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ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE UNITY OF MANKIND

BY
W. W. TARN

Fellow of the Academy

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RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE
UNITY OF MANKIND¹

BY W. W. TARN
Fellow of the Academy

Read 10 May 1933

WHAT I am going to talk about is one of the great revolutions in human thought. Greeks of the classical period, speaking very roughly, divided mankind into two classes, Greeks and non-Greeks; the latter they called barbarians and usually regarded as inferior people, though occasionally some one, like Herodotus or Xenophon, might suggest that certain barbarians possessed qualities which deserved consideration, like the wisdom of the Egyptians or the courage of the Persians. But in the third century B.C. and later we meet with a body of opinion which may be called universalist; all mankind was one and all men were brothers, or anyhow ought to be. Who was the pioneer who brought about this tremendous revolution in some men's way of thinking? Most writers have had no doubt on that point; the man to whom the credit was due was Zeno, the founder of the Stoic philosophy. But there are several passages in Greek writers which, *if they* are to be believed, show that the first man actually to think of it was not Zeno but Alexander. This matter has never really been examined; some writers just pass it over, which means, I suppose, that they do not consider the passages in question historical;² others have definitely said that it is merely a case of our secondary authorities attributing to Alexander ideas taken from Stoicism.³ I want to consider to-day whether the passages in question are or are not historical and worthy of credence; that is, whether Alexander was or was not the first to believe in, and to contemplate, the unity of mankind. This will entail, among other things, some examination of

the concept which Greeks called *Homonoia*, a word which meant more than its Latin translation, *Concord*, means to us; it is more like *Unity and Concord*, a being of one mind together, or if we like the phrase, a union of hearts;⁴ ultimately it was to become almost a symbol of the world's longing for something better than constant war. For convenience of discussion I shall keep the Greek term *Homonoia*.

Before coming to the ideas attributed to Alexander, I must sketch very briefly the background against which the new thought arose, whoever was its author; and I ought to say that I am primarily talking throughout of theory, not of practice.⁵ It may be possible to find, in the fifth century, or earlier, an occasional phrase which looks like a groping after something better than the hard-and-fast division of Greeks and barbarians;⁶ but this comes to very little and had no importance for history, because anything of the sort was strangled by the idealist philosophies. Plato and Aristotle left no doubt about their views. Plato said that all barbarians were enemies by nature; it was proper to wage war upon them, even to the point of enslaving or extirpating them.⁷ Aristotle said that all barbarians were slaves by nature, especially those of Asia; they had not the qualities which entitled them to be free men, and it was proper to treat them as slaves.⁸ His model State cared for nothing but its own citizens; it was a small aristocracy of Greek citizens ruling over a barbarian peasantry⁹ who cultivated the land for their masters and had no share in the State—a thing he had seen in some cities of Asia Minor.¹⁰ Certainly neither Plato nor Aristotle was quite consistent; Plato might treat an Egyptian priest as the repository of wisdom, Aristotle might suggest that the constitution of Carthage was worth studying; but their main position was clear enough, as was the impression Alexander would get from his tutor Aristotle.

There were, of course, other voices. Xenophon, when he wanted to portray an ideal shepherd of the people, chose a Persian king as shepherd of the Persian people. And there were the early Cynics. But the Cynics had no thought of

any union or fellowship between Greek and barbarian; they were not constructive thinkers, but merely embodied protests against the vices and follies of civilization. When Diogenes called himself a cosmopolite, a horrible word which he coined and which was not used again for centuries,¹¹ what he meant was, not that he was a citizen of some imaginary world-state—a thing he never thought about—but that he was not a citizen of any Greek city; it was pure negation.¹² And the one piece of Cynic construction, the ideal figure of Heracles, labouring to free Greece from monsters, was merely shepherd of a *Greek* herd till after Alexander,¹³ when it took colour and content from the Stoics and became the ideal benefactor of humanity. All that Xenophon or the Cynics could supply was the figure of an ideal shepherd, not of the human herd, but of some national herd.

More important was Aristotle's older contemporary Isocrates, because of his conception of Homonoia. The Greek world, whatever its practice, never doubted that in theory unity in a city was very desirable;¹⁴ but though the word Homonoia was already in common use among Greeks, it chiefly meant absence of faction-fights,¹⁵ and this rather negative meaning lasted in the cities throughout the Hellenistic period, as can be seen in the numerous decrees in honour of the judicial commissions sent from one city to another, which are praised because they tried to compose internal discord.¹⁶ There was hardly a trace as yet of the more positive sense which Homonoia was to acquire later—a mental attitude which should make war or faction impossible because the parties were at one; and Isocrates extended the application of the word without changing its meaning. He took up a suggestion of the sophist Gorgias and proposed to treat the whole Greek world as one and the futile wars between city and city as faction fights—to apply Homonoia to the Greek race.¹⁷ For this purpose he utilized Plato's idea that the barbarian was a natural enemy,¹⁸ and decided that the way to unite Greeks was to attack Persia;

'I come', he said, 'to advocate two things: war against the barbarian, Homonoia between ourselves'.¹⁹ But somebody had to do the uniting; and Isocrates bethought him of the Cynic Heracles, benefactor of the Greek race, and urged King Philip of Macedonia, a descendant of Heracles, to play the part.²⁰ But if Philip was to be Heracles and bring about the Homonoia of the Greek world, the way was being prepared for two important ideas of a later time; the essential quality of the king must be that love of man, *φιλανθρωπία*, which had led Heracles to perform his labours,²¹ and the essential business of the king was to promote Homonoia;²² so far this only applied to Greeks, but if its meaning were to deepen it would still be the king's business. The actual result of all this, the League of Corinth under Philip's presidency, was not quite what Isocrates had dreamt of.

This then was the background against which Alexander appeared. The business of a Macedonian king was to be a benefactor of Greeks to the extent of preventing inter-city warfare; he was to promote Homonoia among Greeks and utilize their enmity to barbarians as a bond of union; but barbarians themselves were still enemies and slaves by nature, a view which Aristotle emphasized when he advised his pupil to treat Greeks as free men, but barbarians as slaves.

I now come to the things Alexander is supposed to have said or thought; and the gulf between them and the background I have sketched is so deep that one cannot blame those who have refused to believe that he ever said or thought anything of the sort. There are five passages which need consideration: one in Arrian;²³ one from Eratosthenes, preserved by Strabo;²⁴ and three from Plutarch, one of which, from its resemblance to the Strabo passage, has been supposed by one of the acutest critics of our time to be taken in substance from Eratosthenes,²⁵ and as such I shall treat it. The passage in Arrian says that, after the mutiny of the Macedonians at Opis and their reconciliation to Alexander, he gave a banquet to Macedonians and

Persians, at which he prayed for Homonoia and partnership in rule between these two peoples. What Eratosthenes says amounts to this. Aristotle told Alexander to treat Greeks as friends, but barbarians like animals; but Alexander knew better, and preferred to divide men into good and bad without regard to their race, and thus carried out Aristotle's real intention. For Alexander believed that he had a mission from the deity to harmonize men generally and be the reconciler of the world,²⁶ mixing men's lives and customs as in a loving cup,²⁷ and treating the good as his kin, the bad as strangers; for he thought that the good man was the real Greek and the bad man the real barbarian.²⁸ Of the two Plutarch passages, the first says that his intention was to bring about, as between mankind generally, Homonoia and peace and fellowship and make them all one people;²⁹ and the other, which for the moment I will quote without its context, makes him say that God is the common father of all men.³⁰

It is obvious that, wherever all this comes from, we are dealing with a great revolution in thought. It amounts to this, that there is a natural brotherhood of all men, though bad men do not share in it; that Homonoia is no longer to be confined to the relations between Greek and Greek, but is to unite Greek and barbarian; and that Alexander's aim was to substitute peace for war, and reconcile the enmities of mankind by bringing them all—all that is whom his arm could reach, the peoples of his empire—to be of one mind together: as men were one in blood, so they should become one in heart and spirit. That such a revolution in thought did happen is unquestioned; the question is, was Alexander really its author, or are the thoughts attributed to him those of Zeno or somebody else? To try and answer that question, I propose to leave Alexander out of it for the present, and to take first the connexion of Homonoia with kingship after his time³¹ and (so far as our broken material permits) follow it down the line of kingship, just taking the salient points, and see what this leads to; then I propose to examine

Stoicism so far as is necessary to see if the ideas attributed to Alexander *could* be Stoic; and finally to consider what happened in the years between Alexander and Zeno. It may then be possible to say something about these five passages.

Kingship after Alexander became so important that for some time there was hardly a philosopher who did not write a treatise upon it, giving his views of the theory of kingship and the duties of a king. Nearly all this literature has perished; but among the debris we happen to possess some illuminating fragments from two otherwise unknown writers, Diotogenes and an author whose work passed as that of an ancient Pythagorean, Ecphantus.³² Both are called, and have been claimed as, Pythagoreans, but it is sufficient to say that anyhow they were certainly not Stoics. They belong to the early third century, when the theory of kingship was still in the constructive stage; Diotogenes was contemporary with Demetrius the Besieger.³³ The theory of Pseudo-Ecphantus comes to this: as the king, who is Living Law (that idea is Aristotle's),³⁴ corresponds upon earth to the divine ruler of the universe, and as in an earthly State existence is impossible without fellowship and love, it is the king's business to promote these things as a copy of the Homonoia of the universe (meaning the heavens).³⁵ The theory of Diotogenes is very similar. The king, who is Living Law, bears the same relation to the State as God does to the universe; for the State, formed by the harmonizing together of different elements, is an imitation of the order and harmony of the universe; therefore the king must harmonize the State.³⁶ Both then agree that, whether a good disposition of the State be called harmony or Homonoia, it is the king's business to bring it about; and a writer of a later time, Musonius, alludes to this view as having been widespread.³⁷ But the kings whom these two authors had in mind were the Hellenistic monarchs, who ruled over subjects of many races, Greeks and barbarians; and the subjects whose unity the king is to promote are

implicitly taken throughout to be *all* his subjects without distinction.³⁸ Now the last thing we saw in this connexion (for we are leaving Alexander out of it) was Isocrates urging Philip of Macedon to bring about Homonoia between the Greek cities in order to attack Persia; and here are two writers saying in effect that the king must promote Homonoia between the Greeks and the barbarians over whom his arm reached; that is, Homonoia has ceased to be confined to Greeks and has been extended to include men of any race. Certainly this was not the discovery of these two obscure writers; and as both say much the same thing, something of importance must have happened between Isocrates and themselves.

