are found at every level of group organization, primary or secondary, and are reflected in culture because they exist in man in interaction with his fellows. Through such means we can at once love our fellows and hate our enemies. We can be kindly to our parents or other relatives and in fantasy harbor murderous thoughts about them, or, better still, displace those thoughts into our enjoyment of tragedy on the stage, in movies, or in books.

It does not follow that every group is opposed to a corresponding out-group. Nor are our aggressions all conscious or overt. Often they are greatly disguised and appear in the form of irony, wit, or unconscious slips of tongue or pen. Very often our violent attitudes are dressed up in moral terms of righteousness and in struggle for great causes. Revolutionary agitators and lynchers out "to protect white womanhood" are, from their own standpoint, highly ethical persons. In conflicts of all kinds, persons on both sides rationalize their verbal and overt hostilities in terms of divine or human principles. This salves their moral self or conscience and at the same time serves to motivate their aggression.

Figure 3 summarizes this whole discussion and shows how widespread these divergent yet balancing reactions are. It indicates that the social order, with its many institutions, has grown up in reference to, or out of, these deeper, socially rooted actions and reactions of men. Finally, it shows that, just as basic and acquired drives are fulfilled only in our social acts, so the forms of interaction, oppositional or co-operative, set the stage at the social as well as the cultural level for integration of the personality. While generalization and integration are, for the individual as a biological specimen, the results of certain neurological processes, at the social-psychological level they are products of mind and action, both of which are socially derived. In many chapters hereafter we shall have



FIG. 3. Diagram Showing Opposite Social-Cultural Outlets and Their Correlated Ambivalent Personal Attitudes and Roles.

occasion to examine the operation of these interactional patterns with reference to particular aspects of man's adaptation to man.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CAMERON, Norman, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947). Chapter 4 gives a sound treatment of the concept of role and its importance in personality theory. This concept is an important feature of the author's discussion of mental disorders.

HARTLEY, E. L., and HARTLEY, R. E., *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, Knopf, 1952). Chs. 16 and 17 deal with role theory in social psychology.

LINDESMITH, A. R., and STRAUSS, A. L., *Social Psychology* rev. ed. (New York, Dryden, 1956). Chapters 12 and 13 are on role-taking in relation to the self. Follows George H. Mead.

MEAD, George H., *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934). This posthumous book consists of material taken chiefly from students' notes in Mead's course in social psychology. Role-taking is central to Mead's theory of the rise and functioning of the social self. This entire book is basic to an understanding of role theory.

NEWCOMB, T. M., *Social Psychology* (New York, Dryden, 1950). Chapter 9 is an excellent discussion of role-taking and role-expectation.

SARBIN, Theodore R., "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 1, Ch. 9. Good review of the chief literature on role theory. Excellent bibliography.

STRAUSS, A. L., ed., *The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956). Selections from Mead's three posthumous books: *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934); *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936); and *Philosophy of the Act* (1938).

SYMONDS, P. M., *The Ego and the Self* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951). Considers the ego as the perceiving, knowing, and acting component of personality, and the self as the object of consciousness or awareness.

YOUNG, Kimball, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952). Chapters 7 and 8 present in more detailed form much of the matter discussed here. Chapter 10 deals with various theories of personality—not dealt with in this book.

CHAPTER 7

Personality and Culture

UP to this point we have dealt chiefly with processes that are more or less universal in child training and in the development of the self. Yet most of the illustrations have been drawn from our own culture. We know that man everywhere has a neuro-muscular-glandular system which is basic to his adaptation. In other words, he is capable of learning. We know, too, there are cycles or processes of adjustment which begin in needs or drives and move on through cues and responses to various rewards or reinforcements. Moreover, everywhere these needs and the associated learning operate largely within the matrix of society and its culture, which is to say that there are institutionalized and expected ways of meeting needs.

That individuals living in societies with cultures different from our own show quite distinctive personality characteristics is evident from even slight acquaintance with persons from other societies. Popular misconceptions often rest on the belief that these differences derive either from racial traits or from influence of climate and other geographic factors. Geographic elements may act as limiting conditions in some instances, but such "explanations" of personality are false. For example, the fact that the Swedes and Finns are a stolid people has nothing to do with their living in a subarctic climate. Nor has the fact that the Latin peoples are supposed to be more passionate and expansive than the Scandinavians anything to do with the warm climate in which the former reside. No matter such alleged explanations, historians and writers of literature long ago began commenting on variations in traits, attitudes, habits, and values of peoples in different parts of the world. For example, students of comparative European literature have drawn contrasts between the reserved Britisher and the lively Frenchman. Cultural anthropologists have followed up the observations of traders and missionaries to give us fuller pictures of differing nonliterate cultures. The aim of the present chapter is to describe how the personality varies with the kind of culture in which it develops.

INTERPLAY OF CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

Variability and Culture

Variations in personality may derive from different sources. On the one hand, we have original nature and its modification. This we have already discussed, in part, under the topic of constitutional or biologic foundations of personality (see Chapter 2). These include both physical and psychological components. There are a number of important factors here. There are the variations in the neuro-muscular-glandular make-up of the individual. So, too, there are differences in bodily build or physique, as a result of heredity as well as maturation, diet, and disease. Moreover, there are the biological foundations of age and sex differences which are important in all societies. Culture provides, however, the content and direction which they will take as they operate in the interactional matrix.

In the second place, personality variations may derive from those elements in experience which are common to members of some particular society or group but differ from elements common to others. These common experiences are the roots of what we shall describe later as the basic personality. Then, too, there are subcultural configurations within the larger group or society which may make for additional variations. Such subcultural elements may relate the sex, age, or class structure and other factors influencing adaptation. We shall treat the relations of subculture to personality in the next chapter.

Additional matters must be taken into account in considering the relations of culture and personality. There are the decided influences of early childhood training which carry over to the adolescent and adult personality. As we shall see later, there has been much debate regarding the importance of early training on adult personality. There apparently is considerable support for the view that the early years are significant. Also where there is similarity of cultural training there should be considerable similarity of personality configuration. The techniques of child-rearing and care derive from culture, that is, they are learned. But among the families of a given society having any given culture, such techniques will be similar though seldom if ever identical. Such culturally-determined techniques of child-training differ from society to society in terms of the cultural variations among these societies. The more similar two cultures are, the more similar should be the particular total impact of the culture upon the personality. With these background factors in mind, let us examine three societies with different cultures so as to see the relationship between cultural frame and personality organization.

The Hopi People

The Hopi are an American Indian group who live in northwestern New Mexico and northeastern Arizona.[1] This area is marked by scanty vegetation, relatively mild climate, and a low annual rainfall. The Hopi number about 3,500 and are scattered among a series of pueblos or adobe villages usually located on mesas. Their dwelling places are similar to apartments and consist of living quarters as well as underground rooms called *kivas* which serve as chambers for the various rituals and as gathering places and workshops for the men.

The principal source of food is farming, and corn is the most important crop. Beans, melons, and squash also add to the family larder. In this region of limited soil resources there are occasional disputes over the land and some people get better land than others. Because of droughts there are occasional crop failures, and in some instances the Hopi experience serious food anxieties. In addition to the garden produce, the Hopi hunt rabbits and earlier hunted deer, mountain sheep, and antelopes, although these latter three are now largely extinct.

The Hopi have a well-ordered society in which matrilineal descent and matrilocal residence are the standard patterns. The tribes are divided into a number of clans. Most clans have the name of some plant or animal as their basic symbol and this plant or animal is believed to protect and watch over the members. The clans are, in turn, united into larger units called phratries. Each clan owns its own farmland and this is parceled out among the adult women members of the various families. The phratries are exogamous—that is to say, members of a given phratry must marry outside their group.

The household is the economic unit of a tribe. Moreover, women are the center of the Hopi household. This usually consists of a mother and father, their unmarried sons and daughters, their married daughters and their grandchildren. The mother's unmarried brothers also live in the household. The plots of ground within the clan allotment are held by the women and are passed from mother to daughter. The land is worked by the husband but belongs to the wife who controls the produce. Except in the matter of religious ritualism, which does have an important place in this society, the position of women is quite high and dominant.

The economic system is co-operative, and there is very little striving for individual success along economic lines. There is no system of social class, but some clans have more prestige than others. Any attempts on the part of an individual to gain wealth or power over his neighbor arouse suspicion. As a matter of fact, such striving is normally regarded as due

[1] There is a vast literature on the Hopi and other Pueblo Indians. An excellent introduction will be found in Fred Eggan, *Social Organization of the Western Pueblos* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950).

to witchcraft and is highly disapproved. Conformity rather than social differentiation along class lines is highly emphasized among the Hopi.

The basic unit of political control is the village. Ordinarily, a group of men form a council and act as the major governing body. There is usually also a village chief who in many, if not most pueblos, comes from the bear clan.

Aside from the co-operative family control of land and its products, the great concern of the Hopi is with their religious rituals. Unlike many American Indian tribes, the Hopi do not emphasize supernatural helpers who are acquired by individual endeavor. That is, they do not follow the pattern of securing a guardian spirit—so common elsewhere among our native tribes. Rather, there are a large number of gods who control human destiny and the basic features of the physical world. Some of these beings belong to certain clans and form the basis of the cult of that clan. These gods are generally called Katcinas. The Katcinas, however, are not merely the gods but are representatives of the spirits of deceased Hopi. According to Hopi belief, each year in the winter these beings return to earth for six months, and their arrival and departure is celebrated by elaborate rituals in which men impersonate the Katcinas.

Of all the American tribes north of the Rio Grande, the Pueblo Indians are the most thoroughly engrossed in elaborate ceremonials. In a farming society, living in such sparse territory, the gods that control the rain, the sun, facilitate planting, nourish the seeds, ripen them and control the harvest are most important. One of the major Hopi ceremonies consists of prayers for rain.

On the other hand, shamanism is present in Hopi society only in a minor way. Earlier shamans were organized into their own groups for curing ill people. They were supposed to have the power to cure the sick by supernatural means. It is assumed that shamans will not use their supernatural powers for evil ends. When they do, they are thought to be witches.

Witchcraft is believed to be present and there is considerable anxiety about it. Those individuals who become witches are possessed to kill their nearest relatives by some kind of supernatural power. Sometimes individuals worry as to whether they are witches or not. Witches are thought to belong to a society of their own, and like European witches are believed able to transform themselves into animals.

On the whole, the Hopi community is passive and co-operative, and there is little evidence of the use of force or violence. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that these people or their neighbors the Zuñi and other Pueblo Indians are completely pacifistic. It is sometimes believed by sentimental and uninformed people that these tribes prove that human behavior can be purely co-operative and peaceful, without any evidence of violence and warfare. There was warfare in earlier days when the

Pueblo Indians had to defend themselves from their warlike neighbors, the Apache and the Navajo. In fact, they had quite an elaborate military establishment, and while their strategy and tactics were chiefly defensive, at times they engaged in counterattacking hostile tribes.

It would be a mistake, certainly, to assume that the Hopi show no hostility or aggression. On the domestic front, one of the means of social control is malicious gossip, especially concerning sexual deviations from the norm. Since women are in control of the household, if the wife gets tired of her husband she puts his personal things outside the pueblo, indicating that she does not want him any more. He has to leave. Also there is much political intrigue. For example, in one Hopi village, the Oraibi, there was a split into five separate factions. Although some people believe that in this particular division the pressure of the whites was a factor, the evidence is not completely clear. In any case, it is evident that some forms of hostility may and do come to the surface on occasion.

Hopi courtship and marriage are managed by the young couples themselves. The boys court the girls secretly at night or visit them as they grind corn during the day. A girl may dismiss a boy's attentions, but if she likes him, she allows him to talk to her. If the two decide to marry, their families first discuss the matter separately, the mother's brothers having the most influence in the final decision. When the families agree, a rather elaborate and extended marriage procedure is begun. This lasts for several days and includes ritualized hairwashing of both bride and groom, prayers, and extensive feasts. The male relatives of the groom, assisted by other men in the village, make a set of wedding garments for the bride. When these are completed and both families have exchanged the appropriate gifts of food, the couple is ready to set up housekeeping. They go to live in the household of the bride's mother where they may have a separate room of their own. Unlike many other American Indian tribes, monogamy is the standard practice among the Hopi.

Because of the rules of matrilocal residence, the groom usually has to make the major adjustments after marriage. The husband cannot act as freely, particularly in the presence of his wife's brothers, as he does in his own mother's home. He is at a disadvantage in arguments or quarrels because his wife's relatives tend to side with her. The controlling person in the household is the mother. A man's own children are subject to the control and discipline of his wife's brothers and not to him. Of course, in turn, he is the person who is responsible for the training, in large part, of the children of his married sisters.

We noted above that divorce is relatively simple. The rejected husband usually returns to his own mother's or to his sister's household. However, such final separations are not arrived at from mere whim but usually represent, as does divorce with us, a long period of attempted reconciliation and adjustment. While the husband and wife who wish to get

a divorce do not need the approval of their families, they usually ask their advice.

The Life Cycle in Hopi

Children have a high value among the Hopi. At birth there are a number of important rituals which the members of the household, both the father's mother as well as the girl's own mother, carry out. The mother is secluded for twenty days after the birth of her baby during which time she observes rather strict dietary rules. At the end of the twenty days a ceremony is held in which the father and mother give the child a name belonging to her clan. The mother's mother prepares a feast for this occasion for the entire village. The child is now strapped to a cradleboard for the first time.

The early and basic training of the child is rather permissive. The mother nurses the child, but other females may feed him, too. If the baby becomes hungry when his mother is away, one of her sisters or other close relatives will give him her breast. The breast is used to pacify as well as to feed. Thumb-sucking is not common, although it has been observed. When a child persists in thumb-sucking, the mother may put chili powder on his thumb as a means of getting him to stop.

Weaning occurs usually at the end of the first year or during the second year. It is a slow process in which solid foods are introduced and gradually become preponderant in the diet. Toilet-training is given relatively little direct attention. In fact, there is no formal training and no severity when the young child has an accident, such as bed-wetting. Later the child may be taken outside the pueblo where he learns by imitation of others, or he is talked to and told what to do. Sometimes there is mild scolding of the child for soiling, though bed-wetting may continue until the child is well advanced in the second year.

Walking occurs usually a little late in comparison with our own middle-class society. Some people believe that Hopi children, having spent so much time on a cradleboard, are handicapped in learning to walk. But Wayne Dennis has observed that this is no serious handicap because the child soon "catches up." [2]

Occasionally the child indulges in temper tantrums, particularly between the ages of two and six years. Such outbursts are more common in boys than in girls. The source is usually some kind of frustration. The child may scream, kick, and tear things. But again he is seldom punished. It has been reported that there are some sadistic responses of children toward insects, which they enjoy pulling apart. But this may be lack of training in these matters and is not considered of psychological significance. The children are told to keep away from the edge of the pueblo and

[2] Wayne Dennis and M. G. Dennis, "The Effect of Cradling Practices upon the Onset of Walking in Hopi Children," *J. of Genetic Psychology*, 1940, 56:77–86.

to avoid cliffs and fires. On the whole, there are few frustrations or formal routines in the early years.

Smaller children are often given over to the care of their older siblings. Girls do most of this work, but the boys are occasionally pressed into service. In addition to their own biological mother, Hopi children call a large number of their mother's female relatives, including her sisters, by the term "mother." The children may make demands on these women and receive care and attention from them.

The mother's brothers are the chief disciplinary agents, and sometimes the resentment of a boy is directed more against an uncle than against his own father. The same is true to a lesser extent of a girl, but her behavior is more closely regulated by her mother than by her aunts. Corporal punishment is occasionally used but it is not frequent. When they misbehave, children are told that there will be some kind of punishment or retaliation by a supernatural cannibal woman called Soyoko. This creature is sometimes impersonated by a male masked dancer at the religious ceremony held in February when "she" goes about from one home to another threatening to take the naughty children away in "her" basket in order to eat them. The parents make a show of protecting their children from this supernatural cannibal. Yet on the whole the child grows up in a relatively secure and satisfactory environment. There is much indulgence in the early years. There is little deep anxiety. The children live in a safe and co-operative environment.

Sometime between the ages of seven and ten years the child is initiated into the Katcina cult. Those who enter this cult are severely whipped as part of the ceremony. They discover for the first time that the Katcina dancers are not supernatural beings but rather masked men of their own tribe. Apparently this may be a severe disillusionment to many Hopi. As one Hopi Indian recalls: [8]

> That night everybody went to the kivas to see the Katcinas dance. I accompanied my mother to the Mongwi kiva, where we sat with many others on the raised portion, watching. When the Katcinas entered the kiva without masks, I had a great surprise. They were not spirits, but human beings. I recognized nearly every one of them and felt very unhappy, because I had been told all my life that the Katcinas were gods. I was especially shocked and angry when I saw all my uncles, fathers, and clan brothers dancing as Katcinas. I felt worst when I saw my own father—and whenever he glanced at me I turned my face away. When the dances were over the head man told us with a stern face that we now knew who the Katcinas really were and that if we ever talked about this to uninitiated children we would get a thrashing even worse than the one we had received the night before. . . .

This shock at learning the truth about the Katcinas, of discovering that their parents and other adults have deceived them, is a phase of the

[8] Leo W. Simmons, ed., *Sun Chief, the Autobiography of a Hopi Indian* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1942), p. 84. By permission.

transition to adulthood. It is an illustration of what Ruth Benedict called "discontinuity" in cultural training.[4]

At the ceremony each child has an adult sponsor or ceremonial parent whom he afterwards calls "mother" or "father" and with whom he maintains a special relationship for the balance of his life. After this time the boy may come and go freely in and out of the kivas with the adult men and may participate in various Katcina rites. The position of the girl, however, is little changed at this juncture. She remains largely under her mother's tutelage.

At the onset of puberty, the Hopi girl is secluded for four days in the home of a paternal aunt. She is kept from the view of others and has to observe certain restrictions of diet and other behavior. She spends her time chiefly in grinding corn. After this restrictive period, the girl is ready for marriage.

Later in life the Hopi are initiated into a series of other religious societies. It is interesting that individuals do not strive to be leaders in these organizations, although there is considerable prestige and respect given to those who hold a political or religious office.

Death is greatly feared and only a few close relatives will remain with a dying person. The relatives of the father take charge of the burial, which is made in a shallow grave. Relatives deposit gifts near the grave, including food and water. The ghost is believed to eat the spiritual essence of the food. The living are in considerable fear of the ghost and as they go back to the village from the cemetery they perform a number of magical rituals to keep the ghost from returning.

As to the nature of life after death, there are varied views. One view is that the spirits go to the underground world where they lead lives very similar to those of the living. Some say the dead reside in the Grand Canyon. One widely accepted belief is that, in the form of Katcina representatives, the dead may return to earth. When they appear, they may be entreated by the living to intercede with the more powerful gods to secure human well-being.

Hopi Personality

In terms of the development and function of the self, we may say that the Hopi personality is marked by heavy stress upon co-operation. There is little or no stress upon individualistic response and values. Although there is some slight hostility, as illustrated by gossip, for the most part there is little evidence of interpersonal aggression. There is much indulgence in the early years. Throughout life the strong are expected to be ready to assist the weak. There is, in fact, a distinctive pattern of dependency. Pride and other strong and selfish wishes are not permitted ex-

[4] Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," *Psychiatry*, 1938, 1:161–167.

pression. The absence of self-assertion is the road to success. Personal goals and ambitions are relatively taboo. Group or collective goals are the center of the individual's identification. The most severe punishment consists of withdrawal of group support and denial of the opportunity for participation. There is little personal maladjustment in this tribe of the kind familiar to us. Suicide is practically unknown. On the whole, the Hopi gives the impression of being a quiet and passive person unmarked by many of the individualistic traits and attitudes so common in other nonliterate peoples as well as among middle-class Americans.

We might say that the self or ego development of the Hopi is considerably suppressed or, at least, not greatly developed. There is an emphasis on shame but there is no cultural outlet or channel for pride. Achievement is marked by selfless participation in common life. In one sense, success is measured in terms of the lack of assertiveness. Property is not a highly valued symbol but is socialized for the family and larger group. As to external sanctions, there is the invocation of shame, accusation of witchcraft, and occasionally sorcery.

The individual security system is tempered with the continual fear of shame. The security of dependency is the chief factor here. The compact and reliable kinship group provides an important symbol of identification but in a way is marked also by considerable suspicion toward outsiders. This suspicion is itself an indication of hostile attitudes.

As to religious life, there is a faith and happy trust in the efficacy of the gods and in an impersonal externalized ritual. As indicated earlier, there is no evidence of the operation of the system of guardian spirits such as is found in so many other Indian tribes in America.

Perhaps the most important internal sanction is the fear of being shamed before others. Children are hurried toward adulthood and are shamed by the accusation of childishness. The aged are held in considerable respect and do not lose their status.

Kwakiutl Society and Culture

In rather sharp contrast to the Hopi and other Pueblo Indians are the Kwakiutl of the Pacific Northwest coast. The Kwakiutl are composed of many tribes divided into many bilateral family lines called *numaym*. Here we find a highly developed system of social ranking and a terrific struggle for status, expressed either in terms of economic success or through manifestations of superiority in certain religious activities.

The ranking system is the foundation of their social structure. All tribes, numayms, and families are in a graded system of status. The nobility consists of the first born of the families of high rank. The younger members of these families are commoners as are the members of the lower families. At one time there was a third class, that of slaves, but they

have disappeared with the coming of control by the white man. At the head of each numaym there is a chief who has certain limited political and religious powers.

This region is rich in natural resources and life is centered about fishing and the hunting of sea animals. The fishing is done usually by individuals, but sometimes a group of brothers may co-operate. One-half of the catch is given to the chief to be distributed by him to those who need food. One of the chief's responsibilities is to provide for those of his people who are in need. The other half is used in the households of the men who caught the fish. Members of a given numaym also co-operate in the ownership and exclusive use of hunting, fishing, and berrypicking territory. Along certain rivers fishing rights are carefully respected with regard to the families who control them. Even fishing rights in the sea are marked by sighting against two landmarks. In addition to the occupation of food-getting, a great deal of time is put into wood-working. The rich lumber resources have provided the foundation of a craftsmanship of high order. Basket mats, cedar-bark blankets, containers of various sorts, and all kinds of household utensils are made of wood. The wood working shows much skill and represents a high degree of division of labor.

The social structure is tied up closely with the principle of rank. Every individual in the community has a kind of obsessive motivation or drive for prestige. While property or material goods are important, certain social prerogatives are even more important among the Kwakiutl. There are various names or titles and crests which belong to given individuals because of family background. Yet any claim to superiority, prestige, or nobility must be validated by the distribution of property to one's rivals. This may be blankets, boxes, canoes, candlefish oil, or any number of other valuable objects. The individual gains his prestige by overwhelming a rival with gifts. This intense competition is the heart of the social relationships of the Kwakiutl tribes. Members of a given numaym help get together the property which their chieftain uses in his struggle with rival chieftains. When property is given to a rival, he must repay with 100 per cent interest. If he cannot meet this payment, he loses his social status. The occasion at which the gifts are exchanged is called a potlatch. In addition to the giving of gifts, a feast is usually given by one rival. In return, the other must give an even more elaborate and costly feast or lose his status.

There is some sibling rivalry and sometimes intense hostility between the younger brothers and the eldest son who has the highest status in the family. Although the oldest child inherits the bulk of the names and honorific privileges, there is at least one honorific office which goes to the youngest son. He has the position of counter and tally-keeper of the

dishes used at the various feasts. Interestingly enough, this office passes to the youngest son because he is considered to be more clever than the eldest child. The latter is sometimes thought to be foolish.

Marriage, too, is a contest for prestige. Competition for a mate among the Kwakiutl is really a struggle for names, honorific crests, and dance privileges. Such rivalry is limited by the fact that only individuals of approximately the same rank may marry. This represents a conscious effort in terms of wealth to restrict the upward mobility of individuals who may wish to marry into the higher ranks.

Not only is there a good deal of boasting in connection with the buying and selling of coppers, which represent great wealth and are accumulated in anticipation of a potlatch, but even murder may be used to get ahead. This is particularly likely to happen in the winter months when the religious ceremonials are the basis of the struggle for status. Sometimes a man who owns a dance is killed by an enemy who then assumes the dance himself. In earlier days, murder passed beyond individual hostility and the tribes themselves engaged in internecine warfare in an attempt to increase the number of tribal names, crests, and dances. As Irving Goldman says, "Every aspect of Kwakiutl life is oriented to the basic drive for prestige, which is maintained and augmented by the possession of two types of property, the nonmaterial—traditional histories, names, songs, special privileges, such as the right to give a particular dance or the right to tie a dancer to a post—and the material—blankets, boxes, canoes, coppers." [5]

As already indicated, religious life is centered around the struggle for honorific properties and prestige. Ceremonial dances, like coppers, are owned by individuals. The Kwakiutl, like Indians of many other American tribes, goes through a period of obtaining a personal guardian spirit which provides him with certain supernatural powers. The validation of a ceremonial dance is the obtaining of such a guardian spirit.

Not only does Kwakiutl religion reflect the stress upon rank, but it serves as an important medium of prestige rivalry. Most of the dances are given in connection with the distribution of property, during the feasts prepared for their opponents. Moreover, unlike the Hopi and Zuñi of the Southwest, the dances are often marked by ecstatic frenzy, especially those of chief dancers. The cannibal spirit, the supernatural patron of the cannibal society, is so powerful that it may induce the dancer to crave human flesh. At an earlier date, apparently, cannibalism did, on occasion, occur.

[5] Irving Goldman, "The Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island," in Margaret Mead, ed., *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937), Ch. 6, p. 196. By permission.

The Life Cycle in Kwakiutl

The training of the child fits into this whole struggle for rank and prestige. The child is under the rather sharp control of the mother, and she may on occasion attempt to toughen him up by dipping him into the cold sea or river in the winter time as part of his basic training. During his first year the father distributes gifts to members of the tribe and bestows the first name upon the child. This is his first honorific title. A few years later the father repeats the distribution of gifts and thus validates the child's second name. At about the age of twelve years, the boy begins distributing gifts on his own to validate still further names. Sometimes he has to borrow from members of his own numaym to get sufficient funds or property to pay for the gifts. He must later repay these loans at 100 per cent interest. In other words, even this transaction within his own group is carried on under the potlatch principle. Later, when he grows to maturity, he may undertake a potlatch of his own. This is the mark of arrival at adult status.

Clearly, the whole pattern of life centers around the struggle for status by means of intense interpersonal competition. The seeking of great wealth is not an end in itself but merely a weapon with which to crush a rival. By humbling a rival the individual builds up his own prestige. Moreover, the individual frequently reacts in a manner which we would classify as paranoid. It is unlikely that his behavior is on a par with the paranoid in our own society, but certainly the external features are much the same. The grandiloquent abuse which is hurled by one chief against another at a potlatch resembles megalomania. Yet such unabashed boasting is thoroughly accepted and formalized. Certainly there is nothing in this to be regarded as pathological.

In the return engagement one's rival seeks to wipe out his sense of shame by outdoing his opponent. If an individual fails to recover or attain superiority, he may resort to suicide. It is said he dies of shame. Sometimes a chieftain who finds that his son has married a commoner is said to die of shame. Or a shaman whose own tricks are unsuccessful or are exposed may die of shame. A milder response to such frustration is sulking.

The folklore itself shows this whole way of life. One story tells of a boy who, when reproached by his mother for refusing to marry, went to bed and for four days or more refused to take nourishment. Then he got up and went out of the house into the woods. Here there follows a series of adventures with supernatural beings whose powers, privileges, and totem pole he secured, thus putting his parents to shame.

Death puts the Kwakiutl into a frustrated and mean temper. Frequently a Kwakiutl will demand that another person be killed to atone for the death of a member of his own family. When the son of a certain

chief died, the father accompanied by the son's mother and with the help of henchmen went to another village where they entered the chief's house and shot him dead. When the father of the dead boy returned home with his companions, it is said that "they felt good." [6]

Kwakiutl Personality

Our description has chiefly concerned the behavior of the nobility. The commoner's place is quite different from this. He stands on the sidelines. He may help acquire property for the potlatch, but he is denied the opportunity to indulge in such behavior. At certain times there is something approaching the potlatch among these lowly people, but on the whole they get their satisfaction by close identification with their chieftains. The self-development of the Kwakiutl, at least among the upper class or nobility, would be represented by the acquisition of strong and selfish attitudes. Unlike the Hopi or the Zuñi, there is a tremendous stress on personal achievement in outdoing the rivals. There is an endless race for prestige by means of the potlatch, the loaning of property, and by taking part in the competitive ceremonials. Property is a symbol of high value not for itself but as a means of obtaining high status by dissipating and destroying it in the presence of one's rival. The basic external sanctions are those of public shame at failure in a potlatch, or through exposure to shamanism, or the killing, or expelling under threat of killing, a descendant. Suicide is an adjustive mechanism. It takes place largely under the condition of angry shame.

So far as the personal security system is concerned, the Kwakiutl have a low sense of personal security and safety because of the shifting structure of prestige. There is a certain solidarity in the kinship grouping, but this is always qualified by the personal striving within the group. Religion itself is a belief in a graded series of powers which man tries to control. There is little or no stress on ceremonialism involving a group, such as is found among the Pueblo Indians. Finally, the internal sanctions are largely those of fear of shame and fear of loss of position or status in the eyes of others. Children are pushed toward adulthood and hurried into competitive activities. The aged tend to be demoted in status but are nevertheless respected. In other words, a father at a certain age may give up his place in the numaym to his son who will carry on the potlatch system.

The Tanala and Betsileo

Changes in the basic economy, such as occurred among certain tribes in Madagascar, described by Ralph Linton, offer a good example of the interplay of basic cultural changes and personality. Two tribes, the Tanala and the Betsileo, illustrate the impact of change. On the basis of what was

[6] Goldman, *loc. cit.*, p. 207.

observed in Tanala, and in contrast and comparison with what happened in Betsileo, Linton was able to make a reconstruction of the basic economy of these tribes.[7]

For centuries these people had used the dry-rice method of agriculture as the chief source of their food. They had other crops and they also knew something of the use of swamplands for the raising of rice by the wet method. However, the dry method was the preferred one. Under this technique the rice is planted on cleared land and left to mature without further labor during the growing season. The wet method calls for terracing and irrigation and means constant and hard work.

In former times when the dry-rice culture was common there was a strong in-group feeling among the villagers. They would move into a new area and clear the land and put in the dry rice. There was little to do between the planting of the rice and its harvesting. They had a system of communal ownership of property and land. Cattle were evidence of high prestige but had little economic value. While there was communal ownership, the control of property really rested in the family lineage. The head of the family was the eldest male member and he organized all work, controlled the members, settled disputes, and took charge of funerals. On his death, his eldest son took over. Polygyny was widely practiced. At one time it was found in 40 per cent of the families.

There was a strong desire for children and hence a high emphasis on fertility. Occasionally a newborn child might be killed if it was born at the wrong time or season of the year. The basic training of the child remained about the same under both economies. There was permissive feeding, the child being fed when it cried. On the other hand, there was rather severe toilet training. It was begun as early as two or three months and was completed by six months. There was heavy stress on personal cleanliness and severe punishment for soiling. Sexual play of the children was strongly forbidden. The children were early taught high respect for the eldest member of the family group. There was a great deal of brother rivalry, probably linked to the system of family controls.

Courtship was rather prudish and there was no physical contact between the man and the woman, although occasionally there were some clandestine affairs. Promiscuity was strongly disapproved, since it was thought to cause sterility.

The religious system was an elaborate one with a supreme god who gave good things and was the main controller. More immediate supernaturals were the household gods, often the ancestors. The latter served as intermediaries, that is, as the ancestral ghosts who needed placation in order to secure favors from the higher gods.

The folklore was rather sparse. There were no creation myths or

[7] The material here is drawn from Abram Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1939).

stories of the gods. There were no war stories. There were, however, a few stories that reflected the brother rivalry found in the tribe.

As to the status system, it was the eldest son who was head of the family. There was considerable struggle for wealth, but the lesser members were dependent upon the head man. In the plural families there was usually a head wife and in such families there was some struggle for status. Yet, on the whole, the family groupings were relatively democratic as compared with what happened after they had moved into the system of wet-rice cultivation. The story of this change is significant.

Gradually the soil was exhausted in those areas which were capable of the dry-rice cultivation. This led to a gradual shifting to the use of the wet-rice method. In the latter there are a number of important differences. First of all, there is not the mobility from place to place or from village to village. Rather, families had to settle down either in the low swamplands of the valley or on higher ground where terracing of wet-rice plots along the hills and mountainside was used. These undertakings meant a good deal of hard work, and the control of the water supply became all-important. Irrigation is absolutely essential to the continuity of this type of agriculture.

In turn, this more or less permanent location of the farming areas led to a system of private ownership. While the head of the tribe was supposed to hold all land, as a matter of fact the landlords varied, in terms of their importance to the chieftain or king, in the amount of property they had. There was a definite shift in the social structure. Let us trace this briefly.

First the family and lineage system broke down. Intermarriages between families located in the same area became more common. There was a shift from independent villages to a tribal organization. There arose a good deal of in-group solidarity in the various settled villages as well as some increase in native warfare. The villagers now had to defend their irrigated landholdings against possible marauders from outside.

Furthermore, slaves who had been of no economic importance earlier now became highly desirable. They could be used for labor, and there was a development of new techniques of capturing and holding individuals for ransom. This, in turn, had an effect upon the solidarity of the tribe. The old tribal democracy completely disappeared. There arose instead a headman or king over the tribe.

So, too, there emerged definite social classes, based in part on property holdings, with the king and nobles—the large landowners—at the top. A group of commoners were in the middle and the slaves were at the bottom. The system is described by Ralph Linton as follows:

> Instead of the previous democracy as among the Tanala there is a rigid caste system with a king at the head, nobles, commoners, and slaves. The

powers of the king are absolute over the life and property of everyone. The commoners are the bulk of the population, the nobles, to all intents, feudal lords whose chief control is over land by royal assignment; the slaves are war captives or their descendants.[8]

Paralleling the pattern of control by the king were the powers of the father in the household. All property belonged to the father during his lifetime except the personal property of the wives, such as their clothes. Also the wives might hold personal property that had come to them as gifts. Gifts were sometimes given children, and once the gifts had been given the child had complete right to that property.

The basic disciplines first of all had to do with deference to elders and to rank. Incest taboos were common. Premarital chastity was expected of women and the punishment for breaking this taboo was sterility. The endogamy of marriage became associated with the caste system, although elevation of the status of the slaves could occur.

The father was the disciplinarian in the family. He had the sole right to punish his children which, however, he seldom did. The children occasionally deserted their parents.

The religion of the Betsileo is much like that of the Tanala, but certain significant changes took place in connection with the shift in the basic economy. "The rigid belief in fate is changed somewhat to mean that God arranges everything in advance." [9] Sorcery came to be thought the cause of illness. The idea that God would become enraged if anyone oppressed the poor became common. There arose a strong belief in retaliation for oppression. In other words, a kind of puritan ethic arose which is associated with the differentials in the economic status.

The immediate supernatural operations were carried out by ghosts and spirits of various kinds. Some of these were beneficial and benign. Others were evil in their intent. In this connection, the Betsileo make no sharp distinction between life of the living and the life of the dead. The souls of the dead carry on in the same manner as they did while they were alive. Good funerals are important, because this insures that the dead will be friendly toward his relatives after their death.

Another aspect of the religious life of these people is the belief in the possession of spirits. Spirits may be of human or nonhuman type. In one type of possession, the victims of these spirits are invisible to anyone else. Such spirits may persecute a man in various ways. They may pursue him and cause him to leave the country. He may be dragged about and made to perform a variety of activities. These spells of possession may last for a considerable time and then may pass away only to recur later.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 285. Material in Kardiner prepared by Ralph Linton. All quotations by permission.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

Worship is chiefly by means of sacrifice in expression of thanks. The people may make sacrifices for favors desired or received. They sacrifice for plenty and for scarcity.

Good sorcery is practiced by the *ombiasy* among the Betsileo as well as among the Tanala. He cures the ill, specifies good and bad days for various undertakings, and makes charms. Parallel to these good sorcerers are the malevolent ones who do evil deeds at night and carry on their practices in secret. It is easy to build up a good deal of hysteric fear of these evil sorcerers. They work chiefly by planting charms in places where they can do harm. One charm is a small wooden coffin which contains medicines and small dead animals. When it is destroyed, the charm is no longer in effect. Certain matters associated with the body, such as nail parings, cuttings of hair, food that is left over from a meal, clothing, and earth from a footprint may be used to injure its owner. On the other hand, feces, urine, and spittle—often important in sorcery in other tribes —are not so used.

One interesting difference between the Betsileo and the Tanala is that in the former the breaking of a taboo can be atoned through a purification rite. Also there is a great deal more general anxiety among the Betsileo than among the Tanala. There has been an increase in belief in omens, dreams, and other superstitions. In addition to the increase in the amount of anxiety, there has been a considerable increase in stealing and other forms of crime, even murder.

In short, while the culture of the Tanala and the Betsileo had once much in common, various differences appeared among the Betsileo following the change in their methods of rice cultivation.

Personality Structure

Certain changes in personality are brought out by Kardiner's analysis of Linton's data. For the most part, the early training was not greatly changed by the shift in the economy, but some significance is to be attached to the modification in the position of the father. Under the earlier system, subsistence was definitely provided and status was marked by a certain gradation which could be and was limited. In the new system, subsistence was not certain and prestige could not be limited. A whole set of new loyalties and new hostilities arose. They related, in turn, to the development of a class system in which rank was very rigid and in which there were sharp class differences. New stress was put on enterprise, skill, personal cunning, aggressiveness, and subjugation of others. The significance of property, which had been quite pronounced in Tanala society, was now increased because it became the chief means of enhancing the self or ego. The security system of the individual became intimately tied up with property and with his status or rank.

New anxieties appeared that were not present under the older cultural system. The individuals, especially those in the lower ranks, could never be sure of establishing their security with reference to those above them. This was particularly true with regard to the king, who had acquired absolute power over his subjects. Moreover, conflict between the brothers increased in severity because the father's resources were now limited. Moreover, new needs of the individual came into being and these, in turn, added to his anxieties. The increase in mutual hostility was probably one of the factors in the increase in the anxiety. In short, the disciplines, although not completely changed from those of the old order, did bring on an exaggeration of deference to authority and power and an accentuation of homage and degradation. "The constant reminder of gradations in status cannot enhance the security of the individual." [10]

The development of anxiety was bound up with the growth of oppression from those in power and with the fear of poverty. Moreover, there was considerable fear of retaliation. This probably reflected some response to the taboos on overt aggression. Even success was sometimes interpreted as a possible threat because others might try somehow to undo the effect of one's success. It is said in Betsileo that a man might die if his harvest was too good. While this might represent a kind of fantasy, it nevertheless shows that there is some unconscious fear of success. However, such anxiety did not prevent a Betsileo from continuing to strive for success in his economic and social enterprises.

The expression of hostility was revealed in the increase in crime. Likewise, there was a general increase in anxiety as illustrated in the growth of superstitions and in the extraordinary development of compulsive rituals. These had not been very common in Tanala but certainly they became more intense. Further indications of heightened anxiety were clear from the increase in spirit possession and in the fear and use of evil sorcery.

The basic personality structure, which had been much the same in both Tanala and Betsileo, was modified because of the new economy. There was a fusion of the subsistence needs and the status values associated with the caste system. In Betsileo the former ego organization which had been built within the security of the group had now been modified. The individual had some feeling of loss of protection and a good deal of sense of inferiority associated with the ranking system. The prototype of the anxiety is illustrated in the types of aggressions: jealousy, envy, desire to hurt, or to rob, or not see others successful. These correspond to hostile wishes. As Kardiner puts it, "The new needs for heightened self-esteem are strangulated by the rigid social system, which is now divided into immobile castes. However, the method of raising self-esteem is now

[10] Kardiner, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

exclusively through property, which has all the attributes of prestige because with it one can enhance one's ability to control others and win regard (and also hate)." [11]

While the disposition of the older Tanala was essentially compulsive in character, that of the Betsileo became even more so. This had become linked with the whole ranking system and the high importance of property.

In summary, then, changes in the basic economy of a society with the attendant modifications in the social organization can bring about alterations in the basic personality structure. While we need further evidence on this topic, especially in the form of individual case studies, the general picture is clear. In the next chapter we shall indicate some of the more specific features of the impact of culture upon the personality.

SOME CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS

Likeness and Difference

The accounts of these three tribes with their distinctive cultures and social organization provide us with material to study the possible variability in personality make-up of individuals reared in such societies. For the moment we are interested in a modal or type personality, not with individual differences within any one of these tribes.

1. The Hopi personality is mild-mannered, oriented to the tribal or collective functions and values and not given to competitiveness and personal ambition such as we find in the Kwakiutl or in middle-class United States today. To illustrate, Ruth Benedict used to tell the story of one Pueblo Indian with a great deal of drive and personal ambition who became provoked with the slow and easy-going ways of his neighbors. He began telling them to get more ambitious, to perk up and accomplish more work, and so on. He made himself something of a social pest and, finally, to stop him, the older men of the group decided to punish him. He was taken into a kiva and hung up by the thumbs for several hours. After that he stopped bothering people.

Among the Hopi there is a distinctive pattern of interpersonal dependency. The withdrawal of personal support constitutes a severe form of rejection. The symbols of high value are all centered in the group, and lack of personal assertiveness is highly approved by others. This strong in-group solidarity is related to suspicion of strangers. There is a strong fear of being shamed before others. Also there are some milder forms of hostility as exampled in gossip, which serves as a form of social control.

2. The Kwakiutl are characterized by strong egotism, ambition to rise in social power by the accumulation of expendable wealth, and by great hostility toward their rivals. Along with this goes a sense of

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 337.

personal insecurity, since one is under constant threat because of the shifting status structure. Unlike the Hopi, individuals brought up in this society are hurried toward adulthood and there is heavy emphasis on personal achievement. This is particularly so with the nobility who carry on the potlatch and other practices of rivalry. There is strong fear of shame from possible loss of position and power. The individuals who are not nobles, however, follow pretty much the same patterns. They identify with the leaders of their group and assist in accumulating the property to be used in the gift exchanges.

3. The material on the Tanala and Betsileo was introduced to show how the basic personality structure may be modified as the culture and social order are changed. The shift in the basic agricultural economy led to other changes: the family as a unit tended to break down, personal striving became more acute, and a graded class system emerged with a king and nobility at the top and with impecunious commoners and slaves at the bottom. These alterations are, in turn, reflected in personality changes. Competitiveness for social position replaced earlier more friendly and co-operative attitudes and habits. Much stress was put upon hard work, cunning, open hostility, and the subjection of others. Property became even more the evidence and symbol of power and a means of enhancement of one's ego.

Yet along with these shifts came others. There was a definite increase in mutual anxiety, resort to sorcery became more common, and there was a persistent effort to demonstrate superiority. Even success brought anxiety, because one feared that it might stimulate others to undo it.

Some Theoretical Considerations

Abram Kardiner and Ralph Linton, the former a psychiatrist, the latter a cultural anthropologist, collaborated for some years in an effort to develop some more definite ways of studying this intriguing topic of the relation of culture to personality. In the Foreword to *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, Linton sets down four postulates, which, if correct, lead him to certain deductions.[12]

1. That the individual's early experiences exert a lasting effect upon his personality, especially upon the development of his projective systems.
2. That similar experiences will tend to produce similar personality configurations in the individuals who are subjected to them.
3. That the techniques which the members of any society employ in the care and rearing of children are culturally patterned and will tend to be similar, although never identical, for various families within the society.
4. That the culturally patterned techniques for the care and rearing of children differ from one society to another.

[12] (New York, Columbia University Press, 1945). Quotations are from pp. vii–viii. By permission.

If these postulates are correct, and they seem to be supported by a wealth of evidence, it follows:

1. That the members of any given society will have many elements of early experience in common.
2. That as a result of this they will have many elements of personality in common.
3. That since the early experience of individuals differs from one society to another, the personality norms for various societies will also differ.

Some comments on these postulates are in order: (1) How important and basic are the acquirements of the early months and years with respect to adult personality? This problem has been much discussed, especially since Freudian psychology has had increasing influence on social psychology. It is by no means settled, although the present writer is inclined to agree with those who hold that the initial learning is fundamental and lasting. But in this connection it must not be forgotten that there are always latent traits which may not be in evidence in everyday living. On the other hand, it cannot be gainsaid that certain kinds of later learning may have profound effects. For example, a severe personal crisis, such as the result of emotional conversion, or of intense shock, or one arising from prolonged semi-starvation or some overwhelming disease or bodily injury—as in the loss of limbs—induces new learning that may be of quite distinctive character and which may, in turn, induce quite novel attitudes, habits, and values in the individual.[13]

If we assume, as I think we must, a common biological, social, and cultural base in a given developmental situation, then it seems to me the second postulate clearly holds. With regard to the third postulate, however, I doubt that all training techniques for infants and children "are culturally patterned." The physical factors of the body must be taken into account, as must what I call "personal-social learning" (see Chapter 3). There is little doubt that both emotional and cognitive elements of the personality are influenced by these social but nonetheless noncultural factors. On the other hand, the fourth postulate seems self-evident and needs no comment. There is then a foundation in the organism, in motivation, and in learning capacity and habit to account for both likenesses and differences in individuals as seen against the back-

[13] Among the many discussions of this topic, the following are suggestive: Wayne Dennis, "Does Culture Appreciably Affect Patterns of Infant Behavior?" *J. of Social Psychology*, 1940, 12:304–317, reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1947), pp. 40–46; Frances W. Underwood and Irma Honigmann, "A Comparison of Socialization and Personality in Two Simple Societies," *American Anthropologist*, 1947, 49:557–577, reprinted in D. G. Haring, ed., *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu: A Collection of Readings*, rev. ed. (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1949), pp. 615–636; Harold Orlansky, "Infant Care and Personality," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1949, 46:1–48. There is a cautious review and comment on this entire topic in Clyde Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, Ch. 25, pp. 949–952.

ground of their given society and its culture. At this juncture we are more concerned with the typical or modal features than with the idiosyncratic. Let us pursue the matter further.

Basic Personality Structure

Typology is not new in the description and analysis of personality. Here, however, we are not concerned with such divisions as Jung's introvert and extrovert. Rather we wish to note Kardiner's attempt to develop a concept of basic structure or core of personality as this is related, in turn, to the cultural conditioning of the individual. Out of his collaboration with Linton he evolved an idea of basic type of personality. This is explained by Linton in the Foreword already noted: [14]

> The *basic personality type* for any society is that personality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the society's members as a result of the early experiences which they have in common. It does not correspond to the total personality of the individual but rather to the projective systems or, in different phraseology, the value-attitude systems which are basic to the individual's personality configuration. Thus the same basic personality type may be reflected in many different forms of behavior and may enter into many different total personality configurations.

According to Kardiner, the influences which mold the basic personality are the institutionalized practices of a given society. These include such items as maternal care, early disciplines, development of affectivity and love, sexual permissiveness or restrictions—in fact, permissive or restrictive behavior in any phase of adjustment—special crises or traumata, the activities of parents, siblings, and others. All of these and others play a part in the life cycle of the individual. Yet, as Kardiner notes, the basic structure is not a mere conglomeration of traits but consists of a certain patterning derived from the institutions to which the individual is exposed. Kardiner distinguishes between what he calls the "primary institutions," such as maternal care, sex mores and other early disciplines, and "secondary institutions" which he holds are derived or projected by the individual from his adaptation to the primary institutions. These are illustrated by folklore, religion, magic, value systems, dogmas, and so on. His phrasing is unfortunate because actually our culture carries both the "primary" and the "secondary" institutions. While the individual may indulge in inventive projections with respect to the "secondary" outlets, for the most part he takes these over from others as he grows up. The function of these for the personality is probably much as Kardiner contends. They furnish socially-accepted outlets for unconscious anxieties, hostilities, and other elements of the personality. The accompanying diagram (Figure 4) from Kardiner gives a schematic picture of the manner in which the personality operates within these two "institutions."

[14] Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, p. viii. By permission.

Kardiner does not overlook the existence of unique elements in the personality, but he would draw a sharp distinction between the *basic personality* and the *specific character* of the individual. Nor does he neglect the place of historical factors in the development and continuity



From Abram Kardiner, "Psychodynamics and the Social Sciences," in S. S. Sargent and Marian W. Smith, eds., *Culture and Personality* (New York, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc.), p. 63. By permission.

FIG. 4. Diagram Showing Relations of Primary and Secondary Institutions to the Structure of Personality.

of the basic personality type. He illustrates this interrelation by an essay which traces the emergence, growth, and function of a basic personality within the Judaistic-Christian world.

There are many problems with respect to the probable causal interplay of culture and personality, and for that matter respecting the effect of individuals upon culture. Yet no area of interest in either social psychology or cultural anthropology has received more recent attention than this. Although some writers have undoubtedly exaggerated their generalizations, there is a growing body of research and writing which is slowly building a more secure foundation upon which later we may erect a sound correlational structure.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BENEDICT, Ruth, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934). A widely read and suggestive volume on the relationship of culture to personality.

BENEDICT, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946). An attempt to study the relations of culture to personality by applying to a single nation, Japan, an analysis of national character (see Inkeles below).

FRANK, Lawrence K., *Society as the Patient: Essays on Culture and Personality* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1948). Chapters 12, 15, and 30 are particularly pertinent.

HSU, Francis L. K., ed., *Aspects of Culture and Personality* (New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1954). The papers and discussions of a Conference on Anthropology and Psychiatry held at Northwestern University, May 17–19, 1951, and supported by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. Some stimulating papers.

INKELES, Alex, and LEVINSON, D. J., "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, Ch. 26. An excellent review and comment on the literature of one aspect of this field, so-called "national character." The aim is to discover if there is a modal personality related to the cultural and social systems of the modern nation-state. The authors are fully aware of the methodological and psychological problems involved in such undertakings (see Benedict above).

KLUCKHOHN, Clyde, "Culture and Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Ch. 25 (see Inkeles above). A critical review of this general topic. The author's dynamic approach is sound.

LINTON, Ralph, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945). This little book has become something of a classic in this field. It deals with the interrelations of culture, society, and the individual.

SARGENT, S. Stansfeld, and SMITH, Marian W., eds., *Culture and Personality* (New York, Viking Fund—now Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc.—1949). The proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference, sponsored by the Viking Fund, November 7–8, 1947. The participants were psychiatrists, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, and sociologists.

STOETZEL, Jean, *Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword: A Study of the Attitudes of Youth in Post-War Japan* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1955). A UNESCO publication which reports a study of ideas, attitudes, and values of a sample of Japanese youth in 1952. Reveals the problems which arise from severe public and personal crises and efforts at readjustment. (See Benedict citation on Japanese character, above.)

CHAPTER 8

Subcultures and Personality

THE members of every community or society, except those having very limited numbers, adapt themselves to some ordering of their relationships to each other in terms of differences in age, sex, class status, occupation, ethnic origin, and religion. In many larger societies with complex cultures, rural-urban differentials may be important. Such structuring of relations, either interpersonal or intergroup, rests on the fact that each system of relations has its distinctive roles, statuses, and values. These serve to set off individuals or groups from one another.

While the social organization of a given community or society consists of such subgroupings with their distinctive cultural features, we must not overlook the fact that these subgroups and their respective subcultures are coupled in various ways. Thus, early middle age is associated with the sex roles of child-bearing and child-rearing. So, too, occupations vary with respect to skill, knowledge, and status, and these in turn may be linked to sex differences or to the class structure. In our society there are some vocations customarily regarded as masculine, such as engineering; others customarily feminine, such as nursing. The close tie-up of occupation and class status is beautifully shown in the classic statement of William James on habit. This may be equated, without undue violence to its meaning, to the influence of subcultural elements upon behavior: [1]

> Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there

[1] William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1890), Vol. 1, p. 121.

is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveler, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counselor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the "shop," in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again.

In this chapter we shall deal chiefly with age, sex, and class differences in culture patterns as these influence the personality, especially as to role and status. Some attention will be paid to cross-cultural comparisons with reference to certain of these features.

SOME BACKGROUND FACTORS OF AGE AND SEX

Biologic Foundations

Age is an important constitutional factor with respect to personality. The process of maturation is common to all members of the human species. Moreover, within the range of individual differences, all members will pass through all stages or phases of growth and decline.

The facts of growth and decline in physical and mental performance have long been recognized both by common-sense observation and by accurate measurement through standard scales. Both physical and intellectual powers have important functions in the total economy of the personality. Hence, we must bear these matters in mind with regard to description and analysis of personal adjustment, capacity to play certain roles, and ability to understand oneself as well as others realistically. On a common-sense level, the correlation of age and effective participation in athletics is illustrative. A prizefighter or a baseball pitcher at ages 35 to 40 years is an "old man" in that sport. Golf players, however, often retain high skill well into their fifties. Willie Hoppe held various world championships in billiards from 1906, when he was 18 years of age, until the mid-1950's when he retired. His career extended over nearly fifty years.

More accurate measures of bodily and mental changes have been reported by Walter R. Miles, the psychologist. For example, he showed that manual dexterity and manual motility, reaction times, and the speed and span of visual perception followed a typical curve of rapid increment in performance from ages eight years to 20 or 30 years and then gradually declined. For a wide range of psychological functions, the maximal performances fall in the years 18 to 49, but usually the peak is reached in the first half of this span of years. As a rule, "the decline is not precipitous,

but progressive through later life." [2] As might be expected, there were noticeable individual differences.

Miles showed that intellectual functions follow very much the same sort of pattern. There is a rapid rise in performance from late childhood until 20 to 25 years and then a steady decline. Figure 5 shows Miles' data on this as plotted by David Wechsler. As the latter remarks: "The curve shows very clearly that intellectual ability begins to decline after 25 and falls off progressively with each increasing decade of life. Interestingly enough, the decline for intelligence-test scores is greater than that for certain physiological abilities. This is apparent from an examination of the curve for strength of grip, plotted alongside the one for intelligence, both of course reduced to the same scale." [3] Wechsler also reported on the application of his own Wechsler-Bellevue adult intelligence scale to a sample of over 3,000 individuals ranging in age from seven years to 70. As in other studies he found "that intellectual ability after reaching a maximum at 20 to 25 does not continue unaltered for any length of time, but starts falling off immediately thereafter." [4]



FIG. 5. Changes in Intelligence Scores and Strength of Grip with Aging.

Cultural Qualifications

In acquiring roles and statuses related to age, these and other biologic factors furnish a set of limiting conditions. Yet there is no universal

[2] Walter R. Miles, "Performance in Relation to Age," in *Mental Health in Later Maturity*, Supplement No. 168, Public Health Reports (Washington, U.S. Public Health Service, 1942), pp. 34–42. Reprinted in E. L. Hartley, M. G. Birch, and Ruth E. Hartley, eds., *Outside Readings in Psychology* (New York, Crowell, 1950), pp. 91–99.

[3] David Wechsler, "Intellectual Changes with Age," in *Mental Health in Later Maturity, op. cit.*, pp. 45–46. Reprinted in Hartley, Birch, and Hartley, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–106.

[4] *Ibid.*

agreement as to where precisely the transition between one age grade and another should be indicated. As Ralph Linton pointed out, various "classificatory systems are sufficiently divorced from physiological considerations to make possible almost any amplification of formal categories and almost any choice of transition points. Only birth and death are universally recognized as transition points and even these do not always set the limits of the individual's social participation." [5] For example, the Chinese reckon age from the first detection of pregnancy, and the unborn child is considered a part of the family. In other societies, birth does not automatically make one a member of the society and family, but some ritual or other is necessary to validate one's existence.

In any case, within wide cultural variations most societies subdivide the life cycle of the individual into at least five grades: infancy, childhood, youth, maturity, and old age. The span of years allotted to each will vary with the cultural definition. In some societies infancy and childhood may be relatively short, compared to our system, and we say the child is "hurried into adulthood." In others, infancy and childhood may be prolonged. In the United States today, under conditions of middle-class standards, the period of adolescence with its dependency on parental support is often extended well into the third decade. In contrast, under the conditions of pioneer and rural life of a century ago, a boy passed from later childhood almost directly into the assumption of many adult responsibilities, especially those associated with herding, cultivating, and other farm duties. So, too, in those days the adolescent period of the girl was relatively shorter than in our time. It was not uncommon for girls of 15 or 16 years to marry and thus move into adult role and status.

Another important transition concerns the unlearning and new learning associated with the shift from one age status to another. In some societies this transition from one grade to another is accomplished without stress or strain, but in others the expected conduct in one age grade is so sharply different from that expected in the next that habit patterns must necessarily be considerably altered.[6]

Certainly there is considerable variation in the tempo of these shifts from one age grade to another. Sometimes these take place in a rather gradual and imperceptible fashion. At other times, they may be sudden and painful. This is particularly true in some of the puberty ceremonies found among certain nonliterate peoples. Also, the shift from unmarried to married state may constitute a sudden and difficult step for the individual, particularly for many women in the middle class in our own society. This is especially true among girls who have had little or no preparation for the basic responsibilities of married life.

[5] Ralph Linton, "Age and Sex Categories," *American Sociological Review*, 1942, 7:592.

[6] This is the point Ruth Benedict had in mind in her stimulating article "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," *Psychiatry*, 1938, 1:161–167.

With respect to learning, age factors may be related to adaptability or capacity for new learning. With regard to the shift from infancy to childhood, from childhood to adolescence, and from adolescence to the beginning years of maturity, there may be no great difficulty of unlearning and new learning. However, the shift from adult maturity to old age may present the individual with some difficult situations involving new learning. At this time, adaptability is not as adequate or as facile as in the younger years. This fact along with others makes the problem of old age a difficult one. We shall discuss this later.

Sex Differences

The popular belief that woman is the weaker sex has been disproved by modern science. There is much evidence that women withstand the hazards of life better than men. One measure of this difference is the life expectancy at birth. For 1950, for the white female population of the United States, this was 72.4 years; for white males, it was 66.6 years. Another evidence is the fact that women outnumber men in striking proportions in the older age brackets. There are also distinctive differences in susceptibility to diseases, although the higher death rate for men may, in some instances, be due to their greater exposure to conditions of stress in our highly competitive world. George Lawton has given a thumbnail summary of some of the pertinent facts in these words: [7]

> Woman's biochemical make-up enables her to resist the physical insults and vicissitudes of life. Compared with men, she has more sex hormones, more calcium, nitrogen, more of some vitamins and other elements, and more of white corpuscles. Nature has made the bearer of children more resistant to disease and defect than the male, who plants the seed and retreats thereafter to the sidelines.

Against the background of such facts, one must recognize the basic differences in the sex organs and the sex functions of male and female. Both at the anatomical and psychological levels, however, it is generally realized that we do not have two distinctive distributions of traits, but rather two distributions with considerable overlapping.[8]

PERSONALITY AND AGE-SEX GRADATIONS

With regard to age and sex, there are obvious biological foundations for differences in role and status. Yet an examination of evidence from history, as well as from cross-cultural studies of nonliterate peoples, makes it clear that culture plays an important and distinctive part in providing

[7] George Lawton, "Proof That She Is the Stronger Sex," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 12, 1948, pp. 7, 67.

[8] Some of the implications of these facts are brought out in L. M. Terman and C. C. Miles, *Sex and Personality: Studies in Masculinity and Femininity* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936).

the meaning of roles and statuses associated with age and sex. Since age and sex differences are intricately bound up with one another, both at the physiological as well as psychological and cultural levels, in the material which follows we will treat the age gradation and sexual factors together.

Age and Sex in Infancy

Although, in our society, cards announcing the arrival of a baby girl carry a pink decorative motive and those for a baby boy, blue, for the most part babies are regarded as sexless. This is certainly not the situation in other societies where the sex differences are accepted and recognized almost from the outset. The initial phases of the infant's socialization, as we have already shown, consist largely of learning—at the hands of mother and others—to adopt schedules of feeding, elimination, sleep, and so on, in order to relieve basic tensions and conform to adult standards. Normally from the parent there is a combination of authority and discipline on the one hand, with indulgence and affection on the other. The young and growing infant therefore learns that some of his urgent biological demands must be curbed, redirected, or otherwise brought under his control. Yet at the same time the infant experiences approval and acceptance, that is, rewards of a pleasant sort from the parent. For the child, of course, the mother is omnipotent and omniscient, yet he learns to control her in some situations as a counterpart of her control of him. She not only satisfies his hunger or other needs but may quiet his anxiety, and he, in turn, comes to experience emotional warmth and security from her.

Yet within the first year, if not earlier, we find the beginnings of age and sex typing. The admonition to "act like a big boy," or "act like a big girl," or to "act like daddy or mamma" symbolize efforts on the part of parents to direct the child along a continuum in behavior which will end in proper sex roles at maturity. So too, if there are siblings, the brother or sister may be set up as a model. This provides the older child a certain amount of power over the younger, but sometimes serves to motivate the desired imitation. Sometimes, of course, the setting of a sibling model simply facilitates sibling rivalry (see below).

Sex typing begins with putting boy-clothes on a boy and girl-clothes on a girl. The use of names, distinctly associated with male or female categories, is another way of sex typing. Along with this, in our middle and upper classes at least, goes punishment and taboos regarding overt sexual expression, such as looking at or handling the genitals, masturbation, and sex play with members of the opposite sex. There is no doubt that these negative forms of learning play an important part in the concept of sex and in sexual behavior in later life. They also facilitate the awareness of sex differences.

Further sex typing is brought about in the use of toys and games, and by the stories children read or hear. Certainly by the time the child goes to the first grade and enters fully into the childhood period, sex roles have been established, including the idea of inherent masculine superiority—a notion still prevalent in our own society.

Childhood

In our society, at least, there is no fixed time at which the infant is supposed to move into childhood. In middle-class and upper-class America, when the child goes to nursery school or kindergarten he is thought of as emerging from dependent infancy into childhood with its beginnings of responsibility. Of course, there are cultural variations in this. Sometimes we hear such expressions as "Children should be seen and not heard." This would represent a condition of dependency, obedience, and conformity prevalent in middle- and upper-class families of fifty or seventy-five years ago. In some societies the child is viewed as a miniature adult and is hastened to his full responsibility. In still others the child, like the infant, may be regarded as completely irresponsible. Frequently these years are followed by a rather sudden and quick changeover to a considerable amount of responsibility. This latter would illustrate a discontinuity in status mentioned above.

In our own time there has been some talk about the child-centered home as well as the child-centered school. The tremendous amount of permissiveness allowed children in middle-class families in the United States is an illustration of this particular point of view and practice. However, it should not be imagined that the concept of child-centered household is purely a product of our own time and place. Certainly there are ample evidences from cultural anthropology that in some nonliterate tribes children enjoy a rather high status and a great deal of permissiveness, if not dominance, in relationship to their parents and the household.

Certainly the process of socialization continues throughout childhood. In our society, a part of this is carried out by the school and the playgroup outside the home. As a matter of fact, our educational system is the most highly institutionalized age-gradation scheme in our own society. Again, this is more particularly true of the middle- and upper-class groups.

During childhood the individual begins to acquire certain kinds of skills. Some practice of these at home and outside may be the foundation of later and important occupational skills. So, too, self-discipline and control begin to be more and more imposed as a basic responsibility. These years cover essentially what the Freudians call "the latency period," and a good deal of repression of overt sexuality and hostility may be imposed. But as has been pointed out in discussions of Freudian theory, the

concept of latency period may be partly a reflection of the time and place in which Freud lived.

Also, along with acquiring certain skills, the child may be inducted into certain work and responsibility. This is particularly true in rural and village life and is less likely to occur in urban living. Nevertheless, even in our urban society, girls tend to get a certain amount of training from their mothers as they take a hand in household duties. The boys have no comparable model from the father whose work is outside the home. Hence the urban lad frequently gets his skills outside the household and acquires few skills and little sense of responsibility regarding functions in the home. This experience may serve to give both boy and girl further foundation for conceiving of the differing roles of girls and boys, of men and women. This might help to implant the belief in masculine superiority.

Other aspects of the adult-child relationships are revealed in the amount of personal identification which the child builds up with respect to the mother or the father or other adults. Frequently during this period a child may develop a strong identification with the schoolteacher or with an uncle or aunt, or with other adults outside the home. This is important in the development of the personality, of course, since it represents the spread of affectionate relationships to people outside the immediate family circle.

In this connection, a word might be said about the high status accorded the mother in our society. Our whole culture is saturated with a belief in the tremendous importance of the mother. Because of this high status, it is particularly important for children, especially for the boy, to have some alternate objects of identification, especially identification with other women than the mother. We shall have occasion to say something more about this in a later connection.

Youth Culture and Personality

All societies recognize the transition from childhood to adult maturity. In some, this is highly structured and carefully controlled; in others it is diffuse and relatively unstructured. In any case, there is almost universal recognition that the so-called teen-age years are those which give preparation for adulthood. Not only are there certain physical changes which must be recognized but a variety of significant social changes occur. As Ralph Linton well puts it, "In most societies this difference between the physical and social transfer is more clearly marked than in our own. The child becomes a man, not when he is physically mature, but when he is formally recognized as a man by his society." [9] Among other things learned in this period, to be used later, are the essential skills, the capacity

[9] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), p. 118.

for social co-operation, and the development of responsibility and accountability with regard to self and others. There is also a general concern with the shift from attachment to the parents to the attainment of heterosexuality and independence. We shall have occasion later to examine these more closely.

We have, then, in this period of adolescence, a problem involving sexual maturation and a development of new social attitudes and values. It is well known that girls enter puberty in our society from one to two years ahead of their brothers. There is an accompanying earlier social maturation in the girls. Caroline M. Tryon, who has studied a large group of adolescents in Berkeley, California, has shown that the earlier physical and social development of the adolescent girls makes for some problems of adjustment for the boys of the same age and grade in school.[10] During the early pubertal period when the girls are in advance of the boys, there is almost a reversal of the traditional sex roles. The pre-puberty boys still avoid the girls or are looked down upon by the latter. The boy stresses, as he does later, physical daring, leadership in games, and other elements of physical prowess. As the girls move into adolescence, they want to be known as good sports in large groups of girls and boys, but they also begin to stress some of the glamour aspects of their sex. Although there is this early discrepancy, in a few years the later age and sex differentials are accepted and a culture of peers emerges. This is participated in by both boys and girls.

While it may be true that there is some irresponsibility in some aspects of adolescent recreational life, for the most part there is a gradual shift toward some kind of responsibility. The difficulty in our own society, of course, is that we have not clearly defined the role and status of the adolescent peer group, either for the group or the adult world in which it is embedded. In any case, as Tryon says, the boys and girls in this period must learn certain complementary roles with regard to each other. In other words, they must move from the somewhat sexless childhood to the recognition of differentiation in role and status associated with sex. The rise of heterosexuality is one of the most important features of emancipation from home and the cutting loose from the mother's apron strings. In this situation the older adolescent boy is expected to move toward becoming independent and self-reliant and to take on economic and other responsibilities. In this sense, the shift is less severe for the boy than for the girl. American culture still regards the woman's life objectives as basically concerned with marriage, the family, and affectional relationships. In contrast, the boy learns to repress his earlier dependence and submissiveness and to acquire facility in competition in

[10] Caroline M. Tryon, "Evaluation of Adolescent Personality by Adolescents," *Monograph*, Society for Research in Child Development, 1939, 4, No. 4.

school and in games, these being considered important training periods for economic struggles to come.

Part of the difficulty with the middle-class youth of our own country lies in the fact that we have divergent and contradictory aims and practices. On the one hand, our adolescent boys and girls know a great deal about many aspects of life; they are more sophisticated about sex than their parents or grandparents ever were. They are given more education and hence they learn more from the cultural storehouse of their time. On the other hand, they continue to be dependent upon their parents for legal and financial support. There are certain restrictions on their gainful employment; their legal responsibilities are partly in the hands of their parents, as their guardians, and there are legal restrictions on such things as mating and marriage. These divergencies make for confusion of role and status with regard to themselves and with regard to their parents. From the point of view of learning, this means that there are often contradictory patterns which make a specific and definite role difficult to attain.

These confusions are increased by class differences. There is no doubt that the adolescent boy or girl in the lower classes probably matures socially at an earlier age than his middle- and upper-class peers. It is the usually sheltered and protected child of these latter groups who is faced with most of the confusions. One of the things brought out by the study of Tryon was that children in these groups had difficulty in maintaining their high status throughout adolescence. As a result, there was anxiety and struggle. When the larger-group prestige or status broke down, some found satisfaction in close and intimate friendships. As a matter of fact, Tryon's study shows that the adolescent tends to fluctuate between two poles. On the one hand, there is a strong need for friendship and for intimate association; on the other, there is pressure to achieve and keep a high status in a larger group. This particular situation probably reflects the upward striving so prevalent in middle-class America.

Adult Role and Status

In general, maturity in our society is marked by full participation in the economic and political order, by evidences of intellectual and emotional maturity, and finally, by the attainment of adequate heterosexual components of the personality which make possible the assumption of proper familial responsibilities. For the man, the major roles are those of chief wage-earner, head of family, and participant in civic affairs. For the wife, the domestic pattern still continues to be the central theme, at least in the middle-class group. However, the increasing number of married women in the labor force, as well as feminine participation in politics, shows that the older pattern is being modified. Still, the wife and

mother continues to organize most of her functions around the home, including raising the children, expressing strong affectional devotion to the husband and to the children, and managing the household. Difficulties arise when a woman tries to combine a professional career with homemaking. Certainly the shift in the position of women in our times has made for some disturbance in the traditional patterns of her role and status.

Maturity is difficult to measure at best. Certainly it is easier to determine with reference to economic participation, through such things as occupational status, or with reference to political activity, through such things as voting behavior and participation in civic affairs, than it is with reference to some of the emotional and sexual components of personality. It is not at all uncommon to find a person successful in business and politics who is badly adjusted and rather adolescent in these other components of the personality.

In a time when the patriarchal pattern of male dominance was well established, a man's whims and emotional outbursts had to be understood against his fundamental authority over his family. Today, with somewhat different views emerging, and especially with women in the middle classes working outside the home, these earlier patterns are breaking down. With regard to marriage and the family, we are moving, as E. W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke put it, from an institutionalized form of patriarchal control to that of a more equalitarian companionship between the husband and wife.[11] In this connection, we must note the continuing importance of the romantic love pattern in the courtship and mating in our society. Traditionally, the basic purpose of the woman was to move into marriage and the family through a selective process in which her qualities and effort played a distinctive part. The success or failure in this mating and marrying would largely determine the woman's later status and role. However, as we well know, the romantic love patterns are often dissipated under the pressure of the responsibilities of home and family. Part of the stress to take up a career grows out of the fact that women feel they are unsuited for complete domesticity or that the glamour and the good companionship that they had anticipated in marriage is not forthcoming. Aside from these considerations, most married women work in order to supplement the family income.

The masculine role is sometimes marked by considerable anxiety. In our own middle class, with the heavy emphasis on upward striving, the pressure to achieve, to take on more authority, and to make more money become factors which frequently lead to extreme stress, both with regard to the job and with regard to the family. Moreover, high specialization of occupation may make it impossible for the husband to share

[11] E. W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*, 2nd ed. (New York, American Book, 1953).

many common elements with his wife as far as his job goes. As Talcott Parsons remarks,[12]

> The effect of the specialization of occupational role is to narrow the range in which the sharing of common human interests can play a large part. In relation to his wife, the tendency of this narrowness would seem to encourage on her part either the domestic or the glamourous role, or community participation somewhat unrelated to the marriage relationship. This relationship between sex roles presumably introduces a certain amount of strain into the marriage relationship itself, since this is of such overwhelming importance to the family and hence, to a woman's status, and yet so relatively difficult to maintain on a level of human companionship.

As Parsons goes on to say, the middle-class wife is restricted as to the contacts permissible outside her own family and social circle. This is particularly so with respect to any intimacy with other men. So, too, the husband's contacts with other women are restricted to the appropriate roles with regard to his women employees as they are also with respect to the women in his "social set."

Old Age

Problems related to old age are getting increased attention from psychologists, sociologists, medical practitioners, and others. One reason for this concern is the fact that the proportion of individuals who survive beyond 65 years is steadily increasing in American society. For example, in 1930, only 5.4 per cent of the total population of the United States was 65 years and over. Careful estimates for 1980 show that, by that time, at least 14 per cent of the total population will be in this age bracket.

Every society provides some recognition of old age, but the status given to the old differs widely. First of all, the transition point at which one is considered as being in the old age group varies with the particular society and its culture. So, too, the rights and duties of the old differ. In some cases they retain a great deal of power and prestige. In other societies they are accorded little or none. In the latter instances, the old may be regarded as a social burden by the younger members of the family.

Historically, our society has accorded prestige and high status to elderly persons. Yet in the face of expanding industrialization and changes in the familial system itself, the old have less place today than they formerly had. For example, the removal of many traditional jobs from the household to industrial plants means that old people of both sexes do not and cannot contribute to the household economy as they once did in rural America. In short, the aged are no longer satisfactorily cared for within the family circle. They must be helped in some other way. There has been

[12] Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 1942, 7:613. By permission.

a steady shift from the home as the place for the aged to special institutional arrangements.

Elderly people are subject to physical decline and adequate help becomes increasingly important. But physical health is influenced by mental attitudes. Much depends on how the aged view themselves, and this, as we know, is affected by the way they are viewed by others. If they are to maintain a healthy attitude and a healthy body, the aged need to keep busy, at work if possible, or at hobbies or other forms of recreation.

Some of the problems of personal adjustment in old age are well brought out in Ruth Cavan's study. She investigated the social participation and personal adjustment of a sample of about 500 men and 750 women of 60 years and over. While her sample was chiefly urban in origin and above average in education, and while the percentage in business and professions was higher than in the general population, nevertheless, her study is highly informative. Let us summarize some of her findings.

She first asked about the degree of companionship in her sample, meaning, by this, whether the individual lived with a spouse or with someone else, whether he saw the children or relatives at least once a week, or saw friends—young and old—once a week. For the age group 60-64 years, 47 per cent of the men and women had a high ratio of companionship in their daily lives. For the age group 75-79 years, this had declined considerably, and only 36 per cent of the males and 30 per cent of the females were rated high on the companionship scale. During the fifteen years represented in this shift there had been a steady increase in the percentage of people who were rated low on a degree of companionship. That is to say, as people got older, there was a definite decrease in the number of their companions.

Cavan also secured a measure of participation. She listed nine types of participation, including informal everyday activities such as hobbies, plans for the future, listening to the radio, going to movies, attending church, voting, and so on. Again there was a steady decline in the group participation and activities as the individuals grew older. There is a paradox here: old age is progressively a time of increasing leisure, but it is also a period of declining physical strength to enjoy that leisure.

In the third place, Cavan considered the type of participation, that is—what did the people do? One measure of this was to discover the number of individuals who belonged to certain organizations. For example, among men in the age group 60-64 years, 38 per cent belonged to two or more organizations. For the men in the age bracket 80-84 years, this had dropped to 16 per cent. For the former age group, 60 per cent had one or two hobbies; for the latter age group, only 52 per cent. With reference to men in particular, there was a steady decline in the percentage of those reporting some kinds of plans for the future.

In the fourth instance, attitudes toward religion and activities of a

religious nature were examined. As Cavan says, "Satisfaction with religion and derivation of the feeling of security from it increases with age." [13] For the most part, these aged people showed considerable faith in religion, but there was a small minority who had little or no use for religion. Finally, there was a composite score of general adjustments which revealed, "decrease in feelings of happiness, usefulness, zest, and a corresponding increase in the loss of interest in life." [14]

This study also reveals certain differences in sex with regard to old age. The author states: "It is probable that the most drastic and widespread adjustment which old women must make is to widowhood, whereas the most drastic and widespread adjustment for old men is to retirement from employment. . . . The two differ in that widowhood makes its greatest disturbance in affectional relationships, whereas occupational retirement primarily disturbs social status." [15]

There has been a growing interest in the study of old age. One such research concerns a community of old folks living in trailers near Melbourne, Florida. Evidently such mobile homes have proved desirable for these people. The lower living costs are appropriate for reduced income upon retirement. Furthermore, there is no loneliness where neighbors are in close association in gardening, fishing, sun-bathing, in playing shuffleboard, and in watching free movies. "There is no 'keeping up with the Joneses,' there is no social barrier between the couple with the $3,000 income and the couple with the $10,000 a year income. They all wear low-cost sun suits and live in homes of approximately the same size. This isn't the only way to retire, but it certainly is motivating for many who retire." [16]

Finally, in most societies there is an age status or gradation related to the position of the dead. In many societies, as Ralph Linton puts it, "When a man dies, he does not leave his society; he merely surrenders one set of rights and duties and assumes another." [17] Among the Tanala of Madagascar, for example, the clan was divided into two sections, the living and the dead. The dead may often do beneficial things for the living. The living, in turn, must keep them informed on all important events. For example, the deceased are always invited to all the ceremonies. A failure to invite them might result in serious consequences. In the Christian religion, the world of the dead is a basic reality. In many churches there are special prayers for the dead; for example, the prayers designed to get the individual out of purgatory and on his way to heaven. Moreover, there are plenty of examples of visitations of the dead and

[13] Ruth S. Cavan and others, *Personal Adjustment in Old Age* (Chicago, Science Research Associates, 1949), p. 57. All quotations by permission.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.

[16] From a news story, *Chicago Tribune*, January 4, 1954.

[17] Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

of attempts to communicate with those who have departed. The secularization of the Christian world has been taking place rather rapidly, with the result that many of these beliefs have fallen into decay. There is no doubt, however, that Christianity provides a method for dealing with the world of the dead, and it takes care of certain relationships of the living with those who have departed this earth. Certainly, the whole concept of immortality is a factor here, as is the idea of the resurrection.

Class Structure and Personality

Roles are definitely influenced by membership in a given class. A person's values, attitudes, and habits are, at least partially, the product of his class membership. Every society—except those of small numbers and rudimentary culture—tends to develop some system of social strata arranged along a scale or ladder of superordination and subordination. A class structure is essentially an ordering of power relations within a given society. Historically, the number and fixity of the classes has varied with time and place.

The population of both ancient Greece and Rome was divided into various levels or strata. This varied as to fixity of given level with the historical period. Thus, Roman society was for a long time divided into patricians and plebeians with the slaves representing a third and bottom stratum having no civil rights.

Feudal society in Europe, covering what we call the Middle Ages, comprised four classes or estates: first, the upper nobility, chiefly the large landowners, military leaders, and the top clergy; second, the lesser nobility and the lesser clergy; third, the freedmen, made up mostly of small landowners and some skilled workers; and at the bottom the serfs, who were bound to the soil and had few, if any, civil rights.

In the Western world of modern times, it has been customary to use a three-level classification into upper, middle, and lower classes. Yet specific studies of the class structure in different communities and regions of the United States have revealed a variation as to number of class levels and as to how these should be determined. The whole question of the dividing points in the class structure, especially in the highly flexible situation such as obtains in the United States, is a difficult problem which we need not consider here. However, we do need to say a word or two about the systems of ranking which are the determinants of the class structure as seen by various students. Robert C. Angell has pointed out that there are six basic systems of social ranking in contemporary United States and that these may be regarded as fundamental, in one combination or another, to an understanding of our class structure. These are shown in Table 3.[18]

[18] Robert C. Angell, Lowell J. Carr, and others, *Readings in Sociology* 51 (Ann Arbor, Mich., The Overbeck Co., 1946), Part I, p. 96. By permission.

There are various combinations of these ranking systems. For example, in New England and the Old South, family descent is certainly very important. In contrast, in the Middle West and Far West, the three chief ranking combinations are income, occupation, and education.

Table 3. Some Ways of Ranking People in Contemporary American Society

INCOME	OCCUPATION	EDUCATION	FAMILY DESCENT	RACIAL DESCENT	ETHNIC DESCENT
1. Wealthy	1. Big-business executives	1. Graduate and professional school	1. Leading old families	1. Whites	1. English, Scottish
2. Comfortable income	2. Professional people; independent businessmen	2. College graduates	2. Other—often in terms of residence in community.	2. Orientals	2. Germanic peoples
3. Modest income	3. White-collar employees; small shopkeepers	3. Attendance at but not completion of college		3. Negroes	3. Other nationalities from northern and Western Europe
4. Low income	4. Skilled workers	4. High-school graduate			4. Nationalities from southern and eastern Europe
5. Dependent on public support	5. Semiskilled workers	5. Attendance at high school			5. Orientals
	6. Unskilled workers	6. Elementary school only			

There are also certain other variations. For example, there is frequently high status for ministers and college teachers, but this is usually associated with relatively low income. On the other hand, there are some cases of high income and low status, as in the example of the bootlegger or gambler.

The personality correlates as related to class structure are not always easy to trace. We shall try to indicate the kind of personality which grows up in a highly fixed and stable class order. In contrast, then, we shall attempt to examine the characteristics of individuals who grow up and

live in an open-class system such as ours, especially where there is a heavy stress upon upward striving.

In the fixed and stable class order, the most extreme form of which would be a caste system, practically all the roles and statuses are ascribed. The role expectations and prescriptions are rigid and inflexible. These determine the nature of the goals for which a person strives, what he should do, and the nature of the awards which he may anticipate. In connection with this, there is, as a rule, a high degree of family unity which is but a reflection of a general fixity of the social order. Such a society is a highly protective one from the point of view of the individual. His rights and privileges are carefully defined with regard to his class status and there is no stimulus for him to move from one status level to another. In fact, to do so would invite negative sanctions. Examples of individuals who have broken away from such fixed status systems are seen in students from India, who come to the Western world for an education and frequently break away completely from their former backgrounds. Or, if they go back to their home country, they have difficulty in re-adjusting themselves to the old order. Under the circumstances, conformity is rewarded and deviation punished. While there is always a certain range of variation, it would tend to be restricted.

In an open-class system, such as we have in the United States, the role prescriptions and expectations are closely related to upward striving. There is a strong stress on self-improvement which frequently means a changing of roles, at least from one generation to another. In such a society, the rewards for successful upward mobility are very great indeed but, on the other hand, the individual tends to be punished for failure. A number of studies have shown the extent of such upward mobility by comparing people across a number of generation levels, and there is no doubt that this is a marked pattern in our society. Along with this we have a heavy stress upon individualization, which means that the family unity associated with fixed society is not present.

The difficulties involved in upward striving are indicated by the frequent presence of anxiety, frustration, and other personality difficulties. There is often, in fact, a severe break between aspiration and achievement. Apparently in the United States the demand or felt need to get ahead is not distributed uniformly among the various occupational categories. At least this is the suggestive finding of W. H. Form and D. C. Miller. They examined, in Ohio, 276 work histories that had been selected to match the occupational distribution by age and sex of the gainfully employed labor force. They studied both vertical and horizontal job mobility. They designed modal career patterns which would reveal high and low security levels in occupation viewed against such family background factors as father's occupation and education, and also the education level of the sample.

Among other conclusions, the following have bearing on the dis-

cussion at this point: (1) White-collar workers, skilled workers, and foremen have the highest occupational security, whereas occupational insecurity is correlated with semiskilled, unskilled, and domestic and personal-service workers. (2) Once started at a given occupational level, there is a tendency to remain at this level. (3) The children of white-collar parents tend to inherit the father's occupation or climb to a higher level. Children of manual laborers inherit their father's occupation or fall below it. (4) Except for the level of manual work, the higher the education of the father, the better are the chances for the children to show occupational and educational upward mobility. And (5) workers from the white-collar and skilled-labor group tend to give their children backgrounds conducive to better adjustment and more security in their future occupations. The reverse tends to be the case for other manual workers.[19]

C. Wright Mills has reported for four samples of small businessmen that they have a considerable amount of frustration in the face of competition. They have little political power, but, on the whole, tend to displace their hostility onto the government and toward organized labor. This provides some kind of offset for their underlying sense of insecurity. Moreover, they derive what psychological strength they have from identification with the interests of big business.[20]

This identification with the upper economic brackets is common in the white-collar classes. This fact is reflected in the difficulties encountered in getting such people to join trade unions or to take a more active part in liberal politics. One of the chief problems is to make these people, if possible, class conscious, not necessarily in a Marxian sense entirely, but at least aware of the fact that, with their fellows, they have some common interests which are in conflict with those of people in the upper economic brackets.

Finally, a word should be said about the color-caste system in this country as it applies to the relationship between the whites and the Negroes. Within the Negro group itself there is a fairly close parallel to the class structure found in white society, but between the white group and the Negro there exists a definite barrier to intermarriage and to other relationships that are possible in a more flexible class system.

OTHER GROUPS AND THEIR SUBCULTURES

In addition to the divisions of the population in terms of age, sex, and class groupings, in our society there are certain ethnic groups and others of religious character which neatly illustrate the impact of subcul-

[19] W. H. Form and D. C. Miller, "Occupational Career Pattern as a Sociological Instrument," *American J. of Sociology*, 1949, 54:317–329.

[20] C. Wright Mills, "The Middle Classes in Middle-Sized Cities," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11:520–529. See also his *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1951).

ture upon personality. For the ethnic groups, we shall deal first with certain selected examples of those with European background. Then we will deal with Japanese-Americans with particular reference to Hawaii. With regard to the religious groupings, we shall deal first with one which is a combination of religion and ethnic differences, the so-called Plain People, located chiefly in Pennsylvania. As a second example, we shall deal with the Mormons, particularly with reference to some of the personality modifications under the impact of the system of polygamy which they practiced at one time.

Immigrant Adjustment

During the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth century this country received more than 38 million immigrants, chiefly from Europe. A great many of these people settled in our large industrial cities where many of them experienced a variety of problems associated with acculturation to American ways of life. In city after city these immigrants settled in their own little enclaves which took on names, either self-applied or applied by others, such as "Little Italy," "Little Bohemia," "Germantown," and "The Ghetto." From the point of view of sociology and cultural anthropology, these groups may be studied with reference to the older American group in terms of the conflict of two cultural systems. These little groups represented what we might call cultural islands surrounded by the dominant group with its culture.

In studying the psychology of personality, we are concerned here with the exposure of the individual to two cultural systems, some parts of which were in conflict with each other. The individual of differing cultural background must come to accept the habits, attitudes, and values of the older and more established American system. Sociologically, this exemplifies the process of assimilation. On the other hand, individuals and their families may form a segregated, isolated neighborhood or subcommunity of the kind just mentioned. This is a protective device for these people.

Such forms of isolation and segregation usually have a spatial aspect; for example, the individuals and families live in certain more or less restricted neighborhoods. The effects of such spatial segregation and retention of the immigrant cultures can be characterized as follows: (1) There is a continuity with the old culture. (2) The new arrival sees the new country and its culture through the eyes of his old culture, especially reflected in the ideas and attitudes of relatives and friends already on the ground. As a matter of fact, the newcomer tends to define the American situation in terms of the learning he has had at the hands of fellow countrymen already here. (3) This continuity with the old culture tends to soften the severity of the change and yet profoundly influences the assimilation processes itself. (4) It is only as the immigrant

is introduced more and more to the features of American culture and especially as his children come into contact with the school, with agencies of recreation, with American family life and other features of American culture that the earlier contacts wear off and assimilation really gets under way. As a matter of fact, the whole effect of these changes upon the personality is really found in a transitional period involving, on the one hand, the older generation and, on the other, the next generation. Let us look more closely at what goes on in terms of this culture conflict as expressed also in a conflict of age groups.

The older generation, usually the parents or older children, tend to retain the European culture. They can only face the new in terms of the old. Frequently the members of the older age group who migrate to this country find satisfaction and solace in looking backwards. That is, they tend to live in the past. Many of these people are disturbed by the new, although most of them will have to adopt some of the external aspects of the new culture. This is particularly true with regard to jobs and acceptance of certain external rules of conduct. On the other hand, in terms of religious beliefs, nationalistic values, and so on, they frequently retain these in the face of pressures from other sources.

Children of Immigrants

The new generation, the children of the immigrants, often make their adaptation by rejecting the old ways taught them by their parents. There is frequently a good deal of interpersonal conflict between individuals of different age groups within the family. This is neatly illustrated when the older adolescent girl wishes to go out on dates with young men in the neighborhood only to find herself in severe conflict with her parents who would deny her this kind of "privilege." The children who go to school quickly pick up American attitudes, ideas, and habits and carry these back to their home.

For members of the older generation, the impact of the new culture on personality is probably not too marked. They take on certain external adaptations but retain the basic core of the personality. With the new generation this is not so easy. Where there is strong family identification, where there is a good deal of early training in the ways of the Old World, the exposure to divergent patterns of life through the neighborhood and especially through the school may, in time, induce frustration and even serious inner conflict. This is illustrated in members of these families who wish to anglicize their names, or wish to marry outside of their particular national or religious group. One factor that helps to alleviate some possible strain is freedom of choice as to residential as well as occupational mobility. Going to college is another factor. Here individuals may meet persons of their own age group who come from quite divergent subcultural backgrounds. In any case, marriage across nationality lines is

an important element in the breakdown of the older culture. Intermarriage aids in the formulation of new cultural patterns, as well as of different personality patterns.

Japanese-Americans in Hawaii

Another example of ethnic adjustment is seen in the behavior of the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. These people present a particular set of difficulties. In the first place, in terms of sheer numbers, they are the largest single group in Hawaii. They constitute something between 35 and 40 per cent of the total population. Most of them are concentrated on the island of Oahu and in the city of Honolulu. Here they constitute a considerably large fraction of the total population. And yet these people are under a certain amount of strain due to the fact, first of all, of the long-continued race prejudice against Orientals on the part of the whites, both those who have been long in the islands and those who have more recently arrived from the mainland. Added to this, there continues to be a considerable amount of legend about the disloyalty of the Japanese-Americans at the time of Pearl Harbor and shortly thereafter. While these myths and legends have been largely dissipated officially, they continue as a part of the belief system in support of the antagonism to these people. Added to this, there are economic and occupational hazards which the Japanese-Americans face. The future of the Hawaiian Islands lies largely in agriculture of a highly commercialized character, with pineapples and sugar as the chief crops. Farm property is largely in the hands of large landowners or corporations. With the increase in mechanization, even the demand for semiskilled and unskilled labor is declining. This among other situations helps to produce a serious restriction in upward occupational mobility for people in the lower economic and social ranks, and particularly for those with the additional handicaps of Japanese-American ancestry.

There is still another factor. The Japanese-Americans have retained many Oriental culture patterns with regard to the family. Their young people, brought up in Hawaii, although exposed to schools largely dominated by American patterns, are nonetheless the targets of the authoritarian patterns of the Japanese family life. This situation tends to induce problems of divided loyalty between adherence to the Oriental pattern and adherence to more democratic ways of life.

The American dream of education has touched the Japanese. These people are highly ambitious, and a higher proportion of their young people not only go through high school but attend college than do those of any other ethnic group. But their future is none too certain, since those who have gone to high school and college will have difficulty in finding adequate jobs, even in the white-collar class. They often cannot find a

place in the mainland, and the economic restrictions in Hawaii are severe indeed.

Underneath the docile and somewhat passive external manner which they have acquired from their Oriental background, a great many of these younger generation Japanese-Americans experience much frustration and anxiety. As we know, the expression of anxiety may take a variety of forms. It may lead to retreat from a situation; it may lead to a great deal of obvious worry; it may take the form of hostility toward another group or toward members of one's own group, or finally of hostility toward oneself.

In the face of continued frustration and anxiety, there may be a certain amount of hostility directed toward members of their own group. This is not apparent on the surface, but it does show up under certain conditions of strain or in certain recreational situations. For example, at social gatherings composed of Japanese-Americans, Hawaiian-Americans, and white mainlanders, it is not uncommon for the Japanese-Americans to become very nasty and hostile toward each other after they have imbibed a certain amount of alcohol.

From my personal observations and from more systematic study of cultural anthropology and psychology, there is little evidence that the younger generation of Japanese-Americans tend to retreat into their Old World Oriental patterns. There has been talk in some quarters about the continuation of the influence of the homeland upon these people, and some of these families have returned to Japan. But, on the whole, these people want to live in Hawaii and to be a part of the United States. As citizens, of course, they face a good deal of prejudice at the hands of their white peers. Then, too, there is a high degree of struggle for role and status of a satisfactory sort among members of this group itself as well as with reference to persons of white or native ancestry.

The Plain People

Turning now to religious groups and their subcultures, let us examine the so-called "Plain People." This term has been applied to the Mennonites, the Dunkers, the Amish, the Amana, the Hutterites, and others. The ancestors of these people migrated from Europe nearly two hundred years ago, yet a large number of their cultural features have been retained. These groups often persist as cultural islands within the midst of highly secularized and technically developed areas. Their clothing, many of their social institutions, in particular their religious worship, have been carried down from the time of the Protestant Reformation. They regard the simple life as the good life and try hard to keep their children from becoming "worldly," as they call it. On the other hand, from the point of view of agricultural practices, many of these people have the

most modern farms in the United States. They make use of power machinery and have well-equipped barns and facilities for their livestock. Sometimes, as a matter of fact, there are rather sharp and amusing contrasts. For example, if one drives through Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, one will see farm after farm with utterly plain two-story houses having no electric lights and no inside water facilities. The women carry water from the pump one hundred yards beyond the house and, run their households very much in the manner of their grandmothers. Yet behind the house will be a huge barn, often larger than the house, equipped with water and electricity and, in the dairy section, with the finest assortment of electric milkers and other devices to prepare milk for the market. This group, the House Amish, avoid all technological innovations except those they deem necessary for their economic success.

Despite the hold which the older culture has over these people, some breakdown of the old is becoming apparent. Young Amish do leave home for the city to work and thus get away from the family background. Occasionally they marry outside the group and otherwise cut themselves off from families and neighbors. But, on the whole, the quietistic and pacific religious attitudes and values remain strong.

We have here a curious mixture in the personality of an ethical and religious value system that operates side by side with the attitudes of economic success and money-making which are part of the secularized and competitive capitalist order. Just how much inner conflict may be brought about by this is unknown, yet the history of Protestantism clearly shows that it is not impossible for a person to be severely religious and at the same time be a successful economic entrepreneur. There is no reason why the Amish and other Plain People cannot duplicate this. Evidently internal conflicts do not appear within the broad culturally accepted division just indicated. However, trouble does arise when the older generation attempts to put pressure on the younger to keep them in line with the church affiliations and to prevent their intermarriage with people outside.

The Mormons

As a final example of subcultural influences on personality, we shall cite the case of the Latter-Day Saints or Mormons, particularly with reference to the period when the Utah branch of this church practiced the plural marriage system. Without going into the origin and development of this system of polygyny, we can say that it was superimposed upon a thoroughly monogamous and highly moral social order. The Mormon belief system was essentially that of other Protestant groups, with high stress upon monogamy, marital fidelity, and all the traditional virtues of the Christian world. Yet within a short time, plural marriage became a firm tenet of the Mormon church. On the other hand, polygyny was prac-

ticed by a relatively small percentage of members, chiefly by families in the upper social brackets. Clearly, Mormon polygyny was closely linked to their class organization of upper, middle, and lower ranks.[21]

As to the personal adjustment of those involved, in the early days of the plural system—during the 1840's—many Mormons had difficulty in accepting this novel form of marriage. There had to be and was an emotional conversion to a new way of family life. This was accompanied, first and obviously, by the disappearance of the romantic love pattern which had been so deeply ingrained in the American folkways. Secondly, there was a suppression of jealousy and envy—two natural protective devices under monogamy aimed at keeping the family intact. Jealousy is a perfectly clear-cut and accepted form of restraint of one spouse over the other when family solidarity and harmony are threatened. But romantic love and jealousy had little or no place under the plural system, and other devices of adjustment had to be found. From my own extensive studies, it is pretty clear, however, that for the most part people were able to suppress their romantic impulses and their jealousy and to make relatively satisfactory adaptation to each other. Among other factors there was frequently an implicit and at times enforced co-operation among the wives under the direction of the husband. Or, if there was conflict, it was covered over by an external appearance of acceptance. This is not to say that open conflict did not at times occur.

The children of polygyny present a particularly interesting picture, because again the whole tradition of monogamy had meant that the child had a full share in the father as an object of affection or of authority. The children of plural families were faced with the necessity of sharing their father with their half-brothers and half-sisters. In this connection it is worth noting that although Mormonism is a strong authoritarian, patriarchal system, in actual practice, at the household and family level, the wives played a very important and distinctive part in the handling and training of their own children. For the most part, each wife had her own ménage and the other wives did not interfere with the training and discipline of the children other than their own.

The practical adjustment of these families was made possible by the development of certain new institutions. It must be indicated that the Mormons had no directives as to how to manage their interpersonal and family relations under this system. All they had was their leader's divine revelation that the system should be believed and practiced. As for their day-by-day operation, the Mormons had to invent a variety of social devices. Among others, there was the widespread practice of housing the wives and their children in separate establishments rather than to com-

[21] For a full account of Mormon polygyny and a social-psychological analysis of the system in action, see Kimball Young, *Isn't One Wife Enough?* (New York, Holt, 1954).

bine them under one roof. While some husbands set up one huge household for all their wives and children, this was far less usual than separate houses.

The husbands made a genuine effort, for the most part, to be equal and just in their treatment of all the wives and children. On the other hand, the first wife, technically speaking, was the only legal wife, since polygyny was never really legal in this country. There is no doubt that despite the attempts of the Mormons to emphasize equality of treatment, the first wife and her children were usually well aware of the fact that they were the only legal members of the family. As a consequence, they were entitled to certain property rights. Sometimes, in case of conflict with the father and husband, they went to court and secured redress in property matters. This was something that no plural wife could do, at least not through the civil courts. She might appeal to the church authorities for help, and frequently did so when there was conflict, but these judgments had no binding force outside the local mores of the church members themselves.

It is well to note that some people could not accept this system. As a result the church had to develop a system of separation and divorce to handle families in severe conflict. But on the whole, both the spouses and the children made an amazing adaptation to what is elsewhere regarded as a non-Christian and non-Western form of family life. From the point of view of personality, the significance of this system is its indication that severe changes in social and personality patterns can only be made where there is a high degree of emotional conversion to the new belief and the new practice. In all of these illustrations of subcultural influences, it is well to bear in mind that there is a fundamental unifying body of culture which underlies these particular variations.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

DAVIS, Allison, "Child Training and Social Class," in R. G. Barker, and others, eds., *Child Behavior and Development* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1943), Ch. 34. A discussion of the impact of social class upon the formation of personality, with particular reference to the situation in Negro families in the Deep South. For a more complete account of the research on which this treatment rests, see Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1940).

GREEN, Arnold W., "The Middle-Class Male Child and Neurosis," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 2:34–41. Reprinted, in part, in Kingsley Davis, and others, eds., *Modern American Society* (New York, Rinehart, 1948), pp. 660–666. An insightful paper on the parent-child relations in middle-class American families. Such problems as confusion of roles, inferiority feelings, sense of failure, and sense of guilt are discussed.

HAVIGHURST, R. J., and TABA, Hilda, eds., *Adolescent Character and Personality* (New York, Wiley, 1949). A collection of papers presenting various

aspects of an intensive study of youth made in a Midwestern community. Both group and individual features are presented.

KLUCKHOHN, Clyde, and MURRAY, Henry A., eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 2nd. ed. (New York, Knopf, 1953). Contains a number of papers—originally appearing elsewhere—pertinent to the discussion in this chapter. Among others see Allison Davis and Robert J. Havighurst, "Social Class and Color Differences in Child-Rearing," pp. 308–320; Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," pp. 363–375; Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," pp. 376–385; Allison Davis, "American Status Systems and the Socialization of the Child," pp. 567–576; and Margaret Mead, "Administrative Contributions to Democratic Character Formation at the Adolescent Level," pp. 663–670.

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CHAPTER 9

The Nature and Function of Belief Systems

THE behavior of an individual separately or as a member of a group will be influenced by what we call his belief system, that is, by his view of the world in which he lives—his deepest convictions, not just his passing whims. The core of a belief system consists of fundamental attitudes and values. By values we mean preferences or choices on a scale of things that people desire or want. Let us examine the nature of belief systems more closely.

NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS

General Characteristics

The inner life of the person does not consist of mere collections of ideas, stereotypes, and attitudes. Rather it is the organizing of these into larger units of belief and conviction with which we will be concerned in this section. Such beliefs constitute the life philosophy of the individual, the pattern of which is determined by his basic motives and interests and by the situations in which his daily life takes place. In addition to the individual's technical skills and knowledge, he has certain standards of conduct for himself and others. He expects certain actions from others and is expected to make certain counter-responses, as is illustrated in the interplay of rights and duties. The individual has his interpretation of his place in the world, in the family, in the vast range of secondary groups. Put otherwise, we may say that the meaning of his roles and statuses rests ultimately in his belief system. Linked to interpretations of his roles, he has stories of the heroes and villains and historic events of his society. Likewise he has beliefs about the future. Ideas of inevitable social progress, or of heaven and hell after death, are a part of one's belief system.

Social psychology has long dealt with such organized mental pic-

tures of the world. Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist, and his followers call these subjective components of the person *collective representations.* This term emphasizes not only their symbolic character but also the fact that they are the precipitates of society and culture. Durkheim pointed out the vast effect that these collective representations have on conduct. Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian social philosopher, dealt with these phenomena in terms of what he called derivatives and residues. He showed that these elements, partly irrational, partly rational, were expressed both in conscious and unconscious activities of the individual. Still other writers have used the term "ideology" to define a body of beliefs, values, and rationalizations about the existing social order and the term "Utopia" to define a projection of ideas, beliefs, and values which may appear in the future.

More specifically, a belief system may be defined as an organized body of ideas, attitudes, and convictions centered around values or things regarded as important or precious to the group. Belief systems provide a larger frame of reference or background which tends to control the more specific thoughts or actions of individuals. So, too, it provides stabilizing elements and makes for order and control. A belief system is definitely a social product which arises out of the matrix of symbolic interaction. Hence, it is a shared experience and has no meaning outside a social context. It arises and is maintained largely through communication, and it has a very definite relationship to language and meaning.

Systems of belief range from those linked to logic and science to those expressed in religious and magical thought and practice. In our modern world the high stress on applied science, or technology, has helped build up many popular beliefs regarding science. This, in turn, provides substantial support for the more logical and empirically grounded convictions or beliefs of scientists themselves. Yet we must not overlook the continued importance of the religious and magical aspects of the belief system. These represent culturized and group-accepted daydreams. They provide the foundations of the moral order. They are basic to our concern with the supernatural and immortality. Moreover, they are important for the integration of society, providing the individual with many gratifications. In the middle range in a continuum from logical and scientific beliefs to fantasy-founded beliefs in religion are the ideologies having to do with family life, politics, economics, recreation, and other institutionalized behavior. The beliefs with respect to these activities represent a mixture of logic and fantasy.

For the individual, there is also a range of cognitive and emotional involvement in the systems of belief. This varies from mild acceptance to deep emotional commitment. As we shall see, changes in belief systems are difficult to bring about where there is the latter kind of involvement. As Talcott Parsons put it, for the individual, "It is felt that the welfare of

the group is bound up with maintenance of the belief system and its implementation in action. It can readily be seen that a belief system toward which such an attitude is held in common, must, in fact, acquire integrative significance for the collectivity." [1]

Before examining in more detail certain components of belief systems, we must stress two factors. In the first place, most of us derive our belief systems as a part of the total baggage of culture which comes to us from our parents, neighbors, and other people who are the agencies or conveyors of culture. It is only rarely that the individual, as such, contributes very much to the given body of belief. In the second place, belief systems have no meaning outside of communication and sharing with others. While an individual may have some unique and idiosyncratic ideas and beliefs, we need not call these "personal ideology," as does Parsons. Private stereotypes and private beliefs are not necessarily of the same character as those which are shared and therefore a part of the total culture.

Components of Belief Systems

Systems of belief are made up of cognitive, affective, and evaluative elements. The cognitive refer, of course, to those elements that are grounded in ideas derived from sound and objective examination of facts. The highest level of cognition would, of course, be found in logic and science. Here the rational and intellectual processes of the individual come into play. However, all intellectual processes are not confined to logicians and scientists. A great deal of our everyday living takes place in an intellectual atmosphere. The affective elements are those which derive from the feelings and the emotions. Herein rational and fantasy processes are to be found in operation. The evaluative components are a combination of the cognitive and the affective. They operate as preference choices with regard to things we desire or want. These, of course, are for the most part derived from our culture. These three elements make up the belief system which, in turn, to be effective, must influence or be implemented in overt conduct.

CONTENT OF BELIEF SYSTEMS

Against this background, let us examine the content of the belief system, especially the nature and function of stereotypes, clichés, slogans, myths, and folklore.

Stereotypes

The word "stereotype" was introduced to social psychology by Walter Lippmann, in his book, *Public Opinion* (1922). In its literal meaning, a

[1] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1951), p. 350.

stereotype is a metal plate, cast from a mold or a surface of type. A number of such plates can be produced from the original mold. The term was first used in a metaphorical sense by psychiatrists to describe a frequent and almost mechanical repetition of the same posture, gesture, or word in such mental disorders as schizophrenia. But Lippmann used it in the broad sense of a determining tendency or a composite of ideas and attitudes which make up the "pictures in our heads." An earlier psychology called this phenomenon the "apperceptive mass."

It seems unwise to use stereotype as a name for the entire baggage of internalized content of the person, nor should it be used to mean attitude. The latter is an action tendency. Rather it is best to define stereotype as a false, classificatory concept to which, as a rule, some strong emotional feeling tone of like or dislike, approval or disapproval, is attached. To illustrate, from the field of prejudice, the stereotype "Dago" is used to classify all Italians without regard to individual differences. There is no logical, sound basis for such a classification. Under this term, then, a person is a "Dago" first, and then Signor Romani, the merchant. Similarly, a colored man is first a "Nigger" and then Mr. George Johnson.

There is, however, definite relationship between stereotypes and ideas, attitudes, and meanings. Ideas and attitudes are closely tied together in the many illogical, but emotionally powerful and socially important, stereotypes. While a logical concept presents in verbal or other symbolic form some classification, general quality, or relation of parts to wholes, there is also some association with overt response out of which the idea arose in the first place. Meaning has been defined as a symbol and an attitude or action tendency toward an object or class of objects. An attitude is illustrated by the feature of like or dislike, for or against, approval or disapproval, and it always points to some overt response. This linkage is equally obvious in stereotypes. The stereotype, like the sound idea, has a cognitive core, carried chiefly in words or visual images, from which the attitudes or the action may spring. As we shall see, stereotypes may definitely influence social perception. Moreover, they show stability and persistence. We may say, in short, that the function of a stereotype is to give meaning to a situation, that is, to delimit behavior with reference to it. It defines the situation in terms of acts, potential or actual. This definition of the situation always involves the operation of expectation and acceptance. This, in turn, makes for regularity and hence for prediction and control. Furthermore, a stereotype may well have to do with moral action, in which case it becomes an expression of a cultural norm. The situations from which stereotypes develop and continue in the culture are largely those concerned with group conflict and leadership. In our own historical period, stereotypes arise and function chiefly with regard to race relations, class differences, religious conflict, and international struggles.

Ample illustrations of the play of stereotypes will be given when we discuss these topics.

Perception and Stereotypes

The classic study of the effect of stereotypes on perception and judgment was made by Stuart A. Rice in 1926. He presented 141 Dartmouth College undergraduates, and later a group of Grange members, with a series of nine photographs. The persons represented were Premier Herriot of France; Duncan, a prominent labor leader of the day; Krassin, at that time Soviet ambassador to France; McIntosh, deputy controller of the currency; former governor Glynn of New York; a bootlegger named Agel; Schwab, an official of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation; Heinz, the food manufacturer; and United States Senator G. W. Pepper. The subjects were told that the series contained pictures of a bootlegger, a European premier, a United States Senator, a Bolshevik, a labor leader, two manufacturers, an editor-politician, and a financier. The students were asked to identify these individuals by number. No suggestions were given as to the order of the photographs and each subject made independent choices. The number of correct judgments was double the expectancy from pure chance. An examination of the results with respect to particular individuals, however, showed how false some judgments may be contrasted to others. For Herriot, Duncan, Glynn, Agel, Schwab, and Heinz the judgments were about what might be expected by chance. In contrast, Ambassador Krassin, pictured in wing-collar, Van Dyke beard, and mustache, and evidently well-dressed and distinguished in appearance, was named 59 times as United States senator, nine times as a Bolshevik, and nine times as a labor leader. Duncan, the labor leader, was named correctly 25 times, but 25 times also as premier, 30 as manufacturer, 15 as Bolshevik, and 13 as financier. The highest number of correct identifications fell to the bootlegger, who was the only one shown in outdoor costume. He was pictured in a cap and heavy overcoat with upturned collar, wearing tortoise-shell glasses, and with a cigar firmly gripped between his lips. The results with the Grange farmers confirmed those obtained from the college students.

Rice also secured judgments as to the intelligence and craftiness of the persons shown in the photographs. The students were divided into three groups. Those in the first group were permitted to believe their original judgments were correct. Those in the second group were given different but still false identifications. And those in the third group were informed of the real identity of the pictures. The results were what might have been expected. The estimates of the two traits were definitely biased by the supposed identities of the portraits—that is, by the stereotypes concerning the man's supposed job or social status. Disclosure of

the true identities lead to the changes in the rating to conform to other apperceptive elements which would go into such judgments.[2]

This study, like others made later, shows not only that stereotypes may distort or direct human judgments but that stereotypes are not necessarily or entirely foolish. They grow up on the basis of certain common-sense experience with people and events. Their inadequacy or falseness arises from generalizations made from one or two cases and from the fact that the trait or quality selected as a category does not correspond to the actual facts. It is interesting to note that the bootlegger secured the highest number of correct judgments. But, if Krassin had been dressed in a beaver cap and heavy winter overcoat, flecked with snow, the correct judgments of him would probably have been more numerous than they were. Though in 1924 the usual stereotype of the Bolshevik was a bewhiskered ruffian in a peasant smock and carrying a bomb, such a picture as that suggested would have brought up associations with known or imagined data about Russian winter costumes, and would, in turn, have set loose certain associations with Bolshevism.

A number of studies have shown the effects of prestige-bearing stereotypes. Such stereotypes have been constantly used in advertising, as when Miss Movie Star, of Hollywood, is shown approving a cigarette, a facial cream, or a mattress. Also, studies have shown how people react to such terms as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, and communism. For example, George W. Hartmann gave an attitude scale dealing with liberal political reforms to a group of 107 voters, mostly farmers, small shopkeepers, miners, laborers, housewives, and female clerks. The results showed that the groups were generally favorable to collectivistic or socialistic policies, such as public ownership of natural resources and industry as well as being in favor of extensive provision for social security. Yet, when such policies were presented as representing socialistic or communistic views, most of the individuals took conservative and opposite positions. For instance, two-thirds of the sample would refuse a public-school license to a teacher who believed in socialism, more than three-fourths were opposed to state ownership of land, and three-fifths said that they had no desire to be affiliated with the socialist party. Evidently they wanted many of the socialistic changes and benefits, but, as Hartmann put it, they did not want them "labeled that way."[3]

Clichés, Catchwords, and Slogans

Closely related to stereotypes and often included in the category are slogans, clichés, catch phrases, and jargon of popular speech. When a

[2] Stuart A. Rice, " 'Stereotypes': A Source of Error in Judging Human Character," *J. of Personnel Research*, 1926, 5:268–276.

[3] George W. Hartmann, "The Contradictions Between the Feeling-Tone of Political Party Names and Public Response to the Platforms," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1936, 7:336–355.

newspaper reporter describes the victim of a murder as "lying in a pool of blood," he is using a phrase which, though often of perceptual rather than of conceptual function, takes on the character of a stereotype. The same may be said of various political slogans. For example, "Fifty-four Forty or Fight," and "Remember the Maine" were direct appeals to action in their day. In more recent times, such phrases as "The New Deal" and "The Fair Deal" illustrate the use of slogans. These indicate demands, expectations, hopes, and a variety of established values. The revolutionary battle cry of "Land for the Landless" served to define a line of action.

The stereotype, the cliché, and the slogan are important coins or counters in the more extended symbolic currency which we call a social myth. We shall examine this below. They may be used to describe any type of group toward which an individual is oriented, either as a member or a nonmember. They operate in both primary and secondary in-groups and out-groups. Like attitudes and habits, they arise from and revolve around all sorts of critical situations: birth, puberty, marriage, and death; economic crises, such as strikes and depressions; political struggles, such as are found in elections and wars; and disasters caused by flood, fire, and earthquake. They are likewise to be found in situations which arouse pleasure, hope, and anticipation. The symbols of demand in mass movements for economic security and power are illustrations of this. So, too, stereotypes, slogans, and shibboleths have important functions in the utopian dreams of future justice and happiness. In other words, this whole symbolic baggage helps to define the pattern of the past, the present, and the future.

Clearly language is involved in the meaning of social reality and of our belief system; and in connection with these both objective and fantasy thinking and stereotypes, slogans, and clichés come into play. In fact, such symbols tend to fall into the middle range of our hypothetical continuum from scientific and logical thinking to extreme fantasy. Such forms of jargon grow out of, and reflect, the nonlogical or illogical nature of many of our basic values. Stereotypes may be logically false concepts, but since men live not by logic but by love and hate, fear and anger, anxiety and a sense of superiority, these verbal forms are as normal and useful as any others in our relations with our fellow men. It could not be otherwise. Our values, our deepest desires, the most drastic demands upon us, are a mixture of our wishes for power, prestige, and companionship as well as of our need for economic and political security. Into these patterns fantasy as well as logic enter. True, toward the world of material objects and technology, controlled as they are by science, we are somewhat more rational. But, as we repeatedly contend, the rational side of our life is intermingled with the emotional, fantasy-determined wishes. It is seen in our mating, companionship, occupational activities, recreation, politics, art, religion, and everyday philosophy.

HOW STEREOTYPES AND CLICHÉS ARE BUILT UP

Stereotypes and clichés are part of the culturally-learned language forms and content of meanings handed down from generation to generation. Broadly viewed, these are transmitted through socialization. As a form of learning it falls under Case I: Matched and Dependent Learning (see Chapter 3) which is the essence of cultural learning. As a component of verbal habits, stereotypes become a part of the personality—it is that part of the personality, moreover, which is definitely dependent on parental and other outside influences. This is not to say that individuals do not invent and organize stereotypes. There is a fluctuation and change in the pattern of stereotypes as we shall see. At this point we shall indicate briefly the chief determinants of stereotype.

Interpersonal Sources

The family is the initial and in many ways basic agency for the transmission of culture. With regard to stereotypes—as cultural products—the parents and other family members provide the growing child with his first source. In the course of defining situations in advance, they use a wide variety of stereotypes. Adjectives are used to characterize individuals and groups of individuals to the child. For example, a study by Daniel Katz and K. Braly clearly demonstrated the place of stereotypes in characterizing various nationalities. Thus, the chief designations applied to the Germans were "scientifically minded, stolid, and industrious." The Italians were described as "artistic, impulsive, and passionate." The Negroes were designated as "superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, and ignorant." The Jews were characterized as "shrewd, mercenary, and industrious." The Americans were termed "industrious, intelligent, materialistic, and ambitious." The Chinese were designated as "superstitious, sly, and conservative." The Japanese, on the other hand, were rated as "intelligent, industrious, and progressive." Finally, the Turks were put down as "cruel, religious, and treacherous." [4] For the most part, such designations reflect the stereotypes which are common in the public at large, and the child usually learns these in the home though he may also pick them up from other sources.

Parents, in trying to control the child's relation to other groups, reflect what might be called the status or social-class factor as it operates in prejudice. To tell a child not to play with another child because he lives on the wrong side of the tracks or to say that so and so is a Jew or a Dago or a Polack represent devices by which the child is quickly trained to deal with other people in the fashion expected by his parents

[4] Daniel Katz and K. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1933, 28:280–290.

and social class. Not only parents but brothers, sisters, and friends play a part in this. As we shall see later, prejudice often begins with the application of stereotypes to particular individuals as members of groups regarded as inferior.

Other Sources

In addition to individuals and groups, there is always the influence of newspapers, magazines, books, and other printed materials upon the induction and use of stereotypes. The jargon of the newspapers is an example of the manner in which stereotypes are used and passed on. Headlines and editorial comments as well as general news stories bear this out.

In addition to parents, siblings, playmates and other people, and in addition to printed or other materials, there is also the factor of concrete or actual experience which may determine prejudice or at least give it a start. A customer of Protestant or Catholic background may have an argument or difficulty with a Jewish merchant over some slight matter. Up to this point he has had no overt or conscious prejudice against this particular individual, nor for that matter against the Jews as a group. Even one episode thought about and talked about may lead to the development or acceptance of group stereotypes against this particular Jewish merchant as well as against the group as a whole. It has been my observation that people reared in those parts of the country in which there are few if any minority groups often go through just this experience when they move into urban centers such as New York, Boston, and Chicago where they come into contact with the members of minority groups. Protestants reared in rural areas may furnish another example of this. Having had no particular contact with Catholics, they will have no particular prejudice against them. On exposure to contact with Catholics, however, they may, through some untoward episode emerge with a full-blown stereotype and prejudice against members of this religious faith. It is rare, however, that individuals develop such prejudices on their own. They are usually encouraged by others who make such remarks as "I told you so" or "You should have known."

Persistence and Change in Beliefs

In many ways stereotypes have remarkable stability and persistence. One may raise the question as to what keeps them alive. Probably certain kinds of recurrent situations provide a partial answer.

A number of studies, beginning with the earliest by E. S. Bogardus in 1924, have revealed a remarkable persistence of the rank-ordering of nationality groups. Bogardus prepared a selected list of nationality names ranging from American, British, Canadian, and North European to East European; Oriental, and Turk. Repeated application through the years

of this so-called social-distance test shows that the Americans, the British, and the North Europeans tend to have the higher ranks and that the Orientals and especially the Turks tend to fall at the bottom of the scale.

Although stereotypes tend to be remarkably stable, external events and gradual drift in cultural values may bring about changes. For example, the events and developments of World War II tended to modify the relative position of the Germans and the Japanese in the listing of ethnic and nationality groups on the Bogardus scale. A neat illustration of slow and gradual changes in stereotypes and accompanying attitudes is brought out in a comparison of the Katz and Braly findings, referred to above, and in a repetition of this study done by G. M. Gilbert in 1950. In one part of their study, Katz and Braly had indicated the least number of traits which would have to be taken into account to include 50 per cent of the possible assignments of traits for each nationality group or race. These were then put in rank order and the number of traits required for each ethnic group was indicated. In 1950, Gilbert repeated this study at Princeton and the comparisons of the studies are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Comparison of Stereotype Persistence *

GROUP	NUMBER OF TRAITS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 50 PER CENT OF TRAITS ASSIGNED EACH GROUP	
	1932	*1950*
Negroes	4.6	12.0
Germans	5.0	6.3
Jews	5.5	10.6
Italians	6.9	11.3
English	7.0	9.2
Irish	8.5	17.5
Americans	8.8	13.6
Japanese	10.9	26.0
Chinese	12.0	14.5
Turks	15.9	32.0

* G. M. Gilbert, "Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students," *The J. of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1951, 46:251. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

This table is interesting because it shows the disappearance of certain stereotypes with regard to these groups. Examination will show that with regard to the Negroes, for example, there is a decided shift in the rigidity and definiteness of the stereotypes regarding their race. On the other hand, there is less shift with respect to the Germans and the English. Marked shifts are shown for the Japanese and even for the Turks.

Just how to explain this change is difficult, but it may well be that our American college students of today are more tolerant and less caught up in the stereotypes than were the students of the early 1930's. It may be

that this particular sample of Princeton students were of a different character in terms of family background than those in the earlier study. Gilbert does not provide us with this information. It may well be that, as Gilbert remarks, there has been some disappearance of the stereotype characterization in our entertainment and communication media. It may also be that, while there are shifts in these particular stereotypes, other stereotypes such as those about the Soviet Union may be even more rigid than was the case earlier. This topic needs further exploration.

As to what forces would bring about rapid and revolutionary shifts in the belief system and stereotypes, it is difficult to say. Judging by the example of Soviet Russia, despite the impact over the years of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin propaganda, there has been a remarkable persistence of many of the older Russian values and attitudes. This is particularly true of the peasant and his reactions to the land and toward private enterprise and the profit system. As a matter of fact, the rulers of Soviet Russia have found it necessary to modify and meliorate the earlier rigid regulations regarding farming practices and the sale of farm products. Also, the revival of religious interests and practices in Soviet Russia shows that, despite propaganda against religious practices, large numbers of people still believe in them.

In summary, we may say that the forces which make for changes and for stability in the belief system are extremely complex. As a part of the fundamental culture we may expect the beliefs and convictions of people, especially with regard to their deepest values, to have remarkable persistence. On the other hand, under emotional strain or great external pressures changes may be brought about rather easily. In these more rapid changes, conversion plays an important part.

MYTHS AND LEGENDS

Nature of Myth and Legend

As part of its belief system every society has its myths and legends. All sorts of stories of past and current events, of heroes, and of institutions enter into our systems of belief. Social myth may be defined as an imaginary interpretation of past, present, or future events. Such myths are not created out of nothing but have a basis in some crisis. The crisis may have to do with economic needs, with warfare, success or failure in life, with birth, with puberty, with marriage and divorce, with death and with future life. Myths sometimes arise as a wish-fulfilling device in some difficult situation and serve to stabilize us in the presence of distress. Yet the bulk of them are deeply imbedded in our culture and are passed on from one generation to another.

Legends, in contrast, are stories which have some factual basis, but

which in the telling and retelling lose much of their objective accuracy and accumulate all sorts of imaginary and fictional details. The emergence and spread of rumor is a good illustration of a rudimentary form of legend which may become accepted by a neighborhood or community.

Together, myth and legend make up a body of folklore of immense importance. They are highly significant components of our total belief systems and give a basis for the continuity of social life and culture. Without them the past and present, as well as the future, would seem chaotic. Through them the world takes on order, form, and meaning, and therefore does not need to be constantly recast by us and for us. Myths and legends make up what I have called "social-cultural reality" or what is currently called "belief system." As we use the concept, myths are not fairy stories told to children to amuse them. Unfortunately, our rationalistic tradition is of such character that we imagine myths to be fantastic and purely make-believe stories that only ignorant, illiterate people believe. This is certainly not true. Our own basic beliefs and legends are not something false to us. They are just as real and actual a part of our belief system as any other part. What Bronislaw Malinowski says about myths among nonliterate peoples applies equally well to us: [5]

> Myth as it exists in a savage community, that is, in its living primitive form, is not merely a story told but a reality lived. It is not of the nature of fiction, such as we read to-day in a novel, but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. The myth is to the savage what, to a fully believing Christian, is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of the Redemption by Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross. As our sacred story lives in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conduct, even so does his myth for the savage.
>
> Studied alive, myth is not symbolic, but a direct expression of its subject-matter; it is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements. Myth fulfills in primitive culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.

Myth and Ritual

Myths not only take on narrative and descriptive form, but become associated with various rituals and ceremonials. In fact, as myth has its roots in the association of fantasies, rituals and ceremonies have their source in autistic bodily actions and gestures.

[5] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (New York, Norton, 1926), pp. 18, 19. By permission of the publisher.

By ritual we mean the repeated acts related to certain objects or situations considered significant for our survival. Ritual is a highly stable and habitual, hence predictable, means of dealing with situations. It is the extreme of learned automatic action, and in some ways it takes on the features of reflex action. We must not think of ritual as mere mumbo jumbo. It is as vital to us in many ways as it is to nonliterate man. Just as people take for granted the myths accepted in their own society, so, too, they often do not recognize their own rituals for what they are.

Let us note some further characteristics of ritual. Ritualistic acts are not to be confused with those of the practical arts of getting a living and making an objective adaptation to the world around us. The latter we term technology (skill) and knowledge of how to satisfy our physical needs. The essence of ritual is the symbolism which provides meaning in terms of some supernatural or other great power. Ritual furnishes a link between our unfulfilled wants and the larger demands of our group. Ritual, like myth, of course, is traditionally associated with religion. Yet it is now realized that both myth and ritual are also functional parts of much of our political, economic, and other day-by-day activity. True, some myths and rituals relate more distinctly to the supernatural than do others, but even in our mechanized secular world we find a place for both.

A ritual is a repeated act with a symbolic meaning for a crisis such as death or birth, or for some economic, social, or political crisis; a myth rationalizes the ritual and gives it broader justification. There has been considerable discussion among cultural anthropologists and folklorists about the sequential relation of myth and ritual. Some have held that the ritual arose before the myth and that the latter was invented to explain the former. Others have held the reverse. It is not our intention to enter into this controversy, but there is much evidence that myths produce ritualistic symbols.

The beginning of this process is shown in the story of the seagulls that saved the crops of the Mormons in early Utah by devouring the locusts which had infested the region. From this arose a worshipful attitude toward the birds, many taboos about them, and finally a piece of representative art in the form of a monument. As has been indicated elsewhere, under somewhat different conditions such an episode might have given rise to totemistic rites.[6]

Once a ritual is established, however, it may easily give rise to further explanatory myths. Man may or may not always take his rites for granted, and certainly in many societies people embroider their rituals by additional stories. Moreover, as Franz Boas and others have amply shown, when rituals are transferred or diffused to new peoples, they tend to accumulate new myths and new meanings. In fact, the relation of the

[6] See Kimball Young, "The Story of the Rise of a Social Taboo," *Scientific Monthly*, 1928, 26:449–453. See also Clyde Kluckhohn, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1942, 35:45–79.

rite to the myth illustrates an important principle in the interplay of subjective meaning and overt action. That identity of action does not imply identity of meaning is one of the first rules of social-psychological analysis.

As we have noted above, ritual and ceremony are not confined to the sacred and magical but extend into political, economic, and other activities. In primitive societies, of course, there is less distinction between the sacred and the secular, and technology, ritual, and myth are often interwoven. For example, magical rites and myths connected with plant and animal fertility are extremely widespread. Primitives and peasants not only use manures and other nitrate-bearing substances to fertilize the soil but employ incantations, spells, and all sorts of magic to insure good crops. In an earlier day Bavarian peasants knew enough to prune their orchards, but they also dressed a barren tree in a woman's skirt on the theory that this would make the tree fertile again, an example of what is called contagious magic.

There are many ceremonies, of course, which have lost much of their earlier magical meaning. This is true of some religious rituals and of the formalisms of military and diplomatic service. Other ceremonies have declined into mere conventionalities or manners, such as handshaking, tipping of hats to women, and the like. Yet the saluting of officers, the presentation of the colors, the badges of merit and honor awarded in public, and granting of academic degrees, all give evidence of the continuing function of ceremonies in our society. They provide stability and a sense of mutual identification among members. They arouse emotions in the participants and give the sense of power which is the counterpart of in-group solidarity.

The aesthetic features of rituals and myths must not be overlooked. Even the rhythm of the chant has an artistic appeal, and many kinds of rituals take on the qualities of beauty. The High Mass is not only religiously significant but, to the participant, beautiful. Even routine conventions such as manners have an integrative function. The repetitive niceties of greeting and parting, of table manners, of politeness, are not mere fluff and nonsense. They provide a smooth interactional relationship which gives us a sense of solidarity and of the familiar. They remove the dangers or threats implicit in all preliminary gestures of social intercourse and provide a solid and predictable basis upon which conversation and overt action may proceed. Like other habits, they save time and energy and reduce tensions which might otherwise disrupt or redirect a dynamic interactional relationship.

Superstitions and Popular Philosophy

Closely related to myths are superstitions, proverbs, and popular sayings. In fact, in their psychological composition and their cultural functions they have much in common. Superstition is a firm belief in super-

natural powers, in mysterious or magical procedures derived from fantasy thinking, which has become socially approved. As to content, they may refer to any object, idea, or action. Just as we ordinarily are not aware of our own social myths but may recognize those of others, so we are amused at the superstitions of strangers and nonliterates and often fail to recognize our own for what they are. Superstitions, like other products of fantasy thinking, arise in critical situations involving danger, uncertainty as to the future, chance happenings, accidents, and such unforeseen events as war, earthquakes, flood, famine, and fire. Gamblers are notoriously superstitious, and gambling has given rise to a number of elaborate rituals, really magical techniques to be used in dealing with chance. Superstitions are often accompanied by myth and legends, which give them a certain historical setting. For example, accidents at sea inevitably result in myth, legends, and superstitions. In more recent times, aviation is a good illustration of an activity in which magic, superstition, and myth arise. During World War II an amusing and yet significant number of stories arose about a little demon called a gremlin. All during the war there was much talk of the gremlins interfering with aviation activities. In this particular case, however, the gremlin did not last, but his counterpart does exist and is found in the Walt Disney and other types of artistic creation.

Health is a favorable area for the emergence of magic and superstition, as witnessed by the rise and persistence of health cults. Some take on the nature of diet fads and the like; others get embedded in the culture as serious religious-magical practices with elaborate ideologies. Intellectuals like some sorts, such as Couéism and the earlier mesmerism; others prefer their myth and superstition in less elaborate form. But the fact remains that superstitions continue from the past and are forever emerging out of man's critical experiences.

It is but a step from myth, legend, and superstition to much of that homely wisdom we call proverb and folk philosophy. The observations of men on their own and others' conduct have produced a vast body of everyday concept and judgment into which apparently sound sense and much stereotype and fantasy enter. Proverbs are but cultural precipitates of the concrete experiences of men in society. "A stitch in time saves nine" is certainly applicable to the practice of being forehanded. "A soft answer turneth away wrath, but grievous words stir up anger" indicates that men had learned that words and the way they are spoken may inhibit aggression in another or enhance it. "A penny saved is a penny earned" arose at a time when thrift was considered a virtue, as a means of piling up interest-earning capital.

There are thousands of proverbs and folk sayings. Every tribe, people, or nation has them. An examination of them shows, of course, that they are not a consistent and ordered body of knowledge, but are common

sense though often contradictory distillations of prior experience. Moreover, they are often the result, from a logical point of view, of what we call "reasoning from one case" only. That is, they arise, evidently, in large part from specific situations and are then generalized into formal statements of wider application. In this sense they are illogical and come closer to the fantasy format than to that of strict logic.

Myths, legends, superstitions, and proverbs come down to us from the past as a part of our cultural heritage. They are, however, never static. They are in the making today just as they have always been. Through modern propaganda, myths and legends are deliberately constructed for the purpose of social control. We shall leave the analysis of propaganda to a later chapter. Here we must examine the more or less unconscious growth of myths and legends.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYTH AND LEGEND-MAKING

Perceptual and Associative Components

Though there are individual differences in sensory and associative capacity, we see, hear, and otherwise perceive pretty much what we have been trained to perceive by parents, siblings, and others. Perception is the synthesis of present sensation and past experience or meaning. The apperceptive mass or meaning is determined by personal-social and cultural learning. Stories of heroes and our childhood instruction in the meanings of our culture form the substratum on which all subsequent perceptions are built. Moreover, emotions and feelings color our perceptions, especially in the formative years. It is in this period of early childhood, in fact, that fantastic associations, with their emotional accompaniments, are most easily formed. This early learning, largely based on language, is the foundation of our adult belief system. In short, all perception is affected by individual differences in sensation, by the situation in which it occurs, by the direction of attention to particular aspects of the situation, by emotional factors, and by the residues of past experience.

Now, memory of past experiences is not an accurate photographic reproduction of perceptions and actions. It is affected by other images, other perceptions and emotional states, and by the lapse of time. The process of forgetting and recalling is as dynamic as perception or any other anticipatory response. Not only do we find in memory transposition of items in time and space, condensation, typification, secondary elaboration and dramatization, as various studies have shown, but in the very process of communication of memories from person to person these alterations are enhanced. A story may gather or lose detail in the retelling. Narration is thus a creative process. Although individuals may be certain that their accounts are accurate, we know how faulty they often are.

The will to believe may be so strong that outright fiction is accepted as fact. An interesting illustration of this was the popular reaction in the early 1900's to George Barr McCutcheon's novel *Graustark*. This book, a romantic fantasy about a "never-never land" in the Balkans, had an immense sale. People everywhere took for granted the actuality of Graustark and its characters. McCutcheon was constantly deluged with requests for more information about this place and its people. Here are some examples: [1]

A woman in Cleveland asked him to give her directions for reaching Graustark by rail after landing in Europe. Her daughter was an invalid, and the mother was quite sure that the climate of Graustark would be "of untold benefit to her"! Another woman wrote that her husband was dying of consumption and she felt that if they could buy or rent a house on the mountainside at Edelweiss they could avert the death that seemed so near. These were the letters that hurt him to answer. . . .

A Washington man wrote that he was organizing a Graustark Club in his lodging house with the idea of escorting the entire party to the principality as soon as the weather was favorable for the trip. Of course there were the tales of travelers who professed to know all about Graustark, and found Mr. McCutcheon seriously at fault in his local color. One such traveler, however, was generous. A San Francisco woman who wrote to ask the longitude and the latitude of Graustark said, "I have a friend here who has traveled extensively. She says she has been in Graustark twice and loves it very much." . . .

Many myths and legends arose during and after World War II. The atrocity story emerged chiefly from the conduct of the Nazis in occupied countries rather than from stories of the fighting fronts—with some exceptions from engagements with the Japanese and from the Soviet Union. Though they had much basis in fact, due in part to deliberate policies of the Japanese and Germans, there was doubtless not only unconscious elaboration and fabrication but some intentional manufacture as well. The function of atrocity stories will be discussed in Chapter 20.

At this point we may summarize the significant factors in the development of legends. Many of these same mechanisms are found at work in the development of myths.

1. The emotional state of the observers: This is usually intensified at the time of the perception if the situation is dramatic.

2. Errors of perception at the time of observation: If the event is spectacular or unfamiliar, it is more difficult to perceive it accurately. Attention will be limited to a few details.

3. Errors in recall: These are especially evident when the event is later being described to others.

4. Predispositions, the apperceptive mass, of the witnesses: These predispositions are made up of old stereotypes, prejudices, and legends still persisting in the observers.

[1] From Arthur Maurice, "Buying a Ticket to Graustark," *Literary Digest*, 1928, 99:51. By permission of the author.

5. False interpretation by the observers: As far as they imagine the characteristics of the observed individuals, the observers will err in interpreting their acts.

6. The tendency to telescope and conventionalize into simpler form: Here stereotypes and other shorthand symbols take the place of longer and qualifying details.

7. The operation of fantasy thinking in elaboration of the stories: This is related to the motives to be discussed below.

8. The deliberate manufacture of legends or of details in those which arise unconsciously: This is done in propaganda.

9. The time elapsing between perception and recall: After even a very brief interval, the event as recalled differs from the actual event. As the time elapsing between the event and its recall increases, observers begin to add or change or forget innumerable details.

The myth and the legend tend to become conventionalized—that is, standardized in terms of the values and interests of the group. The process at work is essentially what we find in all perceptual judgments. So, too, the gestural background of rituals represents a fixity of habit which makes for smooth and predictable reactions. Ritual is psychologically closely linked to perseveration, the tendency to repeat stimulus-response patterns once they have been set up. In ritual, as in other actions revealing perseveration, the situation which gave rise to the action becomes progressively less important. That is, there is a reduction of the external stimulus, and the action becomes more and more automatic. In a sense the ritual exemplifies the extreme of conventionalization, which is seen in less marked degree in myth and legend. In the latter, the telling and retelling, especially when not checked by reduction to printed form, always allow the creative fantasies of the narrator to add a bit here and subtract something there. In ritual, the externalization of action and its sacred magical quality tend, on the whole, to prevent such inventiveness. Nevertheless, in crises, or when new motives arise, even rituals grow and change.

Behind these psychological mechanisms which alter the myths and legends lies the motivation which sets them up in the first place. We have already noted this with respect to the situations that give rise to magic, myth, and legend. Let us explore this further.[8]

Any anxiety-arousing stimulus, any situation which sets up a drive that cannot be relieved by an adequate reward, produces frustrations and anxieties, emotions of fear and anger, and trial-and-error or planned intellectual efforts to reduce the tension. Birth, death, sickness, failure of food supply, and unemployment will serve as illustrations of such frustrating and anxiety-inducing situations. In the face of such unsolved prob-

[8] See I. E. Farber, "Anxiety as a Drive State," in Marshall R. Jones, ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, *Current Theory and Research on Motivation*, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1954), Vol. 2.

lems, emotional uncertainty and distress tend to be elaborated and, in an effort to solve the difficulties, fantasy thinking comes into play. Under emotional discomfort the dangers of the situation may be greatly exaggerated. The individual may develop neurotic anxiety—worry, uncertainty, and a sense of insecurity—far beyond that considered normal in the circumstances by other members of the group.

Yet anxieties of this sort are not entirely the result of personal experience. Individuals tend to deposit their anxieties in the myth, legend, and ritual of their culture and thus to carry them over to others. Anticipatory reactions toward actual or imaginary dangers, as these are defined by adults or other group members, are often set up in the child. For example, Jewish children in the Russia of the Czars were often impressed with stories of pogroms against the Jews. Such legends not only served the immediate purpose of social control over the child, but in addition gave him a point of identification with his group and prepared him for future violence. While such culturized and transmitted stories may arouse anxiety in the child, they also reinforce the myths and legends of his ingroup. So, too, Negro children in our country are told of white aggression toward the colored race, and these stories give meaning to the more specific instructions of parents and other persons to avoid open clashes with the dominant whites. On the other side, white children are told stories about Negro violence.

In somewhat the same manner, stories about magical cures set up anticipation of recovery in the sick who seek relief in magic. Much illness has a strong psychological component, and the belief in the efficacy of magic may itself facilitate a recovery. Though the diffusion of medical science and practice has cut into this sort of myth and legend, much of the belief remains. Intelligent physicians and surgeons everywhere realize the beneficial effects for their patients of prayer and faith in a religion. In the face of death, civilized man is no braver than his nonliterate contemporary, even though his science and his medical and surgical skill are superior to the hocus-pocus of the medicine man.

The myth provides ample scope for the individual narrator or hearer to identify himself with the heroes and events of the tale. How thoroughly we do so is illustrated by the fact that children, in listening to fairy stories, often correct adults who depart from the conventionalized steps of the story. In this sense even the myth or legend takes on certain ritualistic features. So, too, myths and legends about evil forces, such as disease, or evil persons provide ample opportunity to project our hostilities onto other groups or objects. This is notably shown in witchcraft.

Then, too, we have a means of sublimating our aggression in myths and legends, through talk and fantasy, and, in rituals, through overt but standardized acts. Purification rites and the mystery and miracle plays of the Middle Ages are good illustrations of identification, projection, and

sublimation. In seeing the devil undone in his attempts to lead mankind astray, we identify ourselves with the characters who successfully overcome temptation and are provided with a rationalization of our recurrent difficulties in leading a moral life. The great dramas of human conduct —the stories of the fall of man and his redemption through Christ, the problem of good and evil presented in the story of Job, the fables of Aesop—illustrate certain universal patterns of man's adaptive struggle against death, disease, physical disaster, human cupidity, oppression, and other recurrent but unsolved human crises. Despite the variations in details and in historical setting, nonliterate and civilized men have given us ample evidence that myth, legend, and ritual represent universal responses to the uncertainties, the disappointments, the unresolved problems of living. They give us some fixed points, some stability in a dynamic and often dangerous world. What Clyde Kluckhohn writes about these matters among the Navahos applies equally elsewhere: "Myths and rituals jointly provide systematic protection against supernatural dangers, the threats of ill health and of the physical environment, antisocial tensions, and the pressures of a more powerful society." [9] Every society finds some definitions of and solutions for its insecurities and conflicts in fantasy-founded stories and rituals.

The Theory of Fictions

Both social psychology and philosophy have at times been concerned with the fiction, the *as if* aspect of myths, legends, and ideologies. The theory of fictions [10] holds, in brief, that the concepts of science, art, religion, and social control are not real but are fictions devised to aid us in controlling practical situations. This is obviously a way of meeting the medieval problem of nominalism versus realism. That is to say, are groups, culture, myths, legends, and concepts generally merely names for concrete perceptual objects or classes and qualities of such objects, or are they actualities or realities in and of themselves? For empirical research and social-psychological theory this old debate is futile. The utilitarian and operational standpoint of W. I. Thomas is applicable when he says, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." For our purposes this pragmatic view should suffice, since we are interested in the effects of such thought forms on conduct. The group is meaningful only as it is related to individuals in interaction. Culture is significant only as that dynamic precipitate of interaction which defines objects and situations and gives meaning to relations and events. So, too, ideology, myth, and legend are basic in social action. Culturized fantasies,

[9] Clyde Kluckhohn, *op. cit.*, p. 77, by permission. See also G. C. Homans, "Anxiety and Ritual," *American Anthropologist*, 1941, 43:164–173.

[10] See Hans Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of the "As If,"* translated by C. K. Ogden (New York, Harcourt, 1924).

ideologies, myths, and legends are among the data of social psychology and cultural anthropology. These are events and objects with which, in their functional processes, these sciences must deal. It is no help to call them unrealistic, unscientific, or fictional. They are devices or instruments in the total adaptive process and are not to be dismissed as unimportant or as meaningless and unscientific fantasies.[11] The controversy, obviously, is chiefly linguistic, and for our purposes philosophic cogitations of this sort reflect an interplay of language and logic which can be checked, after all, only by empirical observations and predictions. The disputed concepts are deeply embedded in our culture and cannot be removed or made ineffective by mere verbal discussion.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF MYTH AND LEGEND

The significant myths and legends arise from recurrent problems of adaptation to our physical and social-cultural world. They are a part of our value and belief system and are closely related to devices of social control. The more common situations in which myth and legend arise involve religion and supernaturalism, economic matters, and political problems. Much of what passes for history is loaded with myths and legends of various sorts. Let us look into the nature of some of these in the following sections.

Religious Myths and Ideologies

Man has long been interested in trying to explain his place in the universe. Primitive mythology is full of such explanations. Some of the creation stories collected by folklorists are products of indigenous invention; others are diffused accounts which have served the purposes of various tribes and societies. Our Judaic-Christian story of the Creation and of the Garden of Eden has played an important part in aiding men to interpret and rationalize their role and status. But we know that the story has its roots in still earlier societies of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. So, too, the Greeks had a variety of stories of origins and early history. Certain passages in Homer reveal the belief that mankind had once lived in a state superior to the present. And Hesiod (about 776 B.C.) traced the downward trend of man from the Golden Age, in which there was no toil or hardship or infirmity, through the Silver Age and the Bronze Age to the Iron Age, in which man had no relief from hard work, sorrow, and disease. There was in this whole decline definite evidence of moral deterioration.

Even a casual examination of these early myths reveals a division

[11] See M. R. Cohen, "Fictions," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), Vol. 6, pp. 225–228, for a view that looks askance at an operational definition of fictions.

between those which depict the past as a golden age from which mankind has descended and those that look upon man as the maker of his own destiny or at least as a character in a vast drama which unfolds as man moves from lower to higher status, from sin to salvation, from degradation to perfection. Later this second ideology gave rise to the doctrine of progress as we know it in our time (see p. 212). Western man, at least, seems to have fluctuated in his daydreams between a belief in some future state, in a millennium, or in a Utopia of perfection.

The concept of a fall from primeval innocence and beauty and the hope of redemption came to be a main theme in Christian dogma. There was no thought of progress in this, but rather a view that the degradation derived from the Fall of Man would be wiped out in the plan of salvation in which Jesus Christ had a central role. On the basis of his sacrifice and his teachings mankind would be permitted to return to a state of perfection.

Certainly one of the most persistent myths has been the belief in a millennium or other future blissful state in which all problems will be solved and no difficulties will ensue. Such fantasies provide release from present hardship and a hope for permanent and lasting peace in the future. Such daydreams arise out of the historical crises of groups and projections into the culture of the fancies of particular persons. In this way they become standardized into acceptable forms and as parts of the culture may last for hundreds of years in various belief systems. In our cultural history, the central idea was that human difficulties are caused by the operation of dark, evil, hostile spirits or forces who may be overcome in time by spirits or forces of light and goodness. It was within this dichotomy of good and evil forces that the idea of some future state of perfection, peace, and continuous well-being became injected into later Hebrew mythology and thence, in part, came down into Christianity. As Israel met disaster after disaster, the thought of the leaders tended to run either to programs of social reform or to fantasies of release from the intolerable situations by some fiat of Jehovah, or to some combination of immediate reform with divine intervention. These ideas were carried by Jesus and his followers into early Christianity, and, in time, they took on somewhat different form and content.

Rebuffed on every hand, persecuted, and denied social status, the early Christians developed a mythology of the early return of Jesus and a restoration of the Saints. The hateful Roman Empire was identified with all that was evil. Later, with the triumph of the Christian church over its rivals, Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian elements merged, and a certain stability of myth and faith developed.

As the year 1000 approached, many began to imagine that the end of the world was about to come, and various fantasies were developed and spread throughout Christendom. The fact that the expected end of the

world did not take place at the end of the first millennium of our era did not deter scholars from projecting the end of worldly events into the future. Joachim of Floris, a twelfth-century monk, had elaborate ideas on this matter. He assumed three historical epochs, the Age of the Father, or the Mosaic law; that of the Son, or the gospel; and that of the Spirit, yet to come.[12] This final phase was to be an idealized monastic order, filled with mystic experiences in association with God.

The Fifth Monarchy movement, begun in 1633, is a later illustration of the same pattern. The advocates held that King Jesus would appear shortly and establish the predestined fifth and final kingdom on earth, the four previous kingdoms having been the Assyrian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman. The last named was held to have persisted in the Roman Catholic Church. The Fifth Monarchy group not only was bitterly opposed to the Catholic Church but had strong leanings toward communism and mysticism. The followers of this myth believed not only in preaching but in acting on their convictions as a means of demonstrating their fitness to enter into the Kingdom of Jesus. This belief expressed itself in two unsuccessful rebellions against the English government, one in 1657 and one in 1661.

During the eighteenth century, a variety of millennial hopes arose in northern and central Europe. These were mixtures of religious utopian dreams and mystical experience. The Shaker movement in England and the United States is one instance. An outgrowth of one branch of the Quakers, the Millennial Church, as it was called, developed under Anne Lee, a movement based on celibacy, communism, and simple living looking forward to a rapturous union with God and the Saints at the second coming of Christ.

After the French Revolution, Napoleon was made the antichrist in the ideologies of various groups which looked for a catastrophic end of evil and a sudden installation of the good. In the nineteenth century a number of sects built on millennial hopes arose in England—for example the Catholic Apostolic Church (Irvingites) and the Plymouth Brethren (Darbyites). In America the rise of perfectionistic sects—partly derived from Britain—are further examples. The Oneida Community and the Shakers fall into this class.

In recent decades the so-called apostolic and pentecostal churches represent somewhat the same sort of millennialism. These religious groups began as sects deviating from various established churches. They were marked by revivalism, emotional expression of religious faith, and a return to what were considered the fundamental Christian doctrines and practices described in the New Testament (primitivism). The appeals were chiefly to the economically handicapped.

[12] For a description of this and other millennial hopes, see S. J. Case, *The Millennial Hope* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1918).

It must not be imagined that millennial movements are confined to Christianity. A development similar in form and content is seen in the rise and spread of the Ghost Dance religion among the Plains Indians during the 1880's. The story of the pressure of white population upon the native tribes in this country is well known, and from time to time Indian leaders preached that sooner or later supernatural powers would intervene to aid the Indians in driving the white man into the sea and in restoring to the tribesmen their lands and other resources. The most striking and widespread of these beliefs developed as the white man spread rapidly into what the Indians considered their last free area, the Western great plains. Various prophet-agitators arose and began preaching a kind of holy war against the intruders. New religious formulations appeared, often a mixture of tribal and Christian theology and ritual, and concerned with the hope and myth of deliverance from white oppression. Some of the Indian outbreaks in the 1880's were partially motivated by these myths.[13]

All these movements have much in common. They appeal to the imagination of the depressed classes and to those who cannot believe in any slow, evolutionary changes in the world. They appeal to those who look for some supernatural fiat to cure the world's ills. The return to a golden age of the past or the advance to a utopian state of perfection runs through these religious myths. But the myths concerning economic and political matters reveal many of the same general features.

Myths of Economic Utopias

Many Utopias of a perfect economic order are millennial in tone. Some express an acceptance of cultural evolution; others advocate a violent overthrow of society and its culture. Religious and political fantasies, of course, usually give some attention to economics. Yet it is especially in modern times that men have announced schemes by which the depressed classes might raise themselves by their own bootstraps out of poverty, illness, and early death.

Most of these programs have been socialistic or communistic. The disasters of the Napoleonic wars and the impact of the Industrial Revolution made millions wish for a better economic order. Some of these schemes, such as that of Robert Owen, the Britisher, were tried out in this country. Others remained pretty much at the verbal level. The most sweeping and dynamic economic myth of the nineteenth century was that developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their dogmas were developed in terms of historical studies reinterpreted by means of a dialectic logic and a materialistic interpretation of history as a class struggle. This is the old familiar good-versus-evil theme. Here are a few sen-

[13] James Mooney, "The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Culture of 1890," *Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 1892–93, Part 2.

tences from the Communist Manifesto (1848), showing some of the basic conceptions aimed at uniting the working classes of all the world into one solid proletariat opposed to the property-owning class: [14]

> The working men have no country. . . .
>
> National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
>
> The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . .
>
> In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. . . .
>
> . . . The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. . . .
>
> The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
>
> Working men of all countries, unite!

The dynamic actionism of Marxism stands in considerable contrast to the more pacific hopefulness of other utopian programs. Yet even here there is predestinationism, a belief in the inevitability of the revolution that will in time not only put the proletariat in power but lead, in the end, to the happy condition of a classless society.

The importance of the social myth as a central theme for revolution has been amply described by Georges Sorel in his *Reflections on Violence* (French edition, 1908). He was especially concerned with instilling in the masses a dynamic belief which would induce social solidarity and move men to the general strike, the first phase of the revolution.

Anarchism, though it shows some of the actionistic fantasy that is common in the radical thought of the previous century, is based not so much on a utopian future as on a return to a primitive naturalism which shall free man from the political state and economic exploitation. In this sense, anarchism has much in common with the mythology of the return to an Arcadian past. Its theory of a perfect world is not a building of the future but a retreat to a golden age.

There are no more urgent needs than those for food, drink, shelter, sexual gratification, and protection from common dangers. The failure of men to satisfy these basic drives leads them over and over again not only to attempt to satisfy them in overt action but to formulate dreams

[14] From Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr, 1924).

of a more satisfactory condition in which there is either a return to an imagined pristine purity or a construction of a new and perfect and everlasting society and culture.

Political Myths

Political Utopias are as common as those of religion and economics. In fact, the three are frequently intertwined. Not to go further afield into ancient history, one may mention Plato's *Republic* as a projected wish done in the grand manner for a perfect society. In it we see an effort to attain justice, happiness, and social solidarity by means of responsible leadership, fixed classes, just economic arrangements, detailed measures regulating eugenics, education, and indoctrination, and other devices that remind us of recent totalitarian movements. In fact, Plato's dream has been the inspiration for dozens of later utopian schemes—religious, economic, and political.

Plato's dream was not realistic but imaginary throughout. Another classical Utopia, which professes to be historical, is Plutarch's idealistic description of the life of Lycurgus of Sparta. Similar Utopias occur in Greek, Norse, Celtic, and Arabic literature which describe an earthly paradise to the west or in the Atlantic Ocean; all the stories of a lost Atlantis are of this sort. They were as firmly believed in their time as our verifiable facts are today. St. Augustine's *City of God* is an early Christian fantasy which divides the world into basic conditions, one divine, perfect, and eternal, the other mundane and transitory. St. Augustine, like Plato, became the basis for later discussions of perfect and imperfect societies.

The Renaissance writer Thomas More, in his *Utopia* (1516), set a new vogue in political and economic myth-making. Living during the emergence of capitalistic exploitation (as witnessed in the enclosure system then begun), when the greed and violence of the ruling aristocracy were countered by abject poverty, disease, and inhumanity, More described a far-off land in which such conditions did not exist, but in which political justice and humanistic decency prevailed. More, who was a great classical scholar as well as an important statesman of his time, drew upon Plato and upon Epicurean and Stoic sources when they suited his purpose. His picture of a humane idealism set a pattern for many later literary daydreams of a more perfect society.

In the next century Sir Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1624–29) revealed a new confidence in science as a key to universal happiness and as a basis or making a perfect society—a type of myth that has continued with amazing persistence to our day. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a variety of utopian fantasies. Of all these, that of Jean Jacques Rousseau had the greatest influence on subsequent demo-

cratic and socialist thinking. His picture of an idealistic, primitive society has a romantic appeal that reaches down to our own time.

In the nineteenth century we had Edward Bulwer-Lytton's *The Coming Race* (1872) and *Erewhon Revisited* (1901), Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), William Morris' *News from Nowhere* (1890), and hosts of socialistic or communistic Utopias, like Theodor Hertzka's *Reise nach Freiland* (1893), which depicts an imaginary communistic society in central Africa; and in the early twentieth century H. G. Wells wrote various books about ideal societies.

The most striking political mythology of recent times is fascism. In the Nazi version, the doctrine of racial superiority was linked with a mystic concept of the folk. The divine mission of the folk was to secure an adequate living space (*Lebensraum*). Furthermore, there was the principle of leadership and a fixed class system. The racially-pure folk, operating through the state, would control every aspect of national life: communal, economic, religious, familial, and recreational. It should be noted here, perhaps, that the spirit of fascism is by no means dead.

Other Varieties of Myth

Closely related to many of these myths is another one known widely as the doctrine of social progress. This became a basic article of faith to liberals everywhere during the nineteenth century. The more extreme belief in some fundamental trend toward perfection was expressed by the Marquis de Condorcet, French mathematician and revolutionary. His faith was so unbounded that even in the shadow of the guillotine he was led to write: [15]

> The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. . . . What a picture of the human race, freed from its chains, removed from the empire of chance as from that of the enemies of its progress, and advancing with a firm and sure step on the pathway of truth, of virtue, and of happiness.

There are, of course, many other myths or fictions. Diet fads and health cults represent popular types in a society which puts as much stress on health as we do. So, too, Yogi and all sorts of Oriental mysticisms have wide appeal. Many of these are not particularly well developed and trail off into mere superstitions. Moreover, in all these cults there is likely to be deliberate exploitation of gullibility and credulity. All the way from magic through religious revivalism to economic and political movements,

[15] From Marquis de Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.* Translation from J. H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind,* rev. ed. (Boston, 1940), p. 383. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Co., publishers, and J. H. Randall.

we find those who use man's interests and faith in such fantasies as a means of making money and otherwise securing power. Charlatanry and sincerity are not always easy to distinguish.

History, Legends, and Values

Religious, economic and political Utopias give ample evidence of the tendency to employ fantasy in getting at solutions of problems. They are always expressed in contemporary phrases designed to catch the imagination of men who cannot come to grips with the concrete problems of their society. Yet we must not imagine that these fantastic pictures are without value to the groups that believe in them. They not only give emotional solace in everyday crises, but may, if they sufficiently fire the imagination, be the basis for attempts to alter the present order in the direction of the imagined better one. The ideology of a religious, economic, or political group may become the basis for attempts to change the whole social organization.

Not only are myths and ideologies highly important in any culture, but the legends of societies, heroes, and villains are also significant. In each generation the children of a tribe, community, or nation are early indoctrinated with the history of their society. This conveniently introduces them into the folklore of the group, its ways of doing things, and its ideals and standards of conduct. Moreover, this introduction is essential to the continuity of culture. It is necessary to stability, order, and social control. One of the most impressive devices is the narration of the life stories of great men, the heroes of the past. Though political events may constitute the major part of even contemporary history texts, it is a fair assumption that the things which most impress children are the personalities of history. We need to believe in great men. If we do not have them, we create them out of any material at hand. This is a natural phase of our ethnocentrism.

Every group believes in the importance of its own past, including therein its heroes. In the telling and retelling of the great events surrounding our heroes, the imagination, rich in wish-fulfillment, is given free scope. Just as the narration of an occurrence before a court, or the retelling of experiences in war or other crises, is colored by emotional toning, so, in the frequent repetition of the tales of our heroes, bits are constantly added here and there until the original actuality of personality and event may be completely obscured. Every historian knows this. He realizes that without the most careful and painstaking approach and use of his data history is not scientific in any ordinary sense of the word. It is more akin to literature and art than to science. Some historians do not like to admit this, but only because to be objective is in the academic folkways and to believe in a place for fictions and art is not. The fact remains that men unconsciously construct pictures of their heroes to fit their wishes.

Thus they satisfy their own egoes by vicarious participation in the great events of their heroes. No one would maintain that Plutarch's *Lives* are scientific pictures of the characters he describes, and yet they live for us in an amazing way.

We have a kind of scale of legends. The earliest go back to such mythical characters as Perseus, Hercules, and Odin. Then we have such heroes as Achilles, Ulysses, and Aeneas, and in northern Europe the romantic legends of King Arthur. Yet colossal legends have grown up about historical figures like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Richard the Lionhearted, and Joan of Arc. In modern history one of the most tremendous figures is Napoleon. Around him has collected such an overpowering mass of legend and counterlegend that the historian is baffled and the layman is at the mercy of each new writer, as again and again the picture of this man is changed in color.

The legends of our own country begin with Columbus and Ponce de León and Hernando de Soto. They become more significant as we learn about Captain John Smith and Miles Standish, and then about George Washington, Patrick Henry, and other revolutionary heroes. We move on to Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, Andrew Jackson, John Brown, and Abraham Lincoln—to note only a few in passing. And in more recent years the names of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Douglas MacArthur take on large stature.

No character in American history is more interesting as a subject of myth and legend than Abraham Lincoln. Some see in him a man of great religious and moral courage; others view him as a rationalist on the theory that he once wrote an essay in defense of atheism. Many object to the ribald stories attributed to him; others find in these an evidence of his deep sense of humor and humanity. His life story helped build the "log-cabin-to-White-House" stereotype that is so potent in arousing individual aspirations. He is a positive character in Northern stories, but for a long time after the Civil War his name was unpopular in the South. There he was the villain of the piece, and Davis and Lee were the heroes.

In our own time, moreover, there have been numerous deliberate attempts to foster legends as a phase of building up popular heroes, both in politics and industry. But, whether the propaganda is deliberate or not, the fact remains that the masses live in these images which serve a distinct purpose in arousing hero-worship, bolstering up in-group patriotism, and affording vicarious satisfactions for the common man. As with religious formulations, if tomorrow we destroyed the myths and legends about our heroes, we would the next day begin unconsciously to make new ones. And so the process never ceases. Not only are political heroes made and unmade in this fashion, but great names associated with the economic development of this country take on heroic proportions. Men like Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, and Ford serve as examples of what

the rising young man may hope for. In like manner there are heroes of baseball like Babe Ruth and Ted Williams, and heroes of adventure like Peary and Lindbergh. These are of great importance in keeping alive the spirit of daring.

Great wars are prolific sources of new legends. These concern both higher officers and common soldiers. World War I saw our own Sergeant York and Eddie Rickenbacker. Germany had her ace flier, Richthofen, and her highly successful commander of sea raiders, Luckner. In World War II, one of the first of the great heroic figures was General Douglas MacArthur, whose brave defense of the Philippines against enormous odds gave rise to a wealth of legends. News stories told of his defensive tactics and of his long preparation for the Japanese attack. Editors and commentators discussed his ability and leadership. Newspapers and periodicals retold the story of his life with pictures. He was soon mentioned as a natural-born leader who should be a candidate for the presidency of his country.

At the end of World War II, General MacArthur was made head of the occupation forces in Japan. Later he received much public homage and publicity on his return to the United States, but it is interesting to note the emergence of a counter-myth, probably from liberal elements, that he was not the great military genius that he had been said to be. Moreover, his connection with isolationist elements in the country was used to further the negative stories about him.

Yet the heroes were not all generals. The exploits of Captain Colin P. Kelly, Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, and Colonel Philip Cochran became common talk, and the masses rejoiced that the American spirit had awakened to great deeds. Not only stories but songs, jokes, and cartoons added to the stock of our popular heroes. The heroism of the common fighting man was told and retold.

The official program of destroying the myth of Stalin's greatness after his death is a neat example of deliberate effort to eliminate beliefs that had been carefully built up over a period of years. An apparent shift in the policy of the Communist party in Russia seemed to require this.

Many earnest persons belittle or regret myth-making. They consider it foolish or pathological and somehow a bit devilish or evil. This very attitude is an illustration of the persistence of the eighteenth-century cult of rationalism and of its myth that man is largely an intellectual, deliberate, and scientific creature. A man may object to what Bertrand Russell calls heroics and may do his best to "cure" the masses of its liking for them, but myth and legend are as inevitable in human society and culture as are mechanical inventions and the use of rational instruments for bending the physical universe to our utilitarian purposes. Moreover, as we have seen, the deliberate manufacture of myth and legend shows that man is aware of the use he may make of deep-lying fantasies and

irrationalities. As we shall see, the problem is not to try to prevent heroics, myths, and legends but to control them within a moral framework which will prevent their abuse in the hands of unscrupulous men.

For the professional historian, history may be objective and scientific in method and even in content, but for the masses it always was and still is rich in emotional suggestiveness. It is a dynamic part of our culture. It is not something superimposed on us as cold fact; it teems with life; it gives us courage in crises, affords us solace in disaster, and provides all of us with a world of vicarious but nevertheless real living. We must remind ourselves that man does not live alone in a colorless universe of passive objectivity, but rather in a subjective, emotionally toned world of attitudes, stereotypes, and dynamic belief systems which determine his behavior quite as much as do his physiological wants.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BECKER, Carl, "Progress," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), Vol. 12, pp. 495–499. An excellent review and comment on the doctrine of progress.

COHEN, Morris R., "Fictions," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), Vol. 6, pp. 225–228. A critical comment on the theory of fictions. He shows the deep emotional roots of fictions and how difficult they are to change.

MERTON, Robert K., *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1949). Chapter 8, "The Sociology of Knowledge," points out the place of a belief system in helping determine form as well as content of ideas, ideologies, legal and ethical beliefs, philosophy, science, and even technology.

PARSONS, Talcott, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1951). The entire volume deals with various facets of belief systems with respect to the social order or social system. Chapter 8, "Belief Systems and the Social System: The Problem of the 'Role of Ideas,' " covers the place of empirical and nonempirical beliefs in the larger social system. Difficult reading but an important contribution.

PARSONS, Talcott, and SHILS, Edward A., eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952). Chapter 3, "Systems of Value-Orientation," treats of the place of such value schemes in the organization of culture. Three classes of value symbols are discussed: cognitive, expressive, and evaluative. The integration of the value orientation system into the large social system is indicated.

Part II

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER 10

The Human Group: Structure, Characteristics, and Norms

AS indicated in Chapter 3, interaction is a basic concept in social psychology, and in that chapter we discussed various important forms and aspects of interaction. The present chapter will deal with certain features of interaction from the standpoint of the human group. In particular, we shall examine its structure, characteristics, and norms.

NATURE AND KINDS OF GROUPS

Definition of Group

For our purpose we shall define a group as two or more persons in a state of social interaction. A group is not a mere aggregate of individuals such as are enumerated in a census report, but it is an association of persons with some degree of give-and-take, that is, interstimulation and response among the members. This may involve gross muscular movements of the individuals, as when two men try to push an automobile out of a mudhole. Or it may involve communication through words and gestures. Or again it may involve both gross overt action and communication. The participants may and usually do share in some group goal, but they also may and usually get some personal gratification out of such conjoint activity.

Operationally, the group may be viewed as a social unit of interacting persons. It may be regarded further as developing or possessing distinctive characteristics of its own. This by no means implies any nonsense about a group mind, social consciousness, collective consciousness, or any other mystic supra-individual quality.[1]

[1] The term "group," of course, is used in still other senses. It may be used in the sense of an aggregate of discrete independent units that are held together in a certain place or in the mind of an observer. Also a group may be defined as a

If a group forms to meet recurrent problems or to satisfy recurrent needs of individuals, some kind of order and stability, that is, structure, will emerge. From the point of view of the members, structure may be defined as a system of differentiated roles and statuses. In addition, structure involves a variety and range of regulations which serve to control roles and make for a certain conformity. Moreover, the differentiation has not only to do with what economists long ago called "division of labor" but it involves reciprocal expectations among the participating members of the group. Furthermore, differentiated roles and the regulations related thereto serve as anchor points for the development and maintenance of social attitudes.

Many groups have long histories in which the differentiated roles, statuses, and regulations are already laid down for the individual before he takes part in the group at all. In other words, many groups have high degrees of stability and persistence. But at this point we are discussing the group as a generic term without regard to its historical features.

Sociologists have described certain basic human groupings and we must review these briefly. First, there are a number of molar concepts such as *society* meaning all mankind, or *race* which is used to divide mankind in terms of skin color and other physical features. Then there are large divisions along geographic lines. Second, there is the division of groups into primary and secondary, and along functional lines into in-group and out-group. We shall focus our attention chiefly on these.

Primary Groups

It was Charles H. Cooley who first clearly delineated the nature and importance of the primary group. The kernel of his classic statement is found in the following words: [2]

> By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate, face-to-face association and co-operation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole. . . . Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. . . .
>
> It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these pas-

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collection of units that have qualities in common. This is illustrated in the concept of social class. But for our purposes, we wish to use the term in the sense of interactional relationships of individuals. For a brief discussion of some of the various definitions of group, see Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Ch. 24.

[2] Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York, Scribner, 1909), pp. 23, 24. By permission.

sions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. . . .

The most important spheres of this intimate association and co-operation—though by no means the only ones—are the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals. . . . Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at anytime been essentially different.

The primary group, then, is characterized by intimate face-to-face contacts, direct interaction, covers a wide range of needs and gratifications, and has a common locus. The social stimuli are of intimate and personal character: visual cues, voice, facial and other gestures, touch, and smell.[8]

Certainly the family is the universal primary group. And while in some nonliterate tribes the children do not learn games, certainly some kind of spontaneous play life does occur. By the same token, everywhere there are clusters of families which correspond to the neighborhood or to the rudimentary community.

The family clearly is the most important group. It is primary not only as to its form but also in time, since this is the first group to which the infant is exposed and in which he gets his fundamental socialization. The importance of the family in giving the basic training to the child is covered in Chapters 4 and 6.

In addition to the play group and the neighborhood, there are other kinds of primary groups. One of these is the comradeship—the dyad—in which two people build up an intimate face-to-face relationship. The dyad appears in all periods from childhood to old age. The pairing off may be between members of the same sex or it may cut across sex lines. As a matter of fact, in the latter we have the foundation of mate selection in many societies.

The congeniality group is another type of primary group. This is really a group featured by conscious association of individuals based on common interests and habits. Such groupings often develop when people find themselves thrown together frequently and thus discover a sense of congeniality and friendliness in doing many things together. Congeniality groups are often concerned chiefly with leisure-time activities. They are

[8] It is unfortunate that George Homans in his otherwise excellent book, *The Human Group* (1950), defines the group as follows: "We mean by a group a number of persons who communicate with one another, often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not second-hand, through other people, but face-to-face." (p. 1) For Homans, secondary groups would have other names. It seems to me that he distorts the history of this long-established concept, making for confusion. As a matter of fact, Homans' book could more aptly be called "The Human Primary Group," because he deals only with this form of human association.

highly informal in character and, unlike the true club, they have neither officers nor formal rules.

Childhood and adolescent gangs represent an outgrowth of the play group and are another type of the primary group. Sometimes these are quite harmless, but some gangs adopt the subculture of the criminal underworld and often get into trouble with the police.

These primary groups outside the family are important because they give the child his first and frequently best opportunity to dissipate the strong identification with the members of his family. Then, too, play groups provide the child with an opportunity to reshuffle and redefine certain roles—something he could not do in his own home vis-à-vis his parents and siblings.

Secondary Groups

In contrast to primary groups are the secondary groupings, characterized by much more deliberate and conscious choice. They represent partial and specialized interests or needs. Sometimes they are called "special-interest groups." Moreover, they do not necessarily depend on face-to-face contact. Actually, direct relations are common but not absolutely essential. Thus, an international scientific association may carry on its affairs for years without the members ever holding a meeting. In contrast, the corporation represents a secondary group which in its operations, let us say in a store or factory, has many primary group situations. Yet the organization as a whole, as a corporation, would be regarded as a secondary group. Easily recognizable secondary groupings are the nation, the political party, trade unions, employee associations, religious groups, all sorts of fraternities, lodges, art and scientific societies, and philosophic schools of thought.

Secondary groups build up elaborate accommodative arrangements and institutional forms which help to define the status and roles of their members. In fact, sometimes we refer to the individual in terms of his secondary group contacts as indulging in institutional behavior.

The basic habits, attitudes, and roles built up in primary groups carry over to one's participation in secondary associations. Hostility toward authority figures or the willingness to co-operate, enthusiasms or anxieties, the tendency to take on leadership or to be a passive follower —all usually have their roots in the primary group, chiefly the family. Perhaps the most important single feature of secondary-group life in terms of training is in formal education which provides knowledge and training in skills. But even here the actual operating units of the classroom or the apprenticeship rest largely upon face-to-face primary patterns.

Both primary and secondary groups may be classified in terms of degree of persistence and permanence. The primary and secondary

groups we have discussed so far are largely of a permanent and persistent type. Certain primary groups are structured and stabilized by institutional controls. For example, in the family, the state requirements regarding marriage clearly reveal the institutionalization of mate selection. On the other hand, there are a good many impermanent and temporary associations of the intimate face-to-face or shoulder-to-shoulder type. The street crowd and the mob are good illustrations. So, too, the audience, though somewhat institutionalized, is still regarded as a temporary congregation of people for only a limited time.

At the secondary level, a good illustration of the more or less impermanent, amorphous association would be the publics which become interested in various kinds of political, economic, artistic, and other issues. Sometimes these develop a certain permanence, especially as they become concerned with more formal political parties. But there are many fluctuating and impermanent publics that grow up around an issue and last only for a short time. These we call secondary impermanent groups.

In-group versus Out-group

With regard to certain intergroup relations, the division into in-group and out-group is important. The in-group, or we-group, is a human association toward which the members have a sense of loyalty, friendliness, co-operativeness, and solidarity. In the we-group the individual expresses his deepest sentiments of love and sympathy. There is a high degree of identification with the group name, the group goals, and with the various means of attaining said goals. The individual in his relations with his fellows remarks: "we belong," "we feel," and "we act." There is a high sense of moral obligation to the other members of the group, especially when critical situations threaten them.

The in-group may be either primary or secondary in form. The family in-group is the most intimate of all. The in-group of largest importance at the secondary level is the nation-state toward which we have feelings of patriotism, loyalty, and willingness to sacrifice.

The out-group, or others' group, is an association of persons toward whom we feel a sense of avoidance, dislike, opposition, fear, aggression, and even hatred. The out-group is the opposite of the in-group, and toward the out-group we have no sense of loyalty, no sense of co-operation, no mutual aid, and no sympathy. Rather, one is prejudiced and hostile toward members of the out-group. It must not be forgotten that a given out-group is always a referent to a given in-group. Examples of out-groups are the race, nation, or religion which we believe inferior to our own, or the neighborhood which we consider inferior.

The in-group versus out-group pattern is a widespread feature of social organization everywhere. We do not hold that every primary and every secondary group necessarily has its corresponding out-group; such

relations develop, however, whenever or wherever groups come into competition or conflict with each other.

The relations of individuals within this framework may be highly institutionalized. This is clearly evident in the case of two armies in battle. In other intergroup situations the conflictive patterns may emerge temporarily and later fade away.

Community

There are two other types of human groupings that have some importance for us in laying the background of group norms. One of these is the community. For our purposes we may define community as a congregate of people of all ages and both sexes having a more or less common culture and living within a restricted geographic locality. This locality is the center for most of their common interests and actions. Ordinarily the community has a more restricted boundary than the national society, though we sometimes speak of a national community. In sociology, the term "community" usually refers to the locality grouping of people within the larger society, such as the nation-state, who carry out among themselves through a variety of groupings their most essential economic, political, educational, religious, and recreational activities.

It is sometimes important to distinguish between the primary and secondary community. The former, characteristically, is that of the small town or village; the latter is that of the urban or metropolitan center or on a broader basis the nation-state.

Class Structure

Another important grouping is social class. The class structure consists of a stratified hierarchy of power distributed in various subgroups along a preferential scale. In our own society the familiar threefold classification, upper, middle, and lower, has long been in use. Lloyd Warner's study of Newburyport, Massachusetts, used a sixfold classification. Karl Marx, of course, reduced the number of classes to two: the exploiting élite at the top, small in number, holding the major power, and the great mass of proletariat at the bottom. He built his theory of revolution around the idea that the proletariat would seize power from the élite and construct a perfect (classless) society thereafter. The question of the number of classes is not only an empirical but also a theoretical matter. It depends, in part, on the criteria and the cutting points and on the distinction drawn between one class and another.

Class is characterized not only with reference to a power structure but takes the form of an in-group versus out-group relationship. Each class is a tight in-group, marked by common ideals and interests, restriction to intermarriage within each class, and opposition to the classes above or below it as the case may be. There are definite attitudes of

avoidance and a sharply defined social distance in a highly fixed class structure. Finally, there are certain obligations among the classes to each other: deference, superiority-inferiority dimensions, and varied values. In a mobile society such as that of the United States there is a good deal of movement from one class level to another, both up and down. This fact led Charles H. Cooley to characterize our class structure as being an "open-class" system.

Groups and Control

In concluding this section on sociological groupings there are several aspects of primary and secondary groups yet to be noted. First, as to the operation of social control in the primary group, this is largely unconscious and involuntary and rests in long-established mores. In the secondary groups, however, we find more institutionalized and formalized regulations and written laws. In the secondary group the high specialization of role (division of labor) and the high complexity of the interlocking groups makes necessary this formalization. Perhaps the most striking example of regulations exerting pressure toward conformity upon the individual is found in the bureaucracies of our political and economic orders. Under bureaucracy there are written rules and a high degree of formalization and rigidity. The individual tends to be enmeshed in a series of firm regulations from which he cannot escape, and the hierarchy of power is such that there is much resistance to changing the rules.

Another interesting aspect of the relationships of primary to secondary groups, is found in the extent to which primary-group attitudes carry over into secondary relationships. There may arise a conflict between the individualistic and personal needs and the group or collective requirements of conformity. There are many illustrations of this problem in administrative evaluation. Military officers, junior executives, and members of other adult peer groups tend, as a rule, to up-grade those of their fellow administrators whom they know personally. Here loyalty to close friends rather than an objective evaluation of fitness make for inefficient ratings.

STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS

Formal and Informal Structures

Students of group behavior realize that structures range from formal to informal. We find formal structure in those groups wherein roles and role expectations are firmly predetermined and are completely independent of, or separated from, individual desires or preferences. In the informal type, the roles tend to be self-made, flexible, and unstable. Very often formal and informal organization are found together. For example,

a military unit represents a highly formalized grouping. Yet, within this, say at the company or lesser level, several informal associations may arise. Other examples of this dual pattern will be cited later in this chapter. In other situations, groups which begin at the informal level will, if they persist through time, tend to become more formalized as to role and status.

It should be obvious, then, that the degree of order and stability of any group is positively correlated with the predictability of responses or roles of its members. This follows because the role expectations of the more formalized association are far more predetermined than is true in the informal group. Then, too, the larger and more complex the group is, the more evident is the specialization of roles and their interdependence. (See below.)

The Basis of Structuring

One may well ask why groups tend to become structured. Various students of this problem have suggested a variety of reasons. Clearly one of the most important of these is the factor of motivation. Certainly physical needs, such as are related to desire for food, for sex satisfaction, or for personal security, as well as the need for social prestige and recognition would tend to motivate individuals to join with others in securing such goals. The whole sense of belongingness and cohesiveness, which we shall discuss in detail later, derives from the need for some kind of group contact. In fact, as indicated elsewhere in this book, the individual begins living in the social situation of mother and child and the extension of other group living is simply carried forward from that point.

A second factor may well be individual differences in ability and temperament as they influence particular roles which people assume. Evidently a kind of differential membership character is built up in terms of the group situation. The structure itself is really a fabric of varied roles and statuses and reciprocal expectations. Finally, there arise group norms or standards that influence the situation within the group and the relationship to other groups.

In addition to these factors is the external or physical environment that may influence a group's activity. For example, studies made of children's groups have shown that the amount of play space available or the type of recreational apparatus will affect the structure of the group. As we shall see below, the spatial arrangement of the houses in a housing project definitely influences the kind and intensity of interaction among the members of the various households.

There are other aspects of social structure which we must examine. For our purposes the following seem to be the most important: power functions, communications, sociometric or friendship relationships, mo-

bility patterns, especially with regard to advancement, and degree of responsibility. The place of the group in providing the norms or standards of conduct is discussed in a separate section.

Power Relations

Group structure is characterized by certain power relations among the members. Power may be defined as the relative effect one person has with regard to changing, altering, modifying, facilitating, or inhibiting the function (role and status) of another person or persons within a given group. Power likewise represents such effects in intergroup contacts. By definition, a leader is a member of a group who possesses and uses relatively more power than another member. In highly structured and formal organizations, the power structure may follow a hierarchical pattern with roles and corresponding statuses definitely fixed. Here there are, as Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander well say, "directed links" in the hierarchy, as illustrated in the following way: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ where A has power over B and B power over C, and so on.[4] In informal and less structured groups, the manifestations of power may be much less stable and more flexible. Moreover, a person may be in a position of power or influence in some matters and, in turn, be influenced by another person in still other situations.

A number of studies of informal and small groups has thrown considerable light on power relations under experimental conditions. Of course, just how far we may go in applying the findings to other and more natural formal and informal groups is hard to say, but some of the results are suggestive. One basic fact is that most small groups of everyday society are overlaid with culture patterns or institutions of long standing, which, in turn, certainly affect the very factors which are studied in the so-called experimental group.

O. J. Harvey's study of status relations in informal groups brings out some interesting and informative facts. His subjects were adolescents who were members of well-defined cliques. From data collected by ratings, sociometric questionnaires, and experimentation, he concluded: First, the higher one's group status is, the more one tends to overestimate one's own future performance with reference to a given task. Second, the higher the group status of a given person, "the greater was the tendency of other group members to overrate his performance." In the third place, the lower one's status was in the group, the less likely was he to overestimate his own performance. Fourth, "the lower the group status of a particular individual, the less other members of the group tended to overrate his performance." They actually tended to underestimate it. In the fifth and final place, "the correlation between extent

[4] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1953), p. 422.

of overestimation of performance on a given task and the status in the group was higher for individuals from slum areas of a large city than for subjects from a higher socio-economic background."[5] This suggests greater solidarity among the cliques in a slum area.

Theodore M. Mills has attacked the structure of small groups from a somewhat different angle. He carried out some ingenious experiments to test one important proposition of George Simmel, the German sociologist, regarding certain interactions in three-member groups. Simmel had contended that there was a basic tendency in three-member groups toward segregation into a *pair* and an *other*. In these situations, the more active members tend to form a strong bond toward each other and to isolate the least active member. In his first research report on this topic, Mills set up a situation which tended to accentuate this initial tendency. Under these conditions he found that there was a tendency to form "a genuine power structure, with internal differentiation, interdependence of relationships between members, stability of activity position, steady trends in receipt of support that are congruent with the initial differentiation, and, finally, stability of the pattern itself." This structure, in its ideal form of one positive relationship and two hostile relationships has been called " 'true correlation structure.' " Mills offers two additional suggestions regarding the principle of initial segregation. First, "The development most threatening to the position of any member in a threesome is the solidarity between the other two." Secondly, "The condition most conducive to the intensification of a solitary bond, once formed, is the presence of a common object of opposition."[6] With reference to this second point, we see this same principle in operation in the in-group versus out-group relations already discussed. In other words, even within a small group it may well be that splits and divisions tend to operate on this same principle, that the stronger the solidarity on the one side, the more threatening and the stronger the opposition on the other.

Mills also reports a study in which he tried to get at the relationship between self-enhancement and certain status factors. He summarizes his chief findings as follows:[7]

First, self-enhancement is more important for the high-status members than for the low; second, the high-status member with a strong need is most apt to resist actively the coalition while his counterpart with low need is apt to show

[5] O. J. Harvey, "An Experimental Approach to the Study of Status Relations in Informal Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 1953, 18:357–367. Quotations are from p. 367, by permission.

[6] Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 1953, 18:351–357, reprinted in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*, pp. 428–442. Quotations are from pp. 355, 356, by permission.

[7] Theodore M. Mills, "The Coalition Pattern of Three-Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 1954, 19:657–667. Quotation is from p. 665, by permission.

positive acceptance of the other members. This tendency for high status and low need for self-enhancement to be associated with submission is found again, though not so strongly, in the test for changes in opinion. . . .

Forms of Communication

Communication systems will vary with the size and organization of the group. In large formalized ones such as the military, a government bureau, or a large industry, the chain of command functions largely through fixed and predetermined channels of communication. In small but primary groups, communication channels and content of communication will vary with the role and status of the members. For example, in the traditional patriarchal family this is neatly illustrated by the instruction that the child is not to speak until he is spoken to. The father is supposed to initiate any given communication.

To understand communication structure we need to know the pattern of positions, that is, the role and status of every member, and the length of the communication from position to position. For example, some positions may be at the hub or central focus on which all communications converge and from which all will be sent or dispatched. Another position might be on the periphery and hence get only the most incidental communications. So, too, we must take into account variations in the kind and amount of content which is communicated.

Research on small groups has given us additional facts and more insight into the nature of communication. Leon Festinger and John Thibaut, for example, have brought out the effects of interpersonal communication on attitudes and opinions. They and others have shown, for example, that belonging to a given group tends to induce changes in opinions and attitudes which make for uniformity of opinion and attitude. In the second place, the amount of shift towards uniformity which may be accomplished is a function of the attractiveness of said group for its members. In the third place, those who do not conform to the prevailing patterns of opinion and conduct tend to be rejected by others in the group. Again the degree of rejection is a direct function of the attractiveness of the group and of the importance to the group of the act or attitude in regard to which the individual fails to conform.

In addition, we want to know who the recipients of the communication are, and also something about the determinants of what gets communicated and what does not. Various studies have shown, among other things, first, that individuals whose social behavior has been changed by hearing something tend, in turn, to relay this information to others who are believed to be affected by it. Secondly, individuals who do not conform to the group pattern tend to have fewer communications addressed to them if they are rejected. This is not true if they are not rejected. Furthermore, individuals who are nonconformist and who tend

to be rejected may serve as the innovators for splitting the group. One of the measures of group cohesiveness, in fact, is the ease or difficulty in subdividing a given group.

On the basis of these facts, Festinger and Thibaut set up an experimental situation to test a number of hypotheses bearing on subgroup formation and the communicative relationships of the individuals involved. Among other findings they learned that when there was a wide range of opinion in the group, communications tended to be directed toward those members whose opinions were at the extreme of a given range. In the second place, the greater the pressure toward conformity and the greater the perception of group homogeneity, the greater the tendency to communicate to these extremes and the greater the actual change toward uniformity.[8]

Harold J. Leavitt has shown that the form of the interactional connections influences the communication of the participating individuals in various ways. He set up four experimental patterns: circle, chain, Y, and wheel, as shown in Figure 6. He had twenty groups of five men each—undergraduates at Massachusetts Institute of Technology—and tested them under conditions of these four patterns of communication.



From Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 46:42. By permission.

FIG. 6. The Experimental Patterns of Communication.

The task was that of passing messages back and forth with the aim of solving a problem which no one man could solve alone. The principal results were: It was found that major behavioral differences are attributable to communication patterns and these affected the deviations in accuracy, differences in the satisfaction of the group members with their work, variation in the emergence of leaders, and differences in the organization. Also variations were found in the speed of solution, in the self-correcting tendencies, and in the durability of the groups. For

[8] Leon Festinger and John Thibaut, "Inter-personal Communication in Small Groups," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 46:92–99, reprinted in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1952), pp. 125–134.

example, in the circle group where there was no leader, there was little adequate organization, yet there was a high degree of satisfaction reported by the members participating in this particular group. On the other hand, the wheel group very quickly developed an effective organization, and a distinctive leader soon emerged. Moreover, this was one of the most efficient of the patterns of communication.

In the second place, the positions which the individuals occupied in the communication chain influenced their behavior during the time they occupied these positions. This affected the chance of becoming a leader, the degree of satisfaction with the job, with the group, and with the quantity of one's activity, and the amount which each one contributed to the group's functional organization.

In the third place, the most characteristic communication pattern relates to *centrality*. That is to say, those at the center were affected more thoroughly than those at the periphery of the communication chains. In the fourth place, centrality influences behavior insofar as it limits independent action: [9]

> Independence of action, relative to other members of the group, is, in turn, held to be the primary determinant of the definition of who shall take the leadership role, total activity, satisfaction with one's lot, and other specific behaviors.
>
> More precisely, it is felt that where centrality and, hence, independence are evenly distributed, there will be no leader, many errors, high activity, slow organization, and high satisfaction. Whatever frustration occurs will occur as a result of the inadequacy of the group, not the inadequacy of the environment.

On the other hand, where one's position is low in centrality relative to other persons in the group, one will tend to take the follower position and be dependent upon the leader and accept his dictates. This means one will fall into a role that permits "little opportunity for prestige, activity, or self-expression."

Status and Mobility

One additional research should be noted at this juncture. H. H. Kelley, in a carefully designed experiment, set up a series of status differences and mobility differences with reference to certain tasks and then studied the relationship of communication to various behavioral situations. He gives the following conclusions:

1. "The more unpleasant is a position in a hierarchy, the stronger are the forces on a person to communicate task-irrelevant content, this holding true whether the communication is directed to one's own level or to the other level. Irrelevant content is postulated to serve the function

[9] Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 46:38–50, reprinted in Swanson and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–125. Quotation is from p. 50, by permission of American Psychological Association.

of permitting the occupant of an undesirable position to escape from it." It was also shown that people of low status but not mobile are in more unpleasant positions than people who are in high position but not mobile. The combination of low status with the tendency toward upward mobility seems to make for less attractive feelings in reference to the low position. In turn, the addition of downward mobility to high status increases the attractiveness of the high position.

2. Communication acts as a substitute for real upward mobility for the low-status individuals who have little or no possibility of genuine upward movement. This was found to be true only for the low-status persons who showed some desire to move upwards on the scale.

3. "We have postulated a general tendency to restrict the transmission of content which would tend to lower the status of one's position in the eyes of others or which would make oneself appear incompetent in the high-status position."

4. A hierarchy of levels tends to produce certain restraints against communicating criticisms of persons at the other level. Yet the high-status persons seem to have greater freedom to express whatever criticisms they have directly to the other level rather than to criticize members of their own level.

5. "The low-non-mobile and the high-mobile conditions are definitely more detrimental to the total groups' cohesiveness than are the other status-mobility combinations. We have explained this in terms of hostility that results from perceiving persons at the other level either as threats to one's own desirable position or as occupants of a coveted but unattainable position." [10]

The attractiveness of groups to individuals varies with the satisfaction of certain needs and the attainment of certain goals. It often happens that groups will mediate the attainment of some important goal for the individual. For example, a social club whose members include upper-class people will be more attractive to an upwardly mobile individual who has just moved to a community than a club of lesser standing. It would be a status-gaining device. In other cases the group as such is attractive to the members. Poker clubs, congeniality groups, political clubs, book-discussion clubs, and the like illustrate the fact that people may enjoy group activity itself. In the third place, there is a strong human need to belong to groups, that is, to have some kind of friendly relations with others. This is sometimes referred to as the need for belongingness.

Patterns of Friendliness

With reference to the need for friendship and informal group relations, a study made by Leon Festinger and collaborators in a housing

[10] Harold H. Kelley, "Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies," *Human Relations*, 1951, 4:39–56, reprinted in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*, pp. 443–461. Quotations are from pp. 55, 56 by permission.

project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is informative. The project consisted of a hundred single or semi-attached small houses arranged in courts consisting of from 8 to 13 houses each. For the most part each court was U-shaped with houses facing into a grassy area between. The open end of each U faced onto the street which bisected the housing project. In addition to this, however, there were at either end of the project a certain number of houses which faced directly onto the street and did not form a U. This was an ideal situation for observation since there was a good deal of homogeneity among the individuals involved. They were all married veteran students in attendance at the Institute. Moreover, they had no freedom of choice in the dwellings within the project, since all were assigned to houses in the order of their application.

The study got underway soon after the project was opened, so it was possible to trace the development of friendship in informal groups. A number of general factors stand out. First of all, friendship is affected by sheer distance between the houses and, secondly, by the direction in which the house faced. "Friendships developed more frequently between next-door neighbors, less frequently between people whose houses were separated by another house, and so on. As the distance between houses increased, the number of friendships fell off so rapidly that it was rare to find a friendship between persons who lived in houses that were separated by more than four or five other houses." [11] It was found that there was practically no contact between one court and another, certainly not beyond the adjacent courts. It should be noted, too, that those houses which faced directly onto the street rather than into a court definitely affected the development and maintenance of friendship. Individuals who lived in these ten houses had less than half as many friends in the project as did those who lived in the houses that faced on the courts.

It was clear that homogeneity of background, common interest of residence, and given location all played a part in developing friendships and involuntary group memberships. One of the most distinctive aspects was the ease with which friendships were formed. About two-thirds of the residents reported their social life was entirely or primarily within this housing community. More than 90 per cent of the residents felt they had as much social life within the housing project as they wished to have and this despite certain physical inadequacies in the buildings.

In contrast to the project just described, Festinger and Kelley made a study of 100 single and semi-attached permanent housing units that had been built in the middle of a residential area in a town about fifteen

[11] Leon Festinger, "Architecture and Group Membership," *J. of Social Issues*, 1951, 7:152–163, by permission of the publisher. A condensation under the title "Group Attraction and Membership," appears in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–101.

miles from a large city. At the time of the study in 1947 about 40 per cent of the population of this project were older residents who had once worked in the shipyards and had remained there after the war. The balance were individuals who had come into this housing project because of acute housing shortages elsewhere.

The feeling of compulsion and hostility which developed within this group stands in sharp contrast to conditions in the other housing project. For the most part, the residents had an inadequate social life. Many described the situation as one of "self-imposed social isolation." Most of the residents reported having only one or two friends in the community. Moreover, 60 per cent of those interviewed said that they believed that their neighbors were low-class people with whom it was undesirable to associate.

These people had little or no contact with the larger community. Only about 20 per cent of the project residents were members of any club in town. There were relatively few friendships between the project residents and the townspeople.

Later, an attempt was made to stimulate contacts with the latter by getting them to co-operate in a program of community activities. There was only moderate success. Feelings of non-co-operation, hostility, threats to status, and reluctance to enter into contact with the townspeople made the program difficult to start and to carry on.[12]

Degree of Responsibility

The structure of the group has some relation to the sense of responsibility. Moreover, the function of responsibility is closely related to the power relations. Then, too, participation in the group is associated with some feeling of moral responsibility for its success. If the group breaks up, such responsibility disappears and may be attached to a new group. Responsibility for the success of the group as a unit is tied up with the whole normative aspect of group living, and we will turn later to an analysis of the normative aspects of group behavior.

GROUP CHARACTERISTICS

In this section we shall discuss various ways in which groups may be differentiated. More specifically, we shall note the aim and function of groups and the patterns of interaction that emerge.

Intergroup Relations

We shall begin by summarizing a study of intergroup relations made by Muzafer Sherif. Sherif was concerned with the study of group tension

[12] *Ibid.* See also Leon Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York, Harper, 1950).

as related to the formation and function of an in-group and to certain conflictive aspects that might develop with reference to an out-group. He set up certain competing groups from a sample of twenty-four boys who were at a summer camp. These boys were not acquainted with each other before the study began. The experimental design called for the manipulation of these boys to form certain desired groups and to follow through specified stages. Stage I was a period of spontaneous groupings on the basis of personal inclinations and interests. This gave the investigators a chance to observe the mixing of the boys in various camp duties and to note the beginnings of friendship groups in terms of personal like and dislike. Stage II was designed as a period of in-group formation of the two experimental groups as similar in composition as possible. Activities were chosen on the basis of motivational appeal and involvement of the whole group. All rewards at this stage were given on group-unit basis, not to specific individuals. This was followed by Stage III, planned to observe intergroup relations, particularly with reference to a series of competitive activities and with regard to certain frustrating situations which one group set up for the other. That is, the frustrating situations were so arranged that the blame or responsibility for the frustration would be placed on the experimental group and not on the adults who conducted this study.

The findings may be summarized as follows: In Stage I, which lasted three days, natural groupings of the boys based on their personal likes and common interests were permitted. At the end of the three days sociograms or popularity ratings were obtained by means of informal interviews. These sociograms were important because they were the basis for assigning the boys later to the experimental in-group for Stage II.

This second period, which lasted five days, was the phase of experimental in-group formation. The subjects were divided into two groups: "Red Devils" and "Bull Dogs." The boys were selected by the counselors without reference to their personal likings as indicated in Stage I.

As had been anticipated, the breaking up of the earlier groups was not easily accepted by some of the boys. In order to alleviate the distress the two groups were taken on short hikes from camp. This particular activity served as a first step in knitting the new groups together. During this stage the two experimental groups were kept apart as much as possible. They lived in separate bunk houses, they ate at separate tables, they served their "KP" on alternate days, and engaged separately in the frequent hikes and overnight camping trips. Swimming was scheduled separately for the two groups and each soon found their own special places some distance apart in the nearby creek. Each group also had its own special hideout in the woods. Among the most striking features was



From Muzafer Sherif, "A Preliminary Experimental Study of Intergroup Relations," in John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif, eds., *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York, Harper, 1951), p. 408. By permission.

FIG. 7. Showing End of Stage II, In-group Formation of the Bull Dogs.

the development of a definite in-group structure, a strong feeling of solidarity, a certain hierarchy of positions and powers, and the development of leadership within this hierarchy. Various sociograms reveal the development of popularity on the part of particular individuals. This was true both of the "Bull Dogs" and the "Red Devils."

This study, as well as many others, shows that popularity is not to be confused with certain power relationships. Some of the boys who were highly popular were not regarded as leaders in other situations. Among



Ibid., p. 409.

FIG. 8. Showing End of Stage II, In-group Formation of the Red Devils.

the "Red Devils," for example, "S" was recognized as leader and won his position chiefly by reason of his daring athletic skill and toughness. In contrast, in the "Bull Dogs" a boy named "C" became leader because he made the greatest contribution in planning and executing common activities and in regulating and integrating the tasks and roles of other group members. He was much smoother and more suave in handling the relations of the other boys. In the "Red Devils" group, "S" sometimes enforced his decisions by actual physical force.

A variety of factors revealed the growing structure of the group. For example, the boys tended to refer to their own bunkhouse as home, there were certain names for their own group, certain songs, and strong negative reactions toward the other group. Then, too, certain norms and standard forms of punishment emerged. It was clear that there was a

considerable reversal of earlier friendship preferences as developed in Stage I.

Strong attitudes toward the out-group were developed as indicated by the fact that boys soon began to make comparisons not merely in terms of what we have or do, and what they have or do, but in terms of such things as "their lousy cabins," "our pond is better," and even, "those low kind." In connection with such remarks the boys began to express to the camp counselors that they would like to have an opportunity to compete with the other boys.

In Stage III—lasting five days—the intergroup relations were carried out in competitive and mildly frustrating situations. At the beginning of this stage there were a series of competitive games and certain credits or points were awarded for winning athletic events on the various days. Two thermometers were placed on a bulletin board and the rising score of each group was filled in day-by-day. The prize for the winning group, which was displayed and much admired, consisted of twelve four-bladed knives, one knife for each member of the winning team.

Each day of Stage III began with a tug-of-war between the two groups. In this competition the various members exhorted each other to intense and common effort. On the first day the "Red Devils" lost, and their reactions are interesting in illustrating perceptual distortion. They became convinced that "the ground was against us." They spent a good deal of the morning discussing this idea and their strategy for the next tug-of-war. The next day the "Red Devils" were on the verge of winning when the "Bull Dogs'" leader started a series of shouts to encourage his boys. The "Bull Dogs" began to gain ground and defeated the "Red Devils" for the second time. This time the "Red Devils" rationalized their loss by agreeing among themselves that the opposition "must have done something to the rope."

During this stage there were many illustrations of individual identification with the group aims and goals. For example, in one ball game a boy was easily tagged out and his side, the "Red Devils," were trailing the "Bull Dogs" with two out and no one on the bases. This boy, "F," came to bat and was quickly tagged out. He later sobbed and went off by himself, saying to a counselor, "I lost the game for us"—a neat example of how group goals easily determine personal ones for the individual members.

There was a growing hostility between the two groups. In time the "Bull Dogs" pulled out in the lead, probably because their leader had a more effective organization. They had, in fact, a dual leadership by this time. The organization was directed by "C," but for the athletic events the leader was "H." During this same time, the "Red Devils" responded to their losing position by labeling the "Bull Dogs" as "dirty players,"

and rationalizing their own status by saying, "At least we play fair." In addition, they referred to their opponents as "cheaters." On the other hand, the "Bull Dogs" openly boasted that they had a more effective organization.

In addition to the competitive games in Stage III, certain frustrating situations were arranged in which one group interfered with the other or at least were thought to interfere with the other. On the evening of the victory of the "Bull Dogs" over the "Red Devils" in the athletic series, the two groups were asked to attend a party in the mess hall. By previous planning the observers saw to it that the "Red Devils" got to the mess hall a short time before the "Bull Dogs." None of the members of either group suspected that the timing was deliberate. The refreshments of ice cream and cake were already on the table. Half of the refreshments had been battered, broken, or crushed, the other half remaining intact. When the first group of "Red Devils" arrived, they were told to go ahead and take their share of the ice cream and cakes, leaving the other half for the "Bull Dogs" who were late. The "Red Devils," being the defeated group, expressed in no uncertain terms their frustration and envy of the "Bull Dogs." Faced with the refreshments half of which were fresh and appetizing and half broken and crushed, the "Red Devils" took the best portions and carried them to their own table. At this point the "Bull Dogs" arrived. Upon seeing the sorry-looking refreshments left for them and the feasting "Red Devils," they immediately protested by sulking and showing hostility toward the other group. The "Red Devils" were quick to react with such remarks as, "First come, first served." The "Bull Dogs" discussed the possibility of throwing their crushed cake at the "Red Devils" but decided against it on grounds that after all it would taste good anyway. They went to the far end of the mess hall and proceeded to hurl insults and names at the "Red Devils," such as "dirty bums," and "rotten jerks." In turn, the "Red Devils" ate their refreshments in righteous indignation and called the "Bull Dogs" "dirty players" and "cheats." The most outspoken of the "Red Devils" were four boys who were rated at the bottom-status level in their group. At the close of the meal two of the boys got directly involved in a vigorous argument, and this set off a series of raids and fights which had to be stopped by the counselors.

Because of the violence of the contest at this point, it was decided to stop Stage III and try to break down the strong in-group feelings. The method was to initiate a camp program in which all the boys would participate on a camp-wide basis. Despite the efforts of the supervisors, there was great difficulty in eliminating the strong in-group solidarity that had been built up. The success, at best, was only partial. We must note again that the boys lowest in status in their respective groups were most hostile toward members of the other group. The consequences of

such intergroup relationships in competition and in meeting frustration are stated by Sherif as follows: "(1) To solidify the in-group belongingness and solidarity, to enhance in-group democracy, and to strengthen the in-group friendships; (2) To generate and increase out-group hostility, to produce derogatory *name-calling* which came close to standardizing of negative stereotypes in relation to the out-group (i.e., *rudiments of prejudice*)." [13]

Clearly, membership in a group involves an appropriate frame of reference which, in turn, affects the perceptual and judgmental responses of the members with regard to the group aims and goals. The aim of a group will differ in terms of the degree of formality and informality. Moreover, the group goals must be those with which the individual can identify himself if the goal is to be attained. In addition, individual needs are often satisfied within the group framework. In the case of formal groups, the goals are of an institutional character and relate to the culturalization of particular interests or needs. Thus, in terms of institutional groups the economic order represents chiefly the satisfaction of the material needs of the individual members. In the same way the control functions are represented by the institutional goals of the political state. So, too, in religious matters the church represents the organization of functions and goals aimed at satisfying man's concern with the supernatural.

Factors Related to Size

The size of the group influences the interactional patterns. Only in the simplest societies do individuals confine their activities to one or two groups. In modern complex industrial society everyone is a member of a wide variety of groups. In fact, multiple group membership is basic in our own society. The research done in small groups brings out the importance of size in affecting the distribution of activities of members. For example, Robert F. Bales found that the top man in groups larger than five or so tends to speak considerably more to the group as a whole than to specific individuals. Also Bales found that other members tend to speak more to specific individuals and particularly to the top man. Moreover, each man inclines to speak to every other man in a manner which is probably a function of his own rank as well as a function of the rank of the recipient of the communication.

As groups increase in size, a larger and larger proportion of the activity tends to be addressed to the top man, and a smaller and smaller proportion to other members. In turn, as size increases, the top man tends to address more and more of his remarks to the group as a whole, and to exceed by larger

[13] Muzafer Sherif, "A Preliminary Experimental Study of Inter-Group Relations," in John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif, eds., *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York, Harper, 1951), p. 420.

amounts his proportionate share. The communication pattern tends to "centralize" . . . around a leader.[14]

Another aspect of group behavior has been discussed by William F. Whyte. He points out that a group may be studied in terms of the frequency of interaction of the individuals within a recurring pattern of social contact. He has clearly indicated the importance of studying groups within larger social organizations such as a business firm, a military establishment, or a government bureau. Furthermore there are variations in the levels of power or control as related to the size of the group. For example, he cites a certain automotive plant of 12,000 employees that for years had ten positions or ranks between the workers and the operating executives of the plant. There were still more levels between this point and the head of the entire company. In contrast, Sears Roebuck and Company has only four levels of supervision between the president and 110,000 workers in the retail division. There is a direct relationship between multiplying of levels of control and failure to get co-operation among the workers. He makes a strong plea for a decentralization of function with more and more opportunity for people in the lower ranks to make their own decisions.

The whole topic of the relationship between democratic interactional patterns and the problem of centralization or decentralization is involved here. One of the difficulties of bureaucracy lies in this very area. Under bureaucratic organization the individual's interactional patterns are largely laid down in advance. There is little opportunity for him to modify or qualify them, at least at the official level. Of course, people actually do modify these patterns in the working situation. In any event the study of size must take into account the following: the number of levels of authority concerned in any sequence of interaction leading to the completion of a given activity, the size of the operating units within the organization, and interaction between the top executive and the minor executives of the operating units. There is no evidence from a social-psychological point of view that the so-called "span of control," mentioned by students of administration, is a fixed matter. Conditions must be specified for the particular span of control to be effective.

Leadership in Formal and Informal Groups

These studies have also indicated the importance of leadership, both informal and formal. Under the formal organization the status and role at various levels of control or leadership are specified in advance. In the informal and less organized group, interactional patterns are more flexible. In his research of interaction in small groups, Bales set up a

[14] Robert F. Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups," in Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), Ch. 4, pp. 131–132. By permission.

series of categories which may have wide applicability in dealing with small groups. Whether they apply to larger groups remains to be discovered.

These categories may be regarded as illustrating certain dimensions of activity ranging from the situation where there is a high level of solidarity, including the benefits of leadership and mutual aid, to the other end of the continuum which is marked by antagonism, deflation of status, and a good deal of defensive behavior. As indicated in Table 5 it is possible to subclassify the problems to which each pair of categories is most relevant:

(1) Orientation is the basic and fundamental problem. This is a combination of getting information, on the one hand, and asking for orientation-information, on the other. (2) This is followed by problems of evaluation secured by giving opinions or asking for opinions. (3) In the third place, there is giving or asking for suggestions and direction about possible ways of action. (4) From this follows problems of decision, the agreeing or disagreeing with certain basic plans or policies with regard to activity. (5) Then there is the question of tension and showing tension, how to release and control it. (6) And finally, there is the problem of integration ranging from high solidarity and the raising of the status of others to the extreme of hostile interaction which leads to deflation of status and defensive reaction.

Then, too, there is the question of the development of norms within these groups. As indicated earlier in this chapter, however, for the most part the individuals move into groups which are already well institutionalized and in which the norms are more or less stable. Moreover, in the day-by-day operation of the norms there are considerable variations.

THE PROBLEM OF NORMS

The Nature of Norms

A norm is a standard of measurement bearing on perception, judgment, and conduct. Here we are concerned with the norms of control of membership and behavior within the given group. These are indicated in the chief institutions of any society, but in our own time the central and basic norms are those which are found in manners, conventions, the mores, and the law. In sociological terms norms have long been treated under the concept *social control.* Strictly speaking, social control may be regarded as the sanctions or means by which the norms are enforced. The purpose of normative standards is to facilitate conformity, solidarity, and continuity of a particular group, community, or larger society.

To control behavior means to bring about regular and recurrent

Table 5. Set of Categories Used for Direct Observation



A subclassification of system problems to which each pair of categories is most relevant:

- a. Problems of orientation
- b. Problems of evaluation
- c. Problems of control
- d. Problems of decision
- e. Problems of tension-management
- f. Problems of integration

From Robert F. Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups," in Talcott Parsons and others, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), Ch. 4, p. 112. This is modified from the original figure in Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1950), p. 9. By permission.

actions or responses. Such regulation makes possible the prediction of behavior. We can anticipate what an individual will do or what will be the punishment if he fails to do so. For example, a contract enables the parties thereto to know in advance what to expect and what each will do. There is no changing of intention from day to day, and the obligation is binding for the time set. Personal whims may be permitted in intimate relations, but they have no place in an established order. Furthermore, control, especially by some over-all power, makes for equilibrium between warring factions or groups by obliging them to accommodate themselves to each other and to the needs and values of the larger society. Control also fosters solidarity and integration. So, too, the mechanisms of control make possible continuity. They form a part of the culture which is passed along from generation to generation. Thus each generation gets a pattern of control which keeps the social order running smoothly. If each generation had to develop its own code, there would be waste of effort through friction.

Yet, in a rapidly changing society like our own, this continuity is disturbed, with the result that new codes have to be developed. New codes often come into conflict with old ones. This makes for difficulty in formulating regulations in a rapidly changing culture. New conditions demand new definitions, and often behavior far outruns the forms of control. The growing sense of insecurity, anonymity, impersonality, and dissociation in the individual in mass society is definitely related to the breakdown of the codes and rules of the more traditional social order.

The Means of Control

Control may be either negative or positive and may be exercised either by overt force or by the use of symbols. The negative means of control include those which are repressive in nature, such as stoppage of free speech and outright physical punishment. The positive means range from such symbolic rewards as honorific badges and other marks of status to such direct physical rewards as wealth and power over others.

The means of control are not always sharply set off from one another. We may, in fact, consider them as ranged along a continuum from the direct positive rewards through a great number of symbolic ones to the negative extreme of the death penalty. Some sample means of control along this continuum are shown in the outline on p. 245.

Most of these means of control are matters of common experience; hence we need not elaborate on them at this point. They operate at the informal level through talk, manners, the mores, and public opinion, and at the formal level through the application of constitutional and statute law, judicial precedent, and the formal codes and regulations of various institutions. None of these—discussion, public opinion, mores, law, or

group code—is independent of the others. It is the law and the group code, however, which are the most rigid and objective. But even these must be interpreted by individuals with particular biases and ideas. Moreover, people can change these formal controls by resort to the informal controls.

Direct Physical and Positive Rewards	*Positive Symbolic Means of Control*	*Negative Symbolic Means of Control*	*Direct Physical and Negative Control by Punishment*
Awards and prizes and other material rewards: wealth, power over others.	Positive gossip, indoctrination, persuasion and propaganda, advertising, flattery, praise, badges and honorific evidences of high status.	Commands to desist, threats to punish, censure, satire, ridicule, epithets, name-calling, negative gossip.	Death penalty, banishment from group, physical torture, imprisonment, fines, censorship.

The foundations of control lie in the primary training of the individual. His conformity to a code is built up in terms of role-taking. In this, as we know, another's conduct becomes the model. Punishment and reward are the rudimentary inciters to conformity, but in time the individual internalizes his contacts with others and develops what we call the "moral me," or moral self. In other words, his role-taking is determined by his expectation that he will act in a certain way, just as previously he acted in terms of what his mother, father, teacher, preacher, or policeman anticipated. The aim of sound moral training—the heart of moral socialization—is the development of self-control and capacity for self-punishment, chiefly through the sense of shame and guilt. This is the area of habits and attitudes which we call the conscience, or what the Freudians call the superego (see Chapter 6).

Controls arise at points of difference or conflict between individuals or groups and are directly related to social organization. In the primary group, controls are chiefly informal, but in the course of specialized and institutionalized activities they tend to be formalized. We shall be interested in primary-group training in control, but our chief concern will be with the distribution and use of power in the class structure, in economic organization, in religious institutions, and especially in the state, which is becoming the dominant form of power, at least at the secondary level of social organization.

THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF POWER

The distribution of power raises the question of who is to control. Through social organization the distribution of power is correlated with age, sex, class, knowledge, skill, and role in political, economic, reli-

gious, aesthetic, and recreational institutions. Let us note some features of the participation of individuals in basic groups of society.

Controls in Primary Groups

The family has long been the fundamental association of individuals. It combines the mammalian biosocial foundations of interaction with the initial induction of the individual into human society and culture.

Some aspects of this process were discussed in Chapter 6 under socialization. The forms of familial organization have varied with the forms of marriage and with the larger community patterns. For the most part, however, they have been either patriarchal or matriarchal. In the former, the husband and father is the dominant individual and the ultimate source of power. In the latter, though women exercise considerable power, the male relatives of the wife and mother usually exercise a great deal of control over the economy and discipline of the household. In present-day Western society, family organization is highly variable, and combinations of control are found. In some the wife and mother is dominant; in others the traditional patriarchal control remains. In many there is a kind of quasi-democratic order in which the children are given more authority and responsibility as they grow older.

The nature of personal relations in the family is qualified by age, if not by sex. A certain dominance of the older over the younger members is inevitable. The parent-child contact is essentially one of superordination and submission, and during the basic training period the child must give way before the superior knowledge, skill, and physical power of the adult.

Yet the older members of the family are not at liberty to do as they please with the younger. The moral and legal codes of the group, and the socially acquired sympathies of family life, set some limits to the exercise of brute force. Habit formation, moreover, makes for regularity, which in turn permits prediction of, and hence control of, the conduct of any member of the family. But the amount of physical coercion, fear, and violent aggression used varies greatly with the accepted cultural norms. In dictatorial, militaristic societies child-training is likely to be severe and brutal. In more pacifistic and democratic societies conditioning is, on the whole, milder and more affectionate. Yet there is no society in which overt coercion is not, at least potentially, a way of disciplining members of the family.

The controls of other primary groups are, in the main, extensions of the controls of the family. In the play group of children, the family pattern may be projected, in part, into the controls, but very often children themselves determine the forms of power distribution according to differences in age, skill, and knowledge. In fact, a play group, especially

in a democratic, flexible society, permits an excellent chance to study the rudiments of power in situations where culture has not yet imposed itself.

Neighborhood controls traditionally take the form of the mores, kept alive and enforced by the older members of the locality. Tribal primary communities are chiefly controlled in like manner.

Controls in Secondary Groups

As differentiation of individual and group functions extends, and as mechanical improvements increase, the older types of control break down. The extreme development of specialization of function and the rise of innumerable groups having impersonal and segmental relations with one another are two basic features of modern mass society. It is a commonplace that the primary-group forms of control often do not work in such a world. This being so, we must examine the distribution and use of power in our machine-dominated world.

The three principal institutions of control are the religious, the economic, and the political. In these days of modern science and a general secularization of life, religion plays a lesser part in control than it once did. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that fear of divine punishment and hope of divine reward have completely disappeared from our civilization. In times of grave crises, especially, such as fire, flood, famine, and war, men frequently return to their worship and find in religion solace and support for their efforts to survive.

Perhaps of even greater continuing influence on the West is the moral code of Judaic-Christian religions. The integrity of the individual with respect to God, the idea of salvation for every repentant soul, the doctrines of co-operation, love, and human justice put forth by the great Hebrew and Christian teachers, have left their effects upon our culture. The role of the individual in society has, moreover, been stressed by many Occidental philosophers from Socrates to the present. The contribution of the Graeco-Roman and Anglo-Saxon cultures to democratic ideals has been important.

Without accepting the somewhat rigid Marxist position regarding the central place of economics in the life of man, there is no doubt that the controls developed around the processes of production, distribution, and consumption have always been of tremendous importance. Today, in an age dominated by a scientifically controlled technology, this is particularly true.

There are two phases of power and its distribution in modern economic life. The first involves the skills and knowledge needed in industrial production. The power of the individual who has special skill or knowledge in a closely knit industrial world is significant. Scientists and engineers and a certain number of trained technicians exercise great

actual or potential control over industrial processes. In contrast, the workers have sacrificed their skills to the machine, which turns out highly specialized and standardized parts to be put together on the assembly line by persons whose skills are simple. Yet what the workers have lost in power, in the sense of handicrafts or special skills, they may regain by the organization of industrial unions and revolutionary political parties. Moreover, the power possessed by the individual machine or assembly-line worker through his opportunities for sabotage is enhanced enormously when it is organized under the guidance of his union or of a revolutionary agitator.

The other phase of power and its use in economics lies in the field of management. The entrepreneur who was also his own manager has given way to the impersonal corporation whose legal and moral claim to existence lies in profit-making. The actual manipulation of the industrial and economic processes needed to make a profit are left largely to paid executives and engineers—the managerial force. In analogy to the state these people are the top policy-making bureaucracy. Below them are the hosts of white-collar workers, whose power is not as effective as that of the industrial workers. White-collar workers, without union organization, have no way to control the supply of their type of work. Moreover, public education, through its vocational and business training, actually provides modern business with a great labor pool of just such people.

The power of organized business management, with the potential support of the white-collar workers, is tremendous. It is a latent threat to the traditional owners of private property in capitalist countries, and no less a threat to the political controls of business and industry under totalitarianism or state socialism.

Yet, in spite of its tremendous importance in our daily lives, and in spite of its long dominance under capitalism, the power of the economic order is waning before the increasing power of the state in mass society. The modern nation-state is a product of the commercial and industrial revolutions, of the centralization of political control in the hands of single rulers (the monarchy), and of the later transfer of power to agencies more representative of the masses. Through its exercise of sovereignty the state has become supreme in its capacity for coercion, the ultimate expression of power.

Because of recurrent mass unemployment, the need to protect the young and the old, and the threat of economic and other forms of exploitation, the modern state has slowly but surely encroached on other forms of social control. From negative police functions and the protection of person and property, government has progressed to positive action involving many aspects of everyday life. The chief functions of the state under democratic conditions are the following: (1) It protects life, providing both for domestic peace and for defense against armed force from

the outside. (2) It protects property. (3) It undertakes to preserve natural resources against wasteful exploitation by private enterprise. This is a kind of assurance to the masses of something for the future. (4) It intervenes in the operations of the economic order, arbitrating labor disputes and attempting to prevent monopoly and to enforce competition. In mass society the state is almost inevitably bound to give more and more attention to both political and economic means of satisfying the masses and providing them security. (5) It is concerned with the broader welfare of its citizens. Long ago provision was made for postal service, sewage disposal, and water. Public education was early recognized as an essential to democracy. Later, various other public services were established, regarding public health, working conditions, consumer protection, housing, foods, sanitary rules, prevention of contagious diseases, and the like. More recently there has been a tremendous extension of measures of social security, including maternal and child care, unemployment insurance, and pensions for widows, the aged, and the handicapped.

In short, whether totalitarian or democratic, the political order has become more and more concerned with broad matters of social justice. As a result, it has increasingly encroached upon the orbit traditionally considered outside its province. For mass-man, the state has come to be a vast source of help, security, and indulgence. In view of this cultural drift, not only the use and distribution but the moral implications of power become particularly important.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CARTWRIGHT, Dorwin, and ZANDER, Alvin, eds., *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1953). A symposium of papers based chiefly on research with small groups. It is divided into six parts: methodology, cohesiveness, pressures and standards, goals and mobility, structure, and leadership. There is an excellent introduction to each part by the editors.

COSER, Lewis A., *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1956). This book had its inception in the author's study of Georg Simmel, the German sociologist. It treats both the theoretical discussions of conflict and a wide range of empirical research bearing on this topic. The function of conflict in group formation and solidarity is ably presented.

GARDNER, E. F., and THOMPSON, G. G., *Social Relations and Morale in Small Groups* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956). Presents the results of an extensive research project in which scales were developed to measure effectiveness of social relations of individuals and "morale effectiveness" of the group.

HARE, A. Paul, BORGATTA, Edgar F., and BALES, Robert F., eds., *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction* (New York, Knopf, 1955). Covers a much wider range of materials than does the Cartwright and Zander volume. It is divided into four parts: historical and theoretical backgrounds, the in-

dividual in social situations, the group as a system of social interaction, and an annotated bibliography of 584 titles.

HOMANS, George C., *The Human Group* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950). Although this book deals only with primary groups, it is very suggestive.

SAPIR, Edward, "Group," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), Vol. 7, pp. 178–182. A good overview of the concept as developed and used in the social sciences.

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CHAPTER 11

Leaders and Followers

WHAT is popularly called leadership is more accurately to be discussed in terms of dominance. We define dominance as an act or response which affects the attitude and act of another. The method of influencing the acts of others may range from the use of flattery, suggestion, persuasion, argument, and threat of employing force to the outright use of coercive means such as physical punishment of varying degrees of severity. This may be viewed as a power device used by one person to control or modify the attitudes and actions of another or others. When the power is structured and widely accepted as a part of the culture, we may speak of the authority of one person over another. This is illustrated in the father's or mother's control over their children, in the teacher's direction of the pupil's learning process, and in the judge's prerogative in determining the extent of legal punishment for an infraction of the law.

Many forms of human dominance depend on suggestion and persuasion. That is, the would-be controller must secure the free and voluntary support of those whom he would direct or influence. This is the core of what is called democratic leadership and is neatly exemplified in the political phrase "consent of the governed."

Yet it must never be forgotten that dominance arises and functions within the framework of social interaction. To say that a person is dominant implies that there is another individual in a submissive position toward him. There is no superordination without subordination; in popular parlance no leaders without followers.

Animal Prototypes

As is true in many other basic social processes—conflict, co-operation, group cohesion—dominance has its prototype in lower forms of life. Among animals the dominant-submissive interactions are precultural, of course, but fundamentally social.

Forms as low as lizards develop a hierarchy of dominance and submission in which a stronger and older member comes to control other

members of the species within a certain area. Such dominance, moreover, is established by fighting or attack, and if threatened will be defended by the same means. Many species of bird life show similar but much more complex interactions. The pecking order of domestic fowl shows this; in some instances there is a gradient of power in which chicken A pecks B, B pecks C, and so on through all the fowl occupying the same yard. In each pair there is evidence of what we term fear, avoidance, and submission on the part of one, and aggressive and attacking reactions on the part of the other.

The dominance-submission pattern among the monkeys and apes is rather similar to that found among men. A number of studies have described the variety of such interactions. Sex differences enter into these situations, but the dominance of the male over the female may be modified by age and strength and, among the apes studied by Robert M. Yerkes, some females reversed the usual roles during the mating season and took the dominating part. On some occasions, two apes may cooperate to attack another that has up to that point been dominant. If defeated, the former "master" may become subordinate to either of the pair that combined against him. Submissive reactions are at times used by some animals in order to secure the protection of a stronger member and to share certain favors in sex or food or both.

Such social patterns arise, as do others, in biosocial interactions prior to culture and independent of it. In other words, we have here the basic forms of dominance and submission which in the human species become highly varied and qualified by the impact of culture.

Groups and Leaders

The processes of dominance and submission are neatly illustrated in those studies of small groups designed to show how leaders emerge. We discussed some aspects of such studies in Chapter 10. We shall have something to say later about the rise of leaders in such groups. At this point we cite an illustration of group formation and leadership.

As a means of selecting candidates for officer training, the British Army in World War II set up what was called the War Office Selection Board. These boards were made up of civilian and army personnel whose job it was to set certain tasks for small groups of prospective candidates and then to observe and judge how these men developed teamwork—especially how certain individuals came to take roles of directing, controlling, and influencing the acts of others. In short, they wished to find out how leadership emerged. Some of the tasks took place outdoors. These included scaling high walls, planning and executing the building of a bridge across a small chasm, and a variety of other difficult tasks—none of which could be accomplished by any one individual—but could be done by the group co-ordinating its efforts. Other tasks took place

indoors and consisted of group discussions of current political problems or the setting of some kind of problem which had to be solved by the group as a whole.

The aim of these activities was to discover what men came to take the lead in planning and executing the various assigned obligations. Sometimes a highly verbal chap would begin almost at once to direct the acts of the group, only later to be superseded by another, though quieter, person who had sized up the situation more adequately and came up with satisfactory solutions. So, too, it sometimes happened that one man would come to take a dominant role in a field exercise only to relinquish it entirely in group discussions of social problems.

These projects are a good illustration of the manner in which a number of men, previously completely unacquainted, could under the stress of a job to be done form themselves into a co-ordinating group with some kind of leadership. Such schemes as this proved helpful in screening officer candidates in the British Army. Later, similar selection projects were used in this country by the Office of Strategic Services. Like devices have been used in industry and elsewhere in the selection of personnel.

Leadership and Headship

In many societies, and certainly in our own democratic world, we must distinguish between that form of dominance which is imposed on group members and that form which is voluntarily determined by the followers or members of the group themselves. The former we call *headship*, the latter *voluntary leadership*. Headship rests upon the formal institutional arrangements. These usually include a certain hierarchy of power distributed in terms of rank or position. Moreover, these positions or statuses are associated with certain kinds of roles or jobs. For example, in industry there is a range from the corporation head through the managerial staff to the foreman, and from him to the subforeman and thence to the workmen. The president of a university, the dean, and the heads of departments represent a gradation of academic power. Officers in military units are a good illustration of gradation of role and status in terms of headship. In our own time most of these particular organizational headships are associated with our complex secondary-group life.

Voluntary leadership is that form of dominance which is more or less willingly accepted by the members who are influenced or controlled. Such voluntary accommodation has to be made by a sufficient number of followers that the others will come into line. In our own society, elected officers of governmental agency, of a school board, representatives of the workers in unions, and leaders of all sorts of informal groups are illustrations of voluntary leadership. Many of these voluntary leaders are

associated with certain primary-group functions in which face-to-face relationships are particularly important. Yet, in political parties and other large-scale operations the function of voluntary leadership is equally significant.

There is also a third kind of dominance which arises in a society where a class system tends to become more or less formalized and widely accepted. This we call class or status dominance. This form of dominance is in some ways closely related to headship, but in this third type all the members of a given stratum of society are in a position, by virtue of their accepted status, to influence, control, or command those below them. This is a kind of social "pecking order" on a grand scale!

Class dominance exemplifies what has sometimes been called the pyramid of power. This figure of speech derives from the common assumption that class systems may be described geometrically in the form of a triangle. The masses form the bottom, with successively smaller divisions or levels above, and at the apex the élite who, though few in numbers, dominate the others. Individuals in the different social levels tend to reflect this hierarchy of power. Where this class structure is highly rigid we may speak of a caste system. In other status systems there is considerable fixity, yet some upward or downward mobility occurs. Sometimes the class organization—such as we have in this country—reveals the power factors to be less evident and much more flexible.

In any case, the upper classes induce in their members an expectation of ascendency and stimulate the feeling of dominance. As one goes down the social ladder, the relationships are successively those of deference to persons above and dominance toward those below. As we saw in Chapter 8, this class organization represents a kind of subculture which, in turn, has definite effects upon the personality of the members of the different classes. It stands to reason then that the leadership function of class status would reflect these very differences.

In the actual operation of many institutionalized groups, the head often becomes to all intents and purposes a voluntary leader. He has to become so in order to secure the support of group members. In fact, in a democratic society it is usually believed highly important that group members come to regard organizational heads as essentially voluntary leaders. As we shall see, the shift from formality and complexity of institutionalized secondary groups to informality and simplicity of the primary-group organization is important.

Against this general background, the balance of this chapter will deal, first, with the determinants of leadership, such as physique, intelligence, and social-cultural factors; second, with basic variables, both within the acts of dominance and within the external situation; third, with personality types and social roles as applied to leaders; and, fourth, with the relations of leaders and their followers. This final section will

bring us back to a full realization that dominance always takes place within the matrix of social interaction and that outside this matrix it has no meaning.

GENERAL DETERMINANTS OF DOMINANCE

Early Theory

A number of older theories have been put forward regarding the determinants of dominance and leadership. One of the best known in the nineteenth century was that of Thomas Carlyle, the English essayist. His great-man theory of history held essentially that history was made by the dominant and leading men of a given time. Moreover, these men were assumed to have certain special gifts or talents unlike those of other men. The more democratically oriented Ralph Waldo Emerson, essayist and poet, rewrote the Carlyle point of view in his little essay entitled "Representative Men." In this essay, he took the position that while leadership was tremendously important in the development of culture and its functioning, nevertheless these men represented the mass of people in a given society. Both Carlyle and Emerson, however, felt, as did many other people at that time, that the leading men of their day or of any historical period, for that matter, possessed something in the way of special and unique talents. Today, such a view is hardly held by any serious student of personality and culture. Rather, individuals who take positions of dominance come to be viewed as characterized by traits and roles not unlike those of other men except with reference to certain circumstances.

Multiple Factors

More recent theory has recognized a variety of factors: biosocial and cultural. These factors, in turn, are affected by the interplay of learning and the particular situation. From the point of view of biology, the most obvious factor is that of physique or body build. The classic study which tried to link physique and leadership is that of E. D. Gowin in his *The Executive and His Control of Men* (1915). Gowin found that certain executives, whom we would classify as organizational heads, were taller and heavier than the average groups of people they controlled. Also persons in executive positions—the so-called doers—were taller and heavier than individuals whom he classified as thinkers. Though the differences were not very great, they do suggest that in certain types of dominance involving physical powers height and weight are important in determining these roles.

This type-approach through physique reminds one, of course, of the whole Kretschmer schema of the relationship of physique to personality.

If the Kretschmer thesis has any merit, it would then follow that the larger and heavier physique would be associated with extroverted personality characteristics. This, in turn, would fall in with Gowin's theory that such people tend to be doers and executives rather than thinkers.

Differences in intelligence also rest on biological foundations and such differences may influence the emergence of leaders and followers. Keith Sward's study of intelligence scores of 114 college leaders, matched with 114 non-leader students, indicated that 70 per cent of the former reached or exceeded the median score of the latter. Moreover, the differences were statistically significant.[1] Comparable studies of men in various practical positions are rare. If we define dominance so as to include attainment in scholarship, research, and the arts as well as in management of men, then, it seems to the present writer, intelligence becomes increasingly important as a basic element in determining leadership or headship. This is borne out in the various studies of exceptional children and so-called geniuses.[2]

Some students of personality and leadership have contended that the ordinal position of a child in the family may influence his interactions with parents and siblings and therefore encourage or repress certain trends toward dominance. Alfred Adler, the Austrian psychiatrist, contended that when a parent transferred his major affections from a first child to the second, the first would develop various compensatory, aggressive means of securing attention and power. A variety of studies have attempted to prove or disprove the Adler thesis but without much clear-cut success. Florence Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, for example, found in a group of nearly 300 kindergarten children that those who were oldest in their families tended to be submissive, and that in 20 per cent of this oldest group this lack of aggressiveness was "manifested to a rather extreme degree." They report that the middle child tends to be less aggressive but not so markedly as the oldest. The youngest child, on the average, showed no tendencies to be either dominant or submissive. In contrast to this, the only-child group had a much higher proportion of aggressive and self-confident children. This group was also the most demanding in wishing demonstrations of fondness from others. They were likewise the most gregarious. So, too, they were the most easily excited and given to the greatest variations in mood.[3]

Yet ordinal position alone can hardly be the sole determining factor in such matters. Rather it is a correlation of personal-social learning, the

[1] Keith Sward, *An Experimental Study of Leadership*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota Library, 1929.

[2] Lewis M. Terman, Melita H. Oden, and others, *The Gifted Child Grows Up*, Vol. 4 of *Genetic Studies of Genius* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1947). Chapters 23 and 26 are particularly pertinent to our discussion.

[3] Florence L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships upon the Development of Personality," *J. of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, 34:45–71.

cultural training, physical condition, and a variety of other factors which will make one child forward and aggressive and another docile and submissive. It is interesting in this connection that Mildred Parton, on the basis of her observations of children in a nursery school, found that some tended to be what she called diplomatic in their approach to control and others the bully type. The former used persuasion and suggestion in getting what they wanted; the latter attempted to control by coercion.[4]

The social and cultural factors which play a part in the development of dominance depend essentially upon learning. As we have already seen, learning, in turn, varies among individuals because of differential ability. This differential capacity rests upon a biological foundation, and we are back to the point made above regarding the possible effect of native ability on dominance. The second factor is that of the situation in which the learning takes place and in which the dominant behavior comes to be a part. A combination of learning and situation must be taken into account. It is especially important to find out what kind of characteristics the child develops in the course of growing up in the family, neighborhood, and community, which in turn would be factors that would help him to become a dominant individual later in life. On the cultural side, there is the whole question of status dominance already noted. A child from an upper-class family may be trained from childhood to take on certain kinds of social responsibilities which a child in the lower classes would not. Certainly in the history of British politics the aristocratic classes have long been the source of leaders of all parties. Only in recent times have leaders begun to emerge from some of the lower ranks. In contrast, in our own country with its high upward mobility, political leaders as well as economic leaders have been recruited from a wide variety of strata. Nevertheless, the upper classes in our own society tend to contribute a far higher proportion of leaders than do the lower classes.[5]

Let us now consider some additional factors which enter into the making and functioning of leaders.

BASIC VARIABLES IN LEADERSHIP

Two Basic Variables

In describing and analyzing social dominance, two basic variables must be considered. On the one hand, there are the factors within the acts of dominance itself. That is, what are the personality traits of the

[4] Mildred B. Parton, "Leadership Among Pre-School Children," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1933, 27:430–440.

[5] See Frank W. Taussig and C. J. Joslyn, *American Business Leaders* (New York, Macmillan, 1932). For an approximate replication of this research, see W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1955).

leader or head? On the other hand, we must take into account situational and group factors. With respect to the first, we want to know how the personality of a dominant individual is organized, especially with regard to his role and status. This would involve noting specific as well as more general traits of leadership. Attention should certainly be given to the nature and range of the influence and control which he exercises over others. Then, too, we should know the method as well as the content of the communication circuits between the leader or head and those under his domination.

As to the group and situational factors, they cover a wide range. These would include the size of the group, the nature and degree of formal organizational structure, the goals—primary and derived—and the degrees in which the goals were obtained. Attention must also be given to the informal groups and the appearance of leadership in such situations. What we call informal groups appear in formal organizations as well as in informal relationships.

A consideration of the situational factors would also include attention to the functional roles within the group. In fact, the whole topic of social role in relationship to personality traits or types would have to be examined. For example, what is the distinctive social role of the planner, the arbitrator, or the organizer? As we shall see, in studies on leadership, there has been some confusion between the significance of basic personality traits or types and the particular social roles such individuals play. This, of course, is not a special problem in the leadership but has to do with the whole relationship of personality type to social role.

Finally, some consideration must be given to the factor of class position in both the formal and informal type of association. As we have noted elsewhere, status has to do with the relative position, within a hierarchy, of the power or rating of individuals on an inferiority-superiority scale with respect to their comparative possession or embodiment of some attribute or characteristic. Obviously, the status factor is linked with the formal structure of a given group, or in informal groupings the status factors may emerge in terms of particular roles which individuals play.

The personality and the group and situational factors will be fully understood only by examining their functions together. Also some of the important background elements must be understood. With regard to the latter, for example, the life history of a dominant person may be extremely important in understanding his present functioning. Then, again, the history of an organization, its structure and functioning, may be important in understanding the interactional relations of management and workers. For example, Elliott Jaques' study of industrial organization in England indicated that in certain instances the managerial staff had

developed a system of dealing with union officials which served to bypass some of their own staff in the lower echelons—for example, the foremen. In working out the relationships of management to the workers, this whole system had been in existence for a long time, but it tended to break down the formal structure of the plant that had been set up in an earlier period.[6] Or, to take another example, the long history of one-family control of a given industry produces a tradition which makes for trouble when the company begins to expand in the direction of new undertakings. Managerial policies that have been in the hands of one or two individuals now begin to interfere with the successful operation of the industry as it is moved out of the earlier forms of control.

Group and Situational Factors

In keeping with the essential standpoint of this book, we regard the group and situational factors as one phase in the larger interactional matrix in which dominance and subordination occurs. Some people, especially those in the field called "group dynamics," regard leadership not as "an attribute of the personality" but as "a quality" of a given role "within a particular or specified or social system." [7] The position of Gibb is essentially that of Dorwin Cartwright, Alvin Zander, and others who believe that we should first identify various group functions with which certain leadership is associated. From the viewpoint of Cartwright and Zander, "Any member of a group may be a leader in the sense that he may take action which serves group functions." [8] These students of group behavior are skeptical of the earlier and more common view that there are certain psychological elements within the acts of dominance themselves, or in the situation of leadership or headship, which must be regarded as particularly important in the planning, decision-making, and co-ordinating of activities of the group. Our own view is that both personality and situational factors must be taken into account. The whole position of interactionism represented in this book could not hold otherwise. At this juncture we shall examine some of the group factors.

The size of the group is certainly a factor of some importance. A group of large membership implies, first of all, considerable individual differences among the members. Secondly, the social-distance factor would operate in a large group in a different way than it would in a small one. For example, how close does one member feel to another in a large group? In the third place, if a large group persists through time it is pretty certain to develop certain kinds of structuring. Of

[6] Elliott Jaques, *The Changing Culture of a Factory* (London, Tavistock Publications, 1951).

[7] See Cecil A. Gibb, "Principles and Traits of Leadership," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1947, 42:267–284.

[8] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1953), p. 540.

course, often the structuring is laid down as an organizational feature of the group from the beginning. This would be true of a large factory. In contrast, in a temporary grouping such as that presented by a political speech to thousands of people during some campaign, the dominance of the speaker over the audience would be temporary. On the other hand, a political leader who operates successfully through a party organization might build up a considerable following which would be persistent in time and which would tend to develop some kind of structure. This is the situation that we find in many social movements, such as the rise of Hitler in Nazi Germany. Such personal appeal and dominance is surely different from that of the president of a large corporation or a large national labor union. In the latter the head man, surrounded by an elaborately structured power hierarchy and gradations of authority, may be considerably removed from the day-by-day operations of his organization and from any close identification with the workers.

In one study John K. Hemphill found that the reported behavior of leaders who are rated as superior "differed significantly in terms of the size of the group in which they functioned." There was greater tolerance for "leader-centered" forms of dominance in the larger groups. These findings suggest that the fact of size may be one important variable which influences the relationship between leadership behavior and the ratings which workers give regarding effective performance.[9]

So, too, the form and effectiveness of the communication system in the group may be influenced by group size as well as by the nature of its formal organization. Surely a working group of small size, say of ten or twelve members, can operate, under a foreman, with a simple system of orders and directions, including, perhaps, an advice-complaint arrangement on the part of the workers. By comparison, the communication system required in a large plant would be much more complex.

In a study of group structure, Hemphill worked out fifteen dimensions or characteristics. These included size, viscidity (sense of unity), homogeneity, flexibility, stability, permeability, polarization, autonomy, intimacy, and control—all referring particularly to the group as a unit. In addition there were position, participation, potency, hedonic tone, and dependence—these latter five expressing the individual's relationship to his group. On the basis of certain criteria of leadership, Hemphill found some correlations between leadership adequacy and certain of these group characteristics. The two highest correlations were those between leader adequacy and viscidity (.52), and hedonic tone (.51). Most of the correlations were low and some of no significance whatsoever. With respect to the higher correlations, Hemphill remarks: [10]

[9] John K. Hemphill, "Relations Between the Size of the Group and the Behavior of 'Superior' Leaders," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1950, 32:11–32.

[10] John K. Hemphill, *Situational Factors in Leadership*, Bureau of Educational Research Monograph 32 (Columbus, Ohio State University, 1949), p. 100. All quotations by permission.

Behavior which is associated with being considered an adequate leader of a group is also associated with the general level of pleasantness of the group membership (hedonic tone) and the tendency of the group to function as a unit (viscidity). The interrelation between the hedonic tone, viscidity, and leadership adequacy and the leader's behavior may point to certain important implications about the functions of an individual who directs group activity. A leader's most important function in the dynamics of group behavior may well be that of maintaining group membership as a satisfying experience for the members of the group and facilitating their acting as a unit rather than as separate individuals. The findings of this study would support such a view.