The next landmark is Iambulus,³⁹ author of the best-known of the Greek communistic Utopias, situated upon the Islands of the Sun somewhere in the Indian Ocean. Iambulus is later than Megasthenes and earlier than Aristonicus, that is, between about 290 and 133 B.C.; but he belongs to the constructive period and ought therefore to be third century.⁴⁰ I need not dwell on his Utopia for its own sake, since its chief importance for my subject lies in the use made of it by Aristonicus; but since it has been claimed as Stoic,⁴¹ and as, if this were so, it would have no business in the line of kingship, I must run through its main features. The people were divided into systems, each system being ruled by a governor whose power was seemingly absolute,⁴² but who had to die at a given age. Wives were held in common. Slavery was unknown, and each member of each system in turn filled every office, from servant to governor; this was rendered possible by the islands bearing crops all the year round, some of them without human aid. The people worshipped Heaven and the Sun, and buried corpses in the sand of the sea-shore; and they prized Homonoia above all things⁴³ and lived in perfect unity and concord. The one thing in this Utopia which is Stoic is the absence of classes; nothing else is, not even the equality of the people; for as every one in turn filled every

office, circumstances were identical for all, and no Stoic ever claimed that 'equality'—a spiritual matter—meant similar conditions of life.⁴⁴ Filling every office in turn has nothing to do with Stoicism; Iambulus took it from Aristotle, who had met the idea somewhere and had criticised it.⁴⁵ Absence of slavery was not a Stoic tenet—one wishes it had been; the compulsory death of the governor at a certain age has nothing to do with the Stoic doctrine of voluntary suicide, but was taken from an old tradition at Ceos and other stories of the sort;⁴⁶ community of wives might have been taken from Zeno, but might just as well have been taken from Plato or from some 'nature-people', like Aristotle's 'Libyans of the interior'.⁴⁷ Crops growing of themselves were not Stoic, but were taken from stories of the golden age.⁴⁸ Stoics did not worship Heaven or the Sun (see note 134), or for that matter any other of the popular gods; their reverence—one cannot call it worship—was given to the Supreme Power, that Universal Law who was also Destiny and Nature, Providence and God. And lastly, though the careless disposal of corpses may correspond to Stoic doctrine, similar views about the unimportance of burial were held by at least three other philosophic schools.⁴⁹ Iambulus in fact has made his own patchwork, and has taken his material wherever he found it. What we do get, however, in the statement that above all things the people prized Homonoia, is, once again, the connexion of Homonoia with kingship; for Diodorus' account compares the governors to kings.⁵⁰ It is a pity that this account—all that we have of Iambulus—is imperfect (for example, it does not say how the several systems were co-ordinated); it does not say that the duty of the governor was to maintain the much-prized Homonoia, though it must have been. But the connexion is clear; and of course absolute governors or kings have no place in Stoic theory.⁵¹

In 133 B.C. Rome purported to take over the kingdom of Pergamon; a slave rising at once broke out, and Aristonicus, the natural heir to the throne, raised a national revolt

against Rome and threw in his lot with the slaves, to whom he promised freedom. His mixed following—Greeks, Asiatics of Asia Minor, mercenaries and slaves of many nationalities—gave Rome so much trouble that one can see that there was an idea behind them, and it is known what it was; they are called *Heliopolitai*,⁵² citizens of the Sun State, and the Sun State was that of Iambulus.⁵³ Aristonicus was using Iambulus as an inspiration to his followers, and the kingdom he meant to set up was the kingdom of Homonoia; probably not Iambulus' unworkable Utopia, but something on the lines of the equality, and absence of slavery which he had preached, and naturally without distinctions of race. It is the only occasion in antiquity on which Homonoia was to extend, not merely laterally—from one race to another—but vertically, to the depths of the slave world; and the moving spirit of it was a king.⁵⁴ Rome put an end to the attempt.

The next landmark is the Greek prophecy about Cleopatra embedded in the third book of the Sibylline Oracles,⁵⁵ emanating from one of her Greek supporters in her war with Octavian. Put briefly, it says that after she has hurled Rome down from heaven to earth she will then raise her up again from earth to heaven and inaugurate a golden age in which Asia and Europe shall alike share; justice and love shall reign upon earth, and with them Homonoia, which 'surpasses all earthly things'.⁵⁶ That is to say, Cleopatra is to end the long traditional feud of East and West by reconciling the two sides, Asia and Europe, and making them of one mind together. Whether she herself ever thought of this is not material to my subject; what matters is that the prophet naturally attributes the establishment of Homonoia, of international unity and fellowship, to a monarch. The connexion of universal Homonoia with kingship had never been stated so sharply before; but the prophecy gives us more than that. Any picture of any golden age is bound to make of it an era of peace and goodwill; but this prophecy depicts at some length a golden age

of *righteousness*, and Homonoia is its central feature; this means that the central feature of any golden age could henceforth hardly fail to be the reconciliation and the unity of mankind. Perhaps there were other prophecies of the sort among the 2,000 which Augustus burned later.

But though Augustus might burn prophecies, his whole work was in a sense directed to making a beginning in carrying out what could be carried out of the Cleopatra prophecy.⁵⁷ Romans now claimed to form a third class beside Greeks and barbarians, though Greeks only admitted this later.⁵⁸ But the two peoples had one thing in common; both were weary of the long-continued civil wars and the misery they brought; and if, to Greeks, the longed-for peace and reconciliation must come from a monarch, it was hardly less so with Romans. For Homonoia, under its Latin name *Concordia*, had come to Rome as a goddess early in the second century B.C.;⁵⁹ and although, prior to Augustus, *Concordia* seems only to have meant to Romans what Homonoia had meant to Greeks before Isocrates—cessation of quarrelling between the orders in Rome itself, the best remedy being a foreign foe—still they had managed to connect the establishment of *Concordia* with kingship, with the mythical kings of legend, Romulus⁶⁰ and Numa.⁶¹ To both nations, therefore, Augustus was the man who should do what he did begin to do. He was the Saviour and Benefactor and father of mankind, to the Greek cities of the Diet of Asia⁶² no less than to Roman poets; the Saecular games, with their mixture of Latin tradition and Greek form, are the end of the bad old times and the beginning of a new era; and to Vergil in the *Aeneid* (vi. 791-4) Augustus will bring to pass the age of gold, an age which could no longer be confined to one people, but must definitely be an age of reconciliation and unity. A new age did in fact begin, an age of progressive unity between the various peoples of the Mediterranean world. How far this may really have been due to Augustus and how far to the actions of many obscure men and women I need not inquire; I am talking

primarily about theory. But the theory was, I think, expressed in that temple to the Imperial Concord⁶³—*Concordia Augusta*—which Tiberius vowed as a private man and dedicated when Emperor. *Concordia Augusta* is a common phrase on the Imperial coinage; it may occasionally have a political meaning⁶⁴—something perhaps like the *Concord of the Provinces* on Galba's coinage⁶⁵—but usually it merely refers to the domestic felicity of the Emperor, precisely as one of the earliest uses of Homonoia in Greek had been to express family affection.⁶⁶ But I do not think that Tiberius took 17 years over a temple to celebrate the fact that Augustus lived happily with his wife. What it means can, I think, be seen from the two figures which flanked the entrance, Mercury and Hercules.⁶⁷ Mercury certainly stood for trade.⁶⁸ Under the Empire the Greek cities of Asia struck innumerable coins to emphasize the Homonoia between themselves and other cities, and it has been shown that this refers to trade relations;⁶⁹ it was widely believed that inter-city trade promoted unity and goodwill.⁷⁰ But I have not myself seen Hercules explained. He can hardly be anything but the Heracles of Hellenistic philosophy, the ideal ruler and benefactor of mankind—no longer of Greeks alone, as before Alexander, but of all men. The temple of the Imperial Concord was to enshrine the spirit of a new age, an age of goodwill and unity.

I need not go through the Roman Empire, or relate how the Roman franchise was steadily extended till early in the third century every fully free provincial of whatever race was made a Roman citizen, or how this raised the juridical standing of the provinces till finally Diocletian abolished Italy's privileged position and the whole Empire stood on an equal footing. All I want to notice is that there were men who fully realized what the Empire had done; and perhaps I may quote from Claudian's great eulogy⁷¹ of the Rome of the Emperors, the swan-song of the Western Empire when the Goth was already at the gates. It is this Rome, he says, who has cared for the human race and given

it a common name; who has taken the conquered to her bosom like a mother, and called them not subjects but citizens; who has united distant races in the bonds of affection.) To the peace which she has brought to us we owe it, every one of us, that every part of the Empire is to us as a fatherland; that it matters nothing if we drink of the Rhone or of the Orontes; that we are all one people. That is the last verdict on the Rome of the Emperors, the proudest boast perhaps that any man in any empire ever made: we are all one people. My theme has been that it was the business of monarchs to promote Homonoia, unity and concord, among all their subjects; whatever the faults of individual rulers, it would seem that monarchy, taken as a whole, *had* tried to promote it. Is it a coincidence that we began with Alexander wishing to make of his Empire one people, and end with Claudian saying that it had come tnsé?

The belief that it was the business of kings to promote Homonoia among their subjects without distinction of race thus travelled down the line of kingship for centuries; but the line, you will remember, had no beginning, for nobody will suppose that it began with writers so obscure as Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantus. It must clearly have been connected with some particular king at the start, and that king has to be later than Isocrates and Philip and earlier than Diotogenes and Demetrius. It would seem that only one king is possible; we should have to postulate Alexander at the beginning of the line, even if there were not a definite tradition that it *was* he. This means that Plutarch's statement, that Alexander's purpose was to bring about Homonoia between men generally—that is, those men whom his arm could reach—must be taken to be true, unless some explicit reason be found for disbelieving it; and I therefore now turn to the Stoics, in order to test the view that the ideas attributed to him were really taken from Stoicism.

If we ask what was the Stoic view of the universe, the answer comes easily enough in Cicero's words: One

common city of gods and men.⁷² But unfortunately, though that was true for Cicero's own day, it was not true for the early Stoa. The world-state drawn by Zeno in his famous *Republic* was not one common city of gods and men; it was a city of gods and *some* men, a very different thing. Zeno took his material from many sources—Heraclitus, the Cynics, Babylon, Sparta, old stories of the golden age; and one of his main sources was Aristotle. For he divided men into *crrou5atot* and *90COA0l*, the worthy and the unworthy, precisely as Aristotle had done throughout his *Politics*, but he sharpened Aristotle's antithesis; the worthy, he said, possessed all the virtues and no vices, the unworthy possessed all the vices and no virtues,⁷³ and only the worthy were citizens of his world-city.⁷⁴ As men with all the virtues and no vices were probably not a numerous class, what we get is a State remarkably like Aristotle's, an aristocratic affair with a small class of citizens and a large class of non-citizens; putting aside for the moment Zeno's universalism, the chief difference is that in Aristotle the citizens govern and exploit the non-citizens, in Zeno they don't. Of course in some respects Zeno had gone far past Aristotle; distinctions of earthly rank, and of race, had vanished; there was neither Greek nor barbarian. But he was still, as regards the division of mankind into two sorts, in bondage to Aristotle and to that to which Aristotle before him had been in bondage, the constitution of Sparta, where a little band of citizens was supported by a very cruel form of serfdom. The attraction of Sparta for Greek philosophers is one of our sharpest reminders that even those philosophers were part of a civilization which had slavery in its blood and could hardly imagine anything else.

Lest I give a false impression of a very noble man, let me say that in private life Zeno knew nothing of all this; he welcomed the poor and the squalid,⁷⁵ and came very near to loving his enemy.⁷⁶ The strength of the philosophy he created lay in its ethics; but I am only speaking of his political theories, and it is no good glossing over their

weaknesses. Certainly it was a tremendous step forward to have abolished the difference between Greek and barbarian; but he had only substituted one line of cleavage between man and man for another. His State did not express the unity of mankind, for Homonoia was not for the unworthy; they are described as quite incapable of being of one mind with their fellows,⁷⁷ and Zeno's successor, Cleanthes, said that they only differed from animals in bodily shape;⁷⁸ and as Aristotle had told Alexander to treat barbarians as animals, all we really get is the substitution of the unworthy for the barbarian as the man who is outside the pale. Enough remains of Chrysippus to suggest that he too, like Zeno, excluded the unworthy from citizenship;⁷⁹ it was apparently to be left to the Middle Stoa, to Panaetius and Poseidonius, to stress the essential oneness of mankind⁸⁰ and make the world-state in truth a city of all men. Consequently, when Plutarch attributes to Alexander the idea of an Homonoia of all men, it is certain that, wherever that idea came from, it did not come from the third-century Stoics.

But there is a far more important matter than that. Whatever the Stoic world-state did or did not include, one thing about it, from Zeno to Epictetus, was certain: it was, and always had been, a unity, a harmony, by the decree of the Divine Power; for the universe was the expression of Himself, and He Himself *was* Homonoia.⁸¹ Stoics had several names for this unity—Homonoia,⁸² harmony,⁸³ sympathy;⁸⁴ but whichever term they used, the world-state, which was co-terminous with the universe, was in harmony together and had been so from the start. Whether it were bound together by something not of its own substance, as by Love in Zeno's conception,⁸⁵ or whether it was an organic whole through which pulsed the life-force emanating from the Deity, as it was to Poseidonius, the harmony, the Homonoia, *was* there; 'It is thou,' says Cleanthes in his great hymn to the Divine Power, 'it is thou that hast made this harmony'.⁸⁶ And what God had once made it was not for men to make over again. We have seen that it was the

business of kings to bring about Homonoia; but this was not the business of a Stoic, because to him Homonoia had already been brought about by the Deity, and it existed in all completeness; all that was necessary was that men should see it. There were plenty of men who did not see it—men who set up little earthly states,⁸⁷ men who did bad actions;⁸⁸ but the business of the earnest Stoic was not to tackle the consequences of bad actions, to smooth away discord or promote unity; his business was to educate the individual man⁸⁹ and teach him to think aright. For if you could get all men to think aright, all other things would be added unto you; discord and wrong, national states and slavery—these things would automatically vanish and there would remain only the unity and concord of mankind, which had really been there all the time, though men could not see it. That is one reason why Stoics never advocated mundane reforms, like the abolition of slavery;⁹⁰ that is why Stoic literature, so far as I know, never says anything anywhere about it being any one's business to promote unity and concord; they could not say such a thing, for it would be a denial of one of their first postulates, that the unity and concord of the universe already existed by divine decree. And that may be one reason why the two Stoics who sat on thrones did nothing to promote unity; Antigonus Gonatas was solely concerned with the good of his own kingdom of Macedonia, and Marcus Aurelius left to another that final extension of the Roman franchise which one might have expected him to have carried out himself.