Organizational structure is important as a phase of the situation. By organization we mean a social group in which there is differentiation of role and responsibility regarding the aim, task, or goal of the group. The purpose of such division of labor or specialization is to reach the goal effectively, that is, to complete the task in the most efficient manner. In many organizations the leadership functions of directing others and of assuming responsibility becomes an important element in the total group operation. Ralph C. Davis recognizes this when he writes: [11]

> The development of organization structure is largely a problem in the division of responsibility, and involves two important problems: (1) the grouping of similar functions to form the various organization elements in a manner that will promote effective co-operation, and (2) the determination of the proper relationships between functional groups and organization elements, with a view to promoting both co-operation and effective executive leadership.

The importance of responsibility is recognized by all students of formal institutional structures. Psychologically considered, what is responsibility? It is first an obligation to complete an assigned task and, secondly, it is an obligation to someone else for such an assignment. The latter, of course, implies a certain scaling of power in an echelon of responsibility.

Organization, therefore, rests upon a system of stable expectations regarding differential responsibility and the relationship of participating members to each other. It is, in short, a cultural pattern which sets down in advance ways for the individual to act. But what the individual does, of course, concerns his interactions with other people. That is, the organization alone does not determine role expectations of its members; the latter also establish expectations for each other and for the organization as a whole. This will be true regardless of the size, the aim, the form of hierarchy and stratification or the member characteristics of the group.

Responsibilities or duties are set down in the formal structuring of the group. But additional types of expectancies develop in the interrelationships of individuals to each other. This is another way of saying that no formal structuring of a group can completely determine in

[11] Ralph C. Davis, *Industrial Organization and Management* (New York, Harper, 1940), p. 81.

advance all the interpersonal relationships. This will vary, of course, with the particular type of organization. For instance, in a military organization this structuring is far more specific and detailed than in a loosely organized recreational group. In the latter the responsibilities of members may be vaguely defined. But this is not to say that there are no responsibilities in such groupings as these. Ralph M. Stogdill has summarized the whole matter in the following words: [12]

> Responsibility, in its broadest scope, defines not only the duties for which a member is accountable; it defines also the persons to whom and for whom he is accountable in the discharge of his duties. In doing so, it also defines a member's formal status, or location in the organization hierarchy. Authority and formal status systems in organization are but aspects of the division of responsibility.
>
> Responsibilities in a systematic organization are determined by the assignment of persons to particular positions, the duties of which are outlined in an organization manual or organization chart. In less systematic organizations the responsibilities of a particular job or position may be determined by on-the-spot instructions, by general hints or by unverbalized assumptions. In a systematic organization an individual's *work patterns* (the tasks he *actually* performs) will correspond fairly closely with his *responsibility patterns* (the tasks he is *supposed* to perform). However, as the mission and activities of the organization change there will be found in many instances an increasing discrepancy between the tasks being performed and the responsibilities originally outlined and defined.

The informal groupings which arise within the formal organization perform important functions not only in productive efficiency but in the matter of group morale. Cliques and friendships develop among the workers, and within these leaders emerge. Sometimes these congeniality groups have bearing upon the work operations of the plant itself, and sometimes they deal only with recreational relationships. With regard to productivity, one important function of these informal groupings of workers is to protect them against practices which they interpret as a menace to their welfare. These practices are a kind of subculture of the employees vis-à-vis management. For example, in one plant pressure was put on any worker who tended to exceed a certain minimum standard of output. This pressure consisted of ridicule, name calling, such as "rate killer," and even a certain amount of mild physical punishment. In this particular study, many of the men admitted to the research team that they could have turned out much more work but said they feared that if production were to increase too much, then the rates of pay would be cut.[13]

[12] Ralph M. Stogdill, "Leadership, Membership, and Organization," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1950, 47:1–14. Quotation is from p. 5. By permission of the author and the American Psychological Association, Inc.

[13] See F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1939); and their *Management and Morale* (same publisher, 1943).

Out of some of these informal groups, particular types of leaders emerge. In one plant under investigation there were two leaders. One of them, Mr. A, an excellent operator, habitually took the brunt of all kinds of criticism from the foreman and other supervisors, both of workers as well as criticism directed to the whole group. This served to prevent external pressure from upsetting the morale of the group. He was the buffer between the workers and the supervisory staff. The other leader, Mr. B, more or less regulated the behavior of the group in relationship to the work itself. For example, he taught the new men various tricks of the trade, saw to it that they appeared to be busy when the supervisory staff made inspectional rounds, and advised the workers not to tell other workers that their jobs were easy or that they got through the day's work early and had time to loaf.

The relationship of such informal leadership to productivity was also brought out in this same study. The group chief or supervisor in charge of the workers in this particular section always consulted with either Mr. B or Mr. A about particular questions. Moreover, the group chief defended the workers against the foreman. He refused to "bawl out" the men as the latter suggested, since he found that he got better results with more friendly tactics.

Recreational associations of an informal sort provide many personal satisfactions. The congeniality group is a widespread form of such association. In such groups there is a good deal of emotional release and an opportunity for expressing hostility regarding the managers of the formal organization. Sometimes leaders appear within a congeniality group, sometimes not. It often depends on how much structuring occurs.

On the development of the informal organization, Stogdill has this to say: [14]

> Informal organization comes about as a result of the development of discrepancies (*a*) between work performance and responsibilities as defined and (*b*) between informal interactions and formally defined interactions. Thus leadership is ever confronted with the task of reconciling discrepancies—discrepancies between what ought to be done and what is being done, between goals and achievements, between organizational needs and available resources, between the needs of individual members and the requirements of organization, between formal lines of co-operation and informal patterns of co-operation.

Formal responsibility may be described as two-dimensional: horizontal and vertical. The former represents the division of responsibility for various types of work; the latter for different levels of decision-making. It shows the persons to whom one is accountable as well as those for whose work one is responsible. The vertical dimension defines the formal authority and the status systems of the organization.

Personal interactions can be seen as varying in both vertical and

[14] Stogdill, *op. cit.*, p. 7. By permission.

horizontal directions. The vertical aspect of personal interaction is recognized by a number of strata or echelons above and below one's own. Some persons may be seen to work only with others at the same level. Others tend to work only with subordinates and still others tend to work only with superiors. The horizontal dimension is indicated by the range or number of persons with whom an individual interacts. Thus, in the Ohio State Leadership studies, it was found that technical consultants and staff aides tended to spend more of their time with assistants and subordinates. Members in co-ordinate positions tended to spend time with superiors and subordinates as well as with associates at the same level in the organization. These types of interpersonal relations are established within the structure and give some measure of the degree of control or dominance which an individual exerts. In other words, group organization tends to define and to limit the leadership functions.

Just as the organization sets certain boundaries or limits by providing a framework within which the members are called upon to carry out their duties, so the individual may provide barriers to the influence of the organization upon his own behavior. For example, some members may be limited in intellectual capacity; others may be highly skilled technicians but not capable of handling interactional situations. Each member of such an organized group brings into it his past experiences, his motivations, his ideas, his personal goals, and his commitments to other organizations. All these tend to modify and determine his capacity for participation.

And, finally, the nature of the group will affect the acceptance or rejection of any inconsistency or show of emotion on the part of the leader. Hemphill remarks: [15]

> Lack of emotional control is less acceptable as a part of successful leadership in a highly structured group than in the informal. . . . Inconsistency in behavior, as revealed, for instance, by reversing decisions, is found more frequently among successful leaders of less flexible, more permeable, less polarized, less pleasant, less united groups than in those with opposite degrees of these characteristics.

Elements Within Acts of Dominance

Let us now examine some features of the acts of dominance. This we can get at by commenting first on the approach to leadership through a study of personality traits. For many years the trait approach was a central theme of most studies of leadership, but in the end the results did not prove satisfactory. In the first place, the defining of traits is difficult. In the second place, it is hard to discover the precise relationship between given traits and given leadership behavior.

[15] John K. Hemphill, "The Leader and His Group," *Educational Research Bulletin*, 1949, 28:225–229, 245–246. Quotation is from p. 245. By permission.

Though many psychologists of the laboratory and mental-test tradition put their chief reliance on the trait approach, hardly any of them when confronted with the practical everyday problems of leadership overlooked the fact that traits operate in a social situation, not in a vacuum. Moreover, some stress the correlation of the specific situation and of a specific trait; others allow for a more general situation. For example, E. L. Munson, writing of military leadership in the American Army, discusses such traits as tactfulness, cheerfulness, decisiveness, initiative, and duty. But he nowhere ignores the basic fact that such characteristics are related to the social situation of the officers and the men.

Although the earlier trait approach has been largely abandoned, this does not mean that students of leadership are unaware of particular combinations of personality elements in given leaders. Speaking of the general characteristics of leaders, and without considering the nature of the group itself, Hemphill remarks: [16]

> He [the leader] exhibits behavior indicative of his ability to advance the purpose of the group. He exhibits behavior indicating competence in administrative functions. His behavior is characterized by the ability to inspire the members of the group to greater activity, or to set the pace for the group. It is of a kind which seems to add to the individual member's feeling of security in his place in the group. The leader's behavior is relatively free from activities serving only his own interests.

Other aspects of the leader performance have to do with the frequency of his assuming a dominant position, the frequency of the delegation of authority to others, and of the carrying out of his duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis the total group. Shartle and his co-workers developed a method designed to report on how a leader or head performed his tasks. In one study they collected 1,800 specific statements of leader behavior. On the basis of this and other materials they set up nine dimensions of leadership behavior. These were as follows: (1) *initiation* or the frequency with which a leader originates, facilitates, or resists new ideas and new practices; (2) *membership* or the frequency with which a leader mixes with the group and stresses informal interaction between himself and members; (3) *representation* or the frequency with which the leader defends his group against attack and advances the interests of his group and acts on their behalf; (4) *integration* or the frequency with which a leader subordinates individual behavior, encourages pleasant group atmosphere, tries to reduce conflict between members, or promotes individual adjustments to the group; (5) *organization* or the frequency with which the leader defines or structures his own work, the work of other members, or the relationships among members in a performance of their task; (6) *domination* or the frequency with which a leader restricts the behavior of individuals within the groups or takes

[16] Hemphill, *Situational Factors in Leadership*, p. 90

over decision-making or restricts the expression of opinion; (7) *communication* or the frequency with which the leader provides information to members, seeks information from them, facilitates the exchange of information, or shows awareness of affairs pertaining to the group; (8) *recognition* or the frequency with which the leader engages in behavior that expresses approval or disapproval of the conduct of group members; and (9) *production* or the frequency with which the leader sets the level of effort or achievement or prods members to greater effort or achievement.[17]

Another consideration is the measurement or evaluation of the results of leader behavior. One obvious evaluation is the degree of attainment of the goal. In industry this could be determined by the figures on production of a given unit or of the total plant; in military operations by success or failure of a given mission. In addition, there might be certain individual factors to be taken into account. In the individual-centered evaluation such matters are important: the personal success of the leader as measured by his advancement in rank or salary, the choice of leader by group members, the effectiveness or other merit rating by group members or others, his own sense of job satisfaction, and the degree of conformity to the role expectation or the degree of role change made by the leader.

On the other hand, the group-centered evaluation might call for the measurement of (1) group efficiency in terms of productiveness as well as in terms of group satisfaction and morale, (2) the survival of the group as measured by member turnover or persistence, by competition with other groups, and by achievement and maintenance of democratic values including utilization of members in decision-making, and (3) the strengthening of the formal organization through informal groupings.

Status is another important situational factor which must be taken into account. This would include both the attitudes toward status and the perception of status on the part of the leader and of the follower. Brief mention of this has already been made. As one part of the Ohio State University project on leadership, Melvin Seeman studied status relations in four school systems in selected communities in Ohio. He analyzed the ratings of the superintendents regarding the teachers and those of the teachers regarding their superintendents. His findings probably have wider applications.

Four dimensions or areas of leader behavior were set up as the basis for the construction of a rating scheme and questionnaire: (1) *Communication*—the extent to which there was upward or downward transfer of ideas, notices, attitudes, directives, or rules bearing on the

[17] Carroll L. Shartle, *An Approach to the Study of Leadership in Organizations*, prepared for the Social Science Research Council Conference on Theory of Organization, Princeton University, June 18–19, 1952.

activities of the organization. (2) *Separatism*—extent of formal and informal interaction, extent to which the leader insists on being recognized as clearly having a higher and more distinctive position as against the degree to which the leader regards himself as just another member of the group. (3) *Change*—the extent to which the leader is receptive to change, to new ideas, and the extent to which he initiates or facilitates modifications, or the degree to which he insists on conformity to the older and routine ways. (4) *Domination*—the degree to which the leader restricts the group's decision-making power, fails to permit individual freedom on the job, restrains personal expression, and indulges in criticism destructive of personal worth.

A series of measurements of status were developed covering both general status and measures specific to the given respondent in a given situation. Some important conclusions from this study are as follows: "Significant correlations (generally at the .05 level) were found between the respondent's seen own status position and the perception of leader behavior, such that high status position of the respondent was associated with seeing high communication on the part of the leader, low separatism, high change, and low domination."[18] With regard to the ideal leadership desired of a school superintendent, there were certain splits in opinion among the teachers as to the degree of nondirective as against more direct control. In many instances, some 25 to 40 per cent of the respondents chose as their ideal leader a person who would give them direction or who had the quality of "leaderness."

Among Americans there is a curious ambivalence in attitude regarding equality and democracy and leadership. On the one hand, we talk much of equalitarian attitudes and behavior, and yet we operate definitely within a hierarchy of power in industry, business, politics, and elsewhere. Such ambivalence was reflected in this study.

Another study in the Ohio group was made by Vernon J. Bentz on leadership in a liberal arts college. The status of each departmental chairman was rated by his staff members by means of a seven-point scale based on the following items: general prestige of a department chairman, his influence in community affairs, his social position in the community, and his economic position in the community. In addition, each department member rated himself according to these same criteria. Among other findings it was found that "those department members who accorded themselves the higher status positions also accorded their department chairman higher status." Moreover, those members

who accorded higher status positions in the community both to themselves and to their department chairman tended also to describe their department differently from those members who accorded lower status positions both to

[18] Melvin Seeman, *A Status Factor Approach to Leadership*, Personnel Research Board (Columbus, Ohio State University, 1950), p. 79. By permission.

themselves and to their chairman. Those who accorded higher status to themselves and their chairman described their departments as less stratified, with less emphasis upon rank and status differences among the members, as having a higher degree of member participation in departmental activities, and as being more pleasant and cohesive groups.[19]

Of particular interest was the comparison of the judgments made by the men who published a great many articles and books and those who published little or nothing. The men who published much regarded their departments as of very little importance to them, felt that the department had little control over their behavior, tended to play down rank and status differences of department members, thought that the relations of members in the departments tended to be intimate. If the man who published much was also chairman, he tended to initiate little change in departmental program. The high publisher also considered his status in the community and that of his chairman to be relatively high. In contrast, the man who published little or nothing regarded his department as being important to him. He felt that the department had considerable control over his behavior, tended to stress the rank and status differences among the department members, and thought the relations between department members was less intimate. If such a man were chairman of his department, he tended to initiate more changes in departmental activities. Also the man who published little considered his status position in the community and that of his chairman to be relatively low.

These differences clearly reflect the differences in the source of status and satisfaction. It is clear that the member of a faculty in a liberal arts college may regard himself fundamentally as a member of a larger body of scholars in his field. He can only do this in any effective way, of course, if he publishes a good deal and thus gets to be known in this larger confraternity of scholars. On the other hand, the man who publishes little or nothing turns to the college and to his department for status and satisfactions. While Bentz does not note it, such people are also likely to stress such factors as their teaching ability and their success with the students.

Many studies have been made of a variety of other factors making for effective leadership and headship. Thus, Douglas McGregor regards three factors as basic to the successful operation of superior-subordinate relations in an industrial plant. (1) There is the dependence of the subordinate on the superior officer. This tends to satisfy certain basic needs that rest probably on early childhood patterns. It is quite likely that the foreman or supervisory staff member represents to the worker a father figure or a mother figure. (2) There is the need for a sense of security. Here the protective functions of the dominant person come

[19] Vernon J. Bentz, *A Study of Leadership in a Liberal Arts College,* Personnel Research Board (Columbus, Ohio State University, 1950), pp. 11, 12. By permission.

into play. These are associated with the organizational and economic features of wages, retirement plans, and such things as health services. Also making for a sense of security is the atmosphere of approval on the part of the supervisory staff. So, too, knowledge or factual information is important to the worker. He wants to know something of the managerial policy, of the rules and requirements of the job. He wants to know his duties, and something of the personal peculiarities of the supervisor, especially the opinion of the supervisor of his own performance. Likewise, the worker wants some advance knowledge of changes in the program which would affect him, so that he will not be exposed to critical situations without some preparation. Moreover, consistency of discipline is important. One should not play fast and loose with the rules. The whole emotional atmosphere is important here. Unanticipated and unstructured actions on the part of supervisors tend to make for insecurity, some uneasiness, and anxiety. And (3) there is the need for a certain amount of independence. While the worker wishes to feel himself a part of the plant, he also desires the right to criticize and suggest changes. He wants to be recognized and rewarded for satisfactory work performance.[20]

One significant element in the relationship of leaders and followers is the imagery each has of the other and of themselves. It is important to determine how people in the leader-follower situation perceive their role and status and relationships to each other. A study on naval leadership by Ellis L. Scott shows how the social structure of an organization is perceived by its members and how these perceptions are, in turn, related to patterns of superior, peer, and subordinate relationships as these are defined in the formal organizational charts.

> Accuracy in perception of organization chart structure appears to be highly related to lines of authority and responsibility. The superior, who has authority over the respondent and to whom the respondent is responsible, is perceived most accurately. Subordinates, over whom the respondent exercises authority and who are responsible to the respondent, are perceived next most accurately. The peer group, with whom the respondent has the least well-defined authority and responsibility relationships, is perceived least accurately. The high, formally-defined, status of the superior, and his crucial position in contributing to the respondent's advancement in the organization, may be important factors in the relatively accurate perceptions of superiors. The fulfillment of his responsibility also inclines the respondent toward his subordinates. His perceptual field, therefore, tends to be vertical, rather than horizontal.[21]

[20] Douglas McGregor, "Conditions of Effective Leadership in Industrial Organization," *J. of Consulting Psychology*, 1944, 8:55–63. Reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1947), pp. 427–435.

[21] Ellis L. Scott, *An Analysis of Discrepancies Between Formal Charts and Members: Perception of Organization Structure in a Naval Squadron*, Personnel Research Board (Columbus, Ohio State University, n.d.), p. 8. See his *Perceptions of Organization and Leader Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1952). By permission.

PERSONALITY TYPE AND SOCIAL ROLE

Basic Personality and Role

If we consider leadership in terms of roles, we may well ask what relation there is between roles and the deeper personality make-up. First we must distinguish between the basic personality and the social role. The former involves mechanisms or characteristics derived chiefly from the organic constitutional foundations of the individual and from his early experiences. Rigidity of outlook as against flexibility of outlook, the nature of frustrations and anxieties, and the use the person makes of such basic mechanisms as identification, displacement, projection, and others are significant. Such contrasting types as introvert or extrovert illustrate basic personality patterns. On the other hand, the social type or general role derives from the play of social and cultural forces upon the individual in the process of his socialization. Such terms as "salesman," "bureaucrat," and "doctor" illustrate major social roles.

There have been a great many attempts to categorize the dominant social roles of the individuals in the field of leadership. One of the older of these was developed by O. L. Schwarz in his dichotomy between the man of action and the man of thought.[22] The former is the executive, the managerial type of person who is concerned with directing the activities of others. The latter is the individual who carries on philosophical cogitations, plans and executes scientific research, or who is the creative artist or writer. The leadership of the man of thought is largely in advancing the frontiers of knowledge. The masses seldom, if ever, understand such people and their contributions. As a result, their audience must always remain small and specialized.

Sir Martin Conway, an English writer in social psychology, discussed leadership of political publics and action crowds. He divided leaders into three types: the *crowd representative,* whom he described as the individual who organized groups. This type falls partly into our category of headship. The leader is thought of as representing a temporary aggregate of persons. The second classification was the *crowd compeller,* who becomes dominant not because he mirrors the crowd but because he obliges the crowd to believe in him. The political demagogue and the religious revivalist are good examples. The third was the *crowd exponent* who, sensing the vague feelings and motivations of the masses, is able to lead them because he verbalizes and crystallizes their wishes and directs them to act.[23]

[22] O. L. Schwarz, *General Types of Superior Men* (Boston, R. G. Badger, 1916).
[23] Sir W. M. Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1915).

F. C. Bartlett, another British psychologist, has classified leaders into the institutional type, the dominant type, and the persuasive type. The institutional leader is illustrated by the executive or manager.[24] The authority of the *institutional leader* rests upon traditions, customs, mores, creeds of the church, the class, the economic order, the school, or the legal forms of the state. In contrast, the *dominant leader* is described as aggressive, coercive, and given to vigorous action. He is similar to Conway's crowd compeller. Bartlett's third type, *persuasive leader,* exercises his control chiefly by words and other symbols. He uses suggestion, flattery, and all the verbal devices of the spellbinder. In political and religious fields, men of this type are free with promises to the masses. They talk glibly of the rights of the common man, of correcting abuses, of reforming or revolutionizing the social order.

These broad categories indicate certain generalities about leadership. But it is apparent that if we would examine the origin and meaning of the social role of the leader, and if we would get at the correlation between the role and the basic psychological make-up of the individual, we must examine leaders in particular areas of activity. In our own society, students of political behavior have done more than any other group in the analysis of certain basic social roles. By way of illustration, we shall discuss briefly the political boss, the democratic leader, the bureaucrat, the diplomat, the reformer, the agitator, and the theorist.

The Boss

The political boss is largely the product of modern democracy, although similar roles have appeared under other forms of government. The political boss may operate on a city, county, state, or national level. He is intimately associated with machine politics—a form of political party control by a solidified clique which has been common in our society almost from the outset of our national existence.

As a phase of machine organization for winning elections and controlling the spoils, there is a hierarchy of power leading from the boss at the top, by various echelons, down to the bottom of the organizational membership. In such a scheme of power distribution, personal fealty akin to that of the feudal order is the rule, and those who depart from it either are disciplined as a means of bringing them back into the fold or are regarded as traitors and cast out of the organization.

As a part of machine politics, the boss is born of conflict and thrives in an atmosphere of struggle for political power. Therefore he must be a good fighter, with capacity for strategy and tactics in organizing his followers to win elections and control the distribution of the rewards.

Since he is essentially concerned with gaining and holding political

[24] F. C. Bartlett, "The Social Psychology of Leadership," *J. of National Institute of Industrial Psychology,* 1926, 3:188–193.

power, the political boss is usually indifferent to political reforms unless they threaten to interfere with his activities. He distrusts and fears reform and revolutionary ideology and stands chiefly for the status quo.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that the boss lacks human qualities. He is fully aware of the factors in human behavior which make for allegiance. Toward his immediate followers as well as to the mass of voters he has sympathetic attitudes and a rather strong sense of obligation. He restores to governmental functions some of the primary-group qualities of warm sympathy and personal friendship which are lacking in a rigid bureaucracy. These are qualities that the reformer, the revolutionary agitator, and the inflexible bureaucrat usually lack.

The Democratic Leader

In contrast to the political boss is the compromiser or democratic leader. He, too, is a product of our democratic system but usually functions outside the close-knit party machine. His principal assets are compromise, toleration, and other features of accommodation. He is not cynical like the boss nor is he intolerant and inflexible as is the agitator. He is not given to viewing the world in terms of black and white. He understands individual differences and possesses human qualities of sympathy and understanding. He is a firm believer in law and order and is not likely to indulge in direct handouts to the masses as do the political bosses. In fact, in his competition with the boss, the democratic leader's adherence to principles may defeat him or undo some of his plans. As a public personality, he is, however, a potent symbol of the essential quality of democratic life: he is tolerant of differences, he is unwilling to use violence to enforce his will, and he has a certain abiding faith in the common sense of the man in the street.

The Bureaucrat

The functionary, or bureaucrat, develops as the political order becomes complex and the field of administration expands so much that a paid body of individuals must be had to operate the government. The bureaucrat is not to be confused with the top administrators in government nor with a combination of democratic leader and administrator such as we have among higher-ranking elected public officials. Rather we refer to the petty officials who are charged with the details of day-by-day execution of orders, rules, and laws.

As to role, the functionary is a man eminently practical, methodical, prudent, and disciplined in regard to his particular job. He is unhappy when he must make his own decisions, and for the most part he abhors that kind of responsibility which carries with it the likelihood of taking blame for failure. This is not to say that he does not like power, but it

is a power exercised in controlling others within the narrow framework of office routine, inspection, or supervision. As a rule he lacks imagination and initiative and operates only within the habitual frame of reference and within the limits of the necessary knowledge and skill. He is usually timid and is motivated in his loyalty and action by the deep desire for personal security. In the business world, he is typified by the bookkeeper who wants nothing of the hazards of the entrepreneur. In the governmental service, he is a bureau operator who would not risk his job on the turn of an election. He wants fixed tenure or civil service and a set of simple and direct rules. His world must be one that is narrow, complete, and easily understood.

The Diplomat

The diplomat has still other functions and possesses different characteristics. While we think of him chiefly in terms of international relations, the role is found in all situations involving potential struggle between various groups within the government or between governments.

The diplomat has to operate on general principles set down by the agency or government he represents. In general, he is closely identified with these, although not always in detail. He finds his basic satisfactions in manipulating individuals and situations, but he is not necessarily concerned with them in any personal way. He is essentially dealing with the grand strategy in a struggle for power. He is suave, not above double-dealing if it is necessary to win his point, and is able to dissociate sincerity from the job in hand. He is patient and averse to the passion of the agitator or the officiousness of the bureaucrat. He is skillful in the use of words, although they are frequently a cover for his aims. As one famous commentator put it, if a diplomat says, "yes," he means "perhaps"; if he says "perhaps," he means "no"; if he says "no," he is no diplomat.

The Reformer and the Agitator

The reformer is a rather common type in democratic societies. He may not be a violent revolutionist, although he resembles the latter in some of his teachings. Psychologically, he is usually a perfectionist. He daydreams of a better world and frequently he does not qualify this by recognizing any of the difficulties of practical operation. His convictions about changes or reforms are supported by strong emotions. He is usually incorruptible and uncompromising as to principle. His basic appeal is to man's rationality, and his elaborate verbal schemes for the future often have little or no place for man's social and emotional impulses and habits.

The agitator is an extreme reformer. He becomes excited about basic

principles and tries to transmit his enthusiasm to others. He is willing to use violence as a method of securing his perfect world and, like the reformer, he leaps quickly over day-by-day difficulties. He is dogmatic and fanatical. He idealizes revolutionary change and tends to exaggerate the differences between one set of institutions and another. He tends to see the world in terms of black versus white, of good fighting evil, and is unwilling to offer compromises. He is usually completely intolerant of divergent opinion, as well as impractical when it comes to putting change into operation.

The Theorist

Finally, it is the theorist who produces a logical picture of the world. This may be an idealistic picture or it may be one which is unpleasant. In either case, the theorist lives in the world of verbal consistency and logically-completed pictures. He is impractical and not interested either in agitating for his views or in attempting to put them into practice. In the field of politics, we consider the political theorist as standing at one end of a continuum, the opposite end of which is occupied by the political boss.

The theorist's role in science and philosophy is much the same. Often he is not concerned with empirical testing of his hypotheses but rather with organizing a rather complete systematic scheme of descriptive analysis. In actuality, of course, the research scientist and theorist may work closely together in the advancement of scientific knowledge and systematic theory.

Family Backgrounds

The origin and development of these social roles will depend on both personal-social and cultural learning. An analysis of particular cases shows that various motives and mechanisms emerge which set the pattern for the individual's life career. Thus, Harold D. Lasswell's analysis of one political agitator revealed that he had been brought up in a family in which there was a strong authoritarian father and great sibling rivalry with another brother. In this family the mother had died early and the children had been brought up by the father, who had never remarried. The father was a minister who put heavy stress on moral training. The development of the agitator's anti-authoritarian complex could be traced back to his strong resistance against the severe authority figure of his father. After completing college the agitator became a minister, but later he joined a radical movement and became a political agitator. He had a strong sense of guilt, however, at his bitter feelings of rivalry for his brother, as well as a sense of guilt with regard to his anti-authoritarian reactions. But these latter he projected outward upon what he regarded as an evil world. His earlier reactions to the father's authority

were displaced into intense opposition to capitalism, biblical orthodoxy, and militarism.[25]

The culture provided him a series of rationally acceptable views which are publicly permitted. His social role as agitator gave an outlet for his deep-seated hostility, derived from his family relations, but now transferred onto public objects. The basic personality remains, but its external responses—through acceptable social roles—will depend upon the culture of the time and place. In this sense, certainly, history makes leaders and not vice versa.

Much this same approach is the basis of various studies on so-called authoritarian and democratic personalities. A group of social scientists in California made an extensive investigation of the factors in personality which make for intolerance, prejudice, and strong ethnocentrism. They developed a battery of tests to uncover and measure these and related attitudes and values. The tests were given to church groups, college students, veterans, members of service clubs, office workers, and others. The results were interpreted, in part, in terms of a continuum of personality characteristics ranging from authoritarian on the one end to democratic on the other.[26]

On the basis of this study, Samuel H. Flowerman has given us a composite or modal portrait of the authoritarian personality. He characterizes him by five basic features: He is a supreme conformist, shows rigid and limited imagination, is herd-minded, is a "phony" conservative, and is a moral purist. The conformity feature is compulsive and irrational. It is an attempt to find security by submission to higher authority. Such an individual tends to see the world as menacing and unfriendly. His limited and rigid imagination is expressed in the fact that the authoritarian personality is a kind of robot who reacts in a restricted way and cannot be moved from ideas and actions to which he has been conditioned. So, too, his perceptions tend to be of this rigid sort. Moreover, the authoritarian personality is one who has strong feelings of in-groupishness and strong antagonisms toward out-groups. In this sense he is herd-minded and ethnocentric. As a "phony" conservative he is inclined to flag-waving and to talking like a patriot. Actually, such a person dislikes and distrusts the institutions of democracy. Finally, the authoritarian frowns on sensuality, a trait which he quickly finds in members of other groups. He regards his own group as morally pure.

In contrast to the authoritarian, the democratic personality is an individual who is much more secure in his own feelings, more flexible, easily adjusting to new situations. He is sensitive to the part he plays in

[25] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930), Ch. 6.

[26] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and others, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, Harper, 1950).

conflicting situations and takes responsibility for his own behavior. The democratic type of personality is far less likely to be prejudiced than is the authoritarian type. However, the democratic personality is marked by inner conflict, some considerable ambivalence, and a tendency toward considerable guilt about his conflicts. On the other hand, the authoritarian personalities tend to externalize their inner conflicts and to idealize themselves and their family members.[27]

Although these studies are open to considerable question with regard to the basic hypotheses as well as the results, they do suggest that even within the democratic society there are variations in the personality structure of an individual. We, of course, are concerned with the linkage of these particular types to the leadership functions which we have been describing. Certainly we would be inclined to hypothesize that the agitator falls definitely on the authoritarian end of the continuum. He is inflexible, strongly attached to principles, and is essentially a moral purist. But by the same token there are some features of the authoritarian personality in the bureaucrat. With him, the particular formulation takes the direction of attention to meticulous details and "living by the book," and there is a good deal of rigidity in his routine everyday life. On the other hand, the responsible democratic leader and the political boss would probably have personality features akin to the anti-authoritarian or democratic person. In order to succeed in their particular operations, both have to develop flexibility and the ability to accommodate themselves to conflicting forces or to compromise, and otherwise to build up a certain amount of close personal loyalty between themselves and their followers. This latter is a very definite aspect of democratic relations. While it is not feasible perhaps to try to fit all the various social roles we have just described into these two basic personality typologies, at least these are suggestions which might be followed up in empirical research.

There is great need for more adequate research which would enable us to separate the cultural factors from the more strictly psychological elements in personality. What the German Nazis called the *Fuehrer* principle of graded dominance may not be psychologically sound for mature individuals. In the same way, a highly bureaucratic or structured society would not suit people of democratic disposition. And yet individuals do make adjustments to these particular social orders. The highly structured society which the communists have tried to impose on the Russian people is another example. In any case, we should raise the question as to the relationship of a highly fixed social structure with a gradation of power and the successful operation of an industrial society. We certainly do not know whether a highly complex and structured industrial order would be more efficient and satisfactory than one less

[27] Samuel H. Flowerman, "Portrait of an Authoritarian Man," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 23, 1950, pp. 9, 28–31.

highly structured and more democratic. Only history can give us the final answer to this problem.

RELATIONS OF LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

As we have maintained throughout, the relations of leaders and followers is essentially one of interaction involving superordination and subordination. The functions of leadership are first to define the situations and provide certain kinds of symbolic meaning for them, to suggest solutions to problems if they are present, to decide on the solutions (the decision-making function), and finally to carry out the solutions. It is seldom, however, that all these functions are handled by one individual. This is especially true if the group operates in a complicated organization.

The interplay of leadership and followership is nicely brought out in the studies made during the war of the attitudes of enlisted men toward their officers. A military organization is an elaborate and complex structure in which there is a definite hierarchy of power relationships. Yet even in a highly formalized military organization, a good many informal features grow up of the kind we have already discussed.

S. A. Stouffer and his co-workers, in their studies of the American soldier in World War II, have brought out some of the important aspects of interplay of enlisted men and officers. It would carry us too far afield to attempt a summary of their report, but some of the highlights of their findings are in order.[28]

In general, the longer an enlisted man is in the army, the less favorable is his attitude toward his officers. In the latter stages of the war, the men tended to have less favorable attitudes toward officers than they had had formerly. For a given period of time, the smallest proportion of favorable attitudes tended to be found in relatively inactive overseas theaters. In contrast, the highest proportion of favorable attitudes were found among combat troops. Of those who had not gone overseas, the proportion favorable to officers in the United States fell in between these two extremes. Better-educated enlisted men, with rank and longevity of service held constant, tended to be less favorable toward officers than were less-educated men. As Stouffer remarks:

> The better-educated tended to have a higher sense of personal commitment to the war than their less-educated fellow soldiers and tended more frequently to say they were in good spirits and good health. On the other hand, the better-educated were . . . less likely to be convinced of the importance of their particular assignment, were more likely to be sensitive to status deprivations, and were more likely to be critical of the army's way of doing things.[29]

[28] S. A. Stouffer and others, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.* Vol. 1: *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life;* Vol. 2: *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949). All quotations by permission of the publisher.

[29] Stouffer, *The American Soldier,* Vol. 1, p. 365.

It was also brought out, in the European Theater at least, that the nearer the troops were to actual combat the more favorable they were toward their officers. The most probable reason for this is the fact that in combat areas the traditional deprivations of the enlisted men in contrast to the officers was not as sharp as in the rear areas. In combat, officers and enlisted men alike shared the common experiences of "deprivation, danger, and death. Social differentiations and special privileges were at a minimum." [30]

The reasons for the enlisted men in the rear areas holding such a low view of their officers were probably the scarcity of women, liquor, and entertainment in these areas and the fact that the officers tended to use their rank to monopolize these desired objects. The resentment of the enlisted man was really an indictment of the entire system, "a system by which a privileged minority acquired, through their authoritarian position, a preponderant share of the scarce objects which were craved by others." [31]

All this neatly illustrates a hierarchal system of power. The enlisted men who came out of the democratic and permissive society disliked the special privileges accorded the officers. As the authors of this study remark, there is some evidence that the American enlisted man "with his democratic civilian background, resented not so much the fact that superiors could *afford* certain privileges as the denial of his own *right* to enjoy them." [32]

These studies brought out two additional specific factors in this matter of attitudes of enlisted men toward their officers. In the first place, enlisted men tended to have higher respect for their officers when the latter "knew their stuff," as the boys put it. Secondly, they had a higher regard for their officers when the latter made a point of giving personal and close attention to the concern of the men's welfare.

Among the factors which prevented understanding between officers and men, it was found that somewhat the same situation developed in the army as is found in the organizational structure of industrial plants described earlier in this chapter. All the studies "showed that officers tended to believe that their men were more favorably disposed on any given point than the men's own anonymous responses showed the men to be." [33] With reference to self-image and other-image it was shown that people in positions of power often lack a correct image of the people under them. This habit of officers in overestimating their own men's favorable attitudes was evidently a case of projection. Officers in low spirits tended to

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 368.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 369.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 373.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

think of their men as having low spirits. Officers in high spirits tended to project the same attitude toward their men.

The power relationship set up by the organization of the army was an obvious barrier between men and their officers. One of the most serious problems of morale in the army centered around the matter of fraternization of officers and men over against the matter of command functions necessary to the operation of the given unit. The authors remark: "A considerable difference in perspective between officers who exercise authority and men over whom the authority is exercised is probably inevitable, at least in an organization operated on an authoritarian basis. And whether in the Army or elsewhere, completely candid interchange of attitudes on all subjects does not ordinarily occur between those who wield power and those who are subject to that power." [34] In other words, the communication between officers and enlisted men is influenced by the power and status relationships laid down in the organization.

There is a definite parallel in industry and the military in the comparable positions of the noncommissioned officer and the shop foreman. On the one hand, the noncommissioned officer is in a position of deference and obedience to the commissioned officers and, on the other, he is in a position of power as he transmits commands to the men who are beneath him in rank. Noncommissioned officers became a target, along with officers, of the resentment and criticism of privates who viewed them as unpleasant symbols of authority. With reference to executive abilities and personal relationships, Figure 9 brings out clearly the differences in the views of officers and noncommissioned officers and privates on certain highly important problems. Whereas the officers believe that the ability to carry out orders and to think for themselves is a highly important aspect of the noncommissioned officer's functions, the private does not take this view. On the other hand, the privates tend to consider more important the "ability to help and advise the men under him," "ability to explain things clearly," and the "ability to gain personal liking of the men under him." On the other hand, officers tend to regard these things as less important.

One final feature of this whole relationship needs to be indicated. This is the "guilt of leadership." On the one hand, Americans put a heavy stress upon democratic and equalitarian attitudes. The men in the American army in World War II as in World War I came from such backgrounds. And yet they were compressed into a highly authoritarian military structure in which the gradation of power was clearly indicated. The officers of this army were recruited in large part from enlisted men who through examination and the demonstration of ability were transferred to officer's training schools. During the years 1940–45 two-thirds

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 395–396.

of all the officers were recruited from enlisted men. In view of their democratic background, how is it that the officers so quickly picked up the authoritarian attitudes and lost apparently their appreciation and understanding of the "GI" way of life?



From S. A. Stouffer and others, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. I, *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 405.

FIG. 9. Judgments of Relative Importance of Selected Noncom Leadership Abilities.

First of all, the officer-training program both formally and informally was geared to bring about changes in the attitudes of the officer candidates toward enlisted men. One technique to encourage this was the degradation suffered by lower-class men at the hands of upper-class men.

The "gigging" and personal degradation of the lower-class man became tolerable to him when he sees them as a necessary condition for the existence of a status position he himself will someday occupy. The personal indignity of the lower-class man, and later of enlisted men as a whole, is thus established

for him as one of the status rewards of the position toward which he is climbing. The graded class system gives opportunity for practice at progressively larger portions of the officer role, and, by providing subgoals and intermediate rewards, makes the metamorphosis easier. . . .

The new officer, somewhat insecure in his role and perhaps a little guilty at his favored status over his previous enlisted confreres, reactively asserts his status, and finds in the OCS ordeal a justification for his new prerogatives; he *earned* them. The means whereby he earned them come to have special value for him. He puts a high value on official "GI" ways of doing things, and rationalizes that what was good for him must be good for those under his command.[35]

There are other aspects of the leader-follower interaction which we should examine. These include prestige, idealization, the veneration of the masses, and the leader as a father figure.

Prestige

A noticeable feature of leadership is prestige. Prestige may be defined as a distinction attaching to a person and dominating the minds of others. Often it refers to the reputation or influence arising from success, achievement, rank, or other circumstance. Prestige depends largely upon the qualities ascribed to the leader by other persons. It is a special instance of our point that a man's personality reflects the images of others about him. That is, the leader takes on the qualities which his adherents project on him.

An interesting aspect of prestige is the almost inevitable transference of prestige from one field to another. This is particularly true in a somewhat loosely organized social structure such as we have in the United States. The interplay of followers and a dominant personality leads to the easy extension of the latter's authority and prestige. A man who has won fame as a nuclear physicist may then begin to speak as an authority on political, economic, and theological matters. There are many examples of this kind of thing.

Leader as Ideal

Another factor, and one not unrelated to this matter of prestige, is the idealization of the leader. As Ralph Waldo Emerson well said, "It is natural to believe in great men . . . the search after great men is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of manhood." We have already indicated how the subordinate identifies himself with the leader. Also he takes an attitude of deference which reveals an acceptance of the leader's dominance.

Leaders provide a vicarious experience which is strangely satisfying. In our heroes we see ourselves as better, bigger, or more active men. We may even secretly admire the great criminal or other immoral individual because he represents to us a defiance of authority and the mores; in his

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

actions we often sense our own secret wishes fulfilled. We often should like to display such hostile attitudes, but in our timidity and conformity we dare not.

So, too, the interest of the masses in mystical literature is bound up with this. Such literature satisfies deep emotional longings. It is often fantastic. Since each reader interprets the mystical element in his own way and inserts his own emotional needs, its vague symbolism provides an outlet for emotions that otherwise might be rigidly suppressed.

Identification and emulation of leaders serve another function. The leader is the symbolic projection of an ideal. He stands for something outside the currents of the commonplace. To him are often attributed qualities which are not his at first, but with which he becomes invested by the social ritual of veneration. The whole process of creating legends and myths about our leaders arises, in part, from the unconscious symbolization of greatness. The power, wisdom, and fame which we ascribe to heroes may be thought of as something independent of them. For example, the holder of an office of traditional importance to a social group may not himself be an ideal character, but the very office he holds, or the prestige the office carries with it, endows him with power and wisdom quite distinct from his actual capacities. Once a man has entered the arena of public affairs, he becomes the common property of the public. His life belongs to the masses. In a sense he thereafter has no private life. To be successful he must live up to the great expectations of his public.

Students of crowd behavior have frequently commented on the veneration of leaders by the masses. Marx and Lenin are magical names among communists. In our country John Brown became a symbol for the North during and after the Civil War. Mary Baker Eddy has become a symbol of faith for the Christian Scientist. The canonization of the living and the dead goes on in our day, under the aegis of democracy, capitalism, or socialism, just as it formerly went on under the guidance or approval of a universal church. Every group has its heroes. Every political convention hears speeches on the heroes of the past. The Republicans adore Lincoln, while the Democrats venerate Jefferson and Jackson as their special deities. Religious groups have their heroes in St. Augustine, St. Francis, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and others. For that matter, the scientists have heroes too: Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, Curie, and Einstein in physics; Boyle, Lavoisier, and Dalton in chemistry; Darwin, Huxley, Weismann, Pasteur, and Koch in biology. All groups, moreover, invariably rationalize the adoration of their heroes. The veneration of scientists for their heroes is no less the result of their identification of themselves with great men in their own universe of discourse than is the veneration of the politician for his hero or the small gang boy for his leader.

The Effects of Veneration on Leaders

Leaders are much affected by this veneration. The masses attribute to the leaders certain qualities. These, in turn, influence the leaders, who react upon the masses in such a manner as to increase their power because they fit the very picture which the masses created for them. Moreover, the followers contribute more than idealization, emulation, and veneration for their leaders. First of all, the masses carry the culture within which the special functions of leadership rest. In any field touching the mores or folkways at all intimately, leadership must fall in line with what the masses hold to be true. More than one ambitious man has destroyed himself by breaching the wall of conventional morality.

In our own day, in some particulars at least, change is in the folkways. The masses expect alterations in our material culture—newer models of automobiles and airplanes, better radios and television sets, faster mail service, improvements in comforts and luxury. In this dimension of behavior, leadership is always welcome. It is not so evident, however, that the masses feel any need for changes in the economic and social bases of our material culture. In the mores of sex, of private property, of religion, and of political organization, their conservatism restrains the inventiveness of men eager to be leaders. Those who step ahead of current ideologies and practice may not secure any great following. We do not look very seriously for inventive leadership in these areas of life, partly, no doubt, because we hold our moral and social values as sacred, and bolster them with strong emotions and feelings.

The masses are, however, important to leadership. One is the reciprocal of the other, and the notion that leaders somehow force their ideas and practices upon a thoroughly docile and subdued people is a colossal bit of nonsense.

The emergence of Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany are illustrative of this. None of these social-cultural changes would have occurred without considerable mass support, although the revolutions were managed by a militant minority in each instance. Nonetheless, the promises of the revolutionary parties in each case symbolized felt needs of the masses or substantial fractions thereof.

Dominance, Followership, and the Father Image

The fundamentals of ascendency and submission—as of other aspects of our adult behavior—develop in the family and other close-knit primary groups. We made note above of the way in which basic motivations and mechanisms lay the foundation for later public roles. We also commented on certain aspects of personal identification with, and veneration of, leaders. Clearly there is a reciprocal interaction between fol-

lower and leader. But there is a second reciprocal relation, too—that between follower and follower, which we must examine.

There is much evidence to show that the dominant individual, be he leader or institutionalized head, symbolizes the authoritative father or father image. The steps by which this develops in our society have been traced in Chapter 6 somewhat along the following lines: First, after the usual basic attachment to the mother, there comes a strong attachment to the father as protector, friend, and source of strength. But, as the father comes to punish and control the child, certain resistances to the father emerge. In some instances, if not all, some of this aggression toward the father may grow out of strong envy and jealousy of the latter's implicit inhibition of the child's complete absorption of the mother. As a result of this, an opposing or ambivalent reactivity to the father is developed. Part of the fear and hatred generated from the frustrations is transferred to other individuals and later to entire out-groups. Yet some of the resentment may be held in check and come out in disguised or sublimated forms. The identification with the strength and love elements is later carried over to persons of both institutional and voluntary dominant status.

The follower-to-follower relation likewise finds its prototype in primary groups. In the family, sibling rivalry reveals the initial struggle for power among relatively equal individuals. There may be conflict for parental affection and care, for possessions such as toys, food, or clothes. Furthermore, there is an ambivalence here: love and affection for the siblings, counteracted by fear of them and aggression toward them. From the training by parents who reward or punish as their wishes are or are not fulfilled, children learn to inhibit their sibling hatreds and to co-operate as dependent and submissive individuals with regard to the dominant and power-wielding father and mother. The children may jointly love or hate the father, and in such reactions is born a certain sibling sympathy. That is to say, the joint attitude of the children toward the father indicates a certain mutuality and comradeship.

This mutuality is evident in the play group, where the children join a leader to accomplish some end. Rivalries give way to co-operation. The same follower-follower relation is found in public and secondary-group situations. The members of a party or movement or other organization join hands, as it were, in their submission to the dominant or top person. Strength is attained in this type of identification, and the leader or head may use this strength for the ends in view. There is, in fact, a pattern of conformity which gives solidity to the group.

The form, then, is two-directional. With the leader there is a person-to-person identification, marked by obedience and veneration. With one's fellows there is identification in mutual love and sympathy, which may be designated as brotherhood and co-operation with the leader to attain the goal.

In view of this dual identification, we may well ask what becomes of the components of the previous sibling rivalry. The hostility there engendered must be drained off into other channels, and again the out-group and its leader provide objects of hatred and hostility. Of course, it is not always completely drained off, and some fear of the leader and aggressiveness toward him may remain in disguised form. So, too, factional splits within any group represent a breakdown in the complete mutuality of the followers and the complete identification with the leader. It is well for the would-be leader to bear in mind that no matter how close-knit his organization is, and how vocal and intense the adoration of the mass of followers may be, turn of circumstance or loss of confidence may bring out hostile reactions to him or to fellow members. To prevent this he may find it well not only to abuse the out-group verbally but to give some opportunity for overt aggression. Pogroms, lynchings, revolutions, and wars serve, in part, just such needs. The group as well as personal function of hostility and conflict should never be overlooked.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

FREUD, Sigmund, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, translated by James Strachey (London, Hogarth, 1922). Presents Freud's views on the sources of dominance in the personality. Uses the military and the church as illustrations of formalized leadership.

GERTH, H. H., and MILLS, C. Wright, translators and eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946), and A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, translators and eds., *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (same publisher, 1947). Chapter 9 of the first-noted deals with the "sociology of charismatic authority"; Part III of the second deals with three types of authority—those resting on legal formulations, those depending on "immemorial traditions," and those which rest on charismatic grounds, that is, on "devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism," etc., of the individual. A most suggestive analysis of authority.

GIBB, Cecil A., "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Ch. 24. A good review of some of the more important books and papers on leadership.

HULETT, J. E., Jr., and STAGNER, Ross, eds., *Problems in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1952). A symposium of papers from the Allerton Conference on Social Psychology, December, 1950. The papers in Round Table III deal with leadership and morale.

MUNSON, E. L., Jr., *Leadership for American Army Leaders* (Washington, The Infantry Journal, 1941). A brief but helpful discussion, chiefly through the trait approach.

STAFF, O. S. S. *Assessment of Men* (New York, Rinehart, 1948). An account of how the Office of Strategic Services trained its personnel. Suggestive regarding observations on leaderless groups, etc.

RIESMAN, David, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950). The entire book is stimulating and suggestive. Chapter 11, "Images of Power," deals with the role of leaders in recent American history.

CHAPTER 12

Behavior of Crowds

IN Chapter 10 we examined the structure and characteristics of human groups. We noted the range of human association from that in which role and status are loosely ordered and temporary to that in which they are fixed and permanent. The crowd is a collectivity involving essentially a considerable number of individuals responding within a limited space to some common object of attention. On the continuum of human groupings it tends to fall into the impermanent, less stable, and less-culturalized sector.

In a psychological sense, mere numbers do not make a crowd. People walking back and forth along a sidewalk do not form a crowd unless they develop some point of common interest and begin to react to it. For example, two automobile drivers have had a slight collision. If a number of pedestrians pause to watch them engage in a heated argument, we have the beginning of a true crowd.

Certain features of a crowd will be made clear if we note what a crowd is not, for instance, a family seated around a table at mealtime, students at work in a laboratory, the directors of a corporation at a board meeting, or a military staff in conference. In these cases, only a few persons are involved, their reactions to each other are on rather fixed lines, and the repetitive character of their relations influences the sense of solidarity and keeps alive their culturized roles and aims. A vaguely delimited number of people who read the same newspaper every morning, or who listen to the same radio program, or look at the same TV show, we would call a public rather than a crowd. Audiences at lectures, in motion picture theatres, or at political rallies are, in a way, institutionalized crowds operating under certain customs and rules. Under certain circumstances, of course, audiences may react in the emotional manner of an action crowd.

THE NATURE OF THE CROWD

We may classify the crowd as action crowd or mob, and audience. The former may, in turn, be subdivided, as does Roger W. Brown, into

aggressive, escape or panic, acquisitive, and expressive crowds. He subdivides the audience crowd into casual and intentional.[1]

General Characteristics

Let us look at some of the important features of the crowd. First of all, its transitory or temporary nature is noteworthy. Second, certain features of spatial distribution frequently involve a polarization around a common focus of attention. Then, too, there is the factor of a loose structuring and, in time, or occasionally, the emergence of some leadership. Let us look more specifically at some of these particular factors.

While many primary groups involve close face-to-face contact, the action crowd is marked by a shoulder-to-shoulder type of contact. The polarization results in a certain configuration of individuals. Usually those near the center of attention are more stimulated and more overtly active. In contrast, those at the periphery are less attentive and less likely to take part directly in any activity. Those between the center and the fringe may, in time, be drawn forward to more active roles, or may be displaced by more dynamic persons pressing in from the fringe. Thus, along with the close, shoulder-to-shoulder contact, there may be milling about, pushing, shoving, movement forward or backward. These physical contacts, accompanied as they are by kinesthetic sensations, tend to heighten the sense of power in the members of the crowd.

Common-sense observation leads us to distinguish between passive and active crowds. The former is illustrated by the temporary gathering of idle pedestrians who watch a workman putting up a new sign on a marquee of a theatre. Looking and listening while others look and listen are old and well-established habits. But, ordinarily, such impermanent groupings do not result in any dynamic participation on the part of the observers. It is only if and when people become emotionally concerned that the passive crowd becomes active. We are chiefly concerned with the latter.

The Action Crowd

An action crowd is a mass of individuals who, with the common focus of attention, unleash certain deep-lying attitudes, emotions, and actions. The action crowd is one in which love, fear, rage, or hostility emerges. The two most common action crowds are the attack-rage or aggressive type and the fear-flight or escape type. Durward Pruden's description of the lynching of a Negro illustrates the attack-rage type of mob behavior.[2]

[1] Roger W. Brown, "Mass Phenomena," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. 2, Ch. 23.

[2] Durward Pruden, "A Sociological Study of a Texas Lynching," *Studies in Sociology*, 1936, 1:3–9. Reprinted in L. Wilson and W. L. Kolb, eds., *Sociological*

In the 1930's, a Negro farm laborer raped the wife of his white employer. Although the victim was tied to a bed, when the Negro left she broke loose and from a neighbor's house telephoned the sheriff. The Negro was shortly apprehended, confessed, and agreed to plead guilty. He waived all rights and was secreted in a jail in a town some distance from Leeville, Texas, where the crime had been committed.

A few days later a number of loiterers near the jail began hearing somewhat exaggerated versions of the nature of the assault. But, at this point, there were no attempts at mob action. However, on the following Friday, the date set for the trial, there were a number of more serious threats and comments made by the growing crowd. The judge refused a change of venue, but had four Texas Rangers present to guard the court. The Rangers brought the Negro to court early in the morning before the crowd had arrived. During the morning, however, the crowd outside the jail became more sizable and more belligerent. Also, some members of the crowd became more threatening and more courageous when word got around that the governor had sent instructions to the Rangers not to shoot anybody in trying to protect the Negro.

In most instances of mob action, some particular event precipitates the more violent outburst. So it was here. During the afternoon of the trial, the victim was brought from the hospital and carried on a stretcher through the crowd into the courtroom. This was about one o'clock in the afternoon. To quote Pruden: "After that the mob went wild. It broke into the courtroom, and was repeatedly driven back by the Rangers, with drawn guns and tear gas. Several shots were fired. The judge at last decided to change venue, and the Negro was hurried into the second-floor, fireproof vault room of the district clerk's office." [3]

When the mob saw that the Rangers were determined to hold the courthouse, several of the more active mob members decided to burn the building. At first some more vociferous members even objected to permitting the judge, the county attorney, the sheriff, and the Rangers to leave the building. Finally, just before the fire was started, all were removed except the Negro who was hidden in the vault room of the district clerk.

In the hours that followed, the governor ordered a detachment of the National Guard to help the Rangers. After nightfall some of the mob became abusive toward the soldiers, and a considerable amount of street fighting broke out between the troops and the crowd. Later, with the help of an acetylene torch, the rioters were able to open the two-story steel and concrete vault and remove the dead body of the Negro. The

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Analysis (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1949), pp. 335–343. Fictitious names are used throughout.

[3] From reprint in Wilson and Kolb, *op. cit.*, p. 336. This and other quotations by permission.

corpse was tied behind a Ford roadster and dragged through the streets of the Negro business section. "Thousands of people followed in a frenzied midnight parade, yelling, singing, tooting horns of automobiles. At an important corner in the Negro section the body was drawn up to the limb of a cottonwood tree in front of a Negro drug store. The store was forcibly entered and ransacked, the money and valuables pocketed, confections passed out to the crowd, and the furniture and furnishings piled under the Negro's body for fuel. Some versions have it that the leader unsexed the Negro in the presence of the crowd of men, women, and children, before lighting the fire. The crowd gave a mighty cheer as flames enveloped the Negro's body." [4]

While some of the lynchers went home, a good many of the others remained in the Negro section and, for some time, further attack on the Negro business houses and homes continued. Cries went up that they would run all the Negroes out of that community. As a matter of fact, a good many Negroes did leave or went into temporary hiding.

The day after the lynching, more National Guardsmen arrived. The town was put under martial law and certain arrests began. The military court of investigation arrested twenty-nine persons and compiled 600 typewritten pages of confidential evidence which they, in turn, gave over to the civil authorities. The civil authorities indicted fourteen men and boys, who were removed to a jail in a large metropolitan city some distance away. However, an attempt to get a trial in a metropolitan city failed. The judge could not find a jury of urban men who would agree to convict, even if the men were proved guilty. Finally, one young man was found guilty of arson and sentenced to two years in jail. The other thirteen were released without a trial.

The views and attitudes of the residents of Leeville regarding the lynching were found to be closely related to their social status. On the whole, the wealthier and upper class, who are not in competition with the Negroes, but who employ them for odd jobs, warmly disapproved of the affair. They preferred law and order, and they did not like to see their home town get unfavorable publicity. The middle-class economic group also disapproved of the episode, not so much for the loss of life but because it distressed them to see valuable property destroyed. Many of these people were present as observers, though they did not participate. It was the lowest economic group, those in competition with the Negro, who furnished the actual mob members.

On the whole, the press was reasonably free of blame, and certainly afterwards editorialized against the lynching. It did, however, carry the rumor that the Rangers had been ordered not to shoot, and this seems to have had some effect on the activities of the lynchers in the early stages of the affair.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 337.

The views of the church leaders followed the class structure of the membership. Ministers from the four largest churches, attended chiefly by upper- and middle-class families, condemned the lynching. Those whose members came largely from the lowest economic strata avoided discussion of the episode lest they offend some of their members who had taken part in it.

The participants, largely of the lowest economic groups, revealed some interesting facts. Pruden got material on fifty-eight individuals who might be classified as a fair sample of the active mob itself. He does not say that this was all of the mob, but it was a substantial fraction. Out of these fifty-eight members, nineteen were totally unemployed, thirteen were common laborers, eight were farmers, eight were skilled laborers, four were sole owners of small businesses, three were salaried people, and three were classified as a miscellaneous group. At least eleven of the active participants in the riot were known to have previous police records. The acknowledged leader of the mob was a man 40 years old who could neither read nor write and had no particular occupation, although he occasionally did a little cattle-trading and riding of broncos in rodeo shows. He was said to be a hard drinker and a rough-and-ready bully.

The boy who was given a two-year sentence for arson was 17 years old, his father was dead, and his mother was a low-paid worker in a factory. He was known to be a truant from school who had stolen chickens and had had a number of brushes with the law. Eventually, he was brought before the court for cattle-stealing. Other members of the mob were transient laborers and known to be heavy drinkers. All five of the high-school participants had been described by high-school officials as problem boys. Certainly there were in this group some serious criminals and many teen-age excitable youths, impatient at the restraint of the law.

This lynching and accompanying rioting against the colored people represents an outburst of a long-accumulated tension between the whites and the blacks. In this particular section of the South, the Negroes had been successfully competing with the whites in their occupations and in agriculture. This was especially true between the lower economic levels of the two races. But the economic factor is not the only one. There were, no doubt, as in many like instances, a number of factors. One of these is the belief regarding the sexuality of the Negro and so-called threat of the Negro man to white womanhood. There is a curious ambivalence in these matters. The white man puts up a strong taboo against any gesture of colored men toward white women. On the other hand, the white men feel they have free access to Negro women. This probably induces a certain sense of guilt and reaction-formation toward the Negro. Some white men, at least, may become

infuriated at the Negro's behavior because they have guilt feelings about their own relations with Negro women. Also, they may fear that their own white womenfolk might enjoy sexual contact with colored men. In addition to this, a certain pleasure may be derived from their imagery of assault and rape.

An attack crowd is motivated by man's most elemental drives. A Negro about to be lynched symbolizes the background conflict between whites and colored. In this conflict, economic competition and personal resentment of the Negro's effort to get ahead are entangled with secret envy of the Negro's alleged sexual potency. So, too, the crowd man, in periods of threatened subversion or during wartime, has much the same attitudes toward individuals who are alleged to be subversive or disloyal or otherwise are threats to his personal safety and to his basic values. In situations of tension and fear, the rudimentary means for survival, mastery, and preservation of the group override kindlier and more sympathetic motivations.

A flight-fear reaction in which prior cultural conditioning and current rumor played important parts is illustrated in the panic during the battle at Adowa in February, 1896. This was a military action which involved about 15,000 Italian troops and nearly 100,000 Abyssinians. The terrain was rough and cut into deep, parallel watercourses separated by steep ridges. An Italian unit advancing through one of these defiles was suddenly attacked by a small body of native troops, and almost at the first brush the Italians turned tail and fled in disorder.

A number of factors contributed to this panic, but the most important appears to have been the rumors about the cruelty and savagery of the natives. All sorts of wild tales were told and retold among the Italian troops about how the natives castrated and tortured their prisoners. These stories made a deep impression on the men, and at the first contact with the natives there was an upsurge of fear which the officers and the less suggestible soldiers were unable to check.

Psychological Factors

All behavior is a combination of present stimulation and the play of pre-existing attitudes, habits, and values. Certainly the same factors apply to crowd behavior.

As to pre-existing attitudes and opinions, in the relations of the poor whites and the Negroes the competitive factor is ever-present. The Negroes are regarded as a threat to the white man's role and status. And the fear with respect to sexual matters is always in the background. So, too, there are boredom and monotony in rural life and these may serve to stimulate periodic outbursts of the sort we have described.

In the transitory or passive spectator crowd, which is quickly formed and quickly disappears, the motivations are usually mere curiosity or

habitual attention to unusual sounds and sights or the imitation of other persons. In the action crowd, however, the more potent and rudimentary drives come into play. They vary, of course, with the particular situation and they are qualified and given meaning by cultural norms. As we pointed out in Chapter 2, there are certain native and original drives, which, though modified, remain throughout life to influence our conduct. Among others are those connected with security and status, those connected with love life, those connected with the norms and values regarding property, and finally the continuance of class and community controls.

To understand these motives we must look at the operation of our color-caste system. When this relation is fully accepted by both white and Negro, their day-by-day contacts may be fairly calm. We have what the sociologist calls an accommodation. There are deference and acceptance of inferiority on the part of Negroes, and clear dominance and superiority on the part of the whites. But under the impact of growing competition for work, or upon any event which breaks through the caste barrier—as when the Negro gets "uppish" or insolent toward some white man, or when improper advances are made, or are thought to be made, by a Negro toward some white woman—individual white men begin to react with threats of violence, fisticuffs, or other personal aggression. These outbreaks may be sufficient to maintain the customary color-caste system. But, if a more serious crisis arises, such as general employment of Negroes in industries where whites work, or if there is an overt attack on a white woman, violent and extensive mob responses may be set off.

Yet it must not be forgotten that lynching, as a form of social control, is publicly, though not legally, recognized. It is deep in the mores of certain parts of the United States and is supported by myths and legends about prior outbreaks of Negroes. Similarly, mob action against horse thieves on the frontier rested on the community acceptance of this method of dealing with infractions of accepted property rights. In other words, there is a cultural foundation for these forms of aggression. When violence is directed, not against individual malefactors but against an entire minority group, as in the anti-Jewish pogroms or the anti-Negro riots, an assumed need for control usually serves as a rationalization for such emotionalized hostilities.

Persons who participate in such activities are not always aware of their motivation. As we well know, many of our motives, or, at least, the sources of them, are hidden from us in the unconscious. The action crowd responds on the basis of impulses not ordinarily admitted by the individual. The source of such impulses is in the unconscious. As Freudians would say, the "id" impulses are released, or in terms of the theory of George Herbert Mead, the biological and unqualified "I" takes pre-

cedence over the controls which the "me's" have built up in the family, the play group, and other associations. Moreover, the tendencies and attitudes thus released are characterized by what William Stekel, the psychoanalyst, called *parapathy*—a state of confusion between reality and fantasy. In other words, fantasy, which influences our attitudes and behavior really comes into its own in crowd reactions. The sense of freedom and irresponsibility fostered by the crowd reflects a dreamlike stage of thought and action.

This is nicely illustrated by an event witnessed by the author. A group of irate college students hazed another student for his failure to participate in an all-college-day activity. One of the participants later confessed to me: "I was out of my head at the time. I didn't know what I was doing. It all seemed like a dream." On the other hand, we should not imagine that the individuals in a crowd are not aware of what they are doing at the time—rather their moral code is temporarily suspended or blocked. The dominating motive is emotional, and the concepts of right and wrong, of kindness and fair-dealing, are overwhelmed by the impulse to injure someone else.

Closely related to such unconsciously directed violence is the fact that action crowds tend to be fixed upon a single line of conduct. Whereas rational thinking tends to be highly variable in direction, the primary drives, or the basic emotions of fear, love, and rage, take on an *all or none* character. One is either for or against an individual, a race, or a class. One is hostile or friendly to a cause or a person. There are no half-measures, no compromises, once the individual has committed himself to a line of action.

This shows both the strength and weakness of the crowd man. He is strong in action but weak in rational morality. As Everett Dean Martin long ago pointed out, men in action crowds are characterized by a heightened sense of egotism or self-importance, by a strong sense of hostility toward the symbol of an out-group or some other person, and by a sense of self-righteousness and self-absolutism which they ordinarily would not condone.[5]

On the other hand, it is probably not true, as Martin contended, that every crowd is opposed to someone or some thing. The spectators gathered to do homage to a returning war hero, or people at a fraternal or political picnic, are not ordinarily dominated by feelings of hostility. In the festival crowd there may be much affectionate and sympathetic outpouring. Everyone is happy and joyous. This is what Roger W. Brown calls the "expressive" crowd.[6] It is true, of course, that even members of such a crowd, when they meet opposition, quickly take up aggressive means and break down whatever blocks their free-flowing

[5] Everett Dean Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, Harper, 1920).
[6] See Brown, in Lindzey, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2.

enthusiasm, be it police, or some other crowd, or an inanimate barrier.

This ambivalence of the direction and emotionality of the action crowd is, in fact, a rather important feature. Sometimes, when the emotions are aroused, the objects of attention or response may be changed. In fact, a favorite device for dissipating the intentions of an angry crowd is to distract it with humor, to re-direct its hostility toward some other object, or to give it some relatively harmless outlet.

In summary, then, there are certain pre-existing conditions or attitudes and values which serve to support motivation toward crowd action. These situations are frequently characterized by long-standing tensions and incipient conflicts between groups. This is neatly illustrated when a minority group is believed to threaten the long-accepted status of a majority group. Anxiety and hostility with regard to role and status are common enough and provide the foundation for a good deal of crowd behavior.

Then, too, there is always a precipitating event or situation. In the Negro-white conflicts in the South, the prolonged depression of the 1930's tended to increase the majority-minority conflict. Sometimes conditions such as those following defeat of a nation at war will bring about sharp changes in the role and status of individuals and serve to precipitate some kind of mob action. As a matter of actual fact, the successful revolutionary practitioner, as we shall see in Chapter 24, frequently plays upon such anxieties and fears.

The action crowd comes into full play, however, only when certain secondary stimuli in addition to the elemental drives are brought into operation. Given the initial situation and motivation for crowd action, and given the emergence of leaders, the further development of mass action depends upon factors which arise after the crowd has begun to operate. Social facilitation comes into play. The gathering of numbers of people in close proximity leads to talk. It is at this point that what N. E. Miller and John Dollard call "crowd stimuli" appear.[7]

Social Facilitation

Social facilitation may be defined as the increase in one's responses due to the presence or activity of other persons. Studies of the effects of praise and blame, of the presence of prestige individuals, and of cooperative or competitive work conditions, among others, indicate some of the factors which serve to enhance responses. So, too, in the crowd situation, the massing of individuals facilitates excitement and readiness to act. Such massing, with its inevitable hemming of bodily movements, may set up hostile responses just as the firm holding of an infant makes

[7] N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 219–221.

him struggle to get free. In the lynching situation, the pushing, rubbing of shoulders, craning of necks, and straining of eyes and ears serve to energize the participants and to give them a certain sense of power. How an audience may be whipped into an action crowd of the expressive type is shown in the report on the funeral of a church leader, "Sister President," by J. H. Douglass. A combination of singing, preaching, and moaning induced a frenzy of excited behavior on the part of those in attendance.[8]

It is extremely difficult to experiment on such reactions although N. C. Meier, and co-workers induced intense emotional responses in an experimental situation. Meier reported a particularly brutal kidnaping to a group of students. The latter were then asked to write down what course of action they were prepared to take with regard to this episode. While, at best, this verbal approach but approximates a life-situation of mob action, some correlations between certain personality characteristics of the subjects and assertions of violent intention parallel certain of the findings of Raper with regard to the participants in race riots.[9]

Imitation and Suggestion

Social facilitation is made possible through imitation and suggestion. The importance of imitation in social learning is set forth in Chapter 3. We need but recall that imitation involves similarity in motor responses, likeness in reactions due to likeness of stimuli, and a deliberate or conscious copying of another's role. We have all been conditioned to run when others run, to laugh when others laugh, and to look where others are looking. As a rule, these are habitual and unconscious reactions. This type of direct imitation doubtless played a part in a panic of a Prussian regiment in the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866: [10]

> The panic of the Prussian cavalry regiment in retreat after the battle of Trautenau in Bohemia is known. As the regiment was trotting back in marching column on the road, the regimental commander sent an aide to the head of the column to bring it to a walk. As this officer was galloping along the column from the direction of the enemy, his pace was regarded as sign of the seriousness of the situation. When the officers tried to gain the head of their troops, the troopers followed suit, and soon the entire regiment was galloping away from the enemy, and overran a Prussian battery. Only after miles and some casualties was it possible to bring the regiment to a halt.

[8] See J. H. Douglass, "The Funeral of 'Sister President,'" *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 44:217–223. Reprinted in T M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1947), pp. 650–654.

[9] N. C. Meier, G. H. Mennenga, and H. Z. Stoltz, "An Experimental Approach to the Study of Mob Behavior," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 36:506–524. A. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1933).

[10] Lt. General Constantin von Altrock, "Panic." *Infantry Journal*, 1930, 37:116. By permission of the publishers.

People living in the same community have been exposed to much the same culture. This is an additional incentive to imitation. At a war rally we react favorably to the speaker's words about our country's heroes and negatively to words about our enemy. Once a mass of people begin to respond together they continue to do so, simply because the crowd stimulus keeps them going. Finally, deliberate imitation, though common in everyday life, is seldom present in emotional crowds. Sometimes army officers have tried to offset the effects of panic by getting their men to start some counter-activity. In a sense, this is a deliberate use of imitation.

Suggestion, which is closely allied to imitation, plays an important part in the action crowd. Suggestion occurs when one person induces an idea, belief, or action in another without the latter's use of logical reasoning. In fact, the aim of suggestion is to get others to think or to do something by stopping their critical habits. It requires a stimulating situation and an inner readiness to react in a certain way.

Suggestibility is qualified by age, sex, level of intelligence, and many personality factors. As a rule, children and young people are more suggestible than their elders. Girls and women—at least in our society—seem more easily persuaded than boys and men. Likewise, the feebleminded and dull appear to be more open to suggestion than the bright and the well-educated. Nevertheless, when the stimuli are appropriate, the well-educated may be more susceptible to rumor, propaganda, and other materials of suggestion than the less intelligent. So, too, suggestibility is affected by such internal conditions as excessive fatigue, lack of sleep, prolonged hunger, and the effect of certain narcotics. Moreover, external influences may affect the suggestibility. For example, reduction in visibility may modify one's perception, or high-sounding words may suggest deep meaning in a politician's speech.

In stimulating crowds to action, rumor is particularly effective. Rumor is a special kind of suggestion, a story about some real or fictitious person or event which grows as it spreads. Beginning as simple facts or suppositions, rumors in time may become elaborated into highly emotional stories of great significance. The three most important ways of diffusing rumor are (1) by word of mouth, or gossip—the most effective rumors are spread in this way; (2) by letter, telephone message, or telegram; and (3) on a larger scale, by newspapers, the radio, motion pictures, television, magazines, pamphlets, and books. One of the classic instances of widespread rumor was that which developed out of Orson Welles's broadcast on October 30, 1938, of a drama depicting an imaginary invasion by an armed force from the planet Mars.[11]

[11] Hadley Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic, with the Complete Script of the Famous Orson Welles Broadcast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).

An analysis by Hadley Cantril of the public reaction to this broadcast brings out some pertinent facts about suggestion and imitation. A small sample of individuals who lived in the area of New Jersey where the Martians are supposed to have landed were carefully interviewed. It will be recalled that the radio drama was presented as a series of news dispatches interlarded periodically into a musical program. Of the listeners, those who tuned in late, after the initial announcement that it was a radio program, were more inclined to believe the dispatches were real than were those who tuned in at the outset.

One of the most obvious psychological features was the place of prestige suggestion. The chief character was one Professor Richard Pierson of Princeton Observatory—played by Welles. The cast was peopled with many professors from Chicago, Toronto, and even from abroad. Then, when the situation was described as calling for organized defense and action, other experts, including generals and the Secretary of Interior came into the play. One interviewee said "I believed the broadcast as soon as I heard the Professor from Princeton and the officials in Washington." Another said, "I knew it was an awfully dangerous situation when all those military men were there and the Secretary of State spoke." The effectiveness of this prestige suggestion was enhanced by the specificity of detail. For example, at one point there was an announcement by Brigadier General Montgomery Smith as follows: "I have been requested by the Governor of New Jersey to place the counties of Mercer and Middlesex as far west as Princeton, and east to Jamesburg, under martial law. No one will be permitted to enter this area except by special pass issued by state or military authorities. Four companies of State Militia are proceeding from Trenton to Grovers Mill and will aid in the evacuation of homes within the range of military operations." [12] The broadcast continued to report details of a full-scale military invasion of the entire country, operations of our military in attempts at defense, widespread panic, and growing death, disorganization, and desolation.

The episode is an excellent illustration of mass suggestion. In his analysis of the reactions to this broadcast, Cantril points out that there are four psychological conditions which can create a suggestible state of mind in the individual. In the first place, a person may refer a given stimulus to a standard or to several standards of judgment which he may regard as relevant for the proper interpretation. That is, the individual may give meaning to a stimulus in an habitual way. Thus a good many of the listeners to the program immediately accepted it as factual without trying to refer it to any particular outside criterion. Many highly religious people believed it some act of God or some kind of super-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 19. "Invasion from Mars," by Howard Koch (Orson Welles broadcast of H. G. Wells's "The War of the Worlds"), copyright 1940 by Princeton University Press. By arrangement with Monica McCall, Inc.

natural punishment. Others, in view of the recent war scare, thought it an invasion by a foreign power. On the basis of a nation-wide survey of reactions to this program, it was found the more highly-educated persons were less likely to fall into this category.

A second condition to suggestibility occurs when a person is not certain which interpretation he should place on a given situation. That is, he lacks adequate standards of judgment to make a reliable check upon his interpretation—he may check his original information against outside data which are unreliable. Others may rationalize this inadequacy. As Cantril remarks: [13]

> Many listeners made hasty mental or behavioral checks but the false standard of judgment they had already accepted was so pervasive that their checkups were rationalized as confirmatory evidence. For example, one woman said that the announcer's charred body was found too quickly but she "figured that the announcer was excited and made a mistake" . . . Others turned to different stations but thought the broadcasters were deliberately trying to calm the people. A woman looked out of her window and saw a greenish eerie light which she thought was from the Martians. . . .

In contrast were those who sincerely tried to check their information but who lacked sufficiently well-grounded criteria of judgment to determine whether or not the new sources of information were reliable.

A third condition of suggestibility—perhaps more widespread than the others—is found when a person "is confronted with a stimulus which he must interpret or which he would like to interpret and when *none* of his existing standards of judgment is adequate to the task." [14] This means that there is an unstructured mental context that makes it difficult to derive a criterion of judgment. A lack of education may well be a factor in this, or some kind of social disorganization.

Finally, a fourth condition of suggestibility arises when an individual not only lacks standards of judgment by means of which he may reorient himself, but even lacks the realization that any interpretation is possible other than the one originally presented to him. This individual accepts whatever he hears or reads as true without even thinking to compare it with other information. Certainly the economic insecurity of the time induced a certain amount of bewilderment in many people. The depression had lasted nearly ten years, many people were still out of work, and there was a widespread feeling that nothing would be done to improve economic conditions. Likewise, the war scare had added to the anxiety of many people. These reactions were found to be positively correlated with low levels of education and sophistication.

The Cantril study clearly reveals the variety of factors which may facilitate suggestion. Unstructured conditions and threats of danger are

[13] Cantril, *Invasion from Mars*, p. 193. By permission.
[14] *Ibid.*

always powerful factors. In regard to panic, darkness and fatigue are known to be important. For example, in Nazi Germany, party parades and the prolonged outdoor meetings where the followers had to stand for hours tended to make for weariness which, in turn, probably enhanced audience suggestibility.

Not only do low intelligence, lack of education, and lower economic status make for high suggestibility, but neurotic tendencies predispose to a like condition. Neurotic and hysteric reactions of the public are neatly indicated in the episode of the "phantom anesthetist" which took place in Mattoon, Illinois, in the autumn of 1944.[15]

The episode began on September 1, about midnight, when Mrs. A asked a friend of hers to telephone the police that she and her daughter had been gassed by a prowler. The police found no signs of any intruder, but Mr. A reported that when he got home about two hours later he saw a man run away from the window. The police returned to the house, but they found nothing. The next evening the local newspaper carried a front-page story on the gas attack with the headline "Anesthetic Prowler on the Loose."

On the day following, another family reported in the middle of the night that they had seen a prowler. In this case the woman said that when she awoke she found she could not walk. Other attacks continued to be reported for a little over a week. After that the excitement subsided.

The symptoms reported by the people were nausea, vomiting, palpitation of the heart, paralysis of the legs, dryness of mouth and throat, and in one case, burns about the mouth. Those that reported also said that they smelled a musty smell or sickish smell or something that smelled like gardenias or like cheap perfume. Others said that this gas was odorless.

The police found no evidence whatsoever to support the stories of the gas prowler. It was a case of rumor and mass hysteria. No doubt the fact that the metropolitan newspapers gave attention to the events helped to facilitate its spread. Yet, such acute outbursts and the snowballing effects were self-limiting. As D. M. Johnson, who studied the episode shortly thereafter, puts it: [16]

> The bizarre details which captured the public imagination at the beginning of the episode became rather ridiculous when studied more leisurely. The drama of the story lost its tang with time, and the absurdities showed through. For example, the volatility of the gas, which was such an asset in penetrating physical barriers, became a liability when anyone tried to capture the gas and

[15] D. M. Johnson, "The 'Phantom Anesthetist' of Mattoon: A Field Study of Mass Hysteria," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1945, 40:175–186. Reprinted in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1952), pp. 208–219.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 186. By permission of American Psychological Association, Inc.

examine it. The facts seemed to evaporate as rapidly as the agent which produced them. At last, the failure of the police and volunteers to find anyone or anything tangible . . . combined with the statements of city officials in the paper produced a more critical public attitude. The attacks ceased. The critical attitude increased and spread. . . . It is proper to say that the wave of suggestibility in Mattoon left a wave of contra-suggestibility in its wake. Objective records document this generalization.

While low economic and low educational levels, combined with neurotic tendencies, play important parts in action crowds, there is no doubt that a large number of otherwise normal individuals will break down, given a sufficient crisis, such as a severe air raid, a physical catastrophe, or prolonged punishment or deprivation. This is shown in the report by Bettelheim on the behavior of prisoners in Nazi concentration camps.[17] So, too, the experiment at the University of Minnesota on the behavior of men under conditions of semi-starvation shows similar effects.[18] The breaking point of otherwise normal people becomes apparent in the face of severe and prolonged crises. Under such critical conditions, their behavior is, in some matters, similar to that of members of an action crowd.

Leadership

In the action crowd, the role of a leader is highly important. Among other things, of course, he functions to produce prestige suggestion. Prestige may attach itself to individuals who are not of the élite. The mob inciter may come from a lower social strata. The prestige comes into play, however, because he assumes a dominant role, and under his inciting harangue, loaded with emotion-arousing stereotypes, the crowd accepts him as a leader. In securing high status as a leader he gets the power which might otherwise in calmer circumstances be denied him. The familiar interactional mechanisms of identification and projection come into play. Members of the crowd identify themselves with the leader's assumption of knowledge and power. In turn, he projects on them his own values and views which they quickly accept as their own. Obedience to the leader follows more or less automatically because, as we saw in Chapter 11, we all learned from early childhood to obey those in authority.

Among the stimuli which the leader provides are the following: (1) He gives a focus to a crowd which might otherwise become diffused in space and attention. That is, he aids in polarizing and thus in unifying the crowd. (2) He verbalizes people's vague attitudes and feelings and gives

[17] Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1943, 38:417–452. Reprinted in Swanson, Newcomb, and Hartley, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–43.

[18] Ancel Keys and others, *The Biology of Human Starvation* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 2 vols.

them communicative symbols, which, repeated and spread, serve later as stimulators to action. (3) He uses myths, legends, and a rehearsal of recent events to arouse emotion and instigate action. That is, he revives the hatreds, fears, and elemental drives that had been aroused earlier in vaguer and less violent form. (4) He points out the direction in which the mass action shall take place. For instance, he suggests or commands whipping, beating, burning, hanging, or some other action. (5) He may lead the action, although in some instances the verbal agitator gives the overt leadership to another.

Finally, the facilitating effects of self-stimulation and self-suggestion are not to be overlooked. Since we respond to ourselves as others respond to us, in the very process of identification with the leader and with other members of the crowd, there arises an inner circuit of self-stimulation. The more we agree, the more we shout; the more we push forward, the greater becomes the drive to carry on overtly in the direction indicated by the leader.

MASS SOCIETY AND CROWD BEHAVIOR

Against the background of our discussion, we may raise some broader questions about the implications of crowdish behavior in the modern world. Does modern urbanized, mass society foster such conduct? In order to get at this problem we must examine the nature of mass society.

The Nature of Mass Society

The concept of mass society arose out of the discussion of the segmentalized nature of secondary groupings in our modern world. The most important features of mass society may be summarized as follows: (1) There is first of all a stress on rationality, specialization of labor, impersonality of social contacts, and self-assertiveness. There is a lack of warm intimacy of individuals and of an emotionalized sense of unity such as we find in the family and other primary groups. (2) Such a condition fosters a sense of personal insecurity, loneliness, anonymity, a sense of incompleteness of response, and an absence of social norms. Émile Durkheim, French sociologist, invented the concept of *anomie* to cover this condition. (3) Out of this condition of *anomie* and impersonality emerges a strong desire for social relationships which will restore some of the much-needed emotional warmth and sense of security. (4) There is a widespread stress on equality of wants and satisfactions among the masses. (5) In spite of the stress on rationality, implied in the factory system, the high division of labor, and in the individual-reward systems such as wages, products, and prestige, there is a marked increase in the irrational and emotional in thought and conduct.

Crowd Behavior in Mass Society

Such characteristics probably foster crowdish behavior. For example, the demand for emotional warmth and sense of security may well foster people's gathering together in large congregations, as in sport events, political rallies, and motion picture houses. The more extreme forms of these gatherings are race riots and lynching parties. In these mass situations, suggestion, persuasion, appeals of an emotional nature, and a sense of vicarious adventure play a large part. These mixtures of the rational and irrational carry the individual away and for the moment provides him with a sense of intimacy, solidarity, and commonality that he lacks in routine, highly specialized, day-by-day contacts. Usually such mass security is only temporary. It fails to afford the permanence and continuity which the human being craves and needs. It is here that the political, religious, or other demagogue comes into play. New leaders and would-be ruling groups arise with all sorts of promises to provide the masses with the very solidarity, permanence, and economic and emotional security they long for. The full dinner pail, the thousand years of peace, the planned and beautiful society, a new heaven and a new earth where there will be no wants and no problems, these and like visions are spread abroad. The modern demagogue makes use of all the tricks of propaganda and indoctrination to organize his followers along his own lines.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AUDIENCE

We may distinguish between the informal and highly casual audience such as assembles to listen to a policeman haranguing a motorist who has committed a traffic violation and the more formal and institutionalized kind such as attend Sunday church service. In this section we are concerned chiefly with the latter. Such formal fatherings are controlled by certain codes, patterns of polarization, and ritual. The audiences gather for a more or less definite purpose and at a predetermined time and place. The polarization between the performer and the auditors tends to take on the one-to-all form.

Audiences may be classified as to aim into information-seeking, conversional, and recreational. The first is illustrated by a college classroom lecture, the second by a religious revival, and the third by a movie audience.

Basic Characteristics of the Audience

The chief features of the formal audience are: (1) It has a specific purpose. (2) It meets at a predetermined time and place. (3) It has a standard form of polarization and interaction. The physical features of the meeting place aid in determining the polarization. For example, the

seating arrangement is designed to produce the polarization of common attitudes. The seats may be arranged in rows, often in arcs, in front of which the speakers or actors are located on a stage or platform. Usually, the lighting and acoustics are designed to foster crowd-like polarization. The seating plan facilitates attention to the performer rather than to other members of the audience. Though the shoulder-to-shoulder configuration of the crowd is found in the audience, the spacing of the seats prevents close physical contact and thus inhibits, in part, the rise of the action crowd. Yet an emotional appeal to prejudice may convert an audience into a dynamic action crowd although the physical arrangement does not foster such a development.

Common-sense observation and experience indicate that the reactions of the audience are influenced by the size of the hall, the number who attend, and many other conditions. For instance, if one were to plan a protest meeting—a type of conversional gathering—it would be well to secure a hall which would by ordinary standards be too small for the expected number. That is, it would be more effective to crowd 200 persons into a room which normally seats only 150, than to scatter 200 persons in a hall that would easily accommodate 1,000. Moreover, temperature, humidity, ventilation, lighting, kinds of seats, and wall decorations all play a part as a background to audience behavior.

The performer's relation to his audience is ordinarily standardized. Unless the room is very small, there is usually a raised platform or stage from which he operates. There is a table or lectern behind which he stands. This provides a separation of the performer from the audience, and the audience has, literally, to look up to the performer. This itself induces an illusion of superiority on the part of the speaker or performer.

The speaker or performer is generally the active agent in the audience situation. He carries ideas and emotions along with him. By painting verbal pictures, by telling stories, by explaining facts or arguing logically, he suggests the trend of imagery and recalls associated feelings. The auditor is the passive member in this one-to-all relation. Though he may be full of images and emotions and feelings, he remains relatively inactive. Whenever the audience begins to act, the purely active-passive relation breaks down. Laughter, tears, applause, shouts of approval, and boos of disapproval are ideomotor evidences of the more active participation of the audience. In some situations the speaker makes a definite bid for this sort of response; in others it is accidental. In a serious, formal lecture by a scientist, it would be quite unconventional and distinctly poor form.

On the other hand, members of the audience influence the performer. A speaker may arouse hostile attitudes in his hearers, and their negative reaction may cause him to alter his words; or his appeals may enhance their identification with him. At times, as in vaudeville, the whole relation of the performer and the audience becomes a game to see which will

submit to the other. The audience's passivity toward the performer is always relative.

The Interactional Processes of the Audience

In the interplay of audience and the speaker or performer, there are certain psychological stages. These are preliminary tuning, establishing the initial relationships, securing and maintenance of rapport, the play of persuasion and suggestion, and possibly the incitement to action. Of course the methods of attracting, interesting, and dominating an audience will vary with the kind of audience, with the purpose of the meeting, with the cultural background of the members, and with the time and place.

Preliminary tuning refers to the appeals made in advance which set up certain expectations or anticipatory responses. The statement of the aim—real or ostensible—is usually important. Advertising is one of the devices used for this purpose. Also the newspaper, pamphlet, handbill, radio, TV, and the motion picture may be used. Press reviews or radio or TV commentaries on books, plays, or future programs aid in stimulating public attention. Moreover, conversation among people interested in a future gathering is an important element in supplementing and enhancing the effects of advertising and press or other comments. There is no doubt that advertisers sometimes overlook the tremendous importance of gossip and conversation in fostering support of audience attendance.

The appeal to prestige suggestion is important. The stage drama and the motion picture and TV shows use famous names to draw their audiences. A large information-seeking audience can be built up for a well-known scientist, traveler, philosopher, statesman, or general, whereas a more competent but less famous man would attract fewer listeners. On the whole, those who manage these affairs tend to use more emotional appeals for recreational and conversational audiences than for the information-seeking audience. We expect the flaming poster and the exaggerated promise of the circus, musical comedy, or million-dollar film production. We would hardly expect these appeals for the meeting of an information-seeking audience.

Preliminary tuning does not cease when the listeners or spectators appear at the predetermined time and place. The announced purpose of the meeting sets up certain mental associations. The anticipatory reactions of the audience in a church differ sharply from those of an audience attending a vaudeville show or a well-advertised stage comedy. The quietness of the church, the stained glass windows, the symbols of worship and the lighting effects enhance the traditional reverential attitude. In contrast, the garish decorations, the bright lights, and the hustle and bustle of the theatre fosters quite other attitudes and expectations.

The opening of the concert, play, lecture, or sermon is marked by

some formality or social ritual which focuses the attention of the audience on the performer. The unstructured one-to-one relations among the audience which marks the conversational or other contacts tend to disappear and an all-to-one polarization begins to emerge. An old device for bringing about this change is a sudden shift in the sensory cue. Thus a lowering of the house lights, the blare of loud trumpets, an announcement of the appearance of the performer, the training of a spotlight on the speaker's stand—these tend to reduce the buzz of conversation in the audience and to turn attention to the performer. Of course, mechanical appeals may be more effective with younger, less intelligent, and more emotional audiences. Such devices are really a part of the ceremonials of party rallies, public celebrations for heroes, and fraternal occasions rather than of serious information-seeking audiences. In the latter instances, the amount of fanfare and preliminary ritualism may be cut to a minimum.

The first purpose—to secure the attention of the audience—having been obtained, the next step is to secure the *rapport* of the audience. There is some evidence that the effect of the performer on the audience does not flow out from him in a concentric circle or in straight lines but moves in a zigzag manner to the most susceptible persons first, and these, in turn, serve as centers of radiation to others about them. It is well to locate such potential centers of further radiation. As a matter of fact, the system of using clackers is designed to do just this. Certain people are located in the audience to lead the applause or direct other activities with reference to the speaker. Where there is a choice of unreserved free seats, the most suggestible points are usually in the central section, but in some audiences those who sit in the front seats are the most ready to react.

While the opening remarks of a scientist before his peers may be somewhat desultory, the quality of an entire scene or act in a comedy may be set by the first lines. In turn, this may affect the audience response. In conversional meetings there is often a deliberate technique for securing quickly the active participation of the audience. The aim is to arouse individuals emotionally and to produce attitudes of activity resembling the action crowd. The musical director for a well-known evangelist thus describes the procedure at a revival meeting: [19]

> At the appointed hour we began the services by getting the entire audience to join in singing. I began with any common songs which I thought the people would know. These did not have to be, in fact they seldom were, religious. Rather they were old favorite folksongs of America: "Old Black Joe," "Dixie," "My Old Kentucky Home." In the years of the war (1914–1918) and shortly thereafter, "Tipperary" was popular. Almost any song which everyone knew was good. Even romantic or slightly jazzy songs were acceptable at first. The principal idea was to get everybody singing. After a few of these popular songs I had them sing more religious pieces such as "Onward Christian Soldiers." The religious songs, however, needed to have no direct relation to the

[19] From a document in the author's possession.

subject of the revivalist's address. Only toward the end of the opening period of song did we introduce religious songs bearing more directly on the subject of the evening.

This technique is obvious. Group singing breaks down the sense of individual isolation. It removes differences of social status and builds up common emotions and feelings. It is peculiarly effective in wiping out the sense of intellectual divergence. Rich and poor, urban and rural, high-church and low-church, Christian and non-Christian—all may meet on the common ground of old familiar tunes. With this as a bridge the speaker can lead his audience into the promised land of religious experience.

Various Methods of Presentation

Psychology has taught us much about the best methods of impressing an audience, especially when an audience is one seeking information. The attention-span of an audience is a function of intelligence and education. The more heterogeneous the audience, the more the speaker must allow for a short span of attention. Long and involved sentences set up fatigue and induce loss of interest. In general, sentences of more than twenty-five words are to be avoided, even before specialized audiences of professional people. So, too, the rhythm of speaking, the quality of the voice, and the placing of emphasis are important.

There have been a number of studies regarding the relative effectiveness of various modes of presentation of material to high-school and college students. In general, it is found that audiences, except highly specialized ones, react more sympathetically and with more attention to papers read informally or to speeches delivered freely than to more formal presentations. Also, a combination of visual and auditory material is superior to either kind alone. It is found in study after study that the presentation of concrete objects along with the statements have the best effect upon the audience. Diagrams, graphs, and pictures are usually more effective when they precede rather than when they follow oral presentation. Visual aids are particularly effective with audiences that are unfamiliar with the material and with younger and less intelligent groups. Concrete material, for the most part, is remembered better than the abstract. It has been found that the typical educated audience, given information in a field in which it is already familiar, may be expected to forget two-thirds of the facts within a week.

Other of the well-known means of impressing audiences are emphatic presentation, repetition, and development of material to a climax, followed by a review at the close of the session. Repetition, however, follows the law of diminishing returns. Usually not more than three repetitions may be made effectively, but the number will vary with the intelligence of the audience and the nature of the matter presented. Adolf Hitler,

like many other demagogues, made effective use of simple appeals, frequently presented. Advertisers and some speakers have shown that, for some kinds of material, anticlimax is more effective than climax. It has also been shown that the first argument is often the most effective. The device of permitting questions in open discussion at the close of a lecture tends to fix the facts and interpretation more firmly in the minds of the auditors. Yet, it may confuse them, in the sense that people do not remember what the speaker said, but what somebody from the audience may have said. However, democratic discussion may break the emotional hold which a speaker has secured and the manipulators of conversional audiences seldom wish this to happen. In recreational audiences, of course, there is little or no provision for this kind of audience-performer interaction.

Suggestion and Persuasion in Audience Situations

The masses have more in common at an emotional and primary-drive level than they do at an intellectual level. If the purpose of a gathering is to convert those present to a course of action, or to impress them with sentiments and values, or to provide emotional release, the appeals made to them will be different from the appeals made to an information-seeking audience. A variety of techniques of suggestion and persuasion may be used.

One method of persuading an audience is the building up of an apparently logical but basically emotional argument. This method meets our cultural expectation of logical reasons for our acts, an expectation to which we are conditioned in the home, in the school, and in other groups where we get our basic training. If we believed that outright emotional appeals were valid, we would not need such roundabout ways of persuasion. Specialized training in science, art, or business by no means provides against susceptibility to logically fallacious argument. Even leaders in these fields succumb to the blandishments of the shrewd manipulator of public sentiment.

Some common forms of faulty argument are confusing logic with appeals to authority or prejudice, confusing anecdote with proof, using analogy and metaphor as evidence, implying that statistical correlation indicates causation, confusing high-sounding words with profundity, and affirming the well-known *post hoc, ergo propter hoc.* In the discussion of public issues, especially, these devices are in frequent use. Since we are trained to defer to authority, the citation of prestige-bearing names or principles quickly convinces most of us. Our prejudices as to class, race, and religion—as we shall note in Chapters 21–23—are easily rationalized in terms of false assumptions about biological or psychological differences. A mere sequence of events is often mistaken for proof of genuine causal relations. A false premise often becomes the basis of assumed results.

For instance, the "encirclement" thesis in international relations being accepted, national aggressiveness against a neighboring nation is taken for granted. This familiar paranoidal pattern is often found in arguments addressed to audiences in times of crisis.

The changing of ideas, opinions, and attitudes takes place at varying rates. New opinions seem to be more easily formed by persons who are undecided than by those who have already made up their minds. Changes in conviction may take place in connection with topics on which the audience has some information. However, as a rule, listening to an argument favorable to one's views seems to strengthen opinions already held. On the other hand, neutral or indifferent opinions seem less stable than decided ones. If neutral views are changed they seem to move in the direction of those held by the majority. There are some variations, of course, in terms of age, intensity of conviction, and culture.

Relation of Audience Response to Overt Action

Whether or not an audience is stimulated to direct action will depend on the purpose of those who initiate and manage the occasion. Information-seeking audiences, for the most part, congregate to get facts and interpretations, not to act. The ideas and attitudes presented in the classroom or in public lectures are thought to influence later, but not present, conduct. The participation of recreational audiences may be enthusiastic at the time, as at football or baseball games, but no subsequent action is anticipated. In the conversional audience, however, or in one altered by appeal from the information-seeking or the recreational into this type, persuasion may lead to overt action. When this occurs, the audience becomes an action crowd.

A common method of turning a passive audience into an action crowd is to shift the attention from general to particular considerations. For example, a meeting called to hear appeals for a local organization of a Ku Klux Klan might be whipped up emotionally to undertake a raid on a Negro residential section, a Catholic church, or a Jewish store. In the shift from generality and vagueness to specific plans of action, various techniques of suggestion may be used: vivid and repeated appeals to deep prejudices or to prestige and class status, or to slogans, catchwords, and well-worn myths and legends. The appeals touch off elemental drives for survival, sexual expression, and the protection of status; when they are reinforced by the audience itself, the latter has become an action crowd.

Where the aim is to get an audience to change into an action crowd, the use of well-organized *claque* is important. Here the preliminary phases are deliberately set up to stimulate action among the members. The use of lights, flags, bands, and enormous halls or open plazas, the marching and countermarching, the fanfare and excitement, tend to inhibit rational habits and ideas and replace them with emotional enthusiasm for

the party or national destiny or whatever end the manipulators have in mind. During the Middle Ages, at the time of the crusades, large gatherings were held to excite the populace against the infidel. Today the purpose is political. The content of the appeals may have changed, but the social-psychological techniques are the same. One special characteristic of modern mass appeals is the deliberate and carefully planned use of all the known devices. Revolutionary dictators and their henchmen have learned to exploit all the old psychological principles for a single end. We shall have something to say about this in Chapter. 24.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CLEVELAND, Catherine C., *The Great Revival in the West, 1797–1805* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916). An account of a period of intense revivalism in the early days of the United States. Contains much material from eyewitnesses of bizarre and wild behavior of participants in these religious revivals.

JANIS, Irving L., *Air War and Emotional Stress* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951). Based chiefly on postwar surveys of opinions and attitudes regarding air warfare, this book, by a thoroughly competent psychologist, interprets the individual and group reactions to stress situations.

MACKAY, Charles, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (London, Routledge, 1852), 2 vols.; new printing (Boston: L. C. Page, 1932). A remarkable collection of historical episodes revealing a range of mass hysteria and action-crowd behavior. Among others it includes the Children's Crusade, the Dancing Mania, The Tulipomania in Holland, the Mississippi Bubble, and witchcraft.

MARTIN, Everett Dean, *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, Harper, 1920). An incisive analysis of crowd conduct, chiefly from a Freudian standpoint.

MERTON, R. K., *Mass Persuasion* (New York, Harper, 1946). A sociological and social psychological analysis of Kate Smith's marathon bond-raising campaign during World War II.

MILLER, N. E., and DOLLARD, John, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941). Earlier chapters deal with the manner in which social attitudes are learned. Chapter 14 is a general discussion of crowd behavior; Chapter 15 presents a descriptive analysis of a lynching.

SIDIS, Boris, *The Psychology of Suggestion* (New York, D. Appleton, 1898). Contains many excellent illustrations of crowd behavior. The psychology is derived from William James, in large part.

STARKEY, Marion L., *The Devil in Massachusetts* (New York, Knopf, 1949). A story of the witchcraft mania in Salem, Massachusetts.

CHAPTER 13

Fashion

AS a form of behavior, fashion has to do with more or less current and accepted matters of dress, personal adornment, decoration, furniture, houses, and a wide variety of social manifestations. The expressions "to be in the fashion" or "the vogue" indicates status or social position in a given society. In our day, more particularly, fashions are subject to periodic change. In fact, we have a convention of fashion change in contrast to the more fixed habits of decoration, costume, and social forms found in other societies.

Closely related behavior is expressed in the ideas of *style* and *vogue*. As applied to fashion, style has to do with a characteristic mode of presentation, construction, or execution of any art. It is the quality that gives distinctive excellence to certain artistic items. Vogue has a time orientation and in relation to fashion has to do with a particular design or decoration at a given period. It may be a temporary mode or custom having wide acceptance and commendation. Associated with both style and vogue is taste. Here we enter into the value systems relating to such objects as clothes and decoration. Taste is really a subjective judgment—based on cultural acceptance—which has to do with the power of discerning and appreciating fitness, beauty, order, proportion, symmetry, and whatever else is considered to be of excellence. We talk of things in good or bad taste, and this is obviously a value judgment and not a judgment of fact.

From fashion and fashion change, style, and vogue we move along a continuum of collective behavior to fads, rages, and crazes. As we shall see, these latter represent something akin to mob behavior as described in the previous chapter.

As a form of collective behavior, fashion illustrates some important aspects of mass or collective phenomena. In particular, we shall see the function of leadership, mass suggestion, social facilitation, the interplay of rational and irrational elements, and the rapid shift of attitude and action which are called into being through changes in fashion. In terms

of the Miller-Dollard scheme, fashion falls into the class of matched and dependent learning—that is, it is highly imitative (see Chapter 3).

The present chapter will begin by noting the setting of fashion in its larger cultural context. Especially we will be concerned with its relationship to the dynamics of social change and the introduction of certain important historical elements into this picture. This will be followed by a discussion of fashion as a part of group behavior. Then we shall take up more particularly the psychological features of individuals in relation to fashion, style, vogue, and changes in these matters. At the close of the chapter we shall have something to say about fads and crazes as special cases of collective behavior.

CULTURE AND FASHION

Stability and Change

Fashion and changes in fashion can only be understood within the larger framework of the culture of the given society. As forms of behavior, fashion has temporary and changing features in contrast to custom and tradition. The latter are marked by a much higher degree of stability and permanence than is fashion. There are changes in custom but they tend to be slow, whereas, at least in our time, those of fashion tend to be rather rapid. The most stable of the cultural patterns are those bound up in the mores and the law. They provide order, continuity, and the norms of behavior. The modifications and deviations which we associate with fashions really revolve around changes permissible within the mores and the law. For example the wearing of clothes is required or demanded by social norms. The particular style of clothes or the amount of clothing worn at a particular time is dictated by the conditions of fashion at the time. As a cultural pattern, in fact, fashion is a kind of social ritual which people are supposed to follow. The dictates of fashion can be very severe. We shall return to this topic in another connection.

When we say that fashion occurs within the context of certain cultural norms, we introduce historical features. Fashion changes, as we know them, really belong to our more recent Western history. In some societies there is little or no permissiveness to change matters of costume, manners, housing, decorations, and so on. This was nicely illustrated in medieval Japan, as described by Lafcadio Hearn. Every class in feudal Japan was under mandatory regulation. Form, size, and cost of dwellings, number and quality of dishes, the amount of property a man might own, and a wide variety of controls over the clothes and decorations of the individual were laid down in sumptuary laws. Hearn remarks: [1]

[1] Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation* (New York, Macmillan, 1904), pp. 182, 183, 184. By permission.

Every class of Japanese society was under sumptuary regulation. The nature of [the controls] . . . is best indicated by the regulations applying to the peasantry. Every detail of the farmer's existence was prescribed for by law,—from the size, form, and cost of his dwelling, down even to such trifling matters as the number and the quality of the dishes to be served to him at meal times . . . A farmer with a property assessed at twenty *koku* (of rice) was not allowed to build a house more than thirty-six feet long, or to use in building it such superior qualities of wood as *keyaki* or *hinoki*. The roof of this house was to be made of bamboo-thatch or straw; and he was strictly forbidden the comfort of floor mats. On the occasion of the wedding of his daughter he was forbidden to have fish or any roasted food served at the wedding feast. The women of his family were not allowed to wear leather sandals: they might wear only straw-sandals or wooden clogs; and the thongs of the sandals or the clogs were to be made of cotton. Women were further forbidden to wear hair bindings of silk, or hair ornaments of tortoise-shells; but they might wear wooden combs and combs of bone—not ivory. The men were forbidden to wear stockings, and their sandals were to be made of bamboo (grass). They were also forbidden to use sunshades . . . or paper umbrellas. . . .

Similar, though perhaps not so severe, regulations distinguished the women of rank from other women in feudal Europe. During the Middle Ages, "the veils of princesses and queens came down to their feet and were surmounted by a crown; those of plebeian women came only to the waist, and no crown was worn." During the seventeenth century, "the length of the train denoted the rank of the wearer. Seventeen yards was prescribed for the queen, ten yards for the king's daughters, seven yards for other princesses, and four yards for duchesses." [2]

Sharp class distinctions have long played an important part in fashion. For example, even to this day, class lines are more sharply drawn in England than in the United States. Before World War II an English merchant would scarcely have felt comfortable if he had not dressed for dinner, whereas in America dressing for dinner was by that time far less common among persons of corresponding wealth and education. The influence of ancient conventions in the matter of clothes is nicely illustrated in the British royalty. The court follows long-established practices. On certain formal occasions, such as the coronation, the clothes and ornamentation of previous centuries are required. For example, during a visit to Scotland, the royal family must wear on certain occasions the kilts of the particular area of Scotland they are visiting. In contrast, in modern daily life, with its swift changes and heightened animation, its mobility and rapid communication, fashions change more rapidly, and these shiftings are among the things we expect in our dynamic world. The dominance of fashion over a good deal of our behavior is everywhere in evidence. It has a distinctive place in the organization of the personality.

[2] Elizabeth Hurlock, *The Psychology of Dress: An Analysis of Fashion and Its Motive* (New York, Ronald, 1929), p. 32. By permission.

History of Fashion

Let us look into the history of fashion in order to expose the nature of the changes in styles. An interesting study was made by Agnes Brooks Young, the well-known stage designer. After some preliminary work, Mrs. Young decided to use skirt contours as the basic item in her investigation. Skirt contours, she says, fall into three modes or types: the bell-shaped, the back-fullness, and the tubular styles. Her data consisted of type dress styles from 1760 through 1937, a time span of slightly more than 175 years. Her analysis showed that for this period there were about two cycles per century as follows: back-fullness was in style from late 1760 through 1795, or 36 years. The tubular style was dominant from 1796 through 1829, or a period of 34 years. The bell-shaped was proper from 1830 through 1867, or a time span of 38 years. Back-fullness returned in 1868 and lasted through 1899, or a 32 year period, and then the tubular reappeared in 1900 and held sway through 1937, or 38 years. At this point in her investigation, she went a little further and began studying well-known paintings of the earlier part of the eighteenth century and added one more cycle to round out a full two centuries. She showed that from 1795 through 1859 the bell-shaped type of skirt was the basic vogue. Mrs. Young regards the three types as "major cycle types, since they dominate fashion for extended periods of time, and in regularly recurring sequences. Each one dominates, in turn, excluding the other two, over a period of approximately a third of a century, and for the past two hundred years they have done so in the order of back-fullness type, bell-shaped, and tubular type." [8]

A much more exhaustive study is that undertaken by Jane Richardson and A. L. Kroeber. Using fashion plates and for earlier periods paintings and engravings, they made measurements of a number of features of women's dress from 1605 to 1936. The data prior to 1787 are frankly scanty and yet adequate to give some idea of trends. They used various measurements, three of vertical and three of horizontal dimensions, of the skirt as a whole, of the waist or restricted middle, and of the décolletage, or cut-out at the neck, using both depth and width. They did not take note of trains, flounces, sleeves, or girdles. From their study they concluded that modern European dress for women has alternated, with a fair degree of regularity, from broad to narrow, short to long, with a full cycle of periodicity of about 100 years. Furthermore, the authors suggest that there has emerged in recent centuries a type or ideal in feminine costume. This basic pattern or type would be a skirt that is both full and long with a waist rather sharply constricted but in about the proper

[8] Agnes Brooks Young, *Recurring Cycles of Fashion, 1760–1937* (New York, Harper, 1937), p. 30.

anatomical place—neither too high nor too low—and a décolletage which is both vertically and horizontally ample.[4]

The discrepancy between Mrs. Young and Richardson and Kroeber shows some of the methodological difficulties in dealing with this kind of material. But the cycle-period of one-third of a century or a little more, found by Mrs. Young, corresponds roughly to the fifty-year half-cycle of the other study. However one may divide up the changes in terms of decades, the fact remains that we have from these two studies clear evidence of alterations in fashion and that these changes take on something of a recurrent form.

FASHION IN MASS AND CLASS

Diffusion of Fashions

The democratization of fashion is clearly evident in our time. What today the upper-class woman has designed in the way of the latest style, tomorrow has reached the middle-class market, and day after tomorrow the mass buyer of petty-bourgeois status or below. Using New York City as an example, we can clearly see the downward seepage. Dresses, hats, and accessories which appear at Bergdorf Goodman's or in Bonwit Teller's on Fifth Avenue will shortly appear in less-expensive grade at Macy's and Gimbel's in the 34th Street section. In only a few weeks other and still cheaper duplicates will appear at stores on Union Square or in corresponding mass-distribution outlets in Brooklyn and the Bronx. As Edward Sapir says, "Fashion is essentially a thing of forms and symbols not of material values." [5]

Despite this democratization, the imperious character of fashion remains. As William Graham Sumner put it, "There is no arguing with fashion." [6] While the earlier pace-setters in fashion were aristocrats and rich bourgeois, today the demands of the mass buyers play an increasing part. To take an example from what is essentially a fad, about 1950 there appeared the poodle cut and the pony tail in hair styles. They spread rapidly, were very popular, and became the expected style for a large fraction of younger women, especially. By 1953, however, there was clear evidence that what someone called "the zoological trend" was dead. Other hair styles appeared on the scene and the animal influence in women's hair styles was a thing of the past. As one editorial put it, "The fashion dictatorship doesn't need any secret police or concentration camps to en-

[4] Jane Richardson and A. L. Kroeber, "Three Centuries of Women's Dress Fashions: A Quantitative Analysis," *Anthropological Record,* 1940, 5:112–150.

[5] Edward Sapir, "Fashion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), Vol. 6, p. 142.

[6] William G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. 194.

force its 'party line' and to apprehend and punish the non-conformers . . . The desire to look a *little* different but—heaven forbid—not *too* different, is quite enough to make the ladies toe the mark." [7]

The ready acceptance of the standards of fashion and of their changes is well demonstrated in a study made by W. Godfrey Cobliner. His subjects were students at Hunter College. While the sample was small, the results tend to support what we have just said. A questionnaire was designed and given to eighteen women students, all of them over twenty years of age and representing a fairly homogeneous middle-class background. Regarding the acceptance of fashion as a group standard, the author writes: [8]

> Most of the subjects expressed themselves as satisfied with the uniformity and periodic change in style which fashion imposes. . . .
>
> In social life they would feel uneasy, uncomfortable, and self-conscious if they did not comply with fashion. There is little resentment of fashion, and even in situations where they themselves do not feel "up to date" they will not attack fashion as such. . . . *They would dislike to have fashion disappear as a standard regulating device,* and some respondents anticipate their own confusion if such a situation should ever develop.

Fashion and Aesthetic Ideal

In discussing hair-style changes we saw a good illustration of the variation in what is regarded as beautiful and in good taste. Fashion has such an influence over our attitudes and values that any style, no matter how ridiculous it may seem in one period, if accepted, will seem beautiful in another. One has but to examine a series of reproductions of earlier fashions to realize this. The hoop skirt, once fashionable, seemed silly in the period which followed. When the tubular skirt, especially the short version, was introduced, it seemed quite outlandish. But soon women everywhere were wearing it. In matters of taste, of course, we recognize that the emotional and irrational appeal is frequently more important than the rational. This is neatly illustrated in the accentuation of some features of physical form and not others. In some periods the waistline was accentuated by the bustle or by the extension of the skirt over the hips. In other periods the décolletage was most prominent in determining what was considered beautiful. Another example of this is the exposure of the leg. For a long time the legs were completely covered and women were not regarded as proper or in good taste if they should expose their legs. During the middle 1920's, however—the so-called flapper age—skirts frequently stopped at the knee or above.

[7] Editorial, "J. Stalin, Please Note," *Collier's* (January 3, 1953), 131:70.

[8] W. Godfrey Cobliner, "Feminine Fashion as an Aspect of Group Psychology: Analysis of Written Replies Received by Means of a Questionnaire," *J. of Social Psychology,* 1950, 31:283–289. Quotation is from p. 285; italics not in the original. By permission.

Fashion and the Economic Order

The people of the United States annually spend billions of dollars as a result of fashions and fads. Along with the tremendous amount of money which is spent, there is a popular idea that designers, manufacturers, and retail operators make the fashion changes. That is, it is believed that they foist upon the public various changes in taste and style. Those who support this view point to the huge amounts spent in advertising of fashion. Not only is this a popular notion but it has some adherents among the economists. Paul M. Gregory has attempted to show that fashion is uneconomic in the sense of the market. That is, he holds that changes are largely those induced by designers, manufacturers, and advertisers for retail stores. He argues, first, that the manufacturers induce a heavy turnover for new fashions by making shoddy goods. Secondly, he indicates that there is a real imposition on, or exploitation of, the lower income groups because they tend to imitate the designs of fashion in order to improve their status. He believes, too, that the frequent rotation of fashion items destroys their utility. And, finally, he contends that fashion and fashion change "result in monopolistic competition by differentiating the goods of rival sellers, and they create further market imperfections by playing upon and reinforcing consumer ignorance." In short, following traditional economics, he feels that the selling of fads and fashions tends to impede rational choice. This idea of rational choice is not borne out by psychological studies of human behavior but it is still maintained in classical economics. He goes on to say: "In the long run, free consumer choice is more seriously restricted by fashion than by ordinary brand differentiation, because merchants do not generally carry what are considered 'unfashionable' goods even though people may want them. . . . Thus fashion . . . limits the genuine variety available to consumers." [9]

Such views, first, completely overlook the irrational character of much of human behavior. Second, they fail to realize that fashion changes, although inducing attention to new garments, also contribute to the interplay of individuality and conformity. This topic will be discussed below. Third, Gregory overlooks the importance of certain class differentiations and the relationship of fashion and its changes to our mobile class system.

A number of people have tried, usually unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that manufacturers and distributors inaugurate fashion phases. The consensus seems to be that fashions and fads arise spontaneously and spread rapidly and that predicting their rise and diffusion is extremely difficult and financially risky. Extremes in fashion are probably a phase

[9] Paul M. Gregory, "An Economic Interpretation of Women's Fashions," *Southern Economic J.*, 1947, 14:148–162. Quotations are from pp. 153, 154. By permission.

of our rapidly changing life and of our somewhat superficial social context. To foist fashion changes on people seems social folly; yet designers and manufacturers naturally attempt to discover the trends in fashion and to stimulate our desire to be in the swing. Modern advertisers have exploited every principle of suggestion and persuasion in order to foster changes in style. They appeal to snobbery, to the desire for keeping up with the Joneses, to the spirit of adventure, and to the observance of social convention. These frank appeals are based on sound psychology. They are deliberate methods of putting into practice the principles of social control. Yet that such devices actually determine fashion trends is difficult to demonstrate. As instability is one of the characteristics of fashion and fashion change, the designer, the manufacturer, and the merchant are all faced with serious economic risks. Fashions in dress accessories often shift overnight. Manufacturers must try to estimate the trends and then by speeding up production to exploit them while they still prevail.

Other students of economics and of fashion change have attempted to discover some possible correlation between changing styles and variations in the business cycle. For example, just prior to the depression of 1929 there was a shift from the narrow dress and the short skirt to much fuller dresses and longer skirts. This latter would involve obviously the use of a great deal more material in the making of a dress. Here was a curious situation in which, on the one hand, there was a general decline in business productivity, and yet, on the other hand, dress manufacturers were in a prosperous condition. Many articles written around that time tried to prove that this was psychological reaction to the effects of the economic depression. It was contended that people faced with bad times wanted to bolster their egoes by indulging in finery. This had occurred in earlier periods of economic decline. However a serious attempt by Agnes Brooks Young to work out some such correlation showed that it was impossible. She could find no definite correlation between economic ebb and flow in business activity and the changes in fashion.[10]

Fashion and the Mores

In our Christian society the dominant churches have made numerous efforts to control the direction of fashion, especially in matters considered sacred or taboo. From the fourteenth century on, laws against indecent clothes have appeared periodically. In the religious enthusiasm of the Reformation and Counter Reformation efforts were made to control personal apparel and ornamentation. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when women began to uncover the neck and bosom, clergy and moralists alike denounced what they considered indecent dress. The Puritans, the Quakers, and other sects tried to stipulate dress and prevent the ex-

[10] Agnes Brooks Young, *op. cit.*

posure of a woman's body or the use of any personal adornment. Outside certain narrow circles, the mores rejected these demands as excessively severe. Ultimately the mores always control fashion.

Whether exposure of the neck and bosom, at one time, and of the legs and arms at another, contributes to immorality always seems to provoke debate. In our own day, certain preachers have repeatedly inveighed against fashion changes. During the 1920's various municipal ordinances and local mores attempted to prevent the wearing of scanty bathing suits by women. Some American communities forbade young women to appear on the streets without stockings—a fad which was permitted elsewhere. Yet in Japan and Russia people are not morally offended by seeing naked men and women bathe together. Women's smoking may not seem immoral to us now, but it certainly seemed so a few generations ago. As in many other fields, the breakdown of the old folkways and mores is evident in dress. Except in isolated areas where modern concepts of living have not become common, conventions in clothes and ornamentation seem to be escaping more and more from the older moral standards. What is considered proper and right in the folkways of fashion is generally accepted.

Men and Fashion

In earlier times upper-class men of leisure were as interested in fashion and fashion change as were women. With the coming of modern capitalistic enterprise and the disappearance of some features of upper-class control, men moved more and more toward a uniformity in clothes that has characterized their dress for over a century and a half. In recent years, however, there has been some effort to break down the formality and conservatism of men's clothes. In 1950 the Metropolitan Museum of Art held a costume institute which displayed certain men's fashions of the future as conceived by twelve or more women designers. An informal poll of the men who saw this exhibit revealed a number of interesting reactions. Most men denounced the creations as "too radical," "effete," and "lousy." They said that they would never consider wearing such clothes. A second group were more favorable but said that they "wouldn't wear them unless men in general took them up." Finally, a small minority said they might try out one or two things, but these were mostly similar to items they had already worn.[11]

Millstein cites the slow changes which have taken place in men's clothes. He recalled that the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University had shown in one of its polls that men do not like to admit wearing anything new. There is a certain anxiety or fear of being too well-dressed. In pursuing the question of why this is true and why

[11] Gilbert Millstein, "Man or Mouse or Butterfly?" *The New York Times Magazine*, April 2, 1950, p. 17.

men are conservative, Millstein indicates three factors: First, there is the culture pattern of masculinity. Second, there is the pattern of work. And, third, there is the strong pressure toward conformity. Men are more worried about being considered different than are women.

Yet there are some gradual alterations. Among others are the disappearance of hats and the fact that men's suits today are a good deal more comfortable and looser than they were earlier. Also there is more color and more varied patterns than formerly. Most striking of all are the changes in men's sports wear which began in the middle 1930's. Men have become increasingly more willing to wear colorful clothes when indulging in recreational activities. There is probably a growing capacity to dissociate the work period from other phases of a day's routine. It is just possible that some of the male's unconscious wish to play the peacock may, once more, be permitted some expression.

Leaders of Fashion

While designers, manufacturers, and distributors do not "make" fashion or fashion change, they do influence styles and vogues at any given time. There is no doubt that Parisian designers of women's clothing have long been leaders not only in France and on the continent but in this country as well. Women have a definite mental set toward French styles. In Paris one finds such great names as Worth, Dior, and Lelong, among others. These names symbolize the potential fulfillment of the desire to be in fashion and these men do influence the development of new styles. Nevertheless, as noted above, there is always great risk in these matters. It has been estimated that at least one-third of the proposed new styles do not catch on. It would be a great mistake to assume that designers and manufacturers can actually control the development of a new style.

Obviously the social élite play an important part in these matters. The royal families of Europe long influenced fashion. The Empress Eugénie, for example, was one of the best known of the fashion leaders from the old royal families of Europe. General Lafayette, in the 1820's, helped introduce and maintain in America certain of the older traditions in French clothing. Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian patriot who visited this country in 1851 is said to be responsible for the introduction in the United States of felt or velour hats. This was a part of the costume of the Hungarian nationalists of the time. Just before our Civil War, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales—later King Edward VII—visited this country. Following this, the Prince Albert coat became the standard and proper garment for formal occasions among American men. In 1924 the Duke of Windsor, then Prince of Wales, visited this country and had some effect upon the introduction of certain plaids, snap-brim hats, and other apparel among men. At about the same time, the excavation of the tomb of Tutankhamen in Egypt started a craze for Egyptian patterns in dress goods and decora-

tive designs. More recently we have had the Bikini bathing suit, an illustration of numerous attempts to link up current events with fashion. Certainly during a war there is always an effect upon the fashion designs. People go in for military types of clothes which symbolize the current activities.

In 1929, the author and Fannie Hurst, the novelist, engaged in a somewhat interesting discussion in the public prints regarding the matter of the utility of clothes as over and against the appeal of irrational elements in design. Miss Hurst maintained that women of her day should not follow the current fashion trends which would put them into uncomfortable dresses, including long skirts. This was just after the period of the tubular and short skirt. Miss Hurst felt keenly that the coming of the long and somewhat restraining skirt was a symbol of putting woman back into the inferior position she had long held vis-à-vis men. The author took the position, on the contrary, that there was little that such a rational appeal could do to prevent the fashion trend once the shift had caught the popular fancy. In terms of the traditional cycle, we were about due for a shift in clothes. The rational appeal of people like Miss Hurst could do very little to alter it. Subsequent events have shown that this was the case.

Apparently every time there is a sharp shift in fashion, some person comes forward with the idea that it is just too bad that women are so stupid as to follow these irrational trends. Certain agitating minorities have long talked about dress reform. Doctors occasionally make remarks about the hygienic ill-effect of certain kinds of clothes. But it must never be forgotten that the strength of fashion lies in the feelings and emotions, and not in the intellect. Hoop skirts in the 1870's, waist-pinching and bustles in the 1890's, leg-of-mutton sleeves one day and tight sleeves the next day, long skirts today and short ones tomorrow indicate the illogic of fashion's appeal. In fashion, as in prejudice, crowd behavior, public opinion, and most social attitudes and activities, men and women manifest a mixture of the illogical and impulsive with the rational. Fantasy thinking, not logic, dominates much of fashion. In the days of narrow sedan chairs, women wore wide-spreading panniers. When people traveled in crowded stage coaches, women wore crinoline. The hobble skirt did not make for easy getting in and out of street cars or automobiles.

Yet it would be a mistake to ignore utilitarian tendencies in certain aspects of dress and personal decoration. The best illustration of this is the shift among men as noted above. The business suit is the symbol not of style and fashion change but of utilitarian in contrast to irrational elements in clothes. Men still wear tuxedos and, on occasion, formal dress suits. But, on the whole, the tendency in men's clothes has been toward a more useful type.

In regard to women, I think a somewhat similar trend may be de-

tected. As women move into business and professional life, they tend to develop a type of dress more suitable for their particular occupation. During their leisure-time activities, however, they still follow the trends of fashion change which we have been describing. In other words, for certain situations there would be a standard or fixed type of garment. But for "social" events these women would be concerned with new styles and various evidences of finery which would keep them in the best of status with regard to other women.

Obviously the continuation of fashion appeal rests, in part, upon the continuation of our particular social-economic order. In the society where there is upward striving for status and where there is strong emphasis upon competitiveness, we may look for a continuation of fashion change. In a society which is highly authoritarian and regimented, we might find little or no fashion change.

The development of utilitarian aspects of women's clothes in relation to their employment in gainful occupations represents a certain masculinization of clothes. Women, at work, probably will continue to wear clothes which have a useful function and which depart from the frills and features that go with leisure-time apparel. This is part of a general emancipation of women and should indicate some reduction or gradual elimination of those factors which mark off women from men in terms of their secondary sex roles.

This whole discussion, of course, raises a question as to whether mass society may not destroy fashion change. This would be a factor in relation to the continuing standardization of certain products. Also it might reflect the whole stress upon conformity and unity in mass society. So long as we have our present emphasis upon individualism and upward striving for status, it is doubtful that mass society would destroy fashion change as we know it. This, probably, could only come about if we had a highly regimented and authoritarian type of government. So long as we have individual freedom, there is not much likelihood of such control. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to overlook the dictatorial aspects of fashion itself. We noted this in discussing the kind of mass demand and mass control which comes with being in the fashion. There is a kind of domination which we cannot overlook. But it is not quite the same as that which we might envisage if we had an authoritarian control that would predetermine the clothes and styles which people wore.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DRESS

Individuality and Conformity

One of the most interesting aspects of fashion with regard to personality is that it provides a nice interplay between the sense of individual-

ism and difference, on the one hand, and the social conformity which is imperative if one is to be in style, on the other. The Cobliner study shows clearly, for his sample, that when one is in the latest style and is, in a sense, ahead of the group, such a person will be looked upon with feelings of admiration and even envy. Cobliner also showed that there is a very definite process of shifting from the nonacceptance of a given new design or style to one of acceptance. For example, at the time he made his study the so-called "new look" was just appearing. Some of the respondents in his study thought it rather silly and thought it would never really catch on. One of his subjects remarked, "I thought it was positively hideous at first, then as time went on I thought it glorified a great deal and this changed my attitude." The rationalization of this was that the "new look" was more feminine, more luxurious, that it increased feelings of security, poise, and a sense of comfort. Most of the subjects thought it was a new and better device to glamorize young people.[12]

There is in fashion-acceptance a certain interplay of individualism and difference with social conformity. George Simmel, the German sociologist, has analyzed this paradox in the following words: [13]

> Two social tendencies are essential to the establishment of fashion, namely, the need of union, on the one hand, and the need of isolation, on the other. Should one of these be absent, fashion will not be formed—its sway will abruptly end. . . .
>
> From the fact that fashion as such can never be generally in vogue, the individual derives the satisfaction of knowing that as adopted by him it still represents something special and striking, while at the same time he feels inwardly supported by a set of persons who are striving for the same thing, not as in the case of other social satisfactions, by a set actually doing the same thing.

Thus fashion furnishes for the personality a nice balance between the desire for conformity, security, and social solidarity, and the desire for distinction, individuality, and differentiation. The whole sway of fashion is related to the disturbance of this ever shifting balance of individualism and conformity.

Fashion and Ego Expansion

Theorists of fashion have come up with three basic motivations for the wearing of clothes. One of the oldest of these is that clothes are worn for bodily protection. True, as mankind moved out of the tropics and subtropics toward the northern climates, there was some utilitarian basis for the wearing of clothes. And yet modern personal hygiene has led us to a considerable reduction in the amount of clothing worn formerly. There is no evidence from cultural anthropology or history that the wearing of clothes was purely a protective device.

[12] Cobliner, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

[13] Georg Simmel, "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, 1904–1905, 10:137, 140.

A second theory is that the wearing of clothes rests on man's demands for modesty. Some writers even go so far as to hold that there is a kind of instinctual foundation for modesty, in particular with regard to the covering of the sexual organs. Again this is hardly substantiated by the facts. Actually the whole matter of what parts of the body to cover and what to expose—in truth, the whole doctrine of modesty—is tied up essentially with that cultural learning that has to do with the development of the conscience or the superego.

A much more supportable theory is that the decorative features of clothes are the basic reasons for their emergence and continuation. This might be called the peacock motive. It is interesting to note that William G. Sumner regarded vanity as one of man's deepest motives. Certainly decorative motivation plays an important part. Yet it seems to me that the decorative wishes must be examined over against the social demands for modesty. As a matter of fact there is a kind of ambivalence between modesty and the decorative desires. As J. C. Flügel puts it, clothes may be used "on the one hand, as a means of displaying our attractions, and on the other hand, as a means of hiding our shame." [14]

Society's demands concerning modesty are, of course, a reflection of what is considered as proper and improper regarding the exposure of the human body. In our puritanical Christian world nakedness is regarded as sinful. This goes back to certain legends and doctrines of the original sin, and there is a continuation of this whole view throughout our history. However, the coming of fashion change which began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries permitted people an opportunity to expose some parts of the body and to cover other. There is a kind of compromise between the general theory of wearing clothes and covering the body and some opportunity to display it. For instance, on the bathing beach, considerable exposure of the human body is today accepted, whereas the proper clothes for a formal dinner are quite different. There a woman might one time expose her shoulders and the upper part of her bosom in a low-cut gown and at another time she might have the front of her body well covered to the neck but expose her back to the waist. These are matters determined largely by the fashion dictates of the time. Surely one would hardly be considered appropriately dressed if one appeared at a formal dinner party in a bathing suit. By the same token no one would think of going on a beach dressed in an evening gown and attempting to take a swim in such a costume. Here then is a curious ambivalence in which, on the one hand, you have something analogous to blushing, shame, and restraint, and, on the other, a certain display of the human body, a kind of exhibitionism, devoid of shame.

The whole appeal of fashion and fashion change represents an extension of the self. The individual may seek a kind of maximization of

[14] J. C. Flügel, *The Psychology of Clothes* (London, Hogarth, 1930), p. 20.

himself through the wearing of modern clothes and being in style. Clothes and accessories are certainly anchor points for the self. By adding to the attractiveness of the individual, or by extending one's physical form, clothing may be thought of as an important aspect of self-consciousness. In this connection Mildred Graves Ryan has suggested certain relationships between various kinds of clothes and particular physical characteristics. For example, tall women should not wear dresses striped lengthwise. This would make them seem too tall. On the other hand, short and stout women should not wear horizontal stripes. This would make them look even shorter and stouter than they are. So, too, short and stout women should wear coats of full length, not box-type. She also suggests that they might use subdued hat tones and small-figured materials.

In relating color to personality—and here certainly a cultural element comes in—a dominant type of individual can wear bright, intense colors. As Ryan puts it, "A powerful personality cannot be dwarfed by brilliance." [15] What she calls timid persons, on the other hand, should wear pale colors, lovely tints of blue, green, violet, pink, and yellow. The modest type, who fall between the dominant and the timid, can wear something in-between. She also indicates five additional types: the (1) mannish type, or the boyish and the unemotional, and (2) the athletic or emotional may wear tailored clothes; (3) the vivacious may wear brilliant colors; (4) the dramatic makes a study of others and tries to obtain novel combinations; finally, (5) the studious may wear rich colors such as burgundy-red and golden-brown.

This whole idea of relating personality to clothes has been discussed over and over again by dress designers and others interested in fashion. Flügel has some such typology and Elizabeth Hawes has followed this up in her book on *Why Is a Dress?* (1942). These efforts show some attempt to relate the use of certain designs or colors with the popular conceptions of personality types. No one has really studied this problem empirically. At best these are but common-sense observations.

Psychologically, the desire for fashion change is associated with an interest in being divergent or set apart from others. We become bored by styles too long in use. Certain seasonal changes in clothes and decorations are taken for granted. In temperate climates in the spring of the year we secure new clothes, redecorate our houses, purchase a new car. We are on the alert for new fads. How much this desire for change is a reaction to boredom and how much it is an outgrowth of the culture of fashion, it is difficult to say. At any rate there is a kind of expectation built up with regard to such changes. Also a shift in fashion may offer us an opportunity to compensate for certain disappointments. Then, too, being in style enables individuals to win attention and admiration from others.

[15] Mildred Graves Ryan, *Your Clothes and Personality* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937), p. 99.

Certainly style of clothes may provide a means of covering up certain kinds of physical or psychological defects. Through padding of shoulders and similar devices a man of physically inadequate stature may compensate for his defects and appear to be an athletic type. The desire for change is probably related to our egotistic wishes for social approval. Rooted perhaps in our childhood habits of exhibitionism, of showing-off, we carry this over into adult life.

As a phase of culture, fashion is a social ritual related to mobility, to upward striving in our modern society.[16] As we noted above, where status is fixed in the mores and in the law, where groups are isolated and codes and manners are inflexible, or relatively so, fashion change, as we know it, hardly exists. Things do change, but they change very slowly. Modification of style or dress in our society is rapid and conspicuous. We have constructed a folkway of change rather than of stability. In terms of role expectation we should be up with the fashions of our group no matter how quickly they may be altered. Whatever exhibitionism may result from our early personal-social conditioning, it becomes reinforced as we discover that there is a convention of fashion change. The extreme result of this desire for new experience, for recognition, and for personal display is seen in fads and crazes which we will discuss below.

Our wish to be divergent, to gain attention, leads to emulation by others who look upon us as prestige-bearers, as persons to be followed. They unconsciously or consciously identify themselves with us as leaders. Emulation, in fact, aids the spread of fashion. Leadership in fashion has, of course, been institutionalized by designers and manufacturers of dress goods, automobiles, and other articles of this kind. However, their success is dependent upon acceptance by people who have money and opportunity to buy these clothes.

In addition, fashion is a means of compensating for a sense of inferiority. When we dress in the latest fashions we are identified as one of the élite. As George Simmel remarked, "From all this we see that fashion furnishes an ideal field for individuals of dependent natures, whose self-consciousness, however, requires a certain amount of prominence, attention, and singularity. Fashion raises even the unimportant individual by making him the representative of a class, the embodiment of a joint spirit." [17]

Many students of social behavior have maintained that women's intense interest in fashion is clearly a case of compensation for their sense of inferiority in the world of men. In an earlier day they found recompense in dress and ornamentation to attract men, on the one hand, and to set themselves off from men, on the other. Today the trend in women's

[16] See Bernard Barber and Lyle S. Lobel, "'Fashion' in Women's Clothes and the American Social System," *Social Forces*, 1952, 31:124–131.

[17] Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

clothes—at least those used in business—toward those of men may be partly the result of a changing position of women in business.

So, too, the masculinization of women's clothes is illustrated in the popularity of slacks, pedal pushers, toreador pants, Bermuda shorts, kilts, and so on. These have come to be more or less of a standard type of dress for certain situations, recreational and occupational, on the part of women.

Where there is a definite leisure class, women reveal the family's economic status through their dress and other conspicuous consumption. As masculine clothing has become more and more sober and conventionalized, it has lost the ability to display the pecuniary status of the wearer. Feminine clothing consequently came to assume this function. For that reason many men encourage the women of their families to outdress other women. In this way, the financial status of the man is displayed. Satisfaction which has been denied him by his own simple dress is thus attained when his women have unnecessarily large wardrobes. We can hardly doubt that our desire to expand our ego and to identify ourselves with activities which give social distinction are powerful motives in promoting fashion and changes in fashion.

Fashion and Sex

A discussion of fashion must face the problem of the relationship of decorative activities to sex. We have already indicated that there is a kind of oppositional relationship between the demands for modesty and the demand for display and decoration. We have indicated that the exposure of certain parts of the body varies with the changes in style. Just what society permits in these matters is determined by the basic moral and legal codes and will be modified in the course of time by variation in what is accepted and what is not. There is often a sharp difference in the standards of beauty and attractiveness on the part of various classes. In our own time, the lower and lower-middle-class groups are strongly attracted to the full-figured female with scantily-covered bosom. The continuing popularity of women like Dagmar, Zsa Zsa Gabor, and Jane Russell is well known. Movies probably play a part in stimulating such appeals. On the other hand, the upper class, the top élite in the social whirl, tend to regard the exposure of a bare bosom or the Varga and Petty type of girl display as being distinctly low-brow in character. As one observer puts it: [18]

> The upper, and presumably more intelligent and sophisticated class, does not go for the obvious in anything. It prefers a more subtle presentation of beauty. To them the overemphasis on the bust is low class, "of the people," "corny." It appeals too directly to too many people to be favored by men and women of distinction. . . .

[18] Grace B. Stern, "The Upper Class Tones Down Sex in Female Figures." A personal document, prepared in 1949.

The Duchess of Windsor, who exemplifies top drawer taste and style, has been said to have an impersonal figure—that is, a slat topped by a coat hanger which is the best device for showing off clothes. Mrs. Harrison Williams, another woman long-known as one of the best dressed women in the world, has the same kind of figure. To be of the fashionable world, a woman simply must be thin. It is said that the Duchess of Windsor admires slenderness so much that she and the Duke will not tolerate overweight people among their friends.

Although dress and personal decoration may be based on the desire to exert sexual attraction, the content of fashion seems dependent on other than purely sexual desire. At least this seems to be true of the upper class. Whatever is accepted in current fashion is thought to be attractive to the other sex. This is nicely illustrated by the opposition of men to stockingless legs for women when this fashion first became popular. Now, however, bare legs have been accepted and men think nothing about them. This is probably true also for the wearing of slacks and shorts. Again the whole matter is seen in the ambivalence between the demands of modesty and the permissiveness of certain kinds of physical exposure. These things change as the culture values change.

FADS AND CRAZES

The Nature of Fad

A fad is a custom, amusement, or vogue in dress or decoration that is followed for a time with an exaggerated zeal. It has much in common with the word "craze." Fads and crazes are really temporary crowd behavior without much structuring. Into these enter suggestion and imitation. Superficial aspects of fashion change are often called rages or crazes. The fad usually refers to certain minor details of dress, ornamentation, or decoration and by the top élite is regarded as bizarre, and hence in poor taste. Crazes and rages are thought of as more extensive or persistent and perhaps are in some ways even more deviant than fads. In both, however, there is a large component of irrationality and emotion.

Fads have been studied by a number of people and it has been estimated that there is usually at first a rapid rate of acceleration until a plateau of popularity is reached and then a rather rapid decline. It has been said that most fads in this country last about a year.

Variations in Fads

J. E. Janney has made a suggestive study of clothing fads as related to certain personality characteristics. His subjects were 279 women college students. Some of his data were gathered in 1936, the balance in 1939.[19] For background data he secured certain additional information

[19] J. E. Janney, "Fads and College Women," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 36:275–278.

from his sample, such as friendship relations, extent of travel, and cliques. He found that he could group his subjects in the following way:

Group A were the *bizarre* faddists. These were nine in number, eight of whom were in the same clique. They started 24 fads in the college —slacks and beer jackets among others. These fadists were most often found when there were no men on the campus, in other words, in women's colleges.

Group B, whom he calls the *distingué* faddists, consisted of seven girls who among them started twenty fads, such as Brooks sweaters with pearl necklaces, wedge shoes, and butcher-boy bobs.

Group C he called the *oscillating* faddists. There were eight students and they started eight fads. These tended to be very extreme, one way or another. These girls were in three different cliques. All of them might be called the malcontents in college.

Group D was called *egregious*. There were only three persons and they tried to start fifteen fads but none of these were followed. There was apparently a certain compulsive factor in this group.

Group E, the *conforming*, were really mere followers. These were by far the largest number of his sample—232 in number. None of these girls originated a single fad. In a sense, they were not faddists at all but conformists.

Group F he labeled *obsolescents*. These were 20 girls who wore outmoded clothes. As Janney says: "These young women did not dress—they upholstered. . . . None of this group was in any clique." [20] They were the isolates of the total sample.

E. S. Bogardus, the social psychologist, collected a list of 3,160 fads during the period 1914–49. Fads in women's dress and decoration led the list with 54 per cent of the total. Men's clothes came second with 16 per cent, and amusements and recreation, with 8 per cent, made up the third category. These three accounted for almost four-fifths of all the fads he had listed.[21]

As Bogardus pointed out, however, some items begin as fads but survive, serving some utilitarian or decorative purpose. For example, men's wrist watches were a fad when they were first used. The use of wrist watches has now become standard practice. Bobbed hair was definitely a fad at one time and has now become widespread and common. Zippers were at first a fad. Other fads on his list were such things as nose veils, the rhumba dance, crossword puzzles, eskimo pies, and pinball machines. All of these latter have become more or less common elements in decoration or recreation.

Apparently people in the United States get a considerable amount of

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

[21] See E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, 4th ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), pp. 305–309.

satisfaction out of fads and crazes. A list of the crazes that have taken the American people by storm during the last few decades would perhaps include among others such things as miniature or midget golf, bobby-socks, boop-boop-a-doop, the big apple, flagpole sitting, marathon dancing, tree sitting, jam-and-jive sessions, zoot suits, swallowing of goldfish, bank night, jigsaw puzzles, and many others.

To offer some concluding comments: fashion and fashion change rest upon institutionalized, stable, and structured features in our culture. The fluctuation in style of dress, decorative designs, and so on depend upon certain accepted and expected features of our day-by-day habits. By the same token the fad and the craze represent more extreme and deviant forms of such changes but are short-lived and only infrequently become stabilized. The latter also fall into the general category of temporary, transient, unstable, and even emotionalized behavior.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BEATON, Cecil, *The Glass of Fashion* (Garden City, Doubleday, 1954). An entertaining and informative essay on fashion in the Western world since about 1900.

BELL, Quentin, *On Human Finery* (London, Hogarth, 1947). A popularly written book on fashion as a reflection of the peacock motive in men and women.

BURRIS-MEYER, Elizabeth, *This Is Fashion* (New York, Harper, 1943). An informative account of the history of clothes, accessories, and home furnishings.

FLÜGEL, J. C., *The Psychology of Clothes* (London, Hogarth, 1930). Written from a Freudian standpoint, this book is a classic of sorts.

HAWES, Elizabeth, *Fashion Is Spinach* (New York, Grosset, 1938). Entertaining and informative, by a well-known costume designer.

LYNES, Russell, *The Taste Makers* (New York, Harper, 1954). A witty and well-written comment on our class system and how fashion and fashion changes are geared into the class structure.

SAPIR, Edward, "Fashion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), Vol. 6, pp. 139–144. An excellent statement of the whole topic by a distinguished cultural anthropologist.

VEBLEN, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, Macmillan, 1899). The classic interpretation of conspicuous consumption, including some comment on fashion. However, it must be realized that the consumption habits in Veblen's day have been greatly changed since, even among the wealthier classes.

CHAPTER 14

Public Opinion

PUBLIC opinion has long been a topic of interest to statesmen and demagogues as well as to more objective students of collective behavior. Despite some of the vagaries which have grown up about the concept, it is an important topic in social psychology. In this chapter we shall discuss its nature, function, and psychological features. Chapter 18 will treat attempts to record and measure it.

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC OPINION

We open our discussion of public opinion by quoting four statements on the nature of public opinion: James T. Young, a political scientist, remarks, "Public opinion is the social judgment of a self-conscious community on a question of general import after rational public discussion." John Dewey, the philosopher, says, "Communication of the results of social inquiry is the same thing as the formation of public opinion. . . . For public opinion is judgment which is formed and entertained by those who constitute the public and is about public affairs." Robert E. Park, sociologist, put it this way, "There is no public opinion where there is no substantial agreement. But there is no public opinion where there is not disagreement. Public opinion presupposes public discussion." And finally, Walter Lippmann, whose work in public opinion is well-known, remarks, "The pictures inside the heads of . . . human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationships are their public opinions." [1]

Facets of Public Opinion

At first glance, these four statements seem to be quite contradictory, one to another. Let us see what each means and if they can be brought

[1] The sources of these statements are: James T. Young, quoted in W. B. Graves, ed., *Readings in Public Opinion* (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1928), p. 102; John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), p. 177; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 832; Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1922), p. 29.

into some common frame of reference. Young's statement certainly carries with its notions of rational discussion of public issues. It also implies something in the way of community understanding. This itself has important implications for the concept of consensus as a phase of public opinion. Dewey's statement carries with it the implication that opinion formation is closely akin to the whole thinking process which he has so ably discussed. As he points out, thinking begins with some problem or issue to be followed by a series of steps toward the solution of said problem. This, too, implies a good deal of rationality. Furthermore, Dewey's point makes clear that public opinion formation has to do with public issues.

The importance of the Park quotation is in the stress upon the interplay of both agreement and consensus as well as differences. In other words, according to Park, there could be no opinion formation unless there were some kind of discussion representing divergent views. But Lippmann's statement introduces still other features, particularly those having to do with images, ideas, and memories inside the heads of human beings. That is to say, he is concerned with the subjective or internalized features of opinion formation. Among other components of these internal elements are man's self-image or concept of self, the image of other persons, and, in particular and of great importance, the recognition of motives—their needs and purposes. In other words, Lippmann recognizes not only the internal and motivational factors but also the important matter of irrationality. None of the other statements implies this element. We shall have more to say about the factor of irrationality later.

Most students of public opinion recognize, in one way or another, the various features in the definitions just presented. All recognize that there must be some basic issue or problem to be solved, that certain rational discussion occurs in trying to work out solutions, certainly that ideas and the residues of previous experience play a part. Then, too, there must be some difference of opinion as well as agreement in order to get discussion. Finally, discussion should normally lead to some kind of consensus or agreement. Moreover, opinions having to do with public questions are in a sense action-oriented. In this connection George C. Thompson says that we may classify opinions in the following three stages: First, there is a "general preference"; second, "a wish for a particular end or course of action"; and, third, "a belief as to the best practical means for achieving those particular ends which are desired." [2]

The operation of public opinion, at least in a democratic society, rests upon certain basic and fundamental agreements or values. We could

[2] George Carslake Thompson, *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield* (New York, Macmillan, 1886), p. 33. Reprinted in B. Berelson and M. Janowitz, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, enlarged edition (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), p. 18.

not have public discussion without some prior understanding that this is the way to arrive at some consensus on public issues. Thus once consensus has been reached, let us say by a majority vote on an issue, the minority or defeated party must recognize its duty to accept the judgment of the majority. In regard to agreement of discussants, A. Lawrence Lowell put the matter thus: [8]

> A body of men are politically capable of a public opinion only so far as they are agreed on the end and aims of government and upon the principles by which those aims shall be attained. They must be united, also, about the means whereby the action of the government is to be determined, in a conviction, for example, that the views of a majority—or it may be some other portion of their numbers—ought to prevail; and a political community as a whole is capable of public opinion only when this is true of the great bulk of citizens.

And in concluding his discussion on this point, Lowell makes this apt comment:

> In order that it may be public a majority is not enough, and unanimity is not required, but the opinion must be such that while the minority may not share it, they feel bound, by conviction not by fear, to accept it; and if democracy is complete the submission of the minority must be given ungrudgingly.

Some Cultural Factors

The history of the rise of public opinion as a device in controlling social behavior is an intriguing one. It would carry us too far afield to go into much detail. But it is worth noting that the use of public opinion as a power device arose in the Western world along with the rise of the national state and particularly with the development of the democratic forms of political order. Accompanying the rise of the middle class, it played an important part in the growing function of discussion and opinion formation on public issues. As the middle class strove more and more for a share of the total power of a given state, there developed a pattern of discussion of public issues. Previously under an autocratic type of governmental control, public discussion—that is discussion by interested citizens—was not permitted or was narrowly restricted to the top élite. Public discussion was not in the mores or in the law. Today public discussion is in both the law and the mores. People expect to discuss public issues. As the political franchise passed from narrow minorities at the top to other and larger groups in the middle and lower classes, public opinion took on even more importance. Today, in Western democracies, it represents a form of mass control.

Parallel to this, the question often arises as to whether there is such

[8] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1913), pp. 6, 15. By permission. Reprinted in Berelson and Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 27.

a thing as public opinion formation, as we know it, under an authoritarian or totalitarian government. Again it has long been recognized that all forms of government rest, in a sense, upon the consensus of the masses. Moreover, the use of modern devices such as newspapers, motion pictures, radio, and television for the dissemination of ideas means that, in the authoritarian states, there is a constant effort on the part of those in power to fill the masses with propaganda which will lend support to authoritarian purposes and aims. Behavior patterns cannot be completely thrust upon any mass of people who do not have some psychological preparation to accept them.

Definition of Public Opinion

Looking more closely at the nature of public opinion, we are concerned first with the adjectival concept of "public." This means something that is published, something that is open to all, and not a private or personal matter. The term "opinion" refers to an idea, conviction, or belief which is short of complete certainty. The very concept of opinion indicates that, for the individual, there may be some discussion or other means of weighing one opinion against another. In discussing public opinion from the individual's point of view, we should realize that there is a kind of inner forum which carries on the discussion as well as the outer forum between individuals.

There are also the group aspects of public opinion. As a noun the word "public" refers to a rather loosely organized and conjoined grouping of people with a common interest. Among some political scientists there has been a tendency to confine the term to the political aggregates of a given time and place. This, however, is a rather narrow view. While the political public in our own country and other democracies is perhaps the most important one, there are other publics. There is, for example, a public with regard to modernistic art, or to jazz music, or with respect to some particular social movement. However, the big bulk of the studies in public opinion formation have dealt with political issues of one kind or another.

It must be recognized that public opinion is used in two senses. One of these is to think of it as static at a given time. The other would be to think of it more dynamically in terms of a process of formation of a given opinion which, in turn, normally, would lead to some kind of public action.

Furthermore, we must consider the relationship of public opinion as a cross section of consensus to the underlying belief systems and mores. First of all, things well established in the mores are not the subject of public discussion. On the other hand, where changes in the belief and action systems are taking place, we can say that these topics are subject to public discussion. For example, consider the attitude toward divorce. Not many decades ago, divorce was under severe taboo and was a rare and unusual

occurrence. But as times changed, as women went into industry and technological changes altered organization and function of the home, as women secured economic and political rights, the legal separation of married couples became more and more accepted.

STEPS IN THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

As we have just noted, democratic public discussion implies an agreement by all concerned on certain moral acceptances and expectancies. Rights are recognized as privileges and public discussion of issues is permitted and protected as a duty. One cannot assume a right without at the same time assuming the duty to give the same privilege to others. Put in other terms, liberty in a democracy is always counterbalanced by a sense of individual responsibility for one's beliefs and actions. The basic premises of democracy are that the source of political power lies in the citizens, that in exercising this power the citizens bear a responsibility, that the delegation of power to leaders or authorities carries with it the right to remove them from office, and that leaders, like other citizens, not only enjoy rights but are bound by corresponding duties. In other words, democratic power is supported by a community morality. When such power is lost or becomes located or concentrated in a small élite, democracy is by that fact sharply reduced or even destroyed.

Stages in Formation of Public Opinion

We may consider opinion formation as proceeding through certain steps. Let us examine these:

1. There is always some issue or problem which involves the community or a considerable fraction of the community. The issue may have its source in such a thing as a physical catastrophe, or it may be something in the way of a voluntary undertaking such as a community fair or a new waterworks system or some other type of public enterprise. In any case, the essence of the first stage is an attempt to state the issue in such terms as will permit its discussion by individuals and groups.

2. This is followed by preliminary and exploratory considerations. Such questions as the following are asked: How serious is the problem? Is this the time to take it up? Is it capable of solution? These topics are explored by talk, by open debate, by news stories and editorials in the press, by radio and television debate or comment, and by any other means of mass communication. So, too, during this period studies may be made by individuals or groups to discover the facts about the problem and about possible solutions. The role of the expert in this phase may be of great importance in bringing information and knowledge to those who participate in the public discussion. In some instances, an interested minority, such as a business or labor group or some reform organization,

may take a highly active part not only in defining the issue more sharply but in stimulating widespread consideration of it.

3. From such early and exploratory discussions we pass on to a more structured aspect of the public discussion. This would include the development of alternative proposals or solutions. This, in turn, might involve more definitely taking sides with regard to such proposals. Further discussion may take place and there may be protest and opposition as well as promotion of the given alternative solutions. Sometimes a good deal of crowdlike behavior may emerge, and often the rational aspect of the topic is lost in the flood of irrational stereotypes, slogans, and emotional appeals, pro and con. This stage is important because by this time the issue is usually sharply drawn and the major decisions may be controlled not only by rational but by irrational factors.

4. Out of the talk, speeches, debates, and writings, individuals arrive at some consensus. Under our American scheme this is recorded and measured by public polls, by memorials and petitions to legislative or executive bodies, and basically and most important, by legal voting for or against candidates or, regarding legislative proposals, through the initiative and referendum. Yet, as we have already indicated, consensus does not necessarily mean complete agreement. In fact, it usually does not. Democracies operate chiefly by majority vote; hence, after elections and other legal forms of registering opinions, the measures and candidates that secure the votes of the majority are regarded as authoritative for the time being. By the same token the minority implicitly and explicitly agree to live by the law and regulations laid down by the majority and to seek only by democratic means to change a set of public officials or a public decision. The minority, however, may continue to press for modification and may serve as critic of the majority.

As a rule, after the consensus has been manifested in some fashion, action follows. Strictly speaking, of course, action is outside the scope of opinion formation as such.

This simple sketch of the steps in opinion formation is subject to many qualifications. It is particularly representative of the political situation in the United States and Great Britain.

Opinion Formation in Primary Society

The process of opinion formation in a primary society living under democratic pattern is probably quite different from what we find in contemporary mass society. In our local American history, one of the most interesting institutions was the town meeting. This was the association of the citizens of a given village or community for the purpose of arriving at some agreement as to what they should do in public matters. The process of public opinion formation in these circumstances centered around local problems. It was carried forward chiefly by talk among the

interested members of the village in the store or postoffice, or at church and neighborhood gatherings, and finally in the more formalized village or town assembly. The older and more prominent men no doubt crystallized and gave direction to many of the common currents of opinion. The major issues probably involved infractions of the moral and property codes as well as the common community interests of protection, of taxation, education, provision of roads and highways, and certain public institutions. For example, if the issue was increased tax rates, the citizens balanced the desired civic improvements against the added financial burden and exchanged opinions with others on the subject. On the basis of such discussions, a consensus of some sort would be formed. From this agreement a common course of action could be laid out.

For the most part, life in the village or town was conservative. The topics of public opinion were usually local and moral. While American villages felt themselves to be a part of the larger nation-state, their information about politics on the wider front depended upon weekly newspapers and occasional campaign speeches. In times of an agricultural or financial crisis, considerable public discussion might arise. Yet for the most part, political public opinion tended to be localized. And while there were legal codes for the punishment of more serious infractions, the mores controlled fundamentally such things as sex conduct, Sunday observance, dancing, card playing, gambling, and horse racing. Little public discussion centered around these topics for the codes were fully accepted in the mores.

In this representative democracy, however, there was a certain class structure, and the leaders in public affairs were generally recruited from men of property and education. The class structure in the Old South, of course, was much more fixed than elsewhere in the United States. Not only in the older regions, but in the expanding West, leaders were recruited from the top élite. Yet the tremendous opportunities for an increase in wealth and power led to a continuous upward mobility of able leaders from the lower ranks into the upper. This open-class system, with its upward mobility, became a basic feature of American democracy.

Opinion Formation in Mass Society

The dominance of rural and primary society in the United States began to break down during the second decade after the war between the states. The Industrial Revolution in this country really got under way about 1880, and it was accompanied by a rapid urbanization of our population. This meant a shift of dominance to secondary or mass society. Machine production, the high division of labor, rapid transportation and communication, corporate business organization, and the rapid growth of population increasingly altered the nature not only of our economy but of our entire culture. Primary-group mores and legal norms adapted to

an earlier economy broke down and new ones began to emerge. The growth of cities, mobility of population, and highly specialized groups induced new attitudes and values. In personal relations, urbanity and superficiality of contact and interest tended to replace the former face-to-face interactions of more enduring sort.

Against this background the scope of public opinion has changed. First, there has been an enormous extension of the range of stimulation. Urban life produces a wide variety of situations unknown to simpler society. It is more mobile, more flexible, and more complex. Our economic, social, and political relations have a wider reach. Formerly the citizens were concerned chiefly with local problems. Today they are faced by issues that involve a whole world. People are supposed to have opinions on topics ranging from local, state, and federal questions to larger ones of war and peace, international trade, and world organization.

As a result, new troubles in the democratic process of opinion formation arise. We cannot cover the entire area of interest in person. We must depend upon indirect and secondary sources of information and interpretation. Facts and inferences alike are changed by the minds of those who bring them to us, through the newspaper, the motion picture, the radio, and television. Unlike public opinion formation in the village, these operations are much more inferential and imaginative than perceptual. In some ways, our behavior and thinking resembles that of the crowd rather than that of the institutionalized and stable primary village or small town.

In this secondary situation, the play of propaganda is much greater than in an earlier day. The widespread sense of personal insecurity, the sense of personal isolation in the midst of urban congestion, the mass demand for jobs, the uncertain state of the world, the hurry and confusion, the enormous power of special-interest groups—these and other features of mass society have led to a decline in many older democratic practices and ideals. Frequently under these conditions, especially if associated with prolonged economic distress, we find agitation for revolution. We shall take up certain aspects of propaganda and of revolution in later chapters. But it must be emphasized that the traditional formation of public opinion tends to be considerably modified under our highly complex and heterogeneous mass society.

FACTORS INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION

The determinants of public opinion cover a wide range. Among other things we have to take into account the information level of the individuals involved. Secondly, we must take into account their mental images, their attitudes and values, and the kind of pictures in their heads. Then, too, there are factors of group membership, including social class. With regard to the various groups, what H. D. Lasswell calls cross-pressures are im-

portant. Leadership is always an important factor. Nor must we overlook the nature of events themselves as they influence both the direction and intensity of public discussion. Finally, the media of public opinion formation are important, and this topic will be taken up in Chapters 15, 16, and 17.

With respect to the groups, we should examine their needs, purposes, interests, and the activities which are directed toward certain group ends. Public discussion may be influenced by intragroup as well as by intergroup conflicts. So, too, individual attitudes come into play. We are particularly concerned with the self-interest or ego-involvement which enters into opinion formation.

Group norms may also help to shape or modify, though not wholly determine, the attitudes and behavior of the component members. We shall have occasion to see how important some of these factors are. As Daniel Katz has pointed out in his discussion of public opinion and polling, there are three important criteria which may be taken into account in collecting data from polls: (1) knowledge, information, or facts held by the person; (2) his convictions, values, and belief system; and (3) the significance of this for social science.[4] Then, too, there are the myths, legends, institutions, creeds, and doctrines that lie behind particular group organizations. Some reference has already been made to these important background factors.

Subjective Determinants

Let us examine some of the internal or subjective factors which play a part in opinion formation. First, there is the self-image of the individual and his image of others. Of course, the images of others, like the self-image, are the product of social interaction. We have examined the basis of this in Chapter 4. Moreover, the pictures of others which we carry in our heads are frequently the product of highly stereotyped myths and legends. For example, in getting at the role of public opinion in the relationships of groups in different nations, such as those between the peoples of Soviet Russia and the United States, it is well to bear in mind that individuals in each country carry with them certain kinds of images of the other. Moreover, such images may be qualified or modified through time, partly by historical events and partly by propaganda.

There have been a number of attempts to study the images which people have in their heads. This is really a phase of content analysis which we shall discuss in Chapter 18. For example, Patricke Johns-Heine and Hans H. Gerth analyzed the values revealed in selected American popular-magazine fiction for the years 1921 to 1940. The authors studied the hero

[4] Daniel Katz, "Three Criteria: Knowledge, Conviction, and Significance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1940, 4:277–284. Reprinted in Berelson and Janowitz, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 50–57.

and heroine in terms of their age, occupation, and personal characteristics. They also examined the setting of the story and the main features of the plot. Their findings indicate certain trends. For example, in reference to occupation, the heroes in the latter half of the two decades are less often in business and agriculture and more often are professional men. The heroes and heroines are younger than the reading audience. The settings tend to be vague and nondescript. There is a general trend away from rugged individualism and stress on economic success toward idolization of the little man as the favored hero. The small town is the most favored locale. For women, successful marriage and love tend to be their major rewards.[5]

Siegfried Kracauer has analyzed the treatment of English and Russian characters in American fiction films for the years 1933 to 1948. Among other interesting findings he noted that before World War II, snobbishness in the class system was the key item in presenting British characters. However, during the war, the virtue of humility was emphasized. The prewar treatment of Russian characters showed varying degrees of satire and aggressiveness. This shifted to an outright pro-Soviet point of view during the war, but from 1945 to 1948 the films tended to neglect the Russians very much as they left the Nazis out during 1939. However, since 1948 the Russians have returned to the films as evil plotters. On the whole, the characters are more or less abstract stereotypes.[6] We shall have occasion to see other aspects of the subjective factors when we take up the discussion of daytime serials in Chapter 17.

As we said above, information, knowledge, and level of enlightenment are all important factors in opinion formation. Of course, it often happens that people have no concern with what other people consider important public issues. Moreover, the levels of information vary tremendously. For example, the American Institute of Public Opinion and the *Fortune* pollsters pretest their questions in order to avoid asking them on issues unknown to the man on the street. For example, in one of their polls, 52 per cent of a representative sample of American adults admitted frankly that they did not know what a reciprocal trade treaty was. Also 31 per cent gave incorrect definitions and 9 per cent doubtful ones. Only 8 per cent were able to define the term correctly. This whole matter concerns the formulation of the questions themselves. As Katz says, "The man on the street may be able to give meaningful answers to important questions if they are stated for him in his own language and in terms of his own thinking rather than in terms of the mental world of the politician and the journalist." [7]

[5] Patricke Johns-Heine and Hans H. Gerth, "Values in Mass Periodical Fiction, 1921–1940," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, 13:105–113.

[6] Siegfried Kracauer, "National Types as Hollywood Presents Them," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, 13:53–72.

[7] Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

There have been a number of studies on the importance of information and attitude as factors in opinion formation. One of these by George H. Smith undertook to investigate the interrelation of attitude, education, and information by means of a re-analysis of data from a national opinion poll. He found on issues such as freedom of the press or internationalism, where an expression of liberalism did not involve any direct restriction of the more privileged class, that those who espouse liberal views tended to be better educated and better informed. With regard to issues where liberalism indicates a restriction of the top class, those who take the conservative position are both better educated and better informed. Smith interprets the conservatism of the well-educated on economic matters to be a function of their feeling of threat. In contrast, he believes that the conservatism in matters of internationalism on the part of the poorly-educated stems from their lack of information.[8]

Obviously knowledge and information are not easily separated from the feeling tone which accompanies perception and thought. People are concerned with topics which touch them personally and will attempt to get support for their particular point of view. This is clearly indicated in the fact that a good deal of the alleged information is actually a form of rationalization.

In this connection, the role of the expert becomes increasingly significant. If we are to discuss public problems which range over the entire world, it becomes increasingly important that we recognize the place of the expert in furnishing us with reliable information. On the whole, American newspapers have done a reasonably good job in providing information. What the public lacks, however, is background information on the culture of a given people. This is particularly well illustrated in some of our misunderstandings of Orientals. In such matters long-range educational programs should be most effective.

Cross-Pressures

Another important feature is reference-group membership. In a highly complex society, most people have membership in a number of groups. Frequently these groups have different aims and functions which may be in conflict. Such conflicting influences we call *cross-pressure.* A cross-pressure may be defined as the operation of two or more determinants of opinion on the same individual or group. A good example of such pressures is found in the Erie County study of the Presidential campaign in 1944. The high importance of affiliations with the family, religious groups, political party, and social class is well demonstrated. Moreover, it was shown that one of the best single predictive measures for individuals under cross-pressure is a knowledge of how their personal friends will vote.[9]

[8] George H. Smith, "The Relation of 'Enlightenment' to Liberal-conservative Opinions," *J. of Social Psychology,* 1948, 28:3–17.

[9] See P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944).

Another illustration of cross-pressure occurred in the mayoralty election in New York City in 1945. Mayor O'Dwyer, the Democratic incumbent, ran against Judge Goldstein, the Republican. A poll taken at the time showed that practically up to the day before the election, 20 per cent of those sampled were in the "Don't know" category. As P. F. Lazarsfeld has pointed out, this percentage represented, in all probability, mostly Jewish voters who were under cross-pressure. On the one hand, they had tended to support the New Deal and all it stood for and, in turn, the New Deal group were for O'Dwyer. Yet the Republican candidate was a Jew and was well respected in the community. In fact, he had been picked by the Republicans with the thought of splitting the Democratic vote. "A large proportion of the Jewish vote, therefore, was squeezed between an ideological adherence to the Roosevelt support, and racial and religious interest in the Republican candidate. In the end they voted for a third candidate, Newbold Morris." [10]

The survey made in Elmira, New York, prior to the 1948 election, also brought out the operation of cross-pressures and conflicting attitudes. Through the use of the panel technique, a sample of citizens were interviewed at various times prior to the election date. It was clear from the beginning of the campaign that issues such as housing, price control, and the Taft-Hartley bill would play a part in the campaign. In August the panel was asked how they felt about these and other issues as well as which candidate they intended to vote for.

The data were then cross-tabulated for views on issues and vote intention. This revealed sharp differences between those who wished to vote Republican and those who wanted to vote Democratic. Those who intended to vote Democratic for the most part were in agreement with the Democratic platform. They were for price control, for the housing bill, and they unanimously supported Truman. On the other hand, the people who intended to vote for Dewey were divided on major issues, especially on price control. It was clear "that the intended Republicans turned out to have an unstable attitude structure. The vote on issues and the vote on the candidate were not in harmony for the intended Republicans as it was for the intended Democrats." [11]

This study well illustrates certain aspects of opinion formation such as we discussed earlier in this chapter. The Elmira study gives us a picture of the decision-making process. Frequently there are underlying contradictions in the people's political attitudes and opinions. If a campaign is vigorous enough, it may force a small number of these contradictory patterns to become harmonized in terms of political shifts during the campaign. This is precisely the purpose of electioneering. In this country in

[10] N. C. Meier and H. W. Saunders, eds., *The Polls and Public Opinion* (New York, Holt, 1949), p. 280. Statement by P. F. Lazarsfeld in discussing "Should Political Forecasts be Made?" Quotations by permission.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

recent decades, this has been particularly important because of the increasingly large fraction of independent voters.

The Elmira study also brought out the place of class differences in political behavior. The members of the panel were asked whether they looked upon themselves as belonging to the working class or to the middle class. On the basis of the replies, the sample was divided into those who said they were middle class and those who said they were working class. They had the same objective position in the community but subjectively differed as to their class identification. Those of the sample who said, in August, that they intended to vote for Dewey were divided as to whether they counted themselves in the working class or the middle class. To quote Lazarsfeld,[12]

> And again we found that an intended Republican . . . who looked upon himself as a worker was more likely to change to Truman in the last weeks of the campaign than a Republican worker who looked at himself as a middle-class man.
>
> You see, in this way again, we could show the element which a definite class appeal in Truman's campaign played, and it didn't consist in changing people's attitudes but in bringing people's attitudes out. Those workers who called themselves workers were more easily swayed by a campaign which contained very strongly a working-class appeal.

Another suggestive study was made by Martin Kriesberg on opinions concerning Soviet-American relations. He interviewed members of a labor-union local, an affiliate of a communist-dominated national organization. This particular local had a good many Catholic members and Kriesberg's purpose was to uncover the cross-pressures—on one side, from the communist source; on the other, from the Roman Catholic. His important findings are: (1) There was minimum awareness of the existence of cross-pressures. (2) There was a tendency to avoid exposure to cross-pressures whenever possible. (3) The views expressed tended toward a more tolerant or moderate view rather than to express all-out partisanship for one extreme or the other. Finally (4) there was a saturation point indicated by a gradual decline in interest which followed prolonged exposure to cross-pressures.[13]

There have been a number of studies of political attitudes and opinions as related to political party membership. George Belknap and Angus Campbell attempted to discover if stated party preferences are correlated with any of the commonly assumed properties of group membership. One such property concerns the sharing of attitudes or opinions regarding political issues. What was called measure of perceived consensus was secured by inquiring, in relation to certain issues, how many of their own po-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[13] Martin Kriesberg, "Cross-Pressures and Attitudes: A Study of the Influence of Conflicting Propaganda on Opinions Regarding American-Soviet Relations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, 13:5–16.

litical party or other preferred group they saw as in agreement with them. For example, on the issue of President Truman's having dismissed General MacArthur from his Far Eastern command, 85 per cent of all self-styled Democrats in a certain national sample who expressed an opinion believed that other Democrats would agree with them. The corresponding figure for Republicans was 90 per cent. As the authors conclude: "Evidence from the present study suggests that people tend to see other Republicans or Democrats as sharing their own opinions." [14]

Howard E. Freeman and Morris Showel made an interesting study on how people react to advice regarding an election from organizations of which they are members. They analyzed their results from members of thirteen organizations most frequently mentioned out of a group of 35, including better business bureaus, parent-teacher groups, political parties, labor unions, and veterans organizations. Among others their results show: (1) that the organizations varied "widely as to the extent of their net political influence"; (2) some were also able to influence positively individuals who were not members; and (3) the most effective associations are those not organized for the specific purpose of influencing voting. Veterans groups, the Grange, and business organizations seem to be "more influential in this area than are either of the political parties." [15]

Influence of Social Class

Of the many reference groups toward which adults may maintain identifying memberships and hence be subject to influence on opinion and attitudes, none is more important than social class. Social class is an outcome of stratification, that is, of the process of establishing or fitting into some more or less stable gradation or hierarchy of status and power. Many studies have been concerned with the class structure in the United States. Certainly in our history the upward mobility has been one of our most striking characteristics. Here there is upward identification of individuals with those in the strata above them and actions centered around aspirations to climb the social ladder. The high rewards in our society are monetary in a large measure, but not entirely. Status is likewise important. Moreover, there is a good deal of punishment for failure to move up the ladder. Frustration and anxiety are common among upwardly striving groups.

It would take us too far afield to review the pertinent investigations and divergent theories which have emerged regarding the class structure in the United States. However, one or two points must be indicated. There

[14] George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1951–52, 15:601–623. Quotation is from p. 623.

[15] Howard E. Freeman and M. Showel, "Differential Political Influence of Voluntary Associations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1951–52, 15:703, 714. Quotations are from pages 713, 714.

have been a large number of attempts to determine the criteria of the social class system in our own society. In general, these break down into economic factors on the one hand, and noneconomic on the other. Of the first, the two most important are income and occupation.

That there is a relationship between occupation and differences on certain public questions was brought out in the Gallup poll regarding the question of whether the Taft-Hartley law is unfair to labor and should be changed. Of the manual workers who were interviewed, 49 per cent agreed with the statement that the law was unfair and should be changed to give labor unions more strength, and 34 per cent disagreed. In contrast, 70 per cent of business and professional people in the sample disagreed with the statement. Only 20 per cent of this group thought the law unfair and should be changed. White-collar employees fell between these two extremes with 32 per cent believing that the law was unfair.[16]

In 1948, the *Fortune* polling staff asked a sample of people whether the government should do more than it has done to improve the conditions of poor people. By income classes, people who said the government should do more revealed the following percentage distribution: prosperous, 28; upper-middle, 35; lower-middle, 44; and poor, 57.[17]

It has also been shown that there is some relationship between voting behavior and socioeconomic factors. In general, the surveys reveal that the lower income groups are more in favor of governmental control of business and the extension of government welfare agencies. They would be willing, apparently, to sacrifice certain institutional property rights and unlimited opportunity for individual achievement in the interest of getting more security and of overcoming the concentration of influence in the hands of the wealthy. It is worth noting, too, that the poorer groups have much more extreme nationalistic attitudes, show greater religious traditionalism, and have generally a more restricted outlook on world affairs.

It is not possible, however, to say that there is a tidy one-to-one correlation of opinions on radicalism and conservatism with class status. True, the lower economic groups tend to want more government regulation, yet they have indicated that they are more conservative on religion, on international relations, and probably are more prejudiced in regard to race relations. In other words, each group is conservative on some things and radical on others.

In addition to these economic factors, there are noneconomic ones which are frequently taken into account in attempts to get at differentials in social class. These groupings cover such matters as age, education, size of community, section of the country, religion, racial and national

[16] Mildred Strunk, ed., "The Quarter's Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, 13:353.

[17] *Ibid.*, 1948–49, 12:781.

origins. On the whole, noneconomic features have a less consistent and less marked correlation with class status than do the income and occupation. However, this should not be regarded as support of an outright Marxist position. For example, in one Chicago survey, Protestants as a group were shown to be rather consistently more conservative in questions bearing on the New Deal, unionism, and distribution of wealth at each income level than were the Catholics and Jews. The same held for the group labeled "no religion." Moreover, the native-born were somewhat more conservative on a number of questions than were the foreign-born. Likewise various regional and racial differences have been shown. For example, in regard to race, one Chicago study showed that the Negroes varied very little from the white respondents at the same income level with respect to public issues. The greatest difference concerned the question of whether they thought that working people, in general, get fair treatment and fair play. Thirty per cent of the white sample said "Yes" to this and only 11 per cent of the Negroes. On questions of unionism and government ownership, the Negroes were slightly more favorable to these, that is, more radical, but, on the whole, the two groups were in general agreement when the income factors were held constant. To quote Arthur W. Kornhauser: [18]

> Economic classes can hardly be subjectively homogeneous when each broad income or occupational division of the population includes men of diverse race, religion, national origin, regional, and community interests—with each of these ties exercising a significant, even if secondary, hold upon the individual's purposes and upon his beliefs concerning appropriate means for fulfilling these purposes. *A simple, automatic "economic determinism" of social opinions is psychologically pure fiction.*

In terms of overt behavior such as voting, the Erie County study throws into focus some interesting aspects of the relationship between economic and other factors. The data showed that the Democratic vote intention there in 1944 was bigger among Catholics than among Protestants. The question arises as to whether this was merely a reflection of certain differences in occupation and income between religious groups. It is known, for example, that the Protestants tend to be higher on the economic and social scale than the Catholics. A cross-tabulation was made in which the Catholic and Protestant vote intentions were compared separately at four economic levels. The relation of religious affiliation to voting was found to be independent of the social and economic factors.

[18] Arthur W. Kornhauser, "Analysis of 'Class' Structure of Contemporary American Society: Psychological Bases in Class Divisions," in George W. Hartmann and Theodore Newcomb, eds., *Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Cordon, 1939), p. 248. Quotations by permission of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Reprinted in B. Berelson and M. Janowitz, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), pp. 70–82. Quotation from *Reader* is from p. 80.

The investigators comment: "On each social economic status level religious affiliation played an important role in determining political affiliation." [19]

Still other relationships have been studied. The Chicago data of Kornhauser, for example, showed that at the high-income level, older men were slightly more conservative on a number of issues, although this was not true in other income brackets. As to education, those among the well-to-do who had had only elementary school education tended to be more conservative. Those of comparable education having smaller incomes tended to be more liberal or radical. Additional education appears to make for greater moderation in class attitudes. As Kornhauser puts it, in summary: "The objective personal data, while less closely and consistently related to opinions than is economic status, do also have a significant bearing upon the particular attitudes held." [20]

It is further clear from such personal indicators of attitudes that people living under somewhat the same "class conditions" often develop distinctive personal views. In other words, there is in this country, for the most part, a good deal more flexibility and variability in a given class situation than might be found in a society with a rigid class or caste system. This was neatly brought out in the relationship of income level and certain opinions regarding the role of the government, especially government ownership. To quote Kornhauser again: [21]

> Government ownership is favored, among those with incomes under $1,000, almost equally by the personally satisfied and those dissatisfied (55 per cent and 61 per cent respectively); at the $1,000 to $2,000 level, the dissatisfied are almost *twice* as likely as the satisfied to be for government ownership (42 per cent and 22 per cent respectively); among those over $2,000 the dissatisfied are favorable *five times* as often as the satisfied (35 per cent and 7 per cent respectively).

On the basis of the answers to this and related questions, Kornhauser says: [22]

> On this and a number of other issues, the personally dissatisfied at the upper income levels tend to hold views approaching those more commonly held by economically less favored. The comparisons suggest the generalization that while at the upper levels it tends to be the personally unadjusted or discontented who are liberal or radical, at the lower income levels *personal* dissatisfaction is secondary as an influence.

To conclude our comments on the effects of social class on opinion formation, it is clear that in our open-class system, there is no easy one-to-one relationship between class position and public attitudes. Of all the various factors, the income factors are probably the most significant among

[19] Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[20] Kornhauser, *op. cit.* Quotation is from p. 81 of *Reader.*
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 82 of *Reader.*
[22] *Ibid.*

the economic ones. Just which are most significant among the noneconomic is hard to say.

Pressures on Media

Students of political science and sociology have long been interested in the operation of pressure groups in local, state, and federal affairs. A pressure group is any association of individuals who have some special interest they wish to promote through legislation or executive action. The lobby is a good illustration. It uses persuasion chiefly, but may, on occasion, resort to coercion or intimidation. Frequently it is well organized and well financed. Lobbies often employ experts who know how to mold and control attitudes. There is no doubt that throughout our history pressure groups have played a part in stimulating and guiding legislation and executive decisions. The National Manufacturers Association, the American Legion, the large labor unions, reform groups, and others have used pressure tactics in order to secure benefits for themselves.

It is well known that the various media of communication themselves sometimes are subjected to the pressures of special-interest groups. The attempt to influence the newspapers, radio, and television is predicated upon the assumption that the media of communication may affect the content and direction of opinion formation. We shall discuss this topic in later chapters. At the moment, we will indicate a few examples of the kinds of pressure that the newspapers, in particular, have to face.

The modern American newspaper is a private enterprise which must depend upon profits if it is to survive. To keep solvent its circulation must be maintained. Moreover, it must draw upon advertisers for patronage because no newspaper can exist on its subscription returns alone. V. O. Key, Jr., who has studied pressure groups, believes that the three big sources of this pressure are business, labor, and agriculture. He regards them as the "big three" in his analysis of political power.[28]

Ralph D. Casey, however, believes there are other elements in the situation. In the course of interviewing editors and publishers, Casey found that not only did agriculture, business, and labor exert pressures on newspapers, but frequently nationality and religious groups likewise added to such attempted influence.

In both World War I and World War II, many nationality groups in this country got involved with the American press in their efforts to influence newspaper material and editorials for or against particular nationalistic ambitions in foreign countries. In World War I, German-language groups attempted to influence American opinions through the press. In both wars, various Polish groups tried to pressure the American press to favor their particular views on the future of Poland.

[28] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York, Knopf, 1949).

The Civil War in Spain provides ample examples of various pressure groups attempting to influence the press. There were many organizations in this country—as in others—which fostered one side or the other in that conflict. Some viewed the Spanish war as a battle for liberalism and democracy; others thought it was a struggle against communism for the preservation of religion. Thomas J. Dillon, the editor of the *Minneapolis Tribune,* thus described the situation: [24]

> The so-called Loyalists had flooded the country with propaganda and certain religious forces had their counter propaganda. To the protagonists of one side, there could be no doubt that the other side was 100 per cent in the wrong, and the newspaper that failed to make this clear was obviously partisan and dishonest; thus the newspaper was regarded as either the tool of the Communist party or of the Catholic church. The newspaper that chronicled the events of the battlefields was stigmatized with the responsibility for the events.

Casey has described the variety of techniques in these words: [25]

> . . . The types of pressure used most *directly* on the press are: lobbying tactics against publishers and editors; letters and telephone calls to the newspaper proprietor, his editor, and, in some cases, his departmental subordinates arguing the group's case; articles in the group's own periodical applauding or taking issue with the newspaper's policy; and the use of rumor and gossip to undermine an editorial point of view.

Leadership and Public Opinion

The chief features of the interplay of leaders and followers have been set forth in Chapter 11. It is well to recall (1) that leaders may be the first to define an issue; (2) that they are particularly important because they verbalize and crystallize the vague but nevertheless strong feelings of the masses; (3) that they can, and often do, manipulate the wishes and motives of the masses to their own ends, and (4) that in our society this constitutes one of the gravest threats to democracy. A discussion of leadership with reference to public opinion forces us to consider the top élite in the class structure.[26] One important function in public opinion study would be to find out who are the opinion élites or influentials, that is, who are the chief decision-makers. Frequently, stratified sampling does not correspond to the realities of political stratification. We need to find which individuals are the most attentive, the most interested, and the most informed. In other words, who are the élite? So, too, we want to find out who are the uninformed, the uninfluential, the inattentive, and those who are not involved. As we have already indicated, many public issues have no appeal to the masses. In poll after poll it has been shown that large

[24] Quoted by Ralph D. Casey in Meier and Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 137. By permission.
[26] See Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

fractions of the public do not know about or are indifferent to particular problems. In other words, what the pollsters and politicians regard as public issues or what various special-interest groups might think an important issue may not appeal to the man on the street at all. A telling example of public indifference was brought out in L. S. Cottrell's report on a sample survey of reactions to the Bikini atom bomb tests. He discovered a widespread lack of knowledge of the event as well as marked indifference to its implications for national security, the future of military actions, and other related topics.[27]

While it is important to discover the role of the top élite in formulating issues as well as in helping to determine final decisions in consensus-making, we must not forget that the masses may and often do have profound effect upon opinion formation. In situations wherein people see their values, interests and attitudes, and own reference groups as important to them, they take a hand in public decisions. What we want to know, of course, is the interrelationship between this process in the masses and the particular contribution of various leaders in directing and manipulating such operations.

The agitator plays a distinctive role in opinion-making in revolutionary times. The political boss tries to control the press and other media of communication in order to get his candidates into office or to keep them there. The leaders of special-interest groups employ advertising, propaganda, and every available means of influence to get support for their side of a controversial issue.

It is clear that the controversial issues in public discussion tend from the outset to be defined in vague and general terms and, as the critics of modern democracy have pointed out, all too often the whole course from original issue to consensus and action is marked by vagary. The expert might provide the masses with sufficient knowledge of the facts to stimulate a more rational consideration of the issue, but this is not always possible. Frequently the agitator who simplifies and personalizes the problem and who offers an appealing and ready solution weighs more heavily in the balance of public judgment than does the soberer and more cautious expert.

The role of leadership in the process of opinion formation today is crucial. The writers who contend that public opinion is made largely by small cliques and leaders—that is, those who hold that mankind is essentially both irrational and stupid—make much of the tremendous power which demagogues and dictators have often acquired. Yet, as we shall note again in discussing propaganda, even the wiliest dictator, al-

[27] L. S. Cottrell, Jr., and others, eds., *Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1947). This survey was prepared by a subcommittee of the Committee on Social Aspects of Atomic Energy, Social Science Research Council.

though he may control the schools, the press, and every agency of mass impression, cannot in a short time remake all the values and attitudes of the masses unless there is a strong predisposing trend in his direction. Actually, there must be shift in the basic value system, a decay of the old mythology and the rise of a new one. When the mores and the law are thoroughly accepted and in full operation, there is no public opinion on these systems of thought and feeling. It is only when the mores and the law are called into question that public opinion as a process begins to operate. In this sense, it would be difficult for any revolutionary élite to "make people change their minds."

The expert may have a place in democratic opinion formation. Modern education has produced not only experts but also a great respect for their knowledge. This fact can be used, and confidence in the expert frequently results in a more satisfactory solution. Certainly the soil chemist, the geneticist, and the economist have given the American farmer much useful information and new skills and have inspired considerable confidence in their leadership. The same may be said of other fields of applied knowledge, such as public health. We still need, however, a better method of conveying to the ordinary man the essentials of scientific knowledge, so that he may understand expert information. This is a challenge to our education and to the media of mass communication. So too, we need to bridge the gap between the political leaders, reformers, and agitators, on one side, and the experts, on the other. Finally, in carrying out measures decided on through public discussion, we must have a working relation between the expert and the administrator. These difficult problems ramify into topics beyond the scope of the present book. Yet they are crucial to the discussion of public opinion in a democracy because they touch on the critical matter of power: its source, its distribution in the population, its use, and the moral responsibility of those who hold it.

It has been frequently remarked that propaganda is an important element in formation of public opinion. Since we shall devote two chapters to this topic, we need only say here that, in general, propaganda is effective only where there is either (1) an unstructured type of attitude or opinion, or (2) when social change has already taken a given direction.

Events and Public Opinion

Finally, we come to the important topic of the influence of events themselves on opinion formation. A recognition of this by old-time revolutionists was found in their expression, "the propaganda of the deed." By this they meant the use of some overt event like an attempted assassination, the throwing up of a barricade and a fight in the streets, and other events which affected people's opinions and attitudes. Moreover, these

deeds later became a part of the propaganda apparatus of such organizations.

We begin this particular section by reviewing the interplay of events and the shifts of opinion in this country during World War II. For the period of 1939 to 1941 Hadley Cantril, using Gallup and other polls, correlated the variation in certain views in regard to war with important external events. See Figure 10.

A number of pertinent facts are shown in these graphs. First, there is a definite relationship between events and the opinions expressed. For example, during the first months of the war the persons polled were overwhelmingly convinced that England and France would win the war. This assurance fell off sharply with the opening success of the German campaign in the west. In contrast, the belief that Germany would win rose sharply during the summer of 1940, particularly after Germany defeated France. Yet this conviction declined again as England continued to hold out. With respect to American participation, note the fluctuation in belief that sooner or later the United States would enter the war. This fell off from the initial 51 per cent at the outbreak of the war in September, 1939, and rose as the public became increasingly willing to risk a war with Japan rather than permit her continued aggressions. Obviously there was a high correlation between shifts in our views about the inevitability of entering the war and the reactions to the questions about helping England even to the risk of getting into war ourselves.

When we did enter the war, of course, further changes in the whole social and cultural configuration took place. Most of the population became convinced of the need for all-out participation, although many of the former isolationists and pacifists, after a period of silence, began agitating for a negotiated peace.

The Cantril study is a good illustration of the close interplay between events and shifts in opinion and attitude. Of course, we might interpret these facts in various ways. First, there is some difference between actual participants in wartime events and those who are not. We discussed some aspects of this difference in describing how difficult it is for people to make up their minds on events which take place outside their own immediate observation. Obviously, events are really neutral. When we talk about the impact of events, what we mean is that people give different interpretations of them and that these, in turn, influence their views and actions. What we want to ask is, are events effective? That is, where do they influence people?

One of the most obvious effects would be that of changes in the social and economic position of individuals. The economic depression of the 1930's would be a case in point. The effect of a revolution which changed the property system and reorganized the class structure would be another.



Redrawn from Hadley Cantril, "Public Opinion in Flux," *Annals Amer. Acad. Poli tical & Social Science*, 1942, 220: pp. 142, 143. By permission.

FIG. 10. Trends in Public Opinion in the United States Toward World War II over a Two-Year Period.

Such basic changes in institutions may well influence the status and self-interest of individuals and, in turn, affect their opinions and actions.

Second, events may change the individual's value system. In the United States the shift from the laissez-faire views and practices of an earlier day to the increase in the state's assumption of many of the responsibilities for welfare, symbolized by the term "New Deal," is an illustration. In our own time too, we have probably seen some alteration in the value system regarding our particular place in international affairs.

Third, events may affect the individual's evaluation of certain external conditions. The periodic purges in Soviet Russia from the early 1930's on have probably forced many people to revalue their views on the nature of conditions in that country. Propagandists on both sides have made use of events like purges to build up their own particular line of persuasion and conversion. Interesting, too, is the fact that during the first years of the post-Stalin régime in Russia, we witnessed an effort to offset the negative reactions to these purges by blaming them on Stalin's "personality" cult which was said to be really anti-communist in theory and practice.

Fourth, events may serve to change the individual's conception of the means of reaching certain objectives. Going back to the Cantril example, the fall of France led to a sharp increase in the number of people who felt that we would have to get into the war. Somewhat similar views are indicated in the growing feeling that we may fall into armed conflict with the forces behind the Iron Curtain. If people come to believe that the only means of obtaining a long-range peace can be had by resort to arms, this may become a stimulus to armed conflict as a means of resolving difficulties.

Fifth, events may actually bring about some modification in the individual's level of information. The operation of the Fair Employment Practice Laws is a good case in point. Or the development of biracial housing in a community may lead to considerable modification of information regarding the relations of whites and colored people. In other words, certain old stereotypes may be broken up and new ones emerge as there is a change in ethnic attitudes and habits.

Sixth, events sometimes affect opinion by tending to crystallize a latent opinion. Thus, a series of international events may oblige people to modify their views regarding our participation in foreign affairs. Or, again, the development of the country of Israel in old Palestine brought about sharp differences of opinion among certain American-Jewish groups. It forced many of them to crystallize certain latent opinions with regard to the future of the Jews.

Finally, events may influence opinion by giving individuals a basis for rationalization or justification of their opinions, attitudes, and sentiments. A good example of this is the occurrence of a strike. For those favor-

able to labor, a strike may justify their opinion of management as an antisocial element. Those sympathetic to management and opposed to unions view the strike as evidence that labor is antisocial. The occasional scandal of some prominent actor in Hollywood may serve to confirm the views of religious and moralistic people about the immorality which is supposed to be rampant in that particular community.

In short, events do influence public opinion. Not merely their occurrence but the manner which they are interpreted is important. It must be recalled that the interpretation of events is not necessarily rational. Many irrational features may enter into our interpretation of a given event and, in turn, affect our opinions and actions with regard to them.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 15

Media of Mass Communication: The Printed Page

THE oldest means of communication is the spoken word. For thousands of years prior to the invention of writing and later printing, oral speech was the chief way by which one man conveyed his thoughts, feelings, intentions, directions, threats, and commands to another. Even today, despite all that mechanical aids have done to increase the speed of communication and extend its range, talk continues to be the principal form of communication.

For many millennia, under conditions of primary group life, communication was relatively simple and direct. Yet, wherever technology developed and centralized government emerged, the dispersion of news and the media of communication became more complex and indirect. With the invention of printing, and later the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television, opinion formation became distinctly indirect and subject to a wide variety of influences. In modern society public opinion is largely dependent upon the press, the radio, television, and the motion picture.

The purpose of this and the two following chapters is to examine the rise and functioning of these media of mass communication and to indicate their effects upon the formation of public opinion. This chapter will discuss the place of the press, particularly the newspaper.

THE NEWSPAPER

The term "news" has been variously defined. Originally it simply meant something novel or new. Later it became more or less synonymous with tidings and still later—approaching its present meaning—with report. An event by itself is not news. It is news when this event is subject to communication. That is, for an event to be news it must not only be reported but must be received by another. News represents a form

of verbal, symbolic interaction. For our purposes we will define news as an event, fact, opinion, or value which is communicated or made public and is of interest to a number of people. The responses to news may be intellectual, emotional, or take the form of overt action. The key to news is its interest, its attention-arousing qualities. Moreover, this is related to another important feature, namely, the timeliness of the news. In short, news must be regarded as novel to the recipients. The newspaper has long been an important agency in reporting the news.

Newspapers in various countries differ in make-up, intention, and utility according to basic cultural values and patterns. With us, as in most democratic-capitalistic countries, newspapers are commercial enterprises which sell news, interpretations of news, and advertising. American newspapers are not charitable or reform institutions. However, they are considered a form of public service and their influence on public morality is often discussed (see below on newspapers and social control). Their present function in mass society will be better understood if we briefly review their history.

The History of the Newspaper

Some form of organized dissemination of news is as old as urban civilization. In ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome, besides talk and gossip, news was frequently transmitted by placards put up in public places. In 60 B.C. Julius Caesar, having been made consul, established in Rome the *acta diurna* ("daily events"), which contained public notices of games, fires, religious rituals, actions of the senate, and news of battles. This official bulletin continued until 309 A.D. During this period there were also newsmongers who wrote letters to their clients on various matters. For example, wealthy and aristocratic Romans living in the countryside would have scribes send them written accounts of events in the capital. Of course, in ancient times, the ability to read was confined largely to educated and upper classes. There was nothing in those times approaching the mass communication which we know today. Certainly, until the modern period, gossip and talk were the principal means of dissemination of news.

During the Middle Ages the Roman Church dispensed official news. In addition, travelers and troubadours carried news from town to town or from region to region. With the rise of commerce, universities, and cities, special newsmongers again came into being. These individuals circulated news of interest to businessmen and other classes. Printing from movable type was invented in the fifteenth century, but newspapers in anything like the modern sense did not appear until 200 years later. During the Protestant Reformation, and later with the rise of nationalism, pamphleteering became widespread and an important source of certain kinds of news.

The newspaper, as we know it, developed out of the newsletters written by special correspondents to clients who wished to be informed of events occurring in the commercial and political centers. The first newspaper was perhaps the *Frankfurter Journal.* This was a weekly paper started by Egenolph Emmel in 1615. A similar venture, the *Gazette of Antwerp* was established in 1619. In 1622 Thomas Archer and Nicholas Bourne set up the *Weekeley Newes* in London. With the shift of the government of England from the Crown to Parliament, following the Puritan Revolution, Parliament assumed more and more right to control the printing of news. Similar control was true in continental countries. In 1631 the first French newspaper, the *Gazette de France* was set up. In 1702 the first successful daily was established in London. All during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a great struggle for freedom of speech and opinion and the newspapers played a definite part in this struggle.

The first newspaper in America was published in Boston by Benjamin Harris on September 25, 1690. It was called *Publick Occurrences both Forreign and Domestick.* Although Harris announced that this paper would appear at least once a month or oftener, if there was "Glut of Occurrences," the Governor and Council of Massachusetts promptly suppressed this journal.

A little more than ten years later, on April 24, 1704, John Campbell started the first American newspaper which survived. This was the *Boston News-Letter.* It consisted of a single sheet printed on both sides. It was issued weekly and concerned itself chiefly with English and European affairs, although it also had such items as arrival of ships, deaths, and special events like fires and accidents. It is said that the first continuous living newspaper was the *New Hampshire Gazette,* founded in 1756. The first daily newspaper was the *Pennsylvania Evening Post and Daily Advertiser,* founded by Benjamin Towne in Philadelphia. It first appeared on June 17, 1783.

These early American newspapers were like their British cousins. They were directed chiefly toward the upper classes and there was nothing like mass appeal in that day. It remained for what we call "Jacksonian democracy" to stimulate the development of the mass-appeal newspaper. First of all, the earlier newspapers were relatively expensive. Second, only a small fraction of the masses could read or write, hence they were limited in their ability to get news from the newspapers.

Benjamin Day's *Daily Sun,* established in New York in 1833, was the first mass-appeal newspaper. Two years later James Gordon Bennett established the *Morning Herald.* Bennett gave special emphasis to recent news, personalities, human interest stories, fashion notes, and business developments rather than political news. The paper sold for a penny and was aimed at the man in the street. The style was dramatic and

simple in comparison to the earlier papers. Day and Bennett made the selling of news a profitable business and are justly considered the founders of American journalism. Yet down to the Civil War, American newspapers were still dominated by special political interests, and so-called personal journalism continued for decades. A good example was Horace Greeley, who aimed at a reformation of society. This whole question as to the influence of the newspaper in molding public opinion has been the subject of much debate, and we will return to it later.

Along with some attempt on the part of Greeley and others to influence the formation of public opinion and direct it toward human betterment, the interest in the penny post and the opinion of the masses continued. Charles A. Dana contributed to the popularization of a daily press by developing a crisp, compelling manner of reporting. It was Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst, however, who extended sensationalism and invented what we call "yellow journalism." (The term came from a comic strip dealing with the life of the "Yellow Kid," popular in the later 1890's and early 1900's.) In 1883 Pulitzer bought the New York *World,* which soon attained a huge circulation. It stressed sensational news, exploited political and personal scandals, and used large headlines, cartoons, and comic strips. Pulitzer often began or supported reforming crusades, chiefly to increase his circulation. Hearst tried to outdo Pulitzer by making ever stronger emotional appeals, by spectacular headlines, and by an appeal to the lowest economic and social stratum of the population. The tabloid, first successfully started in 1919, is merely a further extension of this type of reporting. As newspapers reached more and more people, merchants realized that they were an important advertising medium, and the interplay of advertising and sensational newsmongering became a definite culture pattern. As a business venture, the modern American newspaper is largely supported by advertising.

Recent Developments

One important development in American journalism which reflects our capitalistic system is the organization of newspaper chains. The first of these was that of E. W. Scripps which began in 1887. Apparently the chains neared the peak of their expansion in 1930, when they controlled 43 per cent of the daily and 54 per cent of the Sunday newspapers in this country. In 1945 the total of all chain dailies was 370 newspapers or 21 per cent of the total. The comparable figures for 1954 were 485 chain papers, representing 45 per cent of the dailies and 54 per cent of the Sunday papers. In recent years there has been a tendency away from the large national chains toward smaller state and regional chains. While there still remain some powerful chains, such as the Scripps-Howard, Hearst, and McCormick-Patterson, on the whole, to quote Raymond B. Nixon,

"Daily chain ownership is becoming more *intensive* and less *extensive* in its concentration." [1]

Frank L. Mott cites five reasons for the consolidation of newspapers: (1) The former intense concern with political news led to the establishment of more papers than were necessary to serve the public with either news or advertising. As a result there was an oversupply of newspapers in our early history when each local political party wanted to be represented in its own public organ. (2) Advertisers have found it cheaper to buy space in one paper with a general circulation, even though at increased rates, than in two with overlapping coverage. (3) There have been combinations of morning and evening newspapers which permitted a 24-hour operation at a single plant. This made for economy. (4) Mounting costs forced the elimination of unnecessary competition. Finally (5) this competition became increasingly wasteful as owners, faced with the growing competition regarding news and entertainment from motion pictures, radio, and television, tended to keep but one paper in each city. There has been a steady increase in consolidation. In 1950, for example, out of 106 cities of 100,000 people or over, 50 had single-management newspapers. In other words, in nearly half of our large cities, there was either a single newspaper or there were two papers owned and operated by the same corporation. In seven cities there were two papers separately owned and edited but operated as a unit on the business side.[2]

In smaller communities the change to single daily newspapers or single ownership has been even more widespread. For example, while our population between 1910 and 1950 increased by approximately two-thirds, and the aggregate circulation of dailies more than doubled, the number of dailies increased by about one-sixth. A similar movement has taken place in the reduction of the number of weekly journals. In 1910 there was clearly an overcrowding of such newspapers. Since that time the number of weeklies has been steadily reduced.

Chain ownership introduced many features of big business and monopoly into newspaper operations and definitely influenced the course of American journalism, particularly through standardization of news, of styles, and of editorials. Curtis D. McDougall says that this has changed "The character of the newspaper . . . to a purely commercial organization and instrumentality." [3] However, the influence of chains has not

[1] Raymond B. Nixon, "Concentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper Ownership," *Journalism Quarterly*, 1945, 22:97–122. Reprinted in B. Berelson and M. Janowitz, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, enlarged edition (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), pp. 193–207. Quotation, p. 202. See also Nixon, "Trends in Daily Newspaper Ownership Since 1945," *Journalism Quarterly*, 1954, 31:11–14.

[2] Frank L. Mott, *The News in America* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 188–189.

[3] Curtis D. McDougall, *Newsroom Problems and Policies* (New York, Macmillan, 1941), p. 17.

been as serious as men like McDougall imagine. Then, too, the competition with radio and television may well have offset the possible deleterious effects of chain control.

Moreover, there is agitation in some quarters for governmental regulation of journalism. We shall return to this problem later. Nixon puts the matter well in his excellent article on this topic of concentration and absenteeism in the final words: "Above all, the American press must find ways of adapting itself to changing economic conditions without losing its editorial vitality and independence. As a result of suspensions and consolidations, the daily newspaper admittedly has gained greater economic stability than ever before. We must make certain that this stability does not bring with it editorial rigidity and sterility." [4]

The place of newspapers in our society is made clear by a brief examination of their number and circulation. Between 1850 and 1900 the number of dailies increased from 254 to 2,226. The circulation rose from about 750,000 to over 15 million. In 1940 there were about 2,300 dailies and the average total circulation was well over 43 million a day. As of September 30, 1954, there were 1,765 English language daily newspapers in this country. They had a combined circulation of over 55 million. At the same time there were 544 Sunday newspapers with 46 million circulation. Also in 1955 there were 9,928 weekly newspapers with a combined circulation of over 18 million.

Cultural Influences

Newspapers clearly reflect their particular culture milieu. The British newspapers resemble American newspapers most closely. They have a long tradition of free speech, and sensation-mongering is about as common with British newspapers as it is with us. The control of the metropolitan press by large corporate interests is more evident in England than in our own country.

In France, a distinction should be drawn between journals of information and journals of opinion. Most of the latter have been closely tied to political parties and have been notoriously venal. The circulation is low and the advertising gives little support. There has been little intrusion of big business methods into the financing and management of French newspapers. On the whole, French journalism is much more individualistic than in Britain and the United States. The more or less open link of certain newspapers with political parties, both domestic and foreign, has long been taken for granted. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany, openly boasted of his control of certain influential French newspapers. Just before World War I, the exposé that some of the most influential Parisian newspapers were controlled by Russian interests led to little public criticism. It is well

[4] Nixon, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

known that the Nazis controlled the French press in their own interest in the 1930's.

German newspapers have varied with the shifts in the forms of political organization of Germany. In the German Empire (1871–1918) the freedom of the press was considerably restricted in political and military matters. There was a close alignment between the most powerful business interests and the military. Yet the democratic and socialistic press was not completely tabooed as it was in Czarist Russia of the day. During the Third Republic the German newspapers were free from any rigid control. There was a variety of opinion-forming newspapers, some of them definitely revolutionary. In fact, the free press was deliberately exploited by the revolutionary Nazi party which, once it was in power, destroyed democracy and the freedom of the press. Under National Socialism, newspapers were completely under the domination of the Nazi rulers and their number declined sharply as did their circulation.

Russia has never had a free press in our democratic sense either under the Czars or under the Communist party. In line with the latter's economic and political policies, there are no privately-owned newspapers. Every organ of news and opinion is ultimately controlled by the Soviet State or by the Communist party. Yet, with the spread of literacy and under the pressure of the party and government agents, the circulation of newspapers is said to have increased tremendously.

THE SOURCES AND NATURE OF NEWS STORIES

Most of the news of local events is handled by the newspaper's own reporters, but news from the outside comes over the telegraph or radio, chiefly through press associations. In this country there are three such organizations: the Associated Press, the United Press, and the International News Service. These three provide most of our domestic and foreign news. The Associated Press, founded in 1900, is a co-operative organization of member newspapers. Each paper both receives news and sends news to other members by means of a system of intercommunication. The Associated Press also has its own reporters, especially in foreign countries. The United Press, founded in 1907, and the International News Service, established in 1909, are private enterprises and sell their services to all who wish them. Most newspapers depend upon such press associations as their source of news, but the large metropolitan dailies maintain special correspondents in Washington and in important foreign capitals. As the use of the radio spread, it developed its own news-gathering and news-sending systems. At first, these were dependent upon press associations, but now the radio has its own correspondents, newswriters, editors, and news analysts.

In addition to the press associations, the syndicate has become an

important source of certain newspaper materials. Syndicates sell identical material to their clients. This includes spot news, some pictures, serial novels, comics and cartoons, games and puzzles, poetry, and various special features, such as advice to the lovelorn, medical, legal, and other counsel, and political and economic comment. Such mass diffusion of standardized materials is an excellent illustration of mass production in a mass society. Some of the criticism of the contemporary newspaper in terms of absentee and chain ownership may really arise from the fact that people resent portions of this syndicated material.

Then, too, newspapers get material from public press agents of corporations, government agencies, and a wide variety of special-interest groups. The rise of public relations as a vocation indicates the growing use of promotional or propaganda tactics. These people are supported by private interests and are concerned with obtaining the best kind of treatment in newspapers which they can secure.

Elements of a News Story

While modern news accounts have many features that any good story has, there are certain conditions under present rapid communication which call for particular elements or features. Let us note some of these:

1. The story must be timely. Speed is of the essence in contemporary news gathering and news reporting. This does not mean that the event reported must necessarily have just taken place. News is also related to interest. The discovery that a prominent man has made a secret marriage or committed a crime some time previously is news, of course, because it has just become public. So, too, new light on historical events may be news. In connection with timeliness, there is the aspect of competition with other newspapers—the enthusiasm for what are called "scoops" is well known. Papers try to secure inside information and get it on the newsstands ahead of their competitors.

2. A good deal of news must be exciting or sensational. Exciting news is always easy to read. It is said that the readers "eat it up" and the editors know that it is "sure-fire." Sensational news always affords immediate satisfaction to readers. While a good many critics have railed against sensationalism in the newspaper, it should be realized that this is a form of gossip which is as old as mankind. To put a story in exciting terms is one way to get attention and one way to satisfy the readers. There is no doubt that the newspapers of James Gordon Bennett and others in the 1830's were aimed, in part, to secure some of their circulation by sensationalizing the news. In our own time, crime news is said to take on this character as does news dealing with personal scandals.

3. Human-interest stories have an important place in the newspaper.

Such stories intrigue readers not because of a specific event but because they are pathetic, amusing, striking, or significant as reflections of human life. They are stories about human beings, their joys and sorrows, their loves and hates, and their behavior as victims in such natural disasters as flood, fire, shipwreck, and earthquake. The appeal depends upon human sympathy and identification.[5]

4. News about prominent people or significant events always outshines those regarding lesser people and lesser events. Once a person, place, or an event has awakened wide interest, any related fact is considered important.

5. Events of local and immediate concern usually outweigh more remote events. Yet in a world dominated by secondary group organization, and in times when international crises concern the man on the street, interest in local events may easily give way to attention to outside news. Nevertheless, local events are important, and we like to read of our neighbors and the events in which we participate.

6. Since some news stories are more significant for the public than others, we must consider what the journalists call "consequence." What was said and done during the negotiations between the United States Government and the Japanese envoy just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor had immense news value. The negotiations which led to the truce in Korea in 1953 tended to overshadow a good many important local events. So, too, news of threatened strikes, of a prolonged drought, or of an earthquake will often capture the readers' attention because such matters are not only of general but of personal concern. The factor of consequence is clearly related to the personal identification with a particular story.

Some Psychological Aspects of the News Story

Attention and interest are captured by appeals to universal human interests, modified as these may be by cultural definitions: (1) interest in fighting and conflict—race riot, prize fight, or war; (2) interest in love and sex, illustrated in our society by the attention given to romance, family devotion, children, and divorce; (3) interest in the unusual, thrilling, or extraordinary; (4) interest in new inventions and other evidences of what we call progress—a reflection of our cultural approval of change; (5) interest in fashion and conspicuous personalities; (6) interest in situations which arouse sympathy; and (7) a variety of other subjects of interest, such as old age and animals. In appealing to these interests, the news story makes dramatic use of hero, heroine, and villain, and as we shall see later, the story form has become standardized in many ways.

[5] See Helen M. Hughes, *News and the Human Interest Story* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1940).

The narrative form is important because it fits perfectly into the psychology of legend and myth-making. In the Middle Ages the wandering teller of fabulous stories told of wars, disasters, and foreign places to openmouthed listeners. Today the newspaper performs the same function for millions of readers, and its technique is much the same. The stories it tells function in the creation of the social-cultural world in which its readers live. Just as centuries ago the credulity of listeners was not disturbed by critical attitudes, so today the reverence for the printed word prevents most people from doubting a story set before them in the newspaper. The believer in man's rationality is often amazed, in this age of almost universal education, that the masses follow so blindly what they read, but he forgets that what the reader has before him fits the cultural reality in which he has been brought up from childhood. Learning the three R's and a smattering of history, geography, and science does not free man from the basic irrationalities of behavior. It only extends the range of stimulation by bringing people into contact with the wider world outside their immediate circle of interaction.

In both primary and secondary societies, the telling or retelling of an event and the discussion of a public issue exemplify certain universal features of perception, association, memory, and judgment. Let us examine these with reference to the construction of a news story.

The relation of the reporter to the event reported varies with the situation. Unless the event is a public occasion announced in advance, a reporter is seldom present when an event takes place. Usually, then, the reporter must accept the testimony of others. Even when he tells what he has personally seen and heard, he is subject to bias and faulty perception. When he has to depend on the word of others, he is already one step removed from firsthand contact with the event he is reporting. Like the professional psychologist he knows from experience that some people see and hear better than others, that some report more accurately, and hence are more dependable. He often makes use of all the witnesses to the occurrence in his reporting and uses the testimony of one person as a check on that of others.

Both at prearranged and unscheduled events photographers may be present and such objective records may aid in the reporting. Nevertheless, the initial news story is often subject to many of the disadvantages of any testimony.

The next step is for the reporter to write out his notes and transmit his story to the main office. This may be telegraphed, mailed, sent by wireless or by telephone. Normally it goes to the copy desk in the newspaper office. At the copy desk the story is edited by copy readers. In newspaper parlance, editing means going over the story carefully, checking it for accuracy, for grammatical construction, and for the spelling of proper names. The copy reader may cut down the story if it is too

long or he may add details to make it longer, and he may send to the newspaper library for additional background information. Also at the copy desk is the headline writer who uses a few striking words in order to attract attention. Newspapers in this country develop a special talent in individuals who can compose striking headlines.

Form of News Story

Since most American newspapers have more news copy than they can use, at least as far as the daily spot news is concerned, they operate on what is called the pyramid form of story. In contrast to the traditional plot of the drama, or to the form of the short story or novel, in which there is a forward movement from minor opening details to a climax of complete detail and a denouement, the American news story stands literary tradition on its head by operating on the principles of shock and anticlimax. The aim is to capture attention by giving the most important fact at the outset and the minor details later. A striking headline is followed by minor headlines giving what are considered to be important facts. The body of the story repeats somewhat the same pattern; a brief and smart résumé of the essential facts, and then, by a series of repetitions, an ever increasing amount of detail.

The justification for this inversion of long-established literary practice is that it aids rapid reading by concentrating the essential points for those who do not have time to read the entire story, and that it facilitates the construction of the story by making it possible to drop paragraphs, when necessary, from the end of a story without losing the more important parts.

In the course of seeking and using interesting, timely news items, newspapermen develop what we know of as the five "W's" and the "H." These refer to the fact that each story should cover the *who, what, why, where, when,* and *how.* Following this plan, the lead of the story should tell who and what the story is about. It should give the why—the reason for the event or story. It should then tell where and when the event took place. The full account of the how is given in the extended narrative, but if the how is itself important in the total picture, it may be noted in the headlines. Both headlines and the use of the five W's and the H are related to the stress on brevity and speed. Today the usual news story is far shorter than was true fifty or a hundred years ago. For example, the *New York Times* on June 7, 1872, ran a story about the nomination of General U. S. Grant for President. This story was 18,000 words long and had but one headline. Today the *New York Times* rarely prints a story of more than a thousand words. The usual story is less than this. In many newspapers, especially tabloids, the stories are cut to a bare minimum. Actually, it is not merely brevity which the busy person wants but significance. For this reason, the newspapers have done a rather striking

job in going in for condensation and succinct news writing. Moreover, during the 1930's and 1940's, newspaper writing was somewhat influenced by both radio and the appearance of such news magazines as *Time* and *Newsweek.*

One further word about the headline: it gives the frame of reference for the readers to follow. In this sense, if in no other, newspapers do influence readers, and to say that the flaming and emotion-rousing headline merely reflects what the readers demand is to neglect completely the basic psychological principle of social interaction. Much the same may be said of the story itself. The point is that the modern newspaper is a phenomenon of mass society reaching from the educated and critical élite at the top down to millions of uncritical readers at the bottom of the social ladder. We shall have more to say on this when we discuss social control and the newspapers.

After the news story has been edited, rewritten, and given a headline, it is set in type. A proof is then run off and the story is sent to the proofreading department. The proofreaders correct typographic errors as well as check facts if they doubt their accuracy. At this point the newspaper production department has in type a number of stories, some advertising, various cuts made from photographs, and such materials as editorials, all of which must be put together to make up the newspaper. This material is put in the hands of the make-up editor. Following the basic policy of the chief editor or manager of the newspaper, the make-up editor determines the position of the various stories and advertising and makes other basic decisions in the final composition of the total newspaper. From here the material moves on to final printing and distribution.

All along the line the emphasis of the modern newspaper is upon speed, speed, speed. The newspaper is not only an economic enterprise but it is in high competition with other mass media.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

The American daily newspaper has developed into a complex organization for relaying the news, for providing information on finance and entertainment, for providing editorials and comments of columnists on current problems, for entertaining and instructing readers through cartoons and comics, and for furnishing space for both display and classified advertising. As evidence of this variety, let us analyze the language of the various sections of the newspaper. There is no better illustration of the intimate relationship of language and culture than that found in the make-up of a modern American newspaper. We shall begin with the section of widest appeal, the so-called "front page."

Front Page News

Spot or front page news appeals to the widest range of potential readers. The banner headline reminds one of a barker in front of a circus tent, bidding one and all to enter into the tent for entertainment and information. The headlines deal primarily with great crises, such as conflicts and disasters, or with unusual events and the doings of leaders. The conflicts may relate to industrial, religious, legal, and international struggles. Or they may have to do with personal conflicts such as brawling or murder. Under disaster we include catastrophes of nature, homicide, suicide, and accidents. Prominent people, of course, may get involved in various conflicts either of the group or personal kind.

These conflict items appeal to men's deepest motivation for food, sexual expression, and personal security. Murders, robberies, theft, divorces, floods, fires, earthquakes, political and other quarrels, and most exciting of all, war—these are the events which catch our attention and appeal to our fantasy.

The language used in describing these events is vivid, highly personalized, and, in general, emotionally toned. For example, in 1953 in the reporting of an earthquake in Greece, a midwestern newspaper, among other exciting details, remarked: "Three Ionian Islands looked like a hell on earth today. Americans and Britains toiled beside Greeks to relieve the effects of five days of earthquakes that have left hundreds dead, hundreds injured and almost all of the 120,000 survivors homeless.

"Violent new shocks accompanied by landslides ripped up the islands tonight adding to the toll from the worst disaster in this area's history." [6]

Strikes in industry which involve severe conflict are often described with a heavy stress on such terms as mounted police, conspiracy, attack, strikebreaker, triumph, inquiry, denounce, and refuse.

In addition to words used to describe particular episodes, hosts of hackneyed phrases continue in use. Stereotypes and clichés are used in describing disasters, conflicts, and striking personalities. Sailors still go to a "watery grave." The victim of a murder is still "found in a pool of blood." The police continue to "comb the city" for criminals, and revolutionary plots are usually "nipped in the bud." Resolutions are usually passed by "overwhelming majority." A statesman just back from a vacation usually "looks the picture of health." Heroes are almost always, "cool as a cucumber" while the villain meets "his Waterloo." Brides are always "blushing." Reformers promise to bring "order out of chaos." Orators speak "while thousands cheer," and candidates end their campaign, "with a whirlwind tour." Some of the most frequent personifications are "Dame

[6] *Chicago Tribune*, August 14, 1953.

Rumor," "Dan Cupid," "Lady Luck," "Mother Earth," and the "Grim Reaper."

The Sports Section

Next to the spot news, the sport section of the American newspaper usually gets the widest attention. Dealing as it does with events involving competition and conflict, a great deal of its vocabulary is borrowed from the military. But it also contains many cold facts such as ball club standing, batting averages of players, the time made by runners and swimmers, scores made in various games, the races in which horses and jockeys participate, and so on through the entire gamut of athletics, both professional and amateur. Moreover, the sports section has stories of coaches and others associated with such activities. The vocabulary is colorful and racy as well as warlike. In a way, sporting contests are make-believe battles, and such terms as "opposing camps," "scouting," and "planning the campaign" reflect this fact.

In the United States, at least, the techniques of war propaganda are often employed in promoting sporting events. Local papers do not hesitate to color the sport articles with their own biases and wishes. As a preview to college contests, publicity departments wage psychological warfare with their "dope" stories. They attempt to increase the confidence in their own teams and student bodies and undermine that of their opponents. The condition of the players, the strategy, the preparation of the forthcoming games—all aim to build up the morale of their own group and destroy that of the opponents. In professional sports the publicity departments provide newspapers with stories intended to arouse public interest and thus increase the gate receipts.

Each major sport has its own peculiar lingo. Thus, in describing an international tennis match, an account says: "In an open set that provided unquestionably the greatest display of electrifying strokes ever put on by 18-year-olds in this country, the ruddy, blond Australian youth with the service of four asserted his supremacy over Kenneth Rosewall, the Australian champion." [7]

Business and Financial Section

The financial and business section, with its vast array of statistics, is the most factual and sober part of the modern newspaper. It, too, has its own special vocabulary. Moreover, the make-up and appeal are different from the front page or the sports division. This is no play world but one of serious economic activity. In addition to reports on the stock exchanges, investments, merchandising, and shipping, there are editorial comments on current or expected business conditions and news of con-

[7] *The New York Times*, August 8, 1953.

ventions, conferences, business deals, and other matters of interest to the world of business and industry.

The special jargon of market reports is a curious mixture of clichés, figures of speech, and metaphors which might seem meaningless to those who did not know them. Thus under the heading, "Tame Finish in Eggs," we discover that "expected fireworks in fresh-gathered February eggs failed to materialize in the Chicago market," that "long eggs came out freely and the price dropped 4¢ from the finish of Tuesday."

The "Society" Pages

That section of the newspaper which reports the doings of polite society is probably read chiefly by women. Engagements, marriages, dinners, debutante parties, dances, and sporting activities attended by the social élite are the chief events covered. Photographs of the persons mentioned are frequently included with the stories. The psychological response of small communities to this type of news coverage is different from that of the metropolis. In the former and in rural areas the society columns afford an excellent opportunity to mention the names of many persons in connection with social functions. As Curtis D. McDougall well says, "The strength of the society page is in names. The more names the better." [8]

Lord Byron once aptly remarked, " 'Tis pleasant, sure, to see one's name in print." And as the psychologist William James put it: "We should all be pleased to be seen in Piccadilly Circus with a duke on each arm." In the absence of friends among the nobility, we like to be known as members of the Northbrook Garden Club or of the Entertainment Committee of the American Legion. We like it to be known that we were a guest at a dinner given by a wealthy banker, or toastmaster at a banquet honoring a prominent minister, statesman, or military hero returning from the wars. Such notice expands our self-esteem and fosters our identification with the "best people." In larger cities the society news tends to be confined chiefly to families of upper-middle and high status. Persons in these classes get the same kind of satisfaction as do individuals in smaller towns and rural districts. Moreover, society columns allow the urban masses to indulge in a good deal of vicarious identification with the social élite. They derive pleasure from hearing of expensive weddings and the doings of the Stork Club set. The inner satisfaction of the shop-girl, the housemaid, and the charwoman from such identification is self-evident. These people love to dream of a life of unlimited leisure, wealth, and social prestige. A news story of society events furnishes them with material out of which their reveries may be built. More than that, it convinces them that

[8] Curtis D. McDougall, *Interpretative Reporting* (New York, Macmillan, 1938), p. 291.

this Cinderella world is after all just around the corner—as it often actually is—and this fact confirms their hope that by some miracle they may some day acquire a place in this fairyland. Confirmation of the Cinderella world is found in the story of the midwestern farmer's daughter who, having won a beauty contest, moved on to marry one of the Rockefeller clan. So, too, the marriage of Grace Kelly to the Prince of Monaco stimulated a like fantasy. This kind of success story is a parallel to what we have in the business world when a man moves up the economic ladder to ever increasing success.

Special Features

The special-feature sections of the American newspaper have become increasingly common. Closely allied to the society news are the fashion pages which describe what the well-dressed woman is wearing, give hints on how to retain one's beauty, and often provide practical guides to buying. Considerable space is given to foods and cooking and to other household tasks. Also gardening, both practical and decorative, gets a good deal of attention. Articles on these topics in the metropolitan press are often prepared and signed by experts and then syndicated for smaller papers over the whole country.

Other special features furnish advice to the lovelorn, analyze character by means of handwriting or astrology, provide crossword puzzles, poems, and small humorous items of varied sort. In the Sunday editions there are often special articles on contemporary political, economic, and other issues. There are book review and magazine sections in some of the larger metropolitan papers. In the tabloids and newspapers which appeal especially to the masses there are often lurid stories of earlier society scandals and criminal cases that once aroused great public interest. Many newspapers also carry serial novels. These are said to have only a limited appeal.

Cartoons and comics have become completely accepted in most American newspapers, although a few conservative ones such as the *New York Times* have resisted the adoption of cartoons and comic strips. Cartoons are concerned chiefly with political issues and the nuances of daily life. The appeal of the latter is that of the universal human-interest story. Here attention is on personal conflict, love, sympathy, and the difficulties and triumphs of everyday life.

The Comics

The comic strip is an American invention. It began in the 1890's in the Pulitzer paper under the caption, "The Yellow Kid." Today the comic strip reflects every phase of our contemporary life. It reveals the humorous, the ironic, the sympathetic, and the tragic elements of life in all classes. Some, like "Mutt and Jeff" and "Moon Mullins," may be

regarded as "low brow" in their use of rather ribald and crass humor. Others, such as "Harold Teen," are sentimental, appealing to the adolescent in all of us. There are also the human-interest and success type of strips such as "Blondie" and "Gasoline Alley." Some follow the rags-to-riches-to-rags-again theme. Such is "Little Orphan Annie." Others are mildly philosophical, such as "Crazy Kat," or combine satire and fantasy as in "King Aroo" and "Pogo." Those dealing with the *nouveau riche*, such as "Polly and Her Pals" and "Bringing Up Father," have long been favorites. The adventure theme is highly popular, as witness "Terry and the Pirates" and "Steve Canyon." Closely related to these are detective stories of the "Dick Tracy" variety. Also the magic and miracle themes have great vogue. "Mandrake the Magician" and "Superman" have been partially eclipsed by those dealing with space ships and interplanetary adventure.

When they first began, each day's comic strip was a complete story in itself. It provided particular episodes in the lives of its characters. Some comics still continue largely in this vein, such as "Peanuts." However, most comics now follow the continued-story form. Over a period, sometimes of several weeks, a series of episodes is built up to a dramatic climax and denouement. Often a transition from one series to another is completely arbitrary. In the "Little Orphan Annie" type a number of stories in which she is surrounded by affluence is followed by a period of hoboing it on the road again.

The dramatis personae of the comics reflect our chief social types. Some seem to have more individuality than others. But the commonest types are the Jew, the Negro, the English Lord, the newly rich, the orphan, the cripple, the scheming widow, the boardinghouse-keeper, the hobo, the rich uncle, the soldier of fortune, the detective, the heartbroken young man, the hardworking shop or office girl, the rural wit or half-wit, the criminal, the kidnaper, the spy, and the philosophical ten-year-old boy or girl. In such fantasies as "King Aroo" there is a mixture of human and animal characters.

The comics change their themes with the times. During war periods the military get a good deal of attention, as would be expected. Often there is downright propaganda in some of these comic strips.[9]

The comic book is an outgrowth of the newspaper comics. These books have great vogue and millions of copies are sold and distributed each year. Some are made up of a collection of comic strips already published but most of them are created for the books themselves. Sometimes an entire comic book will be made up of one particular set of cartoons such as "Pogo" or "King Aroo" or "Dennis the Menace." Others are combinations of a variety of popular items.

[9] See Lyle A. Shannon, "The Opinions of Little Orphan Annie and Her Friends," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1954, 18:169–179.

There has been considerable discussion about the influence of the comics upon children. We will turn to this topic when we take up some aspects of the newspaper and social control.

Editorials

Although in these days of mass communication it is probably the least read, the editorial page is still considered by most newspaper men as a sacred section of the modern newspaper. This is perhaps the result of the earlier days of personal journalism. Its appeal to readers is apparently far less today than it was in the heyday of such men as Horace Greeley, William Rockhill Nelson, and William Allen White. It is interesting to note that from the period of personal journalism we have moved into an era when editorial writing is completely depersonalized. The reader does not know the person who writes a particular editorial. Yet we have, in a way, returned to a period of signed editorial comment in the writing of commentators or columnists. A good deal of their material is an important part of the editorial production of the modern newspaper. Such men as Westbrook Pegler, Walter Lippmann, and others have wide audiences and exert considerable influence in some directions. And the radio, as we shall see, has paralleled this with the development of certain high-priced commentators.

The editorial is supposed to be an interpretation, comment, and even argument rather than a source of information. And yet almost all editorials have some kind of "news peg," that is, there is some event from which or around which they center their attention. While partisan newspapers carry editorials favorable to party politics, for the most part the editorial page tends to have a distinctly intellectual tone. That is not to say that editorials may not at times be vigorous and emotional and employ arguments in analysis and interpretation, but the usual tone of the editorial is that of calm deliberation.

Many editorial pages provide space for letters from readers. This correspondence section probably is losing ground, but it still has a place in many newspapers. It is a good source of material on opinions of outspoken readers, although we do not know just how newspapers select materials which they print. Sometimes newspapers print only those letters which tend to be favorable; others print unfavorable comments as well. Newspapers must receive thousands of letters and no one knows whether any kind of adequate sampling is used in selecting the letters to be printed.

Advertising

Finally, advertising is an important section of the modern newspaper. In fact, the modern paper could not exist without advertising. Estimates indicate that about two-thirds of their income is derived from

this source. Sometimes retail advertising constitutes almost an entire section of a newspaper. Then, too, the display advertising in the business section relates to financial and industrial matters. Bond and trust companies, banks, and makers of office equipment usually place their advertisements in the financial section. On the other hand, in special feature sections are advertisements of travel, tools, household furnishings, and the like. In the dramatic and literary sections are to be found the theatre announcements and magazine and book advertisements. The close correspondence between the advertising and subject matter of a specialized reading section is obvious. Display advertising along with the corresponding reading matter probably increases the attention given to both.

It has long been recognized that advertising has news value. James Gordon Bennett as early as 1835 began to insist that his advertisers provide new material every day so as to attract his readers. The short life of the newspaper *P.M.* in New York is a good illustration of the fact that a newspaper can hardly exist without advertising, and this regardless of whether the advertising pays for the newspaper or not. Study after study has shown that the readers often take as much interest in advertising as they do in straight news. For example, studies have shown that the readership of women for the Sunday newspapers is higher for the news of department store offerings than for anything else except those items dealing with women's styles and the rotogravure and comic sections. Mass readership of department store advertising is also high. A summary of 138 studies of reader interest running from the decade 1940 to 1950 has shown remarkable increase in the interest in advertising. It now compares favorably with interest in news and editorial features.

For example, just prior to World War II, one study reported that 32 per cent of the men and 38 per cent of the women respondents said they read the classified advertising. During the war years the corresponding percentages were 40 and 44. In the postwar period they were 44 and 48 respectively. Clearly advertising matter is a basic and essential part of the modern newspaper.[10]

The function of the newspaper in our society is neatly demonstrated by the findings of various readership studies. Let us look at other of their findings.

Readership Studies

Various surveys report an average range of 20 to 40 minutes a day spent in reading the newspaper. This seems like a short time to spend with an ordinary American newspaper, but in our busy life it is probably a good indication of the weight of importance which people give

[10] See "The Continuing Study of Newspaper Reading," Advertising Research Foundation, Study No. 138, 1950.

to newspapers. On the other hand, it is equally important to know what they read, what interests them most, and what least. As we shall see there are sex differences in this, which might be expected from what we have already said.

During the decade 1940–50, repeated readership surveys were made by the Advertising Research Foundation. The interviewers showed each prospective respondent a fresh unmarked copy of a newspaper and asked him to go through the paper, page by page, and point out those items, features, or sections which he had seen or read. Then he was asked: "Did you happen to read or see anything on this page?" and "Did you happen to see or read any of the advertisements on this page?" While there are a good many technical questions which might be raised in regard to this particular research, especially the difference between *seen* and *read*, nevertheless the findings are suggestive. The following table gives the distribution of median percentages of adult readers who reported to have read anything of the category designated.[11]

Table 6. Variations in Reader Response to Different Sections of the Newspaper

	READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPER DEPARTMENTS	
	Men	*Women*
Editorials	43	27
Editorial Page Items	83	79
Comics	81	78
Financial news	26	9
Radio Programs or News	40	50
Society News or Pictures	36	83
Sports News or Pictures	76	34

Other readership findings have been summarized by Paul F. Lazarsfeld.[12] The highlights of his summary follow.

First, for both men and women the graphic items—comics, pictures, editorial cartoons and oddity cartoons such as "Believe It or Not"—are the best-read parts of the newspaper. The one exception to this is that large department store advertising shows greater reader interest among women than one or two types of the graphic material. Nine out of ten men and women look at the pictures, and approximately seven out of ten women read the most popular comic and the editorial cartoon. The odd-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. vi.

[12] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Daily Newspaper and Its Competitors," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1942, 219:8–9.

ities cartoon is read by about seven out of ten men and about six out of ten women.

In the second place, news definitely ranks below the graphic content in reader interest. Two out of three men and fewer than six out of ten women read the leading news tory. About 65 per cent of the women read the chief department store advertisements as compared with about 50 per cent of the women who read the best-read news account.

Third, sports news ranks below general news in men's interest. About one-half of the men read the leading sports story, the local sports column, and the baseball summary in the appropriate season. Next below sports is men's interest in weather prediction. After that come the amusement advertisements and the radio log and following that the leading columnists and the editorials.

Fourth, the interest of women in amusement, advertising, and the obituaries is almost as great as their interest in the leading front-page stories. Nearly one-half of the women read the weather prediction and the women's features, such as "Dorothy Dix's Advice to the Lovelorn." Health advice, fashion hints, recipes, and other features in the special sections are almost equally popular among women. Nearly one-half of the women say that they read the radio log. Two out of five women read the leading society story. About one in five admit to reading the average serial story despite the fact that newspaper serials are not regarded as of high quality compared to those appearing in popular magazines.

Finally, neither men nor women are greatly interested in editorial comment and interpretation. Less than two men in five and only one woman in five read any editorial. The leading columnists in the newspapers in the sample were read by about one-third of the men and women. On the other hand, the influence of editorials should not be overlooked because it has been shown that people of high status and prestige who read editorials pass their arguments along to nonreaders. This fits in with our earlier statement that public opinion is still formed in large part by face-to-face conversation.

Ralph O. Nafziger made an intensive study of newspaper-reading in Minneapolis in order to discover what effect position, length, and content had on attention getting. He showed, for example, as to effective position, that front page items were observed more often than those on the inside pages, that longer articles were more likely to be observed than shorter items, but short news and feature articles were more apt to be read entirely, if read at all. As to effective content, he showed the following important distribution: [18]

[18] Ralph O. Nafziger, "The Reading Audience," in Wilbur Schramm, ed., *Communications in Modern Society* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1948), p. 109.

Category of Pictures and Captions	*Per Cent "Seen"*
Accidents, national disasters, and fires	48
Crime and vice	48
Comics and cartoons	40
Society, family, and individuals	34
Maps	34
Art, literature, and leisure-time activities	33
War-related activities	33
Education, science, and invention	28
Government and political activity	21
Sports	19
Non-news, pictures, and captions	18
Miscellaneous material	18

Also important, of course, were the headline displays and the type of emotion or other appeal in the headlines. We have already commented on this.

A study by Wilbur Schramm showed that the longer the story, the smaller the proportion of readers, and the quicker were readers lost. On the whole, news stories lost readers rapidly in the first few paragraphs. Some 10 per cent dropped out at the end of the second paragraph.[14]

We are also concerned with the factor of reader understanding. Does the reader get the meaning of what he reads?

Readership and Comprehension

There have been a number of criteria or formula set up to deal with the question of readability. This is not the place to review in detail the various methods. For the most part they concern the frequency of what are called "hard words," usually interpreted as long words. Second, average sentence length is important, and furthermore the use of pronouns and prepositional phrases must be taken into account.

A study by Charles E. Swanson has shown the importance of the length of words. He prepared a story in two versions, one with 173, the other with 131 syllables per 100 words. Using an eight-page experimental tabloid, he inserted the test material into a certain position on the fifth page. The position in the paper, headlines, and photograph were the same for the two stories. This little tabloid was then circulated among a total of 250 veteran student families living in trailer villages. The long version was given to one-half of the families and the short version to the other half.

Approximately 30 hours after the distribution of the papers, a readership study was made of the 57 paragraphs in the stories. "For the 173-syllable sample," the mean number of paragraphs read was slightly over 13. "For the 131-syllable sample" the mean was just under 24

[14] Wilbur Schramm, "Measuring Another Dimension of Newspaper Readership," *Journalism Quarterly*, 1947, 24:293–306.

paragraphs. This meant a gain of 83 per cent for the easier version.[15]

Another study by Lester Getzloe revealed that foreign news, on the whole, tends to be written for readers with about five years higher educational status than that attained by the average American adult.[16] Again the significance of these facts is hard to determine. We know that news stories and editorials influence opinions but that opinions, in turn, are formed partly from conversation. In the case of foreign news is there a downward infiltration or seepage of attitudes and ideas from those of higher educational status to those of lower? No one has made an adequate test to discover the extent of such downward communication and its significance.

The rationalists are strong for training people to analyze carefully what they read in the paper. They want to get at the question of credibility and reliability. For example, Milton Mayer has published a report on how to read a certain story in the *Chicago Tribune*. He began by reprinting a story headlined NAME ANGELS OF MOVES TO CURB PRESS and with subhead: FOUNDATION AIDS HUTCHINS GROUP. Mayer reprinted the whole article with corrections and comments which ran to 112 footnotes. The *Tribune* article was long and ran into some 2,000 words. The commentary was still longer, running to about 8,000 words.[17]

While the Mayer method is stimulating and suggestive, it can hardly be expected that the run-of-the-mill reader will go to the trouble to make the kind of careful analysis which he indicates. As a matter of actual fact, the man on the street is incapable of such detailed analysis. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the people get information from other sources than newspapers.

Furthermore, we must distinguish between those items which are strictly factual and those which have to do with interpretation and development of meaning and value systems. Newspapers for the most part make a conscientious effort to check the basic facts: names, dates, events, and so on. The real difficulty arises from what is called "editorializing" of news stories, that is, the introduction of certain biases or prejudices. How to control these in the news story itself has been a difficult matter indeed. Perhaps the best we can hope for is to train people to take a certain active interest in what they read, especially in the matter of interpretation. Also, the intelligent person has some awareness of his own prejudices and knows how to relate these to what he reads in the newspaper. However, we cannot avoid bias and it is often rather hard to balance certain biases with the views of other people. Certainly it would

[15] Charles E. Swanson, "Readability and Readership: A Controlled Experiment," *Journalism Quarterly*, 1948, 25:339–343.

[16] Lester Getzloe, "U.S. Press Does Well in Foreign News Volume, but Less Readable than 1945," *The Ohio Newspaper*, 1946, 28:1–5.

[17] Milton Mayer, "How to Read the *Chicago Tribune*," *Harper's* (April, 1949), 198:24–35.

be well if people applied some logic to what they read. But we must realize that the newspaper is the contemporary gossipmonger, that it is both a medium of advertising and an exchange of much specialized information, and that it provides values and interpretations which may gradually build or modify one's underlying belief system. Viewing the newspaper in this light, we can see some limitations in the purely rational and logical approach to newspaper reading. A consideration of these leads at once to the larger issue of the relationship of the newspaper to the social order in which it is embedded.

NEWSPAPERS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Among the great heritages of democratic society have been the rights of free speech, free press, and free assemblage. This has meant public discussion of public issues and freedom to criticize officials and their policies. As an important section of the press, newspapers have long taken the position that the freedom of the press was a basic part of the larger right of free speech. In defending its position in this matter, the press frequently refers to the First Amendment of the Constitution which states that Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."

It was Thomas Jefferson who insisted on the insertion of this particular item. As he later remarked: "Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe." Clearly Jefferson's position is bound up with the whole idea and practice of public discussion in a democratic society. It implies the fundamental thesis that democracy rests on the enlightened masses and further that this enlightenment and discussion are dependent upon free and adequate communication.

Jefferson, however, had no intention of overlooking the fundamental moral problem of the relationship of rights to duties. Our freedom or rights are limited on every hand by the rights and duties of others. In other words, our rights consist of the duty of other people to protect them. In turn, we have a duty to protect others in their rights. Otherwise we could not live in a democratic moral order. There are, in fact, legal and judicial provisions for just such limitations.

Conflicting Views

The United States has long experienced a struggle between those who wanted to extend the frontiers of freedom and those who felt that they had to control freedom in terms of larger public obligations. There is always an area in which freedom of action is sanctioned but other areas in which individual demands are checked in terms of general welfare.

The relation of the newspaper to moral and legal controls is a subject of continual discussion. Basically it is a conflict between the news-

paper as a business corporation interested in profits and its quasi-public responsibility as purveyor of news and commentator on public events. Some regard the newspaper as essentially a public functionary, giving out information and helping to form public opinion. These critics are strongly against absentee ownership and the emergence of a single newspaper in a given community. Also they have much to say about sensationalism, violence, and bias in news stories.

A basic question seems to be the relationship between the news-giving function and the editorial function of the newspaper. As the modern newspaper developed the reporter became a rival to the editor, and the news story became a competitor to the editorial. As public education increased literacy, the demand for news of a wide variety became stronger. While the editorial function has not completely disappeared, it certainly no longer dominates the daily press.

Some writers, like James R. Wiggins, take the position that the news reporting is the central function of the newspaper. As he puts it, "The news—what happens and what men think, do, and feel about it—this is the first concern of the press." He goes on to say, "The proper question that the news editor should ask himself is: 'Is it news?', not, 'Is it good news or is it bad news?' "[18] It is not the function of the news editor to sit in judgment on events.

Related to these points are a number of criticisms of press reporting. One has to do with reporting in the field of labor and management relations; the other, with the influence of news reports of crime. On the whole, the reporting of the relations of labor and management has improved considerably in recent decades. And as labor unions have become more powerful and influential in governmental affairs and in the country at large, the earlier situation has been changed considerably.