This is the point I want to make, the irreconcilable opposition between Stoicism and the theory of kingship, between the belief that unity and concord existed and you must try and get men to see it, and the belief that unity and concord did not exist and that it was the business of the rulers of the earth to try and bring them to pass. One sees something of this opposition, translated into fact, in the early Roman Empire; while that empire was actually, with whatever faults, bringing about a considerable measure of

unity between the various peoples it comprised, many earnest Stoics, like Thræsea Paetus, fought against it as being merely a despotism.⁹¹ Consequently, when Eratosthenes says that Alexander aspired to be the harmonizer and reconciler of the world, and when Plutarch attributes to him the intention of bringing about fellowship and Homonoia between men generally—those men whom his arm reached—then, wherever these ideas came from, they were not Stoic; between them and Stoicism there was a gulf which nothing could bridge. This does not by itself prove that Alexander held these ideas; what it does do is to put out of court the only alternative which has ever been seriously proposed, and to leave the matter where I left it when considering the theory of kingship, that is, that there is a strong presumption that Alexander *was* their author.

I suppose, however, that I ought to consider whether these ideas of Alexander's, though they cannot be a projection backwards of Stoic thought, might not be a projection backwards from the Roman Empire. They cannot, of course, be from the time of Hadrian and the Antonines, as Plutarch is too early; that means that they could only represent a reading backwards from Augustus. Nobody has suggested this, and it would not be a very hopeful suggestion; for though Augustus made a beginning, he did not himself travel very far along the path Alexander is supposed to have indicated; while if the phrase 'reconciler of the world' applied to Alexander be really from Eratosthenes, two centuries before Augustus, the suggestion becomes impossible. And I am not sure that Augustus does not negative the suggestion himself. When he became *princeps* he put Alexander's head on his signet ring.⁹² This was certainly not Alexander the conqueror of Persia; for Augustus himself had from the start renounced all ideas of conquest in Asia. Was it merely the tribute of one great man to another?⁹³ Or was it perhaps Alexander, reconciler of the world? This may be left to one's imagination. But what does also negative the suggestion is that, if one adopted it, the theory

I traced of a king's duty to promote Homonoia would have no beginning, or rather would begin with Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantus; and that is really not worth considering.

Before leaving Stoicism, I must return for a moment to Zeno's distinction of the worthy and the unworthy; for Alexander, as we saw, is said to have divided men into good and bad, and to have excluded the bad from the general kinship of mankind and called them the true barbarians. Might not *this* distinction, at any rate, have been taken from Stoicism and attributed to him? The reasons against this seem conclusive, apart from the difficulty of discarding a statement made by so sound and scientific a critic as Eratosthenes. First, no Stoic ever equated the unworthy class with barbarians; for to him there were no barbarians. Secondly, while the unworthy in Zeno, as in Aristotle, are the majority of mankind, Alexander's 'bad men'⁵ are not; they are, as Eratosthenes says, merely that small residue everywhere which cannot be civilized.⁹⁴ One sees this clearly in a story never questioned, his prayer at Opis, when he prayed that the Macedonian and Persian races (without exceptions made) might be united in Homonoia. And thirdly, we know where the idea comes from: Aristotle had criticized some who said that good men were really free and bad men were really slaves⁹⁵ (whom he himself equated with barbarians),⁹⁶ and Alexander is in turn criticizing Aristotle; as indeed Eratosthenes says, though he does not quote this passage of Aristotle. The matter is not important, except for the general question of the credibility of Eratosthenes, and may conceivably only represent that period in Alexander's thought when he was outgrowing Aristotle; it does not conflict, as does Zeno's conception of the unworthy, with a general belief in the unity of mankind.

I can now turn to the third and last question which I had to consider: can one get any light on the matter from the period between Alexander and Zeno? Alexander died in 323 B.C., and Zeno opened his school at Athens in 301; but his progress at first was very slow, and possibly he only became

a real force when his pupil and friend Antigonus Gonatas became king of Macedonia in 277. If the current interpretation of a broken Herculean papyrus be correct,⁹⁷ there were already Stoics in existence when he published his *Republic*; and in any case it can hardly have been published for some years after 301.⁹⁸ There are two men especially to consider between Alexander and Zeno—Theophrastus and Alexarchus. Theophrastus was Aristotle's pupil and succeeded him as head of the Peripatetic school in 322, a year after Alexander's death, and died in 288. He did therefore, in his old age, overlap Zeno; but Theophrastus, who once for ten years had been the intellectual power behind the government in Athens,⁹⁹ was not likely to start borrowing from the strange little-known new-comer from a Phoenician town.¹⁰⁰ Now we have seen the rigidly narrow view which Aristotle took of Greeks and barbarians; Theophrastus, on the contrary, comes out bluntly with the statement that all men were of one family and were kin to one another.¹⁰¹ It is not very likely that he thought of this for himself. He was a very learned man; his mind and his note-books were crammed with vast collections of facts on many subjects, and he belonged to a school whose method was to collect facts and draw deductions from them; I doubt if that be the type of mind, psychologically, to initiate a revolution in thought at once simple and vast. The common sense of the matter is that between Aristotle and himself something had happened; and, as regards material things, his extant works regularly reflect the results of Alexander's expedition. Stoic thought his statement most certainly is not; for he traces a chain of progress, from affection for one's family to affection for one's fellow citizens, thence to affection for one's own race, and thence to affection for all men—'love' might be a better translation;—and this chain of progress is unknown to Stoicism, though it does happen to be the course taken in history by the Homonoia concept, which began as family unity,¹⁰² and was extended in succession to the Greek city, the Greek race (by Isocrates), and

finally—the question we are considering—to all men. And Theophrastus calls mankind children of Ouranos and Ge,¹⁰³ Heaven and Earth, which is totally foreign to Stoicism; it is commonplace Greek mythology—with a difference; for in the mythology only certain ruling families descend from the gods, but to Theophrastus it is all mankind. His account of the progress of affection from the particular to the general was taken up later by Antiochus of Ascalon,¹⁰⁴ the first eclectic, and Cicero made it current coin;¹⁰⁵ Stoic it never was. I find it difficult to believe myself that Theophrastus' chain of progress was not taken by him from the actual development in history of the Homonoia concept, and that behind the amazing statement that all men are kin and objects of love there do not lie the ideas we have seen attributed to Alexander:¹⁰⁶ his intention to promote Homonoia among mankind, and to treat all good men as his kin (he did in fact introduce some Persians into the old Macedonian Kin),¹⁰⁷ and above all his statement that God is the common father of all men, which means that they were brothers. I shall come to that presently.

Before returning to Theophrastus I must notice Alexarchus,¹⁰⁸ who is also earlier than Zeno. Alexarchus was a brother of Cassander, who ruled Macedonia from 316 B.C. to his death in 298. Cassander did much for some of his brothers; but Alexarchus, though he had an idea, seems to have been a simple and harmless creature—he was apparently a philologist¹⁰⁹—and Cassander gave him a bit of ground on the neck of the Athos peninsula, where he could play at being king. There he built and settled a large city called Ouranopolis,¹¹⁰ the city of Heaven, and struck a very strange coinage;¹¹¹ on it his people are called, not *Ouranopolitai*, citizens of Ouranopolis, but *Ouranidai*, children of Heaven; and there is a similar phrase in Athenaeus, who does not say that he founded Ouranopolis but that he founded 'the so-called city of Heaven'.¹¹² This shows what Alexarchus was doing; he had set up a little world-state in miniature, years before Zeno's *Republic*.¹¹³ His coins figure the sun, moon,

and stars, primarily as being the natural and universal gods¹¹⁴—they were gods even to the rationalist Euhemerus,¹¹⁵ his contemporary; but doubtless they also symbolized himself, his consort, and the citizens of his city; for the stars also were children of heaven, while he himself called himself the sun,¹¹⁶ which means a world-ruler. His coins also regularly figure as a type the daughter of Ouranos, Plato's great Aphrodite Ourania,¹¹⁷ symbolizing the love which pervaded the universe; it was possibly from him that Zeno took his idea of Love binding the universe together, an idea which Stoicism soon discarded. Now a world-state, like an ideal state, ought to have a language of its own, like the world before the Tower of Babel—Plutarch gives an instance of one which had;¹¹⁸ besides, speaking with 'tongues'—strange words—gave to Greeks a suggestion of divine inspiration.¹¹⁹ So the philologist made a language for his miniature universe. But he probably knew no more of foreign languages than any other Macedonian ever did, except Cleopatra; so he made it as children make private languages of their own, by calling everything something else. There is a letter of his to the magistrates of Cassandreia, written in this extraordinary speech;¹²⁰ no one has ever read it. But the preamble is plain enough: instead of the usual formula, 'Alexarchus to the magistrates of the Cassandreans, greeting,' it runs 'Alexarchus to some chief men of the Brethren'.¹²¹ There was nothing to make the mixed population of Cassandreia brethren of the mixed settlers in Ouranopolis;¹²² and as Alexarchus was head of a world-state in miniature, I see nothing for it but a belief on his part that, in his dream-world, all men were members of his world-state and all men were brothers. But no one is likely to suppose that history jumps straight from Isocrates to Alexarchus and that that simple man thought of this for himself; it is probably as near a proof as one gets in this sort of subject that Alexander really had thought of a unity of the peoples and of men as brothers, and that this was Alexarchus' inspiration.

What made Alexarchus call himself the Sun? It was the first time in the Greek world that human kingship was connected with the Sun; it implied that the Sun was the leader of the universe and the king a world-ruler. The second time was when the Athenians addressed Demetrius the Besieger as the sun among the stars,¹²³ and when he wore a mantle which portrayed the host of heaven¹²⁴ and was depicted as seated on the globe; and it is worth noticing that Demetrius' policy in Greece in the early part of his life was based on a belief in *Homonoia*, a union of hearts. Later, the connexion of the king with the sun became common enough, partly through the connexion of the sun with the golden age or with ideal states like that of Iambulus,¹²⁵ and partly through the allied concepts of the king as the living law of his subjects and the sun as the guardian of righteousness;¹²⁶ the king in fact became the image of God upon earth as the sun was in heaven.¹²⁷ I need not consider these later phenomena here, but one must see how the Stoics stood in regard to the sun. To Zeno and Chrysippus it was only a physical body. Cleanthes toyed with the idea of the sun as the embodiment of the divine ruler of the universe¹²⁸; but he was hardly in earnest, for when the astronomer Aristarchus of Samos produced his heliocentric theory and did make the sun the centre of the physical universe, Cleanthes, instead of welcoming him as an ally, attacked him for impiety.¹²⁹ In fact the sun played no real part in Stoicism till Poseidonius and his theory of the sun as demiurge.¹³⁰ I can only suggest meanwhile that Alexarchus took his idea from the obvious source, something he had heard about Persia; though he might also have been influenced by Plato (*Rep.* 509 B, D) calling the sun king of the visible world.

As to the star-citizens, in Stoic theory the stars had already been citizens of the world-state before men existed,¹³¹ and Zeno's star-citizens are supposed to have some connexion with Babylonian astrology, of which something was already known in Greece by Plato's time;¹³² possibly Alexarchus too had heard of it. But his conception of Ouranos, Heaven, as

the supreme god of the world-state and the father of mankind is interesting, for we have already seen this idea in Theophrastus, whose connexions in real life were also with Cassander's circle; and we shall meet Ouranos again in the Utopia written by another member of that circle, Euhemerus. Theophrastus and Euhemerus seem to suggest that this use of Ouranos was primarily taken from Greek mythology; Plato's *Timaeus* may have helped.¹³³ But it is interesting to find, in Cassander's circle, a whole group of ideas connected with Ouranos which are pre-Stoic;¹³⁴ Ouranos had the great advantage of not being a cult-god in Greece and having no worship, so one could make of him what one would.