The reporting of crimes has been subject to a long discussion, pro and con. It is said, by some, that crime news stimulates crime, though this has never been proved. And while news of crime sometimes offends good taste, it must be remembered that crime news is a form of public gossip; and even though the newspapers said nothing about it, news of criminal acts would spread by word of mouth or by other means. On the other hand, crime news usually displays a strong moral implication that crime does not pay. Many believe that the publicity of criminal acts often helps the police to apprehend the criminal.

In any event, the selection and treatment of the news does affect the responses of the readers. Some critics maintain that the sensational press deliberately fosters interest in scandal and crime and in doing so injures not only public taste but public morals as well. Others say that this merely gives the masses what they like and want. It is true that

[18] James R. Wiggins, "The News Is the First Concern of the Press," *Journalism Quarterly*, 1946, 23:20, 21.

people everywhere, in small tribes, in peasant communities, in small towns and cities, and in metropolitan communities, like to hear about personal conflicts, about love and hate, about tragedy and comedy. On the other hand, the invention and spreading of emotionalized stereotypes, myths, and legends through the newspapers is not to be denied. There is no doubt, that the newspaper has widened the range of mass man's interest in both private and public events.

Newspapers and Mores

As in so many disputes of this nature, it is not an either-or, an all-or-none, matter. In the first place, the newspaper, like other media of communication, has some relation to social control. The presentation of the news of crimes, divorces, disasters, accidents, war, death, or other crises makes people talk. This arouses thought processes, even if not very logical ones. Ideas of right and wrong are bound to arise in even a superficial discussion of such news. We do live in a moral world, and men take sides, approve or disapprove, like or dislike, and seek someone or something to blame for human tragedies. To react so, even if only verbally, is to deal in morality and to affect social control.

Going a step further, we may ask whether the exciting newspaper story stimulates overt action. Critics usually consider this question only as it applies to delinquency, crime, divorce, and other disapproved conduct. Many of those who contend that newspapers incite overt response neglect the possible beneficial and moral stimulations. It is extremely difficult to discover any objective data on this question. It is the considered view of most experts on crime and social problems that the newspaper may stimulate an interest in criminal or other immoral conduct and help built up the belief that crime pays or that moral obligations are of little value. Yet most experts hold that outright misconduct is derived from personality disturbances, from such conditions as poverty and habituation to criminal practices, or from some combination of these.

Since the rise and spread of the motion picture, radio, and television, we hear less about the influence of the newspapers in promoting delinquency and more about the potential effects of these new media of mass communication. We shall take up this topic when we treat these other media.

Before discussing governmental controls and private pressure-group controls, it is necessary to say a word or two about the so-called invasion of privacy by the newspapers and other media.

The demand for freedom of the press arose before the day of the modern newspaper, and the freedom desired was that of editorial comment and of interpretation of economic, political, and moral-religious

topics. No one then considered that it had to do with freedom of the reporter to dig out the news and of the publisher to splash it on the front page of his paper. But the reporter has defended ruthless news-seeking as his right and has given it the moral justification that was formerly given to free editorial comment. It is an interesting commentary on mass society that, despite its impersonality and anonymity, a person may at any time be exposed to public notice of acts which he and his intimates may consider immoral. It may be that the impersonal, anonymous, and fleeting nature of our social relations makes us the more ready to read about the misconduct or accident, the success or failure, of one like ourselves. Such emotional stories may restore, if only vicariously, some of the warmth of human relations which is lost in mass society.

A man in public life finds his conduct at all times liable to exposure. Whatever he does is potential news. As G. A. Spender, the distinguished British publicist, once remarked, "The man in public life has no private life." There have been many episodes of exposure of personal life in both Britain and America. The most striking example in our own times, probably, is the tragic series of episodes following the kidnaping and killing of the son of Charles A. Lindbergh. Lindbergh, who had been a popular hero for a long time, later became the subject of a good deal of criticism by the newspapers because he was dubbed a poor sport in his reactions to the newspaper treatment of the kidnaping and murder. There have been other instances since, but they all bear out Spender's point. Those who become the heroes of the masses must always face the possibility of having the masses turn upon them if they do not conform to their public image.

Governmental Controls

Viewed in historical perspective, even in democratic countries, freedom of the press is a recent acquisition. In countries under autocratic governments the press has always been under official domination. Yet nowhere is there absolute freedom from some form of state control. In addition to control through legal rules of corporate organization and management and through taxation, laws of censorship and libel serve to restrain the printing of certain kinds of news. Moreover, as we shall note shortly, other forms of governmental control of news have emerged.

During the first hundred years of the modern newspaper, European governments viewed this new agency as a threat to the ruling class. Newspapers were permitted only under strict regulations. The same ideas were carried over to the American colonies, as illustrated in a letter of Sir William Berkeley—for thirty-eight years governor of Virginia—to the home office in 1671. Berkeley wrote: "But, I thank God, we have not free Schools nor Printing; and I hope that we shall not have these

100 years. For learning has brought Disobedience and Heresy and Sects in the world, and printing has divulged them and libels against the Government . . . God keep us from both." [19]

Gradually, both in Europe and in the colonies, freedom of the press came to be accepted and expected. During the struggle of the American colonies for independence, newspapers and pamphlets played a considerable part in the spread of information and comment. Yet when the new federal Constitution was submitted to the various states for ratification in 1787, it contained no provision for the liberty of the press. Alexander Hamilton had taken the view that the idea of freedom of the press was so vague it did not need to be provided for specifically. However, various states refused to ratify the Constitution until the Bill of Rights was included in the first ten amendments. They covered not only freedom of the press and of speech, but religious liberty, right of assemblage, of petition, and other provisions regarding individual liberties.

The Sedition Act of 1788 was a direct infringement by Congress on the freedom of the press, but after the events associated therewith were over, the First Amendment of the Constitution became the basis for decisions by the Supreme Court to protect the freedom of utterance in newspapers and periodicals. Moreover, the Supreme Court has maintained a watchful eye over the enactments of state legislatures which threaten to deprive American citizens of the rights guaranteed them under the federal Constitution.

Two recent cases bearing on freedom of the press were those growing out of the so-called Minnesota Gag Law of 1931, and the attempt of Huey Long to tax newspaper advertising in Louisiana in 1936. The former was essentially a device of censorship by injunction. The latter was an attempt to quiet the newspapers opposing Long by putting heavy tax upon them. In the latter case, Justice George Sutherland remarked that the newspaper tax was, "a deliberate and calculated device . . . to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled by virtue of its constitutional guarantees."

Censorship

Yet, in times of grave national crisis, censorship has been invoked. In military operations, the appearance of newspaper correspondents in the field time and again led to strong conflict between the commanding officers and the reporters. During the Civil War, General W. T. Sherman wrote to his brother, Senator John Sherman, complaining that the correspondents were "doing infinite harm," such as revealing various plans for a surprise movement. He went on to say that the only successful campaigns had been carried on in the absence of newspaper men or by throwing them off the scent. During the Spanish-American War, Gen-

[19] Quoted in Frank L. Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

eral W. R. Shafter required all of the Hearst newspaper men to get out of Santiago, Cuba, after this city had been captured. In the war between China and Japan in 1894–95 news correspondents on both sides were curtailed. This was true of the Boer War and certainly was true of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. During World War I and World War II newspaper men were allowed a good deal more freedom than had been true in earlier wars. Yet field censorship was often used in the interests of security.[20]

Aside from falling into the hands of inept administrators, the operation of war censorship of news leads to three difficulties. First, known and accepted control of the news tends to encourage rumor, and rumor is likely to be irresponsible, uncontrollable, and dangerous to public morale and to political action. Second, there is often a tendency to withhold the bad news on the theory that the enemy will not otherwise be informed and furthermore that bad news can be held back until good news can be used in its place. This tends to produce a distortion of the news which defeats the whole purpose of full information within the limits of military security. Then, third, wartime censorship is often put in the hands of civilians and may easily become a means of political manipulation.

Yet there is another kind of restraint which is not administered by formal military agencies as in the case of war. This is censorship of news at its source and frequently this has nothing to do with military security. For example, during World War II there were many complaints about the difficulty of getting prompt news releases from the Navy Department although in other military offices the newsmen found copy less difficult to get. Then news about changes in the Federal Reserve Board was held back on the theory such news would affect the stock market. There were many examples of this kind during the war years. Such a code of secrecy is not restricted to Washington. It is common enough in state and local affairs as well.

Associated with this kind of thing is the use of the government's own press personnel for the preparation and release of news items. These news releases, controlled at their source by various departments and subdepartments of government, both federal and state, constitute a type of control. Very often the recipients of such releases have no way of knowing whether they are accurate or whether other interpretations could be placed upon them. As James R. Wiggins remarks, "These pressures are nowhere more persistent than in the field of public affairs reporting."[21] During the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, many Republican critics were convinced that the New Deal was promoted in just such a manner.

[20] See Kimball Young, "Censorship in Wartime," *American Library Association Bulletin*, 1944, 39:439–442, 468.

[21] Wiggins, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

In Chapter 14 we discussed the place of the pressure group in the formation of public opinion. It is clear that various special-interest groups do, on occasion, bring pressure upon newspapers. This is also true of many individuals. They want to promote this or that movement, or they wish this or that item publicized, or they may wish something to be withheld.

One of the most common beliefs is that advertisers put pressure on newspapers to slant the news in their favor. There is probably far less of this than the public imagines. In the report of the Royal Commission on the Press, 1947–49, in Great Britain, there is some evidence of occasional pressures of certain advertisers on the news and editorials but, on the whole, it is not very extensive. As the Commission says in its conclusions: "We have no evidence of concerted pressure by advertisers to induce newspapers to adopt a particular policy." [22] This report goes on to remark, as does the somewhat comparable privately supported American Commission on Freedom of the Press, that so long as newspapers are private corporations and so long as subscriptions do not pay for the newspaper, they will continue to depend heavily upon advertising. Both commissions were opposed to compulsion as a means of obtaining better newspapers. As the Royal Commission put it; "Free enterprise in the production of newspapers is a prerequisite of the free press." [23] Both these commissions recommended some sort of a general council which would serve to promote better newspapers. The British suggested a council of 25 members to consist of publishers, editors, and other journalists and five members from outside the business. They would be charged with safeguarding freedom of the press, encouraging growth of the sense of public responsibility and public service, and increasing the efficiency and well-being of the newspaper workers.

The American Commission on Freedom of the Press made slightly different suggestions. They recommended that the government facilitate new ventures in the communications industry, "that it foster the introduction of new techniques, that it maintain competition among large units through the anti-trust laws." However, with regard to the latter, they recommended that these laws be used sparingly. And where there was concentration in the newspaper industry, the government might make an effort "to see to it that the public gets the benefits of such concentration." [24]

Finally, as remarked several times, it must not be forgotten that as a private corporation the newspaper is interested in profits. It is all too evident that editors as well as managers are caught up in defense of

[22] *Royal Commission on the Press, 1947–1949* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 143.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 155–156.

[24] Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. v–vi.

the economic system which means their own survival. However, social and moral issues cannot be neglected. What we need in the press, then, is an assurance that both sides on controversial issues will be fully heard. It is most important that we maintain the differential indicated above between good news-reporting of facts and events and the editorial function of the newspaper. Editorializing of news stories has long been criticized by journalists, statesmen, and students of the press. There are certain newspapers in this country and abroad which make a practice of mixing stories and editorials and hence rightly are criticized by many readers. In this connection, it is well to point out that the more serious cases of editorializing of news stories occur in the by-line stories of special correspondents. Also an informal study of the British press indicates that editorializing of news stories, even in the *London Times*, is quite frequent. These trends follow the general drift of public events.

MAGAZINE AND BOOK READING

Newspapers are not the only printed matter which has effect upon opinion formation. While prior surveys show that 90 per cent of American adults read newspapers every day—that is, to some extent—the reading of magazines and books is far less frequent. Nevertheless, the importance of such reading cannot be overlooked, since there is a positive correlation between level of education and frequency of magazine and book reading. There is no doubt that this class of persons will provide a good many of our public leaders, and such people influence public opinion formation and public action.

In connection with a rather extensive study of radio listening in America, P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia Kendall made a survey of book and magazine readership.[25] From a cross section of the American public, 61 per cent reported that they read at least one magazine regularly. The same group revealed that 26 per cent had read at least one book during the month previous to the survey. With regard to the source of the books which are read, one-third said that they bought the books and one-half borrowed them either from a friend, the public library, or from a rental library. The fact that one-third purchased the books is an indication that, though Americans are exposed to a variety of other media—magazines and other printed matter as well as radio and television—book publishing is by no means a lost business.

There is a positive correlation between level of formal education and the extent to which people read magazines and books. For example, the survey shows that of those of the sample who were college graduates, 86 per cent read magazines regularly and 60 per cent had read at

[25] P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1948).

least one book in the previous month. For the high-school section of the sample, only 68 per cent read magazines regularly and 27 per cent had read at least one book in the month previous. Of the sample made up of grade-school graduates, only 41 per cent said that they read magazines regularly and only 11 per cent said that they had read at least one book in the previous month. In each educational group there are fewer book readers than there are magazine readers.

In dealing with mass communication, it has been pointed out that there are really two distinct groups. On the one hand are the magazine and book readers, and on the other hand the movie-goers and radio listeners. (These studies were made before television had taken hold on the country.)

In reading, of course, one must have a certain amount of skill. As a rule, books are more difficult to read than magazines. And since books are more expensive, they are usually less accessible. The total number of magazine readers was 61 per cent of the sample. About one-third of the total read books as well as magazines. It is true that almost every book reader is also a magazine reader. On the other hand, the reverse is by no means true.

Other mass media, such as movies, radio, and television, require no such skill as does the reading of books and magazines. The radio, television, and the movie are more evidently "spectator" media in which the audience need do little more than watch or listen. We shall take up the question of overlapping audiences with regard to movies and radio later. One point, however, might be made regarding the relationship of book reading to movie-going. It has been shown that book readers are more apt to be movie fans, but that there is no relationship between book reading and radio listening. To quote Lazarsfeld and Kendall, "Book readers are more often frequent movie-goers, and conversely, non-readers are more often non-movie-goers." [26] As the authors suggest, there may be a double action effect here. People who read books like to see them dramatized in the movies. In turn, those who witness a dramatized book in the movies may later read the book.

Comic Books

A new form of literature has emerged in the comic book. Born of the newspaper comic strips, these books, distributed in the millions, must be regarded as another medium of mass communication. While designed chiefly for children, they are often read by adolescents and adults.

The content of these books covers a wide range of topics: adventure, crime, super-space operations, and materials from history and classical literature. The characters are humans, superhumans, and animals. Katherine M. Wolf and Marjorie Fiske have made an intensive study of

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

children's reactions to comics.[27] They interviewed 104 children, ages 7 to 17 years, one-half of whom were in the age group 11 to 12 years. The sample was stratified as to sex, age, and economic status. Three-fourths of the children came from public and private schools in New York and one-quarter from rural communities in Connecticut. On the basis of children's reactions the authors classified the comics by content as follows:

1. There is "the funny animal" type, illustrated by the Walt Disney cartoons. The animals act like human beings, have a home life, go to school, and so on. As the authors say, the characters—that is, the animals—are "fantastic in their appearance, but plausible in their behavior." [28]

2. The second category consists of adventure, crime, and mystery. There is a good deal of unreality about these comics and they are characterized by strong emotional excitement. The individuals depicted therein have strange powers, such as x-ray vision, or they fly from planet to planet, or they are capable of appearing and disappearing at will and, in general, defy the laws of natural causation. The heroes not only have great power, but they use it to moral ends in a universe which operates in terms of good and bad. In contrast to the first type, the characters in these comics look like ordinary people but do not act like them. These first two types greatly outnumber the third.

3. What the authors call "true and classic comics" make up the third group. These are usually adaptations from historical or literary books. They are regarded as educational in aim. The physical surroundings are realistic and the actions of the people are thoroughly plausible. As in the other comics, evil is frustrated or eliminated and justice and virtue are always rewarded.

Wolf and Fiske also report certain changes in the interest in comics as the children grow older. They found that for their age group of 10 years and under, the fantastic and adventure comics interested seven out of ten and that one out of four was concerned with the funny-animal comics. None of the children in this age bracket showed any interest in comics falling in the third category. The age group 11 and 12 years had no interest in the funny-animal type, but six out of ten were concerned with the fantastic and adventure type and about 30 per cent said they liked the classic or educational comics. For those in the 13 to 17 year group, one-third reported interest in the fantastic and adventure comics and the balance said they were chiefly concerned with the classic and educational comics.

While the sample in this study was small, the results are suggestive.

[27] Katherine M. Wolf and Marjorie Fiske, "The Children Talk About Comics," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton, eds., *Communications Research, 1948–1949* (New York, Harper, 1949), pp. 3–50. Quotations by permission.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Certainly the interest in comics of educational sort provides a cue to possible use of such materials for school purposes.

The psychological functions associated with reading comics vary with the child. Certainly the appeal of fantasy, the provision of outlets for hostility, and the opportunity to overcome feelings of inferiority are evident. Wolf and Fiske classified their findings into three types of psychological themes: (1) There is the Alice-in-Wonderland motif in which the comics are filled with animals who represent human characters. There is doubtless a good deal of identification and projection in these and a definite enrichment of fantasy. (2) The superman theme provides a hero who is invincible, infallible, and highly moral. This theme probably furnishes two kinds of gratification. On the one hand, it may give the young child who feels inferior to older siblings and to parents a compensatory figure of strength and power. On the other hand, the superman pictures provide an escape; they take the child into another world of exciting adventure. And (3) there is the information function most clearly evident in the classic and educational comics. That those who do read such strips regard the informational feature as important is shown by the fact that they took a very superior attitude toward the younger children who continued to like other types of pictures.

In terms of degree of self-involvement, Wolf and Fiske put the readers of comics into three classes. The first consisted of the fans who were highly intrigued by the comics and spent a great deal of time in reading them. These made up 37 per cent of their sample. The second was a "moderate" group, 48 per cent of the sample, who regarded reading comics as a pastime but who were not emotionally possessed in doing so. The balance, 15 per cent, were indifferent or forthrightly hostile to comics. The bulk of the ardent fans were in the younger age groups.

The most important concern of the fans was to identify with an invincible hero. More than eight out of ten reported that this was the most important single appeal. In contrast, only about one-third of the moderates and 13 per cent of the fans found the true or educational comics their main interest.

It is interesting that 55 per cent of the Catholic children in the Wolf-Fiske sample were classified as fans. The authors believe this may be due to the fact that these children are familiar with stories and pictures of angels and patron saints of supernatural powers and that there is a certain carry-over here. In contrast only 19 per cent of the Jewish children in the sample were fans. Fanship is also related to physical incapacity. Children below normal weight as well as the physically weaker children were heavily represented in the fan group. The authors classified the children in terms of adequacy of adjustment as neurotic, problem children, psychotic, or normal. Of the neurotics, one-half were fans

and one-third moderate readers. Of those considered problem children, one-third were fans and one-half were among the moderates.

The fans, like those highly concerned with the motion picture, television, or radio, experienced emotional possession or complete absorption in reading comics. Such activity grows on them and becomes more and more a central interest. The reading of noncomic books suffers as a result.

While slightly less than half of the parents of the Wolf-Fiske sample objected to their children reading some, if not all, comics, many parents showed a curious ambivalence in the matter, since they were themselves readers of comics. Nine out of ten of the children, however, reported that they paid little or no heed to parental objections to comics. As to conflict between parents and children over this matter, the authors are convinced that there is little difficulty where the home atmosphere is friendly, secure, and permissive.

As to the children's own responses to the comics, except for the more ardent fans, there is a development from deep absorption to a more realistic understanding of their entertainment function. The mature and self-reliant children who are moderate readers understand the function of the comics for the younger children, but as one twelve-year-old girl remarked, "We grow out of the comic stage." [29] Often, too, these children have more insight into the realities of the situation than do their parents. As another twelve-year-old girl put it: "I don't think they are bad. They have a different reaction on different children. You have to know the emotional set-up of the child before you can tell." [30]

With respect to the parental reactions, the authors have this to say: "The ambivalence of the parents, who never praise comics and often consider them seriously dangerous, generates a double standard of comic-reading morality in the child, and this double standard becomes adult ambivalence as the child grows older. Yet . . . comics satisfy a real developmental need in normal children and are harmful only for children who are already maladjusted and susceptible to harm." [31]

A content analysis of comic strips, selected from Sunday newspapers, throws further light on the psychological appeals of this mass medium. Some of the results may be summarized by indicating three questions used as a basis for the examination of content: (1) "To what extent do comic strips depict 'reality'?" It was found that the comics "are 'skewed toward reality' in terms of situation." But with regard to the relationships of real and unreal features, there were two factors: situation and caricature. These were inversely related. That is, if the situation in the comics is depicted as real, the people tend to be unreal;

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

and conversely, if the situation is remote and unrealistic, the people tend to be real. (2) "To what extent are cultural patterns regarding ethnic groups depicted in comic strips?" Here they found that the comics tend to follow "the rank order of acceptance of ethnic groups" in American society as "found by Bogardus." (3) "What is the place and significance of animals in comic strips?" They found that animals appear in 50 per cent of the strips which they examined. Animals are especially important in humor; in fact some of the humor in the comics they define is to "place an anthropomorphized animal in an incongruous situation." [32]

Another aspect of this same investigation dealt with goals and means to goals as shown in comic-strip characters. The chief findings are as follows: (1) There are twice as many male as female characters in the comics and the men have the more important and active roles. (2) The strips reveal ambiguous attitudes regarding the status of women. (3) Altruistic, group-oriented social goals are much prized by both sexes, but self-oriented power goals are also shown, although morally disapproved. (4) A higher fraction of the women characters are in the upper-middle and upper-socioeconomic classes than are the men. (5) The men of the upper class reveal humanitarian goals and means of reaching them, whereas men in the middle class seek self and power goals by aggressive methods. Those in the lower class seek both altruistic and personal goals "depending on fate and charm as means." And (6) as for the women characters, those in the upper class are mostly concerned with being loved and lovable, those in the middle class with achieving a career by hard work, and those in the bottom class tend "to serve others and to accept their fate." [33]

Gerhart Saenger has made a content analysis of the male and female relations as depicted in a sample of American comic strips. His study brings out the personality traits of the chief characters, their goals in life, and especially pertinent is the reflection in the cartoons of the conflict between the real and ideal relationships in marriage.[34]

Social Effects of Comics

The vigorous discussion of the possible influence of the comics on children is paralleled only by the earlier controversy with regard to the motion picture and the radio to be noted in Chapters 16 and 17. First, there are those who realize that the comics provide children with a cer-

[32] Marvin Spiegelman, Carl Terwilliger, and Franklin Fearing, "The Content of Comic Strips: A Study of a Mass Medium of Communication," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1952, 35:37–57. Quotations from page 56. By permission.

[33] Marvin Spiegelman, Carl Terwilliger, and Franklin Fearing, "The Content of Comics: Goals and Means to Goals of Comic Strip Characters," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1953, 37:189–203. Quotations are from page 203.

[34] Gerhart Saenger, "Male and Female Relations in the American Comic Strip," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1955, 19:195–205.

tain amount of stimulation and gratification through showing danger, adventure, hostility, and the like. The material in this medium serves as an external stimulus to fantasy. It may not stimulate the child to construct his own personal and creative fantasies; they come to him ready-made.

Second, as to potential influence of the comics on conduct, there are some who contend that the showing of crime and violence stimulates the children to similar misconduct. But for those reformers who are seeking an easy answer, it is very simple to say that the comic strips or the motion pictures or television or the radio are the "cause" of delinquency. On the other hand, the more careful students of crime prevention and of child psychiatry and psychology do not support this view. Thus, one expert, Dr. Mandel Sherman of the University of Chicago, remarks on the basis of his wide experience, "In studying the causes of behavior problems of children for many years, I have never seen one instance of a child whose behavior disturbance originated in the reading of comic books, nor even a case of a delinquent whose behavior is exaggerated by such reading." [85]

The real factors bearing on delinquency are the social and emotional climate of the home, the degree of congeniality, the give and take, the interplay of love and affection with necessary discipline and, above all, the sense of emotional and physical security. We cannot escape the need for discipline and authority in the training of children. But what we want is some balance with affection. Neurotic parents themselves tend to be insecure and to project on their children their own troubles. When a child grows up we must provide some outlet for his hostility and a bridge from childish behavior to that of the mature adult. The problem child in the home is not the product of the comic strip or comic book, or the motion picture or television or any other type of mass media. He is the product of a wide variety of circumstances and conditions both internal and external. This is not to say that the mass media may not have some effect upon him in the long run, but it cannot be the basic "cause" in any case.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BLEYER, W. G., *Main Currents in the History of American Journalism* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1927). For the period it covers, still a very sound account.

Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947). A privately sponsored and privately financed group of American leaders views the problems of a free press, mass communication, and particularly the matter of monopoly of mass media.

[85] Quoted in Josette Frank, *Comics, Radio, Movies, and Children*, Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 148 (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 7.

EMERY, Edwin, and SMITH, Henry L., *The Press and America* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1954). An extensive and more complete account than Bleyer's. Is regarded as the best book in the field.

HUGHES, Helen M., *News and the Human Interest Story* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1940). A sociological description and interpretation of human-interest stories in the press (See, however, Mott's critique, page 58 of the next citation.).

MOTT, Frank L., *The News in America* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952). An excellent though brief account of the nature of various kinds of news and of the manner in which it is secured and processed. There is a suggestive discussion of controls of the newspaper and of the "responsibilities of the reader" in these matters.

Royal Commission on the Press, 1947–1949, *Report* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949). A full examination by a governmental agency of the political and business influences on the British press. Compare with the American report noted above.

SCHRAMM, Wilbur, ed., *Mass Communications* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1949). A book of readings containing excellent selections covering the wide range of mass media. With respect to the newspaper there are good articles by R. E. Park, R. B. Nixon, Schramm, Mott, and Lippmann, among others.

CHAPTER 16

Media of Mass Communication: Motion Pictures

THE place of the motion picture as a medium of mass communication has been widely discussed. Moreover, while its relative position may be sharply changed by the extension of television, it will doubtless long remain of considerable importance not only as a reflection of the attitudes, the values, and habits of the society in which it operates but also, in part, as a factor in making and altering that society's basic belief system.

This chapter will deal first with a brief history of the motion picture; second, with attendance; third, with various appraisals by sample audiences; fourth, with the content analysis of motion pictures; and, finally, with problems of control, especially as they relate to the impact of the motion pictures on children.

HISTORY OF THE MOTION PICTURE

Preliminary Phases

The practical beginnings of the motion picture were made from the whim of a wealthy man who later became known as the founder of the great university which bears his name. Governor Leland Stanford wished to know if a galloping horse at any one time had all four hoofs off the ground. This question had long been debated in racing circles. In 1872, with the aid of a series of camera shots made as a horse passed along the track, it was definitely shown that all four hoofs might be off the ground at one time. Placing these successive camera shots in a series, a record of the horse in rapid motion could be observed through the use of a device known as a zoopraxiscope. This was an early form of motion picture projector which had been used in studying the muscular movements of animals.

Once the camera had been invented, the basic need was to develop one which would take a series of pictures out of the same machine. An Englishman, William Friese-Greene, invented the first motion picture camera as well as one of the first projectors through which a series of pictures could be passed. These pictures were usually exposed on long strips of paper that had been soaked in castor oil to make them transparent. Later he put these pictures on strips of celluloid. He also punched holes on each side of the celluloid strip so that the passage of the strip could be controlled and steadied by a cogwheel as it went through the projector. In 1890, Friese-Greene moved to London where he projected the first motion picture photographed on a celluloid film. Moreover, Friese-Greene invented photographs in natural colors and made two films in color at this time. This was the beginning of what we now call "technicolor." In addition, as early as 1887 Friese-Greene had developed the idea of synchronizing the moving picture to sound through the use of the phonograph, which had been invented by Thomas E. Edison only a short time before.

Edison's role in the invention of the motion picture has been somewhat exaggerated. Although Friese-Greene tried to interest Edison in collaborating with him and sent him a few diagrams of his camera, little or nothing came of this attempted co-operation. However, in 1889 Edison used a photographic film which had been developed by George Eastman. He gave a demonstration in West Orange, New Jersey, on October 6, 1889, of what he called a kinetoscope. This machine was commercialized in 1894. However, only one person could see the film in motion at a time.

Coming of the Motion Picture

From this point on, there was a rapid development of the projectors and the screen. In 1896 the so-called Theatreagraph was set up in London. The showing was chiefly of natural scenes—of mountains and sea. In 1897, the Corbett-Fitzsimmons prize fight held at Carson City, Nevada, was shown in the United States. During the same year a version of the Oberammergau Passion Play was made by Richard Harlamen.

Another landmark in the development of motion pictures was the showing in 1903 of the first full-length story film, "The Great Train Robbery." The film for this, however, was only eight hundred feet long. It is interesting in this connection that for years a film of eight hundred to a thousand feet was considered sufficiently long for a given story. Today a full-length picture requires several thousands of feet of film.

In 1907 David Wark Griffith began experimenting with a variety of new techniques in photography. These included the fade-out, the close-up, the cutbacks, and the dissolve. In 1907 "Ben Hur" was produced in 16 scenes. This was regarded as a tremendous picture at that time. By

1910 multiple-reel shows had become a fixed part of the process, and by 1912 showings of the great feature pictures were well under way. Adolph Zukor had produced "Quo Vadis" and Griffith the famous "Birth of a Nation."

World War I seriously interrupted the development and expansion of the motion picture industry not only in Britain but on the continent of Europe. It was during these years, however, that Hollywood became the movie capital of the world, and it has remained so ever since. As of 1953, Los Angeles produced about 70 per cent of the world's films.

You will recall that Friese-Greene conceived the idea of combining sound and visual projection. In 1923 another important inventor in the field of the motion picture and radio, Lee DeForest, gave the first demonstration of sound on film. In 1927 came Al Jolson's "The Jazz Singer" which was, in part, a talking picture. In 1928 appeared the first all-talkie, "The Lights of New York." About the same time, additional advances had been made in the color film but they had not been commercialized.

The motion picture as an item of modern culture has spread rapidly over the entire globe. At the mid-century there were said to be over 96,000 motion picture theatres in the world with a seating capacity of about 44 million. Of the total number of theatres, 58 per cent were found in Europe and the seating capacity was 44 per cent of the total. For the United States, the proportion of theatres was 20 per cent of the world total. It is estimated that more than one-fifth of the recreation dollar of Americans is spent annually on the movies. Of course, the whole future of the movie is bound up with the further development of radio and television.

World War II had some effect on certain developments in the motion picture in this country and elsewhere. At about the time of the outbreak, technicolor was ready to be put into regular commercial use, but this could not take place until after the war was over. The same thing can be said of the depth, or 3-D, pictures. There is a good deal of current experimental work going on, and only the future can tell just how these particular developments will be accepted generally. There is no doubt that 3-D produces certain different effects upon the audience, but exactly what they are, we do not know.

MOVIE ATTENDANCE

We have no completely satisfactory census of daily or weekly movie attendance. Gross figures are usually based on admission totals, but this means that people who go more than once during the period under consideration are counted more than once. The published figures vary considerably. For example, in 1945 Standard and Poor put the average

weekly attendance in this country at 100 million. This is probably an excessive figure. A more reasonable estimate has been obtained by the polling technique. Audience Research Incorporated, a Gallup organization, reported that in 1945 the average weekly attendance at motion picture theatres in the United States was 70 million. A year following it was up nearly five million, but since the peak of 1946 it has been slipping steadily. Their estimate for 1950 was 53.5 million in attendance. Certainly the spread of radio and television has had considerable influence on movie attendance. With regard to the three most recently developed mass media, it clearly requires more physical effort and voluntary decision to attend a movie than to turn on the radio or TV. For example, in a 1948 poll the question was asked, "How did you spend last evening?" Of the sample, slightly more than one in five said they were listening to the radio; slightly less than one in five said they were entertaining or being entertained; one in six said that they spent the evening in reading; and only one in fourteen was at the movies. Once more the whole question of the availability and effectiveness of mass media come into play.

Students of mass media, however, are interested in more detailed breakdowns of the facts. They are concerned with such things as frequency of attendance, age factors, sex differences, possible influence of education, and social-economic status. Let us examine these briefly.

Some Characteristics of Movie-goers

There is no basic agreement as to who is a movie-goer. The Motion Picture Research Bureau defines a movie-goer as a person who averages attendance at least once a month. On this basis they estimate that there are about seven out of ten potential patrons in this country, or about 70 million total.

The Audience Research Corporation defines the movie-goer as a person who attends a movie on the average once every three weeks. This organization made an estimate a few years ago that about 56 million persons over 12 years of age attend at least once in this period.

More specific studies throw light on this topic. For example, a study of a sample of 710 women in Central City, Illinois, a community of 60,000 people, showed that 37 per cent were going to the movies once or more often a week; 27 per cent said they went one to three times a month; a quarter of them said that they went but a few times a year or hardly ever. And the balance, 11 per cent, said that they never attended movies.

With regard to the age factor, all surveys have shown that young people go to the movies more often than older folks. It is a matter partly of effort to get out and the competition of other mass media. As P. F. Lazarsfeld well says, ". . . Radio programs and reading material offer a greater variety of choice, and each age group can select from these media items that interest them. The supply of movies, however, is much

smaller and the variety more limited, and they are closer to the taste of younger people." [1]

There has been a long-standing impression that women were more frequent movie-goers than men and boys. But surveys made in the late 1940's and in the 1950's show that approximately equal numbers of males and females attend the movies. However, some studies have shown that women are more versed than men on the topics relating to movies. A review of five surveys, involving over 10,000 persons in the sample and covering 45 pictures, revealed that women outdid the men with regard to knowledge of the cast, the nature of the story, where the movie opened, and like topics. Perhaps men find the movie largely a temporary relaxation and entertainment but do not regard it as of any importance otherwise.

The studies on the relationship of schooling to movie attendance are not completely consistent. Lazarsfeld's study in Central City showed that only in the age category of 45 years and over were there sharp differences with regard to educational status. Those in this age group of low educational level attended the movies far less than did the better educated persons. Recall that this sample consisted of 710 women. One study in Iowa showed that those of grade-school education went to the movies less often than those of high-school education and that those who had attended college went most frequently. It must be borne in mind that in this country those individuals who never went beyond the grade schools for the most part represent individuals in the upper age brackets.

Although 10 per cent of the tickets bought for the movies are said to be purchased by children between the ages of six and 12, we know very little about the composition of child audiences. It is generally known that the most frequent attendance of children is on Saturdays and Sundays. But of more importance for us is the problem of the psychological impact of the motion picture upon children. We shall discuss this topic below.

APPRAISAL, CRITICISM, AND PREFERENCES OF AUDIENCES

Almost from the inception of the commercialized story film, producers have been anxious to find out about the audience's reactions to the product. The most obvious measure of success or failure of the film is an analysis of the box office receipts. But box office returns—which in the best days of Hollywood were often rather fabulous—result from a variety of factors, such as the intrinsic quality of the picture, the popularity of the stars, the effectiveness of the advertising and publicity, the

[1] P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Audience Research in the Movie Field," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1947, 254:163. This entire issue of the *Annals* deals with motion pictures.

appeal of the title, seasonal competition with other films, general public response to films, and the competition of other media of mass entertainment.

Methods of Predicting Success

One of the earlier means of predicting the degree of success—now pretty much abandoned—was the sneak preview. Producers would place a motion picture for a tryout before an assumed typical audience in or near Hollywood. They had no way of knowing whether the audiences of these sneak previews were really a cross section of the general public. There is considerable evidence that they were not. Another device used in an earlier day was the analysis of the fan mail. But the people who write to movie stars by no means represent a cross section of movie-goers. Also the opinions of the exhibitors were frequently regarded as a gauge of acceptability. Still other devices were surveys of the "what to see" type of question in which the respondents were asked what kind of pictures they would like to see.

Far more important than most of these methods are the analytical previews which were developed from the old sneak preview. The analytical preview is essentially a well-planned test after production. After the picture is shown to a relatively good cross-section sample, there follow personal interviews. The interviewers are usually stationed in the lobby of the theatre in order to ask people about the picture and its chief characters as soon as a showing is over. The interviewers usually work in teams of two, since the majority of movie-goers go in pairs. This team of two interviewers makes for an efficient collection of information.

There are some disadvantages to these interviews taken immediately after seeing a picture. Individuals frequently have a favorable response at first but on further thought may modify their judgment. To meet this difficulty mail questionnaires have been used. But the problem of the mail questionnaires is a question essentially of the nonreturnees. It is hard to estimate the opinions of those who do not send back the questionnaires. Moreover, it has been found that the better educated people tend to answer the mail schedule. It is also quite likely that people with more favorable opinions would answer the questions.

One interesting result of these various surveys is in the reasons people give for going to movies in the first place. Word-of-mouth advertising is without doubt the most potent influence in movie attendance. A survey made by the Motion Picture Research Bureau in 1943 indicated that among all the other sources of information about a picture, personal recommendation was the most influential. For example, of those interviewed, 28 per cent of the men and 36 per cent of the women said they learned of movies by conversation with others. The preview trailer accounted for 16 per cent of the stimulation to men and 13 per cent for the

women, while reviews in newspapers accounted for 16 per cent of the men and 12 per cent of the women. All the other percentages were small and derived from newspaper advertisements, signs on the theatre, and radio advertising.

In connection with word-of-mouth advertising, it is interesting to discover the expectancy level of entertainment which the movie-goers have with respect to a given picture. If, for example, the expectancy level is high and later they consider the picture only average, the actual enjoyment is likely to be low and the resulting word-of-mouth publicity to be negative. If, on the other hand, the expectancy level of enjoyment is low but the appeal of the picture is average, the actual enjoyment will tend to be high. As a result, conversational publicity will be positive. High-powered selling campaigns often boomerang if the product does not warrant the expectation. This results from the discrepancy between the anticipated and the actual audience appeal. Moreover, if people suspect a film of being propaganda, they are likely to be more resistant to its influence.

Opinion Leaders

Some of the characteristics of these opinion leaders are of interest. In the first place, opinion leaders are those who go to the movies most frequently. They are also those who are otherwise specially concerned with movies. For example, they read many more movie periodicals than other groups in the population. Moreover, they do more radio listening and read more magazines and their communication habits are of a higher order than is true of people otherwise in the same income, age, and education categories who are not movie leaders. It seems, in fact, that these opinion leaders are individuals with a special inclination toward social activity. They telephone and visit a great deal more than others. These people are important in mediating between the movies and the public in general, and they are likely also to be more than usually impressed by the movies. They admitted getting ideas about clothes and other matters from the movies more than did the usual movie-goer. This may imply that those who influence others are also people who are greatly influenced by the promotional activities of the motion picture industry.

Other Methods

In addition to the analytical preview, there has been developed a second method of discovering how the public will react to given pictures. This is a device known as a program analyzer or profile machine. It is based upon an original program analyzer which was developed and designed for use in radio research by P. F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton. The Lazarsfeld-Stanton program analyzer enables an individual to check

his reactions to a film in terms of like, dislike, and indifference. He holds a green button in one hand and a red button in the other. If he likes a certain part of a motion picture, he presses the green button and keeps it pressed down for as long as his approval continues. If he dislikes what he sees and hears he uses the red button in a similar way. If he feels indifferent he does not press either button. These buttons are connected directly with a battery of pens which keep a continuous record on a revolving drum. From these records, individual profiles of likes and dislikes can be constructed. This provides an easy way to determine the high and low points of audience reaction to given parts of the film.

A modification of the Lazarsfeld-Stanton analyzer is called a reactograph. This device provides not only for individual analysis but for a cumulative result from a number of people who have seen a given film.

A number of criticisms have been made of these mechanical devices. One is that very frequently individuals may forget to activate the apparatus when they are viewing a highly interesting picture. As a matter of fact, many people do not recall having pressed the buttons. Then there is the problem of interpreting negative reactions. The action of the villains and the development of the evil aspects of the plot may be registered as dislike, yet this may not mean that the total picture is not appreciated as a piece of entertainment. On the whole, the reliability as measured by different samples of people has been fairly well developed, but the validity is more difficult to determine. One way has been to compare the reactions from the analyzers with those obtained by questionnaires.

The appraisal of the motion picture, as of other mass media, has been obtained by asking this question in polling surveys: "Do you ever feel like criticizing (*a*) when you read your newspaper? (*b*) when you see a movie? (*c*) when you listen to the radio?" The proportion who said they sometimes felt like criticizing were as follows:

Radio	67 per cent
Newspaper	68 per cent
Motion pictures	66 per cent

The total sample in this survey was 3,225 adults. With regard to these findings P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall remark: "No matter which medium they asked about, approximately two-thirds of the respondents say they experience occasional dissatisfaction. This suggests once more the existence of an underlying critical tendency, for it does not seem likely that, without it, we would find such constancy." [2] In other words, there may well be a general critical attitude toward these mass media.

One study made by the Motion Picture Research Bureau developed

[2] P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1948), pp. 49, 50.

a classification of story types. Their survey replies covered 45 towns and a sample of 2,000 respondents. The aim was to determine the likes and dislikes with regard to particular story types, including the most popular and least popular of the predominant themes in motion pictures. It is interesting to note that the most popular movies for women were love stories, musical comedies, and serious drama. The most disliked by women were Western pictures, mystery and horror pictures, gangster and G-men pictures, slapstick comedies, and war pictures. For men, the most popular were musical comedies, war pictures, and adventure-action films. The chief dislikes of the men were for slapstick comedy, historical plays and biographies, mystery-horror pictures, and gangster and G-men stories.[3]

In general, except for the slapstick variety, comedy seems to be well in the lead in popularity. Romantic themes are particularly well liked by women but not by men. War pictures—long a disputed category—register high with men but low with women. There are some age and income correlates with liking or disliking. People at all income levels seem to like musical comedies. On the contrary, serious drama is a good deal more in demand by those of high economic status than by people in the lower economic strata. Also there is more demand for serious drama among older people than among younger. On the other hand, there is little or no difference in the acceptance of the fantasy pictures.

What Audiences See and Hear

The present-day talking picture uses both visual and auditory stimulation. With the addition of third dimension, the visual becomes increasingly important. Other factors, of course, influence the audience reaction: the nature of the story and the basic social-emotional appeals.

As a form of mass communication the motion picture has gone through an interesting evolution. The silent film made it necessary to develop techniques which would convey ideas, feelings, and emotions largely in visual form, supported by occasional short statements in print. The fundamental device was the pantomime in which the dramatic story was carried by movement, not by language. Facial and bodily gestures became the chief means of conveying the more subtle meanings. Also the rapid change of scenes and the control of the passing of time and place could easily be indicated.

The introduction of sound into the motion picture altered many aspects of the production. Adding the auditory stimuli altered the previous need for exaggeration of expression and mannerism. Attention could now be focused on the human voice, especially on the dramatic intercourse, supplemented, of course, by pictorial and other devices. The

[3] Leo A. Handel, *Hollywood Looks at Its Audience: A Report of Film Audience Research* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1950), p. 121.

modern film still permits rapid changes of time and place and the introduction of hundreds of details not possible in a stage play.

THE CONTENT OF MOTION PICTURES

The reaction of the audience will be qualified by the content of the motion picture which they see. This involves the range of topics which are covered, the plot, and the characters.

Sources and Changes

There are three chief sources of the screen stories: original plays produced for the screen, novels reworked for the movie, and stage plays made over for the same purpose. In the recent decades, at least, the majority of feature-length films consist of original screen compositions. A tabulation of feature-length pictures for the years 1935 to 1948 indicate some definite trends. The percentage of original screen stories rose from approximately one-half of the total in 1935 to three-quarters of the total in 1943 but dropped again by 1948 to 56 per cent. The use of novels has fluctuated considerably over the years. They range between 27 per cent in 1935 to a low of 10 per cent in 1943. For this same period, the range for stage plays has been from 5 to 10 per cent.[4]

The selection of novels for remaking into motion pictures is an interesting illustration of the shift in the production of certain kinds of mass appeals. Sometimes a producer is interested in a story as it is, sometimes in only certain parts of it. In still others, they only want to take advantage of an attractive and well-publicized title or of the prestige of the author.

Lester Asheim made a content analysis of 24 classic and standard novels and the corresponding 24 films based upon them. He wanted to determine exactly what happens when a book is adapted to the screen. First, he estimated the percentage of total deviation from the original novel which occurred with the adaptation. This ranged from 62 per cent in *The House of the Seven Gables* to 11 per cent in *Pride and Prejudice.*

A second matter investigated had to do with whether the film tends to shift the unhappy endings found in many books to happy endings. It was not at all easy to make such judgments, but Asheim found that 18 of the film versions retained the same kind of ending as the books upon which they are based: 11 of these were happy, five, unhappy, and two, a combination of unhappy and happy. In other words, the popular belief that the motion picture producers insist on a happy ending in all films is not substantiated by this particular study. It is true, however, that the happy ending is more typical of motion pictures than of fiction in general.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

However, Asheim makes one qualification, that the unhappy ending may be retained in the motion picture so long as it does not call into question the basic values of the audience. "Although more than half of the 'unhappy' endings are retained in the sample films, none of them keep the note of indecision, frustration, hopelessness, or despair which marks seven of the novels. In every instance, action is rearranged or rewritten to provide hope and consolation, a sense of pattern and meaning, and a note of affirmation." [5]

Other findings are of interest. There is considerable condensation of the original material. Certainly the romantic love story tends to be more heavily stressed in the screen play than in the novel. Some other facts regarding this particular sample are as follows: (1) Although the emphasis must be upon action in the motion picture, the full effect of description is not lost in the transition from page to film. (2) The normal chronological sequence is followed more closely in the screen play than in the novel. (3) While action has to be increased in the film, the proportion of brutality, violence, and sadism tends to be reduced in comparison to their occurrence in the novels. And (4) almost always the title of the original novel is retained by the film version, no matter how extensive the changes in content.

On the whole, American motion pictures tend to stress wealth and high, even extravagant, standards of living. In 1930 Edgar Dale made a content analysis of 115 films. In these one-quarter of the heroes, more than one-third of the heroines, and nearly one-half of the villains were classified as "wealthy." [6]

For the film season of 1941–42, Dorothy B. Jones analyzed 100 grade A and grade B films. There were 188 major characters consisting of 126 men and 62 women. Three out of five of these persons were what she terms "independent adults," that is, "economically established, free of parental influence, usually married, and with definitely limited social and economic responsibilities." Of this particular sample, nearly one-half were either wealthy or well-to-do; 17 per cent were either poor or destitute. About 80 per cent of these characters were middle class, and only 8 per cent were classified as "bluebloods" or in top-bracket social status. Eleven per cent were distinctly *déclassé*. Four out of five were American and seven out of ten were single. With regard to needs and motivations, this author reports that 68 per cent wanted love, 26 per cent wanted fame, reputation, and prestige, 16 per cent wanted safety—that is, health and economic security—14 per cent wanted what they labeled a "way of life." Moreover, 10 per cent wished for money and

[5] Lester Asheim, "From Book to Film," in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, enlarged ed. (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), pp. 299–306. Quotation is from p. 304.

[6] Edgar Dale, *The Content of Motion Pictures* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 47.

material goods and 9 per cent desired to do their duty. These percentages are overlapping, that is, some characters had more than one dominant want. It is interesting to note that 60 per cent of the major characters had their basic wishes satisfied at the close of the picture. Ten per cent were denied such fulfillment and 14 per cent had some wishes gratified and others denied. The outcome for the other characters is not clear from this report.[7] For the most part, the entertainment films have continued to stress expensive living—surely a phase of our continued belief in economic improvement and high levels of consumption.

The news broadcast and news commentary have come to be a regular and fundamental part of the motion picture. However, with the increased impact of radio and especially television in this field, it remains to be seen whether the earlier importance of movie news films will continue. On the other hand, the documentary film has had little place in American movie history. It is true that both federal and local governmental agencies have produced some documentaries, as have some private agencies, but the place of the motion picture in our total educational operation has been slight indeed. The implications of the film for education have been well stated by Floyde E. Brooker: [8]

> The motion picture, in conjunction with all other so-called visual aids, offers the possibility of bringing more information to greater numbers of people more quickly and effectively. The motion picture can free the classroom from the experiences of here and now and can make all the past and all the present and all the phenomena that lie beyond the ken of the senses contribute to the learning of the students. The motion picture can say things that could not be said before; it can say them to people of all nations more easily than can any other media of communication; and it can say them in a way that can be understood.
>
> In terms of the problems of contemporary education in a democracy, these contributions are the significance that make the motion picture potentially the most important tool introduced to education.

Some Psychological Components

One of the most thorough-going studies of the content of motion pictures is that by Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites. They examined all the great American films produced from September 1, 1945, to September 1, 1946. Later they examined all the grade A melodramas produced between September 1, 1946, and January 1, 1948. Furthermore, they made some comparisons of selected British and French motion

[7] Dorothy B. Jones, "Quantitative Analysis of Motion Picture Content," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1942, 6:411–428.

[8] Floyde E. Brooker, "Motion Pictures as an Aid to Education," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1947, 254:108–109. By permission.

pictures. They were "concerned with the ways in which movie plots express psychological dispositions of the culture in which they are produced and consumed." [9]

The two central themes in the American motion picture are romantic love and a display of violence and conflict. Let us look first at the treatment of love. In retrospect, one of the most interesting matters is the disappearance of the vamp and seductress and her replacement by the good-bad girl combination. It is the mixture of sacred and profane love. On the one hand, there is emphasis on what Wolfenstein and Leites call "goodness morality" and, on the other hand, the appeal of sex and wickedness and the consequent function of guilt and conscience as punishing mechanisms. Then, too, there is what Wolfenstein and Leites call "fun morality"—that is, people have to have fun, though they should not extend this to undesirable ends which would undermine the basic monogamic, romantic love of two persons. Then, too, love never runs down but lasts forever. Moreover, love is a youthful experience. As they say, "In United States, there are no middle-aged people, and, if there were, they would have no emotional lives. There is only young love. . . ." [10]

The basic problem is how to combine the good and bad in the same person. Historically, there has been a sharp distinction between profane and sacred love. The institution of prostitution provided an outlet for the former, whereas the latter was reserved for the wife and mother.

The current American screen reveals the good girl who just seems to be bad. The hero may suspect that she is promiscuous, as in the film "Gilda," but, in the end, discovers that she is not and that she loves only him.

This good-bad girl pattern seems peculiarly American. The British films do not follow this mode. Rather, as in "Madonna of the Seven Moons," the British heroine has a dual personality. At one time she is prim and proper; at other times, she is not. In this story the conflict of roles is only resolved by her death. In the French films we find the traditional good woman pitted against the bad woman. The hero is often more attracted at first to the bad woman. Sometimes the bad woman is, in the end, converted to becoming a good woman when the "right man" comes along. The function of the good-bad image is put by Wolfenstein and Leites in these words: [11]

[9] Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites, "An Analysis of Themes and Plots," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1947, 254:41–48. See also their *Movies: A Psychological Study* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1950).

[10] Wolfenstein and Leites, *Movies: A Psychological Study*, p. 58. All quotations by permission.

[11] Wolfenstein and Leites, "An Analysis of Themes and Plots," *op. cit.*, p. 48. By permission.

The movie image of the good-bad girl expresses the feeling that sexual needs can be satisfied by a good girl, that they no longer require involvement with a dangerous bad woman. However, the split in the good-bad girl image suggests that the sexual component is not entirely assimilated. In order to be sexually stimulating, the good girl must retain a semblance of badness, particularly in the form of seeming to be involved with other men. A lingering association of sex and wickedness remains.

Upward social mobility was only moderately reflected in the films studied by Wolfenstein and Leites. Only one-fourth of their sample dealt with social mobility and in no case was it the main theme. On the other hand, the role of woman as manager and director of men is rather common. This whole pattern of female management not only relates to professional careers but even to areas of social and emotional maturation. Often the wife helps the husband to grow up. The authors believe this probably derives from the role which the mother plays in directing the child's life. In the American home—at least those of middle-class status —it is the mother who "sets up the demands for the child's accomplishments, and appears as the model of competence." [12]

With regard to fun morality a somewhat new type of woman has appeared, the masculine-feminine girl who tends to take the initiative almost from the first contact of the hero and heroine. The life of the masculine-feminine girl is not entirely bound up in love. She is casual, deliberate, and knowing. She is apparently not likely to be overwhelmed by unexpected scenes or to have her whole life changed by the appearance of man. In a way, this represents a semblance to the man who is no longer required to fulfill all romantic daydreams. It symbolizes, sexually at least, the neuter intermediate sex, in which there is some play of the homosexual pattern in regard to the man. In a word, the masculine-feminine woman is only part woman, she is also a buddy, pal, or friend. She reduces the threat which the outright feminine woman would make. The relationships of the good-bad girl and the feminine-masculine girl are noted by Wolfenstein and Leites as follows: [13]

While they are frequently combined in a single prize package, [they] satisfy to some extent different needs. The good-bad girl fulfills the wish of enjoying what is forbidden and at the same time meeting the demands of what we may call (with only apparent redundance) goodness morality. The good-bad girl is what the man thinks he wants when he is told by society and his conscience that he must be good. The girl with the masculine approach satisfies a different need. She is related to what we may call (with only apparent contradiction) fun morality. You ought to have fun. If you are not having fun, something is the matter with you. Fun morality, widely current in America today, makes one feel guilty for not having fun. It imposes a new burden, expressed in the stock complaint attributed to the progressive-school child: Do we have to do whatever we like again today? The difficulty of

[12] Wolfenstein and Leites, *Movies: A Psychological Study*, p. 68.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 81–82, 84.

meeting the demands of fun morality may be due to the persistent operation of goodness morality on deeper levels. Fun morality threatens to reveal that we have less strength of impulse than we feel we have when confronted with goodness morality on the conscious level. The masculine-feminine girl helps to solve this problem. With an air of authority she indicates how much intensity is required. Casual and deliberate, she teases the man but does not condemn him when he is not carried away by a kiss. . . . The masculine-feminine girl not only reduces the demand for overwhelming feeling, but in a humorous, reasonable way permits recesses from sex. She is a pal with whom it is possible to have fun apart from sex, maintaining an awareness that she is a woman, but making few special demands on that score. . . . The masculine-feminine girl has the vamp's readiness for love-making without the emotional hazards. Besides reassuring the man about the adequacy of his impulses by not raising too high a demand, she helps him to release feelings which too much femininity tended to inhibit. Her active initiative helps him along, and incidentally relieves him of the apprehension that his advances may be unwelcome. . . .

A type contrasting with the masculine-feminine girl is the bitch, the most dangerous woman to appear since the decline of the vamp. As presented in "Scarlet Street," she is solely preoccupied with sex. Lounging on an untidy couch, she asks drawlingly, "What else is there?" when her pimp and lover, concerned with business, demands impatiently whether she cannot think of anything else. She is ready to heap contempt on any man who, like the hero, seems inadequate to her demands.

One interesting thing about American films is the casualness of the early contacts. For the pictures which they studied, Wolfenstein and Leites report that unconventional meetings are preferred to formal introductions in the ratio of about three to one. One-third of the self-introductions are what we call "pick-ups." So, too, professional contacts are largely the basis for self-introduction.

Related perhaps to the masculine-feminine girl is the casual and cavalier manner in which the whole matter of sexuality is handled in many American films. For example, in "The Road to Morocco" Bob Hope reclines in a vast harem, surrounded by beautiful women and passes the time by sucking a lollipop. He does not seem to be taking advantage of his opportunities. However, underneath the comic façade there is emancipation from a demand for impulse achievement. The comic hero here shows a certain wisdom. As a matter of fact, American film comedies frequently present unusual sexual opportunities as occasions for amusement. This is true in "The Sailor Takes a Wife"; it was certainly evident in "It Happened One Night" and in "The Lady on a Train."

In the French films, however, such missed opportunities are regarded as occasions for persistent regret. It is assumed that the whole occasion is not recapturable. There is a fatal discrepancy in the timing of desire and opportunity. In a great many French films the plot revolves around the inability to consummate such desires. Fate behaves in a negative and mocking way. In the American films, in contrast, these missed oppor-

tunities rarely constitute a permanent loss. First of all, there are plenty of other chances, and frequently, as in many of the comedies, the couple is married and the sexual consummation is completely legal and proper. The British, like the French, tend to present lost opportunities as irretrievable. This is beautifully illustrated in "Brief Encounter," a film of considerable merit.

With few exceptions, our films do not show men and women becoming emotionally disturbed by inner conflict. The source of dangers is usually in the external environment. "The threat of falling hopelessly in love with someone bad or exploitative or unloving, and so having one's life destroyed, seems unreal. . . . In American films, men and women may, and often do shoot each other. They do not break each other's hearts." [14]

One may ask what place does family life have in American motion pictures? Curiously enough the family of origin has little or no place. Even a casual acquaintance with our films will indicate that most heroes and heroines seem to be completely homeless individuals. On the other hand, many pictures give family life a prominent place. We may summarize the analysis of Wolfenstein and Leites on this topic as follows:

In the total balance of love and disappointment the hero, on the whole, tends to be more loved than loving in relation to mother, daughter, or mother substitute. In the case of the heroine and mother there is a good deal of hostility between the daughter and the mother. This is more clearly set forth in the current generation than in the previous one. Aside from the projection of the wishes of the mother upon the son, the mother-son relationships are fairly satisfactory.

Sibling relations in the American films reflect various aspects of our everyday life. The rivalry of brothers for wealth and status is a common theme. But often success is shown to be more a matter of "getting the breaks" than through hard work and merit. In fact, there is often more intense emotional conflict between brothers than is shown in father-son competition.

The sister-sister relationships are shown to be even more overtly hostile. They are often rivals in love, and the defeated sister may resort to extreme measures of revenge. In some films, the hostile, wicked sister is checked by external means which permit the good sister to secure the man with a clear conscience. In many French films the sister-sister relations involve very deep affection, and rivalrous situations give rise to a great burden of sisterly love mixed with hostility. In the British pictures, expression of overt violence of one sister toward another is accompanied by strong guilt feelings.

In the American movies, father-son relations tend to show the son as winning out over the father. The French son's happiness depends on

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

the permissiveness of his father. And the English son, in the Hamlet tradition, may deny himself happiness as an act of posthumous obedience to a beloved and noble father. We have an interesting combination of the father as an ego-ideal with a deep sense of guilt toward him.

In films dealing with love triangles the woman is almost always young and beautiful. Americans find it difficult to associate sexual desire with a mature, maternal figure. The more recent effort to glamorize the mother is not to infuse sexual attractiveness so much as to maintain the illusion of perpetual youth.

> Just as the manifest image of the harmless father fails to eliminate the latent fantasy of the father as dangerous, so the manifest anti-sexual mother image does not obliterate the fantasy of the sexually seductive mother. What is striking in the hidden fantasy images of both parents is the attribution of the child's forbidden strivings for them. It is . . . not the son who attacks the father figure, but the reverse. Similarly, it is the mother figure who makes advances to the hero, not he to her. This is in keeping with the pervasive trend in American movies to deny dangerous impulses on the part of the hero and attribute them to the world around him. He is thus freed from responsibility and, carried along by outside forces, may achieve the fulfillment of his wishes without guilt.[15]

This tendency to consider the major dangers as having their source in the external environment rather than deriving from within oneself is even more clearly set forth when we examine the place of physical violence on the American screen. The threat is not from one's uncontrolled impulses but from the outside. The hero is seldom the murderer. He may wish to kill or he may even be accused of murder. But, as a rule, the real murderer is discovered, he is free, and the police action represents a projection of his own conscience.

In contrast, British films are more concerned with a person's destructive impulses which may get out of control. Often a certain friendly feeling may have existed between the hero and his victim before some break in their relations. French films deal less with either of these matters. Often their central theme in violent pictures is the irony of human justice, or they show the participants as the victims of fate or of forces over which no one has control. Frequently the police are shown as fumbling and incompetent. There is no counterpart to the British Scotland Yard man or the effective American private investigator who clears up the confusion and in the end sees that the villain is punished.

Finally, we find in the American film an interesting illustration of the denial of death. Despite all the killings that occur in the American films, there is little acknowledgment of death. The very title of the film "The Big Sleep" is in itself a joking denial of death. Rarely is a funeral shown in American movies. In the gangster funeral of the Little-Caesar period this was a projection of false sentiment rather than an attempt to show

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

the funeral as an institution. On the other hand, in the French films a funeral is a funeral. Even when it is joked about its significance is confirmed and not denied. There is a real place for bereavement in the French films which is not found in either the American or British counterparts. Also, the French films seem to convey the awareness of the imminence of death, whereas the tendency of the American films is to deny death. This latter tendency, of course, is an example of our pervasive denial of unpleasant experiences. We want to live in a dream world and we do not want to be bothered either by feelings of guilt or the expectation of death. As a rule, American films convey the idea that death cannot frustrate human wishes.

In brief summary, we may note the chief contrasts in the three sets of films which have been discussed:

With respect to the American motion pictures, there is a strong motive to win in all competition and conflict. But most of the hazards are external and are not due to inner struggles or frustrations. The basic features of the fantasy which gives the hero final victory are projection and denial. So, too, though the external world may be dangerous, one is able to manage and control it. In the plots, so often, something is undone rather than done. Earlier false appearances are negated. The hero and heroine do not become involved in some irretrievable act, whose consequences they must later face. Nor do they ordinarily undergo transformation of character, either through ennoblement or degradation, or through overcoming seemingly hopeless conditions, or by the appearance of a new role, or by the lessening of the regrets of old age. They succeed in proving what they were all the time. They simply emerge from the shadow of false appearance. What has changed is other people's impressions of them. In the end they establish themselves in a certain desirable identity. If, and insofar as, they may struggle against a projective conscience that persecutes the wish as if it were overt action, they win a victory for a more tolerant and discriminating morality.

In contrast, the essential feature of the British plot is the conflict of hidden and forbidden impulses with conscience. Either one of the contending forces may win out in the end. The world is presided over by authorities who are good and wise and against whom a willful and unlucky person may contend. In other words, the British films provoke a feeling that the danger is in ourselves, particularly in our destructive impulses. Moreover, the character who embodies the dangerous impulses may well be a superior person, one who should be able to control his own destructiveness.

Self-accusation is a dominant feature in the British movies and may be set up by a person's wishes as well as by overt acts. Characters feel guilty when circumstances beyond their control induce fatalities coincident with their unconscious wishes.

In the French films, the human problems are posed by the nature of life itself. The chief difficulty is not one of inner or outer conflicts which one may win or lose, meet with virtue or be penalized for meeting otherwise; it is rather the conflict in which we all lose in the end, and the problem of the individual is to learn to accept it. There is an inevitable set of disappointments in love. The world is not arranged to suit our own wishes. People do grow older, lovers become fathers, old give way to the young, and eventually we all die. The desire for justice must be seen against the likelihood that we will be frustrated.

In keeping with this tendency, French films often show their central character to be an aging man. He is not the bright, triumphant hero whom we wish to become, nor the criminal hero whom we fear to become. It is simply a man who is steadily growing older. Here we see concentrated disappointment, lost hopes, decline of physical prowess, and ultimately death. Could this possibly be said to reflect, unconsciously and through their art, the sense of being a defeated and dying people and culture? It is difficult to say, but at least it is a suggestion.

PROBLEMS OF CONTROL

In the previous chapter we traced briefly the history of the struggle for a free press and noted the operation of certain forms of control. At this point we shall discuss social control as it bears on the motion picture. In the next chapter we shall say something about controls with regard to radio and television. It is well to bear in mind the broader as well as more narrow conception of control. In the broad sense, any stimulus exercises a control over the response. So, too, at the group level, a given social class or a leader may control the ideas, attitudes, and acts of others. Some reference to this type of control was made in Chapter 14. In the present section, however, we shall deal with the more limited forms of control and with general informal types as well as with legal and more formal applications.

Theory of Control

As with the press, so with the newer mass media we must ask, what are the presumptions behind control? Broadly conceived, they concern two matters: morals, especially those relating to sex; and politics, especially subversion. The concern for these lies deep in our mores and law; they represent values basic to the survival of our way of life. So, too, it is assumed that legal agencies are charged with obligations to punish infractions of the code or to prevent infractions in some situations. In addition, under our democratic system, nonstate organizations such as church or reform groups may likewise, on occasion, act to punish or prevent. For example, not long after the movies began, various reform

organizations and others agitated and lobbied at both state and federal levels for the establishment of official boards of censorship. Nothing ever came of this at the national level, but some states and some cities set up such agencies. The story of these efforts at control has been told and retold.[16] The chief result of such pressure was the establishment of self-censorship by the movie industry itself. This action served to alleviate, if not entirely remove, the earlier pressure for federal regulation.

On the other hand, people concerned with the possible deleterious impact of movies, radio, and television on children have been most active in campaigns to restrain or otherwise control the output of these media.

Against the background of this theory of possible serious influences, a number of studies have been made to uncover the effects of motion pictures upon the attitudes and conduct of children and adolescents, in particular.

Influence of Movies

The most extensive of these studies had to do with the possible impact of the motion picture upon children in the United States. The investigation was financed and sponsored by the Payne Fund. A number of psychologists and sociologists were hired to investigate, with the most objective tools of social science, the effects of witnessing motion pictures on sleep, emotions, information, attitudes, and conduct, the last with special regard to delinquency. Three sets of general facts stand out: First, every study showed striking individual variations in the responses to motion pictures. Second, there were clear differences in reactions in terms of age. And third, economic, class, and educational status have to be taken into account in the interpretation of the findings. Since in the second edition of the present book, these studies were fully reviewed, only brief reference to the more important results will be made here.

The carefully controlled study by Samuel Renshaw and others on the effects on sleep from seeing exciting movies shortly before going to bed showed wide individual differences. Of the sample which Renshaw used, one-quarter of the boys and 14 per cent of the girls were more restless in their sleep after having attended an exciting film. Many youngsters were affected by seeing such a movie in the same way they would be by staying up three hours beyond their usual bedtime or by drinking two cups of coffee just before retiring. On the other hand, a considerable percentage of both boys and girls slept better than usual after seeing such shows. The balance showed no effects.[17]

[16] See, for example, Morris Ernst and Alexander Lindy, *The Censor Marches On* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1940); Morris Ernst, *The First Freedom* (New York, Macmillan, 1946); also Ruth Inglis, *Freedom of the Movies* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947).

[17] Samuel Renshaw, V. L. Miller, and D. P. Marquis, *Children's Sleep* (New York, Macmillan, 1933). The interested student should examine the experimental design of this study. It was quite ingenious.

W. S. Dysinger and C. A. Ruckmick investigated the emotional responses of a group of young subjects. They showed two movie scenes, one showing great danger, the other having obvious sexual implications. Again there were marked individual variations at all ages. The picture of danger aroused the most intense responses in the children who were under 12 years of age and the least intense in those nearing 16 years of age. On the other hand, the love and sex scenes had the greatest influence on those around the 16-year age level. Younger children, especially those under 12 years of age, had little or no comprehension of the meaning or intention of these scenes and showed very little interest in them. In general, these authors believe if a child has been properly trained he will develop what they call "adult discount," that is, the capacity to perceive the artificiality, the "made" quality of motion pictures. They believe, too, that repeated attendance at the same picture may lead to a decided decrease in its emotional effectiveness. They found no clear sex differences in reactions to the love pictures.[18]

While his investigation was less thoroughly controlled, Herbert Blumer found evidence of emotional effects. Through autobiographies and interviews with 1,800 subjects—college and high-school students, and factory and office workers—he discovered four types of emotional experience: fright, love, sorrow, and excitement. He found no permanent effects from these experiences but did discover, on the basis of these data, that many individuals tended to be transported out of a normal frame of mind and subjected to emotional impulses when attending exciting movies. The less educated his subjects were, the more were they liable to experience what he called "emotional possession." [19]

Another study dealing with the amount of information which is transported to children through films showed clearly that as children grow older they are able to attain more and more correct information from the motion picture. It is interesting to discover, however, that incorrect information is equally well retained. Films of action, especially those concerned with sports, crime, and fighting, have high emotional appeal and result in the high retention. Action centering in the home and school is also easily remembered. On the contrary, action associated with unfamiliar scenes such as bootlegging, business life, life in cafés, and on the frontier was least understood. No sex differences in retention were revealed.[20]

In Chapter 19, on propaganda, mention will be made of the study by Ruth Peterson and L. L. Thurstone which demonstrated that motion

[18] W. S. Dysinger and C. A. Ruckmick, *The Emotional Responses of Children to the Motion Picture Situation* (New York, Macmillan, 1933).

[19] Herbert Blumer, *Movies and Conduct* (New York, Macmillan, 1933); also Herbert Blumer and P. M. Hauser, *Motion Pictures, Delinquency, and Crime* (same publisher, 1933).

[20] P. W. Holaday and G. D. Stoddard, *Getting Ideas from the Movies* (New York, Macmillan, 1933).

pictures depicting strong prejudices, such as those related to race and crime, may induce sharp changes in attitudes and opinions, at least for some time afterwards.

One of the greatest questions, of course, has been the possible relationship of the motion picture to overt conduct itself. Do crime films tend to make a boy delinquent? Some of the Payne Fund studies held that there may be such effects. The delinquents in some of the samples were found to go to motion pictures more often than comparable nondelinquents, and they had attitudes seemingly influenced by frequent attendance. However, it is difficult to say which is cause and which effect here. Many of these delinquent children came from homes that are already criminalistic, and they probably learned a good deal more about the overt actions of delinquency from their parents, other adults, and the neighborhood children than from the motion pictures.

There has been a tremendous amount of debate over this whole question. Some psychiatrists believe that the motion pictures, because they provide both auditory and visual experiences, are likely to have greater and more lasting impact on the children than either the radio or comics. If this is true, then television should bring out such effects, too. Certainly, to discover the short-term influence of motion pictures on students' emotionality, factual information, opinions, attitudes, and values does not seem too great a task. To demonstrate a direct and causal relation of motion pictures to overt conduct is much more difficult. The results of the Payne Fund studies are inconclusive. Unfortunately, a good many of the individuals concerned with this particular study were already committed to the strong belief that the motion pictures were injurious to children.

Some of those associated with the Payne Fund hired Henry J. Forman to examine the findings before they were published. Prior to the publication of the twelve monographs which reported the research, he brought out a book entitled *Our Movie Made Children* (1933). By carefully selecting what he wished, his book largely stressed the deleterious effects of the motion picture. The book by no means really reflects the findings of the monographs themselves and should be definitely classified as a piece of propaganda put out by a reform group to show that the movies had an evil influence upon children. The comment of Frank K. Shuttleworth and Mark A. May in concluding their part of this research is a much more accurate generalization: "The movies tend to fix and further establish the behavior patterns in types of attitudes which already exist." [21] And an over-all interpretative summary by W. W. Charters puts the matter thus: [22]

[21] Frank K. Shuttleworth and Mark A. May, *The Social Conduct and Attitudes of Movie Fans* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 93.

[22] W. W. Charters, *Motion Pictures in Youth; A Summary*, 1933, p. 43. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

They [motion pictures] owe their power over children chiefly to the factor of emotional possession; the range of influence of commercial movies is very wide; the motion picture, because of its potency in many directions plays a substantial and significant role in the informal guidance of children; and the influence of pictures can be controlled in considerable measure by the development of emotional detachment and the application of an adult discount.

It seems well to recognize that the motion picture is only one of the many influences which impinge upon children, and with the coming of radio and television the earlier discussion about the influence of the motion picture has sharply declined. The reformers seem to be after other game.

[*For Suggested Readings, see end of Chapter 17*]

CHAPTER 17

Media of Mass Communication: Radio and Television

THE first section of this chapter will deal with a number of factors related to radio: time spent in listening, program preferences, psychological features, radio and news services, quiz and serial programs, and certain criticisms of this medium. The section on television will discuss time spent in viewing, program preferences, impact on family life, psychological features, television and politics, and its competition with other media The third section will deal with some aspects of social control of these media.

RADIO

The rapid development of radio is well within the memory of living men. The first radio station in the United States was KDKA in Pittsburgh. In November, 1920, this station broadcast the results of the Harding-Cox presidential election. It was estimated that the total number of listeners was about 1,000. Less than a year later, in July, 1921, the Dempsey-Carpentier fight was broadcast from the same station to approximately 200,000 listeners. From then on, the growth was unusual. By 1930 more than 12 million American homes had radios and there were 13 million radio sets in use. A decade later, nearly 30 million homes had radios and there were altogether 51 million sets in use. At the end of 1954, radio was found in 50 million homes—37 million had at least a second set—and the total number of sets had reached the colossal figure of 127 million. Of the latter, 32 million were installed in automobiles.

Radio, unlike the newspapers and motion pictures, has been subject to certain legal controls almost from the outset. Following a brief span of relatively uncontrolled competition for the airways, the federal government undertook to regulate the licensing and assignment of wave-

lengths in order to control the distribution of the facilities for broadcasting. Some features of this regulation will be discussed later.

Program Preferences

The radio soon became one of America's chief pastimes. At the height of its popularity, the average man and woman spent most of their leisure time listening to radio. What they had to listen to, or might listen to, has varied over the years. During the first decade of radio, entertainment took up two-thirds to three-fourths of the total radio time. Certain changes, however, have occurred since. There has been a steady increase in the time given to sports, education, and news.

Various surveys have been made of radio listeners, and their preferences on a number of features must be taken into account. The surveys have covered total time spent listening to radio, the appeals of programs, and the opportunity to listen. These, in turn, have been related to age, occupation, sex, income, and other matters.

With regard to the amount of time spent listening to radio, a 1947 survey showed for a national sample only 2 per cent who did not listen at all. For an average weekday, 9 per cent listened from 15 minutes to one hour, 13 to 14 per cent from one to two hours, 16 per cent from two to three hours, 13 per cent from three to four hours, 10 per cent from four to five hours, 10 per cent also from five to six hours, and 26 per cent, or more than one-fourth, spent over six hours listening to the radio. Of these total figures of time spent, most people listened during the evening hours: 29 per cent did not listen at all in the morning, and another 37 per cent listened only from 15 minutes to one hour during the forenoon hours. The biggest listeners in the morning hours are probably women. (This survey predates subsequent widespread televiewing. No doubt there has been a decline in amount of time spent in listening to radio, at least in the home.)

There are some variations in the daytime preferences by sex. This is due to opportunities to listen to certain programs. There are also some specific group differences in radio response. These include such things as age, sex, social-economic status, and rural-urban comparisons. With regard to age, young people like dance music programs much more than do older people, and they like religious programs much less. We know from other studies that young people vote less often than their elders and they do not as often read serious magazines or books. The same general attitudes are revealed in their radio preferences. They note classical music and forums as favorites considerably less frequently than do their parents.

By the same token, there are some striking differences along sex lines. The average American woman, like the average American youth, is not interested in current affairs. This has been shown in many other studies as

well as those on radio preferences. Twice as many men like discussions of public issues and considerably more men are interested in evening news broadcasts than is true of women. Sport programs are four times as prevalent in the preference ratings of men as of women. Yet, it is a curious fact that some studies have shown that men like comedy programs better than women do. During the day the two program types favored by women are serials popularly known as "soap operas" and homemaking programs. These two program types are deliberately directed at the female audience. In the evening programs, women are more inclined to include among their favorites nonserial dramatic programs, quiz shows, and semiclassical music.

It is difficult to determine accurately the class lines in this country. In general, income and education are closely correlated and may serve as a convenient basis for class comparisons. From these surveys it appears that the radio is a great leveler. For many programs there are no marked differences in audience preference as related to education and economic status. As to interest in comedy, news, sports, quiz programs, popular music, and mystery drama, there is a widespread general agreement which cuts across the economic and educational levels. In contrast, with regard to interest in serious music and in talks and discussions of public issues, the preference is two to one in favor of the college group as compared with those who have not gone beyond the grade school.

There are some rural-urban differences. Perhaps the most interesting difference between farmers and city dwellers is in musical taste. Classical and semiclassical music is much more popular in cities than on farms. Conversely, hillbilly music is much better liked by people in rural areas. While drama, mystery stories, and sport programs are somewhat less popular in rural areas they are still widely heard. There is practically no basic disagreement on most nonmusical programs. Religious programs are somewhat better liked on farms. In summarizing the whole discussion of this topic, P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia M. Kendall remark: [1]

> People like to read stories or see movies or hear radio programs which deal with familiar situations. They are particularly interested in content which in some way agrees with their own experiences. Thus, whatever their over-all attitudes toward serious programs, or comedies, or any other general program type, various social groups will like some specific comedies better than others, and some serious programs less well than others.

Preference for various programs is related also to the degree in which people become ego-involved in a particular medium. Lazarsfeld and Kendall have distinguished between what they call fans, average

[1] P. K. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1948). Quotation is from p. 29. By permission

consumers, and abstainers. The fan represents a person who is emotionally highly committed to a particular medium, in this case radio. They say: [2]

> A radio fan in the morning is one in the afternoon and evening as well. Because of their psychological characteristics, their time schedules, and their lack of competing interests, women who are heavy listeners at one period of the day will tend to be radio fans throughout the day. Conversely, those women who cannot or do not want to listen much at any one period will be light listeners consistently.

It is the general impression of these authors that men are far less emotionally committed to radio than are women.

Psychology of Radio

The radio public is never or seldom a solid block of listeners to a single program except in times of a great national or international crisis. It represents, instead, widely diverse interests and tastes. Then, too, while the potential audience may be millions, the producers of programs realize that this audience is capable of shrinking or of disappearing altogether if enough individual listeners simply turn off their radios. Because of this potential, Norman J. Powell says, "The radio tends to be constrained to the maximally intelligible, simple, direct, striking, dramatic." [3]

Since most radio auditors are not congregated, or at best gather in small groups only, there is in radio listening little chance for the development of crowd facilitation of the sort described in Chapter 12. Like the response to newspapers, the radio listener may say to himself, "I like this" or "I disagree with that," rather than think in terms of "We agree" or "We disapprove." There is little collective identification. Nevertheless, even without such crowd facilitation and collective identification, the radio by its very mechanical nature and method of programming tends to make for certain standardization. Simple uniformities of thought, word, and act are fostered by its content.

It is well to bear in mind, moreover, that the stimuli are entirely oral. Hence the individual must fill in his visual or other images on the basis of what he hears. In an ingenious research using the matched judgment technique, Hadley Cantril and G. W. Allport have reported the results of a group of people attempting to estimate the external and subjective characteristics of personality by hearing the voice alone. The external features included age, height, complexion, and handwriting. The subjective traits included vocation, political preference, extroversion or introversion, dominance or submission, and certain fundamental values. Twenty-four male speakers and more than 600 judges took part in this

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16. By permission.

[3] Norman J. Powell, *Anatomy of Public Opinion* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 349.

research. Some of their rather interesting findings may be summarized briefly.

The voice conveys correct impressions about many inner and outer traits of personality far beyond what would be expected from chance. Opinions, however, were more uniform than accurate. There are doubtless certain stereotypes in judgments of voice. For instance, if a voice aroused a stereotype in the mind of a listener, this stereotype tended to determine his judgment of several features of a speaker's personality. To cite one example, a voice was judged correctly to be that of an artist by 71 per cent of the auditors, yet 56 per cent rated him as markedly submissive, 17 per cent thought him of light complexion, and 44 per cent judged him to be tall. All the three ratings were significantly above chance, and all were incorrect. The authors found that more generalized traits, such as introversion and extroversion or ascendance and submissiveness, were more consistently and more accurately judged than single traits, such as physical appearance, handwriting, or age. Finally, the matching of voice and traits was more successful when the listeners were given an over-all descriptive sketch of the speaker rather than specific trait names only.

In general, listening is a more social act than reading. In listening, even though the speaker is not usually present, his voice carries a wealth of social connotation which aids in the transmission of meaning. The human voice is tremendously effective, especially in its emotional appeal. Visual stimulation, as in the silent motion picture, may arouse hatred, rage, pity, sympathy and the like, but the voice alone is usually more effective than visual stimulation alone. The two combined, as in the talking picture or television, have the greatest effect upon the audience. On the other hand, for detailed and accurate intellectual disquisition the radio appears to be less effective than the printed page and the lecture-demonstration technique. Finally, Cantril and Allport suggest some of the effective conditions of broadcasting: (1) In general, people prefer male to female announcers. (2) Vocal affectation and untrained voices are unpleasant. (3) Standard and clear pronunciation and enunciation are necessary for conveying any message. (4) General statements followed by specific detail or illustration seem more effective than either an entirely general or an entirely specific passage. (5) If not overworked, repetition aids comprehension. (6) Length of sentence should be determined by the nature of the subject. When the material is highly interesting, sentences may be longer than when factual material is presented. (7) The best speed of broadcasting varies with the kind of material. For most kinds it runs between 150 and 160 words a minute.[4]

[4] See Hadley Cantril and G. W. Allport, *The Psychology of Radio* (New York, Harper, 1935).

Radio and News Service

The development of the radio as a means of mass communication has raised the question as to its effectiveness compared to that of newspapers in providing news and in qualifying or modifying opinion. For example, in 1939, the *Fortune* poll included this question: "If you heard conflicting versions of the same story from these sources, which would you be most likely to believe?" The percentage distribution of the answers is as follows: [5]

Radio Press Bulletin	22.7
Radio Commentator	17.6
Authority You Heard Speak	13.0
Newspaper Editorial	12.4
Newspaper News Item	11.1
Newspaper Columnist	3.4
"Depends" on Paper, Writer, Speaker	11.6
Don't Know	8.2

Listeners—judged by this sample, at least—have a greater belief in radio news than in any other form. However, various studies have shown that the main criticism of radio news is that it is too brief and lacks detail. So, too, there has been considerable complaint of a scarcity of local news. In the 1945 survey one-third of those who had an opinion about the matter were very critical about the broadcasting of local news.

Quiz and Serial Programs

Quiz programs have long been a favorite of radio listeners in this country. In terms of educational status, quiz programs are mentioned most frequently by respondents who have attended high school but not college. This has certain psychological implications. People with a moderate amount of schooling look to quiz shows as a means of picking up information which individuals of higher education would go elsewhere to secure. Moreover, there is a higher preference for quiz programs, and those involving audience participation, in cities, towns, and rural districts than in large metropolitan areas. There is some indication that regardless of education older people get more out of such programs, or show greater preference for them, than younger people. The heavier listeners—that is, those who listen three hours or more in an evening—prefer quiz shows more frequently than do those who listen to the radio less than one hour in an evening.[6] Other popular programs are the giveaway shows, although there is a good deal of fluctuation in their appeal. They have many aspects of a fad.

Perhaps the most favorite discussion about radio concerns the ap-

[5] "The Press and the People—A Survey," *Fortune*, 1939, 20:70. By permission.
[6] Lazarsfeld and Kendall, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

peal of the soap opera. These daytime serials have been long popular with women. Some people regard the soap opera with considerable disfavor. These are the individuals who regard the radio—ideally, that is—as a means of improving people's minds, their interests, tastes, values, and habits. Despite such "high" views, the soap opera has a substantial place in the daytime programs. In the surveys already mentioned, about one-third of the women respondents rated drama serials high among their daytime preferences. Only the homemaking programs surpassed them and this in slight degree.

A number of studies have been made of the extent of daytime serial listening on the part of women. One survey, of 652 morning listeners selected at random in New York and Philadelphia, showed that 50 per cent listened to serials. Another survey of 60 listeners made in Indianapolis and in a city in South Dakota reported like percentages. Studies by the Bureau of Applied Social Research have indicated that of all the women who listen to radio during the morning or afternoon, about 45 per cent listen to daytime serials. A study made in 1944 by Lazarsfeld and Kendall of about 1,700 women listeners in New York, Cleveland, Chicago, and Kansas City found that 29 per cent were what they called the story audience—the fans. Other listeners constituted 34 per cent, and people who did not listen at all made up the balance. The story audience admitted to spending, on the average, two hours in the morning listening to radio, one and a half hours in the afternoon, and two and three-tenths hours in the evening. In other words, on week days this group averaged five and eight-tenths hours listening to radio. Moreover, the story audience is inclined to listen to afternoon daytime serials. In fact, 63 per cent of those who said that they listened to such stories in the morning admitted that they listened to them in the afternoon as well.

It was found that 54 per cent of the serial listeners also liked mystery programs. And 44 per cent of those who said they liked mystery programs said they liked the daytime serials, too. The taste for suspense is probably a common factor in this overlapping of interests.

In a study made by the Bureau of Applied Social Research on 5,039 housewives, it was shown that 54 per cent of this sample spent an average of one hour and twenty-seven minutes a day listening. Of this entire group, 75 per cent (and of the high-school and college sample included in this, 59 per cent) answered "Yes" to the query, "Do you believe the serial is true to life?" This indication of the emotional seriousness which some find in the daytime serial warrants further examination. What kind of gratification do people get from listening to these programs? Herta Herzog has made a careful analysis of this based on intensive interviews of 100 subjects. She found three major types of gratification. Some listeners enjoyed the serials largely as a means of emotional relief: "The

chance to cry," or to enjoy "the surprises, happy or sad," or to "feel better to know that other people have troubles too."

The second and commonly recognized form of enjoyment concerns the opportunities for fantasy or wishful thinking. People use the serial to fill in the gaps in their own lives or to compensate for their sense of failure through identification with the success of the characters in the serials.

A third, and at first not suspected kind of satisfaction, has to do with the advice which is obtained through listening to daytime serials. Respondents say that they like the stories because "they explain things." A typical comment is, "If you listen to these programs and something turns up in your own life, you would know what to do about it." Thus, one woman remarked, "I think Papa David got me to be more cheerful when Fred, my husband, comes home. I feel tired, and instead of being grumpy I keep on the cheerful side." Another woman remarked, "I like Helen Trent. She is a woman over 35, you never hear of her dyeing her hair! She uses charm and manner to entice men. If she can do it, why can't I?" It is interesting to note that one-third of these 100 women mentioned specific problems which they would like to have had answered in these serials; for example, why a married man, after years of calm and pleasant married life, suddenly takes to gambling and becomes unfaithful, and whether married people should have to live with the mother-in-law. They ask questions about religious and racial differences. On the other hand, there was evidence of prejudice. One woman said, "I don't listen to the Goldbergs. Why waste electricity on the Jews?" [7]

Rudolf Arnheim analyzed certain characteristics of 43 daytime serials. First, he found that the locale of most of them as well as the great bulk of the settings were in large cities, in middle-sized cities, or in small towns. Very few were in rural communities. As to the status of the main characters, 73 per cent were professional persons, 65 per cent were housewives, 33 per cent were in big business, 31 per cent were in small business, and 19 per cent were society people. (There was multiple classification.) There is a complete absence of working-class people. "There is no case of a factory worker, a miner, a skilled or unskilled laborer, playing an important role in any of the 43 serial samples." [8]

Leadership plays an important part in these stories, and the leadership is often of a professional character, such as a doctor or lawyer. About 150 main problems were indicated. Of these, 47 per cent had to do with personal relations, 16 per cent with courtship, 18 per cent with marriage, and 10 per cent with family problems. The great bulk of personal prob-

[7] Herta Herzog, "What Do We Really Know About Daytime Serial Listeners?" in P. F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton, eds., *Radio Research, 1942–1943* (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944), pp. 3–33.

[8] Rudolf Arnheim, "The World of the Daytime Serial," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton, *ibid.*, p. 41.

lems revolved around family and marriage. There was a scattering of others for the remainder. In keeping with our individualistic value system, "causes of different kinds of problems" were largely a person's own doing. There is little recognition of possible larger social-cultural sources of personal difficulties.

Arnheim found three basic types of characters: good, bad, and weak. The *good* are the strong and helpful people. They tend to be spotless, ardent, and full of high virtue. They are leaders because of certain personal qualities. In the serials the overwhelming proportion of these are women. The *bad* type are the opposite of the good. They enter the drama from the outside and cause trouble, yet permit personification of hostile forces. For the most part they are not to be reformed but are in the end disposed of as wicked forces. In other words, these people are evil; they set up nothing but resentment and fear. The *weak* are what they are from unhappy experience or absence of self-control. They are marked by lack of balance, jealousy, vindictiveness, deceitfulness, and selfishness. They carry a large load of guilt. These persons are not bad by nature but need help.

These serials provide the listener with a portrait of her own shortcomings which lead to constant trouble and also indicate her inability to help herself. Yet the listener may identify herself with the ideal type of the good character, usually a woman, who is calm, efficient, and while possessing power and prestige, has to suffer not by her own fault but through the fault of others. This gives the listener an opportunity to perceive and criticize her own personal shortcomings. Such troubles are presented as springing from weakness of character, and here the listener may experience resonance or sympathetic identification with the weak type. Nevertheless, the listener must have a means of detaching herself from the weak characters. This, identification with the good people provides. On the other hand, resentment against evil forces is confirmed and nourished by the bad characters in the story.

The radio, along with other modern means of communication, is concerned with the building of modern mythology, it provides a culturalized and hence accepted fantasy world. Upper-class snobbery comes into play when people view or criticize the soap opera as a low order of entertainment. Such terms as "low" or "high," or "good" or "bad," introduce value judgments which are not helpful in scientific analysis.

This is not to say, however, that the radio might not be regarded as an instrument for the improvement of popular taste. There is some evidence, so far as music is concerned, that there has been considerable broadening of the interest in classical and semiclassical music. But matters of taste are related to fundamental needs and gratifications of the individual, and these are modified by education, occupational status, and

social position. If some people do not have soap operas to listen to, or comic books to read, or murder mysteries to see or to read, they will provide themselves with some other kind of outlet for gratification of unconscious and deepseated motivations. Certainly these things are less harmful than alcoholism, drug addiction, and homicide.

Criticism of Radio

With respect to personal and social criticism of the radio, the individual may select or choose his program by a mere twist of the wrist or eliminate the whole thing by turning off the machine. In general, the over-all public appraisal of the radio is favorable. As noted above, the 1947 survey revealed that 70 per cent of those polled said the radio was doing an excellent or good job. This is comparable to the percentage they gave the churches (76 per cent); it was better than their estimate of the newspapers (63 per cent); and about the same as the opinion of the schools (69 per cent). Also recall that the local government was given a rating of only 42 per cent in the categories excellent and good. This does not mean that the radio is not subject to criticism. It is. The 1947 survey asked respondents about criticizing different media. Sixty-seven per cent said they sometimes felt like criticizing radio, 68 per cent said the same for the newspapers, and 66 per cent, for the motion pictures. There are no significant differences as regard the three media. When the newspaper is their primary source of the news, 58 per cent said they were occasionally critical of this medium but not of radio, and 42 per cent said they were occasionally critical of radio but not of newspapers. Of those who use the radio as a primary source of news, 52 per cent said they were occasionally critical of radio but not of newspapers, and 48 per cent said they were occasionally critical of newspapers but not of radio.

Among the criticisms, the most frequent concerned radio advertising. This is mentioned by 26 per cent of all listeners. Some respondents criticize the amount of advertising, others the content, and still others the timing and form of presentation.

Advertising in radio has long been the subject of heated debate. One proposal is to put radios under some kind of governmental supervision and use a licensing system. Under such a plan the listeners would have to pay a license fee for a radio as they do in countries where the government controls it. When asked this question, "Which one of these four statements comes closest to what you yourself think about advertising on the radio?" a national sample replied as indicated in Table 7.[9]

[9] From P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (copyright, 1948, by Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York), p. 61. All quotations reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Table 7. Reactions to Advertising on the Radio

	PERCENTAGE REPLIES
I'm *in favor* of advertising on the radio	32
I *don't particularly mind* advertising on the radio	35
I don't like advertising on the radio but I've *put up with it*	22
If it were up to me I'd *cut out* all advertising on the radio	9
Don't know	2
	100

When asked what was wrong with commercial advertising, five categories of criticism emerged: [10]

1. Volume and position
2. Uninteresting content
3. Overselling
4. Violation of taboos
5. Attention-getting devices



From P. F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (copyright, 1948, by Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York), p. 71. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

FIG. 11. Severity Scores of Five Statements about Commercials.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

In getting a range of the severity of the scores with regard to five statements about commercials, it was found that noisy and distracting character rated very high and that claiming too much for the product rated at the bottom.

Looking into the future of radio, we have to take into account not only the continuing place of the newspaper and other forms of printed matter and the continued place of the motion picture, but the greater threat to radio—television. Yet it is quite likely that the radio will remain, for a long time, at least, as one of the important media of mass communication. However, it is too early to predict future trends in any accurate fashion. Let us turn to examine some of the features of the newest medium.

TELEVISION

The growth of television in this country has been even more spectacular than that which followed the first burst of enthusiasm for radio. In the words of *Alice in Wonderland*, it is "curiouser and curiouser" and, as with Alice after she drank the magic potion, once advertisers and investors became interested in television they went on growing and growing. The public use of television was authorized by the Federal Communications Commission on July 1, 1941. There were just five months of telecasting to about 10,000 sets before Pearl Harbor. During World War II, the manufacture of equipment was cut down and many programs were given chiefly for instruction to air wardens and for the military services. Technical improvements and new inventions—for example, better infrared tubes, coaxial cable, orthicon pick-up tubes—made possible a wide distribution of television. Color television was the next step.

The rapid expansion of television is well known. At the opening of 1955 there were 33 million TV sets in the United States. This country is still the chief consumer.

More restricted data but certainly suggestive are found in Paul Witty's studies of children's reaction to TV. Regarding his samples—chiefly in metropolitan Chicago—he says: "In 1950, 43 per cent of the pupils had sets in their homes; the percentages increased year by year; 68 in 1951, 88 in 1952; and 92 per cent in 1953." [11]

For a time after the war, the FCC limited the number of TV stations, but this restriction was lifted on April 11, 1952, and at that time there were 109 TV stations. There has been a gradual expansion of stations since that time and the provision is that altogether there will be something on the order of 2,200 stations possible in about 1,300 communities in this country. The FCC is reserving certain channels for

[11] Paul Witty, "Children's Reactions to TV—A Fourth Report," *Elementary English*, 1953, 30:444–451.

educational purposes and also for noncommercial but civil or military purposes.

The chief backers of television have been the radio-station owners. Some newspaper publishers have likewise been active in this new venture. Television is a costly enterprise and in its early years there was little or no profit from it.

As might be expected, advertising firms quickly took to the new medium. At first television appealed to local and retail advertisers, but very shortly large national advertising agencies took over TV almost entirely.

Time Spent in Viewing

Another measure of the impact of television upon our society is how much time people spend seeing and hearing the various programs. Later we shall want to examine the range of personal preference for and interest in the programs.

A number of surveys have been made of how much time children and adults spend with television. The spread of the medium has been so rapid, however, that it has been difficult to get accurate figures. Estimates from a number of sources would indicate, on the average, that children tend to look at their home sets from two to three hours a day; adults spend about one and a half to two hours daily. One study made in the four largest boroughs of New York City showed that, for ages 5 to 6, children spent, on the average, four hours per day viewing TV; at age 7, two and a half hours; at age 8, three and a half hours; at age nine, two and a half to three hours; and at ages 10 to 13, three hours.[12] There is good evidence, as was also found in certain studies by Paul Witty, that as children approach adolescence they spend less and less time with television.

Witty, using an admittedly limited sample, has made a number of surveys of children's reactions to television. In reviewing his own and other surveys, he remarks: [13]

> Recent studies of the amount of televiewing on the part of children and youth show that this strong interest is persisting. Several studies made two or three years ago revealed that children in the primary grades spent on the average four hours per day with TV, while middle grade pupils averaged about three hours daily. It was predicted by some observers that, when the novelty had worn off, children would spend less time with TV. . . .
>
> The fact has become clear that the amount of time pupils devote to TV

[12] Report in *The New York Times*, April 11, 1950, p. 54, of survey made for the United Parents Association of New York City. See F. L. Sweetser, Jr., "Home Television and Behavior: Some Tentative Conclusions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1955, 19: 79–84. Sweetser interviewed 1,076 individuals from 254 TV families in medium-sized communities outside Boston but within its metropolitan area. He brings out some interesting comparisons in respect to age and class differentials and televiewing.

[13] Witty, *op. cit.*, pp. 450–451. By permission.

has actually increased somewhat. In 1953 the average was about 22 hours per week. However, in grades 1–6 of Evanston, the average in 1953 was 24 hours; in Chicago it was 26 hours for grades 1–5. Even among high school students, there was a slight increase in time devoted to TV. In one study, the 1952 average was 14 hours per week while in 1953, it was 17 hours. Parents too, devote a large amount of time to TV—now about 19 to 20 hours per week. Teachers spend an average of 12.5 hours per week as compared with 9 hours in 1950.

Program Preferences

Studies of differential preferences reveal shifts in popularity as well as variations among youngsters and parents. The Witty surveys, though limited as to sample and region, are highly suggestive. Thus, for all grades and for both 1952 and 1953, the program "I Love Lucy" topped the list. On the other hand, the elementary-graders voted "Superman" in second place, the upper-graders selected "Dragnet." Some noticeable shifts in interest are revealed in the decline in appeal of "Howdy Doody," cowboy shows such as "Hopalong Cassidy," and "Milton Berle." The parents' choices have shifted between 1950 and 1953. In the former year, "Arthur Godfrey," "Milton Berle," and "Sports" (wrestling) headed their list of choices. In 1953, "I Love Lucy," "What's My Line?" and "Omnibus" were the most popular. The top favorites of teachers in 1952 were "News," "Meet the Press," and "What's My Line?" The year following they were: "Meet the Press," "Omnibus," and "News." While "I Love Lucy" was in their list of ten favorite programs, it fell in the lower half of the rankings.

A negative measure of appeal is indicated in a listing, for pupils, parents, and teachers of the most "disliked programs." This is shown in Table 8.[14] It is worth noting that the pupils, their parents, and their teachers were in considerable agreement as to the kind of program they disliked. The popularity or unpopularity of programs in the future is certain to be related to nature of appeal, their dramatic quality, and their

Table 8. Most Disliked Television Programs—1953

PUPILS	PARENTS	TEACHERS
1. Howdy Doody	1. Murder, mystery, crime	1. Murder, mystery
2. Westerns, cowboys	2. Westerns, cowboys	2. Wrestling
3. Milton Berle	3. Milton Berle	3. Cowboy
4. Captain Video	4. Old movies	4. Westerns
5. News programs	5. Wrestling	5. Old movies

ability to satisfy conscious and unconscious needs. Moreover, definitive information on the extent and nature of the impact of TV on children and adults is not yet at hand. The medium is still young. One suggestive

[14] From Paul Witty, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

item on the shifting character of popularity was reported for one of the Chicago public schools in the spring of 1955. Apparently the Disneyland TV show gained steadily after its inception, to the definite loss of the "I Love Lucy" program.[15]

Impact on Family Life

An insightful study of the influence of television on school children as seen by their mothers was made by Eleanor E. Maccoby in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In this study, 332 mothers were given open-ended interviews. The sample was a probability one and confined to families with children between the ages of 4 and 17 years. Activity records were obtained for 622 children. The sample was compared with other children in nontelevision groups and matched with respect to age, sex, and socioeconomic status. The interviewing was done during December, 1950, and February, 1951. At that time there were two TV channels broadcasting out of the Boston area. Let us summarize the chief findings:

(1) As to ownership of television in Cambridge, this is clearly related to income, occupation, and education. At this period, professional people, a very small group in proportion to the entire population, were buying fewer television sets because they did not like the programs and were apprehensive about the effect upon their children. A definite majority of all other groups, including business people, white-collar groups, skilled and unskilled laborers were television owners. (2) The children in television-owned families were spending, on the average, at least two and a half hours on weekdays and three and a half hours on Sundays viewing these programs. (3) Television does bring families closer together in the sense that they spend more time in each other's presence after they acquire a television set. However, there is very little interaction among the family members when they watch TV. They are sitting or looking as isolates. It is doubtful whether television brings the family together in any psychological sense. Sitting in a semidarkened room is not conducive to interpersonal conversation. (4) Contrary to certain claims, in this sample it was found that some children do not spend more time with youngsters of their own age once they have television. Rather, the trend is for the children who have a television set to separate and watch the programs in their own homes rather than to watch as a group. (5) As compared to other activities, television is absorbing. In general, people do not try to carry on other activities while they are watching the program. (6) Many parents have difficulty in getting children to leave the television set to come to meals. Some have solved this difficulty by serving meals in front of the sets. (7) Bedtime is a serious problem for parents who have television sets. Children in these homes go to bed later than children of the same age in the nontelevision homes. (8) Television

[15] "Disney Is Kids' Top TV Fare," *Chicago Tribune*, April 7, 1955.

interferes very little with homework. Most of these parents insist that their children finish with school studies before they look at television. However, the number of children who do homework on Sundays is smaller in the television homes than nontelevision homes. Weekdays, however, both groups of children spend about the same time on their homework. (9) Children are tending to substitute television for radio, movies, and reading. (10) While there is some shift from other mass media to television, much of the additional time is taken from play time and from activities such as playing musical instruments and other creative or productive interests. (11) Parents who have television sets do not believe that it is harmful to their children. On the contrary, many believe it has great advantages. First, they all enjoy the entertainment value. So, too, they find many of the programs educational both for themselves and for their children. Also, they find it is a great help in taking care of their children. They say it keeps the children quiet, it keeps them off the street, and generally keeps them from harassing their parents.[16]

In 1950, Edward C. McDonagh made a study of 800 families in a specific community in Southern California. It is interesting to compare his results with those made in the Middle West by Witty and in the New England area by Maccoby. Among his important conclusions are the following: There is no difference in the educational level or age of parents between television and nontelevision families. However, the larger the family the more likely they are to have television. Also, families with television report an increase of visitors to their homes. (Recall that television in 1950 was relatively new. Later studies suggest that this trend is no longer true.)

Moreover, families with television state that they go visiting less often than they did before, while nontelevision families are visiting more than they did previously. There is some evidence that television families go driving for pleasure slightly less than they did previously. Both television and nontelevision families say they are participating in sport activities less, but this trend is most noticeable in the television families.

With respect to the effects of TV on the family as a group, McDonagh comments: "The television family, during the evening hours, is changing from a social group, characterized by conversation, to an audience, sitting in the semi-darkness and silently gazing at their commercially sponsored entertainment via television." [17]

The psychological implications of these and other observations deserve a few general comments. Television has but introduced the talking picture into the home, with its dual sensory-perceptual stimuli—

[16] Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Television: Its Impact on School Children," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1951, 15:421–444. See also her, "Why Do Children Watch Television? *Ibid.*, 1954, 18:238–244.

[17] Edward C. McDonagh, "Television and the Family," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1950, 35:113–122. Quotation is from p. 122.

sight and sound. As to the possible serious effects on children's eyesight of viewing TV, there is every reason to believe that continuing technological improvements will greatly reduce this potential hazard.

Psychology of Television

An excellent example with which to introduce a discussion of the psychology of television—its influence on motives, attitudes, and action—is a comment on the persistently popular human-interest show, "I Love Lucy." For a long time this program had top billing in television popularity. For example, on the 28th of January, 1953, 69 per cent of all the television sets in the United States were turned on for this show. This was the night of the birth of Lucy's own baby. Up to that date this was an all-time high for a regular television show.

The content of this program revolves around the home life of a family with growing children. In the spring of 1953 Miss Ball, both in real life and on this program, gave birth to a second child, and a new series of domestic episodes were built up around the new baby. But she does not use her own children in these plays. Because of the child-labor laws in California which forbid infants to work more than two hours a day, the Ball-Arnaz team hired twins to play their TV child. This makes it possible for them to use first one and then another twin and to shoot their series with a minimum of interruption. The psychology of this particular show is clear enough. It appeals to mother-love, emphasizes the high importance children have in our society, and rings the changes on all the basic emotional sentiments that are deep in our own value system.

Let us now examine some other psychological elements in television. First, television like the motion picture and radio may arouse motivation and in a way produce frustration. As Maccoby points out, the programs doubtless induce states of excitement. Certainly young children enjoy thrills. So, too, adolescents indulge in sexual fantasy which probably induces more, rather than less, drive. But we need to look further into the whole frustration thesis as related to fantasy-thinking and the appeal of these media. It has been somewhat overemphasized. People may engage in fantasy for the sheer pleasure of reverie.[18] Surely, an older person may daydream about the happy experiences of his youth as well as the unpleasant ones.

Then, too, although these mass media—motion picture, radio, and television—represent an external control of fantasy, we must not forget that they are culturalized, time-tested parts of our fiction and folklore. There is plenty of evidence that such culturalized fantasies have long

[18] The idea that frustration and only frustration is the foundation of fantasy is, of course, the source of the theory that *all* creative art—to say nothing of invention—derives from frustration. This view is peculiarly particularistic and misleading.

served to satisfy the individual's unfulfilled needs as well as giving him scope for pleasant wishful thinking.

With regard to addiction or emotional possessiveness induced by television, it has been contended by some that if a child becomes accustomed to a high level of excitement and organizes much of his behavior at a particular level of excitement, he will be disorganized when the level of excitement declines. He will become restless, bored, and ill-at-ease until he finds something to restore his particular level of excitement. There is really too little known about this to have any firm opinion at this time.

Just as mass media may heighten the motivational level, so, too, there is a possibility that vicarious experience may build certain habits. Maccoby remarks: "If it does, continually living through experiences of violence and aggression, vicariously, should have two effects: it may momentarily reduce a child's need to be aggressive in real life, but if at some future time the need to be aggressive is aroused, it should increase the probability that the child will actually perform an aggressive act." [19] Of course, not all television shows employ violence and aggressiveness. Yet aggression is a fairly common theme in the stories which the children like, hence there may be some habit-formation taking place.

Maccoby suggests, though she does not prove the point, that television like other mass media may serve really to provide the child with a series of fantasy-forms of problem-solving situations. By giving the child too many avenues of escape from social pressure, we may actually retard the development of his social responsibility. Closely related to this, of course, is the question of continual practice of identification with the fantasy figure. In time the child may come to feel that this is a real life figure. This, of course, is not confined to children, since adults may likewise accept fictional characters as real. Many women regard Helen Trent and other characters in the daytime serial as real persons. As we pointed out in Chapter 9, such mixture of fantasy and actuality is universal. Aileen Pippett has shown how common this is in literature. She remarks: "Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are more real in the mind than Cervantes, Tom Jones than Fielding, Becky Sharp than Thackeray, Soames Forsyte than Galsworthy, and when one thinks of the tremendous characters Shakespeare let loose on the world it is no wonder that the personality of the poet himself is nebulous and enigmatic." [20]

We need to examine more fully the impact of television on the physical activity of children and on their creativeness. It may be that if we provide them ready-made creative products, we reduce the opportunity

[19] Maccoby, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[20] Aileen Pippett, "The Art of Leading a Double Life," *The New York Times*, Book Review section, August 28, 1955, p. 1.

or likelihood that they will exercise their own creativity. This is the problem for the elementary schools, in particular, and should be studied more closely. Finally, television has great potential use as an aid in education. Yet because of heavy costs it is being used to only a slight extent in educational institutions. However, in time, as television is improved in quality and becomes less expensive, we may expect to see its educational uses expanded. [21]

Television and Politics

The place of television in the formation of political opinions has yet to be determined. The Republican and Democratic National Conventions of 1952 attracted millions of televiewers. Whether various investigations carried on by Congress and the state legislatures will be televised in the future is a matter yet to be determined. However, some rather interesting results are reported from a group of people who saw the televised hearings of the Kefauver Committee on crime in New York. While the sample was small and by no means representative, the results are rather suggestive. With the aid of his students, G. D. Wiebe interviewed 260 adults who said that they had seen the televised hearings of the Kefauver committee. The sample is slightly skewed toward white-collar and professional people under 36 years of age. As to how these people felt about the conditions which were brought to light in the hearings, 51 per cent of the responses could be classified as emotional. This is illustrated by such remarks as "A rotten business," "Terrifying, unbelievable," "I felt mad, paying taxes for graft." Thirty-nine per cent of the sample gave favorable but unemotional responses. They said that the hearings were satisfactory but they showed no surprise or excitement. Finally, 10 per cent of the answers were best classified as cynical. These respondents questioned the intentions of the investigators. Many thought that this was a publicity stunt for Kefauver. As a whole, the respondents were not apathetic. The first group, making up more than half the total, certainly showed emotional involvement.

When the respondents were asked whether they felt personally if they should like to do something to improve conditions, 46 per cent said "Yes," and 12 per cent more added a certain qualification to their "yes" answers. Forty-two per cent said "No." About a third said that they knew that something should be done but did not know quite what to do. About one-fifth had certain power fantasies, as illustrated by one man who said, "I felt like banging a couple of heads together." Another 20 per cent had the feeling the whole thing was quite apart from their personal concern. A quarter of them felt that they should join some committee, write their Congressman, or do something about the situation. In

[21] See Paul Witty, "Television as an Aid to Instruction," *School and Society*, 1951, 74:273–276.

this connection, 80 per cent said they talked to other people of their own social class about the hearings. Ten per cent had not discussed it with others, and scattered small percentages had discussed the hearings with their employer, their children, and others. Some few had actually written or wired their Congressmen or the President. So far as party affiliation was concerned, there was practically no difference in the distribution of the various kinds of replies.

In discussing his results, Wiebe develops a theory of what he calls *social impotence*. By this he means the absence or near absence of any constructive problem-solving behavior of the members of a group when "(1) rank and file members are opposed to specific leadership behavior; (2) the point of contention is not perceived by members as a threat to the perceived primary benefits of membership; and (3) the perceived benefits of membership outweigh the disadvantages of disliked behavior." [22] This theory may have some interesting implications for those concerned with "group dynamics" and "group reference behavior."

Competition Among Media

The effect of television on motion pictures has been a matter of frequent comment. There has been a decline in the weekly attendance at the motion pictures. Whether this is entirely due to the impact of television is difficult to say. Certainly, it is too early to predict just what role television will play with regard either to radio or the motion picture. In 1949, Duane Jones, head of an advertising agency, interviewed 4,500 people in New York City and reported that 81 per cent were going to the movies less often after they acquired television sets. The McDonagh study made in Los Angeles in the same year reported that 80 per cent of television owners were attending motion pictures less than they had before. Certainly there is a generally recognized decline in attendance at motion pictures. What the over-all national situation is, or how permanent it may be, is difficult to say."[23]

Apparently radio listening has been most affected by the coming of television. In the McDonagh survey 88 per cent of the television families reported that they were listening to radio less than ever before. Not a single television respondent in this sample claimed to be listening more to the radio.[24] While over-all national figures are not available, there is no doubt a definite decline in radio listening. Yet, Witty has discovered, in at least one high-school sample, that many students report a decrease

[22] G. D. Wiebe, "Responses to the Televised Kefauver Hearings: Some Social-Psychological Implications," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1952, 16:179–200. Quotation is from p. 196. In this connection see J. W. Riley, and others, "Some Observations on the Social Effects of Television," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, 13:223–234.

[23] See McDonagh, *op. cit.*; also N. J. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 400, for Duane Jones figures.

[24] McDonagh, *op. cit.*

in time spent with TV and a revival in listening to radio. These respondents say that they listen to radio more, first, because they can study at the same time; second, that they can hear their favorite disc jockeys; third, they use their automobile and portable radios a great deal while driving, sitting in parked cars, or lounging on the beach; and, fourth, at appropriate places—homes, restaurants, and so on—they can dance to radio music.[25] It may be that radio, as a major element in mass communication, is on the way out. That it will completely disappear in the foreseeable future is unlikely. It probably will remain an important device for news broadcasts and for certain kinds of music. In this connection, the whole development of high-fidelity radio programs indicates that there is, in the slang of the street, some life left in the old radio system still.[26]

PROBLEMS OF CONTROL

Control of Radio

The Federal Communications Commission was set up in 1927 to regulate various aspects of radio transmission. It was clearly in the public interest to exercise some control in the assignment of wave lengths to private companies. It was when the FCC concerned itself with the content of radio programs that its control functions came in for periodic criticism. There are three areas in which its regulations have operated: business, politics, and public morals.

Regarding the first, the chief discussion has centered around the influence of advertising on radio. We have already indicated some of the more usual complaints about this and noted that while there is some dislike and criticism of radio advertising, most listeners tolerate it. As to the second, the radio has been increasingly used by candidates for office during local and national elections and by high officials of government in periodic addresses to the nation on important issues.

In discussing the whole problem of business and politics in reference to radio, Norman John Powell makes a good deal of the basic timidity of the radio producers. They are afraid of advertising pressure; they are afraid of critics. They are particularly inclined to avoid controversy. Powell makes the point that one of the most striking characteristics of the contemporary broadcasting companies is their avoidance of participation in public issues. Years ago there was a long dispute about the question of whether a licensee had the right to present his point of view in a public controversy. This led to the famous Mayflower case.

[25] Paul Witty, personal communication.

[26] Of course, high-fidelity music may represent only a passing craze. See *Life* August 31, 1953.

Finally, after eight years of discussion and argumentation, the FCC gave way and modified its original rule that a licensee might include in broadcasts "the identified expression" of the "personal viewpoints." This made possible the editorializing of news as long as it was so identified. The FCC was quite insistent that the licensee should regard himself as a "trustee and impressed with a duty of preserving for the public generally radio as a medium of free expression and fair presentation." [27] Despite the winning of the Mayflower case, radio has been inclined to keep away from controversial subjects. Any discussion of touchy topics, such as, birth control, the treatment of Negroes, or critical political problems often led to a variety of pressures from special-interest groups. In order to avoid such pressures, the management of radio has tended to avoid participation in the discussion of such issues. Their attitudes in the matter are not unrelated to their experience with the FCC itself. True, in the early days, radio owners and promoters of radio stations made claims in the name of free speech and free press that could not really be applied to the particular topic at hand. It was almost inevitable that the government take some hand in trying to clear up the confusion. In the Federal Radio Act which set up the FCC the phrase occurs, "In the public interest, convenience and necessity." These are regarded as the fundamental and proper services of radio. The FCC issues licenses under a set of standards based on public interest, convenience, and necessity, but it reviews the licenses every few years to see whether the stations are observing its standards. For example, in its 1946 Blue Book *Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees,* it insisted that more than half the time of the news programs should be directed to local news and less than half to wire news. This brought on great outcries from the wire agencies and led to some modification so long as the local news had some reasonable attention.

Certainly, compared to foreign countries where the radio is largely under governmental control, the amount of freedom in this country is amazingly high. Yet, as Frank L. Mott puts it, "The great gift of liberty of the press and speech places heavy burdens of responsibility on newspapers, radio, and all agencies of communication in America. Those responsibilities . . . can never be too much emphasized." [28]

With respect to problems of morality, protests have periodically been made by individuals or groups about the possible ill-effects of the radio on children and youth. Radio provides a series of adventures both interesting and entertaining to children. Certainly, adventure programs give children as well as adults an escape from the humdrum of ordinary living; again, it is an outlet through culturalized fantasy. Children in

[27] Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

[28] Frank L. Mott, *The News in America* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 198.

modern and urban settings frequently are denied much opportunity for adventure. Certainly it is not available on city or suburban streets or in communities hedged around with many restrictions. Modern housing is very often ill-planned in regards to the needs of children. Not even the routines of school and the playground provide much outlet except in formalized games. Therefore, there is little wonder that many children search for adventure in radio listening, the comics, movies, and television. Along with their favorite hero they can soar through the air, travel to the remote corners of the earth or into space in search of buried treasure or to discover people on a new planet. They can live dangerously and at the same time remain within the reassuring confines of the home. Many adults are amazed at the amount of blood and thunder which children can tolerate in their radio and other programs. Again, this should not be difficult to understand if we realize that children often take these things more or less for granted with much more adult discount than we give them credit for. Let us cite one or two suggestive studies of radio.

Howard Rowland made a study of twenty crime dramas on radio. Seven of these had no reference to murder. Of these, three dealt with sabotage, the other four with counterfeiting, swindling, smuggling, and robbery. Interestingly enough the basic theme in these crime dramas was a superhero who operated "outside the formal machinery of law enforcement." Moreover, this superhero was impersonal, platonic, and an individualist of great strength, courage, ability, and intelligence. In contrast, the villain was bad but vague and often a strange person. As a rule, the justice consisted of disposing of the villains outside the law. As a matter of fact, many of these crime dramas tend to belittle the police and make the private detective or other superhero far superior to the ordinary agencies of the law. Finally, few of these crime dramas give any treatment to the causal context in which the crimes occurred.

In analyzing his findings, Rowland points out that the child is in need of two sets of satisfaction: on the one hand, social acceptance and status in the play or peer group; and, on the other, some kind of satisfactory adaptation to the adult world, and especially to his parents. The world of his peers and the world of his parents represent somewhat conflicting culture patterns. Rowland has this to say: [29]

> The extravagant interest which children (especially boys) manifest in radio-crime drama bears an important relationship to the problem which confronts children adjusting simultaneously to two conflicting sets of standards. Superheroes who are constantly being good but must operate outside the bounds of the law are particularly convenient as fictional companions for

[29] Howard Rowland, "Radio Crime Dramas," *Educational Research Bulletin*, 1944, 23:210–217. Quotation is from pp. 215–216. By permission. For a study of more serious emotional involvement, see Mary L. Preston, "Children's Reactions to Movie Horrors and Radio Crimes," *J. of Pediatrics*, 1941, 19:147–168.

young boys who must act contrary to parental authority in order to make a satisfactory adjustment to the boy gang. . . .

Case studies of children indicate that addiction to crime stories is most acute among those children who have experienced the greatest amount of frustration in their attempts to reconcile the conflicting cultural patterns of adjustment to parental authority versus acceptance in the gang or play group.

Rowland goes on to point out that the frustration tends to be greatest among children who are oversized or undersized for their age or who are markedly retarded or, in turn, markedly precocious. Those who suffer from extreme overprotection or, on the other hand, extreme neglect from their parents, are also in this category. So, too, marginal children who are the subject of conflicting cultures, such as Negro children living in a predominantly white neighborhood or the child of a foreign home living in the neighborhood of settled American families, fall into the group who are the most seriously frustrated.

Again, there are individual differences in the responses of children to these programs. While radio programs, television, or comics may provide the basis of daydreams and nightmares, so too, could the old-fashioned fairy story. The question remains—is the outlet a stimulus to fantasy and hostility? Is it being overdone by the wide exposure of children to such media as radio or television? We have noted the conflict produced in the child between the demand by the parents for conformity and the child's desire to move in his peer world of playmates. With regard to some of the effects, one writer remarks: [30]

The fact that a particular experience—whether radio program, comics, or movies—gives form to his dreams does not necessarily make it harmful. It may possibly be helpful in providing a pattern for working out problems of his own. We do not know, with certainty, how far such experiences provide release or how far they increase tension. Psychiatrists suggest, however, that where a child seems to be unduly disturbed by radio, movies, or comics, he may need to be protected from such experiences.