I must just notice the connexion of Euhemerus¹³⁵ with Alexarchus. Euhemerus wrote a Utopia, but is best known for his rationalizing theory that all the Greek gods were deified men; he was a friend of Cassander, and his book is earlier than Megasthenes, say before 290. The interest of his Utopia for my purpose is that he made of Ouranos the first ruler to unite the whole human race, while Aphrodite created the stars (fr. 7); the connexion with Alexarchus' world-city of Ouranos and the Aphrodite Ourania of his coins is obvious, though Alexarchus probably came first. Another connexion is that Euhemerus, though he represented the Greek gods as only dead men, did nevertheless have real gods in his Utopia, the universal deities sun, moon, and stars;¹³⁶ and these are the gods of Alexarchus' coinage.

There was then, in Cassander's circle, a whole group of related ideas which can be definitely dated to the period between Alexander and Zeno. Theophrastus believes that all men are kin and are sons of Ouranos, Alexarchus believes that all men are brothers and are sons of Ouranos; Alexarchus has the idea of a universal state which he calls the city of Ouranos, while Euhemerus makes Ouranos the first king to unite the whole human race in a world-state; in Alexarchus' world-state love plays some conspicuous

part, and in Theophrastus natural affection is extended to embrace the human race.¹³⁷ It would seem that there must be some common source behind this group, and as that source has to be something later, in the sphere of thought, than Aristotle, it can only be Alexander. Where Alexarchus got his idea of love from I cannot say;¹³⁸ the tradition gives no help here. But the source of the universal state, to Alexarchus and Euhemerus, must be Alexander's alleged intention to promote fellowship and unity among mankind and make them one people; and the source of the brotherhood or kinship of all men, to Theophrastus and Alexarchus, must be the saying which Plutarch attributes to Alexander and which I deferred considering, that God is the common father of all men, that is, that all men are brothers. (The fact that those who came after him made of 'God' a particular god, Ouranos, means no more than does the fact that Stoics called men 'sons of God' and 'sons of Zeus' indiscriminately.) But as Stoics began quite early, with Cleanthes¹³⁹ and Aratus of Soli,¹⁴⁰ to call men sons of the Deity, may we not, in this case at least, have a Stoic concept attributed to Alexander? Well, I mentioned that I was quoting his saying without its context, and I will now give the whole, as Plutarch makes him say it: 'God is the common father of all men, but He makes the best ones peculiarly his own'.¹⁴¹ That is certainly not Stoic, or anything else; I can find no parallel to it anywhere; it seems unique. But it can be explained from Alexander's own life; what he had in mind was presumably his own adoption by Ammon, for his whole career illustrates his conviction that Ammon had made him 'peculiarly his own'.¹⁴² Therefore both the nature of the saying itself, and the fact that it is needed as a common source for Theophrastus and Alexarchus, are evidence of its truth; and it is a plain statement that all men are brothers.¹⁴³

There is just one question still to be asked; whence did Zeno get his universalism? Plutarch says that behind Zeno's dream lay Alexander's reality,¹⁴⁴ and no one doubts

that Alexander was Zeno's inspiration, but the question is, in what form? Most writers have taken Plutarch to mean Alexander's *empire*;¹⁴⁵ but to me this explains nothing at all. One man conquers a large number of races and brings them under one despotic rule; how can another man deduce from this that distinctions of race are immaterial and that the universe is a harmony in which men are brothers? It would be like the fight between the polar bear and the parallel-epiped. The Persian kings had conquered and ruled as large an empire as Alexander, including many Greek cities; why did Darius never inspire any one with similar theories? It does seem to me that what Plutarch really means is not Alexander's empire but Alexander's ideas;¹⁴⁶ after all, the frequent references in antiquity to Alexander as a philosopher, one at least of which is contemporary, must mean *something*.¹⁴⁷ Zeno's inspiration, then, was Alexander's idea of the unity of mankind; and what Zeno himself did was to carry this idea to one of its two logical conclusions. Judging by his prayer at Opis for the Homonoia of Macedonians and Persians, Alexander, had he lived, would have worked through national groups, as was inevitable in an empire like his, which comprised many different states and subject peoples; Theophrastus, who followed him, included national groups in his chain of progress towards world-relationship. But Zeno abolished all distinctions of race, all the apparatus of national groups and particular states, and made his world-state a theoretic whole. His scheme was an inspiration to many; but in historical fact it was, and remained, unrealizable. But Alexander's way, or what I think was his way, led to the Roman Empire being called one people. I am not going to bring in modern examples of these two different lines of approach to world-unity, but I want to say one thing about the Roman Empire. It has been said that Stoic ideas came near to realization in the empire of Hadrian and the Antonines,¹⁴⁸ but it is quite clear, the moment it be considered, that this was not the case; that empire was a huge national state, which stood in the line of kingship and

was a partial realization of the ideas of Alexander.¹⁴⁹ When a Stoic *did* sit on the imperial throne, he was at once compelled to make terms with the national state; to Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic world-state was no theoretic unity, but was to comprise the various particular states as a city comprises houses.¹⁵⁰ And there is still a living reality in what he said about himself: 'As a man I am a citizen of the world-state, but as the particular man Marcus Aurelius I am a citizen of Rome.'¹⁵¹

I may now sum up. We have followed down the line of kingship the theory that it was the business of a king to promote Homonoia among his subjects—all his subjects without distinction of race; and we have seen that this theory ought to be connected at the start with some king, who must be later than Philip and earlier than Demetrius; and there is a definite tradition which connects the origin of the theory with Alexander. We have further seen that the intention to promote Homonoia among mankind, attributed in the tradition to Alexander, is certainly not a projection backwards from Stoicism, or apparently from anything else, while it is needed to explain certain things said by Theophrastus and done by Alexarchus. Lastly, we have seen the idea of the kinship or brotherhood of mankind appearing suddenly in Theophrastus and Alexarchus; their common source can be no one but Alexander, and again tradition supports this. Only one conclusion from all this seems possible: the things which, in the tradition, Alexander is supposed to have thought and said are, in substance, true. He did say that all men were sons of God, that is brothers, but that God made the best ones peculiarly his own; he did aspire to be the harmonizer and reconciler of the world—that part of the world which his arm reached; he did have the intention of uniting the peoples of his empire in fellowship and concord and making them of one mind together; and when, as a beginning, he prayed at Opis for partnership in rule and Homonoia between Macedonians and Persians, he meant what he said—not partnership in rule

only, but true unity between them. I am only talking of theory, not of actions; but what this means is that he was the pioneer of one of the supreme revolutions in the world's outlook, the first man known to us who contemplated the brotherhood of man or the unity of mankind, whichever phrase we like to use. I do not claim to have given you exact proof of this; it is one of those difficult borderlands of history where one does not get proofs which could be put to a jury. But there is a very strong presumption indeed that it is true. Alexander, for the things he *did*, was called The Great; but if what I have said to-day be right, I do not think we shall doubt that this idea of his—call it a purpose, call it a dream, call it what you will—was the greatest thing about him.

NOTES

[I desire to express my thanks to the British Academy for permission to add these notes.]

i. I gave a brief indication in *CAM.* vi, p. 437, of what is here further considered. I do not know of any professed study of the subject.

2. This appears also to be the position of U. Wilcken, *Alexander der Grosse*, 1931, p. 207, as regards what I said in *C.A.H.* vi.

3. J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, V (1927), p. 501; J. Juthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, 1923, p. 49 (if I understand him aright); Max Muhl, *Die antike Menschheitsidee in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 1928, p. 44 (an excellent work).

4. Thus it can mean, politically, an entente, something less than *cnwccxf*: Alexis fr. 244 Kock (ii, p. 386), Ditt.³ 434-5, l. 32; and even a *KOVI* of villages, Sir W. M. Ramsay, *J.M.S.* iv, pp. 386-8. On the worship of Homonoia as a goddess see H. Kramer, *Quid valeat ὁμόνοια in litteris Graecis*, Diss. Gott. 1915, p. 50; Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation*², p. 84.

5. I am deliberately omitting all social questions.

6. A good deal has been made of this by Muhl, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-12; it would imply that what happened after Aristotle was a kind of revival. I see little evidence for this. Empedocles and some Pythagoreans doubtless held that there was a bond of communion (*κοινωνία*) between gods, men, and animals, in that all exist by breathing in air (Sext.

Empir. *adv. Math.* ix. 127); but that takes us no further than the sophist Antiphon (*P. Oxy.* 1364, 11. 275-99) when he says that nature has made no real distinction between Greek and barbarian, since both breathe with their noses; to say that all men belong physically to the species *Homo sapiens* is not to say that they are brothers. The Pythagoreans were thinking primarily of their own society, as is shown by their saying (*Vit. Pyth.* 237) that all wise men are friends, however far apart they may dwell; and the **φιλία** which, according to οἱ σοφοί in Plato, *Gorgias* 508 A, binds the universe together is not the later **φιλία** but only the **φιλότης** of Empedocles, one of the two principles, conservation and dissolution, which together keep the world balanced. The oft-quoted remark of the sophist Hippias (Plato, *Protagoras*, 337 c) that 'we are all kin and fellow-citizens' means only, as the context shows, the little company of Athenian citizens gathered round the table, to whom it was addressed; this was correctly given by J. Mewaldt, *Das Weltburgertum in der Antike* (*Die Antike*, ii. 1926, p. 177), who, however, then went on to suggest that Hippias meant all men! Euripides' famous saying, fr. 1047:

ἄπας μὲν ἀήρ ἀλέτω πέρασιμος,
ἅπανσα δὲ χθῶν ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ πατρίς

is conditioned by the first line; it does not assert the unity of mankind, but only that a noble man can range the world as an eagle the air; doubtless he knew that an eagle has a permanent home-rock. This is how it was understood by the author of Democritus, fr. 247, Diels (whether this fragment be genuine or not), who was quoting it in substance: ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρίς ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος. The one thing really material in the pre-Platonic period relates to law. Heraclitus' extraordinary saying (fr. 114 Diels — 91 Bywater) τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ may have influenced Zeno; and Hippias seemingly had the idea of an unwritten divine law which was universally valid in any country (*Xen. Memor.* iv. 4, 19; see Miihl, pp. 9-10). Miihl admits (p. 11) that any idea of a common humanity in this period was not a factor in history.

7. Plato, *Rep.* v. 470C-471 A. Aristotle agreed; *Pol.* i. 8, 1256 b, I.25.

8. Aristot. *Pol.* i. 2, 1252 b, 1. 9, ὡς ταῦτό φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ λουλον ὄν; iii. 14, 1285 a, 1. 20 (Asia); fr. 658 Rose (Plut. *Mor.* 329 B), τοῖς βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενος . . . ὡς ζῴοις ἢ φυτοῖς.

9. *Pol.* vii. 10, 1330 a, 1. 25 sqq. On this non-Hellenic basis see W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, i, p. 125.

10. As the Pedieis at Priene, the Gergithes at Miletus, the Mariandyni at Heraclea, the Phrygians at Zeleia. References collected by Swoboda, κώμη in *P.W. Supp.* Band IV, col. 962.

11. Among the fragments of the early Stoics it occurs only in two passages from Philo (von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, iii, frs. 336, 337), which does not show that Chrysippus used the actual word; in iii, fr. 323 his word is **μεγαλόπολις**. Stephanus gives no other instance of the use of the word before Philo.

12. Diogenes called himself **κοσμοπολίτης** in answer to the question **πόθεν εἶη** (Diog. Laert. vi. 63); that is, the meaning was negative. It must also be interpreted by what he said of himself (ib. 38), that he was **ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατριδος ἑστερημένος**. The negative aspect of Cynicism has been emphasized by Kaerst, *Gesch. des Hellenismus*, ii², 1926, p. 88, and Helm, 'Kynismus' in *P. W.* When Wilcken (op. cit., pp. 10-11) says that Antisthenes held the ideal 'einer umfassenden Gemeinschaft aller Menschen', I fear I cannot agree; certainly he wrote a **περί πολιτείας**, but we do not know that it was more than a treatise on his thesis (Diog. Laert. vi. 11) **τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς**. Muhl, op. cit., pp. 19-21, writes very justly on the subject.