Control of Television

The control of television, both formal and informal, has followed a course not unlike that of the motion picture and the radio. Once again those people in the community who were concerned with the possible ill-effects of TV went into action. The National Association for Better Radio and Television made quite a to-do about the high percentage of murders, holdups, kidnapings, robberies, and so on, which were shown on the television screen. The FCC had charged earlier that "the merchants of death and hawkers of horror" were all too common on television.[31] Then, too, objection has been made to such things as "the

[30] Josette Frank, "Comics, Radio, Movies—and Children," *Public Affairs Pamphlet*, No. 148 (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 16. By permission.

[31] Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

plunging neckline" of a popular woman performer and to occasional off-color humor.

The debate has been very much like earlier ones before TV. Thus, Dr. Ralph S. Banay, a psychiatrist, told a Senate committee investigating crime that " 'viewing pictures of crime on TV is a preparatory school for delinquency.' " Yet at the same hearing Eleanor E. Maccoby, whose research has been reviewed above, contended "that viewing television was 'not a basic cause of delinquency.' " [32]

In like vein a resolution, passed at a conference on radio and television in Chicago, sponsored by the Church Federation of Greater Chicago and the National Council of Churches "expressed 'deep fear and apprehension for the future of radio and TV' because of 'the continued emphasis on liquor, crime, and violence in many broadcasts.' " [33]

While the further development of television is hard to predict, there is little doubt but that it will continue to be influenced by both formal and informal controls. Certainly its educational potential has not been tapped nor has the emergence of its unique entertainment possibilities been fully appreciated. With regard to the latter, it continues to draw heavily on stage and screen.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CLAIR, Rene, *Reflections on the Cinema,* translated by Vera Traill (London, William Kimber, 1953). An interesting review of the course of the motion picture as a form of artistic expression from the early 1920's to 1950. Not a history of the motion picture.

FIELD, Alice Evans, *Hollywood, U.S.A.: From Script to Screen* (New York, Vantage Press, 1952). A good description of every step from the inception to the end of the production of motion pictures in Hollywood.

KATZ, Elihu and LAZARSFELD, P. F., *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1955). Reports extensive research on the place of interpersonal interaction as a factor in the flow of mass communications. The principal areas of concern are the personal influences in marketing, in fashion, and in public affairs.

POWDERMAKER, Hortense, *Hollywood—The Dream Factory: An Anthropologist Looks at the Movie-Makers* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1950). A study of various facets of movie-making in Hollywood. The author has tried to use the field methods of cultural anthropology to discover the cultural patterns of motion picture production.

ROSTEN, Leo C., *Hollywood: The Movie Colony, the Movie Makers* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1941). This book remains one of the soundest analyses of Hollywood. The author, trained in political science, shows great insight and understanding. He is also the author of some entertaining short stories.

SHAYON, Robert L., *Television and Our Children* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1951). A vigorous attack on television but the discussion is supported with little or no data.

[32] "TV Is Called Delinquent's Crime School," *Chicago Tribune,* April 7, 1952.
[33] "Church Group Hits TV Crime and Violence," *Chicago Tribune,* February 28, 1953.

SIEPMANN, Charles A., *Radio, Television, and Society* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1950). An attempt to describe and interpret the influences of radio and television on our culture, particularly on attitudes, opinions, and taste. The problem of adequate public controls is also discussed.

WALDRON, Gloria, *The Information Film* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949). This volume shows "the great potentialities of the information film as a new instrument of communication and education, but a discouraging picture of the actualities of present-day production and distribution."

CHAPTER 18

The Measurement of Opinion and Attitude[*]

TODAY, the "straw vote," the opinion survey, the attitude study are all integral parts of American life. Every American is constantly bombarded with information on the attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of his fellows. Newspaper columns report the attempts of national polling agencies to predict the outcomes of elections. Magazines carry the results of studies of people's attitudes on race relations, international affairs, and the like. Business and industry are increasingly dependent upon the results of attitude and opinion surveys in order to plan their manufacturing and marketing strategies. And social psychologists employ studies of attitudes in their attempts to build a systematic conception of human behavior. In the present chapter we shall attempt to examine some of the procedures of attitude and opinion study as they are applied in these several areas.

PUBLIC OPINION

When a person is interested in knowing the opinions of his fellows, the reasonable course of action is to ask them. You can, of course, watch their behavior and infer their opinions, but the most direct and common technique merely involves asking people to reveal their thinking on issues of public interest. On the face of it, this seems a pretty obvious and straightforward approach. However, it raises some fundamental questions—questions which must be answered, and answered correctly, if you are to obtain sound knowledge of people's opinions. There are many problems of detailed procedure, but the five most fundamental questions in public opinion study are (1) how to plan, (2) whom to ask, (3) what to ask, (4) how to ask, and (5) how to analyze.

Until recently, most studies of public opinion made only haphazard attempts to answer these questions. They relied on informal questioning

[*] This chapter was prepared by Linton Freeman.

of people who were readily available in order to describe the formation of opinion, changes in opinion, and the like. Public opinion was examined in relation to broad sociocultural movements, political campaigns, or persistent public issues. But the results of such investigations lacked precision; they provided rather vague information and contributed little in the way of systematic prediction and control.

Today, this informal case-study approach has been almost completely discarded in favor of the more rigorous polling procedures. Systematic polling of public opinion grew out of attempts in the early 1900's by "inquiring reporters" to take "straw votes" during election campaigns. These polls aroused public interest, and in 1916 the magazine *Literary Digest* began making regular forecasts of national elections. It was dominant in the field until, in 1936, it made a gross error in predicting the presidential election results.

Following its unfortunate prediction of the results of the 1936 elections the *Literary Digest* discontinued publication. However, it was quickly replaced as a polling agency of national importance by the Gallup Poll, Roper's *Fortune* Survey, and the Crossley Poll. Since that time interest in, and success of, opinion polling has steadily grown. In the national election of 1948 the polls again failed in their predictions, but this was a relatively minor setback. In general, opinion polling has both developed and matured. Today, thousands of agencies across the nation conduct opinion polls not only on elections but on public issues, product preference, the effects of advertising, and a wide range of topics of public or private interest.

Polling yields a relatively objective evaluation of public opinion and allows the investigator, through his more systematic study, to draw conclusions with greater precision and confidence. This accuracy results from the fact that systematic answers to the five fundamental questions posed above are made. These answers will be taken up in turn.

How to Plan

The first question in public opinion study involves planning or research design. Research of any sort is always concerned with a *problem area.* We cannot know everything about everyone, so we must delimit both a problem and a group of people for investigation. We do not investigate public opinion in any over-all sense; rather, we center our attention on a set of particular problems—on the opinions of a defined group of people with regard to some specific issue like income tax, a forthcoming election, or a minority group.

Having determined a problem area, the next step in the research process involves outlining a *basic question.* Here it is useful to distinguish between descriptive and relational studies. The aim of the former is to describe the expressed opinion of some population on some issue. Studies

of the latter type aim at relating differences in opinion to other factors, usually social and cultural.

An example of descriptive research is a pre-election poll. The basic question in this case is what proportion of registered voters will vote for each candidate. Here the issue is clear—the survey must deal with voting behavior. And the population is clear—interest is confined to registered voters. The object of the investigation is to describe opinions and to predict voting.

Suppose, however, we were interested in the relative degree to which men and women favored candidate X. While our problem is still the same, voting behavior—our basic question—differs. It is no longer concerned with describing potential voting behavior, but with relating sex to voting. Our study is relational—we are interested in determining the degree to which some other factor, in this case, sex, is associated with opinions.

We might go further and determine the degree to which other factors, say income or occupation, are related to opinions concerning the relative merits of the candidates for election. Or we might devise an experiment in which we attempt to discover the effects of a propaganda campaign in influencing public opinion on some issue. In any case, our research requires planning. Whether it is descriptive or relational, certain fundamental steps in planning must be taken. A problem area must be delimited, a basic question must be posed, and a population must be defined. Only when these demands are met will research be systematic and results meaningful.

Whom to Ask

The second question in public opinion polling is concerned with whom to ask, or sampling. Sampling refers to the distinction between part and whole. In scientific study it is ordinarily impossible to investigate a whole population, that is, to examine every member of the group in question. Instead, science deals with a part, or sample, of the population. But not just any part will do; a sample must be chosen such that it will be *representative* of the entire universe from which it is drawn. When an investigator has a representative sample, he may make generalizations about the whole population or universe without studying every member of it. It is this quality of representativeness that various sampling procedures are designed to provide.

A sample which is not representative of the universe of which it is a part is said to be *biased.* A biased sample is to be avoided, since sound generalizations cannot emerge from it. If, for example, a sample is to reveal the opinions of Americans concerning Sunday observance, it should not be drawn exclusively from members of the Baptist church. Neither

should it be drawn from the membership of a society of militant atheists, the Communist party, nor from the followers of Father Divine. Information gleaned from a sample of any one of these groups would probably shed light on its members, but it would hardly apply to all Americans. A representative sample in this case would include Americans of all creeds, each represented in the sample approximately in proportion to its occurrence in the universe.

Various procedures have been adopted in order to control the representativeness of samples and to avoid bias. However, regardless of the particular design, all sampling ultimately depends upon the principle of *randomness*. This is the basic technique of control which underlies all successful sampling.

The principle of random sampling demands that each individual in the universe being sampled have an equal chance of appearing in the sample. In theory, this is a simple demand, but in practice it is sometimes difficult to execute. If an investigator is interested in studying the political opinions of the student body of some specific university, he can get a list of the students, write each of their names on a separate slip of paper, put the slips into a bowl, shuffle them, and, blindfolded, select a sample of any desired size. This lottery procedure would guarantee a representative sample. However, in practice, such an ideal design is seldom possible. A list of all the individuals in a given universe is usually unobtainable, and furthermore, the co-operation of every individual who is selected cannot be guaranteed. Actual research, therefore, usually involves an attempt to approximate the ideal of complete randomness. Many specific techniques have been developed; a few of the more important ones will be discussed below.

Stratified random sampling has met with considerable vogue, especially in public opinion polling. When certain characteristics of the universe are known, it may be divided according to these known characteristics, and each subgroup sampled proportionately. Thus, if an investigator is studying daytime radio listeners, and he knows that 90 per cent of this universe are women, he must choose 90 per cent women in his sample. Furthermore, if 10 per cent of the universe are upper class, 10 per cent of the sample will be upper class, and, assuming equal distribution of listening by class and sex, 9 per cent will be upper-class women.

An important point to remember in using samples of this sort is that they are stratified *random* samples. Dividing a universe according to its relevant characteristics merely provides a series of subuniverses; it does not absolve the investigator from his responsibility to sample randomly. Random procedures must be employed to select individuals within each subsample—those possessing the appropriate characteristics of the sub-

group. Without such controls, bias of one sort or another is inevitable.

Some investigators have used a modified form of stratified sampling called the quota sample. Here, quotas are determined according to the relative proportion of each subgroup in the universe and interviewers are assigned to fill these quotas. An interviewer may be instructed to select five males under 25 years of age, all in the highest socioeconomic class, ten females over 60 years, in the lowest class, and so on, depending upon relevant proportions in the universe. Thus, the interviewer controls the actual sampling. This is usually an economical technique, and sometimes a successful one, but there is a chance of error. Too much is left to the interviewers, and bias may be introduced. In such a situation interviewers often tend to avoid run-down neighborhoods and interview only the most willing subjects. Such seemingly trivial actions may seriously bias the results of a survey. Quota sampling, then, may be an effective low-budget method, but great care must be taken in its use. The universe must be properly stratified, and the selection and training of interviewers must be very carefully performed.

Areal sampling is another popular modification of the stratified random procedure. It has been extensively used in public opinion polling and in market research. A geographic territory is divided into units with known characteristics. Each unit is considered as an individual case in the universe, and a sample of such cases is selected. Units are determined according to the stratification plan, but the sample of units must be selected according to the rules for randomness. If recent data are available on the areas, and if the rules are followed faithfully, this can be a most effective sampling device. It is relatively expensive and requires data on the areas, but it allows the investigator to make good use of random procedures as a sampling control. Actually, perfect samples of either of these types would show no difference in results, but sometimes trouble arises in carrying out the required procedures in each.

No discussion of sampling would be complete without a caution about accidental samples. Some investigators seem to confuse randomness with accident; they use a class in a university or people on a street corner, and have no systematic sampling plan. These are inadequate samples and prove nothing at all. One has no idea of what, if anything, they represent. A school class which happens to be convenient is not representative of students in a school, and a group passing a street corner may or may not represent a neighborhood. A good example of misleading results of poor sampling is the report in many newspapers from their "Inquiring Reporter." Effective sampling always requires an explicit program designed to provide a random selection of individuals. Only when the sample is random is it safe to generalize research findings to the population from which the sample was drawn.

What to Ask

The third fundamental question in public opinion study concerns what to ask, or the design of the schedule and questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews usually involve the use of a schedule—a set of questions to be asked of the respondents. Questionnaires are self-administering interviews. Whether the subject is interviewed personally or required to fill out a questionnaire, effective research requires that a specific question or set of questions be worked out. Adequate construction of these questions, and their assembly into schedules or questionnaires, are basic to successful study of public opinion.

Questionnaires and interview schedules vary from formalized forced-choice check lists to the less structured open-ended variety. If a check-list is employed, the respondent is presented with a predetermined set of alternatives for each question; he merely indicates his choice among the alternatives provided. For example, consider the following question on international relations:

> In general, do you believe that top level conferences of the heads of several governments:
> 1. Decrease international tension
> 2. Increase international tension
> 3. Have no real effect on international tension
> 4. Don't know

In the open-ended question form, however, the respondent is free to react in his own words. Thus, in the example above, the question might be worded as follows:

> In general, what effect do you believe top level conferences of the heads of several governments have upon international tension?

Proponents of each argue the inherent superiority of each particular question type. Open-ended questions, it is claimed, reveal more of the actual basic attitudes of the respondent. They do not force him to make a choice which does not really describe his feelings. Arguments for forced-choice questions, however, suggest that they are more reliable, less ambiguous, and that they successfully avoid subjective bias. They are believed to be more direct and objective.

There is something to be said for each of these points of view, but the final choice in question design must depend upon the nature of the proposed study. If a reliable standard measure of opinions or attitudes is a central consideration, then forced-choice questions seem indicated; but if the primary aim of the study is exploratory, open-ended questions might best be used. Then, too, responses to open-ended questions may sometimes be categorized into codes similar to those of forced-choice ques-

tions, resulting in greater reliability. In the light of these developments, considerations of question form become less important.

Another problem in the construction of questions is raised when we consider the possible inability or unwillingness of the respondent to answer the question posed. When the subject matter of the questionnaire or interview is apt to arouse resistance on the part of the respondent, a completely honest reply may be difficult to obtain. Thus, questions concerning sex, law violations, and the like may invite refusal to answer, or worse, an untruthful response. In such case it has become common to employ a technique of *indirect* attitude or opinion assessment.[1]

Indirect question techniques are based upon the assumption that a respondent may reveal information about his attitudes without being personally aware of the implications of his response. One such indirect approach utilizes the projective question. Instead of asking a person if he has taken money from the cash register at his place of employment, he is asked to estimate whether "other people" with access to the cash register might pilfer its contents. It is thought that the respondent will put himself in the place of the other person and that his answer will reveal his own attitude. The extent to which this procedure is successful has never been completely demonstrated. There is some evidence that such projective questions do provide information about the person responding but, of course, the possibility always exists that the respondent is making a sincere and objective evaluation of the "other person" in question.[2]

Other indirect devices have utilized information items. Here the respondent is asked a factual question and erroneous answers are tabulated and evaluated. It is thought that the direction and amount of error in response will indicate something of the underlying attitudes of the person responding. For example, persons may be asked to estimate the number of Jews in an area. Anti-Semitic respondents may make larger estimates than others and it will be possible, therefore, to uncover attitudes of anti-Semitism.[3]

The extent to which such indirect questions yield reliable responses is still largely unsettled. Potentially, they are useful techniques for avoiding direct interrogation on subjects about which the respondent might wish to hide his feelings. However, they do involve some additional assumptions and extreme care must be taken in their interpretation.

Whether questions are open-ended or forced-choice, whether they are direct or indirect, care must be taken to avoid ambiguity and bias in their wording. Ambiguous words or words with a double meaning should

[1] Indirect questions are frequently used to reveal attitudes or underlying response sets. See the discussion of attitude measurement below, pp. 452–456.

[2] See Donald T. Campbell, "The Indirect Assessment of Social Attitudes," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1950, 47:15–38.

[3] E. G. Malherbe, *Race Attitudes and Education* (Johannesburg, South Africa, Institute of Race Relations, 1946).

be avoided. And abstract or technical language is often inappropriate. Questions should be as simple as possible and straightforward. Long questions also may mislead the respondent; he should be able to keep the entire question in mind until he has answered it. Above all, value-laden terms and expressions should be avoided. A questionnaire on attitudes toward union activities would yield very different results if it used such phrases as "labor agitator," "loyal workers," and "mass picketing," rather than the less value-laden "labor organizer," "nonstrikers," and "picketing."[4] In general, it is good practice to avoid ambiguity and to phrase questions simply and directly. Simple, straightforward questioning will often yield more useful information than the most complex and difficult indirect technique.

How to Ask

The fourth basic question in opinion research is concerned with how to ask for—techniques of gathering—information. Information regarding opinions may be collected in many different ways. The most commonly used research devices are the interview-schedule and the questionnaire. At times, opinion research is conducted by means of observations of behavior, records, documents, or census materials, but such studies are relatively infrequent. Studies of this latter sort are usually designed to reveal a more general type of personality and social data, and information on opinions is somewhat of a side issue. When the primary interest of a research program is in opinions as such, the investigator customarily depends upon interviews or questionnaires to furnish him the information he desires.

Interviews range from the deep, intensely personal, free association of psychoanalysis to the brief superficial check-list schedules employed by commercial pollsters. However, regardless of their form or depth, interviews serve one common purpose, that of providing the interviewer with information he desires about the respondent. This purpose, shared as it is by all interviews, necessitates some special considerations. The mere fact that at least two individuals, an interviewer and a respondent, are involved in the situation implies social interaction, and upon the nature of this interaction the success of the entire interview stands or falls. It is necessary to gain communication with the respondent, and to maintain that communication throughout the interview. This, of course, will depend upon a number of factors, but the key to successful communication in the interview is found in *rapport*.

Good rapport is the first prerequisite for any successful interview. It depends upon creating a friendly atmosphere and gaining the confidence of the respondent. The establishment of rapport is primarily the responsibility of the interviewer, and an experienced interviewer will make

[4] See S. Stansfeld Sargent, "Stereotypes and the Newspapers," *Sociometry*, 1939, 2:69–75.

an effort to put the respondent at ease, thereby insuring his co-operation. But even the most skilled of interviewers may run into difficulty. Much depends upon the initial orientation of the respondent. Thus, an interviewer may find a housewife who is bored with her daily routine and welcomes an opportunity to talk with someone who seems interested in what she has to say. However, for others, an interview may be an annoying interruption and a loss of time which might be better spent in doing the laundry, getting dinner, fixing the car, or cutting the grass. The interviewer must be aware of these potential difficulties and behave accordingly.

Usually the interviewer is provided with a schedule or list of questions to be filled out in conducting an interview. In this case, he is not required to frame his own questions nor to lead a discussion; he merely repeats the questions on the form. The important considerations are proper reading of the questions and adequate recording of the responses. In conducting surveys of this type, interviewers need the ability to establish rapport, to read questions, and to record answers.

Unlike an earlier view—at least in some quarters—that the interviewer was but a passive medium through which information from respondents passed into the protocol of the investigator, it is now well recognized that the interviewer is definitely a part of the instrument applied to the informant. Various studies have exposed the nature and extent of biases which must be taken into account if results are to be adequately appraised. Paul B. Sheatsley's analysis of the records of the National Opinion Research Center and other agencies regarding the role of the interviewers in survey research shows clearly the existence of many serious difficulties. He puts part of the problem neatly in these words:

> We have a condition in which the great bulk of market and opinion research interviewing today is conducted by women talking to the men, by college graduates talking to the uneducated, by upper-middle-class individuals talking to those of low socioeconomic status, by younger people talking to the increasingly larger older-age groups, by white persons talking to Negroes, and by city dwellers talking to rural folk.[5]

Bias may be introduced by prestige-suggestion, as, for example, when an educated person asks questions of individuals of lower socioeconomic and educational status, or by resistance as when a Negro may "freeze up" and fail to give a true response to a white interviewer, or by other influences involving subtle but usually unconscious values and views regarding the place of women, the limited empathy between youth and old age, and so on. Then too, there is the matter of the recording of what was said during the interview. The interviewer, as with others in similar

[5] Paul B. Sheatsley, "An Analysis of Interviewer Characteristics and Their Relationship to Performance," *International J. of Opinion and Attitude Research*, 1950–51, 4:473–498. Quotation is from p. 487. By permission.

situations, is likely to hear and remember what he wants to hear and remember and forget other, but equally significant, matter.

It is clear from the discussion above that the selection and training of interviewers is highly important if one is to avoid bias. Such considerations as intelligence, appearance, manner, and adaptability are important in selecting good interviewers. Training will depend upon their past experience and upon the type of survey planned. It is important that each interviewer have a grasp of the fundamentals of interviewing in general and that he be thoroughly conversant with the particular schedule used.

How to Analyze

The fifth and last question in public opinion research is concerned with processing results and reporting findings. So far we have centered our attention on the problems of gathering data on people's opinions. Now we will take up the question of what to do with these data once they have been gathered.

If the aim of the investigation is entirely descriptive, handling the results is a relatively simple matter. Results take the form of frequencies of response in various response categories. Here, one merely has to convert the frequencies into proportions or percentages and report the findings in a straightforward manner. However, it is important in such cases to report the question exactly as it was asked and also to describe the sample upon which the percentages are based. This will give the reader a clear and precise picture of the complete results.

The analysis of relational studies present a somewhat more complex problem. Again the results come in the form of frequencies of response in various response categories, but we wish to contrast these various frequencies. If the research problem involves investigating changes in opinion through time or due to the effects of other variables, or if it is centered upon comparisons of various subgroups, such contrasts must be made. Suppose, for example, you are interested in the differences in opinion between men and women concerning a certain brand of coffee. You design your research, draw your sample, construct a questionnaire, and get your results. You discover that 52 per cent of the men and only 47 per cent of the women in the sample approve the coffee in question. May we conclude, then, that more men than women prefer the coffee in question? Or might this difference of five percentage points result from a chance variation due to sampling in a universe in which men and women are equally approving of the coffee? These are questions the solution of which requires statistical analysis. Through the use of standard statistical techniques, we can determine whether these differences represent real distinctions between men and women or whether they must be attributed merely to chance variations in sampling. The important consideration is to avoid jumping to conclusions before your results have been properly

analyzed. Correct application of appropriate statistical devices is necessary before relational studies can be interpreted.

Reports of both descriptive and relational studies should describe the research—the sampling, the techniques of data gathering, and the analysis of results should be covered. Only when these reports are honest and complete can confidence be placed in the results.

Today, opinion polls are in widespread use, but they are not infallible. Slipshod or inadequate answers to the problems of planning, sampling, questionnaire construction, interviewing, or reporting have led to important errors in predicting the outcomes of the 1936 and 1948 presidential elections. Other errors have been common, if not as marked as these. The over-all trend, however, has consistently been toward providing better answers to the basic questions and consequently toward greater accuracy and precision in polling.

ATTITUDES

Studying attitudes is a somewhat more complex job than studying opinion. Like opinion polling, attitude study requires planning, sampling, questionnaire construction, interviewing, and analysis of results. But in addition to these problems, attitude study raises some special questions.

The primary aim of opinion polls, as we have indicated, is to classify individuals into one category or another on the basis of their stated views on some topic. Thus, we might discover as a result of polling opinions that person A favors foreign aid and person B opposes it.

Suppose, however, we wish to go a step further and *rank* persons rather than just classify them with respect to the issue in question. Then we might conclude that person A favors foreign aid more than does person B, who in turn favors it more than person C, and so on. In this case, we must conduct an attitude survey, the results of which would be a rank ordering of individuals according to the degree to which each exhibits the attitude in question.

Assumptions of Attitude Study

In order to rank individuals in terms of an underlying attitude a fundamental assumption is made. Attitude study is based upon the notion of regularity in human reactions. It is assumed that a person's behavior with respect to an object or idea will be relatively consistent from one point in time to another. Furthermore, this consistency will hold for whole classes of objects or ideas. Thus, if a person removes his hat as the flag passes in a parade, he may be expected to repeat this act the next time the flag goes by. Then he may also purchase government bonds regularly, be entirely scrupulous in preparing his income-tax return, always vote at elections, never shirk jury duty, volunteer in the armed forces in the

event of war, and so on. His behavior will reflect an underlying consistency. This consistency suggests the presence of an attitude.

An attitude, then, cannot be observed directly; it must be inferred from the statements and actions of a person. Attitudes refer not to behavior itself but rather to the set or reaction tendency which is exhibited in patterned regularities in that behavior. Suppose, for example, an individual reports that he dislikes the British navy. He believes that their ships are dirty and that their sailors are undisciplined. He exhibits a whole set of responses, all of which indicate his hostility toward their navy. This set of behaviors oriented toward a class of objects indicates the presence of an attitude—a hostile attitude regarding the British navy.

Underlying consistency is not, however, the only problem in uncovering attitudes. The question of extension, or range of objects in the class to which the individual responds consistently, is also crucial. Our hypothetical individual may not limit himself to the British navy. He may criticize the Queen, refuse to buy things of English manufacture, and condemn the British foreign policy. He may reject all things English. In this case his attitude is not involved with the navy, but with England in general. He has a hostile attitude toward England.

The problem of attitude study, therefore, involves a search for underlying consistency in an individual's behavior and an attempt to delimit the range of objects toward which this consistency is expressed. Only when these are found can individuals be located on a rank-ordered scale in terms of the degree to which they manifest the attitude in question.

Measuring Attitudes

In order to rank individuals with respect to attitudes, various techniques of measurement or scaling have been developed. The first serious attempt at developing such a technique was made by L. L. Thurstone.[6] Thurstone was inspired by the notable successes of investigators in measuring intelligence during World War I, and he set out to duplicate their achievements in the field of attitude study. Borrowing from psychophysics, he adapted two techniques of just perceptible differences to scale construction: the method of paired comparisons and the method of equal-appearing intervals. Each of these methods required the use of judges who were presented with a set of statements which could be checked right or wrong. The judges were employed to evaluate the distance between any two statements or the degree to which the attitude in question was expressed in each statement. Thus, in a scale measuring antilabor attitudes, the statement "Unions should be prohibited by law" might be judged more extreme than "Closed shops are often unfair."

[6] L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitudes* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929).

Although Thurstone's scales represent a step in the right direction, his technique of construction has been criticized on several counts. Most important, perhaps, is its complete dependency upon the opinions of judges who may themselves be biased. Then, too, it is an extremely cumbersome procedure requiring a tremendous amount of effort for the results produced.

In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, Rensis Likert developed an alternative method of scale construction.[7] As did Thurstone's, Likert's technique employed a series of statements to which the subjects were required to respond. However, Likert dispensed with the use of judges. The statements were administered to a group of subjects who were required to respond to each item in terms of several degrees of agreement or disagreement. For example, subjects might be required to indicate whether they (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) are undecided, (4) disagree, or (5) disagree strongly. The results are then tabulated, scored from, say, one to five, depending upon the degree of sentiment expressed, and totaled for each individual. Each statement is then correlated with the total score in order to determine those statements which best discriminate between high and low-scoring individuals. Nondiscriminating items are then eliminated, and the remaining statements form a scale for measuring the attitude in question.

Although Likert's technique succeeded in eliminating some of the pitfalls in Thurstone scaling, both procedures share a common weakness. Both allow two individuals to get the same rank while exhibiting very different patterns of response. For example, an individual who responded very favorably on two items and very unfavorably on two others might achieve the same rank as one who took a moderate position on all four. Since the notion of attitude involves the assumption of regularity of response, different patterns of regularity should yield different ranks. Neither Thurstone nor Likert provides any procedure for evaluating response-regularity; therefore, neither is capable of demonstrating the presence of an attitude. This being the case, individual measurements are noncomparable, and rank positions are arbitrary. They lack descriptive meaning.

Louis Guttman has developed a technique of scale analysis which provides criteria for solving this problem.[8] The Guttman technique affords a method by which the scalability of a set of items may be determined by the criterion of internal consistency or unidimensionality. Responses to the items must be ordered in such a way that persons who respond to a

[7] Rensis Likert, "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes," *Archives of Psychology*, 1932, No. 140

[8] Louis Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data," *American Sociological Review*, 1944, 9:139–150.

given item "favorably" will all rank higher than those who answer the same item "unfavorably."

The model of scale analysis may be understood quite simply if we take an example. Suppose we are interested in mathematical ability. We construct a test consisting of five problems in mathematics and administer it to a predetermined sample. Then we score the tests and tabulate the results, totaling the correct responses for each individual and for each test question. We may then arrange the subjects from the one with the highest score to the one with the lowest. We may also arrange the problems from the most difficult—that is, the one answered correctly the fewest times—to the easiest—the one answered correctly most often. We may now test for the presence of a scale. The scaling model requires that any person passing any item of a given difficulty must also have passed all of the less difficult items. Those individuals who responded correctly to all five items are scored 5, those passing four items 4, and so on. It is important to note that, if a unidimensional scale is present, an individual's score reveals not only the number of problems answered correctly but also just which problems these were. Scale scores, therefore, are accurate summaries of the variation among the scalable variables. Both the items and the individuals are rank-ordered.

Guttman's model is an abstraction. It is seldom realized completely when applied to empirical data. However, we are provided with conventional criteria of scalability by which we may determine whether or not, in any particular instance, the arrangement of the data are such that they may be considered unidimensional. If a scale is present, the variables which make it up are considered to vary together and the presence of a single attitude is indicated. If not, the concept under investigation is complex and cannot be considered as a unitary entity.

Unidimensionality, therefore, exists if, and only if, responses are patterned in such a way that both individuals and items may be arranged from "most extreme" to "least extreme" without contradictions or ambiguity. A universe is scalable if, and only if, unidimensionality can be established. In this way it is possible to arrange individuals in an internally meaningful rank order—one in which the responses of individuals can be *reproduced* from their rank position. Responses to each question are a simple function of rank. However, if some persons respond to one meaning in the items, and other persons to a different meaning, *scale errors* (nonscale types) will occur. In this case relative scores, of themselves, will possess no descriptive meaning. Thus, the Guttman scaling technique by establishing the unidimensionality of a set of items provides a solution to the problem of ranking individuals according to their response consistency.

Although the Guttman technique has been subject to some criticism,

it represents a substantial improvement over its predecessors. It has been widely used, and refinements are frequent. It may be hoped that such refinement will continue, but so far it is the best of the attitude-measuring devices.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

FESTINGER, Leon, and KATZ, Daniel, eds., *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, Dryden, 1953). An excellent overview of research methods in social psychology, including papers by many of the leading authorities in the field.

HAGOOD, Margaret Jarman, and PRICE, Daniel O., *Statistics for Sociologists*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1952). A comprehensible introduction to the application of statistics to social research.

HYMAN, Herbert, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1955). A well-written book dealing with the principles and procedures of the social survey, broadly conceived. Contains much practical advice and instruction.

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KRECH, David, and CRUTCHFIELD, Richard S., *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948). Chapters 7 and 8 include an excellent treatment of the problems involved in the measurement of opinion and attitude.

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CHAPTER 19

Propaganda and Censorship

AN important feature of present-day public opinion formation concerns propaganda. Broadly defined, this has to do with the deliberate use of persuasive methods or other symbolic techniques to change attitudes and ultimately to affect action. Many writers regard propaganda as a particular phase of political operations, but this is a too-limited usage. More narrowly, it has been defined as an attempt to "influence attitudes of large numbers of people on controversial issues of relevance to a group." [1] Many people have come to regard the term as one of evil and sinister connotation. But, as we shall see, this is strictly a value judgment.

THE NATURE OF PROPAGANDA

The word "propaganda" comes from a Latin verb, *propagare,* which means to propagate, generate, or reproduce. In its early and literal meaning it meant to force the growth of plants, by putting them under cold frames or in hothouses. In its literary and figurative sense it was taken over by the Roman Catholics to refer to the process of conversion.

History of Propaganda

In 1633 Pope Urban VIII set up the *Congregatio de Propaganda fide.* This was an organization designed to propagate the faith. Its aim was to educate priests for missions and to serve as a missionary movement to convert people to Catholicism as well as to combat the inroads of Protestantism.

The term came into use in political matters, including military features, during the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon instituted a heavy censorship program and used propaganda as a device to fill in the gaps this caused in the news. At that time, however, the term "propaganda" was not used. So, too, after the Napoleonic wars were over, there was a considerable amount of agitation in England for the repeal of the corn laws

[1] Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in Twentieth-Century Propaganda," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences,* 1947, 1:393.

and to institute various forms of labor legislation. During this time, heavy doses of propaganda were poured out in the public prints.

In our own country the earliest and most effective instance of propaganda probably came with the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* written by Harriet Beecher Stowe and published in two volumes in 1852. While this book did not cause or induce the Civil war, there is no doubt that it had tremendous effect in stimulating concern with the problem of slavery. Some have said that it is the single greatest piece of propaganda in human history.

The Spanish-American war was stimulated, in part at least, by the activities of the newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst. In a way, he was a spokesman for sugar and other business interests that had heavy investments in Latin America and in Cuba. Many of these investors wanted to get rid of the Spanish colonial rule. There is the well-known story that Hearst sent Frederick Remington, the artist, and William Wood, the newspaper man, to Cuba, to make sketches and write stories of alleged Spanish atrocities there. The yarn goes on to relate that, after seven weeks in Cuba, Wood and Remington telegraphed Hearst that all was quiet there, that they found no evidence of impending revolt, and they wished to return. To this request Hearst is said to have sent back the message: "You furnish the pictures, I'll furnish the war." While this story is apparently apocryphal, it illustrates the influence which diffusion of ideas may have upon the masses.[2]

There are many other illustrations of the use of persuasion techniques in reference to domestic matters in our country. The rise of the farmers' Grange, for example, is one illustration of the application of the techniques of propaganda to a particular movement. The Populist movement was a great public upsurge concerned with domestic problems and it was marked by a tremendous amount of propaganda. A striking case in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the agitation in the United States for national prohibition. The metamorphosis of the temperance movement into an agitation for prohibition is well known. The long campaign to make the nation dry was marked by some of the most effective techniques of propaganda. But again, the term was not used at that time.

Propaganda, as we now know it, especially the political aspects of it, came into full bloom during World War I. It expanded in the interim between World War I and World War II and has become a definite and important feature of mass communication in our modern times.

Propaganda and Education

From these examples it should be clear, then, that propaganda has to do with persuasion, conversion, and the use of argument or other

[2] M. M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1932).

verbal communication to change people's attitudes and ultimately to affect their actions. It may be contrasted with the use of violence or force to bring about change. Also, it is not to be confused with the basic function of education. There has been much dispute, however, as to the relationship of propaganda to education. Education, as we know it, concerns three basic features; first, there is the teaching and training in fundamental mental and manual skills. This is exampled by the youngster learning to read and write, to memorize, and to use the multiplication tables. Manual skills are evident in a child's learning to dress himself and to play with mechanical toys. Later he gets more formal training in the schools through a variety of shop courses. The second function of education is the provision of factual knowledge, illustrated in the contents of science, literature, and other subjects, which the child acquires and stores up for future use. In providing knowledge as well as skills, education telescopes the long cultural history of mankind. In the third place, the schools indoctrinate the growing child, adolescent, and young adult with a set of value judgments which are a basic part of the culture. The whole system of Christianity, the belief in democracy, the acceptance of the theory of private property, free enterprise, and the sacredness of contract, the whole field of morality—not only regarding sex but regarding property and human interrelations as well—are all values of importance in our society. It is in this particular area of education that propaganda may come into play. It certainly is used frequently to influence our value judgment. Without its fundamental techniques we could not induce adequate and emotionally-supported values.

Hidden or Open Propaganda

One of the reasons why propaganda has been somewhat negatively regarded is that a good deal of it has been carried on behind the scenes without people knowing who was sponsoring it. This has led us to recognize that there are two classes of propaganda: the hidden or veiled type and the open and self-evident type.

In the first, the recipients are unaware of the aims and sources of the message. They do not know who is putting out the propaganda and frequently do not know what the basic aim really is. During the interim between the two world wars, the munitions makers were putting out types of propaganda which in some quarters were regarded as fostering another war. In the late 1920's, on the issue of public or private ownership of public utilities, the private-ownership interests, under the leadership of Samuel Insull, spent large sums of money to spread their views. At the same time, there was a great deal of counterpropaganda carried on by groups who were concerned with the public ownership of these utilities. It was sometimes difficult to detect who were carrying on these campaigns and why.

In contrast to this, in open propaganda, the aim and source of the material is known. Good illustrations in our own day are political propaganda during political campaigns and money-raising campaigns for combatting cancer, heart trouble, cerebral palsy, and so on. So, too, modern advertising is really a particular kind of open and self-evident propaganda. Many of the techniques in advertising are similar to those in political propaganda. In this chapter we are chiefly concerned with political propaganda but other kinds will be noted.

Propaganda and Changing Belief Systems

Propaganda is really a device to affect our belief system. In this sense it is a technique in the induction of myth and legend, which we discussed in Chapter 9. In propaganda the aim is consciously and deliberately to modify or create myths and legends. Through various techniques of symbol manipulation, the propagandist plays upon our attitudes and ideas. He adds new stories, new explanations, and new descriptions of events, carefully designed to arouse our approval of some things or fear of others and thus build them into our beliefs, attitudes, and values. Like much of our conduct, our fears, angers, irritations, acceptances, avoidances, loves, and sympathies reflect our attachment to some particular group and our attitudes of a negative sort toward another group. In short, the propaganda plays upon us with reference to our membership in certain groups.

As we have seen, the legends and myths on which we are all brought up are largely stories of our national history, of our religion and church, of our political party, and of successful men in our history. Propaganda is merely the conscious creation of this sort of material in the interests of group survival and social control. We believe the propaganda because it fits into the unconscious attitudes which have always been satisfactory both to us and to other members of our group. Myths and legends are necessary to preserve our morale, for morale is simply the emotional toning toward the common end of basic group ideas and attitudes. Propaganda, then, is a deliberate device for increasing the effects of the usually unconscious means by which we maintain our morale and the social order.

In relation to the process of public opinion formation, propaganda comes into play chiefly at stages II and III of our four-step cycle discussed in Chapter 14. It seems to me that propaganda seldom influences issues, or the rise of issues. At least this is not direct effect. It is true that an emerging, vaguely defined social problem may be picked up by the propagandist and blown up into something quite enormous, but to do so means that he is helping to define an issue and then to open up a discussion of it. As Aldous Huxley well put it, "The propagandist is a man who canalizes an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain."

There are three classes of propaganda—the conversionary, the devisive, and the consolidation type. The conversionary type is the kind

which went into operation under the Roman Catholic use of the term. The aim is essentially that of the missionary who wishes to convert. The attempt is made by persuasion and argument to get an individual to change his attitudes, values, and ultimately his actions. Much advertising is conversionary propaganda. The individual is persuaded to buy in terms of the superiority in quality, in terms of price structure, in terms of availability on the market, and so on. Likewise, some wartime propaganda directed toward the neutrals is of this sort. The aim in this instance is to convert the neutral to participate on your side as a belligerent (see below on wartime propaganda).

Divisive propaganda uses essentially the techniques of "divide and conquer." This is frequently employed in political campaigns and is highly important in wartime propaganda directed toward the enemy. For example, during World War I, Allied propaganda to the German people repeatedly stated that the Allies were not at war with the German people but with the Kaiser and the Imperialists who surrounded him. This was directed also at the local German-American segments of our population. During World War II some of our Allied propaganda operated on much the same type of theme. It was indicated that we were at war with the principles of nazism and fascism, that we were opposed to Hitler and Mussolini and all they stood for, but that we did not wish to destroy the German or Italian people and their cultures.

Finally, there is the so-called consolidation propaganda. This is designed to bolster and strengthen the values, attitudes, and habits already at hand. It is used in wartime on the home front to bolster morale. The consolidation form of propaganda is based on the assumption that one's fundamental habits and attitudes are deep-seated and of long standing, and that if they can be aroused, the propaganda tied to them in terms of status quo and survival will be very useful.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPAGANDA

Suggestion is the key to the operation of propaganda. Specifically, propagandists employ various techniques of special pleading. Some important factors in any analysis of propaganda are: (1) the purpose which is always related to the audience toward which the propaganda is directed; (2) the material, or symbol content—the ideas and pictures in people's heads, and so on; (3) the particular suggestion and other psychological techniques employed; and (4) the effects of propaganda in modifying ideas, attitudes, values, and essentially and finally actions.

Motivation

One important and fundamental factor to bear in mind in the building up of the new myth and legend—the new symbolic materials—is to

appeal to old motivations such as desires for economic security, wish for personal and group security and safety, for prestige and mastery, for satisfaction of love, and for the well-being of family members and other intimates. Clearly this is a form of consolidation propaganda. Occasionally, even a desire for new adventure and experience may be desirable. Obviously, not every propaganda aim includes all of these at the same time. The most effective pleading is that which touches on one or more of such fundamental motivations. Since all the basic desires of man are emotionally conditioned, the expert in promotion will make ample use of love, hostility, fear, hope, and any other feelings, emotions, and sentiments appropriate to the purpose in hand.

As we well know, the underlying motivations become more intense when frustrated. It behooves the propagandist to play upon the masses when their desires for food, shelter, public safety, prestige, and the like have been thwarted, or, if they are not thwarted, to induce the conviction that they will be thwarted. Studies made during the depression of the 1930's clearly demonstrated that the propaganda appeals of the Communist party to the unemployed workers of America were always more effective when there was a reduction in the amount of public relief available. As soon as the local and federal relief agencies added to the amount of help given to the unemployed, interest of the latter in the Communist party propaganda tended to decline.[3]

Propaganda Devices

In the 1930's an organization called "Institute for Propaganda Analysis" classified various devices for use in promotional campaigns as follows: (1) *Name-calling* consists of labeling a leader, a follower, or an opponent with an emotionally-powerful positive or negative name. A good illustration of this is attributed to Martin Insull, brother of Samuel Insull, the public utilities magnate of a few decades ago. In a group discussion on how to combat a particular agitator for public ownership of public utilities, Martin Insull is said to have remarked, "The way to stop it is to pin the Bolshevik label on him!" While this story may be apocryphal, it neatly illustrates name-calling of a negative sort. So-called smear campaigns, indulged in during investigation of alleged subversion in government, use this tactic. (2) The *testimonial* is a device in which persons of prestige and high status say that they approve this or that thing or program. Mrs. Astorbilt uses Pond's cream and sleeps on an Ostermoor mattress. This kind of snob appeal is widely used in advertising and in certain kinds of propaganda. The use, for example, of the names of prominent people to sponsor reform movements is a good illustration of the propagandist's use of the testimonial. (3) *Glittering gen-*

[3] Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study* (New York, Knopf, 1939).

eralities is another term for the use of effective stereotypes and clichés. For instance, political promises in terms of *liberty, freedom, full dinner pail, new deal,* and *fair deal,* are all illustrations of the use of vague but glittering generalities. (4) In contrast to the snob appeal in testimonials, there is that directed toward the *plain folks.* The aim is to show that the masses of ordinary people like or dislike a given program or event. This is the appeal to the man on the street. A good illustration of using both the testimonial and the plain-folks appeal is found in the advertising of a well-known liquor firm. In the expensive and slick magazines this advertiser alleges that "men of distinction" drink said whiskey. In contrast, in the public transportation vehicles in many cities, one may see an advertisement which says "Joe Doaks has turned to . . ." (the whiskey in question). This is intelligent advertising because it is directed to two different levels of audience with no inconsistencies to prove bothersome. (5) There is the *band-wagon* effect. This appeal is illustrated in the popular expression "Everybody's doing it." Basically it depends on what Floyd H. Allport calls "the illusion of universality." That is to say, people assume that because they and their friends take a certain view or use a certain gadget, other people will do the same. It is essentially an identification-projection combination of response. Then there is (6) the *card-stacking* device. This is a slang expression for outright deception. Many negative critics of propaganda regard all propaganda as falling in this category. This is obviously a shortsighted and incomplete view, although in the history of propaganda there have been plenty of cases of falsification and we know that, psychologically, once a lie has been told it is very difficult to counteract it. Hitler made much use of the "Big Lie" in his propaganda. Finally, (7) *transference* is an important device. This is the technique of association, illustrated by the familiar "guilt by association." It is frequently used in political campaigns and when tied to name-calling may become very effective indeed.

These appeals are often linked to larger features of promotional campaigns: rational or irrational appeals, the use of prestige and authority and of negative symbols with regard to group affiliation. Since the emotions and feelings are closely linked to man's fundamental desires, glittering generalities about love of country and of home, about national heroes, about the protection of womanhood and property, about economic stability and a job, about political and religious freedom, are always powerful incentives to thought and action. So, too, appeals to authority are particularly effective. These derive from earlier habits of conformity to parental dominance which are now transferred to other persons. Few ever escape the early learning of submission to the powerful parent or parent substitute. Then, too, the desire to keep up with the best people implies the getting and holding of authority and prestige. The aim is to set up identification with leaders and with movements. In this connection, the

testimonial is often effective, especially from a person of high standing in the community or given class. An historical illustration is the long and effective campaign for national prohibition. For years, scientists and medical men were quoted to prove the horrible effects of alcoholic indulgence. Many more recent health campaigns with regard to cancer, heart, cerebral palsy, and other ills are effective because they are associated with big names in medicine, in science, and with people interested in public welfare.

Although these factors are extremely important, we must not neglect the rational appeals. These follow our traditional forms of thought in which we try to choose among competing patterns put before us. As we indicated in Chapter 14, the whole idea of democratic opinion formation is based on the theory of the rationality of man and on the theory that out of discussion can come the truth.

Over and over again, public campaigns to improve the condition of the old—witness the Townsend movement in the 1930's—play not only upon economic security but upon many stereotypes of health and welfare. As the proportion of older people in the United States increases, we are likely to see more of these campaigns. Other promotional programs which combine emotional and rational appeals are those in favor of various pacifistic movements. No one likes war, no one wants to be killed, hence there is a great emotional appeal to various efforts to abolish war.

Propaganda always takes place within a given social setting and in our world of strong in-group attachment and strong negative feeling toward out-groups, propaganda symbols are often fitted into the in-group —out-group dichotomy. Thus, positive in-group stereotypes of the American way of life—free enterprise, democracy, freedom of speech, and the like—are frequently used. By way of contrast, negative terms like communism, nazism, fascism, are used to label the groups and ideas which we do not approve. In this, name-calling is a central device.

Some Rules for Propaganda Campaigns

We may summarize a series of broad rules of propaganda, as follows:

1. The propaganda should be linked to basic aims or motives of those to whom it is addressed. The purpose is to gain acceptance, not reflection or thought.

2. The basic appeals should be made to emotionalized desires by symbols of promise and satisfaction. Appeals put in rational form should be reserved for particular groups and situations where such form has a prestige function.

3. Simplification of issues and solutions is imperative. A few easy symbols on a few basic matters are preferable to complex and qualified symbols and issues. The propagandist deals in blacks and whites, in straightforward right or wrong, good or evil. Such promotion should be

presented so as to be readily absorbed, without any need to be reworked either as to symbol or as to meaning. Biases in one direction or another are indicated.

4. Systematic and persistent repetition of the few simple and basic matters is important. Repetition may have its limitations in some forms of learning, but in promoting desires and ideas it is very effective.

5. Indirection, innuendo, and implication are often preferable to direct statement.

6. Once the basic desire or bias is set up, direct declarative statements may be made, and subsidiary devices, such as exaggeration, startling accusation, and outright falsehood, may be used.

7. Short-run propaganda may be directed to all age groups, but that designed for complete and extensive indoctrination should be directed to children and youth; they are the most vulnerable to suggestion and persuasion techniques.

EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA ON RECIPIENTS

While the above suggestions are useful, they bear chiefly on the stimuli. The real test is the effect of propaganda on its recipients. Some efforts have been made to get at the effectiveness of specific promotional stimuli, but this is not always easy. The long-range effects are, in particular, difficult to trace. One of the earliest studies was made by A. D. Annis and Norman C. Meier. Using a student newspaper at the University of Iowa, they planted a number of editorials regarding a visitor from Australia, Premier W. M. Hughes. Half of these were favorable, and half were unfavorable. None of the 203 subjects knew anything about Mr. Hughes. In the favorable editorials, the distinguished character of the man was stressed. The other editorials were entirely against him. Of the students who read the favorable comments, 98 per cent became pro-Hughes. Of those who read the derogatory accounts, 86 per cent became adversely disposed. A retest four months later showed that their views had not changed perceptibly.[4]

A study by Ruth C. Peterson and L. L. Thurstone showed that motion pictures could influence opinions. For example, 434 high-school students in Crystal Lake, Illinois, were given a test to discover their views on Negroes. A few days later they were shown the 1931 version of the film, "The Birth of a Nation." Shortly afterwards a comparable form of the same test was given. There was a decided shift toward the unfavorable end of the scale as shown in Figure 12. The persistence of their opinions is indicated in the retest made five months later.

Some of the effects of propaganda are brought out in a study by J. M.

[4] A. D. Annis and Norman C. Meier, "The Induction of Opinion Through Suggestion by Means of Planted Content," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1934, 5:65–81.

Levine and Gardner Murphy on the learning and forgetting of controversial material. This study is summarized in Chapter 4. As the authors show, the response to propaganda is greatly influenced by the already existing beliefs and attitudes of the recipients.



Redrawn from Ruth C. Peterson and L. L. Thurstone, *Motion Pictures and Social Attitudes of Children* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 60. By permission.

FIG. 12. Change in Attitude Toward the Negro on the Part of 434 High-School Students After Seeing the Motion Picture "The Birth of a Nation."

Information Campaigns

The limitation of information campaigns in modifying people's opinions and attitude has been amply demonstrated. In September, 1947, two organizations in Cincinnati—the American Association for United Nations, and the United Nations Association of Cincinnati—launched a six-months' crusade to make the city of Cincinnati conscious of the United Nations and to demonstrate, as they put it in their brochure, "how a community may become so intelligently informed on world affairs as to be a dynamic force in the creation of an ordered, and eventually a peaceful, world." And though the sponsors called it an experiment in mass education, it clearly comes under the category of conversionary and informational propaganda.

The National Opinion Research Center was hired to make a before-and-after survey in an effort to determine the effectiveness of this campaign. One problem was to discover whether the flow of information to the local mass media of communication—press, radio, films—was increased. The second question was the extent to which the increased supply of information is accompanied by exposure to it. It is one thing to distribute thousands of pamphlets or to have free time on the radio, and it is another to discover whether people are reading or listening to the

material. Finally, there is the question of the effectiveness of exposure to information on the individual's stock of information, on his attitudes, and upon his overt conduct.

The increased spread of information was obvious. To mention only a few activities: Parent-teachers associations reached 12,868 adults through programs devoted to the subject of world understanding. Every school child was given material on the United Nations to take home. The school teachers kept the subject constantly before their pupils and were themselves supplied with appropriate instruction and materials at their own meetings. Nearly 14,000 children in the weekday church schools held a world-community-day program. One hundred and fifty leaders in the Cincinnati Council of Church Women took training courses so as to help arrange United Nations programs. Members of the Catholic Parent-Teachers Association, numbering 10,000, were persuaded or exhorted by their Archbishop to support the United Nations. A group of clubwomen united to send 1,000 letters and 1,350 telegrams pledging their support to the American delegation of the United Nations. The radio stations broadcast facts about the United Nations, one of them scheduling a spot program 150 times a week. The newspapers played up the United Nations news and information throughout the whole six months. In the last three months of this period, 225 meetings were provided special speakers and appropriate literature. In addition, hundreds of documentary films were shown and the slogan "Peace begins with the United Nations—the United Nations begins with you" was exhibited everywhere. The objective, in one way or another, was to reach every adult among the 1,155,703 residents of Cincinnati's retail trading area.

The questions as to exposure to the materials and the effect upon individual attitudes and behavior were answered by surveys made before and after the campaign in September, 1947, and March, 1948. The first cross-section sample consisted of 745 persons interviewed before the campaign; the subsample of 592 out of the original 745 was interviewed again in March. The balance of the original group were impossible to locate or refused to be reinterviewed. A second sample of 758 adults was interviewed in March. The two samples were representative of the total population and could be matched with reference to such characteristics as age, sex, race, education, and veteran status. While no formal control group was set up, many of the same questions were asked in Cincinnati as were asked elsewhere of other samples of the National Opinion Research Center. Fundamentally, the first survey was arranged so that later changes in interest, information, and opinion with respect to world affairs in the United Nations could be determined.

The survey showed that international events had assumed greater importance in the minds of people in Cincinnati in March than they had in the previous September. On the first date, 47 per cent spontaneously

mentioned an international problem confronting the United States; 74 per cent did so at the second date.

With regard to change in orientation, in the first date in September, 48 per cent of the sample of Cincinnati expected the United States to enter another war within ten years. By the next March, this opinion was held by 73 per cent of the sample.

Although many were uncertain as to practical measures for insuring the peace, for the most part people continued to express some kind of internationalist sentiment. Approximately two-thirds in September and the same in March thought that the United States should take some active part in world affairs rather than to keep out of them. Also, approximately three-fourths in September and in March said that they would like to see the United States join in some movement to set up an international police force to maintain world peace. Moreover, about 60 per cent in September and 57 per cent in March believed that there should be some kind of international control of atom bombs rather than for each country to remain free to make its own. However, in this survey, as in many others, when individuals were pressed for specific details as to how to promote international good will and devise a sound security system, there were fewer people who had any specific ideas as to how to go about it.

One of the most striking findings of this campaign was the low percentage of persons who knew anything about the United Nations. In September, 30 per cent were classified as knowing nothing about the United Nations. In March, this figure was 28 per cent. It is interesting to compare this with a national survey made in April, 1947. At this time, 36 per cent of an adult sample in this country did not know that the United States had joined any international organization working for peace.

There were some slight changes in the number of people actively interested and working in organizations concerned with the international problem. In September, something between 11 and 15 per cent claimed that they either belonged to, or attended meetings, of such organizations. In March, these figures became 12 and 16 per cent.

Thus at the end of the six-month program in Cincinnati, there was a small but growing minority which was interested in international relations and knew something about them. Whether this increase would have occurred apart from the campaign is conjectural. But it was a nationwide phenomenon that could be attributed to the growing apprehension of Russia as the cold war progressed. Majority sentiment in Cincinnati remained generally unaware of international problems and people felt that war with Russia was just a matter of time.[5]

[5] Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGill Hughes, "Report on an Educational Campaign: The Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations," *American J. of Sociology*, 1950, 55:389–400. Quotation is from p. 395. By permission.

The most common source of information about the United Nations was the newspaper. One-half of the entire sample and more than four out of five of those already familiar with the subject said that they had seen items on the United Nations in the press. Of the entire sample, 53 per cent and three out of four of the informed group had heard radio news programs and one-fourth of the entire sample and one-third of the informed group had heard spot broadcasts. Other sources of information in order of descending frequency were signs and posters, mention in church, pamphlets and leaflets, and certain meetings.

There is a good deal of evidence here, however, of selective listening and selective recall. One of the most interesting facts is that 43 per cent, even among the most accessible element of the public, had learned nothing or knew no more, so they said, than what the press and radio reported.

The basic consideration again is the effect of the exposure of propaganda upon the recipients. The Cincinnati study showed that, on the whole, those that were most exposed were, in general, those that were most favorably disposed. The belief that the United Nations should take an active part in international affairs was found in 43 per cent of those who reported hearing nothing of the campaign, in nearly three-fourths of those who were exposed to one or two media of information, and in 85 per cent of those who were exposed to three or more media. Yet as the authors say: "But this relationship does not prove that exposure causes the attitudes; rather, the surveys indicate that people who have preexisting favorable attitudes are the ones who will pay attention to publicity, that is, that people seek information which is congenial to their attitudes." [6]

First, this study showed that those already interested, even though poorly informed, welcome information that is favorable to the United Nations. Interest is of high importance, and it is clear from this campaign that sheer information without interest does not yield very satisfactory results. Lack of interest is the psychological barrier to the diffusion of information. Second, there were less interested or not-interested groups, who, even if well-informed paid little attention to the campaign. ". . . It is the interested rather than the informed who are the more accessible." [7] The propagandist, for the most part, must find some already existing interest and play upon that; and he cannot by sheer information arouse such basic interest. There must be some social and emotional foundation in the belief system upon which he builds.

One topic which has aroused a good deal of discussion among students of public opinion and propaganda is the possible effectiveness of presenting two sides on a controversial subject, rather than concentrating

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 398.
[7] *Ibid.*

on the pro or the con of the given topic. In 1945 there was some feeling among our military chiefs that our soldiers were a little overoptimistic as to how soon the war would be over. This view, in turn, might result in some adverse effect on the operations in some theatres. Under a directive on this matter, the Information and Education Division of the Army Service Forces set up a rather extensive experiment as a check. Two programs were prepared, A and B, which had to do with the presentation of material regarding the possible continuation and the final close of the Pacific phase of the war. Program A presented only one side, and included the argument that the war would be long. This had to do with such things as the problem of distance and logistical difficulties, the resources of the stockpiles and extent of the Japanese Empire, the size and quality of the great bulk of the Japanese army with which battle had not yet been joined, and the firm determination of the Japanese people to carry on. This program, carefully prepared in advance for radio outlets, lasted 15 minutes.

Program B, which gave both sides, ran for 19 minutes. The first part of it presented the same difficulties as indicated in Program A. The additional four minutes of the other program were devoted to considering the opposite arguments, such as the United States' advantages and Japanese weaknesses, our naval victories, our previous progress despite a two-front war, our ability to concentrate all our ability on Japan after V-E day, the shipping losses of Japan, the inferiority of Japan's manufacturing, and the future damage to be expected from our expanding air war.

The design was to find out the men's initial opinions about the Pacific war and then to remeasure their opinions later after the transcriptions had been played as a part of their orientation meetings. In this way, the changes in their opinions from "before" to "after" could be determined. A control group was given the initial survey but heard no transcriptions. They, too, were resurveyed to discover any change in response which might have occurred during the time interval due to causes such as the war news from the Pacific. While there are a number of technical problems involved in this study which are of interest to research social psychologists, for our purpose we can summarize the results as follows:

1. For people who were initially opposed to the point of view being presented, to give the arguments on both sides of the issue was found to be more effective than to give only the arguments supporting the point being made.

2. However, for those who were already convinced of the point of view being presented, the inclusion of arguments on both sides was less effective for the group as a whole than a presentation of only the arguments favorable to the general position being advocated.

3. Men with better education were more favorably affected by the presentation of both sides. In contrast, men with poor education were

more affected by the communication which issued only supporting arguments.

4. The group least affected by the presentation of both sides was the group of poorly educated men who already were convinced of a point of view which was being advocated in the argument.

5. An incidental finding was that the leaving-out of a relevant argument was more noticeable and detracted more from the effectiveness in the presentation which used arguments on both sides than in the giving of arguments where only one side was discussed.[8]

Finally, information does not necessarily change attitudes in the same direction. For example, a poll conducted in this country in December, 1945, and again in February, 1946, asked for views regarding the proposed loan to Great Britain. Those who believed that the loan would be advantageous to this country were strongly in favor, while those of contrary opinion or doubtful opinion were overwhelmingly opposed to it. Interestingly enough, both those favorable and those unfavorable to the loan listed chiefly economic arguments. Apparently if people could be convinced that the economic advantage would be on our side and not against us, they might be willing to change their opinions.

On the basis of this, a sample was taken and given the appropriate information before being questioned on their attitudes. They were told that England had agreed to pay the money back with interest over a period of years and that she would take steps to put certain restrictions on her foreign trade. They were then asked whether they approved or disapproved of lending the money and to specify the amount. The control group was simply asked whether they approved or disapproved of the proposed loan.

> The experiment proved that the given information did materially change attitudes toward the loan. The experimental sample registered a 14 per cent higher "Approve" vote than did the equivalent control sample which was not given the information. . . .
>
> . . . [Another differential effect appears when a comparison is made between those who were already favorably disposed toward England and those who were not.] Among those who were already favorably disposed toward England, the information given to the experimental group was sufficient to sway a large proportion toward approval of the loan. Less than half of this group friendly to England favored the loan in the control sample, but in the experimental sample, which was given the information, the proportion rises to 70 per cent. But among those with hostile or suspicious attitudes toward England, the information had *no effect whatever*. This group was overwhelmingly

[8] Carl I. Hovland, A. A. Lumsdaine, and F. D. Sheffield, "Experiments on Mass Communication," in S. A. Stouffer and others, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949), Vol. 3, Ch. 8. Reprinted, in part, in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., "The Effects of Presenting 'One Side' Versus 'Both Sides' in Changing Opinions on a Controversial Subject," *Readings in Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, Holt, 1952), pp. 506–517.

opposed to the loan without the information, and they remained overwhelmingly opposed to it even when they were exposed to the information.[9]

This study and many others show the limitations of propaganda unless it is tied to the basic and fundamental interests and values of the prospective recipients. The propagandist is chiefly effective when the issue has already been indicated. (See above.)

CENSORSHIP

Propaganda is a form of social control, particularly as it facilitates and modifies social participation. By the same token, censorship is a type of restraint closely related to propaganda. Let us examine some of its features.

Nature of Censorship

Censorship is a form of social control designed to stop the expression of opinion, belief, or idea. The restriction of behavior by physical force is not censorship. Rather censorship refers to formal or informal taboos on communication, traditionally that in printed form and latterly also with reference to motion pictures, radio, and television.

Censorship may be analyzed either from the standpoint of its institutional or its psychological features. On the institutional side, it consists of legal regulations—the formal controls—or of social taboos, or mores —the informal controls—which are exercised by the community at large or by some organized group within the community. Laws regarding the printing of pornography or of subversive political views illustrate formal control. The widespread sanctions imposed in terms of morals on novels openly dealing with sex or undermining accepted faith in religion would illustrate the informal taboos. In practice, as we know, special groups often appeal to legal agencies, in the name of public morality, to secure the suppression of a given pamphlet, book, or motion picture. Sometimes, as in the burning of German books in certain American towns during World War I, the sanction was imposed by mob action.

It is well to bear in mind that the taboos on printed matter are often couched in vague and ambiguous terms, such as "obscenity," "pornography," or "radicalism." This is a common feature of the mores which are often loosely defined. But the same vagueness carries over into the law which has never—at least in our society—carefully defined these terms, just as it has never fully determined whether a book was censorable only when it was considered as a whole, or if it could be censored because of one or a few so-called obscene words taken out of context. As a result,

[9] H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1947, 11:412–423. Reprinted in Swanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–95. Quotation is from pp. 420, 421. By permission.

vagueness and indefiniteness as to how *much* it takes to make a book taboo facilitate a wide variety of attacks on literature by individuals or groups that do not approve them.

Psychologically, censorship prevents a stimulus or impression from reaching an individual. It rests on the essential theory that *if there is no stimulus, there can be no response.* Obviously censorship is a social act in the sense that the stoppage of the stimulus and, hence, of the potential response, derives from one person's imposing his will on another. Some person or group agency acts to prevent another individual or group from receiving ideas on particular topics. This is the essential psychology of the social control involved in censorship. While in democratic societies such taboos usually arise *after* the ideas appear in print or other media, the most effective control is clearly that imposed *before* the material appears at all. In various historical periods, church and state alike have operated in this latter way to stop public communication. In our own time authoritarian states employ these tactics. Total and complete prevention is the most effective method of maintaining an intellectual blackout in any society. In democratic societies censorship is usually less pervasive and severe, except in time of war when political and especially military information may come under heavy restraint.

Such group restrictions have their counterpart in the individual's inner life. We all censor or pass judgment on many matters as "good or bad," "like or dislike." This habit of inner suppression is called the conscience or superego and it may even keep our daydreams in line with the moral code. This mental machinery for tabooing thoughts and especially the expression of thoughts is derived from social training—at home, in school, and in church. In fact, it is the essence of sound moral training to induce just such self-operating inner controls. External pressures have limited effects; but when the taboos are thoroughly accepted, or when there is complete ignorance of conflicting or different views and practices, it may be said that there is little or no need for external censorship.

Present-day Censorship

The first element in an analysis of present-day censorship are the conditions under which such restraints tend to arise. Let us examine some of these. While we seldom experience such over-all and complete taboo on the expression of ideas as is to be found in totalitarian societies, there has been a good deal of censorship in this country. Sometimes this seems to many people to go beyond the needs of national security or the desires to maintain our moral code.

Censorship comes into play when those who dominate our systems of social control begin to feel a threat either to their power or to the system which has been long accepted. Actually, of course, those who are the operating agents of social control—formal or informal—usually identify

the preservation of traditional controls with their own status and power. Among other areas of thought and conduct which have experienced the threat or actuality of censorship in our society are discussions of biological evolution and its implications for morals and religion, critiques of the Bible and Christian writings which put them in an adequate historical and psychological perspective, attacks on the political and economic order by revolutionaries, and, perhaps most common of all, the treatment of sex. These clearly represent basic values in our culture.

Instances of censorship both in peacetime and in war are ample. Books like *Lady Chatterley's Lover, Strange Fruit,* and even classics like *The Decameron* have come under the ban in various communities. The stage has long been subject to periodic censorship and the motion picture industry, to offset periodic public clamor for national censorship, has long since had its own censorship agency which operates *prior* to release of most movies. During World War II a popular book entitled *Undercover,* by J. R. Carlson, aroused much public discussion and many attempts were made to prevent its reaching our military personnel. It was also suppressed in many communities. With respect to the educational programs designed for men in military services, there have been periodic attempts to prevent alleged subversive materials from reaching them. The lengths to which military officialdom may go is illustrated in a case where a book of readings for general economics was banned because one reprinted piece therein was a selection from *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels.

The Rationale for Censorship

To ask why such books, either in the political or literary field, should be attacked raises questions both at the institutional and the psychological level of interpretation. Regarding the institutional analysis, there is no doubt that some persons and some organized groups in this country feel threatened by criticism of their deep-seated convictions on politics, economics, and morals. They easily make use of the generally unsettled psychological atmosphere of wartime to take legal or other measures to ban certain publications. The camouflage of crying "Wolf, Wolf" is an old one, and many people may quickly associate the call for censorship with the preservation of values which really have little to do with the issue. Thus, it is easier to attack *The Grapes of Wrath* as a nasty book than to examine the basic causes of population mobility under conditions of drought and hard times, or to expose the exploitation of farm labor under the highly commercialized agriculture of some sections of our country. It reminds one of the familiar tendency to blame the motion pictures for much of our juvenile delinquency rather than to spend time in seeking out and curing the more direct causes of personal demoralization in our urban society.

Censorship always reveals our deep moral values in the face of changes. So, too, it reveals in our local and national life the persistence of certain agencies who consider themselves the keepers of the moral ideals and the moral conduct of others. There is no doubt that certain class standards, certain political views, and many traditional codes regarding sex are still protected by powerful interests that do not wish to see them altered. Among other such agencies which support tradition are conservative churches, especially those long accustomed to controlling the reading and thinking of their congregations. Then, too, there are the lingering followers of Anthony Comstock who still find considerable community support for their periodical forays against any printed matter which they consider to be obscene, pornographic, and contrary to public decency.[10] These do-gooders often rationalize or excuse their suppression of the free press and free speech in terms which carry a lot of emotional freight and appear to represent values of utmost importance to the continuity of our society. It is an appeal which is bound to find much support, since it symbolizes at least one area in which some stability, some link with tradition and custom, may be found in these otherwise troublesome and changing times.

In this connection, it is worth noting that though the publication of Alfred Kinsey's books on the sex life of American men and women aroused considerable anxiety and hostility, there was no effective suppression of these volumes except in a few localities. This fact itself symbolizes a change in the American attitude toward sex. At least we are arriving at a point where we can discuss this topic rather frankly. As to whether there is a corresponding modification in sex behavior is another question and is beyond our present concern.

[*For Suggested Readings, see end of Chapter 20*]

[10] Comstock was the leading crusader against what he regarded as immoral publications of his day. He died in 1915.

CHAPTER 20

Propaganda in International Relations

PROPAGANDA concerned with international relations is really a part of the larger conflict between contemporary sovereign states. It has now become an integral part of total war. In some quarters the phrase "psychological warfare" has been substituted. But in any case, all the techniques of propaganda used on the domestic front are used in wartime propaganda and in the cold war of the years of peace between overt military actions. Effective propaganda is linked to espionage and to the development of strategy and tactics of war, as well as to censorship and other forms of control.

In this chapter we shall briefly relate the nature of propaganda in World War I and devote more space to the propaganda of World War II and since.[1]

PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR I

During World War I, in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson established a Committee on Public Information. George Creel, long a successful newspaper man, was put in charge. What he called "paper bullets" —to the number of 75 million pamphlets, leaflets, and so on—were poured out on the home front, on the enemy, and on the neutrals. In addition, hundreds of posters and cartoons were prepared and distributed. The Committee organized and directed 750,000 public speeches which were delivered in over 5,000 American communities.

The Targets of Propaganda

Propaganda in World War I had three chief targets. The first of these was to mobilize and direct hostility against the enemy and to under-

[1] One of the best accounts of propaganda in World War I is H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York, Knopf, 1927).

mine and destroy his morale. The second aim was to build up and maintain high morale on the home front. The third, was to build up and preserve the friendship of neutrals and in some instances to enlist their active co-operation in the war.

The most familiar technique in the effort to undermine and destroy enemy morale was to blame the leaders and not the people for the war. Thus, as we noted above, the Kaiser and the German militarists were said to be responsible for the war and not the German people. Secondly, great promises were made to the German people if they would surrender. This is partially a moral plea in the sense that if the war is continued, then the people *will be* responsible. Both sides of the conflict played on this particular view of moral principles and blame. The German propaganda to the German people stressed the story of "Perfidious Albion," of the long-cherished foreign policy of the French to revenge themselves on Germany for the defeat of 1870, and of the menace to Germany of the Russian Pan-Slavism. In contrast, the Allies emphasized German militarism and insane nationalism. The Germans countered this by asserting that British talk of "freedom of the seas" was but a cover-up for their policy of "Rule Britannia." Thus, satanism had a place on each side. Each one accused the other of having devilish intentions and regarded itself as the savior of the world.

The second aim, to build up and maintain the fighting spirit or morale of one's own nation, is based essentially on the strong appeal of in-group versus out-group. The tendency was to paint the world as white and black, as good or evil, with one's own country always in the role of white and good. The kindness and good will for one's own in-group was promoted, in part, by the atrocity stories about the enemy and had an important part in the propaganda of World War I. The purpose of atrocity stories—in contrast to some common-sense interpretations—is not only to get the enemy to stop atrocious practices but to frighten and enrage those at home and thus enhance their fighting spirit. All kinds of wild stories were told about the Germans cutting off the hands of the children, of boiling corpses to make soap, and committing rapine and robbery among the Allied populations. On the German side, the Allies were accused of employing black savages from Africa to fight a white and civilized people; they were accused of the use of guerillas, of imprisoning civilians, of mutilation, plundering, and sadism.

As in other wars, religious ideas were used to sanctify the conflict as evidence of God's will. To hate the enemy was to be not only a good citizen of a country, but a good Christian. Supporting the arms of righteousness against those of evil and sin was a high mark of religious faith. There was the ideal of making the world safe for democracy; it was a war to end all wars.

Then, too, great effort was made to build up friendship among the

Allies. The tremendous sacrifice of France and Britain in the war was played upon. Their heroes and statesmen became symbols of identification for all.

While it was important to keep certain countries neutral so as to act as go-betweens and provide exchange of information, in World War I a great effort was made by the British, especially, to get the United States into the war on their side. In doing this, it was important for the British to avoid antagonizing certain elements of the American public. They got prominent Americans to speak in favor of the Allied cause. They made good use of an extensive press service in this country and sent materials to all the important American newspaper outlets. Some of this British propaganda was cleverly disguised. Among important themes which appealed to the Americans was the sacrifice theme. It aimed at the preservation of Western civilization and the destruction of the evil forces opposing it. Certain atrocity stories were effective with many neutrals, particularly if they were already somewhat favorably disposed toward the British. Moreover, the propaganda the British directed toward this country, both in World War I and World War II, would have been far less effective were it not for the fact that Britain and the United States have the same cultural roots and the same basic and fundamental value systems. Hence the sacrifice theme, linked to our identification with the British, and the Allies-as-savior theme, produced a sense of guilt and shame on the part of many Americans and became a factor in building public sentiment favorable to joining in the war.

All through the war, the basic effort was to induce defeatism and despair in the enemy and to bolster patriotism and strengthen the will to victory on the home front. The first weeks of swift military success against the French and the Russians intoxicated both the German military and the German masses. At the outset the Allies had a much harder time to keep up the morale of their people and to give them assurance of an ultimate victory. Yet, as the war dragged on, the German strength was drained away and Allied powers were gradually built up. The early optimism of the Germans gave way to anxieties and doubts and, finally, to defeatism and despair. Whether it was the home front or the military front which broke first is difficult to determine, but this is of little consequence in the historical review. Apparently it was a combination of the drain on resources, war-weariness, and the effects of Allied propaganda which brought about the final collapse. It would be foolish to attribute too much to the psychological weapons in defeating the Germans in 1918, but there is little doubt that the propaganda had telling effect, as both German military and political historians later admitted.

THE INTERLUDE BETWEEN TWO WARS

Dissipation of Allied Co-operation

Shortly after the end of World War I, the unified and solid front of the Allies—both military and psychological—began to dissolve. The United States witnessed a sharp reaction against involvement in European affairs. The failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the failure to join the League of Nations were symbolic of the isolationism which swept over this country. And the growing awareness that our Allies would not or could not pay their debts to us helped bolster our "hands off Europe" policy. Everywhere went up the cry for a "return to normalcy," which meant a rapid elimination of restrictions that had been imposed during the war years.

Among our former Allies, the British were busy rebuilding their industry and commerce on a peacetime basis and were turning toward their dominions and colonies for co-operation. In France, the old rifts between parties and classes reappeared. Moreover, the growth of what was later called "the Maginot Line" psychology, with regard to future wars with Germany, had a bemusing effect upon French foreign policy. The building of strong internal defenses on the France-Germany borders came to be regarded as efficient security against possible future war. The French fell into an easy attitude toward both their former enemies and their former allies.

In addition to the rebirth of strong nationalistic trends, for a time, in Europe, a great deal of faith was put in the League of Nations. Yet when its inherent weakness became apparent, schemes of "collective security" were developed with an eye to bolstering the peace. Yet in the end, the Maginot Line, collective security, appeasement of the Nazis, and the British navy were unable to prevent World War II.

The attitude toward wartime propaganda is interesting in this connection. There was a veritable wave of anti-propaganda hysteria in the United States and in Britain. The secret power of propaganda which had been felt in Britain and this country began to be dissipated. Propaganda got a bad name. There was a whole shelf of books debunking the wartime propaganda and the idealism with which it had been associated in men's minds. In Western democracies, this phobia of propaganda became enhanced during the years of the depression. It became a firm attitude both in this country and to a lesser degree in Britain. In Germany, the distrust of propaganda was manipulated by the Nationalists and later by the Nazi movement. Propaganda was identified with the Allied effort to defeat Germany and keep her from regaining an important place in European affairs. So, too, the whole propaganda activity in this interlude between

the two wars is linked with the relations of the West toward Russia and the Bolshevik Revolution and a little later toward the rise of Fascism in Italy and of National Socialism in Germany.

The Russian Revolution left a residue of strong antipathy toward the new Russian government. The Allies regarded Russian withdrawal from the war under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky as traitorous. For years after the close of the war, there was widespread avoidance and distrust of the new Soviet Union. Russia developed the theory of the encirclement by its former allies and former enemies, with an accompanying strong in-group solidarity. Having eliminated the counter-revolutionary forces, Lenin, and later Stalin, proceeded to execute a series of programs to industrialize the country and to build a strong national spirit in Soviet Russia. The Communist party in Russia, however, still regarded itself as the torchbearer in the attack on capitalism and the alleged decadent political democracy of the West. From the standpoint of the former Allies, Soviet Russia took on an ever more-menacing aspect. The infiltration of Soviet influence over the world was not unnoticed and a good deal of hostility was developed.

National Socialism

The rise of National Socialism in Germany, however, tended to distract the Western powers from the long-range program of Russian expansion. Since the Nazi movement is an illustration of extremely effective indoctrination and propaganda, let us take a brief look at some aspects of its psychological and related campaigns. The rise of fascism under Mussolini in Italy was but a prelude to the much more important development of National Socialism in Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and his party.

The *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* was but one of several highly nationalistic political movements which followed the Versailles Treaty. The Weimar Republic was a weak compromise between irreconcilable rival forces. The long tradition of monarchy, militarism, and bureaucracy did not make for easy acceptance of democratic forms of government. The severe crises associated with inflation, loss of foreign trade, prolonged unemployment, and international loss of prestige and power, brought on conditions with which the Weimar government could not cope. Hitler, combining the concepts of strong nationalism with those of socialism in the name of his party, gave focus to the gradually reviving German morale. Under conditions of persistent political and economic instability, he was able finally, by use of agitation, propaganda, and an organized minority of militant power, to seize control of the country. Once in the saddle, the Nazis silenced all overt opposition and proceeded to rebuild a national state along their own lines.

As all careful students of the subject know, propaganda alone cannot

make a revolution. It is but one of the various factors which assist the process. The basic conditions for revolution lie in economic, political, and religious conditions within the country itself (see Chapter 24).

It has sometimes been said that, in contrast to revolutionary communism which had systematic formulation at the hands of Marx and Lenin, National Socialism had no basic theory. This is not quite accurate. Its roots lie deep in German political theory and practice. There was a firm belief that racial and folk ideals were basic to the state and that an intense nationalism is an important means of survival. So, too, there was a wide belief in the need for a strong leader and a ruling élite. These notions flowered under National Socialism, but they were not conceived in this movement.

The immediate background of the rise of Nazism is exemplified in the social myth that the war of 1914–18 was lost by a "stab in the back." That is, the blame was put on democratic and socialist elements among the German masses who are alleged to have become indoctrinated by the divisive propaganda of the Allies and of communist Russia. As noted above, propaganda played a part, but by no means was it the basic and fundamental factor in the defeat of the Central Powers. Yet the "stab-in-the-back" theory provided a convenient rationalization in military and revolutionary circles. It was also an emotional defense against accepting the clause in the Versailles Treaty in which Germany was obliged to admit her war guilt. The persistent contention by Germany that she could not pay her war debts and reparations was bolstered by her resentment against the war-guilt clause and loss of power.

The use of propaganda as a means to stir up the German masses regarding their troubles is clearly seen in the writings of Adolf Hitler himself. But he well knew that organization and propaganda must be linked together. As he put it, the aim of propaganda is to recruit followers or supporters, while the aim of party organization is to make active members. The former are those who are more or less passively in favor of the movement, the latter make up the militant minority who fight for it. The aim of propaganda is to work on the general public, to prepare them for the time when the revolutionary idea is ready to be put into effect. The purpose of the organization is to get members who will persistently fight for the success of the idea. He explained it thus: [2]

> If propaganda has imbued a whole people with an idea, the organization can draw the consequences with the help of a handful of men. Propaganda and organization, in other words, supporters and members, thus stand in a certain mutual relation. The better the propaganda has worked, the smaller the organization can be; and the larger the number of supporters, the more modest the number of [active] members need be; and vice versa. . . .
>
> The first task of propaganda is to win people for the subsequent organiza-

[2] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manheim (Boston, 1943), pp. 582, 582–583. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Co.

tion; the first task of organization is to win men for the continuation of propaganda. The second task of propaganda is the disruption of the existing state of affairs and the permeation of this state of affairs with the new doctrine; while the second task of organization must be the struggle for power, thus to achieve the final success of the doctrine.

The most striking success of a revolution based on a philosophy of life will always have been achieved when the new philosophy of life as far as possible has been taught to all men, and, if necessary, later forced upon them, while the organization of the idea, in other words, the movement, should embrace only as many as are absolutely required for the occupying of the nerve centers of the state in question.

Hitler's distinction between organization and propaganda is basic. Without organization, propaganda is meaningless. Moreover, this relationship fits into the important distinction between the use of physical force and the manipulation of symbols. According to this theory, the organization—be it labor union, political party, church, nation, state, or other group—must be prepared to use force if necessary. In contrast, propaganda can only operate with symbols. Yet the two are intimately linked.

What the early anarchists called "the propaganda of the deed" has long since become a basic feature in all psychological warfare. That is to say, overt events—military victory, the use of terror, the "peaceful" penetration of and absorption of a neighboring state, a show of armed force —act as persuasive influences in helping both divisive and conversionary techniques of propaganda.

Such a combination of force and propaganda was little understood among the democratic countries during the two decades 1920–40. It took World War II to teach the United States this aspect of psychological warfare. We had been accustomed to the propaganda of special-interest or pressure groups competing for profits and power within our democratic and accepted framework of law and order. It took us twenty years to realize how the Fascists, the Nazis, and Communists employed this combination of force and persuasion. Surely the liberal elements in the Weimar Republic did not understand what was going on. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, openly boasted that his party deliberately made use of democratic symbols of free speech, free press, and free assemblage to undermine the Weimar government: [8]

> If democracy permitted us to use democratic methods in the time of our opposition, it was because this was necessary under a democratic system. We National Socialists have never maintained that we were representatives of a democratic viewpoint, but we have openly declared that we only made use of democratic means in order to gain power, and that after the seizure of power we would ruthlessly deny to our opponents all those means which they had granted to us during the time of our opposition.

[8] Joseph Goebbels, "Wesen und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus," *Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik*, 1935, Heft 8, p. 13.

The Nazis understood the basic functions of propaganda. The positive means were designed to give center or focus for personal identification of the masses. The negative techniques were used to undermine and destroy old and competing attitudes and values. The following features were important: (1) the clear fixation on a goal—this might be a part of a long or short-term purpose of the party; (2) the use of single and simple themes constantly and persistently repeated till the goal was reached or some other direction seemed more important; (3) the clever exploitation of the weaknesses or divisions in the national state toward which the propaganda was directed; (4) the use of emotional rather than rational appeals, unless the latter were needed for a special group, such as the intellectuals.

The means used were familiar—slogans and symbols, including stereotypes, myths, and legends. Hitler always placed much emphasis on platform speeches, and these were carefully prepared and so presented as to play upon the emotions and ideas both of his immediate and radio audiences. Music, lighting effects, and marching were amply used whenever circumstances permitted. There was much pageantry, especially with a large party gathering. Often there was outright provocation of open fights with other groups, especially with the communists, which served as a warning and as the propaganda of the deed.

In their press the Nazis used flaming headlines, emotional presentation, and other tricks of journalism. Pamphlets and brochures were popular. After Hitler's rise to power, the motion picture was widely used, both at home and abroad. Before 1933, the Nazis had no access to the radio, but they did organize radio-listening groups which protested against programs with which they disagreed. Published accounts of such protests served to keep the party in the public eye. After 1933, the radio became one of their most effective and far-reaching instruments of the psychological warfare.

When they came to power, the Nazis had two basic aims: The first was to complete their conquest of Germany. The other was to so manipulate foreign countries as to make Germany not only a leading European nation but also the dominant Western power. As we know, Hitler had amazing success on both counts.

The first step in the full control of Germany was to make the party the only political and community power in the nation. By modifying the Weimar constitution, ostensibly by legal means, the Nazi party moved to complete control of every state agency. The revolution quickly attained a legality seldom before witnessed in the history of revolutions. The fundamental phase of this was the process of *Gleichschaltung*, a process of liquidation, co-ordination, and acceptance that affected every group and institution in Germany.

The National Socialists completely controlled the schools, the news-

papers, the motion pictures, and the radio. All youth groups, labor unions, and quasi-public insurance companies—all community organizations, even the smallest—came under their aegis. Business and industry were rigidly controlled. The Lutheran Church was coerced into line and the activities of the Roman Catholic Church severely restricted. The methods used were complete absorption by legal means, infiltration of membership, and violent destruction, which was followed by remaking along "proper" party lines of the features they wished to keep. The potential subtle appeals to men in mass society are found in these words of Goebbels: [4]

> National Socialism, by having simplified the thinking of the German masses, and by bringing it back to its original primitive formulas, has presented the complicated processes of political and economic life in their simplest terms. . . . In order to get understanding among the masses, we consciously practiced a popular (*"volksgebundene"*) propaganda. We have taken complexes of facts which were formerly accessible only to a few specialists and experts, and carried them to the streets, and hammered them into the brain of the little man.

This simplification of ideas, this leading the thought of the German masses back to its "primitive formulas," was frequently brought about by downright falsification of facts. The cue to the acceptance of this is found in the oft-quoted defense by Hitler of the big rather than the little lie. As he put it, in view of the simplicity of the minds of the people, they would more easily "fall a victim to a big lie, than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that would be too big." [5]

The Nazis promised the German masses great things for the future: restoration of national power, union of all Germans everywhere, the regaining of lost colonies, and the expansion of industry and foreign trade. Popular targets of hostility were the Versailles Treaty, which was held responsible for Germany's ills, the communists, who threatened capitalism and religion, and the Jews, who became the most popular and enduring of all the scapegoats. In one breath, the Jews were blamed for the stab in the back in 1918 and for the sell-out to the plutocratic democracies of Great Britain, France and the United States. In the next breath they were held responsible for the rise and spread of the powerful and dangerous communism of the Soviet Union.

In their operations in foreign countries, the Nazis made good use of their diplomatic and consular services. So, too, German commercial organizations were operating in other nations as were various literary, research, and other societies, such as the German Foreign Institute, the League of Germandom in foreign countries, and the Fichte society. These latter were largely taken over by the Nazis. In addition, Nazi party organizations were set up among German emigrants wherever possible.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[5] Adolf Hitler, *op. cit.*, p. 231. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Co.

The aims, naturally, varied with the circumstances. With respect to territorial expansion in Europe itself, the Nazis moved step by step to regain the Saar and the Rhineland, to bring about the *Anschluss* with Austria, and still later to move into Sudetenland and Danzig. Moreover, the Pan-Germanism of World War I was transformed into a theory of geopolitics which had as one of its fundamental theses the need for *Lebensraum* or living space in Europe and elsewhere.

The need to know fully the people and culture of each particular region or country was well recognized and fully practiced. What Ewald Banse called "applied national psychology" became an important concern. The military and political leaders well understood that a full knowledge of the other countries was essential in planning and executing a propaganda or military campaign or both. This included not only information on resources, population, industry, and geography but on the attitudes, hopes, fears, and disappointments of a people. The political leaders co-ordinated their work with the military strategists, planning the next war. Espionage, fifth-column infiltration, and propaganda were tied together.[6] The story of the Nazi conquests is well known.[7]

Once these areas were safely in the hands of the Nazis, they prepared to take over other sections, either by outright conquest or by peaceful penetration, with the general pattern of operations in the conquest of Denmark, Norway, the Low countries, and northern France. Since those operations led directly to World War II, we shall treat the propaganda features in the next section.

PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II

In modern total war, propaganda merges with the military and political strategy and tactics of the conflicting nations. The whole aim of psychological warfare with respect to the enemy, the neutrals, and the home front was well put in 1936 in the following statement by two of the leading Nazi propagandists: [8]

> The initial means of action is propaganda. Its aims are three-fold: It will first belittle the strength of the enemy in the eyes of the world, seek to convert the enemy population to the hopelessness of their cause, arouse civil war behind the enemy line, and lure the enemy population into the belief that

[6] See Ewald Banse, *Germany Prepares for War*, translated by Allan Harris (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934).

[7] Chronologically considered, these early Nazi successes were but a continuation of territorial seizures made by other ambitious powers. Japan's taking of Manchuria in 1931 was followed in a few years by Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. So, too, the Soviet Union's "protective" custody of the eastern Baltic states, following so closely on the heels of the Moscow-Berlin pact of 1939 and the quick German conquest of western Poland, were other instances of the same trend.

[8] Hermann Franke and Friedrich Bertkau, "Geistiger Krieg," *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaft*, Erster Band, *Wehrpolitik und Kriegsführung*, 1936, p. 105.

peace can be easily obtained. Second, it will convince the neutral countries of one's love of peace and the righteousness of one's own cause in contrast to the enemy who has broken international law and peace, and further lead the neutrals to believe that the enemy is a dangerous threat to them and to the society of nations and should be wiped out with their help. In the third place it will fortify the faith and confidence of one's own nation in victory and in the justice of one's cause, and induce the masses to exert all efforts to attain victory.

German Propaganda—Early Phase

Germany's preparation, both military and psychological, was superb. The appeasement policies of France and Britain and the overconfidence of the former in the Maginot Line and of the latter in their navy found them both unable to render Poland any effective aid. The conviction of national greatness which came to Germany with these early victories had a tremendous effect on enemy and neutral alike. Hitler's bid for an easy, quick peace, however, did not succeed. During the autumn and winter of 1939–40, military action in the west was slight. In fact, the Germans themselves helped to propagate the myth of the "phony war" in the hope finally of dividing the Allies and securing satisfactory peace terms.

In this period, German propaganda was very active. The Nazis constantly broadcast to the French that they were not really enemies but friends, that the British had dragged the French into the war against the latter's own will and better judgment. Also, as a means of undermining morale, they directed their radio to the French soldiers, informing them that British soldiers who were far behind the lines were making love to their wives and sweethearts. They also impressed the French troops with their omniscience by frequently broadcasting the details of troop movements, naming their commanding officers, and even giving secret details of their personal lives, such as their amours and their hidden political activities. On the French home front the fifth-columnists were busy, often in more or less direct connection with the vast spy system which Germany had built up in France. Left-wing labor, moreover, was under a constant barrage of propaganda by the French Communist party, which followed orders from Moscow and during this period opposed the war as a purely imperialistic venture. The military and civilian authorities attempted to counteract this divisive and disruptive propaganda by jamming the Nazi wavelengths, by domestic morale-building efforts, and by counter-propaganda to Germany.

In contrast, the German propaganda directed to Britain was of somewhat different character. Lord Haw Haw—an Irishman named William Joyce—had defected to Hitler in the early days of the war. His programs aimed at England began in the spring of 1938. The aim of this prewar period was to make the British discontented with their government and to spread the desire for peace. Lord Haw Haw—the name the

British gave him—played upon every issue and every class. To housewives and wage earners he stressed the rising cost of living and mounting unemployment. To the religious he spoke of the moral degradation in the country. To the young people he talked about the decadence and ineffective leadership of the oldsters. He told the lower classes that most of their troubles came from the concentrated wealth and power in the upper classes.

This kind of propaganda continued throughout the first nine months of the war. But with the *Blitzkrieg* in Denmark and Norway, Joyce began to play upon fear, panic, and threats of great force. As events of the spring and summer of 1940 unfolded, Lord Haw Haw detailed the military and other reasons why England could not possibly win. The only sane thing was to surrender.

After the fall of France his tone became even more threatening. The invincibility of Germany was stressed, illustrating the propaganda of the deed. After the defeat in Flanders, he tried open incitement to rebellion on the part of his listeners.

During the winter of 1940–41, the inability of the Germans to force Great Britain to her knees and the coming of lend-lease aid from the United States forced changes in Nazi propaganda. The uselessness of a long struggle was stressed and the success of the U-boat campaign against shipping and the mere trickle of American aid became common themes.

German Propaganda—Later Phases

The early months of 1940 saw a very effective use of the war of nerves as a part of the threat toward overt military action. It was an old device to indulge in verbal sword rattling in one direction while preparing to strike in another. This worked amazingly well for the Nazis in the few weeks between the collapse of the attempt to salvage Norway and the attack on the west on May 10, 1940. Suspense, mystery, fear and impending danger were all used with dramatic effects.

There followed in these weeks many threats, first, that Belgium neutrality was going to be once more violated by the German movement into that country. Then, during the next few days, the Germans focused their attention on the Balkans and the Mediterranean, giving out hints that they were probably going to attack in that area. This was followed by rumors out of Belgrade that Germany and Italy had reassured Jugoslavia that they would not attack that country. There were denials all around, but the news had the effect of further putting attention on the Balkans.

The tempo was stepped up. The Nazis pointed out that, hitherto, the Balkans had been only a secondary theatre of war, but if the British started anything there the Germans would be prepared to meet them on their own terms. Then suddenly the center of attention swung across Europe to the Netherlands with reports that the Dutch had arrested fifth-

columnists and that the Belgians had arrested a few Nazis. Then there was a return of the Balkan theme with reports out of Rome that Italy could easily defeat the British fleet and that Germany had immense air power. Shortly after that, the Nazis played their trump card when they stated, as they had before the Norwegian invasion, that they had discovered Allied plans for an invasion of the Balkans. The neutral news sources in Berlin, especially the American sources, stressed the alarm in the Balkans.

Although on May 8, 1940, the Dutch canceled all military leaves, this got slight attention in the newspapers. The German military communique for that date was cryptic: "Nothing of importance on the western front." And, then, on May 10, the German troops poured into the Low Countries. The Nazis followed by accusing the British of using the Balkan stories to mislead the Axis powers and asserted that the Allies themselves had planned to use the Low Countries as an invasion base against Germany. In keeping with the usual line of propaganda, the Germans announced that their foresight and military preparation had forestalled an Allied thrust in the Low Countries. In fact, German official notes to both Belgium and the Netherlands began by justifying the invasion as a defensive measure against a military plan of the Allies. This is a beautiful illustration of the use of projection and blame on the Allies for what the Axis had in their own plans.

Again, during the battle of Flanders, the Germans made good use of Associated Press Correspondent Louis P. Lochner, by stimulating him to give out a report to the American newspapers that the Nazis were practically on the Channel and ready to attack England. This planted newspaper story had the desired effect of leading many to believe the Germans fully intended to attack England at once. This gullible newsman was merely a convenient pawn in the larger game of strategy. A few days later the Germans had swung their Panzer divisions southward and moved on Paris.

Later the Allies used much the same kind of diversionary propaganda. For example, for some time before the landing at Salerno, Italy, there was talk of invading the Balkans from the Near-Eastern base. Sporadic air raids were made on German installations in the Eastern Mediterranean as a further indication that this might be the Allied plan. Also, there is no doubt that the periodic talk in 1942 and 1943 about opening a second front had the effect of tying down a good many German divisions in Atlantic coastal areas of Europe.

It is clear that wartime propaganda is geared into military and larger political activities. During the early successes of the Germans, the doctrine of their invincibility, of the weaknesses of the enemy, and the inevitability of Nazi success were popular themes from Berlin. In their early propaganda, the Allies had to appeal to time, defensive measures,

and the moral righteousness of their cause. Later they added the theme of their own immense strength.

Allied Propaganda

While the attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized the American people into action, the event was used by the Axis powers to point out American weakness and the foolishness of trying to meet invincible forces. On our part, while we bid for time, we emphasized our amazing industrial capacity, our latent manpower, and our continued determination to defeat all enemies. This defensive period finally came to an end with the landing in North Africa and with the beginning of slow but steady offensive operations in the Pacific. Along with this, American and British propaganda followed the change in strategy and tactics. The growing power of America was stressed, and sometimes the appeal was made directly to the troops opposing our own. In the Tunisian campaign, for example, thousands of pamphlets were dropped over the German line telling of the flight of General Rommel and pointing out his cowardice in leaving his troops to face their defeat at the hands of the Allies.

At the same time, of course, Germany was now able for the first time to reach our men by pamphlet and radio, and she soon had special broadcasts for our boys. These attempted to stimulate homesickness, warned that other men might be stealing one's wife or sweetheart, emphasized the foolishness of Americans who fight Europe's wars, and suggested distrust of American political leaders. This was intermingled with modern dance music and vaudeville patter, in which there was a good deal of ribald humor, some of it from allegedly American girls broadcasting for the Nazis.

The interplay of military events and the psychological offensive is also seen in devices used by the British during heavy aerial action against Germany and German-occupied countries. Along with their bombs, they dropped counterfeit ration cards, false "Official" directions regarding evacuation of stricken areas, and all sorts of misleading advice to the population. Such devices confused people, led to misunderstanding between civilians and authorities, and thus spread discontent and grumbling. All this was but a part of a larger campaign to undermine German morale.

After considerable delay the British set up an elaborate series of foreign-language broadcasts. These were directed to the German home front, to the German military forces, to residents in conquered territory, and to the neutrals of Europe and Latin America. Later, when the United States came into the war, she, too, set up an extensive foreign broadcasting system with programs designed to undermine German and Japanese morale, convince neutrals of our power, and enlist the aid of dissident elements within the enemy countries.

Propaganda and the Neutrals

In World War II, as in World War I, the neutrals played about the same roles. In the early phase, the three most powerful neutrals were the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. They all became later involved on one side or the other. Many smaller states, especially those of Latin America, declared war on the Axis or at least severed diplomatic relations. In the final phases of the war, the number of neutrals was reduced to a bare minimum. This was truly a total war.

The function of a neutral in wartime, as already noted, is highly important. Such a country affords a social oasis in the midst of a world in open conflict. It provides a basis for espionage and counterespionage, for communication of the underground with the mother country, and finally as a sounding board for propaganda. A good example is Latin America.

The long historical affinity of Latin Europe with South and Central America provided a foundation for fascist propaganda there. For example, the Falange, a Spanish pro-Franco group, were active before and during the war in an effort to keep Latin America favorable to their views. The social myth of historical greatness of Spain was stimulated and Franco was viewed as a modern savior of Spain from the antichrist of communism. On the negative side, efforts were made to show that the forces of Republicanism in Spain were destructive, immoral, and completely under the domination of anarchists and communists.

The Nazi Germans were concerned with Latin America as a source of food and raw materials and as a future market for manufactured goods. The Germans in South America, particularly those in Southern Brazil, were strongly pro-Nazi and served as a base for the usual propaganda line of the inevitable Axis victory—that fascist elements were bound to dominate Latin America in the future. Furthermore, the Jewish, communist, British, and Yankee forces were said to aim at enslaving Latin America. Gradually, Britain and the United States became aroused by these threats and themselves began elaborate countermeasures. Their effort was to convince the Latin Americans that their best interests would be served by joining the crusade against fascism and nazism.

The first Nazi effort in the United States was to keep this country neutral. From the outset, the German leaders realized that the general sentiment in this country was opposed to totalitarianism. The aim of their psychological campaign, therefore, was to confuse and divide, on the one hand, and convince us, on the other, that though Germany was all-powerful in Europe, the United States had nothing to fear from her. They had a number of themes, especially those broadcast by the radio as follows: (1) Germany was extremely powerful. (2) The international policy of Germany was morally justified by the hypocritical neglect

of the Versailles Treaty and of Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points. (3) We and the British were weak and morally corrupt. (4) Our leaders were despicable and immoral. And (5) the Jews, communists, and plutocrats—not National Socialists—were the real enemies of humanity.

In line with their usual tactics, the Nazis appealed to ethnic divisions and other prejudices in our country as well as to the pacifistic and isolationist sentiment. They had a number of organizations which flooded this country with printed matter and radio programs. They had a well-planned campaign to make use of German-Americans and their organizations as well as to foster the more obviously quasi-military groups, such as the German-American Bund.

The German psychological war machine tied its propaganda into other aspects of operation, including espionage and sabotage. The Germans themselves described this psychological war machine as having three sections: (1) the trouble-seekers, who found the soft spots in our national morale and honor; (2) the troublemakers, who stirred up difficulties, and (3) the central co-ordinating office, which collected the facts and directed the operations.

The author, in collaboration with Floyd L. Ruch, undertook to get a measure of the importance of the German short-wave broadcasts as a foundation for judging the infiltration of the Axis propaganda into this country. We modified the standard public opinion sampling technique, and used interviewers with a background of training in psychology and social science to get in touch with a cross section of the general public in their homes and in public places. Each respondent was shown a series of cards on which items from recent Axis broadcasts were printed. As each card was presented, the respondent was asked this question, "Have you heard or seen this statement anywhere within the past few weeks? I don't care whether you believe it or not, just tell me if you've heard or seen it." The purpose of this question was to discover the degree of circulation of a propaganda item. The question was so phrased as to remove any connotation of guilt. It is not disloyal merely to have heard a particular rumor or argument. Then a series of cards was presented of some material coming from a selection of short-wave broadcasts and some from our own observations. One card had on it "More than 300 draftees recently deserted from Fort Dix, N.J." Other cards said "Labor-union pickets will be excluded from air-raid shelters according to recent orders from Washington." (This latter was from home-grown sources in New York and had not been used by the Axis at the time of this study.)

Altogether five cards were presented and then certain additional questions were asked. One breakdown showed that of the three religious groups, Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish, the Jewish respondents were nearly twice as likely to believe Nazi propaganda items as were the Protestants.

Of the five rumors we tested, no one of them had a high degree of circulation or acceptance. It was found, however, that 23 per cent of the combined populations of Boston and New York had heard one or more of the five rumors studied, and of those who had heard them 23 per cent believed one or more of them. As the authors report: [9]

> Circulation and acceptance of rumors go together. Both circulation and acceptance were higher:
>
> (1) In New York City than in Boston. (2) Among the poorer than among the more prosperous. (3) Among those over age 45 years than among younger persons. (4) Among Jews than among non-Jews. And (5) among Catholics than among Protestants.
>
> There were no reliable sex differences either in circulation or in acceptance of rumors.
>
> Newspapers were given most often as a source of rumors and people (word-of-mouth) next. Radio was seldom mentioned as a source. This is probably because of the greater prestige of the newspaper as compared with radio.

Propaganda Directed at the Home Front

The major aim of propaganda at home was to build up positive morale. The early successes of the Nazis in this connection are clear enough, but when the extravagant promises of a quick and complete victory began to wane after the defeat in North Africa, and especially in Russia, and during the intense aerial bombardment of German cities, the propaganda on the home front was modified. The call to attack and expand was replaced by a call to defend and preserve the fatherland. However, the fear of communism continued to be a favorite theme, but a close second was the threat of capitulation to "plutocratic" democracy. Having liquidated the chief sources of organized opposition before 1939, and having developed a powerful system of espionage and coercion, the Nazi party skillfully combined threats of force, outright terrorism, and verbal barrages to keep their population in favor of the war. The censorship was so effective that both military personnel and civilians were often kept in the dark regarding the seriousness of events. In the end this strategy proved useless.

Among the Allies, on the contrary, propaganda on the home front, like that addressed to enemies and neutrals, passed from defense to offense. Yet the military successes had some negative effects, especially in fostering a relaxation of the war effort and stimulating hopes for an early peace. In fact, the Nazis, in their propaganda to the Allies often seized on just such feelings as cues to encourage the masses to relax their strenuous work, to neglect community needs for voluntary help, and to foster the black market and other disruptive agencies.

[9] See F. L. Ruch and Kimball Young, "Penetration of Axis Propaganda," *J. Applied Psychology*, 1942, 26:448–455. Quotation is from p. 455.

In one respect World War II was different from World War I. Among the United Nations there was much public discussion and outright planning of the peace and of a more rational world order. It is true that the slogans of 1914–18, "make the world safe for democracy," "war to end war," and "self-determination of peoples," had great emotional appeal, but they were not backed up by any widespread plans to put them into effective operation once the Central Powers were defeated.

The themes on both sides were usually of the good-evil, white-black, satan-savior variety. Closely related to this was the "divide and conquer" technique through which mass demoralization was encouraged. But it must not be forgotten that military and political events determine the effective areas and content of propaganda. Psychological weapons are of little use unless they are co-ordinated with military and political strategies. The propaganda of the deed remains the most powerful, especially in politics and economic life.

The psychological warfare which began in World War I, culminated in World War II, and has continued since, has raised some questions about the relation of symbol-manipulation to action in our mass society. There is no doubt that the leaders of National Socialism were keenly aware of the importance of psychological manipulation in modern society. They deliberately aimed at political, economic, and other controls by indoctrinating the masses with such powerful social myths as those of a superior race, imperialist expansion, and a ruling élite dedicated to their welfare.

In the cold war between the western powers and Russia and her satellites which followed the end of World War II, much of the same strategy and tactics has continued. However, there have been some changes which we must now examine.

SOME COMMENTS ON TWENTIETH-CENTURY PROPAGANDA

Comparisons of the Two World Wars

The aim of wartime propaganda, like the aim of the cold war, is to increase the social participation of members of one's own group and to cut down the participation among members of the enemy group. Since modern warfare is essentially totalistic in character, full national support of the effort becomes increasingly important. The degree to which one can reduce participation on the part of the enemy and maximize it on the part of the members of one's own group is vital. In this connection it is well to compare the differences and likenesses of propaganda in the first and second world wars. Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites have contended that the differences are chiefly of the following character:

1. On the whole, the propaganda of World War II showed a higher

degree of sobriety than that of World War I. There were far less highly emotionalized terms used in World War II than in the former war, just as there was far less stress on the hate themes. The emotionalized hate campaigns remained largely unacceptable. This was also true of the German propaganda against the British and Americans. Some of the German propaganda directed against Russia, however, took on this tone and vice versa.

2. The propaganda of World War II was for the most part less moralistic than that of World War I. This is shown by the incidence "of preference statements as against fact statements." In the second war, the latter were much more in evidence than the former. That is, there were more discussions of rational ideas and less use of terms in defense of one's own cause as right and the contention that the enemy is entirely wrong. In the democratic countries, as in Germany, the moral contention of World War I tended to be replaced by terms which had to do with the kind of profit or loss, or expressions of indulgence and deprivation. In Freudian terms, this meant a shift in appeals from the superego to appeals to the ego—the seat of man's rational considerations.

3. The propaganda of World War II tended, on the whole, to put a moderate limitation on divergences from ascertainable facts. For example, there was far less attention to the atrocity stories. There was more concern with credibility and with detailed information. This could be related, in part, to technological changes. It is true that during World War II the atrocity theme was used by the Russians with regard to German atrocities, and the German propaganda sometimes referred to Russian atrocities. Also this theme was used, at times, with regard to the Japanese. Otherwise, it played little part in World War II. It is a fact that the exposure of the horrors of the concentration camps, such as Dachau and Buchenwald, after the war was over, produced effects not unlike the atrocity stories of the earlier war.[10]

In accounting for the variation in themes and changes in general tone of wartime propaganda, Kris and Leites contend that it is due to two tendencies apparent in public sentiment—distrust, and what they call privatization.

The first of these has already been noted in our discussion of the development of disbelief in propaganda, following World War I. The wartime propaganda of the first war represented the initial use of modern means of mass communication, and the propagandists overextended themselves in their attempts to change the belief systems of the time. They believed propaganda to be all-powerful in this. Later they were disillusioned. Then, too, there was a decline in idealism after World War I. The whole moralistic appeal of Woodrow Wilson broke down.

[10] Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in 20th Century Propaganda, *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 1947, 1:393–409.

This reinforced the distrust of propaganda and became a rather persistent attitude in a large section of the population of this country, and to a lesser degree, in England.

Along with this went the tendency to privatization, which refers to the withdrawal of the attachment to the group values and a tendency to stress self and self-survival. It is marked by striving for individual indulgence. This, in turn, means that the individual becomes vulnerable to the deprivation of his basic wants. On the one hand, in mass society, individuals are more and more involved in public affairs. Yet they are faced with the ever-present and growing feeling that they cannot understand or much influence the varied events upon which their survival depends. This was nicely illustrated during the depression when the old individualistic values and ideas of personal responsibility for job-finding gave way to a recognition that survival depended upon state interference through public-relief "made" work.

Then, too, there is a further disparity between what the common man is expected to know and do regarding the political order in which he lives. This is strikingly recognized in the usual response to foreign policy. The fear of another war, for example, is linked with the fact that the individual is not told the facts or feels that they are incomprehensible because of their complexity or that he cannot know them for security reasons. In other words, the ordinary person feels impotent in a world where specialized skills seem to regulate events which at any time may modify and further control his life. Furthermore, the individual comes to feel that he should not inquire into the causation or moral implications of political events.

Kris and Leites go on to indicate the difference between critical distrust and projective distrust. The former usefully aids one in adjustment to the real world. It is the foundation of scientific thinking and it is a phase of reality testing. Projective distrust, on the other hand, is derived from our unconscious impulses and takes on certain characteristics of ambivalence. It is an expression of hostility in which tendencies toward aggression against other persons, especially those in authority, are perceived as their tendencies toward us. In these conditions, an individual fears and is hostile toward that which he cannot understand and master.

Out of this situation, skepticism and privatization play together in making an individual dubious about propaganda. Therefore, one of the concerns of the propagandist in wartime is to reduce this skepticism.

The analysis proceeds, then, to make some distinctions between the operation of propagandist and the subject of propaganda in totalitarian societies, with their charismatic leaders, and democratic societies of a more stable and secure social order. In the totalitarian state, the identifications with the authority and the power of the state tend to appeal, on the one hand, to basic impulses for security and safety related to what the

Freudians call the id functions and, on the other hand, there is a stress upon the superego aspects of identification. In this latter, the leader of the state is idealized in terms of his "omnipotence, omniscience, and infallibility." For instance, in Nazi Germany, Hitler was all-powerful, all-knowing, and infallible. The same attributes were attributed to Stalin in Soviet Russia.

In contrast, in the democratic states, the identifications in large part are those of rationalistic ego-functions. Here, as H. D. Lasswell points out in an article on this same topic, the basic resort in propaganda is to rationality. The individual is called upon to test reality by scrutinizing the existing situation and by anticipating the future situations.[11]

Of course we know that the identifications relating the ego, the superego, and the id are intertwined and constantly interact. It is a matter of the relative weight of these in determining our use of and reaction to propaganda. The various stresses in the totalitarian state are different from those in the democratic. This difference is reflected in the devices of the propaganda itself. On the one hand, there is the emotional appeal —the relationship between the visible leader and the masses to whom he talks, modeled on the relations of the hypnotist and his medium. In contrast, the propaganda in democracies is to a greater extent modeled on the principles of rationality, insight, and education.

A contrast of these two types of propaganda is easily seen in what happened under conditions of extreme deprivation during World War II. In the totalitarian countries there was a growing cleavage between the faithful and fanatical groups around the leaders and the growing indifference of the masses. This made control of the latter by the former more difficult. As Kris and Leites put it, "Superego identifications cease to function with ever more individuals, and finally they function only with the fanatics." [12] As this propaganda device broke down, the German leaders changed the tactic and put more stress on ego-interests and on the stimulation of fear. The latter, of course, was a direct appeal to the id identification. However, this did not prevent further sense of deprivation and the totalistic control took the form of force and violence. Finally, at the end, the Nazi propaganda, having failed to gain participation in the present situation, resorted to the building of the future Nazi myth.

Democratic propaganda, on the other hand, faced with the problem of people under deprivation, took the line of asking people to trust their leaders even though they could not reveal the war plans. This was nicely illustrated prior to the opening of the second front in Europe, since there had been considerable public demand for the opening of such a front.

[11] See H. D. Lasswell, "The Person: Subject and Object of Propaganda," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1935, 179:187–193.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 404.

For months and months the masses of the Allies, necessarily uninformed, kept their faith in Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The second need of Allied propaganda was to create a sense of rationality and insight. Enthusiasm and emotionality may be kept at a low level if there is a continuing determination and a willingness to sacrifice. An excellent illustration of this occurred in the spring of 1940 when Churchill's leadership was so manifestly clear in the face of serious threats toward Britain. His speeches at that time constitute one of the finest illustrations of high-level propaganda. The function was threefold: first, to make Britain aware of its serious dangers, to clarify their extent, and to show how everyone could help meet the danger. In preparation for the impending Battle of Britain, Churchill's speeches kept the public reasonably well informed on the situation and this, in turn, tended to prevent an extended spread of anxiety. The unknown danger of the past was transformed into a realistic danger which was known in kind and in extent.

Churchill's speeches are a good illustration of the fact that the propagandist may fulfill a double function. In the first place, he may structure the situation so it can be anticipated, understood, and help produce firm trust in the leadership. In the second place Churchill (as leader) offers himself as a model. Here there is a good relationship between ego and superego. Some suggestive aspects are brought out in the discussion by Kris and Leites. Sometimes the ego-functions tend to undermine the positive relationship between ego and superego functions. Such a condition, in fact, encourages certain tendencies to regression. As they put it: "Individuals who feel impotent in the face of a world they do not understand, and are distrustful of those who should act as their guides, tend to revert to patterns of behavior known from childhood, in which an increase of hostility against the adults and many neurotic or delinquent mechanisms may develop." [13]

It is at this point, of course, that the man on horseback appears. The individual has become confused, perhaps, by the propaganda and is struggling between an irrational element in the situation and the demand for security, for safety, and for morality. Certain tensions tend to appear. This is well brought out in Harold D. Lasswell's discussion of the effects of the spread of propaganda in large-scale modern democracies.

Lasswell points out the interrelationships of the ego-aspects of propaganda, that is, the appeal to rationality, and the id impulses which call for spontaneity and enthusiasm. In other words, he is discussing essentially the problem of the rational as against the emotional elements in propaganda.

The long-run effect of resort to rational propaganda may undermine

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

the basic loyalties in democracy which have, in the past, been faith in discussion, in talk, and in the formulation of public opinion which we discussed in Chapter 14. There is a faith in the will of the people and a faith in the phrases which are used in the talk about common goals. Sometimes the spread of propaganda in modern democracy tends to discredit these symbols, that is, to build up distrust. Broad public aims gave place to those of special groups. There is a liquidation "of a sentimental basis of democratic government." When this has been carried far enough, especially during crises such as the depression or a prolonged war leading to defeat, the whole supporting myth of a society may break down. This gives rise to a demand for action instead of talk. At this point, as Lasswell neatly puts it, "Propaganda begets propaganda; and presently propaganda begets frustrations which are resolved by force plus propaganda." [14]

It is in this context that the effects of the debunking of propaganda following World War I are clearly seen. There arose talk of the "menace of propaganda" which tended again to undermine the faith in the democratic discussional process. If people do not know who is talking or why, the talkers become suspect, and the people may lose their faith in the effectiveness of democratic discussion.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CREEL, George, *How We Advertised America* (New York, Harper, 1920). The author describes the way in which he developed and operated the Committee on Public Information during World War I.

DE SOLA POOL, Ithiel, guest ed., "Studies in Political Communication," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1956, 20:3–345. Special issue devoted to various aspects of communication as they bear on domestic and international relations.

KATZ, Daniel, CARTWRIGHT, Dorwin, and others, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, Dryden, 1954). A book of selected readings. Chapters 8 and 9 contain some good papers on propaganda.

KRIS, Ernst, and SPEIER, Hans, *German Radio Propaganda* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1944). A report on the nature of the home broadcasting of the German government during World War II.

LASSWELL, Harold D., *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York, Knopf, 1927). This is a classic study of propaganda in World War I. It served to start a stream of books dealing with wartime propaganda.

LERNER, Daniel, *Skyewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to V-E Day* (New York, George W. Stewart, 1949). On the nature and effectiveness of American-British propaganda during the final phases of World War II.

LOWENTHAL, Leo, guest ed., "International Communications Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1952–53, 16:481–708. Special issue devoted to various aspects of international communications, including propaganda..

MOCK, James R., and LARSON, Cedric, *Words That Won the War* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939). A critical analysis of the operation of the Committee on Public Information established by George Creel.

[14] Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

POWELL, Norman J., *Anatomy of Public Opinion* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951). Chapters 9 and 10 contain a stimulating discussion of propaganda in the modern world. There is an extensive list of citations to most of the literature of recent years.

SMITH, Bruce L., LASSWELL, Harold D., and CASEY, Ralph D., eds., *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946). A comprehensive reference guide in the field of mass communication and public opinion. The book opens with four essays on various aspects of mass communication.

CHAPTER 21

The Nature of Race Prejudice

PREJUDICE is, specifically, conflict between groups characterized by strong in-group and out-group features. The essential aspect is that of giving and applying a stereotyped name or *label of difference* to members of a given group. An out-group individual is labeled first by the name of the group and then as a person. For instance, a man may be called a "dago" and then Mr. Giovanni. A man is called a "Jew" first and then Mr. Goldfarb, or a "Mick" first and then Mr. Murphy.

By strict logic a stereotype is a false concept. It is a word or phrase used to give a group general and abstract characteristics which are not supported by sound reasoning or scientific investigation. Yet a stereotype which fosters prejudice is supported by a variety of myths, legends, and ideologies. To understand prejudice, then, we must examine its historical roots. After all, prejudice is but a special case of group conflict. What are the foundations of the group differences and group conflict? Conflict is a struggle for certain exclusive values in which the immediate aim of the opposing forces is to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals. Hostile behavior is frequently a component of a struggle for the given value.

Historically, the targets of prejudice have been determined by the particular configuration of conflicting values and opposing groups. Sometimes assumed racial differences have provided the fundamental symbol of conflict. At other times national and international factors have played a part, as illustrated in the relation of prejudice to war and peace. In still other situations, religion has been a definite factor. In fact, religious prejudice is probably one of the most widespread of all the forms of intolerance and discrimination. Then, too, there are prejudices in the economic field as between trade-union members and employers and sometimes between groups of workers in terms of their particular skill and differential status.

For the individual as well as for the group, historical factors play a part. Prejudice as an aspect of personality rests upon a combination of early personal-social training and the superimposition later of certain

cultural definitions which give content and direction to bias and intolerance.

The chief source of conflict patterns in the individual are the resistance of children to parental discipline, sibling rivalry for role and status in the family, and the oppositions built up in the playground. Aggressiveness spreads out from these to all sorts of group situations. These early antagonisms may be called, in the words of the philosopher, Josiah Royce, "natural antipathy." They are not prejudices in the cultural sense. The hostility may be directed toward a mother or father, a brother or sister, a playmate or other person as individuals. Then, too, white and colored children may play together without any evidences of group hostility. In some instances they may co-operate but in others they may fall into conflict. But there is no discrimination and no hostility of one group with regard to the other. Whatever dislike and opposition there is, depends on individual-to-individual relations.