13. Isocrates does say of him (*Panegy.* 56) **ἄπαντας ἀνθρώπους εὐεργέτησεν**; but a comparison with *Philippus*, 114, **τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν . . . ἦν εἶχεν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας**, shows that 'all men' means 'all Greeks'. The same thing is shown in two passages from Lysias, cited by E. Skard, *Zwei religios-politische Begriffe: Euergetes-Concordia*, 1932, p. 43, one of which speaks of 'Greeks', the other of 'all men'. This use is not uncommon; a good instance is Diod. xiii. 26, 3, Athens has made the law of suppliants respected **παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις**, i.e. throughout the Greek world. In the long list of the actions of Heracles collected by Gruppe ('Herakles' in *P. W. Supp.* Band III) there are only two definite cases of his benefiting barbarians, both on evidence much later than Alexander: he made a break-through for the Orontes to the sea, and he cleared Libya of wild beasts (which might benefit Cyrene). After Alexander the matter is of course plain enough; e.g. Diod. i. 2, 4 (Heracles) **τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργετήσας**. But evidently Heracles acquired hardly any new *acta*.

14. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4, 16 **ὁμόνοιά γε μένιστον ἀναθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι**. See further on the classical period, Kramer, op. cit., p. 18 and *passim*.

15. See the long *negative* list in Isocrates, *Panath.* 259.

16. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*,² 1930, p. 84.

17. Kramer, op. cit., pp. 38 sqq.

18. *Panegy.* 184, *Panath.* 163.

19. *Panegy.* 3.

20. *Phil.* 114, 116; Skard, op. cit., pp. 56-7; Wilcken, op. cit., pp. 30-3; Kaerst, op. cit., I³, pp. 42-9. Whatever view Greeks took of Macedonians, Philip ranked in their eyes as a Greek, for his forbears

had long been admitted to the Olympic games. What that means is shown by no Roman being admitted, so far as is known, till the time of Augustus (Juthner, *op. cit.*, p. 69).

21. Isocrates calls upon Philip to show φιλοθρωπία like Heracles (*Phil.* 114). On the development of φιλοθρωπία generally see S. Lorenz, *De progressu notionis φιλοθρωπίας*, Diss. Leipzig. 1914, pp. 14-35 (with the necessary correction made by Mühl, *op. cit.*, p. 120, n. 55, that the Cynics before Alexander knew nothing of any general love of humanity), and S. Tromp de Ruiter, *Mnemosyne*, lix, 1931, p. 271. On φιλοθρωπία as the characteristic virtue of a Hellenistic king see Kaerst, *op. cit.* ii², p. 321 and references, and cf. F. Schroeter, *De regum hellenisticorum epistulis in lapidibus servatis quaestiones stilisticae*, 1932, pp. 26, n. 1, and 45.

22. Isocrates, *Nicoles*, 41, lays down the principle: χρή τοὺς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας . . . τὰς πόλεις ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ πειρᾶσθαι διαίγειν.

23. ΑΓΓ. VII. ii. 9: εὐχέτο . . . ὁμόνοιαν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς Μακεδόσι καὶ Πέρσας.

24. Strabo, i. 66.

25. E. Schwarz, *Rhein. Mus.* xl, 1885, pp. 252-4, on Plutarch *de fortuna Alexandri*, i. 6; followed by Susemihl, *Gesch. d. griech. Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, i, p. 411, n. 13 and by Kaerst, *op. cit.* ii², p. 124, n. 1. Schwarz decided, on a comparison with Strabo, i. 66, that the whole of section 6 represented Eratosthenes. I entirely agree as to the part about Alexander, from the words οὐ γὰρ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ to the end; but what comes before that—Zeno's *Republic* and its relation to Alexander—is quite outside the Strabo passage and is I think Plutarch himself. And I do not follow Schwarz about the Cynics.

26. Κοινὸς ἦκειν θεοῦν ἀρμοστής καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὄλων νομίζων. 'Ἀρμοστής here is not harmost, governor, but has its sense directly from ἀρμόζειν—'orderer', 'harmonizer'. It is equivalent to 'one who brings about ὁμόνοια'; for in Stoic literature both words are used for the disposition of the universe, and for ordinary speech see Plutarch, *Mor.* 144 A, where ἀρμόζεσθαι is specifically used for 'to bring about ὁμόνοια'.

27. I have not met with an explanation of the loving-cup, κρατήρ φιλοτήσιας (see Athen. xi. 106); but on the analogy of drinking healths (Tarn, *JHS.* xlvi, 1928, p. 211; cf. G. Macurdy, *A. J. Phil.* liii, 1932, p. 168), there can be little doubt what it was. When A drank B's health, he poured in a ladle of wine, saying 'of B' and drank it; but if he toasted B in a loving-cup, he poured in two ladles, saying 'of A' and 'of B', and mixed them before drinking. Alexander would metaphorically pour in and mix many ladles for the different peoples.

28. I omit the phrase (329 C) πατρίδα μὲν τὴν οἰκουμένην προσέταξεν ἡγεῖσθαι πάντας, as it seems to be either Alexander or Eratosthenes

quoting Euripides, fr. 1047. Nothing turns on *οικουμένην*, as the word is Aristotelian (*Pol.* vii. 7, 1327 b, l. 22).

29. *De fort. Alex.* i. 8 (300 E) *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δμόνοιον καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρασκευάσαι διανοηθέντα*, together with 330 D, *ἐνὸς ὑπήκοα λόγου τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ μᾶς πολιτείας, ἕνα δῆμον ἀνθρώπων ἀπαντας ἀποφῆναι βουλόμενος*.

30. *Life of Alexander*, 27: *ὡς πάντων μὲν ὄντα κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων πατέρα τὸν θεόν*.

31. The fuller treatment of this subject here is intended to supplement and reinforce what I said about it in 'Alexander Helios and the Golden Age', *J.R.S.* xxii, 1932, p. 135.

32. These fragments, preserved by Stobaeus, iv. 7, 61-6, have been discussed by E. R. Goodenough, *The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship*, Yale Class. Studies, i, 1928, p. 55, a study to which I am much indebted.

33. Apart from the doctrine of these writers, which points to the early third century, there seems definite evidence for the date of Diotogenes in Stob. iv. 7, 62 (iv, p. 268 H). The king must not, in overweening pride, hold aloof from the troubles of other men and rank himself near to the gods; this is Demetrius the Besieger, who was notorious for his inaccessibility to his subjects (*τὸ λυσόμενον καὶ λυσιπρόσ-οδον*, Plut. *Dem.* 42), his pride (*ib.*), and acting the god (on the whole matter see Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, pp. 90-1; K. Scott, *A. J. Phil.* xlix, 1928, p. 226). But (the fragment continues) his appearance, walk, and carriage, and also his *ἦθος*, must strike beholders with awe and wonder; this again is Demetrius (on his appearance and *ἦθος* see Plut. *Dem.* 2), whom strangers followed merely to gaze upon (Diod. xx. 92, 3). The parallels in phrasing are numerous; besides *ἦθος*, cf. Diotogenes *κατακοσμηθῆμεν καταπειλαγμένως* with Diodorus *κεκοσμημένην* and Plutarch *ἐκπληξιν*, and the summary of the whole effect as *εὐπρέπειαν* in Diodorus and *ἐπιπρέπτην* in Diotogenes. This use of Demetrius as the illustration for kingship shows that Diotogenes was his contemporary, or nearly so.

34. *Pol.* iii. 13, 1284 a, l. 13: *αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος* (of the *παμβασιλεύς*, the *θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις*). Goodenough, p. 85, derives the conception from Persia, which might have played a part in its extension from the *παμβασιλεύς* to every king; but Diotogenes' words in 61 (p. 265 H), *αὐτὸς ὢν νόμος ἐμψυχος, θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχεματίζεται* admit of no doubt that he is explicitly quoting Aristotle.

35. Stob. *ib.* 64, the whole fragment; especially p. 275 H: *συνεστάναι γὰρ χωρὶς φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας ἀμάχανον. . . ἃ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει φιλία . . . τὰν τῷ πάντος δμόνοιον μεμιμῶται. ἄνευ δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διατάξις οὐλεμία ἐν πόλει οἰκοῖτο*.

36. Stob. *ib.* 61 (p. 265 H): *ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὡς θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ*

·πόλις, καὶ ὡς πόλις ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ θεόν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ Διαφερόντων συναρμοσθεῖσα κόσμῳ σύνταξιν καὶ ἁρμονίαν μεμιᾶται· ἀπὸ the king, being a god among men, must (p. 264) harmonize the state (ποτ)τάν αὐτάν ἁρμονίαν συναρμόζεσθαι.

37. Stob. iv. 7, 67 (iv, p. 283 H): εἰ περ δεῖ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει τοῖ παλαίοις, νόμον ἔμψυχον εἶναι εὐνομίαν μὲν καὶ δμόνοιαν μηχανώμενον, ἀνομίαι δὲ καὶ στάσις ἀπειργόντα, ζηλωτὴν δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ὄντα καὶ πατέρα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὥσπερ ἐκείνου.

38. The king binding all his subjects together in *κοινωνία* represents the idea that only a king, above and outside all divisions among his subjects, could bind Greek and barbarian together. It is allied to the Hellenistic doctrine of the king as benefactor of all men, so common later but already expressed for the third century by Pseudo-Aristeas, 281: ὡς θεὸς εὐεργετῆ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον, οὕτως καὶ σὺ μιμούμενος ἀπρόσκοπος ἂν εἴης.

39- Diod. ii. 55-60; Susemihl op. cit., i, p. 324; E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*², 1900, pp. 241 sqq.; W. Kroll, *Iambulus* in *P.W.*; R. von Pohlmann, *Gesch. der sozialen Frage und der Sozialismus in der antiken Welt*, 3rd ed., by F. Oertel, 1925, i, pp. 404-9; ii, p. 570, n. 3; Tarn, *J.R.S.* xxii, pp. 140, 147; J. Bidez, *La cite du monde et la cite du soleil chez les Stoiciens*, Paris 1932, pp. 39 sqq.

40. Later than Megasthenes, as he knows of the Ganges' mouth. The scene is set in the time of one of the three great Mauryas; but, as Rohde, p. 241, n. 1, rightly says, that proves nothing.

41. Susemihl, i, p. 325; Rohde, pp. 258-9, who elaborates it; Bidez, op. cit., p. 46; Kroll, loc. cit. (practically). I wrongly followed this in *Hellenistic Civilization*², p. 113. No deduction can be drawn from the apparent absence of things like law-courts and temples, as we do not know what the full account may have contained.

42. Diod. ii. 158, 6 τούτῳ πάντες πείθονται.

43. Ib. 58, i. τὴν δμόνοιαν περὶ πλείστου ποιουμένους.

44. Chrysippus' comparison of the world to a theatre, which was common to all but in which each had his own place (Arnim, iii, fr. 371), implies an acceptance of differences in circumstance, since some seats were of necessity better than others. So Zeno's acceptance of Antigonos as ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιον (ib. i, fr. 24) implies that all men were not ὁμοιοι Iambulus carried equality to the point of general similarity in body.

45. *Pol.* ii. 2, 1261 a, l. 35 sqq.; vii. 9, 1382 b, l. 24 sqq.

46. Geos, Strab. x. 486. List of similar customs, Rohde, p. 247.

47. *Pol.* ii. 3, 1262 a, l. 19. Other cases from 'nature-peoples'; Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*², p. 330, n. 1.

48. Plato, *Polit.* 272 A; Dicaearchus, *F.G.H.* ii, p. 233, fr. 1.

49. Stoics: Arnim, i, fr. 253; iii, fr. 752; and see Rohde, pp. 259-60. It was also the view of the Cynics (Diogenes in Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*

i. 43, 104), the Cyrenaeans (Theodorus in Cicero, *ib.* 102), and Epicurus (Usener, *Epicurea*, fr. 578).