In the contact of whites with colored people, there may be some basic perceptual foundation for avoidance. One of these is the awareness of color difference itself; another is the odor which frequently Orientals find unpleasant in the white man or which the white man finds, in turn, unpleasant in the Negro. One man who spent his boyhood in the West Indies among the Negroes and people of mixed American Indian and Negro descent remarked that he was never aware of any odor differences with reference to these colored peoples. He played basketball and other games with the boys, went with them on picnics, and associated with them in school, but he was never conscious of differences of this sort. Because of the infrequency of contact, many people never acquire such sensory accommodation.

Not only may skin color or body odor provide some sense of difference when first encountered, but so, too, may variations in facial feature or body build. Habit plays a part in developing either avoidance or adaptation to such differences. David Livingstone said of his first contact with whites after his long sojourn in the heart of Africa: "One feels ashamed of their white skins; it seems unnatural—'like blanched celery'—or white mice."

Speech is also important as a possible basis for awareness of differences. A man's deep bass voice may cause a small child to cringe and move toward his mother or father. Such avoidance reaction is perfectly natural. But more striking to older children and adults, of course, are outright differences in language. We cannot communicate with a stranger within our gates. We do not understand that which sounds like a mere jumble of nonsense syllables with no rhyme or reason.

Nonetheless, our avoidance of persons with strange odor, skin color, or speech, is not alone sufficient ground upon which to build prejudice. Children have such antipathies or negative responses to people of their

own race or group. But other factors must be superimposed on these physiological and psychological foundations if prejudice and discrimination are to arise. These influences come from culture.

CULTURAL FACTORS: STATUS

Prejudice and Status Differentials

One of the most important cultural influences in producing prejudice is the ordering of in-group and out-group relations along the scale of superiority and inferiority. Such ordering of group differences represents essentially differences in status. This fact is amply illustrated in the origin of the word "prejudice." Our word comes from the Latin *prejudicum*, which means a preceding judgment. The word took on special meaning when it came to refer to judicial examination in Rome held prior to a trial as a way of determining the social status of the would-be litigants. In Rome, at that time, what could be done through the courts depended upon differences in the class system.

This status-defining function of prejudice has never been lost. As a matter of fact, in Nazi Germany the courts actually came around to something like the practice in ancient Rome. All sorts of legal restrictions were put upon the Jews in Nazi Germany, regarding marriage, residence, schooling, property rights, occupation, and social mobility. In the courts the authorities often had to determine the status of persons involved, that is, whether they were Jews, before the litigation was begun.

In our own treatment of the Negro during the shift from slavery to freedom, various states had something approaching this in the "Grandfather's clause" which attempted to fix the status of the Negro at a certain point depending upon whether he had parents who had been slaves. Likewise, both law and the mores tried to set biological limits to determine whether a mixed-blood person was to be considered Negro or white. In democratic societies today we do not determine legal status by private or secret judicial hearings, but we do have something similar to this in what we sometimes speak of as "the court of public opinion."

Prejudice is also a social norm. It serves as a protective function to keep people segregated and in proper or appropriate levels or places according to certain conventions or expectations. Historically this was the function of the Jewish ghetto in the Middle Ages. It was a device to keep the Jews from mixing with the Christians. In other words, there is also a social isolation function in prejudice.

There are three important aspects of status as related to discrimination and prejudice. The first of these has to do with preferential attitudes and social distance. The second has to do with the symbols of such differences. And the third has to do with the function of scapegoating.

While social attitudes may arise from generalization based on specific experiences, or from differentiation of the response out of a larger context, or from shock, one of the commonest sources of attitudes, especially the kind we are concerned with in prejudice, is the matched-dependent form of interaction described in Chapter 3. A child may have a certain avoidant reaction to skin color or speech, but it is when older persons—chiefly parents, teachers, and other adults—give a name with a negative value to such responses that prejudice begins to emerge. Even if a child has no personal experience in this matter, we begin early to construct for him the cultural framework in which he will cast his behavior toward members of strange races, nations, cults, and other outsiders. Definitions of behavior toward these groups are laid down in concepts which have grown out of in-group attitudes of superiority and social solidarity. As status in our own group means definite, predictable relations with other members, so our relations with out-groups come to be determined by cultural norms. Our elders define for us our relationship to the Negro or the white or the Jew or the Catholic or the Protestant as the case may be.

Social Distance

The term "social distance" expresses the idea of a gradation of one's own group and its values with respect to those of another group. Social distance implies subordination and superordination. It indicates a tendency to move toward an object or person, or to withdraw. It is measured by the degree of acceptance and intimacy of contact. There is an ambivalence implied in social distance which may permit the expression of love and hate in the most extreme forms. Social distance symbolizes aversion and avoidance on the one hand, and friendliness and close contact on the other. A student once remarked about Negroes, "They are all right as long as they keep a good distance from you." She apparently meant, reflecting the attitudes of superiority of the dominant white race, not geographic or spatial but rather social or psychic distance. Social distance signifies not merely spatial isolation but, more importantly, isolation of ideas and attitudes.

There are various ways of measuring social distance. One of the earliest devices was developed by E. S. Bogardus who in fact first used this term in its present context. For example, Bogardus gave a group of students a list of thirteen nationalities: English, American, Canadian, Scotch, Irish, French, Germans, Spaniards, Italians, Armenians, Japanese, Turks, and Hindus. He asked these students to put down on paper the order of their preferences for these particular groups. He found that, on the whole, the American native white, English, Canadian, and Scotch came at the top, while the Armenians, Japanese, Turks, and Hindus were at the bottom. Later J. P. Guilford worked out a preferential order by using a method of paired comparisons. He made up a list of fifteen na-

tionality groups and found on the basis of a study of 1,000 college students from seven institutions that they gave the following order of preference: English, German, French, Swedish, Italian, Russian, Jewish, Greek, Japanese, Mexican, Hindu, Negro, Chinese, and Turkish.

A still different manner of getting at the same thing is found in a study by L. L. Thurstone of 21 nationality groups. Thurstone used a somewhat more precise method of equal-appearing intervals than the rank-order method of Bogardus. He developed a scale to measure people's



Redrawn from L. L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *J. General Psychology*, 1928, 1:405–425. By permission of The Journal Press.

FIG. 13. Scale Showing Differences in Sense of Psychological Distance Among Twenty-one National or Racial Groups.

views on the relative position, that is, status-wise, of various ethnic and racial groups. The distribution of a large sample is shown in Figure 13.

These studies show a general over-all attitude toward various nationality groups. Bogardus went further and tried to discover the differences in the attitudes toward various nationality groups with reference to the preferential acceptance which they might be accorded. Subjects were asked whether members of these groups would be acceptable through marriage, through becoming friends or fellow-workers, or would be permitted as neighbors, and so on. Table 9 shows the responses of 1,725 Americans to the selected nationality groups.

Table 9. Percentages of 1,725 Americans Willing to Respond in the Designated Ways to Selected Nationality Groups *

	English	American (native white)	Canadian	Irish	Scotch	French	Germans	Spaniards	Italians	Armenians	Japanese	Turks	Hindus
1. To close kinship by marriage	94	90	87	78	70	68	54	28	15	9	2	1	1
2. To my club as personal chums	97	92	93	89	83	85	67	50	26	15	12	10	7
3. To my street as neighbors	97	93	96	91	86	88	78	55	35	28	13	12	13
4. To work in my occupation	95	92	96	93	90	90	83	58	55	46	27	19	21
5. To citizenship in my country	96	91	96	93	91	93	87	82	71	58	29	25	23
6 As visitors only to my country	2	1	2	2	4	4	7	8	15	18	39	42	47
7. Would exclude from my country	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	5	5	3	23	19

* Items selected and slightly rearranged from E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (Boston, Heath, 1928), p. 25. By permission.

Over the years these tests of social distance have been repeated many times with remarkable consistency in the preferential responses to various nationality groupings. It is true that, during World War II, the Germans and the Japanese both had lower positions than they had in the studies made in the late 1920's and early 1930's. But curiously enough, once the conflict was over and people got back to somewhat more normal relations, these groups tended to re-establish themselves in their old

niches. While there is still some feeling of hostility toward Germans and Japanese on the part of people who served in the war, when Japan and West Germany were brought into defense relationships vis-à-vis Russia, there was considerable improvement in the ratings of these nationalities. One of the most curious facts from this rating scheme has been the persistence of the low rating given the Turks throughout the long life of this particular social-distance test. The Turks have long had a particular meaning for Christians. They symbolize the non-Christian world of Mohammedanism; they symbolize cruelty and persecution of Christians. They are the one living group which has a long history of conflict with certain Christian groups in the Near East. While most American students have never seen a Turk or know very little about Turkish history, as a stereotype the Turks have received a low rating in test after test of the social-distance sort. This is a neat illustration of the fact that certain kinds of prejudice do not rest directly upon contact at all, but upon the cultural continuities of the past.

We should also like to know something about the intensity of attitudes of this sort. In May, 1945, a national sampling of the white population of the United States was asked certain questions regarding Negroes. There were four statements as indicated in the accompanying table with the distribution of the responses of the cross section of white people in this country at that time. The statements regarding the Negroes were given to a group of 80 judges to rate on a scale of 0 to 10. This rating technique used what we call scale values of the four statements of 9.5 for number four, 7.1 for one, 3.5 for three, and 1.7 for two. These are in the right-hand column of Table 10.[1]

There are certain regional differences in attitudes toward minority groups. A *Fortune* survey, made in 1939, asked this question: "Is there any one group—racial, religious, economic, or social—in your city (county) who represents an important problem? More than 5,000 people were interviewed. Of these, slightly more than 20 per cent answered "Yes," 59 per cent said "No," and 18 per cent said "Don't know." In all sections of the country with the exception of the Mountain and Pacific states, the Negro was indicated as the most serious problem. In the Mountain states the Mexican was put down as the most serious; in the Pacific section, the "unemployed." Other problem groups mentioned, in addition to Negroes and Mexicans, were Jews, Catholics, Italians, and occasionally communists. The Japanese were listed only in the Pacific states.

The relationship of status to prejudice is brought out in a study by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz. They interviewed a sample of 150 World War II veterans in Chicago with regard to certain ethnic attitudes, but particularly with reference to anti-Semitism. They classified their re-

[1] From Hadley Cantril, "The Intensity of an Attitude," *J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1946, 41:131. By permission of the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Table 10. Distribution, Intensity, and Scale Value Concerning Alternatives on Attitude Toward the Negro

STATEMENTS	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION	PERCENTAGE INTENSITY			PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	TOTAL CASES	SCALE VALUE
		Very Strongly	*Fairly Strongly*	*Don't Care*			
I believe Negroes should have the same privileges and opportunities as white people	21	58	35	7	100	246	9.5
I believe Negroes should have more opportunities than they do now	15	46	46	8	100	173	7.1
Although Negroes should not be mistreated by whites the white race should always keep its superior position	45	65	28	7	100	535	3.5
Because Negroes are so different from white people as a race, I believe they should not be allowed to mix with whites in any way	16	75	19	6	100	196	1.7
Don't know	3					38	
	100					1188	

spondents into four types: intensely anti-Semitic, outspokenly anti-Semitic, stereotyped anti-Semitic, and tolerant. In addition to data on prejudice, they secured material on the social mobility, that is, the shift in their social, economic, or occupational position from their immediate prewar position to their position at the time of the interview. Some of the men secured better positions and some took jobs below those held prior to the war. Their results showed that one-third of the sample would be classified as upwardly mobile as measured by improvement in socioeconomic status. On the other hand, one-seventh experienced downward mobility, that is, they lost status. The remainder, about half, registered no change in status.

As to personality components the authors remarked: [2]

> Aggressive attitudes, both spontaneous and elicited, were found to be most highly concentrated in the downwardly mobile group, while the pattern was *significantly* reversed for those who had advanced in social status since

[2] Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York, Harper, 1950), p. 58. By permission.

the period of their previous civilian employment. Those who had experienced no change presented a picture somewhat in the middle; among them the number of tolerant persons was almost equal to that of the men who held stereotyped anti-Semitic beliefs.

While there were only 18 cases in the downward-mobility group, they at least suggest a trend. We know from other observations that competitive attitudes and practices are very important with reference both to anti-Semitism and among certain white groups vis-à-vis the Negro. We shall return to some aspects of this later.

Symbols of Difference

A second important element in these status relationships concerns the symbols of difference between groups. This has to do essentially with four factors: the social visibility of groups with reference to each other, their contact, their oppositional or competitive relationships, and the deviations in their values and behavior patterns.

The visibility of groups is most clearly indicated by physical appearance. The most important and obvious of these is skin color, and the Negro is the best example in our own society. But other physical features may play a part, such as the facial characteristics, exampled by the stereotype of the hook-nosed Jew and the snub-nosed Irish. Other illustrations of physical appearance are dress and personal adornment. In these matters, of course, the social definition of visibility is important.

A second element concerns contact between groups. This is particularly related to matters of visibility and competition. With reference to the economic factors, I. D. MacCrone, a South African psychologist, has this to say: "Economic factors, if they are to have any effect upon group prejudice, must presuppose the existence of the psychologically prior division into an in-and-out group. It is not because of their economic competition that Jews and Japanese excite hostility, but it is because they are Jews and Japanese that their competition is [regarded as] unfair, or underhand, or an offense to those who are neither Jews nor Japanese." [3] In our own South the most intense competition arises between the lower economic groups of the whites and the Negroes. It has been shown again and again that as the whites move into certain occupations formerly held by the Negroes, competition and incipient conflict arise.

A good illustration of the economic factors in relation to prejudice is brought out in occupational patterning. The Jew has long been regarded as a moneylender. This idea goes back to the Middle Ages when his function as a banker was important to his Christian clients. The stereotype of Shylock is still with us. This is another illustration of historical fact and the overlay of stereotype which has come down to us from the

[3] I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa* (London, Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 254.

past. In study after study it has been shown that those who have strong anti-Semitic attitudes still view the Jew as a particularly sharp trader and given to underhanded and dishonest methods of making money. In many parts of peasant Europe, the Jew was stereotyped as a peddler. He moved from community to community with his pack of goods and frequently served not only as a dispenser of certain economic goods but as a disseminator of gossip and information as well.

Other stereotypes, of course, are those of the Chinaman as a laundryman, the Irishman as a hod carrier, and of the Italian as a fruit peddler. Other stereotypes tied up with personality characteristics tend to function symbolically. Thus the Negro is seen as a flat-footed, happy-go-lucky, singing fellow.

Scapegoating

The finding of scapegoats is another activity associated with the status differences as related to prejudice. This is essentially dependent upon the projective mechanism so important in this whole area of behavior. The term "scapegoat" has an interesting origin in the history of ancient Israel. The *Book of Leviticus* (16:32) reads: "And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities." On the Day of Atonement, a live goat was selected by lot and the High Priest laid hands upon the goat's head and confessed over it the sins of the people of Israel. The iniquities having thus been symbolically transferred to the beast, it was taken into the wilderness and released. The people felt purged and for the time being free of guilt.

Applied to the field of prejudice today, scapegoating means that the blame for troubles is laid upon the out-group. Scapegoating has been defined as "A phenomenon wherein some of the aggressive energies of a person or a group are focused upon another individual, group, or object; the amount of aggression or blame being either partially or wholly unwarranted." [4]

Scapegoating is the action end of prejudice and discrimination in its more severe form. The victim is abused verbally or physically. Moreover, the ability or power to counterattack is usually limited. All too frequently, intolerance and discrimination are applied to people who are unable to fight back.

The motives for scapegoating are several. Among others, deprivation and thwarting are probably important factors. When frustrated, individuals frequently look around for somebody on whom to lay the blame. So, too, guilt feelings are frequently associated with this whole process. For example, in time of war, guilt feelings increase because we have all been taught that war is evil, but now our loved ones must go out and kill

[4] From "ABC's of Scapegoating," a pamphlet (Chicago, Central YMCA College, n.d.), p. 11.

or get killed. Also during wartime we may experience feelings of guilt at minor infractions of numerous government regulations. To relieve ourselves we may blame other people for our troubles. Anxiety is another element in scapegoating. Thus during wartime a fear of spies and saboteurs makes people suspicious of all foreigners and often of an innocent minority group. This was probably a factor in the forced removal of thousands of Japanese Americans from the Pacific coast states after Pearl Harbor. Yet the most striking scapegoating occurs when those in high status feel threatened by a group which is upwardly mobile and improving its power position. Then, too, individuals with a sense of inferiority may overcome it by identifying with a majority group which uses a minority group as a scapegoat. In the case of demagogues and agitators, the desire for power may be a factor in the use of such projective techniques. Talk about international Jewish bankers, or about communists, or about the Negro threat, by certain agitators illustrates such mechanisms. Finally, those who conform to the general patterns of prejudice and discrimination, of course, usually fall into the habit of scapegoating.

Some students of prejudice have tried to develop a typology regarding those who indulge in scapegoating. In one report, three types of scapegoating are discussed: the compulsive, the conforming, and the calculating.

The *compulsive* scapegoater is frequently characterized by paranoidal trends. He tends to believe that other people are threatening him, as for instance that Jews are trying to ruin his business, or the communists to destroy his church, or the Catholics to put the Pope in the White House. Another element in the compulsive scapegoater appears to be the impoverishment or limitation of intellectual and emotional outlets. So, too, there is frequently an accumulation of frustrations in these people which are relieved through this particular kind of response.

The *conforming* scapegoater is one who tends to follow the conventions of intolerance and discrimination. We shall have something to say about this particular behavior in another connection, but the point is that these people are probably not unlike the great bulk of individuals who feel that the retention of status differences requires them to go along with the majority in its attitudes toward minority peoples.

The *calculating* scapegoater is essentially the demagogue and the agitator, and we have discussed his characteristics in Chapter 11. The demagogue seeks to gain power by using scapegoating as one of the tools to attain this position. First of all, he turns aggression away from himself toward his victim. This is illustrated in Hitler's reactions to the Jews. Secondly, the demagogue focuses hostility on the enemy he must destroy so as to obtain power. This was long the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the capitalistic West. For example, "war-mongering Wall Street" is a favorite symbol of Western aggressiveness. Finally, the calculating

scapegoater uses these techniques to unite various followers in his support. Father Coughlin tried to bring together many otherwise divergent groups through his attacks upon the international Jewish bankers. This was a not too subtle and veiled attack upon all Jews.[5]

The victim of scapegoating, of course, should have certain distinguishing characteristics of the sort we mentioned above. He should be accessible and he should be one who is in a relatively weak position regarding counterattack. He should be something or somebody who can be personified as a group in an easy way.

There are various methods of scapegoating. It may occur in pure fantasy, but it is frequently a precursor of overt action. A good deal of scapegoating takes the form of verbal hostilities including rumors, jokes, stories, and derogatory cartoons. Also there are unjust accusations, teasing, and hostile verbalization such as name-calling and outright threats.

Then, too, there is physical action involving such things as personal violence, enforced social discrimination as in segregation or imprisonment, economic discrimination as represented in forced labor and destruction of property, and, finally, legalized persecution and stigmata such as was found in the Nuremberg laws and is still found in various restrictions on voting by Negroes in our own Southern states.

In concluding our comments on scapegoating, a word of caution must be entered. A good deal of criticism has been leveled against majority groups in this country by certain minority-group leaders. There has been a good deal of talk about the need to suppress cartoons and the telling of jokes about Jews and Negroes. It should be pointed out that these responses to minority groups are usually only a part of a general culture of humor and attitudes which are not always directly related to outright persecution and scapegoating. In other words, they are part of the whole conventionality of group relationships, although humor does frequently serve the purpose of an outlet for repressed and unconscious motivations. The particular targets, however, are not necessarily confined to the groups which we are discussing here. As a matter of fact, some of the best stories on the Jews are told by the Jews themselves. This itself might indicate some ambivalence on their part toward their own exclusiveness as well as their desire to be participants in the majority group. This is a difficult and subtle question which cannot be pursued further at this point.

Some Historical Aspects

We have already traced briefly the origin of prejudice in the individual. On the one hand, there are the personal-social factors which come into play in the development of attitudes of hostility toward other people. These frequently have their roots in the earliest interpersonal relations within the family. Frequently there is little or no cultural defini-

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 45–48.

tion of these, but they grow, rather, out of a natural and spontaneous social situation. Later the cultural factors come into play, as we have seen, when older persons—siblings, parents, teachers, or others—define for the growing child the lines of demarcation between himself as the member of one group and other people as members of other groups. When children are taught to avoid or be hostile toward people "on the wrong side of the tracks," to avoid playing with Negro children on the playground, or otherwise made conscious of group difference, prejudice is already underway.

Moreover, we have seen that the various targets of prejudice are largely determined by the particular cultural and social situation of the time and place. It is clear that the most evident targets of prejudice will be those particular group relationships which are marked by competition or other forms of opposition. Moreover, these may change with time. At the outset of our own country's history, the first targets of strong prejudice were the British, who had opposed our efforts at independence. But there was also a certain amount of sectional division among the states. As the struggle for the extension of the slave states became more and more a factor in national politics, a split between North and South became evident. After the Civil War the whole situation changed in the South with the appearance of the color-caste system which still continues. Later, as the Negro moved into the North and came into competition with the white man, a certain amount of anti-Negro prejudice began to emerge in the northern section of the country. Then, too, the coming of large numbers of immigrants from Europe and Asia played a definite part in the history of prejudice in the United States.

The Negro and the immigrant groups constituted a handy set of specific targets of intolerance, discrimination, and prejudice on the part of the older American citizens. A good deal of hostility toward immigrants began as early as the third decade of the nineteenth century. At this time the first wave of Irish migrants began to come to our shores. These people provided a good deal of cheap labor, and there arose a considerable antagonism on the part of older citizens toward them. While economic competition was a definite factor, there is no doubt that one of the symbols of difference lay in the fact that the large bulk of these newcomers were Roman Catholics. It was out of this particular set of circumstances that the "Native American" movement arose. This was probably the first of what was to be a recurrent and long series of attempts to foster strong group solidarity on the part of the older citizens vis-à-vis the newcomers. "Native Americanism" came to an end in the latter 1850's just prior to the Civil War. But an outbreak of essentially the same attitude in the South is clearly seen in the rise of the Ku Klux movement after the Civil War. While the Ku Klux Klan originally was a mechanism of social control, it later became a symbol of the segregation of the white and colored people in the South. Its nativistic characteristics were evident in the in-

sistence on white superiority from a racial point of view, and in the contention that the Negro was incapable of either democratic participation or the attainment of a high degree of training and education.

In the 1880's the United States for the first time began to admit large numbers of migrants from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. Up to this time, most of the immigrants had come from the Western and Northwestern sections of Europe. Aside from the Irish, moreover, most of these earlier arrivals were of Protestant faith and thus fitted easily into the traditions of America. When increasing numbers of Italians, Slavic, and Hebraic peoples began to reach our shores, it was soon apparent that these people were providing not only needed cheap labor but also bringing with them customs, attitudes, and values considerably at variance with the traditional British-American beliefs and practices. Moreover, the bulk of these people were Roman Catholic, and if not Roman Catholic, either Russian Orthodox Catholic or of Jewish faith. Furthermore, most of them settled in our northern industrial cities which shortly became characterized by a variety of segregated neighborhoods known as "Little Italy," "Little Sicily," "Little Hunkytown," and so on. A good deal of opposition to these immigrants appeared, especially as people began to contend that this cheap labor cut into the opportunities of the older American laboring man to improve his lot and status. This agitation crystallized in the late 1890's and early 1900's when restrictive legislation regarding immigration first appeared. One racial aspect of this had occurred in the late nineteenth century in the exclusion of the Chinese. This legislation was an outcome of opposition to cheap Chinese labor on the Pacific coast. In the early 1900's there was agitation also to exclude the Japanese. This produced tension between the United States and Japan and, while complete exclusion was not accomplished, many restrictions were laid down regarding the entry of Japanese citizens to this country. In addition to this, various Pacific states passed legislation forbidding foreigners to own land. This was aimed chiefly at the Japanese who had begun buying up rich agricultural land in California and Oregon, thus supposedly displacing American farmers.

During World War I many segments of the American public began to realize that the assimilation of our immigrants into our culture had been only partially successful. Formal efforts at what was termed "Americanization" were aimed at making the immigrants and their children first-rate citizens. This was accompanied by further agitation for restrictions regarding migration into this country. As a result, in 1924 and later, laws were passed to limit the number of immigrants to be allowed in any one year and to impose certain quotas in terms of national origins of our population as of 1890. For example, on this basis, the 1955 quota for Great Britain and northern Ireland—the highest—was about 66,000. From this figure the others taper off considerably. The German quota is

40 per cent of the British. For countries of the so-called New Immigration, the quotas are comparatively low. For example, the Polish quota is only 10 per cent of that of Great Britain. The comparable percentage for Italy is 9. This hierarchy of preferences for people of different national backgrounds represents an institutionalization of our attitudes and values respecting what we think desirable as to the composition of our population.

PERSONALITY AND PREJUDICE

Let us turn to examine some features of prejudice as a component of the individual's total set of attitudes and values. One recurrent question is the degree of generality in attitudes of discrimination and intolerance. Some writers argue that prejudice is highly specific. Thus, one sociologist maintains that, if a group of white people of superior status found their target of prejudice to be some particular minority group, the displacement of their hostility on that group would tend to make them more tolerant of others. While there are many situational factors in this, and while we still have no complete and final answers, it is apparent from a number of studies that prejudice easily becomes generalized. It is bound up with the basic psychological problem of specific and general attitudes. The literature on the controversy over specificity as against generality of attitudes is extensive and we need not enter into that discussion here. Certainly the weight of the evidence seems to support the idea that there is a considerable generality of such attitudes or, at least, that generality may be rather easily induced.

Some Characteristics of Prejudiced Persons

One of the first studies to discover what kind of personality structure is found among prejudiced people was made by Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert. Using a form of the Bogardus Social Distance test, they obtained responses of a sample of college students regarding 21 different ethnic groups. They found a rather significant positive correlation between a generalized tolerance factor and attitudes toward specific groups. They obtained not only a single index of generalized tolerance for nations and races, but they constructed a special test of attitudes toward Negroes. The correlation between the latter and the former was sufficiently high and significant to indicate some generality of attitude of tolerance or discrimination.[6]

The studies by T. W. Adorno and collaborators, made in California, have tended to confirm this fact of generalization of attitudes. In one of their investigations they found a correlation of .80 between responses on

[6] See Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert, *Public Opinion and the Individual* (New York, Harper, 1938).

a scale measuring general ethnocentrism and one measuring anti-Semitism specifically. This indicated a tendency among their subjects to respond to ethnic groups in a generalized manner.[7]

One of the most telling studies of this sort, however, is that of Eugene L. Hartley and Ruth E. Hartley. They devised a social-distance test with a list of 35 ethnic groups arranged in alphabetical order. The social-distance test had steps from one through eight to represent varying degrees of view ranging from exclusion from the country to admission to kinship by marriage. Thirty-two of the list of ethnic names were designations of actual national, racial, or religious groups. However, three were completely fictitious: the Danireans, the Pireneans, and the Wallonians. These three groups were in proper alphabetical order without any marks of differentiation.

The Hartleys used these "nonesuch" groups to discover if there were any generalized ethnic attitudes. In other words, here were three names for which there were no corresponding groups. It was thought, however, they might arouse certain unconscious and generalized attitudes of intolerance and prejudice. It must be admitted that the Danireans might have been identified with the Danish, although Danish was the very next item on the list. So, too, the Wallonians might have been confused with the Walloons, a subnational group of Belgium and Holland.

The questionnaires were given to samples of students in eight different colleges and, on the whole, the results showed a consistent and high correlation between responses to existing nationalities and to the non-existing groups. At Columbia College, for example, the correlation between the mean social-distance score of the 32 actual nationalities and the three "nonesuch" was .81. At Howard University, a Negro school, the correlation was .85. It is true that there was some variation in the size of the correlation, but all were positive and all were relatively high and significant. The Hartleys conclude that there was clear evidence of the operation of a factor of generalization.

One crucial aspect of prejudice in relation to personality is brought out in studies aimed to discover whether there is some correlation between the prejudiced individual and measures of intolerance. The Hartleys investigated a sample of male students at City College of New York on the test of tolerance and intolerance. They found that:

> . . . the relatively tolerant personality in this type of collegiate sample is likely to exhibit some combination of the following characteristics: a strong desire for personal autonomy associated with a lack of need for dominance, a strong need for friendliness, along with a personal seclusiveness, fear of competition, a tendency to placate others along with lack of general conformity to the mores.

[7] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and others, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, Harper, 1950), p. 122.

Such a person is also likely to be seriously interested in current events, to have ideas about bettering society, and to possess a feeling of the greater need for personal achievement in vocations. He is "likely to be an accepting personality, disliking violence, able to appreciate the contributions of others, conscious of feelings that people tend to be more or less alike and adopting a nurturant rather than a dominant attitude toward those younger than he."

In contrast, the relatively intolerant person tended to combine in varying degrees such characteristics as: [8]

> . . . unwillingness to accept responsibility, acceptance of conventional mores, a rejection of "serious" groups, rejection of political interests and a desire for groups formed for purely social purposes, absorption with pleasure activities, a conscious conflict between work and play, emotionality rather than rationality, extreme egocentrism, interest in physical activity, the body, health. He is likely to dislike agitators, radicals, pessimists. He is relatively uncreative, apparently unable to deal with anxieties except by fleeing from them.

In connection with the latter, he is given over to a good deal of almost compulsive physical activity characterized by a strong drive to be on the go, to be occupied by sports, traveling, and motoring.

As one part of a larger study by T. W. Adorno and others, a sample of 1,500 boys and girls of varied social and economic backgrounds, ages 11 to 16 years, were given a variety of tests to check the possible relationship of prejudice and egocentrism to the authoritarian personality. A special study was made of 120 of these who were found to be extremely prejudiced or unprejudiced, one-half at either extreme. They were given intensive interviews, as were their parents.

On the basis of this study, Else Frenkel-Brunswik came to the conclusion that there are certain basic features of personality already apparent in individuals in these age brackets. While she admits that there is a good deal of overlapping and that the basic personality is probably not yet completely fixed, she distinguishes between the intolerant, ethnocentric child and what she calls the liberal child. With regard to the former, she points out that the parents are highly concerned with status; they often use more harsh and rigid forms of discipline; and the child submits to rather than accepts and understands parental demands. On the surface the ethnocentric child is inclined, especially in his more general statements, to idealize his parents, but Frenkel-Brunswik insists that they lack genuine affection. In fact, the child feels that he is being victimized. The pressure to conform to parental authority and its external social

[8] Eugene L. Hartley and Ruth E. Hartley, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, Knopf, 1952), p. 710. By permission. This appeared originally in the Hartleys' *Problems of Prejudice* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1946). Also this latter volume first reported the study of the "nonesuch" groups and prejudice cited above.

values tends to make it "impossible for the child to integrate or express his instinctual and hostile tendencies. This lack of integration makes for a narrow and rigid personality. Thus, instinctual tendencies cannot be utilized for constructive purposes, such as genuine ability for love, creative activities, for which both more permissiveness and more guidance on the part of the adult would be needed." [9]

The ethnocentric youngster may exhibit something in the way of a rough gang-oriented type of behavior, conforming later to the adult gang without any internalized superego which would serve to control, directly, or indirectly, his hostility. When the inhibition is stronger there usually results the more conventional pattern of ethnocentrism.

In contrast, the liberal child tends to be oriented more toward love and less toward power. He is capable of giving affection, since he has received affection as a child. He is inclined to judge people more on the basis of their intrinsic worth than is the ethnocentric child. The latter is inclined to put heavy emphasis on conformity to social norms. The liberal child "takes internal values and principles more seriously." He tends to incorporate the values of society into his superego. He also asks for the help of adults in settling his problems of sex and aggression. With reference to his parents, the unprejudiced child seems to be able to express disagreement with the parents and even resentment against them more openly, which exemplifies a greater degree of independence from the parents. "At the same time there is a love-oriented dependence upon the parents and people in general which constitutes an important source of gratification." [10]

Both types of children have certain anxieties and certain types of conflict, but their methods of handling these differ. The ethnocentric child tends to use destructive ways, whereas the liberal tends to use more constructive approaches to his problems. To quote again: [11]

> Glorification of the in-group and vilification of the out-group in the ethnocentric child recurs in the dimension of power-weakness, cleanliness-dirtiness, morality-immorality, conformance-difference, fairness-unfairness, etc., thus mirroring some of the basic dimensions of their outlook and personality dynamics. Above and beyond this, stereotypes provide the individual enough latitude to project onto out-groups his specific problems, such as aggression, underlying weakness, or preoccupation with sex. Different minority groups therefore seem to lend themselves to different types of accusations.

The larger Adorno study brings out very clearly contrasts between what the writers call the "authoritarian" personality and the "demo-

[9] Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "A Study of Prejudice in Children," *Human Relations*, 1948, 1:295–306. Quotation is from p. 305. All quotations by permission.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[11] *Ibid.*

cratic" type. While certain criticisms may be offered regarding the characterization and the typology, nevertheless there are probably basic psychological factors which tend to foster prejudice, discrimination, and hostility between groups. The correlation between a high degree of ethnocentric attitudes and anti-Semitism is indicated in the Adorno study. So, too, there is a high correlation between ethnocentrism and antagonistic attitudes toward the Negro.[12]

On the other hand, it is well to point out that social organization itself is intimately bound up with the whole in-group—out-group pattern of life. There is a disposition on the part of some students of prejudice to regard strong in-group attitudes as something which should be avoided, done away with, or otherwise abandoned. Such advice, of course, flies in the face of many fundamental features of modern society. A highly complex social order is closely tied up with a variety of different groupings. Once we get differences in function, such as division of labor, and differences in status such as in our class structure, we cannot avoid the appearance of the in-group—out-group attitudes. In other words, prejudice, discrimination, and sense of difference are intimately bound up with the very fact of variation in functions of groups and hence in their attitudes toward each other. The tendency in some quarters to attack the white Protestant groups in this country as the holders of power, and to contend that minority groups are always at odds with them or under their duress, is sheer nonsense. We shall return to some aspects of this matter when we discuss attempts at alleviation of prejudice and discrimination. At this point, it is important to indicate, however, that the in-group and out-group attitudes are a fundamental part of our social order and that prejudice in this sense cannot be completely avoided.

Conflicting Values

Another factor comes into play in the relationship between the social norm of prejudice and certain doctrines of equalitarianism. On the one hand, we have been brought up as members of a democratic society to believe in equality of opportunity and avoidance of segregation and discrimination. On the other hand, in-group—out-group contacts, particularly those revolving around our class structure, stimulate awareness of status differences which may encourage discrimination.

The tensions arising around this apparent conflict between equalitarianism on the one hand, and differential status on the other, have been discussed by Robin M. Williams, Jr. He points out that there is a tension in social grouping which depends upon participation and common values in contrast to acquisition either as an individual or group of what he calls scarce goods. While he discusses this problem largely in terms

[12] T. W. Adorno and others, *op. cit.*

of religious differences, what he says applies equally to some other aspects of the matter. To quote Williams: [18]

> The tension level of any social grouping is in part a function of the relative emphasis in that group's culture upon *participation in common values* as over against individual or group *acquisition of scarce "goods."*
>
> In every social system people act in orientation to certain values which can be shared by everyone, and which are not scarce in the sense that one individual's sharing will reduce others' enjoyment of the value. The most ready and conspicuous examples are religious salvation, and group (e.g., national) prestige. All adherents to a religious faith can participate in its values—all, for example, can have salvation—without any member's "success" detracting from that of any other member. Similarly, in this respect, all Americans are presumed to share in any increase or decrease in the prestige of the nation considered as a collectivity. National prestige as such is "participated in" rather than "divided up." On the other hand, in every social system people also act in orientation to scarce, divisible, and divisive values. This is, of course, true even of those who share a common culture in such other respects as language, religion, family mores, political ideology, and so on. The main classes of scarce, divisible values are: wealth, power, and prestige within a given group or culture. In any given state of the economy, the more economic goods held or consumed by one individual, the less there are for others. Power consists of control over others; hence it is inherently scarce and distributive. Prestige status is meaningful only in terms of relative ranking within a system: for one individual or group to be "high" requires that others be ranked "lower."
>
> Thus every society has to work out some equilibrium of relative emphasis upon these two broad classes of action orientation. It seems to be generally agreed among serious students of American society that our culture places a rather extraordinary stress upon competition for distributive values. The "competitive" motif is not merely a matter of such competition being permitted; rather, the striving for "success" is positively enjoined to such an extent that in many areas and classes it approaches the status of a culturally obligatory pattern. At the same time, American society—at least in comparison with many older, more stable, more homogeneous societies—appears historically to have a relatively low development of the shared, nondivisible values. These two aspects seem clearly interrelated. Thus insofar as emphasis upon religious, otherworldly values has declined, this must in itself reinforce tendencies for "worldly" competition, other things being at all equal.
>
> The competition which is significant for the analysis of group hostility is not just any kind of competition but that which revolves around basic security in subsistence and status. In this connection the importance of status-mobility in the United States is difficult to overstress. Rising and falling on the status-prestige scale is nominally free, and in actuality has been very widespread, i.e., the dominant institutional pattern has been that of achieved rather than ascribed status. In fact, "intensive competition" and "emphasis upon achieved status" are merely two formulations of the same situation. As Charles Horton Cooley pointed out, there are only two polar systems for ranking individuals in the social order: either inherited status or some form of competition.

[18] Robin M. Williams, Jr., "The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions," *Research Bulletin*, No. 57 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1947), pp. 55–56.

In fact, Williams treats group prejudice as "a common (shared) attitude of hostile nature toward a social group, whose manifestations conflict with some aspects of the basic value framework of the society in which they occur." [14] That is, he regards prejudice as a form of behavior growing out of exactly the type of conflictive value system we have just mentioned. While this limits prejudice to our particular form of social organization and value system, for the point in hand it is quite sufficient. So, too, it gives the basis for understanding how the internalization of these dual and conflicting value systems produces anxiety and distress within the personality. As we indicated above, both the liberal or democratic person as well as the authoritarian or anti-democratic have certain amounts of frustration and anxiety. The liberal personality seems to take care of this in part by a more sublimated and open recognition of his difficulties and some counterbalance of sympathetic and affectional features. But the other type develops a certain rigidity and inflexibility and a certain inferiority or underlying anxiety regarding his capacity to adjust to others. This is expressed by projective mechanisms and hostility toward various targets of prejudice and intolerance.

It should be recognized, however, that the pressure for conformity to certain status differences makes for a conventionalization of discrimination. Many people just follow along with the general value systems of their particular in-group or class group. The conforming type of scapegoater, noted above, is probably of this character. It is serious, however, when these conforming persons fall under the control of the calculating or agitating type of scapegoater.

The Feedback of Prejudice

We shall close this section by examining the problem of what prejudice does to the person who expresses it. The more violent prejudice seems to reflect some rather distinctive forms of hostility and conscious or unconscious emotional insecurity and distress that are projected upon the victims. Various studies of Negro-white relations show that the white fear of sexual aggression by Negroes stems from the white man's own sense of guilt for his conduct, overt and imaginary, toward Negro women. Moreover, the placing of white women on a pedestal of purity derives from the white man's unresolved sexual wishes for white women. Also, apparently, the white man feels inferior to the Negro man because of the latter's potency. On this topic, Hortense Powdermaker makes the following pertinent observation: [15]

> Those who have the most prejudice seem to be the people who are most insecure, people who are afraid, scared they will lose their jobs, wondering if

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[15] Hortense Powdermaker, "Prejudice: What It Does to People in Society." A radio address over WNYC, March 13, 1943. By permission.

they will succeed, uncertain about their status in society, people who are frustrated in one way or another. Those are the people who use the Negro or Jew or Mexican or someone else as a target for their frustration. Those are the people who are scared of competitors and see the Negro or Jew or immigrant as a rival. Does having prejudice help those scared and frustrated people? Quite the contrary. It acts as a blinder and prevents them from seeing the real cause of their insecurity, and from doing anything realistic about it. Instead they pick out some group to be the scapegoat and the real situation which is responsible for their insecurity is left unchanged. Hence, prejudice prevents people from solving their difficulties. Also prejudice warps the personality of the one holding it. Hate is destructive and uses up a lot of energy. If energy is used in hating Jews, or Negroes, or Catholics, there is not much left for creative and constructive work. The prejudiced person becomes small and mean, and the kindlier and co-operative side of his nature becomes dwarfed. In time his whole nature may become affected and all his human relationships suffer. It is impossible for him to get along with a wide variety of people, or to mix well with anyone who is different from himself. And this is not conducive to success.

On the other hand, the object of prejudice, a member of the out-group, quickly develops a persistent fear of his oppressors. This fear inhibits his reactions, forces him to use a variety of dodges to escape abuse, and otherwise makes for a personality which can easily develop double-dealing, deceit, and other defensive devices toward others. In a democratic society, this type of response is not conducive to healthy interactions on public problems or more intimate personal adjustments. Prejudice, then, induces childish anxieties and dependence where adult maturity should be the rule. In other words, the interaction resembles that of children and adolescents rather than that of mature adults who are concerned with community matters. Such reaction patterns may work out under dictatorship but hardly fit in a society marked by individualism, initiative, and democratic processes of consensus and joint action for public good. Against the background of such facts, in the following chapter we will look at some of the special areas of prejudice.

[*For Suggested Readings, see end of Chapter 22*]

CHAPTER 22

Race Prejudice: White-Colored

DIFFERENCES in skin color have frequently been the basis of prejudice. This is particularly true in the interaction of the whites with members of the colored races. This chapter will treat various aspects of the relations of colored and white groups as they bear on discrimination and intolerance.

NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SOUTH

Some Background Factors

The history of the introduction and extension of Negro slavery in this country is well known. Certainly at the time of the founding of the Republic slavery was generally accepted. It gradually disappeared in the Northern states but was marked by rapid expansion in the South, particularly with the spread of cotton as a basic crop. The westward expansion of the country, in time, brought on the North-South struggle. This was marked by extension of the states favorable to states' rights and slavery as over against those who favored more federal centralization and who were opposed to the extension of slave states. The war between the states settled the matter so far as the political organization was concerned. The emancipation of the slaves, moreover, did away with the system of slavery once and for all.

Under slavery, the social distance of whites and colored was carefully defined. There was security for the slaves. The question of tolerance or prejudice did not arise, since these were not necessary to the system. The Negro had his place and remained in it. He had no desire to participate in the white man's world. There was no competition, no conflict in interests between the races, only accommodation in terms of slavery.

In the days of slavery the master accepted the Negro as a person and often admitted him to intimate and trusted positions, but he was

never accepted as a race or group. The Negro remained chattel property. Between some white masters and Negro women a sort of concubinage grew up. This practice is one basis of the sex attitudes toward the Negroes in the South even today.

There was no social or other preparation for the emancipation of the Negro. As a result, there was considerable social chaos at the outset of the Reconstruction days. Reconstruction brought humiliation to the former proud Southerners. The carpetbag government of the North added to this and the carpetbaggers helped exploit the incipient conflict between the white Southerners and the emancipated Negroes. The Southern whites were forced by circumstances into undercover conflict in order to survive. In contrast, the Negroes were often filled with fantasies for a future which never materialized. Booker T. Washington has pointed out that frequently the Negroes took to studying French, Greek, and mathematics instead of taking up the techniques of farming and developing a sense of responsibility for property and habits of sanitation.[1]

Gradually as the Southern states were readmitted to the Union and were again permitted to set up their own state governments, a new accommodation arose between the Negro and the white. A color-caste system emerged which has persisted to this day. Moreover, the color-caste pattern has diffused itself in the northern and western states wherever the Negro has settled in considerable numbers.

Color-Caste Patterns

The color-caste system in the South is evident in the restrictions on voting, on the use of public transportation and until recently, in the segregated school system. With regard to the latter, the annual expenditure per pupil for public education presents some interesting contrasts. One measure of the variation in education is shown by the fact that in 1947, of all white persons 25 years old or older, approximately 35 per cent had completed four years of high school, whereas only 13 per cent of the nonwhites in this age range had done so.[2]

In the North, Negro-white relations are somewhat different. Mobility and economic opportunities brought a large influx of Negroes from the South, both in World War I and in World War II. The North had no tradition of a color-caste system, yet barriers arose in many points and there was a considerable diffusion of essentially the same pattern as exists in the South. Although in theory Northerners tend to accept the Negro as a racial group, the individual Negro is often as completely rejected as he is in the South. The schools and economic opportunities provide a democratic training, but the color line is rather sharply drawn.

[1] Booker T. Washington, *Up From Slavery* (New York, A. L. Burt, 1901).

[2] Nonwhites include in addition to Negroes, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of Mexican descent. About 90 per cent of the nonwhites are Negroes.

This is particularly true in regard to intermarriage, place of residence, and membership in lodges, clubs, and churches. Also many trade unions do not admit Negro members.

The white man's order of discriminations—to use Gunnar Myrdal's phrase—brings out the differences in the attitude of the whites and Negroes regarding certain values and certain preferences. While some of these patterns are gradually changing, from the point of view of the white man the basic discriminatory attitudes run something in the following order: [3]

Rank 1 would be the bar between intermarriage and sex relations involving white women.

Rank 2 would be a set of specific discriminations such as barriers to dancing together, bathing, eating, drinking, and general social intercourse. This would also cover such matters as shaking hands, lifting hats, the use of titles, the use of the same entrance to houses, and certain matters of meeting and greeting on the street.

Rank 3 would be public segregation in the schools, in public transportation, in churches, and so on.

Rank 4 would be the political disparities, including limitations on voting, and others.

Rank 5 would be discrimination as illustrated in the operations of the police and in the law courts.

Rank 6 would be discrimination in matters of obtaining property rights to land, in getting jobs, and in the matter of public relief.

It is interesting that, from the point of view of the Negro, his rank order is almost the reverse of this one given above for the white man. The Negro is less resentful about the white man's views regarding intermarriage than might be imagined. Likewise he is less concerned about discriminations involving social etiquette. While he feels that public segregation and political discrimination are important, for him the most serious prejudice has to do with holding property and securing jobs on an equal basis with the whites. The Negro realizes that the ban on intermarriage will continue for a long time and he has a realistic recognition of the fact that the first gains are to be made in equality of opportunity regarding property ownership and occupation.

The patterns of discrimination and prejudice in the South are different from those in the North. The Southerner's basic attitude is an acceptance of the discriminatory practices and attitudes which are deep in their culture and which they get from parents, teachers, and playmates. The culture of the South provides a whole series of avoidant and aggressive outlets that bolster the sense of white superiority and serve to keep the Negro "in his place." As evidence that the discrimination derives from the culture, we may note that in the South, as elsewhere,

[3] For a full discussion of this topic, see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, Harper, 1944).

Negro and white children play together unless forbidden by older persons.

Parents and other adults very early begin to segregate the white children from the colored and to furnish them verbal symbols of avoidance, disgust, fear, and aggression. This is the old and familiar device of instructing children about those who "live on the wrong side of the tracks." It is but a special case, in which color becomes the obvious mark of difference, of hostility between in-group and out-group.

The study of Eugene and Ruth Horowitz is enlightening in this connection.[4] In the course of a larger study they spent some time in two Tennessee communities, testing and interviewing students and adults—both black and white—regarding their social attitudes. They show clearly that the white parents will often punish their children in order to get them to stop playing with colored children. The parents also provide verbal definitions. When asked why their parents told them not to play with Negro children, the white children frequently made some remark such as "Because I'm white and he's black." In addition, ideas of disease, filth, and unsanitary conditions are used as excuses.

On the other hand, the Horowitzs discovered, on inquiry, that the parents often denied ever giving their children any such instructions. A common implication was that the children instinctively knew enough to keep away from the colored children. It is evident that older children and adults forget the specific instructions which they received. This is a common aspect of forgetting, of course. Once the attitudes become integrated into larger patterns of avoidance and hostility, their particular genesis may disappear from consciousness.

These avoidant and aggressive reactions of the whites are supported by a variety of stereotypes, myths, and legends. A persistent belief among many seems to be that the Negro is far less intelligent, that he is really a subhuman species, and that he has no sense of moral responsibility with regard to sexual matters or property. To the terms "stupid," "lazy," "shiftless," "irresponsible," and "highly sexed" are added the myths and legends about the original Ku Klux Klan in the 1860's and 1870's and the revived Klan of recent times. However, the two chief rationalizations of outright violence against the Negro have to do with his sexuality and his attempts to change his status.

The conflict between whites and blacks in the South has been kept alive partly by the growing economic competition of the lower-status whites and Negroes. The former have continually taken from the Negro occupations that were previously considered fit only for colored folks. So, too, in the rural areas, the intense struggle of poor whites for survival is influenced by their rationalization of the feeling that the colored

[4] See Eugene and Ruth Hartley, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, Knopf, 1952), Ch. 21.

people are a cause of their difficulties. On the basis of her research in the South, Hortense Powdermaker has summarized the situation in the following words: [5]

> The white aristocrats are the least, and the poor whites are the most, hostile toward the other race. Among the Negroes the upper class is the most, and the lower class the least, antagonistic toward the whites. Again, the older generation of whites are the ones in whom most affect is aroused by the interracial situation, while the younger generation is inclined to view the problem more casually. The reverse is true for the Negro: the older generation shows a tolerance and calmness traditionally associated with age, while the young people are the ones who feel most intensely on racial issues.

Associated with the white Southerner's fear that the Negro will outstrip him economically is his strong feeling about white womanhood. In this matter, rich and poor among the Southern whites join in their fear of the Negro. The idea of pure womanhood carries great emotional weight with most Americans, and particularly with Southerners. As everyone knows, there is a curious double standard of sex mores in the South. White men have access to Negro women within the limits of custom, but a definite barrier is set up against relations between Negro men and white women. It is true that lynchings for alleged rape constitute but a fraction of the total number of lynchings. Nevertheless, fantasy-born generalizations out of chance cases of sexual crimes have created a vast superstition and a body of techniques for dealing with the Negro in these situations. In Jamaica, in South America, and in other parts of the world, the whites and blacks adjust to one another without undue fear of sexual crimes by the Negroes. What discrimination there is functions along class lines.[6] In the South this fear frequently becomes a genuine obsession. The terrific taboo against the sexual approach of a Negro to white women doubtless sometimes constitutes a powerful suggestion to the Negro. It is not surprising that he occasionally engages in a sexual crime.

According to the Freudian interpretation, the taboo arises, in part, from the white man's sense of guilt in his relations with colored women. Possibly this defense mechanism may be further affected by the tradition of sexual inferiority to the male Negro. In any case, a strong tradition segregates Negro men from white women. A world of rich fantasy surrounds this taboo. This intense sex consciousness is also a partial outgrowth of the Christian attitude toward sex—a denial of its reality, a categorical statement of its sinfulness, and a technique of dealing with it by fantasy-thinking and displacement.

[5] Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom, A Cultural Study in the Deep South* (New York, Viking Press, 1939), p. 334. By permission.

[6] See Madeline Kerr, *Personality and Conflict in Jamaica* (Liverpool, England, University of Liverpool Press, 1952).

Lynching as a means of social control is the most severe and extreme form of violence and, though its frequency has declined sharply in recent years, it still serves as a powerful threat to the Negro. It is, as Southerners well recognize, a brutal but effective means of teaching the Negro to keep within the bounds of the caste system.

The decline of lynching in the South is correlated with the improvement of economic conditions, the increase in educational opportunities, the expansion of different culture standards, the breakdown of isolation by improved communication, and the gradual emancipation of the masses from superstition.

Various studies have shown regional differences in prejudice. In general, individuals from regions where there are no or few Negroes have more favorable attitudes toward the Negro than in regions where there are many Negroes.

A study by Sims and Patrick is interesting in this connection. They used Hinckley's scale on race opinions—similar to Thurstone's cited above—on three groups of college students: 97 Northern students at Ohio University, 115 Northern students at the University of Alabama, and 156 Southerners at the latter. The range and the mean (average) distribution of each of these are shown in Figure 14. It is clear that in each group there are great individual differences. Another interesting fact is that the Northern students at the Southern university were the only group which consistently showed an increase in prejudice as they moved from freshman to junior and senior classes. This would seem to indicate that Northern students are, with the passage of time, influenced by the dominant race attitudes of Southerners with whom they associate.[7]



FIG. 14. Attitude Toward Negro of Northern and Southern College Students.

[7] See V. M. Sims and J. R. Patrick, "Attitude Toward Negro of Northern and Southern College Students," *J. of Social Psychology*, 1936, 7:192–203. Figure 14 is redrawn from p. 194. By permission.

NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS: THE NORTH

If we turn to examine the nature of anti-Negro prejudices in the North, we find some differences between that section of the country and the Deep South. While the Northerner tends to accept the Negro in the abstract as a group or race, we have not yet worked out any adequate accommodative techniques in many situations. True, the Negro is permitted to vote and he is accorded many rights not given him in the South. But there is a strong taboo on intermarriage, residential segregation is widely practiced, and the occupational choices of the Negro are distinctly limited. It has often been said that race riots and mass violence against Negroes which occur periodically in the North are an indication that the North has not yet worked out an institutional formulation for segregation. On the other hand, in the South the lynching pattern repre sents the device of controlling the Negro by dealing with the individual malefactor.

Foundations of Prejudice

The sources of prejudices among Northerners are varied. The basic culture belief regarding the lower mental ability of the Negro compared with the whites still persists. Southerners frequently express their views to their Northern friends and acquaintances. Motion pictures, the theatre, and literature, at least in the past, have shown the Negro in an unfavorable light. But perhaps the chief source of difficulty is economic competition and its ramification into housing and educational opportunities.

Young children are conditioned to prejudice in the North as they are in the South. The Horowitz studies mentioned above show that even young children in the North have different stereotypes not only about color but about Negroid facial features, and that these were basic in a negative reaction to a series of pictures of Negroes.

There is one favorable factor which distinguishes the North and the West from the South in this matter of prejudice. The former states lack the persistent tradition of the South which derives from the slave culture and the later color-caste system. In North and West accommodative institutions tend to alleviate the situation. The Negro has opportunities for education, civic participation, and occupation not given him in the South. So, too, in these sections of the country, the more-equal opportunities serve to stimulate the Negro's dream of even better conditions in the future. As conditions have improved, however, there has been increasing agitation in some Negro groups to step up the improvement of the Negro's lot. Moreover, a small fraction of the Negro population have joined more radical political movements.

The study of Bettelheim and Janowitz, already noted, is in point

here. The significant finding of their research was that the intolerance of the men in their sample was shown to be a function of their sense of deprivation and anxiety. Economic and other commonly assumed elements played far less part. The study brings out, once more, that our social organization, especially the in-group versus the out-group feature, provides an outlet for hostility toward ethnic groups. Our social organization also provides various external controls—the mores and our laws. However, the authors show that the outlets and forms of prejudice differ somewhat between the Jews and the Negroes. At this point we shall review chiefly their findings in regard to Negro prejudices.

Seen against the larger social context, the authors point out that while in many circles we tend to control intolerance, discrimination, and prejudice, in Negro-white relations we tend to condone intolerance. The veterans interviewed revealed somewhat different attitudes toward the Negro in contrast to their attitude toward the Jew. As to the latter point, their chief contention was that the Jew had too much power and should be restrained in his efforts to get ahead financially. On the other hand, the principal stress in regard to the Negro was that he should be kept "in his place." He should not be permitted to aspire to a higher status or permitted to gain equal status with the whites. In other words, from the point of view of these Northern veterans, the color-caste system was appropriate and should not be allowed to break down. Of course, it is obvious that if we had a thoroughly accepted color-caste system, prejudice would be less apparent (see the discussion of this above).

A variety of correlations were made in an effort to discover what factors played a part in inducing prejudice. Age, educational level, religion, and political affiliations had little or nothing to do with intolerance toward the Negro. On the other hand, there was concentration of ethnic hostility in those veterans who were downwardly mobile in social status. In contrast, those who had risen in social position were the least prejudiced and those who had retained the same status were between these extremes.

In a few cases of the extremely upward-mobile veterans there was a considerable amount of intolerance. Also the semiskilled workers in the sample were outspokenly anti-Negro but chiefly from fear of economic competition. Contrary to a frequent assumption, the white-collared members of the sample were not particularly anti-Negro.

The real difficulty in this group was psychological rather than otherwise. Among highly emotional stereotypes applied to the Negro were these: The Negro is "sloppy, dirty and filthy"; he takes over jobs "forcing out the whites"; he is "lazy," "a slacker," and is "immoral and dishonest."

This study also revealed a positive correlation between anti-Negro and anti-Semitic attitudes. "As the degree of intolerance toward the

Jews increased, it was generally accompanied by an even greater degree of intolerance toward the Negro." [8]

A good example of some of the differences between the Jew and Negro are found with respect to the demand for restrictive action. The more intense anti-Semitic veterans were for such restrictions as curbing of immigration or even deportation, especially to Israel. With regard to the Negroes, expressions of restrictive desires were usually varied and undifferentiated. Aside from strict taboo upon intermarriage, the main stress was that the Negroes should be kept in their place, that they have too much liberty, that they should not be permitted to aspire to a change in status. Since they could not be deported, they should be kept at a distance. With respect to common employment with Negroes and Jews, there was greater prejudice toward the Negroes. Ten per cent said they would be unwilling to have a Jew work on a job with them but more than 50 per cent said they would be unwilling to work with Negroes under any circumstances. Or if they did work with Negroes, the Negroes should be in inferior positions. With regard to the sexuality of the Negro, this factor was frequently mentioned in the interviews, but it was not noted at all with regard to Jews by those who were anti-Jewish. In Nazi Germany, by contrast, the sexuality of the Jews was an important item in the Nazi attack upon this minority group.

The authors show the two basic psychological mechanisms underlying prejudice to be projection and displacement. The purpose of these mechanisms is to re-establish one's intrapsychic balance. They remark: [9]

> In terms of frequency, the two stereotypes most often applied to the Negro were that they are dirty and that they depreciate property. Both of these are related to id demands, and both contain symbols which are closely connected with anal preoccupation; the first directly, the second as the accusation that the Negro destroys what is the frequent, and in our society, the most highly esteemed reaction-formation against anality: wealth. The acceptance of dirt and the interference with a reaction formation against it are therefore most obnoxious to a culture which maintains that "cleanliness is next to godliness."

It would seem that the Negro provides a target for certain projection and displacement mechanisms centering around elements in the personality of the whites. Unconsciously the white man is overconcerned with the very things for which he blames the Negro.

The Negroes in the United States have developed a class system within their own group which is not unlike that of whites: lower, middle, and upper class. In keeping with the usual American pattern, economic and educational factors are important in this class structure. With regard to the Negro, education and differences in skin color are considered

[8] Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *The Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York, Harper, 1950), p. 27. All quotations by permission.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

more important than economic condition alone. In general, the top class represents a combination of light skin and professional role. The combination of dark skin and low economic condition is most frequently found in the lowest class.

Negro Reactions

The adjustment process of a Negro in regard to the white world runs the gamut from attempts by a few to "pass," thus attaining complete identity with the whites, to the other extreme of outright revolt. It must be recalled that the Negro acceptance of the world he lives in comes from the white as well as the Negro culture. Many Negroes accept what the whites say about them as correct. Often upper-class Negroes blame lower-class Negroes for the difficulties which they all experience. Many of those in the lower class accept completely their inferior position, without a sign of protest, and apparently without experiencing mental distress or sense of frustration or revolt. One is reminded of the remark of an old Negro—a freed slave—who once remarked to R. E. Park: "We want our white folks to be superior."

The economic limitations of the majority of Negroes definitely qualify their reactions to themselves and to the whites. E. Franklin Frazier says that this is witnessed in the fact that the lower-class Negro youth wants above all clothes, food, and decent homes. In contrast, the upper-class youth desires money for conspicuous consumption and for personal attainment. Then, too, the Negro reaction to skin color depends on its function in his particular class and community. If a Negro girl, for instance, identifies herself with the upper class, where light skin has a high value, she will wish for a light skin and do everything to appear to have one. In circles where rich brown color is at a premium, a light skin may be considered a handicap. And dark-skinned boys, girls, and adults of the lowest level tend to accept their color, for, to their minds, and often to that of whites as well, dark color, heavy negroid features, and the lowest status go together.[10]

In terms of cultural training, the Southern Negro child is soon oriented to the color-caste system. In contrast, a colored child in a Northern urban community may not discover until he is 12 or 14 years old that he is caught in the vice of a caste system which ideally has no place in a democracy.[11]

There are a number of different reactions of the Negro to white man's intolerance and prejudice. The most common are the following.

[10] E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways: Their Personality Development in the Middle States* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1940).

[11] See W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, and Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature: Negro Personality Development in a Northern City* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1941).

1. There is a small fraction of persons of mixed descent in which the percentage of Negroid traits is so slight that they "pass" into the white community. Such mobility is chiefly confined to our cities. Yet such transfer ordinarily is not obtained without some emotional strain. For the person who passes it means complete severence of contacts with his colored relatives and friends. A shift of this kind is often accompanied by a sense of guilt and shame, which is not always completely compensated for by attainment of white status.

Sometimes parents put pressure on a son or daughter to keep them from passing. Then, too, several Negro leaders in the United States could have passed into a white community, but they did not do so because they believed it their mission to remain identified with the colored community and to become their leaders in the struggle for improved status.

2. Among the upper-class Negroes one of the common devices for escaping the implication of caste is the development of complacency and self-satisfaction within the Negro group. Various studies have shown that those in this class, and in part in the middle class, often become more concerned with acquiring wealth and in climbing up their own social ladder than in making contacts with whites. The Negro business and professional man who deals entirely with the Negro community illustrates this attitude. Such a person may be well adjusted and may be for the most part satisfied. Yet he may still recall certain painful experiences with whites, or he may, from time to time despite his avoidance of whites, suffer humiliation in situations involving place of residence, travel, recreation, and hotel accommodations.

3. In this country there are a few all-Negro communities where isolation takes geographic form. Here self-satisfaction and complacency are purchased at the expense of severing all relationships with whites. For the most part, however, business and professional opportunities in such all-Negro communities are not sufficient to support more than a small proportion of the upper strata. As a result, ambitious Negroes prefer to stand the threat of some frustration by living in white society. There is little chance for a Negro physician or lawyer, to secure a white clientele or, in the case of Negro professors, to be employed in a white university. While such people furnish the leadership of the Negro group in striving for equalitarian treatment, it means that many of these educated Negroes must suffer a good deal of frustration at not being able to participate in the larger American society.

4. Aggressive responses of the Negroes to the whites take different forms. Sometimes there is a movement for complete racial segregation. Such a view is rationalized on the grounds that the Negro stands to gain more by stressing his color and minority status and rights than otherwise. As a matter of fact, the President of the Tuskegee Institute re-

marked, on one occasion, that segregation had been a help to the Negro: [12]

> The economic progress of the Negro as achieved and as presently enjoyed is due in large measure, if not practically entirely, to the pattern of segregation. The circumstance of the segregation system has been of over-all benefit to the Negro. Handicapped as he was upon emerging from slavery, it has given him a field of his own to develop. Within that field, he has had opportunity to work out his own destiny, find himself, to grow to man's estate without the competition with which he could not have coped had the circumstances been otherwise.

While some Negro leaders greatly resent this position, this was essentially the view held by such leaders as Booker T. Washington. In some quarters, the Negro press has played up the factor of race consciousness. If a scientist who is Negro becomes prominent, his attainments are interpreted in terms of his race and not in terms of participation in the larger culture of his time. Great vicarious satisfactions come from successful prizefighters like Jack Johnson and Joe Louis, and to athletes like Jesse Owens.

Outright hostility of adult Negroes toward whites is under severe taboo, both legally and morally. The fear of lynching, severe treatment by police and the courts, and the loss of jobs keeps colored adults from giving direct expression to any violent attitudes they may have toward the whites. On the other hand, Frazier and others report that a good deal of open conflict exists between lower-class colored and lower-class white children. It is not unusual for colored parents to encourage and even train their children to call names and fight back when they are abused by white playmates. The sources of such aggression lie within the Negro family and community as well as within the larger framework of their relation with the whites. One case cited by R. L. Sutherland illustrates this: [13]

> Julia feels that she is rejected—by her mother because she is the darkest of all her children, by whites because she is a "nigger." She adjusts to her rejection by aggressive behavior. In the theater she is a troublemaker—"Sometimes I lean over the banister and spit down on them ol' white people's head." Repeatedly she says, "I hate white people!" When a white woman called her a nigger, she threatened to beat the woman. Yet she has had a few pleasant experiences with whites.

Upper-class Negroes look down on such aggressive behavior as crude and unbecoming to intelligent persons. When there is occasional fighting between adult Negro and adult white men, such fisticuffs are usually rationalized by the intelligent Negroes as being a result of the system.

[12] Statement of Stanley J. Phillips, President of the Booker T. Washington Birthday Memorial, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 6, 1953, Part 1, p. 2.

[13] R. L. Sutherland, *Color, Class, and Personality* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1942), p. 50. By permission.

Stereotypes help the Negro rationalize and project his own difficulties on the whites and their institutions. Such use of projection is common to members of all minority groups. If an incompetent Negro is dismissed from his job, he may easily shift the blame to racial prejudice. It is also clear that when such an occurrence happens it tends to feed the stereotype of prejudice on both sides.

Another outlet is the deflection of aggression back upon the Negroes' own group. The large amount of quarreling, fighting, and homicide in Negro communities is partly due to the fact that colored people work off their hostilities on members of their own race. Of course, it is difficult to state specifically just what kind and percentage of Negro crime and delinquency are due to such emotional displacements.

Some minor aggressiveness toward the whites is tolerated. For example, petty thievery is a common thing on the part of Negro domestics. White employers often expect this of colored workers and make no particular effort to counteract it. Another sort of hostile behavior is what Hortense Powdermaker calls "unaggressive aggression." Here one finds an outward deference toward whites which overlays an inner antagonism. This kind of adaptation is found among Negro teachers and others who outwardly have to show the customary respect and obedience to white superiors but who, among Negro friends, make fun of the whites and tell with pleasure and even with gusto how they got what they wanted by pretending respect and deference.[14]

5. Finally, there are various forms of servility which have long been accepted by the Negro as the right and proper way of adapting himself to white dominance. Sometimes this is of the kind just described and in other instances the humility may represent a real sense of inferiority. Sometimes the servility is rationalized in religious and moral terms as resignation to God's will that the Negro accept his lowly place. Closely associated with servility, yet showing a certain hostile spirit, is the adaptation seen in clowning. One youth described it best: " 'I know, being a nigger, there are places I can't go and things I can't do. I make a joke of it and act the clown.' "[15]

These ways of adjustment are not unknown in other situations involving class and caste. In democracy, however, they present a particular problem, for they are a serious threat to cultural consistency and hence to personality integration. In the next chapter we shall discuss some possible devices to aid in the peaceful accommodation among the races.

[14] Hortense Powdermaker, "The Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," *American J. of Sociology*, 1943, 48:750–758.

[15] Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

OTHER WHITE-COLORED PREJUDICES

In the United States, aside from the Negro, the chief color prejudices concern the American Indian, the Mexican, and the Oriental. For the most part, the first group is no longer an important target of discrimination. Many Americans have never seen a native Indian outside of a circus. In some areas in the west and southwest there is a slight residue of intolerance toward the Indians. This takes the form of avoidance of intermarriage and any social contact except along economic lines. We no longer maintain separate schools for Indians although, obviously, where they are settled in considerable numbers their children constitute all or nearly all of the pupils enrolled in certain schools. In many localities the Indian has become pretty thoroughly assimilated with the whites, and any prejudice that appears is likely to be bound up with competition. Since the American Indian does not function as a particularly significant or threatening minority group, we shall not discuss him further.

The Mexican

It is chiefly in the southwest and the southern Pacific coast area that the Mexican has been the object of social bias. Various circumstances have made him a factor in the economic and political life of those regions.

Most of the social-distance studies in which the Mexicans are rated along with other nationality groups show that they fall, on the average, in the lowest quarter of the rank ordering. Moreover, it is the migrant from Mexico who is the target of most of the color prejudice. The older residents of the southwest whose family origins were in Spain or Mexico call themselves Spanish-Americans. These groups, chiefly in New Mexico, are often irritated by the confusion of many Americans who make no distinction between them and the recent Mexican migrants. As a rule, unless there are economic, political, or class conflicts, the American whites and the Spanish-Americans get on very well together. Many of the latter are merchants or large landowners, engaged in stock raising or in farming citrus fruits, cotton, and other commercial crops on a big scale. In many cases, while the Spanish-Americans have kept to their own villages, they serve as seasonal laborers on ranches or farms, in the mines, or on the railroads. These Spanish-American villages are really the cultural carry-over of the period before the white Americans arrived in the southwest. They symbolize the social distance and isolation of these groups from the main stream of the American culture groups.

On the other hand, when the Mexican immigrant began to arrive in numbers to provide cheap labor, especially in the expanding commercial-

agricultural areas of Arizona and California, many older whites reacted to this influx in the traditional way. The Mexicans were accepted at the outset as necessary to the economy, but conflict and prejudice arose as they began to rise in economic status, to send their children to school and, as they became citizens, to have some political importance. The occasional anti-Mexican riots have revolved chiefly around economic problems, although the "Zoot Suit" riots of 1943 in Los Angeles involved certain sexual elements, suggestive of the anti-Negro reactions in the South. These prejudices are compounded of the color line drawn originally for the Negro, of our traditional contempt for Mexico as a country of no particular consequence, and of resentment at the new competition.

From his viewpoint, the Mexican migrant has resented our identifying him with the Negro. As to his racial background, he is chiefly American Indian and has a culture which is a mixture of native and Spanish elements. He has a great deal of cultural pride and in-group solidarity. Confronted with the ideals and practices of Anglo-American, he is confused, as other immigrants often are, by an inconsistency between the democratic ideals presented in the schools and elsewhere and what he finds in the stiff competitive world of economic survival. He comes to resent the laws and mores which he does not understand. Or, if he becomes an American citizen, he resents the taboos which prevent full participation in community life.

While the conflict between the whites and Mexican migrants is localized chiefly in the southwest and in Southern California, it does break out occasionally elsewhere as Mexican labor is imported for seasonal crops and other work. For the most part, these migrant laborers move in and out of communities without much impact upon them. When they settle down in some given community for any length of time, they suffer segregation, they produce a problem in the schools, and are generally regarded as of lower social status. For example, in the growing industrial towns in Utah, Mexican laborers have frequently come in for a good deal of hostility from the older white residents. They are tolerated as cheap labor, but they are not welcomed otherwise.

Orientals

The contacts of Orientals and whites in the United States have gone through a typical race-relations cycle, to use the concept of E. S. Bogardus.[16] First with the Chinese and later with the Japanese, the cycle followed a pattern (1) of toleration or even mild acceptance of small numbers of Orientals; (2) an increase in the number of immigrants and growing economic competition with the native white population; (3)

[16] This concept, used as an aid in the study of interracial contacts and prejudice was first developed by E. S. Bogardus in his "A Race-Relations Cycle," *American J. of Sociology*, 1930, 35:612–617.

the rise of conflict and prejudice, rationalized in conventional and acceptable terms by the whites; and (4) efforts to restrict competition by stopping the influx of additional Orientals by legal or other means.

The prejudice against the Chinese, like that against other races, has both a color and economic basis. When the Chinese first appeared in California during the Gold Rush, they served as cooks, fishermen, gardeners, and laundrymen—occupations considered beneath the dignity of the whites. Later, with the demand for cheap labor, they came in larger numbers and became important in railroad construction and commercial agriculture. Serious competition with the white American laborer ended in open conflict. As in other group antagonisms, the conflict was supported by slogans, stereotypes, myths, and legends. Not only were the Chinese said to be unassimilable and able to exist on a frightfully low standard of life in comparison with decent and respectable Americans, but they were accused of being treacherous, wily, given to violence, and altogether a dangerous minority. Finally, under public pressure from the Pacific coast states and elsewhere, the Chinese-exclusion legislation of 1882 was passed forbidding the immigration of any Chinese to this country for purposes of permanent residence.

Today the number of Chinese in this country is very small. In 1950 there were less than 75,000 of them in continental United States, chiefly in California. They are no longer considered a threat to our economy or to our racial purity. Moreover, our general attitude toward them has undergone significant changes. With the sweep of communism over China proper, the Chinese-Americans have been regarded as something of a symbol of the older and more democratic way of life. On the whole, the attitudes of Americans toward the Chinese is reasonably tolerant, although in the ranking of nationalities in a social-distance test, they fall in the lower quartile.

The cycle of our contact with the Japanese in this country has been shorter than that with the Chinese and in some ways more dramatic. At the outset we were probably less tolerant, probably because of our earlier experiences with the Chinese. As the number of Japanese immigrants increased, there was a definite reaction against them. For one thing, the Japanese immigrants were said to be far more aggressive than were their Chinese cousins. Moreover, the international aspects of the situation were not so easily met. The agitation for the exclusion of the Japanese got vigorous protest from Imperial Japan, and, when restrictions were finally put in force, the national pride of the Japanese nation was said to be seriously injured. Finally, our economic and political concern with the Orient came into open conflict with the Japanese at this time. The Japanese rationalized their actions as an effort to prevent what they regarded as a Western attempt to encircle Japan and to hamper the fulfillment of her divine mission in the Far East. The entrance of Japan into

World War II was partly an expression of long-standing hostility. Although Japan became an ally after the peace settlement of World War II, with particular reference toward possible Russian aggression, there is no way of predicting at this juncture just what the future relations of the United States with Japan will be.

Conditions in Hawaii

The situation of color and prejudice in Hawaii constitutes a special problem. Hawaii has a variety of racial and cultural mixtures. The natives, who are in a very small minority now, have intermarried with the Portuguese and the Chinese for some generations. Today there are few if any pure Hawaiians left. Later the Japanese arrived in considerable numbers and some of them have intermarried with Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians. But their numbers are so large that for the most part they have remained a rather solid in-group of their own. In fact, in terms of population, the Japanese-Americans far outnumber all other groups in Hawaii. They number something on the order of 35 to 40 per cent of the total population.

Prejudice is related to both class and color. Among the Japanese the class lines tend, for the most part, to be drawn along economic differences. Yet color and other cultural considerations play a part, especially with the American-Japanese who tend to remain aloof. The Japanese-born, in particular, have been less well assimilated to American-Hawaiian ways and they suffered some prejudice and restriction during World War II. It is rather generally accepted in Hawaii, except in certain circles, that the Japanese and the Japanese-Americans were loyal to the American cause in World War II. However, it must be noted that among whites and part-Hawaiians of lower economic status, there is a good deal of prejudice against the Japanese and the Japanese-Americans. For example, one informant of Hawaiian-Portuguese ancestry was most vehement in expressing his belief that the Japanese were disloyal. He told a group of tourists a long series of stories about Japanese sabotage during World War II. Government officials, of course, do not support such contentions, but the continuation of such myths and legends show that there is an undercurrent of antipathy toward the Japanese.

It is not easy to find this on the surface—certainly not in the elementary schools, high schools, and colleges—but there is reason to believe an undercurrent of some hostility is present. There is a good deal of outward semblence of congeniality and lack of prejudice among the various colored groups in the Hawaiian Islands; in fact, there is some intermarriage of these people. Yet underneath there is a certain amount of avoidance and a certain amount of continuing anxiety and antagonism. One of the serious problems of the Japanese-Americans of the present generation is economic. These young people are going to college

in ever larger numbers and in a society where the economy is not rapidly expanding. Many of these people who have been to college will face real economic hardships in the future because of the lack of opportunities for jobs. They will serve also as a threat to their white peers in age and education, and this may be the basis for the continuation and even increase in the amount of prejudice. In fact, part of the opposition in granting statehood to Hawaii rests upon the fear in some quarters that once Hawaii has statehood, the Japanese-American group will acquire the power that the whites, the part-Hawaiians, and Hawaiians hold at present.

RELATIONS OF WHITE AND COLORED PEOPLES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

It is well known that the British and Americans carry in their culture more color prejudice than do the Latins and other Western peoples. In general, one finds less prejudice against colored races in France, Italy, and Spain than in Great Britain or in the United States. The attitudes of the British and the Americans are probably due to their sense of racial superiority and pride, and to their traditional avoidance of contact with colored peoples. The British at home have had little, if any, direct contact with Negroes, with the possible exception of some English communities near which, during World War II, some military units of Negroes were encamped. Moreover, they, like most Americans, draw little or no distinctions between Negroes and Indians from India. In their colonial relations the British have, on the whole, tended to avoid intermarriage with the native peoples. This has not been true of the Latin peoples. Like the British, the Dutch have, as a rule, tabooed racial intermixture.

Prejudice in South Africa

The emergence and continuation of racial prejudice in South Africa is an illustration of the whole patterning of discrimination and intolerance in the modern world. There we find a multi-racial situation. On the one hand, there are three groups of the colored races: (1) the so-termed "colored," which are really white-Negro mixtures; (2) the Negroes, largely Bantu-speaking peoples; and (3) a relatively small group of Indians. On the white side are the English-speaking group, chiefly of British origin, the Afrikander, descendants of the Boers, and a small minority of Jews.

The population of the Union of South Africa is about twelve million. Of these the nonwhites make up 80 per cent of the total. With regard to the color-caste situation, we have really a minority of whites exercising domination over a majority of nonwhites. I. D. MacCrone remarks on

this matter: "Actually, in terms of power, of status, and of social, political, and economic privileges, the Whites must be treated as a majority group and the Blacks as a minority group since it is the White color-caste group that exercises superior power, enjoys higher status, monopolizes the social, political, and economic privileges in the community." [17]

In some ways, the patterns of race relations in South Africa resemble those of the Southern United States. The color-caste system is relatively rigid. The color bar between the whites and nonwhites represents "maximum impermeability since no element can cross this barrier from one caste to the other." [18] Within each of these sections there are usually



FIG. 15. Diagram Representing the Color-Caste System in South Africa.

three classes: upper, middle, and lower. While there is some in-group versus out-group feeling between the Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking whites, especially along political lines, there is considerable permeability and little resistance to intermarriage. So, too, while there is some prejudice between Jew and Gentile, this is not intense. Within the color-caste itself there are certain gradations. Those mixed groups with more education probably represent the top of this particular section of the total pryamid. At the bottom would be the large number of African natives, many of whom are closely bound to their tribal organization, tribal background, and African culture generally. (See Figure 15.)

Although, in terms of control, the numerical minority is in the position of dominance, some kinds of accommodations have been worked out. Under the leadership of General Smuts some change was accom-

[17] I. D. MacCrone, *Group Conflicts and Race Prejudices* (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1947), p. 25 (a pamphlet). All quotations and Figure 15 by permission.

[18] *Ibid.*

plished looking to a more satisfactory interracial relationship. But following World War II, the growing political power of the Apartheid element under François Malan led to the passing of increasingly severe laws of racial segregation. These included limitations on voting privileges of nonwhites, residential segregation, the issuing of passes for mobility, and other devices to keep the nonwhites in their place—as defined by the party in power.

Sociologically and psychologically, this segregation program reflects growing fear on the part of the whites that sooner or later they will be forced to give up some of their former political and economic controls. The spreading ferment of nationalism among native peoples in Africa can hardly be checked, except temporarily, by such devices as those put through by the Malan group. And by the same token, while the physical suppression of the Mau Mau or other terrorist activity may be accomplished, in the long run the native Africans are going to demand and secure a reshuffling of political and economic power. Race prejudice becomes a defense mechanism in these situations. The members of a group strive to protect the interests of their group against the threats of an out-group. In South Africa the members of the lower group will, as MacCrone says, "regard domination by members of the upper caste as a threat to their legitimate aspirations, as a form of discrimination, exploitation, and oppression, as an attempt to keep them in a permanent position of inferiority and subjection, and to deny them the opportunities for an improvement in status whether in the social, the political, or the economic field." [19]

While there is some likeness between the situation in our own Southern states and that in South Africa, MacCrone indicates that there are certain differences. He believes that some of these differences will influence the manner in which the colored peoples of South Africa will emerge into positions of more control. In the first place, the numerical superiority of the Negroes in South Africa is different from the situation in our Southern states. Even in those communities in our South where the Negroes outnumber the whites, the latter are always aware of the fact that, in terms of control, they represent 90 per cent of the total population of the country and would be backed up by their fellow whites in a crisis. In the second place, the history of racial contact of the two countries is different. The American Negro has a background of slavery. This is not true of a large proportion of the Bantu peoples in South Africa. Then, too, the American Negroes have retained only a very limited amount of African culture. There are some remnants in particular cult and religious activities and in music but, on the whole, they have become part of the American-European culture system. Fourth, the Negro in the United States who finds the color-caste system unpleasant

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

or intolerable can move to some other part of the country. This is absolutely impossible in South Africa where the movement of the native peoples is carefully regulated.

On the positive side, however, the Bantu particularly have a rich cultural heritage, and they are not likely to give this up entirely even as they become Europeanized. Whatever type of culture emerges in South Africa in the future, it will at best be one based fundamentally on the older native culture with some elements of European technological and other patterns added.

And, finally, with regard to the future, MacCrone feels that the real problem is basically psychological, since it exists in the mind of the white man. It is there that the race attitudes and race prejudices are created and kept alive. He feels that if the rigidity of the caste attitudes could be relaxed, some of the main conflicts in the present situation would be alleviated. He believes, for example, that the color bar should be broken for those people who attain intellectual and professional status and who would then be in a position to participate more fully in the European section of the community. Whether this will take place in a short time or in the future is difficult to forecast (see section on alleviation of prejudice in Chapter 23).

Nationalism

Other parts of Africa have already seen a swing toward nationalism. This is certainly true in West and Central Africa. Under the leadership of educated natives and others, there has been a strong movement for the setting up of nationalistic states.

The same ferment is reaching into the Far East. India has already obtained her independence of the British rule. In all southeast Asia the nationalistic spirit is abroad. In all of these areas there is taking place a sharp redefinition of the relationships of the former white rulers and the native peoples. This struggle for nationalism is also confused with the impact of Russian and Chinese communism, and in many of these areas the communist influences have already been felt. In line with the usual tactic of the communist revolutionary party, advantage is taken of local irritations and frictions to enhance the conflict and thus lay the foundation for the disintegration of the old order. Also the communists promise many of these native peoples land reforms and other economic benefits which have a great appeal. Whether these will be carried out is another question. But from the psychological point of view, such propaganda is effective.

In this connection it will be interesting to see what happens to those peoples in India, Burma, and Indonesia who are mixed white and native. In India the most pathetic people in the past were the Anglo-Indians or the so-called Eurasians. They were often ostracized by both British and

native Indians. Yet they had a certain important place in the economy of that country. Their chief occupation has been clerical work, teaching, and nursing. In the past they were in a middle position of being subservient to their British employers, yet they regarded themselves as superior to the native Indians.

The situation of the Indo-Europeans in Java may be a little better than that of the Eurasians in India and Burma. In a population of about 45 million they constitute a relatively small minority. They have been caught between conflicting loyalties as power has shifted from the older Dutch colonial rule to local self-government and native nationalism.

In the decades ahead we may see a further shuffling of the power relations between the white and colored peoples. It is not at all impossible that the color difference may become a symbol around which many of the emerging nationalistic groups may combine against the West and the white race.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

DOLLARD, John, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 2nd ed. (New York, Harper, 1949). A study of "Cottonville"—a town of about 3,000—in Mississippi, made in the 1930's. The aim was to uncover the social, psychological, and cultural factors in Negro-white relations. The emphasis is on the color-caste problems.

DEUTSCH, Morton, and COLLINS, Mary E., *Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1951). The authors found that changes in ideas and beliefs about Negroes were easier to bring about than changes in emotions and feelings on the part of the whites.

GOODMAN, Mary E., *Race Awareness in Young Children* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1952). A study of nursery-school children, Negro and white, which showed that a considerable fraction of them had distinctive awareness of racial characteristics and a range of favorable and unfavorable attitudes about them.

HARDING, John, KUTNER, Bernard, and others, "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), Ch. 27. An extensive review of most of the important literature on prejudice of recent years. Contains a long bibliography.

MACCRONE, I. D., *Race Attitudes in South Africa* (London, Oxford University Press, 1937). A sound analysis of the main factors, but especially the psychological ones, which bear on race relations in South Africa. Compares the situation there with ours.

MYRDAL, Gunnar, *An American Dilemma* (New York, Harper, 1944), 2 vols. By all odds the most comprehensive material on the Negro in the United States. The data on which the author based his writing were collected from other sources by a large number of social scientists. Not based on original research by Myrdal.

POWDERMAKER, Hortense, *After Freedom* (New York, Viking Press, 1939). "A cultural study" of "Cottonville" by a trained anthropologist. May be regarded as a companion volume to the Dollard reference noted above.

CHAPTER 23

Other Areas of Prejudice

THE present chapter will continue the discussion of prejudice and will deal, first, with its manifestations in religious and political differences, and, second, with various suggestions and efforts at the alleviation of discrimination and intolerance. With respect to the first our attention will center chiefly on Jewish-Christian and Protestant-Catholic prejudices. As to modifying and eliminating prejudice, in the closing section we shall deal with a number of proposals and concrete efforts along this line.

JEWISH-CHRISTIAN PREJUDICES

Historical Background

To understand current anti-Semitism some attention to its history is essential. The Jew has long been a symbol and an object of aggression for Christian and Mohammedan groups. Yet the conflict is no more one-sided than is the Negro-White, Catholic-Protestant, or any other such group struggle. There is always interaction predetermined in some way by deep-seated cultural differences. For a long time the bases of Jewish-Christian antagonisms were regarded as essentially stemming from religion, but there is no doubt that economic and political factors have also played a part almost from the outset of such antagonism.

The role of the Hebrews as a minority group throughout history is well known. For centuries before the Christian Era, they were a small but militant nation periodically caught up in mighty struggles between Egypt and her allies on the one hand, and the nations of the Tigris-Euphrates valley on the other. Much of their social and religious philosophy was born of their persistent efforts to prevent absorption by their more powerful neighbors. In attempting this, they developed a strong sense of separateness, an intense in-group unity, and on the religious side the thesis that they were God's chosen people.

When Christianity became fully established in the decaying Roman

Empire, and when it was triumphant in Medieval Europe, the Jew was the culturally accepted target of scorn and oppression. His function as a scapegoat for Christian hostility became deeply embedded in Western culture. He was denied any civil rights, he was segregated into the ghetto, and he was not permitted to own land. On the other hand, he developed important economic functions as a merchant and moneylender. For centuries, the Jew provided the Christian a most convenient outlet for his hostility. In some countries, as in Czarist Russia, periodic outbreaks of aggression ended in bloody pogroms. Such pressure from the outside made for increasing solidarity on the part of the Jewish community. The Jewish culture was carefully guarded, the Jewish family solidarity was of high value, and the hope of release from their hardships by God at some future date helped to keep them in their faith.

The emancipation of the Jew from his medieval restrictions was not accomplished in Europe until political democracy and the Industrial Revolution were well advanced. It was as late as 1831 before the Jew was given full suffrage in England. Such legal barriers were removed elsewhere much later. Other barriers remained and were reinforced as older class lines began to disappear and as the Jew entered into competition for status in an increasing number of occupations.

So far as this country is concerned, there were few Jews here before the middle of the nineteenth century. The first important immigrants of this faith began to come from Germany and elsewhere following the revolutionary movement of 1848. But the great influx of Jews took place toward the close of the nineteenth century. From about 1880 until World War I, hundreds of thousands of Jews from Poland, the Ukraine, and the Balkans settled in the United States. Moreover, most of them settled in the large cities on the North Atlantic seaboard and in and around Chicago. In 1950, the city of New York, for example, had approximately 3,000,000 Jews—nearly half the total in the entire country. Present-day anti-Semitism in the United States stems largely from the economic competition between Christians and Jews which followed this great immigration. Associated with this are status factors of noneconomic sort.

In the development of modern capitalistic society, the Jew has played a distinctive role. Yet his business interests and methods are not essentially different from those of other people who attempt to follow the pattern of our profit system. Accusing the Jew of being a money-grabber is probably a defense reaction of the Gentile to intense economic competition. We tend to find in others what we find in ourselves. When we blame others for practicing what we ourselves practice, we may fairly suppose that our resentment is a reaction to our own manners and morals. This, as we have seen, is a fundamental factor in the psychology of prejudice everywhere. Its targets may vary in different situations but the projective mechanism is the same.

Sometimes the Jew is accused of being antinationalistic. He has been accused of being an international and radical laborite, and of being an international banker. In the heyday of the revived Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's, much was made of the fact that some of the prominent communists in the Soviet Union, Germany, and America were Jews. Good citizens of the country could want no better proof that the Jews were attempting to control the world by spreading disaffection among the laboring classes, by making them class-conscious, restless, subversive, and skilled in the technique of revolution. But this was not all. The wily Jew was also fast obtaining control of the great international banks. Hence unsuspecting Gentiles were caught between two attacks, and with his usual craftiness the Jew would win in either case. If the world went communistic, the Jew would be in control. If the world continued to expand along capitalistic lines, the Jews would retain and increase their power over the rest of us. There was no escape, in the minds of the anti-Semites, from this deep Jewish plot to rule the world. The parallel is close between this attitude and what was later alleged by Hitler and his followers in Germany. That we still get this kind of response in the more intense anti-Semite will be indicated below.

The cultural backgrounds of the modern Jew are worth examining. While this is of a general over-all picture and while there are many individual variations, for the most part the Jew retains much of his old in-group solidarity. On the other hand, no one in our society typifies industrialized mass society better than he. Yet his retention of deeper familial solidarity keeps him within the framework of a primary group situation. For those Jews who are still followers of the faith in one form or another, religion tends to supplement and support this primary familialism. But as a city dweller, the Jew develops sophistication, mobility, restlessness, and an impersonality and individuality in his dealings with others that is unknown to the rural communities or small towns. Perhaps some antagonism toward the Jew arises because he has combined some of the primary group virtues of familialism and close-knit solidarity with the impersonality and sophistication of mass society.

In religious ideas and practices, there is a good deal of variation among the Jews themselves. There are three major divisions: the Orthodox, the Conservative, and the Reformed. Though they share the fundamental Judaic faith and the pride of the chosen people, their divergences are rather sharp on some matters.

Though it is difficult to define completely the general elements of Jewish culture, the following must certainly be considered as important: (1) There is a basic Judaic faith, and among a large number of Jews a deep conviction continues, bolstered by the strong tradition of persecution, that they are a separate and chosen people. (2) There is an intense family solidarity which is linked to their religious beliefs. (3) There is

an abiding faith in intellectualism and rationality which stems out of Talmudic teachings and carries over, especially among the more educated Jews, into business, science, philosophy, and art. And (4) there is a strong individualism which is expressed in intellectual, artistic, political, and economic activities.

One of the unsolved difficulties in Jewish-Christian relations is the fact that many Jews want to remain distinctive as a cultural group and yet, at the same time, to be full participants in the larger European-American culture. This is impossible culturally and psychologically, and is an aspect of minority problems that is important not only for Jews to realize but for Negroes, Catholics, and others as well.

The interactions of Jews and Christians have been exposed in a large number of studies both through polling techniques and by questionnaires given chiefly to college students. We noted earlier that the Jews, along with the Negroes, were the most frequently mentioned group as being national problems. Also, various studies made of nationality differences has shown that, for the most part, the Jewish group falls somewhere in the middle or lower half of the range of nationality preferences, with American and English at the top, and Turk, Negro, and other colored groups at the bottom.

Personality and Anti-Semitism

A study of veterans with regard to their ethnic attitudes by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz—already noted—is probably the most complete analysis of the roots of anti-Semitism yet to be made.[1] Their sample was made up of 150 randomly selected veterans of enlisted rank living in Chicago. They were given detailed interviews by trained personnel. We shall give only the main findings of this intriguing study:

As to the degree of intolerance, on the basis of their findings they divided their sample into four categories or types. There was, first, the intensely anti-Semitic veteran who was spontaneously outspoken in expressing a preference for restrictive action against the Jews. This was even before such a topic was raised. In the second place, there was the outspoken anti-Semitic veteran who revealed no spontaneous preference for restriction against the Jews but whose hostility showed up in the course of the interview, especially in his expression of a wide range of unfavorable stereotypes. In the third place, there was the stereotyped anti-Semitic veteran who expressed no preference for hostile or restrictive action, either spontaneously or when questioned directly. He merely expressed a variety of popularly accepted stereotypes about the Jew. In the fourth place, there was the tolerant veteran who revealed no marked

[1] Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans* (New York, Harper, 1950). All quotations and Figure 16 by permission of the publishers.

stereotyped beliefs about the Jew, although even the most tolerant sometimes expressed isolated negative stereotypes. Moreover, neither spontaneously nor when questioned, did the tolerant veteran advocate restrictions against the Jews. In fact, on policy questions, he denied any just grounds for differentiation or affirmed his lack of concern about such differences. Of these 150 veterans, 41 per cent fell in the tolerant group, 28 per cent in the stereotyped category, 28 per cent in the outspoken anti-Semitic, and only 4 per cent in the intensely anti-Semitic group.

The *intensely anti-Semitic* is typified by the individual who contended that Hitler had done a good thing in restricting the Jews, that the Jews were born "that way," that they can make money when other people starve, and that they are clannish and seriously dangerous to our welfare. The *outspokenly anti-Semitic veteran* showed no spontaneous views about restrictions but did on direct questioning show his strong antagonism toward the Jews.

The *stereotyped anti-Semite* reflected a rather wide range of common views but expressed no attitude as to possible restrictive actions. While he might think the Jews clannish or shrewd in business, he did not regard this as anything unfavorable. Certainly these and related matters should not be regarded as grounds for aggressive actions by government or business toward the Jews.

The veteran tolerant toward the Jews made no spontaneous mention of ethnic minorities nor indicated any particular concern about the Jews. With regard to the Negroes, interestingly enough, while all favored equal treatment, some insisted upon segregation. With regard to discrimination in jobs, he was in favor of merit in qualifications without regard to race, color, and creed. As one veteran put it, "I don't think there is any reason for ill-feeling between the Jews and Gentiles." [2] There is some evidence from this study of an accumulative effect of hostility and prejudice. This matter was mentioned in Chapter 22. Figure 16 shows some interrelationship with the anti-Semitic and the anti-Negro attitudes. Of those tolerant toward the Jews there is a considerable number who are also anti-Negro, but of those who are outspoken and intense anti-Semites, a considerably higher portion are anti-Negro as well.

In Chapter 22 we pointed out that the chief stereotypes about the Negro were that he was sloppy, dirty, and filthy, that he depreciated property, that he tended to force the whites out of jobs, that he was lazy and slack in work, and that he was immoral. In contrast, the five leading stereotypes about the Jew were that he is clannish, that he has money, that he intends to control everything, that he is underhanded in business, and, finally, that he does not work, that is, he will not engage in manual labor. The characteristics attributed to the Negro were largely those relating to personal offenses. In contrast, the Jews tended to be re-

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

garded as members of a powerfully organized group which was a real threat to the non-Jew. On the basis of their case materials, the authors worked out a sixfold classification of individuals who had various degrees



FIG. 16. Interrelation Between Anti-Semitic Attitudes and Anti-Negro Attitudes.

of anti-Semitism or lack of it. The outstanding features of these six classes or types are:

1. There is the tolerant man whose controls are adequate. By controls the authors refer to either external controls or internal ones, such as, conscience or guilt.

Most of them felt relatively secure within the circle of their families and at their jobs. In a matter-of-fact way and without complaining, they accepted their inability to influence the larger events of their lives which they saw as entirely controlled by societal institutions. They felt the need to be controlled and

they accepted such control, even when it was quite stringent. Without such control, they feared that the functioning of society would be impaired.[3]

In another group of persons under this general category, they found a number of men who showed "some measure of ego strength, although their tolerance was closely related to acceptance of external authority—an acceptance which was combined in their cases with some internalization of controls. However, in contrast to the externally controlled group first described, these men expressed a measure of ego strength." [4]

In commenting upon the relationship of ego strength to affection and to other kinds of gratification, the authors say: [5]

> Love alone is not sufficient for a child to develop adequate internal controls, and what has here been designated as ego strength. Parental love may result in an optimistic outlook on life, may promote the conviction that the individual is lovable and will be loved. It may also permit the formation of satisfactory interpersonal relationships. But love alone will not give the individual a sense of permanent security and the feeling that he is able to master successfully the situations he must meet. For that, love must be combined with a conviction that adequate gratification of biological needs such as intake and elimination, rest, motility, warmth, and shelter will always be available. In general the controls only reached mature development in the army where gratification of the most primitive needs was assured and where success was experienced under conditions which allowed for comparison with adult peers.
>
> Examples of the intolerant men, on the other hand, show that in their case the personalities they had developed long before entering the army prevented them from internalizing controls. They violently resented the external controls of the army and also tended to run into actual disciplinary difficulties because of their rejection of all controls. The conclusion may be that only a personality which is so structured by early experiences that internalization of controls is possible can permit the individual to accept external control. The men whose personalities were better integrated were also better able to use the army experience for internalizing controls.
>
> Harsh discipline by parents does not necessarily lead to intolerance if other factors, such as good interpersonal relationships and actual success in life experiences, compensate for it.

A few men in the tolerant group were able to manage themselves as competent, self-reliant, and independent persons in their private sphere in spite of their harsh family upbringing. These men felt they could control their personal affairs but did not believe they could influence the broader aspects of their lives or of society. This represents a combination of affectional background, some external and internal controls, and an ability to manage their own affairs with reasonable success.

2. Next there is a small group of the tolerant men whose controls were inadequate. They were characterized by a mixture of pessimism, hostility, and some tolerance. "They were men who were rather high in

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 113–114.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

hostility, frustration, and isolation, and low in security and ego strength. But they were able to restrain themselves from interethnic hostility although such restraint did not usually originate in ego strength or superego control but rather in a particular life history or family constellation." [6]

3. This group was made up of "the stereotyped men." Of them, the authors remark: [7]

> The *stereotyped* anti-Semites showed less ability to integrate their hostilities. To most of them, controls were relatively effective in exercising some restraints, or their stereotyped opinions would have led them to develop a higher intensity of intolerance. But they had failed to integrate them. Although stereotyped opinions which should have led to a demand for action were not restrained by controls, no demand for action ensued. The reason for this may either have been that the controls were not strong enough to contain the hostility, or that the tension generating the hostility was too great.

It is probable that a great deal of the stereotyped anti-Semitism is represented by people who are the follower type, who live in the world of a more or less conventional stereotyping about a great many situations. Moreover, although highly stereotyped or conventional, these people are under the domination of controls that keep them from being more outspoken and more active in discrimination.

4. This group is the "outspoken anti-Semites who possessed some measure of control." Only two veterans fell into this category. One of these men was a very recent immigrant to this country. He had transferred his controls from his previous environment to the United States and his attitudes were, in part, probably a carry-over of certain of his anti-Semitic attitudes from an earlier time. The other man's father was of American stock, but his mother was born in Austria. He was born and raised in Chicago and he went through grade school and high school. He made rather outspoken demands to restrict the Jews, particularly with reference to jobs. However, he was not opposed to intermarriage nor did he object to working with Jews, though he did not want them as next-door neighbors. His hostility was moderate. He accepted some external control and his anti-Semitism was tempered by these controls.

5. These were "the outspoken anti-Semites whose controls were inadequate." They made up 16 per cent of the total sample. The members of this group made no effort to qualify their derogatory statements about the Jews. As a matter of fact, as the interviews went on, these men became more violent. The pressure of hostility seemed to grow as they expanded their remarks about the Jews. These people expressed the traditionally strong anti-Semitic attitudes and opinions: the Jews controlled business; they were unscrupulous; they would not give other people a chance; they didn't work or fight; they were not good neighbors; and

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 123.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

they tended to bring all of their friends into any situation where they were able to get a start.

6. Finally, the last group, the *intense anti-Semites* were characterized "by low security, high hostility, high frustration, and social isolation." These people showed strong feelings of persecution and little if any restraint in the violence of their responses toward the Jew. It is clear that there was "a steady increase in hostility and a steady decline in the adequacy of controls" as one moved from "the least intolerant to the most intolerant man." With the intense anti-Semite, the controls were largely externalized.

Jewish Reaction

With the Jews as with other ethnic groups, three important features must be noted: First, there are the norms established by the controlling institutions with respect to the particular ethnic group; second, there is the degree to which the individual accepts or submits to the external controls; and third, there is the question of the intensity of the feelings of personal deprivation and anxiety which are associated with the acceptance of the symbol or object of prejudice. In the United States there is a certain amount of social acceptance of anti-Semitism but there is no legal sanction for it. The types of controls are largely those of the class to which the individual belongs and the degree of readiness to operate in a dual world. In this connection, one additional matter warrants comment. In the intimacy of close-knit groups of friends or in private clubs and the like, the expression of anti-Semitism is often quite obvious and open. Yet these same people are usually most careful to disguise or suppress such expression of prejudice in public and particularly to Jews themselves. In other words, there is a freemasonry with regard to talking about the Jews in public groupings, although many of these people in their private conversations are pretty outspoken in their antagonism toward the Jew. This is also true of a good many professional groups, such as those of doctors and lawyers, and sometimes even among college professors.

The responses of the individual Jew to Christian prejudices may take a variety of forms. Among the Jewish élite there is sometimes a complacent retirement behind the sense of superiority, an avoidance of unnecessary and conflict-arousing situations. Among lower-class Jews who are intensely orthodox, somewhat the same retreat from the Gentile world may be made. Though there is always some unavoidable contact with the Gentile world, at least in economic matters, in these groups there is no striving to be accepted socially into the same clubs, fraternities, and so on. In contrast to these are the aggressive individuals—just how many there are depends on the definition of aggression—with whom the Christian comes into conflict, and it is out of this situation that prejudice tends to develop.

As we know, aggressive individuals easily set up like responses in

others. This is particularly true of the Jew in our highly competitive society. There is no conflict so long as there is neither business nor personal-professional competition. If a community has a Jewish junk-dealer, or even one merchandiser, no one gets excited about his presence. It is when the Jew arrives in numbers and begins competing in fields long regarded as the sole domain of the Gentile that prejudice emerges.

This cycle of events, of course, is just as true with regard to other minorities as it is with this one. It is the pushing, forward-striving minority man who gets ahead and who at the same time irritates those who would maintain the status quo. In a sense, prejudice may be considered a form of defense reaction to retain the existing status.

PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC PREJUDICES

While the earlier violent conflict between Catholics and Protestants has been reduced, there still remains a large body of myths and stereotypes which interfere with co-operative and friendly relations between these two major sections of Christianity. Competition for jobs in business or political struggles have been affected by these facts. So, too, reactions against certain minority groups are colored by religious differences. Certain political issues such as are concerned with state support of parochial education have, of course, direct religious sources. In any case, on both sides are a variety of beliefs which influence interpersonal contact.

Negative Beliefs

In certain Protestant circles, common stereotypes about Catholics include such items as that they are "idol worshipers," "have no Bibles," and owe their primary allegiance to the Pope. Others take offense at the system of confession. So, too, many otherwise tolerant and well-informed Protestants and Jews alike misunderstand the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward modern science.

These beliefs do not necessarily arise in localities where the Protestants and Catholics come into daily contact. Nothing could be more intense than the anti-Catholic attitudes of many rural communities in the South, where often there are no Catholics at all. The manner in which prejudice may be built up is evident in a family situation in an almost exclusively Protestant village. The father is Protestant. The wife and her mother are Catholic. The father persists openly in telling his children horrible stories about Catholics. He points out that their maternal grandmother is a member of a church which promotes shocking practices. He, of course, is actually striking at his wife for being a Catholic. This attitude is producing severe inner conflicts in his children by causing them to side against their mother, at the same time creating in them definitely negative attitudes toward Catholics in general.

In some parts of the country where political and economic com-

petition exists between Protestant and Catholic groups, there are prejudices on both sides. One of the oldest of the Protestant myths is that the Catholics aim to control the government. This often takes the form that the Pope wants to see a Catholic in the presidency. A good illustration of the latter appeared during the presidential campaign of 1928. The political propaganda carried on against Alfred E. Smith stirred up old prejudices and added new details to the tradition of a Catholic menace. Some of the stereotypes of the Know-Nothing Party were revived. Adherents of Smith, in turn, responded quite in the manner of their opponents. Old prejudices were phrased in new terms. We have no way to discover how much the campaign altered the fundamental prejudices. It may have made them more explicit. Without the development of critical attitudes, adults can change their basic prejudices only with difficulty.

Catholic stereotypes about the Protestants are illustrated by such ideas as that they "have fallen away from the true faith," that they will not be saved hereafter, that they have no true church or true priesthood armed with divine authority. Born in heresy, they develop worse heresies as they go along. Some of the Protestant churches tolerate divorce and even condone birth control, both of which are opposed by the Catholic church. Just as Gentiles sometimes talk as if a Jew of today had personally assisted in the crucifixion of Jesus, so Catholics talk as if Protestants of today had personally conspired with Martin Luther and John Calvin against the unity of the Mother Church. A child born in a Protestant family finds Protestantism quite as "natural" as a Jew finds his Judaism or a Catholic finds his Catholicism. But it is a Catholic stereotype to refuse to recognize this simple fact. Many perfectly honest Catholics, who probably have liberal Protestants as neighbors, seem heartily convinced that the liberal wing of Protestantism menaces civilization itself. The attachment of liberal Protestantism to modern science is well known; the occasional change in scientific theories is also evident. Apparently it is a Catholic practice to point to these shifts as evidence of the complete unreliability of scientific theory in comparison with the presumed unchanging character of Catholic dogma. Obviously, the fact that the first chapter of Genesis does not change is proof that it is a better account of the origin of man than a modification of any particular theory of evolution. A number of studies have shown that not only on science but on many other issues there is a sharp divergence between Catholics and others.

Educational Policy

In recent decades, a serious conflict between Catholic and Protestant groups in the United States has been over the question of public tax support for the parochial schools in one form or another. Some people among the former have advocated outright tax support for parochial

education. In other communities they have contended that tax funds be used to pay for bus service to transport children to and from school or to pay for the textbooks. On the Protestant side, there have been various efforts to close parochial schools. For example, an Oregon law in 1922 provided that after 1926 all parents must send their children to public schools. The Supreme Court of the United States held this law to be unconstitutional. They said, "The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

In addition to these arguments, an effort has been made to provide for religious instruction in the public schools. This would be done by Protestant ministers, Catholic priests, or Jewish rabbis who would give religious instruction to the children of their respective faiths during regular school hours and within the school buildings. In one case in Illinois an 8 to 1 decision in the United States Supreme Court declared such a law to be unconstitutional.

This continuing conflict illustrates the basic difficulty of striving for unity in a highly diverse culture such as ours. The plea for cultural diversity must always face the counter-argument that to survive a cultural system must have a large component of uniformity and agreement. We are able to tolerate a certain amount of religious difference as long as it does not interfere, as we see it, with certain fundamental loyalties and certain fundamental democratic principles.

OTHER AREAS OF CONFLICT AND PREJUDICE

Anti-Foreigner Prejudice

In the history of the United States there have been periods of intense anti-foreigner prejudice. From about 1830 to the outbreak of the Civil War a series of so-called "Native American" movements arose and flourished. These expressed the growing fear of the older American inhabitants that the recent immigrants would undermine the American way of life as they viewed it. As early as 1817 the *American Daily Advertiser,* commenting on the coming of Irish immigrants, said:

> Let us not forget, before it is too late, what motive brings these people to our shores. Let us remember that it is cheap lands, higher wages, food in plenty, and freedom from military service; not a love of our institutions, or a belief that our form of government is better than they have. Let us remember that they come with all of the prejudices which are the result of race and early training, and that in welcoming what seem to be the oppressed of other lands, we may really be taking an adder into our bosom.

In 1835 the Democratic Association of Native Americans pledged their support to William Henry Harrison's presidential campaign. Two

years later the Native American Association of United States was founded in Washington, D.C. There were riots and public disturbances in a number of cities between the foreigners and native Americans. The Know-Nothing party, founded in 1850, was a distinctly nativist movement. It adopted the tactics of a secret society to gain its ends. The organized prejudice of this group incited fear and hostility in the foreign-born and in some instances this led to open conflict.

Yet the history of prejudice in this country has another feature. As the Irish-Americans became adjusted, they in turn joined with the older Americans in opposing the coming of the Germans. Later, when the German-Americans were assimilated, prejudice was directed toward still newer arrivals—Italians, Jews, and Slavic peoples.

During and right after World War I there was a great outburst of what was then called 100 per cent Americanism. It received considerable support from the racial myth of Nordic superiority. This is one of the basic notions for the theory of racial differences. There were a number of books published at this time which supported this doctrine. Among these was one published in 1916 by Madison Grant entitled, *The Passing of the Great Race.* This Nordic myth was spread far and wide through the writings of Grant and others. Since it fitted in with their plans, the revived Ku Klux Klan took up the racial battle cry. So did the Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic associations bent on bolstering up the older population against the inroads of new peoples with divergent cultures. This was very much the same idea that became the core of Adolf Hitler's writings. We had our own strong pro-white racial movement ten or fifteen years before Hitler came to power. Even to this day the doctrine of Nordic racial superiority lies rather firmly beneath the surface of public life.

As with all other attitudes, prejudices against foreigners and their children are developed through early learning. The home, the neighborhood, the school, and the church all play a part in this process. In the younger children, avoidance and aggression are built up out of fear, cruelty, combativeness, and ridicule. During adolescence, condescension, rivalry, and class-consciousness are added. Although prejudice has its roots in personal-social conditioning, it grows and thrives through culture-learning built upon in-group and out-group relations. Parents forbid their children to play with Italian, Jewish, or with other children whom they meet in school, on the street, or in public parks and thus induce negative reactions toward members of these minority groups.

Of course, prejudices are stimulated and fed by class differences. Differences in economic status, variations in residential area, and differences in playgrounds are all factors which set the cultural direction of prejudice against minority peoples.

Even though the school tries to break down a good deal of this hostil-

ity, on the other hand it sometimes accentuates it. The schools tend to reflect the attitude of the home and neighborhood. Teachers are often of the older American stock, and they naturally share the attitudes and ideas of the parents of the children of similar origins. If a child of recent immigration is backward in learning, he is likely to be singled out for attention and perhaps ridiculed by teachers and pupils.

Some of our school subjects help keep national bias alive. The anti-British tone of most American histories is well known. So, too, the place of the Negro and of various white minorities in the making of American culture is seldom, if ever, given any attention in the school textbooks. Every nation indoctrinates its young with patriotic attitudes and values, and in so doing it often stimulates prejudices not only against rival nations but against minority groups within its own borders.

Obviously, prejudice plays a large part in international relations. The political organization of the nation-state tends to foster conflict. The concept of sovereignty and self-determination is basic to the values and practices of nations in their relations with one another. It is assumed that each nation will determine its actions entirely in line with its own interests. The accommodations between nations—treaties and agreements —are not enforced by any third party. They may be revoked by the stronger nation if its interests change. In short, peace in the world of opposing states rests on a balance of military strength and on a somewhat limited international morality.

Foreign Views of Americans

On the other hand, people in other countries have more or less fixed pictures in their heads about the United States. Their legends and myths influence their activities on the international scene. These beliefs are compounded from books, periodicals, motion pictures, radio programs, and conversational and other contacts with Americans, particularly tourists.

A good example of divergent public images is the contrast in views of the United States presented in Soviet publications and the views of Soviet Russia given in American publications. George S. Counts has made a content analysis of the official history of the non-Russian world designed for the high schools in Russia, entitled *The New History, 1789–1870.* Only four authorities are quoted in this book: Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. There are two chapters devoted to this country and, while on the whole the tone is favorable, economic factors are stressed throughout. There are four chief themes: (1) The great mass of American workers have been severely exploited by the ruling class; (2) the class struggle is to be found on almost every page of American history; (3) "The industrial workers are cast in an heroic and revolutionary mold"; and (4) the basic fact in American history is "the rise of the native capitalistic

class to a position of undisputed power." There is no mention of the Bill of Rights, no reference to political liberty or popular rule; public education and the high level of living are completely ignored.[8]

In another history textbook, dealing with Russia, the students may read that " 'our motherland' is the 'largest country in the whole world,' with 'the richest resources,' and the 'most advanced and powerful.' Also 'in no other land is there such a friendship of people . . . all united in one brotherly union. . . . All the peoples of the USSR work for the general welfare. In the USSR there are no parasites—capitalists and landlords, as in other countries. In the USSR there is no exploitation of man by man.' " [9]

An analysis of the material on this country which appeared in *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist party, for the months February through December, 1946, reveals much the same type of treatment. In his report on this, Alexander Dallin estimates that at least 80 per cent of the material may be regarded as propaganda. In this there are four main topics or themes: (1) Great stress on militarism and imperialism in our foreign policy, couched in such terms as "atomic diplomacy"; (2) considerable reference to pro-Soviet views and criticisms of American and British policies as they are expressed inside this country, (3) the role of the reactionaries in the United States—the fascists, supporters of racial discrimination, and the perpetuation of " 'monopoly capitalism' " and " 'redbaiting' "; and (4) widespread and intensive industrial strife, unemployment, inflation, and the inevitability of a breakdown of the capitalist economy.

Yet, there are forces of " 'effective opposition . . . by the democracies of the world.' " In time, these will block or liquidate such " 'dollar dictatorship.' " [10]

The views about the Soviet Union in American textbooks, in turn, present a limited and largely unfavorable picture of conditions in Russia. An analysis of 117 textbooks, chiefly in geography, history, and sociology, written for junior and senior high-school levels, showed among other things that only a very limited amount of space is given to Soviet Russia, that what is presented is not well balanced, that there are some inaccuracies, that pictorial aids are inadequate, and that most of these books neglect mention of Soviet-American relations. The Czarist days are painted in dark and brutal fashion, but the Soviet government is not much better. The Bolshevik Revolution is said to rest on terror, confiscation of property, and ruthless exploitation of the masses.[11]

[8] George S. Counts, "Soviet Version of American History," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1946, 10:321–328. Quotations are from pp. 324, 325, 326, 327.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

[10] Alexander Dallin, "America Through Soviet Eyes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1947, 11:26–39.

[11] Richard W. Burkhardt, "The Soviet Union in American School Textbooks," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1947, 11:567–571.

A survey of the manner in which Soviet news has been handled in *The New York Times*, from 1917 through May, 1946, showed a definite pattern. During the early years the reporting was definitely biased and partisan. Later—especially during the days of nazism and fascism—it was much more favorable and apparently more objective. Following the defeat of Germany in World War II, the news lapsed back into less favorable forms. Among the unfavorable themes are these: (1) "Soviet leaders are immoral, unethical . . . unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary"; (2) "The Soviet government does not represent the Russian people, and it 'will not succeed' "; (3) "The Soviet Union is a predatory state"; and (4) "The Soviet leaders and people are enigmatic." Favorable themes include mention of co-operation of the Soviet Union with the Allies against the Axis powers, of the Russian people being "resolute fighters," and of the country being "enterprising, forceful." [12]

Over the years and for Europe as a whole, a common image of the United States is that of an untamed country, peopled by gun-carrying cowboys and desperadoes, or by mobs that lynch Negroes as their principal sport. The reputed greed of the American, and his curious spendthrift ways while he is in Europe, make two mutually contradictory pictures for the European. European cartoons often depict Uncle Sam, the stereotype for Americans in general, as a money-grabbing fellow chronically intent on picking other nations' pockets and, on the other hand, as a foolish spendthrift on a holiday, the easy prey of exploitation. Political prejudice against us is usually added to this image. The political prejudice is the result of the European concept of our international politics. Cartoons show perfidious Uncle Sam offering with one hand the olive branch of perpetual peace and reaching with the other hand toward territory south of the United States or in the Orient.

EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE OR REDUCE PREJUDICE

In this, the final section, we shall attempt to indicate some of the possible methods and programs which might be developed for the alleviation or reduction of intergroup tension and prejudice.[13] Let us begin with some remarks on a general orientation to this topic. The most clear-cut solution to problems of intergroup tension would be either complete isolation of one group from the other or complete assimilation. The former would involve spatial or geographic exclusion, such as are found in cultural islands developed in earlier societies. For example, such isolation

[12] Martin Kriesberg, "Soviet News in the 'New York Times,' " *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1946–1947, 10:540–564.

[13] In this section I have drawn considerably on Robin M. Williams, Jr., "The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations," *Bulletin*, No. 57 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1947).

was the aim of the Mormons when they moved into the Great Basin to get away from a hostile Gentile world. The other alternative would mean the full absorption of one group by the other. Since neither of these is likely to happen among most of the groups we have discussed, little or nothing need be said further on these possibilities.

From a theoretical point of view, the reduction of a given group conflict or tension would involve, first, actual reduction of hostility which, in turn, would depend upon cutting down frustrations and insecurities associated with such aggressiveness. In the second place, rather than changing existing hostilities, they might be redirected toward substitute targets. That is, there might be a diversion of prejudice from one group to another or to some object less directly involved. The third possibility would be no change in the hostility level and the retention of the major hostilities and targets but the repression of overt conflict. In this situation, external control would come into play to keep people from falling into outright conflict. Sociologically, this last leads to what we call accommodation. Under this, some kind of working relationship is built up within which the opposing groups perform certain expected functions but are prevented from indulging in open hostility. In these situations there are fundamental factors, some external and some internal. The basic external factors are those of physical and economic security. For example, it is generally agreed that the Negro-white relationships in the South are definitely related to the economics of the South. Until these conditions are improved, we cannot look for a reduction in the present interracial antagonisms. As the general level of economic well-being is improved, we may look forward to some improvement in the relations of Negroes and whites. Another important factor concerns adequate social-emotional security of the personality. This means gratification from interpersonal relationships and a basic integration within the personality which would eliminate the psychological need to discharge hostility. We need recall that apparently many prejudiced persons have a particularly disturbed life organization. As G. W. Allport and B. M. Kramer remark, "These people tend to view the world as a jungle of conflicting elements, as a world basically 'evil and dangerous.' " [14]

It is pretty generally agreed that programs aimed directly against discrimination are likely to set off a good many responses which rather enhance than reduce prejudiced reactions. In this connection Talcott Parsons remarks, "Indiscriminate attack on every form of existent discrimination, regardless of anything but the immediate effectiveness of the means, is not likely to achieve the actual elimination of anti-Semitism, but on the contrary to intensify the reactions it attempts to stop." [15]

[14] G. W. Allport and B. M. Kramer, "Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology*, 1946, 22:9–39. Quotation is from p. 38.