50. Diod. ii. 58, 6 **καθ' ὡς τις βασιλεύς**

51. Stoics never thought monarchy the ideal state-form. Their world-state grew out of the ΠΙΘΙΣ and was a **πόλις**, and knew one king only, the Universal Law which was God and 'king of all things both divine and human' (Arnim, iii, fr. 314, cf. 327, 329). Zeno said that the **σπουδαῖος οὔτε δεσπότης οὔτε δεσπόμενος** (*ib.* fr. ¹⁰* 216); but Chrysippus (*ib.* iii, fr. 691) said that the philosopher would not shirk a throne if it came to him (i.e. as a duty); and of course kings had to be educated like other people, which was why Zeno sent Persaeus to Antigonos, and why Chrysippus (*ib.* iii, fr. 691) recommended the 'philosopher behind the throne' who **συμβιώνεται βασιλεῖ**. As regarded the constitutions of earthly states, Stoicism took no sides; individual Stoics might do so, as men, but that depended on the individual and on the king; Sphaerus helped his pupil Cleomenes III, but was openly contemptuous of Ptolemy IV (*ib.* i, fr. 625); Zeno was Antigonos' friend, while Chrysippus (*ib.* ii, fr. 1) disliked all kings; Stoics fought against the Roman Empire, and a Stoic sat on its throne. The frequent references in Stoic literature to the 'kingly man', **βασιλικός**, or to the wise man as being a king, are merely a method of indicating the virtues and qualities which, men believed, ought to distinguish their rulers; a king, **said Chrysippus** (*ib.* ii, fr. 618), is one who has **βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην**.

52. Strabo, xiv. 646: **πλήθος ἀπώρων τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ δουλῶν ἐπὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ κεκλημένων, οὓς Ἡλιοπολίτας ἐκάλεσε.**

53. Pohlmann, *op. cit.* (i, p. 406 in the 3rd ed.) was the first to see that the name referred to Iambulus' State, and not (as Mommsen thought) to Heliopolis in Syria; see also H. M. Last, *C.A.H.* ix, 1932, p. 104. The proof that this is right is that Aristonicus' following included many slaves, to whom he had promised freedom (n. 52), and Iambulus is the one Greek writer of whom we are certain that he envisaged both a Sun-State and a State without slaves. On what Aristonicus exactly meant see Oertel in Pohlmann³, ii, p. 570, n. 3; Tarn, *J.R.S.* xxii, p. 140, n. 5.

54. The slavery question shows that Aristonicus' inspiration was not Stoicism, i.e. Blossius (as Bidez thinks, *op. cit.*, p. 49), precisely as Cleomenes III did not get his ideas from the Stoic Sphaerus; indeed, how could one philosophy produce two such utterly diverse objectives? What moved Blossius was doubtless sympathy with the under-dog and perhaps a family tradition of hostility to the Roman Optimates (*C.A.H.* ix, p. 21).

55. *Oracula Sibyllina*, iii. 350-61, 367-80; see on this Tarn, *J.R.S.* xxii, p. 135.

56. L. 375: ἡ πάντων προφέρουσα βρῶτοισι ἑμνοῖα σαφῶρων.

57. Appian, *Bella Civ.* i. 24, links together the advent of the principate and of Homonoia. A bronze coin of Antoninus Pius (*B.M. Coins, Alexandria*, Pl. XXI, no. 1167) represents Tiber and Nile holding hands, with legend Τίβερις ἑμνοῖα; but it cannot, of course, be connected with the Cleopatra prophecy.

58. Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, pp. 62, 79.

59. Skard, *Euergetes-Concordia*, p. 72.

60. Dion. Hal. ii. 3; the section is a treatise on τὴν τῶν πολιτευομένων ὁμοφροσύνην.

61. Plut. *Numa* 20, the whole chapter.

62. Two decrees of the Κοινον of Asia: *S.E.G.* iv. 490, about 9 B.C., and *B.M. Inscr.* iv, no. 894, about 2 B.C. See also *Sardis*, vii, i, no. 8, l. 101: πατὴρς . . . τοῦ σύνπαντος τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους; the king as father of mankind has grown out of the idea of the king imitating or representing the Deity, 'father of gods and men', an idea which, apart from Ps.-Ecphantus and Diotogenes, is plainly stated by another writer of that group, Sthenidas (Stob. iv. 7, 63, p. 270 H): the king must be μιμητὰς νόμιμος τῷ θεῷ.

63. Dio Cass. iv. 8, 9; lvi. 25; Suet., *Tiberius*, 26; *C.I.L.* i², p. 231, *Fasti Praenesini* under Jan. 16 of A.D. 10. A full description in Sir J. G. Frazer, *The Fasti of Ovid*, ii, pp. 238 sqq.; p. 240, the goddess of the temple was named *Concordia Augusta*, 'no doubt in compliment to Augustus'.

64. H. Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, i, p. ccxxv.

65. *Ib.*, pp. cciv, 309.

66. Kramer, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-9.

67. On the connexion of Augustus with Mercury see in the last place K. Scott, *Hermes*, lxiii, 1928, p. 15, and with Heracles, E. Norden, *Rh. Mus.* liv, 1899, p. 473.

68. Mattingly, *op. cit.*, p. ccxxxviii.

69. L. Weber, *Die Homonie-munzen des phrygischen Hierapolis, J.I.d'A.N.* xiv, 1912, p. 65.

70. Beside the coins, see Dio Chrys. xl. 30-1 on the connexion of ἑμνοῖα with trade.

71. Claudian, xxiv (*De consulatu Stilichonis*, bk. iii), l. 130. I briefly paraphrase lines 150-9.

72. Cicero, *de leg.* i. 7, 23; *de nat. deorum*, ii. 62 (154).

73. Arnim, i, fr. 216.

74. *Ib.* i, fr. 222 = Diog. Laert, vii, i. 33: πάλιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παρίσταντα πολίτας . . . τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον; cf. fr. 228, Zeno said that the φαῦλοι had not ἰσηγορία with the ἀσπεῖαι. This is explicit enough,

and explains why Plutarch (*Lycurg.* 31) compares Zeno's state with Plato's *Republic* and Lycurgus' Sparta, which for the later Stoic world-state would be absurd. It was this which made later Stoics rather shy of Zeno's *Republic*, and not its supposed Cynic traits, which reappear in Chrysippus. The statement in Plutarch *de fortuna Alexandria* 329 B, that all men were citizens of Zeno's state, must be taken to be a mistake, introduced by him from his own time. Of course Cleanthes in his hymn called all men sons of Zeus; but that is because God was (among other things) Nature, source of all living things, including those animals to whom Cleanthes compared the unworthy (Arnim, i, fr. 517).

75. Diog. Laert. vii. 16.

76. Arnim, i, fr. 297.

77. *Ib.* i, fr. 226; iii, frs. 625, 630. It was what Aristotle had said; *Nic. Eth.* ix. 6: τοὺς φαύλους οὐχ οἶόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν.

78. Arnim, i, fr. 517.

79. *Ib.* iii, fr. 355: the φαῦλοι are not free men but slaves. *Ergo*, it would seem, not citizens.

80. On the equality of all men in ethical value to Seneca see Mühl, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

81. Arnim, ii, fr. 1076 (Chrysippus).

82. Zeno uses the word *ib.* i, fr. 263, and it is implied in his calling the cosmos εὐνομοκράτη πολιτεία (*ib.* i, fr. 98). For Chrysippus, it must follow from his statement (n. 81) that God was Homonoia; but the contents of his two books *περὶ ὁμονοίας* are unknown. On ὁμόνοια and ἁρμοῖα see generally Skard, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–6. Later the ὁμόνοια of the heavenly bodies became a commonplace; Dio. Chrys. xl. 35 sqq.

83. Cleanthes' *Hymn* (n. 86), and in Posidonius.

84. One of Posidonius' terms; see also Arnim, ii, frs. 475, 534.

85. *Ib.* i, fr. 263. In this fragment Eros is supposed to be the actual artificer of Homonoia. On his place in Zeno see *ib.* i, frs. 104, 105; he was φίλα, not συνοῖα, *ib.* iii, fr. 716.

86. *Ib.* i, fr. 537 (Cleanthes' *Hymn* to Zeus), ll. 16, 17:

ὄλε γὰρ εἰς ἕν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἑσθλά κακοῖσιν,
ὄσθ' ἓνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἔοντα.

87. Chrysippus, *ib.* iii, fr. 323, called these merely προσθήκαι—appendages, or accidents—of the world-state, due to men's lack of the sense of fellowship (κοινωνία).

88. Cleanthes' *Hymn*, l. 13: the acts of bad men cut across the universal harmony and are no part of it.

89. τὸ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους: Arnim, iii, fr. 611.

90. Doubtless, as regards slavery, another reason was that (as they thought) it only affected the body, and was therefore a thing indifferent.

91. J. Kargl, *Die Lehre der Stoiker vom Staat*, Diss. Erlangen 1913, pp. 72-4. Cf. Maecenas' supposed advice to Augustus to beware of philosophers, Dio, lii, 36, 4.

92. Suet. *Aue.* 50.

93. All that the tradition can supply is that he was φιλαλέξανδρος, Strabo, xiii. 594.

94. Eratosthenes in Strab. i. 66: they are those who have not τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ παιδείας καὶ λόγων οἰκεῖον, the unteachable law-breakers.

95. *Pol.* i. 6, 1255 a, l. 39.

96. *Ib.* i. 2, 1252 b, l. 9.

97. Arnim, i, fr. 42.

98. *Ib.* i, fr. 2 gives no ground for the belief that he wrote the *Republic* in his Cynic period; for, if we believe this, we must also believe that (as the same words say) he wrote *all* his works before he opened his school! Arnim rightly brackets the passage in question. The polemical statement made by the Epicurean Philodemus in his attack upon Zeno (see Bidez, *op. cit.*, p. 28), that his *Politeia* was written ὑπὸ νέου καὶ ἀφρονος ἔτι, only means (which no one disputes) that it came early among his works.

99. From 317 to 307, under Demetrius of Phalerum, a Peripatetic and another friend of Cassander.

100. I do not mean that *περὶ εὐσεβείας* belongs to his old age; its date is not known.

101. There are two documents: a named fragment of Theophrastus *περὶ εὐσεβείας* in Porphyry, *de abstinentia*, iii. 25, ed. Nauck (first identified by J. Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, 1866, pp. 96 sqq.); and an extract in Stobaeus ii. 7, 13 (ii, p. 120 W), headed 'Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν; as this latter document gives a chain of progress identical with that in the passage in Porphyry and not found elsewhere till very much later, there can be little question, despite the heading, that it is also from Theophrastus (as Spengel said long ago, see Wachsmuth, *ad loc.*, p. 116) and represents the same original as the passage in Porphyry. The latter traces the progress of *φιλία* from the family through the kin to one's fellow citizens, thence to one's own race, and so to mankind; it concludes οὕτως δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλοις τῷ μεν οἰκεῖοι καὶ συγγενεῖς. The Stobaeus extract traces *φιλία* in the same way from the family to fellow citizens, thence to men of the same race, and thence to all men, πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, and continues: ἐπεὶ δὲ κοινὴ τις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει φιλανθρωπία κ.τ.λ. Various views have been taken of this idea of the love of mankind, though all agree that it cannot be Theophrastus' own. Mewaldt, *op. cit.*, p. 182 derives it from Antiphon. Mühl, *op. cit.*, p. 56 derives it from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, which depends

entirely on his own belief that they exhibit a sort of universalism (see n. 6, *ante*), but (p. 57) he adds to this Stoic influence, citing Kaerst, *Die antike Idee der Oikoumene*, p. 32, n. 22; but there is no trace in Stoicism of Theophrastus' chain of progress, and in any case his date renders Stoic influence extremely unlikely. Lorenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 sqq. rightly says it must be pre-Stoic, but assigns the idea to Aristotle as well as to Theophrastus, which is what the heading of the Stobaeus extract *says*. I think this is impossible. There are just two passages in Aristotle which might perhaps be cited as pertinent, and Lorenz cites them; but neither, I think, can survive examination. The first is *Nic. Eth.* v. m. i. 1155 a, l. 21: one can see if one travels *ὡς οἰκείον ἅπας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον*. This has nothing to do with the kinship of mankind or *φιλία* towards all men; it only means that a traveller is generally well received (a parallel to the line from Euripides, fr. 1047 already cited, n. 6) and, looking at Aristotle's uncompromising views about barbarians, can only apply to the Greek world; the same must be true of 1161 b, l. 5, *καὶ φιλία καθ' ἕσπον ἀνθρώπος*. The expression 'all men', in the pre-Alexander period, often meant 'all Greeks' (see n. 13); and, to Aristotle, barbarians were not *men*, in the full sense, but (fr. 658 again) nearer to *ζῷοις ἢ φυτοῖς*. The other passage is *Nic. Eth.* 1155 a, l. 18: *φιλία* is naturally implanted in birds and beasts *καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, which clearly means that, as beasts of the same species are friendly to one another, so are men of the same race—Greek to Greek again. There is no universalism to be found in Aristotle; indeed he was before his time even in extending *φιλία* to the *ἔθνος*, for to Demosthenes *φιλανθρωπία* only embraced one's fellow citizens (references Lorenz, p. 21). I do not myself see how one can expect to explain Theophrastus apart from his contemporary Alexarchus; and I have no doubt that his chain of progress, which is pre-Stoic, is taken from the historical development of the *Homonoia*-concept, which culminated in the ideas of Alexander.