[15] Talcott Parsons, "The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism," in Isacque Graeber and S. H. Britt, eds., *Jews in a Gentile World* (New York, Macmillan, 1942), p. 121.

In short, direct attacks are really of little use. They tend to strengthen intergroup tensions rather than otherwise. In general, we shall be much more effective if we avoid defensive hostility and work through indirection rather than frontal assault. Some aspects of this will become clear as we go along.

Information, Education, and New Values

A good deal of emphasis has been put upon the use of information and education as means of reducing intergroup tension. If the hypothesis of Bettelheim and Janowitz is correct that intolerance tends to derive chiefly from personal deprivation and anxiety, then the use of information and direct education would be rather limited. Certainly prejudices are not likely to be changed by frontal informational attack. When the facts on racial or nationality differences are given, it will have little effect on changing attitudes unless the attitudes are already in the more favorable direction. Moreover, the attitudes of individuals must be personalized in reference to the groups toward which the hostility is directed. For the most part, straight information and direct education have distinctly limited effects in changing such attitudes.

Associated with educational devices has been the stress upon direct reorientation of values. This has been attempted through lectures and speeches, through radio and other methods of mass communication. It is well recognized that any changes in values must be induced so as not to suggest a threat to the status of those groups to whom the messages are being directed. As Robin M. Williams, Jr., well puts it: [16]

> Appeals to conscience or ethics must be carefully handled, if they are to diminish rather than intensify hostility. In general, such appeals are probably most effective in reinforcing the sentiments of persons who are already convinced; they are probably not effective (immediately, at least) with militant anti-ethnics, and may even result in increased hostility as a reaction to guilt feelings. That is, where individuals are utilizing prejudice to satisfy strong emotional urges, activation of the conscience-functions may tend to heighten psychological conflict and thus to result in increasingly devious or irrational hostilities.

On the other hand, appeals to group pride, to national symbols, and to common American achievements might help to reduce some of the hostility toward a subgroup within the nation. But this would be qualified by the general threat from outside as in wartime. In general, those matters which remind or suggest common cultural perceptions rather than differences should be emphasized. Certainly it has been pretty clearly shown that direct religious training in itself does not necessarily lessen prejudice. Very frequently religious training tends to emphasize rather than reduce intergroup opposition.

There have been a number of attempts to see whether hostile rumors

[16] Williams *op. cit.*, p. 67

could be reduced in effectiveness or completely eliminated by the giving of correct information or reorientation of values. Williams makes the point that in chronic but relatively mild situations of tension rumors are probably best ignored or refuted by indirection. On the other hand, rumors of unusual character, such as regards an unfavorable view of minorities in the military during the war, should be met by "official" propaganda to the contrary. But to publicize the rumors themselves would probably only enhance them. In certain crisis situations, as those prior to race riots, the refutation of rumors of hostile intentions or actions of opposing groups may do something to check the conflict. But, in general, the counteracting of rumor is a difficult type of operation. As we move away from verbal approaches to the problem to those involving direct action, we come perhaps somewhat closer to successful devices if well handled.

Intergroup Collaboration

Various agencies designed to help alleviate prejudice—so-called action agencies—have made much of the importance of personal contacts between members of different groups as a means of reducing stress. It has been assumed that tensions will be lessened in situations where the members of different groups have about the same economic and social status. Yet there are some different opinions on this matter. One writer, Paul E. Baker, contends that "the contact of the races in America when it is on the basis of equality often breeds suspicion, fear, resentment, disturbance, and at times open conflict." [17] And I. D. MacCrone has this to say: "Closeness of contact, or familiarity as such, between groups will not necessarily lead to a reduction in social distance between the individual members, unless it is accompanied by the discovery that there are elements shared in common. Otherwise, such familiarity, by enhancing the differences that divide the two groups, would only lead to an increase in social distance." [18]

The effect of personal contacts on hostility will be contingent on a variety of factors. Thus, the status of the minority group in relation to the majority group will be important as will the class position of various individuals within their own group. The initial hostility level of the individuals will also be a factor as will the character and extent of the prejudice in the total social context. For example, the nature of Negro-white contacts in Mississippi will differ from those in Minnesota or Maine. The actual and anticipated duration of intimacy of the contacts is most important. Moreover, the extent to which this contact is explicitly defined in terms of intergroup relations or with reference to

[17] Paul E. Baker, *Negro-White Adjustment* (New York, Association Press, 1934), p. 120.

[18] I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa* (London, Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 178.

activities of common interest will have some bearing. The extent and strength of competitive and noncompetitive relations between the members of the two groups is important as well as the number of persons involved.

These and other situational factors all play a part in the question of how personal contacts and collaboration will work out. It is quite possible that people who share important interests and yet fall into prejudiced groups can then be reoriented in reference to intolerant responses. However, as Williams remarks, "It is not wise for a minority to insist on wholesale liking of its members to the point of claiming 'discrimination' unless universal acceptability is granted the group." [19] This kind of demand by minority groups in regard to majority groups tends to enhance rather than reduce hostility.

Local athletic teams which include multi-ethnic members usually serve to bring about some reduction in former hostility. So, too, the formation of community committees of mixed membership to deal with local problems tends to reduce the likelihood of conflict. In work situations, the integration of minority members will be facilitated by arranging for representation of the minority in the upper as well as the lower "control-group in an organization." For example, a high executive in business or industry will be assured of more success in starting a nondiscrimination program among his employees by hiring a Negro or other colored person in his own department or in some other top management position.

The anxiety so often associated with the idea of mixing of people of different races on the job frequently turns out in practice to be of little significance. This was clearly demonstrated some years ago when Negro women were first introduced in certain divisions or departments in various government bureaus in Washington. For example, in one situation, some of the white employees felt that this would lead to friction if the girls worked in the same room or near each other or shared the same washroom and cafeteria facilities. As it turned out there was no difficulty at all after the first day or two when there was a slight amount of eyebrow-lifting and quiet talk. Interestingly enough, some of the white girls in this group had never before had such close contact with Negroes. A similar adjustment took place in the city of New York when one or two of the larger department stores showed some hesitation about employing Negro saleswomen for the first time. But after a few weeks of trial, these girls did very well, and the anticipated negative reactions of many of the customers proved to be quite transitory.

Legislation and Law Enforcement

The majority of reformers—at least in our society—have great faith in the effectiveness of education and the law in bringing about or facilitating social change. The common remark of these persons is that "There

[19] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

ought to be a law" about it or that "The difficulty can be cured by education." In regard to intergroup hostility, a good deal of confidence has been placed in the imposition of legal measures to bring about change in the occupational relations of individuals to each other. In general, however, legislation cannot run very far ahead of changes in the mores and public sentiment. This is not to say that changes in law or through law may not lessen discrimination or hasten its reduction once there is a disposition to move in that direction. The shifts in the situation regarding interstate travel in pullman cars is a case in point. For decades, discrimination against Negroes with regard to sleeping-car space and dining facilities was taken for granted. With changes in federal regulations such segregation was eliminated. Today it is not at all uncommon in the Southern states to see Negroes and whites in the same pullman car or diner. In many of the Southern states, however, intrastate and local travel continues on the basis of segregation. The same principle operates here as in the work situations. Very frequently public legislation may give just the right push to a change in the relationships of people and thus serve to reduce segregation. Williams puts it in these words, "The existence of laws protecting the rights of minorities and court decisions upholding these laws tend, in the long run, to decrease conflict over the rights involved." [20] The basis for this acceptance lies within the personality. First, there is a general set toward social conformity due to the training of the individuals in our society. Then, too, insofar as "effective sanctions are actually invoked, some deterrent effect is possible and, more important, those who apply or acquiesce in the application of sanctions thereby reinforce their own sentiments toward conformity. [Also] the presumption of legitimacy discourages conflict over rights claimed by minorities, by mobilizing intrapersonality 'conscience' functions of majority-group members." [21]

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed an earlier ruling which had permitted segregation in public education on the grounds of "equal but separate" facilities for Negroes and whites. The Court held that programs for desegregation were to be worked out by various states. Since that time the "transition from complete segregation to co-racial education" has gone forward at varying rates of change. Nevertheless, as Guy B. Johnson has aptly noted, this does not mean that social discrimination has ceased. For a long time to come, the "intimate social worlds" will remain separate.[22] But new forms of accommodation have already emerged, although in some sections of the South some organized resistance to desegregation developed.

With reference to more direct enforcement of various programs to lessen tension, there may be a general expectation of authoritative inter-

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[22] Guy B. Johnson, "Racial Integration in Southern Higher Education," paper read at annual meeting of American Sociological Society, Washington, D.C., September 1, 1955.

vention with the threat of punishment for acts of violence. Effective, well-disciplined, and impartial law enforcement is highly important. Mixed police forces, when properly indoctrinated and trained to handle conflict situations, are most effective.

In situations involving open conflict, the resolution of the crisis with a minimum of damage, violence, and a residue of later hostility will be facilitated by the following factors: (1) Prompt and full publicity to allay fears and to emphasize the capacity of the given agencies to carry out the control. (2) "Assurances of strict and impartial justice." (3) Proper distribution of police to danger spots. (4) Proper provision for prompt summoning of military or other outside help when needed. (5) The enlistment of the co-operation of leaders of the community and neighborhoods involved. (6) Use of personal public appeal from high officials. (7) The presence of high officials in the danger zones. And (8) the minimum use of force.

Social Organization and Reduction of Prejudice

The likelihood of hostility may be lessened by setting up clear, detailed, and widely recognized patterns of interpersonal relationships in places of casual contact, such as public conveyances. Also, the relations of minority-majority groups will be facilitated by the existence of several, and a variety of, community organizations for different purposes rather than having an over-all single organization.

Mediation between groups in conflict is particularly effective when there is an appeal to some over-all or superior value that transcends the differences of the groups. An appeal to the preservation of the larger community or the larger interests of national or religious sort illustrates this. Attention to the leisure-time activities of potential troublemakers is most important; for example, the provision of public recreation for the adolescents of the lower-status groups.

A minority like the Jews or Negroes that is vulnerable to hostility may reduce the threat by modifying the attitudes of its own members. This should include education to an understanding of a dominant groups' reaction to the minority values and behavior. In the case of the Jews, for instance, the expression of aggressiveness and display of ambition tend to keep up the anti-Semitic stereotypes. Members should learn to minimize the conspicuous display of those traits which have a marked negative symbol value. Also they should participate in those wider community activities necessary to the common welfare and different from those of the specialized groups to which they belong. Williams aptly remarks, "All other things being equal, the probability of intergroup conflict is reduced by any measures which facilitate the internal differentiation of minorities, insofar as this serves to remove the objective basis for rigid social categorization." [23]

[23] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

What we need most in our society is the conviction and practice of cultural variation. This is a basic and fundamental principle of democratic thinking and acting. Within the fundamental range of acceptances and conformity, democracy should encourage variationism. Such differentiation is quite possible so long as it does not disrupt the basic values. More specifically, the reduction of prejudice will be helped by lessening the extreme orthodoxies in politics and religion and by the development of more co-operative relations in business, industry, and professions so as to replace the intense competition which quickly turns into open hostility.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

ACKERMAN, Nathan W., and JAHODA, Marie, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorders* (New York, Harper, 1950). Case histories of persons who had undergone intensive psychoanalysis and who had revealed strong anti-Semitic attitudes. Shows the correlation between such attitudes and childhood experiences.

ADORNO, T. W., FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, Else, and others, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, Harper, 1950). The report of an extensive survey of prejudice made in California which brings out some of the important personality components of prejudiced individuals.

MARDEN, Charles F., *Minorities in American Society* (New York, American Book, 1952). A general text which gives excellent coverage of the field and contains some sound interpretations.

MASSING, Paul, *Rehearsal for Destruction* (New York, Harper, 1949). History of political anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany. Shows how the conflict and social pressures associated with this situation blossomed under the Nazis.

PARK, Robert E., *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1950). A reprinting of selected papers of this distinguished student of race relations. Part II, "Race Relations," and Part III, "Racial Attitudes," are most pertinent to the discussion in this and the other chapters on prejudice.

SAENGER, Gerhard, *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (New York, Harper, 1953). Based on some important research in the City of New York which had to do with the integration of Negro saleswomen into various department store sales forces.

SIMPSON, George E., and YINGER, J. Milton, *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination* (New York, Harper, 1953). A general text but heavily stressing the social psychological aspects of race and minority group relations with majority groups. Chapters 22 and 23 deal with attempts to alleviate and reduce prejudice and discrimination.

SMITH, F. Tredwell, *An Experiment in Modifying Attitudes Toward the Negro* (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943). An interesting study of an effort to change attitudes of whites toward Negroes by taking white students on conducted tours through Harlem, during which social gatherings of Negroes and these white students were carried out.

The Racial Factor in Y.M.C.A.'s (New York, Association Press, 1946). A report of a study of Negro-white relationships in the Y.M.C.A.'s of 24 American cities, chiefly in the central and eastern sections of the United States. Three southern cities were included.

CHAPTER 24

The Psychology of Revolution

THE distinction between slow, evolutionary processes of social-cultural change and those called "revolutionary" is a matter of degree. We usually think of the former as more orderly and less violent than the latter. Actually, revolution, though marked by use of force and social disorganization, is preceded by many and often significant changes. In this chapter we are concerned with the nature and function of what is usually thought of as political revolution, that is, fundamental shifts in the power structure of a given nation-state. As we shall do in Chapter 25 regarding war, we will draw on historical instances of revolution with an eye to discovering certain possible recurrent and general patterns of behavior.

THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

For our purposes, we define revolution as an abrupt shift to new forms of power or authority within a nation-state. New forms of social and legal control arise along with the emergence of new social élite who manage national affairs.

Overt violence is not an essential feature of revolution. It may be avoided, largely through the seizure of the military power. The Nazi revolution illustrates this.

Beginning with the extraordinary powers assumed by the coalition regime of Chancellor Brüning, a dictatorship gradually developed; under Papen and Schleicher, in the summer of 1932, the threat of military power led to the surrender of Social Democratic control of the government of Prussia; by 1933, Adolf Hitler, in conjunction with the big industrialist and Junker groups, destroyed the German Republic. There was some violence in the form of street rioting, but nothing resembling organized and armed opposition or conquest.

The essential point is that there was a new form of legality, a new pattern of political control, backed by military force. Open violence was not used, but the shift in the source of power was fundamental.

A word may be said about revolutions which fail, such as the German

one of 1848, or that of 1905 in Russia. Abortive revolutions are often preliminary to later successful ones. Certainly there is continuity between the Russian attempt of 1905 and the success of 1917. When a revolution fails, the conservative forces are usually in such a position as to recapture or retain their political and legal power. From the social-psychological point of view, the basic social attitudes, beliefs, and mythology have not sufficiently changed for the revolutionary party to carry out its purpose. We may say, in fact (and it will become more apparent shortly), that no revolution is possible until the psychological moment has arrived. There must be a definite "readiness" for revolutionary behavior.

Although, in our conception, a revolution is essentially a shift in political power, the economic, cultural, and psychological "causes" are profoundly important. The relative importance of the factors making for revolution varies with time and circumstances. Let us trace some of the more generally accepted "causes."

Background Factors

The search for the cause of revolution has been an exercise of many scholars. Some find it in repressed instincts or drives, which under adequate stimuli break through the bonds of convention and the mores to overthrow the forms of authority. The thesis of repression, in turn, is closely linked with that of the unconscious.

For example, Gustave Le Bon, the French journalist-psychologist, associated revolution with mob behavior, in which the unconscious and lower impulses express themselves, chiefly through the lower classes which seek to wrest power from the upper and more able classes. Followers of Freudian psychology often hold that revolutions are the expression of deeply submerged, unconscious desires to destroy the state or other forms of authority—symbols of an all-powerful father figure whom the masses fear and hate. Others, like Pitirim A. Sorokin, accept the psychology of Pavlov rather than that of Freud, and hold that revolution is a release of inhibited unconditioned impulses.[1] Though not accepting either the Freudian or the Pavlovian standpoint, Lyford P. Edwards also makes the repression of the basic wishes for power, status, and security a fundamental factor in revolutions. He puts it thus: "People come to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideals are being repressed or perverted, that their entirely proper desires and ambitions are being hindered and thwarted."[2] Though Edwards does not rest his analysis entirely on the theory of balked impulses; he, like many others, finds in the psychological factors the deeper foundations of revolution.

[1] P. A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1924), p. 383.

[2] Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 30.

Other writers derive revolutions from intolerable economic injustices. Still others view them as symptoms of widespread social-cultural disorganization, as pathological phenomena. For example, Crane Brinton uses the analogy of a "fever" which attacks the body politic, and Robert Hunter seems to believe that most revolutions are the product of evil men who take advantage of social and economic disturbances, such as prolonged crop failures and monetary disorganization, to impose their will upon the long-suffering masses.[3]

In approaching such a complex topic, however, we should avoid "particularistic" or single-track explanations. Certainly there are two sets of underlying factors, the social-cultural and the social-psychological.

First of all, the old institutions begin to fail in their functions because they no longer fit the needs of the social situation. The failure may be due to new inventions which produce stresses and strains within the older institutions. Abuses in the economic, political, religious, and other special spheres develop. Mass activities, organized or unorganized, frequently arise, such as peasant uprisings, food riots, industrial strikes, and widespread sabotage. The élite, who wield the dominant power, may fail to reckon with these changes. Often the rise of a new class which competes with the old is important, as in the French Revolution, which was largely a middle-class attack on the landed aristocracy, although the peasant uprisings and the economic demands of the city laboring classes helped bring it to a focus. The rise of new classes, which compete for power with the older, often leads to the organization of militant minorities who fashion the actual revolution.

Another condition which fosters discontent is found in mass society. In the modern city, hordes of men and women are cut loose from any fundamental attachment to the soil or to primary groups and become mere atoms in a mass society. Mass suggestion, through organized agitation and a propagandist press, is more quickly mobilized for revolutionary action in the cities than in the rural districts.

The introduction of a new ideology from the outside, and the development of novel ideas out of the other cultural and class changes, help people to interpret and rationalize the stresses around them. Moreover, these new ideas and beliefs often run counter to the old, just as the practices of the newly emerging institutions conflict with those of the older ones (see below).

Prince Peter Kropotkin, the Russian geographer and revolutionist, understood the basic social-cultural factors when he described the two great currents which made the French Revolution as "the current of ideas, concerning the political reorganization" of the state, and "the current of action" which arose from abuses felt by the population. When these two

[3] See Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, Norton, 1938); and Robert Hunter, *Revolution; Why, How, When?* (New York, Harper, 1940).

great currents united, wrote Kropotkin, the revolution was at hand. This statement seems to apply to all revolutions.

As noted above, many writers believe that the foremost factor in revolution is the repression of the fundamental desires. But it is not alone the repression of the basic instincts, impulses, or wishes which produces revolution. It is rather a failure to condition the basic impulses of certain classes to the cultural and social changes which have already occurred; it is the failure of the learning processes to sublimate the primitive tendencies into behavior which is socially adequate in the new conditions; and it is the failure of such reconditioning in the dominant group rather than its failure among the masses. Yet without doubt, the mechanism of repression and its release must be reckoned with in our discussion.

Another important psychological factor is leadership. As we have seen, the qualities of the leader are the result of a combination of a drive directed to certain ends, opportunity, and particular objects of attention. In revolutionary times, leaders direct their activities either to the possibilities of the new order or to the retention of the old. Certainly no revolution could take place without leadership.

We may discuss the background of revolution in terms of what Edwards has called the "master symptoms." He defines a master symptom as "one which, in a marked degree, conditions others and without which a great revolution is impossible.[4] He names the two principal symptoms as economic disorganization and the rise of a new social myth. To these, however, two others must be added: the development of militant minorities and the rise of competent leadership.

Economic and Other Institutional Causes

Most revolutions, and certainly those of modern times, have been closely linked with economic problems. There are no more fundamental culture patterns than those built around the demands for food, clothing, and shelter. Discontent with the economic order, especially with the distribution of wealth, is highly important. Among societies dominated by agriculture, land hunger has been a crucial problem. Absentee ownership produces added discontent. An increase in taxes or rents, crop failures, a decrease in the market demand, and deflation or inflation—all tend to heighten distress.

Often the peasant may be ignorant of the wider economic situation which produces this dislocation in his affairs, but he develops a strong and unpleasant emotional reaction to a system of ownership or tenancy which seems to give him nothing but hard work and the merest necessities. His debts increase; he may lose what land he has; and other hardships prey upon his emotions until he is ripe for revolt.

In somewhat the same way, the city workers—in mill, factory, and

[4] Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

shop—develop a sense of injustice at the unequal distribution of wealth and the lack of economic opportunity. At the outset of the present commercial and industrial period, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, serfs and the peasants fled the land to enter the cities as workers. In time their opportunities for improving themselves became restricted and the urban workers felt the pinch of extreme poverty, especially in periods of unemployment. The growth of absentee ownership, the development of the factory system, and the specialization of occupation increased the difficulties of living for the city worker. Instead of having a well-rounded trade or craft, he had become merely an adjunct of a machine turning out pieces or sections of products which had no meaning to him. He became a "wage-slave," receiving always just what the labor market would supply in the way of money. He was always under the fear of loss of his job and with the knowledge of a blind alley ahead so far as advancement was concerned.

We must, however, be cautious in accepting serious economic conditions as a cause of revolution. We must not imagine that it is the complete submergence of the peasant or the factory worker that makes for overthrow of government. This is a mistaken belief. When peasants, farmers, or city laborers are so reduced in economic status that they "can scarcely keep body and soul together," there is little likelihood of revolt. Degradation, complete discouragement, and resignation to one's fearful lot do not produce revolutionary action. Quite the contrary. There must be a combination of hardship and sense of injustice with a relative improvement of conditions over the past. The peasants and city dwellers of pre-revolutionary France were better off than those of other countries in Europe. Compared with conditions in the fourteenth century, when revolution failed, their circumstances were good. In both pre-revolutionary France and pre-revolutionary Russia, the peasants already owned a third of the land. The American colonies in 1776 were the best governed colonies in the world. They were certainly better managed under George III at the time of the Declaration of Independence than they had been in 1700. So, too, despite economic and industrial dislocation in Russia during World War I, the lot of the factory workers was much improved over that of twelve years before, when the abortive revolution of 1905 took place. And in Germany, despite the horrible conditions of war, the laboring and peasant classes were far better off in 1918, when they overthrew the Kaiser and set up a republic, than they had been in 1848 when a revolutionary attempt failed. Even with six million unemployed in 1933, when Hitler came to power, the economic situation was not entirely hopeless. The revolution in China is another illustration.

To be completely beaten down and to accept such a situation will lead not to revolt but to resignation. Revolutions are not made by downtrodden masses who cannot and will not stand any more repression. There

must be faith in improvement; there must not be such repression that revolt may not be successful; and there must be leadership and a new myth. As Edwards says: "The emotion which furnishes the driving power of revolution is hope, not despair." [5]

Yet economic causes alone, among the cultural factors, do not determine the revolutionary trend. Other abuses than the distribution of wealth and property foster popular discontent.

Social status is connected with the ownership of land and wealth. The submerged classes want to emulate the upper classes. The poor peasant wishes to live like the rich peasant. The rich peasant becomes infected with the luxury virus of his landlord. The city worker wants to possess the comforts of his employer. The rich merchant or manufacturer desires to be knighted and sit in Parliament. Human envy and the desire for prestige in the eyes of one's fellows are deep in all of us. It is the social implications of wealth—what it will buy, the prestige it gives, the improved social status it brings—that count.

Other inequalities also stimulate discontent. Closely linked with social and economic position is political status. Certainly in modern revolutions the desire for political participation of groups hitherto denied it has been a factor in popular unrest. Property and birth qualifications prevented many newly developed classes from taking part in government. Not only were legislative functions often denied these groups, but administrative offices, both in the civil government and especially in the military, were withheld from persons not of noble birth or background. Sometimes religious issues enter into revolutionary movements. The Puritan revolt (1640–60), although dominated by the economic demands of the rich middle class in opposition to the crown and the nobility, was also a religious revolt. Though considerable toleration had been developed in England before this, the power of the crown, which was Roman Catholic and later Anglican, led to a desire among nonconformists for greater freedom of worship, outside the regulations of the state church.

The Russian revolution, although predominantly economic and political, was also, in part, religious. In Russia the state church, which was closely associated with the czarist regime, abused its power and stimulated discontent in the masses, especially the city workers.

The Rise of Militant Minorities

Revolutions do not make themselves. Persons and organizations play an important part in bringing about the radical changes.

In the history of modern Europe and America there is a causative relation between the growing freedom of expression of ideas—of teaching and preaching, of science, and of proposals for economic, political, religious, and other cultural reforms—and the development of revolu-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

tionary movements. This is particularly clear in Great Britain, France, and this country. The conception of natural law, the critical attitude toward religious institutions, the philosophy of individualism and democracy, the undermining of the idea of the divine right of kings, were all factors behind the revolt against the old order. New ideas in science, politics, economics, and religion were not the only factors in the new intellectual climate. The growth of cities, which increased mobility and interstimulation; the breakdown of the feudal folkways of class and status; the freeing of the individual from the station or guild into which he was born, so that he might work for any master he chose—all these changes abetted the rise of the intellectual classes and the development of new movements.

In general, there are two kinds of groups which foster and incite revolution: those which stimulate critical attitudes toward the old regime or propose moderate reforms, and those which in time become outright radical in program. Organizations such as the Freemasons on the Continent have from time to time been a force behind reform. So, too, the intellectual associations linked to the salons in pre-revolutionary France and those organized into scientific or literary societies stimulated intellectual criticism of the established order and encouraged programs for change. Such groups do not make the revolution, but they take an important step toward it.

The more dynamic groups arise out of this older social and institutional and intellectual soil. They foster not new ideas alone but action. These minorities are often organized in secret and carry on their propaganda under cover. In pre-revolutionary France, radical clubs developed in Paris and spread over France. Before the American Revolution there were Sons of Liberty, merchants' associations, and committees of correspondence which undertook the spread of rebellious ideas; sometimes local units of government took over these functions. In Russia, groups of students organized propaganda societies two generations or more before the revolution, and their work was effective in building the background for later action. China witnessed the same feature. Later more active organizations spring up. As a revolution gets under way, such minorities become political parties and prepare to seize power. The manner in which the real revolutionary minorities operate will be discussed later.

The Place of Leadership

Just as there is a shift from moderate to radical groups, so there is a change of leadership. The intellectuals, for example, who criticized the old regime in France were highly important in providing the background, but they shrank from the violence and force that were necessary to make the revolt a success.

The Enlightenment in France gave rise to the Encyclopedists, who had a part in undermining the old order. These were a group of scholars, headed by Denis Diderot, who compiled a huge body of informative and critical material on various phases of contemporary and historical culture. This work had great influence in stimulating ideas and making people aware for the first time of their own society. So, too, other critics of contemporary institutions were found on every hand. Although in 1700 leading political philosophers in France like Archbishop Fénelon and Bishop Bossuet defended the doctrine of the divine right of kings, by 1750 almost every intellectual leader in France believed the same doctrine to be nonsense.

When men begin to criticize their own social order, to question the mores, law, and forms of government, that society is already in the process of change. Institutions and forms of social control are losing force, and a period of transition from old to new forms is at hand. We all know the names of the brilliant writers who helped to bring about the change in France. Voltaire, the popular philosopher of his day, wrote critical essays about almost all phases of contemporary society, sparing no one. Jean Jacques Rousseau, known to us for his influence on modern education and on the romantic movement in both letters and politics, raised basic questions about the foundations of the political and social order in his book *The Social Contract* (1762). In this work he argued that the forms of social control had destroyed the natural goodness of men. His book served as an important intellectual stimulus and helped to build the social myth of a better social order. Men like the Marquis de Condorcet, with their firm belief in the doctrine of progress and the inevitable perfectibility of mankind, appealed to thousands, although their theory was largely a rationalization of the tremendous commercial, industrial, and nationalist changes that had followed the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The role of the intellectual is witnessed in other revolutions. John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Tom Paine, and many other Americans supported the revolutionary agitation for years before the break with England finally came. In Russia the line of philosophic, literary, political, and economic writers from Pushkin and Gogol through Tolstoy and Kropotkin to Gorky, Lenin, and Trotsky runs like a thread through the complex social pattern of Russia for nearly a hundred years.

Most of these intellectuals operate as individuals or as members of associations of scholars which were never designed to encourage overthrow of their governments. As a rule, intellectual leaders are not the type to make good agitators or to manage the revolution once it is under way. In time, however, this stimulation from the upper classes comes into sympathetic contact with organizations and leaders that intend to make the revolution itself. As Prince Kropotkin said, when these two sources of

discontent coalesce, the revolution is near at hand, provided the oppression is sufficient, the political disorganization and weakness are increasing, and the economic system is becoming increasingly unstable. In time the literary men, editors, artists, teachers, priests, preachers, and other professionals trained in verbalization accept overt discontent of the repressed classes of society. From this point, the revolutionary movement takes on added strength.

The early leaders prepare the groundwork, the substructure, upon which the later more carefully organized minorities and their leaders hope to build in order, eventually, to control the entire society. The prerevolutionary writers and talkers are important because they express the wishes and discontent of the repressed classes.

The Social Myth and New Symbol

As we indicated in Chapter 9, the emotionalized symbol, the stereotype, the myth, and the legend are basic to an understanding of behavior. It is the ideas and attitudes which people carry about with them, and not merely the objective material features of their environment, that determine the kind of world they live in. Unless men believe in their own folkways and institutions, unless they have faith in their own culture, they will not carry on. So long as the old belief system remains intact, there is little likelihood of radical upheaval. When the social myths begin to change, the break-up is already under way, although the obvious features of it may not appear for a long time afterwards. The rise of a new social myth means that the desires, beliefs, attitudes, and habits of people have been altered. The new myth is the promise of "a new heaven and a new earth." It may contain inconsistent and contradictory elements, but these are lost in the total picture of a new social order about to come into being.

The moderate intellectuals who begin to criticize the old social order also begin to fashion the new mythology, and the active, militant minority leaders who bring the revolution into being complete the process. Let us examine the major features of this changing mythology. In the next section we shall show how it grows and changes as the revolution gets under way.

The new social myth begins when the intellectuals commence to describe the present order as "bad," "evil," "decadent," "corrupt," and so on. The rich are blamed for all ills, and the redistribution of wealth is said to be essential to happiness. The terms of opprobrium are caught up by others and become stereotypes to define the ruling class. Ridicule is applied to rulers and their practices. Along with this goes the use of name-calling to distinguish the exploiting class from those who are their victims. In Roman history there were the patricians and the plebeians. In the mythology of modern revolutionary minorities the exploiters are

often called "absentee owners," "capitalists," or "bourgeois." The exploited productive workers are called "working men," "wage-slaves," or simply "the proletariat." The intellectuals are called "the intelligentsia" or "highbrows." This conception of a society fundamentally divided into hostile classes is highly important in the development of the social myth.

Under the domination of an oppressive order, free speech is taboo. The intellectuals help to loosen these bonds. In fact, speech is one of the first habits to be freed from repressive restraint and, although speech and writing are censored and suppressed by those in power in an effort to stop the spread of revolutionary ideas, a flood of talk nevertheless precedes the overt action of the revolution. This talk serves as a kind of thermometer of unrest. It is one of the first means of loosening the inhibitions built up under the older culture.

Yet the social myth is not merely negative and critical. Its greater function is positive and constructive. It builds a picture of a world that will be far more just, honest, and delightful for all than the existing society. A utopian picture of the coming day is put before the oppressed and underprivileged, who accept the picture as valid and begin to work for its realization.

Education plays a part in this, as do religion and public discussion. The function of the intellectuals is self-evident, for they are the guardians of education, morality, and religion. As teachers, preachers, and writers, they express our concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, vicious and virtuous, noble and depraved, orthodox and heretical. Though they tend to be dominated economically by the ruling political and economic élite, they have ample opportunity to insinuate novel ideas and values into their audiences.

The particular words and phrases used in constructing the new social myth depend upon the culture of the time and upon the nature of the unrest itself. The Protestant reformers ran counter to the established church in their talk about the individual's finding his salvation in direct relation to God, in their talk about "calling," "justification by faith," "election," and "predestination." The English Puritans, falling back upon ideas of primitive Christianity, were going to restore the "reign of the saints," they being the "saints." The social myth of the French Revolution is epitomized in the phrase "liberty, equality, fraternity." This phrase became a shibboleth for all France, and the enthusiasm for it—not necessarily for the practices implied in it—swept over France like a new religion. A new political or economic myth has the same function as a religious one. There is much in common, psychologically, between the revolutionary agitator, with his faith and enthusiasm, and those who seek salvation through conversions, revivals, and religious ecstasies.

As the revolutionary ideology develops, social myths about earlier revolutions and about how to conduct revolutions grow up. Out of the

French Revolution, street fighting and the barricade become the symbols for revolt. The socialists, communists, syndicalists, and anarchists have all developed their own ideas about how a revolution should evolve out of the historical past and how it should be conducted.

As this revolutionary mythology is developing, those in power, the conservatives, who wish to retain the existing order, also indulge in various devices to bolster up the old mythology. Often their efforts are directed chiefly to suppression of freedom of assembly, speech, and writing. Sometimes, however, there is an attempt to expand and foster the old myths and legends of the country and its heroes, in order to counteract the undermining forces moving in the opposite direction. In Russia, for example, the czarist regime spent large sums of money on counter-propaganda in the hope of bolstering the old order, but the situation was so far advanced toward revolt that its efforts did not stem the tide. In interesting contrast to this, the communist dictatorship, soon after Hitler's rise to power in Germany, endeavored to build a strong national morale by resurrecting the legends and myths of Russia's long history.

THE REVOLUTION ITSELF

Against the background of these four "master symptoms," let us examine the course of revolution itself in terms of a course or cycle of events.

The Preliminaries

The prologue opens when the current of intellectual criticism and suggestion meets the current set in motion by the agitators and revolutionary parties. The former becomes less moderate, and radical demands are made upon the government. People, in public and in private, talk more and more about the inevitability of revolution. The radicals undertake more vigorous agitation and organization. The earlier theorists have less weight, and people eager for action move into control of the movement.

Throughout this period the new social myth continuous to grow. There is sharper criticism of the existing order. "Revolutionary" plays, diatribes, poems, art, sermons, cartoons, forums, lectures, and debates become more common unless suppressed. There is scandalous rumor about the lives of the privileged classes. Gradually public dissatisfaction concentrates upon some one institution or public situation and upon the persons associated with it. This focusing of attention is highly important. Moderate policies, the "good man in office" thesis, and all attempts at further amelioration are thrust aside in favor of a much more drastic program. At this point the more enthusiastic radical minority parties, with their more definite plans of action, begin to take over the leadership.

During this period the population takes on more and more the attitudes and actions of an emotional crowd. Long suppression, the feeling

of inferiority, the sense of being the underdog, and the secret craving for power develop in the masses an intensified hatred of their oppressors who represent all that is evil and bad. The usual crowd paranoia, or sense of being persecuted, develops. The agitators feed this suspiciousness wherever possible, first by indicating that any mild reforms of those in power are mere sops to the revolutionaries. Further, following the pattern of paranoia, the agitators and radical minorities develop the idealization of the repressed class itself and offer a daydream picture of the utopian future which is just around the corner but which can be reached only through revolution. Discussion seems futile. The time for action is at hand. And, when action begins, sadistic and repressed wishes finally become overt.

During this time unrest spreads, strikes become more common, people refuse to pay taxes, and outright agitation to overthrow the government appears. Those most active in political and economic matters tend to divide into two main camps—for the old order and against it. The issues are drawn sharply.

At the same time, those in power attempt to block further development of revolutionary activities. They usually try severe censorship of the press and restriction of freedom of speech and assembly. If more wise, they set up positive counter-propaganda in favor of the established order or moderate changes. Sometimes those in power try to divert the movement away from revolution by arousing patriotic fervor for a foreign war. This happened on at least two occasions in England and at least once in Russia.

In the preliminary phase those in power may lose confidence in their ability to govern. Sometimes members of the ruling class desert to the liberals or revolutionaries. So long as the dominant group or class retain their self-confidence and will to power, they cannot be overthrown. If they have strong moral convictions and are willing to apply force to compel obedience, they cannot be put out. They have all the power of the state and the sanctions of morality and tradition, and they can commandeer the industries and sufficient manpower to keep control. In this sense, revolutions are as much the result of weakness as of strength. When those in the saddle doubt the rightness of their position, when they are disturbed by feelings of guilt, and when they lack the will to rule, they are ready to be unseated.

The Beginning of the Revolution

Often enough the immediate situation which sets off the revolution is insignificant. It is usually some minor, though illegal, act which becomes symbolic and meaningful as people look back upon it in history. Actually there are often many minor and even major infractions of the law which do not precipitate a revolution. The firing on the hungry crowd who went

to petition the Czar for help in 1905 brought on an abortive revolution. Yet breaking a few communist heads in Union Square in New York City in 1930 and 1931 did not start a revolution in the United States, nor did the eviction of the Bonus Army from Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1932. An act, if it is to light the conflagration, must be correlated with the psychological *readiness* of which we have already spoken. In the French and Russian revolutions a combination of hunger, bread riots, dislocation of the social and economic order, and loss of confidence in the established government produced the readiness for revolt.

The seizure of power may come in various ways. The popular notion that angry mobs seize the arsenals and defeat the police and the army is largely fictitious. True enough, the ruling class often finds itself unable to cope with riots and public disturbances, but the cause of its failure is a loss of will and techniques rather than anything else. The restless masses are organized and put to effective use by leaders and minorities that are ready to seize power. In the Puritan, French, and Russian revolutions the ruling élite proved itself unable to manage its affairs, and moderates and reformers, supported at first by more radical minorities and by sufficient military power, took over the reins of government.

The Shift to the Left

This first shift in legal and political power from the old rulers to moderate groups, if not universal, is certainly common. Soon, however, there ensues a struggle for control among the revolutionary factions. The moderates often become incapable of controlling the public. They are unable to keep the promises they have made. Their government, often made up of diverse elements not bound together by any really consistent program, temporizes with the conservatives of the old regime and also tries to keep the support of the radicals, whom it really fears.

The mismanagement of affairs both at home and abroad becomes daily more apparent. Both the conservatives and the radicals attack the moderates. Often the reforms introduced by the latter are excellent and just what the intellectuals have talked and written about for years. But the time of revolution is not like that of peaceful parliamentary rule in a liberal or democratic country. The class which has been dispossessed of wealth and political power plots to return. The more radical groups and their followers are dissatisfied with the first fruits of revolution. It is a time of open conflict. In such a period, temporizing and mild measures will not do. There ensues a struggle for power between the moderates and the radicals. Sometimes the moderates compromise with the conservatives who have been driven out of the country. This increases the radicals' fear and hatred of them, and they are accused of selling out the revolution, of being traitors to the new state. Autocratic and dictatorial powers are necessary. A military regime is essential to preserve the gains already made

and to go on to new ones. This calls for a dictatorship of one form or another. And, sooner or later, this is what we get in almost all revolutions.[6]

The masses, now acting as an emotional crowd, put their faith in determined and bold measures. They identify themselves, as always, with strength and power, because power in a strong man gives the weak man courage and a sense of strength. This simple psychological fact is the basis of all social control and of all domination and submission.

It is at this point that the bold and ruthless revolutionary minority, led by men of courage and often of cupidity, comes into power. To be successful, these leaders must have absolute faith in the righteousness of their cause. Their courage and severe measures quickly bring support from the masses. There is often an amazing outburst of energy, enthusiasm, and under able leadership, genuine accomplishment—at least temporarily—of many of the aims of the revolutionary dreamers.

The rise of a dictatorial minority of radicals is illustrated in the Puritan revolution by the coming of Cromwell to leadership, late in 1648. Even in the rather mild American Revolution it was found necessary to confer nearly dictatorial powers upon George Washington in order that the struggle might be carried on. In the French Revolution, the Commune of Paris overthrew the milder government, and Danton, Marat, and Robespierre came to power. After a period of control by these radicals, the Directory ruled for a time, and then came Napoleon and the end of the revolution proper. The situation in the Russian and Nazi revolutions was much the same.

The Reign of Terror

The ordinary man associates the shift to the left—to the radicals—with revolutionary mob activity and a reign of terror. Both these forms of behavior have been much exaggerated in the popular conception of revolution. From Charles Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities* we have pictures of the storming of the Bastille and the operation of the guillotine. From popular accounts of the Russian Revolution we get distorted pictures of mob violence and of the Red Terror. So, too, the Hitler Brown Shirts are accused of widespread mob behavior. Spontaneous rioting, street fighting, and other mob activities are found in nearly all revolutions, but they are far less significant and far less bloody than most of us imagine. There is a common misconception that a revolution is a period of anarchy. Quite to the contrary, it is a period of intense and concentrated political power in the hands of a new group. The swing to radical and violent measures does not mean chaos and anarchy. Actually, a successful revolution is anything but anarchy. Edwards describes it thus: "It is a period of despotism,

[6] See Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York, Harper, 1942), pp. 36–43, on patterns of modern dictatorship.

with instant destruction to everyone opposing that despotism. Caesar and Cromwell, Robespierre and Lenin, were not anarchists; they were autocrats." [7] In the first place, leaders of the parties who have or seek power are usually afraid of mob action, and they attempt to restrict it unless it seems to serve their own purposes in the struggle for power. This was certainly true in the French and Russian revolutions. In the latter Lenin exerted himself to prevent street mobs in Petrograd from wrecking the plans of the Bolsheviks.

The stereotype of the revolutionary reign of terror causes cold shivers to run through the spines of conservatives and liberals. In terms of actual numbers killed, the terror is probably a very humane affair. Its effect upon the public, both inside and outside the revolutionary country, is great. *The purpose of the reign of terror is to consolidate power in the hands of the new minority.* Since the people will support any strong government after the temporizing and vacillation of the moderates, the new revolutionary party is in a position to carry out its wishes through force. The enemies within the country must be dealt with firmly and decisively. It is not individuals that must be eliminated so much as what they stand for in the minds of people. The imprisonment or execution of these enemies, some of whom are the moderates, gives evidence of power and shows the people that the new dictatorship "means business." Such actions enhance the prestige of the new government and feed the tendency of the "man in the street" to identify with the "man on horseback."

The terror has another purpose, implied by its name. Within the revolutionary country it strikes terror into the hearts of enemies and lukewarm supporters and shows the ardent followers what may happen to them if they should betray the cause. After all, fear is a strong incentive; it prevents certain acts and makes others seem the part of wisdom.

The terror has still other purposes. To the people of other countries, especially of countries which may harbor refugees from the revolution, it demonstrates that the revolution is fact and not fiction. Naturally, it arouses counterrevolutionary agitation. It gives rise to endless myths and legends about the horrible treatment of those who oppose it. While it frightens foreign conservatives into redoubling their efforts to stamp out subversive movements in their own countries, it makes them accept the actuality of the revolution elsewhere.

Often associated with the terror is the new government's need to raise, discipline, and equip an army in order to wage a war against the counterrevolutionary forces which attempt to restore the old regime. The war intensifies the patriotic faith of the masses as they follow the new élite in protecting the country against the counterrevolutionary in-

[7] Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

vaders, and it gives those in power a military backing with which to enforce the terror at home if necessary. The early phase of Napoleon's military career was of just this order.

For the masses the reign of terror may also serve as an emotional catharsis; that is, it is psychologically like a religious revival. The identification of the common man with the deliberate violence of the new order toward its enemies acts as a safety valve for the discharge of repressed attitudes. The terror has great dramatic qualities; it is deliberate melodrama acted out in real life.

The Method of the Terror

The technique of the terror is simple. It is based essentially on the use of fear. Yet it is not anarchy, but is literally a *reign* of terror. It is a deliberate method of social control. Its purpose is to frighten people into obedience, to prevent civil war, and to solidify sentiment for the new regime. The principal purpose is not to kill people but to threaten and scare them. A propaganda of horror is set in motion. Speeches by the leaders are filled with expressions of the new rulers' intention to apply the terror to anyone who opposes them. The impression is created that the secret police system set up to carry out this purpose is greater in number and far cleverer than it could possibly be. Executions are directed at key persons and are staged in a manner to produce the most widespread effects both within and without the country. The guillotine became the symbol of terrorism in all revolutionary France.

The history of revolutions affords ample evidence that this interpretation of terrorism is correct. Cromwell's tactics in Ireland are a legend to this day, but the number of persons slaughtered was far less than popular fancy would have it. He knew how to employ the terror, and the two massacres which he ordered at the beginning of his military campaign against the Irish were well calculated to arouse fear both in Ireland and at home. Even the American Revolution showed some of the marks of terrorism in the treatment of the Tories who remained loyal to England. For the most part, however, this terrorism was locally instigated and, aside from a few instances, was never very violent. It consisted chiefly of mild tortures, imprisonment, and banishment. It is the terror of the French Revolution which most catches the ordinary person's imagination. Yet the total number of victims of the terror in all France is put at about 17,000, including 1,200 women. Not all of these were aristocrats by any means: 4,000 were peasants and 3,000 were workingmen.[8] In Paris 2,625 persons were put to death by the guillotine.[9] These

[8] See Peter Kropotkin, *The Great French Revolution, 1789–1793* (London, William Heinemann, 1909), p. 561. He states that Louis Blanc, the great historian of the French Revolution, classified the known social status of 2,750 persons who had been guillotined and found that "only 650 belonged to the well-to-do classes."

[9] These figures are from Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–181. Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, pp.

numbers look large in themselves, but seem insignificant when it is recalled that 400,000 persons died in the revolt of the Vendée, and that nearly three-quarters of a million Frenchmen were killed in Napoleon's military campaigns of 1792–1800. The Red Terror of Russia was a byword in the years just following World War I. It was instigated after the attempted assassination of Lenin on August 30, 1918, and lasted into 1919. Edwards quotes figures from the national Tcheka, or "extraordinary commission," showing that 6,185 persons were put to death in 1918, and 3,456 in 1919. Reports of local and district tribunals do not seem available.

The Fascist terror in Italy was a mere bagatelle compared with the French and Russian episodes. The Nazis, however, made prolonged and widespread use of terrorist methods. The concentration camp and the gas chamber came into use almost as soon as Hitler took over the state. We have no reliable figures on the total killed, slowly by deliberate starvation and cruelty, or outright. But the numbers run into the thousands.

The reign of terror is generally concluded by the same forces which set it in motion. When the counterrevolutionary armies are defeated, when something approaching unification of power within the country is established, when malcontents are silenced, converted, or driven out, there is little need to continue the terror. Of course, it lingers on in the myths and legends of the masses, and the threat to reinstate it is often effective for years in quelling any sort of organized opposition. In all this we see how the new social myth, which began with the first criticism of the old order, gradually develops through the events of the revolution: seizure of power, mob action, reign of terror, and defeat of counterrevolutionary movements. It needs but the carrying out of the revolutionary plan to become complete.

Consolidation of Political Power

The most obvious feature of the revolution, of course, is the relocation of political and legal power. All revolutions produce their own particular rationalizations or defenses for this redistribution of power. The change is rationalized in terms of public welfare: the property and power of the former oppressors and exploiters were being abused, and this "new deal" was good for them as well as for the classes now in power. The confiscation of property is made moral and legal by conscious and unconscious revision of the codes of morality and law. In the transfer of faith from the old order to the new, the intellectuals again

560–561, puts the figures somewhat higher. He states that in Paris alone, between April 17, 1793, and June 10, 1794, 2,607 persons were executed by the terrorist tribunal, and from June 10, 1794 to July 27, 1794, after an even more severe law was passed, an additional 1,351 were sent to the guillotine.

serve an important function by dressing up the justifications in neat, legal, and revolutionary phraseology which will soothe the consciences of the leaders and masses.

We have made clear that the revolution starts with the breakdown of faith in the old order long before overt violence begins. Yet even the forcible seizure of power cannot wipe out the effects of slower changes or the persistence of many old customs and folkways. Such cataclysmic changes as revolutions always end in accommodation and compromise or, better still, in fusion or assimilation of the new and the old. The reconstructed social order is essentially a merging of the old with the new, in which the old system often contributes more than the new. It is difficult to overthrow a political and economic order, to destroy the forms of worship and marriage, and to abolish the historical forces in art, literature, and ideas. A new order cannot easily scrap the material culture of its time even though it may give new meaning to it. Certainly the "war communism" of the early phase of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia gave way in time to a dictatorial state socialism. Nevertheless, although still far from the communistic ideal of Karl Marx, the Soviet Union has made enormous strides in really building a new social-cultural order. Even there, however, the materials, physical and mental, cannot be cut off from their sources in older Russian and nineteenth-century Western culture. Finally, the U.S.S.R. moved, as did earlier revolutionary countries, toward a stable order in which a new leadership and new patterns of behavior became dominant. The function of the pre-revolutionary agitator has passed. Stable administrators, faithful bureaucrats, and technologists acquire high prestige because their functions are essential. In fact, when a country arrives at this stage, one may rest assured that the revolutionary process is, for the time, completed.

The new state, in short, represents another form of domination and submission. A new class is in power and the old classes are submerged. There arises a new élite, but there is still a class organization, accompanied by many or few changes in the basic institutions.[10]

This notation of the rise of a new ruling class provides a convenient point at which to comment on the social origins and types of revolutionists.

Types of Revolutionists

Those who look upon revolutions as signs of evil and degradation are likely to consider the revolutionists as recruited from the dregs of society. The proponents of particular revolutions, on the other hand, are pretty sure to describe them as men of virtue. Viewing them more objectively than either of these standpoints permits, we may say that most

[10] For a discussion of shifts in the class structure in Soviet Russia, see David J. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944), p. 97.

political revolts are led by persons of the middle and upper social strata—that is, by persons who have had opportunities for leadership and education. Furthermore, the rank and file of the small revolutionary minorities who stand at the center of the movement are by no means recruited from the lower classes of the population. This was certainly true of the Puritan, American, French, Russian, and Italian Fascist revolutions. And, whether one considers the rise of National Socialism in Germany as a counterrevolution or as the shift from moderates to extremists (as the usual pattern would indicate), the same thing may be said for it. The Nazi party contained chiefly lower-middle-class people who in nonrevolutionary times might have been occupied in relatively stable and traditionally accepted roles. The outright scoundrels among revolutionists, especially among the leaders, are few. This is not to say that their rise to power may not be bought by cruel and unscrupulous means or that many of them do not exploit the benefits of their new power for personal ends. They do. But such exploitation is among the rewards that go to all new élites.

When asked for statistical proof on this question, however, one is hard-pressed to produce the evidence. Unfortunately, we have no adequate enumeration from the Puritan and American instances, but we do have supporting data from the revolutionary correspondence of those times. Our data on the French Revolution are fortunately more satisfactory. Brinton has made a searching analysis of the lists of members of the Jacobin clubs between the years 1785 and 1790. From the taxes paid and the occupations noted on these lists, he has been able to give us a pretty accurate picture of the socioeconomic status of the groups that were the focus of the French Revolution. He states: [11]

> For twelve clubs, with a total membership of 5,405 over the whole course of the revolution, 1789–95, in both its moderate and its violent phases: 62 per cent of the members were middle class, 28 per cent working class, 10 per cent peasants. For twelve clubs in the moderate period, 1789–92, with a membership of 4,037: 66 per cent were middle class, 26 per cent working class, 8 per cent peasants. For forty-two clubs in the violent period, 1793–95 with a membership of 8,062: 57 per cent were middle class, 32 per cent working class, 11 per cent peasants.

As to the personality characteristics of revolutionists, they are too varied in role and purpose to be easily pigeonholed. Yet in terms of the phases in the revolutionary process itself, we may say that certain types seem best suited to certain functions. For example, the theorist who prepares the criticism of the old order and the intellectual blueprint of the utopian future tends to be introvertive, given to intellectual analysis, and not much concerned with programs of action. His main job is intellectual preparation. As the drift toward revolution becomes stronger,

[11] Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 118. By permission of W. W. Norton & Co., publishers.

the agitator and the organizer come into prominence. The former stirs up the masses with his vigorous attacks on the old order and his purple pictures of the millennium ahead. The latter develops the revolutionary minority party which plans and trains itself to take over the revolution. The initiation and carrying forward of the revolution demand bold and ruthless men of action. This is no time for the theorist, and even the agitator has only a minor place except as he serves the militant purposes of the leader. As the more violent aspects of the terror and other revolutionary activities give way to a restoration of order, the organizer and the administrator become increasingly important. In time, the agitator and the violent but effective leaders of open revolt give way to men who can organize a bureaucracy and a judiciary, develop a stable police force and military, and revive the economic life of the country. The revolutionary process or cycle has been completed. In fact, the ousting of the extremists, called, in terms of the French experience, the Thermidorean reaction,[12] is the final phase of the revolution. During this time there is a direct shift to more moderate methods of control, and, as noted above, property rights, the individual's roles, and the general pattern of life become legalized, accepted, and relatively stable.

INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF REVOLUTION

A scientific approach to revolution must view it in the larger context of social-cultural change. Its accomplishments, however, are hard to appraise, because revolution, like war, induces great and varied emotions in the individuals who experience it. Some students view revolutions as a social-cultural loss, others believe them beneficial in the long run.

Revolutionary Gains and Cultural Change

For the most part, revolutions do end the worst features of the older order. The new laws fit the cultural needs more closely. Social legislation may benefit the masses. And, despite political interference by the revolutionary party in power, there is often a considerable improvement in the administration of government. The transfer of property and economic organization to new hands may result in a more effective use of the productive capacity of a nation, though it is not always easy to prove such a contention. Certainly a new ruling class comes into being, and this may mean that a vital and vigorous source of energy replaces the depleted and even decadent former ruling class.

Yet a revolution is the product of previous slow changes. In other words, it is embedded in the slowly accumulating alterations which we

[12] So-called from the fact that it was on July 27, 1794, the ninth Thermidor of Year II of the revolutionary French calendar, that Robespierre's terroristic power came to an end.

often call evolutionary. Abuses arise and become more distressing until, under militant leadership, the opportunity to overthrow the older order arises. Yet, before this occurs, the old is already passing away by a process of decay. At best, a revolution seems to accelerate such modifications and leads to a reorganization of society along different lines. Nevertheless, the final results of a revolution are never so marked as the idealists imagine they will be. No matter what sweeping changes are made in the heyday of the revolution, in the end there is always a great deal of accommodation to, and assimilation of, the old in the new order.

The Puritan, American, and French revolutions were all sharp turning points in the expansion of laissez-faire capitalism and in the rise of the nationalistic state dominated by the middle classes. These revolutions marked the triumph of the doctrines and practices of individualism, private profit-taking, and political democracy—the three most characteristic features of the capitalistic ethos of the Western world. But these features were already becoming prominent, and the revolutions but speeded up the process. Brinton may be correct in saying of these three instances and of the Russian Revolution that "in many ways [they seem] to have changed men's minds more completely than they changed men's habits." [18]

To those who were brought up to believe in peaceful and evolutionary social change, the suggestion that we use revolution as a method of cultural change, even in time of grave crisis, may come as a shock. Although most Americans are highly sentimental about their armed revolt against England, and although their patriotic societies decry any attempt to picture the leaders of our revolution in other than favorable colors, we are extremely timid about revolutions during the present epoch. Certainly most Americans would disclaim Thomas Jefferson's contention that a country requires frequent revolutions in order to keep alive the spirit of liberty. The domination of the middle-class ideology has become so pronounced that even the mild suggestions of the socialists in this country are frowned upon as highly dangerous and subversive. And more strictly revolutionary parties are really quite foreign to our thought.

Yet the revolutionary changes in Russia, China, Italy, Spain, and Germany provide examples for leaders and masses in this country and elsewhere. In other words, the idea of revolution may become embedded in the social myth of cultural change. If we ever experience a widespread breakdown of our culture, we may witness new attempts at a revolutionary overturn of the existing order. Much depends, of course, on the development of our domestic and foreign policies. The problem of revolution, like that of war, is related to the larger issue of the nature and use of power. If nations, in both domestic and foreign relations, can develop some kind of moral order which will make for general economic

[18] Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

security, general justice, and the practice as well as the ideal of "live and let live," then both war and revolution may be reduced in frequency if not completely eliminated from human society. Conflict and competition cannot be done away with, but they may be turned to productive and moral uses.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

BARMINE, Alexander, *One Who Survived: The Life Story of a Russian Under the Soviets* (New York, Putnam, 1945). A striking story of one who was reared under the Soviet regime but finally broke with it. While largely a personal document, it reveals many facts of life in Russia under the domination of Stalin.

DALLIN, David J., *The Changing World of Soviet Russia* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956). An expansion and continuation of the author's earlier work, *The Real Soviet Russia* (1944, 1947). Discusses the new social structure, economy, and political system to the years following Stalin's death.

EBON, Martin, *World Communism Today* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948). A review, with comment, on the worldwide spread of communism under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Contains excellent bibliography.

KOESTLER, Arthur, *Darkness at Noon* (New York, Macmillan, 1941). A brillant novel revealing the psychology of revolutionary operatives. The author had observed various revolutions in Europe, particularly the Spanish Civil War in 1931.

LEITES, Nathan, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953). A study of the Bolshevik élite, from the practical beginnings in 1903 as a faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' party to the early 1950's.

LEITES, Nathan, and BERNAUT, Elsa, *Ritual of Liquidation* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1954). A study chiefly of the psychology of the defendants in the Moscow trials of the later 1930's. A contribution to the understanding confessions of members of a group or party or cult who have defected.

LENIN, V. I., *The State and Revolution*, translated by Moissaye J. Olgin (New York, International Universities Press, 1932). The classic statement on the topic by the leader of the 1917 revolution in Russia.

NEUMANN, Sigmund, *Permanent Revolution* (New York, Harper, 1942). An informative discussion of "totalitarian dictatorships in Europe, with special emphasis upon the Fascist autocracies."

PALMER, Edward F., ed., *The Communist Problem in America* (New York, Crowell, 1951). A book of readings showing the activities of the Communist party in the United States, seen against the background of "the strategy and tactics of world communism."

SOREL, Georges, *Reflections on Violence*, translated by T. E. Hulme (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1915). The classic defense of class war and revolution, a defense of the general strike as a technique in revolution. This work is regarded by many as "The Bible" of syndicalism, a movement which Sorel regarded as a further development of the ideas of Karl Marx.

CHAPTER 25

The Psychology of War

WAR is man's most violent form of human conflict; it is also one of man's oldest institutions. Its roots lie deep in the history of groups struggling against each other for resources and power. In modern times it is closely bound up with nationalism and the doctrine and practice of sovereignty.[1]

From the standpoint of process, war may be considered as falling into a cycle of war, peace, and war again. This cycle takes certain more or less distinctive forms, not unlike those found in other conflicts—industrial and others. (1) There usually arises some issue or problem in the former accommodative relations of sovereign states. These may be economic, political, or religious, or combinations of these. Diplomatic and other efforts may be made to resolve these difficulties, but these failing we move into the next phase. (2) In response to unresolved problems, a war fever may develop. During this time there may be threats and counterthreats from opposing nations. Symbols of loyalty and patriotism become widely used. There is a stress on national solidarity vis-à-vis the potential enemy. (3) Hostilities begin. Once the war has started various institutional changes take place: (*a*) Military needs take precedence over all other demands for manpower, production, and other phases of the national economy. (*b*) Military and international policies overshadow domestic ones. Legislative activities become secondary to administrative operations. (*c*) Restrictions on free speech and free assemblage are put in effect. Deviation is regarded as a threat to national solidarity and there is a closing of ranks against critics. (*d*) There are also various effects upon the family, education, recreation, and other phases of community life. (4) The war ends with general sense of relief and a strong urge to return to "normal" as soon as possible. (5) Various postwar accommodations take place, including efforts to put the economy back on a peacetime basis, to remove governmental restraints, and to

[1] See Kimball Young, *Sociology, A Study of Society and Culture*, 2nd ed. (New York, American Book, 1949), pp. 440–442.

return to former civilian patterns. Of course, for a defeated country there may be even more severe and difficult adjustments.

In the present chapter we shall be mainly concerned with individual and group adjustment to the conditions of war. With respect to military personnel, we shall discuss selection and training programs, psychological aspects of military life, leadership, morale, and some phases of mental breakdown under wartime conditions. With regard to the civilian in wartime, we shall treat briefly of morale and of the impact of war upon the family and community.

THE CITIZEN ARMY IN MODERN WAR

Modern wars involve the complete mobilization of manpower and of economic and industrial resources and a distinctive use of psychological as well as military weapons. Earlier wars were fought either by mercenaries or by relatively small bodies of volunteers or conscripts. Today war must be examined against the background of our mass society, technology, and intense nationalism.

The idea of a citizen army arose out of the revolutionary movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Oliver Cromwell raised forces from the masses and our own Revolutionary army was recruited on the theory of the citizen's responsibility for military effort. The idea of a "nation in arms" became highly significant during the French Revolution, when a large army was developed not only to defeat counter-revolutionary attempts but to carry the message of liberty, equality, and fraternity throughout Europe. Although this crusade, under Napoleon, turned out to be another expression of national imperialism, the fact remains that the idea of large-scale citizen armies developed in this period. Moreover, the success of the French stimulated strong nationalist sentiments, especially in Prussia. As one phase of Prussia's recovery from defeat, the practice emerged of conscription of men from all social strata.

In the United States it was not till the Civil War that the idea of general conscription rather than individual volunteering was put into practice. The drafting of men at that time was not very successful. During World War I, however, Americans quickly accepted general conscription as the most democratic means of raising a large army. In World War II this system was again put into operation for the male military. For the women's auxiliary forces we retained the older volunteer system.

Yet most Americans have not held the belief, common in some countries, that war in itself is a glorious and moral occupation. For the most part, we have considered war chiefly as defense of our land. But in the global war of the 1940's the conviction that attack is the best de-

fense became widely accepted. Moreover, the belief that the entire population must take part in total war, either in the armed forces or in essential war work at home, became commonplace. Total war has become an expression of mass societies in conflict. Let us see how large modern military forces are built up.

Selection and Training of Troops

A military unit, large or small, has basically one function, to win battles by fighting or contribute thereto in some way other than fighting —in communications, supply, transportation, and so on. Present-day military personnel are usually carefully picked and trained before being put into active service. In our society the chief steps in securing and allocating manpower are these:

1. Some form of universal registration of all male citizens is adopted, at least in certain age categories. This provides information on the number of persons available by age, birthplace, residence, marital status, level of education, and major occupation.

2. At some local level, selections are made as to men who will go into the military or be deferred for important wartime labor. Under conditions of total war the home-front economy is as essential as war-front action.

3. From such local repositories of manpower, men are sent under some quota scheme to military establishments for induction and training.

4. At these places mental and physical examinations are conducted. In modern warfare, since special skills are needed, various tests bearing on particular skills may be given. Since conditions of warfare require social-emotional stability—an element not previously as well recognized in military circles—in World War II, in particular, much attention was paid to this characteristic. Paper and pencil tests, psychological interviews, and physical tests of various sorts were used. In training officers and men for particularly hazardous assignments, a variety of special devices, both psychological and physical, were used to weed out the unfit.[2]

5. The next step is the induction of the men into military life. This may take weeks or months, but ultimately, unless dismissed for adequate reason, they will be assigned to specific units.

Military Life

Life in the military is certainly unlike that under ordinary civilian conditions. A small number of American men get some peacetime military training, but most get none at all. Adjustment to military routine is

[2] This was particularly true of the selection and training of men for work in the Office of Strategic Services. See OSS Assessment Staff, *Assessment of Men* (New York, Rinehart, 1948).

often difficult. Unlike our loosely knit democratic world, an army—to use this branch as an example—is a closely ordered and disciplined body in which nearly everything is prearranged. The new soldier is put through intensive physical drill; he must learn all sorts of new motor habits; he must accommodate himself to obeying commands. He gets up and goes to bed, eats, works, and goes through the day under regulations and orders. He must accustom himself to living with a large number of his fellows in relatively new and often uncomfortable situations. In short, he must adapt himself to what someone has called an "institution of segregated care," in which he is but one small unit of a highly complex and regimented mass.

It is a world where the rewards go to those who conform and the punishments to those who do not. Moreover, though the demands of superiors often appear silly and inconsequential to the novice, his response to them is often considered highly indicative of his future adequacy as a soldier. Some men take to this life more easily than others, and the qualities which make for successful adjustment are sometimes not revealed in the usual intelligence tests or in those designed to show occupational skills.

Adjustment to military life is doubtless related, as are other phases of adult life, to childhood and background experiences. Cross comparisons were made of a sample of "best adjusted" men, a "cross section" of the army, psychoneurotics, and a group of men who subsequently were classed as "absent without leave," known as AWOL's. With respect to broken homes there was only a slight difference in incidence for the latter two groups as compared to the first two. Maternal overprotection and severity or indulgence with respect to punishment showed no differences at all. On the other hand, the report that some member of the soldier's family had suffered a nervous breakdown and report of poor health in childhood were highly correlated with psychoneuroticism and being AWOL. Moreover, "both AWOL's and psychoneurotics were more likely than others to say they usually went around alone . . . also . . . the psychoneurotics were considerably more likely than others to dislike fighting in their youth and to avoid dates with girls. In these two respects . . . the AWOL's and cross section were much alike." [8] The most striking behavior difficulty of the AWOL's was the frequency of truancy from school. The authors of the study of army adjustment in World War II state: "Broadly, we can say that the evidence seems to show that a stable home background, a healthy childhood, good work habits in school, and association with other boys and girls, including participation in

[8] S. A. Stouffer and others, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949), Vol. 1, p. 141. All quotations by permission.

sports, were assets for the young civilian who put on the uniform and tried to adjust to Army life."[4]

Then, too, there are other experiences which provide some basis for adaptation to the demands of military activity. In school, if not earlier, in such organizations as the Boy and Girl Scouts and elsewhere, young people get some drill in marching, in taking orders from superiors, and in otherwise working together as members of disciplined units. The mild regimentation of our classrooms, with fixed seating, rules of conduct, and training in obedience, punctuality, and politeness, forms habits and attitudes on which more specific training in wartime may be developed. Moreover, our high level of general education has its effect. In World War I the average drafted American had had but a sixth-grade schooling. In World War II he had had a year of high-school work. Only 9 per cent of the men drafted for the first war had finished secondary school; 41 per cent of those in the second war had completed high school, and 25 per cent had attended college at least a year. Furthermore, the better educated men were able to make more satisfactory adjustments to army life. Since modern wars are fought largely by technological methods, not only formal skills but the general cultural attention and habituation to mechanical things are important. The American boy's familiarity with automobiles, radios, television sets, and all sorts of machines and gadgets can be put to good use in military life.

Military Headship and Leadership

A central feature of military operations is the chain of command, that is, the hierarchy of power and authority from the top commander down to the lowest noncommissioned officer. This represents a fixed system of graded responsibility. Though military operations are organized around what we have called headship, or institutional dominance, an effort is made, in most democratic countries at least, to stimulate genuine leadership which will call forth willing loyalty and obedience and the other characteristic responses of free followers. However, the institutional gradation of power remains the norm.

How American soldiers view the qualities of leadership was shown in a study in which some thousands of enlisted men were interviewed regarding army leadership and morale. The men noted 77 aspects of army life as definitely associated with morale, and, of the 20 most closely related to morale, 16 had to do with man-officer relations. The following are statements of the 12 most significant items in the order of their importance with respect to what the men considered good leadership:

1. The officer must have ability and competence; these qualities are basic to confidence.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

2. He must have the personal welfare of his men at heart, both their physical needs and their need of friendly and helpful advice.
3. He must be prompt in making his decisions.
4. He must have patience, ability, and clarity as a teacher.
5. He must show tact, judgment, common sense, and, above all else, the ability to get things done.
6. The good officer does not boss just to be bossing; there is no unnecessary stress on rank for its own sake.
7. The effective officer tells the men when they have done a good job; the men like commendation and praise when they are deserved.
8. An officer should possess a strong physique and good bearing.
9. He should have a "good education," a "sense of humor," and "guts," or courage. [This was the order of preference.]
10. He must be impartial and fair in all his dealings.
11. The officers must be industrious and not "do as little work as they can get away with."
12. They should give orders in a clear and concise way, so that there can be no misunderstanding as to what is expected.

Other matters noted were calmness, keeping promises, and not showing-off rank. But above all else, the men wanted competence and a real interest in their welfare.[5]

These findings agree with the views of most experts on military leadership. Almost without exception, the most important traits of the officer are given as decisiveness, clarity of orders, sense of justice, insistence on obedience, initiative, cheerfulness, understanding of his men, and readiness to provide at all times for their welfare.

The commander, high or low, is responsible for the success or failure of a given mission or action. He is charged with certain tasks, and he must see that they are carried out. The amount of detail in orders handed from those above to those below differs with the military tradition of the country, the commanding officer, and the nature of the military engagement to be undertaken. In highly militaristic nations, complete power and authority are often vested in the higher officers, and little initiative or free choice of alternatives is given the lower officers, noncommissioned officers, and men. In the huge armies of total war, in which a large proportion of the men is secured by universal conscription, there is less evidence of sharp distinctions. Such a democratic pattern—and it is this —keeps the purely institutional aspects of military control from becoming completely hardened into ritual.

In countries like the United States, with a strong individualistic tradition, rigid discipline and sharp distinctions between officers and men have not been as common as in the army of Frederick the Great and in the German army of World War I. Yet even in our army, during basic training and the arduous work of preparing for combat duty, the chain

[5] See the report of this study in *Psychology for the Fighting Man* (Washington, The Infantry Journal, 1943), pp. 373–374.

of command is closely adhered to. In actual combat, especially with the modern use of the small tactical team and the need of careful communication between specialized units, there is much decentralization of command, and the lower officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the men themselves develop some initiative. The demands of modern warfare, therefore, encourage a certain democracy among our fighting men and, in turn, produce a leader-follower relation that has much of the voluntary character which we consider a high value in human affairs.

Studies of the views of enlisted men regarding their officers were made during World War II. Let us summarize the principal findings: (1) Relatively new recruits tended to have more favorable views of their officers—as they did of the war itself—than did men with longer service. (2) During later stages of the war, men tended to have less favorable attitudes toward their officers than did men of comparable rank and length of service in earlier surveys. (3) At any given period, the least favorable attitudes were found in the relatively inactive overseas theatres and the most favorable were found among combat troops. (4) Holding rank and length of service constant, the better-educated enlisted men tended to hold less favorable views of their officers than did men with less education.

It is only natural that officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, should provide a handy target on which to project personal aggression. As Stouffer and his collaborators remark: "Even if the behavior of officers had been a model of self-denial and concern for the welfare of the enlisted men, it is reasonable to expect that the leadership would be a target for aggression. Army life, for most civilian soldiers, was a succession of deprivations and frustrations, and it is not surprising that the blame should have been personalized and focused on those in authority." [6]

Most American soldiers did not resent the necessary barriers in status between themselves and their officers. What disturbed them was that the officers monopolized recreational facilities and opportunities. "If the supply of attractive women, liquor, or entertainment is severely limited, as was the case in many overseas areas, the problem of equitable distribution is much more acute than if there is plenty to go around. . . . The American enlisted man, with his democratic civilian background, resented not so much the fact that superiors could *afford* certain privileges as the denial of his own *right* to enjoy them." [7] From the standpoint of the officer, it is worth noting that the higher his rank, the more likely was he "to defend the system of social segregation and special privilege." [8]

[6] Stouffer, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 369, 373.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 374.

The very nature of military organization depends on the pattern of command and obedience. There is a power relationship which is associated with status differentials and both social and physical distance between the enlisted men and their officers. One reason that men under combat conditions have more favorable attitudes toward their officers is that together they probably share a sense of "deprivation, danger, and death." In these circumstances "social differentiations and special privileges" are "at a minimum." [9]

The noncommissioned officers were likewise targets of hostility and resentment. These men, like the shop foreman in industry, have a two-way role, one toward the commissioned officers from whom they take orders and the other toward the enlisted men under their immediate command. Figure 9, p. 280, portrays a sample of divergent judgments as to leadership qualities or abilities to be found in noncommissioned officers.

An army or a navy is a disciplined mass of fighters organized and trained to win battles. Some officer-leaders can maintain their dominance and yet make their relations with their men personal and intimate, but a great many officers are not capable of going very far in this direction without losing the respect, loyalty, and obedience that are necessary to their command. Hence it is well—say the experts—to maintain the institutionalized social distance, the chain-of-command control, for in the end responsibility rests with the officer.

This view, of course, has wider acceptance than in military affairs alone. It is common in industry, business, government, the church, and most civic and other public organizations. In fact, strict equality of members' authority is relatively rare in any group, with perhaps the exception of associations of the comradeship and congeniality type. Certainly, public and other large groups function successfully only when special roles, rights, duties, and skills are co-ordinated under leadership to some common end. Complete individualism and equality result in anarchy, not in order. Among men and officers, co-operation and initiative must be integrated in a hierarchy of power and responsibility if the purpose of the military unit is to be attained.

This excursion into the patterns of military dominance and submission makes clear the two-directional character of these relations. There are the followers' obedience, loyalty, and sense of duty toward the leader, and there is the mutuality or more or less equalitarian identification among the men themselves. Sigmund Freud has put the matter thus: 'A soldier takes his superior, that is, really, the leader of the army, as his ideal, while he identifies himself with his equals, and derives from this community of their egos the obligations for giving mutual help and for

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 368.

sharing possessions which comradeship implies." [10] The root pattern of this is the patriarchal father and the family under his control: There are affectional and sympathetic ties between the officer-father and the men, who take the role of sons. There are also affectional links among the men, as there are among the sons. Most hostility among the men is, in part, directed toward the enemy and, in part, sublimated into healthy competition for the special roles and statuses which come with the performance of their duties.

The family pattern is, in fact, recognized by many writers on military leadership. In describing one particularly successful officer, Edward L. Munson, Jr. says, "His attitude was that of a father toward his sons." And in another place Munson acutely observes that the successful officer must "bring himself as close to the enlisted man as he can without impairing his own status and weakening his authority . . . ; this relationship should be personal, frank, and candid—mutual and not one-sided. Military and social status should have nothing to do with it, for it is essentially the controlling relation between the head of a family and its members." [11] One British psychiatrist goes so far as to say: "Every officer in the army is a parent surrogate for every person under him." [12]

The successful officer, in the role of sympathetic and understanding yet stern father, must at all times retain the position of the dominant person in the interaction with his men, no matter how friendly and familiar their relations may become. He may be kindly, jovial, and familiar in one segment of his personality; but this must always be kept in check by another segment, his role and function as the commander.

It is a question how rigid the father-son relation should be. If institutionalized at a parent-child or parent-adolescent level, it may be quite different from the relation existing among mature adults when circumstances, training, and ability dictate that one shall lead and others shall voluntarily follow. It may be that our military traditions call for a relation that is too much like that between father and child. Out of his wide experience in dealing with mental disorders among troops, T. A. Ross writes: [13]

> One wonders whether all this reduction of the soldier to a state of childhood has been really necessary or even advantageous. There must, of course, be leaders and led, but I wonder whether all this spiritual dependence on a father-

[10] Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (London, International Psycho-analytical Press, 1922), p. 110. By permission.

[11] Edward L. Munson, Jr., *Leadership for American Army Leaders* (Washington, The Infantry Journal, 1941), pp. 53, 56. By permission.

[12] T. A. Ross, "Anxiety Neuroses of War," in A. F. Hurst, ed., *Medical Diseases of War* (Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1940), Ch. 16, p. 139.

[13] T. A. Ross, *Lectures on War Neuroses* (London, Edward Arnold & Co., 1941), p. 112. By permission.

substitute to the extent which it is the purpose, perhaps not quite conscious purpose, of the army authorities to achieve, is altogether good.

In a highly individualistic society like ours and in a war in which tactical units must operate with a certain independence and yet in closest co-ordination with other units, it might be well to modify somewhat the customary fixity in the chain of command. It is the present writer's impression, obtained from reading many soldiers' letters and from conversing with soldiers, especially with those who have attended college, that considerable frustration and unnecessary resentment often arise from training procedures based on a traditional conception of the officer-men relation. Men who fully appreciate obedience, loyalty, and tough training believe that better morale and better results would accrue if a somewhat more mature attitude and procedure were adopted. This is a subject on which few, if any, military experts have expressed an opinion.

The Nature and Function of Military Morale

The psychological resources of a country include not only intellectual abilities and special skills but also the social and emotional traits which we call morale. Briefly, morale consists of deep faith in, and zeal for, one's cause; zest for combat— a "fighting heart"—in military parlance; and capacity and readiness for sacrifice. Linked to these three are loyalty and complete obedience to orders, pride in oneself and in one's military unit, and positive identification with one's commander and fellows in relation to the general and specific military objectives.

Among the many factors influencing morale, nothing is more important than job satisfaction. And related to this, in turn, and to the larger area of morale are four motivations which tended to characterize our soldiers in World War II: (1) desire for status; (2) desire to maximize their military experience which would be useful to them in civilian life later; (3) desire to minimize the chances of injury and death; and (4) "desire to minimize the deprivations from civilian comforts." [14]

Morale, like other qualities, reflects the cultural setting from which it springs. In a country where individualism, personal choice, and participation in government are expected and habitual, the problems of military morale will be somewhat different from those in a society marked by such characteristics as faith in a divinely ordained ruler or in a mystic cause. In any case, morale has both an individual and a group aspect. The former includes personal identification with the cause and willingness to die for it, desire for adventure, and other positive attitudes of attack and aggression operating under self-discipline and strong conviction of their moral justification. These qualities are co nterbalanced by

[14] Stouffer, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

fears for one's personal security and safety and by deep convictions, among our people at least, that individual life is precious and that killing other persons is both a crime and a sin, punishable by the law and the mores, and accompanied by a terrific sense of shame and guilt. The group aspect of morale is seen in the interaction among those working toward a common goal, the sense of solidarity in comradeship and teamwork, and the identification of oneself with others in relation to both means and ends. In short, group morale is a special aspect of in-group conflict with an out-group.

For most Americans, the development of military morale is a new form of cultural conditioning. In countries with a long tradition of military life, the shift from civilian life to the barracks and the battlefield is not so difficult. Of the changes required by the new cultural value system of warfare, those most important for morale are: (1) learning to kill other human beings and to manage—by training and indoctrination—with the sense of guilt and shame that is ordinarily associated with such actions; (2) learning to react to danger with positive action rather than with fear; (3) becoming accustomed to all sorts of deprivations, such as loss of affectionate companionship with family and friends, interference with normal sexual life, and loss of opportunity for personal choice of work and play; and (4) learning new habits and attitudes.

To meet the demands of the war, military administrators set up training programs to prepare the officers and men for active duty. (1) Basic discipline is taught, as we indicated, in terms of the chain of command, in which the habit of obeying orders is thoroughly fixed in the soldier or sailor. In this training the role of the officer is most important, and hence his own preparation must follow the order-obey form, and he must learn to carry this over to his own troops. The close-order drill, the teaching of routine conventions, and the indoctrination in military custom and tradition are parts of disciplinary routine. (2) There is an enormous amount of instruction in special knowledge and skill. This is particularly important in modern warfare, with its high specialization and mechanization. Clarity of instruction, full explanation, and especially day-by-day practice are important. (3) Once the soldier has had basic training in discipline, knowledge, and skill, he is put through a period of what is called "induration"—that is, simulation of battle conditions in maneuvers. Such experiences not only add further information and skill but train a man to face hardship, fatigue, tactical difficulties, and other conditions similar to those of real fighting. In particular it makes teamwork more meaningful. (4) The means of getting rest, relaxation, and other relief from severe duties are provided by the military organization itself and also by various civilian agencies. It is well recognized that opportunities for change and rest are important in building morale. (5) In modern war not every man is called upon to fight; supply,

communication, planning, and many other functions are not combative in fact. Solid morale, however, can develop only when all arms of the service recognize the place of each.

Some Components of High Morale

Some important elements of high military morale may be listed as follows: (1) Complete and zealous faith in one's country and in the war it is fighting. In this connection there is evidence that in World War II there was little ideological or personal commitment to the war on the part of our fighting men.[15] (2) Efficient, just, and courageous officers who instill complete confidence. (3) A strong "we" or in-group feeling, which is generally known as *esprit de corps.* The sense of pride in one's squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment must extend to the division and higher echelons. (4) Good food, good billets, periodic rest, relaxation and recreation, and frequent delivery of mail from home and dispatching of the personal letters of the troops. (5) Ample and adequate medical care. Not only care of the wounded, relief of their pain and their safe removal to the rear, but the customary faith of people in physicians and surgeons enables the latter to raise the morale of all troops. The surgeon not only renders first aid but by his very presence calms the troops and restores confidence. Furthermore, adequate medical care bolsters the faith of the soldier's family. (6) Efficient and ample equipment and supplies with which to fight or carry out other tasks. Obviously, equipment alone does not make or break morale, but it maintains the men's confidence in their own abilities. In modern warfare one cannot combat tanks, dive bombers, machine guns, and flame throwers with pitchforks or blunderbusses. There is some danger in overstressing morale as such without realizing that it is related to what the soldier or sailor is doing and to the materiel with which he is doing it. In fact, inferiority in morale may be partly compensated for by the men's awareness that their equipment is superior to the enemy's. (7) Thorough training in the knowledge and skill that are needed for the job. The shock of the first battle, the anxiety of the first assignment in supply or communication work, will be lessened by sound preparation. Confidence in oneself and in the unit is born of efficient training. (8) Participation, actual or vicarious, in victorious battles is a tremendous stimulant to high and persistent morale. To wait in a defensive position for the enemy to attack is difficult enough; it is made more serious by the subjective states of the men.

Factors Making for Low Morale

Obviously, the elements of low morale are the opposites of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. But behind them all, as a funda-

[15] See Stouffer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chapter 9.

mental factor, is fear. Any situation or element which does not build up adequate defenses against fear may be considered destructive of morale. Coupled with fear are the conscious and unconscious feelings of guilt produced by the requirement to kill. This factor of conscience may not be present in all soldiers, but it often is in those of Christian and pacifistic countries.

Without attempting to catalogue all the major "causes" of low morale, let us note those which are generally considered most serious. Some are temporary and may be easily corrected; others are more persistent and may lead in the end to defeat. The loss of the will to fight, defeatism, and lack of patriotism are clearly basic factors. Such conditions may be induced by any of numerous causes.

1. A lack of good officers is a prime cause. Recalling the basic relation of son to father which runs through all military command, we see that inexperienced officers, or those indifferent to the welfare of their men or, worse still, those who have become mentally fatigued and despair of success, will have a bad influence on those under their control. The effective officer is he who can share with his men their hardships, problems, and triumphs, but at the same time remain sufficiently apart to maintain discipline and keep the control and final responsibility in his own hands. If an officer cannot do that, the men lose confidence and, in time, hope.

2. Military life carries with it many deprivations: loss of family relations, sexual deprivation, lack of habitual physical comforts and of other gratifications common in civilian life. Homesickness and sense of personal isolation may arise, although the soldier is surrounded by his fellows.

One of the most difficult problems in military life is that of sex. A realistic treatment of this matter is hampered in our society by our Christian mores; and the problem of finding opportunities for sexual relations is complicated by the danger of venereal disease. Though prophylactic and other medical measures may be enforced to reduce the incidence of infection, there still remains the problem of providing for one of man's deepest and most persistent drives. Moreover, the very nature of military life, with its rigid discipline, authority, and severe physical strain, induces emotional states which find orgiastic release on furlough. Some men may find substitutions in drinking, gambling, or milder sublimations, but many do not. Certainly attempts completely to repress sexuality among the troops are likely to undermine morale.

Protracted marches, lack of rest and sleep, poor or insufficient food, long exposure to inclement weather, and inadequate billets—all tend to lower morale, especially when they continue for a long time without any compensating victories.

3. Combat conditions obviously affect morale. Long-continuing

bombardment from the enemy artillery or air force puts a severe strain upon the men. In World War II, in order to depress the fighting spirit of their enemies, the Germans produced terrorizing sounds by means of sirens and devices attached to dive bombers; and the Japanese employed various tricks to frighten our men and disturb their sleep. Provisions for adequate cover, and support from one's own artillery and airplanes, help offset these effects.

Waiting for something to happen is likewise a strain. It is said that patience is one of the most difficult traits to teach new troops. It is reliably reported that we lost many men in the initial engagements in jungle fighting with the Japanese because inexperienced soldiers could not wait and took dangerous chances against hidden enemy troops. Forward movement over terrain sprinkled with land mines is always hazardous, and many of our raw troops in North Africa were lost because they would not pause for the engineers to go ahead with their mine-detecting apparatus. Such losses may reduce the zest for battle.

Uncertainty and surprise may lower morale. Ignorance of where or when the enemy will strike sets up anxiety and sometimes fantasies. When a person does not know, he will usually imagine what may happen to him and, if he passes his fantasy on to others, it may in time infect a large number (see below on panic). Related to uncertainty is surprise. The Germans built *Blitzkrieg* into a fine art; they employed it not only in action in the field but as a threat in their psychological warfare. The handicap of waiting for the enemy to strike may be overcome by initiative. As in other conflict interactions, two may play at this game, and the Germans finally learned this from later Allied campaigns in World War II.

4. Superstitious beliefs may influence morale. The development of superstitions is favored by the soldier's separation from normal life, his ignorance of the intentions of his own command, and his uncertainty as to the enemy's plans. All sorts of magical beliefs may arise. Luck may take a prominent place in this thought. Men talk about a shell coming over with their "number on it"; they carry magical charms to fend off danger and disease; they may resort to mystical interpretations of meteorological or astronomical phenomena. The symbols of superstition are widespread and extremely contagious and may in time engulf an entire army. Officers are advised to counteract the rise and spread of superstitions and magical beliefs.

5. Rumor may also affect the mental state of the soldier. On the whole, unfounded stories seem to be most deleterious in their effects upon men who are about to enter or are actually in the combat zones. One reason for letting the troops know at least the major outlines and the larger objectives of a campaign is to allay fear, stop rumors, and give the men a sense of participation.

Rumor not only affects, but reflects, the morale of the men among whom it spreads. Rumor is always self-propelled. It gives a sense of satisfaction for "being in the know"; its repetition carries no sense of personal liability, for it usually comes from someone else. It often verifies one's secret suspicions; it relieves tensions; and it may allow vicarious satisfaction of dislikes. In a military body, most rumors are either of the wish-fulfillment variety or are based on fear. By keeping track of rumors, an officer may learn a good deal about the hopes and fears of the troops under his command.

Other Evidences of Low Morale

More serious evidences of low morale are found in panic, desertion, and outright mutiny. The chief emotion in panic is fear. Raw troops are more subject to panic, but under certain conditions even seasoned campaigners are not immune. Panic may arise from a cumulation of morale-destroying circumstances: repeated and contradictory orders, unreasonable mixing of troops, operations in fog or in unfamiliar territory, prolonged action leading to overfatigue, high casualties in battle, retreat, loss of confidence in officers and cause, and defeat. Panic is always facilitated by rumor and other forms of mass suggestion. Sound indoctrination, adequate training, habituation to danger, confidence in leaders, and other elements of good morale are the best preventives of panic. If panic does break out, severe measures to suppress it at the very outset, even by force of arms, are necessary.

By its very nature panic is temporary, and its effects may be quickly countered by positive measures. Mutiny, on the other hand, is attack and is obviously much more serious to military discipline and morale. Whereas panics usually arise momentarily and from more or less immediate circumstances, mutinies are usually planned in advance. For this reason, measures may be taken to prevent mutiny if the ringleaders and their plans are detected in time. Once under way, a mutiny disrupts the whole military organization involved, and the news or rumor of it may spread to other units with disastrous effects.

Desertion is the flight of individual fighting men from their units. All military organizations experience some desertion. If it reaches large proportions, it is clear evidence that morale has broken down. Desertion is not necessarily the expression of defiant men who refuse to take orders, or merely a coward's reaction, but it is often a form of neurotic response. It is said that the rate of desertion is higher among men at isolated posts, in barracks, or behind the combat zone than at the front.[16]

In concluding this section we may note that, despite the tremendous mechanization of modern war, the psychological resources of enlisted

[16] See L. Farago, ed., *German Psychological Warfare*, 3rd ed. (New York, Putnam, 1942), pp. 97–98.

men and officers remain fundamental. Napoleon is reported to have said that morale is to materiel as three is to one, and General George C. Marshall, on one occasion, stated that he would raise this ratio to "six to one." [17]

Mental Breakdowns Among Military Personnel

A serious cost of modern wars is the loss in manpower which results from mental breakdowns. While military authorities have long since come to appreciate the testing and screening of prospective soldiers and other military personnel as to physical health, technical skills, and intelligence, it is only rather recently that they have come to appreciate the importance of sound mental health.

Mental breakdowns under military conditions show practically the same range of symptoms that is found in the peacetime population. Injuries to the brain or spinal cord or nerves, due to gunshot or accident, precipitate a variety of mental conditions. Infectious and contagious diseases sometimes induce mental disturbances. Yet the most serious problems seem to be those connected with the functional neuroses and psychoses. The neuroses or psychoneuroses are the most numerous disturbances and have the most serious effects on military operations, morale, and medical costs.

During World War II, 12 per cent of the approximately 16 million men who were examined for military service were rejected on neuropsychiatric grounds. This represented 37 per cent of the total rejected as unfit. Those rejected covered a wide range of mental unfitness. "A small percentage had serious mental illnesses, some had too low an intelligence rating, some were epileptic, but the largest group had a mild to severe psychoneurosis or a tendency to nervousness, with or without symptoms at the time of examination." [18] It must be remembered that these men were being tested for fitness for warfare, not fitness for peacetime living. Very few of those rejected for psychiatric reasons needed hospital care. Most of them continued successfully with their civilian jobs and other obligations.

The rejection rate for World War I was much lower than in World War II. At the time of induction only 2 per cent of the men were rejected for psychiatric reasons and an additional 3 per cent were screened out during the early training period, making a total of 5 per cent. The difference in rates in the two wars is, of course, no measure of the relative mental health of the country for the two periods. Rather, it reflects the greater attention paid to psychological problems in the second war.

[17] See Brigadier General James A. Ulio, "Military Morale," *American J. of Sociology*, 1941, 47:330.

[18] Thomas A. C. Rennie and Luther E. Woodward, *Mental Health in Modern Society* (New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1948), p. 4. The rejection rate for the navy was 5 per cent.

Military service, especially under conditions of combat, obviously puts a heavy strain on a man and there were additional breakdowns. For the years 1942–46 inclusive, from all branches of the service and from all points between reception centers and combat areas, 680,000 men were discharged for psychiatric and other personality difficulties. Approximately 380,000 men from the army and 77,000 from the navy were discharged for psychiatric illness; another 137,000 in the army and 92,000 in the navy were released "because they could not adjust themselves to military life." [19]

Certain types of mental disorder affect officers much more than enlisted men. During World War I the condition known then as "neurasthenia"—a large fraction of what we now call psychoneuroticism—was five times as common among officers as among enlisted men. In general, officers suffer from anxiety neuroses characterisized by exaggerated concern about health, or by lack of vigor, undue introspection, sense of guilt and shame, overcaution, and general emotional preoccupation, or by phobias, obsessions, morbid doubts about their ability or future, and certain feelings of unreality and inferiority. Under battle conditions, intense and abnormal fears and anxieties, jumpiness, strong sense of fatigue, irritability, and difficulty in concentration are frequent. Strong fear of death, the fear of showing fear (especially likely among officers who are proud of their status), and even extreme but compensatory courage are common. There are often harassing dreams and persistent reveries of the carnage one has witnessed. In extreme cases a stuporous state may ensue, or outright panic or terror.

Enlisted men tend to express their mental disturbances in the form of hysteria. So-called conversion hysteria—marked by functional paralysis, blindness, and other bodily symptoms—is almost completely confined to noncommissioned officers and privates. What was incorrectly called "shellshock" in World War I is an example. Often men who had been buried in trenches or shell holes and had received only superficial injuries complained, after they were taken to the rear, that an arm was paralyzed, or that a part of the body was insensitive, or that they could not see—the last complaint often being associated with the fact that dirt had been blown into their eyes. These are the familiar "conversion" symptoms. Fear, worry, and mental conflict unconsciously and autonomically find expression in functional forms. Time and again it has been demonstrated that there was nothing neurologically wrong with vision, hearing, or tactile sensibilities. Yet the soldiers were incapacitated for further front-line duty. Some, however, quickly recovered when told that they would—on getting well—be put into noncombatant units.

Such hysterical manifestations are well known. They are often found in industrial accident cases and are a constant problem wherever in-

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

stitutional provision is made to compensate workers for industrial injuries. Battle conditions especially predispose men to this sort of defense reaction. It is not deliberate but is controlled by autonomic and unconscious factors. It is interesting that this kind of functional illness seldom happens to officers. Their pride of status, their fear of showing fear, their high conscience, and perhaps their moral sensibility about killing, seem to predispose them to the anxiety neuroses.

THE CIVILIAN IN TOTAL WAR

Note has already been made that the former distinction between home front and battle front has largely disappeared. This is particularly true in the countries in which fighting takes place. In any future war, if present lethal weapons are used, the industrial and production areas of a country may become prime targets rather than the locus of the military forces. Moreover, the mobilization of industry and of agriculture for war purposes always disturbs the peacetime economy. It is said that by mid-1943, in Great Britain, 60 per cent of the industrial capacity was devoted to war effort. At about the same time, something in the order of 40 to 50 per cent of the industrial capacity of the United States was so engaged. Along with this shift goes rationing of material resources such as food and clothing, price control, and the regulation of the conditions of labor.

Civilian Morale in Wartime

The basic factors in civilian and military morale are the same, and many of the points made above about the men under arms apply equally well to the people left at home. If a war is to be successful, the civilian must have faith in, and zest for, his country's cause. He must be ready to sacrifice and to co-operate with others in the attainment of the national goal. He must identify himself thoroughly with the national cause: there must be a goal toward which he strives, a sense of support from others, and a sense of movement toward victory.

Yet sound morale is not measured only by such general attitudes and values. Specific situations expose its many components. One summary analysis of such elements lists twelve assets of personality that make for high morale in a democracy.[20] They are: (1) sound physical health; (2) sound mental health, marked by zest, ability to strive, sense of humor, and purpose in life; (3) "economic health," or a job and income sufficient to maintain a good standard of living; (4) sound religious and family values; (5) a goal or aim to fight for, with confidence and faith in our

[20] From G. W. Allport and H. A. Murray, "Worksheets on Morale," 1942, Harvard University, Department of Psychology. Mimeographed. Section entitled "Component of morale." By permission of the authors.

democratic system, and full identification with the country's aims; (6) something definite to do, a job or avocation which distinctly contributes to the winning of the war; (7) realistic understanding of the past and present situations, of the dangers, the enemy's plans, the consequences of defeat, and the implications of victory; (8) a high degree of confidence in the leaders, qualified by freedom of constructive criticism; (9) a sense of solidarity, including tolerance of, and co-operation with, all classes and minority groups which also support the war; (10) faith and confidence in ultimate victory, qualified by sound and realistic knowledge of the enemy's strength; (11) a wise fear of possible defeat or stalemate, not neurotic but of a kind which will stimulate effort to win; (12) a sense of personal hostility to the enemy, grounded in righteous wrath, a will to fight, and freedom from shame over warlike acts and attitudes.

In contrast to such positive features, we may note some characteristics of low morale: (1) apathy with respect to the war—this may range all the way from a "do-nothing policy" and a sense of personal remoteness from the war to overemphasis on rights and neglect of duties, or the belief that conditions could not possibly be any worse under enemy rule; (2) skepticism and distrust—these may include disbelief in democracy as a system of government, confusion as to our war aims and our procedures in carrying on the war, and cynicism about the motives and abilities of military or civilian authorities, about employers or union leaders, and about war aims or promises; (3) displaced hostility—misdirection of aggressive attitudes and action. This is distinctive evidence of low morale and includes habits of destructive criticism, hatred of leaders or of other classes or groups in one's own nation, and distrust and hostility toward the country's allies; (4) misapplied allegiance—loyalty to the enemy country, outright traitorous thoughts and acts, secret acceptance of the values of the enemy, or extreme devotion to some cause, religious or other, which opposes the war effort on moral grounds; (5) lack of knowledge of the war—failure to understand our nation's place in this complex world of peoples, resources, trade, and communication, and to understand war aims, strategy, democracy and other basic values in our society, and the need for national solidarity; (6) various maladjustments—an inveterate tendency to spread rumors, prejudices against minority groups, such as workers who make high wages or employers who get war contracts, lack of emotional balance with respect to national aims and values, mental conflict between selfish interest and the country's call for work and sacrifice, a tendency to exploit the war situation for "all one can get out of it personally," emotional reactions against governmental and rationing regulations which are necessary for successful prosecution of the war, and taking the war and its sacrifices as a personal affront.[21]

[21] See G. W. Allport and H. A. Murray, "Liabilities in Morale," *loc. cit.*

It would take us too far afield to attempt to get at the major causes of apathy, skepticism, ignorance, misplaced hostility, and all these varied evidences of low morale. But a few reasons stand out. Man in modern mass society is easily confused as to his role and status as a citizen. In our country the high stress on competition and individualism has dwarfed the growth of the co-operative spirit and of mutual understanding. There is no doubt that the foreign policy of one's country is difficult to understand or judge. Yet under democratic traditions the citizen is supposed to understand it and to make decisions about it, at least through elected representatives. A lack of confidence in elected leaders easily undermines morale and offers an opening for divisive enemy propaganda.

In this country, at least, pacifistic and antiwar propaganda has added to the misunderstanding of the nature and place of man's conflicts in human society. Young people indoctrinated with antiwar sentiment and the debunking myths about our place in World War I found it difficult to adjust themselves to World War II. There is no doubt that sharp social-economic distinctions and discriminations, prolonged unemployment, and other economic disturbances foster a breakdown of morale.

Effects of Total War on the Family

The direct participation of the whole adult civilian population in modern war—in the military itself, in war industries, or in various community services, has many and varied effects on family life. Statistics on this influence are not usually available, and for our purpose the most important effects are psychological changes which are not easily put into statistical form.

The enlistment or induction of fathers into the armed services obviously affects the customary interactions of the family. Fathers who do not enter the military often make occupational shifts as war industries replace peacetime work. During World War II our country witnessed an enormous amount of internal migration, which meant pulling up the family's roots in one community and setting them down in another. This involved new adjustments in housing, neighborhood relations, schooling, and other matters. So, too, night shifts often disrupted old habits, and wives and children had to adapt themselves to new household routines of eating, sleeping, and recreation.

Sometimes the wife sought work outside the home to help support the family or to contribute to the war effort. This resulted in many alterations in traditional family life. Day nurseries might provide care for young children whose mothers are at work, but in any case, changes in the household routine of shopping, meals, and many other matters are inevitable.

The demand for workers is often so great that adolescents are drawn into the labor market. This further modifies family life. Youngsters who

earn relatively large sums of money often change their views as to their importance in the community and in the family. New problems of discipline and responsibility may arise between parents and children.

Influence of War on Children and Youth

The effects of war conditions on children and young people are widely recognized. In World War II, in Britain, there was a definite rise in the rate of juvenile delinquency, especially in the age groups from fifteen years to the early twenties. The blackouts, the raids, and rationing stimulated crimes against property chiefly, though there were some periodic difficulties with increased personal violence as well.[22] In the United States, delinquency rates tended to rise, though not so sharply as certain critics believed. But statistical facts aside, some psychiatrists, especially those influenced by Freudian doctrines, believe that a war period tends to unleash repressed and previously sublimated aggressions in young and old alike.

With regard to younger children the matter is somewhat different. Many American parents, teachers, preachers, and social workers were shocked to discover that young children, even of preschool age, were enthusiastically playing at war and at killing. It was felt by many that this was further evidence of the brutalizing influence of war on human character. Sometimes adults tried to prevent such play but discovered that it reappeared in secret or in other forms. Wiser counsel and practice, however, recognized that such reactions not only were to be expected but were in many ways normal.

First, aggressiveness lies so deep in all of us that, if it does not express itself in one way, it will in another. It is true that as the child grows up much of his tendency to violence is repressed or sublimated into morally accepted forms; the aggressiveness of older children and adults normally finds outlets in play, in verbal abuse, and especially in dislike for members of various out-groups: people of other classes, races, and religions, and especially of nations not on friendly terms with one's own. Second, killing and war are deep in our culture. Children delight in stories of Jack the Giant-Killer. Older ones enjoy the comic strips and yarns about Superman and Space Ships. Then come the legends of the heroes and battles of national history. It is next to impossible to keep young children from enjoying the vicarious aggressions suggested by such tales, especially if the stories are re-enacted in play. Finally, during wartime itself, with an entire people given over to killing the enemy or helping others to do so, it is futile to attempt to stop youngsters from playing at war.

The observations of children in Britain during the months of the

[22] See H. Mannheim, "Crime in Wartime England," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1941, 217:128–137.

German air raids in 1940 and 1941 are instructive. There is little or no evidence that aerial bombardment has serious effects on large numbers of children. Soon after air raids had destroyed houses and streets, children might be seen playing at war games in bomb craters, with blasted furniture as toy weapons, and throwing bits of rubble as if they were hand grenades. Anna Freud and others believe the problem is not such overt expression of aggression, which is normal for the child growing up in our society, and which is later sublimated. Rather, the real problem is that habits and attitudes are built up which are later easily displaced to outright killing—rationalized as moral by adults. Once deeply embedded in children and young people, though glossed over in times of peace, violent attitudes are quickly rearoused at any later time under threats to national security.[28]

POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS

Sooner or later all wars come to an end. Obviously, the return to peace requires readjustments for the armed forces and civilians alike. The present section will deal with certain problems which the demobilized soldier must face on his return to civil life.

The Readjustments of the Ex-Soldier

In democratic societies, life under military discipline is quite different from life under ordinary civilian conditions. The return to peacetime society demands considerable modification in habits and attitudes.

1. The world to which the ex-soldier will return is not likely to be the one from which he came. Psychologically, if not physically, isolated from his former life, he may be ill-prepared to meet the profound changes in political and economic organization which have taken place in the interim. Young men who daydream of hurrying through the war so as to get back to home, family, and job, and who fail to understand the larger issues which affect local, national, and international affairs, may get a rude shock when the fighting is done. The old world which they left was, on the whole, well defined; the new one may be in turmoil. Disillusionment easily develops.

This disillusionment may take a turn toward intense pacifism and a conviction that the war just won was due to the evil machinations of politicians and munitions-makers. Such was a common belief in Britain, France, and the United States in the decade following the Treaty of Versailles. This almost amounted to a psychological defeatism in the countries which had been victorious on the battlefield. With the convic-

[28] See Anna Freud and Dorothy T. Burlingham, *War and Children* (New York, International Universities Press, 1943). Also, R. D. Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldiers* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1942).

tion that little was gained from the war to improve the lot of mankind went a feeling that the victors had been too severe on the conquered. In Germany, on the other hand, a vast wave of disillusionment, particularly among the military class and strong nationalistic groups, led, in time, to a chauvinistic desire for a war of revenge. In Russia, as we know, defeat at arms was associated with the Bolshevik Revolution.

2. One of the most important needs of the returned soldier, be he officer or enlisted man, is economic and emotional security. Every student of postwar problems and planning recognizes the importance of full employment. But the vocational readjustment of the ex-soldier is not always easy, even if work is available. Obviously, the readaptation will vary with the branch of the service. Men with specialized skills in medicine, engineering, and aeronautics may be quickly absorbed into peacetime occupations. Men from the infantry, artillery, and some of the supply services may not be easily brought back into civil life. Skills related to such combat tactics as deployment, defilade, and enfilade are of little use to them in peacetime.

So, too, the discipline of civilian work, in which authority is often more remote and impersonal than among the military, may prove a difficulty. And conflict between the returned soldiers and the civilian workers who have had high wages and have faced no risks of military action may become severe. Obviously, home-front laborers who have suffered aerial bombardment and other "battle" conditions should not be psychologically remote from those who have been in uniform. In this particular, total war, in which the home front merges with the battle line, is different from previous wars. If employment is not soon available to the returned veterans, economic hardships, restlessness, and disillusionment may give rise to public agitation, ranging from demands for bonuses or other benefits from the state to outright revolutionary movements to overthrow the government in the hope of a better "deal."

3. Though a good job provides emotional satisfaction as well as economic support, the desire for the affection, companionship, and stability of family life is also strong in most returned soldiers. Regular and frequent letters between the man and his family may have helped to preserve the bonds between them. However, the long separation may necessitate new adjustments. Military life tends to induce ideas, attitudes, and habits regarding sex and family life which are quite contrary to those of the Christian tradition. Yet the long separation may lead to overidealization of love and family relations, and this may or may not be helpful in the re-establishment of the home. In the love life of the family, the ex-soldier may seek the ideals which have been shattered in his general disillusionment.

The family life may have been considerably altered. The wife or mother may have gone to work outside the home, thus taking on eco-

nomic and other responsibilities that are normally the husband's. The attitudes and conduct of the children may have changed. The man's acceptance of a life of segregated care in the military may make it difficult for him to resume his responsible position as head of the household. On the other hand, young men, in particular, may have gained something by their emancipation from parental and family ties; many will have escaped their childish dependency on parents and learned adult responsibilities for the first time.

4. Both occupational and family readjustments may be influenced by incipient or open conflict between age and sex groups. The young adults who made up the bulk of the combat forces may well believe that, since they won the war, they are entitled to occupational and political preferment. In the defeated country the men of the same age may feel that, since they fought and lost, they are the chief sufferers and hence are entitled to whatever good things may be salvaged from defeat.

This conflict is also evident in the values which the postwar society develops. For example, after World War I, ex-soldiers who returned to college often expressed disgust at ivory-tower philosophy and traditional instruction. Associated with the common belief that much of the traditional academic curriculum was useless was the sense of conflict with the younger generation of students who had not taken part in the war.

Not only may conflict with the younger generation develop, but the veterans frequently feel resentful toward older people. This not only shows itself in the attitude toward teachers, but after World War I it was particularly violent against alleged profiteers and political warmongers who, the ex-soldiers often felt, were the only beneficiaries of the war.

5. The shift from war to peace usually brings changes in prestige. The expected hero-status is either temporary or absent. During the war itself, much is made of men who are decorated for gallantry or who become publicized for their deeds. But enthusiasm usually subsides rather quickly after the close of the war.

The problems of an officer may be quite different from those of an enlisted man. We have already noted that in a highly individualistic culture like ours soldiers often resent the authoritative techniques of military life. The enlisted man's ego is usually deflated by authority and command. If, on demobilization, he gets a job and is reunited with his family and community, the ego-deflation experienced in the army may be replaced by acceptable civilian status. For the officer, on the contrary, the change from military to civil life may take a quite different turn. In the army or navy his ego has probably been distinctly inflated by the authority and responsibility of his position, and it may be greatly deflated by his return to a peacetime job. The erstwhile captain, major, or colonel may become but a bank clerk or a minor official in industry

or in the civil service. One enlisted man reported that he got a real "thrill" at seeing that his former captain had become a shoe salesman in Wanamaker's; "I also saw another captain delivering milk."

6. The ex-soldier may have developed personal habits and values which border on the neurotic. Military life sometimes sets up restlessness and an unwillingness to settle again into the routine of civilian life. Rather than return to a job and a family, some veterans desire new adventure, travel, and movement. Others may express a devil-may-care attitude by excessive eating, sexual adventure, and extravagance. In most men these reactions are a temporary "letting off of steam."

Sometimes the habit of aggression is carried over into civil life. A certain brutalization may have occurred, though the pacifists doubtless overstress this. Just as the knowledge of human conflict may habituate children and adolescents to violence, so, too, indoctrination and practice in killing among soldiers may leave a mark upon their future attitudes and values. Though some may react strongly against such aggressiveness or may inhibit it during peacetime, it is likely to remain under the surface ready to reappear on adequate provocation. Not only do nationalistic myths and legends tend to keep the war spirit alive during periods of peace, but recurrent conditioning to violence leaves its mark on soldiers and civilians alike. Though the criminal acts of veterans are perhaps not important in the total of postwar crime, there is no doubt that in the difficulties of readjustment some veterans resort to crimes against property or persons.

Some Devices for Aiding Soldiers to Adjust Themselves to Civilian Life

There are a number of group and institutional aids which may facilitate the transition of the ex-soldier from military to civil life. Obviously, family life is one of the most important. Reunion with loved ones is of immense importance in restoring status and in re-establishing contact with the community. Of equal, if not more, significance, is the getting of a job, and every means of putting the veteran to work is a gain. At the community level, religious, fraternal, labor, civic, and veterans' organizations are useful in aiding the returned soldier to get back to peacetime living. Despite some criticism of such bodies as the American Legion, they serve a useful purpose in assisting the ex-soldier to regain his place in the community. Political parties which promise huge bonuses or other benefits to the veterans often get into office because the latter come to believe that this is an effective method of "getting what is coming to them." Participation in such political activities clearly affords a means of re-establishing one's place in local or national affairs.

Yet the readjustments following a war are not confined to the military. After total war, civilians likewise go back to a world unlike the former one. Their readjustments are not so severe, for they concern

chiefly work and residence; but, in terms of larger political and economic matters, in terms of changes in larger values, war has perhaps as great an impact on them as on those who have gone through the ordeal of battle. At any rate, the process from peace to war and to peace again is one of the most striking features of our modern world, and obliges us to consider, in the final section of this chapter, some of the larger problems of war as an institution and its effects upon both group and individual life.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND WAR AS INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT

While some writers have argued that war is a direct expression of a fighting instinct in man, most serious scholars view war as essentially an institution which stimulates and directs the aggressive habits of man. If war is an institution, then, one may ask, can it not be abolished? And, if it can, does this mean that human aggression may, with adequate training, also be eliminated? In this section we shall discuss briefly some of the psychological foundations of war as an institution, war as an outlet for individual hostility, conflict as an integrating element in social intercourse, and the sublimation of aggressiveness in relation to war and other institutions based on conflict.

Some Psychological Features of War as an Institution

Modern war is closely associated with nationalism and the imperialist ambitions of great states. These, in turn, are related to the economic ambitions of certain classes and to population pressures. In support of the nationalistic expansion of population and economic life, military practices and ideas are kept alive through the schools, the churches, the economic institutions, and the military establishment itself. In nondemocratic countries, a military caste has been a distinctive factor, as evidenced in the histories of Spain, Russia, France, Germany, and Japan.

The nation-state is for modern man the largest in-group which calls for his reverence, deference, and sense of belonging. It has replaced the church as the basic center of affection, social solidarity, and security, as the core of basic in-group attitudes and values. Identification with the state is provided by myths, legends, and songs of national heroes and previous great events. The stories of battles and conquests, of artistic and mechanical inventions, and of colonial discoveries and expansion are of utmost importance. The flag, the map, and the concept of the frontier, the national anthem, the military insignia, and many other symbols stimulate patriotism and willingness to fight and to sacrifice for the national state.

These symbols represent the positive attitudes and values organized and perpetuated in modern states, and without them nationalism would

collapse. Their counterpart are the negative views of enemy countries, the largest and most threatening out-groups with which we must contend. It is perfectly obvious that patriotic enthusiasm and belief in a political system or cause depend not alone on the attitudes of affection and approach but also on their opposite attitudes of hatred, distrust, and avoidance. In fact, intensive in-group solidarity is equally dependent on positive and negative attitudes. Group solidarity seems to be born as much of fear and aggression as of love and mutual aid. Hence, no matter how we may view the national state, so long as it exists with its principles of sovereignty and independence and its own closed political system, war as an institution may continue. But, before discussing the alternatives to this as they may effect human personality, let us comment on the roots of aggression and conflict in the individual.

The Interpersonal Bases of Aggression and Conflict

There seems to be little if any evidence to gainsay the widely accepted generalization that aggression is a common and universal experience of mankind. Even in societies known for their co-operative economic and other institutions and for their pacific relations with their neighbors, interpersonal rivalry and conflict are found in some form or another. It is rather generally recognized that personal aggressiveness arises from the frustrations which individuals experience in their daily contacts with others. As we noted in earlier chapters, frustration does not always lead to aggression, but everybody shows some form of resistance to the frustrating contacts with relatives, friends, neighbors, teachers, and others.

If this be sound, then we may go on to state that the earlier aggressiveness—for example, resistance to parental training in feeding, elimination, sleep habits, and play, and resentment toward siblings as to status in the family—will in time be transferred to other situations and social objects, or repressed, or given expression in fantasy, or otherwise disposed of. There is no evidence that the imprint of the early habits and attitudes of antagonism is ever wiped out. The early hostility is soon extended to persons from other neighborhoods or to the people "on the wrong side of the tracks." From this extension, at the primary-group level, it is but a short step to other out-groups: to the labor union if one grows up a member of the employing class, or to the employer group if one is indoctrinated with unionism; or to individuals of another religion, another color, or another social class. And in our modern world, just as we extend our affection and sympathy to our national state, with all its trappings of symbol, so we transfer our most intense aggressiveness to nations that threaten our national security. The love of one's country and the hatred of another country are the psychological underpinning of modern war as an institution. Economic, religious, and other interests

are involved, but the basic interests are political. War, in short, provides the individual with a culturally accepted and expected outlet for his aggressiveness. Racial, religious, and class antagonisms pale into insignificance when compared with international conflicts.

For the individual, moreover, conflicts usually provide a highly emotional and satisfying integration of otherwise opposing trends in his life organization. At the very time when we express our deepest affections and make our greatest sacrifices to save others of our in-group, we indulge in our most violent hatreds. Under these circumstances men kill not only with impunity but with the praise and moral approval of their fellow countrymen. All the most elemental but suppressed impulses to destroy frustrating persons or objects may find an outlet against the nation's enemy. This is not to say that the soldier or sailor in modern mechanized warfare necessarily feels such impulses consciously. In fact, in large measure the business of killing gets to be impersonal and mechanical, except in hand-to-hand combat, which is relatively rare. Rather, this culturized aggressiveness is the psychological foundation of morale or fighting spirit.

When there is a fanatical belief in the sanctity of one's nation and its mission (as in many religious wars or among Communist party members) morale reaches a high pitch, and the defeat of an army with such *esprit de corps*, unless it is badly equipped and inadequately led, may be difficult indeed. The enthusiasm of the French armies under Napoleon grew out of their firm conviction that they were carrying the Revolution to the enslaved peoples of Europe. In contrast, the armies of democracies called upon to defend themselves against such zealous aggressor nations as Nazi Germany may be slow to develop any comparable fanatical aggressiveness. Yet, unless their morale has disintegrated, as had that of France in 1940, such nonaggressive nations may develop a strong fighting spirit that will stimulate intense solidarity. Whether such high morale will lead later to warlike habits and attitudes depends on political, economic, and religious values; a nation forced to defend itself will not necessarily emerge into militarism. That depends on the use of power. But, before closing the present chapter, we must raise two basic problems: (1) the extent and distribution of aggressiveness in a society; (2) the possibilities of sublimation of war-stimulated conflicts into milder and less violent forms.

Equivalents of War: Moral or Otherwise

If we are to divert human aggressiveness from war into less destructive channels, we need, first of all, to ask if there is a given quantity of hostility in every individual which must, sooner or later, come out. Or is aggressiveness, especially at the institutional level, capable of addition or subtraction, depending on cultural training? Freud, who has given us so

much information on aggressiveness and its expression, apparently held that the individual has a destructive and aggressive "instinct" or "death instinct," which is counterbalanced by a libidinous "instinct" or "life instinct." As the individual grows up, such aggressiveness may be expressed or repressed, but it remains a relatively constant element in all thought and conduct. It is seen in paranoia and other pathological forms, in personal fighting, in war, and in sublimated forms such as gossip and sharp wit. In contrast to this view is one which, though it recognizes the universality of personal antagonism, assumes that the amount, intensity, and distribution of hostility, especially at the cultural level, may be affected by training. Children brought up in a highly militaristic society may have more and intenser violent attitudes and habits than those reared in a pacifistic world. In the former world the rewards, material and other, would go to those who developed increasing aggressiveness; in the latter they would go to those who did not.

It is ridiculous to consider modern war as always made or unmade by a small clique of militarists. Certainly, in Germany, Nazi propaganda had laid the foundation for World War II through mass appeals. And the Soviet Union, under the impact of the Nazi attack, experienced a mass approval of war. Even in Britain and the United States, which have traditionally been most removed from the military tradition and customs, long involvement in a serious struggle for survival has left its effect upon the masses. There is a considerable doubt whether even the sufferings of total war will make nations less aggressive. In other words, it is doubtful if wars tend to cure wars. In this sense the old-line pacifists had a point, however inadequate was their analysis of war as an institution or of man's aggressiveness.

In the face of the conditioning to war which has been a common mass experience in the last few generations, one is reluctant to raise the old query about the possibilities of alleviating or abolishing modern warfare. What is the likelihood that we may be able to develop sublimations which will provide acceptable outlets for hostility without disrupting human life and social organization?

In the first place, we must recognize that a social order and a culture built on good will, appeasement, and co-operation are but partial solutions. We must reckon with human aggressiveness. We must give it outlets that will provide personal satisfaction but not destroy society. There is little evidence that we can eliminate aggressiveness in the individual as he grows up. The disparity between human wants and the means of satisfying them is still too great for that. In fact, in order to become a participating member in a social order, the individual must suppress some of his wants. And, once we have such frustration, we have a situation that makes for aggression, which may or may not be sublimated through personal or institutional forms. While the areas of conflict may

change, and the institutions associated therewith may be altered, aggression and conflict remain as fundamental and universal as co-operation, mutual aid, division of labor, and other basic interactional forms. Any plan for a peaceful future which ignores this fact seems to be destined to fail. If men draw blueprints for future social organization and culture, they must reckon with the interactions of the human beings for whom such programs are designed. To do otherwise is to court future disillusionment, out of which even worse disasters may arise.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

CHILD, Irvin L., and VAN DE WATER, Marjorie, eds., *Psychology for the Returning Serviceman* (Washington, Infantry Journal, 1945). Designed to aid the veteran to return to civilian life, this little book contains a great deal of scientific information mixed with much common sense.

CLARKSON, J. D. and COCHRAN, T. C., eds., *War as a Social Institution* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941). A collection of papers by historians, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and others which treat the roots of war, the strategy of war, the role of the neutral, the relation of war to society. It includes a section on the United States and World War II.

FIELD, G. C., *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1945). An essay by a philosopher who served on a British Tribunal to hear applications of alleged conscientious objectors regarding military service. Contains some insightful comments on ethical and related matters with respect to war and citizen obligations.

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