102. Kramer, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-9. See also Chariton's story about the temple of *Homonoia* in Miletus, cited by Zwicker, 'Homonoia' in *P.W.* viii. 2, col. 2266.

103. In the Porphyry fragment: *κοινούς ἁπάντων δείκνυσι γονεῖς οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν*.

104. Cic. *de Jin.* v. 6 (the whole of book V represents Antiochus).

105. Cic. *de Jin.* iii. 62; v. 65; *de Off.* i. 17, 53 sqq.

106. Theophrastus' aim was the pursuit of knowledge. He was personally hostile to the memory of Alexander the man, owing to his execution of Callisthenes; but this did not affect his attitude towards the advance of knowledge, and he regularly reproduces the new knowledge Alexander acquired or caused to be acquired.

107. Arrian, vii. ii. 6.

108. I have not met with any discussion of Alexarchus, but he will be treated in a forthcoming study by O. Weinreich (see *Hermes*, lxxvii, p. 362 n.).

109. Cassander's brother was a philologist or γραμματικός, as is shown by his letter (*post*). There can be no doubt, on account of his coins, that, as Droysen first noticed, he is the Alexarchus of Clement, *Protr.* 36A, who was a γραμματικός and ἐαυτὸν κατεσχημάτισεν ἐς Ἥλιον. He is also, I think, the Alexarchus of Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride* 37, 365 E, who, on the authority of one Ariston ὁ γεγραφὸς Ἀθηναίων ἀποικίας, wrote on curious religious names under an alphabetical arrangement; though Müller, *F.H.G.* iv, p. 298, left this open. I cannot trace this Ariston, and he is unknown to Susemihl and Christ; he *might* be the third-century Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, but no such work of his is known. Clement's source was Aristos the Alexander-historian; it is noteworthy that he somehow brought Alexarchus into the story of Alexander.

110. Strab. vii, fr. 35. The wall was 30 stades round; even if the city synoecised some small existing city, whether Sane or Acroathon, the settlers would be a mixture from more than one place.

111. B. V. Head, *Historia Nummorum*², p. 206; R. S. Poole, *B.M. Coins, Macedon*, pp. 133, cxxxii.

112. Athen. iii. 98 D: ὁ τὴν Οὐρανόπολιν καλουμένην κτίσας.

113. Doubtless the foundation of Ouranopolis was soon after 316, in the period of Cassander's own great foundations, Thessalonica, Cassandrea, Thebes.

114. Plato, *Cratylus*, 397 c; Diod. vi. i. 2; Plutarch, *de Is. et Os.* 377 F.

115. Diod. vi. i. 7.

116. See note 109.

117. Plato, *Symp.* 180 D. On her see L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii, pp. 659 sqq. A representation of her in a star-embroidered mantle is known (p. 685), and the invocation of her in the Orphic Hymn 54, 1. 5 (p. 761) says γενιᾶς δὲ τὰ πάντα. But when Farnell says (p. 678) that at Ouranopolis she was interpreted 'as a mystical term denoting the cosmic power that ruled (my italics) the sun, stars, and earth,' I feel doubtful. I do not think we can say what part she played; it might possibly be creator though not ruler, as in Euhemerus, fr. 7; or the love that bound the Universe together (if Zeno took this idea from Alexarchus). She is connected with Homonoia in *C.I.G.* 2641. What Plutarch is referring to (*Mor.* 601 A) when he makes the rulers of the universe ἡλιος σελήνη φωσφόρος, i.e. the planet Venus, is to me quite obscure.

118. Plutarch, *de Is. et Os.* 370 B: μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ἁμογλώσσω ἀπάντων.

119. *Οπ γλωσσαίς λαλεῖν* see W. von Christ, *Gesch. d. griech. Literatur.*, 6th ed. by Schmid, II, i, p. 116.

120. Athen. iii. 98 ε.

121. 'Αλέξανδρος Ὀυρανίου πρόμοις γαστεῖν.

122. At a much later time communities which had the same founder sometimes called each other brethren, e.g. the coins of Seleucus' Syrian Tetrapolis with ἀδελφῶν δήμων (Head, op. cit., p. 778) and an inscription of imperial times (*O.G.I.S.* 536) in which Lystra calls Antioch-towards-Pisidia ἀδελφῆν. But Cassandreia and Ouranopolis had not the same founder; and anyhow this fancy belongs to a later age.

123. Douris ap. Athen. vi. 253 D, ll. 11-12 of the song. See K. Scott, *A.J. Phil.* xlix. 1928, p. 231.

124. Douris ap. Athen. xii. 535 F; only one mantle, naturally. As he was portrayed at Athens seated on the globe (ib.), we again have the Sun as ruler of the universe, as with Alexarchus.

125. See Tarn, *J.R.S.* xxii, p. 135, and the literature cited in that article.

126. F. J. Dolger, *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze*, 1918, pp. 83-99; A. D. Nock, *Early Gentile Christianity*, pp. 71-2 (in A. E. J. Rawlinson, *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*); Fr. Cumont, *La Fin du monde selon les mages occidentaux*, *Rev. de Vhist. des religions*, ciii, 1931, pp. 3²-3; Bidez, op. cit., pp. 34 sqq.

127. Plutarch, *ad principem ineruditum*, 781 F, cf. 782 D. The deity radiates his power into the physical universe through the sun and into the state through the king; see Goodenough, op. cit., pp. 82, 85, 97.

128. Arnim, I, fr. 499.

129. *Ib.* fr. 500.

130. K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, 1926, pp. 365-76.

131. Arnim, iii, fr. 337.

132. W. Capelle, *Hermes*, lx, p. 373; M. P. Nilsson, *G.G.A.*, 1916, p. 44; Bidez, op. cit., pp. 8 sqq.

133. *Timaeus*, 90 A B: our souls came from heaven, and to heaven man is still attached by his head. See Plut. *Mor.* 600 F.

134. Zeno, it seems, occasionally used Ouranos as a name for the Supreme Deity (Arnim, i, frs. 154, 169, if Ouranos be meant); this may be taken from this group, for to Stoics generally Ouranos was either only a synonym for the universe, as ib. iii, fr. 327 λέγουσι τὸν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πᾶν, or just the physical heaven, ib. i, frs. 115, 116 (Zeno) and often. From this group too doubtless came the worship of heaven and the sun in Iambulus* Utopia.

135. The fragments are collected by F. Jacoby in *F. Gr. Hist.*, part i, no. 63 (p. 100). See R. de Block, *Evhemere, son livre et sa doctrine*, 1876; Susemihl, op. cit. i, p. 316; Jacoby, 'Euhemerus' in *P.W.*, 1909;

Pohlmann, op. cit.³ ii, pp. 293-305; M. Gelzer reviewing Pohlmann² in *Hist. Zeit-* cxiii, 1914, p. 102. On his date see Appendix.

136. This again shows the distinction from Stoicism. Euhemerus (F, fr. 2 = Diod. vi. i. 2) called these gods αἰετοὺς καὶ ἀφθάρτους; to Stoics, no god was either ἀφθαρτον or αἰετιον except the Supreme Power, Zeus (Arnim, i, fr. 536 = part of Plut. *Mor.* 1075 B-D).

137. Given that Theophrastus envisaged the human race as a whole, the extension to it of that φιλανθρωπία which one was supposed to feel towards one's fellow citizens (see Lorenz, op. cit.) would follow naturally. One must suppose it was his own idea; for there is no tradition of universal φιλανθρωπία attached to Alexander, though (like any other king) he is often called φιλάνθρωπος (Diod. xvii. 2, 2; 4, 1, 3, 9. Plut. *Mor.* 330 A. [Isocrates] *Ep.* 5, 2). In Euhemerus, Zeus, when he reunites men in a universal kingdom, joins them together in *amicitia* (fr. 23), which in the original was doubtless Theophrastus' φιλία, a definite link between the two. Φιλία in one aspect is not far removed from δμόνοια.

138. Perhaps the idea was his own. Perhaps it was Empedocles' Φιλότης, the principle which unites. Perhaps, as he took the figure of Aphrodite from Plato, it was Plato's great Ἔρως φιλανθρωπότητος (*Symp.* 189 c; this might also be the origin of Zeno's Ἐρως). And as Cassander and all his circle were allied with the Peripatetics, another suggestion might be to connect it with Aristotle's First Cause—κινεῖ ὡς ἐρωμένον. In fact we do not know. But there seems nothing in the Alexander tradition to account for it; the loving-cup metaphor in Eratosthenes is not enough.

139. *Hymn to Zeus*, l. 4:

ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος εἶσ' ἤχου μίμημα λάχοντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνητ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν.

140. *Phainomena*, l. 5: τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν.

141. *Alex.* 27: αὐτὸς . . . λέγειν, ὡς πάντων μὲν ὄντα κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων πατέρα τὸν θεόν, ἰδίους δὲ ποιούμενον ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους.

142. No Greek would have hesitated to rank himself among 'the best'; the 'vote of Themistocles' illustrates their mentality. It was honest enough.

143. Wilcken, *Alexander der Grosse*, p. 207, says 'Von der Idee einer allgemeinen Weltbrüderung findet sich bei ihm (Alexander) keine Spur.' As the tradition is clear, I take this to mean that he does not consider it true.

144. Plut. *de fort. Alex.* 329 B: τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὡς περ ὄντα ἢ εἰδῶλον εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον πάρεσχεν.

145. Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*², p. 190, 'unter dem Eindrucke der Alexander-monarchie'. Kaerst, op. cit. ii², p. 125:

'Die innere Beziehung der stoischen Weltstaatsidee zum Weltreiche Alexanders ist schon im Altertum selbst erkannt worden'. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 327 (Eng. Translation). Kargl, op. cit., p. 16. Juthner, op. cit., pp. 48, 50. W. Capelle, *Klio*, xxv, 1932, p. 87, n. 3.

146. Plutarch I think shows this by at once proceeding to give the Eratosthenes passage, which deals entirely with *ideas*, except for the reference at the end to the mixed marriages; that is, Τ6 Ιpyov in 329 A (n. 144) means (as the contrast with ὅωσπ also shows) not actual events but 'the reality'. Some have taken it to refer to Alexander's policy of fusion (Kaerst in another place, op. cit., i³, p. 501; Muhl, op. cit., p. 54), which is more hopeful than his empire. But Wilcken, op. cit., pp. 232-3, has recently restricted the policy of fusion to Macedonians and Persians; and this would hardly suffice. As regards the satraps and the army no doubt Wilcken is right, but I cannot think the same applies to the 10,000 weddings at Susa, where Arrian (vii. 4, 8) explicitly calls the brides not Persians but 'Asiatics'; and it is precisely the weddings which Eratosthenes quotes. But however we take it, the policy of fusion was only the beginning of the expression of an idea, which the empire was not: we come back ultimately to ideas.

147. Strabo, xv. 715 (from Onesicritus), ἐν ὅπλοις φιλοσοφούντα; [Isocrates] *Ep.* 5, 2; Plut. *Alexander*, 27; *Mor.* 782 B; *de fort. Alex.* i, 330 A and E and sections 10 to 12 generally. There seems to be no other king to whom the word is regularly applied (it is used once of Ptolemy II in the Jewish Aristas-letter, 287, σὺ . . . φιλοσοφεῖς), and any one wanting to write up Alexander would not have called him a philosopher, but would have invented new conquests, &c., as in the Romance. Wilcken does indeed say (*S.B. Berlin*, 1923, p. 175) that Onesicritus the Cynic wanted to make of Alexander a Cynic Wise Man, but I doubt this for two reasons: (a) when Cynics wanted to invent something about Alexander they invented *P. Berlin* 13044 (Wilcken, *ib.*) and made him not a philosopher but a cruel tyrant; (b) when Onesicritus did write up Alexander, what *he* invented was not philosophy but the Queen of the Amazons story. Book I of the *de fortuna Alexandri* is a treatise on Alexander as philosopher. Many great philosophers, it says (328 A-B), like Socrates, wrote nothing; we judge them to be philosophers by what they said and lived and taught. Try Alexander by this standard, and δρθήσεται οἷς εἶπεν οἷς ἔπραξεν οἷς ἐπαίλασε φιλόσοφος. (a) εἶπεν. This I have been considering in this lecture. (b) ἔπραξεν. The Musonius passage, partly cited in note 37, is headed ὅτι φιλοσοφητέου καὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν; as it summarizes third-century tractates on (among other things) the duty of the king to promote ὁμόνοια, it shows that the fulfilment of this duty (of which the fusion policy was a beginning) would

be part of the king's φιλοσοφία. (c) ἐπαίδευσε (which has a parallel in Aelian, *V.H.* iii. 17: if Persacus taught Antigonus it was equivalent to writing a *Politeia*). Plutarch (328 D) gives, as an instance of what Alexander taught, that Περσῶν καὶ Σουσιανῶν καὶ Γερωσιῶν παῖδας τὰς Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους τραγωδίας ᾔδον. This used to be regarded as mere rhetoric. Then a potsherd was dug up near Peshawar with a scene on it from the *Antigone* of Sophocles (Sir J. H. Marshall in *Camb. Hist. of India*, i, p. 646); and now we have from Susa Herodorus' *Ode to Apollo* (Fr. Cumont, *Mém. Délégation en Perse*, xx, 1928, p. 89, no. 6: first century B.C.), written in a lyric metre which, in the literature we have, is said to have been used once by Euripides and by no one else, showing how well Euripides was known in Susa; the 'rhetoric' is very like simple fact. This enhances the evidential value of the *de fortuna Alexandri*.

148. Kaerst, *op. cit.* ii², p. 126; Mühl, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 sqq.

149. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft*², p. 171.

150. Τῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν iii. 11. Cf. ix. 29: do not hope for an ideal state; be content if the actual state makes just a little progress. This was something new in Stoicism; contrast, for example, how Epictetus throughout subordinates the actual state to the ideal one.

151. *Ib.* vi. 44.

APPENDIX: THE DATE OF EUHEMERUS (*Note* 135)

THIS writer has usually been put too late. F. Jacoby, 'Euhemerus' in *P. W.* (1909), dated him about 280. M. Rostovtzeff, *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates*, 1910, p. 282, said that Panchaea showed the essential features of Ptolemaic Egypt (which we know first in the reign of Ptolemy II); this idea was carried further by M. Gelzer in *Hist. Zeits.* cxiii, 1914, p. 102. I will take the arguments for this first. (1) The peasants have to deliver their crops to the state (Rostovtzeff and Gelzer). What Euhemerus did say (Diod. v. 45, 3 = fr. 3) was that the peasants bring their crops *εἰς τὸ κοινόν* and that each of the ten who were adjudged to have shown the best husbandry λαμβάνει γέρας ἑξαιρέτων ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν καρπῶν, i.e. the best worker got most. There was nothing of the sort in Ptolemaic Egypt; and Euhemerus' source is quite clear. Aristotle (*Pol.* ii. 5, 1263 a, 1. 3 sqq.) had discussed community of land and also community of crops—he cites some ἔθνη who practised the latter—and had pointed out the difficulty of making a division of the produce; for whether it were divided equally or 'to each according to his need', the best workers would feel aggrieved. Euhemerus takes this up and suggests a method of preventing them feeling a grievance;

but he wisely refrains from tackling the main problem, merely saying. (Diod. v. 45, 5) that the division was made *δικαίως*. Naturally, as a friend of Cassander's, his affinities would be with the Peripatetics and he would know Aristotle. (2) On the sacred isle, Hieria, the king took one-tenth of the produce (Gelzer). This was the immemorial system in Asia; but in Ptolemaic Egypt the king did *not* take one-tenth of the harvest; he took a fixed amount, throwing the whole loss of a bad crop on the peasants. Moreover Hieria only produced spices; spices entering Ptolemaic Egypt were a royal monopoly and the *whole* had to be delivered to the controller of spices. (3) The triple division of the people recalls Egypt (Gelzer). Naturally, Euhemerus would know of the Egyptian system; he would also know of the triple division of Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. *Pol.* ii. 8, 1267 b, 1. 33) and probably the division of the Indian castes (through Nearchus). But his own triple division—priests plus artisans, husbandmen, warriors plus herdsmen—does not agree with Egypt or India or Hippodamus or anything else; it is frankly his own. (4) No private property in land except house and garden (Rostovtzeff and Gelzer). This is Ptolemaic, of course. But it must have been Ptolemaic from the very start, for Ptolemy I had claimed that Egypt was 'spear-won territory' (Diod. xviii. 39, 5; 43, 1), that is, that all the land belonged to himself; indeed it might have been pre-Ptolemaic (though it does not seem to be actually mentioned), for there was *some* private property in land as early as Shoshenk I of the twenty-second dynasty¹. I shall come to where Euhemerus probably got it from.

Ptolemaic Egypt therefore affords no argument for a late date. Neither does the taboo on the priests, which made it death to go outside the hieron (Diod. v. 46, 4). Jacoby refers to the king of the Sabaeans in Agatharchides (Strab. xvi, 778), but Greeks had known of such a taboo long before Euhemerus; it existed among the Mossynoeci (Xen. *Anab.* v. 4, 26). Last come the verses of Callimachus, cited by Pseudo-Plutarch, *de blacitis philosobhorum*, 1,7, 880 D.

Εἰς τὸ πρὸ τείχευς ἱερὸν ἄλλες δεῦτε,
οὐ τὸν πάλαι χάλκεον [Παρχαίου Bentley] ὁ πλάσας Ζᾶνα
γεράων ἀλαζῶν ἄδικα βιβλία ψήχει.

Ps.-Plutarch says that Callimachus here αἰνίττεται Εὐήμερον. As it is certain that, on my dating, Callimachus could easily have seen Euhemerus in old age, these verses prove nothing; but there are two things to say about them. (a) I doubt their referring to Euhemerus at all, for *ἄδικα* does not mean 'impious', and Callimachus, always seeking the *mot juste*, could never have used *ἄδικος* of Euhemerus' *ἱερά ἀναγραφῆ*; it would have been senseless. And the Zeus of Euhemerus was Triphylios,

¹ A. H. Gardiner, *The Dakhleh Stela*, to be published in *J.E.A.* 1933. I am much obliged to Dr. Gardiner for this information.

not Panchaios. (b) Literary men did not sit reading or writing in a *ισθόν*. The verses, to me, obviously refer to a *statue*.

I come to the positive reasons for putting Euhemerus early. The tradition (which Jacoby doubted) says that he was a friend of Cassander, *ἠναγκασιμένος τελεῖν βασιλικῆς τινῆς χρείας καὶ μεγάλης ἀποδημίας* (T, fr. i = Diod. vi. 1, 4). Now in the winter of 303 the allies—Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy I—had to communicate with Seleucus; and as Antigonos held all the usual routes, Ptolemy sent men on swift camels across the 'isthmus' of the Arabian peninsula via Jauf to Babylon.¹ Cassander was much the most important of the allies, and there could not fail to be an envoy from him with the party; and there is no reason for rejecting a tradition which in effect makes Euhemerus that envoy. This was enough to enable Euhemerus to claim a knowledge of Arabia; and in his book he dragged in a purposeless journey of Zeus to Babylon (F, fr. 2 = Diod. vi. 1, 9) just because he had really been there himself. Now in 303 another friend of Cassander, Demetrius of Phalerum, was in high honour in Egypt; Euhemerus would see him when passing through, and from him doubtless came the detail about private property in Egypt; there is no need to bring in Hecataeus.² Euhemerus' book then, if this was his only journey,³ is after 303; that is, he probably utilized Alexarchus and not *vice versa*.

Like Iambulus, he made a patchwork from many sources—Aristotle, Alexarchus, Xenophon, Egypt; we find Persian ear-rings and Celtic torques combined with Egyptian hieroglyphs. But his geography shows that the book is earlier than Megasthenes, say before 290. Megasthenes gave Greeks their first knowledge of peninsular India; before him, all that was known about it was a dim report collected by Alexander's pilot Onesicritus (Strab. xv. 691) of a number of islands stretching southward from Alexander's India (the Indus country) and ending with one called Taprobane (later identified with Ceylon). The group of islands off the coast of Arabia on which Euhemerus located his Utopia was derived from these islands of Onesicritus; this is shown by the

¹ Tarn, *Class. Rev.* x1, 1926, p. 13 on Arrian, *Ind.* 43, 4 and 5; *C.A.H.* vii, p. 502. The 'isthmus' joining South Arabia to the continent of Asia is mentioned again in Strab. ii. 84.

- Hecataeus, though, is early enough; he was a contemporary of Alexander (Josephus, *c. Ap.* 1, 183), and Strabo, vii. 299, may mean to say that he preceded Euhemerus, who did use him (Jacoby, 'kuhemeros' in *P.W.*, col. 969). His *floruit* has been put as early as 320; Th. Hopfner in *Beihefte zum alien Orient*, IV, 1925, p. 10.

³ He may have made other journeys, but one journey would satisfy ἀποδημίας. Instances of the rhetorical use of plural for singular in later Greek which occur to me are: Plut. *Mor.* 1075 A, Θεόδωροι καὶ Διαγόροι καὶ Ἰππῶνες; *Alex.* 55, Λυσίμαχοι καὶ Ἄγωνες; *Ant.* 24, Ἀναξήνορες καὶ Ζοῦθοι; *Demetrius* 20, τὰς ἑκαταδμήρεις καὶ τὰς πεντεκαταδμήρεις (there was only one of each); *Athen.* xii. 535 F (Douris), χλαμύδες showing the host of heaven (there was only one).

statement that from the easternmost of them India was visible sticking up in the air,¹ i.e. you could see the Himalaya. This utilization of the islands of Onesicritus shows that Euhemerus' book is earlier than Megasthenes.

Another proof of very early date is his ignorance of the spice-land of South Arabia; he makes of it an island, Hiera, one of his group (Diod. v. 41, 4). Unknown countries always begin as 'islands';² but this ignorance means that he did not even know of the ships sent by Alexander to Yemen, which Theophrastus knew of,³ let alone the voyage of Ariston, c. 280 at latest³. It was to bring in the spice island that he made Onesicritus' islands stretch east and west instead of north and south. His group of islands is not without historical interest; for South-East Arabia long remained unknown, and Euhemerus may be the ultimate source of the story in Pliny⁴ which makes of Oman a group of islands.⁵

There can be little doubt, then, that Euhemerus *was* a friend of Cassander, and that he formed one of a group who can be classed together because of their common relations with this monarch. Besides Euhemerus, the group included Alexarchus and some Peripatetics—Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum, and apparently Dicaearchus;⁶ and it was essentially pre-Stoic. The existence of this group is very important for the subject of Alexander's ideas.

¹ Diod. v. 42, 3: φασι θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν Ἰνδικὴν ἀέρων διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ διαστήματος. For ἀέρων read ἀέριον.

² Instances: Tarn, *J.E.A.* xv, 1929, p. 10 (ancient); M. Cary and E. H. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers*, 1929, p. 214, n. 35 (modern).

³ Tarn, *op. cit.*, on these voyages.

⁴ *H.N.* vi. 148; see Tarn, *ib.*, p. 10.

⁵ Oman appears again as an 'island' in Strabo. In Nearchus (*Arr. Ind.* 37) the tomb of Erythras is on the real island of Khism, which Nearchus touched at and called Oarakta; in (the source of) Strabo, xvi, 766 the tomb has shifted to an island called Ogyris, 250 miles from Carmania, which is clearly Oman; in Stephanus *s.v.*, Ogyris is specifically Arabian. The intermediate stage of the transfer appears in (the source of) Gurtus, x. i. 13-14.

⁶ Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation*², p. 268.

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